Churchill and Roosevelt, Volume 2: The Complete Correspondence - Three Volumes [Three Volumes ed.] 9781400879991

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Churchill £sf Roosevelt The Complete Correspondence

7. Alliance forged

ChurchillfcfRoosevelt T h e Complete Correspondence II. Alliance Forged N O V E M B E R 1942

- FEBRUARY

1944

EDITED WITH C O M M E N T A R Y BY

Warren F. Kimball

Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

Copyright © 1984 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book First Princeton Paperback printing, 1987 This book has been composed in Linotron Baskerville Clothbound editions of Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and binding materials are chosen for strength and durability Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

It is a matter of sacred tradition that, when an American statesman and a British statesman meet, the former will be plain, blunt, down to earth, ingenuous to a fault, while the latter will be sly, subtle, devious and eventually triumphant. In the cases of Roosevelt and Churchill, this formula became somewhat confused. If either of them could be called a student of Machiavelli, it was Roosevelt; if either was a bull in a china shop, it was Churchill. Robert E. Sherwood, in Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History

Contents VOLUME II List of Maps

ix

List of P h o t o g r a p h s (Volume II)

χ

C o r r e s p o n d e n c e : November 15, 1942 - February 29, 1944

4

Editorial C o m m e n t a r y : T h e North African Invasion and the Darlan Deal Postponing the Second Front in Europe T h e Casablanca Conference (SYMBOL) Poland and Russia De Gaulle and the Free French T h e Third Washington Conference (TRIDENT) T h e First Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) Italy T h e Political-Military Relationship Yugoslavia and Greece T h e Cairo and T e h e r a n Conferences (SEXTANT AND EUREKA) Great Britain and Yugoslavia T h e Polish Boundary Dispute

3 48 117 192 208 212 429 455 479 548 605 660 684

See Volume HI for lists of codenames, acronyms, abbreviations, and sources cited

List of Maps VOLUME I The North Atlantic

55

The Western Desert (North Africa) (Campaign Summaries, USMA)

271

Initial Japanese Attacks 7-8 December 1941 and Limit of Advance (Campaign Summaries, USMA)

288

The ABDACOM Area, January-February 1942 (United States Army in World War II series; hereafter U.S. Army history)

311

The Pacific Areas, 1 August 1942 (U.S. Army history)

410

Persian Corridor Supply Routes (U.S. Army history)

573

Convoy Routes to Northern Russia

601

The Battle of El Alamein, 23 October - 4 November 1942 (Campaign Summaries, USMA) 658 Landings in North Africa 8-11 November 1942, and Advance into Tunisia November—December 1942 (Campaign Summaries, USMA) 668 VOLUME II Russian Winter Offensive 1942-43 (Campaign Summaries, USMA)

16

Lines of Communication in China-India-Burma Theater, December 1942 (U.S. Army history)

111

Campaign in Italy, 1943-45

453

Polish Boundary Proposals

685

India-Burma Theater, 1944-1945 (U.S. Army history)

758

VOLUME I I I Campaign in Northern France

184

Situation in the Pacific, 12 March 1944 (U.S. Army history)

192

Campaign in Southern France, 15 August— 15 September 1944 (U.S. Army history)

277

Situation in Europe, 15 January 1945 (U.S. Army history)

525

List of Photographs VOLUME II 7. (frontispiece) Roosevelt and Churchill, Casablanca, January 22, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library) 8. Roosevelt and Churchill, Marrakesh, January 24, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

ϋ 120

9. Roosevelt and Churchill, Casablanca, January 1943 (four pictures) (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

124-25

10. Short-Snorter Ten Shilling Note (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Steve Early Col.)

171

11. Churchill and Roosevelt, White House Rose Garden, May 24, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

213

12. Churchill and Roosevelt, Shangri-la, May 14-17, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

297

13. Brendan Bracken; CDR "Tommy" C. R. Thompson, RN; Churchill; Roosevelt. Hyde Park, New York, September 14, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

531

14. Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt, Churchill, Cairo, November 25, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

607

15. Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill at Teheran, November 29, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

612

16. Bomb damage at 10 Downing Street, February 20, 1944 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

753

See individual volumes for other photographs

II. Alliance Forged

ALLIANCE FORGED

3

THE NORTH AFRICAN INVASION AND T H E DARLAN DEAL The Anglo-American invasion of North Africa marked the high point of equal partnership between the two Allies, although the insistence of Roosevelt and Eisenhower that all Allied forces remain under the American commander foreshadowed changes to come. T h e Americans were eager to find a French leader who could command the loyalty of French troops in the area and who would give orders to cease all resistance to the Anglo-American invasion. De Gaulle could not play that role because he had condemned all supporters of the Vichy government, and French military leaders in Africa retaliated by calling de Gaulle a traitor to his oath of loyalty. Giraud was a possibility, but he proved unable to gain the necessary support among French officers. Thus Eisenhower, who commanded TORCH, turned to Admiral Darlan, the commander of Vichy French military forces. Darlan, who in mid-October had secretly suggested he would be willing to lead the Allied invasion of Africa, had long been a bitter and vocal opponent of British policies. Moreover, he had collaborated closely with the Germans during the two years after the French surrender and was considered by both British and American leaders to be a fascist and a Nazi sympathizer. However, Darlan's authority might bring a halt to the French resistance against the Allies, and Eisenhower agreed to appoint him High Commissioner—head of the civil government in French North Africa. Darlan's orders to cease fire were obeyed in Algeria and Morocco, but the French authorities in Tunisia cooperated with a German force sent to occupy that colony, and the disposition of the main body of the French fleet at Toulon in southern France remained in doubt. Convinced that he needed French administrators to govern the area, General Eisenhower, on the evening of November 13, informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff in London of his deal with Darlan (doc. 622, Eisenhower Papers, II, 707-10). T h e General argued that only Darlan could command the loyalty which French officials had given to Marshal Petain, but which could now be challenged because of Hitler's decision to occupy southern France. Eisenhower further claimed that Giraud and Robert Murphy, Roosevelt's personal representative in French North Africa, would be able to control Darlan. Eisenhower's message, repeated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Roosevelt in the United States, convinced the President not to send instructions which would have forbidden working with any ex-Vichy official "to whom well founded objection might be taken" (FRUS, 1942, II, 437). Eisenhower's proposal was not new; he had made it a month earlier to General Marshall when TORCH planners learned that Darlan might be willing to cooperate with the invasion forces. (Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 415.) T h e press release Eisenhower proposed began by stating that "it has become apparent that Darlan is the one French leader whom all elements in French North Africa will recognize," and went on to note that Allied policy was "to work with a self-constituted government in French North Africa which would assure a continuance of the existing French administration" (Eisenhower to ABFOR/AGWAR, #544, Nov. 14, 1942, Eisenhower papers, Official Cable File).

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Churchill's reaction was unenthusiastic. He had already come under heavy criticism within the War Cabinet for permitting cooperation with Darlan, and public attacks soon were to follow. Nevertheless, since the British military leaders on the spot agreed with Eisenhower's choice, the Prime Minister reluctantly went along. Churchill expressed concern over the problems Darlan would cause with de Gaulle's Free French movement, and emphasized the temporary nature of the whole arrangement. The "disquieting" news in the MAGICS apparently refers to a decrypt of a message, sent to Tokyo by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, which reported that the Vichy government had accepted a German offer of military intervention in Tunisia (Hinsley, British Intelligence, II, 484). As things turned out, Eisenhower, working through Darlan, persuaded Vichy officials in Dakar to cooperate, but Tunisian au­ thorities remained loyal to Vichy.

C-190 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 15, 1942, 1155 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. General Eisenhower's number 527 on political arrangements in French North Africa. We cannot say that our doubts or anxieties are removed by what is proposed or that the solution will be permanent or healthy. Nevertheless, in view of the dominating importance of speed and of the fact that the Allied Commander in Chief's opinion is so strong and ably expressed and that it is endorsed by our officers including Admiral Cunningham who were with him on the spot, we feel we have no choice but to accept General Eisenhower's arrangements for maintaining local and interim equilibrium and for securing the vital positions in Tunis. We feel sure you will consult us on the long-term steps pursuing always the aim of uniting all Frenchmen who will fight Hitler. Great care must be taken that we are not double-crossed. There were some disquieting evidences in our MAGICS two days ago. On the other hand we have these men in our power and should be vigilant lest they escape from us. We do not see any need to publish the press release contained in General Eisenhower's number 544 or anything like it at present, pending further developments in Tunis and Dakar, and hope our views may be met. To save time we are repeating this telegram to you to General Eisen­ hower for his immediate information. [MR*. pWSC, IV, 631-32.]

ALLIANCE FORGED

5

As a public outcry against the Darian deal began to build, Hopkins recommended the following telegram be sent to Churchill. Within was a cable intended for Eisenhower which Hopkins considered "very important for the record." Neither cable was sent, although Roosevelt's distrust of Darian was passed on to Eisenhower through General Marshall. (See memo from Hopkins to Roosevelt, Nov. 16, 1942, HLH: Sherwood Col., box 5; FRUS, 1942, II, 448.)

R-211/1, draft, not sent Washington Nov. 16, 1942 T o the Prime Minister from the President. I have your message regarding the Darian business [C-190] and naturally it disturbed me as much as it did you. I have examined Eisenhower's despatches carefully, however, a n d I am sure that his j u d g m e n t on the g r o u n d is better than ours and that we must support him. I have sent him the following message today with which I am sure you will agree. It looks very much as though either you are going to throw Rommel into the sea or we are going to have him in a nutcracker before long. T o Eisenhower: "Marshall has shown me your despatch giving your reasons for placing Darian in charge of the civil administration of N o r t h Africa. I want you to know that I appreciate fully the difficulties of your military situation. I am therefore not disposed to in any way question the action you have taken. I n d e e d you may be sure of my complete support for this a n d any other action you are required to take in carrying out your duties. You are on the g r o u n d and we here intend to support you fully in your difficult problems. "However, I think you should know and have in mind the following policies of this government: " 1. T h a t we d o not trust Darian. "2. T h a t it is impossible to keep a collaborator of Hitler and o n e whom we believe to be a Fascist in civil power any longer than is absolutely necessary. " 3 . His movements should be watched carefully and his communications supervised. "I have not consulted Churchill in regard to this message but I am sending a copy of it to him at once and I am sure he will approve. "I want to a d d a personal note to you and Clark to tell you what great confidence we have in both of you and how satisfied we are with the progress of events. "This message is not to be m a d e public." [HLH:Sherwood Col., box 5]

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Churchill agreed that the Soviets should be consulted about future AngloAmerican operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

C-191 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 15, 1942 F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. Your 2 1 1 1 entirely agree with t h e course you propose a n d d o not think any time will be lost by t h e p r o c e d u r e which is most necessary. We o u g h t to reach a preliminary a g r e e m e n t in outline ourselves before sending a joint mission. [MR*]

Japanese attempts to send reinforcements and supplies to Guadalcanal re­ sulted in two major naval battles—one on the morning of November 13 and the other on the night of November 14—15. In one of the few engagements of the war between battleships, the Japanese lost two of their heavy warships while the Americans lost two cruisers and a number of destroyers. More significant was the sinking of seven Japanese troopships. Heavy air attacks on the morning of November 15 so damaged the remaining four troopships that only 4,000 Japanese soldiers and very few supplies reached the forces defending Guadalcanal against the U.S. Marines. Although the Japanese Army demanded that continued attempts be made to reinforce Guadalcanal, the Navy argued that the island should be given up, and attempts at resupply were limited to small destroyer and submarine runs at night. In January 1943 the Japanese finally decided to evacuate the island and by February 7, 1943, that withdrawal had been completed.

C-192 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 17, 1942, 1214 Ζ/TOR 9:30 A.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Secret. I a m so glad to read about this splendid American naval victory in the Solomons. Pray accept my warmest congratulations a n d thanks. [MR*]

ALLIANCE FORGED

7

R-212 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 17, 1942, 10:25 A.M. For the Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. Mrs. Roosevelt arrived safely this morning and I met her at airport and found her well and thrilled by every moment of her visit. My thanks to you and Mrs. Churchill for taking such good care of her. [MR*. FDR LTRS, p. 1368.]

The deal with Darlan in North Africa aroused strong opposition within the British War Cabinet and throughout all of Britain. Moreover, as Anthony Eden pointed out to Churchill, the arrangement made it extremely difficult to work with the Free French led by Charles de Gaulle.

C-193 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 17, 1942, 1503 Ζ/TOR 1325 [EDT?]

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Secret. I ought to let you know that very deep currents of feeling are stirred by the arrangement with Darlan. The more I reflect upon it the more convinced I become that it can only be a temporary expedient justifiable solely by the stress of battle. We must not overlook the serious political injury which may be done to our cause, not only in France but throughout Europe, by the feeling that we are ready to make terms with the local quislings. Darlan has an odious record. It is he who has inculcated in the French Navy its malignant disposition by promoting his creatures to com­ mand. It is but yesterday that French sailors were sent to their death against your line of battle off Casablanca and now, for the sake of power and office, Darlan plays the turncoat. A permanent arrangement with Darlan or the formation of a Darlan government in French North Africa would not be understood by the great masses of ordinary people whose simple loyalties are our strength. My own feeling is that we should get on with the fighting and let that overtake the parleys, and we are all very glad to hear that General Ei­ senhower expects to be able to order the leading elements of our first army to attack the Germans in Tunis and Bizerte in the course of the next few days. [MR*. FRUS, 1942, II, 445-46. WSC, IV, 632-33.]

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ALLIANCE FORGED

Although the State Department opposed the deal with Darlan, General Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson pushed for some sort of public statement from Roosevelt giving support to Eisenhower's decision. Churchill's cable apparently convinced the President to make a statement, because a few hours after the Prime Minister's message arrived Roosevelt sent off the following messages. The press release had been drafted by General Eisenhower's younger brother, Milton, who worked in the Office of War Information. Roosevelt revised that first draft, particularly in adding the word "temporary" a number of times. T h e final changes in the revised draft, shown below, are in Roosevelt's handwriting. Not surprisingly, Darlan immediately complained to General Clark that things would go more smoothly if the Americans did not announce that they would soon replace Darlan.

R-213 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 17, 1942, 5:30 P.M. For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. I too have encountered the d e e p currents of feeling about Darlan. I felt I should act fast so I have just given out a statement at my press conference which I h o p e you will like and I trust it will be accepted at face value. It follows in my n u m b e r 214. [MR*. WSC, IV, 633.]

R-214 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 17, 1942, plain language despatch, 5:30 P.M. Personal from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. I have approved accepted General Eisenhower's acceptance for political a r r a n g e m e n t s m a d e for the time being of the present political arrangements in N o r t h e r n a n d Western Africa. I thoroughly u n d e r s t a n d and approve the feeling in the United States a n d Great Britain a n d a m o n g all the other United Nations that in view of the history of the past two years n o p e r m a n e n t a r r a n g e m e n t should be m a d e with Admiral Darlan. People in the United Nations likewise would never u n d e r s t a n d the recognition of a reconstituting of the Vichy G o v e r n m e n t in France or in any French territory. We are opposed to F r e n c h m e n who support Hider a n d the Axis. No o n e in o u r A r m y has any authority to discuss the future Government of France and the French Empire. T h e future French Government will be established—not by any individual in metropolitan France or overseas—but by the French people

ALLIANCE FORGED

9

themselves after they have been set free by the victory of the United Nations. The present temporary arrangement in North and West Africa is only a temporary expedient, justified solely by the stress of battle. The present temporary arrangement has accomplished two military objectives. The first was to save American and British lives on the one hand, and French lives on the other hand. The second was the vital factor of time. The temporary arrangement has made it possible to avoid a "mopping up" period in Algiers and Morocco which might have taken a month or two to consummate. Such a period would have delayed the concentration for the attack from the West on Tunis, and we hope on Tripoli. Every day of delay in the current operation would have enabled the Germans and Italians to build up a strong resistance, to dig in and make a military huge operation on our part essential before we could win. Here again, many more lives would have been lost even will be saved under the present speedy and undclaycd attack offensive, than if we had had to delay it for a month or more. It will also be noted that French troops, under the command of General Giraud, have already been in action against the enemy in Tunisia, fighting by the side of American and British soldiers for the liberation of their country. Admiral Darlan's proclamation assisted in making a "mopping up" period unnecessary. Temporary arrangements made with Admiral Darlan apply, without exception, to the current local situation only. I have requested the liberation of all persons in Northern Africa who had been imprisoned because they opposed the efforts of the Nazis to dominate the world, and I have asked for the abrogation of all laws and decrees inspired by Nazi Governments or Nazi ideologists. Reports indicate that the French of North Africa are subordinating all political questions to the formation of a common front against the common enemy. [MR*. pWSC, IV, 633-34. ftfcfC]

Churchill did not want to miss an opportunity to present his views on a Mediterranean strategy, although at the same time he was rejecting papers from the British Chiefs of Staff which argued that a cross-channel invasion of France would be impossible until 1944 (Howard, Grand Strategy, IV, 20716). In this set of messages Churchill used the phrase "under-belly of the Axis" to draw attention to the weakness of German defenses along the Mediterranean coast of Europe. As the debate over grand strategy continued into 1943, it became clear that the differences stemmed from logistical as much as military problems. The Pacific theater continued to receive an ever-expanding amount of men and matariel, and a 1943 cross-channel invasion

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would pre-empt any major operation in Italy. At this time Churchill seemed unwilling to choose between BOLERO (the buildup for a cross-channel attack) and operations against Italy.

C-194 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 17, 1942; 0215 Z, Nov. 18 F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Your 210 a n d 2 1 1 . 1. As promised in p a r a g r a p h 2 of my 189, I am sending you in my immediately following telegram the text of a note which I have given to the British Chiefs of Staff. 2. T h e Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with this note a n d are busily engaged in studying the implications of the various possibilities which it contemplates. I will send you the results as soon as possible. 3. Meanwhile you might find it convenient to let the Combined Chiefs of Staff see my note before their discussions. This would facilitate and hasten the a g r e e m e n t which we must reach between ourselves before we send a j o i n t mission to Moscow. 4. T h a n k you so much for your statement about Darlan. This puts it all right for us. [MR*]

As Churchill pointed out in his memoirs (WSC, IV, 659), Hitler's decision to reinforce the Tunisian tip proved cosdy, but it delayed the Allied conquest of North Africa by several months. That delay virtually guaranteed that any invasion of Italy, specifically Sardinia or Sicily, would eliminate a cross-channel invasion in 1943. T h e plans for Turkey, upon which Churchill placed so much emphasis, eventually came to naught as the Turks maintained their non-involvement. (Part of the portion of this document which is reprinted in Churchill's memoirs is dated November 25 and is apparently from a later version of the note he sent to the British Chiefs of Staff.)

C-195 London Nov. 18, 1942, 3:50 A.M. /TOR 7:35 A.M. President Roosevelt from F o r m e r Naval Person Most Secret and Personal. Following is text referred to in my immediately preceeding telegram.

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Note by the Minister of Defence to the Chiefs of Staff on plans and operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Near East. In settling what to do in a vast war situation like this, it may sometimes be found better to take a particular major operation to which one is committed and follow that through vigorously to the end, making other things subordinate to it, rather than to assemble all the data from the whole world scene in a baffling array. After the needs of the major operation have been satisfied so far as possible, other aspects of the war will fall into their proper places. Moreover, it is by the continued stressing of the major operation that our will may be imposed upon the enemy and the initiative regained. The paramount task before us is, first, to conquer the African chores of the Mediterranean and set up there the Naval and Air installations which are necessary to open an effective passage through it for Military Traffic: and secondly, using the bases on the African shore, to strike at the under-belly of the Axis in effective strength and in the shortest time. There are therefore two phases—consolidation and exploitation. Dealing with consolidation first we may hope that General Alexander will become master of the whole of Cyrenaica during the present month, and that he will be pressing the enemy in the Agheila position or even at Sirte. We may also assume that in the same period or not long after the American and British forces will become masters of the whole of French North Africa including Tunis, provided they press forward with their present energy and violence. It will be necessary to set up Air Stations at suitable intervals along all the African shore in our power, but particularly and urgently in the Tunis tip. The largest installations for American bombers ought to be set up here so that long range bombers sent by the United States to North Africa, together with American bombers already based on the Middle East can operate against Italian targets. The United States form of day light attack would have its best chance in the better weather of the Mediterranean. The bombing weight of the British night attack should be brought to bear on Italy whenever the weather is more favourable than for bombing Germany. Every endeavour should be made to make Italy feel the weight of the war. All the industrial centres should be attacked in an intense fashion, every effort being made to render them uninhabitable and to terrorize and paralize the population. I have asked for a scheme of desirable targets in Italy. It will no doubt be necessary also to act against the Catania and Cagliar Airfields so as to keep down the attack on Tunis during the period of consolidation.

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As soon as we are sure of ourselves, and consolidated, in French North Africa, including especially Tunis, two successive operations present themselves. The first is the advance to Tripoli. It is possible that General Alexander may be able to take this important prize from the East, and I have asked him how he feels about it, and how long he thinks it would require: but we must also be prepared for a rapid advance from the West. Would General Anderson's two British Di­ visions be sufficient, assuming that Tunis itself can be held by Amer­ ican and French Allied Troops? I should like the best possible esti­ mate of the time that this will take. The second immediate objective is obviously either Sardinia or Sicily. The possession of either of these islands and of the Airfields in the South would create an air triangle, in which we should fight for and secure air mastery. Moreover from either of them continuous intensified short range attacks on Naples, Rome, and the Italian Fleet Bases would raise the war against Italy to an intense degree. Let an immediate report be prepared in order that a decision can be taken. Whichever it may be, the fight for air control in the Central Medi­ terranean should be undertaken as a great air battle with extreme priority, the fullest advantage being taken of the Axis shortage of aircraft. The swift success in French North Africa has completely changed the character of the problem which we had been bound to face in that region. We need no longer contemplate a protracted campaign against French in Algeria, nor immediate trouble with the Spaniards in Morocco. On the contrary, all is well in Algeria, and a French Army will be coming into existence, fed by Allied munitions at our discretion. An examination should be made as to how the follow up TORCH convoys can be drastically reduced and revised. Will the four British Divisions now in North Africa or under orders to go there be required for TORCH? It should be possible sensibly to reduce the "Tail" of these Divisions thus saving escorts for other purposes, including, in the following order: (A) Sardinia or Sicily (B) restoration of the British trans Adantic convoys up to standard strength. (C) resumption of the Ρ Q convoys in the latter part of December. To facilitate these vital needs, and to provide the large Naval, par­ ticularly anti submarine, forces which will be required, together with the necessary air forces, to secure a safe passage through the Med­ iterranean, United States Naval help will be urgently needed. Cannot the American Naval authorities reduce the strength of their follow up Transatlantic convoys and can the American "Tail" be reduced in the same way as I hope the British "Tail" will be combed? What are General Eisenhower's wishes about the force to attack Sardinia or Sicily? There are two British Divisions of the First Army,

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as well as the two others which are standing by. Is there any need to put the first two into North Africa? Can they not be combat loaded here? Are the losses among our combat loaders crippling? How serious are they? There are great advantages and saving of time in going straight from the United Kingdom to the landings in Sardinia or Sicily. We must expect a steady reinforcement of both Islands by the enemy, and speed will make our task definitely lighter. Now that the preparations to attack Sardinia may take as long as those to attack Sicily and that Sicily is by far the greater prize. Decisions on all the above are needed within the next week. The relief and resupplying of Malta should follow naturally from the operations now in progress or in prospect in the central Mediterranean, and the immediate needs of the Island are being dealt with on an effective scale. It would be well, when circumstances and shipping permit, to exchange the units who have long been in the fortress for some of those who have been in the desert, and vice versa. I have received a telegram from the President [R-210] containing the following paragraph: "It is hoped that you with your Chiefs of Staff in London and I with the Combined Staff here may make a survey of the possibilities including forward movement directed against Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece and other Balkan Areas and including the possibility of obtaining Turkish support for an attack through the Black Sea against Germany's Flank." I endorse the above conception by the President. The first part of the President's wishes are being studied by the Combined Staffs in Washington, and are the subject of the foregoing paragraphs for our discussions. The second part relating to Turkey is also of vital importance, though it is a slower process. A supreme and prolonged effort must be made to bring Turkey into the war in the spring. We must expect that our Naval Forces and shipping, landing craft, etcetera, will be fully engaged in the Central Mediterranean, and that only minor amphibious facilities will be available in the Levant. Access can however be had to Turkey by the railways through Syria as well as by coastal shipping, and by a gradual build up of air protection not only Adalia but the Dardanelles itself might become open to supplies for Turkey. Troops can move by rail and road from Syria. I wish to record my opinion that Turkey may be won if the proper measures are taken. Turkey is an Ally. She will wish to have a seat among the victors at the peace conference. She has a great desire to be well armed. Her Army is in good order except for the specialized modern weapons, in which the Bulgarians have been given so great an advantage by the Germans. The Turkish Army has been mobilized for nearly three years, and is warlike. Hitherto Turkey has been re-

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strained by fear from fulfilling her obligations, and we have taken an indulgent view of her policy on account of our own inability to help. The situation has now changed. By the destruction of Rommel's Army, large forces may presently become available in Egypt and Cyrenaicfa]. By a strengthened Russian resistance and a possible counterstroke in the Caucasus, which we should urge upon the Russians with all emphasis, great easement will be secured in Persia and the Tenth Army may be drawn upon. There is also the Ninth Army in Syria. From all these sources it should be possible, on the assumption of the Russians maintaining themselves in the Caucasus north of the mountain line and holding the Caspian, to build up a powerful British land and air force to assist the Turks. A target date for the concentration should be April or May. Let me have proposals. The following is the order of procedure, political and military: (A) Turkey should be offered a Russian-American-British guarantee of territorial integrity and status quo. The Russians have already agreed with us upon this. The addition of the United States would probably be a decisive reassurance. This should be followed by the dispatch to Turkey of a strong Anglo-American Military Mission. (B) All through the winter from now on, Turkey must be equipped from Egypt and from the United States with tanks, A/T and AA guns, and active construction of airfields must be under taken. We have been working upon airfield construction in Turkey for two years. What progress has been made so far? Now that Rommel has been beaten, there is evidently a surplus of material in Egypt. We had over two thousand five hundred tanks at the disposal of the Middle East Army. Much enemy material has been captured, both German and Italian. This is also true of A/T and a AA guns. Experts must be provided to assist the Turks in learning to use and maintain this material. A ceaseless flow of weapons and equipment must go into Turkey. We have already promised a consignment, but the moment Turkey agrees secretly with the plan above, far greater quanti[ti]es must be sent. What is the capacity of the railways from Syria to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles? It would seem a great mistake to attack Rhodes and other Islands in enemy hands in the Eastern Mediterranean until we have got Turkey on our side. Any attacks can then be supported by heavy shore based air power. We have to creep round this coast both by land and sea, building up our air as we go. (C) In conjunction with the above, we should urge the Russians to develop their strength on their southern flank, to try to clear the Caucasus, to regain Novorossisk and, above all, to resume at the earliest date their intentions explained to me by Premier Stalin, of striking south west from the region north of Stalingrad towards Rostov on the Don. An ultimate

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result of these operations, if successful, would be the opening of the Dardanelles under heavy air protection to the passage of supplies to Russian Black Seas Ports, and to any Naval assistance the Russians might require in the Black Sea. (D) Lastly, all being well we should assemble in Syria the British and imperial forces mentioned in preceding paragraphs. [MR*. pWSC, IV, 654-55, 697-98.]

Churchill continued to worry about Russian morale and was willing to send another convoy to northern Russia—if the United States could provide sufficient escort vessels. "Scapa" was Scapa Flow, the home port of the British Home Fleet located in Scotland.

C-196 London [via U.S. Embassy] Nov. 18, 1942, 7:15 A.M. I TOR 7:53 A.M.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. I know your earnestness about sending another convoy to North Russia as soon as possible. We can have thirty-one ships ready to sail from Iceland on 22 December. As Tirpitz, Hipper and two small enemy cruisers are stationed in Norway, it is essential to have with the convoy, in addition to their close escort, a striking force of sixteen destroyers to deal with the German Surface Forces. We can provide the close escort for convoy but, owing to TORCH commitments and the casualties to destroyers in that operation we can only provide seventeen out of the twenty nine destroyers required for a screen for the battle fleet and cruisers and the destroyer striking force mentioned above. I am reluctant to risk sending this convoy unless we give it adequate protection. It is hoped therefore that you would be prepared to send twelve long endurance destroyers to assist in passing the convoy in. It would be desirable for your destroyers to arrive at Scapa by seventh December in order to give time for them to get accustomed to working with our fleet. [MR*]

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Churchill seemed pleased at having received a courteous and optimistic message from Stalin and quickly forwarded it to Roosevelt. The winter campaign referred to by Stalin was the Russian offensive at Stalingrad, which began on November 19. Vladikavkaz (misspelled by Churchill) is currently called Ordzhonikidze and is in the Caucasus, located at a vital crossroad west of the Baku oil fields. T h e town's original name translated as "possessor of the Caucasus."

C-197 London Nov. 18, 1942, 9:27 A.M. /TOR 7:35 A.M. Personal a n d Most Secret F o r m e r Naval Person to President. O n the thirteenth November I sent you t h r o u g h Lord Halifax an unn u m b e r e d telegram containing the texts of two messages from Stalin a n d my reply [C—189/1]. I have now received the following from him in answer to my last telegram. Begins. Many thanks for your message of the thirteenth November we all h e r e delighted at your successes in Lybia a n d at the successes of the British American Forces in the French North Africa. Let me congratulate you from the bottom of my heart on your victory a n d wish you further successes. In the last few days we succeeded in stopping the Germans near Vladikavkas a n d in stabilizing the situation there. Vladikavkas is in o u r h a n d s and, it seems to me, will remain in o u r hands. We are taking all possible measures to keep o u r positions in the N o r t h e r n Caucasus. We h o p e to start o u r winter campaign in the near future. T h e exact m o m e n t of the beginning d e p e n d s on weather which is beyond o u r power. I will regularly inform you on the course of the operation. [MR*. StaUnlWSC, doc. 86.]

Churchill remained concerned about Admiral Darlan in North Africa, and continued to treat Eisenhower as a political innocent. Eisenhower expressed his annoyance privately, but publicly and in messages to Churchill calmly defended his deal with the Admiral on grounds of military expediency. Cadogan was a strong critic of the Darlan deal, and Churchill apparently hoped that the Foreign Office official could convince Eisenhower of the need to consider political as well as military expediency.

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C-198 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 18, 1942, 1351 Ζ/TOR 10:50 A.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. T h a n k you for your statement about N o r t h Africa, which I t h o u g h t admirable [R-214]. I u n d e r s t a n d that Eisenhower is planning to hold a small unofficial conference at Gibraltar. I think it would be helpful if some one from h e r e who u n d e r s t a n d s the political aspect could sit in for the conference. Ei­ senhower would like this. As Bedell Smith is leaving h e r e t o m o r r o w Cad o g a n plans to fly down with him. We should of course keep his j o u r n e y secret. [MR*]

Roosevelt gently but firmly defended Eisenhower by eliminating political issues as a subject for discussion at the Gibraltar meeting.

R-215 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 18, 1942, 12 A.M. For F o r m e r Naval Person from President Personal a n d Secret. Your N o . 198. I have not the slightest objection to the unofficial con­ ference at Gibraltar or your sending Cadogan with Bedell Smith. How­ ever, I think it is of the utmost importance that Eisenhower a n d your people should n o t (repeat not) discuss the political aspects in N o r t h or West Africa at this time except to explore the existing situation in its military aspects. Most certainly no political decisions should be reached at t h e conference. [MR]

Even before Roosevelt's cable arrived, Major General Bedell hower's representative in London, had questioned the value going to the Gibraltar talks. Roosevelt's message eliminated Cadogan to attend and the British so informed the President Cadogan, The Diaries, pp. 494—95.)

Smith, Eisen­ of Cadogan's the need for [C-201]. (See

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C-199 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 18, 1942, 1029 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Secret. Your n u m b e r 215. T h a n k you so m u c h . Of course n o decisions will be taken. [MR]

R-216 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 18, 1942, 12 A.M. For F o r m e r Naval Person from t h e President Personal a n d Secret. Your N o . 197. I also received t h r o u g h Russian Ambassador h e r e a message from Stalin which is almost a p a r a p h r a s e of his message to you [possibly Stalin/FDR, doc. 49]. I note a great i m p r o v e m e n t in t h e tone of o u r messages from Moscow a n d I h o p e this will continue. [MR*]

In spite of strong opposition from the press and from within the British government, Churchill had little choice but to acquiesce in the American decision to work with Darlan. As ever, he tried to make the best of what he considered a bad deal.

C-200 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 18, 1942, 1:40 A.M. / TOR 2210 [EWT?] Personal a n d Secret F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Your public statement about Darlan has settled the matter in the best possible way. I a m as anxious however as you a n d Eisenhower that we should profit to t h e full in t h e actions which are i m p e n d i n g by French cooperation. Also I fully recognize that if Darlan a n d company r e n d e r real services d u r i n g t h e operations these would naturally count in their favour. I feel pretty sure we are looking at it from exactly the same point of view. Every good wish. [MR*. WSC, IV, 634.]

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The American Joint Chiefs of Staff were already engaged in a debate over post-TORCH strategy which would not be resolved until the President decided on an invasion of Sicily. General Marshall staunchly opposed any further operations in the Mediterranean as inspired by British political strategy rather than military considerations; Admiral King continued to fight for increased emphasis on the Pacific; and Roosevelt seemed most concerned about keeping Anglo-American forces engaged against German armies.

R-217 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 19, 1942, 1 1 : 3 5 A.M. From the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal and Secret. Reference your No. 195 of November 18th the Combined Chiefs of Staff are now studying the possibilities for future actions in the Mediterranean T h e a t e r , basing their studies on the following favorable and unfavorable assumptions and/or a combination of both. T h e favorable assumptions are: (1) T h a t Tunisia has been cleared of Axis troops. (2) T h a t the British 8th Army has reached Bengasi, but that the r e m n a n t s of Rommel's force are still in being to the west of that place. (3) T h a t the Spanish reactions to T O R C H remain satisfactory. (4) T h a t the lines of communication are secure. T h e unfavorable assumptions are the converse of the favorable assumptions stated above. T h e Combined Chiefs of Staff will consider the contents of your No. 195 of November 18th in connection with the studies on which they are now engaged. I will tell you of their conclusions as soon as possible. Roosevelt QCS] [MR*]

Although Roosevelt softened slightly the matter-of-fact language proposed by Admiral King, even the President's strong concern about Russian morale could not overcome the severe shortage of escort destroyers. (The final sentence was added in Roosevelt's handwriting.)

R-218 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov.

19, 1942,

11:38 (A.M.?)

From the President to the Former Naval Person Personal and Most Secret. Replying to your message No. 196 of November 18 1 am in complete agreement that every effort should be made to send another convoy to

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Russia at the earliest possible date. It is noted that you can make available escort vessels for the close escort and some for the covering and striking forces but you feel that twelve additional destroyers are necessary for adequate protection. You are familiar with the necessity of o u r radical reduction of escort forces even to retaining in the Atlantic destroyers urgently required in the Pacific in o r d e r to provide escort vessels for T O R C H . T h e movement of essential follow u p convoys from America to Africa is contingent u p o n availability of escort vessels and the T O R C H operation must be adequately supported. Destroyer losses a n d d a m a g e to destroyers in recent naval operations in the Pacific have been so serious as to necessitate an immediate r e t u r n of the destroyers borrowed from the Pacific for T O R C H . This will leave in the Atlantic only m i n i m u m requirements for follow u p convoys to Africa a n d makes it impossible for us to provide the destroyers for the Russian convoy suggested in your message N u m b e r 196. I wish I could send you a more favorable answer. Roosevelt [MR. KfcfC]

C-201 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 19, 1942, 1221 [Z?]/TOR 1240 [Z?] F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Your n u m b e r 215. O n further consideration I think it unnecessary for Cadogan to go now. [MR*]

T h e politics of war continued to plague Roosevelt. Under heavy fire from the press, particularly Walter Lippmann, for seeming to violate all of the ideals professed in the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt continued to emphasize the military expedience of dealing with Darlan. His proposal for sending two political advisers was designed to take some pressure off Eisenhower while simultaneously using the existing Vichy administrative system in North Africa. Newspaper reports that pro—de Gaulle Frenchmen were being persecuted by the Darlan government stimulated the President's specific instructions regarding political prisoners. Although de Gaulle was not free to make public comments (because of British censorship), GauUists had made clear their vehement opposition to the arrangement in North Africa.

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R-219 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 19, 1942, 5:30 P.M. For the Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. I told the press yesterday in confidence an old orthodox church proverb used in the Balkans that appears applicable to our present Darlan—de Gaulle problem. "My children, it is permitted you in time of grave danger to walk with the devil until you have crossed the bridge." In regard to North Africa and possibly additional future areas, I think you and I might give some consideration to the idea of appointing one Britisher and one American to whom would be given authority not to administer civil functions but to hold a veto power over French civil administrators, and to direct them in rare instances to follow out certain policies. For example, I sent word to Eisenhower that all political prisoners in North and West Africa must be released. If Darlan fails to carry out this directive, Eisenhower must at once exercize his authority as Supreme Commander and take independent action in the matter. [MR*. WSC, IV, 635-36. R&C]

Domestic political pressures and a reasonable fear of the Japanese threat to Australia and New Zealand forced the Prime Ministers of those two nations to request the return of their troops fighting in North Africa. Eventually the New Zealand government accepted the Anglo-American arguments and left its troops in North Africa. Prime Minister Curtin of Australia persisted, however, and the Ninth Division returned to Australia.

R-220 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 19, 1942, 5:47 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. I have received a telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia and as he does not say that he is repeating it to you, I am sending it to you in my following dispatch. I have sent it to the Combined Staffs in Washington with the following memorandum: "I enclose telegram from Prime Minister of Australia. I hope you will consider this and let me have your judgment as to what reply should be made. Obviously the British Combined Staffs should be consulted and their opinion be given great weight, in view of the fact

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that while the African operation is largely American on the western end, it is preponderantly British on the eastern end. It is my snap j u d g m e n t that Mr. Curtin should be told: (a) T h a t it is essential that General Alexander's and General Montgomery's operation continue in full swing and that it cannot be int e r r u p t e d by the removal of any division or unit until the whole African operation from Algiers to Egypt is definitely settled in o u r favor and every G e r m a n and every Italian is driven out of Africa. (b) I think we should impress on Mr. Curtin that the opening of the Mediterranean to t h r o u g h shipping to the Far East via the Suez Canal is of major benefit to the safety of Australia, and that the work of the Ninth Division is a component part of the whole. (c) As to the r e t u r n of the Division to Australia after the completion of the African operation, I feel that this is a matter primarily for the decision of the Combined Staffs here and in London. (d) If I felt sure that the r e t u r n of the Ninth Division to Australia would result in its being reconstituted as an experienced fighting division available for use in New Guinea or some other island, I would be inclined to let it go back to Australia for that purpose. T h e division is entitled to a rest period after its strenuous campaigns in the Egyptian area, but I think it should be kept intact, filled u p with trained officers a n d m a d e definitely available to take the offensive northward from Australia." I h o p e , therefore, that you will take this u p with your people and my people in London. T h e primary consideration must, of course, be the relationship of the Ninth Division to the African campaign and after that there is the secondary consideration of building u p the Australian strength for use n o r t h of Australia. Roosevelt [MR*]

Roosevelt forwarded a copy of Curtin's angry message.

R-221 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 19, 1942, 5:45 P.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person Personal and Most Secret. H e r e is the dispatch referred to in No. 220. "Dear President Roosevelt, I have carefully considered the suggestion in your telegram of November 1st for the retention of the 9th Imperial Division in the

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Middle East and your proposal to send the United States Division to Australia from Hawaii conditional on the right to divert it elsewhere within the Southwest and South Pacific areas. 2. As explained to Mr. Churchill in my telegram of October 17th, which was repeated to you, it is impossible for Australia to despatch to the Middle East the reinforcements necessary for the maintenance of the 9th Division in view of the difficulties already being experienced in maintaining the Australian Army and meeting the heavy wastage from tropical warfare in New Guinea. Unless the Division returns to Australia it cannot be maintained, whereas it can be built up again in Australia by the allocation of personnel from other formations which are being disbanded owing to contraction in the number of our divisions. 3. The attitude of the Australian Government has all along been quite definite and clear regarding the future employment of this Division. 4. After the outbreak of war with Japan, and following a statement generously volunteered by Mr. Churchill that no obstacles would be placed in the way of Australian troops returning to defend their homeland, the Government requested that all Australian troops overseas should return to Australia. 5. In March we allowed two brigade groups of the 6th Division to be used in Ceylon on the understanding that the 9th Division would return to Australia as soon as possible. Had these brigades returned directly to Australia we would have been able to strengthen the forces in New Guinea much earlier with battle trained troops. 6. In April the Government agreed to the postponement of the return of the 9th Division until it could be replaced in the Middle East. 7. When the Australian Government had every reason to expect the return of the Division in July it raised no objection to its transfer from Palestine to the Western Desert to help stem the Axis advance. Mr. Churchill was advised there would be difficulties in the despatch of further reinforcements from Australia and that when available reserves were exhausted the Division would have to be withdrawn from the line of battle. 8. On July 30th in a further personal telegram to Mr. Churchill I stated it was impossible for the Government to do more than agree to an extension of the period for the temporary retention of the 9th Division in the Middle East. A limit was set to reinforcements that would be available and it was specifically stated ancillary units were not to be broken up for use as reinforcements. It was emphasized the Commander-in-Chief Middle East would therefore need to have these facts in mind in his use of the Division.

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9. Mr. Churchill, the Australian Representative on the United Kingdom War Cabinet and the Commander of the Division have been informed:— (a) No further reinforcements for the 9th Division are being despatched from Australia. (b) The Government is not agreeable to the 9th Division being broken up by the replacement of wastage from ancillary and other units. (c) It is essential that the Commander-in-Chief Middle East should have regard to this position in his use of the 9th Division. The Government views the present use of the Division as absolutely governed by the fulfilment of the conditions laid down by it some time ago and I have told Mr. Churchill that in our plans and dispositions we are relying on the Division being returned in good shape and strength. Now that the situation in the Middle East for which the 9th Division was retained has been cleared up satisfactorily, the Government expects early effect to be given the understanding reached in April. 10. You might be interested to know that on the entry of Italy into the war certain units of the 6th Division reinforcements and Corps troops were diverted to the United Kingdom, where they were organized into the 9th Division for the defence of Britain against invasion. This Division, which was later transferred to the Middle East and withstood the siege of Tobruk, therefore really became an additional overseas commitment. It was realized at the time that it would probably be beyond our capacity to maintain it and experience has proved this to be the case. 11. Decisions on global strategy have been taken by Mr. Churchill and yourself. The Commonwealth Government has shown a ready willingness to co-operate in other theatres at considerable risk to the security of Australia. This has been demonstrated by the service overseas of our naval, land and air forces and our continued participation in the Empire Air Training Scheme. The Government considers the contributions it has made to other theatres entitle it to the assurance that the fullest possible support will be given to the situation in the Pacific. You will recall that the military advisers of the Commonwealth Government consider that three further divisions are necessary in the Southwest Pacific area. In view of its responsibilities for the local defence of Australia and in light of the views of its advisers, the Government feels that the maximum strength of Australian forces should be concentrated in the Southwest Pacific area to meet all contingencies of the military situation in the Pacific. 12. We are grateful to learn that you are sending to the South or Southwest Pacific Area the Division from Hawaii. We would be de-

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lighted to welcome it to Australia where it would be an invaluable addition to t h e two splendid American Divisions already h e r e . Yours sincerely, J o h n C u r t i n . " Roosevelt [MR*]

Air to surface-vessel (ASV) radar, developed by the British, had been a val­ uable tool for detecting German submarines cruising on the surface—some­ thing the diesel submarines of World War II had to do frequently in order to recharge the batteries they used for undersea cruising. Wellington bombers were being converted to anti-submarine warfare, while American-built Lib­ erator bombers (B-24), along with the Flying Fortress (B-17), were becoming the mainstay of the bombing offensive against Germany. T h e 1 '/2-meter radar was replaced in March 1943 by a more effective unit. As was commonly the case in messages sent to Roosevelt via Hopkins, the reply to Churchill came from Hopkins himself, sent on December 1, 1942. In that message Hopkins informed Churchill that the United States could not meet his request for thirty Liberator bombers with centimeter ASV, but was sending twenty-one such aircraft and associated ground equipment to General Eisenhower for use in anti-submarine operations near Europe. Hop­ kins also promised that the Liberators scheduled for delivery to Britain under the terms of the Arnold-Towers-Slessor agreement would be equipped with the special radars. (See Hopkins to Churchill, Dec. 1, 1942, H L H : Special Asst. to the President series.)

C-202 Washington [via U.S. Army] Nov. 20, 1942, 1310 Ζ Secret from t h e Prime Minister to Mr. H a r r y Hopkins. Could you p u t the following before t h e President on a suitable occasion. 1. O n e of t h e most potent weapons for h u n t i n g the U-boat a n d pro­ tecting o u r convoys is t h e long r a n g e aircraft fitted with ASV equipment. 2. T h e G e r m a n U-boats have recently been fitted with a device enabling t h e m to listen to o u r o n e a n d one-half m e t r e ASV e q u i p m e n t a n d thus dive to safety before o u r aircraft can a p p e a r on the scene. As the result o u r day patrols in t h e bay have become largely ineffective in bad weather a n d o u r night patrols, with searchlight aircraft, have been r e n d e r e d al­ most entirely useless. Sightings of U-boats have accordingly declined very sharply from 120 in September to 57 in October. No i m p r o v e m e n t can be expected until aircraft fitted with a type of ASV to which they cannot

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at present listen called "Centimetre ASV" become available. 3. One of the main objects of patrolling the bay [Biscay] is to attack Uboats in transit to and from the American Atlantic Seaboard. This region is doubly urgent now so many American TORCH convoys pass in the vicinity. 4. We can deal with the inner zone of the Bay of Biscay by modifying and diverting to our Wellingtons a form of Centimetre ASV which has been developed as a target location device for our heavy bombers. 5. A more difficult situation arises in the outer zone of the bay where aircraft of longer range fitted with Centimetre ASV are essential. 6. The very heavy sinking in Mid-Atlantic have forced us to convert our own Liberators for work in this area. This leaves us with no aircraft with adequate range for the outer zone of the bay, unless we make a further diversion from the small force of long range bombers responsible for the air offensive against Germany. Even if this diversion were made a considerable time would necessarily elapse before the essential equipment could be modified and installed. 7. I am most reluctant to reduce the weight of bombs we are able to drop on Germany as I believe it is of great importance that this offensive should be maintained and developed to the utmost of our ability throughout the winter months. I would, therefore, ask you Mr. President to consider the immediate allocation of some 30 Liberators with Centimetre ASV equipment from the supplies which I understand are now available in the United States. These aircraft would be put to work immediately, in an area where they would make a direct contribution to the American War Effort. [MR*. WSC, IV, 284-85. R&C]

The refusal of Vichy French officials in Tunisia to accept Darlan's authority had prevented a quick Allied occupation of that French colony. By midNovember the Germans had taken control of Tunisia, creating a front extending from the Algerian border in the west to Tripoli in the east. The Allies planned to drop paratroops behind this line and bypass the well-defended port of Bizerta on the way to the capital city of Tunis. Field Marshal Jan Smuts of South Africa, whose report Churchill endorsed in this cable, believed that the results of the arrangement with Darlan and such Darlan supporters as Governor General Auguste Nogues of Morocco had more than justified the decision to work with the ex-Vichy leader. Darlan had strongly protested the Anglo-American statements that the deal was temporary. Appealing to the many Frenchmen who could not agree that Vichy had betrayed France, he claimed that his authority came not from the Allies but from Marshal Petain.

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C-203 London Nov. 20, 1942, 2306 Ζ I TOR 8:08 P.M.

From Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Following from Smuts who spent this morning 20th at Gibraltar Head­ quarters. I am in full agreement with him. Begins: This is a most secret telegram. After arrival this morning I had a long talk with Eisenhower and Cunningham, which I summarise for your information. As regards coming operation next Sunday or Mon­ day it is doubtful whether Anderson is strong enough to take Bizerta but Tunis appears more hopeful. In any case every effort will be made to press enemy into as small an area or bridgehead as possible so that air and other attack may finish him later. Further south at­ tempt will be made to clean up small pockets of enemy at Sfax and elsewhere, but no large forces will be employed in Tripoli direction at present. Sea losses so far have been made good. Loss of personnel ships have been compensated by equal number of French ships ac­ quired, and for every merchant vessel lost a U-boat has been sunk. As regards Darlan statements published have had unsettling effect on local French leaders and it would be dangerous to go further on those lines. Nogues has threatened to resign and as he controls Mo­ rocco population results of such a step might be far reaching. From point of view of securing French cooperation and stabilising situation nothing could be worse than impression that we were merely using leaders to discard them as soon as they have served their purpose. There can be do doubt that Darlan and his friends have burnt their boats and are doing their best to fight the Axis and consolidate French behind us in this fight. French are cooperating in non-combatant tasks and even in fighting on small scale, but their fighting value is at present low for want of proper arms. Darlan was not Eisenhower's choice but that of other French leaders some of whom were his enemies and our strong supporters and who all agreed that his lead­ ership in cooperation was essential for our operations. It would be great mistake to create impression that he is to be discarded at early date. Military situation may call for his retention for fairly long period and meanwhile impression to contrary should not be publicly created. I explained to Eisenhower that I do not think that there was any intention to repeat or go beyond statements already made which were only intended to correct impression that political accord with Vichy elements had been come to. Future political arrangements should be left to governments concerned and agreement of French among

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themselves. I think it would be wise to pass on to President Roosevelt my strong impression that further anti Darlan statements might be harmful to o u r cause, a n d indeed are not called for. [MR. WSC, IV, 634-35.]

Eisenhower had negotiated a formal arrangement with Darlan (essentially drawn u p by Darlan and General Clark) and, at the suggestion of his staff, had passed it to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval before issuing a public announcement. As Eisenhower expected, the CCS gave it to Churchill and Roosevelt. T h e President suggested that the word "protocol" be avoided since it implied a stronger commitment to Darlan than was intended. Roo­ sevelt said he did not insist on that restriction to the point of jeopardizing military operations, but he did want the arrangement to be strictly military rather than diplomatic or political. T h e message was sent from the CCS to Eisenhower as R—3361 (Fan 21) with a copy to Churchill.

C-204 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 21, 1942, 1321 Ζ/TOR 10:15 A.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. We entirely agree with your view r e p o r t e d in your R-3361 (Fan 21). In particular we agree that every effort should be m a d e to avoid the form of a protocol o r o t h e r formal diplomatic d o c u m e n t . [MR]

Given the decision to approve Eisenhower's agreement with Darlan, Churchill could not permit de Gaulle to jeopardize the arrangement. Churchill placed the entire blame for muzzling de Gaulle on the Americans and on Roosevelt in particular. Roosevelt saw no need to reply to this cable.

C-205 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 22, 1942, 1647 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. General De Gaulle wished on November 21 to broadcast, t h r o u g h the BBC, the following statement (see my next telegram) d e n o u n c i n g the m a i n t e n a n c e of the Vichy regime in N o r t h Africa. I felt that, in view of i m p e n d i n g operations, I should not allow anything that might compro-

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mise a r r a n g e m e n t m a d e by Eisenhower with Darlan or prejudice the military situation. I accordingly vetoed the broadcast, which will not now be m a d e . De Gaulle was told that as the operations were u n d e r the United States C o m m a n d I felt b o u n d to take your opinion before agreeing to anything which might be detrimental to them. If your view was that broadcasts of this kind were undesirable at the m o m e n t , being your a r d e n t a n d active Lieutenant I should bow to your decision without d e m u r . [MR]

De Gaulle's proposed speech was more than a condemnation of the deal with Darlan; it was also a passionate appeal for French unity under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle. (Churchill cabled the French text to Roosevelt. What follows below is the translation of that text provided to the President.)

C-206 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 22, 1942, 1717 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. My immediately preceding telegram. T e x t begins. T h e F r e n c h nation forsaw that in spite of the arrival of h e r allies the liquidation of Vichy in French N o r t h Africa would not take place without delay o r even s u d d e n changes. But, the French nation, in its imprisonment, felt greatest concern on learning that delays may be such a n d such a n d that s u d d e n t u r n s may take on such a character. T h e nation in its i m p r i s o n m e n t intends to find out what goes on. Much French territory is occupied by the allied armies with the consent a n d enthusiastic support of the people. T h e nation asks whether or not the regime a n d spirit of Vichy will remain there in force, whether or not the present Vichy "lords" will continue in office, w h e t h e r or not this part of the French empire will be able to unite with that p a r t which has already taken u p a r m s again u n d e r the b a n n e r of h o n o r , w h e t h e r or not national deliverance beginning with the liberated e m p i r e o u g h t to be dishonored by a foursome of cul­ prits, camouflaged for the time being u n d e r additional perjury. It would be serious a n d d a n g e r o u s simply to ask these questions if at the same time they could not be answered. Certainly France has only too many times known that in the con­ fusion of this world war there are risks of making mistakes on the p a r t of individuals with the best of intentions. But she (France) has

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also recognized that the alliance of all her allies was a sincere one and that the sacred ideal for which so many, many men and women suffer and die on the field of liberty necessarily rejected dishonor and treason as France herself cursed them. Of a certainty, France knows now a regime of oppression and of lies has long been able to silence free speech and public opinion in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. But she also knows that once the columns of the temple of the idol have been shaken, nothing will again stifle the powerful expression of national will either in Africa or elsewhere. Likewise, France is fully aware of the difficulty in bringing about co-operation in the war of territories so diverse and so long separated as those making up its empire and (she is also aware of the difficulty) of united action in combat of armed forces which she has or which she is going to be able to draw upon from all parts of the earth. But she knows that in order to unite all the forces which belong to her and the possessions which she protects, there exist ties of long standing: just laws of the legally constituted republic and treaties which she has concluded. She knows that her soldiers, whether they fight in Tunisia, Libya, in Tchad, or in the Pacific, are not the soldiers belonging to an individual but are soldiers of France. Since the country fell beneath enemy blows and from treasonable plots, the treasure of national independence and dignity has been safeguarded. Through what trials? Only God knows. But having experienced that, France saw leap from the very depths of the soul of the people, the all enveloping flame of hope and liberty. It is due to this sacred flame that there has been raised up and organized, under the very heel of the enemy and of his collaborateurs, the tremendous resistance of the French people. It is by virtue of this same flame that much of our territory and a part of our forces have little by little come together. It is around this same flame that the whole empire will unite itself with the whole nation to fight and to conquer side by side with all the allies of France. It is thus and thus alone that victory will gloriously wipe out with a single blow, our misfortunes, our factions and our tears. A single struggle for a unified country. [MR]

The answer Roosevelt proposed to Prime Minister Curtin's request for a return of Australian troops from North Africa was sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and is summarized in R—220.

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C-207 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 23, 1942, 1230 Ζ/TOR 9:31 P.M. Personal a n d Secret F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Re your p r o p o s e d reply about recall of Australian Division. I should be glad if this could be delayed for a few days as we are studying t h e question h e r e especially in its shipping aspect. It must be r e m e m b e r e d that t h e Australian action will probably entail similar m o v e m e n t of New Zealand Division. [MR*]

Oliver Lyttelton had gone to Washington to secure from various American officials firm allocations of supplies for Britain. Benefiting from the fortuitous timing of the British victories against Rommel in the African desert, he was most successful in obtaining guarantees for specific percentages of American production, ending at least temporarily British fears that they would receive only what was left over after American military demands had been met.

R-221/1, letter Washington November 23, 1942 My d e a r Winston: Oliver's visit has been most welcome a n d I h o p e he goes h o m e reassured about o u r ability a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n to stand beside you vigorously until the war is won. T h a n k s so m u c h for letting him come over. H e will convey to you some of t h e private thoughts, serious a n d otherwise, which we have discussed together. Very cordially yours, [MR. PREM 3/481/5.]

Although Churchill thought the Australians and New Zealanders were dis­ loyal to the British Empire, he had no choice but to give in to their demands. Even so he passed the final determination on to the American government, along with a hint that the removal of the Australian division from the Middle East might cut back the reinforcements destined for the southwestern Pacific. Churchill was particularly annoyed with J o h n Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, since the New Zealand government was u n d e r heavy domestic pres­ sure to follow the lead of its larger neighbor. That annoyance was heightened

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by Churchill's dislike for the Australian Labour Party, which had taken office in October 1941. Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand, likewise headed a Labour government.

C-208 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 24, 1942, 0040 Ζ / TOR 1:00 A.M. To the President of the United States from Churchill Your No. 220 of November 20 [19]. I cannot do better than send you the two telegrams I have despatched to Mr. Curtin and Mr. Fraser re­ spectively. We cannot of course in any way oppose in principle the with­ drawal of either or both of these divisions, but you who have a great army in the Pacific theatre and have assumed a considerable measure of re­ sponsibility for the defense of Australia have every right to express an opinion, more especially as American armies are also engaged in North Africa and it is arguable their position might be affected. Moreover there is a great case against the uneconomical use of our limited shipping. It therefore seems to me that the view taken by General Marshall is sound and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should lay their view before the Dominion Governments concerned. We are very grateful to the United States for the help you are giving to the defence of Australia and New Zealand while our own troops are so fully engaged with the enemy in other quarters. [MR*]

C-209 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 24, 1942, 0059 ΖI T O R 1:00 A.M.

Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Following are texts referred to in my No. 208. Number 1. Begins: Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand personal and secret. 1. Your Pefra No. 8 (for text see my immediately following tele­ gram). I should very much regret to see the New Zealand Division quit the scene of its glories, but I quite understand your feelings and how embarrassing to you would be the withdrawal of the Ninth Aus­ tralian Division. I am having the whole situation reviewed by the Chiefs of Staff in London. In the meanwhile I send you a copy of the telegram I have today despatched to Mr. Curtin. I am sure it would be a mistake for Australia and New Zealand to ignore the

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opinion of the United States Military Authorities, having regard to the great contribution they are now making to the defence of the Southern Pacific and the still greater efforts we must expect from them. Number 2. Begins: Prime Minister to Mr. Curtin personal and secret. Your Johcu 45 (President's No. 221 to Former Naval Person) and President Roosevelt's telegram of November first. We recognise of course that the withdrawal of the Ninth Australian Division from the Mediterranean Theatre rests with the Commonwealth Government. However, the United States forces are now heavily engaged both in helping Australia and mastering French North Africa as a prelude to further action in Europe. They are therefore entitled to have the opportunity of considering the position as a whole and of making any representations to you which they may think desirable. 2. It seems probable that the Eastern Mediterranean will be the scene of large scale action in the early spring and the position of Turkey is of peculiar interest. If the Ninth Australian Division is withdrawn to Australia, it will of course have to be replaced in the Middle East either by British or American Forces. In the present acute and aggravated shipping stringency it will be necessary to save tonnage as much as possible. For instance it might be most economical to move one of the American Divisions in Australia or destined for the Pacific direct to Suez, where they could pick up the Ninth Australian Division on the return journey. There might be no other way of maintaining the necessary strength in the Middle East. On the other hand it might be possible to carry the Australians' away from the Middle East as an isolated shipping operation. This again would have to be at the expense of our general power to move troops about the world and would have to be considered in relation to the dominating military exigencies. The matter is one on which the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington, who alone have the central point of view, should in the first instance advise. 3. So far as we are concerned we shall of course not oppose your wishes, although we greatly regret the departure from the Middle Eastern Theatre of a division which has rendered distinguished service. The object should be to bring the greatest number of the United Nations Divisions into contact with the enemy, and certainly it would appear more helpful to the common cause if fresh troops were moved from the United States into the Pacific and into action against Japan than that troops already engaged with the enemy in another part of the world should be withdrawn.

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4. As I know the great importance which you have always attached to American opinion and how much you value the substantial aid they have given to the defence of Australia, I feel bound to put these points before you. [MR*]

C-210 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 24, 1942, 0150 Ζ/TOR 1:00 A.M.

Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Following is text of Pefra No. 8. Begins. The time has come I feel when I must raise with you the question of the return of the Second New Zealand Division from the Middle East. In doing so, I assure you that the exigencies of the war situation, both in this part of the world and in the North African Theatre, are fully in my mind. We in New Zealand have for considerable time been of the opinion that, in view of the growing difficulties of the manpower position and of our increased and increasing commit­ ments in the Pacific Area, this request should be made by my col­ leagues and I also felt that to do so in the adverse circumstances which existed hitherto in the Middle East and in Russia would be inappropriate. It was always my intention however at the proper time, and when the situation in Egypt became easier, to place the whole position before you. As late as August of this year, when approval was given for the despatch of reinforcements for the Middle East, it was felt that the urgent needs of that theatre outweighed those of the area in which New Zealand was situated. Now however with the launching of the most promising Anglo American offensive, the im­ mediate security of the Middle East, which we have always regarded as being of such vital importance, appears for all practical purposes to have been achieved, and, with the accession of large new forces from the United States and Britain, the presence of one New Zealand division in this theatre becomes a matter of diminishing importance. Here in the Pacific, on the other hand, we are faced not only with the possibility of Japanese launching further offensive action, both to retrive the situation arising from her recent setback, and to take advantage of the preoccupations of the United Nations in Europe and in Africa, but also with what we regard as the necessity on the part of the United Nations to launch a counter offensive at the earliest possible date. In either case it is felt that the place of the Second Division is here in the South Pacific.

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Now that the New Zealand Army and Air Forces have, at our own request, been placed under the Commander of the South Pacific Area, we anticipate that increasingly heavy demands will inevitably be made upon the resources of this Dominion, both in manpower and materials. Already as you are aware we have, in response to requests from the Commander South Pacific Area, readily and promptly agreed to send a New Zealand Division for service in the islands, part of which has already proceeded to its several destinations. In addition to our Army commitments, it has been decided that the New Zealand Air Force also should be trained and equipped to undertake an offensive role in the Pacific, and, for some time now, I should add a large proportion of our limited force of modern aircraft have been operating in Guadalcanal and Esperitu Santo and other Pacific Islands. New Zealand is now endeavouring to complete preparations for an air force of sixteen squadrons for service in the Pacific, with an ultimate aim of achieving a thirty squadron air force. You will appreciate that with our extremely limited manpower resources, which have now reached straining point, it is not possible for us to maintain two divisions overseas, and an adequate home defence force together with our air commitments, which include, of course, the Empire Air Training Scheme, and our comparatively small but increasingly useful Naval units. We have in fact reached the limit of our manpower resources in New Zealand. Up to the present we have taken over 163,000 men and 5,000 women from industry. We now find ourselves unable to reach the establishment which our Chiefs of Staff laid down as the minimum force required for the defence of the Dominion. There is also the question of production of food and other supplies, both for the United Kingdom and the South Pacific Area. The United States Forces are becoming increasingly dependent upon resources of the Dominion for those essential supplies and services which we must endeavour to provide under the Mutual Aid Agreement. Already, in order to maintain production, it has become necessary to strip the Army of a large number of its personnel and return such men to industry, and we are now forced, in considering the needs of essential industry, and our commitments in respect of the armed forces, to come to the decision to reduce establishment below the level which our military advisers regard as sufficient. I think I should tell you also of the attitude of the New Zealand people, both Maori and European generally, towards the return of the division from overseas. The main body left New Zealand three years ago next January, and the greater proportion of the men now fighting in the Middle East have been absent from New Zealand for well over two years. There is general feeling in the country, partic-

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ularly in view of the extremely heavy casualties which our division has suffered—18,500 so far out of a total of 43,500 sent to the Middle East—that our men have a strong claim to return, and further, that our own tried and well trained troops should be used for the defence of New Zealand in the Pacific Area. And finally I must draw your attention to the effect on New Zealand public opinion of the possible withdrawal of the Ninth Australian Division from the Middle East, concerning which Mr. Curtin has now sent me (corrupt group) [in both British and American files] you will appreciate that it would be absolutely impossible for the New Zealand government to resist the strong feeling to which I have referred should it become known that all three Australian Divisions have returned. I feel bound therefore to place the whole matter fully and frankly before you and to ask that as soon as circumstances permit effect should be given to this request. That there will be difficulties and embarrassments I fully realise, and particulary in regard to shipping, but I hope that it will be possible for some adequate and early provision to be made. The urgent question at the moment is of course the despatch of the reinforcements which we had undertaken to send to the Middle East and for which transport is already bound for New Zealand. It will be necessary therefore to give further consideration to this matter upon receipt of your reply to this telegram. I would like in conclusion to make it plain that it is not our intention to regard the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force as a force to be stationed permanently in New Zealand itself. We are firmly convinced that a long and difficult conflict with the Japanese lies ahead, irrespective of the success of any operations against Italy and Germany and that the United Nations must, at the earliest possible date, make a forward move against Japan. We would wish to participate in any such offensive in the Pacific to the fullest extent of our capacity. Dominion has, I hope, given unmistakeable evidence of its fixed determination to fight this war through to the end, and the losses we have suffered in successive campaigns are proof of the spirit of the New Zealand people and of their willingness to make every sacrifice to this end. I know you will appreciate the reasons which induce me to raise this matter and that you will give to it your full and sympathetic consideration. [MR*]

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As American military planners reluctantly began to accept the idea that a cross-channel invasion was not feasible until the spring of 1944, they naturally began to look to other theaters in which to utilize men and supplies. T h e requirements for T O R C H and operations against the Germans in Tunisia had exceeded original estimates, and the Pacific forces seemed ready for more supplies and troops in order to take the offensive against Japan. Always concerned about the defense of the British Isles and also eager to maintain sufficient reserves for a quick strike in the event of a German collapse, the British continued to support BOLERO—the buildup of forces in England. But in spite of Roosevelt's subsequent assurances, the flow of American troops to Britain slowed dramatically. In the words of the official Army historians, "At the end of February 1943, when its American establishment had dwindled to 104,510 troops, the European Theater of Operations had become a stand­ by theater manned by a skeleton crew" (Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940—1943, p. 487). Churchill expressed in this cable his specific concern that ROUNDUP, the cross-channel invasion in the event of a significant weakening of German resistance, had been abandoned. When Major General Smith returned from North Africa, he assured the Prime Minister that his fears were unfounded. Actually, the debate over strategy was still going on among American military planners and the main issue would not be decided until early 1943, at the Casablanca Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt. In the light of Churchill's later misgivings about the massive cross-channel invasion, there is a good deal of irony in his appeal for a concentration of Anglo-American power against the Germans in western Europe. But at this stage of the war, Churchill feared a shift of American attention, and supplies, to the Pacific theater, and Marshall's arguments for BOLERO suited British purposes. Churchill was also concerned about the Soviet reaction to another cancel­ lation of the second front—hence his reference to the August 1942 talks in Moscow with Stalin and the American representative, Averell Harriman. Sta­ lin had shown considerable anger and disappointment at the failure of the British and Americans to mount SLEDGEHAMMER, a major cross-channel invasion scheduled tentatively for 1942, and Churchill did not want to give him any further reason to suspect Anglo-American motives. Whether or not Churchill had already used Stalin's anger to push Roosevelt into supporting the invasion of North Africa is a matter for speculation. Major General Russell P. Hartle was one of Eisenhower's deputies in Lon­ don.

C-211 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 24, 1942, 1710 Ζ/TOR 3:15 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. 1. We have h a d a letter from General Hartle stating that u n d e r directive from the U n i t e d States War D e p a r t m e n t ("Any construction in excess of

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the requirements for a force of 427,000 must be accomplished entirely by your own labour and with your own materials and that Lend-Lease materials cannot be furnished in these instances"). This has caused us very great concern, not so much from the standpoint of Lend-Lease but on grounds of grand strategy. We have been preparing under BOLERO for 1,100,000 men, and this is the first intimation we have had that this target is to be abandoned. We had no knowledge that you had decided to abandon forever ROUND-UP and all our preparations were proceeding on a broad front under BOLERO. 2. It seems to me that it would be a most grievous decision to abandon ROUND-UP. TORCH is no substitute for ROUND-UP and only engages 13 divisions as against the 48 contemplated for ROUND-UP. All my talks with Stalin in Averell's presence, were on the basis of a postponed ROUNDUP. But never was it suggested that we should attempt no Second Front in Europe in 1943 or even 1944. 3. Surely, Mister President, this matter requires most profound consideration. I was deeply impressed with all General Marshall's arguments that only by ROUND-UP could the main forces be thrown into France and the low countries and only in this area could the main strength of the British Metropolitan and United States overseas Air Forces be brought into action. One of the arguments we used against SLEDGEHAMMER was that it would eat up in 1942 the seed-corn needed for the much larger ROUND-UP in 1943. No doubt we have all been sanguine of our shipping resources, but that is a matter which time can correct. Only by the building up of a ROUND-UP force here as rapidly and regularly as other urgent demands on shipping allow can we have the means of coming to grips with the main strength of the enemy and liberating the European Nations. It may well be that, try as we will, our strength will not reach the necessary levels in 1943. But if so it becomes all the more important to make sure we do not miss 1944. 4. Even in 1943 a chance may come. Should Stalin's offensive reach Rostov on the Don, which is his aim, a first-class disaster may overtake the German Southern Armies. Our Mediterranean Operations following on TORCH may drive Italy out of the war. Widespread demoralization may set in among the Germans, and we must be ready to profit by any opportunity which offers. 5.1 do beg of you, Mister President, to let me know what has happened. At present we are completely puzzled by this information and the manner in which it has reached us. It seems to me absolutely necessary either that General Marshall and Admiral King with Harry should come over here or that I should come with my people to you. [MR*. WSC, IV, 652-53. fi&C]

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Public pressure, distrust of Darlan, and the desire of the American military to avoid political entanglements had caused Roosevelt to suggest the appoint­ ment of two political counselors, one British and one American, in North Africa. Churchill, for the same reasons, agreed. Once again he indicated Britain's wish to avoid anything which smacked of recognition of a Darlan government for France. Roosevelt did not respond to this message and it appears that the War Department convinced the President that nothing should be done to diminish Eisenhower's authority. On December 8 Roosevelt told Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Washington, that any such political representatives should be subordinate to Eisenhower. That suggestion dis­ pleased the British, who wanted to take political affairs out of military hands. (See Woodward, British Foreign Policy, II, 378-79.)

C-212 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 24, 1942, 2120 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. I think that t h e proposal m a d e in the second p a r a g r a p h of your tele­ g r a m n u m b e r 219 of 20 [19] N o v e m b e r is a good one, a n d we shall be glad to a p p o i n t s o m e o n e to act side by side with t h e person you select. T h e functions of o u r two civilians should, I suppose, be defined by us before they go. A m I right in assuming that your proposal is that they should n o t be accredited as representatives to Darlan o r to t h e French Administration, but would act as t h e political agents of their governments on the civilian side in t h e territory, side by side with t h e Allied C o m m a n d e r in Chief, concerting their action with him. [MR*]

This cable crossed one from Roosevelt which explained that the United States did not plan to abandon ROUNDUP, although there would be a delay [R— 222].

C-213 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 25, 1942, 2303 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. My n u m b e r 2 1 1 . I n conference with Major-General Smith, who has j u s t r e t u r n e d from Gibraltar a n d was o u t of England when we received General Hartle's letter, we have learnt that t h e r e is n o change in the

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general plan of BOLERO and ROUNDUP, and that the letter quoted related only to the rate at which accommodation should be provided for the build-up. I am very glad this misunderstanding has been cleared away and that we are as ever in closest agreement. [MR*]

Roosevelt's reply to Churchill's appeal not to cancel ROUNDUP was drafted primarily by Hopkins, although the first paragraph came largely from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the final sentence inserted in Roosevelt's handwriting. Like the Prime Minister, the President seemed reluctant to accept the ramifications of the TORCH operation—its enormous drain on manpower, shipping, and materiel. Moreover, Roosevelt was under heavy pressure to increase support for American forces in the southwestern Pacific in order to secure Guadalcanal and drive the Japanese off New Guinea.

R-222 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 25, 1942, 11:50 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. In reply to your 211. We of course have no intention of abandoning ROUNDUP. No one can possibly know now whether or not we may have the opportunity to strike across the Channel in 1943 and if the opportunity comes we must obviously grasp it. However the determination as to the size of the force which we should have in BOLERO in 1943 is a matter which should require our joint strategic considerations. It is my present thought that we should build up as rapidly as present active operations permit a growing striking force in the U.K. to be used quickly in event of German collapse or a very large force later if Germany remains intact and assumes a defensive position. The conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting last summer in London indicated that the mounting of TORCH necessarily postponed the assembling of the required forces in the United Kingdom. In view of our requirements for the initiation and maintenance of TORCH our studies indicated that we could not send forces and materiel to the United Kingdom at this time in excess of that stated by General Hartle. Until we have provided adequately against the possible reactions from Spanish Morocco, and are clear as to the situation in Tunisia, North Africa must naturally take precedence. We are far more heavily engaged in the Southwest Pacific than I anticipated a few months ago. Nevertheless, we shall continue with BOLERO as rapidly as our shipping and other resources permit. I believe that as soon as we have knocked the Germans

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out of Tunisia, and have secured the danger against any real threat from Spain, that we should proceed with a military strategical conference be­ tween Great Britain, Russia and the United States. I am hoping that our military position in Africa will be such that a conference might be held in a month or six weeks. Our own Combined Chiefs of Staff will, I believe, have a recommendation for us within a few days as to what the next steps should be, but I feel very strongly that we have got to sit down at the table with the Russians. My notion would be a conference in Cairo or Moscow: that each of us would be represented by a small group meeting very secretly: that the conclusions of the conference would of course be approved by the three of us. I would probably send Marshall to head up our group but I presume that all services should be represented. I think it would be wise to keep the numbers down to three from each of us. I have given Oliver [Lyttelton] some private messages [R—222/1] to you which I do not wish to put on the cables and he will be returning I believe next Monday. I hope that all of his problems will have been substantially resolved. Will you let me know as soon as you can what you think of my proposal? [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 48&-90. pWSC, IV, 653, 662. « t f C ]

Although the Prime Minister argued that making agreements with the Soviets required Stalin's presence, since only he could make decisions, Churchill was himself very reluctant to trust any major strategic decisions to his subordi­ nates, particularly the military. Churchill repeatedly tried to arrange a presidential visit to England. When Eleanor Roosevelt visited London in October 1942, she and King George looked at an apartment which could be redesigned for the handicapped President's use. (The plans may be found in the Map Room papers.) But despite Roosevelt's express desire to make the trip, something always inter­ vened. Sometimes his health was the problem, but more often it was concern about raising suspicions among Soviet leaders on the one hand and various political groups in the United States on the other about Anglo-American power politics.

C-214 London Nov. 26, 1942, 1426 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Your 222. Thank you so much about my 211. As I cabled you last night, we are in full agreement.

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I entirely agree in principle that there should be a conference with the Russians, but I doubt very much whether a conference on general war policy, apart from some special point, between officers would be of much value. Certainly if a Russian delegation went to Cairo, which I deem unlikely, they would be so tied up that they would have to refer every point of substance back to Stalin at Moscow. If the conference were held in Moscow there would be less delay, but I trust that before British and United States missions went to Moscow they would have a joint and agreed view, to serve at least as a basis for discussion. I hope also that if General Marshall were sent by you he would not by pass this country. I think I can tell you in advance what the Soviet view will be. They will say to us both "How many German divisions will you be engaging in the summer of 1943? How many have you engaged in 1942?" They will certainly demand a strong second front in 1943 by the heavy invasion of the continent either from the west or from the south, or from both. This sort of argument, of which I had plenty in Moscow, requires to be met either by principals or by Naval and shipping authorities who would certainly have to be present. It would be very difficult to spare all our Chiefs for so long at this time. Stalin talked to me in Moscow in the sense of being willing to come to meet you and me somewhere this winter, and he mentioned Iceland. I pointed out that England was no farther and more convenient. He neither accepted nor rejected the idea. At the same time, apart from the climate, there is a lot to be said for a new triple Atlantic conference in Iceland. Our ships might lie together in Halfjord and we would place a suitable ship at Stalin's disposal wearing the Soviet flag pro tern. He talked with some zest of his desire to fly and of his confidence in the Russian machines. Only at a meeting between principals will real results be achieved. What about proposing it for January? By that time Africa should be cleared and the great battle in south Russia decided. I may add that if ever I can persuade you to come to Iceland I shall never be satisfied unless you look in on this small place before returning. [MR. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 490-91. WSC, IV, 662-63.]

Military strategy and global politics were exhilarating questions, but such mundane issues as merchant-ship production frequently decided broad strategic problems. Roosevelt did not reply to Churchill's letter of October 31 [C—180/1] until Oliver Lyttelton had finished his talks with American supply and production officials. Honestly admitting that he was trying "to have our cake and eat it too," Roosevelt promised Churchill the shipping the Prime Minister had requested. Unfortunately the President failed to pass a copy of this letter on to his military chiefs, and serious difficulties later developed as

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TORCH, the Pacific theater, and German submarines all took their toll of ships. (See Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, pp. 679-86.) In discussing other supply matters, Roosevelt indicated his willingness to give planes to both Russia and England so long as they were used for bombing Germany. This letter was printed as a British War Cabinet paper. (See WP (42) 563, Dec. 6, 1942 (CAB 66) 31; the original is filed in PREM 3/481/5/97.) The printed copy erroneously substitutes "revise" for "review" in the postscript, which Roosevelt added in longhand. He also changed the valediction.

R-222/1, letter Washington [via Oliver Lyttelton] Nov. 30, 1942

My dear Winston: I presume that we shall never satisfy ourselves as to the relative need of merchant ships versus escort vessels. In this case I believe we should try to have our cake and eat it too. At any rate we are moving aggressively here to increase both of these programs and have given them the highest priority for material and machine tools. So far as merchant shipping is concerned, we have, after reexamination of our steel plate problem and other facilities, determined to increase it to 18,800,000 deadweight tons in 1943.1 intend to raise this to 20 million ions if after reexamination by our people it should prove possible. Of one thing I think you can be sure, that we will build in this country a minimum of 18,800,000 tons of merchant shipping of all kinds. Your offices here will keep you informed of the types of ships that are being built and, naturally, I would welcome your judgment in regard to this, because it is very important that we have a proper balance between tankers, cargo vessels and transports. I agree that this is the time for me to reply to you concerning the very urgent requirements of the British shipping program in 1943. I have had the 27 million ton figure of imports to the British Isles examined rather hurriedly here by our own people and they are satisfied that this figure is substantially correct. Our joint war effort requires that this pipe line of material and food to Britain be maintained, that the moving of this tonnage at reasonably even levels is a matter of primary importance. I recognize it as such. I am well aware of the concern with which your government faces the serious net losses in tonnage to your merchant fleet. It is a net loss which persists and I think we must face the fact that it may well continue through all of next year. I, therefore, want to give you the assurance that from

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our expanding fleet you may depend on the tonnage necessary to meet your import program. Accordingly, I am instructing our Shipping Administration to allocate through the machinery of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board enough dry cargo tonnage out of the surplus shipbuilding to meet your imports, the supply and maintenance the war effort of the British Commonwealth, to the extent that they cannot be transported by the fleet under British control. I have been given to understand by our combined shipping people that an average of nearly 300,000 tons each month of carrying capacity will have to be used to supplement the tonnage already engaged on behalf of the British war effort. Because of the commitments already made, the allocation of ships during the next three months must of necessity be less than the average for the whole period. We may hope for a substantial reduction in this if we can make our way through the Mediterranean. Furthermore, I think that you and I should insist that every possible economy is exercised by our shipping and military authorities. You will, I am sure, agree that emergencies may develop which may require me to divert for our own military purposes tonnage which it is now contemplated will be utilized for imports to Great Britain. There will, no doubt, be other cases in which we shall wish jointly to confer relative to vital military uses of merchant tonnage. I want you to know that any important diversions of tonnage will be made only with my personal approval, because I am fully cognizant of the fact that your government may feel that decisions might be made to divert tonnage in contravention of the policy which I am laying down in this letter. The allocation of tonnage month by month must be worked out by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. And hence I confine myself to the above statement of policy, I wish to give you the definite assurance, subject to the qualifications I have indicated, that your requirements will be met. We have increased our escort program recently by 70 for 1943, so that we should turn out 336 escort vessels during the next calendar year. I am asking Admiral King to confer with your representative here and make arrangements about the distribution of these ships. The problem of getting our troops to England is a serious one. I recognize that there must be a minimum joint force there, well equipped and prepared to meet any eventuality. While ROUND-UP seems more and more difficult, I do not think it should be taken off the boards by any means. We never can tell when the opportunity may come for us to strike across the Channel and if that

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opportunity comes we must be ready to take it. Obviously, however, the success of our joint enterprise in North Africa requires us to review the movement of our troops during the next few months. We need to come to an early decision as to what our next steps are going to be and upon that decision must rest our determination of the number of American divisions that should be in England. We have this whole matter very much in mind here and our Chiefs of Staff have it under constant consideration. As you know, we have recently agreed upon a program of 82,000 combat planes. There have been misgivings in some quarters about the size of this program. I have none. We simply must get a complete domination of the air next year, even though other important things give way. One thing is sure, that the aircraft must be brought to bear on the enemy at the earliest possible moment and, if there are competent British and Russian crews to fight these planes and you can get at the enemy quicker and just as effectively as we can, then I have no hesitancy in saying that you and the Russians should have the planes you need. We must give consideration to the shipping difficulties that are met when we send our U.S. air forces great distances. We have heavy commitments in the Southwest Pacific. We are rapidly assuming similar commitments in North Africa, and the bombing of Germany and Italy, whether from England or Russia, must be an unrelenting and constant business. There have been many conferences taking place here between our respective representatives regarding the distribution of aircraft. I am in accord with the agreement that has been reached. Oliver will tell you of this. A detailed memorandum of the agreement will follow in a few days. Oliver has impressed upon me the necessity of making an early decision regarding the distribution of our combined aircraft production. I think the decisions that we have come to regarding aircraft are of the highest importance. I am told that there is a substantial meeting of minds between your representatives and ours relative to the medium tank. I must confess that I think we are both underrating the need for these medium tanks. It is quite possible that the Russians may again press for large increases in medium tanks and I have a feeling that we are cutting our pattern pretty thin. I am asking General Marshall to explore this once more. I should think it would be no great strain on our production to get a few more thousand medium tanks in 1943. I understand that some of your ground force requirements have not yet been discussed with my officers. These are being considered. Every effort will be made to include your essential requirements in our Army Supply Programme and I have asked to have a report of these further discussions submitted to me as early as possible.

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I also recognize that your own production for Navy, Army and Air, a n d for the m i n i m u m needs of the civilian population, requires an assured flow of materials, machine tools, components and complementary items from America. T h e s e supplies, unless unforeseen circumstances intervene, will be maintained. In conclusion, I want you to feel that this letter, together with the agreements that Oliver is taking h o m e with him, gives you the assurances that you need in planning your own production, and that you may regard them as a firm base u p o n which to make the allocations of your remaining reserves of manpower. Very cordially yours, As ever yours, [signed] Franklin D. Roosevelt P.S. I forgot to say: Russia asks 500 transport planes as a prime necessityLet us r e m e m b e r that we ma\ have to review that item. F.D.R. [MR. PREM 3/481/5. pRtfC]

The vehicles required for Operation PLOUGH (a commando raid against various targets in German-occupied Europe using special equipment for traveling on snow) were expected to be ready late in December, General Marshall reported in a memorandum dated November 1. There is no explanation of why Roosevelt did not respond until a month later even though he used General Marshall's proposed draft word for word. Possibly Marshall's memo was misdated.

R-223 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 1, 1942; 00:35 A.M., Dec. 2 From the President to the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. Reference your No. 177 concerning the P L O U G H Project, the vehicle will be p r o d u c e d on schedule and the special service force will have the vehicles for use this winter. Development of improved design now in progress a n d tests will be made this winter for possible production for future use. T h e training of the special g r o u p of U.S. and Canadian soldiers is proceeding vigorously. Roosevelt [MR*]

The Polish Corps was composed of Polish soldiers evacuated from Russia. The British planned to use it in the Middle East.

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C-215 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 2, 1942, 0001 Ζ/TOR 12:00 P.M., Dec. 1 F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. 1. I have h a d a telegram from Mr. Curtin insisting on t h e r e t u r n of the Ninth Australian Division a n d assuming that their e q u i p m e n t will go too. 2. We c a n n o t resist longer the r e t u r n of the personnel, but we o u g h t not to i m p e d e future operations by moving the equipment, which makes a further i n r o a d on shipping a n d is urgently n e e d e d for the Polish Corps. I still h o p e that New Zealand will allow its division to remain. [MR*]

POSTPONING THE SECOND FRONT IN E U R O P E In spite of almost unanimous advice to the contrary from his military experts, Churchill, made even more optimistic by Allied successes in North Africa, continued to grasp at straws, hoping to implement ROUNDUP in 1943. It seems clear, however, that the Prime Minister's concept was not that of Gen­ eral George Marshall and the U.S. Army. ChurchiU wanted a major invasion of France but did not favor the massive, almost total concentration of AngloAmerican forces on a cross-channel attack that the Americans wanted. More­ over, he never lost faith in General Brooke's strategy for a war of attrition. Churchill also worried about Stalin's reaction to any further postponement of the second front, and was thus willing to risk the heavy losses another supply convoy to northern Russia would sustain. T h e " Q P " convoy mentioned by Churchill in his telegram to Stalin was the return of the empty ships which had made u p the P.Q. 18 convoy of September 1942. Churchill was well aware of the difference between the massive Soviet battle and the much smaller, peripheral nibbling being carried out by Anglo-Amer­ ican armies, and he tried to make up in rhetoric what his forces could not do on the field. Bringing "the war home to Mussolini and his Fascist gang with an intensity not yet possible," hardly substituted for an assault against the main enemy—Germany. "Continuous preparations" to "keep the Ger­ mans pinned in the Pas de Calais" and Allied bombers "blasting Germany with ever increasing violence" were a far cry from a confrontation with the enemy's armies. Such measures would "tighten the halter upon the guilty doomed," but the Soviets would continue to suspect that the Anglo-Americans were deliberately delaying the second front. Those suspicions could eventually lead to Soviet-German peace talks, which left Churchill on the horns of a dilemma, a dilemma made worse by the initial Soviet successes at Stalingrad; for if they no longer needed Anglo-American assistance to expell the Germans

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from the Soviet Union, such negotiations would become even more feasible. Stalin, unswayed by the Prime Minister's eloquence, bluntly asked if Churchill was hinting at a change of heart about a 1943 second front. The Prime Minister's fascination with getting Turkey into the war contin­ ued until almost the end. But no matter what aid the Allies promised, the Turks always raised the ante whenever they were asked to join the fight against Germany. Not only had the German and Turkish military had a long, close relationship, but the Turks feared that any alliance with the nations fighting Germany would give the Soviet Union some kind of postwar advantage over Turkey.

C-216 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 2, 1942, 0047 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. 1.1 give below the text of telegrams exchanged between me and Premier Stalin. 2. Please note particularly the last sentence of Para 5 of Stalin's message. The chances of ROUND-UP may be greatly improved by the present battles on the Russian front. 3. It seems to me that the whole question ought to be re-examined in the light of the Russian victories. It would be unwise in my view for us to send separate delegations to Moscow without having decided what we are going to do about ROUND-UP which is almost the sole thing they will want to know. 4. I hope therefore that you will allow General Marshall and Admiral King to come over here, if possible with Harry, at the earliest moment. 5. I still cherish the hope of an Iceland meeting after the ground has been fully explored. 6. Telegram to Premier Stalin dated 24 Nov. 1942 begins: " 1 . It gave me the very greatest pleasure to receive your warm and heartfelt congratulation. I regard our trustful personal relations as most important to the discharge of our duties to the great masses whose lives are at stake. 2. Although the President is unable with great regret to lend me twelve American destroyers for which I asked, I have now succeeded in making arrangements to sail a convoy of over thirty ships from Iceland on December twenty-second. The Admiralty will concert the operation with your officers as before. The Germans have moved the bulk of their aircraft from the north of Norway to the south of Europe as a result of TORCH. On the other hand the German surface forces in Norway are still on guard. The Admiralty are pleased so

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far with the progress of the Q.P. Convoy which has been helped by bad weather and is now under the protection of our cruisers which have been sent out to meet it. 3. I have communicated to President Roosevelt some preliminary ideas about Turkey, and have found that he independently had formed very similar views. It seems to me that we ought all of us to make a new intense effort to have Turkey enter the war on our side in the spring. For this purpose I should like the United States to join in an Anglo-Soviet guarantee of the territorial integrity and status of Turkey. This would bring our three countries all into line, and the Americans count for a lot with the Turks. Secondly, we are already sending Turkey a considerable consignment of munitions including two hundred tanks from the Middle East. During the winter by land route, or coasting up the Levant, I shall keep on sending supplies of munitions to Turkey together if permitted with experts in plain clothes for training and maintenance purposes. Thirdly, I hope by the early spring to assemble a considerable army in Syria drawn from our Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Armies, so as to go to the help of Turkey if either she were threatened or were willing to join us. It is evident that your operations in the Caucasus or north of it may also exercise a great influence. If we could get Turkey into the war we could not only proceed with operations to open the shipping route to your left flank on the Black Sea but we could also bomb heavily from Turkish Bases the Roumanian oilfields which are of such vital importance to the Axis in view of your successful defence of the main oil supplies of the Caucasus. The advantage of a move into Turkey is that it proceeds mainly by land and can be additional to offensive action in the Central Mediterranean which will absorb our sea power and much of our air power. 4. I have agreed to President Roosevelt's suggestion that we each send in the near future, if agreeable to you, two high British officers and two Americans to Moscow to plan this part of the war in 1943. Pray let me know if you agree. 5. I hope you realize, Premier Stalin, that shipping is our limiting factor. In order to do TORCH we have had to cut our Trans-Atlantic escorts so fine that the first half of November has been our worst month so far. We and the Americans have budgeted to lose at the rate of 700,000 tons a month and still improve our margin. Over the year the average loss has not been quite so bad as that, but this first fortnight in November is worse. You who have so much land may find it hard to realize that we can only live and fight in proportion to our sea communications. 6. Do not be disturbed about the rogue Darlan. We have thrown a large Anglo-American Army into French North Africa and are

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getting a very firm grip. Owing to the non-resistance of the French Army and now to its increasing support, we are perhaps fifteen days ahead of schedule. It is of the utmost consequence to get the Tunisian tip and the Naval Base of Bizerta at the earliest moment. The leading elements of our First Army will probably begin their attack immediately. Once established there with overpowering air, we can bring the war home to Mussolini and Fascist gang with an intensity not yet possible. 7. At the same time, by building up a strong Anglo-American Army and Air Force in Great Britain and making continuous preparations along our southeastern and southern coasts, we keep the Germans pinned in the Pas de Calais, etc., and are ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity. And all the time our bombers will be blasting Germany with ever increasing violence. Thus the halter will tighten upon the guilty doomed. 8. The glorious news of your offensive is streaming in. We are watching it with breathless attention. Every good wish." Ends. Telegram from Premier Stalin dated 28 Nov. 1942. Begins: "1. Many thanks for your message which I received on the 25 November. I fully share your view on the importance of developing our personal relations. 2. I am grateful to you for the measures you are taking to send a new big convoy to Archangel. I realise that in view of the considerable Naval Operations in the Mediterranean Sea this constitutes great difficulty for you. 3. I am in full agreement with you and President Roosevelt on the question of Turkey. It would be desirable to do everything possible to have Turkey enter the war on our side in the spring. This would be of great importance in order to accelerate the defeat of Hitler and his accomplices. 4. It seems to me that the Americans used Darlan not badly in order to facilitate the occupation of the Northern and Western Africa. The military diplomacy must be able to use for military purposes not only Darlan but 'Even the Devil himself and his grandma'. [Ambassador] Maisky's footnote: This is a strong Russian proverb. 5.1 paid close attention to your communication that you and Americans do not relax preparation along your south-eastern and southern coasts in order to keep the Germans pinned in the Pas de Calais etc. and that you are ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity. I hope this does not mean that you changed your mind with regard to your promise given in Moscow to establish a second front in Western Europe in the spring of 1943.

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6. I am in full agreement with President Roosevelt's suggestion and your wish to arrange in Moscow conversations of the repre­ sentatives of the three general staffs to prepare the respective military plans for 1943. We are ready to meet the British and American representatives whenever you wish. 7. In the Stalingrad operations we were so far successful partly because of snowfall and fog which hinder the activities of the German aviation. 8. We have intention to start in the next few days active operations on the central front in order to pin here the enemy forces and to prevent the transfer of any portion of them to the south." [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 491-94. pStahn/WSC, docs. 88, 89.]

The original American request for British naval assistance in the Pacific had gone through naval channels in late October after the Battle of Santa Cruz left the United States with only one carrier in the South Pacific, and that one, the Enterprise, badly damaged. Because British naval authorities had not re­ ceived adequate information concerning American losses and fleet disposi­ tions, an unpleasant misunderstanding arose. The Americans, particularly Admiral King, interpreted British questions as indicating reluctance to pro­ vide assistance, whereas the British felt the Americans were insensitive to their problems in the Indian Ocean (the Eastern Fleet of Admiral Somerville) and in supporting TORCH. Churchill's proposal to send two carriers under the command of Rear Admiral A.L. St. G. Lyster met with King's opposition since he did not want any separate British commands operating in the Pacific. The Graf Zeppelin, a German aircraft carrier under construction, was never completed. (See below R-226, C-221.)

C-217 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 2, 1942, 0113 Ζ/TOR 12:00 P.M., Dec. 1 Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. 1. Ever since we received a request for carrier reinforcement for your Pacific fleet we have been earnestly seeking to meet your wishes. We did not feel able to come to a decision about these very few vital units until we knew how our carriers had fared in the restricted and dangerous waters in which they had to operate for TORCH. 2. The hazards of TORCH are not yet ended, as our build-up of shorebased aircraft will not enable the withdrawal for some time of the two carriers now employed on TORCH. Knowing however, how urgently you require a reinforcement of carriers in the Pacific we are prepared to take

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a risk now and come to a decision as to what assistance we can give you. 3. As you are aware, our carrier strength consists of the following:— (A) four long endurance armoured fleet carriers:— Victorious—efficient and just withdrawn from TORCH. Illustrious—efficient and the only carrier now with the Eastern Fleet. Indomitable—undergoing after action repairs, and will not be worked up before February. Formidable—now employed on TORCH but has turbine trouble and must go into dockyard hands for six or seven weeks as soon as possible (B) one short endurance fleet carrier, Furious, which is now employed in TORCH (C) an aircraft repair ship, Unicorn, which can operate about twenty-five aircraft but will not be ready for service until early February. 4. In the hope that your operations in the South Pacific will prevent the Japanese from making serious raids into the Indian Ocean we are prepared to take the serious risk of withdrawing Illustrious from the Eastern fleet, and given Admiral Somerville the Unicorn and an auxiliary carrier. We are also prepared to withdraw Victorious from the Home Fleet, and to send you both Victorious and Illustrious if you can allow Ranger to join the Home Fleet. 5. In view of the vital importance of the Atlantic communication, the necessity of supporting the North Russian convoys, the possible appearance of Graf Zeppelin at the end of the year, and the present condition of Indomitable and Formidable, we could not release both Victorious and Illustrious without the addition of Ranger to the Home Fleet. 6. I am much in favour of sending you two carriers rather than one if this can be managed, as this will not only give you increased strength but would allow the two ships to work as a tactical unit, which would appear to be necessary as neither ship carries sufficient aircraft to operate singly. I would propose to send Admiral Lyster, who is known to a good many of your officers, in command. 7. It is considered necessary for both ships to proceed to Pearl Harbour, where they should arrive about the end of December to adjust their complement of aircraft. 8. If you are in favour of this exchange Pound will settle details with King. [MR*]

A firm believer in personal diplomacy, Roosevelt agreed that a Big Three conference made sense. However, the changes he made to a draft apparently written by Harry Hopkins indicate that the President wanted to avoid preliminary discussions with the British not only for fear of raising Stalin's suspicions but also to avoid being pressured by Churchill. Although Roosevelt's decision to exclude State Department representatives has frequently been

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explained as a means of excluding Cordell Hull from the conference (Hull and his supporters read it that way), it may also have resulted from the President's desire to avoid getting into discussions of postwar political plans, something Eden and the Foreign Office continually tried to bring up. "The raft at Tilsit" refers to the meeting between Alexander I of Russia and Napoleon I of France held on a raft in the Neman River near Tilsit, East Prussia. The resulting Treaty of Tilsit was aimed primarily against the Prussians, which made a fitting analogy since Roosevelt believed that Germany had been "Prussianized" (militarized). The idea was probably suggested when the President compared the discomfort of a conference in Alaska or Iceland to what Harriman termed "the most practical oasis"—Khartoum (R&H, p. 662).

R-224 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 2, 1942, 5:40 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. I have been giving a good deal of thought to our proposed joint conference with the Russians and I agree with you that the only satisfactory way of coming to the vital strategic conclusions the military situation requires, is for you and me to meet personally with Stalin. My thought would be that each of us would be accompanied by a very small staff made up of our top Army, Air and Naval Chiefs of Staff. I should bring Harry and Averell but no State Department representative although I believe we should arrive at tentative procedures to be adopted in event of a German collapse. I should like to see the conference held about January fifteenth or soon thereafter. Tunis and Bizerte should have been cleared up and Rommel's army liquidated before the conference. As to the place. Iceland and Alaska are impossible for me at this time of year and I believe equally so for Stalin. I should prefer a secure place south of Algiers or in or near Khartoum. I don't like mosquitoes. I think the conference should be very secret and that the press should be excluded. It is essential that you and I have a thorough understanding before the conference takes place. I would question the advisability of Marshall and the others going to England prior to the conference because I do not want to give Stalin the impression that we are settling everything between ourselves before we meet him. On the other hand I realize the importance of you and us going into that conference only after the fullest exchange of views and a complete understanding. I will try to suggest a method in the next few days and would welcome any other suggestions from you. I think that you and I understand each other so well that prior conferences between us are unnecessary and when the time comes we can work things out from day to day. Our military people will also be in close cooperation at all times from now on.

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I think that this conference may well result in knocking o u t G e r m a n y sooner t h a n we anticipated. As you know Stalin has already agreed to a purely military conference to be held in Moscow a n d I have today sent him a message u r g i n g him to meet you and me. I believe h e will accept. I prefer a comfortable oasis to t h e raft at Tilsit. Roosevelt [MR. FRUS, CasabUnca, pp. 494-95. WSC, IV, 662-63. «fc?C]

C-218 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 2, 1942, 1137 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. Your 223. T h a n k you very m u c h . [MR*]

Churchill continued to express reluctance for Anglo-American representa­ tives to hold discussions in Moscow with their counterparts, and he was equally adamant about having Anglo-American talks before meeting with Stalin. Khartoum is located in the Sudan, at the junction of the White and Blue Nile. Marrakesh lies about 100 miles south of Casablanca, at the foot of the Atlas Mountains. Churchill's prediction about the expulsion of the Axis from Tu­ nisia and Libya was far too optimistic. Not until May 1943 did the last of the German-Italian forces surrender in Tunisia. "Barkis is willin" was the message Barkis gave David Copperfield for Peggotty, indicating that Barkis was willing to marry her. In this case, Stalin was the uncertain bridegroom.

C-219 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 3, 1942, 1857 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. 1. Your 224. I a m delighted at your proposal which is the only way of making a good plan for 1943. At present we have n o plan for 1943 which is on the scale or u p to the level of events. It is g r a n d of you to come a n d I will m e e t you anywhere. I a m telegraphing Stalin to reinforce your invitation. 2. Meanwhile I d e p r e c a t e sending o u r military representative to Mos­ cow. It will only lead to a deadlock and q u e e r the pitch. We still think that Marshall, King a n d Arnold should come h e r e in advance, so that at least we have some definite plans as a basis for discussion when we all meet in J a n u a r y "Somewhere in Africa." Otherwise Stalin will greet us

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with the question "Have you then no plan for the second front in Europe you promised me for 1943?" 3. Khartoum is at your disposal and would be most satisfactory as regards weather, security and communications. I will report on accommodation tomorrow. We should be honoured to be the hosts. I am not informed, though quite ready to learn, about the Oases south of Algiers. Marrakesh I can personally vouch for as regards accommodation, climate and, barring any extraordinary lapse, weather. 4. A supreme war conference, as this would be, ought to have the necessary staffs. For ourselves I should like to bring Eden from the War Cabinet with me and three Chiefs or Vice-Chiefs of the Staff, supported by a powerful secretariat, cypher staff, map room, etc., say about twentyfive. 5. As to timing, the sooner the better. Every day counts. We may reasonably expect that Tunis will be settled by the end of December and Tripolitania by the end of January. We ought not to be dependent on the actual working out of these operations. All prospect of attack in Europe in 1943 depends on early decision. 6. However everything hangs on whether "Barkis is willin". [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 495-96. WSC, IV, 664-65.]

On November 23, the Governor General of French West Africa, Pierre Boisson, indicated his willingness to accept the authority of Admiral Darlan. Roosevelt and Churchill had long been concerned about who controlled the port of Dakar in French West Africa, since it could have provided a jumping-off point for air attacks on the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, the French battleship Richelieu lay in the harbor. Boisson had finally agreed to support Darlan when Eisenhower gave his personal word that all arrangements would be fairly carried out—particularly those establishing the relationship between the Governor General and the forces of Charles de Gaulle. Boisson, who held both British and Free French prisoners, was reluctant to release them until de Gaulle's supporters released their Vichy French internees in French Equatorial Africa. Churchill did not respond directly to Roosevelt, but British officials informed the Americans that the British prisoners had to be released without any bargaining or further delay.

R-225 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 3, 1942, 12:50 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. I am informed today that the Dakar negotiations are impeded by a question of the release of French prisoners held by De Gaullists in Equa-

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torial Africa in exchange for release of Allied nationals held in French West Africa. It seems to me that it should be made clear to Boisson that if he releases all De Gaulle sympathizers in Dakar, De Gaulle will also release all Vichy or Darlan sympathizers in French Equatorial Africa. The use by us of Dakar is as you know very important and Eisenhower is waiting for a quick decision. [MR*]

Anglo-American authorities regarded Stalin's request for planes instead of a joint Anglo-American air force in the Caucasus (VELVET) as a barely dis­ guised attempt to increase the number of aircraft allotted to the Soviet Union, and Soviet alternatives to VELVET amounted to an increase in their allotment of new aircraft. The purpose of the operation had primarily been to shore up Soviet morale and demonstrate Allied support following the delay in a European second front, but with the Russian victories in the Caucasus the project became less important and Stalin changed his mind. Throughout the war Stalin was reluctant to permit British or American units to operate behind Russian lines.

C-220 London [via U.S. Embassy] Dec. 3, 1942; 4:24 A.M., Dec. 4 / TOR 5:10 A.M. Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. We have had the following exchange of telegrams with Air Marshal Drummond in Moscow. Extract from 0 Ζ 2077 of first December to Drummond. 1. The operational and administrative advantages to the RAF in the Middle East of Russian alternative proposal of number of aircraft equivalent to VELVET force and your suggested compromise are fully realized, but these alternatives would not achieve the overriding political benefits which were the object of the original plan. It was hoped that by sending VELVET force to Caucasus an example would be given of Allied forces working hand in hand with the Russians for the same military objectives and under unity of strategic control on a bigger scale than anything yet attempted. Not only would there have been practical cooperation on a considerable scale but there might also have developed a genuine spirit of comradeship in arms which would have opened up considerable possibilities in the political and military fields. This spirit was very evident in the Russian Navy as a result of our small fighter force going to North Russia in 1941.

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2. The replacement of the whole or the greater part of VELVET force by the equivalent in aircraft would not have this effect and would destroy the whole Raison D'Etre of the plan. There would be the further risk that if we only have aircraft on this occasion we might let ourselves in for sending VELVET force as well at a later stage in the war if the situation in Caucasus should deteriorate. Provision of aircraft is also bound to leave Middle East short at least in certain types and so cause the dismounting of squadrons. Following is Drummond's reply dated second December. 1. Your 0 Ζ 2077 first December gives me political background which I needed. It is already clear beyond question that the Russians will not resume discussions and will [not?] allow us to proceed to the Caucasus to arrange any further details for the establishment and operation of the force until they are convinced that we shall not agree to their alternative proposal of providing aircraft in lieu of the force. I must, therefore, preface my renewed approach with a reasoned refusal to entertain their alternative proposal. Even so I do not think they will accept this unless I can assure them that it is the agreed decision of the joint British and American Governments. I, therefore, suggest that I be authorized to convey to the Russians as from the Anglo/American Governments a reply in the sense of, paragraphs two, three, four and five following. 2. The British and American Governments cannot agree to disarm 22 fully operational squadrons in order to provide aircraft for the Red Air Force additional to those already promised and being sup­ plied. 3. At the present date, the military situation in the Caucasus ap­ pears to be not unfavourable and there is, therefore, less urgent need for the Anglo-American Force to be provided. These units would however, prove a most valuable asset in any offensive operations which the Russian High Command may undertake on the Caucasus front in the spring of 1943. In the meanwhile these squadrons can be usefully employed in the operations now proceeding in North Africa. 4. The Anglo American proposal, therefore, is that the complete Anglo-American Force as originally accepted by Premier Stalin should be dispatched to the Russian Southern Front at a time which will permit it to be fully operational by early 1943. For this purpose detailed arrangements for the reception of the force must now be undertaken by the Allied Staffs and all administrative arrangements including predumping must proceed in the Caucasus and in North

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Persia. The basis of these arrangements had already been most am­ icably agreed between representatives of the Red Army Air Force and my mission. The principles agreed to in Moscow should now be applied in the Caucasus and a nucleus Anglo-American headquarters should be set up at Caucasus G Η Q forthwith. It is desired to perfect these administrative preparations now so that the force can move in at short notice. 5. If this later date for the arrival of the force in the Caucasus is agreed a longer period is available for assembling supplies for it. In consequence the proportional interruption of this flow of aid over the Trans-Persian Railway to Russia will be smaller. We compute that there would be a twelve percent interruption in January, a ten percent interruption in February, a nine percent interruption in March and thereafter less than eight percent monthly. Moreover, if in the mean­ while the Russians will develop or allow us to develop the road Rowandaz-Lake Urmia we may be able to maintain the force without any interference with the flow of Russian aid. 6.1 would re-emphasize that General Falalaev has clearly indicated that the Russian High Command will not engage in further discussion of the original project unless and until a firm Anglo American Gov­ ernment refusal to consider the Russian alternative proposal is re­ ceived. It seems to me that the situation is changing so rapidly that we should do well to let a week or so pass before ourselves taking steps to break the deadlock. We have made an offer which could only be fulfilled by heavy sacrifices on our part. We made that offer largely to take the edge off various Russian disappointments about the Second Front in 1942, about the Ρ Q convoys, etc, and to show that we really wished to help. The offer stands. Since it was made immense improvements have occurred in the Russian position which have already altered and made completely changed the strategic situation on the Russian Southern Front. At the same time by the Anglo American successes along the whole North African Front we have shown the Russians that we are active comrades in the war and they are impressed by this. I do not wish to force upon them what it costs us so much to give. I consider therefore that Air Marshal Drummond and your representative, General Adler, might mark time a little on the ground defined in Air Marshal Drummond's telegram without bringing matters to a sharp point. Meanwhile the strategic situation will be clari­ fying itself and we can make the arrangements for the conference pro­ posed in your number 224 about which I am sending you a separate telegram. It seems to me that VELVET might well be brought into the general scheme and should be decided at this conference. In the mean-

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while all preparations for V E L V E T should go forward so far as they rest with Britain a n d the United States. [MR*]

Although Admiral King, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. fleet, used diplomatic language in writing the draft of this message, an accompanying memo indicated his staunch opposition to any sort of joint naval units. Moreover, the Admiral wanted to retain control of the USS Ranger so it could be used in the Atlantic or Pacific as necessary. Roosevelt sent the draft as submitted to him.

R-226 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 5, 1942, 12:05 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal a n d Most Secret. Your despatch n u m b e r 217 of December 2, 1942, has received serious consideration. Your offers of cooperation are deeply appreciated. In spite of the advantages which would result from the employment of both Victorious a n d Illustrious as a tactical unit in the Pacific, other considerations make it necessary to forego the services of Victorious there. If it becomes necessary to send yet another carrier to the Pacific in the near future, Ranger would be chosen because she does not require special preparation for operations with other American forces. T h e early arrival of Illustrious in Pearl H a r b o r is looked forward to with anticipation. Roosevelt [MR*]

T h e Victorious arrived at Pearl Harbor on March 4, 1943. Not until May 8 was she ready to participate actively in the Pacific operations, since training and technical refitting proved complicated. Churchill was disappointed that the joint naval force did not materialize, for he had hoped to increase Britain's role and influence in the Pacific without hurting the war effort against Germany.

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C-221 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 6, 1942, 1420 Ζ/TOR 11:50 A.M. Personal a n d Secret F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Reference your n u m b e r 226. I bow to your wishes, t h o u g h I should have p r e f e r r e d o n general g r o u n d s the a r r a n g e m e n t we proposed. Not only on account of h e r earlier arrival at Pearl H a r b o u r b u t also for various reasons connected with e q u i p m e n t of aircraft a n d better fighter direc­ tions, it is p r e f e r r e d to send Victorious. P o u n d will communicate with King r e g a r d i n g the transfer. [MR*]

Much to Churchill's satisfaction, New Zealand decided to leave its army di­ vision with the British forces in the Middle East.

C-222 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 6, 1942, 1432 Ζ /TOR 11:50 A.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. I have received a very h a n d s o m e telegram from Fraser stating that his g o v e r n m e n t a n d house of representatives have unanimously decided that the New Zealand division shall stay in the Middle East. I a m sure they would appreciate a complimentary message from you. [MR]

Roosevelt agreed with Churchill about stalling Operation VELVET, but still held out hopes that it would materialize, primarily because of the political benefits.

R-227 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 6, 1942, 2:45 P.M. F r o m the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. Replying to your 220, I agree with you that o u r two representatives in Moscow m a r k time in relation to VELVET. O n the o t h e r h a n d , I would

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not wish to give t h e m any authority to call that enterprise off because it seems to m e to have great political a n d possibly military advantages. Roosevelt [MR*]

Roosevelt quickly followed Churchill's suggestion (C-222) with a message to New Zealand's Prime Minister Fraser.

R-228 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 6, 1942, 3:45 P.M. F r o m the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Most Secret. This message sent to Fraser. " I have b e e n delighted to learn that you are leaving the New Zea­ land Division in the Middle East for the present. This action on the part of your g o v e r n m e n t is a renewed evidence of o u r mutual military interests. I believe you have d o n e the right thing. It is altogether generous." Roosevelt [MR*]

T h e Prime Minister agreed that Operation VELVET should not yet be per­ manently shelved.

C-223 London Dec. 6, 1942, 2255 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Your N o . 227. I entirely agree. [MR*]

Stalin felt unable or unwilling to attend any Big Three conference, and he so informed the Allied leaders. T h e fighting in the Soviet Union had increased in intensity as Russian troops continued to press the encircled German Sixth

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Army at Stalingrad and prepared to attack German forces in the Caucasus (see map, p. 16). T h e increased activity in January which Stalin predicted may have been a reference to the attempt to relieve the siege of Leningrad. Churchill's main concern, of course, was Stalin's continued requests for information about the planned second front in Europe.

C-224 London Dec. 7, 1942 / TOR 1:45

P.M.

F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Following just received from M. Stalin. Begins. Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill Personal and Secret your message of the fourth December received. I welcome the idea of a meeting between the heads of the Gove r n m e n t s of the three countries being arranged in o r d e r to fix a c o m m o n line of military strategy. T o my great regret however I will not be in a position to leave the Soviet Union. T i m e presses us and it would be impossible for me to be absent even for a day as it is just now that important military operations of o u r winter campaign are developing. These operations will not be relaxed in J a n u a r y , probably to the contrary. I am waiting your reply to the p a r a g r a p h of my preceding letter dealing with the establishment of the second front in Western E u r o p e in the Spring of 1943. T h e operations in the Stalingrad area as well as on the central front are developing. In the Stalingrad area we are keeping a large g r o u p of the G e r m a n troops s u r r o u n d e d and we h o p e to annihilate them completely. Pray look especially at sentence beginning "I am waiting". [MR. pWSC, IV, 665-66. pStalm/WSC, doc. 9 3 ]

Churchill planned to release to the public his message on the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. The State, War, and Navy Departments advised Roosevelt against that in order to avoid placing undue emphasis on the defeat, but the two messages were printed on December 9 in the London Times.

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C-224/1 London [via British Embassy] Dec. 7, 1942 [Churchill to Roosevelt] I feel it is right that I should address you, Mr. President, on this day since our country no less than the United States was the object of the infamous outrage of a year ago. The injuries that we have all suffered at the hands of Japan during the past year are grievous indeed. The peoples of the British Commonwealth of Nations are deeply conscious of their duty. We look forward one and all to the day when our full strength can be joined to that of our United States, Dutch and Chinese allies for the utter and final destruction of Japan's aggressive power. [PSF:GB:WSC*]

R-228/1 Washington [via British Embassy] Dec. 7, 1942 [Roosevelt to Churchill] I deeply appreciate your message. Much has happened since the treacherous attack in the Pacific one year ago today. For months, most of the news was bad despite heroic resistance of the Chinese, Dutch, British Commonwealth and American forces. The injuries that all of us have suffered at the hands of Japan are indeed grievous. A partial retribution in kind has been meted out to the Japanese forces during the last seven months. This is only the beginning. We will continue to strike them, with ever increasing force. I welcome your statement and join with you in the resolution that Japan's aggressive power must be utterly destroyed. In no other way can we be certain that their infamous aggression will not be repeated. [CH] [PSF:GB:WSC. R&C]

As the military need for Anglo-American assistance in the Caucasus diminished, the political aspects of Operation VELVET became more important— to both the Soviets and their Allies. What had been designed to help the Russians stabilize the front in the Caucasus had quickly developed into a gesture of good faith by the English and Americans, when they postponed any invasion of Europe into 1943 at the earliest. Then, as the Russians took the offensive, VELVET seemed to become a vague sort of test for Allied-

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Soviet cooperation, at least in the minds of Churchill and Roosevelt. Stalin apparently viewed it from either a strictly military standpoint or suspiciously, as an attempt to introduce Allied forces into the Soviet Union.

C-225 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 8, 1942, 1229 Ζ / TOR 9:40 A.M. From F o r m e r Naval Person to President Most Secret a n d Personal. Your N o . 227 o n t h e subject of VELVET. I suggest that we should now send to o u r two representatives in Moscow t h e instructions p r o p o s e d by t h e Combined Chiefs of Staff, namely: (a) Alternative proposals of Soviet officials that either the equivalent n u m b e r of aircraft o r of aircraft with US or British air crews be sent to South Caucasia in place of Anglo-US air units are not acceptable to Com­ bined Chiefs of Staff. (b) Proposal to send only aircraft or aircraft a n d crews which can only be found by disarming existing formations is b o u n d to lead to a loss of effective air strength a n d serious complications in matters of maintenance, a n d is therefore most undesirable in Russian as well as in Anglo-American interests. Many practical difficulties would arise from the proposal to mix air crews. (c) C o m b i n e d Chiefs of Staff are convinced that experience will show that t h e most effective force will be b r o u g h t to bear against G e r m a n y by establishing in t h e Caucasus the combined British-American air force to be employed u n d e r strategic direction of Russian High C o m m a n d . U p o n approval of t h e original proposal by t h e Russian Government, every effort will be m a d e to expedite operations of the combined force a n d to meet the logistical problems involved without interference with flow of allied supplies obviously committed to Russia. [MR*]

R-229 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 8, 1942, 4:20 P.M. For t h e Prime Minister from t h e President Personal a n d Secret. I a m in full a g r e e m e n t with your n u m b e r 225 on t h e subject of V E L V E T a n d instructions will be issued to American representatives in Moscow to be guided by instructions contained in sub p a r a g r a p h s a, b, a n d c of your n u m b e r 225. Roosevelt [MR*]

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Given Stalin's firm rejection of a tripartite meeting, either the historical record or one-upmanship seems to have been Roosevelt's real motive in sending a second invitation to meet in Africa. T h e changes in the draft were apparently made by Admiral Leahy, probably at the President's direction. As Chief of Staff to the President, the post Leahy held since returning from Vichy, the Admiral drafted or commented on almost all Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges.

R-230 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 8, 1942, 4:35 P.M. From the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal and Secret. Your No. 224: T h e telegram you received from Moscow is essentially identical with the one sent to m e [Stalin/FDR, doc. 56]. For the sake of the record, I am sending another telegram which follows in my next n u m b e r , as I think we should continue to make every effort for the African meeting and put the responsibility for declining u p to o u r friend. In the meantime, I am inclined to think we should send o u r Staff people to Moscow if they arc only to take u p the Caucasus air matter or similar relatively small operational moves. O n the other hand, I think it would be a mistake for o u r Staff people to discuss in Moscow any major moves planned for this coming summer. From the practical point of view they could not bind your Government or mine, n o r could final plans be approved by you or me without careful study with o u r Staffs at home. What would you think, therefore, of suggesting that Staff conversations between military officials from U.K., Russia, and America take place in Africa, either in Algiers, Khartoum, or some other suitable place. T h e results a n d recommendations of such a meeting would, of course, have to be taken u p in all three Capitals before final approval. [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 497-98. pWSC, IV, 666.]

R-231 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 8, 1942, 5:20 P.M. From the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. T h e following is a close paraphrase of the message I sent to Stalin today.

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It was with d e e p disappointment that I learned that you felt that you could not get away for a meeting with me in J a n u a r y . Many matters of great i m p o r t should be discussed between us. T h e y appertain not only to vital strategic decisions, but likewise to matters we should discuss in a tentative way respecting emergency policies which we should be p r e p a r e d with, if and when conditions in Germany permit. Included also would be other matters relating to future policies in N o r t h Africa a n d the Far East, which matters cannot be discussed by o u r military people alone. T h e necessity for your presence near the fighting front, a n d your strenuous situation which exists now a n d in the immediate future, is fully realized by me. T h e r e f o r e I wish to offer a suggestion that a tentative date be set for a meeting in N o r t h Africa about the first of March. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, 1942, III, 675. StahnlFDR, doc. 57. RVC]

Churchill had apparently not read message R-213, which indicated that R— 214 had been given out at one of Roosevelt's press conferences. Moreover, it had been sent to London as a plain-language (not coded) dispatch. Possibly for that reason Roosevelt, in a message drafted in his handwriting, added a little information which increased the distance between Darlan and the Allies.

C-226 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 9, 1942, 2:40 A.M. /TOR 11:00

P.M.,

Dec. 8

Personal a n d Secret F o r m e r Naval Person to President. I should like to read your No. 214 to the House in Secret Session on T h u r s d a y [Dec. 10] as there is a good deal of uneasiness about Darlan which the reading of the above message would clear away. T h e r e is nothing in it which could be harmful if published but you may be sure Parliament will observe the strictest secrecy. [MR*]

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R-232 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 9, 1942, 1 1 : 5 0 A.M. F r o m t h e President for t h e F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. Very glad to have you r e a d my N o . 214 in Secret Session T h u r s d a y . You might a d d from m e if you wish that General Eisenhower has definite instructions from m e to e n t e r into n o a g r e e m e n t o r bilateral contract with Admiral Darlan, but that all decisions by Eisenhower shall be unilateral on o u r part, a n d shall take t h e form of a n n o u n c e m e n t s from the military Commander-in-Chief of o u r a r m e d forces. F u r t h e r m o r e I h o p e you will call attention to t h e fact that D a k a r instead of being a menace is today o p e n to use by British a n d American ships a n d planes in t h e prosecution of t h e war. Roosevelt [MR*]

T h e inability of French General Henri Giraud to gain any following in North Africa forced Eisenhower to rely almost totally upon Admiral Darlan and the bureaucratic structure which had previously functioned under the Vichy gov­ ernment. As a result, organizations like the Service d'Ordre Legionnaire (SOL), which had systematically betrayed and persecuted supposed opponents of the Vichy regime, always paying special attention to Jews, continued to function. Churchill's sources were apparently largely Gaullist, but even taking into account the probable exaggeration of such informants, serious political problems did exist in French North Africa. Generals Charles Mast and Emile Bethouart, who had been instrumental in organizing the pro-Giraud Un­ derground in North Africa, were viewed by their fellow officers as betrayers of their oaths and could not be used effectively by Eisenhower. Mast eventually became Governor General of Tunisia in 1943, but Bethouart had to accept a meaningless liaison post in the United States. T h e Franco-Spanish border to which Churchill referred was the one between French and Spanish Mo­ rocco. (On December 15, this message was sent to General Marshall's office for preparation of a reply.)

C-227 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 9, 1942, 1910 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. I have been disturbed by r e p o r t s received d u r i n g t h e last few days from N o r t h Africa about conditions in French Morocco a n d Algeria. T h e s e reports, which come from i n d e p e n d e n t a n d reliable sources, all paint t h e

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same picture of the results which follow from our inability in existing circumstances to exercise a proper control over the local French authorities in internal administrative matters. You are, I am sure, fully aware of this state of affairs, but I think it my duty to let you know the position as it appears in the light of our own reports. These reports show that the S.O.L. and kindred Fascist organization continue their activities and victimize our former French sympathisers some of whom have not yet been released from prison. The first reaction of these organizations to the allied landing was rightly one of fear but it seems that they have now taken courage to regroup themselves and continue their activities. Well-known German sympathisers who had been ousted have been reinstated. Not only have our enemies been thus encouraged but our friends have been correspondingly confused and cast down. There have been cases of French soldiers being punished for desertion because they tried to support the allied forces during the landing. There is an almost complete absence of control on the Franco-Spanish Frontier. The result of this is that undesirables of all sorts, including Axis agents, cross the frontier in both directions, carrying information to the enemy and preparing trouble for us throughout North Africa. Unless proper control is instituted soon our military operations may be endangered and we may witness sabotage in North Africa on a large scale and other incidents of a serious nature which may culminate in risings in various part of North Africa. There is no allied control of postal and telegraph censorship and therefore nothing to stop enemy agents from writing and telegraphing information to Europe. One informant for example states that certain Germanophile Spanish Consuls in the French Zone send full reports about the military situation by telephone and telegraph to the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan. Veiled anti-allied propaganda continues in the press and on the radio and positive enemy propaganda increases daily. In short elements hostile to the United Nations are being consolidated within the administration and conditions are being created which will make North Africa a favourable resort for Axis troublemakers. If we were to suffer serious setbacks in Tunisia the Axis may be relied upon to exploit the situation to the full and there is no knowing what difficulties we may then encounter even at the hand of those Frenchmen who now appear to be cooperating with us. It occurs to me that there is one step which we might usefully take and that is to see that such good friends of ours as Generals Bethouard and Mast are appointed to high military commands in Morocco. Mast is at present serving as Giraud's Liaison Officer at Allied Headquarters while Bethouard has been sent to Gibraltar to perform non-existent liaison duties. It is a pity that men like these, who took such grave risks on our

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behalf, should not be in active employment. Bethouard, who c o m m a n d e d a division at Casablanca, would be particularly useful in Morocco where a m a n of his s t a m p seems to be badly n e e d e d . All of this reinforces t h e n e e d for immediate political a n d administrative help for Eisenhower. As you know we a r e very ready to give any assistance in o u r power. [MR*. pWSC, IV, 638. RUC]

T h e uproar in Parliament over the Darlan deal was at least temporarily qui­ eted. Believing that Stalin cared only about getting a date for the opening of a second front in Europe, Churchill surmised that the Soviet Premier had concluded that Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to meet with him only to say no. Churchill continued to press for Anglo-American staff meetings and suggested the American military chiefs accompany Harry Hopkins on a trip to London.

C-228 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 10, 1942, 1815 Ζ / TOR 5:30 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. I have never seen t h e House so u n a n i m o u s as it was today in secret session. I explained t h e whole story to t h e m a n d they u n d e r s t o o d it as well as you a n d I d o ourselves. Your message was m u c h appreciated. I a m going to send you a message tomorrow about J o e . I suspect he t h o u g h t he would have p u t across him by us both " n o second front in 1943" a n d that he t h o u g h t h e might j u s t as well get that by post as verbally. We have got to go into t h e whole of this matter again. I am most grieved not to meet you a n d still h o p e we may fix it. But anyhow in t h e interval surely you will let Marshall, Arnold a n d King come over h e r e with H a r r y to survey t h e new scene with your faithful friends. Every day counts. [MR*]

Roosevelt reinforced his support for General Eisenhower in Northwest Africa by asking the General to comment on Churchill's message about Vichy activ­ ities.

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R-233 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 11, 1942, 1 1 : 1 5 A.M. From the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal and Secret. T h e receipt is acknowledged of your message n u m b e r 227 of December 9. I have communicated the reports e n u m e r a t e d therein to General Eisenhower with directions that he comment and advise me in regard thereto and take such corrective measures as are practicable. I will send you the contents of Eisenhower's report when it is received. [MR*]

T h e British were quite upset at the probable appointment of Robert Murphy or H. Freeman Matthews as political adviser to Eisenhower in North Africa. Not only did they fear a loss of political influence, but Murphy was already closely associated with Darlan and the anti-Gaullist forces which the British distrusted. Matthews had been Charge at Vichy and also had favored antiGaullist elements. Harold Macmillan had opposed Britain's appeasement policies in the 1930s and, once Churchill came to office, had served in various ministries. At this time he was Undersecretary at the Colonial Office.

C-229 London Dec. 11, 1942; 0100 Z, Dec. 12 / TOR 10:01 P.M. Personal and Secret F o r m e r Naval Person to President. I am glad that you have it in mind to appoint a political representative for N o r t h Africa who will relieve Eisenhower of day to day administrative and political problems. We should like to collaborate with you in this. I u n d e r s t a n d from Halifax that you have the names of M u r p h y or Matthews in mind. If you decide to appoint either of these I would like to appoint someone to work with him, and would choose an u n d e r secretary of administrative experience whom Eisenhower might be expected to find sympathetic. For your personal information I had Harold MacMillan in mind. [MR*]

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Churchill continued to disparage the idea of joint Anglo-Russian-American military talks since no one but he and the President could answer the "only question that matters."

C-230 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 12, 1942, 1542 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Most Secret a n d Personal. T h e only question which t h e Russians will ask or t h e only o n e that matters will be "Are you going to make a Second F r o n t in 1943 a n d when a n d with what forces?" I cannot answer this exceptjointly with you because the forces we British can dispose of are obviously insufficient. T h e r e f o r e , we cannot reply to Stalin's question until o u r Staffs have explored the possibilities t o g e t h e r a n d h e n c e my strong wish that your friends should come h e r e . If this is not agreeable I a m willing to come to you. We are all h e r e sure that a talk w h e t h e r at Moscow o r K h a r t o u m a m o n g t h e t h r e e Staffs a p a r t from t h e heads of governments would not be useful. [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, p. 500.]

Eisenhower had convinced Governor General Boisson of French West Africa to release the British internees held there regardless of whether the Gaullists released Vichy sympathizers held elsewhere in Africa.

C-231 London Dec. 14, 1942, 1250 Ζ / TOR 9:55

A.M.

F o r m e r Naval Person to President Most Secret a n d Personal. I congratulate you warmly o n getting t h e West African a n n o u n c e m e n t t h r o u g h in so satisfactory a form. We are particularly grateful to Eisen­ hower for securing t h e desired a r r a n g e m e n t about o u r internees who have we u n d e r s t a n d now b e e n released. Please send him o u r congratu­ lations a n d thanks. [MR*]

T h e letter which Roosevelt referred to, printed below (R-234/1), did not arrive until December 23. By that time Roosevelt had cabled the gist of the letter in a message sent on December 21 (R-242).

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R-234 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 14, 1942, 8:00 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. I am sending you a letter by courier in regard to our future plans. You should get it, weather permitting, in three or four days. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, p. 498n.]

(The draft of this letter in the Roosevelt papers at the Roosevelt Library is dated December 11. The letter which Churchill finally received on December 23 was dated December 14. They are the same, except that the version printed in Churchill's memoirs has a slightly different closing.) The content of the letter speaks for itself. The President wanted no discussion of postwar questions unless Stalin decided to attend their meeting. Roosevelt hoped to make some political capital by visiting American troops near the front lines.

R-234/1, letter Washington December 14, 1942 / TOR Dec. 23 Dear Winston:— I have not had an answer to my second invitation to our Uncle Joe but, on the assumption that he will again decline, I think that in spite of it you and I should get together, as there are things which can be definitely determined only by you and me in conference with our Staff people. I am sure that both of us want to avoid the delays which attended the determination on TORCH last July. 1. On the grounds of vile climate and icing on the wings, Iceland must be definitely out for both of us. 2. England must be out for me for political reasons. 3. There will be a commotion in this country if it is discovered that I have flown across any old seas. Therefore, Bermuda would be just as much out for me as Africa. However, on condition that I can get away in absolute secrecy and have my trip kept secret until I am back, I have just about made up my mind to go along with the African idea—on the theory that public opinion here will gasp but be satisfied when they hear about it after it is over. 4. One mitigating circumstance would be the knowledge that I had seen our military leaders in North and West Africa, and that is why I think it would be best if we could meet somewhere in that neighborhood instead of Khartoum. Incidentally, I could actually see some of our troops.

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5. Incidentally also, it would do me personally an enormous amount of good to get out of the political atmosphere of Washington for a couple of weeks. 6. My thought is, therefore, that if the time suits your plans we could meet back of Algiers or back of Casablanca about January fifteenth. That would mean that I would leave about January eleventh, and pray for good weather. My route would be either from here to Trinidad and thence to Dakar and thence north—or from here to Natal, Brazil, and cross to Liberia or Freetown and north from there. 7. In view of Stalin's absence, I think you and I need no foreign affairs people with us—for our work will be essentially military. Perhaps your three top men and my three top men could meet at the same place four or five days in advance of our arrival and have plans in fairly good tentative shape by the time we get there. I asked General Smith, who left here four or five days ago, to check up confidentially on some possible tourist oasis as far from any city or large population as possible. One of the dictionaries says "an oasis is never wholly dry". Good old dictionary! 8. Here is an alternate plan in case Uncle Joe says he will meet us about March first: I would suggest that your Staff people and mine should meet with the Russian Staff people somewhere in Africa, or even as far as Bagdad, and come to certain recommendations which would at least get the preliminaries of new moves started. The three of us could, when we meet, close up the loose ends and also take up some of the post-war matters. With my warm regards, As ever yours, [Franklin D. Roosevelt] [MR. WSC, IV, 667-69. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 498-500. R&C]

At the President's instruction, Robert Murphy was appointed to the rank of Minister so that he would have the status needed to deal effectively with political problems in French North Africa. Murphy had long been active in the area as the coordinator of attempts to organize the anti-Vichy Underground prior to the TORCH invasion.

R-235 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 16, 1942, 12:30 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. Referring to your 273 [229?] of December 11,1 will appoint Mr. Murphy personal representative of the President on General Eisenhower's Staff with the rank of Minister.

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Harold Macmillan will be entirely acceptable in the same status if approved by Eisenhower. Roosevelt [MR. R&C]

In spite of British protests and a steady stream of critical reports from various sources in Algeria and Morocco, Roosevelt stuck firmly by Eisenhower's handling of the touchy political situation in the French territories. Moreover, he refused to go along with suggestions that political representatives report directly to London and Washington rather than to Eisenhower.

R-236 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 16, 1942, 12:45 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. Your No. 227, December 9, 1942, was forwarded to General Eisenhower as coming from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was accomplished by changing the first word to "We" rather than "I". The last paragraph of your message referring to political and administrative help was deleted. A paraphrase of his reply follows: I have had many reports similar to those you refer to in your message and I have been dealing with them as they arise and will continue to do so. There will always be disturbing reports from discontented elements. In French North Africa these include Axis sympathizers, disappointed office seekers, and the de Gaulle element. The latter group is small but there is a definite sentiment against them among Army and Navy officers which should not be underestimated. We have not been able to discuss publicly the reasons for many of the developments here which were brought about by the necessity of consolidating our military position and by our efforts to bring French West Africa into the fold. Some officers and men were imprisoned at the time of our arrival in North Africa for having aided us. They have now been released and restored to their grade. The Franco-Spanish frontier is being brought under control. The situation is not entirely satisfactory but should improve steadily. The difficulties include the type of terrain and the length of the frontier. I have instructed General [George] Patton to do everything possible to gain French assistance in this matter. [Vice] Consul [Ernest de Wael Mayer] Meyer at Rabat has been requested to urge French

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Protectorate Authorities to give us their aid in this respect and at Tangier the Charge d'Affairs is acting in close cooperation with Gen­ eral Patton. I shall continue to give my attention to this matter. Control of postal and telegraphic communication to the outside world is under Allied control, as also in some measure is censorship of local postal and telegraphic communication. Censorship will im­ prove upon the arrival from the United Kingdom of additional per­ sonnel already requested for this purpose. [Brigadier] General [Rob­ ert Α.] McClure is coming from London to aid us in this respect [as head of Eisenhower's Public Relations, Psychological Warfare and Censorship Section]. I have allowed the Spanish consul to continue to enjoy cipher and pouch privileges because of the necessity of avoiding friction with Madrid. There is no doubt that these consuls will give information of our activities. In my opinion, your informants are mistaken when they state that hidden and-Allied propaganda is indulged in by the press and radio and also that such propaganda is on the increase. A great improve­ ment has occurred in this field, particularly as regards the press. The situation should improve further regarding the radio, cinema, and press after we obtain from the United Kingdom and the United States material and film for these facilities which have been requested. With reference to Bethouard and Mast, I have been in close touch with Darlan and Giraud. Mast is a liaison officer at my headquarters and Bethouard is at Gibraltar in accordance with General Giraud's request. It is likely that he will return today. It is planned by Giraud that Bethouard will go to Washington for discussions concerning the supply of military equipment needed by French forces here. I have assurances from Giraud that both Mast and Bethouard will, as soon as he considers it appropriate, be given suitable commands. I can see no other way to handle this matter. Yesterday Giraud went to Mo­ rocco on a much needed inspection trip. This has been impossible for him to do up to this time because the military operations in Tunisia have been both his and my primary interest. Considering the French lack of means and equipment, he has accomplished a fine job and his troops which have been in contact with the enemy have done well. His appearance in Morocco will do much to eliminate misunderstandings, many of which arise because of the distances involved and the lack of information. When he returns, he will report to me and corrective measures will be taken on conditions which he finds to be unsatisfactory. Admittedly, the political situation is confused and difficult. I think you shall continue to receive disturbing reports. Our main effort has

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b e e n to maintain sufficient control of the situation to enable us to fight a battle. I feel that we have m a d e progress toward establishing a sound civil administration. T h e progress will be hastened by help from o u r h o m e governments. T h e authorities h e r e have cooperated in every way to help in the success of o u r military operations. E n d of p a r a p h r a s e . I think t h a t in the above message, Eisenhower has given a clear picture of the situation a n d indicates that he is cognizant of the d a n g e r s pointed out by you. T h e r e can be no d o u b t that his h a n d l i n g of the political a n d civil affairs in N o r t h Africa to date has been a t r e m e n d o u s aid to his military operations. T h e r e f o r e , until the military situation has stabilized, I feel that h e should be allowed to continue h a n d l i n g such matters a n d that we should refrain from setting u p any political o r administrative agencies which would act independently of him. Roosevelt. [MR*]

C-232 London Dec. 17, 1942, 0009 Ζ/TOR 9:12 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Most Secret a n d Personal. Your n u m b e r 234. I a m anxiously awaiting the arrival of your courier. O u r affairs are so i n t e r d e p e n d e n t that I cannot m a k e any plans or even think ahead until I know your wishes. T h a n k you so m u c h for your long letter [R—222/1] about Lyttelton's affairs to which I a m p r e p a r i n g a full answer. We are most grateful to you for all your help. [MR*]

A joint Anglo-American air force in the Caucasus (VELVET) became less likely as Roosevelt backed up his and Churchill's instructions to the AngloAmerican Mission (C-225) with a direct message to Stalin.

R-237 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 17, 1942, 11:45 A.M. From the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. In consideration of an a p p a r e n t impasse between o u r combined avia­ tion mission a n d Russian authorities r e g a r d i n g o u r proposed contribution

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of air power to t h e Caucasus, I have sent t h e following message to Stalin: Quote " I a m not clear as to j u s t what has h a p p e n e d in regard to o u r offer of American air assistance in the Caucasus. I a m fully willing to send units with American pilots and crews. I think they should o p e r a t e by units u n d e r their American Com­ m a n d e r s b u t each g r o u p would of course be u n d e r overall Russian c o m m a n d as to tactical objectives. Please let m e know your desires in this matter as soon as possible as I truly want to help all I can. Pursuit plane p r o g r a m would of course not be affected. What I refer to is essentially the bombing plane type which can be flown to the Caucasus." U n q u o t e Roosevelt [MR*. pFRUS, 1942, III, 677. pStalmlFDR, doc. 59.]

German submarines continued to sink tankers and thus pinch British and American oil supplies, even though the rate of sinkings had diminished and ship construction had increased. T h e completion of the "big inch" pipeline, bringing oil from Texas to the East Coast, would free the equivalent of 100 or so tankers, but that was not expected until mid-1943.

C-233 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 17, 1942, 1400 Ζ/TOR 12:00 A.M. F r o m the F o r m e r Naval Person to the President Most Secret. 1.1 am most grateful for the assistance you have given us by establishing a pool of oil in New York from which o u r tankers can draw. Without this assistance o u r oil position would soon have become grave in the extreme. Unfortunately, despite this new a r r a n g e m e n t , o u r consumption will con­ tinue to exceed imports, a n d it is clear that very early steps are necessary not only to check this d r a i n but also to build u p stocks, which are at a dangerously low level. 2. If the present situation is allowed to persist, o u r stocks will be r e d u c e d in t h e coming m o n t h s to such a d e g r e e that it may be necessary to restrict the movements of o u r warships a n d oil b u r n i n g ships, which would affect the n o r t h Russian a n d T O R C H convoys. 3. I a m advised that his [this] serious state of affairs has arisen as a result of t h e l e n g t h e n e d t u r n - a r o u n d of tankers occasioned by the ex­ tension of t h e convoy system to the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean, ac-

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centuated by the unexpectedly large demands of oil supplies to the TORCH area which under present arrangements can only be made from the United Kingdom resources. 4. Drastic measures are obviously necessary to remedy this situation and proposals which have been worked out by the Admiralty and Ministry of War transport are contained in my immediately following telegram. 5. One of the proposed measures is that as you have assumed respon­ sibility for the civil administration of North Africa, you should also assume responsibility for the supply of petroleum products both civil and military to this area. I very much hope you will be able to agree to this though we cannot offer you any assistance in providing escorts for the tankers so employed. 6. In view of the urgency of preventing our position from deteriorating further, I should be grateful if the proposals contained in para five above and in my immediately following telegram could be given very early consideration. [MR*]

C-234 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 17, 1942, 1430 Ζ/TOR 12:00 A.M.

From Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. 1. With reference to my immediately preceding telegram, the following are the measures proposed for arresting the decline of the UK oil stocks. 2. (a.) To institute direct tanker convoys every twenty days between the Dutch West Indies and the United Kingdom, by which we should hope to improve our imports by one hundred thousand tons a month, (b.) To find the escorts for these convoys by a further opening of the cycle of the transatlantic convoys from eight to ten days, which will enable four groups of escort vessels to be released. 3. By the opening of the transatlantic cycle to ten days, it will be possible to operate these convoys with eight groups of escorts by accepting a shorter period of lay-over between voyages and it is proposed that the eight British manned groups should be employed on this duty. The four groups released would therefore consist of the American group and three Canadian manned groups which it is proposed should be temporarily transferred to the escort of TORCH build up convoys. This would enable four long endurance groups to be released which would provide three groups of increased strength for the D W I to U Κ tanker convoys. It is necessary to have groups of increased strength for these convoys as we hope to include an escort aircraft carrier in the escort of these convoys.

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4. The effect on our non tanker import programme of opening the transatlantic cycle is serious in view of the acute shortage of shipping in the early part of next year. It is estimated it will result in a loss of thirty thousand tons a month using the shipping we have at present available. It is hoped however when more escorts become available in the summer of 1943 that it will be possible to restore the cycle to eight days. 5. The effect of the above measures on the U Κ oil situation combined with the loading of tankers from the U S Navy pool at New York will, it is estimated, do little more than arrest the decline of our stocks and it is therefore necessary to consider measures to build up our stock position. Measures for improving the U Κ stock position. 6. The only ways that can be suggested of effecting any substantial improvement in our stock position are: (A) By direct shipment of oil from the Gulf or Dutch West Indies to the U Κ using fast independently sailed U S tankers. This is the quickest way of building up the stocks in this country. (B) Increasing the supplies of oil in the New York Navy pool for on-carriage to the U K, thus enabling more tankers of convoy speed to be employed on the shortest voyage from New York to the United Kingdom. (C) To meet the oil requirements, both civil and military, of the TORCH area by direct shipment from the United States or Dutch West Indies, preferably by fast United States tankers. (D) The tankers referred to in (C) above to be allowed to proceed to discharge ports in the Mediterranean. [MR*. pR&C]

Stalin's reply to Roosevelt's invitation (R-231) was courteous but firm. More­ over, the Premier's reference to the second front lends credence to Churchill's belief that this was the only question which Stalin really cared about at that time. Stalin's gratuitous support for the Darlan arrangement must have pleased Roosevelt, who was under heavy domestic pressure to repudiate the deal.

R-238 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 17, 1942, 12:10 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. I have received the following from Stalin: "I too must express my deep regret that it is impossible for me to leave the Soviet Union either in the near future or even at the be­ ginning of March. Front business absolutely prevents it, demanding my constant presence near our troops.

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So far I do not know what exactly are the problems which you, Mr. President, and Mr. Churchill intended to discuss at our joint conference. I wonder whether it would not be possible to discuss these problems by way of correspondence between us, as long as there is no chance of arranging our meeting? I admit that there will be no disagreement between us. Allow me also to express my confidence that the time is not being lost and that the promises about the opening of a second front in Europe given by you, Mr. President, and by Mr. Churchill in regard of 1942 and in any case in regard of the spring of 1943, will be fulfilled, and that a second front in Europe will be actually opened by the joint forces of Great Britain and the United States of America in the spring of the next year. In view of all sorts of rumors about the attitude of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics toward the use made of Darlan and of other men like him, it may not be unnecessary for me to tell you that, in my opinion, as well as in that of my colleagues, Eisenhower's policy with regard to Darlan, Boisson, Giraud and others is perfectly correct. I think it a great achievement that you succeeded in bringing Darlan and others into the waterway of the Allies fighting Hitler. Some time ago I made this known also to Mr. Churchill." When you receive the letter [R—234/1] I sent you by courier please send me your answer yes or no. Roosevelt. [MR*. pStalm/FDR, doc. 58 (translation differs slightly). pFRUS, 1942, III, 675. R&C ]

Stalin's reference to the second front brought a quick I-told-you-so from Churchill.

C-235 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 18, 1942, 1318 Ζ/TOR 1 0 : 2 5 A.M.

Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Your number 238. This bears out what I have said and shows how absolutely necessary it is for us to have a plan which we can put to him fairly and squarely. It is bound to be a joint plan, and I can do nothing until I hear from you. [MR*. «fcfC]

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Roosevelt's answer to Churchill's cables about oil tankers and Britain's petroleum stocks only partly met British needs. The "notional" cargo was the cargo carried by a tanker—11,000 dead-weight tons, a planning standard. (See Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, p. 626n.)

R-239 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 18, 1942, 4:35 P.M. For the Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. Your 233 and 234. I am most anxious that every practicable measure may be taken to assure adequate petroleum supply to United Kingdom. The problem continues to have the constant attention of authorities here. Assuming average two notional cargoes per day from New York pool beginning January 1, 1943, plus two additional notional cargoes per day from Caribbean and U.S. Gulf, shipments would amount to approximately 1,250,000 tons per month or 15,000,000 tons per year, thus levelling off if not increasing your inventories in view possibility your offtakes being somewhat reduced if movements direct to TORCH area are later found practicable. This development seems reasonably assured under present plans without giving effect to convoy and escort changes suggested in your 234. Navy Department studying your proposal alterations upon which reply will be made promptly, but time is required to consider possible effect upon all other convoy and escort responsibilities. Any immediate interruption or diversion of our limited carrying and escorting facilities at this time would entail new procedures with consequent loss of efficiency. As of December 3, U.K. reported stock positions very substantially better by comparison than those of other combatant areas. For example, no Pacific base, including Australia, had over ten weeks supply of 100 octane gasoline against at least 27 weeks supply U.K. Similarly these bases did not have over 12 weeks supply fuel oil, and this in Noumea only, as against 21 weeks supply in U.K. Adantic bases including West Indies, Greenland, Newfoundland had average of 100 octane gasoline and fuel oil of eight and four weeks supply respectively compared to above U.K. figures. While everything possible will be done to prevent further shrinkage of U.K. inventories and in fact build these stocks to safer levels, I am confident you agree that the importance of inventories in other areas must be considered and facilities so distributed as to prevent actual shortage in any important area. Supply petroleum products to North Africa for civil administration also dependent upon availability tankers and escorts. Present arrangements for regular convoys that area do not make any provision for such tankers.

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W h e n and if French tankers and French escort vessels are made available, a m o r e accurate estimate as to petroleum relief for N o r t h Africa will be possible. T h e two special convoys, one slow and one fast, scheduled to d e p a r t from Netherlands West Indies early J a n u a r y should relieve the situation to the extent of at least one million barrels, the resulting deliveries being of course applied against total requirements allied services T O R C H area. Roosevelt [MR*. R&C]

In response to Churchill's complaint that he could make no plans regarding talks with the Russians until he heard from Roosevelt, Hopkins assured the Prime Minister that the President's letter (R-234/1) would soon arrive.

R-240 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 18, 1942, 5:45 P.M. From the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. Courier has been delayed but will arrive on the twentieth. Harry [MR*]

Although Churchill sent this message through U.S. Army channels, John Winant, the American Ambassador in London, saw it and cabled directly to the President, pointing out that, when political advisers were originally suggested for North Africa (C-229, R-235), British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden said that the British wanted to put both the American and the British advisers under Eisenhower's command; now Churchill wanted to distinguish Macmillan's and Murphy's roles. Churchill and the War Cabinet believed Eisenhower was politically naive and disliked the pattern of communications which permitted the American government to work directly with Eisenhower, bypassing London. Macmillan's appointment would establish a new channel of communication if he were not officially subordinate to Eisenhower, and Winant did not like Churchill's new suggestion because it seemed to limit Eisenhower's authority as military Commander in Chief. Roosevelt passed Churchill's message on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the comment that he agreed with Winant (Winant to Roosevelt, Dec. 19, 1942, MR; memo from C. Hammond to Leahy, Dec. 19, 1942, MR).

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C-236 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 18, 1942, 7 : 1 0 P.M. Personal a n d Most Secret F o r m e r Naval Person to President. I a m glad t h a t you agree that H a r o l d MacMillan is a good choice. We p r o p o s e that he should r e m a i n a m e m b e r of His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t as a J u n i o r Minister. Locally, we should propose to give him the title of Agent General in F r e n c h N o r t h e r n Africa of H.M.G. in the U.K. T h i s avoids the difficulty of his being accredited to anyone. His status will thus not be quite the same as that of M u r p h y , since on the o n e h a n d h e is not like M u r p h y the personal representative of the h e a d of a State, n o r on the o t h e r can we well appoint him to Eisenhower's Staff. O n e of his functions would be to supervise o u r consular officers in French N o r t h Africa, who are, of course, British officials a n d not m e m b e r s of Eisenhower's Staff. I n all that h e does h e will have instructions to act in the closest concert with Eisenhower, who has s u p r e m e authority in all Military Political a n d Administrative matters in the territory. [MR*]

Eisenhower was willing to commit the Allies to Darlan until the war ended if French Admiral R. E. Godfroy would put his squadron of eight ships, interned at Alexandria, u n d e r Allied command. Churchill wanted no further dealing with Darlan, but he eventually grew so impatient with Godfroy that he threatened to cut off the British subsidy which went to pay the French officers and men. Not until May 17, 1943, after the capture of Tunisia by the Allies, did the French Admiral agree.

C-237 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 19, 1942, 0000 Ζ/TOR 10:10 P.M., Dec. 18 F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Please see N o . 2301 of the 17th instant Eisenhower to General Marshall. While of course we should all like to get Godfroy a n d his s q u a d r o n over, we have waited for two years o r m o r e a n d there cannot be any particular h u r r y for a day o r two o r even a week o r two. We are b o u n d to get him in the e n d . I therefore h o p e that n o promise will be m a d e tying us u p with Darlan till the e n d of "active hostilities". I should have to consult War Cabinet before I could agree in the n a m e of his Majesty's Govern­ ment. With time a n d patience the Godfroy problem will straighten itself

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out in Alexandria. I should therefore be grateful if you will let me know your wishes before taking any irrevocable decision. [MR]

Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that General Eisenhower should retain full control over political as well as military questions in North Africa, and they recognized that Churchill's proposal for separate status for Macmillan was potentially awkward.

R-241 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 19, 1942, 1 1 : 1 0 P.M.

From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. Reference your 236 of December 18th. It was my understanding that your representative MacmiUan was to have the same status as Murphy, a political member of the staff of General Eisenhower and in view of the military necessities of the situation I hope that you can arrange to give MacmiUan similar status with Murphy and thus simplify General Eisenhower's problems. Also I am confident that if Murphy and MacmiUan have precisely the same status they will find life easier. Roosevelt [MR*]

The courier carrying Roosevelt's letter (R-234/1) was still delayed, and the press of time forced the President to cable Churchill about a meeting. Roosevelt instructed his communications personnel to limit the London distribution of the message to the decoding officer and either Admiral Harold Stark or Admiral Alan Kirk (Commander and Chief of Staff of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe) for delivery to Churchill.

R-242 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 21, 1942, 1:40 P.M.

From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. Following is the substance of letter which courier has for you: "In spite of Stalin's inability to meet with us I think we should plan a meeting at once with our respective military staffs. I should like to meet in Africa about January 15th. There is I believe a satisfactory

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a n d safe place j u s t n o r t h of Casablanca. It might be wise for some of o u r military m e n to p r e c e d e us by a few days to clear t h e g r o u n d . I should think if we could have four or five days together we could clear u p all of o u r business. Will you let m e know what you think of this." Roosevelt [ H L H ] [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, p. 500. WSC, IV, 669.

R&C]

Churchill responded immediately and eagerly.

C-238 London [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 21, 1942, 2215 Ζ/TOR 2314 Ζ From t h e F o r m e r Naval Person to t h e President Personal and Most Secret. Yes, certainly; t h e sooner t h e better. I am greatly relieved. It is t h e only thing to d o . All a r r a n g e m e n t s h e r e will be m a d e on basis that it is a staff meeting only. Suggested code n a m e "SYMBOL". [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, p. 501. WSC, IV, 669.]

T h e Anglo-American blockade of German-held Europe caused severe food shortages which the Germans passed on to the civilian population of occupied countries. T h e British believed that any sort of relief, even if designed to feed hungry children, would only make more resources available for other uses, thus slackening the pressure on the German war economy. An AngloAmerican agreement not to violate the blockade without joint consent forced Roosevelt to go directly to Churchill to obtain British concurrence in the plan outlined below. (See C-250.)

R-243 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 22, 1942, 3:26 P.M. From t h e President for t h e F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. I have agreed to send certain relief into Norway to be furnished by the American Red Cross to the Swedish Red Cross a n d by that organization used in Norway for t h e feeding a n d clothing of children. T h e food would be p u t in their m o u t h s in the centers of populations where it is most n e e d e d a n d would not be obtainable by the enemy.

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However a trial would be m a d e in one locality to determine its practicability and safety before any further food is sent in. Apparently your government does not agree to this suggestion. I h o p e that either this plan or an equally good one can be put t h r o u g h as the internal situation in Norway is heartrending. A few extra calories for the children might save a lot of lives. Roosevelt [MR*. R&C]

Macmillan's title was not the real question. What mattered to the British was that he be able to report directly to the British government, thus ensuring a free flow of information and a British voice at Eisenhower's headquarters. (U.S. officials and clerks almost routinely capitalized the second m in Macmillan.)

C-239 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 23, 1942, 2:40 P.M. /TOR 1:00

P.M.

Former Naval Person to President Most Secret and Personal. Your no. 2 4 1 . T h e differences between o u r systems of government make it impossible to achieve exact similarity. For instance, by minister I meant political minister and you think diplomatic minister. Again M u r p h y is the personal representative of you as head of the State. I could not make any similar appointment of a diplomatic character. T h e best I can d o is to send MacMillan out as "His Majesties Governments Political Representative at General Eisenhowers Headquarters", reporting to me direct, a n d enjoying exact equality of rank with Murphy. Will this suit you? In your no. 219 of November 20 you seemed to contemplate the two political representatives being capable of relieving Eisenhower of large part of his political b u r d e n s and that real power should be vested in t h e m jointly subject of course to the ultimate military control of the C o m m a n d e r in Chief. I think this is most urgently necessary as from all I hear the tangles of local French politics and their world implications force themselves into the first place in the military mind a n d might well become detrimental to operations. [MR*. FRUS, 1942, II, 491. R&C]

Roosevelt's long-delayed letter (R-234/1) finally arrived. Arrangements for the Casablanca Conference were made through Eisenhower's deputy, General Walter Bedell Smith.

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C-240 London [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 23, 1942, 1645 Ζ / TOR 1719 Ζ F r o m the F o r m e r Naval Person to the President Personal a n d Secret. Your courier has arrived. I like it all. I will discreetly contact General Smith. [MR*]

T h e exchange of Christmas greeting between the two Allied leaders was warm and sincere, and Roosevelt's formal exhortation to Stalin on the "holiday" (Christmas was not mentioned) is in striking contrast. (See Stalin/FDR, doc. 62.)

C-241 London Dec. 25, 1942, 1415 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Last year I passed a h a p p y Christmas in your h o m e a n d now I send my heartfelt wishes to you a n d all a r o u n d you on this brighter day t h a n we have yet seen. My wife joins with m e in this message to you a n d Mrs. Roosevelt. Winston a n d Clementine Churchill [MR]

R-244 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 25, 1942, 12:50 P.M. F r o m the President for t h e F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. T h e Roosevelts send t h e Churchills w a r m personal Christmas greetings. T h e old teamwork is g r a n d . Roosevelt [MR]

On December 24, Admiral Darlan was assassinated by a member of a small group of French royalists who hoped that General Giraud would support the claims of the Comte de Paris to the French throne. Instead of becoming a national hero, the assassin, Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle, was tried and

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executed within two days by Darlan's successor, General Giraud. Eisenhower quickly arranged for Giraud to succeed Darlan, which satisfied almost everyone. T h e British no longer found themselves working with an old enemy, de Gaulle did not see Giraud as a political threat, and Roosevelt felt his original support for Giraud to be justified. Roosevelt did not want Macmillan in Africa until Eisenhower had arranged the political situation to his liking, since the British were strongly committed to de Gaulle. At the time, Macmillan feared that the elimination of Darlan would make his mission unnecessary. (The final sentence was added in Admiral Leahy's handwriting.)

R-245 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 26, 1942, 12:05 P.M. From the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal and Secret. In consideration of unsettled condition in N o r t h Africa caused by assassination of Admiral Darlan, I believe that arrival of Macmillan in Africa should be postponed until situation is stabilized. I think it would be best for De Gaulle to postpone visit h e r e . This will give SYMBOL a chance to clear situation first. Roosevelt [MR*. R&C]

R-246 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 26, 1942, 12:05 P.M. From the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. T h e following message to General Eisenhower was authorized by m e today: "With approval of the President you are authorized to appoint General Giraud provisionally in charge of both Civil and French Military Authorities in your Area." Roosevelt [MR*]

De Gaulle believed he had been invited to the United States, although the American government insisted that he could come only on his own initiative. Either way the British had encouraged the visit in hopes of improving de Gaulle's relations with Roosevelt. KINGPIN was General Giraud. Macmillan did have an American-born mother, but her birthplace was Spencer, Indiana, not Kentucky.

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C-242 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 27, 1942, 0008 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. 1. Your 245. As I told H a r r y I h a d already asked United States Head­ quarters L o n d o n to delay plane which was carrying De Gaulle for 48 h o u r s as it is essential to see how T O R C H situation develops. De Gaulle sent on 25th t h r o u g h American Embassy message repeated in my im­ mediately following to Giraud. It seems to me that we o u g h t to try above anything to bring t h e m all together a n d have some French nucleus solid a n d united to work with. I a m seeing De Gaulle today a n d will cable you further. 2. I a m sure that N o r t h African settlement cannot be held u p for SYMBOL. We have received news that K I N G P I N has been unanimously elected H i g h Commissioner and C-in-C by the French g r o u p of notabil­ ities. I have already informed Eisenhower that so far as we are concerned we entirely agree with this solution. 3. War Cabinet attach m u c h i m p o r t a n c e to Macmillan's a p p o i n t m e n t a n d arrival. We feel quite u n r e p r e s e n t e d t h e r e yet o u r fortunes are deeply involved a n d we are trying to make a solid contribution to your enterprise. Murphy's a p p o i n t m e n t has already been a n n o u n c e d a n d I h o p e you will agree to my publishing MacMillan's a p p o i n t m e n t . H e will be I am sure a help. H e is animated by the friendliest feelings towards the United States a n d his m o t h e r hails from Kentucky. [MR*. WSC, IV, 644-45.]

Unlike the American government, which apparently sought a coalition of French forces, de Gaulle always strove for a single, unified French government which would fight Germany, preserve the French Empire, and speak for all Frenchmen. Since Giraud had virtually no political organization, de Gaulle was confident that he would come out on top. Events proved him correct, in spite of attempts by Roosevelt to force the two to work together as equals.

C-243 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 27, 1942, 0015 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is translation of most secret message from General De Gaulle to General Giraud, Algiers. Be­ gins.

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T h e assassination at Algiers is an indication a n d warning: An in­ dication of the exasperation into which the tragedy of France has thrown the mind a n d soul of F r e n c h m e n : A warning of the conse­ quences of every kind which necessarily result from the absence of a national authority in the midst of the greatest national crisis of o u r history. It is m o r e t h a n ever necessary that this national authority should be established. I propose, my General, that you should meet m e as soon as possible on French soil either in Algeria or in Chad in o r d e r to study the means of g r o u p i n g u n d e r a provisional central authority all French forces inside a n d outside the country a n d all the French territories which are in a position to struggle for the liberation a n d the salvation of France. [MR*. WSC, IV, 645.]

Boisson was Governor General of French West Africa; Nogues held a similar title for French Morocco. Air Force General Frangois d'Astier was a staunch Gaullist who, along with his brother Henri, a royalist in the French Under­ ground in North Africa, was implicated in the assassination of Admiral Darlan. T h e charges were dropped when de Gaulle took over in North Africa.

C-244 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 28, 1942, 1740 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. I h a d some long talks yesterday with Generals De Gaulle a n d D'Astier, the latter j u s t r e t u r n e d from Algiers. De Gaulle holds it of first importance to create a strong, united, national French authority. H e is anxious to meet Giraud, in w h o m h e sees the c o m m a n d e r who will lead the French troops to the liberation of France after N o r t h Africa has been cleared. H e considers that G i r a u d is m o r e suited for military t h a n for political functions. H e is quite ready to work with Nogues but apparently less so with Boisson, t h o u g h I cannot think he would be obstinate about it. I must say I strongly favor a meeting between De Gaulle a n d G i r a u d as soon as possible, before rivalries crystallize. [MR*]

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Roosevelt's Christmas gift to Churchill was probably a suitably inscribed copy of the Prime Minister's speeches compiled by Churchill's son, Randolph, and published by G. P. Putnam's Sons in New York in 1941 under the title Bkod, Sweat and Tears. However, that inscribed volume was not located in any of the public or private collections of Churchill's books.

C-245 London Dec. 29, 1942, 1022 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President. I a m delighted to receive the beautiful book of o u r addresses. T h a n k you so m u c h for it, a n d for the inscription. [MR*]

Changes in Macmillan's title did not obscure the British purpose—to exert political influence in North Africa—and Roosevelt's answer indicated that he understood that. Eisenhower's authority remained firm. Djibouti was the capital of French Somaliland, a territory which had ac­ cepted the authority of General de Gaulle.

C-246 London [via U.S. Army] Dec. 29, 1942, 1249 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Secret a n d Personal. Macmillan. I could if you like call him Minister Resident at Allied H e a d q u a r t e r s instead of British Representative or H.M. Government's Representative. A m being m u c h pressed h e r e a n d feel a n n o u n c e m e n t should be m a d e t o m o r r o w 30th. Jibouti has passed off quite pleasantly. T h e Governor D u p o n t has signed a d h e r e n c e to United Nations as p a r t of fighting France. [MR*]

Roosevelt checked with Secretary of State Hull about the new title for Mac­ millan; the Secretary replied that the change protected American interests about as well as could be expected. (Roosevelt to Hull, Dec. 19, 1942, MR).

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R-247 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 29, 1942, 1 2 : 1 0 P.M. F r o m the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. T h e designation of MacMillan as "Minister Resident at Allied Head­ q u a r t e r s " is satisfactory to me. It is my u n d e r s t a n d i n g that General Ei­ senhower will continue to have full veto power over all civil officials in the area of operations when in his Eisenhower's opinion such veto is advantageous to military operations or prospects. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, 1942, p. 49 In. «fcfC]

In a cable intended originally as a letter, Churchill summarized the overall British plan for war production. T h e main thrust of the letter, however, was a pessimistic look at the question of shipping. Although the promises Roo­ sevelt made to Lyttelton (R-222/1) could alleviate the crisis, Churchill ap­ peared worried that confusion within the American military and increasing demands from other theaters would jeopardize British shipping plans. A misunderstanding had arisen about what Britain needed and what Roosevelt had promised, and by the time of the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 a gap of six million dead-weight tons of cargo capacity for 1943 existed between British and American estimates of Britain's needs (Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, pp. 681-82).

C-247 London Dec. 30, 1942, 1110 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. Begins: My Dear Mister President, 1. T h e letter which Oliver Lyttelton b r o u g h t a n d the associated agree­ ments about air a n d g r o u n d force e q u i p m e n t are very welcome. I am deeply grateful. T h e s e Washington discussions and the conclusions reached show t h a t o u r d e p a r t m e n t s a n d yours are developing a closer u n d e r s t a n d ­ ing of each others problems a n d getting n e a r e r to a c o m m o n view of t h e war. T h i s is essential to success. 2. T h e a g r e e m e n t s a r r a n g e d by Lyttelton, together with the assurances of your letter, give m e a basis on which to allocate o u r reserves of man­ power in full confidence that o u r British effort will be effectively balanced a n d rightly applied. We have now taken o u r decisions. I will not b u r d e n you with details. I n b r o a d terms we calculate that between m i d s u m m e r

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1942 and December 1943 we may be able to draft into the services and draw into munition production some 1,600,000 extra men and women. Considering the degree of mobilization already achieved in the past three years this is a large figure, and to reach it will mean a further straitening of living conditions and will call upon all the Nation's latent resources. But it is less by 1,100,000 than is asked for by the services and those responsible for our munition production whose combined requirements total 2,700,000. We have therefore had to ration out reserves of manpower and confine the programmes to essentials without allowing any margins for insurance or contingencies. 3. The following is what we have decided. First, we must give the Navy all they need for the anti-U boat war up to the limit of our shipbuilding capacity and the resources which you can assign to us. The Admiralty will get the men for manning the ships but they must reduce their industrial requirements by labour economies in the shipyards and workshops, even though this means slowing down somewhat the building of big ships. Escort vessels will have the highest priority in the Navy's programme, and I am obliged to you for the allocations made to us from the pool. 4. Secondly, we shall strain every nerve to prevent labour shortage from checking the expansion of our aircraft industry. Our policy, subject to the limitations of training, technical problems, the availability of management and the supply of material and machines, will be to move labour into the factories as fast as it can be absorbed. The RAF, which has been taking in recruits on a large scale, will be able to use effectively all the aircraft which we can make or which you will send us under the new agreement—or more. But, like other services, it will have to be economical in its use of man-power and even reduce some of its defensive services, such as the balloon barrage and air field guards. 5. There are two things concerning the aircraft programme about which I am greatly concerned: one is the Fleet Air Arm and the other is Transport Aircraft. I have the impression that neither of our countries is devoting enough of its aircraft production to either of these two objects. We must be certain that we have enough Fleet Air Arm type aircraft to match the carrier programmes in the two countries, and, as things are, it looks as if we might fall behind. Again, the experiences of both the Egyptian and North African campaigns emphasise the great value of transport aircraft, and I am personally much impressed with the Russian argument with which they back their demands for further transport aircraft. It may be that their power to start a successful offensive in 1943 will depend upon increasing our ability to supply them with transport aircraft to supplement their rather rudimentary communications. As you know, we ourselves are woefully short of transport aircraft, but we are

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providing them with one hundred Albemarles for conversion for this purpose. I believe there are proposals in the United States for building wooden aircraft, and I feel that, if you could personally stimulate this production, it might prove a decision of the highest strategic importance. 6. Third, we have had to limit the Army's man-power intake considerably, and we are having to curtail our plans for producing army equipment. The Army will take its cut where it hurts least; we can now run more risk in thinning out the home defences, in generally in combing the Army's tail, in order to sharpen its teeth. Here and there, as in the Middle East, we shall have to make two decisions into one by compression. But at home the main decision is to convert the home Army to an offensive basis with a possible increase in its striking power. We shall be able to reduce the numbers in the factories making ground equipment, partly because the personnel is becoming more efficient and output per head is rising, partly because the initial equipment of the Army is in many items nearly complete and we are reaching the point where we can maintain it on a reduced output. We have been fortified in taking the decision to reduce the labour at the disposal of the Ministry of Supply by the agreements which Oliver Lyttelton brought back covering tanks and other Army supplies. In the circumstances, we shall rely heavily upon your medium tanks; I agree with your view that some increase in your programme would be wise. 7. Lastly shipping. Here again we are fortified by your assurance that our twenty-seven million ton import programme will be met, as well as our other essential needs. This is an undertaking of the highest importance to these Islands. You may rest assured that we shall do our utmost to limit the demands of the British import programme upon the common pool of shipping. We are now running down our stocks, and we shall make what economies we can. But these devices only give us a little relief for a little while. You have warned me that the early months of 1943 will be difficult. This I fully understand. But I must tell you frankly that the prospect in the next few months is going to be more acute than we expected when the figures were prepared which Lyttelton took to Washington. American shipbuilding has turned your own net losses of the spring into a surplus. British and Allied net losses are, however, very serious indeed. In November, for example—admittedly a bad month— losses from all causes of American-controlled and United Nations tonnage other than our own were 260,000 DW [dead-weight] tons, against which, excluding the Todd ships for us, you built 850,000 tons DW, giving us a net gain of 590,000 tons. Losses of British-controlled tonnage, on the other hand, were 850,000 tons DW (100,000 due to TORCH), against which new construction of British and Canadian yards, plus the Todd contracts, gave us 250,000 tons leaving us a net loss of 600,000 tons. With

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this position before us you will understand how vital it is that the reinforcement of our depleted shipping resources should not be deferred. The situation which we now foresee will only give us imports over the five months November to March at the rate of seventeen million tons a year. This is indeed a grim prospect, and one which means for us dangerous and difficult decisions between Military operations, food and raw materials. 8. The suggested average supplement figure of three hundred thousand tons of dry-cargo carrying capacity each month will only be enough if certain conditions are fulfilled. First and foremost, we must be able to load a sufficient proportion of our total import on the North Atlantic Seaboard or at other near or convenient sources of supply. Our joint machinery will examine this and other technical aspects, but in thanking you for the directions which you have given, I must sound the alarm of mortal urgency. I am relieved by knowing that you will keep this whole business constantly under your own eye and that no further important diversion of tonnage to Military purposes will be made without your personal direction after I have had my say. 9. I was also reassured by your resolve to raise the shipbuilding programme to twenty million dead-weight tons, if it should prove feasible; and, as we live and fight upon our shipping, I hope you will be able to give me some good news about the result of this inquiry. Indeed, any news of progress of this would be helpful. 10. In conclusion, Mister President, let me emphasize the fact that our whole man-power lay-out is based upon striking the strongest blows we can in 1943. We will run the utmost risk for this; but unless our shipping resources are, in fact, repaired as you so kindly propose, I shall be forced immediately to reduce the British War Effort in oversea theatres even though this involves prolongation of the war and leaves you a greater portion of the burden we are eager to share, believe me, always your sincere friend, Winston S. Churchill [MR. PREM 3/470 and PREM 3/481/5.]

