Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century: American Evangelical Opinion on Israel 0197649300, 9780197649305

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Christian Zionism in the Twenty-​First Century

Christian Zionism in the Twenty-​First Century American Evangelical Public Opinion on Israel M O T T I I N BA R I and K I R I L L BUM I N Foreword by

YA A KOV A R I E L

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2024 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress ISBN 978–​0–​19–​764930–​5 DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197649305.001.0001 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

From Motti Inbari: To my daughter Shir with love From Kirill Bumin: To my grandmother Maryia

Contents Acknowledgments  Foreword, by Yaakov Ariel 

Introduction: The Cultural, Religious, and Historical Roots of Christian Zionism 

ix xiii

1

1. Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel? (with M. Gordon Byrd) 

21

2. American Evangelicals and the Arab–​Israeli Dispute 

52

3. Analyzing Replacement Theology: Evangelical Pastors’ Views on the Role of Jews and Israel in the End of Days 

71

4. Change of the Guard: Young Evangelicals and the Israeli–​Palestinian Dispute 

113

5. Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves: Content Analysis of Open-​Ended Survey Responses 

150

Conclusion: The Role of Demography and Theology in Shaping Evangelical Attitudes toward Israel 

170

Notes  Bibliography  Index 

181 203 215

Acknowledgments In developing this book, we incurred a great many debts, intellectual and material. Foremost is our debt to Dr. Mitch Glaser of Chosen People Ministries. Dr. Glaser and the Chosen People have been exceptionally generous, financially sponsoring (in part or in full) all the surveys that appear in this book. His extensive knowledge of Christian eschatology, evangelical denominations, and social dynamics in the evangelical community has saved us from countless errors in our theorizing. Dr. Glaser also introduced us to a number of theologians, journalists, and scholars of the evangelical community, who in turn, have provided invaluable information, timely criticism, and inspiration to us, again and again. We are also greatly indebted to the Academic Engagement Network (AEN). When Dr. Kenneth Waltzer, the director of AEN, invited Motti Inbari to participate in the foundation’s event in 2016, the conversation about studying evangelical Christians came up. Motti observed that the Jewish community does not understand Christian Zionism very well. Dr. Waltzer replied: “Then, why don’t you study this?” His urging came with much-​ needed financial support. Dr. Waltzer and his AEN successor, Dr. Miriam Elman, supported two of the three surveys that comprise this book. And, the AEN continues to support our research endeavors to date, as we expand our intellectual horizons beyond the evangelical community to other American religious groups and their opinions of the Jewish people and Israel. The University of North Carolina at Pembroke, where both Motti Inbari and Kirill Bumin worked for over a decade, also provided much-​ needed funding to make this study possible. We are particularly thankful to the UNCP’s College of Arts and Sciences leadership, Dr. Jeff Frederick and his successor Dr. Richard Gay, and Dr. David Nikkel, the chair of the Department of Philosophy and Religion. We are also grateful for the support that Dr. Rebecca Bullard-​Dillard, the Associate Vice Chancellor for UNCP’s Research and Sponsored Programs at that time, provided to help finance our first survey in 2018. We are indebted to Dr. Amnon Cavari of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy at Reichman University in Israel, one

x Acknowledgments of the leading experts on American public opinion on Israel, for his many constructive comments and thoughtful reflections. Dr. Cavari gave us invaluable advice on survey question construction, statistical methods, and on the state of the discipline in American public opinion research. We are grateful to him and hope to partner with him in future research endeavors. Dr. Joe West, Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at UNCP, went above and beyond the call of collegial duty in helping us with statistical modeling and other methodological issues that we encountered along the way. We are immensely grateful for his assistance and advice. M. Gordon Byrd helped us tremendously at the beginning of this project, and for that, we thank him from the bottom of our hearts. Our project also benefited greatly from many conversations with Dr. Darrell Bock of Dallas Theological Seminary, Dr. Yaakov Ariel, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Dr. Richard Averbeck of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, , Dr. Daniel G. Hummel of the University of Wisconsin-​Madison, Dr. Craig Blaising of Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Mr. Wes Taber of Life in Messiah International, Robert Nicholson and Luke Moon of the Philos Project, Rev. Maria Leppäkari, former Executive Director of the Swedish Theological Institute, and Nic Lesmeister, Director of the Gateway Center for Israel Studies. It was also a great pleasure to work with Scott McConnell from LifeWay Research and Savannah Kimberlin from Barna Group to finalize and field our surveys. Our gratitude also extends to Michael Weiner, who served as Motti Inbari’s research assistant during the summer of 2020. There were many others who offered valuable insights and thoughtful criticisms as we presented portions of this project at the conference proceedings of the North Carolina Religious Studies Association, Association for Jewish Studies, Association for Israel Studies, Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, and Tel Aviv University’s “The Americanization of the Israeli Right” conference, organized by the TAU’s Center for the Study of the United States and the Fulbright Program. Many useful comments also came from the reviewers for the Politics and Religion journal and the Journal of Church and State. Finally, we want to thank our families. Motti Inbari wishes to thank his wife, Aliza, for her patience, support, and unconditional love. Motti dedicates this book to his daughter Shir, who has just finished her second year in high

Acknowledgments  xi school, as we write these lines. Kirill Bumin is sending many thanks to his wife, Amanda, for tolerating him and for taking care of their 3-​and 5-​year-​ old kids, while he labored on this project. Kirill dedicates this book to his grandmother, Maryia, whose eternal optimism and drive, even at the age of 95, are a source of continuous inspiration and admiration.

Foreword By Yaakov Ariel The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

On May 14, 2018, the Government of the United States inaugurated its embassy in Jerusalem. The event represented much more than an opening of a new diplomatic post. The embassy operated for almost seven decades in Tel Aviv, where most countries that had diplomatic relations with Israel chose to locate their embassies. Even after the American Senate voted in 1995 to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the American embassy stayed in Tel Aviv. It was only during the presidency of Donald Trump, when the influence of both conservative evangelicals and right-​wing Jews on American policymakers reached a zenith, that the White House decided to relocate the embassy to Jerusalem. The American delegation included a number of right-​ wing religious leaders, evangelicals and Jews, while speakers at the inauguration ceremony invoked biblical and messianic themes. Robert Jeffress, The pastor of First Baptist Church in Dallas, one of the largest and most influential evangelical congregations in Texas, offered a prayer. In it, he spoke of the Jews as the apple of God’s eye and thanked God for the leadership of President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu.1 Those who attended or followed the event could have concluded erroneously that evangelical Christians and Israeli Jews bonded over a mutual understanding of biblical prophecy and were uniformly staunch supporters of the right-​wing Messianic political vision. For many evangelical Christians, Israel is indeed not merely one nation among others, and many in this camp of Christianity have looked upon that country in accordance with the manner they read and interpret their sacred scriptures. Evangelical leaders and activists have often supported conservative Israeli policies. However, as Christian Zionism in the Twenty-​ First Century points out, the realities of evangelical–​Israeli relations are more complex and varied than what the speeches at the inauguration ceremony in Jerusalem tried to convey. The book brings forth updated data

xiv Foreword on evangelical attitudes toward Israel that corrects, if not revolutionizes, common perceptions on evangelical–​Israeli relations. Until recently, most scholars, journalists, politicians, and religious leaders have assumed that evangelical support for Israel has been broad and somewhat uncritical, overlooking other interests in the Arab–​Israeli conflict. For the most part, it was the evangelical involvement in Christian Zionism and the encouragement born-​again Christians have offered the State of Israel that has attracted the attention of commentators. Writers on evangelical–​Israeli relations have often supported, if not represented, particular groups that approve or disapprove of evangelical preferences, or those that play a part in the political life of the Middle East. For example, Christians who take exception to conservative evangelicals and their agenda, as well as ardent supporters of the Palestinian cause, have often attacked evangelical positions as one-​sided and unjust interventions in the realities of Israel and its neighbors. In contrast, conservative evangelicals who have written on Christian Zionism have, quite understandably, related to it appreciatively. Almost all who have expressed opinions on evangelical motivations and positions, whether approvingly or disapprovingly, have suggested that the decisive factor forming evangelical attitudes on Israel has been the group’s Messianic hope, and a belief in the centrality of Jews and the Holy Land in evangelical End Times scenarios. Many evangelical writers have indeed considered the Jews to play an essential role in the advancement of the apocalyptic timetable. They also regarded Jerusalem and the Temple Mount as the ground zero of apocalyptic events. However, as this new book points out, while the evangelical messianic faith provides a valid albeit partial explanation for the evangelical interest in Israel, the focus on the apocalyptic elements does not cover the whole spectrum of evangelical–​Israeli relations. For one thing, not all evangelicals subscribe to a messianic premillennialist faith that places Israel at the center of apocalyptic and messianic times. As the book points out, young evangelicals especially judge Israel and the realities of the Middle East more differently than their parents and grandparents would have done, and do not necessarily subscribe anymore to convictions that would make them predisposed to favor Israel and its policies. Few have bothered to conduct surveys and investigate the actual opinions toward Israel of ordinary evangelicals in a given time. Conducting first-​of-​ their-​kind surveys and analyzing their results, the authors, Motti Inbari and Kirill Bumin, could move therefore beyond older paradigms and dated

Foreword  xv assumptions, coming with extensive new data of which most writers on evangelical–​Israeli relations have been unaware. The book offers, therefore, fresh insights on evangelical trends and opinions in our time, altering conventional assumptions and creating an updated and more accurate picture of the realities of evangelical stands, including on the Israeli–​Palestinian conflict. The current study and its findings are immensely important, providing a timely, updated understanding of the political stands of one of the most important religious communities in the United States. American evangelical Christianity has been a large and dynamic section of Christianity in America, with a huge input on its culture, society, and politics. Evangelical–​ Jewish relations, including evangelical Christian Zionism, are important for understanding American–​Israeli relations, as well as Christian–​Jewish relations. Evangelical relations with the Jews and the idea of their settlement in the Holy Land have departed in meaningful ways from more traditional Christian perceptions of who the Jews were and what that people’s position was in God’s plans for humanity. Believing that the covenant God established with Abraham is still valid, even if temporarily suspended, many evangelicals view the Jews as heirs and continuers of the biblical children of Israel and, as such, the object of biblical prophecies about a restored kingdom of David. This idea has motivated many among the evangelicals who have adhered to a Messianic premillennialist faith to stand by Israel. At the same time, evangelical Christians have insisted that the Jews have to accept Jesus as their savior in order to be redeemed and in order to gain sound moral and spiritual ground. This outlook has created a paradoxical attitude. Evangelical Christians, who ardently believe that only those who have accepted Jesus as their savior are redeemed, have constructed an understanding of the Jews as people in covenant with God who are about to resume their ancient position as God’s first nation. This complicated, double-​edged theological perception has given rise to an amazing relationship between the two communities. Evangelical attitudes have included hopes for the future of the Jews, deep interest in, and, at times, even devotion toward that people. This has been coupled at times with anger and disappointment over the historical Jewish refusal to accept Jesus as a Savior, as well as over what many evangelicals have conceived as the secular character of Israeli society and inability of Israelis to grasp the real purpose of creation of their commonwealth. Some of the details of evangelical–​Israeli relations have therefore been surprising at times. A number of evangelicals called for the restoration of the

xvi Foreword Jews in Palestine and devised political initiatives for the creation of a Jewish settlement there even before the rise of Jewish Zionist movements in the later decades of the nineteenth century. Many evangelicals supported the Jewish Zionist movement and, from 1948, the State of Israel. They reacted with enthusiasm to the outcome of the war between Israel and its Arab neighbors in June 1967, in which they saw a validation of their reading of biblical prophetic passages, as well as of their understanding of global politics and the unfolding of history. The 1970s witnessed a growth of the evangelical camp in the United States and a resurgence in the number of evangelicals active in political life. Israeli leaders have come to welcome evangelical support and have counted evangelicals among their best supporters in the American public arena. For example: after Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear plant in 1981, Israel’s then Prime Minister Menachem Begin called Jerry Falwell, leader of the Moral Majority and founder of Liberty University, and asked him to back Israel in the coming political and diplomatic storms that he anticipated to take place in the aftermath of the attack. Will evangelical leaders, of the same public standing as Falwell, still be willing to oblige Israeli leaders and stand by their policies? The book provides answers to that question and many more like it. How many in the evangelical community are currently supportive of Israel, or approve of it? Who are they, what characterizes them, their demographics and opinions, and what differentiates them from other fellow evangelicals? The surveys and the analysis, which the authors provide, offer an eye-​opening panoramic view of evangelical attitudes. Religious and political leaders, scholars, students, and laypersons interested in religion and politics in the United States, and the realities of U.S.–​Israeli relations, will find this book highly rewarding. This is also true for those interested in Christian–​Jewish relations, where evangelical opinions and interaction with Israel make up an important part of the present picture. For them, as for many others, this groundbreaking prism into the views of evangelical Christianity should be mandatory reading.

Introduction The Cultural, Religious, and Historical Roots of Christian Zionism

In this book, we seek to understand the sources of evangelical support for Israel, utilizing three original surveys on evangelical and born-​again respondents, conducted in 2018, 2020, and 2021. The surveys study the general evangelical community (2018), evangelical pastors (2020), and 18–​29-​ year-​old evangelicals (2021). These surveys seek to deepen and broaden scholarly understanding of the evangelical and born-​again Christian views on Israel, Jews, Muslims, eschatology, and the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. We examine how theological, cultural, social, and political considerations influence evangelical views and actions on what likely represents their most salient foreign policy concern. Our study focuses primarily on the opinions of ordinary evangelical Christians; however, we also probe the political attitudes and religious beliefs of the evangelical elites, the pastors. Israel enjoys strong public support in the United States, not just among evangelicals. Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, evangelicals’ interest in international relations has increased, and the support for the State of Israel has remained at the top of their foreign policy priorities.1 Over time, especially after the 9/​11 terrorist attacks in 2001, support for Israel increased and American views about Israel became clearer and more sophisticated.2 A Gallup survey conducted in 2019 showed that 69% of respondents said they have a favorable or mostly favorable view of Israel. During the last decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-​first century, these levels of favorability have remained stable and are the highest recorded in surveys conducted in the United States since 1944.3 During this era, the support for Israel was bipartisan and widely shared by mainline Protestants, evangelical and born-​ again Christians, and other religious groups in the United States. However, it seems that in the last two decades, a growing religious and partisan divide is influencing attitudes about Israel, where Republicans are more sympathetic to Israel than Democrats.4 Christian Zionism in the Twenty-​First Century. Motti Inbari and Kirill Bumin, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2024. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197649305.003.0001

2  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century This book aims to record and analyze the religious, social, and political changes that are taking place in the evangelical community in order to understand what factors underpin evangelicals’ support for Israel. This research will also show that this support is eroding. While there have been a few excellent studies on this subject in recent years, ours stands apart from those previous analyses by relying on sophisticated regression analysis of original, time-​series data, rather than ideological analysis typical of much of the existing scholarship on the subject (that we will discuss in this chapter). Our study is also unique as it incorporates free-​form comments from evangelical respondents which detail their analytic reasoning and emotional justifications for supporting Israel, Palestinians, or neither. We begin with a brief historical overview of American public opinion toward Israel, and then narrow our focus to the trends in the mainline Protestant and evangelical attitudes.

The Cultural and Historical Roots of America’s Support for Israel A shift away from Christian historical anti-​Semitism began in the sixteenth century, during the early days of the Protestant Reformation. The Puritans who left England to set up colonies in America were very committed to reading the Bible in its original language in order to grasp its unadulterated meaning. Subsequently, the study of Hebrew became a core subject in early American universities. Harvard and Yale made Hebrew a compulsory subject of learning, and Hebrew is found on the university seals of Colombia, Dartmouth, and Yale.5 The Puritans saw themselves as successors to the people of Israel and compared their experience to that of the biblical Israelites.6 Samuel Goldman argues that Puritan thinkers even advocated Jewish restoration in their Promised Land and connected it with ideas of American exceptionalism. Thus, Americans expressed support for Jewish national renewal ideas even before the Zionist movement was officially established in the early twentieth century.7 For example, in 1819, John Adams, the second president of the United States, wrote, “I really wish the Jews again in Judea an independent nation.” In 1891, the famous evangelist, William E. Blackstone, organized a petition to President Benjamin Harrison that called on the United States to help restore Palestine to the Jews. The petition was signed by hundreds of prominent American figures, including many Christian politicians,

Introduction  3 majors of significant cities, chief editors of major news outlets, supreme court justices, university presidents, and leading people in business.8 “There is no nation like us,” said President Ronald Reagan, “except Israel.”9 This statement reflects a long-​standing view among some Americans that America’s claim to exceptionalism is shared only by the State of Israel. This view is not just a Republican position; many prominent Democrats share it as well. Then-​Vice President Joe Biden said in 2010 that “Israel is a tale of remarkable accomplishment.”10 While the biblical Israelites and their Hebrew language were an inspiration to the United States, the American public opinion of Jews was nevertheless stained by anti-​Semitism, especially prior to 1945. For example, during World War II, many Americans did not believe that the victims of the Nazis were completely innocent. In surveys from 1938 to1939, 27–​61% of respondents thought that German Jews were at least partly responsible for their persecution. These views were the product of common anti-​Semitic stereotypes.11 After the war, however, anti-​Semitism was no longer acceptable, at least not publicly. Jews were welcomed, as American society was beginning to embrace the values of universal human rights and self-​determination. The fight against anti-​Semitism was seen as part of a broader, universal cause, which helped justify establishing a Jewish state.12 U.S. President Harry Truman was the first world leader to officially recognize Israel as a sovereign Jewish state on May 14, 1948, only eleven minutes after its creation. His decision came after much discussion and against the advice of senior White House staffers, who had differing viewpoints and feared that creating a Jewish state would produce more conflict in an already tumultuous region. Walker Robins explains that Truman, a Southern Baptist who regularly read and quoted the Bible, was influenced by his faith. However, Truman explained his support for Zionism in secular terms. By supporting Zionism, he wished to help the suffering Jews in Europe. For him, the Jewish state was the necessary reparation for Nazi persecution, and the Holocaust demanded the creation of Israel. Robins also argues that Truman believed that Jews would make better use of the land than Arabs, as it was a common point made by a number of Southern Baptist leaders. He shows that Truman’s religion may have helped shape his opinion that the Jewish people were entitled to the land, but he was not influenced by premillennial thinking, which later would become a mainstream theological view of many Southern Baptists, and which is considered to be the most sympathetic theological position to the Jewish people and the State of Israel.13

4  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Quickly after its establishment, many Americans came to admire Israel. For many Americans, Israel, like the United States, was giving shelter to the persecuted refugees and immigrants. Israel was the only democracy in the Middle East, fighting against its authoritarian enemies, just like the United States was fighting the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Michelle Mart argues that Israel came to be accepted as a natural ally, ready to fight the Cold War alongside the United States. By contrast, Arabs were imagined as non-​western, undemocratic outsiders, too eager to flirt with socialism and to sign up to military and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.14 In the context of the Cold War, it was perceived that Christian Americans and Israeli Jews were fighting together a common enemy—​Communists and Muslims. Thus, the Judeo-​Christian identity became firmly established in Americans’ eyes, and many Christians began to vocally state that Jews and Christians share similar beliefs and values. Mart concludes that Jews became “religious brothers” in the American imagination, sharing moral and political values in a Cold War world. Muslims were stigmatized as the enemy, especially after many Muslim states who were enemies of Israel aligned with the Soviet Union.15 Amnon Cavari and Guy Freedman’s comprehensive study of the historical trends in American public opinion on Israel reviews attitudes toward the Jewish people and Israel from the 1940s until 2020. The authors conclude that Americans feel a strong positive affect toward Israel, and that this level of favorability toward Israel is high in comparison to most other countries. Cavari and Freedman identified seven reasons why there is such a high level of favorability: 1. Shared cultural values: The United States and Israel are both established as immigrant societies; the military plays a vital role, and soldiers are highly revered. 2. Shared religious values: Israel is the only Jewish state in the world, and many Americans, especially evangelicals, find it significant to their belief system. 3. Shared political values: Israel was established as a liberal, secular democracy, and these concepts are fundamental to American political culture. 4. Shared strategic interests: Israel is an essential ally of the United States, and the two countries share strong military ties and complementary foreign policy interests.

Introduction  5 5. American Jewry: American Jews are more inclined to view Israel favorably. However, Jews are a small minority in the United States—​no more than 2.5% of the population—​so it is unlikely that this is a significant influence on the opinions of the majority of Americans. 6. Business relations: Israel is viewed as a “start-​up nation” with a booming high-​tech industry, and many Israelis find work in the United States in this field. 7. Pro-​Israel Lobby: A common and controversial theme in American political culture is that Israel enjoys strong pro-​Israeli sentiments because of an influential pro-​Israeli lobby. Many commentators think this view is exaggerated, but the largest pro-​Israel evangelical lobby, Christians United for Israel, was effective, especially during the Trump administration.16 While we reference Cavari and Freedman’s work frequently and find many meaningful parallels and some similar results to those reported by these authors, our study is sufficiently different, and our findings are significantly more focused on the evangelical community and the determinants of support for Israel that matter to this group specifically.

The Religious Landscape: Mainline Christianity and the State of Israel The founding of the State of Israel in 1948 created a Christian theological dilemma. The world after World War II was no longer tolerant of anti-​Semitism. Still, the idea that the Church replaced the nation of Israel with God’s blessings, and that salvation can be granted only through accepting Jesus Christ as a personal redeemer is an integral part of Christian belief. If, from that perspective, Judaism is a religion that passed its time and independent Jewish existence is irrelevant after the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, how can one explain from a theological perspective the establishment of the State of Israel and the triumph of the Jewish nation? How can Christians explain the Jewish “resurrection” and renewal? Another aspect of this dilemma was Christian silence and lack of action in response to Nazi persecution of Jews in Europe. Both evangelical and mainline thinkers battled with these questions. From the Scopes Monkey Trial (1925) to 1967, modernist liberal mainline Protestants were dominant in American culture and set the religious agenda

6  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century for the country. The movement centered around themes of social justice. Mainline churches adopted theologically moderate positions and became increasingly influenced by the academic study of scriptures, while evangelical Christianity tended to resist these changes and continued to read the Bible literally.17 One of the leading voices supporting Israel among mainline Protestant thinkers was the influential theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–​ 1971). Niebuhr accepted Judaism as a religious tradition that stands on its own, outside the confines of Christianity. Turning his back on traditional supersessionist opinions that argue that the Church replaced Israel with God’s blessings, Niebuhr argued that Jews have valid beliefs and possess high moral standards and social consciousness. Consequently, he called for respect for and recognition of Judaism as a vibrant religious tradition, alongside the Christian Church.18 Niebuhr supported Zionism, but his support was rooted predominantly in secular and political, rather than religious, reasoning. His views brought him to support Jewish nationalism and the Jewish quest for an independent state (Zionism) as a haven and a refuge for persecuted Jews in Europe. For that cause, he founded the journal Christianity and Crisis, soberly telling his American audience that the Nazi regime intended to annihilate the Jewish people and destroy Christianity. In 1942, 40 mainline church leaders and scholars, including Niebuhr, formed the Christian Council for Palestine to support Zionism. The plight of Palestinian refugees during 1947–​1949 concerned Niebuhr, who saw it as a tragic outcome of the foundation of Israel. In 1951, he endorsed a proposal to resettle these refugees in the surrounding countries, in areas under the control of the United Nations. The combination of European anti-​Semitic persecution and Arab hostility had pushed Niebuhr to a moral and pragmatic support for Zionism.19 The change in the attitudes among the mainline Protestant theologians and increasingly positive perception of the Jewish people among the ordinary Protestant churchgoers was partly influenced by a sense of guilt over the historical role of Christian supersessionism and anti-​Jewish accusations that brought about the mass murder of Jews during World War II. Several mainline Protestant thinkers acknowledged that Nazi hatred of Jews had been informed and buttressed by the deeply rooted anti-​ Semitism in the Christian community.20 In the late 1960s, many Christian religious schools changed textbooks and removed passages with anti-​ Jewish overtones.21

Introduction  7 In the 1967 Six-​Day War, Israel defeated its Arab neighbors. It conquered vast territories, including the Old City of Jerusalem and the Temple Mount. The outcome of the Six-​Day War led to an even more profound shift in American Protestants’ opinion toward Israel. Until the war, evangelical Protestants viewed the creation of the State of Israel with enthusiasm, as a sign that the Second Coming of Jesus Christ was near, but their expectations were mostly passive. In other words, the believers were not urged to contribute to God’s plan; that is, to do certain things that might hasten the Second Coming. This passive position had no room for human agency (if God wills it, it will happen) and it did not translate into greater Christian involvement in America’s Middle East foreign policy agenda setting.22 In no small part due to the Israeli gains in the Six-​Day War, evangelical Christianity grew in its influence to become the dominant force in American Christianity. Religious participation in the mainline Protestant churches began to significantly decline, while the evangelical and born-​again numbers continued to grow. By 2014, just 15% of all U.S. adults identified with mainline Protestant churches, according to Pew. By contrast, 35% of U.S. adults in 2014 self-​identified as born-​again or evangelicals.23 Additionally, the mainline tradition has declined as a share of the Protestant population. 32% of American Protestants in 2014 identified with denominations in the mainline tradition (down from 35% in 2007, according to Pew). In comparison, evangelicals constitute a clear majority of all Protestants in the United States, with Pew reporting that their share of the Protestant population rose from 51% in 2007 to 55% in 2014.24 Jason Olson argues that the Six-​Day War reversed the power dynamics between evangelicals and mainline Protestants. In the nineteenth century, evangelicals predicted that a future Jewish state would encompass the Old City of Jerusalem, and that the Jews will eventually rebuild the Third Temple. Some of these predictions came to fruition in 1967, thereby giving evangelical leaders the leverage they needed so as to lead America’s religious culture once again. Therefore, the Six-​Day War should be considered a truly transformative event in the history of American Christianity.25 Whereas evangelicals became strong supporters of Israel in the last decades of the twentieth century, the mainline Protestant attitudes toward Israel, the Jewish people, and the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute were becoming less favorable. While immediately after the war Niebuhr celebrated Israeli victory in his journal Christianity and Crisis, other mainline Protestant leaders began to draw attention to the plight of the Palestinian refugees, and

8  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century criticism of Israel intensified in the mainline Protestant community. Some of the mainline leaders openly expressed concerns that the Israeli victory would lead their followers toward the evangelicals’ ranks.26 In the 1980s, the mainline Protestants appeared to be increasingly absorbed by the human rights concerns in the Third World, including the Palestinian Territories, due to the growing popularity of the social gospel tradition and Liberation Theology, which calls for the liberation of poor people from poverty and oppression. Mainline clergy became increasingly concerned with the progressive agenda that revolved around racial inequality, civil rights, and environmental issues,27 and the mainline Protestants became significantly more pro-​Arab in their orientation than the average American. For example, in 1980, the National Council of Churches, the largest ecumenical body in the United States, endorsed the establishment of a P.L.O.-​led (Palestinian Labor Organization) state alongside Israel, at a time when most Israelis and Americans opposed this idea. Many calls have been made to freeze Israeli settlement construction in the Palestinian Territories during the following years, alongside calls to reduce U.S. aid to Israel and to increase the oversight of how those funds are spent. With the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process in 2000, mainline hostility to Israel exploded. Jonathan Rynhold says that since the early 2000s, the discourse in the mainline Protestant community tends to single out Israel for disproportionate criticism and opprobrium. Between 2000 and 2006, official statements and resolutions by mainline bodies were characterized by strong anti-​Israel positions, much greater detail and much more emotive language were used to describe Palestinian suffering and loss (in comparison to how Israeli suffering and losses were described), and mainline statements tended to emphasize disproportionate use of force by Israel, argues Rynhold. In 2004, the BDS (boycotts, divestment, sanction) campaign made a significant breakthrough among mainline churches: A divestment resolution was passed by the Presbyterian General Assembly, two local regions of the United Methodist Church passed similar resolutions, the Episcopal Church, the United Church of Christ General Synod, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America all seriously considered divestments.28 Despite the fact that the mainline clergy and activists have shifted to the political left, Rynhold notes that the majority of the laity has remained moderate or conservative, and the mainline Protestant public has been broadly supportive of Israel, though slightly less so than the average American. Rynhold argues that not only did the ordinary mainline Protestants remain

Introduction  9 more pro-​Israel than the clergy, but that they actually became more pro-​ Israel throughout the 2000s. The ratio of those who sympathized with Israel over the Palestinians rose from 2 to 1 to 4 to 1.29 In light of the 9/​11 attacks and the general anti-​Muslim and anti-​Arab climate that characterized the American society at that time, this groundswell of support for Israel should not take many by surprise. The overtly anti-​Israeli mood among some mainline leaders can be explained by what Olson calls “national supersessionism.” Since attacking Judaism as an illegitimate religion is no longer accepted among contemporary mainline Christians, the attacks shifted to the Jewish state instead, calling it an illegitimate entity. Olson explains that anti-​Israel mainline activists who say that Israel has no right to exist echo the notion that Jews as people have lost their right to self-​determination, as supersessionist ideology argues. Olson contends that the mainline journal Christian Century exemplifies this type of “national supersessionism.”30

Evangelicals and Israel One of the Reformations’ bold disputes with the Roman Catholic Church was on the centrality of scriptures. Some Protestant reformers began reading the Christian Bible in a new way, which made them more interested in the Jewish people and culture, and led them to develop a much deeper sense of admiration for the Jewish roots of Christianity. David Katz argues that this philo-​Semitic trend gained steam in the late sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century and included ideas of restoring the Jews to the Holy Land in preparation for the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. By the end of the sixteenth century, there was a well-​defined stratum of intellectual philo-​ Semitism, at least in the Protestant world. The two most prominent examples of this phenomenon can be found in Sweden and England, notes Katz. The English case is particularly consequential, as Oliver Cromwell and his party took an extraordinary political risk of holding an open conference on Jewish readmission to England, thereby acting publicly on their philo-​Semitism. The readmission of the Jews to England in the mid-​1650s was one of the chief practical results of the increased seventeenth-​century interest in eschatological speculations, says Katz.31 Evangelism became a common name for a revival that swept the English-​ speaking world in the late eighteenth century. Evangelical theology focuses

10  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century on the redemption that Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross offers individuals who accepted him as their savior, through inner, spiritually, and morally transformative conversion experiences. Evangelicals believe that all human beings need to undergo these experiences of conversion or being “born-​again,” in which they establish a personal relationship with Jesus of Nazareth and adopt him as their savior. Evangelicals are committed to spreading the Christian message and persuading the unconverted of the need to accept Jesus as their personal savior. Evangelicals view the Christian Bible, both Old and New Testaments, as God’s message to humanity, and they insist on the authenticity and integrity of the sacred Christian texts. They tend to read the holy texts literally, and many evangelicals adhere to a messianic faith, expecting the Second Coming of Jesus Christ to earth to occur shortly. Yaakov Ariel argues that these theological principles—​the emphasis on the need to accept Jesus as a personal savior, the commitment to universal evangelism, the more literal reading of the Christian Bible, and the messianic premillennialist faith, which expects the imminent arrival of Jesus and the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth—​have played important roles in shaping evangelical attitudes toward the Jews.32 Of course, not all evangelicals are premillennial. Yet, Ariel stresses that the messianically oriented evangelicals, who expect the imminent return of Jesus, have exercised ideological and political influence far beyond their numbers, often shaping much of the evangelical agenda toward the Jews. Since the late nineteenth century, most leading evangelical pastors, from Charles Spurgeon and Dwight Moody to Billy Graham and Jerry Falwell, had adhered to a premillennialist messianic faith that includes a belief in the imminent Second Coming and Jesus’ literal reign on earth for one thousand years. This theology departed from the traditional Christian claim that Christianity is the “true Israel” and the object of God’s promises to that people. Believing that the covenant with Abraham is still valid, even if temporarily suspended, premillennial evangelicals view the Jews as the heirs of the Children of Israel and the object of biblical prophecies about the restored kingdom of Israel. At the same time, those evangelicals have insisted that the Jews, like all other people, have to accept Jesus as their savior to be redeemed and to gain sound moral and spiritual ground. This complicated, double-​edged theological perception stands at the heart of evangelical–​Jewish relations, but has nevertheless given rise to a unique relationship between the two communities, concludes Ariel.33 In the 1830s, a British student of the Bible, John Nelson Darby, came up with a novel interpretation of the scriptures. From the Creation through the

Introduction  11 present and into the End of Days, concluded Darby, all human history could be divided into seven periods or “dispensations.” These different epochs also largely coincide with successive covenants that God made with humanity. According to Darby’s calculations, humanity now lives in the sixth covenant, under the terms of which Christ offers salvation and deliverance from God’s judgment to anyone who accepts Jesus as the savior.34 Darby’s reading of the scripture led him to realize that this time is the last and final dispensation before the return of Christ and the salvation of true believers. Darby declared that we are at the precipice of the end of human history, waiting for the apocalypse prophesied in the Bible. This doctrine, called premillennialism, held that Christ would return to claim (or rapture) His Church (the true believers) before the millennium, a literal one thousand years of theocratic rule on earth that was predicted in the Book of Revelation 20.35 Darby’s interpretive scheme of seven dispensations caught on in Great Britain, especially with the Plymouth Brethren (of which he was a member). Still, his ideas found especially fervent support among evangelicals in America. When Darby came to the United States in 1862, he discovered that his premillennial views fit the American evangelical temperament perfectly. At that time, postmillennialism was the most common evangelical eschatology. Postmillennialism is based on a belief that Christ would establish his kingdom on earth after the millennium (we discuss these eschatological views in greater detail in Chapter 3). Darby convinced many evangelicals that it was a mistake to assume that the millennium was already underway.36 A central concept of premillennial dispensationalism is that the Second Coming of Jesus Christ will occur in stages. In the first stage, Jesus will reappear in heaven but will not descend to earth. In heaven, he will meet the true believers—​those who were born-​again and adopted Christ as their personal savior—​who will be drawn to him from the earth in an act known as the Rapture of the Saints. The true believers will remain with their savior for seven years, while the earth undergoes the great tribulation. For the Jews, this will be “a time of trouble for Jacob” (Jer. 30:7). Even if they return to their homeland before or during this period, they will be found lacking in faith because they refused to accept Christ as their Messiah. They will establish a sovereign state, but this entity will not be the desired Kingdom of God; this will merely be a stage in the events that will precede the coming of the Messiah. During the period of the great tribulation, a Jewish ruler will rise—​ the Antichrist—​who will pretend to be the true Messiah. Jews will welcome

12  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century him as the Redeemer, and he will then proceed to rebuild the Temple, reinstate the sacrifices, and institute a reign of terror. This period will end with cataclysmic changes: the return of Christ to earth, together with the true believers, to establish His kingdom. He will defeat the Antichrist, establish a regime of justice throughout the world, and make Jerusalem the capital of His kingdom. In this eschatological worldview, the Jewish people are essential for the unfolding of many of the events around the End of Days. Evangelical Christians have therefore taken a particular interest in the fate of the Jews and in the life of their nation-​state. They have often interpreted the reemergence of the Jewish state and the wars with the Arab states in light of their eschatological convictions. Since premillennialism predicts the return of the Jews to their land in “unbelief ” before the arrival of Jesus, it is no wonder that evangelicals saw the fulfillment of biblical prophecies in the large Jewish immigration to Palestine since the late nineteenth century.37 Evangelicals’ interest in Jews grew even stronger with the rise of the Zionist movement. Among its early supporters were prominent evangelical figures like William Hechler, a personal assistant to Theodor Herzl’s, the founder of modern Zionism.38 Scholars even show that the Balfour Declaration (1917), the British promise to assist the Jews in establishing a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, was inspired by philo-​Semitic evangelical sentiment.39 With the creation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, and especially after the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and the Temple Mount during the 1967 War, eschatological references to the imminent and soon-​to-​be Second Coming became more central in evangelical theology.40 For example, Hal Lindsey, an American evangelical preacher, argued in his best-​selling book The Late Great Planet Earth which sold more than 10 million copies, that the Second Coming of Jesus Christ would take place within 40 years of the establishment of the State of Israel.41 A similar theme was also articulated in the Left Behind books, a series of 16 best-​selling religious novels by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins, published between 1995 and 2007. In these novels, Jews and the State of Israel play a central role at the End of Days events.42 The fictional prose that these books used helped attract attention and interest in Israel and helped popularize the evangelical support of Israel.43 However, Daniel G. Hummel argues that to understand Christian Zionism, one must look beyond eschatology to other religious and secular factors that underlie Christian support for Israel. “Brotherhood,” Hummel says, referring to a shared sense of a Judeo-​Christian community, is the term that became

Introduction  13 dominant in this movement in the twenty-​first century. He argues that in the most activist circles of the evangelical community today, Christian Zionism is less about apocalyptic theology or evangelism but rather reflects a range of political, historical, and theological arguments in favor of the State of Israel based on mutual solidarity. In earlier decades, atonement for Christian anti-​ Judaism and Israel’s strategic importance in the Cold War proves decisive. After World War II, Hummel concludes, an entire generation of evangelicals embraces political support for Israel as a reconciliation project. Insiders of this movement have emphasized the “Judeo-​Christian” essence as the base for solidarity and collaboration with American Jews and the State of Israel.44 In recent years, a type of nation-​based “prosperity theology,” promising material blessings to those who bless Israel, has played a prominent role, says Hummel. In order to understand why contemporary evangelicals strongly support Israel it is essential to look at how Christian Zionists read Genesis 12:3, where God tells Abraham: “I will bless those who bless you, and whoever curses you I will curse; and all peoples on earth will be blessed through you.” Christian Zionists understand this verse to mean that Abraham’s physical descendants, the nation of Israel, serve as mediators of God’s blessing to humanity. This, Hummel concludes, is the organizing principle of the modern Christian Zionist movement.45 Furthermore, as Hummel points out, evangelicals who adopted the premillennial eschatology argue that Israel and the Church have distinct covenants and the Christian Church has not replaced Israel in God’s eyes. Thus, the prophecies of the Hebrew Bible are for the Jews and are not about the Church. Premillennial dispensationalists continue to view Judaism as an incomplete religion and Jews as spiritually condemned because of their refusal to accept Jesus. And yet Israel remained central in God’s plans. God wasn’t finished with the Jewish people, concludes Hummel.46 A caveat is in order: when evangelicals speak of the covenants between God and the Jewish people, they refer to the Abrahamic covenant mentioned below, but not the covenant that God made with Moses, commonly referred as the Mosaic law. In their view, Jesus’ death and resurrection abolished the need to follow Jewish laws. Stephen Spector notes that evangelical Christian Zionists testify by their words and actions to a complex set of convictions and motivations that urges them to bless, support, and sometimes love Israel and the Jewish people. He says that the most prominent reason for evangelical support for Israel is rooted in the promise of blessings that appear in Genesis 12:3, and many

14  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century of them believe that the United States has been blessed solely because it has blessed Israel and the Jewish people.47 Spector asserts that many evangelicals believe that God has given the Jews eternal ownership of the entire biblical land of Israel, which includes the Palestinian Territories, and that Arabs and Muslims are determined to sabotage the divine covenant. Spector, who interviewed several evangelical leaders and analyzed their publications, concluded that for them, the Arab–​Israeli conflict could not be facilitated through compromise, which they dismiss as appeasement. For the evangelical elites interviewed by Spector, the Jewish state is the frontline in the global war against “Islamic fascism,” especially since 9/​11. Many conservative religious Americans have come to associate Islamic suicide bombers in Israel with Al Qaeda’s attacks on American targets. In that regard, Christian Zionist leaders ascribe to Islamists the theological status they attributed to the Soviet Union before its collapse—​a source of evil.48 Spector thus argues that opposition to Israel’s rivals and enemies is similarly articulated in religious/​theological overtones.

Political Collaboration The Christian Zionist alliance with right-​wing Israeli politicians is usually traced back to Menachem Begin, who was elected prime minister of Israel in 1977. Begin developed a unique relationship with Jerry Falwell, the founder of the Moral Majority, which emerged as a considerable force in American political life in 1979. This coalition of conservative forces, led by Jerry Falwell, benefited from his television ministry. The Moral Majority was created to combat legislation proposing an expansion of constitutional rights for homosexuals and against legalized abortions. It embraced many other GOP themes, such as smaller government, strong military, patriotism, and deregulation of the economy. Another major policy platform that was espoused by the Moral Majority was their unconditional support for the State of Israel.49 In 1980, Begin awarded Falwell with the prestigious Jabotinsky Award.50 After Begin departed from office, Falwell developed close relationships with his successors, including Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, Ehud Barak, and Benjamin Netanyahu. President George W. Bush is an evangelical and born-​again Christian. Some pro-​Israel pundits speculated that Bush is a premillennial Christian

Introduction  15 Zionist. Spector pushes against this claim. Bush believed that resolving the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute would help the United States to build a coalition to fight global terrorism and political Islam in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, his Road Map for Peace plan that intended to solve the Arab–​ Israeli conflict was opposed by both Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon and American evangelicals. Many Americans, particularly Republicans and Republican-​leaning independents, believed that Israel was experiencing the same type of terrorism that America experienced less than a year earlier, during the 9/​11 attacks, and saw concessions to Palestinians in a negative light.51 On April 15, 2002, Christian Zionists joined American Jews, Israelis, and other supporters of Israel at a huge pro-​Israel rally in Washington, DC’s mall, with over 100,000 people reportedly in attendance. Bush backed down and changed his policy. Some analysts argue that Bush came to believe that even if the Palestinian problem was solved, it wouldn’t make much difference in the larger war on terror.52 John Hagee, the pastor of the Cornerstone Church, a megachurch in San Antonio, Texas, is often portrayed as one of the most dedicated and outspoken American Christian Zionists. While watching the wave of condemnation of Israel for its attack on the atomic reactor in Iraq in 1981, Hagee decided to take a stance and organized a fundraising event for Israel in San Antonio, Texas. He contacted the Jewish federation in the city and convinced them to join the event after some persuasion. Since then, Hagee has organized evening events supporting Israel regularly. In 2006, he founded Christians United for Israel (CUFI), which functions as a grassroots organization and as a pro-​Israel lobby in Washington, DC.53 CUFI is now the largest pro-​Israel organization in the United States, with 10 million members.54 CUFI hosts “Nights to Honor Israel” events in cities across the United States to express Christian solidarity with the State of Israel and the Jewish people. It also holds an annual summit to enable its members to speak with their Congressional representatives on behalf of Israel.55 During Barak Obama’s presidency, CUFI’s central lobbying effort was to block Iran’s alleged goal of securing nuclear weapons, thus clashing with the administration’s so-​called “Iran deal,” an agreement reached in 2015 between the Islamic Republic of Iran and permanent members of the United Nations’ Security Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China), plus Germany and the European Union. The deal required Iran to redesign, convert, and reduce its nuclear facilities and accept the Additional Protocol (with provisional application) in return for

16  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century the lifting of all nuclear-​related economic sanctions and freeing up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue and frozen assets. Hagee views his opposition to Iran as a divine test for the Christian world. “If we defend Israel, God will defend America,” Hagee argued. “But if we remain silent at this very critical time, when the survival of Israel is at stake, I believe the judgment of God will fall on America.”56 During the Trump administration, conservative Christians helped cement support for Israel as a core tenet of the Republican Party. President Trump scrapped the Iran deal and the United States recognized the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights and moved its embassy to Jerusalem. The Trump administration was also able to negotiate the Abrahamic Accords of friendly relations between Israel and four Muslim states while bypassing the resolution of the Palestinian issue. Evangelical leadership helped build political support for Trump’s decision to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.57 In turn, President Trump publicly praised his evangelical backers and said that his 2017 decision to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and recognize the city as the capital of Israel was made for evangelical Christians.58

A Movement in Crisis Despite the fact that evangelicals remain very supportive of Israel, as we described above, seismic intergenerational, theological, and political changes are now rocking the evangelical community. These changes were accelerated by the Trump presidency and its controversial end, but they also precede his time in office and can be traced to the late 2000s or even earlier. Our study shows that pastors with amillennial and postmillennial eschatology are increasingly attracting young adults who have become disenchanted with the dominant strand of contemporary evangelical theology, premillennialism. These two eschatological positions, however, are generally less hospitable to Israel and the Jewish people than premillennialism. As we also show in this book, the amillennial and postmillennial pastors are both younger and more racially/​ethnically diverse than the premillennial pastors and their message—​especially, the postmillennial focus on social justice and improvement of the human condition—​resonates with under-​30 evangelicals and with a pro-​Palestinian, rather than a pro-​Israel, view in the current political environment in the United States.

Introduction  17 Another significant finding in this study is that Israel is becoming a peripheral issue among young evangelicals, with an increase in anti-​Zionist activism.59 This trend is also likely to impact the evangelical political and foreign policy priorities in the future. Older evangelicals who were alive during the Holocaust and witnessed Israel’s creation in 1948, or those who witnessed the failed efforts by the Arab states to destroy the Jewish state in 1967 and 1973, viewed Israel as a core issue, of great concern and interest to them personally and to the evangelical community at large. For the younger cohorts, however, especially for those whose formative years occurred in the late 2000s and early/​mid-​2010s, issues of social justice at home and abroad,60 military asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians, and examples of Palestinian victimhood at the hands of Israeli military are far more central to their understanding of the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute than they are for their parents and grandparents (as Chapter 5 will demonstrate). The timing of the current generation of under-​30 evangelicals’ teenage and young adult years, which are so consequential to developing one’s worldview, coincides with what a pro-​Israel pundit Dexter Van Zile called an “Evangelical Intifada.”61 Their “coming of age” moment came at the time when pro-​Palestinian and anti-​Zionist positions became widespread and popular among a portion of the evangelical and born-​again community. Van Zile points to several events in the early 2010s that signaled the beginning of this period, including the With God on Our Side film and the Christ at the Checkpoint conferences in 2010 and 2012. He argues that millennial evangelicals were increasingly exposed to, and are increasingly embracing, a strong anti-​Zionist perspective that is grounded in their desire to be perceived as different from the “Bible-​thumping fundamentalists of yore.”62 But it is also important to note that the religious beliefs, political leanings, and foreign policy attitudes that we analyze in this book show that the disagreements in the evangelical world go beyond intergenerational differences. Substantial levels of theological, eschatological, denominational, political, and social diversity exist in the evangelical community, and the diversity spans all age groups. The caricatured and oversimplified view of evangelical and born-​again Christians in the mainstream media and in the minds of ordinary, non-​evangelical Americans, is unfortunate. It glosses over the complex historical legacies, intense and thoughtful theological debates, and deep political fissures. Whereas others see a monolithic voting bloc and a coherent religious and social movement, our study demonstrates the contemporary evangelical and born-​again community as a rich tapestry,

18  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century full of important nuances and qualifications. Through rigorous quantitative analyses, hours of conversations and interviews with theologians and pastors of the evangelical community over the course of five years, and careful content analysis of ordinary evangelicals’ free-​ form comments, our study rectifies many misconceptions about who evangelical and born-​ again Christians are, about their sympathies toward Israel, the Jews, and the Palestinians, and the sources of their foreign policy attitudes toward the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute.

The Book’s Structure The book is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, we present our first survey with the evangelical and born-​again Christians, which was fielded in April 2018, and carry out our first statistical analyses of the evangelical data. The study shows that evangelical support for Israel is driven by respondents’ beliefs rooted in evangelical Christian theology and by their feeling of cultural and religious affinity with Jews, rather than geopolitical/​security concerns, feelings of guilt for historical persecution of Jews at the hands of Christians, or feeling of commonality based on political/​democratic institutions. However, and counter to other studies which argue that evangelical support for Israel is driven predominantly by religious beliefs rooted in evangelical eschatology and biblical literalism, our results show that the three most robust predictors of support for Israel are the respondent’s age, opinion of Jews, and socialization (frequency of hearing other evangelicals talking about Israel). One fascinating finding of this analysis is that there are significant differences in pro-​Israel sentiment between 18–​29-​year olds and older evangelicals. In Chapter 2, our interest in evangelical support for Israel goes beyond attitudes; we analyze how the 2018 survey respondents’ support for Israel, or the Palestinians, translates into various types of self-​reported political action. While we find that a significant portion of the evangelicals is indeed pro-​Israel, expressing (1) higher levels of confidence in the ability of Israelis to negotiate with the Palestinians in good faith, (2) higher levels of trust in Israel’s ability to faithfully abide by any agreement reached with the Palestinians, (3) support for Israeli annexation of the West Bank, and (4) preference for non-​interference by the international community in the conflict’s resolution, we also discover a much more nuanced set of attitudes.

Introduction  19 Interestingly, a large segment of the evangelicals supported the “neither agree nor disagree” option on multiple questions that asked them to pick pro-​Israel or pro-​Palestinian positions. In terms of respondents’ action tendencies, we discover that among Israel’s supporters, the most common political engagement was expressing sympathy, expressing support for Israel to a friend, and voting for representatives who pledged to support Israel. Pro-​Palestinian evangelicals, on the other hand, are more likely to engage in high-​intensity political action, such as contacting elected representatives, pledging financial support, or joining pro-​Palestinian or anti-​Israeli BDS (boycott, disinvestment, sanction) organizations. Since this group of respondents is very small, comprising less than 3% of our 2018 sample, we advise caution in interpreting these results, but it may be possible that on the grassroots level, the Palestinian supporters in the evangelical movement are more actively engaged—​and at a deeper level—​than their pro-​Israel counterparts. In Chapter 3, we analyze data from a different survey, conducted in 2020 among 1,000 evangelical pastors. This survey was fielded just before the Covid-​19 pandemic broke out. It shows that there are significant theological and eschatological differences among evangelical pastors that are likely to have direct implications on their current foreign policy views, and especially on their support for the State of Israel and their views of the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute. Our statistical analysis illustrates that certain evangelical denominations are significantly more supportive of supersessionism, a belief that the Church replaced the nation of Israel with God’s blessings, and, by proxy, became less supportive of Israel than others. In particular, we find that the proponents of amillennial and premillennial eschatological views have diametrically opposite views on the role of Jewish people and Israel in the End Times. We also find that pastors of the postmillennial and amillennial persuasions are more ethnically and racially diverse and younger than the now-​dominant, but more racially homogenous and older, premillennial group of evangelical leaders. In late March 2021, we commissioned a survey among 700 evangelical and born-​again Christians under thirty, which we address in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, we discuss a significant and growing generational divide within the U.S. evangelical community (even in comparison to our 2018 data). More than 4 out of 10 young evangelicals told us that their view of the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute and their sympathies for Israel or Palestinians are not at all impacted by their religion. We also find that perceptions of Palestinian

20  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century treatment matter greatly to these under-​ 30 evangelicals. Among those respondents who perceive the Palestinian treatment by Israel as mostly fair, the odds of expressing strong support for Israel rise almost two-​fold in comparison to respondents who perceive the Palestinians’ situation as largely unfair. Our study also confirms that both postmillennialist and amillennialist eschatological views reduce support for Israel, but we additionally show that postmillennialism’s impact is significantly more deleterious and provide a conceptual framework to explain why this is the case. Chapter 5 delves deeper; here, we seek to understand how young evangelicals rationalize and justify their attitudes toward the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute, and how they articulate those positions in their own words. Our content analysis of 18–​ 29-​ year-​ old respondents’ free-​ form comments generates some novel insights. For example, we find that religious arguments dominate only Israel’s supporters’ justifications. Close to 60% of young evangelicals who support Israel ground their preference in religious reasoning (particularly, by mentioning the biblical promises of the Abrahamic covenant), while a plurality (48%) of Palestinian supporters used political/​social justice arguments and references to the Palestinian victimhood as reasons for their support. Thus, we discover that despite the relative decline of premillennialism, religious reasoning, especially rooted in the Abrahamic covenant, remains a powerful force in the evangelical attitudes toward Israel. The conclusion chapter that follows these analyses synthesizes our findings and provides a roadmap for our future research on the evolution of Christian Zionism in the American society.

