Chinese Scholars and Foreign Policy: Debating International Relations 2018046345, 9780367140083, 9780429029738

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Chinese Scholars and Foreign Policy

How does China see the rest of the world? One way to answer this question is to look at the work of China’s scholars in the field of International Relations (IR). This leads to a ­second question – to what extent do Chinese IR scholars influence Beijing’s foreign policy and ­outlook? The contributors to this book seek to answer these key questions, drawing on their own first- and second-hand experiences of involvement in scholarly IR debates in China. Discussing fundamental aspects of China’s foreign policy, such as China’s view of the ­international structure, soft power projection, maritime disputes, and the principle of ­noninterference, this book provides insights into the hinterland of Chinese foreign p ­ olicy ­making. It is an invaluable reference for global IR scholars, especially those with a direct ­interest in understanding and predicting China’s actions and reactions on a range of ­international issues. Huiyun Feng is a senior lecturer in the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. She is a former Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace. Her publications have appeared in the European Journal of International Relations, Security Studies, The Pacific Review, International Politics, Chinese Journal of International Politics, and Asian Perspective. She is the author of Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (Routledge, 2007) and the coauthor of Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia Pacific: ­Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior (Routledge, 2013). Kai He is a professor of International Relations in the Griffith Asia Institute and Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. He is currently an Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow (2017–2020). He was a postdoctoral ­fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program (2009–2010). He is the ­author of Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China’s Rise ­(Routledge, 2009), the coauthor of Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia ­Pacific: Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior (Routledge, 2013), and the author of China’s Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 2016). Yan Xuetong is the dean and distinguished professor in the Institute of International R ­ elations at ­Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. He also serves as the Secretary General of the World Peace ­Forum and the editor-in-chief of the Chinese Journal of International Politics. He is the Vice ­Chairman of both the China Association of International Relations Studies and the China Association of American Studies, in addition to serving as a member of the Consultation Committee in the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. Professor Yan received his PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley in 1992. He is the author of many books and articles, including Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (Princeton, 2011).

Routledge Studies on Asia in the World

Routledge Studies on Asia in the World will be an authoritative source of ­k nowledge on Asia studying a variety of cultural, economic, environmental, ­legal, political, religious, security, and social questions, addressed from an Asian ­perspective. We aim to foster a deeper understanding of the domestic and ­regional complexities that accompany the dynamic shifts in the global economic, ­political, and security landscape towards Asia and their repercussions for the world at large. We’re looking for scholars and practitioners – Asian and Western alike – from various social science disciplines and fields to engage in testing ­existing models that explain such dramatic transformation and formulate new theories that can accommodate the specific political, cultural, and developmental context of Asia’s diverse societies. We welcome both monographs and collective volumes that explore the new roles, rights, and responsibilities of Asian nations in shaping today’s interconnected and globalized world in their own right. The Series is advised and edited by Matthias Vanhullebusch and Ji Weidong of Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Access to Higher Education Refugees’ Stories from Malaysia Lucy Bailey and Gül İnanç The New International Relations of Sub-Regionalism Asia and Europe Edited by Hidetoshi Taga and Seiichi Igarashi Regional Connection under the Belt and Road Initiative The Prospects for Economic and Financial Cooperation Edited by Fanny M. Cheung and Ying-yi Hong Chinese Scholars and Foreign Policy Debating International Relations Edited by Huiyun Feng, Kai He and Yan Xuetong For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com

Chinese Scholars and Foreign Policy

Debating International Relations

Edited by Huiyun Feng, Kai He and Yan Xuetong

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 selection and editorial matter, Huiyun Feng, Kai He and Yan Xuetong; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Huiyun Feng, Kai He and Yan Xuetong to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Feng, Huiyun, 1971– editor. | He, Kai, editor. | Yan, Xuetong, editor. Title: Chinese scholars and foreign policy: debating international relations / edited by Huiyun Feng, Kai He and Yan Xuetong. Description: First edition. | London; New York, NY: Routledge/ Taylor & Francis Group, 2019. | Series: Routledge studies on Asia in the world | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018046345 | ISBN 9780367140083 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429029738 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: International relations—Study and teaching—China. | International relations—Research—China. | China—Foreign relations. | Scholars—China. Classification: LCC JZ1238.C5 C55 2019 | DDC 327.072/051—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018046345 ISBN: 978-0-367-14008-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-02973-8 (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by codeMantra

Contents

List of figures Acknowledgments List of Contributors List of Abbreviations

vii ix xi xv

Introduction

1

1 Why do Chinese IR scholars matter?

3

H uiyun F eng and K ai H e

SECTION I

Key concepts debates

21

2 How do Chinese scholars view the evolution of international structure?

23

Z hou Fangyin

3 China debates soft power: implications for Chinese foreign policy

44

L i M ingjiang

4 The debates among Chinese IR scholars on China’s national interest strategy

63

C hen Qi and L iu L anyu

5 China debates on the non-interference principle C hen Z heng

86

vi Contents SECTION II

Key policies debates

107

6 To ally or not to ally? Debating China’s non-alliance strategy in the twenty-first century

109

L iu Ruonan and L iu F eng

7 Preference expression under political constraints: an analysis of debates about China’s use of force

127

Y in J iwu

8 Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute strategies

152

Z uo X iying

9 China’s debates on economic diplomacy

173

S ong G uoyou

Conclusion

191

10 Rethinking the role of scholars in Chinese foreign policy

193

K ai H e , H uiyun F eng , and Y an X uetong

Index

205

List of figures

5.1 Debating the Non-interference Principle in China 8.1 Change Mechanisms

97 166

Acknowledgments

How to understand China’s rise and its implications for Asia and the world is an imperative task for both scholars and policy makers. China has become the second largest economy next to the United States since 2010. China is also the major trading partner for over 140 countries in the world. As United States– China relations will define the next century, it is essential to build mutual ­understanding for policy makers. With generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Grant No. 16-1512-150509-IPS), the Griffith Asia Institute has collaborated successfully with Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations to carry out a research project, entitled “Understanding the Rise of China through the Eyes of Chinese IR Scholars”. This project aims to make sense of China’s rise in world politics through examining Chinese International Relations (IR) scholars’ perceptions and debates on key issues in international relations and Asian security. It is also intended to bridge the perception gap ­between China and the outside world. This edited volume is a product of “The Griffith-Tsinghua Conference: ­Chinese Debate International Relations”, hosted by Tsinghua University on D ­ ecember 11–12, 2016. We hope that it will shed some light on our ­understanding of ­Chinese IR scholars, especially regarding how they perceive world politics and how they can influence Chinese policy making via their internal debates. We appreciate the institutional support from Griffith University and Tsinghua University as well as the efforts of their skillful staff for successfully o ­ rganizing a two-day conference in Beijing in 2016. Personally, we are grateful to the ­contributors in this volume as well as all of the participants in the conference for their innovative contributions, sharp comments, and constructive suggestions on the project. We would also like to thank Stephen Walker, a mentor, friend, and advisor to this project, for his suggestions and advice as always. We are ­grateful to Daniela Di Piramo, who provided professional editorial assistance for this project. We would also like to thank Dr. John Fei and Dr. Angela Schlater, our program officers at the MacArthur Foundation, for their support for this project. At the publication stage, we appreciate the support and ­encouragement from Simon Bates, our editor at Routledge. Huiyun Feng, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia Kai He, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia Yan Xuetong, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

List of Contributors

CHEN Qi  is a professor in the Department of International Relations at ­Tsinghua University and a Resident Scholar at Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. He received his PhD in international relations from Tsinghua University in 2002, and was a visiting scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University of Illinois in 2001 and 2005, respectively. CHEN Zheng  is an associate professor in the School of International and ­Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and a postdoctoral fellow of the ­Oxford-Princeton Global Leaders Fellowship Programme, University College at Oxford University. Huiyun FENG  is a senior lecturer in the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, and a former Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace. Her publications have appeared in the European Journal of International ­Relations, Security Studies, The Pacific Review, International Politics, Chinese Journal of International Politics, and Asian Perspective. She is the author of Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (Routledge, 2007) and the coauthor of Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia Pacific: Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior (Routledge, 2013). Kai HE is a professor of International Relations in the Griffith Asia Institute and Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University, B ­ risbane, ­Australia. He is currently an Australian Research Council (ARC) Future ­Fellow (2017–2020). He was a postdoctoral fellow in the ­Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program (2009–2010). He is the author of ­Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China’s Rise (Routledge, 2009), the coauthor of Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy ­Analysis in the Asia Pacific: Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior ­(Routledge, 2013), and the author of China’s Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and ­Foreign ­Policy (Cambridge, 2016). LI Mingjiang is an associate professor and coordinator of the China Program at RSIS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His main research

xii  List of Contributors interests include China–ASEAN relations, Sino–US relations, and Asia-­ Pacific Security. He is the author (including editor and coeditor) of 12 books. His recent books include New Dynamics in US-China Relations: Contending for the Asia Pacific (lead editor, Routledge, 2014). LIU Feng  is a professor of International Relations and the associate dean of the Zhou Enlai School of Government at Nankai University, Tianjin. His research focuses on international relations theory and international relations in East Asia and China’s foreign policy. He is the author of The Logic of Balancing: Systemic Pressure, Hegemonic Legitimacy, and Great Power Behaviour. LIU Lanyu is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University. LIU Ruonan  is an assistant professor in the Department of International ­Politics, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE). She was a visiting scholar at the University of Groningen (2014) and the University of California, San Diego (2014–2015). Her research mainly addresses the international relations of Southeast Asia with a special focus on the security strategies of the Southeast Asian States and China–ASEAN relations. SONG Guoyou  is a professor of International Relations and serves as an ­executive director of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation and Governance Research Center, a Shanghai University think tank. He is also the director of ­Economic Diplomacy Studies Center at Fudan University. He received his PhD in ­international relations in 2006 from Fudan University. He is also an advisory member of several ministries of the Chinese government. YAN Xuetong  is the dean and distinguished professor in the Institute of ­I nternational ­Relations at Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. He also serves as the S ­ ecretary ­General of the World Peace Forum and the editor-in-chief of the Chinese Journal of International Politics. He is the Vice Chairman of both the China Association of International Relations Studies and the China ­A ssociation of American Studies, in addition to serving as a member of the Consultation Committee in the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. Professor Yan received his PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley in 1992. He is the author of many books and articles, including ­Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (Princeton, 2011). YIN Jiwu  is a professor of International Relations, School of International ­Studies, Renmin University of China (RUC) and a research fellow at the ­National Academy of Development and Strategy of RUC. His research ­interests focus on IR theory, political psychology, international security, and Chinese foreign policy. He served as a visiting scholar at Munich University, Columbia University, Oxford University, and The University of Tokyo. ­Recent publications include several books and textbooks of IR and political ­psychology such as Social Cognition and Trust Formation among Allies (2009), S­ trategic Psychology and International Politics (2016) and Introduction to Political

List of Contributors  xiii Psychology (editor-in-chief, 2011), and dozens of articles in academic journals both in IR and psychology. He is conducting a research project on Chinese strategic thinking, and will publish the next book Unilateral Consensus and China’s Strategic Choice (forthcoming, 2019). ZHOU Fangyin  is a professor and the director of the Center for China’s ­Regional Strategies, Guangdong Institute for International Strategies, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. His research interests focus on Chinese grand strategy, foreign relations of ancient China, and East Asian regional cooperation. He has published widely in both Chinese and English academic journals such as International Affairs and the Chinese Journal of International Politics. ZUO Xiying  is an associate professor of International Relations at Renmin ­University of China. His research interests focus on international ­security, regional security of Asia Pacific, and American foreign policy. He received his PhD in international politics from Fudan University in Shanghai. From August 2011 to August 2012, he was a visiting scholar in the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins University.

List of Abbreviations

ADB ADIZ AIIB APEC ASEAN AU BRICS CCP CLCS CNKI CPC DPRK EEZ EU FDI GATT GDP ITLOS KLP MFA MLE NATO NGOs OBOR PLA PRC R2P RCEP SD/SJD SOEs THAAD TPP UN UNCLOS  WTO

Asian Development Bank Air Defense Identification Zone Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (China) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Union Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Chinese Communist Party Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UN) China National Knowledge Infrastructure Communist Party of China Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Exclusive Economic Zones European Union Foreign Direct Investment General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Keeping a Low Profile Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China) Maritime Law Enforcement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Government Organizations One Belt One Road People Liberation Army (China) People’s Republic of China Responsibility to Protect Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Shelving Differences and Seeking Joint Development State-Owned Enterprises Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Trans-Pacific Partnership United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea World Trade Organization

Introduction

1 Why do Chinese IR scholars matter? Huiyun Feng and Kai He

Introduction Since 2010, China has become the second largest economy after the United States in the world. China’s military spending is also the second largest, just behind that of the United States’ in recent years. In 2016, China announced a further increase in its military budget by 7–8 per cent. Although the power gap between China and the United States is still significant, “the rise of China is the big story of our era” (Shambaugh 2013, emphasis in original). China’s ­“assertive diplomacy” has also drawn deep suspicions from the rest of the world since the global financial crisis in 2008 (e.g. Swaine 2010, 2011; Swaine and Fravel 2011). The 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis with the Philippines, the still ongoing ­flare-ups with Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes, as well as the maritime competition or even rivalry between China and the United States in the South China Sea have further intensified the strategic concerns over China’s rise. How to understand China’s rise and its implications for Asian security is an imperative challenge for policy makers in today’s world and in the foreseeable future. In order to better manage the rise of China, the United States and other ­nations need to know what Chinese leaders think about its own power and s­ tatus, and perceive the US power and status, so as to predict how China will behave with their increasing economic and military capabilities in international affairs. Understanding the Chinese perspective is the first step in making effective policy on China. As Henry Kissinger (2011: vxi) advises, we “do not always agree with the Chinese perspective…But it is necessary to understand it, since China will play such a big role in the world that is emerging in the twenty-first century”. If “strategic distrust” is a major obstacle in the bilateral relations between the two nations as Kenneth Lieberthal and Jisi Wang (2012) suggest, deepening our understanding of Chinese perceptions and views on international relations (IR) will be a crucial task for bridging the perception gap and mitigating the strategic distrust between the United States and China. China experienced its once-a-decade leadership transition in 2012, and C ­ hina’s new President Xi Jinping is expected to remain in power for at least ten years (until 2022). Chinese foreign policy is moving in a new direction under Xi’s leadership, as reflected in China’s policy preference of “striving for achievement”

4  Huiyun Feng and Kai He (有所作为 you suo zuo wei) in recent years (Yan 2014). How will Chinese ­leaders perceive China’s power versus the United States in the next ten years? How do the Chinese view the US “rebalancing” strategy in Asia? What are Chinese ­leaders’ visions for bilateral relations with Japan and other n ­ eighbors? Will China ­abandon its “peaceful rise” policy? These are some questions of vital importance to policy makers in the Asia Pacific in making a sensible China policy and ­forging a mutually beneficial relationship with China. It is time to investigate the Chinese leadership under Xi and their perceptions of Asian security and IR, so that the outside world can better prepare for both opportunities and challenges brought about by China’s rise. One obstacle in making sense of China’s policy is that there is no direct way to gauge Chinese leaders’ perceptions and opinions due to cultural, political, and social system differences. This book is intended to explore and understand Chinese leaders’ perceptions and attitudes regarding Asian security through the eyes of China’s IR scholars. Chinese IR scholars’ views can be a “proxy measure” to make sense of Chinese leaders’ perceptions on Asian security, given the lack of reliable alternative methods to directly measure Chinese leaders’ perceptions in detail. Chinese IR scholars serve as the mediators between Chinese leaders and the general public in society. We do not intend to simply draw a causal and linear link between Chinese IR scholars and policy makers. Instead, we suggest that there are at least four types of relations between Chinese IR scholars and China’s policy makers. First, some Chinese IR scholars may play an active role in influencing China’s foreign policy as part of an epistemic community. Second, some may provide intellectual products in a free market of ideas for policy makers to consume when making decisions. Third, Chinese IR scholars may also play a policy signaling role in ­facilitating the government’s test of some controversial ideas before new policies or policy changes are formalized. Fourth, the rise and fall of Chinese IR scholars’ ideas and debates can serve as a mirror to reflect the underlying transformations of Chinese foreign policies and domestic politics. Through exploring Chinese IR scholars’ views and debates, therefore, we can better assess how Chinese policy makers may think, behave, and react on major issues in IR. This introduction chapter addresses the question of why we study Chinese IR scholars. We review the state of the art in the studies of Chinese IR scholars and argue that these scholars as a subject of research have a unique value in understanding Chinese foreign policy. Surveying the existing research, we detect two areas of concern: first is the limited attention to the diversity of views and internal debates among Chinese IR scholars; second is the lack of theorization on the role of IR scholars in foreign policy. Therefore, we discuss next how we study Chinese IR scholars’ views and perceptions by investigating internal debates among Chinese IR scholars. We argue that the internal debates among Chinese IR scholars are more dynamic than widely perceived in the Western world. More importantly, the unique feature of this book is to let Chinese IR scholars communicate their own debates among themselves.

Why do Chinese IR scholars matter?  5 We propose in this chapter four possible models as a starting point for other researchers to investigate the role of Chinese IR scholars in policy making in China’s political system: the “epistemic community model”, the “free market model”, the “policy signaling model”, and the “mirroring policy model”. Then, we introduce the structure of this book. In the conclusion, we suggest that through examining Chinese IR scholars’ debates as well as theorizing their ­d iverse roles in foreign policy, we can obtain a more systematic and dynamic picture of Chinese scholars’ perceptions. This perspective will facilitate a deeper understanding of Chinese foreign policy as well as a better assessment of its ­possible orientations in the future.

The state of the art in the study of Chinese IR scholars1 The significance of studying Chinese IR scholars did not appear until after the Cold War. In Beautiful Imperialist (1991), David Shambaugh examined how America Watchers, i.e. Chinese IR scholars who work on US–China relations, perceived the United States between 1972 and 1990. The book was path breaking in that it highlighted the important role of Chinese IR scholars as mediators in connecting Chinese society and Chinese policy makers. Shambaugh concluded that China’s distorted and biased perceptions of the United States contributed to the fluctuations in US–China relations during the Cold War. In the 1990s and early 2000s, other scholars followed Shambaugh’s example to explore China’s changing perceptions of the United States through the eyes of the America Watchers (e.g. Wang 2000; Chen 2003; Zhang 2005). For example, Bonnie Glaser and Phillip Saunders (2002) examined the evolving roles and increasing influence of Chinese research institutions in China’s foreign policy decision-making process. Similarly, Glaser and Evan Medeiros (2007) explored how Chinese think tank analysts and university-based scholars have influenced a change in China’s foreign policy discourse from “peaceful rise” to ­“peaceful ­development” in the 2000s. In 2012, Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell (2012) published “How China Sees America” in Foreign Affairs, based on their extensive interviews and fieldwork in Beijing, in which they analyzed “the sum of Beijing’s fears” towards the United States. In a most recent study, Daniel Lynch (2015) investigates how Chinese academic elites debate China’s ­economics, ­politics, and foreign policy through intensive content analyses of Chinese publications and elite interviews. There are two methodological reasons to treat Chinese IR scholars as a new focal point in the study of China’s foreign policy. First, unlike the general public, the views of IR scholars or experts can be more valuable in examining China’s foreign policy and IR. There is an increasing research trend in the use of elite views to make sense of IR. For example, in 2012, the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project launched a “US-China Security Perceptions Project” with the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for

6  Huiyun Feng and Kai He Scholars, the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association, and the Research ­ ecurity Center for Contemporary China at Peking University. The “US-China S Perceptions Project” aimed to evaluate different views between the general ­public and experts in both the United States and China regarding US–China security issues. The final report was released in December 2013 and suggested that the US public and experts had different perceptions regarding US–China policies (Swaine et al. 2013).2 Second, the changing decision-making structure in China offers a unique ­social role to Chinese IR scholars. With widespread use of the Internet and ­d ifferent social media fora, the foreign policy decision-making process in China is no longer “one man’s rule” (Ning 1997; Nathan and Scobell 2012). Although it would be an exaggeration to say that the public has a direct impact on Chinese foreign policy, China’s policy makers face increasing pressure from society in the process of making foreign policy decisions. By measuring how Chinese IR ­scholars look at Chinese power, US policies, and Chinese foreign policy, we can be more confident in inferring how China’s policy makers might perceive and think of IR when facing constraints from society. These previous scholarly efforts to examine the perceptions of Chinese IR scholars have formed the foundations of this project. However, there are two methodological and theoretical limitations in the existing research. First, there is no systematic study of the internal debates among Chinese IR scholars. Most research focuses on Chinese IR scholars’ views of the United States, not Asian security issues and IR in general. With a limited quantity of published academic works, there is a significant research gap in the study of China’s IR scholars’ ­perceptions after 2000. Moreover, most research highlights the dominant views of Chinese IR scholars and uses the “winning” voice to simply infer what ­Chinese leaders and policy makers might think in foreign policy. However, Chinese IR scholars’ perceptions are in fact much more diverse than widely perceived. Without systematically examining the different views among IR scholars, the origins of their debates, as well as the processes in their debates, we cannot fully grasp and understand the rise and the fall of major ideas in the Chinese IR community as well as the role of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy. Second, there is a lack of theorization about the role of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy. Most research simply draws a linkage between Chinese IR ­scholars’ perceptions and China’s foreign policy without exploring the internal mechanisms and dynamics between the two. Consequently, this lack of theorization phenomenon drives some scholars to question whether in China the socalled public opinion, including IR scholars’ views, is actually a result rather than a source of governmental policy (Jakobson and Knox 2010; Sun 2011). Other scholars suggest that Chinese foreign policy decision-making is widely seen as the elite’s business while the public stays far away from the decision-­making process (Fewsmith and Rosen 2001; Wang and Shirk 2004). Some critics even sharply argue that advising Chinese leaders is a “futile effort” because most recommendations and reports written by scholars and analysts are filtered out by numerous bureaucracies before reaching policy makers at the top (Lu 2012).

Why do Chinese IR scholars matter?  7 As existing research suggests, Chinese IR scholars and the public in general might not affect Chinese foreign policy directly; however, their influence cannot be ignored because of the pluralistic trend in the Chinese decision-making process observed by many Chinese scholars (e.g. Swaine and Zhang 2006; Lampton 2014). Our project is built on this analytical premise. We argue that we need to further theorize the relationship between Chinese IR scholars and policy makers in order to better understand the dynamic role of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy. Therefore, this book is designed to address the above two analytical deficiencies in the study of Chinese IR scholars. On the one hand, we focus on Chinese IR scholars’ internal debates and let Chinese IR scholars tell their own stories to the outside world. On the other hand, we propose four analytical models to further theorize the role of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy. It is not our intention to formalize the relationship between Chinese IR scholars and foreign policy. Instead, we keep this question open in this book for scholars to discuss and investigate. In other words, we only suggest at this point that Chinese IR scholars matter in foreign policy, but how they matter is subject to debate. It will be a major methodological task in this book for our contributors to investigate how Chinese IR scholars matter in their own research.

Why internal debates among Chinese IR scholars matter There are three reasons for focusing on Chinese IR scholars’ debates. First, the Chinese debates will provide a new perspective on the study of Chinese IR ­scholars and foreign policy. As mentioned before, there is no systematic ­research on the internal debates among Chinese IR scholars, especially into the 2000s. Given the fact that both Chinese politics and society are moving in a ­pluralist direction, Chinese leaders can no longer remain immune from societal influences, e.g. from IR scholars over foreign policy issues. IR scholars are also not easily manipulated or influenced by the government. China’s foreign ­policy ­decision-making process has become institutionalized, in that Chinese IR ­scholars and policy analysts play an important consultative role in advising policy makers through various channels. Therefore, Chinese IR scholars’ perceptions can provide a “parameter” or “domain” of Chinese leaders’ opinions and thoughts. This perceptual parameter can not only help outsiders understand the domain of actions or the constraints Chinese leaders may face when making decisions, but also make sense of how Chinese leaders may behave in the future and thereby provide some predictive value. As Daniel Lynch (2015: x) points out, “studying these (Chinese scholars’) images can be useful in trying to assess what trajectory is likely to emerge, precisely because the elites are operating inside parameters imposed by the (still) awesomely powerful Party-state”. Through in-depth discussions of the various debates among Chinese IR scholars, this project will present an updated and a more nuanced, comprehensive picture of different schools of thought in the Chinese IR community.

8  Huiyun Feng and Kai He Second, this project is intended to bridge the perception gap between the Chinese IR community and the outside world. Due to the language barrier and different publication requirements, Chinese IR scholars are not very active in the English-based publishing world, although this situation is gradually changing. In public, especially in English-based media, Chinese scholars seem to uphold the party line when they are interviewed or reported. Consequently, the result is a stereotyped image of a “government mouthpiece”, in that Chinese scholars only explain, elaborate, and defend Chinese foreign policies and positions in IR without contributing their independent thoughts and ideas. We have to admit that, in fact, many scholarly works in China fall into this category for two reasons. First, it is safe to follow the party line in China’s political system. Second, it is easy to obtain funding and get published if scholars conduct research on “hot” topics guided by the government. While we are fully aware of this phenomenon, we suggest that Chinese IR scholars play more diverse and important roles in foreign policy than the “government mouthpiece” argument has suggested. By focusing on Chinese IR scholars’ internal debates, we can explicitly address this “government mouthpiece” problem, because it is impossible for both sides in a debate to support the government’s policy. In other words, the method of exploring Chinese IR scholars’ debates undermines the argument that the views of Chinese IR scholars are simply a “mouthpiece” of Beijing’s party line and have no influence on the perceptions and thinking of Chinese leaders. We contend that understanding why some scholars hold different views from the government is the first step in grasping the potential directions and the boundaries of ­Chinese foreign policy in the future. It is worth noting that Chinese IR scholars have debated and are debating ­publicly many issues in Chinese sources. Some foreign scholars have started to investigate the intense debates among Chinese IR scholars. For example, ­M ingjiang Li (2008) investigates the Chinese IR scholars’ debate on soft power. Shaun Breslin (2015) discusses the evolution of China’s perceptions of human ­security by delving into scholarly works and publications. Zeng and his ­colleagues (Zeng, Xiao and Breslin 2015) focus on the Chinese IR scholars’ debate over a new concept of “core interests” in Chinese foreign policy. This book will extend this intellectual effort to systematically examine ­Chinese IR scholars’ debates over foreign policy. One unique feature of this project is that most of our contributors are based in China, teaching and conducting research in Chinese universities and research institutions. All of them are experts in their respective fields. Some of them have even actively participated in the internal debates with other scholars in China. Therefore, our contributing scholars are in a better position to grasp some nuanced differences in the debates than outside observers. In other words, letting Chinese IR scholars tell their own stories about the debate marks a distinctive feature of this book. These debates will not only enrich our understanding of the evolution of Chinese foreign policy but also make sense of the possible directions of China’s rise in the future. Third, this project has strong policy relevance for both China and the outside world. For Chinese policy makers, the findings from the book will be interesting

Why do Chinese IR scholars matter?  9 and useful. Since the Chinese government is also sensitive to society in ­making foreign policy, given the increasing influence of globalization and information technology, it has established a “public opinion office” [舆情办公室 Yuqing ­Bangongshi] in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to better understand societal attitudes and opinions on international affairs. This book will bring unique perspectives for the Chinese government to grasp about prevailing views, concerns, and perceptions in the Chinese IR scholar community regarding international affairs so that Chinese foreign policy can be more transparent and accountable to both domestic and international audiences. For the outside world, especially the United States, knowing what Chinese leaders might think and figuring out how and why China may behave will deepen their understanding of China’s rise. As mentioned before, enhancing mutual understanding is the first step towards building mutual strategic trust between China and the outside world, especially with the United States, in the twenty-first century. This book is one solid step towards reducing misunderstanding, alleviating security dilemmas and other miscalculations, and contri­ buting to Asian security and world peace.

Four models of Chinese IR scholars’ role in foreign policy For analytical purposes, we propose four models to theorize the roles of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy. These four models are by no means exhaustive or mutually exclusive. They can be seen as preliminary probes that are intended to stimulate more in-depth research on the study of Chinese IR scholars and foreign policy.

Epistemic community model The first model is the “epistemic community” model. As Peter Haas (1992) ­defines it, “an epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”. The causal logic between an epistemic community and policy making is rooted in the uncertainties and complexities of international affairs. A mature epistemic community can provide the information that policy makers need in order to address complexities and reduce uncertainties in making decisions. Therefore, an epistemic community will be able to directly influence the policy-making process and even coordinate international cooperation (Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1992). In China’s case, this “epistemic community” model suggests that some Chinese IR scholars form various epistemic communities with shared beliefs and policy orientations in IR. Through their expertise, reputation, and status in society, they can provide insightful information to policy makers in a way that directly influences China’s foreign policy. Apparently, there is more than one epistemic community among Chinese IR scholars because of their diverse

10  Huiyun Feng and Kai He theoretical beliefs and theories in IR. David Shambaugh (2011) specifies seven schools of thought among Chinese IR scholars such as nativism, realism, “major power”, “Asia first”, “Global South”, selective multilateralism, and globalism. According to the epistemic community model, those Chinese IR scholars who share similar world views and beliefs can exert different degrees of influence on Chinese foreign policy. Shambaugh’s (2011) analysis reveals that after the 2008 global financial crisis, scholars in the globalism camp have gradually lost their voice in the Chinese discourse while realists and nativists – the left and conservative groups – have started to gain more influence in Chinese bureaucracies. Consequently, we see that Chinese foreign policy has turned in an assertive ­d irection since 2008. In a similar vein, Alastair Johnston suggests in Social States (2014) that the ­major reason for the Chinese government to embrace multilateralism in the 1990s was rooted in the socialization process in which Chinese officials and ­policy elites were socialized by the rules and norms of multilateralism through their participation in multilateral institutions. Although Johnston did not e­ xplicitly discuss the role of Chinese IR scholars in influencing China’s ­multilateral diplomacy, some top IR scholars, such as Yan Xuetong from Tsinghua University, Wang Jisi from Beijing University, and Zhang Yunling from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, are regular participants in track-II diplomacy between China and the outside world since the 1990s. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that some top IR scholars have become agents of socialization, in Johnston’s terms, and played a stimulating role in encouraging the Chinese government to ­embrace multilateralism in the 1990s. It is worth noting that one problem of this “epistemic community” model lies in the problematic causal linkage between Chinese IR scholars and policy ­makers. Due to the hierarchical nature of the decision-making system in China, how C ­ hinese IR scholars can influence decision-making is still questionable. Even though we can identify a coherent epistemic community inside the ­Chinese IR community, such as the globalism group, it is still not clear whether and how they can directly ­impact the top decision makers in the domain of foreign policy. E ­ mpirically, it is difficult to test this epistemic community’s argument because of the lack of ­evidence in substantiating the role of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy.

“Free market” model The second type of relationship between the Chinese IR community and policy makers is called the “free market” model of supply and demand, in which Chinese IR scholars are similar to the producers of knowledge and the government is the consumer. In a free marketplace of ideas, Chinese IR scholars produce the supply of new arguments and theories as well as policy recommendations while government policy makers provide the demand and choose the ones that fit their interests and agendas. In this model, the IR community plays a similar role as think tanks in the Western world, which mainly serve to provide new ideas and advice to the government (George 1993). The difference between IR scholars and

Why do Chinese IR scholars matter?  11 policy ­analysts in think tanks lies in the nature of the “market”. While IR scholars develop their ideas in a “free market” environment, think tank analysts work in a “planned economy” in which they are more likely to produce what the government orders through commissioned reports. In China, the distinction between academic scholars and policy analysts in think tanks is somewhat more ambiguous than in the West, because Chinese academic scholars are more likely to conduct policy-oriented research instead of pure academic or theory-driven works. In other words, Chinese academic IR scholars actually compete with think tank analysts in a much bigger marketplace of ideas in the domain of foreign policy. One example of this “free market” model in China is the rise of Yan Xuetong’s “moral realism” theory and ­China’s foreign policy transformation from “keeping a low profile” to “striving for achievement”. Yan and his colleagues (2011) have conducted research on China’s ancient philosophy and its implications for foreign policy since the early 2000s. Yan suggests that a country with superior morality, i.e. humane authority (Wang Dao), is more likely to lead successfully in the international system than a country solely relying on military means (Ba Dao). Therefore, he argues that China should employ “moral realism” to compete with the United States for future leadership in the international system. After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, we see a clear foreign policy change, in which China starts to ­emphasize the importance of “striking a balance between upholding justice and seeking ­interests” (Yi Li Guan) in IR. Although the Chinese government does not ­d irectly recognize that they adopt some elements of “moral realism” in making foreign policy decisions, the clear similarity between the two reveals that Yan’s ideas were likely purchased in the “free market”. The major difference between this “free market” model and the previous “epistemic community” model lies in the activism of IR scholars towards the policy community. While IR scholars are more active in the “epistemic community model”, they play a relatively passive role in the “free market” model because policy makers are the ones who purchase “ideas” in the marketplace. Some scholars vividly create an analogy that Chinese IR scholars are similar to supermarket owners, who provide various ideas as products to the government.3 However, the supermarket cannot determine which product or idea will be picked or chosen by the government. Therefore, what the IR scholars can do is to offer as many ideas and policy advice as possible so that the government can always find what they want. This “free market” model is actually not unique to China. Some Western scholars also question the genuine value of IR scholars in the policy-making process. Lorenzo Zambernardi (2016) argues “politics is too important to be left to political scientists”. IR scholars should not be expected to have direct influence on policy practices. Instead, scholars need to focus on developing different theories and ideas that can serve as foundations for the intellectual development of policy makers. More importantly, keeping pluralism in the IR community can “prevent foreign policy from being formulated in the absence of rival theoretical conclusions” (Zambernardi 2016: 3).

12  Huiyun Feng and Kai He In an interview with the authors, Yan clearly denied that he has tried to influence Chinese foreign policy.4 He implied that he (as well as other Chinese IR scholars) might not have the necessary channels to reach the top policy makers. However, it is difficult to tell from this “free market” model why the Chinese government or Xi Jinping adopt some ideas, such as Yan’s moral realism, but not others in the marketplace of ideas. Moreover, many top IR scholars are also serving as policy advisors to the Chinese government. For example, Professor Shi  Yinhong from Renmin University is a consultant for the State Council. ­Professor Qin Yaqing from the Chinese Foreign Affairs University has given lectures on global governance to the Politburo members. Therefore, the linkage between Chinese IR scholars and policy makers will not be a one-way street. In other words, the “epistemic community” and the “free-market” models may not be mutually exclusive because Chinese IR scholars can both influence and be influenced by the government at the same time.

Signaling policy model The third model is called a “signaling policy” model, in which Chinese IR ­scholars play a signaling role for the government to test societal and international responses to some new ideas for policies or policy changes. This model suggests that some IR scholars who have a close relationship with the government can assist policy makers in signaling some controversial ideas to the outside world. The reactions to these scholars’ ideas will further guide policy makers in making a decision about whether they can go ahead to implement the planned policies or not. For example, due to China’s defensive military doctrine and i­deological constraints, building military bases beyond its borders is always a policy taboo or a controversial issue in its foreign policy. It is reported by The Financial Times that Shen Dingli, a well-known IR scholar at Fudan University, published an ­a rticle in July 2010 entitled “Don’t Shun the Idea of Setting Up Overseas Military Bases” on www.China.org, an official online news media outlet run by the Chinese government. Five years after Shen’s article, China opened its first military base in Djibouti in 2015. According to the report, Shen believed that “the lack of international reaction to his article, which was published in English, might have been a factor in the Chinese decision to go ahead with a foreign base” (Clover and Lin 2016). It is rational for the Chinese government to test for societal and ­international reactions to some potentially controversial ideas, such as the establishment of overseas military bases, before implementing these policies or policy changes. Chinese IR scholars, therefore, become a logical agency to carry out this ­signaling task for the government. One analytical difficulty in distinguishing between this “signaling” model and the “free market” model is the nature of the discretionary relationship between scholars and the government. On the one hand, scholars can voluntarily serve as the signaling agent without a request from the government. This is similar to the “free market” model in which scholars offer bold and new policy recommendations without the government’s

Why do Chinese IR scholars matter?  13 request. On the other hand, scholars may be advised to propose certain ideas for the purpose of signaling and testing for the government. Because of the highly opaque process of policy making, it is often difficult to distinguish which type of role Chinese IR scholars serve in the foreign policy process. Regarding Shen’s example discussed above, it is not clear whether Shen served as a signaling agent for some bureaucracies or was just an idea producer in a free marketplace of ideas. Besides the establishment of overseas military bases, there are other highly debated policy topics in China. For example, whether China should change its bilateralism-based policy in the South China Sea disputes is a vigorously d ­ ebated topic among Chinese IR scholars. Should China change its foreign policy towards North Korea? Will China need to change its nonalignment policy to consider forming alliances with other countries? Should China reconsider its nonintervention policy in international affairs? These are only a few examples of ongoing debates among Chinese IR scholars. Considering the “policy signaling” model, we need to investigate whether these debates function as policy signaling for the government or as a scholarly competition of ideas among scholars.

Mirroring policy model Last but not least, there is a “mirroring policy” model in the study of Chinese IR scholars and foreign policy. In this model, Chinese IR scholars can serve as a “mirror” to reflect Chinese foreign policy orientations and even ­domestic ­politics’ directions. Like scholars in other countries, Chinese IR scholars ­d isagree with one another on many issues. For example, in the early 2000s, Chinese IR scholars heatedly debated “new thinking” on Sino–Japanese relations (Gries 2005). In this debate, some scholars advocated a new foreign policy towards ­Japan through delinking the history issue, whilst others argued that recognizing history is the basis for a good relationship between the two nations. This debate triggered an intellectual storm within both the IR community and society in the 2000s. The debate ended with a gradual defeat of the “new thinking” school in the Chinese IR community. This outcome is not surprising given the strong policy reactions of the Chinese government towards Japan regarding the history issues in the 2000s. It is not clear whether the government intervened in the “new thinking” debate over Sino–Japanese relations. However, the result of the debate, i.e. the demise of the new thinking school in both academic writings and the public media, reflects or mirrors the policy orientation of China towards Japan in the 2000s. Another example is the “peace and development” debate among Chinese IR scholars in the early 1980s. In 1979, after the Cultural Revolution, China commenced its economic opening up and reform, Chinese foreign policy also ­experienced dramatic transformation. Chinese IR scholars debated over whether China should abandon its class-struggle-based revolutionary goal in foreign ­policy. In particular, scholars disagreed on whether China needed to prepare for wars and conflicts with the West or focus on economic development. This debate ended with a clear victory of the “peace and development” school.

14  Huiyun Feng and Kai He From  government statements to scholarly publications, we can see that the “peace and development” school prevailed in the Chinese society in the 1980s and 1990s. This outcome indicated that the reformist faction won out in the power struggle vis-à-vis the conservative faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Thereafter, China has adopted a development-based foreign policy towards the outside world in its reform era since the 1990s. One analytical difficulty in applying this “mirroring policy” model is the ­unclear role of the Chinese government in scholarly debates. While both the  ­“policy ­signaling” model and the “mirroring policy” model assume that the ­Chinese government will be involved in the debates, the nature of the ­involvement is different. The government plays an initiator role to test controversial policies through IR scholars in the former, but it can serve as an initiator, a judge, or just a receiver of scholarly debates in the latter. In other words, in the “mirroring policy” model, we need to examine how and why the government gets involved in the scholarly debates, why it supports some ideas but not others, as well as whether its ­endorsement is the major reason for some ideas to win out in the debates. To make things even more complicated, answering these questions is not an end of our investigation, but rather a beginning of our inquiry, because we need to use the above information to further reflect on and dissect future orientations of Chinese foreign policy and even domestic politics. As mentioned previously, there is no clear-cut winner among these four ­models regarding the relationship between Chinese IR scholars and policy making. The “epistemic community” model draws a strong causal linkage from Chinese IR scholars to the policy community, while the “free market” model reverses the causal arrow from the policy community to the Chinese IR scholars. The “policy signaling” and the “mirroring policy” models entail a strong assumption regarding the government’s involvement in scholarly debates although Chinese policy makers are more active in the former than in the latter. In this book, it is not our intention to test which model is better than others in the study of the role of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy. Instead, we keep our conclusions open at this point and encourage all of the contributing scholars to discuss their own u ­ nderstandings of the relationship between Chinese IR scholars and ­foreign policy. Two caveats are worth noting about the applications of these four theoretical models. First, Chinese leaders have different personalities and leadership styles. Open-minded leaders are more likely to seek advices from professionals and scholars in making policies in international politics. On the contrary, a strongman type of leader is unlikely to seek internal consultations when making decision because of the concentration of power in the political system. However, different leadership styles and decision-making structures do not refute the ­explanatory value of these four models. Instead, some models might be more suitable to strong leaders while others might be more useful under a weak leadership. For example, the “epistemic community” and “free market” ­models make more sense if the Chinese leadership or decision-making process is open to different voices. Under an authoritarian leadership, scholars can play a more important role in the “policy signaling” and “mirroring policy” models. In other

Why do Chinese IR scholars matter?  15 words, scholars’ perceptions and debates can still be useful in understanding Chinese foreign policy and even Chinese leadership. Second, because of the dominant influence of the CCP in the political s­ ystem, China has a unique dual governance structure at the state and CCP level. It makes China’s decision-making process of foreign policy more complicated and even opaque from a Western perspective. In examining Chinese scholars’ ­possible influence in foreign policy, we try to avoid this complication rooted in the dual governance structure by sticking to the public debates among ­scholars. Some prominent scholars with personal connections and the CCP affiliation are ­definitely involved in some high-level and internal debates at the CCP level. However, it is not what we are focusing on in this project because all internal d ­ ebates are treated as classified information in the CCP system. Therefore, we treat Chinese scholars as public intellectuals who can bridge the gap between ­society and the government. Through examining the public debates among scholars, we intend to shed some light on the relationship between Chinese scholars and China’s foreign policy. We understand that our analyses on ­Chinese scholars’ debates in the public domain might be just a drop in the ocean compared to the real internal debates inside the CCP. However, we argue that the public debates among scholars can serve as “a straw in the wind” to indicate which direction Chinese foreign policy might move to.

Structure of the book There are two thematic sections in the book. The first section includes four chapters examining Chinese scholars’ debates on four key concepts in IR, namely international structure, soft power, national interest, and ­noninterference. The second section focuses on Chinese scholars’ debates over four key foreign ­policies, including China’s non-alliance policy, China’s principle regarding use of force, China’s maritime policy, and China’s economic diplomacy and statecraft. Chapter 2 by Zhou Fangyin focuses on how Chinese scholars debate the concept of international structure (guoji geju) and how the debate has shaped their evaluation of the international environment and their policy recommendations. Zhou suggests that Chinese scholars highlighted the importance of economic factors in determining the international structure under globalization and tended to take a long-term view. One interesting debate is about when the end of the Post-Cold War era has occurred and if multipolarization or bipolarization is the trend in international structure, even though the Chinese government has insisted on a multipolar world since the 1980s. Zhou points out that the ­scholarly debate on international structure is of significance to policy makers, but the causal direction is hard to tell. The Chinese academic community focused first on the concept of comprehensive national power from 1980 to 2000; however, from then on, their attention changed to focus on soft power. This change has a significant impact on Chinese scholars’ perception of Chinese power as well as understanding of Chinese foreign policy directions. Chapter 3 by Li Mingjiang focuses on the Chinese debate on soft power. Chinese scholars had a different understanding of the soft power

16  Huiyun Feng and Kai He concept from Joseph Nye. Although Chinese scholars agree that culture and tradition are the most important sources of soft power, they also emphasize that Chinese foreign policy played an important role in building up its soft power. Chinese scholars worry about the influence from the West, because they are not confident in China’s own soft power. Chinese scholars also point out that China should project further its soft power in different regions. Chapter 4 by Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu discusses the recent scholarly debates over “national interests”, a contested concept in IR. After 2010, with the US Rebalance in the Asia Pacific and China’s economic slowdown, these emerging strategic uncertainties prompted the debate among Chinese scholars on what China’s national interests are and should be. In particular, the debates were around several questions: What are China’s strategic goals? Should China set global leadership or regional leadership as its strategic goal with its increasing power? Should China continue to set economic development as its core national interest? Chen and Liu point out that Chinese scholars have different views on the US–China relationship, and on whether mutual trust or overwhelming power will be essential for protecting Chinese national interests. Chapter 5 by Chen Zheng discusses the scholarly debates on China’s “non-­ interference” principle. Chen suggests that the Chinese debate focuses on the relevance and utility of retaining the noninterference principle. Some Chinese scholars argue for changing the principle in order to safeguard China’s expanding overseas interests and improve its reputation as a responsible power. Others defend the principle out of concern for the potential moral cost and protecting China’s core interests. Chen alludes to a more pragmatic consensus which suggests “creative involvement” or “constructive involvement”. Understanding this debate has significant implications for understanding Chinese foreign policy and the need for adjustments under the new international situation. In Chapter 6, Liu Ruoran and Liu Feng examine the Chinese scholars’ ­debate over China’s non-alliance strategy in the twenty-first century. They note a trend of Chinese scholars getting more active in debating Chinese foreign policy, and a most contentious issue is if China should change its non-alliance policy. They argue that more orthodox scholars support the continuing relevance of the non-alliance principle due to concerns over US–China relations, China’s limited capability, and the “alliance dilemma”. The revisionist scholars argue that China should form alliances to defend China’s rise. The moderates look for alternatives to alliances in the form of coalitions, strategic partners, and quasi-alliances. One specific focus of this debate is relations between China and Russia. The government is tolerant on the non-alliance debate, which resembles the “free market” model proposed in the Introduction. Chapter 7 by Yin Jiwu provides an in-depth analysis of scholarly debates about China’s use of force. Yin introduces the debates on both traditional security issue areas as well as nontraditional security issues. He suggests that even on the traditional “use of force” issue, a revisionist school of scholars (which Yin calls “the Cold War Group”) has challenged the official discourse by providing new empirical case studies based on newly found historical evidence. Chinese IR scholars are also tapping into the debate from the theoretical positions of

Why do Chinese IR scholars matter?  17 ­ olitical ­psychology and strategic culture. Yin also suggests that the current p ­debates focus on China’s overseas military bases and China’s participation in international peacekeeping operations in nontraditional issue areas. Yin observes the cultural and political background of scholars and suggests that there are positive interactions between scholars’ views and their relationships with governmental authority. Chapter 8 by Zuo Xiying addresses the Chinese debate on China’s maritime policy. Chinese scholars heatedly debate several questions. For example, should China abandon the policy of “Shelving Differences and Seeking Joint Development Strategy” (SD/SJD) – a long-term principle in maritime disputes? Should China accept multilateralism in the South China Sea disputes? Some scholars in the “supporting camp” argue that the SD/SJD policy is not outdated and is the best policy until now. Others in the “critical camp” point out the SD/ SJD policy cannot defend China’s national interest. While the Chinese government insists on bilateralism as another principle of negotiation in territorial and ­maritime ­d isputes, some scholars argue that bilateralism no longer works in resolving maritime disputes because the South China Sea has been multilateralized. Zuo points out that the scholarly debates at least inspired the Chinese decision ­makers to rethink their maritime dispute strategies. Chapter 9 by Song Guoyou discusses the Chinese debate on economic ­diplomacy and statecraft. China has become a major economic power. An ­imperative question is how to use this newly acquired economic power in foreign policy. Song elaborates Chinese debates on the concept of economic diplomacy, especially the relationship between economy and diplomacy in China’s case; the d ­ ecision-making mechanism and actors involved; and China’s economic sanctions and economic aid policies. Song points out that the theoretical development of economic diplomacy is still relatively new in China. Some scholars have applied two-level game theory to explain international and domestic challenges that Chinese leaders have faced in applying economic diplomacy or statecraft. Other scholars have emphasized the importance of “interest groups”, institutional actors, and the pluralization of the economic decision-making process in China. Although China only supports UN-approved sanctions officially, Chinese scholars have debated over how to use economic sanctions to fulfill economic, political, and strategic goals such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the THAAD issue. Another interesting debate challenges China’s “no-strings-attached” policy on foreign aid, because some scholars argue that China should change this policy practice to add some political conditions to foreign aid. Chapter 10 by Kai He, Huiyun Feng, and Yan Xuetong summarizes the ­major findings of this book and suggests that Chinese scholars have been actively involved in various foreign policy debates in China. The role of Chinese scholars in foreign policy decision-making, however, is not clear. In some cases, scholarly debates seemingly encourage Chinese policy makers to rethink foreign policies such as the maritime policy case. In other cases, Chinese debates seem to have no influence on Chinese official positions. One vivid example is Chinese scholarly debates over “international structure”. He, Feng, and Yan argue that the linkage between Chinese scholars and policy makers is complicated in nature.

18  Huiyun Feng and Kai He However, this complex relationship between academia and policy community is by no means unique to China. IR scholars always experience a dilemma between the ivory tower and the real world. How to bridge the gap between academia and the policy world will continue to be an enduring topic in both China and the outside world.

Conclusion The rise of China is one of the defining political events in the twenty-first c­ entury. How Chinese leaders think, perceive, and behave will shape peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific. However, it is difficult to accurately measure C ­ hinese ­leaders’ perceptions due to China’s opaque decision-making process. Therefore, we ­propose to examine Chinese IR scholars’ views and perceptions on IR. Chinese IR scholars can serve as a “proxy measure” for the views of the Chinese policy community and government. The relationship between IR scholars and Chinese leaders/policy makers is complicated and “mutually constitutive” in essence. On the one hand, IR scholars can influence leaders’ views on international politics. On the other hand, leaders’ policy choices also construct a boundary for Chinese IR scholars as to what to think and write. In this book, we further theorize the role of Chinese IR scholars in foreign ­policy with four models: the “epistemic community”, the “free market”, the “policy signaling”, and the “mirroring policy” models. These four a­ nalytical models are illustrative and inspiring in nature. The contributing scholars ­extensively investigate the complicated relationship between Chinese IR scholars and foreign policy by using these four models as their starting points and provide insights as to how to move beyond these four models. Chinese scholars have heatedly debated China’s IR such as China’s national interests, the structure of the international system, China’s nonalignment p ­ olicy, maritime strategy, and noninterference policy. However, these debates have not been systematically introduced to Western scholars. This book attempts to bridge this knowledge gap between Chinese IR scholars and the outside world. As most of the contributors to this book are China-based academics, they offer unique insights based on their understanding and even personal experience from the debates. Although Chinese IR scholars are not directly involved in the policy-making process, their views can reflect and even influence what Chinese leaders think. This book, therefore, offers a new prism for the outside world to understand Chinese foreign policy behavior and even predict what China might do in the future through the contested eyes of Chinese IR scholars – a distinctive group of insiders in Chinese society.