Brigadier Edward Jacob, an Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, had agreed with the Americans that the Hotel Anfa and some adjacent villas on the southern edge of Casablanca would be the best location for the Casablanca Conference (SYMBOL). Not only were the accommodations good and security easy to arrange, but there was an airfield only two miles away.

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C-248 London [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 30, 1942, 1511 Ζ / T O R 1620 Ζ

Most Secret and Personal from the Former Naval Person to the President. I sent Brigadier Jacob to North Africa on Christmas Day to consult with Generals Eisenhower and Smith about arrangements for SYMBOL. Jacob has now telegraphed that they have found admirable accommo­ dation and that General Smith who is in full agreement is telegraphing the results of their reconnaissance to you. I do not think we can do better than accept these proposals, and as time is short, I am going ahead on the assumption that you approve. My intention is that HMS Bulolo, which is a specially fitted headquarters ship, should leave the U.K. on about 4th January with the more junior staff officers of my delegation, cypher staff, clerical staff, etc. Bulolo will be berthed in the harbour and serve as signal ship. In your 242 you suggested that some of our military men should pre­ cede us by a few days to clear the ground. I entirely agree, and will arrange for British Chiefs of Staff to arrive by air at rendezvous on whatever day it may be possible for American Chiefs of Staff to reach there. Can you give me a date? It would also be helpful if you could let me know as soon as possible your own programme and I will make my own arrangements accordingly. Many thanks about Macmillan. I agree to what you say about Eisen­ hower's final authority. [MR. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 501-2. WSC, IV, 670.]

R-248 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 31, 1942, 1 0 : 1 5 A.M.

From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. Arrangements for SYMBOL satisfactory. Our Chiefs of Staff will arrive twelfth and I will follow two days later so that we could all meet together on fifteenth. I believe our staffs can cover the ground in a two day pre­ liminary conference. The prospect pleases me. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, p. 502. R&C]

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Political problems in North Africa—which rehearsed the postwar struggles in France—continued to occupy an inordinate amount of Churchill's and Roosevelt's time. Even though the British were committed to de Gaulle, Churchill would brook no French restrictions on Allied activity in North Africa. Church­ ill's transparent eagerness to relieve General Eisenhower of his political re­ sponsibilities was echoed by the General, though for different reasons. General Walther Nehring had been the commander of German forces in Tunisia but had been relieved, apparently without Churchill's knowledge, on December 9 by Generaloberst Juergen von Arnim. No such flanking move by the Germans as Churchill feared ever materialized. General Sir Harold Alexander was acting as Deputy Commander in Chief to Eisenhower, but was re-assigned in mid-January to command the Tunisian operation. General Montgomery, commander of the British Eighth Army, launched his attack from the east against Rommel's retreating forces on January 15. Brazzaville, the capital of French Equatorial Africa, was firmly held by the Gaullists. A steady stream of propaganda criticizing the deal with Darlan and related Anglo-American policies had emanated from there, and various American officials had protested. Viscount Swinton of Masham was British Cabinet Minister Resident in West Africa, and Churchill wanted him to calm the French Governor General, Pierre Boisson, who had released British in­ ternees in return for the release of French West African prisoners and the silencing of Gaullist propaganda radioed into the colony. Churchill did release the prisoners and made efforts to cut down the flow of anti-Boisson propa­ ganda.

C-249 London [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 31, 1942, 1951 Ζ I TOR 2212 Ζ F r o m the F o r m e r Naval Person to President, Personal a n d Secret. Your message [R-248] j u s t received. I need not say how m u c h I a m looking forward to SYMBOL but in the meanwhile I send you some of my thoughts on o u r present difficulties with the F r e n c h . 1. We o u g h t not to accept the suggestion that o u r Armies in Northwest Africa are on t h e same footing as they were in France in 1918. We were not invited b u t fought o u r way on shore with the loss of 2,000 m e n . T h e r e f o r e t h e Allied Commander-in-Chief representing you as h e a d of o u r j o i n t enterprise in these regions must be s u p r e m e in all matters military a n d civil of course without prejudice to the territorial sovereignty of France reviving when the war is over. 2. G i r a u d is in my opinion quite unsuited to the discharge of civil responsibilities. H e is a brave capable flamboyant soldier a n d it is his duty to a n i m a t e a n d lead the French Armies in this theater u n d e r Eisenhower's orders.

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3. A civil regime should be set u p in whatever form is found locally convenient in which M u r p h y and Macmillan should have as you suggested a veto as well as powers of guidance and initiation veiled u n d e r a p p r o priate forms. 4. I trust Eisenhower will soon be freed from the distraction of local French politics, the rate of exchange, problems of French sovereignty, etc. I am most anxious about the military situation. If Nehring can get e n o u g h transport—a big if—he might bring off the same kind of attack along the sea flank that Alexander and Montgomery did at Alamein with the disastrous results to all o u r forces to the southward that befell the Italians. T h e d a n g e r to o u r First Army or rather Corps for it is n o m o r e seems to m e far m o r e serious than anything which threatens us on the southern flank. Only a S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r like Eisenhower concentrating his whole t h o u g h t u p o n the fighting can cope with these military perils. 5. For you alone. Alexander and Montgomery h o p e to have Tripoli early in February. Rommel will most likely make his way with his remnants some of which are formidable to Tunisia. We h o p e to be h a r d at his tail in superior force a n d I am encouraging General Alexander to press forward to the utmost. 6. W e are putting h a r d pressure on De Gaulle to shut his Brazzaville m o u t h a n d I am suggesting that Swinton have a talk with Boisson. [MR*]

Although the understanding about Eisenhower's authority was clear, Churchill's instructions to Macmillan as Minister Resident in Northwest Africa made no mention of any formal relationship with the American Commander in Chief.

C-249/1 London [via British Ambassador] Dec. 31, 1942 [Churchill to Roosevelt] T h e Prime Minister would be grateful if you [Halifax] would inform the President that the following directive was given to Mr. Macmillan before d e p a r t u r e : — Mr. Harold Macmillan, M.P., has been appointed Minister Resident at Allied H e a d q u a r t e r s in North West Africa. Mr. Macmillan's primary function will be to report on the political situation and future plans for the territory and to represent to the

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Commander-in-Chief the views of His Majesty's Government on political questions. His reports will be addressed to the Prime Minister. H e will work in closest touch with his United States colleague, establishing relations of confidence and amity with him. H e is not at present accredited to any French authority. T h e present French administration in North Africa is treated by Allied Commander-in-Chief as a temporary de facto local administration. Mr. Macmillan's relations with French authorities will accordingly be of an informal character. Mr. R. M. Makins of the Foreign Office will accompany Mr. Macmillan as his assistant and will act for him should he at any time be absent from Algiers. Mr. W.H.B. Mack of the Foreign Office has for some time past held the post of British Civil Liaison Officer on General Eisenhower's staff. H e will continue to hold this appointment and will not join Mr. Macmillan's staff t h o u g h he will look to him for guidance on any political matter affecting interest of His Majesty's Government. Mr. Macmillan will superintend the activities of such British civilian experts as may be appointed to collaborate with United States authorities in French North Africa. His Majesty's consular officers in French North Africa will be instructed to repeat to Mr. Macmillan political reports which they address to the Foreign Secretary. Mr. Macmillan may communicate direct with them when necessary and they with him. [MR]

Although it is only speculation, Churchill probably had Ambassador Halifax show Roosevelt the "secret document" because it was obtained from a decrypted MAGIC intercept. Knowing the Americans had the same intelligence capabilities, the Prime Minister apparently hoped to discredit the information. However, even with the exaggerations and distortions that inevitably creep into hearsay, Churchill's emphatic denial of "paternity" rings hollow in the face of what is now known about Anglo-American disagreements during the war. (The document referred to, printed below as an attachment to C-249/2, was "sanitized" before being released by the British Government. It appears that the only things deleted were the document identification data and the name of the person/agency to which it should have been returned.)

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C-249/2 London [via British Ambassador] Jan. 1, 1943 From the Prime Minister to the President. Lord Halifax will show you a most secret document, purporting to record a conversation which I had with an Ambassador. There is hardly anything in this which represents what I said. Most of it is the Ambassador's own impressions but a lot of it looks as if it were fathered on me. I am sure that I need not tell you that I have no claim to paternity. [MR, A/16]

ATTACHMENT TO C-249/2

Special Intelligence Serial No. 75

January 1, 1943.

The Duke of Alba, Spanish Ambassador to London, returned to Spain on the 23rd December for the Christmas holidays, and, in conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on that same date, said the following things about conditions in England. "Last year at this time the British were feeling pretty badly and the way their confidence has been restored in one year is most remarkable. They are living fine. There is plenty of food for the mouths of everyone. To tell the truth, never once have they doubted that they would finally win. Now no one any longer dreams that Germany would try to invade the British Isles. They say that even if she did, the defenses are so sufficient that the attempt would be immediately frustrated. In British learned circles, particularly scholarly circles, the question of post-war reconstruction is already being aired, and they take it for granted that victory is certain. Before I came home, I had personal interviews with Churchill on the 6th and 11th December. He said 'The war is 50% over. In the battle of North Africa we used 850 ships, 600 of which were troop transports. On the way not a single ship was attacked. That shows there is no more danger from U-boats. That shows that the British and Americans are again rulers of the waves. America's entry into the war, accompanied by the assurance that we would get plenty of arms, makes our victory absolutely beyond doubt.' Churchill said this over and over, I don't know how many times. "The British and Americans say that by next March all North Africa will be in their hands, and that thus they will have complete freedom of navigation over the Mediterranean; that they will then strike Italy

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from Syria and in another direction they will plunge forward through the Balkans and Turkey. In order to prevent the Japanese and German forces from meeting in the Near East they will busy themselves to their utmost both militarily and politically in that region. They claim that seven million Mohammedans are on their side and this makes them very happy. "By the way, I want to tell you, there is a rift between London and Washington concerning strategy; I mean the United States still emphasizes the Pacific, while England wants to get things in Europe in hand first. When I talked to Churchill the other day he said 'The United States is certainly anxious to whip Japan. She is going to fight her to the bitter end. She wants to get well-based on Australia, Guadalcanal and New Zealand successively, and then hit the Japanese mainland. But you know in Government circles here in London there are plenty of people who remember the Tokyo-London alliance and who say it was a mistake to have foresworn it for the sake of America. These Japanese have a lot of stamina. I fought in the Boer war and other wars too and have known well warriors of various climes, and judging from what I have seen of Japanese prisoners, I can only express admiration for the fine military spirit of the Japanese race.' (3 paragraphs missing, not available). "There is no doubt concerning the strength of the German army, but they rely upon machinery and their genius for organization. These things they stick to to the very last, lacking strategic flexibility. Last year Moscow and Leningrad, and this year Stalingrad, are good examples of what I mean. Furthermore, their heads are as hard as lead when it comes to diplomacy. There is not one single country who, in its heart, is following the Germans. France, Belgium, Holland—all hate the Germans, and I venture to guess that before long even you Japanese will do likewise. Germany's production and mechanical power reached its peak last year and I feel safe in saying that they are on the down grade now. "Not long ago, Jordana got me to see what I could do in the way of finding a chance to mediate for peace, but now that the United Nations are so sure of victory they wouldn't talk peace with Germany under any guise whatsoever. Even to dream of such a thing while the Nazis are in would be ridiculous. That is where Hess made his mistake. Needless to say, the time has not yet come when the United States would think of peace. The other day Ambassador Winant said to me, 'This war is not one in which any compromise will take place. It will be either victory or defeat.' General Smuts also said that this is a 30-year war which began in 1914, and that next year the United

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Nations would reach their peak of their production and would soon defeat the Axis decisively. An intimate friend of mine who manages the Ford Company in England told me that the Ford plant at Dearborn, and the Packard and the Chrysler plants too, are concentrating on the construction of aircraft, and that even Nelson is astonished at the production rate. "My final conclusions are these. This year America and England will put forth their last heave and I must say they are utterly certain of whipping the Axis. Although this estrangement between London and Washington will crop u p now and then, and although after the war England a n d the United States may become icy towards each other, d u r i n g this war we cannot but regard them as one complete solild block. "Even supposing that Iberia were invaded, it will merely be a camouflage for some vaster action on another scene, just like Dieppe camouflaged the North African stroke. T h e pressure which the United States is putting on Chile and Argentina is brazen and bold and England is thoroughly disgusted at it. T h e English say that it would very probably be better to leave these countries alone and let them stay neutral." T o be r e t u r n e d to: [deleted]. [MR box 164, folder 1:A-16.]

Roosevelt always enjoyed keeping secrets from the press, but in this case his trip to Casablanca required strict security measures. Even so, the gathering of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the SYMBOL Conference "was known all over Africa" (Arnold, Global Mission, p. 390).

R-249 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 1, 1943, 6:55 P.M. Personal a n d Most Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. O u r censor plans to issue just before d e p a r t u r e the following instructions to all papers, radio and wire communications systems: Quote. T h e President is going on another trip in the immediate future and for security reasons no comment should be made on his whereabouts or the purpose of the trip until a release is approved by this office. Unquote.

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I am particularly anxious that no confidential information be given to the press as to the place or time of SYMBOL. I wonder if your censor could give out substantially the same statement to your own press regarding you as well as myself. I intend to clamp down the lid a few hours before I leave. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 502-3.]

The struggle between Generals de Gaulle and Giraud for control of the French forces and colonial governments in Africa continued to divide the British and the Americans. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who referred to the Gaullists as "Polecats," and Admiral William D. Leahy, who had been Ambassador to the Vichy government, both advised Roosevelt to avoid any step which would indicate recognition of de Gaulle. As one official noted in his diary, Roosevelt preferred many small local provincial French governments to a centralized authority since that would preserve America's "trading position" at the peace table (Butcher Diary, Jan. 4, 1943, quoted in Zebel, "Harold Macmillan's Appointment," p. 88). Although Churchill avoided any showdown with Roosevelt over the issue, a dispatch from the American Charge in Britain summed up the British position: "If De Gaulle is a 'symbol' to the people of France, he is also a 'symbol' to the British Government, a symbol of justification for its whole French policy since June 1940." Churchill felt his government owed something to one of the few French leaders who had demanded, like the British, that France spurn German offers of an armistice and fight to the end (FRUS, 1943, II, Matthews to Hull, Jan. 1, 1943, p. 24; Hull's characterization of the Gaullists is in Leahy, I Was There, p. 143). The President's cavalier approach to geography, or a play on words, turned the Gaullist-controlled capital of French Equatorial Africa, Brazzaville, into Brazenville. The sarcastic advice that de Gaulle go on the offensive was inserted in Roosevelt's handwriting.

R-250 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 1, 1943,7:20 P.M.

Personal and Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. In reply to your 249 I feel very strongly that we have a military occupation in North Africa and as such our Commanding General has complete charge of all matters civil as well as military. We must not let any of our French friends forget this for a moment. By the same token I don't want any of them to think that we are going to recognize any one or any committee or group as representing the French Government or the French Empire. The people of France will settle their own affairs after we have won this war. Until then we can deal with local Frenchmen

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on a local basis wherever o u r armies occupy former French territory. And if these local officials won't play ball we will have to replace them. I agree that Eisenhower has had to spend too much time on political affairs b u t Marshall has sent him very explicit instructions on this point. I don't know whether Eisenhower can hold Giraud in line with another F r e n c h m a n r u n n i n g civil affairs but I shall find out. Why doesn't De Gaulle go to war? Why doesn't h e start N o r t h by West half West from Brazenville? It would take him a long time to get to the Oasis of Somewhere. A h a p p y new year to you a n d yours. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 23-24. KfcfC]

Although Churchill turned down Roosevelt's proposal that the American and Swedish Red Cross supply food and clothing to Norwegian children, the British did work out a means of getting such supplies into Norway without violating the British blockade. Actually, Churchill was quite accurate when he pictured Secretary of State Hull as a staunch supporter of strict blockade measures. Roosevelt's request had come at the suggestion of persons other than Hull and the top people in the State Department. The President apparently accepted Churchill's proposal, for the message was annotated "no further action." Gotherburg is a partly Anglicized, partly garbled version of Goteborg, a port in southern Sweden.

C-250 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 1, 1943, 8:48 P.M. /TOR 7:45 P.M. Personal a n d Most Secret F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Your telegram n u m b e r 243. 1. About two m o n t h s ago Mr. Hull asked for an assurance, which we gladly gave, that the British Government was in agreement with the United States G o v e r n m e n t that the blockade of enemy territory should be vigorously maintained. T h i s is o u r policy, as agreed with your government. T h e single exception is Greece, where alone of all Allied countries the enemy allowed wholesale starvation conditions to develop. We have resisted extremely strong pressure from the Belgian Government and others to d e p a r t from it. T o a b a n d o n the principle that the enemy is responsible for the territories h e has conquered, will lead very quickly to o u r having the whole lot o n o u r backs, a b u r d e n far beyond o u r strength. 2. Conditions in Belgium are worse than in Norway and in o u r j u d g ment it would not be right to make a concession to Norway a n d not to

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Belgium. It would be impossible, too, to dispute the claims of other Allied Governments who would certainly press violently for equal privileges. 3. In our view the plan you propose might therefore have the eventual effect of reversing our whole joint food blockade policy, and this I am sure you will agree, we should not contemplate. 4. As you are no doubt aware, we have already agreed with your authorities upon a secret scheme, which while distinct from ordinary relief, will help our Norwegian friends without dangerous repercussions. This scheme, which has been welcomed by the Norwegian Government, provides for the despatch in the Gotherburg traffic of limited quantities of supplies disguised as Swedish imports, to be distributed in Norway through secret channels. If it is put into operation it will bring material aid to our friends, although it is of course vital that none but the Norwegian officials directly concerned should know of it. 5. We are also anxious to proceed with plans for the evacuation of Norwegian, Belgian and other children to Sweden and Switzerland respectively, where they could be maintained by extra imports through the blockade. 6. I should be grateful for an expression of your views. [MR*. R&C]

As Admiral Leahy noted in a covering memo, the following cable was drafted in the Navy Department after a joint American-Canadian-British conference on the question of oil supplies. Roosevelt sent it without making any changes. Unlike the Prime Minister, the President preferred to leave such logistical details, important as they were, to his subordinates.

R-251 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 2, 1943, 12:45 P.M. Personal and Secret for the Former Naval Person from the President. Referring further to your 233 and 234. As result of studies in Navy Department it has been found that the following can be accomplished: Lengthen cycle in North Atlantic convoys to ten days and deliver average of two notional tanker cargoes daily by that route. This will release four Canadian escort groups for assignment to UK for replacement of long legged escorts for duty with Aruba UK tanker convoys which should deliver an additional two notional cargoes daily. Total of above deliveries supplemented from time to time by spare tankers as found available should be about fifteen million tons annually. Consider independently

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routed tankers inadvisable at this time. US can not agree to delivery of more than above amount to UK and even this not practicable except as considered with problem of TORCH supply which in our opinion must be combined responsibility. Can furnish fast tankers to inaugurate supply that area but escorts must be combined and provided equally by US and UK. Fast tankers will not proceed beyond Gibraltar or Casablanca. Further deliveries into Mediterranean to be made by UK tankers. Above most economical use of allied tankers for delivery of requirements of oil for UK and TORCH. If the foregoing meets your approval I suggest that further details be worked out between the Admiralty and the Navy Department. Roosevelt [MR*. Rb?C]

The two leaders continued to make arrangements for the meeting at Casablanca but Churchill's personal interest in codenames caused a bit of confusion. Cable C-252, containing the codename Churchill assigned himself, apparently arrived almost simultaneously with C-251, for the typed version of C-251 simply inserted the proper codename without noting that message 252 had thus been incorporated in 251. On January 8 a query went from Roosevelt's Map Room to London asking whether Churchill's number 252 had been sent, and naval communicators sent a second copy. The bracketed phrase was in the PREM 3 version of C-251 in place of the Prime Minister's codename.

C-251 London [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 2, 1943/ TOR 1927 [Z?] From Former Naval Person to President Most Secret and Personal. 1. Your 249. We will conform to your wishes and are observing the strictest secrecy. It might be worth while later on, when our absence becomes noticeable, suggesting we are meeting secretly somewhere in the United States; or anyhow, that I have gone to America. 2. In SYMBOL I am "Air Commodore 'Frankland' " [name in my immediately following]. Suggest you also choose an alias and one for Harry. 3. Also suggest press correspondents be entirely excluded, but presume no objection to our official photographers going out in Bulolo (my headquarters ship), pictures being released and afterwards and simultaneously to both countries. 4. Your 250 also received. Many thanks for your good wishes. Are you going to see De Gaulle before SYMBOL, or wait till afterwards? [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 503-4.]

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C-252 London [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 2, 1943/TOR 1911 [Z?] Former Naval Person to President Most Secret a n d Personal. My immediately preceding telegram FRANKLAND. [MR*]

Roosevelt had no quarrel with any of Churchill's suggestions and, as usual, chose to hold de Gaulle at arm's length. T h e Prime Minister's request that the press be excluded must have raised eyebrows at the White House, since it had been Churchill who violated that same sort of agreement at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941. Nevertheless Roosevelt, who thoroughly enjoyed secrecy, quickly agreed.

R-252 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 2, 1943, 6:30 P.M. Personal a n d Secret for the Former Naval Person from the President. Your 2 5 1 . 1. I heartily approve your P a r a g r a p h O n e . 2. T h e aliases from this e n d will be (a) Don Quixote and (b) Sancho Panza. 3. No press correspondents. I will bring one Navy p h o t o g r a p h e r a n d we can join in joint release. 4. I honestly think De Gaulle would feel happier if h e postponed visit until after SYMBOL. Also I would find great difficulty in giving him any time even if h e were to leave at once. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, p. 504.]

Churchill, ever sensitive to double meanings in codenames (he regularly wrote memos to various British officials about their choices), apparently feared the Casablanca meeting would be characterized as "quixotic" and immediately suggested new aliases. Churchill's supposed expertise about American politics is brought into question by his thought that Roosevelt might bring Willkie to the meeting. American politicians simply did not do such things, particularly not Roosevelt, since Willkie appeared the likely Republican presidential nominee for 1944.

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C-253 London [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 3, 1943/TOR 1843 [Z?] From the F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Your 252. 1. Your p a r a g r a p h 1 will be done. 2. Your p a r a g r a p h 2. However did you think of such an impenetrable disguise? In o r d e r to make it even h a r d e r for the enemy a n d to discourage irreverent guesswork propose Admiral Q. a n d Mr P. (NB) We must mind o u r P's a n d Q's. 3. Should you bring Willkie with you suggest code word W I N D M I L L . 4. De Gaulle. I think it far better the visit should be postponed till T O R C H affairs are Symbolized. [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 504-5. pWSC, IV, 670-71.]

When Roosevelt first agreed to meet Churchill he had insisted that the State Department be excluded but that Hopkins and Harriman attend (R—224). Harriman asked Hopkins on January 1 if that was still the plan, and the following message resulted. Harriman, who had gone to Moscow with Churchill in the fall of 1942 to pass on the news about delaying any second front, expected again to have to carry that news to Stalin. In the same cable to Hopkins, Harriman asked if the President wanted the British party checked for "ringers," that is, members of the Foreign Office (FRUS, Casablanca, p. 503). Harriman's middle name (which he used in lieu of his Christian name, William) was misspelled by the drafter of the telegram, possibly Leahy.

R-253 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 4, 1943, 11:05 A.M. Personal a n d Secret frorn the President for the Former Naval Person. I h o p e you can bring Averill with you a n d I have asked him to go to see you. H e can be very helpful. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, p. 503n.]

Churchill not only delighted in bringing Harriman, but he delighted in using the American as a decoy. Churchill's air transportation was scheduled in Harriman's name on the pretext that the President's Defense Expediter was going to Algeria on an inspection trip. However, Churchill sacrificed secrecy

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for ceremony and arrived at the airport outside Oxford, England, with headlights shining brightly and sirens screaming—something only the Prime Minister could get away with during "blackout" times. (See Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, pp. 179—80.)

C-254 London [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 5, 1943 I TOR 1019 [Z?] Personal a n d Secret from Former Naval Person to President. Delighted to bring Averell. [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, p. 503n.]

The difficulties of carrying out a world war intruded on Churchill and Roosevelt before they could meet at Casablanca. Chinese leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, encouraged by the American adviser in China, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, wanted a coordinated offensive to drive the Japanese out of Burma. T h e British, more interested in protecting India than in reopening the Burma Road (the dirt "highway" from Burma to southern China), were most doubtful about the chances of any such operation. Moreover, the concentration of British naval forces on the North African and Madagascar campaigns made an amphibious invasion aimed at recapturing Rangoon impossible. Chiang was unwilling to support limited action in northern Burma which would serve only to protect the British in India, and Britain had little interest in a risky campaign which would merely reopen the supply route to Chiang's forces. In fact, the British may well have preferred to see those American supplies go elsewhere. General Marshall, who had handpicked Stilwell for his assignment in China, strongly supported the ChiangStilwell argument, but Roosevelt tended to agree with the British. The question was resolved even before it was discussed at Casablanca, because the Admiralty stated it was impossible to provide the required naval support for any major invasion of the Rangoon area. Roosevelt's cable, drafted by Marshall and commented upon by Field Marshal Sir J o h n Dill, the chief representative of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, was completely ambiguous. It made no differentiation between the small operation in the north of Burma (RAVENOUS) and the major invasion of both the south and north (ANAKIM). Operation ANAKIM soon became a casualty of other decisions made at Casablanca, primarily the one to invade Sicily—which took away whatever landing craft might have been available. Akyab and the Chindwin River are in northwestern Burma, near the Indian border, almost 300 miles from the Burma Road. (The underlined phrases were suggested by Dill.)

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R-254 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 7, 1943, 6:00 P.M.

Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. I should like to acquaint you with a message received by me from Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. Begin brief of Generalissimo's message: Last spring the Prime Minister assured the members of the Pacific War Council that before the end of the next monsoon season, eight battleships, three aircraft carriers and the usual complement of other vessels would be in the Indian Ocean to assist in the recapture of Burma. We have been counting on the support of this naval force, for without it the recapture of Burma will be impossible. General Stilwell upon returning from a conference in India informs me that Admiral Somerville stated the British Navy has at its disposal only a few destroyers and submarines for operations in the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore, two months ago General Wavell promised General Stilwell the British could make seven divisions available to assist in the recapture of Burma. Now I learn that only three divisions are to be employed in limited operations with the objective of capturing Akyab and occupying the line of the Chindwin River. You can rely on the Chinese force being concentrated and ready for action on time in accordance with plans already made. I am sure the American air help for the campaign will be present. However, it is impossible to undertake the offensive with my troops unless the British carry out their part of the undertaking. All the principle United Nations spokesmen have pledged that Burma will be recovered in 1943. I therefore earnestly ask that you urge our British Allies to provide the necessary naval, air and land forces to carry out their part. End of brief of Generalissimo's message. I understand that definite progress is being made not only in preparations of the Chinese troops in India for the Burma Road operation but also of the Chinese troops in Yunnan. Units are being reorganized and equipped. Some of the supply essentials are even being flown in. I feel that we must do something to ensure that the Chinese put their full weight into the operations which are due to start in March. Can you suggest any assurance which we can give Chiang Kai Shek which will have this effect? Offensive action by the Chinese and the timeliness of a thrust into Burma this spring are all important. We also want to get started on our air offensive from China against Jap sea lanes (if not Japan itself), the moment sufficient and dependable communications over Burma warrant such action.

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That we may forfeit neither the Chinese potential nor the lift to United Nations morale of early action in Burma, I would like to give the Generalissimo the necessary assurances to prevent the Chinese attack stalling. We might together go over the substance of my reply to the Generalissimo later. Dill has seen this message. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 514-16.]

General Marshall instructed Eisenhower to check on Marrakesh as an alternative site for the SYMBOL Conference, but the shift did not prove necessary. Churchill's enthusiasm for the city was so great that he prevailed upon Roosevelt to join him, following the Casablanca meeting, for a drive to Marrakesh, where the two stayed overnight. The city is located at the foot of the Atlas Mountains about 150 miles south of Casablanca.

C-255 London [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 7, 1943 From Former Naval Person to the President Most Secret and Personal SYMBOL. I think it would be well to have subsidiary alternative base at Marakesh so that we could move there if Casablanca became too public. Weather is often warm and bright at Marakesh when raining on the coast. I stayed there for a month in January 1936 and thought it one of the best places I had ever struck anyway there is no harm in having it under our lee. I am asking that arrangements be made accordingly. [MR*]

R-255 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 7, 1943, 7:30 P.M. From the President for Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. Your 255, am referring matter to Eisenhower for his consideration. Sounds good to me. Roosevelt [MR*]

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Roosevelt delivered his State of the Union address to a joint session of Con­ gress on January 7. He defended the American production effort against critics and promised Hitler that he could not say "when or where the United Nations are going to strike next in Europe. But we are going to strike—and strike h a r d " (Public Papers and Addresses, 1943, pp. 21-34).

C-256 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 8, 1943, 0545 Ζ/TOR 10:30 A.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. Many congratulations on your g r a n d speech. [MR*]

General Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile and Commander in Chief of the Polish armed forces, had written to the President on December 22, 1942, requesting six aircraft needed for com­ munication with Polish underground forces. T h e American Joint Chiefs of Staff had turned down Sikorski's request because all aircraft were already committed. More important, the JCS insisted that all such aircraft should come out of the British allotment, a system which not only made sense logistically but also permitted the British to control the activities of their Polish allies.

R-255/1, letter Washington [via Sumner Welles] January 8, 1943 My d e a r Winston: O u r good friend, General Sikorski, has been urging us to assign at least six B-24 aircraft for t h e maintenance of his liason [sic] with Poland. I have j u s t written h i m that the United States cannot take action on his request without j e o p a r d i z i n g basic agreements in which t h e United States a n d Great Britain have each accepted definite responsibilities for t h e provision of aircraft within the various theaters of operations. I n accord­ ance with these agreements, Poland is within a British theater of opera­ tions a n d responsibility. I feel, however, that his proposal has a great deal of merit, a n d I told him, therefore, that I would refer the matter to you, with the request that you give it all possible consideration. It was my t h o u g h t (which I did not, however, convey to him) that you might p e r h a p s be able to spare

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him six out of the total of 398 B-24's allocated from U.S. production under the recent Arnold-Evill-McCain-Patterson agreement. Sincerely yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt [PSF:GB:WSC. FDR LTRS, p. 1392.]

Even as he was about to depart for Casablanca, Churchill remained concerned about Britain's dwindling oil reserves. An old problem, the lack of adequate escort vessels, continued to plague the Allies as German submarines remained active.

C-257 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 10, 1943, 5:24 P.M. /TOR 12:50 P.M.

From the Prime Minister to the President Personal and Secret. 1. Referring to your telegram number 251. I am grateful for your acceptance of our proposals regarding the ten day cycle and the institution of direct tanker convoys from the Dutch West Indies to the United Kingdom. 2. We agree that under the new arrangements and with the help of the spare tankers to which you refer and assuming that you will provide all the fast tankers required for the TORCH area, our imports into United Kingdom during 1943 will be about fifteen million tons which will barely meet consumption. 3. The Admiralty agree that for the moment the independent sailing of fast tankers to the United Kingdom is inadvisable but I suggest this decision should be reconsidered in the light of changing events. 4.1 agree that details regarding the opening of the Trans-Atlantic cycle, the institution of the direct Dutch West Indies, United Kingdom tanker convoys and the fast tanker convoys to the TORCH area should be worked out between the departments concerned. I fear it will be extremely difficult for us to find the necessary long endurance destroyers for even half of the latter commitment. [MR*]

Churchill's response to Chiang Kai-shek's demands for greater British support was simple: requirements for European operations made additional efforts in Burma impossible. Operation CANNIBAL, an offensive aimed at retaking the Arakan section of west-central Burma near the Indian border, proved a dismal failure. Operation RAVENOUS would not have opened the Burma

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Road to China and was, therefore, unsatisfactory to Chiang. Admiral Sir James Somerville's Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean could only keep open the sea lanes, for it was too depleted to consider major offensive action. General Sir Archibald Wavell, who had taken over the India Command after the collapse of the ABDA Command, was equally short of men and supplies. The monsoon season, which so affected military operations in that part of the world, ran from May through November.

C-258 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 10, 1943, 2208 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Your 254. 1. With regard to the Generalissimo's allegations that we have broken faith with him on two important issues, I should like you to know, firstly about the fleet, that I gave no promise or assurance at the Pacific War Council, but merely stated what were then our intentions, since changed by events of which you are aware. Secondly, Field Marshal Wavell has given no undertaking to operate seven divisions for the recapture of Burma before the next monsoon. The position on these matters is as follows. 2. We had proposed to form the eastern fleet July first, 1942. Since then however all Somerville's essential aircraft carriers have been drawn away. Victorious has been placed at your disposal. Illustrious must come home for refit. Formidable is busy with TORCH but also overdue for refit. The destroyers have been cut to a minimum for the sake of TORCH and the Russian convoys. Our shortage of destroyers is frightful. Therefore, although the battleships for the Eastern Fleet are, or will be all ready shortly, they are shorn of their indispensable ancillaries. The fleet in the Indian Ocean exercises a certain deterrent effect as the enemy do not know what it lacks. Also we hope to send Unicorn to join it pretty soon, but it will not be possible with this fleet to enter the Bay of Bengal until it has been reinforced with carriers, nor indeed is the fleet necessary for operations now being undertaken by Field Marshal Wavell before the monsoon. 3. I have been ardently pressing Field Marshal Wavell to take the of­ fensive to the utmost but, as we have had to cut off his supplies of landing craft for the sake of TORCH and future operations in the TORCH area or elsewhere, he will not be able to manage anything more than operations CANNIBAL and RAVENOUS before the monsoon. I am quite sure that he has been most anxious to bring the greatest force to bear on land upon the enemy and to press forward, but it is absolutely no use Chiang or

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Stilwell saying that m e n can be maintained at particular points in these mountainous a n d rain sodden jungles when in effect we know that they cannot. T h e r e are plenty of troops in India but the difficulty is to supply t h e m in the forward area u n d e r the prevailing conditions. 4. I h o p e therefore that any assurances to Chiang may wait till SYMBOL. In the meanwhile Field Marshal Wavell is keeping General Stilwell fully informed of the limitations which maintenance difficulties impose on his present operations. We had hoped that General Stilwell would have been able to make these problems clear to the Generalissimo. [MR*. FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 517-18.]

THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE (SYMBOL) President Roosevelt left Washington in the evening of January 9, traveling by train to Miami, Florida. There he and his party—including Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, and a number of presidential aides—boarded a Pan American Boeing clipper (a seaplane). After spending the night of January 11 in Trinidad, the group flew to Bathurst in British Gambia on the west coast of Africa. (Admiral Leahy stayed behind in Trinidad because of a serious case of the flu.) At Bathurst, which Roosevelt characterized in a chatty letter to Eleanor as "a tiny unhealthy spot," they took a C-54 (Douglas transport) to Casablanca, arriving in the early evening of January 14. Prime Minister Churchill left England by air on January 12, arriving in Casablanca that evening. A hotel in the resort suburb of Anfa along with some nearby villas provided a lush, comfortable, secure setting. As Churchill cabled home on his arrival: "Conditions most agreeable. I wish I could say the same of the problems" (quoted in Howard, Grand Strategy, IV, 241). Churchill and the British military arrived in Casablanca expecting strong opposition to their proposals for an expansion of operations in the Mediterranean theater. General Marshall had long insisted that the United States and Great Britain concentrate on preparations for a cross-channel invasion, and the American Navy was known to be pressing Roosevelt to shift men and supplies to the Pacific theater. If Marshall and the U.S. Navy had their way, there would not be enough left over to launch any attack in the Mediterranean. Military discussions began on January 13. T h e Americans argued for a major shift of resources to the Pacific theater, but the serious logistical backup, caused by a lack of harbor facilities in the central and southern Pacific, forced the U.S. Navy to lower its requests to a level which even the British found reasonable. In fact, the inability of Pacific forces to utilize the available landing craft prompted Admiral King—much to the surprise of the British—to promise to supply enough landing craft for both the invasion of Burma (ANAKIM) and any invasion of Sicily (HUSKY). Joint discussions about long-term military strategy found the British and the Americans in agreement on the eventual

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desirability of mounting a massive cross-channel invasion, but undecided on immediate operations. All agreed that inaction in 1943 was intolerable. Not only should the pressure be kept on Germany, but also Roosevelt and Churchill wanted to reassure Stalin that the delay in the second front was not a prelude to Anglo-American negotiations with Hitler. Since Marshall was inclined to believe that a major invasion of western Europe was unfeasible until 1944, he could support Eisenhower's recommendation to invade either Sicily or Sardinia (BRIMSTONE), once the Italo-German forces were out of Tunisia. With Churchill convinced that only a major invasion of Sicily and a subsequent move u p the Italian peninsula could satisfy the Russians, Operation HUSKY won out. The Americans insisted upon and finally received British agreement to a large-scale invasion of Burma, but that operation (ANAKIM) fell afoul of later changes in the needs of the central Pacific theater. Churchill summed up the strategic/operational aspects of the conference in a message sent back to the War Cabinet on January 17, 1943. His comment about increased British representation in the High Command reveals his distress over Britain's movement toward second-class status relative to the United States: . . . . The whole field of the war is being surveyed theatre by theatre. Admiral King of course considers that the Pacific should be a first charge on all resources and both the American Army and Navy authorities are very keen on more vigorous action in Burma to help China culminating in a large-scale ANAKIM later in the year. General Marshall is also keen on this, but otherwise his emphasis seemed to lie towards building up ROUND-UP or SLEDGEHAMMER at the expense of the Mediterranean. 2. On the other hand I am satisfied that the President is strongly in favour of the Mediterranean being given prime place. He also seems increasingly inclined to Operation HUSKY which he suggested to me last night should be called BELLY and I advised BELLONA 3. Meanwhile at the Combined Staff meetings it has become apparent that the Americans are increasingly turning to HUSKY instead of BRIMSTONE. That is what I should like. Admiral King even went so far as to say that if it was decided to do HUSKY he would find the necessary escorts. 4. T h e Mediterranean situation is being decisively changed by the victorious advance of the Desert Army.. . . In these circumstances, should all go well in the battle now in progress for Tripoli and should the clearance of Tripoli Harbour not be too difficult, the arrival of the Desert Army in the highest fettle in the Tunisian theatre should be decisive. So great a reinforcement of British troops and our numbers would evidently justify increased representation for us in the High Command . . . (Churchill to Deputy Prime Minister and War Cabinet, STRATAGEM no. 56, Jan. 17, 1943, PREM 3/420/3/64-65).

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During the conference, which proved remarkably free of rancor, two other joint policies received approval. The first, the continued heavy bombing offensive against Germany (Operation POINTBLANK), proved no problem so long as the Americans did not try to commit British air forces to daylight bombing. T h e second, the "unconditional surrender" declaration, provided little cause for discussion in 1943—but later became a matter of historical controversy. The idea that the Allies should demand the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan (Italy was frequently exempted in such discussions) had cropped up early in the war, and Churchill learned of Roosevelt's support for the policy at least as early as August 1942. They discussed it during the Casablanca Conference and then, in a move which Churchill claimed surprised him, Roosevelt set forth the policy in a postconference meeting with the press. Churchill may have been surprised at the timing (there is evidence both ways on that point), but there is no doubt that he and the President had agreed upon unconditional surrender as a general policy. Whether or not it prolonged the war by driving the Germans to fight on with no hope of a negotiated peace is both doubtful and moot. T h e declaration not only reflected a strong Anglo-American desire to eliminate permanently the "German problem" but also represented a clear and unequivocal promise to the Soviet Union that, in spite of the further postponement of a crosschannel attack, the British and Americans were in the war until the complete and utter defeat of Germany. Their hope was that the Russians were equally committed. (The idea that unconditional surrender surprised Churchill is effectively debunked by Pogue, Organizer of Victory, pp. 32—35; O'Connor, Diplomacy for Victory, pp. 50—53; and Cadogan, The Diaries, p. 506. At the suggestion of the British War Cabinet, the statement included Italy.) Roosevelt's fears, and his reasons for insisting on a public statement proclaiming the unconditional-surrender policy, are demonstrated by his proposal that General Marshall visit Moscow after the Casablanca meeting in order to inform Stalin that the Allies were determined to press the war against Germany. Roosevelt and Churchill had no intention of opening negotiations with the Nazi government, but their constant concern about Stalin's reaction to their delaying the second front suggests they feared that the Soviets would make an accommodation with Germany—-just as in 1939, when Stalin apparently concluded that the western European nations were encouraging Hitler to move eastward. Reports had reached the State Department that the Russians would fight only so long as German troops were within Soviet borders. (See Leahy, I Was There, p. 147; FRUS, Casablanca, p. 506.) At that press conference another event occurred which commanded headlines but which had little real effect on the history of the Second World War. As an unplanned part of the performance, French Generals de Gaulle and Giraud, under prodding by Roosevelt, stiffly shook hands while cameras clicked. T h e front-page photographs which appeared around the Allied world were extremely misleading. Giraud, expecting to be proclaimed the leader of the Free French, had eagerly accepted an invitation to come to Casablanca. De Gaulle, aware of Roosevelt's and Churchill's unwillingness to choose be-

8. "The Mediterranean Suction Pump": British policy prevails. Churchill and Roosevelt at Marrakesh, January 24, 1943.

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tween the two Frenchmen, at first refused Churchill's request and stayed in London. Only when Churchill threatened to withdraw his support from de Gaulle did the French leader reluctantly fly to Casablanca. Roosevelt, who spoke of Giraud as the eager bridegroom and de Gaulle as the unwilling bride, tried to get the two to agree to a temporary unified French command, but each refused to submit in any way to the other. Acting like snubbed royalty, de Gaulle refused to cooperate with Giraud while the latter, with equal haughtiness, claimed to be above politics and interested only in liberating France. Roosevelt's annoyance centered on de Gaulle, and the President later described the Frenchman's attitude: "The day he arrived, he thought he was Joan of Arc and the following day he insisted that he was Georges Clemenceau" (FDR LTRS, F. D. Roosevelt to John Roosevelt, Feb. 13, 1943, p. 1400; the allusion to a pair of monarchs is that of Henri Michel, The Second World War, p. 496). The most significant decision of the entire conference was tucked away in a Combined Chiefs of Staff report to Roosevelt and Churchill. The paper noted that the military had agreed to establish a combined staff in London to plan the large-scale cross-channel invasion, but eliminated a specific commitment to make that invasion in 1944. Headed by a Chief of Staff to the as then unnamed Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), this group began planning for the Normandy invasion (FRUS, Casablanca, pp. 789—98). T h e cooperative mood of Casablanca did not last for long. T h e American military felt the British had conned them into a Mediterranean strategy and began to suspect them of looking for ways to avoid a cross-channel attack, particularly when the British suggested that the logical follow-up to the invasion of Sicily might be operations in the Aegean Sea. The British, on the other hand, suspected the Americans of trying to shift the main focus of the war from Europe to the Pacific. When the U.S. Chiefs of Staff Committee requested of its British counterpart, a "clarification of the Casablanca decisions," the London committee commented that "while the American draft pays lip service to the offensive against the Axis in Europe, its implication is to give pride of place to the war in the Far East" (draft reply to J.S.M. 879, undated, PREM 3/420/7/6-9). Churchill scrawled "I fully concur" across the document and dated it April 18, 1943. Some of the participants in the Casablanca Conference had harbored such suspicions all along, and in less than three months the Casablanca mood had dissipated. T H E joint statements and communique which Churchill and Roosevelt issued during the Casablanca Conference are found in the published documentary record (esp. FRUS, Casablanca). Unlike most such Churchill-Roosevelt meetings, at Casablanca the two exchanged no personal notes or memoranda, or at least none have found a resting place in the archives. Churchill did give Roosevelt (Admiral Q) a copy of the following message from the Prime Minister to the War Cabinet which outlined the British position on future operations.

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C-258/1 Casablanca

Jan. 16, 1943 [Churchill to Roosevelt] STRATEGEM No. 36 from Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister for War Cabinet and Defence Committee. I have drawn up following Minute with which the British Chiefs of Staff are in complete agreement. I have reason to believe it will be similarly acceptable to Admiral Q, to whom a copy has been sent, and to American Chiefs of Staff. Minute begins—Most Secret. Note by Minister of Defence. (1) In my WP (42) 543 of November 25th, a copy of which was sent to the President [C—195], it was stated: "The paramount task before us is, firstly, to conquer the African shore of the Mediterranean and set up there the naval and air installations which are necessary to open an effective passage through it for military traffic: and, (Defence?) secondly, using the bases on the African shore to strike at under belly of the Axis in effective strength and in shortest time." This certainly remains our obvious immediate objective. (2) Since then General Alexander has become master of whole of Cyrenaica and the desert army has advanced to Sirte and beyond and is now advancing further. We know Rommel is withdrawing into Tunis with intention of standing on the Mareth position near frontier. The Italian Super-Libya Command is to be disbanded. Tripoli is being hastily cleared of supplies of all kinds which are being transferred to Sfax and Gabes. We are about to attack the Buerat position, and Generals Alexander and Montgomery expect to be in Tripoli in the early part of February. The port will have to be put in working order. However, by middle of March it should be possible to invade Tunisia from the South with 3, 4 or 5 divisions and to drive Rommel from the Mareth line if he is still there. The position here is more satisfactory than could be forecast on November 25th. (3) On the other hand, the attempt to take Tunis and Bizerta at a run has failed, and the enemy has established himself much more strongly there than we had hoped. We cannot now expect to drive him from the Tunisian tip before the end of March. Meanwhile, General Eisenhower is attacking eastward toward Sfax and Gabes and this action, if successful, and if combined and timed with General Alexander's advance and not affected by any counter-stroke by the enemy in Northern Tunisia, should have a decisive effect on Rommel's plan for retreat and place

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him in an awkward position between 2 fires and without any base whatever. Having regard to the costly character of the war imposed upon the enemy in defending the Tunisian (? word omitted) or against our growing force, we may consider the affairs in Tunisia as highly favourable to us, although the course of events has been different from what we had planned. Before the end of January it should be possible to see more clearly how things will go in this theatre. (4) Pending the expulsion of the enemy from Tunisia and destruction of Rommel's remaining forces, we should press on most vigorously with the air and naval measures necessary to re-open the Mediterranean to military traffic. This one of the principal rewards of TORCH, and the relief which will be gained by British shipping is (corrupt group) job. We must not let anything stand in the way of this. We have already reduced by about half up to the end of June, the shipping assigned to the supply of the Eastern Armies around the Cape. The opening of the through supply route will emphasize this gain and make it permanent. The traffic round the Cape will be reduced to very small dimensions and cease to be of major military importance. (5) Even before military operations in Tunisia are finished, and the necessary airfields wrested from the enemy, there should be no pause in our effort to build up the powerful air forces necessary to dominate the narrows of the Mediterranean and prepare whatever exploitation of TORCH may be decided upon as well as for long range bombing of southern Italy. (6) If agreement is reached on all the above, as seems possible, the field is clear for the discussion of the new phase. Minute ends. [PREM 3/420/3/62-63]

Roosevelt's return to the United States from Casablanca was long, busy, and tiring. After a trip to Marrakesh with Churchill, the President flew to Bathurst again. In spite of a low fever, he took a ride up the Gambia River, commenting again on the unhealthiness of the colony. After a flight to Liberia for talks with that nation's President, Roosevelt flew to Brazil for a brief meeting with Brazilian President Getulio Vargas on board an American destroyer. Exhausted by the talks and the flying (he disliked airplane trips because they affected his sinuses), he returned to Washington via railroad from Florida, arriving on the evening of January 31. Churchill also had some chores to do before returning to London. To the dismay of Eden and the Foreign Office, Churchill insisted that Russian victories on the eastern front and British successes in Africa made it an ideal

9. T h e partners

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time to lure the Turks into the alliance against Hitler. After a quick flight to Cairo, the Prime Minister met with Turkish President Ismet Inonu on a train near Adana, in southeastern Turkey. Although Churchill left the talks feeling most optimistic about the results, the Turks interpreted his remarks as endorsing their neutrality. More fearful of Russian expansion than of British displeasure, the Turks invariably asked for far more military assistance than the British could or would supply. Churchill never contacted Roosevelt directly about the location of the talks with Inonu, but he did send the President a summary of the discussions (C-259—A). The one thing which might have brought the Turks into the war—driving Axis forces out of the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea off the Turkish coast—was politically impossible because British policy called for those islands to be returned to Greece, not transferred to Turkey. (Since this message was not handled by the Prime Minister's regular communications staff, it was not assigned a sequential number in the ChurchillRoosevelt series of cables. Roosevelt's Map Room personnel labeled it message 258-A.)

C-258-A Cairo [via British Embassy] Jan. 27, 1943

From the Prime Minister to the President Most Secret. T h e T u r k is delighted, as you will see from his message to you. I am again in Cairo a n d shall start in a day or two to secret rendezvous in T u r k e y , n a m e of which I will telegraph later. I will keep you fully informed. H o p e all is well with you and that you are not at all fatigued. We seem to have got a good deal of world press. [MR*. WSC, IV, 705.]

Churchill was in Adana conferring with the Turks, but his London staff did not forget so important a date as January 30—Roosevelt's birthday.

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C-259 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 30, 1943, 1217 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Many h a p p y a n d glorious r e t u r n s of the day from your friend. Winston. [MR*]

British diplomatic representatives in Ankara, the Turkish capital, soon re­ ported that the Turks had interpreted Churchill's remarks as an endorsement of continued Turkish neutrality. Nothing could have been further from Churchill's mind nor, one suspects, did the Turks really misunderstand. As Cadogan reported to Eden: "Their real pre-occupation is of course Russia" (quoted in Woodward, British Foreign Policy, IV, 118). Roosevelt apparently did not send the long message Churchill had requested. (Paragraph 3 of the following message is, at least in part, a copy of a summary of the Adana talks which Churchill sent to the War Cabinet; see Woodward, British Foreign Policy, IV, 114n. T h e exchanges between Inonu and Roosevelt referred to by Churchill are in FRUS, 1943, IV, 1058, 1060, 1062, 1064.)

C-259-A [Cairo, via British Embassy] Feb. 2, 1943 F r o m t h e Prime Minister to the President. Most Secret a n d Personal. 1. I h o p e i n d e e d you are safely r e t u r n e d a n d are not u n d u l y tired. 2. My visit to T u r k e y was in my opinion a great success. I send you t h e following short note of my conversations with President I n o n u a n d a p a p e r called " M o r n i n g T h o u g h t s " which I gave him. 3. I p u r s u e d a m e t h o d of perfect trust a n d confidence, asking for n o e n g a g e m e n t but giving to the utmost of o u r power. In this a t m o s p h e r e President said that p a p e r was wholly favourable to his views, that if T u r k e y was allowed to be j u d g e we should get all we wanted, that he was in complete sympathy with us. I find him a very agreeable m a n a n d we m a d e friends at once. I n d e e d h e was most warm a n d cordial in all his attitude a n d h e a n d his Ministers reiterated again a n d again that they longed for o u r victory. I m a d e it clear that I did not wish t h e m to e n t e r t h e war in any circumstances which would lead to T u r k i s h disaster, which would be

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o u r disaster too, but that when circumstances were favourable I was sure it would be in the interests of T u r k e y to play h e r part. Everything we said in this sense was accepted with lively accord. I asked them whether there would be trouble with the Germans about my visit. T h e y said that they did not care. I had feeling that they have received an impression of internal condition of Germany very much more satisfactory to us all than anything previously received by them. 4. President I n o n u is sending you a cordial message. I h o p e in reply you will back m e u p a n d send a good long telegram. T h e y all attach the greatest importance to everything you say. If you can add something about an additional packet of munitions this would also be very good, although difficulty will be getting t h e m into their hands rather t h a n providing them. [MR*]

Two caveats must be kept in mind when one reads Churchill's "Morning Thoughts" about the problems of security after the war. First, the note was intended to convince Turkey that entering the war on the Allied side would benefit the Turkish self-interest. Second, the British Ambassador in Washington followed delivery of the note with a warning that the "Morning Thoughts" represented Churchill's personal views and were not a product of full consultation with the War Cabinet. (See Halifax to Roosevelt, Feb. 10, 1943, MR.) Whether that warning meant Churchill had had second thoughts or that the War Cabinet disagreed is not clear, but it does illustrate the difference in power between the President and the Prime Minister. Franklin Roosevelt could establish foreign policy whenever he chose; Winston Churchill could direct foreign policy but was always subject to the decisions of the War Cabinet. In practice, the differences were not as great as in theory, since Churchill frequently led the Cabinet and Roosevelt often deferred to the wishes of his advisers. Even when read with caution, the document offers a fascinating view of Churchill's thinking. Paragraph 3 indicates that "unconditional surrender" was directed at the military defeat of Germany and Japan, not at punishing the general populace. Paragraph 5 apparently grants the Soviet Union's demand for its J u n e 1941 boundary with Poland. Paragraph 10 indicates that Churchill hoped to follow HUSKY with an offensive in the Balkans. And paragraph 11 shows that Churchill's vaunted knowledge about American government was somewhat exaggerated, since he believed that American "isolationism" had constitutional foundations. Churchill chose to publish only paragraph 6 in his memoirs. Marshal Chakmak is Marshal Fevsi Cakmak, head of the Turkish Army. General Sir Alan Brooke was Chief of the Imperial General Staff; General Sir Harold Alexander was British Commander in Chief, Middle East; General

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Sir Henry Maitland Wilson was General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Middle East—Persia/Iraq. (The complicated British command structure in the Middle East resulted from Churchill's earlier attempts to infuse some fighting spirit into the area, and the niceties of British Army politics.) Churchill sent the "Morning Thoughts" to Stalin via the British Ambassador on February 24. (See Stalin/WSC, doc. 117.)

C-259-A/1 [Cairo, via British Embassy] Feb. 2, 1943 From the Prime Minister to the President. Most Secret. Morning Thoughts Note on Post-War Security. When United Nations led by three Great Powers, Great Britain, United States and U.S.S.R. have received unconditional surrender of Germany and Italy, Great Britain and United States will turn their full force against Japan in order to punish effectively that greedy and ambitious nation for its treacherous assaults and outrages and to procure likewise from Japan unconditional surrender. 2. In this, although no treaty arrangement has been made, it seems probable that Great Britain and United States will be joined by Russia. 3. The peace conference of the victorious powers will probably assemble in Europe while final stages of war against Japan are still in progress. At this conference the defeated aggressor countries will receive directions of victors. Object of these directions will be to prevent as effectively as possible renewal of acts of aggression of the kinds which have caused these two terrible wars in Europe in one generation. For this purpose and so far as possible total disarmament of guilty nations will be enforced. On the other hand no attempt will be made to destroy their peoples or to prevent them gaining their living and leading a decent life in spite of all the crimes they have committed. 4. It is recognized that it is not possible to make the vanquished pay for war as was tried last time, and consequently task of rebuilding ruined and starving Europe will demand from conquerors a period of exertion scarcely less severe than that of the war. Russia particularly which has suffered such a horrible devastation will be aided in every possible way in her work of restoring the economic life of her people. It seems probable that economic reconstruction and rehabilitation will occupy full energies of all countries for a good many years in view of their previous experiences and lessons they have learned. 5. Russia has signed a treaty with Great Britain on basis of Atlantic

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Charter binding both nations mutually to aid each other. The duration of this treaty is twenty years. By it and by Atlantic Charter the two nations renounce all idea of territorial gains. Russians no doubt interpret this as giving them right to claim, subject to their agreement with Poland, their frontier of June 1941 before they were attacked by Germany. 6. It is the intention of chiefs of the United Nations to create a world organization for the preservation of peace based upon the conceptions of freedom and justice and the revival of prosperity. As a part of this organization an instrument of European Government will be established which will embody the spirit but not be subject to the weakness of former League of Nations. The units forming this body will not only be the great nations of Europe and Asia Minor only. Need for a Scandinavian bloc, Danubian bloc and a Balkan bloc appear to be obvious. A similar instrument will be formed in the Far East with different membership and the whole will be held together by the fact that victorious powers as yet continue fully armed, especially in the air, while imposing complete disarmament upon the guilty. None can predict with certainty that the victors will never quarrel amongst themselves, or that the United States may not once again retire from Europe, but after the experiences which all have gone through, and their sufferings and the certainty that a third struggle will destroy all that is left of culture, wealth and civilization of mankind and reduce us to the level almost of wild beasts, the most intense effort will be made by the leading Powers to prolong their honourable association and by sacrifice and self-restraint to win for themselves a glorious name in human annals. Great Britain will certainly do her utmost to organize a coalition of resistance to any act of aggression committed by any power; it is believed that the United States will cooperate with her and even possibly take the lead of the world, on account of her numbers and strength, in the good work of preventing such tendencies to aggression before they break into open war. 7. The highest security for Turkey in post-war world will be found by her taking her place as a victorious belligerent and ally at the side of Great Britain, the United States and Russia. In this way a start will be made in all friendliness and confidence, and a new instrument will grow around the goodwill and comradeship of those who have been in the field together, with powerful armies. 8. Turkey may be drawn into war either by being attacked in the despairing convulsions of a still very powerful Nazi power, or because her interests require her to intervene to help prevent total anarchy in the Balkans, and also because the sentiments of modern Turkey are in harmony with the large and generous conceptions embodied in the Atlantic Charter, which are going to be fought for and defended by new generations of men.

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9. We must therefore consider the case of Turkey becoming a belligerent. The military and technical side is under examination by Marshal Chakmak, Generals Brooke, Alexander, Wilson and other high technical authorities. The political aspect is no less important. It would be wrong for Turkey to enter the war unless herself attacked, if that only led her to a disaster, and her ally Britain has never asked and will never ask her to do so under such conditions. On the other hand if the general offensive strength of Turkey is raised by the measures now being taken, and also by the increasing weakness of Nazi Germany, or by their withdrawal to a great distance, or by the great divisions taking place in Bulgaria, or by the bitter quarrel between the Rumanians and the Hungarians over Transylvania, or through the internal resistance to German and Italian tyranny shown by Yugoslavia and Greece: for any or all of these reasons and causes, Turkey should play a part and win her place in the council of victors. 10. In the first instance it is possible that the military situation might be such that Turkey would feel justified in taking the same extended view of neutrality or non-belligerency as characterized by the attitude of the United States of America towards Great Britain before the United States of America was drawn into the war. In this connexion the destruction of Rumanian oilfields by air attacks by British and American aircraft operating from Turkish airfields, or re-fuelling there, would have far-reaching consequences and might in view of the oil scarcity in Germany appreciably shorten the struggle. In the same way also the availability of air bases or refuelling points in Turkey would be of great assistance to Great Britain in her necessary attack on the Dodecanese, and later upon Crete, for which in any case, whether we get help or not, General Wilson has been directed to prepare during the present year. There is also the immensely important question of opening the Straits to Allied and then closing to Axis traffic. The case contemplated in this paragraph is one in which Turkey would have departed from strictly impartial neutrality and definitely have taken sides with the United Nations without however engaging her armies offensively against Germany or Bulgaria; and those nations would put up with this action on the part of Turkey because they would not wish to excite her to more active hostility. 11. However, we cannot survey this field without facing the possibility of Turkey becoming a full belligerent and of her armies advancing into the Balkans side by side with the Russians on the one hand in the north and the British to the southward. In the event of Turkey becoming thus directly involved either offensively or through being attacked in consequence of her attitude, she would receive the utmost aid from all her allies and in addition it would be right for her before incurring additional risks to seek precise guarantees as to her territorial rights after the war.

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Great Britain would be willing to give these guarantees in a treaty at any time quite independently of any other power. She is also willing to join with Russia in giving such guarantees a n d it is believed that Russia would be willing to make a treaty to cover the case of T u r k e y becoming a full belligerent either independently or in conjunction with Great Britain. It seems certain to Mr. Churchill that President Roosevelt would gladly associate himself with such treaties a n d that the whole weight of the United States would be used in peace settlement to that end. At the same time one must not ignore the difficulties which United States Constitution interposes against prolonged E u r o p e a n commitments. T h e s e treaties and assurances would naturally fall within the ambit of the world-instrument to protect all countries from wrong-doing which it is o u r main intention and inflexible resolve to create, should God give us the power a n d lay this high duty u p o n us. [MR. pWSC, IV, 711-12. Howard, Grand Strategy, IV, 637-39. «£iC]

In reporting to Stalin on the results of the Casablanca talks, Churchill and Roosevelt purposefully evaded specifics on the second front. They promised a stepped-up bombing offensive against Germany, an attack on the Japaneseheld island of Rabaul in the southwestern Pacific, and a large-scale amphibious offensive in the Mediterranean, but the invasion of western Europe was put in the vague category of "as soon as practicable" (Stalin/WSC, doc. 104). Stalin chose to interpret that as a promise of a second front in 1943, and on January 30 thanked Roosevelt and Churchill for providing information about the decisions reached at Casablanca and, in what seemed to be a response to the unconditional-surrender proclamation, promised that the Soviet Army would continue its offensive against Germany. As expected, the Soviet leader's primary concern was a cross-channel invasion: "Assuming that your decisions on Germany are designed to defeat her by opening a second front in Europe in 1943, I should be grateful if you would inform me of the concrete operations planned and of their timing" (Stalin/FDR, doc. 71). In spite of advice to the contrary, Churchill and Roosevelt had directed the Combined Chiefs of Staff to build up forces in England so as to be able to conduct some form of SLEDGEHAMMER (cross-channel invasion) in August 1943. Since the Combined Chiefs agreed "that there is no chance of our being able to stage a large scale invasion of the Continent. . . during 1943," the operations under consideration were far smaller than what Stalin expected. An invasion of the Channel Islands or even the establishment of a beachhead on the Cotentin Peninsula near Cherbourg would not engage the vast numbers of German troops which Stalin demanded. As Churchill told the War Cabinet, "nothing in the world will be accepted by Stalin as an alternative to our placing 50 or 60 divisions in France by the Spring of this year." Yet Churchill proposed telling the Russians that SLEDGEHAMMER

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in August 1943 would consist of a maximum of twenty divisions. (The quo­ tations are from FRUS, Casablanca, p. 789; Howard, Grand Strategy, IV, 327, quoting a message from Churchill to the War Cabinet.) The mention of "constitution" is probably a reference to Roosevelt's health, though it could relate to Roosevelt's constant problems with Congress.

C-260 Tripoli [via London] Feb. 3, 1943, 1201 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. See Stalin's telegram to us both of January 30. I think he is entitled to more precise information, and no one can keep secrets better. I think therefore we should say that— (a). There are quarter of a million Germans and Italians in Eastern Tunisia. We hope to destroy or expel these during April, if not earlier. (b). When this is accomplished we intend, in July or earlier if possible, to attack Italy across the Central Mediterranean with the object of pro­ moting an Italian collapse, and establishing contact with Yugoslavia. We expect to meet with serious opposition from German forces. If not, our task will be much easier. (c). This operation will involve all the shipping and landing craft we can get together in the Mediterranean and all the troops we can have trained in assault landing in time, and will be of the order of three or four hundred thousand men. We shall press any advantage to the utmost once ports of entry and landing bases have been established. (d). We are aiming at August for a heavy operation across the Channel, for which between seventeen and twenty British and US divisions will be available, of which four to seven will be US divisions, with a gross strength of fifty thousand each. Here again assault landing craft will be a limiting factor. Weather may, of course, spoil the Channel operation, in which case it will be prepared with stronger forces for Sept. (e). Both the operations will be supported by very large US and Brit Air Forces, and that across the Channel by the whole metropolitan air force of Great Brit. Together these operations strain to the very utmost the shipping resources of Great Brit and the US. It would also say that in accepting the conclusions of our Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister have enjoined upon them the need for the utmost speed and for reinforcing the attacks to the extreme limit that is humanly and physically possible. Let me know what you feel about all this. I have talked it all over with CIGS who is in agreement.

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I am so glad that you are home again. I hope all has gone well with the constitution. I shall soon be moving back by stages. Kindest regards to Harry. [MR*]

Roosevelt's revisions to the proposed message to Stalin showed that the President was equally over-optimistic, although he added some conditions to the second-front promise. Even with the reference to German defensive capabilities, "Pa" Watson, Roosevelt's military aide, commented to the Joint Chiefs that "para (d) promises much more than can be done, even though the word used is 'aiming' " (memo from Watson to Marshall and King, Feb. 4, 1943, MR). Roosevelt also eliminated the commitment to jump from HUSKY (the invasion of Sicily) to an attack on Italy. Instead, the President mentioned the Dodecanese Islands, even though the British—who would have been primarily responsible—premised such an invasion on Turkish cooperation. Possibly Roosevelt assumed the primary American effort would be spent preparing for SLEDGEHAMMER. De Gaulle and Giraud, the "bride" and "bridegroom," were far from even being friends, as Roosevelt soon found out. (The underlined sentence was added in Roosevelt's handwriting.)

R-256 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 5, 1943, 12:50 P.M.

From the President for Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. I wholly approve of your view that we should send a message to Stalin generally as indicated in your 260.1 suggest the following changes in the draft you sent me: Paragraph (B) to be changed to read: "When this is accomplished, we intend in July, or earlier if possible, to seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterranean, promoting an Italian collapse with the consequent effect on Greece and Yugoslavia, and wearing down the German air force; this to be closely followed by an operation in the Eastern Mediterranean probably against the Dodecanese". Paragraph (D), change this paragraph to read as follows: "We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross-channel operation in August, in which both British and U.S. units would participate. Here again, shipping and assault landing craft will be limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing of this attack must of course be dependent upon the condition of German defensive

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possibilities across the Channel at that time." Please inform Stalin that I approve of this message. I was thrilled by your visit to I n o n u . All goes reasonable well here. I take it that your bride and my bridegroom have not yet started throwing the crockery. I trust the marriage will be consummated. Roosevelt [MR*]

The tug of war between de Gaulle and his British supporters and Giraud and his American backers continued at many levels. Ever since taking over command of the French forces in North Africa, Giraud had complained about uneven currency-exchange rates which favored French colonies controlled by the Gaullists, and during the Casablanca talks Roosevelt promised Giraud that the exchange rate would be equalized throughout the French Empire. However, that commitment was made privately, and Churchill later repudiated or modified Roosevelt's arrangement. (This was the dispute over the so-called Anfa memorandum, given by Giraud to Roosevelt on February 3, 1943. In agreeing to the statements, Roosevelt clearly recognized Giraud as the major French leader.) Much to the annoyance of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, the President agreed to drop the exchange rate from seventy-five to fifty francs to the U.S. dollar, which overvalued the franc. Yet the British overvalued it even more, and refused to press de Gaulle to accept fifty; in Guallist colonies the franc remained at forty-three to the dollar. (See FRUS, Casablanta, pp. 823-28.)

R-256/1 Washington Feb. 6, 1943 President Roosevelt to Prime Minister. Most Secret and Personal. In accordance with Casablanca conversations we have reduced the exchange rate of the dollar in French North and West Africa 25 points, from 75 to 50 francs to the dollar, and the p o u n d rate has been correspondingly changed. In view of o u r c o m m o n undertakings in the French situation I earnestly request that the exchange rate in the territories u n d e r the control of the Fighting French be brought into conformity with the rate which has now been established in North and West Africa by raising the rate from 43 to 50 francs to the dollar a n d that a corresponding change be m a d e in the p o u n d franc exchange rate. I know you will realize the importance of immediate action in this particular. [PREM 3/471/474. MR (paraphrased version only).]

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During the Casablanca Conference, Churchill suggested that the British Eighth Army should come under Eisenhower's command once it crossed the border between Libya and Tunisia. He further proposed that General Alexander should become Deputy Commander in Chief of Allied forces in North Africa with direct command of all ground forces. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder would be shifted from his job as Air Commander in Chief, Middle East, to Air Commander in Chief of the entire Mediterranean theater. Ei­ senhower and the other American military leaders liked and trusted both Alexander and Tedder, and heartily endorsed Churchill's proposal. The sensitive nature of the Anfa documents, giving Giraud additional rec­ ognition as head of the French in North Africa, is indicated by Churchill's careful exclusion of that passage (the last three sentences of par. 3) from his memoirs, without the use of ellipses to show that something was missing. The amended agreement reflected Churchill's "intention to treat Giraud and de Gaulle upon an absolute plane of equality." (See Murphy to Roosevelt via Hull, Feb. 6, 1943, FRUS, 1943, II, 48-51.) Robert Murphy remained in North Africa as the President's personal rep­ resentative, Harold MacMillan was the British diplomat assigned to Eisen­ hower's headquarters (Minister Resident), and "Joe" was—of course—Stalin.

C-261 London Feb. 8, 1943, 1120 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. I propose to give the House of Commons some account of our joint affairs on Thursday 11th at noon BST [British Standard Time]. I have received from General Alexander a message saying that the directive I gave him on August 18th has been fully accomplished, as the enemy have been driven out of Egypt, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (see my immediately following telegram). Moreover the advance forces of the Desert Army are already advancing into Tunisia. This therefore is the moment when the Eighth Army should come under the command of General Eisenhower. I propose to announce this, as it should certainly come from this end. I therefore propose to you that Alexander's and Tedder's appointments should be released to synchronise with my state­ ment in Parliament. If you agree, the best arrangements for synchronising can be made between the press officers concerned. I hope however that no advance information about the Eighth Army will get out before I tell Parliament. I have just returned from Algiers where I had very satisfactory talks with Eisenhower, Smith, Giraud, Murphy and others. I hope you will approve of the amended drafts of the document conferring a certain additional status and power upon Giraud. I had not seen it beforehand

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although my name was mentioned. Murphy and MacMillan arrived at a complete agreement which Giraud very readily accepted. I have been travelling almost continuously since I saw you last and will send you a further report in a few days. I am sending you a separate message [C—263] about your proposed amendments to my telegram to Joe. At first sight they seem to be most admirable. Every good wish to you, Harry and all friends. [MR*. pWSC, IV, 724-25. R&C]

C-262 London Feb. 8, 1943, 1150 Ζ Prime Minister to President Personal and Secret. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is exchange of messages referred to. Begins. Prime Minister to General Alexander, Commander in Chief in the Middle East. Your prime and main duty will be to take or destroy at the earliest opportunity the German-Italian Army commanded by Field Marshal Rommel, together with all its supplies and establishments in Egypt and Libya. You will discharge or cause to be discharged such other duties as pertain to your command without prejudice to the task described in paragraph one, which must be considered paramount in His Majesty's interests. Ends. General Alexander to Prime Minister. Sir, the orders you gave me on August 15th 1942 have been ful­ filled. His Majesty's enemies together with their impedimenta have been completely eliminated from Egypt, Cyrenaica, Libya and Tripolitania. I now await your further instructions. [MR*]

Roosevelt was at Hyde Park resting and trying to shake off a fever he had picked up during the return trip from Casablanca when he received Church­ ill's messages about command shifts in North Africa. He instructed Admiral Leahy to prepare a reply and left it up to Leahy to decide whether or not to get presidential approval. In Roosevelt's scheme of things, Leahy was still the expert on policy toward the French. Leahy's attitude toward the Giraud-de Gaulle imbroglio is characterized by a statement from his memoirs: "It was

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certain that de Gaulle's followers were at this time interfering with our war effort, and our British ally, who was financing them, was taking no action to halt this interference" (Leahy, I Was There, pp. 145^46). Leahy continued to insist that the "American" nature of the North African campaign should be emphasized, and Roosevelt, whom Leahy did consult, agreed. (Underlined portions indicate changes made over telephone by Roosevelt.)

R-257 Hyde Park [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 8, 1943, 11:45 P.M. F r o m the President for F o r m e r Naval Person Personal and Most Secret. Your 261 of February 8 I am in agreement to your announcing on February 11 the placing of your Eighth Army u n d e r the c o m m a n d of General Eisenhower and the appointment of Alexander as deputy u n d e r Eisenhower, a n d also the appointment of T e d d e r . It is my opinion that cooperation by French forces will be best if the American S u p r e m e C o m m a n d in North Africa is stressed, and I consider it inadvisable to release a n d thereby make available to the enemy any information whatever as to the details of the duties of Alexander or Tedder. It is r e c o m m e n d e d that British a n d American press officers in L o n d o n send me draft of proposed press release and London time of release in o r d e r that the news may be given to the press of both countries simultaneously. I am so glad you are safely back. You have accomplished marvels. Roosevelt [MR*. pWSC, IV, 725. R&C]

February proved a successful month for the Allies. The German Sixth Army, commanded by Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, surrendered to the Russians at Stalingrad on the second. Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal ended on February 9, although some 13,000 Japanese were successfully evacuated. T h e British, by early February, had driven Rommel and his forces back into Tunisia, where they defended an ever-diminishing foothold around Tunis. Stalin's main concern was the second front, but Churchill merely used Roosevelt's suggested language on that question. Fearing that nothing would distract the Russian Premier from his insistence upon an invasion of Western Europe, Churchill nevertheless seems to have hoped that the intervention of Turkey would offset the delay in mounting such an attack. T h e Soviet-Turkish talks which Churchill was trying to arrange were finally held, but proved a failure. T h e Turks later claimed that the Russians had tried to separate

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Turkey from Britain. (M. Sarajoglu was Sukru Saracoglu, the Prime Minister of Turkey. Ivan Maisky was the Soviet Ambassador in London. Brendan Bracken was British Minister of Information and a close friend of Churchill.) Though obviously annoyed, Churchill went along with Roosevelt's request to emphasize the "American" nature of the North African campaign. In his speech to the House of Commons on February 11, the Prime Minister did not explain the specific orders given to Alexander and Tedder, thus rein­ forcing their subordination to Eisenhower's command. The criticisms Church­ ill and Bracken expected referred to the American handling of political af­ fairs, particularly the "marriage" between Giraud and de Gaulle.

C-263 London Feb. 10, 1943, 0352 Ζ To the President of the United States. Personal and Secret [from Churchill]. I send you the message I have sent to Joe as amended in accordance with your wishes [R-256]. "Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin most secret and per­ sonal. Your message of 30 January. I have now consulted the Pres­ ident and the matter has been referred to the Staffs on both sides of the ocean. I am authorized to reply for us both as follows: (A) there are a quarter of a million Germans and Italians in Eastern Tunisia. We hope to destroy or expel these during April, if not earlier. (B) when this is accomplished, we intend in July, or earlier if possible, to seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterra­ nean, promoting an Italian collapse with the consequent effect on Greece and Jugoslavia, and wearing down the German Air Force: this is to be closely followed by an operation in the eastern Mediter­ ranean, probably against the Dodecanese. (C) This operation will involve all the shipping and landing craft we can get together in the Mediterranean and all the troops we can have trained in assault landing in time, and will be of the order of 3 or 400,000 men. We shall press any advantage to the utmost once ports of entry and landing bases have been established. (D) We are also pushing prep­ arations to the limit of our resources for a cross channel operation in August, in which both British and United States units would par­ ticipate. Here again, shipping and assault landing craft will be limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing of this attack must of course be dependent upon the condition of Ger­ man defensive possibilities across the channel at that time. (E) Both

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the operations will be supported by very large United States and British Air Forces, and that across the channel by the whole Metropolitan Air Force of Great Britain. Together these operations strain to the very utmost the shipping resources of Great Britain and the United States. (F) The President and I have enjoined upon our Combined Chiefs of Staff the need for the utmost speed and for reinforcing the attacks to the extreme limit that is humanly and physically possible." I send you also a telegram I have had from him about Turkey, and the consequential message I have sent to Inonu after a long talk with Maisky who urged it. Perhaps you can emphasize it through your channels. I hope we may be more successful in making this marriage than the other. Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill personal and secret. "I received your messages concerning the Turkish question on the 2nd and 3rd February. Many thanks for information on your talks with the leading Turkish personalities in Adana. "In connection with your suggestion that the Turks would reciprocate any friendly gesture from the Soviet Union I would like to mention that we have already made a number of statements, the friendly character of which is well known to the British Government, some months before the Soviet German war as well as after its beginning. However the Turks did not react to our steps. Apparently they were afraid to incur the wrath of the Germans. I am afraid that a similar reception will be accorded to the gesture suggested by you. "The international position of Turkey remains very delicate. On the one hand Turkey has the Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship with the USSR and the Treaty of Mutual Assistance against Aggression with Great Britain,—on the other hand she has the Treaty of Friendship with Germany signed 3 days before the German attack against the USSR. It is not clear to me how in the present circumstances Turkey thinks to combine her obligations vis-a-vis the USSR and Great Britain with her obligations vis-a-vis Germany. Still if Turkey wishes to make her relations with the USSR more friendly and intimate let her say so. In this case the Soviet Union would be willing to meet Turkey half way. "Of course I have no objection against you making a statement that I was kept informed on the Anglo-Turkish meeting although I cannot say that the information was very full. "I wish the First and Eighth Armies as well as the American troops in North Africa every success in the coming offensive and a speedy expulsion of the German-Italian forces from the African soil.

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"Let me thank you for your friendly congratulations on the surrender of the Field Marshal Paulus and on the successful annihilation of the encircled enemy troops near Stalingrad." Prime Minister to Monsieur Sarajoglu for President Inonu personal and secret. "I told Premier Stalin about our talks, and have described to him the Turkish desire for closer understanding with the Soviet Union. "In reply Premier Stalin has recalled a number of statements of a friendly character towards Turkey which have been made by the Soviet Government in recent years. None the less Monsieur Stalin tells me that if it is the wish of Turkey to make her relations with the USSR more friendly and intimate, then the Soviet Government is willing to meet the Turkish Government half way and would welcome any suggestions that the Turkish Government could make to improve relations between the 2 countries. "In these conditions it seems to me of first importance that you should carefully consider the nature of the arrangements which would best contribute to the growth of confidence between Turkey and the Soviet Union. If you feel able to formulate these I feel sure that Premier Stalin would be ready to give them close and sympathetic examination. You will know that my good offices are always available to promote the successful outcome of any negotiations between our Turkish and Soviet Allies. "I feel most strongly that this is a very fine opportunity. I cannot conceal my desire for a warm renewal of friendship between Russia and Turkey similar to that achieved by Mustapha Kemal. Thus Turkey while increasing her own defences would stand between two victorious friends. In all this I am thinking not only of the war, but of the post war period. Tell me if there is anything I can do." Your number 257.1 will act in the way you wish but I cannot guarantee that there will be no criticism. I have received the attached note from Brendan Bracken who is in close touch with the British and American Press here. "I am having quite a lot of trouble in persuading some of the newspapers not to criticize the American handling of the North African campaign. If General Eisenhower's appointment as Supreme Commander is stressed and General Alexanders and Air Vice Marshal Tedders respective functions are left vaguely undefined, I think we must expect a state of criticism from the British Press. In this respect I have no doubt that the press would be reflecting the general feeling in the country and there would be far too many people who

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would honestly feel that British Commanders and Troops had been unfairly ignored for the sake of some move in international politics. "The British Government is accustomed to criticism and is not likely to be unduly ruffled. But the Americans will very much resent the almost inevitably resulting criticism of General Eisenhower's appointment or any comparison between his military qualifications and those possessed by General Alexander. I think it is important therefore that the public should be told that General Eisenhower is Generalissimo, that Alexander is commanding the forces of the United Nations fighting in Tunis, that Tedder is commanding the Air Forces." I shall utter the most solemn warning against controversy in these matters and every effort will be made by Bracken behind the scenes. Please do the like on your side to help your faithful partner. The Russian successes seem to me to be opening altogether a new situation. My hearty congratulations on Guadalcanal. [MR*. pWSC, IV, 715-16, 725-26, 744

R&C]

French politics continued to claim an inordinate amount of attention. Roosevelt adamantly refused to choose between Giraud and de Gaulle, claiming that only the French people could decide such an important question. Roosevelt's deference to anti-Jewish attitudes among Muslims in North Africa had already been criticized, but his real objection to elections in French North Africa stemmed from a belief that de Gaulle would win.

R-258 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 10, 1943 From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Most Secret. I am making a twenty minute broadcast Friday evening at White House Newspaper Men's Smoker. In regard to the bride and bridegroom problem I thought of saying something along the following lines: "At the Casablanca Conference the Prime Minister and I made it abundantly clear to all of our French friends that we are waging war in French North Africa against the Axis Powers and that this is a part of the effort of the United Nations for the liberation of France itself. We also made it clear that we welcome unity of all Frenchmen in aiding this great objective, and that only the French people themselves, after they shall have regained their liberty, can determine for themselves the Government they desire. Nothing should be done

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now outside of France to influence or prejudice that untrammeled freedom of the French later on a n d everything should be d o n e for present unity toward the prosecution of the war." If you speak at secret session of the House on T h u r s d a y I d o wish you would give me any suggestion of what you propose to say. I still d o not like the things that d e Gaulle and his headquarters are saying to the Press. I u n d e r s t a n d that he intimated yesterday some form of elections in N o r t h Africa for a system of central government. In my j u d g e m e n t this would raise the Jewish a n d Moslem troubles. I said to both Giraud a n d d e Gaulle that elections should not be held. Roosevelt [MR*]

Since some of the British officers subordinate to Eisenhower outranked their commander, General Marshall had asked the President to recommend that Eisenhower be promoted from Lieutenant General to General. Roosevelt's attention to how Churchill planned to announce the new command structure in North Africa reflected the American concern that Eisenhower's authority not be undercut in any way.

R-259 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 10, 1043, 1:55 P.M. For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. Your 263. I see n o particular h a r m in method you suggest announcing appointments and will proceed accordingly. I am sending Eisenhower's name to Senate T h u r s d a y n o o n to be full general. Roosevelt [MR*]

Churchill replied promptly to Roosevelt's request for an advance copy of that portion of the Churchill speech which would announce changes in command.

C-264 London Feb. 11, 1 9 4 3 , 5 : 4 0 A.M.

F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Your n o . 259. Following is the advance text of my reference to changes in c o m m a n d which may be h a n d e d out at 1315 hours BST, Feb 11th i.e.

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at approximately the time that I shall be speaking in the House of Commons. I may make minor verbal amendments later. Text of statement begins. French North West Africa is, as I have said, a United States operation under American command. We have agreed that the boundary between our respective spheres shall be the existing frontier between Tripolitania and Tunisia. But the Desert Army is now crossing that frontier and driving forward on its quest which is Rommel. As it passes into the American sphere it will naturally come under the orders of General Eisenhower. I have great confidence in General Eisenhower. I regard him as one of the finest men I have ever met. It was arranged at Casablanca that when this transfer of the Desert Army took place General Alexander should become Deputy Commander in Chief under General Eisenhower, not only over the Tunisian Area but, like him, for all purposes over the whole field. At the same time Air Chief Marshal Tedder becomes Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean and responsible to General Eisenhower for all air operations in his theatre. He will control also all air forces throughout the whole of the Middle East. This is absolutely necessary because our air forces from Egypt, Cyrenaica and Lybia, and also our powerful air forces operating from Malta, are actually attacking the same targets, both by bomber and by fighter aircraft, as the United States and British Air Forces now working from Algeria and Tunisia. You must have one control over all this, and that control must be exercised under the supreme commander by one man, who better than the trusted and experienced Air Chief Marshal Tedder for whom General Eisenhower so earnestly asked? Under him Air Vice Marshal [Arthur] Coningham, hitherto working with the Eighth Army, whose services have been much admired, will concert the air operations in support of the First and Eighth British Armies and other troops on the Tunisian battlefront. At the same time, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, who already commands all the British and American Naval Forces in this theatre, will extend his command eastwards so as to comprise effectively all the cognate operations inside the Mediterranean, with his headquarters in Egypt, will become commander in chief in the Levant, dealing also with the Red Sea and all the approaches from that quarter. There is no need for me to announce exactly where the line is drawn, but everything is arranged with precision. The vacancy in the command of the Middle East created by General Alexander's appointment as deputy commander in chief to General Eisenhower will be filled by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, now commanding in Persia and Iraq where the Tenth Army is stationed. It is proposed to keep Persia and Iraq

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as a separate command for the present and a new commander will shortly be appointed. Meanwhile, General Eisenhower has already obtained the consent of General Giraud, who commands the French army now being raised by American equipment to a very powerful force, which will play its part later on in liberating the French motherland, to this army being placed under the command of [Lieutenant] General [K.A.N.] An­ derson [Royal Army], together with the strong United States forces which have been moved forward into Tunisia. Thus we have a hi­ erarchy established by international arrangement completely in ac­ cord with the modern ideas of unity of command between various allies, and also between the three services: To wit: General Eisen­ hower with General Alexander as his deputy and under them the commanders in chief that I have mentioned. The House, the press, and the country will, I trust, be very careful not to criticize this arrangement or to run one general against another to the detriment of the smooth and harmonious relations which now prevail among a band of brothers whose teeth are in the job. In General Eisenhower, as in General Alexander, you have two men remarkable for selfless­ ness of character and disdain of all personal advancement. Let them alone, and give them a chance, and it is quite possible that one of these fine days the bells will have to be rung again. If not, we will address ourselves to the problem in all loyalty and comradeship in the light of circumstances. I have really tried to tell the House everything that I am sure the enemy knows and nothing that he does not know. I appeal to all patriotic men on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to stamp their feet on mischief makers and sowers of tares, wherever they may be found, and let the great machines roll into battle under the best possible conditions for our success. That is all I have to say at the present time. [MR*]

Churchill amended his House of Commons speech to put a little more em­ phasis on Eisenhower's authority.

C-265 London Feb. 11, 1943, 1135 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Reference my no. 264. The following passages have been deleted from the text which I sent

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you, and I hope that you can ensure that they are deleted from any hand out: (A) Passage beginning "Not only over the Tunisian area" and ending "for all purposes over the whole field." (B) Passage beginning "To wit, General Eisenhower" and ending "and under them the Commanders in Chief that I have mentioned." [MR*]

Early in January Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, received a message which said that Roosevelt looked forward to meeting with him (Eden, The Reckoning, p. 425). Although that may have been the President's way of mollifying Hull and apologizing to Eden for having excluded them from the Casablanca Conference, the British had long wanted to talk with the Amer­ icans about postwar questions, and quickly seized the opportunity.

C-266 London Feb. 11, 1943, 1715 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Apart from all the broad topics we have discussed together with so much agreement, there is in my opinion a real need for our foreign office and your State Department to have a much more thorough and detailed understanding of each other's viewpoints than now exists. I should like to send Anthony Eden to you for this purpose. He would also be able to tell you about things here, and you would certainly find him a most agreeable companion. Pray let me know how this strikes you. He could start about the last week of this month. [MR». FRUS, 1943, III, 2.]

Roosevelt agreed to meet with Eden, though the visit was delayed because of Churchill's bout with pneumonia, picked up during his journeys following the Casablanca meeting. Churchill's speech to the House of Commons was delivered on February 11 with only minor variations from the text which Roosevelt had approved. (See Churchill, Speeches, VII, 6742-55.)

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R-260 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 11, 1 9 4 3 , 6 : 1 5 P.M.

Personal and Secret for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. T h a t is an excellent thought about Anthony Eden. Delighted to have him come—the sooner the better. Your speech was g r a n d a n d will d o lots of good everywhere. [MR*. WSC, IV, 726. FRUS, 1943, III, 2.]

T h e British continued to push, gently but insistently, for increased authority and status for de Gaulle and the French Committee, though the French leader was less patient. His constant maneuvering for recognition as the head of a French provisional government frequently seemed to put politics ahead of winning the war, which put off even his staunchest British supporters. Churchill found such an attitude intolerable. Under the Third French Republic, the Conseih Generanx were Departement-leve\ elected bodies entrusted with advisory and administrative functions relating to taxation and public property. In addition, the experience of the Commune of Paris and Prussian occupation of parts of France prompted the National Assembly to authorize representatives of the Conseils Generaux to act as a temporary national legislature, charged with establishing law and order, in the event of the illegal dissolution of the Assembly. That law was never put into use, but it was apparently the concept de Gaulle had in mind. Churchill hoped to restrict the General's power and influence by substituting "de Gaulle in council" for just "de Gaulle" (par. 3). Vice Admiral R. E. Godfrey commanded the French squadron interned at Alexandria. To help guarantee that Godfroy would not turn against them, the British had been paying the salaries of the personnel in the French squadron. (See C—104.) However, the Frenchman's stubborn refusal to accept the authority of General Giraud had angered Churchill, who decided to cut off the subsidy even though Godfroy had threatened to scuttle his ships. The stalemate continued until the fall of Tunisia on May 13 finally convinced the Admiral that he had best join the Allies. Since the fall of France in J u n e 1940, French possessions in the Western Hemisphere had been governed by the French High Commissioner in Martinique, Admiral Georges Robert. T h e large number of French warships at Martinique, including the aircraft carrier Biarn with over 100 new Americanbuilt airplanes aboard, caused concern in the United States since Admiral Robert was loyal to the Vichy government. When the United States threatened to occupy the French West Indies, Robert agreed to intern the vessels and to follow policies of benevolent neutrality in return for an American promise to maintain French sovereignty over the territories. With the German occupation of all of France following the Allied invasion of North Africa, the

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British and Free French (under both Giraud and de Gaulle) demanded that Admiral Robert join the fight against Germany. The Admiral stalled, but ultimately was forced to resign in July 1943.

C-267 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 11, 1943, 2355 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. 1. I entirely agree with what you propose to say [R-258] about the Bride and Bridegroom problem. We too did not like what De Gaulle said at his press conference on the 9th February and we gave the press here guidance accordingly. 2. His statement about "elections" was a revival of the idea of bringing together the Conseils Generaux with elected representatives of other bod­ ies such as Chambers of Commerce, and thus forming a central provi­ sional authority. He was not thinking of parliamentary elections. 3. There was no secret session in the House, and I tried to put the Bride in her place by leaving her out. I am pressing very strongly that there should be substituted for De Gaulle De Gaulle in council, that is put him in commission. This will take a week or so. I will let you know how it goes on. 4. I have committed the unspeakable cruelty of refusing to pay any more English money to Godefroy to enable said Godefroy to loll about Alexandria in comfort. I intend to push this to the hard extreme and if he scuttles his ships in a final blackmailing attempt, he and his accomplices will be brought before an Egyptian Court. 5. I do beg you to put the screw on [Admiral] Robert who has just refused to receive Giraud's Emissary. I hope we might clean them both up about the same time. [MR*]

Largely because of a delay in the availability of landing craft, but also in order to allow additional training, General Eisenhower insisted that HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily, could not take place until July 1943. Churchill's impatience is best explained by a message he sent to Hopkins: "I think it is an awful thing that in April, May and June, not a single American or British soldier will be killing a single German or Italian soldier while the Russians are chasing 185 divisions around" (Feb. 13, 1943, MR). Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was British Chief of Combined Operations and an expert on amphib­ ious operations.

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C-268 London Feb. 17, 1943, 1210 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. T h e British Chiefs of Staff a n d Mountbatten have now gone into the whole question of the date for HUSKY in most careful detail, a n d wish to m a k e it perfectly clear that we shall be ready by the J u n e Moon. I h o p e you will see their telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, C.O.S. (W) 473. It would be a great pity to lose a m o n t h if it could possibly be saved. [MR*]

T h e lend-lease protocols were formal agreements regarding the amount and types of supplies to be given to the Soviet Union. Russian requests had usually exceeded America's ability to deliver the goods, but under the third protocol the United States managed to ship 30 percent above its commitments (Her­ ring, Aid to Russia, p. 116).

R-261 Washington Feb. 19, 1 9 4 3 , 6 : 1 5 P.M.

For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal a n d Secret. In accordance with o u r discussion at Casablanca, I think the time has arrived t o make definite a r r a n g e m e n t s for a third Soviet Protocol to cover the period July 1, 1943 to J u n e 30, 1944. I feel o u r two countries should make a combined offer to Russia some­ what similar in principle to the offering u n d e r the second protocol. If you agree, I would be pleased if you would designate some o n e to rep­ resent you in discussions to be held h e r e in the formulation of the p r o ­ tocol. I a m designating H a r r y Hopkins as my representative. In o r d e r to initiate action, we have already asked Russia for a statement of h e r needs from United States production d u r i n g above period. Roo­ sevelt [MR*]

Both Churchill and Roosevelt suffered illnesses following the Casablanca Conference. T h e Prime Minister had a bout with pneumonia and was in bed

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with a high fever from February 16 through the twenty-forth. T h e President had a low fever by the time he left Casablanca and blamed it on the unhealthy conditions in British Gambia. Although this illness persisted (Roosevelt re­ turned to Washington on January 31 and was "indisposed" from February 25 through the twenty-eighth), the medical reports do not indicate anything more serious than an attack of influenza.

C-269 London Feb. 27, 1943, 1555 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. I d o h o p e you are all right a n d that the fever will soon go. I have got rid of mine, which was heavy and long. I h o p e for good. Every good wish. [MR. WSC, IV, 736.]

Colonel J. J. Lleweilin was British Minister Resident for Supply in Washington.

C-270 London Mar. 2, 1943, 1350 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. T h a n k you for your telegram n o . 261 about the 3rd Soviet Protocol. I agree a n d designate Colonel Lleweilin as representative of His Majesty's Government. [MR*]

Roosevelt's letter enclosed a photograph of a portrait of General Sylvester Churchill along with a letter from Mrs. Leland Harrison explaining that people had seen a resemblance between the General, who had died in 1862, and Prime Minister Churchill. In his memoirs, Churchill agreed that the General was descended from the Dorsetshire Churchills, and included an abbreviated family tree (WSC, IV, 728-30).

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R-261/1, letter Washington March 2, 1943 Dear Winston, W h e n you a n d t h e family have a spare m i n u t e to give this a glance. It needs n o reply. I d o think, however, that Mrs. Harrison is right in r e g a r d to a certain resemblance. She is t h e wife of o u r Minister to Switzerland. As ever yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt [WSC, IV, 728-29. PPF 4154.]

Stalin was outraged at the delay in taking Tunisia, and demanded that the Anglo-American forces launch a second front in Europe by the early summer of 1943, in order to divert German troops from the Russian front and to prevent the Germans from recovering after a series of defeats (Stalin/WSC, doc. 114). It was a forceful plea which gave Churchill great concern. T h e explanation of events in Tunisia followed Stalin's comment that he did not understand why the Allied offensive had been broken off in December. T h e Mareth defense line south of Tunis was not breached until March 28, and then only after very heavy fighting. T h e temporary defeat of American forces at the Kasserine Pass in late February was the local reverse referred to by Churchill.

C-271 London [via U.S. Army] Mar. 4, 1943, 2200 Ζ I TOR 8:45 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. So far we have sent n o answer to Stalin's telegram of Feb. 16th which was addressed to both of us. We think it i m p o r t a n t h e r e that we should keep together. I have therefore drafted the following. P e r h a p s you will let m e know what you a n d your advisers think about it. Draft telegram begins: "Most secret. Jointly from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin. Personal and most secret. 1. We t h a n k you for your full statement of the 16th Feb. 2. I n spite of t h e delay in clearing the Axis out of N o r t h Africa, plans a n d preparations are being pressed forward to carry out op­ eration HUSKY (which is t h e new code word, see o u r immediately following telegram) in J u n e .

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3. We are also preparing plans for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as (a) the capture of Crete and/or the Dodecanese, and (b) a landing in Greece. The time of these operations is largely governed by the result of HUSKY and the availability of the necessary assault shipping and landing craft. The assistance of Turkey would of course be of immense value. 4. The Anglo American attempt to get Tunis and Bizerta at a run was abandoned in December because of the strength of the enemy, the impending rainy season, the already sodden character of the ground and the fact that the communications stretched 500 miles from Algiers and 160 miles from Bone through bad roads and a week of travelling over single track French railways. It was only possible to get supplies up to the Army by sea on a small scale owing to the strength of enemy air and submarine attack. Thus it was not possible to accumulate the petrol or other supplies in the forward areas. Indeed, it was only just possible to nourish the troops already there. The same was true of the air, and improvised airfields became quagmires. When we stopped attacking there were about 40,000 Germans in Tunisia apart from Italians and from Rommel who was still in Tripoli. The German force in North Tunisia is now more than double that figure, and they are rushing over every man they can in transport aircraft and destroyers. We suffered some sharp local reverses towards the end of last month but the position has now been restored. We hope that the delays caused by this setback will be repaired by the earlier advance of Montgomery's army which should have 6 divisions (say 200,000 men) operating from Tripoli with sufficient supplies against the Mareth position by March 19th or perhaps a little earlier. In the northern sector of Tunisia, however, the ground is still too wet for major operations. 5. We thought that you would like to know those details of the story although it is on a small scale compared with the tremendous operations over which you are presiding. 6. Our staffs estimate that about half the number of divisions which were sent to the Soviet-German front from France and low countries since last November have already been replaced mainly by divisions from Russia and Germany, and partly by new divisions formed in France. They estimate that at the present time there are 30 German Divisions in France and the low countries. 7. The bomber offensive from the United Kingdom has been going steadily forward. During February over 10,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Germany and on German occupied territory. Our staffs estimate that out of a German first-line strength of 4500 aircraft, 1850 are now on the Russian front, the remainder being held opposite us on the Western and Mediterranean fronts.

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8. With regard to an attack across the channel, it is our earnest wish that o u r troops should be in the general battle in E u r o p e which you are fighting with such astounding prowess. But you should know that o u r shipping situation is very serious at the moment. In o r d e r to sustain the operations in North Africa, the Pacific and India, and to carry supplies to Russia, the import p r o g r a m m e into the United Kingdom has been cut to the bone, and we have eaten, and are eating, deeply into reserves. It would be impossible to provide the shipping to bring back any of the forces now in North Africa in time for operations across the channel this year. However, we are doing all that we can to concentrate a strong American land and air force in the United Kingdom. In h e r e again we are crippled for lack of shipping. In case the enemy should weaken sufficiently we are p r e p a r i n g to strike earlier than August, and plans are kept alive from week to week. If h e does not weaken, a p r e m a t u r e attack with insufficient forces would merely lead to a bloody repulse and a great t r i u m p h for the enemy. [MR*. R&C]

Roosevelt often expressed a desire to avoid "ganging u p " on Stalin, and he frequently contacted the Russian leader without consulting Churchill, as he had already done in this case. His response to Stalin's angry cable was shorter and more vague than Churchill's draft reply. Churchill made some revisions to his own message before sending it to the Soviets on March 11. These consisted mainly of a much fuller presentation of the troop strength available to the Allies plus a mention of the proposed invasion of Burma (ANAKIM) and the VULCAN offensive against the Italo-German forces in Tunisia {Stalinl WSC, doc. 123). On March 18, the British Embassy in Washington sent Roosevelt a copy of Churchill's message and Stalin's reply of March 15. In that cable the Russian Premier again complained of German divisions being transferred from the West to the Russian front and flatly stated that HUSKY "can by no means replace a second front in France," even though he welcomed the invasion of Sicily (Stalin/WSC, doc. 129).

R-262 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Mar. 5, 1943, 1 1 : 3 5 A.M. For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Personal a n d Secret. Replying to your message 271 of March 4th I am sorry we failed to send you my reply to Stalin's message of February 16th which I sent to him on February 22nd and which is quoted herewith following

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"I have received your message of February 16th in which you present certain considerations that you have communicated to Mr. Churchill in reply to his message to you of February 12th. I regret equally with you that the Allied effort in North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the schedule which was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the roads extremely difficult for both troops and supplies enroute from our landing ports to the front lines and made the fields and mountains impassable. I realize fully the adverse effect of this delay on the common allied effort and I am taking every possible step to begin at the earliest possible moment successful aggressive action against the Axis forces in Africa with the purpose of accomplishing their destruction. You are fully informed in regard to the wide dispersion of America's transportation facilities at the present time and I can assure you that we are making a maximum effort to increase the output of ships to improve our transportation. I understand the importance of a military effort on the Continent of Europe at the earliest practicable date in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army, and you may be sure that the American war effort will be projected onto the Continent of Europe at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by our maximum effort. We hope that the success of your heroic army, which is an inspiration to all of us, will continue. Signed Roosevelt." I have no suggested changes to your proposed reply to Stalin as contained in your number 271 to me. In view of my reply to Mr. Stalin it does not seem advisable that your message be considered a joint message from both of us. Roosevelt [MR*. pWSC, IV, 746--17.]

In what proved the last Japanese attempt to use large ships to reinforce their positions in New Guinea, land-based American aircraft destroyed the entire convoy of eight transports and four destroyers during air raids over the Bismarck Sea, March 1-4. Japanese aircraft losses were also heavy. (Roosevelt's first inauguration as President was on March 4, 1932.)

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C-272 London [via U.S. Embassy] Mar. 5, 1943, 1719 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. Accept my warmest congratulations on your brilliant victory in the Pacific, which fitly salutes the e n d of your first ten years. [MR*]

Churchill sent the film Desert Victory to both Stalin and Roosevelt, who en­ couraged its use as a morale builder. It proved most popular.

C-272/1, letter London March 5, 1943 My d e a r Mr. President, I h o p e you will accept the accompanying copy of the new film "Desert Victory", which I saw last night a n d t h o u g h t very good. It gives a vivid a n d realistic picture of the battles, a n d I know that you will be interested in the p h o t o g r a p h s of your S h e r m a n tanks in action. I am having the film sent to you by Air so that you may see it as soon as possible. I was so sorry to see that you had been ill, and I h o p e that you have fully recovered. I a m feeling very m u c h better a n d h o p e soon to r e t u r n to full work. With kindest regards and all best wishes to Mrs. Roosevelt, H a r r y and yourself, Yours always, [initialed] W.C. [MR. WSC, IV, 738.]

T h e r e is no clear explanation for the unusual twelve-day hiatus in exchanges which occurred in mid-March. Possibly Roosevelt's lingering illness, which required a five-day rest at Hyde Park, was the reason for the President's comments in the following letter that his bout with the flu had left him weakened for some time. Anthony Eden arrived in Washington on March 12, and the subjects he and American officials discussed appeared in Churchill-Roosevelt telegrams sent later in the month. (See C-272/A, C-273/1, C-274/A, C-279, R-263, R-266, R-268.) Like Roosevelt, Churchill—who had never held a post in the Foreign Office—was highly suspicious and critical of his professional diplo­ mats; hence the President's remark about Eden's fearing what the Foreign

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Office would be like on his return. Eden remained in the United States until March 30, during which time a vast array of subjects came under discussion. One of these, the severe shortage of shipping, related directly to impending military operations. Presented with apparently irreconcilable demands to support both the British economy and military actions (see C-273/1), Roosevelt held to the premise that England's economic health had first call and scrawled this fascinating scenario (quoted in Howard, Grand Strategy, IV, 297-98): Germany Mediterranean

No BOLERO. Build long-range bombing to maximum. (1) HUSKY. If HUSKY Italy next and at once. (2) And/or Turkey. Burma ANAKIM out. Keep China going by air. South West Pacific Continue as now.

T h e other major topic Eden and the Americans talked about was postwar planning. Hopkins and Roosevelt both emphasized the need to avoid giving American "isolationists" any ammunition in their attempts to keep America from becoming permanently involved in European affairs, and all three men discussed their hope that the Soviet Union would prove cooperative and reasonable after the war. (See the headnote to R—268 for additional material on Eden's talks with the Americans about postwar matters.) Aside from a few digs by the President about British colonialism, the meetings were friendly and candid. Churchill's reputation as the "world's worst patient" reached the White House via a news-service wire report of February 23. It was firmly denied by Churchill's doctor, Lord Moran, some years later (Moran, Churchill, pp. 95— 96).

R-262/1, letter Washington March 17, 1943 Dear Winston: T h a t new film "Desert Victory" is about the best thing that has been d o n e about the war o n either side. Everyone here is enthusiastic. I gave a special showing for the White House Staff and tonight the Interior D e p a r t m e n t employees are having a special showing because everybody in town is talking about it; and I u n d e r s t a n d that within ten days it will be in the picture houses. Great good will be done. I think I picked u p sleeping sickness or Gambia fever or some kindred b u g in that hell-hole of yours called Bathurst. It laid me low—four days in bed—then a lot of sulphadiathole which cured the fever and left me feeling like a wet rag. I was no good after 2 P.M. and, after standing it for a week or so, I went to Hyde Park for five days; got full of health in glorious zero weather—came back h e r e last week and have been feeling like a fighting cock ever since.

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A n t h o n y spent t h r e e evenings with me. H e is a grand fellow and we are talking everything from Ruthenia to the production of peanuts! It is an interesting fact that we seem to agree o n about 9 5 % of all the subjects—not a bad average. H e seems to think that you will manage rather well with the leadership in the H o u s e of Commons—but both of us are concerned over what you will d o with the Foreign Office! We fear that he will not recognize it when h e gets back. Please, please, for the sake of the world, don't overdo these days. You must r e m e m b e r that it takes about a m o n t h of occasional let-ups to get back your full strength. H a r r y is in g r a n d form and all goes well here. Tell Mrs. Churchill that when I was laid u p I was a thoroughly model patient a n d that I h o p e you will live down the reputation in o u r Press of having been the "world's worst patient." God bless you. As ever yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt [PSF:GB:WSC. WSC, IV, 738-39. FDR LTRS, pp. 1413-14.]

After the delay in taking Tunisia and hints of a further postponement of the cross-channel invasion, Churchill was reluctant to give Stalin the bad news that the recently revived convoys to northern Russia had to be suspended again. Four convoys had reached Murmansk between December 1942 and February 1943, but increased German submarine activity in the Adantic forced the British to divert escort vessels to that area, and thus the movement of the heavy German warships to Narvik in Norway, above the Arctic Circle, forced the cancellation of the March convoy. Moreover, the requirements of HUSKY eliminated any further convoys until the fall of 1943. Apparently Churchill hoped that success with PUGILIST, the attack along the Mareth line in Tunisia, would soften the blow to Stalin. Churchill cabled Eden, then in Washington, that "we might just as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb," and the Prime Minister's proposed cable to Stalin was appropriately blunt and candid (Howard, Grand Strategy, IV, 332). Admiral K. Donitz had become Commander in Chief of the German Navy late in January. (This message was sent via the British Embassy, probably so that Eden could see it before Roosevelt got a copy. T h e message was designated no. 272-A by White House personnel.)

C-272-A London [via British Embassy] Mar. 18, 1943 For the President from the F o r m e r Naval Person. Most Secret. G e r m a n naval concentration at Narvik now comprises Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Lutzow, one 6-inch cruiser and eight destroyers with 15 U-boats a n d

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air forces also available. Admiral Doenitz has taken command. The move of Tirpitz and Scharnhorst to north became apparent on Sunday last. 2. It is in the opinion of Defence Committee impossible to run the March convoy (J.W. 54), due to sail 27th, while this concentration is maintained. A German move through leads to Alten Fiord under close air cover cannot be prevented. The convoy and its escort would have to go south of Bear Island under air and U-boat attack. The principal units of the Home Battle Fleet would have to be sent into the Barents Sea as escort, remaining five or six days exposed to U-boat and air attacks. This move would of course open the Atlantic and enable Germans to pass fast heavy ships or, if they chose, to come with their whole fleet on to our main lines of communications with disastrous consequences to our convoys. We cannot therefore send Battle Fleet into Barents Sea and without it the convoy could easily be destroyed by German surface ships. I send you in my immediately following the minutes of the First Sea Lord on which the Defence Committee reached its conclusion. 3. However as the German concentration at Narvik may disperse, it is not proposed to unload convoy J.W. 54. It may therefore start under the protection of the Home Fleet as a blind, being turned back to Iceland, if the enemy keeps his station. Should an opportunity occur in April or May, a renewed attempt to pass this convoy through will be made. Meanwhile two ships, which have already started to load in the United States for May convoy (J.W. 55) might continue to load in order to avoid a premature disclosure to Russians at your ports that this convoy will probably not sail. 4. This news will be a heavy blow to Stalin and his Government. Coming upon them as it does in the mood revealed in paragraph 1 of his telegram [Stalin/WSC, doc. 129] to me, which I have repeated to you in my telegram to Mr. Eden, it will certainly excite their grievous resentment. I propose therefore to allow operation PUGILIST to develop before informing Stalin. This will also give time for me to receive your views and advice. We have not yet broken it to him that convoys will have to be suspended altogether during the operation HUSKY. I feel it will be right and wise to place the picture before him as a whole, dark though it be. What do you say? 5. Sinkings in the North Atlantic of 17 ships in two days in convoys H.X. 229 and S.C. 122 are a final proof that our escorts are evidently too thin. The strain upon British Navy is becoming intolerable. If instead of carrying out blind proposed in paragraph 3 above it were definitely decided now not to run any more convoys to Russia until after HUSKY, viz. August or September, that would release one escort carrier, several ocean-going escort vessels, and six other escort vessels for immediate service and enable us to form support groups in Atlantic, which are vital, and to bridge April and May gap before our reinforcements, particularly

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of air power, come into play. My mind is therefore t u r n i n g to a blunt and complete cessation till after HUSKY. H e r e again I should be most grateful for your advice. [MR]

Attached to the preceding telegram was a proposed message from Churchill to Stalin. It was sent to the Russian Premier on March 30 with the last sentence of paragraph 2 deleted (Stalin/WSC, doc. 136). (See R-263, C-272-A, and R-265.) F I R S T A T T A C H M E N T TO C - 2 7 2 - A

Proposed Message from the Prime Minister to Premier Stalin. 1. T h e Germans have concentrated at Narvik a powerful battle fleet consisting of Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Lutzow, one six-inch cruiser and eight destroyers. T h u s d a n g e r to Russian convoys which I described in my message to you of July 17th last year has been revived in even m o r e menacing form. I told you then that we did not think it right to risk o u r h o m e fleet in Barents Sea where it could be b r o u g h t u n d e r attack of G e r m a n shore-based aircraft and U-boats, without adequate protection against either; and I explained that if one or two of o u r most m o d e r n battleships were to be lost or even seriously damaged while Tirpitz and other large units of the G e r m a n battle fleet remained in action, the whole c o m m a n d of the Atlantic would be jeopardised with dire consequences to o u r common cause. 2. President Roosevelt and I have therefore decided with the greatest reluctance that it is impossible to provide adequate protection for the next Russian convoy and that without such protection there is not the slightest chance of any of the ships reaching you in the face of the known G e r m a n preparations for their destruction. O r d e r s have therefore been issued that sailing of March convoy is to be postponed. T h e cargo ships will however remain loaded so that if German naval concentration should shortly disperse, the convoy could start for N o r t h Russia as soon as the necessary escort vessels could be again collected. 3. It is a great disappointment to President Roosevelt and myself that it should be necessary to postpone March convoy. H a d it not been for G e r m a n concentration it had been o u r firm intention to send you a convoy of 30 ships each in March and again early May; and it is still o u r intention that at least one of the convoys should be sent if position of G e r m a n heavy ships is such that convoy has a reasonable chance of getting through. At the same time we feel it only right to let you know at once that it will not be possible to

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continue convoys by Northern route after early May, since from that time onward every single escort vessel will be required to support our offensive operations in the Mediterranean leaving only a minimum to safeguard our lifeline in the Atlantic. In the latter we have had grievous and almost unprecedented losses during the last three weeks. Assuming HUSKY goes well we should hope to resume the convoys in early September provided disposition of German main units permits and that the situation in North Atlantic is such as to enable us to provide the necessary escorts and covering force. 4. We are doing our utmost to increase the flow of supplies by Southern route. The monthly figure has been more than doubled in the last six months. We have reason to hope that increase will progress and that figures for August will reach 240,000 tons. If this is achieved, the monthly delivery will have increased eight-fold in 12 months. This will in some way offset both your disappointment and ours at the interruption to northern convoys. [MR]

SECOND ATTACHMENT TO C-272-A

Following is Admiralty minute referred to at the end of paragraph 2 of Prime Minister's message. The Naval Staff have always taken the view that if the Germans concentrated a sufficient force in the far north and were prepared to use it properly it would be impossible to run a North Russian convoy. 2. Situation about the running of J.W. 54 is as follows: (a) Channel south of Bear Island is only 200 miles wide which means that convoy will have to pass not more than 200 miles from German aerodromes. (b) At time convoy passes Bear Island there will be no darkness though there will be about nine hours of twilight in which visibility is from five to seven miles. (c) Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Lutzow, one 6-inch cruiser and 8 destroyers are concentrated at Narvik. (d) There are 15 U-boats in North Norway. (e) Air forces in North Norway though not as strong as they have been are very considerable and as follows: dive bombers 39, long range bombers 30. As far as is known there are no torpedo bombers but there are 18 torpedo float planes. It is estimated that North Norway could be reinforced by 60 long range bombers in 3 days.

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(f) We must assume that Admiral Doenitz and Cruiser Admiral who is in command of the concentration at Narvik will be ready to play a game in which the cards are in their hands. 3. Against this force the covering forces which we have relied on, e.g. a covering force of cruisers and a striking force of destroyers would be quite inadequate to deal with the German forces. 4. Hence to run J.W. 54 it would be necessary to send battle fleet and a carrier into the Barents Sea. I do not consider that we are any more justified in doing this now than in the past. 5. I am definitely of the opinion therefore that as long as this German concentration as given in paragraph 2(c) above continues we should not be justified in running J.W. 54. The Commander-inChief quite independently has expressed the same opinion. 6. In June 1942 we attempted to run convoy P.Q. 17 when it was known that the Tirpitz, Scheer and Hipper were concentrated in North Norway. At this time ice limit was well to the northward and there was plenty of room for a wide dispersion if this were ordered. As is known, in belief that attack on convoy by German surface forces was imminent the only alternative of dispersion was ordered, but even this led to disastrous results to the convoy from U-boat and air attack. At present time there is no room for dispersion. 7. If the majority of the Home Fleet are in the far north covering a Russian convoy we shall have inadequate forces to prevent a breakout of German surface forces into the Atlantic. We have had clear indications that the Germans have been collecting data regarding our patrols in Denmark Strait and in Iceland-Faroes Channel. The natural inference is that they are considering a break-out of some surface forces into the Atlantic. 8. It is always possible, though I do not think likely, that the concentrations at Narvik are due to the new Admiral wishing to meet all his ships. It must be realized that the concentration can only be considered to have been reduced when one of the ships forming it is known to have returned to the Baltic. 9. If the Tirpitz were to return to the Baltic we are still faced with a much stronger concentration than we have had to face up to date as Scharnhorst and Lutzow are considerably stronger than Lutzow and Hipper. 10. To run J.W. 54 in face of the present concentration less the Tirpitz it would be necessary to send a battleship right through to Murmansk with the convoy. This battleship would not have any fighter protection and after a certain period would not have a destroyer

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escort as the latter would have run out of fuel. 11. I am of the opinion therefore that even if the Tirpitz returns to the Baltic we should only be justified in attempting to run J.W. 54 if political reasons for doing so are so great that it is justifiable to accept the possibility of losing a battleship of the K.G. 5 class when the latter was being used in an unsound manner, e.g. in range of shore-based air attack and in face of a U-boat concentration without fighter protection and after a time without A/S [anti-submarine] escort. 12. Apart from the possible loss of a battleship and the majority of the ships of the convoy, the loss of an appreciable number of destroyers and escort craft would mean that escorts for HUSKY would be so weak that success of the operation would be jeopardized from the start. The present situation as regards escorts for HUSKY is that allowing for all escorts now employed on the North Russian convoys being available we are still 10 short and at the moment the only source from which they can be obtained is escorts of North Atlantic convoys which are already dangerously weak. 13. Question of Hampdens [torpedo bombers] does not affect the next convoy (J.W. 54) because they cannot get there in time. Although we would like these T/B squadrons in the North as soon as practicable and particularly for J.W. 55 they do not add materially to the security of our covering force which is my main cause for concern. They do however increase our chances of damaging the enemy and if battleship were damaged by torpedo might deter the enemy surface forces from interfering. It is also possible that presence of Hampden squadrons might deter the enemy from putting to sea. 14. On basis of J.W. 54 not being sailed it is proposed: (a) that 38 ships loaded for J.W. 54 be kept loaded on the possibility that the German concentration in North Norway will be dispersed. (b) that the ships which were to form J.W. 55 should not be loaded but be held until further orders. (c) that sailing of J.W. 54 be at 7 days' notice in order that as many of the destroyers and escorts earmarked for J.W. 54 are employed in the Battle of the Atlantic. 15. If it is not possible to run J.W. 54 it will not be possible to bring out as a convoy the 24 ships now in North Russia. The possibility of sailing them singly in foggy weather would be kept in mind. 16. To run a North Russian convoy during a June HUSKY it would be necessary to ask the Americans to provide up to 12 fleet destroyers and 12 other escorts. As the Americans do not possess any suitable escorts other than destroyers it would be necessary for them to provide up to 24 destroyers.

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17. Even if HUSKY is postponed until July it would not be possible to run a July J.W. convoy as the interval between a June and July HUSKY is only 30 days, whereas the interval between successive North Russian convoys must be 42 days. 18. If it were decided that the chance of the German concentration breaking up was so remote as not to justify keeping merchant vessels loaded it would be possible to provide several support groups working from the United Kingdom or Iceland which should make a great difference in the Battle of the Atlantic. [MR]

The underlined portion of the following letter was added in Churchill's handwriting.

C-272-A/1, letter London March 19, 1943 My dear Mr. President, Thank you so much for your letter of March 2 [R—261/1]. I have shown the photograph and Mrs. Harrison's letter to Mrs. Churchill, and we are both much interested in them. Would you please thank Mrs. Harrison so much for letting us see the photograph? Several good judges think there is a singular resemblance. Yours ever [initialed] W. [PSF:GB:WSC. WSC, IV, 730.]

As Churchill was fond of pointing out to his American friends, his mother, Jennifer, was born in the United States and did visit there occasionally.

R-262/2, letter Washington March 19, 1943 Dear Winston: I did not know you came to the United States when you were at the baby carriage age, nor did I know you had visited Amenia. It is in Dutchess County about twenty miles back of Hyde Park. My best to you. As ever, Franklin D. Roosevelt [PPF 7683. FDR LTRS, p. 1415.]

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New York, N.Y. March 15, 1943 Dear Mr. President: I t h o u g h t you might be interested in the following story. A short while ago, we had an old lady, who formerly lived at Amenia, New York, for dinner. She is now over 84 years old but is still spry e n o u g h to travel about alone. She told m e that she r e m e m b e r s that Mrs. Churchill used to visit at Amenia, when Winston was a baby in a carriage. T h e y were guests at the hotel near the railroad station. T o d a y it is quite out of date but at that time it was considered quite fashionable, as country hotels used to be. Perhaps you are already familiar with the facts. Thinking that possibly you might not be, I decided to write you. Very few people r e m e m b e r things that h a p p e n e d that long ago. Respectfully yours, [signed] J e r o m e F. P. Tobin [PPF 7683]

Roosevelt agreed that the northern convoys had to be held up, but he advised a delay in telling Stalin that it could be autumn before the convoys would be resumed. (Roosevelt's additions are underlined.)

R-263 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Mar. 20, 1943, 12:30 P.M. For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Personal a n d Secret. Your message of March 18th. In the face of known G e r m a n naval and air force concentation o n route of March convoy (J. W. 54) there appears to be n o military justification for its d e p a r t u r e at scheduled time. In consideration however of possible political implications it is in my view advisable to inform Stalin only that in view of known G e r m a n p r e p arations for its destruction and in view of the impossibility of providing at the present time adequate protection in the restricted waters, it is necessary to postpone its d e p a r t u r e . I am in a g r e e m e n t with you to not unload convoy (J. W. 54) and, as a deception move, to start it u n d e r protection of the Fleet, if you consider such a move desirable, with the intention of diverting the convoy to Iceland.

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We share your distress over recent sinkings in the Atlantic which we must endeavor to reduce by the provision of additional long range airplanes without any delay. I will provide as many as can be made available and I hope you can augment the number. Additional escort vessels cannot be provided at this time and there is no time to lose. In another three or four weeks it may of course be necessary to break the news to Stalin that convoys to Russia must be interrupted until August or September in order to provide for the HUSKY effort, but it seems to me now that a delay in giving him the bad news would be the wiser course. Incidentally none of us can be positive about the situation four or five months hence. Will you send me your proposed message to Stalin. Roosevelt [MR*. pWSC, IV, 753.]

The Americans, particularly General Marshall, constantly worried about a German occupation of Spain and the resultant threat to Allied movements through the Straits of Gibraltar. The Duke of Wellington's campaigns in Spain during the Napoleonic wars demonstrated the value of mobility, something highly prized by America's military leaders who drew upon a long tradition of cavalry warfare.

R-264 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Mar. 20, 1943, 3 : 1 5 P.M.

From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. We are getting a number of reports of rather large German movements, especially of material, to Spanish border. I wish you would let me know how much importance your people attach to this. I think that if it develops into a definite threat to invade Spain, the Combined Staffs should immediately study methods of reestablishing the Duke of Wellington's war of a number of years ago. We should not be caught without an answer which would be effective. Roosevelt [MR*]

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As Churchill suspected, the reports of a German move against Spain were false. Although the spring thaw had already brought an end to the Soviet offensive, Churchill was correct in claiming that the Germans had transferred much equipment and better-trained troops from France to the Russian front.

C-273 London [via U.S. Army] Mar. 24, 1943, 4:57 P.M. Personal a n d Secret F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Your n u m b e r 264. My people advise me that they also have received n u m e r o u s reports to this effect but that they are convinced that they are being deliberately p u t out by the enemy. T h e y are satisfied that such movement of material and troops as there has been is insufficient to indicate any G e r m a n intention to move into Spain. T h e fact is that as a result of the Russian offensive a redistribution of divisions in France has been taking place since the end of November. Divisions have been taken from France to Russia. T h e s e have been partially replaced by training divisions and by a few battered divisions from Russia. T h e net result in the South of France has been a considerable reduction in strength and in quality since e n d of November. O n the Spanish Frontier itself numbers, but not quality, of G e r m a n forces are now approximately the same as at the end of November. T h e Staffs h e r e d o not believe that Germany has any free reserves of land or air forces out of which to provide a force for the invasion of Spain, Neither d o they believe Germanys intention is to invade. Nevertheless, they are studying what would be the bill in troops, aircraft, ships a n d material, and what would be the effect on o u r other projects if their assumption proves wrong and the Axis went into Spain and, for example, threatened Portugal and the latter called for help. [MR*]

This cable and the accompanying memorandum, labeled "the British bombshell" by the Americans, threw the planning for HUSKY, ANAKIM, and other military operations into confusion. T h e shipping question was complicated, but the British demand was clear: the goal of deploying over 1.5 million troops planned for 1943 would be slashed almost by half, to 800,000, in order to meet Britain's basic needs for food and other materials. A good deal of the problem could be traced to the failure of the military planners at Casablanca to consult properly with shipping authorities, although a close look at the problem showed that much of the shortage stemmed from a maldistri-

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bution of ships rather than from lack of cargo space. Even so, as subsequent documents make clear, the confusion clearly affected the scale and timing of future military operations. (See Leighton and Coakley, Global Logktics, 19411942, pp. 693-702; Howard, Grand Strategy, pp. 292-98.)

C-273/1 London [via British Embassy/Eden] Mar. 24, 1943 [Churchill to Roosevelt] I am extremely anxious about shipping situation. The British Chiefs of Staff have been examining position in relation to requirements of military operations and analysis which they have sent to Washington shows, after allowing for our minimum import programme, there will not be sufficient shipping to implement in full the decisions taken at Casablanca. The Commanders of various operations have been told that they must cut their requirements to the bone. For HUSKY the mounting of British share cannot be made without an increase of 14 ships over and above shipping already allocated to the Middle East in April. Provision of these ships by you is therefore an urgent and immediate necessity. Also the British Chiefs of Staff see little prospect of ANAKIM, much less BOLERO, unless from now onwards a good deal more shipping than is now in sight can be provided for Indian and United Kingdom theatres. As to United Kingdom programme, I realize that the United States are making great efforts to find the necessary tonnage for our imports in accordance with terms of your letter to me. The imports during early part of this year have been at such a low rate that even with increasing allocations already notified for forward months, it is going to be extremely difficult to make up the leeway. I need not go into details of all this as I have asked Eden to explain the situation and its extreme gravity more fully. [MR. flfcfC]

ANNEX TO C-273/1

The Shipping Position (All shipping figures refer to non-tanker vessels, and are in gross tons unless otherwise stated. Imports are reckoned in tons of 20 cwt.) WHILE the United Nations shipping position is improving and likely to continue doing so, the British import position is becoming steadily worse.

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In 1937 we imported nearly 5 million tons a month. After the inevitable dislocation at the outbreak of war, our imports in the summer of 1940 recovered to about 4 million tons a month. Military demands were light and sinkings low. With the loss of France and Scandinavia, and the entry of Italy into the war, with the resultant closing of the Mediterranean, our imports dropped to about 2½ million tons a month. This was not only because we had to fetch supplies from more distant sources over more circuitous routes; increased despatches to the Middle East had made a serious inroad into our importing tonnage. The entry of Russia and Japan into the war and the growing threat to Egypt imposed more severe calls on our shipping. Despatches to the Middle East, India and Australasia increased, supplies had to be sent to Russia, and in the summer of 1942 the United Nations tonnage primarily employed on military or quasimilitary purposes rose to something like 14 million gross tons. American resources did not make up for increased demands and our imports dropped to 2 million tons a month. In the Autumn came TORCH, using 2-2½ million gross tons of cargo shipping alone, of which we contributed more than half. This has resulted in our imports dropping in the 4 months, November to February, to a record low level of 1 lA million tons a month. Thus our imports in the last 4 months have been only a quarter of the average in a good pre-war year, half what they averaged in 1941 (and for that matter in 1918), and only three-fifths of the monthly average in the first ten months of 1942. UNITED KINGDOM IMPORT FLEET.

Amongst the many deleterious factors which have caused this appalling drop in imports, the outstanding one is simply that the ships have not been made available for bringing goods to this country. In peace-time the equivalent of perhaps 12 million gross tons of full-time, fully laden shipping were importing to the United Kingdom. Today we have only 3 million gross tons of shipping freely available for bringing supplies from America and other convenient sources. These 3 million tons bring in about three-quarters of our imports. For the rest we rely on whatever can be brought back by vessels on their return journeys from military errands. War-time delays (convoys, ports, routeing, &c.) fade into insignificance compared with this brute fact that we are trying with the equivalent of about one-third of the normal fleet to feed this country and maintain it in full war production. The impression must be dispelled that the bulk of our ships are importing to this country and that only a small fraction is grudgingly allotted to the Services. Only one-fifth of the Britishcontrolled fleet, or one-eighth of the United Nations fleet, is now wholly reserved for supplying the essential needs of the United Kingdom.

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Owing to the large losses of shipping in the early part of 1942 and the fact that American shipbuilding has only exhibited its big rise in the latter half of the year, the United Nations fleet at the end of January 1943 was barely a million tons greater than when Japan entered the war. With all the extra military demands which have emerged since then, it is not surprising that our imports, which have always been regarded as a sort of inverted residuary legatee, have suffered severely. But this cannot go on. IMPORT REQUIREMENTS.

In peace time about two-fifths of our imports were in the category which would today come under the Ministry of Food, as against threefifths in the purview of the Ministry of Production. The Ministry of Food has been cut by about one-half. Fruit, vegetables and feeding stuffs have been virtually eliminated, and sugar imports halved. Much of the strenuous effort of the Minister of Agriculture has been devoted to replacing the animal feeding stuffs we used to import. Even so, the output of meat, bacon and eggs has dropped to two-thirds. Despite the large increase in the wheat crop, it still provides only onethird to two-fifths of our total wheat consumption. Whether measured in calories or protein, considerably more than half the food of our 47 million people still has to be imported from overseas. Notwithstanding the need to maintain our imports of metals, we have, on the Ministry of Production side as a whole, restricted our consumption of imports to about two-fifths of the 1937 level. Timber has been reduced to one-fifth, iron-ore to one-third, paper and papermaking materials to one-sixth. Imported materials used for purely civilian purposes are now negligible, and, unless we reduce munitions production (already drastically pruned) by a considerable amount, there is no hope of further notable economies on the Ministry of Production programme. Thus we must have nearly a million tons of food imports a month and over a million tons of raw materials. Together with finished munitions, &c, this brings us up to something like 2¼ million tons a month, corresponding to the 27 million-ton minimum import programme. STOCKS.

In 1941 our imports averaged just over 2½ million tons a month; wartime restrictions on consumption had taken effect and we built up stocks from 1¾ million to 4 million tons over and above minimum safety level laid down by War Cabinet and described by Dr. Stacy May, the American economic analyst, as "bedrock minimum". When our imports dropped to two million tons a month in the first ten months of 1942 these stocks fell by nearly 1¾ million tons. The recent fall in imports to 1¼ million tons

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a month has slashed our stocks further by about 2½ million tons despite every expedient, and by April it seems likely that stocks will be nearly one million tons below the minimum safety level.* With these stocks, industry will not as a whole come to a stop, but we shall be living from hand to mouth. Any further drop and the wheels would cease to turn and rations would be jeopardized. When we observe the enormous cost in imports of military operations (TORCH has been costing us about half a million tons of imports a month), and the inevitable uncertainties of forecasting imports (the actual imports in 3 months of November, December and January averaged 300,000 tons less than forecasts made only a fortnight before the end of each month), it is plain that we could not undertake new military undertakings with stocks at present levels. Even if ships are more plentiful later in the year which is none too certain it may be hard to find escorts. Our minimum imports, which are an indispensable condition of the security of the United Kingdom and the maintenance of United Kingdom War Production, must be considered an absolute first charge of Allied shipping; they are as vital to the war effort as supplies to the various theatres. Northwest Africa has recently been receiving about three-quarters as much cargo shipping each month as the whole of the United Kingdom; one-eighth of the Allied fleet is not a great fraction to reserve for United Kingdom imports, to maintain a great munitions output, as well as 44 million civilians, and 3 millions in the Services. Our own fleet is diminished by operating, before and after America came into the war, in the most dangerous waters. We have undertaken arduous and essential operations encouraged by the belief that we could rely on American shipbuilding to see us through.

*Note: Stocks (non-tanker: food and raw materials) now stand at about 15 million tons, having been reduced by about 4 million tons since the beginning of 1941. This is approximately the total which the War Cabinet regard as the minimum safety level, beyond which they regard it as important that there should be some margin; but the stocks are in fact still falling. The stocks need (a) to give a working minimum to ensure continuous production without a hold-up at any stage of production; and (b) to provide some additional reserve required by the need of dispersal (in view of bombing) and against the interruption of inflow of supplies by enemy action. The global figure of stocks moreover exaggerates the true reserve, as some critical stocks are below the general average; for example, at the end of 1942 the import food reserves only included 17 weeks of wheat and flour, under eleven weeks consumption of meat; and reserves of raw materials included only 21 weeks stock of steel, 10 weeks of pig

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iron, 12 weeks of c o p p e r a n d 4 weeks of phosphate: and, as stated, stocks generally have fallen since then. [MR. Howard, Grand Strategy, pp. 632-36.]

Francis J. Spellman, Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York and Vicar of the U.S. Armed Forces, was a strong supporter of Roosevelt. At the President's suggestion, the Archbishop made a six-month tour of Europe. Ostensibly the trip permitted him to visit American military personnel in Africa and England; actually the President used Spellman to conduct talks with Spanish,

10. A "short snorter" ten-shilling note belonging to Steve Early, Roosevelt's Press Secretary. T h e first two signatures on the face of the bill are those of President and Mrs. Roosevelt. The last name is that of comedian Red Skelton. Among the signatures on the reverse are those of Eisenhower, Mark Clark, Harriman, and Hopkins. Early was apparently initiated into the "short-snorter" club on July 20, 1943.

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Irish, and Vatican authorities. Obtaining Irish cooperation and continued Spanish neutrality were a great concern to the Allies, and talks at the Vatican centered on Roosevelt's insistence that Nazi Germany posed a far greater threat to the Catholic Church than Soviet communism, at least for the present. The British criticism of both Irish neutrality and the Vatican's refusal to condemn Hitler had been interpreted by some as anti-Catholicism, but the most explosive issue was the British threat to bomb Rome. (See FRUS, 1943, II, 910-53.) Montgomery's offensive against the Mareth line in Tunisia (Operation PUGILIST) had failed, but a variation (codenamed SUPERCHARGE II) eventually broke through on March 27. American General George Patton's attack from the rear soon stalled, however, and by the end of March the Italo-German forces still held their perimeter around Tunis. The "short-snorter" club was for persons who had flown over the Atlantic. The rules varied, but generally consisted of the initiate either paying a fee (one dollar per short-snorter club member) or buying a round of drinks for the members. The new member's dollar bill (other currencies were occasionally used) was then signed by those present. Thereafter, if a short-snorter was found without his or her bill (Eleanor Roosevelt was a member), he or she had to either buy a round of drinks or pay each short-snorter present a fine, usually a dollar.

C-274 London [via U.S. Embassy] Mar. 25, 1943, 8:00 P.M.

President from Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. Delighted to receive your letter of Mar. 17th [R-262/1] and to know that you are fully recovered. Practically everyone who came with me has been laid up but all are better now. I had a very pleasant talk at luncheon yesterday with Archbishop Spellman, who is a worthy short snorter. I think I convinced him that there is nothing anti-Vatican or anti-Catholic about British policy. I have sent you through Eden a draft of the proposed telegram [C274-A] breaking the news to Joe, and I hope you will discuss with Eden whether it is not better to let him know the worst. My instinct is to tell him the whole truth as soon as PUGILIST takes a favourable turn. I am still confident of success. Patton's Corps has made a fine advance. [MR*]

Rather than paraphrase Churchill's message, Eden apparently gave the following text to the President, since it was found in the American files. GRENADINE was a British proposal to base two of their torpedo-plane squadrons

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in northern Russia, from where they could attack German surface ships which disrupted the Allied convoys. Although the Soviets initially agreed and accepted 1,200 tons of stores for the squadrons, Russian officials refused to allow an advance party to land in January 1943. Stalin continually insisted that the Russians had plenty of pilots but no planes. Roosevelt, in spite of Harriman's argument that there was nothing to be gained from letting the Soviets "kick us around," stayed out of the argument. Eventually the scheme was dropped. (This message was not dated or numbered originally. Roosevelt's staff assigned the number 274-A, and it was found attached to C—274 in the Map Room files.)

C-274-A [London, via Eden] [Mar. 25, 1943]

[Churchill to Roosevelt] Reference the President's personal message to the Prime Minister No. 263 of March 20th. The cargo ships of J.W. 54 are to be kept loaded but we have decided to give up the idea of running the convoy even as a bait or as a blind. To do this would have been to get the worst of both worlds, i.e. Stalin's displeasure and no relief in the battle of the Atlantic. The escort vessels have therefore been dispersed to form support groups in the Atlantic, it being understood that if threat of German naval concentration were to disappear they would reassemble as quickly as possible to escort the Russian convoy. This reassembly might in the worst case take as much as eighteen days. Thus by way of example if we learned on April 1st that German naval concentration had dispersed to Baltic it might be April 19th before the convoy could start. Further on basis of a HUSKY assault on about June 24th, the convoy must start by May 7th if it is to start at all. 2. The President proposes in his 263 of March 20th that it would be wiser to postpone breaking the news to Stalin that the convoys to Russia must be interrupted until August or September. I must admit my own instinct has always been to tell him the whole truth at once, only waiting till PUGILIST perhaps gives us some credit. The Foreign Office have deployed the following arguments in support of my view:— (a) To withhold information for three or four weeks will surely be much more dislocating to Russian plans for the use of the material they expect on convoys than if Stalin is told at once. The delay will therefore be likely to annoy Stalin. (b) Will it not look very inefficient that we are not able to foresee interruption in convoys caused by HUSKY until the last moment.

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(c) How shall we explain to the Soviet Government our decision not to press for their acceptance of GRENADINE if we do not tell Stalin that there will be for several months no more convoys to protect? Unless we do so our acquiescence in Russian refusal to accept air squadrons will look like a climb down since we told the Russians that additional air protection was so essential during the summer that, if it was not available, we would have to consider with the Americans "the whole question of despatch of future convoys". (d) There seems no reason why Stalin should take decision to suspend convoys better later on. A frank and immediate declaration of our inability will come as a shock to him but successive evasions and postponements will inspire him with suspicions of our intentions and of our honesty. 3. On the whole therefore I think we might just as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb. Pray put this view to the President. My immediately following telegram gives text of a message that I should send to Stalin if he agrees. If he does not agree paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 would be omitted from telegram in question. 4. I should be grateful for early reply but I should not in any event send my telegram to Stalin until we know more about PUGILIST.

ATTACHMENT TO C-274-A

Proposed Message from the Prime Minister to Premier Stalin. 1. The Germans have concentrated at Narvik a powerful battle fleet consisting of Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Lutzow, one six-inch cruiser and eight destroyers. Thus danger to Russian convoys which I described in my message to you of July 17th last year has been revived in even more menacing form. I told you then that we did not think it right to risk our home fleet in Barents Sea where it could be brought under attack of German shore-based aircraft and U-boats, without adequate protection against either; and I explained that if one or two of our most modern battleships were to be lost or even seriously damaged while Tirpitz and other large units of the German battle fleet remained in action, the whole command of the Atlantic would be jeopardised with dire consequences to our common cause. 2. President Roosevelt and I have therefore decided with the greatest reluctance that it is impossible to provide adequate protection for the next Russian convoy and that without such protection there is not the slightest chance of any of the ships reaching you in the face of the known German preparations for their destruction. Orders have therefore been issued that sailing of March convoy is to be postponed. The cargo ships will however remain loaded so that if German naval concentration should shortly disperse, the convoy could

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start for North Russia as soon as the necessary escort vessels could be again collected. 3. It is a great disappointment to President Roosevelt and myself that it should be necessary to postpone March convoy. H a d it not been for G e r m a n concentration it had been o u r firm intention to send you a convoy of 30 ships each in March and again early May; and it is still o u r intention that at least one of the convoys should be sent if position of G e r m a n heavy ships is such that convoy has a reasonable chance of getting through. At the same time we feel it only right to let you know at once that it will not be possible to continue convoys by N o r t h e r n route after early May, since from that time onward every single escort vessel will be required to support o u r offensive operations in the Mediterranean leaving only a minim u m to safeguard o u r lifeline in the Atlantic. In the latter we have had grievous and almost unprecedented losses during the last three weeks. Assuming HUSKY goes well we should hope to resume the convoys in early September provided disposition of G e r m a n main units permits and that the situation in North Atlantic is such as to enable us to provide the necessary escorts and covering force. 4. We are doing o u r utmost to increase the flow of supplies by Southern route. T h e monthly figure has been more than doubled in the last six months. We have reason to hope that increase will progress and that figures for August will reach 240,000 tons. If this is achieved, the monthly delivery will have increased eight-fold in 12 months. This will in some way offset both your disappointment and ours at the interruption to n o r t h e r n convoys. [MR]

Roosevelt deleted all references in the Churchill draft to any possibility of a resumption of convoys before September 1943. The only small solace the President could offer Stalin was a promise to increase shipments being sent to Vladivostok, the major Russian port located at the Pacific Ocean terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway. (Roosevelt's handwritten additions are indicated by underlining.)

R-265 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Mar. 28, 1943, 11:50 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Most Secret. Referring to your proposed message to Stalin [ C - 2 7 4 - A ] delivered by Mr. Eden, I agree with you. I have after serious consideration further

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concluded that we are notjustihed in wasting available tonnage by keeping the present Russian convoy (J. W. 54) loaded, and that it is advisable to give Stalin the inevitable bad news now. It is suggested that your proposed message be amended as follows: "1. The Germans have concentrated at Narvik a powerful battle fleet consisting of Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Lutzow, one six-inch cruiser and eight destroyers. Thus danger to Russian convoys which I described in my message to you of July 17th last year has been revived in even more menacing form. I told you then that we did not think it right to risk our Home Fleet in Barents Sea where it could be brought under attack of German shore-based aircraft and U-boats, without adequate protection against either; and I explained that if one or two of our most modern battleships were to be lost or even seriously damaged while Tirpitz and other large units of the German battle fleet remained in action, the whole command of the Atlantic would be jeopardized with dire consequences to our common cause. "2. President Roosevelt and I have therefore decided with the greatest reluctance that it is impossible to provide adequate protection for the next Russian convoy and that without such protection there is not the slightest chance of any of the ships reaching you in the face of the known German preparations for their destruction. Orders have therefore been issued that sailing of March convoy is to be postponed. "3. It is a great disappointment to President Roosevelt and myself that it should be necessary to postpone March convoy. Had it not been for German concentration it had been our firm intention to send you a convoy of 30 ships each in March and again early May. At the same time we feel it only right to let you know at once that it will not be possible to continue convoys by Northern route after early May, since from that time onward every single escort vessel will be required to support our offensive operations in the Mediterranean leaving only a minimum to safeguard our lifeline in the Atlantic. In the latter we have had grievous and almost unprecedented losses during the last three weeks. Assuming HUSKY goes well we should hope to resume the convoys in early September provided disposition of German main units permits and that the situation in North Atlantic is such as to enable us to provide the necessary escorts and covering force. "4. We are doing our utmost to increase the flow of supplies by Southern route. The monthly figure has been more than doubled in the last six months. We have reason to hope that increase will progress and that figures for August will reach 240,000 tons. If this is achieved, the monthly delivery will have increased eight-fold in 12 months.

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Furthermore the United States will materially increase shipments via Vladivostok. This will in some way offset both your disappointment and ours at the interruption to northern convoys." When you send this or similar message to Stalin would you like to have me send confirming or supporting message. Let me have text of your final message. Roosevelt [MR*. WSC, IV, 754-55. R&C]

In spite of arguments from American military leaders that military operations should take precedence over Britain's wartime economy, Roosevelt and a number of his civilian advisers (notably Hopkins and Lewis Douglas of the War Shipping Administration) disagreed. The-President's willingness to drop the attack on Burma (ANAKIM—see headnote to R—262/1) was acceptable to the British, but the American military stubbornly defended that operation as necessary in order to take the pressure off American forces in the southwestern Pacific.

R-266 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Mar. 29, 1943, 8:30 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Most Secret. Replying to your message [C-273/1] handed me by Anthony, we shall find all the ships for HUSKY and are going to scrape the bottom otherwise but we cannot escape the fact that something must give if all of our military operations are to be fully supported. I am going into this matter in detail and Anthony will bring you my immediate views. Roosevelt [MR*]

Roosevelt apparently did not send to Stalin the supporting message Churchill requested.

C-275 London [via U.S. Army] Mar. 30, 1943, 2:35 A.M. Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Your number 265. Have sent telegram in form you approve. Please send supporting message, which I am sure will be most helpful. [MR*]

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C-276 London [via U.S. Army] Mar. 30, 1943, 6:00 P.M. T o President from F o r m e r Naval Person Personal. Your letter of March 19 [R-262/2]. My first visit to America was in December 1895 when I was already too big for any baby carriage. [MR*]

R-267 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Mar. 30, 1943, 5 P.M. Personal from the President for the Former Naval Person. SOME BABY! Roosevelt [MR*. FDR LTRS, p. 1416.]

Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, left Washington on March 30 for Canada and then Britain. His discussions with Roosevelt and other American officials had been useful and informative. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles had outlined the President's conception of the postwar United Nations organization, which would consist of an Executive Committee of the four great powers (Russia, Britain, China, and the United States) plus a general body which would be only "a talking shop." Asked about Soviet attempts to communize Europe after the war, Eden expressed doubts that such was their intent though he recommended keeping on good terms with the Soviets as the best way to avoid a confrontation. In his reports, Eden noted that Roosevelt and Welles agreed on the dismemberment of Germany, while Hull and the State Department were uncertain and divided on the question. Roosevelt argued that the absorption of East Prussia and further compensation in Silesia should be enough for Poland to accept the Curzon line as the Polish-Russian boundary. The President also reluctantly admitted that the Russians would occupy the Baltic states, though he hoped Stalin would accept a plebiscite before formally annexing that area. Eden met with little success in trying to soften American attitudes toward the Free French, though Roosevelt's suggestions that most of the French Empire be internationalized met with criticism from even the Americans. (See memo by Halifax, Mar. 25, 1943, FO 371/35368 (U1679/320/C); CAB 65/38 WM 43 53rd concl. min. 2 conf. annex, Apr. 13, 1943; FRUS, 1943, III, 9-41.) In a message drafted in the President's handwriting, Roosevelt outlined his method of reconciling shipping limitations and operational planning for 1943. Eden was expected to fill in the details for Churchill.

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R-268 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Apr. 1, 1943, 1 0 : 3 0 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. Anthony will give you my thoughts in regard to ANAKIM. T h e quid p r o q u o is threefold. First, greater air support for China air operations against J a p a n e s e shipping and h o m e islands. Second, more general shipping leeway d u r i n g next six months. T h i r d , opportunity definitely to m o u n t B O L E R O for a later date. I have not consulted Combined Staffs o n this as I want your personal slant first. Roosevelt [MR*. RUC(n).]

Stalin's response to the halting of convoys was curt but not unexpected. Churchill appeared concerned lest Roosevelt misinterpret the final sentence as a veiled threat. Actually, the cutoff of new trucks and tanks disappointed the Soviets because motor transport had been important in their successful winter offensive—an offensive which had been halted as much by the lack of transportation as by spring thaws and German defenses. German counteroffensives had met with some success, but the Russians had been planning a spring attack in which tanks and trucks would play a major role.

C-277 London [via U.S. Army] Apr. 2, 1943, 5:40 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. I have j u s t received the following message from Stalin, which I consider is a very natural and stout-hearted response. I read the last sentence as m e a n i n g only that " T h e Soviet Armies will be worse off and suffer more". T h e answer makes me the m o r e determined to back this m a n with every conceivable means. If you like to send him some message it could only d o good. Message begins personal and secret Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill. I received your message of the 30th March conveying to m e that the necessity compels you and Mr Roosevelt to stop convoys to the USSR till Sept. I u n d e r s t a n d this unexpected action as a catastrophic diminution of supplies of arms and military raw materials to the USSR on the

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part of Great Britain and the United States of America, as transport via Pacific is limited by the tonnage and not reliable and the Southern route has a small transit capacity. In view of this both just mentioned routes cannot compensate for the discontinuation of transport via the Northern route. You realise of course that the circumstances cannot fail to affect the position of the Soviet troops. Sgd Stalin. [MR*. pWSC, IV, 755.]

Given Stalin's later distrust and persecution of repatriated Russian prisoners of war, Churchill may have misinterpreted the Premier's motives for rejecting the German offer of a mutual exchange of prisoners. Either way, nothing came of the proposal. Ivan Maisky was the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain; Admiral William H. Standley was the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

C-278 London [via U.S. Army] Apr. 2, 1943, 7:50 P.M.

Most Secret and Personal Former Naval Person to President. After handing me Stalin's reply about convoys Maisky made a point of telling me that Admiral Standley had informed the Soviet Government that the Germans were willing to discuss with the Soviet the reciprocal repatriation of certain officer prisoners, presumably badly disabled, and that this proposal was known to the Vatican through whom it might be arranged for about 150 Russian officers to be sent back to Russia. The Soviet Government had replied that they were not interested in the matter. I thought it might be significant that this should be mentioned just after I had been given the reply about the convoys: that it might have been meant to strike a note of reassurance bearing on the last sentence of the reply: i.e. that they meant to fight on anyhow. [MR]

There is no record of any cable from Roosevelt to Stalin relating to the postponing of convoys to northern Russia.

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R-269 Hyde Park [via U.S. Navy] Apr. 3, 1943, 4:20 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. Reply your 277. I think o u r friend's reply not too bad. A m preparing message to him a n d will send you copy. Roosevelt [MR*]

Since January 1943, the United States had been trying to mediate a settlement between the governments of Finland and the Soviet Union. Boundary disputes between the two countries had a long history, but the immediate problem had begun in 1939 when the Russians had demanded certain adjustments designed to increase Soviet security against a German attack. When the Finns resisted the Winter War of 1939-40 ensued. Admiration for the gallant Finnish effort combined with sympathy for the underdog to produce strong moral support in the United States for Finland, but Soviet military strength proved too great to resist. In J u n e 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the Finns took advantage of that conflict to regain the territory they had lost a year earlier. Now, in 1943, the Soviet government insisted on a restoration of the borders established in 1940, after the Winter War, as well as compensation for war damages. T h e Finns refused until September 1944, when a Soviet-Finnish truce was agreed upon. (The story can be traced in FRUS, 1943,111,213-313.)

C-278/1 London [via British Embassy] Apr. 3, 1943 [Churchill to Roosevelt] O n March 15th Stalin telegraphed the Prime Minister informing him that o n March 12th the United States Ambassador in Moscow had conveyed message to Molotov to the effect that Government of the United States offered its good offices as intermediary for exploring the possibility of peace between the U.S.S.R. a n d Finland. In reply to the question whether the United States Government had information that Finland desired peace a n d what her real position was, the Ambassador replied that h e could say nothing. 2. Stalin said h e was informing the Prime Minister in conformity with the Anglo-Soviet treaty and asked his opinion. H e a d d e d that h e had n o

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reason to believe that Finland really desired peace and was in any case hardly in position to escape from the G e r m a n clutches. 3. Prime Minister replied on March 20th to the effect that while Stalin could best j u d g e military value of getting Finland out of the war, it was to be supposed that it would release m o r e Soviet than G e r m a n divisions and might have considerable effect on other satellites. Composition of the new Finnish Government might denote preparation for new Finnish policy a n d t h o u g h the Finns were probably not yet ripe for negotiations the issue would be decided by events on the Russian front in the next few months. Finns could probably get on without German food supplies after May. In these circumstances it seemed that the United States Gove r n m e n t might usefully be invited to try to discover without disclosing Soviet interest what terms the Finns would be p r e p a r e d to accept. [PSF:GB]

When Anthony Eden returned to London after talks with Roosevelt and State Department officials in Washington, he reported that Harry Hopkins would soon visit England. Churchill found, however, that the President did not want Hopkins to make such a trip until the military situation in Tunisia was settled (FRUS, Wash. Conf., 1943, p. 15). The Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff were eager to commit the Americans to a plan of action premised on the conquest of Sicily (HUSKY). With Tunisia almost won (Operation VULCAN), and a quick victory possible in Sicily, firm plans had to be made. Knowing of the American military's reluctance to attack Italy and of its adamant opposition to any move toward the eastern Mediterranean, Churchill hoped to seize the opening presented by the shipping shortage and to get the President on his side. The British Chiefs of Staff differed with Churchill only on relatively small matters of detail. Churchill's remark about the "foxy attitude" of Yugoslavian resistance leader Colonel Dragoljub (Draza) Mihailovic reflected the British impatience with his inability to prevent elements of his Chetnik organization from cooperating with the Germans and Italians. The Chetniks, an old Serbian nationalist group, had split over the issue of collaboration, and Mihailovic had not effectively harassed the occupying forces. Although the British naturally preferred the pro-royalist forces led by Mihailovic, the communist Partisans led by Josip Broz (Tito) were so effective that Britain sent supplies and liaison officers to both movements.

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C-279 London [via U.S. Army] Apr. 5, 1943, 9:02 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. 1. I h a d a long talk with Anthony last night and I thank you for all your kind reassuring messages. 2. I am delighted to h e a r that there is a prospect of Harry coming h e r e almost immediately. If you could let General Marshall come with him there would be e n o r m o u s advantages and we could then settle about going on to T O R C H area to discuss possibilities with all o u r people on the spot there. T h e battles i m p e n d i n g in Tunisia this week should clarify the position a good deal. 3. From what Anthony told me about your ideas for HUSKY and its exploitation if successful, it seems that we are thinking along the same lines. I therefore send you a copy of the minute which I sent on the second instant to the Chief of Staffs Committee and on which they are now at work. Please keep this to yourself, Harry and General Marshall as I have not yet heard what o u r Chiefs of Staff have to say about it. It is only intended as a channel for thought and planning. Minute referred to in P a r a g r a p h 3 follows: 1. Assuming, first, that VULCAN is finished by the end of April, or, at worst, by May 15th and no large formed body of German or Italian troops escapes: secondly, that HUSKY takes place on July 10: thirdly, that there are not more than five Italian divisions, aggregating not more than 50,000 combatants, and not more than two German divisions, aggregating 20,000 combatants, total 70,000 combatants, in HUSKY-land, a n d f u r t h e r m o r e that we place seven or eight British and American Divisions ashore, at a combatant strength of 15,000 each, total 105,000, a n d reinforce by another 30,000 British, grand total 135,000: and fourthly, that we win the intense battles which the landing involves:—how long is the subjugation of the a r m e d forces of the enemy in HUSKY-land estimated to take? 2. In an operation of this kind, everything depends u p o n the initial battle lasting, say, a week, after which one might reasonably expect that the bulk of the enemy's forces would be destroyed, captured or driven into the mountains. T h e distances are not great and the resources of the country are small and once we have the ports and the airfields we should be effectively the masters of HUSKY-land, and be able to disperse by air power, and sea power covered by air power, all attempts by the enemy to reconquer it.

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3. Hitherto the capture of HUSKY-land has been regarded as an end in itself: but no one could rest content with such a modest and even petty objective for our armies in the campaign of 1943. HUSKYland is only a stepping stone, and we must now begin to study how to exploit this local success. What has been done about this? Every reasonable alternative should be explored. Now that ANAKIM has receded owing to the shipping shortage, Mediterranean operations gain more prominence. If we take the end of July as the date by which we are established in HUSKY-land, what other operations are open? Of course our choice must depend upon what the enemy do. If large German forces are brought down into Italy and Italian morale and will to fight is thereby enhanced, the scale required for the taking of Rome and Naples might be beyond our power. In that case we must be ready with our plans in the Eastern Mediterranean, and put it hard across Turkey to come in with us. We must be ready for an attack on the Dodecanese and for supporting Turkey if she gets into trouble. 4. If however the Germans do not come, and the Italians crumple, there is no limit to the amount of Italian territory we may overrun. Italy may be forced out of the war. We may become possessed of Sardinia without fighting. Corsica may be liberated. All our available forces, including divisions in African not involved in HUSKY, will have to be moved northward into Italy till they come into contact with the Germans on the Brenner or along the French Riviera. How far have these possibilities been studied? 5. Even if Italy remains in the war with a certain amount of German help we ought, the moment we are masters of HUSKY-land, to try to get a footing both on the toe and heel of Italy. The possession of Taranto as well as the Isthmus governing the toe would confer great advantages upon us. The Italian fleet would have to decide on which side of Italy it would take refuge. We cannot tell what its position or condition will be as a result of the HUSKY operation. If it has not retreated up the Adriatic before we are masters of HUSKY-land with our air force established there, it will not be able to do so and will have to content itself with Spezia and Genoa. In any case, it must be considered a most important objective to get a footing on the Dalmatian coast so that we can foment the insurgents of Albania and Yugoslavia by weapons, supplies and possibly Commandos. I believe that, in spite of his present naturally foxy attitude, Mihailovic will throw his whole weight against the Italians the moment we are able to give him any effective help. Evidently great possibilities are open in this theatre. 6. The object of this paper is to request with the utmost urgency the close study of these problems, and to obtain from the Chiefs of

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Staff their view of what can be d o n e and what it is best to do. I h o p e this work may be pressed forward with the greatest speed because the m e r e capture of HUSKY-land will be an altogether inadequate result for the Campaign of 1943. [MR*. FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, pp 12-14.]

Roosevelt agreed that the Allies should quickly take advantage of a victory in Tunisia, but growing opposition from General Marshall and other military leaders to further extensive operations in the Mediterranean may account for the President's reluctance to make an absolute commitment to HUSKY. The British opposed the plan of Army Air Force Chief General "Hap" Arnold and Major General Ira Eaker, who commanded the Eighth Air Force based in England, to conduct intensive daylight bombing raids over Germany. The British had suggested (in exchanges between Harriman, Churchill, and Hopkins) using a number of Eighth Air Force pilots to ferry planes to Russia. Roosevelt did not formally enter that dispute, but his praise of recent bombing efforts may have been a way of making his feelings known. Air Chief Marshals Charles Portal and Arthur Harris were Chief of Staff for Air and head of the R.A.F. Bomber Command respectively. (The underlined portion was added to the message draft in handwriting which may have been that of Harry Hopkins.)

R-270 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Apr. 11, 1943, 3 P.M. T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal a n d Secret. O u r staffs now urgently at work on what to d o after HUSKY. I think there are two or three good alternatives but until o u r respective staffs give us their views I see no advantage of immediate conferences with Marshall and Harry. It is quite possible and, I h o p e probable, that we can reach agreement quickly about o u r post-HUSKY operations. At the m o m e n t we have the Tunisian business to clean u p and that may take longer than we think. Should that be unduly delayed that, in itself, might well unfavorably affect HUSKY a n d if Rommel's army should escape in any substantial force to HUSKY-land that would make it doubly difficult. I think the situation in Tunisia will clarify within a week so that it would be possible for us to make a pretty good guess as to when the enemy will be out of Africa. As I think I told you at Casablanca we should continue every preparation for HUSKY but that you and I should hold ourselves ready to consider o n e or m o r e alternatives u p to J u n e 1. Conditions may greatly change by that time. O u r preparations for HUSKY should not be slowed

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down one iota but 95% of these operations would be equally valuable for some other point, if that should seem best. We pretty much scraped the bottom to get the first twenty cargo ships for ANAKIM and that whole business of the combined use of our mer­ chant fleet needs the closest watching or we will find ourselves conducting operations without adequate cargo shipping. I have been having an ex­ amination made here of a modified ANAKIM and will let you know later my thoughts on that. I am planning to leave early in the week for a two weeks trip of Army and Navy bases. This trip will be off the record, hence I do not wish it known in England. I have good communications, however, and you can get in touch with me quickly. Harry will remain here. I have been very pleased with the recent successful bombings of Ger­ many and we must give them an ever increasing dose. We are making special efforts here to get our big bomber units in England built up as rapidly as possible. I don't believe the Germans like that medicine and the Italians will like it less. Give my congratulations to Portal and Harris. Anthony's visit cleared up many things here and I think it was altogether useful. Roosevelt [MR*. R&C.)

Prior to America's entry into the war against Germany, Churchill had avoided a confrontation with the Irish Republic, which insisted on remaining neutral, lest Irish-Americans unite in opposition to Roosevelt's aid-to-Britain pro­ grams. But by 1943 most Irish-Americans viewed Hitler as anti-Christian and solidly supported the war, and it seemed time to demand that the Irish Republic adopt more cooperative policies. Eamon de Valera was the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, which extended citizenship to residents of Northern Ireland and opposed conscription of those "citizens" into the British military.

C-280 London Apr. 11, 1943, 2137 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. 1. About 2 years ago the Government of Northern Ireland wished to have Conscription in its own area and I favoured the policy. However at that time American opinion was adverse and I received both from you and from Winant strong advice to the contrary. The situation is now changed. United States forces are in [Northern] Ireland in considerable

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n u m b e r s a n d we have the spectacle of young Americans taken by com­ pulsion from their h o m e s to defend an area where young fellows of the locality loaf about with their h a n d s in their pockets. This affects not only recruiting but the work of the i m p o r t a n t Belfast shipyards which are less active t h a n the British yards. 2. I a m thinking therefore of re-opening the question a n d asking the N o r t h e r n Ireland g o v e r n m e n t whether they would like m e to have an­ o t h e r try. A loud caterwaul may be expected from Valera, and I should like to know first of all how you feel about it a n d whether you could d o anything to help. [MR]

Sousse, a port on the southeast coast of Tunisia, had been captured by ele­ ments of the British Eighth Army on April 12.

C-281 London [via U.S. Embassy] Apr. 12, 1943, 1535 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President, Personal a n d Secret. I a m sure you will rejoice with m e that that place you liked so m u c h Sousse is in o u r h a n d s . [MR]

T h e question of postwar occupation policies in Italy remained a point of Anglo-American friction for most of the war. At stake was the nature of Italian government and politics, and Roosevelt and Churchill each had dif­ ferent ideas on that question, as their later exchanges make clear.

C-282 London * Apr. 13, 1943, 1050 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. As you know j o i n t Anglo-American planning is starting at Algiers in connection with the military administration of Italian occupied territory [Operation HUSKY]. I feel it is i m p o r t a n t that both sides should at the outset be clear in their minds about the character of the administration to be set u p .

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I hope you may feel that in view of the fact that the Force Commander under the supreme direction of General Eisenhower will be British, we should be senior partner in the military administration of enemy occupied territory in that area. Our proposal would be that under the supreme authority of General Eisenhower a British General Officer should be appointed as Military Governor of HUSKY-land and that he should be assisted by ajoint Anglo-American Staff. Thus there would be no dualism in the actual executive decisions on the spot. Such a local arrangement would of course in no way affect decisions on major policy being taken as usual by agreement between our two Governments or if convenient by personal correspondence between you and me. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 326.]

Roosevelt, assuming that other nations resented the prewar British influence, had originally wanted an occupation government in Sicily—and Italy—which was predominantly American, but deferred to a plan drawn up by Eisenhower which called for a joint administration emphasizing Allied unity. Hull and Stimson supported Eisenhower's approach, even though they understood "that the British Government feels that because of its interests in the Mediterranean in the past and future, the character of the administration of the HUSKY territory should be British" (memo from Hull and Stimson to Roosevelt, Apr. 13, 1943, MR). Even in accepting the basic premise of an Allied government, the President still wanted its public image to be American. General Sir Harold Alexander commanded the military forces which would invade Sicily, although the overall command rested with Eisenhower.

R-271 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Apr. 14, 1943, 3 P.M. Personal and Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Replying to your 282 of April 13th I have given my approval to the appointment of General Alexander as Allied Military Governor of HUSKYland during the occupation and under the direction of the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower. In view of the friendly feeling toward America entertained by a great number of the citizens of Italy and in consideration of the large number of citizens of the United States who are of Italian descent, it is my opinion that our military problem will be made less difficult by giving to the allied military government as much of an American character as is practicable. This can be accomplished at least to some extent by appointing to the

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offices of the allied military government a large proportion of Americans. I believe that this military government should be presented to the world as a definitely joint allied control and that t h e r e should be n o "senior partner." [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 327.]

Roosevelt left Washington on the afternoon of April 13 for a sixteen-day inspection trip of American production centers and military training camps. As usual, Hopkins handled communications in the President's absence. General Bernard Montgomery commanded the British Eighth Army which was successfully attacking Italo-German positions along the Mareth line in Tunisia. T h e "wherewithal" at Sousse (C—281) is not explained, nor is it mentioned in any of the memoirs and sources where such anecdotes appear. It seems to be a reference to spirits, and brings to mind the character Egbert Souse played by W. C. Fields in the motion picture The Bank Dick (1938). T h e running joke in that film had the other characters frequently mispronounce Sous£ as souse, a fitting slip of the tongue since Egbert drank heavily. Whenever the mispronunciation occurred, Fields would bellow: "That's Sous6. Accent on the e\" It is possible that the movie was the source of this in-joke between Churchill and Roosevelt.

R-272 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Apr. 14, 1943, 1 0 : 1 0 P.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person, Personal a n d Most Secret. I am off on a trip which will take me South a n d as far West as Denver. T h e news from T u n i s is grand and I h o p e Montgomery did not repeat not destroy all the wherewithal when h e took Sousse; you a n d I still have to celebrate. H a r r y remains in Washington. Roosevelt [MR]

Churchill's main interest was in seeing that the Military Governor of occupied Sicily received his instructions from the British and American governments, not from Eisenhower and the military. T h e experience in French North Africa had amply demonstrated the difference between immediate military needs and long-term political strategy, and Churchill wanted to avoid a similar conflict in Sicily and Italy. Montgomery was a cautious man and always preferred to attack from a

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position of overwhelming strength—hence Churchill's reference to "his cus­ tomary battery." The Churchill-Stalin exchanges consisted largely of reports from Churchill about Anglo-American successes in Tunisia and bombings of Germany. Churchill did promise to do everything possible to send the extra aircraft—something which greatly pleased Stalin. (See WSC/Stalin, docs. 139— 45.)

C-283 London Apr. 15, 1943, 1010 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Your number 271.1 hope that paragraph 3 of my number 282 made it perfectly clear that I contemplated HUSKY as our joint enterprise on terms of perfect equality, with our usual intimacy and confidence, and with no question of a "Senior Partner." This expression only applied to the actual executive work to be done by the military governor who would receive his directive from you and me in complete agreement. In the executive and administrative sphere there ought not to be two voices but only one voice which will say what you and I have agreed. General Alexander would be directing the military operations under the supreme commander and he would delegate the powers of military governor to a British Officer mutually agreeable to us both. I entirely agree with you that the utmost advantage should be taken of American ties with Italy and that at least half of the officers of the Allied Military Government should be American and, further, if in case or dis­ trict it is found that American preeminence is more useful to the common cause, this should at once be arranged. The 2 flags should always be displayed together and we should present a united and unbreakable front in all directions. All the above is of course without prejudice to the United States being supreme throughout the whole of French North Africa and my continuing to be your Lieutenant there. I hope I have given satisfac­ tion. I am ready to study with you the outlines of a directive foreseeing and forecasting as far as possible our policy towards (A) conquered districts and (B) peace overtures. These latter may come upon us swiftly and suddenly and we must be ready for them. I have on this subject at present only 2 thoughts. First, we cannot treat with Mussolini and, secondly, we should be immense gainers by getting Italy out of the war as soon as possible. Your number 272 has just arrived. There must be a pause while the armies are regrouping in the north while Montgomery is dragging up

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his customary battery, but I hope for great events before April is out. I continue to have very agreeable correspondence with Joe who has taken the convoy blow extremely well. He is very pleased that we should attempt to send the British and American aircraft quotas to him through Africa or the Mediterranean. I am trying to arrange this through Averell and will communicate with Harry. I trust your inspection tour will be as pleasant as it will be memorable. Let me take this opportunity of thanking you for all your kindness and hospitality to Anthony. He has greatly enjoyed his visit and everyone here has acclaimed it. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 327-28. R(iC]

George McCullagh was the publisher of the Toronto Globe and Mail and a vocal supporter of close Anglo-Canadian-American ties. Newspaper columnist Dorothy Thompson had written Roosevelt on February 5, 1943, to recommend that he see McCullagh. She claimed that, during talks with Lord Beaverbrook and McCullagh, "some ideas have emerged" which could "do a great deal to ease public opinion into certain channels, now, and in the future" (OF 48— B). McCullagh did visit the White House in February, although there is no copy in the Roosevelt Library files of any letter of introduction to Churchill. Brendan Bracken was the British Minister of Information.

C-283/1, letter London April 16, 1943 My dear Mr. President, Many thanks for the letter you sent me to introduce McCullagh, who is now returning to America. I saw him and he has also discussed his proposals with Brendan Bracken. I hope that much good will result. [Signed] Yours always Winston S. C. [PSF:GB:WSC]

Roosevelt had authorized Hopkins to draft a reply, in consultation with the State Department, to Churchill's query about conscription in Northern Ireland.

