Choosing the Labour Leader: Labour Party Leadership Elections from Wilson to Brown 9780755622733, 9781848853812

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:

Labour Party Leaders and Changes in the Party Leadership

5

Ideological Disposition of Candidates and Bases of PLP Support

16

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership Elections of 1960 and 1961

29

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership Election of 1963

36

The Kellner Typology of Ideological Alignments within the Parliamentary Labour Party 1976

56

Table 6:

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership Election of 1976

57

Table 7:

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership Election of 1980

75

Voting at the Wembley Conference on the Electoral Collage

81

Candidate Support in the Labour Leadership Elections of 1981

97

Table 2: Table 3: Table 4: Table 5:

Table 8: Table 9:

Party

Deputy

Table 10: Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1983

106

Table 11: Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1988

129

LIST OF TABLES

ix

Table 12: Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1992

146

Table 13: Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1994

167

Table 14: Candidate Support in the Labour Deputy Party Leadership of 2007

190

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Joanna Godfrey and Maria Marsh at I.B.Tauris for their guidance and support. I would like to thank Susan Smith who ensured that the manuscript was presented to the publishers in the appropriate format. I am grateful to Dr Tim Bale (Sussex University) for providing the commendatory preface in support of the book. Thanks are due to Dr Michael Hill, from the University of Central Lancashire, for providing a statement supporting the book. I am appreciative of the comments made by academics who observed my paper on Labour party leadership elections and succession planning at the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) Annual Conference at the University of Strathclyde in August 2009. I would like to thank Dr Andrew Denham (Nottingham University), who invited me to contribute to the EPOP panel on electing and ejecting party leaders, and edited the special edition of Representation to which the papers from that panel were published. I would like to thank colleagues within the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the University of Leeds, for their support of my research, most notably Professor Kevin Theakston. For proof reading I should thank Andrew Gunn, Andrew Crines and Robert Nicholls. I should also acknowledge the input of many former Labour parliamentarians who responded to questionnaires on voting behaviour; on candidates and their campaigning strategies; and party leadership selection procedures. Finally, I must acknowledge the support of my parents, Irene and Neil, who have followed with great interest my decade long research into party political leadership, from my time as a doctoral student in the Department of Politics at the University of Newcastle. My greatest debt of gratitude is owed to my wife, Gayle, who has offered encouragement during the difficult stages that one experiences when completing a book. I dedicate this book to her and to our sons, Matthew, aged five, and Oliver, aged two. Dr Timothy Heppell School of Politics and International Studies University of Leeds March 2010

PREFACE

Leadership contests tell us an awful lot about the parties that conduct them and the politicians that contest them. By writing this book, as well as his companion volume on the Conservative party, Tim Heppell has done all of us interested in British politics a great service. While such contests inevitably loom large in histories of each party, it is only when one considers them together that one can attempt to draw generalisable conclusions. While there is plenty of fascinating detail in this book, its author continually brings us back to ‘the eternal succession dilemmas’ and helps us ponder the criteria parties use to make their decisions and the qualities aspirants need to possess (or at least look as if they possess) in order to ensure they meet those criteria. The chapters which follow make it clear that a candidate’s presumed capacity to unite his or her party (or at least to avoid hopelessly dividing it) is more often than not the pre-eminent consideration in the minds of those doing the choosing. That said, they also remind us forcefully that even in an age of valence politics, where voters are supposed to value competence over commitment to big causes, candidates’ perceived positions on the left-right spectrum still matter. So too does their history: it takes a very talented politician – or one lucky enough to be faced with no truly credible contenders – to live down a reputation for letting the side down, particularly if the act of disloyalty in question was relatively recent, and especially if it involved some kind of collaboration with opponents. Running a campaign which is geared to the electorate one is facing is also vital – a rudimentary point which so many candidates still seem surprisingly unable to grasp. And, Heppell makes clear that in leadership contests, as in politics more generally, timing (and momentum) is everything: a number of Labour’s ‘nearly men’ may have made it all the way to the top if only the elections they stood in had occurred earlier or later (sometimes only months earlier or later) than they actually did. Politics, then, is about might-have-beens. But it is also about institutions, interests, ideas, and individuals. Tim Heppell’s evaluations of Labour’s leadership contest strikes a judicious balance between each of those factors and captures the interactions between them. Clearly, what social scientists call institutions (and the rest of us call the rules of the game) matter

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immensely when it comes to determining the outcome, which is why, as the author shows us again and again, they are the subject of such bitter infighting. But, as he also shows us, that infighting is rarely, if ever, conducted for its own sake. Struggles over the means are ultimately about ends – both idealistic and instrumental. In the case of the ‘new left’ in the late 1970s/early 1980s, the attempt to move Labour away from a system revolving exclusively around the Parliamentary Party and towards and electoral college which would also give a say to constituencies and trade unions was, at least for some of those promoting it, about the grassroots democracy that, supposedly, was all of a piece with socialism. But, as the author makes clear, it was also bound up with a determination – often on the part of the selfsame people – to secure the election of a candidate who, they believed at least, would not only secure an ideological shift to the left but who would, if given the chance to govern the country, ensure that such commitments were actually adhered to rather than abandoned in the face of media and market opposition. All of which meant that the struggle over the rules of the game was not just about institutions and ideas but individuals. Meanwhile, the involvement of the trade unions, inevitably meant it was about interests as well: did the ultimate guarantors of Labour’s financial viability want to bet their money on a man who, for all that he shared their values, might so scare the electorate that it would never deliver the Party the governmental power which that money was ultimately designed to secure? Tim Heppell’s story is, in the end, a strangely comforting one in that it reminds us that even those playing what they think is the long game often suffer the unforeseen consequences of their attempts to favour themselves or their friends. It also serves as a useful corrective to the caricatured portrayals of Labour activists as purist zealots and those they send to Westminster as sell-outs, more interested in whatever saves their seats than in socialism or even social democracy. This may not prevent such caricatures being trotted out once again during the next Labour leadership contest. But anyone interested in asking how and why Gordon Brown’s successor got him/herself elected will be in better position to answer that question after reading this thought-provoking and well-researched book. Dr Tim Bale Department of Politics and Contemporary European Studies University of Sussex March 2010

INTRODUCTION

Party political leaders are central to how the electorate interprets British politics. The individual selected as leader will find themselves to be seen as the public image of their party. They will be assumed to have an influence upon the ideological and policy direction of the party, and critically their own parliamentarians and activists will expect the leader to influence public attitudes and voting behaviour to the advantage of the party. If the position of the leader is of such immense political significance, then the means by which the individuals who occupy that position acquire the leadership should be of interest to political scientists and political historians. This is because the means by which they acquire the leadership can impact upon their capacity to obtain authority and legitimacy over their own parliamentary party. A leader elected by means which may question their authority and legitimacy may suffer from insecurities regarding their position which may then impede their effectiveness as leader. Having identified that the position of the leader, and the means of their selection, is politically significant and carries consequences, we can now highlight that it is an under-researched aspect of Labour party studies. There are a number of excellent texts on the history of the Labour party, the most notable of which are by Kevin Jefferys, Eric Shaw, Keith Laybourn, James Cronin, Andrew Thorpe and Martin Pugh (Jefferys, 1993; Shaw, 1996; Laybourn, 2000; Cronin, 2004; Thorpe, 2008; Pugh, 2010). However, although these books offer commendable historical and conceptual analysis of Labour party politics, they make limited references to the means by which successive leaders actually acquired the leadership. Due to its inherent centrality to the ideological, political and electoral identity of the Labour party this is a significant limitation. There are a number of impressive books which include evaluations of the methods by which British political parties determine their leadership. For example, Punnett, Stark and Watkins have all offered illuminating appraisals of party leadership determination (Punnett, 1992; Stark, 1996; Watkins, 1998). However, these works are in need of updating, and, furthermore, there

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are significant differences between those books and this book. For example, all of the aforementioned books adopt a comparative perspective. The need to analyse the Conservative party, (in the case of Punnett and Watkins), and the Liberals; the Social Democratic Party (SDP); and the Liberal Democrats in the case of Stark, reduces their capacity to focus on the internal machinations of the Labour party. In addition, the approach of this book differs from those adopted by Punnett, Stark and Watkins. Those books do not offer discrete evaluations of individual Labour party leadership contests, preferring to adopt a more thematic approach. For example, Stark has a comparative chapter structure, focusing on candidates in elections, campaigning strategies and outcomes and impacts. Meanwhile, Punnett devotes only two chapters to the Labour party. He offers one chapter on leadership elections based on parliamentary Labour party (PLP) ballots (pre1980); and one chapter based on leadership elections through the Electoral College (post-1980). What is required is one historical narrative and analytical evaluation of the Labour party leadership elections that have occurred since Harold Wilson acquired the leadership in 1963 to the coronation of Gordon Brown in 2007. The aim of this book, therefore, is to provide that chronologically and thematically driven analysis of all of the leadership elections that have occurred since Wilson acquired the leadership in 1963. Put simply, this book aims to address the eternal succession dilemmas of who was chosen as the new leader; how the succession process was determined (i.e. what procedures were utilised); and why the victors were chosen. Whilst chronologically structured the book attempts to provide a thematic overview. This dual approach will involve each chapter offering a historical narrative of the events that precipitated the electoral ballot; the candidates, the campaigning period, and the outcome; before offering an evaluation of how and why the victor was elected. The book is therefore broken down into eight substantive chapters which will consider the eight leadership elections that have occurred since 1963 – three of which occurred through PLP ballots (1963, 1976 and 1980); four of which have proceeded through the Electoral College (1983, 1988, 1992, 1994) and one of which (2007) occurred without formally activating the Electoral College. Whilst the central focus of the book is to analyse Labour leadership elections for the comparable time period as analysed in Choosing the Tory Leader – i.e. covering the 50 years since the onset of the 1960s – it is appropriate to offer a brief overview of Labour leadership elections prior to the election of Wilson (Heppell, 2008a). It was not until the Labour party secured a parliamentary return of 30 members in the 1906 general election that the issue of formally addressing their leadership was considered. Keir Hardie was elected ahead of David Shackleton as the first chairman of the PLP1 (Laybourn, 1999:5). However, given that his victory was narrow it was

INTRODUCTION

3

decided that the chairmanship should be rotated with Hardie stepping down in 1908. He was succeeded by Arthur Henderson, who like Hardie served for just two years before also stepping down (Pelling, 1991:20-21). Henderson would return to the chairmanship in 1914. In between the chairmanship was held by George Barnes, who stood down after just one year in 1911 due to ill-health and widespread criticism, and Ramsey MacDonald, who held the post for three years. MacDonald resigned the leadership in 1914 as he opposed British involvement in World War One, whilst the general view of the PLP was that it should support the war (Pelling, 1991:36-37; Laybourn, 1999:5-6). Henderson resumed his position as chairman of the PLP, with his primary objective being the retention of party unity (Leventhal, 1989:50-54). However, both Henderson and his immediate predecessor, MacDonald, were defeated in the 1918 general election. Willie Adamson was selected as the new chairman of the PLP before being replaced by John Robert Clynes in 1920. Labour would increase their parliamentary representation substantially in the period between 1918 and 1922, increasing their share of the vote to 29.7 per cent of the electorate, bringing their parliamentary representation up to 142 (Laybourn, 2000:38, 174). Clynes was not rewarded for presiding over a significant increase in their parliamentary representation. He had expected to retain the chair. However, a significant body of opinion emerged suggesting that Labour needed a more high profile leader than Clynes. This concern reflected the improving position of Labour. Their ‘leading’ figure now needed to possess the characteristics of a potential Prime Minister in waiting. It was MacDonald who then defeated Clynes in a PLP ballot, whereupon he became not just chairman of the PLP, but ‘chairman and leader’ of the PLP (McKenzie, 1964:307). This symbolic change reflected an attempt to present MacDonald as leader of the whole of the Labour party, in a way that none of his predecessors had been presented as (Pelling, 1991:52). Punnett notes that for the next 50 years the chairman and leader of the PLP was regarded as the ‘de facto leader’ of the party (Punnett, 1990:181-82). The deeply controversial MacDonald would become the first ever Labour Prime Minister when Labour formed a minority administration in January 19242 (Laybourn, 2000:47). Although Labour would lose office after only ten months, MacDonald would retain his position as chair and leader of the PLP. MacDonald and Labour would return to office after the 1929 general election as another minority administration. MacDonald, however, would remain as Prime Minister after he had ceased to lead the Labour party. In 1931 the government was facing such extreme economic pressures that it was suggested massive cuts in public expenditure were required. The Labour Cabinet divided. This paved the way for MacDonald to form a national government dominated by Conservatives (Laybourn, 2000:49). MacDonald was expelled from the Labour party for his betrayal and was replaced by

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Henderson again (Pugh, 2010:215). Thereafter, a widespread belief emerged within the party that safeguards needed to be put in place to prevent leaders from becoming too powerful3 (McKenzie, 1964:317-24). Henderson would succeed MacDonald in August 1931, but in the November of that year he would lose his seat in the House of Commons, as Labour was reduced to 52 members of Parliament as compared to the 289 elected in 1929 (Laybourn, 2000:53). A short period of dual leadership emerged, as Henderson remained as the designated party leader, whilst George Lansbury assumed the position of chair of the PLP. This was to be a short term leadership approach as Henderson stood down in the autumn of 1932 and Lansbury assumed both the role of leader and chair of the PLP (McKenzie, 1964:320-24). Lansbury was to hold the leadership for just three years before stepping down voluntarily when the Annual Conference rejected the pacifist foreign policy position that he strongly believed in (Shepherd, 2002:307-46). Clement Attlee, who succeeded Lansbury, was to be leader for the next 20 years. He was at first just a caretaker leader in the aftermath of Lansbury’s resignation towards the tail end of the Parliament (Jenkins, 1948:145). Assuming that Labour would increase their parliamentary representation in the forthcoming Parliament it was widely assumed that Attlee would be replaced. Following the November 1935 general election, which tripled their parliamentary representation from 52 to 154, Attlee disputed the leadership with Herbert Morrison and Arthur Greenwood. Morrison was the best known of the candidates, and the one who most assumed would emerge as the new leader. Attlee, despite being the incumbent was viewed as an outsider, having been dismissed as being ‘too quiet and colourless’ (Jenkins, 1948:166; Donoughue and Jones, 1973:234). However, having led on the first ballot with a return of 58 to Morrison on 44 and Greenwood on 33; Attlee defeated Morrison by 88 votes to 48 on the second ballot4 (Brookshire, 1995:19-20; Pugh, 2010:240-41). The Attlee tenure would be a period of considerable progress for Labour. Their recovery from the fiasco of 1931 would result in a prolonged period of office, first as part of the coalition government from May 1940, with Attlee as Deputy Prime Minister to Winston Churchill, and later a majority Labour administration following the landslide victory of 1945. The Attlee era has been subject to considerable academic analysis, and has tended to be revered within the Labour movement and viewed as the high point of Labour5 (Laybourn, 2000:75). When Labour lost office at the general election of October 1951, Attlee was 68 years old. He would have been willing to retire immediately but there was no clamour to remove him and he was re-elected unopposed (Williams, 1961:255). He would then lead Labour to a heavier general election reversal in 1955 than they had suffered in 1951 as the Conservative majority increased from 17 to 59. The Labour vote share fell

5

INTRODUCTION

from 48.8 per cent to 46.4 per cent; as their vote return came down from 13.9 million to 12.4 million (Dorey, 1995:339-40). Table 1:

Labour Party Leaders and Changes in the Party Leadership

Leader

Acquires Leadership

Method of Selection

Departs Leadership

1906 1908 1910 1911 1914 1918 1920

Election by MPs Election by MPs Election by MPs Election by MPs Election by MPs Election by MPs Election by MPs

1908 1910 1911 1914 1918 1920 1922

1922 1931 1932 1935 1955 1963 1976

Election by MPs Election by MPs * Election by MPs Election by MPs Election by MPs Election by MPs Election by MPs

1931 1932 1935 1955 1963 1976 1980

1980 1983 1992 1994 2007

Election by MPs Electoral College Electoral College Electoral College Electoral College **

1983 1992 1994 2007

Chair of the PLP Keir Hardie Arthur Henderson George Barnes Ramsey McDonald Arthur Henderson Willie Adamson John Clynes Chair and Leader of the PLP Ramsey MacDonald Arthur Henderson George Lansbury Clement Attlee Hugh Gaitskell Harold Wilson James Callaghan Leader of the Party Michael Foot Neil Kinnock John Smith Tony Blair Gordon Brown *

**

Henderson replaced MacDonald as chair and leader of the PLP in August 1931, but then lost his parliamentary seat in November 1931. Henderson remained as ‘party’ leader but with Lansbury as chair. Henderson retired as ‘party’ leader in October 1932, whereupon Lansbury assumed the position as chair and leader of the PLP. Brown was the only candidate who passed the threshold for nomination to the Electoral College and therefore automatically became Labour party leader.

Source:

adapted from Stark, 1996:14

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Attlee would justify prolonging his tenure as leader by arguing that the unity of the party would be severely damaged if either of the two main rivals to succeed him – Nye Bevan on the left or Morrison on the right – were elected. By prolonging his leadership tenure this allowed Hugh Gaitskell to emerge as a candidate of the right who was capable of defeating Morrison (Donoughue and Jones, 1973:535-36; Williams, 1978:300; Pearce, 1997:17781). This indeed proved to be the case as Gaitskell secured 157 votes to Bevan on 70 with Morrison the heir apparent for two decades trailing in on 40 (Sibley, 1978:75). Gaitskell would be elected unopposed from 1955 through until the autumn of 1960 when he would be challenged by Wilson in the first of two attempts that Wilson would make to acquire the leadership. Chapter two seeks to explain how and why Wilson managed to acquire the leadership. By profiling the ideological feuding between the left and the right in the 1950s, the chapter identifies how Wilson positioned himself during the course of the struggles between the revisionists on the right and traditionalists on the left. In doing so, the chapter demonstrates how Wilson had acquired a reputation as a divisive influence, which made his subsequent election as leader surprising. The chapter identifies how despite this reputation his campaign strategy was to present himself as a unity candidate. This was a high risk strategy, given his reputation for disloyalty as evident from his resignation from the Cabinet in 1951 and his challenge to remove Gaitskell in 1960. That the Wilson strategy worked demonstrated that he had overcome the opposition that existed within the PLP towards him. After all he was a two time loser, having lost to not just to Gaitskell for the leadership in 1960, but also to George Brown for the deputy leadership in 1962. The success of Wilson was ultimately a result of the limitations of Brown as a leadership candidate. Chapter two outlines how Brown had originally been expected to defeat Wilson as the PLP was predominantly of the right, rather than the left. In this context, it was assumed that the ideological disposition (of candidates vis-à-vis their electorate) was likely to be the primary determinant of voting behaviour, and that this should work to the advantage of Brown and to the disadvantage of Wilson. Having identified that the elevation of Wilson was a surprise given the considerable obstacles to him as a candidate of the left, the chapter concludes by explaining how and why he was successful in reversing the defeat that he had suffered to Brown for the deputy leadership just a matter of weeks earlier. Through this three dominant themes will emerge: first, the fact that the left had just one candidate (Wilson), whilst the non-Wilson supporters on the right fractured between Brown and James Callaghan; second, the momentum and first ballot lead that this provided for Wilson, which made it immensely difficult for Brown to overcome in the second ballot; and third, the weak planning evident in the Brown campaign team. Ultimately, the

INTRODUCTION

7

chapter concludes that despite his evident limitations, Wilson won because ideological factionalism was set aside when voting, as the PLP concluded that Wilson was better positioned than Brown to offer voting appeal and potential political/governing effectiveness. The aim of chapter three is to examine the unique circumstances surrounding the transition of the leadership from Wilson to Callaghan in 1976. The chapter will emphasise how the party had never had a vacancy for the leadership whilst they were in office, and how a leadership election amongst the PLP would constitute the first time that a British Prime Minister had been elected as a result of a parliamentary ballot of party colleagues. The chapter will observe how at that time the process of selection through eliminative parliamentary ballots was praised for being straightforward, practical and efficient and for being conducted without any rancour, yet such assertions proved to be misplaced. The chapter will provide an initial exploration of the limitations of the Wilson administration of 1964 to 1970, as well as analysing the insecurity of Wilson throughout and his fear that leading Cabinet ministers, such as Callaghan and notably Roy Jenkins, were seeking to destabilise him and replace him as leader. This analysis will provide scope for identifying how Callaghan revived his political reputation after the devaluation crisis of 1967 and enhanced his succession chances by his tactical positioning in the 1968 to 1974 period, and how Jenkins undermined his chances by his conduct in the opposition period between 1970 and 1974. The chapter will then proceed to analyse the background, record and appeal of the six candidates: Callaghan, Jenkins, Tony Benn, Anthony Crosland, Michael Foot and Denis Healey. It will suggest that Callaghan overcame the other candidates because of three inter-connected factors. First, he possessed a most professional and experienced campaign team and had the strongest backing amongst ministers. Second, in a contest that involved two primaries, (a left wing primary between Foot and Benn, and a right wing primary Callaghan, Jenkins, Healey and Crosland), it was assumed that the winner of the right wing primary would be the victor overall, as the right wing were deemed to be in the majority within the PLP. Third, relative to the other candidates, Callaghan possessed the most ministerial experience and was deemed to be more of a unifying figure than the others. The chapter concludes that ultimately, the PLP selected Callaghan over Foot as Callaghan was deemed to be superior in terms of the essential leadership determinants: competence, acceptability and electability. His failure on the latter criteria would result in the chaos of opposition post 1979. Chapter four aims to examine the transition from Callaghan to Foot, which flowed from the controversial leadership election of autumn 1980. The chapter will situate the war of the Callaghan succession within the

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context of the bitter constitutional crisis that the party inflicted upon themselves in the immediate aftermath of their loss of office in 1979. The chapter will be broken down into two distinct sections. The first section will examine the drive for constitutional reform within which establishing an Electoral College, and extending the franchise for leadership selection to the wider Labour movement, was a central strategic objective for the new left, who were dominated by the charismatic leadership of Tony Benn. This section will also examine the chaotic period between agreeing that an Electoral College should be established in principle (October 1980), and determining the exact parameters of how exactly the Electoral College should function (January 1981). The analysis on the constitutional crisis element will embrace the 1979 to 1981 period up to the defectors who formed the SDP. The second section of the chapter will focus on the war of the Callaghan succession. The chapter observes how the constitutional crisis and the timing of the Callaghan resignation were interlinked. Callaghan resigned before the parameters of an Electoral College were confirmed as he believed (incorrectly) that a ballot of the PLP would aid the probability of Healey being his successor. Whilst the subsequent analysis focuses on the qualities, platforms and campaigning strategies of the respective candidates, the emphasis is on examining the attitudes and tactics of the left and right to a unique contest. The chapter argues that the impending shift to an Electoral College played a significant role in the subsequent PLP ballot. The chapter outlines how on the left, Benn refused to participate on the grounds of the illegitimacy of a PLP ballot, thus handing the left to Foot. It identifies, however, how the Bennite new left calculated that Foot would be a temporary leader and that the Electoral College could be activated soon to allow Benn to be propelled to the leadership. The chapter highlights how significant divisions within the left emerged as Foot campaigned on the proviso that he would stay as leader until the general election, thus impeding Benn and the delaying the first use of the Electoral College. When analysing the candidature of Healey the chapter argues that in terms of electability and competence, (incorporating government experience), he was clearly superior to Foot. However, the chapter argues that his defeat was caused by the perception that he would be an even more divisive leader than Foot. It will be emphasised how his ministerial career and political methods had made him an anathema to the left. Electing Healey would intensify division as should he be elected by a PLP ballot it would increase the probability of a challenge to him (by Benn) when the Electoral College was established the following year. A Healey PLP ballot could not solve the leadership question; it would only delay it and intensify conflict. If Foot won under the PLP ballot it was far less likely that the Bennite new left could mobilise a challenge under the newly constructed Electoral College. The chapter concludes that Foot winning indicated the party was not concerned

INTRODUCTION

9

with presenting themselves as a potential party of government, but was concerned with preserving its existence. However, that a small number of eventual SDP defectors were later revealed as Foot endorsers, who wanted Foot to win to justify their already decided move to create a new breakaway party, would demonstrate what a demoralised state the Labour movement was in. The aim of chapter five is to examine the first leadership election to be conducted under the new Electoral College system, through which Neil Kinnock acquired the leadership. As a prelude to the debate on how Kinnock succeeded Foot, the chapter will continue the discussion (from the preceding chapter) on the multiple crises that the Labour party had inflicted upon themselves in the 1979 to 1983 period by examining the massively destructive deputy leadership challenge that Benn initiated against Healey in 1981. The chapter will examine the candidates (Kinnock, Roy Hattersley, Peter Shore and John Silkin) for the Foot succession and non-candidates (Healey and Benn). It will attribute the reasons why Kinnock, as a candidate of the left, defeated the main candidate of the right, Hattersely, to the following factors. First, the change in the leadership selection method and the use of the Electoral College worked, on this occasion, against candidates of the right. Had it remained as a PLP ballot, this would have worked to the advantage of Hattersley. Second, Hattersley ran a poor campaign which was more suited to an old style PLP ballot and failed to attune his campaign strategy to the needs of the wider electorate. Third, Kinnock had a number of benefits as a candidate. He had a clear run as the candidate of the left as Benn was unable to stand, whilst he a strong platform for garnering votes from the wider movement (and electorate) due to having built up a strong base of trade union and constituency Labour party (CLP) support. Kinnock was also a time specific attractive candidate because he could disassociate himself from the failed Wilson/Callaghan administrations, having refused to serve in them, and thus his ‘fresh start’ campaigning approach was appealing after the traumas of the last decade in government and opposition. Kinnock could also project himself as candidate of the old left but a candidate of unity by disassociating himself from the extremities of the Bennite new left. Chapter six examines the leadership election of 1988 in which Benn unsuccessfully challenged Kinnock. The chapter outlines the developments within Labour politics since Kinnock acquired the leadership since 1983. This provides scope to analyse how despite improvements in communications and campaigning approaches, Labour still suffered a landslide defeat in the general election of June 1987. This feeds into how Kinnock subsequently sought to initiate a significant policy reappraisal to broaden their electoral appeal. The chapter emphasises how despite being the candidate of the old left or newly defined soft left, and the candidate

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opposed by the right in 1983, Kinnock now found that the Policy Review was coming under sustained attack from the new left. Thus shoring up his position was dependent on retaining the support of the right. The chapter examines the rationale for the subsequent challenge from Benn: it identifies how Benn recognised that he could not win, but by standing he could remobilise the new left, which was seen to be in terminal decline, and in doing so the new left could delay and blunt the Policy Review. The chapter goes on to explore how the Benn challenge, (on a joint left wing ticket of Eric Heffer for the deputy party leadership), intensified and prolonged the perception of division, and was a tactical error. It allowed Kinnock to campaign on a joint ticket of himself with Hattersley as deputy and to make the challenge to his leadership a referendum on the Policy Review and the modernisation of the party. The overwhelming victory that Kinnock secured provided him with a mandate for modernisation; marginalised the new left even further and resulted in a significant amendment that would shore up the security of the incumbent: increasing the threshold of support for candidates within the PLP to initiate a challenge for the party leadership from 5 per cent to 20 per cent. The aim of chapter seven is to examine the leadership election of the summer of 1992 which occurred following the resignation of Kinnock in the aftermath of their defeat in the general election of April 1992. Before profiling the candidates, their platforms and the campaigning period, the chapter will provide insights into the causes of their fourth successive electoral reversal within which a Kinnock factor will emerge. In outlining the leadership limitations of Kinnock as a candidate for Prime Minister, the chapter will explore the argument expressed within the Labour movement that replacing Kinnock with John Smith would have aided their chances of removing the Conservatives. The chapter will outline how Smith would not consider the idea of challenging Kinnock before the general election, but was seen to be the outstanding claimant for the succession should Kinnock fail to win Labour power. The remainder of the chapter will outline the difficulties that Bryan Gould experienced as the candidate of the left (broadly defined), in mounting a viable candidature against the overwhelmingly dominant candidate of the right, Smith. The chapter attributes the success of Smith to the following factors. First, the perception that he was the inevitable successor within the wider Labour movement, which created a momentum that was difficult for Gould to stall. Second, the impact of the threshold for candidates entering the context increasing (to 12.5 per cent of the PLP for vacant contests) made it difficult for Gould to launch his candidature. That knowledge meant that for Gould to prevail the wider Labour movement would be seeking to propel a candidate who was overwhelmingly rejected by the PLP into the leadership. Third, the chapter will argue that Gould compounded these problems by

INTRODUCTION

11

standing for the deputy leadership as well as the leadership, which created an impression that he knew he could not win. Beyond momentum, thresholds and tactical miscalculations Gould suffered from the perception that on all three essential party leadership criteria Smith was clearly dominant: acceptability, electability and competence. Implicit within the chapter is an analysis of how Smith had a clear run from the right of the PLP as the modernisers within the right (Gordon Brown and Tony Blair) failed to challenge the assumption that Smith should be their candidate. The chapter highlights the significance of how Blair encouraged Brown to stand in opposition to Smith as a means of accelerating the modernisation of the party, and the refusal of Brown to do so. Chapter eight focuses on the circumstances surrounding the leadership election of 1994 which was prompted by the tragic death of Smith. The chapter highlights the immensely strong position that Labour were in at the time of his death due to the multiple crises of the Conservative government under John Major since 1992. It also explains the platforms, campaigning strategies and support bases of the three declared candidates: Blair, Margaret Beckett and John Prescott. It also situates the contest within the context of the reweighting of the Electoral College flowing from the one member, one vote reforms of 1993. The chapter argues that Beckett and Prescott undermined whatever small chance that the old/soft left had of prevailing by both standing for both positions, mirroring the Gould precedent of 1992. Neither Beckett nor Prescott expected to win the leadership, but failure to stand for it would give the other an advantage in the deputy leadership contest. The chapter explores how for Blair the crucial issue was not defeating the actual candidates on the left, Beckett and Prescott, but was ensuring that he was the only candidate of the ‘modernising’ right. The chapter outlines how the post Smith contest was really decided through negotiations between Blair and Brown, which ensured that Brown did not stand and instead endorsed Blair. In analysing how and why the Blair/Brown pact was constructed, the chapter investigates how Brown was forced to step aside and how the bitterness surrounding his self sacrifice would pollute Labour politics over the next decade. Chapter nine examines the coronation of Brown as leader after the resignation of Blair in May 2007. The chapter situates the succession within the context of the record of new Labour in office under Blair and the turbulent relationship that he had with his Chancellor, Brown. The chapter explores how the third term Labour administration of 2005 operated within an environment of paralysis as Blair admitted that he intended to stand down before the end of the Parliament. A central aim of the chapter is to examine how Brown and his supporters strove to force Blair to commit himself to a timeframe for resignation. It also focuses on how on the modernising right, Blairites sought to find a non-

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Brown, but new Labour figure, to stand to impede Brown, whilst on the marginalised left there was a desire to find a candidate capable of fulfilling the stipulation that they possessed 12.5 per cent or 45 members of the PLP, which acted as the nomination threshold required to activate the Electoral College. On the first dilemma, the chapter outlines how and why the rumoured candidatures of Charles Clarke; Alan Johnson; Alan Milburn; John Reid and the favourite of Blair, David Miliband, all failed to materialise. On the second dilemma, the chapter examines how the marginalised left, which was split between endorsing John McDonnell and the veteran Michael Meacher, failed to secure enough nominations to ensure that Brown would have to present himself to the Electoral College. In addition to providing an analysis of the congested contest to succeed Prescott as deputy leadership, in which Harriet Harman emerged victorious, the chapter also concludes with an appraisal of the multiple crises that would undermine the Brown administration post 2007. In considering the implications of the economic crisis of 2008 onwards and the expenses scandals of spring 2009, the chapter identifies the decline within new Labour and the perception that this can be attributed to the weak political leadership of Brown. Implicit within this analysis is an insight into the collapse of his authority as Labour leader. This is evident from the various plots that Labour backbenchers, and in some cases former ministers, have tried to conjure up in an attempt to remove Brown. At the time of writing (March 2010), it looks as though Brown will survive until the general election, which is testament to the immense difficulties that exist in removing an incumbent Labour leader. Analysing Brown involves recognising the contradiction between his authority, which is relative and dependent on performance, and his legitimacy, which at the time of his unopposed selection seemed absolute. However, such as been the dismay at his performance, and the destabilisation that has been caused to the government by the near permanent speculation of the desirability of his removal combined with the procedural obstacles to achieving this, many within the Labour movement have questioned the merit of his uncontested succession. The chapter concludes with a suggestion that the lack of any viable alternative to Brown represents one of the failings of the Labour party in office. The inability to provide the party with a real choice, both in terms of individual leadership candidates, and alternative platforms for the post-Blairite era has come to symbolise the complexities facing the party in terms of its renewal. Opinion polling evidence suggests that, along with the recession, there is a correlation between the perceived ineptitude of Brown as Prime Minister; the constant speculation about his possible removal; and the decline in support for Labour. Moreover, the by-passing of the Electoral College when Brown acquired the leadership carried with it a certain irony and would lead to a questioning of the Electoral College. Initiated to enhance the accountability of the leader

INTRODUCTION

13

to the wider Labour movement, the transition from Blair to Brown had been a coronation comparable to an old style Tory magic circle. A generation earlier, the Conservatives transition from Harold Macmillan to Alec DouglasHome in October 1963, by decidedly undemocratic means, had incurred the condemnation of Wilson, the newly elected Labour leader. Wilson condemned the ‘usual processes of consultation’ through which Conservative elites determined the leadership and thus the selection of the next Prime Minister. Wilson denounced the system as ‘an elegant anachronism’ based on ‘intrigue’ and ‘connections’, and derided the lack of democratic principles underpinning their system of leadership determination (Stark, 1996:11). Whilst Wilson could feel a certain sense of democratic superiority regarding his mandate to lead vis-à-vis that afforded to Douglas-Home, Brown does not possess a similar mandate to lead as his Conservative counterpart, David Cameron. The Macmillan succession was disputed and discredited the Conservatives’ traditional un-codified processes of consultation amongst elites through which a new leader emerged; it would act as the catalyst to the democratisation of Conservative party leadership selection (Heppell, 2008a:13-31). Democratisation would develop through three stages. First, there was the initiation of limited internal democracy in 1965. This involved the establishment of formal processes for electing the party leadership from within the parliamentary Conservative Party. Second, there was an extension of internal democracy from leadership election procedures alone to formalised leadership ejection procedures in 1975. Third, there was the extension of democracy to the mass membership in 1998. This led to the establishment of a hybrid system, in which Conservative parliamentarians screened candidates until only two remained and those two were then presented to the mass membership in a one member, one vote ballot (Heppell, 2008a:136). Whereas Brown was selected without a contest, Cameron was elected as Conservative party leader having come first in a ballot of Conservative parliamentarians – the eliminative ballots - and then 134,446 votes from Conservative members (67.7 per cent) in a turnout of 77.8 per cent in the deciding membership ballot (Denham and Dorey, 2006:35-41). Having explained the rationale for the book and how it will be structured, it is necessary to note a few qualifying comments relating to the parameters of this study and the approaches or methodologies that inform the book. The first qualifying comment amounts to a reminder of what the book is not. The book is not a history of the Labour party over the last five decades. It does not claim to be. It seeks to explore a particular aspect of Labour party politics, which has received insufficient attention from the political scientists and political historians who have researched the Labour party. The chapters therefore amount to snapshots of pivotal stages within the Labour party history over the past half a century. As snapshots of pivotal stages they offer

14

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considerable detail about short periods of change, crisis or intrigue as the party has switched from one leader to another. What the chapters do not offer is detailed appraisals of Labour politics in the periods in between leadership elections. It is assumed that the reader already possesses a rudimentary appreciation of the key events and developments within Labour politics over this period. Each chapter does, however, incorporate a brief overview of how and why a leadership election or change would be activated. The second qualifying comment relates to the main theme that will emerge from within the book: the centrality of ideological disposition to leadership campaigns; candidates and voting behaviour. When discussing the importance of ideology we need to note the pre new Labour interpretation of Labour party historical analysis. This interpretation has identified the existence of a ‘majority’ social democratic right within the PLP prevailing over a ‘minority’ socialist left (Heffernan, 2000:246). After the insurgency of the ‘new’ (sometimes referred to as ‘hard’) left in the late 1970s and 1980s, and their attempt to indirectly alter the ideological composition of the PLP, the late 1980s and 1990s has coincided with the erosion of the left. The extent of that erosion was identified by Cowley and Stuart, who observed that the intakes of 1997 and 2001 were overwhelmingly attuned to the new Labour agenda, thus bolstering the ranks of the ‘right’ and depleting even further the influence of the ‘left’ (Cowley and Stuart, 2003:322). Such an overview demonstrates that over time the ranks of the PLP have engaged in a process of continual ideological realignment; a process which has been reflective of the fluctuating adherence to core positions and ideas within Labour party political thought. If this book seeks to examine the short term tactics and long term strategies pursued by the ‘socialist left’ and the ‘social democratic right’ to enhance the prospect of their faction securing the lineage on the party leadership, it is necessary to provide some degree of clarity on the meaning of the terms ‘socialist left’ and ‘social democratic right’. For the purposes of this book the ideological positions identified by Plant, Beech and Hickson of the old left; the new left; the centre; the old right and the new right will apply. The old left, associated with Bevan bemoaned the drift from radicalism towards inertia within the Attlee administration, and advocated further nationalisation and unilateralism. The demise of the old left post-Bevan provided the political space for the emergence of the new left in the 1970s. Their advocacy of industrial reform, protectionism, further public ownership through the Alternative Economic Strategy, unilateralism and withdrawal from the European Economic Community (EEC) was complemented with a commitment to constitutional reform within the Labour party itself. Reconfigurations within the left would see the terms soft left used by the 1980s, amongst those who wished to be distinguished from the Bennite influenced new left. As figures of the left who opposed Benn often referred to them as the new left, as well as the hard left,

INTRODUCTION

15

so they were referred to as the soft left. It is legitimate to suggest that there is a strong correlation between the terms new and hard left, and old and soft left. The centre of the party was driven by the desire to achieve balance between the competing demands of the left and right. The old right, identifiable with the intellectualism of Anthony Crosland and the leadership of Gaitskell, conditioned Labour policy through until the 1970s when it was discredited by the failures of the 1974-79 Labour administrations, and was then fractured and undermined by the formation of the SDP in 1981. The transitions within the right in the long years of opposition saw the emergence of the new right as the architects of modernisation. Within new Labour there has been a greater acceptance of the market and increased tolerance of inequalities than within the old right (Plant, Beech and Hickson, 2004:2-3). How do these positions relate to the respective leadership elections from the era of Wilson to Brown? Candidates for the leadership can be identified along this continuum of Labour party political thought in two ways: first, where they are primarily ideologically located themselves; and, second; the ideological spread of their appeal. For example, Wilson was a candidate who acquired the endorsements of the left in the 1960 and 1963 leadership elections, even though his endorsers were more to the left than he was himself. Table two provides an overview of respective candidates and their ideological locations/appeal, with the victors in each leadership election highlighted in bold. Emerging from table one is an awareness of the following: despite the fact that the constitutional reform agenda initiated by the new left in the late 1970s was driven by a desire to establish an Electoral College, to aid their chances of securing the lineage on the leadership, it is clear that candidates identifiable with the left had more success in PLP ballots than the Electoral College. Although Gaitskell in 1960 and 1961 defeated the candidatures of Wilson and Greenwood, which were identifiable with the old left, and Callaghan defeated Foot on the same basis in 1976, Wilson was able to overcome Brown in 1963 and in controversial circumstances Foot overcame Healey in 1980. Both of these victories were acquired despite the assumption that the PLP was ideologically loaded against candidates identifiable with the left. The shift to an Electoral College, which diminished the influence of the ‘rightist’ PLP, and incorporated trade union and CLP sections with an assumed ‘leftish’ bias, should theoretically have worked to the advantage of the left in securing the lineage on the leadership. However, in the five party leadership contests since its inception, it is clear that the candidate most identifiable with the left has been comfortably defeated on each occasion, with the exception of 1983. Table two (on page 16) invites further consideration of the tactics deployed by both the socialist left, in the guises of the old left and the new left, and the social

16

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER

democratic right, both old right and new right. That further analysis is provided in the chapters that follow. Table 2:

Ideological Disposition of Candidates and Bases of PLP Support Ideological Disposition of Candidates and/or Sources of Support Old New New Left Old Left Centre Right Right

PLP Ballot 1960 1961 1963 1976

Wilson Greenwood

Benn

1980

Foot Silkin

Electoral College 1983 Heffer 1988 1992 1994

**

Kinnock

Benn Gould Beckett Prescott McDonnell

2007 *

Foot

Gaitskell Gaitskell Wilson Brown Callaghan Callaghan Healey Crosland Jenkins Healey Shore * Hattersley Shore * Kinnock ** Smith Blair Brown

Locating the ideological disposition of Shore is complicated as he does not adhere to the one dimensional interpretations of Labour party thought, with his pronounced hostility to the Common Market being more strongly associated with the left. Within the literature there is no real clarity in terms of how he has historically been ideologically defined. Kinnock went through a process of ideological repositioning, from the old left in the 1970s towards the centre ground once he acquired the party leadership. His revisionist policy review of the late 1980s provoked condemnation from the left and adherence to amongst the right.

Source:

Heppell, 2010a

The final qualifying comment relates to sources. I have sought to ensure that every argument, interpretation advanced and conclusion reached has been supported by evidence. In constructing the evaluations of each leadership election since 1963 I have used the following types of sources, through which

INTRODUCTION

17

it can be argued that the analysis can be regarded as adhering to the essential trustworthiness criteria of credibility; dependability and confirmability. The first source which would provide confirmation of basic factual detail relating to historical developments within Labour politics were monographs and peer review journal articles. The second source, which was particularly important for some of the earlier chapters, was the private papers or diaries of significant political elites. For example, the diaries of Tony Benn, Richard Crossman and Patrick Gordon-Walker, provided useful insights into the candidates and campaigning strategies during the course of leadership selection contests. The papers of Hugh Gaitskell, Harold Wilson, George Brown, James Callaghan, Anthony Crosland, Michael Foot, Bill Rodgers and Neil Kinnock, all provided invaluable sources of supporting evidence. The third substantive source was through interviews and correspondence with former Labour parliamentarians, notably Bill Rodgers and Neil Kinnock. Numerous other current and former Labour parliamentarians provided confirmation of various campaigning strategies for candidates whom they supported. Many of these preferred not to be named. The fourth main source were biographies and autobiographies, with for example the excellent works of Kenneth Morgan on Callaghan and Foot, Ben Pimlott and also Philip Ziegler on Wilson; George Drower on Kinnock, Mark Stuart on Smith, and Anthony Seldon on Blair being particularly useful. Amongst the autobiographies Callaghan and Healey proved to be of particular merit when recalling leadership succession planning. Finally, the analysis of each succession contest is supported by insights from newspapers and periodicals which were able to provide an interpretation into how candidates and contests were perceived at the time. The cumulative impact of the range of sources that are utilised will hopefully provide the reader with a detailed and contextualised analysis of each of the last eight leadership election contests that have occurred. It is nearly fifty years since Wilson challenged Gaitskell. After his failed 1960 challenge, two further contests occurred inside two and half years: the Greenwood challenge of autumn 1961 and the contest created by the death of Gaitskell in 1963, which brought Labour into the era of Wilson. Wilson would lead Labour into four general election victories (October 1964, March 1966, March 1974 as a minority administration and October 1974). His capacity to sustain Labour as a party capable of challenging for office would coincide with a period of leadership stability. Wilson would be leader for thirteen years (1963 to 1976), as would Blair a generation later (1994 to 2007). Blair would lead Labour to three successive general election victories and would have parliamentary majorities that Wilson could only envy. The period between the Wilson and Blair tenures would be a period of immense leadership turbulence. In that eighteen year period between 1976 and 1994, Labour would experience six leadership elections (1976, 1980, 1983, 1988,

18

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER

1992 and 1994) and numerous tinkering of their leadership election procedures (1981, 1988, 1993); whilst experiencing four successive general election defeats (1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992). That an excess of leadership elections is indicative of political (electoral) failure is clearly evident. During the era of new Labour dominance under Blair, the Conservative party would have five different leaders and would conduct five different leadership elections (1995, 1997, 2001, 2003 and 2005), whilst changing their method of party leadership selection from a parliamentary ballot to a mass membership ballot following the parliamentary screening of candidates (Heppell, 2008a:210). At the time of writing (March 2010) most political commentators assume that Labour will be entering opposition by the summer of 2010. Is the Labour party about to enter another bout of leadership instability?

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON: THE LABOUR PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 19631

The Labour party secured a dramatic general election victory in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Under the leadership of Clement Attlee, they secured a parliamentary majority of 146. This seemed to indicate the desire of the electorate for change, and suggested that a prolonged period of Labour governance could be imminent. The Attlee years would constitute an era of considerable policy achievement. It would shape the contours of foreign and domestic policy for a generation, and would embed the pillars of what became defined as the post war consensus.2 In the foreign policy sphere, independence for India and Pakistan acted as a prelude to the transition from Empire to Commonwealth, whilst the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation secured the alliance with the Americans within the defence of Western Europe. In the domestic sphere, an extensive programme of nationalisation placed one fifth of the economy under public ownership, whilst the establishment of the National Health Service was the jewel in the crown of the new welfare state (Jefferys, 1993:810). However, the optimism that the political left had held at the prospect of the arrival of socialism proved to be unsustainable after 1948. Acute financial constraints and burgeoning defence requirements would prise open left-right disagreements that would come to dominate in the prolonged era of opposition in the 1950s. To the left further nationalisation was a symbol of their continuing commitment to socialism. To the right came the call for consolidation rather than further radicalism. To consolidators the accomplishments of the Attlee governments should be digested and the objective for further Labour governance was the effective administration of the new welfare state3 (Shaw, 1996:50). That factionalism between the left and the right was to become strongly aligned to the personal rivalry between Nye Bevan and Hugh Gaitskell, both

20

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER

of whom had leadership aspirations. In early 1951, Chancellor Gaitskell decreed that increases in defence spending caused by the Korean War would require greater efficiencies with regard to domestic public expenditure. As such, Gaitskell argued that the costs of the National Health Service had to be reigned in and specified that health service charges should be introduced. Appalled by the imposition of charges, Bevan promptly resigned from the Cabinet; an act which prompted Harold Wilson to join him and resign as President of the Board of Trade. The dual impact of domestic and foreign policy problems critically undermined the credibility of the Attlee administration, and the perception of division eroded their electoral appeal. The forthcoming general election of October 1951 saw Labour return to opposition. They would remain in opposition for thirteen years, until the aforementioned Wilson acquired the leadership in January 1963 following the death of Gaitskell, and entered Downing Street as Labour Prime Minister in October 1964. That Wilson had resigned as President of the Board of Trade in 1951, but would later make the maintenance of party unity the dominant theme of his tenure as leader between 1963 and 1976, is intriguing. It also raises the question of how did Wilson manage to acquire the leadership? This question needs to be asked because there are two inter-related and critical issues that would lend weight to the suggestion that his elevation was surprising. First, he had developed a reputation for deviousness and disloyalty which led many to question his integrity and his ideological commitments (Morgan, 1997:181). He had resigned from the Cabinet in 1951 in support of Bevan, which suggested he was aligned to the left. Despite this he had replaced Bevan, when Bevan had resigned from the shadow Cabinet three years later (Thorpe, 1997:151). Moreover, he had voted for Gaitskell over Bevan in the 1955 leadership election (Ziegler, 1993:108). Having endorsed Gaitskell earlier he then challenged him for the leadership in 1960. In doing so he claimed that his motivation to stand was based on the fact that he could offer less divisive party management methods than Gaitskell. This approach ensured that the left were irritated about his ambivalence to their concerns, (nationalisation and unilateralism), whilst the right viewed him as a traitor and an overly ambitious opportunist (Foot, 1968:133; Ziegler, 1993:128). Second, because deviousness and disloyalty seemed to have defined his political career, there was a suggestion that he may be unable to unify the party (despite his claims). Moreover, it appeared that he lacked appeal within the Labour movement itself. He had twice attempted to secure a leadership position. In addition, to the formal challenge to the leadership of Gaitskell in the autumn of 1960, he had also unsuccessfully challenged George Brown for the deputy leadership in the autumn of 1962. The consequence of the challenge to Gaitskell was that he trailed in a distant ninth in the shadow Cabinet elections in the autumn of 1960 (Thorpe, 1997:151). All three results

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON

21

suggested that there was opposition within the PLP towards him in the 1960 to 1962 period. These factors are significant. Watkins suggests that by January 1963, Wilson looked like an ‘outsider’ for any hypothetical succession contest (Watkins, 1998:135-36). Drucker describes Brown as ‘the candidate to beat’, (Drucker, 1976:384) whilst Punnett observes the strength of James Callaghan vis-a-vis Wilson in the shadow Cabinet elections of November 1962, where Callaghan came first and Wilson third (Punnett, 1964:62, 68). Moreover, if ideological affinity was to inform voting behaviour4 then this would impede Wilson just as it had when he challenged Gaitskell in 1960. His 166 to 81 defeat was seen to be a ‘fairly accurate representation of the left-right power situation within the PLP at the time’ (Haseler, 1969:154). Despite this, Wilson would manage to reverse his deputy leadership defeat to Brown in November 1962 and defeat Brown for the leadership just eight weeks later. Over and beyond the surprise element of his acquisition of the leadership, the dynamics of the leadership election itself should be seen as significant in terms of the development of the Labour party over the next two decades. For example, the Labour administration of 1966-70 would be disfigured by Wilson’s paranoia about plots against him and his fear that he was about to be challenged and removed from the leadership. This paranoia may have been fuelled by the insecurity that he felt as leader. Virtually the whole of the shadow Cabinet that he inherited, and a vast bulk of the frontbench when Labour held office under Wilson, were aligned to the Gaitskellites social democratic revisionist strand within the PLP. When he took over the leadership he knew that around his inherited and elected shadow Cabinet there was virtually no one who had voted for him. This isolation intensified his insecurity, as he knew how deep the detestation was for him amongst the former Gaitskellites. Understanding how and why the Gaitskellites disliked and distrusted Wilson is central to understanding how Wilson acquired the leadership5 (Thorpe, 1997:153). The Defeat of Wilson: The Failed Challenge to Gaitskell The aforementioned Gaitskell versus Bevan feud over health service charges had dominated the final year of the Attlee government. It was to act as a prelude to a virulent bout of internal warfare, which embraced policy formulation, the ideological identity of the Labour party, and the leadership succession to Attlee. A fight for the soul of the Labour party, as Gaitskell famously described, between the Bevanite socialist left fundamentalists or radicals, and the Gaitskellite social democrat right revisionists, (the successor to the consolidators) had begun. Of the chronic factionalism that their rivalry encouraged, Clarke has concluded that:

22

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER Between them, Nye Bevan and Hugh Gaitskell not only dominated the party: they threatened to destroy it as a serious contender for power. In fighting for its soul, they fought each other to a standstill. Two dissimilar but magnetic figures, they repelled each other and attracted eponymous bands of supporters who vilified each other more effectively than either of them hurt the Tories. (Clarke, 1999:236)

In the battle for the soul of the Labour movement, events in the mid 1950s suggested that the revisionists on the right, rather than the fundamentalists on the left, were gaining the ascendant. The first term in opposition had seen the minority Bevanite faction, which included Barbara Castle, Michael Foot, Ian Mikardo, Richard Crossman and Wilson, campaign for further nationalisation, and against British and German rearmament. This would culminate in Bevan mobilising the left to defy the leadership position on supporting the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb. The consequence of this for Bevan was the threat of expulsion from the party. This eventuality was avoided by only one vote on the National Executive Committee (NEC) although Bevan did have the party whip withdrawn (Laybourn, 2000:103-04). Bevan may have sustained his heroic figurehead status amongst the left, but his conduct would seriously undermine his chances of succeeding Attlee (Thorpe, 1997:42). Attlee had been Labour leader since 1935, and due to the longevity of his leadership tenure and his age (he entered his seventies during their first term in opposition), there was considerable speculation about the succession. As was mentioned on page six of the introduction Attlee had long been concerned that the leadership succession contest would result in further infighting between right and left, and that Morrison, rather than Gaitskell, might inherit the crown. Consequently, rather than resign in the immediate aftermath of the second successive electoral reversal in April 1955, Attlee delayed his resignation until the December of that year. In the interim period, the probability of Morrison defeating Gaitskell was undermined by the intervention of Hugh Dalton. Dalton voluntarily retired from the shadow Cabinet on account of his age (he was 67) (Thorpe, 1997:141). Upon his own resignation he suggested that others should retire to make way for younger parliamentarians. In doing so, he made the age of Morrison at 67 a significant issue, thus encouraging the right to coalesce around the younger Gaitskell at the expense of Morrison6 (Jefferys, 1993:44). Had Attlee retired earlier, say in the aftermath of losing office, Morrison would have been the logical successor, but the passage of time had allowed Gaitskell to usurp him as the figure head of anti-Bevanite thinking within the Labour movement (Thorpe, 1997:142). Crucially, the succession contest indicated the strength of the opposition to Bevan and the left. Although Morrison trailed in last with

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON

23

forty, the remainder of the right supported Gaitskell, who with 157 votes, comfortably defeated Bevan who polled 70 votes (Thorpe, 1997:142). Having failed in his bid at the leadership, Bevan adapted his political approach. The Bevanite left had been perceived to be the primary cause of the factional strife that had undermined their capacity to present themselves to the electorate as a unified party. Many in the Labour movement therefore blamed the Bevanites for the general election defeat of April 1955. As Bevan began to display a hitherto unrecognised loyalty to the leadership, and to the newly elected party leader in Gaitskell, so the Gaitskellite right, which included in its ranks Roy Jenkins, Douglas Jay, and Patrick Gordon Walker, sought to advance a new modernised philosophy designed to guide the policy trajectory of an incoming Labour administration. The primary intellectual influence on revisionist thinking was Anthony Crosland. In his seminal publication, The Future of Socialism, published in 1956, Crosland argued that post war management by the state and industry appeared to have addressed the central economic dilemma of delivering economic growth with full employment. As such Labour should redefine their objectives. Their central aim should be the creation of a more equal society through redistributive taxation, comprehensive education and improvements in health and housing (Thorpe, 1997:143). The Crosland argument implied that economic growth within a capitalist framework would lead inexorably to a more socialist orientated social order. Although the left were troubled by the insinuation that nationalisation should be a minor aspect of policy strategy, the trajectory of the Crosland thesis informed social democrat revisionist, and Labour elite level thinking for a generation (Jefferys, 1993:46). The impotence of the Bevanite left towards the revisionist thinking seemed to be confirmed as Bevan formally divested himself of the title ‘leader of the left’ by his conduct at the 1957 Annual Conference. The left assumed that Bevan would support their unilateralist position. Bevan chose to repudiate the unilateralist position, and advocated a multilateralist position. Arguing that unilateralism would send a British Foreign Secretary ‘naked into the conference chamber’, Bevan famously argued that this represented an ‘emotional spasm’, rather than statesmanship (Jefferys, 1993:48). The dual impact of attributing their electoral defeat to the Bevanites divisiveness, and the fracturing of the Bevanite left from their de facto leader on the question of unilateralism, appeared to represent the defeat of the left by the right (Laybourn, 2000:105). Labour thus entered the general election of 1959, with a young and gifted leader, and with a relatively united manifesto platform, based around broadly revisionist thinking that the left broadly accepted, publicly at least (Jeffreys, 1993:49). The scale of that election defeat, with the Conservatives increasing their parliamentary

24

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER

majority, surprised many. It left Gaitskell feeling vulnerable, and in need of a scapegoat in order to shore up his position (Thorpe, 1997:149). The subsequent conduct of Gaitskell and the Gaitskellite right over the next eighteen months did much to reignite the embers of left right feuding. The Annual Conferences of 1959 and 1960 were to be highly divisive, and would culminate in Wilson challenging Gaitskell for the leadership. Whilst the left believed that defeat had been because Labour had been insufficiently socialist and radical, the right believed that the defeat was caused by them being insufficiently revisionist in their approach. Gaitskell utilised the leadership to advance the revisionist case (Jefferys, 1993:50). The scapegoat for failure would be Labour theology and Clause IV of the party constitution which committed the party to public ownership, and thereby nationalisation (Thorpe, 1997:149). Gaitskell believed that Clause IV was politically irrelevant and electorally unattractive. It was not an accurate expression of the policy goals of a forthcoming administration that he would lead. By maintaining its privileged position within the constitution of the party, it enabled the Conservatives to exploit it and engender fears surrounding the implications of Labour occupying power. The left put up a fierce defence of Clause IV, and in doing so, compelled Gaitskell into a humiliating climbdown7, although Clause IV would now be supplemented by supporting statements of principle (Thorpe, 1997:149). Gaitskell was to be subjected to massive criticism for his weak tactical sense. He had managed to deepen the divisions within the PLP, without securing his policy objectives. Wilson was bemused by the conduct of Gaitskell. He could not relate to the policy objective or the method of seeking change. Wilson believed the Clause IV was inconsequential electorally, but massively important to the psyche of the Labour movement. He believed that Gaitskell had demonstrated a crass insensitivity to the traditions of the party. By his approach, Gaitskell pitted the left and the right of the movement against each, rather than their real enemy (Foot, 1968:12831). He would reveal to the political journalist, John Cole, how Gaitskell should have managed the issue. Wilson gave a mock speech to Cole, which went as follows: Comrades, in our deliberations on what this great party of ours must do next let us not forget one undeniable fact: the Tories are a bunch of bastards. But as we consider the future of public ownership, let us not leave ourselves open to the lies and slanders our opponents will throw at us. For never forget, comrades, that the Tories are a bunch of bastards. But do we really want the state to take over every sweet shop or petrol station? Of course we don’t, but that’s what the Tories will say about us, because the Tories are a bunch of bastards…. (Cole, 1995:24)

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON

25

Cole then elaborated on how Wilson was focused on the importance of uniting politically and the dangers of dividing theologically: He [Wilson] claimed that in this way the party could have been weaned away from an obsession with nationalisation, without dividing traditionalists from reformers. It was methods in politics, rather than any great differences in beliefs, which divided Hugh Gaitskell and Harold Wilson. (Cole, 1995:24) By this juncture, Bevan was now a reduced political operator thus increasing the importance of Wilson, and his death in 1960 confirmed the passing of the torch to his fellow resigning rebel from 1951. The hostility between Gaitskell and Wilson was to come close to matching the conflict between Gaitskell and Bevan. Their working relationship was wracked with mutual suspicion. The rivalry between them, and more particularly between their supporters, became extremely bitter8 (Cole, 1995:25). However, during the height of the ideological feuding between the right and the left in the 1950s, it is argued that few saw Wilson as a future leader (Haines, 1977:160-61). Williams claims that during this time Wilson never saw himself in these terms (Williams, 1972:113-14). However, Bill Rodgers suggested to me that Wilson carefully positioned himself9 to enhance his leadership credentials: From his Cabinet resignation in 1951, Wilson placed himself shrewdly towards the eventual Labour leadership. He was young and he knew that the Attlee government had lost its steam. The natural position for him was to be of the left of the Labour party at the beginning of the 1950s but to become rather detached during the decade. (Rodgers) That Gaitskell was fearful of Wilson was evident from the widespread speculation that he wanted to remove him from his high profile position as shadow Chancellor (Foot, 1968:127). Such intrigue fuelled speculation that Wilson wanted revenge against Gaitskell for even contemplating his demotion, and that Wilson felt like an ‘isolated’ figure under Gaitskell (Howard and West, 1965:12). Such was the Machiavellian reputation that Wilson had established there was speculation in 1959, at the height of the Clause IV debate, that Wilson was plotting a coup against Gaitskell, to propel Bevan to the leadership.10 Despite the fact that the left were apoplectic regarding the policies and methods of Gaitskell, no formal challenge against him for the leadership was initiated in 1959 (Pimlott, 1992:258). Gaitskell would survive the skirmish of 1959 over Clause IV, but would find himself gripped by crisis again in the autumn of 1960 when the Annual Conference narrowly passed a resolution endorsing unilateral nuclear disarmament. Although conference was deemed to be the supreme policy

26

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER

making authority, Gaitskell defiantly informed conference that he would not accept the resolution11 (Jefferys, 1993:52). The reaction of Gaitskell had put Wilson in a particularly difficult position. Wilson wanted to succeed Gaitskell. He wanted Gaitskell to be removed from the leadership. But still he did not want to formally challenge Gaitskell. The uncompromising reaction of Gaitskell and his insinuation that the view of conference was intolerable to him as leader and that he would seek to overturn it, created apoplexy on the left (Shaw, 1996:63). Prior to the conference decision Wilson had adopted a carefully crafted position: he stipulated that he believed in the sanctity of conference decisions. Therefore, he would accept the verdict of conference on nuclear disarmament whichever way it went. Critically, Wilson argued that the Labour movement must then unify around the position taken – i.e. acceptance of the process was critical (Pimlott, 1992:238). Given the stance that Wilson had adopted it was inconceivable that he would be satisfied with the defiant position that Gaitskell was now adopting. As the Gaitskellites on the right mobilised their strategy for reversing the decision12, a key element of their approach was dissipating the anti-Gaitskell forces. This made Wilson a target. Removing him from the shadow Chancellorship once again dominated the thoughts of Gaitskellites (Pimlott, 1992:240). Wilson was now in a tactical bind: Wilson did not know what to do. More than ever, he wanted to replace Gaitskell, whose conduct of the leadership exasperated him, and whose survival threatened his own prospects… if he resisted the clamour of the left to stand he might be accused of cowardice…and hence such was the complex psychology of the Labour party be reckoned unfit [for] a later bid for the top…he also knew that any behaviour on his part, even none at all, would be regarded as a calculated move or a machiavellian plot. (Pimlott, 1992:240) With the death of Bevan in July 1960 the deputy leadership was vacant. Wilson had wanted to solidify his position within the party by acquiring it that autumn. Seeking a vacant position would not have stoked up accusations of disloyalty and division, but could have acted as a staging post towards acquiring the leadership at a later date. As Rodgers informed me: After Bevan’s death, Wilson was the only credible leader of the left – but the left were no more than a quarter or, at most, a third of the PLP. So for Wilson to achieve his leadership ambition, he had to become acceptable to the centre-right and keep his powder dry. (Rodgers) The Rodgers insight is critical. Wilson did not really want to be pushed into a situation where he could antagonize the right, but the party management

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON

27

methods of Gaitskell were forcing Wilson into a position that required such an action. This was because whilst Wilson agonised and prevaricated, an alternative candidature emerged from the left. Anthony Greenwood, a committed unilateralist, resigned from the shadow Cabinet and announced he would challenge Gaitskell. Greenwood argued that the Labour party ‘can never be led from an intransigent position on the extreme right wing’13 (The Times, 14 October 1960). Greenwood had intensified the dilemma of what was the best tactical option for Wilson to take. Greenwood was not going to defeat Gaitskell and annex the leadership on behalf of the left. However, if he did well and scored a respectable figure he might usurp Wilson as the leading post Gaitskell alternative amongst the left. Yet, if Greenwood performed very badly then the authority and legitimacy of Gaitskell would be enhanced, thus delaying, perhaps forever, the possibility of Wilson acquiring the leadership14 (Ziegler, 1993:126). Greenwood effectively shamed a reluctant Wilson into a leadership showdown. Wilson could not keep his powder dry as Rodgers implied earlier. Greenwood had according to Bale ‘called Wilson’s bluff and forced him to show his hand rather earlier than he wanted’ (Bale, 1999:121). Wilson knew he could not emerge successful (Pimlott, 1992:242). So why did he do it? Rodgers argues that had Wilson ‘ducked the contest in 1960, the left would have found him feeble and he would have lost support’ (Rodgers). Retaining the allegiance of the left for a future (post-Gaitskell) succession contest was therefore critical for Wilson. Opting out now would lose him their future backing (Williams, 1978:624). Having reluctantly decided to challenge Gaitskell, Wilson assumed that Greenwood would stand aside. Initially, Greenwood seemed unwilling to do so. The rationale for his challenge differed from that of Wilson. Wilson stood not on the basis of support for unilateralism, which would have been the central rationale for a Greenwood challenge, but rather as a unity candidate, opposed to the confrontational style of leadership of Gaitskell.15 Ultimately, however, Greenwood accepted that Wilson would do better than he would. Crossman recalled in his diaries (19 October 1960) that this was after a week of the ‘most elaborate fencing and manoeuvring I have ever experienced’ (Morgan, 1981:884). Realising that maximising the vote against the continuance of Gaitskell was critical, and that Wilson would be better positioned to achieve that end, Greenwood stood down and supported Wilson (Pimlott, 1992:241). Wilson may also have been influenced by the attitude of left wing periodicals who strongly denounced Gaitskell. The New Statesman ran an editorial entitled ‘Wanted: A New Leader’, within which their rationale for removing Gaitskell mirrored the unity appeal of Wilson. They argued of Gaitskell that ‘neither his method of leadership nor his view of socialism is compatible with a united party’ (New Statesman Editorial, 24 October 1960).

