Christian Nationalism and the Paradox of Secularism: Philosophical, Theological, and Historical Reflections on Religious Nationalism 9004727094, 9789004727090

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Christian Nationalism and the Paradox of Secularism

Value Inquiry Book Series Founding Editor Robert Ginsberg Managing Editor J.D. Mininger

volume 406

Social Philosophy Editor Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon (State University of New York, Cortland)

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/​vibs and brill.com/​socp

Christian Nationalism and the Paradox of Secularism Philosophical, Theological, and Historical Reflections on Religious Nationalism

By

Andrew Fiala

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: American 50 dollar bill. Image available in the public domain. The Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data is available online at https://​cata​log​.loc​.gov

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/​brill-​typeface. issn 0929-​8 436 isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​7 2677-​2 (hardback) isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​7 2709-​0 (e-​book) doi 10.1163/​9 789004727090 Copyright 2025 by Andrew Fiala. Published by Koninklijke Brill bv, Plantijnstraat 2, 2321 jc Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill bv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Brill Wageningen Academic, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress. Koninklijke Brill bv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-​use and/​or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill bv via brill.com or copyright.com. For more information: [email protected]. This book is printed on acid-​free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Preface ix Acknowledgments xix 1 Introduction to Christian Nationalism and the Secular Paradox 1 1 A Philosophical Response to Christian Nationalism 6 2 Sincerity, Identity, Belief 8 3 Defining Christian Nationalism 14 4  Political Secularism, Nationalism, and Identity 18 5 Secularism and the Paradox 20 6 Components of Religious Nationalism 23 7 Nationalism and Religious Identity 26 2 The War against God: The Anti-​secular Rhetoric of Christian Nationalism 30 1 Debates about Secularism 34 2 The Paradox of Secularism 43 3 Conclusion 48 3 The Devil of Secularism: The Christian Nationalist Argument against Secularism 52 1 Christian Backlash and America as a Christian Nation 60 2 The Apparent Rise of Christian Nationalism and the Growth of Nonreligion 64 3 Sympathy for the Devil? 68 4 Examples of Christian Nationalism in American Politics 70 5 Conclusion 74 4 God Is Not a Tyrant: A Theological Argument against Christian Nationalism 77 1 Jesus Is Not Caesar 82 2 The Christian Nationalist Warning about Secular Tyranny 86 3 The Problem of Tyranny 91 4 Conclusion 93

vi Contents 5  The Hubris of Christian Nationalism: A Christian Argument for Humility and Nonviolence 96 1 Disputes about Jericho 98 2 Tyranny, Hubris, and Violence 103 3 Early Modern Theology 105 4 The Theology of Tyranny 108 5 Conclusion: Christian Nonviolence and the Secular Paradox 115 6  A Christian State Is Un-​Christian: Idolatry and the Argument against Christian Nationalism 119 1 Idolatry and the Kingdom of God 120 2 Eschatology and Integralism 128 3 A Separate Peace? 133 4 Conclusion 135 7  Against Fanaticism and Hypocrisy: Modern Christian Political Theology and the Worry about “Secular Absolutism” 136 1 The Mystery of Fearing God and Honoring the Emperor 140 2 External Religion as Hypocritical and Fanatical 147 3 Theodicies of Freedom 153 4 Conclusion 159 8  Can We Know What God Ordains? Secularization, Nonreligion, and the “Christian Nation” 161 1 The Diverse Human World 165 2 The So-​Called “War on Faith” 169 3 Atheism, Blasphemy, and Toleration 173 4 Atheism, Ceremonial Deism, and “In God We Trust” 179 5 The Challenge of Diversity 184 6 Conclusion: Avoiding Hyperbole and Falsehood 189 9  The Free Mind of the Secular Enlightenment: The Cut Flower Fallacy, the Social Contract, and the Secular Idea of the American Founding 191 1 Jeffersonian and Madisonian Secularism 193 2 The Christian Vapor Trail 199 3 Reason and the Social Contract 204 4 The Specter of Moral Relativism 212 5 Conclusion 215

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10  A Liberal and Generous Toleration: The Human Wisdom of Secularism 218 1 Christian Nationalism and Human Conflict 220 2 The Minimal Secular Consensus: Maritain and Rawls 223 3 Post-​secular Political Religion 227 4 Anti-​secular religiosity 231 5 John Adams and the “General Principles of Christianity” 235 6 The Declaration of Independence as a Secular Document 237 7 The Secular Constitution as Human Creation 239 8 Conclusion 246 11  On Dissipating the Darkness: A Tragic and Hopeful Conclusion 249 1 The Threat of Violence 250 2 The Secular Argument against Coercion and Violence 255 3 Concluding Hope: Education and Enlightenment 259  Bibliography 263  Index 269

Preface Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

∵

When Donald Trump was re-​inaugurated as President in January 2025 he said, “I was saved by God to make America great again.” This strange, hubristic proclamation is a prime example of Christian nationalism. The second Trump administration we will likely include much more of this. Hence, the need for this book, which was completed before Trump’s re-​election. As I completed the years-​long process of writing this book in the summer of 2024, several U.S. States are attempting to impose the Christian faith on their citizens. In Oklahoma, the state superintendent of education issued an order requiring the Bible to be taught in schools. And in Louisiana, the governor signed a law requiring that the Ten Commandments be posted in schools. When he signed the Louisiana law, Governor Jeff Landry said, “If you want to respect the rule of law, you’ve got to start from the original law-​giver, which was Moses.”1 In defending the law, Governor Landry said, “This country was founded on Judeo-​Christian principles and every time we steer away from that, we have problems in our nation.”2 As the Louisiana law made headlines, Donald Trump posted in support of it, in all caps, on his Truth Social account: “i love the ten commandments in public schools, private schools, and many other places, for that matter. read it—​h ow can we, as a nation, go wrong??? this may be, in fact, the first major step in the revival of religion, which is desperately needed, in our country.”3

1 “Louisiana requires display of Ten Commandments in all classrooms” bbc News, June 19, 2024, accessed July 8, 2024. 2 “Louisiana governor defends 10 Commandments in schools mandate: ‘The US is founded on Judeo-​Christian values’” Fox News, June 21, 2024, https://​www​.foxn​ews​.com​/media​/louisi​ana​-gover​nor​-defe​nds​-dis​play​ing​-10​-comma​ndme​nts​-scho​ols​-us​-foun​ded​-judeo​-christ​ ian​-val​ues, accessed July 8, 2024. 3 Donald J. Trump on Truth Social June 20, 2024 https://​trut​hsoc​ial​.com​/@real​Dona​ldTr​ ump​/posts​/112​6529​3274​0211​401, accessed July 8, 2024.

x Preface The effort to “revive” religion in the schools, as Trump puts it, appears to be a violation of the secular spirit of the American Constitutional system. And it would seem to violate Supreme Court precedents from the mid-​20th Century that interpreted the First Amendment’s establishment and religious liberty clauses in ways that preclude the government from leading a religious revival. But this movement (or revival), which is known as Christian nationalism, has been emboldened by recent Supreme Court cases that appear to chip away at the separation of church and state. One hopes that the Court will find the Louisiana law unconstitutional. That remains to be seen. But the challenge of Christian nationalism is made clear in cases like these. As I understand it, Christian nationalism is connected to efforts like these which hold that the law itself is thought to be dependent on the will of God and Biblical tradition—​ and which want to impose this idea on the legal and political system. This effort ignores the fact that the Constitution is a social contract and a human creation, which was intended to prevent the institution of religious nationalism. As we will see, Christian nationalism comes in variations and degrees. Some Christian nationalists are forthrightly interested in creating a theocracy. Others appear less extreme. But they tend to agree with Governor Landry that the U.S. is a Christian nation and that the law depends on the will of God. The recent revival of Christian nationalism has occurred alongside the growth of a general nonreligious worldview. The first trend concerns me, as someone who thinks that the separation of church and state is a good thing. And although I am not religious myself, I understand that the second trend (the growth of nonreligion) may be one of the things that is driving the growth of Christian nationalism. Some Christians appear to be afraid that their country and their identity is being threatened by the growing number of people who are not religious. I interpret Christian nationalism in part as a backlash to the growing sense that secular political values are simply taken for granted, and to the correlative fact that in a world where there is extensive freedom of religion, nonreligion will grow. As I argue in this book, Christian nationalism is an anti-​secular movement and ideology. It has something in common with other forms of political religion: Hindu nationalism, political Islam, and so on. In its American iteration, it is based in a tendentious reading of American history that fails to acknowledge the basically secular structure created by the U.S. Constitution and its Amendments. It also typically fails to understand the diverse and often unorthodox religiosity of the American founders, as well as their common commitment to religious liberty. My goal in this book is to present an argument in favor of political secularism that responds to the Christian nationalist challenge, and which shows that there are important resources in Christianity, in

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American history, in political philosophy, and in common sense which can be used to oppose the pernicious idea that the U.S. is and ought to be a Christian nation. For atheists and defenders of political secularism, Christian nationalism is a non-​starter. And liberal/​progressive Christian scholars will argue—​against their Christian nationalist co-​religionists—​that Christian nationalism is based on flawed theology, a bad reading of Biblical texts, and an unholy marriage of political and religious power. The fact that Christians disagree about nationalism, theology, and the Bible shows us why secular systems of politics are wise and necessary: secular political systems allow for peaceful co-​existence despite religious disagreement. The inclusive spirit of secularism reaches a limit, however, in the case of political and religious movements that are opposed to secularism itself. Indeed, as this book explains, Christian nationalism is primarily an anti-​secular movement, with some Christian nationalists going so far as to describe secularism as Satanic. This book articulates a critique of Christian nationalism from multiple standpoints including Christian theology and exegesis, historical analysis, and liberal political philosophy. It also considers the question of whether Christian nationalism is a sincere commitment or whether it is merely the rhetorical hyperbole of our polarized political era. While some of this may be mere rhetoric, there are sincerely committed Christian nationalists who aspire to create a Christian nation. The book includes extended criticism and analysis of the words and arguments of a range of contemporary figures who use Christian nationalist rhetoric, including people like Donald Trump who has suggested that “Our enemies are waging war on faith and freedom, on science and religion, on history and tradition, on law and democracy, on God Almighty himself.”4 As we’ll see, even if Trump does not himself sincerely believe that the enemies of his movement are waging war on the Almighty himself, there are others who do think that U.S.’s secular system is anti-​religious and even Satanic. The critique of Christian nationalism discussed here points in the direction of a significant problem, described here as “the paradox of secularism.” The paradox occurs when inclusive secular systems confront exclusivist anti-​secular religious movements. Can secular systems legitimately exclude Christian nationalism and other forms of anti-​secular religiosity without violating the inclusive spirit of secularism? This is related to the question of how a defender of the secular separation between church and state might respond to someone 4 Donald Trump speech at the Faith and Freedom Conference on June 24, 2023, posted at The Rev: https://​www​.rev​.com​/blog​/tran​scri​pts​/trump​-spe​aks​-at​-faith​-free​dom​-coalit​ion​-gala​ -tra​nscr​ipt, accessed July 13, 2023.

xii Preface who claims that the secular system itself is the work of the devil. The book reflects on this problem from the standpoints of political philosophy, theology, and the philosophy of religion. The book shows that Christian nationalism discloses a tragic conflict of values within secular systems, which cannot be easily resolved. Nonetheless, it argues that the wisdom of political secularism is sufficient to withstand the threatening specter of Christian nationalism. Secularism, as interpreted here, is a political framework that is inclusive of religion and not opposed to faith. Political secularism is fundamentally a political system grounded in religious liberty. It presumes that religion and politics ought to remain distinct and that freedom of religious belief is fundamental. Secular principles provide substantial reasons to reject Christian nationalism and other anti-​secular ideologies that seek to combine exclusivist religion with narrowly nationalistic view of political power. Political secularism is also antithetical to atheistic nationalism and overt attempts to destroy or eliminate religion. Secularism, as defended here, is inclusive: it includes atheists, theists, and other believers who each benefit from religious liberty. Nonetheless, political secularism is opposed to the political aspirations of Christian nationalism and other kinds of religio-​political exclusivism (such as political Islam, Hindu nationalism, or state-​mandated atheism). Secularism has been defined in a variety of ways, as Berlinerblau has recently explained.5 My focus here is political secularism, defined as a system of legal norms that limit the state from overt religiosity and which ensure that individual religiosity is protected. In the American system, secularism is grounded in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly recognizes a fundamental right to religious liberty, and which also stipulates that government should not favor or “establish” any religion. Secular systems locate religion in a place outside of political power, preventing any religious group or organization from acquiring political power. This may seem to “exclude” religion. But in excluding religion from political power, a more inclusive and diverse social and political world is supposed to result. And individual believers and religious communities are supposed to be left alone to pursue their own freely chosen faith. Anti-​secular religious ideologies such as Christian nationalism throw a wrench in the works, since they advance the idea that religion and politics should be more closely wedded. In response, secular systems find themselves in a bind. In excluding exclusivist and nationalistic faiths, secular systems appear to violate the spirit of inclusivity and impose a limit on some kinds of 5 Jacques Berlinerblau, Secularism: The Basics (New York: Routledge, 2022).

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religious liberty. Furthermore, religious critics may claim that secularism itself is a new kind of “religion” that seeks, as some Christian critics have suggested, to deify the human in opposition to God. Thus, in thinking about the problem of Christian nationalism, we encounter the problem that is described here as “the paradox of secularism.” This is a concept that has not been adequately discussed in the literature. The idea of the paradox of secularism is a unique and important contribution of this book. The paradox of secularism described here is similar to the “paradox of toleration,” as discussed in the literature on toleration and liberal political theory. This paradox can be formulated as a question: should secular systems include religious beliefs that are anti-​secular? The problem with Christian nationalism, from a secular vantage point is that it is antithetical to the inclusive vision of secular politics, and thus may have to be excluded. But if Christian nationalism is excluded, this may violate the spirit of inclusion and respect for liberty that are hallmarks of secularism. The book explores this apparent paradox in a variety of ways, while admitting that it may be impossible finally to resolve the problem, since it involves a fundamental conflict of values (described here as a “tragic conflict”). The “paradox of secularism” as discussed here is quite different from what Blankholm (2022) has recently called “the secular paradox” (and by which he means to suggest that secularism can include a kind of “religiosity”—​what he calls in the subtitle of his book, “the religiosity of the not religious”).6 I respond to Blankholm’s account implicitly throughout this book, arguing basically that this is a misleading description of secularism. It is true that some “secular people” can be described as “religious” in a broad sense, and that there can be some kind of “religiosity” involved in secular forms of life. There may even be a quasi-​religious devotion to the basic principles of secular political systems (say, when we think that there is a kind of “sacred” value to the fundamental idea of religious liberty). And some secular people may indeed explicitly espouse a kind of “secular religion.” This is, in fact, what many of the Christian nationalists are afraid of: that secularism as religion is seeking to replace Christianity. But this over-​reaction results from a kind of equivocation that is often based on a mis­understanding (sometimes a deliberate misunderstanding) of what political secularism is. Political secularism is not a religious view; it is, rather, a political philosophy. Of course, a critic might claim that you simply cannot have a political philosophy without staking a claim about theology (even if the claim

6 Joseph Blankholm, The Secular Paradox: On the Religiosity of the Not Religious (New York: nyu Press, 2022).

xiv Preface you stake is humanistic or atheistic). But as I attempt to show throughout, there is wisdom in seeking to distinguish between secularism as an inclusive political system, and secularism as a kind of humanistic and quasi-​religious worldview. At any rate, the paradox of secularism that I discuss here is based on the problem of what happens when political secularism confronts its anti-​secular other. When inclusive political secularism finds itself excluding anti-​secular political religions such as Christian nationalism, we reach the limit of inclusivity. The problem described here is substantially different from Blankholm’s focus, and it has not been adequately discussed in the literature on secularism. This book offers both a sustained critique of Christian nationalism and a defense of political secularism. It argues that religion ought to be left in the private sphere and that political life ought to be based on universal values that transcend the values of particular sectarian religious belief. This conception of political life aims to be both inclusive and universal. The inclusive aspect of secular systems is derived from the celebration of individual religious liberty and the diversity that comes with it. At the same time, this approach points beyond nationalism and sectarianism toward a universal and cosmopolitan conception of human rights and shared human values. This universal, cosmopolitan ideal is not antithetical to religion—​and indeed, there are forms of religion that embrace a kind of inclusive pluralism (we see this, for example, in Gandhi’s view of religion or in the idea of a “global ethic,” as embraced by the Parliament of the World’s Religions). But again, the problem is that pluralistic and tolerant religious ideals encounter a limit case in relation to Christian nationalism and other forms of exclusivist political religion. The book considers as well, a religious critique of Christian nationalism, articulated from an inclusive and pluralistic interpretation of theology and religion (what I call “progressive” or “liberal” Christianity). One important point here is the fact that Christianity includes internal diversity, which is a fact that is often ignored by advocates of Christian nationalism. This kind of Christian diversity has been present since the founding of the United States. And indeed, it is clearly present among the American Founders. Contemporary Christian nationalists cite quotes from the Founding Fathers that indicate that the U.S. is a Christian nation. In an oft-​quoted letter from 1816, John Jay said, “Providence has given to our people the choice of their rulers, and it is the duty, as well as the privilege and interest of our Christian nation to select and prefer Christians for their rulers. National prosperity can neither be obtained nor preserved without the favor of Providence.”7 Jay clearly states that this is a 7 John Jay to John Murray, October 12, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jay​/01​-07​ -02​-0264, accessed August 8, 2024.

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Christian nation. And Jay was a pious and scripturally based Christian. But Jay also defended religious liberty, while at the same time thinking it was acceptable to deny toleration to Catholics. This may seem inconsistent. But in this opinion, he appeared to follow the lead of John Locke who both affirmed toleration while denying it to Roman Catholics. The complexity of these ideas would require multiple volumes to flesh out. My point here is simply to register this complexity. Many of the American Founders had orthodox religious views. Some thought that this was a Christian nation. Others wanted to deny toleration to non-​Christians. But most of the Founder were deeply committed to religious liberty. And a number of the most prominent thinkers of the founding generation had unorthodox religious views. This includes George Washington (a Mason who was probably a kind of deist), James Madison (another likely deist who seemed more concerned with politics than with religion), John Adams (a Unitarian who was critical of mysteries such as the trinity and of churches and priests), and Thomas Jefferson (who famously rewrote the Christian gospels, leaving out the miracles).8 It was obvious at the founding of the country that Christian texts and theology can be interpreted in divergent ways. The diversity of opinion about religion at the founding provides an obvious argument against exclusivist and nationalistic interpretations of the faith. And indeed, the Founders set up the Constitution and its First Amendment to ensure religious liberty while also preventing the establishment of a national religion. Today, many progressive Christian believers and faith traditions affirm the importance of secularism, the separation of church and state, and the need for an inclusive vision of Christianity. It is even possible to derive a type of “Christian humanism” in readings of Christian texts and traditions. As I explain, a central idea here is that God is not a tyrant and does not want Christians to exert tyrannical political power. This progressive, humanistic, and modern theological idea is rejected by the advocates of Christian nationalism. Progressive Christian humanism, as I describe it here, is derived from a radical but sympathetic reading of the Bible and the Christian tradition of theology such as we find in the religious musings of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. To return to the issue of the Ten Commandments, which we discussed at the outset, we might note that John Adams and Thomas Jefferson exchanged letters about this text in which they questioned whether the text was, as Adams put it, “not written by the finger

8 A useful source is David L. Holmes, The Faiths of the Founding Fathers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

xvi Preface of God on tables.”9 In reply, Jefferson expressed doubt about the authenticity of the Biblical texts. He suggested that the history of these texts is “defective and doubtful.”10 The humane and philosophical speculation of these Founding Fathers provides a useful remedy for the extremes of Christian nationalism. We ought to carefully read and re-​read key texts in religion (and in U.S. history) and interpret them with a critical eye. Such an approach tends to result in a worldview that is opposed to the cramped and narrow theology that often accompanies Christian nationalism. Inclusive Christian humanism affirms secular political ideas while rejecting the jealous and exclusivist God of nationalistic theology. It also leads to a radical critique of authoritarian and nationalistic ideologies, while giving support for democratic, secular, and cosmopolitan political norms. The strongest argument against Christian nationalism is flatly atheistic: if there is no God, then it makes no sense to insist that political life be oriented around belief in God. Of course, atheism is often viewed as a scary and divisive idea; and atheists remain a small minority among the general public, despite the rising tide of non-​religion. And indeed, Christian nationalism has developed as a backlash against the growth of secularity, non-​religion, and atheism. For this reason, it is useful to establish common ground between atheism and progressive, humanistic Christianity, and to consider the extent to which progressive Christians might agree with their atheist neighbors in a common argument against Christian nationalism. Of course, tensions remain. Progressive Christian theists maintain that God is not a tyrant and that Christianity is not best understood in nationalistic terms. But atheists may object that even while progressive Christians oppose nationalism, they remain wedded to much of the traditional theology of Christianity. And so it goes, in a complex argument that includes militant atheists, disengaged non-​religious people, progressive Christians, Christian humanists, and Christian anarchists each offering arguments against Christian nationalists. Of course, there are more possibilities and problems in a world that includes radical diversity. For example, we ought also to consider Muslim atheists, Hindu cosmopolitans, and Indigenous people who appeal to secular ideas in order to defend their traditional religious ways of life. The fact of robust pluralism has often been ignored, especially in a discourse that has typically focused on the arguments of militant atheists such as Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and Daniel Dennett and progressive Christian theists such as Martin Luther King, 9 10

John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, November 14, 1813, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​son​/03​-06​-02​-0476, accessed July 8, 2024. Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, January 24, 1814, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​ nts​/Jeffer​son​/03​-07​-02​-0083, accessed July 8, 2024.

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Jr., Jim Wallis, and even Pope Francis. But the conversation is more complex than this. And as we encounter a broader range of ideas, the argument in favor of secularism and cosmopolitanism becomes even stronger. Our complex and diverse world needs more religious liberty, less nationalism, and more focus on inclusivity and universality. The critique of Christian nationalism offered here is located in the common ground that can be found between nonreligious humanism, atheism, and progressive Christian theism. I have discussed this elsewhere.11 This approach may seem weak from the standpoint of a more militant kind of atheism that wants to dismantle and discard religion entirely. And some Christians may be unwilling to find common ground with atheists. But the arguments and ideas of progressive Christian theology and of contemporary atheology can be combined with the fact of robust diversity and radical pluralism in a powerful argument in defense of secularism and against Christian nationalism. This general idea points toward an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and other secular systems in which the goal of these systems is understood as peaceful co-​existence in the face of radical pluralism. Christian nationalism poses a challenge to this interpretation. But as I show in the book, there are substantial resources within the Constitutional system and in theology and American history for responding to this challenge. This is not a panacea or a slam-​dunk solution. And tragic conflicts remain. But when we understand the theological and political issues underlying these conflicts and debates about Christian nationalism, we will be better able to negotiate those remaining conflicts and to discover a wise path forward. This path involves a basic commitment to critical thinking, sincerity of belief, careful historical analysis, trust in the value of religious liberty, and a kind of faith in humanity that holds that human beings can in fact understand that religious liberty is valuable and that secular political systems are wise.

A Note on Texts and Methods

In what follows, I mix current affairs with history, sociology, theology, and philosophy. There are difficulties in this way of proceeding. In the opening paragraph of this Preface, I have quoted Donald Trump verbatim—​including his use of all caps in his messaging. The audience, tone, and content of that kind of communication is quite different from what we find in the Bible, in 11

See Andrew Fiala and Peter Admirand, Seeking Common Ground: A Theist/​Atheist Dialogue (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2021); and Andrew Fiala, Secular Cosmopolitanism, Hospitality, and Religious Pluralism (New York: Routledge Publishing 2016).

xviii Preface the philosophical tradition, in sociological data, and in the writings of the Founding Fathers. Some readers who are more interested in a pithy critique of what contemporary Christian nationalists say may not be interested in the historical and philosophical details. Other readers may be more interested in the philosophical arguments than in what any bloviating politician says. My goals here, however, require that we toggle back and forth between different rhetorical styles. One goal is to adequately represent—​and thus understand—​ contemporary Christian nationalism. To accomplish this goal, I quote extensively from Christian nationalist authors and speaker—​without correcting their grammar or style. I also want to demonstrate that there are resources in the Biblical tradition, in Christian theology, in the thinking of the American Founders, and in modern philosophical tradition that can be used to argue against Christian nationalism. To some readers, the tone of these texts may be off-​putting. The Constitution itself is written in prose that is difficult for some contemporary readers to digest, and the style of the Founders can be difficult. Nonetheless, I quote these founding documents and the writings of the Founding Fathers at length, including their often peculiar grammar and capitalization, in detail in order to show that the Christian nationalist interpretation of this tradition is flawed. Things becomes even more complicated when quoting the Bible and other ancient and early modern texts. I have generally quoted from the Revised Standard Version of the Bible. In some cases, where I think it matters, I note difficulties of translation. As a useful resource for Biblical texts, I have consulted the Blue Letter Bible (https://​www​.blue​lett​erbi​ble​.org​/)​. A similarly useful source for the works of the Founding Fathers, I have consulted Founders Online (https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/)​. I have also consulted a number of works in the extensive secondary literature on theology, Biblical exegesis, philosophy, and American history. These resources can be found in the notes and bibliography. But this is a vast field and I do not claim to have reviewed every available resource. Finally, I realize that there are other issues of concern with regard to the sources and subject matter discussed here. I mention issues involving gender, race, slavery, sexuality, and Eurocentrism throughout the text. There important truths that deserve further exploration. John Locke defended colonialism. Thomas Jefferson owned slaves. And many contemporary Christian Nationalists express ideas that are homophobic, Eurocentric, and even racist. I mention some of this, where relevant. But my focus here is not on these important issues. Rather, my goal is to argue against the anti-​secular assumptions of Christian nationalism using traditional theology and political thought, while also exploring the paradoxical limit of a secular response to Christian nationalism.

Acknowledgments Thanks to friends and colleagues with whom I have discussed this topic over the years. I would especially like to thank Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, the editor of the Brill Social Philosophy book series for his support and wisdom on this project (and others).

­c hapter 1

Introduction to Christian Nationalism and the Secular Paradox Christian nationalism is an existential threat to American democracy and the Christian church in the United States. Andrew Whitehead1

…

If we are going to have one nation under God, which we must, we have to have one religion. One nation under God and one religion under God. Michael Flynn2

∵ Two uncanny spirits are haunting the United States, and other secular lands. On the one hand, some religious people are engaged in a spiritual war against the devil of secularism. On the other hand, secular systems are menaced by the rising specter of Christian nationalism. These two spirits are doppelgangers, engaged in a struggle for hearts and minds, and political power. This struggle is not merely a rational debate among political philosophies or theologies, even though in the background there is an interesting and important debate about philosophy and theology. Rather, this is an emotional, psychological, and political struggle for power and control. It is more about religion than about theology, more about national identity than about political philosophy. Of course, it includes a debate about theology and political philosophy. And there are theoretical arguments to be made. Indeed, theology and 1 Andrew Whitehead, Twitter (X) post from Feb. 13, 2022, https://​twit​ter​.com​/ndr​ewwh​iteh​ ead​/sta​tus​/1492​9600​3159​5282​439, accessed January 8, 2024. 2 Quoted in “The Desecrations of Michael Flynn” The Atlantic, Oct. 25, 2022, https://​www​.thea​ tlan​tic​.com​/ideas​/arch​ive​/2022​/10​/mich​ael​-flynn​-maga​-christ​ian​-trump​/671​852​/, accessed October 10, 2023.

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_002

2

Chapter 1

political philosophy inform the theoretical matrix that is the primary focal point of the present book, which aims to shed light on the anti-​secular movement of Christian nationalism. But part of the problem is that the fears and fights about Christian nationalism take place in a murky twilight zone that is often outside the purview of theory, reason, and philosophy. The movement of Christian nationalism is an ideological struggle that involves a mix of modalities and different registers of thought and experience. As an ideological movement, it is less focused on articulating a coherent set of ideas that are defended in the tribunal of reason than it is a matter of rhetoric, vision, and mood. In response, advocates of secularism must be careful not to be pulled into the netherworld of ideological struggle. The solution proposed by this book is clarity of thought and careful argument. I do not intend to pour gasoline onto this fire. There is already too much fire all around this area of concern, which is emotional and existential. When speakers like former General and Trump-​advisor Michael Flynn say that we are in a “spiritual battle for the heart and soul of this country,” he puts fuel on the fire.3 Flynn has been described as one of the leaders of the Christian nationalist movement, even though he himself does not use the phrase or describe himself as a Christian nationalist. But Flynn has said, as quoted at the outset of this chapter, “If we are going to have one nation under God, which we must, we have to have one religion. One nation under God and one religion under God.”4 This is provocative, to say the least. In response, the critics of Christian nationalism have fired back. James Carville, a Democratic pundit, has suggested that “Christian nationalism is a greater threat to America than al-​Qaida.”5 The Christian nationalist threat leads people to worry, as Andrew Whitehead (quoted at the outset) does, that people like Michael Flynn are an existential threat to the secular system of the United States. Whitehead is a leading researcher engaged in critical analysis of Christian nationalism. In the Preface to the co-​authored book (with Samuel L. Perry) Taking American Back for God, Whitehead and Perry reflect on the violence of September 6, 2021 as a manifestation of Christian nationalism: “For all of its horror, January 6th

3 Michael Flynn’s Holy War, pbs, https://​www​.pbs​.org​/wgbh​/frontl​ine​/arti​cle​/a​-glim​pse​-ins​ ide​-mich​ael​-fly​nns​-holy​-war​/, accessed October 10, 2023. 4 Quoted in “The Desecrations of Michael Flynn” The Atlantic, Oct. 25, 2022, https://​www​.thea​ tlan​tic​.com​/ideas​/arch​ive​/2022​/10​/mich​ael​-flynn​-maga​-christ​ian​-trump​/671​852​/, accessed October 10, 2023. 5 ‘The venom of our age’: James Carville on the danger of Mike Johnson’s Christian nationalism” The Guardian, December 16, 2023, https://​www​.theg​uard​ian​.com​/us​-news​/2023​/dec​/16​ /james​-carvi​lle​-mike​-john​son​-christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism, accessed January 8, 2024.

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was the wakeup call so many of us needed. Christian nationalism is neither harmless, nor fringe. It’s in our churches; and it wants the power it feels has been unjustly stolen away.”6 As Andrew Seidel, an attorney who works for the Freedom from Religion Foundation said in testimony before Congress in the aftermath of the January 6 riots at the U.S. Capital (quoting his own previous remarks on the topic), “Christian Nationalism is the biggest threat to America today. An existential threat to a government of the people, for the people, and by the people.”7 The rhetoric is heated here. And the stakes are high. So, we need careful and critical thinking. One worry that motivates the present volume is that these discussions are often a bit too overheated. One argument that I’ll make throughout is that we should trust that the wisdom of secularism is deep and substantial enough to endure despite threats against it. Of course, we ought to take these threats seriously. But the threat of anti-​secularism has an obvious response, which is to be found in the wisdom of secularism. I suspect that at least some of those who might be described as Christian nationalist would actually agree about the value of secularism—​if they were able to think carefully about it, apart from the fire and fury of ideological battles. Some of the worry that Christians have with regard to the threatening nature of secularism likely occurs as a response to the overheated rhetoric of the opponents of Christian nationalism. When James Carville accuses Christian nationalists of being a greater threat than al-​Qaeda, this is bound to produce backlash among Christians who see themselves as pious and patriotic. And so it goes, with the backlash provoking further response and escalation in a tit-​for-​tat ideological squabble. I attempt to avoid hyperbole and escalating rhetoric here. However, I will quote—​sometimes extensively—​from many of those who engage in that kind of overheated discourse. My hope is that in looking critically at the words and ideas of the Christian nationalists, we can better understand the flaws and limitations of the movement. I realize that this may sometimes seem to focus on strawman examples—​since some of the things that Christian nationalists say

6 Andrew L. Whitehead and Samuel L. Perry, Taking American Back for God: Christian Nationalism in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), xv. 7 Andrew Seidel, “Christian Nationalism and the Capital Insurrection,” Written Testimony of Andrew L. Seidel of the Freedom From Religion Foundation on the role Christian Nationalism played in the lead up to and during the attack of January 6th, Delivered to the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol U.S. House of Representative, March 18, 2022, https://​www​.govi​nfo​.gov​/cont​ent​/pkg​/GPO​-J6​ -DOC​-CTR​L000​0062​431​/pdf​/GPO​-J6​-DOC​-CTR​L000​0062​431​.pdf, accessed January 8, 2024.

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are outrageous and bizarre. So, I also delve into the more scholarly and serious theoretical arguments in the background of the more bombastic political rhetoric. I will show in detail in this book how Christian nationalism develops as a response to secularism. I will show that it is often based on a pernicious and misguided interpretation of secularism. And while it is easy to suspect that Christian nationalists are outright theocrats, there are, I think, blessedly few who argue for straight-​up theocracy. And in fact, those who aspire to affirm a kind of Christian American patriotism will have to come to terms with the fact that the U.S. Constitution does not allow the creation of theocracy. I think that most so-​called Christian nationalists ought to understand that—​at least those who combine their Christian fervor with a pledge of allegiance to the U.S. and its Constitutional system. I will further suggest that there is something stable and enduring in the wisdom of secularism that ought to help secular systems resist those who oppose such a system. This somewhat optimistic point is offered, however, with fingers crossed (or with a hope and a prayer, if you prefer such religious turn of phrase). The future is uncertain, and we cannot predict the course of history from within it. One reason to write this book is to analyze the threats discussed here, while also suggesting a path forward. That path must involve a clearer understanding of the promise of secularism—​as well as an understanding of the paradox that is found within it. Secular political systems protect religious freedom while preventing the formation (or “establishment”—​as the U.S. Constitution puts it) of an official religion. Such a system is a wise way of structuring political power in relation to religion. But that system generates a backlash among those who think that their religion ought to be privileged and empowered. This backlash is inevitable. Paradoxically, in attempting to include diverse religious ideas, the secular system will run up against a limit with regard to religious ideas that are not inclusive and which seek to limit the religious liberty of others, or which seek to impose a form of religious national identity onto the lives of those who are not religious or who do not value that shared form of identity. This problem cannot be eliminated—​and so secularism will always be unstable and at least for some, unsatisfying. Nonetheless, there is wisdom in this system. I’ve used that term, wisdom, several times already. My argument about the wisdom of secularism is not a syllogism intended as knock-​out punch that will usher in the triumph of secularism in no uncertain terms. Wisdom is not the same thing as certainty; nor is it the result of mathematical proof. Politics and religion are more complicated than this. These human experiences involve identities, emotions, communities, histories, and traditions. Politics and religion change and develop—​and we change and evolve within them. By claiming

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that there is wisdom in the secular system, I mean that this is a beneficial and coherent system—​for people like us. We modern Americans, Europeans—​and others like us—​live in a world of diversity, change, and uncertainty. A secular system allows diverse religions (and non-​religious) people to co-​exist and to engage one another in communal living despite our differences. If you value liberty, inclusiveness, nonviolence, and tolerance then secularism is useful and wise. There are other values, of course, and not everyone will agree to the wisdom of secularism. Some of the anti-​secular backlash of the Christian nationalist movement is fueled by resistance to change and a reluctance to embrace diversity. But those anti-​secular folks are themselves living in the modern world in which freedom of expression, democratic government, and religious diversity are taken for granted. In a sense, this means that contemporary Christian nationalism is a post-​ secular movement. It unfolds as a reaction against secularism, that is, as backlash against a legal, political, and social world in which secularism is ascendant. Discussions of post-​secularism have emerged in the past twenty years or so in the work of Jürgen Habermas and others who have responded to the apparent re-​emergence of religion from out of a world that has been progressively de-​ sacralized, disenchanted, and secularized.8 As Charles Taylor has explained, modern, Western societies have evolved from a world in which “it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others.” This is, in Taylor’s words, “a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace.”9 It is easy to imagine that in this post-​ secular condition, some religious people will long for a return to a simpler world. But this longing is a kind of nostalgia for time that may not have really ever existed. As I’ll show in this book, religious diversity has always been an issue and it is unlikely that there ever was a world in which religious identity and belief were easy, simply, and obvious. As examples, we might confront the Bible itself—​which contains lots of religious conflict—​or the diverse and often unorthodox religious views of the American Founders—​and which lead the Founders to craft the First Amendment as a safeguard for religious liberty. 8 See: Jürgen Habermas, (2008), “Notes on Post-​Secular Society” New Perspectives Quarterly, 25: 17–​29; Jürgen Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-​secular Age (New York: Polity Press, 2010); and Spyridon Kaltsas, “Habermas, Taylor, and Connolly on Secularism, Pluralism, and the Post-​Secular Public Sphere” Religions 10: 8 (2019), # 460, https://​doi​.org​/10​.3390​/rel1​0080​460​. 9 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 3.

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In understanding Christian nationalism as post-​secular it is worth noting that in the past half century there have been a number of obvious changes in American law and culture, which can be viewed by Christians as threatening. One fact involves the rapid growth of nonreligion and the correlative decline of Christian faith as a percentage of the population. A recent estimate from the Pew Center predicts that within a few decades, Christianity will no longer be the majority religion in the United States.10 And Supreme Court cases such as Engel v. Vitale (1962), which ended school prayer, and Abington v. Schemmp (1963), which ended Bible readings and other school prayers, helped to create the impression that religion was under attack by the secular political establishment. Christian nationalism must be understood as arising out of this historical context, as a post-​secular backlash against the apparent triumph of secularism. 1

A Philosophical Response to Christian Nationalism

The present volume is a work of political philosophy and theology, along with a substantial dose of history. It is circumspect and theoretical. I do not offer any concrete political or religious agendas or programs here. And while much of what I say is quite critical and worried about the phenomenon of Christian nationalism, my conclusions are somewhat optimistic. One important set of facts are the legal and cultural developments I just mentioned: the secular political system in the U.S. is firmly established in the Constitution; and a significant number of people are not on board with the Christian nationalist agenda. Moreover, as a philosopher, I remain hopeful that citizens are wise enough to think critically. Of course, wisdom is not innate: it requires education and nurturance. So, as I’ll argue in conclusion, we need to support efforts at critical education about history, politics, and religion. I am also hopeful that the structures of the secular system are resilient enough to resist the threat posed by the most extreme, theocratic advocates of Christian nationalism. But the secular American Constitution will not defend itself: it requires wise citizens to rise to its defense. I made a similar sort of argument about the value of the Constitution and the need for enlightened citizenship in a recent book about Donald Trump and the problem of tyranny.11 The Constitution is far 10 11

“Projecting U.S. religious groups’ population shares by 2070” Pew Research Center, March 13, 2022, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/relig​ion​/2022​/09​/13​/pro​ject​ing​-u​-s​-religi​ous​-gro​ ups​-pop​ulat​ion​-sha​res​-by​-2070​/, accessed March 10, 2023. Andrew Fiala, Tyranny from Plato to Trump: Fools, Sycophants, and Citizens (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022).

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from perfect; but it remains of value in a world of religious diversity. I worry here (as I did in my book on tyranny and Trump) that overheated rhetoric can lead people to over-​react, which in turn exacerbates polarization, and creates further animosity and dysfunction. I am not a fan of Donald Trump, or of Christian nationalism. But I worry that those who over-​estimate the threat of each of these can end up making matters worse. The Christian nationalists feel threatened by the apparent demise of their religion—​and their sense of value and identity. When folks like that hear others claim that Christian nationalism is an “existential threat” to our democracy (along with the implication that it must be extirpated), there is a tendency toward polarization and escalation. As those who study violence and conflict resolution remind us, the way forward must include de-​polarization and de-​escalation. By recognizing that secularism is ascendent and that it embodies deep wisdom about living well in a diverse world, we can help to alleviate the unreasonable fears of those who see Christian nationalism as an existential threat. It is a threat—​but secularism is strong enough to withstand it. Moreover, by understanding how secularism generates opposition and involves the kind of paradox that I describe here, we can understand (but not endorse) the grievances of the Christian nationalists themselves. This does not mean, however, that we should acquiesce to those grievances. This book affirms that secularism is a wise system. And it rejects the claim that religious nationalism is a good idea. For those who believe that this is a time of spiritual warfare, and that nationalism demands religious unity, the subtleties of political philosophy are irrelevant to the lived experience of crisis and the existential experience of Christian life and American patriotism. But for philosophers who defend, as I do, the legal framework that makes political secularism possible, the theoretical arguments are powerful and persuasive. Furthermore, debates about Christian theology are of interest to philosophers and theologians who, like myself, find this kind of stuff fascinating. But for the folks at the rallies and in the pews, who are moved by piety, community, and identity, these philosophical discussions are of limited interest. This leaves us with a significant conflict of orientations. Many of the devotees of Christian nationalism are focused on identity and experience. There are theories behind this movement. But beyond the theory, are folks who experience the growing secularization of the world as the work of the devil. This feeling of religious loss is sincere, even if it is based in a kind of fake news and a profound misunderstanding of both theology and politics. There are also players in this drama who seem to exploit Christian nationalist sentiment for their own purposes. Not every proponent of Christian nationalism means what they say—​or at least, we might suspect that some of the

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rhetoric of Christian nationalism is, well, merely rhetorical: a way of speaking that is targeted to a specific audience, that is fueled by emotion, and that is not actually connected to serious theoretical commitments or concrete policy proposals. It should be obvious, as well, that this same rhetorical strategy can be employed by the critics of Christian nationalism, who use the threat of Christian nationalism as a tool in their own ideological effort to gain power. To be blunt, in the American political context, Republicans often invoke God and the devil of secularism as a way of stirring up their “base.” At the same time, Democrats use the threat of Christian nationalism in similar ways. 2

Sincerity, Identity, Belief

As we begin our discussion of Christian nationalism, we will have to distinguish between sincere Christian nationalists and insincere advocates of the idea. We should also attend to those who are sincere in their defense of secularism, and those who invoke the specter of Christian nationalism as a rhetorical ploy. My focus throughout will primarily be the former, since I aim to offer a sincere defense of secularism. But on occasion, I will that there can be insincerity among those who criticize Christian nationalism. We should also note that one can sincerely believe something that is false. Consider, for example, a speech that Donald Trump gave in the summer of 2023 at the Faith and Freedom conference, in which he said the following: For seven years, you and I have been fighting side by side to rescue our country from evil and from the sinister forces who hate it. I believe they hate it and I believe they actually want to destroy it. Now we’re approaching the most important battle of our lives. As we gather today, our beloved nation is teetering on the edge of tyranny. I believe that, and you believe that. Our enemies are waging war on faith and freedom, on science and religion, on history and tradition, on law and democracy, on God Almighty himself.12 Trump suggests that there is a war being waged against faith, religion, and God himself. There is no doubt that some in his audience actually believe this, as he says here. He also says here that he believes it as well. With a politician like 12

From the transcript of Trump’s speech at the Faith and Freedom Conference on June 24, 2023, posted at The Rev: https://​www​.rev​.com​/blog​/tran​scri​pts​/trump​-spe​aks​-at​-faith​ -free​dom​-coalit​ion​-gala​-tra​nscr​ipt, accessed July 13, 2023.

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Trump, it is natural to wonder about the sincerity of his claim. I frankly have no idea whether Trump believes what he is saying here. But it is entirely possible that Trump, and some of the other advocates of Christian nationalism, are simply engaging in political rhetoric—​and don’t mean what they say. It is also possible that all of this is a scam. One example of this is found in the “We the People Bible,” a version of the Christian Bible being hawked by Donald Trump, Jr. On the cover of that Bible is a rendering of the American flag, in black, overwritten with the words “We the People.” According to the Bible’s promotional website:13 The We The People Bible was designed with the patriot in mind and features a vertical reversed American flag design that represents a country in distress. Our bible is proudly made in the USA and has been designed with large print that delivers an easy reading experience to anyone looking to explore the tried-​and-​true King James (kjv) translation. Every We The People Bible also includes easy-​to-​read copies of America’s founding documents including the United States Constitution, Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights, and the Pledge of Allegiance. The Bible’s website features a picture of Donald Trump, Jr. and a quote from him saying, “Faith is being targeted and our country’s founding beliefs are being targeted. The ‘We The People Bible’ is restoring what there is an attempt to remove. Preservation of Faith, preservation of America.”14 In hawking the product, the former President’s son also made a video in which he says the following.15 With American Judeo-​Christian values under attack, there could be no better time than to re-​up our commitment to America and to the Christian values that this country was founded on. Go check out the We the people Bible. Made in America. Printed in America. Assembled in America. You’re going to love it, and I think the people in your life probably need it too.

13 14 15

https://​americ​asup​erst​ore​.com​/produ​cts​/we​-the​-peo​ple​-bible​-sin​gle​-bible, accessed Jan­ u­­ary 24, 2025. https://​americ​asup​erst​ore​.com​/produ​cts​/we​-the​-peo​ple​-bible​-sin​gle​-bible, accessed Jan­ uary 23, 2025. Transcript and linked video here: https://​only​sky​.media​/ahall​/don​ald​-trump​-jr​-is​-sell​ ing​-the​-we​-the​-peo​ple​-bible​/, accessed December 4, 2023.

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The Bible sells for $89.99 (as of July 2024). It is not clear who is profiting from this attempt to market Christian nationalism. That lack of transparency is part of the problem. But the more overt problem is the fact that in pursuit of profit, the Bible is transformed into a strange kind of idol—​a token image to be used for political purposes and sold for a profit. From a Christian perspective that is not tainted by Christian nationalism it makes no sense to stamp a Bible with the image of the American flag. As we’ll discuss throughout, the contradictions of this movement are obvious. We see this in the very name of the “We the People Bible.” The phrase “we the people” is associated with the social contract theory of the state. And at least one of the texts included within this book, the Bill of Rights, is foundational for the secular system. But it is that system that is rejected by grifters like Donald Trump, Jr. who uses the claim that “American Judeo-​Christian values [are] under attack” to sell his product. It is not surprising that this attempt to monetize a certain Christian fear of secularism is so cheesy and superficial. The insincere and superficial forms of Christian nationalism are so bizarre that they verge upon parody. On the other hand, there are sincere and committed people who do in fact believe what they say about the diabolical forces of secularism and their desire to transform (or return) this country into a Christian nation. There are deeply committed Christians who feel that their values are under attack and whose sense of cultural identity is being threatened by the growing presence of non-​ Christian and non-​religious people and values in the United States. I will return to the question of sincerity in a later chapter. But let me note here, that the for the most part, I will take Christian nationalists at their word. Thus, even when a grifter like Trump, Jr. says “American Judeo-​Christian values” are under attack, we ought to take that claim seriously, even if Trump does not himself believe it. My assumption will be that there are sincere Christian nationalists who really mean it when they say, as the Patriot Church movement does: “Our country is under attack by demonic principalities and powers. They are destroying the very cultural and religious fabric that makes the USA so special.”16 The Patriot Church movement appears to be one example of sincere Christian nationalism. The Patriot Church movement has emphasized its commitment to nonviolence. But there are others, whom we will discuss, who appear to be keenly interested in a revolution and unafraid of the possibility of violence. These people must also be taken seriously. Consider, for example, Pastor Mark Burns, from South Carolina—​a Black pastor who has affirmed at a Reawaken American rally in 2024 that he is a “proud Christian nationalist,” 16

https://​patrio​tchu​rch​.us​/patr​iot​-netw​ork, accessed November 27, 2023.

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explaining that “This is a God nation. This is a Jesus nation. You will never take God out of America.”17 I have no doubt that Pastor Burns is sincere. Which is why it is concerning that Pastor Burns also said, at that same event, that it is time to take back the nation “by force”—​and that the Bible does not advocate turning the other cheek, but rather that “when they smack you in the face, you smack them back two times harder.”18 Burns is passionate Black southern preacher who believes that God has anointed Trump to be the leader of a religious revival in America. Perhaps his rhetorical enthusiasm leads him to say outrageous things. But there are also less impassioned advocates for revolution—​and even revolutionary violence. Such a revolution would be morally justified by the theological demand to create a Christian nation. In a 2022 book, The Case for Christian Nationalism, Stephen Wolfe explains: A Christian society that is for itself will distrust atheists, decry blasphemy, correct any dishonoring of Christ, orient life around the Sabbath, frown on and suppress moral deviancy … A Christian nation that is true to itself will unashamedly and confidently assert Christian supremacy over the land.19 And: The civil ruler who attacks true religion is not acting as a minister of God. He is an enemy of his people’s good, an enemy of the human race, and an enemy of God.20 Wolfe appears to be a sincere Christian nationalist. His agenda aims to create a Christian society. This is also what we see in the language of Trump and Flynn—​which may be less-​sincere and perhaps understandable as political rhetoric. Nonetheless, whether sincere or not, Trump’s rhetoric will be heard by those who are more sincerely committed to the idea and who are motivated by the existential and emotional pull of Christian nationalism, and who view a

17

Mark Burns at Reawaken America, https://​x​.com​/Bria​nKay​lor​/sta​tus​/1583​8547​2379​4227​ 201, accessed August 5, 2024. 18 Mark Burns at Reawaken America, https://​twit​ter​.com​/Bria​nKay​lor​/sta​tus​/1657​0527​4631​ 3244​679?s=​20, accessed August 5, 2024. 19 Stephen Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism (Moscow, ID, Canon Press: 2022), 240–​41. 20 Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism, p. 338.

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certain form of Christianity as essential to their own identity—​and as essential to their understanding of the American national identity. The drama and rhetoric of this kind of thing—​the focus on identity, the enthusiastic delivery of pastors, the claims about revolution and force, and the idea that a nation or a person could be an enemy or a friend of God—​is quite different from the way of thinking and being of the philosophical defenders of the legal and political framework of secularism. Indeed, as we shall see, the terminology itself is confused and slippery. For many Christian nationalists, secularism is a dirty word, associated with other pejorative terms like godless, communism, socialism, and atheism. These folks also view nationalism or patriotism as a matter of identity and a spiritual value. On the other hand, discussions of secularism as a political system and as a theory within political philosophy—​such as the one that exists in this book—​are dispassionate, rational, and, well … philosophical. Such philosophical discussions are sincere; but they lack the kind of existential depth that extends to identity and faith. There is a crucial difference here between philosophical arguments, on the one hand, and religious and political rhetoric, on the other. Religious and political experience, rhetoric, and identity have a kind of emotional depth and communal power that is different from the rational tone of merely philosophical arguments. To make matter worse, a philosophical argument can appear to be lacking in sincerity (or even in fact disingenuous and ideological) when viewed from the vantage point of those who are more deeply moved and committed by their identity and faith. I pointed this problem out in one of my first published books, where I discussed the ways in which truth and rationality can appear to be ideological.21 This is yet another reason that the advocates of Christian nationalism will have for maligning political secularism and its advocates: the secular system seems, well, too neutral and lacking in passion to be plausible or even to be human. This may be why some of those critics of secularism are quick to suggest that secularism is in fact another religion, which merely pretends to be neutral. Andrew Copson explains this critique of secularism as follows: “Secularism pretends to be neutral, they [the critics] say, but in separating religion from politics it is not neutral. It implicitly favors non-​religious ways of reasoning.”22 There may be some truth to this critique—​ which points toward the paradox of secularism that I’m discussing here. We will have to continually respond to this worry. The response is to assert that 21 22

Andrew Fiala, The Philosopher’s Voice (Albany, NY: suny Press, 2002). Andrew Copson, Secularism: Politics, Religion, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 85.

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political secularism—​secularism as a political structure that allows for diversity and religious liberty—​is in fact neutral and does not attempt to subvert or replace religion. Nonetheless, it is true that defenders of political secularism like myself tend to view things from a more cosmopolitan vantage point that sees nationalism as old-​fashioned, and which reinterprets patriotism in a Constitutional republic such as the United States as a matter of loyalty to the Constitution and to the universal principles of human rights that it is embodies—​but not as a matter of identity or emotional attachment. And of course, for the Christian nationalist, this dispassionate approach is part of the problem, since a soulless secularism will fail to inspire the kind of patriotism, piety, and communal identity that the Christian nationalist seems to desire. In a sense, the defenders of political secularism and the Christian nationalists appear to exist in different realms of value, discourse, and meaning. One part of this difference is a matter of theology and political philosophy. But another part of the difference has to do with the place of religion, identity, and emotion in the lives of individuals and communities. This dispute is really about a fundamental difference of social, political, theological, and existential meaning. This difference is not easily overcome. There is a tragic conflict here, that leaves us with what I am calling in this book the paradox of secularism. In this iteration, the paradox is that those who defend the philosophical idea of a neutral secular state, grounded on law and human rights will find themselves at odds with those who view political life as emotional, identity-​based, religious, and nationalistic. When this difference between the secular state as a legal system and religious nationalism as an emotional movement comes into open conflict, the secular state may find that it cannot include those whose basic worldview is anti-​secular. Hence, the paradox of secularism: an inclusive system may not be able to include everyone. Now let’s return to the metaphor with which I began this chapter. Christian nationalism appears as a frightening bogeyman that was seemingly conjured out of nowhere in a world that is rapidly secularizing. The gravediggers of secularism appear to traffic in a toxic mix of theocracy, intolerance, and authoritarianism. And defenders of secular systems are left wondering whether we should tremble before the threat of an ideology and movement that explicitly aims to overthrow secular political systems. This specter did not come from nowhere. It arises as a reaction against the apparent victory of modern secularism, which is viewed as a threat to religion. In the 21st Century in Europe and North America, religion is dying out, diversity is increasing, and secular systems of government are firmly established. The specter of Christian nationalism arises

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as a response to the historical reality of secularization, which some Christians see as the work of the devil. In describing this as a matter of ghosts, specters, and devils, I intend to point toward one part of a solution, which is demystification. Secularism can sound sinister and diabolical when viewed from the vantage point of faith. And Christian nationalism can appear to be spooky when viewed from a secular perspective. There are indeed some spooky and sinister ideas in this arena. But we must be careful not to overgeneralize. Some would-​be Christian nationalists are merely pious believers who wax hyperbolic in their claims about the need to take back the nation for God. Others use the language of Christian nationalism insincerely, as rhetorical performance intended to egg-​on (and possibly fleece) a more committed religious audience. And defenders of secularism are not necessarily militant atheists who hate religion. Indeed, secularism as a political system can be understood as defending religion insofar as it guarantees religious liberty. We will have to clarify these ideas carefully. Nonetheless, there is a conflict here that is not easy to avoid. On the one hand, some religious people want political life to be organized around religion. On the other hand, secular legal and political systems seek to prevent that from happening. On the one hand, some religious believers are moved by piety and identity to want to wage spiritual warfare for the soul of the nation. On the other hand, secular political philosophy emphasizes laws and states rather than nations and identity. 3

Defining Christian Nationalism

In this book, Christian nationalism will be defined as a political movement that intends to institute Christian laws and which holds that national identity should be understood in Christian terms. On this definition, Christian nationalism can be understood as an anti-​secular movement that seeks to “establish” Christianity as the religion of the land, while also supporting and encouraging the liberty of Christian believers. Christian nationalism is not a new idea developed out of the blue by the current generation of Christians. But it can be surprising to hear Americans in the 21st Century advocate for taking over the government in the name of God. This sounds surprising because during the past couple of decades, the number of nonreligious people in the United States has been growing rapidly. But, as I suggest here, the growth of nonreligion is part of the impetus for the resurgence of Christian nationalism. As nonreligion grows and the religious identity

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of the country shifts away from Christianity, some Christians are actively seeking to resurrect the Christian identity of the country. This may seem like an exaggerated way to describe the agenda of Christian nationalism. But Christian Pastor Sean Feucht said in 2023, “We want God to be in control of everything. We want believers to be the ones writing the laws.”23 Feucht is a leader among self-​proclaimed Christian nationalists. He prayed in the White House over then-​President Trump in 2019.24 In 2023, he led a “Kingdom to the Capital” revival tour aiming to “restore America’s Christian Values.” His ideas are part of a long tradition in American Christianity that includes Billy Graham, Norman Vincent Peale, and before them John Winthrop and Cotton Mather. One could even add to this list Christopher Columbus, who credited the discover of the new world to the Holy Spirit in fulfillment of the prophecies of Isaiah.25 The Spanish conquistadors made no secret of their plan to create a Christian world in the Americas, naming cities after saints as they proceeded. This legacy is found in the place names of Santa Fe, San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles. This tradition of a conquering and ruling Christianity is based in a particular reading of the Bible. Key Bible verses include Proverbs 8:15 and Daniel 2:21, which suggest that a king rules by God’s pleasure, and Romans 13:1, which says “there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God.” Some Christians interpret this to mean that the government ought to be Christian, and that there is a “Great Commission” to go out and transform the world in the name of Christ. The Great Commission is derived from Matthew 28: 18–​20: All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age.

23 “maga Pastor Says Christians Must ‘Be the Ones Writing the Laws” Rolling Stone, April 21, 2023, https://​www​.rolli​ngst​one​.com​/polit​ics​/polit​ics​-featu​res​/maga​-pas​tor​-sean​-feu​ cht​-trump​-christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism​-123​4721​527​/, accessed April 25, 2023. 24 See ‘Worship Inside the White House’: Sean Feucht Prays Over President Trump as Christian Musicians Perform, Faith Wire, Dec. 9, 2019, https://​www​.faithw​ire​.com​/2019​/12​ /09​/wors​hip​-ins​ide​-the​-white​-house​-sean​-feu​cht​-prays​-over​-presid​ent​-trump​-as​-christ​ ian​-musici​ans​-perf​orm​/, accessed April 26, 2023. 25 See Marshall and Manuel, The Light and the Glory (Grand Rapids, MI: Revel Publishing 1977), 14–​15.

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These verses and ideas have influenced a number of Christians who believe that Christians ought to rule in the political world, so that in Feucht’s words, “God is in control of everything.” Again, this may sound shocking and absurd in a world that is rapidly losing its religion. But the idea has deep roots. Peter Marshall and David Manuel wrote about the idea of politicized religion in the 1970’s, when they asked: “Could it be that we Americans, as a people, have been given a mission by almighty God? Were we meant to be a ‘beacon of hope,” as Lincoln declared, or a light to lighten the Gentiles,’ to put it in Scriptural terms?”26 Marshall and Manuel presented a history of the U.S. that sought to answer that question in the affirmative, suggesting also that the “morass of moral decay” of their time (in the 1960’s and 70’s) was a result of the U.S. turning away from its Biblical roots. Fifty years later, the current crop of Christian nationalists is making similar arguments. This movement may seem like an extremist fringe. But there is a sustained effort among some Christian lawmakers in the United States to lead the American nation in a more Christian direction. One group of Christian legislators is organized as the National Association of Christian Lawmakers (nacl). The National Board of Advisors for the nacl includes Mike Huckabee, former Governor of Arkansas, media pundit, and former Presidential candidate, as well as Dan Patrick, the Lt. Governor of Texas. The nacl’s mission statement includes the following statements of belief.27 –​ We believe our nation is in decline due to the moral and spiritual decay of our culture (including churches) and institutions, as evidenced by the number of abortions, violence, civil unrest and disrespect for the traditions of our country. –​ We believe atheists and anti-​Christian groups have recently been more strategic in pursuing their godless worldview through the courts and legislation than Christians. These groups are becoming more aggressive and are trampling on the Christian liberty we have enjoyed in this country for centuries. They must be opposed. –​ We believe the fervent prayer and action of the Christian remnant in America can make a positive difference for millions of Americans.

26 27

Peter Marshall and David Manuel, The Light and the Glory (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Publishing, 1977), 16. National Association of Christian Lawmakers, Mission Statement, https://​img1​.wsimg​ .com ​ / blo ​ b by ​ / go​ / c2cfc​ 7 ff​ - 7938​ - 4e33​ - 8a9c​ - 95efd​ 93ed​ 0 d9​ / NACL%20Ar​ m or%20Bea​ rer%20Sup​port​ing%20Mem​ber%20Ple​dge%20202​.pdf, accessed October 6, 2023.

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–​ We believe positive legislation consistent with traditional Christian values can make a positive difference in our nation, serving not only as moral rules to follow, but also as an encouragement to our Christian constituents. Notice that this statement includes claims about moral decay, a struggle against “aggressive” atheists and “anti-​Christian” groups who are pushing a “godless worldview” that comes at the expense of “Christian liberty,” an appeal to an embattled “Christian remnant” of the population, and the need for laws that are consistent with “traditional Christian values.” The rest of the mission statement also includes claims about the historic basis of the idea that the U.S. is a Christian nation, as well as statements of Christian theology including claims about bodily resurrection and the “personal and imminent return” of Jesus Christ. Now, not every Christian will agree with this interpretation of the texts, tradition, and theology of Christianity. And in recent years, a cottage industry of Christian apologetics has developed that seeks to disabuse the Christian nationalists of their tendentious reading of Christian theology. I will recount this “progressive” version of Christianity in subsequent chapters. But let me emphasize here that the very existence of this debate with Christianity shows us the need for secularism. Christians disagree among themselves about the meaning and application of Christianity. Christians also disagree with non-​ Christians, and with atheists. That’s why we all benefit from a secular system that allows diverse people to co-​exist within a shared political space and under a common legal framework. Before turning to a discussion of secularism, let me note that I will tend to refrain from a different sort of definition of Christian nationalism. Some scholars have linked Christian nationalism to white supremacy, to Trumpism, or to an anti-​homosexual, anti-​trans, or “anti-​woke” political agenda. Some of those links do exist. But I do not think that those should be the primary focal point for analysis. What I’m interested in here is Christian nationalism as a broader political and theological idea that holds that Christian faith and values should play a central role in legislation and in national identity. I approach this idea as a political theory and as a matter of political theology, although as noted above adherents of Christian nationalism may be more concerned with emotion and identity than theory. Behind the opportunistic and trendy political rhetoric of some Christian nationalists, there is a sincere and studied argument. I will examine these arguments in what follows. That’s what I’m interested in as a philosopher: the theoretical justification of Christian nationalism. As mentioned, this method may be at odds with the lived experience of those in the pews and at the rallies and revivals. And so, at the risk of over-​simplification, I offer an interpretation of Christian nationalism that sees it primarily as an

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anti-​secular political and religious movement, which is larger than any particular grievance about homosexuality, trans-​inclusion, abortion, or race. To make my approach clear by way of contrast, consider a definition of Christian nationalism provided by Whitehead and Perry in their influential book on Christian Nationalism. They define Christian nationalism as aiming at the “fusion of Christianity and American national life.” In this definition, I generally agree with them. But then they claim: The “Christianity” of Christian nationalism includes something more than religion … It includes assumptions of nativism, white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity, along with divine sanction for authoritarian control and militarism. It is as ethnic and political as it is religious.28 I have no doubt that some Christian nationalists are nativists, white supremacist, militaristic, and homophobic. And some people may choose to support Christian nationalism because they are racist or homophobic. But those particularities are not the essential challenge of Christian nationalism. And in fact, there are non-​White advocates of Christian nationalism. The problem of Christian nationalism is not racism or some other particular issue. Rather, the essential problem is the challenge posed to secular systems of law by Christian nationalism. I think that homophobia and racism are wrong. But the homophobia and racism of some Christian nationalists is not the only thing what makes their overarching political agenda wrong. Rather, the primary fault is in the challenge to secularism itself, and the idea that any sectarian religion ought to be institutionalized as the law of the land. 4

Political Secularism, Nationalism, and Identity

Secularism, as I understand it here, is a legal and political system that allows diverse people to live together without privileging any religious (or non-​ religious) worldview. We might define this narrowly as political secularism, in order to distinguish it from something like secular humanism (which we can understand as a non-​religious worldview that is more than merely a theory of political restraint). For political secularism, the basic idea is that law and

28

Andrew L. Whitehead and Samuel L. Perry, Taking American Back for God: Christian Nationalism in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 10.

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religion should be distinct. Of course, this idea runs counter to the story told by the Christian nationalists. And therein lies the rub, as Hamlet might put it. Secularism and Christian nationalism are fundamentally at odds about the proper relation between religion and political-​legal authority. One important problem here is the very conception of nationalism. From one fairly common and traditional perspective that extends back to the Greek conception of the polis, a nation is a group of people with a shared identity. This shared identity is often defined in terms of ethnicity, language, culture, tradition, and religion. This shared identity is supposed to link people together in a political and legal system that governs in the name of and in accord with the values of “the people.” This idea was quite important for philosophers of the 19th Century such as Herder and Hegel, who described nations in terms of “the spirit of the people” (Volksgeist), which was typically understood in religious, cultural, ethnic, and even linguistic terms.29 This sense of nationality and national identity is not necessarily connected to an account of political sovereignty and state structures: a cultural nation or nationality can be distinct from a nation-​state, for example. But of course, the goal of nationalism in the 19th and 20th Centuries (and even into the 21st Century) was to construct nation-​states that did in fact link sovereignty to nationality, and often to religion. The creation of the Jewish state of Israel is one well-​known example. In the 19th Century, the idea of nationality and nationalism was closely linked to religion and religious identity. Hegel explains: Religion is the nation’s consciousness of its own being and of the highest being. This knowledge is in fact the universal being. A nation conceives of God in the same way as it conceives of itself and of its relationship to God, so that its religion is also its conception of itself.30 Something like this notion of nationality and nationalism has been defended more recently by Yoram Hazony in his book, The Virtue of Nationalism. Hazony explains the traditional virtue and power of nationalism as follows:

29 30

I discuss this in Andrew Fiala, “Linguistic Nationalism and Linguistic Diversity: Locating Hegel between Fichte and Humboldt” Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 9:1 (Fall 2004); also see: Andrew Fiala, The Philosopher’s Voice (Albany, NY: suny Press, 2002). G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), 105. I discuss Hegel’s political philosophy in more detail: Fiala, The Philosopher’s Voice (Albany, NY: suny Press, 2002).

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Much of what takes place in political life is motivated by concerns arising from our membership in collectives such as families, tribes, and nations. Human beings are born into such collectives or adopt them later in life, and are tied to them by powerful bonds such as mutual loyalty among their members. In fact, we come to regard these collectives as an integral part of ourselves. We are also powerfully motivated by shared concerns that are not physical in this way: the need to maintain the internal cohesiveness of the family, tribe, or nation, and the need to strengthen its unique cultural inheritance and pass it on to the next generation.31 This idea of a shared identity and culture is often wrapped around the religious identity of “the nation.” Hazony opposes such a nationalistic idea of identity to a different idea of political identity, which he associates with globalism and imperialism, and indeed with the tradition of liberal political philosophy which goes back to John Locke. That other version of politics is what we might call secular and cosmopolitan (as I have explained elsewhere).32 Secular systems of law and cosmopolitan worldviews tend to avoid the Hegelian view of nations as organic wholes rooted in religious, ethnic, and cultural identity. Secular theories tend to emphasize individual liberty and universal human rights, which permit individuals to choose (or not) to affirm religious, ethnic, and other cultural forms of identity. We thus ought to distinguish between a secular approach to political life which does not insist on any form of national, ethnic, or religious identity, and another more traditional, nationalistic, and religious understanding of political life and identity. The conflict between Christian nationalism and its secular other hinges in part on a difference of opinion about the proper relationship between national/​religious identity and political power. 5

Secularism and the Paradox

Let’s continue to clear the air by thinking more carefully about the definition of secularism. The term can be traced back to Latin and French terms that meant non-​religious, earthy, or focused on “this world.” The original Latin term saeculum was used to describe an era or length of time, typically a political era. That term shows up in the motto of the United States, novus ordo seclorum, 31 32

Yoram Hazon, The Virtues of Nationalism (New York: Hachette, 2018), 9. Andrew Fiala, Secular Cosmopolitanism, Hospitality, and Religious Pluralism (New York: Routledge Publishing 2016).

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which means “new order of the ages,” or perhaps more colloquially “a new historical era.” We should note that the word secular does not include a denial of the truth of religion. Rather, it focuses our attention on human history and political life in this world. It can also be used to describe institutions, practices, and people who have a worldly orientation understood in opposition to the religious orientation of the clergy, the church, or the sacred calendar. In the 19th Century, a more modern usage of the term appeared. This is usually attributed to George Jacob Holyoake, who explained, “Secularism is the study of promoting human welfare by material means; measuring human welfare by the utilitarian rule, and making the service of others a duty of lie. Secularism relates to the present existence of man, and to action, the issues of which can be tested by the development of the physical, moral, and intellectual nature of man.” Holyoake insists that this is moral and philosophical approach that exists “apart from atheism, theism, or Christianity.”33 In the past hundred years or so, the terminology of secularism has evolved to mean a variety of things. In some cases, it is understood as a synonym for atheism and agnosticism (sometimes connected with the general rubric of secular humanism). In other cases, it is more about the material processes of modernization. And, as noted above, scholars have recently focused on the emergence of a post-​secular historical condition. For my purposes in this book, I define secularism narrowly as a structure of law and a system of government that seeks a separation of church and state, that seeks to be neutral among religions, that seeks to avoid an official establishment of religion, and that seeks to uphold religious liberty. I state this as a kind of “seeking” here, since there is no perfect secular system. On my definition of secularism as a political system or structure, people are free to believe or not believe, and religious organizations are free to exist. I will argue that this is an optimal political arrangement. But there are those who push back against this idea, including those we might describe as Christian nationalists. Sometimes this pushback includes confusion and misunderstanding, as when the opponents of secularism claim that secularism is anti-​religious, atheistic, or even Satanic. No doubt there are some self-​described “secular” people who are anti-​religious or atheistic. But secular political systems are by definition neutral about religion. One can indeed 33 George Jacob Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism Illustrated, 3rd edition (London: Austin and Co, 1870), 11. For more on the definition of secularism see: Andrew Copson, Secularism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2019); Jacques Berlinerblau, Secularism: The Basics (New York: Routledge, 2022); and essays collected in Phil Zuckerman and John R. Shook, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Secularism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

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support secular political systems and still be Christian, Muslim, Hindu, or Jew. And yet, one of the significant problems to be addressed here is that neutrality appears to Christian nationalists as anti-​Christian. Therein lies the rub, and the need for careful argument and analysis. And as we shall see, it might turn out that secular systems cannot remain neutral about those intolerant and political forms of religion that seek to overturn secular political systems. This points us toward the apparent problem that I describe here as the paradox of secularism. The paradox occurs when secularism confronts its anti-​secular other. Is there a place in the big tent of secularism for those who claim that the big tent is inherently evil? I show in this book that these ghosts and devils are not easily exorcized. One reason for this is that if defenders of secularism resolve the dilemma of the big tent by excluding Christian nationalism, this will tend to support the Christian nationalists in their contention that secularism is anti-​Christian. And so it goes. To affirm an exclusionary secularism may seem to reinforce the Christian nationalist argument against secularism. But an inclusive secularism risks self-​ destruction if it allows anti-​secular Christian nationalism into the tent. We can state this point very broadly, looking beyond Christian nationalism toward other politicized religious ideologies: should secular systems include and tolerate any anti-​secular form of political religion, or religious nationalism? Stated this broadly, we can see that this structural problem will be a problem in all secular countries: in European and North American nations where Christian nationalism poses a threat; in Muslim majority countries such as Turkey where political Islam is a threat; in India where Hindu nationalism is a problem; and even in Israel where radical Zionism poses a conundrum for the idea of a secular Jewish state. This book will primarily focus on the problem of Christian nationalism in the United States. But the paradox of secularism haunts all secular systems of government along with the specter of politicized fundamentalists who see secularism as a diabolical force. Despite the tragic conflict exposed in this paradox, there are a variety of ways one might respond to the presence of these ghosts and devils. Among those responses is a theological or religious response, which argues, on grounds that will be familiar to progressive religious people, that secularism is not demonic. That is the argument I’ll make in the Chapters in part one of this book, where I’ll argue that if there is a God, He is not a tyrant and He does not want the state to enforce religious orthodoxy. But as I’ve noted, Christian theology is interpreted otherwise by the Christian nationalists—​so the progressive version of Christianity is but one interpretation among many forms of Christianity. Beyond progressive Christianity, one could offer a more decisive argument against religion in general and offer an atheistic or humanistic critique of both

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kinds of argument that will resonate with the growing population of nonreligious people in the world. If Christians disagree about something as fundamental as this, we might well wonder whether there is any true religion—​and whether we need religion. That’s the argument I’ll make in the second part of this book, where I consider atheist concerns, as well as more direct arguments in support of political secularism. This leads us, however, to the paradox of secularism, which includes arguments against both Christian nationalism and anti-​religious secularism. In the concluding chapters (part three), I present arguments grounded in American history and the Constitution, while concluding with a philosophical perspective that is sensitive to tragedy and remaining problems. I argue throughout that secular systems are not diabolic and that they should be understood as being inclusive of religious diversity. But the fact of the matter is that not everyone agrees that this is true, and an inclusive secularism may reach its limit when confronted by its anti-​secular other. 6

Components of Religious Nationalism

Christian nationalism is best described as a “family resemblance” concept, that includes a variety of behaviors and beliefs. This is to be expected since both of the terms involved in the idea are themselves complex. Christianity is internally complex and diverse; and so too is nationalism, and thus also Christian nationalism. And it is important to note that Christian nationalism is not confined to the United States.34 In Poland, right wing parties such as the Law and Justice party are associated with resurgent Christian nationalism. In Russia, a resurgent focus on Russian Orthodoxy is connected to Russian patriotism and to Russian aggression against Ukraine, which also involves a conflict about religion. The Ukrainian Church and the Russian Church have broken ties as a result. Right-​wing parties across Europe have turned to religion and Christian heritage as a rallying cry in a struggle against immigrants, non-​Christians, and secularism. Something similar is happening in places where other faith traditions are historically dominant. Indeed, we might speak more broadly of “religious nationalism.” In Turkey recently, Islamic nationalism has been on the rise. And what is often called “political Islam” has been a force across the globe, associated with calls for a new caliphate that inspired groups like isis to rise to 34

“How Christian Nationalism Is Taking Root Across the World” Politico October 27, 2022, https://​www​.polit​ico​.com​/news​/magaz​ine​/2022​/10​/27​/glo​bal​-far​-right​-christ​ian​-natio​ nali​sts​-00063​400, accessed March 10, 2023.