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R-273 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Apr. 19, 1943, 6:50 P.M. T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. I have received and considered carefully your telegram n u m b e r 280 in regard to the conscription question in N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e situation has, I feel, changed as regards public opinion in the United States since this matter was u n d e r consideration by the Government of N o r t h e r n Ireland two years ago. I frankly d o u b t whether it would create much of an issue in this country. I d o not feel that I am in a position to express any opinion concerning the effect in Eire and N o r t h e r n Ireland of the reopening of this question. Your information is of course much better than ours in this r e g a r d a n d you are doubtless in a position to weigh the advantages a n d disadvantages of such a move. Roosevelt [HLH] [MR]

POLAND AND RUSSIA From the outset of the war Roosevelt had resisted British and Soviet attempts to make postwar political arrangements. That was particularly true for the thorny Polish-Soviet issues. Even though the President recognized that Soviet influence would play the key role in shaping Poland's future, any such public statement on his part would have created serious domestic political problems, as Polish-Americans and conservatives would accuse him of being pro-communist. Moreover, it would have gone against his stated policy of reserving such issues for the postwar peace conference, a policy designed to nurse Americans along into mature internationalism. But by April 1943, PolishSoviet relations had become explosive. Their common boundary, in dispute ever since the Soviet-Polish wars after World War I, remained at the center of the struggle. T h e Poles adamantly insisted that the territory taken by the Soviets in the fall of 1939 had to be returned, and Stalin just as firmly demanded the opposite. That brief period of Soviet-Polish warfare in 1939 brought Polish prisoners to the Soviet Union and helped guarantee that the Polish government in exile in London would steadfastly look at the Soviets as enemies equal to the Germans. Ever since the Soviet occupation of what had been eastern Poland, a large number of Polish Army officers had been missing, despite efforts by the London Poles to locate them. Then, on April 13, the German government claimed to have uncovered a mass grave in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, an area occupied by the Soviets in the fall of 1939, in which lay the bodies of 10,000 officers and men of the Polish Army. T h e London Poles, never willing to view the Soviets as allies even after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941, immediately called for an investigation by the International Red Cross. Churchill suspected a Nazi propaganda trick (the Ger-

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mans were engaged in exterminating the Warsaw ghetto) and warned the Poles against any move which seemed to ally them with Hitler, but to no avail. (A later British investigation supported the German accusations, though the number of bodies was lowered to 4,510.) The Katyn Forest massacre only precipitated an inevitable Soviet-Polish clash, and there was not much Churchill could do to help the Poles. As Churchill pointed out to Polish Prime Minister Wladyslaw Sikorski, Soviet military successes and the slow Allied advance in North Africa took away what little leverage England had with the Russian government. Stalin's mes­ sage of April 21 to Churchill and Roosevelt accused the Poles of collusion with the Germans and announced that the Soviet Union would "interrupt relations" with the Polish government in exile (Stalin/FDR, doc. 80). Following the lead of Churchill's initial response (printed below), Roosevelt tried to pacify Stalin, suggesting that the Russians suspend but not break diplomatic relations. Alexander Y. Bogomolov was the Soviet Ambassador to the various gov­ ernments in exile set up in London after the Germans occupied their coun­ tries.

C-284 London Apr. 25, 1943, 1728 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. I understand that Stalin has repeated to you his message to me of April 21st about Poland. My two immediately following messages contain my reply. As you see, I am now going to follow these up with a fuller message appealing to Stalin to cooperate with us in getting as many Poles as possible out of Russia. Halifax has already spoken to Hull about this. I shall be sending you a further message on this subject. Message from Prime Minister to Premier Stalin begins: "Ambassador Maisky delivered your message to me last night. We shall certainly oppose rigorously any "investigation" by the Inter­ national Red Cross or any other body in any territory under German authority. Such investigation would be a fraud and its conclusions reached by terrorism. Mr Eden is seeing Sikorski today and will press him as strongly as possible to withdraw all countenance from any investigation under Nazi auspices. Also we should never approve of any parley with the Germans or contact with them of any kind what­ ever, and we shall press this point upon our Polish allies. "I will wire you later how Sikorski reacts to the above points. His position is one of great difficulty. Far from being pro-German or in league with them, he is in danger of being overthrown by Poles who

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consider he has not stood up sufficiently for his people against the Soviets. If he should go, we should only get somebody worse. I hope therefore that your decision to "interrupt" relations is to be read in the sense of a final warning rather than of a break and that it will not be made public at any rate till every other plan has been tried. The public announcement of a break would do the greatest possible harm in the United States where the Poles are numerous and influential. "I had drafted a telegram to you yesterday asking you to consider allowing more Poles and Polish dependents to go into Persia. This would allay the rising discontent of the Polish Army formed there, and would enable me to influence the Polish Government to act in conformity with our common interests and against the common foe. I have deferred sending this telegram in consequence of yours to me in the hopes the situation may clear. April 24, 1943." First message ends. Message from Prime Minister to Premier Stalin personal and secret. "Mr Eden saw General Sikorski yesterday evening. Sikorski stated that so far from synchronising his appeal to the Red Cross with that of the Germans his government took the initiative without knowing what line the Germans would take. In fact, the Germans acted after hearing the Polish broadcast announcement. Sikorski also told Eden that his government had simultaneously approached Monsieur Bogomolov on the subject. Sikorski emphasised that previously he had several times raised this question of the missing officers with the Soviet Government and once with you personally. On his instructions the Polish Minister of Information in his broadcasts has reacted strongly against German propaganda and this has brought an angry German reply. "As a result of Eden's strong representations Sikorski has undertaken not to press request for Red Cross investigation and will so inform the Red Cross authorities in Berne. He will also restrain Polish press from polemics. In this connection I am examining possibility of silencing those Polish papers in this country which attack the Soviet Government and at the same time attack Sikorski for trying to work with the Soviet Government. "In view of Sikorski's undertaking I would now urge you to abandon idea of any interruption of relations. "I have reflected further on this matter and I am more than ever convinced that it can only assist our enemies, if there is a break between the Soviet and Polish Governments. German propaganda has produced this story precisely in order to make a rift in the ranks

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of the United Nations and to lend some semblance of reality to its new attempts to p e r s u a d e the world that the interests of E u r o p e a n d the smaller nations are being defended by G e r m a n y against the great extra-European powers, namely, the USSR, t h e USA a n d the British Empire. " I know General Sikorski well a n d I am convinced that n o contacts or u n d e r s t a n d i n g could exist between him or his g o v e r n m e n t a n d o u r c o m m o n enemy, against w h o m he has led the Poles in bitter a n d uncompromising resistance. His appeal to the International Red Cross was clearly a mistake t h o u g h I am convinced it was not m a d e in collusion with the G e r m a n s . "Now that we have, I h o p e , cleared u p t h e issue raised in your telegram to me, I want to revert to the proposals contained in my draft telegram to which I referred in my message of the 24th April, I shall therefore, shortly be sending you this earlier message in its original form. If we two were able to a r r a n g e this matter of getting these Poles out of the Soviet Union it would be easier for Sikorski to withdraw entirely from the position he has been forced by his public opinion to adopt. I h o p e you will help m e to achieve this. April 25, 1943." [MR*. FRUS, 1943, I I I , 393-95. WSC/Stahn, docs. 151, 153.]

C-285 London Apr. 25, 1943; 1455 Z, Apr. 26 F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Secret. I r e p e a t to you herewith t h e reply I have just received to my telegram which I forwarded to you in my n u m b e r 284. I shall be glad of your views. Begins Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill personal a n d most secret. Kremlin April 25th. "I received your message concerning the Polish affairs. Many thanks for your interest in t h e matter. I would like, however, to point out that t h e i n t e r r u p t i o n of relations with the Polish G o v e r n m e n t is al­ ready decided a n d today V Μ Molotov delivered a note to this effect. Such action was d e m a n d e d by my colleagues as the Polish official press is ceaselessly p u r s u i n g a n d even daily e x p a n d i n g its campaign hostile to the USSR. I was obliged also to take into account the public opinion of the Soviet Union which is deeply indignant at t h e ingrat­ itude a n d treachery of t h e Polish G o v e r n m e n t .

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"With regard to the publication of the Soviet document concerning the interruption of relations with the Polish Government, I am sorry to say that such publication cannot be avoided." [MR* FRUS, 1943, III, 395. R&C]

Churchill still hoped to lure the Turks into cooperating with the Allies. Although the British formally denied it, the Turks insisted upon viewing British aid as primarily designed to help Turkey resist Russia in the postwar world.

C-286 London Apr. 25, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. At Casablanca you agreed that I should play the hand with Turkey. I should like you to know how things are progressing. Since the meeting at Adana much has been done to prepare the way for the move of large air forces to Turkey when the right moment comes. We are giving all the help we can to the Turks in the way of instructors and training facilities of all kinds, and we are doing what we can to improve their communications. General Wilson and Air Marshal Douglas have both visited Ankara and a start has been made with plans for joint operations. We have given them 5 ships from our strained Middle East resources to carry munitions with Turkish crews under the Turkish flag. These I am going to keep filled and busy. We have also received from the Turks expansive requests for further arms and equipment. These go far beyond what they could receive at their ports or use profitably by their troops and also beyond what we can ship. In drawing up the lists of what we are prepared to send, I have thought it necessary to avoid any appearance of being niggardly. It is better that there should be some slight indigestion rather than that the patient should have any cause to complain that he is being starved. Any how their reception ports and transportation facilities are a bottleneck. It is better that the fault should lie with them for not being able to receive, than with us for being unwilling to offer. There is a British-American coordination committee at Angora and you will no doubt hear from it complaints that the lists I have furnished to the Turks and the programmes of imports to which I am trying to work are excessive. In fact 1 of your people has used the expression "Feeding an 8 course dinner to an 8 day old baby". This is an overdrawn picture for the reasons I have given. I want the Turks to feel that they have a call on large supplies of the most modern equipment when the

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time comes as it may this autumn, for strong pressure to be put on them to let us use their bases for operation HANDCUFF (see my immediately following) and also for bombing Ploesti. Their answer will depend upon the extent to which we shall have strengthened them against the enemys counter measures and also upon their conviction that we are in earnest in wishing to help them. I hope you will approve what I am doing, and will convey to the nec­ essary quarters an explanation of the position. It may be that in some cases I have promised equipment which can only come from your pro­ duction. This we will apply for in the usual way: but I hope our requests will meet with a sympathetic reception. [MR*]

The Dodecanese Islands, located in the Aegean Sea off the southwest coast of Turkey, had been occupied by Italy shortly before World War I, although by 1943 the Germans had taken over direction of their defense. They were jointly claimed by Greece and Turkey; hence the British could not offer them to the Turks as an inducement to enter the war.

C-287 London Apr. 26, 1943, 1922 Ζ

President from Former Naval Person Personal and Most Secret. With reference to my last. Dodecanese. [MR*]

Roosevelt's message to Stalin about the Katyn Forest controversy paralleled that of Churchill.

R-274 Ft. Riley, Kans. [via U.S. Navy & Map Room] Apr. 26, 1943, 2 P.M.

To the Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. The following is a paraphrased copy of a message sent by the President to Mr. Stalin this date: "While on my inspection trip out West, your telegram was received by me. I am well able to understand the problem which you have. However, I am in hopes that in this present situation you will be able

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to discover means to label your action as a suspension of conversation with the Polish Government-in-exile r a t h e r than a complete severance of diplomatic relations. Sikorski, I believe, has not dealt in any m a n n e r with the Hitler gang, but in fact h e has merely m a d e a mistake in bringing u p with the International Red Cross this particular affair. Also I a m of the opinion that ways a n d means will be found by Churchill of getting the Polish Government, which is in L o n d o n , to act m o r e sensibly in the future. Please advise m e if I a m able to help in any way, particularly in r e g a r d to taking care of any Poles you may wish to send out of the U.S.S.R. I have several million Poles in the United States, incidentally, a large p r o p o r t i o n of t h e m being in the Army a n d Navy. Knowledge by t h e m of a complete diplomatic break between you and Sikorski, in view of the fact that they are all bitter against the Nazis, would not help the present situation. Signed Roosevelt." [MR*. pFRUS, 1943, III, 395-96. pFDR/Stalm, doc. 81.]

Coming on the heels of the cutting off of convoys to northern Russia, the Katyn Forest controversy caused Churchill grave concern. Joseph Goebbels was the Nazi Minister of Propaganda.

C-288 London Apr. 27, 1943, 1045 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Your n u m b e r 274. I like your telegram to Stalin very m u c h a n d will read it to the Cabinet today. We must work together to heal this breach. So far it has been Goebbels' show. [MR*. R&C]

Churchill managed to get the Poles to make some concessions, but Stalin proved adamant in his decision to break diplomatic relations with the London Poles, a move which eventually led to the establishment of a Soviet-sponsored Polish government. Roosevelt did not respond to Churchill's request for an­ other message to Stalin. (See Stalin/WSC, doc. 154, for changes Churchill made in his cable to Stalin. Eden cabled a copy of those changes to Roosevelt on April 30.)

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C-289 London [via U.S. Embassy] Apr. 28, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. The Poles are issuing tonight the communique in my immediately following. You will see that we have persuaded them to shift the argument from the dead to the living and from the past to the future. I have therefore sent the following message to Stalin feeling sure it will be in accordance with your views. Anything that you can put in now will be most helpful. Message begins. "Eden and I have pointed out to the Polish Government that no resumption of friendly or working relations with Soviet Russia is possible while they make charges of an insulting character against the Soviet Government and thus seem to countenance the atrocious Nazi propaganda. Still more would it be impossible for any of us to tolerate enquiries by the International Red Cross held under Nazi auspices and dominated by Nazi terrorism. I am glad to tell you that they have accepted our view and that they want to work loyally with you. Their request now is to have the dependents of the Polish Army in Persia and the fighting Poles in the Soviet Union sent to join the Poles you have already allowed to go to Persia. This is surely a matter which admits of patient discussion. We think the request is reasonable if made in the right way and at the right time and I am pretty sure the President thinks so too. We hope earnestly that, remembering the difficulties in which we have all been plunged by the brutal Nazi aggression, you will consider this matter in a spirit of magnanimity. "The Cabinet here is determined to have proper discipline in the Polish Press in Great Britain. Even miserable rags attacking Sikorski can say things which the German broadcast repeats open-mouthed to the world to our joint detriment. This must be stopped and it will be stopped. "So far this business has been Goebbel's greatest triumph. It has now been suggested that the USSR will set up a Left-Wing Polish Government on Russian soil and deal only with them. We could not recognize such a government and would continue our relations with Sikorski who is far the most helpful man you or we are likely to find for the purposes of the common cause. I expect this will also be the American view. "My own feeling is that they have had a shock and that after whatever interval is thought convenient, the relationship established on July 30th, 1941, should be restored. No one will hate this more than Hitler and what he hates most is wise for us to do.

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"We owe it to our armies now engaged, and presently to be more heavily engaged, to maintain good conditions behind the fronts. I and my colleagues look steadily to the ever closer cooperation and understanding of the USSR, the USA and the British Commonwealth and Empire, not only in the deepening war struggle but after the war. What other hope can there be than this for the tortured world?" Message ends. The Foreign Office are sending a fuller statement through our ambassador in Moscow setting out our formal and official view and dwelling more in detail on the Polish grievances and on the dangers to the United Nations which would follow from their being incessantly aired all over the world. Ambassador Winant is being kept fully informed. [MR*. R&C. StalinlWSC, doc. 154.]

Only after much arm twisting did the British convince Polish authorities to issue a statement which emphasized the common effort against Germany and downplayed the areas of Soviet-Polish friction. Although Soviet officials assured the British that they would place no barriers against Poles who wished to leave the U.S.S.R., no mention was made of the most critical problem— determining Poland's eastern boundary with the Soviet Union. The Polish statement did not change Stalin's decision to break relations; he insisted that the London Poles were anti-Soviet and infiltrated with Nazi sympathizers. (See StalinlWSC, docs. 156, 159.)

C-290 London [via U.S. Embassy] Apr. 28, 1943 To President from Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. Following is communique referred to in paragraph one of my immediately preceding telegram. Begins: "The Polish Government affirm that their policy aiming at a friendly understanding between Poland and Soviet Russia on the basis of the integrity and full sovereignty of the Polish Republic, was and continues to be fully supported by the Polish nation. "Conscious of their responsibility towards their own nation and towards the Allies, whose unity and solidarity the Polish Government consider to be the cornerstone of future victory, they were the first to approach the Soviet Government with a proposal for a common understanding, in spite of the many tragic events which had taken

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place from the moment of the entry of the Soviet armies on the territory of the republic, that is September 17th, 1939. "Having regulated their relations with Soviet Russia by the agreement of July 30th, 1941, and by the understanding of December 4th, 1941, the Polish Government have scrupulously discharged their obligations. "Acting in close union with their government, the Polish people, making the extreme sacrifice, fight implacably in Poland and outside the frontiers of their country against the German invader. No traitor Quisling has sprung from Polish ranks. All collaboration with the Germans has been scorned. In the light of facts known throughout the world the Polish Government and Polish nation have no need to defend themselves from any suggestion of contact or understanding with Hitler. "In a public statement of April 17th, 1943, the Polish Government categorically denied to Germany the right to abuse the tragedy of the Polish officers for their own perfidious schemes. They unhesitatingly denounce Nazi propaganda designed to create mistrust between Allies. About the same time, a note was sent to the Soviet Ambassador accredited to the Polish Government asking once again for information which would help to elucidate the fate of the missing officers. "The Polish Government and people look to the future. They appeal in the name of the solidarity of the United Nations and that elementary humanity for the release from USSR of the thousands of the families of the Polish Armed Forces engaged in the fight or in Great Britain or the Middle East preparing to take their part in the fight at the side of British Forces—tens of thousands of Polish orphans and children for the education of whom they would take full responsibility and which now—in view of the German mass slaughter—are particularly precious to the Polish people. The Polish Army, in waging the war against Germany, will also require for reinforcement all fighting Polish males who are now on Soviet soil, and the Polish Government appeal for their release. They reserve their right to plead the cause of all these persons to the world. In conclusion the Polish Government ask for the continuation of relief welfare for the mass of Polish citizens who will remain in the USSR. "In defending the integrity of the Polish Republic, which accepted the war with the Third Reich, the Polish Government never claimed and do not claim, in accordance with their statement of February 25th, 1943, any Soviet territories. "It is and will be the duty of every Polish Government to defend the rights of Poland and of Polish citizens. The principles for which

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the United Nations are fighting a n d also the making of all efforts for strengthening their solidarity in this struggle against the c o m m o n enemy, r e m a i n t h e u n c h a n g i n g basis of t h e policy of t h e Polish Gov­ ernment." [MR*]

Churchill continued to push for a meeting to determine what to do after the invasion of Sicily (HUSKY). T h e Prime Minister feared that the Americans, led by Stimson and Marshall, would refuse to attack Italy in favor of con­ centrating on a cross-channel attack. As Churchill put it in his memoirs, "I was conscious of serious divergencies beneath the surface which, if not ad­ justed, would lead to grave difficulties and feeble action during the rest of the year" (WSC, IV, 783). Wavell, Peirse, Somerville, and Mountbatten were the major British com­ manders in the Indian Ocean area. They all strongly opposed Operation ANAKIM. Churchill, while criticizing Wavell for lacking initiative and lead­ ership, was forced to agree. Lord Leathers, the Minister of Transport, would discuss shipping questions, and Pound, Portal, and Brooke were all members of the British Chiefs of Staff.

C-291 London [via U.S. Navy] Apr. 29, 1943, 2006 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Secret. It seems to m e most necessary that we should all settle t o g e t h e r now first HUSKY a n d exploitation thereof a n d secondly t h e future of AN­ AKIM in light of B u r m a campaign experiences a n d shipping stringency. T h e r e are also a n u m b e r of o t h e r b u r n i n g questions which you a n d I could with advantage b r i n g u p to date. I think I could m a n a g e to be with you by T u e s d a y 11th May. I would b r i n g Wavell, Peirse a n d Admiral Somerville as well as P o u n d , Brooke, Portal, M o u n t b a t t e n a n d Leathers. Please say whether you would like this o r w h e t h e r you would prefer to send your people over h e r e which of course would be easier for us. [MR*. FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, pp. 15-16. pWSC, IV, 783.]

T h e following draft, though never dispatched to Churchill, is an unusually full and candid statement of Roosevelt's attitude on the Polish-Soviet dispute as well as the President's general policy toward the Soviet Union. His purpose was to focus attention on winning the war and to avoid bringing u p divisive

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postwar issues. American experiences with the French in North Africa had made Roosevelt more sensitive to politics in occupied areas, and his support for increased Soviet authority over Polish refugees living in Soviet territory reflects that thinking. The instructions to the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir A. Clark Kerr, called for him to explain to Stalin why General Sikorski was better as head of the Polish government than the other probable alternatives. During these talks, however, Stalin suggested that the real problem was that the British could not effectively control the Polish government in exile, regardless of its makeup. The Polish-Soviet treaty of July 30, 1941, restored diplomatic relations between the two governments, identified Germany as the common foe, and permitted the formation of a Polish Army commanded by Polish officers within the Soviet Union. It also called for an amnesty for all Polish citizens held in the Soviet Union as prisoners of war. No mention was made of territorial matters. No explanation is given as to why Roosevelt chose not to send this message even after he had made minor corrections and signed it. He may have thought it better to discuss the matter during the forthcoming talks with Churchill, but the subject did not come up during their next conference.

R-274/1, not sent Washington Apr. 30, 1943 Telegram from the President to Prime Minister Churchill. I appreciate your helpful telegram of April 28 containing your message of that day to Stalin and approve everything which you said, in particular your statement to the effect that we would not recognize another Polish Government set up in the Soviet Union or anywhere else. You are quite correct in expressing the belief that we share your view that Sikorski is the most helpful Polish leader whom we or the Russians are likely to find for the purposes of the common cause. The setting up of a rival Polish Government by the Soviet Government constitutes in my opinion the chief danger at the present time and should be avoided at all costs. I believe you have chosen exactly the right line with Stalin on this point. I also note with gratification that you do not mention the underlying territorial dispute between the Poles and the Russians, attempts at the solution of which would not add to the unity of the United Nations at this time, and that your approach to Stalin is based primarily upon the obvious necessity of creating the most favorable conditions for bringing the full weight of the armed forces of all the United Nations to bear upon the common enemy. Our efforts to heal the present breach will of course continue to be of a friendly nature and void of partisanship towards either

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side. Unless the other Allied nations can prevail on Russia and Poland to adopt a course of collaboration with all members of the United Nations and to declare a truce with regard to all controversial questions likely to impede the prosecution of the war, our whole war effort will be jcop ardizcd impeded. The winning of the war is the paramount objective for all of us. For this unity is necessary. All individualistic and nationalistic ambitions in the meantime must be held in abeyance. We must close our ranks on every front for the prosecution of the war. This is the only road to freedom. Thus both the Russians and the Poles and all United Nations alike during the period of the war must subordinate factional differences to the common struggle for victory. Each government has obligations not only to its own people but to the friends of freedom throughout the world. The peoples on territory conquered by the enemy or those who have escaped from such territories must put their full weight behind the war effort and not by division and dissension become an impediment to the successful conduct of the war. I have read a copy of the instructions to Clark Kerr and feel that they bring up various practical problems which must be squarely faced and solved if relations between the Soviet and Polish Governments are to be resumed on an enduring basis. If the Soviet Government displays a willingness to accept in principle the broad considerations advanced in your message to Stalin, the practical problems which have created difficulties between the Soviet and Polish Governments can then be considered in more detail. I feel sure, however, that both of us realize that an equitable and mutually satisfactory solution of these problems must accompany the formal resumption of diplomatic relations. It is also important that when diplomatic relations are resumed it be understood by both parties that the grievances of the past are not to be permitted to plague the future. So far as the practical problems are concerned, I feel from a study of recent Polish-Soviet relations that a major defect in the agreement of July 30, 1941 as supplemented by informal agreements of the same year was the setting up of what amounted to an extraterritorial apparatus of a foreign government functioning in the Soviet Union. I wonder, therefore, if a more workable solution could not be reached if the Poles would agree to permit relief and welfare work to be carried on by Soviet organizations with, of course, the understanding that Polish citizens would receive treatment no less favorable than that granted to Soviet citizens in similar circumstances. If the Poles would agree to this, the Russians on their part might be prepared to permit Polish citizens in the Soviet Union to have contact with the appropriate Polish consular officers.

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With regard to the question of citizenship, it might be helpful if both the Russians and the Poles would permit the non-racial Poles to opt for Polish or Soviet citizenship. Racial Poles, of course, as you suggest, would be recognized by the Soviet Government as Polish citizens and would, therefore, not be called upon to opt. I place particular importance on the problem of evacuating from the Soviet Union Polish citizens who have close relatives abroad especially those who are members of the immediate families of men in the Polish armed forces. Similarly I feel that every effort should be made for the evacuation as soon as suitable arrangements can be made for their care elsewhere of Polish orphans and other children who cannot be adequately cared for in the Soviet Union. Roosevelt [MR]

After long arguments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to launch a new offensive in the South West Pacific theater, following the successes in Guadalcanal and New Guinea. Although the plan did not give the area commander, General Douglas MacArthur, all that he had asked for, it did permit him to expand his operations greatly. Even so, coordination between the Navy's Central Pacific Command and MacArthur's South West Pacific theater remained a problem, one intensified by the maneuvering among some politicians hoping to nominate MacArthur as the Republic presidential candidate in 1944. Marshall and King planned a trip to the Pacific in order to iron out some of these problems and the following message, drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated their reluctance to postpone that trip. Marshall may also have wanted to postpone any discussion of HUSKY and further European strategy until he could get the President firmly committed to a massive crosschannel attack. Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell was Commanding General of U.S. forces in the CBI (China-Burma-India) theater and headed the American Military Mission to China, a post which made him Chiang Kai-shek's senior American adviser. Major General Claire Chennault had commanded the American Volunteer Group of pursuit pilots (Flying Tigers) before Pearl Harbor and later became commander of the China Air Task Force. Officially subordinate to Stilwell, Chennault became a favorite of Chiang Kai-shek's and the two of them constantly argued about a buildup of the air war against the Japanese. During discussions held in April, the President agreed with Chennault and approved an increase in planes and aviation supplies for his air force, but that commitment further diminished the possibility of launching a major invasion of southern Burma (ANAKIM).

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R-274/2, not sent Washington Apr. 30, 1943 [Roosevelt to Churchill] Reference your radio n u m b e r 291 regarding general meeting in Washington May 11th or in London: Marshall and King are d u e to leave here for Pacific on May 5th or 6th in o r d e r to be back in Washington first week in J u n e for final consideration of post-HUSKY matters. T h e i r Pacific trip at this time is most important relative to final adjustments of matters pertaining to combined operations in the South a n d Southwest Pacific areas about to be initiated. I suggest that the reactions of the British Chiefs of Staff to your minute of April 5th [C-279] reference post-HUSKY operations be m a d e available to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and vice versa, this procedure preliminary to more formal and final consideration early in J u n e in the light of Tunisian and HUSKY developments. I would also suggest that Wavell, Peirse, and Somerville come here immediately in time to discuss with Marshall and King and others in company with General Stilwell and Chennault now here, matters relative to A N A K I M . [MR]

Having received no answer to his request for a meeting with the President, Churchill cabled Hopkins on May 2 to ask if it would be acceptable for the British delegation to depart England by ship on May 4. A sea voyage was necessary since Churchill's doctors advised against high-altitude flying so shortly after the Prime Minister's serious bout with pneumonia. Churchill also proposed staying at the British Embassy in the event that Roosevelt was distracted by domestic affairs, particularly a series of strikes by coal miners.

R-275 Washington [via U.S. Navy] May 2, 1943, 4:05 P.M. T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal a n d Secret. I am really delighted you are coming. I agree most heartily that we have some important business to settle at once; the sooner the better. Marshall a n d King have postponed their Pacific trip. I want you of course to stay h e r e with me. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Washington Conf, 1943, p. 17. R&C]

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Roosevelt did not comply immediately with Churchill's request to send a message to New Zealand, and the Prime Minister repeated his appeal to Hopkins (Churchill to Hopkins, May 10, 1943, MR). On May 12, when Roo­ sevelt thanked Peter Fraser for a congratulatory message about the Tunisian campaign, he added: " I am especially happy to know that New Zealand troops will help in the continuance of the world fight against slavery" (OF 4675-L).

C-292 London May 3, 1943, 1815 Ζ / TOR 1900 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. We a r e asking New Zealand to allow their fine, battle trained division to go forward into HUSKY, which Alexander a n d Montgomery both desire a n d advise a n d which is in full accordance with the plans of General Eisenhower. Prime Minister Fraser is definitely in favour of this, a n d will p u t the issue to the New Zealand Parliament in secret session on or after May 8th. You sent t h e m a message of appreciation at the time they decided to send their division forward with the desert army on the march from Alamein. Mr Fraser has asked m e to send him a message for his Parlia­ ment, a n d hopes h e may also receive o n e from you. Considering how we have agreed to divide o u r responsibilities in the East a n d the West, a n d also the great exertions the United States are making to protect New Zealand a n d Australia, I feel that it would be most a p p r o p r i a t e if you would kindly send one. [MR]

Hopkins had suggested that Harriman return to Washington for consultations prior to Churchill's arrival, but the Prime Minister invited Harriman to ac­ company the British party aboard the Queen Mary, and he accepted. T h e ship left England on May 5 and arrived in New York Harbor on May 11. Mateur was a strong point in the German defense line in Tunisia. Hoping to prevent the Allies from increasing their aid to the Soviet Union, Hitler had ordered his forces not to evacuate Tunisia. T h e fall of Mateur, located about forty miles northwest of Tunis, meant the loss of Bizerte and narrowed the German perimeter to a small semicircle around Tunis.

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C-293 London May 4, 1943, 1722 Ζ/TOR 1900 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. Your N o . 275. T h a n k you very m u c h . I look forward to o u r early meeting. A m bring­ ing Averell. Accept my warmest congratulations on the brilliant advance of United States T r o o p s to Mateur. T h i s will greatly h e l p t h e thrust we shall m a k e soon in t h e centre. [MR*. FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, p. 18.]

DE G A U L L E A N D T H E F R E E F R E N C H Although there is no record that Roosevelt actually gave the following mem­ orandum to Churchill, there is no question that it expressed the President's growing impatience and anger with de Gaulle (the "bride") and the entire controversy surrounding the Free French. A copy of the memo was sent to Secretary of State Hull, and, during the talks with Churchill, Roosevelt com­ plained daily about de Gaulle's haughtiness (WSC, IV, 801). Roosevelt's memo may have been a direct response to a radio broadcast by de Gaulle in which the French leader strongly criticized Giraud's administration of North Africa. T h e pressure from the Americans became so intense that, on May 21, Church­ ill cabled the War Cabinet to ask about withdrawing British support for de Gaulle. T h e Cabinet proposed postponing any decision until after the talks between the various French leaders were completed. T h e struggle for power within the Free French movement defies any brief explanation. De Gaulle's strength lay in his forceful personality, intense na­ tionalism, and refusal to collaborate with the Germans and the Vichy gov­ ernment. He shrewdly played upon all these factors to increase his influence within the Free French movement. British support, given when de Gaulle was the only significant symbol of French resistance to the Germans, had waned by 1943, but the British still saw no alternative. American policy in North Africa had stemmed from both expediency and a general dislike for de Gaulle, but the attempt to create a new French leader in General Henri Giraud had collapsed as a result of his political ineptitude. Instead of turning to de Gaulle, Roosevelt and his advisers, particularly Cordell Hull and Admiral William Leahy, became increasingly angry over de Gaulle's trenchant criti­ cisms of American policy. For example, de Gaulle bitterly criticized Roosevelt's assumption that French territories liberated from the Germans or Vichy rule would have to be administered by Anglo-American occupation forces. Al­ though the British agreed that nothing could be allowed to interfere with military operations, they were more willing to pass control over to French leaders.

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The French National Committee served as de Gaulle's official political vehicle. Anglo-American policy since the Casablanca Conference had been to unify the French forces led by Giraud with those led by de Gaulle, but it had proven impossible to reconcile the two leaders—each insisted on being recognized as the supreme authority. The British had arranged a meeting between them, although de Gaulle's vehement speech of May 4 boded ill for any compromise. General Georges Catroux was de Gaulle's representative at Giraud's headquarters. Philippe is probably Andre Philip, who had been de Gaulle's representative in Washington and who had strongly criticized American policy. Jean Monnet had had a long association with the United States. He had helped organize French efforts to purchase supplies before the war and had become one of Giraud's political advisers. He was generally wellliked by American officials. General J. Leclerc commanded all Gaullist forces in Africa. His contempt for Giraud's supporters mirrored that of de Gaulle.

R-275/1, memo Washington May 8, 1943 Memorandum for W.S.C. I am sorry, but it seems to me the conduct of the BRIDE continues to be more and more aggravated. His course and attitude is well nigh intolerable. The war in North Africa has terminated successfully without any material aid from De Gaulle and the civil situation with all its dangers seems to be working out well. I think that MacMillan concurs in this. However, De Gaulle is without question taking his vicious propaganda staff down to Algiers to stir up strife between the various elements, including the Arabs and Jews. He is expanding his present group of agitators who are working up counter demonstrations and even riots. Unfortunately, too many people are catching on to the fact that these disturbances are being financed in whole or in part by British Government funds. De Gaulle may be an honest fellow but he has the Messianic complex. Further he has the idea that the people of France itself are strongly behind him personally. This I doubt. I think that the people of France are behind the Free French Movement; that they do not know De Gaulle and that their loyalty is to the fine objectives of the movement when it was started and to the larger phase of it which looks to the restoration of France. If they only knew what you and I know about De Gaulle himself, they would continue to be for the movement but not for its present leader in London.

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That is why I become more and more disturbed by the continued machinations of De Gaulle. In my judgment, there should be a reorganization of the French National Committee, removing some of the people we know to be impossible such as Philippe, and include in it some of the strong men like Monnet and others from Giraud's North African Administration, and possibly one or two others from Madagascar, etc. Furthermore, I am inclined to think that when we get into France itself we will have to regard it as a military occupation run by British and American generals. In such a case, they will be able to use 90% of the Mayors of Arrondissements, many of the subordinate officials of the cities and departments. But the top line, or national administration must be kept in the hands of the British or American Commander-in-Chief. I think that this may be necessary for six months or even a year after we get into France, thus giving time to build up for an election and a new form of government. The old form simply will not work. I enclose extracts from some of the reports I recently have received from North Africa relating to De Gaulle. "De Gaulle's dictatorial speech in London on May fourth, Catroux intimated, made it clear that Catroux's role as negotiator has been ended, because De Gaulle is conducting his own negotiations by public speeches. "De Gaulle in messages to Catroux, and in an almost childish manner, kept saying that he would come to North Africa when he pleased and to whatever place he chose. "De Gaulle charged Giraud of welching on his original invitation to come to the City of Algiers. Catroux agreed that Giraud had never invited him to come straight to Algiers. Catroux seemed wholly disgusted and felt that De Gaulle's speech was an open confession that he was seeking personal power. "Monnet thought the speech sounded like pages out oiMein Kampf. "MacMillan felt that De Gaulle's speech dodged every question of principle involved. "In De Gaulle's telegram to Catroux on May third, there were derogatory references to the United States, saying in effect that it was the power against which the French must join forces." All in all, I think you and I should thrash out this disagreeable problem and establish a common policy. I think we might talk over the formation of an entirely new French Committee subject in its membership to the approval of you and me. I do not think it should act in any way as a provisional government, but could be called advisory in its functions.

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Giraud should be m a d e the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army and Navy a n d would, of course, sit on the Advisory National Committee. I think h e has shown fine qualities since we saw him in Casablanca. I d o n o t know what to d o with De Gaulle. Possibly you would like to make him Governor of Madagascar! F.D.R. P.S. I hear the r u m o r that Leclercq forces in Tunisia have been permitted to recruit from the neighboring forces of Giraud because Leclercq offered m o r e pay a n d better rations a n d clothing than Giraud's m e n got. I d o not know if this is true. T h e same source reports that the De Gaulle mission in Algiers seems to have a b u n d a n t funds and has p u t together an active a n d effective p r o p a g a n d a . F.D.R. [MR. FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, pp. 320-22.]

Feeling cooped u p on the Queen Mary during his trans-Adantic voyage, Churchill at one point considered an impromptu drive through the New York streets, but Harriman managed to scotch the idea. T h e President's invitation to Hyde Park apparently came via a third party, for there is no mention of it in the Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges. During the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in Washington in 1942 the fall of Tobruk had stunned the Prime Minister, and he referred frequently to that defeat. (The date of this message is taken from a notation on the document indicating it was received on May 10. T h e document number was assigned by Roosevelt's staff.)

C-293A [On board the Queen Mary] May 10, 1943 Message for the President from the Prime Minister. Admiralty have now routed us a somewhat longer course a n d we shall probably be several h o u r s late. I should like to go by train to Washington and will arrive t h e r e d u r i n g the afternoon. I shall be delighted to come to H y d e Park for the week-end, a n d I dare say we may have better news from N o r t h Africa t h a n we did at the time of T o b r u k in J u n e . Look forward to seeing you. [MR. FRUS, Washington Conf, 1943, p. 20. flfcfC]

After the talk of a weekend at Hyde Park, Churchill and Roosevelt actually spent the weekend of May 15—16 at the presidential retreat in the Maryland mountains, Shangri-la. Churchill became "Naval Person" again while on board the Queen Mary. (One minor Churchill-Roosevelt exchange regarding pub-

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licity about the Prime Minister's travel plans may be missing from the files. See FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, p. 20n.)

C-294 [On board the Queen Mary; via U.S. Embassy, London] May 10, 1943 Naval Person to the President Most Secret a n d Personal. Since yesterday we have been s u r r o u n d e d by U.S. Navy a n d we all greatly appreciate high value you evidently set u p o n o u r continued survival. I look forward to being at White House with you tomorrow afternoon a n d also to going to Hyde Park with you at weekend. T h e voyage has been so far most agreeable and Staff have d o n e vast a m o u n t of work. [MR*. FRUS, Washington Conf, 1943, p p . 19-20.]

THE THIRD WASHINGTON (TRIDENT)

CONFERENCE

The British came to Washington for the TRIDENT Conference determined to commit the Allies to a full and speedy exploitation of the expected victory in Sicily. Their strategy was to eliminate Italy quickly from the war, thus depriving Hitler of both an ally and an advantageous geographic position astride the Mediterranean. Although the British Chiefs of Staff still supported the concept of a cross-channel attack, they hoped to launch an invasion of Italy first and assumed that its success would dictate future strategy. T h e Americans reversed the emphasis of the British position. General Marshall and his advisers insisted that BOLERO, the logistical buildup for the cross-channel invasion, not be cut back to accommodate further operations in the Mediterranean. Although the conferees eventually agreed that Operation ROUNDHAMMER (a combination of ROUND-UP and SLEDGEHAMMER, soon dropped for the less confusing OVERLORD) should take place on or near May 1, 1944—the now famous "TRIDENT date"—the Americans could not answer British arguments that a total concentration on the cross-channel invasion would provide no military assistance to the Soviet Union for a period of about ten months. T h e Sicily invasion—HUSKY—was already approved and being prepared and it made little sense to go ahead without plans to seize any further opportunities it might offer. Although the Americans would not agree to any specific follow-up to HUSKY, General Eisenhower was told how much strength he would have in the Mediterranean after the taking of Sicily and he was expected to submit proposals for further operations in the area. The Mediterranean did not receive priority over BOLERO, but the British were pleased that their plan for a quick thrust against Italy had become a clear probability.

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As in the past, the CBI (China-Burma-India) theater engendered more words than action. Roosevelt remained eager to bolster Chiang Kai-shek for both political and military reasons, for he imagined China would play a strong role in the postwar world, particularly with the elimination of Japanese power in East Asia, and he hoped to support Chiang's domestic position by providing the Nationalist government with substantial military aid. But winning the war always came first with Roosevelt, and since military planners envisioned China as the launching platform for an invasion of Japan, such aid, no matter how opportune politically, also had to be effective against the Japanese. In spite of pleas from Chiang, backed u p by General Chennault, for massive shipments of American aircraft, the President agreed with Marshall and Stilwell that land operations would ultimately be more valuable. Although shortages of ships and landing craft made an invasion of southern Burma (ANAKIM) impractical, Roosevelt insisted that reopening a land route to China be the objective of all future operations. Roosevelt wished for some mention of the capture of Rangoon as a future goal, and Churchill brought u p his scheme of invading Sumatra and Malaya, but Anglo-American military leaders unanimously disagreed and the two leaders accepted that judgment.

11. American policy prevails: agreement on OVERLORD. Churchill and Roosevelt in the White House Rose Garden, May 24, 1943.

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Two other smaller but significant decisions were reached at the talks. T h e British proposed approaching Portugal for permission to use the Azores as an Allied base, and the Americans approved. (Churchill would have preferred a military ultimatum to a diplomatic query, but the British War Cabinet disagreed.) In addition, Churchill and Roosevelt jointly disapproved a suggestion from British and American military leaders in the Mediterranean that Italy be offered "peace with honor" instead of unconditional surrender. Possibly one Darlan deal had been enough, though no one said so. (See FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, pp. 326-31.) The most momentous decision made at the TRIDENT meeting received little mention in the conference records. Only from later exchanges do we learn that Roosevelt and Churchill discussed the atomic-bomb project—TUBE ALLOYS. A number of Roosevelt's advisers, particularly Vannevar Bush (Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development), argued against sharing atomic-bomb research data with the British. Claiming that the British wanted only to exploit atomic energy for its postwar economic value, Bush wanted to restrict severely the kind of information given to them. Churchill had protested to Harry Hopkins, and the Prime Minister and his advisers raised the issue during their visit to the United States. In the absence of written minutes, scholars can only surmise what transpired. Possibly Roosevelt had already begun worrying about Britain's economic health in the postwar era; possibly he was swayed by pleas from Churchill for a partnership that would continue after the war; possibly Roosevelt decided to place the primary emphasis on maintaining a fully cooperative wartime alliance. Whatever the reasons, we do know that the President promised the Prime Minister a complete sharing of the data. Although Roosevelt was tempted later that summer to change his mind, he eventually stuck by his word. (See FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, p p . 630-53; and C-354, R-326, C-388.) ALTHOUGH the TRIDENT meetings lasted from May 12 through May 25, only two memoranda exchanged by Churchill and Roosevelt during those two weeks found their way into the files. Not surprisingly, one concerned the touchy and troublesome problem of French politics. Efforts to arrange a settlement between Giraud and de Gaulle had stalemated, and rumors of deception and betrayal added to the tension. T h e idea of a co-presidency foundered on de Gaulle's insistence that the military be subordinated to the civilian government, while Giraud refused to give u p his claim to be the Commander in Chief of French military forces. Frenchmen who supported neither de Gaulle nor Giraud increasingly found themselves forced to choose one or the other in order to bring some sense of unity and organization to the French National Committee. De Gaulle's history of unwavering patriotism and his shrewd political maneuvering gave him a distinct advantage when such choices were made. Rene Massigli, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and his chief assistant, Maurice de Jean, had worked to arrange a reconciliation between the two French leaders and believed that the establishment of a Gaullist-controlled Council of French Resistance would only add to the disagreement. T h e council, ostensibly designed to coordinate military resistance within France, provided a valuable foothold as well for any politician

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trying to gain control of liberated France. Andre Philip and Gaston Palewski (Palevski) were members of de Gaulle's staff. Both men were disliked and distrusted by the President's personal representative in North Africa, Robert Murphy. Harold Macmillan had continued to function as Murphy's British counterpart. Carlton Gardens was the location of de Gaulle's headquarters in London.

R-275/2, memo Washington May 20, 1943 Memorandum for the Prime Minister The following has just come from London: Massigli's Chef de Cabinet, De Jean, is much disturbed. He says the socalled Council of French resistance and its organization were the work solely of Andre Philip. He sees little chance that De Gaulle will accept any agreement in North Africa which does not leave De Gaulle in completely effective control and with every facility "to prepare for his dictatorship after the liberation of France." It was also said by De Jean that De Gaulle had told Palevski to find out whether decisions of the French Council of Ministers were customarily taken by majority vote. De Jean said that this had obvious reference to any future council or executive committee overseas. One of De Jean's friends just back from Mexico told De Gaulle of the importance of coming to an agreement with Giraud not only for the sake of France, but because of the good effect all through the world. De Gaulle replied that unity is really unimportant because he, De Gaulle, had already been selected by the people of France as their present and future leader. It was also said by De Jean that the reason for De Gaulle's insistence on Algiers as the meeting place was for the purpose of stirring up such acclamations by the crowds as would make it possible for him to refuse any and all concessions to Giraud which would not give De Gaulle full political control. De Gaulle also said he could always say that he was personally prepared to step aside but that such action would betray the people's wishes. The dispatch notes that this admission from the inside of Carlton Gardens seems to be of interest. All the above was sent from London to Murphy and MacMillan. F.D.R. [MR. FRUS, 1943, II, 123-24.]

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It is not clear just what report on Libya and Tripoli was referred to in the following memo. Certainly the news from North Africa had been good since the Italo-German forces in Tunisia had surrendered on May 12, the opening day of the T R I D E N T Conference.

R-275/3, memo Washington May 21, 1943 M e m o r a n d u m for the Prime Minister. I have started to get a brief r e p o r t on Libya and Tripoli and we will have it by Sunday [May 23]. F.D.R. [MR]

At the close of the T R I D E N T Conference, Churchill decided to fly to Algiers in order to discuss strategy with General Eisenhower. Obviously the Prime Minister hoped to get a commitment for an attack on Italy. In order to make any such agreement more binding, Churchill suggested to Roosevelt that General Marshall accompany the British party. To Marshall's chagrin the President agreed. Enroute by seaplane (hence Churchill's self-designation of "aerial person"), General Marshall rewrote a communique to Stalin on which Churchill and Roosevelt had been unable to agree. Despite Churchill's claim that not a word of Marshall's draft was altered, Roosevelt made one correction: he combined priorities (A) and (B) as listed in Marshall's first paragraph so as to give the goal of supporting Russia a priority equal to that of combatting the submarine menace (FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, p. 386). Although the language was hedged, this message gave Stalin his first news of the spring 1944 target date for cross-channel invasion. Some of the Aleutian Islands had been occupied by the Japanese, but between January and July of 1943 a large force of ships, landing craft, and a total of 100,000 troops were engaged in retaking the islands. This is apparently the "pressure against Japan" listed as priority (D). Military historians have criticized the campaign as strategically unimportant and logistically wasteful. Upon arrival in Gibraltar, after a 3,000-mile flight from Newfoundland, Churchill sent a short "good flight" message to Roosevelt. Although that cable was drafted after the proposed message to Stalin, it was apparently dispatched first. (Previously published versions of C—296 date it J u n e 5, 1943. That is the external date assigned by the Map Room staff, but the internal date is May 26. T h e latter is clearly correct according to Marshall's initialed draft. Moreover, Roosevelt replied to the message on May 31 by instructing Marshall to send the corrected message to Stalin by courier.)

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C-295 [Gibraltar via London] May 27, 1943, 2142 Ζ

Personal and Most Secret. Former Naval Person to President. Arrived "G" safely after good flight: proceeding first destination to­ morrow. [MR*]

C-296 [Gibraltar via London] May 26, 1943 / TOR May 28

Present Aerial Person to President Roosevelt (sent in Washington Direct) Personal. General Marshall has himself prepared the following version of the approved decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be sent to Russia. C.I.G.S. and I agree with every word of it, and strongly hope that it can be sent to Stalin as the statement by the Chief of the United States Staff, concurred in by the C.I.G.S., and that it has our (President and Prime Ministers) joint approval. If you agree, will you kindly implement without further reference to me. Message begins draft of message from the Pres­ ident and the Prime Minister to Premier Stalin. In general, the overall strategy agreed upon is based upon the following decisions: (A) to give first priority to the control of the submarine menace and the security of our overseas lines of com­ munication. (B) next in priority, to employ every practicable means to support Russia. (C) to prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the War on the side of the Allies. (D) to maintain an unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her military power. (E) to undertake such meas­ ures as may be practicable to maintain China as an effective ally and as a base for operations (F) to prepare the French Forces in Africa for active participation in the assaults on Axis Europe. With reference to (A) above regarding submarines, the immediate results of the recent deployment of long range aircraft with new equipment and special attack groups of naval vessels give great en­ couragement, better than one enemy submarine a day having been destroyed since May 1st. If such a rate of destruction can be main­ tained it will greatly conserve, therefore increase, available shipping and will exert a powerful influence on the morale of the German submarine armada.

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With reference to the support of Russia, agreement was reached as follows: (A) to intensify the present air offensive against the Axis powers in Europe. This for the purpose of smashing German industry, destroying German fighter aircraft and breaking the morale of the German people. The rapid development of this air offensive is indicated by the events of the past 3 weeks in France, Germany and Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, and by the growth of the United States heavy bomber force in England from some 350 planes in March to approximately 700 today with a schedule calling for 900 June 30, 1,150 September 30 and 2,500 April 1st. The British bomber force will be constantly increasing. (B) in the Mediterranean the decision was taken to eliminate Italy from the War as quickly as possible. General Eisenhower has been directed to prepare to launch offensives immediately following the successful completion of HUSKY (viz assault on Sicily) for the purpose of precipitating the collapse of Italy and thus facilitating our air offensive against eastern and southern Germany as well as continuing the attrition of German fighter aircraft and developing a heavy threat against German control in the Balkans. General Eisenhower may use for the Mediterranean operations all those forces now available in that area except for 3 British and 4 American Divisions which are to participate in concentration in England, next to be referred to. (C) it was decided that the resumption of the concentration of ground forces in England could now be undertaken with Africa securely in our hands and that while plans are being continuously kept up to date by a joint US-British Staff in England to take instant advantage of a sudden weakness in France or Norway, the concentration of forces and landing equipment in the British Isles should proceed at a rate to permit a full scale invasion of the continent to be launched at the peak of the great air offensive in the spring of 1944. Incidentally, the unavoidable absorption of large landing craft in the Mediterranean the South West Pacific and the Aleutian Islands has been our most serious limiting factor regarding operations out of England. We have found that the undertakings listed utilize our full resources. We believe that these operations will heavily engage the enemy in the air and will force a dispersion of his troops on the ground to meet both actual attacks and heavy threats of attack which can readily be converted into successful operations whenever signs of Axis weakness become apparent. [MR. HLH. «6fC (misdated). pStalm/FDR, doc. 90.]

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Upon Churchill's arrival in Algiers, Roosevelt released to the press just one sentence, which served as the only formal joint statement about the results of the TRIDENT Conference. Although longer drafts had been considered, the final announcement simply stated that "the recent conference of the Combined Staffs in Washington has ended in complete agreement on future operations in all theatres of the war" (FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, p. 377).

R-276 Washington [via Eisenhower] May 27, 1943, 4:00 P.M.

For General Eisenhower from the President for Delivery to the Prime Minister. We are all very happy to hear this afternoon that you have safely completed the second leg of the trip. I have given the one sentence announcement of the end of the conferences to the Press. I miss you much. It was a highly successful meeting in every way and proved that it was well timed and necessary. Roosevelt [MR. FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, p. 377.]

Churchill's report of his arrival at Algiers came after Roosevelt had already received the news from other sources.

C-297 Algiers [via London] May 28, 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. Party arrived safely at "A". [MR*]

Shipping had been a problem since the outset of war, and it commanded serious attention during the TRIDENT Conference. The conferees somewhat over-optimistically agreed that the shipping shortage would be alleviated by the end of 1943, and worked up various arrangements. Most of the discussions were held between the British Minister of War Transport, Lord Leathers, and the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the American War Shipping Administration (WSA), Rear Admiral Emory Land and Lewis Douglas. This letter was sent to Churchill via Lord Leathers when the latter returned

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to England in late May. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board was one of the many Anglo-American joint agencies created to allocate war resources.

R-276/1, letter Hyde Park, N.Y. [via Leathers] May 28, 1943 Dear Mr. Prime Minister:— When you were with us during the latter part of December, 1941, and the first few days of 1942, after we had become active participants in the war, plans for a division of responsibilities between your country and mine became generally fixed in certain understandings. In matters of production as well as in other matters, we agreed that mutual advantages were to be gained by concentrating, in so far as it was practical, our energies on doing those things which each of us was best qualified to do. Here in this country in abundance were the natural resources of critical materials. Here there had been developed the welding technique which enables us to construct a standard merchant ship with a speed unequalled in the history of merchant shipping. Here there was waiting cargo to be moved in ships to your Island and to other theatres. If your country was to have carried out its contemplated ship construction program, it would have been necessary to move large tonnages of the raw materials that we have here across the Atlantic to your mills and yards, and then in the form of a finished ship to send them back to our ports for the cargo that was waiting to be carried. Obviously, this would have entailed a waste of materials and time. It was only natural for us then to decide that this country was to be the predominant cargo shipbuilding area for us both, while your country was to devote its facilities and resources principally to the construction of combat vessels. You, in your country, reduced your merchant shipbuilding program and directed your resources more particularly to other fields in which you were more favorably situated, while we became the merchant shipbuilder for the two of us and have built, and are continuing to build, a vast tonnage of cargo vessels. Our merchant fleet has become larger and will continue to grow at a rapid rate. To man its ever increasing number of vessels will, we foresee, present difficulties of no mean proportion. On your side, the British merchant fleet has been steadily dwindling. Depending upon the way in which the calculation is made, it has shrunk somewhere between six to nine million deadweight tons since the war began, and you have in your pool as a consequence about 10,000 trained seamen and licensed personnel. Clearly it would be extravagant were this body of experienced

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men of the sea not to be used as promptly as possible. To fail to use them would result in a wastage of manpower on your side, a wastage of manpower on our side, and what is of equal importance, a wastage of shipping facilities. We cannot afford this waste. In order that the general understanding that we reached during the early days of our engagement together in this war may be more perfectly carried out and in order, as a practical matter, to avoid the prodigal use of manpower and shipping that would result from pursuing any other course, I am directing the WSA, under appropriate bareboat arrangements, to transfer to your flag for temporary wartime duty during each of the suggested next ten months a minimum of fifteen. I have furthermore suggested to them that this be increased to twenty. We have, as you know, been allocating to the British services on a voyage-to-voyage basis large numbers of American controlled ships. What I am now suggesting to you and what I am directing the WSA to carry out will be in the nature of a substitution, to the extent of the tonnage transferred, for the American tonnage that has been usually employed in your war program. The details of the arrangements we can properly leave to the national shipping authorities for settlement through the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board whose function it is to concert the employment of all merchant vessels and will, in accordance with its usual practice, do so in connection with these particular ships. Always sincerely, Franklin D. Roosevelt [Lewis Douglas] [PSF:GB:WSC. FRUS, Washington Con/, 1943, pp. 318-19.]

On May 22, in the midst of the TRIDENT Conference, Churchill attended a luncheon with a group of American government officials. The discussions centered on the Prime Minister's conception of how to construct and preserve order and security in the postwar world. Since Churchill and Roosevelt had discussed the same ideas, the Prime Minister instructed the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, to send a summary of the luncheon conversations to the President. Halifax did so, but included a warning that these were only the Prime Minister's personal views. Churchill's proposals bore a striking resemblance to Roosevelt's scheme of the "four policemen": the great powers would "police" their own geographic area and work together to preserve the peace worldwide. Although Churchill relegated China to a far lesser role than did Roosevelt, the basic outline was the same. The Prime Minister, in a move which foreshadowed the famous "percentage" deal of October 1944, accorded the Soviet Union predominance in eastern Europe, but he also spoke forcefully of the need for close AngloAmerican cooperation. Churchill's musings about the creation of various European federations were nothing new (see, for example, the memoir by John Colville in Wheeler-Bennett, ed., Action This Day, pp. 83—84), but they did

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spell out his ideas in more detail. T h e most striking aspect of the scheme, with its proposals for uniting such ancient enemies as Greeks and Turks in a Balkan association, was its failure to acknowledge the strength of European nationalism. Nor did Churchill deal with nationalism even in colonial Africa and Asia. Rather it was a plan to restore the world the Prime Minister loved the most—the nineteenth-century world of unabashed great-power politics. Count Richard Nicolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi (mentioned below in the second sub-section) promoted the cause of European unity in a long series of books and articles he wrote over a forty-year period. Churchill probably referred to Europe Must Unite, published in an English translation in 1940 by Paneuropa of Glarus, Switzerland.

C-297/1, memo Washington [via Lord Halifax] May 28, 1943 [Churchill to Roosevelt] Memorandum T h e Prime Minister met the following at luncheon at the Embassy on May 22nd, 1943:— T h e Vice President (Mr. Wallace), the Secretary of War (Mr. Stimson), the Secretary of the Interior (Mr. Ickes), the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate (Senator Connally) and the UnderSecretary of State (Mr. S u m n e r Welles). WORLD AND REGIONAL COUNCILS.

In the course of a general talk about the structure of a post-war settlement, Mr. Churchill said that the first preoccupation must be to prevent further aggression in the future by Germany or J a p a n . T o this e n d he contemplated an association of the United States, Great Britain and Russia. If, as h e understood, the United States wished to include China in an association with the other three, he was perfectly willing that this should be d o n e ; but however great the importance of China, she was not comparable to the others. O n these Powers would rest the real responsibility for peace. T h e y together with certain other Powers should form a Sup r e m e World Council. Subordinate to this World Council there should be three Regional Councils, one for E u r o p e , one for the American Hemisphere and one for the Pacific. EUROPE

Mr. Churchill thought that after the war E u r o p e might consist of some twelve states or confederations who would form the Regional E u r o p e a n

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Council. It was important to recreate a strong France, whatever we might think about French deserts or the probable difficulty of achieving o u r purpose. For the prospect of having no strong country on the m a p between England and Russia was not attractive. Moreover the Prime Minister could not easily foresee the United States being able to keep large n u m b e r s of m e n indefinitely on g u a r d in Europe. If such an experiment were tried h e could not believe it would last for m o r e than one Presidential election. Great Britain could not do so either. No doubt it would be necessary, and h e t h o u g h t it would be possible, that the United States should be associated in some way in the policing of E u r o p e , in which Great Britain would obviously also have to take part; but France also must assist. T h e n there would be Spain and Italy. He also hoped that in South Eastern E u r o p e there might be several confederations; a Danubian federation based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bavaria might join this g r o u p . T h e n there should be a Balkan federation. H e would like to see Prussia divided from the rest of Germany, forty million Prussians being a manageable E u r o p e a n unit. Many people wished to carry the process of division further and divide Prussia itself into c o m p o n e n t parts, but on this question the Prime Minister reserved j u d g ment. Poland and Czechoslovakia he hoped would stand together in friendly relations with Russia. This left the Scandinavian countries, and Turkey, which last might or not be willing with Greece to play some part in the Balkan system. Mr. Wallace asked about Belgium a n d Holland suggesting that they might join France. Mr. Churchill said that was a possibility, or alternatively they might form a g r o u p of the Low Countries with Denmark. Mr. Wallace asked whether the Prime Minister contemplated the possibility of Switzerland joining with France, but the Prime Minister was disposed to regard Switzerland as a special case. In his view each of the dozen or so of the E u r o p e a n countries should appoint a representative to the E u r o p e a n Regional Council thus creating a form of United States of E u r o p e . H e thought Count Coudenhov-Kalergi's ideas on this subject had much to r e c o m m e n d them. T H E AMERICAN HEMISPHERE

Similarly there might be a Regional Council for the Americas of which the Prime Minister t h o u g h t Canada would naturally be a m e m b e r and would represent the British Commonwealth. T H E PACIFIC

T h e r e should be a Regional Council for the Pacific in which h e supposed that Russia would participate. H e thought it was quite possible that when

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the pressure on her western frontiers had been relieved Russia would turn her attention to the Far East. RELATION OF THE REGIONAL COUNCILS TO THE SUPREME WORLD COUNCIL

The Regional Councils should be subordinate in the Prime Minister's view to the World Council. The members of the World Council should sit on the Regional Councils in which they were directly interested and he hoped that in addition to being represented on the American Regional Council and the Pacific Regional Council, the United States would also be represented on the European Regional Council. However this might be, the last word would remain with the Supreme World Council, since any issues that the Regional Councils were unable to settle would automatically be of interest to the World Council and bring the World Council in. Mr. Wallace thought that the other countries would not agree that the World Council should consist of the four major Powers alone. Mr. Churchill agreed and expressed the view that to the four Powers should be added others by election in rotation from the Regional Councils. The central idea of the structure was that of a three-legged stool—the World Council resting on three Regional Councils. But he attached great importance to the regional principle. It was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute who could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a settlement the result was likely to be merely vapid and academic discussion. Mr. Wallace asked what in practice would be the procedure if, for example, there were a dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Mr. Churchill said that such a dispute would fall to be dealt with in the first place by the American Regional Council but always under the general overriding authority of the World Council. In the instance chosen the interests of countries outside the American Hemisphere would hardly be affected; but plainly a dispute which threatened the peace of the world might very well not be susceptible to being treated only on a regional basis and the Supreme World Council would quickly be brought in. NEUTRALITY

Mr. Churchill was asked whether the association of nations which he contemplated would be confined to the United Nations, or include the neutrals. He said that in his view there was advantage in trying to induce those nations at present neutral to join the United Nations before the end of the war. He thought we ought to use all possible persuasion and pressure to secure this when it could be done with safety to the nation

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concerned. An example was Turkey. His policy was to help Turkey to build up her own forces to the point where, at the right moment she could and would effectively intervene. When the United Nations brought the guilty nations to the bar of justice, he could see little but an ineffective and inglorious role for Mr. de Valera and others who might remain neutral to the end. THE LESSONS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Mr. Churchill maintained that we had much to learn from the experience of the League of Nations. It was wrong to say that the League had failed. It was rather the member States who had failed the League. Senator Connally agreed and pointed to the achievements of the League in the years immediately after 1919. Mr. Stimson also agreed and thought that if the original guarantee to France had not fallen through subsequent French policy and also the history of the League would have been very different. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FORCES

Mr. Churchill said that force would clearly be required to see that peace was preserved. He suggested that there should be an agreement between the United Nations as to the minimum and maximum armed forces which each would maintain. The forces of each country might be divided into two contingents, the one to form the national forces of that country, and the other to form its contingent to an international police force at the disposal of the Regional Councils under the direction of the Supreme World Council. Thus if one country out of twelve in Europe threatened the peace, eleven contingents would be ready to deal with that country if necessary. The personnel of the international contingent provided by each country would be bound, if it were so decided by the World Council, to undertake operations against any country other than their own. Mr. Wallace said that bases would be required for these contingents. Mr. Churchill agreed. In this connection he said that he would place a total prohibition for an indefinite time upon the practice in the enemy countries, and certainly in Germany, of the art of flying. There should be international air lines, for example, operating in and through Prussia which would give the Prussians as good a service at as cheap rates as obtained elsewhere, but they should neither be allowed to fly themselves nor to build aircraft. FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Churchill said that there was something else in his mind which was complementary to the ideas he had just expressed. The proposals for a world security organisation did not exclude special friendships devoid of sinister purpose against others. He could see small hope for the world

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unless the United States and the British Commonwealth worked together in what he would call fraternal association. He believed that this could take a form which would confer on each advantages without sacrifice. He would like the citizens of each without losing their present nationality to be able to come and settle and trade with freedom and equal rights in the territories of the other. There might be a common passport or a special form of passport or visa. There might even be some common form of citizenship, under which citizens of the United States and of the British Commonwealth might enjoy voting privileges after residential qualification and be eligible for public office in the territories of the other, subject of course to the laws and institutions there prevailing. Then there were bases. He had himself welcomed the Destroyer-Bases deal not for the sake of the destroyers, useful as these were, but because he felt it was to the advantage of both countries that the United States should have the use of such bases in British territory as she might find necessary to her own defence, for a strong United States was a vital interest of the British Commonwealth and vice versa. He looked forward therefore to an extension of the practice of common user of bases for the common defence of common interests. Take the Pacific where there were coundess islands possessed by enemy powers. There were also British islands and harbours. If he had anything to do with the direction of public affairs after the war, he would certainly advocate that the United States had the use of those that they might require for bases. AMERICAN OPINION. IMPORTANCE OF CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT DURING THE WAR

All the American guests present said that they had been thinking on more or less the lines propounded by the Prime Minister, and thought that it was not impossible that American opinion would accept them or something like them. The Ambassador asked Mr. Welles whether he thought that the establishment of a Regional Council for Europe would have the effect of leading United States opinion to disinterest itself in European affairs. Mr. Welles was not afraid of this, having regard to the overriding responsibility of the Supreme World Council and the relation between it and the Regional Councils. Mr. Stimson said most emphatically that in his opinion there would be a tendency to relax after hostilities ceased, and a reluctance to embark upon new international experience. He believed that it would be much easier to secure American agreement during the war; indeed that it was a case of during the war or never. The others were disposed to agree, and all felt that the best approach to future cooperation was to present such plans for the future as a continuation of the cooperation now in force, and to do so while the war was still proceeding.

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T h e Prime Minister m a d e two o t h e r suggestions both of which carried the warm assent of those present. First, that after the war we should continue the practice of Combined Staff conversations, a n d second, that we should by constant contact, take whatever steps were necessary to e n s u r e that the main lines of o u r foreign policy r a n closely together. Mr. Wallace said to the Ambassador as he left that it was the most encouraging conversation in which he h a d taken part for the last two years. Mr. Churchill o n all occasions stated that he was expressing only per­ sonal views. [MR. WSC, IV, 802-7 (summary).]

As so often in the past, Churchill's optimistic appraisal of French politics proved unfounded, as the exchanges between himself and Roosevelt over the summer of 1943 demonstrated. De Gaulle and Giraud continued to battle for control of the French government in North Africa and neither appeared willing to compromise. Anthony Eden was called to Algiers by Churchill on May 29, but he played little role in the marriage between de Gaulle (the bride) and Giraud (the bridegroom) that took place on J u n e 3, when they agreed on a constitution for a new Committee of National Liberation. T h e marriage quickly headed for divorce when de Gaulle and Giraud disagreed on a series of political appointments. By this time Churchill's patience with de Gaulle had grown thin and the British leader hoped that the presence on the new committee of men like General Alphonse Georges, the French Commander in Chief in 1940 and a firm supporter of Giraud, would force de Gaulle to be more cooperative.

C-298 Algiers [via London] May 31, 1943, 1437 Ζ / TOR 2 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Most Secret a n d Personal. Please accept my warmest thanks to you a n d Mrs Roosevelt for your great kindness a n d c h a r m i n g hospitality to m e d u r i n g my visit. I carry away t h e most pleasant memories a n d also I am certain that o u r discus­ sions have averted many difficulties and will grip and focus o u r whole effort in the next few m o n t h s . I a m staying h e r e o r hereabouts for the next week a n d Anthony joins m e tomorrow. T h e weather is lovely a n d the conditions most agreeable. I have h a d very good talks with Eisenhower a n d o u r people a n d yesterday h a d a first preliminary meeting. It looks as if complete a g r e e m e n t will be reached when we r e s u m e the conference on Monday.

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The bride arrives here noon today. I thought Anthony would make a better best man than I. I am therefore reserving for myself the part of heavy father. General Georges whom I flew out of France is here and makes a very good impression. I think there is a chance of his being included in the New Council. It seems essential to make the composition of this council such that it can restrain any individual who pushes personal pretensions which are harmful to the cause. Murphy and MacMillan work hand in hand together, in the closest accord. I will keep you fully informed of any developments while I am here. Once more a thousand thanks. You know how I value your friendship. Kindest regards to all. [MR*. RUC]

Science helped turn the tide in the Battle of the Atlantic, particularly with the new ten-centimeter radar. That advantage was heightened when the German submarine commanders lost faith in their radar counter-measures and began surfacing in daylight hours to recharge thei» batteries, hoping to spot Allied aircraft before being attacked. Beginning in April 1943, sinkings of U-boats increased dramatically as ULTRA intelligence added to the effectiveness of the new radars. Moreover, a number of supply submarines—the so-called milch cows—were also sent to the bottom. The inception of hunterkiller groups organized around the new escort carriers may have been as important as any of the scientific advances, and the reorganization of antisubmarine commands (particularly the establishment of the U.S. Tenth Fleet to coordinate all U.S. anti-submarine warfare) enabled Anglo-American forces to use intelligence more effectively. Admiral King had long been concerned about British attempts to build morale by releasing reports of successful battles against submarines, and there was also discontent within American naval circles about what they considered British attempts to grab all the headlines. A joint statement, as Roosevelt proposed, would end both complaints. The importance of American submarine actions in the Pacific ("the Mikado" was the Japanese Emperor, Hirohito) is best illustrated by a simple statistic: during 1943 American submarines sank a total of twenty-two Japanese warships and 296 merchant vessels.

R-277 Washington June 3, 1943, 12:30 P.M. From the President to the Prime Minister. U.S. Secret. British Most Secret. I know that you will agree with me that we may expect the followers of the Mikado to seize upon any hint we may let fall about weapons,

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method or tactics used by us in successful anti-submarine warfare. It would be difficult to foretell the serious consequences of premature publication of our scientific development. We may be sure it will cost us many submarines and many lives. It seems to me that within the past month too much has been published both in the United States and in England and that serious harm will result if we do not check further disclosures. Can we not agree on a submarine statement to be issued jointly on the tenth day of each calendar month and take steps to prevent any other public statements about submarine warfare except carefully censored versions of individual combat? Roosevelt [MR*. R&C]

Roosevelt's prediction about the short life of any de Gaulle—Giraud agreement proved accurate. The initial dispute was over de Gaulle's attempts to dismiss three French officials—Marcel Peyrouton, the Governor General of Algeria; General August Nogues, Resident General in Morocco; and Pierre Boisson, Governor of French West Africa—all of whom had served under Admiral Darlan following the German occupation of southern France. Boisson received particularly strong support from the Americans because he had cooperated fully with Eisenhower and because Roosevelt adamantly opposed de Gaulle's gaining control of the West African harbor and air base at Dakar. Reports the President received from his personal representative in North Africa, Robert Murphy, buttressed Roosevelt's conviction that de Gaulle was uncooperative and should be prevented from taking over the Free French organization. (This message arrived in Algiers after Churchill had left for London and was forwarded to the Prime Minister by Eisenhower.)

R-278 Washington [via War Dept.] June 4, 1943, 12:30 P.M. /TOR June 5.

For Eisenhower for Murphy and Macmillan to Give to the Prime Minister. I am, of course, twenty-four or forty-eight hours behind the actual events in Algiers but it seems to me that even if they are temporarily settled you and I will be sitting on top of a probable volcanic explosion. I want you to put in a strong plea for Boisson to remain at Dakar. He is thoroughly competent for that post and is probably the best administrator in all the French colonies. Incidentally, I want to give you the thought that North Africa is, in the last analysis, under British and American military rule and that for this reason Eisenhower can be used to insist on what you and I want. The

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bride evidently forgets that there is still a war in progress. Over here we receive only the bride's publicity. What is the matter with our British-American information services? Best of luck in getting rid of our mutual headache. Roosevelt [MR*]

Churchill agreed to the proposal for a joint monthly statement on anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic, and those public releases became a regular feature of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence. Churchill's claim that he was unaware "of the slightest difference" between British and American views on a strategy for Europe was far from candid. Eisenhower had seemed to favor an invasion of Italy, but Churchill had failed to convince Marshall. Thus the decision on what to do after taking Sicily awaited the results of the actual invasion of that island, which Roosevelt and Churchill referred to as HUSKY-land. The question of authority among the various French leaders is discussed in C-298.

C-299 London June 4, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. 1. I had not noticed any serious leakage but I entirely agree with your idea of a monthly joint statement approved personally by you and me. This should cover any information given in general terms about loss in tonnage and say whether it is better or worse, as well as the progress of the attack on U boats. All other statements should be prevented as you suggest. Immediately on my return I will send you a more formal confirmation. 2. We have had long, most agreeable and fruitful discussions and I am not aware of the slightest difference existing between the British and American outlooks. Especially satisfactory was it to hear from all the commanders the confidence with which they undertake the considerable operations impending. General Marshall will tell you about it. 3. I have now learned officially from MacMillan that the bride and bridegroom have at last physically embraced. I am entertaining the new committee at luncheon today, but I will not attempt to mar the domestic bliss by any intrusions of my own. General Georges has been very good. [MR*]

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The squabbling between de Gaulle and Giraud had divided the British gov­ ernment almost as much as the Free French. Although the Foreign Office staunchly supported de Gaulle and had unfavorable reports about Boisson, Churchill and Eden decided to go along with Roosevelt's wish that Boisson not be replaced by a Gaullist. For the next few weeks this problem preoccupied the President and the Prime Minister. Churchill's "Godefroy" was Admiral Rene Godfroy, who commanded the French squadron interned at Alexandria, Egypt; he had finally agreed to accept the authority of Genral Giraud. Roo­ sevelt's "Robert" was not Robert Murphy, the President's personal repre­ sentative in North Africa, as some have thought, but was Admiral Georges Robert, the pro-Vichy Governor of Martinique. (See C-267.) With his au­ thority effectively subverted by Gaullist agents, Robert finally retired in late June, 1943, and Martinique came under the control of de Gaulle's forces.

C-300 London June 6, 1943, 1620 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Your telegram through Eisenhower of June 5th [R-278], We had the whole French committee to luncheon on Friday and every­ body seemed most friendly. General [Alphonse] Georges, whom I got out of France a month ago and who is a personal friend of mine, is a great support to Giraud. If De Gaulle should prove violent or unreasonable, he will be in a minority of 5 to 2 and possibly completely isolated. The committee is therefore a body with collective authority with which in my opinion we can safely work. I consider that the formation of this committee brings to an end my official connection with De Gaulle as leader of the Fighting French which was set out in the letters exchanged with him in 1940 and certain other documents of later date, and I propose in so far as is necessary to transfer these relationships, financial and otherwise, to the committee as a whole. While I consider the committee is a safe depository for arms and supplies, I feel that we should see how they conduct their business and themselves before deciding what degree of recognition we should give them as rep­ resenting France. MacMillan and Murphy are working in the closest ac­ cord and will keep Eisenhower, with whom the supreme and ultimate power rests, fully informed. I was not aware that there was any question of Boisson being dismissed from his post. I should be strongly opposed to it. To make doubly sure I am telling MacMillan to associate himself with your instructions to Mur­ phy. I expect however he has already done so. I agree with you that the publicity is most one-sided. This is due to the press correspondents, most of whom have a De Gaullist bias. I will consult

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with A n t h o n y about what can be d o n e to correct this. I cannot however help feeling fairly confident that things will work better now. Please note that my Godefroy has come to heel before your Robert. I a m very glad that I went to N o r t h Africa and, above all, that you sent Marshall with m e . H e was a tower of strength a n d sagacity. T h e concord a n d confidence of Eisenhower's h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d the a r d o u r a n d con­ viction of t h e c o m m a n d e r s actually charged with t h e operations was most bracing. I was nearly h u n g u p by weather at Gibraltar but at the last m o m e n t a good r e p o r t came in a n d we n i p p e d t h r o u g h safely a n d com­ fortably. I should have liked to stay a n o t h e r week as t h e weather was delicious a n d t h e bathing was doing m e n o e n d of good. Every good wish to you a n d all. [MR. pWSC, V, 174. «fcfC]

Roosevelt's decision to transfer additional merchant ships to Britain brought an immediate and heartfelt response from Churchill. T h e President, probably fearing domestic repercussions, refused to let the decision be made public.

C-301 London June 6, 1943, 1625 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. Have j u s t received your letter of May 28th [R-276/1] about ships. Let m e t h a n k you from t h e bottom of my h e a r t for this b r o a d m i n d e d , j u s t a n d c o m p r e h e n d i n g t r e a t m e n t of this problem. Let m e know w h e t h e r you would care to have t h e letter published. If so, I would write a suitable acknowledgement a n d would also like to refer to t h e matter when I speak to t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s on T u e s d a y [June 8]. However, naturally, it is entirely for you to say a n d I d o not press for publication unless you think it would be advantageous to o u r p a r t n e r s h i p . [MR*. FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, p. 318n.]

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R-279 Washington June 7, 1943, 12:45 P.M. Personal and Secret to the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Reply your 301 I think it not repeat not advisable at this time to release my letter for publication and on the whole think it unwise to refer to the matter in your speech to the H o u s e on Tuesday. Delighted that you have r e t u r n e d safely. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Washington Conf, 1943, p. 318n.]

Joseph E. Davies had been the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union for almost two years during the mid-thirties. A very successful and practical businessman, he disagreed with the State Department's highly ideological, antagonistic treatment of the Soviet Union, and had supported Roosevelt's attempts to construct a better relationship with the Kremlin leaders. In May 1943, as on earlier occasions when Roosevelt considered a mission especially important and controversial, the President decided to send a personal representative to Moscow. Roosevelt was worried about the growing tension between the two nations, heightened a few weeks earlier by complaints that the Soviets had not demonstrated the proper gratitude for American lendlease aid. Fearing that the T R I D E N T decision to delay the second front would anger the Soviets, he hoped through Davies to arrange a meeting between himself and Stalin. But the Soviet leader informed Roosevelt on May 26 (Stalin/ FDR, doc. 88) that such a conference would not be possible until later in the summer. Davies' angry criticism of what he considered the anti-Soviet attitude of many persons attached to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow eventually got into the American press, creating even more problems for Roosevelt. T h e American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Admiral William H. Standley, delivered the joint report of the TRIDENT Conference decisions to Stalin on J u n e 4. Stalin's critical reply (Stalin/FDR, doc. 92) engendered considerable correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill as they sought to pacify the Soviet leader. (See C-309 ff.)

R-280 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 9, 1943, 5:00 P.M. Personal a n d Secret to the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. J o e Davies has r e t u r n e d a n d has b r o u g h t on the whole a favorable r e p o r t b u t nothing definite will be known for another m o n t h a n d I will keep you informed.

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Admiral Standley has delivered to him the Chiefs of Staff plan for forty-three and he is going to answer in a day or two. I think he will send the answer to both of us but if he does not I will transmit it to you at once. Roosevelt [MR]

During the TRIDENT Conference, Churchill and Roosevelt may have dis­ cussed the touchy question of bombing in and near Rome and the Vatican City, although there is no mention of such discussions in the printed record. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, who commanded Allied air forces in the Mediterranean and was responsible for air operations during the invasion of Sicily (HUSKY), was a firm advocate of strategic bombing, although he was more willing to support ground operations than most airmen.

C-302 London June 10, 1943, 0831 Ζ From Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal. You will recall that we agreed together that Rome should not be bombed without prior consultation and agreement between our 2 Governments. The matter came up during discussion at Algiers of air activities in prep­ aration for HUSKY. Tedder explained the steps he was taking to drive the enemy farther back, and to disrupt their communications southwards through Italy. As part of this process, he much wished to attack the important Marshalling Yards at Rome. In this he was supported by Ei­ senhower, and the matter was left that I should consult my Cabinet, and Marshall would report back to you. 2. The targets are the San Lorenzo Railway Junction and Marshalling Yard, and the Littorio Marshalling Yard, each of which is about 3½ miles from the Vatican City, which is on the opposite side of the Tiber from yards. 3. The attacks would be carried out in daylight by a very large force of aircraft. There would be small chance of damage to Rome itself, and none of damage to the Vatican. Severe damage to the yards would se­ riously impair the reinforcement route to the south of Italy, and would hold up the movement of the Herman Goering Division, elements of which we believe to be still in the north of Italy and south of France. 4. We have never agreed to refrain from bombing Rome, and we are quite prepared for retaliation on Cairo. 5. I put these matters to the Cabinet today, and they had no hesitation in supporting the proposal that General Eisenhower should be empow-

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ered to take action against these Marshalling Yards at the moment he thinks best for the successful prosecution of HUSKY. 6. If you agree, I suggest that the decision should be conveyed to General Eisenhower by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the name of the 2 Governments. [MR*]

Robert Murphy's reports from North Africa were invariably anti-Gaullist, which both reflected and reinforced Roosevelt's position. Supported in his attitude by Hull and Leahy, the President adopted a vigorous and vocal policy against de Gaulle, heightened in this instance by Roosevelt's sensitivity about Dakar, a port which he hoped would be controlled by the United States after the war. Although Anthony Eden and the British Foreign Office supported de Gaulle as the only French leader who could command the respect and loyalty of the majority of Frenchmen, Churchill agreed with Roosevelt. Not only did he consider Anglo-American relations more important than the French problem, but de Gaulle's personality had alienated the Prime Minister. Geoffrey Parsons, the chief editorial writer for the New York Herald-Tribune, had written a strong critique of American policies in North Africa.

R-281 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 10, 1943, 6:30 P.M.

Personal and Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. I have just received the following message from Murphy: "I was told this afternoon by Giraud that de Gaulle, during this morning's session of French Committee, finally brought into the open his wish to act as Commissioner for National Defense, having the attributes of a Minister of War in the ordinary cabinet set up. He also demanded the command of French forces not actively engaged in operations which is contrary to what he has told Eisenhower, MacMillan and me with respect to his intentions. Giraud absolutely refused to yield command of French forces. He insisted that General Georges be appointed Commissioner of National Defense. A compromise proposal submitted by Catroux very much favored de Gaulle's proposition. Giraud told me of his determination to retire if the Committee outvoted him on this question and to inform the British and American Governments and the French people of the injustice caused by de Gaulle's ambition. I have asked Giraud to delay any such action until there has been an opportunity to discuss this question with several

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members of the committee. Macmillan and I are disturbed regarding the actions of Gaston Palewski who is a personal counselor of de Gaulle. Palewski is passing around stories harmful to the Allies, such as, for example, that Giraud has not properly protected French interests since he has allowed the Allies to have their way in all things. We believe he is the inspiration for the story of 7 June by Geoffrey Parsons that what is happening here is a victory for de Gaulle over Giraud and the State Department. Giraud also told me that de Gaulle raised the subject of Boisson, demanding his removal on the ground that some of his followers such as de Bois Lambert has suffered at his hands as a result of the Dakar incident of September 1940. Giraud noted that President Roosevelt had indicated we consider Boisson a most capable administrator who had cooperated with the United States wholeheartedly. De Gaulle brushed this aside, Giraud said, as of no consequence." Undoubtedly Macmillan has advised you in similar terms. I have just sent the following to Eisenhower: "I request that the following message from yourself be delivered orally to General de Gaulle and General Giraud as nearly simultaneously as possible. "You will remember that we have conferred together for the ultimate destruction of the enemy forces and for the restoration and liberation of France as a great nation. We have been successful in the first phase of this; the second phase we have still before us. For reasons of our common cause, I feel I should continue to convey from time to time my views, both to General de Gaulle and General Giraud as frankly in the future as in the past, especially upon the happy announcement of the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. In this spirit may I express to you a concern over reports which have reached me, but which are happily unconfirmed, that the Council possibly may be considering the removal of Governor General Boisson from his West African post. Such action would be contrary to the very aim we have in view because of Boisson's ability as an able French Administrator. I very much hope that I may receive reassurances from the Committee that these reports as to the future of General Boisson are indeed unfounded." With this I trust you will agree. In view of the uncertainty of de Gaulle's future attitude, it is unconceivable to me that French West Africa should come under his domination. Please read my dispatch to Churchill [R-278?] with particular regard to your ordering troops there."

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I think this whole matter of de Gaulle domination of Dakar is too serious for me to remain quiescent. Neither you nor I know just where de Gaulle will end up. Therefore I find it impossible to consider any de Gaulle domination of French West Africa. This is so serious that I should have to consider sending several regiments to Dakar and also naval vessels if there were any sign that de Gaulle proposes to take things over in French West Africa. Such things would be highly unfortunate. Finally, I cannot feel happy unless Giraud has complete control of the French Army in North Africa. Control by de Gaulle would create a definitely uneasy feeling about the safety of the rear of the British and American positions, the line of supply and the adequacy of British and American forces left for the protection of the rear. Roosevelt [MR*. pWSC, V, 175. pFRUS, 1943, II, 144-46.]

American leaders suspected that political designs lay beneath British proposals for the military government of Sicily following what all assumed would be a successful invasion. Churchill was eager to retain the earlier agreement giving the British a political voice at Eisenhower's headquarters and also wanted to avoid another deal such as the much-criticized one with Darlan. (See headnotes to R-271 and C-283.)

C-303 London June 10, 1943

Former Naval Person to President Most Secret and Personal. I send you in my immediately following a note which has been prepared here about procedure in HUSKY-land. It seems to me that there is a certain amount of heavy weather being made unnecessarily about two points which will settle themselves quite simply if left to Eisenhower and to the people on the spot. First, about MacMillan. He is my personal representativejust as Murphy is yours. Both get along in all matters relating to the TORCH area. I cannot see why exactly the same relationship should not continue in the HUSKY period and should not apply to the wider areas which may be brought under our joint control. Orders and formal correspondence would go through the Combined Staffs, but it is necessary that the heads of governments should have early and intimate information about what happens in the civil and political sphere. All this is working quite smoothly

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and easily at the present time, and all that is necessary is a ruling from you and me that the present relationship of our representatives to the Supreme Commander will cover the new acquisitions of territory and will not be altered thereby. I certainly left under the impression that this would be quite agreeable to Eisenhower. The second point is about the degree of British and American control and administration which should be imposed upon any newly conquered regions. It would certainly seem wise to make them run themselves as much as possible. Prominent or malignant Fascists should be removed and we must be ready to supply trustworthy administrators in their place, insofar as these cannot be found for our purposes from the local population. It would, I feel sure, be a mistake to flood out all these places with many hundreds of British and American gauleiters, however well trained or well meaning they may be. However, it is quite impossible to foresee in advance what the local conditions or temper of the people in the conquered regions will be. It should surely be left to the Supreme Commander to propose to our two Governments what British and American officers he wants and the degree of their infusion into the local life. My own feelings are that he would want to interfere as little as possible and make things run themselves, subject to the paramount interests of the armies and of the operations. [MR*. R&C]

The memorandum quoted below was apparently written by Anthony Eden.

C-304 London June 10, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Most Secret. Following is note referred to in immediately preceding telegram being draft personal message from the Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. In Algiers I handed the Commander in Chief on June 2nd a memorandum on certain points outstanding in connection with the administration of HUSKYland which I later discussed with him, Marshall and Eden. I should like to take up one of these points, which I believe Harry Hopkins may have mentioned to you towards the end of my Washington visit. It concerns the channel of communication between General Eisenhower and the United States and British Governments and the function of the Resident Minister. I said in my memorandum to General Eisenhower "It is clear that all official communications from General Eisenhower to the United States

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a n d British G o v e r n m e n t s a n d vice versa should pass t h r o u g h the Com­ bined Chiefs of Staff. But incidents may arise, a n d be given publicity in the Press, on which it may be necessary to take rapid political decisions on t h e highest level. So far as His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t is concerned, the p r e s e n t practice is entirely satisfactory, a n d it is suggested that t h e directive should state simply that ' T h e position at Allied Force Head­ quarters of the British Minister Resident remains u n c h a n g e d . ' It will be recalled that Mr. MacMillan as Minister Resident reports direct to the Prime Minister." I very m u c h h o p e that you will be able to accept this proposal which I am sure would m a k e for the smooth and efficient working of the ma­ chinery. [MR*]

Churchill had originally proposed giving the Portuguese government an ul­ timatum: either permit the Allies to use the Azores as bases or suffer an Anglo-American invasion of the islands. T h e British War Cabinet refused to approve Churchill's proposal, preferring to rely on diplomacy and the chang­ ing tide of war to gain the cooperation of the Portuguese President, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. Although the discussions had been initiated by the Por­ tuguese, who no longer feared a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell, soon found that Salazar meant to drive a hard bargain. During discussions about the Azores at the T R I D E N T Conference, Roosevelt had suggested approaching Portugal through the Bra­ zilian government. T h e President had also considered using Brazilian troops as the occupying force in the Azores (FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, pp. 120— 21, 191). Although the Americans were suspicious of British attempts to gain a permanent foothold in the islands, Roosevelt seems to have been primarily concerned with obtaining military bases which would further the war against German submarines in the Atlantic. General J a n Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa, was in an ideal location to guarantee the maintenance of Por­ tuguese rule in the African colonies of Angola and Mozambique, both of which bordered on South African territory.

C-305 London June 11, 1943, 1128 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Most Secret a n d Personal. In accordance with t h e decisions reached at T R I D E N T , plans a n d preparations for c a p t u r i n g t h e Azores are being p u s h e d on as fast as possible. My military advisers are, however, emphatic that it is impossible to m o u n t a full-scale o p e r a t i o n before t h e e n d of August without im­ pinging u p o n operations in the Mediterranean.

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Meanwhile, His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon has reported a conversation with Dr. Salazar on 8th June, the gist of which is contained in my immediately following telegram [C-308]. Dr. Salazar has asked for a renewal of our staff conversations, about which I have informed you in the past, having regard to the changed military prospects of the Axis and the United Nations. His Majesty's Ambassador reports that Dr. Salazar may well be considering the advantages of associating Portugal with the United Nations before this is too late, and that he appears no longer to fear German military reactions as he has done hitherto. It seems to us that Dr. Salazar's approach provides us with a good opportunity to ask immediately for the facilities which we require in the Azores. If he agrees, we will at once move in with a brigade which is being specially prepared for immediate dispatch, and we shall thus be saved all the trouble and expense of mounting a considerable expedition and any stigma that may attach to threatening or using force against our oldest ally. If he refuses and we apparently acquiesce, and nothing happens for some months, we are of the opinion, in which our military advisers concur, that no great harm will have been done. Meanwhile full military preparations to occupy the islands at the end of August will continue. The War Cabinet are agreed that if we have invoked the alliance in vain on the present occasion, and if all other means fail, we should not in August hesitate to use all necessary force, after then making the last-minute appeal to Dr. Salazar at least to avert bloodshed by yielding under protest. I therefore propose, if you agree, to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador to make an immediate approach to Dr. Salazar, invoking the AngloPortuguese Alliance. We shall provide Sir R. Campbell with strong arguments regarding the improbability of a German invasion of Portugal or of adverse Spanish reactions. We cannot, however, meet Dr. Salazar's obvious desire for adequate military assistance on the Portuguese mainland. We can however offer now (1) A measure of assistance against the possibility of German air attacks on Lisbon, and (2) The protection of Portuguese seabourne commerce and the replacement of Portuguese ships sunk by the enemy. To these we would add assurances regarding the maintenance or restoration of Portuguese sovereignty over the whole of her colonial empire, including of course the Azores, after the war. We can offer him a lease arrangement, if this appeals to him, and the free enjoyment after the war of any improvements on the islands effected by us. We have carefully considered your suggestion of using the influence of Brazil, but we think that in the first instance it would be best to rely on the undoubted force and validity of our 600-year-old Alliance. Our

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requests a n d assurances would of course be much m o r e effective if I could have your authority to associate the United States Government with them. If this should fail or h a n g in the balance, then might well be the m o m e n t when you should come into action and the United States Ambassador should make a separate, joint or anyhow additional request, using the Brazil a r g u m e n t to the full. If all fails, then we shall have to wait till August. I should be glad to know as soon as possible whether you agree with an a p p r o a c h on the above lines a n d whether you will authorize m e to associate the United States Government with the above assurances regarding the Portuguese colonies. I am asking Smuts to agree to endorse o u r assurances regarding the Portuguese Colonial Empire. [MR*]

T h e last paragraph of the President's reply was added in Roosevelt's handwriting.

R-282 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 11, 1943, 12:05 P.M. From the President to the Prime Minister Personal and Most Secret. Referring to your No. 305 of J u n e 11, I am in full agreement with your proposal to instruct your Ambassador to make an immediate p r o p osition to Dr. Salazar along the lines suggested by you. My only t h o u g h t about Brazil is that Salazar might be glad to r e t u r n some of his first line troops from the Azores to Portugal and that Brazil would be happy to replace them in the Azores. Roosevelt [MR*]

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Churchill approved Roosevelt's policy toward de Gaulle and French North Africa despite British Foreign Office disagreement.

C-306 London June 11, 1943, 1130 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Most Secret a n d Personal. Your n o 2 8 1 . His Majesty's g o v e r n m e n t are in full a g r e e m e n t with you o n all points, a n d we a r e instructing MacMillan accordingly. [MR. FRUS, 1943, II, 146n.]

Following a massive air and sea bombardment which began on May 8, the Italian garrison on the island of Pantelleria, located midway between Sicily and Tunisia, surrendered without resistance to the British First Infantry Division. British military leaders, fearing heavy losses, had opposed the in­ vasion, but Eisenhower had believed that the enemy's morale could be broken with a heavy bombardment of the fortifications built into the solid rock which made u p the island. T h e nearby Pelagian Islands, about eighty miles westsouthwest of Malta, also surrendered when it became clear that no relief would come from the mainland.

C-307 London June 11, 1943, 1136 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Message e n clair from Pantelleria to Malta j u s t intercepted begins "Beg to s u r r e n d e r owing to lack of water." [MR*]

R-283 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 11, 1 9 4 3 , 3 : 1 5 P.M.

Personal a n d Secret from t h e President to t h e Prime Minister. Your N u m b e r 307. I a m delighted we obtained the Italian Gibraltar with such little cost. I h o p e this is an accurate f o r e r u n n e r of things to come. Roosevelt [MR*]

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As Germany's chances for victory receded, Salazar began to search for ways to improve Portugal's relations with the Allies while avoiding too much de­ pendence on Britain.

C-308 London June 11, 1943, 1708 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Most Secret a n d Personal. My telegram 305. Following is gist of conversation referred to. Begins. Dr Salazar informed Ambassador at Lisbon that he t h o u g h t that the time had p e r h a p s come when o u r two governments should review the conclusion reached in t h e L o n d o n conversations which h a d been based on the premises that G e r m a n y could a n d might invade the Peninsula a n d that Great Britain was not t h e n strong e n o u g h to meet that threat. T h o s e premises said Salazar n o longer held good. Since the occupation of N o r t h Africa Germany, even if she were in a po­ sition to a t t e m p t t h e operation, could hardly h o p e to establish a footing on the Straits of Gibraltar: whilst Great Britain on the o t h e r h a n d was now immeasurably stronger in every way. It was therefore for consideration w h e t h e r the decision that Portugal should only p u t u p a token fight on the mainland a n d that a centre of resistance should be established in t h e islands, any longer c o r r e s p o n d e d to the circumstances of t h e h o u r . In this connection you will r e m e m b e r that as a result of o u r staff conversations with the Portuguese it was agreed with Portugal that in the event of a G e r m a n invasion a token resistance only should be offered on t h e mainland a n d that the government should retire to the Atlantic Islands to carry on the fight. H M Ambassador comments are as follows. Dr Salazar is obviously worried about relations with Brazil a n d disappointed in his hopes of a Latin Bloc. H e is anxious about possible changes in Spain which affect his own regime in Portugal a n d n o longer puts m u c h confi­ dence in the Iberian Bloc. H e therefore seems to be t u r n i n g to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance as his best security a n d to be considering w h e t h e r h e would not be well advised to h o n o u r the alliance whilst he can still r e n d e r valuable services to the United Nations. But he would obviously prefer that the appeal should come from us r a t h e r than from him. [MR*]

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Roosevelt's staunch defense of Giraud and Boisson accomplished little. Only a few days earlier, on J u n e 10, de Gaulle had submitted to the French Committee his resignation as co-President—a move designed to force the committee to give him additional power. Once de Gaulle solidified his power, Boisson resigned as Governor of French West Africa and was eventually arrested as a collaborator, in spite of vigorous American protests. (See C 513ff.) (The White House maintained direct communications with Roosevelt while he was away for the J u n e 11—13 weekend.)

R-284 Charlottesville, Va. [via U.S. Navy] June 12, 1943, 2:15 P.M. Personal and Secret from the President to the Prime Minister. T h e following is a dispatch from Eisenhower to me on the subject of his conversation with Generals Giraud and De Gaulle. See my N u m b e r 281. "Due to language difficulties, the message to De Gaulle and Giraud was delivered orally and personally by Murphy instead of me. Giraud's answer was "tres bien." De Gaulle's answer was that it b r o u g h t u p a grave question of French sovereignty on which h e felt he personally could not yield, but which, of course, was one for the committee to decide u p o n . H e requested that a written copy of the dispatch be given him but was advised that it should be looked u p o n only as an informal oral message. T h e De Gaulle conversation lasted for an h o u r , a n d will be transmitted in a following despatch." Roosevelt [MR*]

In a message sent to both Churchill and Roosevelt on J u n e 11 (Stalin/FDR, doc. 92), Stalin made clear his belief that a campaign to eliminate Italy from the war was far from the second front promised for 1943. Even the firm commitment to a cross-channel invasion in the spring of 1944 did not satisfy the Soviet Premier. T h e last paragraph of Stalin's message read: "As for the Soviet Government, it cannot align itself with this decision, which, moreover, was adopted without its participation and without any attempt at a joint discussion of this highly important matter and which may gravely affect the subsequent course of the war." Roosevelt was reluctant to divulge the precise contents of the letter carried to Stalin by Davies (Davis) since it contained a proposal for a Stalin-Roosevelt meeting without Churchill. According to British sources, Churchill did not learn of Roosevelt's proposal until J u n e 24, although this cable seems to indicate that the Prime Minister had some idea

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that Roosevelt was proposing a separate meeting with Stalin (Woodward, British Foreign Policy, II, 557). Scapa Flow, a British naval base, is located in the Orkney Islands just north of Scotland. King George VI of England had exchanged personal correspondence with Roosevelt on a number of occasions after the King's visit to Washington, D.C., and Hyde Park in J u n e 1939. T h e King visited liberated North Africa beginning on June 12, returning to England on June 25. Churchill's mention of mosquitoes is not explained, though it may refer to Roosevelt's suggestion of the Caribbean as the location for some of their earlier meetings. "U. J." is "Uncle Joe" Stalin.

C-309 London June 12, 1939 F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Most Secret and Personal. T h e castigation we have both received from Uncle J o e u n d e r date of J u n e 11th was naturally to be expected in view of the inevitable course of events governing o u r decisions. In my opinion the best answer will be to knock Italy out of the war and let him feel the relief which will come to him thereby. I quite u n d e r s t a n d their vexation, though they cannot u n d e r s t a n d the facts that dominate o u r action. Any answer I may make will be entirely good-tempered and I will show it to you first. T h e last p a r a g r a p h , about his not participating or "any attempt to consider together etc" is the limit in view of the efforts we have m a d e to bring about a tripartite conference. All this makes me anxious to know anything you care to tell me about your letter sent to him by Mr. Davis and the answer which has been received from him. I will of course come anywhere you wish to a rendezvous and I am practising every day with my pistol to make head against the mosquitoes. Nevertheless, I once again beg you to consider Scapa Flow, which is safe, secret a n d quite agreeable in July a n d August. If you could come there in a battleship I d o not think it would be difficult for him [Stalin] to join us. Every kind of convenient a r r a n g e m e n t could be m a d e for you in Scotland, should you wish to go there. Of course, I should try to lure you farther south, but you would remain as usual master of the situation. T h e King, who has now safely arrived in T O R C H area, is very keen on your coming a n d will, of course, welcome you either secretly or publicly as you may decide. At any rate, it seems to me that this is the m o m e n t to make such a suggestion to U. J. If you have any better idea, pray share it with me. H e o u g h t I think at least to have an offer. [MR*. R&C]

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Contrary to some recollections (see R&H, p. 734), Churchill did give Roosevelt an opportunity to comment on the draft of a message to "Joe" Stalin. Churchill's language was blunt and straightforward, and Roosevelt eventually endorsed it (R-289).

C-310 London June 13, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Most Secret and Personal. This is what I propose to send to Joe. I should be very glad to know what you think of it before it goes. You will no doubt send your own message, which I should also like to see. Begins: "I have received a copy of your telegram of about June 11 to the President. I quite understand your disappointment but I am sure we are doing not only the right thing but the only thing that is physically possible in the circumstances. It would be no help to Russia if we threw away a hundred thousand men in a disastrous cross-channel attack such as would, in my opinion, certainly occur if we tried under present conditions and with forces too weak to exploit any success that might be gained at very heavy cost. In my view and that of all my expert military advisers, we should, even if we got ashore, be driven into the sea as the Germans have forces already in France superior to any we could put there this year, and can reinforce far more quickly across the main lateral railways of Europe than we could do over the beaches or through any of the destroyed channel ports we might seize. I cannot see how a great British defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet armies. It might, however, cause the utmost ill feeling here if it were thought it had been incurred against the advice of our military experts and under pressure from you. You will remember that I have always made it clear in my telegrams to you that I would never authorize any cross-channel attack which I believed would lead only to useless massacre. "The best way for us to help you is by winning battles and not by losing them. If we can knock Italy out of the war this year, as is my earnest and sober hope, we shall draw far more Germans off your front than by any other means open. The great attack which is now not far off will absorb the capacities of every port under our control in the Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to Port Said inclusive. If Italy should be forced out of the war, the Germans will have to occupy the Riviera front, make a new front either on the Alps or the Po, and above all provide for the replacement of the numerous Italian divisions now in the Balkans. The moment for inviting Turkish par-

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ticipation in the war, active or passive, will then arrive. The bombing of the Rumanian oil fields can be carried through on a decisive scale. Already we are holding in the west or south of Europe the larger part of the German Air Force, and our superiority will increase con­ tinually. "We are also ruining a large part of the cities and munition centres of Germany. If the favourable trend of the anti-U-boat warfare in the last few months continues, it will quicken and increase the move­ ment of United States forces to Europe, which is being pressed to the full limit of the available shipping. No one has paid more tributes than I have to the immense contribution of the Soviet Government to the common victory, and I thank you also for the recognition which you have lately given to the exertions of your two Western Allies. It is my firm belief that we shall confront you before the end of the year with results which will give you substantial relief and satisfaction. "I have never asked you for detailed information about the strength and dispositions of the Russian armies because you have been and are still bearing the brunt on land. I should, however, be glad to have your appreciation of the situation and immediate prospects on the Russian front and whether you think a German attack is imminent. We are already again at the middle of June and no attack has been launched. Surely this is a favourable factor. Our information about German intentions is conflicting. On the balance I think Hitler will attack you again, probably in the Kursk Salient, and that he will cut his losses in Italy. On the other hand, our Intelligence reports show that the Japanese are urging him not to make a third attack on Russia but to turn his forces against the United States and Great Britain. "At the end of your message you complain that Russia has not been consulted in our recent decisions. I fully understand the reasons which prevented you from meeting the President and me at Khar­ toum, whither we would have gone in January, and I am sure you were right not to relinquish even for a week the direction of your immense and victorious campaign. Nevertheless, the need and ad­ vantages of a meeting are very great. I can only say that I will go at any risk to any place that you and the President may agree upon. I personally believe that Scapa Flow, our main naval harbour in the North of Scotland, would be the most convenient, the safest and, if desired, the most secret. I have again suggested this to the President. If you could come there by air at any time in the summer you may be sure that every arrangement would be made to suit your wishes, and you would have a most hearty welcome from your British and American comrades." [MR*. pFRUS, Teheran Conf., ρ 8

RUC]

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Command and operational decisions in South and Southeast Asia came to occupy the attention of Roosevelt and Churchill far more than the results justified. Not until the Quebec Conference in the summer of 1943 did the two leaders finally work out the details. Churchill had much earlier become convinced that Field Marshal Wavell was ill-suited for an operational com­ mand, and the retirement of the Marquess of Linlithgow as Viceroy of India provided an ideal opportunity to move Wavell out of the military structure without causing political repercussions. Although General Auchinleck was too cautious for Churchill, the Prime Minister could not ignore the fact that Auchinleck had been out of command for nine months. The creation of a South East Asia Command, a post Churchill slated for Lord Louis Mountbatten, would relieve Auchinleck of direct responsibility for operations against the Japanese. (OSS was the American Office of Strategic Services; OWI was the American Office of War Information; FCC was the Federal Communi­ cations Commission and is probably a reference to the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, which was part of the FCC; BEW was the U.S. Board of Economic Warfare.)

C-311 London June 13, 1943, 1750 Ζ Former Naval Person to President. Most Secret and Personal. I thought you would like to know the way in which my mind has moved about the South East Asia (or Japan) front. (A) I propose to offer Wavell the viceroyalty in succession to Linlithgow. He will act of course in a purely civilian capacity. (B) I propose to offer Auchinleck the position of Statutory Commander in Chief in India. His functions will be limited to the discipline, admin­ istration and training of the Indian Army and British troops in India and defence of India proper. The Indian Army has grown from 180,000 at the outbreak of the war to nearly ten times that number, and it requires constant care and attention on account of the shortage of officers speaking the native languages and for many other reasons inseparable from so vast and swift an expansion. There is no doubt that Auchinleck's knowledge of and reputation with the Indian troops is unrivalled. (C) I propose to create a new command for the South East Asia (or Japan) front in order to secure the prosecution of the war against Japan with the utmost vigour. It has not yet decided whether this shall be a triple command of the three services such as has worked well with us in the Middle East, or whether we shall set up a supreme commander for the three services, like Eisenhower and MacArthur. My mind is turning to the latter, and I should hope it would be possible to make the new organization inter-Allied with a United States Deputy Commander-in-

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Chief and joint Staffs on the North African model. At present we are both using the same overcrowded line of communications, and a whole set of duplicated services, OSS, OWI, FCC, and BEW is springing into existence. I hope to have definite proposals to make in about a fortnight. Meanwhile, I should be grateful if you would keep this matter to yourself. But please give me your ideas. [PREM 3/371. MR.]

In exchange for a base in the Azores, Salazar continually sought assurances that Portuguese forces would be allowed to assist in the liberation of Macao and Timor, both of which had been conquered by Japanese forces. Macao, a Chinese city near Hong Kong, had long been a Portuguese colony. The island of Timor, now part of Indonesia, is about 400 miles northwest of Darwin, Australia. The eastern half of Timor was a Portuguese colony while the western half was part of the Dutch East Indies.

C-312 London June 13, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. I send you herewith a paraphrase of a telegram just received from Lisbon which bears on my 308. Begins: His Majesty Ambassador in Lisbon had thought that we should probably decide to answer Dr. Salazar's approach by suggesting renewal of conversations in London and that at an early stage we would enlarge their scope to embrace complete review of Portugal's position in regard to the war. Not being absolutely sure that Dr. Salazar has so rapidly and so completely changed his mind as actually to be anxious to come into the war at comparatively early date, Sir R. Campbell thought this method would have the advantage of being less abrupt. Sir R. Campbell thinks there is perhaps, however, not much in it worth while and sees no objection to making the approach forthwith and in the more direct manner proposed if we prefer that method as being more expeditious. As regards manner of approach, he has only the following comments to offer. It may be that for reasons of national pride Dr. Salazar would prefer that Portugal should give the appearance of collaborating as a full ally rather than hand over the Islands to us on the basis of a commercial arrangement on the West Indies analogy. Pre-

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sumably local civil administration would remain but Sir R. Campbell asks if it was our idea that Portuguese troops should be withdrawn. If so, he thinks this would be regarded as humiliating and possibly therefore affect Dr. Salazar's decision. No doubt he would be willing even anxious to reduce their number considerably but the Army would certainly be mortified if it were to have no opportunity of seeing some active service. On the other hand, Dr. Salazar might think complete withdrawal of Portuguese forces might reduce the probability or severity of Axis counteraction. Sir R. Campbell inclines, however, to the view that the other consideration would predominate and that Dr. Salazar would be likely to insist on Portuguese collaboration. He asks if we would see any objection to expressing the hope that this will be forthcoming in conditions to be agreed and then going on to say (more in the nature of an afterthought) that of course if Dr. Salazar preferred to lease the Islands on the West Indies analogy, his Majesty's Government would agree. Sir R. Campbell asks whether the answer is in the affirmative, if Dr. Salazar says interrogatively that he assumes assurances in regard to Portuguese Colonial Empire include Timor and Macao. [MR*]

Roosevelt approved the bombing of rail facilities in and near Rome when the American Chiefs of Staff argued that its psychological effect would be even more important than the material benefits. The underlined word was added in Roosevelt's handwriting.

R-285 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 14, 1943, 12:50 P.M. The President to the Former Naval Person Secret and Personal. Referring to your message No. 302 of 10 June 1943 I am wholly in agreement as to the military necessity of interfering with railroad communications to the southward and delaying movement of the Herman Goering Division by bombing attacks on San Lorenzo Railway Junction and the Marshalling Yards at San Lorenzo and Littorio. In consideration of your approval of the proposal I will request the Combined Chiefs of Staff to instruct General Eisenhower as follows: "You are authorized to undertake daylight bombing attacks against the San Lorenzo Railway Junction and the San Lorenzo and Littorio

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Marshalling Yards at any time that you consider best for the successful prosecution of HUSKY. Prior to launching these attacks all pilots concerned must be thoroughly instructed in the geography of the area, the location of the Vatican, and directed that they must not permit any bombs to fall in the Vatican City." I shall inform the Pope and I hope you will also inform him that allied pilots operating over Italy have orders and instructions which will prevent bombs from any of our planes falling in the Vatican City but that we have no reason to be assured that Axis planes will not bomb the Vatican with the purpose of charging us with the outrage. Roosevelt [MR*]

Both Churchill and Roosevelt got what they wanted regarding the occupation government in Sicily: the British retained a diplomatic representative with direct access to the War Cabinet, while Roosevelt kept Eisenhower in charge of occupation policies and the appointment of officials.

R-286 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 14, 1943, 12:50 P.M.

The President to the Former Naval Person Secret and Personal. Replying to your 303 and 304 of 10 June 1943 I am in agreement that the present equal status of MacMillan and Murphy should continue unchanged in the HUSKY and Post-HUSKY periods and that they should continue to communicate to the heads of their respective Governments early and intimate information regarding the civil and political sphere informing the Supreme Commander in each instance. I am also in agreement that in territory occupied by our combined forces in the future the Supreme Commander should during the period of occupation inform our two Governments what British and American officials he wants and the purposes for which he desires to use them in the local administration and that no other civil officials than those requested by the Supreme Commander should be sent to his area. Roosevelt [MR*. R&C]

As later discussions demonstrated, the Portuguese did not want the United States to be associated with any agreement to extend base facilities in the Azores to the British. Fearful of Spanish opposition, Salazar insisted that the

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Anglo-Portuguese alliance serve as the justification for any arrangement. J a n Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, correctly gauged the Portuguese concern about their colonies, a concern which, in light of the veiled threat mentioned in the final paragraph, appears to have been justified. LIFEBELT was the codename for the acquisition of bases in the Azores.

C-313 London June 15, 1943, 1655 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. My telegram N o . 305. I have now h a d a reply from Smuts agreeing with o u r m e t h o d of a p p r o a c h to t h e Portuguese about L I F E B E L T . Smuts considers that the association of t h e U n i t e d States with the a p p r o a c h will carry great weight with t h e Portuguese G o v e r n m e n t . If t h e Portuguese accept o u r proposals h e agrees t h a t t h e U n i o n G o v e r n m e n t should be associated with t h e as­ surances about t h e Portuguese East a n d West African Colonies. Smuts feels that t h e fear of what may h a p p e n to his African Colonies a n d to t h e Azores may be a powerful factor influencing Salazar in favour of accepting o u r proposals. If the Portuguese G o v e r n m e n t reject o u r proposals the Union Gov­ e r n m e n t wish however to r e m a i n free to shape their policy as Union interests may dictate. [MR*]

British officials had frequently hinted to the news media that military needs might require the bombing of Rome. Such hints were frequently accompanied by references to Italian planes having participated in bombing raids over London. Roosevelt's willingness to take the chance of alienating Italo-Amer­ icans and other Roman Catholics seems at variance with the view that domestic politics dominated his foreign policy. (The Pope's letter to Roosevelt is in FRUS, 1943, II, 916-17.)

R-287 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 15, 1 9 4 3 , 7 : 1 5 P.M.

Personal a n d Secret for t h e F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. I received a letter from t h e Pope yesterday a n d have replied as follows: "Your Holiness: T h e letter of 19 May 1943 from your Holiness, stating in eloquent

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words the deep feelings of emotion with which your Holiness observes the devastating effects of war on Italy, strikes a very responsive chord in my heart. No one understands better than I the neverending attempts of your Holiness to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, and subsequently to prevent its spread. Your Holiness knows the repeated efforts made in 1940 by this Government and by many groups within the United States to prevent the Chief of the Italian Government from throwing his country and its people into a ruinous war whose outcome, as I reminded him at that time, could only prove disastrous. I understand and appreciate the sympathetic response of your Holiness to the numerous appeals of the people of Italy on behalf of their country. May I say that my countrymen are among those who treasure most highly the historic monuments and the religious shrines of Italy. However Americans are also united in their determination to win the war which has been thrust upon them, a war for which the present Italian Government must bear its full measure of responsibility. My countrymen and I regret profoundly the loss of life on both sides and the destruction of resources and property. To the extent humanly possible, our attacks against Italy are limited to military objectives. We have not and will not wage war on civilians or on non-military objectives. Should it be found a military necessity for allied planes to operate over Rome, our aviators will be thoroughly instructed as to the location of the Vatican and specifically ordered to prevent bombs from falling within the Vatican City. Your Holiness, this may be an apropos time to say that I cannot feel assured that the planes of the Axis would not manufacture an opportunity to strike Vatican City with the purpose of charging Allied planes with the brutalities which they had committed themselves. There is no choice for my country but to carry forward the war with all force against the enemy until all resistance has been destroyed. I am confident your Holiness will understand that in this battle for human liberty we can make no exception to the full prosecution of the war against any legitimate military objective of the enemy. To follow any other course would only delay the realization of that desire in which the governments and peoples of the United Nations and your Holiness—and I believe the people of Italy—are joined, namely, the return of peace on earth." His letter to me was not a request not to bomb Rome but he spoke of the historic places and also spoke of the Holy See, which, I suppose, includes the Churches outside the Vatican. Roosevelt [MR*]

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C-314 London June 16, 1943, 0808 Ζ From F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. T h a n k you for your telegram n u m b e r 282. You will have seen from my telegram n u m b e r 313 that Smuts is also in a g r e e m e n t with o u r pro­ posed a p p r o a c h . We have accordingly sent instructions to H M Ambas­ sador, Lisbon, to make a n immediate a p p r o a c h to Dr. Salazar. [MR*]

During the T R I D E N T Conference, Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed to send at least 450 American planes to the Royal Australian Air Force.

C-315 London June 16, 1943, 1029 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. T h a n k you so m u c h for your kindness in meeting my wishes by giving additional help to t h e Australian Air Force. I know this decision of yours will give most lively pleasure in Australia, and I am sure t h e aircraft will be p u t to good advantage. [MR*]

De Gaulle's continued efforts to gain control of the French government brought this condemnation from Roosevelt, a statement so harsh that the editors of the series Foreign Relations of the United States, the official documentary record, deleted some of the President's remarks when the document was published in 1964. Roosevelt's personal representative in North Africa, Robert Murphy, had reported that de Gaulle had established control over the French Com­ mittee of National Liberation and was taking steps to ensure civilian (that is, de Gaulle's) control over the French military. Recognizing de Gaulle's enor­ mous prestige among the French in North Africa, General Eisenhower asked General Marshall to prevent Roosevelt from forcing a crisis between de Gaulle and the Allies. When Eisenhower met with de Gaulle, the French leader refused to permit any interference in French political affairs. T h e changes indicated below were made to the original draft, apparently by Admiral Leahy. Murphy's message is printed in FRUS, 1943, II, 152-53.

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R-288 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 17, 1943, 3:30 P.M.

To the Former Naval Person from the President Secret and Personal. I am fed up with De Gaulle and the secret personal and political machinations of that Committee in the last few days indicates that there is no possibility of our working with De Gaulle. If these were peace times it wouldn't make so much difference but I am absolutely convinced that he has been and is now injuring our war effort and that he is a very dangerous threat to us. I agree with you that he likes neither the British nor the Americans and that he would doublecross both of us at the first opportunity. I agree with you that the time has arrived when we must break with him. It is an intolerable situation. I think the important thing is that we act together and my thinking regarding the whole matter runs about as follows: We must divorce ourselves from De Gaulle because, first, he has proven to be unreliable, uncooperative, and disloyal to both our Governments. Second, he has more recently been interested far more in political machinations than he has in the prosecution of the war and these machinations have been carried on without our knowledge and to the detriment of our military interests. One result of this scheming on the part of De Gaulle has been that Eisenhower has had to give half his time to a purely local political situation which De Gaulle has accentuated. The war is so urgent and our military operations so serious and fraught with danger that we cannot have them menaced any longer by De Gaulle. Our two countries have solemnly pledged that they will liberate the French Republic and when we drive the Germans out, return that country to the control of the sovereign French people. This pledge we renew. All of the above can be put by us in language which will be mutually agreeable. Above all I am anxious that the break be made on a basis and for reasons which are identical with both our Governments. There are plenty of emotional and dissident people throughout the world who will try to separate England and the United States in this matter and we must stand shoulder to shoulder, identically and simultaneously through this miserable mess. My affirmative thought is that we should go ahead and organize a encourage the creation of a committee of Frenchmen made up of people who really want to fight the war and are not thinking too much about politics. I am sure we can find such a group. During the formation period we can continue to deal with the military authorities as in the past. The first step in any event should be the deferrment of any meeting of the French Committee in North Africa until later. In the meantime

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you can well suggest your views as to how you will approach and deal with the De Gaulle situation most effectively from the standpoint of later public opinion, also anything this government might say concurrently with any public utterance you may make. Will you communicate with MacMillan to cooperate with Eisenhower in postponing any further meeting of the French Committee in North Africa. I am anxious to have your thoughts on this as soon as possible. The following is a paraphrase of a cable I have today sent to General Eisenhower: "To General Eisenhower secret and personal from the President. To Mr. Murphy for information. Murphy's telegram 1108 is very disturbing. I wish you would carefully read once more War Department Number Nine relative to your W2382 of the 10th of June. The position of this government is that, during our military occupation of North Africa, we will not tolerate the control of the French Army by any agency which is not subject to the Allied Supreme Commander's direction. We must have someone whom we completely and wholly trust. We would under no, repeat no, circumstances continue the arming of a force without being completely confident in their willingness to cooperate in our military operations; we are not interested, moreover, in the formation of any government or committee which presumes in any way to indicate that, until such time as the French people select a government for themselves, it will govern in France. When we get into France, the Allies will have a civil government plan that is completely in consonance with French sovereignty. Lastly, it must be absolutely clear that in North and West Africa we have a military occupation and, therefore, without your full approval no independent civil decision can be made. Our policy, as you know, has been to encourage, as long as they cooperate with our military interests, local officials to manage their own affairs. It is our policy to encourage an extension of this; but civil or military direction which in any way might endanger the safety of our troops, our lines of communication, or otherwise interfere with our military operations must not be tolerated by us. This would include the necessity of keeping in North Africa more troops than we now plan. I want to state for your exclusive information that at this time we will not permit De Gaulle to direct himself or to control through partisans on any committee, the African French army, either in the field of supplies, training, or operations. This message has been seen by Hull and Marshall and has their approval.

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Please acknowledge receipt. Again I want to assure you that you are authorized to take such action as you think best in behalf of this g o v e r n m e n t . " Roosevelt [MR*. pFRUS, 1943, II, 155-57. pWSC, V, 175-76. pfifcfC]

T h e British Foreign Office tended to believe that the United States would, as before, withdraw from participation in European politics after the war. Consequently, it placed heavy reliance on the establishment of good AngloFrench relations. Since General de Gaulle seemed likely to be the French leader after the defeat of Germany, Foreign Office officials steadfastly op­ posed any confrontation with the French General. Churchill, on the other hand, shared Roosevelt's dislike of de Gaulle and considered both the Church­ ill-Roosevelt relationship and postwar Anglo-American cooperation far more important than French politics. Still, Anthony Eden managed to tone down Churchill's response to the President's demand for de Gaulle's "head on a charger" (Cadogan, The Diaries, p. 537). Roosevelt's reservations were essen­ tially political (see R—275/1) but his arguments related mainly to military efficiency, and Churchill supported the President fully on that score while arguing for a delay in any formal break with de Gaulle. Churchill's warning to the French Committee's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Ren6 Massigli, that Britain would hold back its subsidy which had supported de Gaulle since 1940, was designed to force the General to submit to majority rule by a more cooperative French Committee. T h e move failed because de Gaulle invariably dominated any committee the British could come u p with.

C-316 London [via U.S. Army] June 18, 1943, 1459 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. Your N o . 288. 1. It is imperative that t h e F r e n c h Army in N o r t h West Africa should be in loyal a n d trustworthy h a n d s especially on the eve of t h e great op­ erations which i m p e n d . I agree with you that n o confidence can be placed in De Gaulle's friendship for the Allies, a n d I could not myself be re­ sponsible to t h e British nation whose Armies h a d been placed u n d e r Eisenhower's c o m m a n d in N o r t h Africa if o u r base a n d lines of com­ munication were disturbed o r e n d a n g e r e d t h r o u g h the existence of a French Army u n d e r potentially hostile control a n d not properly subor­ dinated to t h e S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r . I am glad therefore to learn t h e clear instructions you have given General Eisenhower not to "Permit De

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Gaulle to direct himself or to control through partisans of any committee the African French Army, either in the field of supplies, training or operations". 2. I am not in favor at this moment of breaking up the committee of 7 or forbidding it to meet. I should prefer that General Eisenhower should take your instructions as his directive, and that Murphy and MacMillan should work towards its fulfillment by whatever means they find most appropriate. HM Government will associate themselves with this policy. 3. The committee will then be confronted with a choice of either accepting our decision by a majority or definite opposition to the two rescuing powers. If as I deem probable they accept the decision by a majority, it will be for De Gaulle to decide whether he and other dissentients will submit or resign. If De Gaulle resigns he will put himself in the wrong with public opinion and the necessary measures must be taken to prevent him from creating a disturbance. If he submits we shall probably have further trouble in the future, but this will be better than our sweeping away a committee on which many hopes are founded among the United Nations as well as in France. We should prescribe the conditions essential for the safety of our forces and place the onus on De Gaulle. At any rate it would be wise to try this first. 4. I have already notified Massigli through MacMillan that no further payments will be made from British funds to the French National Committee in London and that any further payments will only be made to the new committee of 7 acting by a majority. I have received from MacMillan the following paraphrased message: begins I take the right interpretation of your wishes to be full support of General Eisenhower in order to ensure that Giraud remains in effective command of French Forces. This must include measures to ensure that reorganization of personnel and appointments only take place with his concurrence. If this can be achieved while French unity is preserved, and De Gaulle remains on the committee, well and good. Failing this our first requirement must be military security. Ends. 5. In view of the situation that has now developed "The measures to secure that any reorganization of personnel and appointments should have his (Giraud's) concurrence" would not be satisfied by any division of military control between Giraud as Commander in Chief and De Gaulle as Minister of Defence. This last office should be put in the hands of General Georges or some other officer equally acceptable to the rescuing powers. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 159-60. pWSC, V, 176-77. R&C]

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Since Roosevelt had not replied to Churchill's cable proposing a message to Stalin (C-310), the Prime Minister assumed that the President chose not to answer Stalin's complaints.

C-317 London June 18, 1943, 1510 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President. As I u n d e r s t a n d you are not inclined to send a reasoned reply to Stalin, I shall send off my telegram t o m o r r o w unless I h e a r from you to t h e contrary. T h e Chiefs of Staff have m a d e a few additions to it which in no way alter t h e sense b u t make o u r case a little stronger. I d o not n e e d to trouble you with these unless you desire it. T h e telegram will of course be from m e alone. [MR*]

As the original drafts of Roosevelt's answer to C—317 demonstrate, however, the President's explanation of the delay was disingenuous. Even though Roo­ sevelt was in Charlottesville, Virginia over the weekend of J u n e 11—13, he had not received Stalin's message two days later than Churchill, but had spent the time exploring a separate policy toward Stalin and the Soviet Union. Despite a memo from Admiral Leahy pointing out that "this message contains nothing in reply to Prime's inquiry about the 'Davis letter' or about 'Scapa Flow,' " Roosevelt continued to avoid any mention of those subjects in his next draft. He eventually instructed Averell Harriman to divulge the contents of the letter Joseph Davies had carried from Moscow, but may still have harbored hopes of a Stalin-Roosevelt meeting without Churchill, since the latter's proposal for a tripartite meeting at Scapa Flow was not acknowledged.

R-289, draft A, not sent Washington June 14, 1943 President to F o r m e r Naval Person I believe your p r o p o s e d message to J o quoted in your 310 of 13 J u n e is excellent. I have received t h r o u g h the Soviet Embassy h e r e a message similar to the o n e which your 310 replies a n d I shall in a following message send you a draft of my p r o p o s e d reply. [MR]

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Still thinking of approaching Stalin separately, Roosevelt did not accept the draft of a message to the Soviet leader which called for a conference of the Big Three and which generally took a softer and more pleading tone than Churchill's proposed cable.

R-289, draft B, not sent Washington June 14, 1943 President to Former Naval Person. This is what I propose to send to Jo in reply to his message referred to in my [blank] if you approve: "I am in complete sympathy with your disappointment at our inability to provide shipping and equipment in time to make possible an immediate invasion of Western Europe with the purpose of administering together with your gallant Army an early decisive defeat of Germany. "It has long been my desire to make an effective landing of allied forces in Western Europe and now with improvement in our antisubmarine effort and augmentation of our productive capacity it appears certain that such an invasion of Europe from the west can be successfully undertaken next Spring. "Our present effort in the Mediterranean which will be greatly augmented in the immediate future together with our greatly increased bombing offensive in Germany are already certainly reducing enemy pressure on your army, and the operations now about to be launched in the Mediterranean should necessitate a further reduction in enemy forces available for use against you. "I am convinced that the early future holds much relief for your magnificent military effort and much prospect of an early defeat of Hitlerism. "It is my opinion that a conference between you and me and Churchill this Summer would be very helpful to all of us in accomplishing our common purpose." [MR]

Finally deciding to go along with Churchill's approach to Stalin, Roosevelt chose to avoid the second-front issue, concentrating instead on recent successes in anti-submarine warfare. The Russian translation of the President's message lacks the forcefulness of Roosevelt's endorsement of Churchill's cable to Stalin. (See Stalin/FDR, doc. 95.) For some reason, Roosevelt's staff—or

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possibly Roosevelt himself—persistently misspelled Averell Harriman's first name. Max is Lord Beaverbrook, who, although no longer part of the Churchill Cabinet, had accompanied the Prime Minister to Washington for the TRIDENT Conference and had then stayed on for talks with various American officials. Churchill regularly consulted Beaverbrook on Russian affairs.

R-289 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 18, 1943, 5:45 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person. My message from Uncle J o e did not come until two days after you got yours. I heartily approve of your reply a n d am sending the following to him myself. BEGINS. I was away when your message came, consequently I am a few days late in answering it. I whole-heartedly concur in Mr. Churchill's message to you, a n d you may be sure that we are really doing everything that is possible at this time. I trust you will realize that the shipping situation is still tight, t h o u g h we are encouraged by the satisfactory progress of o u r campaign against the U-Boats d u r i n g the past 60 days, showing us an appreciable net gain in ships available, ENDS.

Averill a n d Max will be over there in just a few days, a n d you will h e a r from Averill about the letter J o e Davies b r o u g h t from Moscow for me. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 9.]

Churchill and Roosevelt faced very different political limits. T h e coalition of Conservative and Labour Party leaders in the War Cabinet both strengthened and weakened Churchill's position. When supported by the Cabinet, he was unassailable; but that also meant he could not defy the Cabinet, particularly when both Labour and Conservative ministers agreed. The Prime Minister could frequently manipulate the War Cabinet regarding military affairs, but political decisions were quite another matter. T h e question of "breaking" with de Gaulle was just such a political matter, and the War Cabinet was almost unanimous in its opposition.

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C-318 London June 18, 1943, 1950 Ζ Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Secret. Further to your number 288. Some of my colleagues have questioned your sentence "I agree with you that the time has arrived when we must break with him". As you will remember, I sent a telegram from the White House when we were together, but, as I told you at the time, the Cabinet did not accept this view because, inter alia, this was a new fact to me and we were all inclined to give the meeting a fair chance. Since then we have been watching their manoeuvres with growing dissatisfaction. It would not, however, be right to say that we have decided "That the time has arrived when we must break with him". This may come but it would come as the result of his refusing to accept the necessary military conditions to ensure that the French Army remains in trustworthy hands on which full agreement exists between our two Governments. Will you very kindly read this message in conjunction with my number 316? [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 160.]

Churchill was optimistic about LIFEBELT, the establishment of Allied bases in the Azores, but Portugal's leader, Dr. Antonio Salazar, proved a hard bargainer. Armindo Monteiro was the Portuguese Ambassador in London.

C-319 London [via U.S. Army] June 19, 1943, 1549 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. 1. Pursuant to what we have agreed, Ambassador Campbell yesterday spoke to Salazar about LIFEBELT. He reports that although Salazar showed no great surprise he was evidently not expecting an appeal to the [Anglo-Portuguese] alliance. He took it calmly but declined to be drawn. He said that the communication would require very careful consideration. When Campbell asked if Salazar would authorize him to say that it would receive sympathetic consideration, Salazar replied "Yes of course." The Ambassador says further "On a first approach I think that the omens are not too bad." 2. At the same time the Foreign Secretary saw Monteiro, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, and opened the same matter to him. Monteiro

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is very friendly to the alliance and of considerable influence in Portugal. He said frankly he had been expecting something of the kind and seemed ready to help in every way. He may go back to Portugal by air. He attaches the greatest importance first to the alliance and secondly to the guarantee of the future of the Portuguese Colonial Empire and was further fortified by the fact that Smuts was a party to the demarche and undertakings. 3. On the whole things have moved more favourably than I expected when I was with you in Washington. Meanwhile all the necessary preparations are going ahead and, if permission is granted, will operate before the end of the month. [MR*]

The British preferred a "unified" structure for the new East Asia Command, since that gave effective control to the British Chiefs of Staff. The British proposals caused some concern in the United States and Roosevelt referred them to General Marshall with the comment that any reply should begin with the sentence: "Your India appointments have met with general approval in this country" (MR, attached to C—320). Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas was then Commanding General in the Middle East.

C-320 London June 19, 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Most Secret and Personal. Reference paragraph 3 of my telegram no. 311 of June 13, I have together with my advisers given a great deal of consideration to the creation of the new command for East Asia. The choice lay between a tripartite command such as we have used in the Middle East, and a unified command on the American model such as exists in North West Africa and South West Pacific. We have reached the conclusion that the latter form is the better for East Asia. I, therefore, propose, subject to your wishes, that we should appoint an Allied Supreme Commander in Chief, who will be responsible for the conduct of operations against Japan in East Asia, and for the development of the air route to China. The man whom I have in mind for this appointment is Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, who has considerable experience of the cooperation of all three services and of combined operations. I propose that there should be a Deputy Supreme Commander, who would be a United States officer of your choosing like Stilwell, and a combined Anglo American staff on the model that has worked so smoothly and successfully in North West Africa.

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Under the Supreme Commander there would be a Naval Commander in Chief, an Army Commander in Chief, two Air Commanders in Chief, and a principal administrative officer to coordinate all the administrative arrangements. Naval Commander in Chief. I think that Admiral Sir James Somerville should remain Commander in Chief of the Eastern Fleet, which of course has some responsibilities wider than those comprised with the East Asia Command, and that his relationship to the Supreme Commander should be the same as that which Admiral Cunningham bears to General Eisenhower. Army Commander in Chief. I have not yet made a final selection for the Army command; but since no American land forces will be engaged in this part of the world, I am sure that you will agree that it should be a British appointment. Air Commanders in Chief. I propose that there should be two Air Commanders in Chief: one responsible for the air war against Japan, and the other for the operation of the air route to China and for the defence of its Indian terminal. Each would have direct responsibility to the Supreme Commander within their respective spheres. To command the fighting air forces which will be predominantly British, I should select Air Marshal Sir Keith Park, who has done so splendidly in Malta and was responsible for the defence of London and Southern England in the Battle of Britain. I hope you would agree to give him an American deputy. The air route and the defence of its Indian terminal would naturally fall to an American Air Commander owing to the predominance of the American resources engaged. His deputy would be American or British as you prefer. I would not propose to disturb the present arrangement under which General Chennault, of whom we have the highest opinion and with whom we know that we can work in concert, is responsible through American channels to the Generalissimo. His air forces, American and Chinese, would for the most part be operating to the eastward, but when weather is bad in Eastern China and good in Burma it should not be difficult for General Chennault to combine his operations with those of both the air commanders in the East Asia theatre. The Commander in Chief in India and the Supreme Commander, East Asia, will be independent of each other and co-equal. But it is proposed to lay it down definitely that for operational purposes outside India, the Commander in Chief, India, will meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander. I suggest that the relationship of the Supreme Commander, East Asia, to the higher command should follow as closely as possible, mutatis mutandis, the MacArthur model. Under this arrangement, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategic

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policy and over such relating factors as are necessary for proper implementation of that policy including the allocation of forces and war materials: while the British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy and all instructions to the Supreme Commander would be issued through them. I do not think that you would wish to be troubled at this stage with details of the exact frontiers of the new command, or of the location of command headquarters, or of the means by which the administrative arrangements between the new command and India will be coordinated, or of the manner in which OSS, OWI, FCC, and BEW will be integrated with our own comparable organizations. If you and I are agreed on general principles, all these matters can be thrashed out by our staffs. I should be grateful if you would let me have your ideas as soon as you can, since I have undertaken to make an early announcement on the subject. [MR*]

The Lateran Treaty between the Italian government and the Pope identified certain churches and other buildings outside the Vatican City as being under Papal jurisdiction.

C-321 London June 19, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. I have sent the Pope a message as suggested in paragraph 2 of your telegram number 285 of June 14. In your telegram number 287 of June 16, you mention the churches outside the Vatican. I think we ought to instruct our pilots to observe all possible care in order to avoid hitting any of the Papal buildings in the city of Rome listed in Article 13 of Lateran Treaty, especially St. John Lateran. [MR*]

Churchill made only a few changes to the draft message to Stalin (C—310) which Roosevelt had received. The new wording added emphasis to the argument that the Mediterranean campaign posed a direct threat to Germany (the first two sentences of par. 2); provided statistics showing a slight decline

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in the number of German aircraft on the Russian front (sentence 8 of par. 2); argued that the massive air bombardment of Germany would hurt the overall German war effort (sentence 9 of par. 2); eliminated specific predic­ tions about German military operations in the summer of 1943 (last two sentences of par. 3); and left unchanged the strongly worded protest against Stalin's complaint that the Soviet Union had not been consulted about Allied strategic planning.

C-322 London [via U.S. Army] June 20, 1943, 1545 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. I send you the telegram to Stalin in the final form in which it went. Telegram begins: Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin personal and most secret. 1. I have received a copy of your telegram of about 11th June to the President. I quite understand your disappointment but I am sure we are doing not only the right thing but the only thing that is physically possible in the circumstances. It would be no help to Russia if we threw away 100,000 men in a disastrous cross channel attack such as would, in my opinion, certainly occur if we tried under pres­ ent conditions and with forces too weak to exploit any success that might be gained at very heavy cost. In my view and that of all my expert military advisers, we should, even if we got ashore, be driven into the sea, as the Germans have forces already in France superior to any we could put there this year, and can reinforce far more quickly across the main lateral railways of Europe than we could do over the beaches or through any of the destroyed channel ports we might seize. I cannot see how a great British defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet Armies. It might, however, cause the utmost ill feeling here if it were thought it had been incurred against the advice of our military experts and under pressure from you. You will remem­ ber that I have always made it clear in my telegrams to you that I would never authorize any cross channel attack which I believed would lead only to useless massacre. 2. The best way for us to help you is by winning battles and not losing them. This we have done in Tunisia, where the long arm of British and United States sea power has reached across the Atlantic and 10,000 miles around the Cape and helped us to annihilate great Axis land and air forces. The threat immediately resulting to the whole Axis defensive system in the Mediterranean has already forced the Germans to reinforce Italy, the Mediterranean Islands, the Bal-

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kans and Southern France with land and air forces. It is my earnest and sober hope that we can knock Italy out of the war this year, and by doing so we shall draw far more Germans off your front than by any other means open. The great attack that is now not far off will absorb the capacities of every port under our control in the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Port Said inclusive. After Italy has been forced out of the war, the Germans will have to occupy the Riviera, make a new front either on the Alps or the Po, and above all provide for the replacement of the 32 Italian divisions now in the Balkans. The moment for inviting Turkish participation in the war, active or passive, will then arrive. The bombing of the Rumanian oil fields can be carried through on a decisive scale. Already we are holding in the west and south of Europe the larger part of the German air forces and our superiority will increase continually. Out of a first line operational strength of between 4800 and 4900 aircraft Germany according to our information has today on the Russian front some 2,000 compared with some 2,500 this time last year. We are also ruining a large part of the cities and munitions centres of Germany, which may well have a decisive effect by sapping German resistance on all fronts. By this coming autumn this great air offensive should have produced a massive return. If the favourable trend of the anti U boat warfare of the last few months continues, it will quicken and increase the movement of the United States forces to Europe which is being pressed to the full limit of the available shipping. No one has paid more tributes than I have to the immense contribution of the Soviet Government to the common victory, and I thank you also for the recognition which you have lately given to the exertions of your two western allies. It is my firm belief that we shall present you before the end of the year with results which will give you substantial relief and satisfaction. 3.1 have never asked you for detailed information about the strength and dispositions of the Russian armies because you have been, and are still, bearing the brunt on land. I should however be glad to have your appreciation of the situation and immediate prospects on the Russian front and whether you think a German attack is imminent. We are already again in the middle of June and no attack has been launched. We have some reason to believe that the unexpectedly rapid defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa has dislocated German strategy, and that the consequent threat to southern Europe has been an important factor in causing Hitler to hesitate and to delay his plans for a large scale offensive against Russia this summer. It is no doubt too soon to pronounce decidedly on all this, but we should be very glad to hear what you think about it.

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4. At the end of your message you complain that Russia has not been consulted in our recent decisions. I fully understand the reasons which prevented you from meeting the President and me at Khartoum, whither we would have gone in January, and I am sure you were right not to relinquish even for a week the direction of your immense and victorious campaign. Nevertheless the need and advantages of a meeting are very great. I can only say that I will go at any risk to any place that you and the President may agree upon. I and my advisers believe that Scapa Flow, our main naval harbour in the north of Scotland would be the most convenient, the safest and if secrecy be desired probably the most secret. I have again suggested this to the President. If you could come there by air at any time in the summer you may be sure that every arrangement would be made to suit your wishes, and you would have a most hearty welcome from your British and American comrades. [MR*. pFRUS, Teheran Conf, p. 10.]

Roosevelt continued to search for ways to prevent de Gaulle from consolidating his position in North Africa. Once again an appeal to military necessities seemed the best hope of gaining Churchill's support.

R-290 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] June 21, 1943, 4:35 P.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. Replying to your messages numbered 316 and 318 of the eighteenth of June, I am glad to be reassured that you are in complete agreement with me on the major question of the control in Africa of the Military forces which question includes the security of our lines of supply. My telegram Number 288 was based on the fact that the Committee of seven had, by an unpublished decree of the seventh of June, been increased to fourteen, a fact which had not been made known to MacMillan or Murphy until the sixteenth of June. It would appear that the Committee now stands as overwhelmingly De Gaullist. Full authority over all the war effort of French territory and the French is claimed by this augmented Committee. I am sure you agree that the jeopardizing of our military position in North Africa by an antagonistic element in such control cannot be accepted by us. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 160-61.]

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R-291 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] June 21, 1943, 6:45 P.M. From the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Secret a n d Personal. I am directing o u r people to carry out your excellent suggestion in r e g a r d to churches outside the Vatican [C-321]. Roosevelt [MR*]

Roosevelt had no understanding of the psychological importance of empire to the European powers. Although many colonies had lost their economic value, they represented the prestige and power of a bygone age. The President's curious suggestion that Australia purchase Timor demonstrates the limits of his anti-colonialism and raises the possibility that he considered regional colonialism less pernicious than that practiced by the European nations. (Cf. Eden, The Reckoning, p. 438.)

R-292 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] June 21, 1943, 6:50 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. I am very happy at the way things are going with Portugal. T h e t h o u g h t has come to m e that if any question arises in regard to T i m o r , Australia might be interested in purchasing it in the interest of the defense of the Southwest Pacific. I think it has never b r o u g h t the Portuguese G o v e r n m e n t any interest on the investment. O n the other h a n d , there is n o repeat n o reason why such question should not repeat not be left until after the war is over. T h e same thing applies to Macao. Roosevelt [MR*]

British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had suggested that his American counterpart, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, reciprocate the visit Eden had paid to the United States in May 1943. Always eager to cement Anglo-American relations, Churchill endorsed the idea when Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Washington, reported that Hull was considering the trip. These thoughts eventually culminated in the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in October-November 1943.

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C-323 London June 22, 1943 From Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. We were delighted to hear from Halifax the other day that Mister Hull had some hope that he might be able to accept Anthony's invitation to pay us a visit here. After all the visits we have inflicted upon you, I really think it is time we played the hosts and, short of yourself, there is certainly no one whose visit would be more welcome to the public or more valuable to us than Mister Hull. Perhaps you cannot spare him or feel that he should not be pressed, but if the idea appeals to you too, I hope very much you will be able to give him any encouragement you may think he needs. I can well imagine how hard it must be for him to see far ahead, but he would be very welcome in the late summer or autumn, and he could no doubt come by sea if he so preferred. [MR*]

Churchill was eager to avoid the appearance of cooperating with Fascists, even under the excuse of military exigency. The Darlan deal had caused no end of domestic squabbling in Britain, hence the Prime Minister's desire to have a veto over the appointment of Italians to important posts. In addition, as later events demonstrated, Churchill wanted to be in a position to influence the composition of any new Italian government. HORRIFIED was the codename for occupied Sicily.

C-324 London June 22, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Many thanks for your 286 of June 14. What you say about MacMillan's position exactly meets me. As regards the degree of British and American control and administration which should be imposed upon any newly conquered regions, I am glad that you agree that it is for the Supreme Commander to inform our two governments what British and American officials he wants. In the case of HORRIFIED, I feel that it would be helpful for Eisenhower to know from us at the outset the principles on which he should work in

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framing his requests for the supply of British and American Civil Ad­ ministrators. I suggest the following formula, which seems to me to meet the case: The replacement of any prefects and mayors of important communities who may be removed will rest with the Military Commander. He will decide whether the functioning of the Military Government is better served by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Italian officials. No actual appointment of Italians to important posts, as distinct from their temporary use, will be made until it has been approved by the two governments. It shall be made clear to any Italians who may eventually be appointed to important posts and to all other governmental officials and employees that their continued employment is solely on the basis of satisfactory cooperation, performance and behaviour. [MR*]

Hemmed in by the British War Cabinet's refusal to repudiate de Gaulle, Churchill could only hope that the Frenchman would overreach himself. In fact, de Gaulle did control a working majority of the new fourteen-man National Committee and hence had withdrawn his threat of resignation. The British had been subsidizing de Gaulle's Free French movement ever since the fall of France in 1940. Churchill had thought that transferring such payments to the French Committee would end the British recognition of de Gaulle as the official leader of the Fighting French, but that depended upon the ability and desire of the French Committee to reject de Gaulle's leadership. Churchill's suggestion that they delay in recognizing the new fourteen-man committee—called the French Committee of National Liberation—stemmed from the mistaken idea within the British Foreign Office that the United States was seriously considering extending recognition.

C-325 London June 23, 1943, 0004 Ζ / TOR 0524 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Your 290. I told Parliament on June 8 that the formation of the new Algiers committee of 7 (To wit: Giraud, DeGaulle, Georges, Catroux, Massigli, Monnet and Philippe) marked the end of my relations with DeGaulle as defined by the letters exchanged in 1942 and that our dealings would henceforward be with the committee of 7. Like you, I was surprised when these 7 suddenly sprouted out into 14. However, I thought at first that

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it was a War Cabinet with other members attending its meetings. Presently it appeared that all the members had equal status, and therefore like you I feared that DeGaulle would have a clear working majority. This not certain but if true would I am sure lead to nothing but trouble. Accordingly I have now made it clear to MacMillan that His Majesty's Government can at present deal only with the committee of 7 in its collective capacity expressed by a majority. Our July payments will soon be due and these will have to be signed for by a majority of the 7: otherwise no payments will be made. I am not, however, sure how much money the large committee as a whole can draw from the revenues of French Northwest Africa which are of course much increased by the heavy United States and British expenditure there, or how much they can draw from other parts of the French Empire. The committee of 7 are floating a loan, to which there may be considerable response. DeGaulle has also a private fund of perhaps 150,000 pounds drawn from his partisans and admirers. We should in any case, have to pay French soldiers and sailors who are serving locally with us in different parts of the world through the local paymasters as a Modus Vivendi. It is therefore likely that the committee may be able to get on without the payments hitherto made to DeGaulle from the British Exchequer. We have also made trade arrangements with the various French Colonies, who joined DeGaulle, which are serviceable to us and vital to them, and in addition we have guaranteed the pay and pensions of all French officials who renounced Vichy and gave us their allegiance in these places. Should DeGaulle break with the committee of 7 and go off into the wilderness, I should consider that the discharge of these obligations would depend on our relations not with him any more, but only with the majority of the committee of 7. This would be a very much more powerful lever of control. You will no doubt regulate your issue of arms and ammunition to the French North African Army in accordance with the confidence which you have in the authorities controlling it, and we should both supply goods and shipping to the other French Colonies only on the same basis. On quite a different plane is the question of the recognition of this committee of 7, which they will certainly demand, as representative of France in some degree or other. Here I feel with you that it would be most unwise to commit ourselves until we know much more clearly than we do now how they are going to behave. In this connection I send in my immediately following telegram you a paraphrase of the message which is being sent to Stalin. The United Nations must certainly try to act together on this larger question also. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 161-62.]

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C-326 London June 23, 1943, 0708 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Most Secret and Personal. Following is paraphrase of my message to Premier Stalin mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins: I have heard with concern, through Monsieur Molotov, that rec­ ognition of the French National Committee of Liberation, recently set up at Algiers, is in your mind. It is unlikely that the British, and still more, the United States Governments will recognize this com­ mittee for some time, and then, only after they have had reasonable proof that its character and action will be satisfactory to the interests of the Allied cause. Since he arrived at Algiers, General De Gaulle has been struggling to obtain effective control of the French Army. One cannot be sure of what he will do or of his friendly feelings towards us if he obtained mastery. President Roosevelt and I are in entire agreement in feeling that De Gaulle might endanger the base and communications of the Armies about to operate in "HUSKY". We cannot run any risk of this, as it would affect the lives of our soldiers and hamper the prosecution of the war. Originally there were 7 members of the committee but the num­ ber has now been expanded to 14, and we cannot be sure of its action. General Eisenhower has therefore in the name of both United States and British Governments notified the committee that General Giraud must remain the Commander In Chief of the French Army and have effective power over its character and organization. Un­ doubtedly this will cause discussion in the House of Commons, as well as in the United States, and the President and I will have to give reasons, of which there are plenty, for the course we have taken. If the Soviet Government had already recognized the committee, the mere giving of these reasons and explanations would reveal a difference of view between the Soviet and the Western Allies, which would be most regrettable. We are very anxious to find a French authority to which all Frenchmen will rally, and we still hope that from the discussions now proceeding at Algiers one may emerge. At present it seems to us far too soon to decide upon this. [MR*. StahnlWSC, doc. 164.]

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Under strong pressure from General Eisenhower and British Minister Res­ ident Harold Macmillan, the French Committee of National Liberation issued a decree stating that it would control the Fighting French and establish military policy. Training, organization, and the unification of forces would come un­ der a committee composed of de Gaulle, Giraud, and the French Chiefs of Staff. In addition, Giraud was to be Commander in Chief of French forces in North and West Africa while de Gaulle retained command everywhere else in the French Empire. Article 7 called for French control of French troops engaged in fighting.

C-327 London June 23, 1943, 1441 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. I have just received the text of the so called decree of the French Committee in Algiers. I am very doubtful whether it will work or last. Since, however, our military security in North West Africa is safeguarded by the French Army there remaining in trustworthy hands, I do not see that any action is called for from the British or the United States gov­ ernments. We are not called upon to endorse the arrangements which the French Committee have made among themselves. We must see how they conduct themselves before any question of recognition can arise. As none of their troops will be engaged in the forthcoming operations, the claim made in Article 7 of the decree has no present urgency. [MR*]

The fundamental cause of Anglo-American differences over the command structure in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater was their vastly different long-term goals in the area. The British thought primarily of maintaining their empire and also harbored severe doubts about the willingness of the Indian Army to fight for Britain. The Americans, at least in 1943, had little sympathy for Britain's imperial problems and viewed the CBI war effort primarily in terms of fighting the Japanese in China. Although American military leaders would soon admit that Chiang Kai-shek's forces were inca­ pable of effectively opposing the Japanese, they still hoped that the China theater would occupy a large number of Japanese troops. Moreover, the establishment of a friendly postwar relationship with China depended, they thought, upon convincing Chiang that the United States was a faithful ally. Because General Marshall believed that Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Doug­ las was strongly anti-American, he opposed shifting the British officer from his position as Commanding General in the Middle East to a unified command in Burma.

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As an early draft of R-293 (printed below) indicates, the Americans doubted that Chiang would lend any support to military operations which would not directly aid China, and Chiang's support was particularly critical since he controlled the American air forces in China. Ramgarh was a training camp located in India about 200 miles west of Calcutta. The Ledo Road, then under construction, was to be the supply route from India to northern Burma and, eventually, into southern China (see map, p. 111).

R-293, draft A, not sent June 22, 1943 From the President to the Prime: Reference your No. 320 of June 19. Your India appointments have met with general approval in this country. The organization for unity of command in operations in Burma appears desirable and I am in accord with you as to the formula. However, your No. 320 suggestion raises critical problems which I feel must be taken into consideration before a detailed plan can be decided upon. In the first place, the United States deployment in India-Burma was specifically carried out for the purpose of supporting China. It now involves a considerable number of Chinese troops concentrated at Ramgarh, as well as other Chinese troops, the product of Ramgarh training, along the Ledo Road. Furthermore, the plan for the Burma campaign involves eleven divisions of Yunnan troops. At the present time General Stilwell commands the Chinese elements in India and North Burma and to a certain extent exercises control over those in Yunnan. He has undertaken a large training program in this connection. He also commands the U.S. Air Forces in India and the special troops involved in preparations of roads, airfields, etc., in North Burma. General Chennault is a portion of Stilwell's command, and our most recent proposal was an arrangement for the better coordination of U.S. Air matters between Karachi and the 10th Air Forces in Eastern India, the Assam Detachment, and Chennault's command in China, by providing Stilwell with an Air Officer to command the whole. This the Generalissimo declined to accept because he felt it diminished the authority of Chennault. I am puzzled as to how we could secure the cooperation of the Generalissimo to the suggestion. As a matter of fact, I feel confident that he would, as far as Chinese affairs are concerned, decline to go along with us and would probably be definitely antagonistic. The problem is an extremely difficult one and I do not think your present proposal provides the solution. I am having members of my staff

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struggle with the matter, to see if they can offer something that would meet with your approval, and, at the same time, secure the acquiesance of the Generalissimo. I agree with you that British elements to be engaged in the recapture of Burma are predominant and, therefore, the Supreme Commander for this operation should be a Britisher, but I am not prepared at the moment to accept Sholto Douglas and would appreciate your proposing some additional names. I feel that Montgomery would be an ideal selection. I do not believe that the possible appointment of Stilwell as Deputy to the Supreme Commander would solve our problem with the Generalissimo. Frankly, up to the present time we have treated Stilwell as the only practicable medium of cooperation between your British forces out of India and whatever Chinese forces could be mustered for operations in Burma. When the question of unity of command has been raised over here we have, so far, never progressed beyond the recognition that this highly abnormal situation had to be treated in an abnormal manner. This has had its difficulties because of the Generalissimo's attitude to the air operations under Chennault, for which he undoubtedly wishes so far as possible to eliminate Stilwell. However, this presents the insurmountable complication of not providing—for those air operations—the supply service, lines of communication out of India, and the trained and equipped Chinese troops to protect the fields, which Stilwell has been endeavoring to promote. Altogether the matter is a most complicated one, and is not easy of solution. I would propose, however, that any further plans on this matter be limited to consideration of unity of command for South-East Asia, that is for operations against Burma, Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, and Sumatra. [GCM] [MR]

Roosevelt apparently made the deletion noted below.

R-293 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 24, 1943, 4:25 P.M. Personal and Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Your India appointments have met with general approval in this country. With regard to your No. 320 of June 19, I feel that, for operations against Burma and Southeast Asia, unity of command is desirable. I agree with you that British elements to be engaged in the recapture of Burma

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are predominant and, therefore, the Supreme Commander for this operation should be a Britisher. I am not prepared at the moment, however, to accept Sholto Douglas and would appreciate your proposing some additional names. Your proposal also raises certain critical problems which must be given serious consideration before a detailed plan can be decided upon. The United States Air Force deployment in India was specifically carried out for the purpose of supporting China. Our plan to aid China has furthermore resulted in the concentration of a considerable number of Chinese troops at Ramgarh, as well as Ramgarh trained Chinese troops supported by U.S. service forces, along the Ledo Road. The plan for the Burma campaign moreover involves eleven divisions of Yunnan troops, the control of which is to a large extent exercised by Stilwell. As you have indicated, we must accept the fact that Chennault will continue to report through American channels to the Generalissimo. Meanwhile, we will have to remember that the Generalissimo is the Supreme Commander of the China Theater. Accordingly, as far as China is concerned we shall have a most difficult task in securing the Generalissimo's cooperation to the suggestion of a Supreme Command for all East Asia. Viewed in the light of the above, I am having members of my staff consider the matter from every angle. They will have a proposal for our consideration within a few days. Roosevelt [MR*]

Both Churchill and Roosevelt continued to underestimate de Gaulle's strength.

R-294 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 24, 1943, 4:35 P.M. For the Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. Your No. 327, June 23. I agree with you about the so-called agreement of the French Committee in Algiers. I still have my fingers crossed. I hope Uncle Joe will agree with us. Roosevelt [MR*]

It was not world public opinion that worried Churchill, but rather the fear that the realities of power would bring the United States and the Soviet Union

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closer together—at Britain's expense. Although Churchill understood that Britain's power was steadily diminishing, he could not accept it. He was correct in denying that his visit to Moscow was the same thing as Roosevelt's proposal for private talks with Stalin: the United States was in a position to commit Britain on postwar issues, but the reverse was not true. As troublesome for Churchill as the international ramifications of a Roosevelt-Stalin conference might be, it could have been disastrous for him on the domestic front. Roosevelt's goal, according to Joseph Davies' diary, was to disabuse Stalin of the notion that "understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A." demanded "the intervention of G.B. as a friendly broker." Roosevelt "wanted Stalin to know that [the United States was] on the level—had no axes to grind, and [was] concerned first with winning the war" (Davies' diary, quoted in MacLean, "Davies and Soviet-American Relations," pp. 85—86).

C-328 London June 25, 1943/TOR 10:15 P.M., June 24 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Secret. Averell told me last night of your wish for a meeting with U.J. in Alaska a deux. The whole world is expecting and all our side are desiring a meeting of the three great powers at which, not only the political chiefs, but the military staffs would be present in order to plan the future war moves and, of course, search for the foundations of post war settlement. It would seem a pity to draw U. J. 7000 miles from Moscow for anything less than this. Should HUSKY prosper and the German offensive not occur the end of July or beginning of August will be the moment to make sure that U.J. attacks himself with full strength in October. We shall probably be able to show that our Mediterranean strategy of which he approved, has, in fact, gained Russia the respite of this summer and has, in fact, achieved all he hoped for from a cross-channel second front. This is, therefore one of the cardinal moments. I consider that a tripartite meeting at Scapa Flow or anywhere else on the globe that can be agreed not only of us three but also of the staffs, who will come together for the first time, would be one of the milestones of history. If this is lost, much is lost. You must excuse me expressing myself with all the frankness that our friendship and the gravity of the issue warrant. I do not underrate the use that enemy propaganda would make of a meeting between the heads of Soviet Russia and the United States at this juncture with the British Commonwealth and Empire excluded. It would be serious and vexatious,

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a n d many would be bewildered a n d alarmed thereby. My j o u r n e y to Moscow with Averell in August 1942 was on altogether a lower level, a n d at a stage in t h e war when we h a d only to explain why n o second front. Nevertheless, whatever you decide, I shall sustain to the best of my ability here. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf, pp. 10-11 ]

In spite of British and American advice to the contrary, Giraud insisted on accepting Roosevelt's longstanding invitation to visit Washington. T h e French General wanted to secure additional American political and material support in the forlorn hope of maintaining his leadership among the Free French. As Churchill predicted, de Gaulle used Giraud's absence to further solidify Gaullist control in Africa, particularly to press for the replacement of Pierre Boisson as Governor General of West Africa. (The final phrase, "two groups undecipherable," appears in both the British and American source documents and would seem to be the equivalent of a phrase made popular in transcripts of the Nixon White House tapes—expletive deleted!)

C-329 London June 25, 1943, 1214 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. I a m somewhat concerned at Giraud leaving Algiers at this j u n c t u r e on a visit to you. If both were invited it would be all right, but I think it d a n g e r o u s to leave t h e field o p e n to De Gaulle, especially while t h e po­ sition of Boisson is so uncertain. While the mouse is away the cat will play two g r o u p s undecipherable. [MR*]

In a message apparently hand-drafted by Admiral Leahy, Roosevelt agreed that Giraud should not leave Algiers until the question of the Governor General's post in West Africa, which included the port of Dakar, was settled. Giraud, however, went ahead with his visit. On July 1, the French Committee appointed Pierre Cournaire, then Governor of the French Cameroons, as Governor General of French West Africa. Roosevelt accepted this, but only after emphasizing that America would control future appointments to that post.

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R-295 Washington [via U.S. Navy) June 25, 1943, 11:55 A.M. F r o m t h e President to t h e F o r m e r Naval Person Secret a n d Personal. Your 329. I agree a n d have already asked Giraud to postpone his visit at least until after Boisson's resignation is finally settled. Roosevelt JMR*]

Operation SOAPSUDS, now renamed TIDAL WAVE, was the bombing of the German-occupied oil fields at Ploesti, Roumania, by American aircraft flying from bases in Libya. Churchill always considered codenames important, so much so that, at one point, after running across a number of names he considered inappropriate, he instructed an aide to submit all future codenames to him for personal approval. He relaxed that edict only when in­ formed that such a chore would occupy nearly all his time, but still selected or approved the names for all major operations. As he wrote Ismay: "Op­ erations in which large numbers of men may lose their lives ought not to be described by code words which are 'boastful' or 'frivolous,' " or "enable some widow or mother to say that her son was killed in an operation called 'Bunnyhug' or 'Ballyhoo' " (WSC, V, 662).

C-330 London June 26, 1943, 2036 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. O n reflection, I t h o u g h t SOAPSUDS was i n a p p r o p r i a t e for a n oper­ ation in which so many brave Americans would risk or lose their lives. I d o not think it is good for morale to affix disparaging labels to d a r i n g feats of a r m s . I am very glad that t h e United States Chiefs of t h e Staff have a g r e e d with o u r s to substitute T I D A L WAVE for SOAPSUDS. I wish all o u r problems were as simply settled. [MR*]

Since Churchill staunchly supported the restoration of colonies following the war, it is likely that he truly intended to postpone any decision about Timor rather than deceive the Portuguese. T h e Portuguese had hoped to avoid a Japanese invasion of the island by maintaining strict neutrality. However, in

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December 1941 Dutch and Australian troops were sent to Timor in antici­ pation of a Japanese invasion. T h e Japanese landed in February 1942, drove out the Allies, and occupied the island until the end of the war.

C-331 London [via U.S. Embassy] June 27, 1943, 1310 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. Your telegram N o . 292 of J u n e 22nd. I agree that questions of T i m o r a n d Macao can well be left until after the war. Meanwhile we have told the Portuguese that if they help us now we are ready to give t h e m assurances r e g a r d i n g maintenance of Portu­ guese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies. I n reply to their enquiry we told t h e m that this assurance covered T i m o r and Macao. T h e Por­ tuguese would therefore probably resent any early suggestions concerning the disposal of T i m o r a n d we shall have to tread warily. T h e y are par­ ticularly touchy about T i m o r in view of Allied military occupation without prior a g r e e m e n t in December 1941 which imposed a severe strain u p o n o u r relations with Portugal. [MR*]

Major General Jacob Devers had become commander of the European Thea­ ter of Operations following the death of his predecessor, Major General Frank Andrews, in a plane crash. This cable was sent at the suggestion of Ambas­ sador J o h n Winant and General Marshall, both of whom wanted to build u p Devers' prestige with the British.

R-296 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 28, 1943, 10:35 A.M. For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal a n d Secret. I like t h e n a m e of T I D A L WAVE. May they grow bigger a n d better. By the way, if you have not already met him I h o p e you will see General Devers. I know he will give the fine same s u p p o r t to you as did General Eisenhower a n d General Andrews. Roosevelt [MR]

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Churchill continued his efforts to straighten out the command relationships in the South East Asia theater (see map, Vol. I, p. 410).

C-332 London June 28, 1943, 1214 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Your No. 293 of 25th June. I think that you would wish to have the following comments on your telegram when considering the proposals which your staff are preparing for you. I did not for a moment intend to disturb the arrangement whereby the Generalissimo commands the China Theatre. The eastern boundary which I have in mind for the new command is as follows:— "The frontier between China and Burma and between China and Indo China to the Gulf of Tonkin, thence southwards along the coasts of Indo China, Thai­ land and Malaya to Singapore: from Singapore south to the north coast of Sumatra: thence round the east coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward of the line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 degrees east: thence south to latitude 08 degrees south: thence south easterly towards Onslow, Australia, and, on reaching lon­ gitude 110 degrees east, due south along that meridian". Perhaps it would be advisable to give the new command the title of "South East Asia" instead of "East Asia"? It seems to us essential that all troops, whatever their nationality, op­ erating within the boundaries of the new command, should be under the Supreme Commander. If this is agreed, the Chinese forces operating along the Ledo Road would come under the Supreme Commander from the date he takes up his appointment, while the Chinese divisions oper­ ating from Yunnan would come under his command when they crossed the Chinese-Burma frontier. It is suggested that the objections which Chiang Kai Shek may raise to this arrangement might be overcome by giving General Stilwell dual responsibility to the Generalissimo on the one hand and to the Supreme Commander on the other. This would enable him to co-ordinate the action of the Chinese Yunnan forces with that of the remainder of the forces under the Supreme Commander. It also seems to us essential that the Supreme Commander should have control of all the Air Forces located in his area and of all the air operations into and from that area. This was the control given to General Eisenhower, even though a large part of the Air Force concerned was outside his theatre.

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I am sending you a separate telegram later about the selection for a Supreme Commander. [MR*]

Roosevelt flatly lied when he told Churchill that a Stalin-Roosevelt meeting without the British Prime Minister was "Uncle Joe's" idea. According to Joseph Davies' diary, the President had told him "three is a crowd and we can arrange for the Big Three to get together thereafter. Churchill will understand. I will take care of that" (as quoted in MacLean, "Davies and Soviet-American Relations," p. 87). Later, Roosevelt wrote Stalin that Iceland would be an awkward place for their talks because it would be "difficult not to invite Prime Minister Churchill at the same time" (FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 4). (See also the headnote to R-280.) "An immediate roundup," mentioned in the third paragraph, is probably a reference to the establishment of a second front (OVERLORD). Roosevelt frequently confused that codename with the one for a quick invasion of the Continent in the event of a German collapse—Operation ROUNDUP.

R-297 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 28, 1943, 5:35 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Your # 3 2 8 . I did not suggest to UJ that we meet alone but he told Davies that h e assumed (a) that we would meet alone a n d (b) that h e agreed that we should not bring staffs to what would be a preliminary meeting. H e intimated that h e would bring only a total of four or five people a n d on this assumption I would propose to take only Hopkins a n d Harriman. T h e r e are certain advantages in such a preliminary meeting which I know you will appreciate. First, that without staffs there will be n o military collisions in regard to d e m a n d s for an immediate r o u n d u p . Second, that h e will not think that we are d e m a n d i n g a Russian offensive this s u m m e r if the G e r m a n s d o not attack. T h i r d , that in my opinion h e will be m o r e frank in giving his views on the offensive against J a p a n now and later. Fourth, that he would also be m o r e frank in regard to China. Fifth, that h e would be more frank in regard to the Balkan States, Finland and Poland. I want to explore his thinking as fully as possible concerning Russia's post-war hopes a n d ambitions. I would want to cover much the same field with him as did Eden for you a year ago.

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What would you think of coming over soon afterwards and that you and I with staffs should meet in the Citadel in Quebec? I am sure the Canadian Government would turn it over to us and it is a thoroughly comfortable spot, with thoroughly adequate accommodations there and at the Hotel Frontenac. It is far better than Washington at that time of year. While UJ gave no definite dates he suggested the end of July or early August. This is wholly tentative and I do not expect to hear anything further until about the fifteenth of July. If he confirms this, I would be back about August fifteenth. I would have to be in Washington for a week but could easily get to some place in eastern Canada by the twenty-fifth of August. Of course, you and I are completely frank in matters of this kind and I agree with you that later in the autumn we should most definitely have a full dress meeting with the Russians. That is why I think of a visit with Stalin as a preparatory talk on what you rightly call a lower level. Finally I gather from Davies the Kremlin people do not at all like the idea of UJ flying across Finland, Sweden, Norway and the North Sea to Scapa, especially at this time of year when there is practically no darkness. I have the idea that your conception is the right one from the short point of view, but mine is the right one from the long point of view. I wish there were no distances. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 11-12. RUC]

C-333 London June 28, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Secret. Your 296. Have already seen Devers and think him first rate. I shall keep in touch with him. [MR*]

Maxim Litvinov had been Russian Ambassador to the United States, A. Y. Bogomolov was Soviet Ambassador to the Allied governments in London, and Ivan Maisky had been Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain. All three were proponents of a cooperative Soviet policy toward the Western powers. Disclaimers not withstanding, Churchill constantly worried about some sort of Soviet-German arrangement which would free German forces to concentrate on Britain and the United States. His immediate concern vanished when the Germans renewed their offensive on July 5 with an attack on the Russian salient at Kursk.

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C-334 London June 28, 1943 F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal and Secret. I send you first of all the very unpleasant reply I have received from U. J. a n d my rejoinder. This certainly has its bearing on your proposal to meet him alone a n d I shall not seek to deter you if you can get him to come. It is curious that h e should have recalled Litvinov Bogomolov a n d now Maisky to Moscow. T h e r e is also the cessation of the G e r m a n offensive on the Russian Front which is not necessarily d u e only to o u r Mediterr a n e a n activities. Anthony a n d his Foreign Office are definitely of opinion that n o decisive Volte-face is i m p e n d i n g in Russia. Myself, I d o not see how they could d o it having regard to the deeds d o n e between the G e r m a n a n d Russian masses a n d to what would a p p e a r to be the Russian interest in the future world. I also send you the answer I have received to the telegram I sent U. J. asking him to delay recognition of the Algiers Committee. It is not particularly gracious b u t h e consents. Eden has suggested to Winant that we should deprecate Bogomolov looking in at Algiers on his way back to Russia. We are agreed it would be better this visit should be deferred till after HUSKY on which all o u r hopes are centered and which is now near. [MR*. pFRUS, Teheran Conf, p. 12.]

Stalin had already forwarded to Roosevelt a copy of the message to Churchill in which the Soviet Premier protested the further postponement of the second front (Stalin/FDR, doc. 97). Stalin's message is a comprehensive summary of Anglo-American statements regarding the second front, but it includes none of the conditional language Roosevelt and Churchill were always careful to use. (The bracketed phrase is taken from the gist of StalinlWSC, doc. 165.)

