China’s Role in the Arctic: Observing and Being Observed 2020000636, 2020000637, 9780367278694, 9780429328138

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China’s Role in the Arctic

This book explores the growing interests of China in the Arctic and examines the nature of its interests and motivations in maintaining its involvement and presence in the region. The new geopolitical landscape of the Arctic today is a significant departure from the great power politics that existed in the region during the Cold War era. Apart from traditional Arctic states, more and more international organizations and non-Arctic states are showing an increased interest in this region, not least China. Many have attempted to interpret China’s intention in moving to the high north and this book aims to add to the existing literature from three approaches: China’s participation in the international institutions, China’s relationships with the Arctic stakeholders and China’s sectoral engagement in the Arctic. In taking a three-dimensional approach to the analysis, the author builds a comprehensive picture of China’s interests and activities in the Arctic, not only from the perspective of China but also from the viewpoint of other Arctic states (Russia, Canada, the U.S., Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland). One of the first books in English to cover the subject since the release of China’s Arctic policy white paper in January 2018, this analysis will be of interest to academics, students of Arctic studies, maritime law and international law, as well as policy makers in Arctic and non-Arctic states. Nong Hong heads the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS), an independent, non-profit academic institution based in Washington D.C. She also holds a joint position of research fellow with China Institute, University of Alberta (CIUA), National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS).

Routledge Research in Polar Law

Emerging Legal Orders in the Arctic The Role of Non-Arctic Actors Edited by Akiho Shibata, Leilei Zou, Nikolas Sellheim & Marzia Scopelliti China’s Role in the Arctic Observing and Being Observed Nong Hong For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/law/ series/RRPL

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China’s Role in the Arctic Observing and Being Observed

Nong Hong

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Nong Hong The right of Nong Hong to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Hong, Nong, author. Title: China’s role in the Arctic : observing and being observed / Nong Hong. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in polar law | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020000636 (print) | LCCN 2020000637 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367278694 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429328138 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Arctic Regions—International status. | China—Foreign relations—Arctic Regions. | Arctic Regions—Politics and government. | China. Guo wu yuan. Xin wen ban gong shi. “Zhongguo de Bei ji zheng ce” bai pi shu Classification: LCC KZ4110.P65 H66 2020 (print) | LCC KZ4110.P65 (ebook) | DDC 341.4/209113—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020000636 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020000637 ISBN: 978-0-367-27869-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-32813-8 (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by Apex CoVantage, LLC

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To my husband Wenbing and my daughter Emily

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Contents

List of tables Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

viii ix xi

1 Introduction

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2 Interpreting China’s Arctic policy white paper

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3 China and international institutions

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4 China’s partnership with the Arctic stakeholders

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5 China and shipping in the Arctic

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6 China’s engagement in resource development in the Arctic

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7 China’s scientific research in the Arctic

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8 China’s approach to international cooperation in the Arctic

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Index

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Tables

3.1 International treaties applicable to the Arctic region 4.1 Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation 4.2 China’s experimental voyages along the NSR

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Acknowledgements

Having a book published is a long journey, the process of which would not be able to lead us to the destination without the support of and advice from a broad range of persons and institutions. While sincerely apologizing to those whom I have inadvertently overlooked, I take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude for the following persons and organizations. My interest in the Arctic began in 2011 when I pursued the post-doctoral fellowship program at the China Institute, University of Alberta (CIUA) in Canada. Professor Gordon Houlden, Director of CIUA, has been strongly supportive of my research and has never hesitated to encourage me since then. Dr. Wu Shicun, Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Institute for China-America Studies, of which I am currently serving as the executive director, has kindly recommended me to attend many high profile Arctic conferences and symposiums, including the Arctic Security Roundtable of Munich Security Conference and the Arctic Circle, among others. Their support is also reflected in the series of conferences named Asia Pacific/Arctic Maritime Security Forum, which was initiated by them in 2011. Topics on the Arctic, through an interdisciplinary approach, have been included in the past seven rounds of the forum, which I helped organize to bring together a large number of well-known scholars on the Arctic study, whose discussions have been beneficial to me for this book project. I certainly want to thank Professor Ted McDorman, University of Victoria, and Professor Aldo Chircop, Dalhousie University, for their efforts to include me in the Canada-China Arctic Study Group, which brings together scholars from China and Canada to exchange views on the Arctic issues every two years. I learned a lot from the candid discussions on how Canada, as a key Arctic state, views China’s involvement in this region, which inspired my thinking as I wrote the chapter on China’s partnership with the Arctic stakeholders. My sincere appreciation also goes to Ambassador David Balton, who previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries in the Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science of the United States. He has kindly accepted my invitation to give keynote speeches at the ICAS annual conferences on China-U.S. maritime cooperation, including their interaction in the Arctic. Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute, has kindly shared her remarks on the Artic at the launch of my report on China

x Acknowledgements

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and the Arctic in March 2018, two months after China issued its Arctic policy white paper. I wish to express great appreciation to research assistants at the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS), Asiana Cooper, Jessica Martin and Stephen Dwyer who copy-edited and proofread this manuscript. I would like to acknowledge the support provided by ICAS research assistant Zhang Yilun, alumni Li Mengze and Nataly Cruz-Castillo who assist me with background research. I was happy to learn that they enjoyed reading the chapters and began to take an interest in the Arctic study. I would like to extend my special thanks to Mr. Zhu Yilong, my favorite actor from China, whom I have never met, but has greatly inspired me as I worked through hardships in the past year. He proves himself to be a respectable individual with many merits – hard-working while still enjoying life, showing wisdom both on and off camera. He is pure, unassertive, smart but with a low profile, and has never been deterred from pursuing his dream even in adversity; these are all qualities that I value from the bottom of my heart. I owe my deepest gratitude to my family. My parents, my husband Wenbing and my sweet daughter Emily (Zhixiao) who continuously stand with me and support me in finding the courage to follow my dream.

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Abbreviations

ACIA AEPS AESC AfoPS AGDC AIIB AMAP AMSA ANWR APEC ARCSAR AWPPA BBNJ BEAC BESIS BRI CAA CAFF CAO CAOFA CCAMLR CCCC CIAO CLCS CNARC CNOOC CNPC COMSAR CPC

Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy Arctic Executive Steering Committee Asian Forum on Polar Science Alaska Gasline Development Corporation Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Arctic Search and Rescue Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Barents Euro-Arctic Council Bering Sea Impact Study Belt and Road Initiative Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group Central Arctic Ocean Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources China Communications Construction Company China-Iceland Joint Aurora Observatory United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf China-Nordic Arctic Research Center China National Offshore Oil Corporation China’s National Petroleum Corporation IMO’s Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue Communist Party of China

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Abbreviations

CPRI DHS DoD ECS EER EEZ EPPR

Chinese Polar Research Institute Department of Homeland Security U.S. Department of Defense Extended Continental Shelf EEA European Economic Area Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Exclusive Economic Zone Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group EU European Union FNI Fridtjof Nansen Institute G-77 Group of 77 IAASA International Association of Arctic Social Sciences IABP International Arctic Buoy Program IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IASC International Arctic Science Committee ICC Inuit Circumpolar Conference ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights IHO International Hydrographical Organization IMO International Maritime Organization IO RAS P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of Russian Academy of Sciences IPY International Polar Year ISA International Seabed Authority ISAB U.S. State Department’s International Security Advisory Board LNG Liquefied Natural Gas MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships MINATOM Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-governmental organizations NSR Northern Sea Route NSRA Northern Sea Route Administration NWP Northwest Passage NySMAC Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PAME Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Polar Code International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters PRC People’s Republic of China PRIC Polar Research Institute of China QNLM Pilot National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology RFMO/A Regional Fisheries Management Organizations/ Arrangements SAO Senior Arctic Official SCAR Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research

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xiii SCF SCPAR SOEs SOLAS STCW UNCLOS UNDRIP UN-ECE UNEP UNFCCC UNSC USARC USGS USPRB WMO WWF

Abbreviations Sovcomflot Group Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region Chinese State Owned Enterprises International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples United Nations Economic Commission for Europe United Nations Environment Program United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations Security Council United States Arctic Research Commission United States Geological Survey United States Polar Research Board World Meteorological Organization World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program

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Introduction

The new geopolitical landscape of the Arctic today is a significant departure from the great power politics that existed in the region during the Cold War era. The supremacy of the military presence and the security interests of the two superpowers during that time have now been replaced by the multiple political interests of the eight Arctic states, dominated mainly by the military and security interests and naval capacity of Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway and Denmark. But the exclusivity of the region has been challenged by the activities of stakeholders from outside the region, including international organizations and non-Arctic states such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Japan, South Korea and India, among others, as they are taking special interest in many aspects of the Arctic that focus on scientific research, shipping and resource development. Estimated oil and gas reserves in the continental shelves of the northern seas and visions of new trans-Arctic sea routes are also attracting the attention of transnational corporations that are becoming increasingly interested in the potential commercial value of Arctic energy resources. This book explores the growing interests of China in the Arctic and examines the nature of its interests and motivations in maintaining its involvement and presence in the region. A large number of scholarly works and policy analyses attempt to interpret China’s intentions of moving to the high north. Some argue that China’s interests in the Arctic are driven by its global strategic ambition, just like its Belt and Road Initiative,1 while others see China’s Arctic policy primarily driven by its economic pursuits related to energy, fishing and shipping, and see China as a responsible actor in the Arctic global governance.2 This book aims to add to the existing literature on this debate from three approaches, namely China’s participation in the international institutions, China’s relationships with the Arctic stakeholders and China’s sectoral engagement in the Arctic. This book is composed of eight chapters. Chapter 2 lays out China’s newly published Arctic policy white paper issued in January 2018,3 which sets out China’s key principles for its policy goals in the Arctic – to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic. These policy goals and principles are reflected in the following chapters on the respective areas that China has shown interest in, including participating in Arctic governance

2 Introduction

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affairs, promoting bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic area, accessing potential resources, exploiting shipping opportunities and undertaking polar research. Chapter 2 thus serves as an analytical framework for the subsequent chapters. Chapter 3, by taking on a broader definition of international institutions, explores China’s participation and engagement with relevant international organizations and its perception on relevant international norms and laws for governance of the Arctic. It highlights China’s present and future roles in respective international Arctic institutions involving governance (the Arctic Council), shipping (the International Maritime Organization), scientific research and fishing (the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the central Arctic Ocean). Furthermore, Chapter 3 explores China’s stance on international laws regarding Arctic governance, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Steinberg Treaty, among others. China’s Arctic policy white paper reaffirms China’s international legal commitment towards the Arctic, which is politically significant. It presents China’s official policy position towards the Arctic, and thereby provides the foundation for other nations and organizations to act in mutual cooperation with China in the Arctic. The role of stakeholders has become more salient in the Arctic policy agenda. Chapter 4 applies a broad concept of stakeholders and includes actors who are either significantly affected by an institution or capable of affecting it. It analyzes China’s partnership with the Arctic stakeholders, including the Arctic states (Russia, Canada, U.S., Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland), indigenous people and other Asian states who have similar interests as China in the Arctic, such as Japan and South Korea, that were granted observer status of the Arctic Council at the same time with China in 2013. In order to advance bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic region, China is making two separate but simultaneous efforts. First, China is focusing on resource acquisition in the Arctic through resources-oriented diplomacy, with Russia, Canada and the U.S., for instance. Second, China is trying to expand its influence by bolstering relations with five countries in northern Europe. Cooperation between China and the Nordic states on security and development is growing along with mixed reactions. As Chinese and Nordic commercial and geopolitical activities become closer, questions will be raised about various aspects of the Nordic region, which include the environmental pressures of increased human activity on Arctic ecosystems and the position of geopolitically vulnerable gateway states and small island territories such as Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland in such development.4 While China is pursuing its interests in shipping and resource development in the Arctic, it is careful to emphasize that these developments will be fulfilled in a way that respects the traditions and cultures of the Arctic residents, including the indigenous peoples, while conserving the natural environment at the same time. China has emphasized that it is also willing to cooperate with other Asian non-Arctic states in these areas as well. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 take the sectoral approach – analyzing China’s engagement in the key sectors in the Arctic: shipping, resource development, and

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Introduction

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science and research. Chapter 5 discusses the melting Arctic and its impact on China’s shipping industry. For China and other non-Arctic states, their position on the legal status of the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a fundamental question. Sooner or later, the non-Arctic states will have to adopt a clear position on whether these two passages enjoy the status of international waters for navigation, as the United States and the EU hold, or whether they are internal waters, as Canada and Russia insist. In addition to commercial shipping, the white paper also implies that China is interested in supporting and encouraging its enterprises to cooperate with Arctic states in developing tourism in the region, and calls for concerted efforts to enhance security, insurance and rescue systems to ensure the safety of tourists in the Arctic. This chapter also highlights the debate on China’s call for building a “Polar Silk Road in the Arctic.” China expresses a desire to work with all parties to build a “Polar Silk Road” by developing Arctic shipping routes and encourages its enterprises to participate in infrastructure development for these routes and has conducted commercial trial voyages in accordance with the law to pave the way for regular commercial operations. Skeptics have argued that China’s Arctic ambitions are largely fueled by the economic and political appeal of dominating a resource-rich area. On the other hand, despite criticism in the West due to concerns that China is ensnaring developing countries in debt, it’s welcomed by some of the smaller Arctic players keen on building economic ties with China. The only way for non-Arctic states to be engaged in resource development is through cooperation with the littoral states in the Arctic. Chapter 6 analyzes each Arctic state’s attitude towards China’s engagement in non-living resource development in the Arctic. China’s Arctic policy white paper emphasizes China’s interests in utilizing Arctic resources in a lawful and rational manner. Chinese enterprises, which utilize their advantages in capital, technology and the domestic market, are required to observe the laws of relevant states, conduct risk assessments for resource exploration and are encouraged to participate in the exploration of oil, gas and mineral resources in the Arctic through cooperation in various forms and on the condition of protecting the eco-environment of the Arctic. This chapter also explores the reactions from the Arctic states with whom China has been engaged in resource development and discusses the debate on the “debt trap” in the Arctic context. China’s footprint in the Arctic has been adequately established primarily in the scientific research field, while commerce and multilateral governance have been secondary. Chapter 7 explains China’s research activities in the Arctic through cooperation with North Polar states. China has taken an active role in intensifying research in both the Arctic and Antarctic regions and maintains an active polar research program. The implied potential of science diplomacy indicates options for rising powers, such as China, to integrate into regional economies while mitigating threat perceptions. However, limitations can exist when science is used as an instrument of power – and challenge its objectivity – which can render science diplomacy itself as controversial. China’s science efforts have translated into greater levels of trust and can be categorize as the

4 Introduction

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sharing scientific resources, long-term interactions among scientists, reinforcing knowledge-based institutions and spillover effects. Chapter 8 brings into discussion China’s approach to international and regional cooperation in the Arctic. The gradual disappearance of Arctic sea ice raises serious sovereignty and security issues, some of which are increasingly evident in the evolving relationships between the Arctic states and non-Arctic states such as China, Japan, and South Korea. In the same vein, there is a strong and practical need to strengthen international cooperation on Arctic matters. Recognizing and respecting each other’s rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other relevant international legal frameworks, Arctic states have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the Arctic region, while non-Arctic states also enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. Arctic and nonArctic states have different rights, interests and specific concerns with regards to Arctic-related issues. However, peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic serve the common interests of both Arctic and non-Arctic states. Mutually beneficial cooperative partnerships that promote and enhance these interests will surely be the most appropriate way forward in a region of growing global importance.

Notes 1 For example, Petra Dolata, “A Global Arctic? Chinese Aspirations in the North,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, October 2018, www.cgai.ca/a_global_arctic_ chinese_aspirations_in_the_north. 2 Linda Jakobson and Jingchao Peng, “China’s Arctic Aspirations,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Policy Paper No. 34, © SIPRI 2012, https://arcticportal.org/images/PDFs/SIPRIPP34.pdf. 3 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council, “Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy,” January 26, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/ 2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 4 Ibid.

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Interpreting China’s Arctic policy white paper

On January 26, 2018, the State Council Information Office of China published a white paper titled “China’s Arctic Policy.”1 The white paper highlighted China’s policy goals in the Arctic, which are shaped by four key principles: to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic. In order to realize these policy goals, the paper emphasizes the need for “respect, cooperation, win-win results and sustainability.” These policy goals and principles are reflected in the respective areas that China has shown an interest in, ranging from participating in Arctic governance and accessing potential resources to exploiting shipping opportunities and undertaking polar research. China’s Arctic-specific policy represents a key development in the country’s overarching global plan – it has not done the same to all regions where it aims to be a key player.2 For instance, while China has released white papers for the Arab and Asia-Pacific regions, they have not released any for Central America or Antartica.3 Indeed, “China’s issuance of an Arctic-specific policy . . . contributes to confirming how determined China is to exercise its influence on a global scale.”4 The recent expansion of China’s role in the Arctic has invited international suspicion, especially from the Arctic Council member states. Researchers, international organizations and countries involved in Arctic governance have all held long-standing expectations for clarity from China. This white paper is the result of policy makers’ careful deliberation following half a decade of observer status within the Arctic Council. It spells out its intentions for the Arctic and should relieve some concerns over China’s transparency and commitment to international law.

Essence of the white paper One of the four policy goals set in China’s Arctic policy is to “participate in the governance of the Arctic.”5 In order to achieve this, “China will participate in regulating and managing the affairs and activities relating to the Arctic on the basis of rules and mechanisms.”6 Internationally, China is committed to “the existing framework of international law including the UN Charter, UNCLOS, treaties on climate change and the environment and relevant rules of the

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International Maritime Organization.”7 Domestically, China will devote itself to “regulate and manage Arctic-related affairs and activities within its jurisdiction in accordance with the law, steadily enhance its ability to understand, protect, and develop the Arctic, and actively participate in international cooperation in Arctic affairs.”8 In its white paper, China maintains that all activities to explore and utilize the Arctic should abide by treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Spitsbergen Treaty, as well as general international law. On shipping, China expresses a desire to work with all parties to build a “Polar Silk Road” by developing the Arctic shipping route. China encourages its domestic enterprises to participate in the infrastructure construction for these routes and to conduct commercial trial voyages, in accordance with the law, to pave the way for regular commercial operations. In addition to commercial shipping, the white paper also implies China’s interests in supporting and encouraging its enterprises to cooperate with Arctic states in developing tourism in the region while also calling for concerted efforts to enhance Arctic security, insurance and rescue systems to ensure the safety of tourists. One of the four key principles in the white paper is “respect.” The white paper emphasizes China’s interests in utilizing Arctic resources in a lawful and rational manner. China reiterates that it “respects the sovereign rights of Arctic states over oil, gas and mineral resources in the areas subject to their jurisdiction [and] in accordance with international law and respects the interests and concerns of resident in the region.”9 Another one of the four key principles, “develop,” is expounded upon in the resource development section of the white paper. Chinese enterprises, which can utilize advantages in capital, technology and their domestic market, are explicitly required to observe the laws of Arctic states and conduct risk assessments for resource exploration. Though they are encouraged to participate in oil, gas and mineral resource exploration, this is to be done through various forms of cooperation with Arctic nations and international organizations and under the condition of protecting the eco-environment of the Arctic. In addition to energy resources, the white paper also addresses fisheries and other living resources. China supports efforts in formulating a legally binding international agreement on the management of fisheries in the high seas portion of the Arctic Ocean. It also supports the establishment of an UNCLOS-based Arctic fisheries management organization or institutional arrangement(s). The final two principles highlighted in China’s white paper are “understand” and “protect.” China’s Arctic policy uses these two words to underscore the importance of improving the capacity and capability of scientific research in the region, so as to create favorable conditions for mankind to better protect, develop and govern it.10 China’s Arctic interests are also environmental, a fact that is sometimes overlooked. “In most climate models, China’s coastlines will flood in the next century due to the melting of Arctic ice, which will force the relocation of up to 20 million people, not to mention reduce agricultural production.”11 China has made tremendous efforts to facilitate the early entry and implementation of the Paris Agreement and is committed to the success of the

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2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The white paper emphasizes China’s determination to protect the eco-environment of the Arctic while simultaneously addressing climate change.

Challenges for China’s involvement in the Arctic Thus far, China’s involvement in the Arctic has been fairly low profile. Since obtaining observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013, China has modestly bolstered its bilateral relations with Arctic states and participated in the development of resources in the region. China’s Arctic strategy is only just beginning to unfold and still faces many challenges, including the Arctic states’ disputes over territorial sovereignty, continued skepticism towards Chinese intention, challenges from the natural environment in the Arctic region and the limits of China’s current technology. As the melting of Arctic ice presents potential shipping route benefits, territorial sovereignty disputes in the region have recently surfaced. There are currently five main territorial disputes. First is the dispute between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea. Although they reached a maritime delimitation agreement in 2010, the issue of sovereignty has not been fundamentally solved. Second is the dispute between Norway and certain countries about the Svalbard Treaty. Third is the race between Canada and Denmark for Hans Island. Fourth is the dispute between the United States and Canada about the delimitation of the Beaufort Sea. Fifth is the dispute between the United States and Russia about the delimitation of the Bering Straits.12 In addition, the complexity of the sovereignty disputes is exasperated by two of the methods used to support sovereignty claims. The first method is the Sector Principle put forward by Canada in 1907. According to this principle, the territory is divided in the form of arbitrary sectors, each one having an apex at the poles and including an outer area bounded by the coast. Based on this principle, both Canada and Russia have claimed sovereignty over parts of the Arctic. The second method is the continental shelf mechanism. According to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and UNCLOS, a coastal state’s continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline. The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the seabed either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500-meter isobath, a line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters. If the ownership of islands in the Arctic region is clearly defined, then the country that has territorial sovereignty over an island can delimit its territorial sea and maritime zone according to the UNCLOS.13 The Senior Arctic Official (SAO) Report to Ministers required all observers of the Arctic Council to “recognize the Arctic states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic region,” which forces extra-regional states to recognize the Arctic as a sphere of influence for regional players.14

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In the Arctic players’ race, China faces a dilemma. China has actively sought a voice in Arctic affairs through multilateral and bilateral means. Its over-active posture, however, may invite further suspicion of China’s intentions. The Arctic states, especially the five coastal states bordering the Arctic Sea, are already vigilant in this regard. Indeed, China’s application to become a permanent observer of the Arctic Council was rejected three times before being approved. Russia and Canada are especially vigilant; they seek to control the northern and northwestern sea lanes respectively and China has yet to recognize their rights over these two lanes.15 Russia in particular had shown serious bias against China’s attempts to join the Arctic Council. Ever since Russia planted its flag on the Arctic seabed in 2007, China has paid a great deal of attention to the region. In 2012, after China’s icebreaker Xuelong (Snow Dragon) finished its fifth scientific survey in the Arctic region, it returned to Shanghai through the northern sea lane of the Arctic, which runs along the Russian coast. This sea lane has been emblematic of Russian influence; the expansion of China’s influence has enhanced the vigilance of the Russian military, which is highly sensitive to security issues. In a rare public warning to China in 2010, Russian Navy Commander Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky said “[w]e are observing the penetration of a host of states which . . . are advancing their interests very intensively, in every possible way, [and] in particular China,” and stressed that Russia would increase its military presence in the Arctic to defend Russia’s interests.16 In 2012, Russia resumed its live-fire drills in Arctic waters. In February 2013, Russian president Vladimir Putin remarked in a conversation that Russia’s interests in the Arctic were under threat and necessitated enhanced military actions. In September 2013, Russia announced that it would reopen a military base in the New Siberian Islands and resume its former permanent military presence there. Canada also harbors equally severe, if not more so, suspicions against China. In 2012, an opinion poll conducted by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada showed that only 12 percent of Canadians held a favorable impression of China while 29 percent held an unfavorable impression. Although Canadian officials have not shown vigilance or suspicion against China, the Canadian academic community has. Professors David Wright and Rob Huebert from University of Calgary and Victor Suthren from the Canadian War Museum are all concerned about China’s stance on Arctic affairs. They assume that China believes that the Arctic is open to the international community and that it does not acknowledge Canadian sovereignty over northwestern sea lanes. Despite the lack of vigilance from Canadian officials, the Canadian federal government is still suspicius of China’s desire for resources, sea lanes and strategic positions in the Arctic region; China’s accelerated pace of military modernization suggests a possibility of its enhanced military presence in the Arctic. Commodore Tyrone Pile, commander of the Canadian Fleet Atlantic, was quoted by the Calgary Herald as saying that the Chinese Navy would soon have twice as many submarines as the U.S. Navy, leading the newspaper to ask whether Canada was prepared to defend its Arctic sovereignty.17

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China’s recent white paper has raised particular concern, despite that most other observer states to the Arctic Council have an Arctic strategy, a polar strategy, or at least some official guidelines regarding their Arctic policy.18 For example, in September 2019, the United Kingdom released a defense Arctic strategy highlighting a closer training relationship with Norway and intensified surveillance of submarine activity in the Arctic.19 India is now also investing in Russia’s extractive industry in the Arctic.20 The heightened level of concern is due to the economic and military power that China already achieves. Under this backdrop, how China articulates its Arctic goal is critical for itself to be accepted in this international forum.

When Chinese narration integrates with Western discourse In 2013, five Asian countries, including China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and India were all simultaneously granted Arctic Council observer status. Japan and South Korea proceeded very quickly to issue their Arctic Strategy in the following years. Singapore, whose interests in the Arctic are unique, is more concerned about the potential competition for its port industry arising from the future Arctic shipping. India, as a rule, almost never issues formal policy papers outlining policy objectives. It, by and large, goes about executing policy without first laying out a policy statement of sorts. China, as previously mentioned, keenly responded to international skepticism by releasing its white paper, which clearly outlines its policy goals while highlighting compliance that is in line with Western, multilateral principles. The Chinese media and academic communities responded to the white paper’s release with praiseful reports and analysis, highlighting China’s passion and enthusiasm of China for the Arctic. Meanwhile, the international community, especially those from the Arctic States, very quickly followed the release with their own views. One of the key findings is China’s self-defined role as “an important stakeholder” in Arctic affairs, in addition to being a purely geographic “[n]ear-Arctic state.” This key point was echoed in an event, held on February 6th 2018 by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, which brought together a group of experts from both U.S. think tanks and former Department of State, Department of Defense and Coast Guard government officials. Though the event attempted to catch eyes by calling it “The Polar Silk Road: China’s Arctic Ambitions,” the white paper actually received positive reactions from around 80 percent of group participants. Some key reactions to the white paper included phrases like “comprehensive and holistic,” “increasing transparency,” “constructive participation and active contribution to the Arctic affairs,” “nothing particularly controversial,” “very encouraging emphasis on environment and climate change and rule of law” and “recognizing other stakeholders’ interests.” Experts generally agreed that this Arctic policy white paper, one of the few extra-regional white papers issued by China, uses a narration that is mostly in

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line with western discourse. It focuses its narrative on environment issues and governance by rule of law, which allows it to be recognized and appreciated by a broader range of audiences from abroad. The white paper mentions the words “governance” and “cooperation” a total of 19 and 46 times, respectively. “Research” is mentioned 41 times, “participation” 15 times, while “shipping” is mentioned 15 times, “peace” ten times and “indigenous” seven times. “Security” is referred to 11 times and the word “military” is not mentioned at all. Themes of governance, cooperation, research and participation are mentioned dozens of times, whereas security and military are hardly mentioned at all. The remaining 20 percent of group participants responded less negatively and more cautiously. For example, there was a deep concern that the introduction of a “Polar Silk Road” implies that the white paper may be a de facto strategy of “China-centered Arctic governance.”21 Others interpreted the white paper as a strategic expansion of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative. In addition, some pointed out that the white paper would have provided further clarity and assurance if it had been supplemented with a closing implementation plan. Whereas the Wilson Center event showcased positive responses, the white paper drew a mixed response from the Arctic states, many of whom were already vigilant towards China’s observer status position. Interestingly, Canada is the Arctic state that seems the most concerned about what China’s Arctic policy white paper will mean for them. Canadian experts responded that China’s Arctic policy is attempting to tread a line between respecting the sovereignty of Arctic nations like Canada and the United States while leaving room to benefit from disputes under international law. Language used in the white paper – such as “respect for international law” – is viewed by scholars like Robert Huebert from University of Calgary and Frédéric Lasserre of Université Laval to be an attempt to articulate limits on member states’ sovereignty. Although the white paper admits the sovereignty of Arctic states, it also says that international law must be complied with. Lasserre noted that we do not know how China correlates the positions of the Arctic states with international law.22 Canada is therefore worried about whether China will adopt the same legal position as the United States – treating the Northwest Passage as a “strait for international use,” despite Canada’s claim that it is within “internal waters.” Huebert added that inviting Chinese investment in the Canadian Arctic could be a double-edged sword for Canada’s economic benefit and environmental protection. Both Huebert and Lasserre hold that the white paper leaves out Chinese naval activities, especially those that deserve extra attention, like around the fringes of the Arctic. Despite that they do not see the white paper, or the belt and road initiative, as having an imminent direct impact on the development of the northern sea routes, Canadian analysts do warn Canadian policy makers not to underestimate China’s white paper’s emphasis on the Polar Silk Road. They are concerned that the white paper underscores the role of UNCLOS and international law in managing Arctic shipping routes, rather than that of coastal states. They are also worried about the language emphasized in this white paper; namely, “freedom of navigation and rights to use the Arctic shipping routes should be ensured.” This

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language operates on the assumption, historically promoted by the U.S., and increasingly by China, that Arctic shipping routes are international, not internal, waters. The Canadian government, in contrast, defines all of the waters within the country’s Arctic Archipelago – in other words, the many routes of the Northwest Passage which will be integral to the Polar Silk Road – as “Canadian Internal Waters.”23 Compared with its initial reaction to China’s application for observer status, Russia has indicated a clear transition in its position with China’s Arctic ambitions through its response to China’s white paper. Western economic sanctions on Russia have deepened Russia’s interests in building up its far east and Siberian regions. In this context, China is seen as an indispensable partner and Russia appears ambivalent on China’s Arctic ambitions. On the one hand, the extreme north is regarded by Russia as a sanctuary critical to the country’s security and national identity. On the other hand, Russia’s economic growth is more and more dependent on exploitation of Arctic resources which are expedited by partnerships with China. Generally, Russia responded positively to the possibilities of China’s expanded influence in the Arctic. The China National Petroleum Corporation has a 20 percent stake in the Yamal LNG project, and the countries intend to cooperate on railway and port facilities expansion in Arkhangelsk. China has also implemented joint research projects with the Scandinavian states and Iceland.24 The U.S.’s reaction lies somewhere in the middle. It is difficult to draw on a bid on the Trump administration’s Artic policy. There are concerns that China and Russia’s partnership would begin to dominate the Arctic area; in the meantime, there is also the understanding that for the Arctic to further develop, nonArctic states, including China, Japan, Korea and Europe, should also play a role. U.S. policy makers are called upon to develop a better understanding of China’s Arctic strategy, which is both long term and strategic (which stands in stark contrast to U.S. policy) and will have a noticeable impact on U.S. economic and security interests. China has a long-term vision for the Arctic, which is based on economic development and scientific understanding that fits within its broader global vision. It is vital that the U.S. understands the totality of Beijing’s vision in order to assess how that vision impacts both U.S. Arctic interests as well as the future development of Arctic institutions and governance. As a still very challenging Arctic region continues to evolve in unanticipated ways, the annual U.S.-China Arctic Social Science Forum has played a particularly helpful role in discussions between American and Chinese scholars for better understanding the perspectives and interests of both nations.25 Scientific collaboration is key to understanding the Arctic. China’s emergence as a growing science actor in the Arctic should be welcomed but its scientific activities and research stations must be more purposefully integrated into a broader international collaborative effort.

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Nordic states are very enthusiastic and see China’s inclusion as a great opportunity for developing stronger economic partnerships. In 2016, after a six-year freeze regarding the Nobel Peace Prize award to dissident Liu Xiaobo, Norway restored diplomatic relationship with China. Norwegian companies are very anxious to make up for the lost time and to potentially engage with Chinese firms in areas related to energy, technology, shipping, etc. Although the white paper lacks a clear time frame and distribution of responsibilities, the Nordic states regard it as a comprehensive document that reflects a solid understanding of Arctic issues and enhances their impression of China as a global actor.26 Among all the issues covered in the Chinese policy white paper, environmental protection and climate change stand out and form a positive backdrop for China’s engagement in the Arctic.27 The policy brief by Royal Danish Defence College concludes that China’s increasing presence in the Arctic constitutes a both challenges and opportunities depending on whether Copenhagen and Nuuk are able to find stronger common ground in their approach to China in the Arctic and succeed in establishing open, respectful and constructive dialogue and cooperation on this matter.28 China has labelled itself a “near-Arctic state.” This signals China’s intent to push against Arctic state hegemony and the common term “non-Arctic state” in order to insist on having a say in how the region is used.29 According to Timo Koivurova, research professor and director of the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland, the white paper is “a very carefully negotiated and comprehensive document” with few surprises. However, “[o]f particular and somewhat surprising note are China’s emphasis on climate change throughout the document[,] acknowledging its dramatic consequences on the region.” Although it continues to use the term “near Arctic state,” “as a kind of geographical justification, China does not need any geographical justifications for its position in the Arctic.”30 China’s Arctic policy comes at a time when global warming and ice melt in the polar region make it possible to exploit its resources and sail through its seas during the summer month. Some analysts point out that the Polar Silk Road proposal, with its link to the BRI, may not be well received by the Arctic states, as acceptance of it would mean symbolically giving China the leading role.31 As China experiences rapid military and economic growth, suspicions regarding its global strategic intentions as it moves towards the Arctic are unavoidable. In this respect, China’s white paper was issued at the right time. It should go a long way towards reducing skepticism and providing strategic guidelines for China’s participation in Arctic governance. In addition to a purely geographical “near-Arctic state,” China defines itself as “an important stakeholder” in Arctic affairs.32 China also “supports the peaceful settlement of disputes over territory and maritime rights and interests by all parties concerned in accordance with such treaties as the UN Charter and the UNCLOS and general international law and supports to safeguard security and stability in the region.”33 China’s language is consistent with its position on international dispute settlement. The white paper on China’s Arctic policy sent a positive signal to Chinese researchers and policy practitioners who now have clear strategic guidance.

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The international community, including the Arctic states, welcomes both the transparency of the paper and the increasing confidence China shows in its participation in Arctic governance. The white paper integrates Chinese narration with Western discourse by defining itself as an “important stakeholder,” rather than simply a geographical “near-Arctic State.” This narration wins recognition and respect from the international community and serves to reduce concerns from the Arctic states.

Notes 1 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council, “Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy,” January 26, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/ 2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 2 Maria Bastos, “A Polar Silk Road? China’s Quest for the Arctic and Its Global Consequences,” Pakistan Politico, January 15, 2019, http://pakistanpolitico. com/a-polar-silk-road-chinas-quest-for-the-arctic-and-its-global-consequences. 3 http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2016/01/13/ content_281475271412746.htm; www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/11/ c_135974121.htm. 4 Bastos, “A Polar Silk Road? China’s Quest for the Arctic and Its Global Consequences.” 5 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council, “Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy.” 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Andrew Chater, “What Is China’s Interest in the Arctic?” The Polar Connection, October 12, 2016, http://polarconnection.org/china-interest-arctic/ 11 Robert Nicholls et al., “Ranking of the World’s Cities Most Exposed to Coastal Flooding Today and in the Future,” OECD, 2007, https://climate-adapt.eea. europa.eu/metadata/publications/ranking-of-the-worlds-cities-to-coastalflooding/11240357 12 Qisong He, “Climate Change and the EU’s Arctic Strategy,” European Studies, no. 6 (2010): 69. 13 Zhenfu Li, “Obstacles to China’s Participation in the International Arctic Route Mechanism and Countermeasures,” Navigation of China, (2009), Volume 2, 100. http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTotal-ZGHH200902027.htm 14 “Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Report to Ministers,” Arctic Council (Nuuk: Arctic Council Secretariat, May 2011), 50. 15 Linda Jakobson, “China and the Arctic: What’s the Fuss?” Lowy Institute for International Policy, May 15, 2013, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ china-and-arctic-whats-fuss. 16 Denis Dyomkin, “Russia and Norway Sign Border Deal for Arctic Energy,” Reuters, September 15, 2010, www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-norway-arctic/russia-andnorway-sign-border-deal-for-arctic-energy-idUSTRE68E2WV20100915 17 Whitney Lackenbauer and James Manicom, “East Asia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics,” Canada’s Northern Strategy and East Asian Interests in the Arctic, no. 5 (December 2013): 3–5. 18 Vincent-Gregor Schulze, “Arctic Strategies Round-Up 2017,” German Arctic Office, October 2017.

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19 United Kingdom, United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “Defense Secretary Announces New Defense Arctic Strategy,” September 30, 2018. 20 Stephen Blank, “India Invests in Russia’s Arctic Oil and Gas Offshore Industry,” The Maritime Executive, October 24, 2018. 21 Summary of the event “The Polar Silk Road: China’s Arctic Ambitions,” February 6th organized by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 22 Alexander Shtol, “China Expands Arctic, Antarctic Presence,” The Arctic, February 22, 2018, https://arctic.ru/international/20180222/721073.html. 23 Sebastian Murdoch-Gibson, “Arctic Positioning: China’s Ambitions in the North,” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, February 2, 2018, www.asiapacific.ca/blog/ arctic-positioning-chinas-ambitions-north. 24 Shtol, “China Expands Arctic, Antarctic Presence.” 25 Heather Conley, “China’s Arctic Dream,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 26, 2018, www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-arctic-dream. 26 “China Releases First Arctic Policy,” Fridtjof Nansens Institutt, January 29, 2018, www.fni.no/news/china-releases-first-arctic-policy-article1664-330.html. 27 Ibid. 28 Norup Sorensen and Camilla Tenna, “China as an Arctic Great Power. Potential Implications for Greenland and the Danish Realm,” Danish National Research Database (Royal Danish Defence College, 2018). 29 Danita Catherine Burke, “With All Eyes on China, Singapore Makes Its Own Arctic Moves,” Arctic Today, www.arctictoday.com/eyes-china-singapore-makes-arcticmoves/?wallit_nosession=1. 30 Malte Humpert, “China Publishes First Ever Comprehensive Arctic Policy,” High North News, January 29, 2018, www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-publishesfirst-ever-comprehensive-arctic-policy. 31 Goh Sui Noi, “Challenges of Polar Silk Road,” The Strait Times, February 1, 2018, www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/challenges-of-polar-silk-road. 32 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council, “Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy.” 33 Ibid.

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China and international institutions

As the Arctic becomes a prominent global issue, effective Arctic governance requires international institutions to contribute towards global governance. International institutions, as central focus of international relations scholarship as well as of policy-making efforts around the world, can either have a formal or informal character, such as international organizations as well as international treaties with divergent conceptual designs, missions, and tasks treaties, organizations, regimes, conventions and so on.1 Young defined international institutions from sociology perspective as “recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which expectations converge.”2 Traditionally, China has neither been enthusiastic in developing international organizations nor in great favor of multilateralism in international cooperation.3 However, since China’s chairman Xi Jinping took office in 2012, China has presented the world with a series of spectacular initiatives for multilateral cooperation. Specific examples include the Silk Road Fund, the Free Trade Area of Asia Pacific Framework, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the One Belt One Road Initiative (also simply known as the Belt and Road Initiative or BRI).4 The Arctic is an issue area where China has been actively experimenting with various tactics to overcome structural obstacles, advance its position in existing multilateral institutions and make the best of its position as an outsider by engaging with Arctic regional states bilaterally.5 This chapter, by taking on a broader definition of international institutions, will explore China’s participation and engagement with relevant international organizations and its perception on relevant international norms and laws on the Arctic governance. It will highlight China’s present and future roles in respective international Arctic institutions involving governance (the Arctic Council), shipping (the International Maritime Organization), scientific research and fishing (the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the central Arctic Ocean). Furthermore, Chapter 3 explores China’s stance on international laws regarding Arctic governance such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Steinberg Treaty, among others.

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China and the Arctic Council The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum that addresses common issues faced by governments of the eight states that border the Arctic Ocean or are located in the north pole. Common issues include environmental preservation, sustainable development and protecting the culture and well-being of native peoples living in the Arctic region. Although the Arctic Council promotes “cooperation, coordination and interaction amongst Arctic states,” it does not deal with security issues. Moreover, agreements under the Arctic Council have no binding power on the parties involved. It is unique as a multinational forum for states because it allows six organizations of indigenous peoples to hold permanent participant status, therefore giving them full consultation rights in the Council’s negotiations and decision-making processes.6 Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non-Arctic states, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). States that enjoy observer status receive automatic invitations to attend Arctic Council meetings. Before 2013, the composition of the observer states was predominantly European and included France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. Participation of the observer states is seen by the Council as “a valuable feature through their provision of scientific and other expertise, information and financial resources.”7 More recently, climate change has increased accessibility to potential Arctic resources. This is changing the geopolitical landscape and broadening the international focus on the Arctic to include more geographically distant countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore. Seeking observer status in the Arctic Council is regarded by these Asian countries as an important step towards ensuring involvement in determining the future of the Arctic, a region which they believe will have an effect on their economic interests and global environmental concerns. China, for example, views the Arctic Council as an important body for governance and cooperation. Since 2007, China attended the Arctic Council sessions regularly as an ad hoc observer to gain a better understanding of the Council’s work. Compared with an ad hoc status, a “permanent” observers status is perceived to be more than symbolic and “better positions non-Arctic states to participate in the governance of the Arctic region.”8 According to Linda Jakobson and Peng Jingchao, China has an unspoken concern that it will not be a desired attendee at some point in the future and its aspiration for observers to attain more influence in the Arctic Council will be not achieved.9 Increasing voices from Chinese political and academic fields have indicated that the international community, and China in particular, have important roles in the Arctic region. Hu Zhengyue, the then Chinese assistant minister of Foreign Affairs, acknowledged in his speech at Svalbard that, although the Arctic is primarily a regional issue, it is also an inter-regional issue because of climate change and international shipping. Unsurprisingly, China would like to see the Arctic states recognize the interests of non-Arctic states. At a meeting

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between the Swedish chairmanship of the Arctic Council and observers in November 2012, Ambassador Lan Lijun reaffirmed China’s view on the importance of involving non-Arctic states in the Arctic Council: Arctic issues are trans-regional, such as climate change and international shipping, which involve the interests of non-Arctic states. Arctic states and nonArctic states share common interests in addressing trans-regional issues and should further their communication and cooperation.10 The statement also recognized that the “participation of observers in the work of the Council is based on the recognition of Arctic states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic as well as their decision-making power in the Council.”11 Yang Jian, the vice president of Shanghai Institute for International Studies stated that China, while respecting the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Arctic states, holds that Arctic governance should be a global matter: China maintains that global Arctic affairs need to be handled through global governance and multi-party participation, because such trans-continental issues as climate change, ice melting, environmental pollution and ecological crisis all pose serious challenges to humankind as a whole and cannot be solved.12 In 2008, China began to officially express its intentions in becoming an observer of the Arctic Council. China’s bid for a seat on the Arctic Council, which officially started in 2009, has made much media splash because of China’s growing power and increasing global reach. During this process, China’s efforts also encountered different reactions from the Arctic states. Canada considers the Arctic Council to be “the primary forum for collaboration among the eight Arctic States” and prefers a regional governance regime dominated by the Arctic States.13 Canada “insists the Arctic Council eight are ‘best placed to exercise leadership in the management of the region,’ at a time when China and others are showing interest in the North.”14 Furthermore, Canada seems to advocate for Arctic issues to be governed by as fewer players as possible while keeping the rest of the world at a distance. Canada’s voice of objection targets at the application of European Union given its decision to ban the import of seal products in 2009.15 Canadian ambivalence towards China’s participation in the Arctic Council was evident until the final decision was made in May 2013.16 Before 2013, neither Canada nor the U.S. officials had opposed or supported China’s application. A senior U.S. official attending the 2013 Arctic Council meeting said that the U.S. was open to observers and respected the consensus.17 The official also added that Washington believed that China was a responsible applicant. It can be argued that the U.S. then secretary of state John Kerry helped to pave the way for the successful accession of China and other non-Arctic states’ move to the Arctic Council.18

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China has specially courted the Nordic countries in its bid to gain observer status after expressing interest in activities such as mining in Greenland and tourism in Iceland. Foreign ministry representatives from Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden publicly supported China’s application. Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister and chair of the meeting, hailed the “coming of age” of the Council. He further stated: “Our policy is that the key to success is through international co-operation – whether dealing with the many risks associated with a changing Arctic or the various new economic opportunities.”19 Denmark’s position on China is consistent with its support for more observers. Norway’s foreign minister Jonas Gahr Store officially endorsed China during a speech in Beijing in 2010, indicating his hope for the Arctic Council reaching a similar consensus.20 Russia’s concern about China’s emerging global status was a major impediment to China’s application, which obstructed the process for seven years.21 As Flake analyzed, the Arctic represents one of the few areas in which Russia holds a clear advantage over China. Russia is the largest Arctic state in terms of territory, coastline and population; Russia also possesses great influence over the region’s potentially lucrative energy fields player and sea lanes, which explains why Russia was reluctant to treat China as an equal in the Arctic.22 Moscow reluctantly approved China’s application to the Council only after considerable pressure from Nordic nations and the “Criteria for Admitting Observers” policy was announced by the Arctic Council in 2011, which required new observers to “recognize Arctic states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic.”23 In May 2013, the Arctic Council granted China, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore observer status.24 Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide stated: “There is no such thing as a free lunch. By becoming an observer you’re also signing up to the principles embodied by this organization.”25 These nonArctic states have been working hard to make this a reality, but some analysts still question the new criteria for observer status on the Arctic Council.26 As mentioned previously, part of the new criteria includes an explicit direction that observers must respect “Arctic states’ sovereignty.”27 China submitted a formal application for observer status in accordance with the new criteria and procedures set at the Nuuk Ministerial in May 2011. During the 2011 Nuuk Ministerial, the Council settled upon a formula, setting explicit criteria for the consideration of applications or observer status.28 In 2012, Lan Lijun, China’s ambassador to Sweden, recognized that much of the Arctic region falls under national jurisdiction of the eight Arctic states.29 This paved way for China to gain its observer status in the Arctic Council. One of the four policy goals set in China’s Arctic policy white paper is to “participate in the governance of the Arctic.”30 In order to achieve this goal, “China will participate in regulating and managing the affairs and activities relating to the Arctic on the basis of rules and mechanism.”31 Beijing recognized in this paper that, internationally, China is committed to “the existing framework of international law including the UN Charter, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), treaties on climate change and the environment and relevant rules of the International Maritime Organization.”32 Domestically,

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the paper promises that China will “regulate and manage Arctic-related affairs and activities within its jurisdiction in accordance with the law, steadily enhance its ability to understand, protect, and develop the Arctic, and actively participate in international cooperation in Arctic affairs.”33 Since it was granted observer status in May 2013, China has annually submitted an Observer Review Report to the Arctic Council. In its 2016 report, China stated that it continues to contribute to the work of the Arctic Council as an observer through attending all governmental meetings open to observers under the umbrella of the Arctic Council. China contributed by attending the Working Groups, Task Forces and Expert Groups WG/meetings of the Council and recommended more than 25 experts to relevant programs – eight of whom had been invited to engage in specific programs. The 2016 report also noted that China has hosted several meetings and sessions related to Arctic issues, including the NyÅlesund Science Managers Committee Seminar, the country session in the Third Arctic Circle Assembly, the breakout session regarding the sustainable development of the indigenous peoples, and Asia’s contribution in the Arctic Frontier Meeting. Furthermore, China has claimed contributions to the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat on the “A Story Map of Indigenous Peoples” project and to the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Arctic Council.34 China obtaining an observer status in the Arctic Council aroused concerns from the media, who are skeptical of whether China’s growing influence might be a destabilizing factor in the Arctic governance or even a threat to Arctic states’ sovereignties. However, as some Canadian scholars observed, “these views never held much authority with the halls of the Council itself.”35 Officials, particularly from the Nordic countries and the United States, indicated that they welcomed and had always supported China’s engagement or, at the very least, had no concerns whatsoever about its admission: the mass media’s portrayal of China was heavily skewed and that Chinese diplomats had always behaved very well, both toward the Council states and the permanent participants.36 Within Western and Chinese Arctic academia, there is no lack of analysis on the benefits China may enjoy as an observer of the Arctic Council and potential costs that China may have to bear. “China is aware that although observers do not have voting rights; they do have an automatic invitation to Arctic Council meetings and activities” and China hopes to become increasingly influential over the Council’s decisions.37 While China faces some hurdles in finding a voice in the Arctic north, it seeks ways to justify its position and propose alternatives that could bring more power to the Council.38 Zouyu Liu holds a point of view that with observer status in the Arctic Council, China would be able to take part in the discussion, debate and share

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China’s thoughts and advice on some current rules.39 As an important trade partner for the members of Arctic states, China’s opinions would be a valuable tool while debating Arctic issues. Therefore, China’s claim that “solving the Arctic issue within the framework of International Law” is expected to serve an important role within the Arctic Council, and probably, to a large extent, influence on the trends of resolutions and legislations that are made by the Council, leaning them towards directions that are favorable to China. In the meantime, this could cast an impact on the dominance of Arctic states and impair the trend on the “localization” of Arctic issue.40 Because of the existing governing structures of the Arctic and the setup of the Arctic Council, China, like any other non-Arctic states, “is left with no alternative option but to elbow in if it wants to be seriously involved in Arctic affairs.”41 Beijing is putting full efforts into pushing its way into the Arctic governance and becoming a part of the decision-making processes, which was mostly demonstrated by its successful attainment of gaining observer status in the Arctic Council in May 2013. Combining its accumulated experiences in world affairs with enhanced state capacity, “China could employ innovative methods to carve out a niche to affect the Arctic governance in a way that would at least reduce impediments to its own interests.”42 As an observer at the Arctic Council, China will increase its popularity in the international community and will also find its way to be informed of and air its voice in legislations on the Arctic affairs.43 Problems within the current system of international law in the Arctic area include a lack of universality and authority in regional legal documents. Thus, building a uniform legislative system within a multilateral, authored and institutionalized organization with certain constraints is the most urgent task for negotiating the interests of all parties in the Arctic region. The most realistic choice is to formulate multilateral treaties under the framework of the Arctic Council, follow the related terms in international law and consider special circumstance of the Arctic region. In recent years, the Arctic Council has released many reports and resolutions in order to lay a foundation for the formulation of multilateral normative documents. As one of the Arctic Council’s observers, China will be able to audit and offer opinions related to these topics. China will then be able to track the progress of legislation on Arctic issues and on the Arctic Council resolutions. In the meantime, it can recognize the standpoints and appeals of these countries. On one hand, this can help Beijing effectively adjust its strategy on disputes and cooperate with other related parties. On the other hand, joining the Arctic Council also enables China to have a voice on Arctic affairs, protect its legal interests and clear the air for misunderstandings regarding China.44 In this regard, China’s Arctic policy white paper highlights China’s determination to better understand the region, as it seeks to utilize the opportunities arising from change in the Arctic region, but also to protect the region from imminent threats, such as climate change. China, as demonstrated in its white paper, clearly prioritizes a multilevel governance approach at global, regional and bi-lateral levels.45 China also intends to explore avenues to participate in

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Arctic governance from the United Nations level. Its role on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) provides China with the prerogative, along with other permanent members of the Security Council, to link the maintenance of “peace and security” to Arctic governance.46

China and the International Maritime Organization With the melting of icecaps and the growing shipping activity in the Arctic, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) spent several years preparing polar navigation rules aiming at providing appropriate safety and environmental protection standards. The IMO has adopted the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (also known as the Polar Code) in January 2017 and drafted related amendments to make it mandatory under both the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). The rules underwent several transformations before emerging as the binding document, marking an historic milestone in the Organization’s work to protect ships and the people aboard them, both seafarers and passengers, in the harsh environment of the waters surrounding the Earth’s two poles.47 Although China is a shipping power in terms of vessel numbers and deadweight, it was not a powerful member within the decision-making process at the IMO. Chinese delegates attend most IMO meetings, but are normally quiet and inactive.48 From 2000 to 2009, although China submitted a total of 88 proposals to different committees and subcommittees of the IMO, it ranked only ninth in terms of the number of proposals submitted. In the same period, Japan submitted 640 proposals, Norway submitted 450, the U.K. submitted 627 and the U.S. submitted 567.49 China generally has a conservative reaction to the development of international laws instead of taking initiatives. However, there has been a noticeable increase in China’s willingness to be more active in the decision-making processes at the IMO. Nevertheless, China lacks a long-term strategic plan for making more effective involvement in the decision-making process within the IMO.50 China participated in the development of the IMO’s Polar Code of January 2017, which set rules for ships operating in polar waters. The drafted Polar Code covers a full range of design development, construction, equipment, operational, training, search and rescue and environmental protection matters relevant to ships operating in the inhospitable waters surrounding the two poles.51 It also harmonizes the ice-strengthening standards for polar class vessels. Moreover, the Polar Code has the potential to define what exactly is meant by “icecovered areas” in Article 234 of the UNCLOS.52 It is in China’s interest to adopt a mandatory Polar Code since China, as a flag state, would deal with internationally agreed rules and standards rather than unilateral national legislation when sailing in the EEZ of Arctic coastal states.53 In its Arctic policy white paper, China stated that disputes over shipping lanes should be settled in accordance with international law and expresses support for

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the IMO’s Polar Code and encouraged the IMO to play an active role in future navigation rules. The policy affirms the sovereignty of Arctic states over oil, gas, mineral and other non-living resources, and encourages China’s enterprises to follow national law, if engaged in those activities.54

China and Central Arctic Ocean fishery agreement The Arctic Five has long maintained their stewardship role in the Arctic region. This includes the high seas portions of the Arctic Ocean, such as the ice-covered Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) surrounding the North Pole. Thus, no fishing activities have occurred in that sea area. Nevertheless, due to climate change, a warming ocean means that the area could be open to fisheries in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, according to UNCLOS, all states have the freedom to fish in the high seas. Therefore, in order to sustainably manage high sea fisheries, key fishing states must cooperate with coastal states. China was also one of ten states involved in the recent adoption of the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAOFA), which took place outside the umbrella of the Arctic Council. In November 2015, U.S. special representative for the Arctic Admiral Papp testified to the U.S. House of Representatives on U.S. Arctic priorities.55 Among these priorities was the effort to prevent unregulated fishing in the international waters of the Central Arctic Ocean. The United States passed a law in 2009 banning fishing in its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north of the Bering Strait until there is sufficient information about fish stocks in the area.56 Canada also passed a similar law in 2014 responding to the collapse of stocks of pollock in the 1980s due to overfishing in an area of the Bering Strait known as the Donut Hole. An international agreement was eventually signed in 1994, but this was too late to preserve the pollock population.57 The original initiative that led to the negotiation of the CAOFA came from the United States Senate, which directed “the United States to initiate international discussions and take necessary steps with other Nations to negotiate an agreement for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean.”58 A series of meetings among the Arctic Five then followed this U.S. initiative. On July 16, 2015, the Arctic Five adopted the Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Sea Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean, commonly known as the Oslo Declaration.59 In this nonbinding declaration, the Arctic Five committed themselves to the “implementation of interim measures to prevent unregulated fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean.” The Oslo Declaration also acknowledged: the interest of other States in preventing unregulated high seas fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean and look[s] forward to working with them in a broader process to develop measures consistent with this Declaration that would include commitments by all interested States.60

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China, the European Union, Iceland, Japan and South Korea were invited to participate in negotiations for the regulation of potential fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean. Together with the Arctic Five, these five formed the so-called Arctic Five-plus-Five (Arctic 5+5). The Arctic Five-plus-Five went through several rounds of negotiations in a variety of locations: Washington D.C. (December 2015, April 2016 and November 2017), Nunavut (July 2016), Tórshavn (November/December 2016) and Reykjavik (March 2017), where the Agreement was adopted.61 Two additional scientific meetings were held in Tromsø (September 2016) and Ottawa (October 2017). After two years and six rounds of negotiations, the CAO Agreement was finally published in June 2018 in English, French, Chinese and Russian, with each language being equally authentic.62 On October 3, 2018, the Arctic Five-plus-Five signed the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean in Ilulissat, Greenland.63 As highlighted in its title, the key operative undertaking of the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAOFA) has sometimes imprecisely been called a “moratorium on fishing” in the Central Arctic Ocean. The moratorium imposed by the CAOFA is in fact on “unregulated” commercial fishing, not on commercial fishing per se.64 “The parties retain, with some qualifications, their right to authorize commercial fishing by vessels under their flag pursuant to conservation and management measures adopted by existing Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs)” if they are “operated in accordance with international law to manage such fishing in accordance with recognized international standards.”65 No fishing activities have yet occurred in the ices-covered Arctic Ocean. Therefore, China prioritizes its goal of “understanding” the Arctic by insisting on the freedom of scientific research in the CAO Agreement area. Article 4(2) of the CAO Agreement provides that: The Parties agree to establish, within two years of the entry into force of this Agreement, a Joint Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring with the aim of improving their understanding of the ecosystems of the Agreement Area and, in particular, of determining whether fish stocks might exist in the Agreement Area now or in the future that could be harvested on a sustainable basis and the possible impacts of such fisheries on the ecosystems of the Agreement Area. Though noncommercial fisheries are not covered by the “moratorium” under CAOFA, exploratory fishing will be regulated directly under Article 5(1)(d) of the CAOFA and may only be authorized pursuant to the conservation and management measures established.66 In addition, the freedom of marine scientific research in the high seas, which may involve fishing activities, is expressly guaranteed.67 Nevertheless, the CAOFA does contain obligations to prevent abuse of exploratory fishing and scientific fishing for commercial purposes.68 Furthermore, according to Article 3(7) of the CAO Agreement, “other than as provided

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in paragraph 4, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to restrict the entitlements of Parties in relation to marine scientific research as reflected in the Convention.”69 These statements are in line with China’s position. It is interesting to note the CAOFA’s provisions on participation, which only allows for the Arctic Five-plus-Five’s immediate signature (and thereafter ratification, acceptance or approval.70 Other States can only join: 1 2 3

after the CAOFA has entered into force; if they can show a “real interest”; if the Arctic Five-plus-Five have decided to invite them by consensus (Article 10).71

This agreement presents a vivid example of China’s role in the governance at the final frontiers of the world. China stated in its 2018 white paper that as an important stakeholder and “near Arctic State,” its policy goals are to “understand, protect, develop, and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable development.”72 As stated in this white paper, China is supportive of formulating a legally binding international agreement on the management of fisheries in the high seas portion of the Arctic Ocean. China also supports the establishment of an Arctic fisheries management organization or making other institutional arrangements based on the UNCLOS. In other words, as a rising power, China aims to first understand the Arctic and then to protect and use the resource-rich region.73 In its white paper, Beijing also declared that the country wants to utilize Arctic resources in a lawful and rational way. China raised “conservation in a scientific manner and of rational use” as its stance regarding the governance of marine living resources in the Arctic high seas. Fisheries in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean are mentioned specifically. Timo Koivurova explained that since China is only an observer of the Arctic Council and therefore without voting rights, “by invoking the entire framework of international law, China places itself in the drivers’ seat.”74 This was demonstrated during the adoption of the CAO Agreement, which was negotiated equally between Arctic coastal states and key high sea fishing states, including China. The initial period of the CAO Agreement where commercial fishing activities will not be engaged by signatories is only 16 years. As stated in the preamble of the CAO Agreement, after the temporary ban on commercial fishing in the CAO, the next step is to establish a regional or sub regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements (RFMO/A). This step-by-step approach was proposed by the Chinese delegation during negotiations.75 Unlike the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), which is now widely recognized as a conservation organization rather than a fisheries organization, a RFMO/A is a traditional high sea fisheries body based on the UNCLOS and the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement.76 In short, the CAO Agreement appears to be the first concrete example that showcases how China has shaped Arctic governance:

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China and international institutions 25 Through deft use of the tool of international law, China has established itself a serious player in governing the Arctic.77

China and international organizations on Arctic scientific research China has pursued active international cooperation in Arctic scientific research. It joined the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) in 1996, and jointly initiated the establishment of the 2004 Asian Forum on Polar Science (AFoPS) with South Korea and Japan. China also hosted the 2005 Arctic Science Summit Week and became a member of Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee (NySMAC) during the same year. In 2009, Chinese experts participated in the “Melting Ice: Regional Dramas, Global Wake-up Call” conference and the Task Force on Melting Ice. Concurrently, Chinese experts have participated in the drafting of a mandatory code for ships operating in polar waters in the Subcommittee on Ship Design and Equipment of the IMO, although China has not conducted systematic research on Arctic shipping.78 The IASC is a non-governmental international scientific organization. Under the IASC Founding Articles that were cosigned on August 28, 1990, by the representatives of the eight Arctic states in Resolute Bay, Canada, only scientific institutions’ representatives with national-level authority are eligible to participate in the organization’s activities on behalf of their countries. Since its foundation, IASC has conducted fruitful work. Based on the principle of “peaceful scientific co-operation,” it actively coordinates and guides the Arctic expeditions from different countries and organizes large internationals cooperation programmed to address important scientific problems. The committee provides a platform for scientists in different countries and regions to communicate. The Founding Articles commits IASC to pursue a mission of encouraging and facilitating cooperation in all aspects of Arctic research, between all countries engaged in Arctic research, and within all areas of the Arctic region. Overall, IASC promotes and supports leading-edge interdisciplinary research in order to foster a greater scientific understanding of the Arctic region and its role in the Earth system.79 In 1995, the Chinese Academy of Sciences dispatched a six-member delegation to attend the IASC conference in the U.S. and to make open replies on Chinese scientists’ application to join the committee. Eventually, scientists representing the Chinese Academy of Sciences were allowed to join IASC. Their application was accepted because they had more than three years of experience in engaging in the scientific research in the Arctic and had relevant scientific papers and works published. Moreover, the Chinese Academy of Sciences met the membership requirements of the IASC. Therefore, in 1996, the State Oceanic Administration sent a delegation headed by Chen Liqi and Qin Dahe to attend the IASC conference, officially marking Chinese membership in IASC. The same year, relevant Chinese agencies participated in the IASC’s Bering Sea Impact Study (BESIS) project and the International Arctic Buoy Program (IABP).

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China acquiring IASC membership in 1996 demonstrated its active participation in scientific research of the Arctic region. Since 1999, China utilized its research vessel Xuelong (Snow Dragon) to organize a number of scientific expeditions in the Arctic. China opened its Yellow River Station (黄河站) for scientific research at Ny-Ålesund on the Norwegian islands of Svalbard in July 2004.80 Following China’s first research expedition to the Arctic in 1999, active scientific research activities and increasingly extensive international cooperation conducted by Beijing have gradually shaped the country to be an important Asian player on the international Arctic expedition stage. It is notable that China took a leading role in organizing the Pacific Arctic Group and became the vice chairman of this organization during the Arctic Science Summit Week held in April 2005. Founded in 2013, the China Nordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC) acts as a bridge among Nordic institutions and universities along with their Chinese counterparts for natural and social science exchange and cooperation. By the end of 2019, China had carried out ten scientific expeditions in the Arctic Ocean and had been conducting research, based at Yellow River Station, for 16 years. Using its research vessel and stations as platforms, China gradually established a multidiscipline observation system covering the sea, ice and snow, atmosphere, biological and geological system of the Arctic. According to incomplete statistics and with the exception of a few regional organizations or those with disciplinary restrictions, China has joined most of the influential Arctic international scientific organizations. China has also actively participated in other international forums such as the Arctic Circle and the Arctic Frontier. Along with the development of China’s expedition in the polar region and increasingly extensive international exchanges and cooperation, the Chinese delegations, consisting of members from relevant government agencies, polar expedition management departments and researchers, attended international conferences on Arctic affairs and science meetings. On the international stage, delegates elaborated on Chinese government views on international polar affairs, promoted Beijing’s basic national policy on Arctic expedition and scientific research, fought for the international status of Chinese polar expeditions, and safeguarded China’s national rights and interests in the Arctic. Another example of China’s expanding influence is in the Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee (NySMAC), an international research institution engaging in Arctic research. NySMAC was established in 1994, with the purpose of strengthening cooperation and coordination between countries engaging in Arctic scientific research in Ny-Ålesund region, Norway.81 China hosted the 2005 Arctic Scientific Summit Week and was successfully elected as a member of the NySMAC. NySMAC regularly holds meetings for experts from each member country in order to enable them to communicate research achievements. In this context, NySMAC also serves as a platform enabling Chinese scientists to engage in cooperation and communication regarding Arctic research.82

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China and international law The first component of the international legal framework concerns international law as whole, which includes general international treaties and customary international law that are applicable to the Arctic.83 Rules of customary international law that are applicable to the Arctic are diverse and range from the acquisition of insular territories to State responsibility. As for general international treaties, the UN Charter and the UNCLOS constitute the basis and core of the Arctic legal framework.84 As a state located outside of the Arctic region, it’s valuable for China to put into effect a framework of rules that strongly emphasizes China’s role in Arctic governance. Within the predominant intergovernmental forum of the Arctic – the Arctic Council – China’s observer status is lower than that of the Indigenous Peoples’ organizations that would normally be dubbed as non-governmental organizations in other intergovernmental bodies or treaty negotiations. By calling upon the entire framework of international law, China places itself in the driver’s seat.85 According to China, what governs the Arctic is the following: the United Nations and its Security Council in which China is one of the permanent members; UNCLOS to which China is a party of; specialized agencies of the UN like the IMO and the treaties it produces, most of which China is a party of; and the UN-based regime fighting against climate change as well as various other international environmental treaties, many of which China is also a party of. Two especially important laws that govern the Arctic affairs are the 1925 Svalbard Treaty86 and the 1982 UNCLOS, also referred to as the Convention.87 China ratified the Svalbard Treaty in 1925 and UNCLOS in 1996. Hence, the provisions of both of these documents constitute the legal basis for China’s activities in the Arctic. UNCLOS, which went into force in 1994, remains as the most comprehensive international legal framework today for governance of state activities over the world’s oceans. The Convention aims to regulate all aspects of ocean resources and uses of the sea and is presented by the Arctic coastal states as the primary legal framework in relation of Arctic governance.88 It offers general norms that govern the Arctic region including the rights and responsibilities of both coastal and non-coastal states in areas within and beyond national jurisdictions. UNCLOS forms the main legal basis for states when they carry out marine activities. The legal framework established by the UNCLOS for maritime zones and the use of the sea is applicable to all parts of the ocean, including the marine areas of the Arctic Ocean.89 Therefore, it provides essential legal basis for states within and outside the region in respect of navigation, fishing, oil exploitation, protection of the marine environment, maritime delimitation and dispute settlement. Non-coastal states – states without territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic region – enjoy certain rights in marine areas such as EEZs falling within the jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states as well as the high seas, and the “Area” defined by Part 11 of UNCLOS as common heritage of mankind in the Arctic Ocean.90 UNCLOS provides non-coastal states with

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rights such as freedom of navigation and overflight, and the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines in the EEZs of the five Arctic coastal States. In addition to this, non-coastal states also enjoy constructing artificial islands and other installations, as well as the freedom of fishing and scientific research in the high seas.91 All states operating in the “Area” are under the management of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). They enjoy the right to participate in exploration activities and the exploitation of Arctic resources in conformity with UNCLOS.92 The 1925 Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty, while giving Norway full and absolute sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago, also grants the Treaty’s 42 parties equal rights to undertake fishing, hunting, mining, trading and industrial activities in the region.93 Under this treaty, the High Contracting Parties enjoy the liberty of access and entry to certain areas of the Arctic, as well as the right to carry out scientific research, production and commercial activities such as hunting, fishing and mining in these areas in accordance with law.94 The High Contracting Parties, including some non-Arctic nations, are legitimately permitted to carry out activities in the Spitsbergen Archipelago as well as in its internal waters and territorial sea.95 Because the treaty does not specifically govern scientific research activities, there is an issue of whether the right to “equal liberty of access and entry” includes scientific research.96 According to one view, “Norway may unilaterally impose any regulations on scientific research, unless a convention stipulating conditions for such research has been concluded.”97 Another view believes that the Spitsbergen Treaty prohibits Norway from unilaterally imposing conditions on scientific research. The practice appears to fall between these two views.98 To date, 11 institutions from ten states have established research stations in Ny-Ålesund on the island of Svalbard, and three of these stations are permanently manned.99 The Svalbard Treaty is considered as another legal foundation to safeguard China’s Arctic interests.100 As previously mentioned, signatories of the Svalbard Treaty are allowed to enter designated Arctic zones and enjoy equal right to conduct commercial and production activities such as hunting, fishing and mining in the high Arctic region. Chinese vessels gained these rights when it became a signatory to the Svalbard Treaty in 1925. However, Chinese commercial and scientific endeavors were carried out in the region decades later.101 China has stressed the importance of non-discriminatory rights under the treaty, such as scientific research, resource exploitation, fishing, hunting and commercial activities, etc. Therefore, the final determination of the treaty’s applicable scope has a profoundly direct impact on China’s interests in the Arctic region.102 Other international regulations also exist to cover both universal and regionspecific regulations related to, for example, shipping, resources management and protection of the marine environment.103 The Polar Code, which entered into force in January 2017, regulates the safety and security of vessel operation while simultaneously protecting marine environments in the Arctic.104 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and

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subsequently related regulations, such as the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, are often referred to in discussions on climate changes in the Arctic. In November 2017, all five Arctic coastal states along with four non-Arctic states (China, Japan, Singapore and South Korea) and the European Union (EU) concluded an agreement to ban unregulated fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) for at least the next 16 years pending on the availability of more concrete knowledge on the marine ecology of the Arctic high seas.105 Alongside international regulations, other Arctic specific regulations address cooperation on scientific research, oil pollution preparedness and response, and search and rescue operations.106 These are further supplemented by international human rights documents on the protection and promotion of the rights of over 40 distinct groups of indigenous peoples in the Arctic, whose lives and livelihoods are closely linked to Arctic’s natural environment.107 Although China is not a littoral state, the relevant provisions constitute as the legal basis for its activities in the Arctic.108 In addition to the UNCLOS and the Svalbard Treaty, other global international treaties are also applicable to the Arctic region (Table 3.1). China’s positions on existing legal orders and mechanisms in relation to the Arctic is reflected in its Arctic policy white paper which points out that “China takes an active part in the international governance of the Arctic.” China upholds the current Arctic governance system with the UN Charter and the UNCLOS as its core, plays a constructive part in the making, interpretation, application and development of international rules regarding the Arctic, and safeguards the common interests of all nations and the international community.109 The white paper further indicates that: China is committed to the existing framework of international law including the UN Charter, UNCLOS, treaties on climate change and the environment, and relevant rules of the International Maritime Organization, and to addressing various traditional and non-traditional security threats through global, regional, multilateral and bilateral mechanisms, and to building and maintaining a just, reasonable, and well-organized Arctic governance system.110 China’s basic position on the existing international governance mechanisms on the Arctic is that while governance mechanisms should be maintained and respected, they should also meet the changing needs over time.111 By “maintain,” it refers to the maintenance of the basic legal framework and mechanisms concerning the international governance of the Arctic. By “respect,” it refers to respect for the existing cooperative mechanisms concerning the international governance of the Arctic.112

1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea; 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea; 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers

1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/ 78); 2004 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments; 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation; 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants; 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer

1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety are relevant to the protection of biological diversity

1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); 1997 Kyoto Protocol; 2015 Paris Agreement

1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the UNCLOS; 2000 Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (amended in 2013); 2010 Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area; 2012 Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-Rich Crusts

Maritime Securityii

Environmental Protectioniii

Biodiversityiv

Climate Changev

Resourcesvi

The 2013 Rules of Navigation in the Northern Sea Route Water Area (“the Rules”) is Russia’s main Arctic legislation in place. Replacing earlier laws and regulations relating to the Northeast Passage,ix “the Rules” stipulates a licensing system for navigation in the Northeast Passage and establishes the Northern Sea Route Administration to regulate the Northeast Passage; which includes process applications for navigation in the area.x

The Oceans Act of 1996 establishes Canada’s claim concerning maritime delimitation in the marine area of the Northwest Passage and provides the basis for other Canadian laws on the management of the Northwest Passage. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1985 as well as relevant acts and subordinate legislation also provide legal basis for Canada.

