China’s Rise and Rethinking International Relations Theory 9781529212969

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Bristol Studies in

East Asian International Relations

China’s Rise and Rethinking International Relations Theory EDITED BY

CHENGXIN PAN AND EMILIAN KAVALSKI



Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations Series Editors: Yongjin Zhang, University of Bristol, UK, Shogo Suzuki, University of Manchester, UK and Peter Kristensen, University of Copenhagen, Denmark This series publishes cutting-edge research on the changing international politics of East Asia. It covers the security dynamics, the causes of conflict and cooperation, and the ongoing transformation of the region, as well as the impact of East Asia on the wider global order. The series contributes to theoretical debates within the field of International Relations. Topics studied in East Asia can shed fresh light on disciplinary debates while the theoretical insights can challenge and enrich the propositions of mainstream IR theories which have been derived mostly from the European experience. In welcoming theoretically informed and theoretically innovative works, this series plays an important role in developing and establishing new Asian schools of thought in International Relations theory.

Also available China Risen? Studying Chinese Global Power By Shaun Breslin The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia Towards an Ethical Explanation By See Seng Tan

Coming soon Middle Powers in Asia Pacific Multilateralism A Differential Framework By Sarah Teo

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Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations Series Editors: Yongjin Zhang, University of Bristol, UK, Shogo Suzuki, University of Manchester, UK and Peter Kristensen, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

International advisory board Amitav Acharya, American University, Washington D.C., US Mark Beeson, University of Western Australia, Australia Barry Buzan, London School of Economics, UK Zhimin Chen, Fudan University, Shanghai, China Ja Ian Chong, National University of Singapore, Singapore Paul Evans, University of British Columbia, Canada Rosemary Foot, Oxford University, UK Evelyn Goh, Australian National University, Australia Linus Hagström, Swedish Defense University, Sweden Miwa Hirono, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan Yuichi Hosoya, Keio University, Japan Weixing Hu, University of Hong Kong, China Xiaoming Huang, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Christopher R. Hughes, London School of Economics, UK Yang Jiang, Danish Institute for International Studies, Denmark Hun Joon Kim, Korea University, South Korea Jing Men, College of Europe, Belgium Nele Noesselt, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany John Ravenhill, University of Waterloo, Canada Masayuki Tadokoro, Keio University, Japan Yu-Shan Wu, National University of Taiwan, Taiwan

Find out more at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/ bristol-studies-in-east-asian-international-relations

CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY Edited by Chengxin Pan and Emilian Kavalski

First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1-​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2022 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1294-​5 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1295-​2 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1296-​9 ePdf The right of Chengxin Pan and Emilian Kavalski to be identified as editors of this work has been asserted by ​them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editors and contributors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by Chris at blu inc Image credit: Stocksy_txp899a702ckXy100 Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Abbreviations Notes on Contributors Acknowledgements

vii ix xi

Introduction: The Rise of China and Its Challenges to International Relations Theory Chengxin Pan and Emilian Kavalski PART I  Theorizing China’s Rise: Beyond Eurocentric Knowledge Production 1 Putting China in the World: From Universal Theory to Contextual Theorizing John Agnew 2 Heart and Soul for World Politics: Advaita Monism and Daoist Trialectics in International Relations L.H.M. Ling 3 What Can Guanxi International Relations Be About? Emilian Kavalski 4 Friendly Rise? China, the West and the Ontology of Relations Astrid H.M. Nordin and Graham M. Smith 5 Re-​Worlding the ‘West’ in Post-​Western International Relations: The ‘Theory Migrant’ of Tianxia in the Anglosphere Yih-​Jye Hwang, Raoul Bunskoek and Chih-​yu Shih PART II  Theorizing China’s Rise: Critical Reflection on Mainstream Frameworks 6 China in the International Order: A Contributor or a Challenger? Wang Jisi 7 China’s Rise in English School Perspective Barry Buzan

v

1

23

42

62 83 102

125

145

CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

8

9

10

Deconstructing the Established Westphalian Architecture in Light of China’s Rise Hung-​jen Wang Sino-​capitalism’s Dialectical Processes and International Relations Theory Christopher A. McNally China’s Rise as Holographic Transition: A Relational Challenge to International Relations’ Newtonian Ontology Chengxin Pan

168

190

210

Epilogue: Towards International Relations beyond Binaries Emilian Kavalski and Chengxin Pan

234

Index

245

vi

List of Abbreviations AIIB APEC ASEAN BCIM BIT BRI BRICS CCP CICA

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation Association of Southeast Asian Nations Bangladesh-​China-​India-​Myanmar Bilateral Investment Treaty Belt and Road Initiative Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Chinese Communist Party Conference on Interaction and Confidence-​Building Measures in Asia CPC Communist Party of China CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-​ Pacific Partnership ES English School EU European Union FIE foreign-​invested enterprise GIS global international society GMS Great Mekong Subregion GPM great power management HSR Health Silk Road IMF International Monetary Fund IR International Relations KMT Kuomingtang NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDB New Development Bank NGO non-​governmental organization PKOs peacekeeping operations PRC People’s Republic of China R2P Responsibility to Protect TPP Trans-​Pacific Partnership

vii

CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

TTIP UN UNSC WMD WTO

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership United Nations United Nations Security Council weapons of mass destruction World Trade Organization

viii

Notes on Contributors John Agnew is Distinguished Professor of Geography at the University of California, Los Angeles (USA) and a Fellow of the British Academy. John is the editor for the book series, New Horizons in Human Geography (Edward Elgar). Raoul Bunskoek is Research Associate and Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Chair for Sociology of Africa, University of Bayreuth (Germany). Raoul is a co-​author of the book China and International Theory: The Balance of Relationships (with Shih et al, 2019). Barry Buzan is Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS, Emeritus Professor in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (UK), Honorary Professor at Jilin University (China) and Copenhagen University (Denmark), and a Fellow of the British Academy. Yih-​Jye Hwang (PhD, Aberystwyth University) is Universitair Docent of International Relations at Leiden University (the Netherlands). His research focuses on culture and identity politics in East Asia, East Asian approaches to human security, China’s strategic and just war thinking, post-​Western IR, post-​structuralism, and theories of nationalism. Emilian Kavalski is the inaugural NAWA Chair Professor in the Complex Systems Lab, Centre for International Studies and Development, Jagiellonian University, Krakow (Poland) and series editor for Routledge’s Rethinking Asia and International Relations series. L.H.M. Ling (1955–​2018) was Professor of International Affairs at The New School in New York (USA) and co-​editor of the book series, Global Dialogues: Developing Non-​Eurocentric International Relations and International Political Economy (Rowman & Littlefield). Christopher A. McNally is Professor of Political Economy at Chaminade University of Honolulu (USA). His research focuses on comparative ix

CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

capitalisms, especially the logic of Sino-capitalism and its implications for the global order. He has edited four volumes and authored numerous peer-​reviewed research articles, including in World Politics and The Review of International Political Economy. Astrid H.M. Nordin is the Lau Chair Professor of Chinese International Relations at King’s College London (UK). She is author of China’s International Relations and Harmonious World (Routledge, 2016) and co-​editor, with Graham M. Smith, of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs special issue ‘Towards Global Relational Theorising’. Chengxin Pan is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Macau (China) and Adjunct Associate Professor at University of Technology Sydney (Australia). He is a co-​editor of the series Global Political Sociology (Palgrave Macmillan). His latest publications have appeared in European Journal of International Relations, Review of International Studies, Critical Studies on Security and Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Chih-​yu Shih is Professor of Political Science at the National Taiwan University (Taiwan) and was until recently the editor of the journal Asian Ethnicity. Graham M. Smith is Associate Professor in Political Theory at the University of Leeds (UK). He has published on the topic of friendship in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Political Studies Review and International Politics. He is the author of Friendship and the Political (Imprint Academic, 2011). Hung-​jen Wang is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, National Cheng Kung University (Taiwan). His research interests include post-​Western IR theory, Chinese foreign policy, and Sino–​ US relations. Wang Jisi is Professor in the School of International Studies and President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University (China). He is also an honorary president of the Chinese Association for American Studies. He was a member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of China’s Foreign Ministry from 2008 to 2016.

x

Acknowledgements The idea of this book was first conceived out of the enjoyable collaboration between the two editors on a project ‘Theorizing China’s Rise in and Beyond International Relations’. The project includes an international workshop held at Deakin University in 2016, a subsequent special issue published in International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific (Volume 18, No. 3, 2018), and now this edited volume. Throughout this stimulating collaborative journey, we have accumulated enormous debts to many people and institutions. First and foremost, we are grateful for the generous support of a Conference and Seminar Grant (Grant ID: CS003-​P-​15) from the Chiang Ching-​kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. The support from the Foundation and its President, Professor Yun-​han Chu, was instrumental to the successful holding of the workshop, which laid the foundation for this book. We also thank Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) and the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University, and the (now defunct) Institute for Social Justice at the Australian Catholic University for their support for the workshop. The project was strongly supported by a number of colleagues at Deakin University, particularly Gary Smith (then Deputy Vice-​Chancellor, Deakin University), Matthew Clarke (then Head of School of Humanities and Social Sciences), Fethi Mansouri (Director of ADI), Brenda Cherednichenko (then Executive Dean of Faculty of Arts and Education), Shahram Akbarzadeh (Deputy Director of ADI) and Cayla Edwards (then ADI). For their help, constructive feedback, and commitment to this project, and particularly this edited volume, we thank Shaun Breslin, Yongjin Zhang, Stephen Wenham, Shogo Suzuki, Peter Kristensen, Lorna Blackmore, Caroline Astley, the anonymous reviewers and, above all, our contributors. Sadly one of our contributors, Lily Ling, untimely passed away in October 2018. A tireless pioneer in the field of critical studies of international relations, Lily would have been really pleased to see the publication of this collection. She will be sorely missed.

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CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

We thank Oxford University Press for granting permissions to reproduce the articles from the Special Issue of International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific (Volume 18, Issue 3, 2018). Last but not least, each editor thanks their family for their love, support and understanding, without which the completion of the book would not have been possible, especially given the challenging circumstances during the COVID-​19 pandemic.

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Introduction: The Rise of China and Its Challenges to International Relations Theory Chengxin Pan and Emilian Kavalski

Introduction The development of International Relations (IR) theory is closely bound up with significant events and tectonic shifts in world politics (Acharya and Buzan, 2017: 12). Such watershed moments often prompt IR scholars to recalibrate their frameworks of analysis to better make sense of a changing world. In the 1930s, modern realism emerged ‘as a reaction to the breakdown of the post-​World War I international order’ (Wohlforth, 1994/​95: 91). In the last decade of the 20th century, the abrupt end of the Cold War saw both a fall in realism’s fortune, and the opening of new space for theories from a broadly defined post-​positivist persuasion (Lapid, 1989; Smith, Booth and Zalewski, 1996). Emerging out of the ensuing Third Debate between positivist and post-​positivist theories (or between what Robert Keohane calls ‘rationalist’ and ‘reflectivist’ approaches, see Keohane, 1988), constructivism has since become a new fixture in the IR theory landscape (Guzzini, 2000). Thus, ‘although indirect, the connection between events and theory was undeniable’ (Wohlforth, 1994/​95: 91). Interestingly, such a supposedly undeniable link is yet to clearly emerge in the case of an ongoing major ‘event’ in contemporary international relations, namely, the rise of China. At one level, there is no denying that China’s rise has been one of the most frequently studied and debated contemporary phenomena (Kang, 2007; Lampton, 2008; Kavalski, 2009; Nathan and Scobell, 2012; Pan, 2012; Shambaugh, 2013; Christensen, 2015; Mahbubani, 2020; Breslin, 2021). In the rapidly proliferating literature on China’s rise, there has been no shortage of theoretical perspectives being brought to 1

CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

bear on a number of pressing questions: can China rise peacefully? What does it mean for global governance and the rules-​based liberal order? Will it seek regional or even global dominance? And can it avoid the so-​called Thucydides Trap? But most of these inquiries, instead of allowing for new theoretical explorations, are already underpinned by existing theoretical assumptions. Although a wide range of IR theories such as realism, liberalism, constructivism, power transition theory, and the English School (ES) have shed light on China’s rise, their understanding is primarily about applying existing theories to a perceived empirical case in order to explain its policy and practical implications and/​or to test the validity of those theories. Very rarely has China’s rise been treated as an ‘up-​stream’, theory-​generating event in IR. While theory testing and theory generating are not mutually exclusive and together they are both essential to theory building, some differences between them are nevertheless worth noting here. Theory testing treats the object of an empirical study as something that does not fundamentally challenge existing theoretical assumptions or frameworks. In this case, China’s rise, though remarkable in its own right, is seen as nothing unusual in international politics: great powers rise and fall throughout history. As a consequence, it can and should be more or less explained with ‘off-​the-​shelf ’ theories. The widespread perception of China’s rise as a challenge to the rules-​based international order (Johnston, 2019), for example, has even allowed realism to undergo a revival (Keohane, 2021: 118). On the other hand, theory generating starts with a more open mind and focuses on new general theoretical or conceptual potential in a significant event or phenomenon. As a theory-​generating event, China’s rise needs to be seen as something at least partially new, thus demanding the development of new conceptual frameworks, theoretical perspectives and/​or at least a rethink of ‘old’ ones. A theory-​generating event does not mean that it would render all existing concepts and theoretical assumptions obsolete. Rather, it presents an opportunity for more innovative and imaginative theoretical reflection. To treat a potentially theory-​generating event as simply a normal theory-​testing event would have closed off such an opportunity. We contend that such an opportunity has not been adequately explored in the case of China’s rise, which has attracted inadequate attention as a focus of debate in the core IR theoretical community. This contributes to the neglect of China’s rise as a complex and still evolving global and regional phenomenon, which is not just local or ‘uniquely Chinese’, but may reveal broader and more theoretically generalizable issues and patterns that cannot be satisfactorily understood through existing concepts and theories. Animated by and dissatisfied with the puzzling neglect of China’s rise as a source for IR theoretical innovation, this edited volume addresses this gap by opening possibilities for meaningful dialogue on the theoretical implications 2

Introduction

of China’s rise (broadly defined) for the study of IR. Some might question whether we could really rely on ‘a single-​N case’ as the basis of theorizing. Our response is that the very perception of China’s rise as a ‘single-​N case’ reflects the continued influence of the Newtonian ontology of things (see Chapters 4, 5 and 10) and is part of the reason why theory testing continues to dominate the study of China’s rise. In this volume, it is our belief that China’s rise represents more than a specific foreign policy challenge or a nationally bounded empirical test case for existing IR theories. Though the term ‘China’s rise’ may suggest otherwise, its fundamental relationality in and with the world means that it is not a single national case to begin with. As such, it offers an opportunity for more systematic theorizing to enrich and perhaps challenge IR theory (or at least some aspects of it). This is not to say that many existing IR theories, such as realism, liberalism, the ES and constructivism, will no longer have important things to say about China’s international relations. Far from it. Rather, we suggest that the parameters of existing IR theories may no longer be adequate to understand many changes and complexities associated with this historic event. It is in this context that new theorizing is called for at epistemological, ontological and/​or even spiritual levels. We admit that the challenges facing this enterprise are extremely formidable and the goals here still seem highly ambitious. But as James Rosenau (1994: 527) notes, ‘Notwithstanding the foregoing difficulties that haunt the theoretical enterprise, it remains that we have no choice but to undertake it’. While taking up this challenge, we recognize that it cannot be satisfactorily undertaken by any single project. On balance, therefore, we pitch our contribution here at a necessarily modest level: first, drawing attention to this neglected research agenda and creating an opening for dialogue and exchange among IR scholars, and second, hoping to offer a first cut at theorizing China’s rise beyond IR’s conventional purview.

China’s rise: a blind spot in IR theorizing Buzan and Lawson (2014: 512) observe that ‘most analysis in mainstream IR theory is both Western-​centric and presentist, by which we mean predominantly focused on the 20th century Anglo-​American world’ (see also Chapter 1 in this volume; unless otherwise specified, throughout this book all references to specific chapters refer to chapters in this book). China’s rise, an apparently non-​Western event, does not seem to register as a matter of major theoretical interest. For instance, in the Special Issue of European Journal of International Relations on the ‘End of IR Theory’, China or China’s rise is mentioned sporadically and in passing by four out of the 12 articles (Brown, 2013; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013; Reus-​Smit, 2013; Tickner, 2013). In one of their occasional references to China, John 3

CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2013: 448) note that ‘how one thinks about dealing with a rising China depends first and foremost on one’s broad perspective on world politics’, implying that China’s rise is merely an object of analysis by ready-​made theories, rather than itself a source for theoretical reflection and innovation. In another major theoretical debate –​ ‘Emotions and World Politics’ (International Theory, 2014) –​China figures even less in the discussion. In International Theory (2009–​2021), so far the only interdisciplinary journal dedicated to IR theory, 83 articles published between 2009 and 2021 contain the word ‘China’, but only eight of them briefly mention ‘China’s rise’ or the ‘rise of China’, and none appears to be about whether or how China’s rise may be studied as a theory-​generating event for IR. Perhaps a more promising place to look for such research is the debate on non-​Western IR theory in general (see the Special Issue of International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 2007) and the Chinese School of IR theory (Zhang and Chang, 2016) in particular. The former has led to the formation of a larger ‘Global IR’ project (Acharya, 2014a; Acharya and Buzan, 2017), in which China has featured prominently (for example Kang, 2003; Kang 2003/​04; Johnston, 2012; Zhang and Buzan, 2012; Horesh and Kavalski, 2014; Rozman, 2015; Acharya, 2017). And yet, the main focus seems to be mostly on East Asian and Chinese history, rather than the rise of contemporary China. On the other hand, the ‘Chinese IR theory’ debate has emerged in part against the backdrop of China’s rise, and Qin Yaqing (2005) urges Chinese IR theorists to devote themselves to understanding this phenomenon. But with very few exceptions (Ross and Zhu, 2008; Yan, 2015; Yan 2020), China’s rise per se is not the subject of Chinese IR theorizing. For instance, the Fudan-​based IR theorist Tang Shiping (2013), the first Asian scholar to win the International Studies Association’s best book prize for his theoretical book The Social Evolution of International Politics, bases his research almost exclusively on American and European IR theorists, and China is not a focus of his theoretical endeavour (Kristensen, 2015: 641). More often than not, China’s rise serves primarily as the context, rationale and/​or policy objective for the need to grow ‘Chinese-​style theory’ (Zhang, 2012; Ren, 2020: 396). Just as ‘all theories have a perspective’ (Cox, 1986: 207), all perspectives rest on certain theoretical foundations. In this sense, it can be argued that a steady stream of research on China’s rise in recent years has always come with certain theoretical angles (Callahan, 2005; Kang, 2007; Chan, 2008; Johnston, 2008; Ross and Zhu, 2008; Buzan, 2010; Fravel, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2010; Qin, 2010; Yan, 2011; Hsiung, 2012; Kirshner, 2012; Li, 2016; Walton and Kavalski, 2016; Allison, 2017). Informed by realism, particularly offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2001; Mearsheimer, 2010) and power transition theory (Organski, 1961; Organski and Kugler, 1980; 4

Introduction

Lemke and Tammen, 2003), one influential perspective argues that the tragic consequences of previous power transitions, from the Peloponnesian War to the two World Wars, do not bode well for China’s rise in the 21st century (Tammen and Kugler 2006; Lai, 2011). Another popular perspective, drawing from (neo)liberal institutionalism, constructivism and/​or the ES, believes that China’s rise, taking place largely within a liberal international order, is subject to socialization into international society. As a result, its status quo orientation and prospect for peaceful rise cannot be discounted (Johnston, 2003; Zheng, 2005; Kang, 2007; Ikenberry, 2008; Johnston, 2008; Zhu, 2008; Buzan, 2010; Clark, 2014). However, most of these works, insightful and valuable as they are individually, are best described as ‘theoretical explanation’ and ‘applied theory testing’, in which IR theory is used as a tool to explain what China is or is not, what it will do or will not do, what China’s rise means for other states and the international order as a whole, and so forth. In short, the focus of analysis is largely an empirical one, often with policy relevance in mind, or at least the theoretical focus is narrowly conceived in terms of methodology (Sørensen, 2013). In other words, ‘Theory is engaged but the contribution is framed as empirical/​methodological rather than theoretical as such’ (Kristensen, 2015: 642). As a consequence, even as some studies may be theoretically reflective and devote a substantial amount of attention to the implications for existing theories, the findings often lead to the preference to one existing theory over another, or the refinement of an analytical model incorporating a number of perspectives or a more complete set of variables (for example in terms of analytical eclecticism). Rarely do they result in a more radical outcome of challenging the assumptions and concepts of existing IR theories per se. When China’s rise is understood ‘literally’ and treated merely as a case for theory testing, we argue that this represents a missed opportunity for the development of IR theory. As a result, the theorization of China’s rise tends to be stumped by a twin tendency in IR: (i) to think in paradigms and (ii) to return to familiar concepts. Such a tendency in turn may unwittingly reinforce the impression that countries in the developing world are merely examples of some universal phenomena already observed and theorized elsewhere. Sinologist and political scientist Michael Dutton (2002: 495) once lamented ‘the impossibility of writing a work that is principally of a theoretical nature but that is empirically and geographically grounded in Asia rather than in Europe or America’. ‘Why is it that,’ he asks, ‘when it comes to Asian area studies, whenever “theory” is invoked, it is invariably understood to mean “applied theory” and assumed to be of value only insofar as it helps tell the story of the “real” in a more compelling way?’ Dutton’s grievance is mainly with the field of Asian area studies. But his question is equally applicable to the study of China’s IR. 5

CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

China’s rise and IR theory: a case for deeper engagement It has now become a cliché that China and East Asia in general are the most economically dynamic region in the world. Although we do not necessarily agree with Kenneth Waltz’s (1979:73) assertion that ‘A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers’, we argue that no IR theory claiming explanatory power and contemporary relevance can reasonably ignore the case of China’s rise and IR in East Asia. And yet, existing IR theories, as many have pointed out, are largely based on European/​Western experiences (Kang, 2003; Hobson, 2012; Rozman, 2015: 2; Acharya and Buzan, 2017). Not surprisingly, when applied to the histories and experiences of the ‘non-​Western’ world, ‘long-​established truisms in Western IRT [International Relations Theory] are quickly called into question’ (Buzan and Little, 2010: 197; see also Kang, 2003: 58; Hsiung, 2012; Kavalski, 2012). Chinese foreign policy, for example, has challenged the neat analytical categories of ‘status-​quo’ and ‘revisionist’ powers in IR theory and practice (Johnston, 2003: 6). Indeed, understanding regional IR can ‘expand the conceptual tools for theorising about IR more generally’ (Johnston, 2012: 56). Kang (2003/​04: 168) has demonstrated that the field of political economy has been able to develop new theoretical concepts such as ‘developmental states’ and ‘varieties of capitalism’ through its focus on Asian developments, and he sees no reason why IR theorists cannot enrich IR theory from studying Asia in a similarly way. Despite such calls for connecting Asia/​China with IR theorizing, several factors continue to thwart this endeavour. The first factor concerns the ‘demography’ of IR theorists. While no longer a purely American or Western social science (Hoffmann, 1977; Wæver, 1998), the IR discipline at its ‘theoretical core’ continues to be dominated by ‘Western’ scholars, academia, knowledge and experiences, which in most cases draw upon empirical case studies from Europe and North America, rather than Asia, China or the ‘non-​Western’ world more broadly. As already noted, when China enters the theoretical debate, it is often a matter of applying mainstream Western IR theories and practices to China, rather than drawing new theoretical insights from it. The road to deciphering contemporary China frequently passes through ‘Western’ experiences and analogies such as the Thucydides Trap, the Monroe Doctrine and Wilhelmine Germany (Pan, 2012). Meanwhile, this has not been helped by the fact that the study of China tends to be ‘dominated by Sinologists’ or area specialists, not IR theorists (Chan, 2008: 121). While more scholars now excel at studying both general IR and China (for example Alastair Iain Johnston, the late L.H.M. Ling, Qin Yaqing, Chih-​yu Shih, Wang Jisi, Yan Xuetong and Yongjin Zhang), these are exceptions that prove the rule. 6

Introduction

Second, there seems to be a lack of the ‘surprise’ factor in China’s steady rise over a long period of time, in contrast with the Cold War’s sudden and unexpected end (Gaddis, 1992/9​ 3: 5). Throughout the past few decades, the rise of China has constantly remained in the news headlines. Treated either with some scepticism, or as a normal instance of the rise of great powers, it seems to have been a fixture in the public discourse. Often likened to the rise of previous powers, it is almost taken for granted that the same power transition logic should apply. That is, ‘ “Western” theoretical frameworks [continue to] have much to say about international relations in Asia’ or China, and such frameworks only need to be more ‘context sensitive’ in terms of their variables when applied to Asia/​China (Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2003: 19). A third factor may have to do with an Orientalist assumption of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’. While some see little need for theorizing China’s rise because the phenomenon seems nothing new or unusual, others see it as merely one distinctive case, so much so that its ‘unique 3,000-​year history of essential isolation locates itself outside the purview of any general theory that might be applicable to other states’ (Rosenau, 1994: 524). For instance, perceiving Chinese foreign policy behaviour as ‘dictated by a peculiar operational code of conduct’, Kim (1994: 402–​3) argues that ‘theorizing about Chinese foreign policy becomes an exceptionally daunting task, and the case against joining the theoretical quest seems rather compelling’. The treatment of China’s rise as something either routine or unique reflects a broader problem in mainstream IR theory, namely a ‘Columbus syndrome’ (Kavalski, 2018a: 1–​15). The 1492 voyage of Christopher Columbus set in motion a period of European conquest. Columbus failed to recognize the ‘newness’ of the ‘New World’ that he stumbled upon; he also refused to recognize that the Amerindians spoke a different language from him. Instead, he merely assumed that the indigenous populations were unable to speak. Thus, Columbus’ failure to recognize the diversity of languages permits him, when he confronts a foreign tongue, only two possible, and complementary, forms of behavior: to acknowledge it as a language but to refuse to believe it is different; or to acknowledge its difference but to refuse to admit it is a language. (Todorov 1984: 30; emphasis added) In this respect, Columbus ‘knows in advance what he will find’ (Todorov, 1984: 17) and acknowledges only the things that fit his preconceived model, while ignoring all the aspects that seemed incongruent. The implication here is that IR theory’s knowledge production suffers from a similar condition to that of Columbus. That is, when it encounters ‘other’ concepts, practices, and experience of the ‘international’, IR more 7

CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

often than not reverts to the prism of its Columbus syndrome: either it recognizes them as narratives about world politics but does not acknowledge that they are different; or acknowledges that they are different, but refuses to admit that they are part of IR (thereby relegating them to fields such as cultural studies, area studies and anthropology). As a result, the realities, complexities and dynamism of global life are reduced to fit pre-​scripted (and prescribed) storylines (Kavalski, 2018b: 268–​91). In this setting, considering that the encounters between IR theory and Asia more generally have long been plagued by a broader pattern of ‘narrow vision, slow awakening to an area long overlooked, and belated theoretical reorientation’ (Rozman, 2015: 1), the failure to take China’s rise as a significant theory-​generating event in IR becomes less baffling. The aforementioned ‘Global IR’ project –​which first emerged in an influential Special Issue of International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific –​has begun to call into question the ethnocentric limitations of mainstream Western IR theory (see Acharya and Buzan, 2007; Acharya, 2014b). It has drawn attention to two interlinked aspects of Western centrism in IR theory: first, its overwhelming focus on Western history and experience; and, second, the dominance of Western scholarship in IR theory. Thus far, the ‘Global IR’ project’s emphasis has been particularly on addressing the second dimension of Western centrism, as exemplified by its call for better ‘engag[ing] IR scholarship from the Global South’ (Acharya and Buzan, 2017: 6–​13). It is no doubt important to bring in more ‘non-​Western voices’; however, at the same time including seemingly ‘non-​Western’ issues (for example China’s rise) as a theoretical concern equally deserves attention. As noted earlier, the Chinese IR theory debate has sought to put China’s rise as its theoretical core (Qin, 2005), and some Chinese theorists have made important contribution in this regard (for example Zhao, 2005; Yan, 2011; 2015; Qin, 2016; Zhao, 2016). But we argue that China’s rise is not a purely Chinese phenomenon or even a regional issue which can be fully grasped from a ‘Chinese’ or ‘Asian’ perspective. Rather, as a complex global phenomenon, it should be the subject of theorizing from global as well as ‘Chinese’ perspectives. Over-​emphasizing Chinese/​Asian perspectives may inadvertently reinforce the very bias that ‘non-​Western’ is non-​mainstream, particular, regional and local, whereas ‘Western’ is mainstream, universal and core (Johnston, 2012: 56). Such dichotomies could hinder the opportunity for cross-​fertilization between ‘non-​Western’ and ‘Western’ sources in the understanding of China’s rise. Without underestimating the important and unique role Chinese IR theorists can play, China’s rise is nevertheless too important a global issue to be left for Chinese IR theorists alone to theorize. In any case, what matters is not just whose theories are relevant and ought to be included, but also what theories or perspectives can broaden our understanding of both the increasingly complex worlds and China’s complex and growing roles within them. 8

Introduction

Beyond theory testing, beyond IR By now, it should have become clearer that by ‘theorizing China’s rise’ we do not mean applied theoretical testing (Pan and Kavalski, 2018). Theory testing, as Iain Johnston (2012: 58) notes, involves ‘bringing more detailed empirical evidence to bear on these debates, perhaps helping to clarify which theories, hypotheses, and findings are more plausible than others, and confirming whether there are clear temporal and spatial limits on theory generalization’. It is often driven by specific theoretical concerns, and its testing case is reduced to a source of raw data which may already be framed in accordance with the theory being tested (Acharya and Buzan, 2017: 16). Thus, one problem is that ‘If the contents of observations depend on the theory that should be tested, it is self-​validating rather than a real test’ (Saariluoma, 1997: 148 n 24). The upshot is that rather than challenging IR theory’s ethnocentrism, testing ‘Western’ theory through case studies from the ‘non-​Western world’ is likely to ‘reinforce the image of area studies as little more than provider of raw data to Western theory’ (Acharya, 2014: 650). Therefore, by ‘theorizing China’s rise’ we mean efforts to explore the potential understudied theoretical implications of China’s rise for understanding not only China’s rise but also international relations more broadly. So instead of taking the meaning of China’s rise as self-​evident or debating empirically whether China has been rising or whether its rise will be peaceful, the main focus of theorizing would be on what this phenomenon is or is not, how such a phenomenon may present new conceptual and theoretical challenges and opportunities, and to what extent it may unsettle existing assumptions in IR theory. Questions that may be asked include, for example, in what sense have existing conceptual, theoretical and ontological assumptions been adequate in understanding this phenomenon? How does China’s rise theoretically challenge the Westphalian world? What is new about its rise, in comparison to the rise of great powers in the past? Are changes reflected in this phenomenon indicative of some broader and more fundamental transformation in the world as a whole? Can China’s relations with the rest of the world continue to be understood in terms of inter-​national relations? Have the conventional theoretical observations of China’s use of power been vindicated? If not, what does this say about our conception of power in general and Chinese power in particular? What does it mean and entail to know China? Is it possible to produce objective knowledge about China and its international behaviour? And what do these theoretical reflections mean for our understanding of world politics in general? While not all of these questions (and there are more) can be examined in this volume, the immediate purpose here is to illustrate the kind of questions that may come under the ambit of what we mean by ‘theorizing China’s rise’. In doing so, we adopt a less conventional conception of theory as well. 9

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For example, we are less interested in the function of theory as primarily predicting regularities (Waltz, 1979: 68) since such theory is ill-​equipped to understand change, unpredictability, temporality and complexity (Kavalski, 2015; Shih and Ikeda, 2016; Nordin et al, 2019). Instead, our conception of theory is closer to the meta-​theoretical, ontological and epistemological rethinking of IR, which may include challenging the notion of ‘international relations’ itself. This is in part what we mean by ‘beyond IR’, in search of global political and social theory about world politics. This should not be misunderstood as a suggestion that the contributors to this edited volume subscribe to a uniform understanding of what amounts to theory or theorizing. Rather, the diversity that follows is only possible when we eschew a rather narrow view of theory from the outset. This theorizing inevitably has implications for particular IR theories. Yet its main purpose is not about validating or testing a particular theory, or a particular national school of IR theory for that matter. It is more about reflecting on more meta-​theoretical issues such as identity, power, knowledge production, ontology, relationality and spirituality. It shares some of the attempts in Global IR to ‘develop concepts and approaches from non-​ Western contexts on their own terms and to apply them not only locally, but also to other contexts, including the larger global canvas’ (Acharya, 2014a: 650). In doing so, it challenges the myth that ‘only the Westphalian Self can theorise about the Rest, not the other way around’ and recognizes the ‘critical role [of the non-​Western world] in making world politics’ (Ling, 2014: 92). Nonetheless, it is not our primary aim to challenge the ‘Western theoretical dominance’ (Acharya, 2014b: 59, emphasis added) as such, nor is it mainly about bringing Chinese ideas into IR theory (Qin, 2009; Yan, 2011). In fact, we reject the very dichotomies between ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’ and between ‘the West’ and ‘China’, and seek to embrace all relevant theoretical ideas, be they from China, the West or elsewhere, so long as they are able to shed light on how China’s rise can be best understood and how such understanding may help us better conceptualize world politics. As well as seeing the need to overcome the Western/​non-​Western dichotomy, we advocate the need to go beyond the discipline of IR in order to enrich and stimulate our theorizing of China’s rise (and, by extension, other facets of global life). China is never an exclusively IR property, and its existence is conditioned not only by IR scholars’ favourite factors, such as the international system, the national interest or power, but also by the contingent interactions between culture/​civilization, geography, history, politics, economy, demography, globalization and social change more broadly. So the study of China’s rise cannot be confined to the theoretical and conceptual repository of IR, however intellectually rich that repository has now become. This point should not be controversial, as interdisciplinarity is the norm rather than the exception in the development of all academic 10

Introduction

disciplines. Going beyond IR in theorizing China’s rise does not mean abandoning IR altogether. It means broadening a discipline whose identity is, or should be, from the beginning multidisciplinary and fluid in nature (Cudworth et al, 2018; Kavalski, 2020). In this context, we hope that when our readers read the individual chapters included in this edited volume, they will keep an open mind and welcome unfamiliar concepts and theoretical frameworks from other fields as potential sources of stimulation and cross-​ fertilization, rather than dismissing them out of hand as alien or arcane.