28

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Similarly, writing in Tribune, Michael Foot commented that Gaitskell could ‘neither unite the party, nor lead it to victory’ (Foot, 24 October 1960). Wilson may also have calculated that he could utilize a challenge to embed his status as the voice of the rank and file membership. Whilst they could not participate in this election as it was a PLP ballot, their advocacy of his leadership credentials during the course of the campaign, could have helped Wilson when a latter leadership election occurred – i.e. by enhancing his status amongst activists who might seek to influence their parliamentarians when a future ballot for a vacancy might exist. Whilst Gaitskell could be assumed to have the support of the majority of the PLP, Wilson had strong levels of support amongst the membership base. The Gaitskell papers from the autumn of 1960 are overflowing with letters condemning his leadership methods from members of CLPs, whilst also advocating their admiration for Wilson. Indicative of the tone was a letter from Jack Smith, agent for the Romford CLP, informing Gaitskell that: Mr. Harold Wilson offers real hope of overcoming these difficulties which confront the Labour movement at this present time…we therefore welcome and support Mr. Wilson’s candidature for the leadership of the PLP. (Gaitskell Papers, 213.10) Wilson would campaign16 as the defender of conference decision-making, and on the sanctity of managing and leading the movement in a manner that created and then preserved party unity. The Gaitskellites were contemptuous of his challenge, feeling his unity pitch to be cant – for example, Rodgers derided him as a ‘bogus’ unity candidate (Pimlott, 1992:243; Rodgers, 2000:73). Whilst Wilson garnered the enduring hostility of the Gaitskellites on the right for the fact that he challenged, the terms of his challenge ensured that he received only the lukewarm support of the left.17 Wood and Rodgers concluded that: while the left supported him with little enthusiasm because he refused to endorse their defence policy; the right scorned him for the same reason: it was hard to see any grounds, other than ambition, for him challenging.18 (Wood and Rodgers, 1964:158) What was the impact for Wilson in initiating his failed challenge? The immediate impact was that the Gaitskellite right, who had been long suspicious of him, now distrusted him with a greater passion. The weakening of his position within the PLP was evident when he dropped from second in the shadow Cabinet elections, down to ninth. Those elected ahead of him were all Gaitskellites (Foot, 1968:129-30; Pimlott, 1992:245). What was also worrying for the left was the fact their showing had not improved much in

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON

29

the five years since Gaitskell had defeated Bevan in 1955 (Ziegler, 1993:127). Wilson secured only 11 more votes than Bevan had then and the base of his support replicated the base secured by Bevan.19 The position of Gaitskell was actually enhanced. Gaitskell finally managed to remove him from the shadow Chancellorship. He was switched to the position of shadow Foreign Secretary, which was seen by many as a device to weaken his influence within the party, both in Parliament and outside. Wilson failed to excel when handling the foreign office brief and the Gaitskellites revelled in their neutering of him (Foot, 1968: 132-33). Table 3:

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership Elections of 1960 and 1961 First Ballot

%

166 81

67.2 32.8

171 59

74.3 25.7

1960 Hugh Gaitskell Harold Wilson 1961 Hugh Gaitskell Anthony Greenwood Source:

adapted from Stark, 1996:40

The right then acted as a block to prevent him acquiring the deputy leadership when he challenged Brown in the autumn of 1962. Whilst Brown was inferior to Gaitskell politically, and this was for the deputy leadership, Wilson only managed to increase his vote from 81 in 1960 to 103 in 1962; a defeat which Bale described as being more ‘painful’ to Wilson than the defeat to Gaitskell (Bale, 1999:121). In the time period between his two challenges to Gaitskell and Brown, Wilson had been a passive bystander as another challenge to Gaitskell was launched. When Wilson challenged Gaitskell in 1960, it was on the premise of the need for unity and the inappropriate party management and leadership methods of Gaitskell. He had then swept up votes from the disaffected left, whose motivation was Gaitskell’s stance on defence policy. In launching his candidature, Wilson had asked Greenwood to step aside to allow him to challenge as the sole representative of the left. Greenwood was motivated to stand on the principle of the policy on unilateralism, but acquiesced to Wilson’s demand. When Gaitskell reversed the conference decision on unilateralism the following year, Greenwood

30

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initiated another challenge, which Wilson did not seek to block and replace. The policy based challenge of Greenwood was defeated by 171 to 59 (Stark, 1996:40). The events of the autumns of 1960, 1961 and 1962 appeared to have weakened Wilson (Stark, 1996:192). He had been positioning himself for the vacant deputy leadership thus making himself an alternative leadership figure to Gaitskell. By challenging Gaitskell for the leadership itself, Wilson had enabled Brown to annex the deputy leadership thus enhancing his leadership credentials to succeed Gaitskell. However, there are two positives that can be taken from this period. First, the two challenges provided him with the nucleus of between 80 and 100 Labour parliamentarians. They could be assumed to be backers of Wilson in a future leadership contest, should an opportunity arise. Second, the nucleus of the support for his assumed rival, Brown, may have been bigger at around 130, but there was a question mark over whether they were voting for Brown himself, or whether they were endorsing him as the candidate that Gaitskell was backing. The Triumph of Wilson: Defeating the Gaitskellite Social Democratic Right Having initiated a failed challenge for the leadership, and then having been rebuffed in his attempt to secure the deputy leadership two years later, Wilson feared that his leadership aspirations had ended (Stark, 1996:192). Whilst he came to terms with the perception that his political star appeared to be on the descendent, his nemesis, Gaitskell, saw his political star on the ascendant. Having endured an incredibly turbulent period over Clause IV and unilateralism, Gaitskell appeared to have regained his authority over the Labour movement. This reclamation of his leadership authority was aided considerably by the degeneration of the third term Macmillan Conservative administration. Evidence of relative economic decline provided Gaitskell with considerable political opportunities. He was able to exploit these to the electoral advantage of the Labour party. A healthy opinion poll lead was established and sustained. Gaitskell had become viewed as the Prime Minister in waiting (Pimlott, 1992:253). The death of Gaitskell, in January 1963, which occurred at the zenith of his political reputation, resulted in an out pouring of national mourning (Cole, 1995:39). The right of the Labour movement was devastated. His death was akin to the death of a father20 (Cole, 1995:39). Jenkins believed that the saviour of politics had been taken from them, and he had no stomach for a campaign for the leadership succession (Jenkins, 1991:203). The right were convinced, however, that the successor to Gaitskell should be of their ilk. This determination stemmed from a desire to secure the legacy of their fallen hero. However, Rodgers observes that the left and Wilson had an advantage from the commencement of an unwanted campaign. He informed

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON

31

me that this was because Wilson ‘campaigned for the leadership as soon as Gaitskell died (indeed, as soon as he was seriously ill)’ whereas the Gaitskellites were frozen in grief until after his funeral.’21 For the right to retain their lineage on the leadership they needed the following to happen. First, they needed the left to fracture between two candidates, presumably Wilson and Greenwood. If Greenwood stood, it would depress the first ballot return for Wilson. Second, whilst they needed the left to fracture in two, they would also benefit from the right uniting around an agreed candidate. Neither was to occur. The fact that Greenwood did not stand, and endorsed Wilson, was a significant advantage to the left, and would critically undermine the cause of the right (Morgan, 1997:182). This advantage for the left was then compounded by the fact that the right fractured in two (Morgan, 1997:182). Given that Brown was of the right in the Gaitskellite tradition, and that he had defeated Wilson in the deputy leadership election just two months earlier, it was assumed that he would be the candidate for the right (Haseler, 1969:241; Pugh, 2010:323). Wilson expected to be contesting the succession with Brown and was not confident in his ability to defeat him (Ziegler, 1993:134). Brown had a number of significant advantages as a candidate for the leadership. He had already demonstrated his capability as a stop Wilson candidate. He had a forthright working class manner, which ensured that he possessed immense popularity within the Labour movement. Crucially, he believed that if he were to stand he would defeat Wilson (Pimlott, 1992:245). His candidature made the succession contest appear to be a straightforward battle between the heirs to Gaitskell and Bevan. Brown launched his campaign around the slogan ‘To keep the spirit of Gaitskell alive, vote Brown’ (Watkins, 1998:136). The problem was that Brown was the heir not quite apparent to Gaitskell (Cole, 1995:39). Ultimately, he would not be able to secure the absolute loyalty of the right. A minority of Gaitskellites expressed concerns about whether Brown was the best articulator of their political brand. Whilst Dick Taverne argued the case for backing Brown and ensuring that the right put forward only one candidate, others (most notably Crosland) expressed serious reservations about Brown, and argued the case for an alternative to him (Morgan, 1997:182). The reservations about Brown were three-fold. First, there were concerns about his electoral appeal, both in terms of the leadership ballot itself (i.e. could he defeat Wilson), and to the wider electorate in a general election campaign. These concerns reflected a belief that his defeat over Wilson in the deputy leadership was exactly that: for the deputy leadership. Moreover, in that ballot Brown had benefited from the covert support of the Gaitskellites, who were keen to retain Brown as deputy to Gaitskell, rather than allow a Gaitskell and Wilson instability ticket to emerge. Implicit within this argument was the assumption that Brown had the skills and aptitudes to be a

32

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deputy leader, but not necessarily the skills and aptitudes to be a Labour Prime Minister (Kellner and Hitchens, 1976:39). Second, beyond concerns about his leadership capability there were reservations about his capacity to unify the party. His alignment to the right was so absolute there was a concern that he would be so unpalatable to the left that a new outbreak of infighting would result from his elevation (Ziegler, 1993:134). Furthermore, there were doubts about his capacity to maintain the cohesion of the right themselves. The right were dividing on the question of Europe, and the strong pro-Europeanism of Brown was a significant concern. The reservations that Crosland would have about Brown would stem partly from concerns surrounding this. The refusal of Crosland to endorse Brown would begin his distancing from his old ideological bedfellow, Jenkins (Cole, 1995:40). Finally, there were concerns about the temperament of Brown. His reputation for excessive drinking was well known.22 For this reason, Crosland was strongly opposed to him. Irritated by the probability of a Wilson versus Brown contest, Crosland would ask whether the contest had been limited to a choice between a ‘crook and a drunk’ (Pimlott, 1992:256). It was these concerns about the leadership suitability amongst those who were ideological sympathisers that would stymie his candidature (Patterson, 1993:127). Rodgers acknowledged that whilst ‘Brown’s controversial behaviour (drinking too much) was tolerable as a deputy leader’, it was ‘deeply disturbing as a potential Prime Minister.’ (Rodgers) Concerned about the prospect of Brown emerging as leader, Crosland asked ‘are we really going to be led by a drunk’ (Pimlott, 1992:256). A combination of a desire to impede Wilson, and a concern about whether Brown was suitable for this task, led to the fracturing of the right. 23 Speculation about a third candidate focused around Patrick Gordon-Walker and James Callaghan (The Times, 25 January 1963).24 His diaries reveal that Gordon-Walker contemplated standing, before cutting a deal with Brown (Pearce, 1991:276). Central to his calculations were consultations with Brown and Callaghan, which contributed to his decision not to stand. Callaghan informed him that he could do better than him and that if both stood Gordon-Walker would come in fourth. Brown indicated to Gordon-Walker that the contest was destined to be a two way contest between himself and Wilson, and that it was important to ensure that Brown, as the candidate of the right did not have his first ballot vote deflated by the presence of another candidate from the right (Pearce, 1991:276). Fearing that he might be damaged by entering the ballots Gordon-Walker thus choose to endorse, and indeed nominate Brown (The Guardian, 28 January 1963). Gordon-Walker had calculated that should Brown emerge victorious, then the newly elected leader would utilise his power and influence to help propel Gordon-Walker

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON

33

to the position of deputy leader, which Brown would have vacated (Pearce, 1991:277). Brown had succeeded in binding Gordon-Walker to his candidature. However, the tactics deployed to dissuade Callaghan were less successful. Brown used the same tactic to that of Gordon-Walker – a promise to support Callaghan for the deputy leadership - but Callaghan resisted such overtures (Pearce, 1991:277). Brown had good reason to believe he was a stronger candidate than Callaghan. The 1960 deputy leadership election gave an insight into the comparative appeal of Brown and Callaghan. In a three way contest, involving Brown and Callaghan on the right,25 and Fred Lee on the left, Brown secured a comfortable lead of 118 to 73 over Lee, with Callaghan trailing in with 55 votes, in the first ballot. The second ballot victory of Brown by 146 to 83 suggests that Lee secured around ten of the freed Callaghan supporters, with the rest switching to Brown26 (Punnett, 1964:68). Yet despite this recent reversal, Callaghan was convinced he was the better candidate. Such confidence was derived from canvassing that he had asked Denis Healey to complete on his behalf. From this three conclusions emerged. First, if both Brown and Callaghan stood, Callaghan would come last and be eliminated after the first ballot. However, Callaghan would secure a credible return, which would be sufficient enough for him to claim that he had enhanced rather than diminished his status (Kellner and Hitchins, 1976:40). Second, the canvassing suggested that those who supported Callaghan were supportive of him due to their serious concerns about Brown, and that their concerns were so pronounced that some were willing to contemplate ‘defecting’ ideologically, and switching to Wilson (Kellner and Hitchins, 1976:40). The third and final finding from the Callaghan canvassing was illuminating. It suggested that despite the assumed favoured status of Brown, Callaghan was actually better positioned to defeat Wilson than Brown, when one considered the ideological disposition of the PLP (Howard and West, 1965:23). The premise of this assumption flowed from the Callaghan camp being convinced that whilst some of Callaghan’s supporters made Wilson their second choice, almost all of Brown’s supporters had Callaghan as their second preference over Wilson (Kellner and Hitchins, 1976:40). In effect, the Callaghan camp were acknowledging that Brown could secure considerably more first preference votes from the majority right within the PLP, but that Callaghan could secure more second preference votes than Brown. The Callaghan camp claimed that Callaghan would prevent ideological defections to Wilson, and thus prevent the left from obtaining the leadership. The problem was these findings were disputed within the Brown camp. They remained convinced that even if Callaghan stood, enough Callaghan first ballot supporters would switch to Brown to ensure that he defeated Wilson (Pearce, 1991:277). It was this conviction

34

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER

which explained why when Callaghan tried to persuade Brown to stand aside in favour of him (24 January 1963) he was summarily rejected (Kellner and Hitchins, 1976:40). For those concerned about the temperament of Brown and the deviousness of Wilson, Callaghan could be an acceptable alternative. His temperament was not questioned. Labour parliamentarians accepted that he was a hardworking and likeable political operator, with a reputation for being a good parliamentarian. His loyalty to the leadership was evident from his staunch defence of Gaitskell during the disputes surrounding defence strategy (Morgan, 1997:169). Moreover, although there was considerable evidence at the time to suggest that Brown was the best placed to succeed Gaitskell, it is worth noting that Callaghan and those who advanced his cause, would have been influenced by the insights of the Spectator magazine during Gaitskell’s illness. Heaping praise on Callaghan their editorial concluded that he was ‘the only potential national leader in Labour’s ranks’ (The Spectator Editorial, 11 January 1963). Despite this, Callaghan’s real motivation for standing, however, was not with an expectation of winning this leadership succession contest, but to position himself as leadership candidate for the succession after Wilson or Brown. It was assumed amongst political journalists at the time that the consequence of Callaghan entering the fray was to the advantage of Wilson, as the candidate of the left, and to the disadvantage of Brown, as the candidate of the right (The Times, 1 February 1963). His participation would siphon off probable Brown first ballot voters, and thus depress his vote, but he would struggle to appeal to likely Wilson first ballot voters. Both Brown and Wilson were aware of this. When Callaghan finally decided to enter the succession contest, Brown was devastated. He berated Callaghan, arguing ‘you have ruined my chances and I shall never be leader of the Labour party’27 (Pimlott, 1992:257). If Brown was distraught, then Wilson was ecstatic. Indeed, the entry of Callaghan was a coup for the strategising that the Wilson campaign team had been engaging in. For Crosland and his ilk were not the only ones encouraging Callaghan to participate. Unbeknown to Callaghan one of those encouraging him to enter was actually serving in the Wilson campaign team. The deft persuasion of Leslie Plummer was also critical in splitting the anti-Wilson forces, and increasing the probability of Wilson emerging victorious (Pimlott, 1992:256; Morgan, 1997:182). Of the prolonged discussion on who the right should back, Rodgers commented: In view of the strength of feeling and the sharp division of loyalties, it was agreed that we could not ask for a collective decision that everyone would be expected to follow. Thus we had lost a whole valuable week of campaigning for our preferred candidate and had then failed to agree on who it should be. Meanwhile, Dick Crossman and George Wigg

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON

35

could be seen ticking off names off lists and building up support for Wilson. (Rodgers, 2000:72) In addition, the conduct of the Brown campaign was flawed from the outset. Brown may have inadvertently encouraged the candidature of Callaghan. At the outset of what was assumed to be a two horse race between Brown and Wilson, the two candidates came to interpret an agreement on how the leadership election should be conducted, in different ways. Pimlott observes how: Brown thought he had agreed with Wilson that it should be a clean fight, with as little damage to be done to party unity. Wilson thought he had agreed with Brown an assumption that whoever won the other would serve as their deputy. Wilson leaked this ‘supposed’ agreement. This placed Brown in a conundrum. A public declaration by Brown to the effect that he could work with Wilson might draw the sting from the argument that Wilson was a party splitter (after 1960). Brownites realised Wilson’s tactical coup too late. Brown repudiated the idea of any pact – thereby unwittingly conceding that Wilson had a point: the deputy leader seemed to be setting himself up against party unity; unlike his conciliatory opponent. (Pimlott, 1992:257) This was a critical tactical error. By announcing that he may not accept Wilson as his deputy, Brown increased any reservations that the undecided may have had about his capacity to unify the party. Brown had allowed himself to be positioned as the candidate with a price attached to him winning: i.e. the exclusion of Wilson from the leadership ticket. Wilson came with no such price attached (Howard and West, 1965:28). The impression of Wilson as a unifying peacemaker was gathering momentum, just as the image of Brown as a confrontational splitter was becoming more established. This was crucial to the decision-making of Callaghan. The argument against Callaghan entering the ballots was that his participation could be seen as divisive. Given the tactical miscalculations of Brown, and the fact that he now appeared to be a divisive candidate, this allowed Callaghan to enter without such accusations, and position himself as the alternative or compromise candidate (Howard and West, 1965:3). Another factor that may have influenced Callaghan was the behaviour of the Brown camp towards him whilst he was contemplating entering. Brown and his followers attacked Callaghan ruthlessly (Drucker, 1976:385). The intention was to undermine him to such an extent that participation would not be in his best interests. This tactic backfired in spectacular fashion. In the short-term, such brutal personal attacks ensured that the anger and resentment amongst Callaghan and his supporters made a Callaghan candidature more, not less, likely. In the

36

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long-term, antagonising Callaghan and his supporters was tactically naïve. In a hypothetical second ballot, it was likely the Callaghan would be eliminated and Callaghan supporters would now have to switch to Wilson or Brown. The badmouthing of Callaghan would result in many switching to Wilson, rather than Brown, despite the fact that the Callaghan support base was more ideologically aligned to Brown, than it was Wilson (Stark, 1996:112). Brown also undermined his chances by the manner in which he sought to obtain support. He was criticised for engaging in bullying tactics and robust arm twisting. Crossman would reveal that threats were made to suggest that frontbench careers would be ended, or would never begin, if they did not vote for Brown (Pimlott, 1992:257). In addition to the threats that his campaign team engaged in, there was some concern about their use of rewards as a means of eliciting support. It was rumoured that a total of nearly forty Labour parliamentarians had been offered Cabinet posts in a future Brown administration should their candidate emerge victorious (Howard and West, 1965:26). Whilst Brown canvassed poorly, the Wilson campaigning style was more astute. They engaged in no explicit canvassing for endorsement and offered no press interviews to support his candidature. George Wigg, who masterminded the Wilson campaign approach, outlined how their strategy was not to ‘whip’ votes, but to ‘seek disclosure’ of intended voting intentions. Upon acquiring insights into such intentions, the Wilson team could then use this as a ‘guide to action where appropriate’, such as making Wilson available for consultation with those who were undecided, or in need of reassurance (Wigg, 1972:256). Adopting a low key approach was tactically astute given the reputation, (i.e. for duplicity), that their candidate had acquired. Consequently, they attempted to play down his associations with the left so as to draw in centrists, and by presenting Wilson as a moderate centrist, they highlighted how Wilson was capable of uniting the party, and then winning the general election (Ziegler, 1993:135). Table 4:

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership Elections of 1963 First Ballot

Harold Wilson George Brown James Callaghan

Source:

Stark, 1996:4

115 88 41

% 47.1 36.1 16.8

Second Ballot 144 103

% 58.3 41.7

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON

37

Writing in the New Statesman as the first ballot approached, Anthony Howard commented that opinion was now ‘fairly evenly divided’ between Brown and Wilson (Howard, 1963a:103). Despite this Brown’s supporters remained confident of victory as the first ballot drew closer (Smith, 1964:205). Gordon-Walker was certain that Brown would emerge victorious, albeit after two ballots. Such confidence was derived from the assumption that they had around 120 ‘promises’ of first ballot support (Pearce, 1991:277). Therefore a first ballot lead was a reasonable assumption for them to have (Pearce, 1991:277). Furthermore, a canvass undertaken by the Brown camp had indicated that those who were first preference Callaghan supporters had Brown as their second preference; findings that contravened the intelligence of the Callaghan campaign team28 (Pearce, 1991:277). When the first ballot result was declared, the Callaghan candidature had the impact that Wilson had hoped for. Had Callaghan not stood, and the right had coalesced around Brown as the heir to Gaitskell, then we can hypothecate that Brown could have secured 129 votes to Wilson on 115 votes. This would have virtually replicated the outcome of the Brown/Wilson deputy leadership ballot of just two months earlier. Therefore, adopting this theory there could be an argument for suggesting that if the Callaghan vote block was cohesive and transferred to Brown on the second ballot, then a Brown victory was still a possibility. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the first ballot, Howard commented in the New Statesman, that although Wilson was now slight favourite, there was still talk of ‘fairly evenly balanced support’ for the two remaining candidates (Howard, 1963b:174). However, the probability of a repeat of the deputy leadership outcome of two months ago occurring had been undermined by the dynamics of the leadership campaign itself. During the course of the campaign the Callaghan candidature had ensured that the right turned against each other. As the Brown campaign team berated Callaghan for standing, and Brown adopted a campaigning approach that presented an image of a bullying and divisive leadership style,29 so Wilson was able to establish his role as the peacemaker (Pimlott, 1992:258). Wilson only needed 8 of the Callaghan first ballot supporters, whilst Brown needed 34 of them (Pimlott, 1992:258). The momentum that surrounded the Wilson candidature was then aided by the behaviour of the now ex-candidate, Callaghan. Despite being seen to have a greater ideological affinity with Brown, Callaghan decided to endorse Wilson. With Callaghan supporting Wilson, this enhanced the probability of the Callaghan voting block switching to Wilson, rather than Brown. Wilson was thus able to sweep up the necessary Callaghan supporters without difficulty, as 29 of them switched to Wilson, even if such ideological defectors switched ‘without enthusiasm’ (Morgan, 1987:183).

38

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER

When Wilson acquired the leadership in January 1963 he was aware of two issues: first, the majority of the shadow Cabinet had voted for either Brown or Callaghan and not him; and second, that they had voted for either Brown or Callaghan was a reflection of the fact that the majority of them were social democrats in the Gaitskellite tradition (Smith, 1964:206). This is crucial. For the manner in which Wilson acquired the leadership is central to understanding the complexities of his leadership tenure and his insecurities which were to be a great impediment to Labour in office. It can be argued that three distinguishing features of the Wilson era can be identified as being consequences of the manner in which he acquired the leadership. The first distinguishing feature was that of Wilson’s insecurity and rumoured paranoia (Bale, 1999:123; Pugh, 2010:325). The second potentially significant consequence was the way in which it shaped, or embedded, problematic working relationships amongst Labour elites. The circumstances through which Wilson acquired the leadership impacted upon the working relationships between Wilson and Brown, and Brown and Callaghan. The relationship that Wilson had with Brown, which was characterised by a ‘deep and mutual dislike’, was framed by Wilson’s defeat of Brown; with Brown frequently threatening to resign from the Wilson Cabinet, before eventually doing so in 1968 (Jefferys, 2002:160). It can be argued that the intensification of the conflict within their working relationship can be traced to the leadership succession contest. This is evident from their papers. Terse letters were exchanged between Brown and Wilson in late November 1963 and January 1964 which reflected the tensions that existed (Letter from Wilson to Brown dated 29 November 1963; letters exchanged between Brown and Wilson dated 14 January 1964, Wilson Papers). In the run up to the 1964 general election Wilson would write to political correspondents making clear that it was not the case that if a future Labour Prime Minister (i.e. himself) is unable to continue in office then his deputy would automatically become leader (Letter from Wilson dated 2 December 1963, Wilson Papers). During the course of the 1964 general election campaign, Brown’s papers reveal that he was concerned that the whole campaign strategy was ‘concentrating’ too much around Wilson, arguing to Labour strategists that he should be used to ‘greater advantage’ (Letters from Brown to Wilson during the 1964 general election campaign, Brown Papers). One of the most defining (and turbulent) relationships of the first Wilson administration, between Brown at the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) and Callaghan at the Treasury was framed by their interactions during the post-Gaitskell succession contest. Wilson sought ‘creative tensions’ between Callaghan and Brown to minimize their individual and collective risk to his position. Such tensions had become firmly established by the ‘vicious campaigning’ between the two of them in the leadership contest, after which ‘personal relations’ had ‘soured’ (Jefferys, 2002:160-61; Pugh, 2010:333).

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON

39

In addition to these three key consequences one has to acknowledge the importance that Wilson attached to balance and unity within the party and how this informed his leadership style. Critics would argue that Wilson had a short term mentality and his desire simply to remain in office meant that strategic thinking was substituted for tactical positioning. Crossman writing in his diaries, (11 December 1966), commented that: He certainly doesn’t confide in me any profound thoughts about the future of the Labour party and I’m prepared to say as of today that I don’t think he has them…His aim is to stay in office. That’s the real thing and for that purpose he will use any trick or gimmick. (Howard, 1979: 253-54) Such issues can be related back to the way in which Wilson had acquired the party leadership – i.e. by the fluidity of his ideological positioning and by his support from the left (and centre) and a sufficient proportion (albeit a small minority) of the right. The cunning that he showed to achieve that balance then shaped his way of managing the party as leader. This was evident from his tendency to mix ‘left wing talk’, (to protect his original vote base), with ‘right wing deeds’. This method of holding the alliance of left and right together reflected the historical context that Wilson faced, (a legacy of the leadership methods of Gaitskell between 1959 and 1961 and the behaviour of the Bevanites prior to that time), and the fact that his primary motivation was maintaining some semblance of unity between the left and right. As Bale argues the fact that Labour indulged in ‘its most self-defeating bout of internal warfare’ shortly after the departure of Wilson, was a testament to his ‘talent’ for party management, and may explain why survival (and short term tactics) dominated his thoughts more than vision (long term strategy) (Bale, 1999:128-29). It was his superior talent for short term tactical play that had been at its most evident when acquiring the leadership. Conclusion That Wilson acquired the leadership of the Labour party in February 1963 was surprising. Wilson had entered an unexpected succession contest with a number of significant impediments. His reputation for deviousness and disloyalty, aligned to question marks about his political identity had ensured that he had a significant body of critics within the PLP. His campaign strategy to present himself as a unity candidate was a high risk strategy, given his resignation from the Cabinet in 1951 and his challenge to remove Gaitskell in 1960. There were also doubts about his appeal: he was a two time loser, having lost to Gaitskell and Brown, the latter of whom was the most likely candidate to defeat him in the forthcoming election. That the PLP was predominantly of the right, rather than the left, and that the ideological

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disposition (of candidates vis-à-vis their electorate) was likely to be the primary determinant of voting behaviour, was again detrimental to Wilson. We can attribute Wilson’s reversal of his defeat to Brown in November 1962 for the deputy leadership election, during the leadership election of February 1963, to the following factors. First, the fact that the left only put one candidate forward, which meant that the minority non-social democratic block coalesced around one candidate. Second, the fact that the majority social democratic block could not agree upon one candidate, and thus fractured in two, gave Wilson a first ballot lead, and crucial momentum going into the second and divisive ballot. Third, the astute campaigning approach of the Wilson campaign team, aligned with the naïve campaigning strategy of the Brown camp. The combination of these factors contributed to Wilson being presented as a peacemaking candidate, and Brown as a divisive candidate. The image of Brown as a divisive candidate was reinforced by his aggressive behaviour towards Callaghan supporters which enhanced the probability of Callaghan voters defecting to Wilson in the second ballot. That Wilson was able to sweep up so many of the Callaghan supporters suggests that there was evidence of ideological defection. The majority of the Callaghan supporters were of the right, and thus Gaitskellites, but they switched to the ideologically nebulous heir to Bevan. This suggests that for a crucial minority the ideological feuding of left and right was set aside and broader criteria (i.e. other than ideological acceptability) came into play (Haseler, 1969:240). Applying this argument we can suggest that Wilson was seen to be, despite pronounced reservations, better equipped than Brown to offer first, party unity; second, political and governing effectiveness; and third, voting appeal and the characteristics of a potential Prime Minister in waiting (Stark, 1996:126). It can be argued, therefore, that there was a default argument with regard to how Wilson acquired the leadership. Whilst Wilson had clear strengths as a candidate, it is clear that he also had clear limitations, but that his limitations were less damaging to him, than the limitations of Brown as a candidate, or the limitations within the succession planning of the Gaitskellites (Pimlott, 1992:259). Had the majority social democratic right remained cohesive and coalesced around one candidate – even if that had been Callaghan and Brown had not entered and chosen to remain as deputy then Wilson would probably have been defeated (Ziegler, 1993:136). Herein lay the crux of the argument as to how Wilson had won. Upon securing his mandate to lead, Wilson: Emotionally took some of the Bevanites aside, Crossman, Castle, and Greenwood, to salute the memory of their dead champion, Nye Bevan, who had won at last….Yet it was not the hallowed legacy of Bevan, but

FROM GAITSKELL TO WILSON the political intervention of another Welsh member, Jim Callaghan, that led to Wilson’s triumph. (Morgan, 1997:183)

41

FROM WILSON TO CALLAGHAN: THE LABOUR PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1976

Harold Wilson would be leader of the Labour party for thirteen years. After becoming leader in February 1963 he would lead the party into five general elections between October 1964 and October 1974. Prior to his acquisition of the leadership, Labour had suffered three successive electoral reversals. Of even greater concern was the fact that the parliamentary majorities that the Conservative party secured in 1951, 1955 and 1959 were increasing, culminating in a three figure parliamentary majority for the Conservatives at the general election of 1959. Against this recent electoral history, the record of Wilson in terms of electability seems impressive. Of the five general elections that he contested as leader, Labour was ‘victorious’ in four, and defeated only once. This is more election victories than secured by Clement Attlee, and more than Tony Blair. Beneath the surface, however, the Wilson record is less impressive. Of his four general election victories, only the March 1966 victory provided Labour with a workable parliamentary majority (100). The victory of October 1964 resulted in a parliamentary majority of four, and the victory of October 1974 brought Labour a parliamentary majority of three. Their return to office in March 1974 was a by-product of an inconclusive general election, through which Labour entered office as a minority administration. Given the incompetence of the incumbent Conservative administrations seeking reelection under Douglas-Home in October 1964, and under Heath in February 1974, there is an argument for suggesting that Wilson should have been more effective in mobilizing anti-government sentiment and converting this into a pro-Labour vote. Despite winning four general elections inside ten years, Labour was actually experiencing decline under Wilson. Even though they experienced electoral defeats in 1951, 1955 and 1959, their vote base was around 12 to 13 million, and between 43 to 48 per cent of the electorate.

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Under Wilson Labour saw their vote slip from a height of 47 per cent, and 13 million, in March 1966, to under 11.5 million and below 40 per cent – 37.1 per cent in February 1974. Running simultaneous to the decline in the Labour vote was the increasing appeal of the political centre, as the Liberals increased their vote share by five per cent and one million in 1959, to six million and nearly 20 per cent in 1974. The growth of third party appeal, also evident in the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales reflected the concerns of the electorate regarding the governing competence of the two main parties, as both the Wilson Labour governments of 1964 to 1970 and 1974 to 1976, and the Heath Conservative government of 1970 to 1974, seemed incapable of providing strong and effective governance (Dorey, 1995:33941). Furthermore, in governing and party political terms, the Wilson era of 1964 and 1970 was compared unfavourably with the Attlee era of 1945 to 1951. The Wilson policy legacy was regarded as threadbare against the achievements of the Attlee administrations (Jefferys, 1993:60; Thorpe, 1997:157). We should however acknowledge that the Labour governments of 1964 and 1970 did secure some notable achievements in terms of social policy. They provided parliamentary time to ensure the passage of a raft of liberal reforms which challenged prevailing social attitudes. Their liberal reforming credentials resulted in the abolition of the death penalty; the legislation of male homosexuality (for those over 21); the liberalization of abortion law; and divorce law reform. To their advocates, such as the reforming Home Secretary of the early Wilson years, Roy Jenkins, these achievements contributed to the creation of a more humane and tolerant society (Dorey, 1995:102-08). Beyond the moral dimension, the Wilson era can claim credit in terms of educational reform. By accelerating the demise of the eleven plus, and introducing comprehensive secondary education, the Wilson administration ensured that children would now avoid the stigma of being described as secondary modern failures at the age of eleven (Jefferys, 1993:77). Their legacy in terms of higher education was also evident. They pioneered the Open University whilst the establishment of 30 new polytechnics contributed to a massive expansion of participation in higher education (Thorpe, 1997:167). Other laudable social policy objectives were implemented: they introduced equal pay for women; established the statutory right to redundancy pay; legislated to outlaw racial discrimination; increased old age pensions, doubled the level of family allowances, and introduced rent rebates for nearly one million householders (Jefferys, 1993:77-78). However, the record of the Wilson governments of 1964 to 1970 in the social and moral spheres was off-set by the difficulties that they experienced in the economic sphere. Wilson had raised expectations through his rhetoric in opposition. He had derided the Conservative government for presiding over economic decline. He promised that Labour could modernise Britain

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through science and technology. His white heat of technological revolution rhetoric implied that Labour would preside over a period of economic growth, which could then be used to redistribute wealth. Instead the Wilson government would become defined by three fundamental failures. First, there was the failure of their national economic plan. The national plan, the implementation of which was the responsibility of the newly formed Department of Economic Affairs under the stewardship of George Brown, was designed to achieve a 25 per cent increase in national output between 1964 and 1970, as well as a four per cent annual growth rate of output by 1970. However, the growth rate was only 2.2 per cent. This was considerably lower than intended in the national plan, and lower than competitor nations, such as France, Italy, Japan, the United States or West Germany (Dorey, 2006:362). Second, and aligned to the failure of the national plan, was the humiliation of devaluation in 1967. Their capacity to implement the national plan had been constrained by their use of deflationary measures between 1964 and 1967, which had been undertaken in an attempt to avoid devaluation. Notably the deflationary package initiated in response to another balance of payments deficit and an accompanying run on sterling destroyed the credibility of the Wilson administration. In their desire to avoid devaluation they deflated the economy, (the July 1966 crisis), by introducing severe public expenditure cuts and a statutory six month wage freeze. Growth through planning was jettisoned in favour of deflation, thus destroying the national plan. Despite their deflationary measures, the Labour administration still suffered the ignominy of devaluation in November 1967, as the massive stampede to ditch sterling resulted in the loss of millions and a resultant devaluation of 14.3 per cent (Childs, 1992:193). Third, aligned to the wider economic malaise of the failed national plan and devaluation, the Wilson administration had to grapple with rising trade union militancy. As strike action increased dramatically the pressure to initiate legislation to manage industrial relations more effectively gathered momentum. In January 1969 the Employment Secretary, Barbara Castle, put forward a white paper entitled In Place of Strife. Within it was the proposal that the immunity from legal sanctions that unofficial strikers held should be withdrawn. This provoked considerable levels of disquiet within the trade union movement, the PLP and indeed within the Cabinet, most notably Callaghan. Once it became clear that Wilson would be unable to secure a parliamentary majority for the passage of the legislation he was forced into a humiliating retreat. The legislation would not proceed. The image of Wilson climbing down in the face of widespread opposition within the Labour movement, offered the Conservative party considerable political ammunition (Childs, 1992:209-10).

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Alongside the triple hit of the failed national economic plan; devaluation; and the humiliation on industrial relations, the reputation of the Wilson administration was undermined by the failed EEC application of 1967 and tainted by association with the massively unpopular Vietnam War and their support of the Americans. Intractable problems such as Rhodesia and Northern Ireland came to dominate the time and energies of an increasingly beleaguered administration. With unemployment and inflation hitting record post war levels and the Department of Economic Affairs having been made defunct, it made the earlier rhetoric of technological revolution and economic renewal seem misplaced. Having offered the vision of a brave new world, the reputation of Wilson would be undermined by a failure to deliver. The Non Challenges to Wilson As was mentioned in chapter two, Wilson had entered the leadership with a sense of insecurity. His paranoia would create an environment of speculation which would undermine his effectiveness as Labour leader and Prime Minister. Bill Rodgers argued that his paranoia was to be ‘self fulfilling’, as ‘the more he conceived of plots against him the more plot like discussions became’ (Rodgers, 2000:112). Mutual mistrust would characterize elite relations in the Wilson era. Wilson was disliked by many on the right for his disloyalty to Gaitskell. Thus distrust and disloyalty became the by words for political conduct under Wilson. Wilson was to suffer from both personal and political criticism from within his own Cabinet. Anthony Crosland was scathing in his condemnation of Wilson. For Crosland, the reputation that Wilson had for deviousness was the catalyst for much of the intrigue that was to disfigure Labour and thus undermine their operational effectiveness. Crosland would lament that: One hasn’t the faintest idea whether the bastard means what he says even at the moment he speaks it.1 (Crosland, 1982:184) Beneath such personal criticism was a concern about what were the objectives underpinning Wilson’s lust for office. For critics, the problem with Wilson was his short term mentality and his desire simply to remain in office itself, which meant that strategic-thinking was substituted for tactical positioning2 (Morgan, 1987:261; Jefferys, 1993:79). Denis Healey, who served as Defence Secretary throughout the 1964 to 1970 Wilson administrations, and was Chancellor of the Exchequer after 1974, commented that Wilson: had no sense of direction, and rarely looked more than a few months ahead. His short term opportunism allied with a capacity for self delusion which made Walter Mitty appear unimaginative, often plunged the government in chaos. Worse still, when things went wrong he

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imagined everyone was conspiring against him…The steady deterioration of the economy following his victory in 1966 led him to see enemies in every corner; at worst he began to behave, in the words of an uncharitable journalist, like a ‘demented coypu’. (Healey, 1990: 331, 336) This paranoia would centre around four key figures – Brown, Callaghan, Healey, and Jenkins. Initially Wilson was concerned about the intentions of his defeated rivals, Brown and Callaghan. This insecurity informed Cabinet selection once they entered office. Callaghan was made Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Brown was put in charge of the newly formed Department of Economic Affairs. As was suggested towards the end of the previous chapter, such positioning militated against the formation of a CallaghanBrown axis forming which could undermine Wilson, as they were to become bound up in inter-departmental rivalries (Jefferys, 1993:62; Thorpe, 1997:158; Pugh, 2010:333). The ineffectiveness of the Department of Economic Affairs did much to undermine the political credibility of Brown. He was to become an increasingly unhappy and detached member of the Cabinet. He would frequently threaten to3, and eventually did resign as Foreign Secretary in 1968, by which time the notion of Brown being the successor to Wilson was no longer viewed as possible.4 The chances of Callaghan being seen as the heir apparent were undermined by his association with devaluation and his subsequent switch from the Treasury to the Home Office.5 As Brown disappeared and Callaghan sought to revive his reputation, two younger names were seen as new contenders for the succession. Healey saw his political reputation in the ascendant, and he started to gain favourable press comment. Sensing that Callaghan might not be best positioned to replace Wilson, it was rumoured that Healey was attempting to position himself for the succession. David Owen would reveal that Alan Lee Williams, who was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Healey, was at the behest of his minister, trying to secure Callaghan’s endorsement should Healey attempt to make a ‘move’ for the leadership6 (Owen, 1991:155). Although irritated by the advances of Healey, the real concern for Wilson in 1968 was Jenkins, and in 1969 both Jenkins and a revived Callaghan (Pugh, 2010:339). Wilson was particularly fearful of Jenkins. A disciple of Gaitskell, Jenkins was ambitious and wanted to reclaim the leadership for the right. Distrustful of Wilson for his challenge to Gaitskell, Jenkins believed he was the logical heir to Gaitskell7, as he felt that Callaghan was politically his inferior. His reputation had been established as Home Secretary between 1965 and 1967, and in the aftermath of the devaluation crisis, it was Jenkins who was summoned from the Home Office to replace Callaghan at the Treasury. Thereafter, Wilson became concerned that Jenkins was going to use the Treasury as a powerbase and springboard to challenge him for the

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leadership. There is clear evidence to suggest that Jenkins was contemplating a formal challenge, and that Wilson was aware of it, and fearful of it. At one Cabinet meeting, an emotional Wilson sought to embarrass Jenkins, by informing Cabinet that he knew where: a great part of the leaking and backbiting comes from. It arises from the ambitions of one member of this Cabinet to sit in my place. (Jenkins, 1991:258) This outburst was symptomatic of the strained relationship between the two. Pimlott describes Wilson as a ‘long suffering, much abused, ever exasperated, wearily tolerant monarch’, persistently undermined by Jenkins, who was ‘a brilliant, cruel and indifferent heir impatiently waiting for his inheritance’ (Pimlott, 1992:490). It was at this time that Jenkins had his best chance for acquiring the leadership. The reputation of Jenkins as Chancellor would later be undermined by the electoral reversal of June 1970, but his postdevaluation budget was widely respected and ensured that his political star was on the ascendant in the late 1960s, at the expense of Callaghan, the other leading non-Wilson option. As Wilson was blamed for the devaluation, so his personal poll ratings slumped. As support for Labour began to ebb away, so Wilson’s parliamentary performances began to deteriorate. Pimlott notes that: Rodgers, a keen would be putschist8, believes that at about this time there was a ‘window of opportunity’ for Jenkins. ‘Wilson could have been toppled by Roy and Roy knows it now’…Why did the Chancellor fail to take his chance? According to Jenkins it was because he did not care sufficiently about power. Marquand sees it differently. ‘Roy was too ambitious, not insufficiently ambitious. That was why he never acted against Wilson. He never thought it was the right moment; he always thought it was too risky’. (Pimlott, 1992:490-91) In his political memoirs, Jenkins would look back on the period in 1968 and admit that this was the time when he could have acquired the leadership from Wilson. However, he suggests that he lacked the single minded ruthlessness to seize power. He would lament that: People who effectively seize the prime ministership – Lloyd George, Macmillan, Mrs Thatcher – do not let such moments slip. (Jenkins, 1991:260) Whilst Wilson remained fearful of a Jenkins challenge, Callaghan was seeking to resuscitate his political reputation. Two factors revived his credibility as an

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alternative to Wilson. First, his handling of the outbreak of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland was widely admired (Jefferys, 1993:75). Second, when Wilson attempted to reform industrial relations and curb trade union powers, Callaghan was one of the leading critics of the proposed legislation from within the Cabinet. Given that these proposals had provoked considerable opposition within the trade union movement, the PLP, and the Cabinet, Callaghan was seen to be ingratiating himself with those frustrated with the performance and approach of Wilson. From within the Cabinet, Benn interpreted the stance taken by Callaghan as an opening salvo in a forthcoming ‘challenge’ to the leadership of Wilson (Benn, 1988:166). However, although backbenchers such as George Lawson and John Mackintosh asked Callaghan to challenge Wilson, Callaghan declined to do so (Owen, 1991:155). The option of challenging was rejected by Callaghan, just as it was by Jenkins, by the fear of losing, combined with a sneaking suspicion about the motivations of those asking him to initiate a formal challenge. As Owen concluded Callaghan had ‘judged that [such] emissaries wanted him to open up a contest and then they would vote for someone else – i.e. Jenkins’ (Owen, 1991:155). What is clear, however, is that by mid-1969, many Labour parliamentarians, especially those in marginal seats, were concerned about continuing with Wilson as their leader. However, although there was a concern that Wilson may have become an electoral liability, the idea of a leadership challenge never shifted beyond speculation. Critics may have wanted him removed but they could not construct a strategy to replace him. Both Callaghan and Jenkins wanted the leadership but they did not want blood on their hands. Supporters of each wanted the other to be the one to make the formal challenge and thus face the accusation of disloyalty (Owen, 1991:156). They also suspected and feared that the challenger would be defeated. They also knew that whilst the challenger would lose, they might damage Wilson so badly that the end of his leadership tenure might have been drawn closer.9 In this scenario, the disloyal challenger was unlikely to eventually inherit the crown; playing the long game may ensure that the crown would eventually come to the ‘candidate’ who remained loyal (Pimlott, 1992:535-36). Therefore, strategic calculation and political fear ultimately prevented Jenkins or Callaghan from challenging. Just because no formal challenge was initiated does not mean that Wilson was not rattled, and it did not stop a feverish atmosphere developing within the PLP. It reached a crescendo of speculation in May 1969. Rumours abounded that representatives of Callaghan were attempting to create an environment conducive to a coup. Approaching 80 Labour parliamentarians were supposed to be interested in conducting a ballot on the question of the leadership. It was suggested that if a ballot could be held then a stalking horse candidate could be deployed, thus saving Callaghan, and indeed Jenkins, from the accusation of disloyalty. If

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such a candidate could register significant levels of dissension then that could cripple Wilson. Sensing that Callaghan could gain an advantage, acolytes of Jenkins sought to acquire letters of support from senior parliamentarians, stating a mechanism for ending the divisions within the party must be found. Such a tactic could make the leadership a question requiring resolution, without Jenkins being exposed for disloyalty (Pimlott, 1992:537-38). As press speculation intensified about an imminent threat to his position, an emotional Wilson gambled his future on a joke: May I say for the benefit of those who have been carried away by the gossip of the last few days…that I know what’s going on – I’m going on. (Pimlott, 1992:538) Although Wilson survived the rumoured plots of 1968 and 1969, Labour lost office at the general election of June 1970. This could have intensified the speculation concerning the position of Wilson. However, Wilson survived because again there was no agreement on the best non-Wilson candidate, or the strategy on how Wilson should be ousted (Thorpe, 1997:160; Pugh, 2010:345). However, the deputy leadership was now vacant after Brown had lost his constituency at the general election. Jenkins secured the vacant deputy leadership defeating Michael Foot. In doing so, Jenkins was seen to have established himself as the obvious alternative to Wilson. Rodgers concluded that ‘if Roy could work reasonably well with Wilson, he would become his successor’ (Rodgers, 2000:117). However, Jenkins was to make a major strategic error in opposition; an error that ultimately would cost him the succession. The first two years of opposition were to be dominated by a fratricidal struggle regarding the EEC (Jefferys, 1993:85). The newly elected Conservative government under Edward Heath was seeking parliamentary approval for entry. The PLP was split on entry. Many on the left, such as Foot as well as Tony Benn, were passionately opposed to entry, fearing the capitalist and free market character of the common market (Cronin, 2004:140). However, for Jenkins and many of his advocates on the right10, it was axiomatic that Britain should join the EEC, almost on any terms11 (Thorpe, 1997:182). Wilson, who was more pragmatic than principled in his approach, was driven by a desire to manufacture party unity whilst undermining the Conservatives (Cronin, 2004:140). He sought to achieve these objectives by opposing the ‘terms’ that Heath had secured for entry, rather than the ‘principle’ of entry itself (Thorpe, 1997:182). Infuriated, Jenkins and many of his supporters refused to vote against entry in crucial parliamentary divisions held in October 1971. Jenkins was joined in the Conservative division lobbies by nearly 70 fellow rebels, including Rodgers

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and Owen, as well as Shirley Williams. A further 20 Labour parliamentarians abstained, including amongst them Crosland (Shaw, 1988: 167, 169). The approach to the European dilemma in many ways influenced the eventual post-Wilson succession battle. Jenkins was strongly criticized for instigating the rebellion. He was challenged for the deputy leadership by Foot and the Europhobic left that autumn and only just managed to survive (Thorpe, 1997:182). The position of Jenkins was weakened further in March 1972. Wilson decided12 that membership should not be accepted as a fait accompli. Should Labour be returned to office they would seek to reopen negotiations for entry. They would then submit the new terms for entry to a national referendum (Cronin, 2004:141). Jenkins promptly resigned from the shadow Cabinet. Rodgers and Owen also resigned from their shadow ministerial positions (Thorpe, 1997:182-83). The right, who a decade earlier had berated Wilson for disloyalty after he challenged Gaitskell, now had the disloyalty accusation level against themselves. As a faction they were now splintering and weakened; and their de facto leader, Jenkins was diminished in status. The diminution of social democratic cohesion and their self imposed marginalization left the right ill equipped for the task of resisting the leftward movement within the party (Rodgers, 2000: 134-35; Cronin, 2004:141; Pugh, 2010:347). Although Jenkins returned to the shadow Cabinet in October 1973, he was in a considerably weaker position than had previously been the case (Rodgers, 2000:137). Running simultaneously to his reduced status was the enhanced position of his primary rival, Callaghan. He was historically of the centre right in the social democratic tradition. Although earlier he had not been a strong advocate of membership, his incremental shift towards scepticism whilst in opposition, suggested a strong element of opportunism and self interested careerism13 (Cronin, 2004:140). Opposition had been kinder to Callaghan than Jenkins, but Wilson remained. The question of the succession would be resolved in office and not in a manner that had been anticipated. The Resignation of Wilson After three and half years in opposition, Labour and Wilson limped back into Downing Street in March 1974. The Jenkins faction had already decided that had Labour lost, their man would challenge for the leadership ‘without delay’ (Rodgers, 2000:138). The next two years of office would be turbulent for Labour. They were a minority administration initially, so Wilson was hoping that an upturn in political fortunes would enable him to hold a general election shortly and improve his parliamentary position. This was what had been achieved in his first term a decade earlier. After operating for seventeen months with a single figure majority, the March 1966 general election had provided Labour with a comfortable parliamentary majority. This time

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Wilson was to be disappointed. The general election of October 1974 only resulted in a marginally better outcome for Labour. They had moved out of minority status, but only had a single figure parliamentary majority. Given the ideological splits that existed within the PLP, this would ensure that considerable attention would have to be given to parliamentary party management during the next five years. For the next seventeen months, Wilson would operate in an environment of near permanent crisis management. In March 1976 he informed his Cabinet colleagues that he intended to resign as Labour leader and Prime Minister, as soon as the party had elected a successor (Thorpe, 1997:187). With the exception of the forewarned Callaghan, his Cabinet colleagues were astounded. For example, Healey was described as looking ‘flabbergasted’, whilst Ted Short had ‘tears in his eyes’ (Ziegler, 1993:489). Why Wilson resigned has provoked considerable speculation, as Ziegler notes: The most surprising thing about Harold Wilson’s resignation was how much surprise it caused….The main reason for this was a failure to believe that a man as totally wrapped up in politics as Wilson, who had striven so hungrily for office, who had no other interests that he longed to pursue, who was [now] under no immediate challenge to his position, should voluntarily surrender power. (Ziegler, 1993:482) His departure has been attributed to a variety of reasons including the following: 1. 2.

3.

4.

Wilson felt that serving on the Labour front bench for thirty years and as leader for thirteen years and Prime Minister for eight was long enough (Childs, 1992:261). Aligned to this explanation was the fact that Wilson was turning sixty. Thorpe argues the case for this theory by arguing that Wilson ‘felt a debt to his wife, who had married an Oxford don but then spent three decades in the public spotlight that she hated and…[anyway]…Civil servants retire at 60’ (Thorpe, 1997:187-88). He was no longer enjoying the workload and the demands associated with the post. He was increasingly fretful about Prime Ministers Questions and the stresses involved were affecting his health. He had experienced a heart flutter and psychosomatic stomach pains. Wilson would later suffer from the memory degenerating disease amnesia and there were suggestions that his mental agility and grasp of detail was declining in his final year in office (Ziegler, 1993:468, 486-87). Resigning at the mid-point in the parliamentary cycle was beneficial to the party. Whoever was elected as his successor would have sufficient

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5. 6.

53

time as the new party leader and Prime Minister to prepare the ground for a Labour victory at the next general election (Jefferys, 1993:93). Wilson was abandoning a sinking ship. His political antennae could see that the economic prospects were incredibly bleak and he wanted out before the situation deteriorated further (Jefferys, 1993:93). There was a secret campaign designed to destabilize Wilson orchestrated by elements within the secret services14 (Leigh, 1988:2-5).

Did Wilson have a preference as to who his successor should be? Upon resigning he informed political journalists that the leadership election would be an opportunity to highlight the wealth of political talent within the party (Punnett, 1992:84). Prior to his resignation, Wilson had intimated to the political journalist, John Cole that he had six crown princes, which was better than one, and that he had provided his party with a good choice for the succession (Cole, 1995:146,149). The six crown prince candidates were the Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan; the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins; the Chancellor, Denis Healey; the Employment Secretary, Michael Foot; the Environment Secretary, Tony Crosland, and the Energy Secretary, Tony Benn. Wilson had endured difficult personal relationships with many of his possible successors, but by the time of his resignation he had decided that Callaghan was the most appropriate replacement. Cole argues that: these two old adversaries within the Labour leadership had been drawn together by the need to avoid a disastrous schism. They were both party men, and they discovered their affinity in adversity before the leadership election of 1976…Callaghan was effectively his inner Cabinet and Deputy Prime Minister…for by then there was no realistic rivalry between them. (Cole, 1995:145) Before the succession battle could even commence, Wilson, had done two things that would be beneficial to Callaghan. First, whereas other candidates found out about his resignation around the Cabinet table on March 16th, or hours earlier, Callaghan had been warned in advance of Wilson’s intentions. Callaghan was thus able to prepare for the succession battle earlier than his rivals (Thorpe, 1997:187-88). Second, Wilson actively sought to negate one of the possible limitations of a Callaghan candidature – his age. During his resignation speech, he informed Cabinet that age should not be a factor in the choice of his successor. Given that Callaghan was four years older than Wilson, and the oldest of the likely candidates, this was an intervention that Callaghan appreciated (Callaghan, 1987:392).

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The Battle of the Crown Princes: Candidates and Ballots Callaghan was the preferred successor of Wilson himself, and he was also widely perceived to be the candidate most likely to win (Wood, 1976:1). Callaghan believed that if he stood then he would win. He believed that his status as a centrist, with soft associations to the right, would ensure that he was perceived to be a unity candidate. His strong union connections and his stance on In Place of Strife in 1969 was assumed to ensure his acceptability to the left should he win, even if he had not secured their votes in the parliamentary ballots. He also possessed more high office experience than all of his likely rivals15, as well as a solid base of ministerial support, at both Cabinet and junior ministerial level (Thorpe, 1997:188). Despite these advantages Callaghan did have reservations about standing. Although the above intervention of Wilson, regarding age, seemed to negate one of Callaghan’s concerns, he remained concerned that his role as Foreign Secretary had created a sense of detachment from the PLP and core decisionmaking regarding domestic policy (Callaghan, 1987:386). Having decided to stand, Callaghan was then perturbed to discover that Healey and Crosland had also decided to enter. Callaghan had initially assumed that only four candidates would emerge: himself, Foot, Jenkins and Benn. Foot and Benn would be contesting the left of the PLP and Callaghan would vie with Jenkins for the endorsement of the right. The presence of Crosland and Healey, both identifiable with the right, suggested a four way contest for the support of the right. It was assumed that Callaghan would lose first ballot votes here. The critical issue for Callaghan was to emerge from the first ballot as the dominant candidate of the right and with a clear lead over the next candidate of the right. This would encourage the right to coalesce around him in the subsequent ballots16 (Callaghan, 1987:386, 392-93; Morgan, 1997:473). The candidatures of Crosland and Healey were therefore an irritant to Callaghan, but they were not expected to be an obstacle. Both stood not with the expectation of winning but with the hope of putting down a marker for the future (Drucker, 1976:388). They both had calculated that as Callaghan was 64 and that a general election would occur inside three years, then regardless of the result, Callaghan would probably not serve more than five years (i.e. until around 1981). If they retained power, he would do as Wilson had and resign in the early to mid point of the next Parliament. Should they be in opposition, then it was probable that he would resign shortly after their removal from office (i.e. 1979-80). Therefore, they stood, not in the hope of defeating Callaghan, but with the intention of showcasing their leadership credentials and expanding their powerbase within the PLP, in order to indicate that they were should be Callaghan’s successor (Stark, 1996:100). That Healey did not think he could emerge victorious now was obvious to him. His initial intelligence was remarkably depressing. His sources had

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indicated to him that Callaghan had 100 projected first ballot supporters; Foot 90; Jenkins 70 and that the remaining 40 would be spread between himself, Crosland and Benn (Castle, 1990:742). The projected support base for Healey made him contemplate not standing, fearing that a derisory return would actually undermine his long term chances of being the successor to Callaghan. Ultimately, Healey calculated that avoiding the leadership election would appear as cowardice, and with his fellow Treasury ministerial colleagues, including Joel Barnett, encouraging him to stand, he did so (Healey, 1990:446). By standing Healey was more likely to depress the first ballot Callaghan vote. The candidature of Crosland was actually more likely to depress the first ballot Jenkins vote, both of whom were now perceived to be rather marginal figures17 (Thorpe, 1997:188). Owen was concerned by the listless approach that Jenkins had towards acquiring the leadership. He noted that Jenkins seemed to lack real enthusiasm about the prospect of standing (Owen, 1991:238). The real doubt was about whether Jenkins could perform sufficiently well to be the standard bearer of both the social democratic right in the Gaitskellite tradition, and the more centrist figures who might be inclined towards Callaghan. Cole situates the Jenkins’ predicament within the context of the long running Callaghan versus Jenkins heir apparent analysis: When the leadership election began, one question was whether Roy Jenkins could recover from the eclipse in his position during the opposition, and defeat James Callaghan. This was a contest for which both had been preparing through a long series of ups and downs in their respective fortunes. Many of Jenkins’ supporters suspected that his time had passed. (Cole, 1995:146) Jenkins believed that victory was within his grasp, but that it would be a tough battle (Jenkins, 1991:434). The failure of Jenkins to prevent his former revisionist brother in arms, Crosland, from entering the contest, represented the final breach within social democratic revisionism, a process which could be dated back to their varying prioritization over the European dilemma in the 1971 to 1972 period. Thereafter, Crosland had attempted to present himself as a non-sectarian, unity figure, and this approach informed his candidature. If he could secure a respectable first ballot figure on his platform of uniting the left and right and finding some kind of accommodation on the European dilemma, (Meredith, 2008:8, 80) then it would enhance his reputation and his future prospects. Crosland believed than anything over 30 would be a very good result and would justify participation. Anything beneath 20 would be derisory and would damage his future prospects (Jefferys, 1999:188, 192).