Chapter 1 Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel? (with M. Gordon Byrd) One of the most consistent U.S. foreign policy priorities in the post-​World War II era has been the support for the State of Israel. 1 Israel has enjoyed exceptional levels of financial and military backing by both of the major political parties of the United States, as well as widespread popular support. In 2013, Israel tied with Brazil as the fifth most favorably viewed state by ordinary Americans, with 61% favorability, according to the Pew Research Center.2 Nine years later, in 2022, Gallup reported that 71% of Americans view Israel in a positive light, the seventh highest level of favorability (eclipsed only by Canada, Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany, and India).3 Despite the fact that Israel continues to enjoy considerable political and public support, religious, partisan, and generational differences are increasingly mediating Americans’ favorability of and support for Israel. This chapter considers the sources of support for Israel among the members of the largest religious movement in the United States, the evangelical and born-​again Christians, utilizing an original survey of evangelical and born-​ again respondents that we conducted in 2018. Our primary goal is to statistically assess the relative importance of theological/​eschatological, cultural, social, and political determinants of evangelical support for Israel. We find that evangelical support for Israel is driven by respondents’ beliefs rooted in evangelical Christian theology and by their feelings of cultural and religious affinity with Jews, rather than geopolitical/​security concerns, feelings of guilt for the historical persecution of Jews at the hands of Christians, or feeling of commonality based on political/​democratic institutions. However, and counter to other studies which argue that evangelical support for Israel is driven predominantly by religious beliefs rooted in evangelical eschatology and biblical literalism, our results show that the three strongest predictors of support for Israel are the respondent’s age, opinion of Jews, and socialization (frequency of hearing other evangelicals talking about Israel). One fascinating finding of this analysis is that there are Christian Zionism in the Twenty-​First Century. Motti Inbari and Kirill Bumin, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2024. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197649305.003.0002

22  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century significant differences in pro-​Israel sentiment between 18–​29 year olds and older evangelicals. From the late 1970s, white evangelicals have been heavily involved in American politics, and they are mostly identified with the Republican Party. Their political agenda is almost entirely domestic. While evangelicals have a relatively narrow international agenda, the support for the State of Israel is at the top of their priorities. In this study, we seek to understand the sources of evangelical support for Israel, utilizing an original survey of 1,000 evangelical and born-​again respondents, conducted between April 3 and April 10, 2018.4 The fact that evangelical Christians express such an interest and a sense of shared destiny with Jews and Israel is both fascinating and peculiar, given the long-​standing anti-​Semitism embraced by many Christians and their secular and religious authorities. As discussed in the Introduction, evangelicals developed a sense of historical philo-​Semitism. Israel’s success and the expansion of its borders, including the conquest of Jerusalem and the Temple Mount after the Six-​Day War, triggered a wave of evangelical interest in Israel. The evangelical theologians’ interest in the Israeli victory in 1967 was connected to the predictions about the Second Coming of Jesus Christ.5 Most of the scholarship on the evangelical support of Jews and the State of Israel, including its missionary activities toward Jews, is largely the product of historians and scholars of religious studies. In these publications, the subject is researched from archives and interviews with evangelical leaders and typically entails content analysis of the statements of different evangelical leaders’ speeches. The study of evangelical grassroots attitudes toward and support for Jews and the State of Israel has been limited so far, with only a handful of surveys6 and academic publications.7 Our survey contributes to this growing body of public opinion research on evangelical attitudes. Our study provides one of the first statistical analyses of the causes of evangelical support for Israel. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We begin with an introduction of the motivations of evangelicals in support of Israel, followed by an introduction to the survey and some of its descriptive results. The study then turns to the operationalization of variables and statistical analysis, which tests hypotheses regarding the potential motivations for the support of Israel discussed below. We finish with interpreting and discussing the statistical results and identifying avenues for future research.

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  23

Evangelical Motivations The literature on the evangelical support for Israel identifies several potential sources, which can be grouped into the following categories: 1. Eschatology: Many evangelicals adhere to a Christian school of thought called premillennial dispensationalism. According to this philosophy, the Second Coming of Jesus Christ is an imminent event that will take place in several stages. In the first stage, Jesus will reappear in heaven but will not descend to earth. He will meet the true believers in heaven—​those who were “born-​again” by adopting Christ as their personal savior. In an act known as “the rapture,” these believers will be miraculously drawn up to Jesus from the earth, while true believers who died prior to the appearance of the Messiah will be resurrected from the dead and join Jesus. All of this is expected to happen in the near future, although evangelical writings do not provide a specific timeframe in most cases. For Jews, this will be “a time of trouble for Jacob” (Jer. 30:7). Despite returning to their homeland, prior to or during this period, Jews will be considered “lacking in faith” because they will not have accepted Christ as their Messiah.8   Therefore, Jewish presence in what is currently identified as the State of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories will not be the “kingdom of God,” but rather just a stage in the developments that will precede the coming of the Messiah. During the period of “the great tribulation,” there will arise a ruler9—​the Antichrist—​who will pass himself off as the true Messiah and be accepted by Jews as their redeemer. Taking over the rebuilt Temple, the Antichrist will institute a reign of terror. Jews who accept the kingdom of Christ during this period will be persecuted by the followers of the false messiah, and some of them will even be killed. There will be a series of attempted invasions of the Holy Land from all corners of the world. The period of the great tribulation will end with the return of Christ to earth, together with his true believers, to establish his kingdom. He will defeat the Antichrist, establish a regime of justice throughout the world, and make Jerusalem his capital. During these anticipated events, most Jews would open their hearts to accept Jesus as their Messiah.10   There might be more than one way to interpret the prophecies of the Book of Revelation and the prophetic literature, but the evangelicals

24  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century who prescribe to premillennial dispensationalism connect the establishment of the State of Israel and events such as Israel’s victory in the Six-​Day War and its conquest of the Temple Mount as a temporal fulfillment of prophecy regarding the Second Coming of Christ. Thus, one potential evangelical motivation to support Israel is grounded in messianic expectations and in participation in the divine plan for redemption.   All monotheistic religions contain eschatological visions of End of Days. In most times, these visions have no significant meaning to the life and well-​being of the community of believers. However, these visions can become central at specific points, thus pushing the true believers to action in anticipation of imminent redemption. On the spectrum of “hot” or “cold,” we can identify “hot” as active anticipation of redemption that would transform humanity and bring about an End of Days. These “hot” episodes are followed by prolonged “cold” periods of time, sometimes even blended with negative attitudes toward messianism, in which the possibility of a sudden transition to the End of Days exists, but the general public takes no action to hasten it, or even thinks of it as reasonably possible.11 An example of “hot” messianism can be found in Norman Cohn’s notable research which shows how several movements rose to significance in Medieval Europe, expecting the Second Coming of Christ as an imminent event. Some of them have concentrated their attention on the First Crusade (1096–​ 1099), which was viewed as a holy war that would lead to the End of Days.12 During the seventeenth century, a mass movement developed among Jews who identified Shabetai Zvi as the Jewish Messiah.13 In the history of American evangelism, a notable example of “hot” messianism is the Millerites movement, based on the leadership of William Miller, that expected the Second Coming for the year 1843 and later recalculated their predictions to 1844.14 The Jehovah Witnesses is another contemporary example, albeit not an evangelical movement, steeped with messianic expectations that have already calculated the End six times.15 Scholar Jason Olson argues that the 1967 Arab–​Israeli war and the Israeli capture of Jerusalem brought about “hot” messianism among many American evangelicals,16 as discussed earlier in the writings of Hal Lindsey. These “hot” episodes of messianic expectations are not the normal state of religion that is mostly “cold” toward acute messianism.

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  25 2. Blessings: One of the fundamental principles of evangelical Christianity is biblical literalism.17 Genesis 12:3 mentions that God would offer blessings to the nations who would support Abraham’s offspring: “I will bless those who bless you, and whoever curses you I will curse; and all peoples on earth will be blessed through you.” According to scholar Daniel Hummel, ideas of prosperity gospel which argue that God shows blessings to those who have faith in Him became central in Christian Zionism after Pastor John Hagee took the lead in this movement. According to this understanding, to follow the duties of the Abrahamic covenant of Genesis 12:3 would bring God’s favor on America.18 In Allies for Armageddon, Victoria Clark suggests that a fear of the wrath of God plays a major role in Christian Zionist support for Israel: “If America abandons Israel, then God will cancel America’s most Divinely Favored Nation status.”19 Another example is from the work of journalist Bill Koenig, who prepared a study claiming that a statistical correlation can be seen between American pressure on Israel to make territorial compromises and natural disasters in the United States. Koenig claims that within 24 hours of an American president pressuring Israel, a natural disaster (such as floods, hurricanes, tornados, wildfires, or earthquakes) or terrorist attack takes place in the United States.20 This line of thinking led some evangelicals to argue that Israel’s 2005 Disengagement Plan and the evacuation of the Gush Katif settlement in Gaza brought the destruction from Hurricane Katrina onto the United States.21 Thus, evangelicals believe that supporting Israel could bring blessings to them, as promised by God, and abandoning Israel will be detrimental to America’s future prosperity. 3. A Belief that Jews are God’s Chosen People: Another aspect of this literal reading of the Bible includes a belief that Jews are the offspring of Abraham and are thus God’s chosen people. Evangelical preachers usually oppose the “replacement theology” that argues that Jews lost their election on earth after rejecting Jesus as the Messiah. By rejecting replacement theology, the evangelical message stands in contrast to a long-​standing Christian belief that God is finished with the Jewish people, and that all of his promises of good to Israel have been transferred to the Church. Christian Zionists consider it a profound theological error.22 For example, Pastor John Hagee, leader of Christians United for Israel, said, “It is time that Christians remove the

26  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century self-​imposed scales from our eyes placed there by the sanctimonious teachings of the replacement theology. God never rejected the Jews or replaced them because they could not see Jesus as Messiah. God still loves and cherishes the Jewish people and has a glorious future in store for them.”23 We will discuss this aspect in more length and detail in Chapter 3.   The three potential reasons for evangelical support for Jews and Israel discussed above are deeply rooted in evangelical theology. Beyond these explanations, we consider several other potential determinants of evangelical attitudes. These explanations are secular in scope and concern political, cultural, and historical reasons for evangelical support for Israel. 4. Guilt: Another potential rationalization for supporting Israel may come from a sense of guilt rooted in the belief that the long history of anti-​ Semitism in Christianity eventually culminated in the horrors of the Holocaust. An example of this sentiment can be seen in the preaching of Pastor John Hagee, who declared that anti-​Semitism that led to the Holocaust has its origins in Christianity: “A thread connects the crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, Martin Luther’s attacks on the Jews, Adolf Hitler, and the Final Solution. All these acts were committed by baptized Christians.”24 As Hagee points out, European history of anti-​ Semitism may therefore provide a solid incentive to evangelicals to support Israel in a mea culpa type of reaction. This sense of atonement for previous sins of the Christian nations may be further amplified by a belief in God’s blessings (curse) for those who support (attack/​oppose) Jews and Israel, which we discussed earlier. 5. Shared Political Values: Israel enjoys widespread support from the American public and the political elite on both the left and the right, although this sentiment is weakening among liberals.25 A Gallup poll conducted in 2018 showed that Americans’ stance on the Israeli–​ Palestinian conflict is as strongly pro-​Israel as at any time in Gallup’s three-​decade trend.26 The annual conventions by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a lobbying group that advocates pro-​Israel policies, are an expression of that support, where politicians from across the political spectrum come to express their support for Israel. For example, in 2016, the Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton gave a speech at the convention where she said that

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  27 “we’ve always shared an unwavering, unshakable commitment to our alliance (with Israel).”27 It is undeniable that Israelis and Americans share many (if not most) Western socioeconomic and political foundations.   Thus, it wouldn’t be far-​fetched to argue that evangelicals may see Israel as an American ally because both societies share a set of common political principles and democratic practices, such as competitive politics, rule of law, individual liberties, free press, and limited government. As Tom DeLay, a former House Majority Leader and an evangelical Christian, emphasized this sense of political affinity or kinship in his speech to the Israeli Knesset on July 30, 2003: “The solidarity between the United States and Israel is deeper than the various interests we share. It goes to the very nature of man, to the endowment of our God-​given rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is the universal solidarity of freedom.”28 This “solidarity of freedoms” and democratic values could be a powerful reason for evangelicals to express high levels of support for America’s only democratic ally in the Middle East—​Israel. 6. Common Geopolitical and Security Concerns: Evangelicals may also perceive Israel as an ally due to shared geopolitical and strategic interests. Accordingly, support for Israel can reflect a belief that Israel is America’s best ally in an essential but volatile part of the world. In that regard, many evangelicals may see Israel as a partner in containing Iran and in fighting radical Islam.29 Tristan Sturm argues that Muslims replaced the Soviet Union as America’s and God’s enemies, thus reshaping evangelicals’ foreign policy priorities.30 From this perspective, as Peter Gries notes, “the Israelis are on the frontline of a battle to keep the Palestinians and other Muslims from upsetting the global pecking order.”31   In addition to shared Israeli and American geopolitical concerns, evangelicals may see Israel as a guarantor of Western civilization’s security in the Middle East, in general, and a guarantor of Christian access to the holy sites in Israel. Such concerns for the physical safety of Christians visiting the Holy Land and the security of Christian religious sites may prompt evangelicals to support the State of Israel. 7. Shared Cultural and Religious Values: Finally, and similar to the political kinship argument above, one could argue that evangelical support

28  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century for Israel is rooted in a belief in a shared Western culture, including religion, ethics, traditions, customs, and etiquette. From this perspective, supporting Israel can reflect a sense of cultural kinship based on feelings of shared cultural and ethical values between Jews and Christians.32 Scholar Daniel Hummel argues that the brotherhood and solidarity of Jews and Christians based on shared scriptures has become the dominant argument behind Christian Zionism in the twenty-​first century.33 There is a lack of scholarly consensus on which of the factors identified above are the primary drivers of evangelical support for Israel. Some scholars emphasize the evangelical belief that supporting Jews would bring blessings to them and thus view it more as a philo-​Semite sentiment.34 Other scholars go in the opposite direction and see the motivations of conservative evangelicals in supporting Israel as hypocritical and as bordering on anti-​Semitic, because evangelicals believe that there would be a mass conversion of Jews after the Second Coming, which is considered an imminent event.35 Given that with the possible exception of Jewish Americans, and that the evangelicals are the most ardent supporters of pro-​Israeli U.S. foreign policy,36 it is important to understand whether evangelical support is rooted predominantly in religious beliefs or in more broadly conceived cultural and political affinity and common geopolitical interests, or both. Our study aims to fill this gap by using a new survey of evangelical and born-​again Christians.37

The Survey We analyze the sources of evangelical support for Israel using original survey data compiled for us by LifeWay Research. This national polling company specializes in surveying the attitudes of various Christian communities. The survey was conducted on April 3–​10, 2018.38 The sample was screened to include only those who consider themselves evangelical and/​or born-​ again Christians. We adopted self-​identification as a standard by which we identify evangelical and born-​again respondents. We deliberately avoided narrowing the definition to white evangelicals only (as some do) and included evangelicals of all races (about 40% of the total population are non-​ white). We also chose not to utilize the four principles of evangelism as screening questions for inclusion, as the National Association of Evangelicals

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  29 suggests. As Gregory Smith et al. have shown, the self-​identification method among American Protestants can be used and reliably substituted as an effective measurement of this religious identity.39 A demographically balanced online panel was used. Maximum quotas and slight weights were used for gender, region, age, ethnicity, and education to more accurately reflect the evangelical population in the United States (as defined by the 2014 Pew Religious Landscape Survey). 2,754 respondents started the survey, 1,694 were screened out by quotas or the screening criteria, and 60 were incomplete or spoiled. The completed sample is 1,000 surveys. The sample provides 95% confidence that the sampling error does not exceed plus or minus 3.27%, accounting for weights. Initially, we expected to conduct a set of telephone or face-​to-​face surveys but chose to implement our survey online instead. Several reasons drove this decision. First, completing a survey online significantly reduced the costs and time needed to generate a nationally representative sample. Second, as Gries points out, completing a survey online in the privacy of one’s own home potentially reduces biases or self-​presentation effects that are more likely to manifest themselves in telephone or face-​to-​face interviews, especially when controversial or delicate topics are addressed in the survey.40 Third, all of our questions are measured on a five-​or seven-​point scale. Such questions are easier to employ via an online survey rather than over the telephone because an online format allows for easier use of categorical rating scales. In sum, utilizing an online format helped us decrease costs and time needed to carry out this survey and reduce measurement error.

Who Are the Evangelical Respondents and What Views Do They Hold? In our survey, the majority of evangelicals and born-​again Christians are white (65% of the sample), concentrated mostly in the Southeast (38.3%) and the Midwest (22.5%), and are most likely to hold a high school diploma (37%) or have “some college” experience (29.8%), without obtaining either an associate or baccalaureate degree. They live predominantly in rural (37%) and suburban locations (42%), and their mean household income is roughly $59,500. 61% of the respondents in our survey are female.41 The average age of our respondents is 49.3 years of age and 57.3% of the respondents are married. As expected, our respondents exhibit a relatively

30  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century high level of religiosity (demonstrated by the frequency of church attendance and frequency of reading the Bible), with over a half reporting attending church at least once a week and reading the Bible at least twice a week (see table 1.1). One of the principal findings of LifeWay Research’s Evangelical Attitudes Toward Israel Research Study (2017) was noticeably lower levels of support for Israel among young evangelicals.42 This study shows that American evangelicals under 35 are less likely than their elders to offer strong support for Israel and are more likely to have a critical view of the country and its policies. These findings prompted us to examine this age group more carefully in our research. The authors of the LifeWay Research note that “The majority of those with Evangelical beliefs attribute the primary reason for their support of Israel to the Bible” (p.4) and that frequent church attendance is linked with strong support for Israel (p.18). Are younger evangelicals less supportive of Israel simply because they are less frequently attending church and/​or reading the Bible?

Table 1.1.  Respondents’ religiosity (church attendance and Bible readership) How frequently do you attend church or religious assemblies?

18–​29-​year-​olds 30-​year-​old and older respondents

All age groups

Never Seldom A few times a year Once a month 2 or 3 times a month At least once a week

1.13% 5.09% 8.48% 3.96% 24.29% 57.06%

3.2% 13.9% 13.2% 4.2% 13.9% 51.6%

How frequently do you read the Bible?

18–​29-​year-​olds 30-​year-​old and older respondents

All age groups

Never Seldom Once or twice a month Only in church Once a week At least twice a week Every day

3.39% 15.25% 3.39% 14.12% 7.91% 31.08% 24.86%

3.2% 21.9% 7.4% 7.2% 9.4% 22.0% 28.9%

3.64% 15.80% 14.22% 4.25% 11.66% 50.43%

3.16% 23.33% 8.26% 5.71% 9.72% 20.05% 29.77%

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  31 The data from our 2018 survey do not lend support to this hypothesis and shows that lower rates of church attendance and Bible readership are not likely to be the reason why younger evangelicals (18–​29-​year-​old respondents) express lower levels of support for Israel than other age groups. In fact, 18–​29-​year-​old evangelical respondents have lower, rather than higher, rates of “seldom” or “never” attending church or reading the Bible than the older (30+​) evangelical respondents. The differences are particularly pronounced in the “seldom” category of responses. (In future surveys we will revisit this question to discover a more complex picture that will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). Our results regarding the ideological positions of the evangelical and born-​ again Christians are consistent with other surveys and with the voting patterns of the evangelicals in the 2016 presidential elections. Exit polls after the election have shown that only about 16% of evangelicals voted for the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton.43 Similarly, in our survey, only 17.1% described themselves as “slightly liberal,” “liberal,” and “extremely liberal.” The vast majority of the respondents indicated a preference for conservatism (55.9%). It is noteworthy—​and this will become more relevant in the analysis of evangelical attitudes toward Israel and the Israeli–​Palestinian conflict in the next chapter—​that ideological preferences of the 18–​29 year olds reflect more of a normal distribution, with moderates/​centrists comprising the largest proportion (30.36%) of this cohort. On the other hand, the older generations are more likely to adopt a more conservative platform, with the largest proportion of the respondents (32.73%) picking the “conservative” response category (see Table 1.2 below). The survey also uncovered an interesting contrast between the opinions of different evangelical age cohorts toward Jews and Muslims. Data show that 18–​29-​year-​old respondents manifest much warmer feelings toward Muslims than the older evangelicals. 46.33% of 18–​29 year olds express “good” or “very good” opinions of Muslims, while only 21.14% of older evangelicals responded with positive feelings toward Muslims. Darrell Bock, a bible scholar and professor at the Dallas Theological Seminary, argues that “What drives a millennial are justice questions—​and there are real questions related to justice and how Israel handles the Palestinians.”44 Perhaps, the differences in support for Muslims that we observe here are linked to different conceptions of justice held by the different age groups, with younger evangelicals more likely to perceive the Palestinians as victims of Israeli occupation and maltreatment. No such cohort differences were discovered

32  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Table 1.2.  Respondent’s political ideology Respondent’s political ideology

18–​29-​year-​olds

30-​year-​old and older respondents

All age groups

Extremely liberal Liberal Slightly liberal Moderate/​middle of the road Slightly conservative Conservative Extremely conservative

8.93% 11.31% 8.33% 30.36%

4.27% 6.34% 4.01% 26.26%

5.1% 7.23% 4.78% 26.99%

16.67% 18.45% 5.95%

10.35% 32.73% 16.04%

11.48% 30.18% 14.24%

Table 1.3.  Opinions of Muslims and Jews: Comparing 18–​29-​year-​old respondents to the older evangelicals What is your opinion of Muslims?

Don’t know Very poor Poor Neutral Good Very good

18–​29-​year-​old respondents

30-​year-​old and older respondents

All age groups

11.86% 4.52% 7.35% 29.94% 19.21% 27.12%

11.79% 15.31% 15.55% 36.21% 13.12% 8.02%

11.8% 13.4% 14.1% 35.1% 14.2% 11.4%

What is your opinion of Jews?

Don’t know Very poor Poor Neutral Good Very good

18–​29-​year-​old respondents

30-​year-​old and older respondents

All age groups

10.17% 0.57% 1.70% 22.60% 34.46% 30.51%

7.53% 0.86% 0.85% 25.76% 33.17% 31.83%

8.0% 0.80% 1.0% 25.2% 33.4% 31.6%

regarding respondents’ feelings toward Jews, with 65% of both cohorts expressing a positive view of Jews, and with another 22.6% (18–​29 year olds) and 25.76% (30-​year-​old and older respondents) expressing a neutral attitude (see Table 1.3).

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  33

Mapping Evangelical and Born-​Again Christian Support for Israel: The Dependent Variable There are a few different ways to examine how Americans perceive Israel, the Palestinians, and the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. The most common approach, which has been used for decades (particularly, from the 1940s through the early 1990s) by Gallup and other major polling firms, has been to ask a question about favorability. Such a question typically queries poll takers whether they have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the Israeli people and, separately, of the Palestinian people. Or, the respondents might be asked about their opinions of the Israeli government and the Palestinian government (again, in separate questions). A recent example of this approach can be found in the 2022 Pew Research Center survey.45 Pew asked their respondents, “Thinking about the situation with Israelis and Palestinians these days, do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of each of the following?” The Israeli government, the Palestinian government, the Israeli people, and the Palestinian people were then offered as separate items to which poll takers were asked to respond, with an ordinal scale ranging from “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” to “somewhat unfavorable” and “very unfavorable.” Another way to survey respondents about their perceptions of Israel, the Palestinians, or the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute is to employ a relative measure of support or sympathy for Israel (vis-​à-​vis the Palestinians), rather than a separate set of measures of favorability. Since 1993, Pew has also asked in some of their surveys: “In the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more, Israel or the Palestinians?”46 Prior to 1993, an identical question was also included in many surveys conducted by Gallup for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. The typical question is ordinal, with four or more categories of responses. Some of these surveys include response options for those who may have sympathy/​support for both Israel and the Palestinians or for neither side, and some surveys exclude such both/​neither options. We also chose to a relative measure of support for Israel vis-​à-​vis the Palestinians in this analysis. Instead of “sympathize” (Pew and Gallup language) we chose “support” language in our surveys. A relative measure of support is useful for our purposes because it requires the respondents to assess their degree of support for these disputants in relation to each other rather than in the abstract. The existing literature supports this choice. For example, Gries found that Pentecostals, white Baptists, and other white

34  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century evangelical Protestants displayed the largest gaps (with the exception of American Jews) between their warmth toward Israel and their coolness toward Palestinians.47 In addition, Jeremy Mayer argues that “the comparative favoritism for Israel is greatly lessened when respondents are not asked to choose only between Israel and the Palestinians, but given an option for neutrality.”48 In order to capture this potential effect, we also employ a neutral category by incorporating the “support neither” option into our question phrasing.49 The dependent variable in this study is thus based on the following question: “Where do you place your support?” The respondent was offered the following range of responses: (1) =​Very Strong Support for Palestinians; (2) =​Support Palestinians; (3) =​Lean Toward Support for Palestinians; (4) =​Support Neither; (5) =​Lean Toward Support for Israel; (6) =​Support Israel; (7) =​Very Strong Support for Israel; and (8) =​Don’t Know. We recoded the original variable in the following manner: (1) =​Support Palestinians (1.51%); (2) =​Lean Toward Support for Palestinians (1.28%); (3) =​Support Neither (22.04%); (4) =​Lean Toward Support for Israel (14.39%); (5) =​Support Israel (60.79%).50 The “Don’t Know” category was recoded with missing values to drop these observations from the data. This resulted in a drop of 138 observations, giving us 862 respondents (see Table 1.5 for summary statistics). As the descriptive statistics and previous research on the subject show, evangelical and born-​again Christian support for Israel is substantial. Over 75% of the respondents either lean toward supporting Israel or manifest strong or very strong support for Israel.

Determinants of Evangelical Support for Israel Hypotheses First, we hypothesize that evangelicals and Born-​ Again Christians are motivated in their support for Israel by their messianic expectations of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ and by the necessity to participate in the divine plan for redemption. Since premillennial theology expects that the events of the Second Coming would take place in a near future that Jews would build a Temple for God before these events, and that, eventually, many

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  35 Jews would convert to Christianity, we expect that the respondents who follow this religious belief would also express higher levels of support for Israel, because doing so would contribute to the fulfillment of prophecy. We also hypothesize that evangelicals are motivated by their belief that Jews are God’s chosen people due to their literal reading of scripture. In addition, we argue that evangelicals may be motivated to support Israel if they perceive that common cultural and political institutions unite the Americans and the Israelis. We also hypothesize that evangelicals’ support for Israel is rooted in their geopolitical and security concerns. If evangelicals see Israel as a guarantor of Western civilization’s security in the Middle East, in general, and a guarantor of Christian access to the holy sites in Israel and the Occupied Territories, more specifically, then they are more likely to express a high degree of support for Israel. Another potential rationalization for supporting Israel comes from a sense of guilt rooted in Christians’ long history of anti-​Semitism that eventually culminated in the Holocaust. From this perspective, we hypothesize that the evangelical support for Israel is perceived as one way that Christians can right the old wrongs perpetrated against Jews by Christians. In addition to the factors discussed above, we expect that support for Israel will be affected by the frequency with which a respondent hears other evangelicals expressing support for Israel. We hypothesize that this process of socialization, through which individuals become aware of politics, learn political facts, and form values and attitudes is an important part of the explanation of evangelicals’ support for Israel, which has been ignored by the previous studies on this subject. Similarly, we hypothesize that respondents who exhibit a relatively high level of religiosity—​demonstrated by the frequency of church attendance—​ should express more positive attitudes toward Israel. We expect that more frequent exposure to the message about the importance of Jews and Israel to evangelicals should promote more support for Israel because of the increased potential for socialization, which we discussed above. A number of previous studies identified ideology and partisanship as important determinants of evangelical attitudes toward Israel and the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute. For example, Mayer finds that evangelical Republicans are more supportive of Israel than evangelical Democrats, even after controlling for the effects of premillennial dispensationalism.51 Gries argues that liberals are less sympathetic toward Israel than conservatives because “the

36  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century greater value that liberals place on compassion and fairness contributes to their opposition to what they view as Israeli oppression of the Palestinians in the occupied territories.”52 Thus, we control for the respondent’s political ideology and hypothesize that more conservative respondents will express higher levels of support for Israel. This study also controls for the respondent’s general opinion of Muslims and Jews. We hypothesize that negative attitudes toward Muslims and more positive attitudes toward Jews will increase a respondent’s degree of support for Israel. We similarly expect that people who express neutral opinions toward both groups are also more likely to support neither Israel nor Palestinians, or only express a weak level of support for Israel or Palestinians. Finally, we control for standard demographic factors (age, education, income, gender, race/​ethnicity, and region of residence53). However, in light of results reported by LifeWay Research in their 2017 survey, the effect of age on support for Israel is of particular interest. The authors of the LifeWay study show that young evangelicals are less attached to Israel than are the older cohorts. Accordingly, we anticipate a lower level of support for Israel among the respondents who self-​identify as 18–​29-​year-​olds in our survey than among the older age groups. Additionally, previous findings lead us to expect that black Americans will be less sympathetic toward Israel than are other Americans, due to the close relationship Israel developed with South Africa during the apartheid era and due to the black Americans’ greater concern for racial justice.54 We do not have clear theoretical expectations about the impact of other demographic variables on support for Israel and therefore employ a two-​tailed test of statistical significance to take into account all potential effects.

Operationalization To measure whether theological, cultural, political, or security-​ related attitudes impact support for Israel, we rely on a battery of questions from our survey, which rank respondents’ responses according to the following scale: (1) strongly disagree; (2) disagree; (3) somewhat disagree; (4) neither agree nor disagree; (5) somewhat agree; (6) agree; (7) strongly agree; and (8) don’t know.55

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  37 The theological questions included in our analysis include the following: •​ I support Israel because its existence is proof of the fulfillment of prophecy regarding the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming. •​ I support Israel because Jews are God’s chosen people. •​ I support Israel because it needs to build a temple for God on the Temple Mount in the near future. We attempt to tap into broader cultural, political, and security-​related motivations for support through the following set of questions: •​ I support Israel because of my shared cultural and/​or religious values. •​ I support Israel because of my shared political or democratic values. •​ I support Israel because it protects the holy sites and is the only guarantor of Christian access to them. The following question looks at whether guilt (for the historical persecution of Jews by Christians) is a factor that accounts for evangelical support of Israel: •​ I support Israel because Jews suffered discrimination and extermination at the hands of Christian nations in the past. The distribution of responses to these questions appears in Table 1.4. To control for potential socialization effects, we ask the respondents to estimate how often they hear other evangelicals express support for Israel. Respondents were given the following response options: (1) every week (23.3% of respondents); (2) once a month (26% of respondents); (3) seldom (35.7% of respondents); and (4) never (15% of respondents). The variable was then recoded, with higher values to indicate more frequent expressions of support. The measurement of the remaining variables—​ opinion of Jews and Muslims, respondent’s ideology, and standard demographic variables—​have been discussed above, and the summary statistics for all variables appear in Table 1.5. The Appendix provides variable descriptions and coding rules for all of the variables used in this analysis.

The State of Israel is a proof of the fulfillment of prophecy regarding the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming I support Israel because Jews are God’s chosen people Israel needs to build a temple for God on the Temple Mount in the near futur I support Israel because of our shared cultural and/​or religious values I support Israel because of our shared political or democratic values I support Israel because it protects the holy sites and is the only guarantor of Christian access to them I support Israel because Jews suffered discrimination and extermination at the hands of Christian nations in the past

1.59% 2.19% 4.61% 1.40% 4.44% 1.91% 3.01%

0.32% 0.94% 2.63% 1.40% 3.80% 1.59% 2.54%

Strongly Disagree Disagree

3.33%

2.22%

4.44%

3.59%

2.03% 2.96%

1.27%

28.53%

22.86%

25.52%

17.94%

10.80% 32.89%

12.88%

Somewhat Neither Agree Disagree nor Disagree

Table 1.4.  Descriptive statistics for potential causes of evangelical support for Israel

16.64%

17.46%

17.59%

17.00%

14.71% 11.68%

10.81%

17.27%

23.33%

20.44%

25.27%

22.85% 16.28%

25.44%

Somewhat Agree Agree

28.68%

30.63%

23.77%

33.39%

46.48% 28.95%

47.69%

Strongly Agree

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  39 Table 1.5.  Summary statistics Variable Support for Israel I support Israel because its existence is proof of the fulfillment of prophecy regarding the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming I support Israel because Jews are God’s chosen people. I support Israel because it needs to build a temple for God on the Temple Mount in the near future I support Israel because of my shared cultural and/​or religious values I support Israel because of my shared political or democratic values I support Israel because it protects the holy sites and is the only guarantor of Christian access to them I support Israel because Jews suffered discrimination and extermination at the hands of Christian nations in the past Other evangelicals talk about importance of supporting Israel (socialization effect) Religiosity (frequency of attending church or religious assemblies) Respondent’s ideology Opinion of Muslims Opinion of Jews Age Gender Income Education Race/​ethnicity (African American) Marital status Southeast (region of residence) Rural (area of residence)

Obs

Mean

Std. Min Max Dev.

862 629

4.32 5.99

0.96 1 1.25 1

5 7

639

5.91

1.34 1

7

608

5.11

1.61 1

7

641

5.57

1.39 1

7

631

5.05

1.61 1

7

630

5.45

1.41 1

7

631

5.20

1.54 1

7

1000

2.58

1.01 1

4

1000

4.67

1.66 1

6

941 882 920 1000 1000 954 1000 1000 993 1000 992

4.80 2.96 4.02 2.57 1.61 3.38 3.14 0.19 3.73 0.38 0.21

1.66 1.20 0.86 1.01 0.49 1.73 1.36 0.40 1.65 0.49 0.41

7 5 5 4 2 7 6 1 5 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0

40  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century

Findings and Discussion We utilize a multivariate ordered logistic regression to explore the factors influencing evangelicals’ support for Israel.56 Sampling weights and robust standard errors are used in the analysis. As expected, all tests for parallel lines assumption (Wolf Gould, Brant, score, likelihood ratio, and Wald) were insignificant.57 Table 1.6 displays the statistical results and odds ratios for the explanatory variables.58 As expected, the results show that evangelical support for Israel is driven by respondents’ beliefs rooted in evangelical Christian theology and by their feeling of cultural and religious affinity with Jews. Hypotheses regarding geopolitical/​security concerns, feelings of guilt for historical persecution of Jews at the hands of Christians, or feelings of commonality based on political/​ democratic institutions were not supported by the data. Respondents who stated that they support Israel to fulfill the prophecy regarding the Second Coming of Jesus Christ and because Jews are God’s chosen people are more likely to manifest high levels of support for Israel than respondents who either disagreed or responded with weak support to these statements. The odds ratio shows that for one unit increase (in favor of a stronger agreement) to the statement “The State of Israel is a proof of the fulfillment of prophecy regarding the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming,” the odds of very strong or strong support for Israel (vs. expressing lukewarm/​ weak support for Israel support for Palestinians, or expressing neutrality) are 1.368 times greater, given that the other variables in the model are held constant. Similarly, for one unit increase (e.g., from “somewhat agree” to “agree”) in support for the statement “I support Israel because Jews are God’s chosen people,” the odds of a significant level of support for Israel are 1.385 times greater. In contrast, we find no support for the hypothesis that premillennial dispensation theology, which expects that Jews would build a Temple for God prior to the events of the Second Coming, is a statistically significant predictor of support for Israel. The coefficient for this variable is positive, as hypothesized, but the variable fails to achieve commonly accepted levels of statistical significance. This finding is important since many commentators do associate evangelical support for Israel with the reconstruction of the Temple in the near future. Our results fail to find support for this evangelical motivation.

Table 1.6.  Determinants of evangelical support for Israel (ordered logistic regression results) Variable

Standard Errors

Israel’s existence is proof of the nearing .314 (.131)* Jews are God’s chosen people Israel needs to build a temple for God on .066 (.129)

1.368* of Jesus’ Second Coming .326 (.146)* 1.068 the Temple Mount in the near future .347 (.124)** -​.099 (.119) -​.179 (.148)

Cultural affinity Political affinity Common geopolitical/​security concerns Guilt for previous discrimination of Jews Evangelicals talk about Israel’s importance Religiosity Ideology Opinion of Muslims Opinion of Jews Age Gender Income Educational attainment Race/​ethnicity (African American) Marital status Southeast (region of residence) Rural (area of residence) N (observations) Log pseudolikelihood Wald X2 Prob > X2 McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 Pseudo R2 Difference of BIC’ parameters

Coefficients w/​ Robust Ratio

Odds

1.385*

1.414** 0.906 0.836

.181 (.123)

0.834

.444 (.176)*

1.560*

.195 (.092)* .271 (.103)** -​.324 (.146)* 1.109 (.187)*** .392 (.176)* -​.439 (.300) .139 (.102) -​.103 (.116) .017 (.474)

1.215* 1.312** 0.723* 3.03*** 1.481* 0.645 1.149 0.902 1.185

-​.130 (.101) .213 (.340) .001 (.381)

0.878 1.238 1.001

508 -​171.338 126.94 0.000 0.543 0.3350 1250.944 (very strong support for fully specified model)

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; all significance tests are two tailed; a difference of Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC’) parameters indicates that fully specified model (one that includes all of the variables above) is more likely to have generated the data than the null model (with only demographic variables); McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 provides a close approximation of Adjusted R2 statistic found in OLS; * p>0.05; ** p>0.01; *** p>0.001

42  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century This study similarly fails to find support for political affinity and geopolitical/​security concerns hypotheses. In bivariate regression, both reasons for support show positive coefficients and high levels of statistical significance, but in a fully specified model, the effects of these variables wash out. However, we find strong support for the cultural affinity hypothesis. Perceptions of kinship, on the basis of common cultural and religious values, play a major role in generating high support for Israel. The variable is statistically significant: for one unit increase in favor of stronger support for the cultural affinity statement, the odds of a respondent expressing strong support for Israel increase 1.414 times, with other variables held constant. We fail to find support for the argument that evangelicals are pro-​Israel due to latent feelings of guilt or responsibility for the Christian persecution of Jews in the past. The data show that this is not a significant predictor of Israel’s support. While the coefficient is in the hypothesized direction, it fails to reach acceptable levels of statistical significance (although in a bivariate regression, the coefficient is positive and highly significant, as originally hypothesized). The analysis reveals that the frequency of church attendance (religiosity), ideology (specifically, preference for a conservative point of view), and opinion of Jews and Muslims are all significant predictors of support for Israel among evangelical and born-​again Christians. More frequent attendance of church and religious assemblies increases the odds of strong support for Israel by 1.215 times. Similarly, respondents who select “slightly conservative,” “conservative,” or “extremely conservative” responses to the ideology question are 1.312 times more likely to express high levels of support for Israel than the more liberal or centrist evangelicals. Socialization is a particularly important variable in explaining evangelical support. The odds ratio of 1.56 shows that being around other evangelicals who talk about Israel and its importance to the evangelical community is one of the most significant predictors of support for Israel, second only to the influence of positive opinion of Jews. Put simply, more frequent exposure to positive messages about Israel generates high levels of support, even after taking into account the influence of other variables. Together, frequent church attendance and socializing with other pro-​Israel evangelicals increase the odds of high levels of support almost threefold (2.775 times). However, it is worth noting that these positive effects are less pronounced for the 18–​29-​year-​old evangelicals. As discussed earlier in the chapter, and as the statistical analysis shows, age is one of the three most robust predictors

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  43 of support for Israel. In particular, we find that young evangelicals are less likely to express strong support than their parents and grandparents—​one unit increase in age (i.e., moving from the 18–​29-​year-​old category to the 30–​49 cohort, or from the latter to the 50–​64 age group, and so on) also increases support for Israel 1.481 times. We also wanted to know if the effect of age was isolated to a particular age group only. To consider this possibility, we tested the impact of age on support for Israel for each age category. In a fully specified model, only the 18–​29-​year-​old age category carries statistical significance (negative effect on support for Israel).59 Thus, even though the survey shows that absenteeism or infrequent church attendance is lower among the younger cohorts than in the older age groups, the positive effects of religiosity and socialization on support are less consequential for this age group. Perhaps, the explanation for this lies in the fact that younger respondents, as Table 1.2 shows, are more likely to profess “middle-​of-​the-​road” or centrist political positions than older respondents. Among 18–​ 29-​ year olds, moderates/​ centrists comprise the largest proportion (30.36%) of respondents, with another 29% expressing a preference for liberal positions. The older generations, by contrast, are more likely to adopt a more conservative platform, with more than 59% of the respondents picking a “slightly conservative” or a more conservative position—​only 14.6% of 30-​year-​old and older respondents identified with the liberal ideology. Our findings are consistent with Mayer (2004), who found that the older, white, Republican respondents were most sympathetic toward Israel. Another potential answer lies in the different conceptions of “justice” among younger and older evangelicals, particularly in regard to the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute. For example, Gary Burge, a professor at the Calvin Theological Seminary and former professor at Wheaton College (an evangelical university), said that “the younger generation is less likely to quote Bible passages about Jerusalem, and more concerned with ethics and treatment of the downtrodden.”60 Similarly, Darrell Bock, a professor at the Dallas Theological Seminary, argues that millennials find Israeli treatment of Palestinians inhumane and counter to their conceptions of fairness and justice.61 These results are consistent with Burge and Bock’s impressions, and Chapters 4 and 5 of this book will discuss this specific age group in more detail. The statistical analysis also confirms that respondents’ opinion of Muslims and Jews impact their support for Israel. As we hypothesized, a negative

44  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century opinion of Muslims increases support for Israel, while a favorable view of Muslims reduces support for Israel by 0.723 times. Also, a favorable view of Jews has a highly statistically significant and positive impact on support for Israel. In fact, opinion of Jews is the most significant predictor of support for Israel in our analysis, increasing the odds of registering high support by 3.03 times. While this is, in some ways, an obvious conclusion, there is an important message here. While church activities, interaction with other pro-​Israel evangelicals, belief in a common Judeo-​Christian culture, and theology all play their expected role in explaining evangelical support, our analysis shows that nurturing a positive opinion of Jews, irrespective of theology or other potential explanations, may be the best way for evangelical leaders to promote support for Israel among their congregations. Finally, it is important to note that except for the effects of age, no other demographic variable rose to the level of statistical significance. Our analysis shows that neither education, race and ethnicity, income, marital status, region, or area of residence impact evangelicals’ levels of support. We initially expected that race and ethnicity might play a role, hypothesizing that the African American support for Israel would be low. As Faydra Shapiro argues, “The voting patterns, emphases and styles of white and black evangelicals tend to be distinctive. African American evangelicals are less consumed by issues like abortion, LGBT issues and the war on drugs than are their white counterparts, and more focused on issues of racial justice and poverty.”62 The last issue—​racial justice and poverty—​may certainly have an impact on black evangelical support for Israel and their perceptions of Muslims and Jews. While we did not discover the statistically significant impact of race on evangelicals’ support in this analysis, a more detailed examination of black evangelical views on the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute and their levels of support for Israel is merited.

Notes on Evangelical Ideology: Eschatology and Biblical Literalism In the survey, the most significant ideological statements that came up in the multivariate model were that the respondents support Israel because it fulfills the prophecy regarding the Second Coming of Jesus Christ and because Jews are God’s chosen people. Thus, eschatology and biblical literalism are important factors among evangelicals. In this section, we would

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  45 like to expand upon these two ideological aspects based on the survey results. As we know, evangelical Christianity is highly influenced by the eschatological vision of premillennial dispensationalism. Thus, we asked the respondents about their attitude toward the following statements: •​ The State of Israel is a proof of the fulfillment of prophecy regarding the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming. •​ I support Israel because I believe it will lead to the Second Coming of Jesus. As the responses indicate, there is overwhelming support for the notion that the State of Israel is connected to the idea of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ (83.94%). These data strengthen the literature that emphasizes eschatology as a significant motivation of evangelicals when it comes to Israel. However, the survey responses showed more caution (67.4% support) in the following statement, which emphasizes a more direct connection between the support toward Israel and the Second Coming. In the second statement, “I support Israel because it will lead to the Second Coming of Jesus,” we saw more respondents who rejected the link between the two or a higher level of uncertainty. Since premillennial dispensation eschatology expects that Jews would build a Temple for God before the events of the Second Coming, and eventually, many Jews would convert to Christianity, we also asked respondents to respond to these statements. The results in Table 1.7 show that evangelicals are almost evenly divided over these statements. Since we identified the building of the Temple as an event that needs to take place in the near future, only about half of the respondents expressed support for this statement. The uncertainty of the respondents regarding the question of the conversion of Jews at the Second Coming, with only about half expressing positive support, is also important to note. The biblical narrative relates to a covenant made between God and Abraham, thus offering him and his offspring eternal blessings and turning them into chosen people. Since certain Christian readings argue that Jews lost their election by rejecting Jesus as their Messiah, we asked in the survey: “Do you believe God’s covenant with the Jewish people is eternal?” The results show strong support. 72.8% indicated that “yes, the covenant remains,” 5.6% said that “no, the covenant has ended,” 2.7% said that “God never had a

46  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Table 1.7.  Comparing eschatological visions of premillennial dispensationalism The State of Israel is a proof of the fulfillment of prophecy regarding the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming. Strongly disagree Disagree Somewhat disagree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree

I support Israel because I believe it will lead to the Second Coming of Jesus.

Israel needs to build a temple for God on the Temple Mount in the near future.

Jews will convert to Christianity at Jesus’ Second Coming.

0.32%

1.58%

2.63%

4.08%

1.59% 1.27%

3.79% 3.32%

4.61% 2.96%

5.09% 5.43%

12.88%

22.27%

32.89%

31.07%

10.81%

12.16%

11.68%

13.07%

25.44% 47.69%

21.80% 35.07%

16.28% 28.95%

15.11% 26.15%

covenant with the Jews,” and 18.9% responded with “don’t know.” Similarly, the statement: “I support Israel because Jews are God’s chosen people” generated high levels of agreement, with 84% responding in favor (taking into account “somewhat agree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree” responses). We can thus conclude that the majority of evangelicals do, indeed, reject supersession theology (more on this in Chapter 3). We asked another question regarding evangelicals’ literal reading of the Bible, which taps into more recent political debates—​“Do you believe the Bible says that Jerusalem is Israel’s capital?” Here again, a large majority of respondents (62%) agreed with the statement, 5.1% indicated that the “Bible does not say that Jerusalem is Israel’s capital,” another 6.8% said that “Bible is not relevant in political matters,” while 26% said they do not know. We tested several statements related to God’s promises to the Jewish people and the Gentiles. In the responses to all statements (reported in Table 1.8), we saw a high level of agreement. Since most evangelicals see the Bible as the literal word of God, they express high levels of support for several statements that, although biblical,

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  47 Table 1.8.  Responses concerning God’s promises to the Jews and the Gentiles

Strongly disagree Disagree Somewhat disagree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree

God gave the Land of Israel to the Jewish people.

I support Israel because God promised blessings to the nations who stand by Abraham and his offspring (in Gen. 12:3).

0.63% 0.47% 0.63% 7.69% 13.66% 22.14% 54.79%

0.63% 0.95% 1.89% 8.82% 11.34% 25.35% 51.02%

have contemporary ramifications. Among them are that Jews are God’s chosen people (84%), and that God made promises to Jews, such as giving the Land of Israel to the Jewish people (90.6%) and making Jerusalem Israel’s capital (62%). According to literal reading, God also promised Gentiles to bless them if they would stand by Abraham and his offspring (87.7%). The combination of “cold” eschatology and biblical literalism, in addition to the ones mentioned earlier, have thus significantly contributed to shaping a favorable view of Jews and high support to the State of Israel by evangelical and born-​again Christians.

Conclusion The results of our statistical analysis show that the three strongest predictors of evangelical and born-​again Christian support for Israel are (1) age (older respondents are more supportive); (2) opinion of Jews (rather than the belief that Jews are God’s chosen people; although both are significant predictors); and (3) socialization (frequency of hearing other evangelicals talking about Israel). The following chapter continues to explore the 2018 data on evangelicals’ attitudes toward the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. It considers respondents’ perceptions of the U.S. role in the dispute, the degree to which the respondents trust the Palestinians and Israelis to negotiate in good faith and to dependably implement any reached agreements, and how one’s expression

48  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century of support for Israel or Palestinians translates into various types of self-​ reported political action.