Outline of the book This section provides a brief outline of the chapters included in this volume. For the purposes of organization, the contributions have been divided into two parts –​the first one details theoretical innovations that step outside the Eurocentric analytical paths, while the second one critically reflects on some established frameworks of analysis in relation to China’s rise. Of course, it has to be admitted that such division is schematic and, as the readers of the volume will soon recognize, there are multiple interactions, dialogues and ideational continuities between the chapters in the two parts. In Chapter 1, John Agnew draws critical attention to the underlying geographies of knowledge dominating mainstream explanation and understanding of IR. His point of departure is the suggestion that theories arise in distinctive geographical and historical contexts rather than reflecting universal experience. Representing a clear challenge to the conventional wisdom in IR theory, China’s rise opens up the possibility of thinking about theory in terms of contextual theorizing based on understanding the contingencies between global pressures and local/​national agency. Thus, China’s international relations are best theorized in terms of the politics of choice between alternative framings of China in the world rather than as the invariable outcome of some seemingly general theory that is in fact the projection of a current hegemony and its particular understandings of that world. In Chapter 2, the late L.H.M. Ling offers a poignant critique of what she labelled ‘Westphalian IR’. She argued that the disciplinary mainstream has no other option but to entrench dichotomized deadlocks such as ‘China’ versus the ‘West’. Ling argues that in order to break out of such stultifying bifurcations, scholars need to emancipate IR spiritually, not just analytically, politically or even ethically. For Ling, this meant having an ‘open mind and heart when encountering difference through others’. Epistemic compassion epitomizes this process. Two pre-​Westphalian traditions provide a means and an example: Advaita monism and Daoist trialectics. Chapter 3 offers a contribution to the relational theorizing of China’s rise. The point of departure for this study is twofold: first, that the criticism 11

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of substantialism offered by the Anglophone literature on the relational turn fails to overcome its Euro-​centrism; and second, that by subscribing to the epistemic duality of the West versus the non-​West, the Sinophone literature has aborted the political (and ethical) promise of the relationality which it seeks to uncover. Emilian Kavalski deploys the notion of guanxi as an analytical bridge between the Anglophone and the Sinophone strands of the relational turn in IR. His intent is to amplify the intrinsic relationality both of global life and the realms of IR. In Chapter 4, Astrid Nordin and Graham Smith focus on the concept and practices of friendship in IR theory, in light of the Chinese portrayal of China as a new and friendlier kind of great power. Their claim is that the analytical outlines of such conversations on friendship can contribute to the development of genuinely relational IR thinking. Simultaneously, this mode of relational theorizing moves beyond the traditional focus on ossified forms of friendship and enmity centred on the anxious self. Nordin and Smith emphasize that the vantage point of friendship suggests a way out of the dangers of theorizing Self in contrast to Other, and reopens the possibility to conceptualize Self with Other. Chapter 5 suggests that the theorization of China’s rise offers a unique opportunity for the epistemological re-​worlding of both Western and non-​ Western sites. To that end, Yih-​Jye Hwang, Raoul Bunskoek and Chih-​yu Shih reassess the concept of tianxia –​probably one of the most emblematic notions associated with the study of China. The chapter (i) demonstrates how the concept of tianxia constitutes a post-​Western site; (ii) introduces different interpretations of tianxia; and (iii) discusses how both the concept itself and its contemporary Chinese interpretations have been received by the Anglophone mainstream of IR. The second part of this volume opens with a contribution by Wang Jisi in Chapter 6. His study offers a thoughtful consideration of both China’s attitudes towards and its impact on the existing patterns of world affairs. At the same time, this chapter offers a detailed outline of the basic analytical concepts that go into the explanation and understanding of China, its rise, as well as both its potential and actual effects on international order. Wang’s suggestion is that theorizing China’s rise will do well to engage policy discourses and, especially, the impact of such discourses on the IR perspectives that their narratives inform. In Chapter 7, Barry Buzan draws attention to the strengths and weaknesses of the ES theory for understanding China and its rise. On the one hand, his study explores the conditions under which ES theory can offer a meaningful engagement with China’s rise. On the other hand, Buzan outlines the theoretical challenges posed by China to the established analytical frameworks of ES theory. In particular, he highlights the issues of ‘hierarchy’ and ‘face’ as two challenges that the country’s ‘Chinese characteristics’ pose both for 12

Introduction

policy makers and for how the ES thinks about international society. In this respect, Buzan’s chapter can be read as a programmatic paper outlining the ways in which ES theory needs to adapt if it is to address meaningfully China’s rise. In Chapter 8 Hung-​jen Wang examines the claim that China’s rise infuses an ‘Eastphalian’ normative framework for the study and observation of world affairs. Apart from a mere contrast with the ‘Westphalian’ commitments underpinning the IR mainstream, there appears to be little agreement about what such Eastphalian framework entails and how China’s growing prominence in global life impacts on its ramifications. Advocating a hybrid Westphalian-​Eastphalian approach, which dispenses with the flawed binaries informing the Western-​versus-​non-​Western IR analyses, Wang’s analysis offers a thoughtful analysis of the implications of the term and its contributions to the explanation and understanding of China’s rise. Challenging the mono-​causal, mono-​directional and mono-​disciplinary nature of existing theories in their explanations of China’s rise, Christopher McNally in Chapter 9 argues that a multi-​level, open dialectical approach is needed to better understand Sino-​capitalism dialectic underpinning China’s political economy and the dialectic resulting from Sino-​capitalism’s global emergence, which involves a melding of neo-​statist and neoliberal precepts to forge a new transitional politico-​economic order. In doing so, he criticizes the dichotomous views of China’s rise afforded by the realist and neoliberal institutionalist theories. He argues that the complex and dynamic nature of China’s rising global power lies in the emergence of a new form of capitalism centred on China that is global in reach yet differs deeply in its organizing principles and ideational precepts from established forms of capitalism in the West. Chapter 10 tackles the ontological inadequacies of mainstream IR to account for China’s rise. As Chengxin Pan demonstrates, the disciplinary shortcomings are predicated on IR’s Cartesian/​Newtonian ontological commitments. In order to rectify such defects, Pan proposes an alternative, holographic relational ontology. This ontology posits that the world exists fundamentally as holographic relations, in which a part is a microcosmic reflection of its larger whole(s) (Pan, 2020). As such, China’s rise is best understood as a phenomenon of holographic transition, in which characteristics of those larger wholes are being enfolded into what is known as ‘China’.

Conclusion The phenomenon of China’s rise offers IR an extraordinary opportunity for critical reflection and self-​appraisal. The contributions in this edited volume see themselves as part of the ongoing ‘search for a vocabulary … by 13

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means of which we can start to ask systemic questions about the possibility of fundamental international transformations today’ (Ruggie, 1993: 140). In pursuit of these aims, the contributors offer meaningful discussions of how we might be better able to understand China, while simultaneously exploring how the case of China could provide opportunities for IR scholars to rethink the ways in which we have long theorized international relations. The contention of the contributors to this volume is that the transformative nature of China’s rise for world politics is also a point of departure for theoretical innovation, reflection and transformation in the discipline of IR itself. The contributions to this edited volume do not intend to offer a definitive resolution to all the questions associated with the theorization of China in IR (Kavalski, 2021); however, by illuminating their complexity, the following chapters suggest some outlines of new IR modes of critique, thinking and knowledge capable of imagining global life other than as it currently is (Gunitsky, 2013). At the same time, this volume should not be misunderstood as an exercise in ordering or classification; instead, it aims to draw attention to the multiplicity of Chinese engagements in and with world affairs, as well as their footprint on IR theory building. Accounting for such complexity demands an open-​source medium for this conversation to overcome the aforementioned ‘Columbus syndrome’ in IR. It is hoped that the contributions to this edited volume make a constructive first cut in such an endeavour. Acknowledgements An earlier version of this chapter was published as Chengxin Pan and Emilian Kavalski (2018) ‘Theorizing China’s Rise in and beyond International Relations’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 18(3): 289–​3 11 (republished here by permission of Oxford University Press). References Acharya, A. (2014a) ‘Global International Relations and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, 58(4): 647–​59. Acharya, A. (2014b) ‘Thinking Theoretically About Asian IR’ in D. Shambaugh and M. Yahuda (eds), International Relations of Asia. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp 59–​89. Acharya, A. (2017) ‘Theorising the International Relations of Asia’, Pacific Review, 30(6): 816–​27. Acharya, A. and Buzan, B. (2007) ‘Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 7(3): 287–​312. 14

Introduction

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Qin, Y. (2005) ‘Theoretical Problematic of International Relationship Theory and the Construction of a Chinese School’, Social Sciences in China, 26(1): 62–​72. Qin, Y. (2009) ‘Relationality and Processual Construction: Bringing Chinese Ideas into International Relations Theory’, Social Sciences in China, 30(3): 5–​20. Qin, Y. (2010) ‘International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(2): 129–​53. Qin, Y. (2016) ‘A Relational Theory of World Politics’, International Studies Review, 18(1): 33–​47. Ren, X. (2020) ‘Grown from Within: Building a Chinese School of International Relations’, The Pacific Review, 33(3–​4): 386–​412. Reus-​Smit, C. (2013) ‘Beyond Metatheory?’ European Journal of International Relations, 19(3): 589–​608. Rosenau, J. (1994) ‘China in a Bifurcated World: Competing Theoretical Perspectives’ in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Clarendon, pp 524–​51. Ross, R.S. and Zhu F. (eds) (2008) China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Rozman, G. (2015) Misunderstanding Asia: International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Ruggie, J.G. (1993) ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’, International Organization, 47(4): 139–​74. Saariluoma, P. (1997) Foundational Analysis, London: Routledge. Shambaugh, D. (2013) China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shih, C.Y. and Ikeda, J. (2016) ‘International Relations of Post-​ hybridity: Dangers and Potentials in Non-​synthetic Cycles’, Globalizations, 13(4), 454–​68. Sørensen, C. (2013) ‘Is China Becoming More Aggressive?’ Asian Perspective, 37(3): 363–​85. Smith, S., Booth, K. and Zalewski, M. (eds) (1996) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tammen, R. and Kugler, J. (2006) ‘Power Transition and China-​US Conflicts’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 1(1): 35–​55. Tang, S. (2013) The Social Evolution of International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tickner, A.B. (2013) ‘Core, Periphery and (Neo)imperialist International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 19(3): 627–​46. Todorov, T. (1984) The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (trans. R. Howard). New York: Harper and Row.

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Introduction

Wæver, O. (1998) ‘The Sociology of a Not So Inter national Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations’, International Organization, 52(4): 687–​727. Walton, D. and Kavalski, E. (eds) (2016) Power Transition in Asia. London: Routledge. Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading: Addison-​Wesley. Wohlforth, W. (1994/​95) ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, 19(3): 91–​129. Yan, X. (2011) Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Yan, X. (2015) Shijie quanli de zhuanyi: zhengzhi lingdao yu zhanlue jingzeng (World Power Transition: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition). Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe. Yan, X. (2020) Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zhang, F. (2012) ‘The Tsinghua Approach and the Inception of Chinese Theories of International Relations’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(1): 73–​102. Zhang, Y. and Buzan, B. (2012) ‘The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(1): 3–​36. Zhao, T. (2005) Tianxia tixi: shijie zhidu zhexue daolun [The Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of a World Institution]’. Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe. Zhao, T. (2016) Tianxia de dangdaixing: Shijie zhixu de shijian yu xiangxiang [A Possible World of All-​under-​heaven System: A World Order in the Past and for the Future]. Beijing: Zhongxin chubanshe. Zheng, B. (2005) ‘China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status’, Foreign Affairs, 84(5): 18–​24. Zhu, F. (2008) ‘China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful: How Unipolarity Matters’, in R.S. Ross and Zhu F. (eds), China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp 34–​54.

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PART I

Theorizing China’s Rise: Beyond Eurocentric Knowledge Production

1

Putting China in the World: From Universal Theory to Contextual Theorizing John Agnew

Introduction In much of what goes for international relations (IR) theory, the re-​ emergence of China as a major power is interpreted largely in terms of familiar categories –​from containment and hegemonic succession on the ‘realist’ side to norm acceptance and integration on the ‘liberal’ side (for example Pan, 2012). The particular attributes of Chinese modernity and their contradictions spark little or no interest. We are seemingly trapped between the universals of theory, on the one hand, and the particulars of China, on the other. Never the twain shall meet. Yet, an argument can be made that the Chinese ‘case’ raises important questions about the universality of international relations theory as presently understood (Agnew, 2017). As the Introduction makes clear, and the chapters in this book provide all sorts of evidence, perhaps the ‘rise’ of China with the attendant difficulties of bringing it ‘to theory’ offers an opportunity both to question the very universality claimed by current theory and to reformulate theorizing in light of the Chinese experience. Today, China occupies a central place in what can be called ‘a prophetic culture’ –​the focus of the field of IR theory on predicting future events rather than explaining current practice (Woodside, 1998: 13). This requires applying a universal calculus to cases such as China in which empirical anomalies are viewed as minor particularities. In this vision, China is rising as either or both a miracle and a threat. As William Callahan (2010: 11) says: ‘China’s experience lends itself to hyperbole –​both positive and negative. The People’s Republic of China has the world’s largest population, 23

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largest portfolio of foreign exchange reserves, largest army, largest middle class, and the largest diaspora.’ The list of ‘largests’ goes on. Much of this is usually put down to the recent success of the implementation of the East Asian developmental state model as adapted and expanded from the practices of other states in the immediate region. Of course, it is based at least in part on export-​oriented manufacturing and integration into the global financial system. So, any Chinese foreign policy decisions must be placed in this context. At the same time, because of US decline or retreat on economic and military fronts and the difficulties for a still relatively poor country in responding to this, according to a host of commentators, again in Callahan’s (2010: 11) words, China is ‘either preparing to take over the world or is about to collapse’ under the weight of its own political and economic contradictions. Yet, there is no possibility of any real agency resulting from political choices made by jockeying interests and competing identities within China itself with the inevitable involvement of external actors of various sorts (for example Leonard, 2008). In this chapter I attempt three tasks with the overall purpose of making a case for contextual theorizing. Each task in sequence helps to make the overall argument. The first task is to show that the making of IR theory has been anything but universal. I rehearse the ways in which knowledge is made and circulates, arguing that there is never a ‘view from nowhere’. Knowledge of human society is always ‘local, situated, and embedded’ (Shapin, 1998: 6). The main point is to understand that theories arise in distinctive geographical contexts. The theories then can ‘travel’ and influence thinking elsewhere but only if they have powerful sponsors. This is not to endorse a simple epistemic relativism but to insist that we need to know how knowledge is made and travels in order to judge how well it actually ‘works’ (Agnew, 2007). Dominant IR theories are based on a radical separation of the domestic and international and rely on European and American historical experience as a source of analogies for understanding the world tout court. The second task is to examine recent discussions of ‘Chinese’ versus ‘Western’ approaches to world politics in terms of the geography of knowledge. I am particularly interested in how China’s rising material significance is typically interpreted in terms of either/​or thinking (historic repetition versus novelty, and so on) and how this can be interrogated to provide an alternative conception of ‘China in the world’ –​not just a repetition of other ‘cases’ or the projection of Chinese exceptionalism but of the intersection between Chinese agency and the wider global environment, including the diffusion of ideas about IR. The rise of China particularly represents a crisis for the Eurocentric ‘modern geopolitical imagination’ (Agnew, 2003), which has become second nature in conventional IR theory. This is a point repeatedly emphasized by some historians of Asia in drawing 24

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attention to alternative modernities to that of the West offered by mainstream IR (Woodside, 2006; Duara, 2015). The third task is to reflect something of the space–​time crisis in the relationship of ‘China’ to the world since its reopening to the world in the late 1970s and the types of thinking about international relations that have emerged in China in this overall context. I suggest there are four currently popular IR narratives in China whose provenance and jockeying for influence over China’s foreign policy provide a better basis for understanding ‘China in the world’ than simply importing a singular theory from elsewhere. In brief compass, these are the Pacific Rim, Confucian-​New Orientalist, realpolitik, and IR with Chinese characteristics narratives. It is the politics around these narratives that will determine what kind of knowledge about IR and political practice China will contribute to the wider world. The making of Chinese foreign policy is currently the outcome of varied domestic and external contingencies, partly because the geographical and historical limits of ‘China’ are undergoing a fundamental redefinition as the Chinese government and other Chinese actors become more important in the world (for example Woon, 2018; Foot and Goh, 2019).

‘Familiar’ analogies and the limited geographic origins of IR theory The strength of the conventional wisdom about international relations should not be underestimated. It draws from a pool of knowledge about an idealized European and North American history that gives it an authority well beyond the borders of the world in which it has developed. Through the use of metaphor and analogy, IR theory projects from a limited geographical experience onto the world at large a set of presumptions about the nature of statehood, empire, anarchy and so on that make sense of the larger world in familiar terms (for example Acharya and Buzan, 2017). So, it is not so much a lack of knowledge or curiosity about the world beyond the confines of Euro-​America that is at issue. It is the employment of terms of discourse that are rarely investigated for their particularity. They are simply presumed to be universal. From this perspective, metaphor is a crucial human talent. Metaphors are implicit generalizations whose implications can always be tested against both natural and social reality, even if this is all too rarely the case with the ones used in international relations. The ‘well’ of metaphors we draw from has narrow historical-​geographical confines. Nevertheless, some metaphors can be judged as more or less fruitful and helpful than others. Thus, for example, much of the recent explosion of writing about the United States as ‘empire’ is based on the explicit invocation of historical analogy to this or that prior empire, the British and the Roman usually, with little if any attention to 25

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minimalist criteria for what makes an empire, the changed circumstances of the day, and whether other terms or concepts might not better capture the realities of the moment. Today, for example, technological innovation diffuses readily across national borders, and global production chains transcend nation states, producing a world in which national territories and economies are increasingly disjointed. Territorial expansion is no longer the best approach to global hegemony. A story of historical continuity or repetition through the use of a recycled historical-​geographical analogy thus trumps one of change or adaptation. Analogies are a type of metaphor that involve comparison with a supposedly exemplary, similar or congruent situation elsewhere and/​or at another time. For example, ‘apartheid’ in South Africa as it was before 1994 is employed in relation to Israel’s present-​day behaviour in Palestine, notwithstanding fundamental differences in the geopolitical context concerning how settlement and movement patterns and restrictions have occurred. The term serves to seemingly familiarize a situation but by abstracting it from its actual geographical context. But the familiar language of IR theory is also hard to bypass for similar reasons even as it is imposed onto worlds for which it is possibly ill-​suited or ill-​matched. Most important is the case of an essential and undifferentiated ‘statehood’ based on the model of a historic France or the United States, assuming that all other polities around the world conform more or less to the history and capacities of the ideal-​type state. Full modern personhood has become attached to the image of the state, based in these examples, as its progenitor. Thus, imitating the originals such as France or the United States is the central moment of becoming modern for, for example, Russia, India or China. This Western ‘culturism’ underwrites the self-​ evident historical failure of such polities as China (Wang, 2011: 21–​2; also Wang, 2014: 25–​7). Failure to democratize in the same way as the United States, for example, is seen as an aberration, when the West itself has often failed to live up to its own lofty standards of democratic practice for long periods of time. ‘Illiberal tendencies’ worldwide today suggest the need to rethink the easy association between the West and an essentially ‘democratic’ modernity. The historical geopolitics that brought Europe and North America to the fore globally from the 16th century to the present is seen as a simple ‘social fact’ that can be taken for granted as animating world politics in its entirety. Whatever its precise economic and political roots, however, this global dominance has enabled the projection of a specific set of political norms onto the world at large. The ‘modern geopolitical imagination’ refers to a way of thinking that privileges the idea of zero-​sum conflicts between Great Powers in worldwide competition for ‘top dog’ status and can be thought of as a ‘system’ for visualizing the world with its most significant 26

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roots in the nature of the European encounter with the rest of the world in the 16th and 17th centuries. The analogy to an essentially European statehood also feeds into the strong tendency to radically distinguish a worldwide modern state system without any history except for a sudden moment in 17th-​century Europe when it sprang to life: the myth of the Peace of Westphalia. Widely recognized now as a problematic starting point, it nevertheless still provides the term ‘Westphalian’ to describe the essential nature of the modern state system. This reification of a seemingly timeless system, with new members acceding as they are recognized by existing ones, leaves little room to acknowledge, let alone carefully consider, how polities of various types have fared around the world with varying elements of empire, statehood as typically understood, and clan-​tribal character about them (for example Halperin and Palen, 2015). The world political map with its clearly defined borders imposes an image of geographical order on the world that is completely state-​territorial (Agnew, 1994). In sum, and contradictory to the territorial understanding of statehood (as vested in juridical sovereignty), given that each state is presumed to provide equivalent sovereignty within its territory to all others, in geopolitical space sovereignty is up for grabs as states compete for global power and influence and weak states succumb to more powerful ones. This hierarchical and often imperialist geopolitical system is one that has come to be the byword of the political elites who occupy seats of power in the most important Great Powers, hitherto mainly in Europe and North America. They presume that Rising Powers, like China, will follow their example exactly (for example Mearsheimer, 2006; Friedberg, 2011; Allison, 2017).

The making and the travels of dominant IR theory Indeed, much of what today goes for ‘international relations theory’ is the projection onto the world at large of US-​originated academic ideas about the nature of statehood and the world economy (for example Kristensen, 2015). This follows a mixture of largely mid-​20th-​century European premises about states as unitary actors, and American ones about economies as liberal and open (Inayatullah and Rupert, 1994). The theory reflects the application of criteria about how best to model a presumably hostile world drawn from selected aspects of US experience and a US-​based reading of world history. My point is not that knowledge of world politics is simply a coercive imposition of the view from some places onto others. Rather, the dominant ways in which intellectuals and political elites around the world have come to think about world politics are not the result of either an open ‘search’ for the best perspective or theory or a reflection of an essentially ‘local’ perspective. More specifically, the most prestigious repertoires of thinking 27

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about world politics represent the historical emergence of theoretical genres intimately associated with specific times and places that circulate and adapt in association with the spheres of influence of schools and authors that have the best reputations and which, in turn, reflect the current geopolitical order. US universities have been particularly important in this process. The presumption of my approach here is that global structures of political inequality underwrite whose imagination gets to dominate globally in theorizing about world politics. This in turn has obvious implications for any liberatory or democratic politics. In other words, thinking about world politics reflects the relative hierarchy of power within world politics. Yet, much dominant thinking about international relations usually makes claims that either obscure or limit the degree to which the world to which it refers is seen as hierarchical. I first provide some premises upon which the argument is based and then use the case of Chinese examples of thinking about international relations to illustrate the argument. The ‘marketplace of ideas’ is never a level playing field. There is thus geopolitics to knowledge production and circulation (for example Zhang and Kristensen, 2017). What knowledge becomes ‘normalized’ or dominant and what is marginalized have something to do with who is doing the proposing and where they are located (Agnew, 2005). In the context of world politics what is recognized as ‘serious’ knowledge is socially conditioned by the rituals, routines and recruitment practices of powerful educational and research institutions. At a world scale perhaps the outstanding feature of the past centuries has been the way most places have been incorporated into flows of knowledge dominated by Europeans and extensions of Europe overseas, such as the United States. This is the story, in Eric Wolf ’s (1982) evocative phrase, of Europe and the People without History. Consider, for example, how recent conceptions of ‘China’ in the United States and elsewhere still rely to a degree on understandings established during the term that John Hay served as US Secretary of State at the turn of the 20th century involving the Open Door policy and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Blanchard, 2013). Of course, knowledge about world politics (or anything else) from one place is not necessarily incommensurable or unintelligible relative to knowledge produced elsewhere. Cross-​cultural communication goes on all the time without everything being lost in translation. Cultures in the modern world never exist in isolation and are themselves assemblages of people with often cross-​cutting identities and commitments (Lukes, 2000). From this viewpoint, culture is ‘an idiom or vehicle of inter-​subjective life, but not its foundation or final cause’ (Jackson, 2002: 125). Be that as it may, knowledge creation and dissemination are never innocent of at least weak ontological commitments, be they national, class, gender or something else. But the history of knowledge circulation suggests that rarely are ideas simply restricted within rigid cultural boundaries. This is a deficiency of postcolonial 28

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approaches that simply carve the world up into simple oppositional zones like Global North and Global South. Rather, with powerful sponsors, international and transnational networks arise to carry and embed ideas from place to place (for example Sapiro, 2009). The intellectually dominant realist tradition of US IR theory (although even its opponents, such as liberals and idealists, share numerous assumptions with it) is based on a central assumption of ‘anarchy’ beyond state borders (Agnew, 1994; Powell, 1994). Realist theory was a reaction against the behavioural trend in US political science in the 1940s and 1950s that presumed a science of politics could be founded entirely based on rational principles of individual behaviour. It was also driven by the desire to keep close connections between academic study of world politics and practitioners in a furthering of Staatslehre or the proffering of advice to political leaders on the basis of profound and presumably unchangeable truths about human nature and the state system (Guilhot, 2008). It should be a ‘special field’ separate from the other social sciences. Relative unease over whether or not ‘international relations’ constituted or could constitute a separate ‘discipline’ was never paralleled until recently by fears that it might well be a ‘science’ based largely on projecting American views onto the world at large (for example Kripendorff, 1989; Kahler, 1993).

What China can do for IR theorizing Given its changing material-​geopolitical status, the situation of China in relation to IR theory is no longer as simple as that of an importer of American IR theory. It would also be a mistake to see all of the many commentators and contributors to debate over Chinese foreign policy as working from exactly the same script. By examining the publications of numerous think tanks and universities as revealed by their websites and academic outlets, I identify four relatively distinctive streams of narrative that currently seem to inspire most constructions of ‘China’ and its place in the world among Chinese policy entrepreneurs and intellectuals. After briefly identifying them, I turn to discussing each in more detail including its sponsors and their position within the current Chinese political-​institutional constellation. At the close I suggest that the opening up of China since the late 1970s and the fragmented authoritarianism of the regime tend to make a jockeying for influence among the narratives a real possibility. Future Chinese foreign policy will reflect this fact. This emphasis on the central importance of political agency in the face of divergent intellectual-​policy influences would benefit IR theorizing in general well beyond Chinese shores. In brief compass, the four streams of narrative are as follows. If the Pacific Rim story developed in the 1980s and 1990s is somewhat in eclipse, it still has considerable political-​economic dynamism behind it and not a little 29

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Chinese history of its own, particularly in respect of the powerful diaspora influence of China around the world. The new Orientalism narrative is the most invested in the revival of Confucianism as a guiding hand but relies on idealized images of the Chinese past that also produces hostile as well as pacific postures towards neighbouring states and the world at large. Third, the ‘nationalist geopolitik’ grouping is much less influential than the Orientalist, except perhaps among elements in the military, but is by far the most aggressive in finding much of its inspiration in the major revisionist powers of the 20th century: Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. Finally, the attempt at creating an IR theory ‘with Chinese characteristics’ represents the fourth type of IR narrative as I have defined them. This is the seemingly most benign and as yet has had the least effect in terms of formulating perspectives that can feed into policy making. But that has long been a problem for IR theory without Chinese characteristics as well. What I wish to challenge most forcefully is the popular view that China’s future ‘place in the world’ can be either simply read off from a familiar story told by those oblivious to Chinese discussions about the ‘nature’ of China and the effects that this will have on what will constitute Chinese foreign policy in the years ahead or by reproducing one of the Chinese accounts as ‘the’ single truthful one. As William Callahan (2011: 12) says: ‘To take China seriously as an emerging world power, we need to understand how Chinese scholars and policymakers imagine their future on the international stage.’ Critical examination of what is being imagined and how it affects China’s foreign relations then becomes the goal.