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Jenkins would have been better positioned going into the first ballot had Crosland and Healey stayed out of the contest. Had this occurred then Callaghan and Jenkins would have been competing for the support of the right, whilst Foot and Benn would have been competing for the support of the left. Critically it has been argued that if ideology was a determinant in voting behaviour, then this would undermine the cause of the left, since it was assumed that they were in the minority. This is an assumption borne from extensive press calculations from the time of the leadership election, which was later reinforced by the political journalist and pollster, Peter Kellner. Writing in the New Statesman shortly after the completion of the succession contest, Kellner suggested that the PLP could be broken into the following ideological groupings (Kellner, 1976:461-63). Table 5:

The Kellner Typology of Ideological Alignments within the Parliamentary Labour Party 1976

Ideological Grouping The Tribune Left: None-Tribune Left: (Socialist Left) Centrists/Centre Right Pro-Market Right (Social Democratic Right)

Number of MPs 78 71 (149) 74 90 (164)

Source: Kellner, 1976:461 In these circumstances, given the numerical dispersal of the ideological forces, it would have been advisable for the left to coalesce around one candidate, who could count on the support of the left and might penetrate into the right in the manner that Wilson had done thirteen years earlier. The obvious candidate for the left was Foot. At the end of the Cabinet meeting, in which Wilson had announced his intended resignation, Castle asked Foot to put himself forward (Castle, 1990:740). The attractions of a Foot candidature were as follows. First, he had impressed parliamentarians with his ministerial performance as Employment Secretary. Second, it was assumed that he was the candidate of the left who could conceivably penetrate into the centrist grouping within the PLP (Morgan, 2007:328-30). This second assumption was based on the assumed limited appeal of a Benn candidature. There was no expectation that Benn would win, nor was there an expectation that he would outscore Foot as the leading candidate of the left. Indeed when deciding to stand Benn informed Foot that should his performance not warrant continuation into the second ballot, he would stand down and immediately transfer his support to Foot (Benn, 1989:544). Such

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insights demonstrate that, like Crosland and Healey, the motivation for participation for Benn was future orientated – i.e. the classic case of putting down a marker as a leadership candidate for a later leadership election contest (Stark, 1996:100). Table 6:

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership Election of 1976 First Ballot Votes %

Second Ballot Votes %

Third Ballot Votes %

Michael Foot James Callaghan Roy Jenkins Tony Benn Denis Healey Tony Crosland Abstentions

90 84 56 37 30 17 1

133 141

42.6 45.2

137 176

38

12.2

N=

31418

28.7 26.8 17.8 11.9 9.5 5.4

313

43.8 56.2

313

Source: Stark, 1996:4 When the first ballot was announced it resulted in the removal of three candidates, but not necessarily the expected three. Crosland had received a derisory return of only five per cent of the PLP and was eliminated (Thorpe, 1997:188). Benn had done better than expected, indeed his diaries record that he secured around 20 more supporters than was anticipated. Benn immediately withdrew and pledged his support to Foot (Benn, 1989:544). Jenkins was viewed as having done worse than expected, with Benn suggesting that he was 20 votes down on expectations (Benn, 1989:544). Yet Jenkins had finished third and thus had more moral right to continue into the second ballot than Healey. Yet Healey continued and Jenkins withdrew.19 Of the decision to withdraw, Rodgers informed me that ‘I told Roy that there was no point on going on into the next ballot. We had predicted 68 and hoped for 75. When he got 56 he agreed that withdrawal was a realistic and mature decision’. Similar insights came from within the Foot camp, as Neil Kinnock intimated to me that ‘Jenkins needed at least 70 on the first ballot to give proof of a credible Jenkinsite grouping as a platform for political development.’ Healey was criticized for not withdrawing. By participating in a second ballot in which it was inevitable that he would come last and be eliminated, he ensured that a third ballot would be required and the leadership election would last longer than necessary. He justified continuing

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by stating that ‘I am standing because I am not a quitter’. This caused resentment within the Jenkins camp as it cast aspersions on the resolve of Jenkins (Huckerby, 1976:1). Of Healey’s decision to remain in the contest Rodgers comments that remaining in was ‘pointless’, but then ‘his political instinct was never that good’. Kinnock implied that Healey thought that he might accumulate votes from the freed Jenkins and Crosland voting block and thus a respectable score in the second ballot, (relative to Callaghan), would ensure him becoming in Kinnock’s words ‘heir presumptive’. The problem for Healey was that this was massively difficult as many on the right who had voted for Jenkins or Crosland had already decided that they had to switch to Callaghan as ‘there was the fear that unless Callaghan was firmly backed as the front runner, Foot might just stay ahead and become the winner’ (Rodgers, 2000:156). The withdrawal of Benn freed up 37 votes which were assumed to gravitate to Foot. The withdrawals of Jenkins and Crosland freed up 73 votes which were assumed to be likely to go to either Callaghan or Healey, but presumably Callaghan on the basis that Callaghan could win (and defeat the left wing candidature of Foot) whilst Healey clearly could not (Morgan, 1997:473). Even after the first ballot, when he actually came second Callaghan still remained the favourite to win. It was recognised that Foot had only won because there were fewer candidates to fracture the left wing vote (two) than there were fracturing the centre-right vote (four). Once the right had been whittled down to one candidate (i.e. Callaghan) the strength of centre-right sentiment within the PLP would guarantee Callaghan acquired the leadership (Stark, 1996:119). This proved to be the case. Healey was only able to add eight more votes in the second ballot, whilst the freed Jenkins/Crosland voting block of 73 gravitated virtually en masse to Callaghan, whose vote increased by 57 to 141. Callaghan had reversed Foot’s first ballot lead as expected. Although his second ballot lead was in single figures, the crucial issue was that the newly freed votes from the withdrawn Healey candidature were most likely to gravitate to Callaghan (Morgan, 1997:473). Of the 38 Healey second ballot endorsers, 34 switched to Callaghan and only four to Foot (Morgan, 1997:473). However, the Foot campaign tried to claim that they could secure enough of the freed Healey votes. His campaign manager, John Silkin, claimed that they expected/ hoped to secure 26 of the freed votes, giving Foot a 169 to 153 victory (Hatfield, 1976:1). Such optimism proved to be misplaced. In the end, Callaghan acquired the leadership with a third ballot return (176 to 137 for Foot) which was only one out from the expectations that his campaign team had predicted at the onset of the contest (Callaghan, 1987:394).

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Explaining the Election of Callaghan Before explaining the reasons why Callaghan was victorious, it is probably best to explain why Crosland, Jenkins, Healey and Benn and failed to make the final ballot, and then why Foot failed to win. Given the fact that Callaghan and Healey stood, and had roots in the centre and right of the PLP, and Jenkins stood as the standard bearer of the more purist social democratic right Gaitskellite tradition, it was probably unwise for Crosland to have stood. His involvement clearly hurt Jenkins and contributed to his withdrawal after the first ballot. Crosland performed so badly because in comparison to his rivals, Callaghan, Jenkins and Healey he lacked experience in high office. Callaghan had occupied all three great offices of state; Jenkins had occupied the Treasury and the Home Office twice, whilst Healey was the incumbent Chancellor. Crosland did have Cabinet experience but it was at a tier beneath the level of his rivals. In this context the fact that Jenkins was selected as Chancellor in 1967 ahead of Crosland, and that Crosland was again passed over in preference for Healey in 1974, severely weakened him (Jefferys, 1999:193). Due to the strength of his rival candidates on the right, Crosland could not even secure the endorsements of his closet political allies, such as Roy Hattersley. The latter greatly admired Crosland as well as Jenkins. However, Hattersley decided that he was going to endorse Callaghan, as the best stop Foot candidate. When Hattersley politely explained to Jenkins the rationale underpinning his decision, a disappointed Jenkins listened and reluctantly accepted the reasoning of his younger colleague. When Hattersley offered the same courtesy to Crosland he received an expletive as a response (Hattersley, 1995:162). This rather humorous insight ties into another failing of the Crosland candidature: his weak campaigning approach. Patience and persuasion are crucial skills in garnering supporters and Crosland appeared to lack these skills during the course of his brief campaign (Cronin, 2004:175). Ultimately, he had failed to build up a personal following over the years in anticipation of the post-Wilson succession contest. Moreover, it could be argued that he lacked the single minded drive and long term strategizing required to acquire the leadership: his papers reveal ‘after all, I don’t desperately want to be leader’ (Crosland Papers, Box, 6/2). His detachment from those on the right with a pro-EEC mentality had alienated many potential allies and yet he had failed to secure any alternative support base.20 The disappointment that Crosland felt was overcome, however, by the offer of the Foreign Office which was vacant after Callaghan assumed the leadership and became Prime Minister. It was a sensitive appointment given the bloodshed over the European question within the Labour movement in recent years. Crosland was less of a risk than Jenkins21, who given that he had performed considerably better than Crosland, was immensely disappointed to have been passed over. Given that Jenkins had stalked Wilson and was

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strongly rumoured to be a likely successor, his poor showing is illuminating and tells us much about the developments in Labour politics as the sixties passed to the seventies. In the early to mid point of the sixties, Jenkins and his acolytes strongly believed that Jenkins was the heir at one remove to his hero, Gaitskell. It was the destiny of Jenkins to succeed Wilson and reclaim the leadership on behalf of the right (Cole, 1995:146-47). His campaign team and leading supporters, including Bill Rodgers, Tom Bradley, Dickson Mabon, Ian Wrigglesworth, Alan Lee Williams and John Roper, had calculated that he had 72 definite promises and that they could secure possibly around 80 and come second to Foot. If this was so and he could come ahead of Callaghan in the first ballot, then he might still be able to annex the leadership, if he could secure more second preference votes from those who had supported Healey or Crosland in the first ballot (Drucker, 1976:390). After his failure to claim his assumed destiny, Jenkins sought to explain how Callaghan (whom he believed his inferior) had outmanoeuvred him. He came to believe that his position as the Chancellor deemed to be responsible for the electoral defeat in June 1970, combined with his disloyal behaviour towards Wilson and the party over Europe once in opposition, critically undermined his succession chances (Cole, 1995:147). Jenkins’ best chance for the succession had been in the late 1960s. At that time he was viewed as a powerful Chancellor, respected for his management of the post-devaluation crisis for which Wilson and Callaghan were blamed and not him. Removal from office and his reincarnation as a rebellious and resigning deputy leader was to coincide with the increasing size of the anti-European faction within the PLP, for whom the pro-Europeanism of Jenkins was an anathema (Cole, 1995:147). This combined with his Gaitskellite reputation made it immensely difficult for him to secure support from beyond his own ideological base. On the anti-European left there was real hostility to Jenkins, whom they did not believe was real Labour (Harris, 1994:114). His poor performance, at 56 votes, can be attributed to the fact that he was perceived to be an elitist, detached and divisive figure, due to the fratricidal struggles of the European dilemma, in which his conduct had divided not only the PLP but also the right itself (Drucker, 1976:390). Even some natural allies decided not to vote for him. Donald Anderson informed me that although ‘I was closer to Roy from the viewpoint of what was best for the party, I thought Callaghan would be a unifier, to the contrary of Jenkins. He was always aloof and detached and too much on one wing of the party’. John Cartwright did not vote for him. He told me that he feared that to do so would be an ‘ineffective gesture’ because it ‘made more sense to back the candidate with the best chance of beating the left, and I therefore supported Callaghan at every stage of the ballot.’ His inability to retain many of these natural allies, including the likes of Hattersley and John Smith, who

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also supported Callaghan, depressed his first ballot return to such an extent that withdrawal was inevitable (Radice, 2002: 4-5, 212, 234). Moreover, not only was the Jenkins’ campaign undermined by inaccurate canvassing, but it also made critical tactical errors when trying to garner more supporters. For example, they promised that if elected Jenkins would clear out the ‘dead wood’ in the middle ranks of the government, a promise which served to remind many how arrogant Jenkins was. As a consequence, the payroll based right tended to endorse Callaghan (Drucker, 1976:390). Hostility from the left was also a primary explanation for the difficulties that Healey experienced in his attempt to become the successor to Wilson. His status as a Chancellor imposing increasingly strident budgets had placed him on a collision course with the left (Cronin, 2004:175). Healey was also to be immensely unfortunate in terms of the timing of the succession battle. Healey had no prior notification of the fact that Wilson was about to resign and that a leadership election was about to be initiated. On the night that Wilson informed Callaghan to prepare himself for a leadership election, Healey was on the floor of the House of Commons verbally abusing a faction of left wing critics who were intending to vote against the government that evening (Cole, 1995:147). Such behaviour reinforced the perception that Healey was overly combative and that he would be unable to unite the party (Thorpe, 1997:188). The cumulative limitations of the centre and centre right candidates, Crosland, Jenkins and Healey, all demonstrated that the party was looking for a candidate who was experienced in the highest of offices (unlike Crosland) and could clearly unify the party, which Healey and Jenkins were assumed to be unable to do. In a PLP in which the left were a minority, it was always likely that the most experienced and least divisive candidate of the centreright would emerge victorious. It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened had Crosland, Healey and Jenkins come to an agreement that only one of them should stand. Would this have impacted upon Callaghan? John Horam, who defected to the SDP and is now a long standing Conservative MP told me that he thought that ‘if totally united behind one candidate they might have been able to get ahead of Callaghan on the first ballot and thus get a bit of momentum.’ However, this view is not shared by another defector, Cartwright, who told me that he doubted very much whether an ‘agreement between Jenkins, Crosland and Healey would have defeated Callaghan who was seen as the safe candidate who had held the three great offices of state and appealed to more centrist MP’s.’ Ted Graham, who worked as part of the Callaghan campaign team informed me that ‘Callaghan was always ahead in the popular vote of the PLP and even if Jenkins, Healey and Crosland combined their votes and had had only one candidate Callaghan would still have won.’ Graham suggested that the Callaghan team were confident that the fracturing of the right in the first

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ballot would not prove to be problematic over the longer term: ‘it was clear to us from the beginning that Foot was the most dangerous, and when after the first ballot, he was in front we were not worried because the votes of Jenkins, Healey and Crosland were aggregated to those of Jim, which carried the day.’ Meanwhile, it was more straightforward on the left. Once the future orientated candidature of Benn was removed they coalesced around Foot. The press noted that he secured a final ballot return which was broadly comparable to the ‘assumed’ left wing base of the PLP – i.e. he secured 137 votes and it was assumed that 149 Labour MPs could be ascribed to the left (Kellner, 1976:461). Callaghan therefore emerged victorious for the following reasons. First, he had advanced warning of the succession contest and was thus better prepared and possessed a more professional and experienced campaign team (Morgan, 1997:470). Second, in a contest dominated by the ideological disposition of the candidates vis-à-vis their electorate, he was ideologically acceptable to a sufficient section of the PLP.22 This meant that in the final parliamentary ballot, Callaghan merely had to secure the loyalty of ideological like-minded bedfellows, whereas Foot had to penetrate beyond his natural core constituency. Third, of the other three centre/centre right wing candidates that Callaghan faced, he was more experienced and less divisive than Crosland, Jenkins or Healey. He held a comfortable lead over them in the first ballot, and as they were withdrawn, second and third preference votes tended to gravitate to him. Of the combined Crosland, Healey and Jenkins voting block (103 from the first ballot), Callaghan had secured 92 of them by the final ballot. Finally, Callaghan was superior to Foot in terms of all of the key criteria for party leadership: competence, acceptability and electability (Stark, 1996:127). It was his superiority in that final key criterion for leadership that Drucker believed was critical, but ultimately he was to fail to deliver on: Foot stood for ideals and principles of a kind and was loved for it. Callaghan stood for nothing so much as winning elections. Callaghan won. (Drucker, 1976:394) Conclusion The resignation of Harold Wilson created a first for the Labour party. Never before had they had a vacancy for the leadership whilst they were in office. The leadership election amongst the PLP would also constitute the first time that a British Prime Minister had been elected as a result of a parliamentary ballot of party colleagues23 (Butler and Kavanagh, 1980:30). It was an exceptional party political event for other reasons as well. Whether we use the yardstick of Labour or Conservative party leadership elections, we have to observe that it attracted a surprisingly large number of candidates (six) and

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was also exceptional in requiring three ballots to determine the outcome. It was also an intriguing leadership election in the sense that although the eventual outcome was expected, the candidate who finished first in the first ballot (Foot) was not the eventual victor (Punnett, 1992:86, 89). However, despite the breadth of candidates, the number of ballots, and the fact that the first ballot winner was eventually defeated, the immediate reaction to the methods that the party had used was positive. At that time the process of selection through eliminative parliamentary ballots was praised for being straightforward, practical and efficient and for being conducted without any rancour (Punnett, 1992: 82-85, 89; Butler and Kavanagh, 1980: 30). These interpretations echoed the insights of Drucker, who conducted extensive interviews with Labour parliamentarians in the immediate aftermath of the parliamentary ballots. Speculating on the likelihood of their leadership selection procedures being amended, Drucker suggested that: A major change has been made much less likely…The Parliamentary Labour Party is very pleased with how it has performed….selfsatisfaction is the enemy of reform. (Drucker, 1976:395) There were to be two significant reasons why the Drucker interpretation proved to be so wrong. First, Callaghan failed to deliver what was expected of him: re-election. He may have been elected because he was the most unifying candidate; and the most experienced and potentially most competent candidate, but the main reason why Labour parliamentarians turned to him was because he was least risky and most likely to retain their position in government. His failure to do so intensified the debate on how he was selected. This first factor ties into the second factor which is probably of greater significance. Callaghan had won because he was the strongest candidate affiliated to the right wing and centrist instincts of the PLP, who it was assumed were in the majority. The assumed minority left within the PLP gravitated to Foot. If the left remained the minority within the PLP this would increase the likelihood of the successors to Callaghan being associated within the right or centrists factions within the PLP. In the aftermath of their loss of office in 1979 and the birth of Thatcherism many on the left identified the fight for internal democratic reform as a central constitutional priority. Within this, establishing an Electoral College, and giving a voice to the trade union movement and the extra-parliamentary party of Labour activists in the selection of the leader, was a central objective. If the left could not annex the leadership through a parliamentary ballot as they were assumed to be in the minority, then changing the composition of that electorate, and constructing a more left wing electorate, would enhance their changes of securing the left’s lineage on the leadership (Stark, 1996:46). Four years after their straightforward, practical and efficient leadership succession contest,

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Labour were in the midst of a bitter civil war, in which disputes about leadership succession procedures would be pivotal (Stark, 1996:36). When placed within the context of the previous leadership succession contests of 1963 and 1976, the mentalities of the right and the left towards the crisis of 1979 to 1981 would be immensely illuminating. The right would resist the moves towards an Electoral College, fearing that it would a trojan horse for left wing dominance. The left would campaign hard for an Electoral College, assuming that the numeric dominance of the right within the PLP would impede their attempts to gain the leadership for their faction. Yet Wilson, supposedly of the left had managed to acquire the leadership against the numeric domination of the right in the leadership of January 1963. Moreover, when Callaghan did resign in October 1980 and the final parliamentary ballot took place it was the left wing candidate, Foot, who overcame the right wing candidate, Healey. As the remaining chapters indicate the shift to an Electoral College did not give the left the lineage on the leadership. Candidates affiliated with the left would suffer significant humiliations through the Electoral College after the initial success of Kinnock in the first Electoral College election of 1983. The candidatures of Benn in 1988, Bryan Gould 1992, Margaret Beckett and John Prescott 1994, against a revisionist Kinnock; an old style social democrat John Smith; and an arch modernizer, Tony Blair, respectively resulted in resounding defeats for the left. By 2007, the left would be unable to put forward a candidate for the Electoral College to consider.

FROM CALLAGHAN TO FOOT: THE LABOUR PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1980

James Callaghan would preside over an immensely turbulent four year period in Labour party history. The PLP had selected him because he was deemed to be the most competent and unifying of the candidates, but most significantly because they believed that under his stewardship Labour stood their best chance of retaining power. He was to resign the leadership after a fractious Annual Conference in the autumn of 1980. In the interim period his reputation for competence had been sullied by economic and industrial crises, as the International Monetary Fund loan1 and the Winter of Discontent became labels which Conservative strategists attached to Labour as symbols of their governing ineptitude. The condemnation that the Conservative party heaped upon Callaghan and his administration was then compounded by the vitriolic attacks that the left heaped upon him in the immediate aftermath of defeat. Increasingly mobilised by the charismatic former Cabinet minister, Tony Benn, a betrayal thesis emerged amongst the left. They implied that Callaghan and Cabinet elites had been traitors to socialism by their failure to adhere to the Social Contract (Mitchell, 1983:30). The Social Contract had been hammered out as party policy in the era of opposition between 1970 and 1974 to demonstrate that Labour and the trade unions could work harmoniously after the damaging rift over In Place of Strife in 1969. The Social Contract operated on the principle that the trade unions would exercise voluntary wage restraint, whilst in return the Labour government would pursue measures designed to enhance the social wage, as a means of creating a fairer and more equal distribution of wealth within society. There was an expectation that the Social Contract would be pivotal to the next Labour government as their 1974 Manifesto stated: ‘at the heart of this manifesto and our programme to save the nation lies the Social Contract between the Labour party and the trade unions’ (Dorey, 1995:130).

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The poor state of the British economy would undermine the political viability of the Social Contract. With inflation and unemployment increasing, the Chancellor Denis Healey approached the International Monetary Fund in search of a loan, which came with the condition of pruning government expenditure. The imposition of public spending cuts and deflationary budgets, whilst unemployment increased beyond one million, would mean that the Labour government would be unable to sustain their commitment to enhance the social wage and honour their side of the Social Contract. The imposition of formal pay policies put the Labour government on collision course with the trade unions. For the former further wage restraint was unavoidable, for the latter it was unacceptable. By the autumn of 1978 the Annual Conference, dominated as it was by trade union votes, rejected the new five per cent pay guideline, and the Trade Union Council decided to return to free collective bargaining and rejected any further wage restraint (Taylor, 1987:101-03). The winter of 1978-79 was to be accompanied by widespread strike action by public sector workers demanding wage increases greater than five per cent. The Winter of Discontent put paid to any hopes that Labour had of winning the 1979 general election (Laybourn, 2000:121). A parliamentary majority of 44 for the Thatcher led Conservatives followed and nearly two decades of Labour opposition was the consequence of the perceived limitations of Labour in office.2 The damaging strike action of 1978-79, and the perception that Labour could not operate effectively with the trade unions, stoked up electoral resentment against both the party and the trade union movement. Images of the Winter of Discontent would be repeatedly used by Conservative propagandists over the next four general elections as a warning against the hazards of Labour in office (Pattie, 2001:34-35). The economic constraints that would undermine the Wilson and Callaghan administrations were compounded by political constraints. Although in office their returns at the two general elections of 1974 were reflective of their weakness: below 40 per cent of the electorate for the first time in the post war era, leaving them without a parliamentary majority between March and October 1974 and a majority of only three after the second general election of the year. That slim parliamentary majority would evaporate, necessitating a reliance on the Liberals and other minor parties to secure the passage of their parliamentary business and their political survival. Their capacity to govern effectively was also undermined by the development of a highly organised and sustained expression of factional discontent by the left in the division lobbies (Norton, 1980:431-37). With the nationalist parties losing faith in the Labour administration as proposals for devolution to Scotland and Wales floundered in the spring of 1979, a confidence motion was called which Labour lost, leaving many to regret Callaghan’s decision not

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to hold a general election in the autumn of 1978, before the onset of the Winter of Discontent (Pattie, 2001:34-35). Many party activists on the left felt that the failures of the Labour governments were a consequence of the social democratic right elite abandoning3 the manifesto commitments of 1974, particularly the Social Contract (Whitehead, 1986:349). The apparent betrayal of party policy by the 1974 to 1979 governments raised the issue of the relationship between the leadership and the PLP with the wider movement in a very dramatic fashion and fuelled efforts to restructure the party (Cronin, 2004:217). For the left democracy and the distribution of power within the party became dominant. Ensuring that the party was restructured in a manner that could guarantee the implementation of the policies of the left became their dominant concern (Minkin, 1991:192; see also Kogan and Kogan, 1982 and Seyd, 1987). At the behest of the Bennite dominated new left there developed an irresistible pressure to widen the franchise for leadership selection beyond the narrow, elitist and social democratic dominated confines of the PLP. They argued that the party consisted of three centres of influence – the PLP; the CLPs; and the trade unions; and that each should have a voice in leadership selection (Punnett, 1990:181). A dispirited and disorganised right was ‘temporarily wrong footed’ against the Bennite new left in the constitutional battles that would follow (Joyce, 1999:201-03). Establishing the Principle of an Electoral College The period leading up to the autumn of 1980 would see Labour engage in a venomous bout of factional in-fighting, which would culminate in the principle of shifting from a parliamentary ballot for determining the leadership to an Electoral College. The shift would occur irrespective of the fact that the PLP had operated leadership selection ballots successfully all century, during which time contests had been ‘smooth and relatively painless’. Advocates of reform ignored the historical record that PLP ballots had been ‘easily organised, cheap to operate’ and above all else ‘speedy’, and that the post-Wilson succession contest was deemed to have been completed effectively (Drucker, 1976:395; Drucker, 1981:379; Punnett, 1990:181). The shift to the establishment of an Electoral College was merely a component part of a wider constitutional reform agenda which was aggressively pursued by the left in the mid-1970s, under the auspices of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD). They had emerged in the early part of the decade and were concerned with the ‘democratisation’ of the party as a means of redefining the relationship between the leadership and the base of the Labour movement4 (Cronin, 2004:217). A grass roots organisation they were motivated by a distrust of the leadership and a desire to impede what they perceived to be a propensity for the leadership to tilt to the right (LeDuc, 2001:329). Alongside democratising leadership selection

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the reformers also wanted first, mandatory reselection, whereby parliamentarians would be subject to reselection by their constituencies before each general election, rather than them being automatically retained on the basis of incumbency; and second, the right for the election manifesto to be determined by the NEC, rather than with the leadership (Drucker, 1981:379; Stark, 1996:42; LeDuc, 2001:329). Therefore, the constitutional reformers on the new left wanted to weaken control of the right by redistributing power away from the parliamentary establishment and to the rank and file, and thus ‘end the effective independence’ of the PLP around ‘which right-wing control was seen ultimately to rest’ (Shaw, 1994:163). The agenda of the constitutional reformers gained considerable leverage by the loss of office in May 1979 (LeDuc, 2001:329). In the aftermath of defeat, it was harder for the leadership to withstand the pressure for reform, added to which the mobilising skills of the advocates of reform on the new left, far outmatched the blocking capabilities of a less well managed, and increasingly divided right (Drucker, 1981:379-80; Stark, 1996:45). At the vanguard of the reforming movement was Benn. Opting not to stand for election to the shadow Cabinet5, Benn announced that he intended to ‘devote his energies to fighting for internal reform’, including leadership selection (Benn, 1990:4; Adams, 1992:399; Stark, 1996:46). At the first Annual Conference to be held since the loss of office, two of the reformers proposed constitutional amendments were approved: mandatory reselection of incumbent parliamentarians and the control of the manifesto being in the hands of the NEC (LeDuc, 2001:329). Although the proposed reform to leadership selection was defeated, the architects of reform planned to maintain their campaign (Benn, 1990:543). The dispute over leadership selection would have to wait until the following Annual Conference. That was because a Commission of Enquiry had been established to consider the constitutional apparatus of the party. The decision to establish the enquiry had been made by the NEC in the September 1979, immediately prior to the scheduled Annual Conference. The initial reaction of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy had been one of condemnation, arguing that the enquiry was a mechanism to take the focus of the Annual Conference away from the movement for democratisation. Once the Annual Conference had rejected the proposal for democratising leadership selection, the constitutional reformers were grateful for the existence of the enquiry – ‘the unthinkable was being thought’ (Mitchell, 1983:42; Stark, 1996:47). The Commission of Enquiry was to convene in June 1980 at Bishops Stortford. Having endorsed the new position on the compulsory selection of incumbent Labour parliamentarians’ attention turned to the leadership selection. Callaghan and his deputy, Michael Foot6, as delegated by the PLP argued the case for the parliamentary control of leadership selection or the status quo position7 (Morgan, 1997:716). On behalf of the reformers, Benn

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argued for the establishment of an Electoral College, within which the votes would be split evenly among the PLP, the CLPs and the trade unions. Both positions were rejected. At which point, Callaghan aligned to the right, and Foot, aligned to the old left, compromised in a manner designed to maintain unity but which actually intensified conflict. It was proposed that an Electoral College could be established, which would determine the election of the leadership/deputy leadership and would prepare election manifestos. This Electoral College would designate voting rights in the following way: 50 per cent would be determined by the PLP; 25 per cent to the trade unions, 20 per cent to the CLPs; and the remaining five per cent to affiliated organisations (Drucker, 1981:382; Stark, 1996:47). It was a compromise that infuriated significant numbers amongst the new left and the right. The constitutional reformers aligned to the new left had proposed the Electoral College, with specific weightings, for clear strategic reasons. They needed to end what they perceived to be the dominance of the PLP in leadership selection in order to enhance the chances of the left securing the lineage on the leadership. Given that the PLP was perceived to be dominated by the right, whilst the CLPs and the trade unions, were deemed to be bastions of left wing influence, securing substantial influence for the CLPs and the trade unions in the weighting of any proposed Electoral College was central to their strategic positioning (Punnett, 1990:181). For the reformers managing to get Callaghan to concede the principal of an Electoral College was a significant tactical advance, but the notion of the PLP retaining 50 per cent of the weighted votes was unacceptable to them (Kogan and Kogan, 1982:77). The Campaign for Labour Party Democracy rejected the Bishops Stortford formula and now countered with the following proposal: 50 per cent vote share to the unions; and 25 per cent each to the CLPs and the PLP (Stark, 1996:48). Meanwhile, the right were immensely disappointed by the concessions made by Callaghan. David Owen regarded it as a ‘mortal blow’ which made him question ‘whether the Labour party was now salvageable’ (Owen, 1991:441). Joining Owen in condemnation was Bill Rodgers. Together they strongly criticised Callaghan for committing the party to the idea of an Electoral College without consulting with the PLP. As Owen and Rodgers ratcheted up their condemnation of him for ‘selling out of the rights of the parliamentary party’, Callaghan countered by accusing them of undermining the party by engaging in consultations with Roy Jenkins about the viability of establishing a new party of the centre8 (Morgan, 1997:716-17). At the forthcoming Annual Conference a defeated and dispirited Callaghan included within his speech the plea: ‘for pity’s sake, stop arguing’, but to no avail9 (Morgan, 1997:717). Hayter would describe the atmosphere as ‘poisonous’, as the chasm between the right of the PLP and the activists was clearly evident. Delegates who spoke contrary to the ‘Benn hegemony’

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were openly ‘barracked or slow handclapped’ (Hayter, 2005:12). Indicative of the divisive nature was the fact that those on the Bennite new left were entirely content to see disaffected figures on the right leave the party. Militant delegate, and later Labour MP, Dave Nellist, informed delegates that: If there are 25 Labour MPs who want to join Roy Jenkins and the so called Centre Party, the sooner they do it and give us a chance to replace them with genuine Labour Party MPs, the better. (Hayter, 2005:12) On policy terms, the new left secured their wishes on withdrawal from the EEC and on unilateralism, and by a smaller margin conference endorsed their proposals for mandatory reselection, although they rejected the amendment proposing that the NEC should have control over the manifesto (Drucker, 1981:384). On the principle of establishing an Electoral College, the resolution was passed by 50.7 to 49.3 per cent (Stark, 1996:49). However, conference was unable to determine a method for how the Electoral College should work. What was passed was an emerging resolution calling for a special conference to be convened devoted solely to how the Electoral College should operate. This was to be held in Wembley in January 1981 (Stark, 1996:51). Jenkins concluded that the failure to agree on a formula added ‘the shambolic to the sinister’, a theme that Drucker elaborated on when he noted that: ‘Labour was a party without consensus: without an agreed leadership selection procedure, it became all but anarchic’ (Jenkins, 1991:530; Drucker, 1981:384). Whilst Callaghan promised that he would ‘take account of what had happened at conference’, many were aware that the still existing standing orders of the party required the PLP to determine the leadership of the party in November. Could Callaghan resign now enabling the PLP to circumnavigate the Electoral College? (Stark, 1996:51). The Final Parliamentary Labour Party Leadership Ballot Callaghan was nearly 65 when he had become Prime Minister in March 1976. Having lost office in May 1979 at aged 67 he would be 72 if Margaret Thatcher decided to serve a full parliamentary term through until 1984. As his age had been a discussion point in 1976 it would clearly be a discussion point if he had sought to lead Labour into a hypothetical 1984 general election. Callaghan was aware of this, and this contributed to his decision shortly after ceasing to be Prime Minister that he would not seek to lead Labour into the next general election (Callaghan, 1987:565). Whilst his own personal instinct was to resign with immediate effect, a number of interconnected factors would persuade him not to do so. Callaghan felt that to resign in the ‘moment of defeat’, would suggest that he was ‘unwilling to account for himself at the inevitable inquest’ that would follow (Callaghan,

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1987:565). He felt a ‘call of duty’ to lead the party through this difficult period in its history, during which he hoped to blunt the impact of the Bennite new left, whose accusations of betrayal he was to bitterly resent (Morgan, 1997:702). Callaghan also wanted to organise the succession to ensure that a candidate who met with his approval acquired the leadership. By this Callaghan meant Healey (Pugh, 2010:361). The death of Anthony Crosland in 1977; the decision of Jenkins to become President of the European Commission in 1976; and the electoral defeat of Shirley Williams, left the right short of credible experienced options (Hayter, 2005:8-9). Callaghan possessed reservations about the temperament of Owen, and whilst he recognised that they were talented, Roy Hattersley and John Smith were candidates for a later succession contest (Morgan, 1997:703). It was understood that Callaghan had created a self imposed 18 month period before resigning, which would take him through until autumn 1980 (Punnett, 1992:90). During this time he intended to ‘neutralise’ the impact of the new left. Callaghan famously used a cricketing metaphor to indicate his strategy when he let it be known he would stay around to take ‘the shine off the ball’ for Denis (Morgan, 1997:703). This proved to be a ‘fatal error’, as ‘like many other political leaders, he misjudged the moment when he should have gone’10 (Rodgers, 2000:188; Williams, 2009:274). As his biographer, Morgan notes: Instead of ‘taking the shine off the ball’ to ensure Denis Healey’s election, the veteran opening batsman had left the opposition fast bowlers in total command. The past fifteen months had resulted in the power of the left being all the more emphatic. (Morgan, 1997:719) The principle of an Electoral College had been established, against the instincts of Callaghan himself, yet there was no agreement on the procedures through which it should work. Regardless of the complications that his decision might create Callaghan decided to resign days after the end of the Annual Conference. This was an act which was bound to ‘inflame an already bitterly divided party’ (Shore, 1993:137). Callaghan took this course of action despite his deputy, Foot publicly asked him not to resign (Morgan, 1997:719). How should Labour manage the transition from Callaghan to his successor? Three scenarios emerged. First, although having announced his intention to stand down Callaghan could remain in situ until after the new Electoral College procedures had been agreed whereupon the newly configured Electoral College could be activated with immediate effect.11 Callaghan, however, would not consider the idea of postponing his retirement to in effect aid the succession chances of the constitutional reforming faction and their prime candidate, Benn. Second, if Callaghan insisted on departing with immediate effect, then Foot as his deputy, could be asked to act as interim

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leader, until the procedures for the Electoral College were determined, whereupon a full leadership and deputy leadership election could then take place. However, it quickly became apparent that the third scenario, loaded with implications, was going to be the way forward: the leadership selection would be determined immediately under the existing parliamentary ballot rules. The new left recognised this and angrily questioned the legitimacy of the contest going ahead (Seyd, 1987:128). In the aftermath of Callaghan’s resignation and the realisation that the succession contest would be conducted under soon to be defunct leadership selection rules, three candidates immediately declared their intention to stand. Healey stood as the leading and sole candidate of the right. He was regarded as the ‘natural successor’ and the clear favourite to win (Drucker, 1981:385; Mitchell, 1983:50; Punnett, 1992:91). Indeed the Healey camp believed that they had secured endorsements from 150 of the 269 strong PLP, so they had ‘confidence that their man could easily win the leadership battle’ (Drucker, 1981:383). Given that to win on the first ballot 135 votes were needed there was considerable talk of Healey winning without the need to progress to a second ballot (Hatfield, 1980:1). Two other former Cabinet Ministers entered the succession contest: John Silkin identifiable with the left; and Peter Shore identifiable by his anti EEC mentality. Silkin attempted to present himself as ‘the acceptable face of the left’, although despite his bravado he was not expected to have much chance of defeating Healey12 (Drucker, 1981:385; Punnett, 1992:92). Shore was a more credible challenger to Healey than Silkin, although he was not expected to win. Most commentators assumed that Shore was standing to ‘establish his claim for the next contest’ by securing a credible second place return (Drucker, 1981:385). Whilst Healey was clearly the candidate of the right, and Silkin the candidate of the left, ideologically locating Shore was problematic. At the time of his candidature, Shore was described in the following terms: His appeal in any leadership election will depend to a great extent on his having remained aloof from the left/right battles which have preoccupied the Labour party. His ideological stance is neither the social democratic crypto-monetarism of Denis Healey, nor the alternative socialist strategy of Tony Benn. (Wapshott, 1980:9) In her excellent account of how the traditional right fought back against the ascendancy of the left, Hayter identifies Shore, through his membership of Solidarity as of the right, but noted that his anti-Europeanism disqualified him as leader of the right (Hayter, 2005:8-9). However, in his equally impressive account of the parliamentary right within Labour in the period between 1970 and 1979 Meredith identifies Shore as being of the left alongside Benn, Foot and Stan Orme, with regard to the IMF crisis, but

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being centrist in the mould of Wilson in more general terms (Meredith, 2008: 17, 36, 73, 81). However, when standing against Healey, Shore had calculated that his primary appeal would be to those on the left and those with anti EEC instincts. That being the case it was central to his thinking to ensure that Foot did not stand. Shore believed that he had secured a deal with Foot that Foot would not stand and would instead back him (Morgan, 2007:377). However, considerable attention was now focused in on the two candidates of the left in the previous leadership contest in 1976: Foot who had come second with a credible final ballot return of 137 votes, and Benn who had stood down after his first ballot return of 37 in order to support Foot. Initially it seemed unlikely that Foot would stand. His biography identified three initial reasons why he would not run. First, he was 67 years old and ‘looked even older’, and thus his age would be a factor in a forthcoming general election campaign. Second, he was not naturally predisposed to the rigours of leadership and having only acquired ministerial office late in his political career, (in 1974 and the age of 61), his ‘own wish was for a quieter and more bookish life’. Finally, Healey was a clear ‘front runner’. There was thus a concern about whether Foot would be able to win (Morgan, 2007:376). What changed his mind and persuaded him to participate was to be the particular circumstances facing Labour at the time. First, the left did not feel that Shore was really one of them. Stuart Holland wrote to Foot to express his concern that Shore was not a true standard bearer of the left, and that although his adherence to an anti Common market approach was established they were concerned about his commitment to renouncing nuclear weapons (Foot papers). Second, they were concerned that neither Shore, nor Silkin would be able to prevent Healey from emerging victorious13 (Shore, 1993:139). Ian Mikardo and Clive Jenkins, the General Secretary of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial staffs (ASTMS), were pivotal in persuading Foot to stand. They organised it so that a flood of telephone messages, telegrams and letters were sent to Foot from across the Labour movement, encouraging him to think again and stand (Jenkins, 1990:188; Mikardo, 1988:204). Shore observes that of the persuasive arguments the one that swayed Foot was their view that: Only Michael was strong enough to beat Healey and that the party would be plunged into civil war if Healey became leader. It was indeed the argument that he – more than any other candidate – was best equipped to heal the party’s wounds that moved Michael Foot most strongly. (Shore, 1993:139) The measured way in which Shore explains the late intervention of Foot is not necessarily shared by Healey himself, who recalled the frantic attempts by Shore to prevent Foot from entering the ballots. Healey recalls that:

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CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER Peter still fancied his own chances... I would hear him plodding up and down the shadow Cabinet corridor between his room and Michael’s for anguished discussions. The carpet was worn bare by the time Michael finally decided to run. Peter was bitterly disappointed, particularly since Michael made it clear that he would not run, as most people assumed, as a caretaker until the Electoral College was in place, but to lead the party into the next general election. (Healey, 1990:477)

What of Benn? The new left had been ‘thrown into confusion’ by Callaghan resigning before the parameters of the Electoral College had been established. When Benn had stood four years earlier his first ballot return of 37 and subsequent withdrawal had demonstrated to their now numerous supporters in the CLPs that a ‘change in the leadership election procedure was necessary if they were to win’14 (Drucker, 1981:379). They had nearly achieved their objective only to find that Callaghan had initiated a preemptive strike to install Healey whilst an opportunity still existed through a parliamentary ballot (Thorpe, 2008:212). Ultimately Benn decided not to stand on the grounds that the selection process being utilised was illegitimate. It should be noted, however, that Benn himself was willing to stand. He only decided not to on the basis that non participation was the majority view of his circle of advisors (Kogan and Kogan, 1982:91). Having made their decision the new left argued that to participate would add credibility to a contest which was both illegitimate and inappropriate. Benn declared ‘what is happening now is not the real election. When there is a real election I will be a candidate’ (Punnett, 1992:92). As Shore noted, Benn felt that with an assumed ‘large following’ in both the trade unions and the CLPs then he would emerge victorious (Shore, 1993:138). This was a calculated presentational explanation on behalf of Benn as it was clear that he could not win through a parliamentary ballot. More significantly he might receive a derisory return which would undermine his credibility and his prospects for a later succession through the Electoral College (Adams, 1992:407). The new left had initially been concerned when it appeared that Foot would not stand, that if Benn did not, then Healey would win without any opposition from the left (Kogan and Kogan, 1982:90-91). However, once Foot did enter the contest the new left were not too concerned by his presence. They felt that he would be a temporary leader if selected, both due to his age and the illegitimacy of his selection – i.e. an Electoral College succession contest would occur once the procedures were established (Morgan, 2007:377). When Foot made it clear that he did not want to be seen as a caretaker leader and that he intended to stand through till the general election this presented a tactical dilemma for the new left. A challenge to Healey through the Electoral College could be presented as an act of principle - Healey had been selected by a coup from within what they

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claimed was a right wing dominated PLP – and was thus unrepresentative of the more leftward leaning CLPs. If the so called right wing dominated PLP permitted Foot to emerge as leader it would mean that a Benn challenge would seem to be more motivated by personal ambition than policy/ ideology. In the first ballot of the final PLP ballot to determine the leadership Shore and Silkin were defeated. Drucker commented that his return of 38 was a ‘slap in the face’ for Silkin given his high expectations, whereas finishing last with 32 votes was a ‘sad’ result for Shore who had expected to come an ‘honourable second’ to Healey had Foot not participated (Drucker, 1981:386). The lead that Healey had over Foot at 29 (112-83) was less than expected, and less than he needed, especially as both defeated candidates now indicated their intention to vote for Foot. Their endorsement made it difficult for Healey to obtain their ‘freed votes’. In the end Foot added 56 to his first ballot total to make 139, whilst Healey could only add a further seventeen, taking him to 12915 (Punnett, 1992:93). The Healey camp knew that their candidate was in trouble after the first ballot, as Drucker concludes: To gain votes from the defeated candidates Healey’s team needed to be in an impregnable position. They had admitted before the vote that fewer than 115 would be worrying. Hattersley had predicted 116. Some extra votes always go to a sure winner as bandwagon jumping occurs, but this time it was particularly important for Healey to appear unbeatable (and to win by a large margin) because a narrow victory would legitimise a subsequent challenge under the new rules. The Healey team could not regain the initiative after the first ballot. (Drucker, 1981:386) Table 7:

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership Election of 1980

Denis Healey Michael Foot John Silkin Peter Shore Source:

First Ballot Votes %

Second Ballot Votes %

112 83 38 32

129 139

Punnett, 1992:93

42.3 31.3 14.3 12.1

48.1 51.9

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The victory of Foot was hardly authority enhancing. As had been the case four years earlier the leader in the first ballot had been overtaken in the final ballot, and his winning share of the vote (at 51.9 per cent) was the narrowest margin of victory in the history of Labour party leadership elections (Punnett, 1992:93). There was also a certain irony given the motivations of the left over the previous eighteen months, as the PLP ‘in which a majority of members were drawn from the centre and right of the party had elected the most left wing of candidates’ (Punnett, 1992:93). Despite the fact that both Shore and Silkin had endorsed Foot, which was assumed to indicate that their supporters would do likewise, there was genuine surprise when it was announced that Foot had won (Morgan, 2007:379). The right were devastated. Emphasising the implications of a Foot leadership in terms of the trajectory of economic, defence and European policy, Owen concluded that this was ‘something only for nightmares’ (Owen, 1991:458). However, interpretations on how Healey had conducted himself over the preceding 18 months were significant to the fracturing of the right over the forthcoming months. Whereas the soon to be SDP defectors condemned Healey for his failure to ‘stand up to the left’, those who would stay, such as Giles Radice still regarded Healey as the ‘potential saviour of the party.’ To them his defeat was ‘catastrophic’ (Radice, 2002:292-93; Radice, 2004:20). For the Gang of Three, (Rodgers, Owen and Williams), Healey should have shown more ‘fight’ against the new left and Benn. If Healey had won the leadership contest they would have stayed, fighting alongside him (Williams, 2009:278). However, for Owen, Healey’s campaign and failure to win was the final irrevocable evidence the right had given up trying to reverse the Bennite rebellion (Owen, 1991:458). In 2009, Rodgers informed me that: Healey failed to give any leadership to the natural, historic social democratic PLP majority. He believed that he would succeed Callaghan if he laid low and avoided provoking the left. This was a major error of judgement and a lot of MPs felt that he had let them down by not fighting their corner. Out of despair a handful decided to support Foot so that the whole edifice of the Labour Party would collapse and a new social democratic party could emerge. I voted for Healey and was very surprised much later that a few friends had voted for Foot. No decision had yet been made about launching the SDP. Shirley Williams and I, and probably David Owen, intended to soldier on in the Labour Party for a while if Healey had won although deeply sceptical about Healey’s ability to save the party at its nadir. (Rodgers to author) Benn would write to Foot in the aftermath of his victory to inform him that he had secured a ‘historic win which will put new heart back into the party’

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(Foot papers). The pleasure that Benn felt in the success of Foot did not seem too evident when the result was announced, according to Healey: I was warned, five minutes before the official announcement that I had lost to Michael by 129 to 139. I composed my features into a cheerful grin as I walked past the assembled Lobby correspondents to Committee Room Fourteen for the party meeting. The moment the result was announced I rose to congratulate Michael, and announced that I would be proud to serve under him as Deputy Leader if the party wished, as I knew he would have served under me if I had won. There was a great storm of cheering and banging of desks. I glanced at Tony Benn. His face was ashen. So I knew I had done at least one thing right. (Healey, 1990:478) Explaining the Selection of Foot The defeat of Healey can be attributed to the failings of his campaign and the timing and circumstances of the contest. He ran what was described as a ‘dreadful’ campaign, characterised by complacency and tactical error and a belief that there was no need to try to persuade centre-right MPs, because they had nowhere else to ‘go’ but him (Hayter 2005: 13; Williams, 2009:278). Future SDP defector, John Cartwright argued that his defeat was due to the ‘typically arrogant way in which he approached the contest’. Indicative of this was his refusal to put forward his manifesto to The Guardian, which Foot, Silkin and Shore were prepared to do. Cartwright informed me that Healey chose not to do so as ‘Labour MPs were already aware of his record and achievements’, and Pearce noted that this contributed to a handful of MPs choosing not to endorse him16 (Pearce, 2002:477). In his memoirs Healey offers relatively complementary insights into his campaign team, led by Eric Varley, Radice and Hattersley, whilst admitting that Hattersley did warn him about his insensitivity towards his own supporters (Healey, 1990:477). However, the composition and conduct of his campaign team has been criticised not just by future defector, John Cartwright, but also by Neil Kinnock, who was a pivotal player in the Foot campaign. Cartwright identified for me the limitations of the Healey campaign in that: Despite the proven track record of the Manifesto Group organisation in winning PLP elections, Healey refused to have any hard right MP's on his campaign team. As a result Manifesto members were excluded and the campaign was run by so called ‘middle of the roaders’, who lacked both practical experience and tactical nous. (Cartwright to author)

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Kinnock informed me of the differences in the efforts put into persuading floating voters between the two camps. Kinnock had initially felt that a Foot victory was not possible and that they would be a dozen or so votes short. However, the weaknesses of the Healey campaign helped to propel Foot to victory. He noted that: Denis didn’t fight a good campaign: he didn’t try to cajole individuals who (not unusually in politics, however, pathetic) wanted personal attention. The result was that a ten or a dozen ‘floaters’ who were not natural Footites ended up voting for Michael. Our campaign team also worked damned hard – and had a better result than we anticipated. (Kinnock to author) Moreover, Healey was a divisive politician. There was a reaction against him which flowed from his presence at two of the most controversial ministerial positions that a Labour politician could hold: defence between 1964 and 1970 and the Treasury between 1974 and 1979. As Austen Mitchell noted Healey was thus associated with ‘bombs, cuts, incomes policy and the final ignominy of the five per cent pay policy. All were crimes against humanity in the eyes of the left’ (Mitchell, 1983:49). However, whilst the campaigning approach of Healey is open to criticism the circumstances of the contest contributed significantly to his defeat. The most important was the Benn factor. Foot might have been encouraged to participate as the best ‘stop Healey’ candidate, but he was in many ways also a ‘stop Benn’ candidate. A Healey victory under a PLP ballot opposed by the new left would intensify the conflict. Benn would mount a challenge for the leadership through the Electoral College, especially if the Healey victory was not of landslide proportions (Shaw, 1999:154). As Punnett argues: It was recognized by MPs that Foot would be ‘the acceptable face of the PLP’ as far as the party outside Parliament was concerned. The reasoning of many of the right and centre MPs who might have been expected to vote for Healey, but in fact voted for Foot, was that if a left-wing leader was likely to emerge from the electoral college in due course, it was desirable that he was seen to have been the choice of the PLP in the first place. This factor was reinforced after the first ballot, when it became clear that the best Healey could hope for was a narrow win. Such an outcome would subsequently undermine Healey’s prestige as leader and make it even more likely that an attempt would be made to overturn the result when the Electoral College was in place. Thus some MPs felt that if Healey could not win decisively, and be seen to be the overwhelming choice of the PLP, it would be better if he did not win at all. (Punnett, 1992:94)

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There emerged a significant body of opinion which suggested that there would be less conflict with Foot as leader than Healey. This was an emerging view that Foot sought to exploit during the course of the campaign. He would emphasise to the PLP that if they elected him then the ‘likelihood of him being rejected by the Electoral College was very small indeed’ (Punnett, 1992:94). Thus Foot was unlikely to be forced to fight a further election once the Electoral College was established, as a challenge from Benn was less likely due to two factors: First, he had always been warmly supported by the constituency parties...[with]...an affection and regard in the constituencies that no other senior figure in the Labour Party – except possibly Benn himself – enjoyed. And second, his close contact with Trade Union leaders, his advocacy of the Social Contract, his almost romantic view of the virtues of individual trade union leaders and of the trade union movement itself, meant that he could be sure of massive union support to defeat any move against him. (Shore, 1993:139) The imminent Electoral College altered the dynamics of the post-Callaghan succession contest, but so did another aspect of the Bennite new left’s constitutional agenda: mandatory reselection. Healey sympathisers may have felt pressurised at constituency level not to endorse Healey and may have feared the consequences of doing so (Hayter, 2005:13). This emerged as more of an influencing factor from communications with former Labour MPs than has been implied in the existing academic literature. Three defectors to the SDP identified this as a significant influence. Rodgers suggested that ‘many were bullied by leftward leaning rank and file members in the constituencies’ and concluded that by voting for Foot ‘they might propitiate some of their constituency workers’, whilst John Horam was convinced that Healey ‘lost votes’ due to the fact that ‘right-wing MPs were under pressure from left-wing constituencies’. John Cartwright argued that: the fact that this was certain to be the last Leadership election to be limited to MP's certainly affected some members who felt that they should consult their GMC and abide by their decisions. It is also true that many non-Left MP's felt threatened by their GMCs who, in some cases demanded to see their ballot papers marked for Foot...the possibility of mandatory re-selection probably had more impact than the impending Electoral College. (Cartwright to author) There could be an argument that they would say that wouldn’t they? However, it is worth noting the insights of the loyalist Ted Graham, who informed me of:

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CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER The growing dominance of the left at a constituency level which was resulting in members of the PLP who leaned towards Healey being warned off by their constituency parties that if they voted for Healey they would lose support locally. This is not a myth – it is a fact. (Graham to author)

The planned Electoral College and mandatory reselection were factors that eroded the Healey vote. The final factor relating to circumstances that would erode the Healey vote related to the tentative idea of creating a new party of the centre. A handful on the outer reaches of the social democratic right had already decided that they wished to be part of new party of the centre. They calculated that their prospects were best served by facing a Foot led Labour party, rather than a Healey led one, and thus they voted ‘for’ Foot. Crewe and King found at least five MPs who voted for Foot who subsequently defected to the SDP, enough to ensure a tie in the 1980 contest (Crewe and King, 1995:75). Crewe and King do not reveal who the five were. On the basis of the feedback that I have received from members of the PLP four names were repeatedly mentioned, two of whom – Neville Sandelson and Tom Ellis have already publicly revealed that they voted for Foot. I contacted the other two frequently listed by their fellow parliamentarians, and they have requested that their names are not listed. 17 Healey himself feels these tactics were the major factor behind his defeat (Healey, 1990:477). On explaining their decision to leave ‘slow acting poison’, Sandelson would admit that: There was a collective move by (future) SDP MPs to wreck the Labour party by voting for the more extreme candidate. They deny it and they don’t want their names mentioned – that they will say it was Sandelson and nobody else – I can assure you that it was quite untrue and the number of votes in the Healey-Foot election was sufficient to tip the balance Foot’s way. He was most likely to lead to the crumbling of the Labour Party. (Adams, 1992:408) Establishing the Operation of the Electoral College Upon completing the last ever parliamentary ballot to determine the leadership attention soon moved towards Wembley and the conference to determine how the Electoral College would operate (Drucker, 1981:387). Labour parliamentarians spent the months between Blackpool and Wembley debating various Electoral College formulas (Stark, 1996:53). The right, which had been resistant to the notion of an Electoral College, was now through the auspices of the Campaign for Labour Victory and the Manifesto Group, campaigning for one member, one vote. Mobilised by Owen, one member one vote, was by their own admission not their preferred option.

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What it did do, however, was act as a manifestation of their objection to the block vote being used within the Electoral College. However, the shadow Cabinet rejected the one member one vote proposal and eventually entered Wembley committed to 50 per cent for the PLP, and sharing the remaining half between the CLPs and the trade unions (Stark, 1996:52-53). Table 8:

Voting at the Wembley Conference on the Electoral College First Ballot

Second Ballot

Third Ballot

Type of Electoral College At Conference Postal Electoral College Separate Electoral College One Member One Vote

6 283 000 434 000 11 000 431 000

Composition of Electoral College (PLP-CLP - Trade Unions) 33-33-33* 38-30-30* 30-30-40 1/3-1/3-1/3 50-25-25 75-10-10*

1 763 000 192 000 1 763 000 24 000 2 386 000 992 000

1 757 000 1 813 000

3 375 000

2 685 000

2 865 000

* Do not add up to 100 with the remainder to be granted to non-union affiliates. Source:

Stark, 1996:56

After two ballots delegates were faced with either 50-25-25 (PLP/CLP/trade unions option) or 30-30-40. In an embarrassing setback for Foot and the shadow Cabinet their preferred 50-25-25 option was rejected, and the formula adopted (30-30-40) had given the PLP less than half the votes. The PLP had ‘lost the battle to retain the exclusive right to elect the leader and had been given a smaller share of the Electoral College votes than they wished, or might have expected or could have achieved’ (Punnett, 1992:10203). The success of the new left in securing an Electoral College was a reflection of the divergence of organisational capacity between the new left and the fracturing right. Austen Mitchell noted that the Electoral College outcome was a ‘triumph of organisation, simple priorities and clear headed

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determination’ on the new left, over ‘muddled thinking, diffident defence and an [social democratic right] establishment which never really understood what it was defending or how to do it’ (Mitchell, 1983:45). Tom Quinn, an eloquent analyst of leadership election procedures commented that the new formula for determining the leadership of the Labour party seemed tailor made for the left (and Benn): The most controversial feature of the college as initially configured was the part played in it by the unions. Their 40 per cent vote share meant they could not arithmetically determine the winner but they could substantially decide the trajectory of contests, owing not just to their share of votes but to the concentration of their votes, in the form of block votes. Unions were allocated votes in Labour's decision-making bodies in proportion to the level of affiliation fees they paid to the party. These votes were then cast as single blocks so that each union adopted a single position on any decision.......If a candidate could get an early commitment of support from some big unions, he could quickly find himself home and dry. (Quinn, 2004:339-40) The Consequences of Change: The Formation of the Social Democratic Party The day after the Electoral College was established a group of high profile social democrats issued the Limehouse Declaration, setting up a Council for Social Democracy, which would lead inside two months to the formation of the SDP. The Limehouse Declaration and the formation of the SDP did grave damage to Labour electorally, causing the centre-left vote to divide between the SDP, Liberals and Labour, thereby ensuring Thatcherite hegemony for the next decade (Davies, 1996:385). Although in disagreement with the alternative economic strategy, the turn against Europe and opposed to unilateralism, what had really driven them to the exit door was to be the constitutional reforms. Those on the right who defected did so because they feared that due to these processes they had been made an irrelevance within the party. As Cronin outlines: They grasped intuitively that if MPs could be sacked by their constituency parties, they would in all likelihood lose their seats in Parliament....[moreover]...If the voice of MPs in the selection of leader was reduced to a mere 30 per cent of the total, the chance of choosing someone from the centre-right of the party would be virtually nil and their minority status would become permanent. The restructuring of the party meant that the ‘gang’ and their allies could no longer envision a future within a party that was being forced to become more uniformly left wing. (Cronin, 2004:221)

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Wembley provided a useful departure point for the newly formed party in the eyes of Hayter as: Instead of having to launch their party on the unpopular cause of Europe, they had their ready-made and popular cause – that the leader of the Labour party was henceforth to be elected with the votes of distrusted unions which, two years earlier, had fuelled the Winter of Discontent. In the long run, the Wembley decision was in fact to bolster the case for one member one vote, greater internal democracy in both the unions and the party....it would in time move the Labour party back to the centre-right and to electability. (Hayter, 2005:14-15) That reassertion of the right and the birth of new Labour a decade and a half later could not have been foreseen at the height of the infighting of 1979 to 1981. The right had entered opposition in 1979 defeated, demoralised and blamed. The ideology of revisionist social democracy, which had dominated the intellectual thinking of the party for a generation, was discredited by the crisis of 1976 (Crewe and King, 1995:22-24; Marquand, 1999:175-76). Their hegemony was thus threatened by their association with the failed Callaghan administration, but also by the inferior organisational capabilities (Joyce, 1999:201-03). The Campaign for Labour Victory and the Manifesto Group, which had been established to counter the growing influence of the new left, proved to be organisationally weak. The Campaign for Labour Victory was to suffer from significant divisions amongst their membership and a lack of clarity about their constitutional tactics and their policy programme. (Hayter, 2005:11) They failed to identify a settled position on the drive for an Electoral College. Three of their most significant players – Rodgers, Owen and Hattersley – would all advocate separate views on how to proceed. The acceptance of an Electoral College resulted in the marginalisation of the Campaign for Labour Victory from that moment on. Whereas Rodgers still wanted to argue the case for the primacy of the PLP in leadership selection, Owen was advocating a ‘flanking manoeuvre’ through one member, one vote. However, much to their dismay, Hattersley was accepting the principle of the Electoral College, (in what became known as the ‘Hattersley Compromise’), but was trying to secure an outcome which gave the PLP the largest share18 (McMeeking, 2009:9). Daly observes that by the time a settled view was reached – one member one vote – it was too late and they were unable to persuade the shadow Cabinet of the merit of the case, or prevent the new left from securing far more than was expected from the Electoral College (Daly, 1993:293-94). The Manifesto Group was constrained by ambiguous support from the leadership and lack of either trade union or grassroots support, and they also rendered themselves ‘irrelevant’ within the

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PLP by seeking to steer a ‘moderate middle way’ in their statements on Europe and defence (Hayter, 2005:8-11; Meredith 2007, 69-70; 74-75). Attention would initially focus on what was defined as the ‘Gang of Three’ – Rodgers and Williams later being joined by Owen. It can be argued that there was a series of ‘triggers’ or ‘break points’ – (1) moves towards antiEuropeanism and (2) unilateralism (3) the election of Foot and (4) the failure to achieve one member one vote for the Electoral College (McMeeking, 2009:10). These would push the three to the outer periphery of the party, and make them accessible to the wooing of Jenkins (Jenkins, 1991:513; 522; Crewe and King, 1995:89). Jenkins continued to charm and cajole during this period, as Rodgers admits: ‘Jenkins put pressure on me’, whilst still at the same time insisting that the three of them should come on board his venture on their ‘own terms’ (Rodgers, 2000:200-01). How Owen came on board with Rodgers and Williams having been initially hostile to the idea of any alliance with Jenkins relates to two of the triggers: Europe and nuclear disarmament. Owen joined them after an uncomfortable barracking he had received at the Wembley Special Conference. A NEC motion had been put down on defence policy. When Owen spoke he received boos and jeers throughout his speech. He found the experience deeply ‘shocking’, and it began to undermine his faith in fighting on within Labour. His despair at the party’s policy direction was compounded later, when he heard that Silkin was about to release a statement calling for unconditional withdrawal from the EEC (McMeeking, 2009:11). He happened to bump into Rodgers in Westminster immediately after hearing this and, angrily said that ‘something must be done’. Owen said he wanted to meet Williams as well, with a view to putting out a statement on Europe, which was published shortly afterwards. The ‘Gang of Three’ was thus born as a reaction to the leftwards shift of policy (Crewe and King, 1995:40-41). However, the Gang of Three were to remain wary of Jenkins until autumn 1980, and remained determined to fight the new left from within (Crewe and King, 1995: 68-70). Unilateralism and the EEC would bring the Gang of Three together, and then the election of Foot and the Electoral College that would bring them to Jenkins and the Limehouse Declaration. The Gang of Three were horrified that Callaghan accepted the principal of an Electoral College at Bishops Stortford (June 1980), which they regarded as an ‘unforgivable act of betrayal’ (Daly, 1993:291). Healey would later argue that this was the point when the schism within the social democratic right became definite. He concluded that: ‘it was Bishops Stortford which caused the conception of the Social Democratic Party, although its birth took place, appropriately enough, nine months later’, before adding ruefully that ‘its period of gestation was particularly painful for me’ (Healey, 1990:474).

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The Gang of Three were appalled by the events of the 1980 Annual Conference a few weeks after Bishops Stortford. The conference represented the ‘high tide’ of Bennism (Whitehead, 1986:356). The ‘demagoguery’ of Benn was fully evident, and his calls for the abolition of the House of Lords and other Bennite reforms ‘within weeks’ lead to an ironic slap down from Williams: ‘And this would all be done in a couple of weeks. I wonder why Tony was so unambitious. After all, it took God only six days to make the World!’ (Williams, 2009:276). All of their nightmares had come to fruition. On policy, unilateralism and withdrawal from the EEC was passed; on constitutional reforms, mandatory reselection and the principle of an Electoral College was agreed, even if at that stage delegates could not agree on the formula for the Electoral College. Following the Annual Conference Owen and Rodgers wanted to join Jenkins, but Williams made an impassioned plea at a Campaign for Labour Victory meeting for them to remain, arguing until Wembley had rejected one member, one vote they had a duty to stay on and fight (Daly, 1993:295). However, even prior to Wembley it was clear that Williams was on the edge of defection. In late November she informed her former constituents that unless the left wing policies adopted at the Annual Conference were dropped she would not stand as a Labour candidate at the next general election (Rodgers papers). The election of Foot provided slightly different reactions from Owen and Rodgers. Owen refused to stand in the shadow Cabinet elections and informed Jenkins that he thought that the time had come for them to ‘link up’ (Whitehead, 1986:360). Rodgers was still hoping the party could be ‘saved’ from the new left under Foot. Whereas Owen was ‘psychologically already half out of the party’, Rodgers was more ‘anxious to stay’ (Morgan, 2007:380, 392). Unlike Owen he was willing to stand for the shadow Cabinet elections and was successfully elected. However, Rodgers felt that Foot handled their discussions on shadow Cabinet allocation badly, accusing Foot of failing to acknowledge his last offer to stay (Rodgers, 2000:204). Rodgers refused a series of portfolios offered by Foot, including Health, Social Security, Regional Policy and Northern Ireland, before withdrawing altogether, allowing the next highest member on the shadow Cabinet election ballots, one Tony Benn, to take his place (Morgan, 2007:392). Radice, the Chair of the Manifesto Group, argued in The Guardian for a ‘good honest compromise’ between the left and right immediately prior to Wembley, but to no avail (Radice, 1981:7). The rationale for their departure was clearly set out in the resignation letter of Williams, which stated that: We have almost always been defeated and we have been defeated by larger and larger majorities as the years have gone by. I see no prospect that that will change. (Crewe and King, 1995:98)

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Conclusion The period between their removal from office in May 1979 and the establishing of the procedures for the Electoral College in January 1981 were traumatic for the Labour Party. Wembley and the creation of the SDP would not act as the end point to the turbulence, as in his infinite wisdom Benn then decided to challenge Healey for the deputy leadership, thus prolonging the tortuous infighting. Whilst the drive for democratisation advocated by the new left was presented as an issue of principle (rather than self interest); as was the eventual counter by the right of one member one vote, the reality was that 1979-81 constitutional conflict was about the distribution of power and influence within the party, and the means by which to secure the lineage on the leadership. As Punnett observes the conflict: Reflected the traditional conflict between the right of the party (which was dominant in the PLP) and the left (which was stronger in the party outside Parliament)... It was widely accepted that the influence of the left would be significantly greater under whatever new method of selection might emerge in January 1981 than it had been under the old method of election by the PLP. It was also generally thought that whoever was elected to succeed Callaghan under the old procedure would be obliged to offer himself for re-election once the new procedure was in place. It was assumed that Healey (as the leading centre-right figure in the party) would be unlikely to be elected by any new procedures that might emerge from the special conference in January 1981. The hope of the right, and the fear of the left, however, was that he might well be confirmed in office by those procedures if he had already been established as leader by the PLP under the old rules. (Punnett, 1992:94) The subsequent and surprise victory of Foot, through a PLP ballot, was interpreted as indicating to the wider party that they could actually trust the PLP to elect a leader identifiable with the left (Drucker, 1981:386). As Punnett observes the PLP was thus primarily concerned with maintaining the unity of the party by choosing to elect Foot, whom they believed was better placed to lead them through their constitutional wrangles than Healey (Punnett, 1992:95). In electing Foot, the PLP ignored the evidence that the electorate viewed Healey as the more Prime Ministerial and the more electorally appealing – i.e. the competence and electability criteria in the Stark model of leadership selection. The succession contest was simply not about ‘winning the next election, let alone about being Prime Minister’ (Drucker, 1981:386; Punnett, 1992:95; Stark, 1996:128, 132). Stark notes that this was a truly remarkable set of circumstances:

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That Foot was considered the best candidate around whom the party could unite spoke volumes for the situation in which Labour found itself in 1980...Foot was no neutral figure; he had long been associated with the party’s left wing. However, compared to Healey, Foot truly was the unity candidate. (Stark, 1996:128) The Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, and their talisman, Benn, had achieved their objective of democratising leadership selection. The selection of Foot, however, had not been expected, nor had been his desire to want to stand through until the next general election. The personal ambition that Benn possessed for the leadership would have to wait until the post-Foot leadership succession contest. Benn needed to ensure that this would be held under the Electoral College rules as agreed through Wembley. When the shadow Cabinet and the PLP indicated their displeasure at the formulation of the Electoral College (30-30-40) and their desire to reverse this and replace it with 50-25-25, Benn became (ironically) very resistant to change. He argued that ‘any attempt to reopen the issue at this stage will exacerbate the divisions within the party and can only detract from the fight with the Tories’ (Stark, 1996:57). One has to admire his sheer chutzpah in stating this whilst acknowledging that his subsequent decision to dispute the deputy leadership with Healey totally contradicted his own argument. However, Benn rationalised that if he stood against Healey now it would enhance his support base and leadership aspirations should he win. Critically it would also distract opponents of the formula that had been agreed by the Electoral College. Benn concluded that: ‘If I hadn’t used it that year it would have disappeared without ever having been used’ (Benn, 1992:119). So Healey versus Benn would take place but for the deputy leadership, not the leadership. One of the great unknowns of politics is what would have happened if the PLP had elected Healey as leader when they had the chance. Would Healey have been able to hold off the inevitable challenge of Benn in 1981 or would Benn have won and led Labour into an even heavier defeat in 1983? (Crowther, 2005:139-41).