The 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act and the 1990 the Oil Pollution Act are primarily related with environmental concerns.xi The 2004 Act on Marine and Coastal Anti-Pollution is one of Iceland’s main Arctic statutes, though Iceland’s Parliament later supplemented it with the Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy in 2011.xii

Russia

Canada

United States Iceland

Another component of the international legal framework concerns the relevant domestic laws of the Arctic States. All five Arctic states bordering the Arctic Ocean have adopted national legislation pursuant to UNCLOS which established the territorial seas, the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and the continental shelf. Such legislation usually applies to their respective maritime zones and is not specifically referred to the Arctic.vii One such example is the Law No. 41 of June 1, 1979, concerning the Territorial Sea, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf enacted by Iceland.viii

1995 Fish Stocks Agreement; 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas; 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing; and the 2009 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing

Fisheriesi

Table 3.1 International treaties applicable to the Arctic region

Sweden’s 1980 Act Relative to Measures Against Pollution Caused by Ships is also environmentally focused.xiv

The 1925 Mining Code for Svalbard (amended in 1975), the 1984 Regulations concerning the Control of Ships Carrying Passengers in Waters near Svalbard, the 1988 Regulations relating to Safe Practices in Scientific Research and Exploration for Petroleum Deposits in Svalbard, the 1991 Regulations relating to Tourism, Field Operations and Other Travel in Svalbard, and the 2001 Act Relating to the Protection of the Environment in Svalbard compose Norway’s Arctic-specific legal doctrine.xv While Denmark has no specific legislation concerning the Arctic, Danish mainland as well as Greenland and the Faroe Islands are all situated within the Arctic region so almost all of Danish domestic laws are applicable in the Arctic.xvi

Sweden

Norway

ii

i

Ma, “Chinaʼs Arctic Policy on the Basis of International Law,” 267. Ibid. iii Ibid. iv Ibid. v Ibid. vi Ibid. vii Vladimir Golitsyn, “The Legal Regime of the Arctic,” in David Joseph Attard, ed., The Imli Manual on International Maritime Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 464, 473. viii http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ISL_1979_Law.pdf (accessed on June 21, 2018). ix Such earlier laws and regulations include the 1990 Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route; the 1996 Guide to Navigating Through the Northern Sea Route; the 1996 Regulations for Icebreaker and Pilot Guiding of Vessels through the Northern Sea Route; and the 1996 Requirements for the Design, Equipment, and Supplies of Vessels Navigating the Northern Sea Route. x Northern Sea Route Administration, “Rules of Navigation in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route,” NSRA rules, Article 24. xi Tafsir Johansson and Patrick Donner, “The Shipping Industry, Ocean Governance and Environmental Law in the Paradigm Shift: In Search of a Pragmatic Balance for the Arctic,” Springer International Publishing (2015), 33. xii Johansson and Donner, The Shipping Industry, Ocean Governance and Environmental Law in the Paradigm Shift, 37; “A Parliamentary Resolution on Icelandʼs Arctic Policy,” https://www.government.is/media/utanrikisraduneyti-media/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICEArctic-Policy-approved-by-Althingi.pdf (accessed on June 21, 2019). xiii Johansson and Donner, The Shipping Industry, Ocean Governance and Environmental Law in the Paradigm Shift, 42. xiv Government Office of Sweden, “Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region,” 2011, https://www.government.se/49b746/contentassets/ 85de9103bbbe4373b55eddd7f71608da/swedens-strategy-for-the-arctic-region (accessed on June 23, 2018). xv Johansson and Donner, The Shipping Industry, Ocean Governance and Environmental Law in the Paradigm Shift, 44–45. xvi Greenland and the Faroe Islands are the autonomous constituent country of the Kingdom of Denmark, with a high degree of self-governance. But the Kingdom of Denmark retains control of their foreign affairs and national defense. Johansson and Donner, The Shipping Industry, Ocean Governance and Environmental Law in the Paradigm Shift, 34.

Denmark

Finland’s Arctic legislation mainly focuses on the governance of Arctic waters and the environment. It includes the Act on Water Resources Management, the Government Decree on Water Resources Management, the Government Decree on Water Resources Management Regions, the Environmental Protection Decree, the Act on Environmental Protection in Maritime Transport and the Water Services Act.xiii

Finland

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As Chinese vice foreign minister Kong Xuanyou said, the Chinese side endeavors to work together with all relevant parties and, in the spirit of mutual respect and win-win cooperation, to continue to promote the steady and orderly development of international governance of the Arctic.113 Beijing has also made efforts on enhancing internal mechanisms and legislation. For example, it established the Coordinated Mechanisms between Departments for the Arctic Affairs in 2011. The Foreign Ministry established the office of Special Representative for Arctic Affairs in 2016.114 The Law on Exploration for and Exploitation of Resources in the Deep Seabed Area was adopted in the same year. The State Oceanic Administration issued the Regulations on Administrative Licensing Management on Arctic Expedition Activities in 2017. This standardized China’s Arctic expedition activities and promoted the orderly conduct by setting rules on licensing and environmental impact assessment.115 Other normative instruments applicable to Arctic activities include the 2018 Measures for China’s Polar Expeditions Data Management, the 2017 Measures for Licensing for the Exploration for and Exploitation of Resources in the Deep Seabed Area, Interim Measures for Sample Management Concerning the Exploration for and Exploitation of Resources in the Deep Seabed Area and Interim Measures for Material Management Concerning the Exploration for and Exploitation of Resources in the Deep Seabed Area.116 China has also been actively participating in the development of rules governing the global environment, climate change, international maritime issues and high seas fisheries management, while striving to fulfill its international obligations in accordance with the law.117 China endeavors to play a constructive role in the work of the IMO, and hopes to make solid efforts to fulfill its international responsibilities for ensuring maritime navigational security and preventing its ships from polluting the maritime environment. In addition, since 2006, China has advocated for stronger international cooperation in maritime technology as well as a globally coordinated solution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from maritime transport under the IMO framework. Furthermore, China is taking part in the development of an international legally binding instrument on Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ); as of 2019, Beijing has made two written submissions. In practice, China abides by the Polar Code adopted by the IMO in 2014.118 China’s Arctic policy states its commitments to uphold its international legal obligation as embodied in UNCLOS, the Paris Agreement and other multilateral environmental treaties applicable to the Arctic. It also states that China firmly commits to respect the “diverse social culture and the historical traditions of the indigenous peoples.”119 In other words, China strives to uphold the international legal framework, as it applies to the Arctic, while at the same time, seeks to assert its legitimate rights and interests within the legal framework.120 Even though the white paper confirms Beijing’s international legal commitments, the text of the white paper raises concerns regarding China’s adherence to legal commitments for the protection and promotion of rights of indigenous peoples. While it states that China aims to accommodate the interests of

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Arctic’s indigenous peoples as part of its cooperation with the Arctic states, the document does not provide any clear articulation of which international legal frameworks China will observe. Although China has voted in favor of adopting the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), it failed to ratify a number of human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).121 China’s Arctic white paper may not be evidently presented as an autonomous international legal document. However, as a supplementary policy document, the reaffirmation of China’s international legal commitment towards the Arctic is politically significant. Beijing’s Arctic policy white paper presents China’s official policy position towards the Arctic, and thereby provides the foundation for other nations and organizations to act in mutual cooperation with China in the Arctic.

Notes 1 John Duffield, “What Are International Institutions?,” International Studies Review 9, no. 1 (March 2007): 1–22. 2 Oran R. Young, “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 3 Fengshi Wu, “China’s Ascent in Global Governance and the Arctic” (Thesis, Vestnik of Saint-Petersburg University, 2016), 118, https://doi.org/10.21638/ 11701/spbu06.2016.211. 4 Chinese Chairman Xi Jinping announced the Silk Road Economic Belt plan during his state visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013. A month later, Xi proposed the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in his address to the Indonesian parliament. Later, the Chinese government combined these two regional proposals of international development cooperation and named it One Belt One Road initiative. 5 Wu, “China’s Ascent in Global Governance,” 118–126. 6 Arctic Council, accessed August 23, 2018, www.arctic-council.org/. 7 Arctic Council, www.arctic-council.org/. 8 Aldo Chirco, “The Emergence of China as a Polar-Capable State,” Canadian Naval Review 7, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 13. 9 Lijun Lan, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Lan Lijun at the Meeting Between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and Observers” (Statement, Arctic Council, Stockholm, November 6, 2012), https://arctic-council.org/ images/PDF_attachments/Observer_DMM_2012/ACOBSDMMSE01_ Stockholm_2012_Observer_Meeting_Statement_Ambassador_Lan_Lijun_China. pdf. Statement made to the Arctic Council Observer and Ad-hoc Observer delegates at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Jian Yang, “China and Arctic Affairs,” Arctic Yearbook 2012, Arctic Portal, https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2012/2012-commentaries/22china-and-arctic-affairs. 13 Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,” 9, http://publications.gc.ca/ collections/collection_2017/amc-gac/FR5-111-2010-eng.pdf; P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, James Manicom and Frederic Lasserre, China’s Arctic

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Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2018), 132. “Charting New Arctic Waters,” The Star, August 21, 2010, www.thestar.com/ opinion/editorials/2010/08/21/charting_new_arctic_waters.html. Lackenbauer et al., China’s Arctic Ambitions, 139. Ibid. Ibid. Kim Ghattas, “Arctic Council: John Kerry Steps Into Arctic Diplomacy,” BBC News, May 14, 2013, www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-22528594. Steven Lee Myers, “Arctic Council Adds 6 Nations as Observer States, Including China,” The New York Times, May 15, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/ 05/16/world/europe/arctic-council-adds-six-members-including-china.html. Richard Milne, “China Wins Observer Status in Arctic Council,” Arctic Council, Financial Times, May 15, 2013, www.ft.com/content/b665723c-bd3e-11e2890a-00144feab7de. Jonas Gahr Store, “The Arctic: Norwegian Policy and International Cooperation” (Presentation, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, August 30, 2010), www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumentarkiv/stoltenberg-ii/ud/talerog-artikler/2010/ciis_beijing/id613162/. Lincoln E. Flake, “Russia and China in the Arctic: A Team of Rivals,” Strategic Analysis 37, no. 6 (December 2013): 681–687, www.tandfonline.com/doi/ full/10.1080/09700161.2013.847048?needAccess=true. Ibid. “Criteria for Admitting Observers,” Arctic Council, accessed May 12, 2013, www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers. “Arctic Council Grants China, Japan Observer Status,” CBC News, May 15, 2013, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/Arctic-council-grants-china-japanobserver-status-1.1375121. Ibid. Peiping Guo, “Analysis of New Criteria for Permanent Observer Status on the Arctic Council and the Role of Non-Arctic States to Arctic,” KMI International Journal of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 4, no. 2 (December 2012): 21–38. Arctic Council, “Arctic Council Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies,” May 15, 2013, www.sdwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/EDOCS-3020v1B-Observer-manual-with-addendum-finalized_Oct2016.pdf. According to new criteria for admitting permanent observers to the Arctic Council, aspiring states must recognize the sovereignty and sovereign jurisdiction of Arctic states. See Annex, “The criteria for admitting observers and role for their participation in the Arctic Council,” Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Report to Ministers, Nuuk, Greenland, May 2011, p. 50. Lan, “Statement at the Meeting Between the Swedish Chairmanship.” People’s Republic of China, State Council Information Office, “Zhongguo de beiji zhengce [China’s Arctic Policy],” White Paper, January 16, 2018, www. scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1618203/1618203.htm. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China’s 2016 Observer Activities Report,” November 2016, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/ handle/11374/1860. Lackenbauer et al., China’s Arctic Ambitions, 140. Duncan Depledge and Matthew Willis, “How We Learned to Stop Worrying about China’s Arctic Ambitions: Understanding China’s Admission to the

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50 51 52 53 54

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China and international institutions 35 Arctic Council, 2004–2013,” in Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2015), 766; Lackenbauer et al., China’s Arctic Ambitions, 140. Linda Jakobson and Jingchao Peng, “China’s Arctic Aspirations,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2012, www.sipri.org/publications/ 2012/sipri-policy-papers/chinas-arctic-aspirations. Brianna Wodiske, “Preventing the Melting of the Arctic Council: China as a Permanent Observer and What It Means for the Council and the Environment,” International and Comparative Law Review 36, no. 2 (2014), http:// digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol36/iss2/5. Zuoyu Liu, “Analyzing Benefits and Costs With China’s Overserve Status in the Arctic Council,” Law and Society 1 (2014): 176. Ibid. Oran R. Young, “Arctic tipping points: Governance in turbulent times,” AMBIO 41, no. 1 (February 2012): 75–84, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/ s13280-011-0227-4. Wu, “China’s Ascent in Global Governance,” 118–126. Liu, “Analyzing Benefits and Costs With China’s Overserve Status in the Arctic Council,” 175. Ibid. People’s Republic of China, State Council Information Office, China’s Arctic Policy, January 16, 2018, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/ 01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Kamrul Hossain, “China’s White Paper on the Arctic: Legal Status Under International Law,” American Society of International Law 22, no. 16 (May 31, 2018), www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/7/chinas-white-paper-arcticlegal-status-under-international-law. International Maritime Organization, “Shipping in Polar Waters: International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),” accessed October 30, 2019, www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx; Ibid. Nengye Liu, “China and the Development of International Law on Arctic Shipping: Challenges and Opportunities,” in Timo Koivurova, Tianbao Qin, Sébastien Duyck and Tapio Nykänen, eds., Arctic Law and Governance: The Role of China and Finland (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018), 233–251, http://dx. doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3115830. Dabin Sun, “Statistics and Analysis about Proposals Submitted by IMO Category a Council Members,” China Maritime Safety 8 (2010): 69. At the time of this publishing, Sun was the Chinese representative to the IMO, Maritime Section of the Chinese Embassy in the United Kingdom. Liu, “China and the Development of International Law on Arctic Shipping.” IMO, “International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.” Liu, “China and the Development of International Law on Arctic Shipping.” Ibid. Timo Koivurova, “China & the Arctic: Why the Focus on International Law Matters,” ArCticles – Arctic Centre Papers, February 14, 2018, www.arcticcentre. org/blogs/China-the-Arctic-Why-the-focus-on-international-law-matters/ ne2t4glg/cb324fd9-7981-4181-85a4-b9f583822512. Elizabeth Wishnick, China’s Interests and Goals in the Arctic: Implications for the United States (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2017), 56–57. Shark Conservation Act of 2009. Min Pan and Henry P. Huntington, “A Precautionary Approach to Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: Policy, Science, and China,” Marine Policy 63

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(January 2016): 154; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Arctic Nations Sign Declaration to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean” (Media Note, Washington D.C., July 16, 2015), https://20092017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244969.htm. U.S. Congress, House, A Joint Resolution Directing the United States to Initiate International Discussions and Take Necessary Steps with Other Nations to Negotiate an Agreement for Managing Migratory and Transboundary Fish Stocks in the Arctic Ocean, Public Law 110–243, 110th Cong., June 3, 2008, www. congress.gov/110/plaws/publ243/PLAW-110publ243.pdf. Erik J. Molenaar, “The Oslo Declaration on High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean,” July 16, 2015, https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/ 2015/2015-briefing-notes/159-the-oslo-declaration-on-high-seas-fishing-inthe-central-arctic-ocean. “Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean” (Oslo, July 16, 2015), www.regjeringen.no/ globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/folkerett/declaration-on-arcticfisheries-16-july-2015.pdf. “Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean,” NOAA Fisheries, April 2016, www.afsc.noaa.gov/Arctic_fish_stocks_fourth_meeting/pdfs/ Chairman’s_Statement_from_Washington_Meeting_April_2016-2.pdf; “Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean,” Fisheries and Oceans Canada, July 2016, www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/media/statementdeclaration-eng.htm. Nengye Liu, “How Has China Shaped Arctic Fisheries Governance?,” The Diplomat, June 20, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/how-has-chinashaped-arctic-fisheries-governance/. European Commission, “EU and Arctic Partners Enter Historic Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in High Seas,” March 10, 2018, https://ec. europa.eu/fisheries/eu-and-arctic-partners-enter-historic-agreement-preventunregulated-fishing-high-seas_en; European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion, on Behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean,” https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2554f4756e25-11e8-9483-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF; Valentin Schatz, Alexander Proelss and Nengye Liu, “The 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: A Primer,” EJIL Analysis, October 26, 2018, www.ejiltalk.org/the-2018-agreement-toprevent-unregulated-high-seas-fisheries-in-the-central-arctic-ocean-a-primer/. Ibid. Ibid; Government of Canada, “International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAOFA),” Ilulissat, October 3, 2018, art. 3(1)(a), www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/agreementaccord-eng.htm. Government of Canada, “CAOFA,” art. 3. “UNCLOS,” art. 87(1)(f), art. 238; Canada, “CAOFA,” art. 3(7). Canada, “CAOFA,” art. 3(4), 3(5), 5(1)(d). Paragraph 4 provides that scientific research activities involving the catching of fish in the Agreement Area do not undermine the prevention of unregulated commercial and exploratory fishing and the protection of healthy marine ecosystems. Canada, “CAOFA,” art. 9. Schatz, Proelss and Liu, “The 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries.”

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72 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council, “Full text: China’s Arctic Policy,” January 26, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_ paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 73 Liu, “How Has China Shaped Arctic Fisheries Governance?” 74 Koivurova, “China & the Arctic.”; Ibid. 75 Frontiers of Chinese International Law, “Beiji guoji zhili mai chu chong yao yibu – beibingyang zhongbu gonghai yuye xieding jieshu tanpan [An Important Step in International Arctic Governance],” Weixin, December 7, 2017, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/1bw0vgvr4RuPSp_RBjTYkQ. 76 Cassandra M. Brooks et al., “Science-based Management in Decline in the Southern Ocean,” American Association for the Advancement of Science, October 14, 2016, https://science.sciencemag.org/content/354/6309/185; United Nations, “The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,” www.un.org/depts/ los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm, accessed October 30, 2019. 77 Liu, “How Has China Shaped Arctic Fisheries Governance?” 78 Ye Jiang, “China’s Role in Arctic Affairs in the Context of Global Governance,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (November 2014): 913–916, https://doi.org/10. 1080/09700161.2014.952938. 79 Ren Shidan, “Legal Issues in Arctic Scientific Research: A Chinese Perspective,” in Koivurova et al., eds., Arctic Law and Governance, 43–64, http://doi.org/ 10.5040/9781474203302.ch-003, www.un.org/depts/los/convention_ agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm. 80 “Yellow River Station Opens in Arctic,” China Daily, July 29, 2004, www. china.org.cn/english/2004/Jul/102431.htm. 81 Shidan, “Legal Issues in Arctic Scientific Research,” 52. 82 Ibid. 83 Joaquín Alcaide-Fernández, “The European Union, the Arctic, and International Law,” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 33, no. 2 (March 2018): 285, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718085-13320009. 84 Xinmin Ma, “China’s Arctic Policy on the Basis of International Law: Identification, Goals, Principles and Positions,” Marine Policy 100 (February 2019): 265–276. 85 Koivurova, “China & the Arctic.” 86 Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty, 9 February 1920, in force 14 August 1925, 2 League of Nations Treaties Series 8, art 1. 87 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” United Nations, Montego Bay (UNTS 1833-A-31363), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx? objid=0800000280043ad5. 88 The Ilulissat Declaration 1 (May 28, 2008), https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/2008-Ilulissat-Declaration.pdf. 89 Vladimir Golitsyn, “The Legal Regime of the Arctic,” in David Joseph Attard, ed., The Imli Manual on International Maritime Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 464. 90 Ma, “China’s Arctic Policy on the Basis of International Law,” 265–276. 91 Ibid., 265–276, 66. 92 “UNCLOS,” art. 1 (3), art. 155 (2). 93 Xiaoyi Jiang and Xiaoguang Zhou, “China and Maritime Sovereignty and Rights Issues in the Arctic: Chinese Legal Perspectives on Arctic Governance,” in Koivurova et al., eds., Arctic Law and Governance, 83–100, 90.

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94 As of April 2018, there were 46 High Contracting Parties to the Spitsbergen Treaty, including 14 original High Contracting Parties: Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, India and the United States. China acceded to the Treaty on July 1, 1925. See “Treaty Recognizing the Sovereignty of Norway Over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, Including Bear Island” (in French). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France (depositary country). April 2018; State Council Information Office, China’s Arctic Policy, 3. 95 The Spitsbergen Archipelago and the Bear Island are called Svalbard Archipelago. 96 Ma, “China’s Arctic Policy on the Basis of International Law,” 266. 97 Ibid. 98 Yoshinobu Takei, “Polar Complications in the Law of the Sea: A Case Study of the Regime for Research and Survey Activities in the Arctic Ocean,” Netherlands Institute of the Law of the Sea, 8, accessed June 30, 2018, www.iho.int/mtg_ docs/com_wg/ABLOS/ABLOS_Conf6/S3P2-P.pdf. 99 Zhiguo Gao, “Legal Issues of MSR in the Arctic: A Chinese Perspective,” in Susanne Wasum-Rainer, Ingo Winkelmann and Katrin Tiroch, eds., Arctic Science, International Law and Climate Change (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 149. 100 Jiang and Zhou, “China and Maritime Sovereignty and Rights Issues in the Arctic,” 83–100. 101 Gao, “Legal Issues of MSR in the Arctic.” 102 Tianbo Qin, “Dispute Over the Applicable Scope of the Svalbard Treaty: A Chinese Lawyer’s Perspective,” Journal of East Asia and International Law 8, no. 1 (May 2015). 103 Kamrul Hossain, “China’s White Paper on the Arctic: Legal Status Under International Law,” American Society of International Law 22, no. 7, www.asil.org/ insights/volume/22/issue/7/chinas-white-paper-arctic-legal-status-underinternational-law. 104 Adopted within the framework of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Polar Code offers amendments to Annexes I, II, IV and V of MARPOL, and a new Chapter XIV within the framework International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The measures in the Polar Code are in effect from 2017 and focus on safe vessel operation and protection of the marine environment in polar waters. IMO, “International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),” IMO Doc. MSC. 385 (94) (November 21, 2014), www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/ POLAR%20CODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED.pdf. 105 “Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, Washington D.C., 28–30 November 2017, Chairman’s Statement,” Ocean Conservancy, accessed October 13, 2019, https://oceanconservancy.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/11/Chairmans-Statement-from-Washington-Meeting-2017.pdf. 106 These regulations are adopted within the auspices of the Arctic Council. See “Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation” (2017), “Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic” (2013) and “Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic” (2011) UNCLS. 107 For example, the UNDRIP as well as the specification provisions of the mainstream human rights treaties, such as article 27 of the ICCPR and article 15(1) of the ICESCR are often interpreted in favor of protecting indigenous peoples’ rights, and applicable to Arctic indigenous peoples. 108 Jiang and Zhou, “China and Maritime Sovereignty and Rights Issues in the Arctic,” 83–100.

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109 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy,” January 2018, 17, www.scio.gov.cn/m/32618/ Document/1618357/1618357.htm. 110 Ibid., 8. 111 Ma, “China’s Arctic Policy on the Basis of International Law,” 268. 112 Ibid. 113 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy.” 114 Xu Hong, “The Arctic Governance and China’s Participation,” Journal of Boundary and Ocean Study (in Chinese: bian jie yu hai yang yan jiu) 2 (2017): 7–8. 115 National Oceanic Administration, “Notification of the Issuance of the Regulations on Administrative Licensing Management on Arctic Expedition Activities,” accessed July 5, 2018, www.soa.gov.cn/zwgk/gfxwj/jddy/201709/ t20170904_57692.html. 116 Ma, “China’s Arctic Policy on the Basis of International Law,” 273. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. 119 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy.” 120 Kamrul, “China’s White Paper on the Arctic,” www.asil.org/insights/volume/ 22/issue/7/chinas-white-paper-arctic-legal-status-under-international-law. 121 Ibid.

4

China’s partnership with the Arctic stakeholders

The role of stakeholders has become more salient in the Arctic policy agenda. A wide range of actors who previously paid scant attention to this region are now jockeying for a “position to influence political decisions or to acquire a share in regional industrial activities.”1 This chapter applies a broad concept of stakeholders, and includes actors who are either significantly affected by an institution or capable of affecting it. This broad concept holds that stakeholder status extends beyond those with the legal competence or recognized rights to participate in institutional decision-making.2 This chapter analyzes China’s partnership with the Arctic stakeholders, including the Arctic states (Russia, Canada, U.S., Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland), indigenous peoples and other Asian states (e.g. Japan and South Korea) who have similar interests as China in the Arctic and were also granted observer status of the Arctic Council in 2013. Besides participating in multilateral mechanisms, China is also active in promoting bilateral relations with Arctic states for strategic purposes. In order to advance bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic region, China is making two separate but simultaneous efforts. First, China is focusing on resource acquisition in the Arctic through resources-oriented diplomacy. Second, China is trying to expand its influence by bolstering relations with five countries in northern Europe. Canada is important to Beijing’s cooperation agenda in terms of resourcesoriented diplomacy. Canada assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2013 and controls the Northwest Passage in the Arctic region. China has become Canada’s second largest trading partner and its seventh largest source of foreign investment. China also accounts for half of Canada’s mineral exports trade. China has sought to strengthen its engagement with Russia, a major Arctic coastal state with powerful military capability and resource in the region. The rapid expansion of Chinese activity in the Arctic in recent years has been noted by Washington who noted China’s cooperation with Russia in the development of natural-gas deposits in the Siberian Yamal Peninsula. China also focuses on improving bilateral diplomatic relations with the five northern European nations of Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. Cooperation with these countries is not only aimed at acquiring resources, but also expanding China’s influence within the Arctic. As Zhang Shengjun and Li

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Xing have pointed out, the Northern European states are not strong enough to compete with Russia or with their ally the United States, so these states are willing to turn to China for assistance.3 If China can establish a long-term strategic cooperation mechanism on Arctic affairs with these states, Beijing will garner greater sway in Arctic affairs. China is also willing to cooperate with other Asian non-Arctic states. In 2016, China, Japan and South Korea launched high-level trilateral dialogues on Arctic issues to promote exchanges on policies, practices and experience regarding Arctic international cooperation, scientific research and commercial cooperation. Beijing’s Arctic policy white paper describes how China is also eyeing the development of oil, gas, other non-fossil resources, mineral resources, fishing and tourism in the region. It is careful to emphasize these developments will be fulfilled in a way that respects the traditions and cultures of the Arctic residents, including the indigenous peoples, and conserves the natural environment. Indigenous peoples’ subsistence lifestyles are threatened by ongoing changes in the Arctic. More attention is needed on maintaining the integrity and vitality of existing ecosystems upon which the Arctic indigenous peoples are so dependent. The Arctic is a region in great need of cooperation, which requires efforts from both Arctic and non-Arctic states, and Asian observers constitute the largest share of the Arctic development market. As the indigenous people have local experience regarding the lands they own, the mutual understanding of Arctic indigenous people and Asian observers is important for the development of the Arctic.

China and Russia Russia’s policy and role in the Arctic Russia is one of five countries bordering the Arctic Ocean. Moscow defined its Arctic strategy back in 2008 and named the High North a region of strategic importance in its 2017 naval doctrine. Moscow’s main policy goals are “to utilize its natural resources, protect its ecosystems, use the seas as a transportation system in Russia’s interests, and ensure that it remains a zone of peace and cooperation.”4 It currently maintains a military and Coast Guard presence in the Arctic, both of which it plans to improve upon and strengthen. Russia has also taken gradual steps to exploit the large offshore resource deposits in the Arctic. The Northern Sea Route (NSR), one of the major sea routes in the Arctic, is of particular importance to Russian transportation. Moscow’s Security Council is considering projects for its development and have stated a need for increasing investment in Arctic infrastructure.5 Russian teams have conducted extensive research in the Arctic region that partially aims to back up its national territorial and maritime claims, specifically those related to Russia’s territory on the extended continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean. Among the key themes, military presence is the most instigating topic dominating the discourse in the existing literatures and media coverages analyzing Moscow’s Arctic policy. Moscow has reopened some of its abandoned military

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installations during the Soviet era and placed new facilities and airfields in its northern territory. It has also established a string of seaports along its northern coastline. For example, CNN news reported the Northern Clover military base on Kotelny Island, one of the most forbidding environments on the planet, as one of Russia’s newest military outposts.6 It is one of three new Russian bases above the 75th parallel, part of a larger push by Russian President Vladimir Putin to flex his country’s military muscle across its massive Arctic coastline.7 International attentions are also drawn to four major drills executed on a rotating basis that also correlate to Russia’s military districts: Vostok (East), Zapad (West), Tsentr (Center) and Kavkaz (South).8 In the same article in Foreign Policy, Russia is said to introduce a new transit protocol for the area, which obliges foreign states and firms to host a Russian pilot while navigating the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and stipulates that foreigners may be refused passage at any point.9 The United States and its NATO allies have been responding to these activities on many fronts. For example, the Pentagon is improving the U.S. Navy’s Second Fleet, developing the means to operate more visibly in the Arctic. Also, they are renovating and making use of facilities in Keflavik in Iceland and finalizing longdelayed plans being for the construction of new icebreakers to replace the two aging vessels still in operation by the U.S. Coast Guard.10 Russia’s growing military presence in the region has caused mistrust amongst neighboring countries in the region. Norway, for example, fears that tensions between Russia and the West could negatively affect its territory, so it has been lobbying its partners in NATO to focus on the collective defense of the member states’ territory rather than interventions outside their borders. As a result, Russia has pledged to respond to Norwegian military activity. NATO is now being called upon to craft a strategy for countering Russia in the Arctic and the Black Sea.11 Russia, feeling threatened by an expansion of NATO’s role in the Arctic, has shown consistent hostilities towards the increased support for NATO in Sweden and Finland and the increasing NATO influence in the region.12

The relevance of Russia’s Arctic policy to China Russia’s position on Chinese engagement in the Arctic affairs has evolved from skepticism to active albeit cautious cooperation. Russia has a record of trying to limit non-Arctic states’ involvement in the Arctic affairs. For instance, Moscow’s Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, clearly expressed his irritation in 2015 at how some non-Arctic nations “obstinately strive for the Arctic.”13 The reluctance to accept other actors in the Arctic was driven by Russia’s vision that the region has special ideological significance for their country. To Russia, the Arctic is a resource-rich bounty, a source of geopolitical leverage and a unifying theme for Russian identity. Its policy on non-Arctic states’ role

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in the Arctic Council only relented in 2013 when the Arctic Council finally granted observe status to China, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore, among other nations. The tactical nature of the acceptance and “fairly unproven record of cooperation with China in the Arctic Council” was described as a pragmatic approach.14 While Western companies remain contenders for participating in important projects in the Russian Arctic, Arctic energy cooperation between Russia and China has moved towards a strategic approach, reflecting more general trends in Sino-Russian energy cooperation.15 The identified strategic elements in relation to China are important findings and represent a significant change in Russian policy. Regarding the Northern Sea Route, Russia sees China as a potential partner for making the route more feasible, and China might wish for more unrestricted usage of the route without tariffs. Both countries have common aims in developing and commercializing the route.16 Russia seems to seek strategic partnership on some issues so long as Beijing does not challenge Moscow’s national interests in controlling and regulating the NSR. Russia’s renewed and increasing military presence to ensure its sovereignty and security along the NSR indicates a defensive pragmatic approach rather than a strategic cooperative approach. Hence, Russia, despite its current trend on developing a strategic partnership with China on many issues, will hold long-term concerns about China’s growing power and possible infringements on Russian influence. From China’s perspective, Russia, as the largest Arctic state, stands as an important gatekeeper for non-Arctic states.17 China is dependent on Russia in many ways. Russian goodwill and support are significant for China if it wishes to increase its activities and consolidate its role as a legitimate stakeholder in the region. Consequently, there is no way for China to avoid dealing and getting along with Russia in the Arctic.18 China acknowledges that the support of Russia is needed especially in relation to its broader ambitions to ensure a seat for itself at the table when future Arctic governance and institutional arrangements are debated and developed, for example in the Arctic Council.19 Aware of Moscow’s hesitations about including non-regional states in Arctic governance, Beijing has generally sought to downplay its political and strategic ambitions in the Arctic and has stressed scientific and economic interests and partnerships since assuming its observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013.20 On the other hand, China is seeking to gradually strengthen its presence in the Arctic and develop its relationships with Russia. Moscow is currently entangled in geostrategic and geo-economic vulnerabilities of the Arctic and needs China as a partner to develop the troublesome region.21 The Arctic case generally confirms the mentioned least-likely case, giving support to the broader argument that Russia has a strategic approach in its general relations with China.22

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Sectoral engagement between Russia and China Resources development In addition to military presence, Russia plays a leading role in infrastructure development in the Arctic. Russia has a five-year plan for Arctic investments in regional infrastructure and natural resource development. Its corporate energy giant Gazprom Neft already pumps oil from beneath Arctic waters via an offshore field in the Pechora Sea. Another project, funded by Chinese banks and partowned by France’s Total, the Yamal LNG controlled by Russia’s Novatek was expected to produce 16.5 million tons of super-cooled gas a year by 2019.23 China’s demand for energy resources and minerals continues to grow and Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are constantly encouraged to identify and establish new areas for exploration and extraction. Consequently, several Chinese players see the Russian Far East, Siberia and the Russian Arctic as holding great potential, not only as sources of energy resources, minerals and new shipping and trading routes but also as export markets and recipients of, and partners in, infrastructure and other economic development projects.24 Russia stands as the “unavoidable” partner in relation to more concrete Chinese interests in ensuring access to energy resources in the Arctic.25 Some Chinese scholars see a “window of opportunity” as Western sanctions further encourage Russia to pay more attention to China and to offer better political and economic conditions and deals.26 Over the past decade, most Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation has focused on regions in the Russian Far East and East Siberia (Table 4.1). The potential for cooperation in the Arctic, however, has gradually become part of the negotiations.27 Except for cooperation on the Yamal Peninsula, Russian and Chinese companies have not yet found further mutual ground for energy cooperation in the Arctic. Despite the fact that China is interested in energy projects in the Arctic and Russia is also eager to obtain Chinese partnerships, there are a series of difficulties ahead.28 Russian companies, on the one hand, need and welcome Chinese investments and loans. On the other hand, they are not comfortable with allowing Chinese companies to play too big of a role in Russian energy projects, including those in the Arctic.29 In contrast, Chinese companies “are in a very strong position at the moment and would not agree to anything less than a significant control and management role.”30 Chinese companies will only work on projects which interest them and follow their pre-defined conditions.31 The Chinese companies, in placing their investments, are primarily acting from a profit motive and are not giving their Russian counterparts any easier terms.32 Thus, the Russians have to offer favorable conditions to actually attract the Chinese and develop bilateral energy cooperation. Additionally, Western sanctions on Russia have had a negative impact on Chinese willingness to enter into investment and energy cooperation projects. The current unstable political and economic situation has made the Russian market less appealing to

Rosneft and the CNPC discussed the possibilities for cooperation on Arctic shelf projects in the Barents and Pechora seas, in particular the Zapadno-Prinovozemelsky, Yuzhno-Russky, Medyskoe Sea and Varandeyskoe Sea deposits.i Russia’s energy major, Rosneft agreed to jointly explore deposits with CNPC in the Pechora and Barents Seas.ii China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was given a 20 percent share in the Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in exchange for a commitment to buy three million tons of Russian LNG annually.iii The head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, confirmed the commitment to working with China on the Arctic shelf projects.iv It was reconfirmed that Rosneft was still in discussions with China regarding participation in Arctic shelf projects.v Novatek sold 9.9 percent of Yamal LNG to the Silk Road Fund. The deal amounted to €1089 billion.vi Novatek received a small loan from the Silk Road Fund of around €730 million for a period of 15 years for the purpose of financing the project.vii Yamal LNG announced the signing of agreements with the China Exim Bank and the China Development Bank on two 15-year credit line facilities for the total amount of €9.3 billion and ¥9.8 billion to finance the project. Thus, China has provided up to 60 percent of the capital to implement this project.viii

i Artem Zagorodnov, “Rosneft to Attract Chinese, Korean Investment to Arctic Shelf,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, February 19, 2013, www.rbth.com/ news/2013/02/19/rosneft_inks_memorandum_with_sinopec_on_possible_oil_delivery_increase_23037.html (accessed October 3, 2019); Alexey Topalov. “Шельф ля Китая: «Роснефть» оговаривается с китайскими корпорациями об участии в освоении российского арктического шельф [Shelf for China: Rosneft agrees with Chinese corporations to participate in the development of the Russian Arctic shelf],” Gazeta online. February 18, 2012, www.gazeta.ru/ business/2013/02/18/4972145.shtml (accessed October 3, 2019). ii Atle Staalesen, “China to Drill in Barents Sea.” Barents Observer online. https://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2013/03/china-drill-barents-sea-25(accessed June 28, 2019). iii Malte Humpert, “China Continues to Invest in Arctic Natural Resources as Two Chinese National Oil Companies Secure a 20 Percent Stake in Russia’s Massive Arctic LNG 2 Project,” High North News, www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-acquires-20-percent-stake-novateks-latest-arctic-lng-project (accessed April 29, 2019). iv Ekaterina Klimenko and Camilla T. N. Sørensen, “The Status of Chinese–Russian Energy Cooperation in the Arctic,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinese-russian-energy-cooperation-arctic (accessed August 31, 2019). v “Rosneft, Beijing in Talks on China Arctic Energy Participation.” Sputnik News online, November 16, 2015, https://sputniknews.com/business/ 201511161030170034-rosneft-china-arctic/ (accessed August 31, 2019). vi “Russia’s Novatek Completes Deal to Sell Yamal LNG Stake to China’s Silk Road,” Reuters, March 15, 2016, https://af.reuters.com/article/ commoditiesNews/idAFR4N0ZC01H (accessed August 31, 2019). vii Ibid. viii Yamal LNG, “Yamal LNG Signed Loan Agreements with the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank,” (press release, Beijing, April 29, 2016), www.novatek.ru/common/upload/doc/2016_04_29_press_release_Chinese_banks_FA_(ENG).pdf (accessed August 31, 2019).

April 2016

Early 2014 November 2015 September 2015 December 2015

February/March 2013 March 2013 June 2013

Table 4.1 Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation

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Chinese companies, which are also under growing pressure to obtain profitable and secure deals.33 Moscow is disappointed that energy cooperation with China has not developed as anticipated and mitigated the crisis with the West to the desired degree.34 In Russia’s perspective, China has taken advantage of the situation (e.g. extracting especially favorable terms on energy deals and insisting on high interest rates on major Chinese loans). This discrepancy between anticipation and reality is explained by exploring the differences in the primary concerns by China and Russia behind efforts to improve their overall strategic relationship. From the Chinese side, seeking to pursue economic goals – especially access to Russian energy resources in order to secure and diversify its energy supply – is the major driver in developing its relationship with Russia. This mindset could also explain China’s strategy behind the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is primarily concerned with long-term economic exchanges and gaining influence in every region of the world. Russia, however, aims at strengthening its strategic relationship with China in a geopolitical and security-driven context.35 Russia is not the only Arctic country with which China is eager to develop a sound bilateral relationship. China also seeks to consolidate its role as a legitimate Arctic stakeholder by diversifying and strengthening its bilateral relations with all the Arctic states through economic deals, scientific cooperation and stronger diplomatic ties.36 As a non-Arctic state, China does not want to risk being excluded and kept from engaging in Arctic affairs and developments. To do so, it seeks to establish strong and comprehensive bilateral relationships with all the Arctic states while being actively involved in multilateral institutions. Hence, China needs to carefully play a leveraged role in the heightened tensions between the West and Russia.

Shipping and infrastructure development Apart from resource development, a similar breakthrough on the Russia-China sectoral engagement is likely to occur with Arctic shipping. Russia is as eager to profit from its Arctic sea lanes as it is to profit with energy resources. Since the 1980s, Russia has promoted the Northern Sea Route(NSR) for international use with little success, due to not only weather conditions but also its own exorbitant fees.37 With the Arctic Ocean becoming more navigable, both countries have vested interests in reaching a compromise on simplifying the NSR application regime as well as lowering and standardizing the icebreaker fees.38 Russia is aware that the majority of cargo transit on the NSR will originate from China, while China recognizes the benefit from a polar shortcut given that its trade with European Union accounts for approximately 16 percent of its exports,39 making the EU its single largest partner. There has been an increasing political will to advance cooperation between the two countries in Arctic shipping.

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Partnership with the Arctic stakeholders 47 Two of Vladimir Putin’s policy obsessions since taking office at the end of 1999 have been to develop healthy relations with China and tap the economic potential of Russia’s Arctic sector.40

The Joint Statement signed by Chinese premier Li Keqiang and Russian prime minister Medvedev in December 2015 highlights the first time that the two sides established cooperative measures in developing the NSR into a competitive commercial sea route in the future.41 Beijing and Moscow issued a joint statement during President Putin’s state visit to China in June 2018, which proposed strengthening China-Russia sustainable development cooperation in the Arctic, including supporting cooperation among the relevant departments, institutions and enterprises in fields such as scientific research, joint implementation of transport infrastructure and energy projects, developing the potential for the Northern Sea Route (NSR), tourism and ecology.42 “Sustainable development” was for the first time defined as the overall framework for China-Russia Arctic cooperation, which became another important consensus since the two countries stepped up promoting Arctic cooperation in 2013.43 For China, “the comprehensive opening of the Arctic shipping route in the future would dramatically reduce traditional sailing distance, further enriching international shipping layout and driving economic and trade development of countries and regions along the route.”44 China will benefit from normalizing the operation of NSR, which connects China’s northern ports with Europe economically. Shipping through the NSR will also contribute to expanding the connotation of the Belt and Road Initiative and “enlarging the share of made-in-China products and equipment in the European market.”45 In its Arctic policy white paper, Beijing has further expanded the scope and connotation of cooperation in developing Arctic passages, and proposed building three key blue economic passages, including one “leading up to Europe via the Arctic Ocean.”46 In action, China has made a number of experimental voyages along the NSR (Table 4.2). Despite the increase in shipping, there is no official agreement between China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) and any of the Russian companies, primarily Atomflot, to make the voyages a permanent or at least regular occurrence. Therefore, there is no guarantee that China’s shipping frequency along the NSR will remain at the same level in the coming years.47 Like resource development, Russia’s approach toward China’s engagement on Arctic shipping shows a similar mix of interest and caution.48 While welcoming Chinese interest in the development of port infrastructure along the NSR, Russia is also very much intent on keeping the NSR under its control.49 This policy may challenge China as Beijing sees the NSR as an element of the Belt and Road Initiative and will resent obstacles to its free use of the route.50 From the Chinese perspective, the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Arctic Ocean has to

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Table 4.2 China’s experimental voyages along the NSR 2012 The icebreaker Snow Dragon was the first Chinese vessel to successfully navigate the NSR to the Barents Sea, returning to the Bering Strait via the North Pole. 2013 The first commercial shipping under the Chinese flag, the 19,000 ton cargo vessel Eternal Life, owned and operated by COSCO, sailed from Dalian to Rotterdam, a journey taking 33 days, one and a half times faster than through the Suez Canal.i 2015 Eternal Life conducted another experimental voyage, departing from Dalian on July 8 and arriving in Sweden on August 17.ii 2015 A COSCO representative in an interview with the Wall Street Journal announced: “The group is actively studying the feasibility of operating regular services on the northern route. We are considering to buy second-hand ships or build new ships for the potential routine services.”iii 2016 A total of five COSCO vessels passed along the NSR delivering freight, including wind power equipment, to the United Kingdom.vi Lily Kuo, “A Chinese Cargo Ship Is Sailing across the Melting Arctic to Europe,” August 12, 2013, https://qz.com/114206/a-chinese-cargo-ship-is-sailing-across-the-melting-arctic-toeurope/ (accessed July 3, 2019). ii Atle Staalesen, “China to Drill in Barents Sea”, BarentsObservers, March 25, 2013, https:// barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2013/03/china-drill-barents-sea-25-0 iii Costas Paris and Joanne Chiu, “Chinese Shipping Group Cosco Planning Regular Trans-Arctic Sailings,” Wall Street Journal online, October 29, 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-shippercosco-to-schedule-regular-trans-arctic-sailings-1446133485 (accessed April 25, 2019). iv Malte Humpert, “China’s COSCO Shipping Company Expands Activities on Northern Sea Route.” High North News online, last modified September 30 2016, www.highnorthnews. com/chinas-cosco-shipping-company-expands-activities-on-northern-sea-route/ (accessed April 25, 2019); Marc Lanteigne, “China and the Northern Sea Route: placing their bets,” Arctic Journal, August 16, 2016, April 25, 2019, http://arcticjournal.com/business/2519/placingtheir-bets (accessed April 25, 2019).

i

be accompanied by construction of the NSR. LNG from Yamal, for example, is expected to be exported to Asian and European markets via the NSR. Hence, China tends to package the development of Arctic oil and gas resources and the construction of the NSR together; both require capital, technological investments and political commitment from both Russia and China.51 Both countries have concerns on China’s engagement in the NSR shipping and construction. From Russia’s perspective, for example, further involvement of China in Russian infrastructure projects along the NSR might give China too much say in its regulation.52 Russia worries that the NSR may not remain purely under Russian jurisdiction if there is a stronger Chinese involvement in infrastructure construction there. Besides, Russia’s exclusive right to establish its own rules of navigation will be challenged.53 Although there is no direct questioning by Beijing of Russian military deployment within Russia’s sovereign Arctic territory and of its legitimate right to do so, China is generally concerned about any military build-up in the Arctic, which may further intensify the tension between Russia and the West, especially the United States, subsequently and inevitably affects the Arctic’s geopolitics.

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In addition, Russia’s legal claim over the Northern Sea Route, which it declares to be its internal waters, is opposed by some Arctic coastal states. In its National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive enacted in January 2009, the United States stated that: Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits.54 Norway and Iceland hold the same position that the strait passage regime in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) should apply to the NSR. Beijing’s official position is supportive of UNCLOS, in particularly with Article 234. China asserts that it accepts Russia’s right to establish the rules of navigation in the ice-covered waters and is ready to comply with them, as it has demonstrated over the past five years. Though China does not mention the legal status of the NSR in its Arctic policy white paper, China’s current practice of applying for prior approval from Russia’s shipping route administration when using the NSR, may be interpreted as admitting Russia’s legal position regarding the NSR. In this context, China-Russia Arctic cooperation may be denounced and slandered by Western opinion.55

Scientific research Compared with resource development and shipping, the two countries’ cooperation on Arctic research is not often mentioned in existing literatures, partially because there is less concerns from either side regarding the benefit of research cooperation. China and Russia signed an agreement in April 2019 at the International Arctic Forum held in St. Petersburg that aims to establish the China-Russia Arctic Research Center (CRARC). The research agreement is expected to document the development of bilateral cooperation between the Pilot National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology (Qingdao) (QNLM) and P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of Russian Academy of Sciences (IO RAS), targeting the preservation of the Arctic’s natural, indigenous wealth.56 In June 2019, the establishment of a China-Russia joint laboratory on polar technology and equipment was approved by the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology alongside the 14 other “Belt and Road” joint laboratories approved in the same month. The laboratory will strengthen cooperation between China and Russia in key fields such as Arctic shipping, energy cooperation and polar scientific research, according to the development plan.57

Opportunities and challenges The future of bilateral cooperation is very dependent on managing the imbalance of power between Russia and China in the Arctic which may prove the decisive

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factor in achieving a compromise acceptable to both.58 While China is aware of its dependence on Russia to accept the role of the junior partner in Arctic affairs, Russia, at the same time, is confident in its position to lay aside mistrust for the sake of mutual commercial interests.59 Mutual interests have already borne fruit in the energy realm, in which Russia is in need of both investment in its Arctic shelf and new markets for its energy exports. Moreover, China has a seemingly voracious appetite for future hydrocarbon sources. On the issue of Russia’s military presence, unlike many Western countries, China is more flexible and remains silent. There has been discussion among Chinese and Russian scholars that, from an Arctic governance perspective, that a stronger and upgraded Russian military presence might actually enhance Arctic governance abilities – especially if it enhances the search and rescue capabilities of the Russian coastguard in the Arctic. The growing Russian investment in infrastructure, even within a military dimension, could potentially play a positive role in Arctic economic development and common security efforts.60 Russia, an Arctic littoral state, and China, a non-Arctic state, will undoubtedly will have divergent policy priorities driven by their respective national interests. Arctic governance can be expected to be an area of potential friction between the two states. Beijing has always called for respect for the legitimate interests and rights of non-Arctic states. It seeks to enhance its presence and influence in Arctic governance carefully and gradually by developing strong bilateral relations with all the Arctic states. It also explores other opportunities in international institutions aside from the Arctic Council. For example, China has been actively participating in the Arctic Circle meetings and other Arctic-related institutional frameworks where Chinese diplomats and scholars increasingly and more proactively present Chinese positions, analyses and norms.61 Russia, on the other hand, insists on Arctic states’ privileges in setting the rules of the game within the Arctic and prefers to strengthen the established Arctic legal and political institutions, which ensure the rights of the Arctic states.62 For example, Russia supports not only the development of the Arctic Council, but also the continuation of cooperation within the narrower format of the five Arctic coastal states, that form the Arctic Five. Although accepting China’s observer status in the Arctic Council and therefore emphasizing stronger dialogue with China on Arctic issues, Russia continues to insist that it is the Arctic states that set the rules and conditions for the role and activities that non-Arctic states such as China can play in the Arctic. Russia has also claimed that observer status can be reconsidered and even revoked in the event that non-Arctic states cease to follow the rules.63 In general, the bilateral relationship between China and Russia in the Arctic will continue to be based on a pragmatic approach, stressing mutual economic goods as opposed to a strategic pact.64 Given its ongoing concerns about protecting the sovereignty of Russia’s Arctic territories and their resources, Russia will remain cautious about Chinese goals in the Arctic.65 China will remain watchful of any movement toward the closing of access to the Arctic Ocean to non-Arctic states, especially should the region’s economic development result in more overt competition.66

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The U.S. factor in the Russia-China relationship in the Arctic What makes the Russia-China relationship in the Arctic more complicated is the role of the United States which sees the Russia-China cooperation in this region as a ‘threat’ to the U.S. national interest. U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo warned China and Russia against “aggressive” actions in the Arctic, shocking his fellow foreign ministers at the biannual meeting of the Arctic Council.67 Pompeo’s speech was considered as peeling back the veneer of cooperation to expose the underlying great power competition.68 As Washington contemplates an upgrade of its own Arctic strategy, policy makers will need to take into account the growing links between a veteran Arctic player and an ambitious newcomer.69 As previously stated, the rapid expansion of Chinese activity in the Arctic in recent years has been noted by Washington. A report by the U.S. State Department’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) states: “China’s . . . quest for resources, particularly in Iceland and Greenland, are sources of concern for some.”70 Since the recent collapse of Russia’s relationship with the West over Ukraine, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership has become more pronounced. In the past years, there have been instances of Chinese military vessels operating near the Arctic Ocean, with two examples being the passage of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy ships near Alaska in September 2015, and the July 2017 joint maneuvers between PLA Navy and Russian Navy vessels in the Barents Sea. The report noted China’s cooperation with Russia in the development of naturalgas deposits in the Arctic Siberian Yamal Peninsula. Goodman, an ISAB member, suggested the impact of Sino-Russian cooperation on Arctic regional security has not attracted enough attention from the U.S. government. The report also concluded that the U.S. should strengthen its operational capacity in the Arctic by building new icebreakers and gradually establishing infrastructure in the Arctic as a precaution for potential future security crises. Some call it a new Cold War which sees Russia, China and the United States all vying for influence and control in the Arctic. The recent policy shift of the U.S. is also driven by its concern about this increasing influence of Russia and China and the cooperation between the two. Some even question whether it is possible for something to occur today regarding the Arctic similar to during the Cold War, whether that be the U.S. allying with China or with Russia. While upgrading their own Arctic strategy, U.S. policy makers will need to consider the growing links between a traditional Arctic player and an ambitious newcomer. In light of the complex relationships among the U.S., China and Russia, the U.S. tends to frame the growing Sino-Russian partnership in hard-power terms. However, U.S. policy makers would gain a different perspective by addressing Sino-Russian interests in the Arctic more broadly, as well as coming to understand that both great powers may have different long-term goals in the region. Chinese and Russian joint activity in the Arctic does not pose a great risk to U.S. interests. Russia and China, although they share common goals in many aspects of Arctic cooperation, have a complex relationship balancing competition

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and cooperation with lingering, mutual mistrust; be it in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, or the Arctic. The Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic will continue to be shaped by pragmatism with a focus on mutual economic benefits rather than over a strategic pact. As a major Arctic coastal state that is keen on protecting the sovereignty of its territories and resources, Moscow will remain cautious about Chinese ambitions in the Arctic. Meanwhile, China will remain alert to any movement by Arctic states toward the closing of access to the Arctic Ocean to any non-Arctic state. Reviewing the existing cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and between the U.S. and China may also serve to provide a broader view.71 The emergence of the Arctic as a region of political and economic opportunity adds a new dimension to U.S.-China relations. The region is an arena where the U.S. and China generally enjoy converging interests for the most part, including on issue areas that touch upon aspects of the law of the sea – be it conservation and climate change, marine scientific research, or construction of port and infrastructure facilities. The two countries should aim to realize such cooperative activities, which could play a useful role in stabilizing the troubled state of their current ties. China has the potential to be a strong partner for the U.S. if it can align its own interests in the Arctic with those of the U.S. Together, they could address questions that are important to both nations. The United States and the Russian Federation already cooperate on a wide variety of issues in the Arctic. They have worked together with the six other Arctic nations to negotiate and sign a binding agreement to facilitate how research is conducted in the Arctic. For example, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) approved a joint U.S.-Russian proposal for ship-routing measures in the Bering Strait. The Arctic Coast Guard Forum has brought all eight Arctic states closer together to address their shared challenge in search and rescue operations in the region. At the Arctic Council, the U.S. and Russia have also been cooperating on initiatives related to environmental protection and sustainable development.72 In addition to bilateral cooperation, there are also areas in which China, Russia and the U.S. share common interests and goals. The countries all signed an agreement to prevent unregulated commercial fishing on the high seas in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO), the first document of its kind to use a legally binding, precautionary approach to protect an area from commercial fishing before fishing has begun in the area. The CAO Agreement applies to the international waters beyond the national jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states, which do not have exclusive access to fisheries. China, a large stakeholder, has a significant voice on this regional fishery management agreement. China and the U.S. have held good exchanges and communication on this issue. If this positive trend in multilateral cooperation continues for a considerable period of time, it may create a more functional context to address other pressing and multilateral issues of global importance in the Arctic. One other example is a five-year project, namely ARCSAR (Arctic Search and Rescue) which aims at improving emergency response capabilities across the Arctic. This project, led

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by a Norwegian agency, is funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 program, which has allocated approximately US$4.1 million for the project.73 The main goal of ARCSAR is to establish an international network consisting of governmental authorities, organizations and frontline actors in the Arctic in order to increase security and face the challenges created by increased traffic and activity. Thirteen nations, including the United States and Russia, along with a total of 21 partners will participate in the project. Although China is not currently listed as participating country so far, future participation in ARCSAR would be in its interest in the Arctic considering the need for emergencysupport and disaster-response capabilities. The complex relationships between the United States, Russia and China in the Arctic also bring to the surface concerns from other Arctic players. Spurred by China’s increased interest, Russia’s military presence and the shift in U.S. policy, the president of the European Union Jean Claude Juncker spoke up at a College of Commissioners meeting in Brussels on February 6, 2019. He specifically called on the EU to take a leadership role in the Arctic, and increase European access to Arctic oil, gas, minerals, fish stocks and shipping routes when attending weekly College of Commissioners meeting in Brussels on February 6, 2019.

China and Canada Canada’s policy and role in the Arctic Canada, as another major Arctic littoral state, is a member of the Arctic Council. Canada claims sovereign right over the related continental shelf, its Arctic Archipelago and its mainland in the upper regions of North America. Canada’s Arctic policy, including both the foreign policy in regard to the Arctic region and its domestic policy towards its Arctic territories, encompasses the exercise of sovereignty, social and economic development, the protection of the environment and the improvement and devolvement of regional governance. The three Canadian territorial governments released a joint paper in 2007 titled “A Northern Vision: A Stronger North and a Better Canada.” Its main themes are sovereignty, circumpolar relations and climate change.74 In 2009, the federal government of Canada presented Canada’s Northern Strategy: “Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future.”75 On August 23, 2010, Stephen Harper, the then prime minister of Canada, said that the protection of Canada’s sovereignty over its northern regions was its number one and “non-negotiable priority” in Arctic policy.76 All three of these public statements show that Canada’s Arctic policy prioritizes exercising Canadian sovereignty, promoting economic and social development, protecting the Arctic environment, as well as improving and devolving governance.77 On September 10, 2019, one day prior to the start of Canada’s national election campaign, the Liberal government launched with little fanfare its longawaited Arctic and northern policy framework. The document represents the first phase of a continuing process and will replace Harper’s 2009 Northern

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Strategy and his administration’s 2010 Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy. It is meant to serve as a guide for federal policy in the Arctic until 2030, but it lacks an implementation plan or governance measures to guide future collaboration.78 Canada considers the waters between the islands of the Archipelago to be Canadian, that is they consider the Northwest Passage (NWP) to be internal waters even though it is regarded by the United States and others as international waters. Under the Harper government, Canada sought to further consolidate its sovereignty over the Northwest Passage through a variety of initiatives, including annual summer prime ministerial visits to northern Canada, as well as the partial submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2013 including, controversially, the North Pole itself.79 This submission may place Canada at odds with Denmark and Russia, both of which have overlapping entitlements in comparison with what Canada has asserted to be its home waters in the Arctic.80

The relevance of Canada’s Arctic policy to China China has no territorial or maritime claims in the Arctic and has been silent on any outstanding maritime claims between the Arctic coastal states. As a pre-condition for gaining entry into the Arctic Council, China accepts the Nuuk Criteria, which includes respecting the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the Arctic states as well as acknowledging the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal regime of the region. Canada’s concerns on China’s role rest on the use of the NWP.81 The debate about the NWP pivots on the legal status of the NWP, that is to ask whether or not it constitute an international strait, as asserted by the United States, or internal waters as Ottawa insists. In the latter case, any foreign vessels passing through the NWP would need to seek mandatory prior consent from Canada. In recent decades, the U.S. and Canada have reached an understanding regarding their respective positions. The 1988 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation stipulates that the United States, without compromising its legal position on the status of the NWP, must seek Canadian consent for icebreaker navigation through the passage. However, as the route becomes increasingly free of ice, eventually the United States might eventually wish to reassert its position on freedom of navigation and take a more robust position. Other than the long-standing objections raised by the United States and echoed by the European Union, Canada’s position has not been challenged by other states that also recognize the importance of shipping through the Arctic.82 China, Japan and South Korea, in particular, see the melting Arctic Ocean as a unique opportunity for international trade and will inevitably have a measurable effect on their economies because of their dependence on shipping. In addition, over the past decade a growing number of cruise ships have sought transit through the Northwest Passage. As the world’s largest exporter state, China has an interest in securing unobstructed and expeditious shipping movements globally.83 David Curtis Wright,

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a Canadian historian, speculates that China may promote a protocol similar to the Svalbard Treaty for the NWP in the future that accepts Canadian sovereignty but also guarantees uninhibited access and transiting through the Passage for maritime traffic.84 China, however, has not moved towards such a position that would entail clarifying their stance on the status of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – a traffic route Chinese shippers are far more interested and active in than the NWP.85 Canada and China have similar perspectives on the interpretation of internal waters and international straits.86 Both countries are in similar situations when it comes to the status of Canadian internal waters in the Arctic Archipelago. Unlike Russia, the U.S. and the EU, China has not publicly expressed an opinion on the status of the NPW, preferring to maintain a neutral opinion on whether or not it is an international strait or internal to Canadian waters.87 China prefers not to be involved in a discussion on the status of straits in Canadian and Russian waters because it does not want input from foreign nations on the legal status of contentious waters in the East and South China Seas.88 The positions of China and other non-Arctic states on the legal status of the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route will be crucial for the Arctic littoral states. Non-Arctic states will inevitably have to adopt a clear position on whether the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route enjoy the status of international waters for navigation, as the United States and the EU hold, or whether they are internal waters, as Canada and Russia insist. In its Arctic policy white paper, China maintains that all activities exploring and utilizing the Arctic should be conducted in compliance with treaties such as UNCLOS and the Svalbard Treaty, as well as general international law. However, it does not touch upon the status of the Northwest Passage and other straits in the Arctic. On shipping, China expresses a desire “to work with all parties to build a ‘Polar Silk Road’ through developing the Arctic shipping routes.”89 China encourages its enterprises to participate in infrastructure construction along these routes and to “conduct commercial trial voyages” in accordance with international law, in order to pave the way for regular commercial operations. In addition to emphasizing opportunities for commercial shipping, the white paper infers China’s interest in supporting and encouraging cooperation with Arctic states to develop tourism in the region and to enhance security, insurance and rescue systems.