Notes 1 This section is based on our previous publications: Feng and He (2015) and Feng and He (2016). 2 Following a similar methodology, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also conducted an opinion survey of “strategic elites” in 11 Asia Pacific

Why do Chinese IR scholars matter?  19 economies in early 2014, which aimed to explore regional perceptual trend lines on power and order in Asia. 3 Xu Jin presented this analogy at the first working conference of this project held in Beijing in December 2014. Yan Xuetong also discussed this analogy in the second working meeting of this project in Beijing in July 2015. 4 Personal interview in Beijing in July 2015.

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Section I

Key concepts debates

2 How do Chinese scholars view the evolution of international structure? Zhou Fangyin

International structure is a fundamental issue in international politics. For a country like China with its large scale and at its current development stage, to assess the nature and trend of international structure is not only a theoretical issue but also one of pragmatic significance. The way Chinese scholars and policy experts understand international structure would affect some of the features of China’s diplomacy. This paper sets out to explore how Chinese scholars comprehend international structure and debate on it. The discussion will help to understand how they evaluate the international environment and will offer an insight into how Chinese scholars view many international issues.

The beginning of Chinese scholars’ discussion on international structures and features of their opinions The early stage The discussion of Chinese scholars on international structure dates back to the 1980s, or even earlier.1 Originally, they tended to use the term “international structure” (guoji geju), in line with the traditional Chinese understanding of the term “structure” (geju). In this sense, the main meaning of international structure is about the macro international situation or state of affairs (Wu 1981; Zhu 1981; Liang 1986). This kind of understanding gradually changed in the middle of the 1980s. Chen Lemin, from the Institute of European Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, differentiated clearly between “world structure” and “international situation” (Chen 1984). After that, most Chinese scholars stopped using the term “international structure” to indicate “international situation”. The discussion on international structure turned to more focused issues such as bipolarity or multipolarity. Divergences of views were ­a lready clearly presented in early discussions, many of which still exist in one way or another as evident during the ensuing debates. Chinese scholars’ understanding of the international structure in this period features the recognition of the trend of multipolarization emerging from the background of the bipolar structure (Xie 1987). Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese scholars showed strong preference for the “three-world theory”.

24  Zhou Fangyin In the articles on international structure at that time, the “three-world theory” was often mentioned and regarded as able to reflect the reality and influence of other international actors besides the two poles (Du 1987; Xie 1987; Han 1992; Zhang 1994). The preference of Chinese scholars for a multipolar system had become ­obvious by this stage. They were ready to summarize factors that supported the multipolar trend and had an underlying belief that multipolarization was a more desirable situation. As early as 1987, Du Xiaoqiang wrote that: Bipolar theory focuses on ideology, while multipolar theory emphasizes ­ ational independence and state sovereignty….Bipolar theory stresses n ­national power, that is, international politics equals to “power politics” and powerful countries can have full control; multipolar theory contends that all countries’ national behaviors should be carried out in c­ onsideration to common morality and respect for international principles….Bipolar theory ­values military force, and multipolar theory highlights economic, ­scientific and technological strength and friendly relationships, as well as the ­significance of peaceful development of all countries….The bipolar theory reflects the strategic benefits of the two superpowers, and the multipolar theory reflects the benefits of most countries in the world. (Du 1987: 15) Du’s opinion shows clearly the thinking of many Chinese IR scholars in the 1980s and even in the successive period. They do not regard international structure simply as a reflection of objective distribution of power but instead attach to it values which it does not possess. In this way, some Chinese scholars have linked directly one’s judgment of international structure to one’s position on national interests.

Some features of Chinese scholars’ opinion on international structure During the past decades, international structure has experienced a complex transformation. There exist diverse opinions among Chinese scholars on international structure. There are several features and cognitive inclinations worth noting. First, the importance of the economic factor is given special attention. Since the latter part of the 1980s, there has been an obvious emphasis on the importance of economic factors. Chinese scholars generally believe that there is a basic trend that “political factor and military strengths are losing priority, and international relations are pivoting more around the economy” (Liu 1989). The collapse of the Soviet Union is interpreted by many Chinese scholars as the result of overfocusing on military factors and the pursuit of hegemony, whilst ­ignoring economic development.2 On the one hand, this reflects the way of C ­ hinese scholars learning from major international events; however, on the other hand, it actually promotes the status of the economic factor to a higher level.

Chinese scholars view of international structure  25 Scholars’ common mindset of emphasizing the economic factor was influenced by the Reform and Opening-Up policy starting in 1978, especially the guideline of “centering on economic development” by the Chinese government. It was also affected by the Marxist viewpoint of historical materialism emphasizing “productivity is the decisive factor in the process of human social d ­ evelopment.” It is reasonable to prioritize the economic factor because economic strength has always been a fundamental dimension for measuring the overall strength of ­major powers. But in comparison with scholars in other countries, Chinese scholars have elevated the economic factor to an extraordinary position and consider it as most decisive to the nature of international structure. The role of the military factor, by contrast, is to some extent neglected. This way of thinking provides an ideological and conceptual foundation to the long-term implementation of “keeping a low profile” policy.3 As a result, Chinese scholars tend to view international structure from an economic perspective. Sometimes, when discussing international structure, they are actually talking about international economic structure. Therefore, many scholars partly neglect the fact that the United States became more powerful in military and overall strength after the Cold War. Favoring the economic perspective also results in the persistence of Chinese scholars’ views and arguments on multipolarization from the late 1980s to the early twenty-first century, under changing power distribution. Second, some scholars’ understanding of the process of power shifts in the international system takes on a certain determinist view. Wang Huaining, from the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s the great transition of global political and economic structure was the inevitable result of the longterm unbalanced development of all countries, rather than an accident or the result of sudden events. Wang (1993: 1) states, “The accidents and sudden events only accelerate or delay the transformation. They cannot change the process and direction of the transformation of world political and economic structures”. He believes that the transformation is steadily oriented towards multipolarization. Similarly, Li Jingyu and Wang Yingshu from Liaoning Normal University think that, the composite structure of the contemporary world is of historical necessity. The Yalta system is marked with man-made signs. So it is only a matter of time before its collapse….The themes of the world at present are peace and development. No one can reverse the general trend of the time. (Li and Wang 1995)4 Such a steadfast assertion on future transformation shows a certain degree of determinism. This kind of economic determinism as well as the extreme emphasis on the role of the economic factor in the transformation of the international structure was very popular among Chinese IR scholars in the 1990s. During the

26  Zhou Fangyin 1990s, Chinese IR scholars were generally confident in the multipolar trend based on their belief in the importance of the economic factor. However, ­during the ­Clinton administration, the US economy embraced a new era of high growth with low inflation. Benefiting from supporting policies to high-tech ­industries like “information superhighway”, the US Internet industry developed rapidly. In contrast, Western Europe and Japan were not performing very well. The economic growth of Japan almost came to a standstill. Even from the economic perspective, the realistic evidence for multipolarization was actually weakened at that time. Compounded by the military strength and aggressiveness of the United States shown in the Kosovo War, the confidence and optimism of ­Chinese scholars about multipolarization were somehow affected at the turn of the c­ entury (Liang 1999; Li Jingzhi 2000; Wang 2000; Chen Yue 2001). Third, many Chinese scholars tend to investigate the evolution of international structure with a relatively long-term horizon. They focus more on the future trend rather than on a strict, clear-cut judgment of contemporary international structure. The ups and downs of different dynasties have featured repeatedly in the long history of China. A familiarity with this history may have an influence on Chinese scholars’ perspectives on many issues. Chinese scholars tend to analyze the evolution of international structure from the perspective of quite a long time, ten years, 20 years, or even longer. They tend to grasp the evolutionary trend rather than simply discuss the nature of the current structure based on the contemporary power distribution. A long-term perspective gives Chinese scholars some inherent advantage in that they will not be inappropriately influenced by current events, and they are able to obtain their insight on fundamental factors. But this also has its disadvantages, making it much easier for scholars to defend their opinions, and increasing the difficulty for scholars to find the problems that might exist in their viewpoint. Many Chinese scholars have been insisting on the existence of the multipolarity trend for a long time. With such a long time span, scholars are calm about the setbacks in the multipolar process. Under unfavorable conditions, they would argue that multipolarization is a long and complicated process with possible setbacks, but its overall direction will not be changed.5 Last, in contrast to most US scholars, many Chinese scholars’ definition of international structure includes two aspects. One is the distribution of power, and the other is the strategic relationship between major powers. This embodies an important academic characteristic of many Chinese scholars, that is, a preference for the analysis of relations among countries (guanxi). This is also true for many scholars who deny the existence of the trend of multipolarity.

The debate on the understanding of international structure In general, Chinese scholars are less likely to debate publicly on topics related to the government’s policy stance.6 As a result, there are not many ­a rticles published in academic journals that debate on different views directly and

Chinese scholars view of international structure  27 thoroughly. Nevertheless, scholars hold different views on how and why international structure went through a complicated evolution process from 1985 to 2015. ­Divergences in their opinions could be seen from academic debates and discussions, as shown in the following.

On the end of post-Cold War After 1991, many Chinese scholars thought it was a transition time for the international structure and was called “post-Cold War era” by some.7 “Post-Cold War era” is an ambiguous term in that it does not point out clearly the type of ­international structure. It is only a convenient expression. This definition ­includes different understandings and assumptions about the future i­nternational structure. And there are different views on its length, the ending point and its developing direction. In 1999, Pang Zhongying from the China Institute of International Studies proposed that the “post-Cold War era” had come to an end, marked by the speeding-up of “globalization”. In his opinion, with the arrival of the twenty-first century, “post-Cold War” cannot and should not continue. The year 1999 should be regarded as the year of “the end of post-Cold War.” In terms of the international order indicated by “the end of post-Cold War,” it first means that the United States as the only superpower has a growing comprehensive influence on international affairs. Pang states, “In the foreseeable future, there is no country or allies of states that can threaten the national security of the US” (Pang 1999: 6). Second, this point means the expansion and enhancement of global homogeneity with the standard set by the United States and Europe, thus making the United States the leader of the “new world order”, the power balancer and the rule maker. By contrast, the developing countries have to face reality and accept the international system and rules set by the Western countries, in order to seek survival through adapting to economic globalization. Pang’s viewpoints could be summarized as that the international structure has entered an era dominated by Western countries, especially the United States. On this topic, most scholars insist on multipolarization, and some of them have written articles to engage in the debate. Li Bin (2000) from Nanjing ­University agrees with Pang on the nature of the world order after the Cold War but disagrees with Pang’s suggestions about China’s coping strategies. Li’s article sets out to analyze the debate, but it actually elaborates on a certain viewpoint. Later, Zhang Zhizhou from Beijing Foreign Studies University challenged Pang’s argument more directly. Zhang (2000) questions the foundation of Pang’s view rather than the conclusion itself. According to Zhang, the foundation to judge the end of “post-Cold War” should be the disappearance of the basic features of that period and the establishment of different characteristics of a new era. The period of “post-Cold War” has two basic features: one is chaos and disorder, and the other is uncertainty. By 2000, however, these two ­features lost dominance and were replaced by new and opposite ones. In Zhang’s ­opinion, the proposition of Pang that “‘post-Cold War’ cannot and should not continue in the new century” is an emotional assertion. Besides, the acceleration

28  Zhou Fangyin of “globalization” should not be the standard for the end of an era. On the whole this article is contentious and theoretical. Li Qinglv (2000) from Beijing Normal University doubts the view of the end of “post-Cold War”. From his perspective, the international order is in the transition period and will last for a long time. During this period, a stable hegemonic order based on the huge power advantage of the United States has not been ­established. The distribution of power among other countries is not balanced and is in a process of variation. The major powers have not reached effective consensus and principles. Generally, Li proposes quite different views to Pang’s in terms of the changing nature of the international system. Overall, scholars debate from different perspectives regarding the idea of the end of “post-Cold War” put forward by Pang. This kind of debate helps to get a better understanding of the international structure and its transition. It also reveals that the understanding of the international structure by Chinese IR scholars is getting more sophisticated, diversified, and theoretical.

The debate on multipolarization The general optimism on multipolarization One of the most obvious phenomena in Chinese scholars’ discussions on the international structure is the continuous emphasis on the multipolar trend. Since the middle of the 1980s, the world has been changing from a bipolar to unipolar structure. In the latter years, it has experienced the processes of the beginning of unipolar structure, the stabilization of it, the rise of China, and the impact of the rise of emerging economies. In the last 30 years, although the international structure has gone through complicated changes, the emphasis of Chinese IR scholars on multipolarization has been quite steady. After the end of the Cold War, it was generally believed by US scholars that the world had entered the unipolar system. They began to discuss the issue of the stability of the unipolar system and the reasons for no balance formed against the United States (Wohlforth 1999; Ikenberry 2002; Ikenberry, ­Mastanduno and Wohlforth 2009). Chinese scholars, however, neglected the huge power advantage of the United States in the 1990s and were still confident about the prospect of multipolarization. For example, Wang Chongjie from Xinhua News Agency wrote in 1997 that, “the multipolar structure is estimated to be possibly formed in more than 10 years” (1997: 32). Xi Runchang wrote in 1998 that multipolarization would be completed ­“approximately shortly after 2020” (Xi 1998). He Fang from the Japan Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences wrote in 1999 that the world is now in the development stage from bipolarity to multipolarity. The new structure was believed to be formed around 2010, namely, taking ten years (He 1998). Then doctoral candidate Qiao Mu from Tsinghua University stated in 2002 that the multipolar structure might be formed in the next 20 or 30 years (Qiao 2002). Considering that Chinese scholars are generally reluctant to make specific

Chinese scholars view of international structure  29 predictions about the future, it is amazing for them to make such a specific prediction about the “arrival time” of the multipolar structure. It reflects their strong confidence in their judgment at that time. Although support for multipolarization is the mainstream view in the Chinese IR academic circle, there are also debates and questions about it, and sometimes a public argument flares up.

The debate from 2000 to 2001: whether multipolarization is the trend or not In 2000, Zhou Fangyin from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations wrote to question the multipolar trend that was widely accepted at that time. He stated, “The scholars debating the multipolar trend spend little effort exploring why it exists, its manifestations and the standards to examine its existence”. He is against proving the existence of the multipolar trend with the argument of “peace and development being the themes of the time” (2000: 40). Zhou put forward a standard to examine the existence of the multipolar trend: “a basic requirement of the multipolar trend is that the power gap between ‘one superpower’ and ‘other major powers’ narrows as time goes by” (2000: 40–41). The existence of the multipolar trend should be doubted if the power gap between the superpower and other major powers does not change in an obvious way or even widens from when we assume the trend exists and has lasted for one or two decades or even longer. Based on the data of the last 20 years, he challenges the existence of the trend and points out that the future of multipolarization is not determined by the development of Japan and Germany, but by the development prospects of China and Russia: “If only one of either China or Russia can sustain rapid growth in a long time and narrow the gap between itself and the US, there will be a new bipolar structure in decades rather than a multipolar one” (2000: 43). Considering the situation today, Zhou’s views seem to be practical and predictive. Zhou’s article spoke frankly of the doubts about the multipolar trend and ­approached the debate from different aspects. Later, Qiao Mu wrote to refute the views of Zhou. Qiao pointed out that the multipolar trend of the world would not change: “It is the basic judgment of the international situation made on the Economic Working Meeting of the Central Government at the end of November 2001” (2002: 10). According to Qiao, this judgment provides realistic guidance for people to understand the development of the world correctly. He thinks that the major deficiency in Zhou’s argument is that the EU is not taken into consideration. Zhou chooses individual countries in the EU to compare with the United States and reaches the conclusion that there is a long way to go before the completion of multipolarization. However, the GDP of the EU as a whole surpassed that of the United States long ago. Qiao thinks that the EU will not only be a member of the multipoles, but also the leader of the multipolarization process. This divergence of views is caused by differences in choosing the basic unit for the international structure. Qiao thinks that the pole in the multipolar structure

30  Zhou Fangyin is different from that of the bipolar one. It could be a country or a group of countries such as the EU. The different views are mostly caused by this assumption. On this basis, Qiao wrote, “The multipolar structure is not unforeseeable. It could be formed in 20 or 30 years” (2002: 13). Besides the difference in this aspect, Qiao possibly ignores another aspect. At that time, the EU was close to the United States in terms of strength if considered as a unit. In this sense, there was a bipolar structure at that time with the United States and the EU holding the advantage. Hence, the growing strength of the EU may not indicate the triumph of multipolarization, which disproves Qiao’s arguments.

Post-financial crisis age: multipolarization or bipolarization? Zhou’s paper in 2000 has put forward the prediction of the possibility of a ­bipolar world in the future. With the rise of China’s economic strength and the fall of many Western countries due to the financial crisis after 2008, China’s economic status has been upgraded in the world and the economic growth of Western countries has been sluggish over the last several years. China’s economy exceeded that of Japan in 2010 and then left it far behind rapidly. In 2015, China’s economy was 2.6 times as large as that of Japan. Furthermore, China is bridging the gap with the US economy. China’s GDP was only 6 per cent of that of the United States in 1991. In 2006, it grew to 20 per cent. China’s economy experienced fast growth in the 15 years from 1991 to 2006, but the growth does not have significant structural meaning. Two years later in 2008, China’s GDP was 30 per cent of that of the United States. The percentage reached 40 in 2010, 50 in 2012 and 60 in 2015.8 In this circumstance, Yan Xuetong pointed out in 2013 that the international structure was transforming from “one superpower and several major powers” to bipolarity. He believed that by the end of 2023, there would be a bipolar structure, with China being the other pole, even though at that time China still fell behind the United States in terms of overall strength (Yan 2013). In fact, as early as 2011, Yan had stated that the international structure was evolving from “one superpower and several major powers” to bipolarity. This in turn triggers the debate of whether the development direction of the international structure is multipolarization or bipolarization (Yan 2011). With regard to Yan’s views, most Chinese scholars did not respond directly, but insist that multipolarization is still the basic trend. Cui Liru from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations shows his strong confidence in multipolarization. He even contends, “The world has entered the multipolar age which is the reality of current international politics” (2016: 1). The entry of the multipolar age was proposed because the unipolar structure is gone; in other words, the capacity and willingness of the United States to dominate international affairs through its own power have been weakened. Namely, the core purpose of the multipolar structure is to “decentralize the US”, or “weaken the hegemony of the US”. This view is quite the opposite of Yan’s. However, these

Chinese scholars view of international structure  31 two different views are both based on power shifts and recombinations of major power relations in the international system. Wu Zhicheng from Nankai University argues that the international system is overall in the process of transforming to multipolarization. For him, “There is no substantial change in the international distribution of power, especially among major powers” (2014: 12). The formulation of the new multipolar system is a long, gradual, and complicated historical process. In contrast, Zheng Yu from the Institute of Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has more detailed views. In his opinion, the international structure has been typically unipolar since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The global financial crisis of 2008 marked the end of the stable unipolar world. Since then, the development of multipolarization has speeded up under a loose unipolar structure (Zheng 2015). Chen Zhimin from Fudan University refutes Yan Xuetong’s views. Chen thinks that the world is turning to multipolarization, which is the reality of our age. This multipolarization is progressing on three layers of economic power, military power, and ideas power. The economic multipolarization has basically taken shape, but the military multipolarization is still struggling to be widely accepted and in the meantime the diversity of ideas power is brewing. Chen admits that China’s economy may exceed that of the United States in 2030. But multipolarity would be the main feature of the world in the future, at least before 2030 because of three reasons. First, China’s per capita GDP would still be much lower than that of the United States. Second, the comprehensive strength of China and the United States is not at great advantage compared with others like the European countries and India. Third, power is diffused from states to non-state actors (Chen 2013). Xiao Feng from the China Center for Contemporary World Studies directly refutes Yan’s views in his article. From his point of view, “it is the mainstream opinion of China and even the world that the international structure has been developing toward multipolarity after the end of Cold War” (2016: 72). He takes this as an important reason to support multipolarization. However, whether “the international structure is developing toward multipolarity” is the mainstream opinion of the world still needs to be proved. Xiao thinks that the bipolar theory is not realistic in a world with several major powers. It cannot be accepted by other major powers and will only provoke dissension between China and the others. First, China is not yet strong enough to be one pole in a Sino–US bipolarity. Second, China will not choose to be such a pole even if it had the strength. In his opinion, considering its rise and development interests, China would prefer to be a pole in the “multipolar world” rather than one standing against the United States alone. What should be noted in Xiao’s view is that he interprets international structure from the perspective of policy choices of a country and not from the perspective of the objective distribution of power and relations among major powers. He then continues with further discussion on the bipolar versus multipolar trend. In his view, even if China’s national strength is comparable to the United States,

32  Zhou Fangyin it can choose not to be “the pole in the bipolar world”. Therefore, the international structure would not be bipolar. This is a rather different way of thinking from that of US scholars and many Chinese scholars. Besides, he proposes from the national interest perspective that the bipolar theory would lead to strained relations between China and other major powers in the world (probably mainly including Russia, India, and European countries). Therefore, Xiao reaches the conclusion that “other major powers would not accept it”.

The influence of scholars’ theoretical background on their viewpoints on international structure The different views of Chinese IR scholars on international structure are to some extent influenced by their theoretical background. As mentioned above, those scholars who lean towards the economic factor generally support the trend of multipolarity. It is a common phenomenon for Chinese scholars to stress the importance of the economic factor. This may have something to do with C ­ hina’s development stage; however, with the further development of the ­Chinese ­economy, and with a more balanced development of capacity in other areas, the emphasis of Chinese IR scholars on the economy will not be so evident in the future, and this in turn will influence the judgment of Chinese scholars on international structure. Some Chinese scholars focus on the role played by international ­institutions and international rules. They pay more attention to the soft power side of ­national strength. The superiority of the United States in this field seems to be more prominent and stable. Although China’s economic status has improved rapidly, the gap in this field between China and the United States has not ­decreased markedly. It is much easier for those scholars who focus on international ­institutions, national image, and international reputation to acknowledge the advantage of the United States and its durability, to accept the viewpoint of a unipolar structure dominated by the United States, and to be suspicious and less confident about the existence of the trend of multipolarity (Pang 1999). There are still some scholars who claim that different positions in the international system are related to different values and policy stances. In their opinion, a proposition of unipolar structure reflects the benefits of the unipole, a proposition of bipolar structure reflects the benefits of the two poles, while a proposition of multipolar structure reflects the benefits of the many poles and the whole international society. Based on this logic, some Chinese scholars insist that China should stick to the policy stance of multipolarization, no matter what international structure China really faces. This line of thinking has been around since the 1980s, but in varying degrees (Du 1987: 15; Xiao 2016). Comparatively speaking, those scholars with an inclination towards realism make more effort to get an objective, accurate examination of the existing power distribution, and the future trend of power distribution. They try to eliminate the influence of personal values and wishful thinking from their analysis of international structure, and do not try to make their viewpoint consistent with the

Chinese scholars view of international structure  33 policy stance of the government (Zhou 2000; Yan 2011). In their opinion, there is a need to analyze the real power distribution with a more realistic, prudent attitude, and to decrease the bias of government policy, if there is a difference between the government’s policy stance and objective reality.

Relations between academic views and government policy The academic assessment of international structure is of significance to policy makers Understanding the international system is important for both academic purposes and for policy making. Its policy significance is summarized in the following points: 1. The assessment of international structure is an important part of understanding the international environment and possibly the most significant factor. Seen from the perspective of structural realism, characterized by ­a narchy, the distribution of power is the key to influencing the nature of the international system which places strong constraints on national behaviors. Through the lens of Waltz’s structural realism, if a country misunderstands international structure and makes bad policies options accordingly, under the pressure of the international system it may bring severe consequences on itself (Waltz 1979). 2. The specific character of the international structure constitutes a real constraint to China’s rise. Around 2000, the Chinese government and academia believed that there would be a period of strategic opportunity for China’s rise. This period was built on the basis of a relatively favorable international environment to China that was characterized by multipolarization and globalization. After 2010, Chinese scholars gradually realized that the international environment for China’s rise was not so favorable. The reason is that China has been rising under a unipolar structure which is different from the way most countries have risen in history. The key feature of this system is that there is no single country that is capable of balancing against the United States. In this system, the United States is safer than any other ­major power and exerts greater influence on international affairs. ­Moreover, a ­unipolar structure relieves any restraints on the United States and increases its freedom of action. All these factors increase the difficulties and costs of other countries attempting to balance the United States (Wohlforth 1999; Pape 2005: 11; Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009). The special power distribution under the unipolar system brings particular difficulties to the rising power. The unipolar effect clearly narrows down the behavioral freedom of secondary powers and significantly raises the power threshold to balance the dominant power (Liu Feng 2011). ­Under the ­unipolar system, the lack of external constraints expands the freedom of a­ ction of the dominant power and thus enhances its motivation for revisionism and

34  Zhou Fangyin easily leads to a tendency towards overexpansion (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009: 23–24; Liu 2015). Moreover, the ­hegemonic power regards the maintenance of hegemony as its basic task with the highest sensitivity, the lowest tolerance, and the strongest restricting ­capacity towards the rise of secondary powers (Jia 2007: 57). The ­rebalancing policy promoted by the United States since 2011 has exerted tremendous strategic pressure on China. 3. One of the reasons for understanding the international structure is to make better use of it as an existing environment for the development of China and to play a better role in international society. Since the Sino–US relationship improved in 1972 and formed the famous triangle relations of the Cold War, China has paid much attention to the expansion of its development space under different international conditions and has strived to avoid the difficulties and challenges brought about by its transformation. Based on the recognition of the evolution of the international structure, the Chinese government has put forward the proposition of a period of strategic opportunity. On the one hand, this shows clear political consciousness to take full advantage of the opportunity for development provided by international system. On the other hand, it indicates its sense of some sort of urgency and concern about the possibility of greater developmental pressure if the strategic opportunity is not fully used. In the Report delivered at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1997, President Jiang Zemin said, The worldwide scientific and technological revolution is forging ahead by leaps and bounds, and the economy has continued to grow. This has provided favorable external conditions for us….whether we are able to seize opportunities has always been a major issue which has a vital bearing on the success of our revolution and construction.9 The Report to the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly states that, “An overview of the situation shows that for our country the first two decades of the 21st century are a period of important strategic ­opportunities, which we must seize tightly and which offers bright prospects”.10 The Report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007 makes a full statement of the content of China’s period of strategic opportunities: The world today is undergoing extensive and profound changes, and contemporary China is going through a wide-ranging and deep transformation. This brings us unprecedented opportunities as well as unprecedented challenges, with the former outweighing the latter. The whole Party must grasp and make the most of the important period of strategic opportunities.11

Chinese scholars view of international structure  35 The Report to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012 still emphasizes, An examination of both the current international and domestic environments shows that China remains in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, a period in which much can be achieved. We need to have a correct understanding of the changing nature and conditions of this period, seize all opportunities, respond to challenges with a cool head, and gain initiative and advantages to win the future and attain the goal of completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2020.12 It is evident that the understanding of the period of strategic opportunity by Chinese leaders has been continuous. However, the awareness of the risk behind it increased remarkably after 2007.

The Chinese government’s long-standing insistence on the multipolar structure Since the middle of the 1980s, the Chinese government has never publicly ­opposed the existence of the multipolar trend. But its confidence in it has varied over time. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping pointed out in a talk in 1990 that, No matter if the world structure was tri-polar or quad-polar or penta-polar, the Soviet Union would be one of the poles, even if it is weakened or several Union Republics withdraw. China can be called a pole in a multipolar world. China should not abase itself for this.13 His words have been taken by many scholars as evidence that China should be a pole. Although Deng did not use the word “multipolarization”, his subtext is that the future world will be multipolar because he mentions the possibilities of tri-polar, quad-polar, or penta-polar structure. If the future world will be multipolar, there must be a multipolar trend before it. In August 1998, President Jiang Zemin discussed the two topics of world multipolarization and economic globalization at the 9th Diplomatic Envoy Conference. He asserted, “The world structure is accelerating towards multipolarization”. The current multipolar trend appears under the circumstances of the end of the Cold War, the eased tension of the international situation, and the ever-growing strength of world peace. Jiang continues, “It reflects the profound changes of international relations and the progress of the era”.14 At the ­Economic Working Meeting of the Central Government one year later Jiang said, “The multipolar trend of the world continues to develop….The formulation of a multipolar structure will be a long process full of complicated struggles. But the direction of history cannot be reversed”.15 At this time, the confidence

36  Zhou Fangyin of Chinese leaders in multipolarization was significantly stronger than the statement by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s. However, the expression in 1999 was less affirmative and optimistic than that of 1998. The “accelerating” development of multipolarization was replaced by “continuing to develop”. Multipolarization was considered as “a long process full of complicated struggles”. In the period after the 1990s, the US hegemonic status in the international system got the momentum of further enhancement. The Chinese government had a clear understanding of it. At the same Diplomatic Envoy Conference in 1998, President Jiang said: “The US is attempting to build a unipolar world so that it can determine international affairs”. For a long time, the United States would maintain its advantages in politics, economy, science and technology, military, and so on. As a result, “the contradiction between a unipolar and a multipolar global system will be more prominent”.16 President Hu Jintao said in 2003 that although the world was progressing toward multipolarization, “the contradictions and struggle between unipolar and multipolar are more and more intense”. There is a country (i.e. the United States) pursuing power politics, promoting unilateralism, and riding on the momentum for a new round of strategic expansion.17 Apparently, it was admitted that the tendency towards a unipolar system is strong. The implication was that multipolarization was facing great challenges. In August 2006, at the Foreign Affairs Meeting of the Central Government, Hu Jintao said, “the world structure is still at the important transition period to multipolarization”. The word “still” clarifies that the Chinese government ­believed that the multipolar trend “still” existed although suffering some setbacks. In this way, “world multipolarization will continue to move forward with the twists and turns”.18 Generally speaking, after 2000, the Chinese government still used the expression “the world multipolarization cannot be reversed” in its official statement.19 But it was less emphasized in that period, which is no doubt closely related to the performance of the United States in international politics. In 2007, the subprime crisis of the United States broke out and caused a global financial crisis. In a short time, it triggered a wide debate on whether the United States would experience a relative decline. No matter how much the United States was going to decline in the long run, it would at least mean a big jolt to its unipolar status. In July 2009, at the 11th Diplomatic Envoy Conference, Hu Jintao said: “The international balance of power has greatly changed. The prospect of ­multipolarization is more promising”.20 The confidence of the Chinese government in m ­ ultipolarization was restored and enhanced. In contrast, the statement on multipolarization in the Report to the 18th National Congress is rather bland. There is only one sentence stating: “the global trends toward multipolarity and economic globalization are developing”.21 This statement was adopted by the Xi Jinping administration.22 In November 2014, at the Foreign Affairs Meeting of the Central Government, at which the seven members of the standing c­ ommittee were ­present, Xi said: “We should sufficiently estimate the complexity of the development and evolution of the international structure. Moreover, we should know that the progressing of multipolarization will not change”.23

Chinese scholars view of international structure  37 It is clear that the Chinese government is flexible and pragmatic in estimating the international structure, although it has long adhered to the concept of multipolarization. Moreover, it has always believed that the promotion of a multipolar structure is in line with China’s interests. At the Economic Working Meeting of the Central Government in November 1999, Jiang Zemin pointed out, “Multipolarization is for the common hope and interests of the people all over the world….Only a balanced power structure is beneficial to world ­stability”.24 From this perspective, the proposition of the Chinese government on multipolarization being the developing trend is not only based on the ­understanding of the development trend of power distribution but also based on the consideration of its national interests, with a subjective willingness to promote this trend. Similar views were expressed at several occasions under President Hu Jintao. For example, at the small symposium of diplomatic envoys in ­August 2003, Hu pointed out: “It is in accordance with the fundamental ­interests of our country and the interests of the people in the world to promote a multipolar world, democratic international relations and diversified developing models” and “We would have more room to maneuver with further developed multipolarization”.25 Based on this understanding, the Chinese government generally disapproves of the “bipolar theory” even when the discussion of China’s rise increased greatly in international society because of the rapid and sustained growth of China’s economy. This is clearly manifested in the attitude of China on the ­notion of the G2 in 2009. In July 2009 at the 11th Diplomatic Envoy Conference, Hu Jintao said, “We particularly disagree with the notion of G2. The reason is that it violates the multipolar trend of the world and does not comply with our ­independent and peaceful diplomatic policy”.26

Relations between scholars’ views and the government’s standpoint On the issue of international structure, it is difficult to achieve a definite conclusion on the relationship between academic views and the government’s standpoint and policy choice. Feng Huiyun and He Kai (2016) put forward the notion that there might be four kinds of relations between Chinese IR scholars and government policies: scholars as an epistemic community have an impact on foreign policy; scholars provide new arguments and theories as well as policy recommendations for the government to choose; scholars play a signaling role for the government to test social and international responses to some new ideas for policies; and scholars serve as a “mirror” to reflect the orientation of government’s policy. As for the discussion and debate on the international structure among Chinese scholars, all types of relations described above except the third one exist to varying degrees. In terms of the relation between the views of scholars and the government’s positions, we have the following tentative understanding. First of all, it is quite evident that the understanding of the international structure by Chinese ­scholars is generally highly consistent with the government’s proposition. Which one comes first? Are the scholars’ views influenced by the government or does the

38  Zhou Fangyin government accept the academic consensus? According to the analysis in this chapter, the statements by government may have a larger impact on scholars’ views. If scholars’ views had influenced the government, their views would have developed into several major schools of thought on the changing international situation. All of them would have been fully and deeply discussed and elaborated, with one of them being favored by the government. In fact, the concept of the multipolar trend has always been the mainstream view of Chinese scholars in different international contexts, including ­bipolar structure, unipolar structure, the expansion of United States strength and ­advantage, as well as its recent relative decline. At the same time, the m ­ ultipolar trend has been supported by the Chinese government since the 1980s. Since the end of 1991, the Chinese government has not held views aligned with the ­bipolar or the unipolar structure. Therefore, it is understandable that there are  correspondingly only a few articles by Chinese scholars arguing for a bipolar or ­unipolar structure. To some extent, the consistence and persistence of the Chinese government on the multipolar trend are important background for scholars to analyze the international structure. The support and proactive attitude of scholars towards the multipolar trend may also have had some influence on the government’s judgment and strengthened its confidence. Therefore, the academic view and the government’s proposition have been reinforcing each other over a period of time, particularly in the 1990s. This situation does not encourage scholars to hold fuller and bolder discussions on the international structure. Second, it will help to enrich the government’s understanding of related issues and avoid rigid thinking if scholars conduct more investigations and discussions on multipolarization and other developing possibilities.27 Scholars should insist on their own views and thus diversify them, which in turn will contribute to enriching decision alternatives for the government and widening the thinking space for decision-making. It should be noted that the Chinese government is very open to sources of information. The Chinese government refers to the views of both Chinese and foreign scholars when analyzing the international situation and making a judgment. As mentioned above, from 1998 to 1999, the Chinese government was clear about the purpose of the United States to build a u ­ nipolar world. This concern intensified in the early stage of the anti-terrorism war from 2001 to 2003. However, the Chinese government has never given up the pursuit of the multipolarization of the international structure. In other words, when insisting on multipolarization, the Chinese government is well aware of the ­unfavorable trend and tendency in the international situation. Third, since the latter half of the 1980s, Chinese scholars have generally ­insisted on the tendency towards multipolarization. This has been the unchanged mainstream thought. In this respect, Chinese scholars and the government have similar ideas. Although the government must cope with the present problems in a timely fashion, it often encourages an understanding of the present situation based on the study of long-term trends. Fourth, the Chinese government has long approved the multipolar trend and is happy to see that scholars have

Chinese scholars view of international structure  39 extensive discussions on the subject. But it is very likely that the government does not intend to promote and publicize this view all of the time. As we have seen from the discussion above, some scholars have had public doubts in their discussions on the existence of the multipolar trend. But such views were not the mainstream for a long time. Another interesting phenomenon is that Chinese scholars have paid much ­attention to the economic factor when analyzing the international structure, which was typical in the 1990s. In contrast, the Chinese government ­realized the importance of the military factor much earlier and actively promoted ­sustained military modernization. In the extended meeting of the Central M ­ ilitary Commission held in June 1985, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the four modernizations needed to be sequenced. Building the economy enjoyed priority and military forces could “wait for some years”.28 But this was a policy set in a special historical background. In September 1995, at the 5th Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee, Jiang Zemin said that China should ­implement the military strategy of active defense: “Strengthen the ability of our army to defend and fight in emergent battles with modern technology, especially hi-technology”. China should improve the scientific research in national defense, upgrade the modernization of army equipment, and enhance the ability of transformation between peacetime and wartime.29 In October 2001, Jiang Zemin said in an important speech to the army, “The strengthening of the strategic power of our country should be studied as a major issue with no time to lose”. By ­“strategic power” he meant “the total forces that a country could call up when there is a need of war”. The statement shows a high level of attention to the military factor. Military force is regarded as the core of power.30 Actually, since the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, the Chinese government has been actively promoting military modernization. This runs parallel with the pursuit of multipolarization of the world. In comparison, the perception of Chinese IR scholars on the military factor may have relatively fallen behind in the same period.

Conclusion Since the late 1980s, Chinese IR scholars have published a large number of articles on the issue of international structure and conducted in-depth discussions. China is turning into a great power with the rapid rise of its national strength. Its international environment will be quite affected by any change of the international structure. Therefore, it is of pragmatic significance to understand the present situation and trend of the international structure for China to maintain its interests and play a better role in the international system. From the above analysis and discussion of Chinese scholars on international structure, some ­features are worth noting. In the changing international situation, these scholars have long-standing and firm confidence in multipolarization and believe that it is at least a general trend that is difficult to change. When analyzing the international structure, they stress the importance of the economic factor, economic interdependency,

40  Zhou Fangyin and the development of globalization. Thus, they neglect the military factor to some extent and do not attach enough importance to the unfavorable factors for multipolarization. Although the articles on the international structure are numerous, there are only a few under public academic debate on related issues. In general, the understanding of the international structure by Chinese scholars is in line with the policy propositions of the Chinese government. This does not mean that the government accepts the scholars’ views. At the same time, the Chinese government keeps an open mind and appreciates a rich information source when analyzing the international situation. It helps the government to avoid misunderstandings in practical policy making and assists the implementation of a more balanced policy.

Notes 1 The earliest IR article using the word structure (geju) found on the China National Knowledge Infrastructure was published in 1979; see Mei (1979). 2 At the Annual Meeting in 1992 of the Chinese Association for History of International Communist Movement held in October, the participants concluded that there were important lessons to be learnt from the collapse of Soviet Union, the first one of which was that the country should focus on economic development and promote ­social productivity to meet the increasing needs of the people for material and cultural life. See Wang Youqun and Hu Hao (1992). Also refer to Luo Zhaohong (1994) and Song Kaiwen (1992). 3 The core of the policy of keeping a low profile is to develop the economy on the one hand, and on the other hand solve the other problems through economic m ­ easures, namely, the policy of “promoting political relations with economics measures”. ­Generally speaking, it confers an overwhelming advantageous status to economic ­development in the national strategy. 4 Bold added by the author. 5 For example, Chen Qi (2001), Zhang (2003), Qian (2003), Qiu (2004), Hu (2005), and Wu (2014). 6 In the policy meetings or internal meetings, there were indeed different opinions and propositions. The policy debate did exist and sometimes even became heated. ­Chinese scholars rarely speak out against others in public, especially in published articles, but they will express different views in a euphemistic way. 7 The early use could be seen in the works of Liu Ming (1993), Wang Hongzhou (1993), and Wang Rixiang (1993). 8 World Bank Database. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/. 9 Selected Works of Jiang Zenming, vol. 2, 3–4. 10 Ibid., vol. 3, 542. 11 Report of Hu Jintao on the 17th CPC National Congress of CPC, Selected Works of Hu Jintao, vol. 2, 613. 12 Report of Hu Jintao on the 18th CPC National Congress of CPC, Selected Works of Hu Jintao, vol. 3, 625. 13 International Situation and Economic Issues, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 353. 14 The Current International Situation and Our Diplomatic Work, Selected Works of Jiang Zenming, vol. 3, 195–197. 15 Selected Works of Jiang Zenming, vol. 3, 422. 16 Ibid., 195–196. Bold added by the author. 17 Selected Works of Hu Jintao, vol. 3, 90. Bold added by the author.

Chinese scholars view of international structure  41 18 Ibid., 503–504. 19 For instance, the Report of Hu Jintao on the 17th CPC National Congress of CPC in 2007, see Selected Works of Hu Jintao, vol. 2, 649. 20 Selected Works of Hu Jintao, vol. 3, 234. Emphasis added by the author. 21 Ibid., 650. 22 See the speech Xi Jinping made at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in March 2013, Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, 271–278 (published in 2014). 23 “Xi Jinping Attended the Working Meeting for Foreign Affairs of the Central ­Government and Made an Important Speech”. Xinhua Net, November 29, 2014. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-11/29/c_1113457723.htm. 24 Selected Works of Jiang Zenming, vol. 2, 422–423. 25 Selected Works of Hu Jintao, vol. 2, 88, 93. 26 Ibid., vol. 3, 238. 27 In terms of the possible thinking mindset of Chinese IR scholars, see Xu and Du (2014). 28 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 126–129. 29 Selected Works of Jiang Zenming, 473. 30 Ibid., 356–357.

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3 China debates soft power Implications for Chinese foreign policy Li Mingjiang

Soft power has been one of the most popular terms in the Chinese foreign policy lexicon since the mid-2000s. The concept has frequently appeared in various official documents and political leaders’ speeches. It is noted that Chinese leader Xi Jinping – compared to his predecessors – has attached even more i­mportance to the development of China’s cultural soft power (Han 2016). Numerous ­Chinese scholars have laboriously studied soft power, particularly China’s soft power strategy. Their study on soft power is multidisciplinary, involving political science ­ umanities (including (mainly international relations and comparative politics), h culture, education, and history), and subjects and issues that are commonly studied under the broad umbrella of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. The debate on Chinese soft power among Chinese scholars is dominated by three main groups: (1) Chinese political scientists who tend to pay more ­attention to theories, conceptualizations, institutions, and actual policy cases; (2) ­scholars in the humanities who focus on the sources of Chinese soft power from ­cultural and historical perspectives; and (3) proponents with ­political, ­ideological, and propaganda backgrounds and mostly associated with the ­“sinification” of ­Marxism (makesi zhuyi zhongguohua), theorization of Chinese socialism, ­explanation and justification of Party–State politics and policies, and even propaganda campaigns. Within each group, there are individuals with ­d ifferent views on issues such as specific approaches that Beijing should take to advance its soft power in the world. The Chinese debate on soft power has been most significantly sparked by ­Joseph Nye’s (2005) works and subsequent worldwide intellectual fashion on this notion. The popularity and intensity of the Chinese debate, however, have been shaped by two other factors. First, the Chinese elites have a growing desire to dramatically expand China’s influence and elevate China’s international image and status. Second, the Chinese are disappointed with the international status of their country’s soft power. The contrast between these two factors has sparked keen interest in soft power among the Chinese scholars. Feng Huiyun and He Kai (2016) outline four models for the relationship between Chinese scholars and foreign policy. In the case of soft power, C ­ hinese scholars have played three roles in relation to actual policy making. First, some Chinese analysts who are close to the political circle play the “epistemic

China debates soft power  45 community” role by directly contributing policy ideas and proposals to ­various decision-making institutions. Second, the others (perhaps most of these ­Chinese scholars) “provide intellectual products in a free market of ideas for policy ­makers to consume” (Feng and He 2016). Their academic publications and ­media ­commentaries have led policy makers to pay more attention and allocate more resources to the advancement of China’s soft power. Third, in retrospect, it is quite clear that the Chinese soft power debate reflects two decades of changes in the soft power elements in China’s international relations.1 A few major observations can be made from the Chinese discussions on soft power. Most Chinese scholars believe that Chinese culture and traditions are the most significant sources of China’s soft power, while many Chinese analysts also suggest that Beijing has been successful in developing its soft power in the past decades largely because of its appropriate foreign policy. The predominant view is that China’s soft power is still weak as compared to other major powers, particularly the United States. Explanatory factors for China’s weaknesses, however, are quite different. These range from blaming China’s domestic sociopolitical institutions and policies to accusing anti-China political forces in the world. Many Chinese analysts suggest that building soft power is not just for China’s foreign policy purposes but also for China’s domestic transformation. The debate indicates that China, despite very daunting challenges, should work on expanding its soft power. It is also apparent to debaters that China’s cultural soft power and political values are unlikely to help Beijing transform the international order to its liking anytime soon. A more helpful soft power tool for China in the short and mid-term future is its adroit foreign policy. This chapter will mainly attempt to address the following questions: What are the  main sources of Chinese soft power? How do Chinese scholars assess the strengths and weaknesses of China’s soft power? How do they account for the weaknesses in Beijing’s soft power? What policy suggestions does the ­Chinese research community provide for the cultivation and expansion of ­Chinese soft power?

Concepts, sources, and objectives of Chinese soft power Most Chinese scholars agree regarding Joseph Nye’s (2005) conceptual ­framework on soft power. They concur that soft power aims to achieve ­foreign policy goals through noncoercive means such as attraction, persuasion, and co-optation. Although some Chinese scholars, mainly political scientists, ­attempt to question the scope and logic of Nye’s soft power conceptualization, they do not challenge the core of his ideas about soft power. The Chinese debate largely follows the three main sources of soft power: culture, values/institutions, and foreign policy.

Sources of Chinese soft power While most Chinese scholars believe that culture should be the main source of China’s soft power, there are differences in their emphasis on various aspects of

46  Li Mingjiang Chinese culture. Many Chinese scholars contend that China’s fine traditional culture is the most important source of soft power (Lin 2016). Some characteristics of China’s traditional civilization, such as secularism, rationalism, openness, inclusiveness, emphasis on peace, and high demands for ethics and morality, have been identified as conducive to China’s soft power expansion (Yang Hua 2016). It has been particularly emphasized that China’s “peace-loving” culture is the essence of Chinese culture. Accordingly, it should be the most useful element in China’s cultural soft power (Zhang Lei 2016). It has been pointed out that China’s cultural emphasis on “harmony despite differences” (he er butong) can play a positive role in boosting its cultural soft power in the world. This cultural emphasis could provide a platform for ­peaceful dialogues between the different civilizations in the world and consequently help dissipate the “yellow peril” and “China threat” rhetoric. It may also foster ­positive interactions between Western values such as “freedom, equality, and ­fraternity” and Chinese norms such as “benevolence, loyalty, respect, wisdom, and integrity” (He Xiaoming 2016: 70–72). Others believe that an important source of Chinese power could be China’s cultural cohesive power that has helped the Chinese people and the people from different regions form a common bond that has lasted a few thousand years (Guo Xiaocong 2014). It has also been argued that even Chinese cuisines could serve as an effective conduit for the expansion of Chinese soft power in the world (He Wei 2016). Chinese intellectuals in the humanities also emphasize the role of Chinese language in promoting Chinese soft power. They contend that language carries with it many cultural elements such as national history, mindset, social norms, and aesthetics. In addition, language serves as the carrier for a state’s political ideology and values. In this sense, language is a major source of soft power (Chen Wei 2016). Thus, Chinese language programs in foreign countries should be regarded as one of the core elements of China’s cultural soft power. It is noted that international educational exchanges should be an important source of soft power. The policy prescription from this perspective is that China should allocate more resources to increase Sino-foreign educational exchange programs (Kuang, Chen and Wu 2015). In this regard, Ms. Peng Liyuan, C ­ hina’s first lady, has played a positive role in enhancing China’s soft power through her international exposure and engagements with the outside world (Wei 2016). The media has also been commonly regarded as a major source of Chinese soft power. Chinese interlocutors frequently express their positive assessments of ­major Western media outlets in contributing to Western countries’ soft power while they also reveal their negative views on Western media because of the constraints that they have brought to China’s soft power. Chen Luo and Shao Min (2016) suggest that Chinese documentaries on Chinese Fine Cuisines (shejian shang de zhongguo) could be a tool for increasing Chinese soft power. In relation to media, Chinese elites agree that discourse power (huayu quan) is an important source of soft power for any country. It is argued that two m ­ ajor areas in which China’s discourse power could be significantly improved are philosophy and social sciences. Instead of following the perspectives of foreign

China debates soft power  47 counterparts (gen zhe shuo), Chinese scholars should actively present their own innovative views (ziji shuo) (Shen 2016). Chinese political scientists try to downplay cultural traditions as a major source of soft power. In the views of political analyst Hu Wei (2014a: 60), it is a mistake to equate culture with soft power. He argues that what matters a lot more are political values and institutions. In his view, the core of soft power is the appealing effect of political values and the matching institutional arrangements in China. He contends that China can only significantly enhance its soft power through moving closer towards democracy, freedom, and rule of law (Hu 2014a). These political analysts also believe that soft power is mainly generated from foreign policy. Now that American hegemony is in relative decline, new challenges in global governance and new demands for the provision of international public goods have emerged. They believe that innovative solutions are needed and that in this context China has the opportunity to expand its soft power. To do this, China can contribute to international public goods through building stability and prosperity in international economics, pushing for innovative development models, maintaining open international commons, and shaping a new world order (Wang 2011). Regime supporters tend to analyze the sources of Chinese soft power from ideological grounds and the political reality in China. Some scholars argue that the revolutionary red culture should play a major role in building China’s ­cultural soft power (Gao and Wei 2016: 138–142). These authors contend that the red culture, which originated from the May Fourth Movement, is a product of the convergence of Marxism and fine traditions in Chinese culture. The red culture can be seen in many heroic events evident in the Jinggangshan era, the Long March, Yan’an period, Daqing oil field, nuclear and missile development programs, major disaster relief campaigns, and the manned spaceship program (Gao and Wei 2016: 138–142).