Appendix. Variable Descriptions and Coding Procedures • Support for Israel (dependent variable): Where do you put your support? Coded 1 for “Very strong support for Palestinians”; 2 for “Support Palestinians”; 3 for “Lean toward support for Palestinians”; 4 for “Support Neither”; 5 for “Lean toward support for Israel”; 6 for “Support Israel”; 7 for “Very Strong Support for Israel.” Coded 8 for “I do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Support Palestinians”; 2 for “Lean Toward Support for Palestinians”; 3 for “Support Neither”; 4 for “Lean Toward Support for Israel”; 5 for “Support Israel.” • Israel’s existence is proof of the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming: The State of Israel is a proof of the fulfillment of prophecy regarding the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming. Coded 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Neither agree nor disagree”; 5 for “Somewhat agree”; 6 for “Agree”; 7 for “Strongly agree.” Coded 8 for “Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Jews are God’s chosen people: I support Israel because Jews are God’s chosen people. Coded 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Neither agree nor disagree”; 5 for “Somewhat agree”; 6 for “Agree”; 7 for “Strongly agree.” Coded 8 for “Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Israel needs to build a temple for God on the Temple Mount in the near future: Israel needs to build a temple for God on the Temple Mount in the near future. Coded 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Neither agree nor disagree”; 5 for “Somewhat agree”; 6 for “Agree”; 7 for “Strongly agree.” Coded 8 for “Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Cultural affinity: I support Israel because of our shared cultural and/​ or religious values. Coded 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Neither agree nor disagree”; 5 for

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  49 “Somewhat agree”; 6 for “Agree”; 7 for “Strongly agree.” Coded 8 for “Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Political affinity: I support Israel because of our shared political or democratic values. Coded 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Neither agree nor disagree”; 5 for “Somewhat agree”; 6 for “Agree”; 7 for “Strongly agree.” Coded 8 for “Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Common geopolitical/​security concerns: I support Israel because it protects the holy sites and is the only guarantor of Christian access to them. Coded 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Neither agree nor disagree”; 5 for “Somewhat agree”; 6 for “Agree”; 7 for “Strongly agree.” Coded 8 for “Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Guilt for previous discrimination of Jews: I support Israel because Jews suffered discrimination and extermination at the hands of Christian nations in the past. Coded 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Neither agree nor disagree”; 5 for “Somewhat agree”; 6 for “Agree”; 7 for “Strongly agree.” Coded 8 for “Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Evangelicals talk about Israel’s importance: Estimate how often you hear evangelicals expressing the importance of supporting Israel? Coded 1 for “Never”; 2 for “Seldom”; 3 for “Once a month”; 4 for “Every week.” • Religiosity (church attendance): How frequently do you attend church or religious assemblies? Coded 1 for “Never”; 2 for “Seldom”; 3 for “A few times a year”; 4 for “Once a month”; 5 for “Two or three times a month”; 6 for “At least once a week.” • Ideology: What best describes your political views? Coded 1 for “Extremely liberal”; 2 for “Liberal”; 3 for “Slightly liberal”; 4 for “Moderate, middle of the road”; 5 for “Slightly conservative”; 6 for “Conservative”; 7 for “Extremely conservative.” Coded 8 for “Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Opinion of Muslims: What is your opinion of Muslims? Coded 1 for “Very poor”; 2 for “Poor”; 3 for “Neutral”; 4 for “Good”; 5 for “Very good.” Coded 6 for “No opinion/​Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Opinion of Jews: What is your opinion of Jews as a nation/​people? Coded 1 for “Very poor”; 2 for “Poor”; 3 for “Neutral”; 4 for “Good”;

50  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century 5 for “Very good.” Coded 6 for “No opinion/​Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Age: What is your age? Coded 1 for “18–​29 years old”; 2 for “30–​49 years old”; 3 for “50–​64 years old”; 4 for “65 years and older.” • Gender (biological sex): What is your biological sex at birth? Coded zero for “Male”; 1 for “Female.” • Income: What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months? Coded 1 for “Less than $25,000”; 2 for “$25,000 to $34,999”; 3 for “$35,000 to $49,999”; 4 for “$50,000 to $74,999”; 5 for “$75,000 to $99,999”; 6 for “$100,000 to $149,999”; 7 for “$150,000 or more.” Coded 8 for “Rather not say” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Educational attainment: What is the highest level of education you have completed? Coded 1 for “some high school”; 2 for “high school graduate”; 3 for “some college”; 4 for “trade/​technical/​vocational/​two-​year degree”; 5 for “four-​year college/​university degree”; 6 for “post-​graduate degree.” • Race/​ethnicity: What is your race/​ethnicity? Coded 1 for “American Indian or Alaskan Native”; 2 for “Asian”; 3 for “Black or African American”; 4 for “Hispanic or Latino”; 5 for “Multiracial”; 6 for “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander”; 7 for “Other”; 8 for “White, non-​Hispanic.” Additionally, dummy variables for each of the value categories were created, where 1 represented a particular race/​ethnicity and zero otherwise. • Marital status: What is your current marital status? Coded 1 for Single/​ Never married; 2 for “Separated”; 3 for “Divorced”; 4 for “Widowed”; 5 for “Married.” Coded 6 for “Rather not say” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Region of residence: Which U.S. region are you from? Coded 1 for “Midwest –​IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI”; 2 for “Northeast –​CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT”; 3 for “Southeast –​AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV”; 4 for “Southwest –​AZ, NM, OK, TX”; 5 for “West –​AK, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY.” Respondents were presented the name of the region and the abbreviations for the specific states to aid in their selection. We also generated five dichotomous variables (one for each region), where 1 reflects a particular region and the rest of the regions are coded as zero.

Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?  51 • Area of residence (rural, suburban, urban): Which of the following best describes the area you live in? Coded 1 for “Urban”; 2 for “Suburban”; 3 for “Rural.” We also generated three dichotomous variables (one for each area of residence), where 1 reflects a particular area of residence and the rest are coded as zero. • Bible readership: How often do you read the Bible? Coded 1 for “Never”; 2 for “Seldom”; 3 for “Once or twice a month”; 4 for “Only in church”; 5 for “Once a week”; 6 for “At least twice a week”; 7 for “Every day.”

Chapter 2 American Evangelicals and the Arab–​Israeli Dispute In June 1967, during the Six-​Day War, Israel conquered vast territories from Egypt (the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip), Jordan (the West Bank including East Jerusalem), and Syria (the Golan Heights). The United Nations adopted Resolution 242 after the war.1 Since then, the international community, especially the Western leaders, tend to see the resolution of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors under the formula of “Land for Peace,” according to which Israel would relinquish its holding of the occupied territories it took during the war for peace, while establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (the “Two-​State Solution”). Indeed, in 1979, Israel signed a peace accord with Egypt and returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control, and in 1993 Israel signed the Oslo Accords with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which allowed the creation of the Palestinian Authority in sections of the West Bank and Gaza. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from all its settlements in the Gaza Strip and four settlements in Samaria under the Disengagement Plan, giving the Palestinians full control over the Gaza Strip. In 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. Israel would eventually push back the attacking armies. Immediately following the war, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger undertook intensive diplomatic activity to secure a ceasefire between the sides that would invariably include Israeli territorial concessions. Against the backdrop of the trauma of the war and the expectation of imminent territorial retreat, the Gush Emunim (“Block of the Faithful”) movement was founded in February 1974. Led by young religious Zionist activists, Gush Emunim sought to prevent territorial concessions and to push for the application of Israeli sovereignty to Judea, Samaria, the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip. It attempted to bring its objectives to fruition by settling Jewish communities in the occupied territories.2 As a result of its activities, the number of Israeli citizens living in the settlements has risen steadily. At first, in 1974, the Labor government headed Christian Zionism in the Twenty-​First Century. Motti Inbari and Kirill Bumin, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2024. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197649305.003.0003

U.S. Evangelicals and the Arab-Israeli Dispute  53 by Itzhak Rabin was not officially supportive of the settlements. However, some influential cabinet members of that government had their own vision of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (e.g., the Alon Plan).3 After the 1977 elections and the rise of the Likud to power headed by Menachem Begin, settlers suddenly enjoyed enthusiastic support from the government, and the pace of construction of new settlements increased. As of 2015, the settlements’ population was estimated at 400,000.4 Some 40% of the Judea and Samaria territory was included in the settlements’ municipal areas of jurisdiction.5 The international community never agreed to the legality of settlements in the Occupied Territories,6 and Israel has not formally annexed the West Bank to its jurisdiction (except for East Jerusalem). Israeli public opinion is torn over how to treat these territories occupied in 1967 and their inhabitants, the Palestinian people. When it comes to the Arab–​Israeli conflict, Israeli public opinion is usually divided between two poles: the “doves” and the “hawks.” Doves tend to be open for the Land for Peace formula and the Two-​State solution, as long as some security measures are taken to protect Israel from terrorism and invasions of Arab militaries. Hawks express more reservations about the Land for Peace formula while using two main arguments—​security and entitlement. The security argument asserts that relinquishing Israeli control from the Occupied Territories endangers Israel because the Palestinians cannot be trusted to implement the accords faithfully.7 The entitlement arguments say that God promised the Land of Israel to the Jewish people in the Bible; thus, compromise over these lands is inappropriate from a religious point of view.8 Although the Jewish settlements are illegal from the standpoint of international law, the hawks tend to support them and may justify their support under security or entitlement arguments, or both.

Christian Zionism Evangelical Christianity is known for its ardent support for Israel. Evangelical support and interest began before the formation of the State of Israel, but it has grown much stronger since the declaration of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, as discussed in the Introduction. Evangelical Christianity in America is highly influenced by the teachings of John Nelson Darby, who envisioned a timeline in which the modern times represent the last stage before the coming of the End of Days.9 With

54  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century the creation of the State of Israel, especially after the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and the Temple Mount during the 1967 War, the eschatological visions of the imminent Second Coming became more central in evangelical theology.10 Evangelical Christianity is also highly influenced by the concept of biblical literalism. According to the National Association of Evangelicals, the largest representative body of evangelical churches, there are four primary characteristics of evangelicalism: a belief that lives need to be transformed through a “born-​again” experience and a lifelong process of following Jesus; an expression and demonstration of the gospel in missionary and social reform efforts; a high regard for and obedience to the Bible as the ultimate authority; and an emphasis on the sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross as making possible the redemption of humanity.11 According to the Bible, the Jewish people are God’s chosen people, and God made promises to Jews and Gentiles as part of the Covenant. God promised the Jewish people ownership of the land called The Land of Israel (Gen. 12:1–​9). It is important to note that significant sections of that land are now located in the Occupied Territories, places like Shechem/​Nablus, Jericho, and Hebron, where many of the events of the biblical plot take place. The Bible refers to Jerusalem as the capital of the ancient Jewish nation, and in its heart was the Temple for God as a center of worship. The Temple represents the location of the three annual pilgrimage sites (Exod. 23:14, Deut. 16:16). Genesis 12:3 mentions that God would offer a blessing to the nations who would support Abraham’s offspring: “I will bless those who bless you, and whoever curses you I will curse; and all peoples on earth will be blessed through you.” While viewing Jews as God’s chosen people, many evangelical Christians tend to reject “supersessionism” that assumes that the blessings for the Jews have expired and transferred to the Christian church.

Evangelicals and the Arab–​Israeli Conflict About 25% of the American population define themselves as evangelicals and born-​again Christians, and the above assumptions notwithstanding, evangelical Christianity is not a monolithic movement. Scholar John Green identifies three movements within it: traditionalist, centrist, and modernist.12

U.S. Evangelicals and the Arab-Israeli Dispute  55 Not all evangelicals are conservative; not all of them support Israel over the Palestinians (as we demonstrated in the previous chapter). Traditionalists, for example, are the most ardent evangelical supporters of Israel over the Palestinians. Although many evangelicals are pro-​Israel, a minority are either neutral or pro-​Palestinian. The most famous spokesperson of this minority is ex-​president Jimmy Carter (2006), who labeled Israel an “Apartheid State” in one of his books.13 The progressive evangelist Stephen Sizer called Christian Zionism the most powerful and destructive force in America.14 Because evangelical Christianity in America is influenced by eschatological visions that view Israeli success and Israeli territorial expansion in 1967 as clear signs of an imminent Second Coming, it is not surprising that evangelicals tend to support Israel. Since evangelicals follow the concept of biblical literalism and view the Jews as God’s chosen people, their support for the Israeli occupation of the West Bank is predictable. When it comes to the details of the Arab–​Israeli conflict, it is generally assumed by journalists and scholars that evangelicals would adopt hawkish, pro-​Israeli opinions on several topics. 1. Territories: Since evangelicals follow the literal reading of the Bible, we can assume that they will agree to the concept of Greater Israel, according to which the territories conquered in the 1967 War should be under the control of the State of Israel, since these territories, especially Judea and Samaria, belong to the borders of the ancient Davidian kingdom. Since the Bible clearly states that these territories are parts of the Promised Land and part of the covenant between Abraham and God, it can be assumed that evangelicals would oppose the idea of “Land for Peace.” Thus, for example, Pastor John Hagee said in a sermon on February 18, 2018: God makes a covenant with Abraham to give his descendants the land of Israel forever. In Genesis 17:7–​8, God speaking, to Abraham, ‘And I will establish my covenant between Me and you and your descendants after you in this generation for an everlasting covenant. . . .’ Israel must never be separated from its biblical roots. The Covenant for Abraham and his descendants to own the Land of Israel forever is in the Bible 22 times. . . . The God we serve does not break the covenant and He made a covenant with the Jewish people for that land, the Bible says.15

56  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century High profile figures like Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and John Hagee expressed opinions in support of Greater Israel.16 However, in his research, scholar Steven Spector Evangelicals and Israel, quotes some traditionalist evangelicals like Richard Land, the former political representative of the Southern Baptist Convention, in favor of giving land for genuine peace.17 Jerry Falwell’s opinion did not differ much: “If Israel desires to give part of the land to her neighbors, that is her business . . . It is a democratic society and the final decision will be a result of the democratic process within Israel.”18 This ambivalence toward political compromise would be discussed further in the data. 2. Settlements: Following the logic of the previous argument in favor of Greater Israel, it can be assumed that evangelicals support Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. The settlement enterprise was established to create facts on the ground in these territories and make it harder to fully implement the ideas of Land for Peace and a Two-​State solution, living peacefully one next to the other.19 For those who agree with the belief that Jews are entitled to these territories based on biblical promise, we can assume that they would support the Israeli right to establish and grow the settlements inside Palestinian territories. For example, Tommy Waller, a Christian evangelical and founder of HaYovel, an organization that brings volunteers to work in West Bank settlements, writes, “Judea and Samaria are the historical and spiritual heartland of Israel, and the heart of where we work. The majority of the Biblical history unfolded in this area! Here, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob each received the promise that this land would belong to their descendants FOREVER.”20 Pastor Mike Huckabee, a well-​ known evangelical leader, and former Arkansas Governor, said in 2017: “The Muslim world is far larger and there is no justification for Israel to withdraw from the territories. To divide Jerusalem is like asking King Solomon to divide the baby in half.”21 3. Temple Mount: The control of the Temple Mount has been one of the most challenging issues to resolve in the Arab–​Israeli conflict. Commentators argue that the Taba talks of January 2001 between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak failed over the intractable disagreement about how to control this site.22 The Temple Mount is the holiest site in Judaism and the third holiest in Islam, after Mecca and Medina. Currently, it serves as

U.S. Evangelicals and the Arab-Israeli Dispute  57 a Muslim worship site, the house of the Noble Sanctuary (Haram al-​ Sharif). In Jewish memory, however, this is the site of the Holy Temple, and in Jewish eschatology, the Temple would be rebuilt on that site at the End of Days. Currently, the Haram al-​Sharif is governed by the Muslim Wakf (trust), but Israel is in charge of security. So far, during the Israeli–​Palestinian peace talks, any suggestions of future shared governance of the site, or international oversight, have been rejected by the parties to the dispute. This location is uniquely important to Christian evangelicals. According to their premillennial eschatology, Jews would need to build the Third Temple on the Temple Mount prior to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. Before Israel took control of this site in 1967, this vision was a speculation for the future. Now that this site is in Jewish hands, theoretically, Israel can build a Temple on the site, moving forward the eschatological vision of the Second Coming. Thus, for example, Hal Lindsey, in his famous The Late Great Planet Earth (1970) said: “Obstacle or no obstacle, it is certain that the Temple will be rebuilt. Prophecy demands it.”23 In another comment, in a different book, Lindsey repeated: “[T]‌he Bible also makes it clear that in the last days the Antichrist will establish his reign in the Temple of Jerusalem. Therefore, the Temple must be rebuilt.”24 Any type of Israeli compromise on governing the Temple Mount would likely meet intense evangelical opposition since, in their view, the Temple must be rebuilt and the prospects of rebuilding the Temple are much greater if the Jews retain unilateral control of Jerusalem and the Temple Mount. Relinquishing Israeli control on this site could incur serious setbacks in their eschatological visions. 4. U.S. pressure on Israel: According to the evangelical literal reading of scripture, God promised blessings to the Gentiles if they would stand by Israel. From that perspective, evangelicals’ support for Israel could mean that God would bless them in return. Alternatively, failure to support Israel would result in some form of punishment or supernatural condemnation. Thus, for example, journalist Bill Koenig, who founded a news agency that reports from the White House (Watch.org), prepared a study published in two books claiming that a statistical correlation can be seen between American pressure on Israel to make territorial compromises and natural disasters in the United States.25 We can also safely assume that evangelicals would oppose putting

58  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century any international pressure on Israel to make concessions against its will, like forcing Israel to relinquish territories, outside of a peaceful solution that would be agreed upon by both sides. For example, Mike Pence, previous Vice President of the United States, speaking at the AIPAC Policy Conference on March 5, 2018, said that “[T]‌he days of Israel-​bashing at the United Nations are over.”26 A widespread, simplistic, almost caricature-​like view of evangelicals paints them as unequivocally pro-​Israel, supportive of territorial grabs and discriminatory treatment of the Palestinians. As we show below, this perception is flawed, and our survey findings bring a much-​needed corrective to the discussion of evangelicals and their attitudes of Israel.

Evangelicals’ Attitudes toward the Arab–​Israeli Conflict To help us understand the evangelical attitudes about the Arab–​Israeli conflict, we began by asking our respondents about their general feeling toward the Jews and the Muslims. While analytically separable, these two issues—​ likability of Jews/​ Muslims and positions on Arab–​ Israeli dispute—​ are closely intertwined in practice. The data (reported in Table 2.1) show that evangelicals manifest much warmer feelings toward Jews than Muslims. Among the respondents, 65% view Jews positively, while only 25.6% of evangelicals responded with a positive opinion of Muslims. More than a quarter of the respondents expressed “very poor” or “poor” opinion of Muslims, while only 1.8% thought negatively about the Jews.

Table 2.1.  Opinions of Muslims and Jews

Don’t know Very poor Poor Neutral Good Very good

What is your opinion of Muslims?

What is your opinion of Jews?

11.8% 13.4% 14.1% 35.1% 14.2% 11.4%

8% 0.8% 1% 25.2% 33.4% 31.6%

U.S. Evangelicals and the Arab-Israeli Dispute  59 We also compiled a basic measure of evangelical and born-​again Christian support for Israel and the Palestinians. Rather than two different support measures, we chose to employ a relative measure of support for Israel (vis-​ à-​vis Palestinians). We did so, in part, because we wanted the respondents to assess the degree of their support for these actors in relation to each other rather than in the abstract (see Table 2.2 below).27 We then asked the respondents a battery of questions related to their perceptions about the Arab–​Israeli conflict and the ability and willingness of both parties to the dispute to negotiate and implement any agreement that might be reached in good faith. Specifically, we asked the respondents to respond to two sets of statements, one dealing with negotiating a settlement and another concerning its implementation: • The Palestinians (Israelis) can be trusted to negotiate in good faith with the Israelis (Palestinians). • The Palestinians (Israelis) can be trusted to faithfully implement an agreement reached with the Israelis (Palestinians). Both questions generated similar responses. The evangelicals place a substantially higher level of trust in the Israelis, rather than the Palestinians, to negotiate in good faith and faithfully implement a peace agreement. One can surmise that there is a positive correlation between support for/​opinion of the Israelis and higher levels of trust in Israel to abide by the terms of negotiation, whereas the low level of trust in the Palestinians similarly reflects lower levels of likability of Muslims among the evangelical respondents (see Table 2.3). Table 2.2.  Evangelical support for Israel versus the Palestinians Where do you put your support? Very strong support for Israel Support Israel Lean toward support of Israel Support neither Israel nor Palestinians Lean toward support of Palestinians Support Palestinians Very strong support for Palestinians Don’t know

34.3% 18.1% 12.4% 19% 1.1% 0.7% 0.6% 13.8%

60  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Table 2.3.  Evangelical attitudes on Israeli–​Palestinian negotiations and implementation of a peace agreement

Strongly agree Agree Somewhat agree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat disagree Disagree Strongly disagree

The Palestinians can be trusted to negotiate in good faith with the Israelis.

The Israelis can be trusted to negotiate in good faith with the Palestinians.

The Palestinians can be trusted to faithfully implement an agreement reached with the Israelis.

The Israelis can be trusted to faithfully implement an agreement reached with the Palestinians.

7.3% 8.0% 10.5%

19.6% 18.1% 20.6%

6.6% 8.1% 11.7%

20.4% 18.6% 19.0%

28.0%

30.4%

31.0%

31.5%

15.0%

7.4%

13.3%

6.5%

10.8% 20.4%

2.2% 1.7%

11.7% 17.7%

2.7% 1.3%

The survey also asked the respondents to express their opinion on the future of the Occupied Territories. Our null hypothesis, derived from conventional accounts of evangelical views about who should control the West Bank, is that evangelicals endorse the concept of Greater Israel and therefore support the incorporation of the disputed territories into Israel. This view is likely tied to evangelicals’ biblical literalism, which sees Jewish entitlement to the land as fulfilling God’s promise. We were also interested in assessing evangelical support for a more pragmatic solution, typically endorsed by the U.S. foreign policy establishment and the international community at large—​the “Land for Peace” formula. We thus asked our respondents to rank the following two statements on a seven-​point scale: • I would support Israel if it annexed the West Bank and incorporated it into the State of Israel. • I would support an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that would require an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank it occupied in 1967 in return for peace.

U.S. Evangelicals and the Arab-Israeli Dispute  61 It is noteworthy that close to 37% of the respondents to the annexation question did not express an opinion for or against, instead picking the “neither agree nor disagree” option. It is also important to acknowledge that only 10% disagreed with the idea of annexing the West Bank (see Table 2.4). Similarly, the “Land for Peace” statement generated a significant level of ambivalence, with 30.3% neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the statement. What is particularly notable is that despite the common stereotype that evangelicals would not accept such compromises, only 24.9% of the respondents disagreed versus 30.7% of the respondents who thought that the “Land for Peace” formula was a good idea. We also hypothesized that the evangelical community would strenuously oppose U.S. and the international community’s interference in the dispute from the theological point of view expressed in Genesis 12:1–​9, which promises heavenly blessings to Gentiles to support Abraham’s Jewish offspring. Respondents were offered two questions, one related to the U.S. role and another related to the international community: • I would support a U.S. government’s decision to put significant economic and diplomatic pressure on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank. • The international community should not intervene in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians concerning the status of the West Bank. Our results (see Table 2.4) show that the picture is more complex than the conventional wisdom about evangelicals suggests. A plurality of respondents (39%) agreed with the statement that the international community should not intervene in the negotiations, while 17.7% opposed it. However, a large segment (29.6%) chose the “neither agree nor disagree” option. Regarding the second statement, we see a similar pattern of responses, with 36.9% of the respondents opposed the idea that the United States should put significant economic and diplomatic pressure on Israel and 21.3% agree with the statement. Yet again, a large block of respondents, 28.3%, chose the “neither agree nor disagree” option. In a similar but somewhat differently-​worded question, we asked whether the United States should be a neutral peace broker between Palestinians and Israelis (see Table 2.5). Among the respondents, 44.1% said that the United States should remain Israel’s ally, while 31.2% said that the United States should become a neutral party. What is particularly notable about these

13.0%

10.1%

5.9%

14.1%

I would support Israel if it annexed the West Bank and incorporated it into the State of Israel.

I would support an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that would require an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank it occupied in 1967 in return for peace.

I would support a U.S. government’s decision to put significant economic and diplomatic pressure on Israel to withdrawal from the West Bank.

The international community should not intervene in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians concerning the status of the West Bank.

Strongly agree

11.9%

6.8%

8.8%

11.1%

Agree

13.0%

8.6%

11.8%

12.3%

29.6%

28.3%

30.3%

36.7%

Somewhat Neither agree agree nor disagree

7.1%

8.7%

5.9%

4.6%

Somewhat disagree

5.6%

9.4%

6.6%

2.6%

Disagree

5.0%

18.8%

12.4%

2.8%

Strongly disagree

13.7%

13.5%

14.1%

16.9%

Don’t know

Table 2.4.  Evangelical attitudes concerning the annexation of West Bank, “Land for Peace,” and U.S. and international community involvement

U.S. Evangelicals and the Arab-Israeli Dispute  63 Table 2.5.  United States as a neutral peace broker in the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute Do you think the United States should be a neutral peace broker between Palestinians and Israelis? No, the United States should remain Israel’s ally Yes, the United States. should become a neutral party I don’t know I have no opinion

44.1% 31.2% 13.2% 11.5%

responses, in our opinion, is not that a plurality of respondents express support for the idea that the United States should back Israel’s position in the dispute, but rather that close to a third of the respondents selected a position that is rarely, if ever, identified with the evangelical movement. While evangelicals may not have very strong positions on the role of the United States and the international community in the conflict or about the future of the West Bank, the prime tenets of evangelical eschatology lead us to believe that the members of this religious movement have a strong and uncompromising opinion on the issue of the control of the Temple Mount. It would seem that evangelicals should oppose any type of compromise on this site due to their eschatological beliefs and their expectations that the Jews would rebuild the Third Temple in the near future, as part of the End of Days events. Indeed, the expectation is that the rebuilding of the Temple is an integral and irreplaceable part of the path to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. To test this hypothesis, we asked the following statement, to which we expected to see a strong, negative response: I would support a compromise between Israel and the Palestinians that would include Israeli withdrawal from governing the Temple Mount. As Table 2.6 shows, 30.7% of the respondents indicated that they would not support such a compromise, while 24.3% of respondents expressed support for Israeli withdrawal from the Temple Mount. Again, a large proportion of the respondents (29.6%), almost as large as the proportion who disagreed, chose the “neither agree nor disagree” option. Considering the inherent

64  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Table 2.6.  Evangelical attitudes on Israeli withdrawal from the Temple Mount I would support a compromise between Israel and the Palestinians that would include Israeli withdrawal from governing the Temple Mount. Strongly agree Agree Somewhat agree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat disagree Disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know

7.7% 7.2% 9.4% 29.6% 7.0% 9.7% 14.0% 15.4%

importance of Israeli control of the Temple Mount to evangelical eschatology, these results are quite surprising—​we should have observed a strong, supermajority disagreement with this statement; instead, we see less than a third of evangelicals connect the importance of Israeli control of the Temple Mount to one of the prime tenets of their faith, the Second Coming of Jesus Christ, which cannot happen until the Temple is rebuilt. Overall, our survey results do, indeed, reflect the common belief that the evangelicals are ardent supporters of Israel and that they lean in favor of Israel, not compromising with the Palestinians, or budging to the pressure of the international community. A sizeable proportion of evangelicals (36.4%) tend to support the idea that Israel should annex the West Bank, rather than withdrawing from the Occupied Territories. Similarly, slightly larger than a third of our respondents stated that they prefer no international meddling in negotiations between Israel and Palestine and are against the idea that the United States should put significant pressure on Israel. A larger proportion of respondents also prefer Israeli control over the Temple Mount, rather than Israeli withdrawal from the site. However, our data also clearly show that the evangelical support for these ideas is not as strong or as monolithic as common perception seems to suggest. Evangelicals’ grassroots opinion is far more nuanced and less uniform than expected. Assuming that all or most of the evangelicals are hard “hawks,” as they are oftentimes portrayed in the popular press, is—​without a doubt—​a gross misconception.

U.S. Evangelicals and the Arab-Israeli Dispute  65 Which, if any, of the following are reasons for having little or no support for Israel? (Number of respondents who selected each option) Respondents who indicated any degree of support for Palestinians 8

8

8

Israel’s military occupation of Palestinians

Jews are privileged whites who oppress the Palestinians

I oppose Israel and its policies because of what I learned in my church

7 5

Israel’s policy toward Palestinians

Israel’s settlements built in the Palestinian territories

Figure 2.1.  Reasons for not supporting Israel

In our survey, only 24 respondents (2.4%) mentioned that they support the Palestinians over Israel (see Table 2.2). These respondents were then asked a follow-​up question to reflect on the reasons why they chose to support the Palestinians. As Figure 2.1 shows, three responses generate the most support28—​“Jews are privileged whites who oppress the Palestinians,” “[I oppose Israel because of] Israel’s military occupation of the Palestinians,” and “I oppose Israel and its policies because of what I learned in church.” The numbers are so low that it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about these choices, but the responses raise additional questions that we hope to “unpack” in future research. A large proportion of our sample (32–​44%, depending on the question) chose “neither agree nor disagree” responses. Some potential explanations for this phenomenon might be ambivalence/​ disinterest in the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute, a passive position that God would sort things out without purposive human intervention, or something else entirely. It might also be a sign that there is a large gap between the opinions of the evangelical leadership, which expresses a strong pro-​Israeli view, and the opinion of the ordinary churchgoers.

66  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Our survey data reveals that there are some differences between the group of respondents who selected these “neither agree nor disagree” responses and the overall sample. These respondents are: • slightly wealthier (approximately $61,998 mean household income) than the full sample (approximately $59,500 mean household income), • slightly more diverse than the full sample (whites comprise 61.7% and African Americans comprise 26.2% of respondents versus the full sample, which is 65% white and 19.4% is African American), • more likely to express a neutral opinion of Muslims (46.5%) than the respondents in the full sample (35.1%), and less likely to express dislike for Muslims (21.8%) than the full sample (27.5%), • less supportive of the Jews, with 53.5% expressing support for the Jews and 39.3% of respondents expressing a neutral opinion of Jews versus 65% in support of Jews and 25.2% of neutral respondents in a full sample, • less conservative (36.3% moderate; 20.5% liberal) relative to the full sample (27% moderate; 17.1% liberal), and • somewhat less religious (43.9% attend at least once a week; 21.8% never attend or attend seldom) versus the full sample (51.6% attend at least once a week; 17.1% never attend or attend seldom).29 These differences, especially—​racial/​ethnic diversity, opinion of Muslims and Jews, political ideology, and religiosity—​may potentially explain why a fairly large proportion of the evangelical respondents in our sample have elected to respond with “neither agree nor disagree” answers to the questions concerning the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. For example, in the previous chapter, we found a statistically significant relationship between political ideology and support for Israel (more moderate/​liberal respondents manifest lower levels of support for Israel than their more conservative counterparts). Similarly, we found that less frequent churchgoers are more critical of Israel than respondents with higher levels of religiosity and that lower levels of likability of the Jews are highly correlated with lower levels of support for Israel. In a related question, we asked respondents who indicated that they support neither Israel nor Palestinians to explain why they adopted a neutral stance. Altogether, 206 respondents (20.6% of the sample) selected this option. As Figure 2.2 indicates, the largest number of respondents (75, or 36.4%) chose the option “I do not know enough about the dispute to pick a

U.S. Evangelicals and the Arab-Israeli Dispute  67 Which, if any, of the following are reasons for supporting neither Israel nor Palestinians? (# of respondents who selected each option) 75

54

I do not know enough about the dispute

I do not want to pick a side

50

Both of them deserve support

13

14

Neither of them deserves support

None of these

Figure 2.2.  Reasons for supporting neither Israel nor Palestinians

side.” A large proportion (54 out of 206, or 26.2%) of these respondents said that they did not want to pick a side to support, while another 50 respondents (24.3%) believe that both sides deserve support. Finally, 6.3% (13) indicated that “neither of them deserves support” and another 6.8% (14) said that none of the previously mentioned reasons explains their choice. While responses to this question do not equate to the “neither agree nor disagree” responses we discussed above, they do show that many respondents who chose an opaque response to questions about Israeli–​Palestinian negotiations, Israeli withdrawal from the Temple Mount, the involvement of the United States or the international community in the conflict, and so on, are doing so for reasons that go beyond ambivalence or ignorance. The results we report above leave us with an impression that something else might be driving these “neither agree nor disagree” responses. Since our survey already captures the possibility of ignorance/​lack of concrete knowledge about the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute, one plausible explanation for these responses might be found in the role these respondents ascribe to human agency in the fulfillment of biblical prophecies. It is possible that the respondents selected the “neither agree nor disagree” response (rather than outright support for the Palestinian side) due to their belief that they are not

68  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century in the position to affect God’s plan for the End of Days. If that is the case, they might see themselves as passive bystanders, whose support for Israel (or lack thereof), their views of the trustworthiness of Palestinians and the Israelis in negotiations, or any other facet of potential involvement in the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute is irrelevant to the unfolding of the End of Days events, such as the rebuilding of the Temple or the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. If that is the case, “neither agree nor disagree” responses might reflect less of an ambivalence/​disinterest than a tacit acknowledgment that, as ordinary believers, they have little need to take a position on such complex issues—​if God wills it, it will happen.30 Our survey data does not provide us with an opportunity to test this hypothesis fully, but it is clear to us that it is necessary to examine further the possibility that at least some of the respondents selected the “neither agree nor disagree” set of responses because of their belief that they are passive observers of the unfolding of the End of Days prophecy, in which case, their active support for Israel, for rebuilding the Temple, and so on is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring this prophecy to fruition.

Comparing Opinions and Actions Our interest in evangelical support for Israel goes beyond attitudes. We were particularly interested in seeing if one’s expression of support for Israel or Palestinians translated into various types of political action. To gauge evangelical action tendencies, we asked a set of follow-​up questions, using skip logic on the basis of how the respondents answered the question “Where do you put your support [Israel or Palestinians]?” (see Table 2.2). Respondents who expressed any degree of support for Israel were asked to explain in what ways, if any, they have expressed their support for Israel. Figure 2.3 shows that for the pro-​Israel group, the most commonly selected responses included that they have sympathized with Israel (27.77%), that they have expressed their support to a friend (21.59%), and that they voted for representatives who pledged to support Israel (19.98%). Notably, participation in more labor-​intensive forms of action, such as contacting elected representatives or making donations to pro-​Israeli causes, is low, generating less than 10% of the responses. We see a somewhat similar pattern in Figure 2.4 with the pro-​Palestinian group, but with a noteworthy difference—​pro-​Palestinian evangelicals are

U.S. Evangelicals and the Arab-Israeli Dispute  69 In what ways, if any, have you expressed your support for Israel? (Select all that apply) (Percent of respondents who selected each option) 27.77 21.59

19.98

10.92

10.41 5.17

I have sympathized with Israel

I have expressed I have expressed my support of my support of Israel to friends Israel on social media

4.15

I have made I have contacted I voted for donations to my representatives representatives pro-Israeli in order who pledged to causes to support Israel support Israel

None of these

Figure 2.3.  Actions taken by the pro-​Israeli evangelicals In what ways, if any, have you expressed your support for Palestinians? (Select all that apply) (Percent of respondents who selected each option)

22.58 19.35 12.90

12.90 9.68

9.68 6.45 I have I have sympathized expressed with my support Palestinians of Palestinians and to friends pro-Palestinians sentiments

6.45

I have I voted for I have I have I joined an expressed representatives contacted my made organization(s) my support who pledged representative donations to that pledges to of Palestinians to support in order pro-Palestinians boycott, divest on social Palestinians to support causes from or sanction media Palestinians Israel (e.g. BDS Movement)

None of these

Figure 2.4.  Actions taken by the pro-​Palestinian evangelicals

more likely than their pro-​Israeli brethren to engage in high-​intensity political action, such as contacting elected representatives, pledging financial support, or joining pro-​Palestinian or anti-​Israeli BDS (boycott, disinvestment, sanction) organizations.31 Since this group of respondents is very small, comprising less than 3% of our sample, we advise caution in interpreting

70  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century these results, but it may be possible that the Palestinian supporters in the evangelical movement are more actively engaged—​and at a deeper level—​ than their pro-​Israeli counterparts (see Figure 2.4).

Conclusion While we find confirmatory evidence that a significant portion of the evangelicals are indeed pro-​Israel, expressing higher levels of confidence in the ability of Israelis to negotiate with the Palestinians in good faith, higher levels of trust in Israel’s ability to faithfully abide by any agreement reached with the Palestinians, support for Israeli annexation of the West Bank, and preference for non-​interference by the international community in the conflict resolution, we also discover a much more nuanced set of attitudes than the caricature of the evangelicals that is oftentimes presented in the mainstream and social media. A particularly interesting finding is that a large segment of the evangelicals supported the “neither agree nor disagree” option on multiple questions. Such responses could potentially reflect ambivalence or uncertainty about where they should stand in relation to the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. Or, this can be an indicator of theological and historical determinism, in which the evangelicals view themselves as passive bystanders, whose support for Israel, their views of the trustworthiness of Palestinians and the Israelis in negotiations, or any other facet of potential involvement in the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute is irrelevant to the unfolding of the End of Days events and biblical prophecies. Our findings clearly merit more research on the subject. The following chapter will examine evangelical eschatology and supersessionism (replacement theology) surveying 1000 evangelical pastors.

Chapter 3 Analyzing Replacement Theology Evangelical Pastors’ Views on the Role of Jews and Israel in the End of Days

Supersessionism, or replacement theology, is a Christian doctrine that asserts that a New Covenant was made with humanity through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This New Covenant supersedes (or replaces) the Old Covenant God made with the Jewish people through the Mosaic law. Thus, faith in Jesus is the only path to salvation for Jews and Gentiles alike. This view has been dominant among many Christian denominations for centuries. However, this doctrine has been vigorously debated in the Protestant evangelical community. Many of those who identify as evangelicals and born-​ again Christians disagree with the conclusion that the covenant God made with Abraham and his offspring has been abrogated. A more nuanced and complex view of supersessionism emerged among evangelical theologians, with different versions calling for varying degrees of rejection of Israel and Jews and varying justifications for replacement.1 In this chapter, we explore elite attitudes toward supersessionism in the America’s evangelical and born-​again community by utilizing an original phone survey of 1,000 evangelical pastors. This one-​of-​a-​kind survey was conducted in January–​February 2020 by Chosen People Ministries and LifeWay Research. The primary goal of the survey is to analyze pastors’ beliefs about the End of Days and assess how eschatology—​a part of theology concerned with the final events of history, the Second Coming of Jesus Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the Last Judgment—​impacts their understanding of the current times. We are deeply thankful to Dr. Mitch Glaser, President of Chosen People Ministries, for sharing the survey data and permitting us to utilize it for this analysis. As we present below, the survey results show significant cleavages among evangelical leaders over the role of Jews in Christian eschatology. It centers

Christian Zionism in the Twenty-​First Century. Motti Inbari and Kirill Bumin, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2024. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197649305.003.0004

72  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century on three eschatological traditions: premillennialism, postmillennialism, and amillennialism. In this chapter, we explore statistically significant differences between premillennial and amillenial pastors to illustrate the two contrasting perspectives through which evangelicals imagine the role of Jews and the State of Israel in their End of Days visions. The chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a discussion of the three primary streams of evangelical eschatology, followed by an introduction to the survey and some of its descriptive results. The study then turns to statistical analysis, which tests hypotheses regarding the potential motivations for supporting or opposing replacement theology. We then focus explicitly on comparing the two statistically significant eschatological positions (amillennialism and premillennialism) and analyzing the differences in their beliefs toward the role of Jews in Christian eschatology. We finish with the interpretation and discussion of the statistical results while comparing some of the findings to the study of ordinary evangelicals that we carried out in April 2018.

Christian Eschatology and Three Visions of the Millennium Eschatology is the study of the End of Days. Over the last four decades, evangelicals’ awareness of such topics as the millennium, rapture, and Armageddon has been heightened through the preaching of televangelists like Oral Roberts, Jimmy Swaggart, Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson, and the publication of widely read books such as The Late, Great Planet Earth, authored by Hal Lindsey (1970). The 1967 Arab–​Israeli War, the Israeli occupation of and Jewish settlement on Palestinian Territories, the Covid-​19 pandemic, the move of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, the U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, and other recent events are viewed by some evangelical theologians as potential “birth pains” associated with the soon return of Jesus Christ and the End of Days. While there are numerous variations in millennialist preaching today, three primary eschatological versions have been widely accepted: (1) premillennialism (dispensational and historical); (2) postmillennialism; and (3) amillennialism. Each of these eschatological visions has devout evangelical adherents today. The most commonly held view in the American

Analyzing Replacement Theology  73 evangelical community is premillennialism. The Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views, edited by Robert Clouse (1977), offers a presentation by an adherent of each of the eschatological views in favor of their respective positions. We summarize the essential elements of these eschatological presentations below.

Premillennialism George E. Ladd, a professor at the Fuller Theological Seminary, described premillennialism as a doctrine that anticipates that after His resurrection, Jesus Christ will reign for a thousand years over the earth before the Final Judgment and the creation of new heavens and new earth of the Age to Come. According to Ladd, this is the “natural reading” of Revelation 20:1–​6.2 Another important premillennial view, according to Ladd, is that many of the Old Testament prophecies predict the millennium and serve as a guide for understanding the progression of the Messiah’s millennial reign. This view is based upon the hermeneutic that the Old Testament prophecies must be interpreted literally.3 Thus, Old Testament prophecies must be interpreted in the light of the New Testament to find their deeper meaning. Ladd also states that one of the central tenets of premillennialism, based on its literal hermeneutic of the Old Testament prophecies, is that in the millennium, the Jewish Temple will be rebuilt, and the entire sacrificial system will be reinstituted, according to the prophecies of Ezekiel 40–​48. There are two variants of premillennial thought: historical and dispensational. Dispensational eschatology adheres to a literal interpretation of the Old Testament and then embeds its reading of the New Testament into that context. The historical school forms its expectations about the End of Days from the literal teaching of the New Testament. The primary distinction between historical and dispensational visions lies in the fact that the former interprets Christ’s Second Coming as a “one-​stage event after the tribulation,”4 whereas the dispensational variant describes several distinct stages, or “dispensations,” during which different events of the millennium unfold. In regard to the role of the Jewish people in Christian eschatology, Ladd, who adheres to the historical school, says that the New Testament teaches about the final salvation of Israel. According to the premillennial thought,

74  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Jews remain God’s chosen people—​a “holy” people (Rom. 11:16). Ladd says that we cannot know how the Old Testament prophecies will be fulfilled, except to say that Jews remain the people of God and that either before or after the tribulation, most Jews will convert to Christianity. Along with other believers, they will watch Him defeat and bind Satan and rule over His millennial kingdom on earth. Satan will attempt to overthrow the Messiah’s kingdom after the millennium and be defeated again and destroyed. This will be followed by the resurrection of the dead, a comprehensive judgment of believers and nonbelievers, and eternity. In Clouse’s book, a second premillennial voice is of Herman A. Hoyt, Chancellor of Grace Theological Seminary, who represents and defends the dispensational variant of premillennialism. According to Hoyt, the movement of events in our days suggests that the establishment of the kingdom of God is not far away. In agreement with Ladd, Hoyt argues that the historical content of the Bible is to be taken literally; the literal reading also needs to include doctrinal material, moral and spiritual information, and prophetic materials.5 Dispensationalists usually divide God’s dealings with humanity into seven distinct “dispensations”: Innocence (Gen. 1:28–​3:6), Conscience or Moral Responsibility (Gen. 4:1–​8:14), Human Government (Gen. 8:15–​11:32), Promise (Gen. 12:1–​Ex. 18:27), The Law (Ex. 19:3–​Acts 1:26), The Church (Acts 2:l–​Rev. 19), and the Millennial Kingdom (Rev. 20). In each of these periods, a distinct revelation of God tests mankind’s obedience to some specific revelation of the will of God.6 God has a unique role for Jews in the End of Days. God made many promises for national restoration to the Jewish people, and they should be understood literally, says Hoyt. However, the present State of Israel is not viewed as the final kingdom, though it may be a token of what lies ahead. For him, the final and permanent State of Israel would be with the coming of Jesus Christ. Hoyt explains that the coming kingdom of God will be a literal kingdom, in every sense of that word, as real as the historical kingdom of Israel. It will be centered around Jerusalem and its vicinity (Obad. 12-​21). A real king will sit on an earthly throne (Is. 33:17). Other nations would come to the Temple to seek God (Is. 52: 10). The wicked kingdoms of this world will be brought to a sudden and catastrophic end at the coming of Christ, and His kingdom will replace them (Dan. 2:31–​45). This kingdom will be a revival and continuation of the historical Davidic kingdom (Amos 9:11; see Acts 15:16–​18). A faithful and regenerated remnant of Israel—​that is,

Analyzing Replacement Theology  75 those Jews who accepted Jesus as their Lord—​will be restored and made the nucleus of this kingdom, and thus the covenant with David will be fulfilled (Mic. 4:7–​8; Jer. 33:15–​22; Ps. 89:3–​4, 34–​37). Jerusalem will become the seat of Christ’s kingdom, from which He will govern the world (Is. 2:3; 24:23). According to Hoyt, the establishment of the kingdom of God is a new dispensation that will not entail a long, drawn-​out process, but rather a sudden, catastrophic, and supernatural event, so that all mankind will know that God is interrupting the course of human history and introducing something divine into the natural order. In this vision, there is a unique role accorded to Israel. The redeemed nation of Israel, regenerated and regathered in the land, will lead all earthly nations (Deut. 28:1, 13; Is. 41:8–​16). Jerusalem will be the city for the arbitration of international disputes, and the central authority will be sovereign and inflexible (Is. 24:4; Mic. 4:3). In sum, Ladd and Hoyt argue that premillennial eschatology sees the events of the End of Days as forthcoming and near; that these events would include the fulfillment of biblical prophecies in a literal way; and that they would pave the way for the Second Coming of Jesus, who would rule for literal/​actual one thousand years before the Final Judgment. The Jewish people carry an essential role in this vision, and the worship of God would be reinstated in the rebuilt Temple. To conclude, premillennial eschatology argues that the world is not redeemed (similar to Judaism’s eschatological point of view), and in some respects, is closely connected to Zionism.

Amillennialism Professor Anthony A. Hoekema of the Calvin Theological Seminary presents the amillennial point of view in Clouse’s book. For him, the kingdom of God is now present in the world, as the victorious Christ is ruling his people by His Word and Spirit. However, amillennialists also look forward to a glorious and perfect kingdom on the new earth in the future life to come. Amillennialists interpret the millennium mentioned in Revelation 20 as describing the present reign of the souls of deceased believers with Christ in heaven.7 According to Hoekema, the New Testament does not predict a future restoration of Israel as a nation but finds the promises to Israel fulfilled in the resurrection of Jesus Christ and in the forgiveness of sins, which one can receive through Christ.

76  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Though it is true that amillennialists do not believe in a literal thousand-​year earthly reign that will follow the return of Christ, the term amillennialism is not an accurate description of their view, since amillennialists believe that the millennium of Revelation 20 is not an exclusively future event but that the millennium is in the process of realization now, in the present. Amillennialists believe that the kingdom of God was founded by Christ at the time of his sojourn on earth, exists now, and is destined to be fully revealed in the life to come. The purpose of the kingdom of God is to redeem God’s people from sin and demonic powers and, finally, to establish the new heavens and the new earth. The kingdom of God means nothing less than the reign of God in Christ over his entire newly created universe. Therefore, the most important day in history is not the Second Coming of Christ, which is still in the future, but the First Coming which lies in the past.8 Because of the victory of Christ, the ultimate issues of history have already been decided. It is now only a question of time until that victory is brought to its final consummation. Thus, the kingdom of God is both present and future.9 According to Hoekema, there is no indication in Revelation 20:1–​6 about an earthly reign of Christ over a primarily Jewish kingdom. Unlike premillennialists, Hoekema argues, amillennialists understand the thousand-​year reign of Revelation 20:4 to mean Christ’s reign in heaven with the souls of believers who have died before His Second Coming. This reign is not something to be looked for in the future; it is going on now and will continue until Christ returns. According to Hoekema, amillennialists believe that though many Old Testament prophecies should indeed be interpreted literally, many others are to be interpreted in a non-​literal way. The difference between an amillennial and a premillennial interpreter comes out when each tries to indicate which prophecies must be interpreted literally, and which prophecies are to be interpreted in a non-​literal sense. In summary, amillennialists view the fulfillment of the Kingdom of God as a present event that will reach its inflection point in the Second Coming of Christ. They do not read eschatological prophecies as literal, and, therefore, accept the idea that the Christian church replaced Jews in God’s eyes. Supporters of this eschatological view do not ascribe a unique role to the Jewish people in the End of Days, and there is no need for Jewish restoration to fulfill the Second Coming.

Analyzing Replacement Theology  77

Postmillennialism Theologian Loraine Boettner represents the postmillennial voice in Clouse’s 1977 text. The postmillennial position is imbued with optimism. The postmillennialist author explains that the Kingdom of God is now being extended through Christian teaching and preaching. This activity will cause the world to be Christianized and result in a long period of peace and prosperity called the millennium. The new age will not be essentially different from the present. An increasing proportion of the world’s inhabitants were to be converted to Christianity during that era. Evil is not eliminated but will be reduced to a minimum, as Christians’ moral and spiritual influence is heightened. The Church will assume greater importance, and many social, economic, and educational problems will be solved. This era of world improvement and increasing conversion to Christianity would close with the Second Coming of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the Final Judgment. It is worth adding that according to the postmillennial principles, the Second Coming of Christ will be followed immediately by the general resurrection, comprehensive judgment, and the introduction of heaven and hell in their fullness. Boettner asserts that the millennium to which the postmillennialist looks forward is thus a golden age of spiritual growth and prosperity during the present time. This is brought about through forces now active in the world. It lasts an indefinitely long time, perhaps much longer than a literal one thousand years. Thus, postmillennialism sees the millennium as a golden age that will not be essentially different from our own insofar as the basic facts of life are concerned. The world will remain as it is. When it comes to biblical prophecies, Boettner argues that a great deal of the Bible is given in figurative or symbolic language, which should not be taken literally. For him, premillennialists who interpret the biblical prophecies literally miss their true and more profound meaning, just like Jews of ancient times who looked for literal fulfillments with an earthly kingdom and a political ruler. The result was that the Jewish people missed the redemptive element completely. When Jesus came, they did not recognize him as a Messiah but instead rejected him and handed him over to the Romans for crucifixion. Boettner concludes that the tragic consequences of literal interpretation, as it relates to the First Coming, should put Christians on guard against making the same mistake concerning the Second Coming.