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power.35 In India, there is a resurgence of Hindu nationalism. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his right-​wing Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp) has been described in terms of Hindu nationalism. Hindu nationalism is linked to the geographic and ethnic identity of Hinduism, with some Hindus viewing the region of the Indus River as the heartland of their faith, while turning against Islam and Christianity as foreign religions.36 Under Modi, policies have been enacted involving preferential immigration for Hindus and limitations on autonomy for non-​Hindu minorities. Extremists have called for genocide against Muslims.37 And Modi’s regime has made life difficult for Muslims, including with targeted attacks on Muslim communities involving bulldozing homes, and authorities turning a blind eye toward violence against Muslims.38 We can see here what the consequences of anti-​secularism would be: minority faiths would be persecuted, either directly by the state, or as a function of the state allowing local communities to act out on religious intolerance. The focus of this book is primarily Christian nationalism in the United States. As we continue to analyze the idea of Christian nationalism, let’s stipulate that at a very general level Christian nationalism includes a number of interrelated ideas that can be distilled into three basic claims: 1. A theological claim: that the Christian God is concerned with the political structure and religious identity of one’s country. 2. A historical and anthropological claim: that one’s country is and ought to be working on behalf of the Christian faith. 3. A political agenda: that Christians ought to support laws, policies, and candidates that support 1 and 2.

35

36 37 38

Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State (The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World,” Analysis Paper, No. 19, March 2015, at https://​www​.brooki​ngs​.edu​/wp​-cont​ent​/uplo​ads​/2016​/06​/the​-ideol​ogy​-of​-the​ -isla​mic​-state​.pdf, accessed March 10, 2023. “The Hinduization of India Is Nearly Complete” The Atlantic, May 22, 2022, https://​www​ .thea​tlan​tic​.com​/intern​atio​nal​/arch​ive​/2022​/05​/naren​dra​-modi​-india​-relig​ion​-hindu​ -nati​onal​ism​/630​169​/, accessed March 10, 2023. “India’s Hindu extremists are calling for genocide against Muslims. Why is little being done to stop them?” cnn, January 14, 2022, https://​edit​ion​.cnn​.com​/2022​/01​/14​/asia​/india​ -hindu​-extrem​ist​-gro​ups​-intl​-hnk​-dst​/index​.html, accessed March 10, 2023. “India’s Muslims: An Increasingly Marginalized Population: India’s Muslim communities have faced decades of discrimination, which experts say has worsened under the Hindu nationalist bjp’s government” Council for Foreign Relations, July 14, 2022, https://​www​.cfr​ .org​/backg​roun​der​/india​-musl​ims​-margi​nali​zed​-pop​ulat​ion​-bjp​-modi, accessed March 10, 2023.

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This becomes problematic when the third point becomes militantly anti-​ secular, i.e., when the political agenda actively seeks to undermine secular systems. Notice that this way of putting the matter offers a more general account than that of Whitehead and Perry who emphasize racism, patriarchy, homophobia, and xenophobia. On my account, Christian nationalism is about theology, history, politics, and the law—​and not merely about race, gender, sexuality, and the like. We could extend this analysis beyond Christian nationalism by substituting some other specific religion in context. Thus, political Islam would make historical and anthropological claims, theological claims, and advocate a political agenda focused on Islam; and Hindu nationalism would do something similar with regard to Hinduism. Of course, each of these three focal ideas is itself complicated. Some Christian nationalists in the United States appear to think, for example, that the United States has a special purpose in the plan of creation. Sometimes this is connected to a story about American support for Israel and hope that the “end times” are nearing as the state of Israel has been founded. In other iterations, this is less eschatological and more focused on the interests that Christians have in domestic political power and control over social issues such as marriage, abortion, and sexual morality. In other iterations, Christian nationalist ideas are connected to nostalgia for some mythic notion of a lost homogeneity and shared sense of national identity. Others who might be described as Christian nationalists are worried about crime, social stability, or international challenges and seek refuge in a theological solution. Some Christian nationalists are interested in crusading militarism and have a desire for spiritual combat.39 Some are simply swept along by the usual tropes of patriotic rhetoric. Some Christian nationalists are also racist, misogynistic, and homophobic. And others are sympathetic to the idea of authoritarianism, looking for a leader or party that is oriented toward some kind of “higher truth.” And yet, there is a sense in all of this that Christian nationalism poses a unique threat to secular systems in Western democracies (and that other forms of political religion pose a similar threat in places such as India, Turkey, and so on). Again, our focus here is primarily the United States, where recent work has highlighted the threat of Christian nationalism. A survey from the Public Religion Research Institute published in 2023 concludes, “The rising influence of Christian nationalism in some segments of American politics poses a major

39

I describe this in Andrew Fiala, “Secular Just War Theory and the Spectre of the Crusades” Ethical Perspectives vol. 27, no. 3 (2020): 237–​268.

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threat to the health of our democracy.”40 That survey maintains that 10% of Americans are “adherents” of Christian nationalism, while another 19% of Americans are “sympathizers” with the view. The survey questions provide an idea of what Christian nationalists believe. The survey asked whether people agreed with the following statements.41 –​ The U.S. government should declare America a Christian nation. –​ 27% completely agreed or mostly agreed with that statement. –​ U.S. laws should be based on Christian values. –​ 40% completely agreed or mostly agreed with that statement. –​ If the U.S. moves away from our Christian foundations, we will not have a country anymore. –​ 38% completely agreed or mostly agreed with that statement. –​ Being Christian is an important part of being truly American. –​ 30% completely agreed or mostly agreed with that statement. –​ God has called Christians to exercise dominion over all areas of American society. –​ 20% completely agreed or mostly agreed with that statement. For non-​Christians—​and for humanistic and progressive Christians who disagree with these kinds of claims, these are troubling results. What would it mean, for example, for Christians to “exercise dominion over American society”? Would that mean that non-​Christians would be second-​class citizens, excluded from public life? Would it mean that the moral preferences of Christians would be imposed on others—​say, with regard to lgbtq issues, women’s rights, and so on? And what would become of the First Amendment and other protections of religious liberty in a world of Christian dominion? 7

Nationalism and Religious Identity

As we conclude this introductory chapter, let’s return to the conflict between philosophical theory and the lived experience of religion, faith, and patriotism. The survey results just cited are worrying. Clearly some Americans are not on board with the secular system that exists in the United States, as found within 40

41

“A Christian Nation? Understanding the Threat of Christian Nationalism to American Democracy and Culture” prri, February 8, 2023, https://​www​.prri​.org​/resea​rch​/a​-christ​ ian​-nat​ion​-unders​tand​ing​-the​-thr​eat​- of​- christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism​-to​-ameri​can​- democr​ acy​-and​-cult​ure​/, accessed March 10, 2023. https://​www​.prri​.org​/resea​rch​/a​-christ​ian​-nat​ion​-unders​tand​ing​-the​-thr​eat​-of​-christ​ ian​-nati​onal​ism​-to​-ameri​can​-democr​acy​-and​-cult​ure​/, accessed March 10, 2023.

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the legal regime that is based on the First Amendment to the Constitution. But one wonders both whether those who were surveyed understood exactly what they were being asked and whether their answer reflected an informed and theoretical conception of both Christian religion and American law and political theory. Consider the claim that “God has called Christians to exercise dominion over all areas of American society.” That claim would require a book (or at least a long journal article) to explain and clarify. There does exist a theoretical account of Christian “dominion-​ism” or “dominion theology.” But the arguments of such an account are complex and involve exegetical, theological, and political interpretation. I frankly am doubtful that those who ticked a box on a survey were thinking too deeply about that complex and contentious theory. The same is likely true when asked the question about “U.S. laws should be based on Christian values.” What exactly does this mean? Is this merely an aspirational claim that might even fit well with progressive and liberal (even secular) values? Toleration is, after all, a Christian value. Maybe folks think that the law should be loving and kind and generous—​to cite other Christian values. And what is the nature of the word “should” here? Is it merely a claim about a hopeful convergence of legislation and political wisdom? Or is it, as those who worry about Christian nationalism might suggest, part of a a sinister plot to institute Christian values at the expense of other values? Again, I wonder whether the average respondent to such a survey is really thinking deeply about all of this. So, as we conclude, let’s return to the point I made at the outset, that in some cases the fear that Christian nationalists are plotting to take over may be overblown. I don’t only mean that opinion surveys are superficial and can be deceptive. I also mean that even if a respondent did affirm some of the basic beliefs of Christian nationalism, it is one thing to say so and another to take action in public—​especially when the legal framework of the American system is set up to defend a secular system. Furthermore, there are different kinds of action that could be taken by those who affirm some Christian nationalist values. There is an important difference between supporting Christian candidates for office and a more militant effort to revoke the First Amendment. I don’t mean to be overly sanguine here. There are in fact some who have taken militant action in the name of Christian nationalist ideas. Violence has occurred. Less drastically, there have been lawsuits and efforts to elect Christian leaders who do have activist agendas. So, we ought not simply dismiss this kind of survey data. But we must keep it in perspective. One important factor here is the stability of the secular status quo. The legal framework in the United States is grounded on a well-​established interpretation of the First Amendment and other Constitutional principles that makes it seemingly impossible for the

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more extreme plans of Christian nationalists to come to fruition. Furthermore, the growing number of nonreligious people makes it more likely that religious nationalism will be resisted by a population that has in fact embraced the basic idea of political secularism along with a more broadly inclusive and secular worldview. An important part of the argument in defense of political secularism is that it allows us to coexist in peace. Those who would break the peace and violate the secular social contract would have quite a bit to lose if they were to act on their beliefs. We ought also to inquire about what kinds of actions might follow. There has been some violence in the name of Christian nationalism. And that violence ought to be condemned and punished. But typically (so far), the Christian nationalist rhetoric is meant to motivate a legal and political strategy to challenge laws in the courts and to elect sympathetic leaders within the secular political system. All of that is tolerable within the parameters of secular political and legal systems. But of course, we might reach a limit—​the paradoxical limit—​when a candidate or legislator or lawsuit seeks to overturn the basic secular framework—​say by actively attempting to overturn the First Amendment. The paradox of secularism appears most obviously when secular systems prevent those who would overturn the system in the name of an anti-​ secular ideology. Finally, let’s return to the question of emotion, identity, and nationalism. As mentioned in this chapter, nationalism tends to be at odds with secularism insofar as secular political systems are not focused on national identity or the emotional connection of a religious or ethnic community. Religion and nationalism are complex social phenomena. For philosophers like myself, the questions of theology, exegesis, and rationally chosen belief are often in the forefront. This is also true of the question of political identity. Political philosophers in the modern, liberal tradition tend to agree with John Locke about the importance of the consent of the governed. We tend to the view the state as a kind of social contract project, that involves some kind of rational agreement to the rule of law and the law of the land. We also tend to agree with Locke about the nature of religious commitment and tend to think that religious belief ought to involve what Locke called inward persuasion. This idea of religious belief is why coercion and violence are to be prohibited in the name of toleration. Forcing someone to believe is insufficient in the realm of belief, as understood by philosophers like Locke and a number of theologians and scholars in the modern era. In what follows, I assume this kind of liberal, modern point of view in much of what I say. But I should note that in the background is a different account of religion and of politics, which

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conceives of these things in emotional terms and in relation to communal values and identities. As we’ll see in what follows the conflicts and confusions that occur in this realm often have to do with these quite different ways of thinking about political life, religious belief, and the existential question of meaning, value, and identity.

­c hapter 2

The War against God: The Anti-​secular Rhetoric of Christian Nationalism Our enemies are waging war on faith and freedom, on science and religion, on history and tradition, on law and democracy, on God Almighty himself. Donald Trump1

∵ Christian nationalism is an anti-​secular crusade. Christian nationalists often describe their own worldview in oppositional terms. The target and point of attack is secularism, which is typically understood by Christian nationalists as an anti-​religious worldview. There is also animosity toward the religious “other”—​Muslims, Jews, and other non-​Christians. So, there is some truth to the idea that Christian nationalism is anti-​Semitic, Islamophobic, xenophobic, ethnocentric, and so on. But the focal point of Christian nationalism that I am concerned with here is the anti-​secularism of the post-​secular moment. Contemporary Christian nationalism is not a medieval crusade in which Christendom fought against the Islamic world.2 Rather, the enemy of contemporary Christian nationalism is the secular status quo. Christian nationalists maintain that the ruling institutions are anti-​Christian, anti-​religious, atheistic, and in a word “secular.” As we will see in detail in the next chapter this even includes the suggestion that secularism is the work of the devil. And if it is not the devil himself who is behind anti-​religious secularism, then it is Karl Marx and his minions, who are described as godless atheists who are supposedly seeking to destroy a nation that was once devoutly Christian. Reference to 1 Donald Trump speech at the Faith and Freedom Conference on June 24, 2023, posted at The Rev: https://​www​.rev​.com​/blog​/tran​scri​pts​/trump​-spe​aks​-at​-faith​-free​dom​-coalit​ion​-gala​ -tra​nscr​ipt, accessed July 13, 202. 2 I discuss the Medieval Crusades in a somewhat different context in Andrew Fiala, “Secular Just War Theory and the Spectre of the Crusades” Ethical Perspectives vol. 27, no. 3 (2020): 237–​268.

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_003

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Marx and Marxism show up throughout the rhetoric of Christian nationalism. In the summer of 2023, former President Donald Trump related atheist globalism to Marxism, and called the struggle against this a “righteous crusade” to fight back in those who are waging war on faith, freedom, and “God Almighty himself.” He said, “Together we are warriors in a righteous crusade to stop the arsonists, the atheist globalists, and the Marxists, and that’s what they are. And we will restore our republic as one nation under God with liberty and justice for all.”3 This idea of a righteous crusade to fight back against those who are waging war against God is obviously hyperbolic and inflammatory. And we should rightly wonder whether any of this is meant sincerely—​or whether it is simply the overheated rhetoric of Trumpism (I discussed the problem of sincerity in the previous chapter). One sanguine reading of this kind of rhetoric is that it is meaningless. The claim that atheists are waging war on God almighty in the United States is laughable. Indeed, the secular system of the American Constitution prevents that from happening: religious liberty is guaranteed in the First Amendment. And if there is a God, He is powerful enough to smite the atheists if that is His will, which apparently it is not given the recent growth of nonreligion. Levity aside, this kind of rhetoric is both theologically obtuse and constitutionally illiterate, which is why it is easily dismissed as insincere. And yet … there are some people who take this seriously. One of the reasons that the Trump base is so enamored of him is that they see him as a defender of their faith. A survey conducted in November of 2023 found that 64% of Republicans view Trump as a “person of faith.”4 The same survey found that 67% of Republicans believe that Trump “defends people of faith in the United States.” Trump has willing taken on the mantle of Christian avatar. In a campaign speech in June 2024, he said that in his first term as president he had “defended Judeo-​Christian heritage like no President in the history of our country.”5 He explained that this defense was required because Christians were being persecuted in the United States. As a remedy, he proposed that if elected in 2024 3 Donald Trump speech at the Faith and Freedom Conference on June 24, 2023, posted at The Rev: https://​www​.rev​.com​/blog​/tran​scri​pts​/trump​-spe​aks​-at​-faith​-free​dom​-coalit​ion​-gala​ -tra​nscr​ipt, accessed July 13, 2023. 4 “Most Republicans think Donald Trump is a person of faith. We asked why” Deseret News, January 3, 2024, https://​www​.dese​ret​.com​/2024​/1​/3​/23982​720​/repu​blic​ans ​-think​-don​ald​ -trump​-is​-per​son​-of​-faith​-we​-asked​-why, accessed January 9, 2024. 5 Donald Trump speech at the Faith and Freedom Conference on June 25, 2024, posted at The Rev: https://​www​.rev​.com​/blog​/tran​scri​pts​/trump​-campai​gns​-at​-faith​-free​dom​-con​fere​nce, accessed July 10, 2024.

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h would create a task force to combat anti-​Christian bias. He said, “I will also create a new federal task force on fighting anti-​Christian bias. Its mission will be to investigate all forms of illegal discrimination, harassment, persecution against Christians in America. And it’s taking place at a level that nobody can believe.”6 This way of putting it—​that Christians are being persecuted and are thus in need of a political avatar to defend them—​relates to a general sense among some religious people that there is indeed a war against God going on in the United States and that the “secularists” are winning. Trump’s Attorney General, William Barr put it this way in a speech at Notre Dame in 2019: “Secularists, and their allies among the “progressives,” have marshaled all the force of mass communications, popular culture, the entertainment industry, and academia in an unremitting assault on religion and traditional values.”7 This sense of a general struggle against secularism often engages in a profound equivocation on the meaning of the term “secular” and “secularism.” In William Barr’s usage of the term, secularism is connected to trends in entertainment and academia that are engage in an unremitting assault on traditional religion. As we’ve already noted in the previous chapter, secular political systems such as we find in the United States are not anti-​religious. And while there are some “secularists” who are Marxists, atheists, and militant, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees religious liberty. And the legal limits that have been imposed on faith in the public sphere are grounded in the First Amendment’s establishment clause and are instituted not to destroy religion but to protect minority religions (often including Christian denominations). But the rhetoric of Christian nationalism is not intended to enlighten; rather, it is in intended to enflame. This rhetoric includes discussions of a civil war against the secularists and Marxists who are “on the march,” and attacking religion. This is how Gary Bauer, senior vice president of public policy at the James Dobson Family Institute and a well-​known spokesperson for conservative Christian causes, put it in August 2023:

6 Donald Trump speech at the Faith and Freedom Conference on June 25, 2024, posted at The Rev: https://​www​.rev​.com​/blog​/tran​scri​pts​/trump​-campai​gns​-at​-faith​-free​dom​-con​fere​nce, accessed July 10, 2024. 7 William Barr, “Remarks to the Law School and the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame” October 11, 2019, https://​www​.just​ice​.gov​/opa​/spe​ ech​/attor​ney​-gene​ral​-will​iam​-p​-barr​-deliv​ers​-rema​rks​-law​-sch​ool​-and​-de​-nic​ola​-cen​ter​-eth​ ics, accessed January 8, 2024.

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The key idea of our founding, that the author of liberty is God, is rejected by American elites who increasingly reject the Bible and mock religion. Radical secularists and neo-​Marxists are on the march8 A podcast by Bauer from earlier in the summer of 2023 was entitled, “America, as Founded, is Being Replaced by Godless Big Government Secularism.” The introduction to that podcast invokes the idea of a “new civil war,” putting it this way: [Gary Bauer …] warns Christians not to be deceived, America is indeed in the throes of a new civil war over what kind of a nation it is going to be. Will it remain America, as founded, grounded on Judeo-​Christian principles—​a constitutional republic? Or, will it deteriorate into a godless all powerful neo-​Marxist state?9 The danger of Christian nationalism can be traced back to this kind of rhetoric. Some of it may be insincere rhetorical flourish; but the volume, frequency, and intensity of these kinds of remarks does feed a general sense of grievance that is sincere and heartfelt. The risk of violence and escalation is present here in the claim that there is a righteous crusade against those who have declared war on God, and that we are in the “throes of a civil war” that must be fought against the secular forces of godlessness. In fact, violence has occurred. Violence associated with Christian nationalism might plausibly include: the 2011 terrorist attack in Norway that killed 77 in the name of what the terrorist said was defending Europe against a “multicultural elite” that was “selling us into Muslim slavery”; the attacks on mosques in Christchurch New Zealand in 2019 that killed 51; and on ongoing litany of murders in the United States that includes nine people murdered at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina in 2015; eleven people killed at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 2018; and on and on in an ugly parade of violence, hate, and intolerance.10 8 9 10

Gary Bauer, “Who will defend American History, Dr. James Dobson Family Institute, August 25, 2023, https://​www​.drjame​sdob​son​.org​/artic​les​/who​-will​-def​end​-ameri​ can​-hist​ory, accessed Oct 11, 2023. “America, as Founded, is Being Replaced by Godless Big Government Secularism,” Dr. James Dobson Family Institute, July 26, 2023, https://​www​.drjame​sdob​son​.org​/defend​ ing​-faith​-fam​ily​-free​dom​/policy​podc​ast​-e26, accessed Oct 11, 2023. See: Mark Juergensmeyer, “Is Norway’s Suspected Murderer a Christian Nationalist” Religion Dispatches April 17, 2012 (https://​rel​igio​ndis​patc​hes​.org​/is​-norw​ays​-suspec​ ted​-murde​rer​-and​ers​-brei​vik​-a​-christ​ian​-terror​ist​/); Ivan Strensky “Whether we call White Nationalism Christian is all about Who Gets to Define Christianity” Religion Dispatches

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Some of this violence has been specifically targeted toward non-​Christian religious minorities. But as Trump, Barr, and Bauer make clear the larger war is supposed to be against godless secularism. And here we see the heart of the problem that I am calling the paradox of secularism. How can a secular political system deal with those who call for a righteous crusade and civil war against that system? 1

Debates about Secularism

One of the primary concerns in this discussion is a narrative and historical account of the state. At issue is a story about the essence of the country and its national identity. In the American case, the question is whether the U.S. is a “Christian nation,” and what that might mean. But the Christian nationalist agenda suggests that the U.S. is not a secular nation. Consider the following passage from Andrew Torba and Andrew Isker, the authors of a sincere and extended book that explicitly advocates for Christian nationalism: “America is a Christian nation, but somewhere along the way our tolerance for evil allowed subversive agents of Satan to invade every facet of our country and culture. Our worldly institutions may have been temporarily conquered by secular humanists who hate God, but we worship a God who overcomes all worldly institutions.”11 This claim associates secular humanism with Satan, suggesting that secular humanists hate God. That is from the opening paragraph of their book, Christian Nationalism: A Guide for Taking Dominion and Disciplining Nations. One of the authors of the book, Andrew Torba, is the founder and ceo of Gab, a far-​right social media platform. Similar ideas can be found across the right-​wing religious world. James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, stated the following in 2021, “Contrary to the false claims of today’s secularists, America is a Christian nation, as the Supreme Court declared in 1892.”12 This way of putting things singles out defenders of secularism as presenting a false argument, which claims that the U.S. is not a Christian nation. Dobson got this date from a Supreme Court opinion of 1892 in which

11 12

March 29, 2019 (https://​rel​igio​ndis​patc​hes​.org​/whet​her​-we​-call​-white​-nati​onal​ism​-christ​ ian​-is​-all​-about​-who​-gets​-to​-def​ine​-chris​tian​ity​/)​. Andrew Torba and Andrew Isker, Christian Nationalism: A guide for Taking Dominion and Disciplining Nations (Gab ai Incorporated, 2022), p. 1. “America is a Christian Nation” Dr. James Dobson Family Institute, July 6, 2021, https: //​www​.drjame​sdob​son​.org​/bro​adca​sts​/amer​ica​-is​-a​-christ​ian​-nat​ion, accessed March 10, 2023.

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Justice David Brewer said, “this is a Christian nation.”13 This historical opinion is an important point of contention—​as we’ll discuss further in later chapters. But notice here the focal point of Dobson’s claim is “secularists.” And this is a narrowly tailored point, connected to a matter of interpretation of American history and law. Torba, Dobson, and other American Christian nationalists are not worried so much about the challenges of global Islam, the rise of Asian nations, or the threat of Russian Orthodoxy to Western European Christianity—​although some of those supposed “threats” are also important in this discussion. Rather, they are worried about American secularism, which they see as un-​American and even Satanic. Thus, I argue that American Christian nationalism primarily arises in response to the growth and challenge of “secularism” (broadly construed) in the U.S. It falsely assumes that the United States was founded as a Christian nation and that secularism is un-​American. It also equivocates on the meaning of the term secularism, often using the term as a catch-​all pejorative for anyone who does not share a conservative Christian agenda. This rhetoric has been employed form many years. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Jerry Falwell, a prominent Baptist pastor and Chancellor of Liberty University said in a notorious outburst: “I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the aclu, People for the American Way, all of them who have tried to secularize America, I point the finger in their face and say, ‘You helped this happen.’”14 The sentiment expressed here is that when so-​called “secular” values turn away from traditional Christian values, God may in fact cause retaliation. As mentioned before, this idea is based on a peculiar version of Christian theology, and it also uses the term “secular” in a loose and general way. But those who agree with Falwell argue that secularism is to blame for what they see as what’s wrong in America. Newt Gingrich eulogized Falwell in 2007 in a speech at Liberty University after Falwell’s death, where he said: A growing culture of radical secularism declares that the nation cannot profess the truths on which it was founded … We are told that our public 13 14

See discussion in Erwin Chemerinsky, “No, It Is Not a Christian Nation, and It Never Has Been and Should Not Be One” Roger Williams University Law Review Vol. 26: No. 2 (Spring 2021). “Falwell: blame abortionists, feminists and gays” The Guardian, September 19, 2001, https://​www​.theg​uard​ian​.com​/world​/2001​/sep​/19​/sept​embe​r11​.usa9, accessed January 9, 2024.

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schools can no longer invoke the creator, nor proclaim the natural law nor profess the God-​given quality of human rights … In hostility to American history, the radical secularists insist that religious belief is inherently divisive and that public debate can only proceed on secular terms.15 The Christian nationalism of the Trump years builds on this kind of thinking from prior decades. Among the tendentious claims made here is the idea that secularism is un-​American, and that secularism holds that religious belief is inherently divisive. This is a pernicious mischaracterization of political secularism, which fails to understand that the secular political system of the United States is designed and intended to allow for the inclusion of diverse expressions of religious belief: believers remain free to believe, while the state is prohibited from setting up an established national religion. This idea that secularism is somehow hostile to American history is based on a false interpretation of the United States, its Constitutional system, and its founding. As we’ll see in this book the critique of Christian nationalism will be articulated along with a defense of American secularism that appeals specifically to the Constitution of the United States, including especially the First Amendment, and the history of the evolution of secularism in this country. The Christian nationalists tell a different story of this history and these documents. But the secular history of the United States is well-​known. The American attorney and free-​thinker, Robert Ingersoll put it this way on the 100th Anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1876: “Our fathers founded the first secular government that was ever founded in this world. The first government that said every church has exactly the same rights and no more; every religion has the same rights, and no more. In other words, our fathers were the first men who had the sense, had the genius, to know that no church should be allowed to have a sword.”16 The Constitution does in fact set up the U.S. as a secular nation. The Constitution states, “no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States” (Article 6, Section 3). As most histories of this part of the Constitution remind us, this explicit rejection of a religious test for office was a deliberate rejection of the British use of such 15 16

“Gingrich: Confront “Radical Secularism” cbs News May 19, 2007, https://​www​.cbsn​ ews​.com​/news​/gingr​ich​-confr​ont​-radi​cal​-sec​ular​ism​/, accessed January 9, 2024. Robert Ingersoll in 1876, quoted in Jon Meacham, American Gospel: God, the Founding Fathers, and the Making of a Nation (New York: Random House, 2007), 33. Also see Susan Jacoby, Freethinkers: A History of American Secularism (New Yor: Henry Holt, 2005), who discusses Ingersoll and the history of what she calls “Revolutionary Secularism.”

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religious tests to exclude non-​Anglican lawmakers. The National Constitution Center explains that the English jurist William Blackstone had argued that a religious test for office was needed in England to protect the established Church of England “against perils from non-​conformists of all denominations, infidels, Turks, jews, heretics, papists, and sectaries.”17 Blackstone himself explains that this is to be administered by “corporation” and “test” acts which among other things require that office holders receive the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper and that they swear oaths against heresies, witnessed by a minister and churchwarden, as well as two other credible witnesses.18 This was the kind of thing that the Framers of the Constitution were opposed to, which also helps to explain what they meant when they asserted in the First Amendment to the Constitution that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. And before the Constitution was ratified (in 1788), the basic principles of religious liberty and non-​establishment of religion were widely discussed among the Founding generation. For example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights (ratified on June 12, 1776—​prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence), stated: That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity toward each other.19 Note that this defense of religious liberty is based upon a claim about the nature of faith, which is that it depends upon freedom. In saying that faith cannot be directed by force or violence, the Virginia Declaration—​which was written by George Mason, James Madison, and others of the Founding generation—​ shows us why tolerance (forbearance) is required. This idea extends back at least to John Locke, who said in his influential “Letter Concerning Toleration” (from 1690) that the “care of souls” does not belong to the civil magistrates, and

17 18 19

National Constitution Center, “No Religious Test Clause,” https://​con​stit​utio​ncen​ter​.org​ /the​-const​itut​ion​/artic​les​/arti​cle​-vi​/clau​ses​/32#:​~:​text=​After%20re​quir​ing%20all%20 fede​ral%20and,as%20the%20No%20Re​ligi​ous%20T​est, accessed April 21, 2023. William Blackstone, The Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone (Chicago: American Bar Association Publishing, 2009), 373. Virginia Declaration of Rights, Section 16, https://​www​.archi​ves​.gov​/found​ing​-docs​/virgi​ nia​-decl​arat​ion​-of​-rig​hts, accessed April 21, 2023.

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that “all force and compulsion are to be forborne” when it comes to religious salvation.20 It should be obvious that my discussion here is historically and culturally specific. I am focused primarily on secularism in the United States, as well as the history and philosophical and theological background of that idea. But secularism is an old idea. It can be traced back, at least to ancient Rome. Romans once persecuted Christians. But the Empire eventual stumbled upon a principle of toleration. The Edict of Milan of the Constantinian era (313 c.e.) states the following: No one whatsoever should be denied the opportunity to give his heart to the observance of the Christian religion, of that religion which he should think best for himself … We have also conceded to other religions the right of open and free observance of their worship for the sake of the peace of our times.21 The argument implicit here is significant: that religious toleration is essential for “peace.” But of course, there is also a historical irony related to this idea: eventually, as Christians took charge and united political and religious power, they became intolerant and persecuted heretics and non-​believers. And so it goes in a dialectic that involves struggles for power, persecution, and disputes about which religion or sect ought to rule over others. This dialectic plays out in various ways in different times and places. Conversations about political religion in France, Russia, Turkey, or India will be quite different than the conversations that develop in the United States. And yet, Christianity (like Islam) is a universalizing religion. It is not merely the religion of an ethnic people or a geographically specific group of people. And so there will be universalizing implications of Christian nationalism. This helps explain why there are alliances and connections among Christian nationalists in various countries. This could be loosely connected under the rubric of “Christendom.” Christian nationalism points beyond the boundaries of any specific nation state in the direction of a unity of Christian peoples. Douglas Wilson has described this in a book entitled Mere Christendom, as a “network 20

21

John Locke, Letter Concerning Tolerance (Liberty Fund, 2000) at https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​ und​.org​/title​/gol​die​-a​-let​ter​-con​cern​ing​-tol​erat​ion​-and​-other​-writi​ngs, accessed April 21, 2023; I discuss Locke in more detail in Andrew Fiala, Tolerance and the Ethical Life (London: Continuum, 2005). The Edict of Milan (313 c.e.), at https://​sour​cebo​oks​.ford​ham​.edu​/sou​rce​/edict​-milan​ .asp, accessed April 20, 2023.

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of nations bound together by a formal, public, civic acknowledgement of the Lordship of Jesus Christ.”22 I’ll address the universalizing idea in places in what follows. But my primary focus is on the claims made in the American context. So, in subsequent discussion, I will discuss in some detail U.S. history and Constitutional principles, as well as cosmopolitan norms including the idea of universal human rights. And we’ll need to think about ways in which those cosmopolitan norms and human rights principles point toward a global sort of secularism. At any rate, in order to understand Christian nationalism, it is necessary to understand the critique of secularism that is a prevailing theme among Christian nationalists. A number of interrelated ideas are found in this critique of secularism: –​ The claim that moral and political authority come from God. –​ The claim that political leaders ought to be Christian and pursue a Christian agenda. –​ The claim that without God and God-​fearing leaders, there will be chaos, relativism, and anarchy. –​ The claim that moral impropriety and evil are the result of secularism. –​ The claim that secularism is anti-​religious. –​ The claim that God is an objective reality that should not be ignored in political life. –​ The claim that God’s plan for salvation includes Christians using political power for Christian purposes (including in some cases for the eschatological completion of history). –​ The claim that secularism is the work of the devil. These ideas are articulated in various ways. And they are not only the concerns of American Christians such as James Dobson. Pope Benedict xvi said something similar in 2006: It seems to me that the great challenge of our time … is secularization: that is, a way of living and presenting the world as "si Deus non daretur", in other words, as if God did not exist. There is a desire to reduce God to the private sphere, to a sentiment, as if he were not an objective reality. As a result, everyone makes his or her own plan of life.23 22

Douglas Wilson, Mere Christendom (Moscow, ID: Canon Press, 2023), Chapter 5, no page numbers. 23 Benedict xvi, “Encounter with the Youth,” April 2006, https://​www​.vati​can​.va​ /cont​ent​/bened​ict​-xvi​/en​/speec​hes​/2006​/april​/docume​nts​/hf​_​ben​-xvi​_s​pe​_2​0060​406​_​ xxi​-wyd​.pdf, accessed March 13, 2023.

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Benedict’s explanation of secularization is right about the way that secularism privatizes religion. And he is right that secularization permits everyone to make their own life plan. But secularization is not necessarily atheism. It does not stipulate that God does not exist (or is not “an objective reality,” a Benedict puts it). Rather, it allows individuals to decide for themselves. I include Pope Benedict among the critics of secularism in order to show that the critique of secularism is not unique to White American Evangelical Christianity. I will return to Catholicism later in this chapter (and some more recent words from Benedict’s successor Pope Francis), as we begin to consider an alternative to anti-​secular Christianity. Moving on from Benedict, here is one typical passage from Burk Parson, a Calvinist pastor from Florida. Parson is discussing those who believe that “authority” resides outside of God: Whether or not they know it, they have succumbed to secularism, which begins in the heart and ends in death. Secularism is the belief that man does not need God or God's laws in man’s social, governmental, educational, or economic affairs. Ironically, secularism rejects religion, yet is itself a religion. In these United States of America, many of our politicians, courts, schools, and businesses embrace and promote the religion of secularism under the rubric of freedom from religion and by the advancement of human autonomy, which inevitably leads to anarchy.24 Here is another remark, from Mary Eberstadt, connecting one of the dogmas of secularism to the idea of a “sexual revolution”: In sum, secularist progressivism is less a political movement than a church, and the so-​called culture war has not been conducted by people of religious faith and people of no faith. It is instead a contest of competing faiths. One believes in the books of the Bible, and the other in the evolving, figurative book of orthodoxy about the sexual revolution.25 Eberstadt continues:

24 25

Burk Parson, “The Religion of Secularism” https://​www​.ligon​ier​.org​/learn​/artic​les​/relig​ ion​-sec​ular​ism, Feb. 25, 2017, accessed March 10, 2023. Mary Eberstadt, “The Zealous Faith of Secularism” First Things, January 2018 https://​www​ .firs​tthi​ngs​.com​/arti​cle​/2018​/01​/the​-zeal​ous​-faith​-of​-sec​ular​ism, accessed March 10, 2023.

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At long last and after great troubles, Americans have grown accustomed to the peaceful coexistence of multiple faiths and denominations. The rival church of secularism seeks no such comity, as today’s unprecedented attacks on Christian schools, charities, colleges, and other works go to show. The new church of secularism serves a very jealous god. 26 There is an important equivocation here, which holds that secularism is a kind of anti-​Christian “church” or religion, which is not interested in co-​ existing with Christianity. As I’ve noted, this is not how we ought to understand political secularism, which is a neutral and inclusive idea. One obvious solution would be to disabuse people like Eberstadt of their mis-​construal of secularism and their tendency to equivocate. Political secularism is a political idea that is supposed to be inclusive and neutral. It is not a church. Rather, it deliberately refrains from demanding any specific faith. And it aims to remain neutral among churches. This is, of course, a difficult ideal. And there are a variety of limit cases and circumstances in which this idea of neutrality becomes problematic. We will discuss some of these in what follows, for example with regard to abortion, lgbtq issues, and other points of contention in the culture wars. Eberstadt provides us with an example of where to look to see those problems and points of contention, in her focus on the sexual revolution. In a Christian nation (as Eberstadt might imagine things), sexual morality would conform to some version of church orthodoxy: perhaps homosexuality would be condemned, same-​sex marriage would be prohibited, birth control would be outlawed, pornography would be banned, etc. Some churches and churchgoers might prefer such a world. But in the secular system of the United States, where freedom of speech, conscience, and religious belief are paramount, traditional sexual norms have given way to a more permissive view. We can imagine why conservative Christians might feel that their world has been turned upside down and even that their religious liberty is violated when they feel that they are forced to conform to a world of changing sexual norms. And we can see why these kinds of Christians may think that they need to push back against a version of secularism that seems to normalize things that they view as immoral. We can reply by noting that secular law should not be understood as forcing Christians to embrace permissive sexual morality. Christian churches remain free—​under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment—​to condemn

26

Mary Eberstadt, “The Zealous Faith of Secularism” First Things, January 2018 https://​www​ .firs​tthi​ngs​.com​/arti​cle​/2018​/01​/the​-zeal​ous​-faith​-of​-sec​ular​ism, accessed March 10, 2023.

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homosexuality or pornography among their congregants. But the secular system prevents these Christian norms from being imposed on non-​Christians by the state. Nonetheless, it is this inability to control the larger system of cultural and legal norms that seems disempowering from the vantage point of Christian nationalism. Christian critics of secularism interpret the disestablishment of Christian norms as the triumph of relativism (and as we’ll see in the next chapter, as the work of the devil). Pope Benedict explained this concern in a 2006 book on relativism in which he suggested that in some secular societies traditional values are rejected as a kind of “intolerance.” He claims this occurs when “relativism becomes the required norm.”27 He cites as an example, the case of a Christian pastor who was jailed in Sweden for presenting a “traditional” Biblical account of homosexuality (interpreted here to mean preaching against homosexuality). But the Pope seems to be mistaken about this case as far as I can tell. He is likely referring to a prominent case that concluded in 2005 in which a Swedish pastor, Ake Green, delivered a sermon (in 2003) in which he described homosexuals as “a cancerous tumor on the body of society.”28 Green was convicted of a hate crime. But his conviction was overturned in 2005 by the Swedish Supreme Court on free speech grounds. And this is, in fact, how political secularism should work. Individuals should remain free to pursue their own religious convictions—​even if they are hateful and wrong—​up to the point at which this free exercise of religion becomes violent or interferes with the liberty of others. Pope Benedict does not mention the depth of the hateful words that were preached by this Swedish pastor (indeed, Benedict seems to understate them in describing them as “Biblical teachings”). Nor does he note that the pastor’s initial conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court of Sweden. But from this example we have a better understanding of political secularism, which ought to permit diversity of religion and moral judgment among private persons. But problems occur when Christians try to impose their views on everyone and when the state tries to prevent individual religious believers from obeying the dictates of their consciences. And the deeper problem, that is a form of the paradox of secularism, occurs when Christian nationalists and other political religions attack the secular system and reject the very idea of limiting religion to the private sphere. As I’ll explain in more detail in the next 27 28

Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict), Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam (New York: Basic Books, 2006), p. 128. “Swede pastor in anti-​gay case cleared” New York Times, February 12, 2005, https://​www​ .nyti​mes​.com​/2005​/02​/12​/world​/eur​ope​/swede​-pas​tor​-in​-anti​gay​-case​-clea​red​.html, accessed July 20, 2024.

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chapter, this problem arises when secularism is seen to be evil and even diabolical. If secularism is evil, from this vantage point, then it must be combated. If your worldview involves an account of an apocalyptical struggle between good and evil, and you are required by your religion to impose your values on the world, then your faith might well demand that you fight back against the devil of secularism. 2

The Paradox of Secularism

This leads us to the problem of the paradox of secularism. What can secularism say to those who view secularism as diabolical? Can conservative Christians be required to conform (at least in public) to the norms of secular society; or is that a form of intolerance that seems to betray the secular idea of freedom of religion? And what do secular systems do when those conservative Christians aim to fight for a different interpretation of political reality, one that requires the law to serve a narrowly construed religious vision of the world? The secular system set up by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides a useful set of norms for living in a religiously diverse world. The First Amendment tells us that there should be extensive personal religious liberty and also that the state should not set up an established religion. That idea has been interpreted in the past hundred years or so in a way that is inclusive of religious diversity. The result has been the creation of a religiously neutral public sphere. But for the critics of secularism, this neutral public sphere is viewed as immoral and even diabolical. Again, here is the question that points toward paradox: how can the neutral public sphere defend itself against those who claim that neutrality is both impossible and diabolical? There are, of course, varieties of secularism. French laïcité aims to keep religion and politics separate and develops as a result of a long history of Catholic interference in affairs of state. And as is well-​known, this has resulted in a strenuous effort to keep religion entirely out of the public sphere. This has included controversies around individual choices of religious symbols, including the hijab (headscarf) worn by some Muslim women. American secularism is more inclusive. It is a political framework that is not opposed to public displays and affirmations of personal faith. But American secularism does prohibit the establishment of religion, which means that official policies should not favor any specific religious (or non-​religious) point of view. It would be wrong under this policy to require anyone to adopt a religious (or nonreligious) set of values. This means that churches and individuals should be left alone to live according to their own values—​even values that appear as hateful, as in

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the Swedish case mentioned above. This appears to be insufficient for religious people who want there to be a larger role for religion in public life and who believe that a neutral public sphere is anti-​religious and un-​Christian. Secularism presumes that religion and politics ought to remain distinct, that freedom of religious belief is fundamental, and that the state should remain neutral among religions. Secular principles provide substantial reasons to reject Christian nationalism and other anti-​secular ideologies that seek to combine exclusivist religion with narrowly nationalistic view of political power. If someone suggests that the U.S. should be a Christian nation, this seems to be un-​American, if we mean by “American,” the very idea that the U.S. is an inclusive nation in which there is no national religion. Of course, Christian nationalists interpret the history and values of the United States in a quite different way, suggesting that the American national identity is fundamentally Christian. To say that secularism is neutral also means, by the way, that we also ought to reject atheistic nationalism and overt attempts to destroy or eliminate religion. Secularism, as described here, is inclusive: it includes atheists, theists, and other believers and non-​believers who each benefit from religious liberty. Nonetheless, secularism is opposed to Christian nationalism and other kinds of religio-​political exclusivism (such as political Islam, Hindu nationalism, and state-​mandated atheism), which seek to impose their norms and religious values on others. The paradox of secularism thus arises: in being opposed to those forms of religiosity, secularism appears to violate its own commitment to neutrality and inclusiveness. In the American system, secularism is grounded in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly recognizes a fundamental right to religious liberty, and which also stipulates that government should not favor or “establish” any religion. Secular systems locate religion in a place outside of political power, preventing any religious group or organization from acquiring political power. This may seem to “exclude” religion. But in excluding religion from political power, a more inclusive and diverse social and political world is supposed to result, which is neutral and permissive with regard to individual faith. Individual believers and religious communities are supposed to be left alone to pursue their own freely chosen faith, and the state ought not favor any particular faith. For Christian nationalists who want the state to be Christian, who celebrate the Christian identity of the nation, and who want to impose a set of Christian values on others. This means that the secular idea of state neutrality is their nemesis. Anti-​secular religious ideologies such as Christian nationalism throw a wrench in the works, since they advance the idea that religion and politics

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should be more closely wedded. In response, secular systems find themselves in a bind, especially with regard to those like Donald Trump, who has called for a “righteous crusade” against the “war on faith.” In excluding exclusivist and nationalistic faiths, secular systems appear to violate the spirit of inclusivity and the value of religious liberty. Indeed, religious critics may claim that secularism itself is a new kind of “religion” that seeks, as some Christian critics have suggested, to deify the human in opposition to God. This results in another version of the paradox of secularism. If secularism is itself a religion, is it a religion that is opposed to other “non-​secular forms of religion”? I put this last phrase in scare quotes because I maintain that it is based on a false equivalency. Political secularism is not a religion. Nor is it opposed to religion. And yet, a version of the paradox of secularism seems to arise for those who falsely claim that secularism is itself a religion that seeks to undermine other forms of religion. One of the reasons that secularism appears to be a form of religion takes us back to the point made previously about religion, nationalism, and identity. Those who understand political identity as being related to culture, ethnicity, and religion will tend to see all claims about political membership, citizenship, and legal obligation in that way. Political secularism is inclusive of diverse members, so long as the members qualify for citizenship (according to the established rules of the secular system), and so long as the citizens adhere minimally to the rule of law. This means that the secular form of citizenship and identity is “thin”: it does not depend upon any deep set of shared religious values.29 But for religious nationalists, this is unsatisfying and insufficient—​and some will say even incoherent. Instead, a “thicker” form of communal identity is desired, grounded in shared values and religious beliefs. Furthermore, proponents of thick communal identity will worry that other forms of identity are in fact “thick,” even when they claim that they are “thin.” Thus, the religious nationalist worries that secularism is offering a different and competing sense of value, purpose, and meaning, that is, a church or religion of secularism that 29

The discussion here of thick and thin communities reflects ideas found in discussions from decades ago involving questions of multiculturalism, liberalism, and universal human rights. One useful source is Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2019—​originally published in 1994. Walzer says in his preface to the 2019 edition: “religion is obviously a form of thick or maximalist morality—​in its more extreme versions it is a form of maximalist immorality. The extreme versions are open to a thin or universalistic critique in aid of all the victims of zealotry: heretics, apostates, and infidels” (p. ix). Also see: Seth D. Kaplan, Human Rights in Thick and Thin Societies: Universality Without Uniformity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

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seeks to replace the thick identity of traditional identity with another thick identity. The defender of political secularism may respond by saying that secular systems are in fact thin: the secular legal system offers a way of co-​existing that includes various forms of thick identity. The secularist is trying to be inclusive by admitting that within the secular system, various “thick” forms of identity are permitted. But in response the religious nationalist may claim that this is insufficient, since it neglects the essential component of communal and personal identity, which is fundamentally religious. And so it goes. And a form of the paradox of secularism appears when asking the question of what it means to be a member and to belong to a given political community. Nationalistic answers to this question will depend upon religious, cultural, moral, and ethnic identity and affiliation. The different answer of political secularism establishes belonging and membership in terms of obedience to the rule of law and citizenship that is not understood in religious, cultural, or ethnic terms. Indeed, the secular system rests on a supposedly more universal set of cosmopolitan norms including especially the idea of human rights. These norms establish the “thin” set of agreements that allows diverse religious people to coexist. But the religious nationalist will suggest that there is no universal set of cosmopolitan norms apart from the thick account provided by religion. The paradox leaves us wondering whether a thin secular system can or should include those who claim that thin forms of community are incoherent, and that thick religious identity ought to replace the secular form of community and identity. The paradox of secularism described here is similar to the “paradox of toleration,” as discussed in the literature on toleration and liberal political theory.30 That paradox asks whether tolerant people or systems ought to tolerate those who are intolerant. The paradox of secularism can be formulated as a similar question: should secular systems include religious beliefs that are anti-​secular? The problem with Christian nationalism, from a secular vantage point is that it is antithetical to the inclusive vision of secular politics, and thus may have to be excluded. But if Christian nationalism is excluded, this may violate the spirit of inclusion and respect for liberty that are hallmarks of secularism. The book explores this apparent paradox in a variety of ways, while admitting that it may be impossible finally to resolve the problem, since it involves a fundamental conflict of values. This conflict is a tragic conflict, which means that it exposes a kind of irreconcilable tragedy in political life. The most forceful critics of secularism may have to be excluded from political power. This is not an optimal 30

See Andrew Fiala, Tolerance and the Ethical Life (London: Continuum, 2005).

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outcome. But it is one that is necessitated by the logic of secularism. And while this may seem paradoxical, this form of resolution ultimately depends on a non-​neutral defense of secular neutrality. This is complex—​and I’ll flesh out the details subsequently. But the point is this: defenders of secularism are right to think that secularism is good. Such a judgment about the fundamental value of secular neutrality is not itself neutral. The neutrality associated with secularism is a neutrality that occurs within political life as understood in the context of diversity and the existence of various forms of thick religious communities. The normative judgment about the value of secularism in a sense transcends the squabbles of political life, while aiming to establish a neutral ground in which those squabbles can occur. Of course, a critic of this account may point out that this only pushes the argument back a level. And indeed, Christian nationalists and other critics of secularism will maintain that the problem still remains: an account of political life that requires neutrality remains diabolical from religious perspective that holds that political life should not be neutral and which should, rather, be used to promote and support a specific religious point of view. And so, the paradox returns. The “paradox of secularism” as discussed here has not been discussed on the literature on secularism in this way. What I have in mind is quite different from what Blankholm has recently called “the secular paradox” (and by which he means to suggest that secularism can include a kind of “religiosity”—​ what he calls in the subtitle of his book, “the religiosity of the not religious”).31 Blankholm is describing one form of secularism, which we might define as a secular worldview. From this perspective we might suggest that for some people “being secular” has similar connotations as “being religious” does for others. But secularism as worldview is different from secularism understood as a political theory. Political secularism is not offering a comprehensive doctrine of life (to borrow a phrase from John Rawls). And so the claim, often made by religious critics of secularism, that secularism is merely another worldview that is opposed to traditional religion is based on a false description of secularism. Some secular people may espouse a kind of “secular religion,” and Christian nationalists often suggest that secularism seeks to replace Christianity, but this is an argumentative and misleading misunderstanding of political secularism. The problem is not that secularism is a kind of religiosity: it is not a religious view but rather a political philosophy. Of course, this description of secularism as a neutral, non-​religious theory is rejected by the critics of secularism, who

31 Joseph Blankholm, The Secular Paradox: On the Religiosity of the Not Religious (New York: nyu Press, 2022).

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maintain that any theory that does not include their preferred religious idea is itself religious The problem I identify as the paradox of secularism is that in excluding what we might call “political religions” (i.e., those that want to institute or establish an official national religion), we appear to reach the limit of inclusivity. The problem described here is substantially different from Blankholm’s focus and has not been adequately discussed in the literature on secularism. Of course, as noted, a similar idea shows up in the literature on toleration (state toleration is in fact an important aspect of secularism). As I’ve explained elsewhere toleration becomes paradoxical when we “find ourselves confronting persons, attitudes, or behaviors, which we vigorously reject: we then must, paradoxically, tolerate that which we find intolerable. This becomes especially difficult when the other who is to be tolerated expresses views or activities that are themselves intolerant.”32 The solution I’ve proposed in my discussions of toleration apply here as well: that we should affirm the neutrality of secularism as itself good—​if only a thin or “political” good and not the kind of thick theory of the good associated with any religion or comprehensive doctrine. But as we’ll see, the paradox still remains, and any resolution to this tragic conflict is fragile. 3

Conclusion

The concepts we are discussing here are complex and difficult. They are also spooky and spiritually challenging. One solution to clearing the air is to provide a more careful analysis of what the issues are, and what is at stake in this conversation. We have already begun doing this by unpacking the complexity of key terms. Christian nationalism is not one thing; rather it is a family resemblance idea that weaves together a variety of related ideas. The same is true of Christianity itself: it includes progressive ideas that can support secularism, as well as anti-​secular ideas. The same complexity can be found in analyzing the idea of secularism, which also includes a variety of different notions and can be applied in various ways. One solution or way forward in all of this is to think more carefully about the concepts involved. Christian nationalists are often incensed by a version of secularism that they claim is too friendly with “the enemy” (i.e., the devil) and which the Christian nationalist thinks is trying to destroy religion. In return, defenders

32

Andrew Fiala, “Toleration” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://​iep​.utm​.edu​ /toler​ati​/, accessed July 10, 2024.

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of political secularism are afraid of a version of Christian nationalism that is aggressive and seems to threaten the foundations of a free society. And in the background are worries about changing sexual norms, racial tensions, and global struggles for power. Each camp is afraid of the other. Thus, in trying to find common ground, it is useful to shed light on these specters, devils, and ghosts. If it turns out that secularists are not in league with the devil (and may in fact be sympathetic to religion), then the Christian nationalists may be able to see beyond the pernicious specter of secularism that haunts their imagination. And if Christian nationalists are not simply totalitarians seeking to create a theocracy, then maybe secularists can find some sympathy for this view. Of course, there are extremes on both sides. And as we’ll see, in some cases it will not be possible to find common ground. But it is worth considering how such common ground might appear in a more nuanced view. And here, let’s consider a homily provided by Pope Francis as a useful place to conclude this chapter. Francis appears to open the door toward a Christian embrace of secularism. In a homily delivered in Canada in 2022, Francis said that secularization can appear to be a danger to religion; but he also suggested that the way forward is not to impose religion through political power. First, Francis said the following, which appears to present a challenge to Christianity: We need to reflect on what it is that, in today’s world, threatens the joy of faith and thus risks diminishing it and compromising our lives as Christians. We can immediately think of secularization, which has greatly affected the style of life of contemporary men and women, relegating God, as it were, to the background. God seems to have disappeared from the horizon, and his word no longer seems a compass guiding our lives, our basic decisions, our human and social relationships.33 But instead of arguing for the need to fight against secularization, and instead of arguing that Christians ought to be more political, he said the following: In order to refine our discernment of the secularized world, let us draw inspiration from the words written by Saint Paul vi in Evangelii Nuntiandi, an Apostolic Exhortation that remains highly relevant today. He understood secularization as “the effort, in itself just and legitimate and in no way incompatible with faith or religion” (Evangelii Nuntiandi, 55)

33 Pope Francis, Homily in Quebec, July 28, 2022, https://​slme​dia​.org​/blog​/pope​-fran​ cis​-hom​ily​-at​-vesp​ers​-in​-notre​-dame​-de​-que​bec​-cathed​ral, accessed March 13, 2023.

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to discover the laws governing reality and human life implanted by the Creator. God does not want us to be slaves, but sons and daughters; he does not want to make decisions for us, or oppress us with a sacral power, exercised in a world governed by religious laws. No! He created us to be free, and he asks us to be mature and responsible persons in life and in society. Saint Paul vi distinguished secularization from secularism, a concept of life that totally separates a link with the Creator, so that God becomes “superfluous and an encumbrance”, and generates subtle and diverse “new forms of atheism”: “consumer society, the pursuit of pleasure set up as the supreme value, a desire for power and domination, and discrimination of every kind” (ibid). As a Church, and above all as shepherds of God’s People, as consecrated men and women, seminarians and pastoral workers, it is up to us to make these distinctions, to make this discernment. If we yield to the negative view and judge matters superficially, we risk sending the wrong message, as though the criticism of secularization masks on our part the nostalgia for a sacralized world, a bygone society in which the Church and her ministers had greater power and social relevance. And this is a mistaken way of seeing things.34 Francis’s point is subtle. Three things should be emphasized. First, he rightly suggests that there are various meanings of the key terms, secularization and secularism. His usage of these terms is as follows. For Francis, secularization is the process by which religion is separated from political life; and this is not the same thing as secularism (which he suggests here is a kind of atheism). My usage of these terms differs. As I’ve said, secularism is not necessarily atheism—​rather, it is a political system that is neutral among religions. Second, Francis points out that secularization is simply the way things work today—​in a world in which church and state are distinct. He also suggests that nostalgia for a bygone era of political religious power is mistaken. He is not claiming that Christians ought to seek to re-​sacralize politics and institute something like Christian nationalism or rebuild Christendom. Rather, as he suggests later in this homily, Christians ought to make use of the freedom of the secular world in order to evangelize better. The point is that Christianity ought to be adopted and embraced by free people and not forced upon people, as if we were “slaves.” This brings us to a third point implicit in Francis’s writing

34 Pope Francis, Homily in Quebec, July 28, 2022, https://​slme​dia​.org​/blog​/pope​-fran​ cis​-hom​ily​-at​-vesp​ers​-in​-notre​-dame​-de​-que​bec​-cathed​ral, accessed March 13, 2023.

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here and elsewhere. Nowhere does Francis suggest that there is a war against God. Francis is not calling for a righteous crusade to take back nations for God. There are some interesting historical points that could be made here, about how much the Catholic Church has changed over the centuries, and how far Francis has moved beyond some of his Christian predecessors. But let’s conclude this chapter with a bit of hope that can be taken from Francis’s homily. It might be that the reactive and aggressive specter of Christian nationalism will give way to the more conciliatory approach of Francis. Indeed, this may be necessary as a matter of political power, for as we noted the demographic shift away from religion poses a problem for the churches. Younger generations are more sympathetic to the norms of secular political and legal systems, including how those systems have evolved with regard to cultural and moral issues such as abortion, sexual ethics, and so on. The specter of Christian nationalism may be the last gasp of a dying tradition. And it may also be that proponents of political secularism can be sympathetic to the concerns of those religious folks who are losing power. Rather, than seeing this as a battle of devils and spectral powers, we would do better to see this as a conversation among human beings about how might live together in a world of growing diversity and declining religiosity. Rather than suggesting that secularism is waging war against God, it is better to try to understand how political secularism benefits everyone, including Christians.

­c hapter 3

The Devil of Secularism: The Christian Nationalist Argument against Secularism Godless, atheistic secularism has taken over our country. Rev. Franklin Graham1

∵ In this chapter, I will further describe Christian nationalism in the U.S. by quoting from a number of authors and speakers who espouse this idea. As I’ll emphasize here, the idea includes a sustained critique of secularism. Sometimes this is stated hyperbolically, as in the claim that secularism is diabolic. But even when the critique of secularism is less Manichean, the tone remains apocalyptic. A number of Christians (incorrectly) think that godless secularism has destroyed the American dream. It is difficult to interpret the bombastic claims of this kind of religious rhetoric. Perhaps the claim that secularism is the work of the devil is merely a rhetorical flourish meant to motivate the faithful to be more pious, and not to be understood as a call to action. But the claim that secularism is diabolical may also be a call to radical action in resistance to the evil of the secular system. As noted before, the emotional rhetoric of Christian nationalism is not always the expression of a fully developed and carefully constructed theory. But some Christian nationalists do in fact seem to think that Satanic forces are at work in secularism and offer a theoretical account of the devil’s supposed work. You don’t need to dig very far into the speeches and writings of contemporary Christian thinkers to find the language of devils and demons. Douglas Wilson’s recent book, Mere Christendom, devotes a chapter to “The Wickedness of Secularism,” which he defines as “the idea that it is possible for society to function as a coherent unit without reference to God.”2 This definition is a plausible account of a certain kind of secularism, although 1 Franklin Graham, Twitter, June 28, 2016, https://​mob​ile​.twit​ter​.com​/fran​klin​_gra​ham​/sta​ tus​/747​8777​5068​6388​224, accessed April 2, 2023. 2 Douglas Wilson, Mere Christendom (Moscow, ID: Canon Press, 2023), Chapter 3, no page numbers.

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_004

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it fails to acknowledge that political secularism attempts to set up a political structure in which people who disagree about God can co-​exist. At any rate, Wilson quickly moves from this account of what he see as secular wickedness to speaking of the devil. In a chapter entitled “The Tactics of the Enemy,” he says, “Our naked public sphere has been purged of any reference to Jesus, but we are now left with the devils and the swine.” He concludes, “The current laws are not standing between us and the devil. These laws are the devil.”3 Or consider this from Jay Leach, a prolific Christian author and founder of the Bread of Life Bible Institute: Satan has been successful with his deception of secular humanism—​a belief system that began as a religion, but after many years, withdrew the claim in order to fully engage their secular agenda without the restraints of religion. Secularism’s diabolical goal is to wipe-​out God, Christ, Christians and all things of God.4 This claim is based upon a series of confusing claims (and plagued by odd grammar). This includes moving quickly from secular humanism to secularism. This move is commonly made in the critique of secularism. So, let’s recall, as I stated previously, that there is a difference between a neutral, secular political system and the “thicker” nonreligious worldview of secular humanism. We discussed this slippage or equivocation previously and will note it in other places in this book. In some cases, this equivocation is a matter of ignorance and confusion; in other cases, it may be a deliberate rhetorical ploy intended to stimulate Christian fear of “secularism,” which for some religious folks is a dirty word. The worry is, as Pastor Leach puts it that “secularism” has a diabolical purpose, which aims to “wipe out” God, Christ, and Christians. Pastor Leach did not invent this idea in 2021, when his book was self-​published. As we saw in the previous chapter, Jerry Falwell and Newt Gingrich maligned secularism in a previous generation. And as we’ll see here, this is an old idea in the United States, which can be extended back through the Cold War. The devil of secularism is connected in the mind of many religious zealots with another familiar specter from world history: godless communism. Consider, for example, Reverend Franklin Graham, the son of Billy Graham, 3 Douglas Wilson, Mere Christendom (Moscow, ID: Canon Press, 2023), Chapter 1, no page numbers. 4 Jay Leach, For His Glory: The Church is God’s Glory Mad Visible to This World (Trafford Publishing, 2021), Chapter 1, no page numbers. (The odd grammar here—​“wipe-​out” is in the original).

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who led a cross-​country revival tour called “Decision 2016,” at the same time as Donald Trump rose to power. At a rally in Montgomery Alabama, Rev. Graham said: As the [Berlin] wall came down, secularism began to creep into Washington. It crept into our universities, into our state capitols, it got into our city government. There’s no difference between secularism and communism. They’re both godless. Both are godless. And godless secularism is now taking control of our governments.5 He continued: You say, but Franklin, how about separation of church and state? What about it? Let me tell you that’s just a lie that the enemy uses to try to keep your mouth shut … There will be progressives who’ll say “Oh, you're so intolerant”. Yeah, well, so what? Let me tell you something I’m gonna get more intolerant.6 We can see here the challenge of a kind of rhetorical hyperbole. Does Graham really mean to advocate active intolerance—​or is this just something he is saying to fire up his audience? And is secularism really “godless” in the sense intended by Rev. Graham—​and does he actually believe this? As noted previously, all of this loose talk makes critical thinking a challenge. Public speakers and preachers are simply not doing philosophy! But we must take some of this kind of rhetoric at face value. Perhaps Rev. Graham is in fact preaching intolerance and suggesting that the idea of the separation of church and state is really the work of “the enemy.” The connection with communism further indicates what Graham may have in mind—​and the historical echoes he is calling upon. The communists were in fact anti-​religious. Karl Marx famously said that religion was the “opium of the people,” by which he meant that religion promised an illusory consolation for the injustices and unhappiness of this world. Marx

5 “Franklin Graham Denounces Same-​Sex Marriage, Secularism From Montgomery Capital Steps,” Southern Poverty Law Center, April 14, 2016, https://​www​.splcen​ter​.org​/hatewa​ tch​/2016​/04​/14​/rever​end​-frank​lin​-gra​ham​-denoun​ces​-same​-sex​-marri​age​-sec​ular​ism​-mon​ tgom​ery​-capi​tol​-steps, accessed April 10, 2023. 6 “Franklin Graham Denounces Same-​Sex Marriage, Secularism From Montgomery Capital Steps,” Southerm Poverty Law Center, April 14, 2016, https://​www​.splcen​ter​.org​/hatewa​ tch​/2016​/04​/14​/rever​end​-frank​lin​-gra​ham​-denoun​ces​-same​-sex​-marri​age​-sec​ular​ism​-mon​ tgom​ery​-capi​tol​-steps, accessed April 10, 2023.

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continued, saying that the “abolition of religion” would be an important part of the move toward real justice and true happiness—​in this world.7 Notice that communism is in fact a form of secularism, and that it does call for the abolition of religion. But this form of secularism is extreme. Indeed, I argue against an anti-​religious application of secularism: freedom of religion does not mean that we ought to abolish religion! Moreover, it should be clear that American secularism, based upon the separation of church and state is not anti-​religious. Nor is it Marxist or communist. Rather, it affirms religious liberty along with other fundamental freedoms. Again, we see an equivocation and slippage in the rhetoric of preachers like Rev. Graham: secularism is not necessarily communism, nor is it necessarily atheistic. So, we might ask, which form of secularism are the Christian nationalists arguing against? And that may help us figure out whether Christians should tolerate secularism, and what they exactly mean when they offer this kind of broad rejection of secularism. But if, as seems to be the case in the examples we’ve discussed here and in the previous chapter, a Christian nationalist is adamantly opposed to any form of secularism because they see it as Godless, communistic, and diabolic, then we return to the question of whether secular systems can tolerate such a definitively anti-​secular point of view. Can secular systems tolerate those who claim that the separation of church and state is a “lie” as Graham put, that is used by “the enemy” (which is often a term used by evangelical speakers to refer to the devil)? Now this may seem to secularly-​minded people like an exaggeration or a ghost-​story told for fright value. Nonreligious people may find it difficult to believe that in the modern world people actually think that the devil is opposing God through secularism. But apparently, some do. We’ll see varieties of this idea throughout this chapter. And the idea is not unique to American evangelical preachers such as Leach or Graham. In 2015, a year before Graham went out on his revival tour, a Catholic Cardinal in Bangkok, Thailand, Francis Xavier Kriengsak Kovithavanij, said, “It is not just a challenge for the Asian Churches … all the world is facing the challenge of secularism. Secularism is the new way the devil presents himself in the modern world.”8 This idea has also been explained by Rhett Burns, a Christian author:

7 Marx makes these claims in his Contribution to the Critique of Hegel (1844). 8 “For Thailand’s new cardinal, secularism is the face of the devil” Catholic News Agency, February 13, 2015, https://​www​.cat​holi​cnew​sage​ncy​.com​/news​/31566​/for​-thaila​nds​-new​ -cardi​nal​-sec​ular​ism​-is​-the​-face​-of​-the​-devil, accessed April 10, 2023.

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Where the Spirit of the Lord is not—​for example, an un-​Christian nation—​there is tyranny, the work of the devil who comes to steal, kill, and destroy. [Incidentally, our current Big Secular State mirrors the devil’s work of stealing (excessive taxation), killing (abortion), and destroying (perpetual war, redefinition of marriage and gender)].9 Burns puts his particular criticisms in square brackets here, claiming that these are “incidental.” But these complaints are really part of the heart of the matter. Christian nationalists view abortion, gender issues, and the like as a central manifestation of the problem. The devil is having his way in the world—​killing babies, destroying traditional marriages and gender norms—​by encouraging a secular system in which Christian norms no longer prevail. And as Burns has explained elsewhere, there is no neutrality when it comes to the question of serving God or some “imposter.” Burns explains: In a certain sense, theocracy is unavoidable. Every governing system will have a god, an ultimate authority that it appeals to and serves. The question is will the government serve the One, True, and Living God or some imposter? It’s not whether, but which. Religious neutrality doesn’t exist.10 A key assumption here is that secular neutrality is a lie and an impossibility. Either you serve the One, True, Living God, as Burns puts it, or you serve some “imposter,” which is again another euphemism for the anti-​Christ or the devil, who seeks to impose a social and political system that is actively opposed to God. Among the claims made by Burns is the idea that “religious neutrality doesn’t exist.” This states the problem plainly: a secular political system that claims to be neutral is simply ruled out from this perspective. Taking this a step further, if neutrality does not exist, then it seems that we end up with a condition in which “you are either for us or against us.” This idea may seem extreme. But Christian authors support it by appealing to Biblical sources such as Luke 11:23, where Jesus says (as he is casting out devils), “He who is not with me is against me, and he who does not gather with me scatters.” Christian author Ken Ham

9 10

Rhett Burns, “Should Christians Desire a Christian Nation” Medium, May 28, 2016, https: //​med​ium​.com​/@rhet​t​_bu​rns​/sho​uld​-chr​isti​ans​-des​ire​-a​-christ​ian​-nat​ion​-bfeb0​6dfd​ 596, accessed April 13, 2023. Rhett Burns, “Are You a Christian Nationalist?” Crosspolitic, https://​cross​poli​tic​.com​/are​ -you​-a​-christ​ian​-nati​onal​ist​/, accessed April 12, 2023.

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uses this passage and other to support his critique of neutrality, as applied to the idea of secular education: The secular education system is not neutral at all. The Bible teaches that one is either for Christ or against Him (Matt. 12:30). One walks either in light or darkness (Eph. 5:8); one either gathers or scatters (Luke 11:23). There is no neutral position. An education system is either for Christ or against Him.11 Ken Ham is well-​known for his work with “Answers in Genesis” and the Creation Museum. Like others who share his interpretation of Christianity, secularism is not neutral. He warned in a 2020 article in Answers in Genesis that the agenda of secularism is atheistic: Most secularists don’t just want tolerance—​ they want to outlaw Christianity and impose their religion of atheism on the culture. By making the culture more secular, they aren’t making society neutral—​they are substituting Christianity with the religion of atheism.12 Again, we see the equivocation here. There may be some secular atheists in the United States who do want to “outlaw Christianity,” as Ham puts it. But such an idea would run counter to the American tradition’s secular system, which allows free expression of religion. Neutrality is not anti-​religious. But that is the supposition of the Christian nationalists. And so, with this assumption that neutrality is impossible and anti-​Christian, we are left with an us-​vs-​ them struggle. Christian nationalism is then proposed as the one true idea of social and political life, while secular political systems that aim to be neutral among religions are viewed as anti-​Christian. It is easy to understand that this is a useful rhetorical move, which can help motivate religious people at the level of emotion and identity. If secularism is the devil’s work, then there is a holy mission that requires believers to reinsert God back into political life by opposing the demon of secularism. This crusade involves a rejection of the idea that there can or should be a separation of church and state. As Burns said, “religious neutrality does not exist.” If this is true, then it is a short step to the claim that the one true faith should rule over the nation. 11 12

Ken Ham, The Lie: Evolution/​Millions of Years (Green Forest, AR: New Leaf Books, 2012), 30. Ken Ham, “Will Biden Make a More Secular America?” Answers in Genesis, December 17, 2020, https://​answe​rsin​gene​sis​.org​/cult​ure​/will​-biden​-make​-more​-secu​lar​-amer​ica​/, accessed April 25, 2023.