C-335 London June 29, 1943 F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Secret. My immediately preceding telegram. Reference Para. 1. Following is text of Stalin's telegram to me. "I received your message of the 19th J u n e . "I fully realize all the complexities involved in the organization of the Anglo American invasion of Western Europe, particularly in

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bringing of troops across the channel. These complexities were obvious from your messages. "Indeed in reading your messages received by me in the course of 1942 and 1943, I was sure that you and President had the full understanding of the difficulties involved in such operations. I was sure, also, that you and President in making preparations for invasion were taking into account all these difficulties and all the efforts necessary for overcoming the difficulties. Last year you informed me that the landing of the Anglo American troops in Europe on a grand scale will take place in 1943. In your memorandum delivered to V. M. Molotov on the 10th June, 1942 you stated: 'Finally, and most important of all we are concentrating our maximum effort on the organization and preparation of a large scale invasion of the continent of Europe by British and American forces in 1943. We are setting no limit to the scope and objectives of this campaign, which will be carried out in the first instance by over a million men, British and American, with Air Forces of appropriate strength.' "At the beginning of this year you told me twice, on behalf of yourself and President, on your decisions concerning invasion of Europe by Anglo American troops with a view 'to divert strong German land and Air Forces from the Russian Front.' At the same time, you had in mind to 'bring Germany to her knees in 1943', and fix the moment of invasion as not later than September. In your message of the 26th January, 1943 you said: 'We have been in conference with our military advisers and have decided on the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in the first 9 months of 1943. We wish to inform you of our intentions at once. We believe that these operations together with your powerful offensive may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943.' "In your next message received by me on the 12th February, you fixed more exactly the time of invasion and in this connection stated: 'We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross-channel operation in August in which both British and United States units would participate. Here again shipping and assault landing craft will be limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September.' "In February when you were writing about the plans and timetable of invasion of Europe, the difficulties of the operation in question were more considerable. Since that time, the Germans suffered a number of defeats: they were pushed back and had heavy losses on our front in the south; they were beaten and ejected from North Africa as the result of the Anglo American action; in the U boat war

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they experience far greater difficulties than ever before while the Anglo American preponderance has considerably increased. It is well known also that the Anglo American aviation dominates now the sky of Europe and that the Navies and Mercantile Marine of Great Britain and the United States are at present stronger than hitherto. "Thus all the conditions necessary for the opening of the second front in Western Europe in the course of 1943 not only [have not] deteriorated but on the contrary considerably improved. "Under such circumstances the Soviet Government could not think that the British and American Governments will change the decision on the invasion of Europe in 1943 taken at the beginning of this year. On the contrary, the Soviet Government had every reason to expect that the Anglo American decision will materialize, that the necessary preparations were being carried out and that the second front in Western Europe at last will be opened in 1943. "Therefore, when you are writing now that 'It would be no help to Russia if we threw away hundred thousand men in a disastrous cross-channel attack', I have only to remind you on the following: 1st, on your memorandum of June 1942 in which you talked of the preparation of invasion involving not hundred thousand but one million men in the first instance; 2nd, on your February message in which you mention the great preparatory measures for invasion of Western Europe in August-September of this year. It seemed obvious that this operation had to be carried out not with hundred thousand men, but with an adequate number of troops. "When now you say Ί can not see how a great British defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet Armies'—is it not clear that such state­ ment is groundless as far as the Soviet Union is concerned? Is it not clear also that it is in contradiction to the above mentioned responsible decisions concerning the energetic preparations for the Anglo Amer­ ican invasion in 1943 on which the success of the whole operation should solely depend? "I do not desire to dwell on the fact that your last responsible decision on the cancellation of your former decisions concerning invasion of Western Europe was taken by you and President without participation of the Soviet Government and without any attempt to invite its representatives for talks in Washington although you could not be unaware of the fact that the role which the Soviet Union is playing in the war against Germany and its interest in the question of the 2nd front are not inconsiderable. "It goes without saying that the Soviet Government can not put up with such disregard of the most vital Soviet interests in the war against the common enemy.

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"You are writing that you fully understand my disappointment. I must say: here is not simply the question of disappointment on the part of the Soviet Government, here is the question of its confidence in the Allies which is severely tried by the above happenings. One should not forget that on all this depends the possibility to save millions of lives in the occupied regions of Western Europe and Russia and reduce the colossal sacrifices of the Soviet Armies in comparison with which the losses of the Anglo American troops could be considered as modest." Following is my reply. "I am sorry to receive your message of the 24th. At every stage the information I have given you as to our future intentions has been based upon the recorded advice of the British and American Staffs, and I have at all times been sincere in my relations with you. Although until June 22nd, 1941, we British were left alone to face the worst that Nazi Germany could do to us, I instantly began to aid Soviet Russia to the best of our limited means from the moment that she was herself attacked by Hitler. I am satisfied that I have done everything in human power to help you. Therefore the reproaches which you now cast upon your Western Allies leave me unmoved. Nor, apart from the damage to our military interests, should I have any difficulty in presenting my case to the British Parliament and nation. "The views of our Staffs, which I have shared at every stage, have been continually modified by the course of events. In the first place, although all shipping has been fully occupied, it has not been possible to transport the American Army to Britain according to the programme proposed in June 1942. Whereas it was then hoped that 27 American Divisions would be in Great Britain by April 1943, in fact there is now, in June 1943, only 1, and there will be August only 5. This is due to the demands of the war against Japan, the shipping shortage and above all to the expansion of the campaign in North Africa, into which powerful Nazi forces were drawn. Moreover, the landing craft which in January of this year we proposed to make available for a cross channel enterprise, have either not fully materialized up to date or have all been drawn into the great operation now impending in the Mediterranean. The enemy's uncertainty as to where the blow will fall and what its weight will be has already, in the opinion of my expert advisers, lead to the delaying of Hitler's 3rd attack upon Russia, for which it seemed great preparations were in existence 6 weeks ago. It may even prove that you will not be heavily attacked this summer. If that were so, it would vindicate decisively what you once called the 'Military correctness' of our Med-

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iterranean strategy. However, in these matters we must await the unfolding of events. "Thus not only on the one hand have the difficulties of the cross channel attack continually seemed greater to us and the resources available have not been forthcoming, but a more hopeful and fruitful strategic policy has opened to us in another theatre, and we have the right and duty to act in accordance with our convictions, informing you at every stage of the changes in our views imposed by the vast movement of the war." Reference para 3. Following is text of Stalin's telegram about recognition of Algiers committee. "I received your message of the 23rd June in which you state that the governments of Great Britain and the USA intend to refrain from the time being from the recognition of the French committee of National Liberation created in Algiers. In explanation you say that the high command can not be sure either of actions of General De Gaulle or of his feelings toward the Allies. It seemed to us that the British Government so far was interested in General De Gaulle. Such interest appeared to be quite natural as after the capitulation of France General De Gaulle headed all the French Anti Hitler Forces and led the struggle of the French patriots united round the Fighting France. "The subsequent events in North Africa since November of 1942 as well as participation of the French Military Forces under Generals Giraud and De Gaulle in the Anglo American operations created conditions for their unity. Such unity was considered reasonable by all the Allies and there was no doubt about it. The recognition of the French committee—the expression of this unity—should be the consequence of aspirations and efforts involved in that. Therefore when Giraud and De Gaulle on behalf of the French committee of National Liberation asked the Allies for recognition the Soviet government thought the French opinion would be unable to understand any refusal to accord such recognition. The Soviet Government has no information which would confirm the present attitude of the British Government to the French Committee of National Liberation and more particularly to General De Gaulle. Insofar however as the British Government requests to postpone the recognition of the French Committee and through its Ambassador gave assurance to do nothing in this matter without consultation of the Soviet Government, the Soviet Government is ready to meet the wish of the British Government. "I hope that you will take into account interest of the Soviet Union

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in French affairs a n d will not refuse to supply the Soviet government with timely information necessary to take the appropriate decisions." [MR. Stalin/WSC, docs. 165-67.]

Churchill's fear of a Soviet-German rapprochement outweighed his concern at being excluded from a Roosevelt-Stalin conference. MacKenzie King was the Canadian Prime Minister, who, as Churchill well knew, was eager to appear to be playing a major role in international affairs.

C-336 London June 29, 1943 T o President from F o r m e r Naval Person Personal and Secret. I have now received your 297 a n d I repeat what I said in my 334 that if you a n d Uncle J. can fix a meeting together I should no longer deprecate it. O n the contrary in view of his attitude I think it important that this contact should be established. I should be very glad to arrange for a meeting between us and our staffs about the end of August in Quebec which I am sure MacKenzie King would welcome. Later on I will put the point to him. Many thanks for you very full message. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 12-13. RUC]

Although the President was deeply embroiled in a battle with J o h n L. Lewis, the head of the United Mine Workers, over a national coal-miners' strike, Churchill probably referred to a different political fight. Jesse Jones, Secretary of Commerce and Director of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and Vice President Henry Wallace, who was head of the Board of Economic Warfare, had publicly locked horns over a wide range of policies related to the purchase of strategic materials. Roosevelt eventually abolished the BEW and took substantial power away from Jones, but the British were understandably concerned and confused that domestic politics could become so tangled with the war effort.

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C-337 London June 29, 1943, 1505 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Private a n d Most Secret. I have been so m u c h distressed a n d a n g e r e d to see the way you are being harried. Knowing what war b u r d e n s are, I greatly admire the splen­ did calm a n d buoyancy with which you bear t h e m amidst so m u c h clatter. [MR*]

T h e short-snorter game continued (see C-274).

C-338 London [via U.S. Military Attache] June 29, 1943, 1508 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Private. Will you kindly fly a short-snorter dollar bill signed by yourself a n d H a r r y over h e r e to m e at earliest convenience for the King to join the Club u p o n ? R e p a y m e n t a n d subscription will be m a d e in d u e course a p a r t from Lend-Lease. [MR*]

Although the following message was transmitted directly to the President by Ambassador Winant at Churchill's request, it was not assigned a number in the correspondence. LIFEBELT referred to the occupation of the Azores.

C-338/1 London [via U.S. Embassy] June 29, 1943, 10:00 P.M. [Churchill to Roosevelt] 1. We have now received the Portuguese reply about L I F E B E L T . This stated that the Portuguese are ready in principle to accord us the facilities we require. T h e consequences of this acceptance may, however, be so serious for Portugal a n d the life of h e r people that the actual use of the facilities accorded in principle must be preceded by the previous exam­ ination by the two G o v e r n m e n t s of the political, military a n d economic considerations involved.

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2. The reply also takes note of our undertaking that at the close of hostilities British troops would be withdrawn from Bracken, and of the assurances concerning the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies. In this connection the Portuguese Government state that they will be glad to receive a similar guarantee from the Government of the United States which we had indicated would be forthcoming. I hope you will be able to authorize me to inform the Portuguese Government that in the event of a satisfactory agreement being reached the United States Government are willing to associate themselves with the assurances already given by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. 3. In the course of discussion with His Majesty's Ambassador, Dr. Salazar stated that having responded to our appeal he was willing to face the consequences whatever they might be, but that, in view of the present state of Portuguese defences, he would prefer that Portugal should not be drawn in as an active belligerent if that could be avoided. He hoped that any staff talks would be conducted with that consideration in mind. He also stated that Portuguese susceptibilities would not admit of the cession of bases under any form of lease, and that he would probably desire Portuguese forces to remain in a defensive capacity. These views are in accordance with our own. 4. Arising out of this, Dr. Salazar said that under no circumstances could he agree to admit forces other than British, except perhaps in the event of Portugal becoming fully involved in the war. He would, however, not object to fuelling facilities being given to warships and merchant vessels of the U.S.A. and of other United Nations, as convoy arrangements would obviously make it inconvenient to restrict such facilities only to the British. In view of the fact that the approach to the Portuguese was made on the basis of the treaties of alliance, I hope you will agree that we should conclude an agreement with the Portuguese on the lines desired by Dr. Salazar. I think that at a later stage, if it became necessary, it should be possible to secure Portuguese assent to the use of the facilities by the forces of other of the United Nations. In this connection, Harriman gave me a message on June 24 that you thought it would be useful if Brazil could be associated with LIFEBELT and perhaps station troops in Bracken. I am sure that in view of the statements made to our Ambassador at Lisbon by Dr. Salazar, it would be very difficult to secure Portuguese consent to such a proposal, and that it would jeopardize the success of the negotiations if we were to try to persuade them to accept other than British forces. I should not, therefore, like to have to raise this matter with the Portuguese at this time. We have now proposed to Dr. Salazar that immediate discussions should

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be opened between experts on both sides, and our delegation will leave for Lisbon very soon. [FRUS, 1943, II, 534-35]

One of the unhappiest stories of the war was the failure of the American and British governments to provide relief and safety for refugees, particularly for Jews who had fled German-occupied areas in Europe. In April 1943, British and American representatives had met in Bermuda to discuss the problem, but the talks were, in the words of a British participant, "a conflict of self-justification, a facade for inaction. We said the results of the conference were confidential, but in fact there were no results that I can recall" (Richard Law as quoted in Feingold, Politics of Rescue, p. 206). Rarely did the refugee question intrude upon the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence, and when it did they only mentioned small, partial measures or the political implications of various proposals. One of the suggestions made during the Bermuda talks was for the establishment of a camp in North Africa for Jewish refugees in Spain. The British feared that Germany would press the Spanish government to return those refugees to German-occupied territory, and the Foreign Office wanted to avoid the international criticism which would surely follow. Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed the refugee problem during the TRIDENT Conference, but had not reached any decisions (FRUS, Washington Conf., 1943, pp. 197, 336-46). Roosevelt's response (R-308) raised the same objections originally made by the Americans.

C-339 London June 30, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. The need for assistance to refugees, in particular Jewish refugees, has not grown less since we discussed the question, and all possible outlets need to be kept open. Of these the most practical still is North Africa, and I hope that the difficulties over the proposed refugee camp there have now been cleared up, and that an early practical decision is now possible. Our immediate facilities for helping the victims of Hitler's Anti Jewish drive are so limited at present that the opening of the small camp proposed for the purpose of removing some of them to safety seems all the more incumbent on us, and I should be grateful if you could let me know whether it has been found possible to bring the scheme into operation. General Giraud has given the project his general approval. [MR*. FRUS, 1943,1,321.]

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Because the new South East Asia Command related so closely to the China theater, American military leaders adamantly opposed following the model of MacArthur's South West Pacific Command, where the commander came directly under the Chiefs of Staff of one nation, in MacArthur's case the United States. Instead, they preferred that the South East Asia commander report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, even if the British Chiefs of Staff were responsible for that theater. Moreover, Roosevelt reiterated that Chinese or American forces assisting the Chinese did not come under the authority of the South East Asian Command even if they were within that geographic area.

R-298 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 30, 1943, 11:45 A.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person Secret and Personal. Regarding our messages on Supreme Command for South East Asia, I should like to ask your consideration of the following plan which appears to be in general accord with your ideas. The one point in which this plan differs from that set forth in your number 332, June 28th, lies in the method of integration of the Chinese effort. General Stilwell, I feel, should be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander. His function as Deputy would be to command, under the Supreme Commander, all ground and air forces at present under him in the South East Asia Theater and such additional U.S. and Chinese forces as may in the future be made available. Furthermore he must continue to have certain direct responsibilities to the Generalissimo. Upon his relationship with the Generalissimo will depend the positive action by the Chinese in operations against Burma. To secure this cooperation, Stilwell should have under his immediate control the tangible means to give effect to his requests, including the command of all those U.S. forces which have been deployed for the purpose of making effective the U.S. aid to China. The deployment of the 10th Air Force in India, as has been previously mentioned, was for the purpose of supporting China. Its offensive operations now and in the future against strategic targets in Burma and Thailand and in support of Chinese troops in the Assam-North Burma area, its operations in defense of the India-China air line, and its situation as a strategic air reserve for the 14th Air Force are all bound up with our program of increasing aid to China. As regards the 14th Air Force, I am of the opinion that the Generalissimo would raise serious objection to subjecting Chennault's operations into Burma under any direct supreme command in India other than that provided by the channels already in existence.

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I agree with your boundary for the South East Asia Theater. Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham would be especially acceptable as supreme commander. Air Marshal Tedder is also favorably considered. In view of the established United States policy of aid to China, however, the more appropriate command relationship would be for the Supreme Commander to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I could agree, therefore, only to this command relationship following the Eisenhower pattern, with the British Chiefs of Staff designated as the agency for the Combined Chiefs of Staff charged with the issue of instructions to the Supreme Commander. A British Allied Naval Commander, RAF Commander, and a British Army Commander all would be selected by you. I believe that the above plan will permit us to integrate the Chinese potential with operations against Burma from India. Roosevelt [MR*. R&C]

The placing of Allied forces in continental Portugal was far more than Portuguese President Salazar, or the British, had in mind. General Marshall feared that any such troop dispositions would give the British an excuse to delay the cross-channel attack, and he recommended that Portugal remain non-belligerent. Nevertheless, he admitted that the Allies were responsible for aiding Portugal in the event of a German reprisal. The idea of attacking Germany through the Iberian Peninsula had been rejected by Allied planners, but Admiral Leahy continued to look favorably upon the scheme. Presumably the final sentence of the message, added in Roosevelt's handwriting, came at Leahy's prompting. PRICELESS was the codeword for operations in the Mediterranean after the invasion of Sicily.

R-299 Washington [via U.S. Navy] J u n e 30, 1943, 12:05 P.M.

Personal and Secret for the Former Naval Person from the President. The circumstances of our peaceful occupation of the Azores and the attitude of cooperation and common endeavor of the Government of Portugal in my opinion, place an obligation upon us to furnish military assistance to Portugal. Under these circumstances, I believe that Salazar should be assured that military forces will be sent to Portugal. The Axis thus far has avoided commitment in the Iberian Peninsula under very favorable circumstances, and even though the movement of United Nations' forces into Portugal might precipitate an Axis invasion of Spain, that action appears unlikely. However, we must expect Germany

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to launch concentrated air and submarine attacks upon Portugal as retaliation and in order to impress neutral nations. It is inevitable that grave consequences would result if adequate provision were not made by the United Nations to meet this contingency. A defensive force capable of providing the necessary initial assistance might include one infantry division, plus strong air defense elements consisting of 26 anti-aircraft battalions, ten day and two night fighter squadrons, two anti-submarine squadrons, together with supporting and service troops. Combat elements (less anti-aircraft troops) and possibly, though not probably, a part of the service units for this force could be obtained from the Mediterranean area with, however, a limiting effect on the scope of PRICELESS. The anti-aircraft and the remainder of the service troops must be secured elsewhere, with a resulting effect on OVERLORD. A preliminary examination indicates that the provision of shipping for this force would limit the scope of PRICELESS and would cost OVERLORD from two to four divisions. My suggested action in these circumstances will cause certain delays in operations agreed to in TRIDENT. However, I believe that we must accept this interference. I would appreciate having your views on the foregoing. I think there is something to be said for the thought that a peninsular campaign would be very difficult for the Axis and that secure landing places for us are not to be laughed off. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 535-36.]

R-300 Washington [via U.S. Navy] June 30, 1943, 4:00 P.M.

For the Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. The short-snorter dollar is on its way. Please welcome the King into the Club with adequate initiation and tell him I hope to catch him without his certificate some day. Harry and I are charging the account to a fund to give the Congress a long recess. Roosevelt [HLH] [MR*]

T h e fishing expedition took place at Shangri-la d u r i n g the T R I D E N T Conference.

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12. The fishermen: "Shangri-la," May 14-17, 1943

R-300/1, letter Washington July 1, 1943 Dear Winston: These photos did not turn out very well but at least it proves that you and I tried to catch a fish. Better luck next time! As ever yours, [initialed] F.D.R. [MR (PPF 7683)]

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It took Churchill nearly a month to make arrangements for the anti-submarine warfare statements, but hereafter they appeared monthly.

C-340 London July 1, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. My personal telegram no. 299 of 5th June. I propose that Admiralty should draft such a statement monthly, which would be in general terms, and sent it via B.A.D. Washington and U.S. Navy Department for your concurrence or amendment about the 5th of each month, the agreed version to be issued jointly on the 10th day of each month. I agree that all other statements by persons holding official positions should be prohibited, save those made personally by either of us or those which either of us may specifically authorize from time to time, including on this side statements in Parliament. I also agree that carefully censored combat stories may be released from time to time after at least a month's delay in each case. [MR*]

Churchill quickly defended the Portuguese desire to maintain non-belligerency. Wolfram (tungsten) was essential to the German steel industry.

C-341 London July 3, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Thank you very much for your No. 299, which we have deeply considered. Our discussions with Salazar about LIFEBELT are proceeding on the basis that Portugal maintains non-belligerency. We know this is what Salazar wants. If successful, which is far from certain, we shall secure LIFEBELT islands without deranging our present agreed strategy in the European and Mediterranean theatres. We do not believe that the Portuguese desire Allied Ground Forces on their mainland, and sending them might increase the risk of a German invasion. We share your view that our occupation of LIFEBELT will not, by itself, be likely to bring on a German ground invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. Anyhow the Spaniards

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are more likely to resist such invasion if we have not provoked it by landing troops. Apart from a serious ground invasion, it would hardly pay the Germans to bomb Lisbon and Oporto. By so doing, they would only blot out a valuable listening post and enable us to base air squadrons in Portugal which would, Inter Alia, protect our convoys from German air attack and also strengthen the bay patrol. They would also lose their vital Wolfram. If, therefore, we are right in thinking the Germans will not attack by ground forces, they are also unlikely to attack by air merely out of spite. We have got ready to send simultaneously with the dispatch of the LIFEBELT Brigade about a hundred Ack Ack guns as part of the local defences of Lisbon and Oporto, as well as 2 day and 1 night fighter squadrons which Portal considers sufficient to deal with any bomber attack the Germans could make at this present time. We do not yet know what the Portuguese will ask for. They may be shy even of taking the forces aforesaid, lest it prejudice their non-belligerency. Should, per Contra, the Portuguese make our sending of ground forces a condition of granting LIFEBELT, we must discuss with you what this would mean to our whole strategy. We can, in any case, afford to await the outcome of HUSKY, by which time we shall have learnt the extent and character of the Portuguese demands. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 537.]

Roosevelt quickly denied any intention of imposing Allied forces on Portugal, and correspondence printed in Foreign Relations (FRUS, 1943, II, 538-39) indicates that the primary American interest centered on postwar civil aviation rights in the Azores and Lisbon, not military bases.

R-301 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] July 3, 1943, 1:40 P.M.

To the Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. I had no thought of forcing ground or air forces on the Portuguese, but I think we can tell Salazar what we could send if he asks for them, pointing out that there will be of necessity a little delay in getting them there. I have a hunch that in order to maintain non-belligerency they will not ask for any troops or planes, and I agree with you that Germany will probably not do any bombing. If we can put LIFEBELT through that will be a major accomplishment at this time. Roosevelt [MR*]

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Hoping to take advantage of the declining Italian morale and the increasing opposition to Mussolini, Roosevelt urged the Italian people to overthrow the Fascist regime. But all he offered in return was "honorable capitulation"— unconditional surrender. (Because it was to be broadcast on July 10, as Sicily was invaded, the White House Code Room reclassified this message as confidential.)

R-302 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] July 3, 1943, 6:00 P.M. Personal and Secret for the Former Naval Person from the President. I am proposing to send and have broadcast on D-day the following message to the Italian people: "I am speaking to you, the Italian people. I am speaking to you as President of the United States of America, against whom, on December 11, 1941, your Government declared war. At this moment the combined armed forces of the United States and Great Britain under the command of General Eisenhower are carrying the war deep into the territory of your country. This is the direct consequence of the shameful leadership to which you have been subjected by Mussolini and his Fascist regime. Mussolini carried you into this war as the satellite of a brutal destroyer of peoples and liberties. Mussolini plunged you into a war which he thought Hitler had already won. In spite of Italy's great vulnerability to attack by air and sea, your Fascist leaders sent your sons, your ships, your air forces to distant battlefields to aid Germany in her attempt to conquer England, Russia and the world. This association with the designs of Nazi-controlled Germany was unworthy of Italy's ancient traditions of freedom and culture—traditions to which we, the people of America, owe so much. Your soldiers have fought not in the interests of Italy but for Nazi Germany. They have fought courageously, but they have been betrayed and abandoned by the Germans on the Russian front and on every battlefield in Africa from El Alamein to Cap Bon. Today, Germany's hopes for world conquest have been blasted on all fronts. Germany is concentrating her depleted forces for her own defense. The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United Nations. Italy's sea coasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of sea power the world has ever known. The forces now opposed to you are pledged to destroy the power of Nazi Germany—power which has ruthlessly been used to inflict

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slavery, destruction and death on all those who refuse to recognize the Germans as the master race. The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honorable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations. If you continue to tolerate the Fascist regime which serves the evil power of the Nazis, you must suffer the consequences of your own choice. We take no satisfaction in invading Italian soil and bringing the tragic devastation of war home to the Italian people. But we are determined to destroy the false leaders and their doctrines which have brought Italy to her present position. Every moment that you resist the combined forces of the United Nations—every drop of blood that you sacrifice—can serve only one purpose; to give the Fascist and Nazi leaders a little more time to escape from the inevitable consequences of their own crimes. All your interests and all your traditions have been betrayed by Germany and your own false and corrupt leaders; it is only by disavowing both that a reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European nations. The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to consult your own self-respect and your own interests and your own desire for a restoration of national dignity, security and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler— or live for Italy, and for civilization." Roosevelt [MR*]

The British continued to argue in favor of a South East Asia Command which would report to the British Chiefs of Staff, just as MacArthur reported to the U.S. Joint Chiefs, instead of following the Eisenhower model of reporting to the Combined (U.S. and British) Chiefs. Convinced that the British Command in India was not equal to the tasks it faced, General Marshall insisted that Stilwell retain control over Chinese and American forces based there.

C-342 London [via U.S. Army] July 3, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. 1. We have given earnest consideration to the plan set out in your number 298. The Chiefs of Staff had contemplated that General Stilwell (a) should be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander: (b) should con-

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tinue to have his direct responsibilities to the Generalissimo: (c) should be given the responsibility for the operation of the air route to China, and for the defence of its Indian terminal, having an American Air Commander in Chief under him for this purpose: (d) should control the discipline and administration of all American forces in the South East Asia command. 2. The Chiefs of Staff feel that, having regard to the above responsible and multifarious duties and to the fact that (b) may necessitate frequent visits to China, it would be very difficult for General Stilwell to exercise executive command over a part of the land forces and a part of the operational air force. Nevertheless, we will certainly try what you suggest. We can always make adjustments afterwards in the light of experience. 3. On the question of command relationship, we still think that the MacArthur pattern is the more appropriate to this theatre and I hope that you will be able to agree to it, subject to the modification that the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theatre and the South East Asia Command will be controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 4. I am sending you a separate message about a supreme commander. [MR*. R&C]

Churchill, as eager as President Salazar to keep American forces out of Portugal, gently dismissed the idea that Spain or Germany would attack Portugal because the Allies were granted base facilities in the Azores.

C-343 London July 4, 1943 President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person. Most Secret and Personal. Your number 301. I thank you very much. We will certainly do as you suggest if Salazar raises the point. I agree with you that we could not get them into trouble and do nothing to help them afterwards. I do not think they will get into trouble if they agree, but at present I am far from sure they will be so obliging. At any rate, they will probably spin things out. [MR*]

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Immediate military necessities almost always outweighed domestic or inter­ national politics in Roosevelt's thinking. An accidental bombing of the Vatican might alienate some Catholic voters, but the war effort came first. "Black radio" was a technique whereby information damaging to enemy morale— in this case a fraudulent armistice proclamation—was disseminated from what seemed to be legitimate German or Italian sources.

R-303 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] July 4, 1943, 4 P.M.

Secret and Personal from the President to the Former Naval Person. I have received from Field Marshal Dill information as to your attitude toward bombing the Marshalling Yards in Rome and in regard to Eisen­ hower's proposal to use a black radio armistice proclamation. It is my opinion that Eisenhower should be given full discretion as to the necessity from a military point of view of bombing the Marshalling Yards and should be given full discretion as to the time if and when he considers the attack advantageous. Your concurrence in this is requested. I am in agreement with your opinion that a black radio armistice proc­ lamation should not repeat not be issued and I will so instruct Eisenhower. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

Always sensitive to anything which presented the Americans as the "senior partner" in their alliance, Churchill protested that Roosevelt's suggested proc­ lamation to the Italian people failed to give full credit to the British.

C-344 London [via U.S. Army] July 5, 1943, 1953 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal. Your No. 302. Your War Cabinet had contemplated a joint declaration to the Italian people in the name of both our countries. Whereas TORCH was by agreement planned as an American expedition with a British contingent and I have acted as your Lieutenant throughout, we consider HUSKY and Post-HUSKY as joint undertakings in which we are equal partners. This would certainly seem justified by the proportion of troops, Naval

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forces, shipping and aircraft involved. I fully accepted your dictum that "There should be no senior partner". However since we have been longer in quarrel or war with Italy than you, and also since a document of this character written by one man in its integrity is better than a joint production, we are ready that you should speak at this juncture to the Italian people on behalf of both our countries and in the interests of the common cause. There are a few amendments which I venture to suggest to you in all the frankness of our friendship. They are of importance because without them untoward reactions might grow among the British people and their forces that their contribution had not received equal or sufficient recognition. In fact they are only mentioned once, and all else is either United States or United Nations. The amendments are as follows: (A). After the words "Against whom on December 11, 1941, your government declared war" insert "I speak also on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government and in their name". (B). After the words "Under the command of General Eisenhower" insert "And his Deputy General Alexander". (C). The end of the sentence "The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United Nations" should read "Of the United States and Great Britain. Italy's sea coasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of the British and Allied sea power ever concentrated in the Mediterranean." (I am sure you will see the justice of this, as afterall it is the United States and Great Britain who are doing virtually the whole thing.) Finally we think that the message to the Italian people would seem to come better after an initial success in HUSKY has been achieved, because a repulse would make it somewhat inappropriate. It would anyhow be lost to the world in the cannonade and will hardly get through the Axis fighting troops in time to influence the crunch. Your No. 303 about bombing the Marshalling Yards in Rome. We concur. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 329-30. pWSC, V, 44-45.]

Roosevelt wrote an answer to Churchill and instructed Admiral Leahy to show the message to Hull and General Marshall, adding the comment: "I think the Prime's point is well taken" (MR, attached to R-304).

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R-304 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] July 6, 1943, 12:35 P.M. To Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. I fully agree with your Number 344 and I was under the impression that you were getting out a message to the Italian people of import similar to mine. What do you think of our doing it jointly under our two names? Also I think with you that it should not go out until after initial success is assured. Roosevelt [MR*]

Churchill, not understanding the nature of Roosevelt's objections, continued to defend Sholto Douglas as the most appropriate person to head the new South East Asia theater. (C.A.S. is Chief of the Air Staff; C in C is Commander in Chief.)

C-345 London July 6, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Further to my No. 332, in reply to your No. 293, I feel that Tedder ought not to leave the Mediterranean theatre where he has all the strings in his hands and is working in such complete harmony with the Supreme Commander. The same is also true about Admiral Cunningham who is, 1 am sure, a very great help to Eisenhower in every kind of way. In your No. 293, you demur to Sholto Douglas and say you would like me to propose some additional names. Before doing this, I should like to impress upon you the very strong view which our three Chiefs of Staff all have about Sholto Douglas' qualifications. Both Brooke and Pound assure me that there is no British officer available to whom they would more readily confide the Naval and Military forces involved and Portal is all for him. He is a man of exceptional physical energy and vigour of mind. I can myself testify to his very high mental ability because as head of Fighter Command, he worked on the Night Air Defence Committee over whose meetings I preside myself. I have also seen a good deal of him personally because his headquarters were then only half an hour from Chequers. His record as an airman is extremely good. He was for 2 years an instructor at the Imperial Defence College, an institution which

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after ten years work I got set up in 1929 for the express purpose of bringing the three services together in the study of war as a whole. Here it was that he met Brooke and convinced him and other soldiers of his general military knowledge and grasp of strategic problems. I thought there was a certain fitness in choosing an airman for this great command because of all the business of contact with China by air and the great part the air must play both in the supply and support of troops in the Burma jungles and in the amphibious operations along the coast, or later across the bay towards the Kra Isthmus or Sumatra Tip or thereabouts. Sholto Douglas certainly has held great commands and has, as deputy C. A. S. at the beginning of the war and later as C in C Fighter Command, been in or near the central circle here for three years of war. He is thus accustomed to dealing with large issues and high authorities. This is of importance because of the necessarily complex relations arising between the new Supreme Command, South-East Asia and the Commander in Chief, India, and the Viceroy and Government of India. Finally, I may say that if anything happened to Portal, he would be my first choice for C. A. S., although, of course, Tedder's growing reputation tends to affect this view. Now I have put all my reasons before you. Of course, in proposing an inter-Allied commander, we all of us here feel a special responsibility, and would doubly regret making a mistake. We have, therefore, given the most earnest thought to this matter, especially in view of your query. I have been wondering why it is you have these doubts about him, and I should be grateful if you would let me know from what they spring. The only thing I can think of is that he sat on a very large committee under Eisenhower in the early days of BOLERO before TORCH was settled, and perhaps he could not do himself full justice there. I am sure he is animated by the most friendly feelings towards your people and that he has tact and savoir faire. Supposing, however, that you are still unconvinced, I could make, as a first step, a unified new British Joint South-East Asia Command under Douglas with a thoroughly good liaison with Stilwell and work up to the combined Supreme Command in two stages as confidence grew. Pray tell me with the utmost plainness what you feel. [MR*]

Although Roosevelt believed that the United States—and the Democratic Party—had a special relationship with Italy because of the large number of Italian-Americans, the joint statement to be made following the invasion of Sicily did not prove to be a problem. Roosevelt quickly agreed to Churchill's amendments. (See R-307.)

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C-346 London July 6, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Secret. Your 304. It is lovely working with you. Everyone here would like a joint message and as neither of us is going to read it out, this should be easy. There are only two consequential alterations namely: (A). Omit the opening sentence and begin at the words "At this moment the combined armed forces", also (B). At "This association with the designs of Nazi-controlled Germany was unworthy of Italy's ancient traditions of freedom and culture—traditions to which" insert the words "The peoples of America and Great Britain owe so much." The message could then be signed by both of us and loosed off by leaflet and radio from whatever moment is judged advantageous. I gather that Eisenhower is thinking in terms of five or six days after we get ashore, so that we can judge as things go on. Alexander says that all arrangements are complete up to time and running smoothly and everyone is in great heart and very hopeful. For convenience, I send you the text as I now suggest it should read. Begins: "This is a message to the Italian people from the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. "At this moment the combined armed forces of the United States and Great Britain under the command of General Eisenhower and his Deputy General Alexander are carrying the war deep into the territory of your country. This is the direct consequence of the shameful leadership to which you have been subjected by Mussolini and his Fascist regime. "Mussolini carried you into this war as the satellite of a brutal destroyer of peoples and liberties. "Mussolini plunged you into a war which he thought Hitler had already won. In spite of Italy's great vulnerability to attack by air and sea, your Fascist leaders sent your sons, your ships, your air forces, to distant battlefields to aid Germany in her attempt to conquer England, Russia and the world. "This association with the designs of Nazi-controlled Germany was unworthy of Italy's ancient traditions of freedom and culture—traditions to which the peoples of America and Great Britain owe so much.

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"Your soldiers have fought not in the interests of Italy but for Nazi Germany. They fought courageously, but they have been betrayed and abandoned by the Germans on the Russian front and on every battlefield in Africa from El Alamein to Cape Bon. "Today, Germany's hopes for world conquest have been blasted on all fronts. The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United States and Great Britain. Italy's sea coasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of British and Allied sea power ever concentrated in the Mediterranean. "The forces now opposed to you are pledged to destroy the power of Nazi Germany—power which has ruthlessly been used to inflict slavery, destruction and death on all those who refuse to recognize the Germans as the master race. "The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honourable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations. "If you continue to tolerate the Fascist regime which serves the evil power of the Nazis, you must suffer the consequences of your own choice. We take no satisfaction in invading Italian soil and bringing the tragic devastation of war home to the Italian people. But we are determined to destroy the false leaders and their doctrines which have brought Italy to her present position. "Every moment that you resist the combined forces of the United Nations—every drop of blood that you sacrifice—can serve only one purpose; to give the Fascist and Nazi leaders a little more time to escape from the inevitable consequences of their own crimes. "All your interests and all your traditions have been betrayed by Germany and your own false and corrupt leaders; it is only by disavowing both that a reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European Nations. "The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to consult your own self-respect and your own interests and your own desire for a restoration of national dignity, security and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler—or live for Italy, and for civilization. Signed Roosevelt, Churchill." [MR*. WSC, V, 45-46 pFRUS, 1943, II, 330-31.]

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Discussions with the Portuguese continued. British Air Vice Marshal Charles Medhurst headed the British negotiating team, and Rear Admiral R. M. Servaes represented the Royal Navy on that group.

C-347 London July 6, 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Most Secret and Personal. I have asked Winant to send you the enclosed about LIFEBELT as it is the best we have had so far. The enemy already know something is afoot and we are making all possible haste. Following from Medhurst. Begins: "We had our first meeting this afternoon in a private house in an atmosphere of genuine cordiality. After a welcoming speech by the Major General of the Armada to which I replied, I made a statement on the general strategical situation on land and in the air followed by Admiral Servaes on the war at sea. "A discussion then followed on future procedure from which it seemed clear that the Portuguese representatives had been instructed not to waste time on fruitless side issues. Before any further progress could be made, they wished to know in as much detail as possible exactly what our use of the Azores would mean in men facilities and installations and how our garrison would be disposed. Provided with these details they could then assess what the Axis reactions were likely to be and what they would want from us in the way of material. "Our statement is now being prepared and will be handed over at 900 hours July 6th and the next meeting will be at 16 hours the same day. "Our first impressions are that the Portuguese are willing and even anxious to give us what facilities we want. They are in hopes, however, that our demands will be so moderate that the Germans may take some time before they realize what is happening. Meantime, they would have the opportunity to prepare themselves with our material assistance against retaliation. "We do not of course intend to be deterred from stating our full requirements." [MR*]

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T h e President agreed with the Prime Minister's proposal for issuing a monthly statement on anti-submarine warfare.

R-305 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 7, 1943, 6:50 P.M. T o t h e F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal a n d Secret. Your N u m b e r 340 I wholly agree. Roosevelt [MR*]

Harold Macmillan, the British government's political representative at Eisen­ hower's headquarters in Algiers, firmly believed that the Allies should rec­ ognize the French National Committee as the legitimate French government, and he had managed to convince Eisenhower and Robert Murphy, Roosevelt's personal representative in North Africa. T h e British Foreign Office agreed, but Churchill, who shared Roosevelt's intense personal dislike of de Gaulle, opposed the move. Churchill also argued that unilateral recognition by Brit­ ain, as advocated by the Foreign Office, would put an unnecessary strain on the more important Anglo-American relationship.

C-348 London [via U.S. Army] July 8, 1943, 1111 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Secret. 1. I h e a r from MacMillan that Eisenhower a n d M u r p h y p r o p o s e im­ mediate recognition of F r e n c h Committee. This is r a t h e r sudden. I should like to know your reactions. O u r Foreign Office would also like to go ahead a n d recognise. My chief desire in this business has been to keep in step with you. 2. It is, however, essential that we should act together a n d that we should agree t h e extent a n d m o m e n t of o u r recognition. My immediately following telegram contains formula for recognition suggested by Foreign Office. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 171.]

T h e eagerness of the Foreign Office to restore the "French Overseas Empire" not only answered French demands but also countered Roosevelt's frequent comments about establishing trusteeships for the poorly administered colo­ nies—a precedent the British wished to avoid.

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C-349 London [via U.S. Army] July 8, 1943, 1125 Ζ President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person. Personal and Secret. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is formula for recog­ nition of French Committee suggested by Foreign Office. His Majesty's Government are happy to recognise the French Com­ mittee of National Liberation as administering those parts of the French Overseas Empire which acknowledge their authority, and as having as­ sumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. They also recognise it as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the frame­ work of Inter-Allied cooperation as well as, in principle, the administra­ tion and defence of French interests. The practical application of this principle to the different categories of French interests must be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises. His Majesty's Government have taken note of the Committee's deter­ mination to continue the common struggle, in close cooperation with all the Allies, until French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. They count on the Committee to afford such facilities in the military and economic sphere in the territories under their administration as may be required by the governments of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war. In respect of certain of these territories, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the British or United States authorities. The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements, and pending their revision all such agreements concluded since June 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, will remain in force. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 171-72.]

R-306 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 8, 1943, 11:55 A.M. Personal and Secret to the Prime Minister from the President. Your number 348. Following is paraphrase of message I have just sent to Eisenhower and Murphy:

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"From London it is reported that recognition of the French Com­ mittee is being considered by you and Murphy. You are not to rec­ ognize the committee under any condition without full consultation and approval of the President. Of course it will be necessary to have joint action by British and U.S." [MR*]

The rules of the short-snorter game applied to King and commoner alike. (See R-300.)

C-350 London [via U.S. Army] July 8, 1943, 1550 Ζ President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person Most Secret and Personal. Initiation ceremony took place last night and new member has been duly warned of his new risks and responsibilities. He brought $300 which I now send you in cash. We duly noted the eminently desirable object to which you propose to devote them. [MR]

Aware of the contradiction in picturing German submarine warfare as in­ humane and American submarine actions in the Pacific as beneficial, Churchill conciously followed a policy of referring to German submarines only as Uboats.

C-351 London [via U.S. Army] July 8, 1943, 1427 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. 1. Your number 305. Admiralty have prepared the following for the first of our monthly statements on U boat war. Will you let me know whether your people have any amendments or additions to make, and also, assuming text is agreeable, what arrangements should be made for simultaneous release on Sunday. 2. I also propose a communique to you on the following lines. Begins. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have been concerned at the number of statements which are

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being made from time to time by public persons and in the press on both sides of the Atlantic, about the and U boat war and the methods and devices employed in it. The enemy, by piecing together portions of these statements, may glean more information than is desirable about these affairs. It has therefore been decided that a monthly statement approved by the President and the Prime Minister shall be issued on the 10th of every month, and that, apart from specially authorized announcements or statements by the President or Prime Minister or duly censored accounts of particular incidents and ac­ tions, this monthly statement will be the only one to be made on behalf of the British and American governments. All departments have been so instructed. It is hoped that the press will, so far as possible, cooperate in keeping the technical discussions of U boat warfare within the limits of the official announcements and generally leave the enemy in his present state of doubt and anxiety upon this most important aspect of our successful warfare at sea. [MR*]

C-352 London [via U.S. Embassy] July 8, 1943, 1439 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Following is Admiralty statement referred to in my immediately pre­ ceding telegram. Begins. The following statement of anti submarine operations for the month of June is issued jointly by the British and United States governments. 1. In June the losses of Allied and neutral merchant ships from submarine attacks were the lowest since the USA entered the war. The losses from all forms of enemy action were the second lowest recorded since the war between Britain and Germany began. 2. The number of targets offered to the anti submarine vessels and aircraft of the United Nations was not as great in June as previously, but the sinkings of Axis submarines were substantial and satisfactory. 3. The heavy toll taken of the U boats in May showed its effect in June in that the main trans Atlantic convoys were practically un­ molested, and the U boat attacks on our shipping were in widely separated areas. However, every opportunity was taken of attacking U boats leaving and returning to their bases on the west coast of France.

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4. New weapons and devices have achieved a good measure of success and are constantly being improved. 5. The merchant shipping tonnage of the United Nations has shown a large net increase every month this year. Anti submarine vessels and aircraft are coming into service in considerable numbers. [MR*]

Roosevelt added the last sentence to Leahy's draft of the following message.

R-307 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 8, 1943, 2:50 P.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person Secret and Personal. Referring to your number 346 of July sixth I am in full agreement with your text of the joint message to the Italian people. I suggest for your consideration that Eisenhower be charged with the delivery of the joint message and that he be given full discretion as to the time and method of delivery. Upon receipt of your approval I will issue instructions to Eisenhower. He can decide on the day and hour of release and notify us so that we can then start the short wave people to work in England and America. [MR*]

As always, Churchill wanted political decisions left to politicians, not military men.

C-353 London July 8, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Secret. Reference your no. 307. I should prefer that you and I should judge the political moment on the military situation disclosed by Eisenhower's reports. Let us call it PQ and we can then talk about it on the telephone at any time. [MR*]

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Both Roosevelt and the State Department worried about the Arab reaction to large numbers of Jewish refugees in North Africa, and the American plan for refugee camps emphasized their temporary nature. Myron C. Taylor was the President's personal representative to the Pope. Ex-New York Governor Herbert H. Lehman later became head of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). In the summer of 1943, before the establishment of UNRRA in November, three agencies—the Office of LendLease Administration, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, and the War Department—fought bitterly over control of relief operations in North Africa.

R-308 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 8, 1943, 3:05 P.M. Secret and Personal from the President for the Former Naval Person. This refers to your 339, June 30,1943, regarding provision for refugees in North Africa. I will set out the elements of the problem as I understand them: 1. There are at present an estimated five or six thousand stateless or enemy-nationality refugees in Spain to be moved, largely of the Jewish race. 2.1 am asking Generals Eisenhower and Giraud to designate Mogador or some other place in French North Africa as a place of temporary residence for these refugees and others who may be able to escape from Axis territory into Spain. They have already agreed in principle to the establishment of such a place of temporary residence. 3. I will arrange for the transportation of these refugees by land from Spain to the selected port in Portugal for their embarkation. 4. You will arrange for their sea transportation from Portugal to a port in North Africa. 5. I will request the American military authorities to make available cots and tents in sufficient number to meet the emergency needs of the refugees arriving at the temporary place of residence. 6. I will also arrange that preparations will be begun immediately for a temporary reception center of more substantial character where the refugees can be housed and cared for until subsequent arrangements are made for their disposition which should be at the earliest possible moment. 7. The costs of the refugees' transportation from Spain and their maintenance in the place of temporary residence until such time as a more permanent settlement is agreed upon will be borne equally by our two Governments. 8. The work of administration for the refugees at the temporary place of residence will be the responsibility of the Office of Foreign Relief and

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Rehabilitation Operations u n d e r Governor Lehman, with representatives of your G o v e r n m e n t cooperating a n d assisting. 9. I am in complete accord with the thought of the French military authorities in that area that both for political and military reasons it is essential to transfer the refugees, after their arrival at the temporary place of residence, to a place of more p e r m a n e n t settlement for the duration. In this connection the D e p a r t m e n t of State has j u s t been informed by your Embassy h e r e in response to conversations Lord Halifax has had with Mr. Myron Taylor that certain places, a m o n g t h e m T r i p olitania, Cyrenaica and Madagascar, are u n d e r active discussion and it appears not impossible that sites may be available there for the refugees. It is also my u n d e r s t a n d i n g that a limited n u m b e r of the refugees may be admitted into Palestine. 10. T h e subsequent transportation of the refugees from the temporary place of residence to places of m o r e p e r m a n e n t settlement and their continued care thereafter would be provided u n d e r the auspices a n d jurisdiction of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee, the costs thereof to be underwritten jointly by the British and American Governments. I trust that you will let m e know at the earliest convenient m o m e n t that we are in complete accord when I shall issue the necessary directives to complement those which you will issue. Roosevelt [State Dept.] [MR*. FRUS, 1943, I, 323-24. «fcfC]

T h e Americans were more concerned about security than morale, and deleted all mention of new weapons from the first monthly statement on anti-submarine warfare.

R-309 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 8, 1943, 4:30 P.M. T h e President to the F o r m e r Naval Person Secret and Personal. Your No. 352 proposed statement of anti submarine operations for J u n e to be issued on July 10th meets with my approval except the reference to new weapons a n d devices (paragraph 4). I am advised that all public reference to new weapons should be avoided. I will a r r a n g e its release h e r e to m o r n i n g papers on the same date. [MR*]

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Acting on advice from various American officials who feared that Britain wanted information about atomic research only in order to utilize it com­ mercially after the war, Roosevelt had agreed to keep such data secret. On February 27, 1943, Churchill had protested that decision in a cable to Harry Hopkins (HLH: Α-Bomb folder), correctly noting that Britain had shared its early research on the subject (codenamed TUBE ALLOYS) and expected equal treatment. Although Roosevelt had promised full cooperation, the head of the American Office of Scientific Research and Development, Vannevar Bush, who was then visiting England, continued to prohibit the exchange of information. Hopkins had then promised to raise the issue with Roosevelt.

C-354 London July 9, 1943, 0910 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. Since Harry's telegram of 17th J u n e I have been anxiously awaiting fu r t h e r news about T U B E ALLOYS. My experts are standing by a n d I find it increasingly difficult to explain delay. If difficulties have arisen, I beg you to let m e know at once what they are in case we may be able to help in solving t h e m . [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash, (i Quebec, 1943, p p . 632-33.]

General Marshall's dislike of Sholto Douglas prevailed, although Roosevelt added a final sentence which lessened the harshness of Marshall's draft. Ad­ miral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham was British Commander in Chief, Medi­ terranean. T h e Americans were not the only ones with great confidence in Cunningham, for in October 1943 Churchill appointed him First Sea L o r d — the top position in the British Navy.

R-310 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 9, 1943, 12:00 A.M T h e President to the F o r m e r Naval Person Secret a n d Personal. With reference to your 332 a n d 345 a n d my 293 r e g a r d i n g Sholto Douglas: General Eisenhower has not b e e n involved in this m a t t e r a n d we a r e u n a w a r e of his opinion. I have b e e n advised that a n u m b e r of general officers who have b e e n thrown in contact with Douglas all have gotten the same unfavorable reaction. T h e B u r m a p r o b l e m will be o n e of ex-

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ceeding difficulty not merely in the character of the fighting but m o r e because of the complications and ramifications of the situation. It therefore requires, in o u r opinion, a m a n of unusual breadth of vision, moral courage, a n d personal characteristics that lend themselves to coordinating actions of diverse peoples. It was for that reason that I proposed, with complete a n d spontaneous unanimity of opinion on the part of all of my advisors, the n a m e of Admiral C u n n i n g h a m . H e understands the complications of Allied c o m m a n d and has demonstrated outstanding ability to meet such complications as well as an unusual understanding of Americans. H e enjoys o u r complete confidence. His opinion would not only carry the weight that should be given to that of a supreme c o m m a n d e r in a theater b u t a confidence on o u r part that his view must be right. This would not at all be the case, I believe, with Douglas. H e would start with handicaps of lack of experience in Allied matters, in a most difficult theater, a n d with certain prejudices against him to which I have referred above, whether or not they are justified. I am particularly anxious to obtain for that command an officer of proved ability in combined allied operations, and with the fighting initiative that will insure an aggressive determined campaign against the J a p a n e s e in B u r m a . T h e importance of C u n n i n g h a m in the Mediterranean is fully realized, but I am hopeful that the situation will be so clarified navally in a short time that his services can be spared as well as some of his ships. I will of course abide fully by your decisions a n d give unquestioned support to the carrying out of the task. Roosevelt [GCM] [MR*]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the Pacific an American theater, and General Marshall's draft reflected that assumption. A British command in South East Asia was fine, but only if cooperation with the American command in the Pacific could be guaranteed. T. V. Soong was the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

R-311 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 9, 1943, 12:15 P.M. From the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person Secret and Personal. In reply to your No. 342 July 3rd. O u r agreement in maintaining American deployment in the Southeast Asia T h e a t e r u n d e r Stilwell's comm a n d should assist us in resolving the problem of securing Chinese coordination.

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As to the relationship of the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater following the MacArthur rather than the Eisenhower pattern, practical consideration of the entire deployment against Japan brings me to the conclusion our solution should be the Eisenhower pattern. Planned operations in the Southeast Asia Theater must be more closely integrated with our efforts in the entire Pacific Theater as the tempo of the war in the Pacific is stepped up. I can foresee that centralization in Washington will eventually be required not only to effect coordination but also to furnish the control necessary to prevent undue lag in massing of our means to defeat Japan after Germany's collapse. To center in London on the one hand the major operational planning and strategic control of the Southeast Asia command and direct from Washington on the other the war in the Pacific would materially weaken our combined efforts against Japan. Another consideration we cannot overlook. The Generalissimo has no representation on our combined staffs. Through the Pacific War Council, also in Washington, where he is represented by Dr. Soong, we might be able to enhance our chances of securing cooperation from the Generalissimo. Roosevelt [GCM] [MR*. R&C]

R-312 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 9, 1943, 12:20 P.M.

Personal and Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Your No. 353. I have today instructed General Eisenhower to be prepared to issue our joint statement at a time to be decided later by you and me. Roosevelt [MR*]

Roosevelt's "personal relationship" with the Pope stemmed as much from the large Catholic vote in the United States as from diplomatic contacts.

R-313 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 9, 1943, 12:45 P.M.

The President to the Former Naval Person Secret and Personal. I am sending the following message to the Pope and feel that this should come from me instead of from both of us because of the large percentage

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of Catholics here, and because the Pope and I have a rather personal relationship, especially during the last few months. I know you will understand this and I hope the message will have a good effect. "Draft of Message to Pope Pius XII from the President: By the time this message reaches Your Holiness a landing in force by American and British troops will have taken place on Italian soil. The soldiers of the United Nations have come to rid Italy of Fascism and all its unhappy symbols, and to drive out the Nazi oppressors who are infesting her soil. There is no need for me to reaffirm that respect for religious beliefs and for the free exercise of religious worship is fundamental to our ideas. Churches and religious institutions will, to the extent that it is within our power, be spared the devastations of war during the strug­ gle ahead. Throughout the period of operations the neutral status of Vatican City as well as of the Papal domains throughout Italy will be respected. I look forward, as does Your Holiness, to that bright day when the peace of God returns to the world. We are convinced that this will occur only when the forces of evil which now hold vast areas of Europe and Asia enslaved have been utterly destroyed. On that day we will joyfully turn our energies from the grim duties of war to the fruitful tasks of reconstruction. In common with all other nations and forces imbued with the spirit of good will toward men, and with the help of Almighty God, we will turn our hearts and our minds to the exacting task of building a just and enduring peace on earth. Roosevelt." [MR*. pFRUS, 1943, II, 926-27.]

On the night of June 9-10, British and American airborne forces landed at various locations in Sicily. Shortly before 3 A.M. on July 10, Allied forces began their amphibious assault.

C-355 London [via U.S. Army] July 9, 1943, 1635 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. I am thinking a great deal of our partnership and friendship now that our second great venture is launched. [MR*]

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C-356 London July 10, 1943, 0937 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. I a m very glad you have sent your message to the Pope. [MR*]

Churchill agreed with Roosevelt's proposals for refugee camps in North Af­ rica.

C-357 London [via U.S. Army] July 10, 1943, 1335 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. I a m most grateful for your N r . 308. I a m in complete accord with your suggestions which will provide a solution for o u r difficulties in Spain. As soon as I h e a r from you that you have issued the directives to Generals Eisenhower a n d Giraud, a n d to the American Ambassadors in Madrid a n d Lisbon, I will give the comple­ m e n t a r y instructions to o u r authorities. [MR*]

T h e Canadians were playing a major role in the invasion of Sicily and had asked to be associated with the appeal to the Italian people to overthrow the Fascist regime. T h e lack of time may have been the immediate reason why Churchill said no, but his overall preference for British leadership within the empire and his dislike of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King's attempts to insinuate himself into the highest levels of international politics underlay the refusal.

C-358 London July 10, 1943 F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. I have sent the following message to Mackenzie King a n d I send it to you for your information. Begins:

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" I fear it might be resented by the other dominions if o n e alone were associated with a d o c u m e n t of this character. It seems to m e that if any of the dominions are in, all should be in. T i m e does not p e r m i t this. It is, therefore, with great respect that I am unable to agree to alter the form of the appeal which has been concerted with m u c h t h o u g h t between the British a n d the United States Govern­ ments a n d has received the sanction of the War Cabinet." [MR*]

C-359 London July 11, 1943, 0838 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. T h a n k you so m u c h for the p h o t o g r a p h s which are a charming souvenir of Shangri-La [R-300/TJ. [MR*]

PQ was the codeword for the joint Anglo-American appeal to the Italian people.

C-360 London July 13, 1943, 1050 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. Don't you think the time has very nearly come when we might let P.Q. out of the bag? Otherwise we might lose the psychological effect. [MR*]

Thursday was July 15.

C-361 London July 13, 1943, 1440 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. 1. C a n a d i a n G o v e r n m e n t suggest addition of word "Nazi" before "Ger­ m a n y " in p a r a g r a p h 11 of P.Q. in o r d e r to bring this p a r a g r a p h into conformity with p a r a g r a p h 7.

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I think this is an improvement and we will insert it if you agree. 2. Progress seems so good that I think we ought to loose it off on Thursday. [MR*]

A combination of excellent intelligence and improved technology, particularly the ten-centimeter radar, resulted in effective suppression of German submarine activity in the summer of 1943.

C-362 London [via U.S. Army] July 13, 1943

Former Naval Person to President Personal. Admiralty report 5 U-boats destroyed by our joint forces in the last 24 hours. This is an all time world high. [MR*]

German submarines had attempted a major offensive in the Bay of Biscay in the early summer of 1943, but the two sunken transports mentioned by Roosevelt were among the few German successes. General Wolfe had defeated French General Montcalm during the French and Indian War (Seven Years' War), capturing the Citadel at Quebec—the location of the proposed StalinChurchill-Roosevelt meeting. Roosevelt's sarcastic comment about Congress was typical of his constant complaints about that body, and 1943 had proven a particularly troublesome year.

R-314 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 14, 1943, 11:55 A.M.

Personal and Secret for Former Naval Person from the President. I am sorry about the two transports off the coast of Spain but it is fine that we are working so successfully on the U-boats. More and better hunting. Our records now say seven U-boats in the past few days. I have no further word from U.J. Even if he is unable to get away, I think the time would be ripe for a Staff Conference of all of us in General Wolfe's stronghold around the first of September. My Congress has retired for the night and I am still going strong. [MR*. pFRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 392.]

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C-363 London [via U.S. Army] July 14, 1943, 1924 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Secret. I was w r o n g when I said 5 U boats in 24 hours. It is 7 in 36. In these circumstances I suggest we release at a concerted m o m e n t the following: Begins: T h e President of the United States a n d the Prime Minister of G r e a t Britain a n n o u n c e t h a t in the 36 h o u r s e n d i n g n o o n July 13th 7 U boats were destroyed in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d in the Atlantic by British a n d American naval a n d air forces. T h i s is the record killing of U boats ever yet achieved in so short a time, a n d is therefore m a d e the subject of a special a n n o u n c e m e n t u n d e r the new system of monthly statements on the anti U boat war. [MR*. R&C]

Roosevelt agreed to Churchill's alterations to the appeal to the Italian people.

R-315 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 14, 1943, 2:35 P.M. F r o m the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person Secret a n d Personal. Referring to your 361 of July 13, Eisenhower r e c o m m e n d s July 16 at eleven h o u r s G.M.T. for release. I have approved Eisenhower's recom­ m e n d a t i o n a n d suggested the insertion of "Nazi" before " G e r m a n y " in p a r a g r a p h eleven if practicable. Will a r r a n g e for release to press h e r e at same time. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

Churchill's optimism about an agreement with Portugal to use bases in the Azores (LIFEBELT) proved premature.

C-364 London July 15, 1943, 0730 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d most Secret. I have h a d t h e following digest of the Portuguese negotiations about L I F E B E L T p r e p a r e d for you a n d your staffs. You will see we have de-

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cided to insert the thin edge of the wedge. I am more than pleased with the way in which the Portuguese have responded to the invocation of our ancient alliance. The plan is, no publicity and a gradual build-up. We are hoping to dispatch our occupation guests and some Hudson squadrons within a week. Mums the word. Digest begins—The Negotiations with the Portuguese. The following is a summary of the progress reached in the negotiations with the Portuguese. The Portuguese consider that they can offer us facilities in Terceira and Fayal but that any further facilities in San Miguel would amount to a definite participation in the war. Their idea seems to be that having granted us the initial facilities in Terceira and Fayal, they would then see what the effect is on Spain and the Axis. If little happens, we have no doubt that they will gradually give us more and more until we have everything we want. Facilities offered. The facilities which the Portuguese are in principle ready to concede are as follows: (A) Unrestricted use of the Port of Horta. (B) Such facilities in the harbour of Ponta Delgada as a neutral is permitted to accord to a belligerent under international law. If we accept the Portuguese interpretation of this, it means that any individual warship can only visit the harbour once in 3 months for a period not exceeding 24 hours, and that warning of the visit must be given in advance. (C) Full use of Lagens Airfield on Terceira. (D) "Harbours" in Terceirato be available to us for the supply and maintenance of Lagens: As large a volume of supplies as possible to be put in during the summer months to avoid the bad weather in the winter. (E) The airfields at Rabo De Peixe to be available only as an emergency landing ground, i.e. for forced landings, refueling, etc. (F) Land, sea and air defense of the islands to remain a Portuguese responsibility, except that local defense of the airfield at Lagens would be a British responsibility. (G) The Portuguese to continue to take special precautions for the security of the cable station in Fayal. (H) The Portuguese to be responsible for protection by sea patrol while in territorial waters of the first British supply ship to come to the islands. Further air protection of supply ships to be provided by the British from their resources at Lagens, once we are established. Given the unrestricted use of Horta and the harbours of Terceira, we shall, in fact, have all we want for Naval and maintenance purposes. Our delegation in Lisbon feel strongly that we should clinch

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with the Portuguese offer and consider that it would only be a question of time before we get o u r full requirements. We are telling our delegation that we agree with their view, subject to the following points on which they must insist:— (A) T h a t the sea protection of o u r shipping while it is unloading at Terceira will be a British responsibility, and (B) T h a t the control of the signal traffic passing t h r o u g h the cable station at H o r t a will be in British hands. T h e delegation have been told to make it clear that we regard these facilities as being the first step towards o u r full requirements. We are not however imposing any time limit on the Portuguese for meeting us in full. Consequent u p o n the above we are dismounting the assault force which was being p r e p a r e d in case the negotiations broke down and reconstituting the expedition which is now quite small for organizing the facilities which the Portuguese a p p e a r likely to concede to us. We are moreover keeping going with o u r preparations for sending some day and night fighter squadrons and anti aircraft guns for the defense of Lisbon and O p o r t o in case the Portuguese ask us to help t h e m with protection against air attack. [MR*]

Roosevelt scrawled a quick reply but gave no indication that the United States was simultaneously talking to the Portuguese about establishing a weather station in the Azores.

R-316 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 15, 1943, 12:05 P.M. T h e President to the Former Naval Person Secret and Personal. Your N u m b e r 364. I am delighted with the progress in regard to LIFEBELT. Roosevelt [MR]

The reference is to the appeal to the Italian people.

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C-365 London July 15, 1943, 0902 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Reference your number 315. Eisenhower is being informed that I concur in his proposed time for release. Arrangements are being made here accordingly. [MR*]

As usual, Admiral King's draft cable was too blunt to suit Roosevelt. This time King opposed making a special announcement of the recent sinkings of German U-boats. The changes were made in Roosevelt's handwriting.

R-317 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 15, 1943, 3:45 P.M.

From the President to the Former Naval Person Secret and Personal. I assume that the special release proposed you suggest in your No. 363 is motivated by based on the idea that the news will tend to discourage the Axis, particularly Italy, at this most opportune time, and that it will raise the enthusiasm and morale of the associated powers. While I concur of course in the first idea, nevertheless, I feel that any possible advantages would be more than offset by any pronouncement such as this which would intensify the now unfortunate feeling in this country that victory is in sight. The wave of optimism that has followed recent successes and our latest release on the anti-submarine situation is definitely slowing down production. We cannot afford to further inflate this costly public disregard of the realities of the situation, and I am therefore otrongly opposed to any special announcement concerning the U boat war there­ fore I doubt the wisdom at this time of giving the cat another canary to swallow. Roosevelt [EJK] [MR*. fifcfC]

The attack on Sicily had been very successful, although the island was not completely occupied until August 17. Events were moving faster than Church­ ill knew, for the day after this cable was dispatched, Eisenhower decided to cancel plans for an invasion of Sardinia in order to concentrate on attacking

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Italy proper. This included consideration of landings in the southern portion, generally referred to as the toe, ball, and heel of the Italian boot. " U J " was, of course, "Uncle Joe"—Josef Stalin. Roosevelt and Churchill regularly al­ luded to the Wolfe-Montcalm battle by referring to the Heights or Plain of Abraham, which lay in front of the Citadel at Quebec.

C-366 London July 16, 1943, 0208 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. I like very m u c h the plan of o u r meeting in C a n a d a a n d think the Heights of A b r a h a m most attractive. We think it most i m p o r t a n t to have the meeting earlier t h a n September 1. T h e Combined Staffs at Wash­ ington a g r e e d to meet again at the e n d of July o r the beginning of August. We could come with o u r outfit by the same m e t h o d as last time arriving at the very spot between the 12th a n d 15th of August. If this is agreeable to you, I will o p e n the m a t t e r to MacKenzie King in the greatest secrecy. Events in HUSKY are moving so fast a n d the degeneration of Italian resistance is so m a r k e d t h a t decisions about the T o e , Ball a n d Heel, which were r e g a r d e d as a part of HUSKY, will almost certainly have to be taken before we meet. We shall, however, n e e d to meet together to settle the larger issues which the brilliant victories of o u r Forces are thrusting u p o n us about Italy as a whole. Mid August will only j u s t be in time for this work. This, also, will be the time to check u p intimately u p o n De Gaulle, UJ a n d o t h e r equally agreeable topics. I h o p e , therefore, that you will be able to give m e this date. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, 392-93. RUC]

German submarines now became "canaries."

C-367 London July 16, 1943, 0208 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your n u m b e r 317. My cat likes canaries a n d h e r appetite grows with eating. However, news is now o u t d a t e d as we have altogether 18 canaries this m o n t h . [MR*]

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SOE stood for Special Operations Executive—the organization which super­ vised clandestine operations in enemy territory. The Germans were aware of the decline in Italian morale and had already begun to occupy areas of stra­ tegic importance in Italy and Italian-occupied Greece.

C-368 London July 16, 1943, 0208 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President. You will wish to have the following paraphrase of telegram just received from Commanders in Chief, Middle East. Paraphrase begins: Italian morale. Information received during past few weeks from Greece and Balkans points to growing disintegration of morale of Italian troops there. British SOE officer reports from Acharnania that Commander Casale Division has made approach through Mayor of Agrinion offering surrender his Division to British Forces only. Following are examples of other similar offers on different levels through SOE channels: (I) Covering Italian Troops in areas Trieste, Gorizia and Ljubljana, General Gambarra (XI Corps) and General Roberti (II Army) (II) Area Jannina, through Greek Bishop of Jannina, General Delabona (XXVI Corps). (III) On behalf Commander Cuneo Division at Samos through Harbour Master Port Vathy. Low and falling morale of Italian Troops in Balkans, Greece and Aegean has been confirmed by information received for some time past. Above feelers, though received through unorthodox channels, are therefore considered to be probably quite genuine. Indications that Germans are aware of danger and making dispositions accord­ ingly are shown by recent troop movements and reinforcement par­ ticularly of southern Greece. It is doubtful whether forces available would be adequate from German point of view, both for occupation and defence against invasion, in event of general Italian collapse. Paraphrase ends. We must certainly keep this from both cats and enjoy it ourselves. [MR*]

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Roosevelt's message to Stalin asking if the Soviet leader could attend a tri­ partite meeting is in Stalin/FDR, doc. 99.

R-318 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 16, 1943, 1:20 P.M. F r o m t h e President to t h e F o r m e r Naval Person Secret a n d Personal. I have still h e a r d n o t h i n g from U.J. I wired him yesterday a n d should have a n answer quickly. W h e n I h e a r I will let you know at once about A b r a h a m a n d I like your suggested time. Roosevelt [FDR] [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 393.]

Churchill's report of the types of aircraft Britain would send to the Azores prompted Roosevelt to suggest to Admiral Leahy that an American plane or two should accompany the British. Apparently, an American presence in the Azores was just as important as obtaining bases in the islands (Roosevelt to Leahy, July 17, 1943, MR).

C-369 London July 16, 1943, 1451 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to t h e President. Personal a n d Most Secret. You may like to know t h e types of aircraft we intend putting into the Azores. We p r o p o s e to begin with a flight of H u d s o n s at Lagens in T e r c e i r a to protect t h e initial convoy while it unloads. T h e y will be drawn from Gi­ braltar a n d should be o p e r a t i n g a few days after arrival of t h e convoy. H u d s o n s are comparatively light aircraft a n d should be able to use the airfield without any work being d o n e on it; their r a n g e is however only 450 miles a n d they must therefore be replaced by aircraft with longer range. T h e g r o u n d personnel a n d e q u i p m e n t of two squadrons of Fortresses will be sent out in the ships, and t h e aircraft (30 in all) will be flown out to replace t h e H u d s o n s as soon as we are satisfied that the airfield is fit for t h e m . Later on we h o p e to send Liberators since their longer r a n g e will make

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t h e m even m o r e useful than the Fortresses. Some work on the runways is sure to be n e e d e d before we can d o this, a n d the necessary construction personnel are being sent in the convoy. [MR*]

Since South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts advocated the same sort of major campaign in Italy that Churchill supported, the British leader was happy to forward this report to the President.

C-370 London July 17, 1943, 1714 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. I t h o u g h t you would be interested to see the following p a r a p h r a s e of most secret a n d personal message I have received from General Smuts. Begins: I send you my congratulations on the auspicious start of the Sicilian expedition. Following on N o r t h Africa in the next m o n t h or two Sicily may prove a n o t h e r t r a p for the Axis a n d the question arises, what next? Should not the answer be Rome? I suggest this as a military problem for the serious consideration of your staff. We should a t t e m p t only vital blows at this stage of the war a n d side shows should be avoided. If we c a p t u r e Rome, this would be a mortal blow, severing Italian communications, isolating the south of Italy, probably sweeping away the Royal House and Mussolini a n d securing the Pope who is the only real force left in Italy. T h u s we should knock Italy out of the war this s u m m e r a n d new bases could be created for o u r offensives n o r t h w a r d as well as eastward to the Balkans a n d Black Sea a n d westwards towards France. If Rome is militarily a feasible proposition there would be no less i m p o r t a n t political results for o u r war strategy. I a m inclined to doubt w h e t h e r if the defense of Rome has been decided u p o n , it would be m o r e helpful t h a n h a l f h e a r t e d in view of the Italian fear of its destruction in a regular siege. T o conclude, Rome may m e a n virtually Italy and its possession may m e a n this year a transformation of the whole war situation a n d next year the chance of finishing it. If therefore the suggestion has not been explored a n d rejected already I venture to c o m m e n d it to your consideration. [MR*]

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Roosevelt agreed, and noted that Eisenhower had already recommended an attack on Rome.

R-319 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] July 19, 1 9 4 3 , 5 : 1 5 P.M.

Secret a n d Personal from the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person. I like General Smuts' idea a n d I h o p e something of that kind can be u n d e r t a k e n . I think that Eisenhower a n d his staff are moving forward with similar thoughts. I suppose you have seen Eisenhower's message of yesterday. Roosevelt [MR*]

Stalin had still not replied to Roosevelt's invitation to meet. T h e war in the Far East, particularly the Pacific, had been planned and fought almost ex­ clusively by the Americans. Churchill and the British, wanting to have a strong presence in the Pacific after the war, now began a long and unsuccessful campaign to play a greater role in that theater.

C-371 London July 19, 1943, 1550 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. Should be grateful to know at earliest m o m e n t whether your UJ plan is on. Meanwhile I a m setting everything in train that can be d o n e most secredy for o u r rendezvous on 15th. T h e development of post-HUSKY seems to r e n d e r this all the m o r e u r g e n t . Moreover I am most anxious to learn from you how we are to finish u p J a p a n a n d what is the best plan. You will readily u n d e r s t a n d that e n o r m o u s preparations, moral, political a n d material, have to be m a d e in this country in o r d e r that o u r power may be fully transferred to the Far East when the time comes. We cannot too early begin these studies. We will finish [furnish?] your staffs with a synopsis of points for discussion before we set out. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, pp. 393-94.]

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C-372 London [via U.S. Army] July 20, 1943, 1212 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal Private and Most Secret. I have j u s t h e a r d from Mackenzie King that nothing could afford him m o r e pleasure personally or be m o r e welcome to the Canadian Govern­ m e n t a n d people t h a n a meeting any time d u r i n g August between us a n d o u r staffs at the place m e n t i o n e d a n d that we can count on everything in the way of accommodation a n d hospitality being provided. [MR*. FRUS, Conf at Wash. £i Quebec, 1943, p. 394.]

Encouraged by Harold Macmillan, the British representative at Eisenhower's headquarters, Churchill clung tenaciously to his hope that the French Na­ tional Committee would not be dominated by de Gaulle. One hopeful sign was that Maurice Couve de Murville, the French Committee's Commissioner of Finance, would accept the British subsidy in the name of the committee instead of for de Gaulle and the Free French movement. A great stumbling block, however, was in the Middle East. Both Richard Casey, British Minister of State in the Middle East, and Major General Sir E. L. Spears, British Minister to Syria and Lebanon and head of the Mission to the Free French in those areas, criticized French rule over the Levant as short-sighted, inef­ ficient, and likely to bring on a violent reaction from the native population. Hoping to replace French influence in the area with their own, the British put heavy pressure on the French Committee to promise eventual inde­ pendence for Syria and Lebanon. De Gaulle understood the British intentions and condemned them as hypocritical. Churchill's guarded optimism soon collapsed and by November 1943 Syria had become a major cause of friction between Britain and the French Committee. (See C-504.) Churchill's angry characterization of de Gaulle as a mixture of "Joan of Arc and Clemenceau" indicates how intensely personal the rivalries had be­ come. T h e moderates on the French Committee (Catroux, Monnet, Massigli, and Georges) frequently tried to restrain de Gaulle, but they never challenged his leadership. T h e "pressure from the Foreign Office" to recognize the French Committee came largely in the person of Foreign Secretary Eden, who advised the Prime Minister to pursue a policy toward Europe which did not depend on American support or approval. That ran counter to Churchill's dream of a special Anglo-American relationship in the postwar world and he told Eden that the two of them might have to break over the question of policy toward France. A week later, however, the Prime Minister acquiesced to the Foreign Office and sent Roosevelt the following cable. Even though Churchill recognized the logic of Eden's arguments, he continued to dislike

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and distrust de Gaulle and responded angrily whenever the French leader was unwilling to follow Anglo-American guidance. (See Eden, The Reckoning, pp. 460-63.)

C-373 London [via U.S. Army] July 21, 1943,0711 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. Please see my N o . 348 of the 8th instant. It seems to m e that something has got to be d o n e about this. I am u n d e r considerable pressure from the Foreign Office, from my Cabinet Colleagues, a n d also from the force of circumstances to "Recognize" the National Committee of Liberation in Algiers. What does recognition mean? O n e can recognize a m a n as an e m p e r o r or as a grocer. Recognition is meaningless without defining formula. We submitted to you o u r formula which would m e e t o u r daily practical needs. T h e s e cannot be overlooked. Until De Gaulle went to N o r t h West Africa and the new Committee was formed, all o u r relations were with him and his committee. I stated to Parliament on J u n e 8 that " T h e formation of this committee with its collective responsibility supersedes the situation created by the corre­ s p o n d e n c e between General De Gaulle a n d myself in 1940. O u r dealings, financial a n d otherwise, will henceforward be with the committee as a whole". I was glad to d o this because I would r a t h e r deal with the com­ mittee collectively than with De Gaulle alone. I had in fact for many months been working to induce o r compel De Gaulle to "Put himself in commission". T h i s seemed to be largely achieved by the new a r r a n g e m e n t . Since t h e n we have been dealing with the new committee on a de facto basis. We are now discussing the problems of Syria (where there is m u c h friction) with Monsieur Massigli, a n d are getting a good deal of help from him. T h e Minister of State (Casey) a n d General Spears are stopping off at Algiers on their way back to the Middle East in o r d e r to carry these discussions further. General Catroux has r e t u r n e d from Syria to Algiers a n d also shows a disposition to be helpful. H e is a level h e a d e d m a n and by no means in the pocket of De Gaulle. Neither I am sure is Massigli. I am certain we shall have a smoother course in Syria, which is full of d a n g e r o u s possibilities, by dealing with the committee collectively than with De Gaulle personally. Yet that is the only alternative. Very soon will come h e r e Monsieur Couve De Murville to wind u p o u r financial a r r a n g e m e n t s with De Gaulle a n d transfer them in so far as transference is required to the new committee. What other choice have I b u t to d o this?

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A third instance is supplied by the fact that there are a number of Free French troops and establishments here and about 50 Free French vessels which are doing very useful work and all of which have to be kept under military discipline. For this purpose an act of Parliament was passed in 1940 vesting the powers of discipline for such forces in General De Gaulle. I wish to transfer this to the committee and I shall have presently to submit an amending bill to Parliament. Besides all this there are the numerous colonies of the French Empire which came over to us or were brought over forcibly, including Madagascar, Jibouti, and the French West African and Central African colonies. With all of these we have a varying flow of business and trade to do, and at present all this is formally focused on the person of De Gaulle. I would much prefer it to be transacted with the Committee and with the particular member of the Committee charged with the administration of colonial affairs. In fact from day to day we have been inevitably drawn to recognize the Committee in the sense of doing business with it. Macmillan tells us repeatedly that the Committee is acquiring a collective authority and that De Gaulle is by no means its master. He tells us further that if the Committee breaks down, as it may do if left utterly without support, De Gaulle will become once again the sole personality in control of everything except the powers exercised by Giraud under the armed force of the United States in North West Africa and Dakar. He strongly recommends a measure of recognition. He reports that Eisenhower and Murphy both agree with this. I am therefore reaching the point where it may be necessary for me to take this step so far as Great Britain and the Anglo French interests set out above are concerned. If I do, Russia will certainly recognize, and I fear lest this might be embarrassing to you. I do hope therefore that you will let me know (A) Whether you could subscribe to our formula or something like it or (B) Whether you would mind if His Majesty's Government took that step separately themselves. There is no doubt whatever in my mind that the former would be far the better. There are a lot of good men on the Committee, Catroux, Massigli, Monnet, Georges and, of course, Giraud who arrived here yesterday. He will certainly raise all this and bring it to a head. As you know I have always taken the view that De Gaulle should be made to settle down to honest team work. I am no more enamoured of him than you are, but I would rather have him on the Committee than strutting about as a combination of Joan of Arc and Clemenceau. Pray therefore let me know your wishes, for I try above all things to walk in

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step with you a n d the advantages of o u r j o i n t action in this affair are especially obvious. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 173-75.]

Once again Churchill chose a codename, this one for the meeting at Quebec.

C-374 London [via U.S. Army] July 21, 1943, 2010 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. Planning arrive A b r a h a m 11. For code n a m e see my following. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 394.]

C-375 London [via U.S. Army] July 21, 1943, 2011 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. QUADRANT. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash, (j Quebec, 1943, p. 394.]

Stalin did not reply to Roosevelt's invitation for a meeting until August 8, when he said he could not meet with the Allied leaders until winter because of the German offensive launched in July 1943. T h e changes in the draft message were made by the President.

R-320 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 21, 1943, 6 : 3 0 P.M. F r o m the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. Referring to your n u m b e r s 371 a n d 372, in consideration of the fact that no d a t e for my p r o p o s e d UJ conference has yet been fixed so far I have h a d n o word from UJ t h o u g h I have wired him, I am in a g r e e m e n t with your suggestion that the Q U A D R A N T conference be started about August fifteenth in the location m e n t i o n e d in your 372 of Montcalm.

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Please inform me as early as possible of exact date of meeting that will suit your a r r a n g e m e n t s for transportation. If UJ moves I think August seventeenth would suit me better. Roosevelt [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash, (f Quebec, 1943, p. 395.]

Churchill's cables of July 8 (C—348, C—349) concerning possible recognition of the French National Committee had not been answered, as Roosevelt and his advisers struggled to find some way to avoid increasing de Gaulle's prestige and authority. The matter was apparently the subject of a number of White House discussions, culminating in a draft written by Harry Hopkins (printed below), and one submitted by the State Department which became the final message after Leahy and Roosevelt made only minor changes. Although both drafts were written before the arrival of another Churchill message on the subject (C—373 of July 21), Roosevelt apparently considered the State Department draft to be sufficiently responsive to the Prime Minister's warning that Britain might recognize the French Committee with or without American concurrence. Churchill, however, told Ambassador Winant that he thought Roosevelt had sent his answer before the arrival of C—373. (See Winant to Roosevelt, 24 July 1943, MR.) The cute phrase in the Hopkins draft about Martinique and Guadaloupe being "another canary for us pussycats" also appeared originally in the State Department draft, suggesting that it was— as it sounds—Roosevelt's language. Other similarities in phrasing and concepts indicate that the broad approach had been worked out in conferences between White House advisers and the State Department. Either way, the answer called for mere "acceptance" rather than "recognition" of the French Committee.

R-321, draft A, not sent Washington July 20, 1943 Personal a n d Secret to the Former Naval Person from the President. I d o not think we should use the word "recognize" in relation to the French Committee of National Liberation. This would be distorted to imply that we recognize the Committee as the government of France and would recognize t h e m accordingly as soon as we land on French soil. T h e next thing we know the Committee would want to exchange ambassadors with us. My thought about the Committee is this. We have encouraged Giraud and DeGaulle to get together a n d to stop the everlasting bickering, but we wanted them to get together for the one purpose of rallying all Frenchm e n outside of France in support of o u r military plans to throw the Nazis

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out of Europe. The Committee, in no sense, represents French sovereignty and, as such, has no civil authority beyond the scope of our military necessity. An harmonious committee has a useful subsidiary function of dealing with the resistance of some of the French colonies which have been liberated by us from the Nazis' overpowering influence. The Committee, for instance, may well have a substantial responsibility in North Africa and little, if any, in Martinique. We would welcome and, indeed, actively seek the Committee's cooperation everywhere they could be helpful in gaining a military victory. I am mindful of the fact that there probably is little real unity in the Committee and that some elements have animosities toward the United States and Great Britain. Certainly, some of them give far more thought to their future political ambitions than they do to the liberation of France by the force of arms. There are still visible signs of bitter propaganda against French elements by other French groups. Appearances of unity seem to me to be still on the surface and, at this time, I must conclude that they are continuing, or ready at any time to continue bitter attacks on each other or on us jointly or severally. In spite of this we are prepared to join with you and the other United Nations to move along the line of acceptance of the Committee of National Liberation, subject to military requirements, at the same time making it clear that we insist on a real unity within the Committee's membership and staff. I hope you will agree with me that the word "recognize" is undesirable, and I suggest the word "acceptance" in its place. I am going to try my hand at a formal memorandum. Giraud's visit here was very successful. We kept it on a purely military basis and we are starting immediately to send additional equipment for the French Army with every North African convoy. By-the-way, Martinique and Guadaloupe became ripe and fell into our laps without loss of life or any slowing up of the main war effort—another canary for us pussycats! Do let me have your suggestions. [HLH] [MR]

The phrase "have no justification whatsoever" in the fifth paragraph originally read "are sheer piffle" in the State Department draft.

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R-321 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 22, 1943, 12:25 P.M. Personal and Secret to the Former Naval Person from the President. Various sources continue, though with less pressure, to ask recognition of the existing French Committee of National Liberation. Some people want to recognize it as the organization acting for French interests in all French territory, including France. Other people want to recognize it as acting for French interests only in former French Empire. Most, not all, are willing to accept the Committee's authority subject to the military requirements of the British and American Forces. We have been saying, first, that the military requirements are and will be paramount to all civil matters; second, that the French Committee of National Liberation has only begun to function and should give further and more satisfactory evidence of the complete and genuine unity of the Committee. This unity must eliminate hitherto French political or factional controversies designed to promote either group antagonisms or individual aspirations, and demonstrate a real purpose to unify itself and, behind it, all Frenchmen in support of the cooperative efforts of the United Nations in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, having in mind its single cause of the liberation of France and the success of the United Nations. The French Committee was supposedly conceived on the principle of collective responsibility of individual Frenchmen for the prosecution of the war and our relations with it should be kept on this basis, it being understood that as to matters of a military character the two Governments will deal directly with the French Commander in Chief of the French forces. French political questions must be left to solution by the people of France when they have been freed from the present domination of the enemy. Visible signs of bitter propaganda against French elements by other French groups continue. This applies also to their attitude against Britain and the United States. Attempted claims of the exercise of French sovereignty by the Committee in the face of military exigencies are without basis and hence veiled references to invasion of French sovereignty by the United States and Great Britain have no justification whatever. Appearances of unity within the Committee seem to me to be still on the surface and at this time I must conclude that they are continuing or are ready at any time to continue bitter attacks on each other and on us jointly or severally. This Government is most anxious to join with you and the other United Nations to move along the line of limited acceptance of the Committee,

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subject always to military requirements, but we should make it clear that the plain conditions of French unity must be properly met. I do not (repeat not) think we should at any time use the word "recognition" because this would be distorted to imply that we recognize the Committee as the government of France as soon as we land on French soil. Perhaps the word "acceptance" of the Committee's local, civil authority in various colonies on a temporary basis comes nearer to expressing my thought. We must, however, retain the right and continue the present practice of dealing directly with local French officials in the colonies whenever military advantage to the Allied cause so dictates. Martinique is an illustrative example. Giraud's visit here was very successful. We kept it on a purely military basis and we are starting immediately to send additional equipment for his Army with every North African convoy. As far as concerns the situation of the French Committee, what would you think of the following proposed statement to be made simultaneously to the French Committee on the part of the two Governments by MacMillan and Murphy? "The Governments of the United States and Great Britain desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and territory from the oppressions of the enemy. "Arrangements have been made with the French Commander-inChief in North and West Africa for continuing the cooperation of the French armed forces under his control. The two Governments will cooperate with the French Committee of National Liberation on other matters of mutual interest on the understanding that the Committee was conceived and will function, on the principles of collective responsibility of all members of the Committee, for the prosecution of the war and not for the promotion of factional movements. "They desire to make clear, however, the following two conditions: "1) That the constitution and government to be established for France must be determined by the French people after they shall have been afforded an opportunity freely to express themselves. "2) That the relationship with the Committee will be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders in the prosecution of the war." Roosevelt [MR. FRUS, 1943, II, 175-77.]

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Cordell Hull, who forwarded the State Department report, could not cor­ roborate the examples of low Italian morale given by Churchill, but he pro­ vided Roosevelt with similar examples as did an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) document (G. Edward Buxton to Roosevelt, July 17, 1943, with at­ tachment, MR).

R-322 Washington July 22, 1943, 7:35 P.M. President to F o r m e r Naval Person Secret a n d Personal. Relative your n u m b e r 368, State D e p a r t m e n t a n d Office of Strategic Services have given their opinions which I hereby summarize. All t h r e e examples cited by you a p p e a r credible. Italian morale is very low in Trieste—Gorizia—Ljubljana area. Italians fear Slavs in this area a n d would prefer s u r r e n d e r i n g to Allies to a possible massacre of Italians by Slavs. Some Italians have been r e p o r t e d to have j o i n e d Slovene Partisans. T h e r e a p p e a r to be no G e r m a n troops in this area to prevent Italian s u r r e n d e r . Italian morale is low t h r o u g h o u t Greece a n d particularly in Aegean Islands. H e r e also Italians would prefer s u r r e n d e r to Anglo-Americans than to be massacred by Greeks. I n the Dodecanese, Chios, a n d Samos, Italians a r e nervous a n d have said in case of Allied attack they would resist "to same extent the French did in N o r t h Africa a n d n o m o r e . " However the belief is that Italian c o m m a n d e r s in Greece a n d Aegeans are unlikely to s u r r e n d e r until Allied forces actually arrive or m o r e cat­ astrophic events occur in metropolitan Italy. [MR*]

Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King was under heavy domestic criticism for abdicating wartime leadership to Churchill and Roosevelt. According to King's diary, he quickly accepted Roosevelt's suggestion that, instead of for­ mally participating in the QUADRANT Conference, King and his Chiefs of Staff act as hosts for Roosevelt, Churchill, and their Chiefs of Staff.

C-376 London July 22, 1943, 1550 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Your n u m b e r 320 we can make any date you like from 10th inclusive to 17th or even later, b u t o n military g r o u n d s we think the sooner the better.

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2. I send you in my immediately following [C—377] a telegram from the High Commissioner about the Canadian position a n d my reply, with which I h o p e you will be in agreement. If not, let me know. 3. As soon as I have your final date, I will tell Mackenzie King, as local preparations should not be begun till we are on the way. [MR*. FRVS, Con/, at Wash,fcfQuebec, 1943, ρ 395.]

The British High Commissioner in Canada was Malcolm MacDonald. (The question mark in the first message appears in all the sources.)

C-377 London July 23, 1943, 1009 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is telegram from the High Commissioner Canada a n d my reply. High Commissioner Canada to Prime Minister n u m b e r 1779. 21st July 1943. I know that Mackenzie King is assuming that in any meeting on Canadian soil he would be present t h r o u g h o u t as host and that he would be also a party in the discussions. H e realizes, of course, that the President a n d the Prime Minister will wish to have a great deal of talk between themselves or with their staffs and every a r r a n g e m e n t would be m a d e for this. H e also realizes that he could not be a full p a r t n e r in the discussions without creating awkward (?) problems about the position of other Dominion Prime Ministers. At the same time it would be extremely embarrassing politically to the Govern­ m e n t h e r e if the Canadian Prime Minister seemed to be less than a fairly full p a r t n e r in a meeting in Canada and would cause undesir­ able c o m m e n t from general point of view in Quebec a n d everywhere in Canada. O n the o t h e r h a n d , a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister in Quebec with the Canadian Prime Minister attending would, of course, delight everyone here a n d do m u c h solid good. Prime Minister to High Commissioner Canada 23 July 1943. Your n u m b e r 1779. I d o not anticipate any difficulty in arranging for MacKenzie King and his principal military advisers to be adequately associated with

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the conference. My idea is that MacKenzie King himself, together with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, should attend all plenary meetings over which the President and I preside and that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff should attend all plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. 2. T h e s e arrangements will not, of course, prevent my having private and off the record discussions alone with the President whenever he or I may think it necessary; nor will they prevent the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee (which consists of the American and British Chiefs of Staff) from meeting alone and in camera whenever the n a t u r e of the discussion renders this desirable. 3. T h e above is, of course, business only and apart from all social and personal meetings between hosts and guests and special AngloCanadian discussions to which I am looking forward. 4. Pray sound MacKenzie King on the above proposals and say that if they are agreeable to him I will seek the President's approval. [MR*. FRUS, Con/ at Wash, tf Quebec, 1943, pp. 395-96.]

In a memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Leahy wrote that the President wanted to avoid having Brazil and Mexico demand representation at the forthcoming Quebec Conference if the Canadians were represented. He added that Roosevelt wanted the following language incorporated into a draft answer to Churchill. As you know, Mackinzie [sic] King is one of my oldest personal friends and I will be very glad to make him a personal explanation of my attitude in this matter. It appears certain that an expansion of the Combined Staff to include representatives of the Allied Nations would practically change our small staff into a debating society, and it appears certain the inclusion of Canada in QUADRANT with its attendant publicity would make it extremely difficult to continue to exclude representatives of the other Dominions and the other Allied Nations (Leahy to JCS, n.d., attached to R-323, MR). The JCS draft proposed that King attend the conference sessions without his Chiefs of Staff, but Roosevelt deleted that wording. T h e underlined sections were added in the President's handwriting. Leighton McCarthy was the Canadian Minister to the United States.

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R-323 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 24, 1943, 12:05 P.M. For the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret from the President. Referring to your Number 377 of 23 July, I can not look with favor on the attendance of Canadian Staff officers at plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Quadrant Conference for the following reasons: (1) Inclusion of the Canadian Staff in QUADRANT will almost certainly result in an immediate demand from Brazil and China for membership on the Combined Staff in Washington. (2) It will probably result in a similar demand from Mexico, our neighbor on the southern border, as Canada is on the northern border. (3) We have until now succeeded in preventing the deterioration of our Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington into a debating society by refusing membershp to representatives of other Allied Nations. (4) It appears certain that inclusion of Canada in QUADRANT with its unavoidable attendant publicity would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to exclude from the Combined Chiefs of Staff representatives of the other Dominions and the other Allied Nations. I had a long talk with Leighton McCarthy yesterday and he went to Ottowa last night to explain the whole thing to Mackenzie King, who will, I think, understand. As you know, Mackenzie King is one of my oldest personal friends. Rather than face the difficulties that would follow admitting the Canadian Staff to QUADRANT I would prefer to have the meeting elsewhere—say Bermuda. The seventeenth is the earliest day I can make it, so let us decide on that. Roosevelt. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, pp. 396-97.]

"Colonel Warden" was Churchill's favorite codename for himself and his family. Churchill's daughter, Mary "Warden," was a sub-altern in the British Army and was stationed with an anti-aircraft battery. The Churchill party traveled on the Queen Mary, just as for the TRIDENT Conference. "Canaries" had become Churchill's nickname for German U-boats. The Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff feared that the Americans would refuse to capitalize on the Allied victory in Sicily with an invasion of Italy and would instead prefer to concentrate on the cross-channel invasion. The main British goal at the QUADRANT Conference was to convince the Americans to launch a major attack against Italy, and the Prime Minister hoped the President would keep the question open until the talks began.

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C-378 London [via U.S. Army] July 25, 1943, 1152 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. 1. Operation QUADRANT. As Colonel Warden (see my immediately following) is going by the same method as last time, he will have to arrive at "Abraham" during the 10th and will await you there. I should be glad to know if your delay till the 17th means that you are going to meet UJ. If this is so and you are not taking your staff with you, it has occurred to me that perhaps these might come to "Abraham" a few days earlier so as to begin the discussions, which are always lengthy, with their opposite number. On military grounds, we are very anxious that the staffs should be in contact as soon as possible. 2. Your 323. I quite understand your position and am supporting it by a message to MacKenzie King, which I am repeating to you. I expect that McCarthy will be able to convince him, as he is very keen on the project. 3. Colonel Walden is bringing Mrs Warden with him as you have several times kindly suggested, also Lieutenant Mary Warden as aide de camp. All three members of the Warden family are greatly looking forward to the trip. 4. The HUSKY news is very good and will be better. 1 trust we can keep all important options in this theatre open until we meet. I hope you are not too lonely now that Congress has departed. Up to date in July, we have caught 26 canaries, which is good for 25 days. There should be quite a good meal for our cats when the time comes. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. Ei Quebec, 1943, pp. 397-98.]

In the motion picture Mission to Moscow, based on the book of the same title by Joseph Davies, Churchill had been played by Dudley F. Malone. By co­ incidence, Malone had also been an Assistant Secretary of State during the Wilson administration, a time when Roosevelt had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

C-379 London July 25, 1943, 1156 Ζ Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. My immediately preceding telegram. "Me." Beware of spurious imi­ tations vide mission to Moscow. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash, (i Quebec, 1943, p. 398.]

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Churchill had proposed using the same codename, PQ, for Roosevelt prior to the Casablanca Conference.

C-380 London July 25, 1943, 1426 Ζ Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. Following is paraphrase of message to Mackenzie King referred to in paragraph 2 of my number 378. Paraphrase begins: My telegram number 1783 for High Commissioner Canada (second telegram contained in Former Naval Person telegram number 377 to President) was submitted by me to the President. Insuperable difficulties are seen by him in the Canadian Chiefs of Staff attending plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. President points out that this will almost certainly result in an immediate demand from both Brazil and China for membership of the Combined Staffs in Washington, also from Mexico. And from other British Dominions and allied nations as well. McCarthy so President tells me has left for Ottawa to explain the position to you. I must say I see the difficulties as very little business can of course be done when large numbers are present. It therefore seems to me that the British and Canadian staffs should confer together as may be necessary but that at the combined meetings of the two principal Allies, the British alone should be represented. As he is coming by the same method as last time and runs on schedule Colonel Warden and the whole party will arrive on the 10th at "Abraham". He hopes no preparations or plans of any kind will be made until he is well away. The British-Canadian staffs discussions can take place while awaiting the arrival of PQ and we can formally confer on various outstanding important imperial questions. For meaning of PQ see my immediately following. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6? Quebec, 1943, pp. 398-99.]

C-381 London July 25, 1943, 1429 Ζ Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. My immediately preceding telegram "yourself." [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 399.]

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King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy had just announced the replacement of Benito Mussolini by Marshal Pietro Badoglio. Mussolini was arrested and interned.

C-382 London July 25, 1943 F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. Changes a n n o u n c e d in Italy probably portend peace proposals. Let us consult together so as to take joint action. T h e present stage may only be transition. But anyhow, Hitler will feel very lonely when Mussolini is down and out. No one can be quite sure this may not go farther. [MR. WSC, V, 55. R&C]

Roosevelt did not refer to Churchill's cable (C—382) about the fall of Mussolini, but the time of release on the following message suggests that the President had read the Prime Minister's telegram. The coincidence of being at Shangrila is not explained.

R-324 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 25, 1943; 00:51 A.M., July 26 From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Secret. By coincidence I was again at Shangri-la this afternoon when the news from Rome came, but this time it seems to be true. If any overtures come we must be certain of the use of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the North a n d against the whole Balkan peninsula, as well as the use of airfields of all kinds. It is my thought that we should come as close as possible to unconditional s u r r e n d e r followed by good treatment of the Italian populace. But I think also that the head devil should be s u r r e n d e r e d together with his chief partners in crime. In no event should o u r officers in the field fix on any general terms without your approval a n d mine. Let me have your thoughts. Roosevelt [FDR] [MR. WSC, V, 55. FRUS, 194S, II, 332. R&C]

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Roosevelt responded to C—378 with obvious pleasure. T h e President did go on a fishing vacation to Lake Huron from Saturday, July 31, through August 7, returning to the capital the following day.

R-325 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 25, 1943; 1:05 A.M., July 26 For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal a n d Secret. I a m perfectly delighted. I wish m u c h that Lady W a r d e n a n d h e r d a u g h t e r a n d the Colonel could come to H y d e Park on arrival as my wife leaves on a m o n t h ' s inspection trip on the fifteenth. If they cannot come t h e n I would h o p e for a visit later in August. T h e Staffs can begin their work at A b r a h a m before the seventeenth a n d I will let you have a definite date shortly. I h o p e to go o n a short trip to fish a n d sleep next Saturday. Roosevelt [FDR] [MR*. FRUS, Conf at Wash. 6? Quebec, 1943, pp. 399-400.]

Discussion of the form and substance of any Italian surrender soon developed into a minor controversy. T h e British would have preferred to negotiate an overall surrender with the new government of Marshal Badoglio, whereas the Americans wanted to permit General Eisenhower to accept piecemeal the surrender of Italian forces in the field. Partly because of General Marshall's insistence that Eisenhower have complete freedom to exploit any surrender to the best military advantage, and partly because of fears that recognition of the Badoglio government might perpetuate a pro-British monarchy in Italy, Roosevelt and his advisers shied away from direct talks with the new Italian regime.

C-383 London [via U.S. Army] July 26, 1943, 1825 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. 1. Your 324. I send you my thoughts in the form in which I submitted t h e m to the war cabinet obtaining their full approval. 2. I d o n ' t think myself that we should be too particular in dealing with any N o n Fascist G o v e r n m e n t even if it is not all we should like. Now Mussolini is gone I would deal with any N o n Fascist Italian G o v e r n m e n t which can deliver the goods. T h e good are set out in my m e m o herewith.

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My colleagues also agreed with this. Thoughts on the fall of Mussolini by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. 1. It seems highly probable that the fall of Mussolini will involve the overthrow of the Fascist Regime and that the new government of the King and Badoglio will seek to negotiate a separate arrangement with the Allies for an armistice. Should this prove to be the case it will be necessary for us to make up our minds first of all upon what we want and secondly upon the measures and conditions required to gain it for us. 2. At this moment above all others our thoughts must be concentrated upon the supreme aim namely the destruction of Hitler Hitlerism and next Germany. Every military advantage arising out of the surrender of Italy (should that occur) must be sought for this purpose. 3. The first of these is in the Presidents words "The control of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula as well as the use of airfields of all kinds." This must include the surrender to our Garrisons of Sardinia the Dodecanese and Corfu as well as of all the naval and air bases in the Italian mainland as soon as they can be taken over. 4. Secondly and of equal importance the immediate surrender to the Allies of the Italian fleet or at least its effective demobilization and paralysis and the disarmament of the Italian air and ground forces to whatever extent we find needful and useful. The surrender of the fleet will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian Ocean against Japan and will be most agreeable to the United States. 5. Also of equal consequence the immediate withdrawal from or surrender of all Italian forces in Corsica the Riviera including Toulon and the Balkan Peninsula—to wit, in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. 6. Another objective of the highest importance about which there will be passionate feeling in this country is the immediate liberation of all British prisoners of war in Italian hands and the prevention which can in the first instance only be by the Italians of their being transported northwards to Germany. I regard it as a matter of honour and humanity to get our own flesh and blood back as soon as possible and spare them the measureless horrors of incarceration in Germany during the final stages of the war. 7. The fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly of those south of Rome will probably lead to fighting between the Germans and the Italian army and population. We should demand their surrender and that any Italian Government with whom we can reach a settlement shall do their utmost to procure this. It may be however

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that the G e r m a n divisions will cut their way northward in spite of anything that the Italian a r m e d forces are capable of doing. We should not hesitate to send troops and air support to assist the Italians in procuring the s u r r e n d e r of the Germans south of Rome. 8. W h e n we see how this process goes we can take a further view about action to be taken north of Rome. We should however try to get possession of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far n o r t h as we dare. And this is a time to dare. 9. In o u r struggle with Hitler and the German army we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will kill Germans. T h e fury of the Italian population will now be turned against the G e r m a n intruders who have as they will feel b r o u g h t these miseries u p o n Italy and then come so scantily and grudgingly to her aid. We should stimulate this process in o r d e r that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest m o m e n t a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack u p o n south and central Germany. 10. This air attack is a new advantage of the first order as it brings the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces into action from a direction which turns the entire line of air defences in the west and which furthermore exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air attack from Great Britain. It will become urgent in the highest degree to get agents, commandos and supplies by sea across the Adriatic into Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. It must be remembered that there are 15 German divisions in the Balkan Peninsula of which 10 are mobile. Nevertheless once we have control of the Italian Peninsula and of the Adriatic and the Italian armies in the Balkans withdrawn or lay down their arms it is by no means unlikely that the H u n will be forced to withdraw northwards to the line of the Save and Danube thus liberating Greece and other tortured countries. 11. We cannot yet measure the effects of Mussolini's fall and of Italian capitulation u p o n Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary. They may be profound. In connection with this situation the collapse of Italy should fix the m o m e n t for putting the strongest pressure on T u r k e y to act in accordance with the spirit of the alliance a n d in this Britain a n d the United States acting jointly or severaly should if possible be joined or at least supported by Russia. 12. T h e s u r r e n d e r of to quote T h e President "the head devil together with his partners in crime" must be considered an eminent object and one for which we should strive by all means in o u r power short of wrecking the immense prospects which have been outlined in earlier paragraphs. It may be however that these criminals will

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flee into G e r m a n y or escape into Switzerland. O n the other h a n d they may s u r r e n d e r themselves or be s u r r e n d e r e d by the Italian Government. Should they fall into o u r h a n d s we ought now to decide in consultation with the United States and after agreement with t h e m with the USSR what treatment should be meted out to them. O n e may prefer p r o m p t execution without trial except for identification purposes. O t h e r s may prefer that they be kept in confinement until the end of the war in E u r o p e and their fate decided together with that of other war criminals. Personally I am fairly indifferent on this matter provided always that no solid military advantages are sacri­ ficed for the sake of immediate vengeance. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 332-35. WSC, V, 55-58.]

On July 14, Roosevelt asked Hopkins for advice on reconciling Churchill's request for a full exchange of information about atomic-bomb research with recommendations from American officials that such secrets not be shared. Hopkins' reply was unequivocal: "I think you made a firm commitment to Churchill in regard to this when he was here and there is nothing to do but go through with it" (Hopkins to Roosevelt, July 20, 1943, H L H : Special Assistant: Α-Bomb folder). On July 20, the President instructed his subor­ dinates to "renew, in an inclusive manner, the full exchange of information with the British Government" (Roosevelt to Vannevar Bush, July 20, 1943, ibid.). T h e following message to Churchill was drafted that same day, but not sent until six days later.

R-326 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 26, 1943, 5:35 P.M. Secret Message from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. In reply to your 3 5 4 . 1 have a r r a n g e d satisfactorily for T U B E ALLOYS. Unless you have the p r o p e r person in this country now, it might be well if your t o p m a n in this enterprise comes over to get full u n d e r s t a n d i n g from o u r people. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash £sf Quebec, 1943, p. 636.]

Backed by intelligence reports of war weariness and low morale among Italian troops fighting in Sicily, General Eisenhower sought permission to exploit the situation by offering the Italians simple terms for an honorable peace. T h e Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Roosevelt agreed, but Churchill re-

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mained dubious about stating "armistice terms in an attractive, popular form to the enemy nation" (Churchill to Eisenhower, July 29, 1943, WSC, V, 60).

R-327 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 27, 1943, 12:30 P.M.

Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. The Joint United States Chiefs of Staff have approved the following statement to be made by General Eisenhower to the Italian people: "Message from Allied Headquarters to the Italian people. We commend the Italian people and the House of Savoy on ridding themselves of Mussolini, the man who involved them in war as the tool of Hitler and brought them to the verge of disaster. The greatest obstacle which divided the Italian people from the United Nations has been removed by the Italians themselves. The only remaining obstacle on the road to peace is the German aggressor who is still on Italian soil. You want peace. You can have peace immediately and peace under the honourable conditions which our governments have already offered you. We are coming to you as liberators. Your part is to cease immediately any assistance to the German military forces in your country. If you do this we will rid you of the Germans and deliver you from the horrors of war. As you have already seen in Sicily our occupation will be mild and beneficient. Your men will return to their normal life and their productive avocations and hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners now in our hands will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them. The ancient liberties and traditions of your country will be restored. Eisenhower." senhower." If the above statement meets with your approval I will instruct General Eisenhower to issue it. Roosevelt [MR]

C-384 London July 27, 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Secret. We have 74000 British prisoners in Italy and there are also about 30000 Yugoslavs and Greeks. We cannot agree to any promise to release "hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners now in our hands" unless our

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m e n a n d Allied m e n are saved from the horrors of G e r m a n captivity and restored to us. Moreover, apart from Italian prisoners taken in Tunis a n d Sicily, we have at least a q u a r t e r of a million Italians captured by Wavell two years ago a n d p a r k e d about the world. We think it is too much to offer the r e t u r n of such a large plurality of prisoners arising from earlier phases of the war, n o r d o we think it necessary. We are ready, however, to agree to all Italian prisoners taken in Tunis and taken or to be taken in Sicily being traded against the British a n d Allied prisoners mentioned above. Accordingly, we suggest that Eisenhower's message at this point should read as follows: Begins: "Your m e n will r e t u r n to their normal life and to their productive avocations and, provided all British a n d Allied prisoners now in your hands are restored safely to us and not taken away to Germany, the h u n d r e d s of thousands of Italian prisoners captured by us in Tunisia and Sicily will r e t u r n to the countless Italian homes who long for t h e m , etc" Ends. Otherwise, we cordially agree with the message and to save time, I am repeating this telegram to Eisenhower, making it clear that h e should not act till he has your okay. Since writing the above, I have received Eisenhower's N A F 302 of July 27, setting forth proposed armistice terms. This meets o u r point about prisoners a n d seems otherwise satisfactory to us. It is being immediately examined. T h e broadcast, however, which is coming out before they have asked for an armistice, should still surely be a m e n d e d as suggested above. [MR. pWSC, V, 59-60.]

King George VI had offered Churchill and Roosevelt the quarters of the British Governor General to Canada for their use during the QUADRANT Conference in Quebec. Lord Tweedsmuir had been Governor General of Canada when Roosevelt visited Quebec to give a speech—partly in French— on July 31, 1936.

R-328 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 27, 1943, 7:35 P.M Secret a n d Personal from the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person for the King. I accept with appreciation your invitation to occupy quarters jointly with o u r friend d u r i n g o u r scheduled conference. I well r e m e m b e r a

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delightful visit there with Lord Tweedsmuir, but I h o p e I will not have to make a n o t h e r speech in French. Roosevelt [FDR] [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 402.]

Roosevelt and Churchill seem not to have considered that Germany might stoutly defend its position in Italy, although American military planners had begun to weigh that possibility (Garland & Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 435).

R-329 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 28, 1943, 12:20 P.M. Personal a n d Secret for the Former Naval Person from the President. Referring to your No. 384 of July 27 I have authorized Eisenhower to make an a n n o u n c e m e n t to the Italian people incorporating therein your p a r a g r a p h in regard to the r e t u r n of Italians to their normal life, etc. I am in agreement with you that Eisenhower's N.A.F. 302 of July 27 seems satisfactory a n d will appreciate early information as to the results of your further examination of his proposed conditions for an armistice. It now appears possible that by skillful handling of the situation we may be able to get Italy out of the war without the sacrifice of large n u m b e r s of o u r soldiers a n d sailors. Roosevelt [MR]

Churchill maintained a romantic loyalty to monarchial government and intended to support the retention of the House of Savoy as rulers of Italy. Roosevelt, during his press conference ofJuly 27, had repudiated radio broadcasts by the Office of War Information which had attacked the King of Italy; the President told reporters that such statements should never have been made. Anthony was Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary. Lord Leathers and Lewis Douglas were the British and American officials in charge of coordinating Allied shipping. Averell Harriman did accompany the Prime Minister.

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C-385 London [via U.S. Army] July 28, 1943, 1220 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Colonel a n d Mrs W a r d e n with Lieut M. W a r d e n would like to spend the night of the 10th at A b r a h a m to a r r a n g e things, and could reach you evening of 12th. T h e y are all looking forward very m u c h to this. 2. A n t h o n y will fly over to join me at Abraham in time for o u r general meeting t h e r e . I am bringing Leathers who wants to contact Lew Douglas a n d also would like Averell to come too if you approve. 3. Looking forward m u c h to hearing you tonight. I was delighted at your r e b u k e to t h e foolish broadcast against the King of Italy. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, pp. 403-^.]

When Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, visited London in the summer of 1918, he spoke briefly at a dinner at Gray's Inn, one of the city's ancient and honored legal associations. Churchill, who also attended the af­ fair, made a bad impression on Roosevelt. Joseph P. Kennedy later claimed that the President complained that the Englishman "acted like a stinker, . . . lording it all over us. . . ." (Quoted in Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt, 200. See also p. 230.) A letter to Robert Sherwood from Felix Frankfurter bears out this story (Frankfurter papers, Library of Congress, Dec. 14, 1948, Box 102, folder 2112). Roosevelt apparently made no impression at all on Church­ ill, for when the President brought u p their brief meeting during the Atlantic Conference in 1941, the Prime Minister did not recall the encounter. Roo­ sevelt was obviously crestfallen, and Churchill thereafter went to great lengths to insist that he really had remembered after all, going so far as to write in his memoirs that he even called to mind Roosevelt's "magnificent presence in all his youth and strength" (WSC, I, 440). Gray's Inn had been destroyed during the German bombings of London. T h e President instructed his aide, General "Pa" Watson, to find the full name and title of its Treasurer (it was Nicholas Macaskie, K.C.) and, after a reminder from Churchill (C-412/3), sent a chatty thank-you note on August 15 (Roosevelt to Macaskie, Aug. 15, 1943, MR).

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C-386 London July 28, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal. Following for President Roosevelt from T r e a s u r e r of Gray's I n n . " T h e T r e a s u r e r a n d Masters of the Bench of Gray's Inn, including Master Winston Churchill, recall with lively pleasure your dining with them in the s u m m e r of 1918 and your speech on that occasion: and from their ruined hall send you their most respectful greetings." Signed Macaskie, T r e a s u r e r of Gray's Inn. [MR*]

Churchill and Roosevelt did not keep records of their telephone conversations, but the Germans did! German Intelligence (specifically, a section within the German Postal and Telegraph Service) intercepted and unscrambled a number of trans-Atlantic telephone calls between the two Allied leaders. Although officials working in the captured German records at the National Archives in Washington as well as historian David Kahn, who has made an extensive study of German intelligence activities, state that they have located only this one intercept, there is evidence that the Germans intercepted and deciphered at least two others and probably more. One is available only in a brief summary found in a memoir by a German intelligence officer (see. below, C—R / tel.—5, Feb. 1944), and the other was mentioned during an interview with Kurt E. Vetterlein, a German Post Office official during the war. Vetterlein claimed that, in one Roosevelt-Churchill conversation, the Germans found that the Allies planned to make an amphibious landing in central Italy (probably the Anzio attack). As a result of that intelligence, the German High Command had time to reorganize, and almost repelled the invasion (interview with Kurt E. Vetterlein by David Kahn, Sept. 1, 1967; courtesy of Dr. Kahn). T h e following partial transcript is available only from the printed source given and is printed in the original German. The editor's translation follows.

[C-RI telephone-4] July 29, 1943 U m 1.00 U h r wird ein Funkferngesprach zwischen d e m britischen Ersten Minister Churchill u n d dem Prasidenten der Vereinigten Staaten Roosevelt mitgehort, in d e m von einer Proklamation Gen. Eisenhowers u n d d e m bevorstehenden Waffenstillstand mit Italien die Rede ist.

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Churchill: "Wir wiinschen nicht, dass von uns Waffenstillstandsbedingungen vorgeschlagen werden, bevor wir nicht endgultig darum gebeten werden." —Roosevelt: "Das ist richtig." —Churchill: "Wir konnen auch ruhig 1 oder 2 Tage warten." —Roosevelt: "Das ist richtig." —Dann wird die Lage der brit. Gefangenen in ital. Hand besprochen, deren Abtransport in das "Land der Hunnen" verhindert werden solle. Churchill will deshalb eine Mitteilung an den Konig von Italien schicken. Roosevelt iibernimmt es, sich auch seinerseits an "Emmanuel" zu werden. "Ich weiss noch nicht ganz, wie ich das machen soil."— Damit ist ein einwandfreier Beweis dafur gegeben, dass bereits geheime Verhandlungen der Anglo-Amerikaner mit Italien im Gange sind (vgl. 2. 8.). At about 1 A.M., a long-distance radio-telephone call between British Prime Minister Churchill and the President of the United States, Roosevelt, was intercepted. The subject of the discussion was a proclamation by General Eisenhower and the impending armistice with Italy. Churchill: "We do not want to propose armistice conditions before we are definitely asked about them." Roosevelt: "That's right." Churchill: "We even could wait one or two days." Roosevelt: "That's right." Then they discussed the location of Italian-held British prisoners of war, whose transfer to the "Land of the Huns" should be prevented. Churchill therefore wants to send a message to the King of Italy. Roosevelt took it upon himself to approach "Emmanuel" [saying]: "I really don't know yet how to handle that." This is incontrovertible evidence that secret negotiations between the Anglo-Americans and the Italians are already in progress. [OKW, Knegstagebuch, III, 2, p. 854]

Churchill's first sentence probably refers to his telephone conversation with Roosevelt that same day, although possibly he means the "Fireside Chat" (an informal radio broadcast) of July 28, during which the President gave a lengthy and optimistic summary of the military situation. Roosevelt's commitment to contact the Pope about protecting Allied prisoners in Italy may have been made during that same telephone conversation. As usual, Churchill wanted political decisions to be made by the political leaders, not generals in the field.

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C-387 London July 29, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. I was so glad to hear your voice again and that you were in such good spirits, and also that you like our plans for QUADRANT to which we are all ardently looking forward. I have told Eisenhower that we fully agree to his releasing the proclamation with our amendment inserted about British and Allied prisoners. Discarding etiquette, I have sent a direct message to the King of Italy through Switzerland emphasizing our vehement and savage interest in this matter. I am most grateful for your promise to put the screw on through the Pope or any other convenient channel. If the King and Badoglio allow our prisoners and keymen to be carried off by the Huns without doing their utmost to stop it, by which I mean using physical force, the feeling here would be such that no negotiations with that Government would stand a chance in public opinion. Armistice terms: The War Cabinet are quite clear that we ought not to broadcast armistice terms to the enemy. It is for their responsible government to ask formally for an armistice on the basis of our principle of unconditional surrender. Then I suppose envoys would be appointed and a rendezvous fixed. Our version is already in your hands. As you will see, it follows the main lines of Eisenhower's draft, but is more precise and is cast in a form suited to discussion between plenipotentiaries rather than a popular appeal. There are great dangers in trying to dish this sort of dose up with jam for the patient. We also think that the terms should cover civil as well as military requirements, and that it would be much better for them to be settled by envoys appointed by our two governments than by the general commanding in the field. He can of course deal with any proposals coming from the troops on his immediate front for a local surrender. Finally, all our thoughts are concentrated upon the great battle about to be fought by the British 8th and United States 7th Armies against the 65,000 Germans cornered in the eastern Sicilian tip. The destruction of these rascals could not come at a better time to influence events, not only in Italy but throughout the world. It is grand to think of our soldiers advancing side by side like brothers and with good prospects of victory ahead. [MR*. WSC, V, 60-61. FRUS, 1943, II, 336-37.]

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Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to insist upon giving Ei­ senhower full freedom of action. T h e final sentence was added in Roosevelt's writing.

R-330 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 29, 1943, 12:15 P.M. Personal a n d Secret for the F o r m e r Naval Person. Replying to your N o . 387 of 29 July I am in a g r e e m e n t with the opinion of your War Cabinet that Eisenhower should not broadcast armistice terms to the enemy. I a m however convinced t h a t it is necessary in o r d e r to avoid u n n e c ­ essary a n d possibly costly military action against Italy that Eisenhower should be authorized to state conditions when a n d if the Italian Govern­ m e n t asks him for an armistice. It is therefore suggested that you agree to authorizing Eisenhower in o r d e r that he may act immediately u p o n the receipt of a request for an armistice to use the a n n o u n c e m e n t proposed by him in his N.A.F. 302 of July 27 with the elimination of the following words in his p a r a g r a p h five: " o n phase lines to be so prescribed by the Allied C I N C that the evac­ uation from all Italy will be completed within o n e m o n t h . " Eisenhower should be directed to not repeat not broadcast these terms a n d he should be directed to inform the Italian G o v e r n m e n t that details of the military a n d the civil requirements will at a later date be discussed and settled by envoys appointed by the interested parties. In any event Eisenhower should submit any change or changes in armistice terms to you a n d me. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR]

Churchill was obviously relieved and pleased that Roosevelt had fulfilled his promise to share information on atomic-bomb research.

C-388 London [via U.S. Embassy] July 29, 1943, 2217 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. Your N o . 326. I a m most grateful to you for your news. T h e Lord President of the Council, Sir J o h n Anderson, has been responsible for

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handling this matter on our account for the last 2 years. I am sending him over by air immediately. He should arrive in Washington on Monday or Tuesday. He will make contact with our technical expert, Akers, and thereafter be at your disposal to discuss with anyone you wish. He will endeavour to meet Colonel Warden at Abraham on August 10 or 11 on his way home. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 637.]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended only a few minor changes to Churchill's proposal for dealing with the expected Italian collapse, despite Roosevelt's instructions to consider the Prime Minister's failure to make any reference to self-determination. The self-determination promise in the Atlantic Charter seemed unequivocal: "They [the signatories] respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." Churchill, however, had quickly disassociated the British Empire from the declaration and continued to view the pledge as applying only to the Axis powers. In Italy, Churchill feared the role which the Italian communists might play. The Americans generally argued for a far wider application of self-determination, particularly when its implementation would open European colonies to intercourse with the United States or when it would displace a pro-British monarchy with a popularly elected government. Even though the JCS draft made no mention of the form that a government in Italy should take, Roosevelt signed off the message.

R-331 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 30, 1943, 1 2 : 1 5 P.M.

For the Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. Your message No. 383 dated 26 July 1943 expresses generally my thoughts of today on prospects and methods of handling the Italian situation with which we are now confronted. In the following draft I have suggested for consideration certain minor changes, the reasons for which if they are not obvious we can discuss at our next meeting. 1. It seems highly probable that the fall of Mussolini will involve the overthrow of the Fascist regime and that the new government of the King and Badoglio will seek to negotiate a separate arrangement with the Allies for an armistice. Should this prove to be the case it will be necessary for us to make up our minds first of all upon what we want and secondly upon the measures and conditions required to gain it for us.

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2. At this moment above all others our thoughts must be concentrated upon the supreme aim namely the destruction of Hitler and Hitlerism. Every military advantage arising out of the surrender of Italy (should that occur) must be sought for this purpose. 3. The first of these is the control of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula as well as the use of airfields of all kinds. This must include the surrender to our Garrisons of Sardinia the Dodecanese and Corfu as well as of all the naval and air bases in the Italian mainland as soon as they can be taken over. 4. Secondly and of equal importance the immediate surrender to the Allies of the Italian Fleet, or at least its effective demobilization and the disarmament of the Italian air and ground forces to whatever extent we find needful and useful. The surrender of the fleet will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian Ocean against Japan and will be most agreeable to the United States. 5. Also of equal consequence the immediate surrender or withdrawal to Italy of all Italian forces wherever they may be outside of Italy proper. 6. Another objective of the highest importance about which there will be passionate feeling in this country and Britain is the immediate liberation of all United Nations prisoners of war in Italian hands and the prevention which can in the first instance only be by the Italians of their being transported northwards to Germany. I regard it as a matter of honor and humanity to get our own flesh and blood back as soon as possible and spare them the measureless horrors of incarceration in Germany during the final stages of the war. 7. The fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly of those south of Rome will probably lead to fighting between the Germans and the Italian army and population. 8. When we see how this process goes we can take a further view about action to be taken north of Rome. We should however try to get possession at the earliest moment of a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany and of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far north as we dare. This is a time to dare. 9. In our struggle with Hitler and the German army we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will kill Germans. The fury of the Italian population may now be turned against the German intruders who have as they will feel brought these miseries upon Italy and then come so scantily and grudgingly to her aid. We should stimulate this process in order that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest moment a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany.

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10. This air attack is a new advantage of the first o r d e r as it brings the whole of t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n Air Forces into action from a direction which t u r n s the entire line of air defenses in the west a n d which f u r t h e r m o r e exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air attack from Great Britain. It will become u r g e n t in t h e highest d e g r e e to get agents c o m m a n d o s a n d supplies by sea across the Adriatic into Greece Albania a n d Yugoslavia. It must be r e m e m b e r e d that t h e r e are 15 G e r m a n divisions in t h e Balkan Peninsula of which 10 are mobile. Nevertheless once we have control of the Italian Peninsula a n d of t h e Adriatic a n d t h e Italian armies in the Balkans withdraw or lay down their a r m s it is by n o means unlikely that the H u n will be forced to withdraw n o r t h w a r d s to the line of the Savo [Sava] a n d D a n u b e thus liberating Greece a n d o t h e r t o r t u r e d countries. 11. We c a n n o t yet m e a s u r e the effects of Mussolini's fall a n d of Italian capitulation u p o n Bulgaria Roumania a n d H u n g a r y . T h e y may be pro­ found. I n connection with this situation the collapse of Italy should fix the m o m e n t for p u t t i n g the strongest pressure on T u r k e y to act in ac­ cordance with t h e spirit of the alliance a n d in this Britain a n d t h e United States should if possible be j o i n e d o r at least s u p p o r t e d by Russia. I believe that in any i m p o r t a n t negotiations affecting the Balkans the concurrence of Russia should be obtained if practicable. 12. It is my opinion that a n effort to seize the " h e a d devil" in t h e early future would prejudice o u r primary objective which is to get Italy o u t of the war. We can endeavor to secure t h e person of the " h e a d devil" a n d his assistants in d u e time, a n d t h e n to d e t e r m i n e their individual degrees of guilt for which " t h e p u n i s h m e n t should fit t h e crime." Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. &f Quebec, 1943, pp. 517-19. R&C]

Allied leaders continued to argue over the language in the terms they sent to Eisenhower to use in case of a sudden Italian surrender. T h e British suggestions frequently aimed at precision; the American proposals sought to retain the maximum possible freedom for Eisenhower.

C-389 London [via U.S. Embassy] July 30, 1943, 0140 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. Your 330. I d o not know why we should assume that any proposal for armistice will necessarily be m a d e to Eisenhower, n o n e of whose forces a r e in contact with t h e e n e m y except in Sicily a n d t h e n with G e r m a n s

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only. It would seem more likely that the Italian Government will negotiate through the Vatican, the Turks or the Swiss. You may have information which has not yet reached me. If, however, Eisenhower is suddenly approached by an envoy, I agree that he should have precise terms embodying the principle of unconditional surrender which he could immediately use as the basis for granting an armistice. We have examined the form proposed by him for this purpose in N. A.F. 302 and propose that it should be accepted subject to the following amendments in addition to that proposed by you in his paragraph 5. (1) Omit all reference in the articles as drafted to German Forces and add one general paragraph providing that Italians will use their best endeavours to deny to the Germans facilities which might be used against us. This is necessary because of the practical impossibility of enforcing precise guarantees on this matter now embodied in the articles. (2) Substitute for paragraph 7 the following "The Commander in Chief reserves himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces or for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require. And in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the Military interests of the Allied Nations." This is intended to establish authority of Commander in Chief over existing Italian agencies apart from the establishment of Military Government. (3) Provision should be added for (A) Our full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilisation and demilitarisation (B) The handing over of war criminals (C) The disposal of Italian merchant shipping. These are of sufficient importance to be specifically mentioned. In the event, however, of the negotiations taking the other course suggested in paragraph 1 or if there is time as seems probable we should be grateful if you would consider our most carefully drafted terms of surrender which we sent a fortnight ago and let us know what you think of them and what amendments you desire. I am so glad you agree that the terms in either version should not be broadcast before an armistice has been requested or even immediately afterwards. They would certainly shock the Italian people and would give the Germans full information on which to act. To save time I am repeating this telegram to General Eisenhower minus paragraphs 5 and 6. [MR]

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R-332 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 30, 1943, 5:35 P.M.

From the President to the Former Naval Person Secret and Personal. Referring to your No. 389 of July 30 I am in agreement that it is more likely Italy will negotiate for peace through neutral diplomatic channels but believe it necessary for Eisenhower to have precise terms of an armistice agreement which he may use in the event of his being suddenly approached by the Italian Government with a proposal to cease hostilities between the Italian forces and the United Nations forces. I am agreeable to your proposed amendments to N.A.F. 302, and suggest that Eisenhower be authorized to make the following conditions in case the Italian Government asks him for an armistice, these conditions not repeat not to be made public: 1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian Armed Forces. 2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny to the Germans facilities that might be used against the United Nations. 3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander in Chief, and none of these may from the beginning of these negotiations be evacuated to Germany. 4. Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him. 5. Agreement that Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the needs of his military-naval program. 6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory both islands and mainland to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit. 7. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German Forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian Armed Forces until this function is taken o^er by the Allies. 8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged. 9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice. 10. The Commander in Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for

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the protection of the interests of the Allied forces or for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require, and in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations. 11. The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization. It is my opinion that the question of war criminals should not be brought up by General Eisenhower in a statement of his terms for an armistice. The war criminal problem can be taken up later, and I believe that all demands by the Allied Nations that are not essential at the present time should be postponed with the purpose of getting Italy out of the war at the earliest possible date. If the armistice terms proposed in this message are acceptable to you I will, immediately upon the receipt of your approval, send them to Eisenhower to be used when and if he receives from the Italian Government a request for a general armistice. I am sending a copy of this message to Eisenhower for his information. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6f Quebec, 1943, pp. 519-20.]

H.P. was Hyde Park, where Churchill was scheduled to visit before the Quebec Conference.

R-333 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 30, 1943,5:15 P.M. For the Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Secret. Your Number 385. I have wired Harriman to come if possible. Lew Douglas will be with us. Delighted Leathers is coming. We will be waiting for you and personal staff at H.P. Roosevelt [FDR] [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. (S Quebec, 1943, pp. 405-6.]

Winning the war almost always came first for Roosevelt, and he was willing to work with any Italian government which could best assist that cause. Unlike Churchill, however, the President did not want to recognize the monarchy

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without an election. Ironically, this reversed their positions taken at the time of the "Darlan deal" regarding North Africa.

R-334 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 30, 1943, 5:55 P.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person Secret and Personal. T h e r e are some contentious people h e r e who are getting ready to make a row if we seem to recognize the House of Savoy or Badoglio. T h e y are the same element which m a d e such a fuss over North Africa. I told the press today that we have to treat with any person or persons in Italy who can best give us first disarmament and second assurance against chaos, and I think also that you and I after an armistice comes could say something about self determination in Italy at the p r o p e r time. Roosevelt [FDR] [MR*. FRUS, Conf at Wash. IS Quebec, 1943, p. 521. WSC, V, 64. R(SC]

Equipped with better anti-aircraft guns, German U-boats were ordered to cross the Bay of Biscay on the surface, using their guns effectively to fight off Allied aircraft. The Allied Coastal Command (which covered the west coast of Europe), working with the advantages of the highly effective tencentimeter radar, ULTRA intercepts, and new codes which frustrated German cryptographers, used a coordinated method of air and sea attack to sink twenty-eight U-boats and damage twenty-two others between May and the end of J u n e 1943. T h e sinkings included two U-tankers ("milch-cows"), and forced the Germans to resume the slower undersea transit of the Bay of Biscay as they headed for their submarine pens on the west coast of occupied France.

C-390 London July 30, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. A n o t h e r remarkable day with the U-boats. Following report just received from Admiralty. Begin. " T h e result of the attack on U-boats in the Bay of Biscay is now known. A signal has been received from the g r o u p of ships making the attack to say that three U-boats have been sunk. O n e was sunk by aircraft a n d the survivors are on board H M S Woodpecker. A n o t h e r

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was d a m a g e d by aircraft a n d finally sunk by a ship a n d the survivors are o n b o a r d H M S Kite. And the third U-boat was sunk by a ship with n o survivors but a lot of wreckage and h u m a n remains. It is believed that two of these U-boats were supply U-boats." [MR*]

Roosevelt scrawled a quick answer across the bottom of his copy of C—390. LIFEBELT, the acquisition of bases in the Azores, would provide valuable suport for anti-submarine warfare.

R-335 Washington [via U.S. Navy] July 30, 1943, 7:30 P.M. For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal a n d Secret. Your n u m b e r 390. G r a n d h u n t i n g in the Bay of Biscay. We got one too off Recife, Brazil. We still n e e d L I F E B E L T nevertheless. Roosevelt [FDR] [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. £i Quebec, 1943, p. 609.]

Both the terms to be used by Eisenhower in the event of an immediate Italian surrender and the broad outlines of Anglo-American policy in Italy occupied Churchill's attention, though most of the changes he suggested were minor.

C-391 London [via U.S. Army] July 31, 1943, 0835 Ζ Prime Minister to President Personal a n d Secret. Your 3 3 1 . I have not h a d time to consult my colleagues but I have n o d o u b t whatever that o u r j o i n t draft as a m e n d e d expresses in perfect h a r m o n y the m i n d s of o u r 2 g o v e r n m e n t s o n t h e b r o a d policy to be p u r s u e d . It seems to be a case of " T w o hearts that beat as o n e . " I suggest if you agree that in P a r a g r a p h 6 last sentence "We" should be substituted for " I " a n d that the d o c u m e n t becomes a j o i n t directive conveying t h e instructions of o u r 2 governments to all authorities charged with their execution. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. £i Quebec, 1943, p. 521.]

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Canaries were U-boats; cats referred to the press.

C-392 London July 31, 1943, 0820 Ζ Former Naval Person to President. The July canaries to date number 35 making a total of 85 in the 91 days since May 1. Good hunting. Instead of making any announcement as agreed on August 10 let us settle together on the 12th what food our cats are to have. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. £i Quebec, 1943, p. 406.]

Churchill referred to a lengthy and comprehensive set of surrender terms for Italy which had been circulated to the Americans in mid-June. State and War Department officials opposed any terms which recognized the Italian monarchy, however, preferring to establish an Allied occupation government and to leave political questions until after the war.

C-393 London [via U.S. Army] July 31, 1943, 1729 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Your number 332. We agree that Eisenhower be authorized to prescribe the conditions contained in your Paragraphs 1 to 11 inclusive in case the Italian gov­ ernment ask him for an armistice. These conditions should not be made public without the prior approval of our two governments. 2. We suggest, if there is time as there probably will be, he should add in Paragraph 4, after the words "The Italian fleet" the words "And Italian aircraft". 3. We also agree that the war criminal problem can be taken up later. 4. So much for the immediate emergency. We hope however that you will also urgently have our instrument of surrender examined, so that we reach full agreement on it. There are several points in this not dealt with in the emergency terms, and it is couched in a precise, formal and legal vein, on which much thought has been bestowed here. We are rather puzzled to know why you never refer to this document, as it seems to us

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to be in fact only a more careful and comprehensive version of the emer­ gency armistice terms. We should be very grateful if you would let us know how you feel about it. We ought certainly to have it, or something like it, ready as soon as possible. 5. To save time, I am repeating this present message to Eisenhower, who will thus be fully empowered to act should a sudden emergency occur. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash, (j Quebec, 1943, p. 552. pWSC, V, 63.]

Roosevelt's mention of self-determination had raised Churchill's hackles, for it seemed to place postwar matters ahead of immediate military requirements. Underlying the Prime Minister's reply was the British belief that the Medi­ terranean was properly their concern.

C-394 London [via U.S. Army] July 31, 1943, 1739 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Your 334. My position is that once Mussolini and the Fascists are gone, I will deal with any Italian authority which can deliver the goods. I am not in the least afraid for this purpose of seeming to recognize the House of Savoy or Badoglio, provided they are the ones who can make the Italians do what we need for our war purposes. Those purposes would certainly be hindered by chaos, bolshevisation or civil war. We have no right to lay undue burdens on our troops. It may well be that after the armistice terms have been accepted, both the King and Badoglio will sink under the odium of surrender and that the Crown Prince and a new Prime Minister may be chosen. I should deprecate any pronouncement about self determination at the present time, beyond what is implicit in the Atlantic charter. I agree with you that we must be very careful not to throw everything into the melting pot. [MR*. FRUS, conf. at Wash,fcfQuebec, 1943, p. 523. WSC, V, 64.]

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As much as Churchill despised Nazism, he viewed the war as a struggle against German military power, not just Hitler. T h e overthrow of the Nazi regime would not change his insistence upon unconditional surrender.

C-395 London July 31, 1943 F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your n u m b e r 3 3 1 . It occurs to m e on reflection that your proposed omission of "Nazi Germany" might be misunderstood. It might mean that if the Germans did what t h e Italians have d o n e we should have n o further quarrel with them. I, therefore, suggest that Paragraph 2 should read "namely, the destruction of Hitler a n d the total defeat of Germany." [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. Si Quebec, 1943, p. 523.]

Roosevelt agreed to delay the monthly press release on anti-submarine warfare until the two leaders met at Quebec. (On the evening ofJuly 30, Roosevelt left Washington for a fishing trip at Birch Island near Little Current, a small town on the north side of Manitoulin Island, Canada, at the mouth of Georgian Bay in Lake Huron. He reported that the fishing was good. Roosevelt left the island on August 8, arriving in Washington on Monday the ninth.)

R-336 Little Current, Can. [via U.S. Navy] Aug. 1, 1943, 10:55 A.M. F r o m President for F o r m e r Naval Person Personal a n d Secret. Your 392. I agree. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Corf, at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 407.]

Ambassador Winant had reported that British Foreign Secretary Eden had suggested that the Americans and British should, in some way, bring the Soviets into the discussions about the Italian settlement, lest they take offense. Winant noted that Eden suggested this not as a practical matter but one which the Russians were sensitive about. As Winant noted in closing, "When the tide turns and the Russian armies are able to advance we might well want to influence their terms of capitulation and occupancy in Allied and enemy territory" (Winant to Roosevelt and Hull, July 26, 1943, FRUS, 1943, II, 335).

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Hull immediately instructed Winant to propose a joint communication to the Soviet government which offered only the vaguest summary of Anglo-Amer­ ican political decisions about Italy (Hull to Winant, August 1, 1943, ibid., p. 340).

R-337 Little Current, Can. [via U.S. Navy] Aug. 1, 1943, 1 0 : 3 5 A.M.

Former Naval Person from the President Personal and Most Secret. Before departing please see Eden in regard to a message from Secretary of State to Winant regarding Russian interest in our prospective attitude toward Italy. Roosevelt [MR*]

R-338 Little Current, Can. [via U.S. Navy] Aug. 1, 1943, 2:05 P.M.

President to Former Naval Person. Personal and Secret. Referring to your 393 of 31 July, I have authorized Eisenhower to prescribe the conditions of armistice exactly as stated by you in 393 and in the event of a request from the Italian Government. Referring to your proposed "Instrument of Surrender" which is now being studied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State in Washington, I am in general agreement therewith but must have further advice from the above mentioned agencies of this Government before acting thereon. I am directing the Joint Staff and the State De­ partment to report to me on this document at the earliest possible date. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash,fcfQuebec, 1943, p. 525.]

C-396 London [via U.S. Army] Aug. 1, 1943, 1730 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. I have been considering the terms of the communique which I suggest should be issued immediately upon the arrival of the QUADRANT party in Canada, and I should be glad to have your comments on the following text. I am also consulting Mackenzie King. There are two points I should

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mention in connection with it: (A) O n security g r o u n d s I have purposely not m e n t i o n e d that o u r j o i n t conference will be at A b r a h a m [Quebec City], so as to avoid indicating your future movements. (B) Anthony [Eden] is coming over later by air, a n d his presence will be a n n o u n c e d o n his arrival. 2. T e x t of draft c o m m u n i q u e . Begins: T h e Prime Minister of Great Britain has arrived in Canada accom­ panied by Lord Leathers the Minister of War T r a n s p o r t of the United Kingdom a n d t h e British Chiefs of Staff. Mr Churchill was received o n arrival by M r Mackenzie King a n d d u r i n g his stay in C a n a d a will be the guest of the Canadian Govern­ ment. M r Churchill will have discussions with M r Mackenzie King a n d thereafter will attend a conference with President Roosevelt a n d the C o m b i n e d Chiefs of Staff of the United States and United King­ dom. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash & Quebec, 1943, pp. 406-7.]

C-397 London [via U.S. Army] Aug. 2, 1943, 0833 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. Your n u m b e r 338. Many thanks. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p . 526.]

Once again General Marshall insisted that Eisenhower have complete freedom of action, and Roosevelt supported that position.

R-339 Little Current, Can. [via U.S. Navy] Aug. 2, 1943, 5:35 P.M. President to F o r m e r Naval Person. Personal a n d Secret. I have r e a d i n s t r u m e n t of s u r r e n d e r , a n d while the language seems o n the whole good, I seriously d o u b t advisability of using it at all. After all, the terms of s u r r e n d e r already a p p r o v e d a n d sent to Eisenhower o u g h t to b e all that is necessary. Why tie his h a n d s by a n i n s t r u m e n t that may be oversufficient o r insufficient? Why not let him act to meet situations as they arise? You a n d I can discuss this matter at Q U A D R A N T . Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash, fcf Quebec, 1943, p . 527. pWSC, V, 65.]

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R-340 Little Current, Can. [via U.S. Navy] Aug. 2, 1943, 6:30 P.M.

F r o m the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person. Personal a n d Secret. I fully approve of the text of your proposed a n n o u n c e m e n t u p o n arrival of Q U A D R A N T party as given in your 396. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 407.]

Working through the Vatican, the Italian government had asked for the Allies to specify the terms necessary for Rome to be declared an open city. Roosevelt, personally inclined to worry about damage to historical treasures and religious property, and ever conscious of the Roman Catholic vote in the United States, was sympathetic to the proposal. Churchill, aware that the British public would have little patience with such notions after the bombing of London, argued vehemently against the idea. Eventually, the Americans informed the Vatican that there was nothing to prevent the Italian government from unilaterally declaring Rome an open city, which was done on August 14. T h e American Joint Chiefs of Staff had argued that Churchill's military arguments had some validity and they recommended simply ignoring the Italian requests.

C-398 London Aug. 3, 1943

F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. War Cabinet think that the time for negotiating about Rome being an o p e n city has passed. Surely there would be the utmost d a n g e r that any such bargain would encourage the Italians to make a try on for a neutralization of Italy itself. Anyhow, that is the way it would be viewed here. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash,fifQuebec, 1943, p. 551.]

R-341 [Birch Is., Can.] Aug. 3, 1943, 9:35 A.M. F o r m e r Naval Person from the President, Secret a n d Personal. Receipt is acknowledged of your message 398. I consider it unwise in the time available to interfere with the military plans of General Eisenhower to attack with bombs today the Marshalling Yards a n d airfields in Rome.

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However, I believe further raids should not continue pending outcome of Vatican efforts. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. fcf Quebec, 1943, p. 551.]

During the brief dispute over whether or not to declare Rome an open city, Roosevelt was on his fishing trip in Canada. He was consulted via intermediaries by telephone, but apparently did not draft or even see the drafts of messages sent to Churchill about the problem.

R-342 [Birch Is., Can.] Aug. 3, 1943, 2:45 P.M. Secret a n d Personal from the President to the Former Naval Person. I think we would be in a difficult position if we were to t u r n down the plea to make Rome an o p e n city. I have just received from Washington the proposed conditions ? n d given my approval in principle b u t I think we must be very sure of the inspection if the terms are accepted by Italy. Roosevelt [MR* FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6? Quebec, 1943, p. 552.]

The British Foreign Office, particularly Eden, considered Roosevelt's response to British proposals to recognize the French Committee "petty and deplorable." But Churchill, ever cautious about Anglo-American relations, rejected their recommendation that Britain unilaterally recognize the French National Committee as the government of all liberated French territory. Churchill believed that de Gaulle, who had been constantly attacking American policy, had to learn a lesson and that a delay in recognition might be the best way to teach him. T h e message Churchill finally agreed to send Roosevelt was couched in conciliatory tones.

C-399 London Aug. 3, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. I am sorry not to have answered your n u m b e r 321 in reply to my 373. I thought first that your proposed formula was rather chilling a n d would not e n d the agitation t h e r e is for recognition in both o u r countries. Meanwhile, events have moved in o u r favour. T h e Committee have felt acutely

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being ignored while the whole Italian problem is open. De Gaulle, I feel, has climbed down a good deal and is now more enclosed in the general body of the Committee. The arrangements for command also seem more satisfactory to us than the previous deadlock. I have, therefore, asked the Foreign Office to suggest a certain modification in your formula designed to bring our two views into harmony. Please note especially the sentence "The Committee will, of course, afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war." This gives us complete power to override or break with them in the event of bad faith or misconduct. Revised formula follows in my next. Please let me know what you think of it or how it could be improved. If we cannot agree we will talk it over at QUADRANT. [MR*. pWSC, V, 182. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6f Quebec, 1943, pp. 661-62.]

C-400 London Aug. 3, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. Following is revised draft formula "Recognition" of the French Committee of National Liberation referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. "The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy. "The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of the collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely. "On this understanding the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom wish to make the following statement:

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" 'The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority and as having assumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. The two Governments also recognize the Committee as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war, within the framework of inter-Allied cooperation. They take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be recognized as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this request in respect of the different categories of such interests must, however, be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises. " 'The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's determination to continue the common struggle, in close cooperation with all the Allies, until French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. The Committee will, of course, afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war. " 'In respect of certain of these territories, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the United States or United Kingdom authorities. The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements: and the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom assume that, pending their revision, all such agreements concluded since June 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation will remain in force as between the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation.' " [FRUS, Ccmf. at Wash, fef Quebec, 1943, pp. 662-63. MR*.]

Roosevelt placed great faith in his ability to persuade others in face-to-face talks. With the British moving toward recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation, it seemed easiest to wait until the Quebec Conference before discussing the matter further. Besides, he was fishing.

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R-343 [Birch Is., Can.] Aug. 3, 1943, 2:20

A.M.

To the Former Naval Person from the President, Secret and Personal. Referring to your numbers 399 and 400,1 earnestly hope that nothing will be done in the matter of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation until we have an opportunity to talk it over together. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash, ϋ Quebec, 1943, pp. 663-64.]'

Believing British public opinion demanded revenge for the bombing of Lon­ don, Churchill continued to oppose declaring Rome an open city.

C-401 London Aug. 3, 1943 Prime Minister to President. Personal and Most Secret. Your number 342. We have not yet received the proposed conditions and we ask that, as you assure us, we may be allowed to see them before decision is taken. As at present informed we doubt the wisdom of declaring Rome an open city in the prevailing circumstance. We think piecemeal neutrali­ zation may be very dangerous at this juncture. We think it unwise to make things easier for the Italians before they have taken any decision to yield. Nor do we know, for instance, whether declaring Rome an open city now would preclude our using the communications through Rome, should it later fall into our possession, and thus destroy prospects of the campaign. I must expect a serious reaction in British public opinion, and until we have seen the conditions, I beg that we may not be committed finally. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. £# Quebec, 1943, p. 552.]

C-402 London Aug. 4, 1943, 0825 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Reference my 401. I find we had already received the proposed terms but by an oversight they were not placed before me at the time of my telegraphing to you.

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They and the question of declaring Rome an Open City will be imme­ diately considered by the Cabinet and I hope to send you a reply today. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 553.]

Ironically, Churchill used one of Roosevelt's favorite justifications—what would the Soviets think?—to explain British opposition to declaring Rome an open city. (The proposed conditions are in FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, pp. 530-31.)

C-403 London Aug. 4, 1943, 1217 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. 1. Your number 342. War Cabinet have now given most careful con­ sideration to proposals to make Rome an open city on the conditions specified. We are sure that the effect on public opinion here would be most unfortunate. What will the Russians say? It would be taken as a proof that we were going to make a patched-up peace with the King and Badoglio and had abandoned the principle of unconditional surrender. It would be taken all over the world and throughout Italy as a success for the new Italian Government who would have rescued Rome from all further danger. No doubt their greatest hope is to have Italy recognized as a neutral area, and Rome would seem to be a first instalment. Consid­ ering that Badoglio, according to all our information and especially the most secret [ULTRA and/or MAGIC], is giving repeated assurances to Germany and Japan that they mean to carry on the war and be faithful to their engagements, and that they are even repeating this kind of state­ ment on the radio, we do not think they should be given the slightest encouragement. Although in the interval it would be convenient to secure the conditions proposed for Rome, this advantage in our opinion is far outweighed by the political misunderstanding which would arise among our own people and the stimulus given to a hostile Italian Government. 2. We hope that in a few months Rome will be in our hands, and we shall need to use its facilities for the northward advance. If Rome has been declared an open city by us, it will be practically impossible for us to take away its status when we want to use it and its communications and airfields. The British Chiefs of Staff say these "open city" conditions, applied to us, would paralyze the whole further campaign: and certainly the Germans would threaten Rome with bombardment if they were al­ tered or broken. We think this a great danger.

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3. In these circumstances would it not be better for us to talk the matter over when we meet? In the interest of putting the maximum political and military pressure on the Italian people and Government as well as for strictly military reasons we are most reluctant to interrupt such bombing of the marshalling yards, etc, as Eisenhower evidently thought desirable: but if you so desire it must be postponed until you and I have met. 4. Your number 343. On this ground also I am so glad that we are going to meet. Pressure is growing from all quarters in this country, from the Dominions, particularly from Canada, and from several of the United Nations Governments with which we are in touch to "recognize" the French National Committee. Macmillan reports that he and Murphy are agreed in favouring this and that extreme bitterness and resentment will be caused among all classes of Frenchmen by continued refusal. In accordance with your wishes however we shall take no step pending our meeting to which I am keenly looking forward for reasons far removed from all this tiresome business. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 939-40. fi6fC]

C-404 London Aug. 4, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. Reference your telegram nr. 340. On suggestion of Mr. Mackenzie King words "later on" will be substituted for "thereafter" in last sentence of proposed announcement and latter will not be issued until after arrival at Abraham. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6f Quebec, 1943, p. 408.]

King Victor Emmanuel and the Badoglio government constantly argued that they were the only political alternative to a communist take-over in Italy. Churchill, eager to preserve the monarchy, accepted that reasoning but the Americans, although equally opposed to a communist-led government, sought and found other solutions. Raffaele Guariglia had replaced Count Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo as Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Dayeta is an Anglicized version of the family name of Marchese Blasco Lanza d'Ajeta. Joachim Ribbentrop was the Nazi Minister for Foreign Affairs. (The corrupt passage in par. 3 was apparently received that way from Lisbon since that annotation also appears in the PREM 3 copy. The missing passage must deal with the

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Germans, since that is obviously the antecedent of the pronoun "they" which begins the next sentence.)

C-405 London [via U.S. Army] Aug. 4, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. The following story has been told to British Ambassador Campbell at Lisbon by newly arrived Italian Counsellor, Marquis Dayeta who had been sent to get into touch with him by the Badoglio Government with the knowledge of the King and the General Staff. I send it to you for what it is worth which is substantial. Ambassador Campbell was instructed to make no comment. It certainly seems to give inside information. Though I am starting now [for Quebec] Anthony will be here and you can communicate both with him and me. The King and the Army leaders have been preparing coup d'etat but this was precipitated (probably by a few days only) by the action of the Grand Fascist Council. Fascism in Italy is extinct. Every vestige has been swept away. Italy turned Red overnight. In Turin and Milan there were Communist demonstrations which had to be put down by armed force. 20 years of Fascism has obliterated the middle class. There is nothing between the King and the patriots who have rallied round him and rampant Bolshevism (corrupt passage). They [the Germans] are in complete control. They have an armoured division just outside Rome and will march in if there is any sign of Italians weakening. There are 10,000 scattered about inside Rome, mostly with machine guns. If we bomb Rome again there will be a popular uprising and the Germans will then march in and slaughter everybody. They have actually threatened use of gas. As many Italian troops as possible have been concentrated round Rome but they have no stomach for fighting. They have practically no weapons and are no match for even 1 well equipped German division. In these circumstances, the King and Badoglio whose first thought was to make peace have no alternative but to put up a show of going on with the fight. Guariglia is to meet Ribbentrop (perhaps tomorrow) as a result of which there will be a communique stating in plainer terms than hitherto, that Italy is still the active ally of Germany. But this will be only pretence. The whole country is longing for peace and above all to be rid of the Germans who are universally execrated. If we cannot attack Germany immediately through the Balkans thus causing German withdrawal from Italy the sooner we land in Italy the better. The Germans, however, are resolved to defend it line by line.

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When we land in Italy we shall find little opposition and perhaps even active cooperation on the part of the Italians. He never from start to finish made any mention of peace terms and his whole story as you will have observed was no more than a plea that we should save Italy from the Germans as well as from herself and do it as quickly as possible. He expressed the hope that we should not heap abuse on the King and Badoglio (which would precipitate the blood bath) although a little of this would help them to keep up the pretence vis a vis the Germans. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, pp. 554-55. pWSC, V, 99-100.]

Keeping the Russians informed about Italy without actually giving them a role in shaping policy remained a problem.

C-406 London Aug. 5, 1943, 1507 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Your number 331 and my numbers 391 and 395. I have now consulted my colleagues who entirely agree with your sug­ gested amendments on the paper which I called "The Fall of Mussolini," subject to the 2 following points: (A) We feel that paragraph 11 as now drafted might seem to imply that we had not kept in touch with the Russian Government on our policy in regard to Italy. The Foreign Secretary has however informed the Russian Government of our general intentions in regard to the draft armistice terms and they expressed themselves as satisfied. To cover this point we suggest the omission of the words "affecting the Balkans" in our para­ graph 11 which have a narrowing effect. (B) The point about paragraph 2 which I put to you in my number 395, suggesting "namely the destruction of Hitler and the total defeat of Germany." If you will let me know that you agree to these 2 further amendments, let us regard the document as amended as constituting a joint directive to the United Kingdom and United States Governments on the broad policy to be pursued. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6? Quebec, 1943, pp. 556-57.]

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Churchill left England on Aug. 5 aboard the Queen Mary, arriving at Halifax, Nova Scotia, on the ninth. The following message was sent after Churchill had arrived at the Citadel in Quebec.

C-407 Quebec City, Can. Aug. 11, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Most Secret and Personal. I have just arrived after a most swift and agreeable j o u r n e y on which it has been possible to work continuously. T h e W a r d e n Family are looking forward keenly to their visit to Hyde Park where we propose to arrive the afternoon of the 12th. Are we right in thinking we should all bring o u r thinnest clothes? I send you herewith (see my next telegram) the draft of the monthly a n n o u n c e m e n t about U-boats which I have p r e p a r e d in concert with the Admiralty. Let us discuss it when we meet and a day or two's delay beyond the 10th in its release is not important. Warmest greetings to all. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash £i Quebec, 1943, pp. 410-11. pWSC, V, 81.]

Roosevelt's suggestion to bring thin clothes hit the mark. As Churchill later wrote in his memoirs, "It was indeed so hot that I got up one night because I was unable to sleep and hardly able to breathe . . ." (WSC, V, 82).

R-344 Washington [via British Joint Staff Mission] Aug. 11, 1943, 5 : 2 0 P.M. From the President to the Prime Minister. Your n u m b e r 407. Regret delay in replying. Suggest thin clothes but be p r e p a r e d for a variety of weather. Delighted to see you in any costume. Roosevelt [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 411.]

Because he understood that Roosevelt wanted to avoid complacency in the United States, Churchill's proposed monthly anti-submarine warfare statement combined boasts with a warning about enemy reserves.

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C-408 Quebec City, Can. Aug. 11, 1943, 0759 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Following is draft referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins: During July the U-boats have obtained very poor results for their widespread effort against Allied shipping. The steady flow of trans­ atlantic supplies on the greatest scale has continued unmolested, and such sinkings as have taken place in distant areas have had but an insignificant effect on the conduct of the war by the Allies. In fact, July is probably our most successful month because the imports have been high, shipping losses moderate and U-boat sinkings heavy. Before the descent upon Sicily an armada of warships, troop trans­ ports, supply ships and landing craft proceeded through Atlantic and Mediterranean waters with scarcely any interference from U-boats. Large reinforcements have also been landed in that island. Over 2,500 vessels were involved in these operations and the losses are only about 80,000 tons. On the other hand, the U-boats which at­ tempted to interfere with these operations suffered severe losses. Our offensive operations against Axis submarines continue to progress most favourably in all areas. And during May, June and July we have sunk at sea a total of over 90 U-boats, which represents an average loss of nearly 1 U-boat a day over the period. The decline in the effectiveness of the U-boats is illustrated by the following figures. In the first 6 months of 1943 the number of ships sunk per U-boat operating was only half that in the last 6 months of 1942 and only a quarter that in the first half of 1942. The tonnage of shipping in the service of the United Nations continues to show a considerable net increase. During 1943 new ships completed by the Allies exceed all sinkings from all causes upwards of 3,000,000 tons. In spite of this very favourable progress in the battle against the U-boats, it must be remembered that the enemy still has large Uboat reserves, completed and under construction. It is necessary therefore to prepare for intensification of the battle both at sea and in the shipyards and to use our shipping with utmost economy to strengthen and speed the general offensive of the United Nations. Continued success can only be expected if there is no relaxation of effort. [MR.

R(iC]

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The Italian mission sent to Lisbon, Portugal, to plea for action to rid Italy of the Germans was seconded by another mission to Tangier, Morocco, by Alberto Berio, a Counselor of Embassy attached to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The British representative in Tangier was Arnold E. Watkinson. Roosevelt cabled his full approval of the reply directly to Eden (FRUS, Conf. at Wash,fcfQuebec, 1943, pp. 566-67, 579).

C-409 Quebec City, Can. Aug. 11, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. Eden suggests that our Tangier representative replies to Badoglio's Emissary Berio as follows. Begins: "Badoglio must understand that we cannot negotiate but require unconditional surrender which means that the Italian Government should place themselves in hands of Allied Governments who will then state their terms. These will provide for an honourable capitulation." The instructions would continue: begins: "Badoglio's Emissary should be reminded at the same time that Prime Minister and President have already stated that we desire that in due course Italy should occupy a respected place in New Europe when peace has been reestablished and that General Eisenhower has announced that Italian prisoners taken in Tunisia and Sicily will be released providing all British and Allied prisoners now in Italian hands are released." This is simply made up of our existing declarations. If you approve it in principle, please cable at once direct Eden at Foreign Office as I shall be on the move. If text does not meet your view, we can discuss it on arrival. I think Italians ought to have an answer as soon as possible. It will, at any rate, make it easier for them to decide who to double cross. I have also received what follows in my next from U. J. You will see I am restored, if not to favour, at any rate to the court. I have sent reply which also follows. It is quite cool here and very pleasant and everything is ready for you in Citadel which is admirably suited to our needs. It was indeed a happy inspiration which led you to suggest this particular rendezvous at this particular moment in Canadian politics. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash, fcf Quebec, 1943, pp. 411, 578-79.]

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On August 7 the British government had informed the Soviet government of the forthcoming Anglo-American discussions and formally invited Stalin to participate in a tripartite meeting as soon as possible. Churchill had suggested Scapa Flow as the best location, but expressed willingness to go anywhere (StalinlWSC, pp. 387-88, n. 35).

C-410 Quebec City, Can. [via London] Aug. 11, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. Message from Stalin delivered by Soviet Charge d'Affaires for transmission to Prime Minister 10 August. Following is text referred to in Para 3 of my number 409. Begins: "I have just returned from the front and already had time to become familiar with the message of the British Government dated 7 August. "I agree that a meeting of the Heads of three Governments is absolutely desirable. Such a meeting must be realized at the first opportunity having arranged with the President the place and time of this meeting. "At the same time, I ought to say that in the existing situation on the Soviet German Front, I, to my regret, have no opportunity to absent myself and to leave the front even for one week. Although recently we have had several successes on the front, and extreme strain on the strength and exceptional watchfulness are required in regard to the new possible actions of the enemy from the Soviet Troops and from the Soviet Command just now. In connection with this, I have to visit the troops on that or other parts of our front more often than usual. In the circumstances, at the present time I am not able to visit Scapa Flow or any other distant point for a meeting with you and the President. "Nevertheless, in order not to postpone an examination of the questions which interest our countries, it would be expedient to organize a meeting of the responsible representatives of our States and we might come to an understanding in the nearest future concerning the place and date of such a meeting. "Moreover, it is necessary beforehand to agree on the scope of the questions to be discussed and the drafts of the proposals which have to be accepted. The meetings will hardly give any tangible result without that. "Taking this opportunity I congratulate the British Government

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and the Anglo-American troops on the occasion of their most successful operations in Sicily which have already caused the downfall of Mussolini and the break up of his gang." For reply see my immediately following telegram. [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 19. R&C. StahnlWSC, doc. 170.]

The battles on the Russian front to which Churchill referred in his reply to Stalin took place when the Germans, on July 5, launched an attack on the Russian salient around Kursk. Not only did the Russians fight off the assault, but German armored losses proved so heavy that the Russians were able to conduct a major offensive themselves. By December 1943, Soviet armies would push the Germans back to a line east of the Dnieper River. Churchill assured Stalin that OVERLORD, the cross-channel invasion, would not be delayed by further actions in Italy.

C-411 Quebec City, Can. [via London] Aug. 12, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. Following is reply being sent to message in my number 410 referred to in Para 3 of my number 409. Begins: "Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Most secret and personal. "Your telegram of August 9 gives me the opportunity to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on the recent most important victories gained by the Russian Armies at Orel and Byelgorod opening the way to your further advances towards Bryansk and Kharkov. The defeats of the German Army on this front are milestones to our final victory. "I have arrived at the Citadel, Quebec, and start this afternoon to meet the President at his private home. Meanwhile, the Staffs will be in conference here and the President and I will join them at the end of the week. I will show the President your telegram about meeting of our responsible representatives in the near future which certainly seems to be most desirable. I quite understand you cannot leave the front at this critical period when you are actually directing the victorious movement of your Armies. "Thank you for your congratulations on our Sicilian success, which we shall endeavour to exploit to the full without prejudice to OVERLORD. Certainly our affairs are much better in every quarter than when we met at Moscow exactly a year ago.

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"I am sending you a small stereoscopic machine with a large n u m ber of p h o t o g r a p h slides of the damage d o n e by o u r bombing to G e r m a n cities. T h e y give one a much m o r e vivid impression than any thing that can be gained from photographs. I h o p e you will find half an h o u r in which to look at them. This we know for certain, eighty percent of the houses in H a m b u r g are down. It is only now a question of a short time before the nights lengthen a n d even greater destruction will be laid u p o n Berlin. This subject only to weather. This will be continued for several nights and days a n d will be the heaviest ever known. "Finally in the U-boat war we have in the months of May, J u n e , and July destroyed U-boats at the rate almost of one a day, while o u r losses have been far less than we planned for. O u r net gain in new tonnage is very great. All this will facilitate the establishment of the large scale Anglo-American fronts against the Germans which I agree with you are indispensable to the shortening of the war." [MR. pFRUS, Teheran Conf, p. 20. R&C]

Clementine Churchill's weariness appears the result of seasickness while aboard the Queen Mary, but the record, including the diary of Lord Moran, Churchill's personal physician, adds no detail.

C-412 Quebec City, Can. [via London] Aug. 12, 1943 F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. I am most sorry to say that Clemmie is so exhausted by the j o u r n e y a n d sleeplessness that M o r a n feels she ought to rest h e r e for the next few days. This is a great disappointment both to h e r and me, as I had so much wanted h e r to see you a n d Mrs. Roosevelt in your beautiful h o m e a n d she wanted so much to come. I'm sure, however, that she must regather h e r strength. Mary a n d I a n d the others will arrive as planned. [MR]

Churchill and his daughter, Mary, arrived at Hyde Park on August 12 after a brief stop at Niagara Falls. There are no records of what Roosevelt and Churchill discussed during their stay at Hyde Park, although the next three documents indicate that serious subjects did come up. Roosevelt's "business

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in Washington" is not explained. He left Hyde Park on August 15, arriving in Washington on the morning of the sixteenth. The Usher's Diary (FDRL) for August 16, 1943, lists appointments with James Byrnes (Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization and a close adviser to the President), the Postmaster General (Frank C. Walker), the Secretary of the Navy (Frank Knox), and a luncheon meeting with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Churchill left Hyde Park for Quebec City on August 14. Blenheim Day, which Churchill noted on this letter, referred to the anniversary of the Battle of Blenheim (August 13, 1704), where Anglo-Austrian armies led by Churchill's ancestor, Lord Marlborough, defeated the combined French and Bavarian forces. This was a turning point in the War of the Spanish Succession, and a grateful British Parliament built and presented to Lord Marlborough the Blenheim Palace located a few miles north of Oxford, England. Fittingly, the Quebec Conference of 1943 signaled a similar change in the Second World War as Anglo-American planners now concentrated an offense instead of defense. Churchill had written a well-received biography of Lord Marlborough, and had been born in the palace. When Churchill died on January 25, 1965, he was buried in the Bladon Churchyard, close to the Blenheim Palace.

C-412/1, letter Hyde Park, N.Y. August 13, 1943 (Blenheim Day)!

My d e a r Franklin, T h i n k i n g things over w'd it not be better to go straight from h e r e to the Citadel & let us (Clemmie and I) come back h e r e and to the White House after the Conference? T h e eyes of the world are on the Conference & I doubt if m u c h progress will be m a d e till we are on the spot—wh[ich] I think shd be by Sunday or Monday [August 15/16]. I do not know of course how important or u r g e n t is yr business in Washington, but I am quite sure that the sooner we are u p N o r t h the better. Will you think this over. Yours always, [initialed] W. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6? Quebec, 1943, p. 412.]

T h e subject of the first paper Churchill gave to Roosevelt, the Katyn Forest massacre, is explained in the headnote to C-284. BONIFACE, given by Churchill as the source of the information about conditions in Yugoslavia, was another name for ULTRA material. (See the headnote to C-103x.) Early in the war various codenames were used for that sensitive intelligence, and the label BONIFACE so tickled Churchill's fancy that he continued to use it, often to the bewilderment of contemporaries, even after ULTRA had become standard.

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The attachments provide an unsettling glimpse of the national and ethnic rivalries that had plagued the Balkans for so long.

C-412/2, memo Hyde Park, N.Y. Aug. 13, 1943 Mr. President. The first of these two papers is a grim, well-written story, but perhaps a little too well-written. Nevertheless if you have time to read it, it would repay the trouble. I should like to have it back when you have finished with it as we are not circulating it officially in any way. The second, about Yugoslavia, I had prepared for the discussions at Abraham. I am not sure that your people have quite realized all that is going on in the Balkans and the hopes and horrors centred there. You might find it convenient to keep it by you. Much of it is taken from the BONIFACE sources, and it certainly makes one's blood boil. I must add that I am not in any way making a case for the employment of an Allied Army in the Balkans but only for aiding them with supplies, agents and Commandos. Once the Adriatic is open we should be able to get into close contact with these people and give them aid sufficient to make it worth their while to follow our guidance. [PSF:GB:WSC]

FIRST ATTACHMENT TO C-412/2

[C 6160/258/55] Mr. O'Malley to Mr. Eden.—(Received 31st May.) British Embassy to Poland, 45, Lowndes Square, S.W. 1. 24th May, 1943.