FROM FOOT TO KINNOCK: THE LABOUR PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1983

Michael Foot would serve as leader of the Labour party for just over two and half years. It was a period of unremitting gloom, and one which would later become portrayed in the new Labour narrative as a symbol of the worst of old Labour. The Foot years were treated as a ‘measure of what had failed, as the anti-model that needed to be repudiated if Labour were to revive’ (Shaw, 1999:151). The significance of this time period to new Labour would be critical, as ‘without these years of turbulence, resistance to the imposition of a highly centralised control regime – which became a defining feature of new Labour – would have been much stiffer’ (Shaw, 1999:151). The Foot tenure would culminate in the catastrophic general election reversal of June 1983. Such was the scale of chaos within the party they were still debating the authority and legitimacy of Foot as their leader during the general election campaign itself (Pugh, 2010:371). Two weeks before the polling day, the General Secretary of the Labour party, Jim Mortimer, felt it necessary to announce to the media that we are: all insistent that Michael Foot is the leader of the Labour party and speaks for the party...the unanimous view of the campaign committee is that Michael Foot is the leader’1 (Jones, 1994:510) This reflected a widespread recognition that Foot was a handicap to the party in their election efforts. As his deputy, Denis Healey, acknowledged Foot ‘simply didn’t look like a potential Prime Minister’ (Healey, 1990:499). Healey identified two other significant electoral handicaps beyond the limitations of Foot. First, Healey felt that ‘our election campaign was the worst organised that any I have ever known’ (Healey, 1990:501). It was devoid of a clear media

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strategy: the campaign literature was of poor quality and advertising and poster campaigns lacked co-ordination. Moreover, the figures around which the campaign revolved, Foot, Healey, Peter Shore and Roy Hattersley, were all members of the Wilson/Callaghan administration, whose presence reminded the electorate of the ‘memory of the disagreements and strife of the closing days of the last Labour government’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:29-31). Second, in addition to the poor communication of the message, was the message itself. The 1983 manifesto was later described by Gerald Kaufman as the ‘longest suicide note in history’; thus reflecting the view of the right that it was excessively left wing and an electoral liability. In addition to the problems of weak presentation and a non viable policy platform was the fact that Labour was badly divided. They were campaigning on a manifesto which committed them to unilateralism, despite the fact that the majority of shadow Cabinet members were multilateralists. Symbolic of the divisions surrounding their defence policy was the high profile denunciation of unilateralism made by former Prime Minister, James Callaghan, who loudly stated his commitment to what he defined as the ‘traditional Labour position’ of multilateralism (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:31). The limitations of the leader; the poor campaigning strategy, and the ideological divisions on key areas of policy were symptomatic of the problems that Labour had inflicted upon themselves since their loss of power. They were contributing factors to a shattering electoral reversal. Therefore, despite governing during a period of economic turbulence the Thatcher led Conservative party secured a massive parliamentary majority of 144 on a vote share of 42.5 per cent. The Labour return of only 27.6 per cent was only two per cent greater than the combined Liberal – SDP return of 25.3 per cent. The total Labour vote return of 11.5 million in 1979 was reduced to 8.5 million, with the newly formed SDP securing 3.5 million votes. Thus Labour had seen their vote share decline by 9 per cent, from the 36.9 per cent figure that they had secured in 1979. When Wilson won in the summer of 1966 over 13 million, around 47.1 per cent of the electorate had supported Labour. In seventeen years, Labour had lost nearly five million from their vote base or nearly 20 percentage points in the vote share. Therefore, 1983 represented their worst electoral performance since 1918 in terms of votes cast and percentage share, and it left them with their smallest parliamentary representation since the 1930s. Labour had come third or worse in 292 constituencies, and had lost a record number of deposits at 112; a considerable increase from the 22 of 1979 (Drucker, 1984:283; Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:33; Dorey, 1995:340-42). Reviewing the reasons for their electoral humiliation Healey would inform the NEC that:

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The election was not lost in the three weeks of the campaign but in the three years which preceded it. In that period Labour managed to lose about twenty percentage points in the opinion polls. In that period the party acquired for itself a highly unfavourable public image, based on disunity, extremism, crankiness and general unfitness to govern. (Healey, 1990:502) Healey versus Benn: The Deputy Leadership Contest of 1981 For Healey one of the primary reasons why Labour was perceived as disunited, extreme and unfit for office was the decision of Tony Benn to challenge him for the deputy leadership in 1981. Benn would launch his candidature at the beginning of April and the result was finally declared in late September, during which time the Labour party lost 17 percentage points in the opinion polls (Hayter, 2005:21). The contest was a protracted and increasingly rancorous campaign spread over six months, and would generate a degree of attention that was out of all proportion to the significance of the post of deputy leader in normal circumstances (Punnett, 1992:109). These, however, were not normal circumstances: first, the longevity of the contest was a consequence of the fact that the Electoral College was being activated for the first time; second, it was a contest occurring in the immediate aftermath of the party losing a fraction of its right wing to a new centrist party; and, third, the contest had huge implications for the ideological trajectory of the Labour party. Would the ascent of the new left continue, or would it be halted? In challenging for the deputy leadership now two assumptions were made of the strategy of the left: one short term, the second longer term. The first term assumption was that if Benn could secure the deputy leadership, the left (broadly defined) reasoned that with one of their own alongside Foot, the party could ‘be prised at last from the dead hand of the old parliamentary right’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:17). The second assumption was that Benn as deputy leader was a forerunner for him bidding to become leader after Foot (Hayter, 2005:16). Upon the decision of the Electoral College much would rest. The fear for Labour centrists was that if Benn were to emerge victorious it would act as a catalyst to a wave of further defections to the SDP. That Healey won and not Benn was to be a major ‘turning point’ not only in the history of the Labour party, but also the SDP (Westlake, 1999:174). After the trauma of the constitutional upheavals and the departure of a fragment of the right, Foot was desperately hoping that a truce could be established between the remaining right, symbolically associated with Healey, and the new left and their de facto leader, Benn (Shaw, 1999:159). That Foot had accepted Healey as his deputy created real concerns for the new left2 (Cronin, 2004:225). Addressing this would therefore be the ‘next stage’ of the new left’s crusade; a crusade within which every triumph was seen as a

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staging post in the advance of Benn himself (Freeman, 1982:115; Cocks, 1989:69-71). Once the Wembley conference was completed, Benn and his new left faction decided that he should challenge Healey for the deputy leadership (Adams, 1992:409; Benn, 1994:70). Before considering the rationale for challenging Healey, it is worth considering why they decided not to challenge Foot instead. The relationship between Foot and Benn was complex, and was reflective of two different forms of socialism to which they associated themselves. Whilst there was compatibility in terms of policy, notably in their commitment to unilateralism, Foot as a figure of the old left was an advocate of parliamentary socialism, whereas Benn and the new left were believers in populist socialism. For Foot there was a commitment to a strong, radical Labour party, bound by strong internal loyalties from the grassroots through to the PLP. Benn disputed this. His constitutional reform agenda had been driven by his belief in greater participation for the grassroots (Benn, 1981a, 1981b; Arblaster, 2004:7-22; Wickham-Jones, 2004:23-45). Through their conduct in the 1979 to 1981 period they formed strongly critical views of their respective positions. Looking back on the 1974 to 1979 period in office, Foot came to view Benn as someone who could ‘not be trusted’ (Foot, 1986:117). He felt that Benn had been ‘fundamentally disloyal’ for leaking of Cabinet business and for his ‘disavowal of cabinet responsibility’ (Morgan, 2007:396-97). In turn, Benn was strongly critical of what he called Foot’s ‘conservative’ attitude towards democratisation. He felt that by doing so Foot was repudiating his earlier career (Morgan, 2007:397). Benn would note in his diaries in late 1980, that ‘there is no rebellion in Michael Foot anymore...he is entirely an establishment figure’ (Benn, 1990:545). That Benn was problematic to Foot in terms of shadow Cabinet management was evident from the Kinnock papers. They highlighted Foot’s condemnation of Benn’s conduct. Arguing that there needed to be trust between colleagues, and that members of the shadow Cabinet need to show loyalty to the party, its policy platform, and the leadership, Foot stated that ‘there cannot be one rule for Tony, and another for everybody else’3 (Kinnock Papers, 3rd June 1981). That Foot had acquired the leadership through a PLP ballot, and had indicated his desire to act as leader on a permanent, rather than a temporary basis, was frustrating to the new left. As the previous chapter had suggested, Benn could not realistically justify a challenge to Foot on policy grounds, as ‘after all he was a long time champion of the party’s new non nuclear defence policy’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:17). Mounting a challenge on the basis of Foot’s conservative mentality towards democratisation and his wish to reconsider the distributions within the Electoral College was also not credible. Benn and his supporters were therefore required to turn their attention to Healey. Replacing Healey as deputy leader would have numerous advantages. First, it could badly damage Healey’s credibility as a potential

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successor to Foot and erode his status as a figure head around which the right could mobilise. Second, it could provide Benn with a stronger powerbase in which to enhance his chances of succeeding Foot. Third, initiating a challenge now would dominate debate and discussion on the Electoral College and impede the objectives of those who wished to reopen the debate on the distributions within the Electoral College. Benn’s chances of winning any future leadership contest might depend on retaining the Wembley 30-30-40 (PLP-CLP-trade unions) distribution. A shift to 50-25-25 would undermine his chances considerably. The new left therefore concluded that having campaigned for a wider franchise it was essential to use it immediately to embed it as the means of leadership selection. Moreover, if a challenge to Foot could not be realistically justified (or successful) then a challenge to Healey could be (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:17; Stark, 1996:57). Foot tried desperately to dissuade Benn from his proposed challenge. He warned Benn that a prolonged and bitter campaign against Healey would ‘lacerate the party’ and ‘alienate voters’ and ‘precipitate another bout of defections to the SDP’ (Benn, 1995:512). Their discussions were described as ‘heated’, with Foot warning Benn that ‘if you do ahead, I shall let it be known that I asked you not to’ (Benn, 1995:512). Heffernan and Marqusee argue that Benn was in effect forcing Foot to ‘repudiate’ him and ‘protect’ Healey (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:19). Foot would after some initial hesitation argue that if Benn disagreed with the direction that Foot was taking the party then he should challenge him and not Healey (Adams, 1992:413). Benn responded with a series of logical (if convoluted) arguments. Benn noted that he (and not Healey) had voted for Foot for the party leadership. The logical corollary of this argument was that it did not make sense for Benn to challenge Foot for the leadership when he had voted for him just a few months earlier. Benn therefore argued that Healey had no mandate to be deputy, having been handed the position after Foot acceded to the leadership. In Benn’s eyes, he was therefore standing for a vacant deputy leadership post, through which the victor, be it him or Healey (or anyone else) would, through the Electoral College possess a mandate to hold the position (Benn, 1995:512). Finally, as Benn had endorsed Foot and Healey had not, a Foot-Benn leadership and deputy leadership ticket made more sense than Foot-Healey. As Benn emphasised it was not credible to have a leader in Foot who was committed to the left wing policy objectives agreed by conference on the economy, defence and the EEC, supported by a deputy in Healey, who was utterly opposed to such policies (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:19; Cronin, 2004:226). In the period between losing office in May 1979 and Wembley in January 1981 a plausible argument can be made to suggest that the new left had shown greater tactical sense that the right. However, the initiation of their

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challenge to Healey was undertaken without the same degree of tactical astuteness (Panitch and Leys, 1997:194). The decision to challenge Healey would divide the left and contribute to a reconfiguration of the left and how it related to the rest of the Labour party. Earlier in the year, Benn had decided to join the Tribune Group of leftward leaning Labour parliamentarians. At the time the decision to join was made on the basis that the new left needed to ‘mend fences’ with at least some part of the PLP (Panitch and Leys, 1997:146). However, the problem for the new left was that the Tribune Group was aligned to Foot and loyal to him. Given that Foot opposed the idea of Benn challenging it was likely that the Tribune Group would oppose as well, and would try to dissuade Benn from proceeding. Benn therefore decided that he would not consult with the Tribune Group on the basis that he had only just joined them and ‘it had nothing to do with them’ (Benn, 1995:513). Benn then launched his candidature at 3.30am on April 2nd, during an all night parliamentary sitting, in order to avoid Jack Straw and Robin Cook, who had been searching the House of Commons in a last-ditch attempt to beg him to not stand (Whitehead 1986:404). His treatment of the Tribune Group was to have significant consequences which would damage the cause of the new left. The Tribune Group splintered in terms of how it interpreted his challenge. In ideological and policy terms, Tribune Group members should have aligned themselves to Benn over the right wing candidate, Healey. However, reservations about Benn’s conduct in his quest for democratisation; its impact to the unity and electoral appeal of the party; and their loyalty to Foot who denounced the challenge, made many Tribune Group members question the merit of the Benn challenge. Pro and anti Benn factions formed, and the antis decided that the best course of action for them was to put forward an alternative to both Healey and Benn. Their ‘unity’ candidate was the former Cabinet Minister and former leadership challenger John Silkin. Silkin was nothing more than a stop Benn candidate put forward by leftward leaning Labour parliamentarians opposed to Benn but unwilling to support Healey (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:21). The presence of Silkin alongside Benn meant that the support base of the left would fracture in two in the first ballot of the Electoral College (Kogan and Kogan, 1982:102-03). However, Silkin would be unable to garner sufficient support to ensure that the second ballot would be Healey-Silkin and not Healey-Benn, so in effect his presence offered ‘no real respite’ from the eventual Healey-Benn choice that those of the anti-Benn left would have to make (Hayter, 2005:20). Another reason why an anti-Benn faction emerged within the Tribune Group left was, according to Ian Mikardo, due to the ‘bitterness’ that many of them felt toward Benn for his deliberate failure to consult with them before initiating his challenge. Those bitter would support Silkin. It was the Silkin

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first round backers who would then craft the second ballot abstention strategy, which ultimately cost Benn the election (Adams, 1992:409). Neil Kinnock was to be the central figure in the abstention strategy. Kinnock had been a founder member of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy and a keen supporter of extending the leadership franchise. He had argued in September 1979 that ‘all levels of the party leadership and all aspects of the work of the party must be fully accountable and responsive to the wishes of the membership’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:23). Such rhetoric appeared to align him to Benn. However, Kinnock was personally close to Foot in a way that he was not to Benn. He had campaigned on behalf of Foot in 1976 and 1980 and whatever alignment he had with the Bennite faction had eroded by the summer of 1980 (Benn, 1990:583-84). Kinnock was furious with Benn for initiating what he regarded as a totally unnecessary and damaging challenge, arguing that ‘we needed a contest like we needed bubonic plague’ (Harris 1984:153). Kinnock was completely boxed in by the Benn challenge. If he voted for Healey his credibility amongst the left would be destroyed, as would be his own leadership aspirations, as the left would be his main support base in a post-Foot leadership succession contest. However, he was deeply reluctant to vote for Benn (McMeeking, 2009:17). He was acutely aware of the damage being done to the party by the Benn challenge. He found the damage to party unity ‘disgusting’ and the electoral impact a ‘disaster’.4 Most significantly, Kinnock was greatly angered by the fact that media coverage was now dominated by the deputy leadership struggle thus removing attention away from attacking the Thatcher government and their record on unemployment. Kinnock admitted that ‘when the issue of unemployment could be totally flattened by the deputy leadership [contest] I thought, sod it..[and]...that put the tin hat on it’ (Harris 1984:153-59). Having made his decision that Healey was unsupportable due to his past record and Benn due to his divisiveness, Kinnock penned an article in Tribune in September 1981 that was to create a major political furore (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:23). In his article entitled ‘Personality, Politics and Democratic Socialism’, Kinnock outlined why he would abstain should it come to a Healey-Benn final ballot. Whilst Kinnock did not extol the virtues of Healey, he clearly outlined the faults of Benn and the damage his election would do to the party. He accused Benn of creating ‘antagonism within the party’; of ‘undermining the credibility of policies’ and of harming the ‘standing and electoral opportunities’ of the party (Kinnock, 1981). It was an immensely significant intervention and did much to establish Kinnock as a figure of substance within the party. Heffernan and Marqusee note that: Kinnock had decided at all costs – including a Healey victory – Benn must not win the election. But he knew that the only way to achieve

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CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER this was by setting up a third camp between Healey and Benn... Thus the ‘soft left’ was born, not in the spirit of ideological innovation but in a fit of old fashioned political expediency.....For Kinnock, it was a calculated risk. It could have been his undoing but was, in the end, his making. Until this time he had given no indication that he would not support Benn..[this was thus]....a startling break from the left by one of its parliamentary stars was a major development in Labour’s ongoing civil war, with which the media were fascinated. (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:23)

In his biography of Benn, Adams argues that the Kinnock was a hugely significant figure in establishing the abstention strategy amongst Tribune group members (Adams, 1992:415). Given that the contest turned out to be far closer than was expected this is a justifiable claim to make (Harris, 1984:160). As had been anticipated the Silkin candidature was not so much the stop Benn candidature, as the delaying Benn candidature. The first ballot eliminated Silkin, who secured 18 per cent within the Electoral College as a whole, with a credible support base of just over a quarter within the PLP. Silkin was considerably weaker within the CLPs, when Benn led 78 per cent to Healey on 17 per cent and Silkin on only 3 per cent. Silkin outperformed Benn in the trade union section, where Healey secured a significant lead. In the second and decisive ballot, Benn scored remarkably well in the CLPs, leading Healey by 81 to 19 per cent. Contradicting the views of the CLPs were broadly similar returns from the PLP and the trade union sections. Whilst it was expected that Benn would struggle in the PLP, his returns amongst the trade union section were worse than the new left would have anticipated when they had advocated the case for the Electoral College. Within the PLP, Healey defeated Benn 66 to 34 per cent, amongst those parliamentarians who voted; and the trade union section provided a 62 per cent return to Healey to 37 per cent for Benn (Hayter, 2005:16). Given the distribution between the various component parts of the Electoral College, Healey secured a return of 50.4 per cent to Benn on 49.6 per cent. As Heffernan and Marqusee observed: the deputy leadership of the Labour party, and much more besides, had been decided by less than one per cent of the total vote cast in the Electoral College. (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:24) Having come so close was Benn disappointed to have been defeated? His diaries make interesting reading. He concludes that: It was a staggering result with all of the media against us; the most violent attacks by the shadow Cabinet [and] the full intervention of

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Michael...We got within 0.8 per cent of victory, and it was the best possible result, because if I had won by 0.8 per cent people would have shouted ‘cheat’. It only requires four or six Labour MPs to join the SDP for Healey’s majority to disappear, and then he will hold a post but not have the authority. (Benn, 1995:521) Table 9:

Candidate Support in the Leadership Elections of 1981 PLP (30%)

CLPs (30%)

Labour

Party

Deputy

Unions (40%)

Total

First Ballot Denis Healey Tony Benn John Silkin

51.0 22.4 26.5

17.9 78.3 3.8

61.7 16.0 22.2

45.4 36.6 18.0

65.9 34.1

18.9 81.1

62.5 37.5

50.4 49.6

Second Ballot Denis Healey Tony Benn Source:

Quinn, 2004:342

For the right there was considerable relief at the outcome. Radice would go as far as to so that ‘by beating Benn, however narrowly, Healey had saved the Labour party’ (Radice, 2004:52). One of the primary concerns surrounding a Benn victory was the possibility, (as Benn acknowledged above), that it would have resulted in a further wave of defections to the SDP. Healey was fearful that with a Benn victory and further defections that the structural apparatus of the whole Labour party would ‘disintegrate’ (Whitehead, 1986:405). Healey had been in a strange position over the previous six months; a period that he would describe in his memoirs as the ‘least agreeable of my life’ (Healey, 1990:481). On top of his work in Parliament, in the shadow Cabinet, and on the NEC, he had to do ‘two to three radio or television broadcasts every day’ in addition to ‘three to four meetings with trade union or constituency parties every week’, all for a job which he ‘found disagreeable and which in itself was not worth having’ (Healey, 1990:482). What motivated Healey was a belief that the Labour party would not recover should Benn emerge victorious. As he admits, despite the unappealing nature of the deputy leadership it ‘was essential to deny it to Tony Benn’ (Healey, 1990:482).

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The Healey campaign was co-ordinated through the Solidarity Group, which had formed in the immediate aftermath of the Wembley Conference. The Manifesto Group, of social democratic Labour parliamentarians, had failed to deliver the party leadership for Healey, and had then suffered significant losses as many group members defected. The Solidarity Group comprised nearly 150 Labour MPs, mostly from the aforementioned Manifesto Group but also secured supporters from within the Tribune Group. Solidarity would now provide the much needed organisational infrastructure for the right and the centre against the new left at parliamentary level (Hayter, 2005:130-31). Complementing this was the St Ermins Group of rightward leaning trade union leaders, which came together as a reaction to the perception that the right needed to demonstrate greater planning, organisation and discipline, in order to remove the artificial dominance of the left. Central to their thinking was a belief that a Labour government was essential, and that the only way this was going to be achieved was by moving to the right (Hayter, 2005:98-129). Through Solidarity and the St Ermins Group Healey and his supporters calculated that they could retain the deputy leadership despite the fact that Benn was likely to defeat Healey within the CLPs (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:18). However, whilst influential what really sunk Benn was to be the leftwardleaning abstainers within the PLP. Healey would secure a 65.9 to 34.1 majority amongst those who voted in the second ballot. In the first ballot Healey had secured 124 supporters, Benn 55 and Silkin 65. Due to the strength of Benn’s appeal amongst the CLPs, Silkin had been eliminated, freeing up his 65 votes. How would they switch? Healey increased his return from 124 to 137; an increase of only 13 from the freed Silkin support base. Of the remaining freed Silkin votes, sixteen switched to Benn increasing his share to 71. Amongst these were the votes of future members of the first Blair Cabinet of 1997, including Cook, Straw and Frank Dobson. However, critically the remaining Silkin backers abstained; amongst them obviously Kinnock, but also the likes of Joe Ashton, Joan Lestor, Stan Omre, Jeff Rooker and Silkin himself (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:24). Ashton would explain his motivation: If Benn had become deputy leader it would given a tremendous boost to the Owen mob. That’s what they wanted. That was the main reason I didn’t vote for them. Without Healey to give us a bit of stability and pull towards the middle we’d have finished up in third place. (Adams, 1992:409) By initiating a challenge, but failing to win, Benn had changed the dynamics of the left-right split and managed to galvanise the hitherto disorganised right. The remaining right utilised the challenge to Healey as the starting

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point of a fight back against the new left ascendency, through which they could prove the SDP defectors to be wrong, and prevent further defections from occurring (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:15). In addition, the new left had inadvertently created an opportunity for Kinnock to fashion an alternative focal point for the non-Bennite supporting left to rally around. Those within the Bennite new left faction were now contemptuous of Kinnock, who they felt have engaged in a ‘calculated act of treachery’ to aid his own leadership aspirations.5 However, this is a view that Mikardo disputes. He believes that although Kinnock’s abstention strategy was hugely significant, Benn could have avoided it making the impact that it did. He notes that the way in which Benn handled the Tribune Group prior to his decision to stand was significant. Handled differently, Benn could have ‘reduced the rate of abstention’ to a level that would have enabled him to have won6 (Adams, 1992:416-17). The challenge had thus ensured the fragmentation of the left. The language of old and new left, between the old left currently associated with Foot and the Bennite new left, was to be supplemented by the term soft left. They coalesced around the Tribune Group, and seemed to be associated with Kinnock, as the leading abstainer. The new left was now also referred to as the hard left, which was to be increasingly marginalised within the party. They were split off from the Tribune Group in 1982 to create the Campaign Group. With a parliamentary presence in the twenties, they were a considerably weakened and marginalised force (Seyd, 1987:136, 165; Wickham-Jones, 2004:25; Hayter, 2005:16-18). Regardless of the implications of initiating the contest the fact that a contest had occurred through the Electoral College at all was significant. How effective had it been? The result created some contradictory and uncomfortable findings for Labour. It was uncomfortable that Healey had won, but had not secured a majority in all three sections of the Electoral College. In fact the massive levels of support for Benn, and thereby opposition to Healey, within the CLPs was deemed to be problematic. However, what was really damaging to the credibility of the Electoral College in terms of electoral perceptions was the lack of harmony within the CLPs and trade union sections of the Electoral College. Many on the right, including those who had defected to the SDP had argued that if an Electoral College was to be established then it should operate on the principle of one member, one vote. In the first outing of the Electoral College there was a complete lack of consistency in terms of how the CLPs and trade union sections determined how to utilise their votes. Those CLPs which did ballot their full membership tended to support Healey over Benn, but those were very few. Where CLPs relied on General Management Committees to allocate their votes this aided Benn. Some party members who were not on General Management Comm-

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ittees would come to argue that their views should be sought before their CLPs vote was cast (Hayter, 2005:21). Trade union consultation with their memberships was to be equally inadequate (Morgan, 2007:399). For example, the TGWU cast all of their million plus votes behind Benn despite having no mandate from the membership to do so. Hayter is immensely critical of this. She notes that had they cast their 1.25 million (eight per cent of the Electoral College) votes in accordance with their members wishes through consultations, then Healey would have secured a more comfortable victory at 57.5 per cent to 42.5 per cent (Hayter, 2005:18). The image of block voting would be immensely damaging to the image of the party, as Healey would later acknowledge. He admits that ‘shameless ballot rigging’ by trade unions contributed to the electorates overwhelmingly negative view of the Healey-Benn struggle, as their opinion poll ratings plunged as the contest progressed7 (Shell, 1982:124; Healey, 1990:484). It undermined perceptions of party unity and leadership credibility8 and was a significant contributing factor to their shattering electoral reversal two years later. That Labour would be defeated and that Foot would be replaced was widely expected both inside and outside of the party. The question was who could succeed where Foot had failed: Healey, Benn or someone else? Dream Ticket? Candidates and Non Candidates The preceding chapters have emphasised how Labour leadership elections had drawn forward candidates aligned to the ideological blocks of the left and right. In the past the left had aligned themselves to Wilson (1960); Greenwood (1961); Wilson (1963); Foot (1976 and 1980); Benn (1976) and Silkin (1980); whilst the right had been aligned to Gaitskell (1960 and 1961); Brown and Callaghan (1963); Callaghan, Jenkins, Healey and Crosland (1976) and Healey and Shore (1980); although Shore was a candidate who perhaps defied such categorisation with his economic views aligning him to the right and his attitudes towards the EEC being more identifiable with the left. Each leadership selection contest had seen leading candidates from previous contests in the frame for the succession in the current succession contest. For example, having stood in 1960 Wilson was the leading candidate for the left in 1963. Callaghan stood in 1976 as a candidate of the right having stood 13 years earlier. Foot secured the leadership in 1980 as a candidate of the left, having performed creditably against Callaghan 4 years earlier. Healey was the leading candidate of the right in 1980 having also stood in the previous succession contest. Many of the serious candidates for the leadership had put themselves forward in previous leadership contests. If this were to occur again after Labour lost the general election of 1983 it was assumed, (perhaps even feared), that it would be a repeat of the Healey-Benn deputy leadership contest of 1981. However, neither would stand in 1983. Although Shore would stand as he had in 1980 he was not expected to win. It was clear that

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the battle between left and right had skipped onto the next generation of Labour parliamentarians – the standard bearer for the right would be the 51 year old Hattersley who was 15 years junior to Healey, whilst Kinnock picked up the mantle of the leader of the left that Foot and Benn had fought so hard for. At 41 Kinnock was nearly 30 years younger than the outgoing Foot, and over 15 years younger than Benn. The non participation of Healey reflected the damage done to his political reputation by the bruising battles of 1980 with Foot and 1981 with Benn. In his loss to Foot and his narrow victory over Benn it was clear that Healey had failed to ‘maximise’ the potential support bases of the right. As a consequence many on the right had decided that they did not want to encourage a Healey candidature for the post-Foot succession contest (Drucker, 1984:289). His age (66) was probably becoming a factor as well, just as Foot’s had been in the 1983 general election. Should he stand and win in 1983 it was conceivable that the next general election might not occur until 1988. Should Labour win Healey would enter Downing Street at the age of 71. This would inevitably lead to speculation that he would be a short term tenure Prime Minister should he win in 1988; or a one term leader (19831988) should they lose. Healey would later express ‘no disappointment’ in the shift away from him within the right towards the younger Hattersley, as he acknowledged that: The bulk of the movement wanted a younger man, and I had shared the blame for our election failure. I decided not to run for leader or deputy leader again, and supported Roy Hattersley in the leadership campaign which followed. (Healey, 1990:503) The non participation of Benn was more tragic from the perspective of the new left, or ironic from the perspective of others outside of the new left. Healey would comment that ‘it was just retribution for the years of infighting that Benn lost his seat’, and was thus not able to stand for the leadership, although Healey does admit that that was ‘small compensation’ (Healey, 1990:502). Benn would dejectedly ruminate on how his fortunes could have been different: Looking back on it, I suppose I should have played my cards differently. If I had not stood down from the shadow Cabinet after 1979, had played a less active part in the campaign to change the policy and to bring about democratic changes, and had not stood for the deputy leadership, and if I’d gone to find a safe seat this year, I would be in the running now. I may even have won. But history didn’t work out that way, and the price paid for playing it differently had been enormous in personal terms. (Benn, 1995:550)

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With Healey opting out and with Benn unable to participate the leadership contest landed up being a four way contest between Kinnock, Hattersley, Shore and Eric Heffer. Heffer was the candidate representing the new left in the absence of Benn himself. Heffer stood because the new left were determined to put up a candidate against Kinnock. Jeremy Corbyn reflected the mood of new left when he argued that Kinnock lost the deputy leadership for Tony in 1981 deliberately and specifically and he was busy preparing himself for the leadership campaign during the general election. There must be a left candidate. (Benn, 1995:552) The new left eventually agreed upon Heffer, although considerable thought was given to the idea of Michael Meacher running instead, before Meacher decided to run just for the deputy leadership (Benn, 1995:551). Standing as the candidate to defend the manifesto, Heffer knew that his bid was about drawing attention to the enduring influence of the new left (Drucker, 1984:290). Heffer knew that he could not and would not win, but he wanted to ‘use the campaign as a platform for our socialist programme’ (Heffer, 1986:42-43). Despite having a more credible background to bid for the leadership, Shore would find himself facing the same circumstances as Heffer. He came to acknowledge that his was a ‘token nomination’ and realised that he did not have the ‘slightest expectation or hope of actually winning’ (Stark, 1996:100). The four candidates were thus split into two separate categorisations – those with serious aspirations to win (Kinnock and Hattersley) and attention seekers (Shore and Heffer), and those aligned too or supported by the left (Heffer on the hard left and Kinnock on the soft left) and those perceived to be of the right, (Shore with the exception of his hostility to Europe, and Hattersley). Given his considerable ministerial frontbench experience and the fact that he had served in the Cabinet, whereas Kinnock had no ministerial experience whatsoever, Hattersley went into the succession contest with high expectations of winning, and a belief that he was a stronger candidate than Kinnock. He believed that he was a more capable candidate to be Prime Minister than Kinnock. He certainly did not enter the contest expecting to land up as deputy ‘to a man who was ten years his junior and had none of his experience of government office’ (McSmith, 1994:117). However, even before Foot had formally resigned the dynamics of the Electoral College, and the influence of the trade union section, would derail the Hattersley campaign. Foot had planned to announce (on 15 June) his intention to stand down in October, allowing the Electoral College campaign to determine his successor to proceed over the summer. However, before this was announced, or any

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candidates had declared, Clive Jenkins, the ‘doyen of centre left trade unions bosses’ asked Kinnock if he would accept the ASTMS (Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs) nomination for the leadership, to which Kinnock agreed. Jenkins had already been collecting support from within the PLP on Kinnock’s behalf. Jenkins promptly informed the Press Association9 that Foot was standing down and that the ASTMS were backing Kinnock. Even before the contest had officially commenced, Kinnock was assured of 147,000 votes from one of the largest trade unions (McSmith, 1994:116-118; Drower, 1994:72-73; Westlake, 2001:217). Drower observed that following on from Jenkins’s endorsement union leaders were ‘now scrambling to promise their support’ for Kinnock (Drower, 1994:74). In the first week, the following trade unions promised their support to Kinnock – Union of Communication Workers (UCW); Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT ’82); Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW); Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Fireman (ASLEF); and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). Together these trade unions had 1.25 million votes which amounted to eight per cent of the Electoral College franchise (Drower, 1994:74). This immediate momentum to Kinnock meant that although the contest would last three more months, many felt, (indeed complained in the case of Shore), that the outcome of the contest had been decided before it had even properly begun (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:36; Drower, 1994:76). By the end of June Kinnock had 3.8 million votes pledged to the 1.8 million supporting Hattersley – knowledge of this lead would then shape attitudes within the PLP and CLP (Hayter, 2005:23). This surge of support for Kinnock from union leaders was to fatally undermine the Hattersley campaign. It created a series of negative consequences that Hattersley could not reverse. Maintaining a perception of union backing was critical to Hattersley as there was an expectation that he would perform poorly in the leftish dominated CLPs, as with Benn removed Kinnock was expected to perform strongly. The knowledge that Kinnock was likely to lead in the union and CLP sections aided his campaign’s team attempts to secure endorsers within the PLP. By early July the Kinnock campaign believed that a majority of the PLP was likely to support them. The rumour that he was likely to triumph in the tranche of the Electoral College, where Hattersley should be at his strongest, (and leading) was to reaffirm the perception that the contest was over. A MORI opinion poll confirmed that the momentum had shifted (irrevocably) away from Hattersley: it indicated that Kinnock was the most favoured candidate amongst 56 per cent of the electorate, leading Hattersley on 27 per cent; Shore on 16 per cent, and Heffer trailing in on 1 per cent10 (Drower, 1994:77). The perception that Hattersley was not going to be able to prevent Kinnock winning influenced the contest for the deputy leadership and the

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emergence of the Kinnock-Hattersley ‘dream ticket’. Before the momentum shifted to Kinnock, Hattersley had intended to run for the leadership, with Gerald Kaufman running as deputy as part of a Solidarity leadership ticket (McSmith, 1994:117). The fear for the right was that not only would Hattersley be defeated by Kinnock for the leadership, but that Kaufman would be defeated by the new left candidate, Meacher. The idea of Kinnock-Meacher was as unattractive to Kinnock as it was to those on the right. Kinnock did not want to be saddled with a Bennite as his deputy (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:40-41). It was widely reported that figures such as Healey and Hattersley himself would not be prepared to serve in a Kinnock-Meacher shadow Cabinet. This would immobilise Kinnock and any efforts to unify the party. There was a high degree of suspicion surrounding Meacher and his close alliance with Benn. Drucker reported that Meacher was seen ‘unkindly, but hardly surprisingly’ as a representative of Benn, rather than a candidate in his own right (Drucker, 1984:293). Whilst Heffer was destined to be comprehensively defeated there was a real prospect that Meacher could win, or do well in the deputy leadership contest. Many who feared Benn were concerned that Meacher was being used to demonstrate the remaining strength of the new left. In this contest Meacher was viewed as a ‘stalking horse for Benn’. If he won this could be seen as aiding the prospect of a Benn challenge for the leadership in 1984-85, provided Benn could win a by-election and Kinnock was struggling as leader. If Meacher did well but did not win, then perhaps Benn would challenge for the deputy leadership, (against the assumed victor Kaufman), in 1984 instead. There was thus a strong motivation for the right and the centre to prevent Meacher obtaining the deputy leadership. The right and centre also wanted to ensure that the Meacher bid was defeated so overwhelmingly that it would undermine the status of the new left, and thus reduce the viability of a future Benn candidature (Drucker, 1984:293). It was with this Meacher (Benn) factor in play, the Kinnock and Hattersley campaigns came up with a ‘deal’. The chief mastermind behind this was to be future leader, John Smith, who was the campaign manager for Hattersley. He brokered a deal whereby Kinnock and Hattersley could emerge as a ‘dream ticket’. They would both stand for the deputy leadership and the leadership and each would agree to serve under the other. Part of this agreement would involve Kaufman not standing as a candidate for the deputy leadership, thus freeing up right wing support for Hattersley. For the favourite in the leadership contest, Kinnock, the plan had an obvious attraction: he needed the political confidence of the right in order to unify the party and then modernise and secure its political renewal (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:40-41). In these circumstances Meacher was far less likely to obtain the deputy leadership. This was hugely significant, as Drucker confirms:

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The immediate effect of the announcement of this dream ticket was the intended one of demonstrating the proximity and mutual respect of the two front candidates, and the acceptability of each to the other's team. Had either Healey or, more emphatically, Benn stood, no such arrangement would have been possible. (Drucker, 1984:284-85) Of the emergence of the dream ticket, Hattersley would later reveal: There was about a month at the beginning of the campaign when it looked as if I was the favourite. There was a good deal of thought that the PLP wouldn’t vote for Kinnock, which was wrong, because he got a majority. It was clear that when the TGWU (Transport and General Workers Union) came out for him, without balloting their members that he was going to win. Before it was clear, Neil announced that he wanted to be deputy – or that he would stand for deputy – and I remember John Smith coming to my house with John Golding, and saying: ‘It’s a good ploy, it’s emollient, he looks like a party servant, and you have to announce that you’ll do the same.’ And I said: ‘I don’t want to be deputy’ But Smith said: ‘You’re not going to be deputy – you’re doing it to scotch this idea you only want the top job and Kinnock is a nice chap who’ll serve the party in any capacity’. That’s how it happened. Then, gradually, it became clear that Neil was going to win, and win substantially, and Smith talked to Cook, and Smith and Cook agreed that the best thing for the party would be if we established the idea right from that moment onwards that it would be the two of us – whichever way around it was going to be, it was going to be the two of us. That was worked out between Cook and Smith. (McSmith, 1994:118-19) Trade union support was thus central to ensuring that the dream ticket of Kinnock and Hattersley came to fruition. Kinnock secured overwhelming majorities within the trade union tranche (72.6 per cent) and the CLP tranche (91.5 per cent), although he did not secure a majority of the PLP (49.3 per cent), he did possess a significant lead over Hattersley at 26.1 per cent. With Kinnock defeating Hattersley by 71.3 to 19.3 per cent for the leadership he was removed from the deputy leadership succession contest. The critical question was whether Kinnock would have Hattersley or Meacher as his deputy. Also of significance was whether Hattersley would be the leading candidate in each of the three sections of the Electoral College. Hattersley was to secure a comfortable lead in the PLP (55.7 to 29.4 per cent). In terms of presenting a unified front it would be helpful if Hattersley did not win against the will of the CLP, as had Healey over Benn in 1981. Somewhat surprisingly, Hattersley outscored Meacher by 51.0 to 47.8 per

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cent. The commitment of the trade unions to the dream ticket idea was evident. The TGWU (Transport and General Workers Union); the NUM (National Union of Mineworkers) and COHSE (Confederation of Health Service Employees), having flirted with Meacher now swung behind Hattersley. Securing an overwhelming endorsement from the trade unions (88.1. to 11.8 per cent), ensured that Hattersley would secure a comfortable victory in the Electoral College overall (67.3 to 27.9 per cent) (Drucker, 1984:295). Table 10:

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1983 PLP (30%)

CLPs (30%)

Unions (40%)

Total

49.3 26.1 14.3 10.3

91.5 1.9 6.6 0.0

72.6 27.2 0.1 0.1

71.3 19.3 6.3 3.1

55.7 29.4 10.9 4.0

51.0 47.8 0.8 0.3

88.1 11.8 0.0 0.1

67.3 27.9 3.5 1.3

Party Leader Neil Kinnock Roy Hattersley Eric Heffer Peter Shore Deputy Leader Roy Hattersley Michael Meacher Denzil Davies Gwyneth Dunwoody Source:

Quinn, 2004:342

As the result was confirmed and Kinnock accepted the applause of conference, he was handed a bunch of red flowers. He proceeded to rip off the cellophane, and in the manner of an opera tenor, throw them into the audience. When Hattersley was confirmed as his deputy, he moved towards Kinnock and held his hand aloft, in a presidential style salute (Drower, 1994:85-86). In his acceptance speech Kinnock outlined the need for unity, and the consequences of disunity: If anyone wants to know why we must conduct ourselves in this fashion, just remember at all times, how you, each and every one of us sitting in this hall, each and every Labour worker watching this conference, each and every Labour voter, yes, and some others as well,

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remember how you felt on that dreadful morning of 10th June. Just remember how you felt then, and think to yourselves: June 9th 1983, never, ever again will we experience that.11 (Drower, 1994:86) Explaining the Election of Kinnock Experience and evidence of political and governmental competence had historically been factors in party leadership selection within the Labour Party. In 1963 all three candidates, Wilson, Brown and Callaghan had considerable frontbench experience, and Wilson had served in the Cabinet. In 1976 all of the candidates were members of the then Cabinet, but Callaghan had served on the Labour frontbench continuously for a quarter of a century and held all three of the major offices of state: Chancellor, Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary. In 1980 all four candidates had served in the previous Labour government, and although Healey had served for longer than Foot at Cabinet level, Foot still had five years worth of Cabinet experience before he acquired the Labour party leadership (Stark, 1996:82-83). Kinnock simply did not compare to these former candidates in terms of frontbench experience. As mentioned earlier, he had no Cabinet or even ministerial experience, and had only been on the frontbench in opposition for the previous four years. As Heffernan and Marqusee observe ‘a few years earlier, Kinnock would not have been a likely contender for the party leadership, let alone a frontrunner’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:38). This leads to an obvious question. Was the shift to an Electoral College a factor in Kinnock becoming a realistic contender for the party leadership? In short, how do we explain the victory of a candidate who seemed to lack the normal prerequisites for being Labour party leader and a candidate to be Prime Minister? Kinnock himself admitted to Leonard Stark that he does not think he would not have won if the election had under the traditional parliamentary ballot system; a view endorsed by Harris in his biography of Kinnock (Harris, 1984:137-38; Stark, 1996:134). On this Kinnock was to be in agreement with Benn. Showing his typical cynicism about the ideological composition of the PLP, Benn argued that Hattersley as the ‘right wing candidate’ would have won as ‘it was a right wing parliamentary party’ (Stark, 1996:134). Although Quinn, a respected analyst of party leadership elections, had argued that it is ‘questionable’ as to whether Kinnock would have won under the old parliamentary ballot system, this is a view disputed by Stark (Quinn, 2004:342-43). This is an interesting hypothetical question. Within the PLP section of the Electoral College Kinnock secured 49.3 per cent to Hattersley on 26.1 per cent so that seems a comfortable lead. However, the knowledge that Kinnock was certain to triumph in the CLP and trade union sections will have influenced the voting behaviour of Labour parliamentarians. Thus Quinn is suggesting that had the behaviour of Labour parliamentarians not been influenced by the Electoral College then it is likely that many more

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would have voted for Hattersley – i.e. Kinnock secured a bandwagon as many realised that he was going to win anyway (Quinn, 2004:342-43). The Stark counter-argument runs as follows. He believes that even if the succession had been determined by an old style parliamentary ballot, Kinnock would still have won, due to two factors; first, the back drop to the 1980 contest; and second, the scale of their electoral reversal in 1983 (Stark, 1996:134). For Stark, the 1983 succession contest was determined by the choice made in the previous party leadership contest. In 1980 Stark argues that had they selected Healey over Foot this would have significantly enhanced the chances that the next Labour Party leader after Healey would be Hattersley, or someone of the right. By selecting Foot over Healey, they were in effect enhancing the chances of a candidate of the soft left (i.e. Kinnock) being the next party leader and reducing the chances of Hattersley, or someone of the right. Stark thereby argues that the selection of Foot three years earlier ‘sealed Hattersley’s fate because the transition from Foot to Hattersley would have required too great and too quick an ideological shift’. Stark concludes that in 1983 it was ‘never feasible that the party would suddenly replace a leader from the left with someone from near its right wing extreme’ (Stark, 1996:135). Therefore, the unique circumstances of 1983 meant that Kinnock was better positioned than Hattersley to preserve party unity. Moreover, he was better positioned than Hattersley to create the impression of a ‘fresh start’ for Labour. This brings us to the second factor that Stark outlines: the scale of defeat in 1983. Disassociating themselves from the negative images surrounding their last term in office was now deemed to be critical to their capacity for political renewal. This was to be problematic for the Hattersley campaign team. They failed to fully appreciate the correlation between renewal of the party and disassociation from their recent (failed) past. Jack Cunningham, who had masterminded the election campaign of Callaghan seven years earlier so effectively, miscalculated with Hattersley. He believed the central focus of the Hattersley campaign should be his Cabinet experience under Callaghan. As Drower acknowledges this would normally be an advantage to be exploited, especially against a candidate with no ministerial, let alone Cabinet experience (Drower, 1994:77). However, 1983 was an exception in which the fact that Kinnock was not tainted by association worked to his advantage, as Harris observes: If any one thing can be said to have been the making of Neil Kinnock, it was his repeated and documented opposition to the policies of that period....Ultimately if left Kinnock with clean hands, while his main rivals for the leadership was in the eyes of many, irretrievably sullied by their association with a period of failure. (Harris, 1984:77)

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The dual concerns of preserving party unity and demonstrating renewal made Kinnock more acceptable to the party as a whole than Hattersley. Hattersley would later acknowledge that competence (experience) had become subordinate to the acceptability and electability criteria due to the unique set of circumstances facing Labour at the time. Hattersley informed Stark that: I do believe that Neil was probably the right leader for the time. I have no illusions about who would have made a better Prime Minister, but that wasn’t the task. The task was to build the foundations of a viable Labour Party. I think he did that rather more successfully than I would have done it, because the party trusted him in a way it wouldn’t have trusted me. I think if I had tried to do what Neil did I would have split the party wide open. (Stark, 1996:129) It is important to recognise four other significant factors that explain how and why Kinnock emerged as the new Labour party leader: first, the Benn factor; second, the excellent long term campaign that Kinnock engaged in; third, the limitations that can be identified in the Hattersley campaign; and finally, the influence of the trade unions section within the Electoral College. The non participation of Benn made a huge impact upon the dynamics of the succession contest. For Hattersley, the defeat of Benn was ‘a disaster’ and it ‘effectively ruined his own leadership prospects’ (Drower, 1994:74). Had Benn been able to stand, the left vote would have split between the soft for Kinnock and hard for Benn and Hattersley would have been the ‘chief beneficiary’ (Drower, 1994:74). With Benn in the ballots, and with Heffer a far less credible candidate, it allowed the Kinnock team to maximise their appeal within the left (Hayter, 2005:23). His campaign team appealed to those on the left by arguing that a vote for Kinnock was a vote to protect the constitutional and policy changes that had been won by the left since 1979 (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:38). Kinnock was widely perceived (at the time) to be broadly supportive of the current left wing policy platform and notably their position on unilateralism. Therefore, despite his abstention which prevented Benn winning the deputyship two years earlier, Kinnock could still count on ‘substantial support from the constituency parties and left-leaning trade unions’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:36). However, Kinnock could also present himself as an acceptable face of the left, when seeking support from the centre and the right. His abstention in 1981 was critical in this context, as even Healey admitted that Kinnock had ‘gained great credit by resisting all pressures from the left to support Benn’ (Healey, 1990:503). Heffernan and Marqusee note that Kinnock gained respect from the right for his conduct, and thus could ‘also count on a surprising degree of support from Labour’s centre and right’, as someone who could be ‘relied upon to protect the interests of the Labour

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establishment and stand up to the left when it really counted’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:36). Therefore, when seeking the support of centrists and those on the right, Kinnock could argue that due to his left wing background and political base, he was better positioned than Hattersley to ‘shift the Party back to the right than was his openly rightwing rival’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:36). In addition to the absence of Benn aiding Kinnock and undermining Hattersley, it should be noted that Kinnock fought a more astute and longer term campaign than Hattersley. Drucker noted that after 1981 Kinnock had made cultivating support amongst CLPs a central priority of his preparing the ground for a future leadership challenge (Drucker, 1984:289-90). Kinnock knew that his abstention had caused consternation amongst Bennite supporting constituency members. He knew that it had prised open a further divide within Labour, between the new or hard left and the soft left, and that this division was almost as important as the traditional left right split. Kinnock therefore appreciated that he needed to solidify his position amongst CLPs and not allow them to be automatically aligned to Benn in a post-Foot succession contest (Drucker, 1984:289-90). Kinnock was fortunate that Benn could not stand, but he also reaped the dividends of constantly visiting and speaking to CLPs in the period between late 1981 and the general election of 1983 (Westlake, 2001:178, 216, 219-20). Kinnock was described as being ‘near absent’ from Parliament throughout 1982, and during the course of the twenty one day 1983 general election campaign, he was in London for only two days as he ‘barnstormed’ his way around over 100 CLPs (Westlake, 2001:205-06). Hayter concludes that being better known to those within the others parts of his potential electorate – both CLPs and trade union leaders – was central to Kinnock’s leadership planning and that he was rewarded for it. She concludes that there developed a real respect for him flowing from enhancing exposure to his political methods (Hayter, 2005:24). Whereas Kinnock cultivated support outside of the parliamentary party in an assiduous and long term manner, Hattersley was less adept at responding to the new campaigning demands that the Electoral College had created (Stark, 1996:114). Hattersley admitted to Stark that: I just went on doing my usual things: speaking in the House of Commons, not really focusing on what needed to be done...I think I was actually operating a strategy which was right for an election in the parliamentary party. (Stark, 1996:114) Hattersley lacked support at CLP level, but critically he struggled to maintain support amongst trade union leaders aligned to the rightward leaning St Ermins Group. Many right wing trade union leaders were lukewarm or

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antagonistic towards Hattersley, whom they felt had failed to provide sufficient strength in the fight against the Bennite insurgency in the previous Parliament. For example, EETPU General Secretary, Frank Chapple, admitted that he could not support Hattersley, as his ‘compromise with the left embarrassed those who wanted to fight for moderation in the party...he harmed the party by giving in to the left’ (Chapple, 1984:191). This was a huge setback for Hattersley (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:36). Kinnock was thus able to obtain trade union endorsements due to his active cultivation of support and the realisation amongst some trade union leaders aligned to the right, that Kinnock was ‘someone that they could do business with’ (Hayter, 2005:25). When interviewed by Hayter, Kinnock avoided criticising the approach of Hattersley directly, as he emphasised why he thought many trade union leaders gravitated towards him: The trade unions were really bloody irritated by the fact they knew that a lot of the battle had to be conducted by infantry officers that were willing to walk with their men. And some MPs would get to a TV studio but they wouldn’t do a regional conference. They were seriously brassed off about that. That’s one of the reasons I got on with the union lads. (Hayter, 2005:25) Ultimately, however, the cumulative effect of Benn’s absence, and Kinnock’s astute campaigning as compared to that of Hattersley, was probably less significant than the speed with which Kinnock was able to establish momentum through pledges of trade union support. The snowballing of pledges to Kinnock made him an immediate frontrunner, as ‘without consulting their members or in some cases even their executives, a number of trade union leaders pledged their block votes to Kinnock, thus foreclosing any other options for large sections of the Labour movement’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:37). The knowledge that Kinnock would secure majorities amongst the trade union and CLP sections of the Electoral College significantly aided his chances of increasing his support base within the PLP. As Harris noted ‘few ambitious MPs were eager to be seen to be voting against the man who would probably be leader for the next decade’ (Harris, 1984:221). Of the Hattersley campaign and his later working relationship with him, Kinnock informed me that: Roy tried to reach the CLPs and the Unions, but with a few notable exceptions they didn’t respond. From late July 1983 therefore he tended to concentrate on the PLP. Some said that he intended to get a large proportion of the vote in order to destabilise me or, at least, to assert influence over my leadership. I do not believe that Roy had any such

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destructive intention. He never gave me anything but loyalty – mixed with some deserved criticism on occasions, always privately. The Performance of the Electoral College Earlier in the chapter it was emphasised how the deputy leadership election of 1981 had exposed inadequacies within the new Electoral College system. Primarily, it was regarded as being an issue of concern that there had been such a disparity in the voting behaviour within the sections of the Electoral College. Not only was Healey’s mandate marginal, but within the CLP section he had been overwhelmingly defeated. This tied into the second problematic issue: the lack of harmonisation within the CLP and the trade unions in terms of how they cast their votes within the Electoral College. The 1983 Electoral College managed to avoid the first problem. In the leadership contest Kinnock secured solid leads in each of the three sections of the Electoral College. There was a fear, however, that Hattersley might be able to win the deputy leadership overall but that Meacher would have been the victor in the CLP section – i.e. a replay of the Benn – Healey scenario, albeit with no expectation that Meacher would be able to secure the level of support that Benn had managed. Drucker noted that had this occurred again it would have left open doubts about Hattersley’s mandate to be deputy leader, leaving open the prospect of a challenge to him in 1984 (by Meacher again or a returning Benn) (Drucker, 1984:284). That this was avoided and both the new leader and new deputy leader had mandates from all sections of the Electoral College was reassuring. However, the comparison with 1981 is not entirely valid. The Healey-Benn contest occurred in isolation, whilst the Hattersley-Meacher contest has to be viewed within the context of the leadership contest itself and Hattersley’s participation within that. The establishment of the Electoral College and the Healey-Benn contest had given the deputy leadership a greater degree of importance than had previously been the case within Labour politics. Although historically the post had been subject to election by a parliamentary ballot, many new leaders had tried to bind the party together by asking their defeated rival to assume the deputy leadership. This had been the case when Healey defeated Foot in 1980, whereupon the deputyship was vacated by Foot and filled by Healey without a ballot. Earlier on Harold Wilson asked that his defeated rival, George Brown to remain as deputy leader, again as an act of unity. The Electoral College precluded such methods, as the democratisation agenda deliberately sought to preclude the leader from having such patronage (Drucker, 1984:284). Of the new procedures, however, Drucker noted they had opened up the potential of:

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one group of candidates standing for leader and an entirely different group for deputy, thus depriving the party of a chance of reconciliation, as well as the services of a well thought of and well known candidate who had stood for and lost, the leadership race. (Drucker, 1984:284) Initially this scenario seemed possible in 1983 with the party leadership being contested by Kinnock, Hattersley, Shore and Heffer and the deputyship being contested by Meacher, Kaufman, Davies and Dunwoody. By constructing their dream ticket arrangement, in which Kinnock and Hattersley agreed to stand for both vacancies, (and Kaufman’s withdrawal from the ballots), they effectively ‘circumnavigated’ the recent reform that had been designed to prevent the leader determining their deputy. The effect of the dream ticket arrangement was the increased probability of the defeated leadership candidate being elected as the new deputy leader. It also placed the remaining deputy leadership candidates in a tactical bind. The knowledge that Kinnock was likely to win the leadership and that he wanted Hattersley as his deputy meant that Meacher, the leading alternative to Hattersley, was campaigning to create an outcome that the new leader did not want to have imposed upon him. By presenting Kinnock – Hattersley as a unity ticket, (despite their known policy differences), this meant that by default Meacher was campaigning against a perception that Kinnock – Meacher was a disunity ticket (Drucker, 1984:285). The second problematic aspect of the Electoral College in 1981 had been the perception that the methods for determining how votes were cast in the CLP and the trade union sections lacked clarity and consistency. Within the CLP an array of alternative procedures would be utilised, ranging from branch meetings, balloting members by post and hand delivered ballots, to relying on General Management Committees to allocate their votes. In 1981 Healey had been very badly defeated by Benn in this section, as General Management Committees tended to be hotbeds of Bennism, and a high proportion used General Management Committees over members’ consultation. Where members were consulted Healey performed better. Hattersley was to perform far better against Meacher than Healey had against Benn. This may have reflected a shift in mood within CLPs, or the weaknesses of Meacher when compared to Benn. It may also have reflected the fact that there was an increase in the number of CLPs who chose to ballot their members. This was likely to favour Hattersley, (as it had Healey in 1981), and work against Meacher (Hayter, 2005:27). Within the trade union section there was ‘chaotic diversity’. Drucker would identify how: Some unions allowed their executives to nominate (because of shortness of time) but consulted members more widely on the actual

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vote. Some, like COHSE (Confederation of Health Service Employees) did not nominate in order not to pre-empt their members’ ballot on how to vote. Some union chief officers made the decision about nomination and voting (AUEW – Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers); sometimes the union annual conferences made it (NUR – National Union of Railwaymen). In some cases the branches decided (NUPE – National Union of Public Employees and ASTMS – Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs), but this group has to be subdivided into those whose branches consulted every member by post and those who voted at meetings—and, in either case, there was a problem about how to aggregate branch votes (by block voting or by reporting the actual numbers voting). The decision was occasionally left to the unions' delegations to the Labour Party Conference. USDAW - (Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers) had a special local consultative procedure used only for Labour party business. Some unions - (POEU - Post Office Engineering Union) consulted every member individually. These differences are multiplied when one takes account of the meaning of the decision: does it mandate the union's delegation (usually it does); and does the union vote as a block (again, usually)? (Drucker, 1984:286-87) Conclusion Kinnock acquired the leadership in a convincing fashion. At the time that he was elected he was identified as a candidate of the old or soft left. Future deputy leader and party leadership candidate, Margaret Beckett commented that at the time the election of Kinnock appeared to confirm the following. First, it seemed to demonstrate that the Electoral College would be an electorate that would favour candidates of the left, and second, that Kinnock would be the first in a line of left wing leaders (Stark, 1996:134). Whilst the architects of democratisation believed that the Electoral College should make the leader more accountable to the wider Labour movement, the flip side of a landslide victory across all three sections of the Electoral College, was that an elected leader had conferred upon them unparalleled levels of political authority. Kinnock could claim to represent the whole Labour movement in a way that his predecessors could not. This gave Kinnock a repository of authority and legitimacy that he was to utilise in a manner that differed from the expectations of many on the left who voted him into office (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:43). Circumstances decreed that Kinnock would shift the party to the right. Reorientation was a reflective of his inheritance of a badly divided party, perceived to be incapable of being led properly and pursuing a policy platform at odds with the aspirations of significant swaths of the electorate

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(Wickham-Jones, 1996:205). He would engage in a root and branch reform of the party over the next decade, characterised by organisational, presentational and policy change. Unilateralism and large scale nationalisation alongside their hostility to the EEC would all be jettisoned, as Kinnock sought to expand the electoral appeal of the party (Westlake, 1999:171). To stamp out the disunity and extremism that Kinnock attributed to the influence of the Bennite influenced new left, he would set about strengthening the authority of the leadership, reasserting the supremacy of the PLP in policy construction, gaining control over the NEC, and marginalising the influence of the extra-parliamentary Bennite left and expelling the entryism of Militant Tendency (Shaw, 1994:29-30). To achieve this Kinnock would turn his back on the left wing positions that he had adopted as a backbench parliamentary rebel in the 1970s. His critics would argue that his tenure as leader of the Labour Party was an unmitigated disaster, as he would lead Labour to successive election defeats, and the 35.2 per cent return in the 1992 general election was still 1.7 per cent less than Labour secured when they were lost office in 1979 (Westlake, 1999:171). His allies would counter that when he took over as leader they faced the real and present danger of being usurped by the SDP, and that Kinnock triumphed in the sense of reaffirming Labour as the sole alternative option to the Conservative party. Kinnock was to be a transitional leader, who would initiate change, but would not be the beneficiary (Westlake, 1999:172). His defeated opponent and long time deputy, Hattersley, would eloquently identify the dilemma of Kinnock: The convictions which secured him the leadership, although discarded, denied him the premiership. For the change opened him to the charge that he had either disguised his beliefs to deceive the voters or abandoned them in order to secure election. In fact, he had done no more than move with the times. And the Labour Party had moved with him. (Hattersley, 1997:373) The route that Kinnock adopted in order to reform and modernise the party was to be controversial. He would suffer from continued media accusations that he was an unprincipled opportunist, whilst by initiating change he would secure only guarded approval on the right and the enduring hostility of the new left (Westlake, 1999:171). In his attempts to initiate change Kinnock would later come to regret that he had been unable to defeat Benn immediately as Benn was unable to dispute the succession with him (Westlake, 2001:210). Kinnock informed me that:

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I would have beaten Benn – resoundingly if the final run off had been between us, comfortably in a ballot which still included Roy Hattersley. The first possibility is self explanatory – if Roy had been knocked out, most of his votes would have come to me. If the three of us had been the last men standing, I would still have shared the CLPs more or less evenly with Benn, and I had a clear lead in the Unions, and had more or less the same number of votes in the PLP. I cannot say how much I would have loved it if Tony had kept his seat in the 1983 general election. Several arguments would have been settled by the votes of that October Conference. Instead we had to wait until 1988 to formally finish the tale. (Kinnock to author)

KINNOCK DEFEATS BENN: THE LABOUR PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1988