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Again, I realize that this description of Christian nationalism as a threat to secularism may seem overwrought. But let’s consider a thoughtful and refined account of this idea as articulated in a 2022 book by Stephen Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism: A Christian society that is for itself will distrust atheists, decry blasphemy, correct any dishonoring of Christ, orient life around the Sabbath, frown on and suppress moral deviancy … A Christian nation that is true to itself will unashamedly and confidently assert Christian supremacy over the land.13 Wolfe’s account of Christian nationalism is steeped in theory. He is not merely employing emotional rhetoric. This book was might have remained hidden on the shelves of Christian bookstores, were it not for the fact that it was promoted by blurbs from several prominent figures including R.R. Reno, the editor of First Things (a conservative Christian journal) and Yoram Hazony, a prominent Israeli philosopher (whom we discussed in a previous chapter).14 It is astonishing to see such an endorsement of a frankly medieval worldview that would “assert Christian supremacy over the land.” And again, lest you think that I am overstating the case, consider that Wolfe argues that secular “neutrality” is impossible and that “established Christianity is better than its secularist alternative.”15 In using this phrase, “established Christianity,” Wolfe is offering a direct response to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which asserts that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” This is a bedrock principle of secularism, as found in the United States: the establishment clause of the First Amendment is wedded to a fundamental assertion of the right to the free exercise of religion. But on Wolfe’s account there ought to be a Christian nationalist revolt against the First Amendment’s establishment clause.

13

Stephen Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism (Moscow, ID, Canon Press: 2022), 240–​41. 14 The book also generated mainstream media concern. See Kelefa Sanneh discussion in “How Christian is Christian Nationalism?” The New Yorker, March 27, 2023, https://​www​ .newyor​ker​.com​/magaz​ine​/2023​/04​/03​/how​-christ​ian​-is​-christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism, accessed March 27, 2023. 15 Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism, p. 36.

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Again, you may think that I am exaggerating here. But consider the revolutionary spirit of Wolfe’s conclusions. He claims that secularism is both evil and tyrannical. Any action that is directly detrimental to the highest good is unrighteous in itself and so is evil absolutely and universally. In other words, no set of circumstances would permit a civil ruler justly to destroy true religion, whether by secularization or by replacing it with heresy, infidelity, or paganism. Such actions, in themselves make the civil ruler a tyrant, for he has attacked the principal object of human life, namely, the acknowledgement and worship of God, which is also the ultimate end of civil society. … The civil ruler who attacks true religion is not acting as a minister of God. He is an enemy of his people’s good, an enemy of the human race, and an enemy of God.16 Wolfe’s solution is to pray for a “Christian prince” who would: suppress the enemies of God and elevate his people; recover a worshipping people; restore masculine prominence in the land and a spirit for dominion; affirm and conserve his people and place, not permitting their dissolution or capture; and inspire a love of one’s Christian country.17 This is the idea that is haunting the secular world. It includes a vision of a return to the time of Christian princes who unite God’s people in a crusade against the enemies of God. Chief among those enemies are defenders of secularism, who maintain that political life ought to remain impartial and neutral among religious and nonreligious ideas, and that democratically elected leaders are not princes who wage battle in the name of faith. Christian nationalism also manifests itself as a backlash against religious diversity in general, including as Islamophobia, anti-​Semitism, and anti-​ immigrant sentiment. But as I noted in the previous chapter, nativism, racism, homophobia, and other ideologies are not what I see as the biggest threat of Christian nationalism. That big threat is, I argue, the outright rejection of secularism as evil. And it is this that leads us to the secular paradox: can a secular political system include or tolerate those who see the very idea of secularism as the work of the devil?

16 Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism, p. 338. 17 Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism, p. 323.

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Christian Backlash and America as a Christian Nation

I state the problem in this book as a kind of haunting because Christian nationalism is best understood as a shadowy result of the stability and strength of secular systems of government. This is what it means to say, as I explained previously, that Christian nationalism is post-​secular. In the modern secular world, religion has lost some of its social and political power. There are a growing number of nonreligious people. And the legal framework prevents the establishment of religion. Of course, religious organizations remain powerful, the U.S. Congress and other bastions of power consists mainly of traditional religious people, the world continues to be organized around a religious calendar of Christmas and Easter, and churches and other organization enjoy a certain kind of privilege when it comes to taxation and other social perks and benefits. But there is a sense among some religious people that they are losing a position of dominance that they once took for granted. This inspires backlash and reaction. Christian nationalists see the apparent triumph of secularism as the work of the devil, and opposition to secularism as a holy crusade. And Christians are not wrong to be worried about the strength and stability of their faith. History seems to be pointing in the direction of shrinking religious communities and continued growth of the nonreligious (at least in the U.S., Canada, and Europe).18 But this does not mean that religion will disappear or that suddenly all of the social power of religion will collapse—​despite the worry of some Christians who believe that “the enemy” is winning. The good news—​from the vantage point of defenders of political secularism—​is that these larger cultural trends make it unlikely that Christian nationalists will successfully subvert secular democratic systems. The bad news is that as secularism grows, the specter of Christian nationalism manifests itself as post-​ secular backlash, conjuring both the threat of violence and the possibility of a looming legitimacy crisis. Of course, the future is open. There is no guarantee that the specter of Christian nationalism will remain merely as a shadowy threat to secular democracy. Real world violence may occur, as it already has in some frightening cases. We mentioned some of that in a previous chapter. But despite this 18

See: Brian Clarke, “Going, Going, Gone? Canadian Churches and the Rise of Non-​ religion” in Beaman, L.G., Stacey, T. (eds) Nonreligious Imaginaries of World Repairing (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021); and “‘Christianity as default is gone’: the rise of a non-​Christian Europe” The Guardian, March 20, 2018, https://​www​.theg​uard​ian​.com​ /world​/2018​/mar​/21​/chris​tian​ity​-non​-christ​ian​-eur​ope​-young​-peo​ple​-sur​vey​-relig​ion, accessed March 15, 2023.

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awful reality, we still remain—​so far—​on the path toward secularism, tolerance, and inclusion. And yet, these violent outbursts show us the gravity of the problem, a situation that can be further aggravated by political polarization, hyperbolic rhetoric, and the rise of conservative parties dedicated to dismantling the secular status quo. I ring the alarm bells with caution. This book is a work of philosophy informed by skepticism about the philosophy of history. We have learned (or should have learned) to be cautious about overwrought historical generalizations. History does not unfold according to some inexorable logic, or as a historical dialectic as articulated in the work of Hegel and Marx. Anything can happen—​a religious revival, a revolution, a collapse—​and the best we can do is offer provisional predictions. We should also remain vigilant and keep our eyes out for those ghosts. Marx, of course, spoke of the specter of communism in The Communist Manifesto. I deliberately echo him here because his work reminds us that specters can be dangerous in their own way. For the true believer—​of Marxist communism or of Christian nationalism—​the goal is to bring the specter to life, to encourage sparks to become flames, and to help the revolutionary notion leap from the spectral world of ideas to the muddy streets of political reality. And certainly, the specter of communism wreaked havoc, as revolutions erupted, and backlash ensued. There is also the risk that in responding to spectral threats, we might overreact and pour fuel on a fire. So, as I argue here, the solution is vigilance and moderation. Ghosts are defeated when we turn on the light. It also helps to have faith in democracy, while trusting that secularism is a good idea that is easily defended, and which is persuasive to a variety of people including religious people. Nonetheless, there is a secular paradox lurking in the shadows along with the ghost of Christian nationalism. Can secular systems respond to anti-​secular forces without betraying their basic commitment to liberty and inclusion? Are there some religious ideas that ought to be excluded from what is tolerated and included in the big tent of secular society? And in excluding some ideas, does the openness of secularism collapse into paradox? And wouldn’t that cause further backlash, polarization, and animosity? I suggest that the specter of Christian nationalism may not be as scary as we might think. No doubt there are anti-​secular people and parties roaming in the shadows, along with the terrifying risk of violence. But the way to defeat this specter is to direct the light of inquiry into these shadows. We can show that Christian nationalism fails on its own terms, as an unreasonable and pernicious interpretation of Christianity. That is the argument that has been made by “progressive” Christians, which we will examine in detail in the next few

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chapters. We can also show that as a strain of thought in the American and European traditions, it is a betrayal of the founding principles of the modern Western world. Christian nationalism should be criticized and rejected for both theological and political reasons. It is based on bad theology, a tendentious reading of Biblical texts, and an unholy marriage of political and religious power. Christian nationalism also runs aground, at least in the United States, when it crashes into the historical reality of the American “nation.” The American nation is not united by the kind of national identity which Hazony celebrates (as discussed in a previous chapter). The United States is a motley collection of diverse people who come from diverse faith traditions, and in which the fastest growing religion is “no religion.” This is a nation of laws intended to protect religious liberty and prevent the establishment of a national religion. The American identity is not easily understood as “Christian” because national identity and religious identity are more complex than any simple reductive claim such as this can account for. As we shall discuss in more detail subsequently, the “Christians” of the American founding included figures like George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. These founding fathers were not “Christian” in any sense of the term expressed by contemporary Christian nationalists. Washington and Jefferson were deists, while Adams was a Unitarian: each of these figures denied the trinity, while also doubting the existence of miracles, and the divinity of Christ.19 Furthermore, they advocated on behalf of religious liberty because they understood that enforced religious orthodoxy was often used to foster and support what they saw as the absurd beliefs of traditional trinitarian Christianity. John Adams suggested, for example, that in the era of enlightenment, “men are now sufficiently enlightened to disabuse themselves of artifice, imposture, hypocrisy, and superstition.”20 Adams advocated for a kind of natural law version of unitarian religion. But he wanted this to be “grounded on reason, morality, and the Christian religion, without the monkery of priests, or the knavery of politicians.”21 In other word, Adams advocated for natural law as the heart of

19 20 21

See David L. Holmes, The Faiths of the Founding Fathers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). John Adams, in The Works of John Adams, vol. 4 (Little, Brown, and Company, 1851) (at Liberty Fund, https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/adams​-the​-works​-of​-john​-adams​-vol​-4), Preface, no page numbers. John Adams, in The Works of John Adams, vol. 4 (Little, Brown, and Company, 1851) (at Liberty Fund, https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/adams​-the​-works​-of​-john​-adams​-vol​-4), Preface, no page numbers.

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Christianity without all of the religious superstructure, including the miracles, the Trinity, and the divinity of Christ. Religious liberty was an especially important theme for George Washington as he fulfilled his duties as the first President of the United States. He said (in a letter to the Hebrew congregation of Newport, Rhode Island), the virtue of the American system is that “all possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship.”22 This reminds us that even at the founding, there were non-​ Christian (for example, the Jews of Newport) among the citizens. These people were included by Washington among those who possess religious liberty and full citizenship. Indeed, as President, Washington wrote dozens of letters to diverse religious congregations (Quakers, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Catholics, and Jews) promising them that their religious liberty would be guaranteed. One such letter was sent by Washington to the New Jerusalem Church of Baltimore, which offered a Swedenborgian version of Christianity. Washington wrote: We have abundant reason to rejoice, that in this land the light of truth and reason have triumphed over the power of bigotry and superstition, and that every person may here worship God according to the dictates of his own heart. In this enlightened age and in this land of equal liberty, it is our boast, that a man’s religious tenets will not forfeit the protection of the laws, nor deprive him of the right of attaining and holding the highest offices that are known in the United States.23 This shows that religious liberty, the critique of superstition, and an awareness of the fact of religious diversity was clearly present in the founding of the United States. So, it is difficult to state that the U.S. is or was a “Christian nation.” Of course, all of this is complex—​and depends on how we define our terms. Some of the Christian nationalists claim John Adams and George Washington as sources for their claim that the U.S. is a Christian nation. But, as I suggest here (and will discuss further in a later chapter), this involves a tendentious reading of the historical record. America may once have been a nation in which a very general form of Christian faith (that included Unitarianism and deism) was taken for granted as the cultural currency of the formerly British colonists who founded this country on the eastern shore of the continent. But 22 23

George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, August 18, 1790, https: //​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Was​hing​ton​/05​-06​-02​-0135, accessed January 6, 2024. George Washing to New Jerusalem Church of Baltimore, January 27, 1793, https://​found​ ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Was​hing​ton​/05​-12​-02​-0027, accessed January 9, 2024.

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as the nation grew, so too did religious diversity. And even at the founding and in the early decades of the country, there were profound disagreements among Christians. The struggle regarding slavery provides an obvious example: some Christians thought the Bible provided a basis for slavery, while Christian abolitionists denied this. As Abraham Lincoln famously put it in his Second Inaugural Address both groups of Christians read the same Bible and pray to the same God. But the divide regarding slavery ran so deep that the country devolved into civil war. This obvious example reminds us that in the United States, the historical claims of Christian nationalism are obtuse. There is no shared sense of Christian identity in the United States. And there never was. But there is a shared sense that the Constitution and its Amendments are of value. Of course, this idea of allegiance to the Constitution was not strong enough to prevent the Civil War. But once that war ended, the ideals of the secular Constitution prevailed. And the country expanded to include a growing diversity of believers and non-​believers. It is the Constitution that shows us why Christian nationalism is legally problematic, and we might even say un-​American: it violates the First Amendment to call, as Wolfe has, for the establishment of Christianity as the religion of the land. Despite its problems, Christian nationalism has its devoted adherents including those who see political life as battle of angels and demons. But behind the ghosts and specters there are merely human beings, struggling for power and trying to make sense of a political world that is more complicated and more human than we are often led to believe. 2

The Apparent Rise of Christian Nationalism and the Growth of Nonreligion

Christian nationalism appears to be on the rise. And we should be rightly worried about a rising tide of intolerance and the idea that an established religion (or even a theocracy) is better than secular democracy. We ought to be concerned with violence, hate, and authoritarianism. But should we freak out? And is there a solution to this problem? The story is more complicated than we might think. Christian nationalism is not new. And the apparent rise of Christian nationalism must be interpreted in connection with another important demographic fact: the rapid growth of nonreligion. One way of describing this is as the growth of secular worldview—​or simply the rise of secularism. Note that here I am using the term “secularism” here as a synonym for a nonreligious worldview—​and that this is different from the legal system of political secularism.

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Let me state this as a kind of bold hypothesis: the resurgence of Christian nationalism can be interpreted as the last gasp of a declining tradition seeking to preserve itself against the triumph of a nonreligious or secular worldview. Let’s call this “the bold hypothesis of secularization.” This kind of secularization is often what Christian nationalists appear to be worried about. But they often also appear to equivocate in expressing this worry, suggesting that the problem is political secularism, and not merely “secularization” understood as the loss of faith and the growth of nonreligion. Clarifying this confusion of terms is part of the solution. One could be in favor, for example, of a secular political system but also worried about the cultural trend of people losing their religious faith. The bold secularization hypothesis can be subject to critique. One reason to critique it is that it tends to feed into the fears of the Christian nationalists who do seem to be afraid that they are losing power, and that religion is dying out. Indeed, we ought to be careful in making any bold pronouncement about history. It sounds a bit like the idea of the “End of History,” as found in Hegel, and popularized by Francis Fukuyama a generation ago as the Cold War ended. But history never ends; and prognostications about the future are often colored by wishful thinking. The future could unfold differently. A radical revival of Christian faith could interrupt the secularization hypothesis. Or Christians could seize power and institute of theocracy that wages war against secularization. In a sense, anything is possible. Some Christians may even believe that Jesus will return and sort this all out with a sword of fire. A significant number of Americans do believe that we are living in the end times and that the return of Christ is imminent. A survey from the Pew Research Center, published in 2022, reports that 39% of Americans believe we are currently living in the end times.24 A more general eschatological expectation is more widely shared. When asked if Jesus will return to Earth “someday,” 55% of Americans said yes; this includes 75% of Christians, who believe that Christ will “someday” return. When asked if the return of Jesus will happen in their lifetime, 10% of Americans said yes (which is 14% of all Christians). And here we encounter a problem that we will deal with extensively in this book. It seems that religious and nonreligious people are living in alternative realities. For those who think that we are living in the end times, Christian nationalism may make good sense, as part of the work of preparing the way for the return of Christ. This point was made by Rep. Lauren Boebert (R-​Colorado) 24

“About four-​in-​ten U.S. adults believe humanity is ‘living in the end times’” Pew Research Center, December 8, 2022, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/fact​-tank​/2022​/12​/08​/about​ -four​-in​-ten​-u​-s​-adu​lts​-beli​eve​-human​ity​-is​-liv​ing​-in​-the​-end​-times​/, accessed March 14, 2023.

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in a speech at the Truth and Liberty Coalition Conference in September 2022. Boebert said: We know that we are in the last of the last days, but it's not a time to complain about it. It's not a time to get upset about it. This is a time to know that you were called to be a part of these last days. You get to have a role in ushering in the second coming of Jesus. How cool is that?25 Boebert also spoke of how “the enemy” was using government in ways that are displeasing to God. She urged the audience to work on behalf of God and righteousness. The audience cheered her on. It is easy to imagine that audience seeing the rise of secularism and the decline of Christianity as the work of “the enemy.” And this is why I suggest that understanding the current demographic reality is essential for understanding the apparent rise of Christian nationalism. The demographic picture points in the direction of growing secularization and the correlative decline in Christianity. This is the relevant empirical fact that helps explain the apparent rise of Christian nationalism, and that helps to support the bold secularization hypothesis that is at the root of the problem. Indeed, based on this empirical approach, one can project future change. Such projections are merely extrapolations from the current rate of change. And such projections could prove to be wrong. But—​and here is an important point—​Christians and non-​Christians are witnessing the underlying process of secularization that is the basis for these projections. And the future does not look promising for those who dream of a future that is homogeneous, and in which Christianity is the dominant and unrivaled religion in the United States (This is also seemingly true in Europe and Canada, although my focus here is primarily on the U.S.). A conservative estimate from the Pew Center predicts that by 2060, Christianity will no longer be the majority religion in the United States.26 This conservative estimate suggests that the Christian population of the United States will dip below 50% of the population in 2060, with Christianity predicted to be the faith of 46% of the population by 2070. Pew predicts that 25 26

Lauren Boebert at Truth and Liberty Coalition Conference, September 2022, Day 2, Session 20, https://​www​.trut​hand​libe​rty​.net​/con​fere​nce​/2022, at 20:45, accessed January 23, 2025. “Projecting U.S. religious groups’ population shares by 2070” Pew Research Center, March 13, 2022, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/relig​ion​/2022​/09​/13​/pro​ject​ing​-u​-s​-religi​ous​-gro​ ups​-pop​ulat​ion​-sha​res​-by​-2070​/, accessed March 10, 2023.

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this demographic shift will include a slight increase in non-​Christian faiths (Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and so on). Their conservative estimate is that non-​Christian religions will make up 13% of the population by 2070. But the fastest growing group is the non-​religious—​these are the “nones” (those who claim “none of the above” as their religious affiliation). By 2070, Pew’s conservative estimate is that 41% of Americans will be non-​religious. This does not mean that all of those “nones” will be atheist or agnostic. Atheists and agnostics are only about a third of the nonreligious. A Pew survey published in 2021 found that 29% of Americans are non-​religious. This includes 4% of Americans who identify as atheist, 5% who describe themselves as agnostic, and 20% who claim that their religion is “nothing in particular.”27 The Pew Center’s conservative prediction of future religious affiliation is based on a projection of the current rate of change of these demographic categories. If the rate of change varies, other predictions result. If religious switching accelerates in line with current trends, it could turn out that nonreligious people will outnumber Christians by 2055, with Christianity shrinking to just about one third of the population by 2070. It is also possible that a religious revival could reverse these trends. But the rapid growth of non-​religion is an undisputed fact of the present moment. And the exodus from faith skews toward the youth: young people are more likely to be nonreligious than their elders according to research from the Public Religion Research Institute, another organization that is tracking the rise of the “nones.”28 Given this, it is no wonder that some Christians are freaking out. Christianity, despite the internal diversity of this tradition, was once taken for granted in the United States. But this is no longer true—​and in the future, Christianity will not be a majority religion. Of course, some defenders of secularism, democracy, and toleration are also freaking out about the rise of Christian nationalism. But it seems as if the growth of nonreligion will continue, even as Christian nationalists push back. At any rate, it is pretty obvious that we are in the middle of a great historical shift. It is not surprising that people on all sides of this great transformation in religion and politics are worried. Christians are experiencing decline and disempowerment. And as some Christians react against this cultural shift and 27 28

“About Three-​in-​Ten U.S. Adults Are Now Religiously Unaffiliated” Pew Research Center, December 14, 2021, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/relig​ion​/2021​/12​/14​/about​-three​-in​-ten​ -u​-s​-adu​lts​-are​-now​-reli​giou​sly​-unaff​ilia​ted​/, accessed March 13, 2023. See Public Religion Research Institute, “American Religious Landscape in 2020,” July 8, 2021, https://​www​.prri​.org​/resea​rch​/2020​-cen​sus​-of​-ameri​can​-relig​ion​/, accessed March 13, 2023.

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organize themselves for struggle, defenders of secularism will be forced to confront the question of how to respond to the specter of Christian nationalism. My goal here is to examine this dynamic with a critical eye. Let me note that I am not an expert in demography or the sociology of religion. Rather, my approach is philosophical. I’m interested in ideas, arguments, critique, and normative conclusions. But as a philosopher, I understand that all of this is complex—​and that there are arguments and evaluations on all sides of social, political, ethical, and religious issues. I view Christian nationalism as a “problem” in the philosophical sense. What I mean by this is that the idea of Christian nationalism opens the door to a variety of questions that need careful reflection. The longer we reflect on the problem, the more complicated things become. And yet, when we view the problem of Christian nationalism from a philosophical perspective this can help alleviate some of our tendency to freak out, since things are more complicated than they appear on first blush. 3

Sympathy for the Devil?

This is not to say that all is good. There are reasons to be worried about the apparent resurgence of Christian nationalism and the intolerance and violence associated with it—​otherwise there would be no need for this book! But we ought to think carefully about what exactly we should worry about. I am writing this book from a standpoint that affirms the value of political secularism. For the adamant Christian nationalist this might mean that I am in league with the devil, although I must admit that I do not believe that any such malign being actually exists. I am myself a nonbeliever. However, I remain sympathetic to those who are religious. I both recognize their right to believe and seek to understand the emotional, social, and cognitive sources of their belief. I also think that atheists ought to engage in dialogue with believers, while attempting to find common ground in shared ethical and political values.29 With this in mind, I think defenders of secularism ought to try to be sympathetic to the concerns of Christians who are witnessing a radical shift in the cultural and demographic landscape (by “sympathetic” I mean trying to understand—​ but not condoning—​the worldview of the Christian nationalist). This effort at sympathy is part of a useful solution to the present problem: we are often polarized and unsympathetic to one another.

29

See my discussion in Andrew Fiala and Peter Admirand, Seeking Common Ground: A Theist/​Atheist Dialogue (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2021).

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For people like Rev. Franklin Graham, the world is rapidly changing and their once powerful position in the center of culture and civilization is being challenged. It is not surprising that some Christians would seek to fight back against the forces that they see as challenging them. We also should be careful in over-​generalizing and leaping to the worst-​case description of the problem. Rather than jumping to the conclusion that every Christian who uses the rhetoric of Christian nationalism or who longs with nostalgia for a Christian nation is a violent anti-​Semite, Islamophobe, and theocratic authoritarian, defenders of secularism ought to imagine what it is like to experience such a radical shift in social power. To be sure, some Christian nationalists are aggressive, ignorant, and violent. But Christian nationalism can be seen as an innocuous kind of wishful thinking, in-​group identification, and virtue signaling—​a rhetorical strategy that is not necessarily a literal call to arms. Of course, there are real dangers, when word play becomes sword play. Some Christian nationalists have sought political power and used it to change the law. And as we saw in our discussion of Donald Trump in the previous chapter, some leaders are calling for a religious crusade against secular values. Others have taken the law into their own hands, striking out violently against perceived threats to their Christian nationalist ideal. In the first case, we have a struggle for power in the legal and political realm, which ought to be constrained by the legal framework itself, which in the United States includes the all-​important First Amendment to the Constitution. In the second place, we have terrorism, which is morally wrong and illegal. And yet, in describing the worldview of the Christian nationalists, we “secularists” find ourselves in a bind. At some point judgment and evaluation are required. Can we sympathize with the worldview of Christian nationalism, while also condemning it? That is one version of the paradox of secularism. At what point do we stop the effort of sympathy and understanding and say that something is wrong, ignorant, intolerant, or evil? This problem occurs here in my effort to describe the problem of Christian nationalism. Can we describe this idea entirely in neutral terms, without evaluation? A similar problem holds from the vantage point of the critics of secularism. If secularism is the work of the devil, then Christian nationalists cannot view it simply as a matter of neutrality. In this discussion, impartiality and neutrality are ideals that may not be possible. And yet, secularism is supposed to be impartial and neutral among religions. And so again, we see the problem and the paradox: can there be a secular system that is impartial and neutral toward those who oppose that system and call it the work of the devil?

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Examples of Christian Nationalism in American Politics

We will return to those questions throughout. Let’s continue at this point in an effort to flesh out Christian nationalism. This idea has become mainstream in recent years. Prominent voices have proudly proclaimed that they are Christian nationalists. Among these voices is Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, a Republican from Georgia, who said of the Republican party at a conference in the summer of 2022, “We need to be the party of nationalism.” She continued, “I am a Christian and I say it proudly, we should be Christian nationalists.”30 And while the phrase “Christian nationalism” is not always actively embraced in this way, the idea can be found in the kind of narrow religiosity that is manifest in some statehouses, city councils, and other institutions of government. One controversial recent example comes from the state of Oklahoma, where the Republican governor, Kevin Stitt, claimed a kind of religious authority over the state of Oklahoma. Governor Stitt has not, to my knowledge, explicitly described his worldview as Christian nationalism. But the idea is implicit in his approach. He celebrated his re-​election in 2022 with the following public prayer: Father, we just claim Oklahoma for you. Every square inch, we claim it for you in the name of Jesus. Father, we can do nothing apart from you. We don’t battle against flesh and blood but against principalities and darkness. And father, we just come against that, we just loose your will over our state right now in the name of Jesus. We just thank you and we claim Oklahoma for you as the authority that I have as governor and the spiritual authority and the physical authority that you give me.31 This prayer discloses several interesting ideas that are typically associated with Christian nationalism. One key idea is that Jesus is the source of political, spiritual, and physical authority. Another idea is that this authority extends across the state (which by the way has some interesting historical echoes given Oklahoma’s history as Indian territory). We also see the idea here that God’s will is the source of action and power. And finally, there is the spectral claim 30

Quoted at npr: “More than half of Republicans support Christian nationalism, according to a new survey” February 14, 2023, https://​www​.npr​.org​/2023​/02​/14​/115​6642​544​/more​ -than​-half​-of​-repu​blic​ans​-supp​ort​-christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism​-accord​ing​-to​-a​-new​-s, accessed March 10, 2023. 31 Available at: https://​www​.yout​ube​.com​/watch?v=​wykW​VdHX​fdM, accessed March 10, 2023.

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made here that history and politics are understood as a place of battle in which good, Christian power is fighting against principalities of darkness. This point of view is typically associated with right-​wing Republicans in the United States. A survey from Politico in May 2022 found that 43% of Republicans thought that the U.S. Constitution would allow the government to declare that the U.S. is a Christian nation; and 61% of Republicans were in favor of the government making such a declaration.32 Such an idea obviously conflicts with the First Amendment’s “Establishment Clause.” It would be a pernicious establishment of religion if the government were to declare that the U.S. is a Christian nation. This may be why one strategy of some who are challenging the secular status quo is to bring lawsuits based on the “Free Exercise Clause.” Such lawsuits have succeeded. But they are complicated. And it is not clear that an expansive interpretation of the free exercise clause is as dangerous as the idea that the governor a state claims “every inch of the state in the name of Jesus.” One important example of the free exercise question is the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, decided in 2022. In that case, a football coach claimed he had the right, under the free exercise clause, to pray “privately” on the sidelines at football games (his prayers included players and supporters, making it an open question about how private these prayers were). The school district had banned the practice and fired the coach, suggesting that such prayers ran afoul of the establishment clause. But the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the coach. Some secularists were outraged by this decision, worried that it opened the door to a revision of long-​standing school prayer cases. But this is all quite complicated. I published a column on the decision, in which I suggested that it could be viewed as a boon for nonreligious people, and that it might empower atheists to gather on the fifty-​yard line at football games.33 My suggestion prompted some pushback from my secularist friends. But my point here is the following. The scary type of full-​fledged Christian nationalism asserts that Christianity should be an established state religion, and that non-​ Christians should not be free to exercise their religious beliefs. In other words, full-​throated Christian nationalism would reject the establishment clause,

32 33

“Most Republicans Support Declaring the United States a Christian Nation” Politico, Sept. 21, 2022, https://​www​.polit​ico​.com​/news​/magaz​ine​/2022​/09​/21​/most​-repu​blic​ans​-supp​ ort​-declar​ing​-the​-uni​ted​-sta​tes​-a​-christ​ian​-nat​ion​-00057​736, accessed March 10, 2023. Andrew Fiala, “Why the Kennedy v. Bremerton scotus ruling empowers secular defenders of religious liberty” July 5, 2022, https://​andr​ewfi​ala​.com​/why​-the​-kenn​edy​-v​-bremer​ ton​-sco​tus​-rul​ing​-empow​ers​-secu​lar​-defend​ers​-of​-religi​ous​-libe​rty​/, accessed August 9, 2024.

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while also severely curtailing the free exercise clause. My goal in making this technical point here is to show how complicated this topic is. It is not helpful when hyperbole fueled by fear of the specter of Christian nationalism enters into this complex conversation. The Bremerton decision does not mean that Christian nationalism has won, since atheists can also avail themselves of the permission granted for the free exercise of religion. And yet, there are concerns and we should be vigilant. Among the concerns we should be vigilant about is the connection between Christian nationalism and white supremacy, and other forms of bigotry. Some claim that the idea of Christian nationalism is code for White supremacy. Amanda Tyler of the Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty has said, “Christian nationalism is more about identity than religion and carries with it assumptions about nativism, white supremacy, authoritarianism, patriarchy, and militarism.”34 It is true that the Trump era has seen the rise of anti-​Semitism, anti-​Black racism, and hostility toward immigrants. It is also true that some of this vitriol is combined with Christian nationalist rhetoric. In their book on the topic, Whitehead and Perry explore the links between white supremacy and Christian nationalism. They explain that the prevailing view among Christian nationalists is that “real Americans are native-​born white Protestants.”35 This idea helps explain racists, anti-​immigrant, and anti-​Catholic sentiment within Christian nationalism. Whitehead and Perry explain further: Some scholars believe endorsing Christian nationalism—​again, particularly for white Americans—​is essentially about white (Christian) supremacy and ethno-​religious exclusion. We argue that Christian nationalism is broader than this—​it also involves conceptions of gender subordination, sexual morality, and authoritarian control more generally—​but it has a powerful influence on Americans’ views about ethnic and religious “others.” Understanding Christian nationalism is essential to understanding recurrent conflicts over immigration, anti-​black prejudice, Islamophobia, anti-​Semitism, and even stigma directed toward atheists.36

34

35 36

“Christian Nationalism Is ‘Single Biggest Threat’ to America’s Religious Freedom: An Interview With Amanda Tyler of the Baptist Joint Committee” Center for American Progress, April 23, 2022, https://​www​.ameri​canp​rogr​ess​.org​/arti​cle​/christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism​-is​-sin​ gle​-bigg​est​-thr​eat​-to​-ameri​cas​-religi​ous​-free​dom​/, accessed March 10, 2023. Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry, Taking America Back for God: Christian Nationalism in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 91. Whitehead and Perry, Taking America Back for God, 92.

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Whitehead and Perry remind us that Christian nationalism can be connected to all kinds of bigotry and hate, directed toward anyone who is not part of the white, Protestant community. And yet, there are non-​White people who affirm ideas associated with Christian nationalism. For example, consider Mark Burns, a Black pastor from South Carolina who has linked his support of Donald Trump to his faith in a kind of Christian nationalism. At a rally for Donald Trump in South Carolina held in February 2024, Burns began a prayer saying, “we’re gonna re-​elect Donald J. Trump because he believes in the name of Jesus Christ.”37 Pastor Burns had said something similar about Trump, as a believer “in the name of Jesus Christ” in the prayer he provided at the Republican National Convention in 2016, where he also declared that the Republican Party was a “a party under God.”38 In another speech he gave at the 2016 Convention, Burns rebuked the Black Lives Matter movement and led the audience in a chant of “all lives matter.”39 In his 2024 rally speech, Burns further explained, “You know Donald J. Trump is one of the greatest things to happen to Christians here in America.” Among the reasons for this offered by Pastor Burns is the fact that Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and that Trump is opposed to transgender ideology. In his prayer Pastor Burns said, “Let us pray, because we’re fighting a demonic force. We’re fighting the real enemy that comes from the gates of hell, led by one of its leaders called Joe Biden and Kamala Harris. We plead the blood of Jesus right now over the life of Donald J. Trump … And we need a leader who is fearless, anointed by God. Donald Trump is anointed by God … to lead this nation and to take this country back, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.”40 We will critically discuss some of the themes that appear in Pastor Burns speech and prayer in what follows, including the idea that leaders are anointed by God and the fear of demonic forces at work in the world. Democrats and folks on the Left, including people of color, say some things that might resonate with Christian nationalists. That Politico survey from 2022 found that 17% of Democrats were in favor of declaring the U.S. a Christian 37

Mark Burns speech at Trump Rally, February 14, 2024, https://​www​.yout​ube​.com​/live​/BV​ -kJqja​oZI?t=​9025s, accessed August 5, 2024. 38 Mark Burns at Republican National Convention, 2016, https://​www​.yout​ube​.com​ /watch?v=​HYx​ip8​-0dzY&t=​4s, accessed August 5, 2024. 39 Mark Burns at Republican National Convention, 2016, https://​www​.pbs​.org​ /newsh​our​/show​/watch​-pas​tor​-mark​-burns​-full​-spe​ech​-rep​ubli​can​-natio​nal​-con​vent​ ion, accessed August 5, 2024. 40 Mark Burns speech at Trump Rally, February 14, 2024, https://​www​.yout​ube​.com​/live​/BV​ -kJqja​oZI?t=​9025s, accessed August 5, 2024.

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nation. And in 2023, the mayor of New York City, Eric Adams, said he did not accept the idea of separation of church and state.41 Adams is Black, and a Democrat. His discussion of religion occurred at an “Interfaith” breakfast and were connect to comments about education and child-​rearing. He said, “when we took prayers out of schools, guns came into schools.” He suggested that we need to “instill” in children “some level of faith and belief.” He continued: “Don’t tell me about no separation of church and state. State is the body. Church is the heart. You take the heart out of the body, the body dies. I can’t separate my belief because I’m an elected official. When I walk, I walk with God. When I talk, I talk with God. When I put policies in place, I put them in with a God-​like approach to them. That’s who I am.” The crowd of assembled clergy and practitioners from various faith traditions applauded. This brief discussion reminds us that Christian nationalism is complex. It is likely that Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, Mayor Eric Adams, Governor Kevin Stitt, and Pastor Mark Burns won’t agree about everything. But there is a relationship between Adams’ disavowal of the separation between church and state, Stitt’s declaration that Oklahoma belongs to Jesus, Greene’s affirmation of Christian nationalism, and Burns’s belief that Trump is anointed by God to fight against demonic forces. One central problem is, I argue, a fundamental misunderstanding of the importance and value of political secularism including the idea of a separation between church and state, and the value and power of the First Amendment’s establishment clause. As we shall see, political secularism views political life in human terms that avoid claims about demonic forces and which rejects the idea that any human leader could be anointed by God. 5

Conclusion

In this chapter I have fleshed out the Christian nationalist claim that secularism is diabolical and shown how this idea shows up in the words and ideas of Christian nationalists. I have also hinted at a serious problem for advocates of Christian nationalism, which is found in the fact of diversity and the importance of the secular principle of religious liberty among the founders of this country. We further considered how Christian nationalism may be a reaction to the bold secularization hypothesis and the demographic fact that religion is 41

Mayor Eric Adams, Interfaith Breakfast 2023, https://​www​.nyc​.gov​/off​ice​-of​-the​-mayor​ /news​/139​-23​/tra​nscr​ipt​-mayor​-adams​-hosts​- deliv​ers​-rema​rks​-int​erfa​ith​-breakf​ast, accessed March 10, 2023.

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declining. It may seem natural for religious people to see this as the work of the devil. The specter of Christian nationalism can be understood as a post-​secular backlash against the impending decline of religion in the United States. In conclusion, let’s return to the problem posed by Christian nationalism and how it connects to the paradox of secularism. Let’s recall a sentence from Wolfe’s 2022 book, The Case for Christian Nationalism: “A Christian nation that is true to itself will unashamedly and confidently assert Christian supremacy over the land.”42 The rhetoric here discloses the problem. Wolfe claims that the U.S. is truly a Christian nation—​and that it always has been such. He calls upon his Christian nationalist brethren to affirm this truth and not be ashamed of it. This discussion of shame can be understood as part of the backlash against critical race theory and other efforts to offer a critical history of the United States that points out the difficult heritage of slavery and Native American genocide. The Christian nationalists are tired of being ashamed of the Christian heritage that they affirm. And then Wolfe suggests that Christians should confidently assert Christian supremacy over the land. This is a very provocative statement. Christian political supremacism would seemingly seek either to convert, exclude, or eradicate non-​Christians. Christian supremacism is not “tolerant” and does not seem to agree that non-​Christians should be tolerated. This includes indigenous religions, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, as well as atheists and secular humanists. Again, the most significant threat, from the vantage point of Christian nationalism, appears to be the growth of secularism as worldview, that is, the loss of religious faith among the people. Wolfe explains in his book that one significant problem is that what he calls “secularism” appears to tolerate public expression of false religious ideas, which are spiritual harmful. On his view, the state ought not tolerate false religious ideas from being expressed in public. He puts this in the form of the following syllogism.43 (1) Any outward action that has the potential to cause harm to others is rightfully subject to civil restraint or punishment (in principle). (2) External false religion has the potential to cause harm to others. (3) Therefore, external false religion is rightfully subject to civil restraint or punishment. This argument appears to allow for the restraint and punishment of any expression of false religious ideas. From a Christian nationalist vantage point this would appear to mean the exclusion and punishment of un-​Christian or 42 43

Stephen Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism (Moscow, ID, Canon Press: 2022), 240–​41. Wolfe, 361.

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anti-​Christian ideas, which would seemingly include Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and so on, including atheism. Wolfe’s point here is to focus on the question of “harm.” He suggests that it is harmful to people spiritually when they are exposed to false religious ideas. And so, to protect Christians from that spiritual harm, he suggests false religion be excluded. Said differently Wolfe’s idea is that there is something pernicious about political secularism (which allows freedom of belief) insofar as it tends to allow spiritually harmful ideas to be disseminated and contributes (in my terms) to the secularization hypothesis (that is, to the decline of Christian faith). Wolfe’s solution is to shut down the freedom of thought that is an essential feature of political secularism. Wolfe would, apparently, eliminate the First Amendment in the name of protecting the Christian faith. Again, you may think I am exaggerating. But the implications of this take us back to a time when atheists were persecuted, when religious minorities were ghettoized, and when religious rules were imposed across society, severely curtailing the practice of religious liberty. And here you can see why defenders of secularism ought to be outraged at this kind of Christian nationalism. You might even suspect that Jefferson, Adams, and Washington would be rolling over in their graves if they learned that some Americans thought that it would be a good idea to become more intolerant, as Rev. Franklin Graham put it (in the speech quoted early on this chapter). But—​and here is the problem—​is it intolerant to want to exclude such expressions of intolerance? Note that secularists might respond with a syllogism of their own, arguing that Christian nationalism is “harmful” and can justifiably be subject to restraint or punishment. But we might also note that this drastic conclusion would only be necessary if we were dealing with a potent political force that actually sought to overturn the secular status quo. If Christian nationalism merely remains the grumpy ranting of a dying breed, we might conclude that it is not genuinely harmful. Said differently, if Christian nationalism is merely a spectral ghost haunting the secular world, then we can safely ignore it. But if that ghost were to become more solid, obtaining political power, and seeking actively to subvert secular norms, then a more drastic response might be necessary. But note, that if secular systems ever took such action and actively excluded Christian nationalism, we would end up with the problem I’ve called the paradox of secularism. And surely, if they were actively excluded from the conversation, Christian nationalists would cry “foul!” and reiterate their claim that secularism is diabolical and anti-​Christian.

­c hapter 4

God Is Not a Tyrant: A Theological Argument against Christian Nationalism Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s. Jesus (Matthew 23:21)

∵ In this chapter, I consider some theological questions raised by Christian nationalism. What kind of religion is advocated by Christian nationalism? And how should we understand the idea in relation to other interpretations of Christianity? As I explained in the first chapter, Christian nationalism can be distilled into three basic ideas: 1. A theological claim: that the Christian God is concerned to dictate the political structure and religious identity of one’s country. 2. A historical and anthropological claim: that one’s country is and ought to be working on behalf of the Christian faith. 3. A political agenda: that Christians ought to support laws, policies, and candidates that support 1 and 2. In this chapter and the next, I consider the first of these claims: the question of theology. I argue here and in the next chapter that there is a substantial thread in Christian theology that holds that God is not concerned with dictating the terms of political life in the way that Christian nationalists maintain. Along the way in this chapter, we will discuss some of the anthropological issues. And in subsequent chapters, we will look further into the historical, anthropological, and political questions. But I begin here by arguing that God is not a tyrant—​and that he does not expect us to use political and legal structures to enforce conformity and obedience to religious truth. I make this argument as a nonbeliever myself—​but also as a philosopher who studies theology and religion with a sympathetic ear, and as a scholar who has carefully studied the

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_005

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Bible (and who published a book about Jesus’s moral and political teachings).1 To my mind, the best theological arguments are those that resist the politicization of religion that occurs in movements like Christian nationalism. I realize that, given my personal confession, my speculation here might be rejected by some believers as disingenuous and inauthentic. But progressive or liberal theology has a strong theoretical basis, which can also be grounded in the Bible. In other words, I am not merely offering my own idiosyncratic interpretation of Christian theology. Rather, I am reflecting an anti-​tyrannical and even anti-​ political movement within Christian thought. And at any rate, the diversity of Christian interpretations shows us the need for a secular system in which different forms of faith can co-​exist. Christian nationalists suggest that God wants there to be a Christian political authority. This idea risks becoming authoritarian, theocratic, and anti-​ democratic. And as I argue here, the idea is un-​Christian—​or it is un-​Christian according to a progressive or liberal interpretation of Christianity. This interpretation can be found among theologians who emphasize a loving God and the importance of human freedom. It also fits with a kind of Christian theology that is skeptical of the way that institutionalized religions and politicized churches tend to denigrate the majesty and mystery of the divine, turning God into a political idol. We can find this skepticism in the work of Christian anarchists such as Tolstoy and Ellul, in the critique of Christendom that is found in Kierkegaard, and in the theology of more contemporary thinkers such as Karl Barth and Paul Tillich. I’ll discuss Tillich in the next chapter and turn to Barth and others theologians in Chapter 6. But here let me borrow a phrase from Barth to explain my point. Barth explains at one point that the Christian God is not simply understood in terms of absolute omnipotence or as he puts it “empty, naked sovereignty.”2 Rather, God’s power exists in relation to human freedom and in God’s communion with and love for humanity. From this perspective, God wants humanity to respond to Him with love and freedom as a child of God. Barth put this idea into political effect in his work on the Barmen Declaration—​a document drafted by him and other German theologians in 1934 that rejected the religious perversion of the Nazi regime. The Barmen Declaration stated in its fifth thesis that church and state ought to be kept distinct. And in its fourth thesis it maintained that the church should not be given

1 See Andrew Fiala, What Would Jesus Really Do? The Power and Limits of Jesus’s Moral Teachings (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). 2 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1960), 71.

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over to “special leaders with ruling powers.”3 The warning of the Nazi time is worth considering here. If God is viewed as a kind of empty or naked sovereign power, whose power is wielded by human leaders, we run the risk of the tyrannical idea of God being used to support human tyranny. As opposed to this, secular limitations on church and state can serve to preserve freedom and help to prevent God from transformed into a politicized idol. This progressive or liberal interpretation of Christianity would have been familiar to some of the American founders, such as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and George Washington—​who we discussed briefly in the last chapter. And James Madison, widely regarded as the “father of the Constitution” and the author of the First Amendment, explicitly argued that the Biblical idea of “rendering unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s,” helped to establish the idea separation of church and state. Madison puts it bluntly by stating that with this passage in mind Jesus had stipulated the separation of church and state and that it would thus be wrong to violate that separation by “Joining together what God has put asunder.”4 Madison’s fear was that churches would “encroach” upon the religious liberty of citizens. He further praised a successful campaign to keep the name “Jesus Christ” out of the Constitution of Virginia. He said that inclusion of that name would “profane” that holy name and would have ended up “abridging the natural and equal rights of all men, in defiance of his [that is, Jesus’s] own declaration that his Kingdom was not of this World.”5 For Madison, genuine worship of God is based on freedom of conscience. God Himself does not want us to be forced to obey or worship Him. Madison explains in another text: Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not against man: To God, therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered.6 3 Barmen Declaration (1934), https://​creed​sand​conf​essi​ons​.org​/bar​men​-decl​arat​ion​.html, accessed July 10, 2024. For another translation see Barmen Declaration (1934), https://​www​ .ucc​.org​/bel​iefs​_bar​men​-decl​arat​ion​/, accessed October 23, 2023. 4 James Madison, Detached Memoranda (1820), https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​ nts​/Madi​son​/04​-01​-02​-0549, accessed January 6, 2024. 5 James Madison, Detached Memoranda (1820), https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​ nts​/Madi​son​/04​-01​-02​-0549, accessed January 6, 2024. 6 James Madison, “Memorial and Remonstrances against Religious Assessments (1785),” https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Madi​son​/01​-08​-02​-0163, accessed January 6, 2024.

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This language of “rendering” an account to God is again suggestive of the passage about Caesar. On this view, God is not a kind of tyrant to whom we must render piety and obedience. Nor are churches and states supposed to have that kind of tyrannical power. Rather, when it comes to piety and worship, religious liberty is paramount. Stated bluntly, the liberal or progressive interpretation of Christianity holds that Christ is not Caesar. At the time of the New Testament, Caesar was the Lord (kyrios) of the world with absolute dominion (kyriotes), who demanded sycophantic worship.7 He was a man who was deified. His deification was related to his absolute, tyrannical power, which included the power to kill. Caesar created peace (the Pax Romana) based upon the demands of obedience and conformity. On the progressive interpretation of Christianity, the Christian story is oriented around a different theory of lordship, authority, and theology. This is what we’ll discuss in the present chapter. Progressive Christianity also tends to emphasize virtues such as humility, love, mercy, and nonviolence. We will turn to that in the next chapter. To say that Jesus is Lord is not only to suggest that there is another kingdom (the kingdom of God—​which is “not of this world”) but it is also to imagine a different kind of lordship. The story is not of a man who became God; rather, it is the story of a God who became man and died on the cross. To say that God is not a tyrant is to emphasize the importance of the image of God as love (1 John 4). The dominion of Caesar is tyrannical. It is based on power, violence, and fear. The kingdom of God is different: it is based on love, sacrifice, forgiveness, and freedom. On this interpretation of Christian theology, God does not want sycophantic worship or fearful obedience; rather, genuine piety consists in freely loving the God who loves us. This idea is captured in the verse: “We love because He loved us first” (1 John 4:19). Of course, Christians disagree about this. Not that they disagree substantially about the importance of love or that there is a God or that Jesus is His son (although as we mentioned, some of the Founders themselves were skeptical about the divinity of Christ). Rather, they disagree about what all of this means, including about the image of God—​and the proper way to worship, serve, and love God. History shows that Christians disagree among themselves about the theological, historical, anthropological, and political implications of the Christian tradition.

7 See essays collected in Scot McKnight and Joseph B. Modica, eds., Jesus Is Lord, Caesar Is Not: Evaluating Empire in New Testament Studies (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013).

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The Christian nationalists have a more aggressive or assertive idea based on the claim that worship and the state should be organized around conformity and obedience, while progressive Christians have a more mellow or meek approach that conceives of God and His relation to humanity in different terms. This internal disagreement provides a good reason to embrace secular political systems, which allow for peaceful co-​existence among Christians (as well as among Christian believers and others, including the nonreligious). The question of Christian political theology has long been a focal point of discussion among Christians. Does Christianity require the creation of a Christian nation? Or is Christian theology and anthropology indifferent to politics? We might also ask whether Christian theology supports the idea of a democratic and secular system of government that is neutral among religions. As I argue here the progressive interpretation of Christian theology is that God is “indifferent” to the organization of political life. And as I put it here, God is not a tyrant and does not want humans to use the tyrannical power of the state to enforce conformity to religious orthodoxy. Our focal point here is Christian theology, but we can also trace this idea back beyond Christian theology to ideas that are found in Plato’s discussion of God and ethics as we shall see in what follows. The Western philosophical and theological tradition includes a complex discussion of the question of whether God is a tyrant and whether He expects human beings to submit to His will, to institute political power in the name of God, and to establish a state and society that is not neutral among religions. And while Plato has something to offer in this conversation, there are also resources to support this idea found in ancient Hebrew texts. The Old Testament (as Christians call it) begins with a political theology that is theocratic. God is the “king” of ancient Israel. He is the lawgiver of a chosen people, who has a special relationship with human prophets and kings. He even commands the army and helps the Israelites wage war. As Flavius Josephus, the ancient Jewish historian explains: Some legislators have permitted their governments to be under monarchies: others put them under oligarchies: and others under a republican form. But our legislator had no regard to any of these forms: but he ordained our government to be, what, by a strained expression, may be termed a Theocracy.8

8 Flavius Josephus, Against Apion, Book ii, para. 17, https://​penel​ope​.uchic​ago​.edu​/josep​ hus​/apion​-2​.html#EndN​ote​_​Apio​n​_2​.9a, accessed April 25, 2023.

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The supposition of this theocracy was that God was good and that obedience to God was also good, in other words that God was not a tyrant, even though He ruled through monarchs who possessed concentrated power and who might be called benevolent despots. When these benevolent despots mis-​ruled they became tyrannical and were criticized by prophets who accused them of abusing their power. Josephus, for example, singles out Nimrod (the great grandson of Noah) as a tyrant, describing his tyranny as involving an effort to turn the people away from God.9 Of course, our interest here is not ancient Jewish views of theology or politics but, rather, Christian nationalism. And as is well-​known, Christianity developed as an alternative interpretation to the ancient Hebrew tradition. Among the most important points to make here is that Jesus is viewed as a king: the “king of kings” and “lord of lords” (1 Tim. 6:15) and as a new David. But Jesus also says that his kingdom is “not of this world” (John 18:36). And Jesus does not exercise political power; rather, he submits to the power of the Romans and Jews in Jerusalem. Furthermore, the Kingdom of God, as imagined by Jesus appears to be a kingdom of love, which is an idea that seems far from the story of power and domination, worship and obedience that is typical of tyranny. Progressive Christianity emphasizes love, the other-​worldly kingdom of God, and a notion of God that is anti-​tyrannical. Christian nationalism tends to disagree with some or all of this description of God and His kingdom. Of course, Christian nationalists do not view God as a malign tyrant—​since God is good and just. But they do tend to think in terms of theocracy and benevolent despotism. As we’ll see, this idea is opposed by another vision of the divine, which seems to worry that even benevolent despotism points in the direction of tyranny. 1

Jesus Is Not Caesar

The progressive interpretation of Christianity can be grounded in key texts in the New Testament. While the Old Testament is oriented toward a theocracy based in the Temple in Jerusalem and the lineage of Solomon and David, the New Testament offers a different idea. As Jesus suggests, he is not a new Caesar or a secular king. Rather, he represents a transformed notion of piety and power. One important source is found in the episode in which Pilate asks Jesus

9 Flavius Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book i, Chapter 4, https://​penel​ope​.uchic​ago​.edu​ /josep​hus​/ant​-1​.html, accessed April 25, 2023.

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whether he is the king of the Jews. Jesus replies: “My kingship is not of this world; if my kingship were of this world, my servants would fight, that I might not be handed over to the Jews; but my kingship is not from this world” (John 18:36). I discuss this in more detail in my book on Jesus, where I conclude that the Biblical texts are inconclusive with regard to the theological-​political question.10 This conclusion helps us make sense of the fact that there are deep disagreements among Christians about the proper answer to this question. The Christian tradition includes both Christian anarchists such as Tolstoy or Ellul and state-​centric Christians who follow Augustine or Dante. Christians themselves disagree about the question of whether God wants Christians to create a Christian state. And this disagreement follows from the fact that in the Bible key texts are ambiguous, unclear, and silent on the question. As I explained in my Jesus book, the biography of Jesus ends with Jesus in direct confrontation with political power. We see this in all four Gospels. But when asked if he is “king of the Jews,” he does not answer directly. This could have been an opportunity for Jesus to assert his power, glory, and majesty—​even to name himself as a new Caesar. But it is remarkable that he does not do this. Jesus’s silence here is instructive for understanding the relationship between Christianity and political power—​at least for progressive Christianity. Jesus is meek, mild, humble, loving, and forgiving. He does not call for a rebellion or an insurrection. He does not try to escape. He does not even condemn Pilate and the Roman and Jewish authorities. Really, there is a mystery here that is often overlooked, but we do not know exactly what Jesus thinks about political power—​since he never says. This unspoken mystery does not prevent other Christians from claiming what Christian political authority would look like. But Christians themselves disagree about this, which is one reason that we need a neutral political system that does not pick sides in this theological question. Let’s pursue the thread of progressive Christianity a bit further and consider a religious argument that offers an anti-​political, anti-​national, and anti-​ tyrannical interpretation of Christianity. This argument does not mean that God is indifferent to human affairs or to the religious implications of political life. Rather, the point is that there are resources in the Christian theological tradition that provide a strong argument against Christian nationalism. This progressive version of Christianity emphasizes pacific values like love, toleration, mercy, forgiveness, and sacrifice. It aims at a conversion of the heart rather than forced conformity and obedience to a Christian state or tyrant.

10

Andrew Fiala, What Would Jesus Really Do? The Power and Limits of Jesus’s Moral Teachings (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007).

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As I’ll explain in subsequent chapters, other arguments can be provided—​ from the vantage point of non-​Christian and atheistic theorizing. But in the present chapters, we are considering details of the Bible and Christian theology in order to show that the effort to create state-​centered and nationalistic Christianity would be rejected on theological and Biblical grounds by progressive Christians. One rather cheeky way of putting this is to ask whether God is a tyrant and whether He wants human beings to have tyrannical power over one another, using that kind of authority in order to establish a religious state that executes God’s will on earth. It is easy to see that this is a very large question of theology, which we cannot address in every detail in this chapter. My goal here is to ask these cheeky questions—​Is God a tyrant; and does He want us to use tyrannical political power in His name?—​in order to formulate a Christian argument against Christian nationalism. Progressive Christianity maintains that we should not conceive of God as a tyrant. From this it follows that it is wrong to think that God would want human beings to use political power to establish some kind of religious nation-​state. There is a strong theological argument against Christian nationalism that can be derived from the claim that God is a not a tyrant or even a benevolent despot, and that Christians are wrong to suppose that the state ought to be used to enforce Christian faith. Christian piety and love, from the vantage point of progressive Christianity, is oriented toward loving God and loving the neighbor. It is not focused on centralized political authority, external conformity, or obedience to the will of a tyrant—​or a tyrannical God. The Christian version of an anti-​tyrannical God transforms the idea of the “Lord” into a humble servant who is ultimately slaughtered as a sacrificial lamb to wash away the sins of humanity. Rather than a tyrant, this God is a god who loves, bleeds, and dies on a cross. Of course, that thesis about Christian theology appears to run counter to a more “traditional” or “conservative” view of church-​state relations. One traditional notion of sovereignty associated with Augustine, Dante, and others holds that the state has a kind of divine authorization, and that political authority is legitimate to the extent that the state executes God’s will.11 A frequently cited Christian source for this idea is Paul’s letter to the Romans (13:1) where Paul says “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God.” From this idea that political authority is 11

I discuss sovereignty and related issues in more detail in Andrew Fiala, “Sovereignty” in Andrew Fiala, ed., Bloomsbury Companion to Political Philosophy (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).

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established by God, it is easy to see why someone like Dante would suggest during the Christian Middle Ages (in his essay “On World Government”) that a world government under a unified Christian monarchy is required, because God is the monarchical ruler of the universe, and human government should be established in imitation and support of the God-​governed hierarchy. But Christianity includes a counter-​narrative in which the two “cities” discussed by Augustine are kept distinct: the city of God and the city of man. Indeed, on Augustine’s account, one can address the ethical and political concerns of the city of man (the secular) somewhat independently of the ethical and theological concerns of human souls and the church. Some commentators have suggested that Augustine’s political theology has some implicit connection with modern secular ideas.12 But, of course, Augustine was writing in Rome under the emperor and the form of political life that we know as modern democratic secularism was not imaginable for him; and Augustine’s focus is on the soul of the emperor. That idea may have some impact on the idea, familiar in contemporary Christian nationalism, that leaders ought to be Christian. But the imperial context of Augustine’s work cannot be ignored: the emperor is a kind of father figure; and Augustine suggests that we should want a good father to rule over his people. Such a patriarchal image of the state does not fit well with contemporary democratic ideas, where the state is a result of a social contract in which human beings share power and legislate together. But this mention of patriarchal power should give us a point of caution and critique of Christian nationalism. Is the idea that rulers should be like good Christian fathers? And is this idea acceptable politically and theologically? We should also note that the idea of God as a good father is part of the anti-​tyrannical interpretation of God: God is not a willful and arrogant tyrant; rather He loves his children. But even if God is a good father, we might wonder whether we should consider any single political ruler to be a benevolent despot. And again, there are warnings in the Biblical texts found in the critique of imperial power, prophetic warnings against bad kings, and Jesus’s effort to direct our attention away from the city of man and back toward the Kingdom of God. This tension between religious and political authority most famously comes to a head in the Reformation. Martin Luther argued that secular authority was distinct from church authority.13 He suggested that “the secular sword” (i.e., the 12

13

Kai Preuß, “The Emperor’s Two Cities: Augustine’s Image of the Good Christian Ruler in De civitate Dei 5.24” in Philip Michael Forness, Alexandra Hasse-​Ungeheuer and Hartmut Leppin, eds., The Good Christian Ruler in the First Millennium: Views from the Wider Mediterranean World in Conversation (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2021, pp. 87–​108). See Martin Luther, “On Secular Authority” (1523) in Luther.

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power of the secular or worldly authorities) is a necessary feature of the world since not everyone is a Christian. As he put it, “the secular Sword cannot possibly find any work to do among Christians.” And more poetically, “A good tree needs no teaching and no law in order for it to bear good fruit; it is its nature to do so without teaching or law.” Of course, on this view non-​Christians are not good trees and do not bear good fruit, which is why they need secular power over them. Luther also recognizes that secular powers can be tyrannical and serve bad purposes. But Luther was also worried that the Church in Rome had itself become tyrannical, and he thought that the secular powers outside of Rome could legitimately resist the Roman Catholic Church. The real-​world political struggles of the Reformation made clear the stakes of this dispute and the substantial problem that occurs in thinking about political authority. If the state is not good, then what? And what makes us think that even a self-​proclaimed “Christian nation” would be a good nation? In Luther’s time, the problem was that the Christian authorities disputed among themselves. Luther also thought it would be tyrannical for the state to impose religious belief, and that conscientious refusal to such tyrannical imposition might be justifiable. Of course, Luther is a transitional figure in this conversation, who points toward a deep problem in thinking about the source of sovereignty. After Luther, in the thinking of Locke and other political theorists in the modern world, the story changes to the social contract theory. This theory eventually evolved in an even more secular direction, which holds that the state should be neutral among religious perspectives. It is easy to see how such a modern secular idea of the state might develop out of the wars of religion of the Reformation. A key idea in this development is the idea that God is not a tyrant who needs secular authorities to impose his will on the world. And since human beings disagree about theology and religion, it would be tyrannical for the state to impose an account of religion on diverse religious believers. 2

The Christian Nationalist Warning about Secular Tyranny

Of course, Christian nationalists have a different idea. And it often seems as if the Christian nationalist movement is ignorant of (or indifferent to) much of the history of Western political thought and theology, suggesting as they do that we ought to return to a more robust connection between church and state. The Christian nationalists seem ignorant of (or indifferent) to the history of secularism, which is in the Christian West a development that is connected with the theological and political struggles of the Reformation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some Christians see secularism as tyrannical

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and anti-​religious. Stephen Wolfe said (in a passage I quoted at length in a prior chapter), “no set of circumstances would permit a civil ruler justly to destroy true religion, whether by secularization or by replacing it with heresy, infidelity, or paganism. Such actions, in themselves make the civil ruler a tyrant.”14 Martin Luther might agree. But after Luther and the struggles of the Reformation, the solution cannot simply be to return to a church-​state complex by way of an establishment of religion. Rather, the modern secular solution is to keep religious and political authority distinct. And other Christian theologians and political thinkers—​including the Founders of the United States—​offer a different interpretation of tyranny, freedom of religion, and the importance of secular democracy. These thinkers maintain that a theocracy in which religious orthodoxy is enforced by the establishment of a political religion would be tyrannical. The argument in favor of secularism is anti-​tyrannical in this sense. The theological and political point of emphasis in the pro-​secular argument is that God is not a tyrant, and that tyrannical political power should not be used to enforce religious orthodoxy. The basic theological idea behind secular political limits on power has been explained by a wide range of authors. Most recently, Carter Heyward has explained: “One of the most significant and prescient values enshrined by the founders of the nation was that the American colonies would have no official religion … All Americans could live free of religious tyranny because their government would have no interest or say in their spiritual life. This was spelled out in the establishment clause of the First Amendment.”15 My goal here is to unpack this idea—​that God is not a tyrant who does not want the state to employ tyrannical power in defense of religious orthodoxy—​ and to show how this Christian theological idea can be used to argue in support of secularism and against Christian nationalism. My thesis here is that secularism is anti-​tyrannical, despite the claim made by Wolfe and other Christian nationalists who maintain that it is secularism that is tyrannical. In formulating the dispute in this way, we can see how it points in the direction of the paradox of secularism. Who is right in this dispute: the anti-​tyrannical secularist or the proponent of Christian nationalism who views secularism as tyrannical? And can anti-​tyrannical secularism tolerate those Christian nationalists who fundamentally disagree and who accus secularism of being tyrannical? I am articulating this dispute in these terms in part because the frame of tyranny builds upon my other work on tyranny. In my book, Tyranny from 14 Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism, p. 338. 15 Carter Heyward, The Seven Deadly Sins of White Christian Nationalism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023), 21.

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Plato to Trump, I have examined this in detail, explaining the importance of tyranny as a concept in Greek and Christian though—​including among the American Founders.16 Indeed, the American Founders were acutely aware of the problem of tyranny as articulated in the ancient tradition. And they constructed the Constitution as a safeguard against tyranny. This includes the way that religion is systematically excluded from the Constitution, including in the First Amendment. The tradition that extends from Plato to James Madison and Thomas Jefferson was worried that political life degenerates when human beings think that God is a tyrant, when these humans aspire to have the kind of tyrannical power they associate with God, and when the political system does not contain sufficient safeguards to prevent the unholy conjunction of tyrannical political and religious power. Of course, there is a counter-​narrative to this story, which is told by Christian nationalists and which has connections to the Trump political movement. Norman Vincent Peale, who was one of Donald Trump’s spiritual advisors, once said, “Unless we are governed by God, we shall be ruled by tyrants.”17 This idea may seem innocuous, as a claim of general spirituality which seems to hold that political power should be restrained and directed by Christian piety. But on a closer reading, this comes to sound suspiciously like a kind of anti-​ secular, Christian nationalist talking point. And indeed, it is possible to link Peale’s theology to the form of Christian nationalism that made its appearance during the Cold War in the middle of the 20th Century. Peale worked with Billy Graham and others in a dedicated movement of the 1950’s that successfully campaigned to put the motto “In God We Trust” on American currency, and to add “one nation under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance.18 This political form of Christian piety was even tied, in Peale’s theology, to a forward-​leaning emphasis on “Christian world conquest.”19 We might interpret this as a Cold War relic. But anti-​Communist and anti-​secularist ideas continue to blend together in contemporary Christian nationalism, as we saw in the claim made by Billy Graham’s son, Franklin Graham (quoted in a previous chapter): “There’s no difference between secularism and communism. They’re both godless. Both are 16 17

Andrew Fiala, Tyranny From Plato to Trump (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022). Norman Vincent Peale, “There Are Glorious Days Ahead,” Rotarian, November 1950, 6; quoted and discussed in Fiala, Tyranny from Plato to Trump, p. 33. 18 See: Paul Matzco, “The Pastor Who Helps Explain Donald Trump” The Gospel Coalition, April 19, 2017, https://​www​.the​gosp​elco​alit​ion​.org​/revi​ews​/surge​-piety​-nor​man​-vinc​ ent​-peale​/, accessed April 10, 2023; and Christopher Lane, Surge of Piety: Norman Vincent Peale and the Remaking of American Religious Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), Chapter 4. 19 Lane, Surge of Piety, pp. 80–​82.

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godless. And godless secularism is now taking control of our governments.”20 Franklin Graham has also warned against the tyranny of secularism and communism, while invoking a Christian nationalist interpretation of American history: Christians need to be vigilant on our watch to pray, speak the truth, and resist the slippery slope towards communism. I thank God for America. Our country was founded upon Biblical principles, and the very ideas of political freedom that guided our Founding Fathers came from the pages of the Bible. Though they were not perfect men, the Founders saw Christianity and the Word of God as the bedrock of this new nation. I believe they would be grieved if they could see how far we have strayed and how openly sin is accepted and even celebrated. The United States has been a guardian of liberty for the world for many years—​a place where rights like freedom of religion and speech were protected. Today, however, a new tyranny is at work to erode these freedoms, rewrite our history, and take this nation in the opposite direction.21 This “new tyranny” that Graham is referring to indicates the fault lines in this debate. Graham invokes religious liberty and freedom of speech, linking them to Christian theology. But he suggests that the secularism of the 21st Century has become anti-​religious and tyrannical. As mentioned, this warning about the new tyranny of anti-​religious secularism is part of the general tide of Trumpism. This may seem like an exaggeration. But consider a speech that Trump’s Attorney General William Barr gave at Notre Dame in 2019, where he unleashed a diatribe against secularism, which he (mistakenly on my account) described as anti-​religious and relativistic.22 And indeed, Barr suggested that moral relativism becomes a form of tyranny:

20 “Franklin Graham Denounces Same-​ Sex Marriage, Secularism From Montgomery Capital Steps,” Souther Poverty Law Center, April 14, 2016, https://​www​.splcen​ter​.org​ /hatewa​tch​/2016​/04​/14​/rever​end​-frank​lin​-gra​ham​-denoun​ces​-same​-sex​-marri​age​-sec​ ular​ism​-mon​tgom​ery​-capi​tol​-steps, accessed April 10, 2023. 21 Franklin Graham, “American Freedom is being Defeated from Within” https://​bill​ygra​ ham​.org​/story​/frank​lin​-gra​ham​-ameri​can​-free​dom​-is​-being​-defea​ted​-from​-wit​hin​/, June 29, 2021, accessed April 11, 2023. 22 William Barr, “Address on Religious Liberty to the Law School and the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame, October 11, 2019, https://​www​.ameri​ canr​heto​ric​.com​/speec​hes​/willi​amba​rrno​tred​ame​.htm, accessed April 11, 2023.

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Unless you had some effective restraint, you end up with something equally dangerous—​licentiousness, the unbridled pursuit of personal appetites at the expense of the common good. This is just another form of tyranny—​where the individual is enslaved by his appetites, and the possibility of any healthy community life crumbles. This idea reflects the views of Plato and others in the Western tradition, who warned that tyrants are creatures of appetite, as I explained in much more detail in Tyranny from Plato to Trump. The description of tyranny in terms of appetite and virtue is important. But the moral and psychological question is different from the political question. Plato suggested that the solution to the problem of tyranny was for a philosopher-​king (a benevolent despot) to rule over the land and institute a moral order. This is also an idea found in Medieval Christian thought and in the thinking of other theocrats who suggest that the divine law ought to be the foundation of the political order. From this standpoint, secularism—​and its permissive, neutral, inclusive, and tolerant stance toward moral and religious disagreement—​is the enemy of the moral order. This point was made by Barr in his speech. He called out “militant secularists” who he claims were seeking to “destroy the traditional moral order.” He said, “The problem is not that religion is being forced on others. The problem is that irreligion is being forced, secular values are being forced, on people of faith. This reminds me of the way Roman emperors just couldn’t leave the minority of Christians in the empire alone.” We can see the problem here, as Barr suggests that proponents of secularism are like those tyrannical Roman emperors who persecuted Christians. And asserting his role as Attorney General, Barr said he would work to prevent this: We must be vigilant to resist efforts by forces of secularization to drive religious viewpoints from the public square, and to impinge upon our exercise of our faith. I can assure you that as long as I am Attorney General, the Department of Justice will be at the forefront of this effort, ready to fight for the most cherished of all our American liberties: The freedom to live according to our faith. And so, we see the problem. Is contemporary secularism a kind of tyrannical imposition that is anti-​religious and goes against God, persecuting believers? Or are those who believe that God wants this to be a Christian nation the real advocates of tyranny? This way of formulating the problem points us toward the theological question: is God a tyrant? Diverging answers to these questions

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point toward the need for secular systems that allow for disagreement among Christians about these things. 3

The Problem of Tyranny

There is a long line of inquiry in the Western tradition that wonders whether God is a tyrant and also whether God intends for a tyrant to carry out His will on earth. Those who oppose tyranny in the political realm have often been forced to confront this theological problem, since tyrants and their supporters often link their political aspirations to a perniciously tyrannical theology. Some opponents of tyranny have gone so far as to embrace atheism in their rebellion against the idea that God is a tyrant. Other revolutionaries, such as Thomas Jefferson, believe that in opposing tyranny, they are making manifest God’s love of liberty and divine opposition to authoritarian rule. In response, defenders of tyranny may maintain that the strong-​man they support is the manifestation of God’s will, His strength, and His desire for unified authoritarian power. But the anti-​tyrannical argument maintains that if there is a God, He is not a tyrant, He does not love tyrants, and human beings should not aspire to have tyrannical power. The discussion of tyranny and theology has ancient roots. Plato focused on the theological problem of tyranny in a number of places, suggesting that the tyrant’s desire for God-​like power is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of the divine. The issue recurs throughout the Western tradition in Christian theology. It was also a concern for the founders of the United States. The issue has returned recently during an era of rising authoritarianism manifest in the United States with the rise of Donald Trump and other forms of resurgent authoritarianism around the globe. A decade ago, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox church called Vladimir Putin, “God’s miracle,” and a movement called “God’s Will,” hoped that Putin would use his power to save Christianity.23 In the U.S., Rick Perry (Trump’s Secretary of Energy) was among a number of public figures who suggested that Trump’s election was God’s will.24 Trump himself happily re-​tweeted a comment about himself that said 23 24

“Why Orthodox Christians are losing faith in Putin” Politico (Dec. 24, 2019): https://​www​ .polit​ico​.eu​/arti​cle​/russ​ian​-ortho​dox​-chr​isti​ans​-lose​-faith​-in​-vladi​mir​-putin​/​. Quoted in “About a Third in U.S. See God’s Hand in Presidential Elections, but Fewer Say God Picks Winners Based on Policies,” Pew Center (March 12, 2020): https://​www​ .pewr​esea​rch​.org​/fact​-tank​/2020​/03​/12​/about​-a​-third​-in​-u​-s​-see​-gods​-hand​-in​-presi​dent​ ial​-electi​ons​-but​-fewer​-say​-god​-picks​-winn​ers​-based​-on​-polic​ies​/​.