Contending objectives Chinese scholars view soft power as competitive and as part of a state’s comprehensive power (zonghe shili). The mainstream view in the debate is that soft power serves a supplementary role to hard power in achieving China’s national interests in international relations, albeit through noncoercive means. Chinese scholars concur that soft power is helpful in raising China’s international status and expanding Chinese influence. Cultural soft power is also used to demonstrate the appeal of Chinese state institutions and Chinese values, the innovative force of the Chinese society, and amicable image of the Chinese people in the world (Yi 2012). Soft power is supposed to help achieve specific foreign policy goals in a more efficient and effective manner. For instance, it is argued that cultural soft power can help the implementation of the One Belt One Road ­initiative. With the help of soft power, China’s initiatives and projects may be more easily accepted by other countries (Fan and Zhou 2016).

48  Li Mingjiang For many other political elites, soft power programs also serve various d ­ omestic purposes. Meeting the Chinese demand for more cultural products and public cultural services can contribute to economic growth. In the process of ­expanding ­ orality and spiritual the cultural sector and promoting socialist core values, the m aspirations of the whole society can be upgraded (Yi 2012). They also believe that cultural soft power can advance three goals: national prosperity, national rejuvenation, and people’s happiness. In this sense, cultural soft power can help realize the China Dream advocated by Xi Jinping (Zhong 2016). The fact that the domestic context needs soft power is particularly salient for those pro-regime political analysts. In their view, soft power is mainly about ­ideological struggles between states (Dong 2016). Leftist intellectuals regard soft power competition as a life-or-death game for the survival of the Chinese regime. In their eyes, cultural soft power rivalry is a “war” with smokeless ­gunpowder because Western countries tend to subvert and control other countries politically by using cultural tools to promote their values and ideologies. They believe that China’s primary objective in developing its cultural soft power is to counter ­Western countries’ threat to the ideological security of its political regime. In this assessment, the Chinese political system has been vulnerable to such ­attacks from the West because the development of market economy and the ­Opening Up policy have fostered independent thinking and diverse views among the Chinese people. They believe that Western ideological infiltration and i­nfluence will lead to the weakening of Chinese people’s cultural identity, undermining s­ ocial and national cohesion and ultimately causing a legitimacy crisis for the ruling Party and State (Fan and Li 2013). Thus, enhancing soft power is important for the ­protection of China’s cultural security and overall national security (Chi 2015). For conservatives, cultural soft power can be used to overcome domestic ­political challenges to the regime. They believe that Chinese liberal elites, with support from the West, now increasingly converge with sympathizers of ­X injiang independence, Tibet independence, and Falun Gong forces. They ­accuse the l­iberals of negating the Party’s revolutionary history, creating an ugly image of the Party, undermining people’s morale and aspirations, ­h ighlighting the  ­repercussions of China’s development, advocating “universal values” against  the official ideology, undermining the unity of Chinese society, and weakening the ruling position of the Party. The conservatives contend that various cultural soft power programs need to be solidly based on socialist core values to effectively guard against attacks by liberals (Zhang 2014).

Weaknesses and challenges of Chinese soft power In general, Chinese scholars believe that their country’s soft power has r­ emained weak and has been lagging behind its hard power, particularly economic power. One way to assess China’s soft power is to evaluate the trade figures of ­cultural products. In 2015, China’s total GDP was RMB 6.77 trillion but the cultural ­sector accounted for only 3.86 per cent of the total GDP. In 2014, China ­imported 16,695 copyright items and exported 10,293 items. For books, magazines, and

China debates soft power  49 newspapers, the import volume reached US$ 283.82 million, but the export level was only US$ 6.5 million. The box office of imported films reached RMB 16.9 billion in 2015 and the total income of Chinese films in foreign countries was only RMB 2.8 billion (Pu 2016: 112–113). Some Chinese scholars also try to understand China’s soft power through comparative studies of other major players in international relations. In the post-World War II era, the United States has mainly relied on its military and economic hard power in its international strategies, but it should be noted that American cultural soft power has helped Washington to realize its foreign policy goals. American cultural soft power has helped win the hearts and minds of many nations, shape the identity of many foreign elites, and restore America’s international image. Beijing should spare no effort to learn from Americans to use soft power to gain more influence in international affairs at lower costs (Lu 2015). According to some Chinese scholars, India (unlike China) boasts a good ­balance between its hard power and soft power. A comparative study of Indian and Chinese soft power examines five aspects of soft power: culture, economic ­development model, participation in international institutions, national image, and international influence. The study concludes that Beijing has done much ­better in development model and international influence, slightly better in ­national image, and about the same in culture; however, China did not fare as well as India in participating in international institutions (Xiao Limei 2015). Xiao Bin compares the soft power practices of China and Russia to understand their respective regional policies. Her study suggests that Beijing seems to be more interested in increasing attraction in the different regions whereas Russia tends to use soft power tools for specific goals. The study concludes that China’s soft power influence is broader than Russia’s but Russia’s soft power ­appears to be more effective. In Oceania and Africa, China’s soft power is stronger than Russia’s. In the two countries’ neighboring regions, Russia’s soft power is more significant than China’s. In regional major bilateral relations, Beijing scores better than Moscow. China and Russia employ almost the same set of soft power tools, but Russia’s soft power measures seem to be more resilient and more ­infiltrating that China’s (Xiao Bin 2015). A survey study in the Philippines indicates that China’s soft power is behind that of Japan in areas such as economy, human resources, culture, politics, and diplomacy. The Chinese researcher suggests that China should improve the ­efficacy of its cultural communications, reform its domestic governance to reduce the negative impact of soft power, allow more civil society groups to participate in people-to-people exchanges, amend its current policy of relying on economic means for immediate soft power outcomes, and focus on cultural diplomacy (Dai 2014). Finally, compared to many European countries and the United States, China’s soft power influence in Africa “still lags significantly behind” (hai you bushao chaju). Even compared to other emerging powers such as India and ­Brazil, Beijing enjoys fewer soft power advantages in Africa (Li Wengang 2013). A few empirical studies conducted by Chinese researchers also indicate that Beijing is not satisfied with extent of its soft power in some regions of the world.

50  Li Mingjiang A  survey study indicates that China’s image in Latin America is still below ­Beijing’s expectation. People in the region generally still do not have a solid positive understanding of China despite the rapid development of bilateral ties in trade and economics, high-level political interactions, and the expansion of Confucius Institutes (Ma and Guo 2014). Another study suggests that China’s cultural soft power in Arab countries is “noticeably weak”. Chinese culture is promoted via very few platforms, and a gap exists between the provision of ­Chinese cultural products and the needs among the Arabs (Liu Xinlu 2013).

The cultural challenges Chinese intellectuals have identified several barriers to the spread of China’s traditional culture. First, some fine traditional cultural elements have gradually disappeared (Reng 2016). Chinese proponents of cultural soft power lament that Chinese society does not treat Chinese culture properly. They explain that the Chinese people have three erroneous attitudes towards traditional culture. First, there exists a sense of cultural inferiority. Since the nineteenth century, many Chinese elites have attributed China’s backwardness to the nation’s culture, praising and emulating Western culture. The Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s further damaged Chinese traditional culture. Second, as opposed to cultural inferiority, some Chinese elites adhere to “Sino-­centric” views when comparing Chinese and Western cultures. When the Europeans attempted to divide and conquer China, this kind of cultural ­nationalism was used to safeguard national self-esteem, highlight national crisis, and achieve national salvation. Since the 1990s, the revival of Confucianism has spurred the rapid rise of Chinese material power. This has fostered the erstwhile latent cultural nationalism, which has gone far beyond creating cultural self-­ confidence and has exhibited some signs of xenophobia. Third, there is a tendency to learn and practice the extrinsic forms of traditional culture while neglecting the intrinsic values of China’s traditional culture. It is noted that a major challenge for China is the integration of the official ideology with traditional Chinese culture. The official Marxist ideology came from outside and the Party–State had to laboriously “sinolize” Marxism. So far, success has been limited to the political arena. One example is Mao Zedong Thought and the still evolving theoretical framework of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Yet, Marxism has not been fully integrated into ideas, cognition, values, awareness, and psychology of the Chinese national culture. Neither has Marxism been internalized by the Chinese people to the extent that it would guide their way of thinking and behavioural habits But the Party–State’s need for Marxism as the sole guiding ideology for the whole Chinese society poses a dilemma for China’s soft power (Hao 2016: 135).

China debates soft power  51 It is also argued that the weakness of Chinese soft power may be well ­ nderstood from the perspective of China’s modernization process. Owing to u the sociocultural, economic, and military predominance of the Western countries since the modern era, China’s modernization has always been a process of tension between Chinese traditions and modernity. Chinese elites have struggled to choose between radicalism and conservativism, between liberalism and authoritarianism, and between tradition and modernity. A ­ fter the founding of the PRC, China was isolated from the rest of the world for decades. Besides, the Chinese sociocultural realm became highly one-­d imensional due to domestic politics. Traditions were severely destroyed during the Mao era. In the reform era, Chinese elites’ views of the West were highly polarized. They had mixed feelings of love, hate, inferiority, and arrogance towards the international society. Even today, China continues to be significantly influenced by Western culture from both its modern and postmodern elements. To a large extent, the dilemma China faces today is the same as the dilemma imperial China faced more than a hundred years ago. Its rejection of modernity and modern culture has denied it the opportunity to share the progressive benefits of global society. At the same time, the act of forgoing reconnecting with tradition has made it difficult for Chinese society to identify itself with the main body of its own civilization. Furthermore, the West has begun to criticize some of the negative aspects of Chinese modernity when Chinese culture is still undergoing modernization. This complicates the Chinese elites’ task of transforming Chinese culture. In recent years, the Party–State has attempted to use business approaches to expand the global market for Chinese cultural products in a bid to change other countries’ perceptions of China. These attempts have generated suspicion and open resistance from some countries. The failures can be attributed to a few ­factors. First, these attempts were lacking in values and were aimed at satisfying the outside world’s curiosity about China. Second, the modalities of ­implementation were repetitive, and third, the contents were insufficient. It becomes apparent that China’s soft power is a matter of searching for modernity (Sun 2016).

The debate on political institutions and values Most Chinese analysts would not dispute that China’s current political system and values do not help Beijing’s soft power in the world in any meaningful ­manner. It is noted that the limited positive impact of China’s political system is due to ­d ifferences in ideology and values between China and many other countries. One thing that further damages China’s international image and u ­ ndermines the Chinese political system’s positive impact on China’s soft power is the rampant corruption that exists in the Chinese system (Tian and Yang 2011). In 2013, the Chinese government issued guidelines for the promotion of core socialist values including (1) national goals of prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony; (2)

52  Li Mingjiang social goals of freedom, equality, justice, and the rule of law; and (3) individual values of patriotism, dedication, integrity, and friendship. However, it is commonly acknowledged that despite strenuous efforts by the Party–State in promoting these guidelines, the result has not been satisfactory. Many Chinese people are either indifferent to such campaign efforts or cynical about such efforts (Li Xuhua 2016). The initiative of publicizing and promoting socialist core values is a major effort of the Party–State to reconstruct China’s official ideology. If the entire society is not responding to such an initiative, it is difficult to say whether Beijing will be able to clear all the ideological confusion in Chinese society any time soon. And this may not bode well for China’s soft power trajectory. There is, however, a cautious yet optimistic view about the contributions that the Chinese political system can make to increase Chinese soft power. Zhang Yunling (2015), for instance, notes that the appeal of the Chinese political system exists in the evolution process of the Chinese system itself. The measurement is not the number of countries that adopt or emulate Chinese political institutions. Zhang argues that other countries, especially the developing countries, may be able to learn from the Chinese experience of development: the Chinese political system is willing to adopt an open outlook to secure stability and harmony for the country’s long-term development. These countries may find it useful to incorporate some of the “China elements” into the process of their political ­institution building and domestic governance (Zhang 2015). Some Chinese assessments indicate that China’s soft power in Latin America is gradually on the rise largely due to China’s economic ties, and partly due to cultural exchanges with the region. Ran Jijun (2014) suggests that China may have a chance to significantly increase its political influence in Latin America while various middle and left-leaning political forces in some Latin American countries are gaining more domestic support in the post-Washington Consensus era. The Chinese model of development may provide a reference for these newly emerging political forces in Latin America.

Implementation and policy options Many Chinese scholars believe that the foreign policy arena has plenty of room for Beijing to substantially develop its soft power. For instance, Chinese soft power in the Asia Pacific region is evident in Beijing’s role in regional economic integration and cooperation as well as China’s aid to many regional countries (Chou and Fang 2015). However, Chinese soft power in the foreign policy arena can be undermined by assertive nationalism in China, Beijing’s traditional views on sovereignty, and China’s actual material capabilities. But most Chinese ­literature neglects the foreign policy constraints on soft power. In fact, most Chinese writers on this topic regard foreign policy as the main opportunity for the growth of Chinese soft power. Different schools of thought on Chinese soft power propose different policy prescriptions.

China debates soft power  53 Cultural and communication policies Some analysts attribute the weakness of China’s cultural soft power to the ­government’s lackluster support, insufficient inheritance and development of traditional culture, and shortage of professionals in the cultural arena. These ­reasons are particularly notable when the case of China is compared to the ­success of South Korea’s popular culture (Chen Ling 2016). Therefore, to ­enhance ­China’s cultural soft power, the state should spare no effort to promote traditional culture in the Chinese society. Externally, China should try to spread Chinese traditional values via various international cultural promotion and ­exchange activities (Yang Hua 2016). Proponents of cultural soft power stress the role of language. They contend that Chinese language is not only an important component of soft power but also the foundation and an important tool for the expansion of soft power. Therefore, China should work hard to promote Chinese language programs in the world (Zhao 2016). Proponents suggest that the current way of promoting Chinese language education overseas could be improved. For instance, ­emphasis should be placed on curriculum design to show respect for other countries’ ­cultures (Li Dejun 2015). Educating foreign students in China may help China increase its soft power; more importantly, thousands of Chinese overseas students can also help promote Chinese culture in the host countries to increase the influence of China’s cultural soft power (Liu 2016). It is noted that the international ­education assistance programs have helped Japan expand its soft power since the end of World War II, in particular in African countries and some Asian countries such as Mongolia, Vietnam, and Thailand. Therefore, China should learn from the Japanese experience (Peng 2014). It is widely recognized that China is lacking in external media communication skills and tactics (Hu and Wang 2016; Liu and Liu 2016). Many Chinese elites believe that the key solution for improving China’s soft power is to learn to “tell the China story” more effectively (He Ping 2016). The main reason why Chinese cultural soft power does not match its economic power lies in the way Chinese government officials communicate with the outside world. Chinese officials get so used to making “politically correct” statements in their familiar domestic political setting that they tend to do the same during international dialogues. Their way of discourse has often confused the international community and contributed to the latter’s misunderstanding of China (Gong 2016). Chinese analysts argue that China’s limited communication effectiveness is due to the government’s excessive control of exchange programs. These official programs are inefficient due to the exclusion of other societal actors. Analysts believe that this kind of government-dominated external communications have damaged China’s international image to some extent (Pu and Zhang 2016). It is suggested that China’s external communications should not rely too much on official agencies, because civil organizations and new social media outlets may be more effective in communicating with the rest of the world (Yang Jinyao 2016). As some scholars have argued, Internet and online media outlets and

54  Li Mingjiang tools should be better utilized for external communication purposes (Li Nan 2016; Li and Zhu 2016). Some Chinese elites advocate a cosmopolitan approach to cultural soft power. They argue that a fine traditional culture could help demonstrate China’s historical achievements and raise China’s international reputation and status. The projection of cultural soft power means conducting cultural exchanges based on common ground, not differences. Chinese traditional culture, because of its tolerance, inclusiveness, and receptiveness, can continuously accept elements of foreign cultures to enrich China’s own culture (Reng 2016). Caution has also been suggested. Beijing should guard against appearing too assertive when promoting its cultural soft power. The case of the United States is used as a negative example. It is true that the United States has taken a leading position in the world’s soft power game. But it is also noted that there are significant weaknesses in American cultural soft power. The weaknesses can be seen in America’s cultural arrogance, intrinsic cultural shortcomings, the strategy of using culture to assimilate other nations, assertive cultural exports, and cultural hegemony. Should these weaknesses prevail, American soft power will inevitably decline; therefore, China should draw some good lessons from this example (Wang Rui 2016). There have been suggestions of reexamining China’s overall approach to its cultural soft power. At the macro level, China should abandon the hegemonic paradigm in favor of a coexistence discourse and redefine its soft power (Liu Jia 2013). It is also cautioned that expanding Chinese cultural soft power should not be premised on a zero-sum game. Engaging in such a zero-sum game would lead to the unnecessary expense of the cultural soft power resources of all parties in the game, destroying the mutual foundations of cultural soft power. Aiming at a positive sum game in soft power interactions with other countries should be the correct approach. A positive sum game is possible and necessary, ­because cultures are diverse in nature and are always interrelated in their respective ­development (Wang Rui 2015).

Major political changes required Chinese liberal scholars suggest that major changes to the political system are necessary before Beijing can be successful in boosting its soft power. Realizing the rule of law in China is the “foundational work” for upgrading China’s soft power (Hu 2014b, 2015). One case study concludes that contemporary C ­ hinese painting arts have done exceptionally well in global outreach. The author a­ rgues that the success stems from the fact that Chinese domestic regulatory policy ­towards this sector had been more liberal ever since the 1980s. The arts s­ ector has not received government support since the Opening Up drive, but the ­government’s limited intervention has automatically resulted in the booming of the sector, including its remarkable internationalization. This case study suggests that the key to the success of Chinese cultural soft power is for the government to change its highly interventionist political and policy restrictions on the ­cultural sector domestically (Zhu 2016).

China debates soft power  55 Many Chinese scholars use other countries’ success stories of cultivating soft power to advocate domestic political and policy changes in China. Zhou ­Zhiwei (2014) notes that Brazil has significantly boosted its international image in the past decade or so, presenting a different rise from China’s. Brazil’s success is attributable to its diverse cultures, its political system that features democracy, equality, and popular participation, and its foreign policy that emphasizes multilateralism and development assistance for other countries. One study notes that the US Peace Corps has increased American soft power in the past decades. The study suggests that China may copy this American experience and send ­voluntary groups to Africa to help expand Chinese soft power in the continent (Li Wengang 2015). Another study shows that British charity organizations have been an important source of British soft power. This conclusion suggests that China too should provide more opportunities for its NGOs to engage in international affairs to help improve China’s soft power (Zhang Lijun 2016). Chinese IR scholars have also made many policy proposals for the growth of Chinese soft power. It is argued that China could strengthen its soft power by playing a leading role in regional integration. Ye Renjie and Zhang Miao (2016) have suggested that China could gain soft power influence if its favored R ­ egional Comprehensive Economic Partnership becomes more successful than the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Chinese analysts suggest that strengthening ­China’s role in regional and subregional cooperation should be the main strategy for increasing Chinese soft power in the neighboring countries. Areas for regional and sub-regional cooperation include infrastructure projects, social exchanges, environmental protection, and education (Liu and Xu 2015). The exercise of Beijing’s soft power influence in its neighborhood has been an area of concern for Chinese experts. It is suggested that China can do four things to increase its soft power in its neighborhood. First, Beijing can fully u ­ tilize ­various infrastructure connectivity projects to win the hearts and minds of the peoples in neighboring countries. Second, China can proactively help set the agenda in the Asia Pacific region by proposing various major initiatives. Third, Chinese private companies and NGOs, together with government agencies and state-owned enterprises, should be encouraged to perform various corporate social responsibilities to significantly improve China’s image in the region. Fourth, as a long-term objective, Beijing may attempt to reconstruct the economic, political, and security cooperation mechanisms for the restructuring of the regional order in the Asia Pacific (Chen and Shen 2014). Bold suggestions regarding the South China Sea dispute have been made as well. Li Jieyu (2016) notes that the South China Sea dispute has been a barrier to China’s soft power because other parties see a mismatch between China’s words and actions, the different and even conflicting positions in China, inconsistencies in China’s actual South China Sea policies, and the expediency that the Chinese government gives to negotiations. He argues that Beijing can gain soft power in the South China Sea dispute if it is willing to abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in handling the dispute. Observing UNCLOS would help create a positive image for China: a China that is trustworthy, responsible, and willing to practice the rule of law.

56  Li Mingjiang Scholars have observed that Beijing’s aid programs to Africa have been the most important source of its soft power on the continent (Yu and Liu 2014). Another study contends that China’s relative success in building its soft power in Africa lies in its constant support for African countries throughout history. ­During the Cold War, Beijing lent strong support to many African countries in their attempts to gain national independence and oppose colonial imperialism. In the post-Cold War era, China gave substantially to promote the s­ ocioeconomic development of African countries (Yuan 2013). Chinese analysts believe that China’s medical diplomacy in Africa has been a major source of China’s soft power on the continent. China gained soft power influence through its aid programs to deal with the Ebola disease in Africa. This case provides two key lessons for China’s soft power. First, the growth of soft power is dependent on hard power. China’s Ebola aid programs could not have succeeded without financial resources, disease prevention and control capacities, advanced medical technologies, and long-distance delivery of equipment and materials. Second, China’s Ebola assistance programs were rapidly and efficiently carried out because of the existence of China’s medical aid programs in Africa for decades. This suggests that building soft power should be a long-term project (Guo Jia 2014). China’s soft power in Africa exists mainly in sociocultural exchanges, ­d iplomatic relations, and development assistance. It is noted that Beijing ­cannot compete with Western countries when it comes to the influence of political ­values in Africa. What Beijing can do is to theoretically summarize China’s practical experiences in its Opening Up reforms and make a bid to engage in the discourse competition on democracy in Africa. Beijing may consider basing its values discourse on the concept of “mistake-tolerant democracy”, which may help African countries understand the benefits and losses of practicing Western liberal ­democracy from a new perspective. If African countries are persuaded to examine the Chinese experience versus Western liberal democracy from the “mistake-tolerant democracy” perspective, it is likely that Beijing stands a chance to increase its political soft power in Africa (Zhou Zhifa 2014).

Proposals from regime supporters Regime supporters are significantly concerned about China’s ideological and political security. In their view, ideology plays a “core and predominant” role in cultural soft power. They understand that Beijing’s ideological outlook is still vulnerable to external influence and thus advocate that China should strive to build an “advanced socialist culture with Chinese characteristics” and ­“unswervingly adhere to the mainstream official ideology” (Zhang 2012: 42). Conservative pundits contend that Party leadership and Marxism as the guiding ideology are important principles for increasing China’s soft power (Wang Tingda 2016). Some pro-regime pundits suggest that Xi Jinping’s policy statements should serve as the key guidelines for China’s soft power endeavors. Many of them believe that Xi has already outlined a good policy framework, which includes a few major policy instructions. They argue that cultivating and practicing

China debates soft power  57 the socialist core values should be the most crucial issue for the growth of Chinese soft power (Zhang Li 2016; Zhou 2016). There are some differences in the policy proposals of this conservative group of analysts. While some analysts in this group tend to favor a rigid approach, ­others appear to be slightly more flexible, suggesting that the current g ­ overnance and policies should be reformed. It is suggested that China should allow other forms of ownership to flourish in the cultural sector while retaining most of the cultural sector in public ownership. It is further proposed that China should allow more flexibility in its external cultural exchanges without sacrificing key elements of the Chinese national culture. The cultural market could also play a greater role. An ideal situation would include dual roles for Party and government organizations and the market, with better coordination between the two (Li Yanyan 2016).

Conclusion The Chinese debate on soft power has been extensive, intensive, and revealing. Scholars from many disciplines have joined the debate to discuss the conceptualization, scope, sources, functions, strengths and weaknesses, as well as policy proposals for China’s soft power. Even though nearly all interlocutors accept the core assumptions of soft power, they do not seem to agree on the definition of soft power. Much of the Chinese literature on soft power tends to be policy ­relevant and very few works are theoretically driven. Understandably, ­participants in the debate attempt to interpret soft power from the perspective of their respective disciplines. What is interesting is the fact that the stances on soft power, to some extent, also reveal the scholars’ own political inclinations in relation to China’s political reality and its relations with the outside world. In general, Chinese studies on soft power may need to be empirically more solid. For instance, more in-depth studies of the actual causality between ­China’s soft power influence and foreign policy gains may be necessary. Yao Hong and Guo Fengzhi (2014) note that the study of cultural soft power in China has been rich in quantity, not in quality. More in-depth studies are needed to explore the actual relationship between culture and soft power, and distinguish different concepts such as culture, ideology, values, and mindset. They also suggest that more empirical studies are needed to test the real impact of culture on soft power. The same can be said about cases on the impact of Chinese foreign ­policy on Beijing’s accrual of soft power. In addition, there seems to be a dearth of studies on the barriers and constraints on Chinese soft power in the foreign policy arena. All schools of thought on Chinese soft power point to various domestic concerns. These domestic concerns are real and pose serious challenges to ­China’s soft power. The list of domestic challenges to China’s soft power could be long: the ongoing modernization program, the rapidly changing society, the Party–State’s insistence on the dominant role of the official ideology, the rigid management system of the cultural sector, and the old-fashioned communication and propaganda mechanisms, among others. Chinese analysts have

58  Li Mingjiang well illuminated these challenges, but good solutions for these problems are lacking. Even with good solutions, it remains to be seen whether the ruling elites are willing to take action. The regime supporters may be right in saying that the ruling elites’ main concern is the security of the political system. If it is true, Chinese soft power is largely for defensive purposes in the domestic context, not for the transformation of the existing international system. The only major source of Beijing’s actual soft power in international politics may be its skillful foreign policy that centers on assistance, cooperation, provision of public goods, and at times, less assertive behavior in territorial and maritime disputes.

Note 1 The fourth model that does not apply to the soft power debate is the “policy ­signaling” model. It suggests that scholars can serve for the government to test social and international responses to new policies and initiatives. See Chapter 1 of this volume.

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4 The debates among Chinese IR scholars on China’s national interest strategy 2010–2015 Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu “National interest” is the core concept of international politics. It is also the starting point and foothold of foreign policy. The primary interest of a ­country is its core interest. As the bottom line of national interests, protecting the core ­interest can easily jeopardize negotiation, concession, and compromise. In the first round of the US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in 2009, State Councillor Dai Bingguo pointed out that China has three core interests: to safeguard China’s basic political system and national security; to maintain ­national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and to achieve sustainable ­economic and social development. Since 2010, despite the fact that the overall strength of China has greatly improved, the external security environment of national development has not ameliorated accordingly. The notable increase of external ­security pressure has posed a challenge to the maintenance of China’s core ­interests. The pressure to maintain core interests comes mainly from three directions. First, the “Asia-Pacific Rebalance” strategy pursued by the United States since 2010 has facilitated the shift of strategic focus in the Asia Pacific region and encouraged the wild ambition of changing the status quo on territorial waters and island sovereignty among Japan, the Philippines, and several other countries (Chen and Guan 2014: 4). The deterioration of China’s neighboring environment and the fact that the United States has repeatedly put pressure on China over maritime disputes have led to a significant increase in a sense of urgency to safeguard Chinese national security and territorial sovereignty. Second, when China was facing economic growth slowdown and industrial structural transformation, the United States actively promoted an exclusive Trans-Pacific Partnership institution, “aimed at building an economic cooperation club excluding China and even to create an obstacle for China’s ‘second entry of WTO’, so as to achieve its strategic goal of containing China’s rise” (Li and Li 2014: 47–48). In addition, the United States and its allies have ­repeatedly launched antidumping lawsuits against Chinese commodities. Li and Li state: “As of July 13, 2015, the US has filed 99 anti-dumping ­lawsuits and 31 countervailing lawsuits against China in trade, which accounted for 37.2% and 51.7% of its total number respectively” (Li and Li 2015: 45).

64  Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu Third, China’s expanding interests overseas constantly face regional ­warfare, piracy, and terrorism. These three challenges have increased the pressure to ­maintain national interests since 2010. Facing the increasing pressure on n ­ ational interests, Chinese international relations scholars have been debating on how best to safeguard national interests of security and development under these new circumstances. Scholars have mainly focused on five topics in their discussions: the ­strategic goal of national interests, the key to safeguarding national interests, the m ­ ethods to safeguard national security interests, the practice of safeguarding national ­interests, and the scope of national interests. The focus of the first topic is whether promoting international political power or protecting economic d ­ evelopment should be the primary objective of foreign policy. The second topic emphasizes how to handle Sino–US relations, while for the third topic allies and partnerships are the key issues. Regarding the practice of safeguarding national interests, the emphasis is the key direction of China’s peripheral diplomacy. Finally, the scholars have discussed the different approaches that can be taken to protect China’s overseas interests. Hereafter, the authors will analyze the content of the discussion of the five topics and try to evaluate possible diplomatic changes so that China can successfully maintain its national core interests.

The strategic goal of China’s national interests During the 1980s and early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping established China’s ­national interest strategy as “the modernization of China”. In order to achieve the goal of “modernization”, China needs to “do a good job of China’s modernization drive, all serve the center of economic construction, so that China will d ­ evelop, prosper and thrive” (Ye 2004: 9–10). To achieve this goal, Deng ­X iaoping ­emphasized in his speech several times the long-standing guiding i­deology of China’s d ­ iplomacy, i.e. “hiding brightness and cherishing obscurity”. His ­legacy on foreign policy, i.e. the “28 Character Foreign Policy Guideline”, consists of instructions in seven four-character phrases: observing coolly, holding our ground, ­responding calmly and not being impatient, hiding brightness and ­cherishing obscurity, keeping a low profile, absolutely not taking the lead, and taking some actions (Qian 1996: 6–7). This strategic guiding principle has stood the test of time for the past three decades. The most powerful proof is that ­China’s GDP in 2010 surpassed that of Japan to rank second in the world. However, at the China Periphery Diplomacy Work Conference held by the CPC Central Committee in autumn 2013, President Xi Jinping did not talk about “hiding brightness and cherishing obscurity”. Instead, he put forward “aiming higher and working harder”. This change has led to a debate on the current diplomatic strategy in accordance with the national interests among ­Chinese international relations scholars. Yan Xuetong, a professor from Tsinghua University, believes that the two phrases are semantic antonyms (Yan 2013: 15). He argues that the rising pressure and the new strategic guiding principle have indicated that China’s diplomatic strategy is undergoing a “fundamental

Debates on China’s national interest strategy  65 change in principles” (Yan 2013: 15). However, the “hide brightness and cherish obscurity” strategy, as China’s long-standing foreign policy guiding principle, is still advocated by a large number of diplomats, officials, and political researchers. Qu Xing, the former President of China Institute of International Studies, points out that the two phrases are not contradictory (Xu and Du 2014: 5). China still needs to hide ideological brightness and cherish economic obscurity (Qu 2013: 27). The debate among scholars has centered on “hiding brightness and cherishing obscurity” and whether “aiming higher and working harder” is a divergence from the strategic goals of national interests. The rationality and legitimacy of this goal depend on whether it is conducive to national interests. In terms of timeliness, a country’s foreign strategic goal does not usually contribute to the current needs of the country’s interests immediately, as its implementation ­requires a longer time. When determining an external strategic goal that is in line with national interests, it is necessary to take into account the stable trend of domestic and international conditions that either promote or hinder the ­development of national interests over a period of time, in order to achieve the best possible outcome. Chinese scholars have presented two views on the strategic goal of national interests. The first view clearly states that the foreign strategic goal in line with the national interests should be a power struggle in international political arena, in order to become a leading country both globally or regionally. The second view still focuses on the economic construction dimension; thus, the key interest should still be a good momentum in economic development and steady economic growth.

The strategic goal of national interests from the perspective of power politics The power politics perspective argues that the maintenance and promotion of national interests require more power in international politics. According to this perspective, the power of a country in international politics depends on the country’s position in the international power structure, that is, the relative strength of the country. Economic and military strength, as “hard power”, is the major indicator of national strength. In the face of China’s great achievements in economic development and ­national defense construction since 2010, scholars holding the power politics perspective argue that China’s current national interest is to obtain international political power corresponding to its economic and military strength in international ­politics. Since 2010, China’s economic and national defense strength has greatly improved. The gross domestic product (GDP) reached RMB¥39798.3 billion (US$5.9 trillion) in 2010, replacing Japan as the world’s second ­largest economy. According to the latest data released by the National Bureau of ­Statistics, China’s GDP in 2014 was RMB¥63636.3 billion (US$10.385 ­t rillion), accounting for two-thirds of the US total GDP (US$16.197 trillion), and twice the total GDP of Japan (US$5.997 trillion). According to China’s

66  Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu Outward Foreign Direct Investment Statistics Bulletin 2013 issued jointly by the Ministry of Commerce, the National Bureau of Statistics and the State Administration of Foreign E ­ xchange, investment flow hit a record high of US$107.84 billion, a 22.8 percent annual growth. China has ranked as the world’s third major foreign investor for two ­consecutive years. With the rapid growth of economic strength, China’s military spending reached an expected US$188 billion in 2013, twice the size of Russian defense spending and one-third of America’s expenditure, ranking second globally. ­A lthough China ranked second on economic aggregate and military spending, scholars have different views on how foreign strategic goals line up with national interests. Yan Xuetong (2014a) has stated that fighting for a leading global role should be China’s strategic goal since China trails the United States on national strength, while Shi Yinhong (2015) believes that in this multipolar world China should seek to become a leading country regionally. Yan Xuetong (2014a) contends that the strategic objective of China’s national interests is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. In his view, as a replacement of the “hiding brightness and cherishing obscurity” diplomatic strategy, the “aiming higher and working harder” strategy serves directly as “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. When talking about the essence of rejuvenation Yan states: Literally, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation means to regain the glory of the Reign of Zhenguan (627–649 AD) in the Tang Dynasty ­(618–907 AD), when China was the most developed country globally. Now, this term specifically refers to catching up with the US on comprehensive national strength and national defense influence. To achieve this national interest, China needs to surpass the United States ­socially, economically, as well as in security terms. In this sense, “the ­competition between China and the US for world’s leadership is inevitable” (Yan 2014b: 13–14). The “polarizing” tendency of the international system is an important basis for Yan Xuetong to regard leadership competition as the national interests’ strategic goal. Yan believes that there is no “collective rise among developing countries”. Instead, “Apart from China, the other so-called BRICS countries experienced a slowdown in development … And now only ‘C’ is left in the so-called BRIC” (Yan 2015: 25–27). In fact, the denial of “collective rise among developing countries” is a denial of the idea of a “multi-polarization world”, which remains the mainstream judgment in Chinese academic circles. After proposing the polarization idea, Yan further pointed out that the “Asia-Pacific Rebalance” strategy implemented by the United States in 2010 was aimed at containing China. No matter whether China keeps a low key (hiding brightness and cherishing o ­ bscurity) or a high profile (aiming higher and working harder), the United States will regard China as its major strategic competitor anyway (Yan 2014b: 1–35). The relationship between China and the United States in a polarized world can only be a competitive relationship; thus, a competition for world leadership can hardly be avoided. Therefore, China should strive to rise up.

Debates on China’s national interest strategy  67 While Yan Xuetong sets global leadership as the strategic goal in China’s n ­ ational interests, Shi Yinhong, a professor from Renmin University of China, advocates regional leadership in Asia and the Western Pacific area. Shi believes that, President Xi Jinping has a great ambition for China’s growing influence or even a leading role in Asia and the Western Pacific. In the long run, this influence will undoubtedly weaken and even offset American dominant advantage in the region. Seemingly, Shi Yinhong also underlines the leading role of United States being replaced by other countries. But Shi still believes in a multipolarized world, which is different from Yan’s view. Therefore, according to Shi, the Asia and Western Pacific region should be the boundary of the strategic goal in China’s national interests. China should seek to become a regional leading country, instead of a global one. He especially points out the “long period of time” to achieve this goal, stressing that “China should not advance too fast, ‘more haste less speed’. It must be phased, distinguished into different stages of depth. We must have a clear understanding of the limits of our knowledge, influence and strategy” (Shi 2015: 23). Shi Yinhong has stated that since the 18th Chinese Communist Party’s ­National Congress, China’s hardline stance on the East and South China Sea disputes and the intensifying paramilitary activities have to some extent ­f urther increased the complexity of the relations with neighboring Southeast Asian countries as well as the risk of conflict with Japan and the United States significantly. Shi states that in order to further alleviate some of the toughness of the peripheral foreign policies from the aspects of strength and frequency, properly reduce the doubts and fear of certain neighboring countries so as to convince them to cut down the objective convenience offered to the US, China strives to break through the ‘united front’ created by the US aiming at guarding against and containing China. (Shi 2015: 23) To effectively deal with this security pressure, Shi suggests that China in the next period of time should shift from emphasizing “strategic military” to “strategic economy”. Given China’s huge economic and financial strength, this strategy would benefit its neighbors, and reduce the risk of conflict with Japan based on China–Japan’s “4-Point Consensus”, and between China and the United States based on the military aircraft and warship collision preventive agreement. In general, Shi Yinhong argues that in order to become a regional leader, China still needs to control the risk factor with the United States and Japan. China should gain the trust of neighboring countries by benefiting them, so that it can gradually obtain the leading status, thereby offsetting America’s dominant advantage in Asia and the Western Pacific (Shi 2015). The contrast between the strategic goal of foreign policy in national interests and the power politics perspective is based on different judgments of China’s

68  Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu strength. Yan Xuetong’s judgment of polarization is based on his idea of almost equal strength between China and the United States, while Shi Yinhong’s judgment of “long-term” national interests reflects his view that China is still lagging behind the United States in this multipolarized world. It should be noted that Chinese scholars and government officials still believe in a multipolarized world structure. At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, held on November 28–29, 2014, President Xi Jinping pointed out that it is important to fully estimate the complexity of the evolution of international pattern, and to realize that the multipolarization trend will not swerve. He stressed once more the importance of doing a good job in peripheral diplomacy. All these factors indicate that China’s strategic goal in the near future is still to promote regional leadership, rather than to compete with the United States for world leadership.

Economic development remains the priority of national interests Those who hold the view that economic development is the core national ­interest stress that it is necessary to keep the dynamic momentum of China’s economic development and enhance its absolute national strength in order to maintain ­national interests. To ensure sustainable economic development, China still needs to adhere to the “hiding brightness and cherishing obscurity” ­strategy, and avoid fighting for international leadership. As to the reasons for ­keeping “economic development” as China’s core interest for now and the future, ­scholars offer three explanations. Former President of China Institute of International Studies Qu Xing (2001), based on the judgment that “the West is strong while China is weak”, believes that China still needs to uphold the “hiding brightness and cherishing ­obscurity” strategy, hide ideological brightness, and cherish economic obscurity. Wang Jisi (2011) and Liu Feng (2014) reiterated that “the West is strong while China is weak” viewpoint should further promote China’s endeavor on economic development. They propose the idea that the existing international system is still conducive to China’s development, which is why China should adhere to economic development as a core interest. Wu Jianmin (2014) equates fighting for world leadership with usurping hegemony from the United States, which goes against China’s national policy of “not seeking hegemony”. When talking about the connotation and maintenance of national interests, Qu Xing describes China’s national interests as: [T]o resolutely safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and national ­ ignity; strive to promote the great cause of reunification of the motherd land; carry out fruitful work and necessary struggle to safeguard national sovereignty, security and fundamental interests. To effectively safeguard economic security and jointly safeguard the rights and interests of developing countries. To seek common interests with all countries, to expand mutually beneficial cooperation and jointly cope with the challenges of humanity survival and development. (Qu, Chen and Su 2013: 9)

Debates on China’s national interest strategy  69 In order to safeguard these interests, they emphasize the need to continue to improve and develop the relations with developed countries. ­Focus on the fundamental interests of all peoples instead of the differences of social systems and ideology. To expand common interests on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and properly resolve disagreements. (Qu, Chen and Su 2013) There are two main premises for the above judgment. First, “the imbalance in the world power has not been corrected, the West is still stronger than us”, and “to achieve modernization we still need to strive for a long time. The fundamental task in the long run is to concentrate on the road to ­modernization” (Qu 2001: 16). Second, “despite many new circumstances in the Sino-US ­relationship, China is not threatened by foreign invaders. Peace and development are still the most important elements on the agenda for this era. China still embraces an opportunity for development”. It means China still needs to uphold the “hiding brightness and cherishing obscurity” strategy. China should hide its ideological brightness, not determining international strategy and foreign relations based on ideology. No matter how other countries may change, China should make its own foreign policy based on the five principles of peaceful ­coexistence and on whether the people of other countries accept these principles. China should also cherish economic obscurity. Wang Jisi, former Dean of the School of International Relations at Peking University, emphasizes that the strategic goal of China’s national interests is to build a socialist modern country and become a developed country. In one ­a rticle, he stated that China’s strategic goal is “to become a prosperous, democratic, civilized and harmonious socialist modern country. From an economic point of view, to achieve such a goal will make China a developed country” (Wang 2014: 15). It is clear that Wang Jisi still emphasizes the central p ­ osition of economic development in national interests. He stresses that China should attach importance to the absoluteness rather than relativity of national strength growth. Therefore, according to Wang, “the realistic national strategic goal should not be to overtake the United States, but to go beyond ourselves” (Wang 2011: 9). There are four bases for his judgment. First, although China is the strongest of the developing countries, in many ways it still lags far behind developed countries. Second, although China’s influence is rapidly spreading across the globe, it is still not a leading country in Asia. Third, China’s unique political system and ideology do not yet have the ability to influence other value systems. Finally, although China is constrained by the West, China is indeed the beneficiary of the current international order (Wang 2015). In general, the core of Wang Jisi’s view on national interest strategy is to adhere to the friendly tone of China’s diplomacy and to avoid the idea that “a strong country must seek hegemony”. China should promote international order reform in the process of upgrading its own strength within the existing international order. Similar to Wang Jisi’s view, Liu Feng, an Associate Professor at Nankai University, thinks that China’s national interest strategy should not be a full-scale

70  Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu competition with the United States globally, but to maintain the good momentum of its own development, consolidating the foundation as a regional and world power (Liu 2013). He argues that in a world characterized by unipolarity, the United States has absolute dominance over scarce resources such as power, wealth, and prestige, and will continue to dominate the international system, norms, and rules (Liu 2014). In this case, China needs to improve the relations with neighboring countries and create a stable peripheral environment, rather than competing for world dominance. Wu Jianmin, former Chinese ambassador to France, deems that the ­Chinese Dream embodies China’s current national interests. “It is not a call for world leadership, or to compete with the US for hegemony”. Instead, it is about ­achieving national prosperity through peaceful and win-win measures. First of all, Wu Jianmin refutes the idea that the Chinese Dream is that China is meant to replace the United States as a world leader, and to build the world’s most powerful military force. He equates the idea of “taking the lead” and ­“building the world’s most powerful military power” with the idea of “competing for world hegemony”, which is the Cold War mindset, not only going against the national policy of “do not seek hegemony” articulated during Mao Zedong’s era but also going against Peace and Development, the themes of the time. Second, he believes that China is still in a period of strategic development opportunities. Although in recent years the rise of China has triggered the doubts of the United States and neighboring countries, the neighboring environment is still better than 1978 when the Soviet army massed at the border and 1989 when the West imposed a full sanitation on China. Therefore, Wu Jianmin believes that we should still adhere to Deng Xiaoping’s diplomatic strategy and uphold economic development as the central task (Wu 2014: 55). Keeping economic development as the primary goal of national interests is not only the mainstream idea of China’s international relations academic ­circle but also in line with Chinese government policy. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang pointed out at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in 2014 that China will continue to “uphold economic development as the c­ entral task, run its own things well, unceasingly strengthen China’s economic ­competitiveness, cultural influence and comprehensive strength in the next p ­ eriod of time, ­provide strong support to achieve the strategic objective of ­external work”. This conference drew a conclusion regarding the strategic goal of national i­nterests, namely, economic construction is still the core goal of China’s national interests for the present time.

The key to safeguarding national interests The Sino–US relationship has an important impact on the realization of China’s national interests. It is the key to safeguarding national interests. Since the 2010 US implementation of the “Asia-Pacific Rebalance” strategy, the US strategic center has gradually shifted to the Asia Pacific region. Meanwhile, there has been an outburst of disputes with neighboring countries, especially the conflict with

Debates on China’s national interest strategy  71 Japan over the Diaoyu Islands and with the southern neighbors over the South China Sea. In June 2013, at the Annenberg Meeting, heads of state of China and the United States put forward the idea of “building a new type of great power relationship without conflict and confrontation, upholding mutual respect and win-win cooperation”, which pointed out the direction for the future development of bilateral relations. However, the United States is not actively building the “new type of great power relationship”. The United States agreed that China and the United States should avoid conflict and confrontation, but did not agree on the idea of ­“mutual respect”, mainly because “the US cannot be sure what China’s core ­interests are as they increase from time to time” (Yan 2014b). China’s international relations scholars believe that the current increase in the complexity of China’s peripheral diplomatic work and regional conflicts is due to “the U.S.’s strategic input in Asia and Pacific region and a partial stance on certain disputes of the U.S.” (Chen and Guan 2014: 5). The discrepancies concerning issues sensitive to China have gradually increased between the two countries. In fact, how to achieve national interests through discrepancy control on sensitive issues has become another topic of interest among China’s international relations scholars. Most scholars believe that while China’s rise will inevitably trigger doubts from the United States, this will not eventually upgrade to a comprehensive military confrontation between the two countries. This is exactly the new type of great power relationship. There are four main reasons for this judgment. First, China has a lower nuclear deterrent capability than the United States. Second, the two countries’ economies are interdependent. The United States would have to pay a huge price if it was to cut off the bilateral economic connection. In ­addition, both countries are faced with global security challenges such as climate change, energy, terrorism, and infectious diseases. The absence of either side will make these issues harder to resolve. Finally, there is a tight relationship socially and culturally, with more than 300 million personnel exchanges and active local and nongovernmental exchanges (Da 2013: 62–64). These objective conditions may help China and the United States avoid a Thucydides trap. However, they cannot further alleviate or resolve the structural contradictions between China as the rising power and the United States as the existing hegemon. Chinese international relations scholars have different views on how to ­control the growing Sino–US structural contradictions. There are two main points of view: the first emphasizes the importance of urging the United States to ­respect China’s core interests through “cooperation”, while the second thinks that ­“competition” is the method to completely overcome the structural contradictions. Zhou Fangyin, Director of China’s Peripheral and Global ­Strategy ­Research Centre of the National Institute of International Strategy of the ­Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Da Wei, researcher from the China ­I nstitute of Contemporary International Relations, believe that the core element of the new type of Sino–US relationship is cooperation. The two countries should establish mutual trust to resolve growing conflicts, and one country should take action on major bilateral concerns to assure the other side.

72  Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu In contrast, Yan Xuetong believes in a competitive relationship. He believes that cooperation is only ­necessary to avoid a full confrontation. In order to fundamentally resolve the increasing structural contradictions, China must catch up with the United States.

Sino–US mutual trust is conducive to China’s national interests Zhou Fangyin (2014a) argues that the solution to the growing structural contradictions between China and the United States is to “increase the stability and predictability of bilateral actions.” Similarly, Da Wei raises the idea of ­“confidence building”, i.e. one country should take action on major bilateral concerns to ­assure the other side. He believes that mutual effort is vital to “ ­ Sino-US strategic confidence building” (Da 2013: 68). For Da, The US should assure China that it does not seek to undermine the stability of the Chinese basic system under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, to deter China’s economic development. In return, China should assure the US that it does not seek to replace the US as the world leader, to build a new East-Asia order without the US. (Da 2013: 69) Da Wei believes that the structural contradictions can be mitigated by ­accepting the dominance of the United States in world affairs and the presence of the United States in the Asia Pacific region. First, China has to admit that “as the only superpower, the US presence will remain in China’s periphery for a long time” (Zhou 2014a). In other words, the fact that “the US is strong while China is weak” in the realms of economy and security will hold true for a long time. Therefore, room for strategic mediation exists between China and the United States. Second, it is not in line with the US national interest to suppress and contain China. The United States can draw strength from China’s development. Therefore, “a certain degree of cooperation with China is an inevitable option for the US” (Zhou 2013: 12–13). Since the conditions to break the East Asia dualistic structure exist, China and the United States should seek strategic cooperation. This cooperation should be based on “giving me ‘what I need’ and you get ‘what you need’ in return”. The two countries should understand each other’s preferences and strategy. ­According to Zhang Xinping and Yang Rongguo, “China and the US should follow the principle of all-round communication, correct mutual understa­nding, mutual respect for their core interests, and the establishment of deep mutual trust, stability and harmonious coexistence” (Zhang and Yang 2014: 64). ­Specifically, when dealing with sovereignty-related disputes like the South China Sea issue and the Diaoyu Islands issue, China should seek improvement in stability. At the same time, the United States should take China’s interests into consideration on these issues and the related arms sales to Taiwan.