China-Canada sectoral engagement in the Arctic Resource development Canada will require large amounts of foreign direct investment for infrastructure and resource extraction in order to develop the northern part of its country. Some hold that Canada should consider China as a viable source of direct foreign investment and work to engage China in mutually beneficial development projects.90 China invested US$16 billion in Canadian energy companies in 2010

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and 2011.91 CNOOC’s US$15.1 billion acquisition of Nexen, Inc. was approved in 2012.92 This arrangement is not without unique challenges. Coordination is needed across four levels of Canadian government, including formalizing contractual agreements with China, completing environmental impact assessments, building the infrastructure and balancing resource extraction with social development and skills training. Despite the perceived constraints – any resource development activities with China in the Canadian Arctic would likely include a mandate for a certain percentage of those raw materials to go directly to China. Canada is a primary resource exporter and relatively small amounts of refining or manufacturing occur within its borders.93 In addition, increased trade between Canada and Asia has been a clear objective of the Canadian government’s economic strategy to diversify Canadian trade.94 In 2011, the trade with China – Canada’s second-largest trading partner – was just US$50 billion, while trade between Canada and the U.S. totaled more than US$681 billion.95 During the 2012 tour to Asia by Canadian prime minister Harper, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao said, “China is ready to expand imports of energy and resource products from Canada and enhance cooperation in clean and renewable energy, energy-saving, environmental protection, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”96 Chinese investment in Canada dropped by nearly half in 2018 after Beijing’s restrictions on capital outflows combined “with rising Western scrutiny of its state-owned firms and heightened diplomatic tensions to put a damper on its global deal making ambitions.”97 The decline is partially the result of capital controls imposed by Beijing in 2016 and 2017, but other factors are also likely at play. According to Houlden, the declining investment could be from cautious Chinese investors who are witnessing the poor performance of Canadian energy investments or, alternatively, an overall chill cast by a year of fraught relations between Ottawa and Beijing.98 Chinese state-run CNOOC Ltd. paid US$15.1 billion for Calgary oil producer Nexen Inc. in 2012, only to experience significant losses due to low prices and operational problems. In May 2018, Canada blocked the US$1.51 billion takeover of the construction firm Aecon Group Inc. for national security concerns.99 Other Chinese firms made bets on Canadian energy firms assuming that more pipeline capacity will be built in order to move their product to market.100

Shipping and port facilities Arctic shipping is an area of great interest to China and of great importance to Canada. It should in both countries’ interests to expand cooperation in this field. As both are members of the IMO and signatories to UNCLOS, China and Canada share significant amount of common ground. As efforts by the IMO to implement a common Polar Code for Arctic shipping are stalled, Canada should directly engage China on Arctic shipping standards directly.101 According to Huigen Yang, director general of the Polar Research Institute of China, Chinese Arctic shipping increased 53 percent between 2011 and 2012,

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and China expects to send up to 15 percent of its international trade through the Arctic by 2020.102 Canada has fought to create new standards for Arctic shipping since passing the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) in 1970. Though the AWPPA was controversial at the time of its passing in Canadian Parliament,103 its intent has been validated under UNCLOS Article 234.104 China should appreciate the importance of protecting cargo-carrying ships from strict Arctic sailing conditions. Cost savings is a major factor for Chinese shipping companies while considering transit through the Arctic, which could be substantial given the shorter distances through the NWP compared to traditional routes farther south. There are, however, significant risks, including the lack of hydrological data and navigation infrastructure, which have tempered Chinese assessments of the benefits of utilizing this passage.105 These risks provide further justification for the Canadian government to invest in Arctic shipping by positioning navigation and search and rescue assets, as well as reliable hydrographic and meteorological information along these routes, thereby incentivizing shippers to report to Canadian authorities.106 However, since Canada presently has no intention, at least at this stage, to promote the NWP as an international shipping route as Russia does for its NSR, it may be averse to creating such a system enabling and encouraging further usage. Even so, with yearly transits increasing 144 percent since 2004 (mostly due to tourism), Canada must prepare for increased use of the NWP and therefore be willing to negotiate protocols with Beijing (and other shipping states).107 The aim is not just to guarantee consent over passing through the NWP, but also to build rules and regulations to protect shipping, the ecology of the region and those who live there.108 For Canada, the significance of China’s ‘Polar Silk Road’ Initiative does not lie so much in the potential threat of Chinese commercial shipping through the NWP nor the purchase of Canadian Arctic ports.109 Rather, Canada is cautious about the nature of the large amount of investment in the Arctic region, characterized by high costs and slow payoffs, the sum of which nearly matches the billions of dollars that China spends in Africa and Latin America. Scholars advise that “the Canadian government should be vigilant about any future Chinese large-scale infrastructure investment in the North, not least because the United States may be actively opposed to such activities within its continental security perimeter.”110 Some scholars in Canada advise the government to cautiously welcome China’s participation in the Canadian Arctic through the Polar Silk Road Initiative.111 Canada has been trying to build the necessary maritime infrastructure and advance the resource projects needed in order to create jobs and lower the cost of living in the region but there is undoubtedly difficulty accessing the region given the high costs of Arctic operations. Hence, efforts to improve this infrastructure have been progressing at a slow rate.112 The National Trade Corridors Fund has earmarked money for northern projects and the government has engaged in the inter-departmental, multi-year Northern Marine Transportation Corridors initiative to identify and improve Arctic sea routes through charting

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and infrastructure enhancement.113 Still, these initiatives have been limited by a lack of funds and any immediate requirements. Meanwhile, Canada needs ports and harbors in the Arctic to supply their Navy and Coast Guard vessels over the lengthening ice-free season as well as to support Canadian resource development and commercial shipping.114 Moving forward, Chinese capital investments might be helpful in developing Arctic infrastructure, if a clear business model can be established.115 If Chinese shipping companies are interested in using the Northwest Passage, there may be a matching interest in investing in new infrastructure. Local communities will be supported by the investment by lowering the cost of re-supply. The investment will also facilitate development activities of other companies working in the area. Michael Byers has pointed to “the crumbling facilities at Churchill, Manassas as an obvious opportunity to leverage such funding to support export shipping and rebuild a northern community.”116 Canada, while desiring collaboration and partnership with China, insists that any decisions must be undertaken on Canadian terms.117 Any potential sectoral engagement will depend upon Canadian support and resources, such as Canadian investment in northern shipping infrastructure, aids to navigation and hydrographic surveying. Canada insists that services such as weather forecasting, ice reporting and emergency ice-breaking support must be made available and be exclusively provided exclusively by Canada.118 Reliance on Canadian services and support infrastructure incentivizes compliance with Canadian laws and regulations and provides a real lever to ensure operations remain on Canadian terms.119 Lajeunesse argues that the lack of service supply from Canada will give either the Chinese state or state-owned shipping companies incentives to build their own escort icebreakers or develop Chinese satellite-based iceforecasting services, which will undermine Canada’s role as regulator within its sovereign territory.120 Lajeunesse holds that Chinese ships operating in the North should obey all coastal state laws and regulations which is unlikely to change.121

Scientific research Compared with China’s engagement with Nordic countries on Arctic research, its collaboration with Canada is not substantial. China has put great effort and invested resources into Arctic research. This includes building its polar research icebreaking vessels, such as the Snow Dragon (Xuelong), with its second soon to be birthed to expand Chinese scientific capabilities.122 China also exercises its rights provided by the Svalbard Treaty that permit it to use the Svalbard Island for scientific endeavors at its Yellow River Station. Canada, as one of the few nations to be exposed to both the direct and indirect effects of global climate change, also spends millions of dollars annually on Arctic research projects.123 The data collected and knowledge derived from these activities directly enhance the understanding of climate change and the Arctic environment. Therefore, it will benefit both countries if they continue to engage with each other in maritime research by sharing data and research opportunities to

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further their collective knowledge and contribute to the international scope of understanding.124 China’s rapidly expanding polar scientific research program has the potential for Canadian collaboration and mutual assistance.125 China has been expressing an interest in establishing a research station in the Canadian Arctic. While a stand-alone station is unlikely to be authorized, “a partnership with the recently opened Canadian High Arctic Research Station in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut would combine Canadian facilities with Chinese resources to mutual benefit,” as suggested by Vanderklippe.126

Opportunities and challenges The rising interests of “new actors” in circumpolar affairs creates new uncertainty and thus the possibility of a new threat narrative. Canadian commentators have been particularly skeptical of China’s intentions and agenda with respect to Canada’s Arctic waters, resources, fisheries and continental shelf claim.127 The emergence of China as a major Arctic player and partner in Arctic development has produced mixed reactions in the Canadian media, academia and among the general public, which have been shaped and guided by an ongoing debate among Arctic experts analyzing China’s aspirations and agenda in their region and in the world at large. On the one hand, “alarmists” (e.g. David Wright and Rob Huebert, also called the Conflict School) suggest that Canadians should be wary of East Asian states (particularly China) as revisionist actors with interests counter to those of Canada. On the other hand, some argue that Canada’s national interests in the Arctic are generally compatible with those of East Asian countries and see opportunities for collaboration and mutual benefit.128 Many Chinese media outlets refer to the previously mentioned “Polar Silk Road” concept as the “Silk Road on Ice.” This vision has led many observers like Canada to warn of Beijing’s attempt to get a stronger foothold in the Arctic.129 Instead of adopting China’s slogan of a “Polar Silk Road,” some experts argue that it will be more important for Canada to interpret Beijing’s Arctic policy as yet another articulation of interest in Arctic matters by a global player, as the EU did so much earlier using similar language.130 In both the official documents of China (its 2018 white paper) and the EU (its 2008 Arctic policy), increasing accessibility of energy and mineral resources and climate change have been used as justifications for conceptualizing the Arctic as a region that has attained global political meaning beyond its limited geographical space. Canada will have to accept that any state which sees itself as playing a role in international politics will want to be somehow involved in Arctic matters.131 Canada is also worried about the investment record of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are notorious for leaving behind environmental degradation and labor strife.132 However, some argue that fears of Chinese SOEs importing cheap labor or disregarding Canadian laws have proven groundless and “speak more to Canada’s insecurity over its ability to impose and enforce its own laws than of China’s willingness to violate them.”133 China’s Arctic

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policy white paper explicitly “requires its enterprises to observe the laws of the relevant States”134 in development activities. It not only encourages SOEs to assiduously abide by Canadian regulations so as to avoid fines and penalties, but also threatens a loss of face for the government in Beijing. Rather than reluctantly accommodating Beijing, other voices defend that Canada needs to acknowledge that a greater Chinese presence in the Arctic has many potential benefits, including having a strong partner in scientific research and investment as well as legitimizing the regional order by including external actors.135 This does not preclude China’s “revisionist intentions,” the political motives and decision-making processes of which remain uncertain. Instead, “assuming China’s intentions are fixed, unmovable, and hostile may unnecessarily exacerbate regional relations at a critical moment when Arctic states must show leadership in building pathways towards inclusion. China is and will continue to become an active Arctic player.”136

China and the Unites States The U.S. Arctic policy The United States is one of the eight Arctic nations and one of the five Arctic Ocean littoral countries. It has been a member of the Arctic Council since its inception in 1996. The United States is also an observer of the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region. Its Arctic Policy released in NSPD-66 on January 9, 2009, included the following goals: 1 2 3 4 5 6

meeting national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region; protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources; ensuring environmentally sustainable natural resource management and economic development; strengthening institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations; involving the Arctic’s indigenous communities; and enhancing scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues.137

Another document reflecting the U.S. Arctic policy is its 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region released by the Obama White House, which emphasizes three areas: 1 2 3

advancing U.S. security interests; pursuing responsible Arctic region stewardship; and strengthening international cooperation.138

The 2019 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy outlines three areas of focus in order to achieve the desired Arctic end-state: building Arctic

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awareness, enhancing Arctic operations and strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic.139 Soon after the United States took over the two-year rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council, Obama, on January 21, 2015, signed an Executive Order to enhance coordination of national efforts in the Arctic.140 Under this order, the Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC) was created to coordinate the actions of the federal agencies, state, local and tribal governments in Alaska and the business and non-profit sectors. Current trends suggest that the Arctic is not a high priority for the current administration under President Donald Trump, and the Trump administration has remained dormant on the topic while the AESC continues to exist. Alaska senator Lisa Murkowski introduced legislation in December 2018 to make the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) its chair and a White House office its co-chair, attempting to revive this institution and restore its status as a driver of Arctic policy.141 The Trump administration, concluding the U.S. Arctic Council chairmanship without significant change, began to disassemble the Obama administration’s Arctic-specific administrative structures, emphasize economic development and dismiss climate impacts in the region.142 The U.S. has always been a reluctant power in the Arctic. Among the Arctic nations, it has invested very little into its Arctic resources – with no real ports along Alaska’s Arctic shores, little military presence and insufficient diplomatic engagement. However, the U.S. government released a US$330 billion spending bill in February 2019, allocating a total of US$675 million in funding for new icebreakers, which U.S. military leaders deem vital for competing with Russia and China in the Arctic region. When the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited with NATO allies in the North Atlantic on February 15, 2019 he discussed security relations and the growing presence of China and Russia in the Arctic.143 It seems that the United States has begun to shift its Arctic policy aiming at countering the growing influence of China and Russia in the high north. For the first time, the Arctic Council did not issue a final declaration at its 11th ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland in May 2019 because Secretary Pompeo refused to sign off the statement that makes reference to the Paris Climate Agreement and climate change.144 He instead chose to focus on geopolitics and the race for natural resources amid climate concerns. Failure to reach a consensus on combatting climate change is criticized as undermining the entire purpose of the Arctic Council as a platform for environmental cooperation.145

The relevance of the U.S. Arctic policy to China There have been limited exchanges of views between the United States and China on polar issues. Since 2011, there has been topical debates within the framework of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, as well as a series of workshops on U.S.-China Arctic policy, involving academic and government experts, first in Shanghai in May 2015, and then in Washington D.C. in May 2016.146 Nonetheless, the Arctic has not yet played a major role in U.S.-China diplomacy, which may reflect the relatively modest role the Arctic has played in U.S. foreign

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policy to date or the relative lack of importance of the Arctic on their bilateral agenda, compared to hot button issues such as the South China Sea, trade and human rights.147 The U.S. position on China’s role in the Arctic was somewhere in-between Canadian and Russian wariness and Northern European inclusiveness.148 The U.S. was open to observers and considered China to be a responsible applicant.149 Moreover, China’s observer status in the Arctic Council would provide the then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry an additional forum in which to engage China (as well as India) on climate change, a key priority for the Obama administration.150 There were nonetheless also concerns similar to those expressed by Canada and Russia.151 Until the last moment, the U.S. was undecided about granting observer status to China.152 In 2013, Secretary of State Kerry brokered a compromise which involved requiring observers to agree to specific rules for their conditional participation, particularly recognizing the sovereignty of Arctic states and UNCLOS as the determining legal framework. This compromise paved the way for the admission of China and several other states as observers.153 Some U.S. officials held skepticism about China’s long-term intentions in the Arctic, for example, “its potential to exploit economic weakness in the Nordic states or to take advantage of opportunities to engage in scientific research to improve anti-submarine warfare capabilities.”154 This skepticism has remained and is now reaffirmed by the current administration as the international security environment shifts to a renewed great power competition. This change underscores a question for the U.S. regarding whether and how to respond to China’s growing activities in the Arctic. China’s growing activities in the Arctic could create new opportunities for cooperation between China and the Arctic states. They also, however, have the potential for posing challenges to the Arctic states in terms of defending their own interests in the Arctic.155 Although there is a certain level of cooperation between the United States and China in the Arctic, China’s emergence as an Arctic player takes place at a time of rising tension between China and the U.S. due to a variety of uncertain factors. Among other areas of tension, the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, China’s emergence as a global naval power and a deepening Sino-Russian partnership on some cooperative projects in the Arctic concerns the U.S.156 The Trump administration sees the Arctic as the next frontier of geopolitical competition with China. Secretary of State Pompeo’s address157 in May 2019 at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Finland was aimed at Russia and China, the main strategic rivals of the U.S. Currently, the Trump administration is also working on a new Arctic defense strategy. This strategy, according to Pentagon spokesman Johnny Michael, will detail how the Department of Defense (DoD) “can best defend the U.S. national interests and support security and stability in the Arctic.”158 Such a statement aligns with 2018 announcement of a new defense

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strategy that would put a military focus on the “great-power competition” with Russia and China as opposed to a worldwide counter-terrorism focal point.159 The U.S. said it will boost its military and diplomatic presence in the Arctic by hosting military exercises, strengthening its force presence, rebuilding its icebreaker fleet and expanding coast guard funding, despite the absence of any imminent military threat in the region. In addition, it will create a new senior military post for Arctic affairs within the Department of Defense. Washington’s National Security Strategy (2017)160 and National Defense Strategy (2018), make clear that the U.S. believes it is facing a new era of great power competition which extends into the Arctic.161 In light of the new triangulation between the United States, China and Russia in the Arctic, the United States is called upon to do a principal-level review of national political-military strategy for the Arctic Ocean region. This group should include representatives of the National Security Council and National Economic Council, Departments of State, Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should also be able to consult as necessary with other departments and agencies, most notably the Director of National Intelligence, who chairs the Intelligence Community Arctic Working Group, as well as the Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC).162

Sectoral engagement Resources in Alaska The U.S. would not be an Arctic state without its most northern state of Alaska, making the state directly involved in the majority of Arctic research, security and policy. Alaska’s oil and gas industry, so far, produced more than 17 billion barrels of oil and 13 billion cubic feet of natural gas.163 Ninety percent of the state-funded portion of the budget comes from oil tax revenue.164 The Trump administration has attempted to drive Arctic policies forward by encouraging more fossil fuel production in Alaska despite its public statements on the Arctic having been sparse.165 The Trump administration has also reopened onshore and offshore areas in the Arctic for development such as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). These areas are available for oil and gas drilling with expedited environmental review although judicial review has slowed this process.166 As countries begin to brace for the effects of climate change, China sees Alaska as an opportunity to satisfy its LNG appetite – the Arctic is estimated to hold one-third167 of the world’s natural gas reserves, with half of these resources located in Alaska.168 According to an article by Ashley Feng and Sagatom Saha from The Diplomat, after the Mar-a-Lago summit with U.S. president Donald Trump in April 2017, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Alaska and met with Alaska governor Bill

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Walker to discuss the economic opportunities, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments.169 “Before Trump’s trip to China a few months later, the White House announced multiple memoranda of understanding (MOU) between U.S. and Chinese oil and gas corporations, including the $43 billion Alaska LNG project.”170 China’s top state oil Company Sinopec, Bank of China and China Investment Corp (CIC.UL) agreed to help develop a $43 billion natural gas project in Alaska.171 On the Alaskan frontier, deals are still moving forward even in light of the tense trade relationships between China and the United States. The picture is more mixed for China. While increased U.S. military capacity may be to its detriment to China, expanded energy production, if it becomes profitable in the future, could potentially provide new sources of oil and gas for China in the medium term and help to hold down the costs of its imported energy.172 For the United States, Chinese investment would, at first glance, benefit Alaska. The article by Ashley Feng and Sagatom Saha further stated that, The flagship Alaska LNG project, starting in 2014, could not find funding due to an evaluation calling it “the least economically competitive LNG project in the world.” This project is now back on track after the Alaska Gasline Development Corporation (AGDC) signed a joint development agreement with Chinese state-owned enterprises Sinopec, China Investment Corporation, and the Bank of China.173 However, some question the nature of the MOU – its deals with Alaska are currently nonbinding, and Alaska is unlikely to find a realistic partner elsewhere. If China abandon its commitments, the US$34 billion in investment and 12,000 jobs would be nothing but a dream for Alaskans.174 From the U.S. point of view, Chinese investment in infrastructure is not inherently negative. As Feng and Sahar explain, “if they are able and willing to fund domestic infrastructure that would revitalize development in looked-over states” then United States should let them do so.175 States should, however, ensure that the agreements that they sign are fair and neither have any bearing on state or federal legislation nor undermine U.S. foreign policy.176 The U.S. is wary of the military and strategic links that often come attached to Chinese investment and is not comfortable with China’s self-declaration as a “near-Arctic state.”177 At the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in May 2019 in Finland, Secretary Pompeo explained that The shortest distance between China and the Arctic is 900 miles. There are Arctic states, and non-Arctic states. No third category exists. China claiming otherwise entitles them to exactly nothing.178 Analysts warn that, while it should support China when it’s investing in infrastructure development, the federal government should advise states governance

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when the funding “comes with hidden strings attached or negative, long-term implications to U.S. national security.”179

Law enforcement With the creation of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in October 2015, the Arctic States agreed to develop cooperation in the Arctic among their Coast Guard agencies.180 Although China is not a member of this group, its coast guard cooperates with its U.S. counterpart through the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which also includes Canada, Japan, Russia and the Republic of Korea.181 The North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which served as a model for the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, holds bilateral and multilateral exercises to improve maritime safety and security and develop procedures for various contingencies. Meanwhile, the two countries’ coast guards are finalizing the details of an agreement to improve their communication, one similar to the 2014 multilateral Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea that sought to avoid miscommunication among navies.182

Opportunities and challenges The Arctic’s growing economic and strategic importance means that policy making in the Arctic deserves more attention. There are clear grounds for tensions to increase both within and beyond the Arctic among the great powers. In order to avoid escalation, the great powers should improve their relations by finding areas where mutual interests can be developed. Expanding collaboration on urban sustainability issues, for example, particularly to reduce high Arctic energy prices, “may present a small but high-value opportunity to reduce strains among China, Russia, and the United States, and in doing so, reduce potential causes of instability in the region.”183 Another area of potential convergence of interests between China and the U.S. is on the concept of “freedom of navigation.” Although China has yet to directly state its position on the legal status of the Northwest Passage (NWP) or Russian sovereignty claims on the Lomonosov ridge, in principle, it should stand with the U.S. on the need for freedom of navigation rights.184 Beijing finds itself in a bind here: Siding with the United States on freedom of the seas in the Arctic, while beneficial for Chinese economic interests in the region, would nonetheless open China to criticism of its more restrictive definitions of sovereignty on “near seas” such as the South China Sea and also adversely affect SinoRussian relations.185 The shift in the international security environment has raised a question concerning the priority that should be given to the Arctic in overall U.S. policy making. There may have been less need to devote U.S. policy maker attention

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and resources to the Arctic during the post–Cold War era when the Arctic was generally a region of cooperation and low tensions. Given how renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order might be expressed in the Arctic in terms of issues like resource exploration, disputes over sovereignty and navigation rights, and military forces and operations, it might be argued that there is now, other things held equal, more need for devoting U.S. policymaker attention and resources to the Arctic.186 For U.S. policy makers, a general question is how to integrate China’s activities in the Arctic into the overall equation of U.S.-China relations. The U.S. must also ask how it should link Chinese activities in the Arctic to its activities in other parts of the world – if at all. Conley holds that future relations between the United States and China in the Arctic will likely follow a similar trajectory as that of the U.S. position on Russia’s activities in the Arctic, despite the strategic return to great power competition in U.S. strategy.187 There will be growing concern and suspicion about the ultimate ambitions and projects but a lack of new or adjusted policy direction. Conley continues to suggest that, in the absence of direction, the same U.S. policies apply: focus on maritime security cooperation, scientific collaboration and lowlevel cooperation in the Arctic Council.188 Looking forward, even though the Arctic is often described as a region of cooperation, opportunities for greater tensions may proliferate as great powers’ interests among the great powers in this arena continue to rise. Despite strong economic ties, U.S.-Chinese relations also seem likely to remain tense, especially given the trade disputes dividing them. Such uneasy relations can extend into the Arctic.

China and the Nordic States Nordic states’ Arctic policies “Nordic states” or “Nordic countries” generally refers to Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, including their associated territories (Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Åland Islands). Also known as the “Nordic five,” they are all geographically and demographically small, economically developed and politically like-minded. Sharing a “political culture and identity” that encourages political compromise and alliance building, the Nordic states have a long-term practice and reputation of harmonizing their national interests and positions in international organizations by voting together to increase their political impact on world affairs.189 All the five Nordic states hold their own member state seat at the Arctic Council. There are both commonalities as well as differences between the Nordic countries’ Arctic interests. The commonalities in history, geography, culture, trade and politics knit them closely and together leading them to cooperate intimately at the regional and international levels.190 In their Arctic policy and strategy

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documents, each of the Nordic states define the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other global ocean conventions as the regulatory foundation for the Arctic Ocean.191 Issues specific to Arctic regulation such as sea ice, polar darkness, environmental fragility, among others are not addressed fully in the UNCLOS. Out of the 320 articles, only Article 234 deals specifically with ice-covered waters. For this reason, all Nordic states are in agreement that there is a need to develop supplemental regimes to UNCLOS; for example, develop a Polar Code for shipping. Sticking to economic developments in a sustainable way is another commonality among the Nordic block. On all Nordic political agendas, international cooperation activity ranks high, especially when it comes to Arctic science and research. The cultures and the interests of the indigenous peoples are also prioritized on the respective Arctic agendas of the Nordic states.192 In a historic context, the moderate differences among the Nordic countries are mainly due to three factors: geography, economics, and political and security alliances. Geographically, some Nordic countries are Arctic coastal states, while others are not. Economically, the level of economic activity and interest in the Arctic differs significantly among the Nordic countries. As for political and security alliances, Norway and Iceland are outside of the EU while Finland and Sweden remain outside NATO.193 Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine and other NATO partners like Georgia could have a negative impact on stability and security in the High North and affect NATO-Russia relations in the Arctic context. While NATO allies among the Arctic littoral states hold different views on whether or not there should be a role for NATO in the security of the region, some argue that “the security, environmental, and economic imperatives in the region require that NATO, at the very least, have the capacity and resources to monitor and consider developments in the Arctic.”194 Tensions and disagreements are emerging when it comes to the structure of the Arctic Council. Back in May 2013 for example, the admittance of the five Asian countries’ application for observer status in the Arctic Council were stalled, partly due to a spat between the European Union (EU) (also an applicant for a formal observer role) and Canada over seal hunting.195 Canada is furious at the EU for boycotting Canadian sealskin production, which is seen as a traditional custom and important business opportunity in Canada’s Arctic region. Nordic EU members had to align with Brussels even though they were skeptical of some of Brussel’s reasoning. Norway, which is not a member of the EU, became a major broker in Kiruna, ensuring that a decision was ultimately made. The Asian countries, along with Italy, were accepted as formal observers in May 2013, while the Arctic Council deferred a final decision on the EU application. So far, 14 intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations have been approved for observer status; the EU is still not one of them.

The relevance of Nordic states’ Arctic policy to China China is building partnerships with a wide range of partners in the region, including Nordic countries such as Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden. To ensure that it will have a voice on Arctic affairs in the future, China formally

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incorporated the Arctic into its plans for maritime cooperation under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In their Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the BRI, released in mid-June 2017, Beijing’s National Development and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic Administration envision a “blue economic passage” linking China with Europe via the Arctic Ocean.196 During meeting of the Nordic Council of Ministers in February 2016, a decision was made to explore opportunities for greater Nordic sub-regional cooperation with China. China, in turn, has expressed an interest in establishing a “5+1” dialogue with the Nordic countries. Such a format would be inspired by Beijing’s “16+1” dialogue with 16 central and Eastern European countries.197 China, for example, concluded a free-trade agreement with Iceland in 2013, and the two countries are also cooperating in both geothermal power and tourism. Iceland is viewed as a major shipping hub of the Transpolar Sea Route, which would become an alternative to the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route if the Arctic ice recedes further.198 The Arctic region increasingly represents the nexus of significant political, economic, environmental and academic potential due to global warming. Both China and the Nordic states have significant gains to make by encouraging closer cooperation. Logistical enterprises in the Arctic are highly challenging and have become a source of considerable great power prestige.199 Arctic exploitation will require significant infrastructural development. Transshipment ports and emergency services need to be provided in order to develop this region. As a highly challenging environment, joint development is needed to provide a comprehensive logistical system in the Arctic region. New infrastructure developments are opening commercial and geostrategic opportunities, and China has commercial, academic and military-strategic interests in the region. Through the Arctic Council, all five Nordic states (particularly Norway) have a strong voice in matters of Arctic development as they represent a significant potential economic gain for the countries along the Arctic littoral. However, substantial efforts will be needed to strengthen collaboration between all five Nordic states in order to maintain meaningful relations with China.200 Further challenges lay ahead in developing Nordic institutional coherence at the European sub-regional level. For example, the overall public image of China among Nordic societies has deteriorated in recent years. The understanding of China by Nordic populations is poor, not least in the fields of political affairs, development and security policy. People-to-people relations leave space for improvement.201 Deeper dialogue on areas of common interest such as the Arctic and “Belt and Road” region could offer opportunities for advancement. NATO allied member states among the Arctic littoral states hold different views on whether or not there should be a NATO Arctic strategy. While some argue for an increased presence of NATO in the Arctic, others have voiced concerns that establishing a NATO strategy for the region would give non-Arctic allies an influence in the affairs of the High North.202 Some argue that China’s actions in the Arctic are relevant for the security interests of all NATO allies as developments in the northern region have an impact on the economic and political stability across

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Europe. Given China’s improving relationship with Russia, its growing engagement in the High North should be monitored closely, particularly in the context of heightened tensions between Russia and the Alliance.

China’s engagement with respective states Although all five Nordic states are full member states of the Arctic Council, their roles vary.203 The Nordic countries share common concerns and interests and maintain basic policy frameworks. Towards China, however, they diverge on geopolitical stakes, mutual competition, economic structures and multilateral affiliations.204 With key interests in potential economic development and increased political relevance, Norway and Iceland take a pragmatic position, while Sweden’s relative detachment brings it to adopt a more normative stance.

Denmark Denmark is an Arctic state because Greenland is part of the Danish Realm. It is important that Denmark takes the utmost care of the relationship with Greenland and treads lightly with any possible disagreements between Nuuk and Copenhagen.205 In 1953 a new Danish Constitution incorporated Greenland into Denmark, thereby granting Greenland representation in the Danish Parliament and was recognized as a Danish province known as the County of Greenland.206 In 1979, Greenland was granted home rule by the Danish government, but Denmark remained in control of a number of issues including foreign relations, defense, currency matters and the legal system.207 In 2008, Greenland’s citizens approved the Greenlandic self-government referendum with a 75 percent vote in favor of a higher degree of autonomy.208 As a result, Greenland took control of law enforcement, the coast guard and the legal system. A poll in 2016 showed that there was a clear majority (64 percent) among the Greenlandic people who desired full independence,209 but a poll in 2017 showed that there was a clear opposition (78 percent) if it meant a fall in living standards.210 China is careful not to wade into the complex relationship between Denmark and Greenland. However, Beijing continues to seek support in Copenhagen for its activities in Greenland.211 Nevertheless, there are signs that China, in developing its Arctic diplomacy, intends to explore opportunities to set up direct relations with the Government of Greenland. For example, the Chinese State Oceanic Administration (SOA) (part of the Chinese Ministry for Land and Resources) and the Greenlandic Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and Church signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), effective in May 2016, which aims to increase research networks and exchange between China and Greenland.212 It has been followed by efforts to establish a research station and a satellite receiving station in Greenland.213 It is understandable that Chinese diplomats and Chinese companies have difficulties determining with whom – Nuuk or Copenhagen – to enter into agreements and apply for

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permission concerning Arctic collaborations and projects (e.g. in relation to the Polar Silk Road).214 It is interesting to note that the Arctic has played a limited role in Denmark’s China policy. The term “Arctic” is not mentioned once in the extensive “ChinaDenmark Joint Work Program” signed in May 2017, even though the document has stated its objective to develop stronger cooperation between Danish and Chinese authorities towards 2020 and touches on no less than 58 different areas of cooperation.215 Some analysts see this as the result of the complex relationship between Denmark and Greenland.216 However, as the “Polar Silk Road” remains the priority for China’s foreign policy in the Nordic regions, there will be an increasing rate of meetings between Danish ministers and diplomats and their Chinese counterparts. Similarly, outreach initiatives and proposals from the Chinese to both Danish and Greenlandic authorities are to be expected, for example on potential BRI projects and investments in infrastructure.217 Handling this complex relationship in a way that does not cause misunderstandings and disagreements between Copenhagen and Nuuk poses a great challenges for China. Therefore, the Danish and Greenlandic authorities must work hard to establish open, respectful and constructive dialogue and cooperation on this matter. One of the topics that may interest both governments is how the Chinese projects and investments in the region will benefit both Greenland and Copenhagen. For example, it is important to “identify where the Danish Realm could bid on and actively seek cooperation with the Chinese authorities involving Greenlandic authorities and stakeholders as well.”218 For example, the effects of climate change seem to be an area that can draw on the knowledge of Danish and Greenlandic scientists and potentially create a forum from which they can engage Chinese scientists, while identifying and developing new technology and capacity for vessels and installing satellites in Arctic areas related to the Polar Silk Road. China has been involved in three mining projects in Greenland since 2009. The first one involved Jiangxi Union, a consortium of companies including Jiangxi Copper (one of the world’s largest copper mining companies) and is a venture prospecting for copper, zinc and lead in eastern Greenland.219 The second investment, involving Chinese participation in a British iron-mining venture (London Mining), proved more controversial due to the exacerbated fears of China gaining control over the country’s rich resource base.220 The third investment, involving rare earths, has broader significance both within Greenland and geopolitically. Domestically, opponents of the project criticize the environmental consequences, the use of foreign workers, the processing of resources overseas, the mining of uranium more broadly. Geopolitically, the project has attracted controversy as developed countries seek to counter China’s dominance over the rare earths market by acquiring alternative sources of supply.221 Some see Chinese investment in Greenland as a potential vehicle for Greenland’s independence, since Greenland seeks to develop the mining industry as a way of gaining further political autonomy. This would have important security consequences for U.S. basing rights and missile defense systems in the area.222 A

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Chinese state-owned company, short-listed with five other companies to upgrade the airports by the project operator Kalaallit Airports, has withdrawn its bid to build two airport projects in Greenland.223 This marks the end of China’s potential participation in the infrastructure projects of strategic interest to both Washington and Beijing, as Greenland picked Denmark over Beijing to finance the planned projects.224 Adventure and eco-tourism are other areas that China is interested in with the Arctic becoming more popular as an alternative travel destination. For example, the number of Chinese visitors to Iceland jumped from about 9,500 to 86,000 between 2007 and 2017.225 There is a debate in Nuuk about potentially tapping into the overall growing demand for Arctic tourism, including from Asia. Opportunities have appeared for Chinese firms seeking to develop Greenland’s nascent tourism industry. Chinese firms are being considered for the expansion of three airports in Greenland, which could accommodate expanded tourist traffic, a development which is reportedly worrying Danish authorities. Beijing is also seeking to construct a scientific research base in Greenland, with these plans being outlined by Chinese researchers at the October 2017 Arctic Circle conference in Reykjavík. The exact location of the facilities has yet to be determined. If the project does go forward, it would be China’s second such station in the Arctic. Beijing opened its Yellow River station on Svalbard in 2004, and there is also a joint Sino-Icelandic facility for the study of auroras under construction in northern Iceland.226 The relationship between China and Greenland has been considered very market-oriented, which can be interpreted as a strong signal of Nuuk’s interest in pursuing further sovereignty given its decades-long independence movement.227 Greenland sees China as one of the numerous sources of foreign capital and investment, along with other non-European economies such as Canada. Greenland has been actively embracing China’s goal for an overseas economic presence in the Arctic through building diplomatic ties. Kim Kielsen, the premier of Greenland and Siumut (head of one of the island’s dominant political parties), led a delegation in October 2017 to Beijing to strengthen fishery, mining and tourism cooperation, in addition to preparing to open mutual representative offices in Beijing and Nuuk.228

Norway Asian countries’ increased interest in Arctic affairs, and in particular the application to become observers in the Arctic Council, received a mixed response from the Arctic littoral states. While Russia and Canada were skeptical, Norway signaled a positive attitude towards Asian countries becoming observers in the Council at an early stage.229 Norway has in generally welcomed Chinese investments, in comparison with other Arctic states. The Chinese attempt to acquire the U.S. firm Unocal, a mining investment in Greenland, and a purchase of land in Iceland met with some reservation.230 The purchase by China Offshore Oil Services Ltd. (COSL) of the Norwegian company Awilco in 2008231 and

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China National Blue Star’s purchase of the Norwegian silicon producer Elkem in 2011232 were two of the largest Chinese takeovers in Europe at the time of the respective investments.233 Analysts point to several explanations for Norway welcoming a stronger presence of Asian countries in Arctic matters.234 First, Norway finds it important to engage with new stakeholders at an early stage in order to promote a common understanding of developments in the Arctic. Norway’s asymmetric relationship with Russia and the need for a balanced policy between deterrence on the one hand and reassurance and engagement on the other add to the region’s strategic importance for Norway. Second, in Norway’s view, Asian countries have both the financial means and the expertise in research and technological development to play a greater role in the Arctic.235 Thirdly, most of the “Asia 5” countries (China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and India) are among Norway’s largest and most important trading partners, including in sectors of relevance to the Arctic. The Arctic region is relatively more important to Norway and the Norwegian economy than it is for most other Arctic states. Finally, Arctic diplomacy in various forms with Asian countries provides Norway with an additional platform to discuss economic cooperation and other foreign policy issues of common interests, engage the major players in Asia, and give the government an opportunity to present new initiatives in its communication with a national audience. One immediate issue that Norway and other Arctic states will need to address is what permanent observers of the Arctic Council can achieve and how that differs from the expectations of China and other Asian countries.236 Norwegian research communities have been engaged in environment and climate change studies with Asian states for a number of years, and Norway established formal environmental cooperation with China as early as 1995.237

Iceland Iceland is an important player in Arctic and as a member of the Arctic Council, which it chairs during 2019 and 2020. China, seeking to expand its influence in the Arctic, has been looking for a supportive partner in the region for support while Iceland is still working to recover after the severe economic crisis of 2008, and would welcome the advances of a commercial actor like China. Consequently, the island nation has established remarkably strong economic ties with China.238 Iceland signed a free trade agreement with China in 2013 – the first between a European State and China – which entered into force in 2014.239 In the same year, the Chinese and Icelandic central banks finalized the renewal of a currency swap agreement, worth 3.5 billion yuan (US$507 million), which aimed at facilitating bilateral trade and investment as well as helping strengthen regional stability objectives, according to the Chinese central bank.240 This three-year swap agreement was renewed in 2016.241 The Sino-Icelandic Free Trade Agreement is also complemented by in-depth cooperation, for example, on energy issues (particularly renewable energy).242

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Geothermal energy is one sector of cooperation between the two countries since the energy transition has emerged as a major issue in China.243 Icelandic regional experience is being used in China in pilot cities such as Xianyang, which was twinned with the Icelandic city of Reykjanesbaer in 2012. In addition, China is also willing to respond to Icelandic fossil fuel opportunities as they arise. Dreki, one of the two main potential Icelandic oil fields, was explored by a joint venture between China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Eykon Energy and Petoro Iceland, where once again the Chinese party held a majority stake of 60 percent until January 2018 when the CNOOC and Petoro decided to give up their license for lack of results.244 The bilateral cooperation is also reflected on marine and polar sciences and technologies, such as the construction of common scientific bases on Icelandic soil but financed by China.245 For China, Iceland could become an important shipping hub and research base supporting its activities in the Arctic.246 China and Iceland are working together in building a joint facility to study the Northern Lights, funded by the Polar Research Institute of China. In 2014, Iceland’s National Energy Authority granted a consortium including the CNOOC, Iceland’s Eyki Corporation and Norway’s Petoro, a license to explore for hydrocarbons on Iceland’s northeast continental shelf.247 There has also been cooperation as well on geothermal energy and in mining for ferrocenium, a key element of solar panels.248 This economic and research rapprochement of China and Iceland is reflected in terms of their regional geopolitics.249 In 2013, China was admitted to the Arctic Council as an observer member, backed by Iceland. China sees Iceland as an important stakeholder in the Arctic as it has seen Iceland’s influence on Arctic issues strengthened over the past decade.250 For example, the “Arctic Circle” conference (sometimes referred to as “Northern Davos,” initiated by former Iceland president Olafur Ragnar Grímsson in 2013) has become a very important platform bringing together nearly 2,000 specialists in Arctic issues each year in Reykjavik.251 The annual Arctic Circle symbolizes Iceland’s important role and its voluntarism in polar governance. Nevertheless, increased Chinese presence may become a bone of contention, especially at the NATO level, as the EU still largely depends on the alliance to ensure its security.252 Iceland, as a founding member of the Alliance, “is indeed a strategic point in the surveillance of the Euro-Atlantic area, all the more in a context of tensions with Russia.”253 Iceland depends on the United States to ensure its security, while the latter seems to be gradually engaging in a polar arm wrestling match with China.254 However, this does not prevent the Chinese company COSCO from projecting itself into a future of shipping through the polar maritime routes.255 The counter result of such a move would be the construction of port infrastructures, financed by Chinese rather than Europeans, which would contribute to making Iceland a new logistics hub between Asia and Europe.256 The potential installation of such infrastructure with an increasing role of China would probably encounter strong resistance by the United States, just as it has in Greenland.

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Finland Another actor in China’s Arctic engagement, Finland, is also starting to gain visibility in light of recent potential transportation and communications initiatives.257 In both China and Finland, there are two rhetorical discourses regarding the Arctic. First, the Arctic has huge economic possibilities with transportation and natural resources. Second, the Arctic is a vulnerable place of indispensable environmental importance.258 In both discourses, the Arctic has become the blue heart of the northern hemisphere and promises a lot to the new world order in terms of economic development and aesthetic experience. The potential common interests and fields of activities between the two countries, in the Arctic context, can be interpreted to include science, research and scientific cooperation, transportation and shipping, resource governance and international cooperation.259 In early 2018, it was announced that China and Finland were seeking to cooperate on laying down of a fiber-optic cables to improve internet connectivity and data-sharing in the Arctic.260 However, “this plan may be tempered by the ongoing global debate over the Chinese firm Huawei and its attempts to set the standard for a nascent fifth generation (5G) mobile communication service, especially given that one of Huawei’s major competitors is Finland’s Nokia.”261 In March 2019, China’s Touchstone Capital Partners was reported to be ready to invest up to 15 billion euros (US$16.9 billion) in the construction of an undersea tunnel linking Finland and Estonia.262 Under the terms of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Touchstone and the FinEst Bay Area Development, Touchstone would receive a minority stake in the would-be project. Although there has been little comment thus far from the Chinese government on the project, this link could form another element of the BRI’s far northern tier.263 Cooperation in the Arctic may be developing as a significant cornerstone in the bilateral relations of China and Finland, as demonstrated by the meeting in Beijing in January 2019 between Chinese president Xi Jinping and Finnish prime minister Sauli Niinistö, which culminated in the release of a Joint Action Plan.264 The Plan includes deepening bilateral research partnerships in the Arctic and increasing Finnish presence in the Belt and Road. The Finnish firm, Aker Arctic Technology, for example, had teamed with the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) to design China’s second icebreaker, the Snow Dragon II (Xuelong 2), which launched in September of 2018.265

Sweden Sweden-U.S. relations, both within the bilateral as well as the Nordic setting, are still viewed by Sweden as paramount to the country’s long-term security in the Arctic.266 The Swedish stance on the relationship with China is undergoing a revision, which will probably tend towards friendly since there seems to be no party in Sweden currently who would support a hardline approach towards Beijing, for example in the form of criticizing its Polar Silk Road policy.267

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China is considered as a key source of investment and a major market for Swedish businesses, therefore the current debate is mainly focused on “finding the right balance between commercial cooperation and protection of the core Swedish values such as human rights and freedom of expression.”268 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs noted that the Chinese embassy in Stockholm had issued nearly 60 statements since the start of 2018, accusing media, police and others in Sweden of misrepresenting China.269 The statements were prompted by issues including the plight of a detained Swedish bookseller and a row over a group of Chinese tourists being turned away from a Stockholm hotel. Trade and investment between China and Sweden, however, is growing despite tensions over human rights issues, with a threefold increase from US$1.5 billion in 2017 to US$4.5 billion in 2018, according to data from Rhodium Group.270

Opportunities and challenges Driven by post–Cold War geopolitics, climate change, globalization and the increasing interest from non-Arctic states, particularly China, the Arctic is becoming a political nexus for science, geopolitics and globalization, which has profound effects both locally and globally. Under the conditions of global warming, the Arctic region increasingly represents a setting of significant economic, environmental and academic potential, and consequently political prestige. China has commercial, academic and military-strategic interests in the region. Cooperation between China and the Nordic states on security and development is growing with mixed reactions. Nordic reactions are largely attributable to enduring distrust over Chinese overseas interests which can be seen as being out of sync with Nordic priorities and ideals.271 As Chinese and Nordic commercial and geopolitical activities become closer, questions will be raised about various aspects of the Nordic region, which include the environmental pressures of increased human activity on Arctic ecosystems and the position of geopolitically vulnerable gateway states and small island territories such as Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland in such development.272 China argues that its aid and investment is “ultimately more equal, respects sovereignty, allows greater control (and thus targeting) over the way money is spent, and focuses on economy-oriented training and assistance more than previous western efforts.”273 Overall, more coordination, more deliberate dialogue and further exploration of areas of mutual interest are needed to build trust and encourage more effective efforts in dealing with global challenges on climate change and boosting cooperation in the Arctic region. In conclusion, a common Nordic approach towards China’s Arctic engagement is highly desirable but there is still a long way to go before the Nordic states can tailor and agree on a common approach towards China. Due to their NATO membership, Denmark and Norway have different threat perceptions compared to Sweden and Finland and subsequently have less freedom in determining their China policies on their own.274

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China and its Asian neighbors The three East Asian states (China, Japan and South Korea) were granted observer status in the Arctic Council at the same time in May 2013. Most literatures relevant to these three countries focus substantially on why they are interested in the Arctic, with less attention on the important role that Asian states play in Arctic affairs. Major drivers of Arctic environmental problems originate from outside of the region, which means that the most important Arctic environmental institutions are not regional but global ones. Asian states are among the definite stakeholders in these institutions, combining high scores on power, legitimacy and urgency.275 Asian stakeholders, through raising their participation and ownership in knowledge-building and recommendation work, may contribute much to the Arctic Council for better governance of the activities affecting the Arctic. Such involvement in knowledge-building might promote the regulatory dynamics within broader international institutions crucial to Arctic governance, as well as encouraging collaboration in mutually beneficial capacity enhancement.276 China, Japan and South Korea, as non-Arctic countries, advocate their interests by actively participating in international and regional cooperation mechanisms and taking advantage of the speaking rights within the various organizations.277 Internationally, the three countries participate at the globalized international systems-level applicable to the Arctic region, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and international legal documents developed by the IMO, such as the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Icecovered Waters.278 On the regional level, they participate in multilateral and bilateral agreements and institutional arrangements between countries, such as the Arctic Council. They are able to understand the latest developments in Arctic affairs and gain insights regarding topics of their concern through the Arctic Council. In addition, they could share the latest technologies and learn how to deal with related issues through participation in the various working groups and project meetings within the Arctic Council.279 On the discussion about reforming Arctic governance, “China, Japan, and South Korea can strengthen exchanges and cooperation with member states, observers and relevant international organizations within the organizational framework of the Arctic Council.”280 China, South Korea and Japan believe that the development of the Arctic should be orchestrated between the efforts of all interested countries that have this urgent need, the relevant financial, economic and technological opportunities.281 From a sectoral perspective, China, South Korea and Japan are actively

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pursuing scientific, economic and political activities for the development of the Arctic, seeking to increase their roles in the Arctic Council. They are aiming to ensure an increasing presence in the Arctic in the form of scientific expeditions, cargo transportation, fisheries, mining, education, among others. They are similarly interested in information about the deposits of strategic natural resources in the Arctic and their development, as well as prospects of operation of the sea routes, icebreaker constructions and the situation in the areas inhabited by indigenous peoples of the North.282 South Korea is generally welcomed by Arctic states, as the country can offer the necessary equipment for the developing northern economies, investments for resource extraction, and a growing market for exports. It is the trust that the member states of the Arctic Council place in South Korea on a bilateral level that is driving the rising profile of the country in Arctic affairs, with the hope of receiving help in research and development in their northern regions. South Korea has also demonstrated its sincerity as an Arctic stakeholder by becoming the first Asian country to develop an integrated “master plan” for its regional activities that lays out political, commercial and scientific goals.283 The plan spans from 2013 to 2017 and aims to increase international cooperation, explore and promote Arctic business (shipping, fishing and shipbuilding) and expand Arctic research.284 South Korea sees involvement in the Arctic as an opportunity to strengthen its shipbuilding industry, promote new trade routes and find new sources of energy imports. South Korea has had a central research agency called the Korean Polar Research Institute since 1987, which focuses on Arctic governance, policy, research and industry. South Korea also has a lot to gain from shorter shipping routes. Furthermore, it has also been ramping up its Arctic research and diplomatic activities in recent years. Japan has a long history of Antarctic research; its National Institute of Polar Research launched its first Antarctic mission in 1956, and Japan launched a new icebreaker in 2008. It was not until recently that Japan shifted focus towards the Arctic, when its resource dependency reignited industry interest in Arctic shipping lanes. Though a bit slower than its Asian counterparts in showing interest in the Arctic, Tokyo has been steadily increasing its Arctic programs in an effort to catch up. Japan published its interim Arctic policy in 2008, and adopted the final version in 2015, seeking to increase research and explore strategic opportunities, specifically the Northern Sea Route. Given Japan’s proximity to the Bering Strait, it aims to gain from increased traffic at its ports and the potential to become a central hub in Asia.285 China’s Arctic policy is more upbeat on Arctic shipping options, subsuming them under the larger Belt and Road Initiative as a “Polar Silk Road.” However, the Chinese shipping industry’s actual advancements into the region have been increasingly cautious so over time.286 Heavily reliant on trade, China is home to seven out of the ten busiest ports in the world. When the Arctic routes are passable, they are on average 40 percent quicker than traditional routes such as the Panama or Suez canals, representing a reduction of a week in sailing time, or an estimated savings of US$600,000 per vessel per trip.287 China

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has reportedly planned to have 5 to 15 percent of its container traffic on Arctic routes by 2020.288 Given that Arctic states have direct control of the Arctic trade routes, China wants to be able to observe talks that affect these routes.289 Some argue that shipping and shipbuilding are not the most powerful drivers of the Arctic aspirations pursued by these East Asian countries as many hold.290 Arctic maritime transport is viewed with rising caution at governmental as well as industry levels in these countries.291 Reflected particularly in Japanese and Korean policy documents and industry statements, the evaluation on maritime business opportunities is prudent. The significance of shipping and shipbuilding for Asian engagement in the Arctic has also been conditioned by bureaucratic structures in each country and their proximity to industry associations and fluctuations in the relevant markets. Each nation’s ministry of foreign affairs, the Cabinet Office in Japan’s case, have played important roles in the aggregation of comprehensive Arctic policies. The Ministry for Oceans and Fisheries has been the main driver in South Korea which also has responsibility for shipping and polar research. Deep involvement of the government offices closest to shipping and shipbuilding (characteristic of policy development in Korea and Japan) implies that elaboration of goals, priorities and specific projects build on sector expertise sensitive, not only to opportunities, but also to political or economic constraints.292 In China and South Korea, where Arctic policies convey the clearest emphasis on economic use, the shipping industries have been financially overstretched in recent years, and thus are less prepared to commit themselves to heavy investments where the expected returns are potentially high, but uncertain and still far in the future. For all three countries, rising attention to Arctic developments as well as broader aspirations of playing visible roles in global governance mean that maritime transport projects involving this region are assessed with considerable interest, but we find nothing to indicate that they will be pursued unless the expected returns equal or exceed those of other options.293 China, Japan and Korea also emphasize both their contributions to scientific investigations in the Arctic and the relevance of their capital and technology for regional economic development.294 China’s Arctic policy white paper, for instance, reinforces the scientific factor by referencing to its own prominence in global governance and international affairs. The three states underscore that they fully respect the sovereignty and sovereign rights of coastal states. None of them has explicitly challenged the controversial unilateral shipping regulations that Canada and Russia have established for ice-covered waters adjacent to their coasts. At regional and global levels too, the Asian states have maintained relatively low profiles, specifically in shipping-oriented activities under the Arctic Council and in the negotiations of a legally binding Polar Code under the International Maritime Organization.295 Recently, there has been increasing collaboration among these three East Asian states on their polar goals. The first South Korean scientist to the Arctic was on

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board a Chinese research vessel, and a Japanese scientist traveled with the South Korean icebreaker Araon.296 South Korea and China signed a memorandum of agreement in 2008 to collaborate on polar research. Japan did not enter into formal agreements with China at that time, but in April 2016, Japan, China and South Korea held their first high-level collaboration talks on the Arctic in Seoul.297 The three states agreed to work together to increase scientific research on the Arctic and help each other further their Arctic interests, which marks the first time these three countries have officially collaborated on the Arctic.298 China, Japan and South Korea jointly initiated and play an important role in the Asian Forum for Polar Sciences, which has become the only regional scientific cooperative organization in Asia. The three countries play an important role in this organization. China actively advocated for the Pacific Arctic Group to be set up at the Arctic Science Summit Week. The working group has become a significant channel for the three countries to make an impact in the field of Arctic research. Starting in 2011, the Korea Maritime Institute299 has been the main financier and host of the North Pacific Arctic Conference in Hawaii, discussing Arctic governance matters in an attempt to become an advocate for Arctic affairs among countries outside the region.300 During high-level talks at the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo in 2017, Japan, China and South Korea agreed to conduct a joint study to assess pollution and climate impacts in the Arctic, wrapping up their latest talks on how to develop the region. The agreement on joint scientific research and exploration comes amid increased global attention on navigation and resource development in the Arctic Ocean.301 Under the agreement, the three countries will collect basic data, including on the levels of marine pollution in the Arctic Ocean, to ensure the environment is protected during development work and predict the best timing for navigation in the Arctic Ocean. “It is indispensable for the international community to ensure the protection and preservation of the fragile marine environment of the Arctic Ocean, and maintain peace, stability and constructive cooperation based on a rule-based maritime order,” according to the joint statement issued after the talks.302

China and indigenous peoples of the Arctic What is missing in the discussion of external actors’ roles in the Arctic is the engagement with indigenous peoples of the circumpolar North, including their knowledge systems, worldviews and aspirations.303 Despite their relatively small numbers, indigenous people hold significant political and moral authority within Arctic governance systems.304 What might appear as opportunities offered by climate change may in some cases pose serious threats to the livelihoods of Arctic communities; especially the indigenous peoples. It is vital in other words that the Asian efforts at confidence-building and alliance-making go beyond the state actors in the Arctic Council.305

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Hence, a discussion on both why and how China engages these indigenous people is needed, which would benefit both the Arctic peoples and external actors. When the Asian countries applied for observer status in the Arctic Council, they gave due space and attention to the human dimension of Arctic governance. The three documents outlining the principles and rules for admitting observers are the 1996 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (also known as the Ottawa Declaration), the Arctic Council Rules of Procedure and the Senior Arctic Officials Report to Ministers that was presented in May 2011 at the seventh Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Nuuk, Greenland – also known as the Nuuk Report. “The Arctic Council handled observer admittance and responsibilities on an ad hoc basis before the Nuuk Report.”306 Observers are required to abide by the four criteria related to Indigenous peoples, namely: 1 2 3

4

“accept and support the objectives of the Arctic Council defined in the Ottawa declaration”;307 “respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants”; “have demonstrated a political willingness as well as financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples”; “have demonstrated a concrete interest and ability to support the work of the Arctic Council, including through partnerships with member states and Permanent Participants bringing Arctic concerns to global decision-making bodies.”308

The other two short but important international circumpolar documents are “A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic” (2009)309 and “A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles in Inuit Nunaat” (2011).310 The documents followed over 20 years of discussions between and among states and indigenous peoples from around the world, representing “a growing standard reference of best practices by articulating a variety of Indigenous peoples’ sui generis collective rights including self-determination, control of territories and resources, and right to free, prior, and informed consent.”311 While East Asian states have acknowledged these criteria and affirmed their support for indigenous peoples in the North, indigenous and non-indigenous pundits have remained hesitant about these states’ increased involvement in the Arctic “because of the uncertainties they propose (or not) to engage northern Indigenous peoples.”312 In January 2013, the president of the Inuit, Tapiriit Kanatami, pointed out that the applications need more scrutiny because they have not always respected indigenous rights at home and abroad.313 The Japanese Diet recognized the Ainu as indigenous people group less than a year after the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declarations on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), but it remains unclear how Japan

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views the UNDRIP in relation to their Arctic interests.314 Similarly, South Korea has only recently begun to think of indigenous people as potential actors in the Arctic, and has yet to show an explicit correlation between UNDRIP and their Arctic Policy Master Plan.315 China has signed the UNDRIP and stresses that it respects all rights of the indigenous peoples in the Arctic region. Chinese delegates, when attending the Arctic Council meetings, have maintained contact with the Arctic indigenous peoples’ organizations, and China is striving to strengthen communication and exchanges with these organizations. The Aoluguya tribe in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region of China, similar to some of the Arctic indigenous peoples’ organizations, is a member of the Association of International Reindeer Herders.316 Another factor worth noting is the difference in approach that East Asia states and the indigenous peoples take. East Asian states view the Arctic through a global lens, which means that their specific local and national interests and activities are first filtered through regional and international perspectives. Indigenous peoples and organizations, however, tend to view their interests first from local and regional northern perspectives, therefore using these as a filter when looking at non-Arctic states and organizations.317 East Asian states, despite their reassurances in official meetings and documents, remains unclear as to how they would respectfully create, expand and maintain partnerships with permanent participants in the Arctic Council, more specifically the indigenous peoples of the High North.318 For instance, Beijing has generally viewed indigenous people and related issues as domestic matters of other countries.319 Chinese Ambassador Lan Lijun made a comment on November 6, 2012, at the meeting between the Swedish chairmanship of the Arctic Council and observers that [w]hile some of the Arctic issues are national in nature, some of them are regional that need to be addressed by Arctic states themselves in a coordinated manner, such as those relating to environmental protection, resources exploration, indigenous peoples and other social and economic issues.320 Chinese government officials have recently moved toward a policy of openly stating respect and intent to engage with indigenous people.321 In a 2013 keynote speech at an Arctic conference in Norway, Zhao Jun, the Chinese Ambassador to Norway, said that China “respects the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants,” and is open to exploring potential for cooperation.322 Jia Guide, the deputy-director general of the Department of Treaty and Law at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, echoed Zhao’s views on China’s positive engagement with the Arctic. China “also respects the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic Indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants . . . China is a strong advocate of international cooperation regarding Arctic affairs be it an Arctic state, Indigenous peoples’ organization, or non-Arctic state.”323 On the topic of development he stated that China

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is of the view that specific development activities should be carried out in a sustainable way that protects the environment, respects the interests and concerns of Indigenous peoples and abides by domestic laws of the Arctic state concerned and relevant international conventions.324 As Harrison pointed out, misunderstandings between East Asian agents and indigenous peoples, along with a lack of a clear engagement protocol, could very easily impose significant risks for all parties. If projects, regardless if they are scientific, cultural exchanges or resource and development related, start off on the wrong foot they will likely take more time to take root, have a higher probability of incompletion or ending up being judicially disputed.325 Such outcomes will only increase hesitancy of relevant states to engage with East Asian stakeholders and decrease the possibility of fruitful investment in the North.

Notes 1 Olav Schram Stokke, “Asian Stakes and Arctic Governance,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (November 2014): 770–783, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161. 2014.952946. 2 R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Boston: Pitman Publishing, 1984), 53. 3 Shengjun Zhang and Xing Li, “China’s Energy Security and Its Strategic Positioning in the Arctic Region,” International Review 106, no. 4 (July 2010): 17. 4 “Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and Beyond,” Approved by the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev on September 18, 2008, accessed July 18, 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20111204084631/http:/www. arcticprogress.com/2010/11/russias-arctic-policy/. 5 “RF Ready to Contribute to Preserving Unique Arctic Nature – Medvedev,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, August 6, 2011, accessed November 1, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20120914181900/www.itar-tass.com/en/c32/ 199500.html. 6 Mary Iiyushina and Frederik Plietgen, “Inside the Military Base at the Heart of Putin’s Artic Ambitions,” CNN, accessed April 5, 2019, www.cnn.com/2019/ 04/04/europe/russia-arctic-kotelny-island-military-base/index.html. 7 “An Exclusive Look inside Russia’s Arctic Military Base”, Egypt Independent, April 5, 2019, https://egyptindependent.com/an-exclusive-look-insiderussias-arctic-military-base/. 8 Elizabeth Buchanan and Mathieu Boulegue, “Russia’s Military Exercises in the Artic Have More Bark Than Bite,” Foreign Policy, May 20, 2019, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/20/russias-military-exercises-in-the-arctic-havemore-bark-than-bite/. 9 The Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, “Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation Wants to Clarify the Criteria for Admission of Vessels for Navigation Along the Northern Sea Route,” Official Website of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, November 2, 2018, www.mintrans.ru/ press-center/branch-news/879; Iiyushina and Plietgen, “Inside the Military Base.”

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10 Sommer Brokaw, “U.S. Navy’s 2nd Fleet Reaches Initial Operational Capability,” United Press International, May 30, 2019, www.upi.com/Defense-News/2019/ 05/30/US-Navys-2nd-Fleet-reaches-initial-operational-capability/7791559 228757/; Mark Eckstein, “Iceland Embracing Its Strategic Location by Supporting NATO Air Defense,” U.S. Naval Institute, October 24, 2018, https://news. usni.org/2018/10/24/iceland-embracing-its-strategic-location-thoughsupporting-nato-air-defense-hosting-us-planes; Aradhana Aravindan, “ST Engineering Wins Up to $1.9 Billion Contract to Build Icebreakers for U.S. Navy,” Reuters, April 23, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-st-engineering-contract/ st-engineering-wins-up-to-1-9-billion-contract-to-build-icebreakers-for-u-s-navyidUSKCN1S007E. 11 Mathieu Boulegue, “NATO Needs a Strategy for Countering Russia in the Artic and the Black Sea,” Chatham House, July 2, 2018, www.chathamhouse.org/ expert/comment/nato-needs-strategy-countering-russia-arctic-and-black-sea. 12 Stephanie Pezard et al., “Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia Planning for Regional Change in the Far North,” RAND Corporation, 2017, www.rand. org/t/RR1731. 13 Trude Pettersen, “Shoygu: Military Presence in the Artic Is a Question of National Security,” Barent’s Observer, February 26, 2015, https://barentsobserver.com/ en/security/2015/02/shoygu-military-presence-arctic-question-nationalsecurity-26-02. 14 Tom Røseth, “Russia China Policy in the Artic,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (2014): 854, www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09700161.2014. 952942. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Camilla T.N. Sørensen and Ekaterina Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese – Russian Cooperation In The Arctic: Possibilities and Constraints” (Solna: SIPRI Policy Paper, 2017), 11–12, www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/emergingchinese-russian-cooperation-arctic.pdf. 18 Junyuan Lu and Xia Zhang, 中国北极权益与政策研究 [China’s Arctic Interests and Policy] (Shanghai: Current Affairs Press, 2015), 120–155. 19 Sørensen and Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese – Russian Cooperation,” 11–12. 20 Ibid. 21 Beixi Deng, “Artic Geopolitics: The Impact of U.S. Russian Relations on ChineRussian Cooperation in the Artic,” Russia in Global Affairs, March 20, 2016, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Arctic-Geopolitics-18074. 22 Røseth, “Russia China Policy in the Artic,” 854. 23 Nong Hong, “US, Russia and China in the Arctic: Seeking Cooperation Despite Increasing Competition,” IPP Review, March 5, 2019, https://ippreview. com/index.php/Blog/single/id/907.html. 24 Lu and Zhang, 中国北极权益与政策研究 [China’s Arctic Interests and Policy]. 25 Ibid. 26 Sørensen and Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese – Russian Cooperation,” 11–12. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., 31. 29 Ibid., 41. 30 Ibid. 31 Jeremy Maxie and David Slayton, “Russia’s Arctic Dreams Have Chinese Characteristics,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, October 18, 2016, http:// pacificenergysummit.org/2016/10/18/russias-artic-dreams-have-chinesecharacteristics/. 32 Alexander Nikolaevich Fedorovsky et al., “Asian Players in the Arctic,” Russian International Affairs Council, Report no. 26 (2016): 17–29.

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33 James Henderson and Tatiana Mitrova, “Energy Relations Between Russia and China: Playing Chess with the Dragon,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) Paper (OIES: Oxford, August 2016), www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/ wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Energy-Relations-between-Russia-and-ChinaPlaying-Chess-with-the-Dragon-WPM-67.pdf. 34 Sørensen and Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese – Russian Cooperation,” 41. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Lincoln E. Flake, “Russia China Policy in the Artic: A Team of Rivals,” Strategic Analysis 37, no. 6 (2013): 685, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/ 09700161.2013.847048. 38 Ibid. 39 “The EU, USA and China Accounts for almost Half of the World Trade in Goods”, Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostatnews/-/DDN-20170824-1?inheritRedirect=true. 40 Ibid. 41 Beixi Deng, “Artic Geopolitics: The Impact of U.S. Russian Relations on ChineRussian Cooperation in the Artic,” June 2016. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ number/Arctic-Geopolitics-18074. 42 “Xi Jinping Holds Talks With President Vladimir Putin of Russia,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Grenada, http://gd.china-embassy.org/ eng/zyxw/t1568040.htm. 43 Zhao Long, “China-Russia Sustainable Development Cooperation in the Arctic: Challenges and Approaches,” China International Studies 73 (2018): 115. 44 Ibid., 122. 45 Ibid. 46 The National Development and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic Administration, “Vision for Maritime Cooperation Under the Belt and Road Initiative,” XinhuaNet, June 20, 2017, www.xinhuanet.com//english/201706/20/c_136380414.htm. 47 Sørensen and Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese – Russian Cooperation,” 34. 48 Stephanie Pezard, “The New Geopolitics of the Arctic Russia’s and China’s Evolving Role in the Region,” Testimony presented before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of the Canadian House of Commons on November 26, 2018, www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT500. html. 49 Nadezhda Filimonova and Svetlana Krivokhizh, “China’s Stakes in the Russian Arctic,” The Diplomat, January 18, 2018. 50 Vasilii Erokhin, Gao Tianming and Zhang Xiuhua, “Arctic Blue Economic Corridor: China’s Role in the Development of a New Connectivity Paradigm in the North,” Arctic Yearbook, 2018, 6. 51 Sørensen and Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese – Russian Cooperation,” 34. 52 Evan A. Feigenbaum, “China and the World,” Foreign Affairs, December 12, 2016, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-12-12/china-and-world. 53 Sørensen and Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese – Russian Cooperation,” 35. 54 “National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive,” The White House (George W. Bush), January 9, 2009, full text at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2009/01/ 20090112-3.html. 55 Zhao Long, “China-Russia Sustainable Development Cooperation in the Arctic: Challenges and Approaches,” China International Studies 73 (2018): 128. 56 “China and Russia Launch Scientific Cooperation in Artic,” TASS Russian News Agency, April 16, 2019, https://tass.com/press-releases/1053930.

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57 “China, Russia to Establish Polar Research Laboratory,” XinhuaNet, June 20, 2019, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/20/c_138159589.htm. 58 Sørensen and Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese – Russian Cooperation,” 37. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., 36. 61 Marc Lanteigne, ‘Have You Entered the Storehouses of the Snow?’ China as a Norm Entrepreneur in the Arctic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, March 2017), 117–130, www.cambridge.org/core/journals/polar-record/article/divclasstitlehave-you-entered-the-storehouses-of-the-snow-china-as-a-normentrepreneur-in-the-arcticdiv/400E24FB4EB6B68ADC5D72032AD65AFA. 62 Aton Vasiliev, “Russia’s Approaches to International Cooperation in the Arctic,” Arctic Herald, no. 1 (2012): 22. 63 Sørensen and Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese – Russian Cooperation,” 41. 64 Marc Lanteigne, “Northern Crossroads: Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Artic,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, March 27, 2018, www.nbr.org/ publication/northern-crossroads-sino-russian-cooperation-in-the-arctic/. 65 “Putin: Russia Won’t Threaten Anyone in Arctic, But Will Ensure National Safety,” RT, accessed March 12, 2018, www.rt.com/news/420987-russiaarctic-development-putin. 66 Lanteigne, “Northern Crossroads: Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Artic.” 67 Somini Sengupta, “United States Rattles Artic Talks with a Sharp Warning to China and Russia,” The New York Times, May 6, 2019, www.nytimes.com/ 2019/05/06/climate/pompeo-arctic-china-russia.html. 68 David Auerswald and Terry L. Anderson, “China, Russia Move into the Artic – And Put US at Risk,” The Hill, May 14, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/ national-security/443324-china-russia-move-into-the-arctic-and-put-us-at-risk. 69 Lanteigne, “Northern Crossroads: Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Artic.” 70 Bao Li, “Report: China’s Arctic Activities Demand Closer US Attention,” VOA News, November 3, 2013, www.voanews.com/a/china-arctic-activitiesdemand-closer-us-attention/3579985.html. 71 Nong Hong, “Arctic Ambitions of China, Russia – And Now the US – Need Not Spark a Cold War,” South China Morning Post, March 11, 2019, www. scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2189206/arcticambitions-china-russia-and-now-us-need. 72 Ibid. 73 Arne F. Finne, “A Joint Arctic Emergency Response Network Gets Underway,” High North News, January 29, 2019, www.arctictoday.com/a-joint-arcticemergency-response-network-gets-underway/. 74 Premier’s Office of Yukon, Premier’s Office of the Northwest Territories and the Premier’s Office of Nunavut in Canada, “A Northern Vision: A Stronger North and a Better Canada,” Nunavut, 2007, https://assembly.nu.ca/library/ GNedocs/2014/001377-e.pdf. 75 The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, “Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future,” Ottawa, 2009, www.northern strategy.gc. ca/cns/cns-eng.asp. 76 “Arctic Sovereignty ‘Non-Negotiable’: Harper,” CBC, August 20, 2010, www. cbc.ca/news/politics/arctic-sovereignty-non-negotiable-harper-1.866786. 77 Government of Canada, “Statement on Canada’s Artic Foreign Policy,” 2010, http://library.arcticportal.org/1886/1/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-eng.pdf. 78 Jim Bell, “With Little Fanfare, Canada Quietly Launches a New Arctic Policy Document,” Arctic Today, September 11, 2019, www.arctictoday.com/withlittle-fanfare-canada-quietly-launches-new-arctic-policy-document/.