Chinese IR narratives As China becomes a Great Power in the Western sense of the phrase, an economic and potentially military behemoth, its leaders and intellectual elites must struggle with how to respond. Given that ‘China’ has had a centuries-​long existence as some sort of polity, this task is made particularly difficult by the rich history of geographical forms and modes of rule that have characterized it down the years (Wang, 2014). Over the past 30 years, as modern China has opened up to the world and returned to mining its past for guidance in the present, its intellectuals and policy entrepreneurs have increasingly produced IR narratives that rely heavily on past ‘experience’ as a guide to the present. In universities, think tanks, party schools, the military and among journalists, a class of ‘public intellectuals’ has grown up at least semi-​independent of the ruling party-​state (for the concept of Chinese public intellectuals see, for example, Cheek, 2006). Such narratives are inevitably selective. It is what is selected that is of most interest. Some narratives emphasize martial and expansionist elements from the Chinese past, others pick up on more pacific strains in Chinese 30

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cultural history. A number of different refrains characterize the narratives about China’s place in the world and its consequences. All of these invoke historical events and past geographies of China in their understandings of the present and their directions toward the future. Each has a distinctive geopolitical vision intrinsic to it. Different Chinese policy entrepreneurs and intellectuals and their foreign collaborators and influences have seen their narratives rise and fall in relative popularity over time. Of course, proponents see their narratives as the ‘best’ ones in the sense of providing the truest accounts. They are associated with different intellectual venues across China having differing relationships to the Communist Party and to various governmental institutions. ‘China’ is not the singular location that constant invocation of the country’s name implies. Even with a powerful centralized state and the omnipresent Communist Party, there is still a relative plurality of sites and settings across which interests jockey for influence and prestige (for example Duara, 1995). In the end, however, it is which ones among the narratives that prove most influential to Chinese governments and in the wider world and what governments choose to do on that basis that really matters. But we should not simply leap to the end of the chain before establishing the range of positions in play. As several commentators have noted, increased resort to historical events and philosophical concepts mined from deep in Chinese history has become de rigueur (for example Callahan, 2011; Rozman, 2012; Wang, 2014). At the same time, however, a deeply territorialized vision not only of China’s past and present, but also of its future inspires those narratives that are now most ascendant. The idea of the Pacific Rim (or even that of Asia-​Pacific) now seems somewhat dated. Yet in the 1990s it was central to much debate about the integration of the newly opened China into world politics inside as well as outside China. It is one-​sided to see this narrative of China’s place in the world as simply a US imposition (Connery, 1994). The focus on China as part of a larger Pacific or Asian world –​the terms vary –​was designed to place China at the centre of a web of connections around the massive Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia and around the Pacific Ocean, paying particular attention to how a widespread network of nodes and territories had played a disproportionate role in fostering the opening up and economic growth of China for the past four decades. This rendition of ‘China in the world’ gives central place to trade and investment relations at the regional level. Unsurprisingly, the bureaucracy devoted to trade and opening China to foreign markets has tended to favour this narrative. Dubbed ‘Rimspeak’ by Bruce Cumings (1998), rather than celebrating an essential Chinese identity locked into a historically given territory, this narrative sees China as a central geographical moment in a new geoeconomic logic knitting together the Pacific Rim as an alternative global focus to the previously dominant North 31

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Atlantic core. Today some views of China in relation to Asian regionalism and plans for regional-​level cooperation (even the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), operating well beyond Pacific Asia) continue to take off from this essentially outward-​looking perspective (for example Pan and Lo, 2015; Ye, 2015). What was lacking in the older formulation, it now seems clear, was much to connect the contemporary vision to a positive rendering of the Chinese past. Its proponents seem to have thought that projecting what seemed to be the dominant trend of the present into the future was sufficient justification. Yet, the emphasis on the diaspora, in particular, always ran the risk of bringing to mind, implicitly if not explicitly, the years of Chinese ‘humiliation’ at the hands of foreigners and the emigration of Chinese in search of greener pastures elsewhere than those left at home. The apparent postcolonial and post-​territorial moorings of the Pacific Rim concept have also made it seem less attractive in China in the face of the country’s seemingly self-​ sufficient economic growth, the crisis in global finance, and fears articulated in the United States of the military ‘threat’ emanating reflex-​like from an economically vibrant China. It is the Orientalist vision that has probably been most visible among popular Chinese writers and government-​oriented think tanks over the past ten years or so (for example Zhu, 2009; McGann, 2012). But this has older roots in the common insistence by many authorities, both Chinese and not, of Chinese history for most of its course down until the 20th century as representing the workings of a Sino-​centric world system (for example Wang, 2017). In some accounts, Confucian adages often provide the socio-​psychological basis to a Chinese exceptionalism that is completely different from anything to be found anywhere else. Prominent in certain popular works by Western writers (for example Fan, 2011), this type of narrative based on an idealized image of China’s past also has many Chinese proponents (for example Ye and Long, 2013). Such intellectuals and the policy makers who consume their ideas have been looking to venerable concepts such as tianxia (天下) to rethink empire and world order in a register drawn from Chinese intellectual history but applied to the contemporary world (for example Zhao Tingyang, 2005; 2011; Chapter 5). Thus, for example, Yan Xuetong (2011) borrows from the ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi to construct a hierarchical-​realist perspective predicting that a ‘balanced’ economic-​political-​military approach to Chinese foreign relations will produce better outcomes all round than would a China emphasizing economic growth alone. Others look back not so much for philosophical inspiration as to identify popular ‘historical traditions’, such as some variety of Confucianism, or historical features, such as the lack of a ‘balance-​of-​power’ between polities in East Asia (see, for example Carlson, 2011; Zhang, 2015) to underpin their prognostications about contemporary world politics. 32

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Somewhat less visible has been the discovery of pre-​Second World War German and Japanese geopolitics reframed in Chinese terms. Termed ‘the geopolitik turn’ by Christopher Hughes (2011), this type of narrative, epitomized by such books as China Dream (Liu Mingfu, 2010) and the immensely popular novel (and now film) Wolf Totem (Jiang Rong, 2004), focuses on China’s need to protect access to resources around the world through the projection of sea power. It is associated with the Chinese navy, other elements in the military, and Han nationalists. To one degree or another, all of these accounts recycle old geopolitical nostrums equivalent to Lebensraum, organismic statehood, and racial categorization. They are characterized by the same ‘moral exceptionalism’ as the older German model. China is sui generis. It is a Han Chinese enterprise in a Social Darwinian world. In this construction, China is awakening from its slumber to resurrect the martial values that in the past had led its dynasties to expand territorially across Asia. There is a particularly interesting parallel here with the strand of Japanese exceptionalism (the Nihonjin ron discourse) in the 1980s that emphasized climatic determinism: shinfūdoron. Indeed, the various narratives all have some parallel with the various strands of Japanese exceptionalist discourse. Perhaps all ‘emerging powers’ are faced with similar dilemmas in establishing a strategic rationale for their foreign policies? (for example Nau and Ollapally, 2012). The message from the realpolitik posture for China’s leaders is that every event in China’s ‘neighbourhood’ involving other actors is a potential challenge to China’s status and thus must be met with an immediate response. As a result, and among other things, ‘Ultimately no room is left for compromise in the contest with Japan, because control of the East China Sea is not just about energy reserves; it is about the bigger question of who controls Taiwan, access to the Pacific and ultimately to the world’ (Hughes, 2011: 620). The syncretism with foreign influences here is obvious, yet it now serves to justify totally Sino-​centric ends. Finally, by comparison significantly more anodyne, are those attempts mentioned earlier at configuring a political science conception of international relations with Chinese characteristics (Qin, 2011a; Kim, 2016). Many studies are of this genre. As argued previously, much of what goes for IR theory was invented in the United States. Sinicizing such an approach takes several forms. One involves ‘highlighting Chinese traditions as a partial explanation of Chinese diplomatic conduct’ (Ming, 2012: 105). In this way allusions to ‘harmony’ and analogies to ancient dynastic wars take on deeper meaning as representing something fundamentally Chinese rather than as noble and arguably universal sentiments or historically contingent events of distant memory. Implicit here still is a potential celebration of an essential Chinese difference that remains unrelated to much actual Chinese history. Rather more profoundly, however, the other narrative involves reorienting the entire field (inside and beyond China) around concepts drawn from the 33

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ancient philosopher Xunzi (and others), the benevolent nature of Chinese power, and a ‘normative hierarchical order’. Reading across a number of writers, particularly Qin Yaqing (2011b), Yan Xuetong (2011) and Wang Yiwei (2007), Allen Carlson (2011: 101) sees evidence for ‘the development of a new vision of world order which supplements, if not replaces, Westphalia with newly resurrected, yet historically grounded, “Chinese” concepts of how international politics might be reorganized’. Much of this parallels the Orientalist narrative (second on the list) but using its explicit reference to Chinese history to engage with more universalist theoretical approaches rather than remaining a world apart, so to speak. For example, a rising China needs followers not just supplicants as in the hegemonic stability theory beloved of American exceptionalists. Increasingly, however, these accounts appear more ‘realist’ in their emphasis on China versus the rest than oriented to a ‘rationalist’ view of relative gains among fellow states (Lynch, 2009). Moreover, and ironically, the reference point is Westphalia even as Chinese history is mined for concepts and crucial events to argue against; it is suggestive again of the degree to which this new narrative is of mixed and not simply Chinese origin. Yan, for example, writes of a ‘moral realism’ to convey this hybridity (for example Larson, 2020). Of course, this is by no means a new development. Chinese intellectuals and politicians have wrestled with Western influences, not least the now increasingly forgotten borrowing from Marxism, for centuries (Callahan, 2015). Mining history, it seems, is as much about what is forgotten as about what is remembered.

The politics of the IR narratives To what extent can these narratives be seen as potentially leading to different possible foreign policy positions significant beyond China’s borders? In the first place, the possibility for jockeying among a range of positions inspired by different narratives has a contemporary historical basis. China’s renewed opening to the world since the late 1970s represents a ‘time-​space crisis’ in the sense that China can no longer be set in an eternally present and geographically contained world such as that of the Cold War but must be increasingly externally oriented and dynamic, drawing ideas from abroad but also from what had been ‘lost’ with the official disavowal of the past China from before the 1949 Revolution. This introduces a fundamental instability into the making of Chinese foreign policy simply because the geographical and historical limits of ‘China’ are undergoing a fundamental redefinition (see Chapter 10 on China’s spatio-​temporal holographic transition). This helps to understand why perhaps so much contemporary debate in China involves recourse to pre-​revolutionary historical sources and analogies even as they must be adapted to a different world-​geographical milieu than those 34

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historical ones from which they derive. China’s new prominence demands looking back to when it had a perhaps similar destiny. As yet, however, recognition of the fact that China is ensnared to a startling extent, for example, in the network-​based logic of globalization (for example Pan, 2009) has had only limited effects on most of the IR visions so far in question (for example Hameiri and Jones, 2016). This may change now that President Xi senses a role for China as a sponsor for the US-​led globalization from which the United States itself has been in retreat, and not just with the ascendance of Donald Trump. But contemporary theorizing remains largely captive to territorialized images of global politics with either a world of states or great swathes of the globe presumably always under some Great Power or other’s sway. This focus has twin sources, not dissimilar to elsewhere but with Chinese characteristics. One is the centrality of bureaucratic politics with the jockeying for influence in higher circles between ministries and political factions (Zhang, 2016). The other is the emphasis on centralized diplomacy and the presentation of a Chinese ‘face’ to the world (Ho, 2016). These certainly encourage a degree of pragmatism in the approach to strategic policy (for example Stenslie, 2014). It is also important to emphasize that although the Chinese government remains authoritarian, policy making is still relatively open to a variety of influences, including those of intellectuals, military officers, journalists and others. The literature on Chinese politics sometimes refers to such people as ‘policy entrepreneurs’, suggesting that they compete with one another for the ear of political leaders and public opinion (for example Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Jakobson and Manuel, 2016). This ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ offers a useful heuristic for considering the wide range of IR narratives that have emerged into prominence in recent years. The Chinese party state is no longer, if it ever was, best thought of as a singularly monolithic entity. The 2020–​21 COVID-​19 pandemic, widely interpreted in the United States and Europe as not only the result of the culinary peculiarity of China as its point of origin, but as also showing how simply authoritarian the regime is in its capacity to manage untoward events, was in fact bureaucratically bungled at the outset and then relied on public health practices imported from the broader world to bring the pandemic under control (Baldwin, 2021). A clearer example of the moving between worlds to which I have been alluding could hardly be found. Not only do not-​so-​distant fissures within the party elite over promotions to top-​tier leadership positions reveal distinctive ideological and personalized factions, different factions are clearly recruiting support from within the ranks of the burgeoning intelligentsia to provide them with rationales and justifications for their policy positions. This said, it is important not to overstate the degree to which opinions can be freely expressed outside fairly narrow and officially prescribed limits. China may be a post-​totalitarian 35

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society but it is hardly an open one. The elevation of the princeling Xi Jinping to head the party and the state, only the second leader of post-​1949 China chosen by his peers (Mao Zedong was the other), seems to represent the beginning of a clampdown (McGregor, 2019). The decision in 2018 to abolish term limits for this president suggests an increasingly personalized centralized rule. But as Roderick MacFarquhar (2015: 6) remarks with respect to Xi’s lack of an appealing if incoherent ideology such as Mao Zedong Thought to guide him, ‘Without a substantive positive ideology to grip the Chinese people, Xi has been forced to go negative, listing alien doctrines to be extirpated’ with only his anti-​corruption campaign to possibly transform the party he leads and to prevent the collapse of single-​party rule. A mélange of Marxist-​Leninist slogans, state capitalism and Confucian adages, Xi Thought seems unlikely in itself to provide a coherent guide to Chinese foreign policy. To the extent that it does one can see a certain rendering of the sort of view expressed by Zhao Tingyang (2005) about a ‘balanced’ approach to China’s foreign relations, drawing explicitly on examples from Chinese imperial history even as China still remains officially attached to the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence premised on a classical or Westphalian view of territorial sovereignty (see Chapter 8). Implicit in it is also the strategic vision of a figure such as Yan Xuetong (for ­example 2014). Interestingly, both Zhao and Yan frequently write op-​ed articles in leading Chinese and foreign newspapers and magazines (for example Yan, 2018; Zhao, 2018). As a result, and at least for the near future, as the Chinese proverb says: ‘The gun shoots the bird with its head up’ (qiang da chutou niao) (quoted in Esarey and Qiang, 2008: 755–​6). In other words, there would seem to be strict limits to political-​intellectual pluralism. Events in the wider world, however, may well mandate significant shifts in the balance of power between the various narrative streams in the years to come.

Conclusion In brief compass, I have tried to outline and tie together three general themes. The first is the importance of considering the geographies of knowledge about IR theory rather than simply accepting its ‘self-​evident’ universality. Its very familiarity then informs how we look at the world. Yet it is the result of a very specific contextual rather than universal historical experience. The second is how China represents a clear challenge to the conventional wisdom in IR theory but in a way that opens up the possibility of thinking about theory in different terms from those in which we usually think: contextual theorizing based on understanding the contingencies between global pressures and local/​national agency. The third theme brings these two together by examining recent efforts within China at articulating that country’s relationship to the wider world (putting China in the world) 36

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and how this focus can help us understand international relations in a more contextualized manner, paying close attention to the intersection between Sino-​centric elements on the one hand and borrowed elements and influences on the other. From this perspective, and as illustrated by the case of contemporary China, actual international relations are best theorized in terms of the politics of choice between alternative framings that influence foreign policy rather than as the invariable outcome of some general theory that stands above and beyond the world but in fact is the projection of a current hegemony and its understandings of that world. References Acharya, A. and Buzan, B. (2017) ‘Why Is There No Non-​western International Relations Theory? Ten Years On’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 17(3): 341–​70. Agnew, J. (1994) ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory’, Review of International Political Economy, 1(1): 53–​80. Agnew, J. (2003) Geopolitics: Re-​Visioning World Politics. 2nd edition. London: Routledge. Agnew, J. (2005) Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Agnew, J. (2007) ‘Know-​where: Geographies of Knowledge of World Politics’, International Political Sociology, 1(2): 138–​48. Agnew, J. (2017) ‘Continuity, Discontinuity and Contingency’ in T. Basaran, D. Bigo, E.-​P. Guittet, and R.B.J. Walker (eds), International Political Sociology: Transversal Lines. London: Routledge, pp 49–​67. Allison, G. (2017) Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Baldwin, P. (2021) Fighting the First Wave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blanchard, E.M. (2013) ‘Constituting China: The Role of Metaphor in the Discourses of Early Sino-​American Relations’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 16(2): 177–​205. Callahan, W.A. (2010) China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Callahan, W.A. (2011) ‘Tradition, Modernity, and Foreign Policy in China’ in W.A. Callahan and E. Barabantseva (eds), China Orders the World. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp 1–​21. Callahan, W.A. (2015) ‘History, Tradition and the China Dream’, Journal of Contemporary China, 24(96): 983–​1001. Carlson, A. (2011) ‘Moving Beyond Sovereignty?’ Journal of Contemporary China, 20(68): 89–​102.

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Cheek, T. (2006) ‘Xu Jilin and the Thought Work of China’s Public Intellectuals’, China Quarterly, (186): 401–​20. Connery, C. (1994) ‘Pacific Rim Discourse’, Boundary 2, 21(1): 30–​56. Cumings, B. (1998) ‘Rimspeak or the Discourse of the “Pacific Rim’’’ in A. Dirlik (ed), What’s in a Rim? Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp 29–​47. Duara, P. (1995) Rescuing History from the Nation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Duara, P. (2015) The Crisis of Global Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Esarey, A. and Qiang, X. (2008) ‘Political Expression in the Chinese Blogosphere’, Asian Survey, 48(5): 752–​72. Fan, R. (ed) (2011) The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China. Dordrecht: Springer. Foot, R. and Goh, E. (2019) ‘The International Relations of East Asia’, International Studies Review, 21(3): 398–​423. Friedberg, A.L. (2011) A Contest for Supremacy. New York: Norton. Guilhot, N. (2008) ‘The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory’, International Political Sociology, 2(4): 281–​304. Halperin, S. and Palen, R. (2015) Legacies of Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hameiri, S. and Jones, L. (2016) ‘Rising Powers and State Transformation: The Case of China’, European Journal of International Relations, 22(1): 72–​98. Ho, B.T.E. (2016) ‘About Face –​The Relational Dimension in Chinese IR Discourse’, Journal of Contemporary China, 25(98): 307–​20. Hughes, C. (2011) ‘Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism’, Journal of Contemporary China, 20(71): 601–​20. Inayatullah, N. and Rupert, M. (1994) ‘Hobbes, Smith, and the Problem of Mixed Ontologies in Neorealist IPE’ in S.J. Rosow, N. Inayatullah and M. Rupert (eds), The Global Economy as Political Space. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp 61–​85. Jackson, M. (2002) The Politics of Storytelling. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press. Jakobson, L. and Manuel, R. (2016) ‘How Are Foreign-​Policy Decisions Made in China?’ Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, 3(1): 101–​10. Jiang Rong (Lu Jiamin) (2008) Lang tuteng [Wolf Totem]. Wuhan: Changjiang wenyi chubanshe, 2004. Translated into English as Wolf Totem. London: Penguin. Kahler, M. (1993) ‘International Relations: Still an American Social Science?’ in L.B. Miller and M.J. Smith (eds), Ideas and Ideals. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp 395–​414. Kim, H.J. (2016) ‘Will IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics Be a Powerful Alternative?’ Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(1): 59–​79. 38

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Krippendorff, E. (1989) ‘The Dominance of American Approaches to International Relations’ in H.C. Dyer and L. Mangasarian (eds), The Study of International Relations. London: Macmillan. Kristensen, P.M. (2015) ‘Revisiting the “American Social Science”’, International Studies Perspectives, 16(3): 246–​69. Larson, D.W. (2020) ‘Can China Change the International System?’ Chinese Journal of International Politics, 13(2): 163–​86. Leonard, M. (2008) What Does China Think? London: Public Affairs. Lieberthal, K. and Oksenberg, M. (1988) Policy Making in China. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Liu, M. (2010) Zhongguo meng: hou Meiguo shidai de da guo siwei yu zhanlue dingwei [China Dream: Great Power Considerations and Fixing Strategy in the Post-​American Era]. Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chubanshe. Lukes, S. (2000) ‘Different Cultures, Different Rationalities?’ Journal of the History of the Human Sciences, 13(1): 5–​18. Lynch, D. (2009) ‘Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations: Realism as the Ti, Rationalism as the Yong?’ China Quarterly, 197: 87–​107. MacFarquhar, R. (2015) ‘China: The Superpower of Mr. Xi’, New York Review of Books, 15 August. McGann, J.G. (2012) Chinese Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Global Governance. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. McGregor, R. (2019) Xi Jinping: The Backlash. London: Penguin. Mearsheimer, J. (2006) ‘China’s Unpeaceful Rise’, Current History, 105(690): 160–​2. Ming, W. (2012) ‘Chinese Traditions in International Relations’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 17(2): 105–​9. Nau, H.R. and Ollapally, D. (eds) (2012) Worldviews of Aspiring Powers. New York: Oxford University Press. Pan, C. (2009) ‘What Is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the Rise of China in Global Production Networks’, Journal of Contemporary China, 18(58): 7–​25. Pan, C. (2012) Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China’s Rise. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Pan, S.-​Y. and. Lo, J.T.-​Y. (2015) ‘Re-​conceptualizing China’s Rise as a Global Power: A Neo-​tributary Perspective’, The Pacific Review, 30(1): 1–​25. Powell, R. (1994) ‘Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-​neoliberal Debate’, International Organization, 48(2): 313–​44. Qin, Y. (2011a) ‘Development of International Relations Theory in China’, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 11(2): 231–​57. Qin, Y. (2011b) ‘The Possibility and Inevitability of a Chinese School of International Relations’ in W.A. Callahan and E. Barabantseva (eds), China Orders the World. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp 37–​53. 39

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Rozman, G. (2012) ‘Invocations of Chinese Traditions in International Relations’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 17(2): 111–​24. Sapiro, G. (ed) (2009) L’espace intellectuel en Europe. De la formation des États-​ nations à la mondialisation XIX –​XXI siècle. Paris: La Découverte. Shapin, S. (1998) ‘Placing the View from Nowhere’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 23(1): 5–​12. Stenslie, S. (2014) ‘Questioning the Reality of China’s Grand Strategy’, China: An International Journal, 12(2): 161–​78. Wang, F.-​L. (2017) The China Order: Centralia, World Empire, and the Nature of Chinese Power. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Wang, H. (2011) The Politics of Imagining Asia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wang, H. (2014) China from Empire to Nation-​State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wang, Y. (2007) ‘Between Science and Art: Questionable International Relations Theories’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 8(2): 191–​208. Wolf, E. (1982) Europe and the People without History. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Woodside, A. (1998) ‘The Asia-​Pacific Idea as a Mobilization Myth’ in A. Dirlik (ed), What Is in a Rim? Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Woodside, A. (2006) Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea and the Hazards of World History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Woon, C.Y. (2018) ‘China’s Contingencies’, Geopolitics, 23(1): 67–​95. Yan, X. (2011) ‘Xunzi’s Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications’ in W.A. Callahan and E. Barabantseva (eds), China Orders the World. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Yan, X. (2014) ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7(2): 153–​84. Yan, X. (2018) ‘Trump Can’t Start a Cold War with China, Even if He Wants To’, Washington Post, 6 February. Ye, M. (2015) ‘China and Competing Cooperation in Asia-​Pacific’, Asian Security, 11(3): 206–​24. Ye, Z. and Long, Q. (2013) Huaxia zhuyi [China-​ism: The Grand Wisdom of the 500-​Years China System]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. Zhang, F. (2015) ‘Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 8(2):197–​218. Zhang, Q. (2016) ‘Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy-​making’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(4): 435–​58. Zhang, Y. and Kristensen, P.M. (2017) ‘The Curious Case of ‘Schools’ of IR’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 10(4): 429–​54. Zhao, T. (2005) Tianxia tixi: Shijie zhidu zhexue daolun [The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for a World Institution]. Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe.

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Zhao, T. (2011) ‘Rethinking Empire from the Chinese Concept ‘All-​under-​ Heaven’ in W.A. Callahan and E. Barabantseva (eds), China Orders the World. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Zhao, T. (2018) ‘Trump Sees the World as a Battlefield’, Washington Post, 7 February. Zhu, X. (2009) ‘The Influence of Think Tanks in the Chinese Policy Process’, Asian Survey, 49(2): 333–​57.

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2

Heart and Soul for World Politics: Advaita Monism and Daoist Trialectics in International Relations L.H.M. Ling

Introduction Let me begin with an anecdote. Here is a review from the New York Times on Prakash Jha’s 2010 film, Raajneeti (Politics): ‘Mr. Jha has said he based the dynastic family at the film’s heart on characters from the epic “Mahabharata”, and there are also parallels to the Gandhi clan (generation Sonia). But Mr. Jha’s real touchstone seems to be “The Godfather” ’ (Saltz, 2010). The reviewer just did not get it. Because she knew nothing of the Mahabharata (c. 900 BCE), all she could see were Jha’s occasional, filmic gestures to Francis Ford Coppola’s series on mafia politics in 20th-​century America. She completely missed the Mahabharata’s key teaching: that is, power comes to naught without a cosmic sense of morality behind it. ‘Raajneeti’ for her thus turned into a cheesy Bollywood derivative of a great Hollywood classic. Not simply bad or misled, this review reflects a history of ‘epistemic violence’ (Spivak, 1988) perpetrated on the world, amounting to an ‘epistemicide’ (Santos, 2016). Five centuries of colonialism-​imperialism have killed knowledge not only in the global South, but also, I add, the global North. The field of International Relations (IR) sets one example. Like the New York Times review, IR suffers from three epistemic blinkers: (1) it fails to access how millions outside of Westphalia World understand power and politics; (2) it cannot benefit from ancient insights, whether these come from the Mahabharata or elsewhere; and (3) it remains ignorant of itself, especially the field’s complicity with hegemony and arrogance from it (Ling, 2017). Epistemic compassion can deliver us from such myopic violence. Like learning a new language, epistemic compassion opens worlds by crossing 42

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boundaries previously thought immutable. More than seeing anew, epistemic compassion helps us to feel anew. Utilitarians cross epistemic borders also but for ‘use’ only and not to reflect. Consequently, utilitarians resist any notion of transformation due to new knowledge whereas epistemic compassion begins with it as a premise. No longer trapped in the ‘tragedy’ of power politics (Mearsheimer, 2001), we can appreciate, instead, the joy (Penttinen, 2013; Särmä 2014), beauty (Ling, 2014b) and potential of discovery that our world-​of-​worlds can offer (Ling, 2014a). This includes Interbeing (tiep hien in Vietnamese), an update by the contemporary monk-​teacher Thich Nhat Hanh (1998) of Buddhism’s ancient tenet of ‘co-​dependent arising’ (pratītyasamutpāda in Sanskrit); it refers to a mutuality between Self and Other such that ‘you are in me as I am in you’ (ni zhong you wo, wo zhong you ni in Mandarin Chinese). To get a sense of how-​what-​why, I draw on two pre-​Westphalian traditions: Advaita monism and Daoist trialectics. Here Advaita and Daoism are treated as epistemological traditions –​that is, a way of thinking –​ rather than as historical products. If we were to historicize all concepts, then Christianity and especially the Protestant Ethic, would have lost any epistemological import long ago, and IR as a field would never have continued the conceptual and methodological legacies left by racist-​sexist theorists such as Hobbes, Hegel, Kant, Weber and Locke, to name just a few. Philosophies of peace and prosperity do not necessarily arise from actual conditions of peace and prosperity; more typically, the former results from a lack of the latter. Advaita and Daoism offer a means of and rationale for worldly reconciliation. Not a religious conversion, epistemic compassion simply requires learning from Others with an open mind and heart; consequently, it produces a very different understanding of and relationship to world politics. This chapter concludes with the implications of epistemic compassion for a post-​Westphalian, post-​dichotomous IR. A caveat. This chapter itself requires epistemic compassion. In it, we cross multiple borders: epistemic, linguistic, religious, geographical. This task may seem arduous at first but it promises a magical, transformative journey. The alien Other, it turns out, expresses an intimate element of the Self –​and has always done so. Only its lack of recognition in the field, until now, will appear strange. In this way, the reader will experience the exhilaration, not just challenge, of epistemic compassion. Let me begin with the current discourse on ‘China’s rise’ (Ling, 2013). It exemplifies Westphalia’s blinkered approach. Not only does it pit China against the West, but this discourse also marginalizes and alienates the rest of the world, as if it did not matter. The latter becomes mere backdrop for another Great Game, 21st century style. Bombs thus hiss from a bright, noonday sky in rural Pakistan as much as bullets shatter a serene autumn evening in Paris. 43

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China’s rise: implications for IR Today’s China still disturbs. It may no longer sponsor anti-​Western revolution at home or abroad, and has transformed, instead, into a bastion of neoliberal capitalism for about 40 years. But the People’s Republic still unsettles the West, mainly due to its integration, or lack thereof, into the ‘international community’ (Economist, 2018). What exactly, many worry, is or will be China’s role in world politics? To Liberal Westphalians like Barry Buzan (2010) and G. John Ikenberry (2011), a rising China could destabilize or consolidate the status quo, depending on the willingness of leaders in Beijing to cooperate with the Western-​led, liberal world order –​and how much the West can insist on or entice such cooperation. To Chinese Westphalians such as Yan Xuetong (2011), China will invariably alter the status quo regardless of leadership inclinations. The country’s demographic and territorial size, not to mention its historical import, will make a difference. Another source of convergence comes from Classical Westphalians and Chinese Constructivists. The former, like Henry Kissinger (2011), propose that China and the West should just get together, as the Pope and the kings of Europe did in the 16th century. They divided the world among themselves, then ruled accordingly. Stability and order ensued, at least for the principals involved. (That such comity initiated five centuries of violence and brutality against those not privy to the bargain seems to have escaped classical Westphalians –​or they do not care.) Chinese Constructivists such as Qin Yaqing (2010; 2011; 2016) and other members of the ‘Chinese School of IR’ (Zhang and Chang, 2016) make a slightly different argument. Chinese norms and values, they believe, will naturally interact with the world to effect changes that remain, as yet, unanticipated. Together with the West, Qin suggests, China will form a new global order.