78  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century According to Boettner, God’s plan of salvation was to give humans a Redeemer, through whose life and death redemption could be realized. It was necessary that a particular group of people, the Jewish nation, be set aside to prepare the way and bring the Messiah into the world. But now that the Messiah has come and God’s revelation to humanity has been completed, written in the holy book, and made available to the people of all nations, there is no further need for a separate people or nation to serve that purpose. Since the Messiah has come and has fully performed his work of atonement, this particular role assigned to Jews has been fulfilled. Hence, there remains no reason whatsoever for reviving or reestablishing any elements of the old Jewish system. For him, the destruction of the Temple was the final sign of the end of the Mosaic system. “What a stumbling block it would be even to the church today if it were still in existence!” Boettner says.10 There is no special mission in the future for Jews, other than that they, like the Gentiles, will convert to Christianity as the Church progresses throughout the world, Boettner concluded.11 In sum, the postmillennial perspective argues for an ongoing world improvement and Christianization process that would culminate in the Second Coming and Final Judgment. The life and death of Christ ended the old Jewish covenant, and Jews no longer have a unique role in Christian eschatology. According to Boettner, the resurrection of the Jewish Temple could actually imply that Christians should disavow the replacement theology. According to David Novak, a Jewish scholar who is engaged in interfaith dialogue with Christians, the vast majority of Christians expect that Judaism will ultimately be overcome by Christianity, because all Jews will eventually become Christians. However, Novak distinguishes between soft and hard supersessionists. The soft supersessionist view acknowledges that Jews have a different destiny than Christians. Thus, Jewish exceptionalism should be respected because, as Christians believe, no one should be forced, cajoled, or seduced into the Christian version of the covenant. However, in the soft version, there is an expectation that Jews would join the covenant with Christ during or after the Second Coming. Hard supersessionism, as Novak explains, asserts that God has elected Christians to displace the Jews in the covenant between God and His people. Christianity is taken to be Judaism’s necessary and complete successor, or “fulfillment.” For hard supersessionists, the only option for Jews is conversion to Christianity and abandonment of Judaism.12

Analyzing Replacement Theology  79

Historical evolution of Christian eschatology Scholars assume that in the first three centuries of Christianity, the Church fathers were expecting Jesus’ Second Coming as an imminent event (premillennial). However, once Christianity became the religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century, the view changed to amillennial, and the millennium was reinterpreted to refer to the Church, and the thousand-​year reign of Christ and his saints was equated with the whole history of the Church on earth, thus denying a future millennium. During the Middle Ages, although amillennialism was dominant, there were some episodes of a return to premillennial views (e.g., during the rebellion in the city of Munster in 1534), fueled by “hot eschatology” and acute expectations of the Second Coming.13 The Protestant Reformation set the stage for changes in eschatological interpretation. Martin Luther (1483–​1546), for example, advocated a more literal approach to the scriptures, identified the papacy with the Antichrist, and called attention to biblical prophecies. Some later Lutheran scholars redirected this interest to focus on a premillennial interpretation. These scholars helped to inspire the desire for God’s kingdom on earth, which accompanied the outbreak of the Puritan Revolution of the 1640s.14 The origins of Christian Zionism can be traced to the Puritans of the seventeenth century and their desire to study the scriptures in their original form. Puritan scholars, notably under the guidance of the rabbis of Amsterdam, mastered Hebrew and developed a new understanding of the covenant.15 They moved from a classic replacement theology to a position where they saw a need for Jewish restoration as a nation united in their biblical homeland. As the Hebrew Bible talks of God’s covenant with the Jewish people, which makes them chosen people and grants them land, the Puritans concluded that Palestine was the rightful home of the Jewish people, and that God would eventually ensure that they returned to their homeland.16 During the seventeenth century, postmillennialism became the prevailing eschatological interpretation receiving its most impressive formulation through the work of Daniel Whitby (1638–​1726). Postmillennialism is an optimistic view of human progress, universal peace, happiness, and righteousness that will culminate in the return of Christ personally for the Last Judgment. Perhaps, because of similarity to the views espoused during the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, postmillennialism was adopted by the leading commentators and preachers of the time.17

80  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century John Nelson Darby (1800–​ 1882), one of the founders of Plymouth Brethren in Ireland in the early nineteenth century, articulated the dispensationalist understanding of premillennialism. He described the coming of Christ before the millennium as consisting of two stages: the first, a secret rapture removing the Church before the Great Tribulation devastates the earth; and the second, Jesus Christ’s coming with his saints to set up His kingdom. Darby also believed that God’s plan for humanity, as written in scripture, could be understood through a series of time periods called dispensations. The dispensational system spread throughout the English-​ speaking world, and its influence is vast in many evangelical circles today.18

The Survey To better understand support for supersessionism among evangelical church leaders, we rely on a unique dataset of phone survey responses of 1,000 pastors of evangelical and historically black churches. The phone survey was conducted from January 24 to February 11, 2020, by LifeWay Research and was sponsored by Chosen People Ministries, Alliance for the Peace of Jerusalem, Rich and Judy Hastings, and the Hendricks Center at Dallas Theological Seminary. The survey, which was designed to illuminate how American evangelical pastors view eschatology, was completed before the pandemic outbreak in the United States. The calling list was a stratified random sample, drawn from a list of all evangelical and historically black churches. Quotas were used for church size. Each phone interview was conducted with the senior pastor, minister, or priest of the respective church. Responses were weighted by region to reflect the population more accurately. The sample provides 95% confidence that the sampling error does not exceed plus or minus 3.2%.19 Variable descriptions and coding procedures for the variables used in this analysis appear in the Appendix.

Who Are the Evangelical Pastors? The survey reflects responses of pastors from four denominations: Baptist (53.51%), Pentecostal (17.74%), the Lutheran Church-​ Missouri Synod (15.27%), and the Church of Christ (13.48%). In terms of regional distribution,

Analyzing Replacement Theology  81 42% of the sample is from the South, 31% is from the Midwest, 16.1% from the West, and 10.9% from the Northeast.20 The pastors are well educated, with 47.93% holding a master’s degree, 22.5% with a bachelor’s degree, 13.62% with a doctoral degree, 11.91% with some college, 3.43% with a high school degree, and the remaining 0.61% with less than high school education. The sampled pastors are predominantly white (84.17%). Black pastors comprised 8% of the sample. Hispanic and Latino ministers comprised another 2.88%. Other ethnicities accounted for the remaining 4.93% of the sample. Evangelical pastors are almost uniformly male, comprising 93.5% of the sample. Age groups were fairly well-​ balanced in our sample: 27.25% of the pastors are 18–​44 years old, 22.34% are 44–​54 years old, 28.89% are 55–​64 years old, and 21.52% are 65 and older. The median age is 55. How do evangelical pastors compare to their congregations? Some cautious parallels can be drawn on the basis of the national survey of ordinary evangelicals that we conducted in April 2018 (as discussed in previous chapters). As a group, pastors are much more homogenous than their congregations. Our data show that pastors are: • disproportionately white (85.5% vs. 65% of ordinary evangelicals in our 2018 sample), • almost exclusively male (93.5% vs. 39% of typical evangelicals21), • slightly younger (median age of 55 vs. 57.5 for ordinary evangelicals), and • significantly more educated (43.9% hold master’s degrees and another 13% hold doctoral degrees) than typical evangelicals (only 7.2% have a post-​baccalaureate degree). The pastors’ survey asks the respondents to identify their eschatological views. 58.4% adopt a premillennial perspective,22 22% self-​identified as amillennial, and 9.4% consider themselves to be postmillennial. The remaining 102 observations reflect “none of these” (5.4% of the sample) and “not sure” (4.8%) responses. Since eschatology is a principal variable in our analysis, we do not utilize the latter responses in the remainder of this analysis, thereby leaving us with the following eschatological distribution: premillennial (65%), amillennial (24.5%), and postmillennial (10.5%). There are a few notable demographic differences between the pastors when we compare adherents of different eschatological visions. As Table 3.1

82  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Table 3.1.  Demographic comparisons between amillennial, postmillennial, and premillennial pastors

Education (% w/​ master’s or higher) Age (median) Largest age group Female Church denomination White, non-​Hispanic Black

Amillennial (24.5% of sample)

Postmillennial (10.5% of sample)

Premillennial (65% of sample)

80.8%

55.3%

55%

52 18–​44 (34.7%) 4.6% LCMS (48.5%)

51 18–​44 (36.2%) 16% Baptist (36.1%)

55 55–​64 (31.8%) 5.1% Baptist (70.2%)

86.5%

73.4%

86.2%

7.9%

20.2%

5.3%

shows, postmillennial pastors comprise the most diverse subsample of the respondents, with more female (16%) and African American (20.2%) representation than the premillennial and amillennial groups. Postmillennial pastors are also the youngest group, with over 36% of the respondents under 45. Alternatively, amillennial pastors are significantly more educated than others and most likely belong to the Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod. The premillennial group is the oldest (with 53% of respondents at or above the group’s median age of 55), with its pastors most likely to identify as Baptist.

What Are the Pastors’ Views on Supersessionism? In our previous work, we were primarily interested in understanding why ordinary evangelicals support Israel, and our 2018 survey offered a straightforward question about support for Israel. Our interest in the determinants of support for Israel among evangelicals informs our analyses here as well. However, LifeWay Research survey of evangelical pastors that we are utilizing here did not explicitly ask about support for Israel. Instead, we are utilizing a rough proxy—​attitudes toward supersessionism (also known as replacement theology) to gauge relative support for Israel. As we find in our previous analysis, theology is not the sole (or even the most important) determinant of evangelical support for Israel. However,

Analyzing Replacement Theology  83 theology, especially as it relates to the End of Days, is undoubtedly a significant predictor of evangelicals’ views of Jews and contemporary Israel and their support of Israel’s current position in the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. Arguably, this connection should be even more robust for the evangelical church leaders, who are more likely to understand and adhere to the theological nuances that could be lost on ordinary churchgoers. Thus, for this analysis and given our lack of a direct measure of support for Israel among evangelical pastors, we assume that a pastor’s support for supersessionism is strongly correlated with his lack of support for Israel and our inferences below are made on the basis of this assumption. Pastors were asked to respond to the following question: “The Christian Church has fulfilled or replaced the nation of Israel in God’s plan.” As Figure 3.1 reveals, 57% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. Given the commonplace perception that evangelicals represent a monolithic group that unequivocally supports Israel, the fact that 43% support replacement theology is noteworthy. And, as Figure 3.2 illustrates, the responses to this statement vary significantly based on the pastors’ eschatological view. While postmillennial pastors are more evenly split (with 60.2% expressing support for supersessionism), the contrast between amillennial and premillennial ministers is stark. 75.8% of adherents of amillennialism support replacement theology. By contrast, only 25.8% of premillennial pastors support that position. Given the eschatological differences between amillennial and premillennial positions (especially, in relation to the role of Israel at the End of Days) we discussed earlier, these responses are not particularly surprising, Support for Supersessionism

Percent of respondents

The Christian church has fulfilled or replaced the nation of Israel in God’s plan. 40

39.47

30 20

25.89 17.58

17.05

10 0

Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Figure 3.1.  Support for supersessionism among evangelical pastors

84  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Eschatological Views on Supersessionism The Christian church has fulfilled or replaced the nation of Israel in God’s plan.

Amillennial Pastors

Postmillennial Pastors

Premillennial Pastors

Figure 3.2.  Support for supersessionism across different eschatological views

but they do reinforce our argument that treating evangelicals as a monolithic group with uniform policy preferences and views of Israel is inappropriate. The higher rates of support for replacement theology among postmillennial and amillennial pastors—​a younger group of church leaders than the larger but older premillennial group—​also suggest that a significant change in the evangelical movement is potentially brewing. As you will read in the following chapters, younger evangelicals (18–​29) are more critical of Israel and its actions toward the Palestinians than the older generations. The data from the pastors’ survey provides a potential explanation for that finding—​increasingly, evangelical congregations hear from their pastors that God’s plan no longer has a special place for Jews and Israel in the End of Days. Moreover, since these postmillennial and amillennial ministers are younger than the more pro-​Israel premillennial ministers, this message is likely to spread further throughout the evangelical community as ministers with premillennial eschatological views retire and might be replaced with postmillennial or amillennial ones. Our discussions with several evangelical church leaders with premillennial views23 confirmed that many are concerned about these trends in the evangelical movement and would like to see premillennialism remain the dominant eschatology among evangelicals.

Sources of Support for Replacement Theology Statistical analysis utilizing bivariate ordered logistical regression confirms our descriptive inferences: an eschatological view is a significant predictor of replacement theology, with amillennial and postmillennial positions

Analyzing Replacement Theology  85 positively related to supersessionism and the premillennial view exhibiting a negative correlation. The goodness of fit tests nevertheless reveals that support for supersessionism is contingent on more than one’s eschatology. It is vital to consider a more comprehensive set of factors, both religious and secular. We hypothesize that support for supersessionism is contingent on several additional factors. Beyond eschatology, as Figure 3.3 illustrates, these potential motivations include (1) belief that Jewish people continue to be significant for the history of redemption, (2) strength of one’s belief about the millennium, (3) frequency of speaking to church members about End of Days prophecy, (4) church affiliation, and (5) personal travel to Israel. Eschatology will have the most direct and immediate effect on support for replacement theology. We thus hypothesize that amillennial and postmillennial pastors are significantly more likely to support supersessionism than premillennial ministers, who are expected to reject it as inconsistent with their understanding of Israel’s role in the End of Days. We also hypothesize that the strength of a pastor’s belief about the millennium will reinforce (or reduce) his eschatological position and thereby affect support or rejection of supersessionism. In other words, if a pastor adheres to an amillennial view but holds to his beliefs about the millennium “somewhat loosely” or “very loosely,” he is less likely to manifest strong levels of support for replacement theology; this may simply be a marginal issue in his theological and doctrinal understanding of the world. On the other hand, if a pastor holds “very strongly” or “somewhat strongly” to his beliefs about the millennium, then the impact of his eschatological view on replacement theology would be reinforced and amplified. Our third hypothesis is that if a pastor believes Potential Motivations for Supporting/Rejecting Supersessionism Eschatology (amillennial, postmillennial, premillennial)

Strength of one’s beliefs about the millennium

Church affiliation (Lutheran CoMS, Baptist, Church of Christ, Pentecostal)

Belief that Jewish people continue to be significant for the history of redemption

Frequency of speaking to church members about end times prophecy

Personal travel to Israel

Figure 3.3.  Hypothesized predictors of replacement theology

86  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century that Jewish people continue to be significant for the events that will usher in the Second Coming of Jesus, then s/​he is less likely to support replacement theology. To measure this interactive effect between an eschatological view and the intensity of one’s belief in a particular version of the millennium, we create a set of new variables, which combine three dichotomous eschatology variables—​ amillennial, postmillennial, and premillennial eschatology—​ with the variable “strength of one’s beliefs about the millennium.” This produces three variables that range from zero to 4, where 4 represents “very strong” belief in that eschatological view, 3 reflects “somewhat strong” belief, 2 stands for “somewhat loose” belief, 1 reflects “very loose” adherence to that eschatology, and zero stands for instances in which the respondent does not support that specific eschatological position. This “eschatological intensity” variable is hypothesized to affect support for supersessionism in the following fashion. Amillennial and postmillennial pastors who “very strongly” believe in their vision of the millennium will be most likely to support replacement theology, while those who express “very loose” beliefs will express the least support for replacement theology. In regard to the premillennial pastors, we expect the opposite—​“very strongly” believing in the premillennialism will most significantly reduce support for supersessionism, while “very loosely” adhering to premillennialism will produce the weakest negative effect on support for supersessionism. This study expects that the frequency of speaking to the congregation about End of Days prophecy is also correlated with support for supersessionism. However, we do not have a clear theoretical expectation about the impact of this variable on support for supersessionism (and by proxy, on support for Israel) and therefore employ a two-​tailed test of statistical significance to take into account all potential effects. We also hypothesize that the denominational affiliation of the pastor will affect his/​her support for supersessionism. In particular, we argue that ministers from the Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod and the Church of Christ are more likely to support supersessionism than Baptists and Pentecostals. The Church of Christ is composed of largely autonomous Christian congregations that share certain distinct beliefs and practices, based on their interpretation of the Bible and on examples from the early Christian church, as described in the New Testament. This denomination traces its historical roots to the Restoration Movement, which searched for a return to Christianity’s original, pre-​denominational, version.24 They identify simply

Analyzing Replacement Theology  87 as “Christians” and avoid using any other forms of denominational identification.25 According to scholars Foster and Dunnavant, Churches of Christ are generally amillennial, although many of their original leaders were what the authors describe as “moderate historical premillennialists,” who did not advocate specific historical interpretations. Foster and Dunnavant note that Churches of Christ have moved away from premillennialism, as the dispensational variant of premillennialism became the dominant tradition in the Protestant evangelical circles.26 Ron Rhodes argues that amillennialism and postmillennialism are the prevailing views of Churches of Christ today.27 Approximately 31% of the Churches of Christ membership is composed of African American, Hispanic, and Asian adherents, making this religious group relatively heterogeneous.28 The Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod (LCMS) emerged from several communities of German Lutheran immigrants during the 1830s and 1840s that were seeking the freedom to practice confessional Lutheranism. The term “Synod” comes from Greek, meaning “assembly” or “meeting.” The LCMS shortened its name from The Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio, and other States (Die Deutsche Evangelisch-​Lutherische Synode von Missouri, Ohio und andern Staaten) to its present name in 1947. According to the official LCMS website, “LCMS doctrine reflects the teachings of Dr. Martin Luther, as summarized in The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.”29 LCMS considers itself evangelical,30 amillennial,31 taking the meaning of “thousand years” of Revelations 20:1–​ 10 figuratively.32 On the other hand, Baptists and Pentecostals are predominantly premillennialists who expected the second advent of Christ to occur before the establishment of a one-​thousand-​year reign of Jesus Christ, as described in Revelations 20:1–​7. Most Pentecostal premillennialists are futurists who expect the major fulfillment of biblical prophecy to occur in the imminent future.33 There is also some evidence to suggest that Pentecostal and charismatic denominations are more likely to sympathize with Israel than with the Palestinians.34 Lastly, we hypothesize that pastors who have personally traveled to Israel are less likely to support supersessionist positions than those who have not. In addition to these variables, we use controls for age, education, gender, race/​ ethnicity (two dichotomous variables for Black and White, non-​Hispanic), and region of residence (a dichotomous variable for South). Our 2018 survey and the 2017 LifeWay Research study showed that young evangelicals are less attached to Israel than the older cohorts. Accordingly, we anticipate a

88  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century higher level of support for supersessionism (and thereby, lower support for Israel) among younger respondents than older ministers. Additionally, previous studies found that black Americans are less sympathetic toward Israel than other ethnic groups in the United States due to the close relationship Israel developed with South Africa during the apartheid era and the African Americans’ greater concern for racial justice for underprivileged minorities, including Palestinians.35 And, as discussed earlier, amillennial-​ leaning Churches of Christ have a significant number of black ministers. We thus expect that African American ministers will be more supportive of replacement theology. White, non-​Hispanic evangelicals, on the other hand, tend to be stronger adherents of premillennialism, thus we expect a negative relationship between white ethnicity and supersessionism. Literature tends to identify the South as the home of the dispensational variant of premillennialism,36 which is least supportive of replacement theology. We thus control for this potential effect. We do not have clear theoretical expectations about the impact of other demographic variables on support for supersessionism. Therefore, we employ a two-​tailed test of statistical significance to consider all potential effects. Variable descriptions and coding procedures for the variables used in this analysis appear in Appendix B. Descriptive statistics for potential motivations for supporting/​rejecting supersessionism are reported in Table 3.2 and summary statistics for all of the variables are found in Table 3.3. There are reasons to believe that additional variables are important. Unfortunately, LifeWay survey of pastors focused exclusively on theology and did not ask respondents about their political ideology or contemporary views of Israel and the Arab–​Israeli dispute, making it impossible for us to test the relationship between these variables and supersessionism. Our analysis thus focuses predominantly on theological and eschatological predictors, leaving the exploration of these additional, secular factors for future surveys and future analyses.

Findings We utilize a multivariate ordered logistic regression to explore the factors influencing ministers’ support for supersessionism.37 Sampling weights and robust standard errors are used in the analysis. Table 3.4 displays the statistical results and odds ratios for the explanatory variables.38 The model explains

Region of residence/​church (%)

Race and ethnicity (%)

Pastor’s educational level (%)

Age of the interviewed pastor (%)

Denomination of the Church (%)

How often do you speak to your church in sermons or large group messages about End of Days prophecy? (%)

Jewish people continue to be significant for the history of redemption (%)

3.43 Asian or Pacific Islander 1.95 South 42

Pentecostal 17.74 45–​54 22.34 High School

Church of Christ 13.48 18–​44 27.25 Less than H.S.

0.61 American Indian or Alaska Native 0.82 Northeast 10.9

11.58

Rarely

Never 3.18

15.18

Somewhat disagree

23.99

Strongly disagree

11.91 Black or African American 8.02 Midwest 31

LCMS 15.27 55–​64 28.89 Some college

12.09

About once a year

27.18

Somewhat agree

Table 3.2.  Descriptive statistics for potential causes of evangelical support for Israel

Baptist 53.51 65+​ 21.52 Bachelor’s degree 22.5 Hispanic or Latino 2.88 West 16.1

Several times a year 49.18

33.65

Strongly agree

84.17

Master’s degree 47.93 White

About once a month 12.5

(continued)

2.16

Doctoral degree 13.62 Other

Several times a month 11.48

The millennium is not a literal 1,000 years, but an era in which the world will gradually grow more Christian and just ending with Christ’s Second Coming (often called postmillennialism). 9.4 10.47 Somewhat loosely (%)

The millennium is a symbolic way of describing the period between Christ’s ascension and Second Coming where Christ is reigning spiritually (often called amillennialism). 22 24.5 Very loosely (%) 3.21 8.51 1.38

Original variable Recoded variable Belief intensity

Amillennialism Postmillennialism Premillennialism

16.97 17.02 8.13

Yes 23.1

No 76.9

Have you ever traveled to Israel? (%)

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Table 3.2. Continued

The millennium will be a future literal 1,000-​year period during which Jesus reigns on earth following Christ’s Second Coming (often called premillennialism). 58.4 65.03 Somewhat strongly (%) 26.61 30.85 26.30

Somewhat agree

Very strongly (%) 53.21 43.62 64.19

5.4

None of these

Strongly agree

4.8

Not sure

Analyzing Replacement Theology  91 Table 3.3.  Summary statistics Variable

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev. Min Max

Supersessionism Amillennial eschatology Postmillennial eschatology Premillennial eschatology Strength of one’s belief about the millennium Amillennial eschatology intensity Postmillennial eschatology intensity Premillennial eschatology intensity Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod affiliation Church of Christ affiliation Belief that Jewish people continue to be significant for the history of redemption Frequency of speaking to church members about End of Days prophecy Personal travel to Israel Age Education Gender Black White Midwest South

950 1,000 1,000 1,000 975

1.29 0.22 0.09 0.58 3.38

1.23 0.41 0.29 0.49 0.84

0 0 0 0 1

3 1 1 1 4

975 975 975 727

0.74 0.30 2.09 0.15

1.43 0.96 1.82 0.36

0 0 0 0

4 4 4 1

727 942

0.13 1.70

0.34 1.17

0 0

1 3

976

2.91

1.20

0

5

1,000 976 991 1,000 973 973 1,000 1,000

0.23 53.09 3.55 0.07 0.08 0.84 0.31 0.42

0.42 13.41 1.02 0.25 0.27 0.37 0.46 0.49

0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 92 5 1 1 1 1 1

40.7% of the variance, suggesting that other variables that we mentioned earlier and included in our previous analyses of ordinary evangelicals’ support for Israel (e.g., ideology, perceived political and cultural affinity with the Israelis, a sense of shared geopolitical and security concerns, etc.) could be important here as well. The present analysis considers the most significant theological sources and demographic characteristics but is largely unable to assess how non-​religious factors impact support for replacement theology. We found that three factors have a statistically significant, positive correlation with replacement theology—​ amillennial eschatology, membership in the Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod (LCMS), and membership in the Church of Christ. Those pastors who indicated “very strong” support

Table 3.4.  Determinants of evangelical support for supersessionism (ordered logistic regression) Variable Amillennial eschatology Very loosely Somewhat loosely Somewhat strongly Very strongly Postmillennial eschatology Very loosely Somewhat loosely Somewhat strongly Very strongly Premillennial eschatology Very loosely Somewhat loosely Somewhat strongly Very strongly LCMS church affiliation Church of Christ church affiliation Belief that Jewish people continue to be significant for the history of redemption Frequency of speaking to church members about End of Days prophecy Personal experience of traveling to Israel Age Educational attainment Gender (female) African American respondent White respondent South (region of residence/​church) N (observations) Log pseudolikelihood Wald X2 Prob > X2 McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 Pseudo R2 Difference of BIC’ parameters

Coefficients w/​Robust Standard Errors

Odds Ratio

.899 (.851) .223 (.499) .453 (.432) .865 (.430)*

2.458 1.250 1.573 2.375*

-​2.314 (.899)** .415 (.616) .486 (.537) .282 (.624)

.099** 1.515 1.626 1.326

.694 (.895) -​.239 (.405) -​.597 (.408) -​1.262 (.371)*** .786 (.387)* .718 (.283)* -​.148 (.093)

2.003 .787 .550 .283*** 2.195* 2.051* .862

-​.125 (.078)

.882

.048 (.201) 1.050 .007 (.006) 1.007 -​.130 (.105) 0.878 -​.401 (.487) .669 .080 (.447) 1.083 -​.329 (.318) .720 .019 (.164) 1.019 617 -​714.239 543.48 0.000 0.407 0.1267 863.052 (very strong support for the fully specified model)

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; all significance tests are two tailed; a difference of BIC’ parameters indicates that fully specified model (one that includes all of the variables above) is more likely to have generated the data than the null model (with only demographic variables); McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 provides the closest approximation of Adjusted R2 statistic found in OLS; * p>0.05; ** p>0.01; *** p>0.001.

Analyzing Replacement Theology  93 for amillennialism are almost 2.4 times more likely to express support for replacement theology than those who are less intensely committed to amillennialism or do not consider amillennial eschatology to be their worldview. The differences between amillennial and premillennial pastors are stark, as we discuss in greater depth below. Ministers who indicated membership in LCMS are almost 2.2 times more likely to express support for replacement theology than those who are not LCMS members. This is quite significant, as this result reflects the independent effect of Lutheran Church membership on supersessionism, while holding one’s eschatological view constant. Similarly, pastors who belong to the Churches of Christ are 2.05 times more likely to express support for replacement theology than those who are not members of these churches. On the other hand, premillennialism is statistically significant and negatively correlated with supersessionism, as hypothesized. More specifically, the “very strong” belief in premillennial eschatology reduces support for supersessionism by 72%. We do not find statistically significant effects for other levels of intensity of premillennial belief. Similarly, “very loose” belief in postmillennial eschatology has a negative effect, reducing support for supersessionism by 90.1%. In other words, pastors with a weak postmillennial view are actually more likely to reject supersessionism than to support it. We do not find a statistically significant positive effect for any of the other intensity levels of postmillennial eschatology, although the positive coefficient on “somewhat loosely,” “somewhat strongly,” and “very strongly” categories hints at its support for supersessionism. These findings are consistent with Boninger et al.,39 who argue that salience’s effect on behavior and attitudes is only observable at the highest level of salience. Issue and religious salience have long been established as critical factors that shape public opinion,40 and our present study confirms the effect of religious salience on the elites as well. It is clear that both amillennial and premillennial pastors’ support for supersessionism is most impacted when they view eschatology as a salient factor in their theological and doctrinal approach. This is a common-​sense finding that fits well with the established literature on public policy attitudes, but our analysis provides the first empirical confirmation of such an effect on religious elites’ beliefs. It is particularly interesting to observe those postmillennial ministers with “very loose” beliefs of the millennium default to the currently dominant evangelical view that eschews replacement theology, when asked to evaluate

94  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century an issue of minor personal importance to them. Thus, even though we fail to confirm the hypothesis that postmillennialism contributes to a pastor’s adherence to the replacement theology, we do show that intensity of one’s beliefs in a particular version of the millennium has an important and previously undiscovered moderating effect on evangelical religious beliefs in supersessionism. The frequency of speaking to church members about the End of Days prophecy does not seem to be statistically related to supersessionism once we take the other variables into account. We also fail to find support for the hypothesis that a pastor’s belief that “Jewish people continue to be significant for the history of redemption as Jesus will return when the Jewish people accept Jesus” reduces support for supersessionism. This variable fails to reach meaningful levels of statistical significance. Similarly, personal experience of traveling to Israel also does not exert the hypothesized effect on replacement theology. Neither our 2018 survey on ordinary evangelicals, nor the current survey on pastors’ attitudes, shows the importance of demographic factors, such as race or ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or region of residence on support for Israel in the former survey or support for supersessionism in the latter survey. While other studies find that race and ethnicity play an important role in explaining domestic policy differences among evangelicals and born-​again Christians,41 we repeatedly fail to find such effect concerning one of the most important, if not the most important, foreign policy issue for this group—​support for Israel and one’s stance on the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. The only demographic variable that played a significant role in ordinary evangelicals’ attitudes toward Israel was age—​we found that younger evangelicals (under 30) were significantly less supportive of Israel than older cohorts. We do not find this effect in the current data on pastors. A pastor’s age is not a significant determinant of his support for replacement theology. This conclusion holds even when we disaggregate the pastors into premillennial, postmillennial, and amillennial groups. Although we do not find that attendance at a seminary is statistically correlated with support for supersessionism, it is worth noting that descriptive statistics in Figure 3.4 show that those who have not attended seminary (12.3% of the sample) are more likely than seminary graduates to express support for supersessionism (44.9% agreed or strongly agreed with replacement theology vs. 28.3% of those who attended a seminary or Bible College).

Analyzing Replacement Theology  95

50

47.79

40

40 30 20 10 0

Percent of respondents

Percent of respondents

The Christian church has fulfilled or replaced the nation of Israel in God’s plan. 38.32

30

23.89

20

15.04 Strongly Disagree Agree disagree

13.27 Strongly agree

Pastors who attended seminary or Bible school

27.54 16.77

17.37

10 0

Strongly Disagree Agree disagree

Strongly agree

Pastors who didn’t attend seminary or Bible school

Figure 3.4.  Support for replacement theology among pastors who attended seminary versus for those who have not

Evangelical Pastors’ Views on Jews and Israel: Comparing Amillenial and Premillennial Pastors As we have noted earlier and as the statistical analysis confirmed, there is a great theological divide between premillennialists and amillennialists over the role of Jews in the End of Days. Whereas premillennials identify many essential roles for Jews in their vision of the End of Days, including the regathering of Jews in their ancestral lands, the reestablishment of the Davidic kingdom, and the rebuilding of the Temple, amillennial ministers do not ascribe such significance to Jewish renewal. To illustrate the degree of this eschatological divide between two of the larger strands of evangelical leadership beyond support for supersessionism, we present a number of such disagreements below. Consider the responses to the following statements, responses to which are visually illustrated in Figures 3.5 through 3.11: • The modern rebirth of the State of Israel in 1948 and the regathering of millions of Jewish people to Israel were fulfillments of biblical prophecy. • The modern rebirth of the State of Israel in 1948 and the regathering of millions of Jewish people to Israel show that we are getting close to the return of Jesus Christ. • The Bible teaches that one day most or all Jewish people, alive at that time, will believe in Jesus. • Jewish people continue to be significant for the history of redemption as Jesus will return when the Jewish people accept Jesus.

96  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century

50 40 30 20 10 0

46.08 20.1

18.63

Strongly Disagree disagree

15.2

Agree

Strongly agree

Percent of respondents

Percent of respondents

The Modern Rebirth of the State of Israel in 1948 and the Re-gathering of Millions of Jewish People to Israel were Fulfillments of Biblical Prophecy 80

69.95

60 40 20 0

Amillennial Pastors

3.22

6.44

20.39

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly disagree agree

Premillennial Pastors

Figure 3.5.  Pastors’ views concerning whether the creation of the State of Israel is a sign of a fulfillment of the Biblical prophecy

50 40 30 20 10 0

44.76 20.95

Strongly Disagree disagree

20.48

Agree

13.81 Strongly agree

Percent of respondents

Percent of respondents

The Modern Rebirth of the State of Israel in 1948 and the Re-gathering of Millions of Jewish People to Israel Show that We Are Getting Close to the Return of Jesus Christ 64.5

60 40 20 0

Amillennial Pastors

25.13 3.163

7.206

Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Premillennial Pastors

Figure 3.6.  Pastors’ views concerning whether the creation of the State of Israel is a sign that the Second Coming of Jesus Christ is near

40 30

41.58 30.2 17.33

20 10 0

Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

Amillennial Pastors

10.89 Strongly agree

Percent of respondents

Percent of respondents

The Bible Teaches That One Day Most or All Jewish People Alive at That Time, Will Believe in Jesus

42.8

40

34.13

30 20 10 0

8.856

14.21

Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Premillennial Pastors

Figure 3.7.  Pastors’ views about Jewish conversion to Christianity

Analyzing Replacement Theology  97

50

47.14

40

19.52

30

19.05

20

14.29

10 0

Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Percent of respondents

Percent of respondents

Jewish People Continue To Be Significant for the History of Redemption as Jesus Will Return When the Jewish People Accept Jesus

50

44.72

40

30.59

30 20 10 0

Amillennial Pastors

12.16

12.52

Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Premillennial Pastors

Figure 3.8.  Pastors’ perceptions about Jewish redemption

50

54.93

40 22.28

20 0

11.39 Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

9.406 Strongly agree

Percent of respondents

Percent of respondents

Another Temple Will Be Built in Jerusalem in Accordance with Ezekiel 40–48 80

65.05

60 40 20 0

Amillennial Pastors

23.6 4.324

7.027

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly disagree agree

Premillennial Pastors

Figure 3.9.  Pastors’ beliefs concerning the re-​building of the Temple in accordance with Ezekiel 40-​48

50 40 30 20 10 0

48.95

19.25

13.15

20.66

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly disagree agree

Amillennial Pastors

Percent of respondents

Percent of respondents

Jesus Christ Will Return and Reign in Jerusalem in Fulfillment of God’s Prophecies to King David 81.29

80 60 40 20 0

2.622

2.448

13.64

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly disagree agree

Premillennial Pastors

Figure 3.10.  Pastors’ views concerning Christ’s return and reign in Jerusalem

98  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century

60

63.81

40 20 0

20.95

10.48

Strongly Disagree Agree disagree

Amillennial Pastors

4.762 Strongly agree

Percent of respondents

Percent of respondents

The Establishment of the US Embassy in Jerusalem is a Sign of the End Times

30 20

26.35

31.15 24.62

17.88

10 0

Strongly Disagree Agree disagree

Strongly agree

Premillennial Pastors

Figure 3.11.  Pastors’ views concerning the establishment of the US embassy in Jerusalem

• Another Temple will be built in Jerusalem in accordance with Ezekiel 40–​48. • Jesus Christ will return and reign in Jerusalem in fulfillment of God’s prophecies to King David. • The establishment of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem is a sign of the End of Days. It is clear from the Figures 3.5–​3.11 that the attitudes of premillennial and amillennial ministers in relation to the role of Jews and Israel in the End of Days are mirror images. This pattern also persists in the only statement with contemporary political implications (see Figure 3.11). Amillennial pastors are unequivocally against treating the U.S. embassy move as a sign of the End of Days, with 84.8% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement. By contrast, premillennial pastors are seemingly split. 55.8% agree that moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem signifies that the End of Days is approaching, leaving a sizeable 44.2% of respondents in disagreement. Disaggregating these results by church denomination shows that premillennial Pentecostals and Lutherans have a diametrically opposite view, with 69.6% of Pentecostals expressing agreement and an entirety of the LCMS group42 disagreeing with the statement. Premillennial Baptists and Church of Christ pastors, on the other hand, show the bimodal distribution of opinions that characterized the entire premillennial group (see Figures 3.12 and 3.13). The data presented above leaves little doubt that the evangelical elites are a diverse group, with opinions and—​more importantly—​fundamental

Analyzing Replacement Theology  99

40

36.27

33.33

30 20

14.71

15.69

10 0

Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

Percent of respondents

Percent of respondents

The Establishment of the US Embassy in Jerusalem is a Sign of the End Times 80

76.47

60 40 23.53

20 0

Strongly agree

Premillennial Pastors -Pentecostals-

Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Premillennial Pastors -Lutheran Church MS-

Figure 3.12.  Premillennial pastors’ views concerning the establishment of the US embassy in Jerusalem: Comparisons between Pentecostals and LCMS pastors The Establishment of the US Embassy in Jerusalem is a Sign of the End Times

29.79

30 20

40

33.9 19.86

16.44

10 0

Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

Premillennial Pastors -Baptists-

Strongly agree

Percent of respondents

Percent of respondents

40

40

30 20

25.71 20 14.29

10 0

Strongly Disagree disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Premillennial Pastors -Churches of Christ-

Figure 3.13.  Premillennial pastors’ views concerning the establishment of the US embassy in Jerusalem: Comparisons between Baptists and CoC pastors

religious beliefs that often diverge pretty considerably. There are significant theological and eschatological differences among evangelical leaders that we believe directly affect their current foreign policy views, especially on support for the State of Israel and the Arab–​Israeli conflict. More than any other variable in our analysis, eschatology drives the differences in support for replacement theology among evangelical ministers. Through sermons and conversations with the congregations, we are confident that these disagreements also filter down to the rank-​and-​file members of the evangelical and born-​again community. Given that the postmillennial and

100  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century amillennial pastors are, on average, younger and more diverse than the currently dominant premillennial strand, it is also likely that the future will bring more diversity and, potentially, more rifts within this religious community.

Evangelical Elite and Mass Public Opinion: Drawing Some Preliminary Insights In the previous chapter we demonstrated that certain questions generated a large percentage (between a quarter and a third) of respondents picking the opaque “neither agree nor disagree” responses. Importantly, these responses do not reflect a lack of knowledge—​these questions also provided evangelicals with the “do not know” option. This is particularly pronounced on questions related to “hotter”—​that is, more actionable—​aspects of eschatology. We initially lacked an explanation for this but now speculate that these results reflect the different eschatological perspectives preached by the pastors and partially internalized by ordinary evangelicals. Consider, for example, ordinary evangelicals’ responses to what could be considered a relatively “cold” eschatological issue, reported in Figure 3.14, that the State of Israel is a proof for the fulfillment of prophecy for the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming. There is a relatively low level of ambivalence/​uncertainty on this less actionable (“cold”) statement. The difference between this statement and statements that appear in Figures 3.15 and 3.16, both of The State of Israel is a proof of the fulfillment of prophecy regarding the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming. Results from April 2018 survey among self-identified evangelical respondents 50

46.3

40 30

24.69

20 10.49

10 0

12.5 1.235

Strongly disagree

Agree

1.543

Somewhat Neither Somewhat Disagree Agree Agree or Disagree Disagree

.3086 Strongly Disagree

2.932 Don’t Know

Figure 3.14.  Ordinary evangelicals’ views on the creation of the State of Israel as a sign that the Second Coming of Jesus Christ is near (April 2018 survey results)

Analyzing Replacement Theology  101 I support Israel because I believe it will lead to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. Results from April 2018 survey among self-identified evangelical respondents 40

34.26

30 21.3

20

11.88

10 0

21.76

3.241 Strongly disagree

Agree

3.704

1.543

Somewhat Neither Somewhat Disagree Strongly Agree Agree or Disagree Disagree Disagree

2.315 Don’t Know

Figure 3.15.  Support for Israel among ordinary evangelicals as a function of their belief that it will lead to the Second Coming (April 2018 survey results)

which reflect more action-​oriented (“hot”) items, is quite significant. Figure 3.15 reports responses to the statement: “I support Israel because I believe it will lead to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ,” and Figure 3.16 records respondents’ answers to the statement: “I support Israel because it needs to build a temple for God on the Temple Mount in the near future.” Notice that only 12.5% of the respondents selected the “neither agree nor disagree” response on the “cold” statement versus 21.8% and 30.86% on the “hotter” statements reported in Figures 3.15 and 3.16. What might be the cause of this ambivalence or uncertainty among the grassroots on the “hotter” eschatological statements? We argue that the answer is at least partially rooted in their pastors’ view of the millennium. The pastors’ survey does not replicate the statements from our 2018 survey, leaving us to utilize a pastor question that is, at best, a rough approximation of the questions we utilized in 2018 (see Figure 3.17). Notice that roughly 35% of the ministers disagree with the statement: “Another Temple will be built in Jerusalem in accordance with Ezekiel 40–​48.” Notably, the exact same percentage of pastors identify with postmillennial and amillennial eschatological views.43 This leads us to believe that the “neither agree nor disagree” responses from the ordinary evangelicals on the more action-​oriented eschatological statements reflect two things. First, these responses by the rank-​and-​ file evangelicals reflect internalization of the eschatological views of their pastors. Second, as evidence from other studies of elite–​ mass opinion

102  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century I support Israel because it needs to build a temple for God on the Temple Mount in the near future. Results from April 2018 survey among self-identified evangelical respondents 30.86

30

27.16

20

15.28

10.96

10

2.778

4.321

2.469

6.173

0 Strongly disagree

Agree

Somewhat Neither Somewhat Disagree Agree Agree or Disagree Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Don’t Know

Figure 3.16.  Ordinary evangelicals’ support for Israel based on their expectations that Israel will rebuild the temple on the Temple Mount (April 2018 survey results) Another Temple will be built in Jerusalem in accordance with Ezekiel 40–48. The most comparable question about the rebuilding of the Temple given to pastors. Percent of respondents

50

44.66

40 30 20

22.22

10 0

20.6 12.51

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Figure 3.17.  Ordinary evangelicals’ beliefs concerning the re-​building of the Temple in accordance with Ezekiel 40-​48 (April 2018 survey results)

transmission shows,44 elite messages are usually only partially internalized by the followers and do not reflect perfect alignment with the original views of the leaders. We are under the impression that these “neither agree nor disagree” responses thus reflect partial internalization of the postmillennial and amillennial eschatological positions. Openly disagreeing with those “hotter” eschatological statements may have seemed too strong of a response to the average amillennialist or postmillennialist, but “neither agree nor disagree”

Analyzing Replacement Theology  103 answer provided a way to disagree without fully disagreeing. Of course, we are speculating here, and the evidence of the partial transmission of elite opinions to the mass level is clearly circumstantial at this point. One factor that complicates our assessment is that we did not ask the ordinary evangelical respondents about their eschatological views in our 2018 survey, so we can only guess that the differences in eschatology drive these results.

Conclusion Our analysis begins the process of recording and evaluating sources of support for Israel and Jews among evangelical elites. Pastors’ views of the role of Jews and Israel in the End of Days are clearly impacted by their theology, generally, and their eschatology, more specifically. However, it is abundantly clear at this point that the evangelical leadership is not as cohesive and coherent as conventional media tends to portray it. There are significant theological and eschatological differences among evangelicals that, we believe, have direct implications on their current foreign policy views and, especially, on their support for the State of Israel and their views of the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute. What is particularly critical to highlight is that it is not simply the policy opinions that vary across the evangelical community; our study highlights the fact that the fundamental beliefs about the End of Days and the return of Jesus Christ differ dramatically in this religious movement. Moreover, we find confirmation that the salience of one’s belief in a particular version of the millennium plays an important moderating effect on eschatology, amplifying or reducing its importance as a predictor of support for replacement theology. This, in our view, also has important implications on evangelicals’ contemporary support for Israel. In an analysis of how religious salience impacts roll call votes in the Wisconsin legislature, Yamane and Oldmixon argue that “When religion is salient—​when it matters to a legislator on a personal level—​religion may act as a filter through which the legislator views policy across domains. Religious affiliation indicates identification with a religiously informed view, but salience indicates a high level of commitment to that worldview.”45 It is not hard to see how the beliefs in replacement theology and amillennialism—​if strongly held—​would reverberate to affect one’s current views of Israel. If Israel and the Jewish people no longer hold a special meaning to God’s plan for redemption and End of Days, the likelihood that an evangelical respondent holding such views would also support

104  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Israel in the current Israeli–​Palestinian dispute is certainly reduced. “It is the salience of one’s religious identity . . . that is likely to be most associated with whether one acts in line with religious values or schema,” note Hayward and Pearlman.46 At a minimum, it would be safe to conclude that any support for Israel among strong adherents of amillennialism and replacement theology likely reflects cultural, political, and social, but not religious, underpinnings. Our study also identifies church affiliation as a critically important variable that was previously ignored in the study of evangelicals. The statistical analysis illustrates that certain evangelical denominations are significantly more supportive of replacement theology (and, by proxy, less supportive of Israel) than others. This effect is independent of the eschatological view espoused by the pastors. In particular, we find that pastors belonging to the Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod or affiliated with the Churches of Christ are significantly more likely to support supersessionism than Baptists or Pentecostals. In order to understand these denominational differences, it is important to consider the difference between Arminian and Lutheran-​Calvinist doctrines. The most crucial difference between these two doctrines centers on a deep theological dispute over predestination versus free will.47 Citing the New Testament writings by Paul, Martin Luther and, later, John Calvin had insisted that all humans inherit Adam’s original sin and that only the grace of God, mediated through Jesus Christ, delivers humans from the condemnation they deserve. Individuals can do nothing to earn their salvation.48 Thus, Luther concluded that we are all saved by God’s grace through faith in Jesus Christ, not by our efforts. For him, good works are not a condition of salvation. This is the doctrine of predestination. Jacob Arminius (1560–​1609), a Dutch reformer, challenged this view by restoring human agency to the doctrine of salvation. For him, anyone can choose to follow Christ, and anyone can lose their salvation by falling back into sin. His doctrine thus concludes that man’s freedom consists of his ability to choose good over evil in spiritual matters. The sinner has the power to either cooperate with God’s Spirit and receive salvation or resist God’s grace and perish. Arminian doctrine gained widespread adherence in American colonies as part of the American ethos of free agency.49 Today, one of its strongest manifestations is the Prosperity Gospel, which argues that God rewards people for righteous conduct.50 Luther and Calvin were also hard supersessionists. In On the Jews and Their Lies, Luther described Jews as blind, stubborn, and disobedient, and insisted that only those who believe in Christ are the “True Israel,” who

Analyzing Replacement Theology  105 inherit the promises of God. John Calvin did not echo Luther’s call for violent anti-​Semitism, but still held that the Jews lost their election with the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. For him, only those Jews who believed in Christ continued in the covenant.51 Thus, although Calvin rejected the angry rant of Martin Luther against the Jews, he nevertheless agreed with him that Christian biblical interpretation was a more reliable guide to the mind of the patriarchs in Genesis than the exegesis of Rabbinic Judaism. Therefore, the Hebrew Bible was properly understood as Christian Scripture and had always been addressed to the Church and the ancient (but not modern) Israel.52 These Lutheran-​Calvinist positions are clearly reflected in LCMS doctrine. Furthermore, in 2010, Concordia Theological Seminary and a five-​campus university system affiliated with LCMS partnered with Dar al-​ Kalima College, a fledgling Lutheran college in Bethlehem, during a visit of the president and senior figures to the Palestinian territories. Dr. Mitri Raheb, founder and President of Dar al-​Kalima University’s College of Arts and Culture in Bethlehem, called the visit “historic,” while Dr. Thomas E. Cedel, the president of Concordia University Texas, praised the opportunities this relationship would bring to students “to study where Jesus walked and where geopolitics play a role in the everyday life of the people who live there.”53 This kind of collaboration with the Palestinian Christians and open support for Palestinian geopolitical causes are relatively uncommon among conservative evangelicals. When it comes to the Church of Christ, scholar Paul Blowers notes that the Stone-​Campbell movement, from which the Church of Christ originated in the nineteenth century, was intrigued by Judaism but saw it as a relic of ancient times that was superseded by a new covenant in Christ.54 Thus, the Church supported sporadic attempts to evangelize Jews, but explicitly asserted that Jews no longer have a special covenant with God and were subject to the exact same gospel that “offers salvation to all alike, and on the same terms.”55 Dr. John Mark Hicks, a professor of religion at Lipscomb University and an expert on the Churches of Christ, notes a unique and widespread belief in the Church, which he describes as a “radical discontinuity of Old and New Testaments” that goes beyond eschatology. In an interview with us on August 23, 2021, Dr. Hicks called it a “foundational principle” and a “strong theological conviction” that is deeply embedded in the hermeneutics (i.e., theory and methodology of interpretation of biblical texts) of the Church of Christ. Hicks further noted that the CoC theologians see modern Jerusalem as “just another city, without any theological gravitas.”56

106  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century In the twentieth century, according to Blowers, the Church of Christ did not stand up to Nazi persecution of Jews, similar to many other Christian churches, and in the conservative branch of the movement, there has been support for the racist ideologies of the Ku Klux Klan, including anti-​Semitic activists. In more recent decades, the attitudes have not changed much from those articulated during the nineteenth century, notes Blowers. On the one hand, there was some admiration for Jews as covenant people among Christian Churches (Disciples of Christ) members of the movement, but the dominant view continues to resist notions of Jewish exceptionalism and argues that Jewish people need to accept Jesus as a personal messiah. In 1993, the Church encouraged interfaith dialogue with the Jewish people but fell short of condemning the evangelization of Jews. Blowers concludes that while certain portions of the Stone-​Campbell movement incorporated some liberal ideas during the twentieth century, including calling for reconciliation with Jews, the more conservative branches of the movement, like the Church of Christ, have continued to view contemporary Judaism as “infiltrated (like liberal Christianity) with rationalism, humanism . . . ideals of social justice” and therefore morally corrupt.57 These views may explain our findings that, even after controlling for eschatology, pastors in the Church of Christ denomination are more supportive of supersessionism. Another possible explanation for our results for the Church of Christ variable may reflect this denomination’s adoption of a particularly harsh or “punitive” version of amillennialist interpretation of replacement theology. This view is quite harsh in comparison to economic and structural varieties of supersessionism, because it emphasizes Israel’s disobedience and punishment as the primary reason for its displacement as the people of God.58 As Gabriel Fackre explains, this form of supersessionism not only holds that the rejection of Christ eliminates Israel from God’s covenant, but also “provokes divine retribution.”59 Richard Soulen provides a similar interpretation: because the Jews reject Christ, “God in turn angrily rejects and punishes the Jews.”60 This focus on God’s anger and retributive punishment resonated with Alexander Campbell, the co-​founder of the Stone-​Campbell movement from which the Church of Christ emerged, who wrote that “the unbelieving Jews were rejected and repudiated as the visible and formal people of God.” While some scholars argue that Campbell ultimately settled on a more moderate supersessionist perspective,61 there is definitely some evidence to support our speculation that Churches of Christ theology is driven by a punitive interpretation of supersessionism. If this is the case, one possible way

Analyzing Replacement Theology  107 to interpret our statistical results is that the amillennialism variable picks up the effect of eschatology on supersessionism, while the Church of Christ variable picks up a particularly inhospitable (to Israel and Jews) variant of that eschatology.62 What about anti-​Semitism? Is it possible that Lutheran and Church of Christ pastors support supersessionism because of anti-​Jewish sentiments? Martin Luther’s anti-​Semitism is well-​documented and despite the official statements from the LCMS, Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ELCA), and other major Lutheran authorities disavowing Luther’s anti-​Semitic views, some scholars argue that latent anti-​Semitism is still deeply embedded in this denomination. For example, Ralph Moellering writes: “Now, 36 years later [after the end of World War II], it cannot be said that all of the disclosures about the extermination camps and the plethora of literature appearing on the holocaust have produced a collective guilt consciousness in the Lutheran Church, nor is there evidence of widespread contrition.”63 Relatedly, according to Blowers, Alexander Campbell, the co-​ founder of the Stone-​Campbell Movement which gave birth to the Churches of Christ, asserted that “the Jews historically suffered so precisely because they crucified the Christ . . .”—​a well-​known anti-​Semitic trope. Blowers also asserts that “during the 1940s and 1950s there is evidence of participation by some staunch conservatives form the Stone-​Campbell churches in right-​wing groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, whose anti-​Semitic activism was hardly a secret.”64 Even more generally, there is a possibility that latent theological and cultural anti-​Semitism continues to afflict not only Lutheran and Church of Christ evangelicals but the broader evangelical community as well. For example, Daniel Hummel65 described the deep-​rooted anti-​Semitic beliefs among some evangelicals, with the cultural anti-​Semitism potentially coming from their ultra-​conservative neighbors who harbor anti-​Semitic views and the theological beliefs dating to the early Christian era, when Christians first started casting themselves as the new chosen people. “Some associations in certain conservative areas, with Jews being liberal, cosmopolitan, international and that being a threat to American Christian identity: You’re going to find those views, weirdly, right alongside expressing support for Israel,” Hummel said in an interview with the Washington Post. “Someone like that would be vaguely or even strongly anti-​Semitic but also pro-​Israel.”66 At this point, we are hesitant to strongly endorse this explanation for our findings concerning LCMS and Church of Christ affiliated pastors, but the

108  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century potential that latent theological and/​or cultural anti-​Semitism could still be present in those churches is undoubtedly worthy of more in-​depth investigation in the future. Comparisons between elite and mass public opinion within the evangelical community are critical if scholars are to gain a better grasp of the attitudes and beliefs that characterize this segment of the American public. A more structured study of how elite messages are internalized by the members of their congregations is particularly important. Pastors such as John Hagee (a Pentecostal) constantly emphasize the importance of Jews and Israel in God’s plan for Christians and call for strong evangelical support for Israel, but we have an only a surface-​deep understanding of whether these messages effectively penetrate the beliefs, attitudes, and actions of the evangelical masses. The following chapter returns to the analysis of ordinary evangelicals, with a particular focus on the current generation of 18-​to 29-​year-​old churchgoers. We discuss a significant and growing generational divide within the evangelical community and analyze how young evangelicals rationalize and justify their attitudes toward the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute.