Debates on China’s national interest strategy  73 To surpass the United States comprehensively is the key to safeguard China’s national interests In Yan Xuetong’s view, the core of the new Sino–US relationship is “benign competition” instead of cooperation: “Seeking cooperation as means only to prevent Sino-US competition from turning into confrontation” (Yan 2014c: 19). In order to tackle the threat from increasingly prominent Sino–US structural contradictions regarding China’s national interests, China needs to surpass the United States in overall and political strength. There are two reasons. First of all, Yan believes that with the decline in the overall strength of the United States and the relative strength difference between China and the United States continuing to shrink, “Sino-US structural contradictions will continue to deepen, the conflict of interests will increase faster than the common interests” (Yan and Qi 2013: 20). Second, he believes that the Sino–US conflict is mainly due to the United States reluctance to see China become as strong as they are. China and the United States cannot build trust. Only China’s victory in this competition can resolve the increasingly prominent structural contradictions. To win the competition, Yan believes that China should surpass the United States in overall strength, including political strength. First, overall strength is mainly determined by economic scale and military strength. “From the perspective of economic scale, China’s GDP is likely to catch up with the US in 10 years, but China’s military strength will take more than 15 years to catch up with the US” (Yan and Qi 2013: 22). This means that in overall strength, it is a trend or even a certainty that China will eventually surpass the United States. On this basis, an upgrade of political strength will become increasingly important, given that political strength is the core of China’s access to world dominance. The improvement of political power will accelerate China’s overtaking of the United States. In particular, Yan points out that the best way to improve political power is to obtain as much international support as possible, and the best way to obtain international support is “alliance”. Therefore, China should abandon the policy of nonalignment, to provide security for other countries in order to get many high-quality allies. Up to this point, the Chinese government has endorsed the dominance of the United States in the international order. The Chinese government has been trying to convince the United States that China has no intention of challenging the existing international order and is willing to continue to participate in and maintain this order. However, the Chinese government is also strongly aware of the pressure on China’s development, so it has to amend an international order that seriously hinders China’s further development. China is a reformer of the current international order, not a subverter.

Means to protect national interests The discussion on the means of protection of national interests is focused on whether to abandon the policy of non-alliance. China’s non-alliance policy was

74  Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu put forward in the 1980s, in order to avoid becoming a vassal of any superpower in the then US–Soviet hegemony, and to protect China’s right to independence. This was in line with the national interests at that time. Deng Xiaoping stated bluntly, “China’s foreign policy is independent, it is a truly non-allied policy. China does not play the United States card, nor does it play the Soviet Union card. Moreover, China does not allow others to play the Chinese card” (Deng 1993: 57). For over three decades the policy has been closely followed by ­authorities with firm support from most scholars. However, with the increasing security pressure on China’s rise in recent years, different opinions have been emerging in academic and political circles over whether the non-allied policy is consistent with the latest national interests. Yan Xuetong advocates easing the increasing security pressure through alliance.

The current national interests still need the non-alliance policy Scholars supporting non-alliance views propose three reasons for China to ­continue with the principle of “non-alliance”. First, an alliance will ­f urther worsen the overall external environment of China’s development (Wang ­Cungang 2012: 131). Second, there is a decline in the effectiveness of alliances nowadays for emerging countries, as they do not really help ease the pressure and instead lead to more enemies in the international community; therefore, they are not ideal for maintaining national independence (Ling 2013: 29–30). Third, alliances may cause China to get – albeit reluctantly and passively – “involved” in entrapment situations (Xu 2010). For these reasons, most scholars believe that it is in China’s national interest to continue with the principle of non-alliance. As one of the supporters of the principle of non-alliance, Wang Cungang (2012) of Tianjin Normal University argues that the new changes in the global and regional economic and political patterns, caused by the rapid rise of the emerging countries and the recession of the developed countries, have presented China with a strategic opportunity for peaceful development despite recent ­major external challenges. Therefore, China should continue with the “keeping a low-profile ideology for economic development”, with a focus on seizing the opportunity and extending it as much as possible. In addition, he believes that alliance cannot deal with the threat posed by the United States’ return to the Asia Pacific. On the contrary, it may raise fear and even hostility from the United States in international communities, which will deteriorate rather than optimize China’s overall external environment. Therefore, China should not abandon the principle of non-alliance. Another supporter of the principle of non-alliance, Ling Shengli (2013), believes that the policy of non-alliance is in line with the principle of maintaining national independence. He reaches this conclusion based on his observation that the importance of alliances for developing countries is declining and that ­a lliances may even increase their development difficulties. He believes that ­politics and economics are playing increasingly more important roles than the military in the post-Cold War era for rising powers, which leads to a decline in

Debates on China’s national interest strategy  75 the effectiveness of military alliances. The decline is indicated by three aspects. First, there are conflicts among allies. Since there are differences in interests, the management and maintenance of alliances are not easy. Second, the post-Cold War security threat makes a simple military alliance no longer sufficient. This lack is clearly indicated when the military alliance handles some nontraditional threats such as terrorism and piracy slowly and inefficiently. Finally, the Cold War alliance no longer meets the needs of the times in terms of security and order. The deepening interdependence between countries makes the external security environment increasingly complex, with obvious ­hostility no longer obvious. For these three reasons, Ling Shengli thinks that China should continue with its defensive policy for national defense, sticking to a non-alliance policy in the multipolar world for an enemy-free environment, in order to maintain national independence, which is in line with national interests. China’s Arms Control and Disarmament Association Director Xu Guangyu (2010) agrees by arguing that China is facing many internal and external problems. At this stage, China is far from needing any alliance to guarantee its ­survival or development. Besides, alliances bring more disadvantages. First, ­a lliances come with costs and their disadvantages should never be underestimated. ­Especially in peacetime, alliances between the weak and the strong always sabotage the independence of the weak. Second, he believes that the strategy of non-alliance brings more strategic options and helps to maintain a relatively independent status in a complex and ever-changing international environment, so China can implement all-round diplomacy in more proactive, flexible, and strategic ways with more diplomatic space, thus avoiding passive and reluctant involvement in any dilemma as a result of disagreements in alliances. Finally, he notes that in the current international strategic scene, if China voluntarily gives up non-alliance, it will more than likely be “dominated”, increasing the burden or costs. Therefore, Xu Guangyu (2010) suggests that China should continue to implement cooperation but keep its non-alliance diplomatic strategy.

“Alliance” is helpful for the national goal of “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” Professor Yan Xuetong (2014b), who supports giving up the policy of non-­ alliance, thinks that “alliance” is helpful for the “great rejuvenation of the ­Chinese nation”. He believes that in a bipolar pattern, the competition between China and the United States is a zero-sum game. In the obvious case of China as the world’s second largest economy, for it to become the world’s leading country it is important that it acquires a certain number of strategic allies; this is even more important than economic benefits. He comes to this conclusion based on two main reasons. First, the conflict between China and the United States is that of a rising power versus the hegemon. As long as the gap between China and the United States continues to shrink, conflicts will intensify, no matter whether China continues or abandons its non-alliance policy. Second, he believes that insisting on the principle of non-alliance will make the neighboring countries

76  Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu feel that non-alliance is a way for China to reserve its right to use military force to bully them, which will make them feel more threatened. He also points out that Sino–Russian relations seem a de facto alliance. China and Russia have held a number of large-scale, high-level joint military exercises that only happen ­between military allies. In addition, he also believes that a China and South Korea alliance is the trend of the times, because the alliance with China is conducive for South Korea to prevent Japan’s return to militarism, and also beneficial in terms of China’s ­influence on North Korea. Yan believes that South Korea can form an actual ­a lliance with China and still keep its alliance with the United States, just as Pakistan has been doing. He believes that China’s neighboring countries like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Laos and Cambodia are faced with strategic pressure from the United States, so it is necessary for them to use China to enhance their own security; therefore, they have the potential to become China’s allies. Agreeing with Yan Xuetong and the strategy of alliance, Xu Jin (Xu and Du 2014), an associate researcher at the Institute of Politics and Economy of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that substantive alliances will r­ eplace the policy of non-alliance. He emphasizes that long-term non-alliance is a violation of historical laws, and in the end will place pressure on their own security. He believes that although China’s public abandonment of non-alliance policy is difficult, by using expressions like “a community of shared destiny” China can promote relations with some of its neighbors in the direction of alliance. On March 8, 2015, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi suggested that China is on a new foreign-relation road of “partnership instead of alliance”. This statement affirms that China will continue with the policy of non-alliance in the future. However, in order to steer the international order in the direction of China’s development and ultimately gain the support of other countries, the Chinese government put forward “Partnership Diplomacy”, which is different from the concept of collective security, does not rest on a formal covenant, and has no mandatory binding or clear time frame. Its core feature is: guidance by economic and trade cooperation, with political mutual trust and strategic cooperation, focusing on strengthening economic and trade ties in the international realm plus cooperation on regional issues.…­ Although there is no military security cooperation, when political mutual trust reaches a certain level, economic and trade cooperation become very close, and bilateral relations are mostly mature and stable. (Dai 2015: 30) “Accompany Diplomacy” is the reality in practice of Xi Jinping’s new IR concept of “mutual respect, cooperation and win-win”. Xu Jin (2015), in the concluding part of his article, “Why Does China Dislike Alliance?” states that “accompany” is somewhere between alliance and non-alliance, more like alliance if needed and vice versa, which is in line with China’s current national interests (Xu 2015: 154).

Debates on China’s national interest strategy  77 “Accompany” as an alternative to alliance provides the advantage of ­“flexibility…. with lot of alliance-style things done without actual alliance, this approach not only gives flexibility, but also avoids domestic and international pressure”. This is exactly the foundation of the “non-alliance” foreign policy.

How to maintain national interests Since 2010, China has faced increasing difficulties in the international scene and the Chinese diplomatic environment has become increasingly complicated. ­China’s diplomacy faces three major challenges: outbreaks of land and sea territorial disputes, intensified strategic competition with major surrounding countries, and bottlenecks in East Asian regional economic integration. These three are intertwined and difficult to resolve. A large number of neighboring countries at different levels of political and economic development, social and cultural differences in East Asia, various power struggles in South Asia and Central Asia, plus intensified US strategic operations in East Asia have all directly intensified pressure on China when dealing with related issues. In this case, in order to safeguard national interests, scholars have argued and proposed four views on China’s peripheral diplomacy: “westward”, “maritime breakthrough”, “large neighborhood 大周边”, and “problem-oriented”.

A westward strategy conducive to national interests Wang Jisi (2014) put forward the idea that the “westward” strategy can avoid conflicts with the United States and better achieve national interests: “Most of the security threats in East Asia come from the contradictions between sovereign states and the strategic competition between powers, especially between the United States and China” (Wang 2014: 15). The competition between China and the United States in East Asia has been characterized as a “zero-sum” game. Wang proposes the “westward” view, i.e. if China actively adjusts “westward”, China and the United States have greater potential for cooperation in investment, energy, anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, and maintaining regional ­stability with little danger of military confrontation with each other. Second, in order to avoid the risk of Western countries’ influence and Russian influence in Central Asia, he suggests the joint venture model, which would emphasize mutual benefits and a win-win outcome for all parties involved (Zhan 2013: 19).

Maintaining national interests requires maritime breakthroughs In contrast to the “westward” view of avoiding a potential China–US confrontation, Zhang Wenmu (2015) argues that the threat to China’s national interests comes mainly from the Western Pacific with China–US maritime conflicts as the major source of confrontation. China should seek a “maritime breakthrough”, which should start with the East China Sea. He believes that the main strategic fulcrum of the United States’ maritime threat to China is Japan, who poses a

78  Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu direct threat to China’s national defense “life door”, the Yellow Sea. At the same time, he points out that the strategic core interests of the United States in the Pacific Ocean are from Hawaii to Guam, the Philippines, and the ­Malacca Strait. If China moves its focus of marine strategy to the South China Sea, the United States will inevitably become another strong opponent in the south b ­ esides ­Japan in the East China Sea. Therefore, the South China Sea is not the weakness for China’s breakthrough in the Western Pacific, or even a critical point. China should consider Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea as the starting point. First, Taiwan, ­regarded as only a strategic interest of the United States, is not the core interest of the United States, so the United States will not go to an extreme confrontation with China over Taiwan. Second, the East China Sea is close to China, so in view of logistical support, it gives China advantages and larger odds to win. Disagreeing with Zhang Wenmu, Major General Luo Yuan, Vice President and Executive Secretary General of the China Association for Strategic Culture, thinks that the “maritime breakthrough” should be in the South China Sea. He believes that the United States is biased in the South China Sea dispute so it can increase the strategic cost of China’s rise, keep China in a long-term, unstable environment as a result of opposition and mistrust between China and its neighbors. Thus, the United States can benefit from this bias. In order to break this cycle, China should strengthen its administration and national defense in the South China Sea (Luo 2013: 48).

The “pan-peripheral” concept and national interests Associate Professor Qi Huaigao of Fudan University put forward a ­comprehensive “pan-peripheral” concept to serve the maintenance and development of national interests. Corresponding to the pan-peripheral concept is the “pan-­peripheral diplomatic strategy”. Its goals are mainly to establish “new types of ­relations” with the United States, Japan, Russia, and India; to coordinate China’s ­d iplomacy in “the six sections” of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, ­Central Asia, West Asia, and South Pacific; and to integrate the four diplomatic ideas of ­“maritime breakthrough”, “positive westward”, “domestic foothold”, and ­“external expansion” (Qi and Shi 2013).

Setting the key diplomatic direction is not conducive to realizing national interests With a new perspective, Professor Chen Qi of Tsinghua University believes that “instead of setting the key diplomatic direction in advance, the choice of a key diplomatic direction would better be based on the pressure of agenda”. Chen offers three reasons. First, China’s pan-peripheral diplomacy is interrelated, so any isolated diplomatic efforts without coordination will only lead to failure in other aspects. Second, any selection of a key diplomatic direction will cause the power in that very direction to become salient. Finally, one major problem may occur

Debates on China’s national interest strategy  79 in different surrounding areas, so all the surrounding areas need to be taken into account (Chen and Guan 2014). The “One Belt One Road (OBOR)” strategy, formed in 2013 and considered a “concrete practice of the new relations with major powers for cooperation and win-win”, is now the focus of China’s current diplomatic work. Although it is designed to mainly connect with Eurasia, the Chinese government has always stressed that “OBOR” is: not against any third parties, not a zero-sum game, not for interest exploitation or colonial expansion, and it is open to any country, economy, international organization, regional organization and NGO. This shows that the Chinese government’s choice in this direction is a combination of westward and pan-peripheral. Meanwhile, its openness reflects the flexibility of China’s choice of diplomatic work, which is conducive to dealing with the problems of surrounding emergencies according to the agenda. (Li Jingrui 2016) The “OBOR” strategy is open, comprehensive, and flexible, but this strategy does not point out which areas are the key directions of diplomatic resource investment, consequently inspiring a discussion by Chinese international relations scholars on the choice of “fulcrum” when implementing “OBOR”. Zhou Fangyin thinks that “strategic fulcrum countries in a power’s global regional strategy can significantly increase or support its influence in the international system” (Zhou 2014b). Li Wei says that the fulcrum countries are “critically meaningful to the achievement of a major goal of a country” (Xu et al. 2014: 15). He thinks that being fulcrum countries requires two conditions. First, the fulcrum countries must play an important supporting role in terms of geography or strength for a country to achieve its strategic goal. Second, the strategic fulcrum countries must have strong regional influence, and developing relations with these countries can serve as a role model to leverage relations with other countries. (Xu et al. 2014: 15) Zhou Fangyin further points out that the fulcrum countries can play two roles. One is the defensive effect. In a disadvantageous situation “it can help the great power in the most difficult international situation to keep a number of reliable supporters, to receive material and moral support so that it can successfully ­survive the unfavorable period” (Zhou 2014b). Another role is an aggressive role, “that is to help the great power expand their strategic impact and receive some effective support, in particular, an exceptional level of support from a few countries, thus increasing the likelihood of success of its active actions” (Zhou 2014b). The relationship between China and its strategic fulcrums is not an alliance, but a problem-oriented relation over issues such as security or energy or the

80  Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu internationalization of the Chinese Yuan. This brings flexibility in the choice of strategic fulcrum countries. Qi Huaigao thinks that the six countries, South Korea (Northeast Asia), Indonesia (Southeast Asia), Pakistan (South Asia), ­K azakhstan (Central Asia), Saudi Arabia (West Asia), and Australia (South P ­ acific) can be considered key candidates for China. Scholars agree in general that South Korea should be China’s fulcrum in Northeast Asia. Xu Jin thinks that making South Korea a strategic fulcrum country helps destabilize the US–South Korea alliance. Li Wei believes that the increasingly close economic ties between China and South Korea will pose a threat to the development of J­ apan’s economic interests in China, so that Japan will not fully follow the United States when handling China affairs. As for other candidates for regional strategic fulcrum countries, scholars also strongly agree on Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Australia.

The scope of national interest maintenance Since 2010, China has been the largest trading partner of 120 countries in the world. In April 2015, China replaced the United States to become the world’s largest oil importer. The growing overseas interests have broadened the scope of national interest maintenance. In this context, whether to continue with the principle of nonintervention becomes another important topic of discussion. In the early 1950s, China, India, and Myanmar jointly proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, whose core principle is no interference in each other’s internal affairs. At that time, the principle of noninterference in each other’s internal affairs was in line with the national interests of China, as China was facing the pressure of maintaining sovereign integrity. The principle of nonintervention has survived for more than 50 years with China and the world also having undergone tremendous changes. In this new context, the principle of noninterference is increasingly subject to two challenges. First, the improvement of China’s comprehensive strength has meant that its influence in international affairs is also greater, and many major international problems cannot be solved without its participation. If China continues with the principle of noninterference, it will be accused by other countries of the simple pursuit of economic interests but not taking the corresponding international responsibility, leaving it in an unfavorable position over “international morality”. Second, as the world’s third largest foreign investor, China has about 20,000 Chinese companies overseas running businesses in more than 180 countries and regions. There are more and more Chinese citizens outside the country, many of whom are working in countries with poor political and security conditions for economic returns. Consequently, China faces a huge challenge to protect its growing overseas economic interests and the safety of life and property of overseas Chinese ­citizens. The Middle East and Africa, the main sources of China’s energy, have been in long-term political turmoil. In this case, whether the principle of nonintervention can still guarantee China’s national interests is doubtful, as it is being challenged. Professor Su Changhe (2011) and Zhang Tuosheng (2012)

Debates on China’s national interest strategy  81 think that China should continue with the principle of noninterference, while ­Professor Wang Yizhou (2013) advocates to innovate and replace the noninterference principle with “creative intervention”.

Maintaining national interests still needs the principle of “Non - Interference” Those for the “non-interference” view believe that maintaining the current ­national interests still requires the principle of noninterference, because p ­ ublicly denouncing the principle of noninterference will harm China’s national ­interests in two respects. First, to abandon the principle of noninterference will be ­understood by the international community as a sign of China’s external expansion, which is against China’s adherence to international morals. Second, the ­abandonment of the principle of nonintervention will give other countries legitimacy to interfere in China’s domestic affairs. For these reasons, scholars believe that China should continue with the principle of nonintervention. Shanghai Foreign Language University Professor Su Changhe supports the principle of noninterference for the following reasons. First, the abandonment of the principle of nonintervention shows the rest of the world that China will ­embark on the path of external expansion, which would undermine the established prestige of China as a peacekeeper in developing countries and in the international community, and undermine China’s relations with concerned countries. Second, the abandonment of the principle of nonintervention will make China invest more resources in collective interference, leading to unlimited and unnecessary international responsibilities. Finally, the abandonment of the principle of noninterference will provide an excellent excuse for the prevailing China threat theory, which will damage ­China’s moral high ground in the international community. Su proposes that in the absence of a change in the principle of nonintervention to protect overseas interests, China should avoid entering potentially dangerous areas unless through full investigation and risk assessment, which China has been doing. It should also develop projects with host countries to share the risk, which means relying on host countries’ resources to safeguard China’s own overseas interests; and finally it should make use of the mechanism of multilateral international aid organizations (Su 2011). Zhang Tuosheng, Director of the Center for Foreign Policy Research at the China International Strategic Research Foundation, believes that China still needs to follow the principle of nonintervention in the face of strong e­ xternal ­interference when its strength is still limited. First, he believes that China itself still faces separatists in Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and so on. With a high ­possibility of external forces interfering with these issues, if China gives up the principle of noninterference Western countries will be able to interfere more ­easily. Second, China is not yet able to send warships to other oceans and to serve as global police. Even if China has the capability, it should not give up the principle of not dominating the world (Zhang 2012).

82  Chen Qi and Liu Lanyu “Creative intervention” is beneficial to the maintenance of current national interests In contrast to the abovementioned insistence on the principle of nonintervention, Professor Wang Yizhou, Vice President of the School of International Relations at Peking University, believes that in the face of contemporary international trends and growing overseas interests, China should revise the traditional principle of nonintervention to meet the current national interests. He believes that the traditional unconditional nonintervention principle has been unable to serve the present national interests from three angles. First of all, today’s global challenges, such as civil war spillovers, are becoming more and more serious, so in this situation China should protect its interests in countries that cannot effectively solve problems by themselves. Second, Western countries have been using humanitarian theory, human rights, protection of responsibility, anti-terrorism and preemptive doctrines (rather than the theory of sovereignty) as excuses to interfere in the ­internal affairs of other countries, so as to maintain their own interests. If China still confines itself to the traditional principle of nonintervention, it will put itself at a disadvantage in the area of global governance. Finally, the increasing demand for overseas interests and the urgent need for the maintenance of maritime rights make it necessary for China to rethink the principle of nonintervention. Attempting to innovate the principle of nonintervention, Wang Yizhou has put forward the concept of “creative intervention”, that is, “to take the initiative to intervene in disputes where China is concerned, with proposals or ideas acceptable to all parties involved” (Wang 2013: 4). At the Central Conference on Foreign Affairs Work held in 2014, President Xi Jinping reiterated that: we must adhere to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, adhere to respect other countries’ people’s choice on their development path and social system, and adhere to the peaceful settlement of disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation, against the resort to force or threat by force. However, for the maintenance of overseas interests, the President pointed out that it is important “to effectively safeguard our overseas interests, to ­continuously improve the ability and level of protection, and to strengthen the protection efforts”. This statement shows that the Chinese government will not give up the “non-intervention” principle at the official level, but on the basis of its noninterference with other countries’ internal affairs, China will adopt a more positive attitude to safeguard its overseas interests.

Conclusion This paper has systematically reviewed the controversy among Chinese international relations scholars in the period of 2010–2015 over the important issue of China’s recent diplomacy in five areas: the strategic goals of

Debates on China’s national interest strategy  83 national interests, the key to safeguarding national interests, the means of ­safeguarding national interests, the operation of national interests, and the scope of national interests. The controversy over the national interest strategy since 2010 is a continuation of the academic debate on “China’s rise” that emerged in the mid-1990s, whose core question remains how to alleviate the pressure ­imposed by the United States and its allies in response to China’s rise. The major change in the debate is that after 2010 there has been a more open discussion of the reform of the strategy of “keeping a low profile”, ­including three ­important aspects of “not taking the lead”, “non-alliance”, and “non-­ interference”. In the past two years, the discussion has been ­focused on the “OBOR” strategy. There are three main variables in shaping the strategic view of national interest in China’s international relations scholarship: views on the international power pattern, views on Sino–US relations, and views on the priority of legitimacy. Most scholars believe that the international power pattern is still based on the United States’ superiority to China, more common interests between China and the United States than conflict of interests, and the priority of international legitimacy. This shows that the vast majority of scholars still believe that the “keeping a low profile” strategy is conducive to maintaining current national interests. Views on the power pattern and views on the China–US relation are consistent, but views on the priority of legitimacy and views on power patterns are not obviously consistent. This difference shows that even if China’s position in the international system surpasses that of the United States, it does not mean that China will seek dominance of the international order. National strength and the legitimacy of the means to achieve national interests, to a certain extent, can play a role independently from the logic of power politics. With the gradually diminishing gap of strength between China and the United States, the conflicting interests will exceed the common interests. In this event, the priority of legitimacy will become the key factor to protect China from changing its national interests to international political power competition. Given that dominance of the world and alliances is easily linked to hegemony or a Cold War mentality, the international legitimacy of these issues will continue to retain priority in the future. Maritime breakthroughs and interventions are relatively urgent for the maintenance of national interests, so domestic legitimacy will prevail. In this case, China will increasingly actively participate in overseas conflicts concerning its own interests in order to safeguard national interests, and at the same time it will further improve its strength in safeguarding its own overseas security.

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5 China debates on the non-interference principle Chen Zheng

Introduction Non-interference (or non-intervention) is a long-observed feature of China’s foreign policy. While it still receives rhetorical support from the Chinese government, a public debate has emerged in recent years on the principle’s sustainability. A number of analysts suggest that Beijing should change its commitment to the “non-interference” principle in order to safeguard its expanding overseas interests and improve its reputation as a responsible power. Meanwhile, some others argue that the benefits of further insistence on the principle still outweigh the costs of abandoning it. Recently, a loose pragmatic consensus has gradually emerged, which suggests more creativity and flexibility in practices while maintaining the principle. Concepts like “creative involvement” and “constructive involvement” have become catchwords in academic discussions, while subtle ­d ifferences among scholars still exist. The non-interference debate reflects both the complexity of Beijing’s current international strategy and the intellectual condition of foreign policy studies in China. Therefore, it deserves a thorough examination. Although Beijing’s ­attitude towards international intervention is one of the most perplexing ­topics in Chinese foreign policy studies, the public debate around the principle is only occasionally referred to as the background of Beijing’s policy change (Pang 2009; Ren Mu 2013: 25–29; Duchâtel, Bräuner and Zhou 2014; Huang and Shih 2014). This article delves deep into the debate. It examines the ­d ivergent ­understandings of the non-interference policy among Chinese analysts and how the debate interacts with government policy change. Investigating the ­intellectual context of Beijing’s non-interference policy adjustment, it also tries to provide a new lens to understand China’s current foreign policy studies. From a methodological standpoint, the article surveys relevant Chinese ­academic articles, media reports, and online discussions, including essays ­d irectly engaged in the non-interference debate and concrete discussions on some ­specific non-interference relevant cases. In collecting samples, the author searched within the CNKI’s “China Journals Full-text Database” using keywords “不干涉” and “不干涉内政”. Articles published between the year 2005 and 2016 with a high number of downloads and citations were selected and examined.

China debates on the non-interference principle  87 The article proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the debate’s background. The second addresses various representative arguments. The third part analyzes the main features of the debate and its place in the contemporary grand strategy debates among Chinese scholars. The fourth discusses the relationship between the debate and Beijing’s policy adjustment. The concluding section sums up the various themes and arguments.

The debate Non-interference is a basic principle of China’s foreign policy. In the Chinese context, the principle generally means that a country shall not interfere/­ intervene in other countries’ internal affairs, which are in essence of domestic jurisdiction. The concept dates back to the Sino–USSR alliance treaty signed in early 1950. Since Zhou Enlai included it as part of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1953 and its incorporation into the “Ten Principles” of the 1955 Bandung Conference, it has become a crucial component of China’s foreign policy discourse. Except for some aberrations during the peak of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, Beijing has generally adhered to it. It was also enshrined in the Preamble of the Chinese Constitution in 1982. After the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Beijing cherished the principle even more, and it showed strong o ­ pposition towards some Western countries’ humanitarian intervention initiatives in past decades. Non-interference has therefore been understood as a key guideline and a major rhetorical tool for Beijing’s diplomatic work (Ren Mu 2013). However, this principle has recently been facing growing challenges. It was crafted when Beijing had few interests abroad. However, ever since the turn of the century, China’s phenomenal economic expansion has stimulated outbound investment of Chinese firms and the consequent rush of Chinese citizens into foreign countries (Duchâtel, Bräuner and Zhou 2014: 2). Nonetheless, China’s deepening interdependence with the global economy comes with high vulnerabilities. Increasingly, Chinese companies must deal with domestic ­turmoil in unstable regions like the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa. In the past few years, Chinese personnel have suffered kidnappings, killings, and/or evacuations in countries like Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, Libya, and Yemen. Subsequently, there are growing demands at home that Beijing must develop more active ­policies to protect its expanding overseas interests (Meng and Zhong 2009; Su 2009; Duchâtel, Bräuner and Zhou 2014). Normative developments of the international society since the end of the Cold War also challenge the traditional primacy of state sovereignty. The Western world is promoting a post-Westphalia order, which entails a stronger emphasis on human rights (Donnelly 1998; Zhang 1998; Dunne 2007; Hurrell 2007; Buzan 2010). Many developing countries are also adjusting their positions. The popularity of non-interference has hence declined. Moreover, with the rapid ­expansion of China’s influence, other international players expect Beijing to make more “contribution” and shoulder bigger “responsibilities” in global

88  Chen Zheng issues (Zoellick 2005). All of these developments challenge the non-interference ­principle. A public debate on non-interference policy has emerged.

Criticism Whether non-interference is serving China’s national interest has been ­increasingly questioned by some analysts in the past few years. Most of their criticisms have appeared in news magazines and Internet blogs but not academic journals. In the eyes of those critics, Beijing’s “passive” non-interference policy, combined with a lack of experience and power-projection capabilities, has imposed serious limits on Chinese efforts to safeguard its interests in various regions. For instance, Qiu Lin (2013), an active columnist, suggests that the non-interference doctrine has induced China to bury its head in the sand like an ostrich in countries like Myanmar. Beijing’s passive “wait-and-see approach” stems from its non-interference principle that made China lose an initiative in Myanmar’s political change. Meanwhile, some other analysts have complained that Beijing’s reluctance to intervene in support of Chinese companies and its “no strings attached” ­approach to foreign aid, trade, and investment has not won the goodwill of many local governments. For instance, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation was reportedly not given an equal and fair treatment in its investment in the Sudanese oil industry (Wang 2005; Zha 2006; Li 2008: 38; Taylor 2009). Thus, they argue, Beijing should be more assertive in defending its own interests. Some critics have also complained that China’s “assistance associated with no political condition” benefits only the governors of pariah countries rather than the average civilians, which would probably be interpreted as an implicit moral approval of the wrongdoing. Xie Yiqiu, the deputy chief executive editor of the nationwide influential magazine Nanfengchuang [South Reviews], thus asserts that when some states obtain Chinese aid but use it for “wrongdoings”, it is necessary for Beijing to be quick to intervene. China must monitor African governments to promote the efficiency of its assistance (Xie 2010). Normative developments in the international system are another equally ­important factor contributing to criticisms of non-interference. Critics of non-­ interference highlight that several non-Western regional organizations, ­especially the African Union (AU), have gradually softened their rigid understanding of sovereignty (Duchâtel, Bräuner and Zhou 2014). As a result, they suspect, non-interference would no longer be an effective rhetorical device for China to win support from developing countries (Zhou 2010). In their eyes, the rise of human rights and democratic values is irresistible. Resistance to this global trend cannot be justified either in legal terms or on moral grounds (Wu 2005; Luo 2006: 86; Li 2010: 121). The non-interference principle is therefore inconsistent with China’s p ­ romise of being a responsible power. Beijing’s “ignorance” of human rights abuses in some developing countries, Sudan and Zimbabwe for instance, has only awarded a tool for its adversaries to demonize China (Budabin 2009: 521). Rigid ­adherence to non-interference has become a serious barrier for China’s

China debates on the non-interference principle  89 public diplomacy (Wang Jiangbo 2013: 25–27). Instead, some critics of non-­ interference even expect that abandoning the principle might promote China’s domestic reform (Zhou 2010). In sum, in these critics’ eyes, rigid adherence to the non-interference principle is unfavorable to both China’s national interest and its international reputation.

Defense In contrast to emerging critics of non-interference diplomacy, some people stand out in defending strict adherence to the principle. From their point of view, ­Beijing’s persistent advocacy of non-interference would serve three p ­ urposes. First, the principle is vital in defending China’s sovereignty from foreign ­interference. Western powers will not give up plots to “westernize” and “ ­ divide” China. Therefore, non-interference is indispensable in defending Beijing’s “core interests”, particularly on issues related to its state sovereignty, territorial ­integrity, and the CPC leadership (An 2012, 2013; Liu Wutong 2012). Most of these arguments have appeared in the country’s leading newspapers, and China’s veteran diplomats are among the defendants of the non-interference principle. For instance, China’s former Ambassador to Egypt An Huihou (2012, 2013) argues that to jettison non-interference would only “invite trouble and undermine [China’s] own sovereignty and core interests”. Similarly, Ren Weidong (2013), a senior researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, suggests that the principle of non-interference is still an important “political weapon” for Beijing to prevent external meddling in China’s domestic affairs, and it is a “political guarantee against the submersion of socialist countries in the sea of capitalism”. NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 further intensified these people’ suspicions (An 2012; Lin 2012; Wang 2012; Wu 2012; Duchâtel, Bräuner and Zhou 2014: 7). They assert that China should be vigilant against the West’s attempts to ­soften its position on non-interference, including attacking Beijing’s policy on the grounds of “humanitarian value”, or stepping up rhetoric pressing China to ­assume more “international responsibility” (Zheng 2011). An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also warned bluntly, “If you listen to ­ rinciple the Western countries’ blandishments to abandon the non-interference p ­today, who will stand out to support your sovereignty and dignity in the ­f uture?” (Liu Wutong 2012). Those defendants of the principle also suggest that ­China’s promise of non-interference would portray it as morally superior to those ­Western states (Liu Wutong 2012). If Beijing abandons this policy, they warn, it would not only break its own promise but also damage its partnership with many developing countries (Su 2011a). Therefore, unlike their opponents, these analysts believe the non-interference policy would enhance rather than weaken China’s soft power. Moreover, some other defendants of non-interference argue that forsaking non-interference would damage the credibility of China’s promise of ­“peaceful development” and “not seeking hegemony”, while attracting unnecessary

90  Chen Zheng international responsibilities beyond China’s capabilities (Su 2011a). They ­believe that protecting overseas interests does not necessarily require intervening in domestic politics of other countries, while a more interventionist China would increase the danger of conflict with the West and arouse suspicions from its neighbors (Guo 2012: 4). As Professor Su Changhe (2011a) of Fudan University argues, non-interference would enable China to maximize the resources directed towards domestic economic growth while avoiding the danger of overexpansion. Whenever China is highly reluctant to take part in some international interventions, he indicates, the existence of the principle is useful for Beijing to justify its inaction or opposition (Su 2011a; see also Guo 2012). Those defendants of the non-interference principle thus argue that the ­benefits of further adherence outweigh the potential costs of a major policy change. ­Noticeably, while defending the principle, several scholars also ­suggest that in ­upholding the non-interference principle, Beijing’s practice of non-­ interference can be flexible. For instance, Su Changhe (2011a, 2011b) clearly suggests that while non-interference must be maintained, China should be ­active and ­creative in its international studies and foreign policy practices. Non-­ interference should not restrain people from studying other countries’ domestic conditions ­t horoughly, and providing no-strings-attached aid does not preclude proper ­auditing process and supervision mechanisms. For him, insistence on the non-­interference principle is compatible with non-indifference towards collective ­interests and ­regional cooperation with other countries (Su 2011b).

Pragmatic adjustment As the debate proceeds, a growing number of analysts suggest drawing distinctions between principle and tactics. For instance, Professor Liu Zhongmin (2012), director of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, suggests that Beijing could learn from its experiences during the Arab Spring and that it needs more flexibility in diplomatic practices while adhering to the non-interference doctrine in principle. Similarly, in his study on China’s policy in Sudan, Professor Guo Peiqing (2007) at the Ocean University of China suggests that Beijing should maintain the non-interference principle on a strategic level, whereas on a tactical level it could “meet changes by adapting to changes” through engaging selectively in the local affairs of other states. It should not only interact with government agencies but also increase contacts with “social forces” in these countries (see Duchâtel, Bräuner and Zhou 2014: 17). Pragmatism prevails in these scholars’ arguments (see also Gao 2008). For them, both policies of non-interference and selective involvement are “available options” for Beijing, and the question of which policy is preferred should depend on China’s interests and capabilities (Duchâtel, Bräuner and Zhou 2014: 18). A loose consensus has gradually emerged for a modest pragmatic adjustment of the non-interference policy, which has led to the emergence of several new concepts. Among them, “constructive involvement” and “creative involvement” are two that have attracted the most followers. The notion of “constructive

China debates on the non-interference principle  91 involvement” was first raised by Professor Zhao Huasheng of Fudan University in early 2011. In his analysis of the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan, Zhao (2011, 2012) suggests that China’s hands-off approach damaged Beijing’s credibility as a reliable regional partner in Central Asia and reinforced the impression of China as a self-interested outsider. Zhao thus argues that adherence to non-interference should not preclude the option of involvement as a “tactic” in China’s diplomatic toolkit. Many scholars echo Zhao’s argument to suggest that China should play a more constructive role in international issues (Zhou 2013, for instance). Many government officials have also endorsed this concept in their speeches and a­ rticles. Lu Shaye (2012), the Director General of the MFA’s Department of African Affairs, for instance, has argued that China had already been constructively involved in Africa through sending special envoys to undertake direct mediation, supporting UN or regional-led mediation initiatives, and buttressing regional peace operations. According to Lu, these efforts characterize China’s constructive ­involvement in practice, namely respecting sovereignty, consulting on an equal footing, and promoting peace and impartial dialogues. In a similar vein, Professor Wang Yizhou, Vice Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University and one of the most influential international relations (IR) scholars in China, also coined his “creative involvement” concept in 2011, which attracted even more followers in the academic circle. Wang (2011a) defines “creative involvement” as a “new and positive attitude” and a “new direction” that calls upon China to play a more active role and voluntarily get involved in international affairs. In his various books, articles, and interviews, Wang pays great attention to explaining the necessity of an adjustment to the “non-interference” policy. As China is transiting to a state of global influence, Wang argues, if it fails to shoulder international responsibilities as per its power, China’s reputation and “soft power” would suffer great damage (Wang 2012a). Meanwhile, China’s overseas interests are expanding rapidly. Facing various pressing threats from ­domestic crises in some countries, Beijing can no longer shelve disputes and its traditional diplomacy is incapable of protecting China’s interests abroad (Yu 2011). Wang’s “creative involvement” initiative thus emphasizes that China should move past its previous non-interference doctrine and attach more importance to global and regional public goods (Wang 2011b). While advocating active participation in international affairs, Wang Yizhou (2012a) also emphasizes that his new concept does not contradict the non-­ interference principle but is an enrichment of it. According to Wang, the core of the non-interference principle is that a state’s significant internal affairs  – such as the political system, security arrangements, mode of governance, and choice of leaders – should be decided by its government and its people. When other states play a constructive role for this end, Wang suggests, their involvements should be considered neither as a breach nor a denial of non-­interference. Wang also emphasizes that creative involvement is different from the US style of “ ­ interventionism”. Implementing it has three

92  Chen Zheng preconditions: obeying the UN Charter, the consent of the parties concerned, and support from the UN and regional organizations. It also must be a selective move that would be adopted only when China’s important interests are concerned. Moreover, the “creative involvement” concept stresses full exploration of all possible diplomatic means and prudent attitudes towards the use of force (Ma and Zhang 2011). In sum, Wang’s “creative” involvement argues that China should develop a flexible involvement strategy that is complementary to its non-interference principle. He suggests that China should – in a timely fashion – extend its non-­interference doctrine to provide more public goods for the world (Wang 2011b; see also Jian 2012). Areas that have been identified as appropriate for China’s creative involvement include global governance in the high seas, the polar ­regions and outer space; multilateral peacekeeping; and the protection of sea lines of communication against nontraditional threats (Wang Yizhou 2013: 96–121). Wang (2010: 59, 2012b) also pays great attention to possible reforms of ­d iplomatic policies and institutions. After the publication of Wang’s books, many analysts and especially the young generation of scholars echoed his viewpoints on different occasions. They praised Wang’s idea as a creative policy initiative and an encouraging exploration of China’s “academic independence within international relations theory ­studies”. They also agreed with Wang that although the transformation of China’s foreign affairs would be a long process, now is the time to make pragmatic and partial adjustments (Yu 2011; Global Times 2013). “Creative involvement” has quickly become a catchword in academic publications. The popularity of the “creative involvement” and “constructive involvement” reflects at least that a loose pragmatic consensus is emerging in academic circles. Meanwhile, discussions of concepts like “creative involvement” remain nascent, and more clarification is still needed on how they can be turned into concrete practices. Among these scholars, subtle differences on critical questions remain, for instance, under what conditions and for what reasons should (or should not) China be involved, how to assess the results of China’s involvement, and how to withdraw should China judge its involvement to have been ineffective or even counterproductive. To further clarify the non-interference debate, we should put it in a broader context.

Understanding the debate After the country’s rapid power ascendance in past decades, both the Chinese government and its people are unprepared for a new set of external demands. ­Despite a somewhat constrained intellectual environment, foreign policy ­a nalysts in China have been preoccupied in recent years with animated discussions on the opportunities, risks, and responsibilities of being a rising power (Shambaugh 2010). Controversies around the non-interference principle are just a part of those general debates on China’s grand strategy, as different positions among

China debates on the non-interference principle  93 scholars are derived largely from substantial divisions over some fundamental questions. Is China a major power or still a developing country? What kind of a global role should China embrace as a result of its enhanced power? Chinese foreign policy analysts often uphold diverse and contradictory answers to these questions (Zhu 2010). These competing ideas are crucial to understanding the non-interference debate.

Conflicting strategies In recent years, Chinese scholars and policy makers have been heatedly d ­ ebating whether China should abandon its low-profile foreign policy. Controversies around the non-interference principle are just a part of this debate. On the one hand, those who advocate abandoning or adjusting the principle usually ­believe that, given China’s rapidly rising power, its former attitude of non-­interference should change with the times (Xu and Du 2015). Beijing must update its ­t raditional pattern of staying low key and silent in international affairs and adopt more active and creative strategies in defending its own interests and expanding its international influences (Zhu 2008). They believe that China has transformed from a regional power to a global one, or is at least well on its way to becoming one (Yan 2014). From their point of view, the compatibility between this newly gained status and a rigid commitment to non-interference is tenuous, and the balance between the two requires a less dogmatic approach to non-interference (Hu 2015). Meanwhile, nearly all of those strongly defending the non-interference ­principle argue for maintaining the Keeping a Low Profile (韬光养晦, KLP) guideline laid out decades ago by Deng Xiaoping. Highlighting various ­problems in the process of China’s economic development and barriers in the course of ­domestic reform, these scholars warn that China is still a developing country, albeit a big one, facing a lot of challenges. A low-key profile would help China to avoid confrontation with the United States while assuring other countries, e­ specially its neighbors. More importantly, it will allow China to focus on ­economic ­developments and solve its own domestic problems. Most of the supporters of the non-interference principle share this idea. Different preferences on strategies thus lead to different positions on the non-interference debate.

Divergent ideological orientations Nonetheless, controversies around the KLP strategy and whether to ­intervene or not do not cover the whole non-interference debate. Besides, scholars have d ­ ifferent ideas about when, how, and to what extent China should get ­involved, which are largely derived from their conflicting ideological o ­ rientations. In d ­ efining national interests and formulating an international strategy, ­Chinese analysts attach great importance to their country’s relations vis-à-vis the ­international society in general and Western powers in particular (Zhu 2010). On this problem,

94  Chen Zheng the ideological orientations of Chinese scholars can be roughly classified into ­ lobalism, which are three major categories, namely nativism, pragmatism, and g also closely related to different scholars’ domestic political orientations. Refining David Shambaugh’s previous discussion (2010), this ­a rticle draws on a spectrum ranging from isolationist tendencies on the left ­nativism end to globalism on the right end. In between the two extremes, the school of pragmatism progresses from more realist to more liberal orientations. As these ideas are likely to continue to coexist, China’s non-interference policy will continue to be plagued by competing orientations.

The nativist school: Marxism with Chinese characteristics At one end of the spectrum is the “Nativist” school. As Shambaugh (2010) ­suggests, it is a collection of populists, xenophobic nationalists, and Maoists. They strongly oppose “Western powers” and distrust international institutions. Especially for those retired government officials, two “fundamental” ­contradictions “between independence and hegemony, and between socialism and ­capitalism” are still closely related to China’s survival. They vociferously suspect the West, especially the United States, for their “attempts” to ­u ndermine China’s sovereignty and overthrow the CPC’s rule. Many of them believe ­concepts like “global governance”, “responsible power”, or “responsible stakeholder” are dangerous “Western” traps for retarding and undermining China’s power and alienating China’s relations with its partners in developing countries (Zhang 2007). This idea, in turn, generates anxieties that any compromise on non-interference would backfire. They thus regard the non-­ interference principle as the foundation of China’s national security and foreign policy. Most of those dogmatic defendants of the non-interference principle belong to this school.

Pragmatism: realism with Chinese characteristics Unlike the nativist school, the majority of Chinese IR scholars are pragmatic about China’s national interests and its relations with the international society. Like realists elsewhere, they tend to see the international environment as anarchic. In these respects, they are pessimists about China’s external environment and its relations with the United States. Meanwhile, they believe that foreign policy must be based on practical national interests and specific situations ­instead of on ideas and theories. This pragmatism thinking dominates the majority of elite opinion and is the center of gravity in China’s debates today. These ­scholars generally agree that China should expand its global involvements but must also be selective. For them, contributing to global governance is a tactic, not a ­philosophy (Zhu 2010: 13). Corresponding to the KLP debate, nonetheless, Chinese realists can be roughly divided into “offensive” and “defensive” camps. Those offensive

China debates on the non-interference principle  95 r­ ealists, who have a more optimistic estimation of China’s current power s­ tatus, argue that China should assertively use its newly acquired power and diplomatic ­influence to offer assistance to its allies and close partners (Yan 2014). Meanwhile, defensive realists have a conservative or pessimistic evaluation of China’s power while emphasizing prudence in policy making. Most of them question whether it is within China’s capability to get involved in the internal affairs of other countries. Many of them believe that China is still not ready to engage fully in global governance, and they are deeply suspicious of doing too much abroad (Zhu 2008: 28). Thus, due to different estimations of China’s strength and interests, there are several variations and splinter factions of the realism school disagreeing on when and to what extent China should intervene.

The globalism school: liberalism with Chinese characteristics At the other end of the spectrum are people from the “Globalism” school, who believe that China needs to shoulder more transnational responsibility commensurate with its growing power and influence. In China, the “globalism” school is a very eclectic group comprised of individuals who are more philosophically disposed towards liberalism. They emphasize transnational linkage, soft power, and international cooperation. These people are more supportive of multilateral institutions than those realists who advocate selective multilateralism. In their eyes, China is a beneficiary of the current international order. Hence, Beijing should play a constructive role and contribute more to global governance as a responsible power (Shambaugh 2010: 20–21). In the globalist school, some who have a stronger commitment towards liberal values usually argue for the abandonment of the non-interference principle to follow the trend of human rights protection. Meanwhile, those with a more realistic sense only argue for an adjustment of the principle that would allow more active practices in global governance. The above discussions help us clarify the non-interference debate. For ­instance, we could further divide people advocating policy adjustment roughly into two groups: the “internationalists school” represented by Wang Yizhou and the ­“realists school” represented by Yan Xuetong. While both agree that the non-­interference principle must be adjusted in accordance with the new situation, they have significant differences over specific diplomatic approaches and ­involvement strategies. While suggesting international engagements, Wang ­d isapproves of the use of force but believes in multilateralism and international institutions. He advocates compliance with international norms, cooperation with Western ­powers, and active participation in global governance (Wang Yizhou 2011b, 2013). Meanwhile, Yan Xuetong shows skepticism about China’s cooperation with the Western powers. Instead of global or regional governance, Yan advocates forging military and political partnerships and proposes a selective

96  Chen Zheng strategy of rewarding those states “who are willing to play a constructive role in China’s rise” while punishing those who show hostility towards China, which involves efforts to “guide other countries to act in the direction favorable to China” (Yan 2014). The two scholars thus show subtle disagreements. For instance, in early 2012, China’s two joint vetoes along with Russia of the UN Security Council draft resolutions on Syria sparked heated public debates in China (Zhang 2012: 21). Explaining China’s two vetoes, Wang Yizhou suggests that the paramount concern of Beijing is to delegitimize the regime-change mode of external intervention, but he also clearly showed his dissatisfaction with the government’s passive handling of the issue. He suggests that Beijing should have followed his “creative involvement” formula and played an active role in promoting its own proposal in the first place. It should have suggested political dialogue among different sides, promoted an arms embargo, and initiated a more inclusive and authoritative o ­ bservation group with the participation of other Middle ­Eastern countries beyond the Arab League. Wang believes these efforts would help China to win more international support and safeguard its status as a ­responsible power (Zhang 2012: 21–22). While many people like Wang were anxious about Beijing’s international ­image loss after those vetoes, Yan strongly argued that China has nothing to gain by intervening in Syria. He rejected the notion that the two vetoes damaged Beijing’s international image and achieved nothing. Those rebels in Syria would not appreciate China even if Beijing had abstained, Yan suggested. If they seized power, they would still turn to Western countries for postwar reconstruction, as those Libyan rebels did earlier. Besides, the Western world would also continue to blame Beijing as an authoritarian regime while the Arab countries would ­a lways take the side of Washington. Instead, blocking the Security Council resolutions would bring China some “absolute” gains, including strengthening Beijing’s partnership with Moscow, confirming China’s expanding influence in the region, and reducing the risk of a war between the United States and Iran, which would lessen the likelihood of an interruption in Iran’s oil supply to China. Yan also suggested that the two Chinese vetoes would signal that China’s foreign policy cared not only about its material interests, but was also based on strong moral commitments to principles like non-interference (Yan 2012). Meanwhile, Yan also warned that China should be very cautious about getting involved in military conflicts in the ­M iddle East (Huang 2016). In a word, the understanding of the non-intervention principle in China’s international studies community is not static but in flux. The controversies among different analysts are largely derived from divergent judgments on two interrelated issues. One is whether China should continue to keep a low profile in global ­a ffairs. The other is China’s overall relations with the West-led international ­society. The non-interference debate thus reflects conflicting strategic preferences and ideological orientations that underlie current China’s worldviews (see Figure 5.1).

China debates on the non-interference principle  97 Active Abandon Qiu Lin, Xie Yiqiu and Wang Jiangbo

Abandon

Intervene for Oversea Interests and Influence Yan Xuetong Offensive Realist Flexibility Su Changhe Nativists

Zhou Huilai Abandon

Involvement based on global responsibility and reputation Wang Yizhou

Flexibility Zhao Huasheng

Internationalists Flexibility

Defensive Realist

Avoid conflict and over–expansion Regime Domestic Reform and Security Domestic Responsibility First Strict Adherence Strict Adherence Guo Kai An Huihou, Liu Wutong, Ren Weidong and Zheng Xiwen Low Key

Strict Adherence

Figure 5.1  D  ebating the Non-interference Principle in China.