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he was the “King of Israel” and the “second coming of God.”25 A much more detailed argument would be required to say that Trump or Putin is actually a tyrant.26 But these examples point toward the more general problem of the link between a certain form of theology and authoritarian politics. There have been a number of efforts to diagnose the problem of resurgent authoritarianism in terms of racial resentment, social and economic dislocation, and so on. While these psychological and social explanations of authoritarianism are important, it is also useful to consider rising authoritarianism as a theological problem. Katherine Stewart, for example, concludes that the rising tide of Christian nationalism in the United States is explained in social and economic terms. She writes, “Reactionary authoritarianism doesn’t come out of nowhere. It draws much of its destructive energy from social and economic injustices that leave a few with too much power and many others with too little hope.”27 This anthropological explanatory approach is useful. However, it is also useful to understand the role of theology in what she calls “reactionary authoritarianism.” I focus here on what I call the “theological problem of tyranny,” arguing that this problem has deep historical roots, that it has long been part of theological speculation, and that this problem was a central concern for revolutionaries in the modern era, who were in favor of creating secular democracies. My method in the present chapter is historical, as the reader will have no doubt discerned. The Christian tradition involves a long conversation about the focal claims of Christian nationalism. The theological problem of tyranny was an important question for key figures in the Western tradition including Plato, Augustine, Luther, Milton, Locke, Kant, Leibniz, Knox, Calvin, and the American founders, such as Jefferson and Adams. It was also a concern for Emerson, Frederick Douglass, as well as for more contemporary philosophers and theologians. Obviously, it is not possible to provide a detailed history of this problem in one chapter. My account leaves out some sources and mentions others only in passing. One of my goals is to name the problem and demonstrate its historical importance. Beyond this historical point, I aim to show that those political movements that seek to establish Christianity as a

25

Trump Tweet of August 21, 2019 (available at Trump Twitter Archive: https://​www​.thet​ rump​arch​ive​.com​/)​. Trump’s Twitter account was cancelled so Trump’s original tweets are not available. But Trump Twitter Archive maintains a searchable database of his tweets. 26 I discuss this in greater length in Fiala, Tyranny from Plato to Trump. 27 Katherine Stewart, The Power Worshippers: Inside the Dangerous Rise of Religious Nationalism (New York: Bloomsbury, 2019), 277.

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national religion, or that look for a strong-​man to return a nation to Christian greatness, or solve difficult social problems by instituting Christian morality are not only driven by grievance and resentment, they are also often based upon a theological idea that links authoritarian solutions to the divine will and the tyrannical nature of God. Non-​tyrannical movements—​liberationist, revolutionary, secular, and democratic movements—​often develop from a different conception of theology, and a quite different reading of key Biblical texts. In the political realm, the problem is that tyrants and authoritarian or theocratic governments appear to desire God-​like power here on earth. This tyrannical dream is theological: it is based upon the idea that God is in fact a tyrant who possesses absolute power. Such a conception of God as tyrant has motivated atheists to reject God. This idea has also prompted theologians to propose theodicies explaining why God is not a tyrant. These theological and a-​theological arguments are interesting. But such arguments are only significant if we assume that there is something wrong with tyranny, that is, they only make sense for those who adopt an anti-​tyrannical point of view. Theists can oppose tyranny by arguing that that God is not a tyrant and that He does not love tyrants. This theological solution to the problem of tyranny can also be of use to atheists and anti-​religious thinkers, who can argue that if God is supposed to be a tyrant, then we ought to oppose his tyrannical rule in the name of liberty and justice. And from this, we might conclude that secular and democratic systems of government are best insofar as they promote religious liberty. 4

Conclusion

We have seen in this chapter that there are rival visions of God, of politics, and of the Bible. Christian nationalists tend to agree with Augustine and Dante in thinking that there ought to be a good benevolent patriarchal kind of political system. One extreme version of this idea holds that God is a tyrant who ought to be obeyed—​and that the political system should reflect this hierarchical structure. A less extreme version holds that God is a benevolent despot and that obedience to God is obedience to the moral structure of the universe. From this approach, the political system ought to reflect this theological structure to some degree, with the state acting as a benevolent despot and maintaining a system of order in the world that reflects the divine order of things. But the Biblical texts and theological speculation can also point in a different direction. This progressive interpretation begins from the silence of Jesus in the face of political power and a question of the mystery of what Jesus really expects with regard to political power and national identity. The progressive

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interpretation also emphasizes pacific virtue such as love, mercy, and toleration. Those values do not reflect a tyrannical God or even a benevolent despotism. As we’ll see in a subsequent chapter, it is even possible to derive a kind of Christian anarchism from this interpretation of Christianity. With all of this on the table, we return in conclusion to the need for a neutral political system in which Christian sects can co-​exist. This political system ought to erect a wall of separation between church and state to use a phrase of Thomas Jefferson’s. Jefferson coined that phrase in reply to a letter from the Danbury, Connecticut Baptists. Those Christians explained their progressive or liberal theology to Jefferson as follows: Our Sentiments are uniformly on the side of Religious Liberty—​That Religion is at all times and places a Matter between God and Individuals—​ That no man ought to suffer in Name, person or effects on account of his religious Opinions—​That the legitimate Power of civil Government extends no further than to punish the man who works ill to his neighbor.28 The Danbury Baptists continued by maintaining that the civil magistrate becomes an enemy of religion, law, and good order when he dares to “assume the prerogative of Jehovah and make Laws to govern the Kingdom of Christ.” In replying to this letter, Jefferson said the following: Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.29 This idea of the separation of church and state is supported by a theological vision that holds that worship of God ought to be a matter of free conscience, as James Madison also suggested (as discussed at the outset of this chapter). Another name for this neutral system is secularism. Political secularism allows 28 29

To Thomas Jefferson from the Danbury, ct Baptist Church (1801), https://​found​ers​.archi​ ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​son​/01​-35​-02​-0331, accessed January 6, 2024. Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists, 1802, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​ nts​/Jeffer​son​/01​-36​-02​-0152​-0006, accessed January 6, 2024.

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Christians to live in peace despite their differences. Of course, as we’ve noted throughout, there remains an open question about whether those who call for Christian nationalism can in fact co-​exist with other Christians who disagree, and whether there is room within the secular system for those who think that Christian rulers ought to rule.

­c hapter 5

The Hubris of Christian Nationalism: A Christian Argument for Humility and Nonviolence You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you. Jesus (Matthew 5: 43–​44)

∵ One of the most significant concerns that arise in thinking about Christian nationalism is the problem of violence. There may be some reason to worry about actual violence being employed by Christian nationalists. But we ought to be careful to avoid hyperbole here. I mentioned previously that there have been examples of violence employed by Christian nationalists, including when lone gunmen have attacked religious minorities. And it is not uncommon to see God connected with guns in T-​shirts and flags, including for example, in the slogan “God, Guns, and Trump” that has shown up on the campaign trail. Of equal concern here are the results of a survey from prri and the Brookings Institute published in 2023, which found that 40% of those who agree with the basic outlines of Christian nationalism also agreed with the claim, “Because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country.”1 This hypothetical support for violence is alarming. The survey also shows that adherents of Christian nationalism are more likely to have actually used violence in the past—​and to think that their use of violence was justified. But to be fair, the same survey shows that the percentage of those who admitted to actually using violence in the past was in single digits. Furthermore, it is one thing to talk about violence or to engage in personal violence—​and another to organize and engage in a sustained campaign of political violence. Organized political violence is much 1 prri/​Brookings, A Christian Nation? Understanding the Threat of Christian Nationalism to American Democracy and Culture (2023), p. 27, https://​www​.prri​.org​/wp​-cont​ent​/uplo​ ads​/2023​/02​/PRRI​-Jan​-2023​-Christ​ian​-Nati​onal​ism​-Final​.pdf, accessed July 11, 2024.

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_006

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more complicated. And in the U.S., at least, there is a law enforcement apparatus that will (hopefully) prevent widespread revolutionary violence. Of course, there has been at least one significant instance of organized violence that can be linked to Christian nationalism: the insurrectionary violence of January 6, 2021. A number of commentators have linked the January 6 riot at the U.S. Capitol to Christian nationalism. Of course, the primary motivation of that violent day was to prevent the U.S. Congress from certifying the 2020 election. It was not an attempt to overthrow the government and institute a Christian government. Andrew Seidel, a First Amendment attorney from the Freedom from Religion Foundation, testified in Congress about the role of Christian nationalism in the riots and insurrectionary violence of January 6, 2021. Seidel said: For a long time, Christian Nationalism was treated as a historical debate. Historians on one side, propagandists and politicians on the other. But on January 6th, Christian Nationalism ripped off its mask, showing that it is not a scholarly debate about how America was founded, but a violent, exclusionary movement bent on seizing power here and now.2 But we must be careful here in over-​generalizing. Not every person involved in January 6 was a Christian nationalist. Not every Christian nationalist agreed with the focus or the tactics of the January 6 riot. And the riot failed, with many of the rioters ending up in jail. Nonetheless, this precedent of organized political violence involving at least some Christian nationalists does exist, along with further risk due to the fact that President Trump pardoned the January 6 rioters on the first day of his second term in office. At any rate, my goal in the present chapter is not to chronicle or dissect examples of violence. Nor frankly am I interested in the psychology of individuals who engage in violence or who support the idea of violence being used in pursuit of Christian ideology. Rather, I am primarily interested in the theological question of violence and the vision of God and interpretation of Christianity that might support Christian nationalism and violence. As I’ll argue here, there is a kind of hubris involved in such an interpretation that 2 Andrew Seidel, “Christian Nationalism and the Capital Insurrection,” Written Testimony of Andrew L. Seidel of the Freedom From Religion Foundation on the role Christian Nationalism played in the lead up to and during the attack of January 6th, Delivered to the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol U.S. House of Representative, March 18, 2022, https://​www​.govi​nfo​.gov​/cont​ent​/pkg​/GPO​-J6​ -DOC​-CTR​L000​0062​431​/pdf​/GPO​-J6​-DOC​-CTR​L000​0062​431​.pdf, accessed January 8, 2024.

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extends toward a vision of God as a kind of tyrant, whose will can be projected into the world by revolutionary violence. I’ll contrast that idea with a different vision of Christianity. And I argue that this dispute about Christian theology shows us the need for a secular accommodation that allows diverse Christians to coexist—​up to the point at which violence threatens such an accommodation. 1

Disputes about Jericho

In his presentation in Congress, Seidel presents as evidence a number of images and ideas that were in the air before and the January 6 riot. Among these is a quote from Rev. Kevin Jessip who claimed during a so-​called “Jericho March” of 2020. The Jericho March group was part of the January 6 event. And although the group has disavowed violence, its rhetoric is inflammatory. He is a quote from Rev. Jessip: Some have said this is not a Christian nation. I'm telling you this is a Judeo-​Christian nation. … Today, I call this the warrior mandate, a battle cry, a call to arms … a mobilization of God's men made holy by the blood of Jesus Christ and empowered by the gift of the baptism of the Holy Spirit. This battle cry is a Christian call to all Christian men … as we prepare for a strategic gathering of men in this hour to dispel the Kingdom of Darkness. 3 Jessip can plausibly deny that this is an actual call to arms. Christians do tend to talk about spiritual warfare and may in fact distinguish this from an actual, physical “call to arms.” But all of this talk about blood and battle cries does seem inflammatory. The very idea of a “Jericho march” is modeled on the battle that occurs in the Biblical book of Joshua, when the Israelites call upon God to knock down the walls of Jericho. That episode can be interpreted spiritually—​ as an example of God intervening to take down a political power. But it also includes the very real example of religiously sanctified violence. After the walls of Jericho tumble down, the Israelites slaughtered everyone in the city: “Then they utterly destroyed all in the city, both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep, and asses, with the edge of the sword” (Joshua 6:21). With this 3 Cited in Andrew Seidel, “Christian Nationalism and the Capital Insurrection,” https://​www​ .govi​nfo​.gov​/cont​ent​/pkg​/GPO​-J6​-DOC​-CTR​L000​0062​431​/pdf​/GPO​-J6​-DOC​-CTR​L000​0062​ 431​.pdf, accessed January 8, 2024.

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kind of example in the background, it is easy to see why this kind of inflammatory language can be heard as provoking actual violence. For authors like Seidel (and for me), this is worrying. Scholars and critics continue to sound the alarm. The Center for American Progress states the problem in a similar way (in an interview with Amanda Tyler, of the Baptist Joint Committee that was published in 2022): “At its core, this idea threatens the principle of the separation of church and state and undermines the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. It also leads to discrimination, and at times violence, against religious minorities and the nonreligious.”4 The good news is that in secular countries, outright violence is illegal. Furthermore, in the United States, the First Amendment and other Constitutional principles protect religious minorities and nonreligious people against discrimination. But the threat of violence connects to other themes and issues in the theology and anthropology of Christian nationalism. In this chapter, we will consider this in relation to the Greek concept of hubris, which means pride and arrogance, and also violence. One issue here is the extent to which God supposedly condones violence and would see political violence as a positive good. My contention here is that a view of the divine that suggests that God would encourage violence can be subjected to a substantial Christian critique. This critique of political violence need not affirm full-​fledged pacifism. But proponents of Christian nonviolence such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Lawson have argued that Christians ought to turn the other cheek. Lawson explains: When you are a child of God … you try thereby to imitate Jesus, in the midst of evil. Which means, if someone slaps you on the one cheek, you turn the other cheek, which is an act of resistance. It means that you do not only love your neighbor, but you recognize that even the enemy has a spark of God in them, has been made in the image of God and therefore needs to be treated as you, yourself, want to be treated. Jesus is very clear about this: “do unto others as you want others to do unto you.”5 From this perspective, the notion that violence could be justified in pursuit of religious or political ends seems to be un-​Christian. We might even suggest 4 “Christian Nationalism Is ‘Single Biggest Threat’ to America’s Religious Freedom” American Progress, April 2022, https://​www​.ameri​canp​rogr​ess​.org​/arti​cle​/christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism​-is​-sin​ gle​-bigg​est​-thr​eat​-to​-ameri​cas​-religi​ous​-free​dom​/, accessed January 9, 2024. 5 James Lawson, quoted at pbs, “This Far By Faith” https://​www​.pbs​.org​/thi​sfar​byfa​ith​/witnes​ ses​/james​_law​son​.html, accessed July 11, 2024.

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that the image of God as a tyrant who encourages violence is a “pagan” view of God, such as we find in ancient Greek poetry and myth—​or in the texts of the pre-​Christian Old Testament. Indeed, one interpretation of the Christian tradition is that Jesus arrived as a new Joshua, whose message was of love and nonviolence instead of war and domination.6 A further point must be made here, some scholars of the Bible note that the narrative of Joshua and the walls of Jericho is most likely not true.7 One theory holds that Jericho had no walls at the time that the conquest of the city was supposed to occur. But this critical theory is also subject to critique, and other scholars claim that Jericho did exist as a walled city at around the time that Joshua supposedly marched across the Jordan river. And so it goes, in the world of Biblical archaeology. But does it matter whether the story is literally true? A bit of subtlety in interpreting the story shows us that the story is told to support the idea that God will intervene on the part of righteous people (the Israelites) and that He will kill those who are wicked or sinful (the residents of Jericho). But if none of this really happened, then it is clear that the story is primarily an exercise in myth-​making and narrative theology, intended to inspire further reflection—​and not a recipe for direct action. One take-​away from the story may be to ask ourselves how sure we are that God is on our side, that we are actually righteous, and that we are free from sin. Such reflection can go a long way toward defusing hubris. But even if we disagree about all of this Biblically and theologically, these disagreements show the need for secularism. Christians disagree among themselves about the meaning of key passages in the Bible and about theological interpretation: some Christians defend nationalism, violent revolution, and the just war theory—​others suggest that Jesus was a pacifist who advocated cosmopolitan values and an ethic of nonviolence. Given this divide, Christians themselves need to find a way to co-​exist: a secular political system provides the means for this to happen. Of course, this secular remedy might be acceptable for Christians who value peace, nonviolence, toleration, and hospitable co-​existence. But it might not be acceptable for Christians who reject those values. And so, we see again, the apparent conflict or paradox of the secular political system. How can a political system tolerate or include those who call for violent revolution against it in the name of a religious doctrine such as Christian nationalism?

6 I discuss this in more detail in Fiala, What Would Jesus Really Do? 7 The debate is summarized in Patrick Hurley, Religion, Power, and Illusion (Palgrave, 2023).

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This worry about violence may seem overwrought and hyperbolic. And as I’ve noted throughout, some of those who agree with Christian nationalist ideas are only vaguely committed to taking any concrete action (let alone violent action) in pursuit of this ideology. Many of the fellow-​travelers of Christian nationalism would likely recoil at the suggestion that actual violence ought to be employed in pursuit of tearing down the walls of some contemporary Jericho. But consider some points made by Stephen Wolfe in his book, The Case for Christian Nationalism. Toward the end he lays out a case for revolution and in his own words justifies “violent revolution” by way of the “forcible reclamation of civil power.”8 Wolfe points out that he is not celebrating violence for its own sake. He says, “The purpose or end of revolution is not violence, nor is it to vanquish enemies of God or humanity, but to establish just and suitable arrangements for a peaceful and godly life.”9 His point appears to be to distinguish a justified revolution from a crusade or pogrom to eliminate non-​ Christians. And in this regard, he seems to be following the line of argument made by John Locke and other modern thinkers, including Thomas Jefferson and the American revolutionaries, who also thought that revolution could be justified in these kinds of terms. Despite this bit of moderation, Wolfe does articulate the task in stark and startling ways. He says of his fellow Christians in his conclusion: It is to our shame that we sheepishly tolerate assaults against our Christian heritage, merely sighing or tweeting performative outrage over public blasphemy, impiety, irreverence, and perversity. We are dead inside, lacking the spirit to drive away the open mockery of God and to claim what is ours in Christ. We are gripped by a slavish devotion to our secularist captors. But we do not have to be like this. We have the power and right to act. Let us train the will and cultivate the resolve.10 This language of slavish devotion to secular captors shows the problem: if the Christian nationalist is enslaved by secularism, then a revolution can be justified. Moreover, Wolfe seems to suggest that once the revolution comes, the new Christian nation will be empowered to enforce religious conformity and to eliminate un-​Christian ideas. This includes the idea, as Wolfe says, “that magistrates are permitted to punish external false religion.”11 Wolfe goes on to 8 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 326. 9 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 327. 10 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 351. 11 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 361.

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suggest that in the name of the “primacy of Christian peoplehood” (whatever that means …): Christian nationalism will exclude at least the following from acceptable opinion and action: (1) political atheism, (2) subversion of public Christianity, (3) opposition to Christian morality, (4) heretical teaching, and (5) the political and social influence of non-​Christian religion and its adherence.12 Let’s pause to summarize and underline the point here about the use of force and violence. Wolfe suggests that a violent revolution might be justified when Christian nationalists revolt against their “secular captors.” He further suggests that after the revolution, the Christian nation would be justified in punishing those who propound “false religion.” This would allow the Christian nation to persecute, punish, or silence atheists, heretics, and non-​Christians. The punishments that Wolfe discusses include banishment, long-​term, imprisonment, and capital punishment, which would be reserved for those who are deemed “arch-​heretics.”13 In a critical discussion of this part of Wolfe’s book, Blake Callens says, “There is simply no way that such a government could come into being in the 21st century West without immense atrocity being committed.”14 As I suggest in this chapter, there is a kind of hubris found in the rhetoric and arguments of Christian nationalism. One abbreviated way of putting this is to say that the Christian nationalists seem to believe that it is up to them to make things right in the world. In some cases, hubris connects to a kind of fascination with power and violence. Some of these folks seem to believe that they would be serving God in bringing down the walls of Jericho—​and perhaps even in bearing arms against their enemies. But are we so sure that God would want us to act on His behalf in this way? What kind of pride and arrogance are involved in thinking that one would be entitled to foment a revolution or use violence in the name of God? And how do we know that God would not prefer a different approach that is nonviolent, humble, and less vehement? How, in fact, do we know that God would not actually prefer a secular system in which each person is left free to live according to the dictates of their own conscience,

12 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 384–​5. 13 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 390–​91. 14 Blake Callens, The Case Against Christian Nationalism: An Expository Commentary on Stephen Wolfe’s Book (ebook, https://​christ​iann​atio​nali​smno​tes​.com​/p​/the​-case​-agai​ nst​-christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism), 364.

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as Madison, Jefferson, and other important figures of the American tradition might put it? 2

Tyranny, Hubris, and Violence

This discussion of hubris returns us to the discussion of tyranny that we began in the last chapter. Tyranny has often been diagnosed as a human and political problem, which grows out of the tyrant’s hubris. The chorus in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannos (Oedipus the Tyrant) declares that hubris gives birth to tyranny.15 Hubris is excessive pride, arrogance, and megalomania. Many authors (including Sophocles) have discussed tyranny as a psychological disorder. Plato’s Republic is probably the most famous and influential source: Plato critiques the tyrannical soul throughout the text. Tyranny is also a structural problem in political systems. One of the primary concerns of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution was to create a system that would prevent tyranny. But tyranny and hubris are also theological problems. Paul Tillich noted this in Systematic Theology where he relates original sin to hubris. For Tillich, the problem is that human beings want to elevate themselves into the sphere of the gods.16 Tillich goes so far as to suggest that all human beings desire to “be like God,” which is here meant to imply that we want God-​like power.17 This seems extreme. Rather than indicting all of humanity for hubris, I suggest that the problem is acute in the case of the tyrant or would-​be tyrant. Many people are content to be merely human; but the tyrant aspires to become a god or God. There is some ambiguity here in the difference between “a god” (as we might find in a polytheistic context) and the “God” of monotheism. Tyranny as a problem in the ancient Greek world was understood in terms of the tyrant’s desire to be a god among the gods, while tyranny in the Christian world was understood mono-​theistically and thus in terms of monotheistic omnipotence.18 15 Sophocles, Oedipus the Tyrant, line 873 (etext at Project Gutenberg: http://​www​.pers​ eus​.tufts​.edu​/hop​per​/text?doc=​Pers​eus%3At​ext%3A1​999​.01​.0191%3Ac​ard%3D873)​. 16 Tillich writes: “Hybris ist die Selbsterhebung des Menschen in die Sphäre des Göttlichen” [Paul Tillich, Systematische Theologie i–​i i (Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://​ebook​cent​ral​.proqu​est​.com​/lib​/csufre​sno​/det​ail​.act​ion?docID=​ 4880​110), p. 349]. 17 Tillich, Systematische Theologie i–​i i, p. 349. 18 I discuss some of the differences between monotheism and polytheism in Andrew Fiala, Secular Cosmopolitanism, Hospitality, and Religious Pluralism (New York: Routledge Publishing 2016). Throughout our discussion this ambiguity will appear. But for the sake

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The fatal flaw of tyrants and would-​be tyrants is tyrannical hubris, which is the desire for God-​like power. Thus, in addition to creating political structures that are resistant to tyranny (a written constitution that involves check and balances, for example)—​and in addition to providing a psychological critique of the tyrant’s hubris—​tyranny can also be remedied by theological critique. This has two iterations. On the one hand, critics of tyranny can argue on theological grounds that God is not a tyrant. On the other hand, we can argue on anthropological grounds that human beings should not aspire to have God-​like power (even while leaving open the question of whether God is a tyrant or not—​and also leaving open the question of whether God exists). In the first case, we need an account of God that is not tyrannical and that understands God in a way that is not like what we see in the story of Joshua. In the second case, we need an account of human nature and human limitations—​a moral and political account of the human world that is critical of violence and that calls for peaceful co-​existence. In what follows, we’ll discuss each aspect of the problem as considered theologically and anthropologically. I offer a normative argument throughout which endeavors to show: (1) it is better not to conceive of God as a tyrant; (2) if God is a tyrant, He is not worthy of our worship; and (3) those who aspire to have tyrannical or “God-​like power,” are both hubristic and theologically confused. I make this argument as an atheist who is sympathetic to progressive theology. Would-​be tyrants are wrong to desire God-​like power and to assume that this would mean a kind of tyrannical power. In addition to political limitations, the remedy for tyranny is better theology and anthropology. This point holds even for atheists who may be tyrannical and for tyrants who are atheist. One might think that atheists in rejecting God would also reject the idea that anyone should have God-​like power—​and thus that atheists should be committed to democracy, modesty, toleration, and other liberal values. But atheists can also be tyrannical and seek to impose their will on the world. And tyrannical regimes need not be religious. Atheists become tyrannical when they put themselves in the place of God. The proper anti-​tyrannical conclusion should be that no human being should desire to have God-​like power, not even an atheist!

of simplicity, I will mostly ignore the difference and speak of “God” and “God-​like” power, so long as the context permits this.

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105

Early Modern Theology

Let’s now offer a working definition of tyranny. John Locke (1632–​1704) explained that “tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to.”19 Or as Strauss explains (developing Locke’s idea), “tyranny is essentially rule without laws.”20 The key to this definition is unjust and excessive power. This definition shows that the solution to tyranny is to limit power in accord with what is just or right. Furthermore, if tyranny is excessive and unjust, as Locke suggests, then we have a right to rebel against it. This idea created a theological problem during the modern period. Some conservative thinkers held that while God was on the side of liberty, it would be wrong to revolt against a human tyrant. Often this kind of argument would focus on exegetical concerns regarding key passages in the Bible such as Paul’s letter to the Romans, Chapter 13. One important example is Robert Filmer (1588–​1653)—​who is famous (or notorious) as Locke’s foil in Locke’s First Treatise of Government. Filmer offered a Biblical basis for the divine right of kings that also included a modest defense of tyrannical kingship over and against what he viewed as the much worse tyranny of democracy. He quotes the Bible (including Romans) to support his argument, while also referring to classical Greek texts. Echoing anti-​democratic notions found in Plato, Filmer wrote, “There is no Tyranny to be compared to the Tyranny of a Multitude.”21 Locke accused Filmer of being an apologist for tyrants such as Nero. But a careful reading of Filmer shows that he had offered a theological and anthropological point about Nero—​that even when the tyrant thought he had God-​like power, he remained merely a man. As Filmer put it, “there is no Tyrant so barbarously Wicked, but his own reason and sense will tell him, that though he be a God, yet he must dye like a Man.”22 This remark is fascinating. Filmer here suggests that a tyrant such as Nero may have thought himself to be a kind of God but that the truth of human mortality proposes a natural remedy, i.e., not even Nero was immortal.

19

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 18, no page numbers (etext at http: //​www​.let​.rug​.nl​/usa​/docume​nts​/1651​-1700​/john​-locke​-essay​-on​-gov​ernm​ent​/chap​ter​-18​ -of​-tyra​nny​.php)​. 20 Leo Strauss, On Tyranny (corrected and expanded edition) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 104. 21 Robert Filmer, Patriarcha: Or the Natural Power of Kings (London: Richard Chiswell, 1680—​etext at https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/fil​mer​-pat​riar​cha​-or​-the​-natu​ral​-power​-of​ -kings), Chapter 2, para. 15—​no page numbers. 22 Filmer, Patriarcha, Chapter 2, para. 15—​no page numbers.

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Locke’s remedy was more direct: not simply waiting for the tyrant to die but actually fomenting revolution. John Milton (1608–​1674) defended a similar remedy in the generation before Locke: tyrannicide in the name of liberty. Milton has occasionally been seen as an atheist.23 But perhaps it is better to say that he was a heretic due to the fact that he criticized the notion of a tyrannical God. Of course, the question of whether God is a tyrant or not begs an important question viz-​a-​viz atheism. Atheists, skeptics, and heretics criticize the idea that God is a heavenly tyrant in divergent ways. A famous example comes from Aeschylus, who portrays Prometheus as justified in rebelling against the tyrant Zeus. Aeschylus’s Prometheus regrets the fact that he helped Zeus overthrow Cronus. He says that thus he helped “the tyrant of the Gods” (theon tyrannos) gain power, which has further inflamed Zeus’s tyrannical urge and brought shame to the glory of God.24 Although there is a theological critique here, Aeschylus is not speaking as an atheist. We see something similar in Milton where, in Paradise Lost, Satan turns against God’s tyrannical rule. This is not atheism but, rather, a critique of the tyrant God. Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov explains his rebellion against God in similar terms. Other more overtly atheist authors carry the critique further. Camus explained, for example in The Rebel, that metaphysical rebellion rejects the tyrannical and arbitrary image of God.25 Mikhail Bakunin went so far as to advocate rebellion “against all authority, whether divine or human,” explaining, “this rebellion is first of all directed against the supreme phantom of theology, against God. It is obvious that as long as we have a master in heaven, we shall be slaves on earth.”26 A related atheistic argument is suggested by David Lewis: that God’s demand that we worship Him (under penalty of eternal damnation), makes God into a tyrant and that those who worship this tyrannical God are behaving like sycophants sucking up to a tyrant.27 Modern theological responses to these kinds of atheistic accusations against a tyrannical God led theologians such as Tillich to respond by suggesting, in The Courage to Be, that the view of God as tyrant is deeply mistaken.28 Tillich’s 23

Michael Bryson, The Atheist Milton (New York: Routledge, 2016). Bryson argues that Milton is a heretic and not strictly speaking an atheist in the contemporary sense. 24 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, line 736 (etext at Project Gutenberg: http://​www​.pers​ eus​.tufts​.edu​/hop​per​/text?doc=​Pers​eus%3At​ext%3A1​999​.01​.0010%3Ac​ard%3D196)​. 25 Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt (New York: Knopf, 1956). 26 Mikhail Bakunin, Selected Writings (London: Jonathan Cape, 1973), 149. 27 See David Lewis, “Divine Evil” in Louise Anthony, Philosophers Without Gods (Oxford University Press, 2007). 28 Tillich explains, in The Courage to Be: God appears as the invincible tyrant, the being in contrast with whom all other beings are without freedom and subjectivity. He is equated

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theology includes an effort to show that God is not a tyrant. We find something similar in the process theology of Charles Hartshorne. As Hartshorne once put it, asking ironically, “Tyrannical people may worship a tyrannical God but why should the rest of us do so?”29 He suggested in his critique of the idea of God’s omnipotence that this fundamental theological problem stems from the fact that theologians “were accepting and applying to deity the tyrant ideal of power.”30 We can learn from this discussion without siding at this point either with the atheists or the theists. Reformed theology and the atheist critique of the tyrannical God can both help us better understand the problem of human and political tyranny. If God Himself is not best conceived as a tyrant, then no human being should aspire to be a tyrant either. No human being deserves to have God-​like power. Indeed, God Himself does not have the kind of tyrannical power that would-​be tyrants think He has. Anti-​tyrannical theology suggests that God is limited by justice and by love—​and that God is not an arbitrary and willful tyrant. And indeed, it is the willful, capricious, and tyrannical image of God that is rejected by many of the well-​known atheists mentioned above. The point is that we ought not conceive of God as a tyrant; nor should we worship such a God; nor should we aspire to have tyrannical god-​like power.31 with the recent tyrants who with the help of terror try to transform everything into a mere object, a thing among things, a cog in the machine they control. He becomes the model of everything against which Existentialism revolted. This is the God Nietzsche said had to be killed because nobody can tolerate being made into a mere object of absolute knowledge and absolute control. This is the deepest root of atheism. It is an atheism which is justified as the reaction against theological theism and its disturbing implications. It is also the deepest root of the Existentialist despair and the widespread anxiety of meaninglessness in our period [Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 185]. 29 Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984), 59. 30 Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes, 11. 31 In using the word “we” here, I appeal to a certain audience and set of assumption, which want to clarify here with two caveats. First, this paper is situated in the Western philosophical tradition, focused on arguments and ideas found in ancient Greek texts, the Bible, and the developed Christian tradition—​including in critiques of that tradition articulated by theologians and atheists in the Western tradition. There is obviously a larger context that cannot be considered here. For example, Islamic or Sikh monotheism may approach this question in quite different ways—​and nontheistic traditions such as Buddhism may provide other quite different accounts. My effort must thus be understood as an account articulated within the Western Christian tradition. The second caveat is that that even by narrowing my focus to the Western tradition, I admit that I cannot do justice to the diversity of that tradition. But I hope to shed light on a theme that I have discovered in thinking about some canonical works in the Western tradition that deal

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Before going further, let’s pause to underline how some of the authors mentioned here were also connected with the movement toward secularism. Locke and Milton were early proponents of the idea of “toleration,” which is focused on freedom of thought and freedom of religion. I discuss this in more detail elsewhere.32 But here let me underline two basic points. First, coercion in religion is ruled out by Locke, who argues that genuine religious belief cannot be coerced. Locke is interested in “inward sincerity” of belief. He says, “Faith only, and inward sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God.” And he thought that that the truth would do well enough if left alone, meaning that true religious belief does not require a coercive state to enforce it. If a faith is a good one, its merits would be known by people—​and more readily adopted—​ without tyrannical coercive force. A tyrannical God might want mere external conformity that occurs under threat of coercion. But Locke’s theology points in the direction of freely adopted faith and genuine belief grounded in inward sincerity. From this, we move to the second point, which is that governments should not be focused on religious coercion. Civil authorities should not be in the business of enforcing religious belief. Of course, Locke’s tolerant conclusion is tainted by the fact that he did not think that it was possible to extend toleration to Catholics and atheists. But this is not because of a theological point; rather, it was connected to his conception of Catholicism and atheism. He thought atheists were untrustworthy since they did not believe in God; and he thought Catholics had political allegiances to the pope in Rome that were in conflict with the requirements of civil allegiance in Locke’s England. We should go beyond Locke’s idea and extend the notion of toleration farther today, which is what has happened in terms of the evolution or secular systems in the United States, where atheists and Catholics are tolerated. 4

The Theology of Tyranny

Let’s turn now more directly to the theological issue. We might begin with Biblical concerns. Paul Tillich provides us with a starting point in Genesis when he interprets the problem of original sin in terms of hubris. The human problem is that we want to become like God. This desire for divine power explains the Genesis story of the fall. God prohibits eating the forbidden fruit with the problem of tyranny. This effort was inspired by my recent attempt to understand tyranny in [reference omitted for blind review]. The argument here builds upon insights discussed in that book. 32 Fiala, Tolerance and the Ethical Life (London: Continuum, 2005).

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because if the fruit is eaten, humanity would be “like God” (Genesis 3:5). But human beings desire exactly that. That’s what leads Tillich to explains that hubris is “self-​elevation of man into the sphere of the divine.”33 And: “Its main symptom is that man does not acknowledge his finitude.”34 But the Genesis story does present a troubling view of God insofar as God seems punishes Eve and Adam for a failure to obey His will. At any rate, one wonders whether the God of the Old Testament is not somewhat tyrannical, including in the destruction of the generations before Noah and in the use of violence in the destruction of Jericho. But these ancient texts give way to other Biblical texts, such as Isaiah, Chapter 13–​14, that can be interpreted as offering a critique of political tyranny. In Isaiah, Babylonian pride is maligned as the desire to ascend beyond the clouds and become “like the Most High” (Isaiah 14:14). “Second Isaiah” (that is, the second half of the book) appears to suggest that the coming religious and political regime will be un-​tyrannical (see Isaiah 54). The Bible thus contains an implicit critique of tyranny. But the Bible does not include much in terms of explicit reflection on tyranny. The Greek word tyrannos and related terms do not occur in the Greek Biblical texts—​with one exception (Acts 19:9), where it appears to be a proper name referring to a certain Greek prince. The related term despotes (that is, despot) is also rare. In Acts 4:24, God is referred to as despotes, the one who created heaven, earth, and sea. This philological point is interesting considering the importance of tyranny as a theme for classical Greek authors. Now this is not to say that the Bible does not provide insight into the problem of tyranny. We see unjust kings in the Old Testament—​and Jesus offers a revisionary understanding of nonviolent political power and passive resistance to Roman imperial rule. But there is really no extended theoretical consideration of tyranny in the Biblical texts. Ancient and medieval Christian authors were concerned with the problem of tyranny—​but it was not until the advent of modernity and Reformed Christianity that this becomes a serious focus of Christian scholarship. One text from the medieval period is worth noting: Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, which hints in the direction of justified rebellion against tyrannical rule.35 But Aquinas’s account of tyranny is more closely grounded in Greek 33 34 35

Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 50. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 50. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica ii:ii, Question 42 (etext at New Advent: https: //​www​.newadv​ent​.org​/summa​/3042​.htm):​“Tyr​anni​cal government is not just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10). Consequently, there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant’s rule be disturbed so inordinately, that

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philosophy than in the Bible. Indeed, to support his point, Aquinas quotes Aristotle! So now let’s turn to the Greeks, where tyranny is a more predominant theme (and who, given what we’ve just said about Aquinas, obviously have had an influence on the Christian theological tradition and its thinking about tyranny). As mentioned above, Aeschylus (525–​455 bce) wrote that Prometheus accused Zeus of being a “tyrant of the gods.” Zeus grabbed power from his father. And then he behaved unjustly and violently to other gods and toward mortals. In one scene we learn how Zeus tortured and tormented Io. Prometheus laments Io’s fate and asks, “Does it not seem to you that the tyrant of the gods is violent in all his ways?”36 This worry is key to the theology of tyranny: if God is a tyrant, then he is violent and unjust—​a cruel, capricious being who imposes his will upon the world. Now it is important to note that the word tyrant did not originally mean a violent and willful king. Originally, the Greek word tyrannos simply meant king.37 But Aeschylus uses the term to indicate a violent king. A generation later Plato (428–​347 bce) typically uses the term to mean a despotic ruler who seizes and maintains power by violence. Plato’s work contains a sustained critique of tyranny and theology. Plato’s critique of tyranny is well-​known, as it forms a central part of his Republic. In Republic, Plato shows how the perfect state will degenerate into tyranny. He also diagnoses how something similar happens in the human soul. Indeed, Plato is as interested in understanding the soul of the tyrant (or the tyrannical soul) as he is in understanding the political and structural elements that give rise to tyranny. Plato’s account of tyranny in Republic is not only political; it is also spiritual and psychological. Plato conceives of tyranny as a defect of the spirit. This defect is described as a lack of virtue that results in disordered desires. In Republic’s tripartite account of the soul, significant problems occur when reason (the highest part of the soul) fails to properly contain and organize the lower parts of the soul (the thymotic part that pursues honor and the appetitive part that pursues pleasure). his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant’s government. Indeed, it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the injury of the multitude.” 36 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, lines 200ff (etext at Project Gutenberg: http://​www​.pers​ eus​.tufts​.edu​/hop​per​/text?doc=​Pers​eus%3At​ext%3A1​999​.01​.0010%3Ac​ard%3D196)​. 37 Walter Newell, Tyranny: A History of Power, Injustice, and Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). Parker, Victor. “Τύραννος. The Semantics of a Political Concept from Archilochus to Aristotle.” Hermes, vol. 126, no. 2, 1998, pp. 145–​172.

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A further problem occurs in the definition of justice—​or when we are confused about the nature of justice, truth, and other values. In Book 1 of Republic, Thrasymachus offers an account of justice that is tyrannical. He suggests that justice is whatever the stronger party says it is, that is, whatever is in the interest of the stronger party. A similar dynamic appears to hold for other values such as wisdom, honor, and even truth—​these values are defined by the will of the stronger party. Plato suggests that this is how the tyrannical soul views things. There is a kind of relativism here that disavows any objective standard of morality or truth. But rather than leaving us with a kind of skeptical epoché or suspension of judgment in the face of relativism, the tyrannical personality seizes upon this as an opportunity to create the standard of truth, justice, virtue, and the like. In a sense, the tyrant says, “since there is no objective standard, I will define the standard of justice, virtue, and wisdom for myself according to my own interest.” He might as well say, “I am the truth”; or “I will create the world in my own image.”38 The tyrant’s view of truth and value as resulting from self-​assertion leads the tyrant to seek out a kind of absolute power, not limited by external constraint. The tyrant seeks to define values according to his own will-​to-​power (as Nietzsche might put it). This means that truth and virtue are a matter of power and struggle. When Thrasymachus says that justice is what is in the interest of the stronger party, he is one step away from saying that justice is whatever the tyrant is able to get away with. This shifts our focus from a consideration of objective standards of justice or truth, toward a world of power struggles aiming toward domination. When this move is made, there is a tendency toward unrestrained absolutism and violence. Those who oppose the tyrant’s assertions are enemies who must be conquered, converted, or destroyed. They are not rational parties with whom we might argue and disagree. Remaining disagreements impede the tyrant’s claim to be the standard of truth, justice, and virtue. Thus, the tyrant’s opponents must be eliminated. This struggle to assert oneself as the standard of truth includes a struggle against those who claim that there is an objective standard of truth or virtue. Such an assertion of objectivity will be dismissed by the tyrant (and his followers) as “fake news” promoted by the tyrant’s enemies. These kinds of ideas are woven throughout the Platonic corpus. Beyond Republic let’s consider Theages, Alcibiades I, and Euthyphro.39 Theages has 38 39

These ways of putting it have theological overtones in the Christian tradition (in light of Jesus proclaiming himself the truth at John 14:6; and in light of imago dei arguments). Theages and Alcibiades I have been subject to dispute: some argue they are spurious works, not written by Plato. See Nicholas Denyer introduction to Plato: Alcibiades

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been influential along these lines. Nietzsche quoted from it in Will To Power (paragraph 958) saying that he wanted to reinstate the spirit of Theages, which was the desire to have God-​like power so that one could rule the world. In the dialogue, Socrates is talking with a youth named Theages. Socrates asks him what he wants. Theages say he would become a tyrant, “if possible, over all men, and failing that, over as many as might be possible.” He continues, “even more, I daresay, that I might become a god” (Theages 126a). The connection between tyrannical aspiration and the desire for God-​like power is made explicit here. Would-​be tyrants want the God-​like power to rule the world. Tyrannical power is viewed as having God-​like power and it is God-​like power that would help one rule the world. Something similar is hinted at in Republic’s account of the ring of Gyges: the impunity that the magic ring provides, would help one become a tyrant who could get away with doing whatever one wants. But Theages is more subtle than that. Theages eventually says that he does not want to “rule by violence,” as actual tyrants do. Rather, he wants voluntary submission. This makes things more interesting. The would-​be tyrant wants people to voluntarily worship him and submit to his will. But voluntary obedience is politically problematic and theological puzzling. The tyrant’s dream of power extends to a misguided theological and psychological fantasy. The tyrant who wants to rule over everyone like a god, assumes that what makes God great is God’s power and not His goodness, failing to understand that voluntary submission is not about power but about goodness. This creates a puzzle hinted at by Plato and later developed by Hegel and Nietzsche: the so-​ called master-​slave dialectic. The master wants voluntary submission. But his desire for absolute power creates a problem. The one who is dominated will experience resentment. Thus, there will be instability and the threat of revolt. The theological solution is to connect voluntary submission to God’s goodness and not to His power or greatness. If God is absolutely good, as the Western theological tradition maintains, then worship of God and submission to Him is not a matter of coercion, manipulation or force. Rather, we ought to praise God’s goodness and submit to Him because voluntary submission to God is

(Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Mark Joyal, The Platonic Theages: An Introduction, Commentary, and Critical Edition (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000). The ancient tradition typically held Theages and Alcibiades I to be authentic. At any rate, the technical point about authorship is irrelevant to my argument here. I am not offering a definitive interpretation of Plato or of Platonism. Rather, I am using Platonic texts (texts either written by Plato or associated with his school) to advance my argument about the theological problem of tyranny.

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good. This way of understanding God moves us beyond the threatening and fearful God of Genesis toward a different conception of God as a loving Father. The theme of God’s goodness returns in Plato’s Euthyphro, as I’ll explain below. It also provides Plato’s response to Theages’ tyrannical desire. We should not desire God-​like power for the sake of that power (that is, so that we could rule the world). Rather, we should aspire to have God-​like goodness because it is good to be good. If worldly or political power comes along with goodness, that is fine. But power is not the goal. Rather, goodness is. Theages wants people to love him and submit to him without understanding that love and obedience are intimately tied to virtue, justice, truth, and wisdom. The lesson Plato teaches in Theages is that voluntary submission and political power should be based on virtue, not violence. A similar theme is found in Alcibiades I. Alcibiades was an important character in Athens and in the life of Socrates. Plato’s Symposium makes it clear that Socrates and Alcibiades have an intimate friendship. Alcibiades was well-​known in Athens as a potential tyrant. He betrayed the city during the Peloponnesian War. He was eventually murdered while hiding out in Asia Minor. Thucydides suggests that Athens turned against Alcibiades because people were afraid of his ambition.40 Thucydides writes that Alcibiades claimed, in his own defense, that as a member of a rich family who had won glory in the Olympic games and who had done great things for the city, he deserved power. Alcibiades concluded, in his speech as presented by Thucydides, that a great person should not lower himself to the level of those who are less worthy. Alcibiades tyrannical and elevated pride is quite different from the modesty of Socrates. In the Platonic text Alcibiades I, Socrates says that Alcibiades did not merely want to rule over Athens or over the Greeks but that he actually wanted to rule the world. Socrates suggests that Alcibiades wanted the whole world to be filled with his “power and name” (Alcibiades I, 105). According to Socrates, Alcibiades wants to win the game of honor and glory: to prove to people that he is more worthy of honor “than any person who ever existed.” In making this claim, Socrates compares Alcibiades with other tyrants, kings, and statesmen, saying the Alcibiades wanted to be greater than Pericles, Cyrus, and Xerxes. Socrates then cryptically suggests that his daimonic sign—​the divine voice that whispers in his ear—​prevented him from aiding Alcibiades in his quest to rule the world. This implies that there is something unholy about Alcibiades’ desire for world domination. One explanation is given later in the dialogue. True kings, on Socrates’ telling, are directly descended from the gods. The 40 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 6, available at www​.pers​eus​.tufts​.edu​.

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ancient kings could trace their lineage to Zeus, Heracles, or other gods and heroes. But the present generation is far removed from this God-​like lineage. More importantly, Socrates suggests that Alcibiades has not yet earned enough merit to be considered seriously as a contender for ruler of the world. Socrates indicates that Alcibiades fails to understand that a mortal human being cannot simply assert that he is ruler of the world. Such power only comes directly from the gods (as it did in earlier generations) or it must be earned by demonstrating virtue. Socrates then argues—​as he did in Republic and Theages—​that the goal should not be to acquire power and become a god. Rather, the goal of human life is to be virtuous. And then, if God is willing, power will follow. With these Platonic discussions of tyranny in mind, let’s now turn to Euthyphro, where Plato examines the relationship between God and goodness. The so-​called “Euthyphro dilemma” asks us to consider whether it is God’s will (or power or love) that makes a thing good or whether God is constrained to love things because they are independently good and worthy of love. In the first case, there is the risk of God’s love being capricious and tyrannical. If God simply chooses what to love and, in this way, conjures the good out of thin air, then God is a willful tyrant, who focuses only on what is pleasing to him. Thus, the Platonic solution appears to resolve itself on the other fork of the dilemma, which holds that even God is constrained by the objective goodness and independent worth of virtue, justice, truth, and other values. This discussion has profound implications for divine command ethics and for a critical understanding of religious worship. I have discussed this in more detail elsewhere.41 A significant problem for divine command ethics is that it risks turning God into a tyrant. Louise Antony is an atheist who has made this point. She argues that an entirely voluntaristic interpretation of divine command theory ends up turning God into a tyrant.42 She also argues that it would

41 42

I discuss divine command ethics and Euthyphro in more detail in Fiala, “God, Reason, and Ethics: Love and the Good Samaritan” Philosophy in the Contemporary World 15:2 (Fall 2008), 72–​81. Antony writes: If all “moral” means is “commanded by God,” then we cannot have what we would otherwise have thought of as moral reasons for obeying Him. We might have prudential reasons for doing so, self-​interested reasons for doing so. God is extremely powerful, and so can make us suffer if we disobey Him, but the same can be said of tyrants, and we have no moral obligation (speaking now in ordinary terms) to obey tyrants. (We might even have a moral obligation to disobey tyrants.) The same goes for worshipping God. We might find it in our interest to flatter or placate such a powerful person, but there could be no way in which God was deserving of praise or tribute” [Louis M. Antony, “Good minus God” The Stone (New York Times), Dec. 18, 2011: https://​opin​iona​tor​.blogs​.nyti​mes​.com​ /2011​/12​/18​/good​-minus​-god​/]​.

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be strange to worship a tyrannical God. This point was also made by Kant (as we’ll discuss in the next chapter), who was critical of religious worship that is grounded upon an image of the divine as a tyrant who must be cajoled and appeased. But the issue is as old as Plato’s Euthyphro. In Euthyphro it becomes clear that we must think critically about God’s commands and compare them with what we know independently about truth, justice, and other virtues. Socrates points out that the gods appear to love diverse things—​and that the mythological stories about the gods show them doing terrible and tyrannical things. Zeus rebelled against Cronos, his tyrannical father and Zeus does other immoral things, as in the story of the torture of Io recounted by Aeschylus. Human beings should not emulate the gods as portrayed in these stories. In fact, what is needed is independent moral inquiry which elucidates truth, justice, and other values. We also need a critical reconstruction of theology that eliminates or explains away the apparent immorality of God. Plato made this point more forcefully in Republic where he suggested banning the poets and mythmakers from the city because they made God out to be a tyrant. In Republic (568), Socrates and Adeimantus say that Euripides and other poets eulogize tyranny as godlike, while showing the gods behaving tyrannically. Plato rejects these myths, calling instead for a reformed theology in which tyrants are not praised and in which the gods do not behave tyrannically. Now consider how this affects what Plato suggests about worship, piety, and religious ritual in Euthyphro. If the gods are tyrannical beings engaged in capricious immorality, then the idea of worshipping and praising them begins to unravel. If the gods are capricious tyrants, then we have no real idea about how to honor them—​and they still might harm us anyway. This is a problem that parallels that of the capricious nature of political tyranny. A tyrant who behaves with impunity has no obligation to deal with his subjects fairly and honorably. As a result, the tyrant’s subjects will fear him, resent his injustice, and conspire to disobey and rebel. Furthermore, in Euthyphro Socrates says it is wrong to think that human rituals and piety can somehow manipulate the gods into showing us favor. To think of the gods as susceptible to our praise turns human beings into sycophants sucking up to a tyrant. The solution is a better understanding of God in which God is not a tyrant, does not behave capriciously, and is constrained by objective standards of truth and goodness. 5

Conclusion: Christian Nonviolence and the Secular Paradox

As we conclude this chapter, let’s reconsider the question of fundamental Christian values. Wolfe and others (including Locke) appeal to theological

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arguments in the justification of rebellion. A related tradition—​the just war tradition—​develops in Christianity to justify the use of war. We might also note that the Crusades were justified by medieval Christians as violent pilgrimages to take back the Holy Land from “infidels.”43 In sum we should note that Christianity has not always been opposed to violence. And while we might claim that hubris is part of the story, defenders of Christian violence will argue that it is God’s will—​indeed “deus vult” has been a motto of those who think that they are doing God’s work by taking up arms. This tradition looks back to the violence perpetrated by Joshua as part of a divine mission on earth. This includes the work of bringing down wicked regimes, and perhaps even setting up a Christian nation that would use violence to eliminate the impious. However, there is another tradition in Christianity that emphasizes peace, love, and mercy. I have discussed this extensively in my book, What Would Jesus Really Do? and in my work on pacifism and the nonviolent tradition. This tradition begins with Jesus advising us to turn the other cheek and love our enemies. It develops through the lived nonviolence of early Christian martyrs. It appears in teachings about nonresistance and pacifism in more recent centuries in the writing and lives of authors such as Ballou and Tolstoy. And in the 20th Century it is manifest in the life and works of figures like Martin Luther King, Jr., James Lawson, Dorothy Day—​and even in the recent teachings of Pope Francis. The nonviolent emphasis of Christianity hinges on key passages in the New Testament. We began this chapter with a quote from Matthew and the Sermon on the Mount. It seems fairly clear that Jesus does not anywhere advocate for violent revolution. Nor does he tell his followers to take up arms and spread the faith at the point of a sword. Nor does he suggest that any particular nation-​ state should take up the task of instituting a Christian worldview by using force to do so. The more militant and nationalistic interpretation of Christianity was developed by those following Augustine and which developed after Christians were forced to come to terms with how they might rule and fight in a world in which states and empires were denominated as Christian. But the rival tradition of Christian nonviolence was kept alive by dissenters from the mainstream. Among the ideas we find there is a theme take up by Martin Luther King, Jr. in his sermon “The False God of Nationalism” (from 1953). King says, “One cannot worship this false god of nationalism and the God of Christianity at the same time.”44 Among the problems that King discusses is the fact that 43 44

I discuss this in Fiala, “Secular Just War Theory and the Spectre of the Crusades” Ethical Perspectives vol. 27, no. 3 (2020): 237–​268. Martin Luther King, Jr., “The False God of Nationalism” (1953), https://​bre​akin​ggro​und​.us​ /the​-false​-god​-of​-nati​onal​ism​/, accessed October 23, 2023.

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nationalism is linked to violence—​the violence of militarism and war. We might also add nationalism is linked to a kind of hubris, arrogance, and pride. Nationalism focuses on the salvation (if we are speaking in Christian terms) of a given nation and those who live within that nation, while seemingly ignoring the need for universal salvation, and brotherly (agapic) love. From this vantage point, there is a kind of prideful assertion of the nation and its identity, over against others. But a Christian ethic that emphasizes agape, nonviolence, and universal brotherhood will quickly look beyond the border of nations and national identity toward a more universal concern for humanity. Without rehearsing all of the details of Christian nonviolence, my point here is to emphasize that there is more than one version of Christianity, and more than one account of the role violence and political power. This means that Christians themselves disagree. And for this reason, Christians will benefit from a secular system that allows these rival interpretations of the same tradition to coexist. To make this point clearer, we might also point out that in European history, Christians often persecuted other Christians (as well as Jews and other non-​Christians), and this persecution occasionally included the persecution of pacifist Christians by state-​centric Christians. This is the story of the Anabaptists who followed the teachings of Menno Simons. It is the story of the Quakers. And so on. The development of a nonreligious political sphere that does not pick sides in these kinds of arguments is a benefit for those kinds of Christian minorities. Secularism is a benefit for Christians—​and not a diabolical enemy to be defeated. Of course, not all Christians agree with this: the Christian nationalists do not. And so we find ourselves back with the problem of the paradox of secularism. In this chapter and the previous, we have considered a number of historical sources in the Western tradition. The conclusion I draw points toward the value of an inclusive secular political system. A progressive form of Christian theology holds that God is not Caesar, which means He is not a tyrant and that He does not want the political state to impose God’s will on the people. Nor does God want us to emulate Joshua—​indeed, the message of liberal/​progressive Christian theology sees the nonviolent message of Jesus as replacing that older theological vision. This interpretation runs counter to a political vision of God as a benevolent despot or Christ as king of kings who wants the state to be oriented around religion. The progressive version of Christianity also challenges the hubris and tendency toward violence that we appear to find in Christian nationalism. Of course, as we’ve seen, Christian nationalists suggest that a secular state is not merely neutral but that it actively opposes Christianity; they see such a state as tyrannical. On this we might agree. If the state were decidedly anti-​Christian (and indeed anti-​religious), the charge of

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tyranny might stick. But the secular political state is not anti-​Christian. Rather, it is inclusive of diverse religions, which peacefully co-​exist so long as there is not theocracy, or in the words of the U.S. Constitution, as long as there is no “establishment” of religion. As I’ve suggested this idea of a secular political realm can be grounded in a progressive interpretation of Christianity, which reconceived God in explicitly anti-​tyrannical fashion, and which holds that the state should tolerate religious diversity because God does not want obedience based on fear or violence but, rather, voluntary piety based on love. But beyond this, we might also say that it is in the interest of all Christians (and non-​Christians) to find a way to peacefully co-​exist. This condition of peaceful co-​existence is in fact the aim of political secularism. But as we’ve seen here, the hubris of Christian nationalism points beyond peaceful co-​existence. Christian nationalists want the state and the nation to embody and support specifically Christian values and identity. This hubris can lead them to actively oppose secular systems, even calling for revolution. Some have employed violence and some appear to think that violence can be justified. And here again, we encounter a limit and the paradox: a secular system cannot tolerate those who call for militant action against that peaceful, secular system.

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A Christian State Is Un-​Christian: Idolatry and the Argument against Christian Nationalism My kingship is not of this world. Jesus (John 18:36)

∵ As I’ve stated, the Christian nationalist argument includes theological, anthropological, and political claims. In the previous chapters, I focused primarily on the theological claim and showed that according to a progressive interpretation of Christian tradition, God is not a tyrant and He does not want tyrannical worship. I also warned against the hubris of those who want to institute religious nationalism, following in the model of Joshua who used violence to bring down the walls of Jericho. In this chapter, I extend the argument toward further anthropological and political considerations. One important feature of Christian anthropology is the problem of sin. The Christian tradition tends to teach that human beings are sinful, broken, fallen, and in need of redemption. This is true of all human beings, including the powerful. And indeed, it points toward a fundamental critique of human institutions including states: these institutions are imperfect human creations. This helps to explain why it makes little sense to expect that a Christian government would rule piously, wisely, or justly. And it explains why hope for a Christian nation is often linked to an eschatological expectation about the end times when Jesus will return as king of creation and finally solve the problem of sin. But, as we’ll see here, not all Christians agree about the details. Nor do Christians agree about the way that political life should be arranged in response to Christian theology and anthropology. Christian nationalists appear to want Christians to achieve political dominance and use the power of the state to enforce Christian doctrine. Other Christians view this as a kind of idolatry that is un-​Christian. And so, again, we see the need for a secular system that allows for coexistence among those with such diverse understandings of their supposed shared faith.

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_007

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Idolatry and the Kingdom of God

One basic claim of progressive Christianity is that the “kingdom of God” is not a political kingdom. One Biblical source for this idea is connected to the idea that it is Satan that controls the kingdoms of this world. As we’ve seen, the Christian nationalists often connect the critique of secularism to the claim that secularism is diabolical and Satanic. It is worth noting here that this idea is also found in Biblical discussions of the Kingdom of God, which is described as the antithesis of the Satanic kingdoms of this world. Of note is the episode (Matthew 4:8) in which Jesus is tempted by Satan with political power, who shows Jesus the kingdoms (basileia) of the world (kosmos). Jesus responds by saying “be gone Satan” and stating that true worship should be directed toward “the lord your God” (kyrion ton theon sou). This seems to support the Christian nationalist claim that the kingdoms of this world are in a sense Satanic. But it might be that this kind of claim is specific to ancient Roman times in which imperial rulers were equated with Satan. As McKnight and Modica put it: Jesus and his followers are certainly aware of the ideological and idolatrous nature of the Roman Empire; yet, Jesus ultimately establishes a fundamentally different, one-​of-​a-​kind kingdom—​one “not from this world” (John 18:36). The purpose of the kingdom of God is not to replace, so to speak, the Roman Empire; rather it is to overcome the kingdom of Satan. Let us not forget that in a first-​century cosmology, the New Testament writers see the world championed not by Caesar but by the “Ruler of this World,” Satan (John 12:31, 14:30, 166:11).1 On this interpretation we also find a source of the worry that politicized Christianity becomes idolatrous. If Christ is transformed into a worldly lord by human beings, this may result in the human beings misunderstanding the nature of God and worshiping political power rather than the glory of God. The worry is that in focusing on political power and victories in the political world, Christians are focusing their attention in the wrong direction. Gregory Boyd, an evangelical pastor, explained, “many of us American evangelicals have allowed our understanding of the kingdom of God to be polluted with political ideals, agendas, and issues.”2 Boyd explains that American evangelical Christianity 1 Scot McKnight and Joseph B. Modica “Conclsion” to McKnight and Modica, eds., Jesus Is Lord, Caesar Is Not: Evaluating Empire in New Testament Studies (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013), p. 213. 2 Gregory A Boyd, The Myth of a Christian Nation (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2005), p 11.

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is “misguided” in its effort at “fusing together the kingdom of God with this or any other version of the kingdom of the world.” He says such a politicized Christianity is “idolatrous” and that it is having negative consequences on the church and on Christian efforts “for the advancement of God’s kingdom.” This does not mean that Christians ought not engage in politics. But a progressive political application of Christianity ought to be humble, contrite, and self-​restrained. But even that optimal form of Christian politics still suffers from the old problem that power corrupts. One “progressive” Christian argument against the idea of a Christian nation comes from the idea that political rulers are easily corrupted, and even that Christianity itself becomes corrupted when it is linked to political power. The Christian nationalist vision may seem to ignore that problem entirely, simplistically asserting that a Christian nation would be righteous. But there is a deeper interpretation of Christianity at work in the thinking of some Christian nationalists. Stephen Wolfe spends some time discussing the problem of sin in his book, The Case for Christian Nationalism. The solution he proposes is “grace”: the gift of Christ makes it possible for nations and states to overcome the problem of sin. Wolfe says, “Civil life, indeed nature itself, cannot remedy man’s sinful state. God as the creator did not include in creation an inherent means to reconcile sinful man and a holy God. Salvation required a gracious act of God as redeemer.”3 Wolfe continues to explain that Christian people, who accept the gift of grace, are then entitled to “dominion,” that is, to exercise political power. Wolfe says, “the redeemed are able to exercise dominion well—​to build truly just households and civil communities that practice civil righteousness and worship the true God.”4 Wolfe further suggests that since Christians and Christian nations are righteous and good (and have “true dignity,” as he puts it), they are entitled to rule, and to spread Christianity. This may seem a bizarre idea from the standpoint of a more humble sort of Christianity that disavows power in light of sin. Indeed, a referee of the present book thought I might be setting up Wolfe here as a strawman, since (according to the referee) Wolfe seems to misunderstand “grace.” But Wolfe’s notion of grace as empowering Christian dominion is grounded in a theological idea known as “definitive sanctification,” whereby sinful humans are restored, by grace, to full and true human dignity. Wolfe explains that grace restores Christians to a state similar to Adam in the Garden (i.e., Adam’s prelapsarian state). This means that Christians are empowered, and even obligated, to rule.

3 Wolfe, p. 91. 4 Wolfe, 114.

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Wolfe says: “Since a Christian—​having restored integrity—​possesses the same gifts as Adam, he is equipped and drawn, by his nature, to exercise the same sort of dominion … Christians are empowered and obligated to act according to Adam’s original task.”5 Admittedly, this account seems strange from the vantage point of a more humble Christian faith. But one Biblical source for this idea is Paul’s letter to the Romans, Chapter 6, where Paul suggests that Christians have been made free from sin and have become righteous, which means that they ought to be able to live good lives. Of course, this is not the end of the story in the Bible. And Christians disagree about how texts such as this should be interpreted. Nonetheless, Wolfe seems to think that genuine Christians—​and a good Christian prince—​would be sanctified by grace such that there were able to rule in the name of Christ. A rival story is told by other Christians, including some commentators who have critically discussed Wolfe’s understanding of “definitive sanctification.”6 And the strangeness of this idea becomes apparent when stated so bluntly—​ which seems to show how odd and un-​American Christian nationalism is (at least in Wolfe’s theology). Do many American Christians really believe that a Christian prince, sanctified by grace, is the righteous way that American political life should be organized? Are they aware how such an idea appears to reject the basic idea of a Constitutional republic that includes checks and balances, a separation of powers, and fundamental protections for religious liberty and freedom of conscience? The theological issues raised by Wolfe’s account of Christian nationalism connect to a Christian critique of political power that extends in the direction of anarchism. But one need not be an anarchist to understand the problem. Jean-​Jacques Rousseau argued in his Social Contract (in the Chapter on Civil Religion) that Christianity cannot be united with the idea of political power. Rousseau says that the Gospel “does not establish a national religion.”7 From this he quickly concludes that “no holy war is possible among Christians” (which returns us to the theme of violence and the idolatry of nationalism that we discussed at the end of the last chapter). He explains:

5 Wolfe, 99. 6 For example see: Shane Lems, “Review: The Case for Christian Nationalism By Stephen Wolfe”, Heidelblog, February 15, 2024, https://​hei​delb​log​.net​/2024​/02​/rev​iew​-the​-case​-for​-christ​ ian​-nati​onal​ism​-by​-step​hen​-wolfe​/, accessed July 15, 2024. 7 Jean-​Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract in Basic Political Writings of Jean-​Jacque Rousseau (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1987), 225.

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But I am deceiving myself in talking about a Christian republic; these terms are mutually exclusive. Christianity preaches only servitude and dependence. Its spirit is too favorable to tyranny for tyranny not to take advantage of it at all times. True Christians are made to be slaves. They know it and are hardly moved by this. This brief life has too little value in their eyes.8 This is why Rousseau imagines that the proper “civil religion” is a religion that unites citizens with the state. And while such a religion might be considered as “Christian” in a loose cultural sense, from Rousseau’s perspective, any such political religion would really be in violation of the spirit of Christianity because as he suggests here Christianity and politics are “mutually exclusive.” Of course, this claim—​Rousseau’s idea that Christianity is a religion of servitude, even slavery—​may come across as offensive to Christians. Nietzsche made a similar claim when he called Christianity a kind of “slave morality” in The Genealogy of Morals and elsewhere. Rousseau is not aiming to denigrate Christianity in the way that Nietzsche is. But each hits upon a key point in thinking about Christian political theology: Christianity seems, at least according to one interpretation of the Gospels, to be an anti-​political and anti-​domineering religion. We pointed to this in the previous chapter in relation to the idea of Christian nonviolence. The basic idea is that Christianity is not about domination or ruling. Nietzsche’s critique is offered by way of his advocacy for a more “pagan” approach, which he connects to “master morality.” From this standpoint the important thing is exercising will-​to-​power and achieving mastery and domination. As Nietzsche puts it, citing the Greeks and the Vikings, “The noble man honors the powerful man in himself.”9 Here again we see hubris, as discussed in the previous chapter. From this we might suggest that Christians who aspire to worldly power may oddly be allying themselves with Nietzsche’s critique of a meek and mild Christianity and his advocacy for a more pagan, master-​morality. With this point on the table, we might return to a point I made previously in connection with Karl Barth and his critique of the German church and is subordination to National Socialism in the middle of the 20th Century. For Barth, the risk of the church being manipulated by political powers is significant. To prevent this, church and state must remain distinct. As Barth explains (along with other Christian theologians) in the Barmen Declaration of 1934: 8 Jean-​Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, 225. 9 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 155.

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We reject the false doctrine that beyond its special commission the State should and could become the sole and total order of human life and so fulfil the vocation of the Church as well. We reject the false doctrine that beyond its special commission the Church should and could take on the nature, tasks and dignity which belong to the State and thus become itself an organ of the State.10 From this vantage point there are two related dangers: when the state imposes upon and usurps the power of the state, and when the church attempts to take up the political powers of the state. Barth makes this clear in his essay on “Church and State,” where he says that the state becomes “demonic” when it usurps the separate and distinct power of the church by cultivating a “myth of the state,” which Barth associates with “Caesar worship.”11 The state can also fail to administer justice fairly. Pilate could have saved Jesus, after all—​but failed to do so. But the bigger danger—​and the danger of Christian nationalism—​ appears when the state attempts to usurp religious power and falls into Caesar worship. Barth suggested that this “demonic” turn in politics included, during the Nazi era, the cult of the Führer. The problem occurs when a kind of idolatry takes hold, and religious people seem to think that Christianity ought to ally itself with political power. As Barth put it in 1939, when Christians confront the Nazi’s totalitarian and radical dictatorship, they should ask themselves whether this was the coming of the “perfect kingdom of God” under the Messiah or, rather, the “demonic” counterpart to the Messiah’s kingdom.12 This way of putting it may seem extreme—​especially to non-​religious people. But it resonates with the talk of ghosts and demons that we discussed previously. And perhaps a kind of demonology is appropriate for the Nazi-​era. But the general question remains for proponents of Christian nationalism and a Christian prince: how certain are we that this is really the kingdom of God and not, rather, “the lordship of a false Messiah” (as Barth puts it)? This way of putting the matter may lead to a more general kind of critical theological distance between religion and politics such as is found among thinkers who affirm the idea of Christian anarchism. We find this in the thinking of authors such as Tolstoy, Berdyaev, and Ellul. Tolstoy took the title of his famous Christian anarchist book, The Kingdom of God is Within You, from Jesus who said this in Luke 17:21. Tolstoy interprets this to mean that external and 10 11 12

Barmen Declaration (1934), https://​www​.ucc​.org​/bel​iefs​_bar​men​-decl​arat​ion​/, accessed October 23, 2023. Karl Barth, Community, State, and Church (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1968). Karl Barth, The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day (New York: Scribners, 1939), 40.

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political approaches to the Kingdom of God are looking in the wrong direction. He also argues that political organizations that use violence and war to maintain order are deficient and in violation of the Christian ethic of love. Ellul adds an interesting detail to the Christian anarchist argument, which is that Jesus’s entire biography was afflicted by the excesses of political power: from Herod’s threats to his execution by Pilate. For Ellul, the problem is power itself. With this in mind, the goal is not to improve political power but to abolish it. Interpreting a passage from ­chapter 20 of Matthew, Ellul explains, All national rulers, no matter what the nation or the political regime, lord it over their subjects. There can be no political power without tyranny. This is plain and certain for Jesus. When there are rulers and great leaders, there can be no such thing as good political power. Here again power is called into question. Power corrupts.13 This idea about the corrupting nature of power is linked to the problem of sin. Nikolai Berdyaev explains, for example, the following: The religious truth of anarchism consists in this, that power over man is bound up with sin and evil, that state of perfection is a state where there is no power of man over man, that is to say, anarchy. The Kingdom of God is freedom and the absence of such power; no categories of the exercise of power are to be transferred to it. The Kingdom of God is anarchy … The state and power are bound up with evil and sin; they are not transferable to any state of perfection.14 We can see the conflicting political and anthropological claims clearly in the divergent thinking of Wolfe, on the one hand, and Barth on the other, with Tolstoy, Ellul, and Berdyaev on yet another hand. On the Christian nationalist account, grace solves the problem of sin, allowing Christians to rule wisely and well. Barth suggests that church and state should exist in distinct spheres. And on the Christian anarchist account, there is something intrinsically sinful about political power, which ought to lead Christians to stay out of political power. In the first case, the idea is that Christians should be able to work in the direction of the Kingdom of God by taking control of the state; in the second case, there is a warning against idolatry and a call for a separation of powers;

13 14

Jacques Ellul, Anarchy and Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 61–​62. Nikolai Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom (New York: Scribners, 1944), 147–​48.