Appendix. Variable Descriptions and Coding Procedures • Support for supersessionism (dependent variable): “The Christian church has fulfilled or replaced the nation of Israel in God’s plan.” Coded 1 for “Strongly agree”; 2 for “Somewhat agree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Strongly disagree”; 5 for “Not sure” (recoded as missing value to drop from analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Somewhat disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat agree”; 4 for “Strongly agree.” • Amillennial/​Postmillennial/​Premillennial eschatology: Original variable posited the following question: “Which one of the following statements best fits your views on the millennium described in Revelation 20? This chapter says that Christ shall reign “a thousand years.” Would you say this means . . .” The original variable coding was as follows: 1 for “The millennium is a symbolic way of describing the period between Christ’s ascension and Second Coming where Christ is reigning spiritually (often called amillennialism)”; 2 for “The millennium is not a literal 1,000 years, but an era in which the world will gradually grow more Christian and just ending with Christ’s Second

Analyzing Replacement Theology  109 Coming (often called postmillennialism)”; 3 for “The millennium will be a future literal 1,000-​year period during which Jesus reigns on earth following Christ’s Second Coming (often called premillennialism)”; 4 for “None of these”; and 5 for “Not sure.” The eschatological positions were then recoded as dichotomous variables, where 1 indicates presence of a specific eschatological view and zero otherwise. This generated three dichotomous variables: “Amillennial eschatology,” “Postmillennial eschatology,” and “Premillennial eschatology.” “None of these” and “Not sure” responses were recoded as missing values to drop from the statistical analysis. • Strength of one’s beliefs about the millennium: “How strongly do you hold to your beliefs about the millennium?” Coded 1 for “Very strongly”; 2 for “Somewhat strongly”; 3 for “Somewhat loosely”; 4 for “Very loosely”; 5 for “Not sure” (recoded as missing value and dropped from analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Very loosely”; 2 for “Somewhat loosely”; 3 for “Somewhat strongly”; 4 for “Very strongly.” • Amillennial/​Postmillennial/​Premillennial eschatological intensity: a set of new variables, which combine three dichotomous eschatology variables—​amillennial, postmillennial, and premillennial eschatology—​with the variable “strength of one’s beliefs about the millennium.” This produces 3 variables that range from zero to 4, where 4 represents “very strong” belief in that eschatological view, 3 reflects “somewhat strong” belief, 2 stands for “somewhat loose” belief, 1 reflects “very loose” adherence to that eschatology, and zero stands for instances in which the respondent does not support that specific eschatological position. • Belief that Jewish people continue to be significant for the history of redemption: “Jewish people continue to be significant for the history of redemption as Jesus will return when the Jewish people accept Jesus.” Coded 1 for “Strongly agree”; 2 for “Somewhat agree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Strongly disagree”; 5 for “Not sure” (recoded as missing value and dropped from analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Somewhat disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat agree”; 4 for “Strongly agree.” • LCMS (Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod) /​Church of Christ church affiliation: Original variable was created by LifeWay Research to classify survey participants into one of the following categories: 1 for

110  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century “Baptist”; 2 for “Lutheran”; 3 for “Pentecostal”; 4 for “Christian/​Church of Christ.” We created 2 dichotomous variables, one for “Church of Christ” and another for “LCMS,” where 1 indicates belonging to that church category and zero otherwise. • Frequency of speaking to church members about End of Days prophecy: “How often do you speak to your church in sermons or large group messages about End of Days prophecy?” Coded 1 for “Several times a month”; 2 for “About once a month”; 3 for “Several times a year”; 4 for “About once a year”; 5 for “Rarely”; 6 “Never”; and 7 “Not sure.” “Not sure” responses were recoded as missing values and dropped from the analysis. • Personal experience of traveling to Israel: “Have you ever traveled to Israel?” Coded 1 for “Yes” and 2 for “No.” Recoded zero for “No” and 1 for “Yes.” • Age: “What is your age?” Coded as a continuous variable, where respondent indicated his/​her age in years at the moment of the phone interview. Respondents who refused to answer are dropped from the analysis. • Educational attainment: “Which of the following best describes your highest level of education?” Coded 1 for “Less than High School graduate”; 2 for “High School graduate”; 3 for “Some college”; 4 for “Bachelor’s degree”; 5 for “Master’s degree (include MDiv)”; 6 for “Doctoral degree (include PhD., DMin)” and 7 for those pastors who refused to answer. Which of the following best describes your highest level of education? We drop the “refuse to answer” responses from our analysis. • Gender (biological sex): “What is your gender?” Dichotomous variable coded zero for “Male” and 1 for “Female.” • Race/​ethnicity: Original variable coding is as follows: “Which of the following best represents your ethnic background?” Coded 1 for “American Indian or Alaskan Native”; 2 for “Asian or Pacific Islander”; 3 for “Black or African American”; 4 for “Hispanic or Latino”; 5 for “White or Caucasian”; 6 for “Other”; 7 for those pastors who refused to answer. We drop the “refuse to answer” responses from our analysis and create two dummy variables for “Black respondent” and “White respondent,” where 1 represented a particular race/​ethnicity and zero otherwise.

Analyzing Replacement Theology  111 • Region of residence: Variable created by LifeWay Research to record the region in which the pastor resides. Coded 1 for “Northeast –​CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT”; 2 for “South –​AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV”; 3 for “Midwest –​IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI”; 4 for “West –​AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY.” We created a dichotomous “South” variable, where 1 represents residence in AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, or WV and zero otherwise. • Attended seminary (used for descriptive inferences only): “Did you attend a Bible college or seminary?” Coded 1 for “Yes”; 2 for “No”; and 3 for “Not sure/​refuse to answer” (these responses were dropped). • The modern rebirth of the State of Israel in 1948 and the re-​gathering of millions of Jewish people to Israel were fulfillments of Bible prophecy (used for descriptive inferences only): Coded 1 for “Strongly agree”; 2 for “Somewhat agree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Strongly disagree”; 5 for “Not sure” (recoded as missing value and dropped from analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Somewhat disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat agree”; 4 for “Strongly agree.” • The modern rebirth of the State of Israel in 1948 and the re-​gathering of millions of Jewish people to Israel show that we are getting close to the return of Jesus Christ (used for descriptive inferences only): Coded 1 for “Strongly agree”; 2 for “Somewhat agree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Strongly disagree”; 5 for “Not sure” (recoded as missing value and dropped from analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Somewhat disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat agree”; 4 for “Strongly agree.” • The Bible teaches that one day most or all Jewish people, alive at that time, will believe in Jesus (used for descriptive inferences only): Coded 1 for “Strongly agree”; 2 for “Somewhat agree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Strongly disagree”; 5 for “Not sure” (recoded as missing value and dropped from analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Somewhat disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat agree”; 4 for “Strongly agree.” • Another Temple will be built in Jerusalem in accordance with Ezekiel 40–​48 (used for descriptive inferences only): Coded 1 for “Strongly

112  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century agree”; 2 for “Somewhat agree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Strongly disagree”; 5 for “Not sure” (recoded as missing value and dropped from analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Somewhat disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat agree”; 4 for “Strongly agree.” • Jesus Christ will return and reign in Jerusalem in fulfillment of God’s prophecies to King David (used for descriptive inferences only): Coded 1 for “Strongly Agree”; 2 for “Somewhat agree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Strongly disagree”; 5 for “Not sure” (recoded as missing value and dropped from analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Somewhat disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat agree”; 4 for “Strongly agree.” • The establishment of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem is a sign of the End of Days (used for descriptive inferences only): Coded 1 for “Strongly agree”; 2 for “Somewhat agree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Strongly disagree”; 5 for “Not sure” (recoded as missing value and dropped from analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Somewhat disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat agree”; 4 for “Strongly agree.” • I expect Jesus to return in my lifetime (used for descriptive inferences only): Coded 1 for “Strongly agree”; 2 for “Somewhat agree”; 3 for “Somewhat disagree”; 4 for “Strongly disagree”; 5 for “Not sure” (recoded as missing value and dropped from analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for “Strongly disagree”; 2 for “Somewhat disagree”; 3 for “Somewhat agree”; 4 for “Strongly agree.”

Chapter 4 Change of the Guard Young Evangelicals and the Israeli–​Palestinian Dispute

For decades, evangelicals have been viewed as enduring and reliable supporters of Israel and the Jewish people. Our 2018 survey of national evangelical and born-​again Christians confirms this common insight, finding that 75% of this religious community supports Israel. However, our study also discovered that young evangelicals (18–​ 29) are less supportive of Israel and more likely than the older age cohorts to express support for the Palestinians.1 We also discovered that younger evangelical and born-​again Christians are more likely to profess “middle of the road” or centrist ideological positions and hold much warmer feelings towards Muslims than the older respondents (see Table 4.1). Respondents under 30 years of age are not particularly different from their elders on other potential explanations we considered, leading us to speculate that, beyond political ideology and generally positive feelings toward Muslims, the different conceptions of “justice” and “fairness” (in relation to the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute) among younger and older evangelicals may explain why young evangelicals are more critical of Israel than their elders. In short, our 2018 data point to potential intergenerational differences in the evangelical and born-​again community, which may transform this largely pro-​Israel religious movement into one which is less likely to stand by Israel and the Jewish people than it has done in the past. Our 2018 survey provided a single data point. With only 177 respondents (17.7% of the sample) in the 18–​29 age cohort, we limited our ability to speak confidently about the factors that affect this age group’s support for Israel. To better understand the attitudes of this age group, we commissioned a new survey in late March 2021. This poll, conducted among 700 evangelical and born-​again Christians under 30 years of age, confirms a significant generational divide within the American evangelical and born-​again community and extends our understanding of the processes driving this transformation. Christian Zionism in the Twenty-​First Century. Motti Inbari and Kirill Bumin, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2024. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197649305.003.0005

114  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Table 4.1.  Church attendance, Bible readership, political ideology, and opinions of Muslims comparisons across age cohorts (2018 data) 2018 survey data

18–​29

30–​49

50–​65

65+​

Church attendance (2 or 3 times a month or more frequently) Bible readership (Once a week or more frequently) Political ideology (Liberal) Political ideology (Centrist/​ moderate) Opinion of Muslims (Good or very good)

81.4%

61.6%

57.3%

70.1%

63.8%

55.7%

57.3%

68.3%

28.6% 30.4%

22.5% 30.2%

12.6% 26.5%

7.7% 21.1%

52.6%

30.2%

25.6%

13.7%

The Survey To better understand the driving forces behind the declining support for Israel among young evangelicals, we commissioned a new survey to specifically unpack the puzzles that we were not able to address with our 2018 survey data.2 Barna Group administered the survey on our behalf between March 22 and April 2, 2021.3 The sample was screened to include only those who consider themselves evangelical and/​or born-​again Christians. The use of self-​identification as a basis for sample selection and the specific wording of survey questions that we carried over from our 2018 survey allows us to make relatively direct and reliable comparisons between 2018 and 2021 results for young evangelicals. Our sample includes 700 respondents and is based on a demographically balanced online panel. Maximum quotas and slight weights were used for gender, region, ethnicity, and education to more accurately reflect the 18–​ 29-​year-​old evangelical and born-​again population in the United States (as defined by the 2014 Pew Religious Landscape Survey). The sample provides 95% confidence that the sampling error does not exceed plus or minus 3.7%.4 Variable descriptions and coding procedures for the variables used in this analysis appear in the Appendix. What makes this survey genuinely unique is our incorporation of targeted, open-​ended questions that allowed respondents to explain their policy views in their own words. This, in turn, allows us to paint a rich picture of young evangelicals’ explanations for their support for the Palestinians, Israel, or neither of the parties to the dispute. There are literally hundreds of thoughtful comments

Change of the Guard  115 that provide a unique glimpse into the reasoning of young evangelicals on the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute, a highly complex foreign policy topic. We also challenged our respondents to explain why some studies (including ours) find that younger evangelical and born-​again Christians express lower support for Israel than older evangelicals. We are pleasantly surprised by the thoughtfulness and detail of many of the written responses that we received: they bolster and illuminate the descriptive and statistical findings we report below.

Who Are the Young Evangelical and Born-​Again Christians, and What Views Do They Hold? The plurality of young evangelical and born-​again respondents in our sample are white non-​Hispanic (45.4%). African Americans comprise 25.4%, while Latino/​Hispanic respondents make up another 14.8% of the sample. All other ethnicities account for the remaining 15.7% of the sample. This distribution is quite similar to our 2018 data on 18–​29-​year-​olds, where white respondents comprised 49.7%, blacks—​28.2%, and Latinos/​Hispanics—​12.4%. The other ethnicities made up the remaining 9.7% of the 18–​29-​year-​olds in 2018. However, it is notable that the 2018 respondents aged 30 or older were significantly more homogenous, with whites comprising 68.3% of the subsample. Our data thus show that the evangelical community is becoming more heterogeneous, confirming the trend found by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) America’s Changing Religious Identity study in 2016, which reported that only half of all evangelical Christians under 30 years of age are white.5 Relatedly, Pew Research’s Religious Landscape Survey shows that racial and ethnic minorities made up 24% of evangelical Protestants (of all ages) in 2014, up from 19% in 2007.6 In our survey, the plurality of young evangelicals is concentrated in the South (45.4%). 14.8% reside in the Northeast, 19.3% in the Midwest, and the remaining 20.5% in the West.7 44.8% identify as men, 54.1% are women, and the remaining 1.1% did not provide an answer. A roughly equal percentage of the respondents indicated that they have a high school degree (28.5%), some college (27.1%), or baccalaureate degree (29.4%). An additional 6% said they did not complete high school, 4% said they completed trade, technical, or vocational training, and 4.6% indicated they have a graduate degree. The median household income of this age cohort falls into the $50,000 to $74,999 range, with the largest proportion of respondents (21.5%) reporting annual incomes of less than $25,000, followed by 20.3% who say that their annual household

116  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century income is between $50,000 and $74,999. The median age of our respondents is 24, and 27.1% are married. While marriage rates are pretty low, especially in comparison to the overall evangelical community (57.3% in our 2018 survey; 55% in Pew’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study), it is essential to remember that the sample comprises only under-​30-​year-​olds and these results are actually noticeably higher than the marriage rate for all 18–​29-​year-​old adults in the United States, which stood at 20% in 2011, according to the Pew Research Center.8 In the 2018 survey, we found that 18–​29-​year-​old evangelicals exhibited very high levels of religiosity, proxied by the frequency of church attendance and frequency of reading the Bible (see Table 4.1). Our current survey data reveal substantially lower church attendance and Bible readership levels than we observed three years prior (see Table 4.2). These low numbers do not seem to vary significantly by region, race/​ethnicity, ideology, or vote in the 2020 presidential election. However, the religiosity of the 18–​29-​year-​ old respondents in our sample varies by the levels of educational attainment, gender, and eschatology. Educational attainment impacts both variables measuring religiosity in our data (church attendance and Bible readership): less educated, particularly those with a high school degree only or less, are also less religiously active. The contrasts between those who only have a high school degree and those holding a baccalaureate degree are particularly stark. Our data also reveals that women are less likely to be religiously active than men. Men are 7.7% more likely than women to frequently attend church and 8.4% more likely to read the Bible often. Lastly, eschatology—​a part of theology concerned with the final events of history, the Second Coming of Jesus Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the Last Judgment—​also correlates with religious attendance and reading the Bible. Adherents of premillennial eschatology9 are the most committed churchgoers and Bible readers. Young postmillennialists, by contrast, manifest the lowest levels of religiosity in our Table 4.2.  Church attendance and Bible readership among under-​30 respondents (comparisons between 2018 and 2021 data)

Church attendance (2 or 3 times a month or more frequently) Bible readership (Once a week or more frequently)

Under 30 (2021)

Under 30 (2018)

81.4%

55.1%

63.8%

49.2%

Change of the Guard  117 Table 4.3.  Church attendance and Bible readership comparisons across educational attainment levels, eschatology, and gender (2021 data) Less than HS

High School

Some College

Technical Bachelor’s Graduate training degree degree

Church 53.3% attendance (2 or 3 times a month or more frequently)

45.5%

55.8%

57.1%

63.1%

59.4%

Bible readership (Once a week or more frequently)

39.0%

48.4%

53.6%

61.2%

46.9%

42.2%

Post-​ Amillennial Pre-​ millennial millennial Church 52.3% attendance (2 or 3 more frequently) times a month or

56.2%

59.5%

Bible readership (Once a week or more frequently)

46.6%

48.2%

55.4%

Men

Women

Church 59.2% attendance (2 or 3 times a month or more frequently)

51.5%

Bible readership (Once a week or more frequently)

45.4%

53.8%

data, with amillennialists falling in between (see Table 4.2 and Table 4.3). The results for amillennial and postmillennial adherents are within the margin of error across both measures of religiosity. So, why such a dramatic decline in church attendance among 18–​29-​year-​olds from 2018 to 2021? The most probable answer is the size of our 2018 under-​30 subsample. Out of 1,000 evangelical and born-​again Christians that we polled in 2018, only 177 (less than 18%) fall within the 18–​29-​year-​old group. These religiosity numbers are likely inflated and not fully representative of that age cohort. For instance, 65.5% of 2018 respondents of all ages indicated that they attend church two or three times a month or more frequently. This number is still higher than what we observed for under-​30s in 2021, but by a significantly smaller margin than

118  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century the numbers reported above for under-​30-​year-​old respondents in 2018. Our 2021 under-​30-​year-​old church attendance numbers are roughly in line with Ryan Burge’s assessment of evangelical religiosity; he finds that “about half of self-​identified evangelicals attend weekly or more, with the other ten percent saying they attend about once a month.”10 It is also possible that some of the decline in church attendance we observed may reflect the broader religious trends in the United States. Several studies find that the percentage of American adults who identify as evangelicals have declined over the last two decades.11 Although not explicitly focused on evangelicals, the LifeWay Research 2017 study finds that 66% of American young adults who attended a Protestant church regularly for at least a year as a teenager say they also dropped out for at least a year between the ages of 18 and 22.12 It is reasonable to hypothesize that for a large proportion of those teenagers, church attendance declines at first, eventually leading them to become “exvangelicals”—​those who grow up in the faith but then abandon it in adulthood.13 Lastly, it remains a possibility that a respondent’s perception of their church attendance before the Covid-​19 pandemic (the question wording that we use in the survey) is “contaminated” by their more recent, pandemic-​era attendance. If that is the case, the rates of religious attendance reported in our survey may be slightly lower than the actual, pre-​pandemic attendance levels. Our 2021 data show that the 18–​29-​year-​old respondents also vary substantially from their elders in their eschatological views, reflecting Christian doctrines concerning the End of Days. More specifically, our eschatology question probed respondents about their interpretation of the term “millennium” in the Bible passage in Revelation 20, which says that Christ shall reign “a thousand years.” In 2011, the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) reported that 65% of evangelical Christians followed premillennialism, an eschatology that entails a belief that Jesus Christ will come to earth for the second time after a period of tribulation, followed by a literal “millennium”—​a 1,000-​year period, during which Christ and his followers reign on earth.14 We similarly discovered in our 2020 pastors survey (see Chapter 3) that 65% of evangelical pastors identify with premillennialism. By contrast, a supermajority of young evangelicals in our 2021 data are not committed to premillennialism. Instead, 42.7% of respondents expressed a preference for amillennialism, and another 25.1% indicated that they follow postmillennialism. These two eschatological positions are generally considered to be less hospitable to Israel and the Jewish people than premillennialism.

Change of the Guard  119 Table 4.4.  Supersessionist views among evangelicals (comparisons across age cohorts and over time)

Yes, the covenant remains intact today No, the covenant has ended God never had a covenant with Jews Don’t know

Under 30 (2021)

Under 30 (2018)

30+​ (2018)

57.8% 8.1% 5.0% 29.1%

65.5% 13.0% 5.7% 15.8%

74.4% 4.0% 2.1% 19.6%

Premillennialism draws adherence of only 21.1% of young evangelicals, with another 11.1% following a different eschatology from the three doctrines noted above. Regrettably, we did not ask this question in our 2018 survey and are therefore unable to compare the two samples on this measure. We asked a more pointed question about supersessionism to further explore the theological underpinnings of young evangelicals’ beliefs.15 Respondents were asked: “Do you believe God’s covenant with the Jewish people remains intact today?” 57.8% answered affirmatively, while 8.1% said that “the covenant has ended,” 5% said that “God never had a covenant with the Jewish people,” and the remaining 29.1% were unsure. By contrast, 65.5% of 18–​29-​ year-​old respondents in 2018 agreed that the covenant with the Jewish people remains intact, while 13% thought that the covenant had ended. Roughly the same percentage of young evangelicals in 2018 and 2021 believed that God never had a covenant with Jews. However, as Table 4.4 indicates, a comparison to the older evangelical cohorts shows that the latter were significantly more likely to agree that the covenant is intact than under-​30s and a very small percentage of them believe that the covenant has ended or never existed.

Young Evangelicals’ Politics Where are young evangelicals politically? Are they ideologically similar to their elders? Are there any noteworthy changes since 2018? The plurality of under-​30 respondents (37.5%) in our 2021 survey are centrists/​ moderates (see Table 4.5). In 2018, by contrast, 41.1% of young evangelical and born-​again Christians—​the largest share of respondents—​identified as conservatives. The ten percent change in conservative affiliation in a three-​ year period is significant. Some tentative statistical and anecdotal evidence

120  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Table 4.5.  Evangelicals’ ideology (comparisons across age cohorts and over time)

Conservative (slightly conservative, conservative, and extremely conservative combined) Moderate/​centrist (“middle of the road”) Liberal (slightly liberal, liberal, and extremely liberal combined)

Under 30 (2021)

Under 30 (2018)

30+​ (2018)

31.0%

41.1%

59.1%

37.5%

30.4%

26.3%

31.5%

28.6%

14.6%

suggests that this trend began in the early 2000s and has continued to advance since then.16 However, the difference between the under-​30s in both 2018 and 2021 and older respondents is downright stark. 59.1% of 30-​plus respondents identified as conservatives in our 2018 survey, with less than 15% saying that they are liberal. Twice as many young evangelicals identify as ideological liberals.17 Although we did not ask our 2018 respondents about their political party identification or 2016 vote, our 2021 under-​30 respondents are clearly far more politically diverse than what we typically hear in the media about the evangelical community. Our 2021 survey asked the respondents: “In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?” Those who answered “independent” were then asked a follow-​up question, “As of TODAY, do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?” The combined results of these questions will shock many observers of the evangelical movement (see Table 4.6). What is quite significant is that the largest share of young evangelical and born-​again respondents (48.5%) say that they are either Democrats or lean Democrat, and by quite a significant margin (9% higher than those who identify as Republicans). Only 39.5% of under-​30s identify with the GOP or lean Republican. Perhaps, as the New York Times reported ahead of the 2018 midterm elections, young evangelicals are finding it difficult to reconcile their faith commitments and Republican policies.18 A 2019 Voter Study Group survey similarly highlighted a stark generational divide in favorability ratings for Trump among evangelicals, with the

Change of the Guard  121 Table 4.6.  Young evangelicals’ partisan identification (2021 data) Republican Independent Democrat Independent Other Don’t (leaning (leaning party know or Republican) Democrat) prefer not to answer Party ID 24.8%

14.7%

33.7%

14.8%

1.4%

10.6%

Table 4.7.  Young evangelicals’ vote in 2020 presidential election (2021 data)

2020 presidential election vote

Trump

Biden

Another candidate

Didn’t vote

Prefer not to answer

25.7%

45.8%

4.0%

20.1%

4.4%

18–​44-​year-​old group expressing far less enthusiasm for Trump than the 45+​ age group.19 According to the study, only 25% of 18–​44-​year-​old evangelical Christians report having a “very favorable” opinion of Trump, compared to 55% of older white evangelicals. Our 2021 results for 18–​29-​year-​old evangelicals similarly show that Trump did not fare well with this group in the 2020 presidential election. Only 25.7% of respondents report that they voted for Trump. By contrast, 45.8% said that they voted for Biden (see Table 4.7). Our data does not allow us to answer why Biden won almost twice as many under-​30 evangelicals’ votes as Trump. Still, other analyses show that frustration with Trump’s handling of the Covid-​19 pandemic and ethical questions surrounding his presidency contributed to that swing. According to evangelical Reverend Jim Ball, the founder and co-​chair of the Evangelicals for Biden campaign, rising concern about climate change among younger evangelical voters also played a significant role.20 In a December 2019 Religious News Service article,21 political scientist Ryan Burge also reported evidence of declining support for the GOP among younger white evangelicals, noting that 71.3% of them voted for Republicans in the 2018 midterm election, compared with 79.7% for older white evangelicals. Our results similarly show lower levels of support for the GOP (proxied by vote for Trump) among young white evangelicals. Burge’s preliminary calculations on the basis of Harvard University’s Cooperative Election

122  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Study Common Content, 2020 dataset, show that 80.1% of evangelicals of all ages voted for Trump in 2020.22 Our data show that 73.9% of young evangelical voters who reported voting for Trump in 2020 are white.23 Taking the stock of the data we discussed above, it seems that this new generation of evangelicals is far less willing to automatically side with the Republican Party than their parents and grandparents. But how do young evangelical and born-​again Christians perceive America’s global stature in recent years? The perceptions of the U.S. role in the world may color respondents’ attitudes toward the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute, support for Israel, and opinion of Muslims and Jews. The last 20 years are a particularly critical period for our respondents, as it covers the formative years of this age group. Specifically, we asked our respondents to ponder the following question: “Thinking back over the last 20 years, do you think America has been a positive force for global peace and prosperity?” The respondents were given the following response options: (1) The U.S. has been a positive force for global peace and prosperity; (2) The U.S. has been a negative force for global peace and prosperity; and (3) The U.S. has not had a major impact, good or bad, on the world at large. 40.7% perceive the U.S. role to be positive, 39.1% consider the U.S. influence on global prosperity and peace to be negative, and 20.3% believe that the United States has not had a major global impact at all. These perceptions also vary by partisanship (see Table 4.8). While the difference between Democrats and Republicans is not very large, it is noteworthy that more Democrats (47.5%) have a positive assessment of the U.S. role than Republicans (43.1%). Considering that 12 of the last 20 years were under Republican leadership (G. W. Bush and Donald Trump), we expected to find the opposite, with more Republicans expressing a positive opinion than Democrats. Under-​30 evangelicals also hold a very positive attitude toward Muslims. In both 2018 and 2021, the plurality of under-​30-​year-​olds expresses a good or very good opinion of Muslims. As Table 4.9 shows, positive perception of Muslims is twice as high among this age cohort than among over-​30-​year-​ olds (21.1% expressed a positive opinion of Muslims in 2018). Statistical analysis of the 2018 data showed that positive opinions of Muslims reduced respondents’ support for Israel in a multivariate ordinal logistic regression that controlled for age and a host of other variables. We will also test this hypothesis here, to see if our 2018 findings for evangelicals of all ages hold for the under-​30 cohort specifically.24

Change of the Guard  123 Table 4.8.  Evangelicals’ view of the U.S. global role, by partisan affiliation (2021 data)

The U.S. has been a positive force for global peace and prosperity The U.S. has been a negative force for global peace and prosperity The U.S. has not had a major impact, good or bad, on the world at large

Democrats (excluding independents leaning Democrat)

Republicans (excluding independents leaning Republican)

Independents

47.5%

43.1%

37.2%

39.4%

32.8%

41.1%

13.1%

24.1%

21.7%

Table 4.9.  Evangelicals’ opinion of Muslims (comparisons across age cohorts and over time)

Poor (very poor and poor responses combined) Neutral Good (very good and good responses combined) No opinion/​don’t know

Under 30 (2021)

Under 30 (2018)

30+​ (2018)

12.4%

11.9%

30.9%

35.2% 41.7%

29.9% 46.3%

36.2% 21.1%

10.7%

11.9%

11.8%

Twentysomething Evangelical and Born-​Again Christians and Israel We incorporated several survey questions to understand how young evangelicals view Israel and the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. We began with a fundamental question that probes whether our respondents’ religious beliefs matter to their support for Israel—​“Do your religious beliefs influence how you perceive Israel, Palestinians, and the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute?” 38.2% of our under-​30 respondents agreed that “Yes, my religious beliefs make me more supportive of Israel.” An additional 17.4% said that “Yes, my religious beliefs make me more supportive of the Palestinians,” and 44.4% replied

124  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century that “No, my religious beliefs have little to do with my assessment of the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute.” The fact that a plurality—​almost a majority—​of twentysomething evangelical and born-​again Christians suggest that their religious beliefs do not impact their view of the dispute is significant. While this data point alone does not allow us to say definitively what factors predict and explain young evangelicals’ support for Israel, it does tell us that for a large proportion of this generation the answer lies in political, social, and other secular explanations, not religion. Anecdotally, we frequently hear from pastors and other researchers that support for Israel may be lower among under-​30s because they simply know less about the conflict than their elders. We thus wanted to understand what young evangelicals actually know and what they think they know about the dispute. The survey asked two questions to test our respondents’ objective and subjective knowledge. We first asked, “How knowledgeable are you about the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute?” to understand the subjective perceptions of our respondents. 22.8% told us that they know nothing at all about the dispute; 22.5% said that they possess very limited knowledge and another 26.4% stated that they have limited knowledge. However, close to 30% of respondents indicated that they had either moderate (20.1%) or extensive (8.1%) knowledge of the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. To gauge the objective knowledge of the evangelical twentysomethings, we asked the respondents to answer the following question: “The dispute between Israelis and Palestinians about land ownership usually centers on borders. According to your best recollection (without looking it up), in what year did these boundaries emerge?” It is a tough question. Ordinary citizens, young and old alike, struggle with answering questions related to the dates of historical events. Despite the question’s inherent difficulty, more than one in five respondents (21.8%) correctly identified 1967 as the year when the land ownership dispute emerged. 23.4% selected 1973, 10.8% picked 1993, 3.6% said 2000, and 40.4% indicated they didn’t know. Are those under-​ 30 respondents who say that they are knowledgeable about Israel actually possess a greater level of (objective) knowledge than respondents who indicated that they know little or nothing about the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute? The answer is yes. 11.25% of those who said that they know nothing at all about the dispute provided a correct answer to our question about the borders. 19.6% of those who said that they possess “very limited knowledge” answered the question correctly. 23.2% of those with “limited knowledge” picked 1967. Among respondents who asserted

Change of the Guard  125 that they have a “moderate level of knowledge” about the dispute, 31.2% correctly chose 1967. And finally, 29.8% of the “very knowledgeable” young evangelicals correctly identified 1967. In sum, there is a relatively robust and linear relationship between subjective and objective knowledge about the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute in our sample. So, how do our 2021 respondents perceive Israel? To ensure comparability with our 2018 data, we employed a relative measure of support for Israel (vis-​à-​vis Palestinians), rather than a separate set of measures of support for Palestinians and Israel. Respondents were provided the same question that we posited to our 2018 respondents: “In relation to the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute, where do you place your support?” The respondent was offered the following range of responses: (1) =​Very Strong Support for Palestinians; (2) =​Support Palestinians; (3) =​Lean Toward Support for Palestinians; (4) =​Support Neither; (5) =​Lean Toward Support for Israel; (6) =​support Israel; (7) =​Very Strong Support for Israel. In 2018, we discovered that even though young evangelicals were less supportive of Israel than respondents over 30 years old, the degree of Israel’s favorability was still very high. Overall, 75.2% of the 2018 respondents of all ages either lean toward supporting Israel or manifest strong or very strong support for Israel. When these data are disaggregated based on age, support for Israel among twentysomethings stood at 68.9% versus 76.5% for 30-​plus evangelicals (combined results for those who chose “lean toward support,” “support,” and “very strong support” for Israel). By contrast, as Table 4.10 shows, a meager 33.5% of young evangelicals in our 2021 survey said that they support Israel. These differences are stark, especially considering that despite the obvious differences in the sample size of twentysomethings in 2018 versus 2021, the demographic characteristics of these young respondents are not fundamentally different on most of the factors that we compared above. The relatively large contrasts between 2018 and 2021 twentysomethings, so far, center on ideology (2018 respondents were approximately 10 percentage points more conservative than the 2021 poll participants) and religiosity (26.3% more of 2018 respondents frequently attended church and 14.6% more of them frequently read the Bible than the 2021 under-​30 respondents). In the statistical analysis of the 2018 data, we discovered that socialization with other pro-​Israel evangelicals was critical in boosting a respondent’s support for Israel. More specifically, those respondents who frequently heard other evangelicals talk about the importance of supporting Israel were 56% more likely to express high levels of support for Israel themselves. We

126  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Table 4.10.  Evangelical support for Israel versus the Palestinians (comparisons across age cohorts and over time)

Number of respondents Very Strong Support for Palestine Support Palestine Lean Toward Support for Palestine Support Neither Israel nor Palestine Lean Toward Support for Israel Support Israel Very Strong Support for Israel

Under 30 (2021)

Under 30 (2018)

30+​ (2018)

700 7.6%

148 0.7%

714 0.7%

8.0% 8.7%

3.4% 1.4%

0.3% 1.3%

42.2%

25.7%

21.3%

12.3% 11.0% 10.3%

23.7% 13.5% 31.8%

12.5% 22.6% 41.5%

Table 4.11.  Socialization with pro-​Israel evangelicals (comparisons across age cohorts and over time)

Never Seldom Once a month Every week

Under 30 (2021)

Under 30 (2018)

30+​ (2018)

25.8% 39.5% 22.7% 12.0%

11.3% 27.7% 27.1% 33.9%

15.8% 37.4% 25.8% 21.0%

replicated this question in our 2021 survey to see if more frequent exposure to positive messages about Israel generates high levels of support for it. The participants were asked, “How often do you hear other evangelicals talking about the importance of supporting Israel?” As Table 4.11 demonstrates, more than twice as many twentysomethings in 2021 “never” hear about the importance of supporting Israel compared to the 2018 twentysomethings. Under-​30 evangelicals in 2018 were also almost three times more likely to hear about the importance of Israel “every week” than 2021 under 30s. What could possibly account for these temporal differences? One potential answer lies in the events preceding our 2018 survey, which was carried out April 3–​10, 2018. On December 6, 2017, former President Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and announced the move of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. Trump went further, explicitly naming

Change of the Guard  127 the constituency he was hoping to appease: “We moved the capital of Israel to Jerusalem,” Trump said at a rally in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. “That’s for the evangelicals.”25 It is probable, even likely, that this generated more pro-​Israel conversations among evangelicals and born-​again Christians of all ages—​ not just among the under-​30s—​during the four-​month window between the announcement and the fielding of our survey. It is also notable that young evangelicals in 2018 heard about the importance of Israel even more frequently than their parents and grandparents.26 These differences notwithstanding and in light of our 2018 findings, we similarly expect to find a positive relationship between socialization with pro-​ Israel evangelicals and one’s support for Israel. Additionally, we asked our 2021 twentysomething evangelicals to assess Israeli policies in the Palestinian Territories: “On a scale of 1–​10, with 1 being completely unfair and 10 being completely fair, how do you think Israel currently treats Palestinians in Palestinian Territories?” The data reported in Table 4.12 indicate that a significant plurality (almost a majority) of the respondents do not feel very strongly one way or the other. Respondents’ answers to this question reflect a bell-​shaped curve, with 49.1% of them choosing 5 or 6. 22.8% perceive some degree of unfairness in Israeli treatment of Palestinians,27 while 28.1% consider, to varying degrees, that Israel treats Palestinians fairly.28 Similar bell-​curve distribution characterizes respondents’ answers to the question concerning Palestinian statehood (see Table 4.13). The survey asked, “On a scale of 1–​10, with 1 being complete opposition and 10 being complete support, do you favor or oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, alongside Israel?” We deliberately included “alongside Israel” qualification, as scholars Cavari and Freedman demonstrate that this qualifier provides a more accurate representation of evangelical public opinion on the issue of Table 4.12.  Evangelicals’ perceptions of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians (2021 data) Completely unfair 1 Israeli 5.9% treatment of Palestinians

2 3.1%

3

4

4.7% 9.1%

Completely fair 5

6

7

8

35.7% 13.4% 9.8% 7.3%

9

10

4.6%

6.4%

128  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Table 4.13.  Evangelical support for a sovereign Palestinian state, alongside Israel (2021 data) Complete opposition 1 Independent 5.6% Palestinian state

2 1.9%

3

4

3.9% 9.1%

Complete support 5

6

7

8

35.1% 15.6% 9.4% 7.9%

9

10

5.9%

5.9%

Palestinian statehood.29 With 50.7% indicating 5 or 6 on a 10-​point scale, it is safe to conclude that a majority of under-​30 evangelical and born-​again respondents simply do not consider this to be a particularly poignant issue for them. According to public opinion data from 1977 to 2019 reviewed by Cavari and Freedman, a majority of Americans have remained in favor of a Palestinian state, with minimal partisan differences until the beginning of the twenty-​first century. Since then, support for the Palestinian state declined slightly for all partisan groups, but the decline was more significant among Republicans. “By 2018, a small majority of 56 percent of Democrats still favored an independent Palestinian state, but only 37 percent of Republicans favored it (for independents, the trend is similar to that of Democrats),” write Cavari and Freedman.30 Our young evangelicals’ data show that only 27.6% of those who identify as Republicans indicate some degree of support for establishing a Palestinian state.31 By contrast, 39.4% of Democrats express support for Palestinian sovereignty. Almost a majority (48.3%) of Republican respondents felt ambivalent about the issue, versus 33.5% of Democrats. 17.9% of under-​30 evangelicals oppose Palestinian statehood, 59.9% do not feel strongly about the issue, and 22.2% support it. Substituting ideology for partisanship produces almost identical results for Republicans: 47.9% of conservatives are ambivalent about Palestinian statehood and 25.8% are in support. More respondents who identify as “slightly liberal,” “liberal,” and “extremely liberal” express ambivalence (41.6%) than Democrats, but the levels of support for independent Palestine are roughly the same (37.1%). Educational attainment does not seem to impact support for a Palestinian state. Data for under-​30 evangelicals with high school and bachelor’s degrees are virtually identical. This contrasts significantly with general American trends over the last 40 years, which show that the more educated are more supportive of an independent Palestine than the

Change of the Guard  129 less educated, as reported by Cavari and Freeman.32 Relatedly, we do not observe that women are significantly less favorable of Palestinian independence than men. The differences are within 4–​6 percentage points, with young evangelical men slightly more supportive (31.2%) of Palestinian sovereignty than women (27.7%). Of course, the topic of Palestinian statehood is conceptually different from our measure of support for Israel. As Cavari and Freeman point out, it is not clear that favoring or opposing a Palestinian state necessarily corresponds to opposing or supporting Israel. Page and Bouton similarly find that supporting Israel does not automatically translate into opposing a sovereign Palestinian state.33 We will test these insights later in the chapter to determine whether support for Palestinian statehood varies systematically with support for Israel. Lastly, we offered our respondents an opportunity to reflect on the status of Jerusalem, a particularly contentious issue for the resolution of the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute. More than 7 out of 10 respondents (71.6%) believe that “Jerusalem, in its entirety, should be the capital of the State of Israel, and its governance should not be shared with the Palestinians.” Only 28.4% of the respondents believe that “The Palestinians should have East Jerusalem as their capital, next to Israel.” We interpret these data to mean that despite the substantially lower levels of support for Israel among the twentysomethings, the evangelicals of this age cohort are still staunchly committed to supporting Israel’s unilateral control of Jerusalem. They may be willing to lend greater support to many Palestinian claims, but not those concerning the “Eternal City.” It is also interesting to note that support for Israel’s unilateral control of Jerusalem does not vary significantly by eschatology, despite our suspicion that it would. 75% of premillennials, 69.3% postmillennials, and 72.6% amillennials support this position. Partisan affiliation also does not matter substantially: 70.8% of Democrats, 72% of independents, and 79.9% of Republicans among under-​30 evangelicals support the idea that undivided Jerusalem should remain under Israeli control. Unfortunately, as Cavari and Freeman argue, inconsistency in wording across previous surveys makes it impossible to compare our results to earlier ones directly, but Americans have generally supported either the idea of assigning responsibility for Jerusalem to an international force or to maintaining Israeli control over the city, as long as Muslims and Christians are provided full access to their holy places.34 While we did not add the qualification of Muslim and Christian access to the

130  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century sites to our question, the responses of under-​30 evangelicals thus seem to align with those of the general American public.

Hypotheses The data described above allows us to test several hypotheses about what drives young evangelicals’ support for Israel. Our first group of assumptions centers on religion. Based on our previous findings and extant research on the role of evangelical eschatology, we hypothesize that a respondent’s adherence to premillennial eschatology will increase her support for Israel, while amillennial or postmillennial beliefs will reduce support for Israel. Whereas premillennials identify many important roles for Jews and Israel in their vision of the End of Days, including the regathering of Jews in their ancestral lands, the reestablishment of the Davidic kingdom, and the rebuilding of the Temple, amillennials and postmillennials do not ascribe such significance to Jewish renewal. Is one of these two eschatological traditions more deleterious to support Israel than the other? It is difficult to say. Our research on evangelical pastors found that adherence to the amillennial eschatology strongly contributes to a pastor’s support for replacement theology, exerting a more significant impact than postmillennialism. Because there is a greater number of amillennial respondents in our sample (42.7%) than postmillennials (25.1%), it is certainly possible that the negative effect associated with this eschatology will be more widespread and, therefore, more consequential for support for Israel among twentysomethings. However, it is too early to claim that amillennialism is more impactful for perceptions of Israel than postmillennialism among ordinary evangelical respondents, especially among the 18–​ 29-​year-​olds. Thus, for now, we make no specific hypotheses regarding the relative impact of postmillennialism and amillennialism. To test the effects of eschatology on support for Israel, we create two dichotomous variables—​ one for amillennialism and another for postmillennialism, where 1 indicates that the respondent adheres to this eschatological view and zero otherwise. We also hypothesize that those who believe there is no eternal covenant with the Jewish people will also be less likely to support Israel. Such beliefs serve as a proxy for replacement theology and, as a result, should also be significant predictors of evangelicals’ views of Jews and contemporary Israel and their support of Israel in the current Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. To

Change of the Guard  131 determine if such an effect exists, we create a dummy variable that combines “God never had a covenant with the Jewish people” and “No, the covenant has ended” responses and code them as 1. “Yes, the covenant remains intact today” responses are coded zero. We thus anticipate a negative relationship between this variable and support for Israel. Consistent with our findings from the analysis of the 2018 data, we hypothesize that respondents who exhibit a relatively high level of religiosity—​ demonstrated by the frequency of church attendance—​should express more positive attitudes toward Israel. Similarly, we expect that more frequent exposure to the message about the importance of Jews and Israel to evangelicals should promote more support for Israel. Lastly, we use the responses to the question “Do your religious beliefs influence how you perceive Israel, Palestinians, or Israeli–​Palestinian dispute?” as a control. We expect a strong and positive relationship between “Yes, my religious beliefs make me more supportive of Israel” responses and the respondent’s expressed support for Israel. In relation to the political causes of evangelical support, we expect that partisanship is an important determinant of young evangelicals’ attitudes toward Israel and the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. Jeremy Mayer found that evangelical Republicans are more supportive of Israel than evangelical Democrats, even after controlling for the effects of eschatology.35 To confirm that the impact of political variables is consistent across different specifications, we will test two additional measures—​ideology and the 2020 presidential election vote. For example, in the analysis of the 2018 data, we found that conservative ideology was positively associated with support for Israel. We also hypothesize that young evangelicals’ support for Israel or the Palestinians will be impacted by their perception of Israeli treatment of Palestinians in the Palestinian Territories. Simply put, those who believe that Israel treats Palestinians fairly will also express a more positive attitude toward Israel. This variable is measured 1 to 10, with higher numbers indicating a perception of greater fairness. We thus expect a positive relationship. This study also hypothesizes that the respondent’s general opinion of Muslims will impact his support for Israel. In our analysis of the 2018 data, we found that positive attitudes toward Muslims decreased a respondent’s degree of support for Israel by 27.7%. This variable is coded from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good). Based on our earlier findings, we expect a negative relationship between opinion of Muslims and support for Israel.

132  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Finally, we control for standard demographic factors: education, income, gender, marital status, region of residence (South), and race/​ethnicity. We are particularly interested in the impact of race and ethnicity. On the one hand, some previous findings lead us to expect that African Americans will be less sympathetic toward Israel than other groups. Janelle Wong argues that “even when one takes into account the effects of partisanship, socioeconomic status, and other potential intervening variables, race is still an important predictor of policy attitudes among those who identify as born-​again.”36 Many African Americans see the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute through the eyes of white–​black oppression and identify with the Palestinian struggle for self-​determination and equal treatment and, as a result, express systematically lower levels of support for Israel than other ethnic groups in the United States.37 Black Lives Matter co-​founder Patrisse Cullors even called on the movement’s supporters to “step up boldly and courageously to end the imperialist project that’s called Israel” during her remarks on a panel at Harvard Law School in 2015.38 The platform for the Movement for Black Lives directly singles out Israel in its Invest-​Divest “Cut Military Expenditures Brief ” policy document, calling Israel “an apartheid state with over 50 laws on the books that sanction discrimination against the Palestinian people.”39 On the other hand, our analyses of the 2018 data on ordinary evangelicals and the 2020 data on evangelical pastors found no statistically significant relationships between race (African American) and support for Israel or between race and support for replacement theology. As a result, it remains unclear whether black respondents are systematically more critical of Israel than the other groups. We utilize a dichotomous variable (African American) to test this relationship once again, specifically as it relates to the under-​30 evangelical and born-​again Christians. We include a dummy variable for a region of residence (South). White evangelicals comprise the largest religious group in the South. This region is more conservative/​Republican and has higher levels of religiosity in comparison to the other regions. Also, premillennial eschatology is most widespread in the South. While we control for all of these factors directly, there may be something additional about the region of residence that we have not considered. Thus, even though we failed to find statistically significant results for the South dummy variable in our previous analyses, our present study controls for the region of residence and expects a positive relationship—​ young evangelicals in the South should be more supportive of Israel. We do not have clear theoretical expectations about the impact of other

Change of the Guard  133 Table 4.14.  Summary statistics (2021 data) Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev. Min

Max

Support for Israel (dependent variable) Frequency of church attendance No eternal covenant with the Jewish people Amillennial eschatology Postmillennial eschatology Evangelicals talk about Israel’s importance Religious beliefs make me more supportive of Israel Democrat (Party I.D.) Israel treats Palestinians fairly Opinion of Muslims Biological sex (female) Educational attainment African American respondent Marital status (married) South (region of residence) Income

700

4.18

1.60

1

7

700 700

4.30 0.13

1.72 0.34

1 0

6 1

700 700 700

0.43 0.25 1.21

0.49 0.43 0.96

0 0 0

1 1 3

700

0.38

0.49

0

1

700 700 626 693 700 700 700 700 641

0.34 4.54 2.51 0.55 3.35 0.28 0.27 0.45 2.26

0.47 2.18 1.09 0.50 1.43 0.45 0.44 0.50 1.76

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

1 9 4 1 6 1 1 1 6

demographic variables on support for Israel, and our previous research failed to find statistically significant results for any of the standard demographic controls. We, therefore, employ a two-​tailed test of statistical significance to take into account all potential effects. Summary statistics for all variables appear in Table 4.14. Specific variable descriptions and coding procedure for all of the variables discussed above and used in this analysis appear in Appendix B.

Findings We utilize a multivariate ordered logistic regression to explore the determinants of young evangelicals’ support for Israel.40 Sampling weights and robust standard errors are used in the analysis. Table 4.15 displays the statistical results and odds ratios for the explanatory variables.41 The model

134  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Table 4.15.  Determinants of young evangelicals’ support for Israel (ordered logistic regression results) Variable

Coefficients w/​ Robust Standard Errors

Odds Ratio

Frequency of church attendance No eternal covenant with the Jewish people Amillennial eschatology Postmillennial eschatology Evangelicals talk about Israel’s importance Religious beliefs make me supportive of Israel Democrat (party I.D.) Israel treats Palestinians fairly Opinion of Muslims Biological sex (female) Educational attainment African American respondent Marital status (married) South (region of residence) Income N (observations) Log pseudolikelihood Wald X2 Prob > X2 McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 Pseudo R2 Difference of BIC’ parameters

.095 (.047)* -​.503 (.199)* -​.410 (.208)* -​.889 (.233)*** -​.216 (.102)* .986 (.205)*** -​.448 (.184)* .154 (.044)*** -​.385 (.093)*** -​.209 (.161) .094 (.062) -​.414 (.200)* .210 (.184) .093 (.166) .059 (.049) 574 -​765.894 135.82 0.000 0.269 0.0989 211.296 (very strong support for the fully specified model)

1.099* .605* .664* .411*** .806* 2.680*** .639* 1.166*** .681*** .811 1.098 .661* 1.233 1.097 1.060

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; all significance tests are two-​tailed; a difference of BIC’ parameters indicates that fully specified model (one that includes all of the variables above) is more likely to have generated the data than the null model (with only demographic variables); McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 provides the closest approximation of Adjusted R2 statistic found in OLS; * p>0.05; ** p>0.01; *** p>0.001.

explains about 27% of the variance. All tests for parallel lines assumption are insignificant, as expected.42 As we expected, the statistical analysis has generated several interesting findings. Our research confirms our previous results based on the 2018 data: religiosity is an important determinant of one’s support for Israel.