Critique Neither camp questions categories such as ‘China’, the ‘West’, the ‘inter-​state system’, or even the ‘Westphalian state’. All presume that states will remain the central unit of IR analysis, functioning as self-​enclosed, self-​interested units of power. Even Qin Yaqing imposes a statist-​nationalist frame onto a philosophical and normative tradition –​yin/​yang dynamics –​that had no such intention or purpose in the first place. Indeed, unlike Confucians, Daoists especially disdained any external sources of control such as the state (Ames, 1998). Despite the systemic dynamics that Qin himself has introduced, anything outside the China/​West matrix remains an afterthought or a playground for the powerful. Yan Xuetong puts it more directly: so far, only ‘small fry’ such as Vietnam and the Philippines have complained about China’s moves in the South China Sea –​meaning there is no ‘real’ 44

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opposition from a major power such as the United States, Europe or Russia (Huang, 2016). So China has nothing to worry about. (He conveniently omits China’s standoff with Japan in the East China Sea.) Both camps also unite in their patriarchal proclivities (Ling, 2016c). Whether it is Brotherly Love under Confucian tianxia (All under Heaven) or a more perfect, machine-​like Artificial Man in Hobbes’ Leviathan, the Chinese School and their Westphalian counterparts partake in what is effectively a gentleman’s club. Some, like the English school, may appear in top hat and morning coat; others, like the Chinese school, may dress in changpao magua (a traditional gown for men starting from China’s Republican period). But all revel in a common, hypermasculine camaraderie: that is, they regale one another with clever chatter or perhaps a zinger or two while being served, silently and efficiently, by those whom they will never know or even acknowledge but whose labour and resources make their ‘club’ possible in the first place. Not surprisingly, these hypermasculine theorists discount anything smacking of the non-​masculine (for example postcolonial-​feminism), non-​heteronormative (for example queer theory) and especially non-​secular (for example ‘gods and spirits’). Even postcolonial theorists tend to treat ‘gods and spirits’ as belief only, rather than an integral element of ontology/​epistemology (Vasilaki, 2012). There is no room in the IR club for such ‘distractions’. Herein lies the nub of self-​delusion in Westphalian IR. History has shown, time and again, that society’s so-​called ‘servile’ and ‘inferior’ classes can make new worlds despite generations of racism-​sexism-​imperialism entrenched by hierarchy and privilege, colonialism and imperialism (Kataneksza et al, 2018). As Andean activist Humberto Cholango declared to Pope Benedict XVI in a letter in 2007, ‘we [the Andean people] are still here’ (Cholango quoted in Cadena, 2010: 335). Despite centuries of control, if not genocide, the people of the Andes –​like other feminized, colonized subjects throughout the globe –​have survived, and they have done so by ‘learn[ing] how to merge our beliefs and symbols with the ones of the invaders and oppressors’ (Cholango quoted in Cadena, 2010: 334). Such is epistemic compassion. I turn now to Advaita monism and Daoist trialectics for how-​what-​why.

Advaita monism and Daoist trialectics: connectedness and compassion Advaita monism Most cite Shankara (c. 8th century BCE) for articulating Advaita. It relates to but differs from two other branches of the subcontinent’s vedas (‘knowledge’): dvaita (dualism) and vishishtadvaita (qualified monism or holism). ‘The concept of Advaita (literally meaning non-​dual or non-​ secondness) pre-​supposes a monist epistemology that … ties the perceiver 45

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(subject) and the perceived (object) together with a globe marked with “single hidden connectedness” or Brahman’ (Shahi and Ascione, 2015: 2). From this basis, Shahi and Ascione construct an Advaitic-​monist model of world politics. It suggests an ‘ever-​transient’ but ‘perpetually-​connected’ global system (Shahi and Ascione, 2015: 15). Just as ‘theorist’ and ‘theory’ fuse into an ultimate reality encompassed by Brahma, so, too, Advaitic-​ monist IR would highlight ‘an unbreakable and irreversible ‘micro–​macro linkage’ or ontological nexus between diverse individuals, nation states and the world’ (Shahi and Ascione, 2015: 15). They conclude: ‘The intellectual realization of “connectedness” can make a powerful case for reinterpreting diversities in political identities, thereby creating new ethical space for condemning divisive domestic, international and global politics’ (Shahi and Ascione, 2015: 15). I applaud this articulation of an Advaitic-​monist IR. It brings us closer to a world politics beyond Westphalia. Dichotomies such as ‘China’ vs the ‘West’ begin to dissolve. Advaita monism’s dynamic, perpetual connectedness alerts us to the ties that bind even when conflicts and contradictions seem to pull us apart. Accordingly, our analysis of China and the West cannot abide by IR conventions like the three ‘levels of analysis’ (Waltz, 1954) or ‘structure vs units’ (Waltz, 1979). We need to consider how all the ‘constituents of the globe’ (Shahi and Ascione, 2015: 15) interrelate and interact. Even if national governments may quarrel, various actors (‘individuals … classes, communities, cultures, peoples’) as well as the context in which they operate (‘ecology and the world’) still have a mediating impact, ‘reveal[ing] the hidden connectedness across diversities’ (Shahi and Ascione, 2015: 15). Yet this intellectual and heuristic agenda, as Shahi and Ascione (2015: 15) underscore, remains an ‘unrealized intellectual quest’. It compels further exploration. I could not agree more. Nonetheless, I raise a cautionary note. We need to resist falling into the Cartesian trap of highlighting Advaita monism in contradistinction to its two partners in philosophy: dvaita dualism and vishishtadvaita holism. Analytically, each branch of thought could not be without the others. Note, for example, how people live their lives, demonstrating the fluidity between these categories fixed by Western social science. I focus on three cases, in particular: darsana, dharma and ayurveda. Darsana means a perspective, viewpoint or a way of seeing eternal and philosophical truths; accordingly, it refers to a body, system or school of philosophy. Six such darsanas pertain: namely sāṅkhya, yoga, nyāya, vaiśeṣika, mīmāṃsā and vedānta. Advaita philosophy itself, then, is a particular form of darsana (Miles, 2015). Dharma refers to righteousness, merit, religious duty, religion, law, a goal of life (purushartha). Literally, it means ‘what holds together’. Dharma thus constitutes the basis of all order, whether social or moral. All the different schools of philosophy engage with the essence of dharma and the relevance or not of karmakaand or dharmic rituals (see Miles, 46

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2015). And ayurveda is defined by the Charaka Samhita as ‘that which deals with good, bad, happy, and unhappy life, its promoters and non-​promoters, measurement and nature’ (Van Loon, 2003: 13). The first two, darsana and dharma, show how advaita-​dvaita-​vishishtadvaita cross epistemic borders between the divine and the mundane; the last, ayurveda, the body and the mind. All three link the individual with the community, the environment with the cosmo-​political. These underscore humanity’s undeniable thirst for spirituality, not just ethics. Epistemic compassion thus takes place. Darsana Worship of the goddess Durga induces darsana. An enactment of Advaita monism, darsana facilitates a spiritual exchange between the deity and the worshipper, her community and the cosmos. To begin with, Durga embodies dvaita dualism by bearing multiple personas, guises and genders. These underscore her totality, as encapsulated by vishishtadvaita holism. As consort to Lord Shiva, Durga represents the deity-​as-​couple but, in her fiery mode, she also presides as Chandi; elsewhere, she takes on the figure of a loving mother. Anjan Ghosh (2000: 295) notes Durga’s magic: [T]‌he very act of worshipping Durga elicits dialectical reflexivity: Darsana or gazing upon the image of the deity has a special significance in Hinduism, for it is not a passive gaze. Just as the devotée gazes upon the image the deity also gazes upon the devotée and there occurs an ‘exchange of vision.’ As it is believed that the deity is in the image, this exchange of vision enables the devotée to absorb the shakti (power) that flows from the goddess’s unblinking gaze. In this way the people in the village who come to view the image of the goddess are blessed by her powers. The Durga festival (puja) itself demonstrates the totality of advaita-​dvaita-​ vishishtadvaita. Originally from Calcutta’s Bengali Brahman caste, the puja has now spread to other communities. ‘In multi-​ethnic neighbourhoods (paras)’, Ghosh (2000: 298) writes, ‘Muslims, Christians and dalits (untouchable) have also participated in the organization of the puja … transform[ing] Calcutta during the pujas into a heterotopic [outside-​the-​normal] space’. Dharma The Swadhyaya, a religious group from India, personify the social ideal of dharma (‘devotional duty’). The Swadhyayis, Pankaj Jain (2009) observes, enact their dharma by planting and nurturing ‘tree-​temples’ even on land 47

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condemned as barren. At Vruksh Mandir Temple in Gandhidam (a city in the Gujarat state of India), for instance, 1,500 trees now thrive with a variety of species, including medicinal herbs and vegetables (Times of India, 2002). Yet the Swadhyayis disavow environmentalism or any such modern (that is, instrumental) ideology. ‘Ecology is not our concern’, one respondent insists. ‘Environmental problems are due to industrialization and the solution lies beyond Swadhyaya’s activities. Swadhyayis are not environmentalists!’ (Jain, 2009: 306). Rather, spiritual oneness motivates Swadhyayis. ‘I feed the plants not to obey my father’, an iconic character in the Swadhyayi religious pantheon states famously, ‘but I love and feed them [as] my own brothers’ (quoted in Jain, 2009: 310). Like Durga worship, the Swadhyaya movement creates a space for outside-​the-normal social relations. Muslims and Hindus have planted trees in one another’s burial/​cremation grounds. No greater sign of respect and consideration could there be from one community to another. And no greater indication is there for the mutual embeddedness of advaita-​dvaita-​vishishtadvaita. Admittedly, the dharmic tradition has contributed to the caste system in South Asia but we cannot ignore the role of colonial powers in appropriating and reifying Brahmanic texts to rationalize their own management of the ‘natives’ (Inden, 1986; Dirks, 2001; Doniger, 2009). There is a famous story, for example, of Shankara bowing to a Chandala (low caste) in Kashi and treating him like a guru. Similarly, Shankara acknowledges the wisdom that women possess at various points. Only now are these texts being decolonized. Ayurveda Non-​duality-​duality-​holism also manifests in India’s medical tradition, ayurveda. Initially practised in South Asia only, ayurveda has now spread globally as the benefits of this mode of healing become more widely recognized. Ayurveda comes from two classic texts: Charaka Samhita (hereafter ‘Charaka’, c. 3rd–​2nd century BCE) and Susruta Samhita (c. 3rd century CE). Since the latter primarily concerns surgery, I focus on the former for ayurveda’s main principles, norms and practices. As with advaita-​dvaita-​vishishtadvaita, ayurveda originates from Brahma. From the Void where all begins, a mutual interplay between the masculine (purusha) and the feminine (prakrti) produces the world dynamically, constantly and transformatively. Yet ayurveda remains grounded in the everyday. ‘Ayurvedic texts relied upon images derived from the plant kingdom, with networks of veins on a leaf, the rising of the sap, and milky exudations from resinous plants, providing models for the body’ (Zimmerman quoted in Warrier, 2011: 82). Ayurveda links the environment’s ‘five elements’ (pancamahabhutas) 48

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with one’s five physical senses: earth (smell), water (taste), fire (sight), air (touch) and space (sound) (Van Loon, 2003: 21). A healthy person, the Charaka proclaims, could inspire even the crops to thrive with ‘great endowments’ (Van Loon, 2003: 15). Contrastingly, transgressions against Nature/​Brahma, such as those cited later, signal illness and disease in the individual as well as the general environment: [C]‌hurning the tops of mountains, churning of trees, producing high tides in oceans, overflowing of the lakes, counter-​current in rivers, earthquake, moving of clouds with sounds, showering of dew, thunder, dust, sand, fish, frog, snake, alkali, blood, stone and thunderstorm; derangement of six seasons, non-​compactness of crops, complications in creatures, replacing the positive factors with negative ones, and release of clouds, sun, fire and wind which bring about the end of four ages. (quoted in Van Loon, 2003: 41) Ayurveda prescribes yoga and a good diet for a healthy life. So too does it advise an enlightened spirit. Because life emanates from an essential vitality, energy or force known as prana or jiva, illness (including unhappiness) ensues when an imbalance disrupts or blocks this life force. Healing begins when the prana/​jiva is stimulated and released so it could resume flowing. Good health requires balancing the spiritual with the physical, knowledge with enlightenment, so the whole body or system could operate naturally and organically. For instance, ayurveda aligns the seven ‘energy vortices’ known as chakras. These integrate a person’s health with enlightenment. The chakras register from the base of the spine to the crown of the head; each connects a part of the body to a specific colour, symbol, element, sense and purpose (Rama, 1998). The fourth or heart chakra acts as the linchpin: it connects the bottom three chakras, mostly concerned with one’s physical well-​being (safety, sexuality nourishment), with the top three chakras, which centre on spiritual realization (creativity, intuition, cosmic consciousness). Illness breaks out when a lower chakra (for example need for security) conflicts with or blocks a higher one (for example achieving cosmic consciousness), leading to a systemic imbalance. Elsewhere, I show the links between ayurveda and traditional Chinese medicine, zhongyi (Ling, 2016a). Each has contributed crucially to the other over millennia (Tan and Geng, 2005; Salguero, 2014; Tan, 2015). Indeed, Buddhist monasteries served as clinics of advanced medicine in the ancient world. Rather than repeat that discussion here, I highlight the epistemology common to both ayurveda and zhongyi: trialectical healing. The subcontinent knows this tradition through sāṅkhya, among others; in East and Southeast Asia, yin and yang (Ling, 2014). Both help Zen Buddhism reach a trialectic 49

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of non-​duality with duality. Like health, enlightenment requires a trialectical-​ third beyond the physical and the individual: that is, an ‘awakened wisdom and selfless compassion’ (Hori, 2003: 6). Now, let me introduce trialectics in yin/​yang terms. In Chinese, the term for ‘dialectics’ and ‘trialectics’ is the same: bian (to debate) zheng (evidence) fa (law or rule). Contrary to the English term ‘dialectics’, which indicates a party of two, the Chinese term does not indicate how many parties are involved. It signals, instead, the process of change and continuity, debate and discourse with evidence. Daoist trialectics The Daodejing (Classic of the Way) posits two ontologically equal opposites –​ yin (the female principle, coloured in black) and yang (the male principle, coloured in white). Each faces the other with internal entwinements in tow: that is, yin-​within-​yang, yang-​within-​yin. If we replace the abstractions of yin and yang with their substantive principles, femaleness and maleness respectively, then their internal entwinements refer to the female-​within-​ male and the male-​within-​female. In this sense, yin/​yang theory resonates with contemporary queer theory. Graphically, an S-​like border differentiates the white sphere-​yin from the black-​yang. Their internal entwinements show up as a white dot in the black sphere, and a black dot in the white. Daoist yin/​yang relations thus encompass simultaneous interaction between the two principles and their internal entwinements (in contrast, Hegel’s dialectic never recognized the master in the slave nor the slave in the master. His ‘sublation’, moreover, follows after their interaction rather than in simultaneous action with it. Brincat and Ling, 2014). Together, these account for continuity and change, connections and conflicts, masculinity and femininity, duality and non-​duality. The Book of Changes (Yijing, c. 12 BCE) refers to this concept as tongbian or ‘continuity through change’. Tong indicates passing through doors that open and shut; bian, the changes that accrue during this journey. ‘It is between the door’s opening and being shut, or between a correlated pairing, that continuity through change takes place. … [I]‌n turn, interaction itself is an embodiment of correlativity and continuity’ (Tian, 2005: 23). Systemic health, by extension, requires balance among contending, opposing forces through their mutual embeddedness. Water exemplifies the dao. ‘The highest efficacy’, the Daodejing quotes Laozi (or ‘Old Master’, the mythical founder of Daoism), ‘is like water’ (Ames and Hall, 2003: 87). Endowed with inherently transformative capabilities, water can turn from hot to cold, soft to hard, or calm to stormy at a moment’s notice. Water also swishes in a multi-​layered, multidimensional milieu. Flowing from centres to margins, depths to surfaces, and back again, water dwells in places ‘loathed by the crowd’ as well as loved by it (Ames 50

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and Hall, 2003: 87). Despite being a porous, malleable substance, water can break rocks. ‘The meekest in the world/​Penetrates the strongest in the world’ (Laozi quoted in Thompson, 1998: 17). The dao, accordingly, never discriminates between the yin-​female principle and the yang-m ​ ale principle. Each has its time, place and circumstance. Water thus reminds the powerful and the weak alike not to presume too much. Power seems eternal –​until it is washed away, flooded by the undeniable life force that is water. It evidences, in short, the futility of control. For this reason, Daoism teaches that the highest ideal of social action for the individual and the collective is wuwei or non-​coercive action. Continuing with the metaphor of water breaking rocks, Laozi notes its implications: As nothingness [water] enters into that-​which-​has-​no-​opening, Hence, I am aware of the value of non-​action [wuwei] And of the value of teaching with no-​words. As for the value of non-​action [non-​coercion], Nothing in the world can match it. (Laozi quoted in Thompson, 1998: 17) Confucians and Legalists have also drawn on the Daoist concept of wuwei. Consequently, the tradition reflects an amalgamation of discourses and debates, policies and strategies. The Huainanzi (139 BCE) provides an exemplary document in this case (see Ames, 1983).

Non-​duality with duality One example comes from Zen Buddhism’s non-​duality with duality. Non-​ duality refers to a condition whereby ‘subject and object are not opposed to each other, the one excluding the other’ (Hori, 2003: 15). Still, non-​duality cannot eliminate duality; otherwise, non-​duality itself would impose another kind of duality. Japanese Zen master Eihei Dōgen (1200–​53) identifies a trialectic of thinking to facilitate non-​duality with duality: thinking (shiryō), not-​thinking (fushiryō) and non-​thinking (hishiryō). Transitioning from one to the other helps the mind journey from the conventional to the ineffable. Dōgen cites this example: ‘An ancient Buddha said: “Mountains mountain, waters water.” These words don’t say that “mountains” are mountains, they say that mountains mountain. This being the case, we should study “mountains.” When we investigate mountains in this way, mountains mountain’ (Dōgen quoted in Tanaka, 2013: 326). In other words, Dōgen exhorts us to remove the self when considering others, including that which may seem inanimate. When we think of mountains as ‘mountains’ only, then we are prioritizing ourselves –​that is, our preconceived notion of a mountain –​in our understanding of it. To not think about the mountain, in 51

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turn, would erase something that obviously exists. Both cases would violate the mountain. But when we perceive that a mountain mountains, we begin to relate to it on its own terms and in its own context. We are entering the realm of non-​thinking. We begin to experience the mountain. In this way, we emancipate ourselves from preconceptions or other normalized ways of thinking. We begin to realize the world as it seeks/​needs to be realized and our (minuscule) role in it. Buddhism’s five-​rank protocol specifies a method for integrating non-​ duality with duality. The first two ranks –​(1) recognizing ‘the relative within the absolute’ and (2) ‘the absolute within the relative’ –​caution, in effect, that appearances can be deceiving. Things may seem different on the surface (for example yin vs yang) but they share a common condition or essence underneath (for example yin-​within-​yang, yang-​within-​yin). Even so, the commonality between different things does not negate each entity’s unique qualities (for example, yin is still the female principle; yang, the male). From these two ranks, the third one –​(3) ‘coming from within the absolute’ –​becomes possible. Here, we begin to see and treat the two parts, relative (for example yin) and absolute (for example yang), as one (for example the dao). From this basis, compassion arises and enlightenment becomes a possibility. A fourth rank –​(4) ‘arriving at mutual integration’ –​urges action based on this insight. ‘At this stage, the absolute and relative are integrated, but they’re still two things’ (Loori, 2009: xxvii). For this reason, we need a fifth rank –​(5) ‘unity attained’ –​to affirm ‘There is no more duality. [The entity] is one thing –​neither absolute nor relative, up nor down, profane nor holy, good nor bad, male nor female’ (Loori, 2009: xxvii). From thinking to not-​thinking, we reach Dōgen’s non-​thinking or wuwei. So with Advaitic-​Daoist IR. Integrated into a post-​Westphalian, post-​ dichotomous IR, it urges engagement with hegemonic conventions such as ‘China’ vs the ‘West’ with the ‘ever-​transient’ yet ‘perpetually connected’ nature of our world-​o f-​worlds. Otherwise, where would systemic transformation come from? Buddhism’s five-​rank protocol helps us excavate ‘the hidden connectedness across diversities’ (Shahi and Ascione, 2015: 15). We witness, accordingly, the making of our world-​of-​worlds by different actors and communities in their local and global contexts. More pointedly, an Advaitic-​Daoist IR adds one more element: spirituality. A critical reader could ask: what difference does it make? How does spirituality affect relations between China and the world? Let us see below.

Advaitic-​Daoist IR: a pool of multiple worlds With water as metaphor, world politics becomes a pool of fluid, multiple worlds. Also drawing on yin/​yang theory, Qin Yaqing (2010; 2011; 2016) characterizes world politics as a ‘lake’. I prefer the term ‘pool’ since it 52

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does not eternalize world politics as part of a natural ecosystem; rather, it includes both natural and artificial constructs. Each world represents a node of epistemes that ripples outward, melting at the edges with other concentric spills of epistemes. These circulate communal modes of thinking and doing, being and relating that have evolved over millennia. Like water, multiple worlds must flow freely to stay vibrant; in IR terms, this means interacting with Difference and hybridizing with Others. Today global media serve as a powerful source of circulation for multiple worlds, though they merely formalize what multiple worlds already do: that is, they forge a common world through interactions with one another. Nonetheless, the nodes run deep: that is, multiple worlds do not lose their distinctive characteristics. These reflect and sustain legacies of history and tradition, sentiment and practice transmitted through language, memory, storytelling, and rituals. Indeed, in every ancient civilization, myth accounts for the origin of these nodes. Like raindrops from Heaven, they simply descend upon the pool one day. At the same time, these nodes do not stay the same forever. Past currents fill the present as much as present circulations wash the past. Our brief excursion into darsana, dharma and ayurveda indicates a sense of how epistemic border crossings effect transformations both communally and individually. In this pool of multiple worlds, ‘China’ qualifies as one node among many. Its size and weight may affect the current more than most but all nodes, no matter how big or small, form concentric circles that ripple outwards to merge with others, no matter how far or near (see also the concept of holographic entanglement in Chapter 10). As mentioned, the pool’s water comes from and reflects systemic dynamics beyond the pool: for example the sky and other environmental elements (like climate change), which could disturb the pool’s tranquillity; ripples that evaporate over time (like stories and memories, prayers and traditions) only to return as new raindrops (like innovations trends, and revolutionary developments); and other, unforeseen events (like inter-​galactic contact). Sameness (globalities) and difference (localities) thus coexist, co-​penetrate and co-​produce. The very multiplicity of nodes, ripples and circulations in the pool of multiple worlds ensures a mutual balancing that evens the flow –​if left alone as wuwei advises. With dynamic forces at play, water can stay fresh and vital; otherwise, stagnant water-​like epistemic violence/​epistemicide can spread life-​threatening disease (for example ecological disaster, economic depression, ceaseless warfare) through mosquitoes (for example corrupt bureaucracies, predatory capitalism) or some other vermin. Still, one centripetal force applies: the heart. How else could we awaken wisdom and enact selfless compassion? In Chinese medicine (zhongyi), the heart organ ‘rules’ the body. The canonical source of Chinese medicine states ‘if the ruler [the heart] is enlightened, his subjects are in peace. To nourish 53

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one’s life on the basis of this results in longevity’ (Huangdi Neijing Suwen quoted in Unschuld and Tessenow, 2011: 155). In ayurveda, as noted, the heart chakra alone connects the lower three vortices of physical health with the upper three of spiritual well-​being. The entire system hinges on the heart. The critical reader may interject: where lies the heart or spirituality in water? Here, I return to Laozi’s respect for water. Daoism treats water as if it has volition. That is, water’s transformative qualities (‘meekest in the world’/​‘strongest in the world’) come from an inherent integrity and agency (‘benefits everything’, ‘dwell in places loathed by the crowd’). For this reason, water not only reflects, but also enables the dao. Like the human body, our world-​of-​worlds encases a multitude of life forces operating in dynamic tension. The deepest, most concrete chakras of safety, sexuality and nourishment can rise to the higher, more abstract ones of creativity, intuition and cosmic consciousness, just as the upper chakras can reach down into the lower ones. Indeed, if the principle of wuwei presides, each chakra flows naturally and organically into the other, stabilizing and strengthening the whole. What does this mean in terms of real-​world policies and strategies? Let us consider the implications of Daoist water, ayurvedic chakras, yin/​yang trialectics, Advaita connectedness, and Buddhist duality with non-​duality for understanding ‘China’s rise.

China’s rise reappraised As a thought experiment, let us designate ‘China’ as yin and the ‘West’ as yang. (The specific designation does not matter since the process remains the same.) With Daoist water as metaphor, we see that the initial dichotomy of ‘China’ and the ‘West’ as two fixed binaries cannot hold; instead, each principal flows into the other in all ways and at all levels, ranging from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro’. A trialectical effect takes place, highlighting a heterotopic-​third domain that connects the principals while creating a new hybrid. According to Zen Buddhism’s five-​rank protocol: 1. The first two ranks recognize that a China-​yin exists within a West-​yang as much as a West-​yang exists in a China-​yin. One prominent example comes from immigrant communities in both places. For now, let us date these to the 19th century: say, the Chinese diaspora in the West and Western missionaries/​merchants/​expatriates in China. Each group may assimilate into its new environment but both also retain their distinctive features. Here, we begin to break down the nationalistic confines of the Westphalian state to recognize the transnational communities that make world politics. These include neighbouring sites like Southeast Asia, which also have a long-​standing Chinese diaspora, and, similarly, British 54

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colonial ‘ex-​pats’ in South and Southeast Asia. In this way, we unlock the Westphalian trap of prioritizing powerful ‘Great Gamers’ to the exclusion and at the expense of the rest of the planet. Breaking this colonial bondage enables us to pay attention to crucial connections with and across the global South. ‘Epistemic violence’ and ‘epistemicide’ begin to dissipate. 2. The third rank posits that the two principals, China-​yin and West-​yang, can come together. Communication becomes key. Not only would the two communities have the most at stake to engage with each other directly but also with compassion. There is a need to develop a model of dialogue called Creative Listening and Speaking (CLS). It mandates listening with the courage to speak and speaking with the humility to listen; otherwise, neither listening nor speaking alone could dismantle hegemony. Again, commonalities surge forward, transforming pre-​existing conflicts and contradictions into a trialectical heterotopia (Lederach provides examples of such transformative processes in conflict resolution, though he does not draw on Buddhism’s five-​rank protocol. See Lederach, 2005: 5). 3. The fourth rank urges action based on this insight. We do not need to list here specific policies and/​or strategies. The two principals’ internal entwinements (yin-​within-​yang, yang-​within-​yin) can guide action based on the imaginations and interests of the communities themselves and in their own context rather than anything an outsider or lofty principles could provide. The fourth rank underscores, also, the value and relevance of these transnational communities for the state. They have the expertise in language, cultural knowledge and assimilative experiences to help the state transcend hackneyed dichotomies such as ‘China’ vs the ‘West’. 4. The fifth rank affirms ‘unity attained’. Perhaps a ceremonious event may suffice but it performs a necessary function to declare ‘there is no more duality’. The event, moreover, will need to resonate contextually to attain its full meaning; otherwise, community members will (rightfully) regard it as a cynical move to mask hegemony in ‘friendlier, gentler’ guise. For example, Koreans rarely take seriously Japanese ‘apologies’ for the latter’s annexation of the peninsula from 1910 to 1945. The former see the latter as cynical political moves to appease domestic factional politics rather than an expression of sincere apology to Koreans. (Hong, 2016) Water as metaphor offers innovative strategies for interstate conflict as well. For instance, an ayurvedic lens on China’s regional conflicts would attribute these to a fixation with the lower chakras only, thereby forcing hostilities due to a classic (in)security dilemma. Each state seeks to protect or enhance its own security (safety) by making hypermasculine-​militaristic poses (sexuality) that spiral everyone’s sense of insecurity. Meanwhile, the population’s ability to feed itself (nourishment) suffers, as national security consumes more and 55

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more resources, even as the state claims to protect all aspects of the supposed ‘heartland’. However, the upper chakras can guide the lower ones to reach a healthier, happier, more sustainable outcome. The fifth chakra of creativity, for example, could inspire use of the arts and humanities to broaden, not to mention deepen, sovereign relations among peoples in both states (Ling and Nakamura, 2019). The governments and societies of China and Japan could re-​appreciate what each has meant to the other from ancient times to ‘catch-​up’ modernity (Ling, 2016b). With two millennia of history together, China and Japan cannot –​should not –​risk everything on the past 200 years. The region, furthermore, abounds with strategies for conflict resolution that pre-​date Westphalia (Pan, 2011; Chong, 2012). Why not draw on these precedents? The highest chakras help these strategies reach fruition. With intuition and cosmic consciousness, we gain a sense of ‘awakened wisdom and selfless compassion’. We have a reason, method and ideal to dissolve Westphalia’s deadly deadlock of narrow, nationalistic interests set in immutable, binary oppositions. From this basis, world politics no longer divides into self-​ aggrandizing, hypermasculinized ‘Great Gamers’ vs invisibilized, feminized ‘small fry’. From ‘epistemic violence’ and/​or ‘epistemicide’, world politics can embark, instead, on engagement, learning and mutuality: that is, Interbeing.