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79 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), “Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Partial Submission by Canada,” 6 December 2013, United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, www.un. org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_can_70_2013.htm; Max Paris, “Canada’s Claim to Arctic Riches Includes the North Pole,” CBC News, December 9, 2013. 80 Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Emerging Arctic Strategies: Economics and Institutions,” Institute of International Affairs: The Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, 2014, http://ams.hi.is/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/ChinasEmergingArctic StrategiesPDF_FIX2.pdf. 81 Lu Congmin et al., “Background Note: ‘China-Canada Relations: New Dimensions in Cooperation,’” Conference “Past and Future in China-Canada Relations,” Hangzhou, China, September 3–5, 2012, https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/ uploads/sites/5/2017/04/past_and_future_of_canada-china_relations_201011-10.pdf. 82 Elena Baldassarri, “The Northwest Passage as a Question of Sovereignty,” The Northwest Passage: Myth, Environment, and Resources, Environmental & Society Portal, www.environmentandsociety.org/exhibitions/northwest-passage/ northwest-passage-question-sovereignty. 83 Adam P. MacDonald, “China Looking North: Compromising Canada’s Artic Sovereignty and Security,” Canadian Military Journal 18, no. 1 (Winter 2017), www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol18/no1/PDF/CMJ181Ep4.pdf. 84 The Svalbard Treaty, which entered into force in 1925, is an international agreement between 42 states that recognizes the sovereignty of Norway over the island group, but limits the full exercising of this authority as it also enshrines the rights of the citizens of the respective signatory states to engage in commercial and scientific activities on the islands and in their territorial waters. David Curtis Wright, “The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debates and Discussion in China,” China Maritime Studies Institute, no. 8 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2011), 35. 85 As with the Northwest Passage, Beijing remains ambivalent about its de jure position on the designation of the Northern Sea Route; however, in reality Beijing accepts Russian ownership as internal waters. Andreas Kuersten, “Russian Sanctions, China, and the Arctic,” The Diplomat, January 3, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/russian-sanctions-china-and- the-arctic/. 86 Major T.J.D. Chapman, “A Case for Co-operative Chinese Development,” Canadian Forces College, 2013, 89, www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc39/ mds/chapman.pdf. 87 Frederic Lasserre, “China and the Arctic: Threat or Cooperation Potential for Canada?,” Canadian International Council, June 2010, 8, http://citeseerx. ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.475.2735&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 88 Aldo Chircop, “The Emergence of China as a Polar-Capable State,” Canadian Naval Review 7 (2011): 14, www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/ vol7num1/vol7num1art3.pdf; Chapman, “A Case for Co-operative Chinese Development,” 88. 89 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council, “Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy,” January 26, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/ 2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 90 Chapman, “A Case for Co-operative Chinese Development,” 88. 91 “Canada in Energy Deals with China,” China Mining Association, accessed February 9, 2012, www.chinamining.org/News/2012-02-09/1328751130d54145. html.

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92 Jack Perkowski, “Canada Greenlights CNOOC’s Purchase of Nexen,” Forbes, December 11, 2012, www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2012/12/11/ canada-greenlights-cnoocs-purchase-of-nexen/#2f49abdc3beb. 93 Chapman, “A Case for Co-operative Chinese Development,” 85. 94 John Ivison, “Ottawa Eyeing Full-Blown Free Trade Agreement with China,” National Post, accessed September 11, 2012, http://news.nationalpost.com/ 2012/09/11/ottawa-eyeing-full-blown-free-trade-agreement-with-china/. 95 Information summarized from Natural Resource Canada, at www.nrcan.gc.ca/ home. 96 Ibid. 97 Naomi Powell, “Chinese Investment in Canada Cut by Nearly Half as Diplomatic Spats, Currency Controls Take Toll,” Financial Post, January 28, 2019, https://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/chinese-investment-incanada-off-47-per-cent-as-diplomatic-spats-currency-controls-take-toll. 98 Gordon Houlden, “Interview with Gordon Houlden, Director of China Institute,” University of Alberta, August 4, 2019. 99 Powell, “Chinese Investment in Canada Cut by Nearly Half as Diplomatic Spats, Currency Controls Take Toll.” 100 Ibid. 101 Diane Haecker, “Polar Code Talks Stalled in IMO Subcommittee Meeting,” Pacific Environment, accessed March 1, 2012, http://pacificenvironment. org/polar-code-talks-stalled-in-imo-subcommittee-meeting. 102 Trude Pettersen, “China Starts Commercial Use of Northern Sea Route,” Norwegian Barents Secretariat, accessed March 14, 2012, http://barentsobserver.com/ en/arctic/2013/03/china-starts-commercial-use-northern-sea-route-14-03. 103 R. Michael M’Gonigle, “Unilateralism and International Law: The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act,” University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 34, no. 2 (1976): 191. 104 Article 234 of UNCLOS reads, “Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.” “UNCLOS,” art. 234. 105 Frédéric Lasserre, Lyin Huang and Olga Alexeeva, “Is China’s Interest for the Arctic Driven by Arctic Shipping Potential?,” Asian Geographer 32, no. 2 (2015): 59–71. 106 “The Integrated Arctic Corridors Framework,” The PEW Charitable Trusts, April 26, 2016, www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2016/04/The-IntegratedArctic-Corridors-Framework.pdf. 107 Frédéric Lassere, Linyan Huang and Olga Alexeeva, “China’s Strategy in the Arctic: Threatening or Opportunistic?,” Polar Record, 2015, https://corpus. ulaval.ca/jspui/bit-stream/20.500.11794/876/1/China%20Arctic% 20opportunistic%20Polar%20Record%20OA%20FL%20LH%202015.pdf. 108 Congmin et al., “Background Note: ‘China-Canada Relations: New Dimensions in Cooperation,’” 6. 109 Petra Dolata, “A Global Arctic? Chinese Aspirations in the North,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 3, October 2018, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront. net/cdfai/pages/4055/attachments/original/1538526111/A_Global_Arctic_ Chinese_Aspirations_in_the_North.pdf?. 110 Ibid.

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111 Adam Lajeunesse, “Finding ‘Win-Win’: China’s Artic Policy and What It Means for Canada,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, December 2018, www.cgai. ca/finding_win_win_chinas_arctic_policy_and_what_it_means_for_canada. 112 Ibid. 113 Government of Canada, “National_Trade Corridors Fund: Applicant’s Guide,” www.tc.gc.ca/en/services/infrastructure/apply-ntcf-funding/ntcf-applicantguide-northern-call.html. 114 Dean Ruffilli, “Arctic Marine and Intermodal Infrastructure: Challenges and the Government of Canada’s Response,” Industry, Infrastructure and Resources Division, Parliamentary Information and Research Services, July 11, 2011, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/bdp-lop/eb/201177-eng.pdf, 6. 115 Lajeunesse, “Finding ‘Win-Win’: China’s Artic Policy and What It Means for Canada.” 116 Levon Sevunts, “China’s Arctic Road and Belt Gambit,” Eye on the Arctic, accessed October 3, 2017, www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2017/10/03/ chinas-arctic-road-and-belt-gambit/. 117 Lajeunesse, “Finding ‘Win-Win’: China’s Artic Policy and What It Means for Canada,” 6. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Ibid. 121 Adam Lajeunesse, “Chinese Prepare to Use the Northwest Passage,” World Policy Institute, September 14, 2016, https://worldpolicy.org/2016/09/ 14/chinese-prepare-to-use-the-northwest-passage/. 122 Chapman, “A Case for Co-operative Chinese Development,” 88. 123 Ibid. 124 Water Canada, “Canada Signs Environmental Cooperation Agreement with China,” Environment Canada, Water Canada, November 3, 2010, www. watercanada.net/canada-signs-environmental-cooperation-agreement-withchina/. 125 Chircop, “The Emergence of China as a Polar-Capable State,” 9–14; Lasserre, “China and the Arctic: Threat Or Cooperation Potential for Canada?,” 11. 126 Nathan Vanderklippe, “Chinese Scientists Look to Canadian Arctic for Research Outpost,” Globe and Mail, accessed May 12, 2018, www.theglobeandmail. com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/chinesescientists-dream-of-arctic-research-outpost-in-the-north/article23527009/. 127 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, James Manicom and Frédéric Lasserre, “China’s Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada,” University of Calgary Press 1 (2018): 4. 128 Ibid., 9. 129 Dolata, “A Global Arctic? Chinese Aspirations in the North,” 2. 130 Ibid., 3. 131 Ibid. 132 “Trying to Pull Together,” The Economist, April 20, 2011, www.economist. com/briefing/2011/04/20/trying-to-pull-together. 133 Whitney Lackenbauer and James Manicom, “Canada’s Northern Strategy and East Asian States’ Interests in the Arctic,” in East-Asia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, December 9, 2013), 13. 134 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council, “Full text: China’s Arctic Policy,” January 26, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_ paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.

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135 Lu Congmin et al., “Past and Future in China-Canada Relations,” Institute of Asian Research & the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 9, https:// sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/04/past_and_future_of_ canada-china_relations_2010-11-10.pdf. 136 Ibid. 137 George W. Bush, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25: Arctic Region Policy,” NSPD 66, Homeland Security Digital Library, January 9, 2009, www. hsdl.org/?abstract&did=232474. 138 Barack Obama, “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” The White House, 2, May 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. 139 Full text of The 2019 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF. 140 Barack Obama, “Executive Order No. 13689 – Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic,” Presidential Documents 80, no. 16 (January 2015), govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-01-26/pdf/2015-01522.pdf. 141 Robert Orttung and Katherine Weingartner, “U.S. Artic Policymaking Under Trump and Obama: Implications for Russia and China,” PONARS Eurasia, www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/us-arctic-policymaking-under-trump-andobama-implications. 142 Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, “The Implications of U.S. Policy Stagnation Toward the Artic Region,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 3, 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/implications-us-policy-stagnation-towardarctic-region. 143 Lesley Wroughton, “U.S. and Iceland Boost Trade Ties, Discuss Arctic Security,” Reuters, February 15, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iceland-pompeo/ us-and-iceland-boost-trade-ties-discuss-arctic-security-idUSKCN1Q41RT. 144 “Artic Council Meeting Is Overshadowed by Lack of Consensus on Climate Change,” New Europe Online, May 7, 2019, www.neweurope.eu/article/arcticcouncil-meeting-is-overshadowed-by-lack-of-consensus-on-climate-change/. 145 Ibid. 146 Jingchao Peng and Njord Wegge, “China’s Bilateral Diplomacy in the Arctic,” Polar Geography 38, no. 3 (2015): 240–241. 147 Elizabeth Wishnick, “China’s Interests and Goals in the Artic: Implications for the United States,” The Letort Papers (March 2017): 58–59, https://pdfs. semanticscholar.org/1543/b2f392fa3124f13480fa1863ca103f3c60d2.pdf. 148 Ibid., 53. 149 Kim Ghattas, “Arctic Council: John Kerry Steps into Arctic Diplomacy,” BBC News, May 14, 2013, www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-22528594. 150 Wishnick, “China’s Interests and Goals in the Artic,” 53. 151 James Kraska, “Asian States in U.S. Arctic Policy: Perceptions and Prospects,” Asian Policy 18 (July 2014): 20, www.nbr.org/publication/asian-states-in-us-arctic-policy-perceptions-and-prospects/. 152 Leiv Lunde, “Introduction: Nordic Perspectives on Asia’s Arctic Interests,” in Leiv Lunde, Jian Yang and Iselin Stensdal, eds., Asian Countries and the Arctic Future (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), 8. 153 Steven Lee Myers, “Arctic Council Adds 6 Nations as Observer States, Including China,” The New York Times, May 15, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/ 05/16/world/europe/arctic-council-adds-six-members-including-china.html. 154 Wishnick, “China’s Interests and Goals in the Artic,” 54. 155 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Changes in the Artic: Background and Issues for Congress, R41153 (2019): 66.

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156 Wishnick, “China’s Interests and Goals in the Artic,” 2. 157 Martin Breum, “For the First Time Ever, an Artic Council Ministerial Meeting Has Ended Without a Joint Declaration,” Artic Today, May 7, 2019, www. arctictoday.com/for-the-first-time-ever-an-arctic-council-ministerial-meetinghas-ended-without-a-joint-declaration/. 158 “Trump Administration’s New Artic Defense Strategy,” Babilon Magaizine, March 21, 2019, www.babilonmagazine.it/trump-administrations-new-arcticdefense-strategy/. 159 “Trump Administration’s New Artic Defense Strategy,” Babilon Magaizine, March 21, 2019, www.babilonmagazine.it/trump-administrations-new-arcticdefense-strategy/. 160 United States, the White House, Donald Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Washington D.C., December 2017, full text at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-182017-0905.pdf. 161 United States, Department of Defense, “Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” Washington D.C., 2018, full text at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-NationalDefense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 162 Rebecca Pincus and Walter A. Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic: Grappling With China’s Growing Influence,” War on the Rocks, October 24, 2018, https:// warontherocks.com/2018/10/gray-zones-in-a-blue-arctic-grappling-with-chinasgrowing-influence/. 163 Resource Development Council, “Alaska’s Oil and Gas Industry,” Resource Development Council for Alaska, www.akrdc.org/oil-and-gas. 164 Ibid. 165 Orttung and Weingartner, “U.S. Artic Policymaking Under Trump and Obama.” 166 Conley and Melino, “The Implications of U.S. Policy Stagnation Toward the Artic Region.” 167 “Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Resources,” Today in Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4650. 168 Ashley Feng and Sagatom Saha, “China’s Artic Ambitions in Alaska,” The Diplomat, April 20, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/chinas-arcticambitions-in-alaska/. 169 “Xi Jinping Meets with Alaskan Governor Bill Walker of the US,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, April 8, 2017, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_ 665678/xjpdfljxgsfwbfmgflldjxzmyshw/t1453026.shtml. 170 “Factbox: China-U.S. Commercial Deals Signed During Trump’s China Visit,” Reuters, November 9, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-asia-chinadeals-factbox/factbox-china-u-s-commercial-deals-signed-during-trumpschina-visit-idUSKBN1D90P5?il=0. 171 “Bank of China Ltd (3988.HK),” Reuters, www.reuters.com/companies/ 3988.HK; “Bank of China (601988.ss),” Reuters, www.reuters.com/ companies/601988.SS; “Factbox: China-U.S. Commercial Deals Signed.” 172 Orttung and Weingartner, “U.S. Artic Policymaking Under Trump and Obama.” 173 Elizabeth Earl, “Alaska LNG Project to Move Forward, with Changes,” Peninsula Clarion, May 2, 2017, www.peninsulaclarion.com/news/2016-09-06/ alaska-lng-project-to-move-forward-with-changes/; “Alaska and China Sign Historic Joint Development Agreement,” Alaska Gasline Development Corporation, 2017, https://agdc.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/AGDCNewsletter-Q4-2017.pdf; Feng and Saha, “China’s Artic Ambitions in Alaska.”

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174 Dan Murtaugh and Ryan Collins, “China Steps Toward U.S. LNG Deal as Sinopec Inks Alaska Pact,” Bloomberg, accessed November 9, 2017, www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2017-11-09/china-steps-toward-u-s-lng-deal-as-sinopec-joinsalaska-project; Stephen Culp, “U.S. Stocks Jump in Upbeat End to Tumultuous Quarter,” Reuters, March 29, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-stocks/u-sstocks-jump-in-upbeat-end-to-tumultuous-quarter-idUSKBN1H51OC; Feng and Saha, “China’s Artic Ambitions in Alaska.” 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177 Eva Dou, “A New Cold War? China Declares Itself a ‘Near-Artic State,’” The Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2018, www.wsj.com/articles/a-new-cold-warchina-declares-itself-a-near-arctic-state-1516965315; Ellis Quinn, “U.S. Stuns Audience by Tongue-lashing China, Russia on Eve of Artic Council Ministerial,” Eye on the Artic, May 6, 2019, www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2019/05/06/ u-s-stuns-audience-by-tongue-lashing-china-russia-on-eve-of-arctic-councilministerial/. 178 Ibid. 179 Feng and Saha, “China’s Artic Ambitions in Alaska.” 180 Ronald A. LaBrec, “U.S. Coast Guard Unveils a New Model for Cooperation Atop the World,” Defense in Depth, November 2, 2015, blogs.cfr.org/david son/2015/11/02/u-s-coast-guard-unveils-a-new-model-for-cooperation-ontop-of-the-world/. 181 Wishnick, “China’s Interests and Goals in the Artic: Implications for the United States,” 56. 182 Ibid., 57. 183 Orttung and Weingartner, “U.S. Artic Policymaking Under Trump and Obama.” 184 Wishnick, “China’s Interests and Goals in the Artic: Implications for the United States,” 58–59. 185 Jingchao Peng and Njord Wegge, “China’s Bilateral Diplomacy in the Arctic,” Polar Geography 38, no. 3 (2015): 241–243. 186 “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressonal Research Service, 58, accessed November 27, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ misc/R41153.pdf. 187 Heather A. Conley et al., U.S.-Sino Relations in the Arctic: A Roadmap for Future Cooperation (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170127_ Conley_USSinoRelationsArc- tic_Web.pdf. 188 Ibid. 189 Willy Østreng, “Arctic Policies of Nordic States: The Politics of Geographical Definitions,” Wilson Center, 1, September 2014, www.wilsoncenter.org/ sites/default/files/FINAL%20CI_140915_Ostreng_brief_v1_0.pdf. 190 Leiv Lunde, “The Nordic Embrace: Why the Nordic Countries Welcome Asia to the Arctic Table,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2, July 2014, www. nbr.org/publication/the-nordic-embrace-why-the-nordic-countries-welcomeasia-to-the-arctic-table. 191 Østreng, “Arctic Policies of Nordic States,” 2. 192 Ibid. 193 Lunde, “The Nordic Embrace,” 2. 194 Gerald E. Connolly, “NATO and Security in the Arctic,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, October 2017, www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/ default/files/2017-11/2017%20-%20172%20PCTR%2017%20E%20rev.1%20 fin%20-%20NATO%20AND%20SECURITY%20IN%20THE%20ARCTIC.pdf.

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195 Lunde, “The Nordic Embrace,” 2. 196 The Brick and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious development program through which China plans to build infrastructure connecting it to countries in Asia and Europe, thereby boosting trade and stimulating economic growth. BRI would also open up and create new markets for Chinese goods and technology and help tackle its excess cement and steel capacity. 197 “Sino-Nordic Relations: Opportunities and the Way Ahead,” Institute for Security & Development Policy, 4, accessed August 8, 2019, http://isdp.eu/content/ uploads/2016/11/2016-Sino-Nordic-Relations-Opportunities-and-the-WayAhead.pdf. 198 Connolly, “NATO and Security in the Arctic.” 199 Institute for Security & Development Policy, “Sino-Nordic Relations,” 29. 200 Ibid., 1. 201 Ibid., 2. 202 Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, “NATO Summit 2016: Time for an Arctic Strategy,” The Heritage Foundation, June 2016, www.heritage.org/globalpolitics/report/nato-summit-2016-time-arctic-strategy. 203 Institute for Security & Development Policy, “Sino-Nordic Relations,” 7–8. 204 Ibid., 1. 205 Marc Jacobsen, “Denmark’s Strategic Interests in the Arctic: It’s the Greenlandic Connection, Stupid!,” The Arctic Institute, May 2016, www.thearcticinstitute. org/denmark-interests-arctic-greenland-connection/. 206 Matt Rosenberg, “Learn About Greenland,” www.thoughtco.com/status-ofgreenland-1434963. 207 “Greenland Takes a Step Towards Autonomy,” Spiegel Online, November 26, 2008, accessed January 10, 2015, www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ independence-day-greenland-takes-a-step-towards-autonomy-a-592880.html; “Greenland Profile,” BBC News, May 23, 2013, accessed August 8, 2019, www. bbc.com/news/world-europe-18249812. 208 “Greenland Takes Step Toward Independence From Denmark,” The Telegraph, June 21, 2009, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greenland/ 5594140/Greenland-takes-step-toward-independence-from-Denmark.html. 209 Henrik Skydsbjerg and Walter Turnowsky, “Massivt flertal for selvstændighed [Massive Majority for Independence],” December 1, 2016, https://sermitsiaq. ag/node/192275. 210 Morten Bjerregaard, “Redaktør: Grønlændere vil ikke ofre levestandard for selvstændighed [Editor: Greenlanders Will Not Sacrifice Living Standards for Independence],” DR, July 27, 2017, www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/redaktoergroenlaendere-vil-ikke-ofre-levestandard-selvstaendighed. 211 Camilla T.N. Sørensen, “Promises and Risks of Chinese Investments in Greenland Seen From Nuuk, Copenhagen and Beijing,” in Kristian Søby and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, eds., Greenland and International Security in a Changing Arctic (Oxford: Routledge, 2017), 90–97. 212 Ibid., 86; Sorlannguaq Petersen, “Tættere forbindelser indenfor arktisk forskning med Kina [Closer Connections in Arctic Research with China],” Sermitsia, May 19, 2016, http://sermitsiaq.ag/taettere-forbindelser-indenfor-arktisk-forskningkina. 213 Martin Breum, “Kina vil bygge kontroversiel forskningsstation i Grønland [China Will Build Controversial Research Station in Greenland],” Information, October 18, 2017, www.information.dk/udland/2017/10/kina-byggekontroversiel-forskningsstation-groenland; Walter Turnowsky, “Satellitstation kan være del af kinesisk GPS-system [Satellite Station Can Be Part of Chinese GPS System],” Sermitsiaq, December 19, 2017, http://sermitsiaq.ag/ satellitstation-kan-del-kinesiskgps-system.

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214 Camilla T.N. Sørensen, “China as an Arctic Great Power: Potential Implications for Greenland and the Danish Realm,” Danish Defense, 5, February 2018, www. fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Policy%20Brief%202018%2001%20februar% 20UK.pdf. 215 Ibid., 6; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “China-Denmark Joint Work Program (2017–2020): Upgrading the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to a New Level,” May 3, 2017, http://kina.um.dk/da/om-kina/myndighedss amarbejde/. 216 Sørensen, “China as an Arctic Great Power,” 6. 217 Ibid. 218 Ibid. 219 Jichang Lulu, “Greenland’s Mines Could Finally Attract Chinese Investment,” China Policy Institute: Analysis, 48, December 7, 2015, https://jichanglulu. tumblr.com/greenland-mines. 220 Su Ping and Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Developing Arctic Policies: Myths and Misconceptions,” Journal of China and International Relations 3, no. 1 (2015): 4–7. 221 Elizabeth Wishnick, “China’s Interests and Goals in the Arctic,” 48. 222 Ibid., 47. 223 Daniel Holl, “China’s Icy Silk Road: Beijing’s Ambitions to Use Arctic Circle for Military and Economic Goals,” The Epoch Times, December 28, 2018, www.theepochtimes.com/chinas-icy-silk-road_2749621.html. 224 Reuters, “Greenland Picks Denmark as Airport Project Partner Over Beijing,” Arctic Today, September 12, 2018, www.arctictoday.com/greenland-picksdenmark-airport-project-partner-beijing/. 225 “Numbers of Foreign Visitors,” in “Research & Statistics,” Icelandic Tourist Board, www.ferdamalastofa.is/en/recearch-and-statistics/numbers-of-foreignvisitors. 226 Mingming Shi and Marc Lanteigne, “The (Many) Roles of Greenland in China’s Developing Arctic Policy,” The Diplomat, March 30, 2018, https://thediplomat. com/2018/03/the-many-roles-of-greenland-in-chinas-developing-arctic-policy/. 227 Ibid. 228 Ibid. 229 Jo Inge Bekkevold and Kristine Offerdal, “Norway’s High North Policy and New Asian Stakeholders,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (2014): 830. 230 Ben White, “Chinese Drop Bid to Buy US Oil Firm,” The Washington Post, August 3, 2005, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/ 08/02/AR2005080200404.html; Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Race Is on as Ice Melt Reveals Arctic Treasures,” The New York Times, September 18, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/science/earth/arctic-resourcesexposed-bywarming-set-off-competition.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Will Hickey, “China Targets Greenland for Mining: Countries with Mineral Wealth Can’t Expect Job Bonanza,” Yale Global, April 18, 2013, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/ content/china-targets-greenland-mining; Jonathan Kaiman, “China Pours Cash into Melting Arctic in Bid to Win Influence,” The Guardian, March 18, 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/18/china-arcticmineralinvestment. 231 You Nuo, “COSL Buys Norway’s Oil Drilling Company,” China Daily, September 23, 2008, www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2008-09/23/content_ 7054064.htm. 232 Joachim Dagenborg and Victoria Klesty, “Orkla Sells Elkem to China’s BlueStar for $2 Billion,” Reuters, January 11, 2011, www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 01/11/us-orklaidUSTRE70A13Q20110111. 233 Bekkevold and Offerdal, “Norway’s High North Policy and New Asian Stakeholders,” 831.

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234 Ibid. 235 Jonas Gahr Støre, “The High North: Visions and Strategies,” The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2011, www.regjeringen.no/en/ dokumenter/high_north_visions_strategies/id664906/. 236 Bekkevold and Offerdal, “Norway’s High North Policy and New Asian Stakeholders,” 835. 237 “The Sino-Norwegian Environmental Cooperation – Coordinators Meeting 2010,” accessed March 24, 2014, www.norway.cn/News_and_events/ Bilateral-cooperation/Norway-and-China/The-Sino-Norwegian-environmentalcooperation-Coordinators-meeting-2010/. 238 Alexandre Cornet, “From the ‘Polar Silk Road’ to the Arctic Rimland: A Case Study of the Belt and Road Challenges for the European Union,” iRiS, 11, October 2018, www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/AsiaFocus-90-Anglais-1.pdf. 239 Stefan Skjaldarson, “The Free Trade Agreement: An Important Step in SinoIcelandic Relations,” China Today, April 29, 2014, www.chinatoday.com.cn/ french/Propos/article/2014-04/29/content_616134.htm. 240 “China Central Bank Signs 3.5 Billion Yuan Currency Swap Deal with Iceland,” Reuters, September 30, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/china-cenbank-icelandidUSB9N0HE00J20130930. 241 Xinhua, “China Extends Currency Swap Deal with Iceland,” ECNS, December 22, 2016, www.ecns.cn/business/2016/12-22/238572.shtml. 242 Alexandre Cornet, “From the ‘Polar Silk Road’ to the Arctic Rimland,” 12. 243 Thorkell Erlingsson et al., “Geothermal District Heating System in XianYang, Shaanxi, China,” Proceedings World Geothermal Congress 2010, April 25–29, 2010, www.geothermal-energy.org/pdf/IGAstandard/WGC/2010/3412.pdf. 244 Arthur Guschin, “China, Iceland and the Arctic,” The Diplomat, May 20, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-iceland-and-the-arctic/. 245 Alexandre Cornet, “From the ‘Polar Silk Road’ to the Arctic Rimland,” 13. 246 Jingchao Peng and Njord Wegge, “China’s Bilateral Diplomacy in the Arctic,” Polar Geography 38, no. 3 (2015): 242–243. 247 “CNOOC-led Consortium Meets to Discuss Exploration Offshore Iceland,” Offshore, October 7, 2016, www.offshore-mag.com/geosciences/article/ 16769949/cnoocled-consortium-meets-to-discuss-exploration-offshore-iceland. 248 Guschin, “China, Iceland and the Arctic.” 249 Cornet, “From the ‘Polar Silk Road’ to the Arctic Rimland.” 250 Guschin, “China, Iceland and the Arctic.” 251 “Présentation de l’Islande [Presentation of Iceland],” French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, accessed August 15, 2019, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/ dossiers-pays/islande/presentation-de-l-islande/. 252 Cornet, “From the ‘Polar Silk Road’ to the Arctic Rimland.” 253 Ibid. 254 “Danemark et Groenland [Denmark and Greenland],” Arctic Observatory, www.observatoire-arctique.fr/analyses-regionales/les-etats-du-g8/danemarket-groenland/danemark-et-groenland/. 255 Janne Suokas, “China’s Cosco to Step up Arctic Shipping This Summer,” GBTIMES, June 21, 2018, https://gbtimes.com/chinas-cosco-to-step-uparctic-shipping-this-summer. 256 Cornet, “From the ‘Polar Silk Road’ to the Arctic Rimland.” 257 “China and Finland: The Ice Road Cometh?” Over the Circle, March 17, 2019, https://overthecircle.com/2019/03/17/china-and-finland-the-ice-roadcometh/.

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258 Tapio Nykänen, “A Common Heritage – The Place of the Arctic in the Chinese and Finnish Discourses,” in Timo Koivurova, Qin Tianbao, Tapio Nykänen and Sébastien Duyck, eds., Arctic Law and Governance: The Role of China, Finland and the EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 148. 259 Ibid., 149. 260 Elizabeth Buchanan, “Subsea Cables in a Thawing Arctic,” The Maritime Executive, August 14, 2019, www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/subseacables-in-a-thawing-arctic. 261 “China and Finland: The Ice Road Cometh?” 262 Paul Goble, “Beijing Reportedly Ready to Finance Helsink-Tallinn Tunnel,” The Jamestown Foundation, March 12, 2019, https://jamestown.org/ program/beijing-reportedly-ready-to-finance-helsinki-tallinn-tunnel/?fbclid= IwAR38DuOCWzzmxZpEMHCS848XrEQGmuukJRVjqn_12KpOnT1oI DERAeRnWOc. 263 Peter Versterbacka, “About FINESTBAY,” interview by Genius Media, January 18, 2018, video, https://finestbayarea.online/about. 264 “Joint Action Plan Between China and Finland on Promoting the Futureoriented New-type Cooperative Partnership 2019–2023,” April 5, 2017, https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/Joint+Action+Plan+2019-2023+%283% 29.pdf/bd639013-a815-12d2-ae44-4bc50ded7a97. 265 Liu Zhen, “China Breaks the Arctic Ice with Launch of New Research Vessel Snow Dragon II,” South China Morning Post, September 12, 2018, www. scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2163784/china-breaks-arctic-icelaunch-new-research-vessel. 266 Nima Khorrami, “Sweden’s Arctic Strategy: An Overview,” The Arctic Institute, April 16, 2019, www.thearcticinstitute.org/sweden-arctic-strategy-overview/. 267 Ibid. 268 Ibid. 269 The statements were prompted by issues including the plight of a detained Swedish bookseller, Beijing’s treatment of Muslims in the Xinjiang region, and a row over a group of Chinese tourists being turned away from a Stockholm hotel. Keegan Elmer, “Tensions Between China and Sweden Aren’t Hurting Trade, Researchers Say,” South China Morning Post, June 25, 2019, www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3016040/tensions-between-chinaand-sweden-arent-hurting-trade. 270 Cheryl Arcibal, “Demand for Hong Kong’s Luxury Homes Slips as Trade War, Threat of Extradition Bill Rattle Wealthy Investors,” South China Morning Post, July 16, 2019, www.scmp.com/property/hong-kong-china/article/3018692/ demand-hong-kongs-luxury-homes-slips-trade-war-threat. 271 “Sino-Nordic Relations: Opportunities and the Way Ahead,” Institute for Security & Development Policy, 29, 2016, http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/ 11/2016-Sino-Nordic-Relations-Opportunities-and-the-Way-Ahead.pdf. 272 Ibid. 273 Ibid. 274 Tuomas Iso-Markku, Eeva Innola and Teija Tiilikainen, “A Stronger North? Nordic Cooperation in Foreign and Security Policy in a New Security Environment,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 8, 2018, www.fiia.fi/en/ publication/a-stronger-north. 275 Olav Schram Stokke, “Asian Stakes and Arctic Governance,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (November 18, 2014): 770–783, 778, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09700161.2014.952946. 276 Ibid., 780.

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277 Weifang Li, “Research on the Cooperative Approaches of China, Japan and South Korea in the Arctic,” Polar Strategies, 6 (June 2012), in Chinese, 28. 278 Jian Yang and Leiv Lunde, “Introduction: Nordic Perspectives on Asia’s Arctic Interests,” in Leiv Lunde, Yang Jian and Iselin Stensdal, eds., Asian Countries and the Arctic Future (World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 2016), 1–11. 279 Ibid. 280 Weifang Li and Di Wu, “Analysis of the Relationship Between Major East Asian Countries and the Developing Arctic Council,” International Outlook 6 (2010): 91, in Chinese. 281 Valeriy P. Zhuravel, “China, Republic of Korea and Japan in the Arctic: Politics, Economy, Security,” Arctic and North 24 (2016): 125, www.arcticandnorth. ru/upload/iblock/278/09_zhuravel.pdf. 282 Ibid. 283 Mia M. Bennett, “The Maritime Tiger: Exploring South Korea’s Interests and Role,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (November 18, 2014): 886–903, 898, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.952946. 284 Diana Edwards, “A View from the West: China, Japan, South Korea Look North,” Canadian Naval Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 38, www.navalreview.ca/ wp-content/uploads/public/Vol12num2/Vol12num2art8.pdf. 285 Ibid. 286 Arild Moe, “Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Footprints on Governance,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 10 (2019): 24–52, 43. 287 Linda Jakobson and Seong-Hyon Lee, “The North East Asian States’ Interests and Possible Cooperation with the Kingdom of Denmark,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (April 2013): 9. 288 Hugh Stephens, “The Opening of the Northern Sea Routes: The Implications for Global Shipping and for Canada’s Relations with Asia,” SPP Research Papers, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, Canadian Global Affairs Institute 9, no. 19 (May 2016): 4. 289 Diana Edwards, “A View from the West: China, Japan, South Korea Look North,” Canadian Naval Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 38, www.navalreview.ca/ wp-content/uploads/public/Vol12num2/Vol12num2art8.pdf. 290 Arild Moe and Olav Schram Stokke, “Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Footprints on Governance,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 10 (2019): 43. 291 Ibid. 292 Moe and Stokke, “Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping,” 24–52. 293 Ibid. 294 Ibid. 295 Ibid. 296 Diana Edwards, “A View from the West: China, Japan, South Korea Look North,” Canadian Naval Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 38, www.navalreview.ca/ wp-content/uploads/public/Vol12num2/Vol12num2art8.pdf. 297 “China, Japan, ROK Agree to Strengthen Research Cooperation on Arctic,” Xinhuanet, June 9, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/09/c_ 137240638.htm. 298 Diana Edwards, “A View from the West: China, Japan, South Korea Look North,” 38. 299 More information about Korea Maritime Institute can be found at www.kmi.re. kr (accessed on September 19, 2014). 300 Leiv Lunde, Yang Jian and Iselin Stensdal, eds., Asian Countries and the Arctic Future (World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 2016), 243.

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301 “Japan, China and South Korea OK Joint Study on Artic Development,” Japan Times, June 9, 2017, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/09/national/ science-health/japan-china-south-korea-plan-joint-study-arctic-development/ #.XVbCPOhKiUk. 302 Ibid. 303 Adam Stepien, “Incentives, Practices and Opportunities for Arctic External Actors’ Engagement with Indigenous Peoples: China and the European Union,” in Timo Koivurova, Qin Tianbao, Tapio Nykänen and Sébastien Duyck, eds., Arctic Law and Governance: The role of China, Finland and the EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 205–232, http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474203302.ch-010. 304 Scott Harrison, “The Indigenous Factor of East Asian Engagement with the Canadian Arctic,” Academia.org, December 9, 2018, www.academia.edu/ 37945637/The_Indigenous_Factor_of_East_Asian_Engagement_with_the_ Canadian_Arctic. 305 Sanjay Chaturverdi, “Geopolitical Transformations: ‘Rising’ Asia and the Future of the Arctic Council,” in The Arctic Council: Its Place in the Future of Arctic Governance (Toronto: The Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2012), 251. 306 Harrison, “The Indigenous Factor of East Asian Engagement with the Canadian Arctic.” 307 The Ottawa Declaration, the founding document of the Arctic Council, states that the organization recognizes and supports the region’s Indigenous peoples. The full text can be found at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/ handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_ Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y. 308 Senior Arctic Officials, Senior Arctic Officials Report to the Ministers (Nuuk, Greenland, May 2011), 50, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/ handle/11374/1535/SAO_Report_to_Ministers_-_Nuuk_Ministerial_Meeting_ May_2011.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 309 This declaration was written in opposition to the Illulissat meeting where the Arctic Ocean coastal states “defined themselves as sovereigns with stewardship role also over the ‘livelihoods of local inhabitants and indigenous communities,’” thereby limiting Inuit agency. It also advances Inuit agency within its view of a complex and multifaceted legal and governance architecture of sovereignty. The full text of this declaration can be found at https://iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Signed-Inuit-Sovereignty-Declaration-11x17.pdf. 310 According to Aqqaluk Lynge, the ICC Chair at the time, stresses the need to have the “opportunity to have development centered on our own society.” The full text can be found at https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/cop/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/declaration_on_resource_development_a3_final. pdf. 311 Harrison, “The Indigenous Factor of East Asian Engagement with the Canadian Arctic,” 6. 312 Ibid., 2. 313 Lisa Gregoire, “Arctic Council Should Be Cautious about New Observer Hopefuls,” Nunatsiaq News, February 1, 2013, https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/ article/65674arctic_council_should_be_cautious_about_new_observer_hopefuls_ inuit_or/. 314 Harrison, “The Indigenous Factor of East Asian Engagement with the Canadian Arctic,” 2. 315 Ibid. 316 Ye Jiang, “China’s Role in Arctic Affairs in the Context of Global Governance,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (2014): 913–916.

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317 Harrison, “The Indigenous Factor of East Asian Engagement with the Canadian Arctic,” 2. 318 Ibid. 319 “China, Korea, EU Woo Arctic Council at Norway Conference,” Nunatsiaq News, January 22, 2013, https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/65674china_ korea_eu_woo_arctic_council_at_norway_conference/. 320 Lan Lijun, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Lan Lijun at the Meeting Between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and Observers,” Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, November 6, 2012, www.arcticcouncil.org/ images/PDF_attachments/Observer_DMM_2012/ACOBSDMMSE01_ Stockholm_2012_Observer_Meeting_Statement_Ambassador_Lan_Lijun_ China.pdf. 321 Harrison, “The Indigenous Factor of East Asian Engagement with the Canadian Arctic.” 322 “China, Korea, EU Woo Arctic Council at Norway Conference.” 323 Jia Guide, talk on China’s Nordic Arctic Cooperation at 2014 Artic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, Iceland. Video recording last accessed on 8 August 2019 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQmHtSuC0g4. 324 Ibid. 325 Harrison, “The Indigenous Factor of East Asian Engagement with the Canadian Arctic.”

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China and shipping in the Arctic

The Arctic Ocean contains the shortest potential routes connecting Asia, Europe and North America. The three most popular routes are the Northwest Passage (NWP), the Northern Sea Route (NSR) (also known as the Northeast Passage) and the Transpolar Sea Route. Traveling through the Arctic has great advantages over other routes. Primarily, it shortens the voyage time, which reduces costs, lessens energy consumption in shipping and contributes to environmental protection. Additionally, some traditional alternatives, such as the Suez and Panama canals, have been frequently blocked in recent years and are susceptible to terrorism and piracy. These security concerns can be better avoided by shipping through the Arctic. Despite the related environmental repercussions, the navigation potential of the Arctic will improve as sea ice continues to melt from global warming. These routes will become accessible to large oceangoing freighters for several months in a year, and greatly shorten their course between Asia, Europe, North America. If these polar routes are able to remain open for half of the year, some scholars predict a tremendous transformation of the global trade structure, significantly impacting the world economy. This chapter will first review the development of shipping routes in the Arctic and focus on the related contentions regarding the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Following discussion on the legal regime of navigation in the Arctic, opportunities for China’s maritime industry will be explored. However, the potential challenges as well as the political, economic, legal, environmental and safety dimensions thereof should not be underestimated. China’s engagement in the Arctic shipping sector brings opportunities to the local states, although many view China’s participation with caution and question the goals behind China’s “Polar Silk Road” policy recently unveiled in January 2018.1

The development of shipping routes The possibility of increased shipping in the northern waters is potentially the most significant development for the maritime regions of the Arctic. Historically, the ice cover has prevented most shipping practices from utilizing the Arctic Ocean.2 Nuclear submarines have operated in Arctic waters since the early

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1960s, but surface vessels can only pass through if they are specially constructed (i.e. icebreakers) or if they sail for short periods in the late summer when the ice recedes. As the ice recedes, at least five types of shipping vessels will benefit from using Arctic waters: international shipping, shipping associated with resource development, fishing, cruising and surface naval vessels.

International shipping vessels There are three viable international shipping routes for a vessel traversing the Arctic: the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along the Russian coast, the Northwest Passage (NWP) through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the Transpolar Route. The NSR and NWP are ideal for large bulk carriers to substantially reduce the distance traveled between Asia, Europe and North America. Seaborne cargo transport in Arctic waters has previously been limited due to environmental factors.3 However, the increased melting of Arctic sea ice may lead to a longer navigation season, an improved accessibility for shipping, as well as an extended use of the shipping routes along the margins of the Arctic basin. Utilizing the NSR over Eurasia and the NWP over North America would cut existing oceanic transit times by days. Shipping companies could save 4,700 or 7,000 nautical miles in travel by using the NSR and NWP, respectively. The Northern Sea Route would reduce the sailing distance between Rotterdam, the Netherlands and Yokohama, Japan, by over 40 percent compared to the current route through the Suez Canal. Likewise, the NWP would trim a voyage from Seattle to Rotterdam by 2,000 nautical miles, making it nearly 25 percent shorter than the current route that traverses the Panama Canal.4 While there are diverse views over which new maritime passage will become more important, there is a fledgling consensus that the Northern Sea Route will open sooner than the Northwest Passage – a contention bolstered by the passage of German ships in 2009.5 Taking into account canal access fees, fuel costs and other variables that determine freight rates, these shortcuts could cut the cost of a single voyage by a large container ship billions of dollars a year. The savings would be even greater for large ships that are unable to pass through the Panama and Suez Canals and, consequently, must sail around the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn.6 As well as shorter shipping times, an ice-free Arctic throughway would provide an alternative to the dangerous chokepoints beset by maritime piracy. Moreover, these Arctic routes would allow commercial and military vessels to avoid sailing through politically unstable Middle Eastern waters and pirate-infested regions. An Iranian provocation in the Strait of Hormuz, such as the one that occurred in 2008, would be considered far less of a threat in an age of trans-Arctic shipping.7

Vessels associated with resource development The expansion of oil and gas activities in near-Arctic areas (e.g. the northern Barents Sea) will inevitably increase the number of vessels associated with

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resource development. It is likely that the extension of oil and gas activities planned by Canada, the United States, Norway and Russia will require additional maritime support, including but not limited to materials and equipment transport vessels, offshore rigs, barges and tankers to move the resources to southern markets.8 Furthermore, the concurrent increase in demand for energy, combined with a decrease in mature petroleum production over the last decade may lead to increased pressure to develop oil and gas resources in the Arctic region. Continued melting of Arctic sea ice will result in easier access to these resources and may allow for heightened exploration and production activity, which would inevitably lead to higher numbers of ships to transport hydrocarbons.

Fishing vessels Given that some of the world’s most productive fisheries are located within the Arctic, fishing operations constitute a significant portion of all vessel activity in the region. The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) database may underestimate the actual amount of fishing activity taking place. There are regions of the Arctic for which no data was submitted but where commercial fishing is known to be occurring.9 The warming conditions in the Arctic are transforming the fishing industry. Fishing companies have already begun moving into new waters opened by these changing ice conditions. For example, some are already beginning to move up the western coast of Greenland to pursue both turbot and shrimp.10

Cruise vessels In addition to shipping, the melting Arctic is beneficial to cruise lines as it includes access to new cruise ship destinations.11 The number of cruise vessels navigating the Arctic Ocean has already begun to increase in recent years and it seems likely that the novel experience of cruising in the Arctic will only continue to increase in popularity.12 There are two voyage destinations in northern region of North America: the Alaskan panhandle and a stretch of northern Canada. Next to the Caribbean, cruises along the Alaskan panhandle and southern edges have emerged as one of the largest cruise markets, which are now almost on par with their industry counterparts in the Mediterranean.13

Surface naval vessels The nuclear-powered submarines of the American, Soviet Russian, British and French navies have been in Arctic waters since the 1960s and 1970s and they are the only type of vessel that can enter these waters year-round. With the end of the Cold War, the number of submarines that operate in these waters has significantly decreased. However, as the main powers have scaled back their submarine operations, the interest in operating surface naval vessels in the Arctic Ocean has once again risen. Both Canada and the United States

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publicly stated their intention to improve their ability to operate surface vessels in the Arctic as the ice recedes.14 The U.S. Navy has begun examining the challenges of operating its surface fleet in Arctic waters; other Arctic nations are expected to follow suit.15 Given their geopolitical position, if and when they do begin their recovery, they will also begin redeploying at least around the Kola Peninsula. Thus, steps are now being taken that will result in a small but increasing surface naval presence in Arctic waters. Arctic routes, although they will likely be used for an increasing Arctic bulk and destination shipping market and may provide a seasonal supplement for nonArctic specialists, will not replace traditional canal routes of Suez and Panama in the 21st century. Current commercial viability is focused on destination shipping, largely supplying increasing natural resource projects in the Arctic.16 The Northern Sea Route will likely remain the most commercially popular area due to favorable sea-ice conditions, population and industry centers, and the proactivity of the Russian government in commercializing the route. Although tariffs for the use of the NSR are currently high, the management of the route is necessary for safety and productivity in the coming decades. Destination shipping will certainly still center around the Northern Sea Route, but it remains to be seen what impact the opening of the Arctic Transpolar Sea Route around mid-century will have on the NSR for trans-Arctic shipping.17

Related contentions on the Arctic shipping routes The Northwest Passage The Northwest Passage is Canada’s most important interest in the Arctic region, and a focus of controversy between Canada and its close ally, the United States. During the Cold War, the NWP was an important route and was used as a launching point for American nuclear submarines. The military alliance between the two countries during the Cold War resulted in the passage of American merchant ships, warships and submarines with no contentions. After the conclusion of the Cold War, the Canadian government controlled this maritime region and claimed it as its internal waters. The NWP is a shortcut for the U.S. to ship Alaskan oil to markets in the East and for years the U.S. and Canada have disputed over its international status. Washington claims that it is an international waterway and all countries have the right of “transit passage,” which runs counter to Canada’s stance. At the annual North American Leaders Summit on August 20, 2007, U.S. president George W. Bush met with the Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper and Mexican president Felipe Calderón Hinojosa. At the meeting, President Bush reiterated that the United States has always perceived the Northwest Passage as an international shipping lane. He also said the U.S. did not question Canada’s sovereignty over its Arctic islands, and that the U.S. supported Canada’s investment in exercising its sovereignty.18 As early as August 3, 1956, Jean Lesage, the then minister of Indian and North Affairs Canada pointed out in the hearing of House

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of Commons that Canada’s northern sovereignty exists over the lands and [Canada’s] territorial waters.19 Similarly in 1969, former Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau again stressed that the waters of the Arctic Archipelago “are internal waters over which Canada has full sovereignty.”20 As Donald Rothwell notes, the legal status of the Northwest Passage as a shipping route “was relatively uncontroversial for much of the 20th Century.” This was primarily due to the lack of interest in commercial navigation through the passage as a result of challenges associated with ice conditions.21 In 1969, the voyage of the icebreaking supertanker SS Manhattan from the Beaufort Sea through the NWP to the Davis Strait changed the situation. The Canadian perception was that the United States ignored its sovereignty by conducting these voyages through Canadian waters. Faced with public pressure to reaffirm their national sovereignty, Canada adopted several legal measures. These include but are not limited to the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA), the extension of the Canadian territorial sea from 3 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles, and the 1970 modification that Canada would no longer accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which placed a bar on any attempt by the United States to challenge Canada’s actions before the court with regard to the Arctic.22 The U.S. considered the Manhattan voyage “an exercise of navigational rights and freedoms not requiring prior notification” from Canada. Shipping and navigation capabilities are critical to the economic development of Alaska and, from the United States’ perspective, Canada’s claims were a threat to its strategic interests. Since then, the legal status of the Northwest Passage has been the subject of disagreement between Canada and the United States. In September 1985, U.S. vessels passed through the NWP without notifying Canada. In response, Canadian foreign minister Charles Joseph “Joe” Clark strongly asserted to the House of Commons in Ottawa that Canada held an inalienable sovereignty over the Arctic, which “embraces land, sea and ice,” and includes the interlinked Arctic islands and their surrounding waters. The Canadian government’s policy aimed to maintain the unity of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, and safeguard Canada’s “indivisible” sovereignty.23 The following December, British and American nuclear submarine fleets passed through Canadian waters while refusing to notify Canada, which only accelerated the conflict between the two North American nations. The U.S. and Canada reached an accord on Arctic affairs on January 11, 1988, when U.S. Secretary of State George Pratt Shultz and Canadian foreign minister Clark signed the Arctic Cooperation Agreement in Ottawa. The former promised that American icebreakers would get permission from Canada prior to traversing the Canadian waters in question, regardless of whether or not the U.S. recognized the northern islands as internal to Canada’s territory. That October, after gaining formal approval from Canada, the American icebreaker Polar Star crossed the Northwest Passage eastbound.24 Despite Canada’s firm tone, the special relationship between the U.S. and Canada did have an impact on Canada’s pursuit of sovereignty. While refusing to accept America’s position, Canada was also aware of America’s “special

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interests” in the region. Canada promised that the Northwest Passage would be open to the ships of all countries, but that they must comply with the requirements set by the Canadian government. However, Washington still insisted that the Northwest Passage was an international channel and, therefore, refused to recognize its legal status as Canada’s internal waters. The U.S. went on to reject the status of the Canada’s AWPPA that is designed to protect Arctic waters close to Canada’s land territories.25 On the same day when the two countries signed the accord, U.S. president Ronald Reagan delivered a speech, saying that this agreement is “a pragmatic solution based on our special bilateral relationship, our common interest in cooperating on Arctic affair . . . [and] will neither affect our respective legal stance, nor provide reference for other regions.”26 The two countries also had different interpretations of the January 1988 agreement. It mentioned that “all the US icebreakers can pass the Canadian internal waters only after they have got permission from the Canadian government”27 but neglected to mention warships and merchant ships, nuclear-powered ships or submarines. Subsequently, the dispute between the two countries remained. Now, as the route becomes increasingly free of ice, the U.S. might wish to reassert and take a more robust position on freedom of navigation rights.

The Northern Sea Route The Northern Sea Route (NSR), also called the Northeast Passage, is the shortest sea route connecting the European and Asian continents. Stretching 5,620 nautical miles, it starts at the Murmansk Port in the west, goes through the Barents, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchee seas in the southern Arctic Ocean, continues through the Bering Sea and Sea of Japan in the Pacific Ocean and finally reaches Russia’s Vladivostok Port in East Asia. The Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.), later Russia, viewed it as their domestic traffic route, claiming that they had the right to establish an operation system for the foreign ships and warships. The Laptev Strait and Red Army Strait were regarded as within the maritime territory of Russia, where the need for transit passage or right of innocent passage were not applicable. After the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Eastwind and Edisto were rejected in 1967, the ships from the United States and other countries were almost unable to navigate the Northern Sea Route. By 1968 only three foreign ships had passed through NSR: the Swedish Vega (1878 to 1879), the Norwegian Maud (1918 to 1919) and the German Komet (1940).28 Compared with the NWP, the NSR seldom saw the passage of foreign flag ships, leading some Soviet scholars to believe that the straits on the NSR were not within the international channel. The dispute between the United States and Russia over passage rights in the Northern Sea Route has little to do with the use of the channel. It is more concerned with its universal significance within international law. The U.S. worried that its concession in this dispute would undermine its dedicated principle of freedom of global navigation. In 1971, the U.S. responded to the Soviet sovereignty claim in the Arctic area by proposing an international conference to set up

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an international system on the North Pole. The ultimate goal was to tangibly advocate for the “internationalization” of the North Pole, which had been pursued since the early 1920s. However, this proposition failed due to opposition from the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the U.S. submitted the proposal to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and won the support of Norway and Denmark, both of whom opposed the “Sector Principle.” At that time, the representatives of Canada also advocated for the internationalization of the North Pole’s seabed and therefore supported the establishment of an International Seabed Authority (ISA). However, there remained diverse opinions as to how to realize this internationalization. Some countries held that the whole of the Arctic Ocean should be internationalized and that this internationalization should be limited to the surrounding Arctic nations. Others supported a kind of partial internationalization that constituted effect beyond 200 nautical miles of coastline.20 The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. had repeatedly discussed the NSR claim issue, including two rounds of bilateral negotiations. The U.S. believed that the northern straits of the U.S.S.R. should be governed by the international straits navigation system and foreign vessels should enjoy the right of transit or right of innocent passage. These negotiations were fruitless since Moscow denied international navigation access through these straits. In 1985, the Soviet Union applied straight baseline law to the NSR and some straits were declared its internal waters. Some countries including Norway, Sweden and the U.S. had insisted on establishing international passage rights, which were repeatedly rejected by the Soviet Union. On October 1, 1987, after Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk, the Northern Sea Route was opened to the outside world on the condition that users paid related fees to Moscow. Russia’s current president Vladimir Putin announced in September 2013 that the government was reopening a military base on the West coast of Kotelny Island in the Novosibirsk Island group for the purpose of reinstating a permanent naval and air force capability in the country’s Arctic waters. The preceding week, a task group of ten Russian warships, led by the guided missile cruiser Peter the Great, and four nuclear icebreakers (Yamal, Vaigach, Taimyr and 50 Let Pobedy) arrived at Novosibirsk after sailing 2,000 nautical miles from Severomorsk.29 There were two common interpretations of why this policy decision was made so public by the Putin government. First, it was to establish the means by which Russia could project military power within, and from, its northernmost geospacer. Second, and most importantly, it was to send a clear message to other powers that want to use the NSR for their unhindered trade and potentially for naval expedition and deployment. Moscow wanted to make it clear that the NSR falls firmly within Russia’s geopolitical sphere of control and will remain under its sovereignty regardless of the Arctic region’s advancing internationalization.30

Other interested nations Apart from Russia and the United States, there are multiple other nations that find the Arctic to be a valuable and important region to monitor, understand and control. For example, Iceland has invested a lot in researching the Northern

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Sea Route. In 2003, the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a working panel on the NSR navigation to study the feasibility of utilizing that route and how to ultimately fulfill Iceland’s interests in the Arctic.31 Based on the study produced by the working party, the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted the “Ice Breaking: the Arctic Development and Marine Traffic” seminar in the northern Icelandic city of Akureyri from March 27 to 28, 2007. China sent six representatives to this meeting. The seminar centered on three themes: the shipping feasibility across the Arctic, crisis prevention and response, and future research and monitoring. The results were submitted to the Arctic Council of Shipping Assessment Panel who published the latest Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) in 2009. The Arctic nations, the original inhabitants’ organizations, marine industries (shipbuilding companies, ship classification societies, shipping companies, shipping insurance companies), research institutions and the non-Arctic countries (including China, Japan, Germany, Britain, etc.) participated in this assessment. The 2009 AMSA document predicted different patterns of the Arctic shipping between 2020 and 2050 and proposed the idea of an “eco-management system” in the Arctic Ocean to strike a balance between shipping and environmental protection. Japan and Norway are other nations who has always been concerned about the Northern Sea Route. The Northern Sea Route International Forum was held in Tokyo, Japan in 1995 and was attended by representatives from the U.S., Germany, Norway and China. Ten years later, from June 30 to July 1, researchers from Russia, Canada and Norway gathered in Tokyo and held another meeting on the NSR. Norway, also a participant in the INSROP, is another important stakeholder in the NSR status issue. As early as October 1992, Norway had already begun to convene an international conference of experts on Arctic shipping routes. From September 28 to 30, 2004, the U.S. Polar Research Board (USPRB), Arctic Research Commission (USARC) and the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) jointly established an Arctic shipping expert group at Cambridge University’s Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) to evaluate the prospects of Arctic shipping. The resulting report was drafted by Lawson Brigham from the USARC and Ben Ellis from the NRI.32 Delegates from 11 countries attended the meeting and, alongside the eight Arctic nations, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan all participated. Through a unique combination of its history, geography, economics and scientific achievements, the European Union (EU) is inextricably linked to the Arctic region. Three Arctic countries, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, are EU member states and the EU maintains close relations with Iceland and Norway through the European Economic Area (EEA). The EU, having significant experience in shipping, shipbuilding, satellite navigation, search and rescue as well as port infrastructure development, plays a major role in today’s shipping world. Statistically, 41 percent of the world’s total fleet (in dwt) is beneficially controlled by companies of European Economic Area (EEA) nations.33 As a condition of signing UNCLOS, the European Union declared that maritime transport, safety of shipping, and the prevention of marine pollution contained inter alia

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are considered to be areas of shared competences between the EU and member states, but also subject to continuous development.34

Legal regimes of navigation in the Arctic United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) Designated as the constitution of the world’s oceans, the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the general legal basis for Arctic navigation. The United States, not yet a party of UNCLOS, holds the view that UNCLOS is largely the reflection and codification of the customary norms. Therefore, most of the provisions of the convention are also applicable to the U.S.35 Aside from UNCLOS designating specific maritime areas as under coastal states’ jurisdiction, it also specifies obligations concerning and guarantees rights of navigation for all other states in a manner consistent with its provisions. These include rights of innocent passage through the territorial sea, rights of transit passage through straits used for international navigation and freedom of navigation in the high sea.36 Consequently, the Arctic littoral states are under obligation to allow navigational rights to other states within their territorial sea and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Arctic coastal states may reserve the rights to promulgate specific and stricter measures in order to protect the marine environment within their EEZs empowered under Article 234 of the UNCLOS, which allows coastal states to take stricter legal measures in ice-covered water.37 Therefore, although the freedom of navigation is generally applicable in all navigable waters, it can be restricted to some extent by coastal states by virtue of Article 234.

IMO regulations The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for regulating shipping and is empowered to develop, promulgate and implement technical standards for ships operating in global maritime spaces. It possesses the necessary legal instruments and technical expertise to enforce consensus-based guidelines for sea-based activity while keeping in mind the interests of maritime nations, including flag states and coastal states.38 In the Arctic context, the IMO, while recognizing and acknowledging the remoteness and complexity of this region, is also concerned about the increasing commercial and human activities there. Hence, a set of guidelines was necessary to regulate shipping through the NSR or NWP in order to preserve the pristine and ecologically sensitive Arctic environment.39 The IMO has adopted two significant legal instruments relating to the Arctic and Antarctica: the 2002 “Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters” and the 2009 “Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.” Both legal instruments attempt to address the unique risks and challenges confronted

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by ships and their crew while operating in the Arctic water environments. The latter addresses numerous issues including fire safety, life-saving and navigational equipment, operations, environmental protection and damage control. The 2009 guideline also includes specifications related to ship design, construction, equipment, operations, training, search and rescue and environmental protection matters relevant to ships operating in these inhospitable conditions.40 These guidelines ultimately intended to address those additional provisions deemed necessary for consideration beyond existing requirements of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and MARPOL Conventions, in order to take into account the climatic conditions of polar waters and to meet appropriate standards of maritime safety and pollution prevention.41 In 2014, the IMO adopted the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters – also known as the Polar Code – and set regulations for shipping in the polar regions, which were principally related to ice navigation and ship design. The Polar Code builds on the existing framework of several internationally accepted conventions and protocols that address the unique conditions prevalent in the polar regions. These include, but are not limited to, the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as modified by the MARPOL Protocol of 1978; the 1974 International Convention on the SOLAS; the 1977 Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels; the 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW); and the 1982 UNCLOS.42 International law recognizes the right of non-Arctic states to prominently participate in today’s foremost international regulatory process on Arctic shipping, including the Polar Code or even as members of the Correspondence Group. The power held by Asian states in these negotiations is substantial because IMO decisions proceed by consensus in practice.43 However, there have been few indications that Asian states (e.g. China) have seriously tried to influence the substantive direction of Polar Code negotiations.44

National legislation by coastal states On the grounds of environmental protection, the states along the Arctic routes have adopted legislations to strictly manage and regulate navigations. In the late 20th century, multiple coastal states like Canada and the Soviet Union were utilizing environmental protection legislation to regulate Arctic shipping navigation.

Canada In 1970, the Canadian government introduced the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA), which came into force in 1972. This act announced three

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changes. First, Canadian waters 60 degrees North latitude were under the protection of Canada. Second, waters extending 200 nautical miles from its continental shelf were part of Canada’s EEZ. Third, waters 100 nautical miles within the coastal area were banned from vessel pollution. Although these waters were open for passage, the Canadian government could prohibit the ships from passing if they failed to conform to the legal norms of the act. AWPPA was introduced as a response to the 1969 event when the American tanker Manhattan did not notify Canada of its passing. The Canadian government said the act was not a declaration of territorial sovereignty but a protection of the fragile Arctic environment. The U.S. reacted strongly to Canada’s assertions, and the European Union and Japan also expressed their suspicions. Washington pronounced that it would not accept or acquiesce to such jurisdiction, and that Canada’s actions were improperly interfering with the jurisdiction of the flag states of the ships. Canada was unwilling to yield to the pressure, claiming that the coastal state could protect its coast out of self-defense, since the IMO had for years failed to reach acceptable standards for pollution control accepted by the international community. In addition, Canada asserted that the move was aimed at fulfilling its responsibility to protect the marine environment commissioned by the international community. Due to the tireless efforts of Canada, on the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea the regulation on the environmental protection of the “frozen area” was admitted in the form Article 234, justifying Canada domestic legislation. This was advantageous for Canada’s attempt to mark the northern archipelagic waters as its internal waters. Article 234 of UNCLOS was used by some Canadians in court to defend their jurisdiction over the Northwest Passage. They held that this article was enough to strengthen Canada’s jurisdiction over the NWP and, therefore, that Canada could enact laws and regulations to restrict and reduce the passage of the vessels that are harmful to the environment. The International Court of Justice verdict in 1951 confirmed the validity of the Norwegian gulf straight baseline. Since then, straight baseline has repeatedly been used in cases involving the Law of the Sea. This was undoubtedly helpful for the Canadian government to take it as a legal basis. In 1970, the Canadian government officially declared that the Northwest Passage was neither an international channel nor an open sea because it believed that the northern channel had never been used for commercial navigation in history and it did not meet the legal standards of the international straits. In 1987, Canada issued a white paper on defense, which greatly enhanced the status of the North Pole and greatly highlighted its presence in the Arctic. Most notably, it put forward Canada’s ability to strengthen military construction in the Arctic area, including the procurement of nuclear submarines, uninterrupted patrol and year-round surveillance.5 In the white paper, Canada planned to buy 8 to 12 nuclear submarines from the United Kingdom, for which the U.S. expressed great concern. Over the past decade in Canada, vessel traffic through the Northwest Passage has already increased by 166 percent. Government, industry and Inuit organizations

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agree that Canada’s Arctic shipping policy needs to advance to meet these challenges.45 The Integrated Arctic Corridors Framework offers an innovative blueprint for bringing all stakeholders together around an achievable national policy for Arctic shipping. The framework would make shipping in the Canadian Arctic safer and more affordable while strengthening environmental protections and protecting Inuit rights. Canada’s position as a global leader in Arctic policy and diplomacy will be solidified through this implementation and could help to spark a new era of cooperation with Canada’s international Arctic partners.46

Russia During the Soviet era of 20th century, the Northern Sea Route was under strict jurisdiction. The Ministry of Maritime Fleet of the Soviet Union specially set up an NSR administration responsible for the waterway’s governance. The administration would determine the application for navigation in the NSR based not only on the forecasted and practical navigation conditions, but also on the ability to provide ice patrol, ice-breaking and navigation service at the designated time. In some straits, ice-breaking and navigation services were mandatory for all vessels. In case of bad ocean and climate conditions, or serious threat of sea or sea coast pollution, the authority would retain the right to stop the sailing of ships and other mobile vessels in a particular area of, or even in the entirety of, the NSR. Ships sailing in marine conservation areas (or other specially protected areas) could only sail along the sea routes designated by the authorities of the Soviet Union. According to Soviet legislation, ships could only sail beyond the waterway and navigation routes for safety of life operations in the event of disasters. Otherwise, Moscow had the right to file lawsuit or detainment against any ships that violated the regulations of the Soviet Union and international rules. During the Second World War, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. formed an antifascist alliance, and the two parties cooperated harmoniously in the Arctic. After the outbreak of the Cold War, the Arctic became the frontline of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation and the strategic value of the region rapidly became clear from a series of clashes. From 1947 to 1948, U.S. submarines carried out experiments under the ice in Chukchi Sea and set up several ocean observation stations. In 1955, a maritime patrol aircraft from the USS Neptune warship was shot down – by Soviets near St. Lawrence Island in the southwest region of the Bering Sea – and subsequently invoked a diplomatic dispute between the two countries. In the end, the Soviet Union compensated half of the United States’ losses. After that, the U.S.S.R. again shot down a U.S. surveillance plane over the Barents Sea. In 1958, the U.S. built the world’s first nuclear submarine and crossed it through the Arctic Ocean. Shortly after that, the U.S. nuclear submarine Skate reached the North Pole and rose to the surface of the ice. Since then, American submarines had been active in the Arctic ice cap and repeatedly crossed the Soviet sector. From 1958 to 1960, U.S. submarines reached the Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea and Chukchee Sea to draw the sea bottom map and measure the

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depth, temperature, light permeability rate, phytoplankton and gravity of these seas.13 These moves by the U.S. inevitably led to violent conflicts such as the USCGC Burton Island icebreaker incident, USCGC North Wind icebreaker incident and Vilkitskogo Strait incidents.47 After the incident, the Soviet government began to establish rules of navigation in Arctic waters. Section 5 of Merchant Shipping Code 1968 provided that special navigation services should be executed in some waters. On September 10, 1971, the Statute of the Administration of the Northern Sea Route was approved by Moscow and, under this law, the Soviet shipping department established the Northern Sea Route Administration (NSRA). According to Article 2, the NSRA would provide icebreaker escort, pilot guidance, navigation and hydrological service and assistance to the ships traversing the NSR and adjacent sea area when they were in need. Paragraph B of Article 3 stipulated that the location and other information of the ships must be submitted to the Soviet Union within a specified time. Under Article 6 of the statute, NSRA officials were entitled to board the vessels and conduct inspection and the concerned ships’ passage would be cancelled if they were viewed unsuitable for navigation in the ice zone. Penalties, which included legal prosecution, would be launched if criminal responsibility was involved. The U.S.S.R. Statute on State Maritime Pilots, issued in 1973, established mandatory pilotage. If there were no Soviet pilots on board, then ships could not pass. In order to strengthen control, on June 10, 1971, the Soviet Union stipulated a regulation named “On the Introduction of Modifications to the Statute on the Protection of the State Border of the USSR,” and recommended to use straight baseline to expand the territorial sea, however, this notion had not been implemented in practice. In 1990, the ministers of the Soviet Union promulgated the “Arctic Natural Protection Law: Soviet New Legislative Concept,” which came into force the following year. This law authorized Moscow to establish special marine reserves to implement management, control pollution from ships and handle environmental damage through insurance and a “responsibility” system. This law was inspired by UNCLOS regulations regarding icy waters.48 According to Russian law, passing vessels need to not only obtain permission for passage but also pay a high fee for the Russian icebreaking and navigation services, which inevitably led to heavy complaints. How to best balance environmental protection, coastal states jurisdiction and the passage rights of the non-coastal states remains as a major negotiation topics for the international community. Traditionally, Russia’s legal argument for control and management of the sea route rested on its de facto control over the area and its historical role in developing shipping lanes. However, after the U.S.S.R. signed the UNCLOS their arguments changed by further aligning Moscow claims with international law.49 As a general rule, UNCLOS mandates free navigation within the 200 nautical miles stretch of its exclusive economic zone. There is, however, an important exception: the so-called ice-covered areas clause in Article 234. This clause is crucial for Russia’s modern argument for the management and control of traffic through the sea route. Nevertheless, a certain ambiguity can

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be detected in Russian declarations. Their “Law on the Northern Sea Route,” adopted in 2012, says: [n]avigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, a historically formed communication lane of the Russian Federation, is conducted in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law, international agreements of the Russian Federation, the present Federal Law, other federal laws, and other normative legal acts issued in accordance with them.50 While this clearly refers to Article 234 of UNCLOS, it also references Russia’s specific historical circumstances.51 There is uneasiness in Russia over the prospects of diminishing ice, which at some point could make Article 234 less relevant. If such a situation occurs, one would expect that the emphasis on the historical formation of the NSR would take a stronger role in legal defense.52 Russia has formulated new limitations for foreign warships transiting the Northern Sea Route.53 Warships and vessels will now have to notify Russia of their plans within 45 days and take on board Russian maritime pilots. Passage can be denied, and according to experts, in the event of unauthorized travel along the route, Russia will be able to employ emergency measures, going as far as arresting or destroying the vessel.54 In addition, it will need the name and rank of each vessel captain, along with all ship’s particulars, and it specifies that each ship will take aboard a Russian pilot. These new notification requirements for warships echo similar recent developments for merchant shipping on the NSR. For example, in December 2017, Russia’s parliament enacted a law to restrict loadings of coal, oil and natural gas at ports along the Northern Sea Route to Russian-flagged vessels.