,XT C1 , J (No. 51.) Sir, My despatch No. 43 of the 30th April dwelt on the probability that no confederation in Eastern Europe could play an effective part in European politics unless it were affiliated to the Soviet Government, and suggested that so long as the policy of this Government was as enigmatic as it now is it would be inconsistent with British interests that Russia should enjoy a sphere of influence extending from Danzig to the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. The suppression of the Comintern on the 20th May may be considered to have brought to an end what was in the past the most objectionable phase of Soviet foreign policy and to entitle the Soviet Govern-

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ment to be regarded less distrustfully than formerly. It is not, then, without hesitation that I address this further despatch to you, which also gives grounds for misgivings about the character and policy of the present rulers in Russia. 2. We do not know for certain who murdered a lot of Polish officers in the forest of Katyn in April and May 1940, but this at least is already clear, that it was the scene of terrible events which will live long in the memory of the Polish nation. Accordingly, I shall try to describe how this affair looks to my Polish friends and acquaintances, of whom many had brothers and sons and lovers among those known to have been taken off just three years ago from the prison camps at Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov to an uncertain destination: how it looks, for instance, to General Sikorski, who there lost Captain Fuhrman, his former A.D.C. and close personal friend; to M. Morawski, who lost a brother-in-law called Zoltowski and a nephew; or to M. Zaleski, who lost a brother and two cousins. 3. The number of Polish prisoners taken by the Russian armies when they invaded Poland, in September 1939, was about 180,000, including police and gendarmerie and a certain number of civilian officials. The total number of army officers was round about 15,000. At the beginning of 1940 there were in the three camps named above round about 9,000 or 10,000 officers and 6,000 other ranks, policemen and civil officials. Less public reference has been made to these 6,000 than to the 10,000 officers, not because the Polish Government are less indignant about the disappearance of other ranks than about the disappearance of officers, or were less insistent in enquiries for them, but because the need of officers to command the Polish troops recruited in Russia was more urgent than the need to increase the total ration strength of the Polish army. There is no reason to suppose that these 6,000 other ranks and the police and the civilians were treated by the Soviet Government differently to the officers, and mystery covers the fate of all. For the sake of simplicity, however, I shall write in this despatch only of the missing officers, without specific reference to other ranks, to police prisoners or to civilians. Of the 10,000 officers, only some 3,000 or 4,000 were regular officers. The remainder were reserve officers who in peace time earned their living, many with distinction, in the professions, in business and so on. 4. In March of 1940 word went round the camps at Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov that, under orders from Moscow, the prisoners were to be moved to camps where conditions would be more agreeable, and that they might look forward to eventual release. All were cheered by the prospect of a change from the rigours which prisoners must endure to the hazards and vicissitudes of relative freedom in Soviet or German territory. Even their captors seemed to wish the prisoners well, who were

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now daily entrained in parties of 50 to 350 for the place at which, so they hoped, the formalities of their discharge would be completed. As each prisoner was listed for transfer, all the usual particulars about him were rechecked and reregistered. Fresh finger-prints were taken. The prisoners were inoculated afresh and certificates of inoculation furnished to them. Sometimes the prisoners' Polish documents were taken away, but in many such cases these were returned before departure. All were furnished with rations for the journey, and, as a mark of special regard, the sandwiches furnished to senior officers were wrapped in clean white paper—a commodity seldom seen anywhere in Russia. Anticipations of a better future were clouded only by the fact that 400 or 500 Poles had been listed for further detention, first at Pavlishchev Bor and eventually Griazovetz. These were, as it turned out later, to be the only known survivors of the lost legion, and some of them are in England now; but at the time, although no principle could be discovered on which they had been selected, they supposed that they had been condemned to a further period of captivity; and some even feared that they had been chosen out for execution. 5. Our information about these events is derived for the most part from those routed to Griazovetz, all of whom were released in 1941, and some of whom—notably M. Komarnicki, the Polish Minister for Justice—are now in England. 6. Entrainment of the 10,000 officers from the three camps went on all through April and the first half of May, and the lorries, lined with cheerful faces, which took them from camp to station, were, in fact, the last that was ever seen of them alive by any witness to whom we have access. Until the revelations made by the German broadcast of the 12th April, 1943, and apart from a few words let drop at the time by the prison guards, only the testimony of scribblings on the railway wagons in which they were transported affords any indication of their destination. The same wagons seem to have done a shuttle service between Kozielsk and the detraining station; and on these some of the first parties to be transported had scratched the words: "Don't believe that we are going home," and the news that their destination had turned out to be a small station near Smolensk. These messages were noticed when the vans returned to Smolensk station, and have been reported to us by prisoners at Kozielsk, who were later sent to Griazovetz. 7. But though of positive indications as to what subsequently happened to the 10,000 officers there was none until the grave at Katyn was opened, there is now available a good deal of negative evidence, the cumulative effect of which is to throw serious doubt on Russian disclaimers of responsibility for the massacre. 8. In the first place there is the evidence to be derived from the pris-

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oners' correspondence, in respect to which information has been furnished by officers' families in Poland, by officers now with the Polish army in the Middle East, and by the Polish Red Cross Society. Up till the end of March 1940 large numbers of letters had been despatched, which were later received by their relatives, from the officers confined at Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov; whereas no letters from any of them (excepting from the 400 moved to Griazovtez) have been received by anybody which had been despatched subsequent to that date. The Germans overran Smolensk in July 1941, and there is no easy answer to the question why, if any of the 10,000 had been alive between the end of May 1940 and July 1941, none of them ever succeeded in getting any word through to their families. 9. In the second place there is the evidence of the correspondence between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government. The first request for information about the 10,000 was made by M. Kot of M.Wyshinsky on the 6th October, 1941. On the 3rd December of, 1941, General Sikorski backed up his enquiry with a list of 3,845 names of officers included among them. General Anders furnished the Soviet Government with a further list of 800 names on the 18th March, 1942. Enquiries about the fate of the 10,000 were made again and again to the Russian Government verbally and in writing by General Sikorski, M. Kot, M. Romer, Count Raczynski and General Anders between October 1941 and April 1943. The Polish Red Cross between August and October 1940 sent no less than 500 questionnaires about individual officers to the Russian Government. To none of all these enquiries extending over a period of two and a half years was a single positive answer of any kind ever returned. The enquirers were told either that the officers had been released, or that "perhaps they are already in Germany," or that "no information" of their whereabouts was available, or (M. Molotov to M. Kot, October 1941) that complete lists of the prisoners were available and that they would all be delivered to the Polish authorities "dead or alive." But it is incredible that if any of the 10,000 were released, not one of them has ever appeared again anywhere, and it is almost equally incredible, if they were not released, that not one of them should have escaped subsequent to May 1940 and reported himself to the Polish authorities in Russia or Persia. That the Russian authorities should have said of any Polish officer in Soviet jurisdiction that they had "no information" also provokes incredulity; for it is notorious that the N.K.V.D. collect and record the movements of individuals with the most meticulous care. 10. In the third place there is the evidence of those who have visited the grave: first, a Polish commission including, among others, doctors, journalists and members of the Polish Assistance Committee, a former president of the Polish Academy of Literature and a representative of

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the Mayor of Warsaw; secondly, another Polish commission which included priests, doctors and representatives of the Polish Red Cross Society; thirdly, an international commission of criminologists and pathologists, of which the personnel is given in Annex I. The report of this commission forms Annex II to this despatch, and the reports of the two Polish commissions add little to it. It is deposed by all that several hundred identifications have been established. All this evidence would normally be highly suspect since the inspections took place under German auspices and the results reached us through German broadcasts. There are fair grounds for presuming that the German broadcasts accurately represented the findings of the commissions, that the commissions' findings were at any rate in some respects well founded, and that the grounds were sound on which at any rate some of the identifications were made. 11. In the fourth place there is the fact that a mass execution of officer prisoners would be inconsistent with what we know of the German army. The German army has committed innumerable brutalities, but the murder by them of prisoners of war, even of Poles, is rare. Had the German authorities ever had these 10,000 Polish officers in their hands we can be sure that they would have placed some or all of them in the camps in Germany already allotted to Polish prisoners, while the 6,000 other ranks, policemen and civil officials would have been put to forced labour. In such case the Polish authorities would in the course of two years certainly have got into touch with some of the prisoners; but, in fact, none of them from Kozielsk, Starobielsk or Ostashkov have ever been heard of from Germany. 12. Finally there is the evidence to be derived from the confusion which characterises explanations elicited from or volunteered by the Soviet Government. Between August 1941 and the 12th Ap il, 1943, when the Germans announced the discovery of the grave at Katyn, the Russian Government had, among other excuses, maintained that all Polish officers taken prisoner in 1939 had been released. On the other hand, in conversation with the Polish Ambassador, a Russian official who had drunk more than was good for him, once referred to the disposal of these officers as "a tragic error." On the 16th April, immediately after the German announcement, the Soviet Information Bureau in Moscow suggested that the Germans were misrepresenting as victims of Russian barbarity skeletons dug up by archaeologists at Gniezdowo, which lies next door to Katyn. On the 26th April M. Molotov, in a note to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, said that the bodies at Katyn were those of Poles who had at one time been prisoners of the Russians but had subsequently been captured by the Germans in their advance at Smolensk in July 1941 and had been murdered then by them. On a later occasion, and when the German broadcasts gave reason to think that some bodies were sufficiently well

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preserved to be identifiable, the Russian Government put forward a statement that the Polish officers had been captured by the Germans in July 1941, had been employed upon construction work, and had only been murdered shortly before the German "discovery" was announced. This confusion cannot easily be understood except on the assumption that the Russian Government had something to hide. 13. The cumulative effect of this evidence is, as I said earlier, to throw serious doubt on Russian disclaimers of responsibility for a massacre. Such doubts are not diminished by rumours which have been current during the last two and a half years that some of the inmates of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov had been transported towards Kolyma, Franz Joseph Land or Novaya Zemlya, some or all of these being killed en route. It may be that this was so, and it may be that some less number than ten thousand odd were destroyed and buried at Katyn; but whether the massacre occurred (if it did occur) in one place or two places or three places naturally makes no difference to Polish sentiments. These will accordingly be described without reference to the uncertainty which exists as to the exact number of victims buried near Smolensk. 14. With all that precedes in mind it is comprehensible that the relatives and fellow-officers of the men who disappeared should have concluded that these had in fact been murdered by their Russian captors and should picture their last hours—somewhat as follows—with bitter distress. The picture is a composite one to which knowledge of the district, the German broadcasts, experience of Russian methods and the reports of visitors to the grave have all contributed, but it is not so much an evidentially established description of events as a reconstruction in the light of the evidence—sometimes partial and obviously defective—of what may have happened. But it—or something like it—is what most Poles believe to have happened, and what I myself, in the light of all the evidence, such as it is, incline to think happened. Many months or years may elapse before the truth is known, but because in the meantime curiosity is unsatisfied and judgment in suspense, we cannot, even if we would—and much less can Poles—make our thoughts and feelings unresponsive to the dreadful probabilities of the case. 15. Smolensk lies some 20 kilom. from the spot where the common graves were discovered. It has two stations and in or near the town the main lines from Moscow to Warsaw and from Riga to Orel cross and recross each other. Some 15 kilom. to the west of Smolensk stands the unimportant station of Gniezdowo, and it is but a short mile from Gniezdowo to a place known locally as Kozlinaya Gora or "The Hill of Goats." The district of Katyn, in which this little hill stands, is covered with primeval forest which has been allowed to go to rack and ruin. The forest is mostly coniferous, but the pine trees are interspersed here and there

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with hardwoods and scrub. The month of April normally brings spring to this part of the country, and by early May the trees are green; but the winter of 1939-40 had been the hardest on record, and when the first parties from Kozielsk arrived on the 8th April there would still have been occasional patches of snow in deep shade and, of course, much mud on the rough road from the station to the Hill of Goats. At Gniezdowo the prison vans from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov discharged their passengers into a barbed-wire cage surrounded by a strong force of Russian soldiers, and the preparations made here for their reception must have filled most of the Polish officers with disquiet, and some indeed with dismay who remembered that the forest of Katyn had been used by the Bolsheviks in 1919 as a convenient place for the killing of many Czarist officers. For such was the case, and a Pole now in London, Janusz Laskowski, tells me that when he was eleven years old he had to listen every evening to an account of his day's work from one of the executioners, Afanaziev, who was billeted in his mother's house. From the cage the prisoners were taken in lorries along the country road to the Hill of Goats, and it must have been when they were unloaded from the lorries that their hands were bound and that dismay gave way to despair. If a man struggled, it seems that the executioner threw his coat over his head, tying it round his neck and leading him hooded to the pit's edge, for in many cases a body was found to be thus hooded and the coat to have been pierced by a bullet where it covered the base of the skull. But those who went quietly to their death must have seen a monstrous sight. In the broad deep pit their comrades lay, packed closely round the edge, head to feet, like sardines in a tin, but in the middle of the grave disposed less orderly. Up and down on the bodies the executioners tramped, hauling the dead bodies about and treading in the blood like butchers in a stockyard. When it was all over and the last shot had been fired and the last Polish head been punctured, the butchers—perhaps trained in youth to husbandry— seem to have turned their hands to one of the most innocent of occupations: smoothing the clods and planting little conifers all over what had been a shambles. It was, of course, rather late in the year for transplanting young trees, but not too late; for the sap was beginning to run in the young Scots pines when, three years later, the Polish representatives visited the site. 16. The climate and the conifers are not without significance. The climate of Smolensk accounts for the fact that, though the Germans first got wind of the existence of the mass graves in the autumn of 1942, it was only in April of 1943 that they published to the world an account of what had been unearthed. The explanation is surely this: not that the German propagandists had chosen a politically opportune moment for their revelations, but that during the winter the ground at Smolensk is

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frozen so hard that it would have been impossible to uncover corpses without dynamite or such other violent means as would have destroyed the possibility of identifying dead bodies. The winter of 1942^13 was exceptionally mild and the German authorities probably got to work as soon as the soil was sufficiently soft. The little conifers also deserve more attention than they have received. In the first place they are presumptive evidence of Russian guilt; for, considering the conditions under which the German army advanced through Smolensk in July 1941 in full expectation of early and complete victory, it is most unlikely, if the Polish officers had been murdered by Germans and not Russians, that the Germans would have bothered to cover up their victims' graves with young trees. In the second place, one of these young trees under examination by a competent botanist would reveal beyond any possibility of doubt whether it had last been transplanted in May 1940 or some time subsequent to July 1941. Perhaps this test of Russian veracity will presently be made. 17. The political background against which the events described in paragraph 15 are viewed by Poles is by contrast a matter of undisputed history, including as it does all the long story of partitions, rebellions and repressions, the Russo-Polish war of 1919-20, the mutual suspicions which this left behind it, the unannounced invasion of Poland by Russia in September 1939, the subsequent occupation of half Poland by Russia and the carrying into captivity of some million and a half of its inhabitants. More recently comes the virtual annexation of the occupied eastern parts of Poland, the refusal of the Russian Government to recognise as Polish citizens the inhabitants of the occupied districts, the suppression of relief organisations for Poles in Russia and the persecution of Poles refusing to change their own for Russian nationality. When Poles learned that, in addition to all these misfortunes, round about 10,000 men of the best breeding stock in Poland had (according to Russian accounts) been either dispersed and "lost" somewhere in the Soviet Union or else abandoned to the advancing German armies, or had (according to German accounts) been found to have been murdered by the Russians, many of them naturally concluded (though I do not here give it as my own conclusion) that the Soviet Government's intention had been to destroy the very foundations upon which their own Poland could be rebuilt. This sinister political intention imputed by Poles to Russia poisoned the wound and enhanced the sufferings of a nation already outraged and dismayed by the conduct of the Soviet Government. Some Poles, remembering Lenin's attitude to the holocausts of 1917 and subsequent years, and probing the dark recesses of Stalin's mind when he took (if take he did) the dreadful decision, compare disciple with master. Lenin would have broken apart the heads often thousand Polish officers with the insouciance of a monkey

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cracking walnuts. Did corpses pitching into a common grave with the precision of machines coming off a production-belt similarly satisfy a nature habituated to manipulate blood and lives with uncompassionate detachment? Some at any rate so interpret Stalin's mind. "These men are no use to us," they imagine him as saying; "in fact they are a nuisance and a danger. Here is an elite of talent, here is valour and a hostile purpose. These stallions must not live to sire a whole herd of hostile Christian thoroughbreds. Many of the brood-mares have already been sold to Siberian peasants and the camel-pullers of Kazakstan. Their foals and yearlings can be broken to Communist harness. Rid me of this stud farm altogether and send all this turbulent bloodstock to the knackers." 18. The men who were taken to Katyn are dead, and their death is a very serious loss to Poland. Nevertheless, unless the Russians are cleared of the presumption of guilt, the moral repercussions in Poland, in the other occupied countries and in England of the massacre of Polish officers may well have more enduring results than the massacre itself; and this aspect of things, therefore, deserves attention. As I have as yet seen no reliable reports on public feeling in Poland and German-occupied Europe, my comments will relate only to our own reaction to the uncovering of the graves. 19. This despatch is not primarily concerned with the reaction of the British public, press or Parliament, who are not in such a good position as His Majesty's Government to form an opinion as to what actually happened. We ourselves, on the other hand, who have access to all the available information, though we can draw no final conclusions on vital matters of fact, have a considerable body of circumstantial evidence at our disposal, and I think most of us are more than half convinced that a large number of Polish officers were indeed murdered by the Russian authorities, and that it is indeed their bodies (as well, maybe, as other bodies) which have now been unearthed. This being so, I am impelled to examine the effect on myself of the facts and allegations, and to adjust my mind to the shocking probabilities of the case. Since the Polish Government is in London and since the affair has been handled directly by yourself and the Prime Minister with General Sikorski and Count Raczynski, it may seem redundant for me to comment on it, as I should naturally do were the Polish Government and I both abroad; but, though all important conversations have been between Ministers and the leaders of the Polish Government, my contacts have doubtless been more numerous than yours during the last few weeks with Poles of all kinds, and they have possibly spoken to me with less reserve than to yourself. I hope therefore I may, without impertinence, submit to you the reflections which follow. 20. In handling the publicity side of the Katyn affair we have been

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constrained by the urgent need for cordial relations with the Soviet Government to appear to appraise the evidence with more hesitation and lenience than we should do in forming a common-sense judgment on events occurring in normal times or in the ordinary course of our private lives; we have been obliged to appear to distort the normal and healthy operation of our intellectual and moral judgments; we have been obliged to give undue prominence to the tactlessness or impulsiveness of Poles, to restrain the Poles from putting their case clearly before the public, to discourage any attempt by the public and the press to probe the ugly story to the bottom. In general we have been obliged to deflect attention from possibilities which in the ordinary affairs of life would cry to high heaven for elucidation, and to withhold the full measure of solicitude which, in other circumstances, would be shown to acquaintances situated as a large number of Poles now are. We have in fact perforce used the good name of England like the murderers used the little conifers to cover up a massacre; and, in view of the immense importance of an appearance of Allied unity and of the heroic resistance of Russia to Germany, few will think that any other course would have been wise or right. 21. This dislocation between our public attitude and our private feelings we may know to be deliberate and inevitable; but at the same time we may perhaps wonder whether, by representing to others something less than the whole truth so far as we know it, and something less than the probabilities so far as they seem to us probable, we are not incurring a risk of what—not to put a fine point on it—might darken our vision and take the edge off our moral sensibility. If so, how is this risk to be avoided? 22. At first sight it seems that nothing less appropriate to a political despatch than a discourse upon morals can be imagined; but yet, as we look at the changing nature of the international world of to-day, it seems that morals and international politics are becoming more and more closely involved with each other. This proposition has important consequences; but since it is not universally accepted I hope the following remarks in support of it are not out of place. 23. Nobody doubts that morals now enter into the domestic politics of the United Kingdom, but it was not always so. There was a time when the acts of the Government in London were less often the fruit of consultation and compromise in the general interests of all than of the ascendancy of one class or group of citizens who had been temporarily successful in the domestic arena. It was realisation of the interdependence of all classes and groups of the population of England, Scotland and Wales which discouraged the play of intestine power-politics and set the welfare of all above the advantage of the strong. Similar causes are producing similar results in the relations of States to each other. "During the last four centuries of our modern era," writes Professor Pollard, "the last word in political organisation has been the nation; but now that the world

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is being unified by science and culture" the conception of the nation state as the largest group in which human beings are organically associated with each other is being superseded by the conception of a larger, it may be of a European, or indeed of a world-wide unity; and "the nation is taking its place as the bridge, the half-way house, between the individual and the human family." Europe, and indeed the world, are in process of integrating themselves, and "the men and women of Britain," as you said at Maryland, "are alive to the fact that they live in one world with their neighbours." This being so, it would be strange if the same movement towards the coalescence of smaller into larger groups which brought about the infiltration of morals into domestic politics were not also now bringing about the infiltration of morals into international politics. This, in fact, it seems to many of us is exactly what is happening, and is why, as the late Mr. Headlam Morley said, "what in the international sphere is morally indefensible generally turns out in the long run to have been politically inept." It is surely the case that many of the political troubles of neighbouring countries and some of our own have in the past arisen because they and we were incapable of seeing this or unwilling to admit it. 24. If, then, morals have become involved with international politics, if it be the case that a monstrous crime has been committed by a foreign Government—albeit a friendly one—and that we, for however valid reasons, have been obliged to behave as if the deed was not theirs, may it not be that we now stand in danger of bemusing not only others but ourselves: of falling, as Mr. Winant said recently at Birmingham, under St. Paul's curse on those who can see cruelty "and burn not"? If so, and since no remedy can be found in an early alteration of our public attitude towards the Katyn affair, we ought, maybe, to ask ourselves how, consistently with the necessities of our relations with the Soviet Government, the voice of our political conscience is to be kept up to concert pitch. It may be that the answer lies, for the moment, only in something to be done inside our own hearts and minds where we are masters. Here at any rate we can make a compensatory contribution—a reaffirmation of our allegiance to truth and justice and compassion. If we do this we shall at least be predisposing ourselves to the exercise of a right judgment on all those half political, half moral, questions (such as the fate of Polish deportees now in Russia) which will confront us both elsewhere and more particularly in respect to Polish-Russian relations as the war pursues its course and draws to its end; and so, if the facts about the Katyn massacre turn out to be as most of us incline to think, shall we vindicate the spirit of these brave unlucky men and justify the living to the dead. I have, &x. Owen O'Malley.

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Annex 1. List of Personnel composing the Commission of Criminologists and Pathologists. Dr. Spoleers, Professor of Ophthalmology at the University of Ghent. Dr. Markow, Instructor in Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Sofia. Dr. Tramsen, Assistant Professor of Anatomy at the Institute for Forensic Medicine in Copenhagen. Dr. Saxen, Professor of Pathological Anatomy at the University in Copenhagen. Dr. Palmieri, Professor of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Naples. Dr. Miloslawich, Professor of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Agram. Dr. de Burlet, Professor of Anatomy at the University of Troningen. Dr. Hajek, Professor of Forensic Medicine and Criminology in Prague. Dr. Birkle, Coroner of the Roumanian Ministry of Justice and First Assistant at the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Criminology in Bucharest. Dr. Naville, Professor of Forensic Medicine at the University of Geneva. Dr. Subik, Professor of Pathological Anatomy at the University of Bratislava and head of the Public Health Service of Slovakia. Dr. Orsos, Professor of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Budapest. Dr. Buhtz, Professor of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Breslau. Dr. Costedoat, Medical Inspector. Annex 2. Katyn Wood: Text of Protocol, Berlin. The report of the international commission of scientists on the examination of the mass graves at Katyn Wood in the main section reads as follows: From the 28th April to the 30th April, 1943, a commission composed of leading representatives of forensic medicine at European Universities and other prominent University professors of medicine have conducted a thorough scientific examination of the mass graves of Polish officers in Katyn Wood. The discovery of those mass graves, which was recently brought to the attention of the German authorities, prompted Reich's Chief Health Officer, Dr. Conti, to invite experts from various European countries to inspect the Katyn site in order thus to contribute to the clarification of this unique case. Members of the commission personally heard the testimonies of several Russian native witnesses who, among others, confirmed that during the months of March and April,

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1940, almost daily big railway transports with Polish officers arrived at the station of Gniesdovo, near Katyn, where the Polish officers alighted and were then transported in a prisoners' motor van to Katyn Wood and were not seen again; the commission further took cognisance of the discoveries and facts thus far established and inspected objects of circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, up to the 30th April, 1943, 982 bodies were exhumed, of which approximately 70 per cent, have been identified, while papers found on others must first be subjected to careful preliminary treatment before they can be used for identification. Bodies exhumed prior to the commission's arrival were all inspected, and a considerable number of bodies were dissected by Professor Buhty and his assistants. Up to to-day seven mass graves have been opened, the biggest of which is estimated to contain the bodies of 2,000 Polish officers. Members of the commission personally dissected nine corpses and submitted numerous specially selected cases to post-mortem. It was confirmed that all those so far exhumed died from bullets to their heads. In all cases, bullets entered the nape. In the majority of cases only one bullet was fired. Two bullets were fired only rarely and only one case was found where three bullets had been fired into the nape. All the bullets were fired from pistols of less than eight mm. calibre. The spot where the bullets penetrated leads to the assumption that the shot was fired with the muzzle pressed against the nape or from the closest range. The surprising regularity of the wounds . . . permits the assumption that the shots were fired by experienced hands. Numerous bodies revealed a similar method of tying the hands, and in some cases stabs from four-edged bayonets were found on bodies and clothes. The method of tying is similar to that found on the bodies of Russian civilians that were earlier exhumed in Katyn Forest. The assumption is justified that a ricochetted bullet first killed one officer, then went into the body of one already dead in the pit—the shootings apparently being made in ditches to avoid having the bodies transported to graves. The mass graves are situated in clearings in the forest, the ground being completely levelled off and planted with young pines. The mass graves were dug in undulating terrain which consists of pure sand in terraces, the lowest going down as far as the ground water. Bodies lay, practically without exception, face down, closely side by side and in layers one above the other, clearly ledged methodically at the sides of pits and more irregularly in the centre. The uniforms of the exhumed bodies, according to the unanimous opinion of the commission, were, especially with regard to buttons, rank insignia, decorations, form of boots, etc., undoubtedly Polish. They had winter wear. Frequently furs, leather coats, knitted vests and typical Polish officers' caps have been found. Only a few bodies were those of other ranks. One body was that of a priest. The measurements of the clothes correspond

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with the measurements of the wearer. No watches or rings were found on the bodies, although from the exact date and time found in entries in several diaries, the owners must have had these objects up to their last days, even hours. Comments found on bodies—diaries, correspondence, newspapers—are from the period of the autumn of 1939 to March and April 1940. The latest hitherto established date is that of a Russian newspaper of the 22nd April, 1940. There were varying degrees of decomposition of the bodies, differing according to the position of the bodies within the grave and their juxtaposition to each other. A large number of skulls were examined for changes which, according to the experiences of Professor Orsoa, are of great importance for the determination of the time of death. These changes consist of various layers of calcareous tuftlike incrustation on the surface of the already loamy brain matter. Such changes are not to be observed on bodies that have been interred for less than three years. But this change was observed to a marked degree on the skull of the body No. 526, which was found with a surface layer in one big mass grave. [MR]

SECOND ATTACHMENT TO C-412/2

July 1943 War Cabinet Recent Activities and Present Strengths (July 1943) of Opposing Forces in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. REPORT BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE, 14TH JULY,

1943.

I.—Yugoslavia. (See Sketch Map A.) [Not printed.] 1. In order to make the present situation intelligible it is necessary to retrace the course of operations in the last half-year. The final months of 1942 saw a considerable extension of guerilla activity in Yugoslavia over anything that had taken place previously in that year, more especially on the part of the "Partisans" in Bosnia; and 1943 opened with an extensive operation against them by the Axis forces. This operation began towards the end of January. Initially four German divisions, three Italian divisions and two Croat mountain brigades were employed; and subsequently one further German and four additional Italian divisions were involved. We know that some of these formations suffered considerable losses, and in the case of the Italians, divisions had to withdraw for periods of many weeks to build up again. The strain on the Italians was at one

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time so great that they refused to respond to strong German demands for an additional division; and their refusal resulted in the postponement for several weeks of another operation to take place in Montenegro. This further operation was eventually staged, and elements of five German and three Italian and one Bulgarian divisions took part. 2. The operation which began towards the end of January was designed as a converging attack on the Partisans' headquarters in the Grimec Planina, the mountains between the upper Sava River and the Dalmatian coast. The three Italian divisions advanced towards the Sava from the coastal fringe, with the object of driving the outlying Partisans into the hills, where a net in the form of four German divisions was prepared for them. Of these, only three were heavily engaged; the fourth was to guard against a Partisan break-through to the North-East between the Vrbas and Una Rivers. It was apparently hoped to encircle and annihilate the Partisans by mid-February. The German forces moving down from the North at first made rapid progress, but despite the obvious superiority of the Axis in all the heavy weapons of war and despite their complete control of the air it is quite clear that the guerrillas maintained a formidable resistance and probably caused as many casualties as they received. An even more stalwart defence was made against a subsequent drive directed northwards by German and Croat troops, which with difficulty advanced 10 miles in as many days. 3. The Partisan resistance was, in fact, so strong that a gap was left between the prongs of the intended German pincers, through which the Partisans began to withdraw in mid-February. Moving southwards they captured first Glamoc and Livno and then several other considerable towns. Italian communications between Mostar and Sarajevo were cut, and, worse still, from the Axis point of view, the valuable bauxite mines South and West of Mostar were imperilled. A second Axis operation was therefore designed in order to save Mostar and complete the destruction of the Partisans. Four fresh Italian divisions were employed and a German batde group was drawn from a division in Serbia. The general aim of the operation seems to have been to surround and destroy the Partisans in the area around Livno between these fresh forces and the three original German divisions which were attempting to press South. Again the Germans met with preliminary success and Livno was recaptured on the 3rd March. Confused fighting then developed in the Neretva valley, which progressed not unfavourably for the Partisans. 4. A new element was, however, now introduced into the situation. The Italians had announced their intention of bringing up Cetniks from Montenegro to check the southerly movement of the Partisans. The Germans, who deplored Italian relations with the Montenegrin Cetniks and who still regarded the whole Mihailovic movement as a grave menace to their

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security, protested in vain against this decision. One reason for their dislike of this step was that they contemplated an operation against Mihailovic when once the Partisans had been destroyed. Mihailovic himself expected this and was anxious to drive the remnants of the Partisans back to the North in order that they might continue to give the Axis trouble in Bosnia. By the middle of March some 13,000 Cetniks, supplied with Italian arms and ammunition, had arrived from Montenegro in the battle areas, and the main body were brought into line on the upper Neretva with the duty of preventing a Partisan break-through to the South-East. It is interesting to note that the Germans insisted that the Cetniks should be employed in areas where they could not encounter German troops since the Cetniks were everywhere determined to fight them. The Germans were also fearful lest local conflicts should take place between Germans and the Italians who were backing the Cetniks. 5. By the middle of March the operation against the Partisans was, from a German point of view, over. One of the German divisions, despite Italian indignation, was in Mostar and the bauxite mines were again operating in safety. Another had moved East of Sarajevo, while the remaining two were patrolling and mopping up in what had been the battle area. Communications were restored between Sarajevo and Mostar. The battle had now moved into Hercegovina and had taken the form of a conflict between Cetniks and Partisans, though Italian troops were also involved. Despite Cetnik claims it is clear that the battle at first went against them and the first assault of the Partisans carried them across the Neretva, and in spite of the arrival of Cetnik reinforcements, the Partisans continued to gain ground. The internecine conflict was obviously to German taste and once they had seen the Partisans cross the Neretva into an area in the Italian sphere of influence they ceased their pursuit. Their forces, helped only inadequately by those of their two satellites, the Italians and the Croats, had disloged the Partisans from their stronghold in the Grimec Planina and had harried them for 150 miles over exceedingly difficult country, whose wild character and bad communications gave every advantage of terrain to irregular troops. The Germans, had, however, failed to surround or to annihilate their enemy. 6. As the campaign progressed the Germans had freely expressed their doubts as to whether they could adequately garrison the districts which they had cleaned up. Their apprehensions were soon justified. It became evident that only a part of the Partisans had been driven southwards. Others had somehow gone into hiding, whence, as the Axis troops moved on, they began to emerge. Rallying at local centres they then collected in the hills, South-West of Bihac. To such good effect did they reorganise that in the middle of April they were able to descend on Otocac and force the Italians to abandon the town and valuable stores of food. Other bands

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simultaneously began to assemble in other upland areas of northern Yugoslavia. It is difficult to give any exact estimate of their strength, which varied from day to day. 7. This major operation, extending from late January to mid-March, was not the only occasion of fighting in Yugoslavia through these months. The Partisans north of the River Sava were increasingly active and threatened the two railway lines from Zagreb to Belgrade. On the last day of January the Germans commenced a ten days' attack in this area and succeeded in driving the guerrillas temporarily into the remoter and wilder regions. But at the end of February they were forced to undertake a further operation, presumably against remnants of the same bands. Even then there was no appreciable abatement in insurgent activity in these districts, and at the end of March the Axis embarked on a third operation. The Slavonian Partisans were, however, no easier to destroy than their Bosnian colleagues, and the German troops did not succeed in eradicating them from their hilly strongholds. Axis forces amounting to the equivalent of rather more than one division were involved in these operations. 8. Another appreciable centre of unrest in Yugoslavia in the first months of 1943 was in Eastern Bosnia. All over this district there existed not only stray bands of Partisans but also groups of Mihailovic's Cetniks. Here again, however, divergent tendencies were becoming apparent. All Cetniks were prepared to fight the "quisling" Croat Army, but not all were ready to join with the Partisans in doing so, while others, faithful to the orders of Mihailovic, attacked the Partisans and the Croats with equal zest. These dissensions served as an indication of the difficulties into which the policy at Cetnik headquarters was leading the whole Cetnik movement. This confusion culminated on the 28th February in a somewhat wild speech by Mihailovic in which he bitterly abused the British (despite the presence of our liaison officer) for the paucity of our help, and declared that he would never abandon the Italians, who were his only friends. The outburst provoked a sharp reprimand from the exiled Yugoslav Government, in which Mihailovic was ordered to give up all compromising relations and was roundly told that the British were his allies. But before this message could reach him the course of events had swept the Cetniks into battle with the Partisans, for which the Cetniks received from the Italians, arms, equipment and even food by air. 9. At the end of March the main Partisan body in Hercegovina (see paragraph 5 above), at this time more than 15,000 strong, had advanced southwards and eastwards, after the passage of the Neretva, with the object of crossing the Drina and breaking through into the Sanjak. From there they could either pass into Serbia or continue their migration southwards towards Greece. It seems that the severe fighting of the last few

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months had served to harden and train them; from then on, in any case, Partisan troops began to operate more definitely as "divisions," and their leader, Tito, began to dominate the scene. Leaving a weaker force to hold the Cetniks on their flank, the main body, under Tito, struck at the Drina line. Two Partisan divisions succeeded in crossing the river near Gorazde, but early in May their further progress eastwards was arrested by the arrival of a German division, and they turned southwards towards Albania. 10. At this juncture the Germans decided to stage the operation which had originally been designed to round up Mihailovic's Cetniks in Montenegro, but was now directed primarily against the Partisans, who had replaced them. It involved elements of five German, three Italian and one Bulgarian divisions and met with strong opposition from the Partisans. German figures for the casualties at the end of the operations have been obtained from our intelligence. There were some 3,000 German casualties as against 7,489 Partisans, killed, plus further Partisan losses in wounded and prisoners amounting to nearly 5,000 men. Some 3,500— 4,000 Cetniks were also taken prisoner. About 1,500 sorties were flown by Axis aircraft in the course of the operations and 600 tons of bombs were dropped. During the course of the operations it appeared at one moment as if the whole Partisan force was surrounded, but most recent messages from our liaison officers state that Tito and some 10,000 men succeeded in extricating themselves from the Axis net and reached the area north-east of Sarajevo, where they are now re-forming. Meanwhile, other Partisan groups have continued active. There have been constant clashes in the area of Travnik; other bodies are active between the Kupa and Una rivers, and others again to the west of the lower Drina. Reports from British liaison officers have also been received of activities in Slovenia and Slavonia. The total Partisan strength in all these areas may number 65,000 armed men. 11. In Serbia, where Mihailovic is still supreme, sabotage also continues and is being actively directed by our liaison officers. Most important has been an attack on the important copper mine at Majdenpek in the northeastern corner of Yugoslavia and the sinking of shipping on the Danube. Mihailovic's following in Serbia is very considerable, amounting to perhaps 20,000 armed men. Our liaison officers consider that in the event of success and provided arms could be made available, a further 130,000 men could be put into the field. It should be also remembered that prior to the period under review Mihailovic had carried out many successful operations against the enemy. 12. According to our information, a further large-scale operation against Tito and his Partisans in the Sarajevo area is planned for mid-July. This is likely to involve not less than six divisions. Elsewhere sporadic activity

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by the guerrillas calls for repeated action by German, Italian and Croat troops and there is evidence that from no area can troops be spared for operations elsewhere. A detailed analysis of Axis forces appears at Annex A. A summary of air operations appears at Annex C. An analysis of sabotage carried out since the 1st May, 1943, appears at Annex D. A statement of brutalities committed by the Axis and their satellites appears at Annex F. A German order on method of carrying out mass executions appears at Annex G. II.-—Greece. (See Sketch Map B.) [Not printed.] 13. Serious guerrilla activity in Greece is much more recent than in Yugoslavia and it is only since the beginning of this year that it has begun to cause the Axis really grave concern. But by January the guerrillas had succeeded in obtaining control of most of the mountainous districts of Central and Northern Greece except for the towns and the lines of communication, and since that time their power has regularly increased, until now they constitute a very serious menace to Axis forces in the country. Political differences unfortunately exist between the various groups, the most important of which are that of Zervas (Right Wing) in Western Greece and that known as E.L.A.S., under Left-wing control, in the rest of the country. Though collaboration between these parties has in the past not always been all that can be desired, serious quarrels resulting in civil war which have done so much harm in Yugoslavia have been avoided. The most recent reports from our liaison officers in Greece state that for the present the various bands have agreed to work together satisfactorily under British guidance. They will accept the orders of C.-in-C, Middle East, issued through the numerous British liaison officers in so far as the planning and timing of operations are concerned. 14. The first important move was the destruction, under British direction, of the Gorgopotamos Bridge on the Athens-Salonika railway late in 1942; this took some six weeks to repair. During January 1943 there were no large-scale activities, but in February and early March a series of harassing moves were undertaken by the guerrillas in Thessaly and Pindus, which resulted in fairly serious Axis casualties; we know that in February a column of some 250 Italians was routed, only ten of whom escaped, and that in another action quite a large number of Germans were shot. These small actions continued throughout April and caused such difficulties for the Axis that by May troop movements in Central Greece were

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only possible when made in considerable force, and main routes of communication could be kept operative only if constantly guarded and patrolled. On the 16th April the guerrillas captured and held for 36 hours the town of Amphiclea (15,000 inhabitants) and destroyed all the railway facilities, including nine locomotives. In addition, during April and early May four bauxite mines in the Parnassus region were put out of action and the production of the chrome mines in Thessaly was reduced by twothirds. 15. In Western Greece, in order to counter these activities, the Italians undertook an operation involving at least one division; this was unsuccessful. The Germans, finding that the protection afforded by the Italians to chrome mines in Thessaly and to the Athens-Salonika road and railway was ineffective, sent troops to Lamia, Larissa and Katerine and took over most of the policing of the railway. Sweeps on a large scale into the surrounding country were made from these centres, but on each occasion the guerrillas escaped, thanks to their mobility and good intelligence. As a result of this ill-success, offensive action was initiated on a more extensive scale in the last week of May. This included the wholesale bombing and burning of villages. At the same time two additional German divisions were despatched to Greece, one of which was probably sent more with the object of engaging the guerrillas than with that of resisting a possible Allied invasion; it was soon engaged in Epirus. 16. With the month of June more extensive sabotage was embarked upon under British direction. A tunnel was blown up on the 1st June at Kournovo on the Athens-Salonika line; six bridges, one 100 feet long, were destroyed on the 20th/21st June between Katerine and Gravia; on the same night bridges on the Kozani-Servia road were destroyed; a large steamer used for supplying Axis forces in Crete was sunk in Piraeus harbour; finally, the Asopos Viaduct was blown up, causing an interruption of the vital Athens-Salonika line, estimated to take a minimum of two to three months to repair. 17. Axis counter-action met with little success. A drive in the Parnassus area ended on the 8th June after several Italian defeats, in one of which some 500 men were lost. In another action on the 9th-10th June the Italians lost 700 men; the guerrillas had few casualties, though many villages in Thessaly were destroyed in reprisal. In Epirus another action was fought against the Italians, and it appears to have been so successful that in early July an additional Italian division had to be sent to that area from Athens. The Italians were also heavily engaged in Western Macedonia, while a German column was attacked near Kozani on the 19th June.

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18. During the last weeks there has been a considerable increase in the Axis garrison of the mainland of Greece; the Italian divisions have remained at 8; the Germans have, however, increased from two in March to six, possibly seven, and, according to an intelligence report Bulgarian control is to be extended in Macedonia, and may perhaps embrace Salonika. It is unlikely that either the Germans or, even more, the Italians would wish to see the Bulgars in that city unless severely stretched themselves. It cannot, of course, be claimed that the four additional German divisions have been sent to Greece as a result of guerrilla action alone. But there is evidence that those in Epirus and Northern Thessaly were particularly intended to operate against the guerrillas, and even if the threat of an Allied invasion were removed, it is improbable that the Germans could hope to reduce their forces by more than three divisions. 19. British liaison officers state that there are approximately 20,000 armed mobile guerrillas in the field; in addition, a very large proportion of the whole population would fight the Axis in propitious circumstances if they could be armed and organised. Details of Axis forces in Greece are given at Annex B. A summary of Air Force operations appears at Annex C. An analysis of guerrilla activities from May—July 1943 appears at Annex E. A statement of brutalities committed by the Axis and their satellites appears at Annex F. III.—Albania. 20. Guerrilla activity in Albania has never assumed the proportions seen in Yugoslavia and Greece, nor have the Axis forces there ever exceeded about four divisions. A considerable quantity of minor incidents have, nevertheless, occurred all over the country since early in 1942. Hitherto these have not assumed proportions which have called for serious military action by Italy, but early in July the garrison of Premeti in Southern Albania was asking urgently for reinforcements in view of a strong attack by guerrillas. Incidents of this type would undoubtedly increase in degree and in number as soon as more British liaison officers were infiltrated and money and ammunition introduced. This is now in hand.

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Annex A. Axis Forces in Yugoslavia

German divisions* . . . Italian divisions Bulgarian divisions Croat divisions

January 1943

March 1943

7 18 5 6

8 18 5 6

May 1943

July 1943 9 17 5 8

8-9 18 5 6 and 2 divs. forming

Annex B. Axis Forces on the Greek Mainland

German divisions* (equivalent) Italian divisions . . . . Bulgarian divisions (Thrace)

January 1943

March 1943

May 1943

July 1943

2 8

3 8

3 8

6 8

1

2

2

2

* Whereas in January 1943 the bulk of the German divisions were defensive divisions, of the 15 German divisions now in Yugoslavia and Greece the bulk are offensive divisions.

Annex C. Axis Air Operations in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. German Air Force Operations. The G.A.F. has the following forces employed in operations in Yugoslavia:— Ju. 88 Bombers Do. 17 Bombers He. 46 Bombers He. 126 Close Recce Total

ale. 35 20 10 15 80

Above force is composed of Training and Croatian units; no first-line units are engaged. Sorties during the past 6-8 weeks have averaged 40 per 24 hours comprising bombing and reconnaissance, but the daily scale

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of effort has frequently been in the region of 80-120, the relatively low average being due to lengthy periods of bad flying weather on which only small-scale reconnaissance (5-10 sorties) was flown. A force of some 15 Ju. 87 formerly operating in Yugoslavia is believed to have been transferred to Russia about mid-June. There are further R.T. Stuka units available at Zagreb and Belgrade-Pancevo; operations by these have been only occasional and are thought not to have exceeded some 5 sorties per 24 hours. For similar operations in Greece formations from first-line units operational in Greece have been detached. It is estimated that on an average some 15 Ju. 87 and 10 L.R. Bombers (Ju. 88 and He. I l l ) are assigned for these duties daily. The main G.A.F. bases in Yugoslavia are Semlin, Butmir, Mostar and Zagreb. In Greece, Jannina and Larissa have been used in anti-guerrilla operations. Italian Air Force Operations. The I.A.F. have the following forces employed in operations in Yugoslavia and Albania:— B.R. 20 Bomber Recce C.R. 42/G.50/MC.200 S.E.F C.A. 311/312/314/R.C. 37/B.R. 20 Army Co-op. . Cant. Z. 501/506 Seaplanes Total

ale. 40 30 80 JO 160

Units are based at Durazzo/Sciak, Tirana, Zemonico, Valona, Scutari, Berat/Devoli, Mostar, Ljubljana and Split. During the past two months a relatively small scale of effort has been put up, for the most part in direct support of ground operations. Annex D. Sabotage carried out in Yugoslavia since 1st May, 1943. May. Engine blown up at Pocekovina through ammanol in the coal. Collision between a fast train and a German troop train in Stevanac, near Stalac, was organised. Two railway engines and tenders, six passenger coaches and two motor cars were completely destroyed. A railway bridge 1,000 yards south of Priboj was destroyed by Cetniks from Pristina. 2,500 Partisans carried out wrecking of 5 miles of the Karlovac-Metlika line. Four miles of the Zagreb-Medika-Ljubljana line were wrecked.

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The Ogulin-Fiume line was being continually attacked and Partisans claim an average of one locomotive and ten trucks daily. The ship Johann Walner was attacked and sunk south of Dobra in the Danube. One tanker sunk, tug and other tanker driven on the rocks by the Roumanian bank. Traffic was not reopened for 5 days, and subsequendy important traffic has been accompanied by tanker or motorised units on the Roumanian bank. 200 yards of track wrecked at Ponivak on Karlovac-Ogulin line. One engine and 1 wagon on the Karlovac-Ogulin line between Tounj, Zdenac and Gornje Dubrave damaged and resulting in one day's holdup. Karlovac-Ogulin line wrecked between Generalski Stol and Zvecaj. A troop train attacked by Partisans west of Ogulin resulted in a 314hour battle, causing Axis losses of 100 killed and wounded, including 6 Italian officers, 26 Italian and Pavelic prisoners taken, engine destroyed and 24 wagons burned. 50 yards of track and 2 block-houses on the Karlovac-Ogulin line between Zvecaj and Belovic. A German tug damaged by limpet fixed in the harbour of Velike Gradiste and had to be towed to Vienna in an unserviceable condition. Train wrecked at Gomirje and Ogulin-Susak line, 30 coaches burnt, 200 prisoners, 14 machine guns and other weapons captured. Engine and many coaches of a freight train were mined between Zvecaj and Generalski Stol in the Gorski Kotor sector. Four trains blown up on the Ogulin-Susak line, 2 locomotives and many coaches wrecked; 5 days' hold-up. June. Three freight trains with war material for Greece wrecked on the Belgrade-Zagreb line with large enemy losses. The station of Desinac on this line has been wrecked. The Zagreb-Osijek line has been wrecked in 5 places each for a length of 500 yards. A big railway collision was organised at Vircin station, about 50 Germans killed and injured and a 36-hour delay caused. Partisans raided the German glider school at Samabor, destroying two trainer planes and thirty gliders. Stemnica, Melnica and Ranovac mines were put out of action by Cetniks by demolition of the main working junction. A railway bridge 40 yards long, 6 miles west of Kruselac, was destroyed. 300 yards of line have been wrecked between Daruvar and Bijela. One locomotive and 6 coaches wrecked at Metlika on the Karlovac-Ljubljana line. 1,000 yards of line, including steel bridges 28 yards long and a stretch of embankment, was wrecked; 20 days needed for repairs.

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96 yards of line of the Karlovac-Susak railway wrecked near Zvecaj. 350 yards of line wrecked at Belavici. 70 yards of the Zagreb-Belgrade line destroyed at Pjescenica, causing a hold-up of 24 hours. One German freight train destroyed between Belgrade and Zagreb. Freight train with one engine destroyed at Gradeska. Freight train destroyed at Zdencina, between Zagreb and Karlovac, and line torn up at Metlika, on the Karlovac-Ljubljana line. Annex E. Analysis of Guerrilla Activities in Greece from May—July 1943. May. Railway line south of Tempe blocked for 14 hours by blowing culvert. Three bridges on railway Volo-Larissa blown up, 27 Italians killed, 45 carabinieri captured. Fifty Italians ambushed by 37 guerrillas near Omolion, 7 Italians killed. Metamorphosis chrome mine attack, plant destroyed. Chrome mine at Agios Demetrios destroyed. Rhodiani chrome mine attacked, machinery smashed, buildings burnt. June. Kournovo tunnel on main line Athens-Salonica blown up with German troop train inside. Blocked for 6 days. Skirmish between guerrillas and Italians near Gardiki. Column of Italians engaged by guerrillas who inflicted 300 casualties on Italians. Battle of Pavliani. Italians retreated, losing 300 prisoners and transport, including considerable booty to guerrillas. Action near Aliakmon Bridge in Kozani area. Wooden arch burnt and 2 concrete pillars blown up. Italian ship "Citta di Savona" sunk in Piraeus harbour by limpeting. Asopos viaduct blown up. Four bridges destroyed on main railway line between Dhokara and Lake Xinias. Three road bridges destroyed on road between Kozani and Elasson. In the Katerini area Papa girder bridge, having a span of 100 ft. and another 3-girder bridge destroyed. All telephone wires cut. Demolitions carried out on roads Yannina-Philippiada and ParamythiaKanallakion. Chifliki bridge blown. Telephone line between Elasson and Larissa destroyed over a length of 12 miles. Two-thirds of the line from Elasson to the Sarandoporon Pass destroyed.

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In the Vale of Tempe railway destroyed for a stretch covering 100 lengths of rail including 2 bridges. In the Katerini area, 3-arch girder bridge 30 yards long destroyed, telephone lines cut. On Katerini-Elasson road at Km. 17 wooden bridge 30 yards long burnt and west abutment blown. At Km. 26 the road foundation on the precipice cut away at 2 places. At Km. 28 an 11-yards concrete bridge over a gorge destroyed and abutments blown. Bridge at Petrana blown. Road cut in 2 places in Stena-Portas Pass. Action in area south-west of Yannina. Italian losses 30 dead, 70 wounded and some M.T. destroyed. Demolitions on Yannina-Malakasi road. Bridges destroyed; estimated time of repair five weeks. July. Dubri Bridge successfully demolished. Demolition of Stenos Bridge at Lidhorikion-Navpaktos road. 30 yards bridge blown. Road and telephone communications between Arakhova and Levadia cut. Action in Aigion area, railway bridge between Diakogio and Zahloron successfully attacked. 1,000 yards of line demolished. Annex F. Brutalities Committed by the Axis and their Satellites. YUGOSLAVIA.

There is little doubt that our Liaison Officers in Yugoslavia have seen and heard enough to bear ample testimony to the innumerable brutalities perpetrated by the Germans and their satellites. One of them now with the patriot forces in Western Croatia has sent in a report based on evidence given by trustworthy officers formerly serving in the forces of Pavelic, from which they deserted when they discovered the full significance of his policy. This report refers to the many bodies of murdered persons lying about in mountain gorges and to the mutilated people still alive to tell the tale of their sufferings. He instances such horrors as the following:— Men invited to meetings in churches and then locked in and burnt to death. A captured Ustashi was found to have in his possession 2 kilog. of human eyes intended as a gift for Pavelic. Photographs have been seen of children dashed to death against walls; of individuals with ears cut off and finger-nails pulled out.

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Pregnant women ripped open. Children tied together round haystacks which were then set alight. A priest buried alive at Brinje. Girls raped and made to dig their own graves. Our Liaison Officer goes on to say that the systematic burning of towns and villages and of crops is a mere incidental to the other widespread brutalities of which there is plentiful evidence. From General Mihailovic countless reports have been received over a period of many months. These reveal the indescribable brutality of the occupying and quisling forces. Reports received since the 1st May, 1943, but covering the period since the beginning of 1943 to the present day show that some 7,000 to 8,000 people, including many women and children, have been put to death or tortured. Countless instances are given of villages burnt and plundered, crops seized, heavy fines imposed on villages and settlements for what was considered insufficient surrender of food-stuffs and other produce, cattle driven off, hostages shot, thousands of people thrust into concentration camps, of the inhabitants of entire districts being driven to take refuge in the inhospitable mountains, where they have inevitably been overtaken by famine. The following few instances chosen at random from the General's reports illustrate the state of affairs which has existed ever since the German invasion:— In Eastern Srem German, Gestapo, Ustashi and other Croat troops are said to have sent 5,000 people to Germany in sealed waggons soon after Himmler's visit to Zagreb, in reprisal for sabotage on the railways imputed to the Serbs, but in fact carried out by the Ustashi themselves. At Metchija two train-loads were filled, mainly with women and children, and taken to the concentration camp at Zemun. At Kraljevo 107 women, 3 three-year-old children and 30 fourteenyear-old boys were shot by order of Josef Eckart, the local Gestapo chief. At Kozevi 70 hostages shot in reprisal for the demolition of a bridge. At Belgrade 50 Serbs shot in reprisal for the sabotage of Danube traffic in May. In the Jablanica district, 2,000 people were taken to Germany from 14 villages, which were burnt to the ground. Quotations of the same character from this source could be multiplied endlessly. Doubtless the reports do not err on the side of understatement. Nevertheless, even if heavily discounted, they disclose a sufficiently horrifying state of affairs. The Axis-controlled press also provides illuminating evidence as the following typical examples will show:— (1) In June 1943, eight German policemen were killed and seven wounded, accordingly 575 persons, described as "supporters of Mihailovic

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and the Communists," were shot. (Zora, Sofia, 9.7.43.) (2) In August 1941, the German military authorities decreed the destruction of the village of Skela for the shooting of a German military official. (Donauzeitung, 16.8.41.) A "Memorial of the Orthodox Church" presented to the German C in-C. in Croatia gave a horrifying picture of the massacres of Serbs, especially of priests and intellectuals in Bosnia, Hercegovina, Slovenia and Serbo-Croatia in May—July 1941. In Slovenia and Croatia the Italians and their local quislings have not been far behind the Germans. The shootings of hostages is generally carried out on a scale of ten for each Italian or quisling killed. Many villages have been burnt down in districts where guerrilla activity has occurred, and it is said that tens of thousands of Yugoslavs have been put into concentration camps. In June 1943, the Bishop of Veglia protested to the Vatican against the actions taken by the Italian military and civilian authorities in the Fiume and Kupa districts. Numerous cases of the partial or complete destruction of villages by way of reprisal are cited. The Hungarians, too, have taken a hand in such brutalities: The outbreak of resistance at Zsablya in the Backa in January 1942, was savagely repressed—many civilians being killed. The Prime Minister, Kallay, himself, frankly admitted in the Hungarian Parliament that excessive severity had been applied. The total number of Serbs killed was 2,250. (Magyarorszag, 15.7.43.) GREECE.

Bulgarian-occupied Thrace has been the scene of the worst brutalities perpetuated in Greece by the Axis and their satellites. A movement of revolt in September 1941 resulted in fearful reprisals, and it is estimated that some 10,000 Greeks were shot or otherwise massacred between the 6th and 9th October of that year. Those killed by the Bulgars might now total some 15,000-20,000 souls; in addition, some 150,000 Greeks have been evicted from their homes and deported with what they can carry away with them. In Greece itself every sabotage operation has been regularly followed by the shooting of hostages. For example:— 4th June, 1941— Railway bridge at Liossa blown. 25 hostages shot. 45 lawyers taken as hostages. 24th/25th November, 1942— Railway viaduct at Gorgopotamos blown. 12 officers executed. 300 senior officers, including several generals and admirals, placed in concentration camps.

ALLIANCE FORGED

417

6th January, 1943— Demolitions in Salamis Arsenal. 17 hostages shot. Many hostages arrested. 1st June— Kournovo tunnel demolished and troop train wrecked. 60 officers shot. 17 th June— Citta di Savona limpeted in Piraeus. 80 hostages taken, 19 shot. All the above acts of sabotage were carried out by collaborators of S.O.E. at the direct request of British authorities. The recent widespread guerrilla activity has led to an increase of brutal measures by the Axis. British liaison officers have reported that enemy columns in Thessaly are systematically burning villages and crops, murdering, raping and torturing inhabitants, so as to prevent by this ruthless treatment their giving aid to the guerrillas. The destruction of food supplies will in fact make the task of the guerrillas increasingly difficult throughout the coming winter. The Metropolitan of Kozani, who, cross in hand, rides at the head of the guerrillas of Western Macedonia, has telegraphed through a British Liaison Officer:— "The Greek race within Greece, as in the time of Alaric, suffers persecution aimed at its annihilation. All the nation is in revolt, and His Majesty's Government from outside must give all priority to this second war in Greece against these savage occupiers, and must take even stronger measures to aid its prosecution, urging on the day of liberation. Haste, that the great fire be not extinguished, that the nation be not annihilated!" In Crete a particularly revolting execution of hostages was reported by a British officer. On the 14th June, 1942, the day after our sabotage raid on the Heraklion aerodrome, 50 hostages already held in Heraklion were shot. Amongst the victims were a former Governor-General of Crete, a Cabinet Minister, a former Mayor of Heraklion, a lawyer, the nephew of the former G.O.C., Crete, the editor of a Cretan newspaper, bank managers, school masters, &c. The names of the German Air Force Colonel Schlange and Captain Litzenberger, the Garrison adjutant, were prominently connected with the above offence. Also after our Commando raid on Crete during the night of the 4th/ 5th July, 1943, fifty hostages were shot by the Germans in Heraklion alone, by order of General Brauer. The execution of a further eighteen hostages in Aguia gaol was reported from West Crete.

418

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Resistance in the towns has mainly shown itself in demonstrations by students and others of both sexes. These have been brutally repressed; for example, on the 20th August, 1942, in Tirana, according to the Foreign Office Research Department, sixteen girls were killed and twentyfive wounded when they demonstrated outside the city prison for the release of political prisoners and the Italian guards opened fire on them. In the country a more calculated brutality is evident. In December 1942 villagers in the mountains of Tragjas were tortured in the hope of inducing them to disclose the whereabouts of the patriot forces. Villages which the Italian columns find difficulty in reaching are indiscriminately bombed, and those which are occupied are burned to the ground before the Italians retire to the safety of their nearest fortified camp. In January 1943, to take just one example from the underground press, two women at Pojan were soaked in petrol and burned alive because they had given children supplies to take to the guerrilla bands in which their husbands were serving. Annex G. German Order on Method of carrying out Mass Executions. The following is a translation of an order issued by H.Q., 125 German Infantry Regiment, on the 28th October, 1941:— "Supplementary regulations by G.O.C., Serbia, concerning the manner of carrying out executions make necessary the following amendments to Regimental Orders of 16.10.41:— (a) When a large number of persons have to be dealt with, they are to be distributed for shooting among units. (b) The bodies are to be buried in sufficiently deep graves. Burning of bodies is to cease. The placing of flowers on graves is to be prevented. (c) In order to avoid unnecessary contact with the bodies, those to be shot are to be led directly to the edges of their graves. In the case of mass executions, it is allowable to cause the hostages to kneel with their faces towards the grave. (d) Shooting of large numbers is to be carried out in groups of five to eight, one after the other. Those to be shot have to have their legs tied. (e) Before the execution takes place, those to be shot should have all papers removed. A short report is to be made on the execution, showing—

ALLIANCE FORGED (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) dered.

419

Names of those shot, Reasons for shooting, N a m e of officer i/c. Place, time. N a m e of the officer o r d e r i n g the execution should be ren-

(/) T h e execution is to be carried out in a very regimental m a n n e r with an officer in charge. Two to four men are to be detailed for each m a n to be shot. Aim for the heart and head. After the volley, the officer responsible will, on orders from the Medical Officer detailed to attend, fire a final shot into the body of each with a regulation pistol 08 or 38 (no other calibre). Death is to be certified by the Medical Officer. (g) Articles of clothing (including footwear) and personal effects of those shot will on no account be given to the local population. T h e y are to be h a n d e d in, in exchange for a receipt, to the a p p r o priate local military authority. Until the burial has been completed, one officer is to be present. T h e o r d e r of 16.10.41 by the C o m m a n d i n g Officer, Infantry Regiment 125, is hereby cancelled and will be destroyed." [MR]

Reminded by Churchill, Roosevelt responded the next day with a courteous note to the Treasurer of Gray's Inn in London, Sir Nicholas L. Macaskie. Roosevelt's delay in answering the message from Macaskie forwarded in C— 386 on July 28 may have stemmed from his annoyance that it had been the Prime Minister, not the President, who had forgotten their 1918 dinner meeting. Roosevelt apparently mentioned the lapse often enough to make an impression on a number of advisers and acquaintances. On August 16, the White House released the congratulatory message from George VI along with the President's courteous reply. (See PPF 5565.)

C-412/3, memo Hyde Park, N.Y. Aug. 14, 1943 Mr. President. 1. Would you kindly send a two line message of thanks to Nicholas Macaskie saying you were glad to hear from the T r e a s u r e r a n d Masters of Gray's Inn, a n d that you had not forgotten your dinner with him in 1918, or words to that effect.

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2. T h e King considers that you should publish his telegram of con­ gratulations o n t h e American feat of a r m s at Ploesti with any reply you may care to make. It n e e d only be a line o r two, but I advised him officially to send t h e telegram of congratulation o n account of t h e magnificent p e r f o r m a n c e . [Initialed] W.S.C. [PSF:GB:WSC]

On August 18, Churchill and Roosevelt jointly suggested a meeting with Stalin at Fairbanks, Alaska. T h e "farther point"—the Bering Strait—was not men­ tioned. Stalin replied on August 24 that a meeting in Fairbanks was impossible, but that they should arrange a tripartite meeting as soon as possible (FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 20, 22). T h e final version of the Anglo-American agreement on full collaboration in atomic-energy research—TUBE ALLOYS—was formally approved on Au­ gust 19. (See FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6f Quebec, 1943, pp. 1117-19.) Clarence D. Howe was Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply. Field Marshal Sir J o h n Dill headed the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, and Colonel J. J . Llewellin was the British Minister Resident for Supply in Washington. All three became members of the Combined Policy Committee for TUBE ALLOYS. T h e question of command referred to a Churchill-Roosevelt agreement that General George Marshall would command the cross-channel invasion— OVERLORD. This followed an earlier decision that command of the oper­ ation should go to the nation providing the major portion of the forces, which by the spring of 1944 would be the United States. T h e unresolved question of the structure and authority of the South East Asia Command may also have been taken u p , although there is n o evidence that the problem was discussed (Pogue, Organizer of Victory, pp. 260-62). David Gray, the American Minister in Ireland, had proposed that the Amer­ icans directly request from the Irish permission to use air and naval facilities. Gray visited Hyde Park during Churchill's visit and discussed his proposals with the two leaders. A draft of Gray's proposal dated August 16, the day after Churchill left Hyde Park, is probably a revision designed to meet the Prime Minister's objections (FRUS, Conf. at Wash, ί ί Quebec, 1943, pp. 618— 24, 831-33). T h e question of recognition of the French Committee of National Liber­ ation was not resolved at the Quebec meeting, and the British, Canadian, and American governments all issued separate statements (ibid., pp. 1169—72).

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C-412/4 In the train [enroute Quebec City] Aug. 15, 1943

For you only [handwritten] My dear Mr. President, 1. After pondering this morning I feel pretty sure that we ought to make a renewed final offer to U.J. to go to meet him at Fairbanks or at the farther point you had in mind as soon as this Military Conference is over. If he accepts it will be a very great advantage; if not, we shall be on very strong ground. We must mind the Japanese do not get us! 2. I am having a fair copy made of the TUBE ALLOY Memorandum ready for our respective initials. I am assuming that you would be agreeable to Howe being the Canadian representative on the General Policy Committee. Our two men would be Dill and Llewellin. 3. I will now take up with my Staffs the most important question of the Commands as we outlined them. I am sure the plan you have in mind is the best. 4.1 was very favourably impressed with Gray's Irish message. The only amendment I suggest is to leave out any suggestion that we shall continue being nice to de Valera even if he won't play. The Irish are very practical people and if they don't have to do a thing they don't like, they don't do it. I should be glad if you could let me have a copy of the message when the State Department have seen it in order that I may put it before my Cabinet. I feel it is very important to try to get this additional security for the troops before the concentrations for OVERLORD become very large. It really is not fair that all your Divisions should be ticked off as they come. 5. You said we had dealt with half-a-dozen out of the dozen big points we were to talk over. Here is the fifth: The French Committee. I beg you to go as far as you can in your formula because however justly founded one's misgivings may be there is no use making a gesture of this kind in a grudging form. If you do not like our wording of the formula there seems to me no reason why we should not have separate documents conveying our different shades of meaning provided they are both issued at the same time. Mackenzie King will have his own variant. I did so enjoy my visit and my only regret is that Clemmie was not there to share it. This however perhaps you will allow us to repair. Yours ever, [signed] Winston S. Churchill [MR. PREM 3/139/8A/363-65.]

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As outlined below by Churchill, Roosevelt was met at the Wolfe's Cove station of the Canadian Pacific Railway, about two miles outside the Citadel fortress in Quebec City. T h e Governor General, the Earl of Athlone, was the formal representative of the King in Canada, while the British High Commissioner, Malcolm MacDonald, represented the British government. Anthony Eden and Brendan Bracken, Churchill's personal friend and British Minister of Information, arrived at Quebec on August 18.

C-413 Quebec City, Can. [via London] Aug. 16, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. First of all, the Governor-General will meet you at a wayside station outside Quebec. Mackenzie King a n d I will also be there. T h e GovernorGeneral will drive you to the Citadel where a G u a r d of H o n o u r will be p a r a d e d , a n d h e would like to have a small reception immediately on your arrival where about forty principal persons could be presented to you. This can be cut out if you feel it would be tiring. In the evening, the Governor-General will give a d i n n e r in the Citadel to your personal party a n d mine to which Mackenzie King, the High Commissioner and one or two others will be asked—in all about twenty. I h o p e this will be agreeable to you. Anthony a n d B r e n d a n will be there if they arrive in time. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 414. K&fC]

Roosevelt scrawled his answer across the bottom of Churchill's message, brought to the President from the White House Map Room.

R-345 Washington Aug. 16, 1943 Personal a n d Secret for the Former Naval Person. Reference your 413. Delighted with arrangements. Things are progressing everywhere. Roosevelt [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. £•? Quebec, 1943, p. 414. fltsfC (n).]

Even as Roosevelt and Churchill were about to meet in Quebec, one of their main strategic goals for 1943—the elimination of Italy from the war—seemed

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at hand. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had forwarded to Churchill in Quebec a report from Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Ambassador in Madrid, of talks with Italian Generale di Brigata Giuseppe Castellano, and the aide to the head of the Italian Supreme Command, Generale d'Armata Vittorio Ambrosio. Marshal Pietro Badoglio, who headed the Italian government, had sent Castellano to Spain in order to arrange a settlement with the Allies. T h e situation was complicated by the movement of large numbers of German troops into Italy, apparently with the intention of fighting the Allies regardless of what action the Italian government took. The basic Italian "condition" was that an Allied invasion in force accompany any Italian surrender and agreement to cooperate with the Allied armies. In one way or another, AngloAmerican negotiators stuck to the idea of unconditional surrender, and Castellano's mission came largely to naught. Roosevelt wrote his answer across the top of his copy of the message. He told the British to tell Churchill "that I approve his 'kind of answer.' " (Montanaro is Franco Montanari, an Italian Consulate official in Madrid.)

C-413/1 Quebec City, Can. [via British Embassy] Aug. 16, 1943 From F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Most Secret and Personal. 1.1 send you herewith 4 telegrams I have received from London about a renewed approach by Badoglio. T h e following is the kind of answer which I suggest should be made. Begins. We note the following statement of the Italian Envoy. "We are not in a position to make any terms. We will accept unconditional s u r r e n d e r provided we can join the Allies in fighting the Germans." We for o u r part cannot make any bargain about Italy changing sides n o r can we make plans in c o m m o n at this stage. If, however, serious fighting breaks out between the Italian Army and the G e r m a n intruders, a new situation would be created. T h e Italians know quite well that the British and United States Governments d o not seek to deny to Italy her respected place in a Europe. T h e Italian Government should therefore resist the Germans to the best of their ability as soon as possible p e n d i n g the arrival of the Anglo-American Armies. In particular they should stop further invasion of Italy by the G e r m a n troops by blowing u p bridges a n d tunnels a n d tearing u p railways lines and roads in the n o r t h of Italy and thus cutting the communications of the G e r m a n troops in the South of Italy. Effective action of this kind would be r e g a r d e d by the victorious Allies as a valuable service a n d would r e n d e r further cooperation possible against the common foe. T h e r e is n o doubt of the ability of the Italian government and people to destroy a n d paralyse the G e r m a n communications and action of this kind would be a proof of their sincerity. A n o t h e r proof would be the safeguarding of British and

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Allied prisoners from being taken away to Germany, in any case where this is attempted by the Germans and the Italian Government have not the power to resist the prisoners should be set free and succoured by the Italian people. A further vital service which the Italian Government cer­ tainly has it in its power to render to the Allies is to sail the Italian warships to any ports in Allied occupation. Fourthly the furnishing by the Italian Government of any information of the German dispositions and any assistance given by the Italian troops and people to the disembarkations of the Allies when they take place, especially if accompanied by fighting between the Italians and the Germans, would be favourably recognised. Fifthly, any co-operation between the Italian troops in the Balkan penin­ sula and the various patriot forces in the field, taking the form of resist­ ance to the Germans and leading to bloodshed, would be favourably viewed. Thus, by taking hostile action against the common enemy, the Italian Government, Army and people could, without any bargain, facil­ itate a more friendly relationship with the United Nations. In particular, we state that if the Allied troops arrive at any point where they find Italians fighting Germans, we shall aid the Italians to our utmost. Ends. Eden should be here tomorrow and we can discuss the whole position together. I send you this budget in order that you may see the way my mind is working. FIRST ATTACHMENT TO C-413/1

London Aug. 16, 1943, 0330 Ζ

Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary. Following Telegram No. 1404 of August 15th just received from His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid. Begins: A letter was handed me this morning from His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See asking me to see the bearer. When I agreed two Italians entered the room who introduced themselves as General Castellano, Chief of General Ambrosio's Military Office, and Signor Montanaro of Consulta. General Castellano informed me that he came officially and with full authority from Marshal Badoglio to put before His Majesty's Government the Italian position and to make a specific and very urgent proposal. The Marshal wished His Majesty's Government to know that Italy was in a terrible position. Practically the whole country was in favour of peace, the Italian Army was badly armed, there was no Italian Aviation and German Troops were streaming in by the Brenner and Riviera. Feeling against the Germans was intense. The Italian Government however felt powerless to act

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until the Allies landed on the mainland. If and when however the Allies landed, Italy was prepared to join the Allies and to fight against Germany. If the Allies agreed in principle to this proposal General Castellano would immediately give detailed information as to the disposition of German troops and stores and as to co-operation that the Italians would offer Mihailovitch in the Balkans. General Castellano was also empowered to concert operations e.g. connected with the Allied landings from Sicily. Marshal Badoglio regarded it as essential that action should be taken immediately as every hour meant the arrival of more German Units in Italy and at present there were thirteen Divisions and the German plan was to hold the line of the Apennines and Ravenna. 2. I then put the following questions—What would the Italian Government do in answer to the Allied demand of unconditional surrender? The General's answer was "We are not in a position to make any terms. We will accept unconditional surrender provided we can join the Allies in fighting the Germans". I then asked whether similar proposal had been made to the United States Government or in other Quarter? He replied "No. This was the first official proposal". I then asked how he had got out of Italy. He answered on a false passport under the name of Raimondi as a member of the Italian Mission en route for Lisbon to meet returning Italian Ambassador from Chile. He would have to return to Rome with the Ambassador on August 20th. He then asked whether I could give him an immediate answer and said that if so he would at once give my military Attache complete military information about German and Italian Dispositions. I said I could not do this but that I would telegraph urgently and ask His Majesty's Government to send instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon. I then gave him a letter asking His Majesty's Ambassador to see him. He said provided he could rejoin his Mission by August 20th he would be ready to fly to London. 3. I made it clear that I was expressing no opinion whatever on the offer but that I would transmit it most urgently and secretly to His Majesty's Government. He impressed me as a man of weight and sincerity. He arrives at Lisbon tomorrow Monday afternoon and will immediately give my letter to His Majesty's Ambassador. The letter merely introduces him. I assume that you will send His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon instructions as to the next step. General Castellano insisted repeatedly on the great urgency. Ends. Following are our comments on the above. Begins: It is to be noted that the whole of this Italian approach is based on combined operations with us against Germans. "Italian Govern-

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ment feel powerless to act until Allies land on Mainland". General Castellano says he is empowered to "concert operations, e.g. connected with the Allied landings from Sicily". As regards unconditional surrender, he says "We will accept provided we can join the Allies in fighting the Germans". The only military advantages which these proposals offer are unopposed landings by Army and Navy and Italian co-operation in running railways, ports, etc. but if conditions in Italy are as stated by Castellano we are reasonably sure of this cooperation even though we insist on unconditional surrender. In view of the quality and morale of the Italian Troops in the Balkans, the offer of co-operation with Mihailovitch is not likely to be a very substantial contribution to military operations and would give rise to considerable political complications. Moreover military co-operation would mean at least that the Italians retained their Arms, including the Fleet and would probably eventually claim Allied status and advantages. We could not in any case concert operations with them if that means revealing any of our plans. I am instructing His Majesty's Ambassador to hold these Envoys in Lisbon where it appears that they contemplate staying until August 20th. At the moment, of course, he can only listen to what they have to say and tell them he is seeking instructions. I presume you will wish to return the answer, already given through Signor Berio at Tangier, that the Italian Government should place themselves in the hands of the Allied Governments, who will then state their terms adding that the question of the assistance that Italy could give us against the Germans cannot be determined until this has been done. Although at first sight this offer of cooperation sounds tempting I feel that if we accept it will land us in all sorts of difficulties both military and political with few if any corresponding avantages. If this judgment is correct I am sure we ought to stick to our present policy of refusing to make the Italian Government any promises or enter into any bargain with them in return for their surrender. It is notable that General Castellano has produced no written credentials, though that may be explained by the furtive manner of his departure from Italy. I am telegraphing to Vatican to ask for further information and am asking His Majesty's Ambassador in Lisbon to try to extract more from the Envoys as to their bona fides. I am not repeating this Telegram or Madrid Telegrams to Washington or to Algiers. Leaving it to you to act as you think fit about communicating with Americans.

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SECOND ATTACHMENT TO C-413/1

London Aug. 16, 1943 Most Secret Most Immediate CONCRETE 232—16th August. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary. My immediately preceding telegram. Following telegram received from Madrid No. 1405 of 15th August. Begins: General C has called again to ask whether General Eisenhower could send a senior staff officer to join the Lisbon talks. I said I would immediately transmit to you this request. When I asked General C why Marshal Badoglio had not made these proposals direct to General Eisenhower he said the Italian Government was so closely watched by the Germans that they did not dare and that it seemed safest to use the pretext of Lisbon mission for talks in Madrid or Lisbon. Marshal Badoglio, knowing me personally as a result of my military service in Italy, had hoped for talks in Madrid but General C understood that [as] I was neither authorised to give him any discussions, authorised to give him any answer nor was my Military Attache available for discussions, they must be transferred to Lisbon. I should be grateful of course if you could keep me generally in touch with any developments. See my immediately following telegram. Ends. THIRD ATTACHMENT TO C-413/1

London Aug. 16, 1943 Most Secret Most Immediate CONCRETE No. 233 16th August. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary. My immediately preceding telegram. Following telegram received from Madrid No. 1406 of August 15th. Begins. General C made following additional points. (a) Fascist militia has been disarmed. Their hostility to the Army is however very bitter and if the Government cannot reach agreement with the Allies on basis of Marshal B's proposals, Germans may try to stage a comeback for Mussolini militia and Fascist leaders although Mussolini and Fascism are discredited.

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(b) Although the country is almost solidly for peace, the inhabitants scarcely less solid against the Germans and will consequently support an Italian military alignment with the Allies. (c) Germans are deeply entrenched in Government machine and Hitler sent the 2 S.S. Division Adolf Hitler and Deutschland to Reggio Emilia to intensify German control. (d) All the Italian troops have been withdrawn from the Russian front. German troops have taken over garrison of Greece. Salonika in particular is in exclusively German hands. (e) Italian Government if aligned with the Allies is ready to repudiate the independence of Croatia and to reach agreement with Yugoslavia over Dalmatia. (f) Line that the Germans intend to hold in Italy is Genoa to Ravenna. They are threatening the Italian Government with air and gas reprisals if they do not continue resistance. (g) Recent Allied air attacks particularly the last on Rome and Milan have done great damage but almost exclusively to Italians. The Italian Staff in the event of an agreement will give the Allies fullest possible details for the purpose of inflicting the maximum damage on German troops and stocks. The Italian Army could in this event do much to cut the Germany supply line. Pope knows nothing of General C's proposals but Cardinal Maglione helped to obtain letter of introduction from His Majesty's Minister at the Holy See to me. (h) General C. and Signor M. although they possess individual passports are travelling on omnibus papers covering the whole mission en route for Lisbon; if Germans discover General C's identity they will kill him on his return to Italy. (i) Chilean Ambassador and Staff are on the Spanish S.S. Cabo De Buena Esperanza and General C. and Signor M. will have to return with them immediately after her arrival, e.g. August 20th or August 21st in Lisbon. See my immediately following telegram. Ends. The file copy of the fourth attachment begins the paragraph numbering with 3. FOURTH ATTACHMENT TO C-413/1

London Aug. 16, 1943 Most Secret Most Immediate CONCRETE N O . 234. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary. My immediately preceding telegram. Following telegram received

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from Madrid No. 1407 of August 15th. Begins: 3. My comment, based of course solely on this interview, is that Italian Government seem definitely prepared to accept unconditional surrender provided (1) Allies land on the mainland. (2) Italian army fights the Germans. Without these two conditions Italian Government will not have sufficient courage or justification to make a complete volte-face and will drift impotently into chaos. Whilst His Majesty's Government alone can judge of wider issues at stake, my advice would be to give urgent and serious attention to General C's proposal if for no other reason than to obtain intelligence about the German intentions and dispositions. These he will only disclose to a senior military officer after agreement has been reached upon for this alignment of Italy with the Allies. This being so, you may wish to send immediately some senior staff officer to meet him in Lisbon. [Garble] he was careful to say that whilst his mission was military, he was authorised to speak for the whole of the Government including Minister for Foreign Affairs. Italian Embassy in Madrid know nothing of the mission or proposals. He had, however, been given a message for Marquis Ajeta, Italian Charge d'Affaires at Lisbon, but in view introduction to His Majesty's Ambassador and of the need of great secrecy, he does not propose to deliver it. He will therefore appear in Lisbon as Signor Raimondi official of Italian of Finance and member of delegation of welcome to Chilean Ambassador. 4. You will note that I had no opportunity of consulting you as to my meeting these enemy subjects. Until they started talking, I had no idea of their nationality and their apparent bona fides and letter of introduction from His Majesty's Minister at the Holy See convinced me that you would wish me to listen very carefully to their statements. Signor M. took no part in the discussion except to clear up one or two points on which I needed an interpreter. He speaks English perfectly. Ends. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash, (f Quebec, 1943, pp. 588-94. pWSC, V, 103-4.]

THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE (QUADRANT) President Roosevelt's arrived at Quebec City in the evening of August 17. The conference had actually begun on August 14, when the Combined Chiefs of Staff held their first meeting. Daily talks among the Combined Chiefs, Churchill, Roosevelt, and various other British, American, and Canadian officials continued until the President and the American participants left

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Quebec late in the evening of August 24. After a brief public visit to Ottawa, the Canadian capital, Roosevelt returned to Hyde Park for the weekend of August 27-29. T h e discussions centered on future military operations, although postwar political considerations began to command considerable attention. Two questions of military strategy in Europe occupied the conferees: OVERLORD— the cross-channel attack against German-held France—and future operations in Italy and the Mediterranean. Irrespective of Churchill's fixation on such peripheral maneuvers as an attack on Norway (JUPITER) and the Dodecanese Islands, the British Chiefs of Staff supported the concept of a largescale Allied invasion of France. They argued, however, that operations in Italy, particularly the acquisition and use of air bases in the north, should be considered an integral part of the OVERLORD strategy since they would force the Germans to disperse their troops. General Marshall and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff held deep suspicions that the British planned to postpone OVERLORD until it became superfluous, and interpreted British proposals about Italy as part of that deviousness. When it became apparent, after a number of candid exchanges, that the military leaders of both countries agreed on the primary importance of OVERLORD, they were able to concentrate on specific plans instead of grand strategy. Operations designed to force Italy out of the war, obtain air bases in northern Italy, and open a diversionary front in southern France were all approved with the caveat that "where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD" (FRUS, Conf. at Wash, fcf Quebec, 1943, pp. 1123). Operations in the Balkans were limited to supplying the partisan forces, while JUPITER would be considered only if OVERLORD became unfeasible. Although the war against Japan stimulated lengthy and intense discussion, the final agreements once again postponed the massive transfer of supplies and men which would have made larger operations possible. Campaigns to open the Ledo Road, one of General Marshall's pet proposals, fell afoul of the demands of OVERLORD, and British reluctance. T h e Combined Chiefs did agree upon an island-hopping strategy in the central and southwestern Pacific, and agreed to try to recapture northern Burma, but the other logistical decisions needed to direct the war against Japan were postponed, awaiting further study. The complicated question of the South East Asia Command was finally resolved when the British agreed that it should be established on the North African model; that is, the Supreme Commander would report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on matters of overall strategy as well as on coordination, although the British Chiefs of Staff would exercize operational jurisdiction. General Stilwell, the U.S. commander of the China-Burma-India theater, would be the deputy commander of the new South East Asia Command, while Lord Louis Mountbatten became Supreme Commander. It was a bureaucratic nightmare, particularly with supplies for the CBI theater controlled by the British India Command (see map, p. 758), but it was the best they could do at the time.

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Postwar questions occupied less time, but important decisions were made. T h e Anglo-American agreement to share atomic-energy research presaged the struggle over control of atomic weapons immediately after the war, while the discussion about surrender terms for Italy brought to the surface differing American and British models for the postwar Italian government. In state­ ments regarding the authority of the French Committee of National Liber­ ation, the British and Canadian governments extended recognition with only implied limitations, while the United States government specifically referred to the need for the people of France freely to select their own government after the war. Even the question of postwar relations with the Soviet Union came up, though briefly. General Marshall and General Sir Alan Brooke considered the possibility that the Soviets might use the war as an opportunity to expand communism and they wondered if the Germans might prefer the entry of Anglo-American forces to an overwhelming Russian victory. Alan Brooke surmised the Soviets would demand territory in eastern Europe, but at that point they dropped the subject (FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, pp. 910-11). T h e President's later request that plans be drawn up to ensure that English and American forces got to Berlin as quickly as did the Russians in the event of a German collapse only demonstrates that politics had become more immediate (ibid., p. 942). T h e Anglo-American conferences in Quebec formally ended on August 24, but actually were only briefly suspended while Churchill went fishing at Lake of the Snows, about seventy-five miles outside Quebec City, and Roo­ sevelt returned to Hyde Park for a weekend of rest and relaxation. Both had agreed to combine business with pleasure as the Churchill family paid a visit to the White House the following week. Churchill's real reason for delaying his arrival in Washington seems to have been his commitment to Mackenzie King to deliver a radio broadcast to the Canadian people on August 31. For the time being, Churchill was again calling himself "Colonel Warden."

C-414 Quebec, Can. [via U.S. Army, London] Aug. 26, 1943, 1418 Ζ Colonel W a r d e n to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. Should like to arrive Washington Wednesday 1st in time for d i n n e r instead of Monday 30th. H o p e this will not be inconvenient to you. I feel I require a little m o r e rest. Will this be all right. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash W Quebec, 1943, p. 1178.]

Mary Churchill accepted an invitation to visit the Women's Army Corps at Oglethorpe, Georgia, and was there from August 31 through September 2.

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(The version printed is from Churchill's memoirs. T h e copy of the outgoing message in the Map Room files refers in the last paragraph to "one of the lakes." That may have been what Roosevelt intended, though he did not sign the draft. Churchill interpreted that phrase as "gone to One Lake" and related a story about a brief afternoon's fishing trip during the Quebec meeting. T h e President caught nothing and the Prime Minister landed only one fish—hence the name One Lake. T h e President's Log of the trip notes that the entire fishing party of seven people caught about fifty very small trout FRUS, Conf. at Wash, fcf Quebec, 1943, p. 842.)

R-346 Hyde Park, N.Y. Aug. 26, 1943, 4:45

P.M.

From the President to Colonel Warden, Personal and Secret. Your n u m b e r 414. Wednesday, the First, is all right in every way. If the Subaltern wants to go to Oglethorpe it would give her m o r e time in Washington if she were to come down a day or two ahead. I h o p e Lady W a r d e n is getting a real rest a n d that you are also. Also I h o p e you have gone to O n e Lake. Be sure to have big ones weighed and verified by Mackenzie King. [WSC, V, 120. MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. Si Quebec, 1943, p. 1178.]

Stalin's message of August 24 (received by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 26) agreed with the need for full and decisive discussions, and asked that the three governments work out a detailed agenda in advance. Stalin agreed with the imposition of unconditional surrender on Italy, but complained that he had insufficient information about negotiations with Italy and asked that a Soviet representative be allowed to take part. Roosevelt did not mention his weekend trip to Hyde Park in any message to Stalin, but presumably he so informed the Washington diplomatic corps. (Stalin's message is in Stalin/FDR, doc. 105.)

R-347 Hyde Park, N.V. [via BAD] Aug. 26, 1943, 10:30 P.M. From the President to Colonel W a r d e n , Personal and Secret. I h o p e you have seen Uncle Joe's new message which is greatly improved in tone. As you a n d h e know, I am lost until Monday a n d I would let a few days go by till we answer him.

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However, my first feeling is that h e has come a r o u n d to o u r secondary meeting a n d that it should be held very soon. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, pp. 1178-79.]

C-414/1 Quebec, Can. [via British Embassy] Aug. 27, 1943 Colonel W a r d e n to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Your No. 346. T h a n k you so much. Starting from Ottowa Tuesday 31st. Will reach you for d i n n e r Wednesday. Subaltern [Mary Churchill] a n d I have caught a few, a n d the change a n d air a r e doing us all good. Portal a n d Brooke have won great victories o n t h e same front. Cabinet have cabled expressing pleasure at t h e satisfactory result of o u r conference a n d u r g i n g m e to take a holiday as all is quiet in England. 2. U.J.'s last two telegrams have been distinctly more civil. I think we should agree both to t h e secondary meeting a n d to the setting u p of t h e Commission, t h o u g h not in Sicily. This is certainly the view of my Cabinet subject to settlement of details. Anthony is coming here to-night, a n d I shall be ready to settle the whole thing with you in detail when we meet. 3. If you think a n interim message is required I suggest something o n these lines:— BEGINS. W e a r e considering your proposals a n d have little doubt that plans satisfactory to all of us can be m a d e both for t h e meeting o n the Foreign Office level a n d for the Tripartite Commission. Prime Minister a n d I will be meeting again early next week a n d will teleg r a p h you further, ENDS.

It may well be however that you will think n o interim reply need be made. 4. Mountbatten's appointment seems to have gone well. 5. Many congratulations on your splendid speech at Ottawa which d e lighted t h e whole Dominion. I have p u t off my broadcast till Tuesday. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, pp. 1181-82.]

Harvard University had invited Churchill to receive an honorary degree and give an address there, hence Roosevelt's need to check on details with the university's president, Dr. James Conant.

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R-348 Hyde Park, N.Y. Aug. 28, 1943, 2:45

P.M.

From the President to Colonel Warden. Personal and Secret. It is a coincidence that I was on the point of sending you a suggestion for an interim message to Uncle J o e when yours came this morning. T h e r e f o r e , I am sending the one you suggest via the Russian Embassy in Washington. I am delighted, as Quebec papers say, you are teasing the trout, but I d o not believe New York newspaper accounts that you have landed a five p o u n d e r . I shall require sworn verification. We are looking forward to your arrival Wednesday evening. Am checking with Dr. Conant in regard to degree and will let you know. We will be listening to you on the air on Tuesday. [MR*. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 1182.]

BAYTOWN was the assault on Calabria (southern Italy) by the British Eighth Army, scheduled for September 3. AVALANCHE was a major amphibious attack at Salerno, about fifty miles south of Naples (see map, p. 453). Allied planners had become increasingly worried about that landing because of a large buildup of German forces in the area. As a result, the surrender and cooperation of Italian forces became more important, since AVALANCHE was to be coordinated with an airborne assault near Rome which would, with the assistance of the Italian military, seize and hold the vital air bases in that area. After the fall of the Mussolini government, the British had frozen transfers of troops from the Mediterranean theater to BOLERO (the buildup for OVERLORD). The Americans had insisted at Quebec that any further operations in Italy be carried out with the original allocation of forces; thus additional troops were not available for AVALANCHE. Roosevelt's attitude regarding security may be indicated by the existence of two different copies of the unparaphrased British cables in the White House files. It is, perhaps, more likely that the President's staff simply ignored Churchill's spy-movie-style "burn them" instructions.

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C-414/2, memo La Cabane de Montmorency, Quebec. Aug. 28, 1943

Mr. President I enclosed unparaphrased version of my telegram and the reply about the dates and scales of BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE respectively. The position is still far from satisfactory. As these telegrams are unparaphrased will you please burn them after you have read them. FIRST ENCLOSURE TO C-414/2

Quebec City, Can. Aug. 25, 1943, 1844 Ζ

Prime Minister to General Alexander. Secret, Private and Confidential. 1. [Brigadier] General [J.F.M.] Whiteley, who has been here, has told us the dates and scales of BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE respectively. He has made the statement that it is expected "that six Divisions will be through Calabria by December 1st" and "that six other Divisions will be ashore at AVALANCHE by December 1st". This has filled me with the greatest concern and I hope you will be able to reassure me. Assuming that our landings are successful and that we are not defeated in the subsequent battles I cannot understand why 2½ months or more will be required "to get ashore", or why it would be necessary, once we have obtained an effective port and bridgehead at AVALANCHE to march all the BAYTOWN Divisions through Calabria instead of sending some at least of them round by sea. 2. Moreover the rate of build-up to 12 Divisions on the mainland by December 1st seems to me to open dangers of the gravest kind. First, no effective help can come to enable the Italians in Rome to turn against the Germans, and the dangers of a German Quisling Government being installed or alternatively sheer anarchy supervening will be aggravated and prolonged. Secondly, if your rate of build-up is no more than 12 Divisions by December 1st, and these only in the Naples area, what is to prevent the Germans in the same time from bringing far larger forces against them? They are at present said to have 16 Divisions in the Italian Peninsula. I am not myself convinced that these are in fact complete divisions. On the contrary it would seem likely that they are the leading elements and headquarters in several cases. But if the liberation of Rome and the gaining of the important political and military advantages fol­ lowing therefrom is to be delayed for more than three months from now no one can measure the consequences.

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3. I a m most anxious to h e a r from you before I leave America as the President was also much distressed by the day mentioned, and if it is really the kind of time-table that is being worked to it would be better for us to face the worst in consultation. I h o p e however that you will chase these clouds away. SECOND ENCLOSURE T O C - 4 1 4 / 2

Aug. 26, 1943 [Head of Planning Staff, Fifteenth Army G r o u p to C.I.G.S. (Brooke)] Most Secret CGS 53 26 August. BIGOT. Personal for C.I.G.S. from Richardson. Ref. 62930 (C.I.G.S.) dated 26 (WELFARE 423). 1. General Alexander is visiting formations of 5th U.S.A. Army. T h e slow rate of build u p d u e to length of t u r n r o u n d and limited resources in craft caused some re-examination here. T h e following steps to speed build u p were decided u p o n at a meeting in Algiers on 23rd August. a. T h e withdrawal of the craft from B A Y T O W N after (? initial) assault, thus giving fullest priority A V A L A N C H E . b. T h e allocation of 45 U.S.A. Division in Sicily to 5th U.S.A. Army, so shortening the t u r n r o u n d from Naples. c. T h e examination of use of 2 U.S.A. A r m o u r e d Divisions from Sicily with a view to shortening t u r n r o u n d . 2. T h e r e is n o intention to march all B A Y T O W N Divisions t h r o u g h Calabria if situation permits them to be sent by sea and the resources in shipping a n d (? destroyers) make a sea move m o r e profitable. 3. I cannot give you now the exact rate of build u p we are hoping to achieve but it is considerably greater than that stated by General Whiteley. T h e Air Force commitment is very large and this has to be set against any requirements in allocating the total lift available. 4. I will send an estimated rate of build u p as soon as this has been finally worked out. T h e build u p figure has to be obtained from A.F.H.Q. as so much d e p e n d s u p o n loading facilities. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6? Quebec, 1943, pp. 1186-88.]

Eisenhower's message requested that he be permitted to continue to use the short (military) terms of surrender rather than the comprehensive ones agreed to at the Quebec Conference. Eisenhower feared that any delay in an Italian surrender could jeopardize the attack at Salerno and the simultaneous assault on the Rome air fields. (NAF 342 is in FRUS, Conf. at Wash, fcf Quebec, 1943, pp. 1182-85.)

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R-349 Hyde Park, N.Y. Aug. 29, 1943, 7:25 P.M. From the President to the Prime Minister, Q u a d r a n t . In response to Eisenhower's NAF342 (Copy of which has been sent to you by British Staff Mission) I have sent him a message authorizing him to proceed with military terms, obtain signature, and then give Italian representative the comprehensive terms. I have taken this action because time is of the essence. Roosevelt [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. Etf Quebec, 1943, p. 1189.]

Colonel Frank Clark, a Canadian industrialist, invited Churchill and his party to his lodge on the Snow River and for fishing at Lac des Neiges (Lake of the Snows). Roosevelt dictated the following remark after reading Churchill's memo: "This refers to some very delicious trout which the Prime Minister caught at Lac Des Neiges and sent me via his daughter Mary."

C—414/3, memo Quebec, Can. [via Mary Churchill] Aug. 29, 1943 Colonel W a r d e n to President. Personal. Your No. 348. As sworn evidence was not available Colonel Clarke and I send you the goods by the h a n d of Mary. [MR]

C-414/4 Quebec City, Can. Aug. 30, 1943 From Colonel W a r d e n to the President. Clemmie has benefited by h e r rest u p here and would very much like to come with us to Washington if you still have room. She would not be able to u n d e r t a k e any public engagements. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 1189.]

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Ruth Goggins Roosevelt was the wife of the President's son, Elliott. Margaret Suckley, a cousin of the President, was one of his frequent house guests.

R-350 Washington Aug. 30, 1943, 10:21

P.M.

From the President to Colonel W a r d e n . Perfectly delighted that Lady W a r d e n can come too. We will have a quiet family party. Elliott a n d Ruth will be h e r e and Margaret Suckley and no one else. T h e marvelous big fish d r o p p e d out of the clouds and we had two for supper. [FDR] [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash, (i Quebec, 1943, p. 1189.]

As scheduled, Churchill arrived in Washington in the evening of September 1 and remained until the night of September 11, when he left for Halifax, Nova Scotia, by train. Enroute, he stopped to bid farewell to Roosevelt, who had left Washington on September 9 for a rest at Hyde Park. While there the Churchills celebrated their thirty-fifth wedding anniversary. It was during this stay in the United States that Churchill, on the occasion of receiving an honorary degree from Harvard University, publicly suggested that some sort of "common citizenship" between the United States and Britain might someday develop. Churchill and his party left Hyde Park on September 12, arriving two days later at Halifax, where they boarded the HMS Renown for the trip back to England. Roosevelt and Churchill continued their efforts to fix times and locations for both a high-level preliminary conference among the British, Americans, and Soviets, and also for a meeting of the Big Three. The changes Churchill suggested in Roosevelt's cable to Stalin (shown below by underlining) were minor and largely accepted by the President. Also at the Prime Minister's suggestion, the order of paragraphs was shifted so that paragraphs 5, 6, and 10 came at the end of the message. (See Roosevelt to Stalin, Sept. 4, 1943, FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, pp. 1306-8.) The second enclosure to the following memo contained those suggestions and has, therefore, not been printed. T h e third enclosure, the draft of a Churchill-to-Stalin message, was not in the file. (The actual message sent by Churchill is in Stalin/WSC, doc. 181.) Churchill's message largely echoed Roosevelt's, although the Prime Minister strongly endorsed Stalin's earlier proposal that the French Committee be represented in the talks on occupation policy in Italy.

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C—414/5, memo Washington Sept. 4, 1943 Mr. President. It seemed to me that your draft message to Stalin did not draw clear enough distinction between the Mediterranean Commission and the ThreePower Conference. I have ventured therefore to suggest some alterations which you will be able to identify on the re-typed copy annexed. I also annex a re-draft of my message, in which I have made some changes. In particular, you will see that I show Stalin I am aware that you propose a different procedure, and I suggest an argument in favour of adopting it. [Initialed] W.S.C. FIRST ENCLOSURE TO

C-414/5

Sept. 4, 1943 1. The Prime Minister and I are both happy at the idea of the military, political meeting at the Foreign Office level. 2. I think it should be held as soon as possible. What would you think of a date about September twenty-fifth? 3. In regard to location, the Prime Minister has suggested London or somewhere in England, and I would be willing to have my representatives go to either of these if you also think it best. However, I am inclined to the thought of a more remote spot where also the membership of the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. I would be inclined to suggest Casablanca or Algiers or Tunis. I do not object to Sicily but the communications from and to there are more difficult. 4. The political representatives would, of course, report to their respective Governments because I do not think we could give plenary powers to them. They could be advised on military developments by attaching one or two military advisers to them, though I do not want to have the meeting develop at this stage into a full-scale Combined Staffs' Conference. 5.1 have no objection to adding a French member to the meeting their meetings because we are in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. However, I think it would be very unwise to have the French take part in the discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If the Italians go through with surrender terms already signed, I hope they will be able wholeheartedly to assist the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians greatly dislike the French and if we bring the French into occupation discussions at this time the civil and military elements in Italy will greatly resent it.

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6. We can discuss the problem of consulting the Greeks a n d Yugoslavs later on. 7. If Mr. Molotov a n d Mr. Eden come I would wish to send Mr. Hull, but I d o not believe that the latter should make such a long j o u r n e y and I would, therefore, send the U n d e r Secretary of State, Mr. Welles. Mr. H a r r i m a n would go with Mr. Welles because h e has such good knowledge of all shipping, lend-lease and commercial matters. For an American military adviser, I will try to send somebody from my Joint Staff who is in complete touch with the work of the Combined Staffs. 8. T h e tenacity a n d drive of your Armies is magnificent a n d I congratulate you again. 9. While this coming Conference is a good thing, I still h o p e that you a n d Mr. Churchill a n d I can meet as soon as possible. I personally could a r r a n g e to meet in a place as far as N o r t h Africa between November fifteenth a n d December fifteenth. I know you will u n d e r s t a n d that I cannot be away from Washington m o r e than about twenty days because, u n d e r o u r Constitution, n o one can sign for me when I am away. 10. In r e g a r d T u r n i n g now to a Commission to sit in Sicily in connection with carrying out of further settlements with Italy, why not send an officer to Eisenhower's h e a d q u a r t e r s where h e would join the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject? Roosevelt [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6? Quebec, 1943, pp. 1303-5.]

Robert Murphy, still attached to Eisenhower's headquarters in Algiers, reported on September 3 that de Gaulle and his supporters on the French National Committee were insisting that the French Army, of which Giraud was Commander in Chief, should come under civilian control, that is, the control of the committee. In addition, de Gaulle proposed that the committee should have the power to designate civilian administrators in liberated France as well as the French Empire. Giraud continued to insist that he alone commanded the military forces of France and also claimed that all aid furnished by the United States had been given to him personally. The threat that de Gaulle might gain complete dominance prompted Roosevelt to propose sending Murphy's telegram to Churchill along with this forwarding memo. T h e President eventually decided not to pass on the memo and cable to the Prime Minister and instead, on October 13, asked General Marshall to keep an eye on the situation. T h e "prima donna" and the "old gentleman" referred to de Gaulle and Giraud respectively.

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R—350/1, memo, not sent Washington Sept. 7, 1943

Memorandum for W.S.C. Please read and speak to me about this. I have very distinct feelings that we should not send further equipment or munitions to the French Army in North Africa if our prima donna is to seize control of it from the old gentleman. F.D.R. [FDR] [MR]

ATTACHMENT TO R-350/1

The following is a telegram from Mr. Murphy in Algiers to the State Department, dated September 3, 1943. De Gaulle has raised the issue regarding the control of the Committee over military affairs, following recognition by the Allied Governments and the ensuing clarification of the Committee's position. He has sent to Giraud a very confidential memorandum asking the latter to approve a more clearly defined control of the Committee over the CINC and military activities and the limitation of military power to operations against the enemy and armed force organization. Continuing, the memorandum states that the powers exercised by the CINC in accordance with French law establishing a "state of siege" should be turned over to the responsible civil administrators and that the Committee should control all secret services, amalga[ma]ted under one direction. It is requested that the existence of the memorandum in question not be divulged as it was reported to me in the greatest secrecy. Further along this line, the possibility of having only one President of the Committee, which in this case would be De Gaulle, and the appointment of a defense commissioner has been suggested. With respect to military authority, the divergence is being further emphasized by the insistence of Giraud that alone, he has the authority to speak for the army, and that in his personal capacity the rearmament furnished by the United States of America was given to him. The authority to designate civilian administrators in territories of metropolitan France as they are liberated and the question of the organization and control of resistance movements have been brought to the fore in the discussions of the Committee. The extreme elements of the Gaullist faction have, it seems clear, decided that the time has come to make a further effort to lessen Giraud's power as the CINC as well as to strengthen De Gaulle's own control over even the civilian moderate elements of the

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Committee. The discussions which have taken place in the last few days in the Committee meetings have led to no solution as yet, it is understood. Whatever solution is reached, the moderate element of the Committee insist, the decision will preserve collective responsibility of all members which is the basis of its recognition by the Allied Governments. The fear is beginning to be expressed as discussions of this nature continue, that unless the Committee is able to rid themselves of the personal differences and devote more attention to the prosecution of the war the French people when liberated will have lost respect for the Committee, and the Committee itself will lose the possibility of speaking for them when the time comes. However, it is likely, the principal attention here will be centered on these political matters until the French Army is able to participate more actively in the prosecution of the war. [MR]

Away from the discipline imposed by his War Cabinet and the British Chiefs of Staff, Churchill put to paper for Roosevelt some thoughts on strategy in light of the developments in Italy. (This kind of document, which Churchill seems to have used both as a sounding board and as a means of sorting out his own ideas, appears regularly in the British records, particularly in the Cabinet papers and the Prime Minister's operational files—PREMIER 3. Although we have numerous accounts of Roosevelt's oral statements on such broad questions, written memoranda and papers of this type initiated by the President are rare.) Churchill's proposal to transfer portions of the British fleet to the Pacific was not carried out until much later because of renewed demands for convoy escorts in the North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean, particularly with the resumption of convoys to northern Russia. Churchill's assumption that the Germans would retreat to either the Apennines or the River Po proved erroneous, and the Italian campaign eventually bogged down (see map, p. 453). Nor did the Italians ever contribute significantly to the Allied war effort against Germany. In paragraphs which may have been written with General Marshall in mind, Churchill argued that OVERLORD could not be "whittled down" and that the Allies must be prepared to take a defensive position in Italy in case the Germans launched a strong counter-attack before the end of 1943. Although he remained acutely aware of the Balkans, Churchill emphasized the need to send aid, not troops, to Italian and Partisan forces there. He did believe that greater efforts should be made to regain the Germanheld islands in the Aegean Sea, as well as Corsica and Sardinia, but he expected French and Italian forces to bear the brunt of such actions.

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C—414/6, memo Washington Sept. 9, 1943 Mr. President. 1. It would surely be convenient before we separate to have a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of the Staff in order to take stock of the new world situation which will arise on the assumption that the present battle for Naples and Rome is successful and that the Germans retreat to the line of the Apennines or the Po. 2. Assuming we get the Italian Fleet, we gain not only that Fleet but the British Fleet which has hitherto contained it. This very heavy addition to our naval power should be used at the earliest possible moment to intensify the war against Japan. I have asked the First Sea Lord to discuss with Admiral King the movement of a powerful British Battle Squadron, with cruisers and ancillaries, to the Indian Ocean via the Panama Canal and the Pacific. We need a strong Eastern Fleet based on Colombo during the amphibious operations next year. I should be very glad if it were found possible for this Fleet to serve under the American Pacific Command and put in at least four months of useful fighting in the Pacific before taking up its Indian Ocean station. We cannot afford to have idle ships. I do not know, however, how the arrival of such reinforcements would enable the various tasks assigned to United States forces in the Pacific to be augmented. Apart from strategy, from the standpoint of high policy His Majesty's Government would desire to participate in the Pacific war in order to give such measure of assistance as is in their power not only to their American Allies but on account of the obligations to Australia and New Zealand. Such a movement of our ships to and through the Pacific would undoubtedly exercise a demoralizing effect upon Japan who must now be conscious of the very great addition of naval weight thrust against her, and besides this it would surely give satisfaction in the United States as being a proof positive of British resolve to take an active and vigorous part to the end in the war against Japan. 3. The public must be gradually led to realize what we and our Combined Staffs have so fully in mind, namely, the conversion of Italy into an active agent against Germany. Although we could not recognize Italy as an Ally in the full sense, we have agreed she is to be allowed to work her passage and that useful service against the enemy will not only be aided but recompensed. Should fighting break out between Italians and Germans, the public prejudices will very rapidly depart and in a fortnight or so matters may be ripe, if we can so direct events, for an Italian declaration of war against Germany and Japan. The question of the Italian

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flag flying from Italian ships, and even some arrangement of Italians manning those vessels under British or American control, requires consideration. The whole problem of handling and getting the utmost use out of the Italian Navy requires review now on a high level. 4. On the overall assumption of a decisive victory in the Naples area, we are I presume agreed to march northwards up the Italian Peninsula until we come up against the main German positions. If the Italians are everywhere favourable and their Army comes over to help, the deployment of at least a dozen Italian Divisions will be of great advantage in holding the front across Italy and in permitting relief of Allied forces. If, after the battle of Naples is over, we are not seriously resisted south of the main German line, we ought not to be long getting up against it with light forces, and I should hope that by the end of the year at latest we should be confronting it in full strength. If sooner, then better. There can be no question of whittling down OVERLORD. We must not forget at this juncture our agreement to begin moving the seven Divisions away in succession from the beginning of November. All the more important is it to bring Italian Divisions into the line, and our State policy should be adapted to procure this end. 5. I have been contemplating the 1944 campaign in the light of these new possibilities and I remain strongly convinced that we should be very chary of advancing Northward beyond the narrow part of the Italian Peninsula. Of course, if the Germans retreat to the Alps, another situation is presented, but failing that, it would seem beyond our strength, having regard to the requirements of OVERLORD, to broaden out into the Plains of Lombardy. We have also to consider that the Germans, working on interior lines, may perhaps bring a heavier force to bear upon our front in Italy than we shall have there at the end of the year. The possibility of a strong German counter-attack cannot be excluded. I should like it to be considered whether we should not, when we come up against the main German position, construct a strong fortified line of our own, properly sited in depth. Italian military labour could be used on a large scale for this purpose. Italian troops could naturally take part in defending the line. Thus, by the Spring, we should be able in this theatre either to make an offensive if the enemy were weak, and anyhow to threaten one, or on the other hand stand on the defensive, using our Air power which will in the meanwhile have been built up, from behind our fortified line and divert a portion of our troops for action elsewhere either to the West or to the East. I hope this may be studied. 6. We are both of us acutely conscious of the great importance of the Balkan situation. We should make sure that the Mediterranean High Command, absorbed in its present battle, does not overlook the needs of the patriot forces there. The problem of the Italian forces requires im-

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mediate study. The orders of the C.-in-C. Middle East, General Wilson, published today, are well conceived for the moment, but we require to see more clearly exactly what is intended. On the assumption that the Italians can be drawn into the war against Germany, far-reaching possibilities seem to be open. There is surely no need for us to work from the bottom of the Balkans upwards. If we can get an agreement between the patriots and the Italian troops, it should be possible to open quite soon one or more good ports on the Dalmatian coast, enabling munitions and supplies to be sent in by ship, and all forces that will obey our orders raised to good fighting condition. The German situation in all this theatre will become most precarious, especially from the point of view of supplies. When the defensive line across Northern Italy has been completed, it may be possible to spare some of our own forces assigned to the Mediterranean theatre to emphasize a movement North and North-Eastward from the Dalmatian ports. For the moment the utmost efforts should be put forth to organize the attack upon the Germans throughout the Balkan Peninsula and to supply agents, arms and good direction. 7. Lastly, the question of Islands is now ripe for consideration. Sardinia, I imagine, will come over immediately, though we may have to send some help to the Italians in procuring the disarmament of any German units there. In Corsica the Germans have perhaps already been overcome, but surely here is the place for a French expedition. Even if only one Division could be sent by the French National Committee, the Island could probably be quickly liberated and there is little doubt that its manhood would enable at least another Division or two to be raised locally. General Wilson's telegram about the operations against Rhodes and other Islands in the Dodecanese is all right so far as it goes, but I am not satisfied that sufficient use is being made under the present conditions of the forces in the Middle East. I am making an immediate enquiry into the exact location of all troops above Battalion strength, hoping that improvised expeditionary forces and garrisons may be provided for various minor ventures. 8. We must expect far-reaching reactions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, and these again may produce a movement from the Turk without our having to make any request or incur any obligation to him. All this again requires military and political consideration on the high level and I feel that we should do well to take a preliminary survey this afternoon if you are agreeable. [Initialed] W.S.C. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. Si Quebec, 1943, pp. 1287-90.]

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This proposed public message to Marshal Badoglio encouraged Italian resistance to the Germans, but made no commitments on the part of the United States or Britain. (The message was cabled to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.)

C-414/7 Washington [via Map Room] Sept. 10, 1943 This is from Admiral Brown to the President . . . , the Prime Minister suggests the following from you and him to Marshal Badoglio. T h e President and the Prime Minister have sent the following message to Marshal Badoglio: "Marshal. It has fallen to you in the h o u r of your country's agony to take the first decisive steps to win peace and freedom for the Italian people a n d to win back for Italy an honourable place in the civilization of E u r o p e . You have already freed your country from Fascist servitude. T h e r e remains the even more important task of cleansing the Italian soil from the G e r m a n invaders. Hitler, t h r o u g h his accomplice Mussolini, has b r o u g h t Italy to the verge of ruin. He has driven the Italians into disastrous campaigns in the sands of Egypt and the snows of Russia. T h e Germans have always deserted the Italian troops on the battlefield, sacrificing them contemptuously in o r d e r to cover their own retreats. Now Hitler threatens to subject you all to the cruelties he is perpetrating in so many lands. Now is the time for every Italian to strike his blow. T h e liberating armies of the Western World are coming to your rescue. We have very strong forces and are entering at many points. T h e G e r m a n terror in Italy will not last long. T h e y will be extirpated from your land a n d you, by helping in this great surge of liberation, will place yourselves once more a m o n g the true and long-proved friends of Italy from whom you have been so wrongfully estranged. T a k e every chance you can. Strike h a r d a n d strike home. Have faith in your future. All will come well. March forward with your American and British friends in the great world movement towards Freedom, Justice a n d Peace." [Initialed] WSC [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. £i Quebec, 1943, pp. 1285-86.]

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Roosevelt suggested one minor change in Churchill's message to Badoglio. (Roosevelt's proposal was sent to his Naval Aide, Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, who obtained Churchill's concurrence. The full message was then sent to Eisenhower and released to the press.)

R-350/2 Hyde Park, N.Y. Sept. 10, 1943 [Roosevelt to Churchill] T h e r e are two thoughts in above. T h e first is to Badoglio, the second to the Italian people. This I would make clear by adding at top page two [par. 3 of message to Badoglio] the words "People of Italy". T h e n it can be sent to Badoglio a n d broadcast. If OK with the P.M. it can be sent at once. [Initialed] F.D.R. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. Gf Quebec, 1943, p. 1286.]

C-414/8, letter On the Train, Quebec, Can. September 13, 1943 My d e a r Franklin, I send you herewith a n u m b e r of notes and telegrams which I have p r e p a r e d , arising out of o u r talks yesterday. These include a telegram to U.J. which, as it mentions your affairs, I have asked my Government to hold till I get your okay with any alterations. We have all greatly enjoyed this trip, and I cannot tell you what a pleasure it has been to me, to Clemmie and to Mary to receive your charming hospitality at the White House and at Hyde Park. You know how I treasure the friendship with which you have h o n o u r e d me a n d how profoundly I feel that we might together d o something really fine and lasting for o u r two countries and, t h r o u g h them, for the future of all. Yours ever, [initialed] W. [MR. FRUS, Quebec Conf, 1943, pp. 1336-37.]

T h e messages sent by Churchill during his trip to Washington and return to Canada were assigned the codename WELFARE. The appropriate number was later assigned by British communications personnel.

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C-414/8

Most Secret & Personal Following is text of draft message from Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Begins. The President and I were both very glad to get your appreciative message of September 10th. [See Stalin/WSC, doc. 192.] We have a most intensive desire to help your grand efforts in every possible way. We are each sending you our proposed agenda separately. We shall be very glad to have your list of subjects [for the Foreign Ministers' Conference]. Nothing should be barred out but some may be more suitable for verbal discussion when the heads of government meet. The President seems to think that November 15th would be a good date to aim at for our personal meeting and I will of course conform to whatever arrangements are convenient to you two. There appears to be a very real constitutional difficulty in the President going so far as Teheran and I still hope you will consider Egypt or perhaps a Syrian port like Beirut. One way of holding conference is for us each to have a ship and meet in one of the harbours of Egypt or Levant or possibly Cyprus. If this idea attracts you we could place a fine ship entirely at your disposal and you could send on ahead all your advance party, cypher staff, etc so as to be completely independent of us and at the same time in constant contact with your own war front. Wherever we go we think the press should be entirely banished and the whole place sealed off by an armed cordon so that we are not disturbed in any way in these conversations upon which, I repeat, the hope of the future world depends. [FRUS, Teheran Canf., p. 26]

SECOND ENCLOSURE TO

C-414/8

Quebec, Can. September 13, 1943

Welfare No. —. Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Most secret and Personal. The President thinks we should be prepared to raise with Stalin, at the Foreign Secretaries Conference in the first instance, the postwar world organization. Everything should have relation to an interim or emergency period of unspecified duration, during which permanent structures could

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be shaped and built. In this period he contemplates three forms of United Nations collaboration: (a) The Four Powers, who would guarantee by force the maintenance of peace and order and the enforcement of Armistice conditions. (b) An Executive Council embracing additional members of the United Nations, making up in all and step by step a total of eleven. (c) A general Assembly of all the United Nations in which, presumably, respectable neutrals might find their place. This would provide opportunities for the ventilation of opinion and would be able to pass resolutions but would enjoy no executive power. I repeat that the whole of the above is for the interim Armistice period only and in no way prejudices final decisions as to world order, or of course the natural Anglo-American special relationship. W.S.C. [FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6f Quebec, 1943, p. 1337]

(Churchill's minute, referred to below, was not found in the files. C C S . 310/ 2 is in FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6f Quebec, 1943, p. 1315.) THIRD ENCLOSURE TO

C-414/8

Quebec, Can. Sept. 13, 1943 Welfare No. —. Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Most Secret and Personal. The President agreed with my minute to him of September 10 regarding recommendation in C C S . 310/2 about setting-up of AngloAmerican Emergency Propaganda Committees for Pacific, European and South-East Asian theatres, as follows: (Begins) As there seems to be general agreement on this proposal I think we should accept it. In spite of the increased number of Committees which it involves, it clearly would in no way affect any guidance which you or I might wish to give separately or joindy on special occasions. I am therefore recommending my Government to concur. (Ends) W.S.C. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. &f Quebec, 1943, p. 1338.]

Roosevelt's attitude regarding records of private discussions is set forth clearly in a memo he wrote to Hull concerning this British suggestion that the minutes of the Council of Four meeting in Paris in 1919 be published: "Incidentally,

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in those meetings of the Big Four in Paris no notes should have been kept. Four people cannot be conversationally frank with each other if somebody is taking down notes for future publication. I feel very strongly about this . . ." (Roosevelt to Hull, Sept. 16, 1943, FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 1338n). F O U R T H ENCLOSURE T O C - 4 1 4 / 8

Quebec, Can. Sept. 13, 1943 Prime Minister t o Foreign Secretary Most secret a n d Personal. Reference C O N C R E T E 679 a n d 797* T h e President has vetoed the publication of the Council of Four minutes of the last war. W.S.C. *Publication of the Minutes of the Paris Peace Conference. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. 6f Quebec, 1943, p. 1338.]

For the first time during the war, the question of the postwar government in Greece—a problem which would bring on a fierce dispute between Roosevelt and Churchill—came u p in talks between the two leaders. T h e Greek King, George II, had supported the dictatorial government of General Ioannis Metaxas, and was criticized widely for that support. In an attempt to regain some popular appeal, the King issued a proclamation on July 4, 1943, promising to hold elections for a constituent assembly within six months after the liberation of Greece. T h e British government had approved the statement in the hope of shoring up the monarchy against various republican groups, particularly the communists. Roosevelt's message to the Greek King expressed the hope that the promise of elections would enable all Greeks to concentrate more on winning the war than on politics. (FRUS, Conf. at Wash. &f Quebec, 1943, p. 1046n.) F I F T H ENCLOSURE T O C - 4 1 4 / 8

Quebec, Can. Sept. 13, 1943 Welfare N o . —. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary. Most secret a n d Personal. Reference C O N C R E T E 798. T h e President is sending a message [to the King of Greece] in terms suitable for publication. His angle as H e a d of a Republican Government is not necessarily identical with ours b u t there is n o difference in aim.

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Meanwhile I see no reason to delay indefinitely the publication of my two messages. W.S.C. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. £i Quebec, 1943, p. 1339.]

Count Carlo Sforza, ex-Foreign Minister under Giolitti in the 1920s and a constant critic of the Italian Fascist regime, had fled to the United States in 1940. As a leader of anti-Fascism in America he exercized significant influence among Italian-Americans particularly in New York State. T h e British, who hoped to shore up the Italian monarchy, considered Sforza's anti-monarchial remarks opportunistic and motivated by personal ambition, and they opposed his trip to the Mediterranean area. S I X T H ENCLOSURE TO C - 4 1 4 / 8

Quebec, Can. Sept. 13, 1943 Welfare No. —. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary. Most secret a n d personal. Reference WELFARE 677. It is agreed that C o u n t Sforza's visit to the Mediterranean is p u t off till further notice a n d that we shall be consulted again. [MR. FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 1339.]

Differences over the terms of a postwar civil aviation agreement would bring on a major dispute between Churchill and Roosevelt in late 1944. At this time, however, the problems were not evident.

C-414/9, memo On the Train, Quebec, Can. Sept. 13, 1943 Civil Aviation Mr. President. 1. I have told o u r Government that you m a d e n o objection when I said that we intended to hold a preliminary Commonwealth meeting in Lond o n or in Canada, a n d that his would be only to focus o u r own British Commonwealth ideas for subsequent discussion with the United States Government.

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2.1 said that, about the proposed International Conference, you thought it might wait till the matter had been discussed at the forthcoming tri­ partite Anglo-Soviet-American meetings. 3. I mentioned that your preliminary views comprised the following: (i) There should be private ownership. (ii) Key points should be available for international use on a reciprocal basis. (iii) Internal traffic should be reserved to internal companies. (iv) Government support may be required on an international basis for certain non-paying routes. WSC [FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, pp. 1339-40. WSC, V, 664.]

The cables Churchill asked Roosevelt to read suggested that the Allies should increase their public support for the Badoglio government and for the Italian King. Paragraph 6 of FO 6222 states: "It is worth considering whether Count Sforza should be brought into the fold. We have hitherto opposed his pro­ posed journey to North Africa .. . since we thought that this would embarrass the Badoglio Government, and the United States are holding up his journey on those grounds. It may be that in the changed circumstances Badoglio would be glad of his support" (PREM 3/243/5/253).

C-415 HMS Renown—at sea [via U.S. Army, London] Sept. 18, 1943, 1010 Ζ Prime Minister to President Personal and Most Secret. See foreign office telegrams to Washington number 6222 and number 6223.1 agree generally with this argument and especially with paragraph 6 about Sforza which might well suit you also. Η. M. Minister at Washington is being instructed to send you telegrams under reference. [MR. PREM 3/243/5/249.]

HMS Renown, with the Churchill party aboard, departed Halifax on Septem­ ber 14 and arrived at Greenock, Scotland, on the morning of September 19. AVALANCHE, the amphibious attack at Salerno, Italy, had begun in the early morning of September 9. German opposition proved greater than ex­ pected, and the quick capture of Naples never materialized. For three days it appeared as if the Germans might even push the invaders back into the sea, but on the fifteenth of September the Germans were forced to pull back and reform their lines. In a cable to Eisenhower, Churchill quoted the Duke

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of Wellington's remark about the Battle of Waterloo: "It was a damned closerun thing" (WSC, V, 147). Harry Hopkins had taken part in the Quebec meeting and had so taxed his frail health that he entered a hospital upon returning to Washington. He did meet with Churchill when the Prime Minister visited Washington, but was obviously exhausted. One thing Hopkins did in hopes of regaining his health was to move out of the White House to an apartment in Georgetown. Roosevelt reportedly never understood Hopkins' reason, and some date the decline of Hopkins' influence to that time.

C-416 HMS Renown—at sea [via London] Sept. 18, 1943 Naval Person to President. Most Secret and Personal. O n Friday [Sept. 17] we are halfway t h r o u g h a suitable and uneventful voyage with many pleasant recollections of my visit. I feel easier about A V A L A N C H E than I did and trust the 8th Army will come into action from today on its southern flank. T h e quality of German resistance shows how h a r d we shall have to fight in OVERLORD. I am anxious to know your reactions to UJ's telegram of Sept. 12. Kindest regards to all. I trust Harry is progressing. [MR*]

As one can guess from the tone of this message, Roosevelt was again at Hyde Park for rest and relaxation. Although he avoided discussions with his doctors about his health, the President had earlier told Churchill that the only way he could maintain his strength was to escape the pressures of Washington on a regular basis. The Quebec Conference and the ensuing Churchill visit to Washington must have been tiring, for he spent eight days, September 16— 24, at his Hudson Valley home.

R-351 Hyde Park, N.Y. Sept. 19, 1943, 7:05 P.M. Personal a n d Secret to the Former Naval Person from the President. Delighted you are all safely home, and I h o p e you had a smooth r u n . AH is quiet here. Congress has been h e r e for a week a n d it is still quiet. My best to all three of you. [MR*. WSC, V, 149. R&C]

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ITALY For the next week, the terms and manner of the Italian surrender preoccupied Churchill and Roosevelt. King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Badoglio were reluctant to violate their sense of honor by declaring war against Germany, though they realized that an armistice and surrender to the Allies was necessary. Although Eisenhower promised nothing beyond unconditional surrender, the inference was that the monarchy might be permitted to survive if it cooperated by joining the war against Germany. The inability of the Allies to protect Rome from a German occupation gave the King and Badoglio an excuse to reject the armistice already signed by their representative, but on September 8 the Allies broadcast the details of the agreement, making it impossible for the Italian government to co-exist with the Germans. The King, along with Badoglio and other members of the government, fled Rome and established the new capital at Brindisi, located on the Adriatic coast of the Italian heel. The Italian Army and air forces put u p little or no resistance to the advancing Germans, much to Eisenhower's disappointment. Rome fell to the Germans within two days, northern Italy was quickly occupied, troops which might have blocked the path of German reinforcements heading for Salerno were quickly disarmed, and Italian forces in Sardinia, Corsica, Greece, the Balkans, and the Aegean islands were disbanded or unable to fight. To cap it all, a company of German glider-borne troops, led by Captain Otto Skorzeny, rescued Mussolini from a mountaintop retreat where the Italian government had imprisoned him. Although Churchill and Roosevelt exchanged no comments about the daring rescue, they were disappointed that the "Head Devil" had escaped their grasp. Not only had they wanted to punish the Fascist leader, but now Hitler could establish an Italian government under Mussolini which would divide Italian loyalties and further diminish the value of the Italian surrender. T h e only bright spot was the surrender of the bulk of the Italian fleet and its successful escape to North Africa and Malta. Although the Germans sank one battleship, this force still totaled four battleships, seven cruisers, and eight destroyers—a very sizeable addition to the Allied navies. With little hope remaining that the King and Badoglio could command Italian troops to fight against the Germans, the debate over surrender terms revolved around two issues: the American government's desire to commit Italy to postwar elections and Churchill's goal of shoring u p the Italian monarchy. In between was Eisenhower, whose aim was to obtain a good measure of local support for the quick victory he hoped for in Italy. In this message, Roosevelt bridged the gap by granting de facto recognition to the Badoglio government as Eisenhower had asked, while indicating that the Italian people would retain the right to choose the form of government they wished.

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R-352 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 20, 1977, 9:49 P.M.

From the President to the Former Naval Person. Personal and Secret. I will send the following message to General Eisenhower immediately upon your concurrence. In view of the existing situation in Italy the earliest practicable action is important. Message begins: 1. You will withhold long term armistice provisions pending further instructions. 2. On the basis of military necessity, you are empowered to make recommendations from time to time to lighten the provisions of the military armistice in order to enable the Italians, within the limit of their capacities, to wage war against Germany. 3. On condition that it declare war on Germany, the present government of Italy be permitted, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 hereunder, to carry on as the government of Italy and as such be treated as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. Such relationship to be based on the clear understanding that it is not in any way to prejudice the untrammeled right of the people of Italy to decide on the form of government they will eventually have; that no final form of the government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian territory. 4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio Government on military, political and administrative matters. 5. You will encourage, in all practicable ways, the vigorous use, under your direction, of the Italian armed forces against Germany. 6. You are authorized to inform the French military authorities of the above to the extent that you deem advisable. [MR*. pFRUS, 1943, II, 373-74. pWSC, V, 190-91.]

R-353 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 21, 1943, 1 0 : 5 5 A.M.

Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Please make following correction in my Number 352 of September 20:

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In paragraph four of proposed message to Eisenhower please insert "will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission" between "contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission" and "under the Allied Commander in Chief so that now the sentence will read "The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio Government on military, political and administrative matters." Roosevelt [MR*]

Churchill's response to Eisenhower's request for instructions crossed the President's two messages.

C-417 London Sept. 21, 1943 Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. I send you in my immediately following message our comments on Eisenhower's proposals for dealing with the Badoglio Government. (NAF 409 of September 18.) If you agree, I hope you will instruct Eisenhower accordingly. I am informing the Soviet Government of the line I propose we should take. If you agree, please back this up. We cannot delay action or hamper Eisenhower in these critical days. [MR*. FRUS, 1943,11,371.]

Most of the non-Fascist leaders in Italy were either old pre-Mussolini figures like Count Sforza or elderly academics such as philosopher Benedetto Croce, hence Churchill's comment in paragraph three about Professors. Most of these men were decidedly anti-British and made frequent references to the injustices done Italy during the Paris Peace Conference following World War I. Nevertheless, they would be useful. Ban, located north of Brindisi, had facilities for making a radio broadcast, although the transmitter was too weak to reach very far. (The differences in text between this document, taken from the Map Room papers, and that printed in FRUS are minor and probably stem from the fact that one was transmitted directly to the American government while the other went through the British Embassy in Washington.)

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C-418 London [via U.S. Army] Sept. 21, 1943, 0235 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Following are our comments referred to in my number 417 as sent to Macmillan. Begins following from Prime Minister to Resident Minister Algiers: 1. After considering your telegram number 1812 and NAF 409 I and my colleagues in the War Cabinet have come to the following conclusions. 2. It is vital to build up the authority of the King and the Brindisi Administration as a government and have unity of command throughout Italy. The way to do this is indicated in the Foreign Secretary's telegram number 1928. Despite Badoglio's broadcast to­ night we still feel it is essential that the King should go to the mi­ crophone at Bari, tell the Italian people he is there and proclaim that Badoglio is carrying on the legitimate government of Italy under his authority. This is needed not only for the Italian people but for the Italian representatives and garrisons abroad. 3. The King and Badoglio should be told that they must build up the broadest based Anti Fascist coalition government possible. Any healthy elements that can deliver some good should be rallied in this crisis. These points should be made plain in the King's broadcast. It would be very useful if Count Sforza and the Professors who claim to represent the 6 parties were willing to join in the common effort. 4. It must however be clearly understood that none of these pro­ visional arrangements dictated by war needs, will stand in the way of the full choice by the Italian people of the form of Democratic Government which they prefer. 5. The question of giving the Badoglio Government and [an] Allied status does not come into our immediate programme. Cobelligerency is good enough. On this footing we should work for the gradual conversion of Italy into an effective national force against Germany, but, as we have said, she must work her passage. Useful service against the enemy will be recognized by us in the adjustment and working of the armistice terms. 6. In return we expect Badoglio to continue to work for the Allies on the basis of the armistice. Our principle will be payment by results. 7. Badoglio should be free to declare war on Germany, and by so doing he would at once become, though not an Ally, a cobelligerent. 8. Badoglio can be told that it is no part of our plan to install Allied Military Government everywhere. If he will cooperate we are ready

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to hand over territory to his government as quickly as it is free from the enemy. This offer applies to the historic mainland of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia. The dealings of the United Nations with the Italian Government in the territories which they are allowed to administer will be carried out through a Control Commission. 9. It would make it much easier for us all if the instrument of surrender even though somewhat superseded could now be signed. It is true that many of the clauses could not be operated by the Brindisi Administration in their present situation. But as we go up the Peninsula and turn over territory to the Italian Government, those questions will become real. We do not want to put ourselves in the position of having to haggle over every requirement with the government. The longer we leave it, the more difficult it becomes to get the instrument signed, so I hope Eisenhower will get Badoglio's signature to it as soon as possible on the basis suggested in the Foreign Secretary's telegrams (Nos 1905 to Algiers and 6275 to Washington). 10. The stipulation about Mussolini was of course governed by physical facts: but should certainly stand for the record. 11. This programme should be put to the King and Badoglio at once. The first essential is that the King should make the public announcement suggested. This should not surely await final refinements of policy. 12. I am asking the President, if he agrees with this programme, to instruct Eisenhower accordingly. I am also informing the Soviet Government. Meanwhile you should without waiting urge the King to broadcast at once as proposed in paras. 2 and 3. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 372-73. pWSC, V, 189-90.]

The President's reservations about the value of any speech by King Victor Emmanuel III were borne out when, in an announcement made on the Bari radio, reference was made to "the King of Italy and Albania and Emperor of Ethiopia." Embarrassed, Churchill instructed Macmillan to ensure that such folly was not repeated, but the damage had already been done (WSC, V, 195).

R-354 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 21, 1943, 11:30 A.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person. Secret and Personal. Receipt is acknowledged of your No. 418 of September 21 suggesting a reply to Eisenhower's No. 409.

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My No. 352, which was also sent to Moscow, evidently crossed your No. 418. On the whole I very much prefer my No. 352 as instructions to Eisenhower and I will await a reply from you before taking further action. I have no objection to the King's making an address but from things I hear I do not know how effective he might be. I think we can safely leave this to Eisenhower. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

C-419 London Sept. 22, 1943

Prime Minister to President. Thank you for your Nr. 354 of Sept 21. Our two messages do not seem to me to conflict on any important point, except the question of withholding the long terms. I defer to you on this. We will, therefore, accept yours as the directive but send also ours as amended, as commentary. [MR*]

R-355 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 23, 1943, 12:30 P.M.

From the President to the Former Naval Person. Personal and Secret. Your number 419. I have sent to General Eisenhower as a directive agreed upon by both of us my message as sent to you in my 352. I also sent him your message to me number 418 as a commentary. Roosevelt [MR*]

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T h e Soviet government insisted upon a harsh, unconditional peace with Italy—a demand which, for the moment, suited British designs.

C-420 London Sept. 24, 1943 F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Secret. Following has just arrived from U.J. Please let m e know what he has said to you or you to him. It seems to m e that the question of the longer terms might well be considered by the new commission. Message from Stalin dated Sept 22 begins: "I received your message of the 21st Sept. "I agree with your proposal concerning the appeal by radio of the Italian King to the Italian people. But I consider it entirely necessary that, in the appeal of the King, it should be clearly stated that Italy, which capitulated to Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Union, will fight against Germany together with Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. "I also agree with your proposal about the necessity of signing comprehensive armistice terms. In regard to your reservation that certain of these terms cannot be p u t into force at the present m o m e n t , I u n d e r s t a n d this reservation only in the sense that these terms cannot be realized now on the territory which so far is held by the Germans. I n any case, I should like to receive confirmation or the necessary explanation from you on that point." [MR*. pFRUS, 1943, II, 375-76. Stalin/WSC, doc. 195. pWSC, V, 193-94.]

Marshal Badoglio understood the need to declare war on Germany in order to gain favor with the Allies as well as to give prisoner-of-war status to Italian soldiers held by the Germans. T h e King, however, held out for status as a full ally of Britain and the United States plus the prior re-establishment of a legitimate Italian government in Rome. Both men tried to avoid the "long" surrender terms since they were unconditional and made no guarantee to preserve the monarchy, or put any other group in power.

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C-421 London [via U.S. Army] Sept. 24, 1943, 1458 Ζ

Prime Minister to President Personal a n d Secret. My N o . 420 of September 24th. Macmillan now tells m e that he is confident that Badoglio's signature can be obtained to t h e whole set of terms within the next few days a n d that the longer we leave it the m o r e haggling there will be. It may be some time before the new commission can give their views a n d I should myself feel h a p p i e r if we clinched t h e matter now. This might save us a good deal of trouble later on. At Eisenhower's suggestion we have m a d e the preamble less harsh. We have also provided that t h e armistice of September 3rd will remain op­ erative. See also U J Passim. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 376. pWSC, V, 194.]

T h e declaration by Count Sforza predicted by Anthony Eden was a letter to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle in which the Italian politician, well known in the United States as an anti-Fascist, agreed to support the Badoglio government so long as it sought to drive the Germans from Italian soil. Sforza agreed to "adjourn" domestic politics during the war, but carefully avoided endorsing the monarchy. (The Sforza-to-Berle letter is printed below follow­ ing C-845.) Roosevelt had originally intended to send former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles to the Foreign Ministers' Conference, but Cordell Hull, who had forced Welles to resign and believe that Welles was campaigning to discredit him, protested bitterly. Hull's prestige and influence with Congress left Roosevelt little choice, particularly since the President so vividly remem­ bered President Wilson's earlier mistakes.

C-422 London Sept. 25, 1943, 1508 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal. 1. I have not answered U.J.'s telegram in favour of backing u p t h e King of Italy a n d also his remarks about t h e comprehensive terms because I d o not know what line you are taking with him. You will n o d o u b t have received my 420. Macmillan reports that there will be n o difficulty in getting Badoglio to sign.

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2. Eden tells me Sforza plans to make a most helpful declaration, and surely we ought to promote the building up of a broad based Government including Sforza. 3. I was so glad to hear from Harry on the telephone that there is a possibility of Hull coming to the Foreign Office conference. Do please consider favourably the half way house. It took me only 109 hours to cross the Atlantic in the Renown, and the voyage would surely be most restful to Hull. We should be delighted to see him here. The ease and speed of my homeward voyage makes me even wonder whether your own journey should not be by sea, at any rate to Gibraltar or Algiers. I received on the voyage five or six thousand words a day by wireless and was able to send replies every night by one or other of the escort vessels. Therefore, I was in full touch the whole time. [MR*. pWSC, V, 194.]

R-356 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 25, 1943, 12:45 P.M.

To the Former Naval Person from the President. Personal and Secret. Your number 421. I go along with your thought about the long set of terms if signature can be obtained quickly and I am so advising Eisenhower. [FDR] [MR. FRUS, 1943, II, 376. WSC, V, 194.]

Hull suffered from claustrophobia, and the thought of a long airplane flight to Moscow worried him. Hull had first recommended a cable to Churchill asking the Prime Minister if he would support re-opening the question of the location of the Foreign Ministers' meeting, but the receipt of Churchill's previous cable made that unnecessary. The State Department draft also contained a reference to "the effect upon public opinion in this country of Mr. Hull's presence," a statement written as much for Roosevelt as for a proposed message to Churchill (draft message from the President to the Prime Minister, Sept. 23, 1943, attached to R-357, MR).

R-357 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 25, 1943, 12:40 P.M.

Personal and Secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person. I have just sent the following message to Marshal Stalin:

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"I regret that I feel it necessary to reopen the question of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, but on further consideration I am most anxious that Secretary Hull attend in person in the meeting with Mr. Molotov a n d Mr. Eden. "Mr. Hull would find the long flight to Moscow extremely difficult for physical reasons. Would it be possible therefore for the conference to be held in England? It would, I believe, be a great advantage to all of us if Mr. Hull could personally attend the conference. "I feel sure the British would be willing to make the change. Could the date be m a d e October 15 for the opening session?" Roosevelt [MR. pStalMFDR, doc. 116.]

King Victor Emmanuel III, in identical letters to King George VI of England and President Roosevelt, made two major requests: first, that every effort be made to assist him and his government in returning to Rome as soon as possible, and second, that his government be given civil jurisdiction over all territory in Italy occupied by the Allies (FRUS, 1943, II, 374-75).

R-358 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 25, 1943, 3:35 P.M. From the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person. Personal a n d Secret. Prior to the receipt of your 422 the Secretary of War asked General Eisenhower to express his opinion a n d make recommendation o n the letter addressed to m e by the King of Italy. U p o n receipt of a reply from Eisenhower I will communicate further with you. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

The old problem in the French Committee, that of civilian control over the military, again cropped up. General Giraud, the Commander in Chief (CINC) of French military forces, had led an invasion of the historically French island of Corsica. Although no Anglo-American forces took part, the Germans were primarily interested in evacuating the island, and cooperation though not participation by Italian forces made the struggle brief and easy. Giraud unknowingly cooperated with a communist-controlled branch of the Underground, an error which gave de Gaulle all the more reason to demand that Giraud submit to the political leadership of the French Committee.

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R-359 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 25, 1943, 6:50 P.M. Secret and Personal from the President for the Former Naval Person. Murphy reports the following in relation to Corsican expedition by Giraud's forces: "This expedition by French forces has given rise to further discussion with respect to status of CINC in the Committee. "Last Saturday a dispute took place in a meeting which resulted in the abrupt departure of De Gaulle. I was informed by Giraud that in agreement with allied CINC and for reasons of military security he had not divulged to the Committee the preparations which led to the Corsican expedition. Then, twelve hours before departure he had personally informed De Gaulle, who expressed full approval. However, after reflection, De Gaulle apparently lost his temper at the meeting on September 18th and protested against the manner in which preparations had been held secret by the military. He particularly protested against installation of state of seige which puts Corsica directly under the jurisdiction of CINC. As political leader of the Committee, De Gaulle claims he should similarly exercise control. "At the moment the situation is somewhat tense, but Giraud refused to take the matter seriously. He has left secretly for Corsica where he will assume command. This latter move has brought about the charge by some members of the Committee that he is acting without the Committee's authority. "Now General De Gaulle is taking advantage of this discussion to bring up the issue again regarding the CINC, somewhat in the same manner as his proposal referred to in my 1526 of 3 September. He is reviving appointment of a Defense Commissioner and the single presidency of the Committee. "In today's meeting the discussions were acrimonious but it was decided to delay the issue until September 24 when Giraud returns." Roosevelt [MR]

Obsessed by their dislike of de Gaulle, Churchill and Roosevelt seemed to ignore Giraud's refusal to respect the dual presidency of the French Committee. Maurice Thorez was the Secretary of the Executive Committee of the

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French Communist Party. A "Memorandum on Maurice Thorez," attached to the file copy of Churchill's message, labeled Thorez "an ardent adherent to Moscow" and noted that "his present whereabouts are unknown."

C-423 London Sept. 26, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal. Your n u m b e r 359. I sent the following to Macmillan yesterday. 1. T h e recognition of the French Committee by H M G and still more by the United States was based on the dual presidency, a n d you should warn De Gaulle and all o u r friends on the Committee that very grave d a n g e r would be created by a fundamental change of the character. 2. What is the truth in the report that T h o r e z the Communist has arrived in Algiers? Is De Gaulle intriguing with him? [MR]

T h e last sentence of this message was added in Roosevelt's handwriting.

R-360 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 27, 1943, 12:05 P.M. From the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person. Secret and Personal. General Eisenhower has r e c o m m e n d e d that the long term s u r r e n d e r document, when it is signed by the Italian Government, should be kept confidential because of a continuing attack on all armistice terms by the Italian Fascist g r o u p in Rome. I am in a g r e e m e n t with this recommendation of Eisenhower and will await your reaction thereto. It is my present thought that my reply to the King's letter should be as follows: "It is the intention of the Allied Governments to obtain control of Rome at the earliest practicable date as an o p e n city if practicable and if the enemy will agree that it is an open city u n d e r the conditions originally proposed by your Government. "It is my desire that civil government in the recovered areas in Italy shall be administered by the Italian Government insofar as is

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permitted by military considerations and u n d e r the supervision of the Allied S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r . "Consideration is now being given to arranging a m o r e favorable exchange for the lira." Eisenhower suggests that an exchange rate of 80 lira to the dollar and 320 to the p o u n d would have the desired effect and would not work a hardship on o u r troops. If it is practicable I should like to have your advice on all of this in time to instruct Eisenhower by September 29 when he will confer with Badoglio. I have not vet received the U. S. Treasury's recommendation. Roosevelt [MR]

Hoping to strengthen the Italian monarchy, the British agreed to allow Count Sforza to return to Italy.

R-361 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 27, 1943, 2:35 P.M. T h e President to the Former Naval Person. Secret and Personal. I have learned that Sforza will d e p a r t as soon as necessary arrangements can be m a d e . This should be not later than October second and possibly on September thirtieth. Roosevelt [MR]

Apparently the Soviet government, like the British, preferred the long terms in Italy since they limited the authority of the Allied commander, Eisenhower. T h e Russians hoped to participate more fully in the Military-Political Commission for Italy, seemingly afraid that the Allied Commission would fall under Eisenhower's domination. Roosevelt was correct in surmising that there had been an error in transmission, making paragraph 4 oppose any Italian entry into the war against Germany. (See R—364.)

R-362 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 27, 1 9 4 3 , 9 : 1 0 P.M.

T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President Personal a n d Secret. I am sending you for your information a message I have just received from Molotov. You will notice that Paragraph 4 is exactly the opposite

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of the view expressed by Uncle Joe in his message to you which you passed on to me in your No. 420. I am having the State Department check Paragraph 4 to see if it is an error in coding or transmission, and if necessary, to go to Molotov to see if it is an error originating in the Soviet Foreign Office. Message for the Secretary of State from Moscow dated September 26 begins: "A secret message dated September 25 was delivered at the Embassy this morning, addressed to the Secretary of State and signed by Molotov. As translated by an officer of the Embassy, the message reads as follows: "Having considered your letter of September 22,1943, which gives the contents of the President's proposed message to General Eisenhower concerning Italy, it is considered necessary by the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government of the following: "One. In view of the situation existing in Italy at the present time, the Soviet Government considers it particularly necessary to expedite the signature with Italy of detailed armistice terms. "Two. Obviously, the Allies must be concerned with the strict execution by Italy, under Allied control, of the detailed terms of the armistice ratified and agreed upon by them. The Soviet Government therefore, sees no reason, as is proposed in point two of the message, for giving instructions dealing with the lightening of the terms of the military armistice for Italy, especially since from the contents of point two, it is not exacdy clear what lightening of the terms is being considered. It should also be borne in mind that a change in the provisions ratified by the Allied Governments can take place obviously only with the agreement of the Governments concerned. "Three. It is considered by the Soviet Government that the establishment of an Allied Commission with the powers and functions described in point four of the message is not necessary. As is well known, the Military Political Commission was established by decision of the three Governments, after the ratification of the detailed armistice terms. As a result of this, a controlled commission as proposed in article 37 of the detailed terms should not be needed. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, therefore, the work of the Military Political Commission should include the direction and coordination of the activities of all military bodies organizing conquered enemy territory and of any Allied civil authorities concerned with the armistice and control over execution of the armistice terms. Consequendy, in the functions of the Military Political Commission, there should be included the issuance from time to time of directives and instructions on military, administrative and political questions for the

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Badoglio Government. Operational military questions should remain entirely under the Allied Commander in Chiefs direction. "Therefore, the Soviet Government sees no reason to establish an Allied Commission with the above mentioned functions under the direction of General Eisenhower. "Four. The Soviet Government is opposed to Italy fighting together with the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union against Germany. "Five. The inalienable right of the Italian People, as expressed in point three of the message, to decide the form of Government which they will adopt eventually is agreed upon by the Soviet Government, as are points five and six of the proposed statement." they will adopt eventually is agreed upon by the Soviet Government, as are points five and six of the proposed statement." End of message from Molotov. Roosevelt [MR*. pFRUS, 1943, II, 377-78.]

C-424 London Sept. 28, 1943, 1020 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Secret. Your Nr 360. 1. We agree that the long term surrender document should be kept secret for the present. I have no doubt U J will concur but it would be well if you told him our views speaking for both of us. 2. We think it would be a mistake to talk about making Rome an open city as it may hamper our forward movement and will any way not bind the enemy. We should prefer therefore to omit the words beginning "As an open city" down to the words "Proposed by your government". 3.1 am asking the Treasury about the exchange rate and will cable you tomorrow. I agree with Eisenhower that we should not treat the Italian population unfairly. 4. Your Nr 361. I am very glad about Sforza. Badoglio would be very foolish not to embrace him after his generous letter. A shotgun marriage will have to be arranged if necessary. [MR. FRUS, 1943, II, 378. pWSC, V, 195.]

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Sforza's anti-monarchism annoyed Churchill, hence the Prime Minister's ref­ erence to Balaam, a name used in British literary circles to describe venal, time-serving political figures. Although the message from Molotov had been changed in decoding, Churchill's angry response in paragraph 2 is revealing. Paragraph 3 refers to a secret attack on September 21, when two British midget submarines penetrated the German-held harbor at Altenfiord, Nor­ way, and planted charges which damaged the main propulsion turbines of the German battleship Tirpitz. Putting that warship out of action made it possible to consider resuming the convoys to northern Russia.

C-425 London [via U.S. Army] Sept. 28, 1943, 1206 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Secret. 1. My N o . 424 Para 4 referring to your No. 361. According to reports h e r e Sforza has been abusing a n d deriding the King of Italy in a public speech. Surely h e must be cautioned that h e must play with t h e team. We don't want him to d o a Balaam on us. 2. Your N o . 362. We think " n o t " must have been omitted in Para 4, but this will be cleared u p by your action. We cannot be p u t in a position where o u r 2 Armies are doing all the fighting but the Russians have a veto a n d must be consulted u p o n any m i n o r variation of the armistice terms which Eisenhower considers militarily essential. Unconditional sur­ r e n d e r a n d t h e terms expressing it are the basic principle. T h e Com­ m a n d e r in Chief must be free to apply it as, when and how he thinks most helpful. 3. T h e Russians have d e m a n d e d the renewal of t h e Arctic convoys. We are looking into this a n d I h o p e something may be possible between now a n d O V E R L O R D . Most secret. We believe we have d a m a g e d Tirpitz a n d that she will have to go back to G e r m a n y for docking. If this should be so, it should give us 3 or 4 m o n t h s easement in the n o r t h . [MR]

Because the King of Italy, in his letter to England's King George and President Roosevelt, had asked for a more favorable rate of exchange than had been given the lira in Sicily, the matter commanded the attention of the national leadership.

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C-426 London Sept. 29, 1943, 0006 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal. Reference last p a r a g r a p h your n u m b e r 360 and 3rd p a r a g r a p h my n u m b e r 424. T r e a s u r y view is that there is no economic justification for reduction in the rate at this particular j u n c t u r e . T h e y think it m o r e t h a n likely in view of inflationary tendencies at present operating that even the existing rate may shortly be found to be too low. If the rate had m e a n t i m e been r e d u c e d the ensuing deterioration would be the m o r e disappointing to the Italians a n d we should certainly be exposed to embarrassing criticisms here. [MR*]

Eisenhower continued to push for an Italian declaration of war against Ger­ many in the hope that it would aid his advance toward Rome. King Victor Emmanuel, apparently insensitive to the precariousness of his position, con­ tinued to hold out for what amounted to a full recognition of the legitimacy of his rule, in spite of provisions in the surrender document which called for postwar elections.

R-363 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 29, 1943, 12:30 P.M. T h e President to F o r m e r Naval Person. Personal a n d Secret. T h e following message is received from General Eisenhower: " I n o r d e r to insure m a x i m u m effect a n d clearly define Italian position consider it most desirable that j o i n t a n n o u n c e m e n t by Prime Minister a n d President be m a d e explaining cobelligerent status. An­ n o u n c e m e n t to follow immediately after release of Italian declaration war on Germany. Suggest simultaneous release L o n d o n a n d Wash­ ington. "Please say if this r e c o m m e n d a t i o n is a p p r o v e d . " T h e following is submitted for your consideration as a suitable j o i n t statement from both of us:

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"The governments of Great Britain and the United States acknowledge the position of the Italian government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept with appreciation the active cooperation of the Italian government and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since September 8 culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany have, in fact, made Italy a co-belligerent and the American and British governments will continue to treat with the Italian government on that basis (add the Soviet government if concurrence is received). The two governments acknowledge the Italian government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy and emphasize that the relationship which has developed between the government of Italy and the governments of the United Nations is based on the clear understanding that it will not in any way prejudice the military interests of the United Nations or the absolute and untrammeled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have." I will await your reply. Roosevelt [GCM] [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 378-79.]

R-364 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 29, 1943, 7:00 P.M. For the Former Naval Person from the President. Secret and Personal. Reference my number 362 to you dated 27 September. We have just received word that there was an error in translation in the message from Moscow. The correction now makes paragraph four read: "The Soviet Government is not opposed to Italy's fighting together with the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union against Germany." Roosevelt [MR]

Since Roosevelt was prepared to use Sforza as a lever against the Italian monarchy, he did not reflect Churchill's anger at Sforza's criticisms of the King of Italy.

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R-365 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Sept. 30, 1943, 12:05 P.M.

To the Former Naval Person from the President. Secret and Personal. Referring to your 425 in regard to Sforza playing with the team. His public speech was to say the least not complimentary to the King of Italy. I find, however, in a recording of his September 26th speech the fol­ lowing extracts which indicate that he may be useful to our war effort. "With the present leaders of Italy, if they behave well, if they wage a war well, our duty is to go to war all of us and to oust the Germans out of Italy." "I say so out of my only main desire to do a thing which helps victory—we may rally around any government which enjoys the con­ fidence of the Allies if this government for the time being proves that it is able to wage a war and to oust the Germans out of Italy." "If I had to proclaim a republic tomorrow, I would say No—First of all we must oust the Germans out of Italy. This is what the Italians want but, when Italy is free, the Italians will decide." I am delighted with your news of the Tirpitz and I hope the damage was effective. Roosevelt [MR*. pWSC, V, 198.]

C-427 London [via U.S. Army] Sept. 30, 1943, 2050 Ζ

Personal and Most Secret. Former Naval Person to President. Your Nr 363. I agree that we should make a joint announcement, but would it not be a good chance of getting U J in too? It is clear now, from the correction of Molotov's message, that he does accept the Italians as co-belligerents. It is true that we may lose a few days in communicating with Moscow, but this delay seems relatively unimportant compared with the value of Russian participation. If you agree, would you put it to Stalin in the form that we wish an announcement of the kind made: will he join with us in making it, or would he prefer us to go ahead without him? Of course we should consider any drafting alterations he might wish to propose.

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I myself would like to see several changes, and my immediately following telegram embodies these. If you see no objection to them, would you, if you agree to approach Stalin, put the text to him in this form. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 380. WSC, V, 196.]

C-428 London Sept. 30, 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. Following is amended text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. "The governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledge the position of the Royal Italian Government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept the active cooperation of the Italian nation and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since Sept. 8th and the brutal maltreatment by the Germans of the Italian population, culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany have in fact made Italy a co-belligerent and the American, British and Soviet governments will continue to work with the Italian government on that basis. The three governments acknowledge the Italian government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have. "The relationship of co-belligerency between the governments of Italy and the United Nations governments cannot of itself affect the terms recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by the agreement between the Allied governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian government may be able to afford to the United Nations' cause." [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 380-81. WSC, V, 196-97.]

After explaining all of the naval commitments Britain had to meet, Churchill told Stalin that the convoys to northern Russia could be resumed. The British were genuinely angered by Russian restrictions on the movement of British naval personnel in Soviet ports, but the Prime Minister's plea had little effect. (This cable is dated Sept. 31, but should probably be Oct. 1.)

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C-429 London Sept. 31, 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Most Secret. I send you herewith a telegram we have received from Molotov last week, and the answer I have now sent. The running of these four convoys will be a great strain to us and also a valuable boon to them. We therefore thought it right to put before him the ill usage of our people, only a few hundred during their stay in North Russia. You will see that I have taken for granted the fact that you would wish to participate in the convoys, as so much of your stuff is waiting to be shipped and of your extreme regret at the time when we had to abandon the convoys. Following is text of telegram from Η Μ Ambassador, Moscow, referred to. Begins: "M. Molotov sent for me on the evening of Sept 21st to hand me a long memorandum about convoys. "After recapitulating the substance of M. Molotov's communication to Sir O. Sargent of Aug 25th and of reply sent to him on Sept 6th, the memorandum stated that the Soviet Government had naturally borne in mind the proviso contained in the Prime Minister's message of March 30th to Stalin, but that reasons given by His Majesty's Government for non resumption of convoys were not supported by facts. The Soviet Government wishes to remind His Majesty's Gov­ ernment: (1) of the statement contained in joint message of Aug 19th from the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt about 'LIFEBELT' that the submarines of Germany abandoned the Northern Atlantic and were concentrating on the southern route; and (2) of the claim in joint statement issued by MOI and United States Bureau of Military Information on Sept 11th regarding Naval losses in August that the enemy had not attempted to attack cargo ships in the northern part of the Atlantic and that the chances of attacks on submarines had been comparatively rare. "These facts prove that navigation conditions in North Atlantic since May have not been dangerous for convoys proceeding to north­ ern ports of Soviet Union. "This more favourable position, the increased Naval strength of the Allies and the elimination of the Italian fleet which allowed the convoys to pass through the Mediterranean instead of around the Cape and thus set free escort ships for northern route, made a further

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postponement of convoys quite unjustifiable. The resumption was more necessary since the Soviet Union had this year received by the northern route less than one third of last year's supplies (249097 tons as against 764337 tons). "His Majesty's Government's references to the inadequate carrying capacity of Persian railways in northern zone only made resumption of convoys more necessary, as had been pointed out in Soviet memorandum of Aug 25th and the Soviet Government therefore maintained that in deciding the question of resumption of convoys, due weight should be given to this factor, which is of the gravest importance for the whole question of Soviet supplies. "In view of the above circumstances and of the fact that the Soviet armies were now for the third successive month undertaking wide and most strenuous offensive on almost the whole German front for the success of which every intensification and increase in supply of armaments and other material was important the Soviet Government insisted upon the urgent resumption of convoys and expected His Majesty Government to take all necessary measures within the next few days. "Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Government attached very great importance to the matter and in handing me this memorandum he repeated orally all its arguments which I countered with the obvious replies, reminding him of the unhappy fate of our convoys last summer owing to the presence of German capital ships in Norwegian Fjords. If we were able to dispose satisfactorily of German fleet, I said that I thought convoys would be resumed without delay." Ends. Following is text of telegram I have just sent to Stalin. Begins: "I have received your request for the reopening of the convoys to North Russia. I and all my colleagues are most anxious to help you and the valiant armies you lead to the utmost of our ability. I do not therefore reply to the various controversial points made in Monsieur Molotov's communication. Since June 22, 1941, we have always done our best in spite of our own heavy burdens to help you defend your own country against the cruel invasion of the Hitlerite gang, and we have never ceased to acknowledge and proclaim the great advantages that have come to us from the splendid victories you have won, and from the deadly blows you have dealt the German armies. "For the last four days, I have been working with the Admiralty to make a plan for sending a few series of convoys to North Russia. This entails very great difficulties: "First, the Batde of the Atlantic has begun again. The U-boats have set about us with a new kind of acoustic torpedo, which has proved

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effective against the escorting vessels when hunting U-boats. "Secondly, we are at very full stretch in the Mediterranean, building up an army in Italy of about six hundred thousand men by the end of November, and also trying to take full advantage of the Italian collapse in the Aegean Islands and the Balkan Peninsula. "Thirdly, we have to provide for our share of the war against Japan in which the United States are greatly interested, and whose people would be offended if we were lukewarm. "Notwithstanding the above, it is a very great pleasure to me to tell you that we are planning to sail a series of four convoys to North Russia in November, December, January, and February, each of which will consist of approximately thirty five ships, British and American. Convoys may be [sailed in two halves] to meet operational requirements. The first convoy will leave the United Kingdom about November 12, arriving North Russia ten days later, subsequent convoys at about twenty day intervals. We intend to withdraw as many as possible of the merchant vessels now in North Russia towards the end of October and the remainder with returning convoy escorts. "However, I must put it on record that this is no contract or bargain, but rather a declaration of our solemn and earnest resolve. On this basis I have ordered the necessary measures to be taken for the sending of these four convoys of thirty five ships. "The Foreign Office and the Admiralty however, request me to put before you for your personal attention, hoping indeed that your own eye may look at it, the following representations about the difficulties we have experienced in North Russia. "If we are to resume the convoys we shall have to reinforce our establishments in North Russia which have been reduced in numbers since last March. The present numbers of Naval personnel are below what is necessary, even for our present requirements, owing to men having to be sent home without relief. Your civil authorities have refused us all visas for men to go to North Russia even to relieve those who are seriously overdue for relief. Monsieur Molotov has pressed His Majesty's Government to agree that the number of British Service personnel in North Russia should not exceed that of the Soviet Service personnel and trade delegation in this country. We have been unable to accept this proposal since their work in quite dissimilar and the number of men needed for war operations cannot be determined in such an unpractical way. Secondly, as we have already informed the Soviet Government, we must ask to be the judges of the personnel required to carry out operations for which we are responsible: Mr. Eden has already given his assurance that the greatest care will be taken to limit the numbers strictly to the minimum.

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"I must therefore ask you to agree to the immediate grants of visas for the additional personnel now required and for your assurance that you will not in future withhold visas when we find it necessary to ask for them in connection with the assistance that we are giving you in North Russia. I emphasize that of about one hundred seventy Naval personnel at present in the north over one hundred fifty should have been relieved some months ago but Soviet visas have been with­ held. The state of health of these men who are unaccustomed to the climatic and other conditions make it very necessary to relieve them without further delay. "We should also wish to send the small medical unit for ARCHANGEL to which your authorities agreed, but for which the necessary visas have not been granted. Please remember that we may have heavy casualties. "I must also ask your help in remedying the conditions under which our service personnel and seamen at present find themselves in North Russia. These men are of course engaged in operations against the enemy in our joint interest and chiefly to bring Allied supplies to your country. They are, I am sure you will admit, in a wholly different position from ordinary individuals proceeding to Russian territory. Yet, they are subjected by your authorities to the following restrictions which seem to me inappropriate for men sent by an Ally to carry out operations of the greatest interest to the Soviet Union. (A) No one may land from one of Η Μ ships or from a British merchant ship except by a Soviet boat in the presence of a Soviet official and after examination of documents on each occasion. (B) No one from a British warship is allowed to proceed alongside a British merchantman without the Soviet authorities being informed beforehand. This even applies to the British Admiral in charge. (C) British officers and men are required to obtain special passes before they can go from ship to shore or between 2 British shore stations. These passes are often much delayed with consequent dis­ location, of the work in hand. (D) No stores, luggage or mail for this operational force may be landed except in the presence of a Soviet official and numerous formalities are required for the shipment of all stores and mail. (E) Private service mail is subjected to censorship, although for an operational force of this kind censorship should, in our view be left in the hands of British service authorities. "The imposition of these restrictions makes an impression upon officers and men alike which is bad for Anglo-Soviet relations, and would be deeply injurious if Parliament got to hear of it. The cu­ mulative effect of these formalities has been most hampering to the

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efficient performance of the men's duties and on more than one occasion to u r g e n t and important operations. No such restrictions are placed u p o n Soviet personnel here. "We have already proposed to Monsieur Molotov that as regards offences against Soviet law committed by personnel of the services and of the ships of the convoys, they should be h a n d e d over to the British service authorities to deal with. T h e r e have been a few such cases, no doubt partially at any rate d u e to the rigorous conditions of service in the north. "I trust indeed, Monsieur Stalin, that you will find it possible to have these difficulties smoothed out in a friendly spirit so that we may each help each other, and the common cause, to the utmost of o u r strength." [MR*. FRUS, 1943, III, 700-703. pWSC, V, 263-66. StalmlWSC, doc. 199.]

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY

RELATIONSHIP

T h e relationship between Churchill and his military leaders and that between Roosevelt and his has spawned one of the enduring myths of the Second World War. Despite a growing body of evidence to the contrary, American legend would have it that the wily British, ever conscious of their postwar requirements for economic and colonial empire, planned military and political strategy with only such goals in mind. The reality was that, like the Americans, the British could not separate politics and warfare, although in the early war years military victory clearly took precedence. Moreover, the separation of civilian and military authority, so glorified by the Americans, was in some ways stronger in the British system. Churchill's generals and admirals had some input into broad political-strategic decisions, but his distrust of the military-in-politics was apparent. (Perhaps with good reason. See, for example, C-593.) As he repeatedly told the Foreign Office (and occasionally Roosevelt), civil administration in liberated/occupied territory was a political function, and the generals were replaced by civilian officials almost before the smoke of battle had cleared. Not so with the Americans. Roosevelt did not consult his Chiefs of Staff on political matters, and when such questions came up, men like George Marshall quickly sidestepped involvement by referring to the "traditional" non-political role of the American military. But at other levels, American military leaders made or tried to make key political decisions. Of particular significance was the general assumption among such men as General Marshall and Admiral King that Great Britain's military proposals reflected the primacy of postwar political/economic goals. Admiral King's Anglophobia is well documented, but it is clear that his suspicions were shared by many if not all American military leaders. Thus, the opposition of General Marshall and most of his staff to the GYMNAST/TORCH operation (the invasion of North

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Africa in 1942) becomes more than just a question of military priorities. Marshall and his staff believed that British military propoals for North African/Mediterranean operations reflected a plan to secure British control in the eastern Mediterranean/Middle East region, and he adamantly opposed using American military forces to advance the cause of British imperialism. Marshall's belief in a massive cross-channel invasion as the best way to defeat Germany was deep and sincere, but his opposition to Mediterranean operations was simultaneously an expression of his political beliefs. In a similar disagreement over China, Marshall criticized British prewar and wartime policies while recommending moves that would displace British influence. Coincidence proves nothing, but Marshall's adeptness at finding military reasons to oppose almost every plan that would reassert British power in an area where it had had a significant prewar presence suggests that his politics were a factor. That is not to say that American objections were not valid. Some of Churchill's ideas—an invasion of northern Norway, or a transparently political proposal to liberate Malaya and Singapore—were firmly opposed on military grounds even by his own Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, the reluctance or even refusal of American military leaders to suggest campaigns that would reap political rewards should not be mistaken for a lack of thought, and those political thoughts inevitably affected their actions. (George Patton's public advocacy of marching as far toward Moscow in 1945 as Allied forces could get is the exception that proves the rule—he was quickly rebuffed by his superior officers.) After all, Marshall was one of the first American leaders to express open concern about the spread of Soviet communism as a result of the war (see FRUS, Conf. at Washington & Quebec, 1943, pp. 910-11). There is another aspect of the American military-in-politics during World War II that helped shape the postwar world. Unlike Churchill, Roosevelt permitted his military commanders to supervise closely the civil administration of liberated territory long after the area was secure from enemy attack. Although the policies followed by men like Eisenhower are beyond the scope of this discussion, what is striking is the President's confidence that his generals would implement the policies he advocated. If Churchill's and Roosevelt's comments to each other are to be believed, the Prime Minister saw his military men as narrow, parochial, and unable to grasp the broader requirements of national policy, whereas the President perceived his top officers as men whose vision of how to reconstruct the world paralleled his own. (General Douglas MacArthur may have been the exception to that, but Roosevelt would not have put MacArthur in a position of command had it not been for the general's popularity and connections within the Republican Party.) Secretary of War Stimson, drawing upon his experiences and those of the American Army during the Spanish-American War, insisted that rear-echelon areas be administered by military officers, but whether or not those were the President's reasons, the effect was to give the military a wide degree of political latitude. MacArthur's decisions regarding the restoration of civil government in the Philippines are one obvious example. Less flamboyant but equally critical for American policy were Eisenhower's civil administration policies. They were the key to the Darlan arrangement in North Africa, set the stage

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for the elimination of the Italian monarchy (with Roosevelt's encouragement), and supported the establishment of the Free French and Charles de Gaulle as the provisional government of France (against Roosevelt's betterjudgment). SPECULATION that General Marshall would command the Allied forces invad­ ing Europe had antedated the informal Churchill-Roosevelt agreement at the Quebec Conference to give Marshall command of the cross-channel invasion. However, in the fall of 1943 a campaign developed in the American press claiming that Roosevelt planned to move Marshall out of his job as Chief of Staff in order to appoint someone more sympathetic to the President's political aims. Even though Marshall dearly wanted command of the forces invading Europe, various politicians and public figures condemned what seemed to be a demotion for the Chief of Staff. Since General Brehon B. Somervell, the rumored replacement for Marshall as Chief of Staff, had worked with Harry Hopkins in the Works Progress Administration, the entire episode was labeled by Roosevelt's political opposition as a New Deal plot. In the hope of pre­ venting criticism for demoting Marshall, Roosevelt supported suggestions that the new command include all Allied forces engaged in attacking Germany as well as a seat on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. T h e British, fighting to maintain their national identity in the war, opposed such a broad grant of authority. T h e question continued to plague Roosevelt and Churchill until early December, when Eisenhower was appointed to command OVERLORD. Churchill had cabled Hopkins on September 26 to express opposition to Marshall, as commander of OVERLORD, having authority outside the actual operation. Hopkins reassured the Prime Minister that Roosevelt planned no such moves, but a few days later Churchill raised the question of command appointments directly with the President. (Churchill to Hopkins, September 26, 1943, MR; R&H, pp. 762-64.) Churchill's message indicated that the decision to give command of OVERLORD to an American was part of a bargain whereby a British officer would become Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean. Churchill intended that Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander hold that position, although that decision was later changed. (See C-512.) As for the others mentioned here, General Sir Bernard Paget did receive the post as C in C, Middle East, and Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall, once Chief of Staff of the ill-fated ABDA Command back in early 1942, was sched­ uled to serve as Chief of Staff to Lord Mountbatten, the newly assigned Supreme Commander, South East Asia.

C-430 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 1, 1943, 1131 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I a m somewhat worried by the way in which o u r great changes in the H i g h C o m m a n d a r e being b r o k e n to the public. So far nothing has been said h e r e b u t almost every day some statement is m a d e in the United

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States about Marshall, and I shall certainly be asked questions when Parliament meets on Tuesday the 12th. Moreover it would be difficult for me if Marshall's appointment to the Chief Command in Britain were to be announced apart from Alexander's succession in the Mediterranean. Rumour runs riot and is fed by carefully balanced and guarded statements such as that made by Stimson reported in todays papers. An impression of mystery and of something to be concealed is given. This is a fine field for malicious people. All this would be blown away by publication of the clear cut decisions to which we have come. In all the circumstances I hope you will see your way to a simultaneous announcement by us both of the changes, coupled with a statement that they will be brought into effect as soon as convenient to the military situation. 2. Will you also consider my difficulties in the consequential appointments. For instance I understood that Marshall would like Montgomery for deputy or, alternatively, to command under him the British expeditionary armies in OVERLORD. This would entail my clearing the Home Command here now held by General Paget. An opportunity is now open for this as General Pownall who was formerly C in C Iraq and Persia goes with Mountbatten to India as Chief of Staff, and I can post Paget to Iraq and Persia. It is difficult and also harmful to leave these commands vacant for long. 3. Some of the United States papers seem to have begun attacking Mountbatten bitterly, and he has been affected by accounts telegraphed here describing him as "The British Princeling and Glamour Boy who has ousted the proved veteran MacArthur from his rightful sphere", or words to that effect. The prominence given to the Indian Front Command by these controversies is of course leading the Japanese to reinforce in that quarter and intelligence to this effect has already been received. We are told that a large number of correspondents are proceeding or trying to proceed from the United States to Delhi and that expectation is rife of an early beginning of the campaign. On the other hand the floods and the monsoon rains will of course prevent any decisive action till the New Year. But this cannot be stated publicly without relieving any anxieties of the Japanese. The prospect of having a formidable band of correspondents champing their bits in Delhi is not a pleasant one, and it would help our fighting chances if everything possible could be done to damp down controversy and publicity in this area. 4. In these circumstances a plain statement of what we have settled for all theatres, including Commanders, their Chiefs of Staff and one or two of their principal officers, all brought out together would in my opinion be a great advantage. I could if you desire draft such a statement and submit it to you. [MR. WSC, V, 302-3.]

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Reflecting the concerns of the British Foreign Office, Churchill continued to express doubts about Sforza.

C-431 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 1, 1943, 1703 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Your number 365 about Sforza. He seems to be saying all sorts of things many very different to what he wrote to Berle [C-845]. He really should make up his mind whether he is going to try to help the Royal Badoglio Government or try to discredit it. We ought to know where we are before we build him up. Would it not be a good thing for you to route him to Italy via the United Kingdom and let us give him further friendly treat­ ment here. I don't see much use in having him go to Italy merely to undermine whatever small fighting head against Fascism and the Ger­ mans Eisenhower has been able to produce out of the Italians. [MR*. WSC, V, 198.]

Faced with increasing German resistance, Eisenhower hoped to secure ef­ fective military assistance from the Italians by promising them that their services would be rewarded by a less harsh peace settlement.

R-366 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 1, 1943, 1 2 : 1 0 P.M.

From the President to the Former Naval Person, Secret and Personal. I have sent the following to U.J. regarding Eisenhower's NAF 426: "The Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Area, Eisenhower, has recommended the following changes in the 'Instru­ ment of Surrender of Italy': "1. Change the title to 'Additional conditions of the armistice with Italy.' "2. Change the last sentence of the preamble to read 'and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government'. "3. Omit the statement of unconditional surrender in paragraph one. "General Eisenhower and all of his senior commanders concur in this recommendation as highly advantageous to our progress in de-

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feating the G e r m a n forces in Italy in that it will help to align the Italian Army, Navy, and civil population on o u r side. "Eisenhower urgently requests that p e n d i n g a decision o n these recommendations secrecy in regard to the T e r m s of S u r r e n d e r docu m e n t is 'absolutely vital to our success in Italy'. "I h o p e that these recommendations of General Eisenhower will be approved by the Allied Powers because they are highly advantageous to o u r war effort and can be of n o disadvantage to us. "Your concurrence is requested by telegraph at the earliest practicable date." Roosevelt [MR. FRUS, 1943, II, 381. Stalm/FDR, doc. 119.]