Conclusion: what is next? Former colonies rightfully and joyfully celebrated their independence after the Second World War –​only to discover the scourge of neocolonialism and neo-​imperialism in the decades following. Some contend that current levels of exploitation by the global North over the global South compare with, if not supersede, those of colonial times (Amin, 2004; Foster and McChesney, 2012; Smith, 2015). Still, the situation is not all dire. Transformation is under way. Structurally, ‘emerging economies’ such as the BRICS (Brazil-​Russia-​India-​China-​South Africa) are forging ‘alliances’; similar moves such as in BCIM (Bangladesh-​ China-​India-​Myanmar) are occurring regionally (Lama, 2016). Intellectually, subaltern scholars are engaging in ‘epistemic disobedience’ (Mignolo, 2009) to forge new-​found solidarities within and across the global South. IR scholars need to recognize, also, that the field does not –​cannot –​represent all intellectual activity in ‘China’ or ‘India’ or anywhere else outside the West. Plenty of new thinking percolates in other areas (see, for example, the journal Inter-​Asia Cultural Studies). IR scholars need to broaden their references. To break out of Westphalia’s deadly deadlock, however, we need spiritual emancipation, not just analytical, political or ethical. A water-​like epistemic compassion will help us experience Others directly, like Dōgen’s mountains, 56

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rather than imposing our assumptions about who and what they are. Accepting non-​duality with duality begins the process of systemically-​ accommodating Advaita’s ‘transience’ and ‘connectedness’ and the dao’s yin-​within-​yang, yang-​within-​yin. The bodhisattva Guanyin’s ‘thousand arms and eyes’, like darsana, dharma and ayurveda, become more than metaphors. They shine the light for action. A trialectical-​third of spiritual emancipation emerges. It gives us new goals, desires and voices to evolve global affairs. A single, hegemonic node for Great Gamers will find itself isolated and eventually disappearing. Instead, multiple nodes will circulate and merge vibrantly in the pool of world politics. It is the mix that makes our world-​of-​worlds. The rest of the world thus no longer serves as a mere afterthought, at best, or a playground for the powerful, at worst. All can participate in their own way and on their own terms. IR’s blinkers finally fall off. With philosophies such as Advaita and Daoism, augmented by methods like Zen Buddhism’s five-​rank protocol, epistemic compassion opens circulations of ‘abundance’ and a ‘richness of being’ (Feyerabend, 1999) previously denied in Westphalian IR. Ancient sources of wisdom such as darsana, dharma, ayurveda and zhongyi flow with ontological parity to currents of contemporary Western epistemes. After all, the dao reminds us, the ‘meekest’ waves of creativity can penetrate the ‘strongest’ rocks of hegemonic complicity and arrogance. Interbeing comes into sight: ‘you are in me as I am in you’. We paddle eagerly towards its shore. Acknowledgements This chapter was originally published as L.H.M. Ling (2018) ‘Heart and Soul for World Politics: Advaita Monism and Daoist Trialectics in IR’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 18(3): 313–​37 (republished by permission of Oxford University Press). References Ames, R.T. (1983) The Art of Rulership: A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press. Ames, R.T. (ed) (1998) Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Ames, R.T. and Hall, D.L. (trans) (2003) Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation. New York: Ballantine Books. Amin, S. (2004) The Liberal Virus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World. New York: Monthly Review Press. Brincat, S. and Ling, L.H.M. (2014) ‘Dialectics for IR: Hegel and the Dao’, Globalizations, 11(3): 1–​27. Buzan, B. (2010) ‘China in International Society: Is “Peaceful Rise” Possible?’ Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(1): 5–​36. 57

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Cadena, M. de la (2010) ‘Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes: Conceptual Reflections beyond “Politics” ’, Cultural Anthropology, 25(2): 334–​70. Chong, A. (2012) ‘Premodern Southeast Asia as a Guide for International Relations between Peoples: Prowess and Prestige in “Intersocietal Relations” in the Sejarah Melayu’, Alternatives: Local, Global, Political, 37(2): 87–​105. Dirks, N. (2001) Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Doniger, W. (2009) The Hindus: An Alternative History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Economist, The (2018) ‘The Next War: The Growing Danger of Great Power Conflict’, 25 January, https://​www.economist.com/​news/​leaders/​21735586-​ how-​shifts-​technology-​and-​geopolitics-​are-​renewing-​threat-​growing-​danger Feyerabend, P. (1999) Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction Versus the Richness of Being. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Foster, J.B. and McChesney, R.W. (2012) The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-​ Finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China. New York: Monthly Review Press. Ghosh, A. (2000) ‘Spaces of Recognition: Puja and Power in Contemporary Calcutta’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 26(2): 289–​99. Hong, S. (2016) ‘The Effects of “Apology-​Backlash” Recurrence on Korea–​ Japan Relations’, Korean Journal of Social Science, 43(2): 45–​61. Hori, V.S. (2003) Zen Sand: The Book of Capping Phrases for Kōan Practice. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press. Huang, Y. (2016) ‘Q. and A.: Yan Xuetong Urges China to Adopt a More Assertive Foreign Policy’, New York Times, 9 February, https://​ www.nytimes.com/​2016/​02/​10/​world/​asia/​china-​foreign-​policy-​yan-​ xuetong.html Ikenberry, G.J. (2011) ‘The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America’, Foreign Affairs, 90(3): 56–​68. Inden, R. (1986) ‘Orientalist Constructions of India’, Modern Asian Studies, 20(3): 401–​46. Jain, P. (2009) ‘Dharmic Ecology: Perspectives from the Swadhyaya Practitioners’, Worldviews, 13(3): 305–​20. Kataneksza, J., Ling, L.H.M and Shroff, S. (2018) ‘Decoloniality: (Re)making Worlds’ in Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (eds), International Organization and Global Governance. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge, pp 205–​17. Kissinger, H. (2011) On China. New York: Penguin Books. Lama, M. (2016) ‘Borders as Opportunities: Changing Matrices in Northeast India and Southwest China’ in L.H.M. Ling, Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Payal Banerjee, Nimmi Kurian, Mahendra P. Lama and Li Bo , India China: Rethinking Borders and Security. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp 39–​59. 58

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Lederach, J.P. (2005) Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ling, L.H.M. (2013) ‘Worlds Beyond Westphalia: Daoist Dialectics and the “China Threat” ’, Review of International Studies, 39(3): 549–​68. Ling, L.H.M. (2014a) The Dao of World Politics: Towards a Post-​Westphalian, Worldist International Relations. London: Routledge. Ling, L.H.M. (2014b) Imagining World Politics: Sihar & Shenya, a Fable for Our Times. London: Routledge. Ling, L.H.M. (2016a) ‘Border Pathology: Ayurveda and Zhongyi as Strategic Therapies’ in L.H.M. Ling, Adriana Abdenur, Payal Banerjee, Nimmi Kurian, Mahendra P. Lama, and Li Bo, India China: Rethinking Borders and Security. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp 102–​26. Ling, L.H.M. (2016b) ‘Orientalism Refashioned: “Eastern Moon” on “Western Waters” Reflecting on the East China Sea’ in Andreas Behnke (ed), The International Politics of Fashion: Being Fab in a Dangerous World. London: Routledge, pp167–​225. Ling, L.H.M. (2016c) ‘What’s in a Name? A Critical Interrogation of the Chinese School of IR’ in Yongjin Zhang and Teng-​chi Chang (eds), Constructing a Chinese School of IR: Ongoing Debates and Sociological Realities. London: Routledge, pp 17–​34. Ling, L.H.M. (2017) ‘Don’t Flatter Yourself: World Politics As We Know It Is Changing and So Must Disciplinary IR’ in Synne L. Dyvik, Jan Selby and Rorden Wilkinson (eds), What Is the Point of IR? London: Routledge, pp 135–​46. Ling, L.H.M. and Nakamura, Mari (2019) ‘Popular Culture and Politics: Re-​ narrating the Senkaku/​Diaoyu Islands Dispute’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32(4): 541–​58. Loori, J.D. (2009) The True Dharma Eye: Zen Master Dōgen’s Three Hundred Kōans (trans. Kazuaki Tanahashi and John Daido Loori). Boston, MA: Shambhala. Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Mignolo, W.D. (2009) ‘Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom’, Theory, Culture & Society, 26(7–​8): 1–​23. Miles, J.M. (ed) (2015) The Norton Anthology of World Religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, Volume One. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Pan, C. (2011) ‘Shu and the Chinese Quest for Harmony: A Confucian Approach to Mediating across Difference’ in M. Brigg and R. Bleiker (eds), Mediating across Difference: Oceanic and Asian Approaches to Conflict Resolution, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, pp 221–​47. Penttinen, E. (2013) Joy and International Relations: A New Methodology. London: Routledge.

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Qin, Y. (2010) ‘International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3: 129–​53. Qin, Y. (2011) ‘Qin Yaqing on Rules vs Relations, Drinking Coffee and Tea, and a Chinese Approach to Global Governance’, Theory Talks, 30 November 30. Qin, Y. (2016) ‘A Relational Theory of World Politics’, International Studies Review, 18(1): 33–​47. Rama, S. (1998) Path of Fire and Light, Volume II: A Practical Companion to Volume I. Honesdale: The Himalayan International Institute of Yoga Science and Philosophy of the USA. Salguero, C.P. (2014) Translating Buddhist Medicine in Medieval China. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Saltz, R. (2010) ‘Prakash Jha’s “Godfather,” Bhopal Version’, New York Times, 3 June, http://​www.nytimes.com/​2010/​06/​04/m ​ ovies/0​ 4raajneeti.html?_​ r=0 Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (2016) Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. London: Routledge. Särmä, S. (2014) ‘Junk Feminism and Nuclear Wannabes: Collaging Parodies of Iran and North Korea’, Doctoral dissertation, School of Management, University of Tampere, Finland. Shahi, D. and Ascione, G. (2015) ‘Rethinking the Absence of Post-​ Western International Relations Theory in India: “Advaitic Monism” as an Alternative Epistemological Resource’, European Journal of International Relations, 22 July: 313–​34. Smith, J. (2015) ‘Imperialism in the Twenty-​First Century’, Monthly Review, 67(3): 82–​97. Spivak, G.C. (1988) ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Champaign-​ Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, pp 271–​316. Tan, C. (2015) Himalaya Calling: The Origins of China and India. Hackensack: World Century Publishing. Tan, C. and Geng, Y. (2005) India and China: Twenty Centuries of Civilization Interaction and Vibrations. New Delhi: Centre for Study of Civilizations. Tanaka, K. (2013) ‘Contradictions in Dōgen’, Philosophy in East & West, 63(3): 322–​34. Thich, Nhat Hanh (1998) Interbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism. 3rd edition. Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press. Thompson, K.O. (1998) ‘What Is the Reason of Failure or Success? “The Fisherman’s Song Goes Deep into the River”: Fishermen in the Zhuangzi’ in R.T. Ames (ed), Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp 15–​34. Tian, C. (2005) Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing to Marxism. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 60

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Times of India (2002) ‘Here, Trees Worshipped as Gods’, 27 February, http://​ timesofindia.indiatimes.com/c​ ity/a​ hmedabad/​Here-​trees-​worshipped-​as-​ gods/​articleshow/​2203261.cms Unschuld, P.U. and Tessenow, H. (eds) (2011) Huang Di Nei Jing Su Wen: An Annotated Translation of Huang Di’s Inner Classic –​Basic Questions, volume I. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Van Loon, G. (ed) (2003) Charaka Samhita, Handbook on Ayurveda, volume I. New Delhi: Chaukhambha Orientalia Publishers. Vasilaki, R. (2012) ‘Provincialising IR? Deadlocks and Prospects in post-​ Western IR Theory’, Millennium, 41(1): 3–​22. Waltz, K.N. (1954) Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, K.N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-​Wesley. Warrier, M. (2011) ‘Modern Ayurveda in Transnational Context’, Religion Compass, 5(3): 80–​93. Yan, X. (2011) Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zhang, Y. and Chang, T.C. (eds) (2016) Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations: Ongoing Debates and Sociological Realities. London: Routledge.

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3

What Can Guanxi International Relations Be About? Emilian Kavalski

Introduction Bemoaning the deepening fractures in Sino–​US relations, Yangyang Cheng (2021), a Chinese-​born scholar working in the United States, noted in exasperation that she finds herself ‘at a loss for words’. Cheng was not merely vexed by the mutually reinforcing centrifugal forces of Beijing’s growing authoritarianism, which prevented free exchange of ideas both within China and between China and the world, but also by the intensifying (and thinly veiled xenophobic) Western rhetoric that China is either a threat to be managed or a problem to be resolved. While these dynamics backstopped Cheng’s immediate concern, her main preoccupation has been with the disregard for the language with which knowledge about China and China’s role in the world is produced. She insisted that language is not just a means for communication. It is primarily ‘an instrument of power, a measure of humanity, a map for world-​making’. Cheng called for building polyphonic understandings that challenge the linguistic hegemony of knowledge production ‘both in my birth country and my adopted home, [where] English is coded with whiteness and whiteness signals expertise’. In the context of such silencing of ‘other tongues’, what counts as ‘Chinese-​ness’ and who gets to define it is never a neutral exercise. Cheng concludes with the poignant observation that the: end of the world does not arrive through water, fire, or the plague: it begins with the slow death of language, when words grow stale and complacent with power, when artificial boundaries between nations harden. A new order for our collective survival can only be birthed when we acquire new ways of speaking. (Cheng, 2021) 62

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It seems that a similar malady of language plagues the analysis of International Relations (IR), especially when it comes to theorizing China’s growing prominence on the world stage (Pan and Kavalski, 2018; Nordin et al, 2019). To paraphrase Cheng’s concern, is IR able to speak in tongues unyoked from the bifurcating Thucydides Trap and security dilemmas of power transition, which frame the theoretical and policy imaginaries of the discipline? Is it possible to articulate global relations inculcated in connections, ties and interactions rather than in the bromidic division between ‘those who are with us and those who are against us’? It appears that IR struggles to foster fresh ways of speaking, seeing and encountering the world that can help it generate meaningful answers to the pressing questions of our times. Instead, the dominant models of IR continue to be implicated in the construction of a world that is unravelling socially, fracturing economically and deteriorating ecologically (Acharya, 2000; Cudworth et al, 2018). There is an urgent need to transcend established paradigms and practices privileging one set of experiences, expertise and knowledge over another (Kavalski, 2020b; Tsui, 2021). And this is why the position and framing of China’s rise in IR discourse gains its significance –​it offers an opportunity and a promise for both theoretical and conceptual pluralism in the study of world affairs. To begin with, the study of how China thinks and in what ways its hoary history and traditions inform the idiosyncrasies of Beijing’s international outlook have grown into a cottage industry, both in IR and across the full spectrum of the humanities and social sciences. More often than not, such accounts present China as a hybrid of ancient and modern curiosities and fail to construct any kind of proximity –​cultural, historical, economic, let alone normative –​between China and its external observers (Pan, 2012; Zuchowska, 2013; Kavalski, 2017a). Instead, China is depicted largely as a distant stranger and/​or an awkward giant, which seems to count in the structural stratifications of Eurocentric IR only ‘as museumized history, lucrative ethno-​tourism, or an idiosyncrasy (“local colour”) from a bygone era’ (Ling et al, 2016: 113). At the heart of such representations appears to be China’s positioning in European intellectual imagination as the ultimate Other or what Michel Foucault (2002) called heterotopia –​a disturbing place, whose difference ‘undermines language’. China becomes ‘the Other country’ not merely because of its location on the opposite end of the Eurasian landmass, but also because it represents ‘a culture entirely devoted to the ordering of space, but one that does not distribute the multiplicity of existing things into any of the categories that make it possible for us to name, speak, and think’ (Foucault, 2002: xix). In this setting, it should not be surprising that the recent promulgation of Chinese concepts into the ratiocination of IR questions ‘the very “constitutional structures” that are the core of the international system’ 63

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(Carlson, 2010: 96; Zhang, 2021; Zhao, 2021). In fact, it has urged IR theory to go back to the road less travelled of encountering the multiverse of relations animating global life. This chapter therefore intends an interpretative journey into the Chinese concepts and definitions of the international. The intention is to explore whether these ideas are indeed so heterotopic as to be unintelligible to IR. It has to be stated at the outset that the focus on guanxi (traditional: 關係 simplified: 关系) is not entirely coincidental. It is one of the words that make up the term ‘international relations’ in Chinese –​ guoji guanxi (traditional: 國際關係 simplified: 国际关系). In this respect, it should appear surprising that there has been so little attention in the literature on IR on the meaning and content of the terms that go into the making of the Chinese phrase for IR. The contention is that such disregard illustrates the Eurocentric commitments of the discipline, which has consciously discouraged students of world politics to be ‘curious about the “non-​West” but has encouraged them to explain away non-​Western dynamics by superimposing Western categories’ (Bilgin and Ling, 2017: 11; Hobson, 2020; Seo, 2021). Post-​Western scholars (of different ilk) have long bemoaned the demand to constantly qualify, bracket and signpost their engagement with non-​Western ideas, while the tendency to promote (allegedly) Western concepts –​such as sovereignty, democracy, human rights –​in the abstract (not least because of their presumed universalism) has never seemed to trouble ‘Eurocentric IR’; in fact, it has been ‘fetishized’ in the narratives of its interlocutors (Chowdhry, 2007: 106). While this chapter does not suggest that post-​ Western IRs have to engage in a reverse disregard for Eurocentric ideas, it insists that mainstream IR have a culturally attuned and contextually verdant engagement with ideas independent of the practices of the governments that administer the territories and societies from which such ideas originate. Such an endeavour acts simultaneously as a reminder about the multiversal world we inhabit and the composite nature of IR’s episteme. The attention of this study is to the ways in which the affordances of relationality are either foreshadowed or foreshortened by the engagement with the Chinese concept of guanxi. The following sections tease out the content and practices of this term and assess its implications for IR theory and practice. The necessary caveat is that the study focuses on the ideal type inherent in the guanxi model of relationality rather than the actual practices of Chinese foreign policy (Kavalski, 2018a). While it is certainly possible to establish such connections, the point here is to draw attention to the epistemic and ontological relationality made possible by the encounter with guanxi. The claim is that the defining feature of the Western/​Eurocentric mainstream of IR is its lack of relationality. Conversely, what makes post-​ Western IR ‘post-​Western’ is its responsiveness and receptivity to perspectives that are not one’s own. The concluding section of this chapter evokes these 64

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registers of worlding mutuality by elaborating the ways in which guanxi can help transcend the Western/​non-​Western dichotomies that dominate so much of the literatures both on relationality in IR and IR theory more generally. It is with the intention to aid the disclosure of such ontological and epistemic relationality that this investigation enlists the Chinese concept of guanxi.

Guanxi: what’s in a name? Guanxi appears to be one of those essentially contested concepts, whose meaning and practices are anything but clear cut and universally accepted. Most commentators tend to take as their point of departure the etymology of the two characters that make guanxi: ‘guan means barriers and xi means connections’ (Jia, 2006: 49–​54; Kavalski, 2018b). The literal meaning of guanxi then was ‘connection across barriers’ or ‘pass the gate and get connected’ (Luo, 1997: 49). This framing should not be misunderstood as a suggestion of a fixed and inflexible framework of exclusion. Instead, guanxi denotes openness to connections with others and infers a far more flexible and dynamic ‘web of relationships that functions as the set of interlocking laces which connects people of different weis [positions/​status]’ (Hwang, 1987: 963). It is also claimed that even though pragmatic, a guanxi relationship is profoundly infused with ‘a higher sense of responsibility towards others’ (Tong, 2006: 309). More often than not, the concept of guanxi reflects the establishment and maintenance of ‘an intricate and pervasive relational network’ engendered by the practice of unlimited exchange of favours between its members and bound by reciprocal obligation, assurance and mutuality (Pye, 1982: 882). Yet, many have hinted that such practices reflect a far richer meaning of the term in Chinese than in its English counterpart ‘relationship’ –​namely, ‘guanxi refers to relationship in the most profound sense of the term’ (Bell, 2000: 133). Owing to the dynamism of social interactions, ‘the final word on guanxi can never be concluded’ since the practices that it denotes are constantly evolving to adapt to the ever-​changing contexts and patterns of global life (Yang, 2002: 459; Cho and Kavalski, 2017). This fluidity has permeated the English language literature on the topic through the multiple translations that the term has acquired –​‘relations’, ‘connections’, ‘friendship’, ‘networks of reciprocal bonds’, ‘social capital’, ‘nepotism’ and ‘corruption’. While such multiplicity of meanings should not necessarily be surprising (after all, any translation can offer only a partial impression of the ideational context within which the term originates), it still suggests the layered and contingent framing in the Chinese original as well. In this respect, there are a couple of puzzling features when it comes to the term guanxi. On the one hand, despite its indeterminacy, guanxi 65

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occupies a central position in the Chinese worldview. It has been labelled as ‘the lifeblood of all things Chinese –​business, politics, and society’ (Luo, 1997: 45). The grandee of China Studies, Lucian Pye (1995: 35) referred to it as ‘one of the most fundamental aspects of Chinese political behaviour’, while the political philosopher Wenshan Jia (2006: 49–​54) claims that guanxi is one of the central philosophical concepts, which ‘reflects the Chinese way to know about reality (ontology), the Chinese way to interpret reality (phenomenology), and the Chinese values about humanity (axiology)’. On the other hand, guanxi’s significance appears to be of a very recent provenance. While in circulation a century ago, the term was not deemed significant enough to warrant inclusion in the two classic Chinese dictionaries –​the 1915 ci yuan (‘sources of words’) and the 1936 ci hai (‘word sea’) (Luo, 1997: 44). In this respect, guanxi’s rise to prominence is closely associated with social, political and economic processes set in motion during the second half of the 20th century. Some have even speculated whether there is anything particularly Chinese about guanxi or whether it is merely the Chinese variant of a global social phenomenon for the reliance on favours to achieve political, economic and social goals (Gold et al, 2002: 13–​14; Ledeneva, 2008). It is also noteworthy that such rearticulation of the term and practices of guanxi was occurring simultaneously across the expanse of the ‘Chinese commonwealth’ –​in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and Singapore, as well as the Sinophonic diaspora around the globe (Yeung and Tung, 1996: 58). It did not evade the attention of experienced China hands: while in the past ‘guanxi relations were suspect as the source of corruption and injustice, they have now found champions who saw them as a basis of harmony and a contrast to individualism’ (Rozman, 2011: 90–​ 4). In this respect, commentators have had to contend that the practices of guanxi have acquired positive and negative connotations, both of which seem to arise from its propensity for subversion of state structures. In the case of the former, guanxi assists with bottom-​up and civil society empowerment by permitting ‘individuals to use their social ingenuity to build a web of personal relationships’ (Tsui and Farh, 1997: 60). A number of commentators find the origins of this trend during the Maoist years in China, when guanxi networks provided ordinary people with alternative forms of solidarity, which opened spaces for the subversion of established hierarchies and the mitigation of the political pressures imposed on everyday life (Yang, 2002: 466; Cho and Kavalski, 2015: 433). The negative flavour of guanxi comes from its association with graft. The very patterns that make guanxi a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Ledeneva, 2008: 124) are also the key ingredients of its dark side. Yet, rather than essentializing it as a cultural trait associated with Asian backwardness, this aspect of guanxi can be read as an idiosyncratic encounter between the forces of transnational 66

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capitalism and the economic development of the state (Yang, 2002, 468; Horesh and Kavalski, 2014). As the late Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of modern Singapore, has acknowledged, the Chinese use guanxi ‘to make up for the lack of rule of law and transparency in rules and regulation’ (cited in Yeung and Tung, 1996: 56). In this setting, phrases such as ‘crony capitalism’ and ‘Confucian nepotism’ seem to overlook the socio-​temporal contingency underpinning the bounds of obligation and networks of support that characterize the practices of guanxi (Yang, 2002: 469–​76). In fact, some have gone as far as to claim that what (Western) observers usually criticize as the corrupt side of guanxi is in fact the misunderstood ‘Confucian Ethic’ of Asian capitalism (Luo, 1997: 48). As the earlier discussion demonstrates, both the positive and negative features of guanxi reflect an idiosyncratic coalescence between tradition and modernity –​or what some have referred to as the ‘critical inheritance and critical transformation of Chinese thought’ –​in the process of achieving collective goals (Liu, 2014: 121; Kavalski, 2017b: 232). In particular, guanxi reflects a commitment to act in accordance with social demands and expectations. As the eminent Chinese scholar Liang Shuming insists, the Chinese worldview is ‘neither geren benwei (individual-​based) nor shehui benwei (society-​based), but guanxi benwei (relation-​based)’ (cited in Gold et al, 2002: 10). The emphasis on relationality infers a different way of being present in the world. In post-​Western IR scholarship such difference pivots on the contrast between relational and autonomous self (Nordin and Smith, 2019; Shimizu and Noro, 2021). Associated with Western intellectual traditions, the latter insists on discrete subjectivities, praises individualism, and values and normalizes the lack of dependence on others. The relational self, on the other hand, insists that individuals do not and cannot exist unless they are enmeshed in relations with others; in other words, there is no self without relations. Such framing of the relational self uncovers the ‘Chinese worldview as an integrated system of subject and object: the individual is placed in the spatial-​temporal location of the world, with her experiences, values, and expectations constantly shaping and being shaped by the world’ (Liu, 2014: 124). In this setting, it is the guanxi itself (rather than the individuals involved) that has agency –​namely, it is ‘the “relation that selects,” meaning that relations shape an actor’s identity and influence her behaviour’ (Qin, 2009: 9). It seems that the origins of this conceptualization can be traced back to Confucius himself, for whom ‘unless there are at least two human beings there are no human beings’ (Rosemont, 2006: 11–​17). The relational self, thereby, is ‘one which is intensely aware of the social presence of others’ (Ho, 1995: 117). The interdependence and reciprocity characterizing such relational self accords social relations much greater significance, and relations are often seen as ends in and of themselves rather than means for realizing 67

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various individual goals (Tu, 1985: 133; Tsui and Farh, 1997: 61; Zolkos and Kavalski, 2007: 381). The key inference is that participants in a guanxi perceive each other to be ‘role occupants rather than individuals’ (Hwang, 1987: 945; Shih, 2021). Owing to the fluidity of the way in which these relational roles are lived, guanxi asserts that change rather than stability is an endemic feature of global life. Both through attrition or accretion and depending on the circumstances, issues and situations, the guanxi relationship has diverse and contingent iterations. Such dynamic multiplicity of interdependent conditioning factors engenders an interpersonal realm whose complexity is only partially known to the participating actors (Chang and Holt, 1991: 34). This calls for a contextual embeddedness within the transient constellations of factors and actors that impact on the content and trajectories of a relationship. Thus, the long-​term orientation of guanxi inserts a modicum of predictability by lowering the transaction costs. At the same time, it can be utilized for multiple and diverse purposes, while engendering resilience (Pye, 1995: 44; Kavalski, 2012b: 74).

What might we guanxi about in IR? How would IR look like if we were to imagine it from the point of view of guanxi? To begin with, the outline of such an endeavour should not appear unusual (let alone heterotopic) to those attuned to the inescapable condition of mutual encounter defining global life (Ling, 2014; Uemura, 2015; Nordin et al, 2019; Kurki, 2020; Trownsell et al, 2021). In particular, the relational pattern envisaged by the guanxi perspective supports the efforts to articulate most issues plaguing IR as ‘communication problems’ (Risse, 2000). The critical contribution of guanxi to these conversations is that IR is not merely an outcome of communicative actions (or a solution to communicative problems) but reflects the willingness of actors to expose themselves to the fluidity of ongoing relations with others. This engenders a rather gimballed view of global life –​just like a ship’s compass (or a gimbal), the patterns of world affairs are made up of multiple, interdependent and constantly shifting spheres of relations. Each of these spheres represents an emergent and highly contingent nexus of complex relations, which interact simultaneously at different spatial and temporal scales (Kavalski, 2011). The result is a multi-​ scalar framing of global life in which diverse layers of actors and agency (and the various systems, institutions and regimes which they inhabit) animate overlapping levels of contingent aggregation. The concept of guanxi, thereby, illuminates that the complex patterns of global life resonate with relationality and dynamism, rather than the static and spatial arrangements implicit in the self-​other, centre-​periphery, hegemon-​challenger models underpinning the binary metanarratives of IR (Shimizu, 2015; Kavalski, 2021a). 68

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In contrast to the dualistic bifurcations that dominate IR imaginaries, the concept of guanxi reframes world order as a gimballed interface suffused with the fragility, fluidity and mutuality of global interactions. Hence, the deployment of the concept of guanxi in IR’s knowledge production discloses global life as an emergent, complexly related web of interactions, which is changing constantly and invariably in flux, (trans)forming and adapting to the emergent rhythms of new circumstances and contexts (Kavalski, 2015). Such a gimballed outlook not only suggests a radical reconsideration of the disciplinary mainstream, but is also profoundly at odds with the underlying ontological substantialism of IR (see Chapter 10; Pan, 2021). In fact, in its attempt to ‘abandon the futile quest to articulate a single basis on which to produce knowledge’, relationality –​especially, that prompted by the encounter with guanxi –​proffers a meaningful contribution to the articulation of a ‘post-​foundational IR’ (Jackson, 2011: 189).