Change of the Guard  135 Frequent churchgoers are more supportive of Israel than infrequent church attendees. Every step-​level change in religiosity (for instance, from attending church two to three times a month to once a week) increases one’s propensity to choose Israel over Palestinians by roughly 10% (see odds ratios column in Table 4.14). Among those under-​30 respondents who never go to church, only 25.5% either “lean toward support for Israel,” “support Israel,” or “very strongly support Israel.” Combined support for Israel increases to 41.9% among under-​30s who attend church “at least once a week.” Similarly, the percentage of “support neither” respondents drops from a high of 52.7% for those who never attend church to 37.9% for those respondents who say that they attend “at least once a week.” Substituting church attendance with Bible readership produces essentially the same results.43 Thus, across both measures of religiosity, across two different surveys, and across both under-​30 and 30-​plus age groups, we find that more religious evangelical and born-​again Christians are consistently more supportive of Israel. Frank Newport, a Gallup Senior Scientist, analyzed almost 20 years’ worth of Gallup polling data (2001–​2019) on Americans’ sympathy toward Israel. His findings echo ours: highly religious Americans (in terms of church attendance) are much more sympathetic toward Israel than those who are less religious.44 These findings are further reinforced by the statistically significant result for our My religious beliefs make me more supportive of Israel variable. While we treat it primarily as a control variable, the odds ratio of 2.68 shows that young evangelicals who attest that religion matters in their sympathy for Israel are almost 2.7 times more likely to express very high levels of support for Israel than respondents who say that their religion makes them more supportive of the Palestinians, or those who say that their religion does not influence their view of the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute at all. The data also shows that under-​30 evangelical respondents are highly influenced by their perceptions of how fairly Israel treats the Palestinians in the Palestinian Territories. Regression results for this variable are highly significant and point to a substantial impact. As a respondent’s view shifts one point on a 10-​point scale in favor of greater perceived fairness, support for Israel rises by 16.6%. Thus, for example, a young evangelical who sees the Palestinian treatment as mostly fair (8 on a scale of 1–​10) is 99.6% more likely to express a high level of sympathy for Israel than a respondent who perceives the Palestinians’ situation as one of relatively high inequity and lack of fairness (with a score of 2).

136  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century The three most substantial negative impacts on support for Israel are reflected in the following statistically significant variables: (1) adherence to postmillennial eschatology; (2) belief that there is no eternal covenant with the Jewish people; and (3) identification with the Democratic Party. Although a larger proportion of our under-​30 respondents are amillennial than postmillennial in their eschatological views, amillennialism reduces support for Israel by 33.6%, while postmillennialism decreases support for Israel by almost 60%. As we hypothesized, supersessionism exhibits a highly negative impact on perceptions of Israel. Supersessionism sees the role of Israel and the Jewish people eclipsed by the Christian Church, rendering Jews and Israel inconsequential to the timing of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ and the redemption of believers. Our results for the no eternal covenant with the Jewish people variable clearly reflect this harmful effect, reducing support for Israel by 39.5%. While notions of replacement are embedded in both postmillennial and amillennial eschatology, our results show that supersessionism exerts a powerful independent effect on the feelings toward Israel, even with controls for the effects of eschatology. Previous research indicates that ideology and partisanship strongly affect perceptions of Israel. Our statistical analysis of the 2018 data on evangelicals showed that conservatives are 32.1% more likely to express high levels of support for Israel than ideological centrists and liberals. As mentioned earlier, Mayer similarly finds that evangelical Republicans are more supportive of Israel than evangelical Democrats, even after controlling for the effects of premillennial dispensationalism. Frank Newport goes one step further, arguing that “partisan identity appears to trump religion when it comes to Israel.”45 Newport considers broad religious affiliation, such as Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and so forth, alongside religious attendance, in making this claim. A number of variables in our analysis measure various eschatological views and doctrinal principles, so it is hard to compare Newton’s and our results directly, but both of us analyze the impact of church attendance. If we focus on this metric, as it is measured in our analysis, the combined effect of a 5-​step change (from “never attend” to attending church “at least once a week”) is a 49.5% increase in support for Israel. This significantly eclipses the impact of partisanship in our data. While we indeed find that, in 2021, the twentysomething respondents who consider themselves to be Democrats are 36.1% less likely to support Israel than independents, Republicans, and members of other U.S. political parties, the combined

Change of the Guard  137 effect of religiosity remains greater than the effect of partisanship in our data. Relatedly, substituting partisan affiliation with either ideology or the 2020 presidential election vote does not fundamentally change our results. In other words, conservative ideology, Republican Party I.D., and 2020 vote for Trump exert a roughly similar (positive) influence on support for Israel. Meanwhile, liberal ideology, Democratic Party affiliation, and vote for Biden all exhibit a negative impact on perceptions of Israel, with roughly similar odds ratios. Due to multicollinearity, we are unable to test the impact of these three variables (partisanship, ideology, and 2020 vote) simultaneously, however. The statistical analysis of the 2018 data showed that favorable opinions of Muslims reduced respondents’ support for Israel by 25.5%, after controlling for a host of other potential explanations. However, we were unable to run separate regression analyses for under-​30s and 30-​plus respondents. Our current data provides an answer to that lingering question—​the impact of Opinion of Muslims variable is even more substantial for the 18–​29-​year-​old evangelicals than it was for the evangelicals of all ages in 2018. In the 2021 data, positive opinion of Muslims reduces support for Israel by 31.9%. Earlier, we hypothesized that exposure to positive messages about Israel would increase respondents’ support for Israel. In the analysis of the 2018 data, we found that those respondents who frequently heard other evangelicals talk about the importance of supporting Israel were 56% more likely to express high levels of support for Israel themselves, leading us to conclude that socialization with other pro-​Israel evangelicals was one of the most important determinants of sympathy for Israel in this religious movement. The results of our current statistical analysis, however, are fundamentally different from those earlier results. The result for the Evangelicals talk about Israel’s importance variable is statistically significant and negative. Put differently, those young evangelicals who frequently hear pro-​Israel messages are less likely to express high levels of support for Israel. For every step-​level change in the frequency of pro-​Israel socialization (for instance, from hearing it “once a month” to “every week”), support for Israel is reduced by 19.4% (see odds ratio column in Table 4.14). This is a substantial and somewhat puzzling result. It could reflect a sort of youthful rebellion, where the under-​30 evangelicals are defying their parents’ politics, rallying against the evangelical establishment and its decades-​long, steadfast support for Israel. They are questioning older evangelicals’ unwavering sympathy toward Israel in light of what they

138  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century see on the news—​abject poverty and lack of economic opportunities in the Palestinian Territories, evictions of Palestinian families, retaliatory strikes by Israel that destroy civilian infrastructure, images of dead and injured Palestinian children, and vocal condemnation of Israel by the U.N., Human Rights Watch, the European Union, and others. Their parents and, to an even greater extent, their grandparents, grew up with different imagery. The older generations matured with memories of the recent Holocaust, the expulsion of Jews from the Arab states in the late 1940s, and Israel’s military victories against multiple, well-​equipped Arab adversaries. The older generation grew up during a period of Cold War American propaganda that painted Israel as a shining and sole example of western-​style democracy and capitalism in the Middle East, a bulwark against militant, pro-​Soviet Arab socialism and autocracy. We make no claims here about the accuracy of these different views of Israel; these examples are simply meant to denote that the media and information environment of the last 20 years—​the formative years of the 18–​29-​year-​old evangelicals—​is fundamentally different from the one that existed during the Cold War. In the following chapter, we review the written responses of young evangelicals to our open-​ended questions and delve deeper into these unexpected findings. Some scholars assert that it is not clear that favoring or opposing a Palestinian state necessarily corresponds to opposing or supporting Israel. We ran both bivariate and multivariate regressions to test these insights to see if attitudes toward the Palestinian state impact support for Israel. Indeed, attitudes about Palestinian independence are statistically significant predictors of support for Israel. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant at p =​0.001 level. Strong support for an independent Palestinian state reduces support for Israel by 24.1% among under-​30 evangelical and born-​again respondents. The almost identical impact (in comparing odds ratios) for this variable in both bivariate and fully specified regression suggests that these results are reliable.46 Lastly, our analysis shows that neither education, income, marital status, gender (biological sex), nor region of residence impact young evangelicals’ levels of support for Israel at statistically acceptable levels. We failed to find significant effects of these variables in our analyses of ordinary evangelicals in 2018 and among the evangelical pastors in 2020 survey data. Our previous studies similarly failed to discover a statistically significant relationship between support for Israel and race. However, the present analysis of 18–​29-​year-​old evangelicals clearly shows that race is an important predictor

Change of the Guard  139 for this age cohort. Specifically, we find that African American respondents are 33.9% less likely to support Israel than respondents from other ethnic backgrounds.47 Cavari and Freeman argue that African Americans identify with the Palestinian struggle for self-​determination and, as a result, express systematically lower levels of support for Israel than other ethnic groups in the United States. Indeed, some of the written responses submitted by black respondents in our sample entail the sort of sympathy that Cavari and Freeman describe.48

Digging Deeper into the Effects of Eschatological Doctrines The statistical analysis shows that the impact of the postmillennialist view on the support for Israel is negative and twice as large as the impact of amillennialist beliefs. Why would postmillennialism be more detrimental to support for Israel than amillennialism? Let’s recall that premillennialism, the dominant tradition in the modern evangelical movement, revolves around the belief that Jesus Christ will physically return to the earth (the Second Coming) before the Millennium, a literal thousand-​year period of peace. The premillennialist perspective argues that the world will continue to worsen until Jesus’ return. In regard to premillennialism’s connection to politics, scholar Michael Doran argues that for premillennialists, “government’s job is not to spread the word of God or to perfect the world; it is to protect the community, to safeguard its freedom. Man is inherently broken, so perfection in this world will not come from human agency.”49 As it relates to the future, premillennialism is a pessimistic view that expects the human condition to continue to deteriorate and the U.S. government to be non-​interventionist at both at home and abroad.50 Amillennialism, by contrast, does not teach a literal thousand-​year earthly reign of Christ. The “thousand-​year” reference in Revelation 20 is viewed as a figurative expression for the present reign of Christ that began upon His ascension into heaven and will be fully manifested at His Second Coming. Christ’s Second Coming will be one event at which He will raise all of the dead in final judgment and establish a permanent rule in the new heaven and new earth. So, how might amillennialism affect domestic and foreign policy? Mark Melton argues that amillennialists see “no impetus to improve the world to usher in the eschaton, or to dwell in bunkers while the world

140  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century burns . . . In neither excessive expectation nor despair, Christians would continue their daily lives as normal until Christ’s return.”51 A premillennialist sees the world deteriorating further and further until Jesus’ Second Coming, an amillennialist argues that certain positive developments in politics, economics, and society will occur alongside negative events. Supporters of this amillennial view would also reject, according to Doran, the expectation that technology, government, social reform, or some other mechanism will lead to significant future improvements because humans will continue to sin.52 In contrast to the above, the postmillennial eschatology places Christ’s second advent after (post) the Millennium. Counter to the premillennialism’s claim, the Millennium is not understood to involve a visible reign of Christ in the form of an earthly monarchy, nor is the millennial period to be taken literally as an actual, thousand year-​long period. In this respect, postmillennialism and amillennialism see eye to eye; or, as Thomas Ice notes, “In many senses, postmillennialism is simply an optimistic form of amillennialism.”53 Yet, the postmillennial view does posit a recognizable and future millennial period, a golden age of prosperity and peace among all, at the end of which Christ will return. Doran says this thought downplays mankind’s inherently sinful nature and emphasizes how societies can improve themselves through governmental action. Walter Russell Mead argues that Christian progressives in the United States, particularly during the second half of the twentieth century, followed a version of this belief while promoting the Social Gospel and various political reforms.54 Both Doran and Mead link postmillennial theology to policies abroad and progressive reforms at home to improve the human condition locally, nationally, and globally. Doran similarly argues that, domestically, “Progressive persuasion promoted equality between the sexes and among America’s racial and socioeconomic groups.”55 Globally, he says, “The mission of America is, rather, to use its military and economic power to nudge the world toward universal brotherhood.”56 Following the same line of thought, Mark Tooley writes that “These modernists were ecumenical and interfaith, internationalist, and confident of global collaboration leading to world peace and justice.”57 Given postmillennialism’s preoccupation with reform and positive transformation of society, economics, and politics, how does it view the Jewish people and contemporary Israel? Loraine Boettner, a well-​known postmillennial writer, writes, “It may seem harsh to say that ‘God is done with the Jews.’ But the fact of the matter is that He is through with them as a unified national group having anything more to do with the evangelization of the

Change of the Guard  141 world. That mission has been taken from them and given to the Christian Church (Matt. 21:43).”58 Relatedly, Doran paints postmillennialists as decidedly anti-​Israel: In mid-​[twentieth] century America, the State Department and the CIA were packed with Protestant modernists and missionary cosmopolitans. It should come as no surprise that these institutions were reflexively anti-​ Zionist. Their hostility to the idea of a Jewish state set the stage for a clash between the White House and the State Department during the Truman administration. Truman . . . supported the 1947 partition plan for Palestine and moved to recognize Israel the following year. The State Department responded by seeking first to frustrate and then to reverse his major foreign policy decisions. That fight was bitter and long, but Truman persevered and got his way on major decisions.59

The literature mentioned above makes a strong argument in favor of treating postmillennialism as uniquely and particularly anti-​Zionist. Combined with its focus on social justice and improvement of the human condition, it is not a hard stretch to argue that the postmillennial view naturally gravitates toward the Palestinians and away from Israel in the current political environment. Our finding that postmillennialism decreases support for Israel by almost 60% (versus amillennialism’s 33.6% reduction in support) therefore makes a great deal of sense. Although a larger proportion of young evangelicals in our sample are amillennial than postmillennial, the negative impact of postmillennialism on support for Israel is decidedly greater. And this negative effect of postmillennial eschatology is independent of, but complementary to, the negative impact of replacement theology. Lastly, is it reasonable to assume that all of this even matters to twentysomething evangelicals, who are not eschatology experts? Most likely, the vast majority of our respondents have a very thin understanding of what premillennialism, postmillennialism, and amillennialism entail. Certainly, it is unreasonable to argue that these young Christians are consciously assessing their view of the End of Days, resurrection, the Second Coming, and so on when they are looking at the question of whether they support Israel or the Palestinians. However, it is another thing to argue that these respondents subconsciously incorporate their theological beliefs into their perspective of Israel. If young evangelicals are taught a particular eschatological view in church over the course of their most critical formative years, it

142  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century is certainly possible that they are reflexively responding on the basis of what they were taught, without necessarily giving it much thought. In this respect, eschatological beliefs become a part of a coherent schema that a respondent uses in thinking about contemporary domestic and foreign policy questions. This is the interpretation that we adopt here.

Conclusion The changes in the evangelical and born-​again community that we observe in this study are fascinating. This religious movement is rapidly evolving and fragmenting, from a fairly monolithic, white, conservative, pro-​Israel bloc from the 1950s through the 1990s to one which manifests almost evenly split loyalties on the Israeli–​Palestinian question and considerable levels of eschatological, racial/​ethnic, generational, and political diversity. Only a third of our under-​30 evangelical and born-​again respondents said they supported Israel, and approximately a quarter expressed their support for the Palestinians. More than 4 out of 10 young evangelicals in our sample expressed either ambivalence or a deliberate decision not to endorse either side by selecting the “support neither” response option. In the following chapter, our analysis of this age cohort digs deeper in an attempt to explain how under-​30 evangelicals justify their views toward the Israeli–​Palestinian conflict. We turn to the written comments that our respondents provided to explain why they chose to support Israel, the Palestinians, or neither. Before we focus on this rich qualitative data, let us briefly summarize our findings so far. The most important contributors to a respondent’s support for Israel among the twentysomething evangelicals are religiosity and perceptions of how well Israel treats the Palestinians. Frequent churchgoers and Bible readers are more supportive of Israel than infrequent church attendees and those who rarely read the Bible. These findings are consistent across different age cohorts in 2018 and our 2021 sample of under-​30 evangelicals. In light of our results and similar findings by other scholars, there is now enough evidence to confidently claim that religiosity—​broadly defined as the frequency of engaging in religious activities—​is an important predictor of support for Israel among self-​identified evangelical and born-​again Christians. Whether this relationship between religiosity and support for Israel exists for Mainline Protestants, Catholics, religious Jews, or other religious groups remains to be investigated.

Change of the Guard  143 In regard to young evangelicals, we observed an additional interesting pattern. Although young evangelicals report high levels of biblical literalism (81.5% of under-​30 respondents in our April 2021 survey that the entire Bible is true), their support for Israel is declining. They do not make the connections between a literal reading of the Bible and the support for Israel their parents and grandparents are making. Positive perceptions of Palestinian conditions matter greatly to under-​ 30 evangelicals’ support for Israel. Among those respondents who perceive the Palestinian treatment by Israel as mostly fair (8 on a 10-​point scale) the odds of expressing strong support for Israel rise by 99.6% compared to respondents who perceive the Palestinians’ situation as largely unfair (with a score of 2). As a political strategy, both pro-​Israel and pro-​Palestinian groups can use reporting on the Palestinian conditions in the Occupied Territories to effectively shape young evangelicals’ support (and opposition) for the parties to this long-​standing dispute. However, in light of our discovery that frequent interaction with pro-​Israel evangelicals reduces support for Israel among under-​30s, finding an effective way to reach this audience may be challenging. This study also identified important theological, political, and demographic factors that reduce support for Israel and bolster the pro-​Palestinian position among young evangelicals. A belief that an eternal covenant between God and the Jewish people does not exist, an essential characteristic of replacement theology, reduces young evangelicals’ support for Israel by roughly 40%. Other aspects of eschatology (i.e., one’s understanding of the End of Days, specifically as it relates to the notion of the “millennium,” and the role of human agency in bringing about the Second Coming of Jesus Christ) are also highly significant predictors of support for Israel. As we speculated above, the effect of supersessionist views and beliefs grounded in amillennialist and postmillennialist eschatological doctrines on the support for Israel is likely subconscious, but it does play a significant role. Our analyses of both ordinary evangelicals in 2018 and 2021 and evangelical pastors in 2020 reflect the importance of eschatology. While pastors (and, potentially, highly educated ordinary evangelicals who understand eschatological intricacies) may incorporate their eschatological positions into their perceptions of the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute explicitly and directly, the vast majority of ordinary evangelical and born-​again Christians are doing so reflexively and subconsciously (we will show this more clearly in the next chapter).

144  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Not only do we establish that both postmillennialist and amillennialist eschatological views reduce support for Israel, but we also show that postmillennialism’s impact is significantly higher than that of amillennialism and provide a conceptual framework to explain why that is the case. Premillennialism, while significant and positive in a bivariate regression, fails to reach acceptable levels of statistical significance in a fully specified model. Moreover, adding premillennialism to the model tested in Table 4.15, also fails to generate a more robust explanation of the data. The variance of the data explained by the model remains unchanged. Put differently, adding premillennialism to the existing model does not explain any more of the data than the model without it. Given the relatively low levels of support for premillennialism among young evangelicals, these results are not particularly surprising. But, we need to add a couple of essential qualifications. Some aspects of the premillennial position seem to be nevertheless internalized by the twentysomething evangelicals. Almost 6 out of 10 respondents agreed that the covenant with the Jewish people remains intact today, and more than 7 out of 10 agreed that Jerusalem, in its entirety, should be the capital of the State of Israel. While it is fascinating to observe a broad variety of theological variables play such an important role in explaining contemporary foreign policy attitudes, we must also remember that more than 4 out of 10 young evangelicals said that their view of the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute and their support for Israel or Palestinians are not impacted by their religion. For these respondents, sources of support lie in the realm of politics rather than religion. In terms of ideology, partisanship, and presidential vote, our study shows that conservatism, identification with the Republican Party, and vote for the former President Trump bolster support for Israel. Democrats and ideological progressives, as well as Biden voters in the 2020 presidential election, are more critical of Israel and more likely to express support for the Palestinians rather than support neither party in the dispute. Concerning Palestinian statehood, Cavari and Freeman find that favoring or opposing an independent Palestinian state does not necessarily correspond to opposing or supporting Israel. We see the opposite among twentysomething evangelicals: attitudes about Palestinian independence are statistically significant predictors of support for Israel. Those young evangelicals who support a sovereign Palestinian state are also less likely to express high levels of support for Israel. Similarly, our data show that a

Change of the Guard  145 positive opinion of Muslims substantially reduces support for Israel among both younger and older evangelicals. Whether the negative opinion of Muslims contributes to support for Israel due to a general negative perception of Islam as a competitor religion or due to the collective blame that some respondents ascribe to Muslims for 9/​11 attacks or other terrorist incidents, or due to something else entirely, is not clear at this point. Content analysis of our respondents’ written comments in the following chapter may help shed light on this issue. In a 2006 interview, Pastor Ted Haggard, the President of the National Association of Evangelicals at that time (who later was shamefully removed from this position), pointed to a generational gap between young and older evangelicals concerning support for Israel. The younger generation, he told Stephen Spector, the scholar who conducted the interview, did not grow up on the eschatology of their elders. Haggard argued that the promises of blessings to Gentiles in return for support for the Jewish people described in Genesis 12:3 are not enough to guarantee the kind of alliance with Israel that their parents forged. Because of the prevalence of and firm adherence to premillennialism, the evangelical generation that grew up on the Late Great Planet Earth by Hal Lindsey supported Israel unconditionally, but for the subsequent generations, that sympathy may have to be earned, Haggard concluded.60 Our findings validate Haggard’s concerns and confirm the trends he noted 16 years ago. Young evangelicals today are indeed different from their elders, and those differences translate into substantially different levels of support for the State of Israel. What remains unclear is whether the attitudes of these respondents will change as this age group grows older, becoming similar to the views of previous generations (and thus more favorable toward Israel), or whether this cohort will remain critical of Israel, even as it matures and ages.

Appendix. Variable Descriptions and Coding Procedures • Support for Israel (dependent variable): “In relation to the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute, where do you place your support?” Coded 1 for “Very strong support for Palestinians”; 2 for “Support Palestinians”; 3 for “Lean toward support for Palestinians”; 4 for “Support Neither”; 5 for “Lean toward support for Israel”; 6 for “Support Israel”; 7 for “Very Strong Support for Israel.”

146  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century • Amillennial/​Postmillennial/​Premillennial eschatology: “Which one of the following statements best fits your views on the Bible passage in Revelation 20 that says that Christ shall reign “a thousand years”? This 1000-​year period is . . .” The original variable coding was as follows: 1 for “a symbolic way of describing the period of Christ’s rule in heaven where he is reigning over the believers spiritually (often called amillennialism)”; 2 for “an era in which the world will gradually grow more Christian and just, ending with Christ’s Second Coming (often called postmillennialism)”; 3 for “a literal 1,000-​year period during which Jesus reigns in Jerusalem, the capital of His kingdom on earth, following His Second Coming (often called premillennialism)”; 4 for “I hold a different view concerning the 1000-​year period described in Revelation 20.” These eschatological positions were then recoded as dichotomous variables, where 1 indicates the presence of a specific eschatological view and zero otherwise. We generated three dichotomous variables: “Amillennial eschatology,” “Postmillennial eschatology,” and “Premillennial eschatology.” “I hold a different view” responses were recoded as missing values and dropped from the statistical analysis. • No eternal covenant with the Jewish people: “Do you believe God’s covenant with the Jewish people remains intact today?” Coded 1 for “Yes, the covenant remains intact today”; 2 for “No, the covenant has ended”; 3 for “God never had a covenant with the Jewish people”; 4 for “I do not know” (recoded as a missing value and dropped from the analysis). We then recoded the original variable in the following manner: 1 for combined responses to “No, the covenant has ended” and “God never had a covenant with the Jewish people” and zero otherwise. • Frequency of church attendance: “Aside from weddings and funerals, before the Covid-​19 pandemic, on average, how often did you attend church or religious services?” Coded 1 for “Never”; 2 for “Seldom”; 3 for “A few times a year”; 4 for “Once a month”; 5 for “Two or three times a month”; 6 for “At least once a week.” • Evangelicals talk about Israel’s importance: “How often do you hear other evangelicals talking about the importance of supporting Israel?” Coded 1 for “Never”; 2 for “Seldom”; 3 for “Once a month”; 4 for “Every week.” • Religious beliefs make me more supportive of Israel: Do your religious beliefs influence how you perceive Israel, Palestinians, and the

Change of the Guard  147 Israeli–​Palestinian dispute?” Coded 1 for “Yes, my religious beliefs make me more supportive of Israel”; coded 2 for “Yes, my religious beliefs make me more supportive of the Palestinians”; coded 3 for “No, my religious beliefs have little to do with my assessment of the Israeli–​ Palestinian dispute.” Recoded as a dummy variable, where 1 is “Yes, my religious beliefs make me more supportive of Israel” and zero otherwise. • Democrat (party I.D.): “In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?” Coded 1 for “Republican”; 2 for “Democrat”; 3 for “Independent”; 4 for “Other party”; and 5 for “Don’t know/​no preference/​prefer not to answer.” Recoded as dummy variable, with 1 for “Democrat” and zero otherwise. • Opinion of Muslims: “What is your opinion of Muslims?” Coded 1 for “Very poor”; 2 for “Poor”; 3 for “Neutral”; 4 for “Good”; 5 for “Very good.” Coded 6 for “No opinion/​Do not know” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • Israel treats Palestinians fairly: “On a scale of 1–​10, with 1 being completely unfair and 10 being completely fair, how do you think Israel currently treats Palestinians in Palestinian Territories?” • Gender (biological sex): “What is your biological sex at birth?” Coded zero for “Male”; 1 for “Female”; 2 for “Prefer not to answer” (recoded as missing value and dropped from analysis). • Educational attainment: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?” Coded 1 for “some high school”; 2 for “high school graduate”; 3 for “some college”; 4 for “trade/​technical/​vocational training”; 5 for “four-​year college graduate”; 6 for “post-​graduate degree.” • Income: “What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months?” Coded 1 for “Less than $25,000”; 2 for “$25,000 to $34,999”; 3 for “$35,000 to $49,999”; 4 for “$50,000 to $74,999”; 5 for “$75,000 to $99,999”; 6 for “$100,000 to $149,999”; 7 for “$150,000 or more.” Coded 8 for “Prefer not to answer” and then recoded as missing value to drop from analysis. • African American respondent: “Do you consider yourself to be any of the following?” Coded 1 for “American Indian or Alaskan Native”; 2 for “Asian”; 3 for “Black or African American”; 4 for “Hispanic or Latino”; 5 for “Multiracial”; 6 for “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander”; 7 for “Other”; 8 for “White, non-​Hispanic.” We then created a dummy variable for African American respondents, where 1 represents a belonging to African American group and zero otherwise.

148  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century • Marital status: “What is your current marital status?” Coded 1 for “Married”; 2 for “Widowed”; 3 for “Divorced”; 4 for “Separated”; 5 for “Single/​Never Married.” Recoded as dichotomous variable where “Married” is 1 and zero otherwise. • South (region of residence): “In which U.S. state do you currently reside?” Respondents selected their state of residence from a drop-​down menu. We then coded 1 for “Northeast” which includes CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT. “South” was coded 2 and includes AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV. “Midwest” was coded 3 and includes IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI. West is coded 4 and includes AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY. We created a dichotomous “South” variable, where 1 represents residence in AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, or WV and zero otherwise. • Bible readership (used for descriptive inferences only): How often do you read the Bible? Coded 1 for “Never”; 2 for “Seldom”; 3 for “Once or twice a month”; 4 for “Only in church”; 5 for “Once a week”; 6 for “At least twice a week”; 7 for “Every day.” • Partisan identification (used for descriptive inferences only): Combines responses from party I.D. variable above with the follow-​up question among those who answered “independent.” Those respondents were then asked a follow-​up question, “As of TODAY, do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?” Coded 1 for “Republican” and 2 for “Democrat.” The combined variable was then recoded 1 for “Republican”; 2 for “Independent (leaning Republican)”; 3 for “Democrat”; 4 for “Independent (leaning Democrat)”; 5 for “Other party”; and 6 for “Don’t know/​no preference/​prefer not to answer.” • Ideology (used for descriptive inferences only): “In general, would you describe your political views as . . .” Coded 1 for “Extremely liberal”; 2 for “Liberal”; 3 for “Slightly liberal”; 4 for “Moderate, middle of the road”; 5 for “Slightly conservative”; 6 for “Conservative”; 7 for “Extremely conservative.” • 2020 presidential election vote (used for descriptive inferences only): “In the 2020 presidential election, who did you vote for?” Coded 1 for “Trump”; 2 for “Biden”; 3 for “Another candidate”; 4 for “I did not vote”; 5 for “Prefer not to answer.” • U.S. global role (used for descriptive inferences only): “Thinking back over the last 20 years, do you think America has been a positive force for

Change of the Guard  149 global peace and prosperity?” Coded 1 for “The U.S. has been a positive force for global peace and prosperity”; coded 2 for “The U.S. has been a negative force for global peace and prosperity”; and coded 3 for “The U.S. has not had a major impact, good or bad, on the world at large.” • Independent Palestinian state (used for descriptive inferences only): “On a scale of 1–​10, with 1 being complete opposition and 10 being complete support, do you favor or oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, alongside Israel?” • Control of Jerusalem (used for descriptive inferences only): “Which of the following most closely reflects your opinion for governing Jerusalem?” Coded 1 for “Jerusalem, in its entirety, should be the capital of the State of Israel, and its governance should not be shared with the Palestinians.” Coded 2 for “The Palestinians should have East Jerusalem as their capital, next to Israel.”

Chapter 5 Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves Content Analysis of Open-​Ended Survey Responses

The previous chapter analyzed new trends among young evangelicals and outlined several reasons for their lower levels of support for Israel in comparison to the older generations. In this chapter, we let these young men and women speak for themselves. This survey on young evangelicals deviated from our previous surveys by adding two open-​ended questions. After responding to the question: “In relation to the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute, where do you place your support?,” 18–​29-​year-​old evangelical and born-​ again Christians were offered a follow-​up question, on the basis of their support for the Palestinians, Israel, or neither. For example, a respondent who just noted that he “leans toward supporting the Palestinians” would then be prompted to explain his choice: “Please explain why you support Palestinians more than Israel.” The second open-​ended question asked the participants to confront and analyze the generational differences in support for Israel that were discovered in recent surveys, including ours. Respondents were offered the following question: “Previous studies have shown that younger Evangelicals sometimes express lower support for Israel than older Evangelicals. Why might this be the case, in your opinion?” We received 700 responses to each question. Most of the answers were brief, comprising just a few words, with many typos and abbreviations typical for this age group. For example, some respondents wrote “idk” for “I don’t know,” but as we explain later, there is much to learn even from such a response. Of course, we were also fortunate that many poll participants provided detailed responses, which showed extensive knowledge and analytical complexity. In the examples you will read below, we retained the language used by these respondents verbatim. In addition, when a single response contained several distinct justifications, we coded the response in each relevant category.1 Why use open-​ended questions? How do they enrich our inquiry into evangelical support for Israel? There are several advantages to open-​ended Christian Zionism in the Twenty-​First Century. Motti Inbari and Kirill Bumin, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2024. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197649305.003.0006

Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves  151 questions and to free-​form responses that these questions generate. Free-​form responses deliver novel, often unexpected, insights that are not encompassed in the closed-​end response options created by pollsters. The big problem with closed questions is that to design them into a survey instrument, the researchers need to know roughly what answers to expect. Accounting for all of the potentially valid responses to a complex foreign policy question, such as ours, is a difficult task in a single, closed-​end question. The use of open ends thus allows us to explore reasoning that may not be immediately apparent during the survey design phase. Moreover, free-​form written answers can reveal a great deal about the essential logic of young evangelical and born-​again Christians’ reasoning, language choices, and frames of reference. Content analysis of these comments will thus enhance, confirm, and refine our understanding of the changes in the evangelical community. In order to get a deeper understanding of the participants’ attitudes on the Israeli–​Palestinian conflict, we analyzed the content of the free-​form responses and categorized them into three broad categories: stances based on religious and scriptural arguments, those based on political arguments and historical claims, and those that lacked clarity or encompassed the “I don’t know” responses. In this chapter, we argue that such responses potentially hint at powerful “gut feelings” that direct a respondent toward a particular response about the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute in the absence of extensive knowledge of the dispute or complex analytic assessment.

Who Do Young Evangelicals Support? To recap, we analyze free-​form answers that under-​30 evangelicals provided to explain their response to the following question: “In relation to the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute, where do you place your support?” Poll participants were offered an ordinal scale, with seven response categories, ranging from very strong support for the Palestinians to very strong support for Israel. “Support neither” option was offered to the respondents in the middle of the scale. Those who expressed any degree of support for Israel (33.6% of the sample) were then prompted to explain their choice. Similar conditional response logic was used for respondents who expressed any degree of support for the Palestinians (24.3% of the sample) and for those who indicated that they “support neither” (42.2% of the sample, as shown in Figure 5.1 below).2

152  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century In relation to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, where do you place your support? 60.0

Percent

42.2 40.0

20.0

0.0

7.6

8.0

8.7

Very strong support for Palestinians

Support for Palestinians

Lean toward support for Palestinians

Support neither

12.3

11.0

10.3

Lean toward support for Israel

Support for Israel

Very strong support for Israel

Figure 5.1.  Evangelical support for Israel versus the Palestinians

Israel’s Supporters As Figure 5.2 demonstrates, one-​third of the sample said that they “lean toward support for Israel,” “support Israel,” or express “very strong support” for Israel. 59% of those who voiced support for Israel used religious arguments and around 20% gave political, historical, or foreign policy justifications. Another 21% said they could not clearly explain why they chose this option.

Religious justifications The most commonly used response among supporters of Israel was that “Israel is God’s people.” We explain this curious choice of words later in this section. Around 41% of the religious explanations in this survey encompassed this argument; often, in those exact words. A few representative examples appear below. They are God’s chosen people. Because of my faith and being a Christian, it is important to support God’s chosen people. Israel is and has always been a powerful and respected nation I mean Jesus himself was born there and the Israelites are the most symbolic people in the Bible so that’s why I support Israel. God was with the Israelites.

Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves  153 Please explain why you support Israel more than Palestinians

Percent

80.0 60.0

59.0

40.0 20.0 0.0

Religious reasons

19.8

21.2

Political reasons

“Gut” feeling of favorability

Figure 5.2.  Typology of pro-​Israel responses

The second most frequently referenced religious argument is related to biblical promises given to Israel and the Jewish people by God. Approximately one-​third of under-​30 evangelicals who espoused religious explanations argued that they support Israel over the Palestinians because of God’s promises to Israel. God gave the land of cainan (sic, Canaan) to the jews it is there promised land, and in truth is rightfully theirs, they a peaceable people. The Israelites were promised this land by God. Even though they had essentially abandoned their country, they never officially turned it over to the Palestinians. God did give Isreal to the Jews and eventually it will belong to them again. It’s their land and Palestinians have bad intentions.

The third most common argument in the religious explanations was that support for Israel is justified because the land belongs to God, or it is a holy land, and even that it is “Jesus’ land,” as comments below demonstrate. Around 14% of the religious explanations used a variant of this argument as their explanation. Because israel is God’s country. I support Israel because It is Jesus land and all of the land. It was the holy land that Jesus walked on so it is the Isaerlite’s land.

These three explanations are of course connected with one another; they represent adherence to various aspects of the Abrahamic covenant. These

154  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century explanations together account for roughly 88% of all religious arguments, a clear indication that theologically derived justifications to support Israel are based on a biblical literalist’s acceptance that God made a covenant with Abraham and his offspring, which makes Israel God’s people who are entitled to this land as part of that covenant. This land is holy on its own right, thus making it God’s land or Jesus’ land that belongs to the people of Israel (although it is sometimes unclear from the responses if Israelis are the owners or just the wardens of the land for God). The remaining set of justifications were coached in the language of familiarity (i.e., Israel is supported over the Palestinians due to the respondent’s sense of greater knowledge of and comfort with Israel because of his/​her familiarity with the Bible) and Israel’s relative peacefulness or its less aggressive/​militant stance in the dispute. Praying for the peace of Jerusalem (Ps. 122:6) is a common theme among evangelical pastors, and connecting Israel with peace might come from there, although saying that Israel is more peaceful/​less aggressive could be construed as a political argument than a religious one, as we will show in the section below. In a 2006 interview, Pastor Ted Haggard lamented that the promises of blessings to Gentiles—​an essential part of the Abrahamic covenant (Gen. 12:3)—​in return for support for the Jewish people are no longer enough to guarantee the kind of alliance with Israel that their parents forged. Our statistical findings in the previous chapter and content analysis carried out in this chapter confirm the trends that Haggard noted almost two decades ago. Only three respondents explicitly mentioned God’s blessings as a motivation for supporting Israel. For example, one respondent wrote: “I support Israel because the Bible says you will be blessed for doing so. However, I also have a heart for Palestinians and want the best for them.” The peripheral influence that God’s blessings play in the minds of young evangelicals as they seek to explain their support for Israel is thus an important indicator of the substantial theological changes taking place in the evangelical community. Relatedly, only one respondent out of 700 defended the support for Israel in eschatological terms, in relation to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. “They are God’s chosen people and Jesus will come back there in the end times,” the respondent wrote, elevating the role of eschatology in the explanation. Even “cold” eschatology, which we defined in Chapter 1 as a significant determinant of support for Israel, does not play a considerable argument among young evangelicals, which by itself can provide a powerful example of the disconnect between the generations.

Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves  155 It is also worth noting that we observed a curious usage of terms among our respondents. Young evangelicals supportive of Israel seldomly used the term “Jews” or “Jewish people,” preferring instead to invoke “Israel” in their explanations. The use of “Israel” over “Jews” is a potentially important signal, which might reflect the degree to which a respondent integrates the Hebrew Bible into his or her worldview. Some scholars argue that the New Testament’s references to “Jews” typically carry a negative tone,3 while the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) typically refers to “Israel,” not “Jews.” This preference may indicate that evangelicals invoke the language of the Old Testament to bypass the negative imagery imputed onto the Jewish people in the New Testament. Additionally, this blurring of differences between modern Jews and ancient Israelites reaffirms the continuity between the ancient biblical nation and the modern State of Israel.

Political and historical justifications Approximately a fifth of those who said they support Israel (19.8%) invoke some version of political, historical (i.e., rooted in one’s interpretation of history), and foreign policy arguments to justify their support. One relatively frequent response (23% of the pro-​Israel responses in this category) was that the respondent supports Israel because the land belongs to Israel from a historical perspective. Some readers might object to our decision to code these responses in this category, arguing instead that assertions of land ownership should be understood as drawn from the biblical narrative of the Abrahamic covenant, which sees the people of Israel as the rightful heirs of the Land of Israel, promised to them by God. Our decision to categorize these types of responses as political and historical, rather than religious, was due to the fact that these respondents’ justifications did not reference the Bible or use any explicitly religious overtones. Quotes below are indicative of the secular language prevalent in such responses. They have the historical right to the land. The Palestinians were taking the Israelis land and claiming it as their only even though it belong to the Israelis before. I believe the land historically belongs to the Jews, and that all the Arab nations around are not entitled to it and are all enemies of Israel, many are terroristic and want to destroy Israel just because.

156  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Israel has been around for a very long time they should know where their boundaries lie. I feel like they may deserve it more since they were there, it is all politics I do not like negativity or choosing sides against to people that I have great facts why they deserve it. I just support isreal more. I mean come on its a tiny country next to palestine. Give a bit.

The most frequently cited reason to support Israel among the respondents who provided a non-​religious rationalization focused on Israel’s victimization at the hands of Palestinians, who are perceived to be aggressors/​terrorists and solely responsible for the outbreaks of violence. 34% of Israel supporters who used secular arguments included this reasoning in their comments. The comments below are illustrative of these types of justifications. For centuries the Palestinians terrorized the locals in there (sic, their) area. They also would terrorize the Jews and try to take over their holy land. Although war is not good or fun . .. Israelites have been oppressed for so long it’s high time they take control. i have seen allot of bad parts and bloodshed, but more negitive media about the palestinians side, so i guess that shaped my view. I believe Israel has been treated unjustly in all of this and Palestine has been trying to create war and unjust in what was once a very beautiful country. I really don’t have knowledge over this but I last seen that Israel were the victims. As far as I can understand, the borders have been drawn, and while I understand Palestine’s and Israel’s mutual frustration, I think that it’s a stupid thing to kill people over. I support Israel slightly more because from what I’ve gathered Palestine is usually the instigator.

The third most common response (9% of the political justifications) invoked U.S. foreign policy: as an American ally, Israel deserves and requires support. Statements below are indicative of this line of thinking. Throughout my life, in current and past presidencies, Isreal has been an ally to the people of the United States.

Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves  157 I think that Israel position in the arab world is beneficial for USA because Israel proved that it’s a strong and independent country. whoever (sic, however), i think Israel is over using power against Palestinians.

It is worth mentioning that, generally speaking, we found more nuanced, complex, and detailed arguments among the young evangelicals who invoked political or historical justifications than among those who justified their support solely from the religious perspective. The example below illustrates this type of well-​reasoned and nuanced thinking. It also shows how some of the respondents engage both political and theological justifications to explain their support for Israel. Israel has come out as victor on most of the wars, often surprisingly so but they have. I generally think that the state has earned its position there. And it is supported as an ally of the US in what has been a strategically important region with few tight US allies. The violence on either side is tragic. I’m not sure if I support Israel just on a strong biblical stance but I probably do have some bias towards wanting Israel to succeed from a religious point of view but also historically, given why the state was created as a refuge in the first place. It’s a tough issue.

Other infrequently provided explanations for support of Israel from a non-​religious perspective were that Israel is a democracy (3 out of 139 respondents, or less than 2.2% of this subgroup), that Israel is a strong and independent (3 respondents) or peaceful (4 respondents) country, and that Israelis are good people (3 respondents).

“Gut feelings” of favorability toward Israel The third cluster of responses in our open-​ended questions represents respondents who take a pro-​Israel position, but cannot provide a clearly articulated reason for why they chose this option over the others. Following several recent studies, we believe that this cluster reflects the so-​called “gut feeling” of favorability. When people lack sufficient information about complex foreign policy issues, they intuitively reduce complex political questions into simpler ones

158  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century by utilizing their generalized positive affect toward one of the disputants as a decision-​making tool. Cavari and Freedman show that Americans who wish to compensate for their lack of knowledge about foreign affairs rely on “gut feelings” about countries. Thus, a favorable view of Israel or of the Jewish people (knowledge from the “gut”) may assist respondents in developing their attitudes about a wide range of issues regarding the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. For example, when asked why they chose Israel over Palestine, some young evangelicals answered, “I just do,” or “I support Israel because,” or “I am not completely sure about this one to be honest with you.” 21.2% of the responses from the pro-​Israel respondents can be considered as such. Although these responses may lack the desired clarity, they are instructive. These respondents say they support Israel but cannot articulate a clear reason for this choice; their choice to support Israel over the Palestinians is instinctive. As one respondent put it, “I’m not exactly sure why I have selected that answer It just felt right to do so.” Another respondent, speaking in a similar vein, actually used the same terms that we adopt here: “I have a gut feeling that I should support them more.” Where could this “gut feeling” of support come from? One potential answer lies in socialization with pro-​Israel pastors and fellow evangelicals. The specific reasons for supporting Israel may not be clearly articulated during various social and religious functions where evangelicals discuss the dispute or their support for Israel, or the respondent may not be paying a particularly close attention to find a justification for support that resonates with her, but the interaction itself creates a positive affect toward Israel.

Palestinian Supporters In the survey, 153 poll participants (21.9% of the sample) expressed support for the Palestinians over Israel. Their justifications could be similarly categorized into three types: political and historical, religious, and “gut feelings” (see Figure 5.3).

Political and historical justifications About half of the respondents who expressed support for the Palestinians used political arguments and, as we expected, nearly half of those justifications

Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves  159 Please explain why you support Palestinians more than Israel

Percent

60.0

48.4

40.0 20.0 0.0

39.9

11.8 Religious reasons

Political reasons

“Gut” feeling of favorability

Figure 5.3.  Typology of pro-​Palestinian responses

(47%) invoked social justice, victimhood, the humanity of the Palestinians, and their rights as a people. Responses below reflect this group well. They have the right of the land, jews took it by force and killing civilians to this day l, kicking out locals and expanding to this day, not to mention they’re the most racist full of hate people I’ve ever met and heard of. I support Palestinians for many reasons and their land is one, jews controlling Palestine long time ago had nothing to do with what’s happening now and I can debate about ownership of the land for Years I don’t mind. I support them because they deserve a life just like all of us do and everyone matters in this world no matter what skin tone and matter what height you are no matter what race you are always welcomed in the world and always worth something. It’s wrong what they’re doing to the Palestine’s. #FreePalestine. I believe the Israeli treatment of the Palestinians has been unethical. Palestinians deserve the land and are rather small compared to Israel and violence is really bad. The jews are taking the Palestinians land away with horribly violent force. They kill and maim children. Palestinians are just fighting for their survival.

As the quotes above show, the narrative of Palestinian victimhood plays a major role in pro-​Palestinian respondents’ reasoning. An additional element of this narrative specifically elevates the Palestinians’ historical right to the disputed land as the primary reason for support. 7% of the participants said they support the Palestinians because they are the rightful owners of the disputed land, as statements below demonstrate. Together, these

160  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century justifications of victimhood and land ownership account for 54% of all pro-​ Palestinian responses. It seems like their land you know? Because they are the ones getting their land taken from them. These land was Palestine motherland. I support the Palestinian because they own their land and the Israel’s want to take their land because of their beliefs.

Slightly more than one out of five Palestinian (22%) supporters emphasize the Palestinians’ kindness, hospitality, or moral/​ethical superiority as reasons for their support. They are good and kind people. Because they are amazing. It seems like a better community.

“Gut feelings” of favorability toward the Palestinians Roughly 40% of the respondents could not provide a specific and clear explanation for their support, resorting to explanations such as “I am not sure,” “it makes more sense,” “I just do,” or even confessing that they would like to find clear reasons to justify their support. “I have reasons to support Palestinians more than Israel,” one respondent wrote, “but if anybody where (sic, were) to explains to be (sic, me) I would love it.” We speculate that a significant number of respondents who could not clearly explain their preference for the Palestinians are similar to their pro-​Israel counterparts: “gut feelings” acted below the level of conscious awareness as shortcuts to shape these young evangelicals’ preference for the Palestinians. Where does this positive affect come from? As we indicated in the previous chapter, significant numbers of under-​30 evangelical and born-​again Christians incorporate their postmillennial and amillennial eschatological beliefs into their views of Israel and the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute (likely, subconsciously). We show that both of these eschatological traditions and their close companion, supersessionism, significantly erode support for Israel among under-​30 evangelicals, and these beliefs are becoming more prevalent among this generation of respondents. The postmillennial view, in particular,

Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves  161 with its focus on social justice and social activism, leads its young adherents toward the Palestinians and away from Israel in the current political environment. Exposure to such an eschatological view in church, over the course of their most critical formative years, likely provides young respondents reflexive, “gut” knowledge that rationalizes support for the Palestinians even when in-​depth knowledge of the dispute is lacking. The fact that some pro-​ Palestinian evangelicals justified supporting the Palestinians by noting that this is what they were taught at home (4 responses out of 61) or because they know the Palestinians better (2 responses) solidifies our belief that a subconscious pro-​Palestinian affect, rooted in “gut feelings,” plays an important role.

Religious justifications Very few respondents (around 12%) rationalized their support for the Palestinians through religious arguments. When such a justification was offered, the respondent most frequently referenced Christian values of kindness, inclusivity, and unconditional love. I feel like they have a stronger claim expecially (sic, especially) because of religious beliefs. Because I believe in Jesus and do the right and best thing. Christian love and support all. They are God’s people too. I am a Christian. My strong faith.

Some pro-​Palestinian evangelical respondents share a position espoused by Louis Farrakhan, the leader of the Nation of Islam, that the Jews are not the ancient Israelites. By this logic, Palestinian Arabs are the descendants of ancient Israelites, and as such, the Abrahamic Covenant applies to contemporary Palestinians rather than Jews. “You that think that those who refer to themselves as Jews are the real Children of Israel? No.” said Farrakhan in The Time and What Must Be Done 2013 Lecture Series, “You have made a real theological mistake and some of you have made a theological error because you know the truth, but yet you consider your wickedness in promoting a deceptive lie.”4 We believe that the comments below are reflective of this line of thinking.5

162  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century The bible says those who bless Palestine will be blessed in return. The land was promised to them. I support them very much because the Bible says so I don’t know the full story properly between the two, and I don’t think either of them rightfully own their lands. I think there are real Hebrew people that own both lands, and the current people don’t have the right to either. revelations 3:9/​Jeremiah 14:2 /​james 2:5 . . . (we believe the true people of god to be the negroes latinos and native Indians.

A small minority of pro-​Palestinian responses (only two) are clearly and deliberately anti-​Semitic and anti-​Zionist. Statements they invoke—​that Jews are “evil” or have a “secret agenda,” or referring to a “Rothchild created country” (implying the role of a famous Jewish banking family)—​are clear-​ cut tropes from anti-​Semitic literature, such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Because Jews are evil. I feel like Isreal has a very secret hidden agenda that may not be good for the christians. when referign (sic, referring) to isreal im thinking the rotshcild craeted (sic, created) country.

“Support Neither” Respondents 42.2% of the respondents, the largest proportion of young evangelicals and born-​again Christians, chose to support neither side of the dispute. What motivated them to select this response? The most common justification for not picking a side was the lack of knowledge. Almost 62% of the “support neither” respondents used this argument in their explanation. Considering that 22.8% of our sample told us that they know nothing at all about the dispute, 22.5% said that they possess very limited knowledge, and another 26.4% stated that they have limited knowledge, these results are not particularly surprising. Additional 13% of the “support neither” respondents justified their neutral stance by claiming that both sides are unworthy of support. “Both seem to be at wrong in many ways; while I don’t believe Israeli encroachment is just, the Palestinian rocket attacks and whatnot are not exactly helping me be

Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves  163 sympathetic to their cause,” one respondent noted, for example. Other less common non-​religious explanations included that they support both, or that they all need to live together and get along, or that both sides are human (together, these three arguments were voiced by 32 out of 296 respondents, or 11%). And, 15% of respondents could be classified as a “none of my business” group. These young evangelicals signaled that they don’t want to be involved or that it is not their dispute/​conflict and they therefore have no reason to pick a side. Religious explanations comprised the smallest share of the explanations provided by the “support neither” respondents (6.7% or 18 out of 269 responses). The most common argument in this category of responses was that the respondent chose neutrality because Christian beliefs require one to love all peoples unconditionally. For example: “Because I don’t believe God wants people to fight over beliefs,” or “I feel if they are truley gods people they would be sympathetic and empathetic towards each others issues.”