Academic debates and policy adjustments The academic debate on the non-interference principle is unquestionably relevant to China’s foreign policy adjustment in the past few years, and it fits in more with the mirroring policy model that Huiyun Feng and Kai He raised in the introductory chapter. First, Chinese IR scholars can serve as a “proxy measure” to gauge Chinese leaders’ perceptions. The debate and policy adjustment share the same background of China’s “non-interference” dilemma. The country’s rapid domestic transition and power rising in the past decades have created unprecedented challenges for China’s foreign policy. Formulating its non-intervention policy, Beijing has to simultaneously deal with multidimensional challenges, divergent expectations, and sometimes conflicted requirements (Chen 2009). Various arguments raised during the non-interference debate just highlight the compound challenges that Beijing is facing and reflect the Chinese leaders’ complex considerations over the non-interference problem. Second, debates among policy analysts provide government officials and the general public with a diversity of interpretations of China’s national interests and power status, its international circumstance, and a broader view of other countries’ foreign policies that might assist policy thinking. Today, several channels exist through which decision makers can consult with international studies ­experts (Zhu 2010: 57). Scholars also have various ways to influence wider public

98  Chen Zheng opinion. However, the direct influences of academic debates upon government decision-making and public opinion are difficult to ascertain. Beijing’s long-standing commitment to non-interference does not mean that people within China have always reached consensus on its validity and relevance. Among the three abovementioned options, abandonment, strict adherence, and pragmatic adjustment, the abandonment option was once quite popular in online discussions, which are generally rough and emotional. However, this option has attracted little support in academic circles. Only a few scholars have openly advocated abandoning the non-interference principle. Pragmatic reviews from professional analysts have helped to “pacify” the general public mood and inform people of the problems and consequences of a drastic policy change. Meanwhile, the government still interprets its policies along the lines of the non-interference principle and has not even – at least not in public – been inclined to adjust it. The principle has been repeatedly incorporated in Beijing’s various political reports, policy papers, and newly signed diplomatic statements with other states. The majority of Chinese IR scholars, however, now agree on a pragmatic adjustment of the non-interference policy and have presented many concrete policy proposals. The loose pragmatism consensus reached in the debate has thus assisted the government’s policy adjustments. Nonetheless, the overall impact of academic discussion on foreign policy ­decision makers is difficult to gauge with precision. The autonomy of researchers and their spontaneous influences should never be overestimated. In China, the IR academic agenda is still, to a great extent, set by the top leaders. The significance of research has also been largely evaluated by the attitudes of the ­government. A closer examination of relevant literature would find many scholars intentionally highlighting that the starting point of their analysis is some new practices of Chinese foreign policy, which had already shown growing pragmatism and flexibility regarding non-interference to support their arguments. Even those scholars who have an independent mind are inclined to rely on interpretations of the government policy to support their arguments (Duchâtel, Bräuner and Zhou 2014: 30–34). For instance, Wang Yizhou (2011b) emphasizes that his new concept was inspired by some of China’s diplomatic initiatives such as its mediation efforts in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program and in Sudan. The impact of the debate on Beijing’s non-interference policy is thus difficult to ascertain. Notwithstanding, as Feng and He have argued, the evolution of Chinese IR scholars’ debates effectively reflects the underlying transformations of Chinese foreign policies. In practice, Beijing has slowly been shifting away from a strict interpretation of non-interference and tweaking its behavior slightly. China is now adjusting its foreign strategy. After President Xi Jinping took power in late 2012, China’s overall external strategy underwent a ­f urther transformation from “keeping a low profile” to “striving for achievement”. ­Beijing emphasizes more and more the contribution of the Chinese vision to  the management of international affairs and the provision of international public goods.

China debates on the non-interference principle  99 For instance, albeit cautiously, Beijing has been engaging more actively in international mediation and peacekeeping activities. Beijing is also taking an active part in the global cooperation to curb the spread of communicable diseases and fight terrorism (Xinhua 2014). Furthermore, Beijing has been actively involved in the peaceful settlement of many hotspot issues. In UN debates and decisions of collective interventions, Chinese representatives have become more flexible, emphasizing more and more the idea of “peaceful means”, the “consent of the government”, and the authority of the UN. While this does not violate China’s non-interference principle, it really underscores a growing level of engagement. China’s policy in Sudan and South Sudan offers strong evidence of the ­overseas interests’ influences upon an adjustment in Beijing’s approach to non-­ interference, and its limitations. China is the main investor in Sudan’s oil sector and purchaser of oil from South Sudan. Its first challenge was how to respond to the Darfur crisis. Initially, China abstained on a series of UN resolutions calling for sanctions against Khartoum. By late 2006, however, with an eye on holding a successful Olympics in Beijing, China adjusted its policy and it finally persuaded Sudan to accept the UN–AU hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Lee, Chan and Chan 2012). The South Sudan’s independence in 2011 further complicated Chinese policy as periodic conflicts between the two Sudans continued. At the end of 2013, a virtual civil war broke out in South Sudan, seriously threatening Chinese oil ­interests. Beijing then played an unusually active diplomatic role in mediating the conflict. In early 2015, China deployed a 700-soldier infantry battalion in South Sudan to bolster the UN mission in the country – the first ever Chinese infantry battalion to be sent on an external peacekeeping operation. ­Nevertheless, the non-interference doctrine remains the cornerstone of China’s policy towards the two Sudans. Beijing refrained from imposing itself as the arbitrator of disputes and has never set conditions on its aid allocation process in the two Sudans. Its various engagements have still been reactive and aimed mostly at limiting the damage to Chinese economic interests and international image after the conflict had escalated. The non-interference principle, in fact, provides Beijing with a way of floating above some of the world’s more difficult trouble spots without getting sucked into messy political disputes. For instance, China felt itself in a tight spot over the situation in Ukraine in early 2014 (Zhang 2015). China thus abstained from voting on the March 2014 UN resolutions. Every time it was asked for its view on the Russian intervention in Ukraine, Chinese officials emphasized that Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected and that external forces should not be allowed to interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs. Meanwhile, they also suggested that Western powers should consider ­R ussia’s ­legitimate security concerns over Ukraine. They called on relevant sides to ­engage in diplomatic n ­ egotiations and balance the interests and concerns of different sides (Wang 2015). Apparently, Beijing attempts to carve out China’s ­position as a neutral third party, while the non-interference principle gives them a good reason to do so.

100  Chen Zheng Moreover, Beijing’s evolving position on the emerging norm of responsibility to protect (R2P) reveals both the erosive impact and the limits thereof that normative developments in the international system exert on its adherence to non-interference. Against the rapid progress of the R2P concept, Beijing gradually acknowledges the responsibility to respond, and in certain circumstances intervene militarily, to humanitarian catastrophes. Meanwhile, China has ­developed a prudent case-by-case approach to R2P (and to international intervention more generally) and seeks to condition its support for intervention. It participates actively in relevant debates to shape R2P in a direction that gives primacy to capacity building and preventative measures and to ensure the concept’s limited application, diminishing the instances where it might breach state sovereignty and non-interference. China manages to shape the discursive environment to make R2P more compatible with its preferences. The R2P case thus reveals that without fundamentally changing the non-interference principle, Beijing is exploring alternative strategies to deal with international ­normative challenges (Foot 2011). In sum, after President Xi took office, with its rising power, expanding ­interests, and growing self-confidence, China is embracing more flexible and ­expansive ­interpretations of non-interference to safeguard its interests and reputation. However, while its international posture turns more and more d ­ etermined and active, China still places state sovereignty before all other international ­institutions. The crux of the problem is that domestic concerns still play a paramount role in shaping Beijing’s non-interference policy. While China is ­rising economically and militarily, Beijing’s suspicion of the division and subversion plots sponsored by “hostile external forces” has never faded (Wang 2011). Based on their deep-rooted suspicions that the ultimate goal of “Western powers” is to overthrow their rule, Chinese leaders firmly believe that sovereignty and the non-interference principles are still vital (Lieberthal and Wang 2012). China’s international involvement must not have a negative impact on B ­ eijing’s state security. It is possibly why Professor Wang Yizhou and others emphasize that the transformation of China’s foreign policies is closely associated with and mutually reinforced by domestic reforms. As Wang stated in an interview, “China will have limited opportunity to creatively join in global governance without a sound domestic foundation” and “China can influence the world by changing itself” (Ding 2013). The future of China’s non-interference policy ­depends ­f undamentally on its further domestic reform and developments. Once the Chinese government becomes more confident in its domestic order, its international ­involvement will be more active, constructive, and determined.

Conclusion Non-interference still constitutes a cornerstone principle in Chinese ­foreign ­policy. Nonetheless, the urgent need to protect China’s rapidly ­expanding ­overseas interests, as well as normative developments in the international s­ ystem, has recently contributed to the domestic recalibration of the relevance and ­validity of the non-interference principle. A number of analysts suggest that

China debates on the non-interference principle  101 Beijing should change its commitment to the “non-interference” principle to safeguard its ­overseas interests and improve its reputation as a responsible power. ­Meanwhile, some others argue that the benefits of further insistence on the principle still outweigh the costs of abandoning it. In between these two poles, a loose consensus has gradually been emerging, which suggests more creativity and flexibility in practices while maintaining the principle. New concepts like “creative involvement” and “constructive involvement” represent this emerging consensus of modest adjustment, and have become catchwords in ­academic ­d iscussions. Pragmatism prevails in these scholars’ arguments. For most ­Chinese analysts, both policies of non-interference and selective involvement are ­“available options”, and the question of which policy is preferred should depend on China’s interests and capabilities (Duchâtel, Bräuner and Zhou 2014: 18). Subtle differences among scholars still exist as to when and how to intervene. Various arguments raised during the non-interference debate highlight complex challenges and the dilemma that Beijing is facing over the non-interference problem. The ongoing debate also reveals the diverse and sometimes conflicting identities that underlie China’s current worldviews. The controversies among scholars are derived largely from divergent judgments on two interrelated strategic issues. One is whether China should continue to keep a low profile in global affairs; the other is China’s overall relations with the West-led international ­society. The understanding of the non-interference principle in China’s foreign policy community is not static but in flux. Divergent strategic preferences and ideological orientations explain differences among scholars. The impacts of the public debate on Beijing’s policy are difficult to ­a scertain. Nonetheless, Beijing has realized the limitations of the non-interference principle, but it chooses a cautious approach of pragmatic adaptation. On the one hand, as non-interference remains crucial for its “core interests” of state ­security and territorial integrity, Beijing will not easily relax its vigilance and drop this principle in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, however, maintaining the non-interference principle does not mean China has not c­ onducted any intervention activities. In the past few years, changing situations and g ­ rowing self-confidence have pushed Beijing to innovate and explore policy options that stretch the previously known limits of the non-interference principle. Its ­behavior is becoming more and more pragmatic and flexible. The emergence of new concepts like “creative involvement” facilitates this gradual change and equips Beijing with more leeway to pursue an increasingly engaged foreign policy posture.

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Section II

Key policies debates

6 To ally or not to ally? Debating China’s non-alliance strategy in the twenty-first century Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng Introduction In contrast to the contention and discussion surrounding China’s economic and social policies among economists and sociologists, Chinese international ­relations (IR) scholars rarely openly debate the government’s foreign policy choices for long. Instead, the government’s stance on foreign policy is usually adopted by Chinese scholars and analysts as the orthodox view. However, in the last few years, particularly after the recent leadership transition in 2012, Chinese IR scholars have become more active in debating China’s foreign policy. China’s ascension to the international stage has caused many in the Chinese academia to openly voice their opinions on which policies might best serve China’s national interests, leading many scholars to debate the necessity of the recent policy shift from the traditional principle of “keeping a low profile” (Tao guang yang hui) to a more proactive foreign policy (feng fa you wei) (Zhu 2010; Lynch 2015; Xu and Du 2015). This is a broad debate that engages many different schools of thought, and among the most contentious issues is whether China needs to ally with other states. China’s alliance posture is an important part of the overall discourse surrounding China’s foreign policy. Forming alliances has been an essential instrument that states have used to achieve security in an anarchic system since ancient times. In essence, alliances are mutual security commitments between two or more states (Osgood 1968: 17; Walt 1987: 12). Throughout history, alliances between international actors have formed, collapsed, and reformed. Although Chinese history is rich with examples of the successes and weaknesses of the alliance system, this paper will focus on contemporary China, and how its current policies are informed by its recent past. The People’s Republic of China rose amidst the Cold War, an era that saw the United States and Soviet Union attempt to divide the world into two ­opposing ideological camps. As a newly formed nation, and unable to be completely self-­ reliant, it was unlikely that China would be able to remain neutral. The United States’ heavy presence throughout East Asia, and China’s ideological adherence to Marxism led China to formally ally with the Soviet Union during the 1950s. However, border disputes and ideological rivalry caused Sino–Soviet relations

110  Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng to gradually deteriorate, and by the 1970s China had tilted to the US-led bloc. During this period of rapprochement, the United States and China were “tacit allies”, bonded by their mutual desire to check the Soviet Union’s power. Upon observation, it is clear that the first 30 years of modern China’s foreign policy primarily consisted of playing the superpowers against each other as national interest dictated. However, the early 1980s saw China tire of being caught between the geopolitical confrontation of the world’s two superpowers, instilling the sentiments that would become the foundation of the non-alliance policy. When the second generation of Chinese leaders designed a new “reform and opening-up” strategy, China decided not to ally with any other states. It is widely believed that the non-alliance policy first gained formal recognition when Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping articulated the strategy to a foreign guest in 1983 (Ling 2013: 21). Since Deng Xiaoping, successive Chinese presidents have maintained the non-­ alliance principle, and during the 14th Party Congress Committee in 1992, Jiang Zemin reiterated the policy by stating that China “will not enter into alliance with any country or group of countries and will not join any military bloc” (Jiang 1992). The principle has since been quoted at various times in Party speeches and ­government reports. For example, a 2011 government White Paper titled ­“China’s Peaceful Development” states that China, “does not form alliance with any other country or group of countries, nor does it use social system or ­ideology as a yardstick to determine what kind of relations it should have with other ­countries” (Information Office of the State Council 2011). Since the end of the Cold War, the Chinese government has viewed alliances as an archaic, ­entangling system that only increases the chance of costly military conflict. The non-alliance policy has provided measurable benefits to China, even though China’s changing security environment has caused a debate within C ­ hinese ­academia about the policy’s relevance. Under the non-alliance policy, China has maintained a relatively benign regional environment, allowing the government to focus on the central task of economic development and power accumulation. However, in the post-Cold War era, China is once again under the scrutiny of dominant powers, particularly the United States. China’s continued economic and military rise has given the Chinese populace high expectations of the government’s foreign policy, especially in maritime affairs. These factors have led many to believe that China cannot afford to be passive in its foreign affairs. The implications of an assertive China have caused heated debate among a­ cademics both for and against the non-alliance policy (Zhang Feng 2012; Xu 2016). This paper aims to compile and analyze the mainstream arguments made by Chinese scholars as they debate China’s foreign policy, as well as answer the ­following questions: Which schools of thought have gained the most prominence in this debate? Are there alternatives to these schools of thoughts? What significance does this debate have in understanding China’s foreign policy? This paper concludes with an evaluation of the relationship between this debate and China’s policy shifts in practice.

To ally or not to ally?  111

Three schools of thought in the debate The current debate on whether China should abandon its non-alliance stance is emerging within the context of changing international and regional realities, as well as China’s own shifting policy objectives. It should be noted that most IR scholars and foreign policy analysts in Chinese academia do not have a well-­ defined theoretical position, although some prominent scholars do have clear preferences on IR theories (Shambaugh 2011; Feng and He 2016). For e­ xample, Yan Xuetong is a self-proclaimed realist, though it is rare for most Chinese ­scholars to describe themselves as realists, liberalists, or constructivists. Therefore, scholarly positions on whether China needs to abandon its non-­alliance principle do not tend to fit the traditional theoretical framework found in IR literature. In this paper, we divide scholarly positions into three approximate groups based on their core arguments: (1) the orthodoxy, which generally accepts the view posited by the Chinese government, primarily defending the official standpoint on this question in addition to extant policy issues. In short, this argument assumes that non-alliance has been and will continue to be an optimal choice for China to realize its national interests; (2) the revisionists, by contrast, c­ hallenge the official standpoint and advocate an alliance policy to attract security allies and partners in order to extend China’s influence; and (3) the moderates, who take a middle ground between the extremes of orthodoxy and revision, and attempt to find alternative measures that overcome the shortcomings of both ­a lliance and non-alliance positions. For moderates, it is better to find more fl ­ exible and effective ways to develop security cooperation with other states.

The orthodoxy: the continuing relevance of the non-alliance principle Orthodox scholars generally support the existing policies that have been ­designed by the Party, and implemented by the government. From this perspective, the idea of forming alliances deviates from the fundamental principles of independence and self-reliance that have historically guided China’s foreign policy. Some specific reasons for adhering to the non-alliance principle have been proposed by different scholars. First, orthodox scholars argue that traditional alliances are fundamentally flawed because they force nations into a dilemma of security and ­independence. Every alliance has a cost, and that cost is inevitably a nation’s ability to act ­independently of its alliance partners; therefore, under an alliance system, n ­ ations gain security at the expense of flexibility on the international stage. ­Nonalignment supporters refer to this problem as the “alliance dilemma”. ­Orthodox scholars propose that in light of the alliance dilemma, it is far better for a nation to preserve its independence. This allows a state the flexibility and diplomatic space needed to implement a comprehensive foreign policy that can react as needed, as opposed to being entangled in an alliance where a nation can both unwillingly and inadvertently be thrust into an international crisis (Xu 2010; Jiang 2012).

112  Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng Second, non-alliance scholars often believe that an alliance system is beyond ­ hina’s capabilities. Alliance candidates are few, and of those available, many are C poor or developing nations with which an alliance would cost more than it is worth. Sun Ru warns that allying with underdeveloped states would only give China ­motivation for abandoning the partnership soon after its formation (Sun 2015). In addition, orthodox scholars argue that a Chinese alliance system could very well heighten tensions in East Asia, by forcing regional neighbors to band together to balance against China through political and military means (Zhang 2000). China’s non-alliance policy has been its primary foreign policy principle for nearly a decade. Although a newly formed China allied itself with the Soviet Union for survival, it only served to limit its international flexibility while at the same time not meeting the strategic interests of either party. It wasn’t until after China abandoned its alliance with the Soviet Union that the Chinese strategic environment started to improve. China extended its relations beyond socialist nations, and normalized relations with the West. The consistent implementation of the non-alliance policy has allowed China to avoid being restricted in international affairs due to the actions of others, in addition to allowing China to contribute to global security and stability (Liu 2000). Third, a major factor in the debate surrounding the non-alliance policy is US–China relations. Since the end of the Cold War, China and the United States have been neither friends nor enemies. However, even some pro-non-alliance scholars are starting to admit that the United States poses a threat to some of China’s national security aspects, especially when considering the US-led security alliance system in East Asia. Since 2009, when the Obama administration announced its “pivot to Asia” strategy, the United States has strengthened its military commitments with its formal allies and informal partners throughout the region, while also getting involved in the territorial disputes in both the East China and South China Seas. These actions are interpreted by scholars in both camps as efforts to ­contain China. However, orthodox scholars still emphasize the importance of ­maintaining a low profile and moderate conflicts with the United States, largely in recognition of China’s relative weakness when matched against the United States (Li and Shi 1999). From this angle, Zhu Feng questions the feasibility of an alliance. He points out that few states would like to ally with China at the ­expense of confronting the United States. In addition, the likelihood of an alliance changing the current balance of power is very low; therefore, there is no need to establish an alliance (Zhu 2012). Finally, orthodox scholars argue that the utility of military alliances in the modern era is continuously diminishing (Liu Jianfei 2012). Traditional military alliances are narrow and only allow for limited types of aid and cooperation between nations. These kinds of alliances are unsuitable to respond to the increasingly varied threats of the twenty-first century, particularly threats posed by non-state actors such as piracy, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. Non-alliance scholars propose that the best way to realize China’s interests is to maintain a defensive national security posture, while contributing to the construction

To ally or not to ally?  113 of a new multipolar world order with a neutral security environment (Wang ­Cungang 2012; Ling 2013). This position would allow China to maintain its independence and satisfy its national security requirements while adhering to the non-alliance policy. Orthodox scholars do not believe that China’s current security problems stem from a lack of allies; they argue that they are instead due to the complex interaction of domestic and international politics. An alliance system would not address the root cause of China’s security challenges; it would only exacerbate regional tensions. Therefore, orthodox scholars maintain that China’s foreign policy should continue to be based on non-alliance.

The revisionists: forming alliances to defend China’s rise Revisionist views are best expressed in a quote from Professor Yan Xuetong: “[the] international order is decided by the balance of power between great ­powers, and an alliance policy would help China increase its strategic partners” (Yan 2013a). History has only rarely seen a great power rise or expand without allies, and whenever states have employed a non-alliance policy, it has always been temporary. China’s long-term implementation of a non-alliance policy is a historical aberration. Revisionists argue that the non-alliance strategy is only suitable for weak nations, and if China does not abandon its nonalignment ­posture, it will only lead to more security challenges (Yan 2013b). Many scholars believe that China’s security environment is already f­acing large challenges that would be helped by an alliance. First is the eastward e­ xpansion of NATO, and the increased scope of the US–Japan security partnership, both of which threaten the relevance of China’s non-alliance strategy. Second, the United States’ pursuit of interventionist policies threatens China’s growth, as well as undermining China’s support of non-interstate intervention as a core tenet of the international order. Finally, the role and impact of Third World n ­ ations in international affairs are steadily declining as the influence of ­developed ­nations increases. Given that a significant portion of China’s non-­a lliance ­strategy ­relies on developing nations having a sizeable role in international affairs, the ever-­ increasing gap between rich and poor nations makes the continuation of a non-alliance policy challenging (Ye 2000). At the same time, there is broad domestic support for a formal alliance, as evidenced by recent reflections over the dissolution of the USSR–China alliance. Alliances are not a relic of Cold War antagonism, instead they are a way for nations to gain partners and foster good relations (Li Daguang 2012). China’s current security environment should be what informs China’s foreign policy, and in light of the dangers posed to China’s national security by the United States, revisionist scholars believe that China needs alliances. Revisionist scholars hold that the “alliance dilemma” mistakenly reduces ­a lliances to zero-sum relationships. In fact, revisionists argue that China’s ­unwillingness to give regional neighbors security guarantees through alliances has already caused neighboring states to view their relationship with China

114  Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng as zero-sum, and dominated by fear. Therefore, a China which continues to ­implement a non-alliance strategy will increasingly find itself surrounded by ­nations that distrust it, and turn to the United States for security guarantees (Yan 2013b). Revisionists argue that a rising China needs friends (Yan 2012a, 2012b, 2015). Even though the current international order has been beneficial to ­China’s ­economic and military rise, it has not aided China’s strategic relationships. The United States is still the most allied nation in the world, while China has no significant allies. The United States’ alliance structure has become a significant obstacle in China’s efforts to improve relations with its neighbors. After the Obama administration adopted “smart power” as a foreign policy principle, the United States consolidated and strengthened its strategic partnerships. If China does not ally with other nations soon, it will lose the ability to realize interests in its own backyard. Revisionists believe nonalignment theories misunderstand alliances. An ­a lliance does not automatically equate to Cold War mentality. The Cold War was an ideological confrontation between superpower blocs wherein alliances were merely a peripheral method used by superpowers to achieve victory. Therefore, alliances are not inherently a step towards confrontation. Defensive alliances that encourage international cooperation on security concerns do not threaten regional security. Second, revisionists argue that alliances do not bind a nation’s hands and feet, but instead bind two or more nations together in a mutually restrictive agreement in order to achieve shared interests. Alliances are a system of disparate parts that work together to be mutually binding and beneficial to their members. Alliances also contribute to global stability by dis-incentivizing allied n ­ ations to act against each other’s interests. Since ancient times, Chinese history has ­recognized the value and utility of alliances. From the Flame and Yellow ­Emperor’s alliance against Chiyou, to Mao Zedong and Chiang-Kai-Shek’s ­a lliance against the Japanese, Chinese leaders have used alliances. It is time for modern China to abandon its antiquated model of understanding alliances and align with nations that will contribute to the common good of a new world order (Tang 2010).

The moderates: seeking alternatives Aside from pro- and anti-alliance scholars are moderates who seek a solution to China’s security dilemma that rests between a formal alliance and the non-­ alliance policy. Moderates believe that the United States is employing various aspects of its hard and soft power to obstruct China’s growth and peaceful ­development, and that by itself China is unable to stop US containment. However, realists believe complete abandonment of the non-alliance strategy is ­unrealistic as ­potential alliance partners are few and any alliance formed would not only be weak, but likely to provoke a strong response from the United States.

To ally or not to ally?  115 Therefore, realists propose that as China rises in a changing international environment, it needs to develop a certain degree of security cooperation with other countries. This would fulfill the dual purpose of liberating China from its isolationist ­position whilst also gradually allowing for a discourse about alliances to evolve. Three main alternative strategies have been proposed: coalitions, ­strategic partnerships, and quasi-alliances.

Coalitions In international politics, states understand that some interests are better realized through coalitions. Coalitions allow for nations to discuss and reach a consensus on specific issue areas and are also suitable for solving a number of disputes outside of national security. Although there are few cases of prominent coalitions in IR history, it is an avenue that has not been duly explored. Unlike alliances, coalitions emphasize specialized and informal cooperation to solve particular issues. This kind of informal cooperation certainly can include national security, but can also extend to politics, economics, and atypical security concerns. Furthermore, coalitions rely on cooperation with relevant international institutions to solve international crises and conflicts. Alliances tend to form in times of peace, and generally target a third party. Juxtaposed with alliances, in the event of armed conflict, coalitions of like-minded parties temporarily form to respond to a common threat, and dissolve afterwards. As coalitions are inherently less cohesive and more flexible than alliances, member states focus more on negotiating a fair cost and interest system than on creating binding rules (Liu Feng 2012). Moderates believe that coalitions possess more utility than alliances, and that by using coalitions to develop diverse methods of cooperation and engagement, arguments over the non-alliance policy can be superseded. Coalitions will allow China the flexibility to analyze the significance of a particular issue area and then decide whether it merits cooperation. Ultimately, coalitions sustain the premises of a non-alliance strategy while still enabling China to partner with nations on a variety of issues.

Strategic partners Modern China has pioneered the use of strategic partners as a mainstay of the foreign policy toolkit. Strategic partnerships do not target a third party, and lack an antagonistic connotation. Moderates like Tang Shiping argue that partnerships between nations are fairly common and are based on mutual ­interest (Tang 2010). Although collaboration between partners is often intense, the states themselves do not need to have an intimate relationship; within a strategic partnership, states are relatively autonomous. This independence enables actors to abandon, change, or modify partnerships as needed. Strategic partnerships are allowed to be devoid of military commitments, as represented by the current partnership between China and Russia.

116  Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng Zhao Huasheng believes that the Chinese–Russian partnership best fits the current geopolitical landscape; although Sino–Russian cooperation does not reach that of a formal alliance, the current level of cooperation between the two nations fits their capabilities while satisfying their respective domestic a­ udiences (Zhao 2013). Years of implementation verify the feasibility of strategic partnerships. China has already partnered with 67 other countries, in five different global regions, and has organized or established at least 72 different kinds of strategic relationships (Men and Liu 2015; Su 2015).

Quasi-alliances Beyond those two alternatives, Sun Degang believes quasi-alliances are an ­informal method of collaboration between states. He posits that, “two or more states form an informal arrangement that targets an opponent’s ­security system” (Sun 2011: 61). There are key differences between a quasi-alliance and an alliance in foreign policy. Alliances are based on stringent contracts with binding legal restrictions, while quasi-alliances are based on informal contracts with lax legal conditions. Formal alliances depend on static ­security arrangements while quasi-alliances possess a dynamic quality to their agreements, thus avoiding the rigidity of traditional alliances. Furthermore, alliances are often very exclusive by nature, whereas quasi-alliances have fluid membership with a low barrier to entry. Finally, traditional alliances are structured around the conformity of interests and values, whereas quasi-alliances can be comprised of nations with ­d iffering values but common interests. Sun Degang believes China should pursue a quasi-alliance-based foreign policy termed “Three-Ring Quasi-Alliance Diplomacy” (Sun 2012). The first ring is forming quasi-alliances within multilateral organizations. The second is building quasi-alliances with key nations in East Asia based on a new model of cooperation, and the third is maintaining the model of friendly diplomacy. “Three-Ring Quasi-Alliance Diplomacy” will promote China’s rise from a great power to a dominant power by eliminating China’s isolation within the international system. Aside from Sun Degang, there are other scholars in China who have proposed the quasi-alliance strategy. For example, Yu Zhengliang believes that Russia is the ideal candidate for establishing a quasi-alliance strategy, as Sino–Russian core national interests ­increasingly require cooperation in order to break the United States’ global ­hegemony (Yu 2012). Wang Haiyun has proposed a quasi-alliance strategy that rests upon three strategic aims: continue to declare a “non-alliance, non-­ antagonistic, and non-third party-directed” foreign policy. This policy is referred to as “The Three Nons”. Wang Haiyun further advises that China should not form any alliances in the near future and instead strive to create a series of “belts” for nations on its periphery: “The belt of friendly relations. The belt of strategic stability and the belt of economic cooperation”. The three belts will promote China’s image as a reliable partner with nations on its periphery while also increasing its hard and soft power (Wang 2012).

To ally or not to ally?  117

Should China and Russia ally? A specific focus of the debate It is commonly believed that China and Russia might form an alliance, and ­Chinese scholars continue to debate its feasibility. This case provides us with a specific focus for the broader debate over China’s non-alliance policy. Pro-­ alliance scholars suggest that there are common interests in a China–Russia ­a lliance. In regards to their national security, both nations are unable to completely integrate into the Western-dominated international system, and both nations contend with antagonism from the United States. Particularly after the start of the Ukrainian crisis, Western nations have increased their pressure against Russia, inadvertently creating a situation where China is an increasingly attractive military and economic partner. Neither Russia nor China can individually match the United States’ military prowess; however, together the two nations are a formidable force. Furthermore, China and Russia’s economies are naturally complementary, and with coordination, the two nations could avoid American market restrictions and obtain economic independence. Russia and China have the world’s second and third strongest militaries, ­respectively, and as two nuclear powers, their alliance could attract other ­nations such as Iran, Pakistan, and even some countries in mainland Europe. Were China and Russia to achieve such an expansive alliance network, the United States, even with NATO, would not be able to reasonably contain it. With Russia as an ally, China need not fear being drawn into an unnecessary war. Russia’s nuclear arsenal greatly dis-incentivizes large-scale warfare, and in any small-scale conflict Russia would not need to rely on China’s military. Yan Xuetong points out that the United States’ unipolarity has intensified rather than relaxed in recent years. China and the United States are competing for international leadership while Moscow is in strategic competition with Washington. Neither Russia nor China is able to alleviate pressure from the United States alone. Since alliance making and annexation are common strategies in history to compete for dominance, as long as China regards national rejuvenation as its policy goal, it has to abandon the principle of non-alliance and ally with Russia (Yan 2014). Yan Xuetong also notes that the United States’ unwillingness to accept China in the international arena, Russia’s potential as an ally, and China’s continued rise as a military power, make it increasingly clear that the benefits of a Sino-Russian alliance would greatly outweigh the costs. (Yan 2012b: 25) Dai Xu also advocates a Sino–Russian alliance from the perspective of ­geopolitical competition with the United States in Eurasia (Dai 2012). Luo Yuan and Zhang Wenmu hold more moderate attitudes on China’s ­a lliance strategy, although both of them point out the need to build alliances. Luo (2011) posits that Sino–Russian security cooperation could take the form of

118  Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng a quasi-alliance, while Zhang (2012) emphasizes the defensive objectives of the alliance through which both the legitimate interests of China and Russia can be preserved. Other than the need to cope with US pressure, Zhang (2012) points out that China has traditional experience managing alliances. Tang Shiping, a moderate proponent of the alignment policy, has mentioned China’s alliance history and further noted that the history of Sino–Soviet alliance should not be the burden of contemporary foreign policy. Any strategic tool effective in promoting national interest should be on the list for consideration. Aside from Russia, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and North Korea, are all potential Chinese allies (Yan 2011; Yan and Qi 2012). Anti-alliance academics suggest that there simply is not enough to be gained from a Sino–Russian alliance. These scholars believe that the current level of multitier cooperation between Russia and China already satisfies their mutual interests. Although both nations face similar security challenges, neither faces the threat of large-scale invasion, lessening the need for a military alliance. There is also a large disparity between the two nations in regards to their ideology and respective security challenges. It is unlikely that the two nations would be able to form a consensus on many issues, let alone give each other military support. The aftermath of the 2008 Georgian–Russo War provides a good example. The Russian State Duma passed a resolution recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The reaction from China was muted, and certainly did not align with Russia’s policies. China’s reticence was fueled by its own domestic issues with Taiwan. There is no guarantee that a Sino–Russian alliance would not be fraught with as much, if not more conflict than the current US– China relationship. Li Kaisheng argues that the nature of geopolitics makes competition ­between Russian and China hard to avoid, whereas China and the United States, a­ lready being separated by thousands of miles, have no fundamental security conflicts (Li 2012). A Sino–Russian alliance would still be subject to the alliance ­d ilemma, with both nations concerned about being abandoned in time of need, or being entangled in conflicts decoupled from national security interests (Zhao 2013). Neither Russia nor China has the political foundation needed to resolve the security dilemma. At the same time, once allied nations find that if they cannot reach an accord with one another, they will find it more difficult to set aside their own interests for the sake of the alliance (Jiang 2012). Wang Jisi, a professor from Peking University, argues that the proposal of allying with Russia is based on the view that the United States is China’s main adversary. He acknowledges that the United States does pose certain challenges to China, but proposes that there is no need for the United States to be treated as a threat or enemy if China does not want military confrontation (Wang 2011). China’s continued economic success needs a cooperative partnership with the United States. Moreover, few countries, if any, would want to join China in an anti-US alliance (Wang 2011).

To ally or not to ally?  119 Anti-alliance scholars argue that from an economic perspective Russia and China are not suitable allies. Sino–Russian trade volume falls far below that of the China–US relationship; neither Russia nor China wish to harm trade ­relations with the United States, the European Union, or any large trading partner, as both nations rely on these trading partners for economic exchange and investment (Yu, Bekhbaatar and Ba 2015). The unrest caused by a Sino–­R ussian alliance would inevitably spread to trade relations, needlessly harming both ­nations’ economies. Finally, the core interest of a Sino–Russian alliance would be resisting Western powers and establishing a new international order that is fair to both middle and developing nations. Since 1992, both Russia and China have emphasized transparency in b ­ ilateral relations. Their commitment to the three “nons” (non-alliance, nonconfrontation, non-third-party directed policy) has been the foundation for a new style of relations between the two nations. In 2001, both nations signed the Sino–­ Russian Treaty of Friendship, further embedding the three “nons” into the bedrock of their relationship. China and Russia have jointly promoted peace and international stability through cooperation, consultation, dialogue, mutual respect, and compromise; anti-alliance scholars believe an alliance would in no way affirm these principles. Feng Huiyun points out the current problems in Sino–Russian relations, which prevent them from allying with each other. Although both countries ­employ foreign policies that challenge Western legitimacy and weaken US ­dominance, China and Russia compete for geopolitical influence in Eurasia through arms sales. Their trade imbalance and divergent interests on sovereignty issues are also obstacles to deepening strategic coordination (Feng 2015). Aside from the pro- and anti-alliance scholars, there is another group of scholars who believe that the conditions for a Sino–Russian alliance have yet to be met. Were the conditions for an alliance to be met in the future, this group of scholars would not necessarily support or oppose the alliance. For example, scholar Zhao Huasheng (2013) does not completely reject the ­possibility of a future Sino–Russian alliance, but he maintains that if both governments do not make the necessary preparations and instead force an alliance simply on the pretense of Sino–Russian cooperation, the alliance would only bring harm to both countries (Huang 2008; Wang and Wan 2013). Therefore, as long as there remains no major changes to the international arena for the ­foreseeable future, moderates propose that China and Russia maintain their strategic partnership. When assessing the possibility of a China–Russia alliance, the Russian position must also be taken into consideration. A few Russian scholars do support a Sino–Russian alliance. For example, Alexander Korolev argues that a formal ­a lliance should be expected (Korolev 2015). In contrast, Xie Chao, a student of Yan Xuetong, provides a dissenting answer. Based on a systematic study of Russian strategic consideration, Xie Chao finds that Russia does not have much incentive to form a military alliance with China. As he articulates,

120  Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng from Russia’s point of view, it has the necessary state power to respond to regional security pressures, and as such, Russia will opt to maintain the present alliance structure, and will not attempt to expand its alliances. In the coming years, establishing an alliance with China is neither important nor necessary. (Xie 2016: 44) As noted above, only a few Chinese scholars have a clear theoretical orientation, elaborating their policy positions from one or another theoretical perspective. However, putting the debate roughly into the spectrum of IR theories may give us a better understanding of the differences of these positions. The three broad policy preferences surveyed in the sections above reflect at least five theoretical positions. The first group is in essence nontheoretical and located in the orthodox camp. These scholars do not rely on any theoretical concepts or logics, but only defend the official position. In the current situation, they tend to defend the non-alliance policy. But if the Chinese government was to shift to another side, they would also move to that side. Second, there are some defensive realists, for example, Zhu Feng and others, who generally prefer non-alliance or other alternatives to alliance. Third, the advocates of the alliance position can be put into the camp of hard or offensive realism, with Yan Xuetong and some military academics as leading scholars. Fourth, some widely recognized Chinese liberalists, including Wang Jisi and Wang Yizhou, are advocating a non-alliance strategy mainly because it emphasizes the importance of interdependence and a non-conflictual relationship with the United States. Finally, Qin Yaqing, a prominent constructivist in China, explains China’s non-alliance strategy from an idealist perspective. For him, ­China’s foreign policy is shaped by the background knowledge, more specifically the Chinese dialectic, the zhongyong, which assumes the inclusiveness of two opposite extremes as indispensable parts of an organic whole (Qin 2014).

Policy implications of the debate over non-alliance strategy In IR scholarship, the linkage between academic research and policy making is a controversial issue. In US academia, a mainstream consensus seems to have emerged that the gap between these two worlds needs to be bridged, s­ tressing the importance of policy-relevant research (George 1993; Nye 2008; Avey and Desch 2013). In contrast, the relationship between Chinese academia and the policy making circle is quite different from its US counterpart, which is ­characterized by a revolving-door mechanism. Chinese IR scholars seldom have systematic and institutionalized approaches to infiltrating into foreign p ­ olicy making. Therefore, the separation between theory and policy is even more ­evident in China. However, Chinese IR scholars’ role in foreign policy making has recently been enhanced. As the Chinese government has become more and more active in international affairs, a lot of new issues and challenges have emerged. In this

To ally or not to ally?  121 context, both public and academic opinion have been collected and studied by various institutions and bureaucracies at different levels to provide consultation for policy design. At the same time, Chinese scholars now strive to supply knowledge and advice to the policy circle. It should be noted that the patterns and effects of Chinese IR scholars’ influence on the actual policy-making process are largely dependent on individual scholars’ personal relationships with specific officials and bureaucracies. In their insightful analysis on the role of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy, Huiyun Feng and Kai He propose four ideal models: epistemic community, free market, policy signaling, and mirroring policy (Feng and He 2016). As far as the subject of discussion is concerned, the “free market” model seems to make more sense than the others, because the Chinese government has a strong preference for maintaining the established non-alliance strategy at this stage but also tends to tolerate alternative voices. As can be seen in official media commentaries and other sources, the central authority also needs to respond to the academic ­debates over some strategic issues, particularly when the official guidelines and principles have been challenged. For example, Fu Ying, an experienced Chinese diplomat and former vice ­minister of foreign affairs, recently published a piece in Foreign Affairs, in which she responds to the debate on “the nature of the Chinese-Russian partnership” and “whether it will evolve into an alliance” (Fu 2016). Based on a ­comprehensive analysis of the China–Russia relationship, she clarifies that these two countries will not enter into a formal alliance (Fu 2016). This is a very ­authoritative response to the debate on China’s non-alliance policy in general, and the envisioned China–Russia alliance in particular. In this case, Chinese policy makers have a clear sense of the different views that have emerged. Although a complete policy shift in the short term, Chinese leaders also ­recognize the importance of making friends and recruiting support in international politics. In his address at the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in November 2014, Xi Jinping called on China to “develop a distinctive diplomatic approach befitting its role of a major country” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2014). Building and ­cultivating partnership relations with major powers, neighboring countries, and developing countries is central to China’s aspiration of being a great power. Xi said that China should “make more friends while abiding by the principle of non-alignment and build a global network of partnerships” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2014). Partnership diplomacy is not a new concept in Chinese diplomacy. According to official statements, China had established partnership relations with 67 individual countries and five regions or regional organizations until the end of 2014 (Wang 2014). Moreover, the strong emphasis placed on partnership diplomacy in recent official discourse is unprecedented and leads to the assumption that partnerships might play an even bigger role in the restructuring of China’s ­external relations in the years to come (Wu 2014; Swaine 2015). The newly proposed “global network of partnerships” can also be interpreted as an official response to the scholarly debate on non-alliance.

122  Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng Compared to China’s partnership diplomacy of the past two decades, President Xi Jinping has expanded understandings of strategic partnerships by ­defining them with different characteristics, especially seeking to establish a global network with China at its center. The emphasis on global partnerships in President Xi’s speech shows that Chinese leaders and policy makers are aware of the discourse surrounding the non-alliance policy. They are also aware that there are not many nations that can be relied upon to defend China’s strategic interests; therefore, continued adherence to non-alliance is not due to its efficacy, but because the government does not see many desirable alternatives. It is easy to see that the dilemma of a rising power lies at the core of most of the above debates. For those who call for a change of China’s strategy, allying with other nations is necessary and urgent while those who advocate adhering to non-alliance emphasize the cost and consequences of alignment. In practice, China’s official stance on non-alliance has changed little. The Chinese government has clearly stated in the Peaceful Development White Paper, published in 2011, that its foreign policy is based on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and that it does not form alliances with any other country or group of countries (Information Office of the State Council 2011). Beyond diplomatic rhetoric, however, Beijing’s foreign policy has indeed become more proactive. Whether China will form alliances with other powers and neighboring countries depends on its self-defined role within the current international system. More specifically, there are two important considerations for China: whether China can continue to benefit from the current US-dominated international system, and whether China can bear the costs of challenging US dominance. Only if China views the current international system as more of a constraint to its legitimate national interests than an enabler of power and influence will it choose to ally with other nations that view the United States as a threat to their national interests. Alliances have played a central role in international politics since ancient times. Alliances form, collapse, and transform in response to changes in the security ­environment. China will not change its position in the near future, but in the long term China may ally with other countries again, when external conditions permit and internal strategic calculations change. As Xu Jin sharply argues, “China should not give up the option of alliance in the future, but it must change its traditional mindset before altering its policy stance” (Xu 2015). It is necessary to note that the Chinese government tends to articulate its foreign policy principles and strategies using absolute and negative terminology such as, “China will never enter in any military alliance”. For foreign audiences such ­terminology is unpalatable because it conveys an aggressive and ­uncompromising posture. For domestic audiences, these negative absolutes are misleading as they deny the reality of dynamic actors operating in IR. The absolute discourse the Chinese government employs in IR severely harms China’s reputation and prestige. In fact, some Chinese policies are simply propaganda and have no actual bearing on China’s foreign policy. When China does make changes to its foreign policy, i.e. shifting from a non-alliance strategy to an alliance strategy, this inconsistency undermines China’s strategic reputation.

To ally or not to ally?  123 Wise politicians understand that policy choices are designed to serve temporary aims, which need to be adjusted in accordance with changes in the international system. Absolutes unnecessarily limit foreign policy choices and show a lack of foresight. China’s foreign policy aims would be better served by employing flexible terminology that enables China to operate dynamically in response to changes in the international system.

Conclusion Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has firmly maintained a non-­ alliance policy. Wary of getting unnecessarily entangled in interstate conflicts, China has implemented this policy mainly in reaction to unpleasant experiences with Cold War allies such as the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and North Korea. As China continues to rise, scholars and strategic analysts are beginning to question whether a non-alliance policy should be maintained. Some scholars contend that a non-alliance strategy cannot safeguard China’s national interests in the face of the United States’ security alliance network throughout East Asia, and without allies, China’s rise will be contained by the United States. To that end, pro-alliance scholars are especially favorable towards a formal ­a lliance with Russia. However, orthodox scholars, in favor of maintaining ­China’s nonalignment, argue that a formal alliance deviates from the fundamental principles of independence and self-reliance that have historically guided ­China’s foreign policy. Furthermore, few of the remaining options would even be considered trustworthy. A number of alternative strategies have been proposed to ­replace or complement the non-alliance strategy; among them are ­quasi-alliances, ­coalitions, and strategic partnerships. Although it will not lead to dramatic ­policy change in the short term, the debate surrounding the non-­a lliance strategy has significant implications for understanding China’s foreign policy behavior as well as its relations with other major powers and its ­neighboring countries.

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7 Preference expression under political constraints An analysis of debates about China’s use of force* Yin Jiwu In China, any discussion of the use of force is a politically sensitive research question. Therefore, few works directly focus on this theme. This is mainly due to the fact that China emphasizes its pacifist culture, anti-hegemony and power politics, and criticizes the United States’ use of force. Moreover, the technical difficulty is that it is hard to collect firsthand archival documents of China’s crisis decision-making. My definition of China’s use of force in this chapter is that China uses military capabilities, such as battle or non-battle military troops, missiles, and other traditional or nontraditional forces, to achieve strategic goals whether that be defending its national interests or shouldering responsibility in international affairs.1 This chapter will divide China’s use of force into two issue areas. The first one is China’s use of force in the traditional security field, and the cases are several wars and international crises since the establishment of the PRC2 such as the Korean War, the Sino–Indian Border War, the Sino–Vietnam War, and the Sino–Soviet Zhenbaodao dispute. The second issue area is in the nontraditional security field. Since the end of the Cold War, with China’s declining use of force and the change of security focus, China’s capabilities have spread to two new areas: the building of China’s overseas military bases and its participation in international peacekeeping efforts. China pursues two goals by using force: one is protecting national interests, including traditional security and nontraditional security interests, and the other is taking up international responsibility, especially in the field of international peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. In the traditional security field, Chinese scholars occasionally debate China’s use of force. The mainstream argument comes from the “established ­authority”,3 henceforth referred to as “the authority”, including sources such as the war and crisis history written by the Chinese government or a military research ­institute; together with the biographies and chronicles of China’s national leaders, these sources provide a few firsthand archives. The authority’s voice is based on ­socialist ideology, but it represents China’s official position using highly credible sources. Chinese scholars, either from history or international relations (IR) disciplines, focus on analyzing China’s decision-making and strategic behavior and have started their own independent research based on the progress of the studies of the Cold War and Chinese foreign policy history.

128  Yin Jiwu In the nontraditional security field, Chinese scholars have far more interest in overseas military base building than in international peacekeeping, because China’s position on international peacekeeping is much clearer and less controversial. To put it differently, most studies insist China should actively participate in international peacekeeping and internalize its norms. However, the link between academic debates and policy making is not very clear. More specifically, the main thing is that policy making on traditional security issues places more constraints on debates but not the other way around; in nontraditional security issues, debates can be ahead of policy making.

Debates on China’s use of force in traditional security issues The study of China’s use of force or of China’s wars in the traditional security field focuses on cases such as the Korean War, the Sino–Indian Border War, the Sino–Vietnam War, and the Sino–Soviet Zhenbaodao dispute. Compared with the intensive research in Western countries, the Chinese debate about the use of force is very unique. For instance, the English literature focuses on the question of “China’s use of force”, and contributes to diverse theories with an approach that relies on abundant case studies,4 mainly exploring Chinese decision-­making and motivation. In contrast, the Chinese prefer single case studies rather than comparative case studies except for some scholars’ works in which they use comparative methodology. Yin Jiwu (2011) applies a social psychology analysis, and Nie Hongyi (2008, 2011) discusses China’s strategic behavior in territorial disputes. Furthermore, the mainstream methodology Chinese scholars adopt is the historic approach rather than other IR or foreign policy analysis methods.5 ­Chinese scholars prefer historic cases such as the Korean War to more contemporary cases. Meanwhile, the Sino–Indian Border War and the Sino–Vietnam War are sensitive to political constraints. Next, I will discuss the Chinese debates about the use of force and their policy relevance in the traditional security field.