Guanxi’s harmonious respect for the other The focus on guanxi brings out that the basic ontological condition of international actors is relational –​namely, the content of their existence as actors is constituted inter-​subjectively during the very process of interaction (Kavalski, 2013; Kurki, 2021). Relationality reflects a condition of intelligibility for the sense-​making processes on the world stage. Thus, owing to prior conditions of relationality, an ‘international’ world of holistically structured meaning appears in the first place. In this setting, the various actors that animate global life can be articulated, encountered and accounted for because they are (always and) already relationally structured (Zolkos and Kavalski, 2008; Tickner and Querejazu, 2021). The decentring implicit in such engagement draws attention to the idiosyncratic structural conditions and unique cultural categories that contribute to the participants’ thinking about and involvement in interpersonal situations (Hwang, 1987: 946). A key feature of the guanxi outlook is the emphasis on harmony (Shih and Huang, 2016). The discussion of the Chinese concept of harmony has attracted significant attention in recent years (Pan, 2011). What is important for the purposes of the current investigation is that these discussions of harmony draw attention to ‘respect for the other’ as the ‘cardinal value’ of China’s strategic outlook (Womack, 2008: 294–​7). Such respect for the other articulates relationality through webs of ‘non-​ wilful [and non-​domineering] actions directed to realising the potential events and others, and is action that animates others to act on their own behalf ’ (Barbalet, 2015, 342–​7). The mutually benevolent relationships adumbrated by such harmonious encounters advance relational agency as a dialogical process, whose effects involve the efforts of all sides of the 69

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exchange. The point here is that guanxi ties are volitional (and not forced upon the participants) –​actors intentionally commit to the interaction. It is for this reason that guanxi relations are characterized by dedicated cultivation (Barbalet, 2015: 1042). Such guanxi dynamics can be seen at work in China’s ‘policy of “pre-​emptive participation” ’ (Paltiel, 2009: 49) in relations with a wide range of other international actors not only as a reassurance strategy aimed at allaying their concerns, but primarily as an effort to foster ongoing interactions with them. Agency –​especially international agency –​in such a relational setting is not about the intentional projection of self-​interest, but about strategic receptivity –​that is, ‘knowing oneself insofar as one is related to others, and knowing others insofar as others are related to oneself ’ (Kavalski, 2012a: 87; Wen and Wang, 2013: 192). Guanxi, thereby, presages an understanding of international action and agency –​both cognitively and affectively –​as simultaneously shaped and mediated by ethical obligations and commitments to others (the structure and content of which are acquired through the very relationships by which ethical obligations and commitments to others are disclosed). The currency of such relationality is not legitimacy (as most IR perspectives seem to suggest), but reputation. The cultivation of reputation (or what IR observers tend to refer as status) is the main aim of the harmonious respect for the other. As Jack Barbalet cogently observes, reputational standing is a social and not an economic resource. Thus, guanxi is deployed not with the aim to gain access to economic or political resources, but is ‘primarily directed to acquiring and expending social resources’ (Barbalet, 2015: 1044; Zwart, 2016: 42). Not only that, but such understanding of relationality demands that those engaged in interactions be ‘more aware of the relationships that constitute the objects of their concern than they are of their own interests’ (Barbalet, 2015: 346; Kavalski, 2011: 10). It is in this setting that xinyong (trustworthiness) –​the reputation for meeting one’s obligations to others –​gains its significance as ‘the most valuable asset’ in the transactional web of guanxi (DeGlopper, 1995: 205–​6). Thus, rather than facilitating the legitimacy of one’s actions, the strategic aim of guanxi is to enhance the trustworthiness of actors by providing series of situations in which they can continuously enact (as well as be evaluated on) their ‘meeting the expectations of others’ (Ho, 1976: 873). In this setting, the Chinese claim of a harmonious respect for others –​for instance, as asserted in the discourses of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) –​is nothing short of a strategic desire for status recognition (Callahan, 2001). Motivated by the status insecurity associated with the relational constitution of international interactions, the operational beliefs of guanxi provide ongoing modalities for engendering trust by demonstrating China’s capacity and willingness to meet its obligations to others. 70

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Guanxi’s logic of relationships Guanxi implies both a propensity and a capacity for living with and in ambiguity. In this respect, it provides a ‘relational’ (as opposed to ‘rule-​based’) framework for the meaningful contextualization in the shifting patterns of global life (Qin, 2011). Thus, it is relations that are not only at the heart of explaining and understanding the world, but also central to its observation and encounter. As Qin Yaqing (2009) demonstrates, this understanding reframes power as a ‘relational practice’, whose meaning is distinct from its traditional association in IR with the possession of material capacities for influence (regardless of whether they are coercive or not). On the one hand, relations (and the webs of interactions that they constitute) provide a platform for the exercise of power. On the other hand, relations themselves have power –​namely, they frame future patterns of interaction (Qin, 2009: 9). This then becomes the centrepiece for the ‘logic of relationships’ animating global life (Kavalski, 2013). Such logic assumes that while the future is unknown, the partners in the future are the same as in the past and present. Therefore, the significance of any specific interaction lies in how it shapes a particular relationship. … The bottom line in a relationship logic is that both sides feel that they are better off if the relationship continues –​this is the minimum meaning of ‘mutual benefit’. A normal relationship does not require symmetry of partners or equality of exchanges, but it does require reciprocity [that is, respect for the other]. (Womack, 2008: 295–​7) It should be stated at the outset that such framing should not be misunderstood as an indication of an altruistic outlook on global life, but as an effective strategy for managing a hyper-​social environment. The logic of relationships therefore outlines a ‘context for action’ in which goals can be achieved through an active, committed and responsible involvement in world affairs (Russell and Tokatlian, 2003: 17). Informed by the extremely situational and particularistic nature of Chinese culture, the logic of relationships infers that as the circumstances of interactions change, so too will the patterns of guanxi (Pye, 1995: 46). Such framing also undermines the linear causality backstopping Western takes on relationality –​namely, that if two (or more actors) interact with one another their relations will necessarily lead to greater intimacy (Parks, 1982). Rather than focusing on the personality or identity of participating actors, the logic of relationships suggests that the conditions for interaction ‘cannot be forced’ and remain ‘largely unknown and unknowable’ (Chang and Holt, 1991: 54; emphasis in original). Thus, the process of interaction facilitates the likelihood of future relations (which is the key strategic 71

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function of guanxi) rather than intimacy. This is not to assert that the process is not affective. The point here is that guanxi is not about the subjective qualities of the participants, but about the process of interactions that they enact (Ho, 2019). This demands both contextual sensitivity and an ongoing commitment to the deliberate practices of relationality. What is crucial about such logic of relationships is that as the hub of social knowledge and social life, the patterns of guanxi intimate that shared understandings are not imposed as rules, rights or obligations, but emerge in the process of interaction. Such framing informs the formulation of external relations. Owing to the contextual ubiquity of guanxi, foreign policy making becomes a contingent outcome of relational interactions between actors –​ that is, the relational context frames the policy response, but because of its inherent fluidity, policy is expected to fluctuate (Zhang, 2015: 211). In an interesting move, some commentators have inferred the ‘logic of relationships’ though Beijing’s practice of ‘third culture building to improve international relations’ (Jia, 2009). The proposition is that guanxi can beget a ‘third culture’ through the practices of deliberate and repeated interactions, which brings together elements of the cultures of the interacting actors as well as new ones which emerge in the process of doing things together. It is this dynamism that informs the ‘deeply relational’ character of Chinese foreign policy (Jia, 2009: 322–​5; Xue, 2021). Rather than impeding the policy process, such contextual attunement of the logic of relationships suggests the unexpected opportunities made possible by the ‘third culture’ of guanxi –​for instance, the unintended evolution of the Shanghai-​5 into the BRI via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kavalski, 2010).

Guanxi’s community of practice It is communities of practice that locate the ‘third culture’ engendered by guanxi’s logic of relationships. The inference here is that international agency emerges in a community, not in a vacuum. As suggested, it is the relational (rather than the rule-​based) nature of guanxi that backstops the dialogical outcomes of its effects (Kavalski, 2020a; Shih and Huang, 2020). In particular, it is guanxi’s commitment to deliberate and unconditional sociality that motivates shared meaning-​generation. The suggestion thereby is that while strategic, the relationality of guanxi is not motivated by self-​interest (that is, it is not an instrumental means to an end). Instead, the driving force appears to be a commitment to the practice of doing things together –​an aspect that can explain China’s general aversion to formal institutional arrangements and the imposition of conditionality on its partners (Walton and Kavalski, 2017). In the context of such ongoing and contingent mutual co-​constitution, any occurrence does not exist merely in isolation (as a standalone event), 72

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but reflects a nexus of innumerable interactions which interpenetrate one another in the shifting tapestry of social relations. Hence, the attentiveness to relationality makes a powerful case both for envisioning the fluid iterations of social transactions that percolate and gain salience in the context of ongoing interactions and for creating ethical openings to reimagine the complex webs of entanglements and encounters with others beyond the divisiveness and violence suffusing current domestic, national and world politics (Zolkos and Kavalski, 2016). As such, the relational communities of practice framed by the patterns of guanxi mandate tolerance of at least as much diversity and contradictions as evident in the social relations being performed. Such relationality is not zero-​sum –​that is, ‘the debit and credit sides of this [relational] balance sheet are never in equilibrium’ –​because this would spell the end of guanxi (Yeung and Tung, 1996: 55). At the same time, the value of the personal favour rendered in the context of guanxi (called renqing in Chinese) ‘can never be calculated objectively’ –​instead, its assessment is subject to an ongoing and complex ‘blend of cost and quality and relationship in which one or two elements may be interpreted, by some people at certain times, as being more valuable than the other element(s)’ (Hwang, 1987: 963). The emphasis here is on the strategic value of maintaining the relationship. In fact, it is through the practice of doing things together that the normative and the ideational structure of global life are engendered (Kavalski, 2013; Kritz, 2014). The focus on guanxi suggests that by cherishing the chance of interactions (rather than force and/​or work on a relationship) –​in its ideal form, at least –​the Chinese outlook is predisposed to allow for contingency to take its course (Chang and Holt, 1991: 54). In this respect, the interactive dynamics of communities of practice stimulate new and contextual definitions of the ‘common good’. Moreover, in such a dialogical context the possibility for constructing ‘new histories’ emerges by altering the suspicion and bias from past connections and opening opportunities for new avenues for interaction (Qin, 2011). Guanxi therefore spells a longer-​term horizon for relations than the short-​term gains espoused by mainstream IR. The point is that neither meaningful relations nor good governance ‘can proceed in haste’; both sustainable interactions and their maintenance require interactions that ‘unfold incrementally and non-​dramatically’ (Ling et al, 2016: 115). In this process, communities of practice reveal a new way of being present in the world through the binding power of deliberate interactions.

Conclusion: what is ‘post-​Western’ about post-​Western IR? This chapter has demonstrated that the promise of a relational mode of IR inquiry is considerable. In this respect, the concept of guanxi shifts IR 73

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thinking away from a focus on international relations to one premised on global relationality. Thus, rather than looking at dyadic sets of relations as well as the identities and capacity of individual actors, guanxi inheres in IR as webs of figurations intertwined by a conscious and strategic search for relations with others. In this respect, actors (and their agency) have effects only to the extent that they are in relations with others. Thus, owing to the dynamic nature of such interactions, what passes for world order is not only constantly changing, but demands ongoing commitment to participating in and maintaining these relations. In this respect, the claim here is that the relational turn has become a defining feature of the so-​called post-​Western IR theory. It seems few today would dispute that the disciplinary inquiry of IR is indelibly marked by the ‘colonial signs’ of its Eurocentric make-​up. Not only that, but the ‘apple pie’ flavour that IR acquired in the context of its Cold War transformation into an ‘American social science’ seems to have made the discipline even more inimical towards encounters with the various non-​Western others that its outlook consciously occludes (Iriye, 1979; Kavalski, 2021b). In an attempt to trouble the juxtapositions of temporal and geographical difference that still seem to stump any IR alternative prefixed by a ‘non-​’ or a ‘post-​’, this chapter emphasizes the centrality of relationality as a distinguishing feature of all such projects. Critical/​ postcolonial/​non-​Western/​global IR narratives have difficulty obviating the theoretical slippage as a result of which ‘the East’ is unquestionably equated with ‘Asia’ and is then assumed to be part of the so-​called ‘Rest’ and ‘non-​West’. Equally problematically, ‘Euro-​centrism’ is invariably taken as a stand-​in for ‘West-​centrism’, ‘Sino-​centrism’ for ‘Chinese hegemony’, and ‘post’ for ‘anti’. In this setting, the relationality lens helps outline the contested terrain of post-​Western IR as a space for dialogical learning, which promises a world that is less hegemonic, more democratic, international and equitable. In particular, such an approach allows us to build solidarity between like-​ minded projects targeting the silencing, hegemony, patriarchy and violence of the mainstream by treating them as second-​order aspects deriving from a first-​order problematique –​IR’s poignant ontological and epistemic lack of relationality (Kurki, 2020). It is the very denial of relationality (a first-​order issue) that perpetuates the imperial, patriarchal and racist attitudes (second-​ order issues) of IR. It is in this vein that the attack on the latter which so much of critical, feminist and postcolonial theorizing undertakes overlooks the very condition of its possibility –​the lack of relationality in IR. What this means is that the IR mainstream has been dominated by an atomistic understanding of global life which prioritizes fixed units of analysis (nation states) and their discrete dyadic interactions (conflict/​balancing in the context of anarchy). Yet, at no point is the option of a sociability infused 74

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with the contingent opportunities inherent in the encounter with the other acknowledged in this narrative; let alone the potential that the phenomena and processes animating world affairs are mutually co-​constituted in relation with one another. Instead, the mainstream of IR envisions global life as a domain of disconnected states, infamously imagined as billiard balls –​‘closed, impermeable, and sovereign unit[s]‌, completely separated from all other states’ (Wolfers, 1962: 19). Positing the existence of atomistic units (or entities) before relations, the Eurocentric storytelling of IR asserts that states are almost invariably the ontological priors for any kind of theorization. This outlook then facilitates the entrenchment of the idea that international politics are almost by default anarchical and antagonistic. World affairs are a ‘great game’ for those who can make immediate moves to counter their opponents; failure to do so makes one simultaneously ‘ineffective and useless’ (Ling et al, 2016: 115). In other words, the assumption that relations are self-​evidently secondary to the primary condition of conflict on the world stage legitimizes the post-​ ontological contention that peaceful coexistence is possible only through the complete mastery and subjugation of all forms of otherness (Odysseos, 2007: xxxi). In particular, the ontological and epistemological openings made possible by the encounter with guanxi permit the disclosure of relations that fall outside IR’s traditional focus on competition, conflict, cooptation and defence. A relational IR, which is post-​Western in the sense that it does not treat the West and the non-​West as discrete and disconnected homogeneous opposites, but intertwined and mutually constitutive webs of interactions, proposes a molecular outlook whose unit of analysis is relations (rather than actors) and their multiple triadic dynamics (which open numerous and numinous points of and possibilities for interaction). In other words, what makes post-​Western IR narratives ‘post-​Western’ is their emphasis on relationality –​namely, things in global life are not merely interconnected, but they gain meaning and significance within complex webs of entanglements and encounters with others. The study can thereby be read as a prolegomenon to a genuinely relational IR thinking and practice, one whose attention is not on reifying the bulwarks of national sovereignty and quantifying the national interest, but rather draws attention to the porousness and unpredictability of global life, Western and non-​Western (and the messy and contingent intersections that permeate and constitute both). The emphasis on relationality thereby acts as a reminder that IR knowledge, just like any knowledge, is acquired and mediated relationally through diverse sets of practices. IR’s denial of ontological relationality has its epistemic effects –​perhaps most perniciously evidenced by the imposition of a canon reproduced around the world so that students can contribute to ‘core’ debates, while the inputs of the ‘periphery’ are occluded 75

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from the ‘Anglosphere’ of Western IR journals and academia (Vucetic, 2011; Cho, 2015). Some have labelled this lack of epistemic relationality as IR’s ‘castle syndrome’ –​rather than engagement with the multiverse of global life, proponents of different IR schools engage in defending and reinforcing the bulwarks of their analytical castles, while bombarding the claims of everybody else (Barkin, 2010). Others have termed it as ‘returnism’ –​IR’s predilection for traditional conceptual signposts that provide intellectual comfort zones, disconnected from current realities (Heng, 2010). The claim here is that both these dynamics are instances of IR’s lack of relationality. In other words, one of the post-​Western disclosures elicited by the encounter with guanxi is that knowledge does not exist in isolation; it is not manufactured atomistically and discretely from scratch. Rather, to know one thing, one has to know a lot of other things in the context of their mutual implication. Ideas –​just like life –​arise relationally. Concepts have a history and cultural specificity; yet, they do not grow in a vacuum but are shaped continuously through peregrination, interactions and cross-​fertilization. A post-​Western IR, thereby, acts simultaneously as a reminder about the pluriversal world we inhabit and the composite nature of IR’s episteme. Yet, the multiplicity presaged by such relationality does not seek to eliminate contradictions; instead, it aims to encounter a global life in which ‘many worlds fit’ (Conway, 2019: 170; Chen, 2011). In short, a relational IR involves utterly otherwise than a neutral, invisible and uncommitted mode of inquiry. The epistemic verso of such relational IR is the cultivation of attentiveness to the self-​organizing, shifting, and historically and geographically contingent realities of the global life we inhabit. Such attentiveness will undoubtedly make the realms of IR research ‘messy’, yet would assist with the recovery of a disposition to encounter (and respond to) currents, trends and voices that are uncomfortable and are not easily digestible by established paradigms. In this respect, ‘China’s rise’ is not merely an event circumscribed historically and geographically to specific space, place and time; it is also an ongoing dynamic of begetting, formation and change produced by processes and forces that seem to be polar opposites. The theorization of China’s rise can thereby act as a catalyst for a critical consciousness and emancipatory praxis that pushes IR thinking, feeling, knowledge production, and socially responsible action by engaging creatively with the contradictions, challenges and opportunities of an entangled and unpredictable global life. Going back to Yangyang Cheng’s poignant reflections with which this chapter began, the hope is that such relational IR can nurture ‘new ways of speaking’ the international, attuned to the polyphonies of languages, experiences and knowledges that animate its rhizomatic interactions. The point of such a call for relationality is that the explanation and understanding of world 76

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affairs requires multiple perspectives, voices and points of view, each with their ‘own’ agency and capacity for emplotment in the context of global life. Thus, engaging with and listening curiously and provocatively to the phenomenon of guanxi invokes the complexity of possible worlds uncovered by relational IR. Acknowledgements This chapter was originally published as Emilian Kavalski (2018) ‘Guanxi or What is the Chinese for Relational Theory of World Politics’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 18(3): 397–​420 (republished by permission of Oxford University Press). References Acharya, A. (2000) ‘Emancipatory IR Theory’ in S. Arnold and J.M. Beier (eds), (Dis)Placing Security. Toronto, ON: CISS, pp 1–​18. Barbalet, J. (2015) ‘Guanxi, Tie Strength, and Network’, American Behavioural Scientist, 59(8): 1038–​50. Barkin, J.S. (2010) Realist Constructivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bell, D. (2000) ‘Guanxi: A Nesting of Groups’, Current Anthropology, 41(1): 132–​8. Bilgin, P. and Ling, L.H.M. (2017) Asia in International Relations. London: Routledge. Callahan, W. (2001) ‘China and the Globalization of IR Theory’, Journal of Contemporary China, 10(26): 75–​88. Carlson, A. (2010) ‘Moving Beyond Sovereignty: A Brief Consideration of Recent Changes in China’s Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the Tianxia Concept’, Journal of Contemporary China, 20(68): 89–​102. Chang, H.C. and Holt, G.R. (1991) ‘The Concept of Yuan’ in S. Ting-​ Toomey and F. Corzenny (eds), Cross-C ​ ultural Communication. London: Sage, pp 28–​57. Chen, C. (2011) ‘The Absence of Non-​Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 11(1): 1–​23. Cheng, Y. (2021) ‘China Watching Is a Lucrative Business’, The Guardian, 13 January. Cho, Y.C. (2015) ‘Colonialism and Imperialism in IR Theory’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 28(4): 680–​700. Cho, Y.C. and Kavalski, E. (2015) ‘Governing Uncertainty in Turbulent Times’, Comparative Sociology, 14(3): 429–​44. Cho, Y.C. and Kavalski, E. (2017) ‘Worlding the Study of Normative Power’, Uluslararası Ilişkiler, 15(57): 49–​65. 77

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Friendly Rise? China, the West and the Ontology of Relations Astrid H.M. Nordin and Graham M. Smith

Introduction Chinese policy makers, scholars and pundits have attempted to ameliorate fears about China’s rise by portraying China as a new and friendlier kind of great power. It is claimed that this represents a new way of relating which transcends problematic Western understandings of self–​other relations, and their tendency to slip into domination and enmity. Claims along such lines can be seen in President Xi Jinping’s official discourse, which portrays the Chinese nation as culturally predisposed to friendly, peaceful and harmonious behaviour abroad, and which lists friendship as one of 12 key terms for his socialist ‘core value system’ at home (People’s Daily Online, 2014; Xi, 2014). These claims have been illustrated in various international nation-​branding events, often through the Confucian adage that ‘it is glorious to receive friends from afar’ (Callahan, 2010: 2). They have also been an important part of emerging debates over a possible Chinese School of International Relations (IR) (Noesselt, 2015). Famously, Zhao Tingyang claims that Chinese traditions offer a ‘Chinese ontology, the ontology of relations, instead of the western ontology of things’, which enables the peaceful transformation of enemies into friends (Zhao, 2006: 33, 34; for a discussion, see Nordin, 2016a, 2016b), and researchers discuss ‘China’s self-​perceived role of a friend versus the (often Western) exploiter’ (Shih and Yin, 2013: 81). Taking such use of the term ‘friendship’ as a point of departure, this chapter suggests that a reintroduction of friendship to IR can and should be a key contribution brought about by the increasing influence of Chinese politics and scholarship in international relations. Rather than merely denoting a personal and private relationship, friendship denotes a way of thinking about the co-​constitution of self with other, and theorizes the dynamics of 83

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such co-​foundation. This chapter brings together and juxtaposes a number of ways of thinking through the language of ‘friendship’ and analyses the implications of different theorizations for thinking about China’s rise and world relations. The first section of the chapter explains how the recent theorizations of friendship in IR that draw on Chinese thought indeed constitute a re-​ introduction. It draws a sketch of how friendship was a central political category for virtue cultivation and co-​constitution in both Chinese and European ancient traditions but was transformed under the modern state system into overarching and general forms of community such as citizenship and nationality. Importantly, this public friendship was bound to the idea of enmity and its logic of Us versus Them. The second section develops the argument that the discipline of IR has been shaped by a form of thinking which privileges ‘things’ over ‘relations’ (Jackson and Nexon, 1999; Nordin and Smith, 2019). We show how even some theoretical approaches to IR that aver to focus on relations come to fall back on an ontology of things. In the process, the central question of friendship –​the question of what it means to become with others, and what it means to share and shape a world with others –​has been lost to much analysis in IR. The third section suggests that recovering friendship enables a recast IR based instead on ‘relational ontologies’. We argue that contemporary developments of traditional Chinese thought are particularly significant for IR debates because they indicate a co-​constitutive self–​other relationship which does not emphasize anxiety and fear of difference or of misrecognition. Finally, we conclude that the real divide in understandings of friendship and IR is not between China and the West (nor, for that matter, between ancient and modern). Instead, we contrast the role of friendship in the ontology of things on the one hand, and relational ontologies on the other. The first ontology tends to reproduce an essentialist self–​other dichotomy and ossifies friendship as a role or attribute; the second tends to allow for transformation and so is open to the co-​constitutive dynamics suggested by friendship. Paying attention to current Chinese IR theory that emphasizes relationships and guanxi (social connections), friendship can contribute to the development of such IR thinking and move beyond a focus on ossified forms of friendship and enmity centred on the anxious self. In so doing, this chapter shows that an explicit focus on friendship in IR, as offered by current Chinese theorizations, adds a distinct and valuable vantage point on relationality.

Remembering friendship: ancient and modern Standard accounts of the vocabulary of politics and IR treat the inclusion of ‘friendship’ in their lexicon as somewhat of a novelty. Instead, they 84

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centre on the state, power, sovereignty, citizens, nations and peoples. While many accept that states and nations can have enemies, there is much wider scepticism about the possibilities for friendship (for example Keller, 2009; cf. Koschut and Oelsner, 2014: 6–​8). Nevertheless, friendship was a central political category for both European ancients like Plato (Price, 1989) and the ancient Chinese tradition whose principal source is the thought of Confucius and his heirs (Analects, 1940: 1.8, 9.25, 19.3; Kutcher, 2000: 1615–​16). Incongruous though this might seem to many contemporary students of IR, it was not simply that the ancients fused what scholars might currently be inclined to treat separately: ethics and politics, the personal and the public. Instead, ancient theorizations constructed a concept of friendship which was just as central to theorizing political life as ‘justice’ or ‘equality’ in Greek tradition, and ‘unity’ or ‘harmony’ in Chinese tradition. Thus, although there are differences between seminal accounts of friendship in Chinese and European thought, both traditions understood friendship as an important connector of politics, ethics and human flourishing. Ancients in both Greek and Chinese traditions were concerned that one should have the right kind of friends. Although they were often candid about the emotional, material and social advantages expected from friendship, these were not necessarily the principal reason for friendship. Notably, while affection might emerge, praiseworthy friends were to be chosen not so much for their particularity, but because they provided moral nourishment (Hall and Ames, 1998: 254–​69). In these accounts, the key usefulness of the friend was to transform the self into something new and better, with more virtuous desires, which would in turn lead to harmony and stability in the state. As such, Confucian friendship could and should sustain moral growth in support of family–​state hierarchies. Confucian thought took five key relationships as its foundation, one of which was that between friends (you 友). The other four relationships denoted mutual obligation between father and son, ruler and minister, husband and wife, and older and younger brother. If everybody fulfilled their role in these relationships, families would be stable, harmonious and productive of the good subjects that would ensure stability and harmony for the state. Friendship should be supportive of the other four relationships, where the good friend might both offer respite from their demands, and act as a virtuous example to emulate in order to become a better son, a better official and a better subject (Kutcher, 2000). The importance of the friend as a virtuous example to emulate is so strong that Confucius repeatedly urges: ‘Do not have as a friend anyone who is not as good as you are’ (Analects, 1940: 1.8, 9.25). Put differently, although one should be benevolent to those less virtuous than oneself, it is only one’s betters who support one’s self-​improvement who can be considered true friends. These ancient pictures of friendship contrast with views that have become dominant after the advent of the nation state. Paradigmatically, Carl Schmitt 85

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identifies the friend and enemy distinction as the defining feature of the political, yet he is surprisingly silent on what ‘friendship’ is. When Schmitt does elaborate on the meaning of friendship it is cashed out in relation to the homogeneous identity of a people, where a people’s consciousness of its own identity as a nation means ‘it has the capacity to distinguish friend and enemy’ (Schmitt, 2008: 247). Whereas the ancient literature is able to theorize political forms of friendship without reference to enmity, Schmitt appears unable (or unwilling) to do so. The definitions of enemy and friend are tied together, linked to the possibility of killing and being killed, and seemingly incapable of transformation (Schmitt, 1996: 26–​7, 37, 45–​6). In many ways, Schmitt’s thought is typical of the fate of friendship in the modern state system, a fate which understands friendship as the less significant other of enmity and ossifies both categories. It is perhaps not surprising that this view of friendship is paralleled in Mao Zedong’s thought insofar as it embraces the state. Fairly soon after China’s integration into the modern interstate system, society became dominated by Mao’s interpretation of Marxism-​Leninism, which challenged the ancient understanding of friendship and to a large extent broke away from Confucian thinking (Kam, 1980). The fundamental importance of friendship can nonetheless be seen to have remained, albeit in a new guise. In Mao’s China this new notion of friendship took a domestic and an external form. Domestically, friendship cast the highest friend as the selfless communist comrade (tongzhi 同志). The external form developed in the international arena was ‘foreign-​friendship’ (youyi 友谊). These Maoist terms captured the terrain of friendship for the communist cause and realigned it from emphasizing harmony to a more confrontational polemicization. It no longer focused on mutually constituting elements in a harmoniously transforming relationship (as in Confucianism) but based its dialectic on dichotomized units that clashed in painful revolutions to push history forwards. Under Mao, such dichotomized entities included the ‘friend’ and the ‘enemy’. As Mao posed the question: Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. … To ensure that we will definitely achieve success in our revolution and will not lead the masses astray, we must pay attention to uniting with our real friends in order to attack our real enemies. (Mao, 1961: 13) This snapshot of friendship in ancient and then modern state-​centric thought illustrates a displacement of friendship and what it originally represented: profound relationality and co-​constitution of self and other. The effects of this displacement are reflected in contemporary thought about politics and IR. In ancient thought, friendship had a structuring role for 86

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individuals and political systems. Connected to virtue, it was a means by which political life could be stabilized and made harmonious. In modern politics, friendship is abstracted and put to work by the state in relations of group belonging such as comradeship and nationality. Friendship is formulated as an Us in opposition to a Them; a Self opposed to Others. This suggests a profound shift in thinking about politics, which turns attention away from the possibility of relational production, reconciliation and even a combination of distinctive and contrasting components. Instead, this shift emphasizes the assertion and preservation (or annihilation) of distinct and antagonistically opposed things.