R-367 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 1, 1943, 12:15 P.M. T h e President to the F o r m e r Naval Person, Secret and Personal. Your 427 a n d 428. Italy has not yet m a d e a declaration of war against Germany. I suggest that you endeavor to obtain from Stalin approval of your text of proposed j o i n t statement by all three of us to be made public immediately following a declaration of war against Germany by Italy. Your text meets with my approval. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR. FRUS, 1943, II, 382.]

Ironically, the one time during the war that Roosevelt appeared willing to have a major conference held in Britain, Stalin demurred. It seems likely that Stalin wanted the conference held in Moscow so that he could work directly with Molotov during the talks.

R-368 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 1, 1943, 11:00 P.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person, Secret and Personal. I have j u s t received the following message from U.J. "Today I have received your message of September 27th. "I share your opinion regarding the desirability of the Secretary

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of State Mr. Hull's presence at the forthcoming conference of the representatives of the three governments. "At the same time I have to inform you about great difficulties which could have appeared in case of change of the decision, previously agreed upon, regarding Moscow as the place of the forthcoming conference. "The fact is that in case the conference would not be held in Moscow but in Britain, as you propose, Mr. V. M. Molotov could not have come to the conference at the appointed time, whose presence at the conference I consider to be necessary. Mr. V. M. Molotov's departure from the USSR, at least in the near future, is absolutely impossible, because as you know, Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, the Deputy Commisar for Foreign Affairs, will very soon go to Algiers. "Besides, as it is known, the press in the United States and in Britain has already widely published the information that the forthcoming conference will take place not elsewhere but in Moscow, and, therefore, the choice of a new place for the conference could have caused undesirable perplexities. "I have no objections against October 15th as the date of the conference. "It is assumed that by this time the questions to be discussed will be decided by the Governments." Roosevelt [MR*. StalmlFDR, doc. 117.]

C-432 London Oct. 2, 1943 Prime Minister to President. Personal and Secret. Your 366 and 367 we entirely agree. I have telegraphed to Stalin as follows: "His Majesty's Government are in full agreement with the proposals of General Eisenhower telegraphed to you by the President on this first day of October and hope you will concur. "We also hope that you will join with the President and me in the threefold declaration to be made public immediately following a declaration of war against Germany by Italy." [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 382.]

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Dino Grandi, a longtime Fascist who had opposed Mussolini's declaration of war against Britain and who had been instrumental in forcing Mussolini out of power, had been proposed by Badoglio for a Cabinet position in hopes of challenging the legitimacy of the rival government established by Mussolini. Carlos Almagia and Sforza's son traveled with Count Sforza as his secretaries. Churchill omitted from his memoirs the sentence at the beginning of the last paragraph, which directly criticized the King.

R-369 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 2, 1943, 12:20 P.M. Personal from the President to the Former Naval Person. Your 431 in regard to Sforza, I am informed that he with his son and Carlos Almagia expects to arrive by airplane at Prestwick, Scotland October third e n r o u t e to Marrakech. I h o p e you can effectively indoctrinate him d u r i n g his stop in U.K. I am this date sending the following to Eisenhower: "Inform Badoglio that it is the view of this Government that Grandi's presence in Badoglio Government at this time would not be acceptable. Even t h o u g h Grandi was perhaps chief figure in deposition of Mussolini, he had been so closely associated with Fascism that to place him now in Brindisi Government would cause much adverse comment and misinterpretation. First accretions to Badoglio Government should be m e n of unequivocal liberal and democratic principle. It is only t h r o u g h the use of such men in responsible positions that this Government can feel justified in supporting the present Italian Government. " T h e King's position on the question of declaration of war as stated in NAF 428 is unimpressive. Germany has already taken active belligerent steps against Italy and the chief strength of Badoglio's Gove r n m e n t is its announced determination to rid Italy by force of the G e r m a n invader. An immediate declaration of war by the Italian Government on Germany is necessary if Italy is to be given the status of a cobelligerent." Roosevelt [WDL] [MR. pWSC, V, 198-99.]

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C-433 London Oct. 2, 1943, 2215 Ζ Prime Minister to President Personal. 1. We will try to indoctrinate the party you mention. I h o p e to see him Monday. 2. We entirely agree with you about Grandi. 3. I a m sure they should be m a d e to declare war at once. [MR*]

Roosevelt's careful language regarding the authority of the Control Com­ mission and the Military-Political Commission ensured that both military and political affairs in liberated Italy would come under the direct control of the Commander in Chief. Although it was some time before the details were worked out, the final result was Anglo-American domination, along the lines Roosevelt suggested.

R-370 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 4, 1943, 1:10 P.M. From the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person. Personal a n d Secret. Reference Para 3 of my 362 to you, dated September 27, 1943,1 suggest following message be sent to Molotov to clarify Russian position with respect to two commissions now being set u p in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n Area. Message begins. T o M. Molotov from the Secretary of State. Reference Para 3 of your message to m e dated 26 September 1943. T h e r e appears to be no conflict between the Military-Political Com­ mission envisaged by the three governments of Great Britain, the United States, a n d the Soviet Union, a n d the Control Commission set u p by Para 37 of the long t e r m Italian s u r r e n d e r d o c u m e n t agreed to by the three governments. T h e Control Commission acts directly u n d e r the S u p r e m e Allied C o m m a n d e r to deal with specific problems arising in areas of Italy liberated by Anglo-American armies. T h e s e are problems arising in any active military area u n d e r direct supervision of the S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r a n d so the commission must act u n d e r his direct control. O n the contrary, the Military-Political Commission for the Medi­ t e r r a n e a n Basin will have the purpose, as Marshal Stalin says, of

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"considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the dif­ ferent governments disassociating themselves with Germany". Thus it will deal with the broad overall picture in this area. It will not have plenary powers. Its members will study the problems and advise their governments. The governments will then consult each other and reach a decision. If such decision affects the Supreme Allied Com­ mander, he will be informed of it through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Now that the members of this Military-Political Commission have been appointed and it will meet soon, I feel the policies of our three governments in the Mediterranean area will be harmonized more effectively and quickly than heretofore. End message. I will await your reply before asking the Secretary of State to send above message. I feel it important to straighten out this matter now as it will set the precedent for all such future activities in the war. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 382-83.]

The message referred to by Stalin is quoted in C—432. Stalin acknowledged receipt of Eisenhower's proposals in a cable sent on October 5 (Moscow time).

C-434 London Oct. 4, 1943, 0122 Ζ Prime Minister to President Personal. I have just received the following from Stalin. Please note what he says about not having received your telegram about Eisenhower's verbal mod­ ification. Message begins. I have received your message of October 2nd. The Soviet Government is ready to participate in the Tripartite declaration to be published immediately after Italy has declared war on Germany. The text of the declaration proposed by you, I consider acceptable. On my part, I suggest to publish the declaration simul­ taneously in London, Moscow and Washington. I would like to inform you that I have not yet received the telegram from the President with the proposals of General Eisenhower sent to me, as you wrote, on October 1st. [MR. pStakn/WSC, doc. 201.]

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Uncertain about how to handle the controversy over Marshall's proposed appointment as commander of OVERLORD, Roosevelt postponed the announcement Churchill wanted. Instead he encouraged the Prime Minister to go ahead and make public the British command assignments. On September 28 Stalin had insisted that the Foreign Ministers' Conference be held in Moscow. Roosevelt had passed that information to Churchill in R— 368.

R-371 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 4, 1943, 1:40 P.M. Personal and Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Reply to your 430. The newspapers here, beginning with the Hearst, McCormick crowd, had a field day over General Marshall's duties. The drums were beaten rather loudly by the rest of the press for a few days but it is pretty much of a dead cat now. It seems to me that if we are forced into making public statements about our military commands we will find ourselves with the newspapers running the war. I, therefore, hope that nothing will be said about the business until it is actually accomplished. It may be that the situation, other than newspaper criticism by our political enemies, will warrant a joint announcement sooner than I have anticipated, but at the moment I earnestly urge that we say nothing. I agree with you that at the appropriate time we must make an overall statement relative to commands and I fully appreciate your position at home, but I do not think that the difficulties about secondary commands throughout the world are adequate reasons for making the major announcement in regard to Marshall. I will do what I can about Mountbatten because I realize that some of our press have been treating him very badly, although, on the whole, he has come out of it very well. Certainly American public opinion thoroughly approves of his appointment. I agree with you that we should not permit any undue optimism about this campaign either at home or abroad. Nevertheless there is a very proper feeling that Mountbatten will prosecute vigorously anything he is assigned to do. I hope very much that you will agree that statement about Marshall need not be made at present. The answer we got from Uncle Joe relative to the Moscow meeting was not unexpected so it seems there is nothing to do but take the trip there and we are organizing accordingly. Roosevelt [HLH] [MR. pWSC, V, 303-4.]

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Roosevelt's request for a delay in releasing the Italian terms of surrender was sent to Stalin on September 28 (Stalin/FDR, doc. 118).

R-372 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 4, 1943, 1:30 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. T h e following message has been received from U.J. and is forwarded for your information. Eisenhower has been informed. "To approval by the United States a n d Great Britain of General Eisenhower's proposal to keep secret for the present the provisions of the long term s u r r e n d e r document after it is signed by the Italian Government, I have n o objection." Roosevelt [MR. FRUS, 1943, II, 383. pStalm/FDR, doc. 120.]

Roosevelt's understandable concern over a leak to the press may have been heightened because the touchy question of Soviet-American relations was involved. Churchill did not respond until October 13 (C-455).

R-373 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 4, 1943, 6:45 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, for the Former Naval Person from the President. O n the front page of the Washington Post, dated Saturday morning, October 2, t h e r e a p p e a r e d a story headlined as follows: "STALIN SAID TO HAVE REJECTED LONDON AS MEETING PLACE."

T h e article stated in substance that Russia had politely rejected a proposal m a d e by m e personally to change the location of the three-power conference from Moscow to London because the health of the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, m a d e the longer j o u r n e y undesirable. In o r d e r to a p p e a r in this edition of the newspaper, the story had to be released actually many h o u r s before I had personally received Stalin's reply stating that he did not care to change the location. This article, written by Frederick Kuh and copyrighted by the Chicago Sun, a p p e a r e d u n d e r a L o n d o n date line. Since the Chicago Sun is a highly reputable p a p e r a n d friendly to this administration it seems reasonable to conclude that the dateline was not faked and so the story did in fact

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originate in L o n d o n . T o my mind the m e r e fact that this story got into the newspapers in the first place indicates a d a n g e r o u s leak somewhere, a n d f u r t h e r m o r e , indicates a bad mistake on the p a r t of some censor for passing the story for publication as h e must have in this case. Don't you think p e r h a p s it would be beneficial to us both if this leak could be r u n down a n d so avoid a n o t h e r one in the future when t h e r e is m o r e at stake. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, 1943, I, 538-39. R&C]

On September 17, 1943, the British Embassy in Washington redelivered to Roosevelt a copy of a proposed Churchill-to-Stalin message first given to the President at Quebec (first enclosure to C-414/8). I n that draft the Prime Minister suggested a meeting of the three leaders on board ships anchored in Egypt, the Levant, or Cyprus.

R-374 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 4, 1943, 6:45 P.M. President to F o r m e r Naval Person, Personal a n d Secret. I think your idea of enticing Uncle J o e to the Mediterranean with the offer of the use of a ship is excellent, but I am not sure w h e t h e r or not I have told you this. I n any case, I h o p e that your efforts meet with success for reasons you well know. Please let m e know if you have any news on this matter. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf, p. 27.]

Even with increased pressure (reported in R—380), King Victor Emmanuel continued to delay a declaration of war against Germany. Although he seems to have been concerned about the personal dishonor connected with such a turnabout, his primary motive was more likely the hope of obtaining com­ mitments from the Allies. (The version published in FRUS substitutes "terms" for "waiting" in the fourth sentence.)

C-435 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 4, 1943, 2335 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. Now that U J has come in with us about the Italian declaration (See my N r 428) it a p p e a r s of the highest importance to compel the King to

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declare war as soon as possible. This is, as I know, your view. I suggest that instructions are given to Eisenhower to put the fullest pressure upon him. There should be no nonsense about waiting until Rome is taken. It seems to us high time that the Italians began to work their passage. If you are in agreement, pray give the necessary orders without further reference to us. [MR. WSC, V, 200-1. FRUS, 1943, II, 383-S4.]

"Cairo 3" was Churchill's codename for Teheran. Roosevelt had informed Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek in June 1943 that the two leaders ought to have a formal meeting sometime in the fall of that year. Since the Soviet Union had maintained its neutrality in the war against Japan, both Chiang and Stalin wished to avoid any joint conference; hence having Chiang come to Teheran was impossible.

C-436 London Oct. 5, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. 1. Your number 371. I can of course wait for the announcement about Marshall till you find it convenient on your side. 2. Your number 372. This is good. It will be very advantageous to our policy to publish the agreed declaration about the Badoglio Government over our three signatures. But this can only be done when the King of Italy has declared war. 3. Your number 373. I will have an immediate enquiry made into the possible leakage. 4. Your number 374. Not hearing from you, I did not persist in the ship enticing idea but I don't think it would have been accepted by Uncle Joe anyhow. On September 25, I sent him the telegram contained in my immediately following and received last night his reply. I hope you will approve of all this as good and careful arrangements should be made. This plan would be convenient if you still want to invite the Generalissimo to meet you in Cairo on our return from Cairo 3. I do not think you will find the journey from Cairo to Cairo 3 a burden. It is only about six hours. It would be a convenience if one of your security authorities came over here to work up the whole cover plan. I expect to start from here about the end of October and will meet you with the greatest pleasure in Cairo or at any other point you fix. May I advise your considering

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seriously coming across in a fast cruiser and only using the air for the various hops across Africa. I shall be moving about among the armies till you arrive. [MR. pFRUS, Teheran Cmf., pp. 27-28.]

Beginning with this cable, the staff of the President's Map Room (at the suggestion of then Lieutenant (jg) George Elsey, USNR) began keeping a "log sheet" on each message exchanged by Churchill and Roosevelt. Much of the data on the log sheet repeats the message heading: date, serial number, time of receipt, and the like. However, under the heading of "Action," the Map Room staff usually noted the serial numbers of related messages as well as the final disposition of questions raised in the subject message. In the interest of conserving space and avoiding repetition, the action sheets have not been printed. Cross references can be found in the index to these volumes, and other important data found in the log sheets are included in the headnotes.

C-437 London Oct. 5, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. The text of the telegram referred to in my 436 is as folows: "Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Personal and most secret. For your eye alone Sept 25, 1943. "I have been pondering about our meeting of heads of governments at Teheran. Good arrangements must be made for security in this somewhat loosely controlled area. Accordingly, I suggest for your consideration that I make preparations at Cairo in regard to accommodation, security, etc., which are bound to be noticed in spite of all praiseworthy efforts to keep them secret. Then perhaps only two or three days before our meeting, we should throw a British and a Russian brigade around a suitable area in Teheran including the airfield and keep an absolute cordon till we have finished our talks. We would not tell the Persian Government nor make any arrangements for our accommodation until this moment comes. We should of course have to control absolutely all out-going messages. Thus we shall have an effective blind for the world press and also for any unpleasant people who might not be as fond of us as they ought. "I suggest also that in all future correspondence on this subject we use the expression ("Cairo 3") instead of Teheran which should be buried and also that the code name for the operation should be

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(EUREKA) which I believe it is Ancient Greek. If you have other ideas let me know and we can then put them to the President. I have not said anything to him about this aspect yet." Kremlin Oct 3, 1943. Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill. Personal and Secret. "I received your message of the 27th Sept concerning the forthcoming meeting of the three heads of governments. I have n o objection to the diverting preparations which you intend to carry out in Cairo. Regarding your proposal to throw British and Russian Brigades into the region of Cairo 3 several days before our meeting in that city, I find this measure inexpedient as it would cause an unnecessary sensation and would decamouflage the preparations. I suggest that each of us should take with him a sufficient police g u a r d . In my opinion, this would be e n o u g h to secure o u r safety. "I have no objection to your other proposals relating to the forthcoming meeting and I agree with those conventional denominations which you propose to use in the correspondence concerning this meeting." [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 28-29. Stalm/WSC, docs. 198, 202 pR&C]

In accordance with the Anglo-Portuguese agreement signed August 17, 1943, British forces occupied bases in the Azores on October 8. Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed during the Quebec meeting that American forces would formally enter the Azores about two weeks later (FRUS, Conf. at Wash. & Quebec, 1943, p. 942).

R-375 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 6, 1943, 1 2 : 1 0 P.M. President to F o r m e r Naval Person, Personal and Secret. 1. In accordance with o u r agreement at Quebec initial entry of the United States into the Azores will be by two or more United States escort vessels from UGS-22, sailing on 25 October, 1943, and two aircraft from a CVE. In addition to the convoy escorts, there will be at least two others over and above those normally provided. T h e convoy will be routed so as to pass the Azores on approximately 6 November and the carrier will be within n e a r aircraft range of Lagens Field, Terceira Island, the aftern o o n of 6 November and the m o r n i n g of 7 November. 2. T w o escort vessels will proceed to Horta, Fayal, at time to be designated by the Convoy C o m m a n d e r , for the purpose of fueling from a

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British oiler stationed there; to remain not longer than 24 h o u r s and to rejoin convoy or carrier g r o u p after fueling. 3. At the discretion of the Convoy C o m m a n d e r , u p to three more escorts will be fueled at Ponta Delgada, Sao Miguel. This fueling will be dep e n d e n t u p o n the submarine situation as existing at the time and the Convoy C o m m a n d e r ' s opinion whether the escorts may be spared long e n o u g h to accomplish the fueling. It is expected this fueling will be accomplished unless t h e r e is good reason to the contrary. 4. D e p e n d e n t u p o n weather conditions, two carrier-borne aircraft will be flown off the carrier when n e a r Lagens Field the afternoon of 6 November, to remain there overnight, a n d after fueling, rejoin the carrier the following day. This date may be delayed if required by weather conditions. 5. T h e routing of the convoy and carrier, with d u e regard to the submarine situation, will be such as to make the above operations feasible. 6. C o m m a n d i n g Officers of ships and planes will have plausible reasons for entry. T h e y will obtain such intelligence information as practicable in regard to reactions to their presence a n d facilities observed. T h e Convoy C o m m a n d e r will forward items of value if radio silence is broken for other reasons or u p o n arrival in port. 7. C o m m a n d e r in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, will be charged with the further development a n d execution of this plan. Roosevelt [JCS] [MR*]

This next cable marks the beginning of a brief but instructive episode that illustrates the incredible laxness with which supposedly "minor" foreign-policy decisions were made. As recounted by George Kennan in his Memoirs, 19251950 (pp. 142-63) and documented in FRUS (1943, II, 547ff.), the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented Kennan, then Charge d'Affairs in Lisbon, with an extensive shopping list of facilities desired by the United States in the Azores. Convinced that Portuguese President Salazar would not only reject such exhorbitant demands but would also consider them a threat to Portuguese sovereignty over the islands, Kennan protested to the State Department, which had apparently forwarded the military's requests without a careful consideration of their effect on Portuguese-American relations. When, by a combination of luck and persistence, Kennan managed to see Roosevelt about the problem, the President instructed him to do the best he could and not "worry about all those people over there" (Kennan, Memoirs, 1925—1950, p. 161). Kennan interpreted that as a reference to the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of War, but it probably included the State Department as well. Roosevelt trusted individuals, not bureaucracies, and Kennan was now his man in Lisbon.

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R-376 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 6, 1 9 4 3 , 4 : 1 0 P.M.

President to Former Naval Person, Personal and Secret. I have just received the following recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff quote: The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to convey to you their serious concern regarding the situation which has developed with respect to the use of the Azores. The importance of the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route to the United Nations war effort cannot be over-emphasized. Briefly summarized, it represents: a. Potential saving over the six months period (November 1943— April 1944) of approximately fifty-one and one-half million gallons of high octane aviation fuel; sufficient to support 5,400 heavy bomber sorties per month for the same period or the rough equivalent of one month's consumption by the combined operations of the RAF and USAAF in and from the United Kingdom. b. Potential saving in engine hours of each bomber ferried to the United Kingdom, sufficient to permit six or more additional combat missions before engine over-haul. c. The release of approximately 150 transport aircraft, which could thus become available for service in the India-Burma-China area where they are so urgently needed. d. Some 15,000 trained ground personnel released for duty elsewhere. This gasoline consumption required by the longer southern route is at the direct expense of the U.S. Army Air Forces Training Program which has just been temporarily curtailed due to fuel shortage. Unless immediate action is taken to effect a saving, the flow of replacement combat crews to theaters of operation will soon be reduced. Alternatively, the reserve levels of gasoline now maintained in theaters of operations will have to be lowered. The present British-Portuguese agreement covering facilities in the islands does not provide facilities for air transport and air ferrying operations. We have advised the British Chiefs of Staff of our requirements and of additional steps which we feel should be taken, but we have little confidence that the British will provide facilities for a central Adantic air route in time to be of value to the OVERLORD buildup during the coming winter months. We consider this matter to be so serious that we are suggesting

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that you bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister, emphasizing the grave implications of delay in securing facilities for air ferrying and air transport operations. Our suggestion is that a specific request be made to the Prime Minister to make Lagens Field, Terceira, available for air transport and air ferrying purposes immediately following our initial entry and that further negotiations with the Portuguese be instituted in which the United States will participate with Great Britain to secure the additional facilities so urgently required. Unquote. I agree that this is a very important matter. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 547-48.]

Stalin's reference is to R-366.

R-377 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 6, 1943, 5:30 P.M.

Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. I have just received the following from U J . "I have received your message of October first only today, on October fifth. "On my part there are no objections against the changes proposed by you in the 'Document of the Capitulation of Italy.' " Roosevelt [MR*. StalmlFDR, doc. 122.]

Although Churchill's proposals for increasing Allied strength in the eastern Mediterranean may not have been designed to sabotage OVERLORD, as American military leaders suspected, there is no doubt that the Prime Minister was deeply concerned about the postwar makeup in that area. In both Yugoslavia and Greece the anti-German Partisans were politically divided, and British aid could help determine the ultimate victory. Kos, Leros, and Rhodes—which had an airfield—all lay off the southwest coast of Turkey and were the major islands in the Dodecanese, given to Italy after World War I. When the Italian government surrendered, the Italian troops on those islands offered no resistance to a German takeover. The British Commander in Chief for the Middle East, General Sir Henry Wilson,

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had requested a modest number of troops, a small naval force, and transport aircraft from General Eisenhower's command, and Churchill's cable aimed at supporting Wilson's request. As Roosevelt's reply demonstrated (R—379), the Americans greatly feared the "suction pump" effect of further Mediterranean operations on OVER­ LORD. In a memo to his staff, the President instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft an answer indicating that "OVERLORD is paramount" (Roo­ sevelt to Leahy and Admiral Brown, attached to C-438, MR). Had the Allies succeeded in quickly capturing Rome, Churchill might have persuaded Ei­ senhower to provide the necessary support, but the Italian campaign had already bogged down badly. This was the start of what became a bitter dispute between Roosevelt and Churchill.

C-438 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 7, 1943, 0010 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. 1. I am much concerned about the situation developing in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the collapse of Italy we pushed small detachements from Egypt into several of the Greek Islands especially Kos which has a landing ground and Leros which is a fortified Italian Naval Base with powerful permanent batteries. We ran this risk in the hope that the Italian garrisons which welcomed us would take part in the defense. This hope appears vain and Kos has already fallen except for some of our troops fighting in the mountains. Leros may well share its fate. Our enterprises against Rhodes have not yet succeeded. 2. I believe it will be found that the Italian and Balkan Peninsulas are militarily and politically united and that really it is one theatre with which we have to deal. It may indeed not be possible to conduct a successful Italian campaign ignoring what happens in the Aegean. The Germans evidently attach the utmost importance to this Eastern sphere and have not hesitated to divert a large part of their straitened air force to maintain themselves there. They have to apprehend desertion by Hungary and Roumania and a violent schism in Bulgaria. At any moment Turkey may lean her weight against them. We can all see how adverse to the enemy are the conditions in Greece and Yugoslavia. When we remember what brilliant results have followed from the political reactions in Italy induced by our military efforts should we not be shortsighted to ignore the pos­ sibility of a similar and even greater landslide in some or all of the coun­ tries I have mentioned? If we were able to provoke such reactions and profit by them our joint task in Italy would be greatly lightened. 3. I have never wished to send an army into the Balkans but only by

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agents supplies and Commandos to stimulate the intense guerrilla pre­ vailing there. This may yield results measureless in their consequence at very small cost to main operations. What I ask for is the capture of Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodecanese. The movement northward of our Middle Eastern Air Forces and their establishment in these islands and possibly on the Turkish shore which last might well be obtained would force a diversion on the enemy far greater than that required of us. I would also offer the opportunity of engaging the enemy's waning air power and wearing it down in a new region. This air power is all one and the more continually it can be fought the better. 4. Rhodes is the key to all this. I do not feel the present plan of taking it is good enough. It will require and is worth at least up to a first class division which can of course be replaced by static troops once the place is ours. Leros which for the moment we hold so precariously is an im­ portant naval fortress and once we are ensconced in this area air and light naval forces would have a most fruitful part to play. The policy should certainly not be pursued unless done with vigour and celerity requiring the best troops and adequate means. In this way the diversion from the main theatre would only be temporary while the results may well be of profound and lasting importance. 5. I beg you to consider this and not let it be brushed aside and all these possibilities lost to us in the critical months that lie ahead. Even if landing craft and assault ships on the scale of a division were withheld from the build up of OVERLORD for a few weeks without altering the zero date it would be worth while. I feel we may easily throw away an immense but fleeting opportunity. If you think well would you very kindly let General Marshall see this telegram before any decision is taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. [MR*. WSC, V, 210-11. RfcfC]

These monthly statements regarding U-boat warfare were cleared in the United States by Admiral King and Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information.

C-439 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 7, 1943, 1500 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Personal. 1. Following is draft of proposed joint statement regarding U-Boat warfare in September. I shall be glad to receive your comments as early as possible. Begins:

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(1) Until the 3rd week in September no Allied merchant ship was lost by German U-Boat attack. Then, on the 19th September, the UBoats ended the 4 months lull in the North Atlantic, and a pack of at least 15 U-Boats concentrated on a westbound convoy. The combat lasted 4½ days. The loss of 3 escort vessels has already been an­ nounced. A small number of merchant ships were sunk. As a result of vigorous counter attacks by the surface and air escorts a larger number of U-Boats were sunk or damaged. (2) In spite of the increase in U-Boat activity at the end of the month, the average merchant ship losses from all causes in September and August together are the best record of the war. (3) Nevertheless this resumption of pack tactics is evidence of the enemy's intention to spare no efforts to turn the tide of the U-Boat war and the utmost exertion and vigilance will be required before its menace is finally removed. Ends. 2.1 suggest that as originally intended this and future statements should be headed "Issued under the authority of the President and the Prime Minister". Do you agree? [MR*]

Churchill continued to push for an unconditional-surrender clause in the terms signed by the Italians, particularly since the disposition of the Italian fleet could greatly affect British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. Roo­ sevelt did not answer this message, and Churchill raised the question again in C-452.

C-440 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 7, 1943, 1701 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. 1. Your number 377. It is good that U J agrees. On second thoughts, we are not, however, convinced that dropping Article 1 (A) of the long terms as Eisenhower has suggested may not weaken our power over the Italian fleet. I shall be telegraphing you further about this. 2. I think we ought to go straight ahead now and force an immediate declaration of war by the King of Italy and synchronize release in Wash­ ington, London, and Moscow of our triple declaration. If you agree, will you please act in this manner (para 2) without further reference to me. [MR*]

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At Admiral King's suggestion, Roosevelt queried Churchill about what seemed somewhat exaggerated claims regarding the anti-submarine war in the Atlantic.

R-378 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 7, 1943, 2:30 P.M. From the President to the Former Naval Person, Personal and Secret. I fully agree with your 439 including the new heading. However, can it be proved that a larger number of U-boats were sunk than we lost in escort ships and merchant ships? Roosevelt [MR*]

In spite of Churchill's plea, the American military wanted no part of any increased commitments in the Aegean Sea, particularly with the campaign in Italy way behind schedule.

R-379 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 7, 1943, 4:25 P.M. Personal and Secret, from the President to the Former Naval Person. Reference your 438. I do not want to force on Eisenhower diversions which limit the prospects for the early successful development of the Italian operations to secure a line north of Rome. I am opposed to any diversion which will in Eisenhower's opinion jeopardize the security of his current situation in Italy, the buildup of which is exceedingly slow considering the well known characteristics of his opponent who enjoys a marked superiority in ground troops and panzer divisions. It is my opinion that no diversion of forces or equipment should prejudice OVERLORD as planned. The American Chiefs of Staff agree. I am transmitting a copy of this message to Eisenhower. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR. WSC, V, 211-12. R&C]

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After a week of heavy pressure from the Allies, King Victor Emmanuel of Italy, on October 13, declared war on Germany.

R-380 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 7, 1943, 8:00 P.M.

Personal and Secret, from the President to the Former Naval Person. Reference your 440. On October 5 I informed Eisenhower as follows: "The President and Prime Minister are in agreement that the King of Italy declare war on Germany as soon as possible. There appears to be no necessity for waiting until Rome is occupied. You will there­ fore put pressure on the Italian government for an early declaration of war without waiting for further successes." Eisenhower informs me that he is using the above to reinforce his own efforts along this line. We can arrange to synchronize the three announcements immediately when war is declared. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 384.]

Shortly after the dispatch of this cable it became clear that the Germans had decided to establish a defense line south of Rome instead of withdrawing to northern Italy (see map, p. 453). That decision guaranteed firm American opposition to any transfer of troops or equipment from the Italian campaign to the eastern Mediterranean. Although it would have been possible to meet the moderate requests of the British Middle East Command, American plan­ ners feared that one request would lead to another, eventually creating a major theater of operations in that area. Regardless of promises and protes­ tations from the British, the U.S. military remained convinced that their allies were still searching for ways to avoid the major cross-channel invasion, OVERLORD. BONIFACE was another name for ULTRA (see headnote to C-412/2).

C-441 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 8, 1943, 0322 Ζ

Prime Minister to President Personal and Secret. 1. Your No. 379. I earnestly pray that my views may receive some consideration from you at this critical juncture, remembering how fruitful

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our concerted action has been in the past and how important it is for the future. 2. I am sure that the omission to take Rhodes at this stage and the ignoring of the whole position in the Eastern Mediterranean would con­ stitute a cardinal error in strategy. I am convinced also that if we were round the table together that this operation could be fitted in to our plan without detriment either to the advance in Italy of which as you know I have always been an advocate, or to the build-up of OVERLORD which I am prepared faithfully to support. 3. May I remind you of my anxiety at Quebec when we were informed that the build-up in Italy could not exceed 12 divisions ashore by the first December. There are now by the 9th October over 15 divisions ashore, of which about 12 are in action. We know from BONIFACE that the enemy is withdrawing to the north, fighting rearguard actions and car­ rying off booty. We cannot yet tell whether it is in October or November that we can occupy Rome: But it is certain that we shall not come in contact with the main German forces at the top of the leg of Italy till December or even later and we certainly have control of the rate of advance. 4. There is therefore plenty of time to provide a division for the con­ quest of Rhodes and restore it to the battlefront in Italy before we reach the German fortified line. 5. We must find some means of resolving these difficulties and making sure of what is the right thing to do. I am willing to proceed to Eisenhowers headquarters with the British Chiefs of Staff immediately if you will send General Marshall, or your personal representative, to meet me there and we can them submit the results of a searching discussion to you and your Chiefs of Staff. We can be there Sunday afternoon. [MR. pWSC, V, 212-13.]

Churchill insisted that the primary policy-making role for Italy be played by the two victorious powers, the United States and Britain, although he did recognize the necessity of giving the Soviet Union some role to play.

C-442 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 8, 1943, 1014 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Your number 370 of October 5th. 1. I agree with your proposed answer to Molotov. 2. Since we are in fact rejecting the Soviet proposal it would be a good

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thing to tell Molotov that we understand the Soviet Government's desire to play their part in the control of Italy, and that we hope to propose a scheme to them in the near future which we trust will meet their require­ ments. 3. I suggest that Eisenhower should be asked to submit a scheme for consideration. I understand from Macmillan who is here that this could be done without undue difficulty. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 384.]

Churchill continued to insist that operations in the Aegean Sea could be completed so quickly that they would not interfere with OVERLORD or the Italian campaign. The landing ships referred to in paragraph 2 were part of the buildup for operations in Burma agreed on at the Quebec talks.

C-443 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 8, 1943, 1255 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Further to my 441. 1. I should have added that my estimate of the effect on OVERLORD to which I referred is limited to a delay of about six weeks in sending home nine landing craft which were to have started from the Mediter­ ranean this month, nearly six months before they would actually be needed for OVERLORD. There ought, I think, to be some elasticity and a rea­ sonable latitude in the handling of our joint affairs. 2. The QUADRANT decision to send four landing ships with the craft they carry from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal also for training purposes has turned out ill. This decision should have been reviewed in the light of the new circumstances opened by the surrender of Italy. Unhappily this was not done, and in consequence the Middle East was stripped bare at a moment when great prizes could be cheaply secured. [MR*. WSC, V, 213.]

Advised by a phone call from London that the Prime Minister would stay up until 2 A.M. (London time) awaiting an answer to his request for expanded operations in the eastern Mediterranean, the President asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an immediate answer. Their reply was a clear presentation of the American position: operations in the eastern Mediterranean would be mean­ ingless unless they were part of an overall attack against the Balkans. Eisen-

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hower, supported by the Joint Chiefs, agreed that the cross-channel invasion was the best way to defeat Germany and he further believed that an Allied advance on the Po Valley in northern Italy would provide more support for OVERLORD than operations in the Balkans. The agreement at Quebec had been that operations in the eastern Mediterranean would be carried out with forces already in that area, and the President's decision not to send General Marshall to talk with Churchill further emphasized the American refusal to change that arrangement. (The underlined sentence was not in the War Department draft.)

R-381 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 8, 1 9 4 3 , 8 : 1 5 P.M.

From the President to the Former Naval Person, Secret and Personal. I have received your Numbers 441 and 443 and given careful personal consideration to the points you make. I have given careful thought to them and so has the staff. I am concerned about the possibility of our armies suffering a reverse by the action of an enemy with superior forces except by air, under a Commander of proved audacity and resourcefulness. This applies especially to the absolute safety to the line we hope to gain in Italy. With a full understanding of your difficulties in the Eastern Mediterranean, my thought in sending No. 379 was that no diversion of force from Italy should be made that would jeopardize the security of the allied armies in Italy, and that no action toward any minor objective should prejudice the success of OVERLORD. We have almost all the facts now at our disposal on which to judge the commitments probably involved in the Rhodes operation. As I see it, it is not merely the capture of Rhodes but it must mean of necessity and it must be apparent to the Germans, that we intend to go further. Otherwise Rhodes will be under the guns of both Cos and Crete. I was in accord with obtaining whatever hold we could in the Dodecanese without heavy commitments, but the present picture involves not only a well-organized, determined operation, but a necessary followthrough. This in turn involves the necessity of drawing for the means, largely shipping and air, not ground troops, from some other source which inevitably must be Italy, OVERLORD, or possibly Mountbatten's amphibious operation. The problem then is are we now to enter into a Balkan campaign starting with the southern tip, or is there more to be gained, and with security, by pushing rapidly to the agreed upon position north of Rome. It appears to me that a greater Allied threat against the Balkans is implied in this than by the necessarily precarious amphibious operation against Rhodes with a lack evident to the enemy of the necessary

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means for the follow-through. Strategically, if we get the Aegean Islands. I ask myself where do we go from there and vice versa where would the Germans go if for some time they retain possession of the Islands. As to the meeting you propose for Sunday in Africa, this would be in effect another meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff necessarily only involving a partial representation and in which I cannot participate. Frankly I am not in sympathy with this procedure under the circumstances. It seems to me the issue under discussion can best be adjusted by us through our C C S . set up in better perspective than by the method you propose. We have most of the facts and will soon have the results of the conference scheduled for tomorrow in Tunis. Roosevelt [JCS] [MR*. WSC, V, 214-15. R&C]

Roosevelt, learning of Portuguese fears that the United States would not evacuate the Azores after the war, sent a letter to President Salazar in which he noted that, when he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I, the United States had established bases in the Azores but had quickly evacuated them afterward. The American Charge in Lisbon, George Kennan, eventually guaranteed the postwar continuation of the Portuguese Empire, without prior requests from the Portuguese. At the same time, personnel in the State Department concerned with civil aviation were working on ways to guarantee postwar landing rights in the Azores for American airlines.

C-444 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 8, 1943, 1835 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Your number 376. 1. I fully recognise all the advantages set forth. Our forces were ad­ mitted to these islands on October 8th, and publicity will be given on the 12th. It will be necessary to see what the German reaction is. If, as I expected, it is merely abusive, Salazar, will be reassured and I will then immediately ask Salazar, either by a direct message or through our am­ bassador, that you should have the necessary facilities for the ferry service, which is of vital consequence, and I will explain or have explained the full force of the argument to him. 2. I shall of course argue that Salazar has taken the plunge and to a large extent joined the Allies, and that he runs no greater risk by your being in the islands too. On the contrary, by so doing he gets the added support of friendship of the United States, and the American guarantee

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about respecting Portuguese colonies similar to that which we have given. I assume I may make full play with this argument since we already informed the Portuguese last June, on your authority, that we understood the United States Government would associate itself with our colonial guarantees. I have also received Mr. Winant's message that your charge d'affaires at Lisbon has been instructed to communicate such guarantees only if requested to do so by Mr. Salazar. It should therefore be possible to keep this card in our hand for the present, and it should assist us materially in playing our game. 3. I am communicating through the State Department a Portuguese communication showing that they contemplate eventually taking an active part in the war, at least in the Far East. Our task will be much easier if and when Portugal joins us as a belligerent, and it is very much better in these matters to work things up gradually. 4. Supposing that Salazar refuses, being afraid that you will stay there after the war and of the ambitions of Pan American Airways, I will immediately report to you. Then is the moment for your ambassador to come forward or for you to address Salazar personally, it being of course understood that we shall give you the fullest help and support by every means. We have in any case already provided under our own agreement with the Portuguese for the arrival of the first mixed convoy early in November, to which you refer in your number 375. I agree with the detailed arrangements proposed in that telegram, which should not give rise to any difficulties. I hope that the Portuguese may be brought along in a friendly way and that they will listen to the many good reasons we can both advance for their doing so. 5. Pray let me know how you view this programme. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 550-51.]

In response to C—442, Roosevelt sent a message to Molotov explaining the Anglo-American reasons for rejecting the Soviet suggestion that two commissions deal with the governance of Italy.

R-382 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 9, 1943, 9:35 A.M. President to Former Naval Person, Personal and Secret. State Department has sent to Molotov message in my Number 370 to you. Roosevelt [MR*]

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Churchill hoped that British representatives at the military strategy confer­ ence in Tunis could persuade Eisenhower that stepped-up operations in the Aegean would not interfere with either the Italian campaign or the buildup for OVERLORD. Although Churchill may have been considering a larger military campaign in the Balkans, as Marshall and other Americans feared, his main concern was for postwar British influence in the area, as clearly set forth in the fifth paragraph.

C-445 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 9, 1943, 1730 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. 1. Thank you very much for your kindness in giving so much of your time and thought to the views which I ventured to set before you. At your wish, and as you cannot send General Marshall, I have cancelled my journey which I told Harry on the telephone I would never undertake without your blessing. 2. I agree with the end of your nr 381, namely, that we should await the results of the conference scheduled for today in Tunis, which could then be considered and adjusted by us through the Combined COS Com­ mittee. 3. I am afraid, however, that your number 379 of Oct 8th to me, a copy of which was sent to Eisenhower, will be taken as an order from you and as closing the subject finally. This I should find it very hard to accept. I hope, therefore, that you will make it clear that the conference is free to examine the whole question in all its bearings and should report their conclusions to you and me through CCS. I ask that the conference shall give full, free, patient and unprejudiced consideration to the whole ques­ tion after they have heard the Middle East point of view put forward by its representatives. Part 2 which is less urgent follows. Following is part 2 of my nr. 445. 4. At the present time, General Wilson is preparing to attack Rhodes on the 23rd, with forces from his own command, or which have been assigned to him by General Eisenhower. He thinks these forces are suf­ ficient, but I am doubtful whether they are not cut too fine. When I questioned him upon this, he replied: "Advisable not to change Division now assault loading as time is all important and we cannot afford to postpone date owing to weather, moon, and possible enemy reinforcement. Increase in shipping to allow more of our armour to be carried and provision of an extra

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brigade from Central Mediterranean to arrive on night of 23rd/24th would greatly accelerate completion of operation." The question to my mind, therefore, is whether he should have this modest reinforcement or whether the operation should be cancelled. 5. Cancellation will involve loss of Leros even if they can hold out so long and the complete abandonment by us of any foothold in the Aegean, which will become a frozen area, with most unfortunate political and psychological reactions in that part of the world instead of great advantages. 6. I fully agree with all you say about the paramount importance of the build up in Italy, and I have given every proof of my zeal in this matter by stripping the British Middle Eastern Command of everything which can facilitate General Eisenhower's operations, in which we also have so great a stake. 7.1 am sending you for your information a report which I have received from General Wilson of the operations he has undertaken so far which shows at once their difficulty and their small scale. I also send a report of the fighting in the islands and in the Balkans which may be of interest. These will follow as part 3: Following is part 3 of my telegram number 445. Paraphrase of General Wilson's summary of events connected with Kos, dated 8th October, is as follows. "We took great risks in trying to draw enemy forces from the main area of operations, and to exploit a favourable situation. We succeeded, in that we have been opposed by German Air Forces nearly as great in strength as those opposing us in Italy and North Africa. We managed to build up forces in the Dodecanese in excess of our expectation; but in view of difficulty on line of communication and of unloading at Kos, and in view of shortage of craft of the right type, our forces were lightly equipped, and were intended primarily to encourage and stiffen Italian resistance. We fully realised that not much value could be placed on the quality of the Italians in the Islands, but we thought they would put up more of a fight. We asked for some reinforcements, but we accepted the limitation that we could only get what could be spared from the main theatre. "Naval reinforcements consisted of one flotilla of Fleet destroyers, which was unfortunately withdrawn to escort King George V and Howe to Malta. This left only one British and two Greek Hunt-class destroyers for offensive use in the whole Levant station at the time of the German attack on Kos. "We, of course, foresaw the possibility of seaborne attack but all our intelligence made it seem most probable that the reinforcement

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of Rhodes would take place first, and our dispositions were made accordingly. There was nothing at the time to lead us to foresee that the enemy would be able to collect and launch at such short notice an expedition of the size which assaulted Kos. Our naval dispositions were such that the three destroyers referred to above had to be withdrawn after a period of patrol south of Rhodes, but special air measures were taken to deal with what we thought was a convoy for the reinforcement of Rhodes when we received through the Senior British Naval Officer at Leros a somewhat obscure and delayed report. This convoy was not located, and in the end no attack was made on it until after the landing at Kos had begun. Two submarines which were on patrol were disposed offensively in the northern and western Aegean and they were not able to reach Kos until the transports had withdrawn. "Our battalion in Kos was moved in, two thirds by air and one third by destroyer, and could only take the ordinary battalion scale of three inch and two inch mortars, with no anti-tank or other artillery. We had to risk relying on Italian artillery already in the Island, though in the event we received little or no help from this. The initial situation and the changes which caused the build-up to be slow, and which forced us to give low priority to infantry support weapons were as follows. At first: A. Italian forces had to be bolstered up on the assumption that they would comply with armistice terms. B. No major air threat then existed. C. The Levant station at that time had naval forces which could deal with a seaborne attack as long as there was no major air threat. D. It seemed likely that Spitfires on Kos would be able to give sufficient fighter cover. "The enemy's build-up of air strength in Greece and the Aegean, which first became apparent about 25th September, radically altered the position. A.A. guns for Kos became of paramount importance, and were given priority. They were sent in as soon as possible via Leros, where they had to be transferred to smaller craft. A further build-up was arranged in the City of Lille, which was to have sailed on 5th October, provided air cover and an adequate warning system had been installed at Kos. The radar equipment for the latter was afloat at the time of the German attack. Moreover, City of Lille would have taken six days to unload in Leros, and in view of the loss of three destroyers which had already taken place there, air cover was considered essential. Meanwhile, there was no alternative but reliance on Italian co-operation, as they alone had adequate heavy weapons on the Island. Although these were actually sited to cover beaches

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where landings took place, there is no evidence that their guns fired a shot, and the Italian resistance seems to have been variable, and generally ineffective. "German seizure of Kos was therefore directly attributable to the rapid build-up of his air strength in Greece and the Aegean, against which we could not take counter measures owing to lack of air resources. An adequate build-up in Kos was impossible in the first days owing to shortage of ships and craft, and in the later stages owing to the naval and air situation which developed in the Aegean. "The following measures are being taken to secure our position in the Aegean pending our attack on Rhodes: "Naval. "A force of two cruisers, two or three Fleet destroyers, and two Hunts, is being maintained nightly in the South Aegean, withdrawing out of close range of air attack during the day. This force has already had a success at the cost of one cruiser damaged, and will be favourably disposed to move in to attack any enemy convoy. "Army. A. Observation posts are established on possible lines of approach of enemy convoys, and have already proved of value. B. The reinforcement of Castelroso as an advanced base for operations with garrison of half a battalion and A. A. defence. C. If possible reinforcement of Leros with certain specialists to supervise Italians, and with parties evacuated from Kos. Weapons likely to assist in repelling an assault will be dropped, and attempts will be made by propaganda to stiffen Italian morale. D. Patrols with wireless sets have been put into Kos to make contact with British troops still in the Island and to arrange air supply. Arrangements are also being made to collect stragglers. "Air. "Heavy and medium bombers operating from Cyrenaica, Tunisia, and Italy will attack airfields in Greece, Crete and Rhodes. Two groups of Lightnings which have been given to Middle East as reinforcements will protect the movement of surface craft. "Our naval forces yesterday destroyed an enemy eastbound convoy and escorts off Stampalia [now Astipalaia, east of Kos and Rhodes] which was probably conveying a large number of enemy troops. The steps we have taken have so far proved satisfactory and we hope to administer the same treatment again by maintaining the utmost vigilance." Paraphrase of General Wilson's latest situation report timed 1445 hours on 8th October is as follows:

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"At 0600 hours on the 7th October, a convoy moving south-east from the north point of Kythnos and consisting of one tank landing craft and five small ships was sighted by a long-range desert group observation post. Another of three ships and sixteen aircraft was sighted at 1300 hours on the same day moving east from Naxos. After the naval action (in which the first mentioned convoy was destroyed) one enemy landing craft and one small escort vessel both badly damaged arrived at Stampalia and were captured by the garrison who took eighty prisoners. "About 0600 hours 7th October, eighty Germans landed at Pedi Bay on Semi. Helped by the Italians the British counter-attacked and killed sixteen, wounded thirty and took seven prisoners. Forty five Germans withdrew in a caique. These Germans are from the Sevastopol Division in Rhodes and are reported to be young with poor morale. The British strength on Semi is about forty and Italian morale there is reported as high. Reports of action on the mainland are as follows [the next few paragraphs concern Yugoslavia]: "3rd October. Partisans took Ludbreg capturing four hundred prisoners and much material, and beating back a relief column. Other partisans captured Cacinci destroying the railway station and two armoured trains. "4th October. Partisans engaged the enemy near Karlovac, Generalski Stol, Ostarije, and Ogulin. They were forced to evacuate Generalski Stol by strong German column from Karlovac. Other partisans captured six towns from the Ustashi. The British liaison officer reports that Tuxia was recently captured and cleared of the enemy, twenty guns being captured. Population warmly welcomed partisans who had destroyed the power station at Karka and three coal mines. They suffered about one hundred casualties. "The following is the record of the activity of one Croatian partisan battalion from the 28th August to 28th September: 1. One attack on the railway Zagreb-Karlovac which delayed traffic for 24 hours. 2. Six attacks on the railway Karlovac-Ljubljana which delayed traffic for 26 hours. 3. Sixteen attacks on the railway Karlovac-Susak destroying one KM. of the line and fourteen block houses. Delayed traffic 182 hours. Two armoured trains and one goods train derailed and the railway station Dubrava burnt. "Between the 29th September and the 2nd October there was fierce fighting between partisans and Germans. In the area Skradin-Kistanje eighty Germans and Ustashi were killed, thirty captured, and the power station which supplies Sibenik and Drnis was captured.

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[At this point the r e p o r t again t u r n s to the Aegean/Dodecanese area.] " I n the Aegean cruiser Carlule with destroyers a n d M.T.B's were n e a r Leros on the night 7th/8th October, a n d are standing by for a n o t h e r anti-shipping sweep tonight if t h o u g h t necessary. Baltimores, Wellingtons a n d H u d s o n s searched the Aegean a n d attacked two ships, damages unobserved. " O n 7th October, twenty four American Liberators b o m b e d Pediada a e r o d r o m e (Crete) a n d eleven b o m b e d Maritza a e r o d r o m e (Rhodes). N o fighter opposition. Beaufighters a n d Lightnings cov­ e r e d naval units r e t u r n i n g from the Aegean a n d shot down o n e J U . 88 a n d d a m a g e d two. A reconnaissance Baltimore sighted a convoy of o n e m e r c h a n t vessel 1,000 tons, one m e r c h a n t vessel 5,000 tons, o n e F.-boat a n d t h r e e escort vessels eastbound between Kythnos a n d Syros a n d d a m a g e d one of the t h r e e J U . 88's escorting it. " O n the 7th October there were three enemy bombing attacks o n Leros." [MR*. pWSC, V, 215-16.]

T h e introduction of British forces into the Azores went without a hitch. Not until October 12 did Churchill publicly announce the move, in a speech before Parliament. Horta is the western district of the Azores, and Terceira is the main island and administrative capital of the central district.

C-446 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 9, 1943, 1510 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. I send you the following message which has j u s t been received from the British Vice Consul at Horta. "Shore operations successfully carried out evening October 7th. "2. C o m m a n d e r Colville a n d all ships arrived m o r n i n g of October 8 a n d proceeding according to plan. " 3 . Cable communication with Terceira has been established. (MR*]

This amendment to the monthly anti-submarine warfare statement was, on Roosevelt's instructions, routed directly to Hopkins since the President was resting at Hyde Park.

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C-447 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 9, 1943, 1519 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your n u m b e r 378. 1. T h e answer to your question is " n o . " 2. O u r estimate is that at least three U-boats were sunk and six seriously d a m a g e d . T h r e e escort vessels a n d six m e r c h a n t vessels were sunk. 3. T h e statement is i n t e n d e d to c o m p a r e the n u m b e r of U-boats sunk or d a m a g e d with the n u m b e r of m e r c h a n t ships sunk. 4. T o m e e t your point, however, we are altering the last two sentences of P a r a g r a p h 1 (inter) of my n u m b e r 439 to read "A small n u m b e r of m e r c h a n t ships were sunk b u t as a result of vigorous c o u n t e r attacks by the surface a n d air escorts a larger n u m b e r of U-boats were sunk or d a m a g e d . " We are issuing this statement h e r e at the agreed time of 2330 G M T 9th October. [MR*]

As Churchill pointed out the next day (C-449), the German decision to rein­ force positions south of Rome ended any chance that the Tunis Conference would come out in favor of sending additional forces to the Aegean.

R-383 Hyde Park, N.V. [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 9, 1943, 5:00 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Your 445, the following message has been sent to Eisenhower: " T h e Prime Minister in a message to the President expresses the fear that the repetition to you of the President's Message N o . 379 of 7 October to the Prime Minister would be taken as an o r d e r from the President a n d as closing the subject finally. T h e Prime Minister desires that it be m a d e clear to you that the conference scheduled for today in T u n i s is free to examine the whole question in all its bearings a n d should r e p o r t their (your and General Wilson's) con­ clusions to the President a n d the Prime Minister t h r o u g h the Com­ bined Chiefs of Staff. T h e Prime Minister asks that the conference shall give full, free, patient a n d unprejudicial consideration to the whole question after having h e a r d the Middle East point of view p u t

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forward by its representative. " T h e President directs that the foregoing desire expressed by the Prime Minister be accepted for your guidance." Roosevelt [ H L H , WDL] [MR*. WSC, V, 216-17.]

Roosevelt's assurances that the United States had no intention of remaining in the Azores after the war may have been directed toward the British as well as toward the Portuguese.

R-384 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 9, 1943, 5:05 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Replying to your 444, I am delighted with arrangements to provide in the Azores facilities for o u r ferry service as pointed out in my 376. T h e improvement in efficiency of the Allied war effort by directing o u r ferry service via the islands is so valuable as to justify its commencement at the earliest practicable date. I h o p e you will succeed in convincing Salazar of the value to Portugal that will result from his taking with us an active part in the war. H e may be assured that the United States has no desire to remain after the war in any Portuguese territory, and that we will welcome him as a belligerent on o u r side. T h e first temporary visit of escort vessels and two aircraft will be m a d e approximately o n 6 November as stated in detail in my 375. It is good to know that the landings are going forward so well. Roosevelt [WDL, JCS] [MR*]

Aware that Roosevelt did not like the idea of politicians barging into what the Americans considered military conferences, Churchill consulted about having Foreign Secretary Eden stop at Tunis while the military talks were being held. Roosevelt apparently had no objections for he made no direct answer to this cable. Harry was Harry Hopkins.

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C-448 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 9, 1943, 2103 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Anthony o n his way to the Foreign Office Conference at Moscow is passing t h r o u g h T u n i s tomorrow Sunday. H e will of course not attend the Conference should it still be in progress b u t I have told him that he is free to talk informally with General Eisenhower a n d of course with any of o u r officers w h o m h e may meet about the political a n d military back­ g r o u n d in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d Aegean. I d o not imagine you will have any objection to this b u t if you have pray let m e know. 2. Many thanks indeed for the intimation I have received t h r o u g h H a r r y that you wish the Conference to be free to discuss the whole matter on t h e merits a n d for o u r j o i n t interest. [MR]

Eisenhower called the Tunis meeting because he understood that Churchill considered the question of operations in the Aegean to be of major impor­ tance. As it turned out, none of the British members of Eisenhower's com­ mand (Allied Forces Headquarters—AFHQ) supported either Churchill or the British Middle East Command. As Eisenhower later put it, Churchill "seemed always to see great and decisive possibilities in the Mediterranean, while the project of invasion across the English Channel left him cold" (as quoted in Ambrose, Supreme Commander, p. 286). Moreover, the Americans believed that Churchill hoped to establish postwar political influence in the Balkans and to erase the memory of Churchill's disastrous Gallipoli operation in Turkey during World War I. Whatever Churchill's motives, the German decision to set u p a full-scale defense of Italy made the question moot.

C-449 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 10, 1943, 1450 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Many thanks for your n u m b e r 383. I have now read General Eisen­ hower's r e p o r t of t h e meeting. T h e G e r m a n intention to reinforce the South of Italy a n d to fight a battle before R o m e is what General Eisen­ hower rightly calls "a drastic change within the last forty-eight h o u r s . " We have always trusted this kind of evidence a n d I therefore agree that we must now look forward to very heavy fighting before Rome is reached

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instead of merely pushing back rearguards. I therefore agree with the conclusions of the conference that we cannot count on any comparative lull in which Rhodes might be taken and that we must concentrate all important forces available on the battle, leaving the question of Rhodes, etc. to be reconsidered as General Eisenhower suggests after the winter line north of Rome has been successfully occupied. 2.1 have now to face the situation in the Aegean. Even if we had decided to attack Rhodes on the 23rd Leros might well have fallen before that date. I have asked Eden to examine with General Wilson and Admiral Cunningham whether with resources still belonging to the Middle East anything can be done to regain Cos on the basis that Turkey lets us use the landing grounds close by. If nothing can be worked out on these lines and unless we have luck tonight or tomorrow night in destroying one of the assaulting convoys, the fate of Leros is sealed. 3. I propose, therefore, to tell General Wilson that he is free if he judges the position hopeless, to order the garrison to evacuate by night taking with them all Italian officers and as many other Italians as possible and destroying the guns and defences. The Italians cannot be relied upon to fight and we have only twelve hundred men, quite insufficient to man even a small portion of the necessary batteries, let alone the perimeter. Internment in Turkey is not strict and may not last long: or they may get out along the Turkish coast. 4. I will not waste words in explaining how painful this decision is to me. 5. I am repeating this telegram to General Eisenhower. [MR*. pWSC, V, 218-19. «£sfC]

Churchill's congratulations to the Americans on the success of their daylight bombing program stemmed not only from his pleasure at the tactical success but also because it vindicated his decision at the Casablanca talks to support the American proposals for such attacks. Churchill's message was prompted by the massive air attacks on Bremen and Vegesack in Germany, but his optimism was somewhat premature since massive daylight bombing was suspended for three weeks following heavy losses during a raid over Schweinfurt on October 14. It is not clear just which General Anderson was Churchill's dinner guest. Brigadier General F. L. Anderson commanded the Eighth Bomber Command, while Brigadier General O. A. Anderson was attached to the staff of the Eighth Air Force. General Henry H. Arnold commanded the U.S. Army Air Forces, and Major General Ira Eaker commanded the U.S. Eighth Air Force, stationed in England.

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C-450 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 10, 1943, 1830 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. F u r t h e r to my 449. I must a d d my congratulations u p o n the brilliant exploits of t h e last few days p e r f o r m e d by t h e United States Air Forces in this country in spite of heavy losses unflinchingly b o r n e . This vindication of the daylight b o m b e r must be most pleasing to you a n d General Arnold. I had your General A n d e r s o n dining with m e last night and he is convinced that the saturation a r g u m e n t is overwhelmingly sound. For instance, if he h a d h a d a n o t h e r two or t h r e e h u n d r e d bombers, as he will have in a short time, he could yesterday have gone to any place in G e r m a n y in broad daylight without any opposition except from the local flak. This is very far reaching in its implications. I propose to send a message of compli­ ments to General Eaker for your people a n d also o n e to o u r own bombers who have h a d a very heavy and p r o s p e r o u s week. [MR*]

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, British Commander in Chief in the Middle East, planned to fight to hold Leros and Samos, though he admitted that the Turks would have to provide assistance, particularly in the form of bases for British aircraft. Anthony was Anthony Eden, then on a visit to Tunis before going to Moscow for the Foreign Ministers' Conference.

C-451 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 10, 1943, 3218 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. I have h a d a n encouraging telegram from General Wilson a n d it is possible we may still save something from the wreck. T h e matter is being dealt with by A n t h o n y o n his j o u r n e y . [MR]

T h e Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean was British Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham; hence his agreement with the Italian Navy was labeled the "Cunningham Agreement." Eisenhower still hoped to gain en-

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thusiastic Italian participation in the battle against the Germans and therefore wished to keep ihe humiliating "unconditional surrender" clause, Article 1 (A), out of the surrender terms.

C-452 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 11, 1943, 1052 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. My N o . 440 of October 7th. T h e i m p o r t a n t thing is to a m e n d the draft a g r e e m e n t between the Allied C o m m a n d e r in Chief M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d the Italian Minister of Marine (NAF 381) so as to safeguard the right of the United Nations to dispose freely a n d without restriction of all Italian vessels, both warships a n d m e r c h a n t ships, as the needs of the United Nations may dictate. T h e British Chiefs of Staff have p r o p o s e d the necessary a m e n d m e n t to the United States authorities. But even assuming that the " C u n n i n g h a m A g r e e m e n t " is a m e n d e d accordingly, t h e r e is a risk that we may get landed in an a r g u m e n t with the Italian G o v e r n m e n t if we omit the unconditional s u r r e n d e r clause in the full armistice. T h e Italian Government could argue that we h a d changed o u r m i n d s about the unconditional s u r r e n d e r of the fleet, since we first m a d e t h e m sign this clause a n d t h e n withdrew it. By retaining the clause we should certainly further safeguard the position. I m u c h h o p e therefore that you will tell Eisenhower that we cannot agree to omission of Article 1 (A). Uncle J o e will certainly not mind us having second t h o u g h t s about it on the sterner side. [MR*]

Roosevelt and the State Department agreed with Churchill's next proposal and forwarded it to the American delegation then in Moscow for the Foreign Ministers' Conference. (See R-392.)

C-453 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 12, 1943 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt a n d Premier Stalin. Personal a n d Most Secret. Would you very kindly consider whether something like the following might not be issued over o u r t h r e e signatures.

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"Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union (in whatever order is thought convenient, we being quite ready to be last) have received from many quarters evidence of the atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of the Nazi domination are no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst forms of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that, in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. "Accordingly the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare, and give full warning of their declaration, as follows: " 'At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party, who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to the invaded parts of Russia, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia, Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy. Thus Germans who take part in the wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages, or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in the territories of the Soviet Republic which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back, regardless of expense, to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.' "The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localization. Signed Roosevelt Stalin Churchill."

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If this, or something like this (and I am not particular about the wording) were put over our three signatures, it would I believe, make some of these villains shy of being mixed up in butcheries now that they know they are going to be beat. We know, for instance, that our threats of reprisals about Poland have brought about a mitigation of the severities being inflicted on the people there. There is no doubt that the use of the terror-weapon by the enemy imposes an additional burden on our armies. Lots of Germans may develop moral scruples if they know they are going to be brought back and judged in the country, and perhaps in the very place, where their cruel deeds were done. I strongly commend to you the principle of the localization of judgment as likely to exert a deterrent effect on enemy terrorism. The British Cabinet endorse this principle and policy. [MR*. WSC, V, 296-98. R&C]

General Alexander Baron von Falkenhausen was involved in the conspiracy to overthrow Hitler—the Schwarze Kapelle. His "fantastic" activities apparently consisted of contacting representatives of various refugee governments in an attempt to enlist support and concessions in the event of Hitler's removal from power. He may also have transmitted the "Lisbon Report"—containing political information and data on the German rocket program—to British agents in Lisbon. The full story of the Schwarze Kapelle is long and complicated, but it is clear that the British had developed extensive contacts with the movement. Churchill's answer to Roosevelt would indicate either that the Prime Minister was ignorant of such things or that British Intelligence was keeping things from the Americans, or at least the President. (See Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, pp. 199-200, 313-14, and Winant to Roosevelt, Oct. 13, 1943, MR.)

R-385 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 12, 1943, 1 1 : 5 5 A.M.

Personal and Secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person. We have received fantastic reports regarding the activities of General von Falkenhausen now in Portugal. Have you anything in regard to this and if so why not send it over here by courier. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

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C-454 London Oct. 13, 1943 Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal. Your Nr 385. We have received exactly the same reports as you have. They emanate from the Polish Secret Service, with variations from the Belgians. We are with you in thinking they are totally unfounded and that the German Secret Service are aware of them. I will send you any further information which comes to hand. [MR*]

According to Ambassador Winant, Chicago Sun reporter Frederick Kuh ob­ tained his information about Stalin's refusal to change the location of the Foreign Ministers' Conference from a contact within the Soviet Embassy in London. Winant commented that Kuh was not an enemy of the United States but rather an "efficient and shrewd" reporter with excellent contacts (Winant to Roosevelt, Oct. 13, 1943, MR).

C-455 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 13, 1943, 2035 Ζ Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Your telegram 373 on October 5th. An investigation has been made into this leakage. Your telegram con­ taining Stalin's reply was dated October 2nd and reached me on that day. Kuh's cable was filed on evening of October 1st. Although the Soviet Embassy here are not generally so promptly and fully informed by Mos­ cow these facts suggest that they were on this occasion told the terms of Stalin's reply before that reply reached you and that they gave its contents to Kuh. The censor who passed Kuh's cable made an error of judgment and has been reproved. He was influenced by the statement in Kuh's cable that its contents came from "Trustworthy American sources". This may have been a device to disguise its real origin. Kuh's messages frequently show him to be in possession of information to which he is not entitled. He often causes us trouble. We are trying to track down his sources. Any help your people can give would be welcome. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, I, 557. R&C]

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With Roosevelt reluctant to travel to Teheran ("Cairo Three") for the con­ ference with Churchill and Stalin (the talks were codenamed EUREKA), Churchill had Anthony Eden, then in Moscow for the Foreign Ministers' Conference, suggest Habbaniya in Iraq (CYPRUS), about fifty miles west of Baghdad. T h e White House Map Room staff added the text of St. Matthew, chapter 17, verse 4: " T h e n answered Peter, and said unto Jesus, Lord it is good for us to be here: if thou wilt, let us make here three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias" (punctuation omitted in the original).

C-456 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 14, 1943, 1305 Ζ/TOR 9:50 A.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. I have a new idea about EUREKA which I have asked A n t h o n y to try on U J for subsequent submission to you if U J agrees. T h e r e is a place in the desert which I now call CYPRUS but whose real n a m e is in my immediately following. This would be a m u c h easier j o u r n e y for you from Cairo a n d "Cairo T h r e e " a n d very little longer for U J . We could p u t u p t h r e e e n c a m p m e n t s a n d live comfortably in perfect seclusion a n d security. I a m going into details on the chance of a g r e e m e n t in the Trinity. See also meanwhile St. Mathew C h a p t e r 17 Verse 4. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 30. WSC, V, 307.]

C-457 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 14, 1943, 1417 Ζ/TOR 11:00 A.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. My immediately preceding telegram, the word is "Habbaniya." [MR*]

At Eisenhower's suggestion, the President continued to massage the Italian surrender terms so as to lessen the humiliation of unconditional surrender in hopes of gaining more enthusiastic Italian support.

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R-386 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 14, 1943, 11:45 A.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Your N u m b e r 452. After consultation with General Eisenhower, I suggest that we approve the protocol proposed by him for the reason that it will meet the points raised in your N o . 452 a n d will protect the right of the United Nations to dispose of t h e Italian naval vessels a n d merchant ships as the needs of the United Nations may d e m a n d . T h e following is the text of the above mentioned proposed protocol: "It is agreed that the title of the document signed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government, a n d General Dwight D. Eisenhower, C o m m a n d e r in Chief Allied Force, at Malta o n September 29, 1943, should be changed to: "ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE WITH ITALY". T h e following further a m e n d m e n t s to this

d o c u m e n t a r e also agreed: the word unconditionally in Article 1 (A) to be deleted from that article a n d inserted after the word accepted in clause 6 of the preamble. " T h e clauses in question, therefore, would read as follows: "Preamble Clause 6: 'and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government'. "Article 1 (A): ' T h e Italian Land, Sea a n d Air Forces wherever located, hereby s u r r e n d e r . ' " Roosevelt [ H a m m o n d ] [MR*]

For a variety of motives, both short and long term, the United States quickly moved to take advantage of Portuguese agreement to an Allied military presence in the Azores (INGOT).

R-387 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 14, 1943, 2:35 P.M. T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Secret a n d Personal. You will recall agreement, m a d e d u r i n g your recent Portuguese negotiations, that any direct approach by U.S. Government to Portuguese

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Government would be suspended until those negotiations were concluded. Those negotiations were, as you know, concluded on 17 August with signing of INGOT Agreement. It was not practicable, however, to have included in that agreement adequate provision for U.S. Navy facilities in Azores, or any provision whatever for facilities for U.S. air transport and air ferrying operations. We both fully realize the tremendous importance to combined war effort of establishing Central Atlantic air transport and ferry route via Azores, with resultant saving of millions of gallons of high octane gasoline and many thousands of pilot and engine hours per month. We have received information from Lisbon that the Portuguese Government would not object to direct negotiations with the United States looking toward the use by U.S. airplanes of the islands, and I should like to suggest for your consideration that the U.S. State Department be directed by me to make a direct approach to the Government of Portugal with the purpose of obtaining agreement to permit us to provide aviation facilities in the Azores and to use such facilities for our combatant and transport airplanes in the furtherance of the Allied war effort. I hope you will agree to this line of approach to our common problem and that if practicable your Representatives in Portugal may assist and join with ours in the discussions. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 553.]

Roosevelt continued to search for alternatives to Teheran for the EUREKA Conference, but Stalin remained adamant. Roosevelt's reminder to Churchill that China would eventually have to be treated as a major power with its own "tabernacle" was as consistently part of the President's policy as was the Prime Minister's insistence that France receive similar treatment.

R-388 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 14, 1943, 7:30 P.M. Personal and Most Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. I have finally sent the following telegram to U. J. and I think your idea is an excellent one. St. Peter sometimes had real inspirations. I like the idea of three tabernacles. We can add one later for your old friend Chiang. QUOTE.

"The problem of my going to the place you suggested is becoming so acute that I feel I should tell you frankly that, for constitutional

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reasons, I cannot take the risk. The Congress will be in session. New Laws and resolutions must be acted on by me after their receipt and must be returned to the Congress physically before ten days have elapsed. None of this can be done by radio or cable. The place you mentioned is too far to be sure that the requirements are fulfilled. The possibility of delay in getting over the mountain—first, east bound and then west bound—is insurmountable. We know from experience that planes in either direction are often held up for three or four days. "I do not think that any one of us will need Legation facilities, as each of us can have adequate personal and technical staffs. I venture, therefore, to make some other suggestions and I hope you will consider them or suggest any other place where I can be assured of meeting my constitutional obligations. "In many ways Cairo is attractive, and I understand there is a hotel and some villas out near the pyramids which could be completely segregated. "Asmara, the former Italian Capital of Eritrea, is said to have excellent buildings and a landing field—good at all times. "Then there is the possibility of meeting at some port in the Eastern Mediterranean, each one of us to have a ship. If this idea attracts you we could easily place a fine ship entirely at your disposal for you and your party so that you would be completely independent of us and, at the same time, be in constant contact with your own war front. "Another suggestion is in the neighborhood of Bagdad where we could have three comfortable camps with adequate Russian, British and American guards. This last idea seems worth considering. "In any event, I think the Press should be entirely banished, and the whole place surrounded by a cordon so that we would not be disturbed in any way. "What would you think of November twentieth or November twentyfifth as the date of the meeting? "I am placing a very great importance on the personal and intimate conversations which you and Churchill and I will have, for on them the hope of the future world will greatly depend. "Your continuing initiative along your whole front heartens all of u s . " UNQUOTE.

Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 31-32. pWSC, V, 307-8. R&C]

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As the next two messages demonstrate, both Churchill and Roosevelt were extremely sensitive to the pressures of domestic politics. T h e five Senators to whom Churchill referred had leveled extensive criticisms against American foreign policy for failing to protect and promote the national interest through­ out the world. Calling the United States a "global sucker" they demanded that American aid be used as a lever to obtain practical advantages in trade and politics. Although the group was not dominated by the opposition Re­ publican Party, its members did look with suspicion on Roosevelt's supposed desire to conduct foreign policy without consulting Congress. Coming from so prestigious and powerful a group of Senators, the accusations caused by a public furor which could not be ignored by the administration. (The group's members were Richard Russell, D-Ga., Albert Chandler, D-Ky., James Mead, D-N.Y., Owen Brewster, R-Me., and Henry Cabot Lodge, R-Mass.) Eventually, these and similar criticisms forced the President to create a new super-agency, the Foreign Economic Administration, which took over lend-lease, overseas relief, and other wartime economic programs (Herring, Aid to Russia, p p . 123-24). Harry Hopkins, as in the past, acted as the go-between in these matters, but the messages were clearly part of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence. (Hopkins' role was deeply resented by the American Ambassador in London, Gilbert Winant. See R&H, pp. 754-56.)

C-457/1 London [via U.S. Embassy] Oct. 14, 1943, 0110 Ζ Prime Minister to H a r r y H o p k i n s Personal a n d Most Secret. Very strong feeling has been aroused h e r e by t h e r e m a r k s of t h e five senators, a n d t h e m a n y reports that have got about concerning t h e m . I am most grateful for t h e c o m m e n t s which t h e President m a d e at his press conference but t h e r e are several o t h e r i m p o r t a n t allegations which we think should be answered. I therefore propose to publish from 10 Down­ ing Street o n my authority something like the statement contained in my immediately following. Before doing so however I should be grateful if you would show it to t h e President, a n d let m e know if he objects to anything in it. Statement begins. T h e Prime Minister, answering inquiries about the r e p o r t of t h e five senators, said h e was very sorry to r e a d of t h e things that h a d been attributed to t h e m . Of course he h a d only seen unofficial re­ ports. H e h o p e d these were false a n d garbled. But what h a d b e e n published conveyed a n impression which was unfair a n d u n t r u e . " I have m a d e s u r e " h e said "Whenever it is in o u r power or province to d o so, that American material sent to T u r k e y should be clearly m a r k e d to show its American origin."

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"With regard to the supplies going to Russia, the Russians know perfectly well the origin of every weapon or bale of goods. We have not tried to claim any credit beyond what is our due. On the other hand, practically the whole burden of escorting the Arctic convoys from North British harbours to Archangel and Murmansk has fallen upon the Royal Navy. We lost two large cruisers, three large fleet destroyers, one other fleet destroyer, four minesweepers and one submarine—eleven warships in all and nearly one thousand men of the Royal Navy in the process. No American warship was sunk in these convoys. The loss among the merchant ships however fell more heavily on the United States than on Great Britain; the Americans lost thirty one and we lost twenty four. Many American and British merchant seamen shared the peril and the icy waters. I saw an American film recently called 'Action in the North Atlantic' which depicted in a vivid fashion a convoy going to Russia from the United States, but in which the British were scarcely mentioned at all from the start to finish. On the other hand, I have also seen a notable series of films prepared by the American Army under the authority of General Marshall which have deeply touched my heart on account of their generosity and breadth of view." On the question of the vast army which Britain is alleged to be hoarding in India, Mr. Churchill said "This army is ready to repel a Japanese invasion of the soil of India and still stands there for that purpose. It is physically impossible to employ more than a tiny fraction of it in the vast jungles and mountainous regions which separate India from China. Everything is governed by communications and means of supply. It is very silly to talk about two million men in India and only sixty thousand Japanese in Burma as if these two forces could be brought into contact. You might as well ask why are so many millions of American soldiers standing under arms in the United States? The answer is that they are coming to the war as fast as they can be carried, and it is much easier to cross the Atlantic Ocean than to wade through the hilly jungles of Assam and Burma." The Prime Minister also said: "Complaints are made about the bases lent by Britain to the United States in the West Indies in 1940 in return for the fifty destroyers. These fifty destroyers, although very old, were most helpful at that critical time to us who were fighting alone against Germany and Italy, but no human being could pretend that the destroyers were in any way and equivalent for the immense strategic advantages conceded in seven islands vital to the United States. I never defended the transaction as a business deal. I proclaimed to Parliament, and still proclaim, that the safety of the United States is involved in these bases, and that the military security of the

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United States must be considered a prime British interest. This policy has long governed Great Britain, as is proved by the association of the British for generations with the American Monroe Doctrine in a period when the British Navy was all-powerful on the seas. This has lately been brought into public notice by Mr. Walter Lippman's book on foreign policy." "Another suggestion which I found most wounding, was that in Africa the Americans were conquering territories and the British ruling them afterwards. It is possible that this is an exaggeration founded upon other statements made by the Senators themselves. However as the matter has been raised, it is right that some very simple facts should be stated. In the fighting in Tunis, Sicily and Italy up to the present the British have lost more than twice as many men killed, wounded and missing as the United States; and in Italy at the present moment, we have about twice as many soldiers. We make no reproaches about this. We are proud that it should be so. The honour lies in bearing the burden. Although we have had by far the largest armies fighting in this theatre and have supplied more than threequarters of the Naval forces and very nearly 1-half the Air forces, we have most willingly served under an American Commander-inChief. We have full confidence in General Eisenhower. He is the soul of loyal co-operation between the Allies, and all our Generals and forces have been strictly and punctually obedient to his general authority. The results have not been unfavourable to the common cause. These facts, which I would never have mentioned if I had not been forced to, certainly do not sustain the charge that the British are 'Out-smarting their American Allies everywhere'. As for our 'Taking over', AMGOT [Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories] is an Anglo-American affair. We have nowhere 'Taken over' territory alone except in Italian East Africa which we liberated alone. In the Solomons we never withdrew our administrators. They worked on secretly throughout the Japanese occupation and the natives responded most loyally. It is a cruel and churlish thing to fling out such taunts at a time when the greatest battles ever yet fought by American and British troops side by side in the line are impending, and when the blood and treasure of our two races is poured out for the liberation of the world from a cruel tyranny." "If I were in the United States, although I am head of a government waging war on a great scale, I would offer to go before a senate committee and be confronted with those who make these charges, and be examined in public or in secret for as long as might be necessary." "However", said Mr Churchill in conclusion, "I put my confidence

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in the fact that the American people are a just people, and that they seek the truth objectively whether it tells for or against them." [MR]

In a message probably drafted by Hopkins, the President agreed that the remarks of the five American Senators created friction, but went on to point out that the unauthorized publication of photographs in British newspapers created even greater problems. Moreover, Roosevelt was extremely critical of the failure of British censors to prevent the publication of information withheld from the American press. Another draft of the message, without any reference to the remarks by the American Senators, was finally sent by Hopkins to the British Minister of Information, Brendan Bracken, probably to avoid damaging the personal relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt. Nevertheless, the message is properly part of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence.

R-338/1, draft A, not sent Washington [via U.S. Embassy] Oct. 14, 1943 [Roosevelt to Churchill] Thank you very much for your number 455. We will also keep an eye on him. I have read your message to Harry about the alleged comments of the five fellow travelers and I agree with you that you and I must do all that we can to prevent the growth of friction between our press and people. You have probably noted the general annoyance expressed throughout our press at what they consider repeated instances of publishing information in London that is withheld by agreement in the United States. The most recent instances are: First, the premature disclosure in London of Italy's determination to declare war against Germany and also action of British Censorship in passing dispatch originating in London signed by Reston of New York Times. Reston's cable arrived in New York at 7:19 P.M. Eastern War Time, October 12th. Text of this cable available in British Censorship files also discloses prematurely our agreement to recognize Italy as co-belligerent. Secondly, the distribution from London of photograph of you and me in automobile made at Hyde Park Sunday, September 14th. I am informed that this picture was made by Captain Horton, under pledge previously given to U.S. Secret Service that no picture made by him at Hyde Park would be published. Publication of this picture in on group of American newspapers most embarrassing because American camera-

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13. Roosevelt takes Churchill for a ride: Hyde Park, N.Y., September 14, 1943. (Left to right) Brendan Bracken; CDR "Tommy" C. R. Thompson, RN; Churchill; Roosevelt. m e n were not permitted in g r o u n d s at Hyde Park and n o authorized disclosure of o u r presence at H y d e Park had been made for publication. I know you would want me to tell you frankly that such incidents not only e n d a n g e r national security but arouse antagonisms in the Press which d o not contribute to Anglo-American cooperation a n d good will. Franklin D. Roosevelt [MR. pR&C]

R-388/1 Washington Oct. 15, 1943 [Roosevelt to Churchill] Personal a n d Secret to Ambassador Winant from Harry Hopkins. Will you deliver the following to B r e n d a n Bracken from me? O n Sunday, September fourteenth, at Hyde Park, your Captain Holton took a picture of the President and the Prime Minister driving

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in t h e President's car. H e h a d promised the United States Secret Service that n o picture m a d e by him at Hyde Park would be pub­ lished. Nevertheless this picture was released in L o n d o n with Acme Photos. All American p h o t o g r a p h e r s were b a r r e d from this meeting a n d were told n o pictures would be taken. T h e publication of this picture has caused a hell of a row h e r e a n d the President feels that something must be d o n e to stop this sort of business. It a d d s to the antagonism already developing against Great Britain because every newspaper that gets beat with this kind of picture promptly thinks of some way to take a crack at Britain. This, coming on t o p of the p r e m a t u r e disclosure in L o n d o n of Italy's d e t e r m i n a t i o n to declare war against G e r m a n y , a n d the action of British censorship in passing dispatch originating in London signed by Reston of New York Times. Reston's cable arrived in New York at seven nineteen, October twelve. T e x t of t h e cable available in British censorship files also discloses prematurely o u r a g r e e m e n t to recognize Italy as co-belligerent. T h e r e are j u s t too many of this type of thing h a p p e n i n g in L o n d o n a n d I think you should give this business your most serious personal attention a n d d o not, for a m o m e n t , u n d e r r a t e t h e effect these are having over h e r e on Anglo-American relations. I a m p u t t i n g it mildly when I say t h e highest circles are irritated with these things. Why, in God's world, when we have a tough war to fight, d o we have to cope with these unnecessary leaks, p r e m a t u r e a n d otherwise? Harry Hopkins [MR. pflfcfC]

Hoping to avoid both the embarrassment of having to ask the Portuguese for additional concessions and American recriminations should Salazar refuse, Churchill agreed to Roosevelt's proposal that the United States pursue sep­ arate negotiations with the Portuguese. A notation at the bottom of the Map Room file copy instructed the State Department to wait until October 18 before taking action so as to determine the German reaction.

C-458 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 15, 1943, 1739 Ζ / TOR 2:30 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your n u m b e r 387. By all m e a n s m a k e your own request to the Portuguese G o v e r n m e n t .

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We will back you to the full, quoting particularly the "Friends to Friends" phrase in the [Anglo-Portuguese] Treaty of 1373. Our two ambassadors should play the hand together, your man now taking the lead. The only question open is whether you should give them a few more days to watch the German reaction. We leave this to you. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 554.]

The problem of sending convoys to northern Russia continued to trouble Anglo-Russian relations, as Soviet suspicions and British resentment resulted in petty squabbling. The Map Room staff appended the following to the message: Saint Mark 9 5. And Peter answered and said to Jesus, Master, it is good for us to be here; and let us make three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias. 6. For he wist not what to say; for they were sore afraid. Churchill, and many Americans, frequently assumed that Stalin was effec­ tively limited in his freedom of action by party and government officials.

C-459 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 16, 1943, 0950 Ζ/TOR 7:15 A.M. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. 1. Please see my Nr. 429 about Russian convoys. I have now received the immediately following telegram from Uncle Joe which I think you will feel is not exactly all one might hope for from a gentleman for whose sake we are to make an inconvenient, extreme and costly exertion. I have sent the following suggested answer to Anthony for him to handle as he thinks best. 2. I think or at least I hope this message came from the machine rather than from Stalin as it took 12 days to prepare. The Soviet machine is quite convinced it can get everything by bullying and I am sure it is a matter of some importance to show that this is not necessarily always true. 3. I entirely agree with the telegram [R-388] you have sent to Uncle Joe about EUREKA. Let me know what he replies. 4. Please also see Saint Mark 9 verses 5 and 6 especially sixth verse. [MR*. WSC, V, 270, 308. pFRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 32. RUC]

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T h e British-American supply protocols with the Soviet Union included an escape clause which made clear that the commitment was conditional, but Stalin regarded the supplies listed in the protocols as a firm promise. T h e issue was never resolved but lost its meaning as shipping problems eased in 1944. Whether or not Stalin's complaints about the activities of British military personnel were justified, he did not intend to let the war become an excuse for the British to increase their presence or prestige in the Soviet Union, and he remained adamant about preventing or at least minimizing contacts be­ tween Russian citizens and British sailors.

C-460 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 16, 1943, 1030 Ζ/TOR 9:40 A.M. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. My N r . 459. Following is telegram received from Uncle J o e . Begins. " P r e m i e r Stalin to Premier Churchill. " 1 . I received your message of Oct 1st [C-429] informing m e of the intention to send four convoys to t h e Soviet Union by the North­ e r n Route in November, December, J a n u a r y , a n d February. How­ ever, this communication loses its value by your statement that this intention to send n o r t h e r n convoys to the USSR is neither a n obli­ gation n o r an agreement, but only a statement which, as it may be understood, is one t h e British side can at any m o m e n t r e n o u n c e regardless of any influence it may have on t h e Soviet Armies at t h e front. I must say that I cannot agree with such a posing of t h e ques­ tion. Supplies from t h e British G o v e r n m e n t to the USSR, a r m a m e n t s a n d o t h e r military goods, cannot be considered otherwise than as a n obligation which, by special a g r e e m e n t between o u r countries, t h a t British G o v e r n m e n t u n d e r t o o k in respect of the USSR, which bears on its shoulders, already for the third year, t h e e n o r m o u s b u r d e n of struggle with the c o m m o n enemy of the Allies—Hitlerite G e r m a n y . " I t is also impossible to disregard t h e fact that the N o r t h e r n Route is the shortest way which permits delivery of a r m a m e n t s supplied by the Allies within the shortest period to the Soviet-German front, a n d the realisation of the plan of supplies to the USSR in a p p r o p r i a t e volume is impossible without an adequate use of this way. As I already wrote to you earlier, a n d as experience has shown, delivery of ar­ m a m e n t s a n d military supplies to the USSR t h r o u g h Persian ports cannot compensate in any way for those supplies which were not delivered owing to the absence of delivery of e q u i p m e n t and materials by t h e N o r t h e r n Route which, as it can be well u n d e r s t o o d , were taken into account when planning the supplies for the Soviet Armies.

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By the way, for some reason or other, there was a very considerable decrease in the delivery of military goods sent by the Northern Route this year in comparison with those received last year: and this makes it impossible to fulfil the established plan of military supplies and is in contradiction to the corresponding Anglo-Soviet protocol for military supplies. Therefore, at the present time, when the forces of the Soviet Union are strained to the utmost to secure the needs of the front in the interests of success of the struggle against the main forces of our common enemy, it would be inadmissible to have the supplies of the Soviet Armies depend on the arbitrary judgment of the British side. It is impossible to consider this posing of the question to be other than a refusal of the British Government to fulfil the obligations it undertook, and as a kind of threat addressed to the USSR. "2. Concerning your mention of controversial points allegedly contained in the statement of M. Molotov, I have to say that I do not find any foundation for such a remark. I consider the principle of reciprocity and equality proposed by the Soviet side for settlement of the visa question in respect of personnel of the military missions to be a correct and indeed a just one. The reference to the difference in the functions of the British and Soviet military missions to exclude the usage of that principle, and that the numbers of the staff of the British Military Mission must be determined by the British Government only, I consider to be unconvincing. It has already been made clear in detail in the previous Aide Memoires of the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on this question. "3. I do not see the necessity for increasing the number of British service men in the North of the USSR since the great majority of British service men who are already there are not adequately employed, and for many months have been doomed to idleness, as has already been pointed out several times by the Soviet side. For example, it can be mentioned that owing to its non-necessity, the question of the liquidation of the 126th British Port Base in Archangel was put forward several times, and only now the British side have agreed to liquidate it. There are also regrettable facts of the inadmissible behaviour of individual British service men who attempted, in several cases, to recruit, by bribery, certain Soviet citizens for intelligence purposes. Such instances, offensive to Soviet citizens, naturally gave rise to incidents which led to undesirable complications. "4. Concerning your mention of formalities and certain restrictions existing in northern ports, it is necessary to have in view that such formalities and restrictions are unavoidable in zones near and at the front, if one does not forget the war situation which exists in the USSR. I may add that this applies equally to the British and other

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foreigners as well as to Soviet citizens. Nevertheless, the Soviet au­ thorities granted many privileges in this respect to the British service men and seamen, about which the British Embassy was informed as long ago as last March. Thus, your mention of many formalities and restrictions is based on inaccurate information. "Concerning the question of censorship and prosecution of British service men, I have no objection if the censorship of private mail for British personnel in northern ports would be made by the British authorities themselves on condition of reciprocity, and also if cases of small violations committed by British service men which did not involve court procedure, would be given to the consideration of the appropriate military authorities." [MR*. WSC, V, 267-69, 270 (textual differences). R&C. Stalm/WSC, doc. 203.]

Churchill characterized Stalin's message as "offensive" and decided to refuse formally to accept its delivery. He returned it to the Soviet Ambassador and informed him that British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden would take up the matter during the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow beginning on October 19. Much to his surprise, Eden found Molotov cooperative and the affair was ironed out to Churchill's satisfaction. Stalin said he had not intended offense, and additional visas were granted for British sailors.

C-461 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 16, 1943, 1044 ΖI T O R 9:40 A.M.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. My number 459. Following is suggested answer sent to Anthony for him to handle. Begins. " 1. It is impossible for His Majesty's Government to guarantee that the four convoys mentioned can be run irrespective of the military situation on the seas. Every effort and heavy loss and sacrifice would, however, be made to do so if the Soviet Government attaches im­ portance to the receipt of their cargoes. I cannot undertake to do more than my best and His Majesty's Government must remain the judge of whether any particular operation of war to be carried out by their forces is in fact practicable or not. "2. The running of these convoys would be a very great burden to the Royal Navy and involves the diversion of much needed flotillas from the anti-U-boat war and from the escorting of troop and other important convoys. It also exposes the main units of the fleet to serious risks. His Majesty's Government would be very glad to be

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relieved of the task of r u n n i n g the convoys if the Soviet Government d o not attach importance to them. " 3 . In particular the refusal of the request of the British Government in respect of the reliefs and small increases in the few h u n d r e d s of British service m e n in the North of the USSR and in particular the Signals personnel on which the safety of these convoys to some extent d e p e n d s , raises an insuperable obstacle. His Majesty's Gove r n m e n t would be very glad to withdraw the handfuls of service personnel from N o r t h Russia and will d o so as soon as they are assured that it is not the desire of the Soviet Government to receive the convoys u n d e r the modest and reasonable conditions which the British Government consider necessary." [MR*. pWSC, V, 269-70.]

Chiang Kai-shek and Major General Claire Chennault complained bitterly to Roosevelt that General Stilwell and the British in India were withholding supplies promised to the Chinese. Roosevelt, eager to build u p China's credibility as a great power, instructed General Marshall to straighten things out and get supplies moving again to China (Roosevelt to Marshall, Oct. 15, 1943, HLH: Chinese Affairs). Marshall had previously indicated his suspicions that the British were using their control of Indian railroads to limit the amount of supplies available to be flown over the Himalaya Mountains—the "Hump" (Marshall to Roosevelt, Oct. 4, 1943, PSF: War Dept.: Marshall).

R-389 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 16, 1943, 9:55 A.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. I a m disturbed about the build u p of o u r air facilities at Assam. T h e determination of the supplies that go over the railroad from Calcutta to Assam is u n d e r British control. T h e a m o u n t of tonnage flown over the mountains to Chennault's Air Force has been very disappointing to me. Chennault's Air Force cannot operate without the supplies and his striking force is the one specific contribution that can be m a d e in China p r o p e r by us during the next few months. O u r own transport planes have been disappointing. I wish you would take a personal part in this business because I am a bit apprehensive that with o u r new project in B u r m a o u r air force in China will be forgotten a n d I think that is a great mistake. Roosevelt [MR*. RUC]

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Churchill continued to express deep concern over the disposition of the Italian fleet, and adopted an unusually strong tone with Roosevelt in demanding that appropriate changes be made in the Cunningham agreement—the earlier arrangement regarding the Italian fleet. Although Eisenhower still wanted to avoid harsh language in the surrender terms in hopes of gaining more enthusiastic Italian support, he acquiesced in the face of Churchill's insistence. (See R-395.)

C-462 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 16, 1943, 1519 Ζ/TOR 12:40 P.M. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Your nr 386. 1. I agree that General Eisenhower's proposals will meet the points raised in my nr 452, provided the Cunningham Agreement is amended in the manner suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff. Unless this agree­ ment is so amended, I do not believe that the right of the United Nations to dispose of Italian vessels as they wish would be safeguarded and I could not agree to a protocol being signed on the lines of that proposed by General Eisenhower, unless this condition is fulfilled. 2.1 have seen a telegram suggesting that the Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that the Cunningham Agreement ought not to be amended so soon after having been presented to the Italians. Surely this is a mis­ taken idea since we are in fact contemplating amending the armistice terms themselves. If you would arrange for instructions to be sent to General Eisenhower to have the Cunningham Agreement amended straight away as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, I would then be glad to instruct Macmillan to sign a protocol on the lines proposed by General Eisenhower. 3. There is, however, one further point. The Russians have suggested a rewording of Article 29 about war criminals and a rewording of the preamble to the armistice terms to make it clear that the armistice was signed on their behalf as well as on the behalf of our two governments. The Foreign Office have suggested a form of words to the State De­ partment to put these proposed changes into effect. I think it would be a mistake to ask the Italians to sign two protocols, one to take care of the changes proposed by General Eisenhower and the other to cover the Soviet proposals. Would it not be better that they shall all form the subject of one protocol? If the State Department will agree to the form of words which the Foreign Office have suggested or to something like it to meet the Soviet proposals and if directions could accordingly be sent to General Eisenhower, his protocol could be redrafted accordingly.

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4. I should like to emphasize once m o r e that I cannot agree to the protocol being signed unless t h e C u n n i n g h a m A g r e e m e n t is a m e n d e d simultaneously. [MR*]

Churchill continued to insist that the administration and reconstruction of Italy remain under British and American control, even though he publicly agreed to Soviet requests for tripartite equality. During the discussions at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, the Russians apparently accepted this when they agreed to the creation of the European Advisory Commission. Although this organization had vague authority to deal with all of the Eu­ ropean peace settlements, the real authority in Italy remained with AngloAmerican military and political officials. Roosevelt never responded to Churchill's complaint about Soviet attempts to increase their influence in Italy, but he did react vigorously to the idea of de Gaulle having a significant role in that area. (See R-390, R-395.) T h e amendment proposed by Molotov is probably the note referred to in a message from the U.S. Charge in Moscow to the Secretary of State (Oct. 15, 1943, FRUS, 1943, I, 796). T h e Charge reported that the British had suggested inviting the French to join the Political-Military Commission ad­ vising on Italian policy, but that Molotov had coupled his approval with a restatement of Soviet requests that the Political-Military Commission "direct and coordinate activity of all military organs and of any civil authorities of Allies which are organized on enemy territory.. . ." That would have changed the commission from an advisory to a supervisory board, preventing the Anglo-American Control Commission from having a free hand. T h e British were interested in building up the authority of the French National Com­ mittee, but not at the cost of giving it and the Soviets real power in Italy.

C-463 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 16, 1943, 1803 Ζ/TOR 2:45 P.M. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Molotov's p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t , making t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n Commis­ sion what is virtually a n executive a n d governing body, goes far beyond what we h a d in m i n d . I am not p r e p a r e d to agree to this extension of Russian a n d , as it would now be, De Gaullist powers of interference in a theatre w h e r e they have n o troops a n d where all t h e b u r d e n is b o r n e by us. We are also advising you officially t h r o u g h t h e State D e p a r t m e n t . [MR*]

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Roosevelt's message to Stalin made no mention of the Soviet proposal to expand the powers of the Political-Military Commission, but the messages sent to and from Secretary of State Hull, then enroute to Moscow, made it clear that American policy was to keep control of Italy firmly in AngloAmerican hands. (See FRUS, 1943, I, 797-98.) As in the past, Roosevelt avoided any direct confrontation with Stalin, but was brutally frank about the secondary role he thought appropriate for France.

R-390 Shangri-La [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 16, 1943, 8:20 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Your 4 6 3 . T h e following is a paraphrase of a message today sent to Marshal Stalin. "In o r d e r to avoid misunderstanding with respect to representation o n the Political Military Commission, and in view of Mr. Molotov's October 14 note to the American Charge d'Affaires, I think I should make it clear that, as indicated in my message to you of September 5, I feel that French representation should be restricted to matters other than the military occupation of Italy, in which the three gove r n m e n t s establishing the Commission decide that France has a direct interest. In this regard I feel, as I suggested in my message of October 13, that French representation should correspond to that accorded to the Governments of China, Yugoslavia, Greece, Brazil, or to any other government which by mutual agreement may be invited to participate. T h a t the French Committee of National Liberation should enter into its deliberations on all subjects or should function o n the same plane as the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States was never my intention." [MR*. StalmiFDR, doc. 129.]

Busy as he was, Roosevelt found time to dictate the following memo: Take u p with General Arnold and find out what is the latest date that I can deliver a Christmas tree for Winston Churchill and send it over by a bomber or otherwise in order to reach him at Chequers, England, before Christmas. If I am away, tell Mr. Plog a week beforehand that it should be packed in burlap and sent to wherever General Arnold says. [William Plog was the White House gardener.] (Roosevelt to Grace Tully, Oct. 16, 1943, PSF:GB:WSC.)

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Churchill, eager to announce the command changes he and Roosevelt had agreed upon (Churchill claimed in his memoirs to have been embarrassed by the delay; WSC, V, 304), continued to press for a decision on the command of OVERLORD.

C-464 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 17, 1943, 1833 Ζ/TOR 3:30 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. It seems to m e t h a t it is becoming very necessary to have a decision about t h e high c o m m a n d . Unless t h e r e is a G e r m a n collapse the campaign of 1944 will be far the most d a n g e r o u s we have u n d e r t a k e n a n d personally I am m o r e anxious a b o u t its success t h a n I was about 1941, 1942 or 1943. [MR. WSC, V, 304.]

At Churchill's suggestion, the President of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, Alfred Webb-Johnson, presented to Roosevelt copies of two pri­ vately printed books by Rudyard Kipling. Both books, A Chapter of Proverbs and The Burden of Jerusalem, spoke to the problem of ethnic rivalries in the Middle East. T h e latter collection is particularly anti-Semitic, which apparently explains the decision not to distribute the volumes publicly. Both were hand printed and are available at the Roosevelt Library.

C-464/1, letter London October 17, 1943 My d e a r Mr. President, I a m sending you with this letter two small unpublished works of Rud­ yard Kipling which I think I m e n t i o n e d to you. Similar copies were given to m e by t h e President of t h e Royal College of Surgeons of E n g l a n d on t h e occasion of my admission as an H o n o r a r y Fellow of t h e College, a n d I t h o u g h t that you would like to have both books for your library. I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t Mrs. Kipling decided not to publish t h e m in case they should lead to controversy a n d it is therefore i m p o r t a n t that their existence should not become known a n d that t h e r e should be n o public reference to this gift. Yours sincerely, [signed] Winston S. Churchill [MR]

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More effective than Churchill's promise of a "ceaseless effort" in supplying American air forces in China was a visit to India by the head of the U.S. Army Service Forces, Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell. As General Marshall had suspected, Somervell found the British disorganized and unenthusiastic in their efforts to ship the needed supplies. Once Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten took over the South East Asia theater, the situation improved. Brigadier General Orde Wingate had captured Churchill's fancy by de­ veloping the tactic of using long-range penetration groups, dropped by air behind Japanese lines, to disrupt enemy communications. Impressed by Wingate's daring and imagination, Churchill had brought him to the Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) and had also suggested that he command all British land forces in the South East Asia Command.

C-465 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 19, 1943, 1525 Ζ/TOR 12:40 P.M. Prime Minister to President Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Your n u m b e r 389. T h o u g h t h e Q U A D R A N T decision that opera­ tions in u p p e r B u r m a should be given priority will inevitably result in a m o d e r a t e decrease in t h e air lift to China, I agree that t h e r e must be ceaseless effort to build u p your air force there a n d on the air route. 2. O u r j o i n t staffs have recently considered this problem and as a result have informed Generals Stilwell a n d Auchinleck of their anxiety that the reduction in lift to China should not be greater t h a n is necessary to implement t h e Q U A D R A N T decision, a n d have instructed t h e m to sub­ mit an agreed r e c o m m e n d a t i o n as to the m i n i m u m air lift that should be maintained to s u p p o r t the 14th Air Force in China a n d the Y u n n a n advance. 3. I feel that this is not a matter which can be examined in detail either in Washington o r L o n d o n , a n d that we should await the r e p o r t from Stilwell a n d Auchinleck before taking further action. 4. Latest figures show an increase in September from 4380 tons in August to 6740 tons. 5. I grieve to say that Wingate is down with typhoid fever. All his work a n d plans are being vigorously pressed forward a n d I have every h o p e that he will r e s u m e his duties early in December. [MR. R&C]

Churchill believed the Americans were pushing the Portuguese too hard, and his message to Roosevelt hinted at British unwillingness to support the Amer­ ican requests.

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C-466 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 19, 1943, 2215 Ζ/TOR 12:15 A.M., Oct. 20 F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Secret. I fear t h e r e may be some m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g about your proposed direct a p p r o a c h to Portuguese concerning use of Azores. When you told m e you h a d received information from Lisbon that Portuguese G o v e r n m e n t would not object to direct negotiations with your G o v e r n m e n t on this subject, I encouraged you to go ahead, thinking that all you h a d in mind were the facilities for the ferry service referred to in my n u m b e r 444, because in reply you said you were delighted with these arrangements. Now I learn from Lisbon that you are instructing your Charg£ D'Affaires to p u t the d e m a n d s formulated by United States Chiefs of Staff on September 8th. Difficulties i n h e r e n t in these were telegraphed from h e r e to J o i n t Staff Mission on September 18th. I cannot help feeling that we could not obtain these for you immedi­ ately, a n d I w o n d e r w h e t h e r you have any definite information from Lisbon t h a t you would be able to obtain t h e m by direct a p p r o a c h . [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 558.]

This was the first of a series of requests by Churchill for a full-scale AngloAmerican conference prior to the Teheran (EUREKA) meeting. ANFA was the location of the Casablanca Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt back in January 1943.

C-467 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 20, 1943, 0050 Ζ I TOR 2:15 A.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I n view of the changes that have taken place since Q U A D R A N T we have h a d prolonged discussions h e r e about o u r existing plans for the campaign of 1944. O n these the British Chiefs of Staff a n d War Cabinet are deeply concerned. We ask for a full conference of the Combined Staffs in N o r t h Africa in the first or second week of November, that is between the e n d of the foreign secretaries conference at Moscow a n d EUREKA. We ask this irrespective of w h e t h e r EUREKA takes place o r not. It would be best however if this took place o n o u r way to EUREKA.

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2. We will go wherever you wish, but is t h e r e any reason why we should not meet again at ANFA? I recognize that the date should be fixed in relation to E U R E K A . We must wait to decide o u r own movements till we h e a r from U J . But t h e C o m b i n e d Staffs should begin their discussions not later t h a n about N o v e m b e r 10. I beg most earnestly that you will consider this request in a favourable sense. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 34]

Churchill remained adamant about excluding the Russians from any mean­ ingful role in occupied Italy.

C-468 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 20, 1943, 0808 Ζ / TOR 0920 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. Your 390. T h a n k you very m u c h . More i m p o r t a n t to m e t h a n t h e composition of t h e Commission is w h e t h e r it should have executive a n d administrative powers. T o this I should find constitutional difficulties in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s as well as personal objections. O u r m e m o r a n d u m , which by a g r e e m e n t with Hull has now b e e n communicated to t h e Soviet, proposes that t h e scope of t h e Commission should in t h e first instance b e confined to Italian problems a n d its functions to makingjoint or several r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s to G o v e r n m e n t s . I h o p e I may c o u n t on your s u p p o r t in u r g i n g t h e Soviet to accept these proposals. If scope a n d functions of Commission are limited in this way, I would like to accord F r a n c e full m e m b e r s h i p , as I u n d e r s t o o d was your intention when we discussed this in Washington in September. If, however, t h e scope of Commission is subsequently enlarged I agree that French rep­ resentation should t h e n be altered to c o r r e s p o n d to that accorded o t h e r United Nations. [MR]

T h e r e is no evidence that Roosevelt was trying to gain some sort of psycho­ logical advantage by trying to shift the site of the EUREKA Conference from Teheran, although that may have been in the back of his mind. Nonetheless, given Roosevelt's strained relationship with Congress, his objections based on the U.S. Constitution were probably sincere. Stalin appears to have been unwilling to meet at any place where he could not stay at a Soviet Embassy, thus eliminating Egypt and all of the other locations suggested by Churchill

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and Roosevelt. Asmara was the former capital of the Italian colony of Eritrea, and Basra is an Iraqi port on the Persian Gulf.

R-391 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 21, 1943,4:50 P.M.

Personal and Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Last night I received the following from U.J.: "Concerning the location for the forthcoming conference of the leaders of the three governments, I desire to convey the following information to you. Unfortunately, not one of the places proposed instead of Teheran by you for the meeting is suitable to me. It became clear, during the course of operations of the Soviet forces in the summer and fall of this year, that the summer campaign may overgrow into a winter one and that our troops can continue their offensive operations against the German Army. It is considered by all my colleagues that these operations demand my personal contact with the Command and daily guidance on the part of the Supreme Command. Conditions are better in Teheran, because wire telegraph and telephone communications with Moscow exist there. This cannot be said about the other locations. My colleagues insist on Teheran as the place of the meeting for this reason. I accept your suggestion to designate November 20th or 25th as a possible date for the conference, and I also agree that representatives of the press should be excluded from the meeting. I hope that a great deal of good will be accomplished by the direct participation in the Moscow meeting of Mr. Hull, who has arrived safely in Moscow." I am asking Hull to deliver the following to U. J. at once: "I am deeply disappointed in your message received today in regard to our meeting. Please accept my assurance that I fully appreciate and understand your reason for requiring daily guidance on the part of the Supreme Command and your personal contact with the Command which is bringing such outstanding results. This is of high importance. And I wish you would realize that there are other vital matters which, in this constitutional American Government, represent fixed obligations on my part which I cannot change. Our Constitution calls for action by the President on legislation within ten days of the pas-

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sage of such legislation. That means that the President must receive and return to the Congress, with his written approval or his veto, physical documents in that period. I cannot act by cable or radio, as I have told you before. The trouble with Teheran is the simple fact that the approaches to that city over the mountain often make flying an impossibility for several days at a time. This is a double risk; first, for the plane delivering documents from Washington and, second, for the plane returning these documents to the Congress. I regret to say that as head of the Nation, it is impossible for me to go to a place where I cannot fulfill my constitutional obligations. I can assume the flying risks for documents up to and including the Low Country as far as the Persian gulf, through a relay system of planes, but I cannot assume the delays attending flights in both directions into the saucer over the mountains in which Teheran lies. Therefore, with much regret I must tell you that I cannot go to Teheran and in this my Cabinet members and the Legislative Leaders are in complete agreement. Therefore, I can make one last practical suggestion. That is that all three of us should go to Basra where we shall be perfectly protected in three camps, to be established and guarded by our respective national troops. As you know, you can easily have a special telephone, under your own control, laid from Basra to Teheran where you will reach your own line into Russia. Such a wire service should meet all your needs, and by plane you will only be a little further off from Russia than in Teheran itself. I am not in any way considering the fact that from United States territory I would have to travel six thousand miles and you would only have to travel six hundred miles from Russian territory. I would gladly go ten times the distance to meet you were it not for the fact that I must carry on a constitutional government more than one hundred and fifty years old. You have a great obligation to your people to carry on the defeat of our common enemy, but I am begging you to remember that I also have a great obligation to the American Government and to maintain the full American war effort. As I have said to you before, I regard the meeting of the three of us as of the greatest possible importance, not only to our peoples as of today, but also to our peoples in relation to a peaceful world for generations to come. It would be regarded as a tragedy by future generations if you and I and Mr. Churchill failed today because of a few hundred miles. I repeat that I would gladly go to Teheran were I not prevented

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from doing so because of limitations over which I have n o control. I am suggesting Basra because of your communications problems. If you d o not like this I deeply hope you will reconsider Bagdad or Asmara or even Ankara in Turkey. T h e latter place is neutral territory, but I think it is worth considering a n d that the T u r k s might welcome the idea of being hosts though, of course, I have not mentioned this to them or anybody else. Please d o not fail me in this crisis." T h e possibility of T e h e r a n is out because I find the time risks are flatly impossible to take. I h o p e you can find some way of having Eden back this u p . Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf, pp. 33-34, 35-37. pWSC, V, 308-10.]

Churchill's draft of a tripartite statement promising the trial and punishment of Germans committing atrocities against the peoples of conquered nations was sent to the American delegation at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference with a favorable recommendation from the President. Roosevelt also suggested that "this warning should refer specifically to present and future atrocities in order to avoid in so far as is possible driving to desperation those cornered rats who have in the past murdered their helpless victims and to whom we can and will apply the same punishment without any notice" (FRUS, 1943, I, 566). T h e President's sensitivity to possible acts of desperation indicates that he must have known his stubborn adherence to the doctrine of unconditional surrender could prolong the German resistance. After a few minor modifications, the "Declaration on German Atrocities" was issued over the signatures of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill as part of the Protocols of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference (FRUS, 1943, I, 768-69).

R-392 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 21, 1943, 6:05 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Your 453 was transmitted on 18 October to Secretary Hull with a request that it be considered by the conference. Roosevelt [MR*]

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R-392/1, letter Washington [via State Dept.] October 21, 1943 Dear Winston: I have asked o u r Signal Corps to send you a copy of the motion picture they m a d e of the Quebec Conference. I think it is very good and I know you will like it. Very sincerely yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt [PSF 7683]

YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE Chaotic was the right word to describe the situation in both Greece and Yugoslavia. In each country local guerrilla forces, realizing that alone they could not defeat the Germans, all too frequently concentrated instead on consolidating their postwar position. In Yugoslavia that tendency was complicated by the divisions between Serbs and non-Serbs (largely Slavs) and between monarchists and communists. T h e guerrilla forces of General Draza Mihailovic represented Serbian aspirations and supported the restoration of the monarchy. T h e Partisans led by Tito (Josip Broz) opposed Serbian domination and were avowedly communist, although they asserted their willingness to let the Yugoslav people decide on the form of their postwar government. Initially, the British tried to force the two groups to cooperate with each other, but failed largely because Mihailovic and his associates avoided prosecuting the guerrilla war on the grounds that the Germans would retaliate against the civilian population. This left the initiative in the hands of the Partisans, and their popular image was enhanced further when some of Mihailovic's people collaborated with the Germans in an attempt to gain the advantage over Tito's Partisans. Similar problems existed in Greece, where the cooperation of the King with the authoritarian prewar regime of Prime Minister General Ioannis Metaxas had brought on popular opposition to the monarchy. Although many splinter groups existed, the struggle was primarily between a coalition of the left (the ELAS/EAM) and a coalition of the center, later joined by the monarchists (the EDES). British policy called for a restoration of the monarchy prior to any postwar plebescite regarding the form of the Greek government. T h e EDES, of course, was willing to accept British aid on those terms. T h e others were not, however, and by October 1943 civil war between the two groups had broken out. Major General Sir Colin Gubbins was head of the British SOE (Special Operations Executive), which directed British aid to guerrillas operating behind enemy lines. Brigadier General William Donovan was director of the American Office of Strategic Services, which handled American contacts with

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guerrillas. Donovan was not only a close confidant of the President, but insisted that defeat of the Germans, not postwar politics, was the task at hand, although the British suspected him of working to prevent the re-establishment of British colonial power.

R-393 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 22, 1943, 11:00 A.M.

Personal and Secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person. The chaotic condition developing in the Balkans causes me concern. I am sure you are also worried. In both Yugoslavia and Greece the guerrilla forces appear to be engaged largely in fighting each other and not the Germans. If these forces could be united and directed toward a common end they would be very effective. In the present confused condition the only hope I see for immediate favorable action is the presence of an aggressive and qualified officer. The only man I can think of now who might have a chance of success is Donovan. I do not believe he can do any harm and being a fearless and aggressive character he might do much good. He was there before and is given some credit for the Yugoslavs entering the war against the Germans. If we decide to send him all agencies of ours now working in the Balkans should be placed under his direction and the resources we put into this effort should be at his disposal. I understand that your General Gubbins is now in the Middle East. Donovan could consult with him enroute. I feel this is an urgent matter. If you are inclined to agree to my idea I will discuss the possibilities with Donovan at once. Roosevelt [MR. fltfC]

The precise motives behind Churchill's pleas for a major Anglo-American conference before the tripartite meeting with Stalin, and Roosevelt's equally strong reluctance to have such a conference with Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, lie hidden beneath the rhetoric of friendship and alliance. It appears that Churchill hoped to get an American commitment for a major military move in the Balkans, an idea based more upon the Prime Minister's evaluation of the military situation than any desire to thwart Soviet expansion into that area. To achieve that change in strategy, the British were willing to eliminate promised operations in Burma and delay OVERLORD beyond the spring 1944 target date. The Americans had become worried that the Russians might agree to Churchill's plan, particularly since Soviet losses had been heavy in recent months and a Balkan campaign promised immediate relief. Moreover, the Americans knew that Churchill would try either to cancel or delay

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the campaign scheduled for northern Burma, and Roosevelt and Marshall both intended to stick to their promise to open the supply route to China. That being the case, they felt there was little need to discuss the matter with the British. Actually, the decision in Europe was up to Stalin. If the Soviet leader supported OVERLORD, then Churchill's Mediterranean strategy could not be implemented; if Stalin asked for an invasion into the Balkans and agreed to a delay in launching OVERLORD, Roosevelt would have little choice but to acquiesce. As is evident from the original draft of this message, the reasons listed in the final version were excuses rather than explanations of why Roosevelt opposed a pre-Teheran meeting of the British and American staffs.

R-394, draft A, not sent Washington Oct. 20, 1943 President to Prime. Your No. 467, it appears difficult if not impossible for American staff to be p r e p a r e d and arrive in Africa by November tenth. It is impossible for me to arrive by that time and later meet U.J. In o r d e r that o u r staff preparations may be expedited please inform m e by telegraph subjects that you contemplate considering at meeting of full conference. [MR]

T h e final sentence in this message was added to the original in Roosevelt's handwriting.

R-394 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 22, 1943, 1 1 : 1 0 A.M. T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President, Personal and Secret. With reference to your N u m b e r 467 regarding another full conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff early in November, it appears to me that there are several matters which should first be resolved before we meet. 1. T h e r e should be sufficient time allowed to analyze the results of the c u r r e n t Moscow conference and also I think the subsequent conference we have in mind. For us to stage a meeting while the Moscow conference is in progress or at least before its results can be carefully considered, probably would have unfavorable results in Russia.

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2. Combined planning teams are now planning an overall plan for the defeat of Japan. It is important that this work be completed and that the respective Chiefs of Staff have an opportunity to study it before a general meeting. 3. Certain outline plans for Eisenhower and commanders in the Pacific covering operations approved at QUADRANT are to be submitted on November 1, and these should receive some consideration before we arrive at the moment for a combined meeting. It would be advantageous to our advance preparations for the conference to be informed as to the subjects which you think we should discuss. At the moment it seems to me that consideration of our relations with Russia is of paramount importance and that a meeting after our special conference with U.J. would be in order rather than one early in November. ANFA would be good. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 37-38. pWSC, V, 311.]

Churchill continued to push for announcements on command changes and a pre-Teheran meeting with Roosevelt. (This cable arrived just after R—394 had been dispatched.)

C-469 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 22, 1943/TOR 11:50 A.M. Most Secret and Personal from Former Naval Person to President. 1. Your 391. I am instructing Eden to back you up to the full but I do not think Ankara would be possible; first, because of security, and secondly, because there are the Taurus Mountains to cross. 2. Your 392. Many thanks about my 453. They are shooting hostages more ferociously and on a larger scale than ever. 3. Admiral Andrew Cunningham on return from the Mediterranean told me that the impending changes in command were known or accurately guessed at there. I am hoping this can be settled soon. To give OVERLORD the best chance the commanders should be at it now. The eye of the master maketh the horse fat. 4. Whatever happens we have got to meet soon. [MR*. pFRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 37.]

Churchill finally got his way. In clear language, the Italian surrender terms defined United Nations (the term used to describe the wartime alliance against Germany) control of the Italian fleet.

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R-395 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 23, 1943, 1 1 : 3 5 A.M.

Personal and Secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person. This is in reply to your cable Number 462 to me dated 16 October 1943. I recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be instructed to transmit to General Eisenhower the following cable for his comment or accomplishment. The suggested cable follows: MESSAGE BEGINS.

1. The modifications in the Long Terms of Surrender as proposed in your cable W-2378, 13 October 1943, were referred to the Soviet Government which agreed to the changes recommended by you and suggested additional changes. The British recommend that the proposed amendments of General Badoglio and the suggestions of the Soviet be embodied into one protocol. However, the British do not intend to concur in the protocol embodying the accepted two sets of amendments to the Long Terms of Surrender unless the Cunningham Agreement is amended as follows: 1. The following clause to be added to the preamble to the agreement reported in NAF 381. QUOTE. It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement as to the immediate employment and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not affect the right of the United Nations to make such other dispositions of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. Their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time, UNQUOTE. 2. Final sentence of last paragraph of the Cunningham Agreement be amended to read, QUOTE. Will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by the Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag, UNQUOTE. 2. Soviet modifications of the Long Terms of Surrender should be incorporated into the text of your suggested protocol as follows: 1. The preamble should be amended to read as follows, QUOTE. Whereas, in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand . . . UNQUOTE. It is to be noted that between QUOTE Governments UN QUOTE and QUOTE on the one hand UNQUOTE the words QUOTE acting in the interests of all the United Nations UNQUOTE have been added. 2. In the paragraph of the preamble beginning QUOTE The follow-

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ing together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943 UNQUOTE the words QUOTE a n d Soviet UNQUOTE are to be a d d e d between QUOTE United Kingdom UNQUOTE a n d QUOTE Governments UNQUOTE a n d the word QUOTE a n d UNQUOTE between QUOTE United States UNQUOTE a n d QUOTE United Kingdom UNQUOTE be

deleted so that the text of the p a r a g r a p h would read as follows. QUOTE T h e following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom a n d Soviet Governments acting on. . . . UNQUOTE. 3. Article 29 of the Long T e r m s of S u r r e n d e r be a m e n d e d to read as follows: QUOTE. Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates a n d all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offenses whose names a p p e a r on lists to be communicated by t h e United Nations, a n d who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military C o m m a n d or by the Government of Marshal Badoglio will forthwith be a p p r e h e n d e d a n d s u r r e n d e r e d into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this p u r p o s e will be complied with, UNQUOTE. 4. I n the event that the a m e n d m e n t s proposed by the Soviets a n d the British proposal for the modification of the C u n n i n g h a m A g r e e m e n t are acceptable to you, then you will incorporate into one protocol suggestions in your W—2378 a n d the Soviet a m e n d ments. T h e Italians will execute simultaneously the a m e n d m e n t s to the C u n n i n g h a m A g r e e m e n t a n d the single protocol, MESSAGE ENDS.

Roosevelt [MR*]

Churchill had no intention of sharing influence in Greece or Yugoslavia with the United States, and this message discouraged the notion of putting all OSS/SOE agents in the area under Donovan's command. A notation on the log sheet indicates that Roosevelt instructed General Donovan to proceed to General Wilson's headquarters to see if he could be of assistance. In addition, the log sheet noted "No answer to Prime." T h e situation in Yugoslavia is discussed in R-393. Although Bulgaria was allied with Germany, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria had a non-belligerency pact. As a result, Allied leaders thought it best to consult the Russians before sending American bombers from the Fifteenth Air Force based in Italy to attack railroad yards at Sofia, the Bulgarian capital. In addition to disrupting rail traffic on the important line from Turkey through the southern Balkans to Germany, the bombings were also designed to damage Bulgarian morale. Two raids were made in November and another in December 1943.

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C-470 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 23, 1943, 1500 Ζ / T O R 12:15 P.M.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. 1. In spite of the vexatious broils between followers of Tito and Mihailovitch in Yugoslavia and those that have broken out between the two sets of Greek guerillas, the situation in the Balkan Peninsula is grievous for the enemy. It is at present being managed by General Wilson from Cairo, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff have impressed upon General Eisenhower the urgent need of passing in supplies by ship as well as by air. We British have about eighty separate missions under General Wil­ son's control working with Partisans and Patriot bands scattered over these immense mountainous regions 900 miles by about 300 miles in extent. Some of our officers there of brigadier's rank are very capable and have in numerous cases been there for two years. I have great admiration for Donovan, but I do not see any centre in the Balkans from which he could grip the situation. It would take a long time to move from one of the many centres of guerilla activity to another. If however you would like him to go to Cairo and meet General Wilson, he will be given the fullest information on the spot about the whole scene and can report to you. The fighting is of the most cruel and bloody character with merciless reprisals and execution of hostages by the Huns. But the enemy also is suffering heavily and is now consuming not less than twenty five German and eight Bulgarian divisions in the theatre without being able to control more than key points and with increasing difficulty in maintaining railway traffic. We hope soon to compose the Greek quarrels but the differences between Tito's Partisans and Mihailovitch's Serbs are very deep seated. 2. Eden tells me that Stalin was quite agreeable to the bombing of Sofia by us. I consider this is most important and that no previous warning should be given to make the task of our airmen harder. Also that leaflets should be dropped to say that the dose they will receive is only a foretaste of what will follow if they do not withdraw their divisions from their neighbours lands. [MR*. pWSC, V, 466-67. R&C]

Churchill continued to press Roosevelt for stepped-up operations in the Med­ iterranean, but the Prime Minister's arguments made little headway. The Americans had supported the Italian campaign on the premise that it would offer a good chance for a speedy victory and effective Italian participation in the war against Germany. Neither possibility developed. Rome was not

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taken by Allied forces until J u n e 4, 1944, and the Italian contribution in the fight proved negligible. Moreover, American military leaders constantly ad­ vised the President against delaying OVERLORD in order to build u p Allied strength in an area that would fall within the British sphere of postwar in­ fluence. Churchill's tactic seemed to be to get Roosevelt committed on a Mediterranean strategy before meeting with Stalin, leaving such a tripartite meeting to deal with postwar politics rather than military decisions. T h e idea that the British operations in the Dodecanese Islands were pri­ marily part of a feint (Plan JAEL) to convince the Germans that the main Allied attack would come in the eastern Mediterranean, not across the English Channel (Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, p. 392), is belied by the intensity of Church­ ill's pleas for assistance and by the long-term nature of British commitments in the area. On November 12 German forces attacked the island of Leros, off the west coast of Turkey, and the British garrison finally surrendered four days later. In his memoirs Churchill vented his bitterness about the refusal to divert Allied forces from Italy or from the buildup for OVERLORD, though he treated his ideas about the Aegean campaign as a diversion rather than a major shift in strategy: I was grieved that the small requests I had made for strategic purposes almost as high as those already achieved should have been so obdurately resisted and rejected. Of course, when you are winning a war, almost everything that happens can be claimed to be right and wise. It would however have been easy, but for pedantic denials in the minor sphere, to have added the control of the Aegean, and very likely the accession of Turkey, to all the fruits of the Italian campaign" (WSC, V, 224-25). EUREKA was the codename for the planned Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin conference. Lieutenant General Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma had become Act­ ing Commander of the Afrika Korps when General Rommel returned to Germany. T h o m a was captured by the British at El Alamein early in Novem­ ber 1942.

C-471 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 23, 1943, 1953 ΖI TOR 6:45 P.M. Personal a n d Most Secret. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Your n u m b e r 394. 1. T h e Russians o u g h t not to be vexed if the Americans a n d British closely concert the very great operations they have in h a n d for 1944 on fronts where n o Russian T r o o p s will be present. N o r do I think we o u g h t to meet Stalin, if ever the meeting can be a r r a n g e d , without being agreed about Anglo American operations as such. 2. I would be content with Nov. 15th if this is the earliest date for your

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staffs. I thought the staffs would work together for a few days before you and I arrive, say 18th or 19th, and we could then go on together to EUREKA. I do not yet know whether it is to be Nov. 20th or 25th. I had not imagined that EUREKA would take more than 3 or 4 days or that large technical staffs would take part in it. 3. Nov. 15 would be 90 days from the beginning of QUADRANT. In these 90 days events of first magnitude have occured. Mussolini has fallen; Italy has surrendered; its fleet has come over; we have successfully invaded Italy, and are marching on Rome with good prospects of success. The Germans are gathering up to 25 or more divs in Italy and the Po Valley. All these are new facts. 4. Our present plans for 1944 seem open to very grave defects. We are to put 15 American and 12 British Divs into OVERLORD and will have about 6 American and 16 British or British controlled divs on the Italian front. Unless there is a German collapse Hitler, lying in the center of the best communications in the world, can concentrate at least 40 to 50 divs against either of these forces while holding the other. He could obtain all the necessary forces by cutting his losses in the Balkans and withdrawing to the Sava and the Danube without necessarily weakening his Russian front. The disposition of our forces between the Italian and the Channel theatres has not been settled by strategic needs but by the march of events, by shipping possibilities, and by arbitrary compromises between the British and Americans. The date of OVERLORD itself was fixed by splitting the difference between the American and British view. It is arguable that neither the forces building up in Italy nor those available for a May OVERLORD are strong enough for the tasks set them. 5. The British Staffs and my colleagues and I all think this position requires to be reviewed, and that the commanders for both fronts should be named and should be present. In pursuance of QUADRANT decisions we have already prepared two of our best divs, the 50th and 51st now in Sicily, for transfer to OVERLORD. Thus they can play no part in the Italian battle to which they stood near, but will not come into action again for 7 months and then only if certain hypothetical conditions are fulfilled which may very likely not be fulfilled. Early in Nov. a decision must be taken about moving landing craft from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD. This will cripple Mediterranean operations without the said craft influencing events elsewhere for many months. We stand by what was agreed at QUADRANT but we do not feel that such agreements should be interpreted rigidly and without review in the swiftly changing situations of war. 6. Personally I feel that if we make serious mistakes in the campaign of 1944, we might give Hider the chance of a startling come back. Prisoner German General Von Thoma was overheard saying "Our only hope is

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that they come where we can use the army upon them". All this shows the need for the greatest care and foresight in our arrangements, the most accurate timing between the two theatres, and the need to gather the greatest possible forces for both operations, particularly OVERLORD. I do not doubt our ability in the conditions laid down to get ashore and deploy. I am however deeply concerned with the build up and with the situation which may arise between the 30th and the 60th days. I feel sure that the vast movement of American personnel into the United Kingdom and the fighting composition of the units requires to be searchingly examined by the commander who will execute OVERLORD. I wish to have both the high commands settled in a manner agreeable to our two countries, and then the secondary commands which are of very high importance can be decided. I have the greatest confidence in General Marshall and that if he is in charge of OVERLORD we British will aid him with every scrap of life and strength we have. My dear friend, this is much the greatest thing we have ever attempted, and I am not satisfied that we have yet taken the measures necessary to give it the best chance of success. I feel very much in the dark at present, and unable to think or act in the forward manner which is needed. For these reasons I desire an early conference. 7. All that you say about the plans for Eisenhower and the commanders in the Pacific which are due to be submitted on Nov. 1st would harmonize with a meeting on Nov. 15th at latest. I do not know how long you consider is required for the long term overall plan for the defeat of Japan to be completed by the combined planners and studied by our respective Chiefs of Staff. I do not consider that the more urgent decisions to which I have referred above ought to be held up for this long term view of the war against Japan which nevertheless should be pressed forward with all energy. 8. I hope you will consider that these reasons for a meeting are solid. We cannot decide finally until an answer is received from Uncle Joe. Should EUREKA not be possible it makes it all the more necessary that we should meet in the light of the information now being received from the Moscow Conference. I am expecting Anthony to start home before the end of the month and am ready myself to move any day after the first week in Nov. 9. You will I am sure share my relief that Leros has so far managed to hold out. "The dogs under the table eat of the childrens crumbs". 10. I send you in my immediately following extracts from a telegram I have sent to Eden who asked for guidance about the Russian wish to bring Turkey and Sweden immediately into the war. I wonder what you think on these subjects? [MR*. pWSC, V, 311-14. pFRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 38-39, 110-12. R&C]

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During the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, Churchill instructed Eden to sound out the Soviet Union regarding support for British strategy in the Aegean. Stalin and Molotov favored bringing Turkey into the war, but made clear their opposition to even a short postponement of OVERLORD. Thus Churchill's only hope of redirecting Allied strategy lay in making an agree­ ment with Roosevelt prior to any conference with the Soviets.

C-472 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 23, 1943, 805 Ρ [1805 Ρ?] / TOR 6:45 P.M. President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person Most Secret and Personal. My immediately preceding telegram. Following are extracts from telegram I have sent to Eden, (begins). Your number 48. 1. Para 5: Turkey. If we force Turkey to enter the war she will insist on air support etc, which could not be provided without det­ riment to main operations in Italy. If however Turkey enters on her own initiative, perhaps moving through a phase of non belligerency, we should not have the same obligation and yet great advantages might be reaped. Obviously timing is vital and dependent upon what is the aggressive strength of the enemy in Bulgaria and Thrace. The prize would be to get into the Black Sea with supplies for Russia, warships and other forces. This is what I call giving Russia the right hand. Such a movement by Turkey is not impossible, especially if the Germans would begin to cut their losses in the Balkans and withdraw towards the Danube and the Sava. 2. Finland and Sweden. It would be a great advantage to bring Sweden into the war. We do not think the Germans have the strength to undertake a heavy invasion of Sweden. We should gain a new country and small but good army. Our gains in Norway would be far reaching. Valuable facilities would be afforded to Russian Air Forces. For ourselves, we can do far better bombing of Germany from East Anglia where we are mounted on a vast scale then from Sweden where everything would have to be improvised and imported by air. Our range from England over Germany is just as good as from Sweden. In fact with present British facilities plus those we hope to acquire North of Rome there is no part of Germany we cannot reach with great weight. 3. Personally I would like to see Turkey come in on her own and also Sweden. I do not think either of them would be overrun, and every new enemy helps Hitler's ruin. I suggest however that the first step is to find out what we and the Russians want and what will help

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both of us most in both quarters, a n d t h e n as a second step go into ways a n d means immediately thereafter. T r y this, a n d let m e know. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, I, 621-22. pWSC, V, 288-89.]

T h e President's calendar indicated that his appointments were canceled due to illness on October 22—23, and no appointments were scheduled for Sunday, October 24, or the following day. On Tuesday, Roosevelt had a meeting at four o'clock in the afternoon and then followed a normal schedule for the remainder of the week. However, he spent October 30 through November 3 resting at Hyde Park and went to Shangri-la the following weekend.

C-473 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 24, 1943, 1611 Ζ/TOR 12:52 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your N o . 395. T h a n k you so much. A m m u c h concerned to hear you have influenza. I trust you will soon be better. [MR*]

Although British and American technical experts had exchanged information about the German work on rockets and self-propelled bombs, this was the first message to Roosevelt on the subject. T h e massive R.A.F. raid on the special-weapons research facility at Peenemiinde, an island off the Baltic coast about 160 miles north of Berlin, on August 17, 1943, had slowed work at the facility which was assigned, among other projects, the task of developing an atomic weapon. T h e construction sites on the coast of France opposite Britain were designed for launching the V-l "buzz bomb," a pilotless flying bomb driven by a small jet engine. Watten was located near Calais and had been bombed on August 27, 1943, by planes of the U.S. Eighth Air Force based in England.

C-474 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 25, 1943, 1919 Ζ/TOR 5:40 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I o u g h t to let you know that d u r i n g the last six m o n t h s evidence has continued to accumulate from many sources that the G e r m a n s are pre-

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paring an attack on England particularly London by means of very long range rockets which may conceivably weigh 60 tons and carry an explosive charge of 10 to 20 tons. For this reason we raided Peenemunde which was their main experimental station. We also demolished Watten near St Omer which was where a construction work was proceeding the purpose of which we could not define. There are at least seven such points in the Pas de Calais and the Cherbourg Peninsula and there may be a good many others we have not detected. 2. Scientific opinion is divided as to the practicability of making rockets of this kind but I am personally as yet unconvinced that they cannot be made. We are in close touch with your people who are ahead of us in rocket impulsion which they have studied to give airplanes a send off and all possible work is being done. The expert committee which is following this business thinks it possible that a heavy though premature and short lived attack might be made in the middle of November and that the main attack would be attempted in the new year. It naturally pays the Germans to spread talk of new weapons to encourage their troops, their satellites, and neutrals and it may well be that their bite will be found less bad than their bark. 3. Hitherto we have watched the unexplained constructions proceeding in the Pas de Calais area without (except Watten) attacking them in the hopes of learning more about them. But now we have decided to demolish those we know of which should be easy as overwhelming fighter protection can be given to bombers. Your airmen are of course in every way ready to help. This may not however end the menace as the country is full of woods and quarries and slanting tunnels can easily be constructed in hillsides. 4. The case of Watten is interesting. We damaged it so severely that the Germans after a meeting two days later decided to abandon it altogether. There were 6,000 French workers upon it as forced labour. When they panicked at the attack a body of uniformed young Frenchmen who are used by the Germans to supervise them fired upon their countrymen with such brutality that a German Officer actually shot one of these young swines. A week later the Germans seem to have reversed their previous decision and resumed work. Three thousand more workmen have been brought back. The rest have gone to some of those other suspected places thus confirming our views. We have an excellent system of intelligence in this part of Northern France and it is from these sources as well as from photographs and examination of prisoners that this story has been built up. 5. I am sending you by air courier the latest report upon the subject as I thought you would like to know about it. [MR*. WSC, V, 236-37. R&C]

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As the correspondence printed below makes clear, Stalin's delay in replying to Roosevelt's pleas for a meeting in the eastern Mediterranean area instead of Teheran caused Churchill and Roosevelt a good deal of trouble. T h e Soviet Premier did not reply until November 5. (See FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 6 7 68.) The Generalissimo was Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China. Roosevelt continued to support an increase in operations designed to encourage the Chinese to oppose the Japanese more effectively, and his plan to bring Chiang to any Anglo-American meeting was intended to put pressure on the British to cooperate. Rear Admiral Ross T. Mclntire, Surgeon General of the Navy, was Roosevelt's personal physician. The final sentence was added to the draft in Roosevelt's handwriting.

R-396 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 25, 1943, 6:15 P.M. Personal a n d Secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person. It is a nuisenza to have the influenza. Mclntire says I need a sea voyage. No word from U J . yet. If he is adamant, what would you think of you and me meeting, with small staffs, in N o r t h Africa or even at the Pyramids, and toward the close of o u r talks get the Generalissimo to join us for two or three days? At the same time, we could ask U.J. to send Molotov to the meeting with you and me. O u r people propose November 20. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 39-40. WSC, V, 314.]

"Those two little books" were by Rudyard Kipling. (See C-464/1.) Ibn Saud was King of Saudi Arabia and a vigorous foe of Chaim Weizmann's World Zionist Organization, which demanded an independent Israeli state. (Both Weizmann and Mecca, the holiest city of Islam and located in Saudi Arabia, were misspelled in the copy of this letter found in the Roosevelt papers.)

R-396/1, letter [Washington] October 25, 1943. Dear Winston: T h o s e two little books are gems—and I can well understand why they should not be m a d e public at this time. Perhaps " T h e B u r d e n of J e r u salem" should wait until you a n d I are strong e n o u g h to carry Ibn Saud

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to Jerusalem and Dr. Weizman to Meca. I have thanked Sir Alfred WebbJohnson. I did not know until he wrote that you are an Honorary Surgeon. I am an Honorary Veterinarian! As ever yours, [PSF:GB:WSC]

In what proved to be a long series of messages concerning arrangements for a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting as well as a joint meeting with Stalin, Churchill pleaded for sufficient time to allow full Anglo-American discussions of both military and political matters before meeting with Stalin. Roosevelt slowly but steadily moved in the opposite direction, that is, toward a very brief AngloAmerican discussion before meeting with Stalin or, if the tripartite conference proved impossible, toward the presence of Soviet representatives at the AngloAmerican meeting. Two days before sending this cable to Roosevelt, Churchill had raised with General Marshall the question of increasing the Allied commitment in Italy in order to break through German resistance (Matloff, Strategic Planning, 1943-1944, pp. 263-64). At the same time, Churchill sent Eden in Moscow a number of messages urging him to avoid any "lawyer's bargain" on OVERLORD, lest the invasion have to be postponed a month or two because of the demands on the Italian front. The Americans suspected that all this was but another attempt to delay the cross-channel invasion, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed American military representatives to assure Stalin that no such delay would be permitted (Carlton, Eden, pp. 228-29, and WSC, V, pp. 242—48, 289-92). Moreover, Marshall and his planners agreed that German attempts to hold the line in Italy weakened German forces in western France, thus increasing the chance of success for OVERLORD. Roosevelt made no answer to paragraphs 2 or 3. ANFA referred to Casablanca. General Sir Harold Alexander was Commander in Chief of Allied Armies in Italy, under the overall direction of General Eisenhower.

C-475 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 26, 1943, 1648 A/TOR 12:10 P.M. Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. Your number 396. 1.1 shall be delighted to meet with you anywhere in North Africa, but I hope we need not wait till the twentieth. Strongly recommend sea voyage to ANFA which we know, moving on to Pyramids if and when convenient. By all means ask Chiang. If UJ refuses, then Molotov with a Russian military mission would do. It seems to me fine progress has been made

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by Hull and Eden at Moscow and still more on the Russian southern front. 2. But you will have seen by now Eisenhower's number NAF 486 [WSC, V, pp. 243^17] setting forth the condition into which we are sinking in Italy. We must not let this great Italian battle degenerate into a deadlock. At all costs we must win Rome and the airfields to the north of it. The fact that the enemy have diverted such powerful forces to this theatre vindicates our strategy. No one can doubt that by knocking out Italy we have enormously helped the Russian advance in the only way in which it could have been helped at this time. I feel that Eisenhower and Alexander must have what they need to win the battle in Italy, no matter what effect is produced on subsequent operations. 3. I am so grieved to worry you with these matters while you are still suffering from influenza. [MR. pFRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 4 1 ^ 2 . pWSC, V, 247.]

Reports from Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the U.S. Ambassador in the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, were optimistic about the cooperative attitude of the Soviet government, but Roosevelt still insisted that he could not travel any farther than Basra in southern Iraq lest he not be able to veto something passed by the Congress. General Marshall was initially reluctant to have a Soviet representative at the Anglo-American talks lest the Russians "feel that we were endeavoring to penetrate their strategical and operational plans." He nevertheless supported the President's suggestion "on the basis that we are not asking for anything from the Russians in the way of information but are offering them virtually a complete insight into all of our strategical and logistical doings." (Memo from Marshall to Leahy, Oct. 25, 1943, MR.)

R-397 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 26, 1943, 5 : 1 0 P.M.

Personal and Secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person. The present Moscow conference appears to be a genuine beginning of British-Russian-U.S. collaboration which should lead to the early defeat of Hitler. In order to further stimulate this cooperation and particularly to increase the confidence of Stalin in the sincerity of our intentions it is suggested that immediately upon our receipt of information if it turns out that he is unable to meet with us at Basra or other place that is acceptable to both of us, we jointly transmit some such message as the following to him:

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QUOTE. Heretofore we have informed you of the results of o u r combined British-American military staff conferences. You may feel that it would be better to have a Russian military representative sit in at such meetings to listen to the discussions regarding BritishAmerican operations and take note of the decisions. H e would be free to make such comments and proposals as you might desire. This a r r a n g e m e n t would afford you and your staff an intimate and p r o m p t r e p o r t of these meetings. If you favorably consider such an a r r a n g e m e n t we shall advise you of the date a n d place of the next conference as soon as they have been determined. It would be understood that the p r o c e d u r e outlined carried n o implication of discussion of plans for purely Russian operations except as your representative might be instructed to present. UNQUOTE. If he does agree to meet us at Basra, we can discuss this matter with him at that time. Roosevelt [WDL, GCM] [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 42. R&C]

T h e Americans asked for more extensive facilities in the Azores than the British; the Portuguese—and the British—looked at the American requests with grave suspicion. Salazar, the Portuguese President, not only feared German retaliation but worried about Portugal's economic independence in the postwar world. (The American objectives are summarized in a message from Hull to Kennan, Oct. 16, 1943, FRUS, 1943, II, 554-56.) Roosevelt was under pressure from air force and naval officials, and the last sentence of this cable was added in the President's handwriting.

R-398 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 26, 1 9 4 3 , 5 : 1 5 P.M.

For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President, Secret a n d Personal. I n view of the high importance of using the Azores as a landing for American transport planes, it is suggested that you authorize the utilization of American engineers and American facilities u n d e r British Comm a n d to construct quickly airfields to accommodate transport planes in those Azores Islands now occupied by British forces. This will quiet many of my troubles. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

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Churchill continued to support EUREKA (the tripartite meeting) but fought hard against anything which would prevent the convening of a major AngloAmerican conference before the meeting with the Russians. Roosevelt made no direct response.

C-476 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 27, 1943, 1510 Ζ/TOR 12:10 P.M. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Your No. 397. 1. Like you, I rejoice in the good progress made at Moscow, and I greatly hope we may arrange EUREKA. 2. I deprecate the idea of inviting a Russian military representative to sit in at the meetings of our joint staffs. Unless he understood and spoke English, the delays would be intolerable. I do not know of any really high officer of the Russian Army who can speak English. Such a representative would have no authority or power to speak except as instructed. He would simply bay for an earlier second front and block all other discussions. Considering they tell us nothing of their own movements, I do not think we should open this door to them as it would probably mean that they would want to have observers at all future meetings and all discussions between us would be paralyzed. We shall very soon have six or seven hundred thousand British and American troops and airmen in Italy and we are planning the great operation of OVERLORD. There will not be a Russian soldier in any of these. On the other hand, all our fortunes depend upon them. I regard our right to sit together on the movements of our own two forces as fundamental and vital. Hitherto, we have pros­ pered wonderfully, but I now feel that the year 1944 is loaded with danger. Great differences may develop between us and we may take the wrong turning. Or, again, we may make compromises and fall between two stools. The only hope is the intimacy and friendship which has been established between us and between our high staffs. If that were broken, I should despair of the immediate future. A formal triple conference with the Russians is another thing. Then, they have to be represented by plenipotentiaries, or at any rate, persons having wide discretionary pow­ ers. I need scarcely say the British Chiefs of Staff fully share these views. I must add that I am more anxious about the campaign of 1944 than about any other with which I have been involved. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 47-18. pWSC, V, 315.]

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Churchill continued to try to pin Roosevelt down on a schedule for AngloAmerican talks.

C-477 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 29, 1943, 1645 Ζ/TOR 1:50 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. 1. Earnestly h o p e you are making good progress. 2. It is very awkward waiting about for an answer from Uncle J o e . It is u r g e n t to get dates settled a n d preparations made. Anyhow, I h o p e you a n d I can meet at ANFA between 15th a n d 20th November. I have a great wish a n d need to see you. All o u r troubles a n d toils are so m u c h easier to face when we are side by side. 3. Propose code n a m e see my immediately following msg. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 49-50.]

T h e codename SEXTANT was used for the planned conference of Churchill, Roosevelt, and their staffs.

C-478 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 29, 1943, 1659 Ζ/TOR 1:50 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. My immediately preceding telegram. S E X T A N T . [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 50.]

As early as January 1943, Pan American Airways was requesting commercial airport facilities in the Azores. Although the Army Air Force claimed this request was made in order to obtain facilities needed for the ferrying by Pan American of military aircraft to Europe and Africa, the Department of State recognized that the entire operation had postwar implications. Both the Brit­ ish and the Portuguese realized that and were understandably cautious. Por­ tuguese President Salazar was genuinely worried about German retaliation, and the United States decided not to press the issue too hard.

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R-399 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 29, 1943, 4:55 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Your 466. O u r C h a r g e d'Affaires in Lisbon, on October 2 1 , was instructed as follows: QUOTE. It is desired that the Legation take n o comprehensive action at the present time o n o u r request for air facilities in the Azores, but the Legation should keep in mind that we must have the use of some air facilities there as soon as possible. T h e Legation should, therefore, make as much progress toward that e n d as appears practicable from the Lisbon point of view a n d should keep us fully informed, UNQUOTE. Roosevelt [MR*]

T h e log sheet for this message notes that it was drafted by Leahy, Hopkins, and Rear Admiral Wilson Brown (Naval Aide to the President) and then rewritten by Roosevelt while he was in the doctor's office, probably for a checkup following a severe bout with the flu. The draft, printed below, agrees to a meeting with Churchill at ANFA, whereas the final version, all written in Roosevelt's scrawl except for the last paragraph, calls for a meeting in Egypt. Roosevelt planned an inspection trip of American forces in North Africa first, but still agreed to meet Churchill on November 20. Since the President had decided to sail to the conference on the battleship USS Iowa, Casablanca (ANFA) became unsuitable because of its shallow anchorage. T h e decision to travel by ship was probably taken on the advice of Admiral Mclntire, the President's personal physician, although Roosevelt himself disliked flying because it gave him sinus problems. T h e medical records kept by Mclntire give no indication of fears that Roosevelt had a heart condition, but a 1941 cardiogram did indicate some abnormality. Mclntire strenuously opposed the President's plan to fly to Teheran because of the high altitudes the plane would reach during the flight over mountains in western Iran. T h e doctor may have suspected a heart problem, or may merely have been taking a precaution. (See Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, pp. 146-47; Bruenn, "Clinical Notes," p. 580.)

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R-400, draft A, not sent Washington [Oct. 29, 1943]

President to Prime Your 477. If you agree I will meet you at ANFA by November 20. Combined Staff meeting can be started there November 20 and if U.J. accepts our invitation you and I could leave ANFA with a very small staff for long enough to confer with him at Alexandria or Basra. If U.J. declines I propose to ask him to come to Basra for a single day and to leave Molotov for a longer period. Roosevelt [MR]

R-400 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 29, 1943, 7:25 P.M.

To the Former Naval Person from the President. Secret and Personal. Your 477. I must eliminate ANFA because I draw too much water. I want two or three days in North Africa before getting to Cairo or Alexandria on the 20th. I suggest the Combined Staffs meet you and me there at that time. If UJ is willing to come to Basra we can move on there at any date he wants. If he declines Basra I propose we go there with small staffs and meet Molotov and a small Russian Staff and plead with UJ to come there if only for one day. I still think it vital that we see him, but I simply cannot get out of constitutional communication with my Congress. I too am most anxious that you and I get away from this despatch method of talking. As a corollary of above and in view of overloading transportation facilities, the Combined Staffs could make their headquarters in Algiers or Tunis and you and I could meet them there on the 19th. This is not so good however, because we would want the six top men with us in Egypt or Basra. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 50.]

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R-401 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 29, 1943, 7:25 P.M. T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President, Secret a n d Personal. My immediately preceding message. C o d e word S E X T A N T is accepted. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 51.]

T h e previous month's statement on anti-submarine activity (C—447) had been delayed when Admiral King did not accept the British draft. Brendan Bracken headed the Ministry of Information, the British equivalent of the American Office of War Information (OWI).

R-402 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 29, 1943, 7:25 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person. In o r d e r that we may not be r u s h e d at the last m i n u t e I have directed o u r O W I to send to Bracken early next week o u r suggestions for the October J o i n t Anti-Submarine Statement. I will appreciate an a g r e e m e n t on the statement well before the date of issue. Roosevelt [WB] [MR*]

Once again Churchill tried to arrange for himself and Roosevelt to begin their talks even before the formal conference (SEXTANT) began in Cairo. He also preferred that talks with Chiang Kai-shek and the Russians each be held at different times. Richard G. Casey, an Australian, was a member of the British War Cabinet and Minister of State Resident in the Middle East. Alexander Kirk was the American Minister in Egypt and also Ambassador to the Greek government in exile in Egypt.

C-479 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 30, 1943, 1835 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Most Secret a n d Personal. Your N o . 400. 1. I will meet you in Cairo on the 20th as you suggest a n d will, if you will allow me, assume responsibility for making all a r r a n g e m e n t s for your

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general security and comfort which would fall upon us as the occupying power. Casey has been lent a beautiful villa which I have seen myself and am sure would be in every way suitable for you. It is a mile or two from the Pyramids and surrounded by woods affording complete seclusion. It can be reached from the airfield in twenty minutes without going through any towns. The whole area can be easily cordoned off by British troops. There are some very interesting excursions into the desert which we could make together. I have no doubt Casey would be delighted to place the villa at your disposal. I should probably myself stay at the British Embassy in Cairo, which is perhaps twenty minutes away, but it may be that arrangements could be made for us both to be in the Pyramids area. I believe your Mr. Kirk also has a very fine house. Every facility exists in Cairo for the full staffs to be accommodated and to meet for business, and they can easily come out to your villa whenever desired. If you like this plan, which knowing the layout I consider far the best, I will immediately make all preparations and perhaps you would send an officer to make sure everything is arranged to your liking. 2. Do you propose to go through the Mediterranean in your ship? I should have thought this was more risky than flying on account of the danger of air attack by glider bombs. Our convoys are frequently attacked. I shall myself very possibly go to Gibraltar or Oran by ship and fly on from there by easy hops. I too propose to have a few days in the Mediterranean Theatre before SEXTANT begins, and would probably start from home around the twelfth. I could make preliminary contact with you wherever you first land or alight. It would be good to have a short preliminary meeting of us two and then separate for a few days before SEXTANT. 3. I am quite game to go on to Basra, but I gather Joe will not come beyond Teheran. If it is only Molotov and the Russian generals, I see no reason why they should not come to Cairo. Excellent arrangements can be made for Chiang in Cairo though not at the same moment. Shall we send him a joint invitation or would you prefer to wait till we know about whether we go to Basra? I repeat, I will do whatever you wish. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 54-55. pWSC, V, 315-16.]

Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, the British officer appointed Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), was in Washington to discuss planning for OVERLORD. In a memorandum to the President, Morgan suggested the scheme outlined in the following telegram as a way of avoiding further delays in planning for the invasion of France. Roosevelt continued to delay his decision on a Supreme Allied Commander (SAC), although he had virtually promised the job to General Marshall. Field Marshal

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Sir John Dill was head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington and was well liked by the Americans. Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal was Chief of the British Air Staff, and General Sir Alan Brooke was Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.

R-403 Hyde Park [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 30, 1943, 4:00 P.M. Personal and Secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person. Preparations for OVERLORD seem to have reached a stage from which progress is difficult unless and until Commander is appointed. As you know, I cannot make Marshall available immediately. I am nonetheless anxious that preparations proceed on schedule agreed at QUADRANT with target date May first. I suggest you may care to consider early ap­ pointment of British Deputy Supreme Commander for OVERLORD who in receipt of precisely the same measure of support as will eventually be accorded Marshall could well carry the work forward. If I may make proposal, I suggest appointment of Dill, Portal, or Brooke. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. WSC, V, 304.]

C-480 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 30, 1943, 1840 Ζ I TOR 4:00 P.M. Prime Minister to President. Personal and Most Secret. Your number 402. 1. I was not aware you had been rushed at the last minute on any occasion, and I am very sorry if any inconvenience was caused and if I am to blame. In any case the date of the tenth was not a fixture and a day or two's delay could always have been obtained. In fact we did delay three or four days so as to settle it at Hyde Park in August. 2. I will await your draft instead of submitting one myself. Please send it to me, as the Admiralty have to express their view and I promised to keep [Canadian Prime Minister] Mackenzie King in on it. 3. We have had a magnificent month, barely 100,000 tons of sinkings and at least twenty two certain kills and nine probables. In fact, taking both sinkings and killings together, it is an all time high for the Firm. [MR*]

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Roosevelt's desire to meet with Secretary of State Hull on the latter's return from the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference may have been a ploy to avoid meeting Churchill prior to the Cairo talks. Certainly the President spent very litde time with Hull, for he only briefly met the Secretary at the airport, and somewhat longer at an hour-and-forty-five-minute luncheon meeting the next day. As Hull forlornly wrote in his memoirs, Roosevelt "was more interested in discussing the forthcoming conferences at Cairo and Teheran. He was looking forward to his meeting with Stalin with the enthusiasm of a boy. . . . A few hours later the President was on his way to these historic meetings" (Hull, Memoirs, II, 1313). Roosevelt's message to Churchill was sent before the meeting with Stalin had been arranged, but by the time Hull returned to Washington it is likely that the President's excitement about the Teheran Conference prevented him from concentrating on what the Secretary had to say. Hull had been delayed in Moscow by the need for additional conversations with Molotov and Stalin. T h e Secretary planned to cross the Atlantic by ship since he disliked air travel, and was reluctant to wait in North Africa for Roosevelt's arrival since that meant being exposed to malaria and other tropical diseases for which Hull had no immunizations (FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 52—53). Roosevelt's invitation to Generalissimo Chiang is in FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 55—56. Oran, a major port in Algeria, was located about 300 miles east of Gibraltar.

R-404 Hyde Park [via U.S. Navy] Oct. 30, 1943, 11:00 PM. Personal a n d Secret from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. Your 479. Hull's d e p a r t u r e from Moscow has meant two day delay in his getting h o m e . It is essential I see him before I myself leave, as you can readily u n d e r s t a n d . I had h o p e d to get three days in N o r t h Africa before reaching Cairo. I can, however, d o some of the North African and Italian business on the way back. Therefore, I still h o p e to arrive Cairo by the twentieth by flying t h e r e directly I reach the harbor. But, if wind a n d weather are bad, I might not make Cairo until the twenty-second. I think my ship repeat ship will take me to Oran. Ever so many thanks for offering to make arrangements at Cairo, which we accept with pleasure. If any hitch develops there we can, of course, meet in Alexandria, the staff living ashore and we on o u r respective ships. I am wiring Generalissimo to p r e p a r e to meet us in the general neighb o r h o o d of Cairo about November twenty-fifth. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 55. WSC, V, 316.]

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Roosevelt, still uncertain about having Marshall command OVERLORD, de­ cided not to reply to this cable, preferring instead to take u p the matter at the SEXTANT (Cairo) meeting.

C-481 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 31, 1943, 1459 Ζ/TOR 12:10 P.M. Prime Minister to President. Most Secret a n d Personal. 1. Everything will be ready for operation S E X T A N T from 20th on­ wards a n d Colonel W a r d e n will await Admiral Q. a n d also CELESTES (see my immediately following) at rendezvous. N o difficulty about accom­ modation for staffs. 2. Your n u m b e r 403. Can you give m e a firm date when Marshall will be available, as I see great difficulties in the various stop g a p a r r a n g e m e n t s proposed? T h e press this m o r n i n g publishes reports from Washington c o r r e s p o n d e n t s t h a t Marshall will be succeeded by Eisenhower a n d Ei­ senhower by Alexander. This is of course largely assumed t h r o u g h o u t the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , b u t the uncertainty is harmful. If you still hold to your opinion, which I share, about the t h r e e chief c o m m a n d s , why cannot we make the a n n o u n c e m e n t jointly a n d a d d that the dates of the changes of c o m m a n d s will be fixed in relation to operations? We could t h e n at S E X T A N T settle together the consequential reactions, which are com­ plicated a n d i m p o r t a n t . 3. T h a n k you very m u c h for the Quebec film [R-392/1], which I saw a n d enjoyed last night. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 57. WSC, V, 316-17.]

Colonel Warden and Admiral Q. were used before by Churchill as codenames for himself and Roosevelt. CELESTES, for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, is probably taken from the Celestial Empire, which is China.

C-482 London [via U.S. Army] Oct. 31, 1943, 1459 Ζ/TOR 12:10 P.M. Prime Minister to President. Most Secret a n d Personal. My immediately p r e c e d i n g telegram, p a r a 1: Your h u m b l e servant, yourself a n d the Generalissimo respectively. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 57. WSC, V, 317n.]

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The British did not believe that the military requirement for an American presence in the Azores was strong enough to warrant risking a diplomatic crisis with Portugal; nor were the British enthusiastic about the American demands to begin with.

C-483 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 1, 1943, 1755 Ζ

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Your Nr. 398. I send you herewith a Staff and Foreign Office note on your specific proposal about American engineers. Begins. 1. It would be impossible to send American Army Engineers until Portuguese agreement is obtained. We are not in occupation of any of the Islands and the facilities granted to us by the Portuguese only cover the airfield in Terceira and limited port facilities in Fayal. The Portuguese civil and military administration is still functioning in all the Islands. 2. It would be helpful and save time if you could send the engineer equipment already suggested by our Chiefs of Staff on 9th Oct. 3. Quite apart from securing Portuguese agreement, a necessary preliminary to the construction of new airfields will be the survey by aircraft photography for map making and by a reconnaissance party on foot both of which have been arranged by our two Staffs. 4. We will of course give you all possible facilities for transit aircraft at Lagens airfield as soon as Portuguese agreement to your military aircraft landing there has been obtained. The facilities at this airfield are fortunately better than our earlier reports had indicated. Ends. [PREM 3/471/71. MR.]

This statement on anti-submarine warfare conveyed the accurate impression that Anglo-American forces were winning the Battle of the Atlantic. The new U-boat weapons and tactics—the "schnorkel" breathing tube, the acoustical torpedo, "milch cow" supply submarines, and a renewal of "wolf-pack" attack techniques—had all failed.

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R-405 Hyde Park [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 1, 1943, 10:30 P.M. T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Personal and Secret. O u r Office of War Information and Navy Department r e c o m m e n d the following statement, with which I agree: " 1 . During the months of August, September and October approximately 60 U-boats were destroyed. This brings to m o r e than 150 the n u m b e r of U-boats destroyed d u r i n g the last six m o n t h s . T h e record of the last three months is particularly gratifying because d u r i n g most of this period fewer U-boats were operating, fewer targets were presented for our air a n d sea forces. "2. During August, September and October m o r e U-boats were destroyed than Allied m e r c h a n t ships were sunk by U-boat action. T h e ratio of U-boat to m e r c h a n t ship attrition d u r i n g October was m o r e satisfactory than in any previous month. I n fact, o u r tonnage losses from all causes in October were the lowest of any m o n t h of the war. " 3 . Merchant ship tonnage lost to U-boat action d u r i n g the last three months was less than one-half the m e r c h a n t ship tonnage lost d u r i n g the previous t h r e e months despite the fact that actual shipping increased. "4. T h e Germans have introduced new U-boat weapons a n d tactics. T h u s far we have been able to cope successfully with the changing situation. T h e battle continues in full vigor." Roosevelt [MR*]

Churchill continued to press for an early meeting with Roosevelt at either "O" (Oran, Algeria) or "Gib" (Gibraltar). Churchill and Admiral Cunningham, the newly appointed First Sea Lord (equivalent to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations), also wanted to arrange a staff conference on the British island of Malta, south of Sicily, so that Anglo-American policy could be worked out before any meeting with Stalin or other Soviet representatives. Churchill was correct in believing that the Russians planned to enter the war against Japan, though he was incorrect in predicting that such a move would come in the near future. In the course of table conversation, Stalin told Hull on October 30 that the Soviet Union would join the war against Japan as soon as Germany was defeated. Nor was that the first time Stalin had made such remarks. (See

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McNeill, America, Britain and Russia, p. 335.) Changes were made to this message by C—485.

C-484 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 2, 1943, 0140 Ζ Prime Minister to President Personal and Most Secret. 1. Eden and, I presume, Hull are held up at Moscow by weather and cannot reach Cairo till fourth or fifth. If you wait for Hull to join you at Washington, our meeting at Cairo would be still further delayed beyond twenty-second. Would it not, therefore, be better for you to sail as ar­ ranged on ninth, arriving at "O" say sixteenth, and let Hull rest in Egyp­ tian sunshine for a few days and meet you there? In that case, I will ask Anthony to meet me in Africa instead of coming home. 2. Parliament here rises, eleventh, and I can lie alongside you at "O" or Gib, which last is much the better on fifteenth or sixteenth. We could, then, discuss the general situation and results of Moscow conference which seem to be on the highest level. 3. Admiral Andrew Cunningham, who knows the Mediterranean back and forth, says that our two staffs might meet in Malta on, say, seventeenth and that in his opinion, voyage thru the Mediterranean could be safely arranged. I shall have an extra cruiser. Staffs will want at least four days together, and Malta is by far the best place for the generals to come from the armies. We could join them on the third or fourth day, say, twenty first, and then proceed to Cairo for the main conference on twenty third or twenty fourth. Weather is said to be bad for flying west of Malta at this season but better to eastward. 4. Conference at Cairo will open on twenty fourth, and here I suggest, notwithstanding what I have previously written, we ask for a triple con­ ference with a proper Russian military delegation beginning, say, twenty fifth or twenty sixth. We shall, then, have settled up our own business of the Anglo-American campaign and will open the whole war situation frankly and fully to the Russians. Chiang could arrive twenty seventh or twenty eighth, and we could turn homeward about, say thirtieth. There is no need, unless you wish, for you to touch at Malta. 5. Uncle Joe will not come beyond Teheran. I see no advantage in going to Basra, though I would gladly do so if a triple meeting could be ar­ ranged. I suggest that, when we are at Cairo, we try to wheedle him to Habbaniya, or if the weather is really good, make a six hours hop ourselves to meeting him in Teheran. Failing this, we should ask for Molotov. 6. The above plan seems to me to meet all the essential needs, namely, (A) Our preliminary meeting,

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(Β) T h e preliminary discussions of the Anglo-American staffs in contact with o u r generals, a n d (C) T h e triple, a n d presently, q u a d r u p l e meeting at Cairo, where final decisions can be taken. In p r o p o s i n g this p r o g r a m m e , I am influenced by the prodigious results of the Moscow conference as exemplified in the p a r a g r a p h s of the agreed c o m m u n i q u e beginning, "Second only to the i m p o r t a n c e " a n d "This con­ viction is expressed" a n d especially the sentence "This declaration p r o ­ vides for even closer collaboration in the prosecution of the war a n d in all matters pertaining to the s u r r e n d e r a n d d i s a r m a m e n t of the enemies with which the four countries are respectively at war". This seems to m e to contemplate an eventual, a n d possibly near, breach between Russia a n d J a p a n with all its consequential reactions. 7. I beg you to let m e know how this p r o g r a m m e strikes you a n d what changes in it you p r o p o s e . Matters a r e so u r g e n t t h a t we m u s t settle o u r plans soon. 8. I a m sending a copy of this message to E d e n who will still be in Moscow tomorrow. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 60-61.]

C-485 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 2, 1943, 0951 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. My n u m b e r 484. 1. P a r a g r a p h 2, last line. Omit the words "which seem to be." 2. P a r a g r a p h 3. After the words "an extra cruiser" a d d " t o send staff forward o n if convenient." [MR*]

Richard G. Casey, an Australian, was British Minister of State Resident in the Middle East and a member of the British War Cabinet. CELESTES was Chiang Kai-shek, for whom Churchill had litde respect.

C-486 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 2, 1943, 1613 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. As I expected, Casey proposes that Admiral Q should use United States

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Minister's villa, a n d Colonel W a r d e n Casey's villa, both handy a n d in the Pyramid District. T h e r e are several additional satisfactory villas for others, a n d I have got the option o n T u t a n k h a m e n ' s tomb for CELESTES. Everything can be m a d e thoroughly satisfactory and secure and we shall all be together in the Pyramid District. All arrangements are going forward to be in readiness from the twentieth onwards. Your own Minister is arranging everything for your personal convenience. All will be smooth a n d easy in Cairo a n d I d o u b t not excellent a r r a n g e m e n t can be made in Malta where several palaces are u n d a m a g e d . [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 63.]

Churchill continued to press Roosevelt for a pre-Cairo meeting.

C-487 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 2, 1943 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. F u r t h e r to my No. 484, Chiefs of Staff think it would be simpler a n d m o r e secure if we rendezvoused a r o u n d 17th at Malta. This would avoid o u r ships touching either at O r a n or Gibraltar, both of which are to some extent u n d e r observation. Please consider this simplification. [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 63.]

T h e only reason Roosevelt ever gave for not wanting to travel beyond Basra, Iraq, was his desire to be able to act quickly on legislation passed by the Congress, since such legislation becomes law ten days after passage unless formally vetoed by the President. He never clarified his reasons for wanting Cordell Hull to stay in Washington during the SEXTANT and EUREKA conferences, though it probably related to Hull's excellent relationship with the congressional leadership and his popularity, as well as Roosevelt's desire to direct his own foreign policy. Nevertheless, the reasons given were a convenient way to avoid the pre-Cairo talk Churchill so desperately wanted.

R-406 Hyde Park [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 2, 1943, 4:56 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. For many reasons it is advisable that Cordell be back in Washington while I am away a n d even now h e can be h o m e by the 15th.

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For escort reasons also it will be much easier to carry through the original plan and a change would interfere with convoys. If I leave by 14th at latest and by going straight through I ought to be able to meet you and staffs in Cairo by the 22nd or 23rd. Perhaps it is just as well to get the main business over first, and you and I can do the inspection work on the way back. I am wiring Hull to ask U . J . if he could come to Basra for even one day. That would be infinitely better than no meeting with him at all. I will let you know as soon as I hear. Roosevelt ••I

[MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 62.]

'

Churchill now shifted his efforts to push for an Anglo-American conference in Cairo, but before any Soviet representatives arrived.

C-488 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 3, 1943, 1418 Ζ

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Your number 406. 1. I and the British Staffs will await you in Cairo on 22nd. 2. We think it necessary that the British and United States Staffs should consult together before any triple conference with the Russians takes place, and that when it takes place there should be a responsible Russian delegation and not a mere observer. I should be grateful if you would let me know whether you agree with this. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 64.]

As usual with messages pertaining to the French question, Roosevelt in­ structed that the following cable be passed to the State Department. In this case, the President believed no answer was required. Alfred Duff Cooper, who had held various posts in the British government, the latest being Minister of State in the Far East, did not actually relieve Macmillan as British Rep­ resentative with the French Committee of National Liberation until January 1944. In September 1943, the United States government appointed Edwin C. Wilson, previously Ambassador to Panama, as the American representative on the Mediterranean Commission. He became the American representative with the French Committee, replacing Robert Murphy, in November 1943. Harold Macmillan continued to represent the British government at Eisen­ hower's headquarters.

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C-489 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 3, 1943, 2115 Ζ From Prime Minister to President. Between the end of May and the middle of June there was some cor­ respondence between our Governments on the subject of our represen­ tation at the seat of French authority in Algiers. Our last communication indicated that we did not propose^for the moment, to appoint a repre­ sentative distinct from the Resilient Minister. Much has happened since theft»rWe have recognized the French Com­ mittee of Liberation. The armies have marched forward into new lands. MacMillan has fresh, and increasing, duties and responsibilities with Ei­ senhower in Italy. I have decided, therefore, that the time has come to appoint a new and additional representative who can give his whole time to these anxious and intricate French affairs, and I have selected Duff Cooper for this purpose. I feel bound to give you advance information of this in case you may wish to consider any change in your representation. [MR*]

American military plans had not yet adjusted to the reverses suffered in Italy and the Aegean in October, and BOLERO (the logistical buildup for the cross-channel invasion) continued in accordance with the original schedule. Although the British were overly pessimistic about developments in Italy, American planners soon realized that Eisenhower would require more land­ ing craft for a longer period. (See R—409.) LCT stood for landing craft, tank.

C-490 London [via U.S. Array] Nov. 4, 1943, 1800 Ζ Prime Minister to President Most Secret and Personal. 1. It is with very great regret that I must bring to your notice the increasing anxiety of his Majesty's Government about the withdrawal of landing craft from the Mediterranean at this critical juncture. We now have before us General Eisenhower's forecast that he will not be able to occupy the line necessary to protect the Rome airfields before the end of January or even February if the present programme of withdrawals of landing craft is rigidly adhered to. He further explains in his NAF 498 the cosdy and prolonged frontal attacks that will be necessary in order

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to achieve this disappointing result. We feel entitled to ask our American Allies to attach weight to our earnest representations in view of the very great preponderance of British troops deployed against the enemy in Italy, with proportionate losses, and also in view of the clear opinions of the United States Commander in Chief under whom we serve. 2. Accordingly, the War Cabinet have formally desired me to ask that consideration shall be given by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the requests put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in their COS (W) 929. We very much regret that the urgency of the matter does not permit us to wait another 3 weeks until the next staff conference can be convened, as this would entail the departure or immobilization meanwhile of the landing craft, with grave injury to the Italian campaign. 3. I may mention that by various intense efforts we have every hope that an additional 75 LCT's can be produced in the United Kingdom by the date fixed for OVERLORD. [MR*. WSC, V, 248.]

During the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, both the British and the Russians favored steps which would get Turkey into the war against Germany. The British proposed inducements whereas the Soviets suggested coercion in the form of a halt in Anglo-American arms shipments to Turkey. Secretary of State Hull argued that the entry of Turkey into the war would strain the already over-burdened Allied resources, and instead proposed asking the Turks to lease some air bases to the Allies. When Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov indicated he would support the air-base proposal only if the Americans also tried to fqrce the Turks to enter the war, Hull agreed after noting that he had to consult the President before making a formal commitment. Nothing came of the negotiations. The Turks seemed merely intent on obtaining enough modern military equipment to protect themselves against the Soviet Union.