Opportunities and challenges for China’s maritime industry Commercial opportunities Both climate change and technological developments are opening the Arctic region for longer year-round navigation through the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage and even straight across the North Pole. Commercial shipping is the lifeblood of international trade. According to the International Chamber of Shipping in London, around 90 percent of the world’s international trade is carried by commercial shipping vessels.55 With or without a great global recession, shipping will continue to be the thread that keeps the world economy operating – whether the cargos being hauled are bulk commodities, military equipment, natural fuel or manufactured goods. Ice-class vessels and icebreakers hold the key to successfully voyaging through the Arctic. Subsequently, a number of Asian nations’ shipyards have developed expertise in building ice-class ships and icebreakers. China is one of the leading Asian shipbuilding nations and its shipyards are capable of constructing a

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variety of vessels. Given China’s well-known concern over the vulnerability to closure of its southern SLOCs connecting the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, it will view the NSR as a potential alternative trading route to its markets in Europe and the United States.56 Future economic opportunities are abundant and include capitalizing on increased Europe-bound traffic through the North Sea.57 The prospects of an ice-free Arctic have led the Stornoway Port Authority, given their strategic location, to propose a long-term vision to become an “Arctic gateway hub” in 20 years.58 In 2016, the state-owned China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO), one of the world’s largest shipping and logistics companies, sent five vessels through the NSR. One of the vessels delivered wind power equipment to the United Kingdom, making it the third successful voyage to the U.K. through the NSR.59 About two dozen Chinese vessels transited Russia’s Northern Sea Route in the last five years, making it more active in the route than any other country except Russia.60 China possesses the Xuelong (Snow Dragon) icebreaker which was originally built in Ukraine in 1993 and converted from an Arctic cargo ship to a polar research and re-supply vessel by Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding of Shanghai by the mid-90s. It was then extensively upgraded in 2007 and 2013. Jointly designed by the Finland-based Aker Arctic Technology Inc., the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) and the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC), a second Chinese polar icebreaker named MV Xue Long 2, slightly smaller but more capable than Xue Long, entered service in July 2019.61 Some Chinese shipyards such as the Shanghai Shipyard and the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. are already building ice-class ships of their own.62 An open Arctic Ocean presents a unique opportunity for both China and international trade in general. Any event that affects shipping will have a measurable effect on the Chinese economy. Excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan, in 2010 China enjoyed a 12.7 percent growth rate in merchandise exports.63 Maritime ships and infrastructure continue to be developed in China at a breakneck pace, which is in step with its ever-increasing trade. Its ports are continuously expanding and engaging in strategic alliances to widen their connectivity. Underlining this tremendous growth, seven China-based ports are listed among the world’s top 20 container terminals. Furthermore, COSCO and China Shipping are two of the world’s top ten container service operators in terms of fleet size and total shipboard capacity (TEUs). Because China’s economy is reliant on foreign trade – 46 percent of its GDP is dependent on shipping – there are substantial commercial implications if shipping routes are shortened during summer months.64 As previously depicted, the trip from Shanghai to Hamburg via the Northern Sea Route, which runs along the north coast of Russia from the Bering Strait in the east to Novaya Zemlya in the west, is 3,455 nautical miles shorter than the route through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal.65 The shortest route for maritime transport between Europe and Asia may then become through the Barents Sea, substantially reducing the maritime travel distance between Western Europe and Asia by over 3,955 nautical miles. This

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invariably provides strategic alternatives to other countries, such as China, and potentially makes China a key player due to its current dependence on foreign energy supplies. Concurrently, sailing through the Arctic brings China 4,000 nautical miles closer to the European Union and the East coast of North America. Unlike in the Suez or Panama Canals, there are currently no fees, vessel size restrictions or other regulations. In addition, the smaller ecological footprint of reduced fuel costs per ton-mile might also be an added incentive for the development of an Arctic route. Arctic shipping could be another aspect of the new “green wave” currently sweeping the shipping industry as more attention is being paid to the environmental impact of fuel efficiency and emissions from commercial shipping.66 Moreover, it could save companies money on piracy insurance. Piracy caused the cost of insurance for ships traveling via the Gulf of Aden in the Arabian Sea towards the Suez Canal to increase more than tenfold between September 2008 and March 2009. These potential alternative routes certainly serve to lower the risk of sailing through piracy affected regions.67 Stimulated by the lure of these advantages, China has begun to advance its interests in the region. These interests have resulted in very strong polar research capabilities and, coupled with its heavy dependence on exports and greatly enhanced shipbuilding expertise, China has naturally examined the prospects of greater exploitation of the Northern Sea Route and the commercial possibilities along its length. According to Guo Peiqing of the Ocean University of China, accessing the melting Arctic region’s huge untapped resources and potential for shorter transportation routes figure high on the radar screen of Chinese global strategy.68 Referring to this variety of advantages these routes offer, Li Zhenfu, an associate professor at Dalian Maritime University has succinctly assessed that: Whoever has control over the Arctic route will control the new passage of world economics and international strategies.69 Commenting on the successful test voyages in the summer of 2009 by two German commercial vessels from South Korea to the Netherlands via the Northeast Passage, Chen Xulong of the China Institute of International Studies writes that: the opening of the Arctic route will advance the development of China’s north-east region and eastern coastal area . . . [and][i]t is of importance to East Asian cooperation as well.70 Shipping remains the most energy efficient way to move goods. In a global economy with no depth restriction on a trans-polar shipping route, very large vessels could be built for use, especially if deep water transshipment ports are developed. The vessels would not have to be restricted to icebreaker models but could include containerships, bulk carriers and oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) tankers. Due to shorter travel times, fewer ships would be needed to

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carry the same amount of cargo between Asia and Europe by going across the Arctic, reducing global emissions by 1.2 and 2.9 megatons in 2030 and 2050, respectively. These numbers represent reductions of roughly 0.1 percent in 2030 and 0.15 percent of global ship emissions in 2050.71 The technology and ship design necessary for vessels to operate year-round in the Arctic currently exists. It appears that China has not engaged in the development of ice technology, which tends to be dominated by the Nordic countries. Its focus in recent years has been the development of the Russian gas field in the Barents Sea. Yet this information is readily available and technology transfer agreements could be developed between China, ship design companies and engineering firms. This approach has been used in South Korean shipyards for new vessel construction destined for the icebreaking tankers used in the Russian Arctic gas fields. There is no reason why China cannot come up to speed on this technology as it is readily available in the commercial domain. There are environmental and economic benefits from using both fewer and larger vessels over a shorter geographical distance. With containerships, which China is a major world operator of, ocean freight costs could be greatly reduced as the vessel would not have to enter ports along the West coast of North America and pay the canal fees which can be substantial. Similarly, one cannot underestimate the importance of decreased ecological footprints. In a rapidly warming planet, the environmental factor will become more important to the end consumers, most of whom purchase the goods from manufacturers in China.

Natural resource opportunities The opening up of the Arctic will also provide access to new reserves of natural resources on which China’s economic growth increasingly relies upon. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic contains up to 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil. China has sought to obtain observer status at the Arctic Council, which was established in 1996 as the intergovernmental forum of the nations that border the Arctic Ocean. The Council serves as a forum to deal with Arctic issues, including shipping. The Arctic Council is keenly aware of the challenges presented by Arctic shipping.72 One example of their collaborative work is an Arctic shipping assessment. On November 22, 2010, the Sovcomflot Group (SCF) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a strategic long-term cooperation agreement. The parties agreed to develop a long-term partnership in the sphere of seaborne energy solutions while the SCF fleet served the continually growing Chinese imports of hydrocarbons. Taking into account the significant experience gained by Sovcomflot in developing the transportation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas, SCF and CNPC agreed upon a format for coordination in utilizing the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast. This was meant for both delivering transit shipments of hydrocarbons and the transportation of oil and gas from Russia’s developing Arctic offshore

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fields to China. A new fleet of tankers designed to operate in ice, as well as additional heavy-duty icebreakers, will be built to that end. In a Financial Times article written as early as 2008, Robert Wade described how: [t]he country (China) has lately displayed special interest in relations with Iceland, the tiny island in the north Atlantic, which with its strategic location is believed to get a key role in future shipping in the region. China wants to start shipping containers in the north, and sees the deep-sea ports of Iceland as potential port bases.73 China is currently conducting research in both the Arctic and Antarctic with an emphasis on climate change, and it has one of the world’s largest non-nuclear icebreakers used in polar research. Much of the international community is clamoring for a special international regulatory regime to govern commercial activity in the pristine Arctic Ocean Basin. Traditionally, China has kept relatively quiet on shipping matters. Now, it is starting to take a much more active role in increasing Polar research. In modern history, it has maintained an active program of Arctic and Antarctic stations, has partnered with a number of Arctic nations and has set up a research station in Norway. China’s Arctic research is well-coordinated. In 2008, China established a research station at 87 degrees north, which has since been providing extensive scientific research and a solid basis for the development of Arctic commercial shipping. With its dependency on shipping, China is eager to diversify its supply and trade routes, particularly by reducing its reliance on shipping through the Straits of Malacca and the Lombok Strait. An Arctic route would bring the additional advantage of contributing to the development of China’s Northeast region. There have been reports that China has been working to develop navigation charts for parts of the Arctic, and that very preliminary discussions have occurred to establish a transshipment hub in Iceland. What is known is that China is working to develop a 33,069 ton nuclear icebreaker designed to easily smash and grind its way through ice-covered waters and be bigger than even the epic nuclear-powered vessels built by Russia.74 A nuclear icebreaker will further enhance China’s ability to navigate the Arctic Ocean, even during winter conditions.75 In original project documents, the vessel is described as an “experimental ship platform,” hinting at its role as a test vehicle for nuclear propulsion.76 As China’s first nuclear-powered surface vessel, according to the South China Morning Post, this experimental ship would travel at a max speed of 11.5 knots, or just over 13 miles per hour, paving the way for nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers.77 In addition to the advantage of acquiring shipping-related technology, experts also see this development from a strategic view: “While a nuclear icebreaker is a strong statement of the country’s Arctic goals . . . it is important to remember China’s wider foreign policy ambitions.”78 China’s first atomic icebreaker could pave the way for

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nuclear technological advances which will reverberate far beyond the Arctic region. Currently, China operates two conventional aircraft carriers and, in its great-power competition with the United States, nuclear-powered carriers will be indispensable as guarantors of China’s capabilities.79

Challenges Just like its East Asian neighbors, the People’s Republic of China is a major trading nation that has much to gain from a reliable and low-cost shipping route across the top of the world. However, while China’s economic future may be intricately linked to a melting Arctic, it still faces political, legal, economic, security and environmental challenges in the future of cross-Arctic shipping.

Political challenges During the Cold War, the Arctic was a security flashpoint with American and Soviet nuclear submarines patrolling under the North Pole and bombers flying over the region. Today, the Arctic is disassociated from great power politics, but new geopolitical developments increase with the Arctic’s melting. Traditional Arctic states include Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark and the United States. Russia has made the most aggressive and early claims. One example is the expedition led by Artur Chilingarov expedition in August 2007 when the explorers planted a Russian flag on the sea bed under the North Pole and resumed bomber flyovers.80 Russian military interests center on the Kola Peninsula, home of the Russian nuclear submarine fleet, and on rebuilding the Northern fleet.81 In January 2009, the U.S. released their revised U.S. Arctic Regional Policy. This new policy statement reiterates that national security and defense requires a national goal for the Arctic.82 Vice president Mike Pence, in a visit to Iceland on September 4, 2019, warned about his concern of Russia’s aggression in the Arctic and China’s increasing activities in the region.83 His concern was quickly followed by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who openly challenged Chinese and Russian Arctic intentions at the May 2019 Arctic Council Meeting in Finland. These are just two examples of senior officials who frame U.S. engagement in the Arctic while targeting Russia and China. Even before Pompeo, former secretary of state Rex Tillerson warned that the United States is “late to the game” in the Arctic and needs to start making policy, security and economic investments in the Arctic, or otherwise be left on the sidelines. These indicate a dramatic policy shift from the previous administration, which saw climate change as the clear and present danger to Arctic security and viewed the Arctic as a venue for cooperation and research. Denmark and Norway, which control Greenland and the Svalbard Islands, respectively, are also anxious to establish their claims. For Greenland, which has just approved a new self-governing agreement with Denmark, the focus is on developing a cooperative infrastructure in the Arctic (e.g. through the

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Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organization). Greenland’s desire to have direct participation in the deliberations of Arctic states is complicated by Danish policies, which are focused on Europe and can be at odds with the interests of Greenlanders. Canada is also openly defending its political interests in the Arctic. For example, it made vessel notifications in the NWP mandatory and made it clear that it will not cede anything in the North. In July 2007, Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper announced funding for new Arctic naval patrol vessels, a new deep-water port and a cold-weather training center along the NWP.84 Canada had lodged a submission with the United Nations Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS) under Article 76 of the UNCLOS.85 There are also international organizations and major powers from outside the region which have taken an interest in the north. For example, the new Northern Dimension is interpreted to represent a common policy of the European Union (EU), the Russian Federation, Iceland and Norway in Northern Europe. In addition, northern issues are finally being given a higher priority on the EU’s agenda. Matters relating to the north have been an important concern of the UN for years, who has special duties in the region through the UNCLOS. Non-Arctic actors’ Arctic policies play no less an important role in articulating a governance framework for the Arctic region. EU policies in areas such as environmental protection, climate change, energy, research, transport and fisheries have a direct bearing on the Arctic, which can be evidenced in the “Arctic Policy” in its “Maritime Policy Actions.”86 In Japan, studies on the Arctic are being developed among the academic and policy-making circles, one example being the 2008 First International Symposium on the Arctic Research in Tokyo. After years’ efforts, Japan was granted observer status at the Arctic Council in 2013, hoping to gain greater access to discussions and negotiations on the Arctic. Like its neighbors, China sees the melting Arctic ice as a unique opportunity for itself and international trade. The Arctic states are very concerned about China’s position on the region and are pushing for answers on China’s interest in this region. Due to China’s fast economic growth and expanding military capacity, suspicions about China’s intention in the Arctic also arose, driven by what the West called the “China Threat Theory.”87 Alternatively, China defends itself with its “Peaceful Development Theory.” Different voices exist in China’s academic circle on how China should approach Arctic governance. Guo Peiqing argues that China has great strategic interest in the Arctic and, therefore, China should not adopt a neutral position as an outsider but should instead push for the internationalization of Arctic.88 However, Guo’s proposal of internationalizing the Arctic put China’s image in the international community at risk and does not conform to its consistent position of “non-interference.” Hu Zhengyue, China’s assistant minister of foreign affairs, has said that “China does not have an Arctic strategy,” but Beijing does appear to have a clear agenda regarding this vital region.89 In his speech at Svalbard, Hu acknowledged that the

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Arctic is mainly a regional issue but said that it is also an inter-regional issue due to climate change and international shipping. It is not surprising that China aims to see the Arctic states recognize the interests of non-Arctic states despite the political challenges it would bring.90

Legal challenges As the Arctic sea-ice melts, the Northwest Passage is attracting attention from shipping states and shipping companies looking for a shorter, faster route between East Asia and the East coast of North America. Use of the NWP that passes over North America could shorten these shipping routes by up to 4,344 nautical miles. However, even though Canada is a strong ally of the United States, there are disputes between the two countries over the waters surrounding the Canadian Archipelago. Canada claims that they are their own internal waters and not subject to the conventions of “innocent passage,” but the U.S. regards them as a strait for international navigation through which ships should be allowed to pass without interference by Canadian authorities.91 While neither country wishes to see the issue loom larger in their bilateral relations and both prefer at the moment to “agree to disagree,” all U.S. Coast Guard vessels are at present designated as research vessels and therefore required to request transit permission from the Canadian government.92 However, this is not a long-term solution. As the waterway becomes even more ice-free, Canada will be forced to formally resolve its dispute with the United States over the status of the NWP. Clive R. Symmons argues that historical internal waters require international acceptance and a long-standing claim. There is a burden on Canada to show that their claims have been widely accepted by the international community or else this claim will not be accepted.93 This legal uncertainty undermines the authority of Canada as the coastal state, as well as its ability and willingness to invest in essential infrastructure and services in support of shipping.94 Without the clarification of the legal status of the NWP and NSR, China, just like the U.S. and the EU, will encounter legal challenges regarding future access to Arctic shipping routes. Beijing stated in its white paper that it respects Canadian sovereignty “in the waters subject to [Canada’s] jurisdiction,” without specifying what those areas might be. It goes on to say that China “enjoys freedom of navigation” in accordance with UNCLOS – a reference to the right of transit passage through international straits, guaranteed in Article 38 of UNCLOS. This phrasing may or may not imply a Chinese assumption of free navigation through the region.95 Chinese companies have recently demonstrated interest in the Northwest Passage, evidenced by a lengthy guide published for Chinese shipping companies wishing to use the waterway. For this reason, some assumed that China will eventually side with the United States in its longstanding dispute with Canada about the legal status of the Northwest Passage and assert that the waterway constitutes an “international strait.”96 However, this assumption may be incorrect as China has practical and legal strategic reasons to side with Canada; especially considering

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case similarities between the Northwest Passage and the Qiongzhou Strait,97 though the latter did not receive such high attention as the former. It may be mutually beneficial for both Canada and China to recognize each other’s “internal waters” claims to gain support for their own. China also needs Canada’s support for Chinese vessels using the Northwest Passage and any accompanying aids Canada provides as the unique coastal state such as in navigation, ports of refuge, adequate charts, ice and weather forecasting, security against pirates and terrorists, search and rescue, and ice breaking.98 A major reason the Northern Sea Route over Eurasia is so contested is because it can shorten shipping routes between Northern Europe and Northeast Asia by 40 percent compared to existing routes.99 Washington continues to assert that the ice-covered straits of the NSR are international and subject to the right of transit passage. Russia, like Canada, continues to claim the straits as under their sovereignty and are subject to their exclusive control. This is likely to remain a contentious political issue between the U.S. and Russia despite future access to the Russian Arctic under more favorable climatic conditions. On January 12, 2009, President George W. Bush signed a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-66) and a Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-26) on “Arctic Regional Policy”; the first new U.S. Arctic policy statements since 1994.100 For the maritime and naval communities, NSPD-66 highlights several significant issues. Unsurprisingly, the document lists that “[f]reedom of navigation is a top national priority.”101 More specific to the Arctic maritime region, it notes that the regime of transit passage applies to passage through the straits of the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Other than the long-standing objections raised by the United States and echoed by the European Union,102 Canada’s maritime sovereignty position has not been challenged by other states that also recognize the importance of shipping through the Arctic. In particular, China, Japan and South Korea see the melting Arctic Ocean as a unique opportunity for international trade, which will have a measurable effect on their economies. The positions of China and other non-Arctic states on the legal status of the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route will be crucial for the Arctic littoral states. Sooner or later, the region will have to adopt a clear position on whether the NWP and NSR enjoy the status of international waters for navigation – as the U.S. and the EU hold true – or are instead internal waters, as Canada and Russia insist.

Economic challenges Exploring the shipping routes in the Arctic is difficult and expensive. Developing them as commercially profitable ventures is even more challenging, due to harsh winter weather that requires specially designed equipment that can withstand the frigid temperature, the limited transportation access and long supply lines that reduce the transportation options and increase costs, the physical environment that requires additional site preparation to prevent equipment and structures

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from skinning, and the operating cost that are increased by the ice-pack conditions that extend over much of the Arctic Ocean.103 Compared with traditional sea routes, transiting the Arctic will always be associated with higher risks from sea ice, harsh weather and a higher risk of reduced service reliability. There are also likely to be higher costs per unit of distance traveled due to necessary factors like ice strengthening and icebreaker support. For shippers to choose the Arctic route, the benefits must be substantial and clearly outweigh the disadvantages. The clearest benefits may be found in reduced travel distance, which can substantially reduce fuel cost, and shorter travel time, which may translate into higher profit due to lower inventoryholding costs and increased productivity.104 Emission reductions may also result in reduced costs, assuming that future external damage costs caused by ship emissions are internalized through actions like the introduction of a tax regime or a quota market. Although passing along the Northeast Passage from Eastern China to Western Europe would substantially shorten the journey, high insurance premiums, a lack of infrastructure and harsh conditions may make the Arctic routes commercially unviable in the end, and certainly in the short term. Such a concern had also been raised by Adolf K.Y. Ng.105 Drift ice will continue to plague ships, even once the Arctic passages are officially deemed ice-free. As Greenland’s icecap melts, the number of icebergs is also expected to increase, forcing ships to proceed slowly and make detours. Furthermore, the shallow depth of some of the passages along the shipping routes makes the Arctic unsuitable for big cargo ships that are more economically efficient.106 This is of particular concern in the Bering Strait. Under current climatic conditions, the NSR is only open to mainstream commercial shipping for a few months during the Arctic summer, which limits both transit windows and transit tonnage capacity. Icebreaker escort is still required but availability remains low. Hence, there are important challenges to the evolution of the NSR into a major, high-volume intercontinental maritime trading route. Special and expensive insurance coverage is also required due to the navigational hazards involved.107 Despite the successful 1969 transit of the Manhattan through the NWP, traffic through NWP is not considered plausible.108 This is because the navigation channels suitable for large ships are likely to continue to have difficult ice conditions, making the route unreliable with respect to transit time, and therefore less attractive to the shipping industry than the eastern alternatives.109 The practical availability of the new trans-polar shipping routes is limited both by ice conditions and by the administrative and financial requirements for such shipping under Russian and Canadian law. Initial studies have attempted to determine when it will become economically viable for international shipping to begin.110 The assessment at present is that the existing Russian administrative system is confusing, arbitrary and expensive. However, shipping companies will find the NSR more attractive if the Russians improve their administration of the route and reduce existing charges.

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Safety challenges Sailing across the Arctic Ocean will require improvements in a suite of safety issues, including charting, monitoring and control of ship movements in the Arctic.111 The quality of radio and satellite communications as well as emergency response, including search and rescue, are currently unsatisfactory. Additionally, observational networks and forecasts for weather, icing, waves and sea ice are presently insufficient. Present standards for Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) will need to be changed in order to be appropriate for Arctic conditions.

Environmental challenges Jurisdictional and economic issues aside, as shipping traffic increases, the possibility of environmental damage to the fragile Arctic marine environment will also increase. Although it is by no means the only environmental concern in the Arctic, the accidental spill of oil and chemicals from increased shipping activities is a primary concern.112 As the lasting impacts of the Exxon Valdez incident demonstrate, large oil spills can have a devastating and lasting impact on the local marine environment. Spills may even be more difficult to clean up in icy waters. The level of concern elevated following the blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010; yet, oil spills, resulting from shipping accidents, occur regularly worldwide. Examples include the incidents of Prestige, Heibei Spirit and Full City. The added challenges of Arctic operations may increase the risk of environmental accidents in these waters. At present, there are very few ways to meaningfully recover from oil spills. These factors need to be addressed in order to avoid severe ecological and economic consequences. Other concerns include the introduction of invasive marine species through ballast water discharges and the need for rigorous regulations on ships’ garbage and waste discharge. Even carefully controlled shipping can cause unintended damage to wildlife if shipping routes run through areas of critical environmental concern such as whale foraging zones or migration corridors. Ship strikes are already one of the most significant threats to the survival of the Northern Right Whale. Indeed, as noted by Adolf K.Y. Ng and Su Song, most of the environmental impacts posed by shipping activities nowadays are not due to explicit accidents that often caught media attention (like accidental, large scale oil spills), but by routine shipping operations.113 Increased shipping in the Arctic must be conducted in an environmentally sound fashion. This can only be done in a consistent manner with international agreement from all parties involved in shipping in northern waters.114

Measures of improving shipping conditions Shaping laws and rules As a global shipping power, China is interested in using new Arctic sea routes, especially the Northeast Passage, to save costs and improve energy security.

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However, China is facing both opportunities and challenges concerning the development of international law in the Arctic. Due to climate change, it might be more difficult for Arctic coastal states to justify references to “ice-covered areas” based on Article 234 of the UNCLOS in an ice-free Arctic. China, which played a limited role during the negotiation of the UNCLOS, may see this as an opportunity to interpret Article 234 in their favor on international rules and standards for shipping rather than more stringent unilateral legislation. Moreover, China should have been more proactive for the adoption of the mandatory Polar Code within the IMO, which provides uniform rules and standards for future Arctic shipping.115 China could now make use of its observer status in the Arctic Council together with the European Union and other Asian economies (e.g. Japan and South Korea) to influence decision-making on shipping-related issues. The Arctic received limited attention during negotiations at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea; a reflection of the dominance of more global issues. The Arctic topic was also downplayed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., who were concerned that negotiations could interfere with their military activities in the region.116 Only one article, Article 234, provides guidance for the future development of large-scale, international maritime traffic in the Arctic region. Commonly referred to as the “Canadian Clause,” this article gives coastal states the right to enforce laws and regulations for the prevention of marine pollution from vessels within their EEZs. Article 234 provided coastal Arctic states with the international framework to develop stricter environmental standards for international shipping in “icecovered waters.” However, little-to-no new legislation has been developed since UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, and no significant efforts have been taken to develop greater international cooperation regarding maritime activities in the Arctic. The sole exception to this complacent trend is the Polar Code launched by Canadian officials in the early 1990s.117 Towards the end of the 1980s, it became clear to many states with interests in Arctic shipping that climate change and oil and gas development would soon increase with trade. Over the years, countries like Canada, Russia and former members of the Soviet Union have developed different but similar rules. It was determined that a common set of rules and regulations for Arctic shipping were necessary before this opening up of the region made any such harmonization impossible. A consistent set of arrangements for shipping in the Arctic must be created. Such arrangements should include routing agreements that avoid areas of high environmental sensitivity, waste management and hygiene requirements that reduce pollution and avert the spread of invasive species, and a stronger set of regulations for the construction and operation of ships operating in Arctic waters. Agreements on these issues between Arctic governments could be referred to the IMO with the intent that they be made binding on all shippers operating in the region. In any case, China should work with countries like Japan and South Korea that share similar shipping interests on issues related to Arctic shipping to influence

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decision-making processes within the Arctic Council and ensure their interests in the Arctic are met.118 These countries should collaborate and jointly invest resources to shape the changing governance of Arctic shipping at both the regional (e.g. Arctic Council) and international (e.g. IMO) levels. This cooperation has precedence. On August 25, 2014, a trilateral meeting was held in Yokohama, Japan, at which China joined South Korea and Japan in adopting a joint declaration to promote cooperation on logistics systems, developing eco-friendly logistics services, and a balance between safety and efficiency in logistics.119 One of the action plans is to launch services on the Northern Sea Route. This meeting was led by Beijing’s chief engineer Zhou Haitao (Ministry of Transport), Seoul’s Lee Ju-young (Minister of Oceans and Fisheries) and Tokyo’s Akihiro Ota (Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism), who also chaired the meeting. After exchanging views on international logistics policies, the three East Asian countries unveiled an action plan made up of 12 proposals. The most significant of these was a new route between Hakata, Japan, and Busan, South Korea, in the two nations’ joint chassis service, which allows those from one country to directly enter the other. Another notable proposal was a pilot project to visualize cargo movement in Northeast Asia.

Improving Search and Rescue services and marine infrastructure Developing protocols for ships to serve as SAR (Search and Rescue) resources for each other will be invariably important in the Arctic region. Appropriate measures should be developed that require passenger ships to operate only at locations where adequate SAR resources are available. Emergency response operations are critically limited by unique factors, including lack of infrastructure, distance to travel and harsh weather conditions. Also, at present, there is no common regional communications system available for ships and no communications satellite providing coverage of the whole Arctic Ocean.120 The IMO’s Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR), in liaison with the International Hydrographical Organization (IHO) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), is developing new areas in Arctic waters for the expansion of the World Wide Navigational Warning Service to provide navigational, meteorological and other information. This shall be done through the establishment of a common Maritime Safety Information broadcaster system for the Arctic. In addition, the Arctic states should also support continued development of a comprehensive Arctic marine traffic awareness system. An effective system could not only improve monitoring and tracking of marine activity but also enhance data sharing in near real-time and augment vessel management service in order to reduce the risk of incidents, facilitate response and provide awareness of potential user conflict.

Perceptions of Arctic states on China’s engagement China’s growing interests in the Arctic have aroused a mix of reactions from traditional Arctic states. Canada, for example, views the Chinese presence in

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the Arctic in two broad categories: (1) China as an existential threat to Canada’s Arctic territories and (2) China as a potentially effective partner for Canada’s Arctic plans so long as Ottawa can formulate a coherent Arctic strategy.121 Both assessments highlight important points yet, according to Jeremy Luedi, ultimately “do a disservice to those seeking a balanced understanding of China’s Arctic strategy.”122 China’s most recent Arctic policy white paper, released by the State Council Information Office in January 2018, outlines its plans to develop shipping routes, expand its research programs, pursue environmental protection and develop resources across the Arctic.123 Some experts say the policy is attempting to tread a line between respecting the sovereignty of Arctic nations (i.e. Canada and the United States) and leaving room to gain from disputes in international law.124 Jeremy Thompson also emphasized that: The Chinese do not issue white papers. This clearly illustrated how important the Arctic is to the Chinese.125 The white paper, simply titled “China’s Arctic Policy,” repeatedly emphasizes the respect for international law – a choice Rob Huebert and Frédéric Lasserre view as an attempt to articulate limits on Arctic states’ sovereignty.126 Huebert questioned the long-term impacts on the environment and local communities if China starts investing more in Canada or sending more shipping. This includes the likely economic benefits that China’s presence could provide. He also warns Canada to keep an eye on some Chinese naval activity, especially around the fringes of the Arctic.127 Assessments that a growing Chinese presence in the Arctic could compromise Canadian northern interests tend to rely on larger global analyses of Beijing’s actions in the international system as its power and interests extend beyond the Arctic’s borders.128 The difference of values and institutions between China and the West adds another layer of suspicion and caution, but it is important to note that China is not the only non-Arctic nation bolstering its presence in the Arctic. Work done by China, South Korea and Japan currently surpass any Arctic nation in terms of Arctic research and science output, which insinuates that countries like Canada have been lax in investing in Arctic science.129 Understandably, some might suggest that the presence of South Korea and Japan do not engender the same kind of fear among Canadians as China’s, given that Seoul and Tokyo promote democratic institutions and a pro-Western geopolitical alignment.130 A number of prominent Canadian scholars advocate for reconciling the need to find pathways for deeper engagement with China while mitigating risks and building capacities to manage differences.131 They suggest that actors facilitate both a more balanced and nuanced public debate as well as an informed government approach to relations with Beijing.132 The increasing Chinese activity in the Arctic and the possible implications for Canada are the latest and most visible rationales for such a dialogue on the relationship which is – and will continue to be – both complicated and complex.

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“Predictions of revisionist or obstructionist Chinese objectives in the Arctic are in part explained by the apparent need for a threat narrative.”133 This narrative would sustain public discussion on the Arctic, evident in the persistent inability of successive Canadian governments to develop a strategy for sustained investment and interest in the North.134 Speculations of a more muscular Chinese approach towards the region, politically and militarily, are the latest justification for increased Canadian military and constabulary forces in the Arctic.135 Contrary to portrayals of China as a destabilizing outsider, Beijing’s actions have been conducted through legal and accepted channels, including participating at a low and non-intrusive level in the regional political architecture. Beijing’s interests in the Arctic, furthermore, align with its broader foreign policy goals of diversifying energy and resource suppliers, securing trade routes and becoming more active in global and regional governance instruments commensurate with its growing great power status and global role.

Russia Russia is the gatekeeper for China’s access to the Northern Sea Route. Moscow, like Canada and the U.S., initially had reservations about China becoming an Arctic Council observer. But since the sanctions resulting from conflict in Ukraine, Russian officials have welcomed China’s investment in the Russian Arctic. Many analysts overestimate the current differences between Russia and China in the Arctic and undervalue the Sino-Russian partnership as a whole.136 So long as Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping remain in presidential office in their respective countries, Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic are likely to remain cooperative. Russia needs Chinese investments in energy and infrastructure in the Russian Arctic and China needs Russian escorts, training in Arctic navigation and opportunities for economic involvement in the region. In a joint statement signed by Chinese premier Li Keqiang and Russian prime minister Medvedev in December 2015, joint cooperation was highlighted for the first time in developing the NSR into a competitive commercial sea route in the future.137 For China, the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Arctic Ocean has to be accompanied by construction of the NSR. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Yamal, for example, will be exported to Asian and European markets via the NSR. Henceforth, it is in China’s interest to put developing Arctic oil and gas resources and the NSR together as both in need of capital and technology investments and political commitment from both Russia and China.138 The cooperation on developing the Northern Sea Route is further enhanced with the establishment of a joint venture between China’s biggest ocean carrier, COSCO Shipping Holdings Co., and its Russian counterpart, PAO Sovcomflot, to move natural gas from Siberia to Western and Asian markets.139 These state-owned companies will operate a fleet of a dozen ice-breaking liquefied natural gas tankers from Russia’s massive Yamal LNG project along the northern coast of central Siberia to destinations in Northern Europe, Japan,

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South Korea and China. China Shipping LNG Investment Co., a unit under COSCO, will operate another nine similar vessels. This data is according to maritime data provider VesselsValue Ltd.140 The agreement came as Sergey Frank, the chief executive of Sovcomflot, a Russian shipping company, was appointed as the head of a new northern sea route committee that would oversee seaborne trade across the waterway running from the Bering Strait to the Baltic Sea, and which is open from July to November. However, some Russian experts have expressed concerns that further involvement of China in Russian infrastructure projects along the NSR might later provoke arguments regarding China’s role in the regulation of the Northern Sea Route.141 It is already being noticed in Russia that Chinese Arctic scholars are promoting the idea of the NSR as an international sea route. Stronger Chinese involvement in NSR infrastructure construction is perceived as spurring further debate over the extent to which this route remains under Russian jurisdiction and the extent to which Russia has the right to establish its own rules of navigation.142 Russia and China, though sharing a common desire in many aspects, have a complex relationship in balancing competition and cooperation with lingering mistrust on both sides, be it in regards to Central Asia, the Russian Far East, or the Arctic. The Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic will continue to be shaped by pragmatism, with a focus on mutual economic benefits rather than a strategic pact. Russia, as a major Arctic coastal state that is keen on protecting the sovereignty of its Arctic territories and resources therein, will remain cautious about Chinese ambitions in the icy region. On the other hand, China will be alerted by any movement by Arctic states toward the closing of access to the Arctic Ocean to any non-Arctic state.143 Although China may be concerned about Canadian and Russian sovereignty claims potentially limiting Chinese shipping opportunities – or at least raising their cost due to tariffs – Beijing did not specifically comment on their claims in its white paper. Considering China’s investments in political capital, military assets and infrastructure for the purpose of defending its sovereignty in East Asia, China will likely face a dilemma on whether or not to clarify its position on the legal status of these important sea routes. One potential place might be in the United States’ EEZ in the Bering Strait, though Beijing would “tacitly at least support Canadian and Russian sovereignty over what they view as their internal waters to enlist their support for China’s claims in East Asia.”144

Debate on the Polar Silk Road The investments in the Arctic is prime evidence of China’s wish to become a “polar great power”; a term first used by President Xi Jinping in 2014.145 Beijing’s aspirations in the polar regions have become clearer since January 2018 and the release of its “China’s Arctic Policy” white paper, which calls for international cooperation in order to develop a new shipping route through the Arctic.146 It clearly articulates its goal for a “Polar Silk Road” to connect China’s massive

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business and investment projects in Asia and Europe through the expansion of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).147 China maintains that all activities to explore and utilize the Arctic should be conducted in compliance with both treaties (e.g. UNCLOS and the Svalbard Treaty) but also international law. It does not touch upon the status of the Northwest Passage and other straits in the Arctic. On shipping, China expresses a desire “to work with all parties to build a ‘Polar Silk Road’ through developing the Arctic shipping routes.”148 China encourages its enterprises to participate in infrastructure construction along these routes and to “conduct commercial trial voyages,” in accordance with international law and, therefore, pave the way for regular commercial operations. In addition to emphasizing opportunities for commercial shipping, the white paper suggests China’s interest in supporting and encouraging cooperation with Arctic states to develop tourism in the region and calls for concerted efforts to enhance security, insurance and rescue systems.

Origin of the concept The Polar Silk Road is a relatively new concept for China’s Belt and Road Initiative and was conceptualized four years after BRI was formally publicized in 2013. In terms of policy statements, two official documents paved the foundation for Beijing’s Polar Silk Road endeavor. The first is the June 2017 “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative” jointly released by the National Commission on Development and Reform and the State Oceanic Administration, which proposed building three Blue Economic Passages, including one “leading up to Europe via the Arctic Ocean.”149 The second is its 2018 Arctic policy white paper. The policy statements and language in this document seem to suggest that the Polar Silk Road is a Chinese initiative. The attention paid by international observers and media outlets also support such a seemingly obvious conclusion, more-or-less because it is the first time that China systematically discussed its policies and positions toward the Arctic, hence revealing its ambitions. Conversely for China, the development of a Polar Silk Road originated from a Russian invitation that China reacted to rather than actively pursued.150 Cooperation on the Polar Silk Road was first made by President Putin during his participation in the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May of 2017, in which Putin expressed his hope that “China will utilize Arctic shipping routes and connect them to the Belt and Road.”151 Xi Jinping echoed Putin’s call two months later when he visited Russia and the two leaders confirmed that their respective countries “will launch cooperation on Arctic shipping routes and jointly develop a ‘Polar Silk Road.’”152 During Medvedev’s visit to Beijing in November of 2017, Xi and Medvedev reiterated the desire to jointly develop Arctic shipping routes and the Polar Silk Road. The three events paved the ground for the inclusion of the Polar Silk Road in the Arctic white paper. Since then, the Polar Silk Road terminology has been actively used by both sides.153 China established the Silk Road Fund on December 29, 2014, with investments from the following fund providers: State Administration of Foreign

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Exchange (65 percent), China Investment Corporation (15 percent), Export – Import Bank of China (15 percent) and China Development Bank (5 percent).154 Since 2015, China and Russia have been discussing potential collaborations between China’s Silk Road Economic Belt in Eurasia and the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and aiming to adopt a cooperation agreement between China and the EEU.155 The 2017 China-Russia Joint Statement on Further Strengthening Comprehensive, Strategic and Cooperative Partnership mentioned in particular Arctic cooperation with a focus on the Northern Sea Route as a commercial shipping route, scientific research, energy resources, tourism and environmental protection.156 Chinese authorities see infrastructure development along Arctic sea routes as an economic opportunity.157 It was announced in the Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the BRI that efforts will be made to build a “blue economic corridor” to Europe via the Arctic Ocean.158 Although Nordic countries are not geographically included in the BRI, they are members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and, therefore, are able to collaborate with China’s BRI through this platform. It is expected that, following the normalization of bilateral relations, Arctic cooperation between China and Norway will grow significantly.159 Another example is Finland, which agreed with China that the two countries will intensify economic and technological cooperation in the fields of Arctic marine industry, Arctic geology, marine and polar research (i.e. forecasting polar weather and monitoring sea ice), environmental protection technology, shipping and maritime safety (i.e. monitoring and reporting vessels), information technology and tourism.160

Critics and concerns The inclusion of this new concept of a “Polar Silk Road” in the white paper generated different reactions and interpretation. There are different lenses through which one can view Beijing’s goals in developing the “Polar Silk Road,” and understanding the difference between how China and the rest of the world sees the motivation for the plan’s development is key to understanding how the situation will play out. Some view it as an inflation of Beijing’s already controversial Belt and Road Initiative.161 Commitment to development has been the central theme in all BRI projects. However, “it is precisely the kind of ‘commitment to development’ deployed by China that has become a source of discomfort at the regional and international levels, as in South Asia and the Balkans.”162 In contrast to its first summit two years ago, the BRI takes place in a much less welcoming environment with critics describing the initiative as an effort to cement Chinese influence around the world by financially binding countries to Beijing by way of “debt trap diplomacy.”163 China is also called to institutionalize the BRI so that the project is not seen as entirely Chinese led.164 Others have cited environmental concerns as Chinese companies build coal power projects around the

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world. According to the China Global Energy Finance database, coal projects, for instance, accounted for as much as 42 percent of China’s overseas investment in 2018.165 Some see this driven by Chinese economic motivations. China, who is facing a real containment strategy put in place by the United States and its allies, is using the BRI to acquire land-based access to resources, for example, access to oil from the Middle East across Eurasia. Consequently, it is not surprising that this strategic search for new shipping routes is completed through maritime alternatives, especially via a polar circle promised to an ever-increasing opening.166 China’s white paper in this context could be understood as the projection of its influence in the Arctic. Other parties see the “Polar Silk Road” as an attempt for a smooth transmission of Chinese products from Asia to Europe by sea. Malte Humpert, senior fellow and founder of The Arctic Institute, for instance, interpreted the “Polar Silk Road” as a part of China’s aim to develop or reinvigorate transportation and infrastructure corridors globally.167 Some others regarded this as a move along with China’s other activities in this region, such as proposing to fund airports in Greenland, which has been perceived as of use for possible Chinese military utilization and oil and gas exploration.168 As environmentalists and climate scientists have continuously alerted, the Arctic is one of the key regions where climate change has had a greater impact. There are analysts who raise concerns that a more constant human presence in the core Arctic regions will increase, either by the number of voyages or by raising ‘development infrastructures,’ as China profiles in their white paper, the likelihood of climate change to be further accelerated.169 Furthermore, the risk of environmental disasters like oil spills will prove more damaging not only for the very indigenous populations that China aims to protect but also for the fragile ecosystems in the entire region. In addition to the environmental concerns, the skepticism on China’s proposal of a “Polar Silk Road” also lies in the fact that the Arctic states seem to be united around a shared goal in international geopolitics “to avoid any external interference in the sharing of the zone.”170 The Arctic states are worried that “the greatest danger to Arctic stability comes from imported conflicts.”171 Opening up to external partners then implies for them the risk of becoming involved in confrontations which are not very compatible with the relatively peaceful functioning of the region, which traditionally favors consensus and soft law in terms of international cooperation.172 Faced with the many suspicions, Beijing was eager to assert that it recognizes and respects the sovereignty of riparian states. Transit of several commercial vessels of the COSCO State Company by the Russian Northern Maritime Highway without any provocation is one example.173 Some hold that it would not be in China’s interest to question the sovereignty of Canada or Russia over the Arctic passages since it would then be difficult for it to defend its sovereignty over such passages as the Qiongzhou Strait.174

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Reactions from Arctic States Arctic states are divided on China’s growing interest in the region. Some smaller economies like Iceland and Norway see an opportunity, while others with a strategic interest like Russia and Canada are growing wary. While the Belt and Road Initiative has drawn criticism in the West due to concerns that China is ensnaring developing countries in debt, some hold that the Polar Silk Road is welcomed by some of the smaller Arctic players keen on building economic ties with China. “It has excited quite a few of the Nordic states who see the possibility of expanded Chinese sea traffic and potentially new ports”175 The idea of a mutually beneficial partnership is exactly the reassuring message China sought to drive home in its Arctic policy, with repeated references to “cooperation.”

Russia China’s desire for building the Polar Silk Road was met with enthusiasm on the Russian side, being construed as sign of expansion of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. Russia’s expectations are premised on three assumptions. First of all, Chinese investments in the Arctic are thought to be a remedy for long-lasting structural problems faced by Russia’s High North. China’s involvement is expected to bring new work sites, large infrastructure projects, socioeconomic development of the area and a lifeline from Western sanctions.176 Second, China has no alternatives but to work with Russia since the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage are China’s only prospective maritime transportation routes across the Arctic Ocean. Russia believe that China’s growing conflict with Washington and Ottawa makes the Northern Sea Route the only viable option for Chinese vessels traveling to and from Europe.177 In 2017, Putin proposed to “merge the Silk Road with the NEP, to turn the latter into the former.”178 Third, China will be unable to “sideline” Russia,179 given Russia’s dominant position in the Arctic and the nature of relations between Beijing and Moscow.180 However, Sukhankin sees these three assumptions as questionable for four reasons.181 First, Russia is not China’s only potential partner in the Arctic. Beijing’s white paper clearly points to the fact that Chinese involvement there will be a multilateral, not a bilateral affair. Second China’s interest is in maintaining equally balanced ties with all Arctic governments via the promotion of multinational platforms for dialogue and cooperation as well as through various treaties and think tanks. Third, Russia and China, though sharing a common desire in many aspects, have a complex relationship balancing competition and cooperation with lingering mistrust on both sides, be it in Central Asia, the Russian Far East or the Arctic. The Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic will continue to be shaped by pragmatism, with a focus on mutual economic benefits rather than a strategic pact. Russia, as a major Arctic coastal state that is keen on protecting the sovereignty of Russia’s Arctic territories and their resources, will

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remain cautious about Chinese ambitions in the Arctic. On the other hand, China will be alerted by any movement by Arctic states toward the closing of access to the Arctic Ocean to any non-Arctic state. Finally, international competition by other Arctic players may further outflank Russian efforts. A joint Finnish-Norwegian initiative – a railroad from the Barents Sea port of Kirkenes, Norway, to Oulu, Finland (on the Baltic Sea) – could serve as a direct multimodal transit link for Chinese goods bound for the EU.182

Canada China’s increasingly confident posture in the Arctic represents both real opportunities and real challenges for Canada. For Ottawa, China’s participation in the Canadian Arctic through its “Polar Silk Road” initiative or other ventures should be welcomed, but with caution.183 Since Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s aborted “Roads to Resources” program in the 1960s, Canada has dreamed of developing the Arctic. This is especially with regard to developing the Northwest Passage as a useable sea route, decreasing shipping costs, supporting development and improving the quality of life for Arctic residents.184 Managed properly, Chinese investment may change the continuous failure to build the necessary maritime infrastructure and advance the resource projects needed to create jobs, which could result in lowering the high costs of living in the region, which can be largely attributed to the difficulty accessing the region and the high costs of Arctic operations – which can be 250 percent higher than comparable southern projects.185 Managed incorrectly, however, Chinese activity could leave the Arctic with a degree of de facto control over the Arctic, consequently damaging Canadian sovereignty and imperiling the country’s ability to manage this increasingly important region on Canadian terms.186 Some analysts advocate that the assistance given for Chinese shipping by Canadian ice services, including weather forecasting and even icebreaker support, could serve as an exchange for Chinese companies’ willingness to obey Canadian regulations, comply with vessel reporting requirements and in all actions imply acceptance of Canada’s sovereignty.187 In other words, to Canada, partnership with China in the Arctic is desirable but it must be on Canadian terms. In practice, this means real Canadian investment in northern shipping infrastructure, aids to navigation and hydrographic surveying. It is concerning that the Chinese icebreaker Xuelong was reported to be undertaking hydrographic charting in the Northwest Passage in 2017, not because the ship was acting inappropriately, but because it was emblematic of Canada’s failure to adequately chart the route itself.188 Beijing’s “Polar Silk Road” may be attractive to Canada who needs ports and harbors in the Arctic to supply Navy and Coast Guard vessels over the lengthening ice-free season and to support resource development and commercial shipping.189 There may be a matching interest in investing in new infrastructure if Chinese companies are serious about using the Northwest Passage. With that investment, local communities will be supported by lowering the cost of re-

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supply while facilitating the development activities of other companies working in the area. For example, Michael Byers has pointed to the crumbling facilities at Churchill, Manitoba, as an obvious opportunity to leverage such funding to support export shipping and to help rebuild a northern community.190

The key for China In order to cool down the concerns and skepticism on its “Polar Silk Road,” it is important for Beijing to adhere to what it emphasizes in its white paper: international law and win-win cooperation. Chinese interactions in the North Pole will likely be governed by well-defined legal frameworks, which is an underlying message of China’s Arctic Policy that foresees regional engagement based on collaboration and mutual respect. China holds that disputes over shipping lanes should be settled in accordance with international law, expresses support for the IMO’s Polar Code and encourages the IMO to play an active role in future navigation rules. The policy affirms the sovereign rights of Arctic states over oil, gas, mineral and other non-living resources, and encourages China’s enterprises to follow national law, if engaged in those activities.191 China is willing to play within the confines of international law primarily because they offer Beijing the essence of what it wants from the region: the right to navigate the Arctic waters, fish in the Arctic Basin and develop resources outside of Arctic-state jurisdiction; the last of which is an undefined segment of seabed called “the Area.” Provided that Arctic states respect China’s legal rights, as defined by these treaties and conventions, China would have less reason to upset the status quo or challenge Arctic states’ control over the region.192 The philosophy embedded in China’s Arctic policy white paper is one of cooperation and mutual profit, which the Chinese have dubbed ‘win-win’ polar partnerships. These partnerships have been expanding in recent years with tens of billions of dollars in Chinese capital flowing into oil and gas projects in Siberia and the Russian Arctic offshore, new shipping routes being tested and stateowned mining companies acquiring rich mineral deposits in Greenland and – to a lesser extent – Canada.193 Canada can leverage Chinese resources, interest and even presence in the region to reinforce its own legal and political positions, while financing badly needed infrastructure and development projects. Therefore, China is correct in asserting that it and other non-Arctic states have certain rights in the Polar North. Like it or not, China considers itself a “stakeholder” and “Near Arctic State.” Arctic states should make sure that working with China really is win-win.194

Notes 1 Philip Wen, “China Unveils Vision for ‘Polar Silk Road’ across Arctic,” Reuters, January 26, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-arctic/china-unveilsvision-for-polar-silk-road-across-arctic-idUSKBN1FF0J8.

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2 Ernst Frankel, “Arctic Marine Transport and Ancillary Technologies,” in Cynthia Lamson and David L. VanderZwaag, eds., Transit Management in the Northwest Passage: Problems and Prospects (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986), 100–114. 3 Øyvind Endresen et al., “Emission from International Sea Transportation and Environmental Impact,” Journal of Geophysical Research 108, no. D17 (September 2003): 45–60. https://doi.org/10.1029/2002JD002898. 4 Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008): 63–77. 5 In 2009, the Bremen-based Beluga Group claimed to be the first Western company to pass the Northern Sea Route without assistance from icebreakers, cutting 4,000 nautical miles off the journey between Ulsan, South Korea, and Rotterdam, The Netherlands. “Successful mastered Northeast Passage is followed by planning start for 2010,” Beluga Group, September 18, 2009. 6 Scott G. Begerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2008. 7 Ibid., 63–77. 8 Endresen et al., “Emission from International Sea Transportation,” 4560. 9 “Fishing Vessels in the Arctic,” Arctic Council, 2009, www.arctis-search.com/ Fishing+Vessels+in+the+Arctic. 10 Rob Huebert and Brooks Yeager, The Need for a Regional Agreement on Management and Conservation of the Arctic Marine Environment (Oslo: WWF International Arctic Program, 2008). 11 Clifford Krauss et al., “As Polar Ice Turns to Water, Dreams of Treasure Abound,” The New York Times, October 10, 2005. 12 Emma J. Stewart et al., “Sea Ice in Canada’s Arctic: Implications for Cruise Tourism,” Arctic 60, no. 4 (2007): 370, 372. 13 “Spring 2004: Market and Brand Growth,” Cruise Industry News, October 14, 2004, www.cruiseindustrynews.com/cruise-magazine/feature-magazinearticles/18-spring-042004-market-and-brand-growth.html. 14 Government of Canada Department of National Defence, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence: Canada’s International Policy Statement, D2– 168/2005 (Ottawa, Ontario: National Defence, 2005). 15 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Naval Operations in an Icefree Arctic Symposium, 17–18 April 2001 (Reston: Whitney Bradley and Brown, 2001). 16 Keith Haines, Ed Hawkins and Nathanael Melia, “Future of the Sea: Implications from Opening Arctic Sea Routes,” Government of the United Kingdom Foresight Future of the Sea Project (July 2017): 30. 17 Ibid., 30. 18 Su Wang, ed., “Jia zongli beimei fenghui tan chongshen beiji ‘xibei hangdao’ zhuquan yaoqiu [Canadian Prime Minister’s North American Summit Talks Reaffirming the Arctic ‘Northwest Passage’],” Xinhua, August 21, 2007, http://intl. ce.cn/zj/200708/21/t20070821_12618191.shtml. 19 “House of Commons, Debates, August 3, 1956, 22nd Parliament, 3rd Session, p. 6955,” in Adam Lajeunesse, ed., Documents on Canadian Arctic Maritime Sovereignty 1950–1988 (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2018), 39. 20 “House of Commons, Debates. May 15, 1969, 28th Parliament, 1st Session, p. 8720,” in National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Naval Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium, 17–18 April 2001 (Reston: Whitney Bradley and Brown, 2001), 242–244. 21 Donald R. Rothwell, “Canada and the United States,” in Robert C. Beckman et al., eds., Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of

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Arctic States and User States (Leiden: Brill | Nijhoff, 2017), https://doi.org/ 10.1163/9789004339385_008. The Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Declaration by Canada Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in Conformity with Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the Statue of the International Court of Justice, New York, 7 April 1970, United Nations Treaty Series, no. 10415, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume %20724/volume-724-I-10415-English.pdf. “Statement in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Rights Honourable Joe Clark, on Canadian Sovereignty September 10, 1985,” in National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Naval Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium, 17–18 April 2001 (Reston: Whitney Bradley and Brown, 2001), 372–373. Gail Osherenko and Oran R. Young, The Arctic of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 192. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-12. “Public Papers of the President of the United States Ronald Reagan, 1987, Book 1 (US Government Printing Office), ‘Statement by Assistant to the President for Press Relations Fitzwater on the Canada-United States Agreement on the Arctic,’ January 1, 1988,” in Rob Huebert and Adam Lajeunesse, eds., From Polar Sea to Straight Baselines: Canadian Arctic Policy in the Mulroney Era (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2017), 111. Ibid. Donat Pharand, “Soviet Union Warns United States Against Use of Northeast Passage,” The American Journal of International Law 62, no. 4 (October 1968): 927–935. Rupert Herbert-Burns, “Arctic Commercial Shipping and the Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route,” Stimson Center, August 13, 2013, 8, www. stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Arctic-Rupert.pdf. Ibid., 8. North Meets North, Navigation and the Future of the Arctic, trans. (Reykjavík: Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2006), www.government.is/media/ utanrikisraduneyti-media/media/Utgafa/North_Meets_North_netutg.pdf. Donald R. Rothwell, “International Law and the Protection of the Arctic Environment,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 44, no. 2 (1995): 287. Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The European Union and the Arctic Region” (Communication, Brussels, November 20, 2008), 2, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en. pdf. “Council Decision of 23 March 1998 Concerning the Conclusion by the European Community of the United Nations Convention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement of 28 July 1994 Relating to the Implementation of Part XI Thereof (98/392/EC),” Official Journal of the European Union L 179 (June 1998): 1. Nengye Liu, “China and the Development of International Law on Arctic Shipping: Challenges and Opportunities,” in Timo Koivurova, Tianbao Qin, Tapio Nykänen and Sebastien Duyck, eds., Arctic Law and Governance: The role of China, Finland and the EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 236–237, http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474203302.ch-011. Liu, “China and the Development of International Law,” 236–237. Ibid.

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38 Vijay Sakhuja, “The Polar Code and Arctic Navigation,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (2014): 804, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.952943. 39 Ibid., 805. 40 “Shipping in Polar Waters: International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters,” International Maritime Organization, accessed August 16, 2013, www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx. 41 Kitack Lim, “Address of the Secretary-General at the Opening of the First Session of the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction” (Address, London, January 20–24, 2014), International Maritime Organization, www.imo.org/ MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/Secretary-GeneralsSpeechesToMeetings/Pages/ SDC-1-.aspx. 42 Sakhuja, “The Polar Code and Arctic Navigation,” 807. 43 Olav Schram Stokke, “Asian Stakes and Arctic Governance,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (2014): 776–777, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.952946. 44 Ibid. 45 “The Integrated Arctic Corridors Framework: Planning for Responsible Shipping in Canada’s Arctic Waters,” Pew Charitable Trusts, April 2016, 31. 46 Ibid. 47 From 1962 to 1967, the U.S. Coast Guard carried out ocean hydrological survey in Chukchi Sea, East Siberian Sea, Laptev Sea, Kara Sea and Barents. The U.S. claimed that these activities were out for some scientific reasons, but it also had the nature of the military survey, trying to show the Soviet Union and the international community that the U.S. believed these waters were “open sea.” The appearance of the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker near the Russian coast drew the concern of the Soviet Union, causing a series of disputes between the two countries. See Richard Petrow, Across the Top of Russia: The Cruise of the USCGC Northwind into the Polar Seas North of Siberia (New York: David McKay Co. Inc., 1967). 48 Rothwell, “International Law and the Protection of the Arctic Environment,” 287. 49 Arild Moe, “The Northern Sea Route: Smooth Sailing Ahead?” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (2014): 785–786, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014. 952940. 50 Russian Federal State Budgetary Institution, The Northern Sea Route Administration, “О ВНЕСЕНИИ ИЗМЕНЕНИЙ В ОТДЕЛЬНЫЕ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬНЫЕ АКТЫ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ В ЧАСТИ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЯ ТОРГОВОГО МОРЕПЛАВАНИЯ В АКВАТОРИИ СЕВЕРНОГО МОРСКОГО ПУТИ [On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Concerning State Regulation of Merchant Shipping on the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route],” N 132-FZ, July 28, 2012, trans. by author, www.nsra.ru/ru/zakon_o_smp/. 51 For a comprehensive discussion of the law, see Jan Jakub Solski, “New Developments in Russian Regulation of Navigation on the Northern Sea Route,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 1, no. 4 (2013): 90–119. 52 Moe, “Northern Sea Route: Smooth Sailing Ahead?” 785–786. 53 The Maritime Executive, “Russia Tightens Control Over Northern Sea Route,” The Maritime Executive, March 3, 2019, www.maritime-executive.com/article/ russia-tightens-control-over-northern-sea-route. 54 “Press Review: Moscow Tightens Arctic Passage and Kiev Fears Full Loss of Gas Transit,” TASS, March 6, 2019, https://tass.com/pressreview/1047602. 55 “Shipping and World Trade: Overview,” International Chamber of Shipping, accessed December 5, 2019, www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/shippingand-world-trade.

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56 Herbert-Burns, “Arctic Commercial Shipping and the Strategic Significance,” 8. 57 Nathanael Mella, Keith Haines and Ed Hawkins, “Future of the Sea: Implications from Opening Arctic Sea Routes,” Government of the United Kingdom Government Office for Science, July 2017, 24, https://assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 634437/Future_of_the_sea_-_implications_from_opening_arctic_sea_routes_ final.pdf. 58 “Stornoway Port Authority in Arctic Hub Plan,” BBC, July 31, 2013, www.bbc. com/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-23515405; Jim Mcbeth, “An Overthe-Top Route to Riches,” Scottish Daily Mail, August 8, 2013. 59 Atle Staalesen, “COSCO Sends Five Vessels through Northern Sea Route,” The Barents Observer, October 10, 2016, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ arctic-industry-and-energy/2016/10/cosco-sends-five-vessels-through-northernsea-route. 60 Malte Humpert, “China’s First Nuclear Icebreaker Could Serve as Test Platform for Future Nuclear Aircraft Carriers,” Arctic Today, March 26, 2019, www. arctictoday.com/chinas-first-nuclear-icebreaker-could-serve-as-test-platformfor-future-nuclear-aircraft-carriers/. 61 “Icebreaker Xuelong 2 Joins Service on China National Maritime Day,” Global Times, 11 July 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1157529.shtml, accessed 11 July 2019. 62 Sakhuja, “The Polar Code and Arctic Navigation,” 809. 63 UNCTAD, “Review of Maritime Transport,” 2010. 64 Linda Jakobson, “China Prepares for an Ice-free Arctic,” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2010, no. 2 (March 2010): 5, www.sipri.org/sites/ default/files/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1002.pdf. 65 Peiqing Guo et al., Beiji hangdao de guoji wenti yanjiu [A Study of the International Issues of the Arctic Route] (Beijing: Ocean Press 2009), 323–326. 66 Joseph Spears, “China and the Arctic: The Awakening Snow Dragon,” China Brief 9, no. 6 (March 2009), https://jamestown.org/program/china-andthe-arctic-the-awakening-snow-dragon/. 67 Jakobson, “China Prepares for an Ice-free Arctic,” 5. 68 “China Eyes Arctic Resources and Shipping Potential,” Maritime Magazine, November 18, 2010; Spears, “China and the Arctic: The Awakening Snow Dragon”; Linda Jakobson, “China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic,” SIPRI Insights no Peace and Security, no. 2010/2 (March 2010), www.sipri.org/ sites/default/files/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1002.pdf. 69 Jakobson, “China Prepares for an Ice-free Arctic,” 5. 70 Ibid. 71 Øyvind Buhaug et al., “Second IMO GHG Study 2009,” International Maritime Organization, 2009, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/ PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Documents/SecondIMOGHGStudy2009. pdf. 72 The overall work of the Arctic Council can be found at www.arctic-council.org. Information on the Arctic Shipping Working Group of the Arctic Council can be viewed at www.arcticportal.org/pame/amsa. 73 Robert Wade, “A Warmer Arctic Needs Shipping Rules,” Financial Times, January 16, 2008, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0adece78-c3d8-11dc-b083-0000779 fd2ac.html#axzz2HUgjGNtf. 74 Charmaine Caparas, “Russia’s Largest Ever Nuclear Icebreaker Is a Ship Captain’s Dream,” Futurism, June 21, 2016, https://futurism.com/russiaslargest-ever-nuclear-icebreaker-is-a-ship-captains-dream; Trym Aleixandre Eiterjord, “Checking in on China’s Nuclear Icebreaker,” The Diplomat,

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78 79 80 81 82 83

84 85 86 87 88 89

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September 5, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/checking-in-onchinas-nuclear-icebreaker/. Dan Robitzski, “China is Building a 33,000 Ton Nuclear Icebreaker,” The Byte, March 20, 2019, https://futurism.com/the-byte/china-nuclear-icebreaker. Humpert, “China’s First Nuclear Icebreaker Could Serve as Test Platform.” Liu Zhen, “Could China’s ‘Experimental’ Ship be the World’s Biggest NuclearPowered Icebreaker?” South China Morning Post, March 20, 2019, www.scmp. com/news/china/military/article/3002455/china-build-30000-tonne-nuclearpowered-ship-described. Humpert, “China’s First Nuclear Icebreaker Could Serve as Test Platform.” Humpert, “China’s First Nuclear Icebreaker Could Serve as Test Platform.” Christopher John Chivers, “Russia Plants Underwater Flag at North Pole,” The New York Times, August 2, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/08/03/world/ europe/03iht-02cndartic.6968085.html. James Collins, Ross Virginia and Kenneth Yalowitz, “The Arctic Climate Change and Security Policy Conference: Final Report and Findings,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 24, 2009. Thomas Omestad, “Bush Signs Off on New U.S. Arctic Policy,” US News, January 12, 2009, www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2009/01/12/ bush-signs-off-on-new-us-arctic-policy. Stine Jacobsen and Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen, “In Iceland Visit, Pence Says China and Russia Are Increasingly Active in the Arctic,” Arctic Today, September 4, 2019, www.arctictoday.com/in-iceland-visit-pence-says-china-andrussia-are-increasingly-active-in-the-arctic/. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown,” 63–77; “Ottawa Buying Up to 8 Arctic Patrol Ships,” CBC News, July 9, 2007, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa-buyingup-to-8-arctic-patrol-ships-1.651892. Collins et al., “The Arctic Climate Change and Security Policy Conference.” “Maritime Affairs,” European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/ home_en. Bill Gertz, The China Threat (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2000); Charles Krauthammer, “Why We Must Contain China,” Time, July 31, 1995. Guo et al., Beiji hangdao de guoji wenti [International Issues of the Arctic Route], 323–326. Ning X, “Di qui wei lai de suo yin: wai jiao bu bu zhang zhu li tan ‘bei ji yjan jiu zhi lv’ [A Microcosm of the World’s Future – Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs talks about ‘High North Study Tour’],” Shijie Bolan 349, no. 19 (2009): 58. “Hong guo dui bei ji shi wu de kan fa [China’s Perspective on Arctic Matters],” Shijie Zhishi 55, no. 15 (2009). The right of “innocent passage” precludes such activities as scientific research, fishing, spying, smuggling, polluting and weapons testing. Matthew Carnaghan and Allison Goody, “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty,” Canadian Parliamentary Information and Research Service, PRB 05–61E, January 26, 2006, www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0561-e.htm# BRelations. See also Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (March/April 2008): 63–77. Clive R. Symmons, Historical Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern ReAppraisal (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2008); Alexander S. Skaridov, “33th Annual Conference: Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea” (Response to an Audience Question, Center for Oceans Law & Policy, Seward, May 20– 22, 2009).