Analysis Two major observations seem to emerge from the data described above. First, close to three in five young evangelicals who support Israel ground their preference in religious reasoning, while a roughly similar percentage of Palestinian supporters used political/​social justice arguments and assertions of Palestinian victimhood as justifications for their support. Second, the largest share of respondents who support neither Israel nor the Palestinians cite their lack of knowledge as the reason for their neutrality. Both pro-​ Israel and pro-​ Palestinian respondents predictably invoke Christian values to justify their positions. Thus, supporting Israel is narrated as a Christian value (through a reference to Abrahamic covenant), while supporting the Palestinians is often justified by reference to another Christian value: support of the downtrodden and oppressed. In a similar vein, some respondents justified their neutrality by referring to the Christian mandate to love all of humanity. However, religious arguments dominate only among the supporters of Israel’s justifications. Thus, despite the relative decline of premillennialism, religious reasoning, especially rooted in the Abrahamic covenant, remains a powerful force in the evangelical attitudes toward Israel. The narrative of victimhood is also used by both camps to explain their loyalties. The pro-​Israel group argues that Israel is the victim of Palestinian

164  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century aggression, while the pro-​Palestinian group says the opposite, and the neutral group says that both parties to the dispute are equally bad (or equally good). Demonization of the opponent also plays a role. While Israel’s supporters label the Palestinians as terrorists, some of the pro-​Palestinian evangelicals cite Israeli brutality and use anti-​Semitic tropes to explain their position. It is also notable that the terms “Israel” and “Jews” (or “Jewish people”) seem to have been used to subliminally communicate something positive or negative about Israel’s dominant ethnonational group. Israel’s supporters tended to refer to the Jewish people using the term “Israel,” as a positive trait meant to show continuity between ancient past and the present and to invoke direct parallels between biblical language and contemporary realities, while the pro-​Palestinian group was more frequently referring to “jews,” with an implied negative connotation and perhaps even with a deliberate lack of capitalization to reduce the Jewish people’s social status. The free-​form responses we obtained also potentially illustrate the potent power of “gut feelings” that serve the role of heuristic devices to simplify difficult choices for the young evangelicals who may know little about the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute or simply don’t have the analytical bandwidth to make a difficult foreign policy trade-​off decision. A growing body of research demonstrates that positive affect encourages reliance on the gut—​that is, generic knowledge, routines, and heuristics—​rather than systematic processing of individual considerations, based on extensive knowledge of a particular subject (i.e., relying on the “head”).6 Zaller and Feldman7 point out that rather than holding fully formed and stable attitudes, survey respondents might construct their responses based on the limited considerations accessible to them at the moment they are asked. Thus, when a person has a good “gut feeling” toward Israel or the Jewish people, that positive affect not only has the potential to serve as a decision-​making heuristic but should also signal to the respondent that more specific considerations based on detailed knowledge of the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute are not necessary. This, in turn, explains why and how respondents who just expressed strong support for Israel could, moments later, indicate that they do not know how to explain this choice. It is noteworthy that only 21.2% of Israel’s supporters potentially relied on their knowledge from the “gut,” in contrast to 39.9% of the Palestinian supporters. Israel’s supporters were thus much better equipped to justify their support on the basis of concrete religious and political/​historical claims than the evangelical respondents who favored the Palestinians. Analytic

Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves  165 reasoning dominated pro-​Israel responses. We take this to mean that pro-​ Israel forces in the evangelical community are significantly more successful than the pro-​Palestinian evangelicals in articulating a clear and coherent set of arguments that is then widely internalized by their supporters.

Young Evangelicals’ Views of the Generational Gap in the Evangelical Community We asked an additional open-​ended question of our respondents: “Previous studies have shown that younger evangelicals sometimes express lower support for Israel than older Evangelicals. Why might this be the case, in your opinion?” In doing so, we hoped that our respondents would don their social scientist hats and think carefully and rigorously about the changes taking place in their religious community. Their responses did not disappoint. Figure 5.4 summarizes the distribution of responses that we grouped into seven distinct categories. The largest group of responses focused on the intergenerational differences in values and perceived priorities. “The older generation where rised (sic, raised) with more hate,” one respondent noted, “The young generation where rised (sic, raised) with more acception of others.” Another poll taker said Previous studies have shown that younger Evangelicals sometimes express lower support for Israel than older Evangelicals. Why might this be the case, in your opinion? 40

34.0

29.8

30 Percent

22.5

20 10 0

4.7 Young evangelicals know less about Israel

Media’s fault

6.9 1.3

0.9

Israel’s fault

Those findings are false

Different values and priorities

Unclear response

I don't know

Figure 5.4.  Why do young evangelicals differ from their elders on support for Israel?

166  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century that younger evangelicals are less supportive of Israel than their parents and grandparents: “Because younger Americans prioritize social values above all else, especially tolerance and acceptance.” Yet another argued that “Younger evangelicals are looking at the ethical treatment of all, and recognizing that the Old Testament covenant does not automatically excuse unethical behavior.” One respondent astutely observed that the perceived status as a victim has shifted from the Jewish people to the Palestinians: Older generations, even though they might not have lived through the Holocaust, were closer to it, and the Jewish people were horribly victimized then. So being on their side makes sense. I think now, the narrative has changed; many Palestinians were displaced when this happened and so younger people just hear that and think Israel is stealing the land.

Another thoughtful and frequently referenced argument is that younger and older evangelicals have a different understanding of the scripture. According to this line of thinking, older evangelicals are more dogmatic, while younger evangelicals are more open-​minded in their religious beliefs and much less inclined to be biblical literalists. Here are a few examples. Older evangelicals may be closer to a literal translation of the Bible, while younger evangelicals may take the Bible as a guideline or portrayal, rather than literal rules. We [young evangelicals] have been accustomed to hearing other thoughts and opinions. Many older evangelicals are not as open to hearing other viewpoints. I think it [Israel] isn’t a focus of teaching in the church anymore. I think that churches have changed what they teach throughout the years. I think that younger people tend to question the Bible and the meaning of it. They don’t take it as literally as our elders did. They feel like you need to read in between the lines and not everything should be taken at face value. Our generation in particular tends to question a lot of the traditions and rules that our parents and grandparents followed growing up.

Since biblical literalism is one of the main pillars of the currently dominant view, these comments signal that a significant transformation to the very essence of evangelical identity is underway. In Chapter 3, we discovered that premillennial pastors are less ethnically/​racially diverse and significantly

Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves  167 older than amillennial and postmillennial pastors. Conversations with some of the leaders in the young evangelical community, such as Robert Nicholson and Luke Moon of the Philos Project, as well as other anecdotal evidence, lead us to believe that the greater racial diversity of amillennial and postmillennial pastors, combined with their relative youthfulness in comparison to the premillennial pastors, helps attract a larger share of the under-​30 evangelicals to those churches and eschatological positions. With the increasing attractiveness of amillennialism and postmillennialism, under-​30 evangelicals are thinking less and less about the role of Israel and Jews in the End of Days as catalysts for the Second Coming and salvation. And, without explicit eschatological relevance, support for the Jewish people and for Israel in the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute becomes a matter of peripheral concern. We should note here that Jeremiah Castle, author of Rock of Ages: Subcultural Religious Identity and Public Opinion Among Young Evangelicals, a comprehensive study of evangelicals’ ideological gaps, has noticed that on several issues, the evangelical subculture has allowed their young adults some liberalization, in a political version of the “pick your battle” strategy. Castle said that it might not be helpful for a subculture to be politically distinctive on every issue, or else the subculture risks losing its advantage in the religious marketplace by making the cost of membership too high. Therefore, subcultures may find that a more successful strategy is to highlight a handful of issues that create political distinctiveness and a sense of embattlement to provide an advantage in the religious marketplace.8 Our data reflects Castle’s argument and show that the support for Israel in the subculture of young evangelicals has become a marginal subject, thus it should be no surprise that more than three out of four of our 700 respondents said that they know only a “little bit” or nothing at all about the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. Close to a quarter of the respondents (22.5%) explained the generational differences in support for Israel by referencing education. These respondents argued that younger evangelicals are less knowledgable about Israel and thus express lower levels of support. Some of the respondents lamented this situation, using negative terms, like ignorance, stubbornness, and slackness in religious education available to the younger evangelicals. For example: It could possible be because the younger generation doesn’t have all the information And don’t try to look for it. They are too wrapped up in themselves. Taking God out of schools.

168  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century I think because younger evangelicals share a different persepective and are not as well versed or been around it long enough to know what the older people may know or have experienced and learned to form their current opinions.

Some of the survey takers pointed out that younger evangelicals have a much different media exposure than their parents and grandparents. Those respondents who cited the media as an explanation for generational differences noted that younger generations have more diverse, more balanced/​objective, and more accurate information sources than their elders. Although the role of the media was mentioned in many responses, only a small group of respondents (4.7%) explicitly pointed to the media as a source of changing evangelical opinion on the subject of the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute. Below are some of the comments typical of this group. Lastly, more than a third of the sample said that they did not know how to respond to the question (29.8% of the sample) or provided an unclear response (6.9% of the sample). Media exposure. More and more of what is happening in the area is being exposed and shared on social media. Because of the increased amount of unbiased news sources now available to get the full scope of what’s going on. In my opinion I believe that younger evangelicals have lower support for Israel then older evangelicals because we have social media and we hear more about the bad things that Israel does.

Conclusion Critics of quantitative research frequently (and rightly) assert that “good science” requires more than just showing that statistical correlations exist in data. We agree and our desire to provide a rich and nuanced analysis of evangelical public opinion informed our decision to include open-​ended questions in this survey. We did so to gain a deeper understanding of what this generation of young evangelical and born-​again Christians thinks about the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute, why they are different from the preceding generations of evangelical and born-​again Americans, and how they justify their support for one or the other party to the dispute.

Young Evangelicals Speak for Themselves  169 The respondents to our poll are a fascinating bunch and their comments provide an incredibly important glimpse into the mindset of the future evangelical majority. Many of these young adults are acutely aware that they are different from their elders. Some of them can clearly articulate the reasons for their views on Israeli–​Palestinian dispute and for the intergenerational rifts that are emerging in their religious community. Others are less capable of this kind of reflection, but their writing, no matter how brief, misspelled, or disjointed, still illustrates how they potentially rationalize their preference for Israel, the Palestinians, or neither. Recent studies demonstrate that intuition, or “gut feelings,” can function as a shortcut that shapes political attitudes and preferences, often below the level of conscious awareness.9 The idea that individuals can make successful trade-​off decisions about political support without deliberate analytical thought is not new, but it has only rarely been applied to the analysis of American public opinion of the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute and our understanding of the underlying cognitive–​ emotive processes that are involved in such decision making is still underdeveloped. Intuitive answers, akin to knowledge from the gut, are less demanding and rely on feelings of familiarity. Analytic answers, on the other hand, draw on relevant knowledge and may involve an extensive and laborious search for additional information, which is taxing and requires substantial cognitive resources. The easier a claim is to process and the more familiar it feels, the more likely it is judged “true” and the more likely it is selected by default. Thus, a good “gut feeling” may help respondents to overcome the lack of detailed knowledge of the issue or the potentially paralyzing effect of a head full of conflicting thoughts. Our data provides further evidence in support of this type of gut-​driven decision making.

Conclusion The Role of Demography and Theology in Shaping Evangelical Attitudes toward Israel

This section attempts to draw some general conclusions about evangelical and born-​again Christian support for Israel. We focus on the patterns that exist across our surveys. We also refer to additional surveys and studies conducted during the same time period.

Evangelicals’ Demographics and Israel One of the strongest predictors of evangelicals’ support toward Israel is the age of the believer. Our research repeatedly showed that older evangelicals show high levels of support for Israel, while the youngest cohort, 18–​29 age range, repeatedly exhibited the lowest levels of support. It is important to place this generational divide into the broader contours of the American public’s views on Israel and the Palestinians. What it reveals is that evangelical and born-​again Christians are very similar to, rather than different from, other religious, ethnic/​racial, and secular groups in the United States. For example, the same generational divide was observed in the Pew Research Center’s study of American Jews in 2020, which was fielded from November 19, 2019, to June 3, 2020. Pew found that young American Jews are less emotionally attached to Israel than older ones. As of 2020, half of the Jewish adults under the age of 30 describe themselves as very or somewhat emotionally attached to Israel (48%), compared with two-​thirds of Jews aged 65 and older. In addition, among Jews aged 50 and older, 51% say that caring about Israel is essential to what being Jewish means to them, and an additional 37% say it is important but not essential; just 10% say that caring about Israel is not important to them. By contrast, one-​third of Jewish adults under the age of 30 say that caring about Israel is essential (35%), and one-​ quarter (27%) say it’s not important to what being Jewish means to them. Christian Zionism in the Twenty-​First Century. Motti Inbari and Kirill Bumin, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2024. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197649305.003.0007

Conclusion  171 A similar pattern of lower attachment levels to Israel among younger Jewish adults was also present in the 2013 Pew survey.1 Similar trends characterize the African American community. The Philos Project, a Christian non-​sectarian organization that seeks to promote positive Christian engagement in the Near East, initiated a survey among 1,015 African American participants between March 22 and April 2, 2019, and was fielded by LifeWay Research. In the survey, participants were requested to respond to the following statement: “I am a supporter of Israel’s statehood (existing as an independent country).” Regression analysis of the data shows that as one moves from one age category to the next while holding other predictors constant, the probability of support for Israeli statehood increases by 34.1%, and the oldest cohort (65+​respondents) showed the strongest support.2 Data from Gallup confirm that these intergenerational differences permeate the American public’s views of Israel, the Palestinians, and the dispute. Gallup has been examining the sympathy toward Israel since 2001, and its 2021 poll revealed that Americans of all ages still sympathize more with Israel than with the Palestinians in the Arab–​Israeli conflict. However, since 2011, an age gap has emerged, with net sympathy for Israel declining more sharply among younger than older adults. As of February 2021, net sympathy for Israel was +​13 points among adults aged 18 to 34, +​34 among those aged 35 to 54, and +​45 among those aged 55 and older.3 In their valuable study of American public opinion toward Israel, Cavari and Freedman suggest that these generational differences are based on different life experiences. Baby Boomers born after World War II and the Holocaust witnessed Israel’s establishment as a democracy and its political maturation in the 1960s and 1970s, when Israel’s Cold War prominence was at its peak. Subsequent generations that matured toward the end of the Cold War or in the early twenty-​first century were exposed to a different environment, in which Israel’s military superiority was commonly shown on the TV screens and the issues of social justice and the Palestinian right to self-​determination became far more prominent and visible. Cavari and Freedman’s review of dozens of surveys across a seventy-​year period confirms this societal fissure.4 What still remains unclear—​and will remain so for quite a while—​is whether the attitudes of these young Americans will become more favorable toward Israel as they age (and thus converge with the views of previous generations), or whether their attitudes will remain critical of Israel even as this

172  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century generation grows older. The latter explanation, which raises the possibility of a cohort effect, is plausible, especially in regard to the evangelical community. Today’s young evangelicals comprise the first evangelical cohort that grew up with relatively widespread and popular pro-​Palestinian and anti-​Zionist sentiments in their community. The possibility of cohort effects for the current 18–​29-​year-​old Americans, generally, and evangelical Christians, more specifically, merits further research. A quick note about the racial composition of evangelicals is needed here. It is typical for media personalities and partisan pundits to speak of the evangelical movement as if it is monolithic. It is particularly common to see that by “evangelical” someone implies “white evangelical.” Often, there is also a negative connotation attached to the label, with racist and homophobic innuendos. Popular books published in the last couple of years strengthen this biased view. For example, the titles of best-​sellers such as Jesus and John Wayne: How White Evangelicals Corrupted a Faith and Fractured a Nation, and White Evangelical Racism: The Politics of Morality in America, speak for their content.5 Non-​Hispanic whites do represent between 60–​65% of all evangelicals. Although this is a sizeable majority, 25–​30% of the evangelical community consists of African Americans, while Latinos make up the third-​largest group, comprising 10–​15% of the evangelicals. Some research has shown that this movement is becoming more racially diverse with the influx of Asians and Latinos/​Hispanics.6 Moreover, as the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) 2016 survey found, half of evangelicals under 30-​years-​old are now non-​white (50%), a far higher share than among evangelicals older than 65 (23%). PRRI found that “22 percent of young evangelical Protestants are black, 18 percent are Hispanic, and 9 percent identify as some other race or mixed race.”7 Our 2018 data on ordinary evangelicals of all ages and our 2020 data on evangelical pastors show that race and ethnicity are not significant predictors of support for Israel, once we take into the account potential political, theological, and social explanations. However, in the 2021 survey with young evangelicals only, race became a statistically significant predictor for this sample. Specifically, we found that African American respondents are 33.9% less likely to support Israel than respondents from other ethnic backgrounds (no other ethnic or racial group dummy variable was statistically significant). These under-​30 African American evangelicals tend to identify with the Palestinian struggle for self-​determination and, as a result, express

Conclusion  173 systematically lower levels of support for Israel than other respondents in our sample. The written responses submitted by black respondents illustrate their reasoning very well: “]I support the Palestinians] Because they are getting innocently killed. Children, brothers sisters, it’s not fair,” “The Jews have killed them,” and more. Palestinian victimization was a common justification among the pro-​Palestinian African Americans. It is important to recognize that we conducted these surveys during the years of Trump’s presidency and the tumultuous transition to the Biden presidency. Racial tensions in the United States were high, demonstrations were taking place in the streets of several large cities, and the Black Lives Matter Movement (BLM) became prominent and controversial. Moreover, throughout this time, the BLM leadership expressed unwavering support for the Palestinians over Israel, while labeling Israel as a racist and “Apartheid State.”8 All of this preceded our young evangelicals survey in March–​April of 2021 and could potentially explain these results. However, a subsequent survey that we carried out in July 2021 with the Chosen People Ministries, to examine evangelicals’ response to the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza in May 2021, again found that the participants’ race is not a significant predictor of the attitudes toward Israel.9 Thus, the racial difference found in the young evangelicals’ survey might have been an exception and further research on how race and ethnicity impacts support for Israel is needed. In all of our studies, we found that frequent church attendance increases the support for Israel in a significant way. This repeated finding confirms Jeremiah Castle’s theory that the influence of evangelical subculture on public policy attitudes will be strongest among those most engaged in the subculture. Castle argues that those in the pews on Sundays are more likely to be exposed to the political message from pastors, religious leaders, and their fellow members. Those evangelicals who hold more malleable or more liberal political attitudes, argues Castle, also attend church infrequently.10 Our analysis in Chapter 5 shows that 59% of young evangelicals who support Israel ground their preference in religious reasoning, with almost nine out of ten of them specifically invoking the Abrahamic covenant in their explanation. This is a testament to the significant impact of the pro-​Israel evangelical subculture. Frequency of church attendance for these respondents may also proxy a more direct interaction with a pro-​Israel/​premillennial pastor, who frequently discusses the significance of Israel and the Jewish people to Christians.

174  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century Another aspect of immersion into a pro-​Israel subculture, socialization with ordinary, pro-​Israel evangelicals, has a significant and strong impact on support for Israel in the 2018 survey data. We found that frequent exposure to positive messages about Israel generates high levels of Israel support, even after taking into account the influence of other variables. Together, frequent church attendance and socializing with other pro-​Israel evangelicals increased threefold the odds that a 2018 respondent will express high levels of support for Israel. However, our 2021 survey with young evangelicals reflected a dramatically different effect: those young evangelicals who frequently heard pro-​Israel messages were less likely to express high levels of support for Israel in spring 2021. What could this possibly mean? It could reflect a sort of youthful rebellion, where the under-​30 evangelicals are defying their parents’ politics, rallying against the evangelical establishment and its decades-​long support for Israel. For example, Dexter Van Zile argues that young evangelicals want to dissociate from the “Bible-​thumping fundamentalists of yore.”11 These evangelicals feel strong cultural pressure to adjust to the current social realities that are often at odds with their traditional religious beliefs (e.g., gay marriage). “Part of the problem appears to be that young Evangelicals are internalizing the contempt directed at their community by growing numbers of non-​Evangelical Americans,” argues Van Zile.12 While our evidence cannot address Van Zile’s claim that young evangelicals are internalizing contempt directed toward their religious movement, we show that under-​30 respondents themselves recognize the growing rift between their age group and older evangelicals. The political attitudes and loyalties of evangelicals matter. All of our surveys show that the attitudes toward Israel consistently vary with the political worldview of the respondents. Those evangelicals who consider themselves to be ideological conservatives and/​or belong to the Republican Party are significantly more supportive of Israel. And, liberal ideology, Democratic Party affiliation, and vote for Biden all exhibit negative impact on perceptions of Israel, with roughly similar odds ratios. This discovery corresponds well with the extant research, which argues that since the 2010s a growing partisan divide has influenced support for Israel. While supporting Israel used to be consensual and bipartisan, evangelical Republicans are now significantly more supportive of Israel than the evangelical Democrats.13 In this regard, evangelical attitudes also mirror broader changes in the American public opinion.

Conclusion  175

Evangelical Theology, Eschatology, Church Affiliation, and Israel When it comes to the evangelical theology, one significant trend observed in this research is a decline of premillennial eschatology. In 2011, the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) reported that 65% of evangelical Christians followed premillennialism, an eschatology that entails a belief that Jesus Christ will come to earth for the second time after a period of tribulation, followed by a literal “millennium”—​a 1,000 year period, during which Christ and his followers reign on earth.14 We similarly discovered in our 2020 pastors survey (Chapter 3) that 65% of evangelical pastors identify with premillennialism. By contrast, only 21.1% of young evangelicals in our 2021 data (Chapter 4) are committed to premillennialism. Instead, 42.7% of respondents expressed a preference for amillennialism, 25.1% indicated that they follow postmillennialism, and another 11.1% noted that they follow a different eschatology from the three main doctrines. In our first survey in 2018, we did not ask directly about the respondent’s eschatological understanding of Revelation 20, but we did ask several questions that tapped directly into various aspects of premillennialism. We distinguished between “cold” and “hot” eschatology and discovered that “cold” eschatology, which connects Israel with the Second Coming but does not require any action on the part of the believers, was statistically important. However, the “hot” eschatological statements which require that the support for Israel is followed up by deliberate action by the believers (e.g., rebuilding the Third Temple, or expecting Jews to convert to Christianity with Jesus’ Second Coming) came last on a long list of motivations for supporting Israel. This means that warmer eschatological expectations that might have been more prominent in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, as one can find in the writing of Hal Lindsey’s The Late Great Planet Earth and Tim Leahy’s The Left Behind, do not play a significant role in the motivations of the contemporary evangelical audience. It is probable that significant events like the Holocaust, the Six-​Day War, and 9/​11, created certain eschatological expectations that motivated greater support for the State of Israel, but for the current generation of young evangelicals in particular, the meaning of Israel and the impact of these events is blurred. Young evangelicals were too young when 9/​11 took place, so it is not likely that it left a profound impact on them, as it did on the older evangelical and born-​again cohorts. This may help explain their distancing

176  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century from the premillennial ideology and higher levels of sympathy toward Muslims vis-​à-​vis the older generations. Comparisons between elite and mass public opinion within the evangelical community are critical if scholars are to gain a better grasp of the attitudes and beliefs that characterize this segment of the American public. However, such research has not been undertaken in the past and our 2020 pastors survey provides the first glimpse of this important issue. The higher rates of support for replacement theology (supersessionism) among postmillennial and amillennial pastors—​a younger group of church leaders than the larger but older premillennial group—​provide an important explanation for the recent changes in support for Israel in the evangelical movement, especially among the under-​30 ordinary churchgoers. Increasingly, evangelical congregations hear from their pastors that God’s plan no longer has a special place for Jews and Israel in the End of Days. Moreover, since these postmillennial and amillennial ministers are younger than the more pro-​Israel premillennial ministers, this message is likely to spread further throughout the evangelical community as ministers with premillennial eschatological views retire and are replaced with postmillennial or amillennial pastors. This analysis of the pastors’ data also finds that the salience of a pastor’s belief in a particular version of the millennium plays an important moderating effect on eschatology, amplifying or reducing its importance as a predictor of support for supersessionism. This is an incredibly important finding. Put simply, only pastors with a very high level of commitment to a particular eschatological worldview would see their eschatology impact their current views of Israel. Pastors with a weak commitment to the postmillennial view, for example, are more likely to reject supersessionism rather than to support it. When asked to evaluate an issue of minor personal importance, ministers with “very loose” postmillennial beliefs of the millennium seem to instead default to the currently dominant, premillennial view that eschews replacement theology. If we would have focused solely on the pastors’ eschatological views, this finding would seem counterintuitive, but our results are actually consistent with findings on policy attitudes of the U.S. public that indicate that effect on behavior and attitudes is observable only at the highest level of salience.15 This study also identifies church affiliation as a critically important variable that was previously ignored in the study of evangelicals. The statistical analysis illustrates that certain evangelical denominations are significantly more supportive of replacement theology than others. This effect is independent

Conclusion  177 of the eschatological view espoused by the pastors. In particular, we find that evangelical pastors belonging to the Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod or affiliated with the Churches of Christ are significantly more likely to support supersessionism than Baptists or Pentecostals. A note about non-​denominational churches is important here, as some of our readers might wonder whether these churches harbor systematically less supportive views of Israel. In July 2021, we conducted another survey with Chosen People Ministries (as mentioned earlier), where we asked the respondents to identify their denominations. We discovered that membership of the non-​denominational churches is the second largest (18.8%) in the evangelical community, smaller only than the membership in the Baptist churches (35.9%). The data from that survey shows that participants in non-​denominational churches are not less likely to be biblical literalists or premillennialists than Pentecostals or Southern Baptists (within the margin of error), for example. Our data and more recent research show that although non-​denominational churches are now on the rise, these churchgoers are not significantly different on their understanding of the Bible and their adherence to pro-​Israel eschatological positions than the denominational evangelicals.16 In sum, our data demonstrate that premillennial theology is most deeply entrenched among the evangelical elites and the older generations of ordinary churchgoers. But we also find important indicators that some of premillennialism’s basic ideas are internalized by the grassroots evangelicals who do not necessarily identify as premillennials. For example, the statements that “God’s covenant with the Jewish people is still intact today,” and that the Jewish people have the right to the Land of Israel by the virtue of that covenant, received a supermajority support in all of the surveys we have conducted. The most significant religious rationalization for the support for Israel among all evangelical age groups centers on the Abrahamic covenant, according to which the nation of Israel is the direct descendant of Abraham and thus entitled to heavenly blessings and a specific territory given to them by God. Although the younger cohort expressed more pro-​Palestinian and anti-​Israel opinions than their elders, most of them still supported the statement that Jerusalem should not be shared with the Palestinians. We take this to mean that despite a relative decline of premillennialism, it continues to exert significant—​perhaps, even subconscious—​influence on the evangelical and born-​again Christian beliefs and foreign policy attitudes. We hope to be able to continue to examine how theological and eschatological dynamics

178  Christian Zionism in the Twenty-First Century evolve over time and will integrate additional questions on issue/​belief salience in our future surveys. Christianity believes in its supremacy over other religions and sees itself as a sole path to salvation. However, premillennialism is the most welcoming eschatology to the Jews and most supportive of Israel, since it postpones the conversion of the Jews to the End of Days, as part of the events of the Second Coming. Thus, the Jewish people, as an independent nation, still have a role in current and future events that matter to Christians. The decline of premillennial eschatology raises a concern about the future of Jewish–​ Christian relations, which improved dramatically after World War II. The increasing marginalization of this eschatology may stem from some unfulfilled prophecies regarding the imminent Second Coming. For example, Hal Lindsey in his The Great Late Planet Earth predicted the Second Coming 40 years after the establishment of the State of Israel, meaning 1988, and later postponed his predictions to 2007.17 As time passes, some evangelicals may have become disillusioned by such prophetic failure. However, scholarship has also shown that prophetic movements learn how to cope with cognitive dissonance and survive disconfirmation.18 Future studies should be in a position to confirm if this trend continues and how it will affect Jewish–​Christian relations.

Moving Forward This research was conducted during troubling times. As we write these final words, war is raging in Ukraine, without a clear end and with claims from President Putin that Russia may use nuclear weapons in that conflict. The Covid-​19 pandemic has taken a massive toll and continues to disrupt people’s lives and economic trade. Talks about renewing the nuclear deal with Iran are in the news again. The United States retreated from Afghanistan in August 2021, after 21 years of occupation, in a way that many felt was shameful and embarrassing. In January 2021, a group of Trump supporters, with evangelicals in their midst, violently stormed the U.S. Capitol in order to prevent the certification of the 2020 election results. It remains unclear how these major events, some still unfolding, will influence Americans’ foreign policy preferences in the long run. A return to the Cold War, nuclear Iran, and increasingly assertive China may have a profound impact

Conclusion  179 on the evangelical worldview, returning this community to eschatological speculations and a more profound interest in what is happening in Israel. We are eager to study how these changes reverberate through the evangelical and born-​again community, but we also see an incredible opportunity to broaden our horizons to apply some of the same analytic techniques that we have adopted here to the study of other American religious groups, especially other Christian denominations, such as Catholicism and mainline Protestantism. We also believe that a more structured study into how pastors’ messages are internalized by the members of their congregations is of great importance. Further research that connects elite and mass attitudes would certainly clarify many of the puzzles that still exist in the literature. We hope that this book is just the first step in this new and exciting venue for future research.

Notes Foreword 1. Voice of America, “Jerusalem U.S. Embassy Opening Ceremony,” YouTube, May 14, 2018, https://​www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​fdH7​aYkS​5V8 (viewed on October 4, 2022).

Introduction 1. Mark R. Amstutz, Evangelicals and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 118–​142. 2. Amnon Cavari and Guy Freedman, American Public Opinion toward Israel: From Consensus to Divide (New York: Routledge, 2021), 1. 3. Gallup Organization, February 1–​ 10, 2019, quoted at Cavari and Freedman, American, 1. 4. In the 2019 survey quoted above, Gallup found a 20% difference between the two parties’ supporters. Ibid. Eytan Gilboa, The American Public and Israel in the Twenty-​ First Century, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 181 (Ramat Gan: The Begin-​ Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, 2020), 61–​68. 5. Jonathan Rynhold, The Arab–​Israeli Conflict in American Political Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press 2015), 13. 6. Samuel Goldman, God’s Country: Christian Zionism in America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 13–​16. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., 13. Yaakov Ariel, An Unusual Relationship: Evangelical Christians and Jews (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 78–​81. 9. Quoted at Rynhold, Arab–​Israeli, 4. 10. “Remarks by Vice President Biden: The Enduring Partnership between the United States and Israel,” The White House, Office of the Vice President, March 11, 2010, https://​obam​awhi​teho​use.archi​ves.gov/​the-​press-​off​ice/​rema​rks-​vice-​presid​ent-​ biden-​endur​ing-​part​ners​hip-​betw​een-​uni​ted-​sta​tes-​and-​isr​ael (viewed on May 13, 2022). 11. Michelle Mart, Eye on Israel: How America Came to View the Jewish State as an Ally (Albany: State University of New York Press 2006), 3. 12. Ibid., 22.

182 Notes 13. Walker Robins, Between Dixie and Zion: Southern Baptists and Palestine before Israel (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press 2020), 135–​148. 14. Mart, Eye, 57. 15. Ibid., 141–​167. 16. Cavari and Freedman, American, 29–​48. 17. Jason Olson, America’s Road to Jerusalem: The Impact of the Six-​Day War on Protestant Politics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), 25–​42. 18. Yaakov Ariel, “Contemporary Christianity and Israel,” in Essential Israel: Essays for the 21st Century, ed. S. Ilan Troen and Rachel Fish (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), 280–​310. 19. Carys Moseley, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s Approach to the State of Israel: The Ethical Promise and Theological Limits of Christian Realism,” Studies in Christian-​Jewish Relations 4, no. 1 (2009), https://​doi.org/​10.6017/​scjr.v4i1.1517 (viewed on May 13, 2022). 20. Ariel, “Contemporary,” 285. 21. Ibid., 286. 22. Caitlin Carenen, The Fervent Embrace: Liberal Protestants, Evangelicals, and Israel (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 79–​82. 23. Pew Research Center, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” May 12, 2015, https://​www.pewr​esea​rch.org/​relig​ion/​2015/​05/​12/​chap​ter-​1-​the-​chang​ing-​religi​ ous-​comp​osit​ion-​of-​the-​u-​s/​ (viewed on September 15, 2022). 24. Ibid. 25. Olson, America’s, xi. 26. Carenen, The Fervent, 134–​140. 27. Rynhold, Arab–​Israeli, 118. 28. Ibid., 126–​127. 29. Ibid., 118–​120. 30. Olson, America’s, 56–​60. For example, Christian Century distinguishes between Jews and Israelis and uses the label “Zionists” in a derogatory fashion, according to Olson. 31. David Katz, “The Phenomenon of Philo-​Semitism,” Studies in Church History 29 (1992): 327–​361. 32. Ariel, Unusual, 4–​5. 33. Ibid., 5–​6. 34. Randall Balmer, Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: A Journey into the Evangelical Subculture in America, 25th anniversary edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 33. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., 34–​35. 37. Ariel, Unusual, 35–​46. 38. Shalom Goldman, Zeal for Zion: Christian, Jews and the Idea for the Promised Land (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 88–​136. 39. Jonathan Schneer, The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab–​Israeli Conflict (New York: Random House, 2000); Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London: Valentine, Mitchell, 1961).

Notes  183 40. Olson, America’s, 101–​161. 41. Hal Lindsey, The Late Great Planet Earth (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1970), 41–​47. 42. Ariel, Unusual, 46–​53. 43. Gribben Crawford and Mark Sweetnam, Left Behind and the Evangelical Imagination (Sheffield, U.K.: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2011). 44. Daniel Hummel, Covenant Brothers: Evangelicals, Jews, and U.S.–​Israeli Relations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 3–​4. 45. Ibid., 5. 46. Ibid., 9. 47. Stephen Spector, Evangelicals and Israel: The Story of American Christian Zionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 24. 48. Ibid., 50–​75. 49. Encyclopedia of Religion, “Evangelical and Fundamental Christianity,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, edited by Lindsay Jones, Mircea Eliade, and Charles J. Adams, 2nd edition, vol. 5 (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 2892. 50. Spector, Evangelicals, 147–​148. 51. Frank Newport and Joseph Carroll, “Republicans and Religious Americans Most Sympathetic to Israel,” Gallup News Service, March 27, 2006, https://​news.gal​lup. com/​poll/​22063/​repu​blic​ans-​religi​ous-​americ​ans-​most-​symp​athe​tic-​isr​ael.aspx (viewed on May 13, 2022). See also Spector, Evangelicals, 223. 52. Ibid., 212–​244. 53. Ibid., 35–​46. 54. According to their website: https://​cufi.org/​ (viewed on May 13, 2022). 55. Ibid. 56. John Hagee, In Defense of Israel (Florida: Frontline, 2007), 6. 57. Colum Lynch, “What’s Next for Christian Zionists?,” Foreign Policy, July 19, 2021, https://​foreig​npol​icy.com/​2021/​07/​19/​christ​ian-​zioni​sts-​isr​ael-​trump-​netany​ahu-​ evang​elic​als/​ (viewed on May 13, 2022). 58. Emily Jones “Trump Says He Moved US Embassy to Jerusalem ‘for the Evangelicals,’” Times of Israel, August 18, 2020, https://​www.timeso​fisr​ael.com/​trump-​says-​he-​ moved-​us-​emba​ssy-​to-​jerusa​lem-​for-​the-​evang​elic​als/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 59. According to the Anti-​Defamation League, “Anti-​Zionism is often expressed, explicitly or implicitly in the rejection of Jewish nationhood and the right to self-​ determination; the vilification of individuals and groups associated with Zionism; and the downplaying or negation of the historic and spiritual Jewish connection to the land of Israel.” ADL, “Anti-​Zionism,” May 3, 2022, https://​www.adl.org/​resour​ces/​ gloss​ary-​term/​anti-​zion​ism (viewed on January 16, 2023). 60. While we do not explore young evangelicals’ attitudes on social justice issues in this book, our work on this question has already begun. 61. Dexter Van Zile, “Evangelical Anti-​Zionism as an Adaptive Response to Shifts in American Cultural Attitudes,” Jewish Political Studies Review 25, no. 1/​2 (2013): 39–​64. 62. Ibid., 42.

184 Notes

Chapter 1 1. Sections from this chapter are reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. Originally published as Motti Inbari, Kirill Bumin, and M. Gordon Byrd, “Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?,” Politics and Religion 14, no. 1 (2021): 1–​36. 2. Bruce Stokes, “Which Countries Americans Like . . . And Don’t,” Pew Research Center, December 30, 2013, https://​www.pewr​esea​rch.org/​fact-​tank/​2013/​12/​30/​which-​ countr​ies-​americ​ans-​like-​and-​dont/​ (viewed on October 16, 2022). 3. Megan Brenan, “Americans Rate Canada, Britain, France, Japan, Most Favorably,” Gallup News Service, March 14, 2022, https://​news.gal​lup.com/​poll/​390​641/​americ​ ans-​rate-​can​ada-​brit​ain-​fra​nce-​japan-​favora​bly.aspx (viewed on October 15, 2022). 4. The costs of conducting the survey were covered by grants from the Academic Engagement Network, the University of North Carolina at Pembroke, and Chosen People Ministries. Neither of these donors provided any substantive input into the design of the survey, the analysis, or the writing of this paper. 5. Gershom Gorenberg, The End of Days: Fundamentalism and the Struggle for the Temple Mount (New York: Free Press, 2000). 6. LifeWay Research, Evangelical Attitudes toward Israel, 2017, http://​life​wayr​esea​rch. com/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2017/​12/​Evan​geli​cal-​Views-​on-​Isr​ael.pdf (viewed on June 14, 2018); Shibley Telhami, What Americans (Especially the Evangelicals) Think about Israel and the Middle East, December 4, 2015, https://​www.brooki​ngs.edu/​eve​nts/​ what-​americ​ans-​esp​ecia​lly-​evang​elic​als-​think-​about-​isr​ael-​and-​the-​mid​dle-​east/​ (viewed on May 28, 2019); Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study, 2014, http://​www.pewfo​rum.org/​religi​ous-​landsc​ape-​study/​att​enda​nce-​at-​religi​ous-​servi​ ces/​ (viewed on September 5, 2018); Linda Saad, “Americans Remain Staunchly in Israel’s Corner,” Gallup News Service, March 13, 2018, https://​news.gal​lup.com/​ poll/​229​199/​americ​ans-​rem​ain-​staunc​hly-​isr​ael-​cor​ner.aspx (viewed on August 24, 2018). 7. Peter H. Gries, “How Ideology Divides American Liberals and Conservatives over Israel,” Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 1 (2015): 51–​78; Jody Baumgartner, Peter Francia, and Jonathan Morris, “A Clash of Civilizations?: The Influence of Religion on Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” Political Research Quarterly, 61, no. 2 (2008): 171–​179; Jeremy D. Mayer, “Christian Fundamentalists and Public Opinion toward the Middle East: Israel’s New Best Friends?” Social Science Quarterly 85 (2004): 695–​712. 8. Paul Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 254–​290. 9. Evangelicals have diverse approaches to the origin of the antichrist. According to John Nelson Darby’s theology, the father of modern pre-​millennial dispensationalism, the antichrist should be a Jew. However, according to the majority of contemporary views, this figure should be a European king, who is not Jewish (ibid., 254–​290). Some evangelical scholars argued in the post-​9/​11 period that the future antichrist might be a Muslim (see Joel Richardson, Mideast Beast: The Scriptural Case for an Islamic Antichrist (New York: Midpoint Trade Books, 2012)).

Notes  185 10. Yaakov Ariel, Evangelizing the Chosen People: Mission to Jews in America, 1880–​2000 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 9–​21; Tristan Sturm, “Imagining Apocalyptic Geopolitics: American Evangelical Citationality of Evil Others,” in Mapping the End Times: American Evangelical Geopolitics and Apocalyptic Visions, ed. Jason Dittmer and Tristan Sturm (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 133–​ 154; Timothy P. Weber, Living in the Shadow of the Second Coming (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). 11. Richard Landes, Heaven on Earth: The Varieties of the Millennial Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Yonina Talmon, “Millenarian Movements,” Archives europeennes de sociology 2, 1966: 156–​200; Catherine Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently: From Jonestown to Heaven’s Gate (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000). 12. Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (Wantage, NJ: Essential Books Inc., 1957). 13. Gershom Scholem, Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah, 1626–​1676 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973). 14. David Rowe, Thunder and Trumpets—​Millerites and Dissenting Religion in Upstate New York, 1800–​1850, AAR Studies in Religion 38 (CA: Scholars Press, 1985). 15. Joseph F. Zygmunt, “Prophetic Failure and Chiliastic Identity: The Case of the Jehovah’s Witnesses,” American Journal of Sociology 75, no. 6 (1970): 926–​948. 16. Jason Olson, America’s Road to Jerusalem: The Impact of the Six-​Day War on Protestant Politics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018). 17. According to the National Association of Evangelicals, the biggest representative body of evangelical churches, there are four primary characteristics of evangelicalism: a belief that lives need to be transformed through a “born-​again” experience and a lifelong process of following Jesus; an expression and demonstration of the gospel in missionary and social reform efforts; high regard for and obedience to the Bible as the ultimate authority; and stress on the sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross as making possible the redemption of humanity. National Association of Evangelicals, “What is an Evangelical?,” http://​www.nae.org/​what-​is-​an-​evan​geli​cal (viewed on September 5, 2018). 18. Daniel Hummel, Covenant Brothers: Evangelicals, Jews, and U.S.–​Israeli Relations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 201–​206. 19. Victoria Clark, Allies for Armageddon (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 263. 20. William Koenig, Eye to Eye—​Facing the Consequences of Dividing Israel (McLean, VA: About Him Publishing, 2004). 21. Adam Berkowitz, “Scary Devine Connections,” Israel 365 News, August 24, 2015, https://​www.bre​akin​gisr​aeln​ews.com/​47546/​10-​year-​anni​vers​ary-​scary-​conn​ecti​ ons-​betw​een-​gush-​katif-​hurric​ane-​katr​ina-​revea​led-​jew​ish-​world/​ (viewed on May 24, 2019). 22. Stephen Spector, Evangelicals and Israel: The Story of American Christian Zionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 21–​22; Michael J. Vlach, The Church as a Replacement of Israel: An Analysis of Supersessionism (Frankfurt: Lang, 2009).

186 Notes 23. Hagee, In Defense of Israel, 156. 24. Ibid., 6. 25. Gries, “Ideology,” 51–​78; Amnon Cavari, “Religious Beliefs, Elite Polarization, and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy: The Partisan Gap in American Public Opinion toward Israel,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 25, no. 1 (2013): 1–​22; Baumgartner, “Clash ,” 171–​179. 26. Saad, “Americans.” 27. Ryan T. Beckwith, “Read Hillary Clinton’s Speech at AIPAC,” Time, March 21, 2016, http://​time.com/​4265​947/​hill​ary-​clin​ton-​aipac-​spe​ech-​tra​nscr​ipt/​ (viewed on June 14, 2018). 28. Thomas D. DeLay, “Be Not Afraid,” The Jewish World Review, July 30, 2003, https://​ web.arch​ive.org/​web/​200​3100​8114​539/​https://​www.jewish​worl​drev​iew.com/​0703/​ delay​_​200​3_​07​_​31.php3 (viewed on July 29, 2022). 29. Spector, Evangelicals, 76–​110. 30. Sturm, “Imagining.” 31. Gries, “Ideology,” 72. 32. Mark Silk, “Notes on the Judeo-​Christian Tradition in America,” American Quarterly 36, no. 1 (1984): 65–​85. 33. Hummel, Covenant, 2–​8. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibrahim Abraham and Ronald Boer, “‘God Doesn’t Care’: The Contradictions of Christian Zionism,” Religion & Theology 16 (2009): 90–​110; Jay Michaelson, “Mike Pence’s Love of Israel Is Dangerous for Jews,” The Forward, January 23, 2018, https://​ forw​ard.com/​opin​ion/​392​673/​mike-​pen​ces-​love-​of-​isr​ael-​is-​danger​ous-​for-​jews/​ (viewed on August 24, 2018). 36. Mayer, “Christian.” 37. Since evangelism is associated predominantly with white Protestant Christians, we added the “born-​again” option for self-​identification in order to capture minority groups (mainly, African Americans) who subscribe to the same set of beliefs as evangelicals but prefer to identify themselves as “born-​again.” Treating “born-​again” as a part of the evangelical movement is common practice (e.g., see Pew Research Center, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” http://​www.pewfo​rum.org/​religi​ous-​ landsc​ape-​study/​att​enda​nce-​at-​religi​ous-​servi​ces/​ (viewed on September 20, 2019). 38. We analyzed mass media coverage during the April 3–​10 time period to determine whether any significant events and/​or reporting related to Israel and Palestine could have potentially skewed our respondents’ answers to the survey. No such influences were discovered. 39. We acknowledge that there are certain costs associated with the use of self-​ identification as a basis for sample selection. However, as Gregory Smith et al. have shown, the self-​identification method among American Protestants can be used and interoperated as an effective shortcut when RELTRAD method is unavailable. Gregory Smith et al., “Comparing the RELTRAD and Born-​Again/​Evangelical Self-​ Identification Approach to Measuring American Protestantism,” Journal of Scientific Study of Religion 57, no. 4 (2018): 830–​847.

Notes  187 40. Gries, “Ideology.” 41. This is slightly higher than the recently obtained estimates from the Pew Research Center’s Religious Landscape Study (2014), which reports 55% of the respondents as female. 42. LifeWay Research, Evangelical. 43. Sarah P. Baily, “White Evangelicals Voted Overwhelmingly for Donald Trump, Exit Polls Show,” The Washington Post, November 9, 2016, https://​www.was​hing​tonp​ost. com/​news/​acts-​of-​faith/​wp/​2016/​11/​09/​exit-​polls-​show-​white-​evang​elic​als-​voted-​ ove​r whe​lmin​gly-​for-​don​ald-​trump/​?nor​edir​ect=​on&utm_​t​erm=​.6750a​61e4​49c (viewed on May 6, 2022). 44. Christopher Connelly, “Why American Evangelicals Are a Huge Base of Support for Israel,” The World, October 24, 2016, https://​www.pri.org/​stor​ies/​2016-​10-​24/​why-​ ameri​can-​evang​elic​als-​are-​huge-​base-​supp​ort-​isr​ael (viewed on September 5, 2018). 45. Bekka Alper, “Modest Warming in U.S. Views on Israel and the Palestinians,” Pew Research Center, May 26, 2022, https://​www.pewr​esea​rch.org/​relig​ion/​2022/​05/​26/​ mod​est-​warm​ing-​in-​u-​s-​views-​on-​isr​ael-​and-​pales​tini​ans/​ (viewed on September 28, 2022). 46. Pew Research Center, “Public Uncertain, Divided over America’s Place in the World,” April 2016, https://​www.pewr​esea​rch.org/​polit​ics/​2016/​05/​05/​pub​lic-​uncert​ain-​divi​ ded-​over-​ameri​cas-​place-​in-​the-​world/​ (viewed on September 28, 2022). 47. Gries, “Ideology.” 48. Mayer, “Christian,” 697. 49. And, for our survey of under-​30 evangelicals, addressed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this book, we also add open-​ended, follow-​up questions that ask the respondents to explain their preference for the Palestinians, Israel, or neither in their own words. 50. Any anxious readers should know that we also estimated the statistical model with the original variable and found that recoding does not substantially impact any of the substantive results reported below, but helps streamline the presentation and interpretation of the results. 51. Mayer, “Christian.” 52. Gries, “How,” 73. 53. We include two dummy variables, “southeast” and “rural” to test the possible connection between rural residence and/​or living in the southeastern United States (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV). 54. Robert G. Weisbord and Richard Kazarian Jr., Israel in the Black American Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985); Faydra Shapiro, “Black Christian Evangelicals Are Not Happy with Israel’s Refugee Policy,” The Jerusalem Post, February 25, 2018, https://​www.jpost.com/​Opin​ion/​Black-​Christ​ian-​Evang​elic​als-​ are-​not-​happy-​with-​Isra​els-​refu​gee-​pol​icy-​543​607 (viewed on September 5, 2018). 55. The “don’t know” category was recoded with missing values to exclude these observations. 56. This is necessary due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable. See below in this footnote for an introduction and explanation of ordered logit/​probit techniques and other models with categorical dependent variables. See J. Scott Long and Jeremy

188 Notes Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2003); David W. Hosmer and Stanley Lemeshow, Applied Logistic Regression (New York: Wiley, 2000); Alan Agresti, An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1996). 57. The parallel lines assumption is not violated if the test of parallel lines returns a finding of nonsignificance, meaning there is no significant difference between the model where the regression lines are constrained to be parallel for each level of the ordinal dependent and the model where the regression lines are allowed to be estimated without a parallelism constraint. 58. An examination of the odds ratio allows one to assess the amount of impact a particular explanatory variable has on the dependent variable. The odds ratios represent the change in odds of the outcome being a particular category versus the reference category, for differing factor levels of the corresponding explanatory variable. In our study’s case, we want to explore whether the odds of being in a “higher” category (strong support for Israel vs. expressing lukewarm/​weak support for Israel, expressing neutrality, or support for Palestinians) is associated with each of our explanatory variables. 59. This remains true no matter which category is selected as a baseline (30–​49, 50–​64, or 65+​). In addition, in a set of bivariate regressions, utilizing dichotomous variables for each of the age groups, 18–​29 category is negative and statistically significant; 30–​49 is negative but statistically insignificant; and both 50–​64 and 65+​categories are positive and statistically significant. 60. Quoted from Ian Lovett, “Younger Evangelicals Waver in Support for Israel,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2018, https://​www.wsj.com/​artic​les/​some-​youn​ger-​evang​ elic​als-​waver-​in-​supp​ort-​for-​isr​ael-​152​7937​200?mod=​art​icle​_​inl​ine (viewed on September 5, 2018). 61. Connelly, “Why.” 62. Shapiro, “Black.”

Chapter 2 1. Sections from this chapter are reprinted with the permission of Oxford University Press. Published initially as Motti Inbari and Kirill Bumin, “American Evangelicals and the Arab-​ Israeli Conflict,” Journal of State and Church 62, no. 4 (2020): 603–​629. 2. Dov Schwartz, Religious Zionism: History and Ideology (Boston: Academic Press, 2009). 3. Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of Settlements, 1967–​ 1977 (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2007). 4. Yaakov Katz, “407,118: The Up to Date Number of Jews in Judea and Samaria, Not Counting Jerusalem,” Arutz Sheva, last modified September 1, 2016, http://​www.isr​ aeln​atio​naln​ews.com/​Artic​les/​Arti​cle.aspx/​18210#.VpK8​85sc​TIU (viewed on May 16, 2022) contends the number is 800,000 by 2015 (including East Jerusalem).