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and in the third case, the idea is that politicization of Christianity points in exactly the opposite direction of the Kingdom of God understood as freedom and anarchy. This dispute (and there are other divergent opinions possible with regard to Christian politics) shows us, yet again, why a secular political system might be called for. How can Christians who disagree about sin, grace, and the meaning of the Kingdom of God live together in this world? The idea of religious liberty in a secular political system allows this to occur. In a secular system, Christian nationalists are not free to install a Christian prince or to impose their grace-​ fueled religiosity on others; and the anarchists are not free to tear down the state. Rather, a secular system allows these alternative Christian ideas to co-​exist, even when they fundamentally disagree with one another (and to an extent when they disagree with the secular accommodation of diversity itself). That toleration is inclusive and permissive up to the point at which the Christian nationalist (or the Christian anarchist) attempts to subvert the system—​at which point we return yet again to the paradox of secularism. As we can see, one significant issue here is how Christians understand power and what Wolfe calls “dominion.” The story begins in Genesis, where God gives Adam “dominion” over the world. The Greek word often translated as dominion is kyriotes, which also means lordship and is derived from the term kyrios, which is usually translated as lord. Adam’s dominion is linked to the fact that he is created in the image of God: God is a just and loving ruler of the universe, and so Adam ought to be a just and loving ruler of the created world. But as the story unfolds, Adam sins, and is expelled from Eden. The rest is history, as they say. The problem to be solved in history is the problem of sin. And a prevailing question is whether and how any sinful human being can be a wise and just ruler. The proposed solution is the messiah or savior who will atone for sin and heal a broken world. But the Christian savior arrives with a puzzling message, that his kingdom is not of this world. A key passage to consider is the following: “My kingship is not of this world; if my kingship were of this world, my servants would fight, that I might not be handed over to the Jews; but my kingship is not from this world” (John 18:36). I quoted this in the previous chapter. Let’s pause for a moment and dig deeper. Jesus speaks here of two central ideas: kingship and world. In the Greek, the word for kingship is basileia and the word for world is kosmos. The same word for kingdom or kingship is used throughout the New Testament, and often there is a contrast between the kingdom of heaven and the kingdoms of this world. In the beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount, for example, Jesus says that the poor in spirit will be blessed “for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (Matt. 5:3): the term here is the basileia ouranos, which indicates that there is a distinction between

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heaven (ouranos) and the world (cosmos). The poor may not be at home in the kingdom of this world, but they will be blessed in the kingdom of heaven. In a similar way, the Lord’s prayer includes the phrase “thy kingdom (basileia) come, thy will be done, in earth as in heaven” (ouranos) (Matt. 6:10). It seems pretty clear from these contexts that Jesus was indicating a difference between the kingdoms of this world, and the coming kingdom of heaven. The king or lord of heaven (the kyrios of the universe) is a wise and just and loving ruler. But the kingdoms of this world are fallen, broken, and sinful—​even perhaps kingdoms ruled by Satan. The anarchists affirm this fact and turn away from political power. The nationalists think that through grace and the work of righteous Christians, the worldly kingdom can be improved. And somewhere in the middle, Barth argues that things work best when church and state are kept distinct. But we can see here the depth of this dispute and the need for a secular system in which these divergences can co-​exist. One shared truth for Christians who are worried about sin is the idea that the problem of sin won’t be solved until the lordship of Jesus returns to earth. This is the eschatological story of Christianity, with history ending in the rule of God on earth, which solves the problem of sin. But until that happens, it is likely that we will be left with the problem of human rulers, who assert dominion without being wise or just or loving. Even if grace is factored in, history shows us that Ellul is right to say that power corrupts. Not every political or religious leader is corrupt. But what makes us think that a Christian nation or a Christian prince would be benevolent, just, or loving? This problem has been described in various ways throughout the Christian tradition. One well-​known source is Reinhold Niebuhr, the theologian associated with an idea known as “Christian realism.” Niebuhr explains: To look at human communities from the perspective of the Kingdom of God is to know that there is a sinful element in all the expedients which the political order uses to establish justice. That is why even the seemingly most stable justice degenerates periodically into either tyranny or anarchy.15 This way of putting things may seem hyperbolic: that there is a process in human politics that swings between the poles of anarchy and tyranny. But there is some truth to the idea that it is, after all, sinful (or at least fallible) human

15 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Pacifism” in Reinhold Niebuhr: Theologian of Public Life (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 248.

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beings who create political organizations. On Niebuhr’s view, there is always the risk that these either become tyrannical or devolve into anarchy. And that’s because we are not wise enough and virtuous enough to achieve a just and stable political order. This Christian idea also echoes a similar idea found in Plato, who suggested ironically that human societies will swing between anarchy and tyranny until philosopher-​kings rule. Plato is often interpreted as suggesting this utopian possibility as a serious proposal. But we might also say that Plato suggests the ideal, knowing full-​well that in reality there are no philosopher-​ kings. And this means that utopian solutions will fail in actuality. This same “realist” insight might be applied to the Christian story. And this means that the very idea of a “Christian nation” is as ironic and unreal as the idea of a philosopher-​king. Niebuhr connects this to the problem of sin that is found in all human conflict. He explains: The Christian faith ought to persuade us that political controversies are always conflicts between sinners and not between righteous men and sinners. It ought to mitigate the self-​righteousness which is an inevitable concomitant of all human conflict.16 2

Eschatology and Integralism

This “realist” Christian anthropology gives us a good reason to resist the idea that there could be an authentic Christian nation. In response, defenders of the idea of Christian nationalism might wax eschatological and claim that something special is afoot in history now. Christian eschatology holds out the possibility that the kingdom of heaven will come to rule over the kingdoms in this world—​in which this world is transformed into heaven. This move to the eschatological helps explain quite a bit about Christian nationalism, which is quite often connected to eschatological hope. Said plainly, this means that for many Christian nationalists, the idea of constructing a Christian nation is based on the idea that this is the end times, and the problem of sin will soon be overcome. As we saw in a prior chapter, Rep. Lauren Boebert (R-​Colorado) explained this idea in a speech in September 2022, where she said:

16 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Pacifism” in Reinhold Niebuhr: Theologian of Public Life (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 248.

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We know that we are in the last of the last days, but it's not a time to complain about it. It's not a time to get upset about it. This is a time to know that you were called to be a part of these last days. You get to have a role in ushering in the second coming of Jesus.17 Boebert reiterated this view with a group of Republican donors in October of 2022, where she said: It is an honor to serve in this time. I believe that many of us in this room believe that we are in the last of the last days and that’s not a time to complain, that’s not a time to grumble, to be dismayed, to be disheartened, but a time to rejoice … You get to be a part of ushering in the second coming of Jesus.18 Of course, Christians interpret the present moment and Christian eschatology in divergent ways. Not every Christian believes that we are in the end times. But some do. As I noted in a prior chapter, a survey from Pew, published in 2022, reports that 39% of Americans believe we are currently living in the end times.19 Given the problem we’ve raised here—​about the reality of sin—​it is not surprising that belief in the end times goes hand in hand with Christian nationalism. From this perspective, the conditions for grace to work its magic are present here and now. The kingdom of God is at hand. And the work of Christian nationalism is part of that developing story. Of course, on the other hand, progressive Christians and Christian anarchists reject this story. One way of rejecting the story is to reject the claim that the end is nigh. Another argument holds that Christianity is simply not about political power at all. One need not be an anarchist to be critical of Christian nationalism from a progressive Christian point of view. Progressive Christians can agree that the Christian kingdom is not a political kingdom at all and that it is a spiritual 17 18

19

Lauren Boebert at Truth and Liberty Coalition Conference, September 2022, Day 2, Session 20, https://​www​.trut​hand​libe​rty​.net​/con​fere​nce​/2022, at 20:45, accessed January 23, 2025. Lauren Boebert quoted at Knox County, tn dinner in “Boebert tells Republican dinner guests they’re part of ‘second coming of Jesus’” The Guardian, October 20, 2022, https: //​www​.theg​uard​ian​.com​/us​-news​/2022​/oct​/20​/lau​ren​-boeb​ert​-rep​ubli​can​-din​ner​-jesus​ -sec​ond​-com​ing, accessed April 26, 2023. “About four-​in-​ten U.S. adults believe humanity is ‘living in the end times’” Pew Research Center, December 8, 2022, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/fact​-tank​/2022​/12​/08​/about​ -four​-in​-ten​-u​-s​-adu​lts​-beli​eve​-human​ity​-is​-liv​ing​-in​-the​-end​-times​/, accessed March 14, 2023.

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kingdom quite apart from political power, without affirming anarchism. On the other hand, the claim about “this world” in Jesus’s claim that his kingdom is not of this world could be a historical reference to the fallen world of the Roman empire that points by contrast to a future Christian world in which Christian rulers and Christian citizens would join together to institute Christian doctrine and to defend Christ and His people against the forces of evil. This kind of interpretation would fit well with the ideas of some Christian nationalists. The idea has been described in terms of the need for “dominion.” Consider this passage from Shane Schaetzel’s introduction to Torba and Isker’s book Christian Nationalism: “a Christian is a disciple of Jesus Christ who seeks to take dominion in all areas of life by obeying His commandment in the Great Commission to disciple all nations. A Christian loves his country—​his place in the world—​and because he loves his neighbor he seeks to take dominion and disciple it for the glory of God.”20 Schaetzel is a Catholic who has described and defended the idea of “integralism,” which holds that church and state ought to be “integrated,” by the state being subordinated to the church. As Shaetzel explains: Jesus Christ is King over all things, and His Catholic Church is the only church ever established by him. Therefore, any government established by the followers of Jesus Christ must be subject to the moral teachings of His Catholic Church, and it must acknowledge His Catholic Church as teaching His moral authority of objective truth, because He is objective Truth. Any other system of government is woefully inadequate for a Christian people, harmful to society in general, and ultimately destined to collapse because it is not built on objective truth.21 This may sound like a kind of theocracy in which the state and the church are collapsed into one. But Schaetzel explains that his vision of integralism is not theocratic: Many people mistake integralism for theocracy. They think they’re the same thing. They are not. Under integralism, the state is subordinate to the moral authority and objective truth taught by the church. Under theocracy, the state becomes the church. Under integralism, the state 20 Shane Shaetzel, “What is Christian Nationalism?” in Torba and Isker, Christian Nationalism, xxiii. 21 Shane Shaetzel, “Catholic Integralism” March 22, 2021, https://​compl​etec​hris​tian​ity​.blog​ /2021​/03​/22​/catho​lic​-inte​gral​ism​/, accessed April 20, 2023.

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remains separate but subordinate to the church. Under theocracy, there is no distinction between the state and the church at all. Under integralism, your religious leader is one person, and your state representative is another. Under theocracy, your religious leader and state representative are the same person. Under integralism, holding to a religion that is different from the state church is a protected civil right. Under theocracy, it’s treason.22 Schaetzel notes that integralism can occur in a variety of political systems. He states a preference for constitutional monarchy. But as an American, he asserts that the United States could operate as an integralist republic, if Christian doctrine were the prevailing guide to political decision-​making and so long as Christian faith is not excluded from political life. Schaetzel grounds his vision of integralism in an interpretation of John 18:36. He notes that “modernists and liberals” interpret this passage as pointing toward a separation of church and state. But Schaetzel claims that such an interpretation is in error: They (the liberals and modernists) correctly point out that Christ’s kingship is a spiritual one, reigning through the hearts of men, not a physical one, reigning through brute force. Where they begin to err is in the assertion that Christians should just accept whatever form of government is foisted upon them, because Christ’s kingship is not of this world. That is an error. Nowhere did Christ say that Christians couldn’t strive to bring elements of his kingship into this world through peaceful and practical means.23 This last point offers a useful caveat that may help to defuse the spectral bogeyman of Christian nationalism. On this explanation of the idea, we might imagine that Christians like Schaetzel are simply encouraging Christians to engage peacefully with the political process in order to create legislation that is guided by their Christian ideal. But often this peaceful ideal seems to give way to a more bombastic and hyperbolic set of claims. Consider this passage from Torba and Isker: “Jesus did not command us to sit around getting crushed by Satan waiting to die. He commanded us to make disciples of all nations and we need 22 23

Shane Shaetzel, “Catholic Integralism” March 22, 2021, https://​compl​etec​hris​tian​ity​.blog​ /2021​/03​/22​/catho​lic​-inte​gral​ism​/, accessed April 20, 2023. Shane Shaetzel, “Catholic Integralism” March 22, 2021, https://​compl​etec​hris​tian​ity​.blog​ /2021​/03​/22​/catho​lic​-inte​gral​ism​/, accessed April 20, 2023.

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to take dominion in His name. His Kingdom may be in Heaven, but He Himself told us in Matthew 28:19 that He has all authority on Earth as well. It’s time to start acting like it.”24 This idea of dominion appears to be based in the idea of Christian love. But it is also described in terms that are hateful and intolerant of non-​Christian. Torba and Isker continue: “so often we are called hateful by people who hate our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, so to them I say: yes I am hateful. I hate sin. I hate evil. I hate Satan and I hate the Antichrist.”25 On the same page they continue: “Tolerance is not a Christian virtue.”26 And here we come back to the paradox of secularism. Secularism aims to create a tolerant and inclusive political system. But can a secular political system tolerate a political movement that is intolerant and wants to “take dominion”? Perhaps a secular system can accommodate religious organizations that are “internally intolerant,” by which I mean churches that exclude others and express intolerance. And so, a secular state might tolerate churches that exclude lgbtq people or that espouse hateful and intolerant rhetoric toward non-​Christians or toward certain racial groups. But what if a political movement expresses this kind of intolerance toward the secular system itself and intends to take dominion over that system? Schaetzel provides an example. In his introductory essay in Torba and Isker, he says: “While Christian can embrace a limited form of secularity, we can never consent to the concept of secularism.”27 According to Schaetzel, secularism requires an “absolute separation of church and state,” while “secularity” is explained in terms related to integralism: “Secularity is understood as a functional separation between church and state, government and religion. However, this separation is not absolute. Under secularity, religion can still play a larger tole in government, and government is not used to quash religion’s role in society.”28 The notion of “secularity” is meant to distinguish between theocracy (in which church and state are completely united) and Christian integralism, in which the church is distinct from but has a substantial influence on the state. Despite Schaetzel’s careful distinction, the problem still exists, since as he says “secularism” can never be embraced by Christians.

24 25 26 27 28

Torba and Isker, Christian Nationalism, p. 3. Torba and Isker, Christian Nationalism, p. 3. Torba and Isker, Christian Nationalism, p. 3. Shane Shaetzel, “The Christian Nationalist Declaration” in Torba and Isker, Christian Nationalism, xviii. Shane Shaetzel, “The Christian Nationalist Declaration” in Torba and Isker, Christian Nationalism, xviii.

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A Separate Peace?

If Shaetzel is right and secularism and the separation of church and state are unacceptable for Christians, we end up with the paradox of secularism yet again. One wonders how secular systems can respond to a religious movement that is decidedly anti-​secular. We’ll return to this in subsequent chapters. But here I continue the argument of prior chapters and argue that there are resources in the history and traditions of Christianity that can be used to argue against the anti-​secular idea of Christian nationalism. I argue here for a different interpretation of the idea expressed in John 18:36. This interpretation fits within the “modern and liberal” tradition of Biblical interpretation—​ what I’ve called previously progressive or liberal Christianity—​that Schaetzel and others reject. I suggest that Jesus plainly says that his kingdom is not a worldly kingdom. Moreover, he states that “citizens” of this kingdom (servants of Christ) are right to refuse to fight on his behalf in the political world. On this interpretation, Christianity is a private spiritual practice that is disconnected from political power. In other words, it may be that Christianity encourages withdrawal and retreat from politics entirely, as establishing a kind of “separate peace.” Indeed, we see this in the writings of the Christian anarchists, as well as in the lived experience of minority religious sects who attempted to accomplish this kind of withdrawal in actuality—​among for instance the Amish, the Mennonites, the Mormons, and others. This kind of separatist interpretation of Christianity fits well with the apolitical experience of early Christianity. Early Christians quite simply did not have power. They lived and worshiped as outsiders—​and were often persecuted under Roman imperial rule, since they refused to worship Caesar. This separatist and apolitical Christianity eventually gave way to a more overtly political kind of Christianity, as Christians gained political power in the Empire. One well-​known narrative describes the shift from apolitical (and pacifist) early Christianity toward a more political (and less pacifist) Christianity that occurs as the Roman Empire becomes Christian under Constantine. The Constantinian conversion is an important point in this narrative. The anti-​ political idea is kept alive in the subsequent development of Christianity through minority sects and reformers who were opposed to a political church. This culminates in varieties of modern Christian anarchism, such as can be derived from the writings of Tolstoy and others. Let’s cite one example of this approach in order to show the kind of argument that is made in opposition to the ideas of dominion and integralism that we discussed above. Here let’s consider Adin Ballou, an American Christian author whose ideas influenced Tolstoy. Ballou, like other anti-​political Christians, bases his thinking on the

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principle of non-​resistance found in the Sermon on the Mount: “resist no evil” (Matthew 5:39). Ballou writes the following in his 1846 book Christian Non-​ Resistance, offering an interpretation of the idea that Jesus’s kingdom is not of this world: His kingdom is not of this world, and therefore excludes all military and warlike defenses. His ministers are sent forth unarmed, like sheep in the midst of wolves. They are therefore to be wise as serpents, and harmless as doves. All things must be conducted on the non-​resistant principle. There must be no political strife for the highest place, no patronizing lordship, no Gentile love of dominion; but they that really occupy the highest place must prove themselves worthy of it by an entire willingness to take the lowest, by governing only through the influence of useful service. Government must doff its worldly insignia, its craft and its prerogative to punish, and be vested in real worth—​unglorified, unpampered, and undistinguished by exclusive privileges. This is Christian government.29 And while I have described this idea as a kind of Christian anarchism, it is not opposed to the idea of a “Christian government” that adheres to the principles of non-​resistance. But it is clear that no such government lives up to this idea. In another place in this text Ballou explains: Let it not be said that the doctrine goes against all religion, government, social organization, constitutions laws, order, rules, and regulations. It goes against none of these things per se. It goes for them in the highest and best sense. It goes only against such religion, government, social organization, constitutions, laws, order, rules, regulations and restraints, as are unequivocally contrary to the law of Christ; as sanction taking “life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth,” as are based on the assumption that it is right to resist injury with in jury, and evil with evil.30 Now one might interpret this in “integralist” terms to suggest that a Christian ought to attempt to transform the government into a “Christian government” that is based on non-​resistance. But another plausible interpretation of this idea is that since no government will ever live up to the ideal of a “Christian government,” Christians ought to establish a separate peace and withdraw

29 30

Adin Ballou, Christian Non-​Resistance (Philadelphia: Universal Peace Union, 1910), p. 47. Adin Ballou, Christian Non-​Resistance, p. 20.

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from politics. Somewhere in the middle are the views of thinkers such as Barth and Niebuhr—​and before them, Locke and other early modern thinkers—​ who encourage us to recognize that the idea of the separation of church and state is a good and ‘realistic’ Christian idea. 4

Conclusion

The history of Christianity includes these rival interpretations, which in turn led to dissent, sectarianism, and even violence among Christians. Secularism—​ that allows for these diverse Christian sects to exist along with other non-​ Christians, and non-​religious people—​developed as a modern, humanistic and political response to these kinds of disputes. Note that the development of secularism is a response to diversity and dissent within “Christendom,” including divergence of opinion about the degree to which the state ought to be in the business of picking sides and resolving disputes among competing Christian sects. And so, here again we return to the need for a secular political system that allows these divergent Christian ideas to co-​exist. Christian nationalists appear to want Christian dominance in the political arena that would allow Christians to use the power of the state to enforce Christian doctrine. As we’ve seen, other Christians view this as a kind of idolatry. And of course, there are non-​Christians who live among those Christians who disagree with the idea of Christian dominion. This points toward the need for a secular political system that allows all of these diverse people to co-​exist by keeping church and state distinct. This secular idea can be built upon Christian grounds, as we’ve seen. But some Christian nationalists appear to interpret such secular ideas as un-​ Christian and unacceptable. How can progressive Christians and advocates of political secularism co-​exist with those who think that this idea is un-​Christian and who think that Christians ought to assert dominion over political life? And so, the paradox of secularism reappears.

­c hapter 7

Against Fanaticism and Hypocrisy: Modern Christian Political Theology and the Worry about “Secular Absolutism” You must not be like the hypocrites Jesus (Matthew 6:5)

∵ Christian nationalism is hypocritical and fanatical, when viewed from a certain Christian vantage point. Jesus suggested that there is a kind of hypocrisy in public and politicized religion. Modern liberal theology and political philosophy—​ and modern secularism—​ can be understood in relation to this claim. Indeed, the modern secular system developed from ideas about religious liberty that are often implicit within the preceding Christian tradition. Thus, despite what anti-​secular Christian nationalists claim, there are resources within the Christian tradition that can lead one to support political secularism and oppose the idea of establishing a Christian nation. These ideas include claims about the status of faith, the nature of God, and the role of political authority. The version of modern liberal theology and political philosophy to be discussed in this chapter is different from the theology and politics of Christian nationalists and others who reject political secularism and who seem to think that Christian faith requires a non-​secular political system. To put the point bluntly, I argue here that the anti-​secular argument is un-​ Christian, when viewed from the vantage point of modern Christian political theology such as we find in a tradition with roots in John Locke and Immanuel Kant. Of course, this depends on a contested interpretation of Christianity. But the fact that there is contestation within Christianity shows that we need political secularism, which provides a political solution for managing diversity, including the diversity of ideas found in the Christian tradition. As I’ve argued previously, Christian nationalism is an anti-​secular movement. One way that this anti-​secularism has been stated is in terms of a critique of what is called “secular absolutism.” Secular absolutism is a bogeyman understood as a kind of secularism that would restrict the religious liberty of

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_008

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Christian, and which perhaps would even seek to abolish God. The bogeyman of secular absolutism appears in the thinking of some explicit Christian nationalists, and it also has been discussed by conservative Christians who may not agree with all of the details of a Christian nationalist agenda. In 2004, this phrase, “secular absolutism,” was employed in a Wall Street Journal editorial. The Journal’s editorial board wrote: “Secular absolutism is becoming the most potent religious force in America.”1 The Journal was responding to court cases that sought to regulate private and religious organizations (such as the Boy Scouts and Catholic Charities). The larger worry is that secular governments will seek to impose “secular values” on religious groups and will in fact seek to disempower or even destroy religious organizations. And beyond that is a theological and political question about the source and basis of power and authority. Ralph Hancock, a political scientist at byu, explains: It is unsettling to recognize that the benefits of a “secular” political order derive from and ultimately depend upon the recognition of an authority held to be beyond politics. But the necessity of such an authority is a matter of quite simple logic: If there is no appeal beyond secular power, then that power is in principle absolute. This logic of secular absolutism is playing out in our politics today, as religious freedom is reduced to an increasingly fragile “exception” to the enforcement of new lifestyle “rights” (including a right to the radical redefinition of marriage itself). These rights are demanded on no authority but that of an emerging majority.2 The large theoretical question is whether secular political systems can simply depend upon the authority of “we, the people,” as in a social contract theory of the state—​or whether such a human-​oriented, secular basis for politics and law must end up imposing itself as an “absolute” on religious people who are oriented toward some other, divine or transcendent, theory of morality and law. The answer, from the stand point of the modern, liberal (and Christian!) tradition which includes Locke and Kant—​and many of the American founders—​ is that the separation of church and state is a good idea, that this idea fits well within the Christian tradition, and that secularism need not be absolutist.

1 “Secular Absolutism” Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, March 10 2004: p. A.16. 2 Ralph Hancock, “Religious Freedom Can Now Only Mean Freedom for Religion” Law and Liberty, November 21, 2016, https://​law​libe​rty​.org​/forum​/religi​ous​-free​dom​-can​-now​-mean​ -only​-free​dom​-for​-relig​ion​/, accessed July 15, 2024.

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Of course, this issue cuts deeply. And it raises significant and difficult questions in theology and political philosophy. But the political rhetoric of Christian nationalism is often lacking in nuance and subtlety. The idea has been expressed in a variety of less subtle and theoretical ways by authors and leaders who can broadly be included among the Christian nationalists. Consider this headline from an article by Eddie Hyatt, an author and pastor from Grapevine, Texas: “How Secularism is Destroying America.”3 In this column, published in Charisma News in 2018, Hyatt writes: The god of the secularist is the secular state, and the secular state will not tolerate rival gods. This is why Marxist/​secularist states always seek to destroy or at least marginalize Christianity. It is why countries like North Korea persecute and imprison Christians and put them to death. The state itself is god and will not tolerate any rival. This is why secularists in modern America are so hell-​bent on removing every vestige of Christianity from the public venue. They will not tolerate a deity other than their own.4 But liberal secular political systems are not Marxist. They should not seek to “destroy” Christianity. Nor do they propose that the state is a god. Liberal secular states should not be absolutist. And indeed, we should rightly reject the idea of secular absolutism. A state that seeks to destroy or replace religion would be illiberal and would violate the inclusive spirit of secularism. The vision of a secular political system that I have been discussing throughout is not absolutist. It does not insist on destroying religion or prohibiting religion; but neither does it advocate for religion or empower or establish any religion as the law of the land. There are conflicts, to be sure, in how to interpret the religious liberty clauses of the First Amendment. But the rule of law is not absolutist—​nor is the goal of a secular political system to impinge upon the liberty of religious organizations (even though in some cases there will be regulations that religious organizations do not like). The language of absolutism is misleading and inflammatory. There may be some basis for worrying about absolutism in modern political philosophy. There is a kind of absolutism in the thinking of Thomas Hobbes (1588–​1679) and his notion of the Leviathan, which is a “mortall God” who is a dominant 3 Eddie Hyatt, “How Secularism is Destroying America,” Charisma News, https://​www​.chari​ sman​ews​.com​/polit​ics​/71438​-how​-sec​ular​ism​-is​-des​troy​ing​-amer​ica, accessed Nov. 17, 2023. 4 Eddie Hyatt, “How Secularism is Destroying America,” Charisma News, https://​www​.chari​ sman​ews​.com​/polit​ics​/71438​-how​-sec​ular​ism​-is​-des​troy​ing​-amer​ica, accessed Nov. 17, 2023.

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authority on earth and whose power is the result of the original social contract.5 Some critics of modern secular systems see this Hobbesian notion of the state as a mortal God as part of the problem, and they use the term “Leviathan” as a pejorative that is meant to indicate a kind of secular religion that is hostile to the real God and to traditional religion. One recent and significant example comes from a 2022 manifesto written by a group of scholars known as “Evangelicals and Catholics Together.” They suggest that “secularism encourages political absolutism.”6 And they say, “The hostility to transcendence empowers the political Leviathan to restructure society to serve this-​worldly gods.”7 This way of describing the problem suggests that when the Leviathan is focused only on “this-​worldly” (that is, secular) things, it becomes absolutist. It does so by usurping proper moral authority (that is, the transcendent God) and thereby seeking to “restructure society.” Among the concerns of the authors of this document are social issues such as sexuality, gender, and abortion. The document says that the focus on “this-​worldly” projects leads to “violating the sanctity of life and denying the moral truth inscribed upon our bodies as male and female.” I will discuss this manifesto further in what follows, including what I will argue is its mistaken understanding of modern, liberal, secular political systems. The more general point appears to be that it is anti-​Christian and even blasphemous to view the state as a mortal God with absolute authority. And Hobbes is often considered as a heretic or even an atheist. Of course, Hobbes did say that allegiance to the “mortall God” is merely a “this-​worldly” (to borrow a term) allegiance that occurs against the backdrop of a different kind of allegiance to “the Immortall God.” And Hobbes did suggest that the power of the church ought to be limited more or less to the power to teach and preach.8 My goal here is not to contribute to the vast literature seeking to understand Hobbes.9 Rather, I am attempting to understand the critical viewpoint of the anti-​secular argument. This approach generally dislikes this restriction of what Hobbes called “ecclesiastical power”; and it holds that there is a more substantial real and immortal God, who provides a limit to the power of the Leviathan.

5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1968), 227. 6 “Fear God, Honor the Emperor” First Things, November 2022, https://​www​.firs​tthi​ngs​.com​ /arti​cle​/2022​/11​/fear​-god​-honor​-the​-empe​ror, accessed October 19, 2023. 7 “Fear God, Honor the Emperor” First Things, November 2022, https://​www​.firs​tthi​ngs​.com​ /arti​cle​/2022​/11​/fear​-god​-honor​-the​-empe​ror, accessed October 19, 2023. 8 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1968), Chapter 42: “Of Power Ecclesiastical.” 9 For one useful example see: Jeffrey R. Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2005).

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Of course, there are some significant metaphors at play here: the modern state is not a God or a Biblical beast. We might note that in its profound and persistent dysfunction the state is at best a very messed up and fallible “god”! Moreover, Hobbesian absolutism is not the only modern political theory of interest. Indeed, John Locke (1632–​1704) offered a different account of a social contract that has a less absolutist result. Locke’s theory is much more influential. Locke provides for the right of revolution and an account of toleration, which inspired the American revolutionaries and gave birth to the freedoms enshrined in the First Amendment. Ironically, the Lockean idea is often cited by Christian nationalists, at least in so far as they maintain the importance of ideas about natural rights, the right to revolution, and an account of the nation-​state that is grounded in Judeo-​Christian ideas. But Locke is also one of the most important early modern theorists of the idea that I am describing as political secularism.10 What we find in Locke’s theory is a more modest Leviathan: a secular state that arises from a social contract and that is limited by basic ideas of rights. On Locke’s modest view, religion is an individual concern and churches are voluntary associations. The state exists to moderate and negotiate among these individual and communal values. Locke’s ideal, and the basic ideal of modern secular political systems, is not of an absolutist Leviathan that would destroy religion; rather, the goal is a reasonable political society in which religion is left alone. 1

The Mystery of Fearing God and Honoring the Emperor

But this reasonable secular system is viewed as a bogeyman by some Christians. Of course, there are differences of opinion within Christianity about this. Consider a passage from the Bible in Peter that tells Christians to “Fear God and honor the Emperor” (1 Peter 2:17). In the Bible, this passage occurs in the middle of a discussion of how Christians ought to relate to political authority (I quote it at length below). The context includes advice to obey human institutions including the emperor. This may seem like odd advice coming from a religious sect that was persecuted by the empire! This chapter of Peter also contains the problematic claim that servants (or slaves—​depending on the translation of the Greek term oiketes) should obey their masters. And it

10

See George Kateb, “Locke and the Political Origins of Secularism” Social Research 76:4 (2009), 1001–​1034.

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reminds Christians that the model of Christ was of a person who was persecuted and suffered at the hands of political authority for a higher good. With this mystery on the table, let’s reconsider the argument against secularism. What basis can there be for a Christian to reject the secular state, given that one of the lessons of the New Testament was to obey the emperor? And note that this is not advising obedience to a secular state that allows for religious liberty. Nor is it obedience to a Christian monarch. The context here is of obedience to a persecuting, pagan political power. The early Christians “honored the emperor” by refusing to rebel against the imperial system—​even allowing the system to persecute and martyr them—​while also at the same time refusing to allow external persecution and conformity to corrupt the nature of their private and internal faith. The mystery of Christianity is that it allows for external conformity to the political status quo, while turning inward and finding God in a transcendent space that exists outside of political life. But before we return to this mystery, let’s pick up the thread of the anti-​ secular argument. One concern of the anti-​secularists is the claim that there is an anti-​Christian movement afoot in secular systems. But is this worse than the anti-​Christian persecutions of the Roman empire? And one wonders how the Christians of the Roman empire might judge the present world. Isn’t it much better to be a Christian today, when there are explicit protections of freedom of religion, than to be a Christian in the bad old days of original Christianity, when Christ was crucified, and his followers were thrown to the lions? The modern secular system is an achievement worth celebrating. And if we understand it rightly, as creating an inclusive public sphere, then it is simply not the case that modern secularism is absolutist or intolerant toward Christians. Of course, the anti-​secular Christians and Christian nationalists disagree. We saw in Chapter 2 that former President Donald Trump has suggested that secularists and liberals are waging a war against “God almighty himself.” This notion is not new with Trump. In other chapters, I have mentioned some other sources from the past fifty years who made similar claims. Consider Newt Gingrich, the former Republican speaker of the House of Representatives, who said the following in his 2005 book: Many of us believe that America was founded as a nation in which we are ‘endowed by our Creator with certain inalienable rights’ and that we rightly pledge allegiance to our ‘one nation under God’ which protects these rights. But an arrogant, secular elite, backed by a powerful judiciary that holds itself supreme over the executive and legislative branches of governments, is waging a war against God in our public life. It is a war to define America down—​to change the character of our nation into

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something the men and women who founded this nation wouldn’t recognize.11 Gingrich emphasizes the sense of national identity I discussed in the opening chapter, which is more about identity and value than about a system of law—​it is about “the character of our nation,” in Gingrich’s terms. And Gingrich singles out the secular elite for waging war against God in public life. Again, one wonders at the frankly silly degree of hyperbole here—​and at the lack of context given a text such as Peter which reminds us that in the ancient world there really was a campaign against Christianity. To understand the difference in context, we have to return to the fact of the ubiquity and success of Christianity in the Western world. Gingrich suggests in his book that the idea of a separation of church and state was not part of the American republic at the time of the founding, and he argues that “we are, and always have been, a nation ‘under God,’ regardless of our ‘robust national religious diversity’.”12 But Gingrich fails to note that this diversity includes Christians who disagree about whether a Christian ought to pledge allegiance to a nation under God. It was not atheists or secularists who first refused to say the Pledge in the cases that led the Supreme Court to prohibit mandatory recitation of the Pledge. Rather, it was Jehovah’s Witnesses who objected to being forced to recite the Pledge. Jehovah’s Witnesses interpret Christianity as requiring them to refrain from idolatry—​and they view flag salutes and other political acts as requiring allegiance to the state that violates their higher devotion to God.13 Jehovah’s Witnesses are willing to obey secular authorities unless those authorities require them to violate their religious faith. In a Supreme Court case decided in 1940, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Court concluded that children could be forced to recite the Pledge. In that case, the parents wanted to claim an exemption due to their Jehovah’s Witness faith, claiming that compulsory recitation of the Pledge violated their First Amendment religious liberty rights. Three years later in 1943, the Court reversed its decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. Again, the case was brough by Jehovah’s Witnesses. In this case, the issue was not religious liberty under the First Amendment but, rather, the matter of freedom of speech. The basis of the opinion of the Court in that case was stated in the following 11 12 13

Newt Gingrich, Winning the Future (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2005), xx. Gingrich, 55. See “Why Do Jehovah’s Witnesses Respectfully Abstain From Participating in Nationalistic Ceremonies?” https://​www​.jw​.org​/en​/jehov​ahs​-witnes​ses​/faq​/why​-abst​ain​-nation​alis​ tic​-cer​emon​ies​-flag​/, accessed November 16, 2023.

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famous way, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”14 A fascinating feature the Barnette case is found in the dissenting opinion written by Justice Frankfurter, who was the author of the original Gobitis decision. Frankfurter, who was Jewish and who was also a founding member of the American Civil Liberties Union, suggested that the state could in fact enforce external conformity by requiring something like the Pledge of Allegiance. In his dissent to Barnette, Frankfurter pointed out that as a Jew (as a member of in his words, “the most vilified and persecuted minority in history”), he was sensitive to the worry about limiting state power over religion. Frankfurter explained that religious is “outside of sphere of political government.” He also stated, “The validity of secular laws cannot be measured by their conformity to religious doctrines. It is only in a theocratic state that ecclesiastical doctrines measure legal right or wrong.” Nonetheless, he argued that the state could “promote good citizenship and national allegiance” by requiring the Pledge. I bring this case up in order to show that the discussion about the growth of secularism occurred from within Christian diversity. And, also, to show that there are complex and divergent claims made in the arguments about the relationship between religion and the law. This basic secular idea of the Barnette decision is that the state cannot force citizens to believe, to confess, or to conform to some standard of faith. The fact that this standard was reinforced by a case involving Christians is often overlooked by those who complain about secularism, and who see secularism as the work of atheists (or the Devil). Moreover, one of the defenders of the need for unifying ceremonies that might seem to violate the rights of religious minorities was both a civil libertarian and a member of a historically persecuted (i.e., Jewish) religious minority. With this bit of history on the table, the complaint about a war against Christianity begins to unravel. The growth of secularism in the United States has occurred as part of conversations within and among believers, including Christians who simply disagree about the way that religion and political power should be organized. Furthermore, it is important to point out that Christianity remains a majority religion and there remains in the United States the presence of what is sometimes called “ceremonial deism”—​a general kind of religiosity associated with things like the Pledge of Allegiance which includes the phrase “one 14 At https://​supr​eme​.jus​tia​.com​/cases​/fede​ral​/us​/319​/624​/, accessed November 16, 2023.

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nation, under God.” Furthermore, lots of people continue to recite the Pledge, despite the fact that there is a right not to do so. So, what, one wonder, does this supposed war against Christianity consist of? Of course, twenty years after Gingrich wrote his book, religious diversity is much more robust in the United States, including the rapid growth of non-​religion. And as I’ve argued, that may be why the proponents of Christian nationalism are sounding the alarm more loudly and arguing more stridently against “secularism.” But as I’ve also noted, there is substantial equivocation in this alarm. Is the problem the legal (that is, constitutional) separation of church and state, in other words, political secularism; or is it the demise of religion and the growth of a secular mindset? As I have also argued, the fact of religious diversity (including both Christian diversity and nonreligion) seems to require us to affirm political secularism, unless we want to somehow impose religion on the non-​religious or unless we want to force Christians such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses to conform to some political ideology that violates their own sense of faith and integrity. If a religious group wants to respond to the loss of faith among the broader population, that response ought to be a spiritual and religious response that occurs within the secular political framework. That framework of religious liberty is in fact part of the Christian heritage of the nation. The secular political system allows us to manage the fact of diversity—​even with Christianity. This is the wisdom of modern, liberal political philosophy. This approach is rooted in Christian thinking of the modern period. It is also connected to something like the social contract theory of the state. This is the best theory for responding to diversity among “we, the people.” The social contract theory is a modest theory that grounds political association in a human-​ oriented and human-​created system of law and government. It includes, at least in Locke’s formulation of the idea, substantial room for toleration. The Framers of the Constitution built upon this idea: the Constitution of “we, the people” is a social contract document. The Framers also laid out basic principles of secularism in the First Amendment to the Constitution. The social contract is secular: it organizes political power within this world based upon the “consent of the governed.” This secular system allows people who have different religious and non-​religious beliefs to coexist. But as noted, there are a number of critics who reject the idea of a secular social contract. Now let’s return to the 2022 manifesto of that group of scholars, pundits, and theologians called “Evangelicals and Catholics Together.”15 15

The quotes that follow come from “Fear God, Honor the Emperor” First Things, November 2022, https://​www​.firs​tthi​ngs​.com​/arti​cle​/2022​/11​/fear​-god​-honor​-the​-empe​ror, accessed October 19, 2023.

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The document is entitled “Fear God, Honor the Emperor.” It begins by quoting the problematic passage in Peter cited above. The manifesto was signed by a number of people from a variety of seminaries and divinity schools. In citing that problematic passage from Peter, it could it be that the authors are encouraging us to submit to the political state as it is—​out of fear of God, and in following the model of humility established by Jesus. And in fact, Jesus submitted to the “secular” state of ancient Rome. But this is not, however, the point of the document, which is an anti-​secular manifesto. It was published in First Things, a conservative Christian journal. The document includes the following statement: Secularism encourages political absolutism. It removes religious authority from public life. In doing so, it claims to secure neutrality in civic affairs. We are told that this ostensible neutrality brings religious freedom and allows for a social contract based on needs and interests shared by everyone, without regard to theological convictions. Yet secularism’s promise has shown itself to be hollow. It is a metaphysical project with political consequences, engaging in soulcraft by another name. One of the points of attack in the document has to do with changing ideas about sexuality and gender. It blames these changing norms on secularism. The document states: “Transgenderism represents the latest and most explicit stage in the secular modern project of freeing us from our condition as God’s creatures.” And while “transgenderism” is cited as a symptom of secularism, the deeper challenge is the modern social contract theory of the state. The documents states: Our constitutions, governments, civic traditions, and institutions do not operate independent of God’s authority. Even now Jesus is Lord. Human affairs are ordered in God’s providence toward their final end in Christ, to whom all things have been made subject. Christians cannot accept the secular conceit that the legitimacy of government stems solely from a social contract or the consent of the governed, however useful such concepts may be as part of a fully developed political theology. This document sums up much of the challenge posed to secularism. Its signatories are not typically included among those who explicitly affirm Christian nationalism. And indeed, the manifesto is not calling for the creation of a Christian state. Rather, it claims that political authority is properly grounded in transcendent principles of religious teaching. In this regard it is anti-​secular.

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The document also warns against what it calls “social Pelagianism,” defined as a kind of crusading self-​righteousness and “theologized activism.” This warning in based in a claim about sin and the “fallen condition” of humanity. But the anti-​secular sentiment expressed here is an important component of the more fully developed forms of Christian nationalism discussed previously (in Wolfe and others). Let me underline four key points made here. –​ The claim that Christians cannot accept the idea that the legitimacy of government depends solely upon the social contract theory of the state or the consent of the governed. This document suggests that while the social contract theory may be of limited use, it must be supplemented (or even grounded) in a religious account of divine or natural law. –​ The idea that secular systems tend toward political absolutism. The worry here is expressed as the concern that if there is no religious or natural law basis for political authority, the state will grow to become a tyrannical “Leviathan.” The manifesto explains this in terms of a denial of transcendence and a focus on secular or immanent goods. They write: “The tyranny of the immanent frame demoralizes us spiritually, for it teaches that there are no transcendent truths. The hostility to transcendence empowers the political Leviathan to restructure society to serve this-​worldly gods.” –​ The claim that neutrality is not possible. The concern here is that secular “neutrality” is not really neutral. Rather, the document suggests that proponents of neutrality stake a claim about the good life and about metaphysical ideas, even while pretending that they are not doing so. As they explain, “appeals to political ‘neutrality’ with respect to the good rest on a false conceit.” –​ A claim about the mystery of political authority. The document points out that there is a problem within Christianity about how to make sense of different accounts of political authority. The authors state: “The particular purposes for which God has instituted temporal authority are not transparent to our understanding. We are not privy to God’s designs.” These claims strike at the heart of the conflict between advocates of political secularism and their opponents. On the one hand, secularism as I’ve been describing it as a political or legal system explicitly aims to allow co-​existence and to manage disagreements among diverse people without picking sides. But on the other hand, the critique says that this cannot occur in the way that is supposed here because neutrality is not possible, and because the only real and substantial basis for a system of law and politics is a religious or “transcendent” scheme of values. At the same time, there is a kind of mystery here involving the difference between what Augustine called the two cities. It is not clear exactly how the city of man and the city of God are interrelated. Or to make this

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point in a different fashion: Christians themselves disagree about how political authority is to be understood. Some Christians claim that we should submit humbly to political authorities. They may cite Romans c­ hapter 13 to support that idea, or the passages where Jesus says to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesars (Matthew 22, Mark 12, Luke 20). Others maintain that revolution can be justified based on natural law. Some opt out of politics entirely, as Christian anarchists do. Others affirm a liberal modern notion of the secular state as grounded in the social contract—​as John Locke did. And now again, we appear to see the need for political secularism, since a secular political system allows for the co-​existence of people who disagree about transcendent schemes, and who have different ideas about how the mystery of political authority is to be resolved. This includes disagreements within Christianity such as that we discussed involving the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The secular system would allow for the co-​existence of the more adamant advocates of Christian nationalism such as Wolfe, those who articulate a more chastened critique of secularism such as the signatories of the “Fear God, Honor the Emperor” document, those who defend a more progressive view of Christian theology and politics, and even those who are non-​religious or who come from non-​Christian religious traditions. Of course, as I’ve stated before, an apparent paradox arises when those who are to be included within the secular political system reject the idea of a secular political system. 2

External Religion as Hypocritical and Fanatical

As indicated, American Christians disagree about the nature of political authority. Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse to say the Pledge of Allegiance. The Supreme Court agreed that the First Amendment provides a right to refuse to say the Pledge. Other cases that have promoted the spread of secular values include Engel v. Vitale (1962), which ended school prayer. That case also involved a religious party (in this case Engel who was Jewish) who argued that school prayer violated the First Amendment’s establishment clause. Another case, Abington v Schemmp (1963) involved a Unitarian Universalist who objected to Bible readings and school prayers. At issue in these cases were religious people of various faiths who objected to the state requiring or enforcing certain kinds of official religious activities and expression. These cases point toward a political and theological point of view that argues against the idea that external conformity to religious practices is required by God, and that also thinks the state should not be involved in requiring that kind of conformity as well.

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With this in mind, let’s return for a moment to the problem of God as tyrant—​and a critique that suggests that a focus on external conformity reflects kind of zealotry and fanaticism. In the critical theological tradition that extends back to Plato’s Euthyphro, an important basic idea is that God does not want human beings to worship Him as if He were a tyrant. On this view, God is not the kind of being who is motivated to respond to the recitation of words, incantations, formulas. This idea is also found at the heart of the Christian tradition. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus warns against praying in public like “the hypocrites” and the “gentiles” who “heap up empty phrases.” Here is what Jesus says (Matthew 6:5–​8) And when you pray, you must not be like the hypocrites; for they love to stand and pray in the synagogues and at the street corners, that they may be seen by men. Truly, I say to you, they have received their reward. But when you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to your Father who is in secret; and your Father who sees in secret will reward you. And in praying do not heap up empty phrases as the Gentiles do; for they think that they will be heard for their many words. Do not be like them, for your Father knows what you need before you ask him. This kind of passage can be used to critique any Christian approach that focuses on external signs of belief and conformity to religious rituals and prayers. Not all Christians heed this warning against the hypocrisy of external religious conformity, which reminds again of the need for a secular accommodation for co-​ existence. But the tradition that develops in modern theology and philosophy takes this warning and related worries about external conformity and hypocritical religious faith to heart. There is a worry in this tradition that external religious conformity is inauthentic and superficial. This kind of external worship of a tyrannical God with whom we want to curry favor is what Immanuel Kant (1724–​1804) calls “zealotry,” and which he equates with sycophancy. Kant explains in his lectures on ethics: It is a hateful and repulsive thing to adopt this mode of honoring God, for in that case we think to win Him over without being moral, merely by flattery, and picture Him to ourselves as a mundane ruler whom we try to please by submissive acts of service, hymns of praise and sycophancy.16 16

Kant writes: Zealotry consists in endeavoring to revere God by using words and expressions that indicate submission and devotion in order to procure favor for oneself by such external tokens of respect and laudatory ejaculations. It is a hateful and repulsive thing to

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A zealot on Kant’s account is a suck-​up to God, who focuses on external signs of submission, devotion, worship, and praise. As Kant suggests, this is a “hateful and repulsive” way to honor God. Kant further explains that there is a kind of “unbelief in natural religion” that is connected with a focus on external conformity and which is obsessed with “ceremonies, pilgrimages, chastisements, fast, etc.” Those who think religion is external in this way are, in Kant’s terms, trying to “win God over through non-​moral actions.”17 I suggest, following Kant, that the basic concern of Christian nationalism is “hateful and repulsive” in this sense because Christian nationalism seems to focus on external conformity instead of personal faith, devotion, and ethical transformation. To underline this point, let me bring in a somewhat trivial but well-​known example: the issue of saying “Merry Christmas” that was a focal point for Donald Trump when he was President.18 Trump suggested that there was a “war on Christmas” that was linked to some supposed ban on saying “Merry Christmas.” Trump did not originate this idea, even though he ran with it and used it to drum up support from right-​wing Christian zealots. Even some scholars and theorists have claimed that there is a secular war against Christmas. Bruce Thornton claimed, in 2015 while reflecting on Trump’s campaign to save Christmas, “the attacks on Christmas do reflect an evangelical secularism that aims to drive Christianity from the public square.”19 Thornton continues: “Defending Christmas is also about defending the public right to recognize the spiritual reality upon which most religions are founded. The war on Christmas is really a war on religion.” This is absurd and silly. There is no war on Christmas that aims to drive Christianity from the public square. And the secular state is surely not trying to impose a ban on saying “Merry Christmas.” Some private institutions—​ stores and restaurants—​may choose to say “Happy Holidays” instead of “Merry Christmas.” But that has nothing to do with a political or legal effort to ban the phrase or to wage war on religion. Indeed, the First Amendment protects an

17 18 19

adopt this mode of honoring God, for in that case we think to win Him over without being moral, merely by flattery, and picture Him to ourselves as a mundane ruler whom we try to please by submissive acts of service, hymns of praise and sycophancy [Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 102]. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 104. See Barrett-​Fox, R. (2018). “A King Cyrus President: How Donald Trump’s Presidency Reasserts Conservative Christians’ Right to Hegemony” Humanity & Society, 42(4), 502–​ 522. https://​doi​.org​/10​.1177​/01605​9761​8802​644​. Bruce Thornton, “The Stakes in the War on Christmas” Hoover Institution, Dec. 18, 2015, https://​www​.hoo​ver​.org​/resea​rch​/sta​kes​-war​-christ​mas, accessed November 17, 2023.

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individual’s right to say “Merry Christmas” as well as any other private entity’s right not to say it. That’s the nature of the secular system. In Thornton’s essay, we see the tendentious claim that secularism has an “evangelical” thrust that is opposed to Christianity and that secularism is at war with religion. Again, this is absurd. But Christian nationalists and those who are sympathetic to the idea will hear this as true, and as a threat to their conception of the American national identity. Trump claimed that he was making it possible to say “Merry Christmas” again as part of the project of “making America great again.” This is clearly the kind of idea that appeals to Christian nationalists who feel that “secularism” is changing the religious identity of the nation. Now the problem I want to address here is that saying “Merry Christmas” has very little to do with genuine religious faith. It is superficial and external. And it is linked to that kind of zealotry and fanaticism (to use Kant’s terms) that insists on saying certain words and engaging in other external acts. It is also similar to that kind of hypocrisy that Jesus warned against. Jesus suggested that the Gentiles heaped up empty phrases. And he suggested that true piety is not external but internal. I admit that my interpretation here is tendentious: I am making a Christian argument against Christian nationalism, as it were. And it is possible to interpret the texts and traditions of Christianity as pointing toward a different conclusion—​which again implies the need for a secular system that allows for these different interpretations to co-​exist. In my earlier book What Would Jesus Really Do?, I argued in detail about ambiguities in Biblical texts.20 History shows that Christians have long disagreed about the anthropological, historical, and political implications of Christianity. Augustine suggested that Christian authority could be used to help create political order. And Christian political authorities did in fact prosecute heretics and seek to censor and exclude heretical belief. Those authoritarian Christians might have grounded their idea in passages in the Bible that suggest submission and obedience to the emperor. Peter writes, for example (in the passage we’ve already discussed above): Be subject for the Lord’s sake to every human institution, whether it be to the emperor as supreme, or to governors as sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to praise those who do right. For it is God’s will that by doing right you should put to silence the ignorance of foolish men. Live as free men, yet without using your freedom as a pretext for evil; but

20 Fiala, What Would Jesus Really Do?

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live as servants of God. Honor all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honor the emperor”. 1 Peter 2:13–​1721

Peter suggests that Christians ought to conform, obey, and honor the Roman emperor. This is world’s away from the revolutionary political theory of John Locke and the American founders. It is important to note that when a passage such as this is read in the historical context in which it was written, this call for obedience to a non-​Christian emperor in Rome is based on the powerlessness of Christians, as well as an apocalyptic expectation that Christians were living in the end times. Perhaps the political reality of Christendom (that is, when Christianity achieves social and political power) is different. But this reminds us that early Christianity simply does not provide a model for how Christians ought to use political power. There is a clue about this that can be traced back to the two commandments of Jesus: love God and love your neighbor as yourself (Matthew 22:37–​40; Mark 12:29–​31; Luke 25:27). Love is different from power. It is personal or inter-​personal. And the personalist strain in Christianity, which we find for example in the contemporary Christianity of people like Dorothy Day and Martin Luther King, Jr. is quite critical of the way that political power is used to oppress human beings. A theology of love leads to an anthropology that is quite different from the zealotry, politicized religion, and authoritarian tendences of Christian nationalism. Now of course, a Christian nationalist may suggest in reply to this criticism that love of God and love of the neighbor are what motivate them to want to create a Christian state: the Christian state would enforce Christian piety in order to ensure that properly ordered love is common and widespread. Indeed, the Christian nationalist may suggest that they want the state to be Christian because they love their fellow humans and because they love God. Their imagined utopia brings people and God together in love. Stephen Wolfe explains that the civil law ought to be based upon good laws and that people should “willingly submit to these laws, trusting that the laws are for their good and will assist them in loving their neighbors.”22 Or as Schaetzel explains, “A Christian loves his country—​his place in the world—​and because he loves his neighbor he seeks to take dominion and disciple it for the glory of God.”23

21 22 23

I discuss this passage and the problem of Christian politics in more detail in Fiala, What Would Jesus Really Do?, ­chapter 11. Wolfe, p. 72. Schaetzel, p. xxiii.

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But it is worth noting that love can easily become zealotry, and as we’ve noted one wonders what happens when the nation or one’s neighbors do not share the same values. The Christian nationalist form of love ultimately seeks to transform this world, out of love, in accordance with the love of God and in relation to the Christian nationalist interpretation of Christianity. But what about non-​Christians, nonreligious people, and Christians who do not share this interpretation of Christianity. What becomes of Christian love in a world of diversity? Progressive Christians might link the theology of love to an anthropology and political worldview that is tolerant, open-​minded, hospitable, and accepting of difference. But the Christian nationalist worldview is not so open-​minded or hospitable. At issue here is a big question about the meaning of Christian love. And the worry is that love can become overly zealous and fanatical. Amoz Oz, the Israeli writer, explained this problem as follows: The fanatic strives to upgrade and improve you, to open your eyes so that you, too, can see the light. Indeed, in that sense the fanatic is a wondrously altruistic and extremely unselfish creature: he is interested in you far more than he is interested in himself. … All the fanatic wants is to take you in his arms and hug you, to raise you from the lowly spot you are stuck in and place you in the sublime place he has discovered, where he has since been basking and to which you must ascend immediately. For your very own good. The fanatic is always in a hurry to fall on your neck to save you, because he loves you.24 Oz goes on to explain that the zealot’s fanatical love can quickly turn and become hateful and oppressive. The zealot’s loving embrace can turn into a strangling chokehold, if the zealot discovers that you are beyond redemption and resistant to his loving plan for you and for the world. Let’s now bring this reflection back to Kant and his worry about zealotry as sycophantic worship. Kant’s approach to religion involves a rational reconstruction of religion that includes a sustained critique of fanaticism or enthusiasm (in German Schwärmerei). The religion of love is even viewed by Kant as insufficient because it is too sentimental. Kant is worried that religious delusions and subjective affections can intrude upon the requirements of duty and objective morality. Kantian religion is typical of the enlightenment and its deistic tendencies—​ideas shared to some extent by American founders such

24

Amos Oz, Dear Zealots: Letters from a Divided Land (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), p. 21.

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as Thomas Jefferson. From this perspective, religious enthusiasm, zealotry, and fanaticism were misguided. So too is patriotic love of one’s country, and the delusion that one’s country is in fact a nation chosen by God. Kantian morality, politics, and religion is cosmopolitan and universal. This approach to religion and anthropology points beyond the idea that God has a special love for a chosen people, country, or land. It also points beyond the kinds of hatreds and animosities that might develop when we struggle to prove to ourselves that God loves us and to prove to God that we love him. The progressive Christian view does not think that we need to prove our love to God in this way—​since that would imagine God as a tyrant who withholds His love until we can prove ourselves worthy. From the progressive point of view, God’s love is bigger and better than that, more universal, less judgmental, and more inclusive. And as Jesus suggested, God does not need external signs of faith—​since, as he puts it in the passage from Matthew quoted above, “your Father knows what you need before you ask him.” 3

Theodicies of Freedom

We can see now the depth of diversity of theological and political belief, and the need for a secular system that permits this diversity. Such diversity runs deep, given the nature and importance of human freedom. Consider how this connects to the question of theodicy, which is the human theory about God and how we might make sense of God’s Goodness in relation to the evils of the world. In modern theodicies, such as we find in Leibniz, the problem of evil is solved with reference to human freedom. Fanatics and zealots want conformity. But progressive Christianity is less interested in external conformity than in the free choice of loving God. The assumption here is that God values freedom and want genuine love that is based upon the free choice of love. With this in mind, we can imagine how theological speculation can be connected with political and anthropological ideas that are critical of political conformity and authoritarianism. In a previous chapter we discussed Plato’s theological critique of tyranny and the argument made in Euthyphro and other dialogues against the tyrannical image of God. Subsequent discussions in the history of theology make similar points, especially in modern and reformed Christian theology, which developed Greek themes along lines suggested by Aquinas. Some of the critiques of tyranny and defenses of the right to revolution of the Christian Reformation are odious and bizarre for us today. John Knox (1514–​1572), for example, argued in defense of revolution against Queen Mary based upon the

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fact that she was a woman, and that God ordained the rule of men.25 Knox’s legacy is mixed. But he was an early modern voice arguing in defense of revolt against those whom he saw as tyrants. Knox was a contemporary of John Calvin (1509–​1564). In Calvin’s work we encounter the theological point that God’s power must be linked to His justice and benevolence. In Calvin’s interpretation of the Bible’s book of Job, he emphasizes that God is not a tyrant. Job begins with God allowing Satan to afflict Job. Job finally gives in to the seemingly capricious will of God—​and is rewarded for repenting and submitting. One way of interpretating Job is to argue that it appears to teach us the wisdom of submission to the arbitrary will of a tyrannical God. The God of Job demands absolute submission, while toying with us. On this interpretation, God has much in common with Zeus, the tyrant God of Aeschylus. Calvin understood that this was theologically problematic. In his many sermons on Job, Calvin comes back to this theme repeatedly.26 In general, Calvin suggests that we ought not think that God is a tyrant whose absolute power is separable from his benevolence and justice.27 This kind of argument provides a Christian exegetical response to the problem we encountered in Platonic theology. It is wrong to suggest that God is a tyrant who is violent, capricious and unjust. Texts that seem to imply this—​whether in Aeschylus or in the Bible—​ must be re-​interpreted in light of the theological demand to unite God’s power with His goodness. This interpretive strategy is a key for subsequent Christian theodicies. Leibniz (1646–​1716) offered a famous effort in this regard. Leibniz suggested that Christ moved beyond the ancient Mosaic idea that we should fear God. Instead of fear, it is love that motivates Christianity, as well as justice and benevolence. Furthermore, as Leibniz delves into the difficult task of reconciling freedom and necessity in light of divine foreknowledge, he points out that there are those who think that God’s omnipotence permits Him to 25 26 27

See Roger Mason, “Knox, Resistance, and the Moral Imperative” History of Political Thought 1:3 (1980), pp. 411–​436. John Calvin, Sermons of Master John Calvin on the book of Job (London: Henry Bynneman, Lucas Harison and George Byshop, 1574). Calvin says: Job, then, supposes that God uses an “absolute power” as it is called, that is, “I am God and I will do whatever seems good to me although it has no form of justice. I will act with an excessive domination.” But here Job blasphemes God. Although the power of God is infinite, to make it “absolute” is to imagine a tyranny in God-​which is completely contrary to his majesty. Our Lord cannot be more powerful than he is just; his justice and power are inseparable [Quoted in Susan E. Schreiner, “Exegesis and Double Justice in Calvin’s Sermons on Job” Church History, Sep., 1989, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 322–​338 at p. 334].

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do whatever He pleases, even if it is evil. On Leibniz’s view, however, this turns God into a tyrant. Leibniz invokes Republic’s Thrasymachus to make this point: Thrasymachus’s account of justice ends up, as Leibniz says, taking “power as the gauge of right.”28 But God is not a tyrant and might does not make right. For Leibniz, God’s power alone does not make a thing good or right. Rather, Leibniz suggests that there must be some ethical and theological explanation of how God’s power is linked to His goodness. In arguing against Augustine’s account of original sin, Leibniz says it is not enough simply to assert that we are sinful, and that God permits sin to happen. Instead, we need some reasonable explanation of this, otherwise God ends up appearing tyrannical. Leibniz says that God “is a good and just master; his power is absolute, but his wisdom permits not that he exercises that power in an arbitrary and despotic way, which would be tyrannous indeed.”29 As is well-​known, Leibniz asserts that God is both good and all-​powerful and thus that what God wills must be for the best.30 The Leibnizian theodicy holds that this is the best of all possible worlds created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. But what is important to note in our context is that in the next paragraph, Leibniz points out that critics such as Hobbes fail to understand the intimate connection between God’s goodness and His power. Without this connection, God becomes a tyrant.31 28

Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil (etext at Project Gutenberg: https://​www​.gutenb​erg​.org​/files​ /17147​/17147​-h​/17147​-h​.htm#pag​e49), Preface, p. 59. 29 Leibniz, Theodicy Preface, p. 60. 30 Leibniz explains, for example in his response to Hobbes: Thus I shall say that God, by virtue of his supreme goodness, has in the beginning a serious inclination to produce, or to see and cause to be produced, all good and every laudable action, and to prevent, or to see and cause to fail, all evil and every bad action. But he is determined by this same goodness, united to an infinite wisdom, and by the very concourse of all the previous and particular inclinations towards each good, and towards the preventing of each evil, to produce the best possible design of things. This is his final and decretory will. And this design of the best being of such a nature that the good must be enhanced therein, as light is enhanced by shade, by some evil which is incomparably less than this good, God could not have excluded this evil, nor introduced certain goods that were excluded from this plan, without wronging his supreme perfection. So for that reason one must say that he permitted the sins of others, because otherwise he would have himself performed an action worse than all the sin of creatures. [Leibniz, Theodicy “Reflections on Hobbes,” para. 11, p. 402]. 31 Leibniz writes that this opinion “despoils God of all goodness and of all true justice, which represents him as a Tyrant, wielding an absolute power, independent of all right and of all equity, and creating millions of creatures to be eternally unhappy, and this without any other aim than that of displaying his power [Leibniz, Theodicy “Reflections on Hobbes,” para. 12, p. 402–​3].

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Now let’s consider how Leibniz’s theodicy helps to respond to the issue of worship that we touched upon above in relation to Plato’s Euthyphro. Leibniz suggests that there is a difference between external ceremonies and inward piety. He also argues that God’s concerns are large and comprehensive, and that God is not particularly concerned with the happiness of individual creatures. Nor is God’s universe set up in a way that allows for God to intervene and create “perpetual miracles,” as Leibniz puts it.32 While Leibniz does not explicitly claim that a God who required worship and “importuning prayer” would be a tyrant, this idea is implied in Leibniz’s text. He does say, “importunity in prayers makes no difference to God; he knows better than we what we need, and he only grants what serves the interest of the whole.”33 And here we encounter another theological problem that opens up the question of tyranny, conformity, obedience, and hypocrisy. Plato was worried that if God demanded worship and voluntary submission to his arbitrary will, this made him a tyrant. Jesus suggested that God already knows what we need and that we need not plead with the loving God. Leibniz’s God is similar. Leibniz suggests that God knows better than we do what we need and that it is no use to pray to God since God will only grant us what He knows we need. In this way arbitrariness and caprice are eliminated. But there remains something patronizing and patriarchal here. Leibniz’s idea seems to echo Plato’s notion of the philosopher-​king as a superior being who knows what’s good for us and to whom we ought to submit. This idea of acquiescing to the superior wisdom of God (or the philosopher-​king) does not cohere very well with modern, liberal-​democratic individualism. The ideas of submission, obedience, and worship point toward the problem of the sycophant viz-​a-​viz a tyrant. To worship is to suggest that the one who is giving praise is less worthy than the person or God who is being worshipped. In the modern period, this idea of elevating another person above oneself was strongly criticized. Modern, liberal, democratic individualism emphasizes the equal dignity and worth of human beings. This implies that it is undignified for one human being to worship another. No human being is worthy of being put up on a pedestal and worshipped as a God; and no human being ought to debase themselves in this way by becoming a sycophant—​even a sycophant to God. This modern liberal idea also had an impact on theology. While some Christians emphasize humility and submission to God, a different, enlightened 32 Leibniz, Theodicy “Essays on the Justice of God and the Freedom of Man in the Origin of Evil” para. 120, p. 193. 33 Leibniz, Theodicy “Essays on the Justice of God and the Freedom of Man in the Origin of Evil” para. 120, p. 193.

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theology holds that God ought not be worshipped in this obsequious fashion. Again, we see that Christians disagree among themselves. Some will agree with Leibniz and Locke here that worship should be free, and that God is not a tyrant who requires external conformity. Others will want to emphasize external conformity because they view God as a wrathful being who demands conformity, even obedience to the emperor. And so again, we see the need for a secular system that allows diverse Christian believers to co-​exist. It is the tyrannical idea of God that seems to suggest the need for sycophantic worship, and which would limit the freedom of belief. That idea seems to require a political system set up to serve the tyrannical God. And it would appear to focus only on external conformity rather than on internal piety. This point was made by Kant, who was also a defender of the need for religious freedom—​ and whose own unconventional interpretation of Christianity caused him to get into trouble with the Prussian censors. In his Lectures on Ethics, Kant points out the dangers of zealotry and fanaticism, linking them to the problem of sycophantic worship. Kant suggests that to praise God as a sycophantic suck-​up is to behave as if God is a tyrant, who is susceptible to flattery and “laudatory ejaculations.”34 This idea is, as Kant says, “hateful and repulsive” since it turns God into a vain tyrant, while debasing humanity. Rather, Kant suggests in his Religion book, we ought to value God’s goodness simply because it is good—​and not out of fear or hope for reward. Those who focus only on God’s sovereign power as “supreme ruler” end up sliding “into an abject, servile, and adulatory submission to the will of a despot.”35 Kant goes so far as to claim that prayer is a “superstitious delusion.”36 He has in mind the kinds of importuning prayers discussed by Leibniz—​which would require God’s miraculous intervention. Kant agrees with Leibniz that this is beneath the dignity of God, as God’s necessity and goodness do not permit Him to respond to our importuning. Rather, Kant suggests, the best prayer ought to be a prayer for morality, as this is what God wants for each human being, that

34

Kant writes: Zealotry consists in endeavoring to revere God by using words and expressions that indicate submission and devotion in order to procure favor for oneself by such external tokens of respect and laudatory ejaculations. It is a hateful and repulsive thing to adopt this mode of honoring God, for in that case we think to win Him over without being moral, merely by flattery, and picture Him to ourselves as a mundane ruler whom we try to please by submissive acts of service, hymns of praise and sycophancy [Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 102]. 35 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Pure Reason (Edinburgh: Thomas Clark, 1838), 247. 36 Kant, Religion, 265.

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is, that we should be good.37 Thus, in response to the aspiration of characters such as Theages and Alcibiades—​who want God-​like power in order to rule the world—​Kant might suggest that this is based upon a profound misunderstanding of God. Moreover, as Kant explained in an essay published after he got in trouble with the Prussian censorship, “The End of All Things” (from 1794), Christian love and “obedience” are supposed to be based on freedom. They are supposed to be voluntary and not simply based upon external command. The point is that love of God and love of the neighbor are supposed to be the result of freely chosen moral and religious commitment and not as the result of fear of coercion. Kant writes: Now if to Christianity—​in order to make good on it—​one adds any sort of authority (even a divine one), even if one's intention in doing so is well-​ meaning and the end is actually just as good, then its worthiness to be loved has nevertheless disappeared: for it is a contradiction to command not only that someone should do something but that he should do it with liking. Christianity has the intention of furthering love out of concern for the observance of duty in general; and it produces it too, because its founder speaks not in the quality of a commander demanding obedience to his will, but in that of a friend of humanity who appeals to the hearts of his fellow human beings on behalf of their own well-​understood will, i.e. of the way they would of themselves voluntarily act if they examined themselves properly.38 Kant states here that even a well-​intentioned authority will end up corrupting the Christian religion, which is supposed to be based on love, duty, and subjective piety. Indeed, he goes further in this essay, suggesting that if Christianity were imposed upon people by an illiberal authority, this would breed resentment and animosity and might even fling the people in to the arms an Antichrist. If Christianity should ever come to the point where it ceased to be worthy of love (which could very well transpire if instead of its gentle spirit it were armed with commanding authority), then … disinclination and resistance to it would become the ruling mode of thought among people; 37 Kant, Religion, in a long footnote on pp. 266–​69. 38 Immanuel Kant, “The End of All Things” in Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Allan Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 230.

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and the Antichrist, who is taken to be the forerunner of the last day, would begin his—​albeit short—​regime. This is a fascinating point, which ought to worry the proponents of Christian nationalism: how certain are they that if they were to establish Christianity as the national church and impose it on unwilling people, this would not ironically discredit Christianity by linking Christianity to external, political authority? Beyond this kind of speculative warning, the conclusions of modern theology in Locke, Leibniz, Kant, and others support a form of secularism that is grounded in Christianity. On this view, God is not a tyrant. God does not celebrate power for the sake of power. God is good. He wants us to be good and to love Him for internal, rational, or moral reasons. God does not want us to worship him as a tyrant, out of fear based upon external threats of coercion. Thus, on this view, it does not make sense to suggest that God wants us to set up a Christian state that demands conformity and obedience. Rather, as Kant suggested, Christianity ought to be a religion of love and freedom. It is not clear, then, that Locke, Leibniz, or Kant would endorse the passage from Peter with which we began. It makes no sense on this view to “honor the emperor,” unless the emperor is just and good. And Locke in fact offered a justification for revolution against an unjust monarchy. The key to the Leibnizian theodicy—​and to the Kantian philosophy and the Lockean liberalism—​is liberty, freedom, or autonomy. Evil, from this point of view, is the result of the free choices of individuals—​and this freedom is a great gift, part of the “best of all possible worlds.” A world that includes freedom—​which allows for the free choice of loving God or turning away from Him—​is the best world (even if evil is a possibility in that world). On this view, God wants us to freely follow his laws and to love Him based on his goodness. Enforced obedience, and the kind of conformist love imagined in connection with a Christian state, is suboptimal. 4

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have traced some modern, progressive Christian ideas and a progressive Christian argument against Christian nationalism. Form the progressive Christian point of view, the establishment of a Christian state would be un-​Christian. It would require external conformity, including obedience to some “emperor.” It would be based upon a misunderstanding of love. And it would seem to flirt with idolatry, while seeming to turn God into a tyrant. It would be fanatical (as Kant put it) and hypocritical (as Jesus put it). We’ve

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also seen that Christians disagree about all of this. In addition to the liberal, modern political theology there are also Christian anarchists and separatists who worry that political power is Satanic, or less hyperbolically, that Christians should focus their attention on the kingdom of God that is within, rather than on external politics in the kingdom of this world. As I’ve noted throughout, this progressive interpretation runs counter to much of the thinking of Christian nationalism, and so this leads us to consider the importance of a secular political system that can allow for these rival versions of Christianity to co-​exist. Of course, this also comes along with the problem of the paradox of secularism, which will recur here if Christian nationalists insist that secularism is absolutist, that the secular state is in fact Satanic, and that Christian love requires them to overturn the secular system. As we conclude, let’s note that all of this disputation within Christianity points us toward a further possible conclusion, which is that Christianity, Christian theology, and Christian anthropology are hopelessly convoluted and inconclusive. Such a conclusion may lead us to reject the entire enterprise. And indeed, this ongoing argument among Christians can lead us to leave Christianity behind and embrace either a kind of nonreligious agnosticism or a flat-​out atheism. We take up this thread in the next chapter.

­c hapter 8

Can We Know What God Ordains? Secularization, Nonreligion, and the “Christian Nation” It’s a profound thing, to have been ordained by God to lead the greatest nation in the history of the world for a second time. Mike Johnson, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives1

∵ One of the significant problems to be confronted by any discussion of political theology is the question of how we mortals can actually know what God ordains. Some consult the Bible, looking for signs. But this reference to ancient scripture provides a very limited source of information about current affairs unless one engages in creative prophetic exegesis. Another approach simply says that the way things are is the way that God has ordained them to be. This is a kind of fatalism, that can undermine human creativity, freedom, and agency. Another approach may project a theological interpretation onto contemporary reality based upon a tendentious preference for a given idea. Such an approach is really a variety of wishful thinking. Others—​the agnostics—​may assert that there is no way for humans to know what God ordains. And still others—​the atheists—​will maintain that there is no God and therefore no such thing as divine ordination. Behind all of this are deep questions about God’s existence, human free will, and the nature of God’s omnipotence and divine foreknowledge. Atheists and nonreligious people can simply side-​step those kinds of questions. And one reason that some people affirm atheism or agnosticism is that they think that the metaphysical issues created by religion are unresolvable. But still the Christian nationalists persist in making claims about what they think God wants—​and about how events in the contemporary world seems to be a sign

1 Mike Johnson’s response to the Trump assassination attempt, quoted at: https://​www​ .inqui​rer​.com​/polit​ics​/penns​ylva​nia​/dem​ocra​tic​-party​-messag​ing​-trump​-critic​ism​-20240​ 716​.html, accessed August 5, 2024.