The debate on the cause of China’s use of force: the perspective of decision-making Obviously, one of the vital questions is why China uses force. The decision to go to war for self-defense or not depends on the circumstances. The existing literature makes little effort to discuss the motivation behind Chinese decision-­ making, so this chapter will reexamine some cases studies in its attempt to r­ eveal a more comprehensive picture of the causes of China’s use of force and explore the question of how scholarly discussions might have been influenced by the ­authority’s policy. First, there will be a discussion of the traditional a­ uthority’s policy and its explanation. Chinese scholars have not typically paid much ­attention to the question of China’s use of force, as there are some very official ­explanations for several cases in China’s war history published by the government. Among them, the Korean War and Sino–Indian Border War have their own official publications, but some other cases do not.6

Debates about China’s use of force  129 Those official textbooks and narratives by military historians have their own particular traits. Generally speaking, their answer to the motivation of China’s use of force is some kind of ethno-centralism: China’s response is defensive, and China has had no choice but to exert a military response to the push and harm to China’s territory by opposing countries, such as the United States, India, the former Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Also, it is China’s own right to defend its national interests. China has insisted on its own nonviolent resolution attitude towards disputes; however, it has had no choice but to use force against the ­aggression of these hostile countries.7 It is understandable that this school emphasizes China’s defensive position and presents China as a moral state and as the victim of the conflict. Following this defensive and just logic leads to the authority’s fixed policy in terms of the question of China’s use of force. In other words, China’s policy is the same as the explanation given in war history pieces published by the government. Also, the authority demonstrates the positive effects of China’s use of force.8 It is worth mentioning that the authority’s explanation is based on ideology and on the position that best defends its own interests, a logic shared by other relevant states. Nevertheless, it is based on serious historical study, considering the case selections and the relevant archival documents. Second is the revisionism approach by the Cold War group. The explanation by the authority mentioned above is the mainstream argument regarding the question of China’s use of force, which has been challenged by the Cold War group through empirical case studies of the Korean War, the Sino–Indian ­Border ­d ispute, the Sino–Soviet dispute, and the Cross-Strait crisis with the advantage of access to some but not all diplomatic archives, especially the availability of Russian and US archives. The Cold War group uses archives from different sides and gives a more detailed description of the historical events, which contributes to a more independent conclusion. The Cold War group – whose representatives are Shen Zhihua, Yang Kuisong, Li Danhui, Dai Chaowu, and Niu Jun – ­proposes a revisionist theory. Shen Zhihua’s case studies of the Korean War and the Sino–Soviet relationship (1999, 2007; Shen and Li 2006) are very persuasive. With the assistance of archival studies from China, Russia and the United States, Shen concludes that China’s decision to intervene in the Korean War is a realistic response to the US intervention in the Korean War. More specifically, the US intervention posed a great security threat to China, and the possible participation by the former ­Soviet Union, China’s ally of the time, was a challenge to China’s northeastern national security. Mao’s personal disposition contributed to the decision-­ making. Based on the analysis of the personal relationship between Chairman Mao and Stalin, Yang Kuisong (1999, 2009) stresses that the conflict between the two leaders was vital to China’s Korean War decision-making. The Cold War group’s research is very popular in China, and also acknowledged by the Western academic world. They challenge the authority’s explanation by detailed archival research. Other scholars in the Cold War group base their analysis on different theories but share the same method of historical and archival study. For example, Dai Chaowu (2004)9 explores the origin of the

130  Yin Jiwu Sino–Indian War from the perspective of national security, while Yang Kuisong (1999), Xu Yan (1994), and Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui (2006) analyze the Sino–Soviet dispute with the theoretical argument of ideological conflict and national security. Niu Jun (2013, 2014) prefers to concentrate on the importance of the change in the international structure as the cause of China’s use of force towards Taiwan and Vietnam. Due to political sensitivity, the Sino–Vietnam War is the “forbidden zone” in Chinese scholars’ case studies, except for Niu Jun’s structural analysis where he stresses the strategic structure between China, the United States, and the former Soviet Union, as well as the theory of “alliance and war” (Niu 2013: 273–295, 2014). Xue Li and Li Xiao (2015) propose instead a comprehensive framework pointing out the reasons of international strategic calculation; for instance, China could consolidate its alliance relationship with the United States by teaching Vietnam a lesson, and internal strategic calculation, or China could reform its army and uniforms through the war. It is a fact that researchers still do not have access to unclassified archives. Compared with the intensive revisionism study in case of the Korean War and Sino–Soviet relationship by the Cold War group, the other relevant cases still face more political constraints and could not develop their own revisionist theory. The reason that revisionist theory could challenge the authority’s policy and explanation is that it is possible to explore detailed “true” history and propose a credible argument with the availability of new archives. There is also more room to discuss some of the previously sensitive questions due to changes in the relationship between China and some relevant states such as Korea and Russia. The third is the foreign policy decision-making perspective. The advantage of revisionism by the Cold War group is that they rely on detailed archival “facts”, and then establish their more accurate argument, but they have no interest in contributing to IR and decision-making theory. At the same time, the Chinese IR group – divided into two approaches – is more interested in discussing the question of China’s use of force gradually. The first approach focuses on China’s use of force and intends to develop a theoretical explanation. Among them, Yin Jiwu (2011) explores the causal effects of “China’s face”, the personal willingness of leaders to endorse China’s use of force when China’s interest is at stake, while hoping to develop a more comprehensive framework with an approach that combines rationalism, social psychology, and culture. Shih Chih-yu (1993) insists on the psychoanalytic approach,10 arguing that the deep motivation of China’s use of force or China’s “symbolic” war is the indignity and face (Mianzi) of China’s leaders, rather than simple interest. The second approach is the single case studies conducted by Chinese IR scholars. Some prefer to analyze China’s use of force in territorial disputes with its neighbors from the perspective of domestic politics and crisis management. Qiu Meirong (2014) explores India’s domestic politics’ influence on its aggressive policy, and then argues that China has no choice but to use force after the breakdown of crisis management. Nie Hongyi (2008, 2011) focuses on China’s territorial disputes, and proposes that whether the opposing state endangers China’s

Debates about China’s use of force  131 core interest is what determines China’s use of force. Yin Jiwu (2016a) discusses the causal effect of cognitive bias on the origin of the Sino–Indian Border War through building a theory of unilateral consensus. Actually, the decision-making approach is not the mainstream approach in China, and they have not yet produced an intensive case study based on the Cold War group’s detailed archival study. The Cold War group provides the archives and document sources and their own excellent research, but it lacks theoretical contributions. The fact that the decision-making and IR approaches contribute even less to theory building than the Cold War group means that they have less influence. The authority provides its official explanation and policy on the question of China’s use of force, while the Cold War and the IR groups conduct more scientific empirical studies and reach their own conclusions. The current debate shows more support for the Cold War and the IR groups, but the rest of the scholarship from researchers in military institutions to those in government continue to insist on the traditional ideological explanation. It is hard to figure out whether the research of revisionism and IR has influenced China’s foreign policy. Either those are two parallel lines, or there is the possibility that the more detailed and accurate archival exploration did innovate the perceptions of the authority and other researchers. I argue that it is the perception of China’s national leaders with regard to its national interest over some specific bilateral relationship that contributes to China’s policy adjustment. Furthermore, both the revisionism and IR theory approaches would face pressure from the authority’s policy, which means that most research in China cannot completely break away from the authority’s political constraint and express its own theoretical preferences, values, and particular ethno-centralism traits.

The debate about the cause of China’s use of force: the perspective of strategic culture Generally speaking, strategic culture is one of the most important factors influencing the strategic choice of the use of force. Compared with the few and dismissed studies of China’s use of force, the debate about Chinese strategic culture is more intensive and focused, and the arguments put forward by the cultural, military, and IR schools are very diverse. It is interesting to note that Chinese scholars prefer to engage in debates with Western literature. The mainstream opinion represented by Alastair Iain Johnston emphasizes the parabellum paradigm of Chinese strategic culture.11 Most Chinese scholars debate with this argument of Western scholars on Chinese offensive strategic culture, demonstrating the pacifist trait of China’s strategic culture. Actually, the outcome of the debate is that most scholars support and agree with the authority’s policy. First is the traditional pacifist cultural theory. Chinese national leaders all ­emphasize the love of peace and the cultural tradition of peaceful dispute ­resolution since the establishment of the PRC such as the proposition of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the 1950s. Peace and harmony are truly the core traits of Chinese culture, as they are core characteristics of Confucianism.

132  Yin Jiwu The traditional theory of pacifist culture originates from Chinese dialectic thought on peace and conflict. For many it is debatable whether peace is the core trait of Confucian culture, although this trait dominated the Chinese culture school, while some argue that Chinese culture is Confucian on the outside and Legalist on the inside.12 The Chinese authority’s expression of China’s strategic culture is a peace-based culture, which derives from the historic fact that China has never invaded any state, resolves disputes peacefully, and cites the tribute system as evidence.13 Following the authority’s policy, the mainstream argument of Chinese ­scholars holds true to the belief of peace-oriented culture, and Li Jijun from the Chinese Academy of Military Science is the leading scholar in this group. In his definition of Chinese strategic culture, he states that the core factors are the idea of just war, grand unification thinking, “non-offensive” thinking, preparing for the future thinking, preparing for war thinking, strategic thinking, and personnel training thinking. The traits of Chinese traditional strategic culture are “peace seeking, unification preference, defense concentrated”, and China has historically pursued an active defensive strategy, also known as a “tit-for-tat” strategy (Li 1998). The pacifist cultural theory developed by China’s authority and mainstream school originates from a combination of traditional culture and realist politics. Specifically, it is the mixture of cultural moral superiority, self-justification, and strategic calculation. Second is the debate about the nature of Chinese strategic culture, whether it is defensive or offensive. As discussed above, the mainstream Western school ­focuses on the offensive argument about the causal relationship between ­Chinese offensive strategic culture with China’s use of force (Johnston 1998b). China would like to use force when it has superiority in the power structure: while ­China’s policy and rhetoric are defensive and peaceful, its strategic behavior is more offensive. Critiques of the Western offensive theory focus on the nature of Chinese strategic culture. Some criticize the offensive theory through the analysis of ancient China’s strategic culture, and stress the pacifist trait. Li Xiaoyan (2006, 2011) resorts to a detailed analysis of the classic documents of ancient China and clarifies the pacifist cultural tradition in Chinese history. Zhu Zhongbo and Zhou Yunxiang (2011) study war data in the Ming Dynasty and eight other empires to demonstrate that Chinese strategic culture is not driven by offensive realism, but appears to have a low-level violence trait. Another group proposes that China’s strategic culture is based more on ­defensive realism with rigorous scientific methodology. Feng Huiyun (2005, 2009) argues that Chairman Mao’s personality is more defensive using operational code analysis from political psychology. Specifically, she analyzes the ­official texts of Mao Zedong on foreign affairs, studying Mao’s philosophy and instrumental beliefs, and concludes that Mao’s strategic cultural traits are more dynamic through content analysis. Feng’s scientific research model is impressive but not popular in China. Overall, Chinese scholars criticize the Western theory of Chinese strategic culture and support the authority’s policy expression. Clearly, the authority conditions Chinese scholars’ ways of thinking about

Debates about China’s use of force  133 Chinese strategic culture with the result that the two share the same idea. It is interesting to note that the debate does not originate from the Chinese, but from outside – the pacifist trait of Chinese strategic culture emerges from the debate with Western offensive theory. After examining the existing literature on Chinese strategic culture theory, Yin Jiwu (2014, 2016b) proposes a strategic thinking model transcending the debate of the offensive and defensive theory through a case study of Chinese strategic behavior. He does not deny the offensive or defensive traits of Chinese strategic culture. Instead, he points out that they fragment Chinese strategic thinking and further argues for the unilateral consensus/false consensus trait of Chinese strategic thinking in order to avoid the misleading nature of the debate. Specifically, unilateral consensus thinking originates from the strategic calculation in which China needs to form false and superficial consensus with its counterpart while not sharing the same idea; the other originates from the shortcomings of culture, habit, and cognitive ability so that China or both parties involved cannot realize the false consensus. The practical forms of unilateral consensus in specific Chinese strategic thinking and choice include harmony, compromise, shelving the dispute, and so forth. Unilateral consensus could ­result in the difference between an actor’s expectations and conflict of interest versus China’s strategic choice of the use of force in certain circumstances. The above debates did not bring about consensus or move the debate further; the reality is that most scholars would like to express their own ideas, but not debate with others. In sum, the pacifist culture theory remains the accepted mainstream view shared by the authority and most scholars; it is also the theory that some scholars resort to in their debates with Western scholars. It is very interesting to point out that the mainstream debate actually supports the official policy, and that scholars prefer to debate with the Western offensive school (it is unclear whether Western scholars know this due to the language barrier). As my brief analysis above shows, the debate about Chinese strategic culture within China displays a characteristic of China’s study of the use of force – criticism of and challenge to the official policy are quite unlikely whilst socialization by the authority in some areas is very successful. The explanation of the cultural approach places more weight on the causal effect of culture, honor, and moral superiority but not rational calculation in terms of the consistency between academia and authority.

The debate about the effects of China’s use of force Different schools of thought have focused on assessing the effects of China’s use of force as one strategic choice to deal with international crisis. According to the authority’s policy, China’s use of force is a just and limited war measure to defend national interest, which is the mainstream argument supported by most but not all scholars. The Cold War and IR groups partially challenge this point and there are some debates on this issue in China.

134  Yin Jiwu The first debate is over the mainstream egocentrism theme and its critics. Based on the Chinese position, the authority narrates war history and establishes the correct explanatory line for China’s use of force, whether defensive or offensive – all that is understandable – but one issue is the political position while another is the egocentrism in social psychology. The Chinese government values highly the positive effects of the Korean War and the Sino–Indian Border dispute. Specifically, China’s decision to enter the Korean War was rational in that it was beneficial to China’s international status, China’s unification, and the demonstration of power of the socialist union (Xu 1990: 315–346). With regard to the Sino–Indian Border War, China has defended its territorial integrity, consolidated its national security, and maintained border peace for at least 60 years after going to war in self-defense.14 It is beneficial for China to improve the relationship with the United States and promote its reform, opening-up strategy, and military modernization through the Sino–Vietnam War (Han 1990: 285– 287). It is reasonable that the authority would strongly emphasize the positive effects of China’s use of force for the reason that it is one of the most efficient measures to defend China’s national interest. Another reason is the fact that China has won most of the wars since the establishment of the PRC and gained improved international status from the conflicts. With the blossoming of Cold War studies, especially with more available ­archives, some Chinese scholars have challenged the dominant positive effect idea. Shen Zhihua together with some other dedicated Cold War historians has presented some outstanding works. One leading scholar, Yang Kuisong, argues for the positive effects of the Korean War, such as a better alliance relationship with the Soviet Union, promotion of international status, acceleration of Chinese military modernization, and consolidation of domestic foundations of the ruling CCP (2009: 142–143). Shen Zhihua demonstrates a more balanced view that includes the positive effects above, but also the negative sides: the delay of Taiwan’s liberation, the confrontation with the Western international system led by the United States, and the obstruction to China’s modernization (2007: 294–300). As for the Korean War’s assessment, with the escalation of the North K ­ orean nuclear crisis, some argue that China should reassess the narrative of the K ­ orean War. Other scholars question the negative side of China’s strategy in the Sino– Indian Border War, and think that even if China acted as a good winner, namely retreating to the former control line after military victory and being kind to war prisoners for the sake of peace and friendship building, India would not ­appreciate the Chinese kindness. As a result, China has kept a “cold peace” ­relationship with India for a few decades (Wang 2009: 252–260). Interestingly, there are a few debates about the political effects in the Cross-Strait crisis, the Sino–Soviet dispute, and the Sino–Vietnam War cases with no conclusive ­assessment of the overall question of China’s use of force.15 Several factors ­contribute to the debate on the effects of China’s use of force. One factor is the reflection of China’s own position and emotion; another is that freedom of discussion is limited by the official policy; and the third is that it is unacceptable to the Chinese as a victim mentality and nationalism are more popular. The last is that it is impossible to

Debates about China’s use of force  135 continue debating due to the lack of primary sources of archive. The few questions and criticisms above have not influenced the mainstream positive assessment theory. In other words, the authority still sticks to the positive narrative and assessment, and more often it is the authority that places constraints on scholarly debates, not the opposite. The second debate is about when China’s use of force is good for its interests. It is debatable when force should be used and when other strategic measures should be chosen instead. Another aspect of the debate is how China should use force, since the purpose of China’s use of force is to defend its national ­interest.16 The authority has not given a detailed explanation to this question, but does provide a rational justification of China’s use of force. More specifically, it is ­necessary and correct for China to use force to defend its interests, but it is ­reasonable for China not to use force in other circumstances. The logic of the Chinese authority is that reality dictates what is reasonable. In contrast to the official narrative, some Cold War scholars criticize the timing of China’s use of force; for example, Shen Zhihua initiated a hot debate on the Korean War studies. ­ orean There have been different voices assessing the five specific battles of the K War. The authority’s war history textbook represents the mainstream approach; Xu Yan and The Chronicle of Mao share a positive view that the initiation timing of the five battles is positive and correct. Scholars in the Cold War group put forward a more sophisticated analysis. In a detailed case study, Shen Zhihua and Yang Kuisong argue that from the third to the fourth battle there appeared to be a turning point — before that time, China was controlling the initiative and achieving great victory, but weaknesses and shortcomings were exposed at that time, such as the quick decline of the Chinese military capability due to cold weather and insufficient supplies (Yang 2009: 123–143). An opportunity appeared for China when the United States promised to sign an armistice with China in the UN. Mao rejected General Peng Dehuai’s request to reassemble due to cognitive bias and overconfidence, and then went ahead with the fourth and fifth battles (Shen 2007: 288–300). China lost the best ­opportunity to sign an armistice with the United States and in the next two years gained little either militarily or politically from the war, which means that it did not improve its bargaining power at the cost of an extra two years of war. This new narrative of the “best opportunity lost” in the Korean War challenges the official traditional theory and is agreed upon by more and more Cold War and IR scholars in China. Up to now, there has been no adjustment in the traditional narrative, which shows a bottom line that the debate among scholars cannot push the authority to adjust its politically correct narrative.17 In other words, I argue that the authority would revise theory more based on its own judgment of interest and politics. Additionally, the Cold War group proposes its revisionism theory to explain China’s assistance to Vietnam to fight against France. Yang Kuisong (2009) ­a rgues that Prime Minister Zhou’s behavior was more cautious with lessons learnt from the Korean War’s lost opportunity. Zhou arranged a secret talk in

136  Yin Jiwu Guangxi province with the national leaders of North Vietnam after the victory of the Dien-bien-phu Campaign. During the meeting it appeared obvious that Vietnam wanted to unify the whole country, but Zhou held the opposite view (Yang 2009: 144–173). In sum, broadly speaking, the mainstream theory by the authority shared by most scholars suggests the positive effects of China’s use of force, while the Cold War group criticizes it and recovers more credible historical facts, especially regarding the question about the timing to sign an armistice treaty with the opposition. The Cold War group does challenge the authority and its view is shared by most scholars in IR, but this does not change the authority’s policy. A signal that China has adjusted its attitude towards the Korean War is that it did not hold an official memorial in 2013 and only sent Li Yuanchao to the DPRK on the mission of participation at the 60th anniversary of the Korean War; its counterparts such as South Korea and the United States initiated a high-profile public memorial.18 Overall, the Cold War group changes the social foundation and public opinion underlining the adjustment of the authority’s official policy, but it does not cause change to this policy directly.

Debates about the use of force in the nontraditional security studies Since the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalization along with China’s own venture in globalization, the domain of its use of force has transcended the former national territory to the defense of overseas Chinese interests. There are debates on China’s overseas military bases and debates of China’s participation in international peacekeeping. The first issue has triggered heated discussions both in academia and the media; the second issue’s debates are comparatively calmer and more theoretical where scholars’ arguments are more consistent with the official authority. The outcome of the debates is that China has changed its policy towards overseas military bases and has kept a more ­consistent, positive policy of participation with international peacekeeping.19 Compared with the political sensitivity of debating traditional territory disputes, the debate concerning these two issues is freer and is more a reflection of the global interest defense problem in contemporary China. To some extent, the debates in academia are a mirror of the social background of the policy change.

The debate about overseas military bases The issues shaping the debates of China’s overseas military bases include the need for escort, the security problems of overseas Chinese, and the protection of overseas investment. These reasons render it urgent for the Chinese ­military force to provide more efficient protection of China’s overseas nontraditional ­security interests. From the normalization of China’s naval escort in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, the debates on whether China should build an overseas military

Debates about China’s use of force  137 base have flourished quickly and focus on the name of a military base, the necessity of the military base, and the specific form a military base should take. First is the issue of the name of the Chinese overseas military base. Most of the discussions about China’s overseas military base tacitly approve the existing term of “base”, which is shared by Chinese academics and the Western world. Only few propose that China should select a softer term, a view represented by Xu Yao, who argues the traditional term of “military base” may conjure up the picture of military confrontation and arms race which is the typical trait of offensive realism. In her eyes, China’s overseas military bases should care more about the ­cooperation of nontraditional security, thus a more neutral depot whose function is more on cooperation such as international cooperation against terrorism with local states, the supply of escort, and maritime technological cooperation. For the sake of strategic but not military thinking, China’s overseas military bases could be named “strategic pivots” (Xu 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).20 This would be more consistent with China’s existing policy, because China’s intention is to avoid possible confrontation and conflict with the hegemony due to the military bases. The other advantage is that China has had mature overseas “trade post” building experience in ancient times, so it is feasible that China would put more effort into the nonmilitary side by drawing on its experience of building a “trade post” along sailing lines by Zheng He from the Ming Dynasty. Obviously, the name of a military base is not a hot topic, and most debates use the traditional term “military base”. Nevertheless, the idea of “trade post” ­actually shows China’s deep strategic defensive and nonmilitary thinking. The other factor underlying the debate of the “military base” term is the research on US overseas military bases. Traditionally, it is politically correct to criticize US overseas military bases as the products of imperialism and colonialism. Since China became globalized in the post-Cold War era, it has been helpful to study the ­experiences of modern Western states, but negative thinking towards the idea of a military base has been the outcome of political correctness in China. The ­debate about the name of China’s overseas military base is not only a ­debate about a name but also a policy choice about whether China should go the ­universal way of Western society or its own particular road with its own characteristics regarding overseas military base building. It is also a debate based on the philosophy of China-centralism or globalism concerning China’s use of force in nontraditional security issues in the post-Cold War era. Second is the discussion of the necessity to build an overseas military base. The debate about the necessity of China’s overseas military bases dominated the Chinese academic community from 2009 to 2014. This may have originated from the fact that the authority changed the policy in 2008 when China started its first escort. It is a signal that China would like to build the first overseas ­military base, and that its strategy and policy could be affected by the situation. The other element is the increasing number of overseas Chinese’ security problems, including overseas Chinese treatment, and the protection of overseas investment causing intense discussion in Chinese society.

138  Yin Jiwu There are three views on this debate: supporters, objectors, and compromisers in terms of the necessity of building China’s overseas military bases. The reasons held by supporters are the protection of China’s overseas interests and the need to use force overseas, which could be provided by China’s oversea military bases; hence, it is reasonable for China, the emerging global power, to build certain overseas military bases to protect its overseas interests, even from the perspective of Western powers.21 The objectors stick to the authority’s policy, arguing that overseas military bases are a policy tool for Western superpowers to execute ­hegemonic policy, and that China should pioneer its own policy ideas such as the nonintervention policy. Li Guoqiang argues it is impossible for China to build an overseas military base, and that China does not have enough facilities because it is a more domestically oriented and strategically defensive state (cited in Yao and Lu 2009).22 Based on the existing policy, the objectors criticize the supporters and ignore the need for overseas military bases due to the expansion of China’s overseas interests. The compromisers agree with the supporters that it is a good thing China builds overseas military bases, but they argue that it should adopt a softer way to build the bases. Specifically, what China needs is not “overseas military bases”, but nontraditional security supply posts such as “overseas soft military presence” or “strategic cooperation or supply posts” (Sun 2011). According to the division of China-centralism and globalism, the value base of the supporters leans more towards globalism, which means that globalism is seen as the necessary way to defend China’s national interest, and is the foundational value of the Chinese globalization experience, but the objectors’ conviction is China-­ centralism or internalization while the compromisers intend to build a middle road between China-centralism and globalism, resorting to a particular Chinese way to defend China’s interest. Up to now, the supporters have dominated the debate and the objectors’ voices are gradually disappearing. One point is the normalization of China’s e­ scort activities. Today it is widely accepted in China that the protection of ­China’s overseas interests is becoming a vital strategic problem, which means it is urgent for China to build overseas military bases – this is a view shared by both academia and the authority. The other change is the authority’s attitude and policy. The spokesperson of the Department of National Defense denied that China would build an overseas military base in the Seychelles in 2011. However, China announced the decision to build the first overseas military base in Djibouti in December 2015, even though the function of China’s base is more focused on cooperation and nontraditional security protection, which is different from its Western counterpart.23 As the authority changed its policy, we would expect that the debate in ­academia would become more approving, and there would be fewer objecting voices. The supporters have overwhelmingly won the debate, and the question next would be how, where, and what kind of base China should build in the future. In terms of the necessity of military bases, the debate was dominated by the supporters, and a few years later the authority changed its policy from

Debates about China’s use of force  139 objection to approval officially. However, it is hard to figure out whether the debate is influenced by policy making or is more a relationship of coordination with each other and a common reaction to the need of protection of China’s overseas interests. The third is the debate on what kind of base should be built. At present the focus is on specific sites, and the nature and forms of China’s overseas military bases. Few debates appear in terms of site selection, and most scholars mention China’s strategic port in the Eastern part of South Asia and the Indian Ocean, especially some port cities that have a good relationship with China, such as Gwadar Port, Djibouti, and Chittagong (Xu 2015a). With the development of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese scholars have shifted more towards the research of the Belt and Road, exploring the relationship between China’s overseas military bases and the Belt and Road. They argue that China should build the base along the lines of the Belt and the Road so that it can protect the political, economic, and security interests while proceeding with the Belt and Road (Xu 2014, 2015a). China has announced the first base building and no further information about the next locations of bases, but we can figure out that the other two ports mentioned above could be the priority. Actually, the debate has taken place before the policy, but the authority may have prepared the options and not revealed the specific policy yet. Two schools debate about the specific forms of China’s overseas military bases. The first school tacitly approves the traditional form of base, which means they do not talk much about the specific form of the problem. Rather, they discuss more the urgency with which China should protect its interests through ­building a military base. As to what kind of base, they do not specify, which indicates the default base model of the Western states. The second school emphasizes a base that is different from the West, and the particular forms are proposed. Sun ­Degang (2011, 2014) explains the “soft military presence” based on research about the overseas military bases of Western powers, and he concludes Western ones are the product of power politics and a measure/tool of US foreign military intervention, while China’s overseas military bases should be built consistently with China’s foreign strategic goals, i.e. the nonuse of force, no intervention in internal politics, war, and support of overseas citizens. According to Sun (2014), China should choose a softer form of military base, and focus on functional nontraditional security cooperation, including ­escorting, logistic supply, international peacekeeping, and overseas military representative port and military training. The other category is the nontraditional security ­cooperation bases promoted by Xu Yao (2015d) and Li Chen (2016), who ­suggest that strategic port and supply bases are the appropriate forms of military base for the purpose of protecting China’s overseas interests. More specifically, China could initiate nontraditional security cooperation with ­local states, such as counterterrorism, maritime cooperation and investment, and ­ensuring its energy, and financial sources and overseas Chinese security. Li Chen distinguishes three traits of military bases which determine their critical role in the traditional strategy of a great power: vital strategic location, relatively

140  Yin Jiwu abundant resources, and capability against striking and continuous o ­ peration. Furthermore, China should build the bases for the sake of ­securing nonmilitary action and the development of international cooperation. Long X ­ inchun’s view (2011) is that China should develop a different way from the West, in which the building of the military bases addresses the goal of i­mplementing the task of nontraditional security, and provision of international c­ ommon goods. The outcome of the debate is the prevalence of “Chinese” overseas military bases that are different from the West and more oriented towards nontraditional security cooperation. Few scholars agree with traditional Western military bases publicly. More scholars criticize the US overseas military bases and claim that they are tools for the United States to achieve global hegemony. It is clear that the above debate reflects the contrast between Western and Chinese values, as well as the contrast between Sino-centralism and globalism. Actually, the fact is that more scholars have been arguing about how the ­specific values of China contradict the global diplomacy pursued by China since the end of the Cold War when China started to “go global”. It is also a w ­ indow through which the contradiction between Sino-centralism and globalism ­appears as China rises, as seen from the debate about international peacekeeping below. China has confirmed the first overseas base (not using the term “military base”), one that includes nontraditional security cooperation, and strategic but not military goals. It seems that the outcome of the debate is consistent with the authority’s official policy, the two sharing the same direction. It is hard to figure out whether the debate has influenced the policy change, but it is clear that the logic of strategic thinking about an overseas military base in academia is similar to that of the authority, both placing more importance on the nonmilitary, defensive, and nontraditional cooperation traits of China’s overseas military base.

The debate about participation in international peacekeeping China has taken on more international responsibility since the end of the Cold War and currently plays a vital role in international peacekeeping, especially compared with the diminishing participation from the Western states. The Chinese academia, IR scholars, the police department, and the medical divisions share the same attitude and ideas with the authority. Chinese scholars agree with the authority’s active attitude, and are cautious about the high expectations from the West; moreover, the debates on this issue are relatively less vociferous. The first debate is about the motivation of China’s participation in i­nternational peacekeeping. As one of China’s major objectives is to take up international ­responsibility during the process of integration into the international society, its participation in international peacekeeping is interpreted according to various theories in terms of motivation. Realists put weight on the interests and social pressure from home and abroad (Zhao and Gao 2011: 479–483). Institutionalists are more concerned about China actively integrating into the world and internalizing international institutions; last is the constructivist perspective from norm dynamics – following the change in social identity, China would then ­internalize the norms of international peacekeeping (Zhao 2007).

Debates about China’s use of force  141 Most explanations follow the approaches of institutions and norms analyses, although it is debatable whether China should accept the norms of international peacekeeping at the preliminary stage of its participation. Now the debate has shifted to the question of whether and how China could shape the existing norms of international peacekeeping. For instance, He Yin (2014: 105–121) ­a rgues that “development and peace” norms provided by China compete with and complement Western “freedom and peace” norms. With the deepening of China’s participation in international peacekeeping, the prevailing position is active participation, 24 so what is important next is the question of how and in what ways China should participate: How could China shape international peacekeeping norms? Second is the debate about some specific issues of China’s participation. One is region selection. The specific region of China’s participation is determined by the development of international conflict. One motive behind China’s ­participation is to build a good relationship with its neighbors. This is the argument proposed by Tang Yongsheng (cited in Wang 2003: 69–111), who suggests that Southeast Asia should be a key region of China’s participation, due to the strategic importance of the region. In terms of conflict resolution, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have been the key regions of international peacekeeping in the past decade. From this point, Zhao Lei and Gao Xinman (Zhao and Gao 2011) argues those regions are the most vital places for China. It is worth ­noticing that region selection is not a heated debate topic, and it is up to China’s ­authority. The choice of region reflects the value judgments of Sino-centralism and ­globalism in China’s participation. Another debate is about who will compose the Chinese PK staff. Most of China’s peacekeeping staff are noncombat military watchers, peacekeeping ­policemen, and peacekeeping armed forces, with the latter including e­ ngineering, medical, transportation, and logistics units. All of these roles demonstrate the nonmilitary and nonconflict purpose of China’s participation. Western states expect China to dispatch its combat troops in order to strengthen its power in peacekeeping; however, China’s mainstream attitude is more cautious about the high expectations from the West. For example, Li Dongyan (2012) and Zhao Lei and Gao Xinman (2011) hold a prudent view towards the question of dispatching combat troops, arguing that China should avoid the type of intervention that could complicate p ­ eacekeeping. Chinese academia also supports a cautious response to the high expectations from the West in relation to the issues of international peacekeeping, and it has the same attitude with the authority (Cao 2009). A major adjustment o ­ riginating from a recent leadership change may imply that China would like to take a more active role in international peacekeeping, but scholars have not voiced any arguments, either in support or against this idea. In sum, the mainstream voice in terms of the staff dispatching issue reflects the Chinese own position regarding peacekeeping, but not the pressure from Western states. A further point of the second debate above is that Chinese ­academia holds a more active attitude in terms of form, scale, and diversity of China’s participation (Zhao 2007; Xue 2010; Zhao and Gao 2011; Li 2012).

142  Yin Jiwu This is an outcome of China’s active participation attitude globally, as a result of which China is now pursuing a more active role in global governance. To some extent, the fact that there are few debates shows most research in peacekeeping participation has not moved beyond the constraints of the authority. The third debate concerns the change in ideas and norms brought by China’s participation. China is pursuing a more active role in peacekeeping, which is consistent with its general attitude towards the international system. However, it may still confront conflicting ideas about peacekeeping participation, typical problems involving the adjustment of the principle of nonintervention, and the balance of human rights and development. Most researchers realize the conflict between reality and traditional ideas, and Xue Lei (2008) proposes that it is time to reconsider the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention. Zhang Chun (2016) discusses whether China should observe the nonintervention principle when it participates more actively in peacekeeping operations. With regard to the idea of conflict, most research points out the reality of value system differences, but it does not provide a solution, whether to abolish, adjust traditional norms, or adopt a new idea. The debate about conflicting norms originates from the contradiction between Sino-centralism and globalism. China now faces more pressure from outsiders when it participates more actively in peacekeeping operations. It is reconsidering its traditional norms, but it has not yet internalized global v­ alues from the West. China has not yet adjusted its policy towards peacekeeping, which is a signal that the debates have not influenced the authority’s attitude towards t­ raditional norms. At best, it makes policy makers realize the difficulties e­ merging from participation and the contradicting values with its traditional norms. This ­contradiction reflects the logic that practice makes policy change: China could adjust its own policy after the practice of participation. These debates appear to confirm that Chinese academia keeps its attitude ­consistent with the official authority. Specifically, they agree to a more ­active ­attitude, but keep a cautious eye on the high expectations from the West. In terms of the motivation of China’s participation, the different theories of ­realism, institutionalism, and constructivism provide different explanations. On operational issues, such as regional choice, staff arrangement, and scale of expansion, Chinese scholars adhere more to the values of Sino-centralism, as against the norms of Western globalism, although more scholars realize the conflict ­between these values and are willing to reconsider the value of traditional norms. From this perspective, the debate about China’s participation is a case demonstrating the authority’s influence on academia. The debates about peacekeeping are far less intense than the overseas military bases issue. Given the high degree of support for the authority’s policy, few scholars explore the negative aspects of ­China’s international peacekeeping. One of them, however, is Gao Xinan (Gao and Wang 2008), who discusses in detail the shortcomings of Chinese ­peacekeeping ­policemen, including the weakness of basic skills in communication, driving, and professional ability.

Debates about China’s use of force  143

The sociology of the Chinese studies of China’s use of force The Chinese academia’s debates on China’s use of force in the traditional security or nontraditional security areas are indirect rather than specific in themes, and its policy influence is limited. For instance, the particular issue of the use of force demonstrates a corresponding sociological logic of knowledge about ­Chinese diplomacy studies in China. First, it is obvious that the social psychology of egocentrism appears in the ­debate. This observation is not intended to criticize the debate, since ­egocentrism is a universal social psychological mechanism in diverse social groups. The ­empirical evidence is that when analyzing the issue of China’s use of force, ­Chinese scholars are overconfident about its morality. Surely, the revisionism of the Cold War and IR groups intends to get rid of the impact of egocentrism and seek the truth from archival studies; despite this effort, it is clear that they appreciate the complexity of China’s position and are defending China’s national ­interest. This position is indicated by the fact that Chinese scholars seldom use the term “China’s use of force”, which shows the Chinese value judgment towards the use of force, as they stay true to the conviction of their pacifist tradition. Second, it is a highly sensitive issue to talk about the use of force. This point is related to the egocentrism mentioned above, and it is also impossible for scholars to conduct their own research about China’s use of force. For instance, it is highly sensitive to assess the motivation of China’s use of force in case studies, for the reason that a negative assessment means that the Chinese leadership has made wrong decisions. The other side of the sensitivity coin is the cultural roots – it is the history of national humiliation in the modern era that gives the ­Chinese a sense of victimhood and weakness. Different from the glorious memory of China dominating East Asia in history, this feeling of victimhood contributes to self-justness and moral rightness in terms of the use of force. This kind of social psychology shapes not only the national leaders’ perception and emotions but also the feelings of the ordinary people. It follows that the mainstream of Chinese academia shares the same values and attitudes of the authority in both politics and culture. It is China’s national interest and ideology that determine the answers to China’s use of force, which are based on Sino-­ centralism rather than globalism. With the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization, globalism could shape some scholars’ definitions of ­China’s ­national interest in the debates of overseas military bases and international peacekeeping, but they have not yet overcome the constraints of Sino-centralism. Third, one fundamental feature is the few debates and the decentralization of the issues. It is interesting that Chinese scholars focus more on the counterpart’s use of force – the United States and the Korean War, the Indian decision to go to war, the US role in the Cross-Strait crisis, but not on China’s own use of force. Four difficulties are listed below. The first is that the archives have not been opened to the public in China. This impediment is followed by the political

144  Yin Jiwu constraint on research to reach a value-free conclusion. The third reason is the fact that grand strategic study is very popular in China, but a detailed case study is hard to find in the field of China’s foreign affairs and IR studies. The last is a cultural feature: the Chinese prefer not to debate in public, but more in private. We can attribute these reasons to two dimensions, political and cultural. The fourth debate is about the prediction of China’s use of force in the future. Up to now, the debates about China’s use of force have been underdeveloped due to the constraint by the authority, which means that China has adopted a more cautious attitude towards the question of the use of force, and will pursue a ­pacifist policy in the future. To speak more specifically, China never abandons the use of force on traditional security issues such as territorial dispute resolution. China may adjust its strategic behavior before changing the traditional ­policy, so we can predict it would be more likely to resort to using force in response to territorial disputes and international crisis. In the nontraditional security field, China may use force to defend its overseas interests in global governance and nontraditional security cooperation.

Concluding remarks This chapter presents the debate on China’s use of force in two fields, traditional and nontraditional security. This is by no means a full map of the debates on the issue in China, particularly because the studies are limited, decentralized, and fragmented. On specific issues mentioned above, such as the motivation for China’s use of force or for overseas military bases, many scholars concentrate on their debates and apply different theories.25 With regard to policy influence, it is hard to figure out the real impact of scholars on policy adjustment even from a single case study. The logic of a possible map may be the following: the debates in academia interact with official policy adjustments, and the Korean War is a good case. It is the authority loosening the constraints on Korean War studies and publishing research, which contributed to the flourishing of Cold War and IR studies, even though the revisionist school of the Korean War study may only influence the authority indirectly. It is worth mentioning that the theory of China’s use of force could not be published in China without permission from the authority. To put it differently, it is impossible to publish any new theory that challenges the authority’s policy if China has not adjusted its own policy, so it is hard to hear any dissenting voices in open publications. Taking the Korean War as an example again, Shen Zhihua published his work abroad with a detailed archival study, which then appeared in the mainland after the policy change. Second, it is from political and cultural origins that most of the research shares the same voice with the authority. And last, it is possible that the research has no direct relationship with the authority. Broadly speaking, the positive interaction between academic research and the adjustment of the authority’s policy is determined by two things. One is whether the bilateral relationship between China and the counterpart has changed. This is the case in terms of the Sino–Soviet relationship and the possible China–DPRK

Debates about China’s use of force  145 relationship. Otherwise China should not change its policy for the political consideration of the bilateral relationship. The other is the political sensitivity of specific issues; in these cases, it is not feasible to break the line of China’s self-justness, moral right, and sense of correctness, and this is true even for the nontraditional security issues. The debate about China’s use of force is a window to explore the complex relationship between the Chinese academia, politics, and culture. The study of China’s use of force will thrive in the future, with features such as open archives, value-free research, and the broadening of specific issues. This development is important for China to achieve its own national goals, the accomplishment of the “two 100-years plans” and the strength of its strategic capability, as well as better understanding of its own strategic behavior and psychology, to make it easier to fulfill these national goals.

Notes * The author would like to thank He Kai, Li Mingjiang, Sun Degang, Xu Yao, Niu Jun, and Chen Zheng for their helpful comments. 1 This definition is important when I discuss the Chinese debates of China’s use of force. In China, most academic writings exclude the Cross-Strait relationship as an international affairs issue, but include it as a domestic affairs issue which means that China’s use of force in the Cross-Strait issue is not one of the themes in this chapter, although it is a common topic in Western literature. In this book, Zuo Xiying in Chapter 8 discusses the Chinese debates on the South China Sea issue, so in this chapter, I will not mention the debates on China’s use of force in South China Sea. 2 For the review of China’s international crisis management theory, see Johnston (2016). 3 Strictly speaking, the Chinese scholars in this book come from academia and media. In this chapter, considering the authorities (researchers or institutions) that have proposed the mainstream argument in terms of China’s use of force in the traditional security issue, I include their descriptions as one key source of Chinese debates. 4 Johnston (1998a), Christensen (1996, 2006), Garver (1992), Gurtov and Hwang (1980), Scobell (2003), Segal (1985), Whiting (2001a, 2001b), Burles and Shulsky (2000), Fravel (2005, 2008). 5 In his review of the Chinese studies of China’s foreign diplomacy, Niu Jun (2007) points out that there are few studies on this issue. 6 Editor Department of Contemporary China Series, The War of Countering the US and Assisting the North Korean (1990); Military History Research Institute of China’s Military Science Academy, The History of Countering the US and Assisting the North Korean (2014); The Writing Group of Sino-Indian Border War, The Battle History of Sino-India Border War (1994). From the titles of the military history books published by the authority, we can observe China’s position and attitude. It is worth noticing that China held the 60th anniversary of countering the United States and assisting North Korea in 2010, and since then these terms appear very rarely in public. 7 Xu Yan is the representative of the authority, see Xu Yan (1990). 8 This is the basic argument in the biography of Chinese leaders published by the ­authority. CCPC Party Literature Research Office, The Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976 (2003); CCPC Party Literature Research Office, The Biography of Zhou Enlai (1998). 9 Dai (2004). Dai Chaowu is conducting a project on the origin of the Sino-Indian Border War with archival studies, in which he explores the mutual misunderstanding between decision makers of the two countries. See Dai (2014/2015). 10 For the English version of the book, see Adelman and Shih (1993).

146  Yin Jiwu 11 See Johnston (1998b, 1996: 216–268). 12 For different approaches to the nature of Chinese culture, see Ni (2001) and Zhu (2012). 13 The two white papers on peaceful development published by the authority propose a detailed and official explanation. See PRC States Council Information Office (2005) and PRC States Council Information Office (2011). 14 The Writing Group of Sino-Indian Border War (1994: 391–423). 15 Those cases mentioned hold a more positive assessment but few criticisms. 16 In Chinese academia, few discuss when China should use force to defend its national interest. For some excellent studies, see Li (2005) and Shi (2000). 17 Xi’s speech on the 60th anniversary of Countering US and Assisting North Korea in 2010 is the authority’s policy and position of China. See Xi Jinping (2010). 18 Xinhua News Website. 2013. The Chinese Delegation headed by Li Yuanchao Visits DPRK and Attends the Armistice 60th Anniversary of the Korean War. Available at http:// news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-07/24/c_116665105.htm. 《李源潮将率中国代 表团访朝并出席朝鲜战争停战60周年纪念活动》，新华，http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2013-07/24/c_116665105.htm，2015年12月20日登录。 19 The Chinese Government expressed the willingness to take on more international responsibility in the future in the 13th Strategic Plan. Yang Jiechi (2015) elaborates China’s issues of International Responsibility, in which “active support and participation in the UN peacekeeping” is one of two directions. 20 Xu (2015a, 2015b, 2015c). 21 Yin Zhuo is one of the supporters, while Li Guoqiang and Zhang Zhaozhong belong to the Objector. See Word News Paper. 2010. China Debates Oversea Military Base. January 6. [参见： 《中国热议海外军事基地》， 《世界报》2010年1月6日。] and Long (2011). 22 Reporters in an article published by National Defense Times cited Li’s argument, see Yao and Lu (2009). 23 In May 11, 2015, the spokesperson of MFA Hua Chunying did not answer the question of whether China should build the first overseas military base at Djibouti and stressed cooperation between China and Djibouti. In January 2016, spokesman Hong Lei pointed out that if China builds the military facilities in Djibouti, it will be for the goal of providing a supply for China’s escorting fleet. Later, on February 25, spokesperson Hong Qian of the National Defense Department confirmed that China has initiated the building of a navy security base in Djibouti. See Military New in Sina. 2016. The Confirmation of National Defense Department: China has Initiated the Security Base in Djibouti. February 26. Available at http://mil.news.sina.com. cn/china/2016-02-26/doc-ifxpvysx1664968.shtml [《国防部证实：中国海军在吉布 提保障设施已经开建》，新浪军事，http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2016-02-26/ doc-ifxpvysx1664968.shtml，2016年2月26日登录。]. 24 A senior official from National Defense Department agreed with this view, and he argued that China should have changed the traditional principle of “keeping a lower profile”. Private communication, March 30, 2017. 25 In the security and risk study of China’s overseas investment, a security company that provides private protection is an important part of the theme.

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8 Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute strategies Zuo Xiying

Maritime disputes are key security issues in China’s foreign policy. Especially since the global financial crisis in 2008, they have triggered several waves of tension in the Asia Pacific region. To some extent, maritime disputes involve all the major powers that have a stake in the stability of the region. As a stakeholder, China plays a crucial role in maritime disputes. For that reason, we need to discuss China’s strategies in maritime disputes. Interestingly, in the past several years, remarkable changes in China’s maritime disputes strategies have been observed. Scholars also have been debating maritime dispute strategies in China during the past decade, which has significantly pushed forward strategic adjustments. This chapter aims to explore scholars’ debates on maritime disputes in China and addresses the following questions: What are the main topics Chinese scholars have been debating over the past decade regarding maritime strategies? Why did they debate those topics? What are the consequences of the debates and how have those consequences come about? The author seeks to answer these questions and refine the logic of China’s strategies in maritime disputes.

Chinese scholars debate maritime disputes Chinese scholars debate two main topics on maritime disputes. The first topic is whether China should abandon the Shelving Differences and Seeking Joint Development (SD/SJD) strategy. The second topic is whether China should accept the principle of multilateralism in the South China Sea dispute. This chapter will trace the development of China’s strategies on maritime disputes.

SD/SJD, or not? as the principle to managing the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, SD/SJD was first proposed when China and Japan negotiated to establish diplomatic relations. After that, SD/SJD was proposed as a systematic foreign policy by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and early 1980s to deal with territorial disputes and resolve them peacefully (Deng 2004: 411–412). Frankly, this restrained strategy has maintained stability in the East China Sea and South China Sea for the past 30 years. However, scholars in China have increasingly criticized the SD/SJD

Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute  153 policy publicly in recent years. We can identify two camps, one supporting and the other opposing the SD/SJD policy. The supporting camp presents three different standpoints. Some scholars believe that the SD/SJD policy is not outdated. For these scholars, the SD/SJD policy is not a stopgap measure (Xu 2013). It exemplifies Eastern wisdom and remains a meaningful approach for territorial disputes (Zhou 2013). Moreover, when China deals with territorial disputes with other countries, it is regarded as a “new exploration” in diplomatic principles (Cao 2011). This viewpoint has two key arguments. One argues that SD/SJD has been the best policy until now and China has not found a better way. The other insists that SD/SJD is a peaceful approach (Wang 2013). Just as Pan Guang, a scholar from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences mentions, “If (we) use power or force to resolve the dispute, (we) may get benefits for a short while. But it can bring about an outcome of loss to all sides. The longstanding problems will be harder to resolve” (Pan 2010). In fact, for those scholars, SD/SJD does not mean inaction. On the contrary, the SD/SJD policy is China’s own initiative. All it needs to do is wait for a more powerful China (Hu 2014a). Some scholars argue that China should find a new breakthrough to advance the SD/SJD policy. Jin Yongming, an expert in international law, emphasizes that China needs new thinking. He argues that China and its neighbors can sign agreements about maritime issues such as environmental protection, scientific research, navigation safety, search and rescue, and anti-piracy (Jin  2012). In fact, the strategies for China may be distinctive in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Xue Li, an influential expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, suggests China should exploit the South China Sea unilaterally. He insists that although facing more pressures, China exploiting the Spratly Islands unilaterally will promote joint development (Xue 2014d). But in the East China Sea, the new prospect of joint development will be based on finding the right area for joint development in the disputed region. The northern region of the Diaoyu Islands may be the most viable area (Cai 2008). In reality, if we look at the studies of Chinese scholars, most of them believe that institution building may be the most potential area for breakthrough of joint development. New models, new frameworks, new institutions, and new practices are four pillars for joint development (An 2011; Shao 2011; Luo and Guo 2012). Other experts still believe that China should have two strings to its bow. Liu Zhongmin (2012) argues that China will not totally abandon the SD/SJD policy, but the key question is whether China has sufficient room for management and enough capability to deter revisionist behavior from the Philippines and Vietnam, which means that the troublemaker in the East China Sea and South China Sea is not China, but Japan, the Philippines, or Vietnam. Illustrating the key point of the second string to China’s bow, Zhao Kejin from Tsinghua University writes: Actually, the root of the South China Sea dispute is that all parties deny the consensus of Sovereignty Belonging to China, Shelving Differences, and Seeking Joint Development. For the behaviors that violate the principle of

154  Zuo Xiying sovereignty belonging to China or try to change the status of sovereignty, whatever they are, China should draw a clear line and leave the door open to the use of force to defend its sovereignty. Of course, if all parties still recognize the fact that China possesses sovereignty which is affirmed by international laws and a series of documents, China will have no need to react strongly, and it will then be able to persist on the principle of Shelving Differences and Seeking Joint Development. (Zhao Kejin 2014) The critical camp appears relatively weak. In fact, many scholars criticize the SD/SJD policy in conference or in private, but seldom publish papers or reviews. Despite this limitation of resources, we can still identify their major arguments. In brief, scholars mainly attack the SD/SJD policy on two fronts. One is that the SD/SJD policy has an internal logic problem. Some scholars raise objections particularly in regards to the view that China should hold the SD/SJD policy under the precondition of Sovereignty Belonging to China. When discussing the Sino–Japan dispute, Guan Jianqiang points out, There is a logic problem in the position of (China and Japan) shelving differences temporarily under the precondition of sovereignty belonging to China. If China and Japan can reach an agreement that sovereignty belongs to China, the dispute will be non-existent. Why the need to shelve differences? (Guan 2012: 117) Other scholars express similar opinions that there is an irreconcilable conflict in SD/SJD (Tong 2011: 4). To some extent, this criticism gets right down to the heart of the matter. The second front aims at the policy’s predicament in practice. These scholars criticize the fact that the SD/SJD policy cannot defend China’s national interest, and it will make China lose the chance to control or exploit those islands. Shao Feng (2012) argues that China ought to shelve less and resolve more in order to avoid potential risks. Moreover, China should use both diplomatic measures and military force. In the East China Sea, Japan’s unilateral actions have left no room for SD/SJD to work, which means China has to rethink how to urge Japan to give up resistance. If China continues to insist on the policy, the Diaoyu Islands dispute will not be resolved (Lin 2010). In the context of the South China Sea dispute, some scholars contend that the principle of SD/SJD is not accepted by other countries and that it has failed. According to Li Guoqiang (2014), it would be wise for China to take more measures to adjust the policy in the South China Sea.