International Relations and the ‘ontology of things’ If it is the case that the state system has marginalized friendship as a concern with co-​constitutive self–​other relations from the political, how is this more broadly reflected in IR? This section revisits the ontological assumptions of ‘mainstream IR’, arguing that much contemporary IR scholarship rests not on an ontological focus on relations, but on an ‘ontology of things’, which has marginalized friendship. Surprisingly, this is true not only of Realism and Liberalism, but also of Wendtian Constructivism, where discussions of friendship explicitly appear. Common stories about the development of IR depict a Eurocentric discipline, where varieties of Realism, Liberalism and constructivism are often said to be ‘mainstream’. Realism emerged near the conception of the discipline of IR, as it is commonly rehearsed, and so Realism set the tone for both the ontological assumptions of IR and its lexicon. Its vocabulary is more than a choice of words; it identifies the ‘things’ of IR. Key within this lexicon are ‘sovereignty’, ‘power’, ‘state’ and ‘nation’. Realists tend to view the international state system in terms of ‘anarchy’ constituted by sovereign states, seeking survival and locked into a ‘security dilemma’ as a result (Morgenthau, 1972; Mearsheimer, 1990: 5–​56). From its imagined inception, then, IR was infused with an ontology of things (see also Chapter 10). The state was taken as the object of IR and assumed to be a self-​contained, independent and unchanging unit. This view is exemplified by Waltz when he writes that states ‘are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination’ (Waltz, 1979: 118). Realism has adapted and transformed, and has remained remarkably influential. As a result, even theories that offer an alternative approach or methodology for understanding the international system have often accepted the lexicon of Realism and its ontology of things. For example, most liberals accept the basic realist assumptions concerning the state and the basic rules of the game, in terms of the wider ontology (Keohane, 1993: 272; Milner, 1993: 9; Jervis, 1999: 43–​4). Of course, liberals differ from realists by pointing 87

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to the role of norms and actors other than the state. However, by doing so they merely stress an additional consideration to that of the state; they do not seriously challenge its importance or its ‘thingness’. As Robert Jervis (1999: 45) has observed, what differs is the level of focus. Liberals and realists have conducted a lively debate but they have been able to do so precisely because they share a lexicon and an ontology. Having identified their objects of study, they are only then concerned to theorize their interaction. In the words of Erik Ringmar (1996: 441, emphasis in the original), ‘the state is given exogenously to the analysis … and hence endowed with something akin to a transcendental ontological status’. States are treated as pre-​constituted calculating machines much in the same way that Hobbes theorizes human beings (Ringmar, 1996: 447). Factored out of IR is precisely the idea that the units in question can be transformed –​moreover, constituted –​through their interaction. If Realism and Liberalism share a core set of assumptions (and ontology of things), constructivism appears to offer something new. Indeed, at first blush constructivism appears to move away from the assumptions that underpin debate between realists and liberals, and to offer an alternative ontology. Here Alexander Wendt’s 1999 book Social Theory of International Politics is paradigmatic. In this book, constructivism is not a theory of IR, but a way of approaching ontology (Wendt, 1999: 7). Wendt’s purpose is not to challenge realist and liberal use of ‘the state’, but to confront how this is understood ontologically (Wendt, 1999: 1). For Wendt, state behaviour does not depend on hard structural facts relating to ‘anarchy’ or fixed intentions (as realists and liberals might be inclined to think), but on how roles and identity are formed and maintained by interaction with others (Wendt, 1999: 257). Thus, Wendt’s point is that (contra realists) state behaviour is determined not by anarchy, but by how states identify themselves and others. This identity formation is relational. As Wendt writes: ‘What this means is that in initially forming shared ideas about Self and Other through a learning process, and then in subsequently reinforcing those ideas casually through repeated interaction, Ego and Alter are at each stage jointly defining who each of them is’ (Wendt, 1999: 335). Yet, despite appearing to offer an alternative to the ‘ontology of things’, Wendt’s theory of international politics falls back on it. Ironically, the feature of Wendt’s social constructivism which connects it squarely to an ontology of things is precisely the one which suggests his thought might exemplify a relational ontology: his discussion of the social construction of ‘the identities and interests of purposive actors’ (Wendt, 1999: 1), and in particular his use of the terms ‘Self ’ and ‘Other’. Wendt’s terms are little more than placeholders for what he must assume, but not theorize. This is best illustrated by comparing Wendt’s thought to other traditions that also employ these terms, not least feminism, postcolonialism and post-​ structuralism. In these traditions, ideas of Self and Other are drawn from a 88

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wider philosophical debate focused on the alterity of Self and Other. These traditions also point to the fluid and even contradictory meaning of the Self. By contrast, while Wendt makes the rather strong claim that the state is a kind of person, he does not spend much time thinking about the tensions inherent in the notion of personhood itself. While real persons can have a range of relationships and roles, Wendt limits these to three in his cultures of anarchy: enmity, rivalry and friendship. These cultures allow only a rather limited and static view of the relationship of friendship. Indeed, as Wendt claims, it is not a relationship but a role. Wendt uses the role of the president of the United States as an illustration of what such roles mean: irrespective of the person who fills this role, qua president that person can only act in certain prescribed ways (Wendt, 1999: 258–​9). Similarly, in Wendt’s world, friends must rehearse their friendship in a narrowly scripted way. Wendt’s limitation of the possible relationships that a state as person can have, and in particular his limitations of the transformative nature of friendship, does not indicate a relational ontology, but an ontology of things. The state’s relations are not transformative of Self and Other. Although the roles that states adopt can change their interests, the roles themselves are fixed. The consequences of this identity fixing become especially evident when Wendt conflates Self and Other with Ego and Alter. These terms carry different connotations. While self and other (and especially Self and Other) can indicate radical difference or alterity, Ego and Alter are, in fact, a linked pair. In Latin, Ego denotes I, we, myself and us, whereas Alter does not mean Other in the strong sense that links it to difference, strangeness and alterity, but the other of two, the second, the other one. Thus the idiom alter ego: the other, which is linked to the first I and has identity with it. Thus, although Wendt talks about a constitutive relation between self and other, the other encountered in this relationship is really a form of self. Wendt’s three cultures of anarchy do not depend on difference between actors, but on what they share. The only real encounter of difference in his book (between self and other, rather than alter and ego) is that of Cortés and Montezuma (Wendt, 1999: 158). This encounter is telling as it exemplifies exactly what Wendt cannot theorize with his view of ‘relations’. The encounter between Cortés and Montezuma is a real encounter between Self and Other. The two are alien to each other; they do not fit into one another’s script. By using this encounter to illustrate the claim that culture needs to be shared, Wendt betrays the fact that such shared culture depends on a relation of self–​self, not Self–​Other. Furthermore, what the Self and Other are in Wendt’s thought remains ‘fixed’ (at least at the level of his analysis). What is transformed is not the self or the state (the ontologically pre-​existing things) but the identity, intentions and behaviour of those units. Identity is central and possible precisely because in others the self sees not alterity and difference, but an Alter Ego. 89

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From this discussion of Realism, Liberalism and constructivism it is clear that even accounts that have tried to theorize the relationships of IR, including friendship, have tended to fall back on an ontology of things. In doing so, they have failed to account for states as embroiled in complex processes of becoming with others. In this way, much IR literature fails to adequately engage with the central questions raised by friendship, questions concerned with the co-​constitution of self and other. Nevertheless, friendship persists in IR as an intellectual space or question in need of theorization.

International Relations and the ‘ontology of relations’: Qin, Berenskötter and Ling We are now in a position to consider the contribution of Chinese tradition to the debates about ontology and self–​other relations in IR. In what follows we show how Daoist dialectics can complement the ‘ontology of things’, which has stressed the conflictual incompatibility of Self and Other. The focus on relational ontologies in recent Chinese thought provides a platform to reintroduce friendship to the IR discipline. Such reintroduction refocuses not only on relations, but on the very possibilities of thinking Self with Other. We develop this line of thought by discussing friendship and relationality in three key theorists from across the discipline: Qin Yaqing, Felix Berenskötter and L.H.M. Ling. Qin argues that guanxi relations (关系) should be the hard core of a Chinese IR theory and uses a Daoist ‘Chinese dialectic’ to overcome what he sees as the conflictual understanding of dialectic in the West. Such a dialectic denies dichotomy and suggests mutual structuring. Berenskötter is also concerned to overcome the dichotomy of self–​other and suggests friendship can tame the ontological anxiety of the state. Such a relation accepts, but reconciles, difference. Finally, Ling develops relationality through Daoist dialectics. Rather than separate self and other, and attend to the anxiety induced by this separation, Ling points to the co-​dependency and intermingling of self with other.

Qin: guanxi (关系) and dialectics A proponent of a ‘Chinese school’ of IR theory, Qin Yaqing has been key to refocusing relationality in IR. Qin argues that the basis for Western IR theory is ‘individuality’, while the Chinese model is focused on ‘relationality’, upon which he proposes a ‘relational theory of world politics’ (2009: 5; 2016; 2017; 2018). Furthermore, Qin (2009: 5) suggests, ‘mainstream International Relations theories that have arisen in the past thirty years … have all missed an important dimension, i.e., the study of processes in the international system and of relational complexity in international society’. He draws on sociologist Fei Xiaotong, who famously argues that ‘Western 90

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society’ is based on independent individuality, like bundles of rice straw tied together by social contract and institutions. ‘Chinese society’ is instead like the continuous circles that ripple outwards from a pebble dropped on the surface of water. The ripples spread social relations and each circle is connected in one way or another (Fei, 2007; see Qin, 2009: 6). Qin emphasizes friendship guanxi (关系) in his development of Chinese relational ontology. In contrast to sociological accounts which focus on guanxi’s role in support networks and welfare provision, or its role in diplomacy creating friendly ‘feeling’ (ganqing 感情) between peoples, which can help them develop a guanxi relationship (Brady, 2003: 15), Qin (2005a, 2009) argues that guanxi should form the ‘hard core’ of a Chinese IR theory. He focuses on guanxi as an ontological assumption of IR which differs from ‘Western’ interpretations, as embodied in theories like structural Realism, Neoliberal institutionalism, and structural constructivism (Qin, 2005b, 2009: 5). Qin argues that taking relations as the focal point of IR steers away from understandings of relations between states that start with state units or individuals and conceive of their relations as secondary. In Qin’s view, a reliance on guanxi means Chinese people have a distinct and geo-​culturally determined way of thinking about relations between peoples, which is different from Western thinking. Whereas in European social science ‘rationality became the dominant word’, in Chinese thought the counterpart is ‘relationality’ (Qin, 2009: 5). In his account of guanxi relationality, Qin takes processes and agents to be symbiotic and ‘inter-​constitutive’ in an intermingled practice of socialization. There can be no one-​way causality between the two because neither precedes the other and neither is external to the other (Qin, 2009: 9; 2016: 39). Qin illustrates these relations through the yin-​yang symbol that is common to explaining Daoist thought. This symbol consists of a black and a white half that together form a ‘harmonious and holistic’ circle (Qin, 2009: 9; 2016: 39) (see Figure 4.1). The circle does not exist without the halves; the halves cannot form a shape without the circle. In this way, ‘Yin, yang, and the circle are in and of one simultaneously’ (Qin, 2009: 9). The relationship between agents and process must therefore be interpreted in terms of circular constitution, rather than linear causality. Qin further explains this in terms of what he calls a ‘Chinese dialectic’ of change and inclusiveness, which he contrasts with a ‘Hegelian dialectic’ (Qin, 2009: 10; 2016: 39). In his view, the ‘Western way of thinking’ focuses on the independent entity and tends to assume discreteness (Qin, 2009: 10; 2016: 39). On its dichotomizing understanding, A can never be non-​A, because the two have essentially different properties. In contrast, in Qin’s Chinese dialectic, A can be non-​A or include non-​A; it is inclusive and puts emphasis on change. On this understanding, there can be no social actors that pre-​exist social relations and process. Moreover, the processes of 91

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Figure 4.1: Yin-​yang

relationships transform both the behaviour and the essential properties of the actors involved. A can transform non-​A or be transformed into non-​A. In contrast to Qin’s reading of the Hegelian dialectic, where thesis clashes with anti-​thesis, in Chinese dialectics, thesis and antithesis complement one another to make a harmonious whole. In this way, yin–​yang relationality ‘denies the dichotomously structured concept of “thesis vs. anti-​thesis” or “us vs. them.” ’ (Qin, 2016: 40). In recent writing Qin highlights the importance of friendship as a neglected kind of relationship in IR, with reference to its theorization by Felix Berenskötter (Qin, 2016: 37). Although Qin does not discuss Berenskötter other than to underline the importance of friendship, dwelling on it here can bring out the distinct contribution of relational ontologies that draw on Chinese thought to the broader discussion of this topic.

Berenskötter: friendship and anxiety Berenskötter, like Qin, sees limitations in an ontology that assumes ‘the individual (state) as an autonomy-​seeking entity’ common to mainstream Western IR (Berenskötter, 2007: 653). Berenskötter draws on Heidegger to advocate an ‘evolutionary ontology of the state as something which is neither static nor ever complete but a work in progress, something always in the process of becoming’ (Berenskötter, 2007: 655). Berenskötter draws 92

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on feminism, post-​structuralism, and other European thought to propose that states are not primarily concerned about other states that threaten their survival (as Realists, for example, might have it), but rather about uncertainty as such (Berenskötter, 2007: 655). Anxiety about uncertainty and incompleteness provides ‘the foundational sentiment defining the human condition’ (Berenskötter, 2007: 655). It is because of such fundamental anxiety that people and states are said to ‘look for what Anthony Giddens calls “anxiety-​controlling mechanisms” employed to gain “ontological security”, or a stable sense of Self ’ (Berenskötter, 2007: 656). States, on his view, seek friendship to control anxiety (Berenskötter, 2007: 656). Berenskötter bases his understanding of friendship on that of Aristotle and highlights a number of features that we suggest Aristotle’s account has in common with that of Confucius: that true friends share a common goal of virtue, that such virtue is obtainable primarily through activity with virtuous friends, and that this process is what can lead to harmony (Berenskötter, 2007: 664–​8). However, Berenskötter’s friendship is not simply rooted in a sense of group membership or identification with humanity in general. Part of friendship’s ability to control anxiety stems from its capacity to ‘sustain the individual’s sense of self by treating [it] particularistically’ (Berenskötter, 2007: 664). A similar concern with particularity or alterity has led philosophers such as Derrida to worry that Aristotle’s understanding of friendship as an extension of self-​love collapses the differentiation between self and other, and therefore negates the very possibility of a friendship relation in the first place (Derrida, 1997: 11; Berenskötter, 2007: 667). Here, the worry is that understanding the friend as ‘another Self ’, as Aristotle does, makes it a narcissistic extension of that Self, and therefore treats it as derivative. In this sense, the hierarchy of the ‘total’ construct obliterates or ignores difference. If we follow Derrida and understand politics to be made possible by a plurality of being, or better perhaps of becoming, this merging of selves would make friendship apolitical. Therefore, Berenskötter notes, “in order to conceptualize friendship as a relationship in which politics occurs, friendship relations must allow for heterogeneity and be conceived ‘through a philosophy of difference so as to be rendered politically relevant’ ” (Berenskötter, 2007: 668). The tendency to construct difference negatively, which Derrida identifies in Aristotle’s friendship, is sometimes claimed to be a wider feature of ‘Western’ language or thought. Some have also claimed that it is Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Western thought that creates the hierarchical and totalizing understanding of difference (Massey, 2005: 49–​54). Berenskötter’s reading of friendship, in Aristotle and in IR more generally, also centres on concerns with the individual’s sense of particularity and self and the anxiety that stems from it. He is not alone in such a focus, which regularly occurs in literatures interested in ontological security, including those that focus on China (Pan, 2014: 455–​6; Gustavsson, 2016). In contrast to those 93

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who understand this type of ontological anxiety to be a feature of Western thought, Chih-​yu Shih argues that one of the things that distinguishes the Chinese relational turn in IR is that it concerns anxiety rather than passion. He sees in both ‘China’ and ‘the West’ a ‘general feeling of anxiety ingrained in relationality’, which can be calmed when positive feelings in relationships provide individualized and mutually assuring recognition (Shih, 2016).

Ling: the intimacy of ‘self and other’, and the possibility of multiple worlds Both Qin and Berenskötter link relationality and friendship to questions of the co-​construction and dependence of self and other. Berenskötter seeks to show how friendship can allay a state’s anxiety as it seeks recognition of its self from others. Qin develops his notion of relationality through Daoist yin-​yang dialectics, which he nationalizes as ‘Chinese’ dialectics. For him the issue is not so much reconciling self and other, but realizing that self and other are inter-​constitutive. Thus, although Berenskötter and Qin agree about the co-​constitution of self and other, they place different importance on the origin and permanence of antagonism between self and other. For Berenskötter anxiety appears to be a permanent ontological fact of self–​other relations. It can be tamed, but not eradicated. In contrast, Qin sees no such tension as ontologically foundational. However, this also indicates another contrast. Berenskötter’s Heideggerian self and other have the potential to be radically different, whereas Qin’s Wendtian foundation attenuates difference. A similar understanding of yin–​yang relationality is also at the root of L.H.M. Ling’s ‘worldism’. Ling critiques what she calls ‘Westphalia World’, the common understanding or hegemonic vision of IR that includes the ‘mainstream approaches’ that we have shown to be characterized by an ontology of things. Ling shows how this view and its ontology ‘perpetrates a profound violence’ by denying its reliance on those it excludes, as well as their knowledges and ways of knowing, what she calls ‘Multiple Worlds’. Ling also reacts against Wendt’s claim that first encounters like those between Cortés and Montezuma led to an accretion of culture at the systemic level, leaving the enemy, the rival and the friend as the only roles available to others, locking out any other considerations of relations among worlds (Ling, 2014: 30). As a result of such an ontology of things, Ling describes how a ‘ “postcolonial anxiety” festers in Multiple Worlds that, in turn, aggravates a “colonial anxiety” in Westphalia World’ (Ling, 2014: 3). This leads to a nihilistic logic where the lives of others need to be forfeited in order to save one’s own. Ling offers an alternative to that violent and anxious worldview in the form of a Daoist dialectic similar to Qin’s. Ling writes that in such a Daoist dialectic the ‘complementarities (yin) prevail despite the contradictions (yang) between and within the polarities. Nothing remains static or the same’ 94

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(Ling, 2014: 15). This worldview strives to re-​centre contributions to world politics that have been marginalized from it, and to conceptualize these as having ontological parity with Westphalia world. It is thus a response to the negative spiral of violence and anxiety in the relation between Westphalia World and Multiple Worlds: A dao of world politics propels us from this dilemma. In recognising the ontological parity of things, a post-​Westphalian IR experiences the constant potential of creative transformations due to the mutual interactions that transpire, especially between opposites. Multiplicity and difference manifest, enacted by local agents and their transformations of knowledge. (Ling, 2014: 3) In this way, and in contrast to Wendt’s account of relations, which falls back on an ontology of things, this worldview emphasizes a recognition of the complexity of the self, which includes traces or elements of the other in the self. Intimacy, rather than autonomy, marks its condition (Ling, 2014: 12). However, the point is not to replace Westphalia World with Multiple Worlds, just as the point is not for the ontology of things to be superseded by relational ontologies. Rather, the Daoist dialectic urges us to move closer towards balance and engagement. In Ling’s terms, ‘fortified with Daoist dialectics, worldism re-​visibilises Multiple Worlds in relation to one another as well as to Westphalia World’ (Ling, 2014: 18; emphasis in the original). Equally, we might say that it makes multiple relational ontologies visible again, both in relation to one another and in relation to the ontology of things. The area of intersection between different ontologies forms a dialogical space. However, unlike the Socratic dialogue on friendship, Daoist dialectics do not presuppose that there is a stable and discoverable truth independent of human perspectives (Ling, 2014: 66). Ling’s insistence on this contrapuntuality between West and Rest, Self and Other, ‘to jointly produce the complicities that endure despite and sometimes because of the mutual conflicts that tear them apart’, adds an important emphasis to Qin’s account (Ling, 2014: 45). Qin is clearly aware that the relational ontology he advocates is not uniquely Chinese, that it has both ancient and contemporary parallels in Europe and elsewhere. Our previous discussions of friendship have highlighted further commonalities between Confucian and ancient Greek understandings of friendship in their focus on friendship as a relationship of learning for the purpose of developing virtue. Ling’s efforts to articulate her ‘Multiple Worlds’ without falling back on dichotomizations of ‘the West’ and ‘China’ (or ‘the Rest’) helps to further underscore that the ‘Chinese view’ that Qin describes need not be exoticized as a geo-​culturally specific example. On the contrary, it might even be that contemporary IR theories which have assumed an ontology 95

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of things and marginalized friendship relations should be considered to be a highly specific exception to the more general global and historical trend. Furthermore, the move away from a focus on individuality in Qin’s yin-​ yang processual constructivism and Ling’s Daoist dialectic decentres the prior focus on anxiety. We are not suggesting that Berenskötter, Shih and others are wrong in observing existing anxiety. We are, however, suggesting that these emotions are as constructed as the relations that are said to provoke and soothe them. In Qin’s guanxi relations, affect and emotion have an important role, but do so in terms of ‘collective emotion’, rather than in terms of the anxiety that resides within the self (Qin, 2009: 12). On a similar note, Ling’s Daoist dialectic of multiple worlds is offered as a ‘social ontology’, ‘a vision, an understanding, a state of being to treat and put into remission this “postcolonial anxiety” ’ (Ling, 2014: 31–​2). We may all be in a process of becoming, but there would be no reason to be anxious about this if we never attached ourselves to an ontology of things or of being in the first place. To Berenskötter, to reach harmony means to ‘tame anxiety’, and so friends matter because they can help us provide some sense of ontological security (Berenskötter, 2007: 666). Shih sees a similar role for friendships or ‘non-​competitive relationships’ drawing on Chinese tradition (Shih, 2016). On at least one reading of the yin–​yang dialectic, harmony is not the opposite of anxiety. Granted, harmony depends on our ability to manage relationships in a way that mediates disagreement, but this process as described by Qin and Ling is very different from that of taming the anxious self.

Conclusion: rediscovering friendship in international relations This chapter started with claims that China will be a new and friendlier kind of great power because it relies on a Chinese relational ontology instead of a Western ontology of things. Our focus has been on friendship as a component of relational ontologies in the theories of IR. We have suggested that it is a mistake to essentialize or exoticize relational ontologies as being specifically Chinese; the predominance of an ontology of things in IR may be the exception rather than the rule in global and historical perspective. Chinese thought is a useful reminder to scholars of resources and ways of thinking that many contemporary views of politics and IR either ignore or neglect. Chinese thought on friendly relations can make a distinct contribution to disciplinary efforts to develop relational ontologies. Relational ontologies are an essential counterpart to the ‘ontology of things’, which is so foundational in much contemporary IR. Chinese relational ontologies suggest that understanding the co-​constitution of Self and Other is both necessary and useful if we are to have a fuller understanding of international politics. Moreover, Chinese thought shows that the relations between Self and Other 96

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need not be conflictual or colonial. On the contrary, they can be the basis for a dynamic of interdependent growth and change. Thus, the relational ontologies considered in this chapter provide an alternative starting point for understanding China’s friendliness in international relations, which differs from common accounts in Chinese official, academic and diplomatic discourse. Through them, we come to see how China’s friendliness and ‘peaceful rise’ will not depend on the autonomous actions of some imagined independent ‘China’, or on some essential characteristics of the Chinese people, nation or state. Nor does it require conformity, integration or socialization into an imagined ‘international society’ (cf. Ling, 2014: 91). Most importantly, scholars do not have to assume that IR is built up of state units that are made anxious by the incompleteness and change that is indicated by the presence of others. Nor do they have to assume that the only possible significance of friendship is to soothe the anxious self. Instead, friendship can be understood as that which creates and maintains our continuous becoming with others, and the ontological parity of multiple worlds. That we have found contemporary discussions based on Chinese epistemic legacies to add to the debate in constructive ways does not indicate a necessary link to subject positions designated as ‘Chinese’. Specifically, much policy and discourse of the Chinese state is wedded to ‘Westphalia world’, as expressed in its fixation on territorial sovereignty, the claim that others should not voice opinions about China’s ‘internal affairs’, the demand that those who are considered ‘insiders’ be patriotically loyal to the party state, and strong attachment to the ‘ontology of things’ more generally. We want to be clear, therefore, that the Daoist political imaginary suggested here offers a new vocabulary for those who want to think differently about relationality and anxiety in IR, regardless of whether they are speaking from China, about China, or neither. This is not ‘how Chinese people think, feel and behave’; it is how people could think, feel and behave. It offers IR a different starting point to what many of us are used to, with the potential to help us know our worlds in a different way and to produce knowledge about those worlds in a different way. It offers one possibility, which does not exclude or denigrate other possibilities for thinking world politics. Some critics will object that while it might be a better world if state identities were accepted as insecure, and both elites and the public were to see each other as parts of a whole, this seems unlikely. Indeed, since the Western world does largely accept the ontology of things, it remains unclear how the view espoused here could come to fruition without a fundamental change in worldview. Such critics speak from what Robert Cox famously referred to as problem-​solving theory, which ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’ (Cox, 1981: 128–​9). To 97

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these critics we want to suggest that now commonplace ideas like democracy, human rights, the abolition of slavery, or gender equality were all criticized as unlikely to be implemented at some point in history. Nonetheless, they continued to be developed as alternative vocabularies and ideas to those that dominated intellectual discourse at the time of their emergence. The dominance of one set of ideas in a particular society or system is not a good reason to refrain from exploring alternative ways of thinking and doing world politics. Quite the opposite, as critical academics we should explore what may be made possible by mobilizing alternative vocabularies, ideas, and traditions of thought, even if we do not make hubristic claims that our writing alone will transform the world. It is as a possible alternative starting point for thinking that ‘friendship’ is useful. As we have argued, friendship should not be understood as simply denoting a concern with the personal and private. In fact, its historical and cultural usage is far broader and more complex than that. Friendship is useful to IR insofar as it helps us refocus on relations and to conceive of those relations as a constitutive dynamism of self with other. Bringing friendship back to parity can help us grapple with something that is lost when we focus on enmity, conflict, war and disjuncture: what it means to ‘become’ in relation with Others. This is different from discussions of agreements and alliances, or understandings of international community that still see peoples and states as discrete entities based on an ‘ontology of things’. Chinese thought thus reintroduces an ontology of relations to the West and to the discipline of IR, and acts as a reminder of what has been forgotten. Such a meeting does not reinforce the supposed differences between China and the West but acts as a reminder that they are part of creating each other. While an ontology of things tends to cast friendship as a conflictual ‘Us and Them’, the relational ontology of contemporary Chinese debates on friendship can contribute to such debates by viewing other possibilities for Self and Other. Friendship achieves this through its focus on the relationship of the friends, and the way in which this relationship is formed by, and forms, both Self and Other. This ontology reopens the possibilities for friendship as a way of conceptualizing Self with Other, rather than Self in contrast to Other. Acknowledgements This chapter was originally published as A.H.M. Nordin and G.M. Smith (2018) ‘Reintroducing Friendship to International Relations: Relational Ontologies from China to the West’, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 18(3): 369–​96 (Open Access). Nordin and Smith would like to thank participants at the 2016 ‘Theorising China’s Rise in and beyond International Relations’ Workshop (Deakin University) and the 2017 WISC 5th Global International Studies Conference for their valuable comments on earlier 98

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versions of their chapter. In addition to the support from the Chiang Ching-​ kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange, this chapter was made possible by funding from the Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation (Grant No. 2013.0162), and an Institute for Social Futures Small Grant. References Analects (Lun-​yü) (1940) Peking, Harvard-​Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement 16. Berenskötter, F. (2007) ‘Friends, There Are No Friends?’, Millennium, 35(3): 647–​76. Brady, A.-​M. (2003) Making the Foreign Serve China. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. Callahan, W.A. (2010) China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cox, R.W. (1981) ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, Millennium, 10(2): 126–​55. Derrida, J. (1997) Politics of Friendship, trans. G. Collins. London: Verso. Fei, X. (2007) Xiangtu Zhongguo [Earthbound China]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe. Gustavsson, K. (2016) ‘Routinised Recognition and Anxiety’, Review of International Studies, 42(4): 613–​33. Hall, D.L. and Ames, R.T. (1998) Thinking from the Han. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Hsun Tzu (1966) Harvard-​Yenching Sinological Index Series, Supp. 22. Taipei: Chinese Materials Centre. Jackson, P.T. and Nexon, D.H. (1999) ‘Relations Before States’, European Journal of International Relations, 5(3): 291–​332. Jervis, R. (1999) ‘Realism, Neorealism, and Cooperation’, International Security, 24(1): 42–​63. Kam, L. (1980) Critiques of Confucius in Contemporary China. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Keller, S. (2009) ‘Against Friendship between Countries’, Journal of International Political Theory, 5(1): 59–​74. Keohane, R.O. (1993) ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War’ in D.A. Baldwin (ed), Neo-​Realism and Neo-​Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp 269–​300. Koschut, S. and Oelsner, A. (2014) Friendship and International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kutcher, N. (2000) ‘The Fifth Relationship’, American Historical Review, 105(5): 1615–​29. Ling, L.H.M. (2014) The Dao of World Politics. Abingdon: Routledge. Mao, Z. (1961) ‘Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society’ in Selected works of Mao Tse-​Tung, Volume 1. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, pp 13–​21. 99

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Massey, D.B. (2005) For Space. London: Sage. Mearsheimer, J.J. (1990) ‘Back to the Future’, International Security, 15(1): 5–​56. Milner, H. (1993) ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory’ in D.A. Baldwin (ed), Neo-​Realism and Neo-​Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Morgenthau, H. (1972) Politics Among Nations. New York: Knopf. Noesselt, N. (2015) ‘Revisiting the Debate on Constructing a Theory of International Relations with Chinese Characteristics’, The China Quarterly, (222): 430–​48. Nordin, A.H.M. (2016a) China’s International Relations and Harmonious World: Time, space and multiplicity in World Politics. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Nordin, A.H.M. (2016b) ‘Futures Beyond “the West”? Autoimmunity in China’s Harmonious World’, Review of International Studies, 42(1): 156–​77. Nordin, A.H.M. and Smith, G.M. (2019) ‘Relating Self and Other in Chinese and Western Thought’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32(5): 636–​53. Pan, C. (2014) ‘The “Indo-​Pacific” and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68(4): 453–​69. People’s Daily Online (2014) Renmin you xinyang, guojia caiyou liliang: yi lun hongyang shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan [The People Has Belief, the Country Has Strength: On Carrying Forward the Socialist Core Value System], [online] http://​paper.people.com.cn/​r mrb/​html/​2014-​02/​12/​ nw.D110000renmrb_​20140212_​2-​01.htm Price, A.W. (1989) Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Qin, Y. (2005a) ‘Guoji Guanxi Lilun de Hexin Wenti Yu Zhongguo Xuepai de Shengcheng’ [‘Theoretical Problematic of International Relationship Theory and the Construction of a Chinese School’], Zhongguo shehui kexue, 3(3): 165–​76. Qin, Y. (2005b) Quanli, Zhidu, Wenhua [Power, Institutions and Culture]. Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe. Qin, Y. (2009) ‘Guanxi Benwei Yu Guocheng Jiangou: Jiang Zhongguo Linian Zhiru Guoji Guanxi Lilun’ [‘Relationality and Processual Construction: Bringing Chinese Ideas into International Relations Theory’], Zhongguo shehui kexue, 30(4): 69–​86. Qin, Y. (2016) A ‘Relational Theory of World Politics’, International Studies Review, 18(1): 33–​47. Qin, Y. (2017) ‘Representation Is Practice: Practicality, Rationality, and Relationality’, paper presented at Futures of Global Relations, 16–​17 May, Lancaster University. 100

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Qin, Y. (2018) A Relational Theory of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ringmar, E. (1996) ‘On the Ontological Status of the State’, European Journal of International Relations, 2(4): 439–​66. Schmitt, C. (1996) The Concept of the Political. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Schmitt, C. (2008) Constitutional Theory. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Shih, C.-​Y. (2016) ‘Affirmative Balance of the Singapore-​Taiwan Relationship’, International Studies Review, 18(4): 681–​701. Shih, C.-​Y. and Yin, J. (2013) ‘Between Core National Interest and a Harmonious World’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 6(1): 59–​84. Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Boston, MA: McGraw-​Hill. Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wikimedia commons (2005) ‘Yin Yang.Svg’, http://c​ ommons.wikimedia.org/​ wiki/​File:Yin_​yang.svg Xi, J. (2014) ‘Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at China International Friendship Conference in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the CPAFFC’, delivered 15 May, http://​ en.cpaffc.org.cn/​content/​details25-​47426.html Zhao, T. (2006) ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept “All-​under-​ Heaven” ’, Social Identities, 12(1): 29–​41.