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94 Adam McDonald, “China Looking North: Compromising Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty and Security?” Canadian Military Journal 18, no. 1 (2017): 4–15. 95 Adam Lajeunesse, “Finding ‘Win-Win’: China’s Arctic Policy and What It Means for Canada,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute SPP Publications 11, no. 33 (December 2018), www.cgai.ca/finding_win_win_chinas_arctic_policy_and_ what_it_means_for_canada. 96 Michael Byers and Emma Lodge, “China and the Northwest Passage,” Chinese Journal of International Law 18, no. 1 (March 2019): 1. 97 Ibid., 1. 98 Adam Lajeunesse, “Chinese Prepare to Use the Northwest Passage,” World Policy Blog, September 14, 2016, www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2016/09/14/ chinese-prepare-usenorthwest-Passage. 99 Tavis Potts and Clive Schofield, “Current Legal Developments: The Arctic,” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 23 (2008): 156. 100 Lawson Brigham, “Navigating the New Maritime Arctic,” Proceedings, May 2009, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009/may/navigating-newmaritime-arctic. 101 Ibid. 102 Elena Baldassarri, “The Northwest Passage as a Question of Sovereignty,” in “The Northwest Passage: Myth, Environment and Resources,” Environment & Society Portal, Virtual Exhibitions 2017, no. 1, www.environmentandsociety.org/exhi bitions/northwest-passage/northwest-passage-question-sovereignty. 103 Philip Budzik, “Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential,” U.S. Energy Information Administration Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting Oil and Gas Division, October 2009, www.arlis.org/docs/vol1/AlaskaGas/Paper/Paper_EIA_ 2009_ArcticOilGasPotential.pdf. 104 Lars Ingolf Eide, Magnus Eide and Øyvind Endresen, “Shipping across the Arctic Ocean: A Feasible Option in 2030–2050 as a Result of Global Warming?” Det Norske Veritas Research and Innovation, Position Paper 04–2010, www. slideshare.net/mobile/teriax/shipping-across-the-arctic-ocean-position-paper. 105 Adolf K.Y. Ng et al., “Climate Change and Its Impacts: Opening Up the Arctic Seas for Maritime Transport,” in Transport Nodal System (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2018), 180. 106 Jakobson, “China Prepares for an Ice-free Arctic,” 5. 107 Herbert-Burns, “Arctic Commercial Shipping and the Strategic Significance,” 2. 108 Larry Gedney and Merritt Helfferich, “Voyage of the Manhattan,” Fairbanks Alaska Science Forum, University of Alaska, December 19, 1983, www.gi. alaska.edu/alaska-science-forum/voyage-manhattan. 109 Eide, Eide and Endresen, Shipping across the Arctic Ocean: A Feasible Option. 110 The Northern Sea Route: The Shortest Sea Route Linking East Asia and Europe (Tokyo: Ship and Ocean Foundation, 2001). 111 Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group, “PAME Work Plan 2009–2011,” (Paper Presented at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Tromsø, Norway, April 29, 2009), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/ bitstream/handle/11374/1605/pame_work_plan_2009-2011.pdf?sequence= 1&isAllowed=y. 112 Aldo Chircop, “International Arctic Shipping: Towards Strategic Scaling-Up of Marine Environment Protection,” in Myron Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Tomas H. Heider, eds., Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Martinus: Nijhoff, 2010), 177–202. 113 Adolf K.Y. Ng and Su Song, “The Environmental Impacts of Pollutants Generated by Routine Shipping Operations on Ports,” Ocean and Coastal Management

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53, no. 5–6 (May–June 2010): 301–311, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman. 2010.03.002. Brooks Yeager and Robert Huebert, “A New Sea: The Need For a Regional Agreement on Management and Conservation of the Arctic Marine Environment,” WWF International Arctic Program, Oslo, Norway, January 22, 2008, https://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/a_new_sea_jan08_final_ 11jan08.pdf. Haines et al., “Future of the Sea: Implication,” 18. Yeager and Huebert, “The Need For a Regional Agreement on Management and Conservation.” Lawson Brigham, “Commentary: An International Polar Navigation Code for the Twenty-First Century,” Polar Record 33, no. 187 (1997): 283. Haines et al., “Future of the Sea: Implication,” 16. See full text at www.mlit.go.jp/common/001053757.pdf. J. Ashley Roach, “Arctic Marine Transport: Navigation Issues,” in Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea, 203–224. Jeremy Luedi, “Are China’s Arctic Ambitions a Threat to Canada?” True North Far East, May 29, 2019, https://truenorthfareast.com/news/china-arcticinfluence-threat-to-canada. Ibid. Philip Wen, “China Unveils Vision for ‘Polar Silk Road’ across Arctic,” Reuters, January 26, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-arctic/china-unveilsvision-for-polar-silk-road-across-arctic-idUSKBN1FF0J8. Jimmy Thomson, “What Does China’s New Arctic Policy Mean for Canada?” CBC News, January 27, 2018, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/what-doeschina-s-new-arctic-policy-mean-for-canada-1.4506754. Thomson, “What Does China’s New Arctic Policy Mean for Canada?” Ibid. Ibid. Congmin Lu et al., “Past and Future in China-Canada Relations” (Paper Presented at Past and Future in China-Canada Relations: A Forty-Year Perspective Meeting, Institute of Asian Research & the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Shanghai, November 10–12, 2010), 9, https://sppga.ubc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2017/04/past_and_future_of_canada-china_ relations_2010-11-10.pdf. Luedi, “Are China’s Arctic Ambitions a Threat to Canada?” Ibid. Liu et al., “Past and Future in China-Canada Relations.” Ibid. Adam P. MacDonald, “China as an Emerging Arctic Player: Compromising Canada’s Northern Interests?,” Canadian Naval Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 9. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Canada and the Asian Observers in the Arctic Council: Anxiety and Opportunity,” Asia Policy, no. 18 (July 2014): 22–29. Levon Sevunts, “Canada’s Defence Review and the Arctic,” Radio Canada International, 8 April 2016; and Adam MacDonald, “The Canadian Armed Forces and the Arctic: Maintaining a Suitable and Sustainable Role,” CDA Institute Analysis, May 2016. Elizabeth Wishnick, “The New China-Russia-U.S. Triangle,” National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis Brief (December 16, 2015), 1–2. Beixi Deng, “The Impact of U.S.-Russian Relations on Chinese-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic,” Russia in Global Affairs 14, no. 2 (2016): 206–220; Chinese Arctic scholars, Interviews conducted by Camilla T.N. Sorensen, Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), Shanghai, January 17, 2017.

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138 Camilla Sorensen and Ekaterina Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic: Possibilities and Constraints,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2017, www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/201706/emerging-chinese-russian-cooperation-arctic.pdf. 139 Costas Paris, “China, Russia Carriers to Ship Gas on Arctic Route,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/china-russia-carriers-to-ship-gason-arctic-route-11560284812. 140 Ibid. 141 Chinese Arctic scholars, Interviews conducted by Camilla T.N. Sorensen, Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), Shanghai, January 17, 2017; Deng, “The Impact of U.S.-Russian Relations,” 206–220. 142 Sorensen and Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese-Russian Cooperation.” 143 Nong Hong, “Arctic Ambitions of China, Russia – And Now the US – Need Not Spark a Cold War,” South China Morning Post, March 11, 2019, www. scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2189206/arcticambitions-china-russia-and-now-us-need. 144 Matthew Willis and Duncan Depledge, “How We Learned to Stop Worrying about China’s Arctic Ambitions: Understanding China’s Admission to the Arctic Council, 2004–2013,” in Leif Christian Jensen and Geir Hønneland, eds., Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 397. 145 Cigui Liu, “Haiyang ju juzhang: cong jidi daguo mai xiang jidi qiangguo – Zhongguo jidi kaocha 30 nian huigu yu zhanwang [Director of Ocean Affairs Bureau: From Polar Power to Polar Power – Review and Prospect of 30 Years of Chinese Polar Expedition],” Xinwen, November 19, 2014, www.gov.cn/ xinwen/2014-11/19/content_2780849.htm. 146 State Council Information Office, “Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy,” People’s Republic of China, White Paper, January 26, 2018, http://english.gov.cn/ archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 147 Helen Chin, Fong Lau, Winnie He and Timothy Cheung, The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (Hong Kong: The Fung Business Intelligence Centre, 2015), www.fbicgroup.com/sites/default/files/ The%20Silk%20Road%20Economic%20Belt%20and%2021st%20Century% 20Maritime%20Silk%20Road%20MAY%2015.pdf. 148 State Council Information Office, “China’s Arctic Policy.” 149 Mengjie, ed., “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative,” Xinhua, June 20, 2017, accessed November 26, 2018, www. xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/20/c_136380414.htm. 150 Zhimin Wang and Yuanhang Chen, “The Polar Silk Road: New Artery for International Sea Shipping Communications,” Northeast Asia Economic Forum, March 12, 2018. Accessed November 27, 2018, http://m.dunjiaodu.com/ waijiao/2626.html. 151 Shaohua Liu, Anqi Lv and Zhenmeng Cai, “Xiangbei dazao bing shang Sichouzhi Lu [Creating the Ice Silk Road toward the North],” People’s Daily, February 14, 2018, http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0214/c100229823374.html. 152 Guangmiao Xu, “An Analysis on the Prospect of Integrating ‘Northern Sea Route’ Development Project into the Construction of The Belt and Road,” Journal of Boundary and Ocean Studies 3, no. 2 (March 2018): 87. 153 Yun Sun, “The Northern Sea Route: The Myth of Sino-Russian Cooperation,” Stimson Center, December 5, 2018, www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/fileattachments/Stimson%20-%20The%20Northern%20Sea%20Route%20-%20The %20Myth%20of%20Sino-Russian%20Cooperation.pdf.

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154 “About Us: Overview,” Silk Road Fund Co., Ltd., accessed December 5, 2019, www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23773/23767/index.html. 155 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he eluosi lianbang guanyu jinyibu Shenhua quanmian zhanlve xiezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe shengming [China–Russia Joint Statement on Further Strengthening Comprehensive, Strategic and Cooperative Partnership],” Xinhua, July 4, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ world/2017-07/05/c_1121263941.htm. The EEU is an international organization for regional economic integration. Its members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation. For more information on the EEU, see www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about. 156 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he eluosi lianbang guanyu jinyibu Shenhua quanmian zhanlve xiezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe shengming [China–Russia Joint Statement on Further Strengthening Comprehensive, Strategic and Cooperative Partnership].” 157 Mengjie, “Vision for Maritime Cooperation,” paragraph 42. 158 Ibid. 159 Norwegian prime minister Erna Solberg made a four-day official visit to China in April 2017 to meet the Chinese leadership and re-establish political and economic cooperation. “Xi Jinping Meets with Prime Minister Erna Solberg of Norway,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Norway Embassy News, April 10, 2017, www.chinese-embassy.no/eng/zjsg_2/sgxw/ t1453829.htm; “Statement of China and Norway on Normalization of Bilateral Relations,” China Daily, December 19, 2016, www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/ cn_eu/2016-12/19/content_27714255.htm. 160 Nengye Liu, “Will China Build a Green Belt and Road in the Arctic?” Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 27, no. 1 (April 2018): 55–62. 161 “China’s ‘Silk Road’ Stirs Unease Over Its Strategic Goals,” Fox News, May 23, 2017, www.foxnews.com/world/chinas-silk-road-stirs-unease-over-itsstrategic-goals. 162 Maria Bastos, “A Polar Silk Road? China’s Quest for the Arctic and Its Global Consequences,” Pakistan Politico, January 15, 2019, http://pakistanpolitico. com/a-polar-silk-road-chinas-quest-for-the-arctic-and-its-global-consequences/. 163 Lily Kuo, “Belt and Road Forum: China’s ‘Project of the Century’ Hits Tough Times,” The Guardian, April 24, 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/ apr/25/belt-and-road-forum-chinas-project-of-the-century-hits-tough-times. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Alexandre Cornet, “From the ‘Polar Silk Road’ to the Arctic Rimland: A Case Study of the Belt and Road Challenges for the European Union,” IRIS Asia Focus 90 (October 2018): 10, www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2018/10/Asia-Focus-90-Anglais-1.pdf. 167 Hollie MacKay, “Trump Administration’s New Arctic Defense Strategy,” Babilon Magazine, March 21, 2019, www.babilonmagazine.it/trump-administrations-new-arctic-defense-strategy/. 168 Ibid. 169 Maria Bastos, “A Polar Silk Road? China’s Quest for the Arctic and its Global Consequence,” Pakistan Politico, January 15, 2019, http://pakistanpolitico. com/a-polar-silk-road-chinas-quest-for-the-arctic-and-its-global-consequences/. 170 Mikkel Runge Olesen, “Comprendre les rivalités arctiques [Understanding Arctic Rivalries],” Politique étrangère Autumn, no. 3 (2017): 15–25. 171 Ibid. 172 Cornet, “From the ‘Polar Silk Road’ to the Arctic Rimland,” 5.

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173 Frédéric Lasserre, “Arctique: le passage du Nord-Ouest sous tension [Arctic: The Northwest Passage under Pressure],” Politique étrangère Spring, no. 1 (2017): 141–153. 174 Ibid. 175 Bethlehem Feleke, “With an Eye to Power and Profit, Beijing is Building Influence in the Arctic,” CNN, December 30, 2018, www.cnn.com/2018/12/29/ asia/china-arctic-influence-intl/index.html. 176 “Полярный шелковый путь. Китай активизируется в Арктике [The Polar Silk Road: China Activates in the Arctic],” Asia Russia Daily, January 31, 2018, http://asiarussia.ru/news/18878/. 177 Dmitry Lekukh, “Россия и Китай соз а ут Полярный шелковый путь [Russia and China Will Create the Polar Silk Road],” RIA, January 29, 2018, https://ria.ru/20180129/1513490180.html. 178 “Путин на еется, что РФ и Китай совместно с елают Северный морской путь Шелковым [Putin Hopes that Russia and China Jointly Make the Northern Sea Route Silk],” TASS, December 8, 2017, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/ 4797575. 179 “Дракон в Арктике. Новый Шёлковый путь станет полярным [Dragon in the Arctic: New Silk Road Will Become Polar],” Top War Military Review, January 30, 2018, https://topwar.ru/134818-drakon-v-arktike-novyy-shelkovyy-putstanet-polyarnym.html. 180 Sergey Sukhankin, “China’s ‘Polar Silk Road’ Versus Russia’s Arctic Dilemmas,” Eurasian Daily Monitor 15, no. 159 (November 2018), https://jamestown. org/program/chinas-polar-silk-road-versus-russias-arctic-dilemmas/. 181 Ibid. 182 Arctic Ocean Railway Report (Helsinki: Finnish Transport Agency 2018), https://julkaisut.vayla.fi/pdf8/lr_2018_arctic_ocean_railway_report_web.pdf. 183 Lajeunesse, “Finding ‘Win-Win’: China’s Arctic Policy.” 184 Ibid. 185 Mining Association of Canada et al., Levelling the Playing Field: Supporting Mineral Exploration and Mining in Remote and Northern Canada (April 2015), www.pdac.ca/docs/default-source/priorities/securities/levelling-theplaying-field–final.pdf?sfvrsn=8b46a798_2. 186 Lajeunesse, “Finding ‘Win-Win’: China’s Arctic Policy.” 187 Ibid. 188 Nathan Vanderklippe, “As Ice Levels Recede, China Eyes Shipping Opportunities in Canada’s Northwest Passage,” Globe and Mail, November 14, 2017, www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/as-ice-levels-recede-china-eyesshipping-opportunities-in-canadas-northwest-passage/article36971509/. 189 Dean Ruffilli, Arctic Marine and Intermodal Infrastructure: Challenges and the Government of Canada’s Response (Ottawa: Industry, Infrastructure and Resources Division, Parliamentary Information and Research Services 2011), 6. 190 Levon Sevunts, “China’s Arctic Road and Belt Gambit,” Eye on the Arctic, October 2, 2017, www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2017/10/03/chinasarctic-road-and-belt-gambit/. 191 Timo Koivurova, “China & the Arctic: Why the Focus on International Law Matters,” Arctic Centre, February 14, 2018, www.arcticcentre.org/blogs/China– the-Arctic-Why-the-focus-on-international-law-matters/ne2t4glg/cb324fd97981-4181-85a4-b9f583822512. 192 Lajeunesse, “Finding ‘Win-Win’: China’s Arctic Policy.” 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid.

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China’s engagement in resource development in the Arctic

The melting Arctic ice cap has led some analysts to believe that previously inaccessible oil and gas deposits may now be permanently, if not periodically, accessible.1 While there are deposits of uranium and coal scattered throughout the area north of the Arctic Circle, the main energy resources of interest for commercial operators are oil and gas. The precise quantities of these resources remain unknown. However, a study conducted in 2008 by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) suggests that the Arctic may contain approximately 13 percent of the global mean estimate of undiscovered oil, which was at that time approximately 618 billion barrels of oil.2 While the availability of natural resources on the Eurasian side of the Arctic is more natural-gas-prone, the North American side is more oil-prone. The North American side of the Arctic is estimated to have about 65 percent of the undiscovered Arctic oil, but only 26 percent of the undiscovered Arctic natural gas.3 The Arctic Alaska region, the Amerasia Basin and the East Greenland Rift are expected to hold about 48.6 billion barrels of undiscovered oil, which is about 54 percent of the total undiscovered oil in the Arctic. Approximately 2.5 billion barrels of oil have already been discovered in large fields in both the Amerasia Basin and the Northwest Canadian Interior Basins and are not yet being extracted.4 Comparatively, the estimated amount of undiscovered natural gas is more significant. On an energy-equivalent basis, there is approximately three times as much natural gas as oil, and the median estimated amount represents around 30 percent of global estimated undiscovered gas.5 Of course, the existence of these resources does not mean that they will all be exploited. Ultimately, this will most likely be decided by the price of the resource, weighed up against the extraction, processing and transportation costs associated with getting it to market. Current estimates of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic vary between 3 percent and 25 percent of the total amount in the world. Most sites are likely to fall within established Russian territory but the extent of deposits in disputed or international spaces is unclear and the viability of extraction depends on a host of shifting economic and technologic variables.6 Currently, much of the attention on the Arctic has been devoted to maritime boundary disputes involving the Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States. In addition to this, the emerging interest of non-Arctic

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states in non-living resource exploitation also adds uncertain elements to Arctic geopolitical development. Many Arctic states’ populations are skeptical about non-Arctic states’ intentions in the Arctic. For example, when reacting to China’s investment in the Arctic, questions are often raised, such as: “Is China going to take away our oil and gas from the Arctic to meet its energy needs?” or “Why are Japan and South Korea interested in observatory status in the Arctic Council?” Associated with these concerns is the essential question: “Is the energy factor a curse upon Arctic cooperation or an opportunity for a peaceful settlement of Arctic maritime disputes?” This chapter, which limits the discussion on “resources” to non-living resources like oil and natural gas, examines the status of energy resources in the Arctic and discusses the ownership of resources from the perspective of international law; especially the law of the sea. It then explores China’s participation in resource development in this region by looking into its engagement with respective Arctic states and unfolds the opportunities and challenges for both China and the Arctic states. Lastly, this chapter will analyze the debate on China’s “debt trap” and the implication for the Arctic.

The legal regime of non-living resource development The melting of Arctic sea ice, in combination with external developments elsewhere concerning future energy security, have led some commentators and analysts to construct different future scenarios for the region. These speculative scenarios range from low-level friction to potential conflict between Arctic states, and they also lead to the legal question of who owns the energy resources in those parts of the Arctic that do not fall under national jurisdiction.7 To help clear up this uncertainty, it is necessary to unfold the disputes among the Arctic states. Article 76 of UNCLOS provides that the continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin. Alternatively, the continental shelf extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. In the Arctic Ocean, it is estimated that 88 percent of the seabed would be subject to coastal state control if all the claims were to be accepted as presented in their submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), one of the three institutions established under the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). A framework to resolve boundary disputes in the Arctic exists in the form of UNCLOS, which contains provisions regarding the delineation of the outer limits of continental shelves and maritime boundaries. It obliges states to submit their boundary claims to CLCS within ten years of ratifying UNCLOS.8 Russia, the U.S., Canada and Norway have each claimed their own 12 nautical mile territorial sea and a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic Ocean. Like the EEZ, the continental shelf automatically extends out

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to 200 nautical miles unless there is a boundary with a neighboring state. The international law on how to define a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is found in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Within the extended continental shelf, a state has sovereign rights on and under the seabed, including hydrocarbons (e.g. oil, gas and gas hydrates) and minerals. Each of the five Arctic states also has a claim to the Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) in the Arctic Ocean. Russia was the first to make a claim submission to the CLCS in December 2001. The CLCS issued recommendations at its June 2002 meeting that included a recommendation that Russia make a revised submission that includes additional data for the central Arctic Ocean. Russia filed its partially revised submission respective to the Arctic Ocean in 2015 and the presentation of their partially revised submission was made on February 9, 2016, by the head of delegation and Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, Sergei E. Donskoi.9 In 2016, the Commission decided that the subcommission would commence its work during the 41st session, from August 8th to 12th. Norway has proceeded the farthest of any Arctic state to define its ECS. It made a submission in 2006 that covers three areas: the Banana Hole, the Loop Hole and a small area north of Svalbard. The CLCS issued recommendations in March 2009. Norway has publicly accepted those recommendations. Denmark has an ECS in five areas, two of which are off the Faroe Islands and three of which are off Greenland. On August 17, 2016, Denmark’s government presented their partial submission respective to both the southern and northeastern continental shelves of Greenland.10 Canada has an ECS in the central and western portions of the Arctic Ocean as well as off its East coast. Ottawa has two separate cooperative data collection efforts, one with Denmark since 2005 on the Lomonosov Ridge and another with the U.S. since 2008 on both the Canada Basin and the Chukchi Borderland. On 23 May 2019, Canada submitted to the CLCS information on the limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the Arctic Ocean. The United States has been gathering and analyzing data to determine the outer limits of its ECS since 2002 and has been collecting data in the Arctic Ocean since 2003. Five Arctic states issued the Ilulissat Declaration on May 28, 2008, which affirms that each state would remain committed to the legal framework set by UNCLOS to resolve any overlapping claims.11 The agreement by the Arctic states to resolve their disputes through the UNCLOS framework suggests that the overlapping boundary issues will be settled amicably, although it is likely that they will still take some time to be finalized. UNCLOS provides direct definitions for the rights to maritime resources. Article 136 of UNCLOS provides that the “Area” beyond national jurisdiction and its resources are the common heritage of mankind. Specifically, Article 137 declares that: no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested

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in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the International Seabed Authority shall act. The non-Arctic states have interests in the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources in the seabed beyond the jurisdiction of any Arctic states in this region. However, the general conduct of states in relation to the Area shall be in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS, the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and other rules of international law in the interests of maintaining peace and security and promoting international cooperation. Outside of the EEZs, the waters in the Arctic Ocean are considered high seas under Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention. To this purpose, non-Arctic states, with no sovereignty claims and coasts, can only lay claim to resource access in this Area. However, until the CLCS comes out with recommendations to the Arctic states who have submitted applications, it is too early to determine what the boundary between national jurisdiction and the shared area will be. The only reliable way for non-Arctic states to be engaged in resources development is through cooperation with the littoral states in the Arctic. One of the four key principles in China’s Arctic policy white paper is respect. The white paper emphasizes China’s interests in utilizing Arctic resources in a lawful and rational manner. China reiterates that “China respects the sovereign rights of Arctic states over oil, gas and mineral resources in the areas subject to their jurisdiction in accordance with international law and respects the interests and concerns of resident in the region.”12 Another key principle, develop, is reflected in the resource development section of the white paper. Chinese enterprises, which utilize their advantages in capital, technology and their domestic market, are required to observe the laws of relevant states and conduct risk assessments for resource exploration. Additionally, they are encouraged to participate in the exploration of oil, gas and mineral resources in the Arctic through cooperation on the condition of protecting the eco-environment of the Arctic.

China’s engagement in resource development According to the International Energy Outlook published in 2011 by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, world energy consumption will grow by 53 percent between 2008 and 2035. The report points to Asia’s rapidly growing economies as the primary drivers of increasing global energy demand. China and India are major importers of oil. By 2035, China and India’s combined energy use is projected to account for 31 percent of total world energy consumption.13 Chinese companies, including those with close government ties, are investing heavily across the Arctic because of the expected gains from China being among the top ten trading partners for each of the Arctic countries and the second largest partner for the United States, Canada and Russia. China is deepening its Arctic presence through resource-oriented investments and the development of ports. It is in the process of diversifying its energy resources by investing in both Russia’s Yamal liquid natural gas (LNG) complex and

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Norway’s oil and gas fields. These sources not only provide China with an alternative supply of oil and gas but also help China gain experience in developing Arctic infrastructure and technology, which will eventually allow it to control the routes through which its imports travel. For similar reasons, China is now seeking to make oil and gas investments in Alaska, Canada and Norway, as well as investments in the mineral industries and ports of many Northern European Arctic states.14 The five Northern European members of the Arctic Council (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) are potential regional partners for Beijing and are especially eager for financial backing for their own Arctic ambitions.15 Iceland, Greenland and Finland are particularly attractive targets for Chinese foreign direct investment. Iceland has had a mixed response to Chinese presence, which is evident in how it welcomes investments in geothermal technology and discusses opportunities for Chinese support of a deep-sea port, but yet still declines tourismrelated land purchases. Across the Denmark Strait in a melting Greenland, China is investing in potential ports and the rare earth minerals needed to feed its vast manufacturing economy. Simultaneously, in 2012, the Chinese energy company Sinopec and the Icelandic company Orka Energy announced plans to invest more than $100 million in geothermal technology.16 Finland and China have recently inked a deal to create a data Silk Road that will link Arctic communications to the Asian market.17 Chinese investments in the mining and energy industries are also taking place beyond the immediate region surrounding Iceland, Greenland and Russia.18 In Canada, for example, Chinese firms have acquired interests in two oil companies that could afford them access to Arctic drilling. India has also managed to gain access to potential resources in the Arctic. A consortium led by the public-sector unit Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) has recently acquired a 15 percent stake – worth $3.4 billion – in the South Tambeyskoye LNG project on the northeastern part of the Yamal Peninsula. It is notably being developed by Novatek, Russia’s largest independent natural gas producer. ONGC has also acquired stakes in oil and gas fields in Sakhalin in Russia’s Far East. A 2017 study of Arctic investment conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), a non-profit research and analysis organization, estimated that China invested over US$1.4 trillion (9.6 trillion Chinese yuan) “in the economies of the Arctic nations” from 2005 to 2017, including US$89.2 billion (613 billion Chinese yuan) “in infrastructure, assets, cooperative agreements, financing agreements, or other projects located within the 60 degrees north boundary drawn by this paper.”19 The second-largest listed investment is the 2013 acquisition by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) of the Canadian oil and gas company Nexen for US$15.1 billion (103.8 billion Chinese yuan) which includes access to production in the Middle East, the Gulf of Mexico and West Africa. The largest Chinese investment listed in the study is for the Belkomur Railway – an unrealized project to link Perm in central Russia and the Arctic port of Arkhangelsk – with a total value of US$20.6 billion (141.8 billion Chinese yuan); 80 percent of which was sourced from “private sources.”20

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Russia Since 2013, China’s biggest ocean carrier company, China COSCO Shipping Co. Ltd., has conducted 22 commercial voyages and its cargo volume is predicted to increase in the coming years.21 Furthermore, there is particular attention being paid to the related potential extraction of both natural and living resources.22 A recent bureaucratic shuffle in Beijing in March 2018 placed the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) under the direct supervision of the new Ministry of Natural Resources.23 This illustrates the importance that Beijing attaches to the potential economic utilization of the Arctic.24 China recognizes the strategic benefit of partnering with Russia to facilitate its entry into the Arctic.25 It has stepped in to provide financing a part-owner of Russia’s LNG facility in the Yamal Peninsula, which is lacking international investment due to U.S.-led sanctions on Russia-owned gas producer Novatek. China aims to fund the second planned Yamal LNG plant as well. As part of their retaliatory tariffs against the United States, Beijing chose to institute a 10 percent tariff on American liquid natural gas, effectively pricing the U.S. out of their energy market in favor of Qatar, Australia and Russia.26 In a major breakthrough in 2018, the first shipment of liquefied natural gas was delivered from the Russian port of Sabetta in the far north – home to the Yamal LNG project in the Russian Arctic – to the eastern Chinese port of Rudong in Jiangsu Province.27 Two LNG tankers named the Vladimir Rusanov and the Eduard Toll, each possessing a cargo capacity of more than 172,000 cubic meters, sailed without any icebreaker escort through the Northern Sea Route, in just 19 days compared to the 35 days that it would normally take to navigate the traditional eastern route via the Suez Canal.28 On the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok on September 4, 2019, Russian president Vladimir Putin told the head of Moscow’s statecontrolled Gazprom to consider making Russian gas exports to China via Mongolia.29 Gazprom is now due to start exporting gas to China in December via the eastern Power of Siberia pipeline. China is breaking into the Arctic transport market through a joint venture between the country’s China COSCO Shipping and its Russian counterpart PAO Sovcomflot to move natural gas from Siberia to Western and Asian markets. The state-owned companies (SOEs) will operate a fleet of a dozen ice-breaking liquefied natural gas tankers from Russia’s massive Yamal LNG project along the northern coast of central Siberia to destinations in Northern Europe, Japan, South Korea and China. According to maritime data provider VesselsValue Ltd., China Shipping LNG Investment Co., a COSCO unit, will operate nine similar vessels.30

The United States For the United States, Chinese investment would benefit Alaska, the state that makes the U.S. an Arctic nation. Ninety percent of Alaska’s state-funded portion of the budget comes from oil tax revenue.31 U.S. president Donald

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Trump and his administration have attempted to drive Arctic policies forward by encouraging more fossil fuel production in Alaska, despite his public statements on the Arctic being sparse. For example, although judicial review has slowed this process, the Trump administration has reopened onshore and offshore areas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil and gas drilling development with expedited environmental review. On August 23, 2019, the Trump administration released documents that pushed forward two controversial projects in the Alaskan Arctic. First, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management issued a draft environmental impact statement for the Ambler Road Project, which would carve a 211-mile road through the Brooks Range foothills to an isolated region of northwestern Alaska that holds copper reserves.32 Second, the agency released a similar draft environmental statement on ConocoPhillips Alaska’s plan to develop its Willow prospect. Located in the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska, the Willow prospect holds what ConocoPhillips has estimated to hold up to 750 million barrels of oil.33 The picture is more mixed for China. While increased U.S. military capacity may be a detriment to China, expanded energy production, if it becomes profitable in the future, could potentially provide new sources of oil and gas for China in the medium term and help to hold down the costs of its imported energy. In this context, China sees Alaska as an opportunity to satisfy its LNG appetite. After the Mar-a-Lago summit with U.S. president Trump in April 2017, Chinese president Xi visited Alaska to meet with Governor Bill Walker and discuss economic opportunities, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments. Before Trump’s trip to China a few months later, the White House announced multiple memoranda of understanding between U.S. and Chinese oil and gas corporations.34 China’s top state oil company-Sinopec, Bank of China and China Investment Corp agreed to help develop a US$43 billion natural gas project in Alaska.35 Before he became the U.S. secretary of state, Rex Tillerson knew of the importance of the Arctic from his time as the CEO of ExxonMobil. In 2013, he cut deals with Rosneft, the state-owned Russian oil company, to enable ExxonMobil (and by extension the United States) to have an economic foothold in the Arctic oil and gas economy.36 After ExxonMobil’s abandonment of its joint venture with Rosneft in March 2018 because of sanctions, U.S. oil and gas companies have essentially abandoned the Arctic oil and gas economy.37 However, there are ongoing talks of a natural gas pipeline project between an Alaska natural gas consortium and China’s Sinopec.38

Canada The potential benefit from drilling in Canada’s Arctic may still be substantial even though it is under-explored and less developed than the Eurasian North.39 The estimation in the Mackenzie region holds upwards of 2.8 billion barrels of crude oil resources and more than 60 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.40 According to the Geological Survey of Canada, The Sverdrup basin located farther east contains 4.3 billion barrels of oil and 79.8 trillion cubic feet of gas.41 However,

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compared with its investment in Russia, China has refrained from taking a similar stake in the North America Arctic, despite showing keen interest in the Canadian energy and resource sector. Increasing Chinese investment in Russia, particularly in oil and gas sectors, may limit future Chinese investment in the Canadian Arctic.42 Other reasons for limited Chinese investment in the Canadian Arctic include how drilling in the Canadian Arctic is inhibited by heavy regulations and protests from environmental groups, the high costs of operating in the harsh climate and Canada’s dearth of shipping, pipeline, resupply and support infrastructure.43 The operating costs would likely be too large for China’s SOEs. Hence, Chinese companies have sought partnership agreements to share risk and minimize political exposure.44 Even though Chinese investment in Canada’s oil and gas industry is deemed as necessary for Canada, it also provokes concern in the country over the growing influence of the Chinese state in an important sector of the Canadian economy. These worries were exemplified in 2013 during the $15 billion takeover of Nexen Energy by China’s National offshore Oil Company.45 However, as P. Whitney Lackenbauer and his co-authors argue, popular fears of a Chinese resource grab in the Arctic are unfounded, particularly in the short to medium term.46 Arctic hydrocarbon resources are either onshore or in waters well within Canada’s national jurisdiction. Hence, Chinese participation will likely occur under Canadian law, which is a condition emphasized in China’s Arctic policy white paper. China’s decision to purchase minority shares or acquire North American companies is driven by its inability to develop unconventional oil reserves on its own; especially in the Arctic where its SOEs lack not only cold-water drilling experience but also the special skills and equipment that the Western companies have been developing since 1970s.47 From the Canadian perspective, Chinese companies are welcomed to share the costs and risk.

Nordic countries Nordic nations that border the Arctic tend to have mixed stances on China’s investment in the Arctic region. Beijing leveraged this to ink its first free trade agreement with a European country once Iceland faced pressure from the 2008 financial crisis.48 Chinese investments have been welcomed in Iceland following its 2008 financial collapse, and in 2016, the Chinese company Shenghe Resources bought 12.5 percent of Greenland Minerals and Energy. However, in recent years Nordic countries have become more cautious. When a Chinese company tried to buy a privately owned former military base on Greenland in 2018, the Danish government hurriedly bought the base back to prevent it from falling into Chinese hands. Beijing also appears to be planning to buy two ports in Iceland as well as Norway’s Arctic Kirkenes port, both as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); yet, these projects may now be stymied.49 In Greenland, melting glaciers provide new opportunities for the exploration of natural resources.50 International investment on natural resource extraction could reduce Greenland’s current reliance on Danish subsidies despite the environmental concerns that have been raised.51 Chinese firms have sought to invest

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in Greenland’s emerging mineral wealth and its companies are involved in six different projects. For instance, this includes a partnership with the Australian company to extract uranium and rare earth minerals, which may serve a growing demand for the latter in China.52 A zinc mine is planned at Citronen Fjord in Greenland’s far north, overseen by Perth-based Ironbark, which signed a memorandum of understanding with China Nonferrous Metal to assist with that project’s development.53 General Nice, a Hong Kong-based company, currently holds the rights to a potential iron mine at Isua in western Greenland. The same company ran afoul of the Danish government when it attempted to purchase an abandoned American-built naval facility at Grønnedal, but the purchase was blocked by Copenhagen.54 China’s growing influence in Greenland has aroused concern.55 The Danish government maintains authority over security and foreign affairs but has devolved authority to the Greenlandic government in other areas, including natural resources.56 Though Greenland desires independence, it is financially dependent on annual transfers from Copenhagen.57 It sees the development of the island’s abundant resources (e.g. uranium and other rare-earth elements (REE)) as a path to independence.58 Like much of the Arctic region, Greenland lacks infrastructure of all kinds, making it a ripe opportunity for Chinese investment.59 Ports built and operated by China in Greenland might be predicated on their use as refueling stations for Chinese vessels. Some view China’s efforts in Greenland as dual-use targets beyond economic incentives, and point to a former naval base, airfields, strategic minerals and a satellite ground station as proofs.60 As is described by Rebecca Puncus and Walter A. Berbrick, “[i]n the future, we could plausibly imagine ‘debt trap’ lending – as seen in the One Belt One Road Initiative – linked to badly needed infrastructure, like ports, airfields, roads, communications cables or towers, hospitals, or housing.”61 As Greenland continues to pursue its goal of independence from Denmark, significant Chinese influence could play a growing political role; for example, in how an independent Greenland might approach its potential EU and NATO memberships.62 Even though the relationship between Beijing and Nuuk has grown considerably closer in recent years, there are still obstacles in the way of a greater Chinese economic presence in Greenland. Included in this is the domestic-level bureaucracy on the island, the uncertainty of the time required to obtain licenses to commence actual mining activities, potential opposition from local communities over the effects of mining on the environment and traditional economic activities, and possible pushback from Copenhagen.63

Challenge and cooperation in energy development Multiple challenges Political challenge for oil companies that show interest in energy extraction may stem from unresolved boundary disputes. Simultaneously, the opening up of Arctic sea routes, which were once only navigable by icebreakers, threaten to

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complicate delicate relations between countries with competing claims to Arctic territory – particularly as areas previously inaccessible become ripe for exploration for oil and natural gas. Alongside the Nordic nations, the United States, Russia and Canada are among the countries attempting to claim jurisdiction over the Arctic territory. Analysts predict that Japan, South Korea and China are also likely to join a rush to capture oil and gas trapped under the region’s ice. The Arctic states are very concerned about these non-Arctic states’ position on the legal status of their backyard. These states recognize that China has an agenda and is looking to use existing regimes to advance its interests at the multilateral and bilateral levels. Beijing has recently entered into bilateral discussions with both Norway and Canada. Due to China’s fast economic growth and military capacity-building, suspicions about China’s intentions in the Arctic also arise, driven by what Western analysts call the “China Threat Theory,” which is countered by China’s “Peaceful Development Theory.” Economic challenges also exist. The Nordic states and parts of western Russia are the only areas with the infrastructure to support large populations and commercial activity.64 Basic infrastructure is extremely sparse throughout the rest of Russia, Greenland, Canada and Alaska.65 In most areas, hydrographic charting is also largely inadequate, causing increasing risks for maritime activity.66 Furthermore, satellite coverage and other communications tools are often impaired at high latitudes. More complex insurance costs will arise associated with the risks of operating in remote, poorly understood areas with weak communications and dangerous conditions.67 As a result, investment in the Arctic does not always offer competitive returns compared to projects conducted farther south.68 Thus, states that can direct investment and lending from state-controlled or affiliated sources face little competition in the region.69 Finding large Arctic oil and natural gas deposits is particularly difficult and expensive; developing them as commercially viable ventures is even more challenging. Arctic oil and natural gas resource exploration and development are expensive because harsh winter weather requires that equipment is specially designed to withstand frigid temperatures. Simultaneously, limited transportation access and long supply lines reduce transportation options and increase transportation costs, the physical environment requires additional site preparation to prevent equipment and structures from skinning, and operating costs are increased by the ice-pack conditions that extend over much of the Arctic Ocean. In addition, while the Arctic has the potential to be a more important source of global oil and natural gas production sometime in the future, the timing of a significant expansion in Arctic production is difficult to predict. Statoil, a global energy company, announced that it had made the most significant discovery in the past decade off the coast of Norway at its Skrugard prospect in the western Barents, breathing new life into Norway’s hitherto declining oil prospects. But producing oil and gas in Norway’s remote “High North” might entail higher costs and possibly greater risk of spills. In addition to political and economic challenges, technological concerns should not be neglected since the feasibility and subsequent cost of extracting

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oil and gas in the Arctic will heavily depend on the state of the available technology as well as climatic developments which may produce a more or less hospitable environment in which to operate. Extraction technology has been grappling with extreme-climate marine drilling for decades, but the pace of new advancements will dictate the feasibility of exploitation in coming years. It is more challenging to forecast the level of offshore hydrocarbon extraction in the future. As noted, operating in the Arctic environment is made more challenging by the presence of ice and the commonly severe weather conditions. In order to manage the risks that flow from these conditions, hydrocarbon extraction operations must design safety and protection into their infrastructure and procedures. Moreover, given the more fragile nature of the Arctic environment in comparison to other hydrocarbon producing areas of the world, companies will be expected to operate with increased environmental safeguards in the vulnerable region. Combined with other factors, these higher standards will result in increased operating costs for the oil and gas companies. These costs may convince some companies that the potential gains are not worth the risks of investing in the region despite the deposits that exist.

Opportunity for cooperation The high cost of conducting business in the Arctic suggests that only the world’s largest oil companies, most likely as partners in joint venture projects, have the financial, technical and managerial strength to accomplish the costly, long-term projects that are often dictated by Arctic conditions. Incentives to settle outstanding disputes would rise with the increasing potential economic returns posed by exploitation and the resulting polarization within the international system. While there are disagreements between the Arctic states on maritime boundaries, there are still reasons to believe that these disagreements can be resolved amicably. The prospect for conflicts relating to unresolved boundary disputes seems remote. The existing vehicles for dispute resolution and cooperation in the region – UNCLOS and the Arctic Council – will also play roles in reducing tensions. The joint management of resource fields is another potential solution that might come into play as the disputing countries involved recognize this method’s advantages as more favorable than losing a claim in an international tribunal. Cooperation between Norway and Iceland regarding the development of the Dreki field could serve as a model for similar arrangements in the future. Another example is the continental shelf dispute concerning an area rich in natural gas between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea. Both countries dispute over the other’s interpretation of how far their borders extend into the offshore EEZ. While it is possible that there could be a conflict between the two countries over this area, it seems highly unlikely when the potential costs are weighed against the potential benefits. Although national interests are a major instigator, geopolitical issues do not exclusively result in conflicts over interests. They can also reflect cooperative,

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multilateral initiatives by which a state pursues its interests vis-à-vis others. Such cooperative ventures are often considered desirable, or even unavoidable, when a state is seeking a result that cannot be achieved unilaterally. At the same time, cooperation frequently establishes a level of governance – sometimes formally and other times informally – by which mutual understanding can clarify intentions and help to build trust. Recognizing and respecting other states’ rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. In accordance with UNCLOS and other relevant international laws, Arctic states have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the region while non-Arctic states also enjoy certain rights of scientific research and navigation. First and foremost, to develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and non-Arctic states should recognize and respect one another’s rights under international law. Examples of mutual respect between Arctic and non-Arctic states exist. On November 22, 2010, the Sovcomflot Group (SCF) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a strategic long-term cooperation agreement.70 The parties agreed to develop a long-term partnership in the sphere of seaborne energy solutions, with the SCF fleet serving the continually growing Chinese imports of hydrocarbons. Taking into account the significant experience gained by Sovcomflot in developing the transportation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas, SCF and CNPC agreed upon the format for coordination in utilizing the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast. They successfully delivered transit shipments of hydrocarbons and transported oil and natural gas from Russia’s developing Arctic offshore fields to China. A new fleet of tankers designed to operate in ice, coupled with additional heavy-duty icebreakers, will be built to that end. South Korea´s Samsung Industries corporation is looking into filling the technological gap to make it possible to deliver Arctic natural gas across the Pacific Ocean to East Asia.

A debate on China’s “debt trap” and implications for the Arctic With its January 2018 Arctic policy white paper and the incorporation of the Arctic into its Belt and Road Initiative, a Chinese “Polar Silk Road” outlines the potential construction of airports, railroads, ports, undersea cables as well as the exploitation of the Arctic’s energy and mineral resources.71 China has been willing to invest in foreign nations’ infrastructure projects despite their lack of commercial viability. One example is the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka which has caused much unease and expanded the concept of “debt trap diplomacy” within the international dialogue.72 Even Russia, being the first one to bring up the concept of an Ice Silk Road, remains wary of the mounting investment funds and is seeking to counter-balance Chinese influence by building upon a strategic partnership with India.73 Some analysts hold that the heart of the BRI is debt-trap diplomacy through which China oversells the benefits of infrastructure projects and offers credit for

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them on onerous terms. When the bill comes due and its debtors are unable to pay, China demands control over the infrastructure and influence in the region as compensation.74 The Arctic economic context, in which capital is badly needed to fund basic infrastructure, offers rich targets for influence campaigns, and the division of authorities between federal and indigenous actors may tempt potential disruptors.75 Some commentators argued that China has adopted a “Strategic Buyer” approach towards the Arctic region, as Chinese companies – specifically stateowned enterprises – move to secure increasing share holdings of Western companies, joint ventures and purchasing of natural resources through special partnerships.76 SOEs are not simply seeking new areas of growth and profit, but are under the explicit direction of Beijing forming an important aspect of their resource diplomacy to establish economic dominance as an investor and trading partner in Arctic economies.77 A study by the Center for Naval Analyses shows that Chinese foreign direct investment now accounts for an eye-popping 11.6 percent of Greenland’s economy, as well as nearly 6 percent of Iceland’s GDP.78 Chinese actors have pursued, not always successfully, deals for key harbor real estate in Iceland, Norway and Svalbard in addition to airfields, fiber-optic cables and other strategic minerals.79 In addition, Chinese funds built an aurora observatory in northern Iceland.80 Chinese economic and scientific activity in the Arctic is perceived as profoundly ambiguous.81 The high cost of development means that free markets often fail to deliver capital to the Arctic. As a result, though state-directed, Chinese investment in the Arctic serves to fill an important need. However, for the Arctic state, it is difficult to see China’s growing presence and influence around the Arctic region as a net benefit for their country.82 What is occurring in the Arctic is sometimes perceived as another piece in a larger geopolitical puzzle. From Vanuatu to Venezuela to Oman, debates are raging about the long-term political and security effects of Chinese investment.83 Understanding China’s activities in this region is useful for both improving our understanding of how it exerts power in less conventional ways and developing a framework for responding to these actions to protect the interests of the United States and its allies.84 Investments from China have been met with wary eyes, like in Greenland and Denmark.85 In 2017, two Chinese construction companies applied for a government tender to build three airports. However, their bid to improve the infrastructure network of the island sparked fears in the Danish Parliament of a Chinese takeover.86 In order to prevent Greenland from falling into a potential debt trap, Denmark offered to finance the projects instead.87

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A similar story is ongoing at a newly opened research facility in Kiruna, Sweden. The facility has been put under scrutiny after the Swedish Defense Research Agency, which is an entity of Sweden’s Ministry of Defense, argued that its monitoring capabilities could be abused by the Chinese military.88 In January 2019, China’s first fully owned satellite ground station opened aimed at improving global satellite data reception.89 However, the highly blurred lines between the civilian and military sphere in China’s space efforts mean that potential military applications of its new satellite base cannot be ruled out.90 Some hold that the level of Chinese control over infrastructure in the Arctic should be subject to careful review. Lajeunesse, for instance, suggested that many projects could take on a strategic dimension given the dearth of access points in the Arctic.91 Schultz cited Sri Lanka’s recent handover to China of the port of Hambantota as one example to warn that Chinese-SOE control over strategic assets in Canada would be unacceptable: “Its sale of a 99-year lease to a Chinese company stemmed from Columbo’s failure to cope with its heavy Chinese debt.”92 Some pointed to how Malaysia backed away from similar Chinese investment.93 Daniel Holl of The Epoch Times worries that China is using a similar approach in Canada.94 According to a Canadian Broadcasting Company report, China used a state-run corporation to attempt to purchase a major Canadian construction company.95 Chinese acquisition of the construction company Aecon, which is responsible for several iconic Canadian buildings including the CN Tower, was blocked by the Canadian government.96 However, Chinese state-owned and private companies have acquired Canadian natural resources, real estate, communications and advanced technology. Some Canadian media call this method the “front-door strategy.”97 The United States has been carefully examining China’s investment in the Arctic.98 It is concerned about the Chinese FDI beachhead in Russia, mainly in the Yamal oil and natural gas sector, but also minerals and infrastructure development. Washington is also concerned about Beijing’s activities in Greenland. Chinese firms have “attempted to purchase and invest in infrastructure of military significance, including an abandoned naval base in Gronnedal and three airports” in Greenland.99 The U.S. has taken measures to provide alternative financing for countries who are hesitant to accept Chinese investment.100 The recent passage of the BUILD Act in June 2018 will expand Washington’s ability to fund overseas development projects.101 Development banks also play an important role in providing international funds, with an emerging option for an Arctic Development Bank.102 Even in the case of Russia, there still exists skeptical mindsets and practical obstacles. The so-called China threat and China expansionism rhetoric is still prevalent among some Russian media, scholars and social elites despite the advanced high-level interactions and local cooperation between China and Russia. Some people think that Russia will pay the price in energy, employment or even land for China-Russia cooperation.103 Some even exaggerate or deliberately fabricate the negative impact of China’s participation on the environment,

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soil and water, citing China’s non-adherence to rigorous environmental protection standards and regulations, as well as no respect and consideration of local residents’ interests.104 In addition, local residents, aboriginal organizations and opinion leaders may make an issue not only of environmental conservation standards, labor protections and aboriginal rights and interests in the development of Arctic shipping routes but also in energy and transport infrastructure projects, which may even make the China-Russia relationship another obstacle in Russia’s Far East development.105 While greater economic ties with China raise regional and strategic challenges, Canada has taken some action to minimize these risks while finding other ways to extend further bilateral engagement.106 For example, the Canadian federal government has enacted tough laws on SOEs since one of China’s largest, CNOOC, purchased the Canadian oil company Nexen in 2012. Chinese companies have displayed a willingness to abide by stronger regulations as they look to invest in not only lucrative, but politically stable, countries such as Canada, even among grumblings that regulations are too strict and not clear.107 Furthermore, Canada emphasizes that external actors must respect the indigenous peoples who live in the Arctic. From the Chinese side, its SOEs have started to reshape their corporate image, including ownership and management relations, to ease Western concerns of political interference by Beijing.108 The denial of Chinese investments projects in Iceland and Norway over concerns of possible connections to the Chinese military did not lead to any major repercussions by Beijing.109 This demonstrates the ability of Arctic states to exercise diligence against suspicious Chinese entities and practices without jeopardizing the entire relationship and potential mutual benefits that could be found therein.110

Notes 1 Scott G. Borgerson, “The Great Game Moves North,” Foreign Affairs, March 25, 2009, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/global-commons/2009-03-25/ great-game-moves-north; George Kolisnek, “Canadian Arctic Energy Security,” Journal of Energy Security (December 2008), www.ensec.org/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=172:canadian-arctic-energy-security& catid=90:energysecuritydecember08&Itemid=334. 2 Donald L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science 324, no. 5931 (May 2009): 1177–1178. 3 Philip Budzik, “Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, October 2009, www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp? session=28&docid=741. 4 Budzik, “Arctic Oil.” 5 Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil,” 1178. 6 Budzik, “Arctic Oil.” 7 Barry S. Zellen, “Viewpoint: Cold Front Rising – As Climate ChangeThins Polar Ice, A New Race for Arctic Resources Begins,” Center for Contemporary Conflict, 2011, www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3130. 8 Vsevolod Gunitskiy, “On Thin Ice: Water Rights and Resource Disputes in the Arctic Ocean,” Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2008): 261–262.

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9 United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, “Progress of work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Statement by the Chair” (Statement on the 40th Session of CLCS Prepared for General Distribution, April 2016), https://undocs.org/en/clcs/93. 10 For the details of respective submission by the Arctic coastal states, see website of United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UNDOLAS), www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. 11 Full text at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2008Ilulissat-Declaration.pdf. 12 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council, “Full text: China’s Arctic Policy,” January 26, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_ paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 13 “China and India Account for Half of Global Energy Growth through 2035,” Today in Energy, Energy Information Agency, September 19, 2011, www.eia. gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3130. 14 Sherri Goodman and Elisabeth Freese, “China’s Ready to Cash In on a Melting Arctic,” Foreign Policy, May 1, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/ 01/chinas-ready-to-cash-in-on-a-melting-arctic/. 15 Ibid. 16 Alexander Richter, “Icelandic Orka Energy to Collaborate More Closey With Sinopec on Geothermal Development,” Think Geoenergy, May 9, 2012, www. thinkgeoenergy.com/icelandic-orka-energy-to-collaborate-more-closely-withsinopec-on-geothermal-development/. 17 Andrew Chater, “What Is China’s Interest in the Arctic?” The Polar Connection, October 12, 2016, http://polarconnection.org/china-interest-arctic/. 18 Ibid. 19 Michael Lelyveld, “China’s Arctic Investments Generate Heat,” Radio Free Asia, May 24, 2019, www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/chinasarctic-investments-generate-heat-05242019113856.html. 20 Ibid. 21 Malte Humpert, “Russia’s Northern Sea Route Sees Record Cargo Volume in 2018,” Arctic Today, February 20, 2019, www.arctictoday.com/russiasnorthern-sea-route-sees-record-cargo-volume-in-2018/. 22 Daniel Molenaars, “Chinese Activity in the Arctic,” Global Risk Insights, June 3, 2019, https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/06/chinese-us-arctic/. 23 Chun Zhang, “Zhongguo haiyang guanli mianlin xi pai [China Ocean Management faces reshuffle],” China Dialogue Ocean, April 16, 2018, https:// chinadialogueocean.net/2563-shake-up-for-chinas-ocean-management/?lang= zh-hans. 24 Molenaars, “Chinese Activity in the Arctic.” 25 Sherri Goodman and Marisol Maddox, “China’s Growing Arctic Presence,” Wilson Center Polar Institute, November 19, 2018, www.wilsoncenter.org/ article/chinas-growing-arctic-presence. 26 Scott DiSavino and Sabina Zawadzki, “China LNG Tariff Casts Shadow Over New U.S. Export Terminals,” Reuters, September 18, 2018, www. reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-lng/china-lng-tariff-casts-shadow-overnew-u-s-export-terminals-idUSKCN1LY27T; Goodman and Maddox, “China’s Growing Arctic Presence.” 27 Hsin Hsuan Sun, “China Just Received Its First LNG Shipment to Arrive Directly from the Russian Arctic by Ship,” Arctic Today, July 20, 2018, www.arctictoday. com/china-just-received-first-lng-shipment-arrive-directly-russian-arctic-ship/. 28 Donald Gasper, “China and Russia Want to Develop Arctic Energy Resources Together, and US Disapproval May Not Deter Them,” South China Morning Post, September 12, 2018, www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/asia/ article/2163719/china-and-russia-want-develop-arctic-energy-resources.

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29 Maria Grabar and Vladimir Soldatkin, “Putin Pushes Idea of Russian Gas Supplies to China via Mongolia,” Arctic Today, September 9, 2019, www.arctictoday. com/putin-pushes-idea-of-russian-gas-supplies-to-china-via-mongolia/. 30 Costas Paris, “China, Russia Carriers to Ship Gas on Arctic Route,” The Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/china-russia-carriers-toship-gas-on-arctic-route-11560284812. 31 “Alaska’s Oil & Gas Industry,” Resource Development Council for Alaska (akrdc. org), accessed October 28, 2019, www.akrdc.org/oil-and-gas. 32 “Alaska: Ambler Road EIS,” U.S. Bureau of Land Management, accessed October 28, 2019 www.blm.gov/programs/planning-and-nepa/plans-indevelopment/alaska/AmblerRoadEIS; “DOI-BLM-AK-F030-2016-0008-EIS (Road to Ambler) Documents,” NEPA Register, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, accessed October 28, 2019, https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/ eplanning/planAndProjectSite.do?methodName=dispatchToPatternPage& currentPageId=111130. 33 “DOI-BLM-AK-0000-2018-0004-EIS (Willow Master Development Plan) Documents,” NEPA Register, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, accessed October 28, 2019, https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/eplanning/planAnd ProjectSite.do?methodName=dispatchToPatternPage¤tPageId=161457; “Willow Project Description,” ConocoPhillips Alaska, accessed October 28, 2019, https://static.conocophillips.com/files/resources/willow-fact-sheet-final.pdf. 34 Bill Tarrant and Clarence Fernandez, eds., “Factbox: China-U.S. Commercial Deals Signed during Trump’s China Visit,” Reuters, November 9, 2017, www. reuters.com/article/us-trump-asia-chak-Ingina-deals-factbox/factbox-china-u-scommercial-deals-signed-during-trumps-china-visit-idUSKBN1D90P5?il=0. 35 “601988.SS – Bank of China Ltd Profile,” Reuters, accessed October 28, 2019, www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview/601988.SS; “Welcome ak-Ing. com,” bluehost, accessed October 28, 2019, http://ak-lng.com. 36 Kate Yoder, “Rex Tillerson is Caught in a Love Triangle with Russia and the U.S.,” Grist, February 20, 2018, https://grist.org/briefly/rex-tillerson-iscaught-in-a-love-triangle-with-russia-and-the-u-s/. 37 “Exxon, Citing Sanctions, to Abandon Joint Ventures With Russia’s Rosneft,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, March 1, 2018, www.rferl.org/a/exxonmobil-citing-us-eu-sanctions-to-abandon-joint-ventures-exploration-russianoil-gian-rosneft/29070046.html. 38 Charlie Passut, “Alaska, Chinese Firms Extend Negotiations for LNG Export Project,” Daily GPI, January 4, 2019, www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/ 116974-alaska-chinese-firms-extend-negotiations-for-lng-export-project. 39 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, James Mancom and Frédéric Lasserre, China’s Arctic Ambitions and What they Mean for Canada (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2018), 119. 40 Whitney Lackenbauer, James Manicom, “Canada’s Northern Strategy and East Asian Interests in the Arctic,” in Kimie Hara and Ken Coates eds., East AsiaArctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics (Montreal: McGill–Queen’s Press, 2014), 77–116, 97. 41 Graham Chandler, “Really Stranded Gas,” Up Here Business Blog, June 2008. For more information on this period see Tom Keedy, Quest: Canada’s Search for Arctic Oil (Edmonton: Reidmore Books, 1988). 42 Lackenbauer et al., China’s Arctic Ambitions, 118. 43 Ibid., 119. 44 Ibid. 45 Chris Windeyer, “There and Back Again,” Up Here Business Blog, February 2013, 27.

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46 Lackenbauer et al., China’s Arctic Ambitions, 119. 47 Frédéric Lasserre, China Papers No. 11: China and the Arctic: Threat or Cooperation Potential for Canada? (Toronto: Canadian International Council, June 2010), 7. 48 David Jolly, “Iceland and China Enter a Free Trade Agreement,” The New York Times, April 15, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/business/global/ 16iht-iceland16.html. 49 Charles Digges, “Russian-China Relations are Warming the Arctic,” The Maritime Executive, May 26, 2019, www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/ russian-china-relations-are-warming-the-arctic. 50 Molenaars, “Chinese Activity in the Arctic.” 51 “Naalakkersuisut allerede givet Kina adgang til Kuannersuit? [The government of Greenland already granted China access to Kuannersuit?],” Inuit Ataqatigiit, January 26, 2019, https://ia.gl/google426c9ea506fcddea.html/dk/harnaalakkersuisut-allerede-givet-kina-adgang-til-kuannersuit/. 52 Mingming Shi and Marc Lanteigne, “The (Many) Roles of Greenland in China’s Developing Arctic Policy,” The Diplomat, March 30, 2018, https://thediplomat. com/2018/03/the-many-roles-of-greenland-in-chinas-developing-arcticpolicy/. 53 John Miller, “Ironbark Moves to Financing Stage of Zinc Strategy,” Proactic Investors, January 16, 2018, www.proactiveinvestors.com.au/companies/ news/189993/ironbark-moves-to-financing-stage-of-zinc-strategy-189993. html; Shi and Lanteigne, “The (Many) Roles of Greenland.” 54 Erik Matzen, “Denmark Spurned Chinese Offer for Greenland Base over Security: Sources,” Reuters, April 6, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-chinagreenland-base/denmark-spurned-chinese-offer-for-greenland-base-oversecurity-sources-idUSKBN1782EE. 55 Mary Thompson-Jones, “Why America Should Lose Sleep Over Greenland (Think China),” The National Interest, April 18, 2018, https://nationalinterest. org/feature/why-america-should-lose-sleep-over-greenland-think-china-25447. 56 Office of the Prime Minister, “The Greenland Government Agreement,” Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, accessed October 2, 2019, www.stm. dk/_p_13090.html. 57 Katja Göcke, “The 2008 Referendum on Greenland’s Austonomy and What It Means for Greenland’s Future,” ZaöRV 69 (2009): 103–121, www.zaoerv.de/ 69_2009/69_2009_1_a_103_122.pdf. 58 “Chinese Investment may help Greenland Become Independent from Denmark,” The Economist, May 3, 2018, www.economist.com/europe/2018/05/03/ chinese-investment-may-help-greenland-become-independent-from-denmark; Puncus and Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic.” 59 Puncus and Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic.” 60 Aaron Mehta, “How a Potential Chinese-built Airport in Greenland Could be Risky for a Vital US Air Force Base,” Defense News, September 7, 2018, www. defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/09/07/how-a-potential-chinese-builtairport-in-greenland-could-be-risky-for-a-vital-us-air-force-base/?utm_source= Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ebb%2010.09.18&utm_term= Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief; “Chinese Investment May Help Greenland Become Independent from Denmark,” The Economist, May 3, 2018, www.economist.com/europe/2018/05/03/chinese-investment-may-helpgreenland-become-independent-from-denmark; Matzen, “Denmark Spurned Chinese Offer,” Jichang Lulu, “Greenland: China Discreetly launches Satellite Ground Station Project,” Wordpress, December 14, 2017, https://jichanglulu. wordpress.com/2017/12/14/greenland-satellite/.

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61 Rebecca Puncus and Walter A. Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic: Grappling with China’s Growing Influence,” War on the Rocks, October 24, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/gray-zones-in-a-blue-arctic-grapplingwith-chinas-growing-influence/. 62 Ibid. 63 Shi and Lanteigne, “The (Many) Roles of Greenland”; Maurice Walsh, “‘You Can’t Live in a Museum’: The Battle for Greenland’s Uranium,” The Guardian, January 28, 2017, www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/28/ greenland-narsaq-uranium-mine-dividing-town. 64 Puncus and Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic.” 65 U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System, “A Ten-Year Prioritization of Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic,” Report to the President (Washington D.C., 2016), www.cmts.gov/downloads/NSAR_1.1.2_10-Year_MTS_ Investment_Framework_Final_5_4_16.pdf. 66 “Arctic Charting: Mapping a New Frontier,” U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, June 21, 2016, www.noaa.gov/explainers/arcticcharting-mapping-new-frontier; NOAA Office of Coast Survey, “NOAA Surveys the Unsurveyed, Leading the Way in the U.S. Arctic,” U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, July 20, 2018, www.nauticalcharts. noaa.gov/updates/?p=171043. 67 Helle Hammer, “Insurance for Arctic Sailings,” IUMI Eye Newsletter, September 2018, https://iumi.com/news/iumi-eye-newsletter-september-2018/ insurance-for-arctic-sailings. 68 Charles Emmerson et al., Arctic opening: opportunity and risk in the High North, Chatham House, April 2012, www.lloyds.com/news-and-risk-insight/riskreports/library/natural-environment/arctic-report-2012. 69 Puncus and Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic.” 70 “Sovcomflot Group and China National Petroleum Corporation become Strategic Partners,” Safety Comes First, www.scf-group.ru/en/press_office/press_ releases/item1726.html. 71 Heather A. Conley, “The Implications of U.S. Policy Stagnation toward the Arctic Region,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 3, 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/implications-us-policy-stagnation-toward-arctic-region. 72 Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” The New York Times, June 25, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/ china-sri-lanka-port.html; Goodman and Maddox, “China’s Growing Arctic Presence”; “The Perils of China’s ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy,’” The Economist, September 6, 2018, www.economist.com/asia/2018/09/06/the-perils-of-chinasdebt-trap-diplomacy. 73 Ying, ed., “China, Russia Agree to Jointly Build ‘Ice Silk Road,’” Xinhua, July 4, 2017, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/04/c_136417241.htm; “Putin Urges India to Join Russia’s Energy Projects in Arctic Region,” TASS, October 5, 2018, https://tass.com/economy/1024686. 74 “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy,” The National Review, July 3, 2018, www. nationalreview.com/2018/07/china-belt-and-road-initiative-debt-trapdiplomacy/. 75 Puncus and Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic.” 76 Timothy Curtis Wright, “China’s New Arctic Strategem: The Strategic Buyer’s Approach to the Arctic,” in Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 15, no. 1 (2013): 1–36; RobHuebert, “Canada and China in the Arctic: A Work in Progress,” Polar Commission, Summer 2012, www.polarcom.gc.ca/index.php?page= canada-and-china-in-the-arctic.