Bilateralism or multilateralism? For a long time, the Chinese government persisted with bilateralism in the South China Sea issue. However, this strategy faces a large number of criticisms.

Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute  155 Should China uphold bilateralism or use multilateralism to resolve the South China Sea dispute? This is another central issue in the debate. If we look back, two totally tit-for-tat groups existed before August 9, 2014, which mainly focused on three aspects. The first conflict point is about the reasoning behind bilateralism or multilateralism. The multilateralism school believes bilateralism cannot resolve the South China Sea dispute. That is to say, bilateralism already has no operability (Zuo 2010: 40). Pang Zhongying, a professor from Renmin University of China, has gone further in this argument. He states that, “China should accept America’s advice of multilateralization” in the South China Sea issue. He continues to argue that China should change its thinking towards a broad view that there should be no fear of multilateralization in South China Sea (Pang  2010). Interestingly, the Global Times did a questionnaire just below Pang’s essay asking readers whether they supported multilateralization or not in August  2, 2010. The result was that 96.8 per cent of the readers disagreed. According to the multilateralism school, China should have new ideas to resolve the South China Sea issue. In this circumstance, multilateralism would be good for China’s national interest (Zheng 2010). The multilateralism school has come under fire. The bilateralism school argues that territorial disputes concern sovereignty, and there is no need to follow the path of multilateralism. Some scholars believe that bilateralism is the only way for resolving the South China Sea issue (Hu 2014b). Liu Zhongmin, a scholar from Shanghai International Studies University, writes that, “The nature, scope, and degree of disputes between China and other countries are different; every country’s proof for its assertion is different too, so it is inappropriate to use the bilateral approach to resolve the dispute” (Liu 2012). He criticizes Pang Zhongying’s arguments on multilateralism pointedly. He asserts that: “There are some questions we should make clear when talking about bilateralism and multilateralism regarding the South China Sea issue. We cannot simply talk multilateralism.” He continues, We must define the South China Sea issue exactly. About the essence of South China Sea issue, we have to stick to the principle of negotiation bilaterally……The dispute about the islands which involves sovereignty is the same as the traditional territorial dispute. The maritime dispute is about territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)……the South China Sea issue is related to sovereignty and territorial integrity. (Liu 2010) The second debating topic is on the consequences. The bilateralism school argues that the multilateralization of the South China Sea dispute will provide an opportunity for the great powers external to the dispute to get involved in this dispute, thus further complicating the issue. This approach will be a false proposition, a blind alley, or the shadow of brutal multilateralism (Liu 2011; Xiu and Li 2012; Wu 2012). Taking aim with these arguments, the multilateralism school derogates the bilateralism school. As Zuo mentioned in a review, bilateralism or

156  Zuo Xiying multilateralism is not the key, what matters is who seizes the majority control in agenda setting (Zuo 2010: 41). Moreover, just as Pang Zhongying notes, we cannot neglect the fact that the South China Sea dispute had already been dealt with by multilateral means (Pang 2010; Zheng 2010). For the multilateralism school, the bilateralism school ignores or does not want to acknowledge the reality that the South China Sea has already been “multilateralized” and is an irreversible process. Third, the multilateralism and the bilateralism schools also disagree over specific operations. Facing great pressure in the South China Sea, the bilateralism school tends to defend China’s bilateral principle. However, they support that China should treat the South China Sea dispute in two ways. One is that China should insist on bilateral negotiations on sovereignty, opposing the process of internationalization. Meanwhile, China can consider multilateral cooperation in some areas like environmental protection, anti-terrorism, and anti-piracy (Zhang 2011). For the multilateralism school, it is a different story. They believe that China should use multilateral actions, which will be better if they are legitimate measures or non-package agreements (Luo 2010: 93–99). Xue Li advises that China can build a flexible multilateralism and that a seven parties’ round table may be feasible in the South China Sea (Xue 2013).

Classifying scholarly positions Scholars have different versions of what they observe with regard to Chinese foreign policy. If we look at the spectrum of all positions, there are two obvious major standpoints, i.e. the critics and the defenders. The critics group criticizes the government’s position, especially those policies that may no longer guard China’s national interest. The scholars in the defenders group defend the government’s position. Some scholars choose to justify the position of the government. Their job is to defend the government’s policy, and their argument is simple, which is that government’s policies are always right without critical advice. From this perspective, the government wants some scholars to recognize and support its policies in consideration of its legitimacy. The others tend to defend the standpoint themselves, which indicates that these scholars are firmly convinced that the government’s choices are the right ones to promote the national interest. It is not easy to distinguish those scholars who are defending their own views from simply justifying the government’s rightness.

China’s predicaments and scholars’ threat perception We find that once other claimants pushed too far and infringed on China’s bottom line, the situation changed and scholars started to debate. This was the case because scholars’ threat perceptions were changing. When external threats to China were increasing in maritime disputes, scholars became split in their standpoints. Therefore, we are able to explain this phenomenon theoretically from threat perception theory.

Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute  157 China’s predicaments in maritime disputes Summarizing the above points, clearly there are two schools debating the SD/ SJD policy, bilateralism or multilateralism, and the core interest issue in China. Why is there increasing criticism? Because both the critics camp and supporters camp had to face China’s predicament in territorial disputes. One external threat is other claimants’ unilateral actions. First, other claimants’ strategies in maritime disputes place China at a disadvantage. The Japanese government sought a new maritime strategy to manage the maritime issues. In April  2007, the Abe administration issued a new law named the Basic Act on Ocean Policy. In March  2008, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was created to promote ocean policy. In the South China Sea, Vietnam passed the Sea Strategy to 2020 in January 2007. In the same year, the Vietnamese Congress passed the Vietnam Maritime Law. Vietnam used domestic legislation to institutionalize its strategic goals, which became a huge challenge for China. Second, the countries involved in the South China Sea disputes all extract gas and oil unilaterally. Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei have many oil and gas fields around the Nine-dashed Line. For instance, Vietnam is the major oil producer in the South China Sea. It has invited many countries such as Russia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, the United States, and India to exploit oil and gas. By drawing in a third party, Vietnam has increased the production of oil and gas. Today the export of oil accounts for 30 per cent of Vietnam’s GDP, most of which is offshore oil exploitation (Li 2014: 107). Finally, some claimants strive for actual control via land reclamation and island administration. In the East China Sea, the Japanese government “nationalized” the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands on September  10, 2012. However, the situation is even more disappointing in the South China Sea. In the Spratly Islands, Vietnam seized 48 outposts; the Philippines occupied eight; China also occupied eight; Malaysia held five; and China Taiwan possessed one (Shear 2015). Another external threat is the internationalization of the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes which increases the external pressure on China and further complicates the situation. First, China is not comfortable with the use of international law to arbitrate ownership. The Philippines under the previous President was trying to control the initiative in the dispute and used international law to counter China. In July 2013, the Philippines government lodged its claim with the Permanent Arbitration Tribunal in Hague, and on March 30, 2014 it asked the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to arbitrate on the sovereignty of the South China Sea, infuriating China. Second, multilateralism seems to be inevitable at the regional level. In the past several years, there have been two streams of thought in Southeast Asia. One is that other claimants insist on negotiating multilaterally. They allege that they are all small countries, and the power gaps are too huge to win. Otherwise, when

158  Zuo Xiying the dispute involves several countries and one-to-one negotiation cannot settle it, multilateral negotiation becomes the only way (Xue 2014a). The other stream is that China keeps in touch with the ASEAN; however, it would not like to let ASEAN get involved into the dispute directly. Third, external powers are getting involved in the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes. Actually, the United States now is emboldening its allies and partners. In the US–Japan–China trilateral relations, the United States has taken Japan’s side. In the South China Sea, the United States has interests in the freedom of navigation, peaceful solution of disputes, and its own military activities. Those concerns may lead the United States and China to a strategic rivalry (Buszynski 2012).

Explaining Chinese scholars’ threat perceptions Although supporters and critics face the same external threats, their threat perceptions are totally different. Before we explain how they assess the threats, we should review the approaches in threat perception theory studies. Theoretically, there are four approaches in threat perception studies in international relations. The first approach focuses on how power distribution and transition influence a state’s threat perception. In this approach, some scholars follow with interest how a state assesses threats to balance other countries (Walt  1987; Wohlforth 1993; He 2012). Some other scholars pay attention to how changes in power distribution have shaped threat perceptions (Levy 1987; Press 2005; Davidson 2006; Yarhi-Milo 2014). The second approach is dedicated to how domestic politics impact threat assessment. Randall Schweller (2006) has argued that elite consensus, regime vulnerability, social cohesion, and elite cohesion would influence the elite’s calculations of costs and risks that determine whether a state decides to balance other countries or not (Schweller 2006). For some scholars, it is the perception of external threats to national security or regime security that makes the elites decide whether to balance or not (Taliaferro 2004). The third approach attempts to analyze a state’s signal and how audience cost influences its foreign policy. Actually, a clear signal will be helpful for credible commitment, which is crucial to intention and threat assessment (Shelling 1960, 1966; Fearon 1994; Schultz 2004). The fourth approach can be called “psychological explanations of threat perception”, which can be traced to Robert Jervis’ work exploring threat perception and misperception (Jervis 1976; Stein 2013). Since then cognitive revolution, perception, memory, image, and metaphor have been included in the foreign policy decision-making studies. In this approach, cognitive biases and emotion are the core concepts in threat perception (Hall 2015). We can understand defenders’ threat perceptions from the domestic politics approach and explain the critics’ threat perceptions from the current power environments. For the critics group, the threat assessment process will be much easier; hence, critics should pay attention to other claimants’ actual policies. Meanwhile, power shifts in the Asia Pacific also influence Chinese

Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute  159 scholars’ external threat assessments. In the East China Sea, since 2007 the Japanese government has been reconstructing the legal system with regard to ocean issues (Li 2013). Moreover, the Japanese government “nationalized” the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012, which can be seen as a step to control the islands. In the South China Sea, those countries’ unilateral movements inevitably led to competing energy claims in the South China Sea (Buszynski 2012, 141–143). In contrast, China’s reaction from Chinese scholars is that the SD/SJD comes down to having no effect. There is a solid and pressing threat to address. This threat is why an increasing number of scholars have reflected on the SD/SJD policy and want to find a new approach. Some Chinese scholars also feel threats from the United States. Washington has encouraged Japan to announce a reinterpretation of the Constitution and ease restrictions on the right to collective self-defense. In the South China Sea, the United States is conducting a freedom of navigation operation to challenge China’s claims. All these movements have made some scholars nervous about what amounts to US assertive policy in maritime disputes. In the defenders’ camp, choices are different. For the scholars who only justify the position of the government, their motivations are more personal, which means they desire to get economic or political profits from the defending position. As mentioned earlier, the government wants to earn the support of academia. So those scholars have been embedded into the regime, and to a certain degree they have formed a political–academic complex. Frankly speaking, most scholars in universities and colleges do not belong to this camp, so we will not use the theory to do the work of explanation. We can instead use the domestic politics approach to explain how Chinese scholars who defend the government’s choices will promote the national interest and assess the threats. We must say that they definitely know China’s predicament in maritime disputes. However, the way they calculate threats may be much more complicated, which includes a combination of external and internal threats. Theoretically, those scholars have two processes of calculations. The first is the external threat assessment. The second will calculate the profits of the first assessment and then calculate the internal costs; then, the overall costs and profits are assessed. About maritime disputes, those defenders acknowledge that external threats may deviate from the principle of Sovereignty Belonging to China and fall into a passive position. But they insist that some domestic considerations are a crucial constraint on other claimants’ threats. One is the danger of abandoning political legacies, especially Deng Xiaoping’s theories. Since 1978, Deng’s political ideals have dominated the party system and became the guiding ideology, leaving a precious legacy to his successor (­Vogel 2011). In the field of foreign policy, Deng drew up most of the basic principles for China. It was Deng who put forward the SD/SJD policy and bilateralism in the late 1970s and early 1980s to deal with territorial disputes. Later, Deng elaborated the “24-Characters strategy” in 1990, which was to “Observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide

160  Zuo Xiying our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership”. All those principles have become the core pillars of Chinese foreign policy. So every generation of Chinese leadership must treat this legacy seriously. Another potential risk that those scholars fear is the breakdown of the policy. The Chinese political system is different from Western countries, which means there is only one party and no “ruling in turn”. In Western countries, the former government’s policies can be easily denied, which will have no political costs but can be used to enhance the incumbent government’s legitimacy. However, China cannot work in this way. China’s leaders must defend the former leaders’ rightness and adjust their policies on the basis of political legacy. Traditionally, breaking or changing political legacy will create some costs for both the regime and the audience, which will decrease the legitimacy of the current government. This is the first consideration. Here, those scholars also evaluate the external threat from maritime disputes. For them, the calculation of the external costs and benefits when changing the current policy is lower than the internal costs and benefits of keeping the status quo. That is why they insist on the position of the SD/SJD policy and bilateralism in maritime disputes.

Hedging strategy as the choice Faced with these challenges, Chinese scholars have different threat perceptions that trigger the debates. When tensions rise, debates may be an important factor encouraging leaders to change their policy. In past years, the predicaments in maritime disputes have pushed China to adjust its strategies. China’s current strategy on maritime disputes can be regarded as a “hedging strategy”, which means that China is partially compromising with the international society while strengthening its actual control of the disputed islands and reefs.

The dual-track approach The first strategic change is that China has launched a strategy named the dual-track approach. Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, advocated the dual-track approach in his remarks to resolve the South China Sea dispute at the China–ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Myanmar on August 9, 2014. The dual-track approach, which includes two parts, indicates that “relevant disputes are being addressed by countries directly concerned through friendly consultations and negotiations and in a peaceful way, with peace and stability in the South China Sea being jointly maintained by China and ASEAN countries”.1 In the 9th East Asia Summit, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang reaffirmed China would use the dual-tack approach to deal with the South China Sea issue on November 13, 2014.2 Xue Li comments that Wang’s remark was testing the ground, while Li’s speech is actually the real declaration of the dual-track approach (Xue 2014b). For China, the dual-track approach is a major strategic shift in the South China Sea dispute. Before that, the Chinese government insisted that only countries

Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute  161 directly concerned could participate in the negotiation and that such negotiation should be bilateral. Yet, the dual-track approach suggests that disputes should be resolved peacefully by the countries directly concerned, and that peace and stability in the South China Sea should be maintained by China and ASEAN countries. This step means China is partially compromising in some aspects. Some scholars interpreting the dual-track approach emphasize two points. The first is that China’s position in the South China Sea dispute is shifting from a bilateral negotiation to a bilateral plus multilateral negotiation; the second is that China agrees that non-claimants in ASEAN can play a positive role in maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea (Xue 2014c: 13; Zhao Minghao 2014). Just as Wang Lianhe (Wang 2014) said in an interview, the dual-track approach is actually a tentative adjustment from bilateral to multilateral negotiations. Hence, the implication of the dual-track approach is that the resolution of the South China Sea issue not only depends on China’s change or concession but also hinges on the interaction or compromise of other countries. In fact, China’s South China Sea policy, especially the dual-track approach, is adapting gradually to reality. To respond to the assertive policy of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan, Wang Yi adhered to five commitments on the South China Sea issue when meeting the press in Singapore on August 3, 2015. Wang Yi said, “The South China Sea issue is not an issue between China and ASEAN, and thus shall not impact the bigger picture of cooperation between China and ASEAN”. He continued to say that the five commitments include “peace and stability of the South China Sea, a peaceful solution based on negotiation and consultation, proper management of disputes by rules and mechanisms, freedom of navigation and over-flight in the South China Sea, and win-win outcomes through cooperation”.3 Analyzing the main components of the five commitments clarifies that they reflect the development of the dual-track approach. There are three main audiences: the other claimants, the rest of the ASEAN countries, and the United States. For other claimants, China insists on negotiating in a peaceful way and refuses to publicize this topic on the multilateral platform (Xue 2015). For ASEAN countries, China commits to promoting crisis management through rules and institutions. For the United States, China reaffirms to keep the freedom of navigation and overflight operations. The dual-track approach and the five commitments have the same logic. In the process of policy evolution, the five commitments are the preconditions of the dual-track approach. For one thing, the Chinese government seems to intentionally elaborate the dual-track approach when adding the five premises. For another, China wishes to clarify its position that it does not want to escalate the dispute and allow the South China Sea issue to hinder its cooperation with ASEAN countries. However, three factors are not conducive to the dual-track approach. First, the United States has intervened in the South China Sea issue directly. In reality, the United States has declared that it would not take sides in South China Sea issue. But since China began the land reclamation, the United States has

162  Zuo Xiying abandoned its position and has been directly involved in this issue. Second, the ASEAN countries are splitting. In 2012, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting did not reach a joint statement owing to the South China Sea issue. Since then, for several times the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting have not issued a joint statement. This incident reflects the huge differences that exist among ASEAN countries, which means there is a tendency towards fragmentation in ASEAN. Third, China’s behavior itself will impact the dual-track approach. In the South China Sea, China’s ambition “is primarily driven by a historic mission to achieve its rightful status as a maritime nation” (Morton 2016: 911). For some ASEAN countries, the dual-track approach is just China’s cover for actual possession. The suspicion from those countries might make it hard for the dual-track approach to take effect.

Taking actual possession We do not know whether the debates in academia and society have pushed the Chinese government to rethink and revise its policy in the East China Sea and South China Sea. But to some extent, the debates are accompanied by China’s policy adjustment, which is that the Chinese government is to take all measures for actual possession. First, China has taken measures to enhance the government’s administrative ability. China has reorganized the new State Oceanic Administration by unifying the decentralized and overlapping five branches into one department to manage maritime disputes in 2013. Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army set up the Strategic Planning Department on November 22, 2011; one of its purposes is to enhance the capability to handle maritime issues. China also established the government of Sansha City and a Central Maritime Rights Leading Small Group in the party in 2012, and the State Security Committee in 2013. All those political arrangements can boost the Chinese government’s capability to tackle the challenges (Zuo 2014: 50–51). China is also increasingly strengthening the capability of the Chinese Coast Guard to enforce its claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Especially in Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE), China is enhancing its capabilities fast. China’s MLE fleet, which has 205 ships, has been increasing in size by 25 per cent until 2015.4 Second, the Chinese government also devotes itself to the promotion of resources exploration. In the East China Sea, China has accelerated its development activities of natural gas. China has 16 structures on the Chinese side of the geographical equidistance line between Japan and China, and four of them have been finished already. In the South China Sea, China is investing money and providing policy support to innovate the new maritime technologies. Haiyang Shiyou 981, China’s rig, began its first operations on May 9, 2012. That means China has the ability to explore oil and gas unilaterally. In May 2014, China began the drilling work which caused a crisis in the South China Sea. This situation implies that China will develop the South China Sea by itself as a response

Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute  163 to other states. It is a strategy of independent exploitation under the condition of insisting on the SD/SJD policy (Zhu 2015b). It is certain that China will dedicate more money to the exploitation of the resources of the South China Sea. Since Xi became president, China’s thinking on joint development is changing, which means unilateral development will push other countries to accept joint development. Third, land reclamation in the South China Sea has become the crucial part of China’s strategy to enhance actual possession. China’s intentions are to advance the capability of control, to enhance the capability of resources development, and to strengthen the capability of deterrence. As Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange (2014) point out, “In reality, however, by creating new facts of ground, Beijing is expanding the territory it controls and literally changing the security landscape in the South China Sea”. Considering China’s magnitude, this turn-back is undoubtedly shaping the existing order in the South China Sea. Since 2013, China has reclaimed land at seven islands or reefs. By June 2015, China had reclaimed almost 3,000 acres. Compared to Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines, “China has now reclaimed 17 times more land in 20 months than the other claimants combined over the past 40 years” (Cronk 2015; O’Rourke 2018). There is no doubt that land reclamation and the relevant island-building activities will upgrade China’s influence and capability; moreover, China considers that land reclamation is conducive to the peace and stability of the South China Sea. Some Chinese scholars argue that China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea “is commensurate with its economic size and power as the largest economy in Asia” (Zhu 2015a: 18). This means that China’s policy adjustment is currently matching its capabilities. Fourth, China is strengthening its defense deployment in the East China Sea and South China Sea. In the East China Sea, China has established the Air Defense Identification Zone, and surveillance ships patrol routinely. In military deployment, China has placed Japan under huge pressure, which will lead to inevitable conflict between Xi and Abe (Auslin 2016). In the South China Sea, China is enhancing its defense force. On February 16, 2016, Fox News reported that China had deployed an advanced surface-to-air missile system on Yongxing Island, which brought about an accusation that China is militarizing the South China Sea (Tomlinson and Friling 2016). Moreover, China has also deployed J-11 and J-7 fighter jets in the South China Sea (Starr and Sanchez 2016). In the future, China will keep on modernizing its military power, which will put more pressure on Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam in relation to the East China Sea and South China Sea.

The logic of China’s strategy transition Why did China’s behavior in maritime disputes change so much after the global financial crisis? What was the role of the scholars in the policy change? To answer these questions, we should discuss the change in China’s international

164  Zuo Xiying environment and political elites in the past few years. Then we can try to find the mechanism for the whole maritime issue. Apart than the Chinese scholars’ debates, there are two other crucial factors.

External pressure The Asia Pacific region became a US strategic priority when President Barack Obama announced the Rebalance strategy. Washington elites see the Asia Pacific as critical to America’s future; thus, the United States must maintain leadership in this region. So, the United States decided that 60 per cent of its naval assets would be stationed in the Pacific. In the Asia Pacific region, the United States is facing the rise of China and the attendant challenges. In this situation, transforming the alliance system has become an urgent task for both the United States and its allies. The United States is therefore encouraging Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines to assume more responsibilities. Moreover, the United States has strengthened its relationship with Vietnam, India, and Singapore, and so forth. This enhances its security ties with those countries, which makes China feel stressed. China has also been facing a bad situation in maritime disputes, and what is worse, there are two disputes happening at the same time. With the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands dispute, China–Japan relations deteriorated to a historical low. Moreover, the United States has increased its commitments to Japan. In the South China Sea, the situation has been compounded by a series of crises. Tensions between China and the Philippines, Vietnam, and even the United States have pushed China to having two strings to its bow. It is the strategic adjustment of the United States, from taking no position to taking a position, which has pushed China to change its maritime policy. When discussing the source of the tension in the South China Sea, Fu Ying and Wu Shicun (2016) argue that, it must be admitted that despite a continuing tug-of-war in the South China Sea, the general situation was under control before 2009. Soon thereafter, things became more complicated, mostly due to an official deadline set by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), according to which relevant states should submit claims over a continental shelf extending the 200 nautical miles from their territorial sea by May 15, 2009. An even greater factor is the introduction of the American Asia-­ Pacific rebalancing strategy. For Fu and Wu, the Scarborough Shoal Incident was the “last straw that broke the camel’s back” in the South China Sea. They continue, “In 2013, in view of the changing situation in the South China Sea, and to meet the civil and defense needs on the islands and to defend its sovereignty, China launched reclamation projects on its controlled Nansha islands”. Another challenge comes from the South China Sea Arbitration which was initiated by

Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute  165 the Philippines. The arbitration is absolutely supported by the United States. To occupy the moral high ground, the United States and China are fighting a public opinion war.

Strong leadership Chinese diplomacy is undergoing a great change. Indeed, since Xi Jinping gained power, China’s diplomacy is facing a comprehensive transformation, which includes three main aspects. First, Xi has put forward new ideas of foreign policy about the international order. Jeffrey A. Bader argues that “the new ideas of the Xi era reflect massive changes in China’s place in the international system, its economic, political, and military strength, and China’s expectation that the international system would and should accommodate this transformed China” (Bader 2016: 5). In this context, China pushed forward the reforms of the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank. Furthermore, China also launched the new regime Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and initiated the Belt and Road strategy, which are seen as the rudiments of its grand strategy. Second, as mentioned above, in the past few years, China has advanced its ­major-country diplomacy as a whole. Major-country diplomacy means that China is already a major power, who defines its interests and uses the means which match its status and power. The third one is that Xi wants to cope with the predicaments in the periphery. It seems that Xi has the willingness to use statecraft to pursue various geopolitical objectives (Blackwill and Campbell 2016: 16). China’s foreign policy seems to be new compared to the past, with an obvious change from keeping a low profile to pressing boldly ahead, leading some strategic analysts to label Chinese foreign policy as assertive. If we focus on the maritime policy, we find that the new leadership makes an effort to realize China’s maritime ambitions and to control the islands and reefs. In the East China Sea and South China Sea, China is attempting new measures to deal with the disputes, which shows how Xi’s strongman leadership has influenced the maritime policy (Chan and Li 2015). Xi’s personal style has definitely reshaped China’s maritime policy. There is a tendency to believe that China has the option to use strong measures to maintain de facto control.

Mechanism Chinese leaders have been facing China’s predicaments in maritime disputes and the domestic debates for a long time. Before the 2008 global financial crisis, Chinese leaders tended to tolerate these predicaments and the style was generally soft. However, Japan’s and the Philippines’ aggressive foreign policies have changed the status quo. Meanwhile, China has changed its leadership from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping who is much more assertive. Confronted with huge pressures, the new leadership has come to realize that China already possesses enough

166  Zuo Xiying capabilities to deal with those issues, so they made a choice which changed the SD/SJD policy in the East China Sea and South China Sea plus the bilateralism in the South China Sea. China has adopted a hedging strategy, which means that it not only promotes actual possession but also puts forward a dual-track approach in the South China Sea. From the perspective of the decision-making process, there are two mechanisms to explain why China changed its policy on maritime disputes. One is that the external pressure has pushed leaders to adjust the policy. In this mechanism shown in Figure 8.1, how leaders assess the threats is the key. The second mechanism is that domestic pressure has forced leaders to rethink the current policy and to make some changes. To some extent, external pressure and internal pressure can both play an important role simultaneously.

The debates and China’s policy adjustment

Scholars’ Threat Perceptions and Debates

Strong Leadership

Actual Possession Dual-Track Approach

Figure 8.1  Change Mechanisms.

Shelving Differences

External Pressure

How did the debates affect China’s decision-making process of foreign policy? The direct and straight answer is we do not know. Frankly speaking, the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process is so complicated that it is hardly possible to clarify it. However, we find the discussions and debates in China’s academia indeed have a correlation with China’s policy adjustment. We guess that there are two possibilities. One is that some Chinese scholars certainly are involved in the process of decision-making. As a matter of fact, some scholars indeed have the courage to speak out and criticize the Chinese government’s foreign policy as flawed. And scholars who are involved in the decision-making process would usually like to promote a better foreign policy. Some advice can be adopted by the government immediately, but some will not. However, the advice that is not adopted may be accepted in the future. From the government side, two points should be noted. First, the Chinese government is working on a movement to build think tanks,

Chinese scholars’ debate on maritime dispute  167 which will be good for decision-making. Second, the Chinese government will focus as well on the public voice of academic scholars, although we do not know which kind of voice it likes. So we do not know how those scholars influence foreign policy. Another possibility is that some scholars deliberately demonstrate the rationales of Chinese foreign policy. Maybe this choice will come from personal faith, or personal economic interest, or may be rooted in the political culture. Whatever its initial motivations, this kind of scholars’ choice has shown a behavior pattern, which embeds those scholars in the regime and becomes vested interests. So when foreign policy changes, they will interpret it in the right way and prove it to be flawless without independent thinking. If we use their work in our research, we will end up with a fake correlation.

Conclusion The Asia Pacific region is entering a turbulent era. The unstable situation reveals how the rise of China has shocked the United States and its partners. The China–Japan Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute and China–Philippines, China–Vietnam South China Sea disputes are typical examples. America’s significant role is obvious, which means the rivalry between China and the United States will be the key. The author has aimed to explore scholars’ debates and has attempted to find the logic of China’s maritime policy adjustments. This chapter has argued that Chinese scholars’ debates are mainly focused on two topics: the SD/SJD strategy, and the options of bilateralism or multilateralism. That is because China has been facing double challenges, including other claimants’ unilateral actions and the tendency of maritime disputes towards internationalization. Confronted with huge pressures both from the domestic and the international level, some Chinese scholars have felt the threats from other claimants and realized that China should change its policy on maritime disputes. This may have partly inspired China’s leaders to rethink their strategies over maritime disputes. The outcome is that China has adopted a hedging strategy, which means that it not only promotes actual possession but also puts forward a dual-track approach in the South China Sea.

Notes 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2014. Wang Yi: Handle the South China Sea Issue through the “Dual-Track” Approach. August 9. Available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1181523.shtml. 2 Li, Keqiang. 2014. Remarks in the 9th East Asia Summit. Nay Pyi Daw, Myanmar, November 13. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/2014-11/14/c_1113240192. htm. 3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2015. Wang Yi: The Chinese Side Adheres to Five Commitments on the South China Sea Issue. August 4. Available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1286125.shtml.

168  Zuo Xiying 4 Department of Defense. 2015. The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment, July 27, 11–13.

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9 China’s debates on economic diplomacy Song Guoyou

Given its transformative economic development, it is no surprise that China has become more involved in the world economy. Because of this shift, the economic diplomacy of China has made a series of significant achievements and has ­become a crucial part of its overall diplomacy. This new reality has inspired Chinese scholars to conduct extensive research on China’s economic diplomacy, and the academic achievements are already impressive. These studies involve both theoretical and policy research, including mechanisms, approaches, and the transformation of China’s economic diplomacy. Based on previous studies of China’s economic diplomacy, this paper focuses on the debates of Chinese scholars about economic diplomacy. There are three main debate topics. The first one is how to understand the definition of economic diplomacy, especially how to define the relations between economy and diplomacy in China’s situation. The second debate topic is the decision-­ making mechanism of China’s economic diplomacy, especially the position of governmental actors in the overall decision-making process. The last topic is how ­Chinese scholars evaluate the means of China’s economic diplomacy, in particular economic sanctions and aid. After reviewing and analyzing these three topics, this chapter concludes with several reasons that explain the different attitudes of Chinese scholars towards the issues of economic diplomacy.

Debating on the definition of economic diplomacy Chinese scholars have different understandings of the definition of economic diplomacy. Zhou Yongsheng (2004) makes a thorough review of the concept of economic diplomacy and holds the view that all economic-involved diplomatic behavior can be considered as economic diplomacy. Specifically, economic diplomacy is made either for economic purposes or by economic means. Zhang Xiaotong (2013) defines economic diplomacy as “mutual transformation between wealth and power” and argues that the key of the theoretical construction of China’s economic diplomacy is to achieve the strategy and mechanism of this kind of mutual transformation. He then points out four theoretical aspects of China’s economic diplomacy for further research – economic diplomacy of developing countries, economic diplomacy of big

174  Song Guoyou powers, economic diplomacy in an open economy, and economic diplomacy under Chinese civilization. Zhao Kejin (2011) analyzes the connotations, mechanism, and development pattern of economic diplomacy, arguing that the scope of the concept should be strictly defined. According to Zhao, economic diplomacy is the extension of diplomacy in the economic arena. It is a series of foreign policies implemented by countries or groups of countries to resolve economic frictions or conflicts peacefully. In this regard, there are only three forms of economic diplomacy, which are foreign aid, economic cooperation, and economic sanction. Li Wei and Sun Yi (2014: 1–24) also put forward the view that economic diplomacy is “official diplomatic activities – usually conducted by a government or its functional departments – with other governments, international organizations or multinational companies on economic affairs. The essence is countries’ intervention in international economic relations through governmental diplomatic behavior” (Li and Sun 2014: 3). The most crucial point in defining the concept of economic diplomacy is whether economy serves diplomacy or diplomacy serves economy. In other words, which part is the crucial one, economy or diplomacy? It is on this point that scholars have different opinions. As Li Wei (2012) argues, economic diplomacy by its nature is a series of political activities and thus should be included in the subject of international relations. Zhao Kejin (2011) agrees with this point and further proposes that economic diplomacy is a diplomatic extension of economy. When talking about the implementation of attractive economic power in Chinese diplomacy, Chang Lulu and Chen Zhimin (2014) claim that Chinese economic power is an ideal and an effective diplomatic resource that can better serve China’s diplomacy. Zhang Xiaotong (2014) highlights the power relationship in economic diplomacy. He regards the main goal of economic diplomacy of big powers as power transition and shaping the world order. In general, these points of view consider that the emphasis of economic diplomacy should be on diplomacy and that economy serves diplomacy. However, there are also some scholars who consider economic diplomacy from the perspective of the economy. For example, while analyzing the main goals of economic policy, Zhu (2015: 45) puts forward that “China’s economic diplomacy is expected to achieve three strategic objectives: to enhance the interests of economic and trade cooperation, to ensure the supply of resources and elements, and to shape a favorable new international economic order”. In saying this, Zhu’s focus is no doubt on the economic realm. When using the concept of “economic diplomacy”, Zhou (2003) especially emphasizes the economic characteristic of diplomacy in terms of means and ends. The concept of economic diplomacy is beneficial to strengthening the economic sense of diplomats, urging them to bear the country’s economic interests in mind, so that diplomatic work can be closely around the center of economic development. Jiang (2009: 40–55) analyzes the main challenges confronted by China’s economic diplomacy and summarizes five key points, which are “increasing global economic risks,

China’s debates on economic diplomacy  175 frequent outbreaks of foreign trade friction, the serious international financial imbalance, the re-emerged choke point of energy resources and the pressure from unprecedented strong, protectionist climate and environment”. Obviously, Jiang also considers economic diplomacy from an economic point of view. In other words, economic diplomacy serves the economy and aims to complete economic objectives. The Chinese government has also mentioned “economic diplomacy” in its official reports while Chinese scholars have discussed the concept in academic circles. The concept of economic diplomacy was first proposed by the Chinese government. Premier Wen Jiabao mentioned the concept in the Government Work Report, which was submitted to the National People’s Congress for approval in 2005. He said, “We will comprehensively strengthen economic and cultural exchanges with foreign countries, and actively safeguard the safety and legitimate rights and interests of our citizens overseas”.1 He no longer used the concept of economic diplomacy in the Government Work Reports of the next nine years. Wen Jiabao left office and was succeeded by Li Keqiang. Premier Li mentioned economic diplomacy again in his first Government Work Report on behalf of the State Council in 2014. He said, “China has entered a new phase in pursuing neighborhood diplomacy. Progress has been made in economic diplomacy”. Premier Li mentioned economic diplomacy in each subsequent Government Work Report. In 2015, he said: “We have made steady progress in developing relations with other major countries, entered a new phase in neighborhood diplomacy, and made new headway in our cooperation with other developing countries. Notable progress has been made in conducting economic diplomacy”.2 In 2016, he said: Fresh progress has been made in China’s relations with other major countries; pragmatic cooperation with neighboring countries has been promoted; friendship and cooperation with other developing countries has developed; relations with the United Nations and other international organizations and mechanisms have been strengthened in all areas; and remarkable achievements have been made in economic diplomacy and cultural exchanges.3 In 2017, he noted, “Economic diplomacy and personal and cultural exchanges have yielded notable outcomes”.4 In documents or conferences of the Chinese Communist Party, economic diplomacy was first mentioned at the end of August 2004, when President Hu  ­Jintao mentioned economic diplomacy at the Tenth Diplomacy Envoy Conference held by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC). We will better understand the status of economic diplomacy from the use of the concept in official documents of the Chinese government and the Communist Party. In general, the Chinese government has placed more emphasis on the status of economic diplomacy in the general context of diplomacy and has a higher opinion of economic diplomacy.

176  Song Guoyou In addition to theoretical debates about which factor, “economy” or “diplomacy”, is more essential in economic diplomacy, Chinese scholars also analyze how to balance “economy” and “diplomacy” in the Chinese government’s foreign policy. Wu Baiyi and Li Dan sum up the characteristics of changes in ­China’s economic diplomacy over motivations, norms, mechanisms, and practices, and argue that the development and revisions of China’s economic diplomacy in recent years have continued to comply with external standards, and that China has been placing more emphasis on “serving the overall situation of domestic economy construction” in its diplomatic work (Wu and Li 2008: 11). But Ren Jingjing contends that since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, both the function and attributes of China’s economic diplomacy have “transitioned” from the past way of overwhelmingly serving the domestic economic construction to an approach that places equal emphasis on promoting domestic development and working on the overall strategies for external affairs (Ren 2015). So how does the Chinese government understand in its policy practice the interrelationship between “economy” and “diplomacy” in economic diplomacy, especially the question of which should be given more importance? Actually, the debate on this question has also gone through a process of change and evolvement. At the beginning of China’s Reform and Opening Up, Deng Xiaoping changed Mao Zedong’s line of “taking class struggle as the key link” and “being politically minded”, and determined the national strategy as “taking economic development as the central task”. Diplomacy should create good external conditions for economic development, and the former should serve the latter. China’s national interests are ranked in order as “sovereignty, security and development” and “development” is behind “sovereignty” and “security”. This order means that the Chinese government also believes that the economy can serve diplomatic goals, an idea that contains two layers of meanings. First, when it comes to the core interests of sovereignty and security, economic means must be of service to these two major concerns, especially when it has to do with issues regarding Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea, and the like. Some of the policies adopted by the Chinese government also reflected this change. Second, since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the Chinese government has been stressing the right approach to upholding justice and seeking interests in its diplomatic practices, which is essentially a benchmark for “diplomatic justice” and “economic interests”. After Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the CPC, he underscored in particular the need to adopt the right approach to upholding justice and seeking interests. In order to carry out this guiding principle, Xi put forth the viewpoints of “upholding justice and fairness” and “placing justice before interests”, indicating his belief that China will not attach too much importance to pursuing economic profits in diplomatic practices – and when necessary, we will even sacrifice certain “economic interests” to achieve “diplomatic justice”. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi published an article providing an interpretation of Xi J­ inping’s view of justice and interests, proposing that “China is obliged to provide assistance to poor countries within its own capacity. In some cases, it even puts

China’s debates on economic diplomacy  177 justice above interests and sacrifices its interests for justice, instead of calculating gains”. He asserts that this pattern shows how China is “getting more actively involved in international affairs and playing its due role as a major responsible country” (Wang 2013). By studying the definition of economic diplomacy and the arguments by different scholars on the differences between economy and diplomacy, we can observe the obvious interaction between academic background and the research priorities. Scholars with an international economics background are more inclined to advocate that diplomacy should serve economic development, while those with an international political background pay more attention to how the economy should serve foreign policies, highlighting the “strategic” attributes of economic diplomacy. Despite such preferences, they come to a consensus that, from the perspective of better promoting the practice of economic diplomacy, neither economic nor diplomatic policies should be too discipline-based. Rather, they should get connected to serve the country’s “big diplomacy”. Song Guoyou (2015) stresses that China’s economic diplomacy features the integration of both economic and diplomatic objectives, rather than the contradiction or confrontation between the two. Economic diplomacy is not devised with the sole purpose of achieving simple economic or political goals. In fact, it transcends the narrow vision that economy should serve for diplomacy or vice versa. He also points out that Chinese leaders are more concerned about the country’s overall diplomatic goals, and have no projections as to which goal is more important in economic diplomacy. Nor do they suggest which goal should serve the other. Objectively speaking, some progress has been made in theoretical research on economic diplomacy by Chinese scholars, but studies in this field generally remain in their initial stage. Despite the fact that Chinese scholars have tried to construct a theory of economic diplomacy with Chinese characteristics with the aid of abundant evidence and research materials from China’s existing economic diplomacy practices, the theoretical innovation of economic diplomacy research is still nascent, and thus no theory of economic diplomacy with significant influence has been put forward so far.

The decision-making mechanism of economic diplomacy The research on the decision-making mechanism of China’s economic diplomacy is relatively scarce. For instance, little research has applied the theory of diplomacy decision-making and international relations to explain China’s economic diplomacy policy making or discussed the role local governments play and the impact of big data on the decision-making process. The two-level game theory has strong explanatory power in understanding the development of the main actors in China’s economic diplomacy since the Reform and Opening Up. Zhong and Wang (2007) find that the policy-­ making environment of China’s diplomacy has changed towards increased foreign exchanges, a pluralization of actors and an expansion of public politics.

178  Song Guoyou Thus, China’s policy-making model has been transformed from an international level game to an international and domestic game. The two-level game theory is used to carry out an empirical analysis of the bargaining process for accession to the GATT and WTO. In the process of decision-making, China’s leaders have to face dual pressures from international and domestic politics. Interest group theory facilitates understanding of the pluralization of economic diplomacy decision-making. Li Xin (2012) points out that the pluralization trend emerged in China’s foreign policy making with the advent of globalization. It is especially evident in areas of high internationalization. Li explores the concept of interest groups from both the narrow and broad perspectives and advocates the broad concept to categorize foreign policy makers. A three-level decision-making framework is constructed on this basis and used to explore the ways in which different actors influence policy making. The author explores a number of conflicts of interests, between the Ministry of Commerce and the People’s Bank, the influence of industry associations on the policies of the Ministry of Commerce, and the contradictions between state-owned enterprises and the National Development and Reform Commission. Zhang (2011) points out that interest groups play an increasingly important role in China’s economic diplomacy. With fair and reasonable mechanisms, interest groups should play an important role and take part in the whole process of commercial diplomacy to increase the efficiency of the government’s policy making on trade and commercial diplomacy. Furthermore, interest groups can establish an effective dialogue and exchange mechanism plus take responsibility for protecting industry interests, creating a fair environment and enhancing national competitiveness. Only with an effective interaction between the government and interest groups can the general goal of commercial diplomacy really be achieved. The institution of economic diplomacy is a systemic project rather than an independent administrative department. The Central Foreign Affairs Office and ministries related to foreign affairs are involved in making decisions on major foreign affairs, including strategies and tactics of economic diplomacy. Hence, scholars have done some research on the status and role of the different central ministries. Ye (2013) has analyzed the function and status of economic diplomacy in China’s diplomacy from different aspects and provided suggestions on institutional structure, aim setting, construction of overseas agencies, team building, main implementation actors, and so forth. From the perspective of policy making on economic diplomacy, scholars have called for coordination of different ministries to promote economic diplomacy. In order to promote China’s neighboring diplomacy, Song (2014) suggests coordinating the relationship among different ministries when making decisions on neighboring economic diplomacy. However, Chinese academics have different opinions as to which ministry should play a dominant role. Some believe that attention should be paid to the role of the Ministry of Commerce. After all, economic diplomacy involving policies of trade, investment, and aid are the responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce. He Maochun (2012) suggests that the Ministry of Commerce is the functional department of the State Council

China’s debates on economic diplomacy  179 for the management of domestic and foreign trade and economic cooperation. It is the primary executive department and an experienced institution of economic diplomacy responsible for overseas trade, service trade, international investment, aid, and overseas economic cooperation. The China International Trade Representative (Ministry level) and the Ministry of Commerce are the primary institutions of economic diplomacy (He 2012). In terms of the financial sector of economic diplomacy, the Ministry of Finance and People’s Bank of China should play an important role. The Ministry of ­Finance is the department in charge of financial diplomacy and in control of fiscal revenue and expenditure, taxation policy, and state capital. It is also responsible for making and executing national taxation policy. The People’s Bank and State Administration of Foreign Exchange are also important executive departments responsible for financial diplomacy, financial service trade, and the exchange rate. Also, there are scholars who vehemently expect the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take responsibility. Economic diplomacy consists of not only economic actions but also diplomatic activities. Besides from the government standpoint, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can get rid of interest limits and promote economic diplomacy objectively. From the aspect of departmental structure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was lacking in specific departments to promote economic diplomacy before 2012. However, after a period of preparation, the Department of International Economic Affairs was established in October 2012. According to former Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, this department was founded to enhance economic diplomacy under new circumstances and participate in international economic cooperation and governance. In addition, the establishment of this department aimed to implement a mutually beneficial open strategy, protect developmental interests and economic security, and make greater contributions to boost economic growth and achieve common development. The stated responsibility of the Department of International Economic Affairs includes: the preparation of big summits such as G20, BRICS, APEC, and GMS; coordination with related domestic departments on economic and development affairs under the framework of the UN or other international and regional cooperation; studying issues like global economic governance and the international financial situation; construction of institutional rules; and regional cooperation. After the Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally founded the Department of International Economic Affairs, some researchers believe that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can play a more important role in economic diplomacy, coordinate related ministries, and plan China’s economic power as a whole (Li Wei 2012). Judging from the actual work, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is now more deeply involved in economic diplomacy. It is obvious that specialists from institutes and think tanks associated with the Ministry of Commerce tend to strengthen its role, while those from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or international study areas tend to strengthen the role of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. This not only reflects the influence of institutional and academic background

180  Song Guoyou on economic diplomacy study, but also shows the need to further integrate economic diplomacy institutions. According to diplomatic practices, the model that both the Ministries of ­Foreign Affairs and Commerce participate in making decisions remains the same, but the two ministries have different focuses. Traditional functional areas of economic diplomacy are still dominated by the Ministry of Commerce, while major economic diplomacy arrangements such as G20 and the BRICS summit are the responsibility of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. At the same time, the central government also tries to strengthen coordination. Joint Ministerial Conferences and Leading Groups play quite an important role on major issues. While analyzing the positions of various ministries and commissions in the decision-making process of economic diplomacy, some scholars highlight the problem of diffusion of economic and diplomatic benefits. That is, more and more ministries and commissions, striving for their own benefits, are engaged in making policies of economic diplomacy, which in a way causes the diffusion of power. The Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, challenged by other central offices, are losing their dominant position in economic diplomacy. For instance, on the issue of whether China should join the WTO, all ministries and commissions were involved in long-lasting give-and-take negotiations and discussions about how to improve coordination. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (Now the ­M inistry of Commerce) has been entangled in domestic controversy several times. Its policies were fiercely criticized by other ministries and commissions. Some governmental ministries, like the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the State Planning Commission, the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, the General Administration of Customs, and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, not only expressed their disagreements about its decision but also made contact with the foreign side directly. In the end, the “Supreme Leader” intervened by supporting the plan of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and stressing the importance of making compromises (Wu and Li 2008). Since the Reform and Opening Up, actors who could influence decision-­ making in diplomacy have multiplied. Local governments have gradually begun to play a proactive role in economic foreign affairs. Based on their level of administrative power and local benefits, local governments actively engage in the central government’s foreign policy-making process, seeking policies that benefit their local economy. Yang (2016) takes the example of Pan-Tonkin Gulf Regional Economic Cooperation led by the government of the Guanxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and analyzes the phenomenon of local governments, especially the governments of border areas, proactively participating in the foreign policy-making process. Cui and Liu (2012) analyze the relationship between central and local governments in economic diplomacy and conclude that although the central government takes priority in economic diplomacy while local governments play a supplementary role, they also interact in a complementary way.

China’s debates on economic diplomacy  181 Thus, they argue that both the central and local governments should take part in economic diplomacy and make concerted efforts to promote the economic development of the whole country. Song Guoyou (2014) focuses on local level actors in economic diplomacy. He advocates that the role of local actors in economic diplomacy should be emphasized and that local governments are supposed to cooperate with each other when developing economic diplomacy in specific areas.

Means of economic diplomacy One of the core questions for China’s economic diplomacy is its means. Generally speaking, there are two ways of practicing economic diplomacy: coercion and inducement. The former is to cause or threaten to cause economic loss in target countries in order to force them to comply or change policies. The latter one is to offer or promise to offer additional economic profit to make them change their minds or comply. Which tool can best serve China’s diplomatic aims is still a debated question.