The previous two chapters highlighted the multiple crises that bedevilled the Labour party in the period between 1979 and 1983. The process of reforming the party, and addressing their electoral, ideological, and organisational problems, which would eventually culminate in the birth of new Labour and a decade and a half in government post-1997, began during the leadership tenure of Neil Kinnock. The process of reform or ‘modernisation’ in the first term of the Kinnock leadership tenure (1983-87) was relatively slow. That process was delayed by the prolonged miners’ strike of 1984-85 and the internal squabble with the Militant Tendency in 1985-86. The manner in which Kinnock conducted himself in relation to these two crises would increase condemnation of him amongst the new left. That condemnation would culminate in a challenge to his leadership by Tony Benn, which would dominate the politics of the Labour party throughout 1988. It would result in a humiliating rejection for Benn and would signal the terminal decline of the left. The miners’ strike of 1984-85 was used by the Thatcher government to discredit Labour. It left Kinnock frustrated as it undermined his attempts to create an impression of greater moderation and increased unity. The miners’ strike was to be immensely damaging to the Labour party and to Kinnock personally. The Labour leadership was left torn between two instincts. On the one hand, emotionally they naturally sympathised with the workers who were threatened by the pit closures. On the other hand, politically they were reluctant to condone the unpopular picketing methods associated with Arthur Scargill, the President of the National Union of Mineworkers, who chose not to call for a national strike ballot before calling strike action (Jefferys, 1993:118). Kinnock was clearly frustrated at how events between March 1984 and March 1985 had developed. They ensured that Labour

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remained viewed as extreme and divided (Laybourn, 2000:136). As Shaw outlines: In Kinnock’s view it was an immense diversion of energy, ‘taking a year out of the job we should have been doing, renovating policy, and the episode confirmed the belief of many voters that Labour was little more (to use Kinnock’s expression) than a ‘union support group’. The leader himself was the target of incessant obloquy at great cost to his public image. Almost universally, his handling of the situation was castigated – by the more radical sections of the…hard (new) left…for whom it symbolised his willingness to every principle; by the less radical or soft (old) left, who criticized his half-hearted support for the strike, by the other parties and more or less the entire press for his failure to denounce picket line violence….His need to temporise, to engage in intricate balancing acts, offered manifold opportunities which a hostile press exploited with alacrity to present him as a weak, indecisive leader of a party infested with left wing militants. (Shaw, 1994:34-35) That the National Union of Mineworkers had suffered such a crushing and humiliating defeat provided significant political capital for Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative party, whilst demoralizing the trade union movement (Shaw, 1996:174). Although it did damage Kinnock in the short term, it also undermined the new left and provided the basis for political space for Kinnock to exploit over the longer term. As Shaw observes: The rout discredited the left’s radical strategy and – together with the fate of the radical 1983 manifesto – was seized upon by those who argued that the only feasible strategy was a return to moderate, mainstream politics. Further, it also soon became apparent that the miners’ strike had but temporarily retarded a growing fissure in the ranks of the left over a wide range of policy, organization and strategy matters. The process dubbed ‘the realignment of the left’ witnessed the emergence of two separate currents, the ‘soft’ (old) and the ‘hard’ (new) left. (Shaw, 1996:174) The new left continued to be supported by the infrastructure of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, as well as the Campaign Group of Labour MPs. They also had ‘the backing of about a quarter of the NEC and had various Trotskyist bodies as outriders’ (Shaw, 1996:174). As the previous chapter observed the new left groupings had supported Eric Heffer in 1983 in the absence of Benn (Panitch and Leys, 2001:201). The old left, often identified now by the term ‘soft’ left, mobilised itself around the Labour Coordinating Committee and the Tribune Group. Significantly figures

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formerly associated with the Bennites and the new left, such as Michael Meacher, David Blunkett and Tom Sawyer, were now perceived to be representing the more soft or old left within the NEC (Shaw, 1996: 174). Kinnock was to be aided by the fact that the friction between the new left and now soft left over the Militant Tendency would resolve itself in a manner that marginalized the new left further, and began to bind the soft left to the centre/right and to the leadership approaches of Kinnock (Shaw, 1996:174). Kinnock had come to regard the Militant Tendency as a ‘maggot in the body of the Labour party’, of whom he stated: ‘I want them out’ (Westlake, 2001:329). Kinnock was aided now by the fact that the old/soft left had ‘swung behind his determination to clamp down on the entryist group’ (Shaw, 1996:175). At the 1985 Annual Conference, Kinnock launched an attack on the irresponsibility of militant influenced Labour councils. Focusing in on Derek Hatton, leader of the Militant Tendency faction that controlled Liverpool City Council, he condemned their decision to issue redundancy notices to all of their city council employees as a means by which to pressurize the Thatcher government to remove its capping of council expenditure. In a highly evocative conference speech, Kinnock turned on Militant: I will tell you what happens with impossible promises. You start with far-fetched resolutions. They are then pickled into a rigid dogma, a code, and you go through years sticking to that…outdated, misplaced, irrelevant to real needs, and you end up with the grotesque chaos of a Labour council – a Labour council – hiring taxis to scuttle around a city handing out redundancy notices to its own workers…You can’t play politics with people’s jobs1 … (Cronin, 2004:261) The new left was contemptuous of Kinnock for his broadside. Heffer walked out before the speech was concluded. Benn left in a less conspicuous manner than Heffer, although like Heffer he felt ‘unable to bring himself to stay and hear the leader attack his own members’ (Adams, 1992:448). The significance of his attack at the 1985 Annual Conference cannot be underestimated as Shaw argues: Co-operation over Militant solidified the alliance between Kinnock, the right and the soft left. As long as the right lacked the strength to reassert its traditional control over the party, and as long as the hard (new) left still posed a threat to the leadership, he needed the soft left and they played an influential role in the internal politics of the party. The soft left-right axis afforded him for the first time a solid and reliable majority in all key institutions but, at the same time, further intensified the limits on his freedom of action on the more sensitive

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policy issues by the need to negotiate the approval of the centre and left wing unions. (Shaw, 1996:175-76) However, Laybourn argues that although Kinnock had ‘alienated’ the new left he went to the 1987 general election without having addressed the central policy problems that prevented the party from being perceived as moderate such as nationalization, industrial relations, and unilateral nuclear disarmament (Laybourn, 2000:137). Although the Labour general election campaign of 1987 was widely commended for the professionalism that had been lacking at the last general election, the fact that Labour had suffered another significant defeat, (polling only 31.7 per cent which was five per cent lower than when they lost office in 1979), suggested that the reform and modernisation process needed to be extended further. As Butler and Kavanagh concluded: Replacing the red flag with a red rose as the party symbol and adopting modern techniques of communication might help to a degree. But could skilful presentation be effective without major changes in policy? The high marks accorded to the presentation of the 1987 election campaign only drew attention to the problem of the product being sold – the party’s policies…For all the moderation of the leadership and the manifesto, the Labour party in 1987 was still widely perceived as committed to high taxation, untrustworthy of defence, unreliable on inflation, and beholden to the unions. To become electable the party had to detach itself from the misperception of its policies and if necessary from the actual policies. (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992:45) The starting point for addressing these electoral impediments was made at the Annual Conference of September 1987, which endorsed a proposal to revaluate the whole spectrum of party policy which had been rejected so convincingly by the electorate just a few months earlier (Laybourn, 2000:140). The Policy Review process would dominate the 1987 to 1992 Parliament. It would be a significant period that would help lead the way towards the politics of new Labour. The purpose of this evaluation here is not to outline the Policy Review process in detail2, but to highlight how the initiation of the process, (and the assumptions underlining the process), acted as the catalyst for the challenge to Kinnock. For Kinnock initiated the Policy Review process as a mechanism through which the party could be seen to be dropping the main policies which were felt to be electoral negatives: punitive levels of tax, extended nationalization, the restoration of union rights, and above all unilateralism (Hughes and Wintour, 1990:205). Much of the academic analysis of the Policy Review would imply that it amounted to an accommodation with the politics of

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Thatcherism (Heffernan, 1999; Hay, 1994, 1999). That such an ‘accommodation’ with Thatcherism was being pursued by a leader who had acquired the leadership as a candidate of the ‘left’ was intriguing. Kinnock was identifiable with the old left, but the left was not a cohesive grouping. As mentioned in earlier chapters the left had evolved in what were defined as old and new, or soft and hard, groupings. Benn was the de facto leader of the new or hard left. Kinnock had acquired status as a significant player within the old or soft left for having led the opposition to Benn’s challenge to Healey for the deputy leadership in 1981 (Cronin, 2004:247). Kinnock then clearly benefitted from the removal of Benn from the post Foot succession contest following his defeat in the 1983 general election. As Cronin concludes: Kinnock was the first leader to be selected by the Electoral College and his triumph must have been galling to those on the left who had campaigned so hard for the reform… Kinnock had historic ties to the left of the party … [and]…he still managed to receive the support of the left, although not the so-called ‘hard left’ in the leadership election. (Cronin, 2004:247) Benn-Heffer Challenge Kinnock-Hattersley The above analysis demonstrates that one of the primary objectives that Kinnock had set himself upon acquiring the leadership was to reduce the significance of the new left, which necessitated reducing the influence of Benn within the party. If Kinnock wanted to reduce the importance of Benn it would have helped if he had been able to defeat him for the leadership in 1983. Kinnock would later admit that he would have preferred it if Benn had retained his constituency in 1983 and then Kinnock could have disputed the leadership with him there and then (Hayter, 2005:23). Kinnock believed that defeating Benn and the new left immediately would have been preferable, as the ‘result of the leadership election would quickly have defined the character of the party’ (Westlake, 2001:210). Once Benn returned to the House of Commons in 1984 there was a concern that he might seek to initiate a challenge to Kinnock. Responding to the attack that Kinnock made on Militant, Benn observed that ‘it was all part of a strategy, going back to 1983, to kill off any left wing challenge to his leadership’ (Benn, 1992:424). Such assertions imply that Benn was agitating for a challenge to Kinnock. Just as Labour in 1981 was disfigured by the Benn challenge to Healey for the deputy leadership, so 1988 was to be dominated by another (and final) Benn challenge. The catalyst for the challenge would be the Policy Review process that Kinnock initiated in the immediate aftermath of the general election defeat of 1987. However, by the time Benn launched his quest for the leadership his personal credibility and that of the new left had been significantly eroded.

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The influence that the new left had acquired within Labour politics in the immediate aftermath of their removal from government reached its height with the challenge that Benn had made to Denis Healey for the deputy leadership in 1981. Thereafter their influence began to erode due to the scale of the electoral defeat in 1983 on the most socialist manifesto that Labour had advocated since 1935; the removal of Benn from Parliament in 1983; the defeat of the Miners in 1984-1985; and the realignments that occurred within the broad left as Kinnock set about expelling the Militant Tendency from the party. Many influential Bennites, such as Meacher, Ken Coates, Stuart Holland and Frances Morrell began to review their own political positions. Members of what had amounted to the ‘Bennite’ new left group were now beginning to adopt a less confrontational attitude towards the leadership. Adams noted Benn’s disappointment at ‘the repudiation of fair weather friends’. Benn was deeply distressed by the perception that his main political allies ‘have all deserted me and I am alone with Denis Skinner and the headbangers’ (Adams, 1992:445). By the time Kinnock set about the Policy Review in the autumn of 1987, Benn was perceived to be a ‘spent force’ and a ‘dinosaur’ of the new left (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992:48; Adams, 1992:453). Despite the creation of such perceptions Benn retained political ambitions. As Adams identifies: Typically Benn reacted to the erosion of support and the distancing of friends with no compromise or admission of defeat. He set about building a power structure elsewhere which would keep the flame burning. (Adams, 1992:445) The new structure around which Benn aimed to retain the influence of the hard left was the Campaign Group, which had been set up in 1981 and comprised those members who had stayed loyal to Benn when he challenged Healey for the deputy leadership (Adams, 1992:445). The focus of the Campaign Group and the new left was to dispute the underlying assumptions underpinning the Policy Review. They viewed the Policy Review with suspicion. They feared that such revisionism would imply that Labour would abandon their historic commitment to transform society. Most critically, they suspected that the ultimate objective was to secure what Gaitskell had failed to achieve half a century earlier: the removal of Clause Four and the commitment to public ownership (Drower, 1994:229). Although Kinnock was promoting the Policy Review process as a means by which to engage with the public and party members, the new left feared that Kinnock was using public involvement as a mechanism of manipulation towards his own ends.3 As such, they felt that it amounted to an ‘elaborate means of abandoning key socialist principles’. Heffer later argued that through this Labour would emerge as the ‘SDP Mark II’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992:45).

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The Campaign Group and the new left now faced a tactical conundrum: should they use the Policy Review as a justification for a challenge to Kinnock? A challenge could result in one of three outcomes: 1.

2.

3.

A Benn challenge removes Kinnock from the leadership, with Benn assuming the leadership thus enabling the new left to pursue a policy agenda based on their ‘Campaign for Socialism’ agenda. The marginal status of the new left made this a highly improbable outcome, and the new left and Benn were fully aware of this. A Benn challenge mobilises the left beyond the new left and stalls the Policy Review process even though Kinnock retains the leadership. A strong performance by Benn demonstrates the residual strength of the new left and compels the leadership to show greater moderation in policy development, and requires that Kinnock must afford the new left greater respect. A landslide Kinnock victory and the humiliation of Benn which demonstrates the terminal decline of the new left. Such an eventuality provides Kinnock with a clear mandate for change with regard to the Policy Review process, whereupon the new left can be dismissed as an irrelevance. (Drower, 1994: 229)

In March 1988, the NEC met to endorse Aims and Values, a statement identifying the broad intentions of the Policy Review process. The time had come for the Campaign Group and Benn to make their decision. The argument for making a formal challenge was according to Adams as follows: The next step for the (new) left had to be to challenge the leadership. The incumbent leadership had failed to win the election; a leadership challenge was only really viable when there was no general election in the offing; the (new) left needed a rallying point; and anyone with an opposing idea to the prevailing orthodoxy had a moral obligation to put it to the test. (Adams, 1992:453) The Campaign Group concluded, after heated debate, that Benn should dispute the leadership, with two thirds of the group in favour of challenging. The decision to stand was strongly opposed by Claire Short, Margaret Beckett and Jo Richardson, all of whom resigned from the group in protest (Drower, 1994:230). Condemning the challenge Short claimed that: ‘this is not the way to change the Labour party. The contest will be a waste of time and energy’ (Brown, 1997:183). Moreover, other female members of the group, who were sceptical of the merits of challenging as a political approach, argued that: ‘politics should not be about who the leader was, which was an outdated macho approach to public life’ (Adams, 1992:454).

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Benn rejected such critiques. His candidature would aim ‘to sharpen the ideological debate within the party’ and thus ‘offer the party another way forward’ (Smith, 1988; Punnett, 1990:184; Stark, 1996:93). Benn then announced that his candidature was designed: To strengthen, encourage and unite public opposition to the government; to promote and advocate realistic programmes of policies to bring peace and jobs, and to put forward clear arguments for democracy and socialism and win majority public support for them. (Punnett, 1990:184) The decision to mount a challenge meant that an incumbent leader would be challenged for only the third time in the post war period, and for the first time since Anthony Greenwood challenged Hugh Gaitskell in 1961, just one year after Harold Wilson had failed to remove Gaitskell. Both the Wilson and the Greenwood challenges were viewed as emanating from the disaffected old left. Both challenges were what Quinn would define as ‘signal senders’, rather than ‘serious candidates’. A serious candidature was demonstrated by Michael Heseltine, when he challenged Margaret Thatcher for the Conservative party leadership in November 1990. Heseltine entered with the intention of winning there and then. Signal senders do not expect to secure the leadership by their challenge. Rather they seek to demonstrate dissatisfaction within the trajectory of the current leadership. Quinn suggests that signallers ‘aim to force a change in policy or to weaken the position of the incumbent, leaving them vulnerable to a future serious challenge’ (Quinn, 2005:795). The classic signal sender that softened an incumbent leader up for a serious challenge was the challenge made by Anthony Meyer to Thatcher in November 19894 (Heppell, 2008a:74). For the Campaign Group and Benn the third scenario was their greatest fear; and the second scenario their most realistic target. At no point in time did they believe that a Benn leadership victory, (the first scenario), was a realistic possibility. Benn ‘knew perfectly well he had no hope of winning or even running Kinnock close’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:102). So presumably when conducting their cost benefit analysis, the Benn faction calculated that the second scenario was a realistic target and thereby amounted to their justification for standing: i.e. stall and blunt the Policy Review process and undermine Kinnock; strengthen the base of the left, and aid the chances of a left wing candidate being successful in a future leadership election. However, given these insights into likely scenarios, Benn and the new left were widely condemned for initiating a contest that they knew they could not win. If the candidacy was ‘a political statement by the left of its discontent’ with the style of leadership of Kinnock and his policy direction, it did not

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appear to instil fear in the present incumbent (Stark, 1996:92). Kinnock did not fear defeat. He responded by stating that: The challenge would end in massive defeat for those who have put their self indulgence above the interests of the party. (Adams, 1992:454) However, Kinnock was clearly irritated by the time that would be lost focusing on an unnecessary leadership election, as Heffernan and Marqusee noted: He denounced the use of the party’s democratic machinery by Benn and Heffer as an ‘outrageous distraction’ which would ‘not be forgiven’.5 (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:102) Prescott Challenges Hattersley By deciding to stand on behalf of the new left with Eric Heffer as his running mate Benn ensured that the deputy leadership would be disputed in conjunction with the leadership. This provided Kinnock with two significant consequences: one negative; one positive. The negative consequence related to the deputy leadership: it gave John Prescott a justification to challenge Hattersley. This was something that Prescott had been contemplating during the autumn of 1987. Prescott wanted to change the function of the deputy leadership. Concerned about the declining membership and the need to enhance the electioneering of the party, Prescott argued that the deputy leader should be responsible for campaigning. Implicit within his principle of amending the function of the deputy leadership was the insinuation that Hattersley would not be suited to such a role, whereas Prescott would be ideal for it. In January 1988, two months before Benn announced his challenge for the leadership, a furious row erupted between Kinnock and Prescott. Prescott later recalled: Kinnock was furious. He said I was causing divisions, not healing them. That I was being egotistical…I said ‘No. What concerns me is the function of the deputy. If it is redefined by the party, on the lines I suggested, and the party has the opportunity to vote on it [at the 1988 Annual Conference], I won’t stand….Kinnock’s real worry was that Tony Benn would stand [and] that would really divide the party. So me coming along and wanting a deputy leadership contest was making things worse, according to him. I said Benn would stand, whether or not I stood for deputy or not. (Prescott, 2008:160)

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Drawing together the challenges of Benn to Kinnock and Heffer and Prescott to Hattersley, Kinnock outlined to me his critique of the motivations of those challenging. He bemoaned: the vanities which propelled people into unnecessary contests for leader and deputy leader…The whole performance was a distraction of attention and a diversion of energy and resources. (Kinnock to author) The decision of Benn and Heffer in March 1988 to stand against Kinnock and Hattersley allowed Prescott to renege on a deal not to stand that he had hammered out with Kinnock in January. Then Prescott had announced that he would not stand against Hattersley as Kinnock had assured him that conference would be permitted to debate the role of the deputy leader.6 When the Benn-Heffer joint ticket was announced, Prescott, (with the endorsement of Margaret Beckett), calculated that he had nothing to lose in challenging for the deputy leadership after all (Drower, 1994:231). Whilst Kinnock could be confident of defeating Benn, and was secure in the knowledge that Hattersley could defeat Heffer, he could be less sure of Hattersley defeating Prescott. Benn and Heffer would appeal to the new left, whereas Prescott would appeal from the more numerically strong old or soft left (Punnett, 1990:18384). If the Prescott challenge was the negative consequence, then what was the positive consequence of the leadership and deputy leadership being challenged for in conjunction? Drower outlines how and why the presence of Prescott and Heffer influenced the strategy that Kinnock adopted: Aware that the contest was being perceived as being an internal party referendum on the Policy Review, and anticipating that there could be many votes against Hattersley serving as warning shots against his style of leadership, Kinnock considered it best that he and Hattersley combine their campaigns. Accordingly, the leader and deputy leader attended a bizarre photo-session, at which they signed each others’ nomination papers. Kinnock declared: ‘I will be voting for Roy Hattersley as deputy leader and myself as leader. As far as I am concerned there are no other tickets’. (Drower, 1994:232-33) A complicating factor was that Hattersley was also not massively committed to remaining deputy leader. According to Stuart, Hattersley briefly tried to persuade John Smith to stand for the deputy leadership in his place, but Smith was not interested in being ‘associated’ with Kinnock’s leadership that explicitly (Stuart, 2005:148). With the Prescott challenge already initiated Smith informed Hattersley that ‘nobody you approve of wants the job. You can’t escape. It’s either you or Prescott’ (Stuart, 2005:148). The reluctance of

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Smith to replace him forced Hattersley to fight hard to retain the deputy leadership. Retaining Hattersley was far more useful to Kinnock than having Prescott imposed upon him (Hattersley, 1995:291). Whilst the Benn-Heffer ticket was never seriously going to threaten Kinnock-Hattersley, it was clear that a Kinnock-Prescott outcome was a serious possibility. It was felt that whilst the new left would endorse BennHeffer, the presence of Prescott in the deputy leadership ballot, would allow the old/soft left to register their disapproval with the Policy Review by endorsing Prescott. There was also a fear that many in the mainstream of the party might be tempted into supporting Prescott as a way of ‘registering their opposition to Kinnock’s abrasive style of leadership’ (Stuart, 2005:148). However, the decision of Robin Cook to act as the campaign manager to the Kinnock-Hattersley ticket was a damaging blow to the Prescott challenge. They had assumed that as Cook had been critical of the Aims and Values document he would endorse Prescott (Brown, 1997:182). The KinnockHattersley re-election team had balance with joint managers in the shape of Cook and Smith. Cook was on board to shore up the left wing vote for Kinnock, whilst Smith would ensure that the votes from the centre and the right stayed with Hattersley (Stuart, 2005:148). Ultimately, Prescott was undermined by the dynamics of the leadership contest itself. It was widely accepted that Kinnock would defeat Benn. It was widely known that Kinnock wanted to retain Hattersley as his deputy and did not want Prescott. A Kinnock-Prescott joint ticket could carry one of the following implications: 1.

2.

3.

The prestige of Kinnock would be damaged. Given his consistent endorsement of Hattersley, the imposition of Prescott would have provided political capital to the Conservative party and would have allowed them to highlight divisions at elite level within the shadow Cabinet. Those recurring Labour nightmares of internal unity and leadership credibility would be intensified by a Kinnock-Prescott ticket (Punnett, 1990:184). Doubts would exist about the working relationship between Kinnock and Prescott and the stability of an imposed ticket. McSmith argues that had a Kinnock-Prescott ticket emerged the probability of it surviving beyond a year was remote. It might mobilise the broad left, and encourage them to challenge for the leadership again; or it might act as a catalyst for the right to seek to reclaim the deputy leadership on behalf of their ideological faction (McSmith, 1994:174). Given the damage that such an imposed ticket might do to the perceived unity of the party; the prestige of Kinnock himself; and the fact that it amounted to an instability ticket, there was a possibility that a Prescott victory might result in Kinnock resigning the

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For party centrists and loyalists interested in entering the next general election with a unified party, and a leader with a mandate to lead and the authority and legitimacy to do so, then the Prescott challenge was unnecessary. The instability of a Kinnock-Prescott ticket, aligned to the damaging consequences to party unity and leadership credibility were key resources employed by the Kinnock-Hattersley campaign team. These factors badly undermined Prescott.8 The awareness of consequences one and two, (listed above), would encourage many towards the status quo position of Kinnock-Hattersley (Punnett, 1990:184). At the Annual Conference of autumn 1988, the Kinnock-Hattersley ticket was endorsed by an overwhelming margin. Kinnock had given himself two objectives when this unnecessary contest was imposed upon him: first, ensure that he retained Hattersley as his deputy; and second, to ensure that the scale of the victory needed to be as large as possible. With this second objective in mind, it is worth reflecting on the insights of Heffernan and Marqusee, in their classic evaluation of the Kinnock leadership, who noted the heavy handed tactics that the Kinnock-Hattersley re-election campaign engaged in: Maximum pressure was brought to bear on every Labour MP to support the Kinnock-Hattersley ticket. Any erstwhile critic who abandoned the Campaign Group to back the leader was rewarded with elevation to or within the frontbench team. Anyone who hesitated or toyed with an abstention or a vote for John Prescott was threatened with demotion or even removal from the front bench. This was the ultimate loyalty test and anyone who failed to pass it with flying colours could expect short shrift from the leadership. It was not enough for Kinnock to win or even to win well. Victory had to be crushing. (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:102-03)

KINNOCK DEFEATS BENN Table 11:

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Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1988 PLP (30%)

CLPs (30%)

Unions (40%)

Total

82.8 17.2

80.4 19.6

99.2 0.8

88.6 11.4

57.9 24.0 18.1

60.4 26.2 13.5

78.3 21.6 0.2

66.8 23.7 9.5

Party Leader Neil Kinnock Tony Benn Deputy Leader Roy Hattersley John Prescott Eric Heffer Source:

Quinn, 2004:342

Victory was indeed crushing. It was expected that in the PLP and the trade unions section that Kinnock would secure significant victories. After all, when Benn challenged Healey in 1981, he had been defeated in these parts of the Electoral College – 65.9 per cent to 34.1 per cent within the PLP and 62.5 per cent to 37.5 per cent within the trade unions. The intervening years had resulted in a significant erosion of the powerbase of the new left. His return of 17.2 per cent within the PLP was half the level he had secured against Healey. The depreciation in his trade union return was considerably more – down from 37.5 per cent to 0.8 per cent. What was devastating to the Benn challenge was his performance within the CLP section of the Electoral College. Against Healey, Benn had triumphed in the CLP section, securing 81.1 per cent; and as a result of his strength within the CLP section, he had come within a percentage point of removing Healey from the deputy leadership. Given the altered political context, no one expected Benn to repeat this performance, but he was expected to perform well within this section of the Electoral College. As such, his miserly return of 19.6 came as a surprise. As Adams concludes: No one had expected the Benn challenge to be successful but the heaviness of the defeat was shocking. Benn had used the leadership campaign to put [an alternative] message across and it had been decisively rejected. (Adams, 1992:455)

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Kinnock would offer me the following interpretation of the significance of the dual challenges of 1988: If people had acted like adults, there would have been no contest and no cost. The crunch vote was obviously in the deputy leadership because Heffer and Prescott wanted to inflict damage on the leader by challenging the deputy leader. It was more a parade of egos than a noble duel over strategy. Conclusion Since the inception of the Electoral College, the Benn challenge to Kinnock has been the only occasion upon which the incumbent leader has had their right to lead the party questioned. The experience of Benn and the new left was humbling. It was to carry a significant consequence as prior to the contest the threshold for nominations that would permit challenges to the incumbent leader stood at 5 per cent of the PLP. The negative reaction that the Benn challenge created resulted in an amendment being passed to increase the threshold for nominations from 5 per cent to 20 per cent (although for vacancies this was brought down to 12.5 per cent after 1993). Although annexing the leadership for Benn and the new left was never a realistic target – it was a signal sender challenge rather than a serious challenge - they had hoped that a challenge would galvanize the broad left and stall the Policy Review process (Quinn, 2005:795). The Benn challenge was initiated to signal the enduring significance of the broad left and was thus designed to enhance the possibility of them mounting a more successful leadership challenge at a future date. It completely failed, from both a short term and long term perspective. Benn was tactically and strategically inept in his challenge. At the moment when Benn challenged Kinnock was politically very weak. If a challenge from the old right had been initiated by a credible figure such as Smith, Kinnock would have found this far more problematic to withstand than a challenge from the discredited and marginalised new left. The fear amongst many within the Labour movement about Benn and the new left would ensure that Kinnock would secure a landslide victory. Although Kinnock attempted to make the contest a referendum on the concept of the Policy Review, the result was as much a condemnation of Benn and the new left, as it was on Kinnock as leader and a potential Prime Minister. Benn thereby renewed and refreshed the mandate to lead (and change) that Kinnock wanted and needed (Shaw, 1994:165). Benn thereby ensured that Kinnock was stronger post 1988 than he had been pre 1988. Kinnock informed me that the ‘comfortable’ nature of his and Hattersley’ reelection could be interpreted as ‘proof that the Labour movement was developing a new maturity’. However, he qualified this by acknowledging that its duration meant that it was a reminder that the Labour party was

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‘faction prone’. However, after defeating Benn in 1988 Kinnock claimed that his victory gave him the opportunity to lead the party as he chose (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:103). Kinnock later argued that his modernisation project was aided by the fact that the new left was considerably weakened by the 1988 challenge which contributed to the ‘evaporation of the difference between the so-called (old) soft left and what used to be called the right’ (Kinnock, 1994:549). However, the Policy Review concealed a debate between on the one hand, an interventionist, neo-Keynesian school of thought led by Bryan Gould and, on the other, a more market orientated approach favoured by Smith (Jones, 1996:126).

FROM KINNOCK TO SMITH: THE LABOUR PARTY LEADERSHIP OF 1992

Neil Kinnock would lead the Labour party into two general elections and would suffer two defeats. If the primary purpose of a leader is to secure power, then against this yardstick Kinnock has to be regarded as a failure. However, if we recognise the circumstances that he inherited in 1983 and compare those circumstances to those facing his successor, John Smith in 1992, then a more contextualised evaluation of the Kinnock era can be advanced. He inherited a Labour party with a support base of only 27.6 per cent, and a percentage lead over the SDP and Liberals (at 25.3 per cent) of only 2.3 per cent. The Conservative party under Margaret Thatcher (on 42.4 per cent) had a lead over Labour of 14.8 per cent. In the short term, eliminating the threat from the SDP-Liberal alliance on the centre ground of British politics was the priority. That Labour was so disappointed by their electoral defeat in 1992 was a reflection of the progress that they had made in the Kinnock era. Under Kinnock the threat from the SDP-Liberal alliance was largely overcome, forcing them into an awkward merger in 1988 and the death of the SDP. In the 1992 general election defeat that was to prompt the resignation of Kinnock, the Labour vote share had increased from 27.6 per cent in 1983 to 35.2 per cent; the gap between them and the Liberal Democrats (on 18.3 per cent) had increased from 2.3 per cent in 1983 to 16.9 per cent; and the 11.6 million who voted Labour in 1992 was a 3 million increase on their 1983 return (Dorey, 1995:342). After the turbulence of the Policy Review and the Benn challenge from the new left, Labour and Kinnock had recovered and had managed to establish an opinion polling lead of some substance by the summer of 1990. Their 20-point lead following on from their victory at the 1989 European Parliament Elections, combined with the economic recession; Conservative divisions surrounding European integration; the unpopularity of the poll tax,

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and increasing concerns about Thatcher herself provided reasons for Labour optimism regarding the forthcoming election. Such optimism proved to be misplaced. A decade of repositioning and repackaging Labour; of shedding controversial policies; of banishing its trouble makers; and courting public opinion, still resulted in defeat, albeit a marginal defeat, rather than the landslide defeats on 1983 and 1987. In the immediate aftermath, Heffernan and Marqusee penned their interpretation, (from a leftish perspective), of the defeat of 1992 entitled ‘Defeat from the Jaws of Victory’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992). It can be argued that three factors explain the unexpected return of the Conservative party for a fourth successive term in office. First, despite the slickness of the Labour campaign and the careful packaging of Kinnock, the appeal of Labour was critically undermined by the change from Thatcher to John Major in November 1990. Their electoral strategy had been predicated on attacking the leadership style of Thatcher; the record of her administration; and the need for change. Major had partly addressed the appetite for change, and Labour was wrong-footed in the immediate aftermath of his elevation to the premiership. The effect upon Labour of the change was devastating. On hearing of her demise, Labour strategist, Philip Gould admitted that he ‘felt numb. I knew it was all over’ (Gould, 1998:106). Cronin argues that: Labour’s entire strategy of rebuilding, reshaping and moderating itself was premised upon Thatcher and the need to fashion itself as the alternative. Kinnock’s personal image, for example, had been reconstructed deliberately to contrast him as ‘caring’ and Thatcher as obviously not, to paint her as fanatical and him as not. Even in 1987, party strategists regarded Thatcher’s strident personality as the Tories’ biggest liability and her behaviour since had underlined how right that view was. Suddenly that liability was removed and the Conservatives could present to voters a likeable face with a reassuring message: he would preserve the gains of the Thatcher revolution but moderate its impact and remove its hard edges.1 (Cronin, 2004:318-19) The departure of Thatcher also reshaped the terrain upon which the election campaign was fought. Had she remained then the poll tax and divisions on Europe would have provided political capital for Labour to exploit. Major negated the poll tax by replacing it, whilst his handling of the intergovernmental conference at Maastricht provided, (at the time), the basis for relative Conservative unity, although that unity was to dissolve during the parliamentary ratification of the treaty in the 1992-93 Parliament (Heppell, 2006:87-94; 171-81). With the Thatcher effect removed, the poll tax replaced, and Europe less of a divisive issue than could have been the case, it was

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essential that Labour exploit their strengths effectively. Their primary strength, and the central weakness for the Conservatives, was with regard to the public services, most notably health care provision. However, Labour badly mishandled their advantage. In an attempt to press home that advantage, Labour ran a Party Political Broadcast, focusing on two girls with ear problems. One girl received an immediate operation through private medicine, but the other girl (called Jennifer) had her operation delayed as she was a National Health Service patient. The father of Jennifer, who claimed the delay was caused by financial constraints, was then exposed as a Labour activist. To compound the problem for Labour, her mother was exposed as a Conservative who was unaware that her child was being used in this way. Rather than cause the Conservatives embarrassment, Labour were put on the political defensive2 (Laybourn, 2000:146-47). The undermining of the Labour campaign on Thatcher, the poll tax, Europe, and even the National Health Service, would tie into the second significant factor that aided the Conservatives and undermined Labour further: the centrality of taxation and perceptions of economic competence. The Labour alternative shadow budget backfired and provided considerable political opportunities for the Conservatives (Westlake, 2001:541). The Shadow Chancellor, John Smith, proposed to raise national insurance contributions for wealthier voters and to increase the top rate of tax. When critiquing their alternative budget, the Conservatives alleged that Labour would mean higher taxation, and that they would be imposed on ordinary workers and not just the highest earners (Cronin, 2004:324-25). As Dorey concludes: In 1992, the Conservatives launched a ferocious campaign against the Labour Party, not only regarding its tax plans, but more generally on its alleged lack of fitness and competence to govern Britain. In spite of the recession, high unemployment and high interest rates, the Conservative party, still convinced many voters that the return of a Labour government would spell economic disaster for the British people, due to higher taxes, increased interest rates, further unemployment, spiralling inflation and exorbitant wage demands as a consequence of restored trade union power under a Labour administration. (Dorey, 1995:230-31) Therefore, not only did the alternative budget give credence to the Conservatives claims about Labour and tax and spend, it crucially reaffirmed their status as the party of low taxation, and even more importantly ensured that they retained their status as the party best equipped to manage the economy. When the electorate was asked to identify which party was more economically competent, the Conservative lead was significant: 52 per cent to

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31 (Sanders, 1992:171). The success of the Conservative propaganda campaign was thus clearly evident. Not only did they manage to imply that the economic plight would be worse if Labour acquired office, but they also succeeded in disassociating themselves from blame for the recession. When the electorate was asked to apportion blame for the current economic crisis, 47 per cent blamed the world wide recession, 46 per cent blamed the Thatcher administrations, and only 5 per cent blamed the Major administration (Crewe, 1992:28). That such economic woes were associated more with the Thatcher administrations than the Major administration, demonstrated that swathes of the electorate believed that the transition from Thatcher to Major had constituted a significant change of governing approach (Crewe, 1992:25). The final explanatory factor relates to competing interpretations on leadership. Put crudely, it can be argued that at this juncture, the new comer, Major, was perceived to be an asset to the Conservative party. Meanwhile, the long-serving Kinnock was seen to be a liability to Labour. Kinnock could not shake off the perception that he was a political lightweight. Labour strategists had worked tirelessly to overcome the fear that Kinnock lacked gravitas and did not look Prime Ministerial. With the opinion polls suggesting that Labour were destined to return to office, this provided the backdrop for a campaign rally in Sheffield, just days before polling. Kinnock became overexcited due to their wild applause, and in a widely criticised performance, kept bellowing ‘we’re all right’ repeatedly. In a matter of seconds, Kinnock destroyed the statesmanlike image that his minders had so assiduously cultivated. It was widely assumed that the rally was a public relations disaster. Labour appeared over-confident; it raised questions about the character of their leader; and it was seen to have alienated the electorate (Shaw, 1994:14851). Ultimately it can be argued that the difficult task of rebuilding Labour from the rubble beneath him in 1983, and many of the tough but necessary tasks that he undertook, critically undermined Kinnock’s attempts to appear to be a Prime Minister in waiting. As Shaw concludes: Trust in a party or its leader is likely to be influenced by the degree that they display consistency in pronouncements and behaviour over time hence Kinnock’s many reversals of policy were likely to leave an impression of unreliability. This was exploited by the Tory tabloids: a man, they charged, who had changed his mind on so many issues – unilateralism, opposition to the European Community, nationalization, planning and so forth – was hardly someone in whom the electors could repose their trust. (Shaw, 1994:150) When the NEC convened in June 1992 to assess the reasons for their electoral defeat, it was acknowledged that the:

FROM KINNOCK TO SMITH

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Long running attack on the leader did have a considerable effect upon the general unease about Labour and its fitness to govern. (Report to the NEC, 21 June 1992, Kinnock Papers) An Uneasy Relationship: Kinnock and Smith Despite the shifts that Kinnock orchestrated with respect to the policy platform of the party, his historical ties to the left ensured that he received only guarded approval from the right (Westlake, 1999:171). So whilst Kinnock was wary of the probability of a challenge to his leadership being launched by the new left, as was the case in 1988, he also was aware of the need to shore up his base on the centre and right of the party. After all, two thirds of the shadow Cabinet had endorsed his rival, Roy Hattersley, in the leadership election through which Kinnock first claimed his mandate to lead (Westlake, 1999:172). However, the reputation of Hattersley had not been enhanced by his performance as deputy leader. The right was unlikely to support Hattersley in a future succession contest. They were now leaning towards Smith as their next candidate for the leadership (Seldon, 2004:113). Smith had been elevated to the position of shadow Chancellor in the aftermath of the 1987 general election, replacing Hattersley who became shadow Home Secretary. In the autumn of 1987 and spring of 1988 satisfaction ratings with Kinnock as a potential Prime Minister remained poor. The superior satisfaction ratings that Smith was now receiving as shadow Chancellor created real concerns for Kinnock (McSmith, 1999:200). Relations between the two were undermined by the fact that Smith was contemptuous of Kinnock for ‘his intellect and grip’, whilst Kinnock’s advisors believed that Smith was ‘jostling for power’ (Seldon, 2004:113). In his biography of Kinnock, Westlake would claim that after a blazing row in January 1991, Kinnock wanted to demote or even dismiss Smith, but felt that he was not strong enough politically to do so (Kinnock strenuously denies this allegation)3 (Westlake, 2001:546). As a consequence, there was considerable speculation as to whether Labour would be better positioned to win the general election of 1991 or 1992 if they had Smith as their leader, rather than Kinnock4 (McSmith, 1999:200). The dilemma for those who believed that this would be in the best long term interests of the party, was finding a mechanism through which to initiate change. Three scenarios would emerge for those seeking a Smith leadership. First, the pressures and frustrations of managing the party over the previous Parliament, aligned to the criticism that he was being subjected to within the party, and from the Conservative dominated press, could result in Kinnock resigning. This is a course of action that Kinnock did contemplate in mid 1988, when he admits that he became ‘really, chronically brassed off’ (McSmith, 1994:180). Despite his frustrations, Kinnock refused to resign on the grounds that only he could see through the Policy Review

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and the necessary wider changes to the party. Given that it was widely assumed that if he did cease to be leader, Smith would be his successor, such an assertion amounts to a strong denunciation of Smith (McSmith, 1994: 180). Second, Smith could have exploited the fact that Benn had decided to initiate a challenge to justify entering himself. However, Smith was concerned that such a course of action was too divisive and risky, although many on the right believed that had he challenged he way well have secured the leadership (McSmith, 1994:173). So rather than damage his reputation as a loyalist, and potentially undermine his chances in the longer term, Smith accepted the title of campaign manager for Kinnock and Hattersley (McSmith, 1994:201). The third scenario was that Smith could wait until the Benn challenge was completed and evaluate later into the Parliament the merits of initiating a challenge in 1989, 1990 or 1991. Running parallel to the Kinnock-Benn contest had been a staggeringly high level of press interest in Smith, putting the campaign manager of the Kinnock-Hattersley re-election ticket in a difficult position. Smith stated that he was not ruling himself out of seeking the leadership if a vacancy arose at some point in the future. However, the idea of challenging Kinnock was ruled out; Smith told Robin Cook in 1990 that ‘categorically’ he would not challenge (Seldon, 2004:113). It went against his nature to challenge. As Chris Smith recalls ‘John was 100 per cent not contemplating a coup to oust Neil, but people were pushing him to do so’ (Stuart, 2005:146). The insights of Labour MP, Barry Sheerman, demonstrate how loyalty was massively important to Smith. In 1987, before the Benn challenge, Sheerman recalls encouraging Smith to stand for the leadership at the earliest opportunity. The reaction of Smith is illuminating: He [Sheerman] found Smith eyeing him with cold disapproval across the rims of his glasses. With apparently unfeigned anger, Smith demanded to know how he could be expected to be disloyal to the elected leader of the party. Sheerman countered that there was a higher loyalty to consider. The rest of the conversation was unpleasant and when it ended the two politicians walked off in different directions. Sheerman never broached the subject again. (McSmith, 1994:181) Indeed, Smith was highly critical of Benn for having challenged Kinnock for two reasons. First, it was an act of disloyalty which damaged the party; and, second, it was a pointless challenge as Benn had no chance of winning (Stuart, 2005:149). Stuart concludes: It seemed at the time that the sheer scale of Kinnock’s victory ruled out any question of a more serious challenge from John Smith (or possibly Bryan Gould) before the general election. In any event, Kinnock’s

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opponents knew that he would stand and fight if cornered, making any leadership contest very bloody indeed. Also, while the PLP was divided over his future, Kinnock still enjoyed high levels of support amongst the constituency party and the trade union components of the Electoral College. (Stuart, 2005:149) When I asked Kinnock about the media speculation that surrounded the idea of Smith challenging him for the leadership, he acknowledged the strengths of Smith and his leadership potential. He noted that Smith was ‘admired because he was damn good’. However, Kinnock was dismissive of the speculation saying that it was: Nearly all newspapers speculation….Only one member of the Shadow Cabinet even tried to get a Smith ball rolling – and when he approached Smith, he was rebuffed. As far as I can gather from events and from stories since, John Smith simply wouldn’t run against me, especially when the loyalty of people like Roy Hattersley and Gerald Kaufman more than counterbalanced the one individual who tried to get Smith to run. (Kinnock to author) That Smith suffered a severe heart attack in December 1988 ensured that discussion and debate on him challenging Kinnock in 1989 ended. As Smith concentrated on his health so debate on the leadership diminished in the 1989 to 1990 period. The narrowing of the opinion poll gap that occurred after Major replaced Thatcher, and the fact that the Conservatives and Labour were running neck and neck by mid-1991, provoked another bout of leadership speculation as the Parliament drew to a close. Stuart claims that in January 1992, the idea of copying what the Australian Labour party did just before the 1983 Australian general election, (when they replaced William Hayden with Bob Hawke), was floated within senior Labour circles (Stuart, 2005:199). The problem was the method of change. Kinnock would not resign and Smith would not challenge. There was also the problem that with it being so close to the general election there was not sufficient time to activate the Electoral College (Stuart, 2005:199). However, for much of the 1988 to 1992 period, it was widely assumed that should Kinnock lose the general election then a leadership election would follow. As McSmith observes for much of that period ‘Westminster gossip predicted that Smith’ and the ‘fast-rising’ Gould would be the candidates of the right and the left in a post-Kinnock leadership succession contest (McSmith, 1999:197). The Resignation of Kinnock and the Succession Timetable Kinnock announced his resignation on Sunday 12th April 1992, just three days after the general election. Many within Labour circles had anticipated

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that he would remain as leader until the Electoral College could convene at the time of the Annual Conference in the autumn (Alderman and Carter, 1993:50). The period between April and October would allow the party to engage in a considered appraisal of the reasons for their electoral rejection. There was therefore considerable disquiet when Kinnock and Hattersley suggested that the NEC should attempt to conclude the succession process by the end of June (Alderman and Carter, 1993:50). The desire of Kinnock and Hattersley to shorten the campaigning period for the succession contest met with opposition from the likes of Gould, Claire Short and John Prescott. Gould, who was widely expected to be the candidate of the left, would argue that the Electoral College should coincide with the Annual Conference in October. Such an argument was deliberately calculated as it provided more time for the strongly fancied Smith to ‘make a mistake’, and would provide him as the outsider with more time to ‘put his case across’ (Punnett, 1992:114). Short complained that the party had not had an opportunity to ‘mourn’ its defeat, and yet it is ‘being told the result of the next leadership election’ (Short, 1992). Prescott complained about the assumption that the leading candidate, Smith, wanted Margaret Beckett, to be his deputy, which meant that: What the election seems to have been based on is the idea that we can get two candidates (i.e. Smith for the leadership and Beckett for the deputy leadership) and perhaps…(we)…have no need for any election at all. People are getting angry about it, particularly in the constituency parties….that somehow it is being settled before even the MPs have met. (Brown, 1997:209) The feeling that Smith was preordained to acquire the leadership was intensified by the conduct of trade union leaders in the immediate aftermath of defeat. Even before Kinnock had announced his resignation, John Edmonds, leader of the General Municipal Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union (GMB), appeared on the BBC’s On the Record and appeared to offer the backing of his union to Smith by stating that there is ‘one name on everybody’s lips’ (Rentoul, 2001:186; Stuart, 2005:224). The Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU); the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and the Electoral, Electronic Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (EETPU) then all called for Smith. This was significant as these four unions comprised one fifth of the total votes within the Electoral College. (Stuart, 2005:224) Amongst the largest trade unions, only the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) chose not to declare for Smith without holding an election (Stuart, 2005:244). The ‘astonishing ineptitude’ in which trade union leaders ‘began jockeying’ to endorse Smith, created a feeling that such behaviour was ‘undemocratic’ (Brown, 1997:2008). Stuart confirms that:

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It appeared that a combination of Neil Kinnock’s determination to step down quickly and the union barons’ desire to see a swift shoe in for Smith would lead to a very precipitous leadership contest, or perhaps no contest at all. But there was a huge backlash in the party against rushing into things. (Stuart, 2005:225) Kinnock believed that by resolving the leadership question by the end of June that would allow the PLP to hold shadow Cabinet elections. This would enable the newly elected leader to allocate shadow Cabinet portfolios before the parliamentary recess. Kinnock believed that it was important to ensure that effective opposition was established quickly given the small parliamentary majority of the Major government and their economic problems (Punnett, 1992:112; Alderman and Carter, 1993:50). He was concerned that he was a ‘lame duck’ leader and that it would be ‘humiliating for him’ and ‘demoralizing’ for the PLP to prolong his leadership through until the autumn (Alderman and Carter, 1993:50). The party would be devoid of effective leadership and lacking a clear political direction (Stuart, 2005:225). A six month interregnum would be impracticable, as Kinnock could not preside over the ‘urgently needed post-mortem’. He felt that this could only be done ‘effectively’ by a newly elected leader (Alderman and Carter, 1993:50). Kinnock attended the NEC meeting (14 April) and argued the case for a specially convened meeting of the Electoral College for 27 June. The Kinnock papers reveal the approach that the departing leader would adopt during this meeting. His notes state: Case…Simple…Leadership election two months or six months. Labour preoccupied, ‘divided’…Tories six months off; latter cannot be justified…5 (Kinnock Papers) However, Kinnock did not manage to shorten the succession process as much as he would have liked. The NEC blocked the late June succession timetable. Critics of the shortened timetable felt that this undermined the nomination process and the participatory elements of the Electoral College amongst the CLPs. It was well established that Smith was the leading candidate, and the appearance of considerable trade union support being provided in the immediate aftermath of losing the general election, could influence the nomination process. The nomination process would need to be completed remarkably quickly to ensure that a late June Electoral College could be convened, and this may impede the chances for other candidates beside Smith, from securing nominations from within the newly formed PLP. The first scheduled PLP meeting was to be April 27th, which would probably leave only a week for candidates to campaign for nominations

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(Alderman and Carter, 1993:50). It was also pointed out that a June ballot would not provide an adequate ‘opportunity for party and trade union membership ballots’ to be undertaken (Alderman and Carter, 1993:50; Punnett, 1992:112). With regard to the Kinnock argument that effective opposition needed to be mounted as soon as possible, delayers argued that Parliament would soon enter its summer recess, so a newly elected shadow Cabinet would ‘achieve little’ in terms of parliamentary opposition anyway (Alderman and Carter, 1993:50). The NEC then rejected the delaying argument of holding on till October (Stuart, 2005:225). Instead they endorsed a compromise of convening the Electoral College for July 18th. In the end Kinnock would have to wait three weeks longer than he had wanted. The Complex Nomination Process The first stage in the process for selecting the successor to Kinnock was the nomination stage. In the aftermath of the challenge by Benn in 1988 the threshold for candidates seeking nomination had been increased from 5 per cent to 20 per cent of the PLP. The newly elected PLP comprised 271 members and this meant that candidates now needed to secure the support of 55 Labour parliamentarians in order to proceed to the Electoral College. In 1983, with a PLP of 209 members and the nominations threshold at 5 per cent, it had been far easier for candidates to secure their passage to the Electoral College. Therefore, the nomination stage acquired a far greater importance in 1992 than had been the case in the 1983 and 1988 leadership elections (Punnett, 1992:113; Alderman and Carter, 1993:51). Three candidates sought the support of their parliamentary colleagues. In addition to the widely anticipated candidatures of Smith, from the right, and Gould, broadly aligned to the left, there was Ken Livingstone, the new left former leader of the Greater London Council. For the deputy leadership contest, it was clear that John Prescott would stand, as he had done in 1988. Outside candidatures were initiated by Ann Clywd and Bernie Grant. There was considerable speculation about the decision made by Gould to put himself forward for both the leadership and deputy leadership contests; and the indecision surrounding the intentions of Beckett.6 She initially seemed unwilling to enter the contest, until receiving sufficient encouraging messages from within the Smith campaign team about the benefits that she could offer as a deputy leader. The knowledge that she was the preferred candidate for the deputy leadership with the front runner for the leadership encouraged her to stand. Smith had put out encouraging signals to Beckett as he wanted an alternative to Prescott and more importantly Gould.7 Smith particularly did not want Gould as his deputy, as ‘their differences over Europe and their personal animosity were too great’8 (Rentoul, 2001:181). Once she declared her interest in standing it became clear that Beckett, like Smith, would have no difficulty in attracting enough support to proceed

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onto the Electoral College (Punnett, 1992:113). In the leadership contest, the Livingstone candidature was a signal sender candidature, in which Livingstone appreciated that he would not proceed to the Electoral College. The Campaign Group around which Livingstone hoped to base his candidature was now a rump of only 34 members which fell short of the 55 required nominations (Hosken, 2008:276-77). Moreover, they were divided on whether Livingstone should stand at all. Alan Simpson argued that unless their candidate was Benn or Denis Skinner they should not put a candidate forward, a view with which Alice Mahon concurred (Hosken, 2008:277). The presence of Livingstone was likely to take away support that would have been expected to go to Gould, rather than Smith. This is significant as very early in the contest there was considerable debate as to whether Gould himself would secure a sufficient level of support to proceed to the Electoral College9 (Stuart, 2005:230-31). A Smith-Beckett walkover began to seem a real possibility (Punnett, 1992:113). The benefits and costs of Smith winning the leadership without the need to activate the Electoral College would be widely discussed. Kinnock would later admit that he would have preferred it if a contest had been avoided arguing that: ‘it just would have been better if I’d gone almost instantly and the new leader had been in place immediately’ (Stark, 1996:156). This view would explain why Kinnock tried to persuade Gould to withdraw from the leadership contest, and focus all of his campaigning energies on the deputy leadership contest. Kinnock warned Gould that he would only get a ‘fraction of the vote’ and it was therefore ‘better to let him [Smith] have it. He won’t last the course. It’s important that you’re there to pick up the pieces’ (Gould, 1995:253-54). What exactly Kinnock meant by Smith ‘not lasting the course’ was unclear, but it implied that Smith would experience a relatively short leadership tenure, due to either political or health reasons. Gould admitted that his advice ‘certainly proved to be remarkably prescient’ (Gould, 1995:253). Gould ignored the advice to withdraw from the leadership contest. In doing so he ignored the suggestions of his own campaign manager, David Blunkett, who like Kinnock felt that he concentrate on just the deputy leadership contest (Rentoul, 2001:186). However, Gould was determined that Smith should not be allowed to secure the leadership without a contest (Gould, 1995:258). He knew that he could not win the leadership, but he wished to dispute the succession as a means of drawing attention to a range of policy and strategic issues (Stark, 1996:94, 209). He attempted to pitch himself as an ‘ideas man’ who could provide Labour with a choice between his more centre-left vision of radical change, and the consolidation approach that would be provided by Smith as a man of the traditional old right (Punnett, 1992:114). Whereas Smith would offer a cautious campaigning approach, which appeared to preclude a serious evaluation on the future of

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the party, Gould chose to raise the ‘awkward issues’ that Smith would avoid (Stark, 1996:228). When evaluating the evolution of Labour politics over the last decade, Gould argued that Labour had failed to ‘excite and inspire’ the electorate, with an alternative positive vision for Britain, primarily because they had become defined by what they were against, rather than what they were for. That drive to disassociate the party from negative images had manifested itself by proving it was not like Militant Tendency; it was not unilateralist; and it was not a ‘collection of cliques, caucuses, and pressure groups with members who are only interested in a single issue’ (Drower, 1994:331). Gould wanted to offer a more positive reinterpretation of what Labour stood for. His reinterpretation would involve challenging the trajectory of economic and European policy in the late Kinnock era. Gould caused anxiety by claiming that he wanted to ‘put before the party some different views’ especially on economic policy. The implication was that the handling of this, and particularly the controversial shadow budget, for which Smith had been responsible, had been an important factor in their electoral defeat (Punnett, 1992:114; McSmith, 1993:206; Brown, 1997:210). Whilst Smith stated that he would co-operate fully with whichever deputy leadership candidate the Electoral College selected, the criticism that Gould made of economic policy and the shadow budget, intensified his desire to block Gould from being his deputy (Punnett, 1992:114). This may have been a tactical error on behalf of Gould. Initially Beckett did not enter, and Alderman and Carter have speculated on the reasons why: There were even indications that between Beckett’s initial ‘withdrawal’ and the official announcement of Gould’s candidature some Smith supporters suggested that if Gould did not contest the leadership his candidature for the deputy leadership would not be opposed by the Smith camp. (Alderman and Carter, 1992:54) This suggests that Smith may have been willing to tolerate Gould initially. However, by criticising the economic policy strategy adopted prior to the general election, this would have made a Smith-Gould ticket decidedly problematic. If Gould stood down from the leadership nomination, or failed to secure enough support to proceed to the Electoral College, this may indirectly enhance the level of support that he might get in the deputy leadership ballot. Given the controversy caused by the conduct of some trade union leaders in the days after their election defeat, the Smith camp began to realise that it could be politically damaging for Smith to be elected unopposed (Stuart, 2005:229). In the midst of the speculation as to whether Gould would secure enough support, it was leaked that some original backers of Smith within the PLP had been ‘released’ by the Smith camp, and then

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they had switched to Gould to ensure that he had enough backers to activate the Electoral College (Alderman and Carter, 1993:56). When the nominations were closed less than one month after their shattering general election reversal, Beckett, Gould and Prescott had passed the nomination threshold for the deputy leadership ballot, and Grant had been eliminated. Clywd, who had initially entered the deputy leadership nomination, withdrew before nominations closed when her number of presumed supporters began to fall. She had 42 pledges early on in the contest, but by the time of her withdrawal this figure had fallen to 28 (Alderman and Carter, 1992:54). In the leadership nominations, Livingstone was eliminated as expected, but the Electoral College was activated as Gould passed the nomination threshold of 55 by eight votes. Smith secured 162 nominations which represented 60 per cent of the PLP. Gould who had secured the support of only three other members of the shadow Cabinet trailed Smith by nearly 100 Labour MPs (at 63). The Electoral College: A Critique Even before the Electoral College was activated, John Edmonds commented that ‘there is no electoral system which wouldn’t elect John Smith at the moment’ (Stark, 1996:80). When the Electoral College was convened on 18th July, Smith secured the landslide victory that was expected in the leadership election. He obtained the deputy that he wanted as Beckett comfortably defeated Prescott and Gould. For Gould the whole process had been a humiliation. Against Smith, he secured only nine per cent overall; and his performance within the CLPs and the trade union sections was lamentable. His support base within the PLP at 22 per cent was only marginally higher than Benn secured 4 years earlier when challenging Kinnock who, as the last chapter utilized outlined, used all the advantages that incumbency provides. His return of 3.7 per cent amongst the trade unions improved on Benn’s 0.8, although Benn performed better amongst the CLPs– 19.6 per cent to Gould on 2.3 per cent. Gould also suffered the humiliation of coming last in the deputy leadership contest on 14.6 per cent. Beckett won a significant victory, with her overall return of 57 per cent, only slightly down in the return secured by Hattersley in 1983. Prescott secured a marginal improvement in his 23 per cent return against Hattersley, to 28 per cent against Beckett. Prescott attributed his defeat to the fact that Smith preferred Beckett to him, and his view that many within the Labour movement wanted the post to be held by a women. They would dispute the deputy leadership again two years later, with a different outcome. Prescott admitted that his decision to stand in 1992 had created problems between himself and Beckett. He admitted that ‘she never forgave me for standing against her’ (Prescott, 2008:170). Whilst Prescott and Beckett would see their political careers progress onto a decade long period in Cabinet between 1997 and 2007, the dual reversal

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effectively ended the frontbench career of Gould. Smith moved from the Environment portfolio that he had held in the last Parliament under Kinnock, to the new Heritage portfolio, which was widely interpreted as a demotion. Frustrated at his marginalisation and the trajectory of economic and European policy, Gould resigned from the shadow Cabinet in September 199210 (Bevins, 1992:1). He had entered both contests, believing that by disputing the leadership with Smith it would generate a degree of publicity, which would enhance his chances of defeating Beckett and Prescott for the deputy leadership. Alderman and Carter conclude that his dual candidacy was ‘something of a gamble’, which became seen as a significant ‘tactical error’, as it was ‘interpreted as an admission that he expected to be defeated for the leadership, thereby diminishing credibility in his campaign for that post’ (Alderman and Carter, 1993:53). Table 12:

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1992 PLP (30%)

CLPs (30%)

Unions (40%)

Total

77.3 22.7

97.7 2.3

96.3 3.7

91.0 9.0

42.9 31.4 25.7

63.5 23.7 12.9

63.5 29.1 7.4

57.3 28.1 14.6

Party Leader John Smith Bryan Gould Deputy Leader Margaret Beckett John Prescott Bryan Gould Source:

Quinn, 2004:342

In many ways the procedures through which the CLPs and the trade unions engaged in the election was the most intriguing aspect of the process. Smith did particularly well in the CLPs. The sheer scale of his support was surprising given it was the CLPs that had been the bastion of left wing sentiment, and the bedrock of the Benn support when he had challenged Healey for the deputy leadership in 1981. Peter Shore noted that: There had been a genuine shift of sentiment away from the left in the latter Kinnock years but undoubtedly the main factor was the introduction of new rules in the CLPs that gave to all individual

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members the right to vote for the leader – a decision previously left to the activists on the general management committees. (Shore, 1993:176) Whilst the means by which the CLPs participated in the Electoral College did not draw criticism11, the role played by the trade unions certainly did. During the course of the contest, the departing leader; the soon to be elected leader, and the defeated candidate, all indicated their dissatisfaction with the continuing existence of the trade union block vote (Punnett, 1993:270; Rentoul, 2001:186; Cronin, 2004:334). The system was clearly not democratic and was lacking in clarity and consistency. It was left to individual unions to determine how their Electoral College block votes were to be cast, as the party rules did not prescribe a particular procedure (Alderman and Carter, 1993:61). As had been the case in previous Electoral Colleges a diverse range of methods were utilized. These would include a decision at the annual conference of the union – Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT); branch ballots – Manufacturing, Scientific and Finance (MSF); the use of ‘consultation ballots’ in a selected number of branches – Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU); branch consultation which was then supplemented by a random membership sample being asked to participate in a postal ballot – Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU); workplace ballots – Graphical, Paper and Media Union (GPMU); workplace ballots supplemented with a postal back up ballot – General Municipal Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union (GMB); and a full postal ballot – National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) (Alderman and Carter, 1993:61-62). Given the inconsistencies it was hardly surprising that 81 per cent of Labour party members indicated their desire to see the party move towards a system of one member one vote for future leadership elections (Stark, 1996:61). The existing means through which the trade union participated within the Electoral College invited condemnation upon the party. From the Liberal Democrats, Shirley Williams argued that Smith would ‘carry from the day of his election the stigma of not having been elected by a properly democratic method’ and concluded that ‘every year in which he is leader elected by a discredited method is a wasted year in terms of the opposition’ (Stark, 1996: 198). The Conservative Chairman, Norman Fowler, speaking shortly after Smith was declared the victor, argued that Smith was ‘crazy to let himself be elected’ by it and challenged him to show ‘more courage’ and seek re-election under a more democratic system (Stark, 1996:61). The battle to secure one member one vote would become one of the defining features of the leadership tenure of Smith between 1992 and 1994. That it did would have implications for candidates in future leadership elections.