R-407 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 4, 1943, 12:35 P.M. Personal and Secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person. This government agrees to join Great Britain and Soviet in making immediate demand on Turkey for use of air bases and later pressing Turkey to enter the war before the end of the year subject to the following: no British or American resources will be committed to the Eastern Mediterranean area which in the opinion of the commanders responsible are necessary for OVERLORD or for operations in Italy. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 151.]

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Mackenzie King was the Canadian Prime Minister.

C-491 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 5, 1943, 1113 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Secret. Your n u m b e r 405, anti U boat warfare statement for October. I entirely agree subject to o n e point. Latest figures have increased losses in October, which now becomes second best m o n t h of war, August being the best. I suggest therefore that last sentence of p a r a g r a p h two be a m e n d e d to r e a d " O u r t o n n a g e losses from all causes in October were the second lowest of any m o n t h of the war." I a m sending text as a m e n d e d to Mackenzie King a n d will let you know as soon as h e has replied. [MR*]

C-492 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 5, 1943/TOR 12:45 P.M. Personal a n d Most Secret to President Roosevelt from Prime Minister. Your 407. T h a n k you very much. [MR*]

R-408 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 5, 1943, 7:30 P.M. T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Personal a n d Secret. Your N u m b e r 4 9 1 . T h a n k you for your p r o m p t reply. We shall issue the statement as a m e n d e d by you at the agreed time. Roosevelt [MR*]

On this same day, Admiral King, the American Chief of Naval Operations, announced that he would allocate seventy-one additional landing ships to the European theater. T h a t did not restore the cuts made at the Quebec Con­ ference, but it did make it possible to slow the transfer of such vessels from Italy to England. (LSTs were Landing Ships, Tank, larger than LCTs.)

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R-409 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 5, 1943, 7:30 P.M. T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President, Personal a n d Secret. Replying to your 490, the Combined Chiefs of Staff today authorized Eisenhower to retain until December 15 sixty-eight L.S.T.s now scheduled for an early d e p a r t u r e for the United Kingdom. It seems to m e that this action o u g h t to meet his essential requirements as stated in his N A F 498. Roosevelt [MR*. pWSC, V, 249.]

In spite of his airsickness, Hull planned to fly all the way from Moscow to Washington in order to talk with Roosevelt before the SEXTANT Confer­ ence. Ο was Oran, Algeria. Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, who commanded the Army Service Forces, Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell, who commanded U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater and also served as Chief of Staff to the Su­ preme Commander of the China theater (Chiang Kai-shek), and Admiral Lord Louis "Dicky" Mountbatten, head of the South East Asia Command, met with Chinese officials in Chungking, China, during the third week in October. Somervell, there to investigate the problems in the supply route between India and China, and Mountbatten, in Chungking to present his credentials to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and to get full Chinese coop­ eration in proposed operations in Burma, found themselves caught u p in an attempt by Chiang Kai-shek to force the recall of Stilwell. T h e Generalissimo resented Stilwell's demands for reform within the Chinese government and for the Chinese to take a more active role in fighting the Japanese. Chiang disliked foreigners to begin with, and Stilwell's abrupt and candid manner further angered the Chinese leader. Moreover, Chiang was primarily inter­ ested in consolidating his own domestic strength while the Americans and British fought the Japanese. A combination of palace intrigue and Mountbatten's intervention kept Stilwell on the job. (See Tuchman, Stilwell, pp. 393— 95.) Roosevelt did not make it clear just how there could be "many meetings" between the British and Americans before the meetings with Russian or Chinese representatives since Chiang and Roosevelt planned to arrive on the same day, November 22. Possibly the President was thinking that the Amer­ ican military leaders would fly on ahead, although virtually all of the top American military men accompanied the President on board the USS Iowa from the United States to Oran. This entire message was drafted in the President's handwriting. T h e log sheet indicates the cable was written by Roosevelt in his study, and makes no mention of anyone else being present.

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R-410 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 5, 1943, 9:40 P.M. Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Your Number 488. I am sorry that the uncertainty of Hull's return and no reply from U.J. have made my plans so uncertain. Hull has now decided to come back by plane and should be here by the 10th. Therefore I expect to get away by the 11th and get to Ο by the 19th or 20th. I think it best to go straight by air to Cairo with perhaps one short stop. Perhaps you could arrange to meet me in Ο and we could go on together. I think it simpler in every way for the Combined Staffs and planners to meet in Cairo just as soon as my people, most of whom will start when I do, can get there. Of course they and we will have many meetings before the Russians or Chinese meet with us. In regard to Chiang, Somervell who is just back from that very suc­ cessful meeting in Chungking at which Dickie was present, thinks you and I should see Chiang before we see U.J. or Molotov. Therefore I think I should ask Chiang to get to Cairo by the 22nd. In regard to U.J. I am begging him to meet us for even one day in Basra or at the point of the railway just south of the mountains [Dizful, Iran?]. This would take very little of our time and his, and Molotov could then proceed back to Cairo with us. This jaunt into Persia would be let us say between the 25th and the 28th. You and I can arrange for Tunis or Italian visits after the Egyptian campaign is over. All goes well. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 66-67.]

Predictably, Churchill preferred that decisions which had political implica­ tions—such as military commitments to Turkey—be taken out of the hands of field commanders. In this case, Eisenhower's strong support for OVER­ LORD heightened the Prime Minister's desire that such decisions be left to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, where Britain was equally represented. HMS Renown was a British battle cruiser. Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay was Deputy Secretary to the British War Cabinet and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence (Churchill). The Senate resolution referred to by Churchill was the Connally resolution, passed on November 5, which com­ mitted the United States to participate in a postwar international organization formed to keep the peace. Introduced by Senator Tom Connally (D-Tex.), the resolution was similar to the Fulbright resolution passed by the House of

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Representatives on September 21, although the Senate specifically labeled American membership in such an organization a treaty action, thus requiring consent by two-thirds of the Senate.

C-493 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 6, 1943 I TOR 3:00 P.M. Former Naval Person to President Personal and Most Secret. 1. Thank you very much for your numbers 408, 409 and 410. 2. Your number 409. My colleagues and I are greatly relieved that the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will give time for our affairs to be discussed between us on the spot and for our strokes in the South and West to be concerted and timed so as to give the best prospects of success in the campaign of 1944. The Chiefs of Staff also are grateful. 3. Please also refer to your number 407. Since I telegraphed thanking you for this the British Chiefs of Staff have examined the proviso in the last part of this telegram. They do not think that the Commanders should be responsible for allotting the forces for OVERLORD, operations in Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean, but that this should remain as hitherto the duty of the Combined Chiefs of Staff who would naturally have before them the opinion of the "Commanders responsible". They would therefore like to leave out the words "Commanders responsible" and insert "The Combined Chiefs of Staff. Will you very kindly think over this. I imagine we all mean the same thing. 4. Your number 410. I start 11th or 12th probably in Renown which anyhow is carrying my party. I can certainly meet you at "O" on 19th or 20th. I agree with the arrangements you propose that the British and American Combined Staffs and Planners should meet in Cairo and then, after they have had their necessary meetings, meet the Russians and/or Chinese. I also agree that Chiang should be asked to get to Cairo by the 22nd. I shall be obliged if you will send him a joint invitation from us both. I hope indeed you will succeed in persuading U.J. to meet us as you propose between the 25th and 28th, and I think it will be very good if Molotov and some Russian Generals came back to Cairo with us when the triple conference could be held and our Staffs could go into all technical details with them and convince them at once of our resolve to strike with all our strength while reserving the necessary flexibilities inseparable from the ever changing fortunes and hazards of war. 5. I told Ismay to make a thorough examination on the spot of the communications between Cairo and Cairo 3 and I send his report in my immediately following. I had not realised that the railway journey from Basra to Cairo 3 was so short. I do not see why we should finally shape

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our plans until we get to Cairo. You may be sure however that in all this I shall defer to your wishes and act with you. 6. Many congratulations on the Senate resolution. [MR*. pFRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 68-69, 156.]

Roosevelt did not reply to General Ismay's favorable report on transportation between Teheran (Cairo 3) and Cairo, but it may have influenced his later decision to travel to Teheran in order to meet with Stalin. Bandar Shahpur is located at the head of the Persian Gulf in western Iran.

C-494 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 6, 1943, 1550 Ζ/TOR 2:25 P.M. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is report from Ismay referred to in paragraph 5. 1. Begins: "Best information from most experienced and reliable quarters shows that chances of interruption due to weather of com­ munications between Cairo and Cairo 3 are exaggerated. 2. Last year during the period Mid-November to Mid-December Β Ο A C flight between Cairo and Cairo 3 was only twice delayed and then for not more than 2 days. 3. Even if flights over the mountains were prevented by the weather journey from Baghdad to Cairo 3 should not be interrupted and should not exceed 3 days. This could be reduced to 2 days by a properly organized relay system of cars along the route. 4. A further and quicker alternative would be flight from Cairo to Basra and then by rail (26 hours) Bandashahpur to Cairo 3. Train travels regularly 5 days a week". [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 69-70.]

The political situation in Italy remained confused. King Victor Emmanuel III had lost virtually all credibility and prestige by his ineffectual actions during Mussolini's regime, and most of the political groups vying for power in Italy demanded the King's abdication. Even the monarchist Prime Minister, Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio, had concluded that Victor Emmanuel should abdicate in favor of either the Crown Prince or the King's grandson, the Prince of Naples. Count Carlo Sforza, unofficially sponsored by the United States and the leading liberal political leader, had long expressed anti-mon-

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archial views, although he had indicated a willingness to permit the Prince of Naples to assume the monarchy pending full, free elections on the form of government. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in a cable to Ambassador Winant in London, summed up the American evaluation of British policy: "While many of the British arguments against a fundamental change at this time in the Italian political structure are valid, their attitude is probably dictated by their desire to protect, particularly in Europe, the dignity and prerogatives of monarchial institutions" (Nov. 13, 1943, FRUS, 1943, II, 427). On the other hand, Churchill's representative in Italy, Harold Macmillan, believed that "the more politically-minded Americans, including Mr. Murphy, were afraid of another Darlan episode and would like to see the King dis­ appear" (Woodward, British Foreign Policy, II, 514). At this juncture, Badoglio agreed to stay on as Prime Minister until Rome was liberated, an event that was expected to happen before Christmas.

C-495 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 6, 1943, 1942 Ζ / T O R 4:00 P.M.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. 1. All my information goes to show that we should lose a lot in breaking up the present King Badoglio show. Victor Emmanuel is nothing to us but his coordination with Badoglio did in fact deliver the Italian Fleet which is rendering very useful service now and this same combination is at this moment holding the loyalties of a very large part of the unhappy Italian Army and people and of course of Italian Diplomatic Represent­ atives everywhere. Why should we add to the burden of our British and United States soldiers on the march to Rome by weakening any of these aids? We ought not in my personal opinion to countenance a change in the Badoglio King Regime till we are seated in Rome and a really broad based Italian government can be formed. 2.1 understand Eisenhower in the main inclines to this view. Surely we should stick to what we have got till we are sure we can get something better and this can only be ascertained when we have Rome in our pos­ session. 3. I do not believe that Sforza counts for anything that will make men kill or die. [MR*. FRUS, 1943, II, 420.]

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Alexander Kirk was the American Minister in Egypt as well as the Ambassador to the Greek government located in Cairo. Michael F. Reilly was a supervising agent for the U.S. Secret Service—charged with protecting the President.

R-411 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 8, 1943, 4:40 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Your 479. I have not received invitation from Kirk a n d have directed my representative Reilly to make arrangements after consultation with British Minister. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 71.]

T h e protocol referred to by Roosevelt had been worked out at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference and called for joint efforts to induce Turkey to enter the war against Germany. W. Averell Harriman had just been appointed U.S. Ambassador in Moscow.

R-412 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 8, 1943, 4:45 P.M. From the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person Secret and Personal. Your 4 9 3 . I accept your suggestion that " C o m m a n d e r s responsible" in P a r a g r a p h 3 be changed to "Combined Chiefs of S t a f f and have so informed Harriman a n d have authorized him to attach agreement to the protocol. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 161.]

In the draft of the message Roosevelt sent to Stalin accepting Teheran for their meeting, Roosevelt crossed out a sentence stating that Chiang Kai-shek would attend the SEXTANT Conference in Cairo (FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 71—72). Chiang's message agreeing to a meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill had been sent via General Somervell on October 30 (FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 56).

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R-413 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 8, 1943, 5:00 P.M. For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President, Secret and Personal. Your N u m b e r 4 9 3 . For your information I have today dispatched the following message to Chiang: "Many thanks for your message. I am leaving for N o r t h Africa in two or three days a n d I h o p e to get to Cairo on the twenty-first. Churchill will meet me there. We h o p e to meet Marshal Stalin in Persia about the 26th or 27th. However I would prefer that you a n d Churchill a n d I meet before that. T h e r e f o r e can you try to reach Cairo by the 22nd of November? We will a r r a n g e good accommodations and g u a r d for you and your party in or n e a r Cairo. Please let me know as soon as you can." Roosevelt [WDL] [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 72.]

The log sheet attached to this document indicates that it was drafted by Lieutenant George Elsey, USNR, of the Map Room staff, and that it was derived "from various sources." Those sources, including the unnamed informant in Turkey, were confused as to the facts. T h e commandant of the Peenemiinde facility was Major General Walter Dornberger, not Shemiergembeinski. In fact, no one of that name or anything similar seems to have been associated with German rocket research and production. Moreover, of the factories listed by Roosevelt, only Peenemiinde and Wiener Neustadt were directly connected with rocket manufacturing or research. T h e final sentence of the message was added to the draft in the President's handwriting.

R-414 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 8, 1943, 7:30 P.M. Secret a n d Personal from the President to the Former Naval Person. Your 474. We too have received many reports of the G e r m a n Rocket activity. T h e only information recently coming to m e which might be of value to you is a statement that factories manufacturing the Rocket b o m b are situated in Kaniafried, Richshafen, Mixtgennerth Berlin, Kugellagerwerke

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Schweinfurt, Wiener Neustadt and at an isolated factory on left side of the road going from Vienna to Baden just south of Vienna. Production is said to have been delayed due to death in bombing of the experimental station at Peenemunde of Lieutenant General Shemiergembeinski who was in charge. This came from an informer via Turkey. Roosevelt [GE] [MR*. R&C. WSC, V, 238.]

The United States continued to work to obtain extensive landing rights for aircraft in the Azores. The immediate and primary goal was to facilitate the transfer of land-based airplanes from the United States to England in preparation for the cross-channel invasion. However, the scope of the original American demands prompted George Kennan, then the Chargi d'Affaires in Lisbon, to write later in his memoirs: "It was perfectly clear that facilities of these dimensions would simply sink the economy and administration of the islands under their own weight. . . . It was idle to pretend that this represented anything other than a virtual takeover of the islands by our armed forces for the duration of the war and the ruination of the culture and traditional mode of life of the inhabitants" (Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, p. 151). Moreover, Kennan's description of the confusion regarding the Azores illustrates the lack of coordination in the American government. Only the President could make firm, final decisions, and diplomats in Lisbon received a steady stream of contradictory "advice." Not until Kennan returned to Washington on a hurried and accidentally arranged trip was he able to talk with Roosevelt and obtain firm policy guidance. Although Roosevelt asked for British assistance in the negotiations, the British Foreign Office learned from Kennan that the Americans preferred to deal with the Portuguese on their own. There was, of course, mutual suspicion between the British and Americans about postwar aviation interests in the Azores. (See Woodward, British Foreign Policy, IV, 62.) Because Roosevelt had entrusted the negotiations with Portugal to Kennan personally, this message was routed via State Department channels rather than the Map Room.

R-414/1 Washington [via U.S. Ambassador] Nov. 8, 1943, 12:00 P.M. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister. Personal and Secret. George Kennan our Charge d'Affaires at Lisbon is returning to his post after brief consultation with us here. He expects to take up with Salazar immediately upon his return the urgent question of obtaining what we consider minimum necessary facilities in the Azores for the operation of the Air Transport, ferrying, anti-submarine and convoy operations by U.S. forces in that area.

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I h o p e that h e can d e p e n d on t h e full s u p p o r t of the British Ambassador in Lisbon in impressing u p o n t h e Portuguese t h e compelling importance to o u r c o m m o n war effort of the early use of these facilities by U.S. forces a n d would appreciate your sending him instructions in that sense. [PREM 3/471/44. FRUS, 1943, II, 565.]

T h e recommendations Roosevelt continued to receive from his personal rep­ resentative with Eisenhower in Italy, Robert Murphy, are reflected in this cable. Murphy believed that the monarchy could be saved only if King Victor Emmanuel III ("the old gentleman") abdicated in favor of his grandson, the Prince of Naples ("the boy"). T h e main American goal was to facilitate military operations, though Roosevelt consistently pushed for the establishment of a liberal government.

R-415 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 9, 1943, 1 1 : 3 0 A.M. Personal a n d Secret, for t h e F o r m e r Naval Person from t h e President. I feel personally that I am so far removed from firsthand knowledge of Italian conditions that in regard to your N o . 495 I a m asking for r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s from people on t h e spot. T h e old gentleman, I a m told, clicks only before lunch. In advance of further recommendations, I am inclined to t h e idea of retaining t h e H o u s e of Savoy t h r o u g h t h e boy a n d , at the same time, bringing in all parties as soon as possible. Roosevelt [WDL, FDR] [MR*]

This referred to the arrangements being made for Roosevelt's accommoda­ tions in Cairo.

C-496 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 9, 1943, 0927 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your N o . 4 1 1 . You may be sure that everything is being a r r a n g e d . Will telegraph m o r e fully. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 73-74.]

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T h e American Minister in Cairo, Alexander Kirk, was "a carryover from an older day when to be rich entitled you to be eccentric, and he made the most of the privilege. . . . Kirk worked at giving himself the aspect of exactly that sort of American career diplomat of which the American philistine has always been most suspicious: elegant, overrefined, haughty, and remote" (Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, pp. 112—13). T h a t may be the most satisfactory expla­ nation of Kirk's lateness in extending an invitation to the President. OBOE stood for Oran, Algeria. General Sir Harold Alexander was Commander in Chief of Allied forces in Italy and a personal favorite of Churchill's.

C-497 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 10, 1943, 0242 Ζ/TOR 11:45 P.M. Prime Minister to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your 4 1 1 . Casey tells m e that Kirk did not feel entitled to telegraph to you till he h e a r d from the State D e p a r t m e n t about S E X T A N T . H e is p r o u d a n d delighted to know t h a t you will use his house a n d all preparations are proceeding actively to that e n d . I leave by sea 12th reaching Gibraltar evening 15th, arriving Malta by air dawn 16th. I shall s p e n d two or t h r e e days in the field with Alexander, meeting you at O B O E , o r if you prefer, a n d I think it would be better fun, at Malta. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 77.]

T h e President changed the original draft of this message, as indicated below, in a way which prevented any extensive talks with Churchill before their meeting in Cairo. J o h n Winant, the American Ambassador in London, had requested and received permission from Roosevelt to travel with the Prime Minister (FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 73).

R-416 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 10, 1943, 12:15 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. Your 497. As we c a n n o t arrive O B O E before forenoon November 20th it seems to m e impracticable to have a meeting at Malta e n r o u t e to S E X T A N T . It is best to go straight t h r o u g h with o n e stop at T u n i s for the night.

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Perhaps we can visit Malta on the r e t u r n j o u r n e y . I am glad you are bringing Winant. Roosevelt [WB] [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 77.]

On November 9, the French Committee of National Liberation announced some changes in its makeup. T h e primary difference was the elimination of Generals Henri Giraud and Alphonse Georges from the committee, thus ending the co-presidency of Giraud and General Charles de Gaulle. Although the British Foreign Office considered the move logical, given Giraud's ineffectiveness as a politician, Churchill's distrust of de Gaulle prompted a cable to Roosevelt.

C-498 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 10, 1943/TOR 12:23 A.M. Prime Minister to President. Personal. I am not at all content with the changes in the French National Committee which leave d e Gaulle sole President. T h e body we recognized was of a totally different character, the essence being the co presidency of Giraud a n d de Gaulle. I suggest we maintain an attitude of complete reserve until we can discuss the position together. [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 174. WSC, V, 184.]

Churchill was eager to preserve the monarchy in Italy, though he realized that eventually Victor Emmanuel would have to abdicate.

C-499 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 10, 1943/TOR 8:20 A.M. Most Secret a n d Personal. T o President Roosevelt from Prime Minister. Your n u m b e r 415. I h o p e the abdication will not take place before o u r armies have reached Rome a n d certainly not before you a n d I have had a talk about it on the spot. [MR*]

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T h e project Roosevelt referred to was the long-range bombing of Japan by B-29 "Superfortress" bombers flying out of India and southwestern China. T h e message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China is in FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 172-73.

R-417 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 10, 1943, 7:00 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. We have u n d e r development a project whereby we can strike a heavy blow at o u r enemy in the Pacific early next year with o u r new heavy bombers. J a p a n e s e military, naval and shipping strength is d e p e n d e n t u p o n the steel industry which is strained to the limit. Half of the coke for that steel can be reached a n d destroyed by long-range bombers operating from bases in the Chengtu area of China. T h e bombers can supply themsevles by air, from bases to be constructed near Calcutta, without disturbing present air lift commitments as agreed at Q U A D R A N T . I n o r d e r to expedite this project I ask that you a r r a n g e for the Gove r n m e n t of India to r e n d e r every possible assistance in the construction of these four air bases for long-range bombers. American Aviation Engineer forces, u n d e r a capable general officer, are being p r e p a r e d for a movement as a matter of first priority, so that we may contribute experienced construction personnel to this enterprise without drawing on similar forces in India which are now engaged in other operations. Mountbatten is familiar with this project. I am sending a similar message to the Generalissimo asking him to expedite construction of five advanced bases in the Chengtu area, financed by Lend-Lease funds. This is a bold but entirely feasible project. T o g e t h e r by this operation, we can partially cripple the J a p a n e s e naval and military power a n d hasten the victory of o u r forces in Asia. Roosevelt [HHA] [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 172.]

Churchill continued to press for a clear schedule of Anglo-American staff meetings to be held before any conference with Stalin or with Soviet military leaders. Roosevelt never replied to this suggestion since it was essentially superseded by C - 5 0 1 .

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C-500 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 10, 1943, 2345 Ζ/TOR 11:30 P.M. F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. I think it would be best, irrespective of any a r r a n g e m e n t s which we may be able to make for o u r own meeting with U. J., to cable him at once in the following s e n s e : — " T h e British a n d American Chiefs of Staff are meeting in Cairo about t h e 22nd November to discuss in detail t h e operations of t h e Anglo-American Armies a n d also t h e war against J a p a n , for which o u r long t e r m plans have now been p r e p a r e d . For t h e latter subject it is h o p e d that Chiang Kai Shek himself a n d a Chinese Military Delegation may be present. After these domestic a n d far eastern discussions have been concluded we have the h o p e that the meeting of t h e t h r e e h e a d s of G o v e r n m e n t s may take place. Besides a n d a p a r t from this it is p r o p o s e d that t h e r e should be a formal triple confer­ ence of the Soviet, United States a n d British Staffs, starting about t h e 25th o r 26th November, to discuss the whole field of t h e war in all its aspects. It is m u c h h o p e d , therefore, that you will send a pow­ erful military delegation to this conference, accompanied if possible by M. Molotov. All this is separate from a n d additional to t h e meeting which we still h o p e it may be possible to a r r a n g e between t h e t h r e e heads of G o v e r n m e n t s . " As I feel sure that t h e above is in accord with your views a n d wishes, I a m sending it off today in o r d e r to avoid delay. I have j u s t received your 416. A meeting at Malta en route to S E X T A N T is clearly out of t h e question. I shall therefore go direct to Cairo. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf, p. 78.]

Although Churchill charitably labeled the schedule set forth by Roosevelt a "misunderstanding," the Prime Minister must have suspected that the Pres­ ident had been trying all along to avoid Anglo-American staff talks before any meeting with Stalin. Even though Roosevelt's message to Chiang (sent to Churchill as R-413) had hinted at the President's willingness to travel to Teheran, Churchill protested, as a matter of pride and principle, any action which seemed to treat Great Britain as anything less than an equal power. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr was the British Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Roosevelt's invitation to Molotov is found in Stalin/FDR, doc. 134. T h e President delayed his departure from Washington in order to dictate an answer to Churchill. He then left on the first leg of his journey to Cairo.

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Roosevelt boarded the Presidential yacht, Potomac, at Quantico, Virginia, at 10:38 P.M. and shortly thereafter the yacht departed for a rendezvous with the battleship USS Iowa in Chesapeake Bay at the mouth of the Potomac River. He boarded the Iowa on Friday morning (November 12). After taking fuel on board and being joined by an escort of three destroyers, the Iowa left Hampton Roads, Virginia, at 12:06 A.M. on November 13, headed for Oran, Algeria.

C-501 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 11, 1943 /TOR 10:00 P.M. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal. 1. T h e r e seems to have been a most unfortunate misunderstanding. I t h o u g h t from your n u m b e r 410 that the British and American Staffs would have "many meetings" before being j o i n e d by the Russians or Chinese. But now I h e a r from Ambassador Clerk Kerr that on the 9th November the United States Ambassador at Moscow delivered a message from you to Stalin inviting Monsieur Molotov to go to Cairo on November 22nd with a Military representative. November 22nd is, however, the first day on which the Staffs can meet. I ask therefore that the date of the arrival of Molotov and his Military representative shall be postponed till the 25th November at the earliest. 2. I am very glad to h e a r also from Ambassador Clerk Kerr that you contemplate going o n November 26th to T e h e r a n . I rather wish you had been able to let me know direct. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 79. WSC, V, 317-18.]

T h e arrangements for the Teheran (EUREKA) Conference are a striking indication of the change that had been developing in the Anglo-American and, therefore, the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship. T h e President's attitude was more that of a senior than an equal partner when he made it clear that there would be no changes made in the schedules for Cairo and Teheran. Moreover, as his comment about not ganging up on Stalin makes clear, Roosevelt was far more concerned about Soviet-American relations than about the Anglo-American alliance. T h e President planned to negotiate with the Soviets on his terms, not Churchill's, and the tone of the message indicates that the Prime Minister was expected to go along. Most likely Roosevelt had learned through Cordell Hull that Foreign Secretary Eden opposed holding Anglo-American military talks without Soviet representatives in attendance (Carlton, Eden, pp. 229—30; the Stalin-Roosevelt exchanges on this are in Stalin/FDR, docs. 133-35).

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R-418 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 11, 1943, 9 : 3 0 P.M.

Personal and Most Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Your 501. I have just heard that U . J . will come to Teheran. I received a telegram from him five days ago which made me think he would not come even to that place—this because his advisors did not wish him to leave Russian soil. I wired him at once that I had arranged the Constitutional matter here and, therefore, that I could go to Teheran for a short meeting with him and told him I was very happy. Even then I was in doubt as to whether he would go through with his former offer to go to Teheran. His latest message has clinched the matter, and I think that now there is no question that you and I can meet him there between the twentyseventh and the thirtieth. Thus endeth a very difficult situation, and I think we can be happy. In regard to Cairo, I have held all along—as I know you have, that it would be a terrible mistake if U. J. thought we had ganged up on him on military action. During the preliminary meetings in Cairo the Combined Staffs will, as you know, be in the planning stage. That is all. It will not hurt you or me if Molotov and a Russian military representative are in Cairo too. They will not feel that they are being given the "run around". They will have no Staff and no planners. Let us take them in on the high spots. It is only five hours ago that I received U. J.'s telegram confirming Teheran. Undoubtedly, Molotov and the military representative will return there with us between the twenty-seventh and the thirtieth and, when and after we have completed our talk with U. J., they will return with us to Cairo, possibly adding other military Staff to the one representative accompanying Molotov on the first trip. I think it essential that this schedule be carried out. I can assure you there will be no difficulties. I am sending you this at the first opportunity of letting you know about

U.J. I am just off. Happy landing to us both. Roosevelt [FDR] [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 79-80. pWSC, V, 318-19. «fcfC]

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In spite of the tone of finality in Roosevelt's message, Churchill continued to insist on private Anglo-American talks before meeting with the Russians or the Chinese. This and the next three messages sent by Churchill were not dispatched from Washington to the President on board the USS Iowa until November 15, and were actually delivered to Roosevelt at Oran on November 20.

C-502 London Nov. 12, 1943, 1448 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. Most I m m e d i a t e . Your n u m b e r 418. 1. I a m very pleased that you have m a n a g e d to a r r a n g e t h e Constitu­ tional m a t t e r a n d that o u r meeting is now definitely a r r a n g e d . T h a t is a great step forward. 2. T h e Chiefs of t h e Staff are however very apprehensive about the a r r a n g e m e n t s which you have settled for military conversations a n d I share their misgivings. I t h o u g h t from your n u m b e r 410 that the British a n d American Staffs would have "Many meetings" before being j o i n e d by t h e Russians or Chinese. I still r e g a r d this as absolutely essential in view of t h e serious questions which have to be settled. T h e r e is n o ob­ jection to you a n d m e seeing Molotov before o u r meeting with U J , but the presence of a Soviet military observer so early in the conference may cause grave embarrassment. Η Μ G cannot a b a n d o n their rights to full a n d frank discussions with you a n d your officers about the vital business of o u r intermingled armies. A Soviet observer cannot possibly be admitted to the intimate conversations which o u r own Chiefs of Staff must have a n d his exclusion may easily cause offense. N o n e of these objections would have applied to the formal triple staff conference which I suggested should take place in d u e course. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 81-82. WSC, V, 319-20.]

General Sir Claude Auchinleck was Commander in Chief of British forces in India.

C-503 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 12, 1943, 1758 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Reference your No. 417 of 11th November.

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2 . 1 have immediately telegraphed Auchinleck to r e n d e r every possible assistance in t h e construction of t h e four air bases. [PREM 3/471. MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 188.]

Nationalism in Syria and Lebanon had begun to pose a serious challenge to French control of the Levant. Made more courageous by the spectacle of French collapse in the face of the German attack in 1940, Syrian and Lebanese leaders demanded true independence once the Vichy government was forced out of their countries. Unwilling to confront a broad Arab nationalism in the Middle East—an area of great economic and strategic importance—the British forced the French Committee to promise limited independence. Although that declaration came late in 1941, not until the summer of 1943 were elections held. When nationalists won both elections, they demanded full recognition as sovereign governments. T h e French refused and on November 10-11 arrested the Syrian President and his Cabinet. Protests from the other Arab states followed, including cables from King Ibn Saud of Arabia to Roosevelt, Churchill, and de Gaulle. Prime Minister Churchill, already distrustful of de Gaulle, hoped to use the affair as a means of either eliminating the French leader or at least limiting his power, although the British Cabinet still advised working with de Gaulle. T h e irony of Churchill's appeal to the principles of the Atlantic Charter—ones he had specifically denied as applying to the British Empire—was apparent to the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Hal­ ifax, who warned that any attempt to use force in the Levant would be interpreted as imperialism, particularly in the light of British actions in India (Woodward, British Foreign Policy, IV, 278). T h e French eventually released the Syrian leaders, but the struggle with local nationalists continued past the end of the war.

C-504 London [via U.S. Army] Nov. 13, 1943, 0240 Ζ

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. You have, n o doubt, been informed of the lamentable outrages committed by t h e French in Syria. T h e s e completely stultify t h e agree­ ments we have m a d e with the French a n d also with the Syrians a n d Lebanese. T h e r e is n o d o u b t in my m i n d that this is a foretaste of what De Gaulle's leadership of France means. It is certainly entirely contrary to t h e Atlantic C h a r t e r a n d m u c h else that we have declared. T h e situation will be most grave t h r o u g h o u t t h e whole of t h e Middle East a n d t h e Arab world a n d also every where people will say: "What kind of a France is this which, while itself subjugated by the enemy, seeks to subjugate others?" 2. Accordingly, I a m of the opinion that t h e British a n d United States G o v e r n m e n t s should take this u p in t h e strongest m a n n e r together. Al-

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ready we have seen t h e character of the body we recognised at Q U A D ­ R A N T totally altered by De Gaulle's complete assumption of power. T h e outrages in t h e Levant are of a different character a n d afford full jus­ tification, with t h e s u p p o r t of world public opinion, of bringing t h e issue with De Gaulle to a head. 3. O u r position should be that t h e k i d n a p p e d Lebanese President a n d Ministers should be set at liberty a n d p e r m i t t e d to r e s u m e their full func­ tion, a n d that t h e assembly should meet again as soon as conditions of law a n d o r d e r can be g u a r a n t e e d . If he fails to d o this at once, we should withdraw o u r recognition from t h e French National Committee a n d stop the process of a r m i n g t h e French troops in N o r t h Africa. 4. Meanwhile, I a m enquiring carefully into t h e state of o u r forces in the Levant. At t h e same time, should action be taken it would be necessary to take precautions in N o r t h Africa, for I assure you t h e r e is n o t h i n g this m a n will not d o if h e has a r m e d forces at his disposal. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 189-90.]

In this cable to Roosevelt Churchill failed to mention his earlier message to Stalin in which he informed that Soviet leader that Chiang Kai-shek would be in Cairo at the same time that Molotov was scheduled to meet there with the Anglo-American staffs—a fact which Roosevelt had deleted from one of his messages to Stalin. T h e Russians wanted to avoid giving the Japanese any pretext for war and it appears that those were the "reasons of serious char­ acter" which prevented Molotov from going to Cairo. Planned or not, Church­ ill thus had the private Anglo-American talks he so eagerly wanted. Stalin's reference to the absolute exclusion of other powers from the T e h e r a n Con­ ference seems to be a reference to the Chinese. Churchill left England aboard the battle cruiser Η MS Renown on the after­ noon of November 12, stopping at Algiers on the fifteenth, Malta on the seventeenth, and finally Alexandria, Egypt, on the twenty-first.

C-505 HMS Renown [via U.S. Embassy & Army] Nov. 14, 1943 Prime Minister to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I have received t h e following message from Stalin. " 1 . I have received your two messages today. 2. Although I wrote to t h e President that Monsieur Molotov would come to Cairo on 2 2 n d November, now I must say, however, that o n certain reasons of serious character Monsieur Molotov to my r e g r e t cannot c o m e to Cairo. H e will be able to c o m e to T e h e r a n at t h e e n d

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of November and will arrive there together with me. Several military men also will accompany me. 3. It stands to reason that a meeting of the heads of only 3 governments must take place at Teheran as it had been agreed. There should be absolutely excluded the participation of the representatives of any other powers. 4. I wish success to your meeting with the Chinese concerning the far eastern affairs. Sgd Stalin". 2. I have sent the following reply. 3. "Your message of November 12th received. I entirely understand your position and I am in full accord with your wishes. I am at sea. All congratulations on your continued triumphant advance." [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 85-86. Stalm/WSC, docs. 207, 208.]

The Cairo talks were scheduled to be held at the famous Mena House located about a half-mile from the Giza pyramids, including the tomb of Cheops and the Sphinx. (It was later the scene of the 1977 conference between President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister M. Begin of Israel.) Originally built as a royal lodge for the Khedive Ismail, the representative of the Ottoman government in Egypt, it was purchased by an English couple who turned it into a hotel catering to European high society. The security breach which worried Roosevelt's advisers was a United Press dispatch which announced the temporary closing of the Mena House and the probability that this meant some sort of major conference would be held there. (See FR US, Teheran Conf., pp. 90—96.) Khartoum is located at the junction of the Blue and White Nile rivers about 1,000 miles south of Cairo. COMINCH stood for Commander in Chief.

R-418/1 USS Iowa [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 17, 1943

From COMINCH Embarked. To Former Naval Person. Official information from Washington to effect that meeting place is known to enemy through press and radio. Propose meeting place be changed to Khartoum. Confirm seriousness of leak. Adjust transit as you deem requisite. [FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 96]

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C-505/1 Malta [via Eisenhower &: U.S. Navy] Nov. 18, 1943, 1610 Ζ / TOR 1817 Ζ

From Former Naval Person to Admiral Queen [Roosevelt]. Immediately on receipt of your Ultra 331 [R-418/1] I had a conference here with General Eisenhower, First Sea Lord and Commander in Chief Mediterranean. We all agreed that it would be better to go through with the Cairo rendezvous. We had of course always thought that the news was bound to leak directly we got there, and the fact that it has leaked a few days earlier should not therefore very much affect our plans. We would be well dispensed at Cairo. Enemy aircraft have to fly 100 miles over land before reaching us and arrangement have already been made to strengthen the fighter and gun defenses of the enclave in which we propose to live. In addition we could, if necessary, have alternative res­ idences. If, however, you remain of the opinion that we should not go through with Cairo, your suggested alternative, Khartoum would not I fear be feasible. Apart from the fact that accommodation there is inad­ equate it is 1000 miles from Cairo and off our route and it would be very difficult to move the necessary staff. The best substitute for Cairo seems to be Malta where I am now and I am having the possibilities examined. C-in-C Mediterranean strongly advises that your ship should not come here since its presence would be sure to be detected by the enemy and this would give away our where­ abouts. We are of course nearer the enemy here but the defences are good. Pray let me know your wishes as soon as possible as it will take some time to alter arrangements. Please reply saying Cairo or Malta. [MR. FRUS, Teheran Canf., p. 98.]

C-505/2 Malta [via U.S. Navy & BAD] Nov. 19, 1943, 1634 Ζ

To Admiral Queen [Roosevelt] from Spencer [Churchill] Further examination shows that Malta would be most inconvenient administratively and conditions would harm work of conference. We are not repetition not therefore proceeding with Malta preparation. All au­ thorities here strongly recommend adhering to Pyramid area and that air raid danger is slight. If desired principles could sleep in Cairo at any rate part of the time. Everything is prepared and all precautions are taken

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in present position a n d I h o p e that you will decide to come t h e r e . Unless I h e a r from you to t h e contrary d u r i n g the day of 20th I shall proceed to Cairo. [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 99.]

R-418/2 USS Iowa [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 19, 1943 Following for F o r m e r Naval Person from Admiral Q [Roosevelt]. I agree with your r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . Will proceed to Cairo as planned. [FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 99]

Churchill had left England with a cold which worsened during the entire journey to Cairo and Teheran. It eventually turned into a serious case of pneumonia and required a lengthy convalescence. T h e underlined phrases were added in Roosevelt's handwriting.

R-418/3 Tunis [via U.S. Navy] Nov. 21, 1943 Personal a n d Secret for the Prime Minister from t h e President. T h a n k you very m u c h for your messages N u m b e r s 502, 503, 504 a n d 505, which were delivered to m e u p o n my arrival early yesterday. I expect to reach S E X T A N T early m o r n i n g November twenty-second, a n d it will be g r a n d to see you again. I h o p e your cold is better. Roosevelt [WEB] [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf, p. 104.]

General Georges Catroux was assigned to Free French military forces in the Middle East and was involved in the crisis in the Levant.

C-506 Cairo [?] [via London & U.S. Army] Nov. 21, 1943, 1500 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. My arrival in Egypt is b o u n d to be known as I shall pass t h r o u g h to see C a t r o u x a n d others: moreover British Parliament meets on 23rd a n d

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my absence must be explained. Unless I h e a r from you to t h e contrary I shall allow it to be stated on 22nd that I am in Cairo. 2. This publicity will be u n s u p p o r t e d cover for your movement which I think should not be a n n o u n c e d for a few days. 3. You will be receiving a telegram about military precautions which are excellent. [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf, p. 104.]

T h e Map Room staff noted on the log sheet that the biblical reference in the following message read as follows: 1. Let not your heart be troubled: ye believe in God, believe also in me. 2. In my Father's house there are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you, I go to prepare a place for you. 3. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also. 4. And whither I go ye know, and the way ye know.

C-507 Cairo [?] [via U.S. Embassy, London, & U.S. Army] Nov. 21, 1943, 1728 Ζ F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Most I m m e d i a t e Personal a n d Most Secret. See St. J o h n , c h a p t e r 14, verses 1 to 4. [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf, p. 105. WSC, V, 327. R(iC]

As promised in C—506, Churchill provided a summary of the military pre­ cautions taken to protect the Cairo Conference site.

C-508 Cairo [?] [via London & U.S. Army & Washington Map Room] Nov. 21, 1943, 2114 Ζ Most I m m e d i a t e F o r m e r Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I asked Commanders-in-Chief Middle East to let m e have: (1) T h e i r estimate of t h e risk attached to o u r meeting. (2) A r r a n g e m e n t s already m a d e to deal with air a n d p a r a c h u t e attacks. (3) Proposals for reinforcing above.

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2. Their reply is as follows. (A) Appreciation of risk. Risk small in view of precautions taken. Target is 100 miles inland giving ample warning and good fighter and A. A. defences have been provided. There is a remote possibility that low flying enemy aircraft might reach target, but every possible precaution is being taken against this. (B) Arrangements made against air and parachute attacks. (1) Fighters. Five Spitfire Squadrons, three Hurricane Squadrons and one Night Fighter Squadron of which one Spitfire Squadron at Matabeleland West and one at Heliopolis. (2) A.A. One Regiment Light AA (54 guns) two Regiments Heavy AA (48 guns) and 18 searchlights deployed in target area. One Balloon Squadron standing by but not deployed. Smoke screen available. (3) R.D.F. and Warning System. R.D.F. will cover along whole coast and special arrangements have been made for cover inland. Special arrangements have been made also for WT observer posts covering target. Specially organized gun and fighter operation rooms controlling air and AA defence of area. Adequate air raid warnings and shelter arrangements have been made in target area. (4) Ground. Three Infantry Bns. Plus one Troop of Armoured Cars guarding Mena area which is fully wired. Extent of parachute attacks appreciated by command. (C) Proposal for increased insurance. We are taking following steps to increase insurance. (1) Fighters. We are adding one Spitfire Squadron to air defence scheme. (2) Ground. We are reinforcing ground defence by equivalent of one Regiment Mixed Armoured Cars and Tanks. (D) We consider arrangements in (B) and (C) above fully adequate to deal with all foreseeable contingencies. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., 105-6.]

T H E C A I R O AND T E H E R A N C O N F E R E N C E S ( S E X T A N T AND EUREKA) A screen of destroyers and aircraft from escort carriers protected the USS Iowa from German U-boat attack during the President's voyage to the Mediterranean, but who was to watch the watchers? A live torpedo, fired from one of the destroyer escorts by accident, required violent evasive action by the President's ship and the weapon passed astern only 1,200 yards away. Admiral King, a member of Roosevelt's party, ordered an immediate inves-

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tigation, although, on orders from the President, no punishment was meted out. Orders designed to prevent a repetition of such accidents were subsequently issued to the fleet. Of far more significance were the staff discussions held on board the Iowa between Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admirals Leahy and King, Generals Marshall and Arnold). Unlike Churchill, the President rarely met with his Joint Chiefs as a group, and the military leaders were quick to seize this unique opportunity. As one official historian put it, "In the course of the discussions the President gave the staff a clearer indication of the direction of his thinking and the fullest guidance on politico-military issues he had given them since America's entry into the war" (Matloff, Strategic Planning, 1943-1944, p. 338). One thing Roosevelt did was to provide the Joint Chiefs with copies of cables and the final report from Secretary of State Hull's conference with Eden and Soviet leaders in Moscow. Hull had been specifically instructed to deal with postwar issues—an area where he and the President were in general agreement—and Roosevelt obviously expected little of substance to come out of the talks. To his surprise and pleasure the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference "broke up in a blaze of vodka and good feeling" (McNeill, America, Britain and Russia, p. 335). A Soviet promise to join the war against Japan, Stalin's relaxed acceptance of a two-month delay in launching a cross-channel attack, and Russian willingness to create a commission to draft plans for the occupation of Germany and Italy (the European Advisory Commission) all pointed toward easier relations between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviet Union during the war. More important, the Four-Power Declaration on General Security (China was included at the insistence of Secretary Hull), which called for the establishment of a postwar international organization, promised Soviet cooperation after the war. In such a euphoric atmosphere Stalin's refusal even to discuss independence for the Baltic states or to deal with the Polish government in London was quickly forgotten. Ironically, although Hull considered the Moscow talks the high point of his career as Secretary of State, it was British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden who acted as spokesman for the Anglo-American alliance. It was the last time during World War II that the Americans would accept anything less than the role of senior partner with Britain. The optimism which flowed from the Moscow talks seems to have affected the conferees aboard the USS Iowa enroute to the Mediterranean. T h e only question they discussed foreshadowing the Cold War was Plan RANKIN, for the rapid introduction of Anglo-American forces into Germany and the European continent in the event of a German collapse. T h e President spoke of a "race" for Berlin but then assumed that the occupation of Berlin and Germany would be carried out in accordance with British-Soviet-American plans. At times during the staff meetings on board the Iowa it seemed as if the Americans viewed Great Britain as a greater problem than the Soviet Union. They continued to worry that Churchill might convince Stalin to support increased operations in the Mediterranean, particularly in view of Harriman's reports from Moscow that the Soviet Premier had seemed receptive to such

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14. Body language at Cairo: Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt, and Churchill, November 25, 1943

plans. Roosevelt firmly supported appointing a Supreme Allied Commander over Anglo-American forces in Europe and expressed concern that the appointment of General Alexander as Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean might permit Churchill to dominate that sphere of activity. T h e postwar condition of both France and Germany also occupied the attention of the President and his staff. Roosevelt considered it unlikely that France would be able to regain major-power status "for at least 25 years," even though the British were looking for a European ally. As a result, he opposed any significant increase in the arms and equipment being given to the French National Committee, since that material could not be effectively utilized. He also commented that France should not regain her colonies, particularly Dakar on the West African coast, an area Roosevelt considered critical to American national security. The occupation of Germany posed a series of difficult questions. Roosevelt was inclined to support the permanent dismemberment of that country, particularly the separation of Prussia, and his proposals for the establishment of

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three zones of occupation reflected that inclination. Plans for OVERLORD called for the Americans to be on the southern flank of the attack and to move from France into southern Germany—a plan which reflected the British preference for an occupation zone in northwestern Germany. T h e President, however, feared that an American zone in southern Germany would force the United States to become involved in French internal affairs, and he flatly refused to accept the proposal. As with Yugoslavia and other parts of eastern and southeastern Europe, Roosevelt shied away from any postwar American military commitment to maintain order in France. As the President commented, "We should not get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence" (Matloff, Strategic Phnning, 1943-1944, p. 342). Roosevelt, concerned about maintaining good relations with China's Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, wanted to talk to Chiang alone before meeting with the British. Moreover, he emphasized the need to work out a postwar settlement between China and the Soviet Union, and indicated that he assumed China would share in the occupation of Japan after the war. He opposed any discussion of a Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific, however, thus maintaining American control over that theater. After arriving at Oran on November 20, the Americans flew to Cairo with a brief sightseeing stop at Tunis to view the battlefields. They landed in Cairo on the morning of the twenty-second to find Chiang and Churchill both waiting. T h e decisions reached at the SEXTANT Conference in Cairo proved far more short-lived than the pyramids which loomed over the meeting site. In what General Marshall understood to be a political decision to enhance China's postwar role, Roosevelt and his advisers insisted on a major amphibious invasion against the Japanese in the Andaman Islands off southern Burma (Operation BUCCANEER) as well as the eventual equipping of ninety Chinese divisions. T h e British, who preferred to use Allied landing craft in the Mediterranean, disingenuously argued that BUCCANEER would delay OVERLORD, but the Americans insisted. That led the British to believe that the Americans were willing to postpone OVERLORD and follow British strategy in Europe (assuming the Russians agreed), providing the British went along with American plans in Asia (Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 167). Roosevelt might have agreed, but General Marshall insisted that BUCCANEER had to be implemented quickly so that it would not interfere with the cross-channel invasion. T o Chiang's later distress, what seemed to be a firm commitment to a major Allied effort in the China-Burma-India theater soon became a casualty of decisions reached at the Teheran Conference. In wanting to provide military support for Chiang, the Americans were indeed looking past the defeat of Japan. Roosevelt had repeatedly insisted that China would eventually assume a great-power role, telling Foreign Minister Molotov in the spring of 1942 that the "Four Policemen"—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and China—would keep the postwar peace secure. T h e President spoke similarly during Eden's visit in March 1943, although the Foreign Secretary suspected that Roosevelt was using American sympathy for China to lure the nation into an active internationalist

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postwar policy. During the Quebec Conference, the President took u p the same theme, proposing a Four Power declaration on the postwar world, and at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, Cordell Hull persuaded the Soviets to agree. But Chiang's shaky government needed wartime aid to survive—both in the war against Japan and in the expected postwar struggle against the communist forces of Mao Tse-tung. Operations like BUCCANEER and ANAKIM, which would open supply routes to China, or an increase in Chiang's allotment of aircraft, would thus serve both a wartime and a postwar purpose. Roosevelt seems to have had some doubts about the feasibility of major campaigns in the China-Burma-India theater, but he had no doubts about the long-term value of a friendly China, growing into its great-power role under American tutelage. The Cairo Declaration reflected that conviction, while the gestation of the statement suggested the manner the United States would adopt in its East Asian diplomacy. Bypassing the British, Roosevelt first showed the draft declaration to the Chinese, making it awkward for Churchill and his aides to push for changes. On the surface, the Cairo Declaration seemed innocuous, calling as it did for the unconditional surrender of Japan and the loss of most of its empire. But the return of Chinese territory including Formosa and Manchuria, and independence for Korea "in due course," required Soviet concurrence. In addition, the disposition of the Pacific islands gained by Japan after World War I raised complex questions of great-power expansion, in spite of the usual disclaimers regarding territorial ambitions. At the same time, British hopes for a simultaneous promise to restore the colonies of the European Allies were dashed by the combination of American anti-colonialism and Chinese anti-Europeanism. Churchill's stubborn opposition to the decolonization of the British Empire, particularly India, may have further persuaded Roosevelt that China would have to play an increasingly important role in the postwar world. T h e President viewed colonialism as a dangerous anachronism, and he hoped that the European powers would commit themselves to the establishment of democratic national governments, a process which would take twenty or thirty years. Since Roosevelt also assumed that East Asia and the Pacific would be a SinoAmerican sphere of influence (though that phrase would never have been used), he began to think of an American tutelage for the British and French colonies in the area, a tutelage which would be assisted by the Chinese. As Churchill had feared, he and Roosevelt concluded their Cairo talks without having arrived at any joint agreement on either short- or long-term strategy. Moreover, Roosevelt had hinted at the changing relationship within the alliance when he pointed out that American military forces overseas now exceeded those deployed by Britain by a sizeable margin. On the key choice between operations in the Mediterranean and OVERLORD, the President seemed to leave the decision to Stalin, stating that the entire matter would have to be taken u p with the Soviet leader. T h e availability of amphibious craft provided a technical issue on which strategy could be argued, but wartime and postwar policies underlay the entire discussion. Sardonically, perhaps, Churchill noted in his memoirs that a Thanksgiving dinner, during

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which Roosevelt carved the traditional Turkey, stood out in the Prime Minister's memory as "among the most agreeable features of the halt at Cairo" (WSC, V, 341). Certainly the talks had failed to be so pleasant. T h e British and American parties flew separately from Cairo to Teheran on November 27, a six-and-one-half-hour flight. Roosevelt, in keeping with his liking for personal diplomacy, insisted on informal meetings without formal lists of delegates or official agendas. The continuing shift in the AngloAmerican relationship was quickly driven home to Churchill when Roosevelt refused to meet privately with him. Instead the President insisted on a personal talk with Stalin, accompanied only by two interpreters. Churchill had no choice but to acquiesce, and testily commented to Averell Harriman (the U.S. Ambassador in the Soviet Union) that "he was glad to obey orders." Visibly annoyed, the Prime Minister gave u p his right to be chairman of the conference—a claim he based on his age, the alphabetical order of their names, and the historic significance of the British Empire—and sarcastically demanded the privilege of hosting a dinner on November 30, his sixty-ninth birthday. As Harriman recalled, "He said he would get thoroughly drunk and be prepared to leave the next day" (Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, p. 265). British isolation seemed heightened by Roosevelt's acceptance, albeit reluctant, of Stalin's offer to shift the American delegation's headquarters from the American legation to the Soviet Embassy, where the talks would take place. T h e Soviets had expressed concern over an alleged German plot to assassinate one or more of the three leaders, an excuse which most Western historians have dismissed as a ploy which would permit Soviet wiretappers to eavesdrop on the Americans. That is, of course, possible, but the story told by a Soviet counter-spy, Nikolai Kuznetsov, who had penetrated German intelligence using the nom de guerre Paul Siebert, bears out Stalin's warning. (See Dm. Medvedev, Silnye Dukhom, pp. 328-29.) Despite Churchill's statement that he encouraged Roosevelt to make the move, the change worked against any improved Anglo-American coordination during the conference. During the talks, Roosevelt continued to pursue a close relationship with Stalin, frequently at Churchill's expense. T h e President avoided long private meetings with the Prime Minister and prodded Stalin into a series of teasing remarks, one of which, a suggestion to execute 50,000 Germans after the war, brought an angry reaction from Churchill. (It was the idea of executions, not killing, which bothered the Prime Minister, for he called for killing as many Germans as possible—on the batdefield—before the war ended.) Whether Roosevelt took British friendship for granted or had come to view Soviet power as more important, or both, the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship had shifted. T h e Teheran meeting effectively ended the Anglo-American debate over BUCCANEER, OVERLORD, and eastern Mediterranean operations. After again promising to join the fight against Japan following the defeat of Germany—a commitment which made BUCCANEER and the buildup of Chinese strength less necessary—Stalin insisted on the long-promised second front in France. Even more, he strongly recommended a simultaneous invasion of

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southern France in support of OVERLORD. Possibly, as Churchill later thought, Stalin wanted to forestall any Anglo-American presence in the Balkans, but whatever the reasons, a two-pronged invasion of France guaranteed that eastern Mediterranean plans would have to be shelved. Churchill continued to claim that increased activity in the Mediterranean would only slightly delay OVERLORD, but Stalin dismissed operations in the Aegean Sea as merely diversionary. By the end of the conference, Churchill and Roosevelt had committed themselves to OVERLORD and an invasion of southern France no later than J u n e 1, 1944, and Stalin had responded with a promise of a simultaneous Soviet offensive. T h e three leaders reached no firm decisions on territorial settlements in postwar Europe, but the principles they discussed and agreed upon foreshadowed the arrangements made fourteen months later at the Yalta Conference. T h e proposal to dismember Germany brought quick agreement, although the leaders left the details to their subordinates. They readily accepted a proposal to move Poland westward and to incorporate part of East Prussia and portions of what had been eastern Poland into the Soviet Union, although Roosevelt refused to commit the United States publicly to such an arrangement lest he alienate the important Polish-American voting bloc. With the 1944 presidential election still in mind, he asked Stalin to permit some sort of referendum in the Baltic states on the question of their incorporation into the Soviet Union. But Roosevelt softened what might have seemed like a challenge to Soviet claims to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia by pointing out that such a vote did not have to take place immediately after Soviet forces re-occupied the region, and by expressing confidence that the Baltic peoples would choose to remain part of the U.S.S.R. When Stalin firmly rejected any internationally supervised plebescite and commented that the Soviet constitution provided ample opportunities for the expression of public will, the President merely asked for "some public declaration in regard to the future elections to which the Marshal had referred" (FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 595; the conversation, which took place during a Stalin-Roosevelt meeting on December 1, 1943, is not reported in the printed Soviet record of the talks— see U.S.S.R., The Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences). The entire discussion, particularly the failure of either man to define clearly what was meant by an "expression of the will of the people," bears a striking similarity to the Yalta talks about the future of Poland and the Declaration on Liberated Europe. Similar misunderstandings and evasions characterized the discussions about a postwar international organization, something all three governments had agreed upon in principle at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' talks earlier that fall. Churchill and Stalin, thinking of traditional spheres of influence, favored regional "policemen." Roosevelt, trying to avoid such a rigid division of the world, spoke instead of a "worldwide" structure. But the President could not explain how his original concept of Four Policemen could be both regional and worldwide. His vagueness on just how the Four Powers could act together throughout the world without using American military forces outside the Western Hemisphere left Stalin and Churchill confused, and they all agreed to postpone any firm decisions. T h e Soviet leader later told the President that

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15. "Papering over the Cracks": T h e apogee of wartime collaboration; the Big Three at Teheran, November 29, 1943

they should have an international rather than a regional system, but neither tried to clarify just what that meant. Thus, the Teheran Conference avoided the hard questions—a kind of diplomatic pampering over cracks in the wall. Although the tone and texture of the talks suggested that all three leaders desired some form of postwar cooperation, the precise relationship between the Soviet Union and the AngloAmericans was left carefully undefined. But that was not just because they wanted to avoid potentially disruptive issues. To a great degree, their attention was still centered on the issue at hand: the defeat of Hitler's Germany. That battle was going well, but was far from over. It was in that atmosphere of both optimism and work to be done that Churchill and Roosevelt returned to Cairo. T h e second phase of the SEXTANT talks began the evening the two leaders arrived in Egypt, December 2, and continued until Roosevelt left for the United States on the morning of December 7. Not only were the talks a letdown after the euphoria of Teheran, but both the British and the Americans were forced to accept small defeats. Churchill, in a last-ditch effort to save his eastern Mediterranean strategy, tried in vain to convince or coerce the Turks into entering the war. T h e Americans, presented with evidence from the British that there were not enough landing craft for both the invasion of southern France and operations in Burma, reluctantly agreed to cancel

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BUCCANEER. T h e most positive note of the conference was Roosevelt's longdelayed decision to appoint General Dwight Eisenhower to command OVERLORD, leaving Marshall in Washington as Army Chief of Staff. Taken altogether, the SEXTANT-EUREKA talks were the most significant in the war. T h e postwar shape of Europe and East Asia was sketched out; the concept which became the United Nations organization had been agreed upon; and, most importantly, the British and Americans had come to a complete and candid decision to conduct a large-scale invasion of northern France (OVERLORD) supported by an accompanying attack on southern France (ANVIL). Roosevelt returned to Washington on December 17 after stopovers at Tunis and Sicily and a long, relaxing ocean voyage aboard the USS Iowa. Churchill's return to England was delayed by a serious bout with pneumonia which necessitated bed rest in Tunis and a longer convalescence in Marrakesh. T H E files have yielded only three written exchanges between Churchill and Roosevelt during the Cairo-Teheran conferences. T h e first forwarded the Prime Minister's strong objections to the appointment of a single Supreme Commander in Europe in lieu of independent commanders in the Mediterranean and for OVERLORD. Although Churchill assumed that having a British officer as Supreme Commander would be unacceptable to the United States, the Joint Chiefs told Roosevelt that they would accept the appointment to that post of Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British Mission in Washington and a man who had demonstrated his ability to work with American military leaders (FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 209). In his memoirs, Churchill wrote that he gave the following memo to Roosevelt in Cairo before they left for Teheran, and that they did not discuss the matter until they returned to Cairo (WSC, V, 338-40). At that time, the Americans dropped their efforts to have a single unified command for all Anglo-American forces fighting Germany. T h e tone of the entire memorandum fits Churchill's opposition to the total preoccupation of the Americans with the cross-channel invasion. T h e Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes for November 24, 1943, paraphrase the Prime Minister's comment that OVERLORD should not become a tyrant (FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 333).

C-508/1, memo Cairo Nov. 25, 1943 [Churchill to Roosevelt] 1. T h e difficulties a n d short-comings in o u r conduct of the war since the Battle of Salerno have arisen from divergencies of view between o u r two Staffs a n d Governments. It is not seen how these divergencies would be removed by the a p p o i n t m e n t of a S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r working u n d e r the Combined Chiefs of the Staff a n d liable to have his decisions

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reversed by them. The divergencies, which are political as much as military, would still have to be adjusted by the present methods of consultation between the Combined Staffs and the Heads of the two Governments. Thus the Supreme Commander, after being acclaimed as the world war-winner, would in practice find his functions restricted to the narrow ground between the main decisions of policy and strategy which can only be dealt with by the present methods, and the spheres of the two chief regional Commanders. 2. This would certainly not be sufficient to justify arousing all the expectations and setting up all the apparatus inseparable from the announcement of a "Supreme Commander for the defeat of Germany." 3. On the other hand, if the power of decision is in fact accorded to the Supreme Commander, the work of the Combined Chiefs of the Staff would be virtually superseded and very great stresses would immediately arise between the Governments and the Supreme Commander. Without going into personalities, it is greatly to be doubted whether any single officer exists who would be capable of giving decisions over the vast range of problems now dealt with by the Heads of Government assisted by the Combined Chiefs of the Staff. 4. The principle which should be followed as far as possible between Allies of equal status is that the Command in any theatre should go to the Ally who has the largest forces deployed or about to be deployed there. On this it would be natural that the Command in the Mediterranean should be British and that the Command of OVERLORD should be American. Such Commands would also correspond with the outlook of the two Governments, the Americans regarding OVERLORD of overwhelming importance, while the British believe that the greatest and most immediate results can be obtained in the Mediterranean and that OVERLORD is a knock-out blow, the timing of which must be settled in relation to the condition and dispositions of the enemy. 5. If the two Commands are merged under a Supreme Commander, the British would have available against Germany in May decidedly larger forces than the United States. It would therefore appear that the Supreme Command should go to a British officer. I should be very reluctant, as Head of His Majesty's Government, to place such an invidious responsibility upon a British officer. I have very little doubt that he would concentrate his main effort on the Mediterranean and treat the OVERLORD sphere as a highly important but none the less residuary legatee. This point of view would certainly not be accepted by the Government or Staff of the United States. If, on the other hand, disregarding the preponderance of forces involved, the Supreme Command was given to a United States officer and he pronounced in favour of concentrating on OVERLORD irrespective of the injury done to our affairs in the Mediterranean,

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His Majesty's Government could not possibly agree. T h e S u p r e m e Comm a n d e r , British or American, would therefore be placed in an impossible position. Having assumed before the whole world the responsibility of p r o n o u n c i n g and being overruled by one Government or the other, he would have little choice but to resign. This might bring about a most serious crisis in the harmonious a n d happy relations hitherto maintained between o u r two Governments. 6. It is not seen why the present a r r a n g e m e n t should not continue, subject to any minor improvements that can be suggested. U n d e r this a r r a n g e m e n t , a n American C o m m a n d e r would conduct the immense O p eration O V E R L O R D a n d a British C o m m a n d e r would conduct the war in the Mediterranean, their action being concerted and forces assigned by the Combined Chiefs of the Staff working u n d e r the Heads of the two Governments. Regular periodic conferences should be held at Gibraltar between the two C o m m a n d e r s , at which they could adjust minor differences about the movement of units, landing-craft etc., so as to help each other as m u c h as possible, a n d they should also p r e p a r e together the timing a n d concert of their respective operations. More frequent meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should also be arranged, a n d possibly visits of one weeks' duration by the Chairman of each Chiefs of Staff Committee alternately to London and Washington. [FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 407-8. pWSC, V, 338-40.]

Churchill celebrated his sixty-ninth birthday on November 30, in the midst of the Teheran Conference. Although Robert Sherwood wrote that Roosevelt purchased his gift for Churchill at the local U.S. Army Post Exchange, documents at the Roosevelt Library and Averell Harriman's memoirs indicate that the valuable Kashan bowl given by the President was obtained by Harriman from an American friend then stationed in Teheran (R&H, p. 791; Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, p. 276; Roosevelt to Joseph Upton, Dec. 1, 1943, PPF 7683). T h e gift was apparently accompanied by a note from the President which read: "my affection, may we be together for many years" (FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 631, n. 1).

C-508/2, letter Teheran, Iran December 1, 1943 My d e a r Franklin, I was indeed touched by your kind present. It is a beautiful bowl, a n d I shall always treasure it as a r e m i n d e r of o u r sunlit days in T e h e r a n a n d of the most memorable of my Birthdays.

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I cannot t h a n k you e n o u g h for all your friendship and support in the years in which we have worked together, and I am glad of this occasion to send you a message of sincere affection and gratitude. Yours always Winston S. Churchill [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 631-32.]

T h e original plan for operations in Burma called for an Anglo-American amphibious invasion of the Andaman Islands in the south (BUCCANEER) in conjunction with British attacks across the Chindwin River in central Burma and a major Chinese offensive (TARZAN) in the north. Although the Americans, particularly General Marshall, staunchly defended this plan (which had the overall codename CHAMPION), Chiang Kai-shek had only reluctantly agreed during the first Cairo Conference to commit Chinese troops to TARZAN. During the Teheran Conference, however, Roosevelt became convinced that the Allies did not have sufficient landing ships and landing craft to carry out both BUCCANEER and ANVIL (the invasion of southern France). As a result, the President overruled his Joint Chiefs of Staff and ordered the cancellation of BUCCANEER. Chiang, always eager to avoid pitched battles with Japanese forces, accepted Roosevelt's suggestion that TARZAN be postponed until the fall of 1944. Churchill wrote in his memoirs that, on December 5, the President sent him "a laconic private message: 'BUCCANEER is off.'" No such written message was found in either the American or British archives and it is likely that the word was passed through a third party, not in writing. (See WSC, V, 412, and FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 725.) T h e following letter was originally drafted as a Hopkins-to-Churchill message, but Roosevelt apparently crossed out the original heading and made slight alterations so that it became a Roosevelt-to-Churchill memorandum.

R-418/4, memo Cairo, Egypt Dec. 5, 1943 Memorandum For: T h e Prime Minister I propose to send over my signature the following message to the Generalissimo tonight. Do you concur in this action? "Conference with Stalin involves us in combined g r a n d operations o n E u r o p e a n continent in late spring giving fair prospect of terminating war with G e r m a n y by e n d of s u m m e r of 1944. T h e s e operations impose so large a requirement of heavy landing craft as to make it impracticable to devote a sufficient n u m b e r to the amphibious operation in Bay of Bengal simultaneously with launching of T A R ZAN to insure success of operation.

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"This being the case: Would you be p r e p a r e d go ahead with TARZAN as now planned, including commitment to maintain naval control of Bay of Bengal coupled with naval carrier a n d c o m m a n d o amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with TARZAN? Also t h e r e is the prospect of B-29 bombing of railroad and port Bangkok. "If not, would you prefer to have TARZAN delayed until November to include heavy amphibious operation!?] Meanwhile concentrating all air transport on carrying supplies over the h u m p to air and g r o u n d forces in China. "I am influenced in this matter by the t r e m e n d o u s advantage to be received by China and the Pacific t h r o u g h the early termination of the war with Germany." FDR [ H L H ] [R&H, p. 801. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 80S-4.]

Churchill, who looked with contempt on Chinese military capabilities and would have preferred some sort of operation in the East Indies to Burma, quickly scrawled his agreement with Roosevelt's proposal across the bottom of the memorandum.

C-508/3, memo Cairo, Egypt Dec. 5, 1943 [Churchill to Roosevelt.] I agree. WSC [R&H, p. 801]

Roosevelt agreed with the recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Mediterranean Command be unified, without public announcement, on December 10, 1943, and that Eisenhower hand over command of that theater as close to January 1, 1944, as he thought feasible. T h e third and fourth sub-paragraphs of the CCS cable called for Eisenhower's new command to be referred to publicly as Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, and that any announcement of Eisenhower's appointment be made simultaneously with release of the news about the new Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, who would be a British General. (See C—512.) Churchill, who was concerned about maintaining a high visibility for British officers, had already approved the CCS recommendations, and Roosevelt was asked to send his comments directly to the Prime Minister. (See Colonel Mathewson for Admiral Brown, White 115, Dec. 8, 1943, forwarding the CCS recommendations, MR 210, SEXTANT Conf., box 17.) Roosevelt drafted

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his cable while enroute to either Tunis or Malta, but it was sent via U.S. naval communications channels in Washington.

R-419 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 8, 1943, 10:30 P.M. From t h e President to t h e F o r m e r Naval Person, Secret and Personal. With reference to t h e Cairo despatch of December 8th from t h e Com­ bined Chiefs of Staff r e g a r d i n g t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n c o m m a n d , I a m in a g r e e m e n t with sub-paragraphs one a n d two b u t would like m o r e time to consider t h e third a n d fourth sub-paragraphs. Roosevelt [MR*]

T h e British continued to press Turkey to declare war against Germany. T h e Turks countered that they believed the Germans would follow such a dec­ laration with an invasion into Turkey from Bulgaria, and Turkish negotiators repeatedly raised higher demands for supplies and military equipment. Turk­ ish President Ismet Ιηόηϋ had met with Churchill and Roosevelt during the latter stages of the second Cairo Conference, but neither of the Allied leaders was ever able to convince Ιηόηϋ that Turkish interests would be served by going to war with Germany. By the fall of 1943, the British-supported Greek monarch (George II), exiled in Egypt, had come under heavy attack from partisan bands in Greece which hoped to gain control of the country when the Germans withdrew. King George's association with the dictatorial prewar regime in Greece had cost the monarchy much of its public support, and the British government had decided that a Regency Council should rule Greece until a plebescite on the future of the monarchy could be held. The British made that proposal to the King, but when Roosevelt met with him on December 6, in Cairo, the President unexpectedly advised against the British plan. None of the docu­ ments currently available explain why Roosevelt should suddenly oppose a democratic election in Greece, though one suspects it may have been the kind of reflex action exhibited by so many Americans when faced with British influence in smaller nations. (See Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I I I , 401, and FRUS, 1943, IV, 157.) At the time this message was sent, Churchill did not know that weather had forced Roosevelt to cancel plans to stop at Marrakesh and to fly directly to Dakar. Pansy Palace is not mentioned in any of the memoirs or documents, but appears to be a barbed reference to Flower Villa, where Churchill and Roosevelt had stayed during their trip to Marrakesh after the Casablanca Conference. During that earlier visit, they had been at a number of social functions which were also attended by the international community that had grown u p in the permissive atmosphere of Marrakesh. Though it is only

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conjecture, the play on words seems to be Churchill's and Roosevelt's sarcastic reference to the guests whom they had met at Flower Villa. Andrei Vyshinsky was Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. The biblical reference is explained in the headnote to C-507.

C-509 Cairo, Egypt [via U.S. Army, London] [Dec. 9, 1943], 0948 Ζ ( L o n d o n ) / T O R 7:20 A.M.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most Secret and Personal. 1. I gave the paper in my immediately following to Inonu. They have asked for 4 days in which to consult their Parliament but meanwhile will allow build up to begin and 250 specialists are starting forthwith. On the whole I am hopeful. Vyshinsky liked the layout. 2. Earnestly trust your voyage has prospered that Malta was interesting and Pansy Palace comfortable. I am so glad that the 14th chapter was verified. I am tidying up with the King of Greece and expect a solution and arrangement in harmony with your feelings. Every good wish to you and Harry. [MR. pFRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 839.]

Operation SATURN, the plan for placing British forces in Turkey following a Turkish declaration of war on Germany, never became a reality.

C-510 Cairo, Egypt [via U.S. Army, London] [Dec. 9, 1943], 0955 Ζ (London) / TOR 7:20 A.M.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most Secret and Personal. Following is paper referred to in my. immediately preceding telegram. Begins timetable for operation "SATURN" most secret. 1. Air preparations and other supplies till February 15th. 2. Discussion of war plans. 3. Programme of munitions import. 4. Discussion of political questions. Fifteen February Allies ask permission to "Fly in". If reply negative—Allies direct all resources to another Theatre and must abandon hope of wartime cooperation with Turkey. If reply "Yes"— 1. Continuation at fullest speed of programme of import munitions for Army and Air.

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[MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 755-56.]

Churchill had left England suffering from a cold and a fever, the latter possibly an aftermath of a typhoid infection. T h e head cold persisted through­ out the Cairo and T e h e r a n conferences and the Prime Minister complained frequently to his doctor about exhaustion. Churchill had planned to visit Allied troops in Italy after the summit conferences, but by the time he arrived in Tunis he had developed a fever and pneumonia. He was confined to bed in Tunis, near the ancient city of Carthage, until December 27, when he flew to Marrakesh for a two-and-one-half-week rest. T h e Deputy Prime Minister was Clement Attlee.

C-511 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 15, 1943, 2208 Ζ (London) / TOR 8:16 P.M. [Prime] Minister to President Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. A m s t r a n d e d amid the ruins of Carthage, where you stayed, with fever which has r i p e n e d into p n e u m o n i a . All your people are doing every­ thing possible, b u t I d o not p r e t e n d I a m enjoying myself. I h o p e soon to send you some of the suggestions for the new c o m m a n d s . I h o p e you h a d a pleasant voyage a n d are fit. Love to Harry. 2. Deputy P r i m e Minister wishes to a d d that on security g r o u n d s no reference whatever is being m a d e at present to the fact that the Prime Minister is ill. [MR. pWSC, V, 422. p«fc?C]

Roosevelt arrived back in Washington about 9:30 A.M. on December 17, after a short ride u p the Potomac River aboard the presidential yacht. T h e problem of stabilizing China's currency was a complicated and persistent one. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau opposed Roosevelt's suggestion that the United States purchase Chinese currency and redeem it after the war, but in spite of the Secretary's arguments that such a move would provide little or no economic relief, the State Department convinced the President that some sort of major financial aid to China was politically necessary. Sarah Churchill was the Prime Minister's daughter and had accompanied Churchill on his trip to and from Cairo.

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R-420 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 17, 1943, 12:50 A.M. T o the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President, Personal and Secret. Your n u m b e r 5 1 1 . I am distressed about the p n e u m o n i a a n d both Harry and I plead with you to be good and throw it off rapidly. I have j u s t left the Iowa and am on my way u p the Potomac. T h e Bible says you must d o just what Moran orders, but at this m o m e n t I cannot put my finger on the verse and the chapter. As soon as I get back to Washington tomorrow, I will try to help Chiang out on the stabilization question. I am glad about the T u r k i s h offer. N o t h i n g further seems to be imminent, so d o what Sara says a n d give h e r my love a n d take it easy. Roosevelt [MR. pWSC, V, 422.]

Command relationships and appointments have the appearance of dull, routine business, but close Anglo-American coordination and agreement made it possible for the unified command structure to function effectively—a unique event in modern military history. Churchill was concerned about two issues: British public opinion and morale, and the effective wielding of British power in the Mediterranean area. Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to assign the Mediterranean to the British so long as the United States remained in charge of OVERLORD. The details of which officers were finally appointed to which commands are set forth in Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 203—7; Pogue, Organizer of Victory, pp. 370—78; and Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 36-65. What follows is an identification of each person referred to in Churchill's message, listed in the order in which his name appears: Lord Moran (Sir Charles Wilison): Churchill's personal physician. General Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. Army: Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (all Allied forces connected with OVERLORD and ANVIL). General Sir Harold Alexander, British Army: Commander in Chief, Allied armies in Italy. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, R.A.F.: appointed Deputy Supreme Commander of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) in January 1944. Previously C in C, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, British Army: victor at the battle of El Alamein, he commanded the British Eighth Army in North Africa and Italy until December 1943, when he became C in C of the Twenty-first Army Group. General Sir Henry M. Wilson, British Army: appointed Allied C in C, Mediterranean theater, on January 8, 1944. Previously C in C, British Middle East forces.

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General Jacob Devers, U.S. Army: transferred from the planning staff for OVERLORD (COSSAC) to be Commanding General, North African theater, beginning in December 1943. Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, U.S. Army: Commanding General, U.S. Fifth Army in Italy. He was not transferred to the ANVIL Command and eventually became Commanding General of all Allied armies in Italy. General Sir Bernard Paget, British Army: transferred from command of the Twenty-first Army Group in England in December 1943 to become C in C of the Middle East Command. General Henry H. Arnold: Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces. Lieutenant General Lewis Brereton, U.S. Army Air Forces: transferred in October 1943 from command of U.S. Army forces in the Middle East to command the Ninth Air Force in England. Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, U.S. Army Air Forces: transferred in early 1944 from command of the Eighth Air Force in England to become C in C, Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean theater. Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, R.A.F.: Commanding Officer, R.A.F. in the Middle East. In January 1944 he took over the British Air Coastal Command. Robert Murphy: political adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Med­ iterranean theater, and member of the Allied Control Commission for Italy with the rank of Ambassador. Harold Macmillan: British representative on the Allied Control Commis­ sion for Italy. A. Duff Cooper: British representative to the French Committee of Na­ tional Liberation. Richard G. Casey: Minister of State Resident in the Middle East. Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. Army: Chief of Staff for Allied forces in the Mediterranean and North African theater. He was trans­ ferred in December 1943 to become Chief of Staff for SHAEF.

C-512 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 19, 1943, 1151 Ζ (London) Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. T h a n k you so m u c h for your telegram No. 420. I have b a r k e n e d u n t o the voice of M o r a n a n d m a d e good progress but I a m fixed h e r e for a n o t h e r week. Since o u r last talk o n the subject I have given m u c h t h o u g h t to the remodelling of t h e C o m m a n d s a n d have h a d discussions with Eisenhower, Alexander a n d T e d d e r . I have also consulted my colleagues at h o m e a n d have today (18th) h a d a long conversation with the CIGS on his r e t u r n from a visit to Italy. As a result I a m able to place before you the following proposals which if you approve t h e m will, I am satisfied, be generally accepted.

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I had always thought that Alexander would succeed Eisenhower, but am convinced by the arguements of the CIGS, Eisenhower and others, that it would be impossible for him or Montgomery to act as Supreme Commander and at the same time fight the battles which will take place in Italy after this conquest of Rome. Alexander, by himself, quite saw this. I therefore propose General Wilson as Supreme Commander, vice Eisenhower. Under him will be: A. General commanding Algiers, a US Officer. We have heard that it might be convenient to you to transfer General Devers from his present post. B. Commander in Chief of the Armies in Italy, Alexander. C. General in charge of operation ANVIL, Clarke. We understand that this was what you and General Marshall had in mind. If so, we concur. D. A British Major General in charge of the Yugoslav assistance measures, Tito, Greeks, etc. E. Commander in Chief, Mideast, for operational purposes within the Mediterranean Theatre, also in charge of the Turkish operations, Paget (now Commanding British home forces). The Air Officer Commanding in Chief should be an American appointed by you. Arnold when passing through here spoke of Brereton or Eaker. We would agree to either, but we should miss the latter from the bombing and OVERLORD buildup. Sholto Douglas will be Deputy AOC in C and also Commander in Chief of all the RAF in the Mediterranean Theatre. Political assistance will be provided for the Supreme Commander: A. By Messrs Murphy and MacMillan who work hand in hand. B. From the French angle by Duff Cooper and Wilson. C. From the Middle Eastern area by the Minister of State or his successor. Bedell Smith will accompany Eisenhower after a few weeks and become his Chief of Staff in England, being replaced here by a British Chief of Staff. We leave it to you to decide whether you would like to have a Deputy Supreme Commander, who would of course be an American. You will understand that I have given most careful consideration to the appointment of Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, having regard to his age and I am satisfied that for the great coordination task which will be entrusted to him he has all the qualifications and the necessary vigour. This is also the opinion of the CIGS. When I mentioned this idea to you at Cairo you seemed to like it. Turning to the OVERLORD Theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhowers Deputy Supreme Commander on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower. The War Cabinet desire that Montgomery should com-

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mand the First Expeditionary Group of Armies. Eisenhower would have chosen Alexander, but I feel the Cabinet are right as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not shared by yours. I beg most earnestly that I may soon have your reply on these proposals, or at least upon the key ones, as the Commander of OVERLORD is urgently required, and I should like to arrange for Wilson to take over from Eisenhower at an early date and to come to him even sooner in order to settle the many consequential details. [MR. WSC, V, 423-25.]

The final paragraph of this message was added to the draft in Roosevelt's handwriting. Churchill's hobby was painting, hence the reference to brushes. Clemmy was Churchill's wife, Clementine.

R-421 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 20, 1943, 1:10 P.M. Personal and Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Replying to your 512 of December 19,1 am agreeable to an announcement on January first of selection of Eisenhower to command OVERLORD, Tedder to be Eisenhower's Deputy Supreme Commander, Wilson to relieve Eisenhower as Supreme Commander Mediterranean, this change to be made when Eisenhower reports that conditions in Italy justify the change, Eaker to command Allied Air Force Mediterranean. I prefer to delay announcement of changes in subordinate commands until after the first of the year, because I want to have opportunity to discuss it with Marshall who will return to Washington in a few days. I am delighted that you are really so much better and I wish I could be with you at the flower villa at Marrakesh. I hope you have sent for your brushes. My love to Clemmy. I feel relieved that she is with you as your superior officer. Roosevelt [MR*. WSC, V, 425, 426.]

During the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had asked that a portion of the captured Italian fleet be transferred to the Soviet Union. The British agreed in principle, but deferred any decision. Molotov again raised the question informally during the Teheran Conference and again the British postponed any decision. Later in December Ambassador Harriman cabled Roosevelt that the Soviets were pressing the

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issue and Roosevelt responded with the suggestion that one-third of the captured fleet be sent to Russia.

R-422 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Dec. 21, 1943, 1:15 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. I have j u s t received the following message from H a r r i m a n dated 20 December, QUOTE. Request that I be informed of the action taken to carry out the c o m m i t m e n t m a d e by you a n d the Prime Minister at the T e h e r a n Conference that the Italian ships requested by the Soviets should be de­ livered o n o n e February, as 1 shall undoubtedly be queried at a meeting with Molotov scheduled for Friday o r Saturday to discuss unfinished business of T e h e r a n , UNQUOTE. I have sent the following reply. QUOTE. It is my intention that Italian s u r r e n d e r e d ships to a n u m b e r of one-third of the total be allocated commencing about o n e February to t h e Soviet war effort as rapidly as they can be m a d e available from their present employment in the Allied War effort. After the s u r r e n d e r of o u r c o m m o n enemies the title of ownership will be decided. I have requested Combined Chiefs of Staff to issue necessary o r d e r s to General Eisenhower, UNQUOTE. Roosevelt [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 852.]

Pierre Boisson, Marcel Peyrouton, and Pierre-Etienne Flandin were all exVichy officials who had eventually cooperated with Anglo-American forces during the North African campaign. Both Churchill and Roosevelt greatly exaggerated the contributions of the three Frenchmen, and the anger ex­ pressed by the President and the Prime Minister was more directed at de Gaulle personally than at his decision to prosecute the ex-Vichy officials as collaborators.

C-513 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 21, 1943, 2209 Ζ (London) Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I a m shocked at the arrests r e p o r t e d this m o r n i n g of Boisson, Pey-

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routon a n d Flandin. T h e r e are even r u m o u r s here that the first two at any rate will be shot. I consider I have a certain obligation as, in supporting your policy a n d that of General Eisenhower, I did undoubtedly in Algiers in February encourage these m e n to hold firm in their posts a n d aid us in o u r struggle for T u n i s , saying also in that case, "Count on me". It seems to m e the American obligation is even stronger because we were admittedly following (query) your general lines. 2. I trust, therefore, you will take what steps you can to impress u p o n the French Committee the unwisdom of their present proceedings. You, n o doubt, will also be considering the question of offering asylum. Pray let me know if there is any way in which we could help. [MR. FRUS, 1943, II, 193-94.]

Roosevelt, who disliked de Gaulle and de Gaulle's challenge to Allied authority even more than did Churchill, responded quickly to the news of the arrests. (The final paragraph was added to the draft in Roosevelt's handwriting.)

R-423 Washington [via U.S. Army] Dec. 22, 1943, 1 1 : 5 0 A.M. For the Eyes of General Eisenhower or General Smith Only for Delivery to the Prime Minister. Personal a n d Secret, from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. Referring to your 513, I have sent the following to Eisenhower this date: "Please inform the French Committee as follows: 'In view of assistance given to the Allied Armies d u r i n g the campaign in Africa by Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin, you are directed to take n o action against these individuals at the present time.' " I h o p e you are in full agreement with this directive and will so inform Eisenhower a n d Macmillan. It seems to m e that this is the p r o p e r time effectively to eliminate the Jeanne d'Arc complex a n d to r e t u r n to realism. I too am shocked by the high h a n d e d arrests at this time. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. pFRUS, 1943, II, 195.]

Churchill's concern that the Americans might object to the appointment of General Montgomery probably stemmed from some friction which had de-

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veloped between the British General and the Americans during the invasion of Sicily. Actually, Eisenhower made no effort to block Montgomery's ap­ pointment even though the Americans had expected and preferred General Alexander for the position. (See the headnote to C—512 for identifications of persons mentioned in this message.) The parenthetical remark in paragraph 2 appears in both the British and American sources.

C-514 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 22, 1943, 0910 Ζ (London) I TOR 7:50 A.M.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. Your 421 of 20th December. 1. I am very glad to have your agreement as set out in paragraph 1 to the key changes. May 1 take it however that you are also agreeable to Montgomery commanding the British and Canadian expeditionary group of armies under Eisenhower and to Alexander commanding the Allied Armies in Italy under Supreme Commander Wilson. Both these appoint­ ments are an essential part of any announcement that could be made on January 1st. I hope to see Eisenhower on the 23rd and will discuss the matter with him. He would prefer Alexander for OVERLORD but War Cabinet consider that the public confidence will be better sustained by the inclusion of the well known and famous name of Montgomery and I agree with them as the operations will be to many people heart shaking. You will I am sure also remember that although Tedder will get on excellently with Eisenhower and will make a fine deputy, he is an airman and the British Army which will have to sustain very heavy losses will expect to have some soldier who they can trust placed in command of home forces and the British Expeditionary Army and also that some British soldier of eminence should find a place in the hierarchy of com­ mand at the moment of its announcement. 2. Other secondary appointments can take their turn later but if we leave out these at the outset it will only be possible to delay decision (for a question) very few days thereafter and it is better to do things straight away than to have them pulled out piece meal by the press. 3. Eaker will have a warm welcome in the Mediterranean though we shall miss him with the bomber force at home. [MR*]

In a cable to the Prime Minister on December 21, Hopkins proposed that Roosevelt and Churchill announce the names of the new Allied commanders for the European and Mediterranean theaters. Roosevelt also planned to

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emphasize that a large American army and air force would remain in the Mediterranean area. Churchill replied to Hopkins the next day to ask that Montgomery's assignment as commander of the B.E.F. (British Expeditionary Forces for OVERLORD) be made public at the same time as Eisenhower's appointment as SCAEF (Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force) and Wilson's assignment as Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean. Churchill also mentioned that his health had improved and that he planned to leave Marrakesh shortly after Christmas. (See Hopkins to Churchill, Dec. 21, 1943, and Churchill to Hopkins, Dec. 22, 1943, MR.) General Carl Spaatz was Deputy Commander of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces at the time of his appointment to command U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, beginning in January 1944.

R-424 Washington [via U.S. Army] Dec. 23, 1943, 12:45 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, from the President to the F o r m e r Naval Person. Your 514 a n d message to Hopkins 22/1855 Ζ I will on December 24 a n n o u n c e that Eisenhower will c o m m a n d the Allied Expeditionary Forces organizing in t h e U.K. for operations against the fortress of E u r o p e , a n d that Spaatz will c o m m a n d the entire American strategic bombing force operating against Germany, that the M e d i t e r r a nea n C o m m a n d is to be t u r n e d over to a British C o m m a n d e r whose n a m e will be a n n o u n c e d by you. I will also a n n o u n c e that a large American Army a n d Air Force will be employed in the vital M e d i t e r r a n e a n Area. It is agreed that you may at the same time if you wish to d o so a n n o u n c e that Wilson will c o m m a n d in the Mediterranean, that Montgomery will c o m m a n d the British a n d Canadian Expeditionary G r o u p u n d e r Eisen­ hower, a n d that Alexander will c o m m a n d the Allied armies in Italy u n d e r Wilson. Subordinate c o m m a n d e r s will be a n n o u n c e d later. My a n n o u n c e m e n t will be in a radio speech from Hyde Park at t h r e e P.M. Eastern War T i m e . Please synchronize your a n n o u n c e m e n t . Roo­ sevelt [WDL] [MR*]

This and the following message were apparently sent before Roosevelt's cable R—424 arrived in Tunis. Flower Villa was in Marrakesh.

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C-515 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 23, 1943, 1525 Ζ (London) I TOR 1655 Ζ

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. War Cabinet fully approve my last to Harry Hopkins about announce­ ment but they say that unless the announcement of General Eisenhower's appointment is accompanied by simultaneous announcement of Alex­ ander and Montgomery the effect on public opinion will not be good. Although we have full confidence in Eisenhower and know his worth and zeal, Marshall is a greater figure in British eyes. As Montgomery's appointment is exclusively to the command of British and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and Alexander involves in fact no alteration, since he already commands the 15th Army Group, I hope you will be willing to agree to my mentioning both names. We should also greatly prefer to add Tedder as Deputy to Eisenhower, Ramsey agreed upon as Naval Commander-in-Chief and Paget, who is displaced by Mont­ gomery, to be announced simultaneously to command Middle East. Could it not be simultaneously stated in Washington that the other United States Commanders in United Kingdom and Mediterranean will be the subject of an early announcement? I am getting on well and hope to reach Flower Villa on 26th. [MR]

General W. Bedell Smith was about to become Eisenhower's Chief of Staff.

C-516 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 23, 1943, 2142 Ζ (London) / TOR 6:45 P.M.

Colonel Warden to President. Personal and Most Secret. Bedell Smith who is now with me says that Montgomery whom he saw yesterday would like the proposed appointment very much and that he is entirely acceptable to Eisenhower. [MR*]

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Churchill continued to be angered by de Gaulle's arrest of former Vichy officials who had cooperated with the Allies in North Africa and whose safety had been spoken for by the Allied leaders.

C-517 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 23, 1943, 2215 Ζ (London) / TOR 7:45 P.M. Colonel Warden to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. 1. I have signalled my colleagues that I am in entire agreement with your No. 423 about the arrests and have every expectation that instruc­ tions will be given to Macmillan to support your action. The actual form of the demarche might be discussed by Eisenhower with Macmillan and Wilson. 2. Our case is a very strong one. Boisson saved us the cost and diversion of a major expedition against Dakar. Peyrouton returned voluntarily at the invitation of Giraud and his journey was approved and facilitated by the State Department. Flandin was, it is true, a minister at Vichy and was turned out for his opposition to the German demands. Notably he pre­ vented an expedition from Dakar being sent to attack the Free French near Lake Chad. 3. But far above individuals, the whole question of our relations with France is raised. France can only be liberated by British and American force and bloodshed. To admit that a handful of emigres are to have the power behind this all-powerful shield to carry civil war into France is to lose the future of that unfortunate country and prevent the earliest expression of the will of the people as a whole, in fact, we should be lending ourselves to a process of adding to the burdens and sacrifices of our troops and of infringing our fundamental principle, "All govern­ ments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." [MR*.FRUS, 1943, II, 196-97.]

British civilian and military morale required that command appointments reflect an atmosphere of equality between Britain and the United States, hence Churchill's nagging concern over the form and timing of the public an­ nouncements of such appointments. Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford LeighMallory had commanded the R.A.F. Fighter Command, and in December 1943 became Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (the tactical air forces for SHAEF). Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey was Allied Naval Commander in Chief for Europe (SHAEF).

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C-518 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 24, 1943/TOR 1825 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal and Most Secret. Your 424. Announcement will be made accordingly from London as soon as you have announced Eisenhower. I wish to announce certain further British secondary appointments ie Tedder, Ramsey, Leigh-Mallory and Paget with a short explanation in time for the British newspapers when they resume on Tuesday morning. They will be vexed at the present time table which favours the United States Press and all wireless at their expense. Can you not make your appointments fit this plan? Can we concert a list? About your speech ought we to make a present to the Germans of the phrase "The Fortress of Europe" which we are to attack. Would not the expression "For the liberation of Europe" be better than "For operations against the Fortress" etc. Pray think of this. Hitler is always trying to make out that he is Europe which we are disturbing. 3. In any case the following is the text of the announcement which I am making from No. 10 [Downing Street] tonight. [PREM 3/471/18. MR.]

The personnel mentioned in this cable are identified in the headnotes to C— 512 and R-424.

C-519 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 24, 1943, 1829 Ζ / TOR 4:10 P.M. Prime Minister to President. Personal and Most Secret. Following is text of announcement referred to in my number 518. The following appointments which have been the result of con­ versations between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister are announced on behalf of His Majesty's Government: To be Supreme Allied Commander of the British and United States Expeditionary Forces organizing in the United Kingdom for the lib­ eration of Europe: General Eisenhower. To be Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre: Gen­ eral Henry Maitland-Wilson.

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T o be Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Italy: G e n e r a l Sir H a r o l d Alexander. T o be Commander-in-Chief of the British G r o u p of Armies u n d e r General Eisenhower: General Sir B e r n a r d Montgomery. T o C o m m a n d American Strategic Bombing Force operating against G e r m a n y : General Spaatz. Various consequential a p p o i n t m e n t s of o t h e r C o m m a n d e r s will be a n n o u n c e d shortly. [MR*]

C-520 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 24, 1943, 2200 Ζ (London) I TOR 2315 Ζ Mr. a n d Mrs. Churchill, R a n d o l p h a n d Sarah to President a n d Mrs. Roosevelt. O u r t h o u g h t s are with you at this Christmas season. We send out warm­ est good wishes to you a n d yours. [MR]

Concerned over the stalemate developing in Italy, Churchill pleaded for a delay in returning to England a number of amphibious landing ships sched­ uled to participate in OVERLORD, the cross-channel invasion of France. Operation SHINGLE, an amphibious assault at Anzio, a town on the west coast of Italy about thirty miles south of Rome, was designed to flank the German defensive line at Cassino, where the major Allied forces had been stopped. BUCCANEER was the recently canceled attack on the Andaman Islands in southern Burma. HERCULES was the British plan for a joint Turkish-British attack against the Germans on the island of Rhodes, and PIGSTICK was an attack on the Arakan coast behind Japanese lines in Burma. ANVIL was the invasion of southern France, scheduled to complement OVERLORD.

C-521 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Embassy, London] Dec. 26, 1943, 0953 Ζ (London) I TOR 1130 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I held a conference today with Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, General Wilson, T e d d e r , Alexander a n d Admiral J o h n C u n n i n g h a m with o t h e r high officers. R e p o r t as follows.

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2. General Alexander is prepared to execute operation SHINGLE about 20th January if he can get a lift of two divisions. This should decide the Battle of Rome and possibly achieve destruction of a substantial part of enemys army. To strike with less than two divisions would be to court disaster having regard to positions likely to be achieved by that date by Fifth and Eighth Armies. 3. For purpose L.S.T.S. [LSTs] are required, these can only be obtained by delaying the return home of 56 L.S.T.S. due to leave the Mediterranean from 15th January onward sending them home by convoys starting 5th February. Nothing less than this will suffice. The 15 L.S.T.S. ex BUCCANEER cannot arrive in time though they would be invaluable to replace casualties and for the building up of ANVIL. 4. By various expedients it is believed that lost three weeks can be recovered and existing prescribed build up for OVERLORD maintained. This will be the subject of further telegram in detail. 5. Having kept these 56 L.S.T.S. in Mediterranean so long it would seem irrational to remove them for the very week when they can render decisive service. What also could be more dangerous than to let the Italian battle stagnate and fester on for another three months thus certainly gnawing into all preparation for and thus again affecting OVERLORD. We cannot afford to go forward leaving vast half-finished job behind us. It therefore seemed to those present that every effort should be made to bring off SHINGLE on a two division basis around January 20th and orders have been issued to General Alexander to prepare accordingly. If this opportunity is not grasped we must expect the ruin of Mediterranean campaign of 1944. I earnestly hope therefore that you may agree to the three weeks delay in return of the 56 landing craft and that all the authorities should be instructed to make sure that the May OVERLORD is not prejudiced thereby. 6.1 recognise with regret that HERCULES and the Aegean policy must be sidetracked in these higher interests and it may well be that PIGSTICK will require to be moderated in order to build up three divisions for ANVIL. This has been most painful to me but I could not face the Italian stalemate and disaster which will otherwise ensue. [MR*. WSC, V, 436-37 (with minor variations).]

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Churchill left Tunis on December 27 for Marrakesh, Morocco.

C-522 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 26, 1943/TOR 12:01 Z, Dec. 27 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal. 1. I have received n o reply to my telegram N u m b e r 518 of December 24th r e g a r d i n g the further secondary appointments. 2. As I shall be travelling tomorrow (Monday), I am telegraphing to instruct the Minister of Information to a n n o u n c e appointments of T e d d e r and Paget in T u e s d a y mornings newspapers leaving to you to a n n o u n c e further American appointments. U p o n which we are agreed or which in any case rest with you. [MR*]

On the advice of both British and American officials in North Africa, Roosevelt softened his original complaint about the arrest of the former Vichy officials. Although Churchill remained dubious of de Gaulle, the British Foreign Office believed the arrests had been demanded by new members of the French National Committee who represented the Resistance movement within France.

R-425 Washington D.C. [via U.S. Navy, London] Dec. 27, 1943, 1 1 : 3 0 A.M. Personal a n d Secret for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Your 517. Yesterday I sent the following instructions to General Eisenhower: "In view of developments in the situation since dispatch to you of the instructions included in AGWAR 5456, it is desired that if not already delivered to the French Committee you withhold it and, subject to your discretion, deliver the following which expresses my views o n the matter. If, in your j u d g m e n t , the same ends can be obtained t h r o u g h informal discussions, formal presentation need not be m a d e . I n any event we must have formal assurance from the French Committee that n o trials of these individuals will take place until the restoration of France is accomplished a n d then in accordance with the constitutional laws of the French Republic.

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" 'In view of the assistance r e n d e r e d the allied armies d u r i n g the North African campaign by Peyrouton, Boisson and Flandin the United States Government views with alarm reports reaching it to the effect that these gentlemen have been charged with high treason. If, in view of the charges m a d e , it is necessary that these individuals should stand trial, their trials should not be held until after the liberation of France and the establishment of constitutional government.' " Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. pFRUS, 1943, II, 197.]

T h e real cause for delay in announcing American command decisions was the time it took Eisenhower and Marshall to coordinate their choices—a ticklish balancing of young talent with experienced officers who had earned their chance to command a combat unit.

R-426 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Dec. 27, 1943, 3:40 P.M. Secret and Personal, for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Your fine Christmas message reached us at Hyde Park where Mrs. Roosevelt a n d I were gathered with the children. T h a n k you all ever so much. Reference your 518 a n d 522. My brief absence has intervened to delay decision on some of the secondary American c o m m a n d e r s for the Mediterranean and United Kingdom. It should be settled within the next few days at which time I will a n n o u n c e them. Meanwhile I can see n o objection to announcing the appointments of T e d d e r , Ramsey, Leigh-Mallory a n d Paget as you have indicated. Roosevelt [GCM] [MR*]

General Marshall, who drafted the President's response to Churchill's request for sufficient landing ships to carry out the Anzio assault (SHINGLE), was convinced that the Prime Minister hoped to distract Roosevelt from the firm commitment to a cross-channel attack (OVERLORD).

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R-427 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Dec. 27, 1943, 3:50 P.M. Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Your Number 521. It is agreed to delay the departure of fifty-six LST's scheduled for OVERLORD for mounting SHINGLE on 20 January and on the basis that OVERLORD remain the paramount operation and will be carried out on the date agreed to at Cairo and Teheran. All possible expedients should be undertaken to overcome probable effect on OVERLORD preparation to which end the other twelve LST's for OVERLORD should depart as now scheduled and the fifteen LST's ex-BUCCANEER arriving in Mediterranean on 14 January should proceed directly to U.K. I agree that HERCULES and Aegean must be sidetracked and that we cannot give further consideration to launching HERCULES prior to ANVIL. In view of the Soviet-British-American agreement reached in Teheran I cannot agree without Stalin's approval to any use of forces or equipment elsewhere that might delay or hazard the success of OVERLORD or ANVIL. Roosevelt [GCM] [MR*. WSC, V, 440-41. KfcfC]

The German battle cruiser Scharnhorst had long threatened British convoys traveling the sea lanes around Norway to northern Russia. After a long period of inactivity, partly due to the need for repairs, the Scharnhorst left Altenfiord, Norway, on Christmas evening to intercept a British convoy (JW 55B). Warned by ULTRA intelligence, the British were prepared, but weather prevented the use of aircraft, and when the German ship encountered a British task force headed by four cruisers and the battleship Duke of York, a classic naval battle ensued. Only the effective use of radar by the British prevented the fight from being a faithful reproduction of the naval battles of World War I. Caught with insufficient escorts and no air support, the Scharnhorst could not withstand the heavy pounding from the British warships, and a massive torpedo attack by the British destroyers finished off the German ship. Only thirty-six of her crew of almost 2,000 survived the battle and the bitter cold waters of the Barents Sea, and from that point on British convoys could sail almost unhampered to northern Russia. Roosevelt's brief congratulatory message was released to the news media on December 29.

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R-428 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Dec. 27, 1943, 6:45 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. T h e sinking of t h e Scharnhorst has been great news to all of us. Congratulations to t h e H o m e Fleet. Roosevelt [MR]

Russian victories on the eastern front made it increasingly important for the Polish government in London to make boundary agreements with the Soviet Union before the Red Army liberated and occupied Polish territory. T h e insoluble problem was the Soviet demand for the boundary established in 1939 after the German and subsequent Russian invasions of Poland, versus the equally rigid Polish demand for the boundaries established by a series of military actions during the early 1920s against the new and weak Bolshevik regime in Moscow. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Prime Minister of the Polish gov­ ernment in London, hoped to get a public commitment from both the British and the Americans supporting the Polish claims, though the British were trying to get the Poles to back down.

C-523 Tunis, Tunisia [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 27, 1943, 1837 Ζ (London)/TOR 1955 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I u n d e r s t a n d you have invited Polish Prime Minister to visit Wash­ ington, arriving J a n u a r y 15. Would you very kindly consider w h e t h e r this visit could not be p o s t p o n e d for a m o n t h or six weeks? T h i s would enable m e to see t h e Poles before they leave. If they come over to you with n o sort of a g r e e m e n t , is t h e r e not a d a n g e r of their becoming t h e centre of Polish enthusiasm, m u c h of which is likely to be anti-Russian a n d may this not cost t h e m dear? I am sure you will not m i n d my making this suggestion. [MR* FRUS, 1943, III, 494-95.]

T h e State Department recommended that the President accede to Churchill's request about Mikolajczyk's visit and Roosevelt agreed. T h e message to the Polish leader candidly stated that the postponement was at the request of the British. Typically, the State Department draft, though bureaucratically cor-

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rect, lacked the warmth and personal touch Roosevelt preferred, and he quickly changed " I n accordance with the request in your 523, I am in agree­ ment to the postponement" to a more emphatic, chatty style.

R-429 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Dec. 28, 1 9 4 3 , 6 : 1 5 P.M.

Personal a n d Secret from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. I agree absolutely with your 523, in regard to the p o s t p o n e m e n t of the Polish Prime Minister's visit to Washington until after you have h a d an o p p o r t u n i t y to see him. I am sending him a message accordingly. Roo­ sevelt [CH] [MR*. FRUS, III, 495.]

Lord "Max" Beaverbrook (William A. Aitken) held a series of posts in the Churchill government and was a close adviser and friend of the Prime Min­ ister. Although Beaverbrook was Lord Privy Seal at the time, he came to Flower Villa, in Marrakesh, at the personal invitation of Mrs. Churchill. SHIN­ GLE was the invasion at Anzio, Italy.

C-524 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Embassy, London] Dec. 28, 1943, 2245 Ζ (London) / TOR 0100 Z, Dec. 29. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Your n u m b e r 427. I t h a n k God for this fine decision which engages us once again in whole hearted unity u p o n a great enterprise. 2. I have h e a r d from the British Chiefs of Staff that the Admiralty can conform to the conditions provided the releases are m a d e from S H I N G L E of the n u m b e r s which a r e agreed u p o n . T h e Chiefs of Staff will be tel­ e g r a p h i n g today in full detail to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Meanwhile, h e r e the word is "Full steam ahead". 3. After travelling quite unaffected at 12,000 feet I arrived yesterday at Flower Villa, where I a m indeed in the lap of luxury, thanks to overflowing American hospitality. Max has j u s t flown in from L o n d o n . I p r o p o s e to stay h e r e in the sunshine till I am quite strong again. 4. H o p e you are pleased about the Scharnhorst. [MR. pWSC, V, 441.]

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C-525 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 29, 1943, 0850 Ζ (London) I TOR 1000 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your n u m b e r 428. T h a n k you for your message. I am forwarding your congratulations to t h e h o m e fleet who will be most gratified. [MR*]

In making recommendations for command appointments, Eisenhower nat­ urally tended to suggest those officers he had learned to trust during cam­ paigns in North Africa and Italy. Although Marshall suggested that General Jacob Devers, who had succeeded Eisenhower in May 1943 as commander of the European theater, should lead an army group in the assault on Nor­ mandy, Eisenhower preferred General Omar Bradley. General Marshall did not try to force his selections on Eisenhower, and Devers became commanding general of the North African Theater of Operations, succeeding Eisenhower. Field Marshal Alexander was commander of Allied ground forces in the Mediterranean area. T h e position of Allied Commander in Chief for Air Forces (A.O. C-in-C) in the Mediterranean had been reserved for an American officer with a British deputy.

C-526 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 30, 1943, 1251 Ζ (London)/TOR 1350 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I see you have a n n o u n c e d General Devers as C o m m a n d e r of all t h e American T r o o p s in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n . This is very agreeable to us a n d I would be quite p r e p a r e d that Devers should become Deputy S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r , a title which Alexander with his customary selflessness is quite willing to relinquish. 2. As soon as you let m e know whom you choose for your A.O. C-inC in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , I will proceed to n o m i n a t e the British Deputy. [MR*]

Harold Macmillan and Edwin Wilson were the British and American diplo­ matic representatives, respectively, to the French Committee. Although the British Foreign Office wanted to play down the matter, Churchill continued

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to be annoyed that de Gaulle did not respect British promises to the three Vichyite officials who had been arrested.

C-527 Marrakesh, Morroco [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 30, 1943, 1610 Ζ (London) I TOR 1700 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Your n u m b e r 425. We are instructing MacMillan to associate himself with Wilson in accordance with your message. 2. It is not only a question of trials but of detention in prison meanwhile. In my view t h e t h r e e gentlemen you mention should be at once accorded either parole o r bail o r residence surveille. [MR*]

Assuming that Churchill would spend Christmas at his country residence near London, the President sent to Chequers a Christmas tree and a case of maps assembled by the National Geographic Society. T h e "grimly simple issue" Churchill referred to was apparently the allocation of amphibious ves­ sels needed for the Anzio (SHINGLE) invasion. (See R-427.) Lieutenant General Mark Clark, who commanded American ground forces in Italy, had recommended against the Anzio landing, but the British had insisted and Roosevelt agreed. Generalissimo Francisco Franco was the Spanish Chief of State and had earlier been openly sympathetic toward Germany; Tito led the communist Partisans in Yugoslavia. Churchill had little liking for either of them, as leaders of what he considered two extremes. Sarah Churchill was the Prime Minister's daughter.

C-528 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Army, London] Dec. 30, 1943, 1714 Z[?] (London) / TOR 2:30 P.M. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I have now received from my b r o t h e r , Jack, full accounts of the Christmas tree at Chequers. All my g r a n d c h i l d r e n were t h e r e a n d a n u m ­ b e r of o t h e r children a n d a good time was h a d by all. Winant, who was present, has promised to write to you about it. T h a n k you so m u c h for sending m e this token. I have, also, to t h a n k you for the wonderful m a p case which has arrived from you for m e a n d which I a m longing to see. We are i n d e e d in comfort at this beautiful flower villa, a n d I a m making

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good progress. T h e sun is shining today, but nothing did me the same good as your telegram showing how easily o u r minds work together on the grimly simple-issues of this vast war. Alexander reports he has arranged satisfactory plans with Clark for S H I N G L E . He is using the British First a n d the American T h i r d Divisions with paratroops and a r m o u r . I am glad of this. It is fitting that we should share equally in suffering, risk and h o n o u r . 2. I received o n the same day congratulations on my recovery from Franco a n d Tito. So what? 3. Sarah thanks you for your message a n d sends her love. [MR. WSC, V, 445.]

Roosevelt's attack of influenza apparently had a lasting effect on his health. To quote one of the President's doctors: "After this he failed to regain his usual vigor and subsequently had several episodes of what appeared to be upper respiratory infections. There had been occasional bouts of abdominal distress and distension, accompanied by profuse perspiration. Since the attack of influenza he had complained of unusual and undue fatigue" (Bruenn, "Clinical Notes," p. 579).

R-430 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Dec. 30, 1943, 6:05 P.M. Secret a n d Personal, for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. I am in bed for two or three days with a mild case of the "flu" which, in a mild form, has become epidemic t h r o u g h o u t the country. Your 528. I am delighted that you are safely at Flower Villa. I suggest that o n New Year's Day you invite the two gentlemen who congratulated you, t h e n lock t h e m u p in the tip of the tower where we saw the sunset a n d tell t h e m you will stay at the bottom to see whether the black or the red throws the o t h e r one over the battlement. [MR*. WSC, V, 445-46.]

When de Gaulle informed the President's representative to the French Committee, Edwin Wilson, that Flandin, Peyrouton, and Boisson would not be tried until a representative French government had been established, the mini-crisis was over. Nevertheless, the incident further poisoned relations between de Gaulle and the Allies.

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R-431 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Dec. 31, 1943, 1 1 : 1 5 A.M. Secret a n d Personal, for the Former Naval Person from the President. Replying to your 527 I am informed today by Eisenhower that Mr. Wilson has r e p o r t e d to him that the persons referred to in 527 will not be b r o u g h t to trial before there is a properly constituted National Assembly in France a n d that d e Gaulle guarantees they will in the meantime be housed in comfortable quarters on outskirts of Algiers. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

General Marshall had proposed that Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, who had successfully commanded the Eighth Air Force, work on Eisenhower's team at SHAEF, but Eisenhower again preferred men he had served with in North Africa and Italy.

R-432 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Dec. 31, 1943, 1 2 : 1 5 P.M. For the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Personal a n d Secret. Referring to your n u m b e r 526. T h a n k you for agreeing that General Devers may be assigned as Deputy to General Wilson in addition to comm a n d i n g U.S. troops in the Mediterranean Theater, which appointment I have a n n o u n c e d . I have also a n n o u n c e d that General Eaker has been chosen to c o m m a n d the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean. Roosevelt [WDL, GCM] [MR*]

Roosevelt sometimes complained about "the striped pants" boys at the State Department, but on the question of de Gaulle and France, the President and Secretary of State Cordell Hull saw eye to eye. Roosevelt commented to Hull "Thank the Lord I don't have the same trouble with the State Department that he has with his Foreign Office!" but that was because the President could override his diplomats more easily than could Churchill, not because the State Department opposed de Gaulle as adamantly as did the President (memo, Roosevelt to Hull, Dec. 31, 1943, PSF:Hull).

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R-432/1, memo Washington Dec. 31, 1943

Memorandum for the Prime Minister of Great Britain. I have received the enclosed memorandum from the Secretary of State. When you and I look back eleven months we realize that de Gaulle and his Committee have most decidedly moved forward by "the process of infiltration"—in other words, here a little, there a little. This is another example. This puts France on to the Allied Commission for Italy, even though the memorandum says that the French representative will not have anything about it. However, he will still be a member of the Commission. For the life of me I cannot see why France is entitled to anybody on the Allied Control Commission for Italy. His presence there will, as we know from experience, cause controversy and more trouble with the French Committee. I know what problems you have with your own Foreign Office—and I wish you and I could run this Italian business. We would not need any help or advice. I am holding up cabling until I hear from you. F.D.R. [PSF:Hull. FDR LTRS, pp. 117S-74.] ENCLOSURE TO

R-432/1

Washington Dec. 30, 1943

Memorandum for the President The United States member of the Advisory Council for Italy has strongly recommended that a French as well as a Soviet representative be attached to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. The "British formula" which is acceptable to the Soviets and French provides only for token representation by accepting a representative of the U.S.S.R. and France on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission and avoids placing Soviet and French representatives throughout the entire structure of the Control Commission; in other words it provides for a kind of superior "liaison officer". Our representative further reports that the British and the Soviet members of the Advisory Council have already committed themselves to recommending the acceptance of a French representative on the Control Commission. Consequently if, after consideration, you perceive no objection, I shall

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instruct your representative on the Advisory Council to concur in the British formula r e c o m m e n d i n g the acceptance of Soviet a n d French rep­ resentatives o n the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Com­ mission. [Initialed] C.H. [PSF:Hull]

One of Roosevelt's Christmas gifts to Churchill was an inscribed copy of Addresses of the President, currently owned by the Prime Minister's grandson.

R-432/2, inscription [Dec. 1943] [Roosevelt to Churchill] For Winston S. Churchill. I n m e m o r y of the joy of having him in the White H o u s e for Christmas, 1941. Franklin D. Roosevelt [Courtesy of Winston S. Churchill]

As the steady stream of cables to Roosevelt demonstrates, Churchill continued to direct the British war effort even while convalescing in Marrakesh. Foreign visitors and British officials shuttled in and out and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, complained that "Winston sitting in Marrakesh is now full of beans. As a result a three-cornered flow of telegrams in all directions is gradually resulting in utter confusion. I wish to God that he would come home and get under control" (Bryant, Triumph in the West, pp. 93-94). T h e Red and the Black referred to Yugoslavian partisan leader Tito, a communist, and Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, a fascist. Though Church­ ill distrusted Tito's communist politics, the British continued to increase their support to the Partisans, who effectively resisted the German occupying forces. (See R-430.) Rear Admiral Ross Mclntyre was the President's personal physician. Clemmie and Sarah were Churchill's wife and daughter respectively.

C-529 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Army, London] Jan. 1, 1944, 1752 Ζ (London)/TOR 1900 Ζ Colonel W a r d e n to President Personal a n d Most Secret. Your 430. 1. I a m so sorry about your influenza. I earnestly h o p e you will defer

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to Mclntyre's advice a n d show that attitude of submission to the Medical Faculty which you have so sedulously enjoined on me. 2. Flower Villa is perfect. T h e doctors want me to stay h e r e for the next 3 weeks. T h e weather is bright t h o u g h cool. T h e cook is a marvel. We go for picnics to the mountains. Last night Eisenhower was with us on his way to you, a n d I had long talks with him. Montgomery is h e r e now on his way to England. I think we have a fine team, and they certainly m e a n to pull together. 3. I have not yet been able to a r r a n g e the contest in the tower. T h e Red is in better training than the Black. 4. Accept all my best wishes for a new year which will not only be m a r k e d by t r i u m p h but will o p e n wider doors to o u r future work together. Clemmie a n d Sarah also send their salutations. [MR*. WSC, V, 446.]

T h e American records indicate that, during the Teheran Conference, Stalin criticized the unconditional-surrender principle in evening talks with Churchill and Roosevelt on November 28, using language similar to that found in Anthony Eden's cable (quoted below). At dinner the following evening, Stalin proposed that "at least 50,000 . . . of the German Commanding Staff must be physically liquidated." Roosevelt tried to make a joke of the suggestion by offering a compromise of 49,000, but Churchill, who had been the subject of repeated barbs from Stalin all evening, responded angrily that such actions would "sully my own and my country's honour." When the President's son, Elliott, spoke out in support of Stalin's idea, Churchill stalked out of the room, returning only when Stalin went out and assured the Prime Minister it was all a joke (FRUS, Teheran Conf, pp. 513, 554; WSC, V, 374). Secretary of State Hull, who had not been at Teheran, had raised the question of unconditional surrender in response to a suggestion from Eden that they should respond quickly to Stalin's remarks. When Roosevelt said he did not recall discussing unconditional surrender during the conference, Ambassador Winant was asked to get clarification from the British (Hull, Memoirs, II, 1572).

C-530 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Army, London] Jan. 2, 1944/TOR 9:12 A.M. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal. Hull tells Eden that you have n o recollection of any remarks by UJ about unconditional s u r r e n d e r . I certainly heard, with great interest, him saying something to the effect that h e thought it might be well to consider telling the G e r m a n s at some stage what unconditional s u r r e n d e r would

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involve, or perhaps what it would not involve. After that we began talking about the 50,000 and your compromise and my high falutin, and I fin­ ished up by no means certain that the Germans would be reassured if they were told what he had in mind. Find also Anthony telegraphed to the Foreign Office on November 30 as follows: "Last night (November 29th) Marshal Stalin spoke to the President about unconditional surrender. Marshal Stalin said he considered this bad tactics vis-a-vis Germany and his suggestion was that we should together work out terms and let them be made known gen­ erally to the people of Germany". Perhaps this may give you a cue to what Anthony and I had in our memories and you may feel inclined to join with us in asking UJ whether he would care to develop his theme to us. If however, you prefer we can of course leave things where they are for the time being. [MR*. FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 862-63.

R&C]

The establishment of separate Allied commands for the European and Med­ iterranean theaters continued to occupy much of Churchill's attention. Major Generals Ira Eaker and Lewis Brereton of the U.S. Army Air Corps had both worked with British Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas in the Middle East/ Mediterranean theater. General Marshall's continued belief that Douglas was anti-American prevented the Englishman from holding any joint command, hence his transfer to the British Coastal Air Command. (See R-293/A, R293, R-310, and C-345.) Air Marshal Sir John Slessor had effectively led the British Air Coastal Command during the crucial anti-submarine campaign of 1943. He had also served in Washington with the Britain Purchasing Com­ mission before Pearl Harbor, and had excellent contacts within the American military. He replaced Douglas as commander of British Air Forces in the Mediterranean and deputy to Eaker, who commanded Allied Air Forces in that theater. (The dispatch and receipt times given on the American copy of the message are obviously in error.)

C-531 Marrakesh [via U.S. Army, London] Jan. 4, 1944, 2209 Ζ (London) / TOR 1930 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. 1. I wish to announce Air Marshal Slessor who you know as Eaker's deputy in the Mediterranean Air and in command of all the RAF as I am moving Sholto Douglas from the Mediterranean to the British Coastal Command to replace Slessor. I hope you will not mind my putting on

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record the fact that after having made the most careful and searching enquiries in every direction I am absolutely convinced that there is no foundation for the suggestions which have been made that this most capable officer has shown lack of goodwill and loyalty towards the United States or its officers. General Marshall has only to ask Brereton and Eaker and he will find how strongly this view is confirmed by them. [MR*]

The Germans had cut their U-boat losses only by limiting the practice of having submarines operate in large groups. That move also drastically reduced their ability successfully to attack Allied convoys.

R-433 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Jan. 4, 1944, 6:10 P.M. Secret and Personal, for the Former Naval Person from the President. The Navy Department has prepared the following draft of the proposed January tenth statement on the submarine situation. I concur. " 1. Our merchant ship tonnage lost during the month of December to U-boat action was relatively low. Fewer U-boats were destroyed during the month by our air and sea forces because of several factors: namely, a shift in U-boat areas of operation and altered U-boat tactics. In the main, however, our supply routes continue to be reasonably secure. "2. In 1943 U-boats sank but 40% of the merchant ship tonnage that they sank in 1942. On the other hand, United Nations merchant ship tonnage constructed in 1943 approximately doubled the tonnage delivered in 1942. Nearly half of our tonnage lost for the year 1943 was during the first three months: 27% was lost during the second quarter of 1943, and only 26% was lost during the last six months." Do you agree? Roosevelt [Navy Dept., OWI] [MR*]

Roosevelt's humor tended toward sarcasm and mockery. This is but another example. (The original of this letter was not located in the British files, but it appears that the phrase "from the Prophet himself was removed at the President's instruction. If something else was added in its place it is not on the copy in the Roosevelt Library or in the printed version.)

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R-433/1, letter Washington January 4, 1944 Dear Clemmie a n d W i n s t o n : — I find the enclosed clipping on my r e t u r n h o m e . Evidently, from o n e of the p a r a g r a p h s , the Deseret News of Salt Lake City claims t h e r e is a direct link between Clemmie a n d the M o r m o n s . A n d t h e last sentence shows that Winston is a sixth cousin, twice removed, from the P r o p h e t himself. All of this presents to m e a most interesting study in heredity. H i t h e r t o I h a d not observed any outstanding M o r m o n characteristics in either of y o u — b u t I shall be looking for t h e m from now o n ! I have a very high opinion of t h e M o r m o n s — f o r they are excellent citizens. However, I shall never forget a stop which my Father a n d M o t h e r m a d e in Salt Lake City w h e n I was a very small boy. T h e y were walking u p a n d down t h e station platform a n d saw two young ladies each wheeling a baby carriage with youngsters in t h e m , each about o n e year old. My Father asked t h e m if they were waiting for somebody a n d they replied "Yes, we a r e waiting for o u r h u s b a n d . H e is the engineer of this t r a i n " P e r h a p s this was the origin of the Good Neighbor policy! As ever yours, [PSF:WSC. FDR LTRS, p. 1480.]

T h e r e is no indication who proposed January 18 for the formal transfer of command in the Mediterranean theater from Eisenhower to British General Sir Η. M. Wilson, but Eisenhower saw a copy of Churchill's message and quickly told the President that the Prime Minister's suggestion was a good one (Eisenhower Papers, I I I , no. 1472). Eisenhower had left the area on De­ cember 31 for talks in Washington and to assume his new post as Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), the cross-channel invasion force. Churchill was deeply engaged in planning an amphibious attack at Anzio (SHINGLE) south of Rome, hence his reference to "birth throes."

C-532 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Army, London] Jan. 5, 1944/TOR 1205 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal. Original d a t e a g r e e d for h a n d i n g over of c o m m a n d in t h e Mediter­ r a n e a n was 10th. It is now suggested it should be 18th. Considering that we a r e in t h e birth throes of a very serious batde, I trust you will agree

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that Maitland Wilson should take over with full powers from the date h e returns to Algiers, namely J a n u a r y 8th. Pray let m e know whether you agree. I am very anxious about the present situation. [MR*]

R-434 London [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 5, 1944, 1:05 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, from the President to the Former Naval Person. Referring to your 531 and 532 I fully approve of your selection of Air Marshal Slessor for Eaker's Deputy in the Mediterranean Air and comm a n d of the R.A.F. a n d of your moving Sholto Douglas to the British Coastal C o m m a n d . I am also in complete agreement with General Wilson's taking over with full powers u p o n his arrival in Algiers. I have seen Eisenhower this m o r n i n g and he left a note for General Wilson telling him to take over at any date satisfactory to him (Wilson). Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

In a cable to Hopkins (MR, Jan. 5, 1944), Churchill had argued that since "our object is 'the liberation of Europe from German tyranny'," the Allies would " 'enter' the oppressed countries rather than 'invade' them. . . . T h e r e is no need for us to make a present to Hitler of the idea that he is the defender of a Europe which we are seeking to invade." Harry Hopkins' illness proved far more serious than Roosevelt predicted. After an operation for stomach cancer in 1937, Hopkins' system became unable to absorb proteins and fats in adequate amounts, and he was able to survive only by taking medication constantly. On New Year's Day 1944 Hopkins complained of weakness, and it was almost seven months before he returned to Washington and his work. T h e additions were made in Roosevelt's handwriting. Fortunately for the President, his remarks about Italian soldiers never reached the Italian-American electorate he courted so assiduously.

R-435 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Jan. 5, 1944, 1:10 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, from the President to the Former Naval Person. Referring to your personal message of 5 J a n u a r y to Hopkins I will endeavor to have o u r people use the word "invasion" only in reference

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to crossing t h e G e r m a n frontier, a n d to use the words " e n t e r for the liberation of E u r o p e " in referring to operations in o t h e r E u r o p e a n Coun­ tries than G e r m a n y . H a r r y is temporarily on the sick list with flu, but I think h e will be in the Naval Hospital only a few days. This epidemic is very widespread b u t while it is not serious it makes you feel the way an Italian soldier looks. My best to Clemmie a n d Sarah. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

Churchill was the guest of the American Army at Villa Taylor (Flower Villa) in Marrakesh. (His stay there is described in greater detail by Pawle, The War and Colonel Warden, pp. 280—90.) Clementine and Sarah Churchill were in Marrakesh with him. Planning for the Anzio invasion occupied much of Churchill's time, hence his meeting with the major Allied commanders in the Mediterranean theater. Eduard BeneS, President of the Czechoslovakian government in exile, understood the precarious position of the eastern European nations and hoped to strike a balance between East and West. His government had come to an agreement with the Soviet Union on boundaries and had drawn u p a general postwar arrangement, and he now hoped he could mediate a similar settlement of Soviet-Polish problems. Two quotations from the British official history of the Second World War illustrate the complexity of Soviet-Polish relations and British policy. " T h e Prime Minister was at this time less sympathetic than the Foreign Office with Polish difficulties in accepting the Russian demands." " T h e Prime Minister does not appear to have realized at this time the implication of the Czecho­ slovak-Russian treaty in the Polish frontier question" (Woodward, Brituh For­ eign Policy, III, 156, 157n). T h e new Soviet-Polish boundary sketched by Stalin did not include Lwow (Lemberg) within the new Polish frontier, an omission which the Poles found unacceptable. (The Curzon line is discussed below in C-557.)

C-533 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Embassy, London] Jan. 6, 1944, 2158 Ζ (London) I TOR 9:30 P.M.[?]

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your 435. 1. A m grieved that H a r r y has got the flue ['flu.] H e stood u p wonder­ fully to S E X T A N T . I a m most grateful to you for all you have d o n e for my comfort a n d safety h e r e . Clemmie a n d Sarah are enjoying themselves greatly a n d send their warmest greetings. T h e weather is lovely, both bracing a n d bright. We set out every day to the foot of the Atlas a n d have

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a picnic in olive groves by some mountain stream. You would enjoy it very much. 2. The L.S.T. position here is very difficult to understand and at general desire I am holding a conference on the 8th at which Maitland Wilson, Bedell Smith, Devers, Alexander and representatives of the Fifth Army and Admiral John Cunningham and Tedder will attend. I do not doubt things can be straightened out in a satisfactory manner. I will report to you direct. 3. Benes has been here and is very hopeful about the Russian situation. He may be most useful in trying to make the Poles see reason and in reconciling them to the Russians, whose confidence he has long possessed. He brought a new map with pencil marks by U.J. showing the eastern frontier from Konigsberg to the Curzon line giving the Poles Lomza and Bialystok regions in the north but not Lemberg at the southern end. For their western frontier he offers the line of the Oder including the major part of Oppeln. This gives the Poles a fine place to live in more than 300 miles square and with 250 miles of seaboard on the Baltic. As soon as I get home I shall go all out with the Polish government to close with this or something like it and having closed they must proclaim themselves as ready to accept the duty of guarding the bulwark of the Oder against further German aggression upon Russia and also they must back the settlement to the limit. This will be their duty to the powers of Europe who will twice have rescued them. If I can get this tidied up early in February a visit from them to you would clinch matters. 4. The Russians are quite agreeable to Benes having his old Pre-Munich frontier back with a slight military adjustment along the northern crests of the mountains and a little territory to the eastward linking them with Russia. [MR*. pWSC, V, 452.]

C-534 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Embassy, London] Jan. 6, 1944, 2224 Ζ (London) / T O R 8:30 P.M.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Thank you so much for the delightful copy of your manuscript ad­ dressed [R—432/2] which was delivered to me on New Years day and which I deeply value. [MR]

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C-535 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Embassy, London] Jan. 6, 1944, 2226 Ζ (London) / TOR 8:30 P.M. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Your 434. Thank you very much. [MR*]

The unconditional-surrender declaration may have been a short-term attempt to reassure the Soviet Union that the Allies would persist in the fight against Germany, but the concept was deeply colored by Roosevelt's belief that there was no distinction between Germans and Prussians or Nazis. The President retained that conviction throughout the war and never backed down from his insistence on unconditional surrender. The additions were made in Roo­ sevelt's handwriting.

R-436 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Jan. 6, 1944, 12:15 P.M. Personal and Secret, for the Former Naval Person from the President. Your 530 of 2 January. I made the following public announcement on 24 December: "The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop in peace, as useful and re­ spectable members of the European family. But we most certainly em­ phasize the word 'respectable' for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the 'Master Race'." It is my opinion that at the present time it is best to permit our un­ derstanding of unconditional surrender to rest upon that. If we should at the present time make any number of specific conditions for the surrender we might probably omit or leave open for discussion some other conditions that are now or that may in the future become of equal importance from our point of view. In view of all the above I prefer to leave things as they are for the time being and we really do not know enough about opinions within Germany itself to go on any fishing expedition there at this time. I hope you and Anthony will agree. Roosevelt [MR. PREM 3/193/5. R&C]

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Lieutenant General Jacob Devers had just been appointed Deputy Com­ mander in Chief for the Mediterranean Theater of Operation but had pre­ viously been involved with planning for OVERLORD. Major General W. Bedell Smith had just been transferred from Chief of Staff of Allied forces in the Mediterranean to the same position with SHAEF in England. T h e COSSAC plan for the cross-channel invasion had been too limited to suit Eisenhower, and "Beetle" Smith agreed that OVERLORD should be on a larger scale. (See Euenhower Papers, I I I , no. 1473.) Churchill's recollection about the agreed-upon time for OVERLORD was correct. At Teheran the United States and Britain promised only to launch a cross-channel invasion sometime in May 1944 (FRUS, Teheran Conf., pp. 579-30). ANVIL was the proposed invasion of southern France scheduled to take place shortly after the OVERLORD landings.

C-536 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Army, London] Jan. 7, 1944, 0927 Ζ (London) I TOR 1203 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Bedell Smith a n d Devers came t h r o u g h h e r e m o r n i n g of 5th. Bedell told m e that he a n d Montgomery are convinced that it is better to p u t in a m u c h heavier a n d b r o a d e r O V E R L O R D than to e x p a n d A N V I L above o u r p r e - T e h e r a n conception a n d that he is putting this to Eisenhower a n d your Chiefs of Staff. I have always expected that when the Com­ m a n d e r s took the m a t t e r into their h a n d s they would make alterations in the plans which nevertheless have proved invaluable as a basis for future decisions. As you know I have always h o p e d that the initial assault at O V E R L O R D could be with heavier forces than we have hitherto men­ tioned. It also seems to m e from what I h e a r d very probable that the Υ Moon (see my immediately following) will be at the earliest practicable date. I d o not see why we should resist this if the C o m m a n d e r s feel they have a better chance t h e n . At T e h e r a n , however, the C.O.S. r e c o m m e n d a t i o n was Yl o r o n e day earlier which you a n d I agreed to express m o r e agreeably as " D u r i n g May". In conversation with U.J. we never m e n t i o n e d such a d a t e as May 5th or May 8th b u t we always spoke to h i m a r o u n d 20th. N e i t h e r did we at any time dwell u p o n the exact phase of the o p e r a t i o n which should fall on any particular day. If now the Υ date is accepted as final I d o not feel that we shall in any way have b r o k e n faith with him. T h e operation will anyhow begin in May with feints a n d sof­ tening b o m b a r d m e n t s a n d I d o not think U.J. is the kind of m a n to be unreasonable over 48 h o u r s . O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h e g r o u n d will be d r i e r for U.J.'s great operations by Y. We shall m a k e a m u c h heavier attack a n d with m u c h better chances

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of success. I a m making you suggestions t h r o u g h Leathers for r u n n i n g a n o t h e r Arctic convoy for which we can provide the escorts if you can provide t h e ships a n d cargoes, we have practically finished o u r quotas. I d o not think it necessary to make any communication to U.J. at the present time b u t in a few weeks after Eisenhower has presented his final conclusions to us we should n o d o u b t tell him all t h e story in all its strength including any modification of A N V I L with the authority of the respon­ sible C o m m a n d e r s behind o u r statement. I will r e p o r t to you further about the whole situation after o u r con­ ference on t h e 8th. [MR. pFRUS, Teheran Con/, pp. 865-66. pWSC, V, 448-49.]

FROZEN was the code for the cables sent by Churchill to London while he was on his trip to North Africa and the Middle East.

C-537 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Army, London] Jan. 7, 1944/TOR 1310 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Reference FROZEN 1121 [C-536]. Υ date is J u n e 2d. [MR. FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 865n.]

Soviet demands for a share of the captured Italian fleet became, in the spring of 1944, a significant irritant in relations between the three major Allies. Molotov had originally made such a request during the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow in October 1943, and the topic had been informally discussed at Teheran. T h e Combined Chiefs of Staff, and particularly the British, feared that a transfer would not only take away ships they needed in the Mediterranean but might incite the Italians either to mutiny or to scutde their fleet. Anti-Bolshevism was the stock in trade of the government of King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Badoglio, and such a transfer of ships would force them to take a public stand. Moreover, although no one said so openly, British diplomats appeared profoundly uneasy at the notion of Russia having even a small fleet of large, modern warships. But all such consider­ ations had to be subordinated to the overriding need to maintain the wartime coalition, particularly before the Allies made their assault on France. (The final sentence was added in Roosevelt's handwriting.)

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R-437 Washington [via U.S.Navy, London] Jan. 8, 1944, 11:40 A.M.

Personal and Secret. For the Former Naval Person from the President. As I told you in my 422, Harriman requested information on the action we were taking to carry out our commitments to turn over Italian ships to the Soviet by 1 February so that he could discuss the matter with Molotov if he were queried. I told him it was my intention to allocate one-third of the captured Italian ships to the Soviet war effort beginning 1 February as rapidly as they could be made available. Harriman then reminded me that Stalin's request at Teheran was a reiteration of the Soviet request originally made at Moscow in October (namely for one batdeship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines for North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of merchant shipping for the Black Sea) and that no mention was made at Moscow or Teheran of the Russians getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured. Accordingly Harriman regarded my cable of December 21 as being for his information and he has not discussed the question of onethird with Molotov. Harriman also emphasized the very great importance of fulfilling our pledge to yield these ships. For us to fail or to delay would in his opinion only arouse suspicion in Stalin and in his associates as to the firmness of other commitments made at Teheran. On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff have raised numerous objections to the transfer based on probable effects that this course would have on pending operations. They fear a loss of Italian naval and military cooperation, and the scuttling or sabotage of valuable ships which we need for ANVIL and OVERLORD. They foresee no material benefit to the Russian war effort at this time since the warships are presently quite unsuited for Northern waters and the Black Sea is closed to merchant vessels. The very wise provisions of the modified Cunningham Agreement give the United Nations the right to make disposition of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. It is of importance that we shall acquire and maintain the confidence of our Ally and I feel that every practicable effort should be made to arrive at a solution whereby the Italian ships requested by the Soviets be turned over to them beginning about February first. Do you believe it wise to present to U.J. the possible effect on OVERLORD-ANVIL as expressed by our Staffs, and suggest a delay in assigning Italian ships to him until after the launching of OVERLORD-ANVIL. I am particularly desirous of having an expression of your opinion in view

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of t h e present British c o m m a n d of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n theater a n d in o r d e r that we may reach a complete a g r e e m e n t as to the action to be taken. It is patently impracticable for either of us to act singly in this matter, b u t I think you will agree that we must not go back on what we told U.I. Roosevelt [WDL, GE] [MR. PREM 3/240/5. WSC, V, 454-56. pFRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 866. RUC]

R-438 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Jan. 8, 1944, 5:20 P.M. F r o m the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. Personal a n d Secret. If n o answer to my N o . 433 relative submarine situation can be trans­ mitted in time to be received h e r e by 1600 E.W.T. Sunday, 9 J a n u a r y , r e c o m m e n d twenty-four h o u r s delay in agreed time of release. Roosevelt [MR*]

General Wilson had chosen as his Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sir James Gammell. (See C—532 and C-536 for other identifications.) Roosevelt in­ structed the War Department to issue the statement just as Churchill had proposed.

C-538 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Embassy, London] Jan. 8, 1944, 2245 Ζ (London) I TOR 0040 Z, Jan. 9 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. Unless I h e a r to contrary from you I p r o p o s e that we issue following statement synchronized from Monday's papers. Begins: General Sir H e n r y Maidand-Wilson assumed his duties as S u p r e m e Allied Commander-in-Chief, in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n T h e a t r e as from 8th J a n u a r y . General Devers, United States Army, assumed the duties of Deputy S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r . Lt General Gammell is a p p o i n t e d Chief of Staff in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . Major General Bedell Smith, U n i t e d States Army will become Chief of Staff to G e n e r a l Eisenhower in the United Kingdom. [MR]

Churchill's next three telegrams to Roosevelt concerned SHINGLE—the am­ phibious landing at Anzio, about twenty miles south of Rome. Using landing

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craft scheduled for the ANVIL operation in southern France, SHINGLE would outflank the German defense lines (the Gustav and Hitler lines) which had successfully stalled the Allied drive northward. T h e X date which con­ trolled all other planning was the mid-May schedule for OVERLORD. Churchill had predicted, however, that the cross-channel invasion would actually take place on J u n e 2—the Υ date (C-537).

C-539 [Marrakesh, Morocco via U.S. Embassy, London] Jan. 8, 1944, 2255 Ζ (London) I TOR 0040 Z, Jan. 9 Prime Minister to President Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. As you will see from my immediately following a u n a n i m o u s agree­ m e n t for action as p r o p o s e d was reached by the responsible officers of both countries a n d of all services as a result of o u r two conferences. Everyone is in good h e a r t a n d the resources seem sufficient. Every aspect was t h r a s h e d out in full detail by sub-committees in the interval between the two conferences. 2. You will see that all plans are related to the X date a n d if as I think increasingly probable the Υ date prevails there is a lot of r o p e to veer a n d h a u l on. [MR*. pWSC, V, 447.]

Churchill's commitment to the Anzio landings has led some historians to speculate that the Prime Minister was driven by a desire to erase the memory of the unsuccessful amphibious attack at Gallipoli during World War I. Such psychological motives may have had some influence, but more important was Churchill's hope that the Italian campaign would provide a quick victory and opportunities for additional operations in the Mediterranean. Lord Beaverbrook as Lord Privy Seal was a member of Churchill's gov­ ernment, but not the War Cabinet. He was in Marrakesh at the request of Clementine Churchill more to keep the Prime Minister company than as an official adviser. (Other personnel have been identified in the headnotes to C-512, C-532, and C-536.)

C-540 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Embassy, London] Jan. 8, 1944, 2300 Ζ (London) / TOR 0040 Z, Jan. 9 Prime Minister to President Personal and Most Secret. Following is telegram referred to in my immediately preceding. Begins: F r o m Prime Minister to General Ismay for Chiefs of Staff

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committee, Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Defence committee. 1. Meetings on SHINGLE were held here 7th and 8th January under my chairmanship attended by Lord Beaverbrook, General Wilson, Admiral John Cunningham, General Alexander, General Devers, General Bedell Smith and Brigadier General [Edward J.] Timberlake and others. 2. It was decided unanimously to proceed with SHINGLE on D day, weather permitting (see my immediately following telegram). 3. Intention is to land a corps of two divisions for the assault and to follow up with AA mobile striking force based on the elements of a third division to cut enemy's communications. 4. It should be possible to do this barring accident without con­ flicting with requirements of OVERLORD or ANVIL on SEXTANT scale and X date, and still have sufficiency of landing craft to maintain the force up till the end of February weather permitting and God being with us. 5. General Wilson, who today assumes duty as Supreme Allied Commander in Chief Mediterranean, has issued instructions to give effect to the above to subordinate commanders. He is also informing Combined Chiefs of Staff. [MR*. pWSC, V, 447.]

C-541 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Embassy, London] Jan. 8, 1944, 2306 Ζ (London) I TOR 0040 Z, Jan. 9

Prime Minister to President Personal and Most Secret. My immediately preceding. D day is 22nd January. [MR*]

C-542 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Army, London] Jan. 9, 1944, 1645 Ζ (London) I TOR 1835 Ζ

Prime Minister to President Personal and Most Secret. U-Boat statement. Your number 438. 1. Admiralty propose an alternative for all paragraph 1 which on the whole I prefer as follows. Begins. Total merchant shipping tonnage lost by U-Boat action in December was again low despite an extension of operating areas. Fewer U-Boats

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were destroyed d u r i n g the m o n t h by o u r air a n d sea forces owing to several factors including increased caution by enemy. O u r supply routes were, however, well secured against U-Boat attack. E n d . We d o not m u c h like saying so plainly that a change in U-Boat tactics has b e e n successful from their point of view. I think, also, we are entitled to r e m e m b e r that o u r supply routes were "well secured". P a r a g r a p h 2 is excellent. 2. Pray settle it as you think best a n d to save time, will you kindly inform the Canadians? We agree to 24 h o u r s delay in time of release. [MR*]

C-543 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Army, London] Jan. 9, 1944, 1705 Ζ (London)/TOR 1835 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your 437. I entirely agree with you that we must not break faith with Stalin about the ships. I have b e e n for a week in correspondence with Anthony [Eden] on subject a n d h o p e to submit a proposal to you for ajoint communication from you a n d m e in a day or two. [MR. PREM 3/420/5. WSC, V, 456. R&C]

Roosevelt agreed to Churchill's suggestions regarding the monthly anti-sub­ marine warfare statement.

R-439 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Jan. 10, 1944, 1 1 : 3 5 A.M. F r o m t h e President for t h e F o r m e r Naval Person. Personal a n d Secret. Your 542. I c o n c u r in your p a r a g r a p h o n e which we shall issue 24 h o u r s after the original release time. T h e Canadians are being informed of the change. Roosevelt [GE] [MR*]

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YUGOSLAVIA

Although Britain had continued to recognize the exiled Royal Yugoslavian Government of King Peter II, the failure of General Draza Mihailovic to mount an effective guerrilla campaign against the German occupation forces caused Churchill to look more favorably on the Partisans led by Tito, a com­ munist. In May 1943, Major F.W.D. Deakin, a Fellow of Wadham College at Oxford and collaborator with Churchill on the latter's Marlborough: Hh Life and Times, parachuted into Yugoslavia to establish a Liaison Mission at Tito's headquarters. Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, previously on the staff of the For­ eign Office, took charge of that mission in July 1943. Backed by Ralph S. Stevenson, the British Ambassador to the Yugoslavian government, Brigadier Maclean concluded that Britain should work with Tito since the Partisans appeared certain to be the postwar rulers of Yugoslavia. British hopes that the Partisans might accept King Peter as the monarch, at least until elections could be held, were doomed by Peter's association with Mihailovic, a man the Partisans accused of collaborating with the Germans. Moreover, according to Maclean, the monarchy could not act as a unifying force in the country since it was supported primarily by the Serbs, whereas Tito's forces were made u p of non-Serbs, particularly Croats. T h e British Foreign Office opposed switch­ ing support from Mihailovic to Tito unless Tito made firm commitments to work with King Peter, but Churchill had lost all faith in Mihailovic after receiving reports of the latter's willingness to cooperate with the Germans in attacking the Partisans. (Later documents provided ample evidence that, in the words of the British official historian, "General Mihailovic's collaboration with the Axis was determined—and limited—by his conception that his first duty was to prevent a Communist control of Yugoslavia after the war"— Woodward, Bntuh Foreign Policy, III, 315n.) Churchill sent his son, Randolph, to the British Liaison Mission to demonstrate to Tito that the Prime Minister's support was genuine. In the following letter to Tito, Churchill gave in to Foreign Office requests to delete a recommendation to King Peter that he dismiss General Mihailovic, but the Prime Minister left intact his promise to cease sending military aid to the Chetniks (Mihailovic's forces). Roosevelt dictated a memo attached to this message: " I do not think this calls for any answer?"

C-544 Marrakesh, Morocco [via U.S. Embassy, London] Jan. 10, 1944, 2215 Ζ (London) I TOR 0045 Z, Jan. 11 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. I have sent following letter to T i t o by o u r mission who are para­ chuting in in next few days. I send you this for your personal information only. Begins

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Africa, 8th January 1944. Sir, I thank you very much for your kind message about my health from yourself and the heroic patriot and Partisan Army of Yugoslavia. From Major Deakin, who is a friend of mine, I learnt all about your valiant efforts. It is my most earnest desire to give you all aid in human power by sea supplies, by air support and by commandos helping you in the islands fighting. Brigadier Maclean is also a friend of mine and a colleague in the House of Commons. With him at your headquarters will soon be serving my son, Major Randolph Churchill, who is also a member of Parliament. One supreme object stands before us: namely, to cleanse the soil of Europe from the filthy Nazi Fascist taint. You may be sure that we British have no desire to dictate the future government of Yugoslavia. At the same time we hope that all will pull together as much as possible for the defeat of the common foe, and afterwards settle the form of government in accordance with the will of the people. I am resolved that the British government will give no further military support to Mihailovic and will only give help to you, and we should be glad if the Royal Yugoslavian Government would dismiss him from their councils. King Peter The Second however escaped as a boy from the treacherous clutches of the Regent, Prince Paul, and came to us as the representative of Yugoslavia and as a young prince in distress. It would not be chivalrous or honorable for Great Britain to cast him aside. Nor can we ask him to cut all his existing contacts with his country. I hope therefore that you will understand we shall in any case remain in official relations with him while at the same time giving you all possible military support. I hope also that there may be an end to politics on either side, for these only help the Germans. You may be sure I shall work in the closest contact with my friends Marshal Stalin and President Roosevelt: and I earnestly hope that the military mission which the Soviet Government are sending to your headquarters will work in similar harmony with the AngloAmerican mission under Brigadier Maclean. Please correspond with me through Brigadier Maclean and let me know anything you think I can do to help, for I will certainly try my best. Looking forward to the end of your sufferings and to the liberation of all Europe from tyranny. Believe me, Yours faithfully, Winston S. Churchill [MR*. pWSC, V, 470-71.]

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On January 11, Churchill had cabled Hopkins about rumors that Eisenhower had reconciled his differences with de Gaulle and that the United States contemplated working with the French General. According to most accounts, there was some truth in the claim that de Gaulle and Eisenhower had parted on good terms (Eisenhower was leaving North Africa to take command of the Allied Expeditionary Force which would invade France), but Roosevelt remained distrustful of the French leader. (The underlined sentence was added by Roosevelt.)

R-440 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 12, 1944, 1 : 5 5 P.M.

Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Replying to your message to Harry unnumbered of 11 January, I have no intention whatever of withdrawing support from Giraud. He is a fine old fellow and represents certain decencies which I still like. Harry is still in the hospital with influenza but is improving. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

Though it was only a matter of a few weeks at most, Roosevelt was reluctant to discuss any delay of OVERLORD with Soviet leaders. (The President added the final sentence.)

R-441 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 14, 1944, 1 1 : 3 5 A.M.

Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Your 536. It is my understanding that in Teheran U.J. was given a promise that OVERLORD be launched during May and supported by strongest practicable ANVIL at about the same time and that he agreed to plan for simultaneous Russian attack on Eastern Front. I do not believe that we should make any decision now to defer the operations, certainly not until the responsible commanders (Eisenhower and Wilson) have had full opportunity to explore all possibilities and make factual reports. In the meantime no communication should be sent to U.J. on this subject. I think the psychology of bringing this thing up at this time would be very bad in view of the fact that it is only a little over a month since the three of us agreed on the statement in Teheran. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. pFRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 870. WSC, V, 449. u£iC]

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OSS reports about German intelligence activities in Turkey, where Franz von Papen was German Ambassador, were quite accurate. In September 1943, Elyesa Bazna, valet to the British Ambassador in Turkey, had begun passing secret British documents to the Germans. Operating under the Germanassigned codename CICERO, Bazna delivered the codewords ACCOLADE (an invasion of Rhodes, actually canceled in September 1943) and ANVIL (the invasion of southern France), as well as the word OVERLORD. That was less significant than it appears, however, since the British had insisted on changing the meaning of OVERLORD to cover general Anglo-American strategy in western Europe while assigning the codename NEPTUNE to the actual cross-channel invasion. A case can be made for regarding CICERO as an agent under British control. (See Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, pp. 391-405.) Marshal Rudolfo Graziani, largely out of personal hatred for Marshal Badoglio, had remained loyal to Mussolini and had become War Minister in the Republican (Mussolini) government in September 1943. Cassino, which Graziani wanted to defend, was a key stronghold in the German defensive position (Gustav line) holding the British Eighth and American Fifth Armies about eighty miles south of Rome. Graziani's suggestion for an offensive went against the basic Germany strategy, which was simply to counter any Allied advance on Rome u p the west coast of Italy (see map, p. 453). (The fact that this message and Churchill's answer (C—548) are not in the appropriate PREM 3 files lends credence to the belief that the British have not declassified those messages which relate to intelligence matters.)

R-442 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Jan. 14, 1944, 1 2 : 1 5 P.M. Personal and Secret for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Office of Strategic Services reports to me, t h r o u g h their intelligence channels, the following: 1. T h a t Von Papen learned air bases in T u r k e y would be ready by February fifteenth for receiving twenty United Nations air squadrons a n d that in the event these squadrons go there, two programs called ACC O L A D E and A N V I L would be p u t into effect a n d Allied submarines would be permitted to enter the Black Sea. 2. T h a t G e r m a n agents secure British reports o n Turkish-British relations. 3. T h a t o n December ninth, Marshal Graziani urged Hitler to hold Cassino at any cost and that the time had come to try to throw us back to the Sangro by a very large counter-attack along the Adriatic. H e claimed the Eighth Army is short of reserves. This information comes from a good but not sure source. I am merely passing it on to you for what it is worth. Roosevelt [FDR] [MR]

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Churchill figured out a way to avoid sending portions of the Italian fleet to the Soviet Union. His proposal, drafted on January 12 and subsequently amended by the Admiralty to exclude any transfer of British submarines, attempted to circumvent the problem of embarrassing the anti-communist government of Italy, which Britain supported, by suggesting a loan of British ships to Russia instead of a transfer of Italian ships. The main British concern appears to have centered on two considerations: first, the fear that a transfer of Italian warships would destabilize the government of King Victor Em­ manuel; second, the Italian ships the Russians wanted were already committed to OVERLORD, ANVIL, or other duties. The final (sixth) paragraph of this message was sent separately. Dispatched six days later (January 22) it contained a copy of what Churchill called a "MAGIC Summary." (MAGIC loosely referred to all material obtained from various Japanese cryptosystems.) This paragraph does not appear in any of the relevant British files and was located only in the Map Room papers at the Roosevelt Library. That it was sent via special channels raises the suspicion that other still classified ULTRA/MAGIC summaries may have arrived via similar routes. (See the Editorial Procedures, C-103x, and C-737/1.) Benedetto Croce, a seventy-seven-year-old Italian philosopher and histo­ rian, had played a role in Italian parliamentary politics in the early 1920s and was a staunch opponent of the Fascists. Count Carlo Sforza, an outspoken opponent of Mussolini, had left Italy in 1927. He had gained considerable support from the Roosevelt administration in his campaign to become the leader of a democratic government in liberated Italy, but the British looked on him as an ineffective bore.

C-545 HMS King George V, at sea [via U.S. Army, London] Jan. 16, 1944, 1120 Ζ (London) /TOR 1436 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal and Most Secret. I. Further to my reply to your 437. Would you please see the memo­ randum by Combined Chiefs of Staff to us both about transference of Italian ships to Russia. My recollection is clear that nothing was said at Teheran about "one third" but that promise was made to meet the Russian claim put forward at Moscow to have transferred to them one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines, and forty thousand tons of merchant shipping. On the other hand, the main difficulties raised by C.O.S. are solid and I think very likely that once Stalin is convinced of our intentions and our good faith he will leave us to handle the matter in smoothest and swiftest way possible. I suggest, therefore, that we now signal him joindy to the following effect.

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1. With regard to the handing over to the Soviets of Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet Government at the Moscow conference and agreed to with you by us both at Teheran we have received a memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in our immediately following telegram [not printed]. For the reasons set out in this memorandum we think it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until their cooperation is no longer of operational importance. 2. Nevertheless, if after full consideration you desire us to proceed, we will make a secret approach to Badoglio with a view to concluding the necessary arrangements without their becoming generally known to Italian Naval Forces. If in this way agreement could be reached, such arrangements with Italian Naval authorities as were necessary could be left to him. These arrangements would have to be on the lines that Italian ships selected should be sailed to suitable Allied port where they would be collected by Russian crews who would sail into Russian northern ports which are the only ones now open where any refitting necessary would be undertaken. II. We are, however, very conscious of dangers of above course for the reasons we have laid before you and we have, therefore, decided to propose the following alternative, which, from the military point of view, has many advantages. 1. The British battleship, Royal Sovereign, has recently completed refitting in the U.S.A. She is fitted with Radar for all types of armament. Great Britain has also a cruiser available. His Majesty's Government are willing for their part that these vessels should be taken over during February at British ports by Soviet crews, and sailed to North Russian ports. You could then make such alterations as you find necessary for Arctic conditions. These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to the Soviet Government and would fly the Soviet Flag until, without prejudice to the military operation the necessary transfer of Italian vessels could be arranged. III. This alternative has advantage that Soviet Government would obtain the use of vessels at a very much earlier date than if they had to be refitted and rendered suitable for northern waters. Thus if even it should take a favourable turn with Turks and the Straits become open these vessels would be ready to operate if desired in the Black Sea. We hope you will very carefully consider this alternative which we think is in every way superior to first proposal. IV. The above message the line of which I venture to suggest to you would be of course incomplete without a statement of what the United

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States will do. If, for instance, you could find the cruiser instead of our having to do so, we should be relieved. We cannot do anything about eight destroyers but perhaps you may be able to supply this need. Otherwise we must say we have absolutely not got them until after OVERLORD and ANVIL. As to the forty thousand tons of merchant shipping I should think that with your great supply and vastly improved sinkings you might supply these but we should be willing to share fifty-fifty. V. I hope, my dear friend, you will consider all these possibilities and let me know how you feel. In my opinion, Stalin will be moved in a favourable manner by this handsome proposal. At any rate, it shows our faith and our goodwill. I doubt whether having this alternative before him he will press for the premature raising of Italian problem but we shall have done the right thing. [MR* (c.f. PREM 3/240/5). pFRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 871.]

Because such messages appear to have been systematically removed or excluded from the declassified files, all the transmission information found on the source copy is included with paragraph 6 of C—545. There is a handwritten notation at the bottom of the document: "This message was received by the War Department for the President."

C-545, par. 6 From London, 22 January 1944 HMOC/395 A. On January 16th Prime Minister sent message to President via Embassy under his number 545 (F.O. No. 411 January 17th) Following message for President is paragraph 6 of above telegram which you should arrange reached him by Safe Hand. Message begins: See also in this connection following MAGIC Summary on political situation in Italy. This squares very much with what I have heard from having had source. MAGIC begins: According to the Irish Minister in Rome on December 21st political confusion reigns in North and South Italy and there is no suitable leader. CROCE is hardly known except in academic circles. SFORZA has lost touch as a result of his long exile. The Communists seem the most important party and claim 70,000 followers in Rome alone including a number of intellectuals. The King still has largest potential following and view of sound observers in

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R o m e is that if he were to abdicate before n o r m a l political life h a d b e e n restored, existing confusion would be intensified." E n d MAGIC a n d e n d message. [MR]

In claiming that he and the President were "in complete agreement," Church­ ill glossed over Roosevelt's refusal to consider even a slight postponement of OVERLORD.

C-546 HMS King George V, at sea [via U.S. Army, London] Jan. 16, 1944, 2057 Ζ (London)/TOR 2155 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your n u m b e r 4 4 1 . 1 a m very glad to see that we are in complete agree­ ment. [MR*]

Portuguese Premier Antonio Salazar's motives in opposing the entry of Amer­ ican combat forces into the Azores are unclear. As Churchill noted with some annoyance, there was no longer any danger of a German attack on Portugal, and "there is no need for us to be apologetic in dealing with any of these neutrals who hope to get out of Armageddon with no trouble and a good profit" (Woodward, Brituh Foreign Policy, IV, 63). It is quite possible that Salazar preferred that British influence predominate in postwar Portugal.

R-443 Washington [via U.S. Navy, London] Jan. 17, 1944, 11:25 A.M. F r o m t h e President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. Personal a n d Secret. O n December 3 1 , 1943 Salazar in an interview with the U.S. Minister in Lisbon agreed to the use of Lagens Field, Terceira by an American V.L.R. S q u a d r o n of Navy planes u n d e r British operational control. I n a subsequent interview with the U.S. Minister on J a n u a r y 12, Salazar stated t h a t u p o n reflection he cannot g r a n t permission for the Navy S q u a d r o n to o p e r a t e from Lagens. If you agree it is my desire to send the S q u a d r o n at an early date as p l a n n e d disregarding Salazar's change of mind, the S q u a d r o n to o p e r a t e

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under British operational control as already approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In view of the fact that plans for the departure of our Squadron of planes are complete do let me hear from you. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

Churchill left Marrakesh by air on January 14 for Gibraltar, where he boarded the batdeship King George V for the voyage back to England. SHINGLE, the Anzio assault, was scheduled for January 22, though it was preceded by a general Allied offensive along the Gustav line beginning on January 17. Churchill's reference to the Poles related to the controversy over the SovietPolish boundary; his mention of the Turks concerned British efforts to get a Turkish declaration of war on Germany; and the case of Argentina, not previously mentioned in his messages to Roosevelt, concerned American op­ position to the military dictatorship which took over the Argentine govern­ ment in July 1943 and which the United States accused of cooperating with Germany. The message to Congress referred to in paragraph 4 with Roo­ sevelt's annual State of the Union address of January 11. The President had emphasized domestic reform, calling for the federal government to imple­ ment a series of economic rights. As one historian of the Roosevelt presidency put it, "Roosevelt gave the most radical speech of his life. . . . And this appeal fell with a dull thud into the half-empty chambers of the United States Con­ gress" (Burns, Soldier of Freedom, pp. 424, 426).

C-547 London [via U.S. Embassy & Army] Jan. 18, 1944, 1944 Ζ/TOR 2142 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. I have now got home again safely and am all right except for being rather shaky on my pins. I must thank you for the delightful stay we had at Flower Villa and for the princely hospitality which you extended to me through the American Army. I was very much tempted to remain another fortnight but thought it my duty to return on account primarily of SHINGLE. 2. I will see Anthony [Eden] tonight about your No. 443 and will reply tomorrow. Salazar is a pedant as well as a dictator but I have no doubt in the end we shall get what we want. I am also examining the cases of the Poles, the Turks and the Argentines. 3. I hope you liked my letter to Tito [C-544]. Maclean and Randolph hope to j u m p with it tomorrow. 4. We thought your message to congress splendid.

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5.1 h o p e H a r r y is going on well. This protracted t e m p e r a t u r e must be a strain. I a m making him a signal. [MR*]

Even though Roosevelt warned Churchill of German spying within the British Embassy in Turkey, CICERO (Bazna) continued to operate until April 20, 1944. At that time he left the British Embassy and, using the money paid him by the Germans, organized a company to build a luxury hotel in Turkey. Eventually the Turkish government found that the German payments had been largely in counterfeit pound-sterling notes, and Bazna ended u p bank­ rupt.

C-548 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 19, 1944, 1924 Ζ / TOR 2032 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your n u m b e r 442. T h a n k you for d r a w i n g my attention to this matter. I a m assured that o u r respective intelligence services are closely col­ laborating o n this subject a n d a n investigation has been o r d e r e d . [MR]

T h e President made only a few changes in Churchill's proposed cable to Stalin about the disposition of the Italian fleet. In addition to lending an American cruiser, Roosevelt promised to transfer to the Soviet Union some destroyers and submarines from the Italian Navy as soon as feasible.

R-444 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 19, 1944, 12 noon Personal a n d Secret from the President for t h e F o r m e r Naval Person. Replying to your N o . 545 I propose t h e following message to Uncle Joe: QUOTE: With r e g a r d to t h e h a n d i n g over to t h e Soviets of Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t at the Moscow con­ ference a n d agreed to with you by us both at T e h e r a n we have received a m e m o r a n d u m by t h e Combined Chiefs of Staff contained

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in our immediately following telegram. For the reasons set out in this memorandum we think it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until their cooperation is no longer of operational importance. Nevertheless, if after full consideration you desire us to proceed, we will make a secret approach to Badoglio with a view to concluding the necessary arrangements without their becoming generally known to Italian Naval Forces. If in this way agreement could be reached, such arrangements with Italian Naval authorities as were necessary could be left to him. These arrangements would have to be on the lines that Italian ships selected should be sailed to suitable Allied port where they would be collected by Russian crews who would sail into Russian northern ports which are the only ones now open where any refitting necessary would be undertaken. We are, however, very conscious of dangers of above course for the reasons we have laid before you and we have, therefore, decided to propose the following alternative, which, from the military point of view, has many advantages. The British battleship, Royal Sovereign, has recently completed refitting in the U.S.A. She is fitted with Radar for all types of armament. The United States will make one light cruiser available at approximately the same time. His Majesty's Government and the United States are willing for their part that these vessels should be taken over at British ports by Soviet crews and sailed to North Russian ports. You could then make such alterations as you find necessary for Arctic conditions. These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to the Soviet and would fly the Soviet flag until without prejudice to military operations the Italian vessels can be made available. His Majesty's Government and the United States will each arrange to provide 20,000 tons of merchant shipping to be available as soon as practicable and until the Italian merchant ships can be obtained without prejudice to projected essential operations OVERLORD-ANVIL. An effort will be made at once to make available from the surrendered Italian war ships 8 destroyers and 4 submarines to be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U. S. ships. This alternative has the advantage that the Soviet Government would obtain the use of vessels at a very much earlier date than if they all had to be refitted and rendered suitable for northern waters. Thus if our efforts should take a favorable turn with Turks and the

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Straits become open these vessels would be ready to operate in the Black Sea. We hope you will very carefully consider this alternative which we think is in every way superior to first proposal, UNQUOTE. It is my opinion that the Italian Government and the Italian Navy might not seriously object to joining with us in providing the Soviet with ships "needed" in the war effort. If we cannot get this contribution by Italy to the common effort an alternative is suggested as follows: The British Navy furnish 8 destroyer escorts from the U. S. production which vessels are now in Halifax or Bermuda waiting for crews. I do not know where we can get any submarines except from Italy, or possibly from the French Committee of Liberation. It would seem that even a beginning of the delivery of ships to Russia in the near future as suggested above would meet the Soviet request for early action on their Teheran understanding of this problem. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

R-445 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 19, 1944, 1 2 : 1 0 P.M.

Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Your 545. If you are in agreement with my 444 it is suggested that "our immediately following telegram" referred to therein be as follows: QUOTE: Our Combined Chiefs of Staff have made the following positive recommendation with supporting data: (a) The Present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied operations. (b) To enforce the transfer at this time would remove needed Italian resources now employed in current operations, would interfere with assistance now being given by Italian repair facilities, it might cause the scuttling of Italian war ships and result in loss of Italian cooperation thus jeopardizing OVERLORD and ANVIL. (c) At the earliest moment permitted by operations the implementation of the delivery of Italian vessels may proceed, UNQUOTE.

Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

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R-446 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 19, 1944, 12 noon Personal a n d Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. I am so glad to learn from your n u m b e r 547 of your safe r e t u r n h o m e a n d that you have benefitted by your stay at Flower Villa. H a r r y is also making steady progress so that I think we may h o p e that all of us will be over o u r various complaints in the n e a r future. Roosevelt [MR]

On January 17 a report appeared in the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, accusing the British of having conducted talks with German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop somewhere in either Spain or Portugal. T h e British filed a stern protest, particularly since the Foreign Office learned that the Soviet government had ordered that the report be given wide publicity and that Pravda did not have a correspondent in Cairo, even though the story was attributed to a reporter assigned to that city. Although the British official history referred to the Pravda report as "a fantastic story," it seems likely that Roosevelt was correct in assuming that the Russians had somehow gotten hold of the same report of such Anglo-German talks as contained in a MAGIC intercept of a message sent to Tokyo by the Japanese Embassy in Madrid. Nothing has been uncovered which verifies the Pravda story, but Soviet suspicions had some basis in fact. Representatives of the German anti-Hider movement and British agents frequently contacted each other in Lisbon, although the British carefully kept such meetings secret from the Russians. (See the headnotes to R-385 and R-I69/2.) In a memo to Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy noted that the Marquis Don Manuel de Rialp, the head of the Information and Press Bureau of the Spanish Foreign Office, was a known double agent and peddler of "sensational 'intelligence.' " Since so few MAGIC summaries have been found (declassified?) in the British and American files, the portion of JAA 1342 attached to this correspondence is printed after the President's cable to Churchill.

R-446/1 Washington Jan.

19, 1 9 4 4 , 6 : 1 5 P.M.

Unnumbered For the Prime Minister from the President. As a possible clue to origin Pravda story refer to your MAGIC of De-

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cember 23 last JAA number 1342 part one of the two part message. Roosevelt [WDL?] [MR]

WS 5850 From: Madrid (Suma) To: Tokyo 23 December 1943 JAA Revision #1342, Part 1 of a 2-part Message. Absolutely secret. 1. On the 22nd, Rialp told me of a man whom he very much wished to introduce to me; so I called on him. It was the Spanish Duke b Santeyanac, an intimate friend of Rialp, who lives in Biarritz. The Duke began by saying that Ribbentrop had come to Biarritz incognito in the early part of November, had changed cars there, and gone on to Lisbon in order to talk with —G —. I replied: "If that is the story, I have already heard it. I made various inquiries at the time, and found no basis for it. The Germans—Ambassador [Hans Heinrich] Dieckhoff in particular—denied it flatly. It is no more than a wild rumor." The Duke said, by way of introduction: "Probably (?the German Ambassador?) received no hint of the matter. As far as I am concerned, I have no reason to tell any lies to the Japanese. In view of the relations between you and Rialp, I am going out of my way to tell you this, simply because it may be of some benefit to Japan for me to do so." The Duke continued: "(?The facts about?) the automobile trip from Biarritz to Lisbon are these: Ribbentrop in person arrived in Lisbon on the 11th. It had been arranged, through the mediation of Salazar, that he was to meet Churchill there, but Churchill did not come, and Salazar was on that account severely blamed. However, before this meeting, the British had written to the Germans through German Army channels, not through Salazar, but received no formal answer. For this reason, the British believed the Germans not to be acting in good faith, and therefore, did not keep the Lisbon rendezvous. "These facts have already been presented to the Japanese," he added, "but if there are any doubts they may be settled by this story." a — Part 2 not available. b — KOSHAKU—Prince, Duke or Marquis.

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c — As in text. Possibly SANTILLANA, or SANTA ANA. Inter 25 Dec 43 (1) Rec'd 26 Dec 43 Trans 29 Dec 43 Revised 30 Dec 43 (2111 -e)

# 106212 Japanese

[MR]

Churchill firmly discouraged any use of force by the United States in the Azores, and enlarged on a suggestion made by General Marshall that Amer­ ican aircraft be given British markings. The Prime Minister now proposed that American air crews wear British insignia on their uniforms—no doubt taking great pleasure in making the suggestion.

C-549 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 19, 1944, 2155 Ζ /TOR 0030 Z, Jan. 20 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. 1. We are convinced that it was a misunderstanding that Salazar agreed to the use of Lagens Field by an American V.L.R. squadron of Navy planes. Apparently the Germans making a virtue of necessity have said that they respect Salazar's age long engagements under the Anglo-Por­ tuguese treaty but that this would not cover United States forces. At the same time Salazar is prepared to lend himself to any fiction or camouflage which would give the results we both desire. 2. At our talks in Washington in May 1943 we thought the prize was great and you will remember that I in particular was ready to use force if necessary to obtain it. I was for a long time skeptical of the Foreign Office view that Salazar could be made to meet our needs through the invocation of the old treaty. However he has done so to a very great extent in spite of the fact that we gave no guarantee to send an army to defend Portugal at a time when things looked much more dangerous for him than they do now. All the arrangements for the ferry service are now agreed and in hand, and my impression is that the only other matter immediately outstanding is that of your Liberator squadron. Although we possess overwhelming strength it would be as you yourself felt rather inconsistent with our general attitude towards small powers to override them roughly in matters of neutrality. I feel we have been spared a very difficult decision and I should not like to upset things for the sake of a single squadron.

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3. I am told that there would be no difficulty if your squadron would operate as a British unit with British markings but with American crews wearing some badge to indicate that they are temporarily incorporated in the RAF on the analogy of the Eagle Squadron. Commander Huff U.S. Navy who has been advising the American Legation in Lisbon on U.S. Naval facilities in the Azores and is now returning to Washington favours this idea. In judging this please remember that we were quite ready to put large numbers of troops into American uniforms at the time of TORCH if that would help. This is the course I would recommend. It seems to give all we want in fact. 4. I would at the same time send a message to Salazar pointing out to him the great importance of meeting your wishes in every way compatible with his own security. I should invoke the "Friends to friends" phrase in our treaty of 1373 as a reason for his making things agreeable to you in every way and I should emphasize the extraordinary unwisdom of any abrupt step on his part which would lead to a breach with the United States which would certainly entail a change in our relations too. [MR*. R&C]

With the British and American navies bearing the brunt of the naval war against Germany, and for that matter Japan, Churchill could see little sense in sending warships to the Soviet Union, particularly since there was no longer any danger of a German victory on the eastern front.