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_009

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of some larger theological issue or struggle. Again, most nonreligious people will find this all to be quite unconvincing. One significant example of the discussion of divine ordination playing itself out in political life occurred in the summer of 2024 in the aftermath of an assassination attempt in Pennsylvania that nearly killed Donald Trump, as he campaigned for a second term as President. That Trump survived this attack, in which a bullet grazed his ear, was viewed by many of his supporters as a miracle and a sign of divine ordination. House Speaker Mike Johnson explained it in just this way (as quoted above). In a post about this on X (Twitter), Johnson said, “God protected President Trump … just as He miraculously protected George Washington from a gunfire ambush on July 9, 1755—​also in Pennsylvania, less than 50 miles from the Trump rally stage”2 This kind of miraculous reading of contemporary events was echoed by a number of other Trump supporters. Rev. Franklin Graham said, for example, that the fact that Trump was saved shows us that “It’s obvious that God’s hand of protection was on him.”3 And as I noted in the Preface, when Trump was inaugurated for the second time Trump himself claimed that it was the will of God that saved him. This idea of divine intervention and divine ordination is typical of Christians such as Johnson, who see theological forces at work in the human world. When he was elected Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, in October 2023, Speaker Johnson saw this as part of a divine plan. In his remarks after his election, he said that this rise to power was “ordained” by God. I don’t believe there are any coincidences. I believe that scripture, the Bible, is very clear that God is the one that raises up those in authority, he raised up each of you, all of us. And I believe that God has ordained and allowed us to be brought here to this specific moment and time. This is my belief. I believe that each one of us has a huge responsibility today to use the gifts that God has given us to serve the extraordinary people of this great country and they deserve it and to ensure that our republic remains standing as the great beacon of light and hope and freedom in a world that desperately needs it.4

2 Mike Johnson Twitter: https://​x​.com​/Spe​aker​John​son​/sta​tus​/1812​5167​4467​9858​260, accessed August 5, 2024. 3 Franklin Graham on Fox news: https://​www​.foxn​ews​.com​/lifest​yle​/trump​-shoot​ing​-gods​ -hand​-pro​tect​ion​-rev​-frank​lin​-gra​ham​-oth​ers, accessed August 5, 2024. 4 Mike Johnson’s Remarks after being elected Speaker of the House of Representatives, Oct. 26, 2023, https://​www​.rev​.com​/blog​/tran​scri​pts​/mike​-john​son​-deliv​ers​-rema​rks​-after​-being​ -elec​ted​-house​-spea​ker​-tra​nscr​ipt, accessed January 6, 2024.

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This and other remarks led critics to pounce on Johnson’s record of flirtations with Christian nationalism.5 Speaker Johnson apparently combines his political theology with conservative views of sexuality, abortion, and other hot button issues. And he appears to believe that God’s hand is at work in the messy elections that led to his elevation, as well as in the failed assassination of Donald Trump. But—​and here is the good news—​his election to a leadership position in the U.S. Congress does not thereby entitle him to do whatever he wants. This reminds us that some of the fear of Christian nationalism is a bit over-​wrought. We still live in a Constitutional system. Elections occur regularly. There are institutional safeguards. And even zealous Christian nationalists have to play by the rules. Of course, there is a worry—​in light of much of what we discussed in preceding chapters—​that some of the Christian nationalists will not play by the rules. And there is the danger of violence—​from all sides—​as the political struggles of our polarized political world play out. But the case of Mike Johnson’s Constitutionally limited power as Speaker of the House can reassure us that the secular Constitutional system can work to prevent any single person from claiming the mantle of divine ordination. And these days, the struggles for power of the Christian nationalists occur against a background that is profoundly secular. In the speech he gave after his election to the Speakership, Johnson celebrated the motto on the rostrum in the Congress, which reads “In God We Trust.” But he noted that the motto was only placed there in 1962. It was added to official ceremonies as part of Cold War response to the threat of communism—​as Speaker Johnson acknowledged. Thus, even Speaker Johnson is aware that American religiosity is an evolving thing that depends on the contingencies of history. In his speech, Johnson repeated the truisms of Christian nationalism, which claim that the Declaration of Independence sets the creed of the American people. Johnson said, “What is our creed? We hold these truths to be self-​evident that all men are created equal, not born equal, created equal, and they’re endowed by the same creator, with the same unalienable rights, life, liberty, pursuit of happiness.” This is important. But what is missing in this retelling of the American story is the Constitution itself including the First Amendment, and its guarantee of religious liberty. 5 See: “The Christian Nationalism of Speaker Mike Johnson,” Time Magazine, Oct. 27, 2023, https://​time​.com​/6329​207​/spea​ker​-mike​-john​son​-christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism​/, accessed January 6, 2024, and “Mike Johnson is the Christian Nationalist we should have seen coming,” The New Republic, December 20, 2023, https://​newr​epub​lic​.com​/arti​cle​/177​474​/mike​-john​son​-christ​ ian​-nati​onal​ist​-seen​-com​ing, accessed January 6, 2024.

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Moreover, what we should also ask is whether God was really at work in the election of Speaker Johnson to his position—​or whether it was simply the contingencies of political squabbling. We might also ask whether God’s providential presence really prevented Trump from being assassinated—​or whether Trump’s amazing survival was simply a matter of contingency and luck. The deep theological question here is whether God ordains or allows or causes things to happen in political life? And how would we know? We might also ask how we would know that God would want a secular nation based on the secular principles outlined in the First Amendment—​or whether God would want some other more decidedly Christian form of government to be created. The question of what God “ordains” is often answered tendentiously and from within a religious worldview that makes sweeping assumptions about the meaning and purpose of political life. When Trump or Johnson is elected, this is viewed as ordained by God. But when some other party wins, this is viewed as demonic and thew work of the devil. What criteria are employed in making this distinction between the divine and the demonic? How would we know which is which? And furthermore, why should any of this be employed in making decisions about the human-​oriented world of political actuality? One of the significant hallmarks of Christian nationalism is an answer to the later question that insists that political life be interpreted in theological terms. This is the significance of the language of ordination. The concept of something being “ordained” by God appeals to a deep theological claim about divine foreknowledge or Providence. It is also connected to an account of the world in which it is God’s will that “puts things in order or “appoints” things to their proper place in accord with natural law. In the Bible, a key passage in Romans (13.1) links this to political life: “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been ordained by God.” The Greek word here is tasso, which can also be translated as “instituted” or “established.” Stephen Wolfe, our go-​to author of theoretical Christian nationalism, links this idea to his account of a “Christian prince.” He writes: “the Christian prince is a civil ruler (as divinely ordained in nature) who possesses and uses powers (both civil and interpersonal) to order his people to commodious temporal life and to eternal life in Christ.”6 A different way of putting this appeals to the concept of “anointment” or being “anointed” by God. This concept may seem to go further than the concept of ordainment. Something could be ordained by God’s providential will that is not necessarily holy or sanctified: as in the case of Trump’s near-​assassination. 6 Stephen Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism, 292.

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But some Christians go farther and view Trump as “the anointed one,” which comes close to viewing Trump as the Messiah or even the second-​coming of Christ. Indeed, one translation of the word “Christ” is “anointed one.” Pastor Mark Burns—​a Black pastor who has been featured prominently in Trump’s campaign and at the Republican National Convention—​used this language (as quoted in Chapter 3 above): “We need a leader who is fearless, anointed by God. Donald Trump is anointed by God.”7 1

The Diverse Human World

It is easy to see that this appeal to divine ordination and the idea that a political leader is anointed by God can lead to a tendentious interpretation of contemporary affairs. As a form of American theology, Christian nationalism in the United States is typically conjoined to an equally tendentious theory about the American heritage and tradition. This point is made, for example, as Speaker Johnson did, by citing mottos such as “In God we Trust.” Related to this is a reading and interpretation of the lives of the Founders and foundational documents such as the Declaration of Independence. But these citations and interpretations are often selective. They leave out the diversity of human life contained in the American tradition. American heritage includes the likes of Jefferson, Adams, Madison, and Washington—​figures who do not fit nicely into a traditional Christian understanding of things (as discussed before—​and which we’ll return to in the following). It also contains radical Christian anarchists such as Aiden Ballou and open-​minded transcendentalists such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. We also forget that the religion of the American people has also included Jews, freethinkers, and the religious experience of slaves and Indigenous peoples whose native religions were often deliberately destroyed. Which religion should we go for? Which version of Christianity or of American thought are we supposed to take as paradigmatic? Which one would God Himself want us to affirm? Which leaders and religious institutions does God ordain or anoint? And how would we know? The fact of the matter is that Christians disagree among themselves. One reason for this is obvious: human beings do not have access to the mind of God (assuming that there is a God). So, when Speaker Johnson proclaims, as he did on his swearing-​in as Speaker of the House, “God has ordained and allowed us

7 Mark Burns speech at Trump Rally, February 14, 2024, https://​www​.yout​ube​.com​/live​/BV​ -kJqja​oZI?t=​9025s, accessed August 5, 2024.

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to be brought here to this specific moment and time,” we can rightly ask what exactly that is supposed to mean. This problem of knowledge runs deep. It extends to the question of how we ought to behave in relation to God: what kind of worship or piety does God expect? It includes questions about political theology: how does God expect us to organize our lives politically? And it even includes questions about history and eschatology: is there really an eschatological struggle going on in the world—​what some, including former President Donald Trump calls a war against God—​and what ought we do about this? So much of this is beyond our ability to know. Those who describe themselves as Christians disagree about these things. And folks who are atheist, agnostic, or simply nonreligious might think that these questions are either nonsensical or unanswerable. If Christians disagree among themselves about theology and politics, we are left wondering which version of Christianity is supposed to rule over the Christian nation. And we might also ask how any of us is supposed to know that there is a God or that God wants Christians to take power in this way. These critical and wondering questions lead to even more problems when we open up the door to even further critical questions about religion. Which religion is the right one? And what about atheism or agnosticism or a kind of open-​minded ecumenicalism? A skeptical kind of nonreligion results when we understand that religious people themselves do not agree.8 Perhaps it is better simply to opt-​out of questions about faith all together. This may be part of what the growth of nonreligion is about. This is not necessarily a firmly held kind of positive atheism but rather the result of a gradual process of losing faith, which might be linked to what Zuckerman has called “shallow apostasy.”9 This is not the result of a definitive argument against God that converts one whole-​ heartedly into atheism. Rather, it is a kind of agnostic indifference to religion that grows out of recognition of the diversity of opinions among human beings with regard to political theology. It is well-​known that nonreligion is growing rapidly. I cited survey data indicating this in previous chapters, including the prediction that nonreligion will likely grow to become the identity of the majority of Americans. In 2021, it was estimated that 29% of Americans were nonreligious, while 63%

8 I have made this argument in Fiala, Secular Cosmopolitanism, Hospitality, and Religious Pluralism (New York: Routledge, 2016); and Fiala, Against Religions, Wars, and States: Enlightenment Atheism, Just War Pacifism, and Liberal-​ Democratic Anarchism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013). 9 Phil Zuckerman, Faith No More: Why People Reject Religion (Oxford University Press, 2015).

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identify as Christian.10 The population of American Christians has declined from 78% in 2007, while the population of nonreligious people has increased from 16% back in 2007. A similar demographic shift is already occurring in Europe. For example, according to 2021 census data, Christians are no longer in the majority in England and Wales: 46.2% of the population claims to be Christian; Muslims make up 6.5%; Hindus are at 1.7%; and 37% claim no religion.11 As stated before, in the United States, a conservative estimate from the Pew Center predicts that by 2060, Christianity will no longer be the majority religion in the United States.12 The decline of Christianity will reflect some growth among non-​Christian faiths. But the major factor will be the growth of nonreligion. By 2070, Pew’s conservative estimate is that 41% of Americans will be non-​religious. As stated previously, this does not mean that all of those “nones” will be atheist or agnostic. Atheists and agnostics account for about a third of nonreligious people. A Pew survey published in 2021 found that 29% of Americans are non-​religious. This includes 4% of Americans who identify as atheist, 5% who describe themselves as agnostic, and 20% who claim that their religion is “nothing in particular.”13 Let’s define our terms here. –​ Atheism denies the truth of theism. Most basically, it maintains that the claims of theism are false. Atheists are firmly committed to the denial of the existence of God, and reject the theological and metaphysical assumptions of religious texts and traditions. But as we’ll see in a moment, this idea is more complex than we may think, since atheism depends upon the theism it rejects. –​ Agnosticism is a kind of skepticism about religious truth. It maintains that we cannot know whether the claims of theism are true. Agnostics are not so certain that there is no God. Rather, agnosticism means that we don’t know

10 11 12 13

“Roughly 3 in 10 Adults Now Religiously Unaffiliated” Pew Research, December 14, 2021, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/relig​ion​/2021​/12​/14​/about​-three​-in​-ten​-u​-s​-adu​lts​-are​-now​ -reli​giou​sly​-unaff​ilia​ted​/, accessed January 24, 2025. “Census: Christians a minority in England; non-​religious grow” ap News Nov. 29, 2022, https://​apn​ews​.com​/arti​cle​/eur​ope​-relig​ion​-engl​and​-wales​-sec​ular​ism​-93b89​4a1e​7e26​ ddaf​244d​3592​1a17​2e0, accessed June 8, 2023. “Projecting U.S. religious groups’ population shares by 2070” Pew Research Center, March 13, 2022, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/relig​ion​/2022​/09​/13​/pro​ject​ing​-u​-s​-religi​ous​-gro​ ups​-pop​ulat​ion​-sha​res​-by​-2070​/, accessed March 10, 2023. “About Three-​in-​Ten U.S. Adults Are Now Religiously Unaffiliated” Pew Research Center, December 14, 2021, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/relig​ion​/2021​/12​/14​/about​-three​-in​-ten​ -u​-s​-adu​lts​-are​-now​-reli​giou​sly​-unaff​ilia​ted​/, accessed March 13, 2023.

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whether there is a God or not. Again, agnosticism is also complicated by the question of which form of religion it is skeptical about. –​ Nonreligion is a broader term used primarily in the sociological literature to describe people for whom religious practice and belief is not important. Those who do not affirm a religious belief may be nonreligious for a variety of reasons Nonreligious people may be atheists, or agnostics. They may also have some kind of hybrid or idiosyncratic religious belief that keeps them from affiliating with any specific religion. This may include those who are “spiritual but not religious.” According to the sociologists, nonreligion is growing fast, while atheism and agnosticism are not growing as quickly. Note that the growth of nonreligion may thus include a lot of people who are vaguely sympathetic to religion but who are not specifically affiliated with any specific form of religious identity or community. To be “spiritual but not religious” may mean that someone is sympathetic to the metaphysical, theological, and spiritual ideas found in religious traditions but that they do not affiliate themselves with any set of concrete dogmas found in a given religious tradition. It could be that the spiritual but not religious folks are eclectic and syncretic: they may find truth and value in a number of religious traditions and have a hard time deciding on one faith. It could also be that these folks see a kind of failure or corruption in organized religions. For example, they may take the teachings of Christianity seriously, while avoiding church due to scandals and corruption in the church. It may also be that the broader category of the nonreligious includes people for whom the question of religion is simply not a “live question.” Perhaps these nonreligious people were not brought up around religion, and have never attended religious services. They do not know much about religion. And, thus, they live nonreligiously. It may also be that some of those who are nonreligious are still figuring these things out. Or perhaps they are as puzzled by the kinds of questions we raised above that they find themselves thinking things over without committing to any final answer. This “figuring things out” or “thinking it over” standpoint may be understood as a kind of agnosticism. But agnosticism implies that one has at least figured something out, which is that it is not possible to know the truth of any religion. But agnosticism is a fairly advance cognitive achievement, and some nonreligious people may simply not be that interested in the question of religion to bother to figure out what they actually think about the truth of religious teachings. Finally, it may also be the case that some nonreligious people are more definitely atheists but who are unwilling to affirm their atheism, due to social stigma against atheism. There are obviously a complicated set of causal factors contributing to the decline of religion and the growth of nonreligion. But a substantial

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contributing factor is political secularism. This is what happens when there is freedom of religion and freedom of inquiry: the more we learn about religion, religious controversy, and religious diversity, the harder it is to stick with any narrow conception of faith or religious identity. The secularization hypothesis of modern sociology holds that as modernity develops—​along with its emphasis on autonomy, freedom of choice, and the growth of scientific rationality, increased access to information, and mixing of social and religious groups—​ secularity will increase. This hypothesis has been contested. But the trends point toward the growth of “secularity” and irreligion. In response to skeptics of the secularization hypothesis, Kasselstrand, Zuckerman, and Cragun argue that religion will likely continue to fade. Will religion continue to fade? Will more and more people continue to live in increasingly secular societies? Yes, so long as the relevant forces of modernity continue to be experienced by an ever-​widening circle of humanity. And yes, given that more and more secular people are raising their children without religion.14 2

The So-​Called “War on Faith”

Of course, secularization—​understood as a decline in religiosity—​is what the proponents of Christian nationalism are worried about. Secularization means that the religious identity of the nation is changing away from Christianity. In response to the social phenomenon of secularization, Christian nationalism lashes out against “secularism” more broadly, arguing that it is secular elites and the secular system of government that are causing this loss of faith because of an anti-​religious agenda. Some see this as a deliberate attack on religion, what is sometimes called a war on faith. But as I’ve been arguing, we should distinguish between political secularism (a system of law and government that prevents government from advocating or supporting religion while also allowing for free expression and religious liberty), secularization as a social phenomenon, and a different form secularism that is more decidedly anti-​religious. The secularization hypothesis shows us how these different forms of secularism might be linked: modern secular systems of government create conditions in which secularization (in the broader cultural or religious sense) happens.

14

Isabella Kasselstrand, Phil Zuckerman, Ryan T. Cragun, Beyond Doubt: The Secularization of Society (New York: nyu Press, 2023), 166.

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But it is false to say that modern secular systems of government are actively engaged in a war on faith that is aggressively seeking to encourage the growth of nonreligion. Rather, once freedom of religion becomes established (along with other conditions of modernization), some people will leave their religious beliefs behind. Of course, it is not true that everyone will leave religion behind. If secular systems were more decidedly or adamantly anti-​religious the complete annihilation of religion might be the goal (as for example, in avowedly atheist political systems that repress religion—​such as in the former Soviet Union or in China). But in liberal, secular systems some people will stay committed to faith, some people will change religions, and some people will leave religion behind. This is not a coordinated “war on God” as some people suggest. Rather, it is a process in which God and religion fade in importance for some people, and in which the religious identity of the nation changes and evolves. Instead of seeing this as a matter of battles and wars, and the triumph or defeat of religion, this is an evolutionary process. It is more like the changing of the seasons or a process of growth and development than it is a matter of victory, triumph, or defeat. The Christian nationalist argument generally disagrees with this description of secularization as an evolutionary process. Those Christian nationalists who see all of this as the work of the devil certainly do not think that secularization is a natural process. And even if the devil is not invoked, there are those—​like former President Donald Trump—​who view secularization as the work of the enemies of faith. In the summer of 2023, speaking as a Republican candidate for the Presidency, Donald Trump, unleashed an assault against atheism and the basic spirit of secularism. His speech, at the annual Faith and Freedom conference, positioned him as a proponent of Christian nationalism.15 He said: Our enemies are waging war on faith and freedom, on science and religion, on history and tradition, on law and democracy, on God Almighty himself. And: The radicals are setting fire to our constitution, abolishing free speech, attacking religious belief, erasing our borders, corrupting our elections,

15

The following quotes are from the transcript of Trump’s speech at the Faith and Freedom Conference on June 24, 2023, posted at The Rev: https://​www​.rev​.com​/blog​/tran​scri​ pts​/trump​-spe​aks​-at​-faith​-free​dom​-coalit​ion​-gala​-tra​nscr​ipt, accessed July 13, 2023.

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and we have corrupt elections, and trying to impose their blasphemous creed and woke communism on every American man, woman, and child. And: We will not waver in defense of our faith, our freedom, and our great American flag. They don’t want the flag either. They don’t want anything. They don’t want anything that’s good. And you wonder why and how did they ever get elected in the first place. It’s sick. Together we are warriors in a righteous crusade to stop the arsonists, the atheist globalists, and the Marxists, and that’s what they are. And we will restore our republic as one nation under God with liberty and justice for all. The assembled crowd cheered him on. The warriors in Trump’s righteous crusade understand themselves as fighting a spectral bogeyman, identified as atheists, globalists, and Marxists who are waging war and trying to destroy the nation. Atheists pushed back on this tirade, pointing out, for example, that atheists are not necessarily Marxists, or globalists.16 It is worth noting, as I did in a newspaper column in response to Trump’s speech, that in his speech, Trump proposed preventing “foreign Christian-​ hating communists, socialists and Marxists” from entering into the U.S. He also suggested he would pass a law against the un-​Christian folks who already live here. He asked, “What are we going to do with the ones that are already here, that grew up here? I think we have to pass a new law for them.” This vague threat seems to imply that non-​Christians were going to be harassed, driven out of the country, or worse, if Trump and his Christian nationalist supporters were to gain power. This is absurd, dangerous, and un-​American. We can see here how invoking the specter of a “war on faith” can provoke a Christian nationalist backlash that would result in obvious violations of the basic freedoms guaranteed by the secular political system. Thus, a very basic argument against Christian nationalism is that it is in fact un-​American. The threatened “righteous crusade” (as Trump puts it) against the phony war on faith would violate the liberty of, and cause substantial harm to, the growing number of nonreligious people in the United States. Christian nationalism, as formulated by Trump, appears to point 16

I discussed this myself in a Fresno Bee column, July 2, 2023, https://​www​.fresno​bee​.com​ /opin​ion​/read​ers​-opin​ion​/artic​le27​6873​328​.html, accessed July 13, 2023. Also see a sarcastic letter addressed to Trump from the Secular Coalition of America: https://​secu​lar​.org​ /2023​/07​/let​ter​-to​-mr​-don​ald​-j​-trump​/, accessed July 12, 2023.

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toward a round-​up of atheists, Marxists, communists, globalists, and others he deems as “Christian-​hating” and “blasphemous.” He wants to have them (us!) deported, or worse. We might wonder whether this is really in fact what Trump has in mind. It could be that this is merely insincere campaign rhetoric and that Trump does not really believe that atheists and others ought to be rounded up and deported. But, as we shall see toward the end of the present chapter, this presents a significant problem. What are we to make of those whose espousal of Christian nationalism is insincere? And, of course, there is an open question about how sincere any of the advocates of Christian nationalism are. If this is really supposed to be a Christian nation, then what would become of the non-​ Christians and non-​religious people who are already here, and are a growing part of the population? Would a sincere Christian nationalist really advocate policy that would round up an deport (or worse) non-​Christians? Thanks to the U.S. Constitution, such an atrocity is impossible to imagine in the United States. The First Amendment to the Constitution sets up a secular system of government in which non-​religious people including atheists have the right of religious liberty, and the growth of agnostic secularity is allowed. But the leading man in the Republican party does not seem to understand the Constitution, if we take him at his word. He has affirmed the basic idea of Christian nationalism. And the agenda he is advocating singles out atheists as enemies and arsonists who must be defeated. He seems to suggest, moreover, that this is connected to a kind of Christian piety and American patriotism. But is the persecution of atheists really what God wants? That theological question may be unanswerable. But the example from Trump’s speech shows us why non-​religious people should reject Christian nationalism, and embrace the idea of an inclusive secular system of government. It may also help explain the growth of nonreligion and atheism. If religious people seem intent on excluding and attacking the nonreligious, then religious faith ends up looking small-​minded and mean. Moreover, the hyperbolic language of a war against the Almighty is so obviously false and inflammatory that nonreligious people will find it absurd. Indeed, this would be almost comical if this were not the case of the leader of the Republican party threatening to oppress a substantial and growing minority of the American population. The nonreligious should be alarmed at this call for oppression. This is also true of progressive Christians and members of non-​Christian faiths. The political theology of Christian nationalism is narrow, oppressive, and vitriolic. Nonreligious people and liberal religious people have good reason to reject it and to embrace political secularism.

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173

Atheism, Blasphemy, and Toleration

Atheists have often been discriminated against. A survey taken in 2016 found that 10% of Americans believed that “Congress can outlaw atheism because the United States is one country under God.”17 These two ideas, that atheism could (or should) be outlawed and the U.S. is one nation under God, are at odds with the very idea of a secular nation under the First Amendment. Now it may be that those folks (the 10%) who believe this are simply ignorant. And no doubt, most Americans understand the secular system of this country fairly well (the other 90%). But the Christian nationalist movement seems to appeal to the 10% who believe such an outrageous idea. And similar ideas have been articulated by important leaders in the American system, including by Donald Trump, the former President of the United States. In some countries, atheists and non-​believers can be executed today. Non-​ belief is connected to general laws against blasphemy. For Americans, laws against blasphemy may seem like ancient history. But it is worth noting that blasphemy was a crime during the American colonial period. And it was only with the creation of the Constitution and its explicit protections of freedom of religion and free speech (in the First Amendment) that blasphemy laws disappeared. Several state-​level cases in the 19th Century narrowed the law against blasphemy: People v. Ruggles in New York in 1811; State v. Chandler in Delaware in 1837; and in 1838 in Commonwealth v. Kneeland in Massachusetts.18 While there were residual blasphemy laws on the books in some U.S. states, in the 21st Century, American courts have rejected the idea of blasphemy laws, while thereby reaffirming the American commitment to secularism. And in 2020, the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate passed resolutions condemning blasphemy laws. The text of these resolutions explicitly rejects oppression of Muslims, Christians, and “secularists.” And the resolutions state: blasphemy, heresy, and apostasy laws inappropriately position governments as arbiters of religious truth and empower officials to impose

17 18

“Americans’ Knowledge of the Branches of Government Is Declining” Annenberg Center, September 13, 2016, https://​www​.anne​nber​gpub​licp​olic​ycen​ter​.org​/americ​ans​-knowle​ dge​-of​-the​-branc​hes​-of​-gov​ernm​ent​-is​-declin​ing​/, accessed July 19, 2023. See The First Amendment Encyclopedia, https://​www​.mtsu​.edu​/first​-amendm​ent​/encyc​ lope​dia​/case​/17​/blasph​emy​-and​-prof​ane​-spe​ech, accessed July 19, 2023; also see: Leonard Williams Levy, Blasphemy: Verbal Offense Against the Sacred, from Moses to Salman Rushdie (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).

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religious dogma on individuals or minorities through the power of the government or through violence sanctioned by the government.19 The text of these resolutions is an explicit affirmation of secularism, stating that the government is not the arbiter of religious truth. This is the law and prevailing majority opinion in the United States, despite what former President Trump says, or what those 10% of Americans say who think that Congress could outlaw atheism. Unfortunately, the same secular spirit does not exist in other parts of the world, where blasphemy laws exist and where nonbelievers are subject to legal penalties, including the death penalty. In May of 2023, Iran executed two people for blasphemy: they were members of a Telegram channel called, “Critique of Superstition and Religion.”20 And according to a Pew Center report from 2019, seventy-​nine countries had laws prohibiting blasphemy—​that’s forty percent of countries. This includes: 18 countries in the Middle Easte and North Africa, 18 countries in sub-​Saharan Africa, 17 in the Asia-​Pacific region, 14 in Europe, and 12 in the Americas.21 In some countries, blasphemy laws are not enforced. But in some places, the punishment for blasphemy can be severe. According to Pew: Among the 79 countries that criminalized blasphemy, penalties varied widely, from fines to prison sentences and in some cases lashings and execution. In some countries—​such as Afghanistan, Brunei, Iran, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—​violations of blasphemy laws can carry the possibility of the death penalty, according to sources used for this analysis. In Pakistan, at least 17 individuals were sentenced to death on blasphemy charges in 2019.22 19 Senate Resolution 458 (December 19, 2020), https://​www​.congr​ess​.gov​/bill​/116th​ -congr​ess​/sen​ate​-res​olut​ion​/458​/text, accessed July 19, 2023; and House Resolution 512 (December 12, 2020), https://​www​.congr​ess​.gov​/bill​/116th​-congr​ess​/house​-res​olut​ion​/512​ /text, accessed July 19, 2023. 20 “Iran executes two people convicted of blasphemy” cnn, May 8, 2023, https://​www​.cnn​ .com​/2023​/05​/08​/mid​dlee​ast​/iran​-blasph​emy​-exe​cuti​ons​-intl​/index​.html, accessed July 19, 2023. 21 “Four-​in-​ten countries and territories worldwide had blasphemy laws in 2019,” Pew Center, January 24, 2022, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/short​-reads​/2022​/01​/25​/four​-in​ -ten​-countr​ies​-and​-terr​itor​ies​-worldw​ide​-had​-blasph​emy​-laws​-in​-2019​-2​/, accessed July 19, 2023. 22 “Four-​in-​ten countries and territories worldwide had blasphemy laws in 2019,” Pew Center, January 24, 2022, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/short​-reads​/2022​/01​/25​/four​-in​ -ten​-countr​ies​-and​-terr​itor​ies​-worldw​ide​-had​-blasph​emy​-laws​-in​-2019​-2​/, accessed July 19, 2023.

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Pakistan has not officially executed anyone for blasphemy despite these convictions. But an American citizen of Pakistani origin, Tahir Naseem, was murdered in a courtroom in Pakistan, where he was on trial for blasphemy in 2020.23 Naseem had travelled to Pakistan in 2018, when he was detained. Naseem was not an atheist. Rather, he was a member of a non-​traditional Muslim sect. Nonetheless, the use of violence in this case, the case of the two executed in Iran, and other cases shows us the seriousness of the issue. These are extreme cases. But the threat of death and the persecution of nonbeliever, are nonetheless frightening. And it is part of a long historical pattern of anti-​ secular animosity, and intolerance toward atheists and nonbelievers. I am not suggesting here that American Christian nationalists are interested in bringing back the death penalty for blasphemy or atheism. Rather, I am suggesting that the anti-​secular backlash should be understood in light of historical and contemporary threats of violence and oppression against non-​ believers. With this in mind, it is obvious why atheists and other nonbelievers would support secularism, and be opposed to the anti-​secular thinking of Christian nationalism. It also helps to clarify the paradox of secularism: can a secular social and political system tolerate the kind of anti-​secular ideology that would support the death penalty for blasphemy (as in Iran) or that would encourage religious believers to take matters into their own hands (as in the courtroom murder in Pakistan). Even advocates of religious toleration excluded atheists, as John Locke did in his Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). Locke wrote: Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the Being of a God. Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no hold upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all. Besides also, those that by their Atheism undermine and destroy all Religion, can have no pretense of Religion whereupon to challenge the Privilege of a Toleration.24 Locke says here that atheism “dissolves all,” by which he means that atheism undermines morality itself, and the possibility of social and political 23 24

“American Accused of Blasphemy Is Killed in Pakistan Courtroom” New York Times, July 20, 2022, https://​www​.nyti​mes​.com​/2020​/07​/30​/world​/asia​/pakis​tan​-blasph​emy​-kill​ ing​-ameri​can​.html, accessed July 19, 2023. John Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings (Liberty Fund, 2010), no page numbers, https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/gol​die​-a​-let​ter​-con​cern​ing​-tol​erat​ion​-and​ -other​-writi​ngs, accessed July 5, 2023.

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cooperation. And since, as Locke supposes, atheists “undermine and destroy all religion,” there would be no reason for religious people to tolerate atheists. One essential assumption of Locke’s argument is that atheists are themselves intolerant. The paradox of toleration asks us to consider whether those who are tolerant should also tolerate those who are intolerant. Locke says no. If atheists are intolerant in their view of religion—​that is, if they seek to undermine and destroy all religion—​then religious people are justified in refusing to tolerate atheists. A similar kind of argument was made by Rousseau in his account of civil religion. Rousseau suggested that that those who refuse to affirm the civil religion of the state can be banished and even put to death. This may sound like intolerance. But Rousseau also said that one of the main problems of civil society was intolerance. And he seems to support intolerance toward nonbelievers on the basis of the suspicion that nonbelievers were themselves intolerant. A more extensive examination of disputes about atheism and toleration in the early modern period would include a discussion of Bayle, Voltaire, and Spinoza. And of course, we would need to proceed carefully in light of what we mean by atheism. The thinkers of this era had diverse religious ideas. Spinoza, for example, was a pantheist of sorts: he identified God with nature itself. Some accused him of atheism, despite this. Hobbes was suspected of atheism. And so on.25 And in a sense, the accusation of atheism can be used as a pejorative directed at those we disagree with. In this kind of usage, atheism is not meant to be an accurate description of the other person’s beliefs. Rather, it is meant to malign the non-​Christian (or non-​orthodox) “other” and exclude them. Indeed, this is how President Trump appears to use the term atheism in the speech of his discussed above. This is not to say that the substance of the argument made by Locke is not worth discussing: if atheists are inherently untrustworthy, immoral, and opposed to living peacefully in society with others, then we might need to think more carefully about the challenge of atheism. But such a characterization of atheism is false and unfounded (a point that was made by Pierre Bayle in the early modern period). Nonetheless, history is full of more overt hatred and disgust against atheism. For many centuries, atheists were deliberately and directly persecuted and oppressed. And even today, atheists are 25

See: Thomas M. Lennon, “Bayle on Hobbes’s Alleged Atheism” Aufklärung, 16 (2004), 67–​77. http://​www​.jstor​.org​/sta​ble​/24362​636; Michael A. Rosenthal, “Why Spinoza is Intolerant of Atheists: God and the Limits of Early Modern Liberalism” The Review of Metaphysics, 65(4), 813–​839. http://​www​.jstor​.org​/sta​ble​/41635​521; Ourida Mostefai, ed., Rousseau and L’Infâme: Religion, Toleration, and Fanaticism in the Age of Enlightenment (Leiden, NL: Brill, 2009).

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often viewed with suspicion. But atheists are also suspicious of religious folks. Atheists distrust evangelical Christians, and Christians distrust atheists. A survey from 2023 reports that Atheists feel overwhelmingly negative toward evangelical Christians (79% express unfavorable views, compared with 3% who express positive views). Atheists also are more negative than positive toward Catholics, mainline Protestants, Mormons and Muslims. The negative feelings are mutual when it comes to Protestants and Catholics, who give atheists net negative ratings.26 I will return to this data point toward the end of this chapter, where I’ll suggest that we need to work to develop more inclusive and friendly relation between atheists and believers, under an inclusive secular vision. This inclusive secular vision runs aground, however, when Christian nationalists insist that secularism (and atheism) are un-​American. It also runs aground when atheists espouse intolerant attitudes toward Christianity. At any rate, with Locke’s condemnation of atheism and the ongoing negative view of atheism in the background, it is worth noting that things are better for atheists these days than they were for non-​believers in the 17th and 18th Century. In the U.S., the First Amendment created a framework that eventually protected the religious liberty of atheists. As Jefferson suggested in his Notes on the State of Virginia, in a famous phrase, “It does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”27 Over the course of the next two centuries, Supreme Court cases and legislation expanded the secular protections in ways that were beneficial to Christians, including Roman Catholics (who were also not tolerated in Locke’s account), and to atheists and non-​believers. In 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law an amendment to the International Religious Freedom Act (originally from 1998) that explicitly included non-​religious people under its protection. The updated “Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act” states that “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is understood to protect theistic and non-​theistic beliefs and the right not to profess or practice any

26

27

“Americans Feel More Positive Than Negative About Jews, Mainline Protestants, Catholics” Pew Research Center, March 15, 2023, https://​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/relig​ion​/2023​/03​/15​ /americ​ans​-feel​-more​-posit​ive​-than​-negat​ive​-about​-jews​-mainl​ine​-prot​esta​nts​-cathol​ ics​/, accessed July 2, 2023. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Boston: Lily and Wait, 1832), p. 166.

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religion.”28 The Act calls out persecution of religious minorities. And extends this to atheists by recognizing that atheists are often oppressed. The Act states: “Though not confined to a particular region or regime, religious persecution and the specific targeting of non-​theists, humanists, and atheists because of their beliefs is often particularly widespread, systematic, and heinous under totalitarian governments and in countries with militant, politicized religious majorities and in regions where non-​state actors exercise significant political power and territorial control.” We have described Christian nationalism as resulting from a backlash against growing atheism, agnosticism, and dissatisfaction with religion. It is possible to see this kind of legislation, which explicitly calls for protection of atheism, as part of the problem that provokes this backlash. This backlash is understandable, as some Christians seek to defend their faith against what they see as an increasingly antagonistic culture. And the critique of what Timon Cline has called “public atheism,” is linked to a defense of the idea that the United States was founded as a Christian country. By “public atheism” Cline means something like secularism (a system that does not privilege any religious idea). Cline explains in an article for The American Conservative, “Public atheism, for our purposes, is marked by suspicion of, and hostility to, whatever smells of formal, state-​level recognition and privileging (that is, honor) of Christianity over and against other faiths on offer.”29 In contrast to this, Cline argues in defense of an “establishmentarian” interpretation of early American history (which argues that Christianity was in fact “established” as the American religion in culture and practice, despite what the First Amendment says about the establishment of religion). Of course, other historians tell a different story. And while historical arguments are informative, they are not ultimately useful for solving normative disputes in the present. Indeed, part of the American story involves the evolution of the American system in a more secular direction, in which atheists, agnostics, and non-​believers were granted more tolerance, and in which the establishment of religion was minimized. The historical debate is interesting and informative. But the question for us today is whether we should support a secular system in which atheists are welcome, or whether we should support the less inclusive view of Christian nationalism. As I argue here, it seems futile and ultimately irrational for the Christian backlash against growing secularism to take the form of an assault on 28 Frank R Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, http://​usc​ode​.house​.gov​/view​ .xhtml?path=​/pre​lim@titl​e22​/chapte​r73&edit​ion=​pre​lim, accessed July 5, 2023. 29 Timon Cline, “Against Public Atheism” The American Conservative, August 2, 2022, https: //​www​.thea​meri​canc​onse​rvat​ive​.com​/agai​nst​-pub​lic​-athe​ism​/, accessed July 5, 2023.

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secularism that is wedded to an image of God that is rapidly being rejected by people. That image of God includes the idea that God ordains or anoints political leaders, along with the idea that God wants the legal system to oppress non-​religious people. It is as if in defending a dubious claim (that the U.S. is a Christian nation), the defender ups the ante on what is doubtful about the claim, thereby making the claim even more dubious (by claiming there should be a war against secularism waged by the anointed leader). Not all Christians do this. We previously discussed liberal and modern Christian arguments against Christian nationalism. A modern, progressive version of theism is also typically sympathetic to the idea of a secular and inclusive political sphere. But while the progressive Christian rejects the image of God found in Christian nationalism, the Christian nationalist argues that progressive Christianity is wrong, and thereby excludes Christians who are sympathetic to secularism and an inclusive understanding of theology. Meanwhile, in describing God in nationalistic and tyrannical terms, the Christian nationalist paints God into a corner, creating an image of God that atheists, agnostics, skeptics, and nonreligious people won’t accept, and which also seems to fit the negative stereotypes that non-​Christians hold regarding Christianity. 4

Atheism, Ceremonial Deism, and “In God We Trust”

Now let’s turn to a straightforwardly nonreligious critique of Christian nationalism. Recall that the Christian nationalist maintains that the Christian God is concerned with the political structure and religious identity of one’s country, and that the God of Christian nationalism appears to want human beings to create institutions and organize their lives in accord with this vision, as lead by ordained and anointed leaders. This leads to a political agenda that is intolerant toward non-​Christians, and rejects an inclusive vision of secular political society. Atheists and other nonreligious people have good reason to reject this idea for practical social and political reasons. Christian nationalism would oppress atheists, agnostics, and nonreligious people (as well as people of non-​ Christian faiths). Atheists will have the deepest antipathy toward Christian nationalism. As we’ve seen President Trump has singled out atheism for oppression. This is of obvious concern for atheists. A growing number of Americans are atheist (currently at around 4%) or agnostic (5%)—​as cited above. The concern about oppression and backlash is serious. And it would be bizarre for an atheist to have sympathy for Christian nationalism. But atheism is not merely motivated by practical, social and political concerns. Committed atheism (as opposed to

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nonreligion more generally) is primarily about metaphysics and theology. The atheist claims that no God exists. And while atheists may be sympathetic to the political agenda of progressive Christianity and its inclusive secularism, they will part ways with progressive Christians when it comes to metaphysics. Consider the conflicts found among following three points: (1) The Christian nationalist maintains that God wants the nation to conform to God’s will, and that the Christian faith ought to be the official faith of the country. (2) The progressive Christian claims that God is more inclusive than that, and that there is room for many faiths (and even no faith) within the country. (3) The atheist maintains there simply is no God, and that faith is absurd. The atheist’s denial of God is metaphysical. From this denial of God, practical and political implications follow. If there is no God, then any attempt to use theology to ground secularism will be a non-​starter. And so, while atheists and progressive Christians may agree and find common ground in their support of secularism, this agreement will be grounded on quite different first principles. This is the gist of the idea of “overlapping consensus” as found in the literature on secularism and political liberalism (to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter).30 Atheists will support secular political systems because it takes the non-​existent God out of the public sphere, while progressive Christians will support political secularism because it fits their conception of political theology. We might add that agnosticism can be accounted for in a similar way. Agnostics, who doubt that we can know anything about God’s existence or non-​existence will likely also be wary of a religious political system, and so will also see the value of political secularism. This may seem a bit abstract, so let’s consider a concrete issue related to the so-​called war against God: the matter of “ceremonial deism,” which is a term used to describe the various and vague references to God in official political ceremonies and documents. This occurs regularly, for example, when political leaders say “God bless the United States” (or something like that) at the end of a speech. In the United States, God is also mentioned in certain formulas and mottoes. The Pledge of Allegiance speaks of “one nation, under God.” The phrase “in God we trust” is the official motto of the United States. But as we noted in our discussion of Speaker Johnson, this is a Cold War creation that only appeared in the Congress in 1962, as Speaker Johnson himself noted. Of

30 One important source is John Rawls, Political Liberalism expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

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course, it now appears on America money, and is often posted in public places such as in city halls. These mentions of God have been found to be permissible under the First Amendment, since they are so vague that they do not seem to privilege any religion and so do not violate the establishment clause. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained in a decision from 1984 (Lynch v. Donelly) allowing these kinds of utterances: “I would suggest that such practices as the designation of “In God We Trust” as our national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance can best be understood … as a form of ‘ceremonial deism,’ protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious content.”31 She continued: These references are uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply could not be fully served in our culture if government were limited to purely nonreligious phrases … The practices by which the government has long acknowledged religion are therefore probably necessary to serve certain secular functions, and that necessity, coupled with their long history, gives those practices an essentially secular meaning (emphasis added). 32 This is an interesting point that provides a critique of Christian nationalism. Justice O’Connor argued in defense of a secular meaning and usage of these religious terms, assuming that the secular system was firmly in place (as protected by the First Amendment), while also arguing that given the strength of political secularism, religious terminology can be used in some cases because it has lost, as she puts it here, “any significant religious content.” So much for the claim that this is a Christian nation! In 1984, Justice O’Connor made the case that secularism was so firmly established that it would be a mistake to think that the utterances of ceremonial deism had any religious content. Atheists, however, have often objected to these formulas of ceremonial deism. They see the movement to push these mottoes and expressions of deism as part of the project of trying to move in the direction of a Christian nation. In a number of cases, atheists have even sued public agencies while claiming that these formulas violate the First Amendment’s establishment 31 32

Lynch v. Donelly (1984), https://​supr​eme​.jus​tia​.com​/cases​/fede​ral​/us​/465​/668​/#opini​ons, accessed November 17, 2023. Lynch v. Donelly (1984), https://​supr​eme​.jus​tia​.com​/cases​/fede​ral​/us​/465​/668​/#opini​ons, accessed November 17, 2023.

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clause. For example, in a recent (2021) case in Mississippi, atheists successfully sued to have the motto “In God we Trust” removed from state license plates beginning in 2024. That motto, by the way, has been used in American history as a way of antagonizing atheists—​despite what Justice O’Connor suggested about the supposedly innocuous “ceremonial” usage of the phrase. In the 1950s the motto was made the official motto of the country, as part of the effort to establish the Christian identity of American as the antithesis of Soviet atheism. President Dwight Eisenhower led the effort as part of a “Back to God” agenda. He said: “Without God, there could be no American form of Government, nor an American way of life. Recognition of the Supreme Being is the first—​the most basic—​expression of Americanism.”33 Does this statement from the 1950s imply that nonreligious people are not really American? In discussing the 2021 Mississippi license plate case, Nick Fish, the President of American Atheists said, “In God We Trust’ is a stain on our country’s history. For too long, politicians have used this religious message to portray non-​Christians as insufficiently American.”34 One interesting point in this case is the fact that Mississippi only added the motto to license plates in 2018. This appears to be part of the movement of religious nationalists to push forward these mottoes and religious utterances, that aims to re-​establish the United States as a Christian nation. In a sense, the religious nationalists are attempting to prove Justice O’Connor wrong by insisting that the phrases of ceremonial deism have a deeper religious significance and that Christianity should be established as the state religion. The Courts, however, have put a limit on this effort—​as in the Mississippi case. And yet, the proponents of Christian nationalism continue to push back. In 2023, the state of Louisiana (Speaker Johnson’s home state) passed a law requiring that “In God We Trust” be posted in public schools across the state. Similar laws have been passed in other states: Florida, Arkansas, South Dakota, Tennessee, South Carolina and Texas.35 This has been celebrated by religious organizations who see it as part of their effort to return the nation to Christianity. In August of 2023, as Louisiana passed its law, Ed Vitagliano,

33 34 35

https://​www​.pre​side​ncy​.ucsb​.edu​/docume​nts​/rema​rks​-recor​ded​-for​-the​-back​-god​-prog​ ram​-the​-ameri​can​-leg​ion, accessed November 17, 2023. Also see: https://​www​.nation​almo​ tto​.org​/; accessed November 17, 2023. https://​www​.athei​sts​.org​/2023​/05​/miss​issi​ppi​-remo​ves​-in​-god​-we​-trust​-lice​nse​-plate​/, accessed November 17, 2023. https://​www​.foxn​ews​.com​/us​/louisi​ana​-law​-requir​ing​-in​-god​-we​-trust​-displa​yed​-all​-pub​ lic​-scho​ols​-goes​-into​-eff​ect, accessed November 17, 2023.

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the Executive Vice-​President of the American Family Association praised it by issuing the following statement: What Louisiana has done should be done in schools across the nation—​ and in every public space of every community. The sentiment expressed in our national motto is simple yet critically important to the future of America. We will either return to a deep trust in the God of the Bible or perish. Our nation has, in so many ways, abandoned God, and we are witnessing the damaging effects of that rebellion in real time. Placing the national motto in our public schools is a great place to start if we hope to see a great awakening in the next decade.36 It is important to underline the hyperbolic language we see here. Vitagliano presents a stark either-​or: either we return to “deep trust” in God or the country will perish. It is worth noting that this claim is not inclusive of other religions. It is the God of the Bible who is being defended and promoted here. And the phrases of ceremonial deism are being used as a way to slip this more decisively Christian nationalist agenda into the public schools. A similar strategy and intention can be found in more recent cases in the state of Louisiana. In 2023, the state passed a law require “In God We Trust” be posted in schools. One of the proponents of the law, Louisiana state representative Dodie Horton said of the 2023 law, “I’m not asking you to accept my God or pushing religion on anyone.”37 But the following year, Rep. Horton led the campaign to pass a law requiring that the Ten Commandments be posted in public schools. The Ten Commandments have also been defended as a kind of innocuous historical text that is not meant to promote or establish any specific religion. This is disputable, given the fact that the first several commandments focus on proper reverence for the Jewish/​Christian God. But Rep. Horton gave her own religiously focused strategy away in remarks she made in public debate of the Ten Commandments law. She said, “I’m not concerned with an atheist. I’m not concerned with a Muslim. I’m concerned with our children looking and seeing what God’s law is.”38

36

https://​www​.afa​.net​/who​-we​-are​/press​-relea​ses​/2023​/afa​-amer​ica​-will​-eit​her​-ret​urn​-to​ -a​-deep​-trust​-in​-the​-god​-of​-the​-bible​-or​-per​ish​/, accessed November 17, 2023. 37 Quoted in https://​www​.theadv​erti​ser​.com​/story​/news​/2023​/01​/19​/louisi​ana​-lawma​ker​ -files ​-bill​-to ​-put​- god​-in​- every​- sch​ool​- classr​oom​/6982​1507​007​/, accessed January 23, 2025. 38 Quoted in https://​www​.nbcn​ews​.com​/polit​ics​/polit​ics​-news​/louisi​ana​-lawma​ker​-ten​ -comma​ndme​nts​-bill​-eye​ing​-cult​ure​-war​-wins​-rcn​a158​144, accessed August 6, 2024.

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The Challenge of Diversity

We can see here that Christian nationalism is not only opposed to atheism. Indeed, Christian nationalism also stands opposed to other forms of theism. And Christian nationalists tend to see secularism and other religions as equally diabolical insofar as they are supposedly equally opposed to Christianity. This idea has been articulated by Douglas Wilson in a recent book, Mere Christendom, where he says in a chapter entitled “The Wickedness of Secularism”: “The root of secularism is actually a rejection of the Christian faith, and the root of Islam is also a rejection of the Christian faith. Anything but Christianity, and anyone but Jesus.”39 The result of this kind of thinking is a fundamental conflict among various forms of political religion, as well as a conflict with atheism, non-​religion, and the process of secularization. What will the defenders of the God of the Bible say about Hindu nationalism, political Islam, and so on? What would they say about the Indigenous religions of the precolonial people of the Americas? This leaves us with a problem of diversity. Is Christian nationalism true, and all other religions false (including atheism and nonreligion)? Or are there diverse nationalistic Gods? A religious pluralist might claim that there simply is a diversity of political theologies and that different people encounter divinity and experience religion in diverse ways. A progressive Christian might embrace this idea and secularism as well, as a way of respecting autonomy of belief. Religious pluralism tends to want to avoid imposing religious ideals on others. But the Christian nationalist typically argues that other religions are false, and that the one true God wants social and political life to cohere around Him. One contemporary Christian author, H.M. Hyra puts it this way in a book published by Christian Faith Publishing (a venue for self-​publishing Christian authors—​I note this because the author’s identity is unknown, and because the prose I quote below contains typographical and grammatical errors): Diversity is not the answer to whether a nation succeeds in accomplishing its goals. Without a common purpose both in terms of secular and religious objectives things happen that fosters (sic) separation and eventually violence. A relative position where your beliefs are as good as mind (sic) does not work. Pluralism where all religions are considered equal is

39

Douglas Wilson, Mere Christendom (Moscow, ID: Canon Press, 2023), Chapter 1, no page numbers.

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a farce. Multi-​cultures without assimilation lead’s (sic) to isolation and separate standards for different ethnic groups. Immigrants coming across our borders illegally and sanctuary cities that protect criminals can only lead to chaos and violence. America is a Christian nation. Put the one true God back in charge. Live by trusting God. Put God in to (sic) our government and back in our classrooms so our children can grow in Christian values.40 This bit of tortured prose is typical of the anti-​pluralist arguments of Christian nationalism. Relativism and pluralism are rejected in the name of “the one true God.” A possible alternative might view God as a tribal deity—​the God of chosen people. Perhaps there are other gods. And other nations may be devoted to those other Gods. But the tribal approach to political religion holds that there is a special relationship between God and His people. The tribal deity might only be concerned with us—​how we live and organize ourselves. Perhaps the tribal deity would want us to live in peace with people who worship other gods. But our God may want us to seek conquest and conversion, and who would require devotion and prosecute impiety. We see the tension between the tribal God of a chosen people and a more expansive and universal image of God in the Bible. In the Old Testament the Hebrews fight to establish their religion, and to oppose those who worship false gods. But often this is simply a matter of theological geography: it is about rule and domination in the Holy Land. The Israelites do not seem concerned about conquering others and converting them to Judaic monotheism. But Christianity is a more universalizing sort of religion. It takes religion out of the Holy Land and eventually ends up in “the new world,” where there were diverse people who had never heard of the Christian “good news.” It may be that Christian nationalism is essentially universalizing, although most contemporary Christian nationalists in the United States seem focused on American politics and are not concerned to impose Christianity on other nations. But there are universalizing accounts of Christian nationalism that point toward a global kind of Christian regime. Douglas Wilson affirms this idea under the rubric of what he calls “mere Christendom.” He explains, for example, “Mere Christendom is not Christian nationalism. Mere Christendom is the

40

H.M. Hyra, Divine Providence (Christian Faith Publishing, Inc., 2020)—​online at Google books (https://​books​.goo​gle​.com​/books?id=​a6MuE​AAAQ​BAJ&new​bks=​1&newbk​s​_re​ dir=​0&print​sec=​fro​ntco​ver#v=​onep​age&q&f=​false) no page numbers.

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sum total of lots of smaller Christian nationalisms.”41 He imagines this as a “network of nations bound together by a formal, public, civic acknowledgement of the Lordship of Jesus Christ … I mean a public and formal recognition of the authority of Jesus Christ that repudiates the principles of secularism.”42 It could be that the logic of Christian nationalism, based upon the universalizing claims of Christianity, ultimately points in this global direction. But at any rate the idea of a universal religion ruling over the nations is as unbelievable in our cosmopolitan world as the idea that any single nation should be ruled by a tribal deity. God seems much bigger and religion is more complicated than either of these political theologies permit. Philosophers have argued against the conception of God as a tribal deity for centuries. Universal monotheism appears deep in the heart of the Western philosophical and theological traditions. Socrates’s dialogue with Euthyphro provides an ancient example. So too does Aristotle’s account of the unmoved mover. We see something similar in the work of Averroes (Ibn Rushd) in Medieval Islam and in the theology of Medieval Christianity. Indeed, one significant argument that derives from this historical development is whether Islam is a purer form of monotheism than Christianity. At any rate, the theological purification of God eventually develops into Enlightenment deism. The God of philosophy and theology is not a tribal deity. He is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, unmoved mover. He does not pick sides in tribal disputes. But this monotheistic God is so far removed from the world that He does not concern Himself with mundane political affairs. Since the time of Epicurus, philosophers have argued that God is focused on bigger things than the affairs of human life. This means, then, that for many theists, the God of Christian nationalism—​ the tribal deity concerned with political life—​is a false God and does not exist. In fact, that is what progressive Christianity seems to imply. Progressive Christianity may even be understood as a kind of atheism, when directed toward a denial of the tribal God of Christian nationalism (I’ll return to this in the next chapter). Furthermore, progressive Christians who are interested in interfaith cooperation, and who are sympathetic to the ideas of religious pluralism will refrain from imposing the idea of Christian nationalism on any other nation. Such an approach will also be wary of the imperialistic imposition of the idea of Christendom. Of course, in reply, authors like Douglas Wilson may claim that such a view is not sufficiently Christian. As Wilson explains, “a religiously

41 Wilson, Mere Christendom, Chapter 5, no page numbers. 42 Wilson, Mere Christendom, Chapter 5, no page numbers.

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thick” version of Christianity is required for his idea of Christian nationalism and for the larger project of universal Christendom.43 This means, for Wilson, that Mormonism is wrong. So too is unitarianism of the sort espoused by John Adams. And so, of course, are Islam and other religions supposed to be wrong. These other faiths are as wrong, on this view, as atheism and secularism itself. Now, atheism is not one thing. Nor do all nonreligious people believe the same thing. Atheists do not need to be anti-​religious. And nonreligion is not necessarily anti-​religious. This important complexity is often overlooked in non-​academic discussions of religion and secularism. One can be nonreligious, while remaining tolerant of those who are religious. One could even believe that there is no God and that those who believe in God are deluded, while still thinking that the public sphere should be inclusive and tolerant. Some atheists are anti-​religious. And some varieties of secularism seek entirely to exclude religion. But, as I’ve been arguing, the best form of secularism is inclusive. One reason to support an inclusive form of secularism is because the claim that there is no God is an invitation to further thought. Before turning to that point, let’s review what we have seen so far. As we’ve discussed, Christians disagree among themselves about theology and politics. Progressive Christians disagree with Christian nationalists about the nature of God, about the relationship between God and human beings, and about the nature of political life. This provides us with a strong argument in support of secularism, understood as a political system in which diverse religious beliefs co-​exist, in which no religion is given political power, and in which individual believers are free to practice their faith. This argument in favor of secularism becomes stronger when religious diversity is viewed broadly to include non-​ Christian believers. The argument becomes even stronger, when we include the non-​religious. The political world includes various Christians, non-​Christian religious believers, and the non-​religious (including atheists). We must find a way to coexist despite our differences. An inclusive form of political secularism is the solution. An inclusive political secularism is based on the idea that non-​religious people can and should co-​exist with religious people. Non-​religious folks have a very good reason to argue that there should be no establishment of religion, that there should be no religious litmus test for holding office, and that freedom of conscience should be respected. A system that prevents religious power from dominating social and political life, and that permits the free exercise of nonreligion will be of benefit to nonreligious people who will then be 43 Wilson, Mere Christendom, Chapter 5, no page numbers.

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able to coexist with religious people in an inclusive public sphere. This form of secularism would be inclusive of most forms of religion and nonreligion, except decidedly anti-​secular forms of religion including Christian nationalism and other forms of political religion that seek to eliminate or disempower the nonreligious. Of course, some nonreligious people may however also support a more definitively anti-​religious form of secularism. Beyond the inclusive ideal, which envisions nonreligion coexisting with the various forms of religious faith, an anti-​religious form of secularism may claim that religious faiths tend to be irrational, superstitious, anti-​modern, illiberal, anti-​democratic, and in need of constraint and deconstruction. Anti-​religious secularism would more definitively work to eliminate religion from the public sphere, and may even seek to bring about the disempowerment of religion entirely. In its most extreme form, anti-​religious secularism takes active steps to eliminate religious belief, and may thus become dogmatic, illiberal, and intolerant. This is likely the form of secularism that provokes Christian nationalist backlash. The risk of that backlash—​the ongoing animosity and threat of violence—​provides a reason to support a more inclusive form of secularism. There is considerable tension between these two approaches. The ideal of inclusive secularism ought to be sufficient. But nonreligious people may be tempted to take a further step and affirm an anti-​religious version of secularism. This move from inclusive to anti-​religious secularism may be prompted by the anti-​secular backlash of Christian nationalism. For nonreligious people, the anti-​secular Christian nationalist movement is threatening. This threat can lead nonreligious people to (mistakenly) think that all religions are anti-​ secular. And so it goes, in a dialectic of intolerance. The dialectic that unfolds here reflects long-​standing historical arguments, as well as conceptual confusion. In contemporary Christian nationalist thought and the backlash against secularism, there is often confusion between these two sorts of secularism. As we saw in earlier chapters, Christian nationalists tend to view all forms of secularism as anti-​religious, and even diabolical. It remains an open question about whether that characterization and the resulting confounding of the difference between forms of secularism is a deliberate political/​rhetorical strategy or whether it stems from ignorance. At any rate, the second form of secularism (the anti-​religious) form of secularism may in fact seem diabolical from the standpoint of Christianity, since it wants to constrain and even eliminate religion. But the first, more inclusive, form of secularism is not so obviously “diabolical.”

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189

Conclusion: Avoiding Hyperbole and Falsehood

One solution to this ongoing dialectic and the apparent paradox of secularism it exposes is to acknowledge what we do not know. I began this chapter with a number of questions about the limits of our knowledge of God. A growing number of people take these questions seriously—​as indicated by the growth of agnosticism, atheism, and nonreligion. We simply do not know which religion is superior, right, or true. Nor do we know what God’s plan (if there is a God) is for the nation. Nor do we know what God intends for us to do in the present moment. Nor do we know that God ordains or anoints any human being as his representative on earth. The proponents of Christian nationalism often ignore these difficult questions of theology and epistemology—​or simply assume that faith provides the answers. They facilely claim that there is a war against God, that God’s will is being done in the world, that God wants the nation—​and the nations—​to unite under the rule of Jesus Christ, and so on. But a moment of critical thinking makes it clear that most of this is either insincere rhetoric or very shallow and unsupportable theology and piety. The way forward must include more and better critical thinking. We ought to continue to ask the difficult questions of theology and of American history. We ought to critique the insincerity and shallowness of many of the public expressions of piety we encounter in this arena. Furthermore, we ought to avoid hyperbole, outright falsehood, and the polarization that it provokes. Inclusive forms of secularism work best when the parties are sincere in their attempt to find common ground. But hyperbolic and polarizing caricatures of the parties makes this impossible. It is also impossible to find common ground when the parties are not sincere, forthright, or honest. Let’s begin with the problem of hyperbole. Consider again some of the rhetoric associated with the Christian nationalist critique of secularism. To call secularism diabolical rules out any cooperation or accord. The same is true with Donald Trump’s rhetoric of a war on God Almighty. Recall the statement from Trump that we quoted toward the beginning of this chapter: “Our enemies are waging war on faith and freedom, on science and religion, on history and tradition, on law and democracy, on God Almighty himself.” This description of a war of enemies that is directed against the totality of one’s beliefs and identity does not allow for negotiation or accommodation. For those who believe that we are in the middle of such a war, it is not possible to co-​exist with this kind of anti-​religious and anti-​American enemy. As I’ve noted, this characterization of political secularism is false and hyperbolic. Inclusive political secularism is not at war with faith, freedom, religion, history, tradition, or democracy. Indeed, inclusive political secularism is in fact

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a central component of the American system, based in the First Amendment and subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence. It is true that the developed secular system of the United States has resulted, in some cases, with religion being taken out of the public sphere: as in school prayer and other cases we discussed here. But there is wisdom in these developments, as the secular political system attempts to find some way to accommodate the diversity of theological, religious, and nonreligious views of people who must live together. This is not a war on God, faith, and religion. The secular system in the United States developed as an inclusive approach that allows the free exercise of religion, while putting safeguards in place that prevent the establishment of a public religion. Far from being a kind of anti-​religious state-​atheism, the wisdom of the American system is that it allows for public expressions of ceremonial deism that are supposed to allow diverse persons of different religious faith to find meaning in these basically “secular” expressions (to use Justice O’Connor’s terminology). Indeed, the remaining aspects of ceremonial deism have continued to be offensive for some atheists and nonreligious folks. This in fact shows us that secularism in the U.S. is not anti-​religious. Indeed, some nonreligious folks think that American secularism is overly accommodating to ceremonial deism and other forms of religious expression. As we conclude, let’s consider a further iteration of the paradox of secularism. What can an inclusive political secularism do with those who insist on hyperbolic mis-​characterizations of the system itself, which serves to undermine that inclusive system? To put this bluntly, is there room for toleration of those who espouse views such as Trump’s, which falsely accuse the secular system of being at war with God? The problem of hyperbole and mischaracterization brings in a further difficulty involving the challenge of responding to false and manipulative rhetoric. Consider the difference between those Christian nationalists who sincerely believe that secularism is wrong. A sincere Christian nationalist may simply and straightforwardly believe that the state ought to enforce Christian orthodoxy. But there is also insincere and polarizing rhetoric, which falsely claims that the secular system is waging a war against God. In the first case, we have a straightforward conflict of values: the Christian nationalist forthrightly rejects inclusive political secularism. And as we’ve seen, this results in the paradox of secularism, insofar as forthrightly anti-​secular beliefs may not be welcome within the inclusive public sphere. In the second case, things are murkier and confused. But there is also a version of the paradox here as well, as the inclusive secular public sphere seeks to include those who are sincere in their beliefs. But it is not clear whether the secular system can include those who are insincere and who deliberately mischaracterize the system, despite the evidence to the contrary.

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The Free Mind of the Secular Enlightenment: The Cut Flower Fallacy, the Social Contract, and the Secular Idea of the American Founding Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether insusceptible of restraint. Thomas Jefferson1

∵ One of the canards of Christian nationalism is that nonreligion and secularism are tainted by moral relativism. This claim has been made in various ways by those who broadly defend the idea that without some grounding in a religious worldview, modern social and political life is left without any objective basis and cast adrift on the tides of subjectivism and unfounded opinion. But we might justifiably wonder how Christianity, with its myths and fables, its multifarious interpretations, and its bloody past involving the persecution of heretics and dissidents is supposed to provide a more objective and stable foundation for morality and political life. A secular approach that is grounded in a rational approach to morality and the idea of a social contract makes much more sense. Moreover, the basic idea of religious liberty is non-​ relative. Proponents of secularism who affirm the importance of freedom are not relativists. This remains true, even if liberty is itself grounded in a variety of ways. Some Christians think that religious liberty is fundamental because of the kind of anti-​tyrannical theology we discussed previously. Liberty is also affirmed by deists, and others who understand religious belief and theology in various ways. And in fact, atheists and nonreligious people agree that religious liberty is a fundamental good. The fact that there are diverse reasons to support the idea of religious liberty is a sign of its universal value. And indeed, this

1 Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​son​/01​-02​-02​-0132​-0004​-0082, accessed December 5, 2023.

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_010

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pluralistic consensus lies at the heart of the social contract theory of political life, which holds that diverse people will be able to agree to a basic set of governing principles. Some proponents of religious ethics including the Christian nationalists maintain that no such secular theory is possible. One form of this argument maintains that the supposed consensus of the secular social contract theory is a pale ghost of genuine morality. We will discuss that claim here, while exploring responses to this found in the modern social contract theory, and in the thinking of some important and foundational American thinkers. The basic argument made here is that the American founders affirmed a social contract theory of the state. Moreover, I suggest that, given their own diversity of views about religion, including some of the Founders who had quite unorthodox religious thinking, their advocacy for religious liberty would put them at odds with the contemporary Christian nationalist idea that the U.S. is or ought to be a Christian nation. The foundational idea of the social contract is found in the Declaration of Independence, which states, “governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” According to one useful interpretation, the American founders tended to think of a “social compact,” rather than a social contract, viewing a contract as a commercial agreement.2 Madison explained, for example, in an essay from 1835, “all power in just & free Governments is derived from Compact.”3 But in this chapter, rather than using the term “compact,” I’ll use the more familiar idea of a social contract. At any rate, the basic idea is that law and government depend upon a rational agreement that goes beyond self-​interest and power. There are complexities among the thinking of the American founders about this idea. The anti-​Federalists accepted the basic idea of the social contract, but they argued against the Constitution, for example, by arguing that the country was too large and diverse to be united by any actual compact.4 And the idea of the social contract has a long and complex history in the philosophical tradition that includes Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, as well as contemporary thinkers such as Rawls and Gauthier. The theory has been developed in various ways as “contractarianism” “contractualism.” We will not dwell on the

2 Gary Rosen, American Compact: James Madison and the Problem of Founding (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1999). 3 James Madison, Essay on Sovereignty (1835), https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Madi​ son​/99​-02​-02​-3188, accessed January 9, 2024. 4 This is the gist of the argument made by Brutus #1 and #2, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay The Federalist: With Letters of Brutus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

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subtleties and complexities of these philosophical theories here.5 But I will argue that the basic idea of the social contract is fundamentally secular. The founding fathers did not use the term “secular” in our modern sense, although they did view the United States as a novus ordo seclorum (a new order for the ages). As I noted in Chapter 1, the contemporary terminology of secular and secularism develops later in the 19th Century. So, at best we can say that the founders were advocates of political secularism, avant la lettre. They imagined the state as guaranteeing religious liberty and as preventing the establishment of any particular religion. They thought that the wisdom of this system would be upheld by we, the people joining together by way of a social contract. So, rather than embracing relativism, they maintained that the social contract idea provides a firm grounding for ethics and law that does not depend upon religion. This was in fact the prevailing way that the American founders understood politics, as a system grounded in rational agreement and the consent of the governed. 1

Jeffersonian and Madisonian Secularism

To begin, let’s consider Thomas Jefferson’s conception of the importance of freedom of religion. We see this expressed in the Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom (1779).6 Jefferson authored this piece of legislation, which begins with this preamble Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether insusceptible of restraint; all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the holy author of our religion, who being lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do, but to extend it by its influence on reason alone; that the impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, 5 See: “Social Contract” at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://​plato​.stanf​ord​.edu​/entr​ ies​/contr​acta​rian​ism​-conte​mpor​ary​/, accessed August 7, 2024; and “Contractarianism” at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://​plato​.stanf​ord​.edu​/entr​ies​/contr​acta​rian​ism​/, accessed August 7, 2024. 6 Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​son​/01​-02​-02​-0132​-0004​-0082, accessed December 5, 2023.

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being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others, hath established and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world and through all time: That to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical. This statement of theological and political belief is typical of enlightenment arguments in favor of what I have been calling “political secularism.” Several points should be highlighted. First, the idea is that God wants us to have freedom of religion. Second, political attempts to enforce religious conformity and limit freedom of religion are hypocritical and impious. Third, political (and ecclesiastical) systems are the creation of fallible and uninspired men. Fourth, false religions have in fact been imposed on people. And fifth, systems that limit freedom of religion are sinful and tyrannical. Jefferson does ground this claim in a kind of political theology. He assumes that there is a God and that God wants us to be free. But this is quite far removed from any specific kind of “Christian nationalism.” Indeed, Jefferson explains this further in his autobiography, where he describes his broad and inclusive thinking about this Statute in connection with the consensus of the majority of those who voted for the Statute. He wrote: Where the preamble declares that coercion is a departure from the plan of the holy author of our religion, an amendment was proposed, by inserting the word “Jesus Christ,” so that it should read “a departure from the plan of Jesus Christ, the holy author of our religion” the insertion was rejected by a great majority, in proof that they meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and infidel of every denomination.7 We can see here that at the founding of the nation, there was a deliberate effort to set up a system that was inclusive of a wide variety of religious and nonreligious belief (even including so-​called “infidels”), and which could be supported by a kind of overlapping consensus, such as we might discover through the social contract. This explanation of what we might call a pluralistic approach 7 Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography in The Works of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1905—​at Liberty Fund: https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/jeffer​son​-the​-works​ -vol​-1​-autobi​ogra​phy​-anas​-1760​-1770, accessed December 5, 2023), no page numbers.

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to political fundamentals may come as a surprise to contemporary Christian nationalists. Jefferson notes here that there was an explicit rejection of the idea that one needed to affirm Jesus Christ as the source of religious liberty and that this was meant to include non-​Christians. This understanding of the character of the new nation as not specifically Christian was highlighted under the Presidency of John Adams, who signed the Treaty of Tripoli in 1797, which stated: As the Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion; as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquility, of Mussulmen; and as the said States never entered into any war or act of hostility against any Mahometan nation, it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries.8 This treaty has often been cited by critics of Christian nationalism. I do not quote it here in order to offer a definitive argument against Christian nationalism. A treaty is an odd place to look for a definitive argument. Rather, this document should be interpreted as indicating the general sense of the times, when important American leaders such as Adams and Jefferson were taking pains to avoid the establishment of Christianity as the religion of the land. Jefferson and Adams thus help set the stage for a response to the contemporary Christian nationalist argument against secularism. Jefferson and Adams were important members of the founding generation. But they held unorthodox religious beliefs—​and were not alone in their heterodox or even heretical thinking.9 Other heterodox thinkers of the founding era include, in addition to Adams and Jefferson, the likes of Thomas Paine, Ethan Allen, Thomas Young, Benjamin Franklin, and even George Washington. They also thought that freedom of religion was fundamental. They based their secular argument on their enlightenment conception of God as a supreme being who is quite different from the God of the developed religious traditions. Indeed, Jefferson often maligned the beliefs of the establishment churches as a kind of “Platonic mysticism.” Jefferson thought that the muddled notion of the Trinity 8 At: https://​fir​stam​endm​ent​.mtsu​.edu​/arti​cle​/1797​-tre​aty​-of​-trip​oli​/#:​~:​text=​The%20tre​ aty%20was%20an%20u​nsuc​cess​ful,was%20no%20lon​ger%20cove​red%20by, accessed Dec­ ember 5, 2023. 9 See Matthew Stewart, Nature’s God: The Heretical Origins of the American Republic (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014).