Economic sanctions The literature by Chinese scholars on economic sanctions focuses mainly on two dimensions. One is basically from the defensive perspective, discussing how China should deal with the influence of economic sanctions. Xiong and Liu (2016) present the potential risk of economic sanctions that China’s energy security will face, by comparing the US and the EU’s economic punishment of Russia, including on energy imports, foreign investment, and export trading. They also point out that there are ways to cope with economic sanctions such as ensuring the imports of energy, improving the economic development mode, promoting win-win results in foreign investment, and exploring the potential of the domestic market. Zhao Zhou (2016) analyzes the influences on China’s “Belt and Road initiative” if economic sanctions were to be imposed on Belt and Road countries. He also advocates that China should classify unilateral economic sanctions into three types: sanctions that are obviously illegal, sanctions whose legality is uncertain, and legal sanctions, and adopt different strategies according to the type. Some scholars investigate the impacts that the US and EU’s sanctions on Russia have had on China as well as the US punishment on Iran on the nuclear issue. The other dimension is based on an offensive perspective, according to which China should proactively use economic sanctions as a tool to achieve diplomatic goals. Yan (2012) analyzes the characteristics of China’s economic sanctions, including the objectives of the policy, the actors who implement the sanction, the range and intensity of the sanctions, and their contents. Moreover, some scholars analyze the potential risk for China to be sanctioned. In viewing China as the executor of economic sanctions, these studies attract little attention when compared to research portraying China as a victim. First, it is because since the

182  Song Guoyou PRC was founded, China has been weak in economic capability and was not able to apply economic sanctions to other countries. Moreover, Chinese scholars are influenced deeply by traditional thoughts of “harmony” and thus talk very little about punishment. However, with the rapid development of China’s economic power and disputes with foreign countries increasing, more and more scholars argue that economic sanctions should become a choice of China’s economic diplomacy (Song 2014). During the period of tension between Beijing and Tokyo over the disputed ­Islands, Mei Xinyu (2012) advocated a sanction on Japan and provided four major options on how to punish Japan. Some scholars hold that it is still not suitable for China to apply economic sanctions as a tool. This view is based on two reasons. First, sanctions are usually ineffective, inferred from the experience of the United States and other developed countries. Second, from the moral perspective, economic sanctions will damage China’s national image. There is a heated discussion among scholars about whether China should impose economic sanctions on South Korea over the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense). Professor Zheng Jiyong (2016) advocates that China should sanction South Korea considering the huge harm on its national interest caused by the deployment of THAAD. Economic sanctions on South Korea would have a direct impact on its people and its society, which could in turn put great pressure on the South Korean government. The type of sanction may include limiting Chinese tourists’ entry into South Korea, imposing restrictions such as technical barriers, and so on, making the people of South Korea bear the brunt of economic recession. Also, the sanctions could be suspended or even lifted, if South Korea were to take positive moves on the THAAD issue. China should show its determination in opposing THAAD in South Korea by applying tough restrictions on bilateral trade and economic links. In the meantime, China could also impose sanctions at the local level such as suspending the relationships of twin cities, economic and trade links, and cultural communication. In addition, considering the big influence they have on the politics of South Korea, conglomerates and chaebols should not be ignored while imposing economic sanctions. By limiting business activities of some corporations, the pressure will ultimately be passed on to the South Korean government. On the other hand, some scholars oppose the idea of imposing economic sanctions on South Korea, stressing the mutual benefits of Sino–Korea trade. Li  Tianguo from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argues that Sino–­ Korea trade benefits China substantially. It has helped expand China’s production, improve the international competitiveness of Chinese products, and accelerate its economic development. South Korea, as the second largest FDI home country for China, has helped improve China’s local employment and develop the industrial chain. According to Li, there is no question that we should let South Korea realize the serious consequences of the deployment of THAAD, and people’s anger over related corporations is understandable. However, if we accuse South Korea by instigating negative impacts on Korean products and

China’s debates on economic diplomacy  183 people, and make those Korean people who also oppose THAAD feel abused and threatened, it would not only damage our national image but also do harm to economic cooperation and communication with other countries in the long term (Li 2017). The position of the Chinese government on economic sanctions is clear. Aside from acting under UN decisions, for example, imposing multilateral economic sanctions on certain countries (e.g. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK), unilateral economic sanctions on specific countries are not recognized at the governmental level. Although the Chinese government technically delayed the entry of Philippine’s agriculture products into China during a tense period between these two countries over the South China Sea, it did not use the word “economic sanctions” officially. On the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs has also denied using an “economic sanction”. When asked whether the Chinese government had imposed economic sanctions on Korean corporations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied: “We support the normal economic cooperation and exchanges between China and South Korea, but those need to be based on the will of the people”.5 The measures of economic sanctions are not officially recognized, but the Chinese government believes that the domestic market and society are highly dissatisfied about the deployment of THAAD, and thus the opposition to trade and economic cooperation with South Korea is a spontaneous civil act. There are several factors contributing to why the Chinese government does not officially recognize economic sanctions. First, there is the issue of law. In contrast to the United States, the legal system in China does not include items on economic sanctions. As one of the signatories of the Charter of the United Nations and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the decision to impose economic sanctions has to be made according to Article 16 of the ­Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, which states, The State may impose restrictions on the import or export of goods and technologies in any of the following circumstances: (11) where, as the international treaties or agreements to which the People’s Republic of China is a contracting party or a participating party require, the import or export shall be restricted. In April 2016, the Chinese government imposed economic sanctions on North Korea by announcing: “in order to implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and according to Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, we prohibit the import of coal, iron, iron ore, etc. from North Korea”.6 Because there is no special law, China mainly imposes economic sanctions through executive orders. To implement those resolutions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs usually informs other ministries of the State Council via administrative correspondence to authorize the power of specific plans to administrative branches. In the meanwhile, it will stress that if encountering any essential problems in implementation,

184  Song Guoyou they are supposed to consult with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries can coordinate and keep control over crucial diplomatic issues. However, the problem is that although it is convenient, efficient, and fast to operate by administrative correspondence, it is still a temporary measure while there is no law to follow. The correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the internal official document that only has limited validity and constraining effects. During implementation, those internal files cannot replace the law to allow authorization. As for the correspondence itself, there are no regulations about which laws to follow. As a result, the lack of legal validity makes it quite difficult to implement economic sanctions in China. Moreover, the difficulties of legislating for foreign economic sanctions not only lie in the legislation itself, but also at the diplomatic level. That is, to impose economic sanction would have the negative spillover effects of establishing a “coercing” image of China.

Foreign aid Foreign aid is a very important and strategic part of economic diplomacy. In China, academic research focuses on its historical development, as well as its mechanisms. Huang Meibo and others examine the current situation of ­China’s foreign aid, including principles, policies, and major institutions and also discuss its future tendencies (Huang 2007; Huang and Hu 2009; Huang and Ren 2012). Zhou Hong (2008, 2010) bases her work on historical research and divides the development of China’s foreign aid into three main periods: the initial stage of the new China, the Reform and Opening Up period, and the early ­t wenty-first century. Zhou summarizes the policies, methods, and managerial system of ­Chinese aid in each period. Li Anshan (2009) offers suggestions for China’s foreign aid to Africa by analyzing the history and current situation of aid from France to Africa. Diao and He (2008) reflect on China’s foreign aid. Based on an analysis of the relationship between foreign aid and state interests, they study guiding principles, strategic focus, and country-based strategies of Chinese aid and give several suggestions on reform and improvement of its ­decision-making, management, operation, and evaluation mechanisms. Xiong (2010) reviews the conceptions and practices of multilateral foreign aid of China, pointing out the problems it is facing and the tendencies of future development. Bai (2013) analyzes the implications of strategic objectives of ­Chinese foreign aid from the perspective of strategic conceptions such as strategic concerns in development, and the balance between security and development interests. Bai advocates that Chinese policy practitioners need to seriously combine foreign aid with strategic objectives. Sun (2010) studies China’s objectives and policies of its aid to Latin America from 1960s to 2010 in historical perspective. Jiang and Wang (2011) discuss different views regarding attached political conditions in China and in the West, basing their comparative research on aid practices of China and Western countries, and suggest China should neutralize the understanding of the additional political conditions.

China’s debates on economic diplomacy  185 Among the arguments about foreign aid, the most important point of contention is whether China should attach political conditions to achieve its diplomatic objectives. Some scholars support additional conditions. Pang Zhongying claims, “Under the premise of respecting other developing countries’ independence and sovereignty, China should attach certain proper political conditions to its foreign aid. The attached conditions could help Chinese foreign aid work better” (Pang 2012). Ding Xueliang even puts forward directly the question of “How should China attach conditions to foreign aid?” (Ding 2009). Yan Xuetong (2016) rethinks economic aid and argues, “China should increase its military aid and decrease its economic assistance”. On the other side, there are some scholars who insist that additional conditions should not be attached. Li Anshan argues that only few developing countries could fulfill the political conditions, and therefore there is little sense in foreign aid (Li 2011). Zhang Haibing (2009) advances the view that “non-political conditionality” should be followed. It is the requirement of principles of state sovereignty, noninterference, and the internalization of economic development, and these principles are also the theoretical foundations for “non-political conditionality”. Zhang believes that China’s principle of nonpolitical conditionality will remain highly robust. The debate over whether to attach conditions or not basically reflects various political philosophies. The scholars who support political conditionality are generally realists and emphasize state interest and policy effect, while those holding liberal thoughts insist on the “non-political conditionality” principle with the characteristics of idealism. The Chinese government also sticks to the “non-­ political conditionality” principle of foreign aid, which is clearly articulated in two published white papers. In China’s Foreign Aid (2011), the Chinese government announced, Imposing no political conditions, China upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects recipient countries’ right to independently select their own path and model of development, and believes that every country should explore a development path suitable to its actual conditions. China never uses foreign aid as a means to interfere in recipient countries’ internal affairs or seek political privileges for itself.7 In China’s Foreign Aid (2014), China reaffirmed this principle that “China will impose no political conditions and that China will never interfere with the domestic politics of recipient countries and will respect the right of each recipient country to choose their own development path and mode”.8

Conclusions With China’s economic power increasing and the tools to achieve a nation’s interests multiplying, its current need for economic diplomacy has stimulated scholarly research on this issue. Generally, there is consensus among scholars

186  Song Guoyou that economic diplomacy can play a more important role in diplomacy, but they disagree on how to achieve it. By analyzing disputes over the definitions of economic diplomacy, decision-making mechanisms, and tools, we find that the primary factor affecting scholars’ opinions is their discipline background. In general, scholars with the doctorate degree in international politics or international relations are more influenced by realism. They believe in power politics and emphasize the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and thus support using economic sanctions as a tool. At the opposite end, scholars of economics pay more attention to the economic nature of economic diplomacy. They emphasize the role of the Ministry of Commerce, prefer economic aid or cooperation as the ideal tool, and approve of liberal thinking on this issue. Even some scholars in agencies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have an economics background tend to believe that economic goals are the focus of economic diplomacy.

Notes 1 Reports on the Work of the Government, 2015. Available at: www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/ 2015-03/16/content_2835101.htm. 2 Reports on the Work of the Government, 2015. Available at: www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/ 2015-03/16/content_2835101.htm. 3 Reports on the Work of the Government, 2016. Available at: www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/ 2016-03/05/content_5049372.htm. 4 Reports on the Work of the Government, 2017. Available at: www.gov.cn/premier/ 2017-03/16/content_5177940.htm. 5 Regular Press Conference of Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, March 20, 2017. Available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1447096.shtml. 6 “MOFCOM Announcement No. 11 of 2016 Announcement on List of Mineral Products Embargo against the DPRK”. Available at www.mofcom.gov.cn/­a rticle/ b/e/201604/20160401289770.shtml. 7 China’s Foreign Aid, 2011. Available at www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-04/21/­content_ 1849712.htm. 8 China’s Foreign Aid, 2014. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/2014-07/ 10/c_1111546676.htm.

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Conclusion

10 Rethinking the role of scholars in Chinese foreign policy Kai He, Huiyun Feng, and Yan Xuetong

China’s rise is an undeniable fact in today’s world politics. Scholars and pundits heatedly debate the strategic implications of China’s rise for the United States as well as the world order. By investigating Chinese scholars’ debates, this book offers a new perspective to understand what Chinese policy makers might think and what they might do in world politics in the future. As mentioned in the introduction of the book, Chinese international relations (IR) scholars play a mediating role in linking the policy community and the general public in the Chinese society. Challenging the stereotype of Chinese scholars as the mouthpiece of the government, the contributors of this book introduce and analyze eight ­policy-relevant key debates among Chinese scholars in the field of IR, including the nature of international structure, the concept of soft power, China’s non-alliance principle, and China’s maritime policy. It is not our intention to draw a direct causal link between IR scholars and policy makers in China. However, through investigating these debates, we can better grasp and understand the diverse and contending ideas and perspectives in Chinese society, which might impact Chinese foreign policy in the future. It is hoped that this book opens a new window for the outside world to comprehend the complex nature of Chinese society and make better sense of Chinese foreign policy in the future. This concluding chapter has three sections. First, we discuss four major findings through investigating the eight IR debates in the book. We suggest that Chinese scholars are not shy about presenting new ideas and different views from official policies, but the debates among Chinese scholars are more nuanced and gentler in nature. Leading scholars dominate the debates while a younger generation of scholars has also emerged. The Chinese debates are more policy driven with limited theoretical underpinnings. The linkage between scholars and the policy community is ambiguous at best and even irrelevant at worst. Second, we examine the role of academics in policy making through comparing China and the United States. We argue that the gap between the a­ cademe and policy communities exists in both countries. However, the nature of the gap is different. Scholars in the United States tend to isolate themselves in the ivory tower more than their Chinese counterparts, so that their findings and theories are “too obscure” to be understood by policy makers. On the contrary, ­Chinese IR scholars are seemingly more (or too closely) engaged with the policy

194  Kai He et al. community than their US counterpart. This relative closeness with the government may somehow erode their independence and critical thinking capabilities to a certain degree in terms of contributing new ideas and knowledge. In conclusion, we suggest that Chinese scholars should consider returning to the ivory tower a bit if they intend to offer more insightful policy recommendations and play a more important and independent role in providing insights on ­Chinese foreign policy. Political openness and tolerance by the Chinese government are also a prerequisite for the emergence of more dynamic scholarly debates in China.

Major findings from the debates Unlike Western scholars, Chinese scholars are not likely to engage in debates with one another in public. During this project (2015–2017), we had three formal workshops discussing the book proposal, its structure, plus preliminary drafts of the chapters. One shared difficulty by workshop participants and chapter contributors is the lack of public debate among Chinese scholars. As some authors point out, although Chinese scholars do not always agree with one another, they do not like to debate in public. Part of the reason is the impact of the Confucian political culture, which encourages harmony rather than disagreement or diversity. Therefore, the contributors of this book have endeavored to read between the lines when analyzing the debates among Chinese scholars. This effort is also one unique feature and an added value of this book. Despite the difficulties in exploring the debates, this book reveals that there are indeed diverse and contending views among Chinese scholars on foreign policy in three different patterns. Some scholars directly challenge existing official foreign policy by examining the logic behind the policy under new international situations, or the need to change China’s national interests given its newly gained power. One vivid example is the debate over the long-term “non-­a lliance” policy of the Chinese government from the 1950s. As Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng point out in Chapter 6, Professor Yan Xuetong from Tsinghua U ­ niversity directly questions the validity and applicability of the non-alliance policy for China’s national interests while other scholars forcefully defend the official policy. One interesting outcome, according to Liu and Liu, is the proliferation of China’s “partnership diplomacy”, which entails various meanings and connotations. For example, China officially denies a military alliance with ­R ussia, but the two nations’ strategic partnership is substantiated with close military and defense cooperation. Will the Chinese–Russian strategic partnership evolve into an alliance? It is still a hotly debated question among Chinese scholars. Another type of Chinese scholarly debate is complementary in nature. It means that scholars do not directly question an official policy, but offer some auxiliary proposals to make it better. For example, Professor Wang Yizhou did not directly challenge China’s “non-interference” principle. Instead, he proposed a new concept of “creative involvement” to enrich the “non-interference” policy principle. As Chen Zheng points out, Wang’s “creative involvement” encouraged

Rethinking the role of scholars  195 the Chinese government to develop a flexible involvement strategy that is complementary to its “non-interference” principle (see Chapter 5). The third pattern of scholarly debate in China focuses on different strategies of policy implementation, rather than the policy itself. For example, the debate on economic diplomacy, as Song Guoyou points out in Chapter 9, is mainly around how to effectively conduct economic diplomacy and which bureaucracy should take the lead in implementing China’s economic diplomacy. In Chen and Liu’s Chapter 4 on China’s debate over “national interests”, most scholars focus on how to protect China’s national interests instead of examining what China’s “national interests” are or should be. The second finding of the book is that most Chinese debates are policy-­ oriented, not theory-driven. Chinese scholars like to present their new ideas and perspectives without focusing much on backing them up with relevant theoretical foundations. Although contributors to this book have worked hard to trace the theoretical roots of these scholarly debates, they experience difficulties in identifying relevant theories that scholars used to substantiate different perspectives and views in debates. For example, on the “non-alliance” debate, Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng (see Chapter 6) point out that some scholars “do not rely on any theoretical concepts and logics, but only defend the official position…if the Chinese government was to shift to another side, they would also move to that side”. Li Mingjing (see Chapter 3) also suggests that “much of the ­Chinese literature on soft power tends to be policy-relevant and very few works are theoretically driven”. To be fair, most contributors clearly identify that realism in various forms has been a major player in Chinese debates. But besides realism, other theoretical underpinnings seem weak among Chinese scholars. Liberal arguments have filtered into the international structure debates with a focus on multipolarization and economic statecraft. It is also interesting to see that Marxism’s voice seems relatively weak in the debates. More importantly, Chinese scholars tend to propose new ideas without solid empirical and theoretical foundations. This statement is by no means intended to criticize Chinese scholars who are engaging in policy debates in China. Policy debates, by definition, are about policy, and not about theory. One problem, however, is that scholars do not have a comparative advantage in discussing foreign policy in general because of the complicated nature of the policy-making process. Without solid empirical and theoretical research, scholars might not be able to offer high-quality ideas and proposals that can draw attention from the policy community. Recently some critiques in China even sarcastically compared IR scholars to Beijing taxi drivers because both groups seem to have similar perspectives on world politics, i.e. closely following the official media and government lines. The third finding of the book is that some leading scholars dominate the debates while a new generation of IR scholars is also emerging. Some big names repeatedly appear in the eight debates in this book, such as Professor Yan Xuetong from Tsinghua University, Professor Wang Jisi and Professor Wang

196  Kai He et al. Yizhou from Peking University, Professor Shi Yinhong from Renmin University, and Professor Qin Yaqing from the China Foreign Affairs University. Obviously, these leading IR scholars have more say in the Chinese academic community. More interestingly, these big names are also respected policy advisors for the Chinese government. As mentioned before, Professor Qin Yaqing lectured on global governance at a Politburo study session. Professor Shi Yinhong serves as an advisor for the State Council. Professor Yan Xuetong’s “moral realism” is seen as a major theoretical backbone of China’s foreign policy transformation under Xi Jinping. It seems that these prominent scholars play an important role in connecting Chinese academia and policy community. Besides these “big names”, a new generation of scholars has emerged and also actively engaged in the IR debates. For example, many young scholars have embraced Professor Yan’s idea that China should consider changing its “non-alliance” policy. Consequently, some scholars conducted serious research on alliance formation and quasi-alliance strategies (see Liu and Liu’s chapter 6). In a similar vein, as Chen Zheng points out, Professor Wang Yizhou’s “creative involvement” idea has encouraged many young scholars to engage in the debate over the noninterference principle. It should be noted that all of our contributors in this volume are top young scholars in their respective fields who have actively engaged in various debates in China. It will not be a surprise that the contributors of this volume will dominate the future debates in China in coming years. Last, but not least, the linkage between scholars and foreign policy in China is ambiguous. At the beginning of this project, we proposed four possible models to explain the role of Chinese scholars in China’s foreign policy: the “epistemic community”, the “free market”, the “policy signaling”, and the “mirroring policy” models. All contributors have conducted in-depth analyses on the relationship between scholarly debates and the policy making and policy adjustment processes of the government in their specific chapters. As it turned out, the “free market” model is the most popular one in these eight debates, which means that Chinese scholars do offer their ideas as intellectual products for policy makers to consume and purchase in the market of ideas. However, scholars cannot control which ideas will be chosen. Policy makers are the major players in determining the market value of these scholars’ ideas. Sometimes, a good idea can shape and even change an existing policy. One example is Wang’s “creative involvement” as a complement to the “noninterference” policy. China’s active involvements in UN peacekeeping missions can be seen as an endorsement of Wang’s idea of “creative involvement” (see Yin’s Chapter 7). Sometimes policy makers can also use scholars’ ideas and theories to justify their policy agendas. For example, the mainstream view of ­Chinese scholars on “the international structure”, which is to view the post-Cold War era as moving towards a multipolar system, is highly consistent with the Chinese government’s position. Therefore, as Zhou Fangyin (see Chapter 2) points out, “the academic view and the government’s proposition have been reinforcing each other” in the 1990s.

Rethinking the role of scholars  197 Besides the “free market” model, contributors also highlight the potential value of two other models: the “mirroring policy” model and the “epistemic community” model. For example, the intense debates among scholars over the “non-interference” principle actually reflect the transformation of China’s foreign policy from “keeping a low profile” to “striving for achievement” under Xi Jinping’s leadership. In other words, the scholarly debate can mirror what ­Chinese foreign policy is undergoing. Regarding the epistemic community model, scholars highlight the role of some individual scholars in influencing policy, but not the “community” of scholars. For example, Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng (Chapter 6) point out that “the patterns and effects of Chinese IR scholars’ influence on the actual policy making process are largely dependent on an individual scholars’ personal relationships with specific officials and bureaucracies”. In the Chinese culture, “guanxi” or network is the key to binding society together. Therefore, it is not surprising to discover the importance of personal networks in connecting individual scholars and the p ­ olicy-making community. It will take longer for scholars to construct a real academic community that can exert influence on foreign policy. One interesting finding is that the “policy signaling” model is the least popular one among the contributors in this book. The policy signaling model suggests that scholars sometimes play a signaling role for the government in testing social and international responses to some new policy ideas and initiatives. None of the contributors in this book drew a substantial example to support this model except some level of tolerance on certain sensitive topics that might be close to signaling, e.g. Yin’s Chapter 7 on the Cold War Group’s revisionist works on the Korean War and Shi Yinhong’s new thinking on Japan. As there is still no policy change that would substantiate a potential signal, it is hard to say if these ideas are signaling or not. This ambiguity is understandable for two reasons. On the one hand, scholars sometimes are reluctant to play a signaling role for the government, because it might jeopardize the independent nature of scholars as well as their scholarship. On the other hand, even though some scholars indeed serve as a signaling agent for some governmental agencies, they or the governmental agency might not want to be identified out of concerns of confidentiality and conflicts of interests in the decision-making process. Therefore, as outside observers, it is difficult to find solid evidence to substantiate this “signaling policy” model in China. However, it does not mean that it is an invalid model. More research seems necessary to test this model in the future.

Rethinking “scholarship and policy”: China versus the West The relationship between scholarship and policy is an enduring topic in both China and other countries in the world. In the United States, Alexander George (1993) once called for “bridging the gap” between academia and policy community. George (1993: xvii–xx) identified two tracks that define possible

198  Kai He et al. relationships between academic scholars and policy makers regarding the transmission of knowledge from academia to government. The two tracks are a diagnostic track in which scholars transmit their views about the nature of the political universe and an instrumental track in which scholars transmit their prescriptions about how to act in that universe (see also Nincic and Lepgold 2000; Lepgold and Nincic 2001). This knowledge from scholars is assumed to be superior to the flawed beliefs about these matters already held by policy makers. In a similar vein, Stephen Walt (2005) summarizes four possible roles for IR theory to aid policy making. One is the “diagnosis” role in which IR theories can provide policy makers with a broader set of diagnostic possibilities regarding the dynamics of world politics. The second role is the “prediction” role, in which IR theories can help policy makers anticipate events. The third role is the “prescription” role through which IR theories can prescribe what policy makers should do to address various challenges. The last role is the “evaluation” role. It means that IR theories can be used to evaluate the success and failure of policy decisions. In the Chinese culture, scholars (shi) have always served multiple roles for policy makers. First, scholars are responsible for educating policy makers. Similar to George’s argument, the Chinese tradition also assumes that scholars have higher, deeper, and broader knowledge than policy makers. It should be noted that here scholars are treated as a group, not necessarily referring to any individual scholar. In Chinese history, a wise ruler or emperor would always like to seek advice from scholars. On the other hand, scholars also have the responsibility to produce better knowledge to serve policy makers. It is also possible for scholars to have a negative impact on policies if their ideas are not good enough or ineffective. The key to this advising role lies in the quality of knowledge that scholars can produce as well as the willingness of policy makers in seeking advice. As Confucius argued, scholars need to accomplish “great learning (daxue)” to be used by officials. The sage king will be smart enough to identify the great learners to be their advisers. Confucius in his life regrets he was not able to “be used”, and emphasized the idea of “ru shi”, i.e. to serve in the officialdom. Second, in Chinese culture, scholars can also serve as an evaluator of government policies. This Chinese view echoes Walt’s argument regarding the evaluative role of IR theory in making policy. However, this Chinese view of evaluator entails a high expectation on Chinese scholars. It means that Chinese scholars should be brave enough to criticize and challenge official policies, especially when they perceive some flaws or mistakes in existing policies. Hence, the success of this evaluator role for scholars is rooted in the courage of scholars themselves as well as the openness of the government/ruler in accepting criticisms. One historical exemplar is the Tang dynasty’s Emperor Taizong and his advisor Wei Zheng. Wei Zheng was famous for offering direct advice or even criticisms to Emperor Taizong, who was also a good model as an open-minded ruler in Chinese history.

Rethinking the role of scholars  199 Comparing the Western and Chinese understanding of the relationship between scholars and policy makers, it is interesting to notice that a consensus exists about how scholars and their scholarship are important and critical for policy makers and making policy. However, there is a huge difference in the relationship between academia and the policy community in the United States and China. In the United States, scholars have called for bridging the gap between scholars and policy makers for a long time (George 1993; Newsom 1995; Wallace 1996; Lepgold 1998; Jentleson 2002; Walt 2005; Nye 2008; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Kristof 2014). However, as Walt (2005: 41) observes, “the gulf between academic scholars and policy-oriented analysts is widening”. If we borrow the “free market” model, it seems that there are two major problems on the “supply side”. First, academics like to live in their ivory tower for the sake of independent scholarship and academic integrity. Christopher Hill (1994: 16) points out that if scholars seek “policy relevance, even if only to justify our existence in the eyes of society at large, the more difficult it becomes to maintain intellectual integrity”. Therefore, scholars care more about their own discipline than about the world. The dominant disciplinary norm turns to a “cult of irrelevance” (Shapiro 2005). This follows the philosophical root of Socrates. Second, the complicated methodology and abstract theory are other barriers between scholars and policy makers. As Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former dean of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, points out regarding methodology, “all the disciplines have become more and more specialized and more and more quantitative, making them less and less accessible to the general public” (cited in Kristof 2014). As for theory, Stein (2000: 56) suggests that “international relations theory deals with broad sweeping patterns; while such knowledge may be useful, it does not address the day-to-day largely tactical needs for policymakers”. In other words, policy makers will not be able to or will not have enough time to understand the formal modeling, statistics, or grand theories that have few utilities in meeting their immediate policy needs. In China, IR scholars are also criticized as “irrelevant” but for different reasons. In 2014, Niu Xinchun (2014) published a controversial article in Contemporary International Relations, which discussed the “group blindness syndrome” of Chinese IR scholars in predicting and explaining the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Niu critically points out, “forecasts and estimation regarding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq made by Chinese experts on international affairs ten years ago, no matter strategic estimation or tactical forecasts, were far from the reality”. For example, before the Afghanistan War, most Chinese scholars believed that the United States would be defeated in Afghanistan. In reality, however, the United States won a swift victory against the Taliban. The same happened during the Iraqi War. Niu suggests that the major problem is not that the predictions of Chinese IR scholars about the two wars are wrong. In IR, predictions are always difficult. The strange thing, in Niu’s words, is that the same group of Chinese scholars

200  Kai He et al. easily altered their positions and arguments as soon as the international situation changed. Niu (2014) argued that this “group blindness” of Chinese IR scholars stems from the weakness in theory, the confusion of logic, and the lack of scientific method. More importantly, to a certain degree, the impetuous academic environment in China pressured IR scholars to write media-oriented policy briefs instead of serious academic research. In a similar vein, Li Jiang (2017) also harshly criticizes the irrelevance of Chinese IR scholars and asks an even tougher question: Why are Chinese IR scholars not much different from taxi drivers when discussing international affairs? It should be noted that we do not agree with the views presented in Niu’s and Li’s articles belittling Chinese IR scholars as an irrelevant group in China’s foreign policy. Our book has shown that many scholars have seriously and diligently used their knowledge to challenge official policies as well as offer valuable recommendations to the Chinese government. However, compared to the US counterparts who prefer to stay in the ivory tower to conduct “pure” research that is not easily accessible to policy makers, Chinese IR scholars seem to face another dilemma. They are not shy about engaging in foreign policy discussions. However, due to the lack of methods training and theory-building efforts from inside the ivory tower, the quality of Chinese scholars’ involvement in the policy community seems questionable. This is why critics, such as Niu and Li, feel frustrated about the intellectual contribution of Chinese IR scholars to society as well as to the policy community in general. It might be true that due to different funding structures and institutional incentives, Chinese IR scholars like to engage in more policy-oriented analyses, but seem weak in conducting theory-driven research. However, this phenomenon is gradually changing. Some Chinese scholars are actively engaged in building new theories in IR. For example, Yan Xuetong (2011) has introduced a new IR theory of “moral realism”, which emphasizes the role of leadership and morality in world politics. Qin Yaqing (2016), borrowing insights from constructivism and Chinese culture, has developed a “relational theory” of world politics, which “conceives the International Relations (IR) world as one composed of ongoing relations, assumes international actors as actors-in-relations, and takes processes defined in terms of relations in motion as ontologically significant”. Tang Shiping (2013) has introduced a new “evolutionary theory” of international politics, and his book won the Best Book award from the International Studies Association in 2014. All these examples suggest that the Chinese IR community is by no means irrelevant as some critics have argued. However, in order to avoid another “group blindness” syndrome, Chinese scholars should seriously consider how to cope with this “irrelevance” problem in the future, which will be a difficult task. George (1993: 21) argued that it is impossible to eliminate entirely the gap between academia and policy making. General academic knowledge “can only be an input to, not a substitute for, the policy analysis of a specific problem conducted within the government”, and “is not a substitute for, but only an aid to, the final judgments of high-level policymakers”. George’s statement has one

Rethinking the role of scholars  201 key presumption. It is that general academic knowledge should be different and potentially superior to policy makers so that policy makers can utilize scholarly findings to make better decisions. In the United States, the gap between academia and policy makers lies in the accessibility of academic knowledge. In contrast, the gap in China seems to be rooted in the differentiation of knowledge. If Chinese scholars cannot produce different, independent, and superior academic knowledge that is theory-driven, empirically based, and practically relevant, their contribution and involvement in policy making will be limited. We suggest that Chinese scholars should consider staying in the ivory tower to distance themselves from the policy community. Compared to Western/American IR or political science disciplinary building, the Chinese IR discipline seems too close to the policy world. To be fair, this close proximity between scholars and the government is not unique to China. As Amitav Acharya (2014) points out, it has become a normal phenomenon in Asia, for “policy writings and advice from think-tanks and academics tend to be uncritical, and often geared toward rationalizing a regime’s preferences and positions”. It is by no means to suggest that the self-enclosed ivory tower style of the American IR community is better. The US scholars face their own problems in terms of how to make their research more accessible and relevant to the policy community. For Chinese scholars, the first step is to conduct pure academic research, which has independent intellectual and theoretical value for the policy community. More methods training and theory-building efforts should be considered by the Chinese IR community. Again, it is not an easy job to accomplish by one or several scholars. It might take several generations to achieve. More importantly, political openness is also an important prerequisite for scholars to freely present and debate their independent ideas and views, which may not be necessarily consistent with official positions.

Conclusion This chapter summarizes four major findings of this book. Through examining Chinese scholars’ debates over eight topics, we suggest that Chinese scholars indeed have diverse opinions and views from one another and some of them are significantly different from official policies. Most scholarly debates focus on policy description and prescription while theory-driven policy diagnosis, prediction, and evaluation seem limited. While some leading scholars dominate debates, a new generation of scholars has emerged in the community. The relationship between scholars and policy making is ambiguous at best. The interaction between the two communities, however, is very clear. Chinese scholars actively produce new ideas and perspectives for selling on the “free market”, and the scholarly debates presented in the book also reflect or mirror some potential and actual changes and adjustments in Chinese foreign policy. Like their counterparts in the United States and other places in the world, Chinese scholars also face the dilemma of how to effectively engage the policy

202  Kai He et al. community. Western scholars, especially US scholars, care more about the discipline than the real world because of the high professionalization of the academic discipline. Consequently, their research suffers from relative inaccessibility and irrelevance for the policy community. On the contrary, Chinese scholars seem too close with the real world at the expense of independent scholarship and academic integrity. We suggest that Chinese scholars and Western scholars should learn from each other. While Western scholars might consider stepping out of the ivory tower a bit, Chinese scholars should think about staying longer inside the tower for the sake of the intellectual independence and academic integrity. Political openness, however, is critical for new ideas in any society. This book has served three academic and policy purposes. First, it opens a new window for the outside world to better understand different ideas and views of Chinese IR scholars in debating world politics. Chinese scholars are by no means the mouthpiece of Chinese government. Their vivid and critical debates can also reflect the changing trends of Chinese foreign policy in the future. Second, it reveals some problems of Chinese IR scholarship in general and also suggests a new direction by calling Chinese scholars to return to the ivory tower. More importantly, this book is the first systematic study of Chinese scholarly debates in IR after 2000. We strongly hope that it will be the starting point of a new wave of studying Chinese scholarly discourse. In his new book, Harvard Professor Graham Allison (2017) asks a critical question: Can America and China escape the “Thucydides’s Trap”, i.e. the unavoidable conflict between a rising power and a ruling power in the international system. Allison argues that “war between the US and China is not inevitable”. However, in order to avoid the Thucydides’ trap, US policy makers must “understand what China is trying to do” (2017: 235). The rise of China is also accompanied by the rise of Chinese IR scholars in the world. If the world wants to better understand China, they can start with analyzing the ideas of Chinese IR scholars who serve as the brain and the heart as well as a bridge to Chinese foreign policy making in the future.

References Acharya, Amitav. 2014. Narrowing the Academic-Policy Divide in International Relations. East Asia Forum, May 20. Allison, Graham. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Melbourne: Scribe. George, Alexander L. 1993. Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Hill, Christopher. 1994. Academic International Relations: The Siren Song of Policy Relevance. In Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas, edited by C. Hill and Pamela Beshoff. London: Routledge, 3–28. Jentleson, Bruce W. 2002. The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In. ­International Security, 26(4): 169–183. Jentleson, Bruce W. and Ely Ratner. 2011. Bridging the Beltway-Ivory Tower Gap. International Studies Review, 13(1): 6–11. Kristof, Nicholas. 2014. Professors, We Need You! New York Times, February 15.

Rethinking the role of scholars  203 Lepgold, Joseph. 1998. Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and the Problem of Policy Relevance. Political Science Quarterly, 113(1): 43–62. Lepgold, Joseph and Miroslav Nincic. 2001. Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Li, Jiang. 2017. Weishenmo Zhongguo Guoji Guanxi Kanqilai Namoshui? [Why Is ­Chinese IR Scholarship So Weak?]. Fenghuang Zhiku [Phoenix Think Tank], April 1. Newsom, David D. 1995. Foreign Policy and Academia. Foreign Policy, 101: 52–67. Nincic, Miroslav and Joseph Lepgold, eds. 2000. Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Niu, Xinchun. 2014. Jitixing Shiming: Fanxi zhouguo xuejie dui yi zhan azhan de yuce [The Group Blindness: A Reflection on Chinese Academia’s Predictions about the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan]. Xiandai Guji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], 4: 1–9. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2008. Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy. Political ­Psychology, 29(4): 593–603. Qin, Yaqing. 2016. A Relational Theory of World Politics. International Studies Review, 18(1): 33–47. Shapiro, Ian. 2005. The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences. Princeton, NJ: ­Princeton University Press. Stein, A. 2000. Counselors, Kings, and International Relations: From Revelation to ­R eason, and Still No Policy-Relevant Theory. In Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory, edited by Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 50–74. Tang, Shiping. 2013. The Social Evolution of International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wallace, William. 1996. Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations. Review of International Studies, 22(3): 301–321. Walt, Stephen M. 2005. The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations. Annual Review of Political Science, 8: 23–48. Yan, Xuetong. 2011. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Index

Note: Italic page numbers refer to figures and page numbers followed by “n” denote endnotes. academic assessment: of international structure 33–5 “Accompany Diplomacy” 76 Acharya, Amitav 201 Africa: and China soft power 56; Ebola disease 56 African Union (AU) 88 Air Defense Identification Zone 163 “alliance dilemma” 111–12, 113 Allison, Graham 202 American cultural soft power 49, 54 An Huihou 89 Asian Development Bank 165 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 165 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy 168n4 “Asia-Pacific Rebalance” strategy 63, 66, 70 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 158, 160–2 Bader, Jeffrey A. 165 Basic Act on Ocean Policy 157 Beautiful Imperialist (Shambaugh) 5 Belt and Road Initiative 139, 165, 181 bilateralism 13, 17, 154–7, 166, 167 bipolarization 15, 30–2 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries 66, 179–80 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 18n2 Chang Lulu 174 Chen Lemin 23

Chen Luo 46 Chen Qi 40n5, 78 Chen Zheng 145, 194, 196 Chen Zhimin 31, 174 China–ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Myanmar 160 China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) 40n1, 86 China Periphery Diplomacy Work Conference 64 China’s Foreign Aid 184, 185 China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment Statistics Bulletin 013 65–6 “China’s Peaceful Development” 110 China’s predicaments: in maritime disputes 157–8; and scholars’ threat perception 156–60 Chinese Association for History of International Communist Movement 40n2 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 14, 67, 175 Chinese culture 16, 45–7, 50–1 see also culture Chinese foreign policy: China vs. the West 197–201; implications for 44–57; major findings from the debates 194–7; rethinking “scholarship and policy” 197–201; role of scholars in 193–202; soft power and 44–52 Chinese IR scholars: China vs. the West 197–201; internal debates among 7–9; on international structure evolution 23–39; major findings from the debates 194–7; overview 4–5; rethinking

206 Index “scholarship and policy” 197–201; role in foreign policy 9–15, 193–202; study of 5–7; views and Chinese government standpoint 37–9 Chinese language 46, 53 Chinese realists 94–5 Chinese soft power: contending objectives 47–8; cultural and communication policies 53–4; implementation 52–7; vs. Indian soft power 49; and policy options 52–7; political changes 54–6; regime supporters 56–7; sources 45–7; weaknesses and challenges of 48–52 The Chronicle of Mao 135 coalitions, and non-alliance policy of China 115 Cold War 114, 129, 131 communication policies 53–4 Confucius 50, 198 “constructive involvement” concept 86, 90–1 Contemporary International Relations 199 creative intervention, and national interests 82 creative involvement, concept of 86, 90, 91–2 Cross-Strait relationship 145n1 Cui Liru 30 cultural communication 49, 53–4, 182 Cultural Revolution 13, 50, 87 culture: Chinese 16, 45–7, 50–1; Western 50–1 Dai Bingguo 63 Dai Chaowu 129–30, 145n9 Dai Xu 117 Darfur crisis 99 Da Wei 71, 72 Deng Xiaoping 35–6, 64, 74, 93, 159, 176 Ding Xueliang 185 “Don’t Shun the Idea of Setting Up Overseas Military Bases” 12 Du Xiaoqiang 24 East China Sea 77–8, 152–4, 157–63, 165–6 economic development, and national interests 68–70 economic diplomacy: China’s debates on 173–86; debating on definition of 173–7; decision-making mechanism of

177–81; economic sanctions 181–4; foreign aid 184–5; means of 181–5 economic growth, of China 65–6 economic sanctions: coping with 181; economic diplomacy 181–4; multilateral 183; on South Korea 182; unilateral 181, 183 Emperor Taizong 198 “epistemic community” model 5, 9–10, 18, 37, 121, 196, 197 Erickson, Andrew 163 Feng Huiyun 18n1, 37, 44, 119, 132 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 69, 80, 87, 122, 131, 185 foreign aid: China’s “no-strings-attached” policy on 17; economic diplomacy 184–5; multilateral 184 “4-Point Consensus” 67 Fox News 163 “free market” model 5, 10–14, 16, 18, 45, 121, 196, 197, 199, 201 Fu Ying 121, 164 G20 179–80 Gao Xinman 141 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 178 George, Alexander 197, 198, 200 Glaser, Bonnie 5 Global Attitudes Project 5 globalism school 95–7 Global Times 155 “group blindness syndrome” 199, 200 Guan Jianqiang 154 Gulf of Aden 136 Guo Peiqing 90 Haas, Peter 9 “hard power” 47–9, 56, 65 hedging strategy: as the choice 160–3; dual-track approach 160–2, 167n1; taking actual possession 162–3 He Kai 18n1, 37, 44, 145n He Yin 141 Hill, Christopher 199 Hong Lei 146n23 Hong Qian 146n23 “How China Sees America” (Nathan and Scobell) 5 Hua Chunying 146n23 Huang Meibo 184

Index  207 Hu Jintao 36, 37, 40n5, 40n11, 41n19, 165, 175 Hu Wei 47 IMF 165 Indian soft power: vs. Chinese soft power 49; vs. Russia soft power 49 international peacekeeping 17, 127, 128, 136, 140–3 international structure: academic assessment of 33–5; Chinese IR scholars debate on understanding 26–33; Chinese IR scholars definition of 23; Chinese IR scholars on evolution of 23–39; multipolarization 28–9; and “post-Cold War era” 27–8 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 157 Japan: conflict with China 67; maritime threat to China 77–8 Jiang Zemin 34, 35, 37 Jin Yongming 153 Johnston, Alastair Iain 10, 131 Keeping a Low Profile guideline 93 “keeping a low profile” policy 25, 40n3 Korean War 127, 128–9, 134–5 Korolev, Alexander 119 Kosovo War 26 Li Anshan 184, 185 Li Bin 27 Li Chen 139–40 Li Dan 176 Li Danhui 129, 130 Li Guoqiang 146n21, 154 Li Jiang 200 Li Jieyu 55 Li Jijun 132 Li Jingyu 25 Li Kaisheng 118 Li Keqiang 70, 160, 167n2, 167n3, 175 Li Mingjiang 8, 15, 195 Ling Shengli 74–5 Li Qinglv 28 Li Tianguo 182 Liu Feng 68, 69–70 Liu Ming 40n7 Liu Zhongmin 90, 153, 155 Li Wei 79, 174 Li Xin 178 Long Xinchun 140

Luo Yuan 78, 117 Lynch, Daniel 5, 7 Mao Zedong 50, 114, 132, 176 “maritime breakthrough,” and national interests 77–8 maritime disputes: China’s predicaments in 157–8; explaining Chinese scholars’ threat perceptions 158–60 maritime dispute strategies: bilateralism or multilateralism 154–6; China’s predicaments and scholars’ threat perception 156–60; Chinese scholars’ debate on 152–68; classifying scholarly positions 156; hedging strategy as choice 160–3; logic of China’s strategy transition 163–7; SD/SJD, or not 152–4 Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) 162 Marxism 44, 47, 50, 56, 109, 195 means of economic diplomacy: economic sanctions 181–4; foreign aid 184–5 Mei Xinyu 182 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 89, 179–86 “mirroring policy” model 5, 13–15, 18, 97, 121, 196, 197 “mistake-tolerant democracy” 56 moderates view on non-alliance policy, of China 114–15 “moral realism” theory 11 multilateralism 154–6 multipolarization 28–9; China’s insistence on 35–7; debate on 28–9; and postfinancial crisis age 30–2; Qiao Mu on 29–30; Zhou Fangyin on 29 Nanfengchuang 88 Nathan, Andrew 5 National Development and Reform Commission 178 national interest strategy: goal of 64–70; importance of 63; maintaining 77–82; protecting 73–7; safeguarding 70–3 nativist school 94 Nie Hongyi 128 Nine-dashed Line 157 Niu Jun 145n5 Niu Xinchun 199–200 non-alliance policy, of China: and coalitions 115; moderates view on 114–15; and national interests 74–5; orthodoxy school of thought

208 Index 111–13; overview 73–4, 109–10; policy implications of 120–3; quasi-alliances 116; revisionists view on 113–14; and strategic partners 115–16 “non-interference” principle 97; academic debates on 97–100; and China’s foreign policy 87–9; conflicting strategies 93; criticisms of 88–9; debate on 87–9; defense of 89–92; divergent ideological orientations 93–4; and national interest 81; overview 86–7; policy adjustments and 97–100 “non-political conditionality” principle 185 Nye, Joseph 44 Obama, Barack 112, 114, 164 “One Belt One Road (OBOR)” strategy 47, 79 orthodox scholars on non-alliance policy, of China 111–13 overseas military bases 12, 13, 17, 127, 128, 136–40, 142, 143, 144 Pan Guang 153 Pang Zhongying 155, 156, 185 “pan-peripheral” concept, and national interests 78 Pan-Tonkin Gulf Regional Economic Cooperation 180 partnership diplomacy 76, 121–2, 194 “peace and development” school 13–14 People’s Bank of China 179 People’s Liberation Army 162 Permanent Arbitration Tribunal, Hague 157 policy makers, and academic assessment of international structure 33–5 “policy signaling” model 58n1 political institutions, China 45, 51–2 “post-Cold War era”: described 27; international structure and 27–8 power politics, and national interests 65–8 pragmatism 90, 94–5, 98, 101 “promoting political relations with economics measures” policy 40n3 Qian Wenrong 40n5 Qiao Mu 28, 29–30 Qi Huaigao 78, 80 Qin Yaqing 12, 196, 200 Qiu Shi 40n5 quasi-alliances 116, 123 Qu Xing 65, 68

Reform and Opening-Up policy 25, 110, 176–7, 180, 184 regime supporters 47, 56–7 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 55 Ren Jingjing 176 Ren Weidong 89 revisionists, on non-alliance policy, of China 113–14 Russia: alliance with China 76, 117–20; rapid growth of 29; soft power practices of 49 Russia soft power: vs. Indian soft power 49 Saunders, Phillip 5 Schweller, Randall 158 Scobell, Andrew 5, 145n4 Sea Strategy to 2020 157 Shambaugh, David 5, 10, 94 Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 153 Shao Feng 154 Shao Min 46 Shelving Differences and Seeking Joint Development (SD/SJD) strategy 152–4 Shen Dingli 12 Shen Zhihua 129, 130, 134, 135, 144 Shi Yinhong 12, 66–8, 196, 197 “signaling policy” model 12–13, 197 Sino–Indian Border War 127, 128–9, 131, 134, 145n9, 146n14 Sino–Japanese relations 13 “sinolize” Marxism 50 Sino–Soviet Zhenbaodao dispute 127, 128 Sino-US relationship 70–1; and China’s national interests 72; China surpassing United States 73 Sino–Vietnam War 127, 128, 130, 134 Slaughter, Anne-Marie 199 Social States (Johnston) 10 soft power 58n1; and Chinese foreign policy 44–52; and Chinese scholars 44–5 Song Guoyou 177, 181, 195 South China Sea dispute 13, 17, 55, 67, 152–67 South Korea: alliance with China 76; economic sanctions on 182–3; popular culture of 53 Strange, Austin 163 “strategic elites” 18n2 strategic partners, and non-alliance policy of China 115–16

Index  209 strategy transition, of China: debates and China’s policy adjustment 166–7; external pressure 164–5; logic of 163–7; mechanism 165–6, 166; strong leadership 165 Su Changhe 80–1, 90 Sun Degang 116, 139, 145 Sun Yi 174 Tang Shiping 115, 118, 200 Tang Yongsheng 141 “Ten Principles” of the 1955 Bandung Conference 87 THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) 17, 182–3 “The Three Nons” 116 “Three-Ring Quasi-Alliance Diplomacy” 116 “three-world theory” 23–4 Tiananmen Square incident 87 “tit-for-tat” strategy 132 “trade post” 137 Trans-Pacific Partnership 55, 63 “28 Character Foreign Policy Guideline” 64 “24-Characters strategy” 159 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 55 United States: alliance structure of 114; antidumping lawsuits against China 63; “Asia-Pacific Rebalance” strategy pursued by 63, 66–8; China’s changing perceptions of 5; Cold War and 112; increasing conflicts with China 75–6; interventionism style 91–2; nativist school and 94; safeguarding China’s national interests and 73; South China Sea and 157–61, 167 UN Security Council 96, 183 “US-China Security Perceptions Project” 5–6 US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 63 use of force (China): decision-making perspective 128–31; effects of 133–6; international peacekeeping 140–2; in nontraditional security studies 136–42; overseas military bases 136–40; overview 127–8; sociology of the Chinese studies of 143–4; strategic culture perspective 131–3; in traditional security issues 128–36 US Peace Corps 55

values, China 51–2 Vietnamese Congress 157 Vietnam Maritime Law 157 Walt, Stephen 198 Wang Chongjie 28 Wang Cungang 74 Wang Haiyun 116 Wang Hongzhou 40n7 Wang Huaining 25 Wang Jisi 68, 69, 195 Wang Lianhe 161 Wang Rixiang 40n7 Wang Yi 76, 160, 161, 167n1, 176 Wang Yingshu 25 Wang Yizhou 81, 82, 91, 100, 194, 195–6 Wei Zheng 198 Wen Jiabao 175 Western culture 50–1 see also culture westward strategy: described 77; and national interests 77 “Why Does China Dislike Alliance?” 76 World Bank 165 World Bank Database 40n8 World Trade Organization (WTO) 63, 178, 180 Wu Baiyi 176 Wu Jianmin 68, 70 Wu Shicun 164 Wu Zhicheng 31, 40n5 Xiao Bin 49 Xiao Feng 31 Xie Chao 119 Xi Jinping 3–4, 36, 41n23, 48, 56, 64, 68, 165, 176, 196, 197 Xinhua News Agency 28 Xi Runchang 28 Xue Li 153, 156, 160 Xu Guangyu 75 Xu Jin 19n3, 76 Xu Yan 130, 145n7 Xu Yao 137, 139 Yang Jiechi 146n19, 179 Yang Kuisong 130, 135 Yang Rongguo 72 Yan Xuetong 11, 19n1, 30, 64, 66–8, 73, 113, 185, 194, 195, 200 Yin Jiwu 128, 131, 133 Yin Zhuo 146n21 Yu Zhengliang 116

210 Index Zambernardi, Lorenzo 11 “zero-sum” game 77 Zhang Haibing 185 Zhang Jianxin 40n5 Zhang Tuosheng 80–1 Zhang Wenmu 77–8, 117–18 Zhang Xiaotong 173, 174 Zhang Xinping 72 Zhang Zhaozhong 146n21 Zhang Zhizhou 27 Zhao Huasheng 116, 119 Zhao Kejin 153, 174

Zhao Lei 141 Zhao Zhou 181 Zheng Jiyong 182 Zhou Enlai 87 Zhou Fangyin 29, 71, 72, 79, 196 Zhou Hong 184 Zhou Yongsheng 173 Zhou Yunxiang 132 Zhou Zhiwei 55 Zhu Feng 112 Zhu Zhongbo 132 Zuo Xiying 145n1