C-550 London [via U.S.Army] Jan. 21, 1944, 1754 Ζ/TOR 1945 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Your numbers 444 and 445. 1. I deprecate the inclusion in the second of the alternatives we are putting before U.J. of an offer to obtain at once eight Italian destroyers and four Italian submarines. My idea in suggesting that Royal Sovereign and a cruiser should be offered was to avoid any immediate approach to the Italians and thus escape the dangers stressed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We fear that the second alternative as formulated in your draft may give us the worst of both worlds. 2. I, therefore, hope you will agree to the omission from the message of the following passage in your draft: "An effort will be made at once to make available from the sur­ rendered Italian war ships eight destroyers and four submarines to

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be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U S ships." Let me know if I may despatch the message as amended and the accompanying telegram on behalf of us both. The British Ambassador in Moscow has just been reminded by the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that the delivery date is February 1st. 3. The eight destroyers could not be found from British resources since all the ships in Halifax and Bermuda are now manned and we expect to man every ship completing according to programme and will assuredly need them all to meet our huge commitments for "OVERLORD" and the battle of the Atlantic. [MR*. RUC]

The message discussed below was sent to Stalin on January 23 (Stalin/WSC, docs. 230, 231).

R-447 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] January 22, 1944, 11:00 A.M. Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Your 550. I agree to your suggestion that the following paragraph in my 444 be omitted from your message to U.J. QUOTE: An effort will be made at once to make available from the surrendered Italian war ships eight destroyers and four submarines to be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U. S. ships, UNQUOTE.

Please let me know when your message is sent and ask your Ambassador to inform Harriman. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

As with previous messages which referred to MAGIC, the next cable is printed with all notations found on the source document in the hope that this will aid future researchers in locating these materials in what are currently classified files.

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C-550/1 From London, 22 January 1944 HMOC/399 Following message to be transmitted by Safe Hand to President. All copies to be destroyed after delivery to addressee. Message begins: Personal and Most Secret for President from Prime Minister. I am grateful for your having drawn my attention to MAGIC of 23rd December between Madrid and Tokio. I incline to view that Russians may well be reading this series, and if this surmise is well founded, it might explain the Pravda story. Anyhow there is no excuse for Soviet behavior. Stalin could perfectly easily have asked us. I hope you will continue to remonstrate as we are doing. Message ends. [MR-163]

Admiral Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations, disliked the British and told the President's Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, that the Navy "prefers to use the squadron elsewhere than from the Azores rather than masquerading as a British squadron" (Leahy to Roosevelt, Jan. 22, 1944, MR).

R-448 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 22, 1944, 3:30 P.M. Personal and Secret, for the Former Naval Person from the President. Replying to your 549, it appears preferable to delay sending our V.L.R. squadron to Lagens Field pending further efforts to obtain Salazar's agreement for the American squadron to use the field under British operational control. I hope you can succeed in influencing Salazar to permit your air command in the Azores to utilize in its anti-submarine campaign an American squadron under British operational control. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. «£iC]

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In R-447, the President had agreed to Churchill's suggestions for a message to Stalin about the transfer of elements of the Italian fleet to the Soviet Union.

C-551 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 23, 1944, 0055 Ζ I TOR 2300 Z, Jan. 22 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. I t h a n k you so m u c h for your No. 4 4 7 . 1 have dispatched joint messages tonight a n d H a r r i m a n is being informed. [MR*]

T h e cable Churchill had promised (C—547) about problems with Argentina was a plea to the President not to break diplomatic relations with the military government which had taken control in Buenos Aires in J u n e 1943. T h e Americans were angry that the Argentine government had failed to suppress German economic and intelligence activities in that country, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull believed that the cautious British policy was dictated by business pressure. T h e r e was no doubt that Britain had substantial financial interests in Argentina, but there was truth in the British claim that cutting off trade with Argentina would hamper preparations for OVERLORD; at least the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed with this argument (Woodward, British Foreign Policy, IV, 74).

C-552 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 23, 1944, 0104 Ζ / TOR 2300 Z, Jan. 22 Prime Minister to President Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. We shall h e l p all we can about the Argentine a n d above all avoid any public divergence. I beg you however to look into the formidable consequences which would follow from o u r losing their meat, hides a n d o t h e r supplies. O n e third of o u r meat supply comes from t h e m . How are we to feed ourselves plus the American Army for " O V E R L O R D " if this is cut? T h e j o i n t examination of the supply aspects by the Combined Boards in Washington will show you how m u c h these people have us in their h a n d s . O u r Chiefs of Staff consider that an immediate cessation of Argentine supplies will r u p t u r e military operations on the scale p l a n n e d for this year. I c a n n o t cut the British ration lower than it is now. We really must look before we leap. We can always save u p a n d pay t h e m back when o u r h a n d s are clear. I must e n t e r my solemn warning of the gravity

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of the situation which will follow an interruption of Argentine supplies. Even recall of Ambassadors only means that the field is left open to the Germans. These rascals have calculated very carefully and know the hold they have over us for the time being. [MR*. R&C]

Churchill's message of support for the Italian monarchy and the government of Marshal Badoglio came in response to the scheduled meeting of opposition political leaders in Bari, Italy—the so-called Bari Congress. The congress, which began meeting on January 28, called for the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel and the formation of a government composed of representatives of the opposition parties. To the annoyance of the British, Count Carlo Sforza, the American favorite, consistently attacked the Italian King and government during the talks. Two days after Churchill sent this cable, Secretary of State Hull, in a letter to the President, argued "that any political reconstruction in Italy is impossible under the present King and that there should be no further delay in the reconstruction on a broad political base of the present Italian Government." The Secretary further noted that Churchill's telegram pro­ vided "an admirable opportunity" to state American views (Hull to Roosevelt, Jan. 25, 1944, FRUS, 1944, III, 1004-5). Hull included a draft of such a cable (printed below), but Roosevelt chose not to send it. (See headnote to R-464.) Harold Macmillan was British Minister Resident at Allied headquarters in Algiers as well as his government's representative to the Allied Control Coun­ cil for Italy. Andrei Vyshinsky was the Soviet representative on that council, and Ren6 Massigli represented the French National Committee. Both of the latter had supported demands for the establishment of a democratic Italian government which included representatives of the Italian Communist Party.

C-553 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 23, 1944, 1550 Ζ /TOR 1335 Ζ

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Private Also. I should like you to see the following telegram I have sent to Harold MacMillan which is of course one of our internal messages, so I send it to you quite informally. Text begins. "Prime Minister to Mr. Harold MacMillan. and personal. "1.1 have talked over the whole position with the Foreign Secretary and we are both agreed that we should hold on to Badoglio and the

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King till we can be sure of something better and more effective for our purpose. It would follow, therefore, that we should do nothing to weaken them in the interval. On the contrary, should we become masters of Rome in the near future the early return to the Capital of Badoglio and the King would be beneficial. Thereafter at leisure we can survey the scene and see what other alternatives are in sight. No doubt the Vatican would play a part in this. "2. You should be on your guard against the kind of views put forward by Massigli. President Roosevelt has misgivings about our having let the French in on this Italian business on account of the hatred prevailing between the two nations. I too was chilled by Massigli's views. Vyshinsky seems to chop and change. You are quite right to keep in close touch with him but it does not follow we have to obey everything he says." [MR*. FRUS, 1944, III, 1004.]

R-448/1, not sent Jan. 25, 1944 Draft Telegram for the Prime Minister from the President. Thank you for your telegram no. 553, January 23, containing the text of a message which you have sent to Harold MacMillan concerning our policy with respect to the King of Italy and Marshal Badoglio in the light of recent military developments in Italy. I have come to the conclusion that there can be no political reconstruction in Italy or any effective and united cooperation from the Italian people under the present King. While I have no desire to see the constitutional question of the monarchical institution in Italy raised until the entire country is liberated, I am convinced that Victor Emmanuel, in view of his long association in the minds of Italians with the Fascist regime, must complete the anti-Fascist revolution begun on July 25 by withdrawing himself from the Italian political scene. I am informed that he will never abdicate voluntarily and it is obvious that the longer his abdication is postponed the more difficult it will be to facilitate it. Consequendy, I am opposed to his return to Rome, even for a visit, since this indication of our support for him would strengthen, if anything, his own determination to remain. In brief, our position is that the reorganization of the Italian Government on a broad political base should no longer be delayed and that, since Victor Emmanuel is an obstacle to the cooperation of the liberal anti-Fascist forces in liberated Italy, his abdication must be arranged without further delay. The formula suggested by the anti-Fascist groups in Naples last November providing for the King's abdication in favor of his grandson, the Prince of Naples, would appear to be most satisfactory

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under the circumstances. American public opinion would never understand our continued tolerance and apparent support of Victor Emmanuel. [CH] [MR]

The Argentine government's decision to break diplomatic relations with Germany ended the immediate crisis with the United States, although the pronounced anti-Americanism of Argentine leaders and their decided preference for maintaining strong commercial ties with Great Britain continued to annoy American officials. Moreover, German agents were permitted to operate freely in Argentina, and the Argentine government had supported a coup d'6tat in Bolivia conducted by pro-German military leaders. The key incident in Argentina's break with Germany was the arrest of Osmar Alberto Helmuth, an Argentine naval reserve officer and collaborator with the major German agent in Argentina, Johann Harnisch. Helmuth had been sent by his government on an arms-purchasing mission to Berlin, but had been arrested by British authorities when his ship stopped at Trinidad early in November 1943. Since he carried written instructions, there was no way for the Argentine government to plead ignorance. Ironically, the pressure exerted by the United States on the Argentine government to break diplomatic relations with Germany caused the collapse of the government of General Pedro Ramirez and set into motion the chain of events which brought to power Colonel Juan Peron, an even more anti-American and pro-German leader.

R-449 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 24, 1944, 8:55 P.M.

Secret and Personal, for the Former Naval Person from the President. Your 552. I am glad to say that the Argentine picture has changed since receipt of your telegram of January twenty-third. This morning our Ambassador in Buenos Aires telephoned urgently that the Argentine Government gave its solemn word of honor that it would break relations with Germany before Saturday noon of this week. At long last the Argentine Government apparendy has suddenly discovered that the German Embassy is carrying on espionage and subversive activities in flagrant violation of assurances made to the Argentine Government. The contemplated Argentine action is convincing proof that what I have been saying all along is correct, namely, that Argentina is a base of operations for activities dangerous both to our common war effort and to the peace of the Americas. I think it is clear that the Argentines got word of what was up and are taking this action in an endeavor to stave off moral and possible economic sanctions against her. Although it is of

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real military advantage to have t h e G e r m a n Embassy out of the way, Argentina will have to d o m u c h m o r e in the way of housecleaning of undesirable elements a n d of compliance with h e r inter-American com­ mitments to convince m e of the sincerity of h e r conversion. Now is the time for us to press forward a n d insist that Argentina p u t a n e n d to the e n c o u r a g e m e n t of sinister activities that menace t h e conduct of t h e war a n d internal peace within several of t h e American Republics. If you a n d I should refuse to deal energetically with the situation, the subversive forces in Argentina a n d elsewhere would construe this as a backward step a n d would be greatly h e a r t e n e d . This would prejudice o u r j o i n t war effort. In addition it would tend to destroy inter-American solidarity a n d place t h e lower p a r t of the Continent in the power of elements unfriendly to us. O u r friends t h e r e would lose faith in us. Argentina's p r e s e n t willingness to break with G e r m a n y shows that we h e r e h a d correctly diagnosed t h e situation a n d that Argentina would not have fought back in t h e way you feared against t h e action which we earlier contemplated. We believe that this action together with any assistance which you may be willing to r e n d e r should not be a b a n d o n e d b u t merely held in abeyance p e n d i n g developments. For t h e present, we are merely issuing a statement to the effect that we are not recognizing t h e Bolivian revolutionary J u n t a . A similar state­ m e n t from you would be useful. Roosevelt [CH] [MR*. fifcfC.J

Not only had Churchill established a cordial personal relationship with Harry Hopkins, but the Prime Minister believed that the presidential adviser was an important force for good Anglo-American relations.

C-554 London [via U.S. Embassy] Jan. 24, 1944, 1442 Ζ/TOR 1545 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. I should be grateful for m o r e news of Harry. [MR]

Churchill expressed pleasure at the turn of events in Argentina, but the British Foreign Office did not believe that diplomatic and economic pressure from

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the United States was the cause. Rather, with a German defeat increasingly probable, the Argentine government decided to move away from its pro-Axis stance, but without dropping its anti-American policy. T h e Helmuth case, reported by the United Press on January 26, is discussed in the headnote to R-449. Following the American lead, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden announced to the House of Commons on January 25 that the British government would not recognize the new Bolivian j u n t a headed by Major Gualberto Villarroel.

C-555 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 25, 1944, 1035 Ζ/TOR 1205 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your n u m b e r 449. 1.1 a m very glad that the H e l l m u t h disclosures a n d your pressure have p r o d u c e d so good an effect u p o n the Argentine. 2. I have asked E d e n to make a statement to the House this m o r n i n g backing you u p about Bolivia. I h o p e this will be satisfactory to you. [MR*]

R-450 Hyde Park, N.V. [via U.S. Navy] January 25, 1944, 12:40 P.M. Secret a n d Personal, for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. T h a n k you for your p a r a 6, N o . 545; N o . 553; a n d 555. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

C-556 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 26, 1944, 1023 Ζ/TOR 1155 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Secret. I h o p e you liked Anthony's answer today about Bolivia. [MR*]

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Leahy and the State Department drafted R—451, and President Roosevelt made the changes.

R-451 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 27, 1944, 2:30 P.M. Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Replying to your 556, I am highly pleased with Anthony's statement about Bolivia. I am delighted to have your and his support. Your helpful support in this matter is appreciated. Now that Argentina has broken relations with Germany and Japan, I trust we can both urge again that we press forward with the Argentine Government to bring about full cooperation by Argentina in the suppression of activities inimical to the cause of the United Nations. Roosevelt [WDL, State Dept.] [MR*. fi£s?C]

T H E P O L I S H BOUNDARY D I S P U T E Soviet armies crossed the pre-1939 Polish-Soviet boundary on January 4, 1944. The following day the Polish government in London issued a statement asserting its authority over liberated Poland and calling for an agreement with the Soviet Union so that the Polish Underground forces could cooperate with the liberating armies. Such language masked the insoluble problem: the Soviets, determined to take advantage of superior strength, insisted on moving the boundary with Poland substantially westward, whereas the Polish government rejected anything beyond minor adjustments to the prewar boundary. Moreover, the Soviet government had never restored diplomatic relations with the Polish government in London following the crisis over the Katyn Forest massacre. (See C-284ff.) The boundary conflict involved more than just a Soviet search for security against attack from the west, although that was the most oft-stated issue. The dispute was rooted in ethnic and historical arguments about the peoples and the land west and south of the Pripet Marshes, particularly those sections known as Galicia and Volhynia. The controversy had been complicated by the attempts of the peacemakers after World War I to establish the eastern boundary of Poland. Although negotiators at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 spent a good deal of time and effort trying to draw a reasonable Soviet-Polish boundary (see Woodward, British Foreign Policy, II, 657-62), the so-called Curzon line was casually invented by British Prime Minister Lloyd George and formally set forth in a note from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, to the Russian government on July 11, 1920. The boundary line was proposed as an attempt to end the armed conflict between the new Polish state and

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Bolshevik Russia, but it was satisfactory to neither the Poles nor the Russians. In the military action which followed, the Poles, with French aid, gained the advantage and forced the Soviet governments of Russia, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia to sign the Treaty of Riga in 1921—a treaty which established the Polish boundary a substantial distance to the east of the Curzon line. Since a return to the Curzon line would award the Soviet Union most of the territory Poland had gained by the Riga Treaty, particularly the city of Lwow (Lemberg), which lay in the center of the disputed area, the Poles rejected it as a post—World War II boundary. Misled by President Roosevelt and some members of the British Foreign Office and by their own wishful thinking into believing that Britain and the United States would oppose the Soviet Union on such boundary disputes, the Polish leaders desperately refused to compromise. In fact, however, during the Teheran talks Stalin had proposed that Poland's western boundary (with Germany) be shifted to the Oder River, considerably west of where it had been in 1939, and Churchill had responded by suggesting that the Soviet Union, Poland, and Germany all "execute the drill 'left close,' " which would move the first two to the left (westward) at the expense of Germany (FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 512). Stalin then agreed to accept the Curzon line as Russia's boundary with Poland, but only if the northwestern half of East Prussia,

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including the ports of Konigsberg and Tilsit, also became part of the Soviet Union. The southeastern portion of East Prussia would go to Poland.

C-557 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 28, 1944 I TOR 2325 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal. After much thought and talk I have sent the following signal to U J. 1. On Thursday last, accompanied by the Foreign Secretary and with the authority of the War Cabinet, I saw representatives of the Polish Government in London. I informed them that the security of the Russian frontiers against Germany was a matter of high consequence to His Maj­ esty's Government, and that we should certainly support the Soviet Union in all measures we considered necessary to that end. I remarked that Russia had sustained two frightful invasions with immense slaughter and devastation at the hands of Germany, that Poland had had national in­ dependence and existence restored after the first world war, and that it was the policy of the Great Allies to restore Poland once again after this war. I said that although we had gone to war for the sake of Poland, we had not gone to war for any particular frontier line but for the existence of a strong free, independent Poland, which Marshal Stalin had also declared himself supporting. Moreover, although Great Britain would have fought on in any case for years until something happened to Ger­ many, the liberation of Poland from the German grip is being achieved mainly by the enormous sacrifices and achievements of the Russian ar­ mies. Therefore Russia and her Allies had a right to ask that Poland should be guided to a large extend about the frontiers of the territory she would have. 2. 1 then said that I believed from what had passed at Tehran that the Soviet Government would be willing to agree to the Easterly frontiers of Poland conforming to the Curzon line subject to discussion of enthnographical considerations, and I advised them to accept the Curzon line as a basis for discussion. I spoke of the compensations which Poland would receive in the North and in the West. In the North there would be East Prussia; but here I did not mention the point about Konigsberg. In the West they would be free and aided to occupy Germany up to the line of the Oder. I told them it was their duty to accept this task and guard the frontier against German aggression towards the East in consequence of their liberation by the Allied Forces, I said that in this task they would need a friendly Russia behind them and would, I presumed, be sustained by the guarantee of the Three Great Powers against further German attack. Great Britain would be willing to give such a guarantee if it were

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in harmony with her Ally, Soviet Russia. I could not forecast the action of the United States, but it seemed that the Three Great Powers would stand together against all disturbers of the peace, at any rate until a long time after the war was ended. I made it clear that the Polish Government would not be committed to the acceptance of the Curzon line as a basis of examination except as part of the arrangement which gave them the fine compensations to the North and to the West which I had mentioned. 3. Finally I said that if the Russian policy was unfolded in the sense I had described, I would urge the Polish Government to settle now on that basis and His Majesty's Government would advocate the confirmation of such a settlement by the Peace Conference or by conferences for the settlement of Europe following the destruction of Hitlerism, and would support no territorial claims from Poland which went beyond it. If the Polish ministers were satisfied that agreement could be reached upon these lines, it would be their duty at the proper time not merely to acquiesce in it but to commend it to their people with courage, even though they ran the risk of being repudiated by extremists. 4. The Polish ministers were very far from rejecting the prospects thus unfolded, but they asked for time to consider matters with the rest of their colleagues, and as a result of this they have asked a number of questions, none of which seems to me to be in conflict with the general outline of my suggestions to them. In particular they wish to be assured that Poland would be free and independent in the new home assigned to her; that she would receive the guarantee of the Great Powers against German revenge effectively; that these Great Powers would also assist in expelling the Germans from the new territories to be assigned to Poland; and that in regions to be incorporated in Soviet Russia such Poles as wished would be assisted to depart for their new abodes. They also inquired about what their position will be if a large part of Poland West of the Curzon line is soon occupied by the advancing Soviet armies. Will they be allowed to go back and form a more broad based government in accordance with the popular wish and allowed to function administratively in the liberated areas in the same way as other governments who have been overrun? In particular they are of course deeply concerned about relations between the Polish underground movement and the advancing Soviet forces, it being understood that their prime desire was to assist in driving out the Germans. This underground movement raises matters important to our common war effort. 5. We also attach great importance to assimilating our action in the different regions which we hope to liberate. You know the policy we are following in Italy. There we have taken you fully into our counsels, and we want to do the same in regard to France and other countries to whose liberation we look forward. We believe such uniformity of action is of

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great importance, now and in the future, to the cause of the United Nations. 6. The earliest possible agreement in principle on the frontiers of the new Polish State is highly desirable to allow of a satisfactory arrangement regarding these two very important points. 7. While however everyone will agree that Soviet Russia has the right to recognize or refuse recognition to any foreign government, do you not agree that to advocate changes within a foreign government comes near to that interference with internal sovereignty to which you and I have expressed ourselves as opposed? I may mention that this view is strongly held by His Majesty's Government. 8. I now report this conversation which expresses the policy of His Majesty's Government at the present time upon this difficult question to my friend and comrade, Marshal Stalin. I earnesdy hope these plans may be helpful. I had always hoped to postpone discussions of frontier questions till the end of the war when the victors would be round the table together. The dangers which have forced His Majesty's Government to depart from this principle are formidable and imminent. If, as we may justly hope, the successful advance of the Soviet armies continues and a large part of Poland is cleared of the German oppressors, a good relationship will be absolutely necessary between whatever forces can speak for Poland and the Soviet Union. The creation in Warsaw of another Polish government different from the one we have recognized up to the present, together with disturbances in Poland, would raise issues in Great Britain and the United States detrimental to that close accord between the Three Great Powers upon which the future of the world depends. 9. I wish to make it clear that this message is not intended to be any intervention or interference between the governments of the Soviet Union and Poland. It is a statement in broad outline of the position of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain in regard to matters in which they feel themselves deeply concerned. 10. I should like myself to know from you what steps you would be prepared to take to help us all to resolve this serious problem. You could certainly count on our good offices, for what they would be worth. 11. I am sending a copy of this message to the President of the United States with a request for complete secrecy. [FRUS, 1944, III, 1240--43. R&C. Stalin/WSC, doc. 235.]

Churchill continued to worry about Hopkins' health, and Roosevelt responded on the basis of a memorandum from his personal physician, Vice Admiral R. T. Mclntire.

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R-452 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 29, 1944, 5:35 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Your 554. Harry is improving slowly following a severe attack of influenza. This however was complicated by a recurrence of his old digestive disturbance. I h o p e h e will be on deck again in a month's time, but it is a slow j o b . Roosevelt [MR*]

On January 12, during Churchill's convalescence in Marrakesh, General Charles de Gaulle had visited the Prime Minister. Churchill had not commented on the talks and Harry Hopkins suggested that the President send the following cable.

R-453 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 29, 1944, 5:35 P.M. Personal a n d Secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person. I should be very m u c h interested in hearing about your talk with General DeGaulle at Marrakech. Roosevelt [ H L H ] [MR*]

Poor British leadership in India and British doubts about the value of military actions in China as compared with other theaters, compounded by the AngloAmerican strategic decision to cancel or postpone a land offensive in northern Burma, had reduced the flow of supplies and equipment to China (see map, p. 111). Even so, those supplies getting as far as Calcutta were slow in reaching the front. In a memorandum to the President, General Marshall blamed the bottleneck on the civil authorities in India and recommended that the military take control. T h e only change Roosevelt made to Marshall's draft was the addition of the final sentence.

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R-454 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Jan. 29, 1944,6:15 P.M.

Personal and Secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person. Operations of the Air Transport line from India into China and op­ erations in Burma have, from the outset, been embarrassed by a lack of vigorous management of the lines of communication. Efforts on the part of the civilian management for improvement have produced disappoint­ ing results which are now directly and adversely affecting the support of U.S. air forces in China at a critical moment. Up to the present time, steps leading to military control have been fruitless except for the ac­ ceptance of American railway battalions on Bengal-Assam Railroad. These troops are now progressively taking over portions of that line. This, how­ ever, has not prevented a breakdown elsewhere on the lines of commu­ nication which has put three of our China Air ferry fields in Assam out of action because of lack of aviation gasoline. Congestion begins in Cal­ cutta itself where many vessels are seriously delayed through lack of effective coordinating control over the activities of the port and on the barge lines leading therefrom. I feel that only your personal intervention will secure the prompt adop­ tion of those forceful measures which are essential to success in handling the port of Calcutta, railway and barge lines leading from that port into Assam. I urge that all of the lines of communication, from Calcutta in­ clusive, into Assam be placed at once under full military control and that officers of outstanding competence who will tolerate neither failure nor delay be assigned to this work. The United States stands ready to assist in furnishing expert personnel should you desire this. I am sure Mountbatten would agree that the situation is serious. Roosevelt [GCM] [MR*]

On January 30, Roosevelt celebrated his sixty-second birthday.

C-558 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 30, 1944, 0923 Ζ / TOR 1025 Ζ To President Roosevelt. Personal. Many many happy returns of the day. Winston and Clementine Church­ ill. [MR*]

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Churchill's lecture to de Gaulle did little to change the Frenchman's attitude. The General insisted that Britain and the United States treat him and the French Committee as the legitimate French government and as equals. But de Gaulle's manner may have been only the surface problem, for Roosevelt and many American officials had no room for a strong, independent France in their assumptions about the postwar world. The arrest of the three ex-Vichy officials, Boisson, Peyrouton, and Flandin, by the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) had brought an angry response from Churchill and Roosevelt (see C-513, R-423, C-517, and R—431), but that was only the beginning. The elimination from the FCNL of General Alphonse Georges, a longtime Giraud supporter, worried Church­ ill, and French efforts to maintain their special position in Lebanon originally granted by a League of Nations mandate heightened American fears of French colonialism. (See C-504.) Those present at the talks between Churchill and de Gaulle were Lord Beaverbrook (Max), A. Duff Cooper (the British representative to the FCNL), Bryce Nairn (British Vice Consul in Marrakesh), and Gaston Palewski (de Gaulle's personal Chief of Staff)· The other French official mentioned in the cable is not identified in the sources. Edwin C. Wilson was the American diplomatic representative to the FCNL. Emmanuel R. d'Astier de la Vigerie had the same appeal for Churchill as similar adventurous men of action like General Orde Wingate. Before becoming Minister of the Interior for the FCNL, d'Astier had led the "Liberation" section of the Resistance movement.

C-559 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 30, 1944, 1530 Ζ/TOR 1805 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. 1. Your 452: I am sorry to hear Harry has been so ill, and shall be grateful for any further news. 2. Your 453: Talk took place in Garden of Flower Villa after lunch, Max, Duff Cooper, our Consul General and two of De Gaulle's followers also being present. It consisted mainly of a prolonged complaint and lecture by me, in good manners and bad French, upon his many follies. I explained how foolish he was to create needless antagonisms with you and me and that he hindered the interests of France thereby. 3. I spoke of Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin, saying that we had en­ tered into obligations towards the first two and that these must be re­ spected by the French committee. About Flandin I said that if they were going to draw the line of impurity at Flandin they could be making so wide a schism in France that the resultant friction in any territory that might be liberated would hamper our military operations and was there­ fore a matter of concern to us. 4. De Gaulle in reply showed me the report of the bitter debate in his

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Assemblee the day before printed in the local newspaper, and certainly there is no doubt that the pressure comes from there and also by messages from France. I remarked that it was an odd way to restore the greatness of France by proving how many Frenchmen had behaved badly. I then complained to him about the Lebanon, etc. How unwise it was for a nation having great colonies to act in this high-handed manner at a time when two of her principal Allies had no colonial possessions worth speaking of and could therefore afford to take a very detached view. I spoke also of my regret that General Georges, who was an old friend of mine, had been dismissed, and made it clear to him that we had confidence that General Giraud would not allow French troops to be used for our detriment but that we had not yet the same confidence in the French committee nor, by implication, in its head. He seemed upset by this. The impression I tried to create was that they would have to work their passage in order to regain from us that confidence which might be of marked advantage to them. I made no commitments of any kind. 5. Duff Cooper, who began De Gaullist, formed an unfavourable view of the General's attitude and thought that I had been very patient with him. He promised to send a record of the conversation but it has not yet arrived and I have telegraphed for it today. When it comes I will send it to you [C-563]. I would have reported earlier had anything occurred of significance. 6. Since then, both at Marrakech and here in London, I have seen Monsieur Dastier De La Vigerie who is De Gaulle's Minister of the Interior. This is a remarkable man of the Scarlet Pimpernel type and fairly fresh from France, which he has revisited three or four times. He has made very strong appeals to me to drop more arms by air for their resistance movements. I hope to be able to do more in February. He says that in Haute Savoie, south of Geneva between Grenoble and the Italian frontier, he has over 20,000 men all desperate, but only one in five has any weapon. If more weapons were available, very large numbers more would take to the mountains. As you know, I am most anxious to see a Guerrilla A La Tito started up in Savoy and the Alpes Maritimes. 7. I also spoke to Dastier about Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin, and the great delay in giving effect to the promises made through Ambassador Wilson, USA, to you. He is a fine fellow, very fierce and bitter but one of the best Frenchmen I have struck in these bleak times. He said that De Gaulle might seem unreasonable to us but felt the humiliation of his country so deeply that he had an inferiority complex, to which I replied sententiously that to have suffered great disasters was no excuse for committing great follies. 8. I was sorry in a way for De Gaulle, who is a bigger man in his own way than any around him. We were personally quite friendly. I attended

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his review. I a m satisfied t h a t h e is being increasingly caged a n d t a m e d by the committee a n d the Assemblee a n d that there is no longer any d a n g e r of a one-man show. Naturally it was to his interest to make as m u c h of o u r meeting as possible, b u t I d o not think this has d o n e any h a r m a n d my outlook is u n c h a n g e d except that I realize that a great deal of power is passing to t h e committee a n d the assemble [Assemblee] while military personalities decline. [MR*]

In the memorandum referred to by Churchill (R-432/1), the President had strongly opposed giving the French Committee of National Liberation a seat on the Allied Control Commission for Italy. Harold Macmillan was the British representative on that commission.

C-560 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 30, 1944, 1540 Ζ / TOR 1805 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. T h a n k you for consulting m e about the representation of France on the Control Commission for Italy (your m e m o r a n d u m of December 31). My own feeling is that this is not a particularly i m p o r t a n t point. I a m assured by MacMillan t h a t all that is involved is the p e r f o r m a n c e of Liaison work a n d t h a t the F r e n c h (like the Soviet) representative would have no effect o n the structure or the working of the Control Commission. After all, we both agreed to French representation o n the Advisory Council for Italy on the same basis as the United States, British a n d Soviet representative. I myself would regard the present French request as a gnat c o m p a r e d with this fairly substantial camel. It would be r a t h e r a smack in the face for the French if their c a n d i d a t u r e were now t u r n e d down, since their m a n sat on the Advisory Council for Italy when the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n was m a d e . T h e y have got a corps in action fighting well. So my view is t h a t we o u g h t to let it go. [MR*]

Roosevelt's cable 454 concerned problems on the supply route from Calcutta and Assam to Burma. American military personnel eventually took over the administration of those facilities and, by the summer of 1944, the delays were largely eliminated.

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C-561 London [via U.S. Army] Jan. 30, 1944, 1704 Ζ/TOR 1805 Ζ Prime Minister to President Personal and Most Secret. 1. Your No. 454: I am giving this immediate personal attention. [MR*]

Stalin paid no attention to Allied arguments that the transfer of Italian war­ ships to Russia could destabilize the Italian government and might interfere with the OVERLORD and ANVIL operations.

C-562 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 1, 1944, 0020 Ζ / TOR 0305 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal and Most Secret. The following has just arrived from U.J. and as I do not know whether you have a separate copy I repeat it to you with the following comment "What can you expect from a bear but a growl?" From Premier Stalin to Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. Personal and Secret. I received on the 23rd January both your joint messages, signed by you Mr. Prime Minister, and you, Mr. President, regarding the question of the handing over of Italian shipping for the use of the Soviet Union. I must say that, after your joint affirmative reply at Tehran to the question which I raised of the handing over to the Soviet Union of Italian shipping by the end of January 1944. I considered this ques­ tion settled and the thought never entered my mind of the possibility of any kind of reconsideration of this decision which was taken and agreed between the three of us. All the more so since, as we agreed at the time, this question was to be completely settled with the Italians. Now I see that this is not so and that nothing has ever been mentioned to the Italians on the subject. In order however not to complicate this question, which is of such great importance for our common struggle against Germany, the Soviet Government is prepared to accept your proposal regarding the despatch from British Ports to the USSR of the Battleship Royal Sovereign and one cruiser, and regarding the temporary use of these

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vessels by the Naval High Command of the USSR until such time as the appropriate Italian shipping is made available to the Soviet Union. Similarly we shall be prepared to accept from the USA and Great Britain 20,000 tons of merchant shipping which will also be used by us until such time as a similar tonnage of Italian shipping is handed over to us. It is important that there should be no delays now re­ garding the matter and that all the shipping indicated should be handed over to us during the month of February. In your reply however there is no mention of the handing over to the Soviet Union of 8 Italian destroyers and 4 submarines, to the handing over of which to the Soviet Union at the end of January you, Mr. Prime Minister, and you, Mr. President, agreed in Tehran. Meanwhile, for the Soviet Union this very question, the question of destroyers and submarines, without which the handing over of one battleship and one cruiser has no significance, is of capital impor­ tance. You understand yourselves that a cruiser and a battleship are powerless without escorting destroyers. Since the whole of Italy's fleet is under your control, to carry out the decision which was taken at Tehran to hand over the use of the Soviet Union 8 destroyers and 4 submarines out of that fleet should present no difficulties. I am agreeable (literally "I agree") that, instead of Italian destroyers and submarines, a similar number of American or British destroyers and submarines should be handed over to the Soviet Union for our use. Moreover, the question of the handing over of destroyers and sub­ marines cannot be postponed, but must be settled at once and the same time with the handing over of the battleship and cruiser, as was definitely agreed between us at Tehran. [MR*. RUC. pSlalm/FDR, doc. 157.]

As promised in his cable 559, Churchill forwarded Duff Cooper's report on the talks in Marrakesh.

C-563 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 1, 1 9 4 4 / T O R 2230 Ζ

Prime Minister to President. I have now received Duff Cooper's account of my talks with De Gaulle and am sending it by the next air courier. [MR*]

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Anglo-American emergency propaganda committees had been established in London, Washington, and New Delhi following a recommendation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in September 1943, but the New Delhi operation had never gotten started. Most American leaders thought that was just as well, for they distrusted British motives, particularly in Asia. Convinced that Great Britain sought to retain and even expand its colonial holdings, men like Admiral Leahy and General Marshall frequently sought to limit Britain's role in Asia and to disassociate the United States from British policies in that area. A few paragraphs from a memorandum dated 31 January 1943 from Leahy to the President capture those sentiments: It has become evident that differences between the interests and objectives of the United States and Great Britain in Southeast Asia raise serious objections to the continuance of the New Delhi committee. Much of the territory in which military operations in that theater of the war are to be conducted consists of portions of the British Empire now under Japanese occupation. British interests and objectives in that area are, therefore, both military and political, while those of the United States are concerned with the defeat of Japan. American representation on the New Delhi committee tends to create or confirm suspicion among Far Eastern peoples that the political policies of the United States with respect to this area conform to those of Great Britain. T h e State Department has consistently taken the position of opposing any integration of our propaganda program for the IndiaBurma region with the program of the British . . . (MR). Given Roosevelt's condemnations of British rule over India, the idea of a presidential visit to that nation must have made Churchill wince. T h e final sentence was added to the draft in Roosevelt's handwriting.

R-455 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 2, 1944, 12 noon Personal a n d Secret from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. Emergency P r o p a g a n d a Committees in Washington for the Pacific T h e a t e r , China, a n d Indo-China; in L o n d o n for the E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r have b e e n functioning for four months. T h e New Delhi Committee for the Southeast Asia T h e a t e r has not yet started to function. O n the basis of experience with these committees, it would seem that they should be confined to Washington and L o n d o n where the highest civilian a n d military authorities of both governments are located, a n d where the members of the committees can be a n d are readily in touch with those authorities. It is my strong conviction that the New Delhi Committee should be discontinued and I recommend such action for your consideration. Frankly

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I think it will d o m o r e h a r m t h a n good a n d by discontinuing it you a n d 1 can avoid a trip to I n d i a to straighten it out. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

Churchill's argument that the Italian monarchy and the government of Mar­ shal Badoglio depended upon Anglo-American support in order to survive was precisely why Secretary of State Hull (who was sent a copy of this cable) and Admiral Leahy (who was asked to prepare an answer) wanted to establish a new government in liberated Italy. T h e Americans believed that a new political order in Italy would be far less inclined to accept British guidance and would instead look to the United States for leadership. T h e prior asso­ ciation of Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio with the Fascists may have been awkward, but Americans had countenanced such awkwardness before, when it suited their purpose. Both Leahy and Hull, for example, had staunchly supported the deal with French Admiral Darlan in North Africa.

C-564 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 3, 1944, 1405 ΖI TOR 1620 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. I earnestly h o p e t h a t the existing regime in Italy will be allowed to function at least until t h e great battles now being fought by t h e soldiers of o u r two countries have resulted in o u r c a p t u r e of Rome. I a m sure that a disturbance now of such authority as remains in the Italian State a n d t h e a t t e m p t to create a new authority o u t of political g r o u p s with n o real backing will a d d greatly to o u r difficulties. Moreover these g r o u p s w h e n formed into a government, in o r d e r to win credit from t h e Italian people would feel it essential to assert Italian interests in a m u c h stronger form t h a n t h e King a n d Badoglio d a r e to d o . I feel it would be a great pity if Badoglio threw in his h a n d , a n d o u r reports show that t h e Italian Navy might be powerfully affected by action against t h e King. Much British a n d American blood is flowing, a n d I plead that military consid­ erations should carry weight. [MR*. WSC, V, 497. fi&fC]

Churchill was at first inclined to ignore Stalin's demand for the transfer of Italian warships. In the draft printed below, which Churchill initialed, the Prime Minister indicated that his primary concern was the morale of the Italian Navy, whose loyalty was essential to the Italian monarchy and the

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Badoglio government. Possibly realizing that the United States would insist upon a more conciliatory approach, Churchill finally proposed lending British destroyers and American submarines to Russia.

C-565, draft A, not sent London Feb. 1, 1944 Prime Minister to President. Personal and Most Secret. 1. Further to my No. 562, in view of the ungracious tone and evident refusal to try to understand our position which was so patiently and considerately explained, I am of the opinion that it would be better to leave this message unanswered for a week or ten days. 2. Meanwhile we could consider what to do about the eight destroyers and four submarines. Every one of yours and ours is engaged at full strain against the enemy. To hand them over to the Russians now is to put them out of action for several months, and these are the months most critical in our triple affairs. The destroyers would have to be taken at the expense of OVERLORD or of the Russian convoys. I could not be responsible for this. 3. Alternatively we could revert to the idea of asking the King and Badoglio to hand us over eight destroyers and four submarines for trans­ fer to the Russians. This would probably cause a mutiny in the Italian Fleet at the present very dangerous time. I am told that the Italian Navy is already worried by the attacks that are made on the Government they have hitherto obeyed. I should think it quite likely that Badoglio would throw in his hand rather than agree to this demand. As he is so often being told that he is to be kicked out as soon as we get to Rome he does not seem to have very much to lose. 4. I should be very glad to hear how you feel about it. I wonder what sort of answer I am going to get to my telegram about Poland [C-557]? [PREM 3/240/5/311-12]

C-565 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 3, 1944, 1418 Ζ/TOR 1620 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. 1. Further to my 562. We could revert to the idea of asking the King and Badoglio to hand us over 8 destroyers and 4 submarines for transfer to the Russians. This might easily cause a mutiny in the Italian Fleet at the present very dangerous time. I am told that the Italian Navy is already

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worried by the attacks that are made on the government they have hitherto obeyed. I should think it quite likely that Badoglio would throw in his hand rather than agree to this demand. As he is so often being told that he is to be kicked out as soon as we get to Rome, he does not seem to have much to lose. There are only 7 Italian destroyers in the whole Italian Navy and these are all being used in the heavy operations now in progress in the Mediterranean. 2. In these circumstances his Majesty's Government is prepared to find 8 destroyers for loan to the Russians pending delivery of the Italian vessels. These will of course be old destroyers, most of them, those that we got from you in 1941. They are however serviceable and will steam and fight. The Russians will not use them in the same continuous sea service as we are accustomed to maintain. They will probably lie in harbour in Northern Russian Ports. Here they will be available for training the crews which can man the Italian destroyers when these are handed over and have been fitted for Arctic work. In view of the ungracious tone of Stalin's reply and evident Soviet refusal to try to understand our position which was so patiently and considerately explained, I have little doubt that they will reproach us upon the quality of these vessels. It is however the best we can do. 3. It will be more difficult for us to find 4 old submarines, and we cannot spare any of the new ones which are in constant action. We should be glad therefore if you could supply these on loan until we can get the Italian craft. 4. Let me know how you feel about all this, and I will then submit to you a draft from us both to Uncle Joe. [MR*. R&C]

As the British expected, Roosevelt's inclination was to placate the Soviets as much as possible, though that did not include the dispatch of American destroyers or submarines. Stalin had frequently criticized the Allies for conducting small operations which were an "unnecessary diversion" from the major second front, hence Roosevelt's turning of the phrase in his suggested reply to Stalin.

R-456 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 4, 1944, 11:45 A.M. Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Referring to your 562 and 565 it is suggested that our reply to U.J. should be in effect as follows:

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QUOTE. The receipt is acknowledged of your message in regard to handing over Italian shipping to the Soviet. It is our intention to carry out the transfer agreed to at Teheran at the earliest date practicable without hazarding the success of ANVIL and OVERLORD which operations we all agree should be given first priority in our common effort to defeat Germany at the earliest possible date. There is no thought of not carrying through the transfers discussed at Teheran. The British battleship and the American cruiser can be made available without any delay, and an effort will be made at once to make available from the British Navy the eight destroyers. Four submarines will be taken from Italy. I am convinced that disaffecting the Italian Navy at this time would be what you have so aptly termed an unnecessary diversion and that it would adversely affect the prospects of our success in France. UNQUOTE.

If we send to U.J. a message similar to the above, it will involve making available the batdeship and cruiser at once, sending the merchant shipping to him without avoidable delay, and taking from Italy four submarines from those now in our possession which I believe number about thirty. Under the conditions existing at present and prior to a success in landing OVERLORD and ANVIL I would prefer that the U.K. find the destroyers for this contribution as so kindly offered in your 565. I need all of ours that can be made available for current and pending operations in the Pacific. It seems to me that if this matter ofjoining with Britain and the United States in providing Russia with needed ships should be diplomatically presented, the Italian Government could offer no valid objection to taking part in the common effort by the provision of four submarines at this time; or it might be best to simply direct the Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, Wilson, to send four Italian submarines in tow to a port in U.K. without making any explanation to the Italians of their future use. Please let me have your reaction to these suggestions and your draft of a proposed reply to U.J.'s growl. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. R&C.)

The British Foreign Office feared that the Soviet Union planned to establish its own Polish government, thus bypassing the Polish government in exile in London and giving the Soviet Union effective control of the liberated portions

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of Poland. But Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, was optimistic in this report of his talk with Stalin, although the Soviet insistence on the elimination of certain figures in the Polish government in exile provided a good indication of what Stalin wanted. The three Polish leaders Stalin mentioned to Kerr were General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Commander in Chief of Polish Armed Forces, which included the Polish Underground; the Polish Minister of Information, Professor S. Kot, who was associated with an anti-Russian faction; and General M. Kukiel, the Minister of National Defense, who had been involved with the Polish appeal to the International Red Cross concerning the Katyn Forest massacre. Polish Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk was reluctant to eliminate these men from his Cabinet lest he be repudiated by the Polish Underground while the Russians went ahead and installed their own Polish government.

C-566 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 5, 1944 / TOR 0630 Z, Feb. 6 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal. 1. I have not yet received any answer from Uncle J to my telegram about Poland which was repeated to you in my Number 557. Ambassador Kerr has however had an encouraging interview with him about the questions posed on behalf of the Poles in my telegram. Uncle J replied that of course Poland would be free and independent and he would not attempt to influence the kind of government they cared to set up after the war. If Poland wished to ask for a guarantee she would get it. She could count upon all the help she needed in expelling the Germans. All Poles would be free to move out of the regions to be assigned to Russia and he would ask for the same freedom on behalf of the Ukrainians now west of the Curzon line. The Poles need have no anxiety about their position when Poland west of the Curzon line was occupied by the Red Armies. Of course the Polish Government would be allowed to go back and to establish the broad based kind of government they had in mind. Poland was their country and they were free to return to it. 2. On the other hand Uncle J continues to press for the expulsion from the Polish Government of Soznkowski, Kot and Kukiel, and I doubt very much whether he will deal with the Poles while they remain in. I am seeing Premier Mikolajczyk tomorrow and shall point out to him the very great advantages of regaining Russian recognition and obtaining a definite settlement now with Russia which can be approved by the Allies. The greatest inducement will be the possibility of his going back to Warsaw after the advance of the Russian Armies to the westward has passed it, and being able to constitute there a Polish Government and State.

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3. I will r e p o r t to you again after I have h e a r d from Uncle J a n d have seen Premier Mikolajczyk. Meanwhile I am m o r e hopeful than I have yet been. I can u n d e r s t a n d that you are unable to j o i n in any g u a r a n t e e o t h e r t h a n those general a r r a n g e m e n t s for maintaining world peace which we have to m a k e at t h e e n d of t h e war. [MR*. «£5?C]

Churchill still shied away from any action which might cause the Italian Navy to mutiny or withdraw its support of the monarchy. The Prime Minister's promise of naval support in the war against Japan would not have tempted American naval leaders, most of whom preferred to see the Pacific war remain an American fight—at least now that the tide had turned against Japan.

C-567 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 5, 1944, 2158 Ζ / TOR 0630 Z, Feb. 6 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your 456. Although we have a perfect right I still shrink from taking the four Italian submarines as it would seem to raise t h e whole issue we have b e e n trying to avoid for such a small r e t u r n . I will therefore provide four of ours to bridge t h e gap till we can take t h e Italians'. T h e y are m o d e r n vessels a n d we shall want t h e m later o n against J a p a n . For the next six m o n t h s we can spare them. I will therefore send on your telegram with t h e following a m e n d m e n t s : — About t h e 80th word for "Discussed" say "Agreed", a n d about 35 words further o n insert " F o u r submarines will also be provided temporarily by Great Britain." O n receipt of your O K I will dispatch signed "Roosevelt. Churchill." [MR*]

C-568 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 6, 1944 / TOR 0630 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Matter Most Secret, Private a n d Confidential. I have received t h e message in my immediately following signal from Stalin. It seems to m e that it is by n o means devoid of h o p e . Premier Mikolajczyk is coming h e r e to l u n c h e o n tomorrow and I will r e p o r t to you further after my conversation with him. [MR*]

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In a gentle but firm way, Stalin repeatedly referred Churchill to earlier prom­ ises about the Polish government and the Soviet-Polish boundary, promises made when the British feared that the Soviet war effort might collapse. The military situation had changed and there was little likelihood of a separate Soviet-German peace, but Stalin's memory was long and changes in British policy did not go unnoticed. To the dismay of the Foreign Office, Stalin kept emphasizing the need to change the makeup of the Polish government in exile. Statements warning the Poles and Britain not to trust Stalin, made by Polish leaders like General Wladyslaw Anders, commander of Polish forces in the Middle East and Italy, continued to annoy the Soviet leader and lent credence to claims that the Polish government, as constituted, was implacably anti-Soviet. The British government interpreted this cable as conciliatory and reasonable, though the Poles continued to believe that Stalin planned to impose a unilateral setdement.

C-569 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 6, 1944, 0204 ΖI TOR 0630 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Matter Most Secret. Private and Confidential. My immediately preceding telegram. Begins. I received your message on the Polish question from Sir A. Clark Kerr who arrived in Moscow the other day and with whom I have already had a useful talk. I see that you are giving much attention to the question about Soviet Polish relations. We all value these efforts very highly. It seems to me that the first question on which there ought at once to be full clarification is the question about the Soviet Polish frontier. You have, of course, rightly remarked that Poland ought on this question to be guided by the Allies. As far as the Soviet Government is concerned, it has already openly and clearly given its opinion on the question of the frontier. We have declared that we do not consider the 1939 frontier to be unalterable and have agreed on the Curzon line, thereby making very great concessions to the Poles. But in the me'antine, the Polish Government has evaded answering our proposal about the Curzon Line and continues in its official statements to declare that the frontier imposed on us by the Riga treaty is unal­ terable. One can infer from your letter that the Polish Government is ready to acknowledge the Curzon Line but as is known the Poles have nowhere made a declaration about this. It is my opinion that the Polish Government ought to make an official declaration that the line of the frontier established by the Riga treaty admits of alteration and that the Curzon Line constitutes the new frontier between the USSR and Poland. It ought to make its

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declaration about this as officially as did the Soviet Government when it declared that the line of the 1939 frontier admitted of change and that the Curzon Line ought to be the Soviet Polish frontier. As regards your statement to the Poles to the effect that Poland could move its frontier considerably to the west and north we are as you know in agreement with this subject to one amendment. About that amendment I spoke to you and the President at Teheran. We claim that the north eastern portion of East Prussia including the port of Koenigsberg, as an ice free port, should go to the Soviet Government. That is the only portion of German territory which we claim. Without the satisfaction of that minimum claim of the Soviet Union the concession of the Soviet Government expressed in its acknowledgement of the Curzon Line loses all meaning as I have already told you at Teheran. Finally about the actual composition of the Polish Government. You understand that we cannot renew relations with the present Polish Government and indeed what sense could there be in renewing relations with a government when there was no certainty that we should not tomorrow again be obliged to break off these relations as a result of some fresh Fascist provocation from their side such as the "Katyn story." During the most recent period the Polish Government where Sosnkowski sets the tone has not put an end to hostile statements against the Soviet Government. The statements extremely hostile to the Soviet Government of the Polish ambassadors in Mexico and Canada and of General Anders in the Near East, the publication of Polish underground papers on German occupied territory which overstep all bounds in hostility to the USSR, the destruction at the direction of the Polish Government of Polish partisans fighting against the German occupying forces and many other pro-Fascist acts of the Polish Government are well known. In this situation without the fundamental improvement in the composition of the Polish Government it is impossible to expect any amelioration. The exclusion of pro-Fascist imperialist elements and the inclusion of people of democratic turn of mind, it might be hoped would provide the necessary conditions for the renewal of good Soviet Polish relations, the settlement of the question of the Soviet Polish frontier and generally for the regeneration of Poland as a strong free and independent state. In this improvement of the composition of the Polish Government the Poles themselves above all are interested and the broad layers of the Polish people. I remember, by the way, that in May last year you wrote to me that the composition of Polish Government could be improved and that you would busy yourself in this direction. At that time you did not think that this would be interference in the internal sovereignty of Poland.

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As regards the question put by the Polish ministers mentioned in the fourth point of your letter I do not think that it would be difficult to reach agreement. [MR*. Slalm/WSC, doc. 236.]

Churchill was correct in identifying the problems bedeviling Anglo-American planning in Europe. The Anzio landing (SHINGLE), which should have broken the stalemate in Italy, had bogged down, largely because Major Gen­ eral John Lucas, the American commander of ground forces for the invasion, failed to take advantage of the initial surprise and resulting confusion among the German defenders. Attempts to bring Turkey into the war had failed and the time had come to decide whether or not to continue to hold back forces and supplies destined for Turkey. The British Chiefs of Staff continued to claim that ANVIL, the invasion of southern France scheduled to take place shordy after the OVERLORD invasion, would actually drain strength from the main cross-channel invasion instead of acting as a diversion. Moreover, the British military doubted that ANVIL could succeed with the forces currendy allotted to it. Some of Eisenhower's staff, General Bedell Smith in particular, had expressed similar doubts about ANVIL, and Churchill's call for a meeting of Anglo-American military staffs along with the OVERLORD commanders was apparently designed to take advantage of such sentiments.

C-570 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 6, 1944/TOR 2140 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal. In the swiftly changing course of events a number of questions have arisen since the Chiefs of Staff parted at Cairo. The Turkish problem, the great battle on the Italian front including SHINGLE, ANVIL—its place and scale, the preparations for OVERLORD which are on a gigantic scale, all require direct consultation. Could you send your Chiefs of Staff over here, or at any rate General Marshall, in the next few days? This will give a far better opportunity of coming to agreement than if they continue to correspond by telegraph. I am sure the time has come for a further talk on the highest staff level. The OVERLORD Commandersin-Chief must know where they stand and every day counts. [MR*. R&C]

For reasons not explained, Roosevelt chose to respond to Churchill's messages about the Soviet-Polish crisis with a cable sent outside of the usual "President

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to Former Naval Person" channels. Since the President worked on this problem with the State Department, it is possible he wanted to conceal from Hull and others in Foggy Bottom the extent of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence. Whatever the reason, the following messages to Churchill and Stalin were drafted in the State Department after Hull and the President had talked things over. Both men remained optimistic about the spirit of cooperation Stalin had exhibited at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' and Teheran conferences, and their objective was to prevent the Polish question from souring that attitude. Roosevelt added the final paragraph.

R-456/1 Washington [via U.S. Ambassador] Feb. 7, 1944, 12 noon [Roosevelt to Churchill] I share your concern over the potential dangers of the present PolishSoviet situation, and I understand the spirit in which you sent your number 33 [C—557] to U.J. Isn't there a possibility that the wording of paragraphs 7 and 8 will give him the impression that you are wedded to the present personalities of the Polish Government-in-exile and are determined to see them reinstated as the future government of Poland? He may interpret this as evidence of a design on your part to see established along the borders of the Soviet Union a government which rightly or wrongly they regard as containing elements irrevocably hostile to the Soviet Union. I know that this is not your intention and that you are only interested in preserving the principle of the right of all countries to choose their government without interference, and specifically to avoid the creation by the Soviet Government of a rival Polish Government. Might it not be well to make this clear to U.J. by some reference to the possibility that the Polish Government would of its own accord, if a real solution on the frontier and other questions with Russia was in the offing, accept the resignation of those persons known to be particularly objectionable to the Soviet Government. I recognize that because of treaty obligations with both sides you are more direcdy concerned with the immediate issues between the USSR and Poland. Our primary concern is the potential dangers of this situation to the essential unity which was so successfully established at Moscow and Tehran. It is for this reason that I have confined the official action of this Government to a tender of good offices looking towards the resumption of relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. Feeling, however, that this unity and the larger issues connected therewith are now definitely at stake, I have just sent the following message to U.J.:

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"I have followed with the closest attention the recent developments in your relations with Poland. I feel that I am fully aware of your views on the subject and am therefore taking this opportunity of communicating with you on the basis of our conversations at Tehran. First of all, let me make it plain that I neither desire nor intend to attempt to suggest much less to advise you in any way as to where the interests of Russia lie in this matter since I realize to the full that the future security of your country is rightly one of your primary concerns. The observations which I am about to make are prompted solely by the larger issues which affect the common goal towards which we are both working. "The overwhelming majority of our people and Congress, as you know, welcomed with enthusiasm the broad principles subscribed to at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences, and I know that you agree with me that it is of the utmost importance that faith in these understandings should not be left in any doubt. I am sure that a solution can be found which would fully protect the interests of Russia and satisfy your desire to see a friendly, independent Poland, and at the same time not adversely affect the cooperation so splendidly established at Moscow and Tehran. I feel that it is of the utmost importance that we should bear in mind that the various differences which inevitably arise in the conduct of international relations should not be permitted to jeopardize the major all important question of cooperation and collaboration among nations which is the only sound basis for a just and lasting peace. "I have given careful consideration to the views of your Government as outlined by Mr. Molotov to Mr. Harriman on January 10 regarding the impossibility from the Soviet point of view of having any dealings with the Polish Government-in-exile in its present form and Mr. Molotov's suggestion that the Polish Government should be reconstituted by the inclusion of Polish elements at present in the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. I fully appreciate your desire to deal only with a Polish Government in which you can repose confidence and which can be counted upon to establish permanent friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but it is my earnest hope that while this problem remains unsolved neither party shall by hasty word or unilateral act transform this special question into one adversely affecting the larger issues of future international collaboration. While public opinion is forming in support of the principle of international collaboration, it is especially incumbent upon us to avoid any action which might appear to counteract the achievement of our long-range objective. I feel I should ill serve our common interest if I failed to bring these facts to your attention.

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"Prime Minister Churchill tells me that he is endeavoring to persuade the Polish Prime Minister to make a clean-cut acceptance as a basis for negotiation of the territorial changes which have been proposed by your Government. Is it not possible on that basis to arrive at some answer to the question of the composition of the Polish Government which would leave it to the Polish Prime Minister himself to make such changes in his Government as may be necessary without any evidence of pressure or dictation from a foreign country? "As a matter of timing it seems to me that the first consideration at this time should be that Polish guerrillas should work with and not against your advancing troops. That is of current importance and some assurance on the part of all Poles would be of great advantage as a first step." Roosevelt [CH] [MR. FRUS, 1944, III, 1245-46, 1243-45. R&C. pStalmJFDR, doc. 159.]

The correspondence exchanged by Churchill and Roosevelt during the early months of 1944 indicates how much the Anglo-American relationship had changed since the years before the Cairo-Teheran talks. Political issues had never been totally absent from the cables, but now they came to dominate. During talks with the Joint Chiefs of Staff while enroute to the Mediterranean for the Cairo and Teheran conferences (see the headnote to C-508/1), the President had insisted that the United States should occupy northwestern Germany, not the southern portion as the British preferred. He argued that the northwestern zone would provide access to the ports of Hamburg and Bremen and would also keep the Americans from becoming involved in France and central Europe. Roosevelt's instructions to the Joint Chiefs were clear: "We do not want to be concerned with reconstituting France. France is a British 'baby'. The United States is not popular in France at the present time. The British should have France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtenburg. The occupation of these places should be British. The United States should take northwest Germany" (FRUS, Teheran Conf., p. 254). The various RANKIN plans (A, B, and C) called for a rapid occupation of previously German-occupied countries and Germany itself in the event of a German collapse before OVERLORD took place. That required prior agreement on Anglo-American occupation zones in Germany, and Combined Chiefs of Staff memorandum 426/1 presented the American position that the United States "sphere" would be the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and northwestern Germany (FRUS, Teheran Conf, pp. 813, 786-87). The British Chiefs of Staff objected to the change since American troops were already scheduled to land on the right flank during the Normandy invasion. A crossover after the invasion would be complicated and a shift of the American forces to

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OVERLORD's left flank would delay the invasion. The American Joint Chiefs agreed that it was too late to change plans for OVERLORD, but argued that in the event of a German collapse U.S. forces could easily occupy northwestern Germany. A crossover after the Normandy invasion would be more difficult but, as Admiral Leahy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Roosevelt in a memorandum, "although the occupation of the northern area will render our military problem more difficult initially, the long term political and military advantages to the United States are of such importance that we should not accept the recommendation of the British Chiefs of Staff' (Leahy to Roosevelt, 26 Jan. 1944, MR).

R-457 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 7, 1944, 12:20 P.M. Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Combined Chiefs of Staff have reached an impasse on the subject of countries and areas to be occupied by British and United States forces in RANKIN or following OVERLORD. U.S. Chiefs of Staff have pointed out that a change-over from spheres of responsibility connection [connecting?] OVERLORD to spheres of later occupational responsibility desired by U. S. is militarily feasible and no vital objection can be made on that score. Matter now appears necessary for study by you and me in order to have decision before OVERLORD and to proceed with plans. United States proposals are set out in C C S . 426/1 paragraph eighteen. (Report to President and Prime Minister, SEXTANT Conference.) I am absolutely unwilling to police France and possibly Italy and the Balkans as well. After all, France is your baby and will take a lot of nursing in order to bring it to the point of walking alone. It would be very difficult for me to keep in France my military force or management for any length of time. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR. FRUS, 1944, I, 166. R&C]

R-458 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 7, 1944, 12:20 P.M. Personal and Secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person. Your 567 meets with my approval. Upon receipt of Uncle Joe's acceptance of the proposal I will send the cruiser to U.K. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

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R-459 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 7, 1944, 12:55 P.M. Personal a n d Secret, for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. T h a n k you for your 557, 566, 568, a n d 569. Roosevelt [MR*]

T h e anti-submarine warfare statement for February indicated that the Battle of the Atlantic was no longer in doubt.

C-571 London [via U.S. Embassy] Feb. 7, 1944/TOR 1315 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal a n d Most Secret. T h e following is o u r proposed draft for the monthly statement on the U-boat war. We have sent a copy to MacKenzie King a n d have asked him to communicate with you direct. Statement begins. T h e year 1944 has o p e n e d with a very satisfactory first m o n t h for the Allies in their continued campaign against the U-boat. In spite of the limited opportunities to attack U-boats owing to the e x t r e m e caution now exercised by them, m o r e were destroyed in J a n u a r y than in December. This has been accomplished by u n r e ­ lenting offensive action of o u r surface a n d air forces. T h e a m o u n t of m e r c h a n t ship t o n n a g e sunk by U-boats d u r i n g J a n u a r y 1944, is amongst the lowest monthly figures for the whole war. T h e G e r m a n claims should, as usual, be ignored as they are in­ variably grossly exaggerated a n d issued purely for p r o p a g a n d a p u r ­ poses. Statement ends. [MR*]

Robert E. Sherwood, a distinguished playwright who became a speechwriter for the President, had subsequently worked in the OSS. T h e Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information directed psychological warfare against the Axis nations.

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R-459/1, letter Washington February 7, 1944

Dear Winston: This note is brought to you by my friend, Robert E. Sherwood, who as you know is the head of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information. He will be spending a couple of weeks in London and I hope very much that you can find time to have a talk with him. Very sincerely yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt [PSF:GB:WSC]

C-572 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 7, 1944, 2315 Ζ / TOR 0100 Z, Feb. 8

Prime Minister to President Personal and Most Secret. Many thanks for your number 458. I have dispatched the message to

UJ. [MR*]

R-460 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 8, 1944, 1 2 : 1 5 P.M.

Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Your No. 571. We agree with your proposed statement except that we will omit the word "invariably" in the last paragraph when published in this country. Roosevelt [WEB] [MR*]

With the Allied offensive in Italy stalled in front of Monte Cassino, Churchill argued that military considerations made it unwise to permit Count Carlo Sforza to continue his attempts to force the abdication of King Victor Em­ manuel and the collapse of the Badoglio government. Sforza's letter of Sep­ tember 23, 1943, to Adolf Berle (Assistant Secretary of State) promised to

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support the Badoglio government while it fought the Fascists, but did not endorse the monarchy. (See the headnotes to C-422 and C-845.)

C-573 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 8, 1944; 0110 Z, Feb. 91 TOR 0237 Z, Feb. 9 Prime Minister to President. Personal and Secret. I am much concerned at any attempt at working with Sforza and the Italian Junta at this critical moment in the battle. If you read Sforza's original letter to Berle you will see how completely he has broken his undertaking. I do beg that no decisions will be taken without our being consulted and without you and me trying to reach agreement. We are in for a very heavy struggle on the Italian front. [MR*. FRUS, 1944, III, 1020.]

C-574 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 9, 1944, 1559 Ζ/TOR 1655 Ζ Prime Minister to President Personal and Most Secret. Your number 460. It is nearly always better to cut out adverbs, and adjectives too. The combination "Invariably grossly" is cacophonous. I have advised the Admiralty accordingly. [MR*]

The stalemate in Italy threatened to force a delay in transferring landing craft needed for the ANVIL invasion of southern France, and the British hoped to convince the American military that ANVIL should be canceled so that OVERLORD could be conducted on a broader scale. General Marshall sarcastically pointed out that it appeared that the British had become the supporters of the cross-channel attack while the Americans took the role of being Mediterraneanites (Pogue, Organizer of Victory, p. 334). The American Army Chief of Staff gently warned Eisenhower not to be too sympathetic to the British arguments and worried that American officers in SHAEF had become infected with "theateritis"—the belief that their theater of operations was all that counted. Marshall, who believed that the OVERLORD/ANVIL strategy agreed upon at Teheran should not be altered, saw no need for a meeting of the Combined Chiefs, and Admiral King, who feared the British would only demand the transfer of more landing craft to the ETO (European Theater of Operations) from the Pacific, adamantly opposed Churchill's sug­ gestion. Eisenhower's private doubts were set down in a diary entry:

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But the whole original ANVIL-OVERLORD assault involved only a total of 5 + Divs. in the assault. I think there must be 7 +. And with Italy requiring an allotment, it looks like ANVIL is doomed. I hate this—in spite of my recognition of the fact that Italian fighting will be some compensation for a strong ANVIL. The fighting in the Pacific is absorbing far too much of our limited resources in landing craft during this critical phase of the European war (memo for Diary, Feb. 7, 1944, Eisenhower Papers, III, no. 1712). Major General Thomas T. Handy, the Assistant Chief of Staff for the Operations Division, headed the planning staff at U.S. Army headquarters in Washington. (The final sentence of this cable was altered in Roosevelt's handwriting.)

R-461 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 9, 1944, 12:25 P.M. Secret and Personal, for the Former Naval Person from the President. Replying to your 570 my Chiefs of Staff are now involved in an important and difficult study of the provision of troops for both the Pacific and Atlantic and of the strategy to be followed in the Pacific in the immediate future which makes it difficult for them to be absent from Washington at this time. We are informed that the Combined Planning Staff in Washington reports that by the end of May facilities will be available in the U.K. and in the Mediterranean to launch a five to seven division assault in OVERLORD and a two division assault in ANVIL. If this report of the Planning Staff is accepted by your Staff in London there does not appear to be any essential necessity for a meeting of our Chiefs of Staff in the immediate future. Messages exchanged between Marshall and Eisenhower and between Bedell Smith and General Handy indicate that an agreement on the OVERLORD-ANVIL problem will be reached within the next twentyfour hours. If you have other reasons unknown to me that in your opinion ncccs sitate an early meeting of our Chiefs of Staff please let me know what they are and I will make every effort to meet the situation. I hope an early meeting of our Chiefs of Staff with yours can be delayed unless the general situation gets more complicated. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. R&C]

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R-462 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 9, 1944, 12:30 P.M. Personal and Secret, for the Former Naval Person from the President. Your 572 is acknowledged. I will be very much interested in Uncle J's reply and I hope it will quiet the growl on this subject for some time. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

In spite of being allied with Germany, the Bulgarian government did not declare war on the Soviet Union, though it was at war with Great Britain and, after June 5, 1942, with the United States. The British resented the Bulgarian action and were inclined to take a tough line on negotiations. Moreover, British interests in Greece and Turkey, traditional enemies of Bulgaria, might suffer if Britain seemed to move toward better relations with the latter. Heavy bombing raids over Bulgaria, particularly on the capital city, Sofia, in November 1943 had stimulated unofficial peace feelers. The British did not like Roosevelt's suggestion that the Bulgarian Army join the fight against Hitler since that would be predicated on an agreement not to punish Bulgaria for having been a German ally. (The additions were in Roosevelt's handwriting.)

R-463 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 9, 1944, 12:35 P.M. Personal and Secret for the Former Naval Person from the President. I have received an unconfirmed report that the Bulgarian Government desires to send a mission to Istanbul to discuss conditions under which Bulgarian Army would joint the Allies. If this report should prove to be true it appears to me that it would be worth while for us to make some concessions such as suspending the bombing attacks on Bulgaria for a limited period and with your sending representatives to meet the Bulgarian Mission at Istanbul. Probably the Russians should be in on this too. It is assumed that your sources of information in Turkey have heard the same story if it has any validity. I am repeating this to you only for what it is worth in anticipation of possible future developments. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. R&C]

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C-575 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 10, 1944, 2320 Ζ/TOR 0045 Z, Feb. 11 Prime Minister to President. Personal. E d e n a n d I a r e agreed h e r e that the bombing of Bulgarian targets as weather permits should not be stopped because of the peace overtures. If t h e medicine has d o n e good, let t h e m have m o r e of it. [MR*. KfcfC]

Churchill's discussions with the Polish government in London illustrated the simple yet insoluble dilemma of Polish-Soviet relations: Stalin would accept nothing less than the Curzon line (with Lvov and Vilna going to the Soviet Union) and the elimination of anti-Russian figures in the Polish government, but no Polish government could survive after giving in to those demands. (The Poles had taken Vilna or Wilno, located in Lithuania, in the SovietPolish war following World War I.) T h e "liberum veto," mentioned near the end of this document, was an eighteenth- and nineteenth-century procedure which required a unanimous vote on matters before the Polish National As­ sembly. It had paralyzed the legislature, and Churchill believed the Polish government in exile encouraged a similar paralysis by permitting its constit­ uent factions to veto any compromise with the Soviet Union on the question of frontiers. Churchill may have been too harsh. T h e effective power of veto lay with the Polish Underground, the only coherent political/military force in Poland which supported the restoration of the exiled Polish government; and the Underground demanded the retention of Poland's pre-1939 fron­ tiers. Most of the central characters are identified in this message. Two who are not are Lieutenant General Zygmunt Berling, who commanded Soviet-spon­ sored Polish forces, and J a n Ciechanowski, Ambassador to the United States from the London Polish government.

C-575/1 London [via Winant & secretary of state] Feb. 11, 1944, 11:00 A.M. /TOR 10:05 P.M. For t h e President from the Prime Minister: I send you herewith the agreed record of o u r conversation with the Poles last Sunday. I will shortly send you a r e p o r t on o u r further talks with t h e m . T h e record of the conversation mentioned by the Prime Minister in his message is as follows.

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Record of a meeting held at Chequers on Sunday sixth February 1944 at 3 P.M. Present: The Right Honorable Winston S. Churchill, C.H., M.P., Prime Minister, in the chair. M. Micolajczyk, Polish Prime Minister. The Right Honorable Anthony Eden M.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. M. Romer, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Lord Cherwell, F.R.S., Paymaster General. Count Raczynski, Polish Ambassador to Great Britain. Sir Owen O'Malley, British Ambassador to the Polish Government. Secretariat: Mr. J. R. Colville. The Prime Minister read the text of his telegram to Marshal Stalin of the 28 January (No. 227 to Moscow), in which he had said that the Polish Ministers were far from rejecting the proposals put forward, but that after considering them, they had asked a number of questions which he had agreed to pass on to Marshal Stalin. Mr. Churchill then referred to the American attitude, which he summarized as follows: There could be no legal bond, as far as the U.S. was concerned. This certainly did not mean that American aid would be withheld, and he asked the Poles to work on the basis that the U.S., Britain and the U.S.S.R. would cooperate for many years to come in the task of maintaining world order and unity. Mr. Eden read out extracts from Sir A. Clark Kerr's telegrams numbers 281 and 282 of the 3rd February, in which the Ambassador described his discussion with Marshal Stalin of the Prime Minister's message of the 28 January. He pointed out that Stalin had without hesitation, answered the five questions put by the Polish Government and contained in the Prime Minister's message. Marshal Stalin had said: (a) That, after the war, Poland would certainly be free and independent, as much so as Czechoslovakia, and he would not try to influence either country's choice of government. (b) That, if Poland required a guarantee from Russia, one would be given. (c) That Poland could count upon all Russian help in expelling the Germans. (d) That all Poles would be free to move out of the former Polish territory assigned to Russia, and the same facilities should apply to Ukrainians at present west of the Curzon line. (e) The Polish Government would be allowed to return to Poland

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and establish a broad based government, which could function administratively in the liberated areas. The Prime Minister said that, as regards the underground movement, Stalin maintained that the Polish Government has directed it to refuse cooperation with the Russians. If the movement opposed the Russian troops and partisans, it would be attacked; if it did not, it would receive assistance. The matter would all depend on the attitude of the Polish Government. M. Micolajczyk said he wanted to clarify the Polish Government's position. He had shown to the British Government the instructions which had originally been sent to the Polish underground movement to the effect that, if relations with Russia were re-established, the movement should come into the open in support of the Soviet troops but that otherwise its members were to remain inactive. Orders to oppose the Russian troops had never been given. You will now allow me, said M. Micolajczyk, to place before you our information. Our former instructions to the Polish underground movement were to the effect that in case Polish-Soviet relations had not been renewed, at the moment of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland our underground forces should not come into the open. In the meantime, we acquired the conviction that the reestablishment of mutual relations was most unlikely, and in this situation the Polish Government addressed an enquiry to the country as to the readiness of the underground movement to disclose its identity even in the absence of Polish-Soviet relations and without regard to the dangers which such a step involved. The answer received (dated the 28th November, 1943) was that the underground army was ready to come into the open and to meet the requirements of the Soviet commanders. Mr. Eden attached great importance to this information and asked whether it could be conveyed to the Soviet Government. M. Micolajczyk expressed his agreement with this. He further explained that the local Polish Military Commander, accompanied by the local civilian (underground) authority, would receive orders to meet the commander of the incoming Soviet troops and to declare that following the instructions of the Polish Government, to which they remained faithful, they were ready to join in the fight against the common foe. The Prime Minister: This is very important. I agree with this line of action. M. Micolajczyk: There is only one essential reservation. Our underground forces are determined to preserve their own organisation and they are not prepared to join Polish formations created in Russia

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under the auspices of the so-called Polish Patriots and placed under Berling's command. On the other hand, in order to secure friendly cooperation, Polish detachments, which had in the past had any friction with local Soviet "partisans" have been ordered to move to other districts and change places with other Polish forces free from such disability. The country is anxiously expecting to receive an ample supply of arms indispensable in view of a general rising behind the lines of the retreating German armies. M. Micolajezyk handed to the Prime Minister a copy of the telegram received from Warsaw on the 22 January in reply to M. Micolajczyk's speech to the country of the 6th January. He pointed out that the country's willingness to join with the Soviet forces in their fight against Germany was clearly shown in this telegram. But as regards the political aspects it equally clearly showed the country's determination to maintain Poland's territorial integrity. The reply was drafted before the country was informed of the last conversation between the Prime Minister and M. Micolajezyk on the 20 January. The Polish Government withheld its publication in order to avoid difficulties, but the British Government must see in it an indication of the country's opinion. The Prime Minister: In that case the situation is hopeless. No agreement could be reached on such a basis and the Soviets having occupied the whole of your country will impose their will. M. Micolajezyk handed over to the Prime Minister a copy of a telegram from Poland received in London on the 27th January 1944 announcing the setting up in Warsaw by the "Polish Workers Party" (Communist) of a "National Council" in opposition to the Polish underground movement. He considered this move as clearly indicating the real intentions of the Soviet Government with regard to Poland. The Prime Minister: Yes, this danger exists and will only increase if no agreement between Poland and Soviet Russia is reached. M. Micolajezyk: I am only placing before you the information I possess: For the time being, i.e., before the "Curzon Line" is crossed by Soviet troops, the Soviets have in view the setting up of a "Committee of National Liberation," composed of Polish pro-Soviet elements in the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and, if possible, also the United Kingdom. Later, after the Curzon Line is crossed the plan foresees the creation of a "Polish Government" by the "National Council" recently formed in Poland under Moscow's auspices. This information throws a revealing light on the cryptic sentence of Molotov addressed to

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Ambassador Harriman that the situation had not yet matured for the resumption of Soviet-Polish relations. Mr. Eden said that this talk about a committee would automatically cease if agreement were reached on the lines of Stalin's latest telegram. The Prime Minister said that if matters were allowed to drift, such a committee would undoubtedly be established and the Polish Government would have no say in the matter. M. Micolajczyk: The latest changes introduced in the constitution of the U.S.S.R. finally complete the picture. M. Micolajczyk recalled the reply given by Mr. Eden on the 1st February to a letter which was addressed to him on the 23rd of January by Ambassador Raczynski on instruction of the Polish Government, and also the memorandum of the 1st February handed to Ambassador Ciechanowski in Washington in reply to the questionfs] put by him to the American Government and pointed out that the Polish Government was not offered guarantees which would protect Poland against imminent dangers and safeguard her independence and sovereignty as well as the life and property of her inhabitants. He had already stated that he was willing to enter into discussion on all outstanding questions including frontiers. This in itself had caused serious concern in Polish circles. The acceptance of the "Curzon Line" as a starting point of any discussion would, in fact, constitute dictated terms and would preclude any real negotiation. Such a course could only undermine the Polish Government's authority with the Polish nation and also disrupt the latter's unique solidarity. The Prime Minister said the Curzon Line was the best that the Poles could expect and all that he would ask the British people to demand on their behalf. M. Micolajczyk: The Soviet Government invokes the "Curzon Line of 1919". This is confusing. The "line" of 1919 did not extend to former Austrian Galicia. M. Micolajczyk handed over to the Prime Minister a memorandum on the Curzon Line, together with a map illustrating this subject. The Prime Minister said the Russians must have Lwow. Przemysl and Bialystok would be left inside Poland. M. Micolajczyk repeated that the Curzon Line did not apply to Galicia. If he were honestly convinced that the Russians were acting in good faith, he would give the matter more serious consideration. But he was not. If the Russians meant to honour their word, it would be simple for them to bring the Polish Government into negotiations, since they had all the trump cards. He suspected that they were purposely trying to make the Polish Government refuse their terms in advance.

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The Prime Minister replied that, had not the Russians won great victories, Poland would have no future at all. If necessary, he was prepared to tell the Russians and the British people what conditions His Majesty's Government would endorse at the peace. He would do his utmost for Poland, but, if he could not reach agreement with the Polish Government, he would have to make his own position clear to the Russians and to come to an understanding with them. For this he would take full responsibility before Parliament and the world. There were three courses open:— (1) To make an agreement to which all parties joined. (2) To make an Anglo-Russian agreement, in which he would endeavour to setde the frontier problem and to procure humane treatment for the Poles. (3) To do nothing, while the Russian steam roller moved over Poland, a Communist Government was set up in Warsaw and the present Polish Government was left powerless to do anything but make its protests to the world at large. Mr. Eden pointed out that the second course would be of small value to the Polish Government, as it would preclude their return to Warsaw. M. Micolajczyk said he must state his case. He was not at all anxious to be left out of the agreement. He had already gone so far as to accept negotiations on all questions, including changes of frontier during the war, and had issued orders to the underground movement to enter into friendly contact with the Russians even though no agreement should be reached. He could not announce that he would accept the Curzon Line and give away Wilno and Lwow. The Prime Minister said that, in that case, he must look at the matter from the British point of view and make his own agreement with Stalin. He thought that the Polish Government had no grounds for complaint, and he would say so in Parliament. He must frankly say that, while the Polish troops over here, and particularly the air force, had made themselves both loved and respected, the people of Poland had lost their independence more than 150 years ago, and even after its recovery during their short period of freedom had not always had a record of which they could be proud. Now they had a fine opportunity if they were prepared to take it. If they were not, he would certainly make the agreement without them. Mr. Eden asked whether the Polish Government could not state publicly— (1) That they would consider the frontier established by the Treaty of Riga as admitting of alteration. (2) That they wished to be a homogeneous state. (3) That they would be prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Curzon Line.

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Μ. Micolajczyk replied that, while it might look as if only the fron­ tier line were in question, he was convinced that his Government were in reality defending the independence of Poland itself. The Prime Minister said that the Polish Government had no power to defend it. It was arguable whether they had a moral right, since after the last war Poland had occupied Vilna by an act of war against the wishes of the Allied Governments. On the other hand, the Rus­ sians, in view of the blood they had shed, had a moral right to the security of their western frontiers. M. Micolajczyk: The existence of Lithuanian claims to the Polish city and territory of Wilno is no justification for Russian claims to the city. Mr. Eden said that, if the Polish Government went back to Warsaw, they would do so under joint Anglo-Russian auspices. The Russian guarantee would be underwritten by His Majesty's Government. How could this be called sacrificing the independence of Poland? M. Micolajczyk restated the impossibility of accepting the Curzon Line. Perhaps a solution might be found on the basis of a demarcation line within which the Polish administration would be set up imme­ diately after the liberation of the territory from German occupation. The fixing of the Polish-Soviet frontier would be left over to be decided after the conclusion of hostilities. The Prime Minister then informed the Polish Government that Marshal Stalin demanded Konigsberg and the part of East Prussia lying to the east of it. M. Micolajczyk said this showed that the Russian scale of demands was increasing and would increase. They started asking for the Cur­ zon Line, then for a change in the Polish Government, and now for half of East Prussia. The Prime Minister replied that Poland had taken many wrong turns in her history and that a refusal now might be the most fatal and disastrous of all. If the Poles turned down this offer, he would certainly explain their views to the Soviet Government but he would also state the British view and would make the separate agreement of which he had spoken. If the Soviet Government should refuse to guarantee Poland her rights, her independence and adequate territory, he would certainly resist. But he would not exert the strength of Britain for Poland's exact frontiers; he was struggling for the life of the Polish nation and for a home for the Polish people. These were the great objectives. M. Mikolajczyk said that to adopt a demarcation line for the du­ ration of the war might be a solution justified by circumstances. If this were impracticable and no agreement could be reached, he hoped

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that Mr. Churchill would do everything in his power to help ameliorate the position of those in Poland. The Prime Minister read Marshal Stalin's reply to his message of the 28th January. The following points arose: (1) Marshal Stalin was incorrect in stating that the Polish Government continued to declare the Riga Treaty frontier unalterable. The Polish Government had agreed to discuss all problems, including that of frontiers. (2) Mr. Churchill suggested the Polish Government should make a declaration that the Riga Treaty admitted of alteration, and that in principle they agreed the Curzon Line should form the basis of discussion subject to ethnographical modifications. (3) Mr. Churchill emphasized the advantages which Poland would derive from possessing nearly 250 miles of Baltic seaboard and the town of Danzig. This was a fair healthy and wholesome offer. To refuse it would be a mistake comparable to the use in former times of the "liberum veto" in the Polish Parliament. (4) The demands for a reconstitution of the Polish Government were trifles compared with frontier question, and would fade away if the latter were settled. If M. Mikolajczyk made changes in his Government, they would not be dictated but would be decisions taken in consultation with Poland's friends and allies. (5) Poland was to be a strong free independent state. This was a line on which the Prime Minister could bind the Russians down. He could obtain a firm engagement for Poland similar to the AngloRussian 20 years treaty. The Prime Minister asked the Polish Ministers to think carefully over what had been said. They had these alternatives: A fine land of security and peace, or the certainty either that an Anglo-Russian agreement would be made apart from the Polish Government, or that things would be left to drift into chaos. M. Mikolajczyk said he understood Marshal Stalin's conclusions to be that: (1) The Polish Government must announce that they did not consider the frontier established by the Treaty of Riga to be unalterable. (2) They must recognize the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern frontier. (3) Marshal Stalin did not recognize the present composition of the Polish Government. He had done [as much as he could?] but he could not go so far as was proposed without abandoning Poland's moral right and losing the support of his people. The Prime Minister said that he intended, in consultation with Mr.

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Eden, to draw up a note stating the kind of proposition to be made to the Soviet Government. He asked the Polish Government to consider this note and, if they wished, to draw up alternative proposals for submission to His Majesty's Government. If the Polish Government finally refused to join in this approach to Marshal Stalin he would, with Cabinet concurrence, take the necessary action himself. M. Micolajczyk reminded the Prime Minister of the urgent need of supplying the Polish underground army with arms indispensable in view of the general rising against the Germans, the time of which was approaching. The Prime Minister replied that the British Government had already decided to treble for the next 3 months the load to be carried to Poland by air in order to hasten the fulfilment of the agreed programme. M. Micolajczyk expressed his thanks for this decision. [FRUS, 1944, III, 1249-57. pMR. pPREM 3/472.]

Roosevelt acceded to requests from Churchill and General Wilson, the Allied commander in the Mediterranean, to support the Italian government of King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Badoglio, but made clear that such support was temporary. The final sentence was added to the draft in Roosevelt's handwriting.

R-464 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 11, 1944, 11:40 A.M. Secret and Personal, for the Former Naval Person from the President. Your 573. I have directed the Department of State to take no action toward effecting any change in the existing Government of Italy at the present time and until our military situation in the Italian Campaign is sufficiently improved to warrant risking the disaffection of those Italians who are now assisting the Allied Forces. I think though that you and I should regard this only as a temporary reprieve for the two old gentlemen. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. WSC, V, 497. R&C]

Like Roosevelt, Churchill viewed Bulgaria as within the Soviet sphere of influence, hence the curious arrangement calling for the Russians to participate in any negotiations even though Bulgaria and the Soviet Union were

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not at war. T h e Bulgarian government did not make any formal attempt to open peace talks until after Russian troops entered the country in September 1944.

C-576 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 12, 1944 / TOR 1355 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Many thanks for your telegram n u m b e r 463 of February 9th. 2. It seems to m e most undesirable that a Bulgarian Mission should open conversations in Constantinople. If the Bulgarian Government really m e a n business, they should be told to send a fully qualified mission to m e e t representatives of t h e T h r e e Powers at a place which will be indicated a n d might be Cyprus o r Cairo. Cyprus is absolutely secret a n d n e a r e r . 3. O u r b o m b i n g of Sofia a p p e a r s in fact to have h a d exactly t h e effect we h o p e d for, in that t h e Bulgarians are falling over each o t h e r in their haste to m a k e contact with us. T h a t being so, would it not be a mistake to suspend it at t h e request of the firstcomer who n o d o u b t hopes for a respite d u r i n g p r o t r a c t e d conversations. 4. If you agree, therefore, I h o p e we may send identical instructions to o u r representatives in Moscow on t h e above lines a n d get Molotov's a g r e e m e n t to o u r p r o p o s e d line of action. [MR.

«yc.]

Roosevelt scrawled a reply across the bottom of the Prime Minister's cable. Leahy added the second paragraph.

R-465 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 12, 1944, 1 1 : 1 5 A.M. Secret a n d Personal, for t h e F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. I wholly agree with your 576. Let the good work go on. Please send m e a draft of the message which you consider sending to o u r representatives in Moscow for delivery to Molotov with t h e p u r p o s e of getting his approval. Roosevelt [FDR, WDL] [MR*. KfcfC]

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Churchill continued to defend the utility of working with the Badoglio gov­ ernment and hinted that the capture of Rome should not automatically signal the end of that government. Although the Spanish government of Francisco Franco had maintained non-belligerency (later neutrality), it had openly sup­ ported the Nazi cause. During the campaign in North Africa, Allied policy toward Franco had emphasized caution lest Spain permit German forces to pass through and threaten Gibraltar. With North Africa secured and Italy out of the war, Spain's strategic position became less important and American officials began to push for stronger diplomatic pressures to cut off Spanish trade with Germany, particularly the sale of wolfram, or tungsten, a metal used in machine tools and armor-piercing shells. On February 11, the Amer­ ican Ambassador to Spain, Carlton Hayes, was instructed to demand a total embargo on shipments of wolfram to Germany. Otherwise, the suspension of oil deliveries to Spain, announced late in January, would continue. Al­ though Churchill thought the United States should concentrate on other issues, particularly the Spanish Blue Division fighting against the Soviet Union on Germany's eastern front, he nonetheless ignored Foreign Office advice and supported the American demand. (Sir Samuel Hoare was the British Ambassador in Madrid.) Harry Hopkins' eighteen-year-old son, a private first class in the Marine Corps, was killed on February 2 during an amphibious invasion of the Jap­ anese-held atoll of Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands.

C-577 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 13, 1944, 1810 Ζ /TOR 4:12 P.M. Prime Minister to President. Personal and Most Secret. 1. Many thanks for your number 464. I fully agree we should review the whole scene after we are settled in Rome. We have not get there yet, and Lincoln's Birthday celebrations remind me about not crossing the Fox River till you got to it. 2. The present regime is the Lawful Government of Italy with whom we have concluded an armistice in consequence of which the Italian Navy came over and with some of the Italian Army and Air Force are fighting on our side. This Italian Government is tame and completely in our hands. It will obey our directions far more than any other that we may laboriously constitute. On the other hand, it has more power over the Fleet, Army, Officials, etc than anything else which can be set up out of the worn out debris of political parties, none of whom have the slightest title by election or prescription. A new Italian Government will have to make its reputation with the Italian people by standing up to us. They will very likely try to wriggle out of the armistice terms. As for being instrumental in handing over without a mutiny part of the Italian Fleet to Russia, I cannot conceive that they would do so or that, if they did, their writ would run with the

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Italian Navy. I hope therefore that when the time comes we shall consult together. I gave strong support to the State Department over Darlan. They seem rueful about that episode now. Looking back upon it I consider it was right. Several thousand British and American soldiers are alive today because of it and it got us Dakar at a time when we could ill have spared the large forces needed for its capture. 3. About Spain. We have told Ambassador Hoare that he is to align himself with your representative. When a large, strong, healthy elephant (no reference intended to GOP) comes into a garden and tramples down the flower beds some perturbation is natural among the local gardeners. As you know, we have had our own point of view about this. Now however, that the United States has taken such decided action, I am of opinion that we must go on and we shall give you all the help we can. It will be tiresome if Germany gives the gasoline and Spain becomes even more definitely associated with the Nazis. I hope, however, that they will be more far sighted. 4. We have had a whole week with the Poles and there is still some hope that we may get something out of them which may prove the basis of a settlement. At the present time they are making more trouble about the Curzon Line than about changes in personnel. We have furnished them with the kind of telegram we should like to send to Stalin and they have promised to give us on Tuesday next their amendments to it or their alternative version. I will send you a copy of what results the moment I get it. 5.1 have had a letter from Harry. He is an indomitable spirit. I cannot help feeling very anxious about his frail body and another operation. I should always be grateful for any news about him for I rate him high among the Paladins. 6.1 have just heard that his son has been killed in the Marshall Islands battle. As I do not know whether his state of health will have permitted him to receive this news I am sending my immediately following through you. [MR*. pWSC, V, 497-98.]

Churchill's message of sympathy was immediately forwarded to Hopkins by Roosevelt.

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C-578 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 13, 1944, 1813 Ζ/TOR 4:12 P.M. Prime Minister to President. Personal. Following for H a r r y if you so decide. Dear H a r r y : Please accept o u r most p r o f o u n d sympathy with you in your h o n o u r a n d grief. Winston a n d Clementine Churchill [MR]

T h e President reluctantly agreed to permit the French to sit on the Allied Control Commission for Italy. (The final sentence was added to the draft in Roosevelt's handwriting.)

R-466 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 14, 1944, 1 2 : 5 0 P.M. Secret a n d Personal, from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. Your 560. I have agreed to the a p p o i n t m e n t of a French representative on the Control Commission for Italy a n d the Combined Chiefs of Staff have issued the necessary authority to General Wilson. So e n d e t h the first lesson. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

C-579 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 15, 1944, 0940 ΖI TOR 1200 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your 466. T h a n k you so m u c h . [MR*]

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Like Spain (see headnote to C-577), Portugal exported wolfram to Germany, but the Americans left negotiations with Portugal largely in British hands.

R-467 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 15, 1944, 1 0 : 5 0 A.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. I believe that as a result of o u r suspension of tanker loadings the Spanish situation is developing satisfactorily and that if both o u r Governments hold firm we can obtain a complete and p e r m a n e n t Spanish e m b a r g o on the export of wolfram to any country. O u r information indicates that the G e r m a n s are very short of wolfram a n d that supplies obtained at this time can be directly translated into terms of British and American casualties. We have had indications of a disposition on the part of your Ambassador a n d ours at Madrid to accept some compromise short of a complete embargo. I d o not consider this satisfactory and I see n o d a n g e r that o u r j o i n t insistence u p o n a complete embargo before resuming loading of Spanish tankers will produce any serious reaction in Spain which would adversely affect the Allied position. T h e establishment of a complete e m b a r g o would be entirely within Franco's announced policy of neutrality a n d I h o p e you will send instructions to H o a r e to stand firm as we are doing to Hayes. We know that the Portuguese are watching the Spanish situation carefully and o u r insistence u p o n the embargo should have a helpful effect in obtaining satisfaction with regard to wolfram from Salazar. Roosevelt [State Dept.] [MR*. FRUS, 1944, IV, 337-38. R(jC]

Since the Italian campaign continued to go poorly for the Allies, it is difficult to determine what news so relieved the President. Possibly he had received early reports about the destruction of the monastery at Monte Cassino and the subsequent assault on German positions in that area. However, by February 16 that assault had failed and, on the same day, the Germans launched a counter-attack against the Anzio beachhead. T h e reports from Generals Alexander and Wilson, presumably concerning the Italian campaign, are not filed with this message. German submarine losses in January and February were high, and in midFebruary the German Navy High Command ordered all U-boats out of the central Atlantic. By May there were only five submarines operational in the entire North Adantic. Such heavy losses must have taken their toll on the morale of German submarine crews.

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R-468 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 15, 1944, 12:55 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person, Secret and Personal. Your 577. The news about Harry's youngest son has, of course, hit us all very hard. Harry has gone to Miami Beach and will be there a month. He is distinctly better but they will not decide whether an operation is necessary until he returns and is re-examined. I sent him your wire. I am distinctly relieved by news from Italy. I was delighted to see Alexander's and Wilson's reports. Do you remember that in October, 1918, it was the crews of the German submarines which cracked first? Similar rumors are coming in now. Roo­ sevelt. [MR]

Not only were the Soviet Union and Bulgaria geographic neighbors, but the smaller nation had long viewed the Russians as the defenders of Slavic in­ terests. Aware of these attitudes, the British and the Americans sought to inform their Ambassadors in Russia and thus bring the Soviets into any peace talks with the Bulgarians. Colonel C. L. Jadwin, previously the U.S. Military Attache in Sofia, was working with the OSS in Turkey in an attempt to set up negotiations with Bulgarian representatives.

C-580 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 15, 1944, 1631 Ζ/TOR 1850 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Your number 465. 1. I would propose to telegraph as follows to Ambassador Clark Kerr: "Your United States colleague, who will be receiving from Wash­ ington identical instructions to those contained in this telegram, will be able to furnish you with full details of proposals made on February 6th by Bulgarian Minister to Turkey on behalf of the Regent, the Bulgarian Prime Minister and the principle opposition leaders for the initiation of discussions with the USA with a view to Bulgaria joining the United Nations. "These proposals have been considered by the President and the Prime Minister whose views are as follows: It is undesirable that a

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Bulgarian mission should open conversations in Constantinople. If the Bulgarian Government really mean business it would be a mistake to rebuff t h e m because they d o not at the outset offer unconditional s u r r e n d e r . T h e y should be told to send a fully qualified mission to meet United States, Soviet and British representatives at a place which will be indicated and which might be Cyprus or Cairo. Advantage of Cyprus is that it is n e a r e r to Bulgaria and absolutely secret. "This Bulgarian peace feeler shows that the air bombing of Sofia appears to have h a d exactly the effect which was h o p e d for. In these circumstances it would be a mistake to suspend it at the request of the Bulgarian Minister to T u r k e y before it is known whether the Bulgarian proposals really are serious ones a n d when it is probable that the Bulgarian Government h o p e for a respite from bombing d u r i n g protracted conversations. It is therefore proposed to continue with the bombing of Bulgarian targets. "In concert with your United States colleague, please convey views of President a n d Prime Minister to Molotov a n d seek his a g r e e m e n t to proposed line of action." 2. O n hearing from you that you consider this message suitable, I would at once despatch it. 3. Meanwhile you will no doubt have informed the J a d w i n mission of o u r decision. [MR*. fifcfC]

R-469 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 16, 1944, 12:05 P.M. Secret a n d Personal, for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. Replying to your 5 8 0 , 1 am in agreement with your proposed telegram to Clark Kerr a n d I am today sending identical instructions to H a r r i m a n together with such details of the Bulgarian proposal as are available h e r e . I have also informed Jadwin of o u r decision. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. KfcfC]

Already upset about the decision not to step up operations in the eastern Mediterranean and increasingly dubious about the invasion of southern France (ANVIL), Churchill protested any transfer of aircraft to a theater of operations he considered far less important than Europe.

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C-581 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 16, 1944, 1003 Ζ / T O R 1220 Ζ

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Eisenhower is not yet ready to meet our Chiefs of Staff on the main OVERLORD/ANVIL question, but there is a point which I must bring to your notice at once. We are distressed at the prospect of two groups of fighter aircraft having to leave the Mediterranean at this juncture for China. We think it essential that the forces for OVERLORD and its supporting operations should be as strong as possible and this has been the policy accepted and the priority assigned in all our discussions. By abandoning our Aegean projects, which I most loyally do for the above object, we have freed eight fighter squadrons for operations to the Central and Western Mediter­ ranean but it is most disheartening to find that this sacrifice in no way improves our chances in Italy and ANVIL since more than the equivalent of eight squadrons are now being taken away for the Far East. Moreover, we are expecting to have to send home from Mediterranean for OVERLORD three groups which may have to stay if China gets the two. Thus OVERLORD would be the loser in spite of its supreme priority. [MR*]

R-470 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 17, 1944, 11:50 A.M.

Personal and Secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. I have today sent the following quoted message to Uncle Joe: QUOTE. Replying to your message of January 29, I am pleased to inform you that the following United States ships are available for temporary use by the Naval Command of the U.S.S.R. until adequate Italian tonnage to replace them can be placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union. The merchant ship (10,000 tons) Harry Percy, now at Glasgow. The merchant ship John Gorrie (10,000 tons), now at Liverpool. The cruiser Milwaukee will arrive in some port in the United King­ dom March 8. UNQUOTE.

Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. R&C. pStaltn/FDR, doc. 161.]

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Although Project MATTERHORN, the bombing of Japan by B-29s based in central and western China, had been approved at the Teheran Conference, it was to be established without seriously affecting other operations of higher priority, particularly OVERLORD. Nevertheless, Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs insisted that MATTERHORN receive the necessary supplies and support, including the fighter aircraft needed to protect the newly constructed air bases. HARDIHOOD was the program of aid to Turkey once that nation declared war on Germany. Air Marshal Sir John Slessor had recently taken command of British Air Forces in the Mediterranean.

R-471 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 18, 1944, 11:55 A.M. Personal and Secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person. Replying to your number 581, as you know the project for very long range bomber operations (B-29's) from China against Japan was approved at SEXTANT. A necessary part of this project is the fighter protection required. In relating available resources to agreed operations at SEXTANT provision was made for the movement of these two groups from the Mediterranean to China. These new, powerful and very long range bombers demand adequate protection. In making preparation for the use of the B-29's we have run into considerable difficulty particularly as to construction of airfields in China. I have urged the Generalissimo to aid in every way possible. The Generalissimo in a message to me said this: "While favoring your view that very long range air operations against Japan proper from China should do much to heighten the morale of both our nations I am strongly of the opinion that in order to assure the success of these operations the present American air force stationed in China should be immediately increased to such an extent as to be able to protect our air bases from attack or destruction by the enemy." In reply I told the Generalissimo that we had been planning to provide this protection by dispatching the two fighter groups in question. The movement is now actually in progress. The bulk of the crews and maintenance personnel have been in process of movement for a month with the special equipment required. The final increment is scheduled for transportation before the end of the month. I am informed that Slessor in his study of air requirements in the Mediterranean stated that if HARDIHOOD were abandoned there would be enough places to take care of China as well as sparing some units for OVERLORD if this were considered essential. I am confident that OVERLORD's fighter strength can be adequately taken care of by fully utilizing the fighter planes available in the U.K. Roosevelt [GCM] [MR*. R&C]

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Still smarting over American criticisms of British colonialism in India, Church­ ill wanted to maintain control over Allied activities in that nation.

C-582 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 19, 1944, 0815 Ζ /TOR 7:50 A.M. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your telegram n u m b e r 4 5 5 : New Delhi Emergency P r o p a g a n d a Com­ mittee. I a m p r e p a r e d to agree to t h e discontinuance of the New Delhi Com­ mittee. But, in that case, I think its main functions should be exercised in L o n d o n . T h a t is to say, that emergencies arising in the geographical area of t h e Southeast Asia C o m m a n d should be dealt with by an AngloAmerican C o m m i t t e e here, leaving all emergencies arising in China o r India-China to be dealt with in Washington. Do you agree? [MR*]

Anglo-American competition for Middle Eastern (and other) oil predated World War II, but reports that American petroleum reserves were below expected postwar demands stimulated both congressional and administration concern. At first Roosevelt had supported a proposal by the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, to have a government-owned corporation, the Petro­ leum Reserves Corporation, take control of all American oil interests in the Middle East and vigorously seek out new petroleum concessions. However, the State Department insisted on keeping control of postwar economic foreign policy, and the President eventually went along. Either way the result for Britain was the same. Pressure from Congress and the news media as well as a sincere conviction that American national interest was involved forced the Roosevelt administration to call for Cabinet-level Anglo-American discussions on petroleum affairs, including "transportation problems," "concession rights," and "price and marketing policies" (FRUS, 1944, I I I , 95). T h e British tried to downplay the matter and postpone the discussions, but to no avail. In spite of American assurances to the contrary, the Foreign Office suspected that the United States hoped to gain access to British oil concessions, not merely coordinate a search for new ones. British Ambassador Lord Halifax claimed that American officials "were treating us shockingly, and that they were being as cavalier as U.J." (quoted in Woodward, British Foreign Policy, IV, 393—94). T h e five Senators mentioned by Churchill had been on a worldwide tour of American military and foreign-aid facilities and had strongly criticized what they called "give-away" programs. They proposed that Britain should give the United States raw materials and bases in return for lend-lease, and they complained that too much American oil was being used in the war effort

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instead of oil from other nations, especially British resources. (Contrary to the annotations in other printed sources, Churchill's "Five Senators" did not refer to the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Petroleum Resources.)

C-583 London [via U.S. Embassy and Army] Feb. 20, 1944, 1500 Ζ /TOR 1740 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. 1. I have been watching lately with increasing misgiving the official telegrams about the oil business. I am very glad you have consented to delay for a few days the publication of a purely American statement. You may be sure I should only wish to arrive at what is fair and just between our two countries. Surely this can be patiently considered between us before it is flung into public discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. A wrangle about oil would be a poor prelude for the tremendous joint enterprise and sacrifice to which we have bound ourselves. 2. Lord Halifax has explained to me the difficulties of the situation on your side. We too have our difficulties which may become very formidable in Parliament. There is apprehension in some quarters here that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our oil assets in the Middle East on which, among other things, the whole supply of our navy depends. This sensitiveness has of course been greatly aggravated by the Five Sen­ ators. I am sure these suspicions are entirely unfounded so far as the Government of the United States is concerned. When however it is an­ nounced that you are to open a conference upon oil in Persia and the Middle East and that the Secretary of State is to be the leader of the American Delegation the whole question will become one of first mag­ nitude in Parliament. It will be felt that they are being hustled and may be subjected to pressure. I am sure to be asked for an assurance that the question of no transfer of property will arise and I shall be unable to give such an assurance. Moreover great expectations will certainly be aroused in the United States by a conference on oil opened under your auspices. Will there not be unceasing pressure upon you from those elements in the United States which are least friendly to us to gratify those expec­ tations at our expense? 3. International conferences at the highest level should surely be care­ fully prepared beforehand and I would beg you to consider whether it would not be more advisable to proceed as a first step for official and technical talks on the lines which had, I understand, already been agreed between the State Department and ourselves. [MR*. FRUS, 1944, III, 100-1. R&C]

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Two days after Churchill confidendy assured Roosevelt that the Poles had agreed to British proposals for a Soviet-Polish modus vivendi, Foreign Secretary Eden instructed Lord Halifax to tell the President that the correct language was that the message sent to Stalin "has been seen by the Polish Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been written in close consultation with them and is despatched with their agreement" (Halifax to Roosevelt, Feb. 22, 1944, MR). In other words, it was only a British proposal and the Poles were not committed to it.

C-584 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 20, 1944, 2159 Ζ / TOR 2340 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal. My immediately following telegram to Uncle J o e has b e e n agreed with the Poles. You will see that it achieves in essentials actually saying so t h e settlement outlined at T e h e r a n . Anything d o to c o m m e n d its acceptance to t h e Soviet G o v e r n m e n t will be assistance. I h o p e you will feel we have laboured helpfully.

textually without you can of great

[MR*. pFRUS, 1944, III, 1259n.]

Roosevelt responded to Churchill's request and sent a supporting message to Stalin on or about February 22 which Stalin received on February 28. But such pleas made little impression on the Soviet leader. T h o u g h he did not mention the refusal of the Poles to dismiss certain Ministers who had ex­ pressed strong anti-Soviet views, Stalin's response to the President summed up the Russian position: " T h e Polish emigres in London not only reject the Curzon Line, they also claim Lvov, and Vilna, the Lithuanian capital. . . . the time is not yet ripe for a solution of the problem of Polish-Soviet relations" (Stalin/FDR, docs. 171, 172). Churchill's goal was a temporary arrangement which would give the Polish government in London a chance to assert its authority in liberated Poland, but Stalin refused to let that happen. (See the headnote to C-557 for background material on the Polish-Soviet border dispute.)

C-585 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 20, 1944 / TOR 0315 Z, Feb. 21 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text of telegram which I have sent to Marshal Stalin.

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1. The Foreign Secretary and I have had numerous long discussions with the Polish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. I shall not attempt to repeat all the arguments which were used but only to give what I conceive to be the position of the Polish Government in the upshot. 2. The Polish Government are ready to declare that the Riga Line no longer corresponds to realities and with our participation to discuss with the Soviet Government as part of the general settlement a new frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union together with the future frontiers of Poland in the north and west. Since however the compensations which Poland is to receive in the north and west cannot be stated publicly or precisely at present time the Polish Government clearly cannot make an immediate public declaration of their willingness to cede territory as indicated above because the publication of such an arrangement would have an entirely onesided appearance with the consequence that they would immediately be repudiated not only by a large part of their people abroad but by the underground movement in Poland with which they are in constant contact. It is evident therefore that the Polish-Soviet territorial setdement which must be an integral part of the general territorial setdement of Europe could only formally be agreed and ratified when the victorious Powers are gathered round the table at the time of an armistice or peace. 3. For the above reasons the Polish Government until it has returned to Polish Territory and been allowed to consult the Polish People can obviously not formally abdicate its rights in any part of Poland as hitherto constituted but the vigorous prosecution of the war against Germany in collaboration with the Soviet Armies would be greatly assisted if the Russian Government will facilitate the return of the Polish Government to the territory of liberated Poland at the earliest possible moment: and in consultation with their British and American Allies as the Russian Armies advance arrange from time to time with the Polish Government for the establishment of the Civil Administration of the Polish Government in given districts. This procedure would be in general accordance with those to be followed in the case of other countries as they are liberated. The Polish Government are naturally very anxious that the districts to be placed under Polish Civil Administration should include such places as Vilna and Lwow, where there are large concentrations of Poles, and that the territories to the east of the demarkation line should be administered by the Soviet Military Authorities with the assistance of representatives of the United Nations. They point out that thus they would be in the best position to enlist all such able bodied Poles in

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the war effort. I have informed them and they clearly understand that you will not assent to leaving Vilna and Lwow under Polish administration. I wish on the other hand to be able to assure them that the area to be placed under Polish Civil Administration will include at least all Poland west of the Curzon Line. 4. At the frontier negotiations contemplated in paragraph 2 above, the Polish Government, taking into consideration the mixed character of the population of eastern Poland, would favour a frontier drawn with a view to assuring the highest degree of homogeneity on both sides while reducing as much as possible the extent and hardships of an exchange of populations. I have no doubt myself, especially in view of the immediate practical arrangements contemplated by the Polish Government as set out in paragraph 3 above, that these negotiations will inevitably lead to the conclusion you desire in regard to the future Polish-Soviet frontier, but it seems to me unnecessary and undesirable publicly to emphasize this at this stage. 5. As regards the war with Germany which they wish to prosecute with the utmost vigour, the Polish Government realise that it is imperative to have a working agreement with the Soviet Government in view of the advance of the liberating Russian Armies onto Polish soil from which these armies are driving the German invader. They assure me emphatically that they have at no time given instructions to the Underground Movement to attack "Partisans". On the contrary, after consultation with the leaders of their Underground Movement and with their accord they have issued orders to all Poles now in arms or about to revolt against the Hitlerite tyranny as follows:— when the Russian Army enters any particular district in Poland the Underground Movement is to disclose its identity and meet the requirements of the Soviet Commanders, even in the absence of a resumption of Polish-Soviet relations. The local Polish Military Commander, accompanied by the local civilian Underground Authority, will meet and declare to the Commander of the incoming Soviet Troops that, following the instructions of the Polish Government, to which they remain faithful, they are ready to coordinate their actions with him in the fight against the common foe. These orders which are already in operation seem to me, as I am sure they will to you, of the highest significance and importance. 6. For the first time on February 6th I told the Polish Government that the Soviet Government wished to have the frontier in east Prussia drawn to include, on the Russian side, Konigsberg. The information came as a shock to the Polish Government who see in such a decision a substantial reduction in the size and in economic importance of the German territory to be incorporated in Poland by war [way] of com-

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pensation. But I stated that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government this was a rightful claim on the part of Russia. Regarding as I do this war against German aggression as all one and as a thirty years war from 1914 onwards I reminded Monsieur Micolajczyk of the fact that the soil of this part of east Prussia was dyed with Russian blood expended freely in the common cause. Here the Russian Armies advancing in August 1914 and winning the battle of Gumbinnen and other actions had, with their foreward thrusts and with much injury to their mobilization, forced the Germans to recall two Army Corps from the advance on Paris, which withdrawal was an essential part in the victory of the Marne. The disaster at Tannenberg did not in any way undo this great result. Therefore it seemed to me that the Russians had an historic and well founded claim to this German territory. 7. As regards the composition of the Polish Government, the Polish Government cannot admit any right of a foreign intervention. They can however assure the Russian Government that by the time they have entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, they will include among themselves none but persons fully determined to cooperate with the Soviet Union. I am of opinion that it is much better that such changes should come about naturally and as a result of further Polish consideration of their interests as a whole. It might well be, in my opinion, that the moment for a resumption of these relations in a formal manner would await the reconstitution of a Polish Government at the time of the liberation of Warsaw, when it would arise naturally from the circumstances attending that glorious event. 8. It would be in accordance with assurances I have received from you that, in an agreement covering the points made above, the Soviet Government should join with His Majesty's Government in undertaking vis a vis each other and Poland first to recognize and respect the sovereign independence and territorial integrity of the reconstituted Poland and the right of each to conduct its domestic affairs without interferences: secondly, to do their best to secure in due course the incorporation in Poland of the free city of Danzig, Oppeln, Silesia, East Prussia west and south of a line running from Konigsberg and of as much territory up to the Oder as the Polish Government see fit to accept: Thirdly, to effect the removal from Poland, including the German territories to be incorporated in Poland of the German population: and fourthly, to negotiate the procedure for an exchange of population between Poland [and] the Soviet Union, and for the return to their mother country of nationals of the powers in question. All the above undertakings to each Kingdom should, in my view, be

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drawn up in such a form that they could be embodied in a single instrument or exchange of letters. 9.1 informed the Polish Ministers that should the settlement which has now been outlined in the various telegrams that have passed between us become a fact and be observed in the spirit by all parties to it, His Majesty's Government would support that settlement at the conference after the defeat of Hitler, and also, that we would guar­ antee that settlement in after years to the best of our ability. [MR*. FRUS, 1944, I I I , 1259-62. StalmlWSC, doc. 243. fifcfC]

The British Foreign Office believed that Spain supported Germany in several important ways besides the export of wolfram, and the British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, had obtained a commitment from the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Spanish would close the German con­ sulate in Tangier as well as remove German agents from Tangier and Spain, bring home the Spanish units fighting in Russia, release all Italian merchant vessels interned in Spain, and drastically limit wolfram exports. The Amer­ icans, however, continued to enforce a complete embargo on oil shipments to Spain until all exports of wolfram to Germany ceased, regardless of Spain's other concessions. German air raids over London were particularly heavy between February 18 and 24, inflicting severe damage in the Battersea area and breaking win­ dows and doors at St. James's Palace, 10 Downing Street (the Prime Minister's official residence and office), and at Whitehall (the Foreign Office).

C-586 London via U.S. Army Feb. 21, 1944, 0021 ΖI TOR 0212 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and [Secret?] Your number 467 of 15th February. 1. Sir Samuel Hoare had already been instructed to give his fullest support to your Ambassador and I have now seen reports of the further representations made by our Ambassadors at Madrid. These show that a settlement which I should myself regard as eminently satisfactory can now be reached on all points, if we act quickly. This settlement would include the complete cessation of Spanish wolfram ex­ ports to Germany for six months. If all goes as we hope, I do not think we need anticipate much difficulty in maintaining this position when the six months have elapsed. The Foreign Secretary is telegraphing in greater detail to the State Department. I hope you will agree that we should immediately clinch

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matters on the above basis, which I am sure would represent a major political victory over the enemy. 2. We have just had a stick of bombs around 10, Downing Street and there are no more windows. Clemmie and I were at Chequers and luckily all the servants were in the shelter. Four persons killed outside. [MR*. FRUS, 1944, IV, 345-46. flfcfC]

Churchill hoped to keep the Soviet government open to negotiations with the London Poles by convincing Stalin that the Polish leaders would acquiesce to the Russian demands concerning the boundary and the makeup of the Polish government. The force of the Prime Minister's arguments was weak­ ened, however, by the refusal of exiled Polish leaders to associate themselves formally with the British position. Although Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, For­ eign Minister Tadeusz Romer, and Ambassador to Great Britain Count Eduard Raczynski all suported Churchill's efforts, the Polish Cabinet did not. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr was the British Ambassador in Moscow.

C-587 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 21, 1944, 0950 ΖI TOR 1210 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. 1. My telegram number 585. While the Polish Ministers cannot formally authorise us to proceed on this basis, they are ready that we should do so on their behalf and assure us that they will not subsequently disavow our actions. For the reasons explained in my message they cannot however themselves come out formally and publicly at this stage in the sense of this message. There is the further difficulty that three of the four parties represented in the Polish Government, i.e. all except the Peasant Party, refuse to authorise Monsieur Mikolajczyk to go as far as we would have wished. The present proposals therefore represent agreement with Mon­ sieur Mikolajczyk, Monsieur Romer and Count Raczynski for which they would hope subsequently to secure the support of the Polish Government and the Polish underground movement in Poland if it proves acceptable to U.J. 2. You will see that my message goes very far to meet Soviet require­ ments in so far as (1) Orders have already been issued to the Polish underground move­ ment to cooperate with the Soviet forces (see paragraph 5 of my telegram): (2) The Polish Government will accept a position under which the Soviet Government hand over to them for administration only those areas of Poland west of the Curzon Line (this abandonment of large Polish ag-

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glomerations in Vilna and Lwow areas means a great sacrifice to them): (3) The Polish Government agree and we are ready to declare that the Riga Line no longer corresponds to realities. They realise that while reserving their formal rights their acceptance of a demarkation line based on the Curzon Line in fact prejudges the future frontier about which they are ready and indeed anxious to open negotiations soon. It has been made very clear to the Polish Ministers in this connection that His Majesty's Government regard the Curzon Line as the appropriate future frontier and will support this at the postwar settlement. 3. Clark Kerr has been instructed to emphasize the above points when communicating my message to U.J., and also to stress the necessity for reserving the formal settlement of future Polish frontiers until we are in a position to deal with the western and northern as well as the eastern frontiers. 4. Clark Kerr has also been asked to draw Stalin's attention to the great public and parliamentary interest and anxiety here regarding Polish-Soviet relations, pointing out the importance of reaching some early practical arrangements on the lines suggested in my message to calm public anxiety and to avoid grave embarrassment to the United Nations war effort as a whole. Ambassador is to add that we also have to consider the effect of what we are now doing upon the Polish divisions which have now gone into action in Italy or are preparing to go into action from the United Kingdom and upon the Polish Air squadrons and Navy who have already rendered notable services to the United Nations. 5. Instructions to Clark Kerr conclude: The Polish Ministers have recently shown great restraint by refusing to enter into polemics as a result of the bitter and unjustified attacks upon them in the recent Pravda article. They are showing realism and courage in enabling us to proceed on the present basis despite the contrary view held by large sections of the Polish Government and population in Poland and abroad and despite their own misgivings regarding the overwhelming Soviet power. We doubt very much whether we can push them any further and we should feel alarmed about the effect upon opinion here and in the USA, and therefore upon the United Nations war effort, of a Soviet refusal to give sympathetic consideration to the present proposals. You should make use of the above arguments in your representations to Marshal Stalin. [MR*. FRUS, 1944, III, 1262-64. «fcfC]

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R-472 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 21, 1944, 3:10 P.M. Secret and Personal, for the Former Naval Person from the President. Your 582. I am glad that we agree on the discontinuance of the New Delhi Emergency Propaganda Committee. I concur in your proposed reassignment of its functions to the Washington and London Committees. Emergencies arising in the geographical area of the Southeast Asia Command will, therefore, now be handled by the London Committee and those in the China or Indo-China area by the Washington Committee. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

The President believed that Churchill had managed to get the Poles to accept the British proposals for a settlement with the Soviet Union. The changes in the original draft were apparently made at Roosevelt's suggestion.

R-473 Washington [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 21, 1944, 3:15 P.M. Secret and Personal, for the Former Naval Person from the President. Your 585 and 587. I have sent the following message to U.J. QUOTE. I am informed as to the text of the message sent to you on February 20th by Mr. Churchill on the subject of a tentative settlement of the Polish post-war boundary by agreement between the Soviet and the Polish Governments. This suggestion by the Prime Minister, if accepted, goes far toward advancing our prospects of an early defeat of Germany and I am pleased to recommend that you give to it favorable and sympathetic consideration. In view of the large number of citizens of the United States who arc of Polish descent, it is of much importance to me that the Polish dispute be adjudicated without any avoidable delay. As I intimated before, I think the most realistic problem of the moment is to be assured that your armies will be assisted by the Poles when you get into Poland, UNQUOTE.

You are to be congratulated on getting the Polish Government in Exile

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to agree to your p r o p o s e d compromise a n d I h o p e Stalin will also agree a n d take his share in t h e settlement of this very serious difficulty. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. Rb?C]

C-588 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 22, 1944, 2145 Ζ I TOR 2300 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. 1. Your N o . 473. I a m so glad you approve of o u r work with t h e Poles a n d t h a n k you very m u c h for giving it a fair wind with Uncle J . 2. Your No. 472. O.K. [MR*]

As the next two messages illustrate, postwar considerations had begun to intrude more insistently on the Anglo-American alliance. Roosevelt and Churchill still agreed on the wisdom of trying to cooperate with the Soviet Union, though not always on the details, but the old competitive spirit in matters of economics had reasserted itself. Partly in response to heavy criticism from the Republican Party (see headnote to C—457/1), the Roosevelt admin­ istration had decided to eliminate lend-lease transfers which were designed to assist the British economy rather than to provide direct support for the war effort (for example, the purchase of Caribbean sugar for British domestic use). T h e question of a buildup of British dollar balances found American policy-makers divided. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau had supported re­ strictions on British dollar balances (U.S. dollars actually held by or owed to British firms or the government), but believed that the matter should not be raised until later in the war lest it poison Anglo-American relations. On the other hand, Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius told the President that "if the financial side of the war is run in such a way as to keep British balances at or about $1 billion, we thereby reduce our chance to achieve the basic economic policy we want and need." In other words, Britain would be strong enough to withstand U.S. economic pressure and chart an independent post­ war course. Concluding that "the domestic political aspect of this situation was great enough to be controlling," Roosevelt instructed Stettinius to draft the message printed below (Stettinius to Roosevelt, Feb. 22, 1944, MR; Stet­ tinius to Acheson, Feb. 19 and 23, 1944, Stettinius papers; Blum, Morgenthau Diaries, III, 137—38). Mr. Ben Smith, the United Kingdom's Minister Resident in Washington for Supply, and Sir David Waley, the U.K. Treasury repre­ sentative on the British Supply Council, had joined Ambassador Halifax to discuss Anglo-American monetary questions with representatives of the U.S. State Department and Treasury Department.

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R-474 Washington [via U.S. Navy & State Dept. courier] Feb. 22, 1944, 6:00 P.M. Personal and Secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person, Copy to the Foreign Secretary. May I ask your help in solving a troublesome problem which is of deep political concern both for you and for us? Officers of our Government have lately discussed with Lord Halifax, Mr. Ben Smith and Sir David Waley the possible termination of certain lend-lease transactions which we have found to be embarrassing, and no longer necessary. Your people have, as I understand it, promptly agreed to take over the purchase of goods which cost about $400 million in 1943. Final agreement on the whole list of articles is expected soon, and the negotiations, in view of their complexity, have gone very well. Quite apart from these lend-lease negotiations, I have been wondering whether it would be feasible for you to consider so ordering your financial affairs as to reduce your gold and dollar holdings available in this country to the neighborhood of about $1 billion. What do you think should and can be done? Roosevelt [ERS] [MR*]

In spite of Churchill's plea (C-583), the President backed the State Department and insisted upon unrestricted, high-level discussions in Washington on postwar competition for petroleum. The tone of Roosevelt's message was unyielding and almost peremptory.

R-474/1 Washington [via U.S. Embassy] Feb. 22, 1944, 12:00 P.M.—midnight Please Deliver This Message Personally to the Prime Minister from the President. QUOTE. I have given most careful consideration to your telegram of February 20. I have noted particularly your concern that a wrangle between the two Governments on oil must be avoided. You point to the apprehension on your side that the United States desires to deprive you of oil assets in the Middle East. On the other hand, I am disturbed about the rumor that the British wish to horn in on Saudi Arabian oil reserves. Problems and questions which give rise to rumors and apprehensions of this sort also clearly indicate the strong need for arriving at a basic un-

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derstanding between the two Governments regarding Middle Eastern oil, which understanding should lead to oil agreements of a broader scope. I agree that the actual working technical discussions should be at the expert staff level. However, in view of the great long range importance of oil to the post-war international security and economic arrangements, it is my firm conviction that these technical discussions should take place under the guidance of a group at Cabinet level and I cannot, therefore, change my position in this regard. While the American group will be under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, I desire to preside at the first meeting of the joint group to be held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. It is my view that all of the discussions should take place in Washington and that, in order that the broadest possible understandings may be reached, there should be no limitations on the petroleum problems to be discussed. I assure you that it is the firm intention of this Government to approach these conversations in a frank and fully cooperative manner and with a clear desire to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement which will strengthen our collaboration in the tremendous joint enterprise to which you have alluded. Roosevelt, UNQUOTE. [MR*. FRUS, 1944, III, 101-2.]

Roosevelt's demand that the American occupation zone be in northwestern Germany had shocked American military leaders as well as their British coun­ terparts. (See headnote to R-457.) Churchill failed to realize that the President believed that France would be in political chaos immediately after the war; hence the Prime Minister's argument that French forces could relieve the Americans fell on deaf ears. Roosevelt did not change his mind about the occupation zones until after the two men met at Quebec in the fall of 1944.

C-589 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 23, 1944, 1016 ΖI TOR 1200 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Most Secret. 1. Reference your telegram number 457 on the question of countries and areas to be occupied by British and US forces in RANKIN, or after OVERLORD, the position seems to me to be as follows. 2. COSSAC's original plan suggested three zones to be occupied by our forces, your forces and the Russians, respectively. Our sphere included NW Germany, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark:

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Your sphere southern Germany, France and possibly Austria. The Russian sphere lay to the east of the British area. 3. On the basis of this allocation which was approved in principle at QUADRANT, planning proceeded both for OVERLORD and RANKIN. At SEXTANT when plans were already far advanced, your Chiefs of Staff proposed that the allocation should be virtually reversed, but gave no reason. 4. I agree that your proposals might be military [militarily] feasible for the true RANKIN case "C" (i.e. the collapse of Germany before the launching of OVERLORD). But even then there would, from our point of view, be the following serious objections:— (i) The whole of the German coastline in the North Sea and a large part of their coastline in the Baltic, and therefore all the German naval establishments of any importance and the majority of the naval and shipbuilding yards, would be included in the United States area. The naval disarmament of Germany is a matter of peculiar interest to us and we are better equipped and situated than any other power to ensure that this process is carried out with the maximum thoroughness. (ii) There is close liaison between the Royal Air Force and the Norwegian and Netherlands Air Force which we have trained and organized, and it is desirable that this should be continued after the war. It will be extremely difficult to maintain this association of these countries which are outside our zone of responsibility. On the other hand, you have had the major responsibility for re-equipping the French land and air forces. 5. If, however, the collapse of Germany occurs after Allied forces have been committed to the continent in OVERLORD, which seems almost certain, most serious practical objections must be added to those in 4 sub para 1 and sub para 2 above. Our forces would be operating on the left flank of OVERLORD with their overseas bases in the Havre Cherbourg area, whilst the United States forces, on the right flank, would have their overseas bases in the Brittany ports. 6. Your proposals therefore would involve either the crossing of the land lines of communication of the two parts of the Allied force advancing on Germany, or the withdrawal and re-embarkation of the US forces. Both these would cause severe administrative difficulties and delays. It is obviously too late to replan OVERLORD with British forces on the right and US forces on the left. 7. In view of the serious objections which I have described and the fact that at this late stage all our thoughts and energies must be given to making a success of OVERLORD, I consider that only reasons of overriding importance could justify such a fundamental change of plan as that proposed. 8. As I understand it your proposal arises from an aversion to undertaking police work in France and a fear that this might involve the sta-

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tioning of US forces in France over a long period. I rather think, however, that I can put a different complexion on this matter. 9. I agree that our connection with France will be closer than yours and that it will be primarily our concern to see that she is if possible restored as a strong power, without whose cooperation the controlling of Germany is going to be much more difficult. But surely the question of policing does not arise? Under the new directive (which I hope is now agreed) we are, I think, going to recognize some provisional government as soon as we can, and we must hope that such a government will be able to establish its authority over the whole country. 10.1 recognize that you must protect your communications, but I hardly think that the mere fact that your communications pass through France would involve you generally in the policing of France against your will. 11. I believe indeed that if you have the southern zone, the French, so far from holding more of your men in Europe for longer than you wish, may prove the means for releasing some of your men more quickly than you had hoped. If a satisfactory regime were set up in France and you were anxious to withdraw some of your troops from Germany there would probably be little difficulty in French troops being moved into the southern German zone to take over from your men; the French would in those circumstances be only too anxious to assume this responsibility. 12. All these reasons make it most undesirable to make a change which would alter the whole basis of our work and planning over the last 6 to 9 months and which must lead to serious complications in the future. [MR*. FRUS, 1944, I, 180-82. R&C]

Roosevelt assumed that Churchill's message to Stalin (C-567) had been delivered, but the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, had delayed until the message could be delivered personally to Stalin, who was away visiting the front. (See R-456, R—458.) The confusion was quickly straightened out (see C-590), although Stalin expressed misgivings about the capabilities of the destroyers, since Clark Kerr had warned him that the vessels were quite old. (See Stalin/FDR, docs. 158, 161, 162, 166, 167.)

R-475 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 23, 1944, 11:40 A.M. Secret and Personal, from the President for the Former Naval Person. Reference your 565 and 567. The following message from Stalin and my reply thereto are quoted for your information:

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QUOTE. Stalin to Roosevelt. I have received your message of February 18 [R—470]. Thank you for the information. It, however, does not exhaust the question since there is nothing mentioned in it about the Anglo-American destroyers and submarines instead of Italian ones (8 destroyers, 4 submarines), as it was agreed upon at Teheran. I hope to receive a speedy reply regarding these questions, touched in my communication of January 29th. UNQUOTE.

QUOTE. Roosevelt to Stalin. I have received your message of February 21 regarding the loan of Anglo-American ships to the Soviet Navy. It was my understanding that Great Britain would provide the one battleship, the eight destroyers and the four submarines. I have telegraphed to Prime Minister Churchill in regard to this and will let you know when I hear from him. UNQUOTE.

Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. pStahn/FDR, docs. 162, 166. R&C ]

The neo-Wilsonians in the State Department, led by Cordell Hull, firmly believed that only the establishment of freer trade and liberal economic institutions could provide an adequate foundation for permanent peace. Although Roosevelt had less faith in economic cooperation as a cure-all, he did believe that it would help. This message, which was simultaneously sent to Stalin, was Hull's attempt to capitalize on the support he mistakenly thought such proposals had received at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference. In the long run, both the Soviet Union and the British viewed such freetrade programs as designed to perpetuate the competitive edge that American corporations held in many foreign markets.

R-476 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 23, 1944, 1:10 P.M. From the President for the Former Naval Person, Secret and Personal. In recent months a number of important steps have been taken by the Governments of the United Nations toward laying the foundations for post-war cooperative action in the various fields of international economic relations. You will recall that the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, held in May, 1943, gave rise to an Interim Commission which is now drafting recommendations to lay before the various governments for a permanent organization in this field. More recently, there

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has been established—and is now in operation—the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. For nearly a year, there have been informal technical discussions at the expert level among many of the United Nations on mechanisms for international monetary stabilization; these discussions are preparatory to a possible convocation of an United Nations Monetary Conference. Similar discussions have been taking place, though on a more restricted scale, with regard to the possibility of establishing mechanisms for facilitating international developmental investment. To some extent, informal discussions have taken place among some of the United Nations with regard to such questions as commercial policy, commodity policy, and cartels. Discussions are in contemplation on such questions as commercial aviation, oil, and others. In April a conference of the International Labor Organization will take place, in part for the purpose of considering the future activities of that organization. In a document presented by the Secretary of State at the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers, entitled "Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation", the need was emphasized for both informal discussions and formal conferences on various economic problems. It was suggested that "the time has come for the establishment of a Commission comprising representatives of the principal United Nations and possibly certain others of the United Nations for the joint planning of the procedures to be following in these matters". It is clear to me that there is a manifest need for United Nations machinery for joint planning of the procedures by which consideration should be given to the various fields of international economic cooperation, the subjects which should be discussed, the order of discussion, and the means of coordinating existing and prospective arrangements and activities. I do not mean to raise at this time and in this connection the broader issues of international organization for the maintenance of peace and security. Preliminary discussions on this subject are currently in contemplation between our three governments under the terms of the Moscow Protocol. What I am raising here is the question of further steps toward the establishment of United Nations machinery for post-war economic collaboration, which was raised by the Secretary of State at the Moscow meeting and was discussed by you, Marshal Stalin, and myself at Teheran. I should appreciate it very much if you would give me your views on the suggestion made by the Secretary of State at Moscow, together with any other thoughts as to the best procedures to be followed in this extremely important matter. Roosevelt [State Dept.] [MR*. FRUS, 1944, II, 14-16 (paraphrase). i?6fC]

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The Combined Boards, which coordinated Anglo-American economic policy during the war, were four in number: Production and Resources, Food, Raw Materials, and Shipping Adjustment. During discussions on the scope and activities of UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration), officials from both countries had suggested that the Combined Boards should continue beyond the end of the European war and even the Pacific war. T h e Americans were reluctant to permit the liberated European nations to sit on the boards, however, lest they press for a shift of resources from the Pacific war to European rehabilitation. Churchill did not answer this message until April 15 (C-647), and then was vague and circumspect. T h e entire question of postwar economic relations with the United States generated a major debate within British government circles, as officials tried to adjust to the unpleasant reality of overwhelming American dominance. (The debate can be followed by reading the appropriate documents in FRUS, 1943, I, and FRUS, 1944, II. T h e British position is clearly, if unsympathetically, summarized therein by various American diplomats.)

R-477 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 23, 1944, 1:10 P.M. Personal and Secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person. In connection with my telegram to you of February 23 ( N u m b e r 476) suggesting the need for United Nations machinery for joint planning of the procedures by which consideration should be given to various fields of post-war international economic relations, I think that both of our Governments should be giving attention to the future status of the Combined Boards. I am impressed, as I know you are, with the good work these Boards have been doing. It is clear, as we go forward with United Nations planning in the international economic field, that the question of the part which the Combined Boards could or should play in such future a r r a n g e m e n t s as may be planned will become increasingly important. This is b o u n d to raise the question of the relation between the Combined Boards a n d the United Nations not represented on them. T h a t question, as you know, has already arisen and some phases of it were discussed in an exchange of m e m o r a n d a between the Department of State a n d the British Embassy here. I do not believe that it has as yet been satisfactorily solved. We are at work u p o n possible solutions, and I believe that it is of the utmost importance that immediate consideration be given to the matter on your side. I also believe that in the none-too-distant future we should

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have exchanges of views in o r d e r to p r e p a r e ourselves to meet these questions. Roosevelt [State Dept.] [MR*. FRUS, 1944, II, 16 (paraphrase).]

Although the President seemed willing to accept the British proposal for a compromise settlement with Spain—one which would cut off wolfram shipments to Germany within six months—the State Department refused to consider lifting the embargo on oil to Spain until all wolfram shipments to the Nazis were halted.

R-478 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 23, 1944, 1 2 : 1 5 P.M.

Secret and Personal, from the President for the Former Naval Person. Your 586. It is very pleasing to know that a settlement of o u r c u r r e n t controversy with Spain promises to be accomplished quickly. I am happy to know that you a n d Clemmie were absent at the time of the bombing and that n o n e of your people were injured. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

American military leaders wanted to accelerate operations in Burma to permit the construction of a supply road from Ledo, in northwestern Assam (India), through the northern tip of Burma, linking u p with the old Burma Road at Wanting, on the Chinese border (see map, p. 111). Doubting the Americans could build the road before the war ended, and further doubting that, in the unlikely event of the completion of the road, the amounts of supplies which could be sent to China would be sufficient to justify the effort, the British were understandably reluctant to launch an offensive which had as its only purpose the protection of the proposed route for the unfinished road. T h e British did launch an attack with troops under the command of Brigadier General Orde Wingate. Using his concept of long-range penetration, he planned to disrupt Japanese communications by occupying territory in advance of Chinese forces led by General Stilwell. T h e mission was only partly successful, Churchill's enthusiasm not withstanding (C-620), and it fell far short of the kind of British assistance which Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell hoped for. T h e entire question was complicated by a Japanese offensive against Imphal in eastern India, and by the proposals of the South East Asia theater commander, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, to concentrate on the Netherlands East Indies instead of Burma. (See R-480, C - 6 0 3 , C - 6 2 2 , C - 6 2 3 , C-626, R-503, R-505.)

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Roosevelt received two drafts of this message. T h e one drawn u p by Admiral Leahy went to Churchill over the President's name with only minor changes; the draft written by General Marshall was softer in tone, but said the same thing: Progress of Ledo Corps is approaching the phase where their further advance requires vigorous action on the part of the 4th Corps from Imphal. Is there anything we can do to accelerate forward movement of this Corps? (Marshall draft in Leahy to Roosevelt, Feb. 23, 1944, MR.) T h e movement of the British Fourth Corps into Burma was halted as reports came of an impending Japanese offensive.

R-479 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 23, 1944, 5:30 P.M. Personal a n d Secret from the President for the F o r m e r Naval Person. I h o p e you will let m e know the progress m a d e in B u r m a by the ex­ pedition scheduled to move from I m p h a l in an easterly direction p l a n n e d for February 15. T h e expedition from the northwest which is building the r o a d is on time a n d fu r t h er progress requires protection from the I m p h a l force. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

C-590 London Feb. 23, 1944, 2300 Ζ / TOR 0157 Z, Feb. 24 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal a n d Most Secret. Your 475. Delivery of o u r j o i n t telegram to Stalin about the ships [R— 456, C—567] was delayed by the absence of Stalin from Moscow, it being h o p e d that the personal delivery of this information by the Ambassador would possibly evoke some expression of pleasure from the Potentate, which would cheer o u r way. However, I yesterday told Clark Kerr to h a n d it in. I a m sorry t h e r e should have b e e n some delay, he was expected back every day. I a m very glad to have your telegram about Spain. [MR*]

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Roosevelt wrote "This is terrible" across the photograph of the damaged room inside 10 Downing Street that Churchill enclosed in this letter. In a memo which was obviously misdated "20 Feb. 1944," one of the White House staff noted that Churchill refused Life magazine permission to publish the photograph. The Argentia (Newfoundland) picture was a painting done from a photograph of Churchill and Roosevelt taken during the Atlantic Conference in August 1941.

C-590/1, letter London February 23, 1944 My dear Franklin, Clemmie suggested to me that we should send you this photograph of some of the rooms of 10, Downing Street after the bombs fell last Sunday night, as it contains a copy of the picture of us both at Argentia. The carpet in the foreground is the one given me by the Shah at Teheran; luckily it is undamaged.

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It is surprising what curious blast effects have followed from these few bombs. Places as much as 500 yards away have been affected, while others quite close to have been missed out. They were very quick at clearing up all the mess and we are back again. Yours always W. [PSF:GB:WSC (with enclosure)]

The response of Churchill and the British Cabinet to Roosevelt's demand for high-level petroleum discussions in Washington was quick and angry. Church­ ill genuinely feared that such disputes could endanger his dream of an en­ during Anglo-American partnership, while the entire Cabinet resented what it saw as American pressure. John Gilbert Winant was the United States Ambassador in London.

C-591 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 24, 1944, 1334 Ζ/TOR 1334 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Your telegram of February 22nd [R-^174/1] was brought to me by Wi­ nant and I told him that I was much concerned at the way things were developing. Our cabinet are quite willing to have a technical enquiry into the oil position throughout the world. We should then know how we both stood. The cabinet however has definitely expressed the following view, namely: First, that the enquiry should be on the official level in the first instance in order to ascertain the facts. Secondly, they would prefer that it should take place here in London, and Thirdly, that we should be authorized to state to Parliament that no proposal will be made to change the existing ownership of oil interests in the Middle East on which, as you know, our Navy depends or elsewhere. Your telegram dismisses all these points and if you will allow me to say so seemed to convey your decision on these matters. When I read the telegrams to the cabinet this evening I found them also very much disturbed at the apparent possibility of a wide difference opening between the British and United States governments on such a subject and at such a time. I have called for reports from the Ministers particularly concerned and will bring the matter before the cabinet again in a few days. Meanwhile I trust you will not commit yourself to any public announcement because I am by no means sure that we could endorse it. Should the matter become public, otherwise than by agreement, debates

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will take place in Parliament at which all kinds of things would be said which would darken counsel and be resented on your side of the ocean. I am deeply grieved that all these troubles should arise at a time when you have so many worries to contend with, and you may be sure that I will on every occasion do my best to be helpful. But I feel sure that to open up these matters with the maximum publicity without knowing where they will lead us might do real harm to Anglo-American relations. [MR*. FRUS, 1944, III, 102-3. R&C]

From the beginning, American leaders had treated the war in the Pacific as primarily theirs to direct as well as fight. Although the British had vital interests and colonies to defend in Asia, and imperial tradition to uphold, they were in no position to challenge United States leadership. British naval commanders could not think of leaving European and Mediterranean waters until the surrender of Italy, and after that the planned invasion at Normandy required most of the available British forces. The broad strategy outlined in the following cable from Roosevelt had been set forth at the Teheran and Cairo conferences, and the Americans refused even to consider Churchill's pet scheme for an attack on Sumatra and Malaya, Operation CULVERIN. What the President did not know was that British military leaders were also unenthusiastic about CULVERIN, although Mountbatten loyally followed Churchill's directions, particularly since the Burma campaign appeared so unpromising.

R-480 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 24, 1944, 8:13 P.M.

Personal and Secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person. My Chiefs of Staff are agreed that the primary intermediate objective of our advance across the Pacific lies in the Formosa-China Coast-Luzon area. The success of recent operations in the Gilberts and Marshalls indicates that we can accelerate our movement westward. There appears to be a possibility that we can reach the Formosa-China-Luzon area before the summer of 1945. From the time we enter this vital zone until we gain a firm lodgement in this area, it is essential that our operations be supported by the maximum air power that can be brought to bear. This necessitates the greatest expansion possible of the air strength based in China. I have always advocated the development of China as a base for the support of our Pacific advances and now that the war has taken a greater turn in our favor, time is all too short to provide the support we should have from that direction.

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It is mandatory therefore that we make every effort to increase the flow of supplies into China. This can only be done by increasing the air tonnage or by opening a road through Burma. Our occupation of Myitkyina will enable us immediately to increase the air lift to China by providing an intermediate air transport base as well as by increasing the protection of the air route. General Stilwell is confident that his Chinese-American force can seize Myitkyina by the end of this dry season and once there, can hold it, provided Mountbatten's IV Corps from Imphal secures the Shwebo-Monywa area. I realize this imposes a most difficult task, but I feel that with your energetic encouragement Mountbatten's commanders are capable of overcoming the many difficulties involved. The continued build-up of Japanese strength in Burma requires us to undertake the most aggressive action within our power to retain the initiative and prevent them from launching an offensive that may carry them over the borders into India. I am gravely concerned over the recent trends in strategy that favor an operation toward Sumatra and Malaya in the future rather than to face the immediate obstacles that confront us in Burma. I fail to see how an operation against Sumatra and Malaya, requiring tremendous resources and forces, can possibly be mounted until after the conclusion of the war in Europe. Lucrative as a successful CULVERIN might be, there appears much more to be gained by employing all the resources we now have available in an all-out drive into upper Burma so that we can build up our air strength in China and insure the essential support for our westward advance to the Formosa-China-Luzon area. I most urgently hope, therefore, that you back to the maximum a vigorous and immediate campaign in Upper Burma. Roosevelt [WDL, GCM] [MR*. RUC]

COS(W) 1168 recorded an agreement between the British Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower, representing the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, which assigned operations in Italy priority over all other campaigns in the Mediterranean. Subject to that restriction, any Mediterranean operations in support of OVERLORD were to be planned by the Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, with an attack on southern France (ANVIL) to come first. However, a total of forty-one landing vessels were then reallocated from ANVIL to OVERLORD, a loss only partly compensated for by the transfer of six cargo ships (AKAs) from OVERLORD to ANVIL. All this reflected a widening difference of opinion about ANVIL. The British had come to believe that an attack on southern France would, at best, pin down only a few reserve German divisions. Led by General Montgomery and vigorously sup-

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ported by Churchill, the British Chiefs of Staff argued that any forces which could be spared from OVERLORD should be sent to help break the stalemate in Italy. Although Eisenhower believed that ANVIL would constitute "an important contribution to OVERLORD," he harbored some doubts about the availability of sufficient landing craft and supporting ships for an invasion of southern France. Accordingly, he agreed to a compromise which called for a review in March of the practicability of ANVIL. (See Chiefs of Staff to Joint Staff Mission, COS(W) 1168 of 23 February 1944, MR.)

R-481 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 25, 1944, 9:30 A.M. Secret a n d Personal, for the F o r m e r Naval Person from the President. I have approved conclusions reached at meeting between British Chiefs of Staff a n d Eisenhower, 23 February, as reported in COS(W) 1168. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR]

Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Commander of the South East Asia Command, and the British Chiefs of Staff had provided full support for current operations in northern Burma, but they did not agree with long-term American plans in the China-Burma-India theater. Mountbatten did not think that either British or American forces could achieve the objectives set forth by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor did he believe that the Ledo Road could carry enough supplies to make it worth the struggle. The British believed, incorrectly, that General Stilwell had undercut Mountbatten's authority and had appealed directly to the U.S. Joint Chiefs for support of extensive British operations in northern Burma. Actually, the JCS had drawn those conclusions without hearing Stilwell's case. Major General A. C. Wedemeyer, U.S. Army, was Deputy Chief of Staff to Lord Mountbatten, and was on a mission to London and Washington to present his commander's position. CULVERIN, an attack on Sumatra aimed at eventually recapturing Singapore, was primarily Churchill's idea, and the shift of a large Japanese fleet to that area worried the Prime Minister. Not only did he fear renewed raids against Ceylon, but such a large naval force would complicate any invasion in the Dutch East Indies. The Americans had other plans, and they considered CULVERIN in direct conflict with their overall Pacific strategy. T h e "tense" situation in Italy stemmed from a German offensive against the Anzio beachhead. Although Allied forces repulsed the initial attack on February 20, the Germans were preparing another, which they launched on February 28.

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C-592 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 25, 1944, 1900 Ζ/TOR 2135 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal and Most Secret. Your numbers 479 and 480. 1. You will by now, no doubt, have seen Mountbatten's SEACOS 99 and will soon see British Chiefs of the Staffs number COS (W) 1175. 2. I can give you the most positive assurance that nothing will be with­ drawn or withheld from the operations in North Burma for the sake of CULVERIN. I have telegraphed to Mountbatten emphasizing this. Gen­ eral Wedemeyer, who goes to you tomorrow by air, will be able to explain the position in detail. He will also unfold the facts about the Ledo Road which show that it cannot be open for traffic and then only limited traffic, before 1947. 3. We fear that General Stilwell has been giving a wrong impression both of the position in the South East Asia Theatre and of the views of Mountbatten. I earnestly hope that General Wedemeyer may be able to state Mountbatten's side of the case. 4. The arrival of the main Japanese fleet at Singapore is an event of the first order and we do not know what it portends so far as the Indian Ocean is concerned. From your point of view it should open fine oppor­ tunities in the Pacific to the American fleet. We must ourselves, however, review our naval dispositions CULVERIN and our communications with India and Australia without delay in the light of the new fact. I shall be cabling you soon about all this. 5. Your number 481. I am very glad to receive your approval of the agreement between the British Chiefs of Staff and Eisenhower. I will also cable you about the military situation in Italy which, I agree with you, is "tense." How I wish we could have a talk. [MR*]

Roosevelt had reluctantly agreed to hold off demanding any change in the Italian government until after the capture of Rome (R-464), but public dem­ onstrations and pressure from the Italian opposition parties caused the Allied Commander in Chief, General Sir Η. M. Wilson, to conclude that only King Victor Emmanuel's abdication and the replacement of the Badoglio govern­ ment could prevent serious civil disturbance. Although the opposition parties had circulated an appeal asking that the Italian people treat the King and the Badoglio government as rebels, the Junta of pre-Mussolini liberals had agreed to let Crown Prince Umberto accede to the throne providing he del­ egated his powers to a person or group which represented the opposition.

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Wilson sent his recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, but before either of them could act the U.S. State Department, which had also received copies of General Wilson's messages, drafted a cable which approved the abdication of the King and the resignation of the Badoglio government. That cable was approved by the President and dispatched to Wilson through the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington as DON 170. On the same day, February 22, Churchill spoke before the House of Commons and reiterated British support for King Victor Emmanuel and the Badoglio government, at least until the Allies occupied Rome. (See Churchill, Speeches, VII, 6888.)

C-593 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 25, 1944, 2013 Ζ /TOR 2135 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal and Most Secret. 1. Relying upon your 464 of 11/2/44,1 made my statement in Parliament about the Italian Government with the full assent of the Cabinet. The statement was very well received by the House and no criticisms of any kind arose from Left Wing elements. I am, of course, now publicly com­ mitted. 2. Meanwhile, on receipt of telegrams from General Wilson, numbers NAF 622 and 624, you authorized on February 22 the telegram DON 170. I freely admit that General Wilson's attitude was a surprise to me and I did not and do not agree with the view he took. On the contrary, I think it would be very dangerous indeed to give way to threats from people who have so recendy surrendered unconditionally. It was quite natural for you to telegraph as you did because you might well think I should be influenced by General Wilson's attitude and I am not making the slightest complaint. 3. At the same time, I hope you will allow matters to rest where they were in your 464. This would not preclude reconsideration of the position if the fall of Rome is unduly protracted and after the crisis of the battle had passed. If the Italian political parties think they can play one of us off against the other, we shall have the worst of both worlds. Moreover, I gather that General Wilson acted in the sense of my public statement and it would be a great pity to throw things into the melting pot again. [MR*]

Churchill and Roosevelt had previously agreed to respond cautiously to peace feelers from the Bulgarian government. (See R-469.)

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R-482 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 25, 1944, 9:30 P.M.

Personal and Secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person. I have received the following message dated 21 February from Harriman in regard to our report of an attempt at peace conversations by Bulgaria: QUOTE. First—The Soviet Government agrees that Bulgaria should be asked to send a fully qualified mission to confer with representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. Cairo is preferred by the Soviet Government as the place for such a conference because a responsible Soviet Representative is now there. Second—the Soviet Government considers that it is for the Governments of the United States and Great Britain to reach a decision in connection with the request of the Bulgarian Government that Allied air raids and bombing of Bulgaria be stopped for a few days, UNQUOTE.

I would be pleased to have your reaction to this message and, if you approve of the Soviet attitude, a suggested line of approach to the Bulgarians. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*. FRUS, 1944, III, 302.]

R-483 Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy] Feb. 26, 1944, 8:00 P.M.

From the President to the Former Naval Person, Secret and Personal. Your 593. I find upon inquiry that message DON 170 was sent by your Joint Staff Mission in Washington to "War Cabinet Officers" and it was my understanding at that time that it was being sent by your staff representatives for your consideration. It was not my intention to give any approval to the proposal in DON 170 without your concurrence, and I regret the misunderstanding. Referring to paragraph four of your 593, my attitude as expressed in my 464 has not changed. In view of the fact that the campaign in Italy is under the operational control of General Wilson, I should like to meet your desires as to details of handling the problem referred to in DON 170, which with your disapproval seems now to be finished business for the present. Roosevelt [WDL] [MR*]

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Although the President had accepted the British lead in Italian political mat­ ters, and Churchill was grateful, the pressure of events inside Italy soon prompted Roosevelt once again to suggest that the opposition parties be brought into the Italian government. (See below, R-490.)

C-594 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 27, 1944, 1920 Ζ I TOR 2150 Ζ Prime Minister to President. Personal a n d Secret. Your 483. I am really most grateful to you for the consideration with which you treat me. [MR]

Churchill's hopes for an amicable settlement between the Soviet Union and the Polish government in London (see C-585) were soon dashed. Stalin spurned all opportunities for discussions and compromise and plainly reiterated his fundamental demands—the Curzon line boundary and the exclusion of antiSoviet members from the Polish government, particularly General Kazimierz Sosnkowski (Soznkowski), the Polish Commander in Chief. T h e Soviet Pre­ mier went a little further and proposed that some Polish-Americans who were not members of the Communist Party but were "good men" be added to the Polish government. He also tried to exploit differences within the PolishAmerican community on the boundary controversy by inviting Oscar Lange (Linge) and the Reverend Stanislaw Orlemanski (Orlemansi) to Moscow to discuss the makeup of a new Polish government. Both men led small groups which had opposed the tough stand taken by the Mikolajczyk government regarding the Soviet-Polish border. Orlemanski, the Pastor of a Roman Cath­ olic parish in Springfield, Massachusetts, had organized the Kosciusko League; Lange, a Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, had signed a public statement, along with twenty-nine other Polish-American intellectuals and artists, criticizing the London Polish government's refusal to cooperate with the Soviet Union on the frontier issue. Lange later became Poland's first postwar Ambassador to the United States. Stalin's requests for more modern destroyers came to naught. Both Britain and the United States insisted that the vessels being sent to the Soviet Union were adequate for convoy duty and, moreover, that there were no others to spare (Stalin/FDR, doc. 175).

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C-595 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 29, 1944, 1934 Ζ / TOR 2140 Ζ Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal. I have received from Ambassador Clark Kerr the two following tele­ grams about Poland and the substitute Italian ships. They are not very pleasant. I will cable you later about them. Telegram about Poland begins: 1. I saw Stalin tonight. It was not a pleasant talk. He attempted to dismiss with a snigger the position of the Polish Government as de­ scribed in the Prime Minister's [Churchill's] message. 2. He snorted from time to time as I made one by one the points contained in your telegram number 457. For instance when I said that the Polish Government had assured us that they would not dis­ avow our actions he said: "Is that serious? How handsome of them!" When I got to point two of your [Eden's] paragraph two about Curzon Line he broke in with "But the Polish Government do not want to give us Lvov and Vilna. If they did they should say so". When I explained that they well understood that they would have to do so, he replied that this was not clear from the message. Indeed in a recent official statement they had made it manifest that their view did not tally with the Prime Minister's [Churchill's]. I countered this by drawing on your telegram number 526 but without much success. 3. At this stage Molotov confused the issue by evoking the bogey of Soznkovski, which haunted us throughout the talk and which I tried in vain to shoo away. A long wrangle followed during which Stalin said that he had little hope of settling the matter on basis of the Prime Minister's message. I said that you [Eden] and the Prime Minister would be much discouraged by this and he replied that he must tell the truth. The Polish Government did not want a settlement. Its purpose was to embroil us with the Soviet Government. When I said that if this were so the Polish Government would fail, he said that he feared that it might succeed. It had indeed made a rift between the Soviet Government and yourself and might do so later with the Prime Minister [Churchill] also. The Poles always had fresh demands. For instance they had had the effrontery to suggest something that ignored the sovereignty of the Soviet Government over territory which belonged to the Soviet Union, when they proposed that represent­ atives of the United Nations should take a share in the administration of regions east of the demarcation line.

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4. When I scouted all this Stalin said that until the Prime Minister [Churchill] had returned from Africa Polish affairs had been in your [Eden's] hands. You had offered mediation which he had been obliged to reject. This had been a score for the Poles and you had been displeased. He had been obliged to hurt your feelings. Why? Because of the Poles. 5. I did my best here to explain what was your position in this affair. To this he replied that the Russians and British shed their blood while the Poles sat on your back or hid behind the Prime Minister's. 6. When it became clear that Stalin was determined not to take the Prime Minister's as the basis of a settlement, I asked him to make some constructive suggestions. He replied that this was simple. He only asked for two things: the Curzon Line and the reconstruction of the Polish Government. If the Poles meant business they should clearly and openly accept the Curzon Line and he for his part would not tolerate any further demands from the Ukranians or White Russians. He dismissed the Polish contention that it was impossible for them to make such a declaration at present. If the government were to be reconstructed there could be no question of waiting until the recapture of Warsaw. But if a quick reshuffle were effected and genuine democratic elements were brought into the administration this would help. (At this point the Bogey of Soznkovski stalked across the stage again). But there arose the question of who would enter into a reconstructed government, and here to my surprise, he took up the old Molotov proposal to do some recruiting in America and in this country. About America I used the now well worn arguments which he finally admitted had some force, but not until he had tried to persuade me that dual citizenship was possible—witness Ex-President Moscicki who was both Polish and Swiss. 7. He then suggested, if citizenship were a bar, a couple of PolishAmericans—for instance Professor Linge and Orlemansi (a Catholic priest) might come to Moscow to see what was going on here and advise on the choice of appropriate Poles. He did not know either of them, but he understood that they were "Good men, non-party men and not Communists." He said that he would like also to see some recruits from this country but he could not name any at the moment. He would not admit that all this presented any serious difficulty and he assumed that United States Government would put no obstacles in the way of its citizens coming to the Soviet Union. But it seemed to him that the Polish Government in London with its Soznkovskis and its Kots and their agents in United States and Canada was too firmly established to be shaken.

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8. This dreary and exasperating conversation lasted for well over an hour. No argument was of any avail. 9. When he has consulted his government Stalin will be telegraph­ ing his reply direct to the Prime Minister. Second telegram begins: 1. Stalin assured me last night that he was satisfied that this matter had been put right. He made a sort of gruff apology for having had to keep me waiting explaining that he had been away. 2. He referred to his message to you of February 26th and pressed strongly for the four modern destroyers he had asked you to let him have. He claimed that it should be within reach of the two leading naval powers to find them. 3. In reply to a question from myself he said that in the North, the Baltic and Black Sea, the Red fleet since the beginning of the war had lost 32 destroyers including 3 Flotilla leaders. This repre­ sented more than half its whole strength in these vessels. He said that if you wished it he would give you full particulars. [MR*]

The Jadwin Mission in Turkey was handling discussions with Bulgarian rep­ resentatives.

C-596 London [via U.S. Army] Feb. 29, 1944, 2040 Ζ / T O R 2140 Ζ

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret. Your last message about the peace feelers from Bulgaria [R-482]. We have already had the same reply through Clark Kerr and agree that Cairo is probably the best rendezvous. I think the only thing to do now is for the Jadwin mission to inform the Bulgarian Minister that representatives of the three Allies are pre­ pared to meet a fully qualified Bulgarian mission in Cairo. If the Bul­ garians send a mission, we can then listen to what it has to say. The Foreign Office have already suggested that the State Department should send the necessary instructions to the Jadwin mission. [MR*. FRUS, 1944, III, 303.]

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Given the opportunity, Roosevelt frequently postponed hard decisions and seemed to let events take their course. In the case of postwar France, which he believed would be convulsed by internal disorders, the President made procrastination into positive policy by not letting the European Advisory Commission (EAC) draft detailed plans for governing either liberated France or occupied Germany. As in North Africa and Italy, Roosevelt preferred that the military commander of Allied forces (in this case General Eisenhower) take care of the initial political arrangements. Whether or not this approach masked a desire on the President's part to maintain American control through military rule is uncertain, though there is no question that he advocated a dismembered and demilitarized Germany. There are also indications that he preferred a weak and decentralized France. (See Kimball, Swords or Ploughshares?, pp. 13-23.)

R-483/1, letter Washington [written at Hyde Park, N.Y.] February 29, 1944 Dear Winston:— I have been worrying a good deal of late on account of the tendency of all of us to p r e p a r e for future events in such detail that we may be letting ourselves in for trouble when the time arrives. As you doubtless remember, at Quebec last S u m m e r the Staff people took a shot at drawing u p terms of s u r r e n d e r for Italy. T h e American draft was short and to the point and was finally adopted and presented. But later on the long and comprehensive terms, which were drawn u p by your people, were presented to Badoglio. I did not like t h e m because they attempted to foresee every possibility in one document. But, as so often h a p p e n s when such an attempt is made, certain points were omitted and additional protocols with respect to naval and other questions had to be later presented. T h a t is a good deal the way I feel about all this detailed planning that we are jointly and severally making in regard to what we do when we get into France. I have been h a n d e d pages and pages with detailed instructions and appendices. I regard t h e m as prophecies by prophets who cannot be infallible. T h e r e f o r e , I re-drew t h e m with the thought of making the Commander-in-Chief solely responsible for O V E R L O R D a n d for the maintenance of law, o r d e r a n d reasonable justice for the first few months after we get into France. I have suggested that he get in touch with local persons and with representatives of the French National Committee in such places as have n o military status. H e and his Staff should bear the sole responsibility. Now comes this business of what to d o when we get into Germany. I

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understand that your Staff presented a long and comprehensive document—with every known kind of terms—to the European Advisory Commission, and that the Russians have done somewhat the same. My people over here believe that a short document of surrender terms should be adopted. This, of course, has nothing to do with the locality of the occupying forces after they get into Germany, but it is an instrument of surrender which is in conformity with the general principles. I am enclosing (a) an argument—facts bearing on the problem and (b) a proposed acknowledgement of unconditional surrender by Germany. I hope much that you will read the argument. I think it is very cogent. I am trying as hard as I can to simplify things—and sometimes I shudder at the thought of appointing as many new Committees and Commissions in the future as we have in the past! I note that in the British proposal the territory of Germany is divided up in accordance with the British plan. "Do please don't" ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now! With my warm regards, As every yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt [PREM 3/197/3/164-66. MR. FRUS, 1944, I, 188-89. R&C] ENCLOSURE TO

R-483/1

SECRET 905-5 J.C.S. 623/3 29 January 1944 Joint Chiefs of Staff INSTRUMENT AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF GERMANY References: a. C C S . Memo for Info No. 189 b. J.C.S. 623 Series. Report by the Director, Civil Division, War Department. THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department for study and recommendation, C C S . memorandum for Information No. 189 (a memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff concerning a draft of proposed German Armistice Terms).

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2. The discussion is contained in Appendix "A". CONCLUSIONS

3. There is a wide difference of opinion between the views expressed by the British in C C S . Memorandum No. 189 and those of the United States outlined in J.C.S. 623/2. RECOMMENDATIONS

4. That a United States draft instrument of surrender, (Appendix "B") in conformity with the general principles oudined in J.C.S. 623/2, should be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and be transmitted to the United States member of the European Advisory Commission for his submission to the Commission. 5. That since the British Chiefs of Staff have furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff a copy of their draft of the German Armistice Terms for informal consideration, the substance of J.C.S. 623/2 and 623/3 should be furnished to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for information. 6. That the Instrument and Acknowledgement of Unconditional Surrender should be brief. 7. That the Secretary of State be informed of the above recommendations and be requested to transmit copies of Appendices "A" and "B" to the United States representative on the European Advisory Commission as a basis for consideration by that body. Draft of a proposed letter to the Secretary of State is enclosed (Appendix "C"). Appendix "A" Facts Bearing on the Problem Memorandum in Support of U.S. Views 1. The United States and the United Kingdom are each committed to the principle that an "unconditional surrender" will be exacted from Germany. With this in mind, it becomes important to define the term unconditional surrender before determining the type of document best adapted to express all that the term implies. 2. It is submitted that an unconditional surrender is an acknowledgement on the part of Germany that: a. Its military forces are totally defeated and incapable of resisting the accomplishment of the military objectives of the adversary. b. Its resources and peoples are expended to the point where further resistance is futile. c. It is ready to submit without question to any terms of military, political, economic and territorial nature which may be imposed upon it by the victor.

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3. When such an acknowledgement is made, few words are needed to constitute the unconditional surrender for Germany. 4. Such brief document would be implemented by proclamations, orders, and directives issued to the German military and civil authorities from time to time by the appropriate Allied Commanders. The detailed military directives necessary to implement a short surrender document bear a somewhat similar relationship to such a document as the by-laws of a corporation bear to the corporate charter or the statutory laws of a state bear to its constitution. 5. The advantages of having a short instrument are as follows: a. It indicates affirmatively that the war has ended. b. It leaves no room for the insinuation, as might be implied from a lengthy armistice document, that only a temporary suspension of hostilities has occurred. c. Each covenant of a document necessarily creates a condition of surrender binding in law upon the conquered and the conqueror alike. Each covenant constitutes a subtraction from the powers bestowed upon the victor by the unconditional surrender of the enemy state. There is little room for legal quibbling over a short instrument and the victor cannot be accused of bad faith or a violation of its agreement. d. No document can be all-embracing or all-inclusive as to foresee every possible contingency. Under a brief document containing broad general provisions there will be no legal obstacles to effect such matters as transfer of population, the immediate creation of a "separate" Austria, the giving of the Czech Government immediate control of Czechoslovakia and similar questions that are bound to arise. e. A brief instrument will not be an obstacle in the procuring of a new central government, other than the surrender administration, if that be desirable. A brief instrument eases the burden of dealing with a new German central authority in the event there be a change of the central government. f. A brief instrument eliminates the disadvantages, pitfalls, and embarrassments of a comprehensive document in order to meet unanticipated changing conditions. Experience in Italy should serve as a warning that it is impossible to comprehend in a single detailed document all of the situations which will arise out of the military occupation of an enemy country. The Italian comprehensive document has proved to be insufficient in its scope, limiting the authority of the Allies. g. The German people, under the Nazi regime, have become accustomed and amenable to orders emanating from military or semi-military sources. The position of the Commanders of the Allied forces would be materially weakened if their directives were subjected to legal scrutiny and debate prior to popular acceptance.

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6. At the time the instrument is signed by the Germans, it is contemplated that directives will be handed to the German authorities which will have as a basis the provisions presently in the draft comprehensive instrument submitted by the United Kingdom. Appendix "B" Instrument and Acknowledgement of Unconditional Surrender of Germany I. The German land, sea and air forces and all forces of any other nationality serving under their commands, wherever located, acknowledge their total defeat, and hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting by authority of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in the interests of the United Nations. II. The German High Command will, immediately upon the acceptance of the unconditional surrender, order the immediate cessation of hostilities of any kind against forces of the United Nations, and will direct German military, naval and air authorities in all theaters to issue forthwith appropriate instructions to those under their command. III. The German High Command will forthwith order all persons and individuals within Germany and German-controlled territories to refrain from the destruction of or damage to military, naval and air property, installations and equipment, and all other property of whatever kind, real or personal, public or private. IV. The German High Command will order immediate compliance on the part of all residents of Germany and German-controlled territories with the provisions of the annexed proclamation and orders and of all future proclamations, orders, ordinances, and instructions as may be issued by or under the authority of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. V. All of the resources and facilities of Germany and of the German people, including all rights, powers and privileges of any and all character whatsoever will be placed undamaged at the disposal of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interests of the United Nations.

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VI. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interest of the United Nations, will take such measures and issue such orders and instructions for the occupation and governing of Germany and Germancontrolled territories as may be deemed by them to be appropriate. VII. All German authorities, civil and military, and the German people, will comply with and faithfully execute such duties and conditions as may be imposed by the occupation authorities. The German authorities and people will in particular, and in addition to such other duties and conditions as may be imposed, extend full cooperation to the occupation authorities and to all of the United Nations in apprehending and making available for trial by the United Nations as they may determine, all persons of German nationality and other persons within Germany or subject to German jurisdiction who are or may be charged with having committed war crimes. VIII. Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and all other nationals of those countries, or of neutral countries, who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint and German nationals who may be similarly confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, creed, color or political belief, will be protected in their persons and property by the German authorities and people pending further instructions. Similar steps will be taken by the German authorities and people to safeguard all property, records and archives, public and private, pending further instructions. IX. The rights, powers and privileges of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, arising as a result of the complete conquest and unconditional surrender of Germany, shall be without limitation of any character whatsoever. X. The term "occupation authorities" as used herein includes the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and any other agency or individual designated by them and acting under their authority. XI. The present instrument may be denounced by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or by the

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Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with immediate effect, if German obligations thereunder are not promptly and completely fulfilled. In such event, said Commanders-in-Chief and their respective governments will take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances. XII. This instrument of unconditional surrender will enter into force and effect immediately upon its acceptance by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. XIII. Those provisions are drawn up in English, Russian and German languages. The English and Russian texts are authoritative. Signed at (month)

(place) , at

, this (hour)

day of .

(Name) (Title) (Highest German Military Authority) (Name) (Title) (Highest German Civil Authority) The foregoing terms of unconditional surrender are accepted by: General, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces General, Commander-in-Chief, Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Appendix "C" Draft The Honorable, The Secretary of State. My dear Mr. Secretary: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the "Draft German Armistice" received from the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached the following conclusions with respect to this British document which it is understood is now before the European Advisory Commission for consideration: a. That there is a wide difference of opinion between the views expressed in the "Draft German Armistice" and accompanying memoranda submitted by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff and the views contained in the documents WS—10a and WS-12 prepared by the Working Security Committee.

ALLIANCE FORGED

773

b. That a U.S. draft instrument of surrender in conformity with the general principles outlined in the documents WS-lOa and WS—12 should be transmitted to the U.S. member of the European Advisory Commission for submission to the Commission. c. That the "Instrument and Acknowledgement of Unconditional Surrender of Germany" should be brief. In furtherance of the forementioned conclusions, there have been prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by them two documents entitled "Memorandum in Support of U.S. Views" and "Instrument and Acknowledgement of Unconditional Surrender of Germany." The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that these two documents, copies of which are enclosed, be transmitted to the U.S. member of the European Advisory Commission for submission by him to the Commission. Sincerely yours, William D. Leahy Admiral, U.S. Navy Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy [PREM 3/197/3/167-177]

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA

Churchill, Winston, Sir, 1874-1965. Churchill & Roosevelt: the complete correspondence. Includes bibliographies and index. Contents: 1. Alliance emerging, October 1933November 1942—2. Alliance forged, November 1942February 1944—3. Alliance declining, February 1944-April 1945. 1. Churchill, Winston, Sir, 1874-1965. 2. Roosevelt, Franklin D. (Franklin Delano), 1882-1945. 3. World War, 1939-1945—Diplomatic history. 4. Great Britain—Foreign relations—United States. 5. United States—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 6. Prime ministers—Great Britain—Correspondence. 7. Presidents—United States— Correspondence. I. Roosevelt, Franklin D. (Franklin Delano), 1882-1945. II. Kimball, Warren F. III. Title. IV. Title: Churchill and Roosevelt. DA566.9.C5A4 1984 940.53'22'0922 83-43080 ISBN 0-691-05649-8 (set: alk. paper) ISBN 0-691-00817-5 (set: pbk.)