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The Non Candidatures of Brown and Blair Although it was widely expected that Smith would stand as a candidate of the ‘old’ right, it is interesting to speculate on the non-candidatures of the two modernising figures on the ‘new’ right – Gordon Brown and Tony Blair. Although both ultimately chose not to dispute either the leadership or the deputy leadership, the means by which the two modernisers came to their decisions would have massive implications for Labour politics for the next decade and a half. In the immediate aftermath of the election defeat, Brown, Blair and Peter Mandelson, met to evaluate whether they – the modernisers – should make a bid for the leadership positions now, and if so which contest - leadership or deputy, and which candidate – Brown or Blair (Seldon, 2004:143). At this juncture Brown was clearly the stronger candidate. Blair was aware of this and was willing to defer to Brown. Blair felt that this was an opportunity for the modernisers and Brown (Rentoul, 2001:180). Despite the optimism that had characterised some within the party in the lead up to the 1992 general election, Blair had been pessimistic about their chances. He expected them to be defeated and he expected that in the aftermath Brown would challenge Smith for the (vacant) leadership; that he would stand for the deputy leadership; and that Mandelson would orchestrate the media campaign for them both (MacIntyre, 1999:232; Rentoul, 2001:179). During April 10th and 11th, the two days that followed their electoral reversal, Blair tried hard to persuade Brown to stand (Seldon, 2004:134; Bower, 2005:91). He believed that Brown could have defeated Smith. The argument for switching to the modernising Brown, rather than the traditional old right candidature of Smith, was that Smith was representative of the ‘old order’, and as a consolidator he would be an obstacle to the modernising project (MacIntyre, 1999:233; Beckett, 2007:73). Brown was clearly viewed within the Labour movement as a future leader (Seldon, 2004:143). He had enhanced his reputation considerably in the period when Smith had been convalescing after his heart attack in 1988. As Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury he covered for the Shadow Chancellor, Smith, when the opposition responded to the autumn statement given by the then Chancellor, Nigel Lawson. Demonstrating both mastery of his brief and parliamentary skill, Brown was subsequently first in the shadow Cabinet elections; ahead of Smith who came second, and an emerging Blair (ninth) (Beckett, 2007:69-70). Brown came first in the following three shadow Cabinet elections, demonstrating that he possessed appeal within the PLP (Seldon, 2004:143; Bower, 2005:91). Kinnock recognized and admired the political skills of Brown, and later admitted that: From 1988 to 1992, in terms of political prominence and huge capacity, Gordon was absolutely striking. In terms of exposure, performance in

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the House of Commons, recognition in the party and the country, everyone knew Gordon was a very considerable figure.12 (Beckett, 2007:69) Given the general election of 1992 may result in another Labour defeat, political journalists, perhaps attempting to challenge the widespread assumption that Smith would be the only candidate of the right, speculated as to whether the emerging Brown would dispute the leadership with Smith (Seldon, 2004:143). As a consequence of this it was evident by the summer of 1991, that Brown and Smith, or their associates, were conducting a ‘virtual leadership contest’ in preparation of a post-Kinnock succession contest. In his account of how the modernisers saved the Labour party, Philip Gould noted that ‘every move Gordon Brown made was considered to be jostling for the leadership’ (Gould, 1998:111). Supporters of Smith were increasingly agitated by the conduct of Brown. Patricia Hewitt would admit that: ‘the whole thing was so debilitating because every time Gordon appeared on TV, someone in John’s camp would say “Look, it’s another bid for the leadership”.’ (Gould, 1998:111). The manner in which Brown appeared to be showcasing his leadership credentials prompted Smith to search for clarification on the motives of his protégé. Brown assured Smith that he was not seeking to undermine Smith (Seldon, 2004:134). Critically, Brown assured Smith that ‘when the time comes, I won’t stand in your way’. Brown instructed Mandelson to ensure that his loyalty pledge to Smith should find its way into the press (MacInytre, 1999:267; Seldon, 2004:134). Despite the loyalty pledge, leaked before they suffered their electoral defeat, Blair remained convinced that Brown would stand against Smith (Seldon, 2004:134). However, the case against standing was as follows. First, standing involved considerable risk: Brown could not be certain of victory and in all probability would be defeated (Stuart, 2005:224-25). After all, Brown knew that the trade unions would support Smith. Moreover, Brown feared that many Labour parliamentarians on the right were against their group fracturing during the course of a leadership contest (Bower, 2005:9192). Brown risked being ‘the losing candidate’ who had ‘turned on his popular mentor’ and he feared that this might end his leadership prospects for ever (Seldon, 2004:144). Second, Brown was convinced that as the senior partner in the modernising project, he would be the leading post-Smith candidate for the succession, which would presumably occur towards the latter stages of the first term of Labour in office (around 1999-2000). Whilst Brown was tempted to enter the contest, he calculated that ‘his time would come’. Given that he was only 41 and Smith was ‘not a young 53’, as he had ‘a history of heart problems’, Brown had reasons to assume that Smith would retire as leader and possibly Prime Minister within seven years (Seldon, 2004:134).

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Rather than claim that he had given serious thought to standing, but had calculated that he might not emerge victorious and thus was now going to endorse Smith, Brown and his associates would argue that it was loyalty to Smith that explained his non participation. To his biographer, Paul Routledge, he would claim (in 1998) that: I felt I owed a debt of gratitude to John Smith. I felt that I had to be loyal. It was for no other reason. I had worked for him for almost eight years on the front bench, and it was right for me to be loyal…I never thought for a minute of standing against John Smith. (Routledge, 1998:164) With Brown choosing not to stand, Blair did briefly contemplate standing himself as the modernising candidate. However, at that juncture he lacked sufficient standing and would have suffered a humiliating defeat (MacIntyre, 1999:264; Seldon, 2004:144). If neither of the modernisers was to stand for the leadership, then the next best alternative was for one of them to acquire the deputy leadership. Mandelson floated the idea that Brown could run for the deputy leadership on a joint ticket with Smith (MacIntyre, 1999:235). However, there were political limitations in a Smith-Brown ticket – two Scots did not fulfil the need for geographical balance (Seldon, 2004:144). Smith offered Brown a guarantee of the Shadow Chancellorship as a position that was reflective of his status. Moreover, Brown was reluctant to stand for the deputy leadership if Smith did not want him to do so. Rather, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, Smith seemed to prefer either Beckett or briefly perhaps even Blair: Beckett offered gender balance and her allegiance to the left, whilst Blair offered youth and a greater geographical balance than Brown (Rentoul, 2001:181). Having seen the case for Brown undermined by the geographical balance argument, Mandelson now argued the case for Blair standing (MacIntyre, 1999:235). Ultimately, Blair chose not to enter. He realised that the electoral arithmetic was against him as he lacked the necessary appeal across the constituent parts of the Electoral College. As Smith moved towards preferring Beckett to him13, he realised that this would undermine his capacity to secure votes within the PLP (Seldon, 2004:145). It also undermined his appeal amongst the CLPs, where Blair had (at that stage) admittedly ‘little recognition’ (Rentoul, 2001:182). Blair also feared that the trade union movement was largely unsympathetic to the changes in Labour’s trade union policy strategy. This was deemed to be significant as Blair had been responsible for such changes in Labour policy, as it was he who had been shadow Employment Secretary between 1989 and 1992 (Rentoul, 2001:182). In addition to these concerns Blair was not short on advice on whether he should participate. Brown thought Blair could not win (Rentoul, 2001:182).

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Cherie Blair wanted her husband to stand and felt that Brown was ‘holding him back so that Gordon could consolidate his position as Smith’s undeclared successor’ (Rentoul, 2001:182). Despite the fact that the deputy leadership was seen to be a graveyard of political ambitions for aspiring Labour politicians, Brown was ‘adamantly against Blair standing’ as he feared that ‘Blair might make something of the job, outshine him, and establish himself as Smith’s clear successor ahead of him’ (Seldon, 2004:145). Blair may also have been influenced by the sage words of the departing deputy leader, Hattersley, who had once had aspirations for the party leadership. Hattersley advised Blair not to run: I urged him not to stand for deputy because I believed he should be leader of the Labour party one day….I believed he was John’s natural successor, more than Gordon. I then assumed that John was going to be leader for two parliaments and we would almost certainly win the coming election, and there was nothing to be gained from him being just deputy. Everybody who’s been deputy knows it’s a ‘rotten job’ and everybody tells their friends not to do it. Everybody told me not to do it. And I didn’t take their advice. Tony did take mine. (Rentoul, 2001:184) Therefore, both Blair and Brown contemplated standing for the leadership and/or the deputy leadership, before calculating that non-participation was the most appropriate course of action for them in the circumstances. The decisions that they would make; mostly made over the weekend from Friday 10 to Monday 14 April, would critically shape attitudes in the next leadership election (Rentoul, 2001:179). When Blair chose to stand as the modernisers’ candidate in the immediate aftermath of the death of Smith in May 1994, it was on the grounds that ‘Gordon had his chance in 1992 and he ducked it’ (Seldon, 2004:144). As Beckett concludes: Blair thought that Brown had no real grounds for complaint – for his moment had come in 1992, and he had inexplicably chosen to pass it up. Had it been Blair, and not Brown, who stood a chance of defeating Smith in 1992, he would have had a go. But Blair was not as credible in 1992. Brown was, just. Blair never understood why Brown did not throw his hat into the ring. (Beckett, 2007:74) Although Blair had himself calculated that he should not stand for the leadership or deputy leadership, his view of Brown was therefore shaped (negatively) by the 1992 succession contest. As Bower observed:

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Blair was unimpressed. In the opinion of those to be associated with the Blair project Brown lacked the courage to seize the opportunity and break the mould. He was unable, like a star pupil waiting for the offer of a prize, to elbow his way brutally past others…[Blair]…. came to believe that Brown lacked the resilience to withstand personal criticism from his peers, and that he feared failure. He was a coward. The scales had fallen from his eyes. In the future he would be less deferential towards Brown, less obedient. (Bower, 2005:92) Conclusion Notwithstanding the debate about the operation of the Electoral College, it can be argued that Smith did come to the leadership in a relatively strong position. He had secured four significant achievements. First, leadership elections have the potential to be divisive and prolonged. The campaign had been relatively harmonious and thus unity was broadly maintained, and the issue of the succession did not pollute the summer of 1992 as much as it had in 1988. Second, although critics would focus in on the legitimacy of the trade union aspect of the Electoral College, it was clear that Smith had a clear mandate to lead from within the PLP, and a very strong level of support within the CLPs. As Alderman and Carter observed the sheer ‘scale’ of his victory ‘effectively dispelled all of the possible doubts about the legitimacy of his leadership’ (Alderman and Carter, 1993:64). Third, Smith avoided having Gould imposed upon him as an unwanted deputy leader and instead secured his preferred option of a Smith-Beckett ticket. Finally, the shadow Cabinet elections ensured that Smith was surrounded by his supporters: only 4 out of the 18 elected had failed to endorse him (Alderman and Carter, 1993:64). The fact that the contest was viewed as a foregone conclusion was reflective of a relatively long held and widespread understanding within the party that should Kinnock lose the general election then Smith was his natural successor. That Gould struggled to secure the necessary level of nominations to secure entry to the Electoral College was indicative of this. The defining characteristic of the 1992 leadership election was not its impact on the outcome of who won. Rather the dynamics of the contest mattered in the sense that they increased the probability that this was the last time that the Electoral College would operate in this way. The era of block voting was about to end and one member, one vote, advocated by David Owen over a decade earlier, was now centre stage in terms of the next stage of reform. It would be the defining issue of Smith’s tragically short tenure as leader.

FROM SMITH TO BLAIR: THE LABOUR PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 1994

Under the leadership of John Smith the Labour party opened up a solid opinion polling lead over the Conservative party. The seven percentage point deficit that had consigned them to another term in opposition (April 1992) was turned into a four percentage point lead one month into the Smith tenure (August). When the Major administration was forced out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism on Black Wednesday (September), that percentage point lead moved into double digits, as Smith derided John Major as the ‘devalued Prime Minister of a devalued government’ (Timmins, 1992: 1). The difficulties Major experienced in terms of maintaining unity over European integration, during the parliamentary passage of the Maastricht Treaty, meant that Smith was afforded opportunities that few previous Labour leaders of the opposition had experienced. He could chide Major and the Conservative party for their ideological divisions and their economic incompetence. Within 18 months of acceding to the leadership Smith had opened an opinion poll lead of 25 percentage points (Denver, 1998:21). Labour had good cause to believe that their long and painful period of opposition was about to end. Smith was viewed as a Prime Minister in waiting (Pugh, 2010:386). On the morning of 12 May 1994, Smith suffered a heart attack and died. His sudden and tragic death would elicit an extraordinary display of public grief, and parallels were drawn between his passing and that of Hugh Gaitskell a generation earlier, when he too was on the verge of becoming Prime Minister (Alderman and Carter, 1995:438). Writing in The Guardian the day after his death, the acclaimed political journalist, Hugo Young, paid tribute to the integrity of Smith and his unifying capabilities:

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There has not been a less divisive leader, and none had fewer enemies…by comparison with Kinnock, Foot, Callaghan and Wilson, this leader’s tragically shortened years were a time of tranquillity when the party members were finally prepared to let him get on with the job. (Young, 1994:24) Whilst it was fair to comment that Smith would be bequeathing to his successor, whoever that may be, a party ‘that was more united, more popular, and more trusted by the British electorate, than at any time since the 1960s’, the passage of time since reveals that there were more tensions within the Labour party under his leadership than was acknowledged at the time (Rentoul, 2001:222). In the immediate aftermath of their fourth successive electoral reversal, the Labour party had three broad strands of thought regarding their strategic development. First, on the left was a traditionalist strategic approach. This implied that the incoherence of the Kinnock message, being its partial adaptation to the social changes that were a consequence of Thatcherism, had contributed to defeat. Many who subscribed to this mentality had endorsed Bryan Gould for the leadership. His humiliation indicated that the argument that Labour should reassert its socialist credentials was now clearly rejected. Second, on the outer reaches of the social democratic right was the modernising strategic approach. Operating around the alliance of Gordon Brown, Tony Blair and Peter Mandelson, the modernisers believed that Labour was too reliant on the working class and the trade unions, both of which were in decline. They argued that Labour needed to fundamentally change and shake off the Conservative caricature of them as a tax and spend party; and as a party of the poor and the disadvantaged. Central to their interpretation was the recognition that society was now more individualistic and middle class as a consequence of Thatcherism, and that Labour had to break the association between the party and holding people down or back and with levelling down. Their calculating decision(s) to not participate in the leadership and deputy leadership contests of 1992 had ensured that an advocate of a third approach, that of the consolidation strategy was now leader. The essence of the Smith strategy was to argue that no fundamental change was required. Labour had improved their position by three per cent between 1987 and 1992. An improvement of slightly better proportions, aided by Conservative mistakes and the swinging of the electoral pendulum - the ‘one more heave’ argument – would be sufficient (Fielding, 1997b:24). The agenda that the modernisers wished to pursue was stalled by the two year consolidation strategy under Smith. Whilst not widely reported at the time it was clear that Blair, in particular, was frustrated by the emphasis on consolidation and reconciliation under Smith (Cronin, 2004:343-44). Blair became ‘contemptuous’ of Smith, berating his inactivity and complacency

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and complaining that his leadership was insufficiently focused (Rentoul, 2001:222; Seldon, 2004:180). Disregarding the opinion poll lead that Labour had secured under Smith, Blair remained concerned that the Conservatives would reverse this lead as the economy improved in the second part of the Parliament, and that Smith would lead Labour to their fifth successive election defeat. Seldon records that Blair had already decided that he would challenge Smith in the aftermath of another defeat (Seldon, 2004:182). Fate would ensure that Blair would never need to do so and that he could stand for a vacancy. What is clear, however, from evaluating the decisions made in the post-Kinnock succession and the Smith tenure, is that Blair had predetermined that he would stand for the leadership at some time in the near future. Six months before Smith died, MacIntyre confirms that Blair had told Mandelson that the modernisers’ ‘unwritten assumption about Brown’s primacy could not be taken for granted’ (MacIntyre, 1999:253). This was evident from the insights of shadow Cabinet member, Chris Smith, who recalls the days following the death of Smith My reading of it was that there was never any doubt in his mind that he had to be the candidate. And what Gordon decided about whether he was or wasn’t going to stand was really irrelevant. Tony was going to stand. He’d made up his mind...I never picked up a shadow of doubt. I remember him saying to me something like, ‘There are times in life when your ticket comes up with your number on it, and this is one of them’. (Rentoul, 2001:226) Such rhetoric seems inappropriate in the aftermath of the death of such a popular politician, who Blair had publicly praised and privately berated. That he had slipped past Brown as the heir apparent was a view understood by Smith himself. Three days before his fatal heart attack, in a conversation about his health and diet, his advisor David Ward, asked him what would happen? Smith replied: ‘It’s got to be Tony, hasn’t it?’ (Rentoul, 2001:21718). One Member One Vote Whilst not regarded as a moderniser, one of the most defining contributions that Smith would make as leader was to be a modernising reform. Blair would be a beneficiary of his campaign to introduce one member one vote in the selection of the leader and deputy leader, thus ending the trade union block vote. However, whilst moving towards one member one vote in terms of party and deputy leadership selection was relatively straightforward, Smith would put his leadership on the line to secure one member one vote for the selection of parliamentary candidates. A degree of resentment would built up towards Blair from within the Smith camp, with them feeling that Blair failed

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to appreciate the risks that Smith had taken in pushing this through (Seldon, 2004:182). The previous chapter emphasised how during the course of the 1992 leadership election campaign, Smith had indicated his dissatisfaction with the continuing existence of the trade union block vote (Punnett, 1993:270; Rentoul, 2001:186; Cronin, 2004:334). However, addressing the issue of the trade union block vote for leadership and deputy leadership selection was tied to the wider issue of the selection and reselection of parliamentary candidates at constituency level. In the early years of his leadership tenure, Kinnock had attempted to move towards one member one vote for the selection and reselection of parliamentary candidates, and suffered defeat at the 1984 Annual Conference (Shaw, 1994:31). As a consequence Smith was cautious and did not seek any reform at the 1992 Annual Conference. Indeed, the NEC set up a review group whose remit was to examine the nature of the relationship between the party and the trade unions (Stark, 1996:61). With regard to any reform of the Electoral College, Smith had made it clear during the leadership campaign what his preference was. He wanted to eliminate trade union participation within the Electoral College and he proposed a 50-50 formula within which votes would be divided equally between the PLP and the CLPs (Stark, 1996:61). Advocating the removal of the trade unions from the Electoral College and the imposition of one member one vote for parliamentary selection and reselection provoked considerable disquiet amongst trade union leaders, and even his own deputy, Margaret Beckett (Stark, 1996:61-62). Whilst accepting the need for reform of the Electoral College, influential trade union leaders began to mobilise opposition to their removal from it, and the proposed reform of candidate selection. On candidate selection reform, the General Municipal Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union (GMB); the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) all came out against the measure. It looked as though Smith would suffer a damaging conference defeat. Smith indicated to his closest staff members that he would contemplate resigning should he be defeated (Cronin, 2004:344). At this juncture, Smith and the shadow Cabinet crafted a compromise. Smith was now willing to back down from his proposed 50-50 Electoral College in which the trade unions were excluded. Instead he indicated that he was willing to back a reweighted tripartite Electoral College, within which the PLP; the CLPs and the trade unions, each controlled one third of the votes. Within the new 1/3-1/3-1/3 formula, however, block voting would be abolished and would be replaced by a postal ballot of levy payers under a system of one levy payer, one vote (Quinn, 2004:343). In return for Smith conceding that the trade unions could retain a voice in leadership and deputy leadership selection, he then expected the trade unions

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to adopt one member one vote in the selection and reselection of parliamentary candidates (Stark, 1996:61-62). Securing the passage of this compromise would dominate the Annual Conference of 1993. The new 1/3-1/3-1/3 Electoral College formula1 passed relatively easily, but Smith only narrowly managed to secure the passage of the proposed reform of parliamentary candidate selection. On the latter, the intervention of John Prescott has entered the folklore of Labour party history.2 That Smith asked Prescott to deliver the case for the one member one vote reforms for parliamentary candidate selection was tactical. To have the argument for replacing the block vote put forward by ‘a quintessentially old Labour figure such as Prescott’ was likely to be more persuasive than using a moderniser such as Blair or Brown (Cronin, 2004:348-49). Smith warned Prescott that should he be defeated he would resign. Without an autocue Prescott delivered ‘the speech of his life’ as ‘words tumbled in a torrent’, but ‘people knew what he meant’ and he was to receive a ‘standing ovation’ (Brown, 1997:221). Prescott pitched his argument, not so much on the principle of the reforms proposed, but on the political fallout should the reform be rejected. Emphasising how defeat for Smith would be exploited by the Conservative party and the right wing press, Prescott passionately encouraged conference to support the reforms: There is no doubt that this man, our leader, put his head on the block by saying, basically ‘I fervently believe – because that is what he believes – in the relationship, and a strong one, between the trade unions and the Labour party’. He has put his head on the block. Now is our time to vote. Give us a bit of trust and let us vote to support him. (Prescott, 2008:177) Smith secured the passage of the reform by a small margin. Prescott was lauded for his loyalty, which was to be critical in winning him the deputy leadership less than a year later.3 What was the reaction of Blair to this ‘modernising’ reform? Blair and indeed Brown had favoured the 50-50 formula split between the PLP and CLPs for the Electoral College (the initial position adopted by Smith) (Rentoul, 2001:211). Blair was contemptuous of the concessional mentality of Smith. He regarded the compromise that Smith fashioned as a ‘disaster’ and that Smith had backed down too much in the face of pressure from trade unionists and traditionalists on the left (Rentoul, 2001:211; Seldon, 2004:182). Candidates and Non Candidates The Electoral College that would determine the succession to Smith was thus significantly different to that which had elected him. Whilst the reweighting of the Electoral College, and the introduction of one member one vote, had

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dominated the debates outlined above, there was another significant amendment to leadership selection that occurred in 1993. The damage caused by the challenge of Tony Benn to Kinnock in 1988 had resulted in an amendment to increase the threshold for nominations from 5 per cent to 20 per cent. This figure had applied in the post-Kinnock succession contest, and as the previous chapter outlined, there was a real possibility of Smith being the only candidate who could pass the 20 per cent threshold for the leadership nomination. Although Gould did just manage to secure his passage to the Electoral College the concerns that existed about the danger of Smith being elected by a coronation had been raised as an issue of real concern (Alderman and Carter, 1993:51-53). As a consequence as part of the 1993 reforms of the Electoral College, it was decided that the nominations for vacancies should be reduced to 12.5 per cent, in an attempt to ensure a contest, although the 20 per cent threshold remained to deter challenges to incumbent leaders. The other amendment was that the parliamentary section, which was now increased to one third, would comprise both members of the PLP at Westminster, and Labour members of the European Parliament (Quinn, 2005:809). Although the Labour party was in mourning in the aftermath of the death of Smith, there was a ‘frenzy of media speculation’ on who his successor might be (Thorpe, 2008:243). Attention was focused around the following eight names. From the new left there was once again the former Leader of the Greater London Council, Ken Livingstone, and from a unilateralists position was the former shadow Defence Secretary, Denzil Davies. From the old/soft left, there was the now acting leader, Margaret Beckett; the shadow Transport Secretary, Prescott, and the shadow Trade and Industry Secretary, Robin Cook. From the consolidating social democratic right was the shadow Foreign Secretary, Jack Cunningham, and from the modernising right was the shadow Chancellor, Brown and the shadow Home Secretary, Blair. Livingstone had attempted to secure enough nominations to proceed to the Electoral College in 1992 but had fallen a long way short of the participation threshold. Mobilising his candidature around the infrastructure of the Campaign Group, he launched his campaign with Jeremy Corbyn as his running mate for the deputy leadership. Their campaign was to last three days in mid June, whereupon they withdrew realising that they would be hopelessly short of the threshold. They supported Beckett instead (Hosken, 2008:279). The other outside and backbench candidature came from Davies, who despite the overwhelming evidence that he would not secure enough nominations to proceed, decided to remain in the succession contest, on a unilateralist dominated platform. The rumoured candidacy of Cunningham also floundered. He initially refused to rule himself out but such was the strength of the expected support for Blair on the social democratic right and the modernising right, he chose not to stand (Foley, 2002:107).

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Before analysing the conflict on the old/soft left between Beckett and Prescott, which resulted in both standing for both positions, and the ‘agreement’ that Blair and not Brown should stand as the candidate for leader from the modernising wing of the party, it is worth considering the other non-candidature: that of Cook. Of the old/soft left, Cook was widely admired for his parliamentary skills and his effectiveness as a shadow minister (Thorpe, 2008:243). He had good reason to believe that he should be viewed as a credible candidate as he had come first in the most recent shadow Cabinet elections. This suggested that should he stand he would have a chance of passing the nomination threshold. Initial enquires about his level of projected support, (obtained on his behalf by Peter Hain), indicated that he could probably obtain the backing of 70 of his fellow Labour parliamentarians. From within this it was assumed that he could count on the backing of five members of the shadow Cabinet: David Blunkett; Frank Dobson; Michael Meacher; Ron Davies and Joan Lestor (Kampfner, 1998:98-99). However, when Cook became aware that the sympathisers such as Chris Smith and Mo Mowlem had already aligned themselves to Blair he decided not to enter the contest (Kampfner, 1998:99). During the short period of time whilst he was being considered as a possible candidate there was much speculation on his electoral disadvantages, which was a code for his ‘physical appearance and poor television image’ (Alderman and Carter, 1995:442). Upon making his decision to step aside, Cook confided in Hain that apparently I am not ‘pretty enough’4 (Kampfner, 1998:99). The Traditionalists: Beckett and Prescott Upon the death of Smith, Beckett as the incumbent deputy leader had assumed the position as acting leader of the Labour party. She was to be widely praised for the dignity and poise that she displayed in the immensely difficult circumstances that she faced. It was noted that she dealt with Prime Ministers Questions competently and had few difficulties in terms of shadow Cabinet leadership; party management; or the electioneering aspect of leadership (at the time of Smith’s death Labour were gearing up for the European Elections) (Brown, 1997:234). Prescott himself would admit that she ‘did an excellent job’ and showed herself to be ‘calm and organised’, before ruining the complement by stating that she was ‘far better than some had expected’ (Prescott, 2008:184). Beckett was in an awkward tactical dilemma. The groundswell of support for Blair, that emerged almost instantaneously, indicated that she was highly unlikely to be able to defeat him. Moreover, she had a mandate for the deputy leadership that was unaffected (technically) by the loss of the incumbent leader. Given her conduct as acting leader it would have been politically difficult for anyone to challenge her for the deputy leadership directly (Alderman and Carter, 1995:442-43). However, she was ambitious to

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lead5 and was under strong encouragement to stand for the leadership from within the PLP.6 In addition to her political ambition and the encouragement that she was receiving was a degree of political and personal pride. She was immensely disappointed that the political press were discounting her as a possible successor (Stark, 1996:105). Beckett decided to ‘vacate’ the position of deputy leader, and stand for the leadership and the deputy leadership7 (Stark, 1996:94). This was a high risk strategy. She was unlikely to win the leadership. By the strategy that she was now adopting the likelihood of the deputy leadership being contested was dramatically increased, as was the likelihood of her losing (Alderman and Carter, 1995:443). Her approach impacted upon the approach taken by Prescott. In his autobiography, Prescott outlines the failure of the traditionalist old/soft left to construct a ‘deal’: I offered Margaret a deal. She was obviously going to stand for leader, having been doing the job, so I said I would only stand for deputy if she didn’t stand for leader and deputy. A women and a man at the top seemed a good idea. But Margaret declined. She decided to stand for both positions, deputy as some form of assurance I’m sure. She may well have faced some pressure from some of the feminists, the sisters. Maybe they wouldn’t let her stand down. So I decided to stand for both positions. (Prescott, 2008:184) Therefore, it can be argued that Beckett and Prescott undermined whatever small chance that the old/soft left may have had by both standing for the vacant leadership post, and fracturing the non-modernisers (i.e. Blair) vote in two. Their decision to stand for both the leadership and the deputy leadership reflected the fact that although both expected to lose in the leadership contest, failure to stand for it would give the other an advantage in seeking to secure the deputy leadership. The Modernisers: Brown and Blair…or…Blair and Brown? The Blair bandwagon, partly driven by media perceptions, made it highly unlikely that either Beckett or Prescott would be able to defeat him (Stark, 1996:94). The only ‘candidate’ was the other leading moderniser, Brown. As the previous chapter emphasised between 1988 and 1992 Brown had established himself as a serious political figure within the Labour movement, and was widely viewed (at that time) as the next leader after Smith (if Labour lost in 1992); and after Kinnock if Labour did enter government (Seldon, 2004:143; Bower, 2005:91; Beckett, 2007:69-70). As of 1992 it was clear that Brown was the senior figure within the modernisers’ faction, and that Blair was the junior and subordinate figure (Foley, 2002:103; Rawnsley, 2010:59). Prescott went as far as to say that prior to 1992 they had a ‘teacher-student’

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relationship (Prescott, 2008:186). Blair was frustrated by the caution that Brown displayed when faced with the opportunity to dispute the leadership with Smith in 1992. Despite this Brown believed, as did his supporters, that his ‘claim to the leadership was prior and more solid’ (Cronin, 2004:376). It was alleged that a ‘secret pact’ had been struck between them, (dating back to 1992), that ‘neither would oppose the other’. Crucially it implied ‘that Brown was to have first crack at the top prize’ (Cronin, 2004:376). Brown would see his leadership ambitions evaporate in two stages. Stage one was the period between 1992 and 1994 when their respective political fortunes would be significantly altered. Stage two would be the period in the immediate aftermath of the death of Smith, during which a short series of positive assumptions were attached to Blair, against which Brown could not compete. Mapped on top of these two stages were to be competing temperaments: the decisive Blair matched against the cautious or indecisive Brown. In the period between 1992 and 1994 Brown was to be constrained and undermined by political circumstances just as his subordinate Blair was to be empowered. Two key factors can be identified to explain this and they relate to the allocation of shadow ministerial portfolios. The first factor relates to the fact that Brown succeeded Smith as shadow Chancellor. In this role, Brown was described as ‘wading through treacle’ (Naughtie, 2002:54). To the modernisers Labour had lost the 1992 general election because the Conservative party and the right wing press were still able to exploit the tax and spend imagery. This impeded the appeal of the party to middle class voters. Brown needed and wanted to reverse this perception. However, this was politically difficult as the primary architect of their economic policy strategy between 1987 and 1992 was now his leader (Seldon, 2004:183). More significantly in terms of future party leadership aspirations, seeking to reverse the tax and spend imagery did not make him popular (Routledge, 1998:155). Depressing expectations and refusing to agree to the spending demands of shadow ministerial colleagues changed ‘conditions negatively’ for Brown, according to Kinnock (Beckett, 2007:84). Seldon argues that the impact of this politically sensitive responsibility was compounded by the ‘abrupt’ manner in which Brown dealt with colleagues, which ‘needlessly’ lost him support (Seldon, 2004:183). The second factor relates to the fact that Blair was allocated the Home Office brief where he excelled (Beckett, 2007:84). With his ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ sound-bite, Blair had proved himself to be highly effective in an area of supposed Conservative electoral dominance. It was noted that Blair had developed into a ‘substantial front bencher’ who critically now could be defined as a ‘national figure’ (Naughtie, 2002:54). Therefore, in the stage one period between 1992 and 1994, whilst Brown was making enemies Blair was cultivating allies and admirers (Foley, 2002:105).

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Whereas Brown was becoming perceived as ‘gloomy, remote, negative’, Blair was increasingly viewed as ‘young, personable and able to touch the nerve of the nation’8 (Seldon, 2004:187). These factors would impact on the second stage – the time period immediately after the death of Smith – when momentum was to swing dramatically against Brown and in favour of Blair. Despite the improved political status of Blair in the period between 1992 and 1994 it is clear that Brown still expected to be the modernisers’ candidate (Gould, 1998:111; Rentoul, 2001:226). On the day of the death, Brown would meet with his leading supporters, including Alistair Darling and Nick Brown, to consider how to orchestrate his campaign for the leadership (Bower, 2005:126). As Brown considered his tactics, Bower records that there was no mention of the ‘agreement’ between Brown and Blair, that Blair would stand aside, or that they would not campaign against one another (Bower, 2005:123-24). Within hours of the death, Brown met with Mandelson, whose neutrality during the course of that first meeting, Brown was to misread for support (Bower, 2005:125). However, whilst the Brown camp made their initial calculations, it was clear that there was a considerable media momentum to proclaim Blair as the strongest candidate for the succession (Alderman and Carter, 1995:452). Two days after Smith died, Mandelson appeared on Channel 4’s A Week in Politics. When discussing the leadership succession he asked: Who will play best at the box office, not simply appeal to traditional supporters and customers of the Labour Party....who would fully maximise support for the party in the country? (Routledge, 1998:156) He appeared to construct a question that others should answer in the knowledge that the majority would answer Blair. Brown and his supporters were appalled by the behaviour of Mandelson, and his insinuation that Blair was more likely to broaden the support of Labour in middle England (Routledge, 1998:156). However, of this Rentoul has intelligently observed that: The illogic and paranoia of the Brown team’s reaction speaks volumes for the bruised emotions of their man. The idea that maximising support for Labour should be code for Blair meant, on the face of it, that they accepted that Brown would not be such an effective vote winner. (Rentoul, 2001:229) The Brown camp had implicitly acknowledged the superiority of Blair over Brown in terms of media engagement9 (Cronin, 2004:376). The media responded positively to Blair, and they had begun to gravitate towards him as

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the new media representation of Labour, seeking him out for comments, statements, and profiles. Brown had a political style that was less engaging than that of Blair. The media was not responding so well to his tendency to allow his media engagements to be dominated by ‘treasury statistics and analysis of tax regimes’ (Foley, 2002:106). As Foley observes, Brown ‘found it difficult to compete with Blair’s telegenic properties or with the public attention and professional leverage’ that would accompany them (Foley, 2002:105). Critically Blair was more attractive to middle England. By dent of his social background and his professional training, and a model marriage of middle class professionals, he was the embodiment of those types of voters that Labour desperately needed to acquire in order to win the next general election (Foley, 2002:105). The family man imagery contrasted sharply with Brown the bachelor10 (Beckett, 2007:84). The cumulative effect of their contrasting media portrayals in the time prior to the death of Smith meant that Blair was in the political ascendant at the moment in time when people had to choose between the two modernisers. Timing was thus crucial and this was a point that Mandelson highlighted in a letter that he sent to Brown four days after the death of Smith. The main thrust of the letter was: Timing is bad.....you have a problem in not appearing to be the front runner....if... Tony felt he had to stand and you did too...it would be a gift to our enemies...you would be appearing to come in as second runner, you would be blamed by the media for creating the split...the media would attack you....your standing in the party would suffer...(if you stand)....I could not guarantee success...you either have to escalate rapidly...or you need to implement a strategy to withdraw with enhanced position, strength and respect... (Routledge, 1998:156-58) Mandelson was reflecting the growing movement towards Blair. Whilst appearing to attempt to adopt a position of support, Mandelson was not so much as trying to broker a deal, as advancing the cause of Blair (Bower, 2005:127). The desertion of Mandelson was followed by the realisation that even figures not traditionally associated with the modernising wing were endorsing Blair, such as Chris Smith, Blunkett and Dobson (Bower, 2005:132). Even senior Scottish parliamentarians, such as Donald Dewar and George Robertson, were recognising that Blair might be the better candidate (Bower, 2005:127). The day before Brown publicly would announce he would not be a candidate, a BBC poll of Labour party members indicated that 47 per cent wanted Blair, 15 per cent preferred Prescott and only 11 per cent would endorse Brown (Bower, 2005:139).

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Faced with the inevitability of defeat, Brown reconciled himself to not standing. However, he decided that he would attempt to stand down on specified terms. Brown wanted to secure two agreements with Blair – first, on the parameters of his role in a future Blair led government; and second, on the timing of when Blair would stand down. It was apparently agreed that Brown would become Chancellor, and Brown was led to believe that he would have a degree of autonomy in domestic, economic and social matters to pursue what was described as the fairness agenda. On this aspect of the so-called Granita deal11, Seldon observes that: The hard negotiations over this issue can be clearly seen in a draft of the private briefing note, which came out into the open in 2003 as part of the continuing war between the camps. Originally drawn up a few days before Granita, the aim of the document was to enable Blair and Brown to present a unified view to the press on what they had agreed. Time and time again, the two men went over the draft as they argued and bargained over the ‘deal’ between them. In the leaked draft, the original typed text reads, ‘Gordon has spelled out the fairness agenda – social justice, employment opportunities and skills – which he believes should be the centrepiece of Labour’s programme and Tony is in full agreement with this, and that the party’s economic and social policies should be developed on this basis.’ However, using a black felt-tipped pen, Brown has scribbled out ‘Tony is in full agreement with this’ and replaced it with ‘Tony has guaranteed this will be pursued’. Despite Brown’s repeated efforts to extract this ‘guarantee’ Blair stood firm, and the words ‘in full agreement’ remained. This left considerable room for uncertainty as to the exact degree of control that Blair had ceded to Brown over economic and social policy. (Seldon, 2004:193-94) On the question of the succession there is also considerable confusion. Those in the Brown camp claim that there was a clear understanding that if Brown stepped aside then Blair would agree to stand down as leader (and Prime Minister) after a certain period of time. When he did step down Blair would endorse Brown for the succession (Beckett, 2007:79). On the date, the Brown camp asserted that a firm undertaking was given that Blair would be Prime Minister for no longer than seven years – that is either 2003 if an election in 1996 or 2004 if an election in 1997 (Seldon, 2004:194). In his widely praised analysis of the political marriage of Blair and Brown, The Rivals, James Naughtie identifies the problem in how the ‘deal’ should be interpreted: There is no firm evidence of what was said. Brown believed he had a near promise of the succession; Blair insists that nothing so clear could

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have been offered, and wasn’t. The understanding was more like a misunderstanding. (Naughtie, 2002:73) Even if there was a deal on the succession date, Brown must have known that Blair might not honour it. Circumstances change and anyway Brown could not be certain that he would be the only credible candidate by 2003 or 200412 (Beckett, 2007:79). Regardless of whether a deal on the succession was or was not agreed, it was clear that Brown wanted his ‘withdrawal’ to be presented as an act of self-sacrifice in the interests of party unity (Bower, 2005:145-46). Bower claims that Brown watched the ITN News at Ten coverage on the evening of his withdrawal. He was dismayed to hear their political editor, Michael Brunson, claim that he had withdrawn because he knew he would have lost. According to Bower, at that point: Brown began to shout at the television. The shout became a scream. He lost all self-control. He rushed into his private office. Slamming the door he furiously kicked the furniture, ranting a string of obscenities. He was outraged by the truth. The antidote was to conjure a fiction. (Bower, 2005:145-46) What is intriguing about the Blair-Brown deal, or no deal, is the position adopted by Brown. It was within the tradition and culture of the party that senior figures should put themselves up for election to the party leadership. For example, no deals were struck between Gaitskell, Morrison and Bevan in 1955; Wilson had to defeat both Brown and Callaghan in 1963; six members of the Wilson Cabinet had put themselves forward candidates in 1976, including four aligned to the right, Callaghan, Jenkins, Healey, and Crosland. Participating and accepting the democratic will of the Labour movement, be it through a PLP ballot, or through the Electoral College, was the norm. By not participating, Brown put himself alongside Benn in 1980. Then Benn put forward the argument that the parliamentary ballot was illegitimate as a reason for not entering the succession race when he had been expected to do so. Beckett concludes that supporters of Blair have since put forward two interpretations of why Brown stood down (Beckett, 2007:80-81). Charles Clarke, who later served in the Blair Cabinet and developed an abiding hostility towards Brown, argues that Brown feared being defeated (Rawnsley, 2010:62). As early as 1995 Clarke argued that: I started out believing that Gordon should not run for the leadership, but I have subsequently come round to the view that it would have been better if he had, and actually been beaten. That would have humiliated him and meant that Tony did not owe him a debt. (Sopel, 1995:189)

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Running alongside the Clarke theory that Brown extracted more than he was entitled to from Blair, was the indecision charge: Brown failed at the crucial moment, as he always will fail at crucial moments, because he lacks the decisiveness and self-belief without which you cannot do the top job – just as he failed to challenge John Smith in 1992. (Beckett, 2007:81) With Brown not entering the succession contest, the PLP, (and Labour members of the European Parliament), had four candidates from which to select from in the nomination stage. As expected Blair came a comfortable first; both Beckett and Prescott were nominated for both the deputy and the leadership, and Davies was eliminated from the leadership contest. Amongst the PLP, Blair secured 154 backers; Prescott 46; Beckett 42 and Davies 7. For the deputy party leadership Beckett secured 106 to Prescott on 101 (Alderman and Carter, 1995:443). A Mandate for Modernisation: Blair and the Electoral College Whilst not as inevitable as with Smith in 1992, there was little to excite and enthuse during the campaign, as it was clear that Blair was going to be the victor. The only issue of significance would be the size of his victory and the breakdown with the constituent parts of the Electoral College. In the event, Blair secured an impressive 57 per cent of the Electoral College. His return was strongest within the PLP section (at 60 per cent), although that was only marginally ahead of his 58 per cent return in the CLPs. His smallest return was at 52 per cent within the trade union section, but this was still a significant majority. Seldon records that Blair derived considerable pleasure from the fact that he polled nearly three times more than Prescott amongst the trade unions, which given that Prescott was ‘the friend of the unions’ was a significant return (Seldon, 2004:198). Given the expectation that Blair was going to win, the two most intriguing aspects of the Electoral College in 1994 were first, who would win the deputy leadership election; and, second, how would the college perform in its first use since the one member one vote reforms of 1993? The deputy leadership contest, just as had been the case in 1992, was influenced by the likely outcome of the leadership contest. Then Beckett had benefitted from the fact that she was the preferred candidate of Smith. This time she was to suffer from the fact that she was not the preferred candidate of Blair.13 Although Brown preferred Beckett, Blair had serious reservations about her (Rentoul, 2001:242). During the course of the campaign she would describe herself as being proud to be a left-winger14, whilst arguing that her (re-) election would represent continuity with the objectives of Smith. Given that she was accused of displaying a lack of loyalty to Smith during the one

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member one vote reforms this claim jarred with some (Alderman and Carter, 1995:448). Whereas Beckett had failed to show loyalty to the leadership on one member one vote Prescott had clearly done so (Gould, 1998:208; Cronin, 2004:380). Furthermore, during the course of the campaign it was clear that Blair and Beckett were not as one on their responses to Conservative employment legislation. Beckett implied that we ‘have to get rid of the framework put in place by the Tories...(we)...need to sweep the board clear and start again’. This convinced Blair that she would be a ‘liability’ as deputy leader15 (Rentoul, 2001:242). Table 13:

Candidate Support in the Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1994 PLP (1/3)

CLPs (1/3)

Unions (1/3)

Total

60.5 19.6 19.9

58.2 24.4 17.4

52.3 28.4 19.3

57.0 24.1 18.9

53.7 46.3

59.4 40.6

56.6 43.4

56.5 43.5

Party Leader Tony Blair John Prescott Margaret Beckett Deputy Leader John Prescott Margaret Beckett Source:

Quinn, 2004:342

With more support from shadow Cabinet colleagues, and the backing of the expected winner, Prescott managed to secure the deputy leadership at the third time of asking. Prescott also benefitted from the fact that he ran a more focused campaign than Beckett. Alderman and Carter note that: Her ambition sharpened by having officially assumed the leadership on Smith’s death, Beckett’s determination to be regarded as a serious candidate for the leadership led her to pay less attention to the deputy leadership campaign. In this and other ways she conveyed the impression that she regarded the deputy’s post as a poor consolation prize. Moreover, her reluctance to commit herself to serving in a Blair shadow Cabinet, were she to lose both contests, was interpreted by some as petulance. Prescott, on the other hand, happily discussed his

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ambitions and plans for both posts. The contrast between the two operated to his advantage. (Alderman and Carter, 1995:447) The second intriguing aspect of the 1994 leadership election was how the new Electoral College performed. The protracted nature of Electoral College elections was deemed to have been problematic in 1988 and had been a contributing factor in the shortening of the contest in 1992. Then Kinnock had resigned in mid-April and the Electoral College was convened in mid July. The shift to one member one vote had the potential to lengthen the process considerably16 (Alderman and Carter, 1995:438). In 1992, however, one of the main concerns about a shortened time period for the contest was the perception that trade union barons were orchestrating a ‘shoe-in’ for Smith. One of the other reasons for the hasty decision was political – a vacuum in terms of leadership was perceived to be damaging as it meant that effective opposition was not being mounted. On the latter point Labour did not want a protracted and potentially divisive leadership contest to undermine the significant progress that had been made since 1992 (Alderman and Carter, 1995:439). A swift resolution to their leadership void would allow them to sustain their opinion poll lead and exploit the turbulence being experienced by the Major government. On the former point the concern about the abuse of the trade union block vote no longer applied. As the previous three chapters demonstrate, the power of the trade union block vote had enabled union barons to shape the trajectory of leadership contests. With the block vote removed trade unions were responsible for conducting their own ballots (Stark, 1996:63). Their role in the formative stages of the succession of the contest was significantly different than say in 1983 and 1992. Then Kinnock and Smith were front runners partly because of the known support of significant trade union leaders. In 1994 the reason why Blair was immediately perceived to be the front runner was because he was assumed to be the most electorally attractive. Many trade union leaders were reluctant to endorse Blair as they had reservations about his modernising views on the links between the party and the unions. However, on the other hand, the knowledge that Blair was a strong candidate amongst trade union members put trade union leaders in a tactical bind. They feared that with the voting patterns of each trade union being published, their authority would be undermined were the figures to reveal that a majority of their members had rejected their recommendations.17 John Edmonds, who was no ally of Blair, explained the dilemma: Union leaders were confused and demoralised. They might not have liked Blair personally but there was no concerted effort to stop him because it became very obvious to us after John Smith’s death that he was going to win, and when Brown withdrew, it indicated this even

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more strongly. What else could we do? Most of us thought Labour could not win under Prescott. I tried to hold it together for Margaret Beckett but it didn’t make any difference. (Seldon, 2004:197) The shift to one member one vote did not completely neutralise the issue of whether the trade union section was conducted appropriately however. The new procedures determined at the Annual Conference the previous autumn had established the principle that members should participate on a one member one vote basis, but had not laid down procedures on how unions should set about balloting their members. Fears that discrepancies between the procedures adopted by different trade unions would leave the outcome open to ‘ridicule’ or even ‘legal injunctions’ proved to be unfounded. In the end, the vast majority of trade unions held postal ballots, although a small selection were permitted to employ alternative systems with the approval of the NEC (Alderman and Carter, 1995:439). The new Electoral College had emerged largely unscathed from its first outing, and in considerably better shape than its discredited predecessor, although teething problems were identified by Alderman and Carter: Satisfaction with the 1994 exercise was inevitably tempered by the low turnout; the hoped-for mass mobilisation of trade unionists did not materialise. There were also several specific features which drew media criticism. Adverse comment was attracted by the number of votes MPs and MEPs could cast: most were entitled to vote in all three sections of the Electoral College by virtue of individual party, trade union and socialist society membership as well as their parliamentary status. As a result, several MPs publicly urged their colleagues to vote only once. Attracting less public attention, but affecting far more individuals, was the fact that many ordinary party members also possessed votes as trade unionists or socialist society members. David Blunkett, party chair for 1994, officially defended the system, but the possibility of such multiple voting exposed the party to embarrassment. (Alderman and Carter, 1995:450-51) Conclusion The 1994 leadership election was a succession contest of immense importance to the ideological trajectory of the Labour party. Previous leadership elections had been perceived to be contests between candidates identifiable with the left (Wilson in 1960 and 1963; Greenwood, 1961; Foot, 1976 and 1980; Benn 1976 and 1988; Silkin 1980; Heffer 1983 and Gould 1992) and the right (Gaitskell 1960 and 1961; Brown 1963; Callaghan 1963 and 1976; Healey 1976 and 1980; Jenkins 1976; Crosland 1976; Shore 1980 and 1983; Hattersley 1983), with Kinnock being perceived as a candidate of

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the left in 1983 and the centre/centre right in 1988. Table two in the introduction to this book identified the ideological disposition of candidates and their bases of PLP support. Within this those candidates of the right between 1960 and 1992 were identifiable with what has become viewed as the ‘old’ right (Plant, Beech and Hickson, 2004:2-3). The 1994 contest was the first succession contest to be disputed by a candidate of the new right in the shape of Blair. It was a triumph for the modernisers and a reflection of the importance of timing and context in politics. The timing was crucial. After a decade and a half in opposition Labour was willing to align itself to the pragmatism of Blair and his focus on the importance of electability rather than ideological purity. The context was also crucial. The one member one vote reforms of 1993 made the Electoral College a more hospitable terrain to a candidate like Blair, rather than the block voting dominated Electoral College of 1981 to 1993. The modernising Blair had defeated the (marginalised) parliamentary left; the extra-parliamentary left and the trade unions. There has been a considerable amount of comment on the deal between Blair and Brown to make sure that the modernisers on the social democratic right did not fracture, but less attention has been given to the non-deal on the left. Prescott offered not to stand for the leadership, which would siphon off votes from Beckett but not Blair; on the proviso that Beckett did not stand for the deputy leadership. When Beckett declined the offer, Prescott decided to stand for both positions (Prescott, 2008:184). Therefore, it can be argued that Beckett and Prescott undermined whatever small chance that the old/soft left may have had by both standing for the vacant party leadership post, and thus fracturing the non-modernisers (i.e. Blair) vote in two. Blair was thus able to claim a resounding victory in which his lead over the second place candidate was over 30 per cent overall, with equal margins of preference being secured in each component part of the Electoral College. It is unlikely that an agreed candidate, or what Kinnock described to me as the ‘Bescott’ candidate, could have stopped Blair from claiming the leadership. However, it could be argued that by securing an agreement for Beckett to run for the leadership and Prescott for the deputy leadership, the old/soft left could have maximised their vote more effectively, and critically reduced the margin of Blair’s victory to a smaller amount. Blair had a more ‘legitimate’ claim to lead by the fact that he had ‘handily’ defeated both Beckett and Prescott (Stark, 1996:159). Of his relationship with his defeated rivals – Beckett and Prescott - Cronin concluded: Blair emerged from the leadership contest with his reputation enhanced, with a solid mandate, with his powerful rival firmly a member of the team, and with a loyal deputy who brought a following

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of his own, and without having compromised on the key issues of the modernisers agenda. (Cronin, 2004:380) However, whilst Beckett and Prescott would play important roles within the Blair Cabinets of 1997 to 2007, the pivotal relationship would be that of Blair with Brown. Their close working relationship of the previous decade would be soured by the events of May to July 1994, although the chapter acknowledges that the dynamics between them had been changing since 1992 anyway. The outcome between the two leading modernisers would ensure that Brown viewed himself as a near equal partner in new Labour, although he was to be left feeling ‘abandoned’ by the manner through which the deal was determined. As Foley noted the circumstances surrounding how Brown was displaced as a party leadership contender would be a significant conditioning factor in the development of the Blair government post-1997 (Foley, 2002:106).

FROM BLAIR TO BROWN: THE CORONATION OF BROWN AS LABOUR PARTY LEADER 2007

By the time of his resignation as Labour party leader and Prime Minister in the summer of 2007, perceptions of Tony Blair had become dominated by Iraq and the war on terror; his alliance with President George W. Bush; sleaze and the cash for honours scandal; and his fraught relationship with his eventual successor, Gordon Brown. However, the difficulties that Blair would experience in the second part of his period as Prime Minister, should not be allowed to overshadow the manner in which new Labour had redefined the landscape of British electoral politics (Heppell, 2008b:578). The twentieth century had been the Conservative century and they claimed that they were the natural party of government and the party of economic competence. Since the time of Wilson the Conservative party had weaved a narrative of Labour economic incompetence around the devaluation of 1967; the financial crisis of 1976; and the Winter of Discontent in 1979. Once Blair acquired the leadership in 1994 he began modernising the party. Through the rhetoric of new Labour, the modernisers set about disassociating the party from its past; accepting aspects of the Thatcherite revolution, and projecting Blair as the heir to Thatcher, (in terms of leadership style), as a means of recruiting disgruntled Conservative voters (Heppell, 2008b:578). Buckler and Dolowitz argue that evoking the rhetoric of ‘old’ and ‘new’ was central to the modernisers’ ideological renewal project1 (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009:16). They argue that the utilisation of the term ‘new’ allowed the modernisers to distance their Labour party from ‘old’ Labour which was perceived to be ‘economically inefficient’ and ‘insufficiently committed to individual autonomy’ due to its adherence to ‘structural interventions’ geared towards reducing inequality. That old/new rhetoric demonstrated that new Labour would be an enabler, rather than an engineer which was an old Labour approach (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009:17). New Labour was thus

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cloaked in electoral calculations of what was politically feasible, rather than what was ideologically desirable. For example, central to the new Labour rhetoric was the neutralisation of the perceived negatives around which the Conservative narrative could be constructed. Critically the abandonment of Clause IV2 and the shift towards the rhetoric of the state as an enabler rather than a provider or social engineer was central to limiting the tax issue. The shift provided an internal and historical comparison as it allowed new Labour to differentiate themselves from the class bound and sectional appeal of old Labour, as well as the perceived economic policy failings associated with Labour in office in the 1940s, 1960s and 1970s (McAnulla, 2006:122). Central to the modernisers’ analysis was a need to respond to the fact that the working class was declining as a percentage of the electorate, whilst the middle classes were expanding. Labour needed, therefore, to recognise that the era of class driven political cleavages shaping electoral behaviour had ended. Class configured partisan loyalties had been eroded and Labour needed to find a response to ‘issue’ based voting (Shaw, 2007:153-54). As such, new Labour became obsessed with appealing to middle England. Hay argues that new Labour set about making an accommodation with Thatcherism in key areas of economic policy, social policy, privatisation and trade union reform (Hay, 1997:372-79). This process of accommodation involved determining the preferences of key voters through focus groups, and then designing policies that reflected the preferences of such voters (Hay, 1999:77-103). Ideological renewal also provided an external and contemporary electoral comparison, as it provided new Labour with an alternative strategy for growth, rooted in notions of stability and investment, which could be used as comparison to the ‘boom and bust’ economics associated to Thatcherism. Buckler and Dolowitz observe that through this process new Labour created for themselves the ‘rhetorical space’ for their discourse of ‘emancipation, autonomy and choice’, which were ‘themes that had been captured by the right and allied to Thatcherite free market commitments’ (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009:17). The social justice dimension to their narrative provided new Labour with electoral utility, as it allowed them to ‘position themselves against an outmoded Conservative obsession with the free market’, and it could be argued that this had ‘blunted their ability to address problems with the social fabric.’ As such, new Labour could portray the Conservative party ‘as socially regressive and lacking in compassion, particularly with respect to the excluded’ (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009:24). Through this method new Labour offered a means of critiquing both their past in the shape of old Labour who were portrayed as extremists, whilst also critiquing the present Conservative administration, who were extreme and incompetent. New Labour was thus neither the Labour party that had been rejected five years earlier under Kinnock, but nor was it like the Major led Conservatives. It was

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an electoral strategy known as ‘triangulation’ (Toynbee and Walker, 2004:270). New Labour therefore amounted to a process of ideological renewal designed towards voter mobilisation. As a political brand and an electoral strategy, new Labour has been particularly successful, right up until the economic crisis of 2008 onwards.3 After three successive electoral victories in 1997, 2001 and 2005, two of which justify the term landslide, Labour could claim to have usurped the Conservatives as the supposed natural party of government. Critically, up to early 2008 Labour had usurped the Conservatives as the party of economic competence (Bentley, 2007:111; Beech, 2008:2-3; Lee, 2008:189). Central to their electoral appeal was the capacity of Blair to occupy a centre-right position while leading a centre-left governing party, thus colonising political territory traditionally assumed to belong to the Conservatives (Gamble, 2006:308). Therefore, between 1994 and 2007 the advocates of new Labour could dismiss the critiques of the increasingly marginalized left by arguing that their politics had been the ‘politics of dominance’4 (Beech, 2008:1). The electoral success was reflected by three characteristics not normally associated with Labour when in office. Especially in the first term, although less so thereafter, the Blair administrations could legitimately claim to be competent (especially in the sphere of economic management); united; and well lead. Until the early stages of their third term in office, new Labour could argue that under their stewardship, the economy had maintained steady growth and low inflation rates and that they had presided over falling unemployment. The prudence that they displayed during their first term in office5 helped to establish credibility with the financial markets and sustain their image of economic competence with the electorate, most notably the middle classes. Growth within the economy enabled them to retain a focus on public services and from 2000 onwards there was significant extra investment in health and education (McAnulla, 2006:122, 126). In addition to establishing a reputation for economic competence, the Blair era was also characterised by a degree of unity that his predecessors could have only envied (Cowley and Stuart, 2003:317). Until tensions emerged in the second term over education (tuition fees); health (foundation hospitals) and most notably Iraq, the PLP developed a reputation for acquiescence. In the age of new Labour, the left was significantly depleted.6 They lacked the methods through which to mobilise dissent. The Campaign Group was, according to Cowley and Stuart, the ‘smallest and least organised factional groupings ever to face a Labour Prime Minister’. When compared to the parliamentary dissent mobilised against the Wilson and Callaghan administrations7, the Campaign Group was ‘poorly organized’ and ‘chaotic’. Cowley and Stuart concluded that the Campaign Group ‘could not always deliver its own MPs and punched below its (already slight) weight’ (Cowley and Stuart, 2003:323).

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Establishing a reputation for governing competence and internal unity contributed significantly to the perception that Blair was an effective Prime Minister. In an age where it was felt that election campaigns were increasingly personalised and focused around the charisma and capabilities of the respective party leaders, Blair came to personify new Labour. They built their image around his character and his ability to inspire electoral trust in his ability. Thus new Labour generated a ‘conception’ of Blair as being ‘above’ the ‘more general political affray, yet in touch with ordinary people on the ground’ (McAnulla, 2006:132, 140). Finlayson would identify how through his public pronouncements, Blair would seek to simultaneously exude ‘formal authority’ with ‘ordinary bloke’ type qualities (Finlayson, 2002:593). The linguistic expertise of Blair, and his capacity to tap into the psyche of the nation, was seen to be best displayed in the aftermath of the tragic death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in August 1997. His reference to her as the ‘people’s princess’ demonstrated that Blair was ‘the consummate political actor of his age’ (Rawnsley, 2001:61-62) Although Blair obtained many plaudits, a central figure to establishing new Labour in the period between 1994 and 1997, and ensuring that they were deemed to be economically competent once they acquired office, was Brown. The nature of his relationship with Blair was to be speculated upon intensely by the media, with constant debate on the ‘deal’ that they had, or had not, agreed back in 1994 (Wring, 2008:218). Numerous biographers of the two men offered different interpretations of the deal. The publication of Gordon Brown – The Biography, by Paul Routledge, which was undertaken with the cooperation of the Chancellor, offered a sympathetic interpretation of Brown and the deal, and created a considerable media frenzy. In 2005 Tom Bower published Gordon Brown from a critical perspective and a second edition Gordon Brown: Prime Minister published in 2007 was just as critical. In the same year in Gordon Brown: Past, Present, Future, Francis Beckett derided the Bower book as reading like ‘splenetic ramblings’ (Routledge, 1998; Bower, 2005, 2007; Beckett, 2007). Similarly biographies of Blair had focused on the complex relationship between the two men, notably Tony Blair: The Modernizer by Jon Sopel; Tony Blair by John Rentoul; and Anthony Seldon Blair and Blair Unbound (Sopel, 1995; Rentoul, 2001; Seldon, 2004 and 2007a). Such was the media interest in their relationship it was even made into a Channel 4 drama entitled The Deal, which was shown in September 2003. The drama was largely based on the excellent The Rivals by James Naughtie, which examined the ‘political marriage’ between Blair and Brown. The restlessness and relentlessness of Brown was evident throughout. Their feud would increasingly pollute new Labour and undermine the effectiveness of the government. As Naughtie noted of Brown:

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We all know the truth.....with every day that passes Gordon will make another cross on the calendar. Day after day after day..... (Naughtie, 2002:75) The Blair – Brown Feud There are only two people who know whether a deal was arranged, and if so, the terms of that deal. Whereas former Prime Ministers, leaders of the opposition, Cabinet ministers and shadow Cabinet ministers have published biographies that enable us to understand their own interpretations of their quest for the leadership, we have as yet only heard through intermediaries of Blair and Brown, and not directly from them. At the time of writing, (March 2010), Brown remains Labour Prime Minister. Should Labour lose office it is conceivable that it would trigger a movement to remove him from the leadership, and possibly the freedom to write his memoirs. Should Labour defy the current opinion polls and retain office that would delay the publication of the Blair memoirs. Blair signed a contract with Random House in October 2007 and they intend to publish his memoirs, if they are ready, once Brown ceases to be Prime Minister. It has been suggested that Blair was concerned about the political fallout for Brown, should he publish whilst his erstwhile ally remains in Downing Street. This may explain his request that Alistair Campbell, his former press secretary, ‘tone down’ the diaries that he published shortly after Blair left office (Campbell, 2007; Miles and Rumbelow, 2007). The Campbell diaries offer less than might have been hoped in terms of discussing the Blair-Brown feud, although the 2008 autobiographies by John Prescott, entitled Pulling No Punches, and by Cherie Blair, Speaking for Myself, provided some interesting insights into the complexity of their relationship and its impact upon the governing effectiveness and unity of Labour in power (Prescott, 2008; Blair, 2008; see also Mullin, 2009). Cherie Blair admitted that during the second term, which was the supposed time for a transfer of power under the terms of the deal that Brown thought he had brokered, ‘Gordon was always trying to pin him down with ‘when are you going to go’?’ (Blair, 2008:324). According to Campbell, Blair had never settled in his mind how long he would serve. Apparently Blair revealed to him that two terms or eight years ‘was about all you get in the modern world’ and ‘you have to know when to go’ (Campbell, 2007:628-29). Prescott was blunt in his assessment. Of their relationship he commented that: Tony found Gordon frustrating, annoying, bewildering and prickly, but also brilliant, innovative and highly effective. Gordon brooded about Tony’s breezy style, his refusal to consult him on reshuffles and his sometimes cavalier approach to policy. But he also respected his abilities as Prime Minister. (Prescott, 2008:306)

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On the central issue of a deal between the two men on the succession, Prescott revealed that such was the scale of the conflict over this that Blair contemplated dismissing or demoting Brown and that Brown contemplated resignation. He concludes that on the latter, Brown could not resign as he thought it might harm his chances of securing the succession. On the former, Blair could not bring himself to dismiss or demote Brown as it would ‘tear the unity of the party apart’ (Prescott, 2008:309-10). Prescott admitted the insoluble nature of their problem: I often did tell Tony privately that I believed that he had broken his word. But, of course, his defence was that Gordon had broken his promises of co-operation. Each believed that the other was in the wrong. (Prescott, 2008:313) Whilst Blair set about presenting himself as a Prime Minister in waiting in the period between 1994 and 1997, his shadow Chancellor continued to brood over his belief that ‘the crown had been unjustly seized from him, and that he was far better qualified for the job’ (Seldon, 2004:658). Brown and his followers developed a narrative of the 1994 leadership contest, within which Blair and Mandelson were guilty of ‘scheming for the succession from the moment of death’, whilst ‘he and his own supporters observed a dignified period of restraint’ (Seldon, 2004:663). Once new Labour had entered office in May 1997 the ramifications of this remained as ‘tensions existed’ (Blair, 2008:324-25). During that first term the struggles between the two architects of modernisation and new Labour lacked a strong ideological or policy dimension. Drawn into the feud were factional groupings – the Blairites and the Brownites – involving ministers, backbenchers and advisors, whose activities, whether at their own instigation, or at the behest of their masters would sustain the feud (Mullin, 2009: 166-7, 308, 370, 381, 524, 551, 558). For example, the Blairites were angered by the publication of the Routledge biography of Brown in 1998. They felt that it had been authorised by Brown and supported by the Brownites, as a means of making trouble for Blair (Beckett, 2007:140). It was later alleged that when outlining the personality flaws that would make Brown unsuited for leadership, Campbell had described the Chancellor as being ‘psychologically flawed’. This comment would inform many discussions and debates on Brown over the next decade8 (Seldon, 2004:672; Rawnsley, 2010:13-14) After a prolonged honeymoon period Blair would seek re-election in June 2001 which was achieved with a commanding majority of 167. Brown had ensured that the Labour campaign was to be built around their (and his) impressive economic record, so that victory could be attributed to him to some degree. The size of the parliamentary majority and the subsequent chaos that this created within the Conservative party gave Brown good

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reason to believe that a third term, which would commence around 2005 or 2006, would be comfortably within their grasp. Brown anticipated now that on the basis of their deal, Blair would stand down in around 2003-04 thus enabling him to have a lead in period into the next general election. That Blair was to renege on the prior agreement that Brown thought he had secured became apparent in the immediate aftermath of re-election (Seldon, 2004:664). Part of the supposed deal had been that Blair would cede power to Brown on the domestic front, which was in the most part broadly adhered to in the period between 1997 and 2001 (Seldon, 2004:664). There was an expectation that this would be adhered to in the second term. However, clearly indicating that Blair was concerned about this, he contemplated moving Brown to the Foreign Office (Beckett, 2007:134). Brown was aware of this possibility and its implications. If he accepted the offer he would be politically neutered and Blair would have demonstrated his dominance and control over him. If he declined the offer and went to the backbenches this could reduce his political capital, make him the focal point of backbench dissenters. It would undermine his capacity to project himself as a unifier, and thus reduce his chances of securing the succession. Ultimately, however, Blair decided that the costs – to party unity and electoral perceptions of new Labour – were too great and he kept Brown at the Treasury. However, the non-shuffle made Brown suspect that Blair was not intending to stand down in 2003-04 and that he might not favour him for the succession (Seldon, 2004:678; Rawnsley, 2010:270). Seldon reveals that: When it became clear to Brown that Blair had no intention of handing over in this timeframe, he came to believe that Blair had lied to him. If Brown had not received these assurances, it is said, he never would have agreed to make way in the leadership election for his younger colleague. (Seldon, 2004:664) Once into the second term, Prescott admits that he had ‘many discussions’ with Brown about ‘when exactly is Tony going’ (Prescott, 2008:307). In 2001 Brown is reported to have held a tense meeting with Blair, which ended with Brown thumping the table and shouting ‘when are you going to move off and give me a date....I want your job now!’ (Seldon, 2004:678). Three years later in June 2004, by which point Brown assumed that he would have taken over, or would be about to take over, Brown reportedly said to Blair, ‘when are you going to f*** off and give me a date?’ (Seldon, 2007a:277; Rawnsley, 2010:270-71). It was clear that in the spring of 2004 Blair suffered what his own wife admitted was a ‘crisis of confidence’ (Blair, 2008:370). Blair was clearly becoming demoralised by the criticism within his own party over Iraq, the increasingly fractious nature of public sector reform, and the omnipresent

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harassment from Brown and the Brownites (Mullin, 2009:470; Rawnsley, 2010:264-65). Encouraged to continue by his wife, Blair crafted a strategy that would indicate in principle that he intended to stand down, but only after having secured a third term. In September 2004, Blair therefore announced that he would seek a third term, but would not seek a fourth term, although he intended to serve the third term. In the course of his television interview outlining his intentions, Blair did mention that he did not think that plan ‘rules Gordon out in any shape or form at all’, and suggested that age should not be an issue as in 2008-09 as Brown would still be ‘younger than many Prime Ministers have been if he took over at the end of a third term’9 (Seldon, 2007a:301). Prescott would reveal that Blair did not tell Brown in advance of his thinking. Prescott felt that this was ‘petty’ by Blair, and recorded that although Brown was ‘furious’ he felt that it was ‘typical’ of the way in which Blair kept ‘doing things behind his back’ (Prescott, 2008:317). No Prime Minister had ever pre-announced their intended departure date (Beckett, 2007:150). It now seemed pencilled in for 2008-09, which was one election and approximately 5 years later than Brown had hoped for. During the second term in office, the journalist Robert Peston had been working on another biography of Brown, which was scheduled to be published around the time of the assumed transference of power from Blair to Brown. Even though Brown remained at the Treasury Peston went ahead with the publication of Brown’s Britain in early 2005. Shortly before the 2005 general election, the Sunday Telegraph serialised the book. Trailing the exasperation that Brown felt at the ‘repeated lying of Blair’, Peston claimed that Brown had said to Blair ‘there is nothing that you could ever say to me that I could ever believe’ (Peston, 2005:349). By now the electorate were fully aware of the lack of trust in the working relationship between Blair and Brown and the contempt which Brown had for Blair. More significantly, given that Labour was approaching the latter stages of their parliamentary term, it was concerning that there was increasing evidence that the Blair-Brown feud was having a negative effect on voters. (Mullen, 2009:524). It was clear that the nature of the feud was different in the second term. Their feud was increasingly policy orientated and ideologically motivated. Blair and Brown appeared to possess slightly divergent views of public sector reform (Prescott, 2008:305). Blair found Brown to be less enthusiastic than he was about foundation hospitals, although some suspected that this was because Brown felt threatened by the then Health Secretary, Alan Milburn, whom Brown (incorrectly) feared was emerging as a Blairite of credibility and ambition. Brown also displayed less interest in academies than Blair and the fact that the tuition fees rebellion of January 2005 involved leading Brownite, Nick Brown, led some to assume that Brown shared some of the reservations of the rebels (Seldon, 2004:680; Beckett, 2007:141; Mullin, 2009:523-24). In

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addition to their disagreements on public sector reform, Blairites were also contemptuous of the measured way in which Brown addressed the defining issue of the second term: Iraq. Support was lent in the narrowest of terms, thus allowing the numerous opponents of the strategy that Blair adopted to assume that Brown might sympathise to some degree with their criticisms (Seldon, 2004:682). Of the impact of Iraq upon the support within the Labour movement for Blair, and his popularity with the electorate generally, Seldon has commented that: It was considered better for Brown to succeed Blair because the war in Iraq backfired than to precipitate a crisis by challenging Blair directly over it. (Seldon, 2004:682) This is a significant point. The biographical work on the Blair – Brown feud focuses on the competing interpretations of the deal, and the breakdown in the working relations that flowed from this. Whilst this carries considerable validity more could be said on the security of tenure that incumbent Labour leaders possess. Blair was protected from Brown by the high eviction costs that were built into the Electoral College procedures. The threshold for participation is high at 20 per cent of the PLP for a challenge to an incumbent leader. In their second term, Labour had 413 members of Parliament, so that would have meant obtaining over 80 supporters simply to initiate a contest against Blair. Compare this to when Margaret Thatcher was challenged by Michael Heseltine in 1990. Under the then Conservative Party rules a challenge could be initiated on the basis of a contest being requested by only two Conservative MPs (Denham and O’Hara, 2008:23). The other significant difference between the circumstances of Thatcher in 1990 and Blair in his second term was that Cabinet figures in the Thatcher era did not necessarily have to do the challenging themselves. Thatcher was challenged by Heseltine and although she came first in the parliamentary ballot, she failed to secure the 15 per cent lead required under their then rules, and a second ballot was required. When it became clear that she might be defeated on the second ballot, she resigned to allow other candidates who might be able to defeat Heseltine to enter the contest. Major then entered and defeated Heseltine. Major did not take the risk of challenging, and as he did not have to do so, he avoided accusations of disloyalty and could project himself as a unifier and healing new leader (Heppell, 2008a:71-93). Aspiring leaders could enter once a contest had already been initiated, but in the Electoral College candidates had to be in from the start. Brown will have calculated that even if the nomination threshold could be overcome the costs, in terms of party unity and his own leadership credibility, were not worth the risk. So a direct challenge to Blair by Brown was politically too risky, and Brown was not able to benefit from a stalking horse candidature (Quinn, 2005:808).