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77 Adam MacDonald, “China Looking North: Compromising Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty and Security?” Canadian Military Journal 118, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 8, www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol18/no1/PDF/CMJ181Ep4.pdf. 78 Mark Rosen and Cara Thuringer, “Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security,” Center for Naval Analyses, November 2017, www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2017-U-015944-1Rev.pdf. 79 Andrew Higgins, “A Rare Arctic Land Sale Raises Alarm in Norway,” The Seattle Times, September 27, 2014, www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/a-rare-arcticland-sale-raises-alarm-in-norway/; Andrew Higgins, “Teeing Off at Edge of the Arctic? A Chinese Plan Baffles Iceland,” The New York Times, March 22, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/03/23/world/europe/iceland-baffled-by-chineseplan-for-golf-resort.html; Knut-Eirik Lindblad, “Norwegian Landowner Sells Huge Amount of Land to Chinese Billionaire Huang Nubo,” Nordlys, May 16, 2014 www.nordlys.no/nyheter/norwegian-landowner-sells-huge-amountof-land-to-chinese-billionaire-huang-nubo/s/1-79-7362483; Ting Shi, “10,000 Kilometers of Fiber-Optic Cable Show China’s Interest in Warming Arctic,” Bloomberg, December 13, 2017, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201712-13/undersea-cable-project-shows-china-s-interest-in-warming-arctic. 80 Dorothee Thiesing and Jill Lawless, “China’s Arctic Ambitions take Shape in Remote Iceland Valley,” phys.org, November 16, 2016, https://phys.org/ news/2016-11-china-arctic-ambitions-remote-iceland.html; Puncus and Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic.” 81 Puncus and Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic.” 82 Ibid. 83 Ben Bohane, “South Pacific Nation Shrugs Off Worries on China’s Influence,” The New York Times, June 13, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/world/ asia/vanuatu-china-wharf.html; Alexandre Cornet, “From the ‘Polar Silk Road’ to the Arctic Rimland: A Case Study of the Belt and Road Challenges for the European Union,” IRIS Asia Focus 90, October 2018, www.iris-france. org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Asia-Focus-90-Anglais-1.pdf; Saleh AlShaibany, “Chinese ‘Takeover’ Stokes Unease in Oman Port,” The National, February 28, 2018, www.thenational.ae/world/mena/chinese-takeoverstokes-unease-in-oman-port-1.708802. 84 Puncus and Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic.” 85 Jiang Yang, “China in Greenland: Companies, Governments, and Hidden Intentions?” DIIS Policy Brief, October 26, 2018, www.diis.dk/en/research/ china-in-greenland. 86 Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen and Angus MacSwan, “Greenland Picks Denmark as Airport Project Partner over Beijing,” Reuters, September 10, 2018, www. reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-greenland/greenland-picks-denmark-asairport-project-partner-over-beijing-idUSKCN1LQ2BX. 87 Malvika Singh, “India’s Concerns over the Strengthened China-Maldives Relations,” July 9, 2018, https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/07/indiasconcerns-over-the-strengthened-china-maldives-relations; Gronholt-Pedersen and MacSwan, “Greenland picks Denmark.” 88 Molenaars, “Chinese Activity in the Arctic.” 89 Stephen Chen, “China Launches Its First Fully Owned Overseas Satellite Ground Station Near North Pole,” South China Morning Post, December 16, 2016, www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2055224/chinalaunches-its-first-fully-owned-overseas-satellite. 90 Lorand Laskai, “Civil-Military Fusion and the PLA’s Pursuit of Dominance in Emerging Technologies,” China Brief 18, no. 6 (April 2018), https://

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jamestown.org/program/civil-military-fusion-and-the-plas-pursuit-of-dominancein-emerging-technologies/; Molenaars, “Chinese Activity in the Arctic.” Adam Lajeunesse, “Finding ‘Win-Win’: China’s Arctic Policy and What it Means for Canada,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute SPP Publications 11, no. 33 (December 2018): 3, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3305305. Kai Schultz, “Sri Lanka, Struggling with Debt, Hands a Major Port to China,” The New York Times, December 12, 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/ world/asia/sri-lanka-china-port.html. Isabel van Brugen, “Malaysia Cancels Megaprojects Under China’s OBOR to Save Country From Debt,” The Epoch Times, August 21, 2018, www. theepochtimes.com/malaysia-cancels-megaprojects-under-chinas-obor-to-savecountry-from-debt_2629309.html. Daniel Holl, “China’s Icy Silk Road: Beijing’s Ambitions to Use Arctic Circle for Military and Economic Goals,” The Epoch Times, December 28, 2018, www.theepochtimes.com/chinas-icy-silk-road_2749621.html. “The Dangers of Chinese Investment in Canada – The Weekly,” CBC The Weekly, January 25, 2018, www.cbc.ca/news/theweekly/the-dangers-ofchinese-investment-in-canada-the-weekly-1.4504021. Holl, “China’s Icy Silk Road.” Tara Deschamps, “A History of Foreign Takeovers in Canada,” Toronto.com, February 12, 2018, www.toronto.com/news-story/8130901-a-history-offoreign-takeovers-in-canada/. Rosen and Thuringer, “Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment.” Mark Rosen, “Will China Freeze America Out of the Arctic?” The National Interest, August 14, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-chinafreeze-america-out-arctic-73511. Goodman and Maddox, “China’s Growing Arctic Presence.” U.S. Congress, Senate, BUILD Act of 2019, S. 2463, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in Senate February 27, 2018, www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-bill/2463. Rosen and Thuringer, “Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment.” Zhao Long, “China-Russia Sustainable Development Cooperation in the Arctic: Challenges and Approaches,” China International Studies (English) 115 (November 2018): 130. Ibid. Ibid. MacDonald, “China Looking North,” 8. Dean Beeby, “Chinese Companies Feel Misled by Canada, Report Says,” CBC News, June 7, 2016, http:// www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-mining-ambassador-investors-infrastructure-1.3619228. Wendy Dobson and Paul Evans, “The Future of Canada’s Relationship with China,” Institute for Research on Public Policy, November 2015, 12, https:// irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policy-horizons-2015-11-17.pdf. Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Emerging Arctic Strategies: Economics and Institutions,” University of Iceland, Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, 2014, 15. MacDonald, “China Looking North,” 8.

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Two of the four key principles highlighted in China’s Arctic policy white paper, “understand” and “protect,” underscore China’s concern to improve the capacity and capability of scientific research in the Arctic region. Chinese footprints in the Arctic have been adequately established primarily in the scientific research field, while commerce and multilateral governance are secondary. This reflects China’s goal to create favorable conditions for mankind to better protect, develop and govern the Arctic. China maintains an active polar research program, where it is intensifying research in both the Arctic and Antarctic regions. In 2004, China opened its first Arctic scientific research station Huang He Zhan (Yellow River Station) at Ny-Ålesund in Svalbard, Norway. Furthermore, with Xue Long, the world’s largest non-nuclear icebreaker, China has embarked on several Arctic research expeditions. These activities are part of China’s larger polar scientific research efforts, which have resulted in more than 20 expeditions being sent to the Arctic and Antarctic since 1984. In fact, these research interests began taking serious shape in 1989 with the creation of the Chinese Polar Research Institute (CPRI).1 A year earlier, the Chinese Academy of Sciences had published a new journal, the Chinese Journal of Polar Research, which has been devoted exclusively to Arctic and Antarctic. Up until 2008, most of the Chinese publications related to the Arctic focused on the natural sciences.2 China’s Arctic policy white paper emphasizes China’s determination to both protect the eco-environment of the Arctic and address climate change. Despite its centrality in Chinese research efforts and policy goals, these environmental goals are sometimes overlooked.3 Indeed, Chinese environmental concerns are legitimate and critical. “In most climate models, China’s coastlines will flood in the next century due to the melting of Arctic ice, which will force the relocation of up to 20 million people, not to mention reduce agricultural production.”4 Outside of the Arctic, China has already made tremendous efforts to facilitate early entry into the implementation of the Paris Agreement while also remaining committed to the success of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

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China’s efforts in Arctic research Developments in the 20th century Chinese activities came earlier in the Arctic than in the Antarctic. It is difficult to verify who was the first Chinese person to enter the Arctic Circle. Some scholars awarded this honor to Kang Youwei and his daughter Kang Tongbi, who arrived in the Arctic in 1908, as narrated by Kang Youwei’s diary; however, it is not necessarily accurate to make this judgment based only on this diary. Although it may still be fair to reason that Kang Youwei was the first Chinese political celebrity or famous scholar to reach the Arctic region, there are lots of historical records of additional Chinese expeditions to the Arctic. On the national level, the Chinese government began to get involved in Arctic affairs in 1925, when the administration of the Northern Warlord Tuan Ch’i-jui’s signed the Svalbard Treaty on behalf of China. Expeditions and treaties, like these, were not without relevant publications. In the 20th century, China published several books on the Arctic. Its first polarfocused publication came from the Shanghai Commercial Press, which published a book entitled “两极探险记” (Chinese Pinyin: Liangji Tanxian Ji). This book was translated by the Chinese scholar Liu Hu Ju. The English version of this book, titled Polar Exploration, was written by W.S. Bruce.5 After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the famous Chinese meteorologist Zhu Kezhen jumpstarted China’s interest in the Arctic, arguing that as a large country, China should conduct research on the polar region. He maintained that all people should take a holistic perspective to see the earth on the whole; the formation and evolution of China’s natural environment is part of the Earth’s environment and the existence and evolution of the polar region is therefore closely related to the health of the environment of China. He also suggested that China should dispatch students to other countries to major in polar research.6 In 1964, thanks in part to Zhu’s efforts, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party approved the establishment of the State Oceanic Administration. Among the six missions entrusted to this new agency was “to organize Chinese Arctic and Antarctic expeditions.”7 This was the PRC’s first major political decision concerning the Arctic region. It was not until more than a decade later – in part due to the Cultural Revolution – that in 1977 the State Oceanic Administration’s work became fully restored and began to put forward the objectives of “exploring Chinese seas, marching towards three oceans and landing on the Antarctica.” It is clear that these planning objectives follow the sequence of going from near to far; yet, these original objectives did not include the Arctic Ocean, which is the main reason why China’s explorations in the Arctic came later than those in and around Antarctica. In the 1990s, China began to prepare for Arctic scientific expeditions by sending small groups of scientists and technological managers to Arctic countries to strengthen research cooperation. Some Chinese scientific institutions and civil societies also organized their own Arctic exploration activities. China also

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began to trade with some Arctic countries. Notably massive Arctic expeditions organized by the Chinese government did not begin, however, until the late 20th century. In 1996, China joined the International Arctic Scientific Committee (IASC) as its 16th member state. Then, in July 1998, the State Oceanic Administration organized a delegation of experts and captains to use a Russian nuclear-power icebreaker to inspect the Arctic Ocean routes and the natural environment on the North. It was this expedition that led to China’s Arctic expedition and scientific research being officially launched.8

Civilian activities in the Arctic In 1925, the Chinese government’s signing of the Svalbard Treaty, which allowed citizens of the signatories free access to the Svalbard Islands and the Arctic, officially launched China’s activities in the Arctic. Despite this early agreement, the Chinese government rarely conducted research. This section mainly describes some of the Chinese scientific research activities which were organized by civil societies that were essentially semi-official in nature. In 1951, Gao Shiliu, a Chinese student studying at the University of Toronto, Canada (previously graduating from Wuhan College of Geodesy and Geomatics), joined a group of Canadian scientists who all entered the Arctic Circle to conduct a geomagnetic survey at the Earth’s North Pole (71°N, 96°W). He was the first Chinese scientific scholar to reach the Arctic. On November 12, 1958, Li Nan, a Xinhua News Agency correspondent stationed in Moscow, departed aboard an IL-14 aircraft and arrived in the Arctic after 13,000 kilometers of flight. He conducted interviews at the No.7 floating research station of the Soviet Union (86°380 N, 64°240 W) and traveled to the North Pole. His 1961 book, titled A Record of Arctic Travels described the travels as the first Chinese citizen to reach the North Pole. In 1991, Gao Dengyi, a research fellow with the Institute of Atmospheric Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, accepted the invitation from the University of Bergen, Norway, to participate in an Arctic expedition team, which consisted of scientists from Norway, Russia and Iceland, in order to conduct scientific surveys in Svalbard Islands and the adjacent waters. They carried out atmospheric physics observation for seven consecutive days on the ice floe at 80°10.80 N, 30°0.50 E, where China’s national flag was unfolded for the first time. In 1991, the National Antarctic Research Expedition Committee sent Guo Xiaogang, Zhang Fugang and others to Canada to investigate possible routes for China’s proposed Arctic expedition. Afterwards, a route from Canada’s Resolute Bay to the North Pole was put forward. In the same year, Tao Lina was sent to the U.S. to learn about Arctic expedition management, and Wei Menghua was sent to Barrow, Alaska, for a tour. In 1992, the Second Marine Research Institute of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) joined hands with Kiel University, the University of Bremen and German Polar Institute to conduct a five-year exploration on Arctic marine ecology, studying the Arctic ecosystem structure and the impact of Arctic activity on marine ecology. On April 8, 1993, a

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Hong Kong journalist named Lee Lok-sze became the first Chinese woman to reach the North Pole when she arrived on a Canadian plane and unfolded a Chinese national flag. In 1993, according to the Cooperation Agreement between the Chinese Academy of Science and the North Slope Borough of Alaska on Arctic scientific research, Gao Dengyi, Zhang Qingsong, Zhu Qing and other scientists participated in an international cooperative expedition and carried out research on the atmospheric sciences, geology and biology in Svalbard and Alaska. In 1993, a China Arctic expedition preparatory group was set up by the China Association for Science and Technology; Shen Aimin, Wei Menghua and Dr. Lee Lok-sze were sent from Alaska to the Arctic region for expedition work. From January to February 1994, Zhou Liang, director of the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping, went to the Arctic Lapland region of Finland to conduct investigations on GPS technology. In 1994, from April to May, and then also from August to September, Dr. Zhu Qian from the Institute of Oceanography of the Chinese Academy of Sciences visited Barrow, Alaska, for the investigation of the endangered Arctic right whales. From August to September 1994, research fellow Zhang Qingsong, from the Institute of Geographic Science of Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Dr. Hou Shugui, from Lanzhou Institute of Glaciology and Cryopedology of Chinese Academy of Sciences, bounded for Alaska’s Arctic region to conduct observations on climate and environmental changes as well as an anatomic comparative study of the eyes of large Arctic marine animals. From March to June of 1995, the self-funded Xu Liqun and his wife went to the Arctic for a comparative study of the cultures of the Eskimo and Oroqen ethic groups. In May 1995, led by China Association of Science and Technology, the Chinese Academy of Sciences organized China’s first research expedition to the North Pole. The scientific objective of the expedition aimed at studying the impact and response of the Arctic region to global environmental changes, and the research involved the study of the ocean, snow, ice, atmosphere, paleoenvironment, ecology, remote sensing and geodesy, etc. The team carried out research on four subjects, collected 542 samples in total and obtained tens of thousands of pieces of observation data. This was also the first time that China had obtained firsthand information on the North Pole. In 1995, the Chinese Academy of Sciences dispatched a six-member delegation headed by Qin Dahe (others including Gao Dengyi, Zhang Qingsong, Liu Jian, Liu Xiaohan and Zhao Jinping) to attend the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) conference in the U.S. and to have Chinese scientists apply to join the IASC. In their view, the Chinese Academy of Sciences had engaged in scientific research in the Arctic for more than three years and had relevant scientific papers and works published, therefore meeting the membership requirements of the IASC. Eventually, Chinese scientists were allowed to join IASC in the name of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In 1996, the Chinese State Oceanic Administration sent a delegation, headed by Chen Liqi and Qin Dahe to attend the IASC conference. Since then, China has officially become an IASC member. In 1996, relevant agencies of China participated in the IASC’s Bering Sea Impact Study

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(BESIS) project and the International Arctic Buoy Program (IABP). The National Natural Science Foundation of China provided support to the research projects of the Arctic ice numerical simulation study and the Arctic change study. From August to September of 1997 the National Natural Science Foundation of China sponsored the research team of experts from the Institute of Atmospheric Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences, University of Bergen in Norway and the University Centre in Svalbard. Together, they embarked onboard the Norwegian research vessel, Lance, and used Tethersonde Meteorological Tower (TMT), ultrasonic wind speed temperature meter, radiometer and other technologies to conduct observations on the atmospheric boundary layer structure and turbulent flux in different subsurfaces (floating ice region, open sea and land, etc.) in the Svalbard Islands. In May 1998, Chen Liqi and Wang Yong, from the CAA of State Oceanic Administration, and Yan Qide, from the Polar Research Institute of China, went to the Svalbard Islands (80°N) to investigate the island’s natural environment, visit already established scientific research bases and work on the feasibility of establishing a new research station for conducting international scientific cooperation. From July to August of 1998, a Chinese delegation, headed by Chen Bingxin and consisting of Chen Liqi, Yuan Shaohong and Tao Lina, was dispatched by the SOA, departing from the northern Russian city of Murmansk and sailing onboard the Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker, Sovjetskij Sojuz, via Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land, to the North Pole. The group conducted research on the Arctic sea ice fields, the natural environment of surrounding islands, the Arctic sea route and ice-breaking practices. Their investigation provided a scientific basis for the route selection and implementation plan of China’s first Arctic research expedition. In April 1999, Chen Liqi, Dong Zhaoqian (Polar Research Institute of China), Liu Jian (Research Institute of Resources and Environment, CAS) and Peng Peng from Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) attended the Arctic Science Forum and the IASC annual meeting. At this meeting they announced the plan for China’s first Arctic research expedition. In July 2002, the expedition to the Arctic, organized by the China Association for Scientific Expedition, had once again inspired Chinese people’s new yearning for the Arctic. A temporary expedition station was built in the southern suburb of Longyearbyen on the Svalbard Islands. A comparative study on the ecological environment systems between the Arctic Svalbard Area and the QinghaiTibet plateau was conducted. In August 2002, Dr. Lee Lok-sze, Vice Chairman of the China Association for Scientific Expedition, led a group of 15 from the Hong Kong academic expedition team to the Arctic Svalbard region. The interaction between civil groups and the Chinese government has led to the success of China’s Arctic expeditions. Although China’s Arctic expeditions began later than its Antarctic ones, these expeditions have progressed rapidly and already achieved plenty of fruitful results. As the international situation in the Arctic further develops, and the need of scientific research there increases, the State Oceanic Administration is organizing experts to carry out strategic studies on how to push forward polar research, prepare Arctic scientific expeditions for the

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next five to ten years, conduct investigations on Arctic legislative work and strive to push forward more consistent and in-depth Arctic expeditions and research.

Scientific expeditions Affiliated with the State Oceanic Administration, the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) is the national authority that organizes, coordinates and supervises Chinese Arctic and Antarctic expeditions. The functions of CAA covers the following areas: (1) drawing up the development strategies, principles and policies of Chinese Arctic and Antarctic expeditions, as well as framing the expedition plans and formulating the corresponding laws, regulations and rules concerning polar activities; (2) organizing the examination and verification of major projects on infrastructure and large-scale material equipment for Chinese polar expeditions and being responsible for the implementation and supervision of projects; (3) establishing major polar scientific research projects, formulating the implementation plans of these projects, and supervising the practice as well as managing the data, samples, files and scientific results of polar expeditions; (4) organizing and participating in international affairs and the organizations involved in polar research. The Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) was founded in 1989 and coordinates national polar research. PRIC provides logistics for Chinese National Arctic/ Antarctic Research Expeditions (CHINARE). PRIC is also in charge of running and managing the M/V Xuelong, the Great Wall and Zhongshan Antarctic stations.

The first Chinese scientific expedition to the Arctic In the 1980s, there was a wave of research on “global change”; its core scientific goal was to understand and predict the evolution of the Earth’s environment as a whole.9 Like Antarctica, the Arctic is also a huge and special geographical unit, which has a direct impact on global ocean circulation global climate change. The Arctic has naturally become one of the key areas in scientific research concerning global change. At the same time, because China has a complex and diverse natural environment and is located in the northern hemisphere, environmental changes in the Arctic influence China’s coastlines, bodies of water, climate, ecology and socioeconomic development. Therefore, the Arctic has become an integral area for Chinese geoscientific research. In 1999, with the approval of the State Council, a massive Arctic expedition was officially launched by six Chinese government agencies, including the National Oceanic Administration, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Agriculture, China Meteorological Administration and the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. On July 1, 1999, the Chinese team traveled towards the Arctic aboard the Chinese icebreaker Xuelong. As a member of the IASC, China conducted substantive scientific research, realizing the mission of the State Oceanic Administration to organize Arctic expeditions and kicking off Chinese scientific expedition to the Arctic.

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The first Chinese Arctic scientific expedition researched three topics: the role of the Arctic in global change and its impact on China’s climate, influences of the water mass exchanges between the Arctic and the Pacific on the North Pacific circulation, and influences of the ecosystem and biological resources in the Arctic on fisheries in China. These studies were designed to study the sea-iceair energy exchange processes so as to correctly understand the role of the Arctic in global climate and environmental change and to improve China’s capacity to forecast weather patterns, climate changes and natural disasters. Researchers also studied the hydrology, biology, ecology, sea ice, circulation and other natural factors in order to both ascertain the water mass exchange and material transport modes between the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and find out the influence of the Arctic Ocean and the western Pacific on China’s offshore marine environment. A comprehensive investigation of fishery resources in the Arctic Ocean (and the surrounding high seas) can provide direct guidance for the operation of China’s offshore fishing vessels and provide a strong scientific basis for the sustainable development of fisheries in China. In order to comprehensively research the aforementioned topics, the first Chinese Arctic scientific expedition utilized advanced information and technology, from different participating agencies, including the intelligent voyage ocean monitoring system of the scientific research vessel Xuelong, and conducted a comprehensive observation of the ocean, sea ice, atmosphere and biology. The first Chinese Arctic Research Expedition was made up of 124 people, respectively from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Russia, Japan and South Korea. Mr. Chen Liqi, director of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration of State Oceanic Administration, was the head and chief scientist of the expedition team. The 71-day Arctic expedition took the following route: Shanghai-Japan, Sea-Okhotsk, Sea-Bering, Sea-Chukchi Sea, the Arctic (Canadian Sea Basin), Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea, Bering Sea, northwest Pacific Ocean, Japan Sea, Shanghai. The scientific research vessel Xuelong crossed the Arctic Circle for the first time and the northernmost latitude it reached was 74°580 N.10

The second Chinese scientific expedition to the Arctic China is located in the mid-latitude region of the northern hemisphere, and cold air from the Arctic has a direct correlation with many of its climate disasters, such as snow disasters in the winter, sandstorms in the spring and droughts and flood in the summer. Clearly, changes in the Arctic climate system will have an important effect on China’s environment, with an impact which cannot be underestimated. The Chinese State Oceanic Administration organized its second scientific expedition to the Arctic. The team sailed for 74 days, from July to September of 2003, for 14,188 nautical miles. This team was composed of 96 Chinese professionals from China and 13 foreign professionals from the U.S., Finland, Canada, Japan, South Korea and Russia. Zhang Zhanhai, Director of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration of State Oceanic Administration, was the head and chief scientist of this team. The route was as follows: Shanghai,

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Dalian, Japan Sea, Okhotsk Sea, Bering Sea, Canadian Sea Basin, Chukchi Sea, Canadian Sea Basin, Bering Sea, Japan Sea and Shanghai. In this expedition, the Chinese icebreaker Xuelong crossed the 80°N for the first time, setting a new record in the history of Chinese Arctic expedition. One of the major scientific objectives of China’s second expedition to the Arctic was to thoroughly investigate the impact of Arctic changes on both global climate change and China’s climate environment.11 By covering 3,000 kilometers from south to north and 900 kilometers from east to west, this expedition became the world’s largest Arctic expedition, involving representatives from the most disciplines and the most countries, since 1994. This expedition succeeded in many ways and carried out seven major studies: the mechanism of ocean circulation, water mass exchange and seawater structural variation; the effect of sea ice variation process on sea-air exchange in the Arctic Ocean; the influence of carbon flux of upper ocean and terrigenous material flux on the Arctic Ocean; the interaction between the north Pacific and the Arctic Ocean; the variation of Arctic climate and its influence on China’s climate; the geochemical process and paleo-environment of the arctic marine life; and the interaction between biological processes and physical processes in high-latitude sea zones in the northern hemisphere. This study was supported by the Xuelong ship and supplemented by helicopters, surface operational ships and ice-mobile vehicles. The experts established temporary observation station in the Arctic and used satellite-tracking buoys, subsurface buoys, submersibles, satellite remote sensors and other high-technology equipment to conduct multidisciplinary comprehensive observations in the Bering Sea, Chukchi Sea, Canada Basin and other locations. A large number of valuable data and samples were gathered concerning ocean, ice, snow, atmospheric, biological and geological conditions. The experts used 209 observation stations in the Arctic Ocean and the Bering Sea to gather data on oceanic hydrology, sea ice, atmospheric conditions, marine chemistry, marine biology and marine geology. They used polar satellites with proprietary intellectual property rights to track buoys for gathering continuous observation data for more than two years and used subsurface buoys to gather 40-day data at different depths of the same location. Finally, researchers used China-made robots to gather data on sea ice thickness, under-ice imagery and ocean thermohaline, all of which could not have been gathered before. Although the research zones are roughly similar, the scientific goals of the second expedition were more concrete and in-depth, going from enhancing the macro understanding of the arctic conditions to bolstering awareness of the arctic ocean, sea-ice change and its mechanism. Research methods were more advanced, and the international influence has been greater.

The third Chinese scientific expedition to the Arctic After organizing the 1999 and 2003 Arctic research expeditions, the Chinese government conducted its third Arctic expedition from July 11 to September

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24 of 2008. Compared to previous expeditions, this expedition team use more advanced technologies to conduct more in-depth and comprehensive research. In addition to the 110 Chinese expeditioners, 12 researchers from France and Finland, members of the European IPY project – DAMOCLES – and PAG members of the U.S., Japan and South Korea were also invited to participate. Yuan Shaohong, then deputy CPC secretary of the Polar Research Institute of China, led the expedition. Zhang Haisheng, director of the third Marine Research Institute of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), served as the chief scientist. According to the expedition plan, the icebreaker Xuelong (Snow Dragon) set off from Shanghai and entered the Bering Sea via the Sea of Japan; here, it began to conduct research in the sea areas along the Bering Sea, the Bering Strait, the Chukchi Sea, the Chukchi Strait and the Canada Basin. On September 25, after traveling for 76 days and 12,000 nautical miles, the team returned to Shanghai. The icebreaker set a new record by reaching the northernmost point at 85°250 N, and the onboard helicopter reached even further north at 87°N. China’s third Arctic expedition constituted an important part of the China Program for the fourth International Polar Year (IPY). The objectives of this expedition included (1) expounding Arctic climate variability and its influence on China’s climate; (2) clarifying the marine environment changes in the Arctic Ocean and its ecological and climatic effects; (3) understanding the evolution history of the late-quaternary ancient sea in the Arctic Ocean and the waters in the vicinity, and understanding the constraints of major geological events in the Arctic sea area on regional and even global changes; (4) studying the diversity of deep-sea marine microorganism resources and their genetic resources in the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent waters, and by combining with geological time, illustrating the relationship between the evolution of biodiversity and the change of marine environment. There were two major scientific objectives of this expedition: to conduct further research on the effects of rapid changes in the Arctic on the ocean, sea ice and atmosphere of the region, as well as its impact on China, and to conduct multidisciplinary oceanography, physical oceanography, marine biology, geochemistry, marine geology, geophysics and atmospheric observations in the Bering Sea, the Chukchi Sea and the vast waters and ice zone of the Canada Basin.12

The fourth Chinese scientific expedition to the Arctic China’s fourth Arctic expedition was the second and last important polar exploration activity organized by China during the fourth IPY. From July 1 to September 20 of 2010, the team of 123 sailed 12,600 nautical miles over the span of 82 days. This expedition, which laid out two major objectives, focused on the rapid changes of Arctic sea ice and the response of the marine ecosystem. The first objective was to use observations of the atmosphere, sea ice and ocean to study the causes of rapid sea ice changes and establish a base understanding to predict future trends. The second objective, which was based on both global climate change

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and its effects on Arctic sea ice changes, was to study the Arctic marine ecosystem’s response to the rapid change of sea ice and conduct multidisciplinary comprehensive research of the ecological system by studying the structural and functional changes of marine ecosystem, clarify the regulation methods of this ecosystem and provide a scientific basis for predicting ecological and biological trends.13 Six breakthroughs were achieved during this expedition: first, the Chinese Arctic expedition team reached the North Pole and established a station that was located in a vast area stretching across 2,300 nautical miles from north to south and 1,100 nautical miles from east to west; here, while collecting vast amounts of data and samples to fulfill a wide range of research objectives, the team became the first in the history of China’s Arctic expedition to have worked in vast areas and at high latitudes. Second, researchers completed a 24-hour continuous oceanographic observation at the 3,742-meter depth of the Bering Basin and extended the research station to the deep sea plain at a high latitude of the Arctic Ocean, obtaining from the Alfa Ridge and Makarov Basin data and samples of marine hydrology, marine geochemistry, marine atmospheric science, marine biology and marine geology which filled a want of data in the Arctic expedition region; both of these accomplishments were notable firsts. Third, it was not only the first time that the vertical stratification sampling of marine ecosystem research was conducted at 88°260 N in 3,000-meter deep waters and of which successfully acquired a biological sample of an 18 cm long Arctic cod fish; it was also the first time that, at high latitude of 88°240 N, the columnar sediment samples at 3,997meter deep water were obtained, the longest of which was 4.4 meters. Fourth, and also for the first time, ice buoys and conductivity, temperature and depth (CTD) instruments were deployed in the ice fields at the North Pole, helping with ecological observation conduction, collecting of sea ice and sea water samples, and obtaining a 2.5-meter-long polar ice core. Fifth, the integrated observation submerged buoy system deployed in 2008 (i.e. the polar deep-water long-term submerged buoy system over 1,300 meters long) was successfully recovered. Finally, the icebreaker Xuelong traveled to 88°260 N for its first time.

The most recent Arctic scientific expeditions In 2016, China successfully conducted its seventh Arctic scientific expedition. China initiated various Arctic-based projects regarding climate change, pollution and environmental issues. China built the Arctic UAV remote sensing system and carried out five flights over the Svalbard archipelago. As a member of the International Arctic Science Committee and the Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee, China also actively engaged in international cooperation with research initiatives. In 2015, the Ocean University of China dispatched experts to the sixth Korean Arctic scientific research, as well as worked on data collection in the Nordic Sea with the Institute of Marine Research of Norway. In 2016, China and Russia conducted a joint Arctic scientific research mission. The foundation-stone laying ceremony of the China-Iceland Joint Aurora Observatory (CIAO), a scientific cooperation between Icelandic and Chinese research institutions, was held in

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October 2016 at Kárhóll, Þingeyjarsveit. After establishment, the Observatory will become open to international citizens. After 83 days voyage in the polar region, China’s research ship Xue Long returned to Shanghai on Oct. 9 2017, marking a fruitful ending of the country’s 8th arctic expedition. The country’s 9th Arctic expedition was conducted with its icebreaker Xuelong setting sail from Shanghai July 20 2018. Chinese scientists set off for the 10th Arctic expedition in August 2019 as the oceanographic research ship Xiangyanghong 01 departed from the coastal city of Qingdao in east China’s Shandong Province.14

Establishment of the Arctic expedition station After the first successful Arctic expedition in 1999, the State Oceanic Administration responded to proposals by scientists by initiating consideration for establishing an Arctic expedition station in order to meet China’s need to participate in Arctic affairs The SOA offered support and funding for a group of scientists to visit the Arctic to explore opportunities for international cooperation and joint research. This trip made preliminary preparations for the establishment of the Arctic observation station. In 2001, in the Tenth Five-Year Plan on building greater capacity for China’s polar expedition, a proposal for establishing an Arctic expedition station was submitted. In September 2002, the State Oceanic Administration, in conjunction with relevant State Council departments, conducted a special investigation on the Arctic region’s and compiled the Master Plan on Building Chinese Arctic Expedition Station. The master plan stipulated that an Arctic station would be established at the Svalbard Islands town of Ny-Ålesund, with the main purpose being to carry out perennial and multidisciplinary Arctic region investigation and research on oceanography, atmospherics, space physics, geophysics, biology, ecology, geography, geology and glacier science; it shall be able to accommodate the living and working needs of 20 to 25 people. By drawing on both other country’s similar experiences and working with existing infrastructure, the proposal was mostly successful. In 2003, via the Ministry of Land and Resources, the State Oceanic Administration submitted to the State Council a formal application for establishing a Chinese Arctic station. On July 28, 2004, after State Council approval, the Chinese Yellow River Station was completed and formally began operations. Hu Jintao, then general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and Chinese president, sent a letter of congratulation to the Yellow River Station for its completion and operation. In his letter, President Hu pointed out how polar scientific expedition was an important field for mankind’s exploration of the mysteries of nature and changing conditions of the global environment The completion of the Yellow River Station opened a new chapter in China’s polar scientific expedition. Together with the Antarctic-based Great Wall and Zhongshan Stations, which were both constructed in the 1980s, these three stations have now constituted an important platform for both Chinese polar explorations and foreign scientific exchanges.

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The Yellow River Station is helping to catalyze international Arctic expeditions. Every year, about 30 expeditioners have worked at this station, conducting observations on Arctic GPS satellite tracking, sea ice, Svalbard atmospheric conditions, physical changes to the surface of the Arctic tundra, glacier changes, regional auroras and other climate conditions. The completion and operation of the Yellow River Station marked a new milestone in China’s goals for Arctic expedition, giving China a fixed standpoint for its Arctic exploration and increasing the capability of long-term research ability. The establishment of this station has had profound significance, from both scientific and historical perspectives.

National Arctic research project The 2007–08 International Polar Year (IPY) was a large-scale polar scientific expedition jointly planned and carried out by scientists from around the globe. It was hailed as the “Olympic” event of the international Arctic and Antarctic scientific expedition community. All countries took this opportunity to increase input, organize large-scale expeditions, conduct promotion activities, maximize their respective national rights and interests in these regions, and enhance international consciousness of the polar regions. For historical reasons, China did not participate in the first three IPY activities and lost opportunities for establishing more favorable expedition station locations. This most recent IPY was not only a strategic opportunity for China to pursue its long-term Arctic research and development goals, but also a historic challenge for China to pursue its rights and interests in these regions. Indeed, the State Oceanic Administration attached great importance to the IPY. In June 2004, a preparation committee of 25 scientists and management personnel was set up for the IPY Chinese Polar Year Plan. Six months later, the forum on IPY China Program was held. Only one month later, Chinese scientists submitted a total of 15 scientific projects to the IPY planning committee. In April 2005, the SOA worked together with 13 ministries, commissions and administrations, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to establish the IPY China Commission, which was responsible for the leading and planning of China’s IPY programs and the coordination and communication with the IPY joint commission, foreign countries and international organizations. It also clarified that the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA), an affiliated organ of the SOA, and the Polar Research Institute of China were responsible for the organization and implementation of the IPY China Program. On March 1, 2007, the IPY 2007– 2008 global launch ceremony was held in Paris. At the same time, the launch ceremony of IPY China Program was also held. Zeng Peiyan, a former member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and vice premier of the State Council, was present at the latter ceremony, which marked the beginning of China’s involvement in the fourth IPY. The IPY China program consists of five parts: PANDA (PrydzBay-Amery ice shelf and Dome A transect comprehensive expedition), Arctic Ocean scientific research, international cooperation, information and data sharing, and science popularization and publicity. From 2007 to 2010, in addition to the annual tasks of conducting Antarctic and Arctic research

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expeditions, China also launched its National Arctic Research Project – one of the IPY China program. During this period, Chinese scientists took the lead in conducting, in two summer voyages, joint explorations with other countries in key areas of the Arctic Pacific and Atlantic regions. Meanwhile, they also participated in the voyages of other countries so as to work with other scientists on measuring environmental conditions, to explore the main variations and laws of the Arctic ocean, sea ice, and the atmosphere, and to study the causal relationship between these processes, global and regional climate change, and China.15

International cooperation in Arctic expeditions In fact, the Arctic environment is extremely complex, and it would be difficult to complete research in many relevant areas when relying only on one nation’s capacity; close cooperation between several countries is necessary. China has taken steps to augment Arctic scientific cooperation and governmental dialogue with Arctic and non-Arctic states. So far China has established a cooperative international relationship by carrying out research cooperation and personnel exchanges with the U.S., Norway, South Korea, Japan, Germany, Finland and Russia, in such fields as the Arctic ocean, sea ice, high-altitude atmospheric physics, biology, ecology, and the geological and geophysical science. While it has enjoyed Arctic scientific cooperation with Russia, there has not yet been any formal governmental dialogue between the two countries. Norway has welcomed China’s increased involvement in polar research. The Norwegian Minister of Research and Higher Education, Tora Aasland, attended the signing ceremony in Shanghai of an agreement on cooperation on polar research and said that “Chinese polar researchers are among the best in the world, and we are happy that China is now investing increased efforts in polar research.”16 China’s Arctic expedition has also been open to the outside world. The 1999 expedition included four scientists from Russia, South Korea and Japan; the 2003 expedition included 13 scientists from the U.S., Canada, Japan, South Korea, Finland and Russia; the 2008 expedition witnessed the participation of 11 scientists from the U.S., South Korea, Japan, Finland and France; the 2010 expedition included eight scientists from the U.S., South Korea, Finland, Estonia and France. In these expeditions, scientists from around the globe worked together with Chinese scientists. At the same time, Chinese scientists were also sent to join Arctic expeditions from the U.S., Canada, Germany and other countries. Moreover, some national research institutes and universities, such as Polar Research Institute of China, Wuhan University and the Ocean University of China, conducted extensive scientific cooperation and exchanges and signed cooperation agreements on Arctic research with foreign Arctic research institutes and universities, including the University of Alaska, University of Washington, International Arctic Research Center, Bedford Institute of Oceanography of Canada, Finnish Institute of Marine Research, Polar Science Laboratory of the South Korea Polar Research Institute, Hokkaido University of Japan and Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute of Russia.

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The MAGICS Program (Mass Balance of Arctic Glaciers and Ice Sheets in Relation to the Climate and Sea Level Changes), which was initiated and implemented in 1996 by the Arctic Glaciers Working Group of the IASC, was designed to achieve two major objectives: predicting the Arctic ice volume changes in both the future decades and hundreds of years to come and reconstructing the Holocene climate change in the Arctic. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an ice monitoring system to understand the relations between glaciers and climate change. The establishment of the glacier monitoring system by China in Ny-Ålesund in the Arctic will not only be helpful in conducting comprehensive study on the physical changes of polythermal glaciers in the Svalbard Islands but will also contribute to further understanding of the response of the Svalbard Islands to global climate and environmental changes. In May 2013, China, together with five other states, was granted observer status in the Arctic Council. By December that year, with joint efforts by Nordic and Chinese research institutes, the China-Nordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC) was established and has evolved from a nascent concept to a realized and functioning entity that is to eventually develop into a full-fledged platform for academic exchanges between China and Nordic countries. The initiative and development of CNARC has aroused attention from other Arctic and non-Arctic states, marking a highlight of international cooperation on Arctic issues.17 Structured with an Assembly of Member Institutes, a Director and a Secretariat, CANRC is composed of 11 member institutes, 6 from Nordic states and 5 from China, all leading think-tanks and institutes in Arctic studies in their respective country and endowed with capacities to influence, coordinate and initiate Arctic research in their professional fields.18 Formed by representatives from each member institute, the Assembly convenes annually and operates by consensus. The Director and Secretariat are currently hosted at the Polar Research Institute of China, responsible for the routine operations of CNARC and carrying out advice for development from the Assembly. China-Nordic cooperation, through CNARC include carrying out joint research projects on Arctic climate change, resources, shipping and economy, as well as Arctic policy making and legislation, developing Arctic research networks and frontiers by providing opportunities for Chinese and Nordic scholars to conduct Arctic research through fellowship programs, convening the China-Nordic Arctic Cooperation Symposium and other workshops and facilitating information sharing and cultural exchanges between China and Nordic countries in Arctic context.19

Debate on “science diplomacy” and perceptions of the Arctic states With science and technology becoming a major focus in the field of International Relations,20 “science diplomacy” is often praised for fostering international coordination to respond to global challenges. It often refers to the use of scientific collaborations among nations to address common problems and to build constructive international partnerships. As Haas and Mayer pointed out,

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epistemic communities enable knowledge elites across different fields to determine global problems, shape regional or global policy coordination and aim at long-term scientific problems.21 Chinese scholars, for example, emphasize the role of scientific communities and contribution on scientific research in improving China’s regional policies and for regulating Arctic governance.22 The Arctic is experiencing rapid environmental changes, an increase in transport and shipping, and an advancement of resource extraction technologies, which had been producing an extremely vulnerable and volatile setting.23 Geopolitics sometimes add to regional uncertainties. In this context, scientific cooperation and knowledge production can play an important, stabilizing role.24 China’s Arctic presence has invited suspicion, in part due to the dynamics of global power shifts.25 For instance, observers see the five Chinese Navy ships that were cruising off the coast of Alaska in September 2015 as a signal of extending its naval reach into the Arctic.26 The fact that China, in its 2018 Arctic policy white paper, identifies itself as a “near Arctic state” and “stakeholder” has also raised suspicions.27 Additionally, Beijing’s large new embassy building in Reykjavik, and Chinese investment plans with a mining company in Greenland, have both been described as evidence of China’s expansionist ambition.28 Against the tense geopolitical backdrop, China’s scientific presence in the Arctic is mostly welcomed.29 China’s scientific community has developed substantial global collaborations and networks. In 1996, China joined the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC). Three years later, China organized the first of eight Arctic expeditions. It initiated the Asian Forum for Polar Sciences with Japan and South Korea and established the Yellow River Station. In 2007, China joined the International Polar Year. In 2012, Russia and China established a bilateral annual dialogue, paving the way for similar bilateral dialogues with Canada and the US; all of these dialogues are hosted by universities or research institutions. In the next year, the China Nordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC), a China-led multilateral track-two platform, was initiated and has been connecting scientists, entrepreneurs and politicians from China, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland as well as Russian and U.S. observers. In 2017, China and Iceland opened the new joint Aurora Observatory. In addition to the necessary technological hardware capabilities for polar research, related academic disciplines and institutional frameworks have quickly evolved within China. The vibrant Chinese polar research community includes scholars from natural and social sciences who debate findings in new journals, research centers and conferences.30 In their article on science diplomacy and trust building, Su and Mayer analyze how China’s science efforts have translated into greater levels of trust, which they categorize as the sharing scientific resources, long-term interactions among scientists, reinforcing knowledge-based institutions and spillover effects.31 Chinese scientists are members within most multilateral arrangements, such as the Arctic Observing Network, the International Arctic Science Committee, the University of the Arctic, the Forum of Arctic Research Operators, the International Network for Terrestrial Research and Monitoring in the Arctic, the World

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Meteorological Organization, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, the Pacific Arctic Group, the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists and the International Arctic Social Sciences Association. Indeed, China’s sharing activities in polar science can be traced decades back to the early 1980s, when its polar research was initiated by sending scientists to research programs shared by Australia, Chile and Japan. Another example of the sharing scientific resources is illustrated by China’s sharing its icebreaker and research resources while conducting 31 China Antarctic Research Expeditions and other national Arctic research expeditions;32 not to mention that Chinese scientists have also participated in the Arctic expeditions of many other countries, too.33 Long-term interactions among scientists is important for trust building. For example, Yang Huigen, the director of the Chinese Polar Research, a longstanding national representative of the International Arctic Science Committee (ISAC) and Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), and former leader for the Yellow River Station, is currently the vice president of IASC. His wide-ranging networks and experience in international polar research collaboration were helpful in promoting the establishment of CNARC.34 Another advantage of “science diplomacy” is that most scientists spend their career in one field of expertise, which gives them the opportunity to develop long-term personal relationships – unlike diplomats, who often have to change locations and subject areas in regular three- to four-year terms. Transnational partnerships or networks gradually improve the scientists’ ability to develop new frameworks of corporation, such as the deeper cooperation between the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI), Shanghai Institute International Studies, and Tongji University, as well as the annual bilateral and multilateral dialogues between China and the Arctic states.35 A third category of trust building is achieved by reinforcing knowledge-based institutions. The Chinese presence in the Arctic Council actively supports the key regional organization which bases its deliberations on the assessments of working groups composed of scientists from Arctic and non-Arctic states.36 Though the contribution of Chinese scientists in the working groups of the Arctic Council might arguably be insufficient, the idea of producing objective knowledge collaboratively favors an institutional setting of transparency, openness and trust.37 The last mechanism assumes that collaborative research institutions and scientific exchanges have spillover effects beyond their original realm.38 In SinoNorwegian relations, networks among scientists and institutions kept communication channels open. In the period when the two countries experienced a deep freeze at the diplomatic level, two Norwegian research institutions were accepted as the founding members of CNARC (2013) and the Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee has consistently supported China’s Yellow River station.39 The implied potential of science diplomacy indicates options for rising powers, such as China, to integrate into regional economies while mitigating threat perceptions. However, limitations can exist when science is used as an instrument of power – and challenging its objectivity – which can render science diplomacy

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itself as controversial. Scientists themselves raise concerns with the conceptual term “science diplomacy,” which makes their work appear political, despite that many view it as purely scientific. They hold that the term “science diplomacy” could intensify the political instrumentalization of scientific collaborations. Hence, some avoid the term and refuse to be labeled as “science diplomats” in order to preserve an independent position.40 Correspondingly, as Yang Yu points out, the Chinese literature about expertise in international relations advances the notion of a “group of scientists” or epistemic community instead of “science diplomacy.”41 In a broader context, “science diplomacy” is unlikely to generate sufficient confidence in China’s peaceful intentions in the Arctic. For example, the response of Western media to China’s 2018 Arctic policy white paper shows that the term “polar silk road” is very often cited as evidence of China’s desire for global leadership.42 Further, it is also apparent that China has been developing contracts with the smaller Arctic powers of Denmark and Iceland (and earlier also attempted to do so with Norway) to facilitate collaborations in both Arctic research as well as economic development. With the bigger Arctic powers, such as the U.S. and Russia, China appears to prioritize other, more pressing bilateral issues than those pertaining solely to the Arctic.43 Some of China’s investments, especially on scientific research, have been welcomed by regional actors, for example the China-Iceland Joint Arctic Science Observatory,44 which is fully funded by the Chinese government and originally meant to monitor the northern lights. Both parties have already committed to expanding its activities.45 Despite earlier suspicions (2011) regarding investments by a Chinese billionaire, Iceland’s attitude towards scientific cooperation with China remains neutral, and the Iceland based observatory was inaugurated in October 2018.46 In Greenland, melting glaciers provide new opportunities, not only for the exploration of natural resources, but also for science and research. While environmental concerns have been raised, international cooperation on natural resource extraction could reduce Greenland’s current reliance on Danish subsidies. In other cases, China’s investments are met with suspicion. In Sweden, for example, a newly opened research facility in Kiruna has been put under scrutiny after the Swedish Defense Research Agency, an entity of Sweden’s Ministry of Defense, argued that its monitoring capabilities could be abused by the Chinese military.47 China’s first wholly owned satellite ground station opened48 in January 2019 and is meant to improve global satellite data reception. Yet the highly blurred lines between the civilian and military sphere in China’s space efforts mean that potential military applications of its new satellite base cannot be ruled out.49 It is these concerns that fuel U.S. antagonism towards a growing Chinese presence on the North Pole.50

Opportunities and challenges of China’s Arctic research Today, population explosion, resource depletion, environmental degradation and ecological imbalance all challenge our world. These problems have led to tensions between different nations and tensions between civilization and nature itself.

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Under such circumstances, thanks to the unique and advantageous geographical location, abundant natural resources, interaction with the global climate system and the potential for playing an important role in pushing forward sustainable development and global governance, the status of the polar regions is dramatically rising. Moreover, the changing global climate, and especially its accelerated ablation of Arctic sea ice, has greatly stimulated the demand of the countries concerned for developing and utilizing polar energy and resources. Experts, scholars and politicians from all over the world have set their eyes on the Arctic, and the contest for polar rights and interests and resources intensifies day by day. In the context of the globalization of the world economy, China is regarded as a developing power in the northern hemisphere and is undergoing fast economic growth. In this sense, the Arctic is closely related to China’s potential strategic interests and long-term development. However, Arctic affairs have thus far been primarily dominated by the Arctic countries. Safeguarding the stability of the Arctic region and the rights and interests of China in the Arctic, promoting the development of polar scientific research, utilizing polar resources by peaceful means, protecting the polar environment and establishing a new Arctic international order all encapsulate the major challenges and opportunities faced by China.

International context The purpose of China’s Arctic research is to understand its environment and to develop its economic potential. Scientific expedition and research results constitute an increasingly important basis on which countries claim their national rights and interests in the polar region. With the end of the Cold War and the opening of the Arctic region to the outside world, the competition in Arctic exploration and scientific research has become more intense than ever before. The Arctic countries have invested a lot of capital for carrying out scientific research expeditions to the Arctic and seek expansion of rights and interests in the Arctic. In 2008, Russia’s planting of a national flag on the North Pole seabed during its expedition once again intensified the contest among Arctic countries for rights to the Arctic continental shelf. Considering their traditional interests in the Arctic, Britain, Germany, France, Spain and other European countries are also strengthening their presence in the Arctic by increasing their Arctic expeditions. The European Union has increased its support for scientific research, environmental monitoring and indigenous social development through its “Arctic Dimension” program. Some Asian countries are also actively participating in the Arctic expedition; for instance, Japan, South Korea and India have all set up scientific research stations in the Svalbard Islands. Since the 1990s, Japan has continually invested in scientific expeditions of the Arctic route and Arctic Ocean. The 2009 launch of its newly built icebreaker greatly enhanced South Korea’s polar expedition capabilities. In the face of growing demand, the Arctic countries, which seek to protect their own national interests, have strengthened their jurisdiction on the continental shelf and an exclusive economic zone, set up scientific investigation and research licensing system for those foreign vessels that

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intend to enter the sea areas under their jurisdiction, and actively facilitated the international organizations to pass rules of mandatory regulation on Arctic navigation, which raised the threshold of safety and environmental requirements of those vessels entering the Arctic region. These measures will certainly challenge previous, less regulated freedoms of conducting Arctic scientific expeditions. Despite their recent measures, the post–Cold War period saw the Arctic countries actively promoting cooperation in science, environmental protection and sustainable development and establishing the International Arctic Scientific Committee, the Arctic Council and other important international Arctic collaboration platforms. Norway has established an international scientific expedition village in the Svalbard Islands, and Canada is also actively considering the idea of establishing an international Arctic village. The opening up to scientific and, sometimes, economic interests offer a good opportunity for non-Arctic countries to become more involved in the Arctic region. In 2008, the five Arctic coastal states, namely, the U.S., Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark, announced the Ilulissat Declaration, clarifying to solve the disputes over the Arctic ocean and continental shelf in line with the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, basically excluding the idea of establishing an international Arctic governance mechanism similar to the Antarctic Treaty. However, this does not mean that non-Arctic countries are left out. The Ilulissat Declaration will likely not significantly hinder the international and integrated fields of science, technology, environment and social economy in the development of the Arctic. Indeed, it would be impossible to solve the myriad of complex problems by relying on only a single declaration. In this sense, the declaration could actually provide an opportunity for nonArctic countries to get involved with Arctic affairs. China has significantly increased its strategic research and development in the Arctic with dozens of scientists in Svalbard, Norway, as well as more than 200 scientists dedicated to the mission of the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC).51 The number of China’s ice-breaking research vessel transits continues to increase annually.52 China has also invested in scientists and technology within its oceanographic research enterprise to better understand the undersea domain.53 Outside of research, Beijing has also, for several years, engaged in dialogues with Japan and South Korea on a changing Arctic. Even now, some still skeptically see China’s influence in the Arctic as characterized by a gradual and calculated transition from the scientific to the political, ultimately leading to the construction of legitimacy within polar states.54 Under the trend of economic globalization, international cooperation will provide a wide range of opportunities for the development of science and technology and the realization of polar resources. In the future, whether it is to conduct large-scale, long-period scientific expedition and research projects in the polar region, establish an efficient and convenient logistical support system, settle disputes, promote the development of polar international politics and agreements, or form a more active and effective environmental protection mechanism, the international cooperation will be an indispensable part of the whole Arctic

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system. Confronted with both opportunities and challenges, China now faces a new opportunity to work with cooperative channels within the framework of international laws. China should continue to proactively work with Arctic states and institutions so as to safeguard its rights and interests in the Arctic.

Domestic context China’s official Arctic expeditions started in the 1990s, later than those of other big powers, such as the U.S. and Russia; because of this, there is a considerable gap between the scale, scope and depth of their polar expeditions. The scientific research activities conducted in the Arctic region are mainly concentrated in the scientific research of global environmental change, with only minimal attention being paid to the region’s resource and shipping. Meanwhile, the depth of research concerning global warming’s effects on both the Arctic region and China’s coastlines are far from sufficient. Despite this demand, over the years, China’s Arctic research expeditions have yielded a number of scientific results; however, they lack the integrity and continuity necessary for high-level research results. Chinese polar expedition and research teams are dispersed and often not highly specialized. Due to the lack of stable funding channel for polar science and technology research so far, it has been difficult to attract high-tech talents into the polar expedition causes. It has also been difficult trying to establish a stable, high-level, high-quality group of polar professionals, which is a major goal for future development of polar sciences and technology. Compared with other polar powers, China faces severe challenges in terms of polar activity support and emergency guarantee capabilities. Currently, there is only two polar research icebreaker, and it cannot solely meet Chinese research needs in the Antarctic and Arctic regions simultaneously. The on-site observation techniques are insufficient the high-tech observation instruments (polar satellites, intelligent robot applications) are still in their exploratory stages, the continuity of observations of long-term monitoring projects and core projects is inconsistent, and the business-based observation system has not yet formed. These are the bottlenecks that restrict China’s environmental investigation in the Arctic. China has carried out ten Arctic research expeditions, mainly in the Bering Sea and the Chukchi Sea; the scope of expeditions has been limited. China has not yet carried out resource survey-oriented expeditions in the Arctic region. In the face of abundant polar biological resources, China still lacks relevant research and arrangements on the commercial exploitation and long-term utilization of polar biological resources. Compared with Japan and South Korea, which have already started research on the Arctic route, China still does not have any long-term research plan on the Arctic route, still lacks an understanding of the Arctic route policies of relevant Arctic states and still lacks relevant detailed and reliable data on the sea routes, let alone conducting relevant sea trials. These all have restricted China’s voice and capabilities in international competition and cooperation.

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Despite severe challenges, China’s polar expedition movements and capabilities are still rapidly developing. There are many favorable conditions and opportunities contributing to the polar research work of China. China has joined most of the major international treaties or organizations in the Antarctic and the Arctic, which has laid a foundation for China to play an increasingly important role in the Arctic scientific expedition system. The in-depth development of political multi-polarization and economic globalization, China’s growing economic and technological strength, the increasing importance attached by the Communist Party of China (CPC) central committee and State Council, the support of relevant state departments, and the rise of people’s understanding of the importance of polar research across the country as a whole could be regarded as a powerful spiritual motivation to maintaining the aforementioned developments. Given the continuous increase of the state’s investment in polar region, the accomplishment of capacity building project on polar expedition, the rapid development of the polar expedition, the great improvement in polar expedition support capacity, it is accurate to say that the space for polar activities has been expanded, and China’s capacity in conducting polar activities has been enhanced. The release of the Development Plan of China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan on Polar Expedition and the Plan for Medium- and Long-Term Development of China’s Polar Science have pointed out the direction for China’s polar work until 2025. The implementation of these plans will lay a foundation for China to solve their key problems in polar research and related work. The planning of building a new scientific research icebreaker will help China break the bottleneck of ice-breaking navigation capability in the iced polar region, enhance its ability to conduct extensive and long-term comprehensive surveys on polar marine environments in several key areas of the Antarctic and Arctic Oceans, and provide necessary conditions for carrying out multiple different expedition activities.

Notes 1 Frédérix Lasserre, “La Chine en Arctique ? [China in the Arctic?],” Diploweb.com, October 3, 2013, www.diploweb.com/La-Chine-en-Arctique.html. 2 Ibid. 3 Andrew Chater, “What Is China’s Interest in the Arctic?” The Polar Connection, October 12, 2016, http://polarconnection.org/china-interest-arctic/. 4 Robert Nicholls, Celine Herweijer and Stéphane Hallegatte, Ranking of the World’s Cities Most Exposed to Coastal Flooding Today and in the Future (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007), 5. 5 Wu Heng and Qian Zhihong, Antarctic Expeditions in Contemporary China (in Chinese 当代中国的南极考察事 ) (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1994), 29–30. 6 Zhao Jiandong and Wang Tao, “China’s Arctic Research: A 30 year’s Review ” (in Chinese: 中国极地考察事 30年回眸), China Ocean Newspaper, November 19, 2014, www.oceanol.com/zhuanti/2014zhuanti/jidizhuanti11/ztlm111/201411-19/37805.html.

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7 Zhang Xiaojun and Wu min, “Considerations on the Legal Security of China’s Arctic Safety” (in Chinese: 关于中国北极安全法律保障问题的思考), Liaojing Normal University Press 38, no. 1 (2015): 38–43. 8 Ibid. 9 Liqi Chen et al., chen li qi, deng. bei ji hai yang huan jing yu hai- qi xiang hu zuo yongy an jiu [Research on the Marine Environment and Sea-Air Interaction in the Arctic] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2003). 10 zhong guo shou ci bei ji ke xue kao cha dui. zhong guo shou ci bei ji ke xue kao cha bao gao. [China’s First Arctic Scientific Expedition. China’s First Arctic Scientific Expedition Report] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2000). 11 Zhanhai Zhang, 张占海.中国第二次北极科学考察报告. 北京:海洋出版社 [China’s Second Arctic Scientific Expedition Report] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2004). 12 Huigen Yang, zhong guo ji de di shi ye de yan jiu ti xi [Research System of China’s Polar Scientific Expedition], 2004. 13 Haisheng Zhang, zhong guo di san ci bei ji ke xue kao cha bao gao [China’s Third Arctic Scientific Expedition Report] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2009). 14 Yang Xiaoning, “China’s 2016 Observer Activities Report,” Arctic Council Secretariat (November 2016), http://hdl.handle.net/11374/1860. 15 “IPY zhong guo wei yuan hui. IPY zhong guo xing dong ji hua(gang yao) [IPY China Commission, IPY China Program (Guideline)],” 2006. 16 Mari Solerød, “Norway and China Strengthen Polar Research Cooperation,” Norwegian Research Council, 2010, www.norway.cn/News_and_events/ Education-and-research/Research/Norway-and-China-strengthen-polar-researchcooperation/. 17 Beixi Deng and Jian Yang, “Asian-Arctic Cooperation: A Briefing on the ChinaNordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC),” Arctic Portal, 2014, https:// arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2014/2014-commentaries/95-asianarctic-cooperation-a-briefing-on-the-china-nordic-arctic-research-center-cnarc. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes and Ruth Knoblich (Eds.) The Global Politics of Science and Technology Vol. 1: Approaches, Concepts and Interdisciplinary Conversations (Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2014). 21 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46, no. 1, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (Winter 1992): 1–35. www.jstor.org/stable/2706951? origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1; Maximilian Mayer, “Chaotic Climate Change and Security,” International Political Sociology 6, no. 2 (2014): 165–185. 22 J. Yang and H. Yu, “The Community of Chinese Scientists and the Agenda Setting of Arctic Governance [zhong guo ke xue xue jia qun ti yu bei ji zhi li yi cheng de she ding],” Journal of International Relations 6 (November/December 2014): 37–49. 23 Robin Leichenko and Karen O’Brien, Environmental Change and Globalization: Double Exposures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 24 Rasmus Bertelsen, “Triple-Helix Knowledge-based Sino-Nordic Arctic Relationships for Trust and Sustainable Development,” Advances in Polar Science 27, no. 3 (November 2016): 180–184. 25 Ping Su and Maximillian Meyer, “Science Diplomacy and Trust Building: ‘Science China’ in the Arctic,” Global Policy 9, no. S3 (July 2018), https://onlinelibrary. wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12576. 26 Anne-Marie Brady, China as a Polar Great Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

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27 Linda Jakobson and Jingchao Peng, “China’s Arctic Aspirations,” SIPRI Publications, November, 2012, www.sipri.org/publications/2012/sipri-policy-papers/ chinas-arctic-aspirations. 28 Ping Su and Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Developing Arctic Policies: Myths and Misconceptions,” Journal of China and International Relations 3, no. 1 (2015): 21–25, https://journals.aau.dk/index.php/jcir/article/view/1144. 29 Su and Meyer, “Science China in the Arctic.” 30 Huigen Yang, “Development of China’s Polar Linkages,” Canadian Naval Review 8, no. 3 (Fall 2012), www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/ vol8num3/vol8num3art7.pdf. 31 Su and Meyer, “Science China in the Arctic.” 32 Yang, “Development of China’s Polar Linkages.” 33 J. He and F. Zhang, “cong bei ji guo jia de bei ji zheng ce pou po xi bei ji ke ji fa zhan qu shi [The Development of Arctic Science and Technology Based on the Arctic Policies of Arctic Nations],” Chinese Journal of Polar Research 4 (December 2012): 408–414. 34 Su and Meyer, “Science China in the Arctic.” 35 Ibid. 36 “Working Groups,” Arctic Council, September 10, 2015, www.arctic-council. org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups. 37 Rasmus Bertelsen and Ping Su, “Knowledge-based Institutions in Sino-Arctic Engagement: Lessons for the Belt and Road Initiative,” in Maximilian Mayer, ed., Rethinking the Silk Road (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 147– 160, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5915-5_9. 38 Su and Meyer, “Science China in the Arctic.” 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Yang, “The Community of Chinese Scientists,” 37–49. 42 Su and Meyer, “Science China in the Arctic.” 43 Jingchao Peng and Njord Wegge, “China’s Bilateral Diplomacy in the Arctic,” Polar Geography 38, no. 3 (2015): 233–249, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 1088937X.2015.1086445. 44 Liu Jia, “China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory Inaugurated in Northern Iceland,” Chinese Academy of Sciences, October 22, 2018, http://english.cas.cn/ newsroom/archive/china_archive/cn2018/201810/t20181022_199897.shtml. 45 Melody Schreiber, “A New China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory is Already Expanding Its Focus,” ArcticToday, October 31, 2018, www.arctictoday.com/ new-china-iceland-arctic-science-observatory-already-expanding-focus/. 46 Robert Jackson and Leslie Hook, “Iceland Rejects Chinese Investor’s Land Bid,” Financial Times, November 25, 2011, www.ft.com/content/26b0f8e2-178a11e1-b157-00144feabdc0; “Why is China Pouring Money into the Arctic?” OilPrice.com, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Why-Is-ChinaPouring-Money-Into-The-Arctic.html#. 47 Inuit Ataqatigiit Kattuffiat, “Har Naalakkersuisut allerede givet Kina adgang til Kuannersuit? [Has Naalakkersuisut already given China access to the Kuannersuit?],” INUIT ATAQUATIGIIT, January 26, 2019, https://ia.gl/google426 c9ea506fcddea.html/dk/har-naalakkersuisut-allerede-givet-kina-adgang-tilkuannersuit/; “Why is China Pouring Money?” 48 Stephen Chen, “China Launches its First Fully Owned Overseas Satellite Ground Station Near North Pole,” South China Morning Post, December 16, 2016, www. scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2055224/china-launches-itsfirst-fully-owned-overseas-satellite.

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49 Lorand Laskai, “Civil-Military Fusion and the PLA’s Pursuit of Dominance in Emerging Technologies,” China Brief 18, no. 6 (April 2018), https:// jamestown.org/program/civil-military-fusion-and-the-plas-pursuit-of-dominancein-emerging-technologies/. 50 United States of America, Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress,” May 2, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/ 1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf; “Why is China Pouring Money?” 51 “Polar Research Institute of China About,” University of the Arctic, 2019, www. uarctic.org/member-profiles/non-arctic/8627/polar-research-institute-ofchina. 52 Malte Humpert, “Record Traffic on Northern Sea Route as COSCO Completes Five Transits,” High North News, September 3, 2018, www.highnorthnews.com/ en/record-traffic-northern-sea-route-cosco-completes-five-transits. 53 Sherri Goodman and Marisol Maddox, “China’s Growing Arctic Presence,’ Wilson Center Polar Institute, November 19, 2018, www.wilsoncenter.org/ article/chinas-growing-arctic-presence. 54 Alexandre Cornet, “From the ‘Polar Silk Road’ to the Arctic Rimland: A Case Study of the Belt and Road Challenges for the European Union,” Asia Focus 90 (October 2018): 6, www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ Asia-Focus-90-Anglais-1.pdf.

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China’s approach to international cooperation in the Arctic

While some of the most critical Arctic issues are national, many issues are regional or trans-regional and relate to the environmental impacts of climate change, shipping and resource development. These issues require a more comprehensive understanding of the causes and impacts of both natural variability and humaninduced environmental changes in the Arctic. The areas of international Arctic cooperation are continuously expanding, which is creating enormous potential but also significant challenges. Arctic cooperation – which began in the early 1990s and mostly focused on environmental protection and scientific research – quickly expanded to encompass sustainable development as well.

A review on the international cooperation in the Arctic If taking Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk speech as a dividing line, then international cooperation in the Arctic region can be divided into two phases.

Cooperation during the Cold War The earlier forms of cooperation in the Arctic included international aid, scientific cooperation, denuclearization and demilitarization. During this period of time, limited economic and technical cooperation existed between the Soviet Union and the West.

International aid Humanitarian cooperation was an important part of the earlier cooperation in the Arctic region. Due to the Arctic’s harsh natural environment, our limited understanding of the region, and still developing exploration technology, the risk of Arctic expedition was far greater then than now. A rescue operation in 1928 was the first international joint rescue in the Arctic history. On May 24, 1928, an Italian pilot, Umberto Nobile, steered his newly designed dirigible, Italia, to fly across the North Pole. Unfortunately, the airship crashed on the ice the next day. Six countries dispatched rescue teams involving 18 ships, 22 aircraft and 1,500 personnel. The Soviet Union sent two icebreakers with one aircraft

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aboard each vessel. On July 12, 1928, the U.S.S.R.’s icebreaker Krasin found and rescued the whole crew of the Italian expedition. This joint effort represented a spirit of coordination and cooperation in the polar environment.1

Scientific cooperation (International Polar Year) Scientific cooperation is the core of the international cooperation in the Arctic region. The first International Polar Year (IPY, 1882–1883) set a new precedent for human cooperation in science and technology in the Arctic region.2 The second IPY (1932–1933) expanded upon the first, and relevant scientific activities were conducted.3 In 1946, a total of 15 countries signed the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (the founding document of the International Whaling Commission); thus, the International Whaling Commission was established, marking further cooperation in environmental protection as an important part of international cooperation in the Arctic. This Convention – and several others, including the Fur Seal Convention (1911), the Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean, including Bering Sea (1923), the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (signed by Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Soviet Union and the U.S.) and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Convention Concerning the Conservation Of Migratory Birds and their Environment in 1970s – constituted the basis for Arctic environmental cooperation. The International Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957–1958) ushered in a new era of large-scale scientific expedition in the Arctic. More than 10,000 scientists from 12 countries conducted large-scale, multidisciplinary observation and research in the Arctic and the Antarctic regions. During this period of time, 54 land-based comprehensive observation stations were built along the coast of the Arctic Ocean and numerous floating research stations and unmanned buoy stations were set up in the Arctic Ocean itself. The fourth IPY (2007–2008) was sponsored by the International Council for Science (ICSU) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

Limited bilateral cooperation During the Cold War, bilateral cooperation emerged between some countries. For instance, the Soviet Union conducted a certain extent of cooperation in science, economy and environmental protection with Canada and the Nordic countries. In 1965, Canada’s minister of the Indigenous Affairs and Northern Development visited the Soviet Union upon invitation. In the same year, the National Development Commission of the Soviet Union paid a reciprocal visit to Canada. In 1971, the minister of Canadian Industry, Commerce, and Trade and the chairman of the Soviet Union National Science and Technology Commission both signed the Agreement on Cooperation of Science and Technology. The next year, both countries signed a memorandum of understanding on Scientific Exchanges and Cooperation in the Arctic. Both in 1973 and 1974, the two sides signed minutes of meetings. Ten years later, significant progress was made again when, in 1984 and 1987, both countries recognized the significant importance of science and technological cooperation and signed cooperation

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agreements. On the basis of these, a mature cooperation agreement was then signed in 1990, extending their cooperation fields to encapsulate science and technology, the economy and cultural exchanges. Energy exports used to serve as the Soviet Union’s main source for earning hard currency from the Western world; however, it has lagged behind the Nordic countries (e.g. Norway) in terms of manufacturing large-caliber pipelines, conducting continental shelf surveys and improving upon drilling techniques. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union often collaborated with these Nordic countries, which, as a quasi-member of the Paris-based Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls was limited in its ability to cooperate technologically and economically.