Notes  189 5. Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War over Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967–​2007 (New York: Nation Books, 2007). 6. With the exception of the United States, which, in 2019, recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel. 7. Gadi Taub, The Settlers and the Struggle over the Meaning of Zionism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 8. Motti Inbari, Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromises (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 9. Timothy P. Weber, Living in the Shadow of the Second Coming (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). 10. Jason Olson, America’s Road to Jerusalem: The Impact of the Six-​Day War on Protestant Politics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018). 11. LifeWay Research, “NAE LifeWay Research Evangelical Beliefs Research Definition,” LifeWay Research, August 14, 2019, http://​life​wayr​esea​rch.com/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​ 2015/​11/​NAE-​Life​Way-​Resea​rch-​Evan​geli​cal-​B eli​efs-​Resea​rch-​Def​i nit​ion-​Meth​ odol​ogy-​and-​Use.pdf (viewed on May 16, 2022). 12. Cited in Spector, Evangelicals, 43. 13. Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (London: Pocket, 2007). 14. Cited in Spector, Evangelicals, 135. 15. John Hagee, “Israel, God’s Prophetic Clock,” YouTube, last modified February 18, 2018, https://​youtu.be/​v_​XK​ajlR​77Q (viewed on July 28, 2022). 16. For more details, see Spector, Evangelicals, 178–​179. 17. Ibid., 162. 18. David Brog, Standing with Israel (Lake Mary, FL: Frontline, 2006), 196. 19. Inbari, Messianic, 15–​36. 20. Jesslyn Lancaster, “Is Jeremiah 31:5 Coming to Fruition This Passover Season?,” Charisma News, June 4, 2017, https://​www.chari​sman​ews.com/​world/​64113-​is-​ jerem​iah-​31-​5-​com​ing-​to-​fruit​ion-​this-​passo​ver-​sea​son (viewed on May 31, 2023). 21. Eliran Baruch, “Huckabee Calls UN Resolution an Act of Hate,” Arutz Sheva, last modified March 1, 2017, http://​www.isr​aeln​atio​naln​ews.com/​News/​News.aspx/​222​ 698 (viewed on May 16, 2022). 22. Ron E. Hassner, War on Sacred Grounds (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 78–​88. 23. Lindsey, The Late, 56. 24. Hal Lindsey, Planet Earth—​ 2000 A.D.: Will Mankind Survive? (Palos Verdes, CA: Western Front Ltd., 1994), 163. 25. John McTernan and Bill Koenig, Israel: The Blessing or the Curse (Oklahoma City, OK: Hearthstone Publishing, 2002); William Koenig, Eye to Eye—​ Facing the Consequences of Dividing Israel (McLean, VA: About Him Publishing, 2004). 26. AIPAC, “Transcript: Vice President Mike Pence,” AIPAC Policy Conference, August 14, 2019, http://​www.polic​ycon​fere​nce.org/​arti​cle/​tran​scri​pts/​2018/​pence.asp (viewed on May 16, 2022). 27. The existing literature supports this choice. For example, Gries found that Pentecostals, white Baptists, and other white evangelical Protestants displayed the

190 Notes largest gaps (with the exception of American Jews) between their warmth toward Israel and their coolness toward Palestinians. Gries, “How.” 28. Respondents were able to pick more than one response. 29. Other differences between the full sample and the “neither agree nor disagree” group of respondents are relatively small and within the margin of error. 30. Also see Frances FitzGerald, The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017). FitzGerald notes that a more traditionalist/​ fundamentalist wing of evangelicals advocates separation from, not engagement with, the modern political world. She argues that this was the major tendency in conservative American Protestantism, particularly during the first half of the twentieth century. 31. High-​intensity political action is a type of political participation that requires a lot of effort, resources, and time by those who are involved in it.

Chapter 3 1. For a concise review of the punitive, economic, and structural versions of supersessionism, see Michael Vlach, “Various Forms of Replacement Theology,” TMSJ 201, no. 1 (2009): 57–​69. 2. Robert Clouse, The Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1977), 17–​40. 3. The Lutheran Church-​-​Missouri Synod, Doctrine: Brief Statement of the Doctrinal Position of the Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod (Saint Louis: CPH, 1932), 5. 4. Ibid., 6. 5. Clouse, The Meaning, 63–​92. 6. The Lutheran Church, Doctrine, 5. 7. Clouse, The Meaning, 155–​188. 8. Ibid., 104. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 33. 11. Ibid., 117–​142. 12. David Novak, “Supersessionism Hard and Soft,” First Things, February 2019, https://​ www.firs​tthi​ngs.com/​arti​cle/​2019/​02/​supe​rses​sion​ism-​hard-​and-​soft (viewed on July 28, 2022). 13. Heinrich Gresbeck, False Prophets and Preachers: Henry Gresbeck’s Account of the Anabaptist Kingdom of Münster (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2016). 14. Samuel Goldman, God’s Country: Christian Zionism in America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 13–​64. 15. Peter Toon, Puritans, the Millennium and the Future of Israel: Puritan Eschatology 1600 to 1660 (Cambridge: James Clarke Company, 2003). 16. Goldman, God’s Country, 13–​64.

Notes  191 17. James H. Moorhead, “The Erosion of Postmillennialism in American Religious Thought, 1865–​1925,” Church History 53 (1984): 61–​77. 18. Yaakov Ariel, An Unusual Relationship: Evangelical Christians and Jews (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 35–​57. 19. Margins of error are higher in some subgroups. 20. Northeast –​CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT; South –​AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV; Midwest –​IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI; West –​AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY. 21. Our sampling shows a slightly higher incidence of women (61%) than other comparable surveys. For example, Pew’s Religious Landscape Study identifies 55% of evangelicals as women. Pew Research Center, “Religious Landscape Study,” 2014, http://​www.pewfo​rum.org/​religi​ous-​landsc​ape-​study/​att​enda​nce-​at-​religi​ous-​servi​ ces (viewed on May 18, 2022). 22. The survey did not distinguish between historic and dispensational stands of premillennial eschatology. 23. Among them, Dr. Mitch Glaser of Chosen Peoples Ministries, Dr. Darrell Bock of Dallas Theological Seminary, Dr. Richard Averbeck of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Dr. Craig Blaising of Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, and Mr. Wes Taber of Life in Messiah International. 24. Batsel B. Baxter, “Who Are the Churches of Christ and What Do They Believe In?,” http://​www.lbc​ofc.org/​whowe​are.htm (viewed on May 18, 2022) and C . Leonard Allen and Richard T. Hughes, Discovering Our Roots: The Ancestry of the Churches of Christ (Texas: Abilene Christian University Press, 1988), 108. 25. Samuel S. Hill, Charles H. Lippy, and Charles R. Wilson, Encyclopedia of Religion in the South (Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2005), 213. 26. Douglas Allen Foster and Anthony L. Dunnavant, “Churches of Christ,” in The Encyclopedia of the Stone-​Campbell Movement: Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Christian Churches/​Churches of Christ, Churches of Christ, ed. Anthony L. Dunnavant, D. Newell Williams, Douglas A. Foster, and Paul M. Blowers (Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2004), 219. 27. Ron Rhodes, The Complete Guide to Christian Denominations (Eugene, OR: Harvest House Publishers, 2005), 125. 28. Bobby Ross Jr., “Elephant in the Pews: Is the GOP the Party of Churches of Christ?,” The Christian Chronicle, February 25, 2016, https://​chr​isti​anch​roni​cle.org/​eleph​ ant-​in-​the-​chu​rch-​is-​the-​gop-​the-​party-​of-​churc​hes-​of-​chr​ist/​ (viewed on May 18, 2022). 29. The Lutheran Church of Missouri Synod, “About us,” The Lutheran Church of Missouri Synod, https://​www.lcms.org/​about (viewed on May 18, 2022). 30. The Lutheran Church-​ Missouri Synod, “Frequently Asked Questions—​ Denominations,” viewed on January 16, 2023, www.lcms.org/​about/​beli​efs/​faqs/​ denomi​nati​ons. 31. The Lutheran Church, Doctrine, 5.

192 Notes 32. A. L. Barry, “What about the New Millennium,” The Lutheran Church of Missouri Synod, http://​lcms.org/​Docum​ent.fdoc?src=​lcm&id=​1095 (viewed on May 18, 2022). 33. Margaret M. Poloma, “The Pentecostal Movement,” in: Christian Millenarianism: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Stephen Hunt (New York: New York University Press, draft), http://​hirr.hart​sem.edu/​resea​rch/​pen​teco​stal​move​mnt.pdf (viewed on May 18, 2022). 34. Luis Lugo, “Spirit and Power—​A 10-​Country Survey of Pentecostals,” Pew Research Center, October 2006, http://​www.pewfo​rum.org/​2006/​10/​05/​spi​rit-​and-​power/​ (viewed on May 18, 2022). 35. Robert G. Weisbord and Richard Kazarian Jr., Israel in the Black American Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985); Faydra Shapiro, “Black Christian Evangelicals Are Not Happy with Israel’s Refugee Policy,” The Jerusalem Post, February 25, 2018, https://​www.jpost.com/​Opin​ion/​Black-​Christ​ian-​Evang​elic​als-​ are-​not-​happy-​with-​Isra​els-​refu​gee-​pol​icy-​543​607 (viewed on September 5, 2018). 36. Pew Research Center, “Religious Landscape Study,” 2014, https://​www.pewfo​rum. org/​religi​ous-​landsc​ape-​study/​reg​ion/​south/​ (viewed on May 18, 2022). 37. This is necessary due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable. For the introduction and explanation of ordered logit, ordered probit, and other models with categorical dependent variables. J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2003); David W. Hosmer and Stanley Lemeshow, Applied Logistic Regression (New York: Wiley, 2000); Alan Agresti, An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1996). 38. An examination of the odds ratios allows one to assess the amount of impact a particular explanatory variable has on the dependent variable. The odds ratios represent the change in odds of the outcome being a particular category versus the reference category, for differing factor levels of the corresponding explanatory variable. In our study’s case, we want to explore whether the odds of being in a “higher” category (“strongly agree” with replacement theology versus “somewhat agree” or responding “somewhat disagree” or “strongly disagree”) is associated with each of our explanatory variables. 39. David S. Boninger, et al. “The Causes and Consequences of Attitude Importance,” in Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences, ed. Richard E. Petty and Jon A. Krosnick (Hillsdale, MI: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1995), 159–​189. 40. David S. Boninger, Jon A. Krosnick, and Matthew K. Berent, “Origins of Attitude Importance: Self-​ Interest, Social Identification, and Value Relevance,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68, no. 1 (1995): 61–​80; Kevin Arceneaux, “Can Partisan Cues Diminish Democratic Accountability?” Political Behavior 30, no. 2 (2008): 139–​160; David J. Ciuk and Berwood A. Yost, “The Effects of Issue Salience, Elite Influence, and Policy Content on Public Opinion,” Political Communication 33, no. 2 (2016): 328–​345; James Dennison, “A Review of Public Issue Salience: Concepts, Determinants and Effects on Voting,” Political Studies Review 17, no. 4 (2019): 436–​446. 41. Janelle S. Wong, “The Evangelical Vote and Race in the 2016 Presidential Election,” Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics 3, no. 1 (2018): 81–​106.

Notes  193 42. Only 20 out of 111 LCMS pastors identify themselves as premillennials. 43. 79.1% of amillennial and 60.2% of postmillennial pastors either “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with the statement. By contrast, 88.7% of the premillennial ministers said that they “agree” or “strongly agree.” 44. Joshua D. Kertzer and Thomas Zeitzoff, “A Bottom-​Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy,” American Journal of Political Science 61, no. 3 (2017): 543–​558. 45. David Yamane and Elizabeth A. Oldmixon, “Religion in the Legislative Arena: Affiliation, Salience, Advocacy, and Public Policymaking,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2006): 433–​460. 46. George M. Hayward and Jessica A. Pearlman, “Measuring Five Dimensions of Religiosity across Adolescence,” Review of Religious Research 59, no. 3 (2017): 367–​ 393; Hanks Johnson et. al., Understanding Family Change and Variation: Toward a Theory of Conjectural Action (New York: Springer, 2011); Sheldon Stryker, “Identity Salience and Role Performance: The Relevance of Symbolic Interaction Theory for Family Research,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 30, no. 4 (1968): 558–​564. 47. Grace Online Library, “ Calvinism vs. Arminianism—​Comparison Chart,” Grace Online Library, http://​gra​ceon​line​libr​ary.org/​refor​med-​theol​ogy/​armi​nian​ism/​calvin​ ism-​vs-​armi​nian​ism-​com​pari​son-​chart/​ (viewed on May 18, 2022). 48. Ibid. 49. Randall Balmer, Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: A Journey into the Evangelical Subculture in America, 25th anniversary edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 240–​242. 50. Daniel Hummel, Covenant Brothers: Evangelicals, Jews, and U.S.–​Israeli Relations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 204–​207. 51. Peter Barnes, “Calvin and the Jews,” The Reformed Theological Review 68, no. 3 (2009): 175–​193. 52. David Steinmetz, “John Calvin and the Jews: A Problem in Political Theology,” Political Theology, 10, no. 3 (2009): 391–​409. 53. Roland Lovstad, “LCMS Educators Connect with College in Bethlehem,” Reporter—​ Official Newspaper of the Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod, January 27, 2010, https://​ repor ​ ter.lcms.org/​ 2 010/​ l cms-​ e ducat​ ors-​ c onn​ e ct-​ w ith-​ c oll​ e ge-​ i n-​ b ethle​ h em/​ (viewed on May 18, 2022). 54. Paul M. Blowers. “Jews and Judaism, Views of in the Movement,” in The Encyclopedia of the Stone-​Campbell Movement: Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Christian Churches/​Churches of Christ, Churches of Christ, ed. Anthony L. Dunnavant, D. Newell Williams, Douglas A. Foster, and Paul M. Blowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004), 426–​430. 55. Ibid., 428. 56. For a similar interpretation, also see David R. Dungan, ed., Hermeneutics: A Text-​ Book (Cincinnati: Standard Publishing, 1888), 112–​155. Dungan notes that “The [Mosaic] law has been abolished and the gospel remains” (131). 57. Blowers, “Jews,” 428. 58. Vlach, “Various.” 59. Gabriel J. Fackre, Ecumenical Faith in Evangelical Perspective (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1993), 148.

194 Notes 60. Richard K. Soulen, The God of Israel and Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Publishing, 1996), 30. 61. John M. Hicks, “ ‘God Has Not Kept [The Jews] These Many Years for Nothing’: Alexander Campbell on Israel, the Church, and Eschatology.” Paper presented at the annual Stone Campbell Journal Conference, hosted by Emmanuel Christian Seminary at Milligan, Johnson City, TN (April 2018). 62. Additionally, it is worth noting that in our interview, Dr. John Mark Hicks noted that among Churches of Christ members, contemporary geopolitical views, particularly those that are linked to the Israeli–​Palestinian dispute, are not really impacted by theology or eschatology, instead mostly reflect secular ethics and secular conceptions of justice. Perceptions of maltreatment and mistreatment of Palestinians by Israel are a “significant shared belief ” among the members and pastors, Dr. Hicks added. 63. Ralph L. Moellering, “Lutheran–​Jewish Relations and the Holocaust,” Consensus 8, no. 1 (1982): 21–​ 32, https://​schol​ars.wlu.ca/​cgi/​view​cont​ent.cgi?refe​rer=​&htt​psre​ dir=​1&arti​cle=​2202&cont​ext=​consen​sus (viewed on May 18, 2022). 64. Blowers, “Jews,” 427–​428. 65. Hummel, Covenant. 66. Julie Z. Weil, “How Anti-​Semitic Beliefs Have Taken Hold among Some Evangelical Christians,” The Washington Post, August 22, 2019, https://​www.was​hing​tonp​ost. com/ ​ relig ​ i on/ ​ 2 019/ ​ 0 8/ ​ 2 2/ ​ how- ​ anti- ​ s emi ​ t ic- ​ b eli​ e fs-​ h ave-​ quie​ t ly-​ t aken-​ hold-​ among-​some-​evan​geli​cal-​chr​isti​ans/​ (viewed on July 28, 2022).

Chapter 4 1. One exception to this is Bible readership for the 65+​age cohort. 2. We are deeply thankful to the UNCP College of Arts and Sciences, Academic Engagement Network (AEN), and to Dr. Mitch Glaser, the president of Chosen People Ministries, for their generous support of our research. Neither of these donors provided any substantive input into the design of the survey, the analysis, or the writing of this chapter. 3. We analyzed mass media coverage during this time period to determine whether any significant events and/​or reporting related to Israel and Palestine could have potentially skewed our respondents’ answers to the survey. No such influences were discovered. Of course, much of what happened in 2020 and 2021 is hard to categorize as “things as usual”—​the Covid-​19 pandemic, hotly contested presidential election in November 2020, and violent assault on the U.S. Capitol building on January 6, 2021—​ so timing of the survey may reflect the volatility of the times. However, to our knowledge, none of these events have a systematic, persistent effect on evangelical attitudes related to the Israeli–​Palestinian conflict specifically. 4. Margins of error are higher in some subgroups. 5. Robert P. Jones and Daniel Cox, “America’s Changing Religious Identity,” PRRI, September 6, 2017, https://​www.prri.org/​resea​rch/​ameri​can-​religi​ous-​landsc​ape-​ christ​ian-​reli​giou​sly-​unaff​i lia​ted/​ (viewed on May 19, 2022).

Notes  195 6. Alan Cooperman, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” Pew Research Center, May 12, 2015, https://​www.pewfo​rum.org/​2015/​05/​12/​ameri​cas-​chang​ing-​religi​ous-​ landsc​ape/​#fn-​23198-​2 (viewed on May 20, 2022). 7. Northeast—​CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT; South—​AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV; Midwest—​IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI; West—​AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY. 8. D’vera Cohn et al., “Barely Half of U.S. Adults Are Married—​A Record Low,” Pew Research Center, December 14, 2011, https://​www.pewr​esea​rch.org/​soc​ial-​tre​nds/​ 2011/​12/​14/​bar​ely-​half-​of-​u-​s-​adu​lts-​are-​marr​ied-​a-​rec​ord-​low/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 9. An eschatological view that we have previously found to be the most supportive of Israel and the Jewish people because it identifies a clear and indispensable role for them in the future salvation of Christians. 10. Ryan P. Burge, “So, Why Is Evangelicalism Not Declining? Because Non-​Attenders Are Taking on the Label,” Religion in Public, December 10, 2020, https://​relig​ioni​npub​ lic.blog/​2020/​12/​10/​so-​why-​is-​eva​ngel​ical​ism-​not-​declin​ing-​beca​use-​non-​attend​ ers-​are-​tak​ing-​on-​the-​label/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 11. Natalie Jackson, “PRRI Releases Groundbreaking 2020 Census of American Religion,” Public Religion Research Institute, July 8, 2021, https://​www.prri.org/​press-​rele​ase/​ prri-​relea​ses-​gro​undb​reak​ing-​2020-​cen​sus-​of-​ameri​can-​relig​ion/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 12. Aaron Earls, “Most Teenagers Drop Out of Church When They Become Young Adults,” LifeWay Research, January 15, 2019, https://​life​wayr​esea​rch.com/​2019/​01/​ 15/​most-​teenag​ers-​drop-​out-​of-​chu​rch-​as-​young-​adu​lts/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 13. Bradley Onishi, “The Rise of #Exvangelical,” Religion and Politics, April 9, 2019, https://​reli​gion​andp​olit​ics.org/​2019/​04/​09/​the-​rise-​of-​exvan​geli​cal/​. However, Burge refutes the argument of an evangelical decline, showing that “Between the previous GSS [General Social Survey] in 2016 to the most recent in 2018, evangelicals dropped about 1.4 percent—​not enough to amount to a significant change, and within the survey’s margin of error. When you look at the long-​range trends, evangelicals have increased their share of the population by about 5 percentage points since 1972, though they’re currently 7.5 percentage points lower than their highest share of the US population: 29.9 percent in 1993, just as the nones began their upswing.” Ryan P. Burge, “Evangelicals Show No Decline, despite Trump and Nones,” Christianity Today, March 21, 2019, https://​www.christ​iani​tyto​day.com/​news/​2019/​march/​evan​geli​cal-​nones-​ mainl​ine-​us-​gene​ral-​soc​ial-​sur​vey-​gss.html (viewed on May 20, 2022). 14. National Association of Evangelicals, “Premillennialism Reigns in Evangelical Theology,” National Association of Evangelicals, https://​www.nae.org/​premi​llen​nial​ ism-​rei​gns-​in-​evan​geli​cal-​theol​ogy/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 15. Supersessionism, or replacement theology, is a Christian doctrine that asserts that the New Covenant was made with humanity through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and that this New Covenant supersedes (or replaces) the Old Covenant that God made with the Jewish people through the Mosaic law. According to our earlier

196 Notes arguments in the chapter on pastors, supersessionism is closely correlated with low levels of support for Israel and a relatively ambivalent, although not necessarily hostile, view of Jews. 16. Stephen Spector, Evangelicals and Israel: The Story of American Christian Zionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 183. 17. For example, Ryan Burge found that young evangelicals are more liberal than older ones on immigration, health insurance, and race and gender inequality. Abortion remains one of the key issues that, according to Burge, complicates young evangelicals’ relationship with Democrats. Burge found that young evangelicals are almost as conservative as older evangelicals on abortion. Ryan P. Burge, “Will White Young Evangelicals Turn Their Back on Trump?,” Religion News Service, December 16, 2019, https://​relig​ionn​ews.com/​2019/​12/​16/​will-​young-​white-​evang​elic​als-​turn-​their-​ backs-​on-​trump/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 18. Elizabeth Dias, “‘God Is Going to Have to Forgive Me’: Young Evangelicals Speak Out,” The New York Times, November 1, 2018, https://​www.nyti​mes.com/​2018/​11/​01/​ us/​young-​evang​elic​als-​polit​ics-​midte​rms.html (viewed on May 20, 2022). 19. Daniel Cox, “Could Trump Drive Young White Evangelicals Away from the GOP?,” FiveThirtyEight, August 20, 2019, https://​five​thir​tyei​ght.com/​featu​res/​could-​trump-​ drive-​young-​white-​evang​elic​als-​away-​from-​the-​gop/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 20. Laurie Goering, “Young Evangelicals Push to ‘Build a Bigger Choir Loft’ for U.S. Climate Action,” Reuters, May 12, 2021, https://​www.reut​ers.com/​arti​cle/​us-​clim​ate-​ cha​nge-​usa-​relig​ion/​young-​evang​elic​als-​push-​to-​build-​a-​big​ger-​choir-​loft-​for-​u-​s-​ clim​ate-​act​ion-​idUSKB​N2CT​1PK (viewed on May 20, 2022). 21. Burge, “Will White Young Evangelicals.” 22. Ryan P. Burge, “The 2020 Vote for President by Religious Groups—​Christians,” Religion in Public, March 21, 2021, https://​relig​ioni​npub​lic.blog/​2021/​03/​29/​the-​ 2020-​vote-​for-​presid​ent-​by-​religi​ous-​gro​ups-​chr​isti​ans/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 23. Only 8.9% of young Hispanic and 7.8% of young black evangelicals voted for Trump in our sample. 24. Tests on 2018 data for 18–​29-​year-​old respondents failed to show a statistically significant relationship between the opinion on Muslims and support for Israel, but the low number of available observations for the regression analysis raises concerns about the reliability of those results. 25. Emily Jones, “Trump Says He Moved US Embassy to Jerusalem ‘for the Evangelicals,’” CBN News, August 18, 2020, https://​www1.cbn.com/​cbnn​ews/​isr​ael/​2020/​aug​ust/​ trump-​says-​he-​moved-​nbsp-​us-​emba​ssy-​to-​jerusa​lem-​lsquo-​for-​the-​evang​elic​als-​ rsquo (viewed on May 20, 2022). On the background of transferring the embassy and the role of evangelicals see Stephen Spector, “This Year in Jerusalem: Prophecy, Politics, and the U.S. Embassy in Israel,” Journal of Church and State 61, no. 4 (2019): 551–​571. 26. Tests on 2018 data for 18–​29-​year-​old respondents failed to show a statistically significant relationship between pro-​Israel socialization and support for Israel, but the low number of available observations for the regression analysis undermines the reliability of those results.

Notes  197 27. Combined 1–​4 responses. 28. Combined 7–​10 responses. 29. Amnon Cavari and Guy Freedman, American Public Opinion toward Israel: From Consensus to Divide (New York: Routledge, 2021), 183–​201. 30. Ibid., 184. 31. Combined responses 7–​10 on a 1–​10 scale. We classify 5–​6 as relative ambivalence on the issue, and 1–​4 as opposition to establishing an independent Palestinian state. 32. Cavari and Freedman, American Public Opinion toward Israel, 185. 33. Benjamin I. Page and Marshall M. Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don’t Get (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 151–​152. 34. Cavari and Freedman, American Public Opinion toward Israel, 70–​71. 35. Jeremy D. Mayer, “Christian Fundamentalists and Public Opinion toward the Middle East: Israel’s New Best Friends?,” Social Science Quarterly 85 (2004): 695–​712. 36. Janelle S. Wong, “The Evangelical Vote and Race in the 2016 Presidential Election,” Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics 3, no. 1 (2018): 81–​106. 37. Eytan Gilboa, American Public Opinion toward Israel and the Arab–​ Israeli Conflict (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1987); Robert Weisbord and Richard Kazarian, Jr., Israel in the Black American Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985). 38. Samuel Chamberlain, “BLM Co-​Founder Called In 2015 to ‘End Imperialist Project’ of Israel,” New York Post, May 30, 2021, https://​nyp​ost.com/​2021/​05/​30/​blm-​co-​foun​ der-​cal​led-​to-​end-​impe​rial​ist-​proj​ect-​of-​isr​ael/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 39. The Movement for Black Lives, “Invest–​Divest,” The Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) 2020 Policy Platform, https://​m4bl.org/​pol​icy-​platfo​rms/​inv​est-​div​est/​ (viewed on May 24, 2022). 40. This is necessary due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable. For introduction and explanation of ordered logit, ordered probit, and other models with categorical dependent variables, see J. Scott. Long and Jeremy Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2003); David W. Hosmer and Stanley Lemeshow, Applied Logistic Regression (New York: Wiley, 2000); Alan Agresti, An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1996). 41. An examination of the odds ratio allows one to assess the amount of impact a particular explanatory variable has on the dependent variable. The odds ratios represent the change in odds of the outcome being a particular category versus the reference category, for differing factor levels of the corresponding explanatory variable. In our study’s case, we want to explore whether the odds of being in a “higher” category (“strongly agree” with replacement theology versus “somewhat agree” or responding “somewhat disagree” or “strongly disagree”) is associated with each of our explanatory variables. 42. The parallel lines assumption is not violated if the test of parallel lines returns a finding of nonsignificance, meaning there is no significant difference between the model where the regression lines are constrained to be parallel for each level of

198 Notes the ordinal dependent and the model where the regression lines are allowed to be estimated without a parallelism constraint. 43. The two variables are too closely correlated to be included in the model together. 44. Although Newport does not focus specifically on evangelicals, nor does he consider differences across age cohorts, his data are based on responses to Gallup’s question that is quite similar to ours: “In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with the Israelis or more with the Palestinians?” See Frank Newport, “Americans’ View of Israel Remains Tied to Religious Beliefs,” Gallup News Service, March 19, 2019, https://​news.gal​lup.com/​opin​ion/​poll​ing-​matt​ers/​247​937/​americ​ans-​views-​isr​ ael-​rem​ain-​tied-​religi​ous-​beli​efs.aspx (viewed on March 23, 2022). 45. Ibid. 46. However, the inclusion of this variable into the statistical model renders the results for amillennialist eschatology and the pro-​Israel socialization variables insignificant; other variables in the model are not impacted. 47. We also tested dummy variables for other ethnicities, including one for Latino/​ Hispanic respondents, and failed to find statistically significant relationships. 48. We used conditional logic to ask our respondents a follow-​up question on the basis of their response to the question about supporting Israel, the Palestinians, or neither. Respondents in each of these categories were asked to explain their choice, in their own words. Some of the respondents among the pro-​Palestinian African American subgroup painted the Israeli–​Palestinian conflict as one between oppressors (Israel) and the oppressed (the Palestinians), a narrative that resonates with the history of black oppression in the United States. For example, the following responses are emblematic of this perception: “Because they are getting innocently killed. Children, brothers, sisters, it’s not fair.” “Palestinians are going through a lot more then Israel.” “Because they seem like innocent people.” “The Jews have killed them.” “Palestinians are being displaced and painted as a militant state because they lack power.” “I feel like Israel takes advantage of the land.” 49. Michael Doran, “The Theology of Foreign Policy,” First Things: The Institute on Religion and Public Life, May 2018, https://​www.firs​tthi​ngs.com/​arti​cle/​2018/​05/​the-​ theol​ogy-​of-​fore​ign-​pol​icy (viewed on March 23, 2022). 50. Ibid. 51. Mark Melton, “What about Amillennialism in Foreign Policy?,” Providence, May 7, 2018, https://​provid​ence​mag.com/​2018/​05/​ami​llen​nial​ism-​fore​ign-​pol​icy-​preter​ism-​ mich​ael-​doran-​first-​thi​ngs-​esch​atol​ogy/​ (viewed on March 23, 2022). Melton notes that amillennialists may still try to improve the world at the margins because God calls them to love and act justly, but the overall thrust of the amillennial view is to eschew active engagement in politics and societal issues of the day. 52. Doran, “The Theology.” 53. Thomas D. Ice, “The Unscriptural Theologies of Amillennialism and Postmillennialism,” Article Archives 54, May 2009, 4, https://​dig​ital​comm​ons.libe​rty. edu/​pretr​ib_​a​rch/​54.

Notes  199 54. Walter R. Mead, “American Power and the Ways the World Ends,” Providence, February 14, 2018, https://​provid​ence​mag.com/​2018/​02/​ameri​can-​power-​ways-​ world-​ends-​christ​ian-​escha​ton/​ (viewed on March 23, 2022). 55. Doran “The Theology.” 56. Ibid. 57. Mark Tooley, “Part 1: Protestant Roots of US Foreign Policy Divisions,” Providence, April 16, 2018, https://​provid​ence​mag.com/​2018/​04/​part-​1-​pro​test​ant-​roots-​of-​usa-​ fore​ign-​pol​icy-​divisi​ons/​ (viewed on March 23, 2022). 58. Loraine Boettner, The Millennium (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1957), 89–​90. 59. Doran, “The Theology.” 60. Spector, Evangelicals, 183.

Chapter 5 1. Thus, the reported percentages add up to more than 100%. 2. Due to rounding, reported percentages add up to more than 100%. 3. Amy-​Jill Levine, “Is the New Testament Anti-​Jewish?,” Bible Odyssey, https://​www. bible​odys​sey.org/​bible-​bas​ics/​is-​the-​new-​testam​ent-​anti-​jew​ish/​ (viewed on March 10, 2022). 4. Louis Farrakhan, “‘The Time and What Must Be Done’ 2013 Lecture Series, Part 5,” The Final Call, February 12, 2013, https://​www.finalc​all.com/​art​man/​publ​ish/​Min​iste​ r_​Lo​uis_​Farr​akha​n_​9/​artic​le_​9​629.shtml (viewed on September 11, 2022). 5. For the sake of being cautious, we must admit that it is hard to understand the logic behind some of these responses. As much as some of them sound similar to the language of Pastor Farrakhan, some of these answers might have been mistakes, where the respondents confused Israel with Palestine, but we cannot know for sure. 6. Amnon Cavari and Guy Freedman, American Public Opinion toward Israel: From Consensus to Divide (New York: Routledge, 2021); Eric Groenendyk, “Of Two Minds, but One Heart: A Good ‘Gut’ Feeling Moderates the Effect of Ambivalence on Attitude Formation and Turnout,” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 2 (2019): 368–​384; Peter Gries, The Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives over Foreign Affairs (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014). George Marcus, Russell W. Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Herbert Bless et al., “Mood and the Use of Scripts: Does a Happy Mood Really Lead To Mindlessness?,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71, no. 4 (1996): 665–​679. 7. John Zaller, and Stanley Feldman, “A Simple Theory of Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences,” American Journal of Political Science 36, no. 3 (1992): 579–​616. 8. Jeremiah Castle, Rock of Ages: Subcultural Religious Identity and Public Opinion among Young Evangelicals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2019).

200 Notes 9. Alexander Todorov, Face Value: The Irresistible Influence of First Impressions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017); Eric Groenendyk, “The Anxious and Ambivalent Partisan: The Effect of Incidental Anxiety of Partisan Motivated Recall and Ambivalence,” Public Opinion Quarterly 80, no. 2 (2016): 460–​479; Jason Coronel et al., “Remembering and Voting: Theory and Evidence from Amnesic Patients,” American Journal of Political Science 56, no. 4 (2016): 837–​848.

Chapter 6 1. Pew Research Center, “Jewish American in 2020,” Pew Research Center, May 11, 2021, https://​www.pewfo​rum.org/​2021/​05/​11/​jew​ish-​americ​ans-​in-​2020/​ (viewed on March 18, 2022). 2. We are thankful to the Philos Project for sharing the dataset with us. This research merits a further analysis that we hope to conduct in the future. For the full report, see LifeWay Research, Attitudes of African Americans toward Israel, viewed on March 18, 2022, http://​resea​rch.life​way.com/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2019/​11/​The-​Phi​los-​Proj​ect-​ Afri​can-​Ameri​can-​Attitu​des-​Tow​ard-​Isr​ael-​Rep​ort.pdf. 3. Lydia Saad, “Key Trends in U.S. Views on Israel and the Palestinians,” Gallup News Service, May 28, 2021, https://​news.gal​lup.com/​poll/​350​393/​key-​tre​nds-​views-​isr​ ael-​pales​tini​ans.aspx (viewed on March 28, 2022). 4. Amnon Cavari and Guy Freeman, American Public Opinion toward Israel: From Consensus to Divide (New York and London: Routledge, 2021), 102–​107. 5. Kristine Du Mez, Jesus and John Wayne: How White Evangelicals Corrupted a Faith and Fractured a Nation (New York: Liveright, 2020); Anthea Butler, White Evangelical Racism: The Politics of Morality in America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2021). 6. Jannelle S. Wong, Immigrants, Evangelicals, and Politics in an Era of Demographic Change (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2018). 7. Robert P. Jones, “America’s Changing Religious Identity,” PRRI, September 6, 2017, https://​www.prri.org/​resea​rch/​ameri​can-​religi​ous-​landsc​ape-​christ​ian-​reli​giou​sly-​ unaff​i lia​ted/​ (viewed on September 28, 2022). 8. The Movement for Black Lives, “Invest–​Divest,” The Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) 2020 Policy Platform, https://​m4bl.org/​pol​icy-​platfo​rms/​inv​est-​div​est/​ (see Cut Military Expenditures Brief) (viewed on May 24, 2022). 9. Jason Casper, “Trump or Netanyahu? Many Evangelicals Support Israel, but Signs of Change,” Christianity Today, December 15, 2021, https://​www.christ​iani​tyto​day. com/​news/​2021/​decem​ber/​ameri​can-​evang​elic​als-​isr​ael-​pales​tini​ans-​barna-​sur​ vey-​cpm.html (viewed on March 28, 2022). 10. Jeremiah Castle, Rock of Ages: Subcultural Religious Identity and Public Opinion among Young Evangelicals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2019), 29–​31. 11. Dexter Van Zile, “Evangelical Anti-​Zionism as an Adaptive Response to Shifts in American Cultural Attitudes,” Jewish Political Studies Review 25, no. 1/​2 (2013): 39–​64. 12. Ibid., 42.

Notes  201 13. Eytan Gilboa, The American Public and Israel in the Twenty-​First Century, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 181 (Ramat Gan: The Begin-​Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, 2020), 61–​68; Cavari and Freedman, American, 129–​154. 14. National Association of Evangelicals, “Premillennialism Reigns in Evangelical Theology,” National Association of Evangelicals, https://​www.nae.org/​premi​llen​nial​ ism-​rei​gns-​in-​evan​geli​cal-​theol​ogy/​ (viewed on May 20, 2022). 15. David S. Boninger, et al. “The Causes and Consequences of Attitude Importance,” in Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences, ed. Richard E. Petty and Jon A. Krosnick (Hillsdale, MI: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1995), 159–​189. 16. Kirill Bumin and Motti Inbari. “In the Shadow of 2021 Gaza Conflict: Evangelical and Born-​Again Christian Views of the Israeli-​Palestinian Dispute.” Initial report on the July 2021 survey with evangelical and born-​again Christians. Available at: https://​ www.resea​rchg​ate.net/​publ​icat​ion/​357062​740. 17. Motti Inbari, Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromises (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 151–​184. 18. Diana G. Tumminia and William H. Swatos, Jr., eds., How Prophecy Lives, Religion and the Social Order 21 (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

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Index For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–​53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages. Tables and figures are indicated by t and f following the page number 18-​29 year-​old evangelicals. See young evangelicals 9/​11 terrorist attacks, 1, 8–​9, 14–​15, 144–​ 45, 175–​76 Abrahamic Accords, 16 Adams, John, 2–​3 African Americans, 66, 87–​88, 115, 132, 138–​39, 172–​73 AIPAC, 26–​27, 57–​58 amillennialism, 71–​73, 75–​76, 79, 83, 86–​ 87, 89, 91–​93, 103–​4, 106–​7, 118–​19, 130, 136, 139–​42, 166–​67, 175 Antichrist, 11–​12, 23, 57, 79 anti-​Semitism, 2–​3, 5, 6, 22, 26, 35, 104–​ 5, 107–​8 Arab-​Israeli conflict, xiii–​xiv, 14–​15, 24, 53, 54–​68, 72, 88, 98–​100 Arafat, Yasser, 56–​57 Ariel, Yaakov, 9–​10 Arminius, Jacob, 104 Bakker, Jim and Tammy Faye, 72 Balfour Declaration, 12 Baptists, 3, 33–​34, 86, 87, 98f, 104, 176–​77 Barak, Ehud, 14, 56–​57 Barna Group, 114 BDS, 8, 19, 68–​70 Begin, Menachem, xv–​xvi, 14, 52–​53 biblical literalism, 18, 21–​22, 25, 44–​47, 54, 55, 60, 143, 166–​67 Biden, Joe, 3, 121, 136–​37, 144, 173, 174 Blackstone, William E., 2–​3 Blowers, Paul, 105, 106, 107 Bock, Darrell, 31–​32, 43

Boettner, Loraine, 77, 140–​41 Boninger, David, 93 born-​again Christians, xiii–​xiv, 1, 7, 9–​10, 11–​12, 14–​15, 17–​18, 19–​20, 21, 22, 23, 28–​30, 31, 34–​35, 42, 47, 54–​55, 59, 71, 94, 99f, 113–​15, 118, 119–​20, 122, 123–​24, 126–​28, 132, 135, 138, 142, 143, 150–​51, 160–​61, 162, 168, 170–​71, 175–​76, 177–​78, 179 Brotherhood, (shared values), 12–​ 13, 27–​28 Burge, Gary, 43 Burge, Ryan, 118, 121–​22 Bush, George W., 14–​15, 122 Calvin, John, 104–​5 Campbell, Alexander, 105–​7 Carter, Jimmy, 54–​55 Castle, Jeremiah, 167, 173 Cavari, Amnon, 4–​5, 127–​30, 138–​39, 144–​45, 171 Cedel, Thomas E., 105 Chosen People Ministries, 71, 80, 173, 177 Christian Zionism, xiii–​xiv, xv, 12–​13, 20, 25, 27–​28, 53–​55, 79 Christians United for Israel, 5, 15, 25–​26. See also Hagee, John church attendance, 29–​31, 35, 42–​43, 116–​18, 131, 133t, 134t, 135, 136–​ 37, 173–​74 Church of Christ, 8, 80–​81, 85f, 86–​87, 89, 91t, 91–​93, 92t, 98, 105–​8 Clark, Victoria, 25 Clinton, Hillary, 26–​27, 31

216 Index Cohn, Norman, 24 Cold War, 1, 4, 12–​13, 137–​38, 171, 178–​79 Concordia Theological Seminary, 105 conversion of Jews. See eschatology covenant, 10–​11 Abrahamic, xv, 10, 13, 14, 20, 25, 45–​ 46, 54, 55, 71, 74–​75, 78, 79, 104–​7, 119, 130–​31, 133t, 134t, 136, 143, 144, 153–​54, 155, 161, 163, 165–​66, 173, 177–​78 dual, 13 Covid-​19 pandemic, 19, 72, 118, 120–​ 21, 178–​79 Cromwell, Oliver, 9 cultural affinity hypothesis, 41t, 42, 88–​91

Gallup, 1, 21, 26–​27, 33–​34, 135, 171 Genesis 12:3, 13–​14, 25, 54, 145. See also Covenant geopolitical and security concerns, 27, 35, 88–​91 Glaser, Mitch, 71 God’s chosen people, 25–​26, 34–​35, 37, 38t, 39t, 40, 41t, 44–​47, 54, 55, 73–​74, 152, 154. See also biblical literalism; supersessionism Goldman, Samuel, 2–​3 Graham, Billy, 10 Green, John, 54–​55 Gries, Peter, 27, 29, 33–​34, 35–​36 guilt, 6, 18, 21, 26, 35, 37, 40, 41t, 42, 107 Gush Emunim, 52–​53 gut feelings, 151, 157–​58, 160–​61, 164, 169

Darby, John Nelson, 10–​11, 53–​54, 80 DeLay, Tom, 27 Democrats, 1, 3, 31, 35–​36, 120, 121t, 122, 123t, 128–​30, 131, 133t, 134t, 136–​37, 144, 174 Disengagement Plan, 25, 52 dispensationalism. See premillennialism Doran, Michael, 139–​41

Hagee, John, 15–​16, 25–​26, 55, 56, 108 Haggard, Ted, 145, 154 Harrison, Benjamin, 2–​3 Hastings, Rich and Judy, 80 Hayward, George, 104 Hebrew (language), 2–​3, 79 Hechler, William, 12 Herzl, Theodor, 12 Hicks, John Mark, 105 Hoekema, Anthony A., 75–​76 Holocaust, 3, 17, 26, 35, 107, 137–​38, 166, 171, 175–​76 Hoyt, Herman A., 74–​75 Huckabee, Mike, 56 Hummel, Daniel G., 12–​13, 25, 27–​28, 107

Egypt, 52 End of Times. See eschatology Episcopal Church, 8 eschatology, 1, 11, 12–​13, 16, 18, 21–​22, 23, 44–​47, 56–​57, 63–​64, 71–​80, 81, 83–​86, 91t, 91–​94, 92t, 98–​100, 101–​ 3, 105, 106–​7, 116–​19, 117t, 129–​30, 132–​33, 133t, 134t, 136, 140, 141–​42, 143, 145, 175–​78 See also amillennialism; premillennialism; postmillennialism Evangelical Lutheran Church, 8, 87, 107 evangelical pastors (survey), 1, 19, 70, 71, 80–​84, 95–​100, 118–​19, 130, 132, 138–​39, 143, 154, 172–​73, 175, 176–​77 evangelism, four principles of, 28–​29 Fackre, Gabriel, 106–​7 Falwell, Jerry, xv–​xvi, 10, 14, 56, 72 Farrakhan, Louis, 161

Ice, Thomas, 140 Iran, 15–​16, 27, 178–​79 Israel, vs. Jews terminology, 164 a democracy, 4, 137–​38, 157, 171 Land of, 14, 46–​47, 53, 54, 55, 155, 177–​78 Jeffress, Robert, xiii Jehovah’s Witnesses, 24 Jerusalem, xiv, 7, 11–​12, 22, 23, 24, 43, 46–​ 47, 52–​53, 54, 56, 72, 74–​75, 98–​100, 101, 105, 129–​30, 144, 154, 177–​78 American embassy in, xiii, 16, 126–​27 Jesus Christ, Second coming. See eschatology

Index  217 Jordan, 52 Judeo-​Christian identity, 4 Katrina hurricane, 25 Katz, David, 9 Kissinger, Henry, 52 Koenig, Bill, 25, 57–​58 lack of knowledge (variable), 100, 157–​58, 162, 163 Ladd, George E., 73–​74, 75 Land for Peace, 52, 53, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62t Late Great Planet Earth. See Lindsey, Hal Left Behind, 12, 175 Liberation Theology, 8 LifeWay Research, 28, 30, 71, 80, 82, 87–​ 88, 118, 171 Lindsey, Hal, 12, 24, 57, 72, 145, 178 Luther, Martin, 79, 87, 104–​5 Lutheran Church-​Missouri Synod, 80–​82, 86, 87, 91–​93, 104, 176–​77 Mainline Protestants, 1, 2, 5–​9, 142, 179 Mart, Michelle, 4 Mayer, Jeremy, 33–​34, 35–​36 Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views, 73–​78 Melton, Mark, 139–​40 Messianic hopes. See eschatology Millerite movement, 24 Moody, Dwight, 10 Moon, Luke, 166–​67 Moral Majority. See Falwell, Jerry Muslims, attitudes toward, 1, 4, 14, 27, 31–​ 32, 32t, 36, 37, 39t, 41t, 42, 43–​44, 58, 58t, 59, 66, 113, 114t, 122, 123t, 129–​ 30, 131, 133t, 134t, 137, 144–​45 National Association of Evangelicals, 28–​ 29, 54, 118–​19, 145, 175 negotiate in good faith (variable), 46, 59, 60t neither agree nor disagree (variable), 18–​ 19, 38t, 46t, 60t, 61, 62t, 63–​64, 64t, 65–​68, 70, 100–​3 Netanyahu, Benjamin, xiii, 14 Nicholson, Robert, 166–​67 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 5–​6, 7–​8

Novak, David, 78 Obama, Barak, 15–​16 occupied territories. See West Bank Oldmixon, Elizabeth, 103–​4 Olson, Jason, 7, 9, 24 online surveys, why use, 29 open-​ended questions analysis, 163–​65 I don’t know, 157–​58, 160–​61 political and historical claims, 155–​ 57, 158–​60 religious and scriptural arguments, 152–​55, 161–​62 support neither, 162–​63 why generational gap, 165–​68, 169 why use, 150–​51 Oslo Accords, 52 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 52 Palestinians, favorability of, 8–​9, 14–​15 refugees, 6, 7–​8 treatment, 17, 19–​20, 43, 58, 127, 127t, 131, 132, 135, 143, 159, 165–​66 Paul (Apostle), 104 Pearlman, Jessica, 103–​4 Pence, Mike, 57–​58 Pentecostals, 33–​34, 86, 87, 98, 104, 176–​77 Pew Research Center, 21, 33, 115–​16 Philos Project, 166–​67, 171 philo-​Semitism, 9, 22 political action, 18–​19, 47–​48, 68–​70 postmillennialism, 16, 19, 77–​78, 81–​82, 82t, 83–​86, 91t, 92t, 93–​94, 98–​100, 101–​3, 117t, 118, 130, 133t, 134t, 136, 140–​41, 160–​61, 166–​67, 176 premillennialism, 3, 10, 11, 13, 14–​15, 16, 19, 23–​24, 34–​36, 40, 45, 46t, 57, 71–​72, 73–​75, 76, 79–​80, 81–​82, 82t, 83–​84, 85–​86, 91t, 91–​94, 92t, 95–​100, 116–​18, 117t, 130, 132–​33, 136–​37, 144, 166–​67, 173, 175–​ 76, 177–​78 Presbyterian Church USA, 8 prophecy. See eschatology prophetic failure, 178

218 Index Protestant Reformation, 2–​3, 79 Puritans, 2–​3, 79 Rabin, Itzhak, 52–​53 Raheb, Mitri, 105 Ralph, Moellering, 107 rapture. See eschatology replacement theology. See supersessionism Republicans, 1, 14–​15, 35–​36, 120, 121–​ 22, 123t, 128–​30, 131, 136–​37, 174 Restoration Movement, 86–​87 Revelation, Book of, 11, 23–​24, 73, 74, 75–​ 76, 78, 87, 118–​19, 139–​40, 162, 175 Rhodes, Ron, 86–​87 Robertson, Pat, 56, 72 Robins, Walker, 3 Rynhold, Jonathan, 8–​9 salience, 93–​94, 103–​4, 176, 177–​78 Second Coming. See eschatology settlements. See Land for Peace Shapiro, Faydra, 44 Sharon, Ariel, 14–​15 Six-​Day War, 7, 22, 23–​24, 52, 175–​76 Sizer, Stephen, 54–​55 Smith, Gregory, 28–​29 Social Gospel, 8, 140 socialization, 18, 21–​22, 35, 37, 39t, 42–​43, 47, 125–​26, 126t, 127, 137, 158, 174 Soulen, Richard, 106–​7 Southern Baptists. See Baptists Soviet Union, 4, 14, 27 Spurgeon, Charles, 10 Stone-​Campbell movement, 105–​7 Sturm, Tristan, 27 supersessionism (replacement theology), 6, 9, 19, 25–​26, 54, 71, 72, 78, 79, 80, 82–​94, 91t, 95, 98–​100, 103–​4, 106–​7, 119, 130–​31, 132, 136, 143, 160–​61, 176–​77 support neither (variable), 33–​34, 36, 59t, 66–​67, 125, 126t, 134–​35, 142, 144, 151, 162–​63 Swaggart, Jimmy, 72 Syria, 52

Temple Mount, xiv, 7, 12, 22, 23–​24, 37, 39t, 41t, 46t, 53–​54, 56–​57, 63–​64, 66–​67, 100–​1, 102f Tooley, Mark, 140 Truman, Harry, 3, 141 Trump, Donald, xiii, 122, 126–​27 Two-​State Solution, 52, 53, 56. See also Land for Peace United Church of Christ General Synod, 8 United Methodist Church, 8 Van Zile, Dexter, 17, 174 Waller, Tommy, 56 West Bank, 52, 55, 56, 61, 63, 127–​28 annexation, 18–​19, 52–​53, 64, 70 Whitby, Daniel, 79 Yamane, David, 103–​4 young evangelicals attitudes toward Muslims, 122, 131, 137, 144–​45 eschatology, 118–​19, 130–​31, 136, 139–​ 42, 145 Israeli treatment of Palestinians, 127t, 127–​29, 131, 138, 143 Jerusalem, 129 knowledge of the dispute, 124 media exposure, 137–​38 political views, 119–​22, 131, 136–​ 37, 144 race, 115, 132, 138–​39 religion and the Israeli-​Palestinian dispute, 123–​25, 135, 142–​43 religiosity, 116–​18, 131, 134–​35, 136–​37 socialization effects, 125–​26, 126t, 137 supersessionism, 136, 143, 144 support for Israel, 125 US role, 123t Zionist, movement, xv–​xvi, 2–​3, 52–​53 Christian involvement in the, 12, 14 anti-​17, 141, 162, 171–​72 Zvi, Shabetai, 24