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and the other abstractions of Christianity represented a kind of clever ploy on the part of priests to keep themselves in power by peddling an artificial system that generated controversy and confusion. Jefferson said, in a letter to John Adams from 1814: The Christian priesthood, finding the doctrines of Christ levelled to every understanding, and too plain to need explanation, saw, in the mysticisms of Plato, materials with which they might build up an artificial system which might, from its indistinctness, admit everlasting controversy, give employment for their order, and introduce it to profit, power & pre-​eminence.10 To alleviate this problem, Jefferson went so far as to create a book called “The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth,” which removed the miracles from the Bible, while focusing on the moral teachings of Jesus.11 Jefferson explained in a letter from 1816: I have made a wee-​little book … which I call the Philosophy of Jesus; it is a paradigma of his doctrines, made by cutting the texts out of the book, and arranging them on the pages of a blank book, in a certain order of time or subject. A more beautiful or precious morsel of ethics I have never seen; it is a document in proof that I am a real Christian, that is to say, a disciple of the doctrines of Jesus, very different from the Platonists, who call me infidel and themselves Christians and preachers of the gospel, while they draw all their characteristic dogmas from what its author never said nor saw. They have compounded from the heathen mysteries a system beyond the comprehension of man, of which the great reformer of the vicious ethics and deism of the Jews, were he to return on earth, would not recognize one feature.12 With this unorthodox and critical view of Christianity on the table, we can understand why Jefferson and Adams defended the idea that a secular government was necessary and reasonable. Jefferson notes in this last passage that there are those who suspect him of being an infidel, while asserting that 10 11 12

Jefferson to Adams, July 5, 1814, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Adams​/99​-02​ -02​-6314, accessed January 6, 2024. Available at: https://​amer​ican​hist​ory​.si​.edu​/Jef​fers​onBi​ble​/#1, accessed January 6, 2024. Jefferson to Charles Thomson, January 9, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​ nts​/Jeffer​son​/03​-09​-02​-0216, accessed January 6, 2024.

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his focus on the moral philosophy of Jesus qualifies him as a “real Christian.” Again, this shows us that there is a debate among Christians (and among important figures in the American tradition) about who counts as a genuine Christian. This in turn reminds us of the need for a secular political system in which people are free to believe according to their conscience and in which the government is prevented from imposing any kind of orthodoxy. Moreover, Jefferson, Adams, Madison, and others of the founding generation were convinced that the law of the land ought to be understood as resulting from a kind of social contract, made of “we, the people,” who join together (as the Constitution puts it) in pursuit of domestic tranquility, general welfare, and the blessings of liberty. The government of the United States is clearly the product of a social contract that is inclusive of diverse religious and even nonreligious belief. But one important caveat was noted by the founders, which is that religious liberty itself ought not be subject to any limitations imposed upon it by the social contract. James Madison makes this clear in his arguments about a proposed piece of legislation, that would have funded religious education in Virginia. Madison argued strenuously against the “establishment” of religion that would occur if the state subsidized religion in this way. He points out that “torrents of blood” have been spilt as a result of such establishmentarian efforts. And then he stipulates that religious liberty is a fundament right that ought not be abrogated by the claims of “civil society.” He explains that religious liberty is thus an unalienable right: Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty to the General Authority; much more must every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion,

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no man’s right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.13 Now some Christian nationalists may attempt interpret this kind of argument by claiming that this somehow supports the claim made by Christian nationalists about the Christian heritage of the American system. Madison does say that liberty of conscience transcends the social contract, and he connects it to “the Creator.” But this document shows more clearly that Madison was an advocate of what I have been calling throughout political secularism. With religious liberty understood as a fundamental value, the social contract is then set up in such a way as to protect that basic value. Madison’s approach here is to argue that the idea of religious liberty is one that human beings should rationally agree with; and that any government would be wrong to interfere with this basic right. On Madison’s account, the right of religious liberty may ultimately be grounded in the Creator. But he also suggests that God himself appears to want there to be a secular system of government that would preserve this right. And in fact, Madison crafted the First Amendment to the Constitution as a way of weaving this fundamental idea into the basic law of the United States. Madison introduced the First Amendment in the First Congress in 1789. Madison’s initial proposal for the idea spelled out the idea of religious liberty as follows: The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext infringed.14 Eventually this became the text of the First Amendment, which reads in part: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

13 14

James Madison, “Memorial and Remonstrances against Religious Assesments” (1785), https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Madi​son​/01​-08​-02​-0163, accessed January 6, 2024. James Madison, Amendments to the Constution (1789), https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​ /docume​nts​/Madi​son​/01​-12​-02​-0126, accessed January 6, 2024.

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The Christian Vapor Trail

As opposed to this basic conception of what we now call political secularism, the Christian nationalist opponents of secularism claim that it is a mistake to attempt to avoid an establishment of religion and that the country ought to explicitly affirm Christianity as the religion of the nation. The Jeffersonian and Madisonian approach grows out of the background of Enlightenment and early modern philosophy, such as is found in the philosophy of John Locke. That approach aims toward creating a non-​sectarian consensus grounded in a reasonable belief in the fundament importance of freedom of religion. That ideal has some basis in reformed Christian faith. But for Jefferson, Madison, and others of the founding generation, it was more fundamental and inclusive than that. In response, some have argued that secularism is a kind of relativism, thereby suggesting that it is foundationless and unsupportable. This idea has been articulated in a variety of places. Admittedly, there is some confusion about exactly what is meant when people make this kind of argument, due to the fact that secularism can be defined both as an inclusive political system (of the sort I am defending here in the spirit of Jefferson, Madison, and Adams) and as a more broadly understood nonreligious or anti-​religious worldview (as understood by the Christian nationalist critics of the idea). But the critics of secularism often elide this difference while carelessly maligning secularism. Let’s now consider a prominent recent voice who has made this kind of anti-​secular argument: William Barr, who served as Donald Trump’s Attorney General. Barr expressed these ideas in a speech in 2019 given at Notre Dame University (reiterated in another speech in 2020).15 He says: The fact is that no secular creed has emerged capable of performing the role of religion. … What we call "values" today are really nothing more than mere sentimentality, still drawing on the vapor trails of Christianity. The claim here is that secular values are weak and foundationless in comparison with religion, nothing but vapor, or rather, the after-​image or “vapor trail” 15

The quotes here are from William Barr speech at Notre Dame, Oct. 11, 2019, https: //​www​.just​ice​.gov​/opa​/spe​ech​/attor​ney​-gene​ral​-will​iam​-p​-barr​-deliv​ers​-rema​rks​-law​ -sch​ool​-and​-de​-nic​ola​-cen​ter​-eth​ics, accessed November 27, 2023. Barr reiterated some of his ideas in a speech to the National Religious Broadcasters Association on Feb. 25, 2020, https://​www​.just​ice​.gov​/opa​/spe​ech​/attor​ney​- gene​ral​-will​iam​-p​-barr​- deliv​ers​-rema​ rks​-2020​-natio​nal​-religi​ous​-broad​cast​ers, accessed November 27, 2023.

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of the supposedly more substantial values of Christianity. I’ll return to that metaphor in a moment. But let’s quote further from Barr’s 2019 speech. I cite the speech at length here in order to set the stage for the critique of this anti-​ secular argument. I also note that some have seen this speech as setting an agenda for a new Christian movement. Charles Moore, a Baptist pastor with a law degree who preaches in Nashville, TN, admires Barr’s speech and said of it: “I have a sneaky suspicion that this may go down in history as one of the most important speeches delivered in our lifetime.”16 Here are some key passages from Barr’s speech. I think we all recognize that over the past 50 years religion has been under increasing attack. On the one hand, we have seen the steady erosion of our traditional Judeo-​Christian moral system and a comprehensive effort to drive it from the public square. On the other hand, we see the growing ascendancy of secularism and the doctrine of moral relativism. We can see here, the purported link between secularism and moral relativism—​ which is supposed to have come from a concerted effort to drive traditional morality out of the public sphere. Barr continues by appealing to a claim he finds in the Framers of the U.S. Constitution: To control willful human beings, with an infinite capacity to rationalize, those moral values must rest on authority independent of men’s will—​ they must flow from a transcendent Supreme Being. In short, in the Framers’ view, free government was only suitable and sustainable for a religious people—​a people who recognized that there was a transcendent moral order antecedent to both the state and man-​made law and who had the discipline to control themselves according to those enduring principles. He maintains furthermore that the guidance of natural law is a necessary feature of morality but that this claim about the need for moral guidance is rejected by anti-​religious secularism: The Founding generation were Christians. They believed that the Judeo-​ Christian moral system corresponds to the true nature of man. Those moral precepts start with the two great commandments—​to Love God 16

https://​moor​etol​ife​.org​/when​-non​-god​-is​-god​/, accessed November 28 2023.

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with your whole heart, soul, and mind; and to Love Thy Neighbor as Thyself. But they also include the guidance of natural law—​a real, transcendent moral order which flows from God’s eternal law—​the divine wisdom by which the whole of creation is ordered. The eternal law is impressed upon, and reflected in, all created things. From the nature of things we can, through reason, experience, discern standards of right and wrong that exist independent of human will. Modern secularists dismiss this idea of morality as other-​worldly superstition imposed by a kill-​joy clergy. He also claims that the danger of secularism and irreligion is that it is intolerant of faith and that it is on the attack against religion: The problem is not that religion is being forced on others. The problem is that irreligion and secular values are being forced on people of faith. This reminds me of how some Roman emperors could not leave their loyal Christian subjects in peace but would mandate that they violate their conscience by offering religious sacrifice to the emperor as a god. Similarly, militant secularists today do not have a live and let live spirit—​ they are not content to leave religious people alone to practice their faith. Instead, they seem to take a delight in compelling people to violate their conscience. This series of claims is typical of the kinds of arguments heard among those who espouse various forms of Christian nationalism. That they were made by the Attorney-​General of the United States is disturbing. Barr suggests that secularism and moral relativism have divorced the American people from the transcendent religious source of objective moral truth. He claims that the American system is somehow grounded in Judeo-​Christian religion, suggesting that in the past decades, the United States has fallen away from the original source. Furthermore, he suggests that the proponents of secularism are aggressively pursuing an agenda that demands worship of an imperious state that indeed takes delight in harming religion. One thread found in this argument and others like it is what we might call “the cut flower fallacy.” We might also call it the “illusion of the vapor trail.” I take that last description from that metaphor used Barr’s speech, where he suggests we are living “on the vapor trails of Christianity.” Barr’s contention is that when society turns away from the Judeo-​Christian basis of morality, there is nothing left but vapor.

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In naming this as a fallacy or a kind of illusion, I mean to say that it is bad argument. Varieties of this argument can be found in many places. It is related to of an argument often attributed to Dostoevsky, what I have called elsewhere “Dostoevsky’s Maxim.”17 The worry is that if there were no God, everything would be permitted. Behind this worry is an implicit argument in favor of “divine command ethics,” which is the basic idea that God provides both the source of ethics and a motivation to be ethical. This argument assumes that human beings would run wild if we are not constrained by God. Such an argument ignores however other sources of moral, social, and legal restraint. This is not the place to rehearse all of the arguments in favor of some kind of objectivity in ethics. But we should note that the social contract theory provides an important source. Indeed, the social contract theory is foundational in the United States, in which the Constitution is itself the result of an agreement of “we, the people.” However, in response to this historical point, proponents of the cut-​flower argument will claim that such an agreement was predicated on the existence of an objective sense of morality grounded in religion. The cut-​ flower argument maintains that problems occur when social and political life are severed from this religious source, and nothing remains but a vapor trail—​ or lifeless stems with rotting flowers. I adopt the cut-​flower form of this fallacious argument from a text written in 1951 by Will Herberg, Judaism and Modern Man, which has been cited by proponents of some forms of Christian nationalism. Herberg was a Jewish author, who was influential in conservative circles in the United States, contributing for example to National Review. Herberg writes the following: The attempt made in recent decades by secularist thinkers to disengage the moral principles of Western civilization from their scripturally based religious context, in the assurance that they could live a life of their own as ‘humanistic’ ethics, has resulted in our ‘cut flower culture.’ Cut flowers retain their original beauty and fragrance, but only as long as they retain the vitality that they have drawn from their now-​severed roots; after that is exhausted, they wither and die. So with freedom, brotherhood, justice, and personal dignity—​the values that form the moral foundation of our civilization. Without the life-​giving power of the faith out of which they have sprung, they possess neither meaning nor vitality.18

17 See Andrew Fiala, Secular Cosmopolitanism, Hospitality, and Religious Pluralism (New York: Routledge, 2016). 18 Will Herberg, Judaism and Modern Man (New York: Meridian Books, 1951), 91.

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The argument maintains that secular systems are based in and grow out of the moral foundation of Judeo-​Christian religion. The importance of this idea can be seen in repeated references to the religious beliefs of the founding generation in the Christian nationalist narrative. The idea is that the U.S. was, at its founding, a Christian nation, and that the moral basis of the Constitution itself is found in that original Christian faith. Once severed from this source, so the argument goes, the system dies—​just as cut flowers eventually die when taken from the living plant and placed in a vase. One recent iteration of this argument can be found in a 2023 op-​ed in the Washington Times, written David S. Jonas and Patrick Rhoads (Jonas is an attorney who is also a lecturer at George Washington University Law School and at Georgetown University Law School). Jonas and Rhoads quote Herberg’s words and write further, while quoting John Adams: “With the rise of anti-​religionism posed by the nones, we throw ourselves back to the admonition of John Adams, who served on the committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence: “Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”19 By citing John Adams, Jonas and Rhoads echo William Barr, who quoted the same passage from John Adams in his 2019 speech. In critically considering this kind of claim, let me underline that Jonas and Rhoads describe the “nones” as being anti-​religious. The argument seems to imply that the growing number of people who are not religious are in fact anti-​ religious, as William Barr also suggested. Some atheists may be anti-​religious (we will discuss this further below). But many nonreligious people are simply indifferent to religion. And in a secular system, a variety of worldviews will be allowed to develop, including religious, nonreligious, and anti-​religious points of view. The cut flower fallacy argues both that a secular system that allows for religious freedom is dependent upon a prior religious worldview and that the system lacks a moral basis when severed from that source. As Herberg puts it in the passage quoted above, values such as “freedom, brotherhood, justice, and personal dignity” depend upon the “life-​giving power” of the Judeo-​Christian faith. There is some historical truth to this claim: in the Western world, modern moral and political ideas do in fact have a Christian (and Jewish) genealogy. But they also have a Greek and Roman (that is, pagan) genealogy. And, more importantly, these values can be grounded independently of this genealogy. 19

David S. Jonas and Patrick Rhoads “The rise of the irreligious: Historic Judeo-​Christian origin behind humanism is being dismissed” Washington Times, Oct. 30, 2023, https: //​www​.wash​ingt​onti​mes​.com​/news​/2023​/oct​/30​/rise​-of​-irre​ligi​ous​-histo​ric​-judeo​-christ​ ian​-origi​/ accessed November 27, 2023.

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The mere fact of a historical background does not tell us much about the objective truth of these values. Indeed, this is the problem of the cut-​flowers argument: it commits a version of what philosophers call “the genetic fallacy.” The genetic fallacy is a bad argument that maintains that the truth or falsehood of a claim depends upon its background, history, or genesis. That this kind of argument has found favor among law professors and Christian nationalists shows a profound failure of critical thinking. Furthermore, defenders of Christian culture and advocates of Christian nationalism should seemingly want to avoid genetic and genealogical arguments, since they want to assert that what they maintain is objectively true. But genetic and genealogical arguments do not focus on the objective truth of the claim being defended—​rather, they focus on the contingencies and vagaries of history. 3

Reason and the Social Contract

Let me put my claim bluntly: if political, legal, and moral principles are good, valuable, and true, these principles should stand and flourish on their own, even when severed from their historical roots. To stick with the metaphor of flowers: the flowers of morality—​“freedom, brotherhood, justice, and personal dignity”—​are good in themselves, apart from any basis in a prior religious worldview. Indeed, these values can be supported independently without appeal to any specific religious idea—​and they continue to bloom even when transplanted into some other soil. Less metaphorically speaking, if these values are good, they will be supported independently by ideas found in diverse religious and nonreligious traditions. The claim I am discussing here, that the flowers of morality are independently good, was made centuries ago in the argument that Socrates made in response to Euthyphro. But notice that we would commit the genetic fallacy again, if we claimed that the truth of this claim depended on the fact that Socrates (or Plato) said it. In citing Socrates here, I don’t mean to say that this claim—​about the objectivity and independence of morality—​depends upon him saying it. Rather, we ought to believe what Socrates said because it is true, and not the other way around. We might also say that morality has a basis in natural law theory (an idea mentioned by Barr), which maintains that there are moral principles discernable by reason. These principles are not dependent up a divine revelation, nor does it matter that they have a source in the utterances of certain characters from the history of philosophy or religion. Nor, frankly, does it matter that the American founders affirmed these things. If the ideas are good, it does not matter who affirmed them or where

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they came from. This approach to thinking about these matters can be found in the writings of Jefferson, Adams, and Madison—​who were inspired by the enlightenment idea that natural law was discoverable by the light of reason. But notice that this idea undermines the claim that there is something special or fundamental about the fact that the Founders affirmed this kind of thing. Yes, this enlightenment ideal had an influence on the founding of the American secular system. But the secular system is not good because the Founders said so. Rather, it is a good system based upon what we know about the reasonable nature of the social contract and about the fundamental importance of religious liberty. Beyond the natural law theory, we can also argue in a different vein that moral principles emerge (or are discovered or created) through something like the social contract. One way that this has been explained in recent decades is through the process of finding common ground and developing overlapping consensus (as outlined by John Rawls). But prior to that, the prevailing view of early modern thinkers who inspired the American Founders was that there was a connection between natural law and the social contract. Human beings will agree to freedom, justice, and dignity because these things are good and known by reason. And when we imagine the situation of the social contract (as a meeting of minds who come together in a state of nature to devise a social system), we will also imagine that rational social contractors would agree to these basic ideas because they are useful and good. This sort of account was famously articulated by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. This way of discerning values, and establishing agreement, was not based on any specific religious revelation. Indeed, it was supposed to operate independently of any specific religious revelation. This process, through which rational beings discerned the basics of morality, was understood by authors such as Locke in connection with a kind of “natural religion.” Locke explained it this way in describing the kind of truth that God provides outside of religious revelation, and which is discovered by the “light of reason”: Since then the precepts of natural religion are plain, and very intelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing

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the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter.20 Locke’s idea, that the light of reason was common to all of mankind, helped to explain how people who had never heard of the Christian revelation could discover the truths of morality. These truths were the common endowment of humanity, woven into the structure of reality, and known by human reason. Moreover, Locke suggests that sectarian religious claims (what he calls here “revealed truths”) are not obvious to reason and that we should therefore avoid being “magisterial” or “imperious” about imposing these ideas on others. This critique of revealed religion was commonly accepted by the American founders. More importantly, it is this natural law argument about the importance of the truths made evident by the light of reason, connected to related arguments about the social contract, that was important for the founding generation in the United States. When the Declaration of Independence says, “we hold these truths to be self-​evident,” they were reflecting Locke’s ideas. It is true that the self-​evident truths of the Declaration include the fact that we are “endowed by our Creator” with rights. There is a religious sentiment there connected with Lockean “natural religion.” But that religious sentiment is much broader than any narrow revelation. And it worth noting that Jefferson’s original statement of the basic principle of the Declaration did not mention the Creator. As Matthew Stewart explains: In Jefferson’s first draft of the Declaration of Independence, interestingly, the relevant clause reads as follows: “all men are created equal & independent.” The phrase “equal & independent” comes from Locke, and here it serves to remind us that neither God nor nature supplies any order of subordination among humans. In that first draft, Jefferson’s derivation of our rights from “that equal creation”—​rather than from the Creator—​ confirms that the equality of concern here is a fact of nature, not an imperative from on high.21

20

John Locke, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Part 2 in John Locke: The Works, vol. 2 An Essay concerning Human Understanding Part 2 and Other Writings (Rivington, 1689; reprinted at Liberty Fund, https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/locke​-the​-works​-vol​-2​-an​ -essay​-con​cern​ing​-human​-unders​tand​ing​-part​-2​-and​-other​-writi​ngs), Chapter 9, § 23, no page numbers. 21 Stewart, Nature’s God, 328.

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Furthermore, the Constitution does not make such an appeal to any religious doctrine or revelation. And indeed, the Constitution is a more important source, since it is the document that actually establishes the United States as a nation under law. But as is well known, the Constitution was a work of consensus, negotiation, and agreement. It involved much wrangling on the part of the representatives of the various states. Rather than viewing it as a work of divine providence, we ought to see it as a human creation. The founding of the United States was, after all, the result of a social contact. Now let’s return to the quote from Adams that is cited by Barr, and also by Jonas and Rhoads. Here is how Barr uses the quote: In the Framers’ view, free government was only suitable and sustainable for a religious people—​a people who recognized that there was a transcendent moral order antecedent to both the state and man-​made law and who had the discipline to control themselves according to those enduring principles. As John Adams put it, “We have no government armed with the power which is capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion. Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate for the government of any other.” This quote from Adams and others like it have often been used by Christian nationalist defenders of the idea that the American system is dependent upon Christianity. The quote is intended to show that the American founders believed that the Constitutional system will only work for a Christian people. But it is worth noting that Adams says “morality and religion” and a “moral and religious people,” implying that there may be two sources instead of one: namely a system of morality and a system of religion. Nor does Adams specify that the religion in question is Christianity! By naming both religion and morality, perhaps Adams was suggesting that some religious people are not moral (and so you need to be both religion and moral). Or maybe he was trying to be inclusive of those who are moral despite not being overly religious (perhaps members of the founding generation who were more overtly deistic like Thomas Jefferson or Thomas Paine). At any rate, quoting Adams in this regard does not show that the Constitution is a Christian (or even a more generally religious) document. In fact, there is in fact no mention of God or Christianity in the Constitution. And religion is only mentioned twice (in Article vi and in the First Amendment): in the first case, the text prohibits religious tests for office; in the second case, the text ensures freedom of religion while preventing the establishment of religion.

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Furthermore, religion is broadly construed by Adams, who was himself a non-​ traditional Christian—​who did not believe in the Trinity, and who as a result did not believe in the divinity of Christ. Adams explained this in a letter to his son John Quincy Adams (March 28, 1816), where he also pointed out that it was not easy to sort out which Bible or which version of the Bible ought to be consulted (which is a similar point to that made by Locke about the “obscurities” of religious texts in the passage quoted above). And with regard to the divinity of Christ, Adams writes dismissively: An incarnate God!!! An eternal, Self existent, omnipotent omnipresent omnicient Author of this Stupendous Universe, Suffering on a Cross!!! My Soul Starts with horror, at the Idea, and it has Stupified the Christian World. It has been the Source of almost all the Corruptions of Christianity.22 Notice that Adams here dismisses much of what are central tenets of orthodox Christianity, which emphasizes the incarnation of God in Jesus, the trinitarian doctrine, and the importance of the crucifixion. Indeed, much earlier, in 1756, Adams had expressed his doubts about the theology of the atonement associated with the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. He wrote in his journal: “Thus mystery is made a convenient cover for absurdity.”23 This youthful rejection of the mysteries of Christianity may help to explain Adams’ more mature critique of Christianity. Adams did not deny that Christianity involved a new “revelation” of truth. But he was explicit about the way that the religious traditions had distorted the original truth of Christianity. He wrote in 1816: “As I understand the Christian Religion, it was and is a Revelation. But how has it happened that Millions of Fables, Tales, Legends have been blended with both Jewish and Christian Revelations that have made them the most bloody Religions that ever existed?”24 He continues to speak of “fraud” and “superstition,” wondering how the original ideas of Christianity have been “prostituted.” He expresses sympathy for atheistic thinkers and critics of religion such

22

23 24

John Adams to John Quincy Adams, March 28, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Adams​/99​-03​-02​-3058, accessed November 27, 2023. For discussion see: John Fea, Was America Founded as a Christian Nation?: A Historical Introduction (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2011), Chapter 12. John Adams Diary, February 13, 1756, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Adams​/01​ -01​-02​-0002​-0002, accessed December 1, 2023. John Adams to Van Der Kemp, December 27, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​ nts​/Adams​/99​-02​-02​-6681, accessed December 1, 2023.

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as Diderot, D’Alembert, Condorcet, D’Holbach and Dupuis. Adams does reject the idea that there is no afterlife saying, “I am certain there is nothing in this World worth living for but Hope, and every Hope will fail Us, if the last Hope, that of a future State is extinguished.” But he suggests that what he has learned from reading these critics confirms his own nontraditional view of Christianity, which he has held for most of his life: Jesus is benevolence personified. An Example for all Men. DuPuis has made no Alteration in my opinions of Christian Religion in its primitive Purity and Simplicity, which I have entertained for more than Sixty Years. It is the Religion of Reason, Equity and Love. It is the Religion of the head and of the heart. 25 The DuPuis that Adams is referring to here is Charles François Dupuis, a French philosopher and polymath who published a book in the 1790’s The Origin of All Religious Worship, in which he argued for a kind of pantheism in which God is more or less the same as the whole world. Dupuis further argued that the religious myths of the world were various attempts to disclose this pantheistic unity. He argued among other things that Christianity pulled upon and developed ideas familiar from other religious, even equating Christ with a kind of sun-​god worship of the ancient world. Dupuis said, for example, “the author of the legend of Christ had made a collection of various marvelous fictions, which were current among the worshipers of the Sun under different names.”26 This kind of enlightenment critique of the myths and fiction of ancient religions helps explain Adams’ critique of the “Fables, Tales, Legends” of religion which we referred to above. Adams was not alone among the American Founders in questioning Christian orthodoxies. Thomas Jefferson classified much of Christian dogma as myth. Jefferson suggested that the mystical “fancies” of Christianity distracted from the ethical teachings of Jesus, which are the heart of Christianity. In a letter to Adams dated April 11, 1823: The greatest enemies to the doctrines of Jesus are those calling themselves the expositors of them, who have perverted them for the structure of a system of fancy absolutely incomprehensible, and without any foundation in his genuine words. And the day will come when the mystical 25

John Adams to Van Der Kemp, December 27, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​ nts​/Adams​/99​-02​-02​-6681, accessed December 1, 2023. 26 Dupuis, The Origin of All Religious Worship (1872 translation, ebook at https://​arch​ive​.org​ /deta​ils​/origin​allr​elig​i00d​upug​oog​/page​/n7​/mode​/1up), 259.

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generation of Jesus, by the supreme being as his father in the womb of a virgin will be classed with the fable of the generation of Minerva in the brain of Jupiter. But we may hope that the dawn of reason and freedom of thought in these United States will do away all this artificial scaffolding, and restore to us the primitive and genuine doctrines of this the most venerated reformer of human errors.27 Here Jefferson expresses the hope that reason and freedom of thought in the United States will lead away from the mystical and fanciful doctrines of orthodox Christianity. This does not mean that Jefferson was an atheist. Rather, he was sympathetic to the kind of natural law account of reason and morality that Locke also advocated, and more likely a deist of the sort that was common during the Enlightenment, which was a “religion” that focused on the abstract notion of a “Supreme Being,” who was quite different from the God of revelation. Returning to Adams, it is important to note that Adams was suspicious of organized religion and religious power. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1815 he said, “The question before the human race is, Whether the God of nature Shall govern the World by his own laws, or Whether Priests and Kings shall rule it by fictitious Miracles? Or, in other Words, whether Authority is originally in the People? or whether it has descended for 1800 years in a succession of Popes and Bishops, or brought down from Heaven by the holy Ghost in the form of a Dove, in a Phyal of holy Oil?”28 Adams was opposed to the mysterious view of the connection between religious and political power. And in fact, he was a proponent of the deistic and enlightenment idea that there was a natural law of the world. This law could be understood in religious terms; but it was also known by reason. Furthermore, Adams understood the framers to be working within a secular social contract idea. Adams himself explains this in his book, A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America. Adams notes that ancient peoples believed that political authority came from the gods: he cites the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans, and even the Norse and the “Peruvians.” He dismisses this idea, however, saying, “There is nothing in which mankind have been more unanimous; yet nothing can be inferred from it more than this, that the multitude have always been credulous, and the few are always 27 28

Jefferson to Adams, April 11, 1823, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​son​/03​ -19​-02​-0400, accessed January 23, 2025. Adams to Jefferson, June 20, 1815, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Adams​/99​-02​ -02​-6483, accessed November 27, 2023.

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artful.”29 He continues to explain that the United States was founded as part of a new era that focused on simple principles of nature and which turned away from superstition. He says, “The United States of America have exhibited, perhaps, the first example of governments erected on the simple principles of nature; and if men are now sufficiently enlightened to disabuse themselves of artifice, imposture, hypocrisy, and superstition, they will consider this event as an era in their history.”30 Adams continues: “It will never be pretended that any persons employed in that service [of the formation of government] had interviews with the gods, or were in any degree under the inspiration of Heaven, more than those at work upon ships or houses, or laboring in merchandise or agriculture; it will forever be acknowledged that these governments were contrived merely by the use of reason and the senses.”31 And: “Thirteen governments thus founded on the natural authority of the people alone, without a pretense of miracle or mystery, and which are destined to spread over the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe, are a great point gained in favor of the rights of mankind. The experiment is made, and has completely succeeded; it can no longer be called in question, whether authority in magistrates and obedience of citizens can be grounded on reason, morality, and the Christian religion, without the monkery of priests, or the knavery of politicians.”32 Adams here explains that the Constitution of the United States was a creation of human beings. He says that it was grounded on reason, morality and the Christian religion. But this inclusive description does not say that the U.S. was created as a Christian nation. And the mention of Christianity here is meant to invoke a kind of enlightenment Christianity that has evolved beyond miracle and mystery, as he puts it. And at any rate, for Adams, the basic foundation of the “thirteen governments” of the United States is, as he says, “the natural authority of the people alone.” This natural authority is understood as

29 30 31 32

John Adams, in The Works of John Adams, vol. 4 (Little, Brown, and Company, 1851) (at Liberty Fund, https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/adams​-the​-works​-of​-john​-adams​-vol​-4), Preface, no page numbers. John Adams, in The Works of John Adams, vol. 4 (Little, Brown, and Company, 1851) (at Liberty Fund, https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/adams​-the​-works​-of​-john​-adams​-vol​-4), Preface, no page numbers. John Adams, in The Works of John Adams, vol. 4 (Little, Brown, and Company, 1851) (at Liberty Fund, https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/adams​-the​-works​-of​-john​-adams​-vol​-4), Preface, no page numbers. John Adams, in The Works of John Adams, vol. 4 (Little, Brown, and Company, 1851) (at Liberty Fund, https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/adams​-the​-works​-of​-john​-adams​-vol​-4), Preface, no page numbers.

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the work of reasonable people creating a system of law based upon agreement and the social contract. 4

The Specter of Moral Relativism

From a certain standpoint, Adams and Jefferson were not really Christians. Consider Adams’s reaction to the Founding of a National Bible Society, which he discussed in a letter from 1816. He had been reading Dupuis at the time, and wrote to Thomas Jefferson: Would it not be better, to apply these pious Subscriptions, to purify Christendom from the Corruptions of Christianity; than to propagate those Corruptions in Europe Asia, Africa and America! Suppose We should project a society to translate Dupuis into all Languages.33 Adams adds that this does not mean that he has renounced Christianity: Conclude not from all this, that I have renounced the Christian Religion, or that I agree with Dupuis in all his Sentiments. Far from it. I see in every Page, Something to recommend Christianity in its Purity, and Something to discredit its Corruptions. 34 But this kind of purified Christianity is quite different from what contemporary Christian nationalists are imagining when they claim that the Founders were Christian and that the American nation was founded as a Christian nation. And indeed, some Christians may suggest that Adams and Jefferson were atheists. To reject the Christian idea of the trinity, the incarnation of Christ, and the atonement theory of resurrection as fables, myths, and legends appears to be a kind of atheism. These foundational American thinkers were nonetheless “religious” insofar as they understood religion in terms of the deistic interpretation of Christianity that was found in the Enlightenment. And as we saw, Adams was sympathetic to the idea of an afterlife. With this on the table, a problem arises for Christian nationalists. Christian nationalists often want to claim that the American founders were Christian 33 34

Adams to Jefferson, November 4, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Adams​ /99​-02​-02​-6652, accessed December 5, 2023. Adams to Jefferson, November 4, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Adams​ /99​-02​-02​-6652, accessed December 5, 2023.

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and that the country was set up as a Christian nation. Not only does this engage in a kind of genetic fallacy. But we have just shown that this narrative can be countered by citing Adams and Jefferson, and by understanding the Constitution, as Madison did, as the result of a social compact. A variety of the cut-​flowers argument appears again in this regard, with Christian nationalists suggesting that that social contract could not have been formed without assuming the background culture of Christianity. The Christian nationalist narrative may maintain that Adams and Jefferson were sufficiently immersed within Christian culture so that even if they turned away from orthodox Christianity in some ways, the nation was still conceived from Christian roots. The Christian nationalist argument continues by saying that contemporary secular systems have been cut-​off from those roots, leaving nothing but an insubstantial vapor trail that dissolves into relativism. I suspect that Jefferson would disagree, in light of the passage cited above, where he seems to aspire for further development of enlightenment ideas that leads beyond the myths and fables of Christianity. Adams would have concurred with Jefferson on this point even though as we’ve seen Adams remained committed to a kind of spirituality that affirmed an afterlife. But what then of the worry about moral relativism? The issues here run deep. The history of philosophy includes a variety of ways to ground moral values objectively. Each different type of moral theory provides a different account of morality. It is exceedingly difficult to conclude definitively that one of these theories is correct, and the others are wrong. If one invokes the divine command theory, as similar problem occurs: which religion, which texts, and which interpretation shall we claim as the objectively true account? Now the argument made by Barr and by others who advocate Christian nationalism implies that it is easy to resolve this problem, as if invoking the Judeo-​Christian tradition leads to an obvious set of non-​relativist moral claims. The history of Judaism, Christianity, and the rest of the world’s religions shows us that this is not as easy as the Christian nationalists suggest. Indeed, we’ve seen here that members of the American founding generation were themselves aware of this difficulty in their reading and advocacy for non-​traditional accounts of Christianity. Furthermore, the Founders were also aware of the challenge of moral relativism. Thomas Jefferson discussed this problem in a variety of places, including in a letter to John Adams (from October 14, 1816) in which he also discussed the French philosophe Dupuis.35 Jefferson writes with admiration of Adams’ 35

Jefferson to Adams, October 14, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​ son​/03​-10​-02​-0332, accessed December 5, 2023.

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attempt to read all of the 12 volumes of Dupuis. In the letter, Jefferson writes that he had been studying another French author, Destutt-​Tracy. Jefferson notes that Destutt-​Tracy appeared to agree with the Hobbesian social contract account of justice. But Jefferson sees this as problematic, since Jefferson believes that the “moral sense” is “innate.” Then Jefferson says that it is not true that morality is relative to different cultures, even though it may appear so. Jefferson writes: The non-​existence of justice is not to be inferred from the fact that the same act is deemed virtuous and right in one society, which is held vicious & wrong in another; because as the circumstances and opinions of different societies vary, so the acts which may do them right or wrong must vary also.36 This is intended to make a subtle point. Jefferson suggests that even though different societies have different ideas about justice, this does not mean that there is no universal idea of justice. Part of the apparent problem is that different societies embody or enact justice in different ways, oriented around differing “circumstances and opinions.” Jefferson is not then a moral relativist, even though he understands that there are divergent moral beliefs and interpretations of morality and religion. It is the fact of this kind of diversity that then leads Jefferson to advocate for freedom of religion and conscience—​the basic secular values that we are thinking about in this book. This was a concern for Jefferson throughout his career, and led him to author the Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom, which held that the natural law (or as he puts it “natural right”) requires toleration and freedom of religion. This basic principle is non-​relative. Rather, the foundational principle of freedom of religion is what allows the diversity of religious and moral opinions to flourish. Jefferson concludes in the Virginia Statute: No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion.37 36

Jefferson to Adams, October 14, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​ son​/03​-10​-02​-0332, accessed December 5, 2023. 37 At: https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​son​/01​-02​-02​-0132​-0004​-0082, acces­ sed December 5, 2023.

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This idea can be traced back in Jefferson’s thought to his reading of Locke. In his notes on Locke and Shaftesbury he wrote, “it is the refusing toleration to those of a different opinion which has produced all the bustles & wars on account of religion.”38 5

Conclusion

In reflecting on these passages from Jefferson, note that the tone and emphasis is secular. Religious toleration is fundamental. And he does not say that God or Christianity requires religious liberty. Rather, the basis of these values is found in applying the light of reason in a philosophical analysis of history, politics, religion, and human nature. As we conclude this chapter, let’s summarize what we’ve discussed here. We’ve just seen that the basis of a secular system with extensive freedom of religion was grounded, at least in Jefferson’s thinking, in a claim of natural law or natural right, as understood by the light of reason, or what Jefferson also describes as “the light of science.” In a letter he wrote in 1826, reflecting on the 50th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson used this phrase to describe the hopeful vision of the Declaration. He explained: Our fellow citizens, after half a century of experience and prosperity, continue to approve the choice we made. May it be to the world, what I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all), the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-​government. That form which we have substituted, restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion. All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God. These are grounds of hope for others.39

38 Jefferson, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​ son​/01​-01​-02​-0222​-0007, accessed December 5, 2023. 39 Thomas Jefferson to Roger Chew Weightman, June 24, 1826, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​ /docume​nts​/Jeffer​son​/98​-01​-02​-6179, accessed August 7, 2024.

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From Jefferson’s perspective, the spread of reason, freedom of opinion, and science represented the hope of mankind. The secular system he imagined and helped create was intended to prevent the rule of religion, which he here derides as ignorance and superstition and which he connects to inequality and oppression. Now Jefferson is not a perfect messenger of equality and reason. His views on slavery and race should be noted and criticized. But the point of the present chapter is to argue that the Christian nationalist interpretation of American history is wrong to suggest that the U.S. was founded as a Christian nation. Rather, it was founded as a nation committed to science, reason, and extensive religious liberty. As we saw here, James Madison agreed that religious liberty was so important that it was an unalienable right not subject to the social compact. This explains why the First Amendment is focused on religious liberty and why it prevents an establishment of religion. It also explains why the Constitution prohibits religious tests for office. The founders wanted this secular system, avant la lettre, to avoid religious entangelement. They appeared to understand that this would allow a variety of beliefs to proliferate—​including their own unorthodox religious thinking. But they did not thereby affirm moral relativism. Indeed, the basic argument in favor of religious liberty was a non-​relative claim about the importance of toleration and freedom of conscience. This claim can be grounded in modern political and moral philosophy (and also in the thinking of the Roman and Greek philosophers). The members of the founding generation may have taken a general sort of Christian worldview for granted. But they did not argue that the Constitution was based on Christian values. Rather, they understood it as the result of a social contract, albeit one that was connected to Enlightenment ideas about “moral sense” and natural right. Furthermore, Jefferson and Adams were not advocates of Christian orthodoxy, much of which they viewed as Platonic mysticism, myths, fables, and superstition. Rather than clinging to the vapor trails of Christianity, Adams and Jefferson were interested in clearing the air and cultivating an Enlightened form of Christianity. They also understood that religious liberty was essential for this project, which would be viewed as unorthodox. But rather than seeking to resurrect the dead flowers of traditional Christianity, these important members of the Founding generation thought that religious liberty could disclose new and better, and indeed more universal ideas: the shared moral sense of natural law and natural right. Critics of secularism such as William Barr have offered a skewed interpretation of the American tradition. They have quoted authors such as John Adams out of context. They have falsely suggested that secularism is anti-​ religious and that it leaves us with moral relativism. And they have engaged in

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the genetic fallacy when they suggest that secular values cannot be supported independently of Christian heritage. What we have learned from our interpretation of Madison, Jefferson, and Adams is that the founding fathers affirmed freedom of religion because they thought that enlightenment was good, that religious liberty was inherently valuable, that the fables, tales, legends traditional religion should be criticized, and that faith could be purified through the use of critical reasoning. They also believed that the state was created by a social compact, not that it was instituted by God or that it should be used to promote or “establish” some preferred religious dogma.

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A Liberal and Generous Toleration: The Human Wisdom of Secularism The people of the United States in general were for a liberal and generous toleration—​I might indeed employ a stronger word and call it a right and the first right of Mankind to worship God, according to their Consciences. John Adams (1816)1

∵ Governments, laws, and social institutions are human creations. It is up to us devise the kind of social and political system that “we, the people” want. This is true, even if there is a God. And indeed, many pious and sincere Christians, and the faithful of other traditions, will understand and assent to this basic idea: that the state is a human creation. As such, it is up to us to figure out how best we can live together. One obvious fact is that there are diverse people among us with diverse religious views. With this in mind, the proponents of political secularism maintain that we ought to create a system that includes as many people and diverse faiths as possible, while respecting the right of each individual to believe (or not believe) according to their own best judgment. Since we do not agree about religion, and since it is up to us to figure out how to exist in the presence of diversity, we the people ought to set up a liberal and generous system that respects religious liberty and prevents the state from using its substantial coercive power to impose or establish any given religion as the right, true, or proper faith. Whether there is a God or no God—​and whether any particular interpretation of Christianity or some other interpretation (or some entirely different faith) is the true one—​human beings must create and administer the institutions in which we live and, hopefully, thrive and co-​exist in peace.

1 John Adams to John Jay, January 4, 1786, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Adams​/06​ -18​-02​-0042, accessed January 10, 2024.

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_011

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These human institutions include both the state and the church. The latter point might seem contentious (that churches—​and indeed faiths and traditions—​are human creations). But the fact of religious diversity points toward this basic fact. Some may claim that churches and faiths are created by God or gods (or by the devil, as the case may be). But the reality is that these are human attempts to interpret the divine, to give shape to experience, and to organize spiritual life in common with others. The reason there are so many diverse faiths is that we, mortal and diverse human beings are trying to work all of this out for ourselves. Let’s call this the “humanistic hypothesis,” which holds that human systems, including both church and state, are human creations. As we discussed in the previous chapter, in its political iteration, this is the basic insight of the social contract theory of the state (what Madison and the other Founders understood as the “social compact”). The state is the result of “we, the people” coming together. The humanistic hypothesis is rejected by those who advocate an anti-​secular approach to social and political life. Christian nationalists and advocates of other kinds of political religion suggest that states and churches are created by God, gods, or by saints, saviors, messiahs, prophets, or other god-​ like human beings. At issue in this dispute is a question of the source of sovereignty, the power of the law, and the value of the modern notion of the social contract. Those who adopt the humanistic hypothesis will be sympathetic to the idea of the social contract. They will think that sovereignty is grounded in the will of “we, the people.” And they will see the power of law as being based on social and political processes of legitimation. As the Declaration of Independence states, “governments are instituted among men”—​not ordained by God. And they derive their just powers “from the consent of the governed.” From this human perspective, the wisdom of political secularism is obvious. It develops from an attempt by human beings to find a way for the diverse forms of faith (including nonreligion) to coexist. This tolerant and inclusive spirit is clearly seen in the works of modern philosophers such as found in John Locke. It is also found among the American Founders. In 1786, after the Revolution, John Adams visited with the Archbishop of Canterbury, where he discussed the status of the Episcopalian Church in America. Adams explained (in the quote used as the epigraph for the present chapter) that the people of the United States were liberal and generous in their spirit of toleration because they believe that the first and most important right is the right of religious liberty, which he defines as the right to worship God according to the dictates of one’s own conscience. In the present chapter, I explain this deeply American idea as a wise and humanistic idea. I’ll connect it to some issues in modern

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secular political theory. And I’ll further criticize the post-​secular backlash to this idea found in Christian nationalism. 1

Christian Nationalism and Human Conflict

Among scholars, there is an open and technical question about differences among the Founders with regard to their understanding of religious liberty and what is meant by an establishment of religion.2 One thing is clear: the Founders disagreed among themselves about religion and about the religious character of the nation. But the seem to be united in their defense of religious liberty, even when this was interpreted by them in different way. Contemporary defenders of Christian nationalism cite examples from among the Founders to support their claim. One oft-​cited example is that of John Jay, who served as the first Chief Justice or the Supreme Court. In a letter from 1816, Jay said, “Providence has given to our people the choice of their rulers, and it is the duty, as well as the privilege and interest of our Christian nation to select and prefer Christians for their rulers. National prosperity can neither be obtained nor preserved without the favor of Providence.”3 Jay clearly states that this is a Christian nation. And he seems to argue that Christian rulers would be best—​thus appearing to violate the Constitution’s prohibition on religious tests for office. And indeed, Jay was something of a Biblical fundamentalist, who served as President of the American Bible society, which aimed to disseminate Christianity by “distributing the Scriptures far and near.”4 His understanding of religious liberty was narrower than that of Jefferson or Adams. In his work on the Constitution of New York, Jay introduced a motion that would withhold toleration to Catholics unless they foreswore allegiance to the Pope. Nonetheless, Jay was a defender of religious liberty, who invoked God while also saying, “Adequate security is also given to the rights of conscience and private judgment. They are by nature subject to no control but that of the Deity, and in that free situation they are now left. Every man is permitted to consider, to adore, and to worship his Creator in the manner most agreeable

2 See Kevin Vance, “A Liberal and Generous Toleration: John Adams and the Freedom for Religion” in Shannon Holzer, ed., The Palgrave Handbook of Religion and State Volume i (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023). 3 John Jay to John Murray, October 12, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jay​/01​-07​ -02​-0264, accessed August 8, 2024. 4 John Jay, Address to the American Bible Society, May 9, 1822, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​ /docume​nts​/Jay​/01​-07​-02​-0356, accessed August 7, 2024.

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to his conscience. No opinions are dictated, no rules of faith prescribed, no preference given to one sect to the prejudice of others.”5 The debates about religion and religious nationalism of the founding generation have proceeded through the centuries. As we’ve seen in our previous discussions of various court cases involving the First Amendment, the American understanding of all of this has evolved and continues to evolve. The current Christian nationalist backlash can be understood as part of this ongoing evolution. Some Christian nationalists want the Courts to shift how they interpret freedom of religion and the establishment clause. From a certain vantage point, what is maligned as “Christian nationalism” by some of its critics is merely part of the ongoing struggle to refine and redefine these things under the law. As I have mentioned previously, we need to be careful to distinguish between those who are advocating that the First Amendment be overturned (and who might be interested in creating an explicitly Christian nation) and others who are merely attempting to tweak and refine the status quo. We should also be wary of trying to pin down the insincere bloviators who blow Christian nationalist dog whistles without knowing or caring too much about what they say. The spooky specter of Christian nationalism is of the first variety: as a theocratic effort aimed at creating an establishment of religion, which would then punish blasphemy and even outlaw atheism. This spooky form of Christian nationalism is found in the writings of authors such as Stephen Wolfe who says: “a secularist or ‘neutral’ civil government or one that has no cognizance of eternal things must be bad for people”; and “by eliminating public religion, secularism generates its own ultimate commitments that are false, idolatrous, and harmful to all but especially and most importantly harmful to the church.”6 Wolfe imagines a revolution that would set up an establishment of religion in response to the sins of secularism. A less sinister form of activism is sometimes described as Christian nationalism by its critics—​but remains committed to the First Amendment and to the tradition of political secularism found in the United States. This less sinister approach can be found in the conservative criticisms of people like William Barr who maligns “secularism” as waging an “unremitting assault on religion and traditional values.”7 Barr offers 5 John Jay, “Charge to the Grand Jury of Ulster County, NY,” 1777, https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/tit​ les​/johns​ton​-the​-cor​resp​onde​nce​-and​-pub​lic​-pap​ers​-of​-john​-jay​-vol​-1​-1763​-1781#lf1​530​-01​_h​ ead​_​085, accessed August 7, 2024. 6 Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism, Chapter 9. 7 William Barr, “Remarks to the Law School and the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame” October 11, 2019, https://​www​.just​ice​.gov​/opa​/spe​ ech​/attor​ney​-gene​ral​-will​iam​-p​-barr​-deliv​ers​-rema​rks​-law​-sch​ool​-and​-de​-nic​ola​-cen​ter​-eth​ ics, accessed January 8, 2024.

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a significant critique of secularism and prevailing trends in the culture; but he does not imagine overturning the First Amendment. We should also note, as I’ve discussed previously, that there are those like Donald Trump whose language is hyperbolic but who are likely insincere and who seem ignorant of the deep Constitutional and philosophical issues under discussion here. With this quick review of prior discussions on the table, it is important to underline the fact that all of this disputation occurs among human beings in the human constructed world of churches and states. In other words, the humanistic hypothesis holds true in the dispute about Christian nationalism. John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and John Jay were human beings involved in constructing the American legal system. They disagreed. Some of their views were abhorrent and absurd: as in their denial of the franchise to women, in the defense of slavery among Southerners such as Jefferson, and in Jay’s supposition that Catholics should not be tolerated. The American system, like every other system of government, is a human construction. It is flawed and evolving. Some extreme Christian nationalists may, I suppose, reject this claim. They suppose that governments are ordained by God. They may even maintain that they are themselves channeling divine inspiration. And so it goes among human beings who disagree (and who sometimes maintain strange and outrageous things). The humanistic hypothesis holds, however, even if there is a God. Even if some religious traditions teach that there is something like “natural law” that guides questions about sovereignty, political legitimacy, and the like, this is still a matter for human interpretation and application. Even if there is a God, it is up to us to figure out how He would want us to organize our lives and live together. And the fact remains that human beings—​even religious human beings—​disagree about religion, morality, legislation, and the status of the state. These disagreements among humans involve claims about the nature of God, society and politics, and holy scripture. The fact of these ongoing disputes means that there is no agreed upon theological solution to the problems of human life. Since theological, anthropological, and exegetical disputes exist, and there is no way to resolve these disputes without dogmatically asserting the supremacy of any given religious worldview, we are left with the challenge of figuring out among ourselves what rules and principles will govern our coexistence. This is the gist of the social contract theory of the state, which holds that states and laws are created by diverse human beings.

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The Minimal Secular Consensus: Maritain and Rawls

The wisdom of political secularism is found in its attempt to include religious diversity. To make this point concrete, imagine a kind of social contract emerging involving three parties (person or communities): person A, who is devout in their Evangelical Christian belief; person B who is a devout member of another faith tradition; and person C who is a nonreligious nonbeliever. These three parties will not agree about theology, anthropology, or exegesis. They will have to come together despite their differences and seek agreement among themselves. We hope that it is possible for overlapping consensus to emerge. But the basic fact of diversity means that there is no transcendental truth that will emerge to guide the process of deriving a consensus view. Rather, the consensus will be merely human: it will be the product of human interpretation and negotiation. Now some of these parties may believe that there is divine guidance in the human world. Party A may well believe that God is guiding the process and that the political and ethical result is a manifestation of divine intervention. But the other parties will disagree. B may believe that another metaphysical power is making itself manifest in the process (it could be the intervention of some other god, the structure of karma, or the guiding hand of the guru, and so on). And C will reject the notion of divine intervention and the idea that any metaphysical power is involved in the process. Despite this, they can agree about basic structures. We might call this a “minimal consensus”: it is a consensus about basic rules and procedures for co-​existence. It is minimal in the sense that it does not require any deeper consensus about metaphysical ideas; nor does it require a deep sense of solidarity or any further agreement among the parties about a vision of the good life. To see how this works, consider the following: although Party A will find the idea of divine intervention inspiring, that idea is not required for A to come to consensus with B and C. Nor do any of the parties need the others to agree with them about metaphysics for the consensus to emerge. The consensus that emerges will be the result of human negotiations and compromise. This idea has been developed by thinkers such as Jacques Maritain and John Rawls. Maritain was a Thomistic thinker who contributed to the development of the idea of universal human rights: he led the French delegation to the unesco convention that produced the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights. Maritain describes the process of achieving consensus and its result as a “practical agreement among men who are theoretically opposed to one

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another.”8 He explains that at the unesco meeting the consensus about universal human rights was understood as follows: “We agree on these rights, providing we are not asked why. With the ‘why,’ the dispute begins.”9 Maritain explained in a speech given at the unesco meeting in Mexico City in 1947, how this consensus might emerge as a practical agreement between Christians (such as him) and what he calls a “rationalist” (what we would describe today as a humanist or nonreligious person). I quote this at length because it shows how the minimal consensus might develop (and what remains left over in terms of fundamental differences): It is sufficient to distinguish properly between the rational justifications, inseparable from the spiritual dynamism of a philosophical doctrine or religious faith, and the practical conclusions which, separately justified for each, are, for all, analogically common principles of action. I am fully convinced that my way of justifying the belief in the rights of man and the ideal of freedom, equality, and fraternity is the only one which is solidly based on truth. That does not prevent me from agreeing on these practical tenets with those who are convinced that their way of justifying them, entirely different from mine or even opposed to mine in its theoretical dynamism, is likewise the only one that is based on truth. Assuming they both believe in the democratic charter, a Christian and a rationalist will, nevertheless, give justifications that are incompatible with each other, to which their souls, their minds, and their blood are committed, and about these justifications they will fight. And God keep me from saying that it is not important to know which of the two is right! That is essentially important. They remain, however, in agreement on the practical affirmation of that charter, and they can formulate together common principles of action.10 Maritain points out that the practical consensus—​what I am calling a “minimal consensus”—​is about “the democratic charter,” by which he means the basic idea of a society that guarantees basic freedoms, including freedom of religion. In further discussion, Maritain explains that in the United States and France, this idea emerged from within Christian faith and that “religious faith” and “secular faith” work in cooperation.11 This is, perhaps, something like 8 9 10 11

Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 76. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 77. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 78–​9. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 113.

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the “vapor trail” of Christianity we discussed with reference to William Barr’s argument in Chapter 9. Nonetheless, he also states that Christian faith is not a prerequisite for this kind of consensus. The minimal consensus is obtained by discovering a common set of political ideas that diverse human beings agree to, focused primarily on the basic structure of political society and the limits of civil authority. He concludes: “what the civil authority and the state would be concerned with is only the common secular faith in the common secular charter.”12 This kind of language—​of a “secular faith”—​may cause some of the Christian nationalists to react by claiming that secularism is attempting to somehow replace religion. But this is not Maritain’s point at all. Rather, the basic idea of the secular faith is very minimal: it is about the fundamental importance of religious liberty and about the importance of a kind of social contract. This secular faith is inclusive of religious diversity, which ought to include Maritain’s own religious faith, as well as the faiths of others who should see the wisdom of creating a secular system. This idea is quite similar to what John Rawls has proposed in terms of “overlapping consensus” about what he calls a “political” conception of justice (as opposed to a deeper metaphysical or religious account of justice). Rawls explains this in his 1987 article on the topic where he maintains that despite a diversity of religious and philosophical views (what he calls there “comprehensive doctrines”), a stable social system can emerge from a kind of minimal consensus about political structure, rights, and procedures. Rawls explains: Questions of political justice can be discussed on the same basis by all citizens, whatever their social position, or more particular aims and interests, or their religious, philosophical, or moral views. Justification in matters of political justice is addressed to others who disagree with us, and therefore it proceeds from some consensus: from premises that we and others recognize as true, or as reasonable for the purpose of reaching a working agreement on the fundamentals of political justice. Given the fact of pluralism, and given that justification begins from some consensus, no general or comprehensive doctrine can assume the role of a publicly accepted basis of political justice.13

12 13

Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 113. John Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies7:1 (Spring, 1987),p. 6.

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Rawls explores this idea in much detail, attempting to show for example why overlapping consensus creates a stable system that is more than a mere “modus vivendi.” A key idea is that adherents of diverse “comprehensive doctrines” will “endorse” the political system, as he puts it later in Political Liberalism, in making a historical point: “The religious doctrines that in previous centuries were the professed basis of society have gradually given way to principles of constitutional government that all citizens, whatever their religious view, can endorse.”14 The idea of a consensus view being endorsed despite diversity helps us understand why religious people may in fact endorse secular systems. They endorse or support these systems both because there are resources within their own traditions that agree with basic secular structures (such as the need for peace, toleration, compassion, or love of the neighbor) and because they understand that by achieving consensus about religious liberty, they will be allowed to pursue their own religion (or non-​religion) in their own way. In other words, there are both deeply held religious (or metaphysical, moral, or spiritual) reasons for endorsing secularism and practical or pragmatic reasons for doing so. This idea of a minimal (public, practical, or political) consensus is fundamental to the notion of political secularism that I’ve been describing in this book, and which I have traced back to the thought of American Founders such as Adams, Jefferson, and Madison. Rawls’s account of this has given birth to a wide literature that ask how this works, whether it is possible, and whether devout religious people will (and can or should) agree to the idea. Among the more famous responses to Rawls is that of Jürgen Habermas, who argues, basically, that Rawls is too dismissive of religion—​and that religious views should be taken more seriously.15 One issue has to do with the so-​called Rawlsian “proviso” which limits public discussion to non-​religious language, which could be generally accepted by those who do not share religious worldviews. Habermas suggests that perhaps this is too restrictive.16 I do not intend to chase the Habermas-​Rawls discussion down a scholarly and historical rabbit hole. But let me note that Habermas points out that 14

John Rawls, Political Liberalism expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 10. 15 See James Gordon Finlayson, The Habermas-​ Rawls Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019). 16 Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008); and Jürgen Habermas, “’The Political’: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology” in Judith Butler, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Cornel West: The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, ed. by Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 15–​33.

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Rawls’s view creates a problem that we will address in this chapter. Here is how Rawls puts it in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (from 1997): How is it possible for citizens of faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic society who endorse society's intrinsic political ideals and values and do not simply acquiesce in the balance of political and social forces? Expressed more sharply: How is it possible—​or is it—​for those of faith, as well as the nonreligious (secular), to endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline?17 These questions point us back to the problem of Christian nationalism, which we’ve been discussing throughout. The second question (about the decline of religiosity) connects to my interpretation of Christian nationalism as a backlash response to growing nonreligion and the decline of religion. The first question asks whether it is possible for some religious folks to “wholeheartedly” embrace secularism. Indeed, as we’ve been discussing “political religion” of the sort we can associate with the more extreme forms of Christian nationalism does not embrace secularism at all. Rather, it sees secularism as diabolical—​at least in part because it is blamed for the decline in religiosity. And so, some of those extreme Christian nationalists will explicitly reject the so-​called “secular faith” that is humanistic and that aims to be non-​metaphysical and pragmatically inclusive. 3

Post-​secular Political Religion

It is worth noting here that the discussion we’ve been engaging in this book about Christian nationalism echoes a related set of concerns that came to the fore in the Habermas-​Rawls debate and in relation to real world events that grew in importance during the past several decades, and which often revolved around the question of political Islam in Europe. This also included questions about whether secularism should be understood as a Eurocentric and colonial imposition on non-​European and non-​Christian peoples.18 Some of the real-​world issues of concern stemmed from Islamist terrorism in Europe and 17 18

John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” The University of Chicago Law Review 64:2 (Summer, 1997) pp. 765–​807, p. 781. For further discussion see Andrew F. March, “Political Islam: Theory” Annual Review of Political Science (2015) 18:1, 103–​123.

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America—​including the attacks of September 11, 2001. Questions that were asked included whether this was to be understood as a backlash against colonialism or as the rise of anti-​secular Islamist ideology—​and how these things are interconnected. Those kinds of questions involving geopolitical conflicts, immigration, and the colonial or post-​colonial situation are somewhat different from questions about the rise of anti-​secular movements such as Christian nationalism from within the United States and in other secular places (also perhaps including the rise of Hindu nationalism in India, and so on). Nonetheless, these various forms of the backlash against secularism are related. In 2008, Habermas pointed out that the challenge of political Islam has led to something like a “crisis of faith” within secularism, and which may require us to rethink secularism under the rubric of something like “post-​secularism.”19 For Habermas, the point is that resurgent nationalisms and religious fundamentalism create a significant challenge to the secularization hypothesis (the idea that modernization and secularization will grow hand-​in-​glove to create the triumph of secularism). Habermas’s point is that it is not certain that secularization will continue to grow. In discussing this, Habermas is using the term secularism in a broad cultural sense that has to do with the growth of nonreligion and the general waning of religious belief. I’ve noted the demographic shifts in terms of church membership and the growth of nonreligions previously. I’ve also noted that even though the data appear to point toward continued growth of nonreligion (“secularism” in a broad cultural sense), we cannot predict this with certainty. But, to return to my focus on political secularism, these cultural trends are different from the legal and constitutional framework of secular states—​and the political philosophy that undergirds such institutions. To put this bluntly, the people may be more or less religious (more or less “secular” in the cultural sense), while still agreeing that a secular political system is wise. Of course, there are some extreme forms of political religion that reject the political argument: the advocates of political Islam and the advocates of outright Christian nationalism. As I’ve argued throughout, Christian nationalism in the United States, at least, can be understood as a kind of backlash against cultural secularization that also sometimes becomes an explicit rejection of the norms of political secularism. This connects to the concern about post-​ secularism insofar as the contemporary concern involves a turn away from secularism that occurs after secularism has long been established as the status

19

Jürgen Habermas, (2008), “Notes on Post-​Secular Society” New Perspectives Quarterly, 25: 17–​29.

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quo and law of the land. Christian nationalism and other forms of political religion are post-​secular insofar as they develop out of, and in reaction against, the prevailing secular consensus. Now, as I’ve noted previously, not every person who has been described as a Christian nationalist is interested in overturning the political system in order to institute Christian dominion or create a theocratic regime. But some are. Here, as a reminder is a passage from Stephen Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism, which I quoted previously, which shows what this might look like: A Christian society that is for itself will distrust atheists, decry blasphemy, correct any dishonoring of Christ, orient life around the Sabbath, frown on and suppress moral deviancy … A Christian nation that is true to itself will unashamedly and confidently assert Christian supremacy over the land.20 That kind of vision of Christian supremacy is quite different from what would be permitted within the secular political system of the United States. A remaining question then, is how a secular system ought to respond to those post-​secular religious folks who do not support political secularism, who are alarmed by the growth of nonreligion and what they see as the changing cultural (and religious) identity of “their” nation. Again, I think it is important to defuse anxiety about this. Some of the anti-​secular (or as we’ve described in this chapter post-​secular) backlash is merely cultural. For religious folks who want to renew and revive their faith in the face of the growth of nonreligion, that is their right. They can follow their conscience in this regard and their renewed religiosity should be tolerated and included. The more difficult problem arises with regard to those who are adamantly opposed to the very idea of secularism and who reject the secular political structure itself. The humanistic hypothesis of political secularism is supposed to be inclusive. For consensus to emerge, there is no requirement that parties must agree about metaphysics or ethics, or about what the process and its results indicate about ultimate reality. The consensus can thus include a variety of those who are willing to abide by the result, despite their different metaphysical ideas, so long as they do in fact agree to go along with the consensus. This inclusiveness even allows (permits or includes) those who interpret the process and its result in a quite different way. Party A thinks the Christian deity has guided the process; B thinks another

20

Stephen Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism (Moscow, ID, Canon Press: 2022), 240–​41.

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deity or metaphysical principles can be seen as working in the process; and C does not think that any deity or larger metaphysical principle is at work in the process. So long as they agree to abide by the result, the consensus will hold. If the result is inclusive, it will be sufficient “secular” (in a political sense), even if not all of the parties are “secular” in a cultural sense. The challenge posed by politicized post-​secular (and frankly anti-​secular) religions including Christian nationalism is that ultimately these religions do not agree to abide by the result of this humanistic process. And so, the paradox of secularism emerges from the question of how inclusive secular systems can respond to those who reject the humanistic hypothesis and the minimal consensus described here. To state this plainly: it would be illegal under the secular constitution to stage an insurrection against that system that would undermine religious liberty or that would aim to create an establishment of religion. A system of law cannot “include” those who reject that legal system. Nor can a social contract theory find a place to include those who refuse to abide by that contract. And now let’s say something further about the idea of being “inclusive.” I have argued elsewhere that secularism and toleration can appear to offer only a thin kind of inclusivity.21 Toleration can sometimes appear as something that a dominant power offers as a boon to those who lack power or are otherwise marginalized. It would be better, I think, if we were all more hospitable, welcoming, and compassionate. But that kind of inclusivity involves an ethical disposition that takes us beyond the bare consensus of secularism at the institutional level. This point has been noted elsewhere. Phillip Gorski has recently said, “Religious nationalism provides for solidarity but is exclusionary; liberal secularism is inclusive but produces thin solidarity.”22 One of the attractions of religious nationalism, including Christian nationalism, is that it seems to rest on (and require) a deep kind of agreement, which the minimal consensus of secularism does not provide—​and that deeper sense of solidarity can be deeply satisfying to some people. Gorski also, by the way, considers a third option, which he calls “civil religion.” That would be a public sphere imbued

21 22

See: Andrew Fiala, Tolerance and the Ethical Life (London: Continuum, 2005) and Fiala, Secular Cosmopolitanism, Hospitality, and Religious Pluralism (New York: Routledge Publishing 2016). Gorski, Philip, ‘The Past and Future of the American Civil Religion’, in Rhys Williams, Raymond Haberski Jr., and Philip Goff (eds), Civil Religion Today: Religion and the American Nation in the Twenty-​First Century (New York, NY, 2021; online edn, nyu Press Scholarship Online, 19 May 2022), https://​doi​.org​/10​.18574​/nyu​/978147​9809​844​.003​.0002, accessed 25 Aug. 2023.

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with a deeper kind of solidarity. That is of interest—​but I will not pursue it further here, other than to suggest that a larger spirit of hospitality and compassion points beyond the minimal framework of a constitutional legal system. And indeed, it should be this way. It would be wrong for the law to require us to welcome strangers or show hospitality toward strangers, especially if we take religious liberty seriously. Consider what it would mean if the law said that Jews had to welcome Christians into their houses of worship, or that Muslims were required to include atheists in their communities, and so on. Religious liberty seems to include the right to exclude others. Of course, this does not mean that the state itself can exclude people because of their religion. And indeed, we see this as a basic Constitutional principle in the United States under Article vi where the state is prohibiting from requiring religious tests for office. Hospitality and welcome are important social values. But they go beyond what a secular political law ought to meddle with. 4

Anti-​secular religiosity

As we’ve seen, Habermas and Rawls indicate that there will be remaining tensions between political secularism and some religious folks. The non-​secular or theological approach suggests that political life can and should embody God’s law. For example, a recent (2019) book by Mormon author Paul Skousen states: “United States has a manifest destiny to eventually become a glorious example of God’s law under a restored Constitution that will inspire the entire human race.”23 Skousen’s notion of a restored Constitution is focused on a legal and moral revival, that would bring the nation into conformity with God’s law. This idea has been articulated by a variety of others who can be understood as advocating the general idea of Christian nationalism. Another example is Jenna Ellis, a Christian attorney who rose to national prominence as she worked with the Trump administration to overturn the 2020 election (and who was indicted in 2023 in Georgia for her participation in that effort). In a book she published in 2015, she reacted against the Supreme Court’s Obergefell v. Hodges decision (which legalized same sex marriage) by claiming that the Constitution needed an “objective” moral foundation. She maligned secularism in the book, and criticizes what she sees as a “secular” interpretation of the Constitution. She writes:

23

Paul B. Skousen and W. Cleon Skousen, How to Save the Constitution: Restoring the Principles of Liberty (Salt Lake City, UT: Izzard Ink, 2019), Principle 28, no page numbers.

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A secular view of government teaches that objective morality is contained nowhere in appropriate Constitutional law and there is no universal standard or parameters for government, just that restraint which we impose on ourselves through the government’s own action.24 Elis rejects this view, which is in fact the humanistic hypothesis that I defend in this chapter. Government is in reality a human creation. It is a set of restraints that we impose on ourselves. This idea is a central tenet of modern political philosophy, and well-​known as the social contract theory of the state. But Ellis, and other Christian critics of secularism reject the idea of the social contract. As Ellis puts it: “The Social Contract cannot logically provide a rational basis for any legitimate authority.”25 This would come as a surprise to the American founders who understood the creation of the American constitution in terms of social contract theory. Ellis thinks that the Constitution must be based on an “objective” moral standard that comes from God. She suggests that the authority and, indeed the structure, of the law comes from God: Divine Law presumes rational, objective limits and the legislative bodies of social government have no power to influence, redirect, redefine, ignore, or legislate against rigid laws of science and morality. God gives authority and enforcement to the law, and has firstly ordained all rigid, discoverable law, and secondly has given limited power to the three spheres of government (which He also ordained) to wisely legislate the law that is fluid and made in accordance with discoverable scientific and moral law.26 The three spheres she is referring to are civil government, family, and church. Her point is that the divine law ought to rule in each of these areas of life. Ellis continues: Divine Law therefore supersedes all human-​run government and man himself, and the three spheres of government, including civil law, must exercise their limited legislative and enforcement authority only to the 24

Jenna Ellis, The Legal Basis for a Moral Constitution: A Guide for Christians to Understand our Constitutional Crisis (Bloomington, IN: West Bow Press, 2015), Chapter 1, no page numbers. 25 Ellis, The Legal Basis for a Moral Constitution, Chapter 3, no page numbers. 26 Ellis, The Legal Basis for a Moral Constitution, Chapter 2, no page numbers.

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extent they do not contradict the fixed, unchanging laws, even within their overlap with each other.27 I’m quoting at length here so we can understand the argument against secular government. From Ellis’s standpoint, the divine law supersedes the human law. It is God who “ordains” in her words, the authority of the law (cf. my discussion of the idea that God ordains things in Chapter 8). From Ellis’s point of view, God is the reference point which sets up the system of government, and which indicates its purpose and limits. Among Ellis’s proximal concerns is the Obergefell decision, which legalized same sex marriage. She also is opposed to transgender rights. Her argument is basically that the law ought to reflect traditional “Biblical” ideas about marriage, family, and gender. She also argues that it is wrong to understand the Constitution as a human construct, created by human beings for the purpose of setting up a government of diverse human beings. In a speech in Colorado in 2022 she explained that the Founders viewed the authority of the American government as being “under God.” She continued, saying: They [the founders] recognized that only by His authority, His limited delegated authority, that is where we have legitimacy in government. And so, we have to be a Christian Nation. By understanding that the Christian worldview has to be reclaimed in this country if we are ever going to protect our constitution, if we're ever going to continue to have our freedoms that are protected by government.28 Ellis and the other Christian nationalists are right to an extent. The secular interpretation of the Constitution, and of government in general, does in fact maintain that governments are created by human beings for the purpose of ruling over human affairs. And while the Christian nationalists reject the idea, the historical fact is that the U.S. was in fact founded in accord with the humanistic hypothesis of secularism. And even beyond the particulars of the American founding, it is just basically true that human beings create governments. Human beings also create churches (and families—​the other of Ellis’s three spheres). And so, Ellis and others are simply wrong when they claim that the American founding was not secular; and they are wrong when they claim that “God gives authority to the law,” as Ellis puts it. 27 Ellis, The Legal Basis for a Moral Constitution, Chapter 2, no page numbers. 28 Jenna Ellis, Western Conservative Summit 2022, https://​www​.yout​ube​.com​/watch?v=​ rESQ​ZGM3​uC8, accessed July 18, 2023.