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Unable to find a way to persuade Blair to voluntarily stand down, and finding the Electoral College provided Blair with a protective shield, all Brown could do was wait. Part of the impatience that Brown and his supporters would display was not just to do with the terms of the supposed deal. Inheriting the premiership too late would limit his potential to make a positive and successful political/policy impact. This is because long serving administrations do tend to suffer from degenerative tendencies. It can be argued that there are six symptoms of degeneration. First, the appropriateness of their policy objectives and their reputation for governing competence becomes questioned, especially in the sphere of economic management. Second, there are increasingly negative perceptions of leadership credibility and thereby electoral appeal within the governing party. Third, there was increasing evidence of ideological division and mutual suspicion within the governing party. Fourth, there are accusations of abuse of power as allegations of sleaze and corruption engulf the governing party. Fifth, the inability of the governing party to avoid culpability for past mistakes and withstand the time for a change argument is significantly reduced. Finally, they suffer from the evolution of an increasingly unified, electorally appealing, politically renewed and credible main opposition party (Heppell, 2008b:580-81). What was troubling for Brown was the knowledge that there were embryonic signs of these degenerative tendencies in the lateBlair era (Bevir, 2007:322). Underlying these concerns was the fear that by the time Brown might finally secure the leadership and thus become Prime Minister, the political circumstances would make securing a fourth successive term immensely difficult. The economy could go into decline and the Conservatives might find a credible new leader and a viable and attractive narrative. When thinking about the difficulties of inheriting well into a third term and seeking a fourth successive term, the Brownites looked at the precedents and realised their man could be like Alec Douglas Home or even Major. Douglas Home inherited 12 years into a period of prolonged Conservative rule and was Prime Minister for 1 year before losing power. Major inherited 11 years into the age of Thatcherism and although he did succeed in holding onto power, their fourth term was an unmitigated disaster from which the political reputation of Major was to suffer badly (Seldon, 2007a:301; Heppell, 2008b:594). Despite these worrying symptoms of decline identified above, new Labour was still able to secure a third term in office. This was despite the fact that Blair and Brown were allegedly not on ‘speaking terms’ during the re-election campaign. This was apparently partly due to the fact that Blair appointed Milburn, a supposed ‘pathological Brown hater’ to manage the campaign (Beckett, 2007:152; Bower, 2007:480-81; Rawnsley, 2010:276). However, after securing two successive parliamentary majorities over 150, with shares

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of the vote over 40 per cent, their third successive election victory was tainted by the fact that their share of the vote had fallen to 35 per cent. Labour was electorally in decline. There was a tangible sense that Labour would need to engage in a process of political renewal to facilitate their chances of securing a fourth successive term (Heppell, 2008b:589). For the Brownites renewal implied a change of leader. The September Coup The political fall-out of Iraq; the knowledge that he would not be their leader at the time of the next general election; and the anxiety caused by the election of the charismatic and popular David Cameron as leader of the Conservative party, ensured that the authority that Blair needed to possess to be effective would drift away from him. He was increasingly perceived to be a lame duck Prime Minister. Anxieties within the Labour party would increase in the aftermath of poor local election results in May 2006. Blair had up to then been adhering to his claim that he would serve a full third term. Although he refused to name an exact date he did assure the PLP, (at a meeting held on 8 May), that he would provide his successor with ‘ample time’ before the next general election10 (Seldon, 2007a:479). Throughout the summer of 2006 rumours abounded of attempts to mount a delegation to press Blair to set a timetable for departure. The Defence minister and staunch Brownite, Tom Watson, worked with Sion Simon on a draft letter which would be circulated amongst pre-selected and sympathetic members of the 2001 intake. In addition to the circulating of the Simon letter to the 2001 intake, it was rumoured that similar letters were being circulated amongst the 1997 and 2005 intakes (Bower, 2007: 504; Seldon, 2007a:480, 483, 485; Rawnsley, 2010:392). On 4 September, the 2001 intake completed their letter to Blair and it comprised seventeen signatories, including Watson, despite the fact that he was a government minister. It stated that: Sadly it is clear to us – as it is to almost the entire party and the entire country – that without an urgent change in the leadership of the party it becomes less likely that we will win the next election. This is not a plot against you by people who want you to reverse or slow down the progress you’ve made...but we believe it isn’t possible for the party and the government to renew itself without renewing its leadership as a matter of urgency. This is the brutal truth. It gives us no pleasure in saying it. But it has to be said. And understood. We therefore ask you to stand aside. (Seldon, 2007a:485) The press were aware that Watson was involved in the planning of the 2001 intakes letter to Blair. They also knew that he was a Brownite. They also

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spotted him visiting Brown at his Scottish constituency home, and they suspected that he was meeting with Brown to discuss their emerging plot to unseat Blair. When cornered by the press, Watson would claim that he was visiting Brown for personal reasons. Specifically he had travelled to see Brown to deliver a Postman Pat video to the newly born second son of the Chancellor (Rawnsley, 2010:393). In an attempt to limit the impact of this, the Blair camp tried to get signatories from centrist MPs stating that they supported the idea of Blair continuing for another year. They would claim to have 60 signatories and argue that they could have secured more but they wanted the composition to exclude those strongly associated with Blair to demonstrate that he still retained the support of the PLP (Seldon, 2007a:490). As a leadership crisis began to swirl around Labour, Blair and Brown convened early in the morning of September 7th. Seldon records that: Although Brown had received the assurance from Blair earlier in the year that the Prime Minister would go in the summer of 2007, he did not believe it. He now thought he had Blair on the run, and according to reports of the meeting, demanded ‘bankable’ public pledges on both Blair’s departure date and that he would have a ‘clear run at the leadership’. (Seldon, 2007a:490) According to one Blair ally the meeting ended with Brown stating: ‘if you don’t do what I ask, then there’ll be big trouble’11 (Seldon, 2007a:490-91). Shortly after the meeting finished, Watson resigned from the government. Blair condemned him for his disloyalty and his discourtesy (Bower, 2007:507). Around lunchtime, Khalid Mahmood, a Parliamentary Private Secretary resigned. As the afternoon progressed a further six Parliamentary Private Secretaries tendered their resignations, in what was claimed to be a ‘spontaneous insurrection’ by critics of Blair, although it did appear to be ‘carefully choreographed’ (Bower, 2007:507; Seldon, 2007a:491). Blair supporters now feared that what Brown had meant that morning was ‘there’ll be more resignations if you don’t actually give a date’ (Seldon, 2007a:491). Blair and Brown met again that afternoon and Blair finally agreed to resign next summer, in either May or June.12 However, Blair refused to give Brown a guarantee that he would endorse him for the succession or that he would work to prevent anyone else from standing (Rawnsley, 2010:401). As Brown departed Downing Street in his ministerial car, photographers would capture a shot of him with what political journalists could only describe as a smirk across his face. He would claim that he was smiling after telling his fellow passenger about his new baby, but it was an explanation that many found difficult to believe (Bower, 2007:508, 510; Rawnsley, 2010:402). Charles Clarke, the recently departed Home Secretary, condemned Brown for his failure to stop the plotters (Bower, 2007:509; Rawnsley, 2010:403).

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Brown would claim that the coup was not undertaken at his instigation, but Seldon speculates that it is likely that he knew of it and did nothing to stop its implementation (Seldon, 2007a:499). A few weeks later at the Annual Conference, Brown would attempt to defuse the impact of the September coup and the feud that had characterised their working relationship over the previous decade. In what was assumed to be his final conference speech as Chancellor, Brown said that: It is hardly surprising that as in any relationship there have been times when we have differed. And where over these years differences have distracted from what matters. I regret that, as I know Tony does too. (Bower, 2007:513) After the apology came the compliment. Brown claimed that it had been a ‘privilege to work with the most successful Labour Prime Minister’. Rather than focus on the compliment that Brown was attempting to deliver, the media focused in on the reaction of Cherie Blair when she heard those words. It was alleged that she blurted out, within earshot of a political journalist, ‘well, that’s a lie’, an allegation that she denies (Blair, 2008:402). In his final conference speech as Labour Prime Minister, Blair acknowledged that: I know that new Labour would never have happened, and three election victories, would never have been secured, without Gordon Brown. He is a remarkable man. A remarkable servant to this country. And that is the truth. (Seldon, 2007a:496) Given the media furore over the alleged comment that his wife had made during the course of the speech made by Brown, Blair decided that humour was in order. As he ended his speech he thanked his wife for her support over the last ten years and joked: At least I don’t have to worry about her running off with the bloke next door. (Seldon, 2007a:497) Brown by Acclamation Although all the attention was on Brown13 as a known candidate to succeed Blair, there was considerable press speculation of who might attempt to stop him becoming the next Labour party leader and Prime Minister. Between September 2006 and May 2007 media speculation fell predominantly on two former Cabinet ministers – Charles Clarke and Alan Milburn; and three current Cabinet ministers – John Reid, Alan Johnson and David Miliband (Prescott, 2008:315). Clarke and Milburn were less serious candidates than

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the current Cabinet trio, although Brown was contemptuous of them as well. According to Rawnsley, in a heated exchange between them in September 2006, Brown demanded that Blair prevent any candidate from standing from within the Cabinet. Brown apparently asked Blair: ‘Do you think there is anyone better than me? John Reid is ‘far too right wing’. Alan Johnson...a ‘lightweight’...Miliband...was ‘much too young’. Was Blair saying, Brown demanded, that any of them was better qualified to become Prime Minister? This face off came to an end without resolving anything. Talking about it afterwards to close allies, Blair described this confrontation with Brown as ‘ghastly’ and ‘terrible’ and told them that ‘he kept shouting at me that I’d ruined his life’. (Rawnsley, 2010:398) Blair was concerned that whoever was to succeed him should wholeheartedly support the policy trajectory that he had been outlining – i.e. they must adhere to the new Labour project. In the aftermath of the September coup, Blair was willing to endorse Brown, provided that he demonstrated his adherence to new Labour thinking. If that was not forthcoming then it was clear that Blair was willing to encourage talk of a leadership election within which an alternative to Brown could be indentified and encouraged (Seldon, 2007a:511). Furthermore, Philip Gould was of the opinion that the electorate as a whole would prefer the leadership of the Labour party to be determined through the democratic processes of the Electoral College, rather than through Cabinet ministers making calculations of their relative strength, before coming into line behind Brown, when they realised that they might not be able to defeat him. (Rawnsley, 2010:435) He felt that as the successor to Blair would start as an ‘unelected Prime Minister’ it would be better if he was an ‘elected’ leader of the Labour party, rather than acquiring the position through a ‘fix’ (Seldon, 2007a:513; Rawnsley, 2010:436). In the event, the terms around which Blair would depart could have potentially worked against Brown. The long gap between announcing his intention to resign and actually doing so was politically dangerous for Brown as the frontrunner (Beckett, 2007:168). In the Conservative party leadership election the previous year, Michael Howard had announced his intention to resign in May, to allow a review of the leadership selection procedures. Once that review was completed he tendered his resignation (in October), during which time the candidature of the front runner, David Davis, had been undermined, and the credibility of a new and younger candidate, Cameron, had been enhanced (Denham and Dorey, 2006:35-41). The fear for Brown was that like Davis before him the delay would allow time for enemies to expose him and for rivals to enhance their chances (Beckett, 2007:168). Seldon argues that Blair decided over Christmas that he wanted to see an

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alternative candidate put up against Brown: ‘it lasted from the beginning of the year until the point he realised no serious candidate was going to stand’ (Seldon, 2007a:545). As Beckett concludes, right up until May there was a restless search for a candidate called ‘Notgordon Brown’ (Beckett, 2007: 169). Of the rumoured candidates they all chose not to stand. Johnson decided to concentrate on the deputy leadership, after admitting that he did not ‘feel up to the job’ of party leader and Prime Minister (Rawnsley, 2010:434). Rather than risk humiliation, Clarke and Milburn decided to establish a website, The 2020 vision, as a guardian of the Blairite flame (Wring, 2008:22021). Reid decided not to stand for the leadership in the knowledge that he could not defeat Brown (Rawnsley, 2010:435). He also decided to stand down from the Cabinet, which many expected given the problematic working relationship that he had experienced with Brown (Thorpe, 2008:278). The strongest of the non-Brown candidates was Miliband. By early December, Miliband was believed to have upwards of 40 Labour MPs who would be willing to nominate him (Seldon, 2007a:513, 545). Although Blair was reported to be encouraging a Miliband candidature in an Observer article in late March, the Miliband camp would counter brief in The Guardian (early April) about his reluctance to being sucked into a contest. Was standing a sensible strategy for Miliband to adopt and how strong was the support from Blair for him? (Temko and Hinsliff, 2007; Tempest, 2007). It was deemed unlikely that Miliband could achieve something similar to Cameron and acquire the leadership. His best hope in standing would be to position himself as the strongest candidate of the next generation and thus the heir to Brown (Thorpe, 2008:278). However, in standing he risked losing and being humiliated in the process. Furthermore in disputing the leadership with Brown, he would have to question the policies, approaches and methods of Brown and he feared the ramifications of doing so (Seldon, 2007a:513; Rawnsley, 2010:435, 440, 442). Here the real fear for Miliband would be that his support base would comprise all of the anti Brownites and thus his candidature would split the party (Bower, 2007:534). Alongside the negatives of likely defeat and undermining the unity of the party by standing there was a positive. Brown had indicated preferment would come his way if he did not stand, and so it proved. Miliband entered the Foreign Office when Brown became Prime Minister. Therefore, Seldon speculates that if Blair had really wanted to groom Miliband as a potential rival to Brown he needed to have done so earlier and to have promoted him to the Foreign Office in 2006 (Seldon, 2007a:546, 550; Rawnsley, 2010:370). By early May it was clear that Brown would not be facing any candidate from within the Cabinet or recently within the Cabinet, and Blair finally endorsed Brown. However, when Blair formally announced on May 10th that he would be standing down as leader, it was still not clear whether anyone

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from the backbenchers and/or the left of the PLP, would be able to surpass the nomination threshold of 44 Labour MPs (Bower, 2007:512-13). Both John McDonnell, Chair of the Campaign Group, and the former minister, Michael Meacher, expressed an interest in standing. On the day that Blair resigned, they delayed a decision on which one of them should stand as their respective levels of support were very close. However, McDonnell did indicate that he would not be prepared to support Meacher as he had voted with new Labour on too many issues. After an uncomfortable impasse Meacher decided to step aside and encouraged his supporters to nominate McDonnell. Despite this encouragement McDonnell was to remain short of the nomination threshold14 (Wring, 2008:220). At the close of nominations Brown was declared the sole candidate for the PLP leadership – i.e. he was elected unopposed (Thorpe. 2008:278). Having secured 313 nominations from within the PLP to 29 for McDonnell he was declared the new Labour party leader on 17 May, although his formal appointment would not be until a Special Convention on 24 June. Blair resigned as Prime Minister on 27 June and Brown became the new Labour party leader and Prime Minister. Brown had secured the coronation that he craved and had avoided the risks associated with a contest (Rawnsley, 2010:436). The Deputy Leadership Election The knowledge that the leadership election was likely to involve few candidates contributed to a large field of candidates in the deputy leadership election15 (Wring, 2008:221). Since the inception of the Electoral College deputy leadership contests had, with the exception of the titanic Healey-Benn contest of 1981, been conducted simultaneously to party leadership elections, such as in 1983, 1988, 1992 and 1994. As they were conducted simultaneously the deputy leadership contest was overshadowed by the fight for the leadership. With the coronation of Brown more media attention was able to be focused on the contest to determine who should succeed Prescott, who had informed the Annual Conference in September 2006 that he would stand down from the deputy leadership at the same time that Blair would relinquish the leadership (Prescott, 2008:325). In the period between notifying the party of his intention to resign and actually doing so, six candidates emerged. Five were existing ministers – the International Development Secretary, Hilary Benn; The Labour Party Chair; Hazel Blears; the Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Hain; the Justice Minister, Harriet Harman; and the Education Secretary, Johnson. The final candidate, Jon Cruddas16, came from the backbenches. All were able to surpass the nominations threshold of 45 MPs. When nominations closed on May 17th Johnson had 73 nominations; Harman 65; Hain 51; Blears and Cruddas 49 and Benn 47 (Denham and Dorey, 2007:528). Of the candidates

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standing only one – Johnson – had been mentioned as a realistic candidate for the leadership. His motivation for standing was that acquiring the deputy leadership could act as a means by which to enhance his political standing for the post-Brown leadership succession contest. Harman was similarly motivated by a desire to cement her role within the upper echelons of the party and to ensure that a female occupied one of the leadership positions. Johnson presented a defence case for the new Labour agenda, as did Blears, arguing against increases in taxation, which were rejected as ‘electoral suicide’ and representations of the ‘politics of envy’ (Denham and Dorey, 2007:529). Meanwhile, Harman and Cruddas were the candidates who adopted the strongest line of criticism when it came to the defining issue of Iraq. Given that Harman was to win the deputy leadership, against expectations, and Cruddas was to perform far better than had been anticipated, this suggested that Iraq was a key influence in voting (Wring, 2008:221). Johnson, who had been the pre-contest favourite, had indicated that he had ‘no regrets’ about the military invasion in 2003. Given the narrowness of his final round defeat to Harman, a more conciliatory tone from him on this could have helped secure crucial votes17 (Denham and Dorey, 2007:529). Harman had not been the favoured candidate for the succession and upon her election she was described as the ‘grass roots choice’ (Wintour, 2007). It was somewhat unfortunate that the financing of the candidates for the deputy leadership was to generate considerable debate. Harman, Johnson and Hain faced probing questions on the identities and motives of those who made donations to their campaigns. Due to this Hain was forced to concede that he was unaware of the identities of up to seventeen of his donors whose combined donations to his campaign added up to £100,000. Whilst Harman and Johnson were able to retain their ministerial roles in the face of such adverse media comment, Hain was forced to step down as Work and Pensions Secretary (Wring, 2008:221). In addition to the corruption attached to the deputy leadership succession contest, it could be argued that the outcome was to provide Labour with a less useful leader-deputy leader relationship (Brown/Harman) than they had possessed with Blair/Prescott. One of the advantages that Prescott offered was the widespread knowledge that he would not be advancing himself as a candidate to succeed Blair. He could offer Blair support on the left where Blair did not naturally possess allies and thus Prescott could act as a bridge between the ideological factions within the wider Labour movement. He could do so without presenting himself as a threat to Blair and it was apparent that he was not seeking to undermine him. Whereas Prescott was loyal and unthreatening, Harman has proved to be, (in the eyes of her critics), disloyal and jockeying for the succession. There has been constant media speculation about her ambitions for the leadership. For example, her August

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2009 intervention that men could not be trusted to run organisations on their own was tied to a claim that Labour should amend their leadership selection rules to ensure that there is always a female on the leadership ticket – i.e. as either leader or as deputy leader. Whilst she would frequently pronounce her support for Brown, and her belief that he would lead Labour in the next general election and win, her conduct as deputy leader had created an image of an aspiring candidate positioning themselves as the next leader in waiting (Oakeshott, 2009). Table 14:

Candidate Support Leadership of 2007

in

the

Labour

Party

Deputy

Returns in Each Round of the Electoral College

Hilary Benn Hazel Blears Jon Cruddas Peter Hain Harriet Harman Alan Johnson

First

Second

Third

Fourth

Final

%

%

%

%

%

16.40 11.77 19.39 15.32 18.93 18.16

18.22

22.33

20.39 16.42 21.23 23.74

23.89

30.06

25.88 27.90

33.58 26.35

50.43 49.57

When candidates were eliminated their second preferences were transferred to the remaining candidates

Source:

Denham and Dorey, 2007:529

Conclusion Brown entered the leadership and the premiership with high expectations. He had ten years of Cabinet service in which to acquire the necessary experience for the office of Prime Minister. The years of waiting to be Prime Minister should have ensured that he was well prepared and that he was in possession of a clear political programme to implement (Foley, 2009:502, 506). Despite an initial honeymoon period he has endured one of the worst beginnings to a Prime Ministerial tenure in living memory (Kettell and Kerr, 2008:492). The cancelled general election in the late summer of 2007, that Brown contemplated during that brief honeymoon period, would fatally shape perceptions of the new Prime Minister (Coates, 2009:423; Foley, 2009:500). Speculation mounted that Brown would call a snap general election to establish his own mandate to lead and step out of the shadow of Blair. This was speculation that Brown and his advisors allowed to mount

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whilst the opinion poll ratings for Labour suggested that they would be reelected. Brown appeared to expect the bounce that he had established in the opinion polls and the immediacy of a rumoured general election to result in a chaotic Conservative party annual conference that September. When George Osborne, the Conservative shadow Chancellor, announced their new policy on inheritance tax and the Conservatives secured a surge in their support, a turning point had been reached (Cole, 2008:34). The seven point Labour lead was wiped out inside a matter of days and a small Conservative lead was established. Having dithered about whether to dissolve Parliament when the political circumstances were to his advantage, Brown once again had to withstand the charge that he was indecisive (Riddell, 2008:10). What was to really damage his political credibility was that having decided not to hold a snap general election he denied that his decision was influenced by the changes in the opinion polls over the previous week (Riddell, 2008:10). Thereafter, having decided not to go to the polls until 2009 at the earliest, his administration was to be undermined by two seismic crises – the banking collapse and the subsequent recession, and then the scandal of the parliamentary expenses – the cumulative effect of which has been to shake the foundations of our economic and political systems (Riddell, 2008:8; Kenny, 2009b:671; Beech, 2009:528). It is therefore, justifiable that Brown has faced immensely constraining circumstances. In addition to these two seismic events, the electorate were beginning to tire of new Labour after a decade of power; just as the Conservatives had stumbled upon a potentially electorally appealing Prime Minister in waiting in the shape of Cameron (Foley, 2009:500, 510). These were all constraints that Blair did not have to manage. However, ignoring such constraints, many in the PLP and political journalists began to indentify a correlation between the ‘loss of governing competence resulting from policy failure’ and the ‘capabilities’ of Brown as Prime Minister (Kettell and Kerr, 2008:492). Within a year of him becoming Prime Minister there was a degree of media speculation on whether he could survive, the likes of which had not been seen since Major in the 1992 to 1995 period, and he only just survived plots to unseat him in the autumn of 2008 and later in the summer of 2009 (Heppell, 2007:471-90; Coates, 2009:423). McDonnell, the candidate that never made it to the Electoral College, argued on the first anniversary of Brown becoming leader that he was leading the party to ‘extinction’ (McDonnell, 2008). The media salivated at the suggestion that Blair was appalled by Brown’s ‘lamentable’ leadership; a rumour that sparked speculation about a Blairite plot to unseat Brown (Kirkup, 2008). An environment of near permanent criticism of Brown developed as the position of the party plummeted in the opinion polls. As such, interviews undertaken by senior Cabinet ministers became viewed as leadership bids by proxy. When Miliband provided an insight into his vision of Labour’s future

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in an article that failed to mention Brown once (July 2008), it was immediately assumed that he was offering himself as an alternative. Miliband had, according to Rawnsley, taken the view that Brown had to be removed in order for Labour to win a historic fourth term. However, the Miliband offering lacked impact as the timing was deemed to be poor, (just before the parliamentary recess), and because he had done so without consulting with Cabinet colleagues, other than James Purnell, the Work and Pensions Secretary (Rawnsley, 2010:557-59). Running simultaneous to the failed Miliband plot were a series of meetings involving Jack Straw, Geoff Hoon, Charles Clarke, and Stephen Byers in which they agreed that ‘something had to be done’. Such a view was deemed to be shared by a third of the Cabinet, including Alistair Darling, but they were ‘unsure of how his removal could be brought about without destroying the government’ (Rawnsley, 2010:557-58). That sense of crisis reached its peak in early June 2009 as rumours circulated of a plot by backbench Labour parliamentarians to pressurise Brown to stand down. E-mails were circulated of an intended letter to be sent to the Prime Minister. Revealed by The Sun with a pun designed for Dr Who fans, ‘Labour’s Cyber Men Prepare to Delete PM’, the letter suggesting that Brown stand down occurred during a week of complete panic within his administration as a series of high profile ministerial resignations undermined him (Pascoe-Watson, 2009). Jacqui Smith stood down as Home Secretary and Blears resigned as Communities Secretary. However, it was the resignations of Purnell and Caroline Flint (the Europe Minister) which would most damage Brown. Flint resigned having accused Brown of running a two tier administration in which many female ministers were treated as ‘window dressing’, whilst Purnell resigned having argued that Brown must stand aside as his ‘continued leadership makes a Conservative victory more, not less likely’ (Hoskin, 2009; Stratton and Wintour, 2009). As Purnell was closely aligned to Miliband, there was speculation when he resigned that his resignation was the ‘beginning of a well organised putsch’, and if Miliband followed Purnell’s lead, then Brown’s ‘premiership could be dead by midnight’ (Rawnsley, 2010:655). Once Miliband was assured that he would not be removed from the Foreign Office in the ensuing Cabinet reshuffle, which had been rumoured, he agreed to continue to support Brown. However, at the height of the attempted plot, Brown rang Blair for advice. According to Rawnsley, he: Asked his predecessor to intervene with Blairites to prevent them from resigning...Brown, who had used a coup to push out Blair had been reduced to pleading for Blair’s help to protect him from a coup. The irony was not lost on the other man (Rawnsley, 2010:655).

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193

Although Brown survived the crisis of June 2009, by the late summer, numerous Labour MPs were willing to confirm their view that Brown should go. Nick Raynsford felt that ‘without change, the electoral consequences will be dire’; Paul Flynn argued that ‘for the sake of the millions who benefit from the work of the Labour Party in government, we must select a new national leader’; whilst Frank Field argued that: ‘we cannot win with the present Prime Minister. I was one of those who did not support his coronation. But even I didn’t think that a Brown administration would be as inept as this one.’ (Weaver, 2009; see also Mitchell, 2009) The last substantive attempt to coordinate the removal of Brown was initiated by former Cabinet ministers, Hoon and Patricia Hewitt, in January 2010. This involved a call for a secret ballot of Labour parliamentarians on Brown continuing as leader, and an expectation that Cabinet ministers would support the idea of a ballot. After an afternoon in which many Cabinet ministers disappeared from view and could not be contacted, they all issued statements of support for Brown by the early evening (Johnston, 2010). At the time of writing Brown has survived till March 2010, although his attempt to re-launch his leadership at the Annual Conference was undermined by unfounded allegations that he was in poor health, (losing his eyesight or taking anti-depressants), and the defection of The Sun to the Conservatives (Lewis, 2009). ‘Project Gordon’ was then launched in February 2010, as Labour strategists attempted to improve the image of the Prime Minister, through an appearance on Piers Morgan’s ITV celebrity series Life Stories (Walters, 2010). However, the ‘project’ was undermined within a week as allegations of ‘bullying’ by Brown and his acolytes were revealed through the publication of Andrew Rawnsley’s End of the Party (Rawnsley, 2010). As Labour face the electorate seeking a fourth term, and a first mandate for Brown, they do so after a two year period in which the PLP has been trapped in a vicious circle. The Brown administration would be undermined by an event which led to a questioning of their competence; the PLP would be rumoured to be mobilising an attempt to unseat him; and then they would hit the brick wall of the procedures which make it so difficult to unseat the incumbent. (Kenny, 2009a:503-05) Earlier in the parliament Brown himself had been determined to remove Blair, but due to the nature of the Labour leadership selection procedures was unwilling to formally challenge Blair. As Theakston eloquently argues Brown was ‘willing to wound but not kill’ and instead he let ‘his supporters pile on the pressure and destabilise Blair but flinched from finally pulling the trigger himself’ (Theakston, 2010:380-81). In a sense the Brown strategy had reflected the limits of formally seeking to remove Blair and the need to apply informal non procedural methods to pressurise him to stand down. The tragedy for Brown is the very methods that he deployed, (or his supporters deployed on his behalf), are now utilised by his detractors. The manner in which Brown acquired the leadership would

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also create a contradiction. His mandate to lead and thereby his authority and legitimacy could have been said to have been enhanced by the fact that he was elected unopposed (Beech, 2009:531). However, the fact that the Brown leadership has been perceived to have been such a cataclysmic failure, has led many Labour party members to question his mandate on the basis that only one third of the Electoral College contributed to his selection. The Brown era has also witnessed the interaction of two uncomfortable aspects of Labour politics: first, the propensity for plots and rumours designed to remove the incumbent; combined with the second aspect, their ejection procedures which make it immensely difficult to unseat a sitting Labour leader (Quinn, 2005:793-815). A state of permanent speculation on whether Brown can be challenged has disfigured the party which in turn has undermined him as Prime Minister. Ultimately, the post Blair succession contest was characterised as a personality or leadership competence based succession contest, rather than an ideologically influenced succession contest where the party could be asked to make a choice. Yet the non contest produced an uncharismatic new leader who became viewed as incompetent. Whilst an excess of contests is damaging, as is an excess of ideological factionalism (as Labour well knows), the absence of ideologically constructed, or even influenced, opposites for the wider Labour movement to select from, reflected the crisis of identity facing the party in the end-Blair/post-Blair era (Beech, 2009:530). Successions are about making strategic choices, and as Kenny argues the non contest in 2007 was indicative of the exhaustion of the new Labour project. Kenny argues that the widespread personal criticism of Brown between late 2007 and 2009: Conveniently obfuscates the kind of structural question that historians of the future will surely want to ask. If not Brown, then who? Which other figure could have taken up the reins after Blair and done better than Brown? The fact that no other candidate was in the frame once Blair came under serious pressure to depart office is highly revealing about one of the defining features of politics in the Blair premiership. The centrality of the relationship between the towering figures of Blair and Brown, and their entourages, was both destructive and productively dialectical. One of its most significant consequences was to leave precious little space for other possible successors to emerge... Whatever Brown’s failings may be, the absence of consideration within Labour circles about why so few other potential leaders have come through the ranks smacks of an unwillingness to accept a key area of collective responsibility for any political party— the ability to manage the question of the succession. (Kenny, 2009b:666)

CONCLUSION

Party leadership selection has until recently been an underdeveloped area of research amongst political scientists and political historians. However, there is now an increasing awareness of its importance due to the centrality of leadership to contemporary party politics (Fieschi, 2007:486). The importance of leadership effects to party identification means that leadership selection, and the procedures underpinning leadership selection, are now recognised as being of real political significance (Evans and Andersen, 2005:821). As Fieschi notes leadership contests, and the behaviour leading up to these contests, are crucial to the way in which the electorate perceive parties and their leaders (Fieschi, 2007:486). The Fieschi justification is best reinforced by the comments of Bale: In an era of valence rather than position politics, an era in which some see parliamentary systems becoming ever more presidentialised, party leadership is clearly crucial. Just as importantly, one can argue that contests to elect leaders provide something of a window into the soul of a particular party. They not only help determine its electoral fate. They also expose fault-lines. They show what really matters to those involved. They demonstrate strengths and weaknesses, collective and individual. They mark turning points. Or they show that the party in question is not yet ready or able to change. (Bale, 2009:364) The previous eight chapters have set about providing answers to the dilemmas that Bale identified. Each of the chapters have demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the Labour party at the time of their succession contests, whilst highlighting the advantages and limitations of individual candidates, alongside the short term tactical and long term strategic positioning of the groupings supporting those candidates. In laying open the soul of the Labour party at these critical moments, by analysing the leadership succession contests of 1963, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1988, 1992, 1994 and 2007, the previous eight chapters have identified the fault lines that may

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have existed at these times, and provided a context to the subsequent electoral performance of the party, except as yet (writing in March 2010) in the case of 2007. What conclusions can we draw from analysing half a century of successions in Labour party politics? It is clear that whilst electability and competence criteria have been factors in succession contests, the ideological disposition of candidates in relation to their electorate, (be that the PLP or the Electoral College), has been crucial. The notion of candidates being viewed as acceptable identifies the importance of ideology and the associations between ideological disposition and the establishment and maintenance of party unity. The need for a leader who can demonstrate that the party is unified has been a perennial problem for the Labour party. Ideological disagreements and a propensity towards factionalism have historically worked to their electoral disadvantage. When Labour have experienced periods of electoral competiveness (in the era of Wilson), or dominance (in the era of Blair), leadership elections and debates on leadership selection procedures have been minimal and controllable. However, when that inclination towards disunity and factionalism has contributed towards electoral rejection and periods in opposition, so the party has displayed a tendency towards an excess of leadership elections, and an obsession with leadership election procedures. The comparison between the Wilson and Blair eras as opposed to the periods under the other Labour leaders is illuminating. Both Wilson and Blair would be Labour leaders for thirteen years. Wilson would lead them into five general elections, emerging outside Downing Street on four of those occasions. Blair would lead them into three general elections, and would be triumphant in all of those, with two resulting in crushing landslide victories. Their capacity to remain electorally competitive would ensure that speculation about their continuing leadership would remain at a level that was manageable and both were able to resign as incumbent Prime Ministers (largely) on their terms. The combined twenty six years of 1963 to 1976 and 1994 to 2007 would witness just four leadership elections and no formal changes to the leadership selection procedures. The other periods, including the dual challenges to Gaitskell in 1960 and 1961; the period between 1976 and 1994; and the period post Blair would see an excess of leadership contests and debate. There would be a total of six including 1976 and 1994 inside just 18 years. The obsession with constitutional reform and the shift to an Electoral College disfigured Labour party politics in the 1979 to 1981 period and contributed to the splintering off and establishment of the SDP, whilst further tinkering in 1988 and more substantial amendments were made in 1993 through one member, one vote. The fact that Brown acquired the leadership by circumnavigating the Electoral College, and has subsequently been seen to be a failed leader, has raised questions about his authority and

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legitimacy. The assumption that Brown is a primary cause of their opinion polling difficulties between 2007 and 2010 has contributed to increased debate within the party about the Electoral College. In the aftermath of shocking local council results in 2009 the issue of Labour councillors was raised by Sally Prentice in Prospect magazine: The rules for electing the leader and deputy leader of the Labour party must be changed to give councillors a greater role. It is odd that councillors receive ballot papers as party members, as trade unionists and as members of Socialist Societies such as the Fabians and the Christian Socialist Movement, but not as councillors. There can be no justification for giving unelected Peers a greater say in the election of our party leader than elected councillors. (Prentice, 2009) The challenge for Labour if they enter opposition in 2010 will be to avoid a retreat towards internal debates about their leadership election procedures. Fieschi observes that British political parties seem inclined towards tinkering with the party leadership election procedures (Fieschi, 2007:482-86). Indeed, constant amendment has characterised the Conservative party history on leadership selection. Like Labour this has historically afflicted them when in opposition – 1965, 1975 and 1998 (Heppell, 2008a:196-98). What is also apparent is that irrespective of the rhetoric, debates on leadership election procedures are not exercises in party democracy, but disputes about power (Stark, 1996:64). Ideological based groupings adopt positions on leadership selection methods designed to enhance the chances of their ideological block securing the lineage on the leadership. The new left, under the charismatic leadership of Tony Benn, argued the case for party democracy and the Electoral College as a means of reducing the power of the right from within the PLP. The right attempted to withstand the new left argument for democratisation. Once it was inevitable, some of them stumbled across the idea of one member, one vote as a means by which to produce an Electoral College that would be more suited to their needs. Personal ambition and cynical opportunism on behalf of respective factional groupings, rather than principle or rational contemplation of desirable procedures, have historically characterised debate and decision-making (Stark, 1996:64-66). The drive of the new left was assumed to be about enhancing the chances of a leader from the (new) left assuming the leadership (presumably Benn). It was also about enhancing their accountability to the wider Labour movement, to ensure that they had a mandate from the CLPs and the trade unions, as well as from within the PLP. Part of enhancing that accountability implied a need to limit leadership autonomy. However, whilst the election process was democratised, the ejection procedures, (the decision to challenge), remained within the control of the PLP. As the third term of new

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Labour heads towards the electorate and requests an unparalleled fourth term, the position of Brown has become the defining concern of the Labour party. Amongst the PLP and wider Labour movement, and political journalists, there has been considerable speculation on the merits of removing him; and the means by which to do so. However, academics would note that within the culture of the Labour party there is an unwillingness to assassinate the leader, in the way that the Conservatives have been able to do (Quinn, 2005:783; Fieschi, 2007:487). This may well be fair comment. However of greater importance than their cultural instincts are their procedures. Here, it can be argued that there are costs associated with conducting leadership elections; costs which are maximised when the contest has been caused by a challenge. Quinn has argued that these costs can be summarized under three headings: financial costs; decision costs; and disunity costs (Quinn, 2004:347-48; Quinn, 2005:795-96). For example, when we consider the costs and implications of the Benn challenge from the new left in 1988, it is clear that many of the aspects of the Electoral College, that the new left had fought so hard to construct, had now undermined their cause. This is significant when we consider how the shift to party democracy was initially interpreted, as outlined by Kavanagh: Changing the rules to party democracy had far reaching political consequences, in the short run at least. If the old informal rules of the game were tailor made for the revisionists, or the right of the party, then the new rules were tailor made for the left…they were promoted by the left and the left gained from them. (Kavanagh, 1998:34) Kavanagh implies that from the vantage point of 1983 the left had benefitted from the chaotic period of 1979 to 1981 due to two factors. First, the right had lost support due to the split from within that faction flowing from the establishment of the SDP; a split caused in part by the formation of the Electoral College to determine the leadership. Second, they had gained greater influence in policy terms, culminating in the 1983 general election manifesto, which was strongly influenced by the policy preferences of the left (Kavanagh, 1998:34). However, from the vantage point of late 1988 it can be argued that the new left had actually made a series of tactical and strategic miscalculations: the humiliation of the Benn challenge suggested that the rules for party democracy were not as tailor made as had initially been assumed. We can demonstrate the flaws in the conduct of the new left by considering the three costs theory – financial, decision, and disunity – highlighted by Quinn (Quinn, 2004:347-48; Quinn, 2005:795-96). On the first cost which focuses on the financial cost, it is clear that the Electoral College carried with it far more significant financial costs than the old style parliamentary ballot. The financial costs in initiating a challenge to

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an incumbent prior to the Electoral College were limited, as the parliamentary ballot system was cheap to operate, whereas the costs of balloting for example during the 1988 challenge was £500,000 (Stark, 1996:122; Quinn, 2004:347; Quinn, 2005:800). And herein is a massive contradiction in the thinking of the new left. The central issue underpinning the shift to the Electoral College from the perspective of the new left was the need to make the incumbent leader more accountable to the party. To ensure that such accountability was ‘embedded’ within the new rules for extended party democracy was the provision for annual contests (providing that a challenger put themselves forward). The new left wanted this provision as they believed that the possibility of annual contests would provide an institutional check on the incumbent, and would provide them with an incentive to be responsive and receptive to activist concerns – i.e. it would be easier for the left to ‘control’ the incumbent (Quinn, 2004:334, 346). However, the provision only has controlling powers if there is a probability that it will be utilised. The left appeared to have failed to realise that accountability (to their agenda) could necessitate annual contests, but that there would be a limited desire for annual contests to occur due to the costs associated with them (Quinn, 2004:346). The second cost associated with leadership elections relates to what Quinn defines as the decision costs. It is inevitable and necessary for political parties to change their leaders (Heppell, 2008a:209). Indeed, there will be pivotal moments within distinct periods of party development, when significant strategic decisions on the trajectory of the party have to be made. Leadership elections can provide that forum for choice and thus help to determine those strategic choices (Kenny, 2009b: 666). However, parties should be wary of the impacts of an excess of leadership elections. Quinn argues that when a party conducts an internal leadership election it incurs a decision cost – i.e. the ‘decision’ to engage in an internal leadership election means that considerable time and effort will be devoted to looking politically inwards rather than outwards (Quinn, 2005:806). For example, the decision to hold a leadership election in 1988, which would last approximately eight months, clearly irritated Kinnock (Drower, 1994:230). Punnett argues that: From March to October the leadership was put into a state of limbo: in Parliament, on the NEC and before the public. The contest also clearly diverted the party from its principal task of attacking the government. In April, Kinnock appealed for an electoral truce to prevent harm being done to the party’s chances of success in the local government elections, but Benn and Heffer did not respond. Labour’s poor performance in the Kensington by-election in July (where it failed narrowly to achieve victory in an eminently winnable seat) was

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attributed by Kinnock to the diversion of the party’s energy into the leadership contest. (Punnett, 1990:188) The new left campaign for the construction of the Electoral College to enhance intra-party democracy, and the accountability of the incumbent leader to the entire party, contains an inherent contradiction surrounding annual contests beyond the financial costs. That the Electoral College takes considerably longer to activate than a parliamentary ballot actually serves to discourage challenges to the incumbent. The parliamentary ballots that had resulted in victories for Wilson in 1963, Callaghan in 1976, and Foot in 1980 had been completed within a matter of a few weeks. Thus the timescale in which Labour parliamentarians are focusing on succession concerns, for example in 1988, was almost eight times longer than was the case in a parliamentary ballot (Stark, 1996:121-22). The protracted nature of activating and operating the cumbersome machinery of the Electoral College, and the time (and financial costs), created a sense of ‘turmoil’ and a reticence towards activating this ‘pantomime’ (Punnett, 1990:191; Quinn, 2004:346). The protracted nature of the Electoral College was a significant conditioning factor in the thinking of Labour parliamentarians in the 2007 succession contest. By ensuring that Brown was the only candidate passing the nomination threshold the paralysis created by the duration of the Electoral College, magnified when in government, rather than opposition was shortened. If those leftist advocates of the Electoral College failed to identify how such financial and decision (time) costs would be damaging to the party, they also failed to recognise the importance of the disunity costs, which would be magnified by the long duration of the Electoral College. I wrote in Choosing the Tory Leader that during the course of party leadership elections: Candidates condemn the leadership credentials, policy positions and ideological beliefs of their rivals. The image of the party can be damaged if rival candidates ritually belittle each other during the course of the campaign. That can leave an inedible representation of disunity and mutual hostility at elite level within the party. Given that the electorate tends to punish divided parties, then leadership elections can be seen as a symptom of the failings of the party, rather than showcasing the talents and ideas that exist within the party. (Heppell, 2008a:209) What was particularly interesting about the 1988 challenge to Kinnock was the fact that it was a signal sender challenge from his critics on the new left without a prospect of victory, rather than a serious challenge from a more

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credible candidate on the right – i.e. Smith, who might actually defeat Kinnock. On this Quinn observes that: Kinnock’s standing as Labour leader had fallen sharply in the aftermath of the 1987 election defeat, yet he was not challenged by a mainstream candidate, despite a whispering campaign in the parliamentary Labour Party and the unions. Given the revival of the ‘baronial’ view of Labour politics, enormous damage would have been done to the party if union leaders were seen to be pushing Kinnock out. However, the structure of the college almost demanded that this would need to happen if an incumbent was to be dislodged. An unintended consequence of the college was that in giving so much power to the unions, the latter were encumbered with the burden of responsibility. They had to protect the leader or face being depicted as undemocratic ‘barons’ by a vitriolic press. It was impossible for union leaders to stay neutral in this so they had little choice but to defend Kinnock. (Quinn, 2004:347-48) In addition to emphasising the costs associated with what was a needless leadership election contest, we should also recognise that conducting leadership elections can have significant implications for the future methods of how leadership selection should be managed. In this context 1988 was pivotal. It was clear that the Benn-Heffer ticket was not going to result in a change in the leadership directly: Benn would not replace Kinnock. It was clear that the share of the vote that Benn was going to receive was going to be so poor as to discredit the new left, and thereby not significantly alter the progress of the ongoing Policy Review. It was also clear that permitting Benn-Heffer to initiate such a challenge, which then drew in Prescott, was incurring costs (financial, disunity and decision) without the prospect of real change. The decision to initiate a leadership contest rested with Labour parliamentarians. In order to activate this right all that was required was that a candidate wishing to dispute the leadership could pass the threshold of support from within the PLP, which currently stood at 5 per cent. After 8 months of conflict, Benn had secured the support of 17.2 per cent of the PLP. Thus although clearly marginalized, the support base that Benn possessed was still significantly larger than the threshold for initiating a further challenge. In theory, the new left could probably muster enough endorsers from within the PLP to initiate another challenge to Kinnock before the end of the Parliament. This was a significant concern that Kinnock wanted to address. As the costs to the party of holding a contest when initiated by a challenge to the incumbent leader were so high, and thus so damaging to perceptions of the party, in terms of unity and leadership competence, it was felt that the threshold for initiating the Electoral College

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should be increased from the current level of 5 per cent (Stark, 1996:60). Therefore, at the Annual Conference of 1988, the NEC moved an amendment for a higher threshold arguing that those who: Decide to embark upon a campaign which has such a severe impact on the Labour movement’s morale, its finances, and its energy…must be able to demonstrate that they have substantial support in the House of Commons amongst their working colleagues. (Stark, 1996:60) In this context, by challenging when he had no prospect of success, Benn contributed to increasing the security of tenure of the incumbent (Stark, 1996:1998). Stark concludes that Kinnock was inadvertently assisted by Benn: Kinnock claimed that he had been planning to seek this reform before Benn announced his challenge. Benn’s candidacy made it easier to win passage of the new threshold…‘He delivered himself into my hands’ Kinnock said of Benn. (Stark, 1996:59-60) It is intriguing to note the new threshold figure. Determining what should replace the 5 per cent initiation threshold was politically symbolic. Kinnock wanted to ensure that no future leadership challenge could be initiated against him from the new left. David Blunkett suggested that doubling the threshold from 5 to 10 per cent would be an appropriate level of change. Kinnock was opposed to this as the number of members of the Campaign Group exceeded 10 per cent of the PLP and therefore 10 per cent would be insufficient. Instead, the threshold for individuals wishing to secure their names on the ballot forms was increased to 20 per cent – more than the membership of the Campaign Group and more than the 17.2 that had endorsed Benn (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992:103). Quinn argued that 20 per cent was significant in entrenching the security of tenure of the incumbents (Quinn, 2004:333). He concludes that: The 20 per cent rule confers gate keeping powers on the PLP when the pressure for leadership change comes mainly from outside the PLP. If, in opposition, the party had 250 MPs, a challenger would need the nominations of 50 MPs to start a contest. However, given that up to a hundred MPs could have frontbench positions (the ‘payroll vote’) and many more would be hopeful of obtaining future preferment, the hurdle would seriously impede challenges. (Quinn, 2004:338)

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In his compelling evaluation of leadership ejection rules within the Conservative and Labour party parties, Quinn highlights the long term consequences for the security of tenure of Labour leaders, flowing from the 1988 Benn challenge: Small left wing cliques in the PLP were able to surmount the 5 percentage threshold but have struggled with the 20 per cent barrier. The higher the nomination threshold, the broader the ideological coalition required to instigate a contest, but the more moderate these MPs are, the lower are their net policy benefits from leadership change, assuming that the incumbent is more moderate than the challenger. Hence, higher nomination thresholds increase entry costs, because there are more MPs to mobilize, and it is harder to mobilise moderate MP against a moderate incumbent (unless s/he is unpopular and discredited). That makes it difficult to launch signal sender challenges, which are associated with the left: since the 20 per cent rule was introduced, no incumbent has been challenged. (Quinn, 2005:800) Therefore, the Benn challenge demonstrated how the costs of initiating a challenge had been increased by the apparatus of the Electoral College; costs which seem to have not been factored into the tactical and strategic thinking of the new left in the 1979-81 period. It also provided the rationale for intensifying the security of tenure of the incumbent by seeking to minimise the capacity of frivolous signal sender candidatures; a consequence which again the new left seemed to have not considered before launching a challenge which marginalized them even further. One final aspect of the reforms to intra-party democracy dating back to the 1979-81 period, instigated at the behest of the new left, had now served to undermine the Benn candidature in 1988. As Quinn observes: The publication of MPs choices in the nomination and voting stages of leadership contests increases greatly entry and campaign costs in the Electoral College. This rule was demanded by the college’s left wing backers who wanted MPs to held accountable by the CLPs (even though the latter had their own votes). Because MPs behaviour can be monitored and punished, it is harder for challengers to mobilize them. Most frontbenchers, including the incumbent’s serious rivals and ambitious backbenchers have little option but to back the incumbent during a signal sending challenge. (Quinn, 2005:800) Therefore, it can be argued that the new left had failed in their objectives on reforming leadership selection: the Electoral College failed to produce left-

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wing leaders and has enhanced the authority and autonomy of incumbents. As former leadership candidate, Margaret Beckett would later admit the Electoral College ‘has had almost the reverse effect of what its proponents intended’ (Stark 1996:66). It can be argued that there are three substantive ways in which as a succession planning exercise the new left can be shown to have miscalculated. 1.

Disunity Costs and Strategic Reorientation: The process of establishing the Electoral College, and its associated constitutional reform agenda, occurred with considerable costs to the image of the Labour party. In their pursuit of the Electoral College, the new left made a significant contribution to the fracturing of the social democratic right, for whom disagreements about how to withstand the onslaught of the new left (and the policy implications on the economy, defence and the EEC) contributed to the establishment of the SDP. After the establishment of the SDP, the new left through Benn challenged Healey for the deputy leadership in 1981 – an act of such divisiveness that it acted as a catalyst for many on the old left, notably Kinnock, to move towards the centre and make an accommodation with the remaining old right. The left’s association with extremism, division and defeat ensured that a process of ideological alignment would occur within Labour thought culminating in the increasing ascendancy of the social democratic right; the electoral expedient move towards new Labour; and the marginalisation of the left (both old and new).

2.

Legitimatising Leaders and One Member One Vote: In the aftermath of the 1974-79 Labour administrations, a betrayal thesis gathered within the new left which argued that a social democratic right leadership had betrayed the Labour movement, from whom they did not possess a mandate to lead. Designed to hold the leader to account, the Electoral College, through the CLP and trade union voting sections, would ensure that leaders possessed a stronger mandate from across the wider Labour movement. The criticism that the Electoral College suffered from, especially in 1992 about the influence of the trade union block vote, contributed to the extension of one member, one vote for the CLP and trade union voting sections in 1993. A year later, the Electoral College gave Blair hugely enhanced authority and legitimacy to carry out the further modernisation of the party that

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was incomplete following the Kinnock and Smith reforms. Blair could then take the party further to the right in policy terms and secure the replacement of Clause IV. The legitimisation of Blair in 1994 was enhanced by the knowledge that he possessed broadly similar mandates from the PLP (60.5%); CLP (58.2%) and trade unions (52.3%). This was just over a decade after the new left had argued for an Electoral College, under the assumption that CLPs were ‘hotbeds’ of new left support, (a justified assumption in light of Benn’s return in the deputy leadership contest against Healey). The returns for Blair suggested that the process of ideological realignment at PLP level was replicated at CLP level as many CLPs loosened their alignment to the new left (Thorpe, 2008:221). The Electoral College has not increased the accountability of the leader to the wider Labour movement; rather through their stronger mandate it has enhanced their autonomy. Between 1981 and 1992 the existence of the trade union block vote meant that union leaders could determine the trajectory of succession contests: the curtailing of that power gave a degree of power and influence back to the PLP (Quinn, 2004:333). 3.

Nominations and Security of Tenure: Having seen the old left candidate Kinnock become leader through the Electoral College, and then re-orientate the party to the right, the left have seen three successive leadership elections in which the candidates of the left has been defeated: Benn (1988); Gould (1992); and Prescott and Beckett (1994); and one (2007) in which the left’s candidate (McDonnell) could not pass the nomination threshold for entry to the Electoral College. The attempt of the new left to use the Electoral College to stall the revisionist trajectory of the Kinnock leadership backfired. The increasing of the threshold for nominations (from 5 per cent to 20 per cent in 1988 then down to 12.5 per cent in 1993) was a contributing factor to two problems that the left would face in the age of new Labour. First, it prevented the left from mobilising enough support to challenge Blair at the height of the Iraq crisis in 2003-04 and ensured that they were unable to field a candidate for the succession in 2007 (Quinn, 2005:799-801). Designed to ensure that elected leaders were accountable to the wider Labour movement, it has had the reverse effect of intensifying the security of tenure of incumbents (Quinn, 2004:333).

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The non contest of 2007 highlighted to primacy that the PLP held with the Electoral College, despite the nominal three thirds split in the weighting of the college sections. For it is the PLP that possessed dominance in terms of nominating candidates for the succession, and in doing so it is they who possess the power to initiate a challenge (Quinn, 2004:336-38). Therefore, with the benefit of hindsight it can be argued that the left made a series of tactical and strategic miscalculations, which suggested that the rules for party democracy were not as tailor made as had initially been assumed. The new left’s campaign for democratisation created such disunity costs that it indirectly contributed to the strategic reorientation to the right; and to the enhanced authority and legitimacy of social democratic right leaders with increased security of tenure (Minkin, 1991:357; Stark, 1996:66). As a succession planning strategy, Andrew Thorpe offers a damning conclusion: The imprimatur of the Electoral College, designed as a guarantor for the left, was ultimately to be the weapon with which to beat it. (Thorpe, 2008:221)

NOTES

1. Introduction 1 2 3 4 5

For an analysis of the performance of the chairs of the PLP between 1900 and 1922 see Laybourn, 1999. For a definitive assessment on Hardie, see Morgan 1975. For an account of the first Labour government under MacDonald see Laybourn and Shepherd, 2007. For a detailed analysis of MacDonald’s political career, which challenges the betrayal thesis that he schemed to abandon Labour, see Marquand, 1977. For an evaluation of Labour in opposition after 1931 and the contribution of Attlee thereafter, see Swift, 2001. The best examinations of the Attlee era are provided by Pelling, 1984; Morgan, 1984; Jefferys, 1992; and Hennessy, 1992.

2. From Gaitskell to Wilson 1

2

3

4

Much of the research that informs this chapter can also be seen in an article that I published with Contemporary British History, entitled ‘The Labour Leadership Election of 1963: Explaining the Unexpected Election of Harold Wilson’ (Heppell, 2010c). Copyright lies with the publishers of Contemporary British History. The theory of consensus implies that the post war period involved a bipartisan agenda forged around policy pillars such as the welfare state; full employment, the mixed economy and Keynesian economic management; equality as an objective in social policy, and a role for the trade union movement. Advocates of the theory of post-war consensus include Addison (1975, 1987, 1993; Kavanagh, 1987, 1992 and Kavanagh and Morris, 1994). Critiques of the consensus thesis, who have challenged the notion of a bipartisan accord, include Pimlott, 1988; Jefferys 1991; Brooke, 1992; Rollings 1994; and Kerr, 2001. Detailed and sympathetic evaluations of the Attlee era have been put forward by Morgan, 1984 and Hennessy, 1992. Critics on the left have suggested that the Attlee era represented a wasted opportunity, characterised by an insufficient socialist transformation of society. For this interpretation, see Miliband, 1961 and Saville, 1988. Ideology is an important variable when considering voting behaviour within leadership elections. However, it is not the only factor. It is acknowledged that candidates for the leadership will be assessed not just on their ideological

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6 7

8

9

10 11 12

13

14

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER acceptability and their capacity to unite the party (an internal dimension), but on their external appeal – are they electable and can they offer governing credibility – i.e. are they politically competent? (Stark, 1996:126) It should also be acknowledged that parliamentarians may be influenced by socialisation factors, such as education and occupational background; and by generational factors such as age, year of parliamentary entry, and career status. Such factors have been recognised by academics analyzing Conservative party leadership elections. See for example, Cowley and Garry, 1998:473-99 and Heppell and Hill, 2008:63-91. The seminal study on the Gaitskellites during the era of Labour opposition between 1951 and 1964, written by Haseler, makes only limited references to the challenge to Gaitskell by Wilson, and the war of the Gaitskell succession (Haseler, 1969). The hostility that Attlee had towards Morrison was due to personal as well as political reasons (Williams, 1978:300). Gaitskell underestimated the extent to which Clause IV was the cornerstone of the political outlook of many within the Labour movement (Jefferys, 1993:51). Attacking the symbol of Clause IV was like ‘trying to persuade Christian fundamentalists that they need not believe in God’ (McLean, 1978:48). Speculating in September 1960 about whether he would challenge Gaitskell that November, Wilson outlined his reservations to Cole: ‘Take it from me, John, when the dagger is shoved between the shoulders of that chap over there, (Gaitskell is standing thirty yards away), there will be six policeman, none below the rank of sergeant, standing around J. H. Wilson’ (Cole, 1995: 25-26). The complex character of Wilson was emphasised by the 1955 leadership election. He voted for Gaitskell, yet Greenwood wrote to Gaitskell in the immediate aftermath of his victory and noted the following: ‘if in your speech of acceptance it seemed appropriate to refer to the need for a tolerant and broad based party I think that (a) it would have a good effect in the constituency parties and (b) it would be a great help to people like Harold, Dick (Crossman) and myself.’ Letter from Greenwood to Gaitskell, 12th December 1955, Gaitskell Papers, C. 144-145.1, University College, London. Had Bevan not passed away in 1960 it is conceivable that he may have challenged Gaitskell in the autumn of 1960 (Pimlott, 1992:239). During the course of the 1960 Annual Conference, Gaitskell famously announced his objections to the resolution by declaring that he ‘will fight and fight again to save the party we love’ (Pimlott, 1992:238). The 1961 Annual Conference would pass a resolution reversing the vote on unilateral nuclear disarmament. This came about as a result of powerful lobbying by Gaitskellite social democratic forces within the Campaign for Democratic Socialism (Thorpe, 1997:151). Callaghan was scathing about the support for unilateralism offered by Greenwood, Crossman, Castle, Foot and the opportunism of Wilson. Letter to Greenwood, 2 Jan 1961 (Callaghan Papers, Box 31) and letter to Frank Cousins, 29th September 1960 (Callaghan Papers, Box 1A). Roth argues that Wilson was loathed to stand, partly because he believed that at least two thirds of the PLP was identifiable with the right and thus the electorate was loaded towards Gaitskell and against him (Roth, 1977:249).