Arctic denuclearization and demilitarization movements After the Second World War, Europe saw a widespread peace movement that centered itself on denuclearization and demilitarization. The Nordic nuclearfree zone was first mentioned in letters to the prime ministers of Norway and Denmark in January 1958 by Bulganin, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet gesture was simply a peace offensive, designed to divide and disrupt the Nordic relationship with the West. When Finish president Kekkonen called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark in 1963, the Soviet Union reacted coolly, with few countries responding in the West. In the mid-1960s, scientists from the United States and the Soviet Union revived the Arctic denuclearization initiative.4 Hanna Newcombe, a political scientist specializing in peace studies in Canada, engaged himself in continuously promoting it. Newcombe’s initiative prompted an echo from the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Subsequently, responses rose from various peacesupporting institutions around the world. The Arctic denuclearization movement gave rise to the demilitarization of the Arctic. In 1977, the People’s Alliance of Iceland made a proposal on forbidding any military activities between the 55th to 70th north latitude, from the east coast of Canada to the Soviet-Finland border. The proposal immediately received a response from the first Inuit Circumpolar Conference in Barrow, Alaska. The resolution on Peaceful and Safe Uses of the Arctic Circumpolar Zone passed at this conference and called for prohibition in the Arctic regarding “any measure of a military nature such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, and the testing of any type of weapon, and/or the disposition of any type of chemical, biological or nuclear waste, and/or other waste.”5 On August 3, 1986, the fourth ICC passed a resolution on Arctic demilitarization, proposing that through various policies and actions, the ICC should continue to promote international cooperation in the Arctic region that is peaceful in nature and remove any motive for militarization of the Arctic.6 The demilitarization movement was also supported by Canadian and Finnish scholars and peace organizations. Franklyn Griffiths, a prominent

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Arctic scholar at the University of Toronto, Canada, proposed the demilitarization of the central Arctic. His proposal aimed at limiting the nuclear submarine activities beneath the Arctic Ocean’s central ice sheet. Canada’s civil anti-nuclear volunteers association called on the government of Canada “to negotiate with the Arctic countries, and establish a circumpolar demilitarized zone north of the 70th north latitude,” within the scope of which the signatories could conduct surveillance and patrolling. The Finland Peace Conference also proposed that “the Arctic should be declared an international zone of peace, a demilitarized and a nuclear-weapons-free zone.”7 However, in the era of serious confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, these proposals lacked practical feasibility.

Turning point of the Arctic cooperation The Arctic denuclearization and demilitarization movements attracted few followers; the root cause of this lied in the lack of mutual confidence between countries involved in the Cold War. No country would be willing to demilitarize itself at the Arctic frontlines. Nevertheless, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had warmed since Gorbachev came to power. On January 1, 1986, then U.S. president Reagan extended his New Year’s greetings to the Soviet Union in a broadcast, and the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev responded by also greeting the American audience. It was the first time that the heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union had exchanged greetings since 1973. At the beginning of 1986, Gorbachev realized that the security of the Soviet Union could only be solved by political means. On October 1, 1987, Gorbachev toured Murmansk, a military town in the northern Soviet Union, and delivered a speech which marked a major turning point of the Arctic politics and the Cold War. Gorbachev believed that Cold War conflicts were actually focused on the Arctic; the world’s nuclear power distribution was around the Arctic, the Arctic was under serious militarization, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was training troops in the Arctic and practicing the use of sea-based and air-based nuclear weapons, on top of strengthening its military presence in Norway and Denmark. Additionally, the U.S. “Star Wars” plan was underway in Greenland, and its cruise missiles were being tested in northern Canada. Even the Canadian government had extensive military deployment in the Arctic. Thus, Gorbachev called for multilateral or bilateral cooperation to turn the Arctic into a peaceful region. Gorbachev’s speech marked a new era of Arctic cooperation. His speech, which proposed the establishment of a joint Arctic Research Council, eventually led to the founding of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC). Other suggestions made in his speech, such as giving attention to the ethic distinction and cultural studies of the Arctic indigenous peoples, became one of the core elements of Arctic research.

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Arctic environmental problems The effects of two centuries of industrialization and nearly half a century of Cold War conflict were deleterious to the Arctic environment, pressuring necessary cooperation on sustainability. In addition to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the environmental problems in the Arctic can be summarized into the following categories: 1 Organic pollution. Organic pollutants converge at the poles, and scientific research has proved that the Arctic has become the most vulnerable area for transboundary pollutants. The level of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in organisms in the region is much higher than in the South Pole. The level of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBS) and organophosphorus in the blood of the Arctic inhabitants is four to six times higher than that in areas south of the Arctic Circle. In 1998, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) released a report on Arctic pollution. This report exerted a strong impact upon the negotiating process for global POPs and heavy metal pollution. The adoption of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants in 2001 was a major advance in protecting the Arctic environment and its population. 2 Petroleum pollution. Because of low temperatures, weak light and wide ice coverage, oil pollution in the Arctic is very difficult to solve. The 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster in Prince William Sound had a devastating effect on the sea life in the Arctic Beaufort Sea. Then, in 2004, a Malaysian freighter encountered engine damage and hit the north coast of Alaska. The hull was split in half by a following storm, resulting in 328,000 gallons of fuel leak; the consequences were also disastrous. 3 Radioactive pollution. From the beginning, the Soviet Union did not prioritize the safety of nuclear waste disposal. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had been secretly dumping radioactive waste from nuclear powered vessels, icebreakers and reactors into the Arctic and the Barents Sea. This waste includes that of nuclear weapon manufacturers in Chelyabinsk, nuclear test sites, numerous nuclear power plants and discarded nuclear reactors from the nuclear-powered submarines. Despite that, in 1975, the Soviet Union had ratified the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (commonly called the “London Convention”), it was not until 1992 that the Soviet Union (later Russia) ceased its dumping activities. Much of Soviet dumping was done in coastal and shallow waters near the continental shelf, converging at the sea area near the 40th north latitude in the Far East in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk and the 70th north latitude in the Barents and Kara seas. Indeed, the Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resource Protection of the Russian Federation issued a report on the status of the environment in 1995, saying that “the greatest danger in recent years is found in the radioactive waste repositories located on the Kola Peninsula.”8

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Today, the Russian Northern and Pacific fleets contain 250 surface and subsurface nuclear-powered vessels and submarines, with about two-thirds berthed in the northern region (with Murmansk as the center). These vessels will generate large quantities of nuclear wastes. Moreover, approximately 160 nuclear submarines have been taken out of service, and 90 of them are berthed in the Kola Peninsula, and 40 of them are waiting for de-fueling in the Pacific ports. The disposal of these de-commissioned nuclear-powered submarines was far beyond the capability of Russian government, and no one knows when the dismantlement could start.7 Although more than three decades has passed since the Chernobyl accident, the memories and lessons of the disaster still apply today. Experts estimate that the amount of nuclear pollutants released from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident is about 8 million to 14 million roentgens, while the nuclear waste pollutant discharged into the Arctic Ocean by the U.S.S.R. accounts for hundreds of millions roentgens. Scientists predict that the vast amount of nuclear waste in the Arctic Ocean will slowly be absorbed by sea creatures and then eventually enter the food chain, eventually reaching its way to human beings. The severe problem also lies in poorly structured administration of nuclear facilities. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) is, in principle, responsible for all nuclear facilities in the country, whereas the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) claims that military nuclear facilities are under its jurisdiction. The lack of administrative distinction has caused some of the nuclear waste facilities to be in an unattended vacuum. Moreover, some of the fund for disposing nuclear waste has been diverted. To completely improve the ecological environment of the Arctic Ocean, all relevant parties must comply with appropriate measures.

Large-scale cooperation Since 1990, the international community has conducted all-around cooperation and formulated some international measures to deal with Arctic radioactive pollution. For example, the International Nuclear Event Scale was released in 1990; the 1991 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) proposed the concept of Safety Culture in 1991; the first Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in 1994; in 1996, heads of state from Russia, the United States, Britain, Japan, Germany and other countries jointly convened at a nuclear safety conference, where the declaration on strengthening nuclear safety cooperation was adopted; in 1997, the IAEA adopted the first Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Given Russia’s inability to handle nuclear waste alone, at the 1999 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit in Cologne, leaders agreed to address these issues by building a broad international partnership on jointly addressing the management of

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radioactive waste originating from Russian military activities, and addressing the decommissioning of Russian nuclear submarines, particularly at sites in the Russian Arctic.9 Other environmental problems in the Arctic include noise pollution, acid pollutants and heavy metal pollution. Noise pollution mainly comes from icebergs, underwater nuclear submarines and surface icebreakers. The non-Arctic industrial pollutants, such as sulfide and nitrogen, flow through the atmosphere, converge over the North Pole, greatly reduce the visibility of the air, and eventually result in seasonal “Arctic haze,” a phenomenon that is particularly severe in spring. The density of the heavy metal content, both in the soil and sea water of the Arctic, is among the highest in the world. By means of food chain spread, those heavy metals are accumulated in populations of animals and people in the Arctic and elsewhere. Since the end of the Cold War, the resource, environmental and sustainable development in the Arctic has become more and more prominent than military development. The Arctic’s rich natural resources, poor development conditions, vulnerable ecological conditions, indigenous peoples’ economic improvement and the region’s impact on global environmental change have all spread past national boundaries and warranted international attention and cooperation. The rise of international cooperation in the Arctic inevitably calls for the establishment of corresponding international organizations. The International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH) was formed by the United States, the Soviet Union and other circumpolar countries on March 19, 1986. Based at the institute of health sciences at the University of Alaska in Anchorage, it aims to promote and support the international cooperation and information exchange on health sciences in the circumpolar region.

International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) During an informal discussion at a meeting of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) on June 20, 1986, scientists from Germany, Finland, France, Japan, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the Soviet Union and Britain jointly drafted and proposed to establish an Arctic non-governmental organization (NGO) as a platform for advancing Arctic scientific expedition and promoting international cooperation. In December 1987, after delivering a speech in Murmansk at the U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan emphasized the significance of cooperation on the Arctic scientific research, encouraged expanding contacts and cooperation on the Arctic issues, and supported the Arctic countries to conduct bilateral or regional international cooperation on issues concerning the Arctic scientific expedition and environmental problems. This summit meeting laid a solid foundation for the establishment of International Arctic Science Committee (IASC). In March 1988, representatives of the eight Arctic countries, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the U.S. and the Soviet Union

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who have territorial land and sea in the Arctic Circle, unanimously agreed to establish the non-governmental IASC. At the Leningrad Conference on Arctic Science, held during December 12 to 15, 1988, relevant articles were drafted to set up IASC. On August 23, 1990, the International Association of Arctic Social Sciences (IAASA) was established and pushed forward the negotiating process of the founding of IASC. On August 28, 1990, representatives from the eight Arctic countries signed the Founding Articles of IASC (also called Treaty of Eight Countries) at Resolute Bay, Canada. A unified effective non-governmental international organization on science was thus founded. Being an NGO in nature, the Founding Articles explicitly stipulate that only representatives of national scientific organizations of the Arctic countries are qualified to join this committee on behalf of their respective country. Although nations priorities affect IASC, it is a scientific organization and expresses some desire for various governments to downplay the economic, military and political interplay that may inhibit pure, scientific research. The IASC promotes Arctic research, exchanges and coordination. It is also open to non-Arctic countries that wish to engage in significant Arctic scientific research. In January 1991, the first meeting of IASC was held in Oslo, Norway, and included new representatives from France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland and Britain. Then in 1996, a Chinese delegation became a member of IASC and sent a representative to its meeting. Despite the short history of IASC, its operations are fairly effective. On the basis of the principle of “peace, science, cooperation,” the IASC is actively coordinating and providing instructions on Arctic expedition activities; organizing international cooperation programs; and conducting timely and effective protection for the marine life, mineral resource, energy and environment of the Arctic (through “conventions,” “agreed measures” and “resolutions”). This committee provides scientists from different countries and regions a platform for cooperative activities and an opportunity for expressing opinions.

Arctic Council During September 20 to 26, 1989, based on the initiative of the government of Finland, officials from the eight Arctic countries convened for the first Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, discussing Arctic environment protection through international cooperation. This meeting helped to promote the establishment of the Arctic Council. The first step of establishing the Arctic Council (also mentioned here as “the Council”) was the signing of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) by the eight Arctic countries in 1991. The implementation of the Strategy is regarded as a prelude to the 1996 Ottawa Declaration. Thanks, in part, to the Finish government’s active role on the matter, on June 14, 1991, the eight Arctic countries signed the Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment in Rovaniemi, Finland. The signing of the Rovaniemi Declaration led to one of the series of acts on protecting the Arctic region – the

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Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). According to this strategy, the pollution problems of today do not respect national boundaries and no state alone will be able to act effectively against environmental threats to the Arctic; further cooperation is essential for increasing the protection of the Arctic environment. AEPS also sought to not only provide an adequate mechanism for the exchange of information on various sources of Arctic pollution data but to also provide a platform to consider further measures to control pollutants and reduce their adverse effects to the Arctic environment. The implementation of the AEPS gave impetus to the formation of interregional governmental organizations of the Arctic. On September 16, 1996, the eight Arctic nations convened at Ottawa, Canada. At this meeting, the Arctic Council was founded and the activities of AEPS were absorbed into the Council. The Arctic Council has six working groups: the Sustainable Development Working Group, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (CAFF) and the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group (EPPR). The biennially Ministerial Meeting is the decision-making body of the Council. The Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Meeting is the executing body of the council, held twice a year. The Chairmanship of the Arctic Council rotates every two years among the Arctic countries. In 2007, China and Italy were accepted as special observers to attend meetings. In addition, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Britain, IASC, IUCH, the Northern Forum, the Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program (WWF) are all observers of the Arctic Council. The scope of the Arctic Council’s mission is broader than that of the AEPS, and it provides for a much more extensive space for promoting cooperation, coordination, interaction among the Arctic countries (including the Arctic indigenous community and other inhabitants), and particularly on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection. Besides the eight Arctic countries, the Council also provides opportunities for indigenous peoples, who are granted status as Permanent Participants, to get involved in Arctic affairs. The Permanent Participants have full consultation rights in connection with the Council’s negotiations and decisions. The Arctic Council is the largest and, generally speaking, the most effective Arctic international organization. On May 18, 2007, with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese delegation (consisting of members from the Chinese embassy in Norway and the Polar Affairs Office of the State Oceanic Administration) attended, as a special observer, the SAO Meeting in Tromso, Norway. This was the first time that China participated in Arctic Council activities. During November 28 to 29, 2007, the SAO meeting was held in Narvik, Norway. The Chinese delegation, represented by delegates

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from China’s Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Oceanic Administration, all attended the meeting for the second time. In 2002, the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting required the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) to coordinate the work of assessing oil and gas in the Arctic. The objective of the assessment was to present a holistic assessment of the environmental, social, health and economic conditions of current oil and gas activities in the Arctic. This assessment report provided reliable information for decision-makers of various states and was good for the proper management of the future Arctic oil and gas development activities. Between 2004 and 2007, experts from the Arctic countries worked together with those from indigenous peoples’ organizations, private industry and other countries and all participated in the preparation of the scientific assessment of oil and gas in the Arctic. The outcome of their work was published in a fully referenced technical report during the spring of 2008. This report was built around five substantive chapters: oil and gas industry activities, socioeconomic impacts, input and fate of hydrocarbons in the environment, toxicity and organism-level impacts (including impacts on human health) and ecosystem-level impacts.10 In 2004, the Arctic Council drafted the “Arctic Marine Strategic Plan” and the “Arctic Climate Impact Assessment” (ACIA), both of which attracted global attention. The ACIA is the first comprehensively researched, fully referenced, and independently reviewed evaluation of Arctic climate change and its impacts on the world. It was the fruits of several hundred scientists’ hard work over a span of four years.

Conference of parliamentarians of the Arctic region The Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region is a conference for parliamentarians representing the eight Arctic countries and the European Parliament. The first Conference of Parliamentarians was held in Reykjavik, Iceland in 1993. The Arctic indigenous peoples were permanent participants, and other observers were included. The Conference of Parliamentarians is held biennially. The 13th Arctic Parliamentary Conference was held in Inari, Finland, September 16th to 19th 2018. The Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), which started its activities in 1994, is responsible for the work between conferences and aims to promote cooperation in the Arctic. The Standing Committee has played an active role in supporting the establishment of the Arctic Council. Since the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996, the Committee has worked actively to support the Council and is also an important observer of the Council. Meanwhile, the Committee is also an important partner of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. The Committee holds three meetings each year. At the 7th Conference, the SCPAR was asked to prepare a discussion on the possibilities of a unified legal system for the Arctic. The SCPAR consequently asked the Fridjtof Nansen Institute to conduct research on the subject.

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Northern forum In November of 1991, delegates from 24 regional governmental and commercial organizations from ten northern countries convened in the small city of Anchorage, Alaska, to discuss issues of common concern about politics, the environment and the global economy. At this conference, the Northern Forum was formally established, with the secretariat set in Anchorage. The Forum’s mission is “to improve the quality of life of Northern peoples by using leadership networking to tackle common problems; and to support sustainable development and cooperative socio-economic initiatives in Northern region and on the international stage.” The Northern Forum is active in communications with other institutions and organizations of the Northern region and is playing an increasingly greater role internationally. Its key members include northern provincial and regional governments from Canada, Finland, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Norway, the People’s Republic of China, Sweden, the U.S. and the Russian Federation. Russia sends the greatest number of delegates. The Regional Coordinators Committee of the Northern Forum is composed of governors and prime ministers of its regional members. Sometimes, presidents may join in, too. The Committee is responsible for policy guidance; half of its members are from Russia. The provincial government of Heilongjiang participates in this Forum on behalf of China. The history of the Northern Forum can be traced back to the inaugural conferences held in 1974 and in 1979 in Sapporo, Japan. In 1979, the conference was held in Edmonton, Canada; in 1990, it was held in Anchorage, Alaska. The conference in Anchorage saw more than 600 participants who all agreed to the establishment of a permanent, regional organization named the Northern Forum. In 1991, the Northern Forum founding meeting was held in Anchorage; in 1992, the Secretariat was set up. After that, the Northern Forum meetings were held biennially. When the Arctic Council was founded in 1996, the Northern Forum was absorbed as an important observer.

Barents Euro-Arctic Council Another important regional Arctic cooperative organization is the Barents EuroArctic Council (BEAC). In January of 1993, thanks to the proposal of the Norwegian government, the BEAC was established in the northern city of Kirkenes, Norway, in order to improve the long-lasting east-west confrontation situation in the Barents region and enhance understanding and cooperation; the Kirkenes Declaration was subsequently released. Its members include the Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Finland and Sweden), Russia and the Commission of European Communities. The United States, Canada, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Japan participate in the cooperation as observers. The mission of the Council is to provide impetus to the existing cooperation in economic development, environmental protection and science and technology improvement in the Barents Region, as well as to provide support to Russia’s reform process.

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On January 11, 2003, the Barents Euro-Arctic Summit Meeting of Prime Ministers was held in Kirkenes, Norway, to mark the tenth Anniversary of Barents cooperation. At this meeting, a Declaration was released, stating that all countries concerned had reached an agreement on the cleanup and maintenance of Russian nuclear waste and obsolete military facilities along the coast of Barents. With multilateral consultations and negotiations, the heads of governments of the Nordic countries and Russia finally reached agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation, which was formally signed within the year in Sweden. According to this agreement, the Nordic countries would provide expert and technical guidance to the scientific storage of nuclear facilities, technical equipment and other assistance in the Russian Barents sea area. That paved the way for Russia to clean up the nuclear waste in the Kola Peninsula for the next ten years and also facilitated Russia’s access to Western aid. Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov said that the Russian government would invest hundreds of millions of dollars in related nuclear security projects in the future, and would impose tax exemptions on related technologies and equipment imports.

Non-government organizations and the Arctic region The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War also created opportunities for other Arctic forces, particularly the NGOs. For example, the rightsprotection awareness of the indigenous peoples in the circumpolar region was awakened as the Cold War came to an end. At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the calls from the interest group consisting of the Arctic indigenous peoples shocked the world. Thus, it is quite necessary to speak separately about the impact of the Inuit on Arctic politics. In 1977, the first Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) was held in Barrow, Alaska. The conference not only reaffirmed the status of the Arctic indigenous peoples among the nations of the world, but more importantly, indigenous representatives from other parts of the world were also invited. In this sense, the significance of the conference was far beyond the Arctic. For the first time, the conference proposed the concept of the “fourth world,” which included all indigenous peoples of the world. It turned out that the voices of the Inuit, as a unique political force, could not be ignored, especially in regards to Arctic affairs. Other NGOs, including various environmental organizations, such as National Audubon Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace, Nature Resources Defense Council and World Wide Fund for Nature, all turned their attention to the Arctic. These organizations have their own “territories.” For instance, the National Audubon Society attaches its attention on the Bering Strait and the area extending from Siberia, the Bering Sea and Alaska to the Yukon Territory of Canada. The priority of the Environmental Defense Fund’s objective aims to monitor air and water pollution in the Arctic and investigate the effects of these pollutants on Arctic creatures. Greenpeace focuses on Russia’s Arctic region because of the radioactive pollutants released by nuclear tests in Severnaya Zemlya, the disposal of the radioactive waste and abandoned nuclear reactors in

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Barents and Kara seas and the radioactive pollutants flowing into the Arctic Ocean through the Ob River and Yenisei River.11 In short, the presence of these environmental protection organizations in the Arctic plays an important role in the transnational and trans-regional cooperation in this region.

Arctic in a global treaty system On June 16, 1972, the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, which was adopted in Stockholm, indicated that the international community had begun to understand the relationship between development and the environment. Since the Arctic environmental concerns are also part of global environmental problems, such as climate change and ozone depletion, the global institutional arrangements targeted at those problems are often adapted to the Arctic. This may include the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances and the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Article 234 of the UNCLOS makes special stipulations on the ice-covered areas, including those of the Arctic: Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. In particular, although the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution of UNECE does not mention the Arctic in the text, the subsequent three protocols give special attention to the Arctic. The preface of the 1994 Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions states that the parties are “mindful that measures to control emissions of sulphur and other air pollutants would also contribute to the protection of the sensitive Arctic environment.” The 1998 Protocol on Heavy Metals mentions specially the Arctic in its preface: “Mindful that measures to control emissions of heavy metals would also contribute to the protection of the environment and human health in areas including the Arctic and international waters.” The 1998 Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants attached special attention to the Arctic by acknowledging that “the Arctic ecosystems and especially its indigenous people, who subsist on Arctic fish and mammals, are particularly at risk because of the biomagnification of persistent organic pollutants.” The 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants uses similar phrases in its preface by “acknowledging that the Arctic ecosystems and indigenous communities are particularly at risk because of the biomagnification of persistent organic pollutants

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and that contamination of their traditional foods is a public health issue.” As of 1995, there were 34 bilateral agreements giving considerations on the Arctic environmental protection, five of which were about the conservation of wildlife, 11 of which were about notification and cooperation on the occurrence of nuclear accidents, and seven of which were about scientific cooperation and border agreements.12

Challenges to Arctic cooperation Despite the increased interest in Arctic cooperation following Gorbachev’s aforementioned speech in Murmansk, Arctic cooperation, which lacks a unified legal and management system, still does not compare to the level of cooperation in the Antarctic region. The Arctic was split into two parts of serious confrontation by the Cold War and became a frontier of their contest. Under those circumstances, there was practically no international cooperation at all. After the Cold War, although the international community and the circumpolar countries conducted a series of joint efforts to protect and improve the Arctic environment, these efforts still have a long way to go. The following factors might hinder the further development of the Arctic cooperation.

Environmental issues subject to national security During the Cold War, the Arctic was a strategically important region for great powers to contend for; after that, and especially in recent years, the contest between great powers has not been weakening. The No. 198 Resolution passed by Russian government in March 2000 introduced a blueprint to support the economy and social development of the Russian Arctic Region and outlined specific missions on advancing both the social economic development and strengthening ecological protection. In early October 2004, the Canadian government proposed the Northern Strategy, aiming to vigorously develop local economies, consolidate national defense and effectively defend national sovereignty. In September 2004, after the establishment of the Red-Green three-party coalition of government in Norway, the Northern Region Policy was introduced and given top foreign policy priority. After Russia planted its flag on the seabed at the North Pole in 2007, the Arctic dispute once again became one of the world’s hot spots. Circumpolar countries started to conduct military exercises and construct military facilities, making Arctic cooperation even harder. Since the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Defense has allocated special yearly funds for Arctic research. The United States claimed that any affairs relating to the Arctic Ocean were trilateral, rather than bilateral. It also intervened in the territorial disputes between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea. Although the U.S. Arctic Policy Review released in the middle of 1994 listed environmental protection on the top of its agenda, freedom of navigation in Arctic waters was still in the U.S. Navy’s strategic interests, particularly in regard to submarines. In January 2005, the U.S. Department of State believed that the importance of

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the Arctic would be on the rise because of climate warming, and it would lead to policy adjustments by the U.S. and other countries in the development of energy, fishery and other resources, as well as the opening up of new sea lanes and expanding territory. The Arctic policy of each country aims to develop its Arctic region and enhance its presence. Although different from the Cold War confrontation mentality, new policies still aim at achieving favorable results in future fights for Arctic territory and resource. Therefore, when considering its activity in the Arctic, some countries focus on the strategic and national security implications, while such issues of traditional “Low Politics” (e.g. environmental protection) often occupy a subordinate position. For example, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) has insufficient pollution information. Many national agencies are unwilling to provide necessary raw data due to security reasons, and those that do not completely ignore requests for data often only supply data that is already publicly available. Although the provision of data is a responsibility listed in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, it is difficult to fully implement.

Northern “peripheral area” subordinate to southern “central area” Excluding the high seas, the Arctic region is under the respective sovereign jurisdiction of the Arctic countries. These areas are basically the northern frontier of each country, and the regional governance and development is subordinated to their southern central area. Apart from Iceland, other Arctic countries’ economic and political centers are all located south of the Arctic Circle. Whereas Alaska is subject to Washington D.C., other Arctic regions are all subject to jurisdiction from Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki and Stockholm. The issue concerning the Arctic is mostly a “marginal” one about domestic politics and economy. This peripheral-central relationship has resulted in limited government attention to the Arctic environment. Moreover, the cooperation activities focusing on environmental issues, and even the operation of the Arctic Council Secretariat, rely on the voluntary contributions of participating countries. Additionally, since it has no fixed financial budget, the amount and sustainability of funds cannot be guaranteed, which greatly limits its ability to carry out environmental projects.13

Lack of implementation guarantee mechanism for “soft law” At present, Arctic cooperation has mainly been limited to nonbinding “soft law” instruments like declarations, programs, and plans, rather than conventions or treaties. There is, therefore, no clear commitment and response timetable regarding environmental problems. Most Arctic institutions have limited functions and the Secretariat of the Arctic Council has no executive power.14 The Arctic management system lacks

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adjustment function and decision-making capabilities.15 The Ottawa Declaration provides that the Arctic Council is a “high level forum” designed to provide a means for “promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic countries” through regular consultations among the governments. The Arctic Council does not, and should not, deal with matters related to military security. The use of the term “peoples” in this Declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regard to the rights which may be attached to the term under international law.16 The Arctic Council has no unified Secretariat and all decisions must be made through unanimous consensus. It is simply a high-level forum aimed at “promoting cooperation among the Arctic countries on common Arctic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.” The status of the Arctic Council is similar to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), or the Group of 77 (G-77). The establishment of the Arctic Council as a forum without a legal body was an intention of the United States.17 For example, the United States’ intention was obvious when the Arctic Council was dealing with the dispute over marine mammals. The United States insisted that the protection of marine mammals by the Arctic Council should not conflict with the Marine Mammal Protection Act of the United States, which, enacted in 1972, was much looser on the taking and importation of marine mammals, with many exceptions imposed. For instance, it would not go against the act if a mammal is not pregnant, nursing, or not less than eight months old. Besides, Alaskan natives enjoy more exemptions if such taking is done manually and not in a wasteful manner.18 Washington held that this issue should be negotiated by the International Whaling Commission and the World Trade Organization and was beyond the administration of the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council, the largest intergovernmental organization in the Arctic, has neither decision-making power nor organizing ability. Moreover, the Council neither has the control over Arctic resources nor has the rights to bind its members. The Council is funded by contributions from member states. In general, member states will burden themselves a little more if taking chairmanship or contribute funds to a single program that addressed their own concerns. For example, Norway bears the costs of the AMAP working group, Iceland pays for PAME, America and Iceland share expenditures of the CAFF and Denmark pays most of its expenses for Copenhagen’s Council of Indigenous Peoples. International cooperation should be further strengthened in response to environmental problems in the Arctic region. First, the eight Arctic countries should strengthen cooperation on the basis of the existing international environmental governance mechanisms. Faced with increasingly urgent environmental problems, the countries concerned, especially the big powers, should abandon the “Cold War mentality” and prioritize environmental protection. Second, efforts should be taken to strengthen cooperation with the international community outside of the Arctic Circle. The fundamental causes of some environmental issues in the Arctic region do not only lie in the circumpolar countries, and so the

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involvement of countries outside the Arctic Circle is necessary, especially when it comes to the air pollution problem. The Arctic countries are now aware of the transboundary problem of today’s air pollution, and cooperation with countries outside the Arctic should be further strengthened in order to better meet the challenges of the Arctic environment. In addition, the current environmental cooperation in the Arctic region is mostly decentralized and issue based. Should a comprehensive and legally binding treaty on the protection of the Arctic environment be agreed upon, the status of environmental issues would further ascend on each state’s agenda, so as to better protect the Arctic environment and expand coordination in the course of environmental protection.

China’s approaches to cooperation in the Arctic Policy The gradual disappearance of Arctic sea ice raises challenges to sovereignty and security issues, some of which are increasingly evident in the evolving relationships between the eight Arctic states and non-Arctic states, such as China, Japan, South Korea and India. In the same vein, there is a strong and practical need to strengthen international cooperation on Arctic matters, especially in the face of growing global attention on melting Arctic sea ice. Cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states has continued to develop on a number of levels, either bilaterally or within the existing frameworks of regional forums and international organizations, and on issues of scientific research, environmental protection and sustainable development. At the third Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, Iceland, in 2015, Zhang Ming, China’s vice minister of foreign affairs, delivered a keynote speech titled “China in the Arctic: Practices and Policies.”19 The following year, Gao Feng, China’s chief negotiator for climate change, gave another speech about China’s view on Arctic cooperation at the fourth Arctic Circle Assembly.20 Furthermore, Xu Hong, head of the Department of Legal Affairs in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, talked about China’s view on Arctic economic development at the sixth International Meeting of Representatives of Arctic Council Member States, Observer States, and Foreign Scientific Community, which was hosted by the Russian Federation between August 29 and September 2 of 2016.21 These speeches, which often focus on “cooperation,” display an emerging Chinese Arctic policy that is well reflected in the China Arctic policy white paper. Recognizing and respecting each other’s rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. In accordance with the UNCLOS and other relevant international legal frameworks, Arctic states have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the Arctic region, while non-Arctic states also enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. In order to develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and non-Arctic states should, first and foremost, proceed from the basis of recognizing and respecting each other’s rights under international law.

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Second, mutual understanding and trust provide a political guarantee for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. Arctic states, with a larger stake in Arctic-related issues, argue that they should play a more important role in Arctic affairs than non-Arctic countries. In the meantime, given the transregional implications of certain Arctic issues, non-Arctic states that fall under such influence also argue that they have legitimate interests in Arctic-related issues. With their interests intertwined, there is no doubt that both Arctic and non-Arctic states will play increasingly significant roles in Arctic affairs. To enhance cooperation, Arctic and non-Arctic states should, on the basis of respecting each other’s rights, strengthen their communication, improve mutual understanding, foster trust and seek areas of converging interests. Third, addressing trans-regional issues through joint research endeavors represents a major field of cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. Enhanced cooperation in scientific research will enable Arctic and non-Arctic states to view trans-regional issues from a wider perspective, send a more comprehensive message to the international scientific community and facilitate the settlement of relevant issues. This model of cooperation has already yielded sound results in addressing issues such as climate change and Arctic shipping. The issue for Arctic Council members now is how to involve non-Arctic states at the early stages of relevant research endeavors and in-depth discussions. Arctic and non-Arctic states have different rights, interests and specific concerns with regards to Arctic-related issues. However, peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic serves the common interests of both Arctic and nonArctic states. It is crucial for the Arctic and non-Arctic states to intersect and share these different rights, interests and concerns. Mutually beneficial cooperative partnerships which promote and enhance these interests will surely be the most appropriate way forward in a region of growing global importance. For instance, Arctic resources require enormous foreign investment to develop; China, which is flush with capital, is well positioned to facilitate this investment. In turn, Chinese leaders hope that Arctic states will be inclined to back Chinese interests in the region. China’s strategy of scientific diplomacy, participation in Arctic institutions and resource diplomacy has proved fairly successful, enabling the PRC to acquire peacefully a (limited) say in Arctic affairs.22 China is acquiring various technologies that are essential for building upon new economic opportunities in the Arctic. China is building ice-strengthened bulk carriers and tankers capable of commercial Arctic navigation as well as planes that can fly in harsh polar weather conditions. Arctic shipping will not only benefit such countries whose economy heavily depend on international trade and shipping (e.g. China, Japan, South Korea), but also serves the interests of Arctic states as well. Breum points out that, spurred by climate change and hopes of funding from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, “the government of Norway and Finland are breathing new life into a vision of an Arctic Corridor from Asia to the Europe mainland.”23 “Cooperation” is an effective means for China’s participation in Arctic affairs, and “respect” is the key basis for China’s participation. A “win-win result” is the value pursuit of China’s participation in Arctic affairs, which carries on the

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message that all stakeholders should pursue mutual benefits and common progress in all fields of activities. “Such cooperation should ensure that the benefits are shared by both Arctic and non-Arctic states as well as by non-state entities and should accommodate the interests of local residents including the indigenous people.”24

Practice “Cooperation” with Arctic states In 2012, China and Iceland signed the Framework Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, which was the first intergovernmental agreement on Arctic issues between China and an Arctic state. The China-Iceland Joint Aurora Observatory formally opened on October 18, 2018, in the northern part of Iceland.25 The observatory and the land of Karholl are owned by the Icelandic non-profit organization “Arctic Observatory.” The Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) leases the land for the operations of the observatory. On April 8, 2018, China and Finland signed an agreement to establish a joint research center for Arctic space observation and data sharing service in Sodankyla, which is location in north Finland’s Lapland.26 The center will enhance cooperation on cryosphere research with the use of satellites, which will provide information from the Arctic region for use in climate research, environmental monitoring and operational activities (such as navigation in the Arctic Ocean). The cooperation between Norway and China on climate monitoring and predictions in the Arctic will be increased and carried out on the platform of the Nansen-Zhu International Research Center (NSC), jointly established by China and Norway in 2003.27 A climate research seminar was attended by Chinese and Norwegian scientists in Beijing from April 16 to 17, 2018. At that seminar, they decided that they will conduct more research on how the Arctic climate change influences the climates of Europe and Asia. They will also develop a prediction system for extreme weather and secondary disasters. China’s Ministry of Natural Resources held the Arctic Circle China Forum in Shanghai from May 10 to 11, 2019.28 The forum discussed the importance of developing broader international cooperation in areas such as climate change. On June 5, 2019, China and Russia signed a joint statement vowing to strengthen contemporary global strategic stability and promote the cooperation between the two countries in the Arctic area, mainly by expanding shipping routes and cooperating in the development of infrastructure construction, resource exploitation, tourism, environment protection and scientific expedition.29 In 2019, China and Russia launched scientific cooperation in the Arctic through an agreement that documents the development of bilateral cooperation between the Pilot National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology (QNMLM) and P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of Russian Academy of Sciences (IO RAS); the agreement is targeted at Arctic research and preservation of its indigenous natural resources.30

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Cooperation with international institutions On October 3, 2018, ten countries (including Canada, China, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Russia, Korea, the U.S. and EU) signed an agreement to prevent unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean.31 This agreement is the first to use a legally binding, precautionary approach to protect an area from commercial fishing before fishing has begun in the area. Under the agreement, the Parties commit to not initiate commercial fishing in the central Arctic Ocean until there is more knowledge about the fish stocks in the area. As part of the agreement, the Parties will establish a joint scientific research and monitoring program to improve understanding of the area’s ecosystems and determine if fish stocks can be sustainably harvested. The China-Nordic Research Center (CNARC) was established in Shanghai on December 10, 2013, by ten member institutes (four Chinese and six Nordic).32 CNARC’s research themes include Arctic climate change and its impacts, resources, shipping and economic cooperation, and Arctic policy making and legislation. Since 2013, CNARC has held an annual symposium that cover topics on human activity and environmental change; North meets East; Arctic synergies: policies and best practices; the sustainable Arctic; trans-regional cooperation in the Arctic development and protection; integrated ocean management in the Arctic; Arctic fisheries; the Polar Silk Road; and sustainable development practices.

Cooperation with non-Arctic states China is involved in the trilateral High-Level Dialogue on the Cold Affairs with Japan and South Korea.33 The dialogue was initiated in 2011 during the JapanChina-South Korea Summit by South Korea’s motion. The dialogue seeks to build mutual understanding through consistent communication among the three countries regarding the Arctic region. As the observers of the Arctic Council, the three countries also communicate the outcome of their dialogue to the Arctic Council. The first dialogue took place in Seoul in 2016, the second in Tokyo in 2017 and the third in Shanghai in 2018. During the latest trilateral dialogue, which took place on June 26, 2019, in Pusan, the three countries agreed to further negotiate for and promote a “free and open rule of the sea” in the Arctic in regard to the rule of law, freedom of navigation, openness and transparency.34 The three countries also agreed to further discuss data sharing and collaboration in scientific research on the Arctic region. Finally, the three countries also seek to further discuss creating a rule-based economic environment in the Arctic region. China has also engaged separately with the U.K. and France regarding bilateral dialogues on the law of the sea and polar issues.

Other actors’ perception about China The United States is worried about China’s increasing cooperation with the Arctic countries in regard to economic development and scientific research. Triggered by China’s involvement in Greenland, U.S. president Donald Trump has,

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with varying degrees of seriousness, repeatedly expressed interest in buying the autonomous Danish territory.35 China Communications Construction Company’s (CCCC) bid for Greenland’s airport construction projects in 2018 triggered huge reaction from the U.S., since Greenland is strategically important for the U.S. military and its ballistic missile early warning system. Under U.S. pressure, Greenland decided to pick Denmark over Beijing for financing the planned projects.36 U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo expressed concerns over China’s participation into the Arctic affairs and suggested that China’s participation could transform the Arctic Ocean into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims.37 While Russia turned to China for potential investments and technology partnerships, the pivot to Asia was seen as a potential boost for development of the Russian Far East and Urals region.38 Against a background of strained relations with the West, China is viewed as Russia’s primary source for capital to develop in the Arctic. Although both China and Russia have strong interests in strengthening cooperation over energy resources and minerals – and more broadly over trade and investment flows – in general, there has been much skepticism as to the extent to which Russia welcomes the non-Arctic states, and China in particular, in the Arctic region. Pervasive are the mistrust rooted in historical grievances and strategic cultural differences and the growing concerns, particularly on the Russian side, about the long-term implications of the ongoing shift in relative power.39 In the midst of a bruising dispute with China, Canada has sided with Beijing over Washington on the Arctic, dispatching a senior parliamentarian to Shanghai to express support for cooperation in the high latitudes. Liberal MP Andrew Leslie told a forum on May 10, 2019, that “Canada welcomes opportunity for further productive cooperation with China” and suggested that “the whole idea is to engage in dialogue . . . we can work cooperatively.”40 Former president of Iceland, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, who is also the current chairman of Arctic Circle, suggested that it is worth remembering that China, along with South Korea and Japan, is surpassing even the Arctic states in Arctic science and research, and that Asia is now playing a greater economic and diplomatic role in Arctic affairs “than any of us could have predicted five years ago. That is the new model of the Arctic reality – that not only China, but Asia has arrived in the Arctic, big time.”41 The Swedish government seeks to develop an innovative, multidisciplinary and globally coordinated polar research process.42 One of its ambitions is to introduce this research process into its international cooperation with new partners, including China. Sweden is also very positive about Iceland’s cooperation with China. The Swedish government described the introduction of geothermal energy into China’s clean energy transformation as a “standard setter” for geothermal energy development in China’s future energy system. Given its geographic proximity to the two countries, Japan is concerned, from a security perspective, with China’s energy cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. Japan has been seeking to cooperate with Russia in order to balance the potential threat posed by the Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic region.43 Moreover, Japan is also concerned with China’s approach to the other Arctic nations.

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Analysis from the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) expressed concern over the China-Iceland Joint Aurora Observatory and its potential implication for China’s scientific cooperation with the Arctic countries in 2018.44 On economic cooperation, however, Japan is joining with China’s initiatives to participate in the development of the Arctic. Together with Finland, Russia and Norway, Japan joined China’s polar fiber link project, which will see a 10,000kilometer fiber-optic cable network that connects Europe and Asia.45 The Japanese government keeps a close watch on China’s cooperation with the Nordic countries (e.g. Iceland) and believes that China’s main interests in the Arctic include the exploration and exploitation of Arctic resources, development of a commercial shipping route in the Arctic region and enhanced global security.46 Yet, the Japanese government still holds positive views on China’s participation in international cooperation in the Arctic and, in its Arctic report, puts more emphasis on China’s principles of mutual respect, cooperation, win-win and sustainability.

Future of Arctic cooperation A basic question has been raised: with the shift in the international security architecture, will the Arctic in the future continue to be a region generally characterized by cooperation and low tensions, as it was during the post-Cold War era, or instead become a region characterized by competition and increased tensions, as it was during the Cold War?47 Some hold the view that this shift poses a potential challenge to the tradition of cooperation, low tensions, peaceful resolution of disputes and respect for international law that has characterized the approach used by the Arctic states, particularly since the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996, for managing Arctic issues.48 In this regard, some observers argue that “the Arctic states and other Arctic stakeholders should attempt to maintain the region’s tradition of cooperation and low tensions, and work to prevent the competition and tensions that have emerged in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere in recent years from crossing over into the Arctic.”49 They point to the experience of Arctic states and other Arctic stakeholders that have achieved success in promoting cooperation on a range of issues, which have served as a useful model for other parts of the world to follow.50 Nevertheless, the Arctic has no way to staying fully isolated from the competition and tensions that have arisen in other parts of the world.

Notes 1 北极问题研究 [A Study on the Arctic Issues] (Beijing: Ocean Publisher, 2011), 259. 2 During this period, 15 expedition teams composed of about 700 scientists from 11 countries (11 teams stationed in the Arctic region and four in the Antarctic region) participated in the construction of 34 fixed observation stations and 49 temporary observation points and conducted, under unified a plan, the first ever systematic and comprehensive scientific expedition on the astronomy, geography,

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meteorology, and geophysics of the polar regions. The focus of the expedition was the Arctic region. These activities marked the start of a scientific age in the Arctic and the beginning of the modern history of the Arctic region. Not only did it further advance the scientific research, but it also was the first ever extensive international cooperative effort in Arctic history. Therefore, it was particularly significant. Thirty-four countries participated and built 55 permanent observation stations, among which 43 were in the Arctic, five were in the Antarctic, and seven were in tropical and temperate zones. The focus was still placed on the Arctic region. The scientists conducted continuous observation, measurement and recording of the earth’s magnetic field, earth current, atmospheric voltage and conductivity, and the height of the ionosphere. They also studied the relations between aurora polaris and radio transmissions and accomplished complete meteorological reports and records. Both in depth and broad, the second IPY activities took a big step forward and could be regarded as the second milestone in the history of Arctic scientific research. Alexander Rich and Aleksandr P. Vinogradov, “Arctic Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (1964): 22–23. Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1983: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 377. ICC Resolution on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, 1986, full text at www. arcticnwfz.ca/documents/I%20N%20U%20I%20T%20CIRCUMPOLAR% 20RES%20ON%20nwfz%201983.pdf. Inuit Circumpolar Conference Resolution ICC 77–11, as amended: Peaceful and Safe Uses of the Arctic Circumpolar Zone,” from the files of CARC, Ottawa; cited in Ronald G. Purer, “Arms Control Proposals for the Arctic: A Survey and Critique,” in Kari Mottola, ed., The Arctic Challenge: Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), 185, 196–198, 185. United States of America, Department of State, “Environmental Security Threat Report, October 2001, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/2001/ c4647.htm. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy,” 16, http://library.arcticportal.org/ 1255/1/The_Northern_Dimension_Canada.pdf. “Release of the Arctic Council Oil and Gas Assessment,” http://arctic-council. org/article/2008/1/release_of_ the_arctic_council_oil_and_gas_assessment. Oran R. Young, Creating Regime: Arctic Accords and International Governance (London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 47–48. David Vanderzwaag, John Donihee and Mads. Faegteborg, “Towards Regional Ocean Management in the Arctic: From Co-existence to Cooperation,” U.N.B.L.J. 37, no. 1 (1988): 15–21; for a consideration of other cooperative agreements entered into on a bilateral basis, see W. Slipchenko, “International Arctic Cooperation: A Canadian Dream or a Necessity,” in The Arctic: Choices for Peace and Security (1989), 93–104; Kathleen E. Braden, “US-Soviet Cooperation for Environmental Protection: How Successful Are the Bilateral Agreements?,” in Massey Stewart, ed., The Soviet Environment: Problems, Policies and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1992), 125–149. Young, Creating Regime: Arctic Accords and International Governance. Oran R. Young, “Governing the Arctic: from the Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Cooperation,” Global Governance 11, no. 1 (2005): 10. Ibid.

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16 See the full text of the Declaration on its website at www.arctic-council.org. 17 Evan T. Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” The American Journal of International Law 3, no. 3 (1999): 721. 18 United States of America, United States Congress, “Marine Mammal Protections Act of 1972,” December 21, 1972. 19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming Attends the Third Arctic Circle Assembly and Delivers a Keynote Speech,” October 17, 2015, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/ t1307440.shtml. 20 Arctic Circle, Videos from the 2016 Assembly, at www.arcticcircle.org/ assemblies/2016/videos. 21 Liu Nengye, “China’s Emerging Arctic Policy,” The Diplomat, December 14, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/chinas-emerging-arctic-policy/. 22 Shiloh Rainwater, “Race to the North: China’s Arctic Strategy and Its Implications,” Naval War College Review, 66, no. 2 (2013): Article 7, 62–82, 73. 23 Martin Breum, “How Angry Birds and Prospects of Chinese Funding Power Visions of the Shortest-ever Route from China to Europe,” Arctic Today, March 13, 2018, www.arctictoday.com/angry-birds-prospects-chinese-funding-power-visionsshortest-ever-route-china-europe/. 24 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council, “Full text: China’s Arctic Policy,” January 26, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/ 2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 25 See https://karholl.is/en/. 26 “China, Finland to Enhance Arctic Research Cooperation,” China Academy of Sciences, October 31, 2018, http://english.cas.cn/Special_Reports/Belt_of_ Science_Road_for_Cooperation/Technology_Cooperation/201810/t2018 1029_200564.shtml. 27 “China, Norway to Boost Cooperation in Arctic Climate Research,” Xinhuanet, April 19, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/19/c_137123061.htm. 28 Nannan Lundin, “Arctic, Climate Change and Science Diplomacy,” Offices of Science and Innovation, May 22, 2019, https://sweden-science-innovation.blog/china/ arctic-climate-change-and-science-diplomacy/. 29 “zhong hua ren min gong he guo hee luo si lian bang guan yu fa zhan xin shi dai quan mian zhan lüe xie zuo huo ban guan xi de lian he sheng ming (quan wen) [Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Development of a Comprehensive Stategic Partnership for the New Era (full text)],” Xinhua News Agency, June 6, 2019, www.chinanews.com/gn/2019/0606/8857473.shtml. 30 “China and Russia Launch Scientific Cooperation in Arctic,” Cision PR Newswire, April 16, 2019, www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/china-and-russia-launchscientific-cooperation-in-arctic-300832682.html. 31 Catherine Benson Wahlen, “Nine Countries, EU Sign Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in Central Arctic Ocean,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, October 9, 2018, http://sdg.iisd.org/news/ninecountries-eu-sign-agreement-to-prevent-unregulated-fishing-in-central-arcticocean/. 32 “Background,” China-Nordic Arctic Research Center, www.cnarc.info/ organization. 33 The People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “di san lun zhong ri han bei ji shi wu gao ji bie dui hua lian he sheng ming [Joint Statement of the Third Round of China-Japan-Korea High-level Dialogue on Arctic Affairs],” June 8, 2018, www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/tyfls_ 674667/xwlb_674669/t1567101.shtml.

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34 “di si lun han zhong ri bei ji shi wu gao ji bie dui hua jiang zai fu shan ju xing [The Fourth Round of High-level Dialogue on Korean, Chinese and Japanese Arctic Affairs will be held in Busan],” Yonhap News Agency, June 24, 2019, https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20190624006300881; Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dai 4-kai Hokkyoku ni kansuru nitchūkan haireberu taiwa [Japan-China-ROK High Level Dialogue on the 4th Arctic],” June 2, 2019, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/fp/msp/page22_003228.html. 35 Vivian Salama et al., “President Trump Eyes a New Real-Estate Purchase: Greenland,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/trump-eyesa-new-real-estate-purchase-greenland-11565904223. 36 Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen and Stella Qiu, “China Withdraws bid for Greenland Airport Projects: Sermitsiaq Newspaper,” Reuters, June 4, 2019, www.reuters. com/article/us-china-silkroad-greenland/china-withdraws-bid-for-greenlandairport-projects-sermitsiaq-newspaper-idUSKCN1T5191. 37 Blake Hounshell, “Pompeo Aims to Counter China’s Ambitions in the Arctic,” Politico, May 6, 2019, www.politico.com/story/2019/05/06/pompeo-arcticchina-russia-1302649. 38 Camilla T.N. Sorensen and Ekaterina Klimenko, “Emerging Chinese-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2017, www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/emerging-chineserussian-cooperation-arctic.pdf. 39 Ibid. 40 Nathan Vanderklippe, “Agreeing on the Arctic: Amid dispute, Canada Sides with China over the U.S. and How to Manage the North,” The Globe and Mail, May 10, 2019, www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-agreeing-on-the-arcticwhy-canada-sides-with-china-over-the-us-on/. 41 Ibid. 42 Lundin, “Arctic, Climate Change.” 43 “Roshia no seiiki ‘Hokkyoku-kai’ ni Chūgoku ga shokushu nichiro bōei kyōryoku ni katsuro [China’s Reach in Russian Sanctuary Arctic Ocean],” The Sankei News, November 15, 2018. www.sankei.com/politics/news/181115/plt1811150001n1.html. 44 “Chūgoku no Hokkyoku-kai shinshutsu to kenen jikō – Chūgoku kokusan saihyōsen, setsuryū 2-gō shinsui o ki ni kangaeru [China’s Arctic Ocean Expansion and Concerns-Considering the Launch of Snow Dragon No. 2],” September 28, 2018, www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/SSG/topics-column/col-122.html. 45 Ting Shi, “10,000 Kilometers of Fiber-Optic Cable Show China’s Interest in Warming Arctic,” Bloomberg, December 13, 2017, www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2017-12-13/undersea-cable-project-shows-china-s-interest-in-warmingarctic; Thomas Nilsen, “Major Step towards a Europe-Asia Arctic Cable Link,” The Barents Observer, June 6, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industryand-energy/2019/06/mou-signed-set-arctic-telecom-cable-company. 46 www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/gijyutu/gijyutu5/siryo/__icsFiles/afieldfile/ 2018/09/14/1409210_003.pdf. 47 United States of America, Congressional Research Service, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” November 27, 2019, 53, https://fas.org/ sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf. 48 See, for example, Melody Schreiber, “As the Arctic Changes, International Cooperation May Be Put to the Test,” Arctic Today, July 25, 2018; Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, and Alexandria Hall, “The Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environment,” RAND Europe (2018): 18; Geoff Ziezulewicz, “As Arctic Waters Open, Nations Plant Their Flags,” Navy Times, April 8, 2018; James Stavridis, “Avoiding a Cold War in the High North,” Bloomberg, May 4,

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2018; Kristina Spohr, “The Race to Conquer the Arctic – The World’s Final Frontier,” New Statesman, March 12, 2018. 49 “Changes in the Arctic,” 53. 50 See, for example, Kevin McGwin, “More Military Activity May Spoil the Arctic’s Atmosphere of Collaboration, Warns a Danish Report,” Arctic Today, December 6, 2018; Hsin Hsuan Sun, “Arctic Council Sells Itself As a Model for International Cooperation at the UN,” Arctic Today, July 23, 2018; John Grady, “Panel: Cooperation, Not Conflict Key to Future of the Arctic,” USNI News, April 9, 2018; Levon Sevunts, “Arctic Nations Develop Coast Guard Cooperation,” Barents Observer, March 13, 2018; Doug Tsuruoka, “Despite USRussia Tensions, Arctic Powers Eye Cooperation,” Asia Times, March 29, 2017.

215

Index

Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the central Arctic Ocean 2, 15 Alaska 51, 61, 63–64, 103, 144, 148–150, 153, 167–168, 177, 179, 191, 193, 195, 198–200, 203, 204 Arctic 1–13, 15–33, 40–82, 99–133, 144–158, 165–185, 189–210 Arctic Circle 19, 26, 50, 71, 73, 144, 166–167, 171, 193, 195, 203–205, 207, 209 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 198 Arctic Council 2, 5, 7–9, 15–20, 22, 24, 27, 33n6, 33n7, 34n27, 40, 43, 50–54, 60–62, 64, 66–69, 71–73, 76–81, 106, 115, 117–118, 123–124, 126, 145, 148, 154, 178, 180, 183, 196–199, 203–206, 208, 210 Arctic denuclearization initiative 191 Arctic Executive Steering Committee 61, 63 Arctic Five-plus-Five 23–24 Arctic Institute 130 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 101, 106 Arctic policy white paper 1–3, 5, 9–10, 18, 20–21, 29, 33, 41, 47, 49, 55, 78, 125, 127–128, 147, 151, 155, 165, 179, 181, 205 Arctic Research Commission 106 Arctic Search and Rescue 52 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 30, 57, 103, 108 area, the 6, 22, 30, 42, 52, 58, 70, 77, 111, 131, 133, 144, 146–147, 189, 200, 208 Article 234 21, 49, 57, 67, 87n104, 107, 109, 111–112, 123, 201

Asian Forum for Polar Sciences 79, 179 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 15, 129 Barents Sea 7, 45, 48, 51, 100, 110, 113, 115, 132, 154, 193, 200, 202 Beaufort Sea 7, 103, 171, 193 Belt and Road Initiative 1, 10, 15, 46–47, 68, 77, 128–129, 131, 151, 155, 206 Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction 32 Canada 1–3, 7–8, 10, 17, 22, 25, 30, 36n66, 36n70, 40, 53–60, 62, 65, 67, 71, 78, 101–104, 108–110, 117–120, 123–126, 130–133, 144–148, 150–151, 153, 157–158, 167, 171–173, 177, 179, 183, 190–192, 197, 199–200, 209 CAOFA 22–24 Central Arctic Ocean 2, 15, 22–23, 29, 52, 146, 208 challenges 7, 12, 17, 49, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65–66, 68, 70, 75, 99, 102–103, 107, 110, 112, 115, 117, 119–123, 132, 145, 152–153, 158, 178, 181–182, 184–185, 189, 202, 205 China 1–13, 15–33, 40–81, 99–133, 144–158, 165–185, 189–210 China Investment Corp 64, 129, 150 China National Offshore Oil Corporation 73, 148 China Nordic Arctic Research Center 26, 178, 179 Chinese Academy of Science 25, 165, 167–169 Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration 113, 149, 169–171, 176

216

Index

climate change 5, 7, 9, 12, 16–18, 20, 22, 27–29, 30, 32, 52–53, 58–59, 61–63, 70, 72, 75–76, 79, 112, 116–119, 123, 130, 165, 170–172, 174, 177–178, 189, 198, 201, 205–208 CNOOC 56, 73, 148, 158 Cold War 1, 51, 66, 75, 101–102, 110, 117, 182–183, 189–193, 195, 200, 202–204, 210 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 54, 86, 145, 159n9 cooperation 2–6, 10, 12, 15–17, 19, 25–26, 29, 30, 32–33, 40–47, 49–52, 54–56, 60–62, 65–68, 70–77, 79, 81, 103, 110, 114–115, 117, 123–124, 126–133, 145, 147, 152, 154–155, 157, 166, 168–169, 174–181, 183–184, 189–210 debt trap 3, 129, 145, 152, 155–156 Denmark 1–2, 7, 18, 31, 40, 54, 66–67, 69–71, 75, 105–106, 117, 144, 146, 148, 152, 156, 179, 181, 183, 190–192, 196, 199, 204, 208–209 Department of Defense 9, 60, 62–63, 202 Department of Homeland Security 61, 63 Departments of State 63 diplomacy 2–3, 40, 61, 69, 72, 110, 129, 155–156, 178–181, 206 energy 1, 6, 12, 18, 43–50, 55–56, 59, 64–65, 72–73, 77, 82, 99, 101, 114–115, 118, 122, 126, 129, 130, 144–145, 147–153, 155, 157–158, 171, 182, 191, 194, 196, 203, 209 environment 2–3, 5–7, 9–10, 12, 16–18, 21, 27–32, 41–42, 52–53, 56, 58–63, 65, 67–68, 70, 72, 74–76, 79, 81–82, 99–100, 106–111, 114–115, 117–118, 120, 122–123, 125, 129–130, 146–147, 150–154, 157–158, 165–175, 177–179, 181–185, 189–190, 193–205, 207–208 European Economic Area 106 European Union 17, 23, 29, 46, 53–54, 67, 106, 109, 114, 118, 120, 123, 182 exclusive economic zone 22, 30, 107, 111, 145, 182, 201

216 Finland 2, 18, 31, 40, 42, 61–62, 64, 66–67, 74–75, 106, 113, 117, 129, 132, 148, 168, 171, 173, 177, 179, 191–192, 195–196, 199, 206–207, 210 Finnish-Norwegian initiative 132 fishing 1–2, 15, 22–24, 27–29, 30, 41, 52, 77, 100–101, 108, 171, 208 foreign direct investment 55, 148, 156 Foreign Ministry 18, 32, 79 freedom of navigation 10, 28, 54, 62, 65, 104, 107, 119, 127, 202, 208 governance 2, 10, 43, 76–77, 82, 182 Greenland 2, 18, 23, 31, 51, 66, 69–71, 73, 75, 80, 101, 117–118, 121, 130, 133, 144, 146, 148, 151–153, 156–157, 179, 181, 191–192, 208–209 Group of 9, 75, 105, 167, 169, 175, 177, 181, 184, 194, 204 Group of Eight 194 Iceland 2, 11, 18, 23, 30–31, 40, 42, 49, 51, 66–69, 71–73, 75, 105–106, 116–118, 131, 148, 151, 154, 156, 158, 167, 175, 179, 181, 191, 196, 198–199, 203–205, 207–210 Ilulissat Declaration 146, 183 IMO 21–22, 24, 27, 32, 52, 56, 76, 107–109, 123–124, 132–133 India 1, 4, 9, 16, 18, 43, 62, 72, 102, 113, 147–148, 155, 182, 205 indigenous people 2, 16, 19, 27, 29, 32–33, 40–43, 67, 77, 79–82, 158, 192, 195, 197, 198, 200–201, 204, 207 infrastructure 3, 6, 15, 41, 44, 46–48, 50–52, 55–58, 64, 68, 70–71, 73, 106, 113, 117, 119, 121, 124, 126–133, 148, 151–158, 170, 175, 207 Intelligence Community Arctic Working Group 63 internal waters 3, 10–11, 28, 49, 54–55, 102–105, 109, 119–120, 127 international aid 189 International Arctic Science Committee 25, 106, 168, 174, 179, 180, 192, 195 international institutions 1–2, 15, 50, 76, 208

217 international law 2, 5–6, 10, 12, 15, 18, 20–21, 23–25, 27, 29, 31, 55, 104, 108, 111–112, 123, 125, 128, 133, 145–147, 155, 184, 204–205, 210 International Maritime Organization 2, 6, 15, 18, 21, 29, 52, 78, 107, 118 International Polar Year 173, 176, 179, 190 International Seabed Authority (ISA) 28, 105, 147 international strait 54–55, 105, 109, 119 Inuit Circumpolar Conference 191, 211n7 Inuit Declaration 80 investment 10, 15, 40–41, 44, 45, 48, 50, 55–60, 64, 70–72, 75, 77–78, 82, 102, 117, 126–132, 145, 147–153, 155–158, 179, 181, 185, 206, 209 Japan 1–2, 4, 9, 11, 16, 18, 21, 23, 25, 29, 40–41, 43, 54, 65, 72, 76–80, 100, 104, 106, 109, 118, 120, 123–126, 145, 149, 153, 171–173, 177, 179–180, 182–184, 193–196, 199, 205–206, 208–210 Joint Chiefs of Staff 63 jurisdiction 4, 6–7, 17–19, 27, 32, 48, 52, 103, 107, 109–111, 119, 122, 127, 133, 145–147, 151, 153, 155, 182–183, 194, 203, 205 Mackenzie region 150 Manhattan voyage 103 maritime transport 31, 32, 78, 106, 113, 131 MARPOL 21, 30, 108 military presence 1, 8, 41–44, 50, 53, 61, 192 National Antarctic Research Expedition Committee 167 National Defense Strategy 63 National Security Council 63 National Security Presidential Directive 49, 120 National Security Strategy 63 NATO 42, 61, 67–68, 73, 75, 152, 192 near-Arctic state 12–13, 64 non-Arctic states 1–4, 11–12, 16–18, 20, 29, 41–43, 46, 50, 52, 55, 64, 75, 81, 108, 119–120, 127, 132–133, 145, 147, 153, 155, 177–178, 180, 205–209

Index

217

non-living resource 3, 22, 133, 145 Nordic countries 18–19, 58, 66–69, 115, 129, 151, 178, 190–191, 199, 200, 210 Nordic states 2, 12, 62, 66–69, 75, 131, 153, 178 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 192 Northern Sea Route 3, 10, 30–31, 41–43, 46–49, 55, 68, 77, 99–100, 102, 104–106, 110–115, 120, 124, 126–127, 129, 131, 149, 155 Northern Sea Route Administration 30–31, 111 North Pacific Arctic Conference 79 Northwest Passage 3, 10–11, 30, 40, 49, 54–55, 58, 65, 68, 99–100, 102–104, 109, 112, 119–120, 128, 131–132 Norway 1–2, 7, 9, 12, 18, 21, 26, 28, 31, 40, 42, 49, 66–69, 71–73, 75, 81, 101, 105–106, 116–118, 129, 131–132, 144–146, 148, 151, 153–154, 156, 158, 165, 167, 169, 174, 177, 179, 181, 183, 190–192, 195–197, 199–200, 202, 204, 206–208, 210 nuclear submarines 99, 102–103, 109–110, 117, 192, 194–195 Nuuk 12, 18, 54, 69–71, 80, 152 observer 2, 5, 7–11, 16–20, 27, 40–41, 43, 45, 50, 59–60, 62, 67, 71–73, 76, 80–81, 115, 118, 123, 126, 128, 178–179, 197–199, 205, 208, 210 Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 148 One Belt One Road 46 One Belt One Road Initiative 10, 15, 33n4, 152 Oslo Declaration 22 Ottawa Declaration 80, 97n307, 196, 204 perception 2–3, 15, 75, 103, 124, 178, 180, 208 Polar Code 21–22, 28, 32, 56, 67, 78, 108, 122–123, 133 polar great power 127 Polar Research Institute of China 56, 73, 113, 169–170, 173, 176–178, 183, 207 Polar Silk Road 3, 6, 9–12, 55, 57, 59, 70, 74, 77, 99, 127–133, 155, 181, 208 Polar Star 103

218

Index

protect 1, 3, 5–7, 10, 12, 16, 19–21, 24, 27–32, 41, 50, 52–53, 56–57, 60, 75, 79, 81–82, 99, 104, 106–111, 118, 125, 127, 129–131, 147, 154, 146, 158, 165, 182–183, 189–190, 193, 196–197, 199–205, 207–208 rule of law 9–10, 208 Russia 1–3, 7–9, 11, 18, 23, 30, 40–55, 57, 61–63, 65–67, 69, 71–73, 78, 100–102, 104–106, 110–113, 115–118, 120–121, 123, 126–133, 144–151, 153–155, 157–158, 167, 169, 171, 174, 177, 179, 181–184, 193–195, 199–200, 202, 205, 207–210 science and research 3, 67, 181, 209 science diplomacy 3, 178–181 scientific expeditions 26, 77, 166, 169–176, 182–183, 185, 190, 195, 207, 210n2 scientific research 1–4, 6, 15, 23–26, 28–29, 31, 41, 49, 52, 58–60, 62, 71, 79, 116, 129, 155, 165, 167–171, 174, 176, 179, 181–182, 184–185, 189, 193, 195, 196, 205–206, 208 search and rescue 21, 29, 50, 52, 57, 106, 108, 120, 122, 124 Sector Principle 7, 105 shipbuilding 74, 77–78, 106, 112–114 shipping 1–3, 5–7, 9–12, 15–17, 21, 25, 28, 31, 44, 46–49, 53–58, 67–68, 73–74, 77–78, 99–103, 106–108, 110–117, 119–133, 149, 151, 158, 178–179, 184, 189, 206–208, 210 Silk Road Fund 15, 45, 128 Singapore 9, 16, 18, 29, 43, 72 Snow Dragon 8, 26, 48, 58, 74, 113, 173 SOLAS 21, 38n104, 108 South China Sea 55, 62, 65, 113, 209 South Korea 1–2, 4, 9, 16, 18, 23, 25, 29, 40–41, 43, 54, 72, 76–79, 81, 114–115, 120, 123–125, 127, 145, 149, 153, 155, 171, 173, 177, 179, 182–184, 205–206, 208–209 sovereign rights 4, 6–7, 17–18, 27, 53–54, 78, 146–147, 155, 205 Soviet Union 104–105, 108, 110–111, 123, 167, 189–193, 195–196, 200

218 stakeholders 1–2, 9, 24, 40, 43, 46, 52, 70, 72–73, 76–78, 82, 106, 110, 133, 179, 207, 210 State Oceanic Administration 25, 32, 68–69, 128, 166–171, 173, 175–176, 197–198 state-owned enterprises 59, 64 Steinberg Treaty 2, 15 Strategic and Economic Dialogue 61 Svalbard Islands 117, 167, 169, 175, 178, 182–183 Sweden 2, 18, 31, 40, 42, 48, 66–67, 69, 74–75, 105–106, 148, 157, 179, 181, 191, 195–196, 198–200, 209 trans-Arctic shipping 100, 102 Trump administration 11, 61–63, 150 UN Charter 5, 12, 18, 27, 29 UNCLOS 2, 4–7, 10, 12, 15, 18, 21–22, 24, 27–29, 30, 32, 49, 54–57, 62, 67, 76, 106–109, 111–112, 118–119, 123, 128, 145–147, 154–155, 201, 205 understand 1, 5–6, 11–12, 16, 19–20, 23–25, 41, 51, 54, 58, 59, 64, 68–70, 72, 74, 76, 82, 105, 125, 129, 150, 152, 155–156, 165, 170–173, 178, 182–185, 189–190, 199, 201, 206, 208 United Nations Declarations on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 80 United Nations Security Council 21 United States 1, 3, 7, 10, 19, 22, 30, 41–42, 48–49, 51–55, 57, 60–66, 73, 101–105, 107, 110, 113, 117, 119–120, 125, 127, 130, 144, 146–147, 149–150, 153, 156–157, 191–192, 194–195, 199, 202, 204, 208 United States Geological Survey 144 U.S. Arctic Regional Policy 117 U.S.-China relations 52, 66 U.S. Polar Research 106 Xuelong 8, 26, 58, 74, 113, 132, 170–174 Yamal 11, 40, 44, 45, 48, 51, 105, 126, 147–149, 157 Yamal LNG project 11, 126, 149 Yellow River Station 26, 58, 71, 165, 175–176, 179–180