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This is so obvious from a historical and philosophical standpoint that it almost seems silly to point it out. But consider this: the history of churches is a history of human beings struggling to figure out how best to worship God and create a community of those who follow God. And consider this: human families are structures in which human beings form intimate communities that support and nurture multiple generations. Or this: states have been formed by human beings throughout history for the purpose of organizing large groups of people, resolving disputes, and promoting justice and welfare. Now it might be that some human beings believe that God set these institutions up. But human beings have always disagreed about what that means. Some churches require priests to be celibate and prevent women from being priests; others do not. Some families include the complex relationships created by divorce, remarriage, adoption, and so on, including relations among same sex couples; other families are narrowly focused on the nuclear family, or do not believe in divorce. And states have been formed in various ways and in accord with different structures, institutions, and ideas about justice and the common good: some states are monarchical and undemocratic; some states permit slavery; some states promote equality and liberty. And so it goes. Human history unfolds as a process involving human choices. Often this includes disputes about what God would want, or what the divine law is. But those disputes are arguments among humans. God is not present in history, sitting on a throne, and dispensing law. Some believe that God once did dispense law—​say on Mount Sinai. Some believe that prophets continue to receive revelations from God. Muslims believe the Mohammed received such a revelation, in Arabia in the centuries after the death of Christ. Mormons believe that Joseph Smith received another revelation in New York in the 19th Century. The fact of history is that even if God was present in those moments of miraculous revelation, the human beings who follows Moses, Mohammed, or Joseph Smith still had to sort out for themselves how they would organize their lives together. The empirical reality in which we live is a human world in which there are disagreements among human beings about church, state, and family. This is a historical fact recognized by the Founders of the U.S. Constitutional system. They did not think that they were channeling God’s will in creating the Constitution. Rather, they viewed it as a human creation. This is the secular view, which holds to the humanistic hypothesis that states are created by we, the people, and gain their legitimacy from the consent of the governed.

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John Adams and the “General Principles of Christianity”

Political secularism need not affirm atheistic secularity. The basic idea of an inclusive political sphere rings true, even if there is a God. Now, some Christian nationalists claim, quite correctly, that the Constitution was created by Christians. So there is some slight truth to the “vapor trail” idea. But as noted above, the American founders were envisaging a human social contract that would include diversity of religion under the rubric of religious liberty. John Adams, for example, is often quoted as an important source by those who insist that the nation was founded by Christians as a Christian nation.29 There is no doubt that Adams was a “Christian” in a very loose sense of the term. As noted previously, Adams did not accept the doctrine of the trinity or the divinity of Christ. But whatever his personal religious beliefs, Adams was inclusive and basically secular in his understanding both of the founding of the American republic. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson from 1813 in which he reflects on their roles in the founding, Adams points out that the revolutionary army included “fine young fellows” who were religiously diverse and included Catholics, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and even “horse protestants,” “Priestleyans,” as well as “Deists and Atheists” and Protestants “qui ne croyent rien” (that is, “who believe in nothing”).30 This letter is often quoted out of context to indicate that Adams is asserting the importance of Christian faith in the founding (Ellis does this, for example). Adams states in the letter that he believes that the “general principles of Christianity” are eternal and immutable. But the gist of the letter is to indicate that these general principles of Christianity were united with general principles of liberty to create the consensus that led to the formation of the diverse revolutionary army that Adams was discussing. Adams said: And what were these general Principles? I answer, the general Principles of Christianity, in which all those Sects were United: And the general Principles of English and American Liberty, in which all those young

29

30

William Barr cites Adams in his 2019 speech, as I discussed in Chapter 8, https://​www​ .just​ice​.gov​/opa​/spe​ech​/attor​ney​- gene​ral​-will​iam​-p​-barr​- deliv​ers​-rema​rks​-law​- sch​ ool​-and​-de​-nic​ola​-cen​ter​-eth​ics​. Also see Geoffrey R. Stone, “The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?” 56 ucla Law Review 1 (2008). John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, June 28, 1813, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​ nts​/Jeffer​son​/03​-06​-02​-0208#RFH4​9384​8181​3062​8100​_11​-ptr, accessed July 18, 2023.

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Men United, and which had United all Parties in America, in Majorities Sufficient to assert and maintain her Independence.31 And here it is worth considering that the “general principles of Christianity” to which Adams referred were basic moral ideas, divorced from any larger account of revelation or the claim that the United States was the fulfillment of some prophetic ideal. In a letter to Jefferson from 1816, Adams explained that after a long life of study, his basic creed was simple: be just, do good, and tolerate others. In speaking of the books he had been reading, Adams said: I have learned nothing of importance to me, for they have made no Change in my moral or religious Creed, which has for 50 or 60 Years been contained in four Short Words “Be just and good.” In this result they all agree with me. … My Conclusions from all of them is Universal Toleration.32 These letters and others support the idea that Adams did not think of the U.S. as a Christian nation, despite the fact that he did believe in God. And indeed, we must cite here a document often discussed in this context (which we also cited in a previous chapter): the 1797 Treaty of Tripoli, which was signed into law by John Adams, when he was President. The Treaty states: “the government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion.” Some critics of Christian nationalism tout this document as demonstrating that the founders did not think of the U.S. as a Christian nation. But this is a minor document used in a diplomatic negotiation with a foreign power over 200 years ago. It is interesting but not definitive. The more important argument is found in Adams discussion of the religious diversity of the revolutionary generation, and the consensus among the founding generation about basic principles of liberty, the idea that government rests on the consent of the governed, and the very general “Christian” idea of “be just and good” while tolerating others. Of course, there were differences among the Founders: Jefferson was less pious and orthodox. But here’s the point: even if some of the Founders were Christian and thought of the Constitution through the lens of their Christian faith, they set up a system as human beings (and as diverse human beings). The 31 32

John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, June 28, 1813, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​ nts​/Jeffer​son​/03​-06​-02​-0208#RFH4​9384​8181​3062​8100​_11​-ptr, accessed July 18, 2023. John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, December 12, 1816, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Adams​/99​-02​-02​-6670, accessed July 18, 2023.

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secular system they set up allows for robust personal faith. But it does not contain any reference to God. Nor does it privilege the Christian faith, or stipulate that the law comes from God. 6

The Declaration of Independence as a Secular Document

Some of the Christian nationalists will argue that there is an explicit reference to God in the Declaration of Independence and its claim that human beings are endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights. But notice that this vague claim does not make a declaration of which human faith is foundational: Judaism, Islam, Quaker Christianity, Anglican Christianity, Swedenborgian Christianity, Episcopalian Christianity, or Roman Catholicism. The idea of a “Creator” is an inclusive idea found in the deism of the Enlightenment era. The basic philosophical standpoint of the era was focused on the idea of natural rights, linked to some account of the structure of reality as organized under natural law. But the natural law tradition is not only or necessarily Christian. The ancient Greeks and Romans had an account of natural law, as found for example in Stoicism. The deistic “Creator” who creates a natural moral order discernable by reason (and “self-​evident,” as the Declaration puts it) may be closer to Stoicism than to the miraculous revealed faith of Christianity. But beyond that, the Declaration states that the source of political authority in the Declaration is not in a state created by God, or a set of institutions derived from God’s commands. Rather, the Declaration asserts the social contract theory as fundamental. Indeed, the right to revolution is grounded in the idea that political authority depends upon the consent of the governed. And that states exist in order to promote human safety and happiness. Here is what the Declaration says (I’ve put the important points in italics): That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,—​That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. This is a statement of a secular social contract theory of political legitimation. The first italicized phrase makes this clear. The last phrase is also crucial. The authors of the Declaration thought that government depended upon human

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judgment about human “safety and happiness.” The Declaration does not say that government depends upon channeling the will of God or abiding by a political structure that was ordained by God. Furthermore, the all-​important right to revolt—​which is the primary action resulting from the Declaration—​is not described here as connected to some divine command. Rather, the idea that governments are instituted among men is stated as a matter of “self-​evident” truth. Now the Declaration also suggests, in its final paragraph, that its signatories were relying on “Divine providence” and appealing to “the Supreme Judge of the world” to support them in their cause. But again, this does not mean that the decision to revolt was commanded by God, or that it was connected to some explicitly Christian doctrine. Rather, this is vague deistic language, connected to a kind of Stoic view that was common during the Enlightenment: the idea that there was a purpose and plan to history. Moreover, the revolutionaries do not claim that God commanded them to revolt. Instead, they suggest in using this language they hope that they are justified in making the decision to revolt, a decision that was made of their own free will. I focus on the Declaration here because many Christian nationalists appeal to it as a source of the idea that the U.S. was founded as a Christian nation. They argue that appeal to a Creator in the document indicates this. But they fail to note the very humanistic focal point of the Declaration’s account of political legitimacy. At any rate, the Declaration is not the Constitution. The Declaration is important. But it is the Constitution that sets up the system of law of the country. The revolutionaries who broke away from England may have conceived of their right to revolution in vaguely religious terms—​although, as we noted in the previous chapter, Jefferson’s first draft of the Declaration did not include the idea of the Creator. But the revolution was justified in human terms, as focused on the consent of the governed and human judgment about safety and happiness. And the legal system they created that established the new country was conceived in secular terms. The wisdom of that system was that it removed religion entirely from consideration (as we mentioned above in Article vi’s prohibition on religious tests for office), while also guaranteeing freedom of religion and preventing an establishment of religion (in the First Amendment). The anti-​secular argument of Christian nationalism poses a direct challenge to the secular idea that is central to the American tradition. If people like Jenna Ellis or Paul Skousen claim that the Constitution is, or ought to be, oriented around divine law, while also claiming that they know what the divine law is (and that the divine law mandates this interpretation of history and of political life), this creates a conflict with the system itself that points in the direction

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of the paradox of secularism. When these folks claim that the Constitution is connected to divine law (other than to some vague idea of a natural law known by reason), they are wrong. When they claim that the U.S. was ordained to be a Christian nation, they are wrong. They are entitled to their false beliefs. But if those false beliefs lead them to oppose the system itself or to call for its overturn, then we end up with the conflict that gives rise to the paradox of secularism. 7

The Secular Constitution as Human Creation

The anti-​secular idea that the U.S. Constitution should follow God’s law is not found in the Constitution. The word God does not show up in the document. Article vi of that document states that there should be no religious test as a qualification for holding office. And the First Amendment to the Constitution focuses on free human choice of religion (the free exercise clause), while also prohibiting the state from taking sides in religious disputes (the establishment clause). And indeed, the anti-​secular or religious interpretation of the Constitution is quite different from what James Madison and the Founders imagined in terms of a human constructed constitution that would govern human beings in this world. As a statement of this idea, consider the following passage, written by James Madison, from Federalist 51 (from 1788). After stating that “ambition must be made to counteract ambition,” Madison suggests that the Constitution must be a “reflection on human nature.” He explains: But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.33

33 Federalist 51, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Hamil​ton​/01​-04​-02​-0199, acce­ ssed July 18, 2023. The editors of the Founders Online website indicate that this could be authored either by Madison or by Alexander Hamilton.

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Key points made by Madison include the idea (1) that government ought to be based on experience, (2) that religious power (that is, the angels in this statement) is not in charge of human affairs, and (3) that government is men ruling over men. Madison’s thinking shows that the Framers were viewing things from the standpoint of the humanistic hypothesis. If angels ruled, then another hypothesis would be plausible. But human beings are ambitious. Thus, a system ought to be created by humans, which can control and limit human ambition. Madison connected this way of thinking to his proposal for a Bill of Rights that included the First Amendment, which sets up the secular system we have in the United States. The ideas of free expression of religion and non-​ establishment of religion were familiar from debates in Virginia. As those debates were unfolding Madison explain his thinking in a document known as “Memorial and Remonstrance” (1785), which we discussed previously. It is there that he suggested that religion must be left to the “conscience of every man, and the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.” He continues: This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him.34 If we adopt the humanistic hypothesis, that governments are created by human beings for human beings, then it is up to us to devise a system of rules that will allow us to live together—​and which suit our conception of humanity. Madison and others of the founders maintained that religious liberty was a primary human right. The system they constructed was set up to guarantee this. Now a political system could be constructed in various ways. We can analyze this variety of organizations in terms of where authority resides, who is empowered, and whose interests are served. This way of analyzing social and political structures is familiar from the traditional distinctions between monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, organized along the lines of a logical distinction between one, some, and all. Monarchy is a system characterized as “rule by one.” Monarchy is set up as a system that empowers one person, while also

34

“Memorial and Remonstrance” https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Madi​son​/01​-08​ -02​-0163#JSMN​-01​-08​-02​-0163​-fn​-0002, accessed July 18, 2023.

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serving the interests of one person. Oligarchy is “rule by some” or “rule by a few.” It is set up to empower a group of elites, while serving the interests of a minority of people. Democracy, according to this logical schema, would be “rule by all.” The idea is that the people (the demos) would have power, and that ruling power would be used in the interest of all. A more complex elucidation of ruling structures might also include a variety of further qualifications: anarchy as a system without a governing structure; panarchy as system of rule by/​ of all; a republic as a system in which the good of the public (the res publica) is the primary focus; aristocracy as a system in which the best rule; and so on. Political philosophy includes other qualifications and categories: cosmopolitanism as a system of universal rules; nationalism as a system in which the nation is the primary focus; and so on. With this brief overview of the varieties of political organization in the background, now let’s return to the humanistic hypothesis, which is that these systems are set up by human beings for human purposes. With this in mind, we might say that monarchical systems are set up by humans to empower a specific human being: the monarch. Oligarchy is set up to empower the ruling human group: the oligarchs. And democracy is set up to empower “we, the people.” Various arguments may be presented in support of these systems. But according to the humanistic hypothesis, these arguments will be “anthropological” or humanistic. These arguments will appeal to fundamental claims about human nature. They will be informed by how we understand human history. And even if religious or theological claims are brought in, the humanistic hypothesis suggests that it is human beings who interpret and apply these claims in “this world.” And here let’s reintroduce the term “secular.” This term typically refers to “this world,” as opposed to a sacred or other-​worldly focus. The term originally indicated “this century” or this ordinary human temporal frame—​in opposition to the different temporality of the sacred or divine. That difference can be understood as the difference between eternity and historical time. If we use the term secular to indicate historical time, then this is in fact humanistic, since it involves the changes, crises, and developments of human experience: both within the life of an individual and in the larger story of society as it develops in history. The humanistic hypothesis suggests that in the end it is up to human beings to interpret, manage, and organize events unfolding in history, that is, in secular time. As mentioned, there are various ways that human beings have sought to interpret, manage, and organize the structures of secular life. The distinction between monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy indicates one such difference. Decisions and judgments about the proper organization remains secular, so

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long as the arguments and analyses used in political theory are based upon generalizations about human beings living in history in this world. The social contract theory is humanistic and secular. It offers an account of the formation and/​or justification of political structures based upon human agreement. The social contract theory typically results in some kind of democratic political structure. This is the conclusion reached by Locke, Rousseau, Kant and John Rawls and others. But the social contract could also result in a monarchical form of government, as Hobbes appeared to argue. We might also note that the social contract approach can be more or less liberal, conservative, or libertarian. A social contract approach could be illiberal: for example, Hobbes appears to suggest that the absolute sovereign could impose significant restrictions on free speech and freedom of religion. And, as we’ve noted previously, even a more liberal theorist such as Locke may suggest intolerant and illiberal treatment of atheists and Roman Catholics. Ignoring the details of these various arguments for a moment, our point of emphasis here is to note that these arguments are humanistic: they base the justification of the state upon the consent of the human beings who live under political laws. And when they make arguments about freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and so on, they base these arguments on claims about humanity, human nature, and human history. In the American Constitutional system, the basic humanistic approach is seen in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution where we read: We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. This, the basic law of the United State is based upon the social contract. It states that the law is the creation of “we the people” who join together with the goal of establishing justice, domestic tranquility, common defense, and promoting liberty and welfare. The orientation is this-​worldly: it is focused on the current generation of Americans (at the time of the drafting of the document), and also oriented toward “posterity,” that is, subsequent generations of Americans. The Constitution as social contract is made clear in the document itself. The Constitution states (in Article vii) that it will become the law when ratified by nine states. For the document to become law, it required the agreement of those who would be governed by it. Indeed, there was a controversy at the time involving the question of how many states were required for ratification (and as to what kind of mechanism would be employed in the ratification). And as

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critics of the original Constitution have pointed out, the ratification process was flawed by the fact that women and slaves were not able to participate in that process. Despite these flaws, the law of the United States is fundamentally secular: it was created by human beings, to govern human beings within history, and agreed to by human beings. This humanistic and secular approach to social and political life is so widely accepted as common sense in the modern world, that it is often unremarked. And it is also difficult to imagine alternative to it. But the Christian nationalists have offered an alternative conception of social and political structures. And American Christian nationalists have suggested that the American founding was not secular at all, and was not (and should not) be interpretated humanistically. Let’s name the antithesis of the humanistic hypothesis “the theological imperative.” The theological imperative includes a couple of related claims: a claim about the foundation/​origin of social and political life, and a related normative claim about our duty viz-​a-​viz social and political institutions. A very strong and comprehensive interpretation of the theological imperative holds that churches, states, and other social/​political institutions are created or ordained by God. One very literal interpretation of the theological idea holds that social and political institutions are literally created by God in a miraculous founding act. Such an idea is found in ancient stories about a god or gods as the founding figure of political life, and related ideas about the gods as beings that give the law to humans. In Rome, for example, the twin founders of the city (Romulus and Remus) were fathered by Mars, the god of war, and suckled by a she-​wolf. In Babylon, Marduk was seen as the god who founded the city, while the King Hammurabi was eventually chosen by the god Enil to rule. And it was the god Shamash who gave the law to Hammurabi, which is known as Hammurabi’s Code. This idea, of a god giving the law to people, is also found in the ancient Hebrew tradition, which holds that Moses received the law from God on Mount Sinai. This kind of story is related to versions of the “divine command theory” of law and morality. That theory holds that the law comes directly from God, and that God’s system of reward and punishment (in heaven or hell) provides the motivation for moral and law-​governed behavior. It is easy to see how this idea relates to the medieval and early modern idea of a divine right of kings. That idea holds that the king rules by the grace of God. We might also see some version of the divine command theory in the modern notion of natural rights that are gifts of God. This theological point is implicit, for example, in the Declaration of Independence, which holds that all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable

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rights. Of course, the deistic worldview of the Declaration is not that closely related to the idea of the divine right of kings. Rather than claiming that a king rules by divine right, the modern liberal-​democratic idea is that all individuals are endowed with a kind of sovereignty, dignity, and right. And in the modern liberal-​democratic approach, the divine endowment of rights is seen as a limit to political power and the law, which also includes the right to revolution. Indeed, the social contract tradition tends to hold that our rights (whether God-​given or not) are the starting point for thinking about the law and government. Now the Christian nationalist and other anti-​secular approaches tend to deny that there is a humanistic origin story. As such, they also tend to argue against the social contract theory. One of the most influential versions of the theological argument was that of Robert Filmer, whose book Patriarcha was published in 1680, thirty years after his death. The book is influential because it gave voice to a theological conception of social and political life, and because it became the foil for John Locke (who discussed it critically in his Two Treatises of Government: the first of these treatises is an extensive critique of Filmer’s ideas). Filmer had argued explicitly against the social contract idea, which Filmer describes as follows: Mankind is naturally endowed and born with Freedom from all Subjection, and at liberty to choose what Form of Government it please: And that the Power which any one Man hath over others, was at first bestowed according to the discretion of the Multitude.35 Filmer views this idea as a great error. It forgets, he thinks, that the liberty of the multitude is connected to Adam’s first sin. And it is based upon the mistaken belief (according to Filmer) that God gave the multitude the power of self-​rule. Filmer suggests that this idea misunderstands the entire history of the world, as disclosed in scripture. On Filmer’s interpretation, scripture teaches that God gave sovereign power to Adam, who passed it down to his children and on through the patriarchs. Patriarchal rule continued up through Noah’s flood, and was reinstituted by Noah and his sons, who passed it down to Moses and Joshua. And on Filmer’s telling, Jesus, Paul, and Peter suggested that Christians ought to submit to patriarchal political power.

35

Robert Filmer, Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings (London: Richard Chiswell, 1680), at https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/fil​mer​-pat​riar​cha​-or​-the​-natu​ral​-power​-of​-kings​.

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Now contemporary Christian nationalists may not explicitly invoke Filmer. And they may not necessarily agree with the patriarchal interpretation offered by Filmer. But there is a tendency to think that the law ought to reflect the religious endowment that can be traced back to Biblical times. And some Christians go so far as to suggest that the idea of the social contract is un-​Christian and heretical. Among those making that kind of argument is Joseph Boot, a Canadian Christian. Boot correctly traces the social contract idea to Locke. But he argues that Locke was wrong. Boot says “Locke was supplanting creational and biblical revelation by making man’s reason the basis of justice and civil concord rather than the Word of God.”36 He continues: This view of the human person as rational, virtuous, independent and equal (in a pseudo-​mathematical sense) is nowhere to be found in Scripture. In biblical faith, man is a fallen sinner. His human understanding, or reason, is distorted by rebellion against God, often leading him radically astray, and he is anything but independent and autonomous. From the Christian standpoint, man is under law in every area of life and not only is he dependent upon God and subject to Him in the totality of his being, but he is set in profound mutual interdependence with other people—​including those long dead who shaped the culture and customs of the society in which he lives. For the Bible, a person’s life is embedded in created and covenantal reality in relationship to God and others, not in a religiously neutral, self-​evident, contractual arrangement between abstract individuals in an idealized state of nature.37 The basic point seems to be the following. Christianity makes the idea of a social contract absurd, since Christianity views humanity as sinful and since these sinful humans cannot be trusted to create a rational social contract. Instead of a social contract, what Christianity demands is a renewed covenant with God that would bring humanity into conformity with God’s law. Furthermore, Boot contends that any government that sees political power as resting in “the people” is a form of tyranny that is antithetical to God-​oriented authority. Boot concludes: “any constitution that claims that ‘the people’ have 36 37

Joseph Boot, “The Heresy of Liberal Democracy,” Part 2, https://​arch​ive​.chris​tian​conc​ ern​.com​/our​-iss​ues​/chu​rch​-and​-state​/the​-her​esy​-of​-libe​ral​-democr​acy​-part​-2, accessed August 24, 2023. Joseph Boot, “The Heresy of Liberal Democracy,” Part 2, https://​arch​ive​.chris​tian​conc​ ern​.com​/our​-iss​ues​/chu​rch​-and​-state​/the​-her​esy​-of​-libe​ral​-democr​acy​-part​-2, accessed August 24, 2023.

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ultimate sovereignty (rather than seeing government as a delegated sovereignty under God) is, by definition, a tyranny.”38 And so Boot claims that the very idea of the social contract is heretical since it substitutes sovereignty of “the people” for the sovereignty of God, and since the social contract idea misunderstand what a nation is supposed to be. Thus Boot claims, “secular dogmas are heretical in their assertion of popular sovereignty, their denial of God’s sovereignty, of human sin and fallenness, and the Lordship of Jesus Christ.”39 Indeed, Boot contends that liberal-​democracy itself is a kind of heresy. In a discussion of Christian nationalism (that includes some critique of Stephen Wolfe’s book), Boot also contends that nationhood and national identity ought to be understood in terms of a “covenant.” He explains, “nations are constituted covenantally and they are defined religiously not ethnically.”40 Furthermore Boot describes himself “as somebody who believes in the importance of a Christian nation-​state because I believe, just like the family and the church, the state has to be under God and submit itself to the lordship of Christ.” In other words, from Boot’s perspective nations, families, and individuals are to be properly understood in relation to God, as the result of a covenant with God—​and not as constituted anthropologically or by way of something like the social contract. 8

Conclusion

As mentioned before, the Christian nationalist critique of the social contract (or compact) does not reflect the text of the U.S. Constitution, or the sentiment of the Founders and the founding generation of Americans. Joseph Boot, as mentioned, is not talking directly about the American experience—​he is a Canadian theologian residing in the U.K. But Jenna Ellis and others of the American proponents of Christian nationalism should be more aware that the critique they are offering of the social contract and of the secular constitutional system is at odds with the reality and history of the American system, 38 39 40

Joseph Boot, “The Heresy of Liberal Democracy,” Part 3, https://​arch​ive​.chris​tian​conc​ ern​.com​/our​-iss​ues​/chu​rch​-and​-state​/the​-her​esy​-of​-libe​ral​-democr​acy​-part​-3, accessed August 24, 2023. Joseph Boot, “The Heresy of Liberal Democracy,” Part 3, https://​arch​ive​.chris​tian​conc​ ern​.com​/our​-iss​ues​/chu​rch​-and​-state​/the​-her​esy​-of​-libe​ral​-democr​acy​-part​-3, accessed August 24, 2023. Interview with Joe Boot and Andrew Sandlin, Christ Over All, Oct. 2023, https://​christ​ over​all​.com​/arti​cle​/conc​ise​/tra​nscr​ipt​-interv​iew​-with​-p​-and​rew​-sand​lin​-and​-joe​-boot​ -on​-christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism​/, accessed January 10, 2024.

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and is also at odds with the prevailing understanding of political power and authority in the modern world. Steven K. Green makes this clear in his book, Inventing a Christian America: Compact theory can be considered the central ideological concept underlying American republican government. The Founders no doubt agreed with David Hume that “it cannot be denied that all government is, at first, grounded on a contract. Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 22 that “the fabric of the American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people,” which he termed “a compact.”41 Green points out that while some have claimed that the religious notion of a “covenant” has been a focal point of some accounts of the American founding, it is false to claim that the early Americans thought of the nation in convenantal or religious terms. And indeed, Green argues that the notion of a religious founding of the United States is more myth than fact. This myth, Green explains, is used by politicians and others to support their own agendas in the contemporary world. With this point on the table, let’s conclude this chapter by returning yet again to the challenge of the paradox of secularism, this time with a focus on those who offer anti-​secular accounts of the secular system itself. What should we make of those who engage in historical mystification and who offer false and pernicious accounts of the law and history of the country? Obviously, in a secular system, people are free to peddle propaganda and to write and say whatever they want (within limits of harm, defamation, and libel). The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains, in addition to its religious liberty clauses, guarantees of freedom of speech, and of the press. And indeed, it would not make any sense in a secular political system to seek to establish some kind of ministry of truth, or to have the government engaged in policing the thought and beliefs of the citizens. A limit may be reached in terms of freedom of expression, when someone actively calls for a rebellion or insurrection against the law of the land. But there are no laws against doing bad history or engaging in theological speculation—​nor should there be. So, this leaves us with the task of critical thinking and the pursuit of wisdom. The enlightenment idea of toleration opens the door to a variety of opinions and ideas. It may also include fake news and ideas we do not like. But the

41

Steven K. Green, Invention the Myth of Christian America: The Myth of the Religious Founding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 64–​5.

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antidote to bad ideas is better ideas. The cure for bad arguments is better arguments. This idea of the importance of a free tribunal of reason in which ideas can be debated is widely held by many of the key figures we have discussed in relation to political secularism. John Locke said, “the truth certainly would do well enough if she were left to shift for herself … She is not taught by laws, nor has she any need of force to procure her entrance into the minds of men.”42 Madison and Jefferson built upon that idea and stated in the preamble to the Virginia Religious Freedom Act: “Truth is great and will prevail if left to herself, that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate, errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them.”43

42 43

John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration in Locke, John. The Works, vol. 5 Four Letters concerning Toleration. Rivington, 1685, https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/locke​-the​-works​-vol​-5​ -four​-lett​ers​-con​cern​ing​-tol​erat​ion, accessed January 10, 2024. Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785), https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​ nts​/Madi​son​/01​-08​-02​-0206, accessed January 10, 2024.

­c hapter 11

On Dissipating the Darkness: A Tragic and Hopeful Conclusion To penetrate and dissipate these clouds of darkness, the general mind must be strengthened by education. Thomas Jefferson1

∵ As we conclude this book, let me summarize briefly what we have discovered, offer a warning, and provide a bit of hope. I have argued that Christian nationalism is an anti-​secular movement or ideology inspired by a kind of post-​ secular backlash. We have seen that a number of authors and public figures have defended the idea that the U.S. is a Christian nation. This claim is usually connected to a critique of a diabolical kind of anti-​religious secularism. But this critique often equivocates on the meaning of the term “secularism.” I have argued, in response, in defense of political secularism: the political idea that religious liberty is fundamental, that the state should not establish an official national religion, and that social and political life should be inclusive of diverse religious and nonreligious points of view. I have made this argument by considering sources in the history of Christianity, resources in modern political philosophy and theology, and by examining how American Founders such as Jefferson, Madison, and Adams thought about religion and religious liberty. I have offered arguments against “nationalism” and in favor of a more cosmopolitan approach to thinking about political life. I have also argued that, on a progressive interpretation of Christianity, God is not best understood as a tyrant who ordains political systems that are supposed to follow the divine law. Throughout, I have argued that political secularism is wise and that this was in fact was the American founders had in mind when they created the Constitution as a social contract that prohibited religious tests for office, and

1 Jefferson to Van Der Kamp, July 9, 1820 https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​ son​/03​-16​-02​-0074, accessed January 12, 2024.

© Andrew Fiala, 2025 | DOI:10.1163/9789004727090_012

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that guaranteed religious liberty while preventing the establishment of a national church. I have also suggested that there is a limit that is reached when secularism confronts its anti-​secular other. At some point, the secular system cannot include or tolerate those who reject the idea of inclusive religious liberty and who call for the establishment of a national church. This leaves us with a kind of unstable and tragic circumstance that I’ve called the paradox of secularism. Despite this tragic possibility, I have also suggested that some of the proponents of Christian nationalism are either insincere or are not offering a revolutionary agenda. Moreover, I hope that a book like the present one might help to educate critics of secularism about its wisdom and that we might establish a consensus (such as I’ve described as a “minimal” consensus), despite our differences. Of course, as we’ve seen there are more sincere and committed critics of secularism among the Christian nationalists. The stronger and more vehement the criticism of secularism, the more the danger of reaching the limit at which the paradox of secularism appears. 1

The Threat of Violence

In order to understand the extent of this challenge, we ought to consider the potential for violence found within Christian nationalism. Christian nationalism is a political movement. It pursues political power with the goal of institutionalizing the Christian religion. It is not exactly clear what the Christian nationalists would do or be able to do, if they were to gain power. But it is likely that the Christian nationalist movement would need to use force or violence to accomplish its goals. This is true because the radical goal of creating an establishment of religion will require legislation and legal enforcement that would be both outrageous and illegal. We’ve discussed versions of the threats posed by Christian nationalists throughout the text. One of the more outrageous claims was made by former President Trump (as discussed in Chapter 8) who proposed in the summer of 2023 preventing “foreign Christian-​hating communists, socialists and Marxists” from entering into the U.S. And who asked rhetorical, “What are we going to do with the ones that are already here, that grew up here? I think we have to pass a new law for them.”2 Here is another

2 The following quotes are from the transcript of Trump’s speech at the Faith and Freedom Conference on June 24, 2023, posted at The Rev: https://​www​.rev​.com​/blog​/tran​scri​pts​/trump​ -spe​aks​-at​-faith​-free​dom​-coalit​ion​-gala​-tra​nscr​ipt, accessed July 13, 2023.

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example, from a 2020 speech by the Lieutenant Governor of North Carolina, Mark Robinson, who said: As for this, not being a Christian nation. Yes, it is. If you don't like it, I'll buy your plane, train or automobile ticket right up out of here. You can go to some place that is not a Christian nation. As long as there's a remnant of His people in this place that continue to pray to Him and for his wisdom, this will always be a Christian nation. It was established by Him.3 Trump may not be sincere in proposing to ban, deport, and harass atheists and non-​Christians. And Robinson is not saying here that force will be used. Robinson and Trump may simply be bloviating. But imagine what might happen if governors in some states or the federal government took this seriously, and began expelling nonreligious people, banning non-​Christians, and those who simply do not believe that the United State is a Christian nation. Now not every advocate of Christian nationalism is willing to countenance the use of force or violence in pursuit of their aims. And so, we might distinguish between those who maintain that the Christian nationalist movement is more akin to a religious revival and those who see it more along the lines of a political revolution. The “revivalists” will tend to be focused on cultural change that could be affected nonviolently, while the “revolutionaries” will understand their movement in political terms that may necessitate force and violence. It is primarily the second group, the revolutionaries, that represents a fundamental threat to a secular political order that they themselves view as diabolical. The first group, the revivalists, may still view secularism as an “enemy” but may hold that political revolution is not the best way to achieve their goal of spiritual revival. This distinction between the revivalists and the revolutionaries has been noted in the literature on Christian nationalism, although not in these specific terms. Ruiqian Li and Paul Froese have explained in a 2023 paper that Christian Nationalism includes a “duality.” One group of Christian nationalists are what Li and Froese call “religious traditionalists.” These folks are what I’m calling “revivalists.” They see the culture of the United States as fundamentally Christian and in need of protection and encouragement. The other group are what Li and Froese call “Christian statists.” These are what I am calling “revolutionaries.” These people want political power. Li and Froese explain: 3 “nc Lt. Gov. Mark Robinson Offers to Deport People Who Dislike U.S. as a ‘Christian Nation’” Newsweek, Sept. 29, 2021, https://​www​.newsw​eek​.com​/nc​-lt​-gov​-mark​-robin​son​-off​ers​-dep​ ort​-peo​ple​-who​-disl​ike​-us​-christ​ian​-nat​ion​-1634​125, accessed September 1, 2023.

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Christian Statism is strongly linked to exclusive and intolerant attitudes toward most marginalized groups while Religious Traditionalism is related to more socially inclusive attitudes with few exceptions. Our findings reveal that only a particular subset of Christian Nationalists—​ the Christian Statists—​hold strong nativist and intolerant sentiments. In contrast, while contemporary Religious Traditionalists continue to advocate for a religious-​based cultural conservatism, they tend to be more trusting of others overall, less Islamophobic, less anti-​Semitic, and less nativist than Christian Statists.4 Building on the work of Armaly, Buckley, and Enders on violence in Christian nationalism (and in religious nationalism more generally),5 the 2023 paper by Li and Froese claims that Christian statists are not afraid to employ violence in pursuit of their ends. The new ideals of Christian Statism (or state-​ centric Christian Nationalism) are qualitatively different from traditional civil religion because they enlist state power to enforce Christian cultural dominance and ethno-​national boundaries, even if the means are anti-​democratic, racist, and violent.6 Whitehead and Perry have also noted the violent streak in their account of Christian nationalism. They write: It valorizes conquests in America’s name and bloodshed in its defense. It idealizes relations marked by clear (metaphorical or physical) boundaries and hierarchies both in the private and public realms. It baptizes authoritarian rule. It justifies the preservation of order with righteous violence, 4 Ruiqian Li and Paul Froese, “The Duality of American Christian Nationalism: Religious Traditionalism versus Christian Statism” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 62:4 (2023), 770–​801, https://​doi​.org​/10​.1111​/jssr​.12868​. 5 Miles T. Armaly, David T. Buckley & Adam M. Enders, “Christian Nationalism and Political Violence: Victimhood, Racial Identity, Conspiracy, and Support for the Capitol Attacks” Political Behavior 44 (2022), 937–​ 960, https://​doi​.org​/10​.1007​/s11​109​-021​-09758​-y; Also see: James Aho, “Christian Dominionism and Violence” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion 31 Aug. 2021, https://​oxfor​dre​.com​/relig​ion​/view​/10​.1093​/acref​ore​/978019​9340​ 378​.001​.0001​/acref​ore​-978019​9340​378​-e​-732, accessed 1 Sep. 2023. 6 Li, R. and Froese, P. (2023), “The Duality of American Christian Nationalism: Religious Traditionalism versus Christian Statism” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. https: //​doi​.org​/10​.1111​/jssr​.12868​.

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whether that be carried out by police against deserving (minority) criminals, by border agents against presumptively dangerous (minority) immigrants, or by citizen ‘good guys’ with guns rampaging against ‘bad guys’ with guns.7 This account, by Whitehead and Perry, is more focused on the use of “righteous violence” by individuals. This may account for some individual acts of terror committed by Christian nationalists. That is worrying and should rightly be condemned. But the lone wolf terrorism of the occasional terrorist is less worrying than a larger ideological movement that aims at outright revolution. Obviously, this leads to the problem we have been discussing throughout under the rubric of the paradox of secularism: an inclusive secular system may have to take active steps to exclude those who oppose it, especially who are willing to take up arms to oppose it. We are also not primarily concerned here with the insincere ranting of some of the political firebrands who use Christian nationalist rhetoric to fire folks up at a political rally. This is problematic and dangerous. But it is episodic and often obviously insincere and moronic. So, what I am primarily concerned with here is the way that the revolutionaries (what Li and Froese call Christian statists) conceive their larger political agenda. Individual acts of terrorism are appalling and concerning, they may be seen as harbingers and symptoms. But the larger problem is what the use of violence and force in the name of Christian nationalism tells us about the anti-​secular ideology and its political agenda. The revolutionaries imagine that the government would become explicitly Christian, that secular laws would be overturned, and in some cases even that religious minorities and nonreligious people would be persecuted. The abstract discussions of the sociologists mentioned above may seem overly general and distant from what Christian nationalists actually think, say, and do. So, let’s make the threat concrete by considering a few examples of the way that revolutionary Christian nationalism appears to be linked to the idea that force and violence may be employed in the struggle against secularism. One way that we see this in the Pew Center’s survey questions about Christian nationalism in a poll published in October 2022.8 That poll found that 45% of Americans believed that the U.S. should be a Christian nation. Of course, that 7 Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry, Taking America Back for God: Christian Nationalism in the United States (Oxford, 2020), 152. 8 “45% of Americans Say U.S. Should Be a ‘Christian Nation’” Pew Center, Oct. 27, 2022, https: //​www​.pewr​esea​rch​.org​/relig​ion​/2022​/10​/27​/45​-of​-americ​ans​-say​-u​-s​-sho​uld​-be​-a​-christ​ ian​-nat​ion​/, accessed September 1, 2023.

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could mean a variety of things. The “revivalists” might think, for example, that this means that there ought to be a Christian revival and that Christianity in the United States ought to grow and develop—​but without any change in the political/​legal structure of the land. A more revolutionary or political interpretation of this notion could be found in answers to more specific questions. There was a sizable minority of Americans who agreed with the following: –​ That the federal government should declare the U.S. a Christian nation (15%) –​ That the federal government should advocate Christian values (13%) –​ That the federal government should stop enforcing the separation of church and state (19%) These opinions focus on what the federal government should do, advocate, declare, and enforce. If we consider what that might involve, we see how force and violence can be connected to the idea insofar as the state would be empowered to enforce Christian laws, and to punish violators of those laws. To make this very concrete, let’s return to Stephen Wolfe’s book, The Case for Christian Nationalism. I discussed this in some detail in Chapter 5. But let’s return again to what we discussed there in light of the claim of a critic Wolfe’s book, Blake Callens who says of Wolfe’s vision of a Christian nationalist government (as I quoted in Chapter 5), “There is simply no way that such a government could come into being in the 21st century West without immense atrocity being committed.”9 Wolfe justifies “violent revolution” by way of the “forcible reclamation of civil power.”10 He also says as we quoted above: It is to our shame that we sheepishly tolerate assaults against our Christian heritage, merely sighing or tweeting performative outrage over public blasphemy, impiety, irreverence, and perversity. We are dead inside, lacking the spirit to drive away the open mockery of God and to claim what is ours in Christ. We are gripped by a slavish devotion to our secularist captors. But we do not have to be like this. We have the power and right to act. Let us train the will and cultivate the resolve.11 Wolfe imagines that the Christian nation would use its reign of power to eliminate un-​Christian ideas and false religions. This includes the idea, as Wolfe

9

Blake Callens, The Case Against Christian Nationalism: An Expository Commentary on Stephen Wolfe’s Book (ebook, https://​christ​iann​atio​nali​smno​tes​.com​/p​/the​-case​-agai​ nst​-christ​ian​-nati​onal​ism), 364. 10 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 326. 11 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 351.

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says, “that magistrates are permitted to punish external false religion.”12 As we noted previously, the false religious ideas that could be persecuted and punished would include: (1) political atheism, (2) subversion of public Christianity, (3) opposition to Christian morality, (4) heretical teaching, and (5) the political and social influence of non-​Christian religion and its adherence.13 The punishments that Wolfe discusses include banishment, long-​term, imprisonment, and capital punishment for “arch-​heretics.”14 Whether Wolfe sincerely believes this is an interesting question. This may be a thought-​experiment; and Wolfe may not intend for this part of his book to be taken seriously. Further, the question of whether others would take such ideas seriously and join a movement that would bring this about is another significant question. But if this came to fruition and coalesced in a movement to stage a violent anti-​secular revolution, the secular system would reach a limit and would find it necessary to take measures to exclude and punish those who pose a threat to its basic principles. 2

The Secular Argument against Coercion and Violence

The secular political system is set up as a safeguard against this revolutionary Christian nationalist agenda. The secular system rejects the use of force or violence in defense of religious orthodoxy. This idea can be found in the writings of John Locke, who argued in his “Letter Concerning Toleration” that inward persuasion was essential for genuine religious faith and that external coercion was ineffective to convert people religiously. This kind of political and theological idea had a direct impact on the American Founders. Thomas Jefferson, for example, wrote notes about Locke and paraphrased him in a number of places. Locke said, for example, “the truth certainly would do well enough if she were once left to shift for herself.”15 Jefferson adopted that idea himself along with other ideas from Locke. In 1776, Jefferson quoted Locke, explaining 12 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 361. 13 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 384–​5. 14 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 390–​91. 15 John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, (Liberty Fund, 2000), no page numbers, at https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/gol​die​-a​-let​ter​-con​cern​ing​-tol​erat​ion​-and​-other​-writi​ngs, accessed April 21, 2023.

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that “truth is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error.”16 Jefferson’s Statute for Religious Freedom for the state of Virginia (written by Jefferson and taken up by James Madison and passed in 1786) expressed a similar sentiment. The Statute paraphrases Locke, saying, “truth is great and will prevail if left to herself.” This implies that political coercion will undermine truth. A hope is expressed here as well: that if the truth were left alone, freedom of conscience would lead people to enlightenment, wisdom, and truth. That Statute maintains that God wants us to be free. It argues that God could have used coercion (since He is all powerful); but that God “chose not to propagate” the truth by coercion. Furthermore, the Statute explains that churches and states are led by “fallible and uninspired” human beings—​who, we might think, should not be trusted with using the levers of power to manipulate faith. It also claims that these corrupt human beings have “established and maintained false religions” throughout history. The statute further says that “our civil rights have no dependance on our religious opinions.” This means that every person has the same civil rights, no matter what they believe (or don’t believe). Civil government exists to maintain peace and good order. Beyond that, it should not go. The state does not exist to enforce religious orthodoxy.17 This idea can be found in other texts and ideas from the Founders. Consider the Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George Mason before the American Declaration of Independence, and widely considered to be an inspiration for the American Declaration. That document states in its concluding section: That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity toward each other.18

16 17 18

Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on Religion” in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: 1776–​1781 (New York: g.p. Putnam’s Sons, 1893), p. 102. This paragraph is based on Andrew Fiala, “What Christian Conservatives Won’t Tell You About the Ten Commandments” Sacramento Bee, July 7, 2024, https://​www​.sac​bee​.com​ /opin​ion​/op​-ed​/artic​le28​9743​274​.html, accessed August 9, 2024. Virginia Declaration of Rights, Section 16, https://​www​.archi​ves​.gov​/found​ing​-docs​/virgi​ nia​-decl​arat​ion​-of​-rig​hts, accessed April 21, 2023.

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We see here, again, the idea that religion is not to be subjected to force or violence because religious belief ought to be only directed by reason and conviction. This idea leads directly to the basic secular idea that the free exercise of religion is fundamental. This idea builds upon Lockean insights. And in maintaining that the state has no right over conscience and that religion ought to be free of coercion, we reach a condition of mutual toleration. The Virginia Declaration quoted above emphasizes a “mutual duty” of forbearance, love, and charity. In a note on Locke, Jefferson explained further, “Perhaps the single thing which may be required to others before toleration to them would be an oath that they would allow toleration to others.”19 This kind of mutuality would seem to fend off the problem that is often called the paradox of toleration, which is whether those who are tolerant ought to tolerate the intolerant. The answer here is no: toleration appears to require a kind of mutual toleration and a pledge for mutual toleration. This way of formulating it seems to understand toleration as a relation among persons: I tolerate you if you tolerate me. Political secularism is somewhat different. It is about including a variety of people who may not really feel tolerant toward each other. And in fact, individuals and individual religious congregations may be allowed, within a secular system, to be somewhat intolerant toward one another. A church may be allowed to teach that another church is wrong, or it may not be required to include and welcome those from another faith. Within a secular system, intolerant parties can be included, so long as they do not infringe upon the rights of others to freedom of religion. But within such a system, the state has an obligation to be neutral: it ought not use its coercive power to exclude a believer or congregation; nor should it use its power to privilege one religion or set of beliefs in comparison with some other faith. In short, this is the idea found in the First Amendments two principles of religious liberty and the non-​establishment of religion. Unlike the paradox of toleration, the paradox of secularism is reached when this political system confronts is anti-​secular other: those who do not want to allow for the religious liberty of everyone and those who seek to set up an establishment of religion.

19

Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, 11 October–​9 December 1776,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​ son​/01​-01​-02​-0222​-0007​. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, 1760–​ 1776, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, pp. 544–​550.], accessed July 5, 2023.

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Jefferson is the source of the idea of a “wall of separation between church and state.”20 We can understand now, why Jefferson would describe it this way: the problem arises when the coercive power of the state is used to enforce orthodoxy or to violate religious liberty, which is why there ought to be a wall of separation. Jefferson argued for individual toleration in a number of places. He suggested in his Notes on the State of Virginia, in a famous phrase, “It does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”21 This memorable claim was made in a chapter in which Jefferson expresses criticism of the generally intolerant atmosphere of his day, which he calls “religious slavery.”22 He passionately defends the natural right of conscience, which he understands in opposition to the coercive power of the state: Our rulers can have no authority over such natural rights, only as we have submitted to them. The rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not submit. We are answerable for them to our God.23 Again, this point seems to be grounding in a Lockean understanding of faith as a sphere of individual conscience that is not susceptible to coercion and that ought to be left alone by those in power. Jefferson further explains that the employment of coercion and force against the non-​believer will produce pernicious results, while the cure for error is the tribunal of reason: Constraint may make him worse by making him a hypocrite, but it will never make him a truer man. It may fix him obstinately in his errors, but will not cure them. Reason and free enquiry are the only effectual agents against error. Give a loose to them, they will support the true religion, by bringing every false one to their tribunal, to the test of their investigation. They are the natural enemies of error, and of error only.24

20

21 22 23 24

Thomas Jefferson, “To the Danbury Baptist Association, 1 January 1802,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​son​/01​-36​-02​-0152​ -0006​. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 36, 1 December 1801–​3 March 1802, ed. Barbara B. Oberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 258.], at https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​son​/01​-36​-02​-0152​-0006, accessed July 5, 2023. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Boston: Lily and Wait, 1832), p. 166. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Boston: Lily and Wait, 1832), p. 166. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Boston: Lily and Wait, 1832), p. 166. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Boston: Lily and Wait, 1832), p. 166.

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259

Concluding Hope: Education and Enlightenment

Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and the other philosophers and political figures discussed here are basically hopeful about the project of enlightenment, and about the power and wisdom of political secularism. As I have argued, secularism is a wise system: it allows us to coexist in freedom and peace, despite our differences. Of course, as we’ve seen, not everyone agrees that this is a wise system. Christian nationalists, and other advocates of political religion in other traditions, want to limit religious liberty and impose (or establish) a particular religion on the whole of society. These folks tend to imagine that states are ordained or created by an act of divine will. They also tend to understanding national identity in ethnic and religious terms. The vision of political secularism is different from that. As we’ve also noted throughout, there is a paradox lurking in the heart of the secular idea that is exposed by the challenge posed by the post-​secular backlash that has given rise to anti-​secular movements and ideologies. Can secular systems include or even tolerate anti-​secular movements? At some point a limit may be reached and anti-​secular forces will have to be excluded. What that might mean in practice has not been discussed here. And if one considers the kind of legal sanctions that might be applied—​bans, prohibitions, exclusions, jails—​it is easy to see a kind of analogy to the proposals of those like Trump, Robinson, Wolfe, and other Christian nationalists, who also propose bans, prohibitions, and harassment. In thinking about this analogy or parallel, we touch upon the paradox again. Christian nationalists would be wrong to exclude atheists and non-​Christians. But would a secular political system also be wrong to exclude anti-​secular movements and people? In naming this a paradox, I do not think that there is any easy way to resolve the problem. At some point, we must decide that certain values are worth defending. But we might have to admit that at the end of the day, there is a simple conflict of values—​a tragic conflict. And in the case of genuinely tragic conflicts of value, we must pick sides—​even while realizing the risks of making such choices. I am not advocating for such bans or exclusions. Nor do I expect or want Christian nationalism to engage in outright anti-​secular behavior. But it is possible to imagine this happening, given the rhetoric and arguments we’ve explored here. The response of political secularism in such an eventuality ought to be restrained by a sense of the paradox and the nature of the tragic conflict. Nonetheless, exclusions and bans might be justified on radical and extreme anti-​secular movements when they violate the law, cause harm, and pose a serious challenge to the secular status quo. If concrete actions were

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taken to overthrow the secular system, or to subvert its fundamental principles this might result in serious sanctions since such actions would be seditious and illegal. And if the anti-​secular movement becomes violent and insurrectionary, the secular system would be justified in reacting to preserve itself. Now one hopes that things would not end up this way. That hope is linked to a kind of enlightenment faith in rationality and education. This hope is humanistic insofar as it is linked to the belief that human beings can solve problems without the need for divine intervention. Moreover, from this perspective the hope is that human beings can be persuaded by rational argument, that people can agree about values, and that sincerity and moderation are good and wise. This does not mean that every human being is perfect or perfectible. But we can improve. There are some insincere and even malicious players in the contemporary scene—​people who use the rhetoric of Christian nationalism to inspire hatred and division as they pursue political power. Perhaps some of those people are beyond reform and cannot be reached by rational arguments. But the hope of the enlightenment values that inspire political secularism is that there are more rational people than irrational people, that most people understand the importance of sincerity, moderation, and wisdom, and that we can find a minimal secular consensus despite our differences. This hope is found in a variety of places in the thought of the figures we have discussed in this book. I conclude with a quote from Thomas Jefferson from 1820. Jefferson is not a saint or a perfect person. He owned slaves, including a slave he kept as a “concubine,” Sally Hemmings—​and the children produce by Jefferson’s liaisons with Hemmings were themselves kept in slavery. We have good reason to critique Jefferson. Nonetheless, he is an important figure in the founding of the United States, an articulate critic of religion and politics, and an ardent proponent of enlightenment. There is an open question about his own religiosity. But he clearly thought that Jesus was a wise moral teacher. Jefferson was critical of the way that the Christian religion had become subject to what he called “superstition,” which he thought was the result of priests turning Christianity into a kind of mystery religion. Jefferson’s proposed solution to that, however, was education and enlightenment. If people are mistaken about their religious (or political) beliefs, the way forward is to enlighten them. Here, in conclusion, is how Jefferson explained this in 1820: I trust that the genuine and simple religion of Jesus will one day be restored: such as it was preached and practiced by himself. Very soon after his death, it became muffled up in mysteries, and has been ever since kept in concealment from the vulgar eye. To penetrate and dissipate these clouds of darkness, the general mind must be strengthened

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by education. Enlightened by its torch the disciples of religion will see that, instead of abandoning their reason, as the superstitions of every country requires, and taking for the will of their god whatever their own hierophants declare it to be (and no two of them declaring it alike) that god has confided to them the talent of reason, not to hide under a bushel, but to render him account of its employment. I hope that that day of restoration is to come, although I shall not live to see it.25

25

Jefferson to Van Der Kamp, July 9, 1820 https://​found​ers​.archi​ves​.gov​/docume​nts​/Jeffer​ son​/03​-16​-02​-0074, accessed January 12, 2024.

Bibliography This book has referred to a large number of journalistic essays, Twitter posts, websites, speeches, and the letters and writings of historical figures. These reference have all been documented in the notes in the text and are not included in the Bibliography. Rather, this Bibliography includes primarily scholarly resources, as well as some sources among the more scholarly advocates of Christian nationalism. Aho, James, “Christian Dominionism and Violence” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion 31 Aug. 2021, https://​oxfor​dre​.com​/relig​ion​/view​/10​.1093​/acref​ore​/978019​ 9340​378​.001​.0001​/acref​ore​-978019​9340​378​-e​-732​. Armaly, Miles T., David T. Buckley & Adam M. Enders, “Christian Nationalism and Political Violence: Victimhood, Racial Identity, Conspiracy, and Support for the Capitol Attacks” Political Behavior 44 (2022), 937–​960, https://​doi​.org​/10​.1007​/s11​ 109​-021​-09758​-y​. Bakunin, Mikhail, Selected Writings (London: Jonathan Cape, 1973). Ballou, Adin, Christian Non-​Resistance (Philadelphia: Universal Peace Union, 1910). Barrett-​Fox, Rebecca, “A King Cyrus President: How Donald Trump’s Presidency Reasserts Conservative Christians’ Right to Hegemony” Humanity & Society, 42: 4 (2018), 502–​522. https://​doi​.org​/10​.1177​/01605​9761​8802​644​. Barth, Karl, Community, State, and Church (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1968). Barth, Karl, The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day (New York: Scribners, 1939). Barth, Karl, The Humanity of God (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1960). Berdyaev, Nikolai, Slavery and Freedom (New York: Scribners, 1944). Berlinerblau, Jacques, Secularism: The Basics (New York: Routledge, 2022). Blackstone, William, The Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone (Chicago: American Bar Association Publishing, 2009). Blankholm, Joseph, The Secular Paradox: On the Religiosity of the Not Religious (New York: nyu Press, 2022). Boyd, Gregory A., The Myth of a Christian Nation (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2005). Bryson, Michael, The Atheist Milton (New York: Routledge, 2016). Calvin, John, Sermons of Master John Calvin on the book of Job (London: Henry Bynneman, Lucas Harison and George Byshop, 1574). Camus, Albert, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt (New York: Knopf, 1956). Chemerinsky, Erwin, “No, It Is Not a Christian Nation, and It Never Has Been and Should Not Be One” Roger Williams University Law Review 26: 2 (Spring 2021). Clarke, Brian, “Going, Going, Gone? Canadian Churches and the Rise of Non-​religion” in Beaman, L.G., Stacey, T. (eds) Nonreligious Imaginaries of World Repairing (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). Copson, Andrew, Secularism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2019).

264 Bibliography Copson, Andrew, Secularism: Politics, Religion, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). Denyer, Nicholas, Plato: Alcibiades (Cambridge University Press, 2001). Ellis, Jenna, The Legal Basis for a Moral Constitution: A Guide for Christians to Understand our Constitutional Crisis (Bloomington, IN: West Bow Press, 2015). Ellul, Jacques, Anarchy and Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991). Fea, John, Was America Founded as a Christian Nation?: A Historical Introduction (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2011). Fiala, Andrew and Peter Admirand, Seeking Common Ground: A Theist/​Atheist Dialogue (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2021). Fiala, Andrew, “God, Reason, and Ethics: Love and the Good Samaritan” Philosophy in the Contemporary World 15:2 (Fall 2008), 72–​81. Fiala, Andrew, “Linguistic Nationalism and Linguistic Diversity: Locating Hegel between Fichte and Humboldt” Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 9:1 (Fall 2004). Fiala, Andrew, “Secular Just War Theory and the Spectre of the Crusades” Ethical Perspectives vol. 27, no. 3 (2020): 237–​268. Fiala, Andrew, “Sovereignty” in Andrew Fiala, ed., Bloomsbury Companion to Political Philosophy (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015). Fiala, Andrew, “Toleration” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://​iep​.utm​ .edu​/toler​ati​/​. Fiala, Andrew, Against Religions, Wars, and States: Enlightenment Atheism, Just War Pacifism, and Liberal-​Democratic Anarchism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013). Fiala, Andrew, Secular Cosmopolitanism, Hospitality, and Religious Pluralism (New York: Routledge, 2016). Fiala, Andrew, The Philosopher’s Voice (Albany, NY: suny Press, 2002). Fiala, Andrew, Tolerance and the Ethical Life (London: Continuum, 2005). Fiala, Andrew, Tyranny from Plato to Trump: Fools, Sycophants, and Citizens (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022). Fiala, Andrew, What Would Jesus Really Do? The Power and Limits of Jesus’s Moral Teachings (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). Filmer, Robert, Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings (London: Richard Chiswell, 1680), at https://​oll​.libe​rtyf​und​.org​/title​/fil​mer​-pat​riar​cha​-or​-the​-natu​ral​-power​-of​ -kings​. Finlayson, James Gordon The Habermas-​Rawls Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019). Gingrich, Newt, Winning the Future (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2005). Gorski, Philip, “The Past and Future of the American Civil Religion” in Rhys Williams, Raymond Haberski Jr., and Philip Goff (eds), Civil Religion Today: Religion and the

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Index Abington v. Schemmp 6 abortion 18, 25, 41, 51, 56, 139, 163 Adams, Eric 74 Adams, John xv, xvi, 62, 63, 79, 187, 195, 196, 203, 207, 208, 209, 211, 213, 216, 218, 219, 220, 222, 235, 236, 259, 268 agnostic 67, 166, 167, 172, 179 agnosticism 21, 160, 161, 166, 167, 168, 178, 180, 189 Alcibiades 111, 113, 158, 264 American Civil Liberties Union 35, 143 anarchism 94, 122, 124, 125, 130, 133, 134 anti-​Semitic 30, 252 anti-​Semitism 59, 72 Aquinas, Thomas 109, 110, 153 Aristotle 110, 186, 267 atheism xii, xvi, xvii, 12, 21, 40, 44, 50, 57, 76, 91, 102, 106, 107, 108, 160, 161, 166, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 182, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 212, 221, 255 atheist xvi, 23, 31, 67, 104, 106, 107, 114, 139, 166, 167, 170, 171, 175, 179, 180, 183, 210 Augustine 83, 84, 85, 92, 93, 116, 146, 150, 155, 267 authoritarianism 13, 25, 64, 72, 91, 92, 153 Ballou, Adin 116, 133, 134, 165, 263 Barr, William 32, 89, 199, 203, 216, 221, 225, 235 Barth, Karl 78, 123, 124, 125, 127, 135, 263 Bauer, Gary 32, 33 Berdyaev, Nikolai 124, 125, 263 Biden, Joe 73 Blackstone, William 37, 263 Blankholm, Joseph xiii, 47, 48, 263 Boebert, Lauren 65, 66, 128, 129 Burns, Mark 10, 11, 73, 74, 165 Burns, Rhett 55, 56 Boot, Joseph 245, 246 Buddhism 67, 107 Callens, Blake 102, 254 Calvin, John 92, 154, 263, 266, 268 Canada 49, 60, 66

Carville, James 2, 3 ceremonial deism 143, 180, 181, 182, 183, 190 Christendom 30, 38, 39, 50, 52, 53, 78, 135, 151, 184, 185, 186, 187, 212, 268 Christmas 60, 149, 150 communism 12, 53, 54, 61, 88, 89, 163, 171 Copson, Andrew 12, 21 cut flower fallacy/​argument 201, 203, 204, 2123 Dante 83, 84, 93 Day, Dorothy 116, 151 Declaration of Human Rights 223 Declaration of Independence 9, 36, 37, 163, 165, 192, 203, 206, 215, 219, 237, 243, 256 deism/​deist xv, 63, 181, 186, 190, 196, 201, 237 democracy xi, 1, 7, 8, 26, 30, 60, 61, 64, 67, 87, 104, 105, 170, 189, 240, 241, 246 devil xii, 1, 7, 8, 14, 30, 39, 42, 43, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 68, 69, 75, 164, 170, 219 divine command 114, 202, 213, 238, 243 divine right 105, 243 Dobson, James 32, 33, 34, 39 dominion 26, 27, 59, 80, 121, 126, 127, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 151, 194, 229 Dostoevsky, Fyodor 106, 202 Douglass, Frederick 92 Dupuis, Charles François 209, 212, 213 Eberstadt, Mary 40, 41 Edict of Milan 38 Eisenhower, Dwight 182 Ellis, Jenna 231, 232, 233, 238, 246 Ellul, Jacques 78, 83, 124, 125, 127, 264 Emerson, Ralph Waldo 92, 165 Engel v. Vitale 6, 147 enlightenment 62, 152, 194, 195, 205, 209, 210, 211, 213, 217, 247, 256, 259, 260 Enlightenment 166, 176, 186, 191, 199, 210, 212, 216, 237, 238, 259, 264, 267 eschatology 128, 129, 166 establishment clause 32, 58, 71, 74, 87, 147, 181, 182, 221, 239 Establishment Clause 71, 99, 181 Europe 13, 23, 33, 60, 66, 167, 174, 212, 227

270 Index Euthyphro 111, 113, 114, 115, 148, 153, 156, 186, 204 Falwell, Jerry 35, 53 Filmer, Robert 105, 244, 245, 264 First Amendment ix, x, xii, xv, 5, 26, 27, 31, 32, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 58, 64, 69, 71, 74, 76, 79, 87, 88, 97, 99, 138, 140, 142, 144, 147, 149, 163, 164, 172, 173, 177, 178, 181, 190, 198, 207, 216, 221, 238, 239, 240, 247 Flynn, Michael 1, 2 France 38, 224 Franklin, Benjamin 195 freedom of religion x, 43, 55, 87, 89, 108, 141, 169, 170, 173, 193, 194, 195, 199, 207, 214, 215, 217, 221, 224, 238, 242, 257 Gingrich, Newt 35, 53, 141, 142 gender xviii, 25, 56, 72, 139, 145, 233 genetic fallacy 204, 213, 217 grace 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 129, 215, 243 Greene, Marjorie Taylor 70, 74 Graham, Billy 15, 53, 88 Graham, Franklin 52, 53, 54, 69, 76, 88, 89, 162 Habermas, Jürgen 5, 226, 227, 228, 231, 264, 265 Ham, Ken 57 Harris, Kamala 73 Hartshorne, Charles 107 Hazony, Yoram 19, 20, 58, 62 Hegel, George Friederich Wilhelm 19, 55, 61, 65, 112, 264, 265 Herberg, Will 202 Hindu nationalism x, xii, 22, 24, 25, 44, 184, 228 Hinduism 24, 25, 67, 76 Hobbes, Thomas 138, 139, 155, 176, 192, 205, 242, 265, 266 hubris 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 108, 116, 117, 119, 123 human rights xiv, 13, 20, 36, 39, 45, 46, 223 humanistic hypothesis 219, 222, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234, 240, 241, 243 idolatry 119, 122, 124, 125, 135, 142, 159

India 22, 24, 25, 38, 228 Ingersoll, Robert 36 integralism 130, 131, 132, 133 Isker, Andrew 34, 130, 131, 132, 268 Islam 24, 25, 35, 38, 42, 67, 76, 184, 186, 187, 227, 228, 237, 267 Islamophobia 30, 59, 72, 252 Israel 19, 22, 25, 73, 81, 92 January 6 3, 63, 79, 94, 97, 98, 162, 163, 196, 198 Jay, John xiv, 192, 218, 220, 221, 222 Jefferson, Thomas xv, xvi, xviii, 62, 79, 88, 91, 94, 101, 153, 177, 191, 193, 194, 207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 215, 222, 235, 236, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260 Jehovah’s Witnesses 142, 144, 147 Jessip, Kevin 98 Jesus 11, 17, 39, 53, 56, 65, 66, 70, 71, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85, 93, 98, 99, 100, 109, 111, 116, 117, 119, 120, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 153, 156, 159, 184, 186, 189, 194, 195, 196, 197, 208, 209, 244, 246, 260, 264, 267 Johnson, Mike 2, 161, 162, 163 Joshua 98, 100, 104, 116, 117, 119, 244 Judaism 67, 76, 202, 213, 237, 265 Kant, Immanuel 92, 115, 136, 137, 148, 149, 150, 152, 157, 158, 159, 192, 242, 266 Kennedy v. Bremerton 71 Kierkegaard, Søren 78 kingdom of God 80, 82, 120, 124, 129, 160 King, Jr., Martin Luther xvii, 99, 116, 151 Knox, John 78, 92, 129, 153, 154, 208, 263, 264, 267 laïcité 43 Lawson, James 99, 116 legitimacy crisis 60 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 92, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 266 Lincoln, Abraham 64 Locke, John xv, xviii, 20, 28, 37, 38, 101, 105, 136, 140, 147, 151, 175, 199, 206, 219, 244, 248, 255, 266 Luther, Martin xvii, 85, 87, 99, 116, 151

271

Index Madison, James xv, 37, 79, 88, 94, 192, 197, 198, 216, 222, 239, 256, 267 Mason, George 37, 256 Maritain, Jacques 223, 224, 225, 267 Marshall, Peter 16 Marx, Karl 30, 54, 55, 61 Milton, John 106 Modi, Narendra 24 Mormonism 187 Moses ix, 173, 234, 243, 244, 266 Muslim xvi, 22, 24, 33, 43, 175, 183 natural law 36, 62, 146, 147, 164, 200, 201, 204, 205, 206, 210, 214, 215, 216, 222, 237, 239 neutrality 22, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 56, 57, 58, 69, 145, 146 New Zealand 33 Niebuhr, Reinhold 127, 128, 135, 267 Nietzsche, Friedrich 107, 111, 112, 123, 267 nonreligion x, 6, 14, 31, 64, 65, 67, 144, 166, 168, 170, 172, 180, 184, 187, 188, 189, 191, 219, 227, 228, 229 nonreligious x, xvii, 14, 23, 28, 43, 53, 59, 60, 64, 65, 67, 71, 81, 99, 117, 152, 160, 161, 166, 168, 171, 172, 179, 181, 182, 187, 188, 190, 191, 194, 197, 199, 203, 204, 223, 224, 227, 249, 251, 253 Norway 33 O’Connor, Sandra Day 181, 182, 190 Obergefell v. Hodges 231, 233 overlapping consensus 180, 194, 205, 223, 225, 226 Oz, Amoz 152 pacifism 99, 116 Paine, Thomas 195, 207 paradox of secularism xi, xiii, 12, 13, 22, 23, 28, 34, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 69, 75, 76, 87, 117, 126, 132, 133, 135, 160, 175, 189, 190, 230, 239, 247, 250, 253, 257 paradox of toleration xiii, 46, 176, 257 Parliament of the World’s Religions xiv patriotism 4, 7, 12, 13, 23, 26, 172 Paul 49, 78, 84, 88, 103, 105, 107, 108, 109, 122, 244, 251, 252, 266, 268

Peale, Norman Vincent 15, 88, 266 Perry, Rick 91 Perry, Samuel L. 2, 3, 18, 72, 253, 268 Plato 6, 81, 88, 90, 91, 92, 103, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 128, 148, 153, 156, 196, 204, 264 Pledge of Allegiance 9, 88, 143, 147, 180 pluralism xiv, xvi, xvii, 184, 185, 186, 192, 194, 225 Poland 23 political Islam x, xii, 22, 23, 25, 44, 184, 227, 228 political philosophy xi, xii, xiii, 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 47, 136, 138, 144, 228, 232, 249 political secularism x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, 7, 12, 13, 18, 23, 28, 36, 41, 42, 46, 47, 49, 51, 53, 60, 64, 65, 68, 74, 76, 118, 135, 136, 140, 144, 146, 147, 169, 172, 180, 181, 187, 189, 190, 193, 194, 198, 199, 218, 219, 221, 223, 228, 229, 231, 248, 249, 259, 260 Pope Benedict 39, 40, 42, 267 Pope Francis xvii, 40, 49, 50, 116 post-​secular 5, 6, 21, 30, 60, 75, 220, 229, 230, 249, 259 progressive Christian xi, xv, xvii, 117, 129, 153, 159, 179, 180, 184 Quakers 63, 117 Rawls, John 47, 180, 192, 205, 223, 225, 226, 227, 231, 242, 264, 267 relativism 39, 42, 89, 111, 191, 193, 199, 200, 201, 213, 216 religious diversity 5, 7, 23, 43, 59, 63, 118, 142, 144, 169, 187, 219, 223, 225, 236 religious liberty x, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvii, 4, 5, 13, 14, 21, 26, 31, 32, 37, 41, 43, 44, 45, 55, 62, 63, 71, 74, 76, 79, 80, 89, 93, 122, 126, 136, 138, 141, 142, 144, 163, 169, 172, 177, 191, 192, 195, 197, 198, 205, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 225, 226, 230, 231, 235, 240, 247, 249, 250, 257, 258, 259 revival ix, x, 11, 15, 54, 55, 61, 65, 67, 231, 251, 254 Rousseau, Jean-​Jacques 122, 123, 176, 192, 205, 242, 267, 268 Russia 23, 38

272 Index Satan 34, 53, 106, 120, 127, 131, 154 Schaetzel, Shane 130, 131, 132, 133, 151 secular humanism 18, 21, 34, 53 secularization 7, 14, 39, 40, 49, 50, 59, 65, 66, 74, 76, 87, 90, 169, 170, 184, 228 Seidel, Andrew 3, 97, 98 Stitt, Kevin 70, 74 separation of church and state x, xv, 21, 54, 55, 57, 74, 79, 94, 99, 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 142, 144, 254 sexuality xviii, 25, 139, 145, 163 slavery xviii, 33, 64, 75, 123, 216, 222, 234, 258, 260 social contract x, 10, 28, 85, 86, 137, 139, 140, 144, 145, 146, 147, 191, 192, 194, 197, 198, 202, 205, 206, 210, 212, 213, 214, 216, 219, 222, 223, 225, 230, 232, 235, 237, 242, 244, 245, 246, 249 socialism 12 Socrates 112, 113, 115, 186, 204 sovereignty 19, 78, 84, 86, 219, 222, 244, 246 Sweden 42 Taylor, Charles 5, 226, 265 Ten Commandments ix, xv, 183, 256 Thailand 55 theocracy x, 4, 13, 49, 56, 64, 65, 82, 87, 118, 130, 132 theodicy 153, 155, 156, 159 theological imperative 243 theology xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, xix, 1, 6, 7, 13, 17, 22, 25, 27, 28, 35, 62, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 104, 106, 107, 108, 110, 115, 117, 119, 122, 123, 136, 138, 145, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165, 166, 172, 179, 180, 186, 187, 189, 191, 194, 208, 223, 249 Thoreau, Henry David 165 Tillich, Paul 78, 103, 106, 108, 109, 268

toleration xiii, xv, 28, 38, 46, 48, 67, 83, 94, 100, 104, 108, 126, 140, 144, 175, 176, 190, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 226, 230, 247, 248, 257, 258 Tolstoy, Leo 78, 83, 116, 124, 125, 133 Torba, Andrew 34, 35, 130, 131, 132, 268 transgender 73, 233 Treaty of Tripoli 195, 236 trinity xv, 62, 63, 196, 208, 212, 235 Trump, Donald ix, xi, xvii, 6, 8, 9, 10, 30, 31, 32, 45, 54, 69, 73, 88, 91, 141, 149, 162, 163, 165, 166, 170, 173, 189, 199, 222, 263 Turkey 22, 23, 25, 38 tyranny 6, 8, 56, 79, 82, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 118, 123, 125, 127, 146, 153, 154, 156, 245 Ukraine 23 Unitarian xv, 62, 147 vapor trail 199, 201, 202, 213, 225, 235 violence 2, 7, 10, 11, 16, 24, 28, 33, 34, 37, 60, 61, 64, 68, 80, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117, 119, 122, 125, 135, 163, 174, 175, 184, 188, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257 Violence 27, 33, 103, 250, 252, 255, 263 Virginia Declaration of Rights 37, 256 Washington, George xv, 62, 63, 79, 162, 195, 203 Wilson, Douglas 38, 39, 52, 53, 184, 185, 186 Whitehead, Andrew L. 1, 2, 3, 18, 72, 253 wisdom xii, xiv, xix, 3, 4, 6, 27, 111, 113, 144, 154, 155, 156, 190, 193, 201, 219, 223, 225, 238, 247, 250, 251, 256, 259, 260 Wolfe, Stephen 11, 58, 75, 87, 101, 102, 121, 122, 151, 164, 221, 229, 246, 254 Zuckerman, Phil 21, 166, 169, 266, 268