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15 When announcing his candidature Wilson claimed that ‘the issue facing us today is not defence. It is the unity, indeed, the survival of this party’. The Guardian, 21st October 1960. Wilson reinforced this message later in the short campaign when he announced that the mutual tolerance between both sides was essential and that ‘the issue was not multilateralism versus unilateralism, but unity versus civil war’. The Guardian, 22nd October 1960. 16 The leading supporters of Wilson were Jennie Lee (the widow of Bevan), Richard Crossman, Tony Benn, George Wigg, Barbara Castle and Michael Foot (Foot, 1968:129). 17 The Gaitskellites were sure that they would win by 140 to 70 (Roth, 1977:252). 18 Immediately after he was defeated Wilson voted with the leadership, (and the majority), when the unilateralists asked that a motion on hydrogen weapons should be considered (Foot, 1968:129). 19 The Times reported that the position of Gaitskell seemed unaffected by the challenge – 4th November 1960. 20 Over the next decade former Gaitskellites would compare what they perceived to be the shortcomings of Wilson with the now idealized attributes of their lost leader (Fielding, 1997a:66). 21 Brown had not anticipated a succession contest occurring. He had fully expected Gaitskell to recover – this was evident from a letter from Brown to Henry Brandon, a Sunday Times journalist, indicating he expected Gaitskell to return to full health, dated 15th January – Brown Papers, Bodleian, Box 118. 22 Nairn noted the personality flaws of Brown created real reservations about his suitability for high office: ‘his impulsiveness, his lack of tact, his bureaucratic brutality of outlook, his too vulgar populism, all disqualified him as a potential Prime Minister’ (Nairn, 1964:54). 23 Brown would become quite bitter about the conduct of many during the course of the succession contest. In his memoirs he noted that it was an unpleasant leadership election and that a ‘bitter campaign was waged against me’ (Brown, 1971:83). 24 Many felt that Alfred Robens would have been an ideal standard bearer for the right but Robens had opted out of politics in favour of the Coal Board (Ziegler, 1993:135). 25 Callaghan had stood for deputy leadership on a clear platform – support for unilateralism and support for Gaitskell – see Callaghan papers Box 1A. 26 Such was the stand that Callaghan had made in support of Gaitskell he lost his position on the NEC. This was seen to be a punishment from CLPs and some unions. Gaitskell was sympathetic – ‘it makes one despair – and it makes one angry at the same time’ Gaitskell to Callaghan, 2nd October 1962 (Callaghan Papers, Box 31). 27 Shortly after the death of Gaitskell, Callaghan wrote to Brown and stated that: ‘I am sorry that I cannot give you a reply about standing yet. People whose opinion I respect believe that I should do so. I have not given them a reply for the moment’ (Callaghan to Brown, 18th January Brown Papers, 118). 28 However, this is not a recollection shared by Rodgers. He understood that it was estimated that Wilson would have a small lead over Brown, with a projected vote distribution of around 105 Wilson, 95 Brown and 45 Callaghan, which

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overestimated Brown and Callaghan and underestimated Wilson (Rodgers, 2000:72). 29 After the outcome of the first parliamentary ballot, Brown sought traitors who had failed to endorse him as the sole candidate of the right. He corned Richard Marsh and shouted at him: ‘what a shit, what a bastard’ (Pimlott, 1992:259).

3. From Wilson to Callaghan 1 2

3

4

5

6 7

8

Meanwhile, another unnamed Cabinet critic, was quoted as saying: ‘there are two things I dislike about Harold: his face’ (Kellner and Hitchens, 1976:180). On the conduct of Wilson in his first period in office, Crossman would comment: ‘What are Harold’s long term economic objectives for this country? Does he want to go into Europe or doesn’t he? I don’t think he knows himself…And what about the long term future of the Labour party? Does he see it as a real socialist party or does he, like the Gaitskellites, aim to turn it into an American Democratic party or a German SPD?’ (Howard, 1979: 253-54). It was estimated that Brown threatened to resign on 17 separate occasions between 1964 and 1968. Jefferys notes that on one occasion a concerned civil servant disturbed Wilson to inform that he was holding a resignation letter from Brown, only for Wilson to inform him: ‘put it in the file, with the rest of them, there’s a good chap’ (Jefferys, 2002:164). Brown lost his constituency at the 1970 general election and formally left the Labour party in 1976. Later he joined the SDP (Jeffreys, 2002:166). Brown, who was an advocate of devaluation (unlike Wilson), asked Barbara Castle, (at the time of the July 1966 crisis), whether she would be prepared to support him as an alternative leader. Any Brown plot was short lived; Castle rejected his invitation (Jefferys, 2002:152). In July 1966 Callaghan had briefed journalists that he expected, indeed hoped to be switched from the Treasury to the Foreign Office relatively soon. Wilson decided that Callaghan needed to be ‘taught a lesson’ as such behaviour suggested to Wilson that Callaghan had ambitions for the leadership. Callaghan, who was eventually switched to the Home Office in 1967, saw his arch enemy, Brown enter the Foreign Office. Wilson moved Brown there to ‘give him less scope to interfere in domestic politics’. The two appointments were indicative of the divide and rule mentality of Wilson (Jefferys, 2002:156-57). Callaghan refused to endorse Healey (Owen, 1991:155). Healey makes no reference to this in his autobiography (Healey, 1990). Lipsey suggests that the decline in the friendship between Jenkins and Crosland could be explained by their respective relationships with Gaitskell. He notes that: ‘certainly Crosland later in life could be incandescent at the various attempts by the Jenkinsites to establish their man’s claims to be Hugh Gaitskell’s natural heir’ (Lipsey, 2002:106). Rodgers later commented that it was in actually in the autumn of 1968 that Jenkins might have ‘successfully engineered a coup d’etat’, but by the spring of 1969 the chances of this had subsided due to the impact of In Place of Strife and the respective positioning of Jenkins and Callaghan on this. Rodgers admits however, that Jenkins was ‘not against his friends keeping the pot gently boiling, but he cautioned against a long, drawn out and bloody leadership fight which would be very damaging to the party’ (Rodgers, 2000:114).

NOTES 9 10

11

12 13

14 15

16

17

18 19

20

211

David Owen recalls that ‘Jenkins felt that it was too early to strike…[but]… his critics felt he was too meek to strike’ (Owen, 1991:157). Cronin argues that ‘Jenkins and his closet allies were firmly committed to British membership…and came over time to regard the commitment as a sign of their intellectual sophistication, worldliness and modernity and hence a matter of high principle’ (Cronin, 2004:139). Crosland did not share the staunch pro-Europeanism of Jenkins (Jefferys, 1993:85). Although pro-European in his outlook, he lacked the passion and zeal for it that characterized the attitude of Jenkins. For Crosland it was a minor issue (Cronin, 2004:140). This decision was at the instigation of Benn and was secured through a narrow majority in the shadow Cabinet (Thorpe, 1997:182-83). In May 1971 Callaghan had delivered a controversial speech in which he spoke of the ‘language of Chaucer, Shakespeare and Milton’ which was interpreted as indicating his willingness to act as a leading representative of the antimembership faction (Morgan, 1997:392-97). Healey has argued that the conspiracy theories should be discounted. He suggests that Wilson told too many people years earlier that it was his intention to resign at 60 for the conspiracy theories to have any real plausibility (Healey, 1990:446). At the time of the contest, Callaghan had served in the shadow Cabinet or Cabinet for 25 years as opposed to Healey 17; Benn and Crosland 11; Jenkins 9 and Foot 6. Callaghan had also occupied all of the great offices of state: the Treasury, the Foreign Office and the Home Office. No other candidate offered the same longevity or seniority: for example, Benn, Foot and Crosland had occupied none of the major offices of state (Stark, 1996:82). Jack Cunningham, who ran the Callaghan campaign, calculated at the beginning of the contest that Foot would lead on the first ballot, but that Callaghan would win the third and final ballot (Morgan, 1997:473). Inside the Callaghan team, alongside Cunningham were Merlyn Rees, Harold Lever, John Morris, Fred Peart, Ted Graham, John Smith and Roy Hattersley. Interestingly two of the campaign team – James Wellbeloved and Mike Thomas – would later defect to the SDP, and therefore should have been natural Jenkins supporters (Callaghan Papers, Box 17). John Cartwright noted that Jenkins was undermined by defeat in 1970 as ‘there appeared to be some residual resentment about the 1970 budget which some Labour MPs felt played a major part in the unexpected general election defeat’. Correspondence with the author. There were 314 members of the PLP at the time of the first ballot. Brian O’Malley, who supported Foot, died before the second ballot. In withdrawing Jenkins recalled the words of the defeated Adlai Stevenson: ‘It hurts too much to laugh and I’m too old to cry’ (Lipsey, 2002:112). The Callaghan papers reveal than upon Jenkins’s withdrawal, four of his keenest supporters – John Horam, Robert Maclennan, Giles Radice, and Dickson Mabon – all declared for Callaghan. The papers also reveal that Owen switched to Healey first and then to Callaghan in the final ballot (Callaghan Papers, Box 17). Crosland had an eclectic bunch of supporters including one Tribunite, Bruce Grocott. In correspondence, modern day arch Europhobe, Robert Kilroy-Silk confirmed to me that he endorsed Crosland. See also Crosland Papers Box 6.3.

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21 Foot had demanded that Jenkins should not be awarded the Foreign Office. He also demanded that his ally Albert Booth be made Employment Secretary and that Barbara Castle should be kept in the Cabinet (Callaghan Papers, Box 3, Callaghan Diary entry: 5.4.76). Shortly before Wilson resigned he had suggested to Jenkins that he might want to leave the Home Office and become President of the European Commission. Once eliminated from the succession contest Jenkins had hoped to be offered the Foreign Office. Had he been so, he would have rejected the offer to go to Brussels. Bill Rodgers went to see Jenkins in his office on the evening that Crosland had been offered the Foreign Office instead. Rodgers recalls: ‘on his desk, propped up against an inkstand, was a letter accepting the Presidency of the European Commission. It was still unsealed. But when the BBC Six O’ Clock News announced the new Callaghan Cabinet, with Crosland at the Foreign Office, Roy fastened the envelope down. It was a symbolic ending to his ministerial career’ (Rodgers, 2000:157). 22 This interpretation adheres to the orthodox view of Labour party historical analysis in the 1960s and 1970s, which has assumed the existence of a ‘majority’ social democratic right within the PLP prevailing over a ‘minority’ socialist left. In the limited academic work that exists on the Labour party leadership to determine the successor to Wilson, it has become established that voting behaviour by Labour parliamentarians, and the subsequent election of Callaghan over Foot, was shaped by ideological alignments and was thus indicative of the enduring numeric strength of the right vis-à-vis the left. My 2010 British Politics paper questions the viability of the orthodox one-dimensional left-right ideological divide. The paper identifies the cross-cutting nature of ideological alignments within the PLP in 1976, and demonstrates that individual Labour MPs could not necessarily be placed in left wing (i.e. economic expansionist, unilateralist and anti-common market) or right wing (i.e. economic consolidators, multilateralist and pro-common market) pigeon holes. By analysing the attitudes and behaviour of all Labour parliamentarians across the three dominant ideological policy divides (i.e. the economy, defence and the common market) the paper suggests that left wing thinking was actually in the majority within the PLP on the economy, defence and the common market. This revisionist account which takes account of the complex and cross-cutting nature of ideological alignments within the PLP, would suggest that Callaghan may not have won because of ideology, but because many Labour parliamentarians set aside their ideological commitments to vote for the most superior candidate in terms of the key criteria for party leadership: competence and electability (Heppell, Crines and Nicholls, 2010:65-91). 23 Changes in Prime Minister that had not been the result of a general election had traditionally occurred within the Conservative party, through what was known as the magic circle, i.e. non-democratic processes of consultation amongst party elites, through which a new party leader emerged. This mechanism operated on the following basis. Elites within the Conservative establishment would collectively evaluate the merits of potential leading Conservative cabinet ministers. Through their deliberations one candidate would emerge. Once elites had agreed on an approved candidate for the succession, that individual would be ritually acclaimed as the new leader/Prime Minister. The Conservatives switched to a ballot of the PCP in 1965. See, Heppell, 2008a, chapter two.

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4. From Callaghan to Foot 1 2

For a full and detailed appraisal of the IMF crisis, see Hickson, 2005. Meredith notes that appraisals of the 1974-79 Wilson/Callaghan administrations have generally been very harsh (Meredith, 2008:5). For a revisionist analysis which contextualises the adverse economic, social and political circumstances, see Seldon and Hickson, 2004. 3 Morgan noted that the dislike that the left had for Callaghan was close to hatred (Morgan, 1997:702). 4 This argument for extending the franchise for leadership selection was made strongly by Michael Meacher at the 1979 Annual Conference: ‘the fundamental reason, I believe is simply this: that the leader of the party is accountable, not just to the parliamentary party, but to the movement as a whole and he should therefore be elected by those to whom he is more broadly accountable’ (Punnett, 1990:181). 5 Foot regarded Benn’s decision not to stand for the shadow Cabinet in 1979 as ‘an act of disloyalty’ (Morgan, 2007:370). 6 Foot had been the deputy leader since April 1976, although Williams disputed the deputy leadership with him that autumn. Williams recalls that Callaghan did not support her, as ‘he probably felt my time would come, but certainly not yet’. Although Williams was defeated 166 to 128, Williams took comfort in her belief that the margin was smaller than Foot’s backers had anticipated (Williams, 2009:227). 7 Callaghan was contemptuous of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy. He felt that their strategy was ‘basically undemocratic’ and constituted an attempt to make the PLP and the leadership the ‘creatures of left wing constituency activists’, rather than being answerable to the country as a whole (Morgan, 1997:710). 8 Healey did not condemn the proposals as he felt that to do so would fatally upset trade union leaders whose support he might need in a future leadership contest (Morgan, 1997:717). 9 After the Annual Conference of 1980 Callaghan wrote to Harold Lever admitting that ‘the conference was pretty beastly as you can imagine but I do not let it disturb me any more’ (Callaghan Papers, letter dated 8th October 1980). 10 Rodgers reveals that after the Annual Conference of 1979 some on the right argued that Callaghan had to go now, as he was a ‘fixer’ who had failed to fix’. Rodgers talked to Healey who was against an earlier than planned change in the leadership. Rodgers bemoaned the fact that Healey ‘showed no great disposition to fight’ (Rodgers, 2000:190-91). 11 The PLP voted on a proposal to delay the leadership contest to determine who should succeed Callaghan, and concluded that they should proceed with a parliamentary ballot. A total of 119 voted against postponing with 66 arguing for – a total of 83 abstained (Punnett, 1992:91). 12 Silkin showed considerable bravado when faced with the prospect of Foot entering the succession contest. Silkin informed The Times that ‘I will beat him. Already I have warned Michael, sadly, that I have him well beaten’, although he did acknowledge that if Foot entered that ‘there would have to be two ballots’ (Emery, 1980:1).

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13 To support the argument that Foot was the best placed candidate to defeat Healey was the 1976 leadership election in which Foot comfortably outscored Healey. However, that argument had to be countered by the awareness that many Callaghan supporters would prefer Healey to Foot (Punnett, 1992:91). 14 Figures on both the right and the left assumed that Benn was motivated by personal ambition as well as principal. Michael Cocks, a long time rival concluded that ‘the only way that Benn could attain his ambition was to change the system of electing the leader to allow much wider participation by the Labour movement as a whole’ (Cocks, 1989:71). Silkin, identifiable with the left, felt that Benn argued for the principle of an Electoral College because it was the best method by which he could secure the leadership (Silkin, 1987:34). 15 One oddity in the voting was the fact that Wilson supported Healey in the first ballot then switched his vote to Foot in the final ballot (Morgan, 2007:379). 16 The failure of Healey to seek to outline the reasons why Labour MPs should endorse him contributed to the centrist Philip Whitehead voting for Foot (Morgan, 2007:379). 17 John Cartwright informed me that some ‘eventual SDP MP’s may well have voted for Foot in order to hasten the split. However the numbers were tiny and I was not among them. I gritted my teeth, held my nose and voted for Healey!’ 18 Rodgers later observed that many in the shadow Cabinet were not prepared to fight hard enough for either preserving a parliamentary ballot (his own preferred option) or one member, one vote (his second best option, and that advocated by Owen). He noted that Hattersley, Merlyn Rees, Eric Varley, Roy Mason and John Smith shared concerns about the movement, (and manner of movement), towards an Electoral College. Of Smith, he commented that he ‘would shuffle past me, avoiding my eye, ashamed of his feebleness’ (Rodgers, 2000:195).

5. From Foot to Kinnock 1

2

3 4

Healey notes that Foot ‘did briefly contemplate resigning [in 1982] so that I could lead the Labour party in the election campaign. The opinion polls showed that 49 per cent of the electorate would be more likely to vote Labour if I were leader’ (Healey, 1990:499). Valerie Wise, advisor to Benn, appeared to feel that a wider purge of the previous leadership was required. She said of Healey and Hattersley that ‘the sooner they go the better, because the trouble with those people is that they are very much identified with the last Labour government and with previous Labour governments who betrayed the working people of this country’ (Jones, 1994:468). This altercation between Foot and Benn occurred in the midst of Benn’s challenge to Healey for the deputy leadership. Two events – at the height of the deputy leadership campaign – appear to have pushed Kinnock towards an abstention strategy. Evidence of electoral damage came in July with the Warrington by-election, where Roy Jenkins, fighting the SDP’s first parliamentary campaign, polled over 40 per cent of the vote, turning a safe Labour seat into a marginal. Evidence of the contest’s damage to party unity was revealed in August, when a rally against unemployment was ‘almost destroyed’ by hecklers howling down Healey. Many of them were Benn supporters (Harris, 1984:153-59).

NOTES

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5

Kinnock admitted to me that ‘the fact that I deliberately and publicly organised abstentions made me a target for the self appointed new/hard left and earned me some new friends on the right of the party’. 6 In addition to the fracturing within the left, and the strengthening of the old/soft left, the Benn challenge also served as the rallying point for a counter attack by the remaining old right. In addition to withstanding the Benn challenge, the right made significant gains in the NEC elections (Seyd, 1987:159). 7 After the confirmation of the result Foot would return to the issue of the composition of the Electoral College, arguing for the 50-25-25 formula. However, the 1981 Annual Conference reinstituted the three year rule, meaning that constitutional amendments affecting the Electoral College could not be debated until 1984 (Stark, 1996:58). Debates over constitutional arrangements abated after the Healey-Benn contest (Cronin, 2004:227). Under the ‘Bishops Stortford Accord’ that summer, the Electoral College was ‘saved’ in an attempt to settle hostilities (Panitch and Leys 1997: 263-64). 8 Of its impact on Foot, Shaw observed that ‘the embittered contest exacted a heavy toll on Foot. Virtually the first 12 months of his leadership had been taken up with unavailing attempts to maintain the unity of the party against successive debilitating crises: over constitutional reform, the right wing breakaway and then the deputy leadership contest’ (Shaw, 1999:160). 9 When the announcement from the Press Association came through that Clive Jenkins was backing Kinnock, Shore was being interviewed live on television by the former Labour MP Brian Walden. Shore had yet to formally declare that he was a candidate. Upon revealing to Shore the news that Kinnock had secured a major union backer, Walden asked Shore if was intending to stand. Drucker noted that ‘Shore had no chance to reflect, no chance to consult trusted friends, no chance to consider the implications. Shore was caught: he said yes’ (Drucker, 1984:284). 10 Kinnock led Hattersley 56 to 27 per cent amongst the whole electorate. However, amongst former Labour voters who had defected to the Conservatives or the Liberals – SDP in the general election earlier that year, Hattersley was the preferred candidate by 45 per cent to 30 per cent (Drower, 1994:77). 11 Of his speech, Benn was grudging in his acknowledgement; it was ‘pretty vacuous...but he got a huge ovation’ (Benn, 1992:320).

6. Kinnock Defeats Benn 1 2 3

4

The NEC investigation resulted in the restructuring of the local party and the expulsion of 16 members of Militant (Cronin, 2004:262). For a detailed study on the Policy Review, see Shaw, 1994:81-107. Benn claimed that he did not object to a review of policy. However, what he feared was that the process that Kinnock was entering into was designed to justify the abandonment of policies so that the party can be orientated towards the centre. As such Benn dismissed it as a public relations exercise and refused to participate in it (Adams, 1992:452). Alderman and Carter imply that the Meyer challenge of 1989 amounted to a necessary prerequisite for the challenge from Michael Heseltine that did cause the downfall of Margaret Thatcher one year later (Alderman and Carter, 1991:139). In Choosing the Tory Leader, I commented that ‘Meyer knew that his candidature

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8

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER was for a specific purpose. It was about enhancing the feasibility of a more serious challenge from the economically damp, Europhile wing of the parliamentary Conservative Party. Put crudely, Meyer was interested in enhancing the probability of Heseltine succeeding Thatcher’ (Heppell, 2008a:74). Drower notes that between March and October 1988, never once did Kinnock ‘grant Benn the distinction of referring to him by name’ (Drower, 1994:230). The fact that representatives of Kinnock had briefed against Prescott suggested that no such deal between Kinnock and Prescott had been agreed. By doing so Prescott was seen as being humiliated (Drower, 1994:231). Given that Prescott ultimately landed up as deputy leader to Tony Blair for the duration of his leadership tenure between 1994 and 2007, it is ironic that Kinnock would have resigned rather than accept Prescott. At the time, Kinnock felt that such a move would indicate that Labour was not serious about projecting themselves as a potential party of government (Drower, 1994:232). Despite these impediments, Prescott had an impressive list of supporters in terms of quality, if not quantity, including Peter Shore, Clare Short, Chris Smith, Ron Davies, David Blunkett, Michael Meacher, Jo Richardson and Margaret Beckett (Brown, 1997:184).

7. From Kinnock to Smith 1

2

3

4 5

6

Kinnock later admitted ‘Labour hadn’t seen Major coming. We had been looking forward to an election against Thatcher, which we would have won whenever it came because she was very beatable. At the time of the 1990 leadership election, Heseltine was also thought of as a known and beatable candidate, while the worry was over [Douglas] Hurd because his style was so different to Thatcher. Major came from nowhere and we had no pre-existing strategy that could be used against him. The tactical dilemma was whether to portray him as a Thatcherite, or attack him for the new things he was doing’ (Seldon, 1997:258). The Kinnock papers reveal the frustrations that would surround health as a campaigning issue in the 1992 general election. Of the scandal of Jennifer’s Ear the post-election report to the NEC revealed that: ‘it did us no favours and we did not achieve the full lift off for which we had hoped’ (Report to the NEC on the general election campaign, Kinnock Papers). Technically when in opposition the Labour leader cannot dismiss an elected member from the shadow Cabinet. They can remove them from portfolio responsibilities, but if elected in the shadow Cabinet parliamentary ballots the ‘dismissed’ individual is entitled to attend shadow Cabinet meetings (Stuart, 2005:198). According to Stuart, as early as late 1987 a number of union leaders and MPs made clandestine approaches to Smith to stand against Kinnock (Stuart, 2005:146). The Kinnock papers reveal the departing leader’s frustrations during the NEC meeting to determine the timetable for the succession contest. As objections to an early leadership contest were discussed, Kinnock jotted down notes which included ‘gave [give?] me back my dignity’. When Prescott decided to stand he assumed that Beckett would not be standing (Rees, 1992).

NOTES 7

8

9

10 11 12

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Beckett did not campaign for the deputy leadership as part of a ‘dream ticket’. She did attempt to emphasize her independence from Smith. As Stuart noted ‘she stressed her Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and trade union roots, the contribution she could make as a women towards addressing the gender gap’ (Stuart, 2005:235). Smith asked Robin Cook to be his campaign manager. Smith and Cook had disagreed on many policy issues but ‘having Cook on board meant that Smith could shore up his support on the left’ (Stuart, 2005:229). That Smith persuaded Beckett to stand for the deputy leadership created tensions with Cook, who had been arguing the case for Gould as deputy (Rentoul, 2001:184). The process proved to be controversial. The number, and names, of backers were not to be announced until nominations closed. This meant that candidates had to attempt to assess whether they had the required support. Furthermore, the leadership election procedures were not clear on whether MPs could back more than one candidate. After a period of confusion it was confirmed that should MPs submit a second nomination that would invalidate their first nomination. Not surprisingly, Alderman and Carter concluded that there was ‘disenchantment with the rules governing the contest’ which ‘was matched by dispute—at times bordering on total confusion—over their interpretation’ (Alderman and Carter, 1993:51). Gould later left British politics and returned to his native New Zealand where in 1994 he became Vice Chancellor of the University of Waikato, a post he held until retiring in 2004. Both Smith and Gould praised the mandatory use of one member, one vote in the CLPs (Stark, 1996:60-61). Kinnock noted that ‘until the 1992 election my assumption had been that if we had formed the government in 1992 my successor would be Gordon, and if we lost the election then John Smith’s successor would be Gordon’ (Beckett, 2007:69). In addition to his preference for a gender balance and his good working relationship with Beckett, Smith also switched to her due to the complications that could ensue from Blair entering the deputy leadership contest. The deputy leadership contest was already going to involve three candidates – Beckett, Prescott and Gould – and Smith feared that if Blair entered, then this would prompt his more senior north-east Labour MP, Jack Cunningham, into entering and making a 5 way tie for the deputy leadership (Rentoul, 2001:182).

8. From Smith to Blair 1

2

On the reform of the Electoral College, Stark noted that ‘1/3-1/3-1/3 had once been the preferred formula of the left-wing reformers who got the party to adopt the Electoral College in the first place. The left had only reluctantly abandoned this formula in favour of 30-30-40 because they knew 1/3-1/3-1/3 had insufficient support to win at Wembley in 1981’ (Stark, 1996:63). Jon Cruddas believes that the conference vote would have been lost without the intervention of Prescott (Seldon, 2004:711).

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However, writing in The Times Matthew Parris ridiculed his delivery, much to Prescott’s chagrin, ‘Prescott went twelve gone rounds with the English language and had left it slumped and bleeding over the ropes’ (Prescott, 2008:179). 4 Once aware of the futility of standing, advisors to Cook encouraged him to concede and support Blair before Brown did. However, Cook could not bear the thought of Brown running and him not, so he only formally declared his non involvement after Brown withdrew. Within the internal dynamics of Labour politics, some believe that this was critical. If he had declared for Blair earlier, he could have ‘emerged as a stronger player in the Blair set up’. As a ‘consequence the old/soft left would have been harder to ignore’ (Kampfner, 1998:98-99). 5 Rentoul observed that Beckett ‘had already eyed up the job’ when she thought that Smith might resign over one member one vote at the 1993 Annual Conference (Rentoul, 2001:236-37). 6 Alderman and Carter noted that Beckett attempted to utilise the position of acting leader to aid her leadership aspirations, by ‘meeting prominent international figures like Bill Clinton and Jesse Jackson, or attending such events, as a conference of European socialist leaders in Crete’ (Alderman and Carter, 1995:447-48). 7 Alderman and Carter noted ‘the precise timing of the contest could have a crucial bearing upon who would be the party's deputy leader. The rules did not provide for a challenge to Beckett's position until the party conference, so that opting for July would prevent what many felt was the advantage of simultaneous election of a leader and deputy leader, as had occurred in 1983 and 1992. A subsequent autumn challenge for the deputy leadership would be very improbable; two separate ballots would be both highly expensive and divisive, so potential deputy leadership challengers would be pressured not to provoke a contest’ (Alderman and Carter, 1995:438). 8 Seldon notes that Smith deployed a ‘divide and rule’ method of managing Brown and Blair. By ‘deliberately playing one off the other’ Smith would heighten the tensions in their ‘fraying’ working relationship (Seldon, 2004:184). 9 On the law and order sound bite that did so much to advance the profile of Blair, Cronin has observed ‘the experience of propagating Labour’s new policy on crime was indicative’ of the Brown-Blair relationship and their respective strengths. It was Brown who invented the sound bite – ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ – but critically it was Blair who delivered it so well and got the credit. Blair ‘struck a chord with voters that Brown, though articulate and presentable, simply did not’ (Cronin, 2004:376). 10 Cherie Blair revealed that Tony Blair had long said to Brown ‘if you really want to be leader, you need to get married’ (Blair, 2008:169). 11 Blair and Brown held their final meeting prior to Brown standing down on 31st May at the Granita restaurant in Islington. Although the terms of the deal were determined over a series of meetings over the previous three weeks, the ‘Granita Deal’ has entered the lexicon of Labour history (Seldon, 2004:193). 12 Kinnock is sceptical about the idea that a deal on the succession would have been possible. He says ‘I’ve never believed in it. I’ve never asked them but here are two young guys in 1994 who have only ever known opposition. Both were less certain than I was that they were going to win the next general election. They would not be sitting there making a sort of deal, it would have been castles in the

NOTES

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14

15

16

17

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air. Neither of them would have the arrogance to make a deal on the carving up of power’ (Beckett, 2007:79-80). Of their respective campaigning strategies, Alderman and Carter noted that ‘Beckett and Prescott projected images of themselves rather different from those of 1992. Beckett had then stood as the 'establishment' candidate, capable of forming a gender-balanced team with Smith, whereas Prescott had been almost anti-establishment—a traditionalist distrustful of the modernisers’ (Alderman and Carter, 1995:447-48). That Beckett sought to demonstrate her left wing credentials was interesting. That she had historic ties to the left was not disputed, but it was noted that she had distanced herself from the left in the mid to late 1980s (Alderman and Carter, 1995:446-47). That Beckett could be problematic to Blair in presentational terms was emphasized by her reaffirmation of her support for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and her belief the water industry should be renationalized (Alderman and Carter, 1995:446-47). Alderman and Carter noted that ‘the logistics of conducting a contest with a potential electorate exceeding four million, including individual party members and trade union political levypayers, were beset with difficulties’ (Alderman and Carter, 1995:438). Union members were eligible to vote only if they had paid the political levy, indicating that they supported Labour, and declared that they were not members of another political party (Stark, 1996:63). Alderman and Carter noted the following with respect to voting within the trade union sections ‘it was clearly embarrassing for the TGWU (which recommended Beckett for both posts) that a plurality of its members (44%) voted for Blair. But Beckett received twice as large a share of the vote from the TGWU as she did from the GMB union —which made no recommendation (33% as opposed to 16%). In the deputy leadership election, 56% of the TGWU vote went to Beckett by comparison with 43% of the GMB. In the RMT and GPMU, Prescott, who was recommended by their executives, actually received more votes for the leadership than Blair (45% to 43%). He also beat Beckett for the deputy leadership much more convincingly (72% to 28% in the RMT and 70% to 30% in the GPMU) (Alderman and Carter, 1995:449-50).

9. From Blair to Brown 1

2

To obtain a wider theoretical appreciation of the political thought underpinning new Labour see Plant, Beech and Hickson, 2004 and Beech 2005. For discussion of new Labour and the Third Way consider Driver and Martell 1998, and Giddens, 1998, 2000. To demonstrate that new Labour could create a new Britain, Blair needed to prove that Labour was new. Modernisers felt that Clause IV of the Labour party constitution, which committed them to public ownership, was a symbol of old Labour. Its continued existence was anarchistic, (as Labour would not renationalise if returned to office), and it provided electoral utility for the Conservatives (Fielding, 1997b:25). It enabled the Conservatives to infer that taxation would have to rise under Labour, (to finance re-nationalistion), and it indicated Labour’s misunderstanding of the global economy and the role of

220

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4 5

6

7

8

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER markets. Clause IV was successfully challenged and reformed by Blair. He had succeeded where Gaitskell had failed 25 years earlier, and by 1995, Labour had broken with its past. New Labour possessed a new clause, which asserted their belief in a dynamic economy; the enterprise of the market; and the rigour of competition (Cronin, 2004:383-87). Brown worked assiduously as Chancellor at establishing and maintaining Labour as the party of economic competence. This was aided by having inherited propitious economic circumstances (Heppell, 2008b:589-90). Keegan observes that as shadow Chancellor, and latter as Chancellor, Brown was ‘terrorised by fear of doing anything to offend middle England’ who new Labour strategists felt had recoiled from Labour in light of the Smith shadow Budget. Through the Conservatives ‘tax bombshell’ and Labour’s ‘double whammy’ propaganda these concerns had dominated the 1992 general election agenda (Keegan, 2003:11). For an evaluation of new Labour in government see Seldon, 2001, 2007b; Walker and Toynbee 2001, 2005, 2008; and Beech and Lee 2008. Perceptions of their vulnerability to the tax and spend allegation had explained why in January 1997, Brown announced that if elected new Labour would adhere to the spending plans outlined by the Conservative Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke, for the next two years. As previous Labour administrations were deemed to have been economically incompetent, modernizers believed that stating that they were committed to the spending plans already outlined by the incumbent Conservative administration would demonstrate their ‘realism’, as compared to the ‘idealism/profligacy’ of old Labour administrations. Through such ‘prudence’ they could shape electoral perceptions of them as economically (and thereby governmentally) competent (Heppell, 2010b). Numerically the left was in decline. Many previously associated with the left had made an accommodation with the Blair project – Prescott, Cook and Beckett – leaving the left shorn of its profile and leadership figures. Disharmony was created when Ken Livingstone was expelled from the party and stood as an independent to defeat Frank Dobson for the Mayoralty of London. The departure of Livingstone ensured that the faces of the left were ‘relics’ such as Denis Skinner and Benn (Butler and Kavanagh, 2001:31). Mentioning the scale of disunity prior to new Labour was significant, as Cowley, Darcy and Mellors observe ‘previous Labour leaders used to play down their rebellions, arguing either that things were not as bad as people thought, or that some division was a sign of healthy discussion. Blair’s strategy was different: he talked about how bad things used to be, in order to talk about how good things now were. The supposed cohesion of new Labour was presented as an important part of its novelty and a useful contrast to the Conservatives’ (Cowley, Darcy and Mellors, 2001:103). Nearly a decade later the ‘psychologically flawed’ allegation would act as the central driver of a Channel 4 documentary shown just weeks before Brown was to become Prime Minister. In the documentary ‘Gordon Brown: Fit for Office? the journalist Peter Oborne managed to add to this allegation an assertion from one unnamed Cabinet minister that he will be a ‘f***ing disaster’ as Prime Minister (Channel 4, 2007). Two years after this description had been made public, it was finally revealed to have been made by John Hutton. Hutton had resigned from the Brown administration during 2009, at which point the media

NOTES

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11

12

13 14 15

16

221

had attempted to suggest that it was due to his frustration with the leadership performance of Brown. At the time of his resignation Hutton appeared to deny this (Savage, 2009). Shortly after announcing his intentions to seek a third term, but not a fourth term, Blair would enter hospital for an operation on an irregular heartbeat (Seldon, 2007a:299). In May 2006 many within the Brown camp sensed that this might be an opportunity to move him out. In the immediate aftermath of the election results, it was rumoured that leading Brownites, including Ed Balls and Nick Brown, had prepared a grid of media appearances, in which they would state the need for Blair to set a timetable for departure. Within this orchestrated plot, Brown was to appear on the Today programme on Radio 4, during which his acolytes expected him to ‘pull the trigger’. By that it was meant that Brown should adhere to the ‘script’ and ‘call in the strongest terms for an urgent transition’ (Seldon, 2007a:452). The message could be delivered in a coded manner, but there was a clear need to highlight the advantages of an early transition and the disadvantages of Blair remaining for too long. But Brown could not do it. Or he did not know of the plot. Brown would deny being a participant in any predetermined plot – the so called May coup - but Seldon does notes that afterwards Balls screamed at him ‘you bottled it’ (Seldon, 2007a:451-52). At the height of the plot, Blair bumped into the former leader of the Conservative party, Iain Duncan Smith, himself famously deposed a few years earlier. Blair commented to Duncan Smith ‘I suppose you’re laughing your head off about all of this, aren’t you’. Duncan Smith responded sympathetically: ‘I know only too well what can go on’ (Seldon, 2007a:490-91). A leaked document in September 2006 revealed plans for a grand departure based on tours of major cities and television appearances. It stated that Blair ‘needs to go with the crowds wanting more. He could be the star’. Such suggestions angered the Brown camp due to the following comment ‘the more successful we are, the more it will agitate and possibly destabilise [Brown]’ (Bower, 2007:505). It was deemed to be so obvious that Brown was going to be the next Labour leader that in May 2007, Anthony Giddens and Polity Press published ‘Over to You Mr Brown’ (Giddens, 2007). The Guardian reported on 17 May that McDonnell objected to the ‘machine politics’ that Brown was engaging in to thwart a contest taking place. There was a suggestion that the deputy leadership election should not take place. Arguing that it was a ‘non-job’ unnamed Cabinet ministers were alleged to be lobbying that it was a post that was not required and did not justify millions being spent by candidates to acquire it. Given that the party was £23 million in deficit the cost of a £2 million contest was deemed to be unnecessary. The suggestion that the post be abolished failed to gather momentum and a full succession contest was undertaken with a larger than normal number of candidates (Morris and Brown, 2006). Cruddas differentiated himself from the other candidates by arguing that as a ‘party job’ he would not want a Cabinet post if elected stating that ‘I am not interested in the trappings of power’ (Denham and Dorey, 2007:531).

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17 Cruddas and Harman claimed that they had been misled over Iraq, particularly over the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction. They were the only candidates who stated that the British people were owed an apology for the invasion (Denham and Dorey, 2007:534).

APPENDIX

Labour Party Leadership Election Procedures: Parliamentary Ballots 1922 to 1981 Procedures formally related to when in opposition as there were no procedures set down for leadership elections when in government, although when this did occur in 1976, the same procedures were utilised. At the beginning of each parliamentary session, nominations are invited for the position of leader. If two or more nominations were received, then ballot papers would be issued. Candidates required a proposer and a seconder, and their names would be publicly revealed. A series of exhaustive secret ballots would take place over a period of weeks at most. All candidates had to enter the first ballot. Labour parliamentarians voted for one candidate in each ballot and were allowed up to a week to return their ballot papers in each round of the election. This gave them time to consult with their CLP, although they were not formally required to do this. In order to be elected the winner would have secured a simple majority of the parliamentary votes cast. If after the first ballot, no candidate had secured a majority then the bottom candidate would drop out of the contest and a second ballot would take place. Candidates were permitted to drop out at any time. Ballots would continue until a candidate secured a majority. Source: Adapted from Quinn, 2005:809 Labour Party Leadership Election Procedures: Electoral College 1981 to 1993 Candidates who wish to stand for the leadership, whether for the vacancy or as a challenge to an incumbent, have to secure nominations from five percent of the PLP. The nomination threshold of five percent applied between 1981 and 1988. After 1988 that nomination threshold for candidates was increased

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from five percent to twenty percent. CLPs, trade unions and socialist societies could also nominate candidates. Candidates for the leadership had to be members of the PLP. Nominators’ preferences would be publicly revealed. If Labour was in government, the principle of initiating a contest had to be approved by party conference. This provision does not apply when Labour are in opposition, when annual contests are permitted. Electoral College votes would be collated at a special party conference and the leadership determined through exhaustive ballots. The voting of Labour parliamentarians, of CLPs and the affiliated organisations would then be made public. The breakdown of the constituency parts of the Electoral College was as follows: 1. Thirty percent for the PLP based on one vote for each Labour parliamentarian. 2. Thirty percent for CLPs. This was based on undivided block votes of CLPs which were dependent on affiliation level. After 1989 the pre balloting of members was made compulsory. 3. Forty percent for the affiliated section. This was based on undivided block votes for trade unions and socialist societies dependent upon affiliation level. The pre balloting of members was left optional. To win the Electoral College vote a candidate had to achieve a majority. If no candidate was able to secure a majority in the first or subsequent ballots, the bottom candidate would be removed, and the vote would take place again after delegates had had time to consult. All candidates had to enter the first ballot. To win the leading candidate only needed to secure a majority in the Electoral College overall; there was no procedural mechanism relating to strength of support within the separate sections of the Electoral College. Source: Quinn, 2005:809 Labour Party Leadership Election Procedures: Electoral College 1993Candidates who wish to stand for the leadership when a vacancy arises must secure nominations from 12.5 percent of the PLP (down from the twenty percent threshold introduced in 1988) Candidates who wish to challenge an incumbent leader still need to secure nominations from 20 percent of the PLP. CLPs, trade unions and socialist societies could also nominate

APPENDIX

225

candidates. Candidates for the leadership had to be members of the PLP. Nominators’ preferences would be publicly revealed. If Labour was in government, the principle of initiating a contest had to be approved by party conference. This provision does not apply when Labour are in opposition, when annual contests are permitted. Electoral College votes would be collated at a special party conference and the leadership determined through exhaustive ballots. The voting of Labour parliamentarians, both parliamentary at Westminster and European Members of Parliament; CLPs and the affiliated organisations would then be made public. The breakdown of the constituency parts of the Electoral College was as follows: 1. One third of the Electoral College based on support within the PLP at Westminster and Labour members of the European Parliament. One vote per MP/MEP 2. One third for CLPs. Individual members to vote by post and votes aggregated nationally 3. One third for the affiliates section. Individual Trade Union members and socialist society members to vote by post and votes aggregated nationally. All individual Trade Union members must belong to a Labour affiliated union; they must indicate on their ballot paper their support for Labour; and must confirm that they do not belong to another political party To win the Electoral College vote a candidate had to achieve a majority. First preference votes counted. If no candidate secures a majority of first preferences, the bottom candidate is eliminated and their votes are reallocated on the basis of second, third etc preferences. This eliminative process continues until one candidate secures a majority. All candidates must compete from the start. Source: Quinn, 2005:809

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INDEX

Adamson, Willie 3, 5 Anderson, Donald, 60 Ashton, Joe, 98 Attlee, Clement, 4, 5, 6, 14, 19-22, 25, 43-44, 207-08 Balls, Ed, 221 Barnett, Joel, 55 Barnes, George, 3, 5 Beckett, Francis, 176 Beckett, Margaret, 11, 16, 64, 116, 123, 126, 140, 142-46, 150, 152, 156, 158-60, 166-67, 16971, 203, 205, 216-20 Benn, Hilary, 188-90 Benn, Tony, 7-10, 15-17, 49-50, 53-58, 61, 64-65, 67-69, 71-79, 82, 85-87, 91-107, 109-13, 11519, 121-31, 133, 138, 142-43, 145-46, 158, 165, 169, 188, 197-99, 201-05, 209, 211, 21316, 220 Bevan, Nye, 6, 14, 19-23, 25-26, 29, 31, 39-40, 165, 208-09 Bishops Stortford Conference 1980, 68-69, 84-85 ‘Black Wednesday’, 153 ‘Blairites’, 11, 178, 181, 187, 192 Blair, Cherie, 151, 177, 186, 218

Blair, Tony, 5, 11-12, 16-17, 43, 64, 98, 148-55, 157-71, 173-94, 196, 204-05, 216-21 Blears, Hazel, 188-90, 193 Blunkett, David, 119, 143, 159, 163, 169, 202, 216 Booth, Albert, 212 Bower, Tom, 176 Bradley, Tom, 59 Brandon, Henry, 209 ‘Brownites’, 178, 180-81, 18384, 188, 221 Brown, George, 6-7, 15-17, 2021, 29-40, 45, 47, 50, 100, 107, 112, 169, 209-10 Brown, Gordon, 2, 5, 11-13, 1617, 148-52, 154-55, 157, 15866, 168, 170-71, 173-94, 196, 218, 220-21 Brown, Nick, 162, 181, 221 Brunson, Michael, 165 Bush, George, W. 173 Byers, Stephen, 192 Callaghan, James, 5-8, 15-17, 21, 32-38, 40-41, 43, 45, 47-55, 5766, 68-72, 74, 76, 79, 83-84, 86, 90, 100, 107, 165, 169, 175, 200, 209-11, 213

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Cameron, David, 13, 184, 192 Campaign Group, 99, 118, 12223, 128, 143, 158, 175, 188, 202 Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS), 208 Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD), 67-69, 87, 95, 118, 213 Campaign for Labour Victory (CLV), 80, 83, 85 Campbell, Alistair, 177, 179 Cartwright, John, 60-61, 77, 79, 211, 214 Castle, Barbara, 22, 40, 45, 56, 208-10 Chapple, Frank, 11 Churchill, Winston, 4 Clarke, Charles, 12, 165-66, 18587, 192 Clarke, Kenneth, 220 Clause IV/Nationalisation/Public Ownership, 14, 19-20, 22-25, 30, 122, 174, 204, 208, 219-20 Clinton, Bill, 218 Clynes, John Robert, 3, 5 Clywd, Anne, 142 Conservative Party, 2-4, 10-11, 13, 18, 23-24, 40, 43-45, 50, 61-62, 65-66, 90, 115, 118, 124, 127, 133-37, 139, 147, 153-55, 157, 161, 167, 173-75, 179, 181-84, 187, 191, 193, 197-98, 202, 208, 212, 215-16, 219-21 Coates, Ken, 122 Cocks, Michael, 214 Cole, John, 24-25, 53, 208 Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs), 9, 28, 67-69, 74-75, 7982, 96-100, 103, 106, 110-11, 113, 116, 129, 141, 145-47, 150, 152, 156-57, 166-67, 197, 203-05, 209, 217, 223-25

Cook, Robin, 94, 98, 105, 127, 138, 158-59, 217 Corbyn, Jeremy, 102, 158 Cousins, Frank, 208 Crosland, Anthony, 7, 15-17, 23, 30-32, 34, 46, 50, 53-62, 71, 100, 165, 169, 210-11 Crossman, Richard, 17, 22, 27, 34, 36, 39-40, 208-10 Cruddas, Jon, 188-90, 217, 221-22 Cunningham, Jack, 108, 158, 211, 217 Dalton, Hugh, 22 Darling, Alistair, 162, 192 Davies, Denzil, 106, 113, 158, 166 Davies, Ron, 159, 216 Davis, David, 186-87 Devaluation, 1967, 7, 46, 173, 210 Dewar, Donald, 163 Diana, Princess of Wales, 176 Dobson, Frank, 98, 159, 163, 220 Douglas-Home, Alec, 13, 43, 182 Drower, George, 17 Duncan Smith, Iain, 221 Dunwoody, Gwyneth, 106, 113 Economic Crisis 2008, 12, 175, 190 Economy / Economic Policy, 14, 23, 30, 38, 44-47, 53, 65-66, 76, 82, 100, 133-36, 141, 144, 146, 155, 161, 164, 173-76, 179, 182-83, 191, 204, 207, 210, 212-13, 219-20 Edmunds, John, 140, 168 Electoral College, 2, 5, 8, 9, 1113, 15-16, 63, 64, 67-71, 74, 78-87, 102-03, 105-14, 121, 129-30, 139-48, 150, 152, 15658, 165-66, 168-70, 181-82,

INDEX 186, 188, 192, 194, 196-201, 203-06, 214-15, 217, 223-25 Ellis, Tom, 80 Europe / European Economic Community / European Union, 14, 32, 46, 50-51, 55, 59-60, 70, 72-73, 76, 82-85, 93, 100, 102, 115, 134-36, 142, 144, 146, 153, 158-59, 166, 211-12, 218 European Parliament Elections, 1989, 133 European Parliament Elections, 1994, 159 Expenses Scandal 2009, 12, 190 Field, Frank, 193 Flint, Caroline, 193 Flynn, Paul, 193 Fowler, Norman, 147 Foot, Michael, 5, 7-9, 15-17, 22, 28, 50-51, 53-65, 68-69, 71-81, 84-87, 89-95, 97-102, 107-08, 112, 169, 200, 208-09, 211-15 Gaitskell, Hugh, 5-6, 15-17, 1931, 34, 37-40, 46-47, 51, 55, 58-60, 100, 122, 124, 153, 165, 169, 196, 208-10, 220 General Elections (1906), 2 (1918), 3, 90 (1922), 3 (1924), 3 (1929), 3 (1931), 4 (1935), 4 (1945), 4, 19 (1951), 4, 20, 43 (1955), 4, 23, 43 (1959), 23, 43, 44 (1964), 17, 38, 43-44, 51 (1966), 17, 90

243 (1970), 50, 210-211 (1974, February), 17, 44, 51, 66 (1974, October), 17, 43, 51, 66 (1979), 66, 68, 86, 90, 115, 120 (1983), 89-90, 100-01, 110, 116, 121, 198 (1987), 9, 17, 120-21, 133, 137, 200, 215 (1992), 10, 115, 133, 137, 13941, 144-45, 148-49, 152, 161, 216-17, 220 (1997), 17, 164, 175, 178, 183 (2001), 17, 175, 183 (2005), 17, 175, 180, 183, 187 Gordon-Walker, Patrick, 17, 23, 32-33, 37 Gould, Bryan, 10-11, 16, 64, 131, 138-40, 142-46, 152, 154, 158, 169, 205, 217 Gould, Philip, 134, 149, 186 Graham, Ted, 61, 79-80, 211 Grant, Bernie, 142 Greenwood, Anthony, 15-17, 27, 29-31, 40, 100, 124, 169, 208 Greenwood, Arthur, 4 Grocott, Bruce, 211 Hain, Peter, 159, 188-90 Hardie, Keir, 2-3, 5, 207 Harmon, Harriet, 12, 189-90, 222 Hattersley, Roy, 9-10, 16, 59-60, 71, 75, 77, 83, 90, 101-07, 10913, 115-16, 119, 125-29, 13740, 145, 151, 169, 211, 214-15 Hatton, Derek, 119 Haydon, William, 139 Hawke, Bob, 139 Healey, Denis, 7-9, 15-16, 33, 4647, 52-62, 64, 66, 71-80, 84, 86-97, 89-102, 104-06, 108-09, 112-13, 122, 146, 165, 169, 204-05, 210-11, 213-15

244

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER

Heath, Edward, 43-44, 50 Heffer, Eric, 10, 16, 102-03, 106, 109, 113, 118-19, 122, 125-27, 129-30, 169, 199, 201 Henderson, Arthur, 3-5 Heseltine, Michael, 124, 181, 21516 Hewitt, Patricia, 149, 193 Holland, Stuart, 73, 122 Hoon, Geoff, 192-93 Howard, Anthony, 37 Howard, Michael, 186 Horam, John, 61, 79, 211 Hurd, Douglas, 216 Hutton, John, 220-21 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Loan 1976, 7, 65-66, 72, 173, 213 Iraq, 173, 175, 180, 181-83, 189, 205, 222 Jackson, Jesse, 218 Jay, Douglas, 23 Jenkins, Clive, 73, 103, 215 Jenkins, Roy, 7, 16, 23, 30, 32, 44, 47-51, 53-55, 57-62, 69-71, 8485, 100, 165, 169, 210-12, 214 Johnson, Alan, 186, 188-90 Kaufman, Gerald, 90, 104, 139 Kellner, Peter, 56 Kelly, David, 183 Kilroy-Silk, Robert, 211 Kinnock, Neil, 5, 9-10, 16-17, 5758, 64, 77-78, 92, 95-96, 98, 101-31, 133-34, 136-44, 14649, 152, 155-56, 158, 160-61, 168-70, 174, 199-202, 204, 214-16, 218 Labour Coordinating Committee (LCC), 118

Labour Party Annual Conferences (1935), 4 (1957), 23 (1959), 24 (1960), 24-26, 28, 208 (1961), 30, 208 (1978), 66 (1979), 68, 213 (1980), 65, 69-71, 85, 93, 213 (1981), 215 (1983), 106-07, 116 (1984), 156 (1985), 119 (1987), 120 (1988), 125-26, 128, 201 (1992), 140 (1993), 157, 169, 217-18 (1994), 218 (2006), 185-86, 188 (2009), 193 Labour Party ‘centre’, 14-16, 26, 39, 51, 56, 58, 61-62, 98, 104, 109-10, 119-20, 127, 137, 204, 215 Labour Party Deputy Leadership Elections (1960), 30, 33, 209 (1962), 6, 20, 29, 31-32, 40 (1970), 50, 60 (1972), 51 (1976), 213 (1981), 9, 86-87, 91-100, 102, 109, 112, 121, 129, 188, 20405, 214-15 (1983), 100-16, 188, 218 (1988), 10, 121-31, 188 (1992), 11, 139-52, 154, 188, 216-19 (1994), 11, 155-71, 188, 219 (2007), 12, 183-90, 221-22 Labour Party Leadership Elections

INDEX (1906), 2, 5 (1908), 3, 5 (1910), 3, 5 (1911), 3, 5 (1914), 3, 5 (1918), 3, 5 (1922), 4, 5 (1931), 4, 5 (1935), 4, 5 (1955), 5, 6, 20, 22, 208 (1960), 5, 6, 15-17, 20-30, 35, 39, 100, 169, 208-09 (1961), 5, 15-17, 29-30, 100, 169 (1963), 5-7, 13, 15-17, 20-21, 30-41, 43, 64, 100, 106, 169, 195-96, 200, 207-10 (1976), 5, 7, 16, 18, 51-64, 7374, 100, 106, 165, 169, 195-96, 200, 211-12, 214 (1980), 5, 8-10, 15-16, 18, 64, 70-80, 86-87, 100, 106, 108, 165, 169, 195-96, 200, 213-14 (1983), 5, 10, 15-16, 18, 64, 100-16, 118, 121-31, 142, 16870, 195-96, 205, 215, 218 (1988), 5, 10, 16, 18, 64, 117, 121-31, 137-38, 142, 152, 158, 168, 169, 195-96, 198-203, 205, 216 (1992), 5, 10, 11, 16, 18, 64, 139-52, 154, 156, 158, 161, 166, 168-69, 195-96, 204-05, 217-18 (1994), 5, 11, 16, 18, 64, 15571, 176-83, 195-96, 204-05, 218-19 (2007), 5, 11-13, 16, 183-88, 195-96, 205, 220, 221 Labour Party ‘left’, 6-11, 14-16, 19-36, 39-40, 50-51, 54-56, 58, 60-64, 134, 137, 139-40, 14243, 146-47, 150, 154, 157, 166,

245 169-70, 175, 188, 190, 203-04, 206 (New / Hard left), 8-10, 14-16, 67-72, 74, 76, 78-79, 81-86, 9194, 96, 98-102, 104, 115, 11731, 133, 137, 158, 197-206, 215 (Old / Soft left), 9, 11, 14-16, 69, 92, 96, 99, 102, 108-10, 114, 118-19, 121, 124, 126-28, 131, 134, 136-39, 142, 148-49, 15960, 170, 204-05, 215, 218 (Traditionalist left), 6, 21, 25, 154, 157, 159, 162, 219 Labour Party ‘right’, 6-11, 14-16, 19-34, 37, 39-40, 44, 46-48, 5051, 54-64, 67-72, 74-86,90-91, 93-94, 96-102, 104, 107-11, 115, 118-19, 127, 128, 130-31, 154, 158, 165, 169-70, 197-98, 200-01, 204-06, 208-10, 212-15 (Old Right), 14-16, 128, 130, 170, 204, 215 (New Right), 14-16, 170 (Consolidation Right), 19, 22, 154, 158, 212 (Defecting Right), 8-9, 76-80, 8299, 204 (Modernising Right), 11, 148-51, 154-55, 157, 160-63, 170-71, 173-74, 219 (Revisionist Right), 6, 16, 23-24, 55, 83, 198, 205, 212 Lansbury, George, 4-5 Lawson, George, 49 Lawson, Nigel, 148 Lee, Fred, 33 Lee, Jennie, 209 Lestor, Joan, 98, 159 Lever, Harold, 211, 213 Liberal Democrats, 2, 133, 147 Liberal Party, 2, 44, 66, 82, 90, 133, 215 Livingstone, Ken, 142, 158, 220

246

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER

MacDonald, Ramsey, 3-5, 207 MacLennon, Robert, 211 Macmillan, Harold, 13, 30, 48 McDonnell, John, 12, 16, 188, 192, 205, 221 Mabon, Dickson, 60, 221 Mahon, Alice, 143 Mahmood, Khalid, 185 Major, John, 11, 134, 136, 139, 141, 153, 168, 174, 181, 182, 191 Mandelson, Peter, 148-150, 15455, 162-63 Manifesto Group, 77, 80, 83, 85, 98 Marsh, Richard, 210 Mason, Roy, 214 Meacher, Michael, 12, 102, 10405, 112-13, 119, 122, 159, 188, 213, 216 Meyer, Anthony, 124, 215-16 Mikardo, Ian, 22, 73, 94, 98 Milburn, Alan, 12, 181-82, 186-87 Miliband, David, 12, 186-87, 192 Militant Tendency, 70, 115, 11719, 121-22, 144, 215 Miners Strike 1984-1985, 117-18, 122 Mitchell, Austen, 78, 81 Morgan, Kenneth, 17 Morrell, Frances, 122 Morris, John, 211 Morrison, Herbert, 4, 6, 22, 165, 208 Mortimer, Jim, 89 Mowlem, Mo, 159

Nellist, Dave, 70 Nuclear Disarmament and Multilateralism / Unilateralism divide, 14, 19-20, 23-30, 34, 70, 73, 82, 84-85, 92, 109, 115, 120, 136, 204, 208-09, 212

National Executive Committee (NEC), 22, 68, 70, 84, 90, 97, 115, 118-19, 123, 136-37, 14042, 156, 169, 199, 201, 209, 214-16 Naughtie, James, 164, 175

Radice, Giles, 76-77, 85, 97, 211 Raynsford, Nick, 193 Rawnsley, Andrew, 193 Rees, Merlyn, 211, 214 Rentoul, John, 176 Reid, John, 12, 186-87

Oborne, Peter, 220 O’Malley, Brian, 211 One Member One Vote (OMOV), 11, 13, 80-81, 83-86, 99, 139, 147, 152, 155-57, 16670, 196-97, 204, 214, 217-18 Orme, Stan, 72, 98 Osbourne, George, 191-92 Owen, David, 47, 49-51, 55, 69, 71, 80, 83-85, 98, 152, 211 Parris, Matthew, 217 Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) Ballots, 3-18, 20-41, 43, 51-64, 70-80, 86-87, 100, 106, 108, 223 Peart, Fred, 211 Peston, Robert, 187 Pimlott, Ben, 17 Plummer, Leslie, 34 ‘Policy Review’, 10, 16, 120-124, 126-27, 130-31, 133, 137, 201, 215 Prentice, Sally, 197 Prescott, John, 11-12, 16, 64, 12530, 140, 142, 145-46, 157-60, 166-67, 169-71, 177-78, 180, 188-90, 201, 205, 216-17, 219 Purnell, James, 192

INDEX Richardson, Jo, 123, 216 Robertson, George, 163 Robens, Alfred, 209 Rodgers, Bill, 17, 25-28, 30, 32, 34, 46, 48, 50-51, 57, 59, 69, 76, 79, 83-85, 209-10, 212-14 Rooker, Jeff, 98 Roper, John, 60 Routledge, Paul, 176 Sandelson, Neville, 80 Sawyer, Tom, 119 Scargill, Arthur, 117 Seldon, Anthony, 17, 176 ‘September Coup’, 183-86 Shackleton, David, 2 Shadow Budget 1992, 135, 144, 220 Shadow Cabinet / Elections, 2022, 27-28, 38, 51, 68, 73, 81, 83, 85, 87, 90, 92, 96-97, 101, 104, 127, 137, 139, 141-42, 145-46, 149, 152, 155-56, 159, 161-62, 167, 177, 211, 213-14, 216 Sheerman, Barry, 138 Shore, Peter, 9, 16, 72-77, 90, 100-03, 146, 169, 215-16 Short, Claire, 123, 140, 216 Short, Ted, 52 Skinner, Denis, 122, 143, 220 Silkin, John, 9, 16, 58, 73, 75-77, 84, 94, 96-98, 169, 213-14 Simon, Sion, 184 Simpson, Alan, 143 Smith, Chris, 138, 155, 159, 163, 216 Smith, Jacqui, 193 Smith, Jack, 28 Smith, John, 5, 10-11, 16-17, 60, 64, 71, 104-05, 126-27, 130-31, 133, 135, 137-57, 159, 161-63,

247 166-68, 204, 211, 214, 216-18, 220 Social Contract, 65-67, 79 Social Democratic Party (SDP), 2, 8-9, 15, 61, 76-77, 79-80, 8286, 90-91, 93, 97, 99, 115, 122, 133, 196, 198, 204, 215 Solidarity Group, 72, 98 Sopel, Jon, 176 Straw, Jack, 94, 98, 192 Stuart, Mark, 17 Taverne, Dick, 31 Tax, 23, 120, 135, 154, 161, 163, 174, 189, 191, 219, 220 Thatcher, Margaret, 48, 61, 66, 70, 82, 90, 95, 118, 121, 124, 134-36, 139, 169, 173, 181, 183, 215-16 Thomas, Mike, 211 Trade Unions, 45, 49, 63, 65-69, 74, 79, 81, 93, 96-100, 102-03, 105-06, 108-14, 118, 120, 129, 135, 139-41, 144, 145-47, 14950, 152, 154-57, 166-70, 174, 197, 201, 204-05, 207, 209, 213, 215-17, 219, 224-25 AEEU, 147 ASLEF, 103 ASTMS, 73, 103, 114 AUEW, 114 Block Vote, 81-82, 111, 147, 155-57, 168, 170, 204-05 COHSE, 106, 114 GMB, 140, 147, 156, 219 GPMU, 147, 219 MSF, 147 NUPE, 114, 140, 147, 156 NUR, 114 NUM, 106 POEU, 114 RMT, 219 SOGAT 82, 82, 103

248

CHOOSING THE LABOUR LEADER

TGWU, 103, 105-06, 140, 147, 156, 219 UCATT, 147 UCW, 103 USDAW, 103, 114 Tribune Group, 56, 94, 96, 98-99, 118 Varley, Eric, 77, 214 Walden, Brian, 215 Ward, David, 155 Watson, Tom, 184 Wellbeloved, James, 211 Wembley Conference, January 1981, 70, 80-87, 92-93, 98 Whitehead, Philip, 214 Wigg, George, 34, 36, 209 Williams, Alan Lee, 47, 60 Williams, Marcia, 25 Williams, Shirley, 50, 71, 76, 8485, 147, 213 Wilson, Harold, 2, 5-7, 9, 13, 1517, 19-22, 24-41, 43-56, 59-62, 64, 66-67, 72, 90, 100, 107, 112, 124, 169, 173, 175, 196, 200, 208-09, 212-13 ‘Winter of Discontent’, 65-66, 83, 173 Wise, Valerie, 214 Wrigglesworth, Ian, 60 Young, Hugo, 153 Ziegler, Philip, 17