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Re-​Worlding the ‘West’ in Post-​Western International Relations: The ‘Theory Migrant’ of Tianxia in the Anglosphere Yih-​Jye Hwang, Raoul Bunskoek and Chih-​yu Shih

Introduction The International Relations (IR) discipline developed over the course of the 20th century has predominantly focused on the concerns of powerful Western states and has elaborated conceptual frameworks that could be applied elsewhere (Smith, 2002). Mainstream IR scholars treat different regions of the world as test cases for their theories rather than sources of theory in themselves. The ‘non-​West’ becomes a domain that IR theorists perceive as backward, hence requiring instruction in order to reach the ‘End of History’ encapsulated by Western modernity (Fukuyama, 1992). In response, over the past two decades the discipline has witnessed a post-​ Western quest urging IR scholars to ‘re-​World’ subaltern voices. From a post-​Western perspective, no single modernity exists to which all actors must aspire and no actor or set of actors is reified. Rather, it seeks out multiple worlds and hidden voices (Ling, 2002). In its quest to rediscover ‘non-​Western’ worlds, post-​Western IR urges scholars to re-​world non-​Western sites by examining how Western IR discourses have been interpreted and appropriated in each particular site over time. This allows the ever-​changing and differing meanings of IR to be released from the monopolistic grasp by one exclusionary epistemology, whereby agency can be rediscovered at non-​Western sites for adaptation, feedback and reconstruction of the Western influences. Such worlding of the non-​Western worlds, if successful, exposes the ‘provincial’ characteristics of the West, which has mistakenly presented itself as the universal, a result of 102

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Eurocentrism reinforced by the power of expansion (for example imperialism and post/​neo-​colonialism). Nevertheless, a number of caveats exist concerning the post-​Western exercise. First, post-​Western IR seeks to provincialize ‘the West’ as an undifferentiated entity and yet strives to world non-​Western sites each in their own differently different geo-​cultural genealogies. Such endeavours risk the epistemological pretention that the provincial West cannot and should not be worlded. The West is reduced and yet simultaneously promoted to the status of an epistemologically unquestioned premise. Second, post-​Western IR encourages site-​centrism in its celebration of contextual alternatives to dominant Western discourses, institutions and values; yet, it faults the West for committing Eurocentrism when doing the same. A third caveat is the tricky assumption of the unilaterally expanding West as if, to date, the West has been always on the exporting side. What is consistently ignored, however, is that historically and intellectually the West, within its own sitedness and provincial geo-​cultural trajectories, has likewise been engaging in similar kinds of receiving, reinterpreting/​reimagining and re-​appropriating (van der Veer, 2001). In other words, the post-​Western quest in IR has paid little attention to how the West has itself been (re)worlded through the appropriation and combination of exotic, external and currently subaltern knowledges from a variety of similarly provincial sites. Indeed, we underscore that the re-​worlding of both Western and non-​Western sites is epistemologically of equal importance. To illustrate the re-​worlding of the West, this chapter explores the different routes –​exoticization, denial, collusion and absorption (Shih, et al, 2019: 230) –​through which the West, and more specifically the Anglosphere, have received and appropriated Chinese IR theories. An allegedly rising China has inspired many Chinese scholars to argue that there should be a Chinese School of IR theory (Qin, 2005), resulting in various attempts over the past decade to establish one (Ren, 2020). Chinese IR scholars are dissatisfied with being mere consumers of knowledge rather than knowledge producers. Despite their different focuses, all of them have resorted to China’s historical experiences and ideas derived from traditional philosophies and traditions in order to understand, explain and interpret world politics, ostensibly in distinctively Chinese ways (Wang, 2013). Specifically, Chinese scholars have attempted to acquire and appropriate theories and practices of Tianxia (Zhao, 2019; Shih, 2020a), an ancient Chinese notion which now inspires a range of Chinese scholars to formulate ambitious plans for China’s future. This chapter is structured as follows: first, the chapter demonstrates how China’s rise can be understood through a particular Chinese philosophical understanding of the world, namely the concept of Tianxia, which constitutes a post-​Western site. Secondly, it introduces different interpretations of 103

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Tianxia by Chinese scholars from Greater China. Thirdly, it discusses how both the concept itself and its contemporary Chinese interpretations have been received and evaluated in the Anglosphere.

A post-​Western genealogy of Tianxia The concept of Tianxia is at the heart of the Chinese School of International Relations that has emerged in the context of China’s rise in the 21st century (Wang H., 2017; 2021; Hwang, 2021; Ren, 2020). The literature notes that the idea of Tianxia can be both exclusionary and cosmopolitan (Chu, 2020; Wang B., 2017; Xie, 2017). Historically, the term first appeared in the ‘Tribute to Yu’ (or Yugong), a chapter from The Book of Documents (Shujing), which describes Tianxia as encompassing ‘Nine Regions’ (Jiuzhou). Zou Yan (305–​240 BCE), a scholar from the Yin-​Yang School in the Warring States period, proposed the concept of the ‘Greater Nine Regions’. While the concept of Tianxia appeared to be geographical, it was in fact cosmological due to its heavenly mandated consciousness of universal kingship. The well-​ cited line in The Book of Poetry (Shijing) –​‘Under the whole heaven, every spot is the sovereign’s ground; To the borders of the land, every individual is the sovereign’s minister’ –​clearly expresses this consciousness. In a nutshell, the Tianxia philosophy consists of three main points. First, heaven (tian) orders the king to rule the world on behalf of heaven. Therefore, he is called the ‘Son of Heaven’ (tianzi). Since only one heaven exists (spontaneously), there can also be only one heavenly mandate and, by extension, only one Son of Heaven. Therefore, in order to obtain and retain their legitimacy, emperors have to work carefully to prove that they are the true recipients of destiny, and that the destiny claimed by other competitors is false. Secondly, to show that they are the true kings ordered by heaven, they must establish a complete etiquette system, including calendars, clothing and communication rituals, to arrange relationships for everyone. Although, implicitly, the order to be entrusted to heaven is socially and politically mundane, the etiquette system actually plays a role similar to vindicated membership, so the rituals become a shared identity. Consequently, the destruction of etiquette is tantamount to violating the relational security of all things in the universe. This explains why the issue of etiquette frequently became a point of contention in China’s foreign relations. Thirdly, the Middle Kingdom is not a higher civilization, but the only civilization in the entire world, due to its hosting of the one who possesses the heavenly mandate. On its periphery is where ‘aliens’ (or Yi and Di) live, and the shift of the mandate between the Middle Kingdom and ‘aliens’ is also an important part of the Tianxia philosophy. Moreover, Tianxia philosophy considers that ‘there is nothing left outside the reign of the king’ whenever he has the mandate, and that ‘the whole world 104

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is the king’s land’. Therefore, all known countries are seen as being part of the Tianxia system, at least nominally. In reality, however, there are always external forces that the king cannot completely subdue. For example, the northern nomads rarely entered the etiquette system –​in fact, they and the Han people were in regular confrontation with each other, and the nomads even usurped the mandate of heaven during the Northern Wei, Yuan and Qing dynasties. Therefore, since nomads such as the Xiongnu could have the mandate, so could the Western imperialist forces that came much later. To this extent, Tianxia proves to be practically a cosmology that legitimates both the incumbency as well as successful revolutions ex post. Given that the thrust of Tianxia is to relate through the etiquette system without touching upon the ontological beliefs of alien people and how they run their systems or live their lives, the greatest effort goes into introducing into their relationships some etiquette agreeable to the other side. Even so, material forces achieve a double-​sided role, which alludes to the difficulty of the Tianxia system to adapt to Western intrusion. On the one hand, the king himself should live a frugal life lest the people think the role of the king entitled him to unlimited treasures or power and, consequently, desire to overthrow him to become the king. On the other hand, since the king is apparently unable to rule the entire world physically, his mandate truly relies on the willingness of the people of the Middle Kingdom, whom he should control, and the aliens, whom he has little influence over. The better strategy and the advice given by generations of saints for the king was to allow all the people to enjoy better material lives. For the alien people, the advice was to provide generous gift giving during the exchange of tribute. For the subjects of the Middle Kingdom, the appropriate approach would be low taxation so that the people would be able to sustain a content and happy life. As such, the mission of the king was to curb the landed classes from imposing heavy rents, while defending his people from invasion and natural plagues. Such duties encouraged the king to save and accumulate as a fulfilment of his mandate. The post-​Western turn of Tianxia in the Sinosphere began when the Western forces invaded China with a force undergirded by materialist industrialization. However, the Middle Kingdom had to learn materialism to compete for the mandate (Shih, 2010; 2021). Yet, the Middle Kingdom embraced an anti-​materialist philosophy, since from its viewpoint materialism would wrongly encourage the elites as well as the people to desire more. Nevertheless, toward the second half of the 19th century, China had already run out of material gifts that could be bestowed upon the invading imperialist forces. It did not even have enough to appease Japan, a presumably lower partner in the etiquette system, which now acted in a European style by demanding concessions from a beleaguered China. This embarrassment eventually compelled a Westernization campaign in order to strengthen the 105

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Middle Kingdom. To make sense of this, neo-​Confucianism justified this materialist turn by arguing that the Chinese use of material forces carried a benevolent message. The material forces, once owned, were not to be used for selfish interests, but for the well-​being of the entire population of Tianxia. Such a Tianxia appropriation of materialism has intellectually inspired the drive for material forces into the 21st century. Its pursuit of beneficial treatment of the people of Tianxia reflects the classic pursuit of the heavenly mandate (Bunskoek and Shih, 2021), although the way to achieve this is no longer by simply renouncing or sharing the king’s own treasures. Rather, the king is obliged to actively grow them in order to have enough to share and to defend. The post-​Western sensibilities of Tianxia vividly testify to the composite of cyclical and linear historiographies in the 21st century of Chinese IR (Zhang, 2017; Ren, 2020; Shih, 2020b). A cyclical historiography that began in the late Qing dynasty is characterized by a constant oscillation between materialist self-​strengthening and a resort to a culturally appealing spiritual devotion and the development of a substituting etiquette system. The history of the People’s Republic, for example, has witnessed the sequencing of the Great Leap Forward, Four Modernizations, Reform and Opening-​up, and the Scientific Outlook on Development, with the Cultural Revolution, Anti-​Spiritual Pollution Campaign, and the Chinese New Left school of thought in between. In the practitioners’ world, however, a linear historiography is emerging that integrates vicariously the material and the spiritual, the Western and the Chinese. This integration displays in both the personality of Xi Jinping and his policies. Xi has been the first PRC leader to enlist Buddhist thought to justify a Socialist drive for material growth, in the same way that Republican neo-​Confucians had done before him. Both Socialism and Confucianism embrace materialist sensibilities, with Confucianism harbouring the idea that material welfare for the people is the essence of benevolence and Socialism equalizing economic profits between the capitalists and the workers. This theoretical as well as pragmatic overlapping connects Tianxia to the ethos of capitalism. Meanwhile, the Chinese allies of Western liberalism have been the indispensable bridge over the gap between the privatized market and property system and the stress of public welfare by Confucianism and Socialism. In fact, the Chinese literature on Tianxia consistently connotes a message of coexistence of liberalism and Chinese thought (for example see Xu, 2012; 2016b; Bai, 2014; Liu, 2015; Zhao, 2016). This composite of Confucianism and Socialism has paralleled a much-​ publicized campaign for a ‘community with shared future for humankind’, whose flagship projects include the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Health Silk Road (HSR). While his predecessor Hu Jintao had envisioned 106

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and embarked upon both projects, Xi Jinping made them his signature platforms. Although HSR is often thought to have started during the COVID-​19 pandemic, it was already part of the BRI. In 2015, Chinese health officials released the initiating document titled ‘A Three-​Year Implementation Plan for Advancing BRI Health Cooperation (2015–​2017)’ (Ngeow, 2020). Therefore, the foundation laid earlier for HSR shows that China had already paid attention to international preparedness for potential global health crises, and its largely successful handling of domestic COVID-​ 19 outbreaks also enables it to showcase the potential of HSR and play a leading role in combating the global COVID-​19 pandemic. According to Xi, the community of common destiny is like a Swiss army knife, a multifunctional tool which can solve a variety of global challenges (Tobin, 2018: 157). For mainstream IR, the Tianxia discourse that has emerged in support of both the BRI and HSR is nothing more than culturally distinctive propaganda meant for domestic consumption and for triggering nostalgia among China’s neighbours for tributary benevolence. Yet, geographically, Tianxia’s evasive scope does resonate with the vision of the community for humankind. Thus, the tendency to resort to Tianxia in Chinese IR seems only to confirm China’s long-​suspected revisionist intention to reformulate world order. This could be true or untrue. The epistemological lacuna of this evaluation lies in the disregard for Xi’s romantic drive for materialism for the sake of making China benevolent again. The mandate of heaven will not fall on him unless he is able to compete better than the former imperialist forces in terms of his selflessly frugal way of life and his unreserved concern for the material benefits of the people of the world.

Interpretations of Tianxia by contemporary Chinese scholars The emergence of the Chinese School of International Relations draws on Chinese cultural resources to expound distinctive kinds of IR unfamiliar to its Western counterparts (Hwang, 2021; Wang, 2021). Tianxia is a major point of interest. Chinese officials tend to avoid mentioning the concept of Tianxia though. This is mainly due to concerns about the seemingly unequal power structure implied in the Tianxia system, which is incompatible with the Socialist egalitarian ideology and the government’s ‘anti-​hegemonic’ foreign policy. Nevertheless, Beijing’s foreign relations have not been without traces of the centre–​periphery relationships so characteristic of Tianxia. During the Cold War, by supporting the wars of liberation led by communist forces in countries such as North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, China (and its leader Mao Zedong) came to be regarded as the new leader of the world communist revolution. In the 107

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21st century, along with China’s rising power, China’s strategic thinking has changed from ‘hiding our capacities and biding our time’ (tāoguāng yǎnghuì) in the era of Deng Xiaoping to ‘doing something and making a difference’ (yǒusuǒ zuòwéi) by Xi Jinping. Against this background, the concept of Tianxia has inspired a range of Chinese scholars in formulating emancipative plans for China’s transcendence of the Westphalian system. Zhao Tingyang, a professor in the Institute of Philosophy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, is the most prominent Chinese intellectual to date to discuss how China could change the world order through the application of Tianxia (Zhao, 2006; 2009; 2016a; 2016b; 2019). According to Zhao, political theorists in the West are mainly concerned with political life at the three levels of the individual, the community and the nation state. In contrast, the Chinese tradition looks at the world (that is Tianxia), the state and the family. Therefore, the largest political unit in the Western political tradition is the nation state, whereas in the Chinese tradition the largest is the world. The current Westphalian world order will inevitably lead to conflict in world politics due to its nature of being primarily based on competing national interests. Hence, Zhao suggests that we need to transcend the principle of ‘internationality’ and think about the world from a truly global perspective. Here, Zhao draws from an idealized version of the Tianxia system, presumably implemented during the Zhou dynasty (c. 1046–​256 BCE). He argues that this pragmatic system would solve the problems of contemporary world affairs by means of a world institution. In Zhao’s view, the Tianxia system in the Zhou dynasty was all-​inclusive geographically, psychologically and institutionally. It operated on three levels: (1) the earth, that is, all lands under the sky; (2) a common or public choice made by all peoples in the world, truly representing the general will; and (3) a universal political system for the world. Zhao therefore believes that, in the ontology of Tianxia, the entirety of the world is the unit of analysis, and sub-​system units, such as nation states, only distract the analysis from the systemic level and thus he excludes them (Zhao, 2009: 9). Moreover, the Tianxia system makes no distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ since all remain what they are internally (Zhao, 2006). In other words, the system has only internality, and there will be no insurmountable externalities. The system therefore belongs to all humans equally and is more peace-driven than the Westphalian system, which has dominated the world order for centuries. Zhao’s project can therefore be regarded as an attempt to create a holistic entity of humanity, a world of oneness, or a Chinese version of Kantian cosmopolitanism or perpetual peace. Zhao’s Tianxia system is a utopia that has practical applications. Resembling Rawls’ idea of the original position, it is a thought experiment that aims to reflect what principles of global governance would manifest in the Chinese tradition premised on the holistic entity of humanity. Importantly, Zhao does 108

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not ‘equate his Tianxia system with the ancient Chinese tributary system’ (Xu, 2017: 48). According to Zhao (2016a), the unified China from the Qin to the Qing dynasties constituted a ‘country containing the world’, its fundamental characteristic being that it had inherited the spiritual heritage of the Tianxia concept but given up the world institution. In other words, China transformed ‘the Tianxia spirit into a state spirit, changing a world structure into a state structure and consequently turning China into a “world-​ structured” country’ (Zhao, 2019: 22). In this vein, Zhao only attempts to utilize the original meaning of Tianxia as derived from the Zhou dynasty and not how it was practised after the Qin dynasty in order to propose a plausible practice (and way of thinking) for world governance (Zhao, 2016b). His theory does not imply that China should lead the world. As Zhao suggests, the system ‘is open to any qualified candidates who best know the Way (dao) to improve the happiness of all peoples universally’ (Zhao, 2006: 32). That said, Zhao implicitly suggests that China can contribute to the establishment of the world institution, since the ‘Tianxia spirit’ has remained constant in the process of the formation of China today (Zhao and Tao, 2019: 21–​36). It is worth noting that the scholarship engaged in the study of the Tianxia system is not limited to PRC scholars, nor does it begin with Zhao Tingyang (for example Mancall, 1984; Shih, 1990). Between 1992 and 1995, Huang Chih-​lien, a Hong Kong-​based scholar, published successively three research works on what he called ‘the etiquette system of the heavenly dynasty’ (tiāncháo lǐzhì tǐxì) (1992; 1994; 1995). According to Huang, the system was derived from the development of the small-​scale peasant economy and became the main spirit and content of the ‘Han civilization’, which represented Chinese civilization. As Huang states (1992: 2; our translation): Before the nineteenth century, that is, before the rise of Western culture, the Western state, and Western colonialism and imperialism, there was a prominent regional order here [that is, East Asia], which was centred on the Chinese feudal dynasty (the so-​called heavenly dynasty), and on etiquette, justice, rule and ritualism as its operating form. It played a crucial role in maintaining and stabilising the bilateral and multilateral relations between China and its neighbouring countries, and between neighbouring countries themselves. Therefore, it is called ‘the etiquette system of the heavenly dynasty’. In Taiwan, the most important research on the Tianxia system is conducted by Chang Chi-​hsiung (or Zhang Qixiong) of the Academia Sinica (2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2018). According to Chang, the concept of the ‘Chinese World Empire’ originated from the philosophy of ‘Tianxia’. Tianxia equals the Chinese world, which is where China’s influence can reach. It consists of two parts: a central part and the periphery. In terms of ethnicity, the centre 109

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is Hua and the periphery is Yi. Hua plus Yi are the concept of people; the Middle Kingdom plus its surrounding kingdoms are the concept of territory; the central government and local autonomous governments are the imperial institution; the emperor, the king and canonization, plus the tributary system, are the concept of power operation (Chang, 2013a: 55). According to this, as Chang notes, the Chinese World Empire is an interdependent suzerain community, with a higher-​level ‘country’ consisting of the Middle Kingdom and its surrounding kingdoms. Hence, the 2,000 years of Chinese history not only witnessed the change of dynasties among Han Chinese, but also saw non-​Han Chinese dynasties entering China and becoming the Middle Kingdom. Accordingly, the Chinese World Empire is shared and governed by people from all over the Chinese world. It is thus a multi-​ethnic country as well as a ‘Tianxia state’. Due to the different (ethnic) compositions of the Western and Chinese worlds, there were big differences in the principles of their respective (international) orders. And when the two worlds met, these different principles inevitably led to clashes. Starting in the 19th century, using advanced technologies and powerful armies, Western countries occupied and colonized the world. Public international law, which was originally conceived and used to regulate the interactions among European nation states, became the only legal framework available (or legitimate) to regulate the entire world, thus acting as the ‘common’ law of all nations. This law has never extracted any relevant legal principles from non-​Western cultural values and principles and used them as a legal basis for regulating the ‘universe’ of international compliance. Therefore, Chang believes that we should retrieve China’s inherent principles of international order, rather than just blindly following Western jurisdictions to regulate and interpret our international behaviour. To Chang, the international system of today’s world should at least be divided into Chinese, European, Islamic, Hindu, Latin American and African international systems. Based on the principles of international order formed by their unique historical and cultural values, each should implement its own ‘international system autonomy’. For Chang, this would be the fundament of long-​term peace and stability in the world. In short, despite their different foci in interpreting Tianxia, all of the Chinese scholars discussed earlier have tried to de-​peripheralize China in the world of theory by resorting to China’s historical experiences and ideas derived from traditional philosophies and traditions, in order to understand, explain and interpret world politics in distinctively Chinese ways. They all believe that a new interpretation of the pre-​modern world order in East Asia is vital for transcending the Westphalian system and understanding China’s rise and contemporary IR in East Asia. Therefore, it is necessary to re-​ examine the Tianxia system in the history of East Asia and the international order established on this basis. As Hsu noted in 1960 (p. 210), 110

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it was only through necessity, not free choice, that China had entered the world community. The old dream of the universal empire … still lingered in the Chinese mind, and their residual effects were clearly discernible … [w]‌ith the rise of Communist China as the most powerful nation in East Asia … one wonders whether the ‘universal’ State and the tributary system of the past have not been revived in a modern term.

The reception of ‘Tianxia’ in the Anglosphere: exoticization and denial The concept of Tianxia has become an important focus of debate in academic circles in the Anglophone world since the publication of Zhao Tingyang’s book. Many authors have been discussing the intricate details of the re-​ emergence of Tianxia and its applicability for today’s international politics. The majority of those studies suggest that the Tianxia system constitutes a particular (Chinese) way of thinking about international order, either in the past or in the future. Those readings of Tianxia are greatly influenced by J.K. Fairbank, who, by systematically studying the ‘tributary system’, spread the concept to European and American academia. He introduced the concept of ‘Chinese World Order’ to cover the traditional Chinese Tianxia worldview. In his PhD thesis, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–​1854, published later in 1953, Fairbank pointed out that the Chinese empire, no matter whether it was ruled by Han Chinese or non-​Han Chinese, had always used the tributary system to manage its foreign relations with the outside world. He further believed that the tributary system functioned not only as an institution dealing with trade and diplomatic relations, but also as a religious ceremony that asserted the universality of the Confucian order. The most successful aspect of this system, according to Fairbank, was that it integrated the various dimensions of social life in the Chinese empire. Fairbank’s edited book The Chinese World Order: Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations (1968) can be regarded as the most important study of the Chinese tributary system in English. In his Introduction to the book, Fairbank briefly outlined his view on the tributary system, which is summarized as follows. According to Fairbank, the relationships between the Chinese people and the surrounding areas, as well as with non-​Chinese people in general, are characterized by a Sino-​centrism reflecting China’s superiority. Chinese people often perceived diplomatic relations as a demonstration of the same principles embodied in the political and social orders in China. Therefore, China’s diplomatic relations, like relationships within Chinese society itself, were hierarchical. Foreign countries that wished to have relations with China were expected (and, when possible, obliged) to integrate into this system by becoming tributary states; the trade system was then used 111

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to maintain this patriarchal relationship (Fairbank, 1968: 4). Consequently, terms such as ‘international’ and even ‘interstate’ are inappropriate to describe China’s relations with the outside world. Conversely, other countries can be categorized into three major circles. The first one is the Sinic zone, which consists of several neighbouring countries with similar cultures –​that is Korea and Vietnam, and for brief periods also the Ryukyu Kingdom and Japan –​some of which were ruled directly by the Chinese Empire in ancient times. The second is the Inner Asian zone, which is composed of subordinate countries and tribes such as Asian inland nomadic or semi-​nomadic ones. They are not only racially and culturally different from China, but they lie also geographically outside or on the edge of the Chinese cultural zone. The third circle is the outer zone, which is generally blocked by high mountains and composed of foreigners separated by vast oceans. It included countries and regions that had to pay tribute by means of trade, such as Japan, Malaysia, Siam and other countries in South(East) Asia and Europe. Fairbank’s ‘Chinese World Order’ paradigm has since become a dominant model for the study of the ancient Chinese tributary systems in Anglophone academic circles and beyond. This includes not only the general studies of the Chinese tributary system by scholars such as Mark Mancall (1984) and Zhao Suisheng (1997), but also the bilateral case studies between China and Korea, China and Thailand, and so on by scholars such as Sarasin Viraphol (1977). Although Fairbank’s views have been increasingly criticized and challenged in Western academic circles (for example Cohen, 1984), his interpretation of the tributary system still affects the responses of most Western IR scholars. Among them, William Callahan’s criticism of Zhao Tingyang is the most representative. Callahan (2008) argues that the majority of the literature on Tianxia, including Zhao’s theory, has focused on its potential as a resource for recentring China and the Chinese understandings of world order as a patriotic activity. It embraces a distinctively Chinese practice of hegemony that the West has never encountered before. As Callahan (2008: 759) states: [While] the Westphalian system is rightly criticized for being state-​ centric, the Tianxia example shows how non-​Western alternatives can be even more state-​centric. Moreover, proposals for a ‘post-​hegemonic’ system often contain the seeds of a new (and often violent) system of inclusion and exclusion: Tianxia presents a popular example of a new hegemony where imperial China’s hierarchical governance is up​dated for the twenty-​first century. Callahan goes further to question Zhao’s motivations. To Callahan, Zhao appears to be a grand strategist who seeks to dissolve the identities of China’s neighbouring countries in order to preserve their relationality within the 112

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Tianxia system. This framing offers China ample room to manoeuvre for the submission of others in the name of benefiting them. According to Callahan, behind Zhao’s argumentation of a ‘benign’ world order and the promotion of peace lurk the aspirations for a new hegemon; namely China. This is underscored by the attention that Zhao’s theory has garnered from numerous Chinese scholars. In other words, Callahan underlines that although Zhao’s theory might seem unrealistic, it does sketch an image of China that the CCP could strive for, an image that is mainly based upon making China the centre of the world through hard military and economic power and normative objectives. It would seem that despite the observations of other scholars (for example Jiang, 2007; Wang, 2008), Callahan’s fierce criticism of Zhao’s thesis has been the one that has gained traction among scholars in the Anglosphere and beyond. The similarity among those critics of Zhao’s thesis lies in their shared treatment of Tianxia as a resource to be appropriated strategically to undergird China’s interest. There is doubt whether or not China is capable of ruling Tianxia again (Dreyer, 2015). Even so, China appears as an owner of an initiative, an agency and a different identity, and Tianxia represents an alternative discursive empire or hegemony that justifies China ruling at the top (Callahan, 2008; Wang, 2017). These approaches consider Tianxia to be a strategic resource that proffers a Chinese way of expanding the country’s influence, underscoring a hierarchical world order, and may be used to change and silence its neighbours. To those critics, a rising China could only represent a territorial empire, and the uses of the concept of Tianxia by Chinese scholars are primarily intended to serve China’s ambition for territorial expansion. As a result, the concept is not productive for advancing IR theorization. Unlike Callahan, however, Martin Jacques is less concerned by the re-​ engagement with Chinese ideas such as the concept of Tianxia. In his book, When China Rules the World (2009), Jacques points out that the world affairs of the future will be dominated by China, and that the global system developed by China will differ from the one promoted by the West. Jacques argues that whereas we used to live in a world in which modernization and globalization were synonymous with Westernization, with the rise of China (and other Asian countries such as India), this view is increasingly being threatened. In short, we are entering a period of ‘contested modernity’ in which the norms and ideas associated with ‘modernity’ will be challenged significantly by non-​Western influences. The bearer of this change will be China. In addition, Jacques asserts that the rise of China is and will be unlike that of Western countries. Echoing Lucian Pye, Jacques insists that China should not be seen as a nation state, but as a civilizational state (2009: 13) because China existed within its contemporary approximate borders long before the emergence of the concept of the nation state. In terms of foreign relations, 113

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Jacques asserts that the new international order that China is building will contain elements of the ‘tributary system’ (2009: 646–​9) even though he does not think that it would be ‘a simple rerun of the past’ (2009: 721). A more likely scenario is the ascendance of a China-​centric hierarchical order in East Asia with ‘underlying recognition and acceptance of Chinese superiority’ (Jacques, 2009: 721). Nevertheless, Jacques (2009) is curious about the changes Tianxia could bring to global governance. He states that ‘The rise of China and a return to something more akin to a tributary-​state system will not necessarily be distinguished by instability; on the contrary, the tributary-​state system was highly stable, rooted as it was in China’s dominance and a virtually unchallenged hierarchical pattern of relationships’ (Jacques, 2009: 721). In this regard, Jacques’s position is similar to that of David Kang, who argues that China’s traditional hierarchical order is more peaceful than Europe’s egalitarian Westphalian system (Kang, 2010). Jacques believes that China will ‘be rather less overtly aggressive than the West has been’ (2009: 678). Hence, he is more willing to see the Tianxia system as a plausible alternative to world governance. While the literature discussed has seen Tianxia as a distinctive Chinese worldview and focused on its either positive or negative potential as a resource for out-​groups, Fei-​Ling Wang, a Chinese political scientist based in the United States, regards Tianxia as neither universal in fulfilling functions nor useful to out-​g roups. In his book, The China Order (2017), Wang argues that ‘the world empire of Tianxia’ was built upon the model of the ‘Qin-​Han polity’. It was implemented by the rulers of ‘Centralia’ or ‘China Proper’ during the Qin and Han dynasties for the first time. Although this ‘China Order’ collapsed several times as a world order, it never disappeared as a dominant political ideology in China. The key characteristics of this order include ‘its totality, universality, dualities, control, hypocrisy and duplicity, efficacy, and longevity’ (Wang, 2017: 101). According to Wang (2017: 31), there were only three periods in Chinese history that did not follow this dominant order. The first one was the pre-​Qin era, which had a ‘de facto Westphalia-​like world political system’ that consisted of multiple states interacting in trade, diplomacy, and war. The second period was the Song dynasty of the 11th century. In this period, the Song signed the Chanyuan Treaty of 1005 with the Liao, recognizing one another as coexisting equals. In Wang’s view, this is a proto-​Westphalian model. The third period was the early Republican period, or ‘the century of humiliation and progress’ (1842–​1949). To Wang (2017: 30), these three periods represented ‘the real golden eras of the long history of the Chinese World’. Unaware of many Chinese Tianxia writers aiming at incorporating liberalism, Wang obviously sees the Westphalian system of nation states as a better system for spreading liberalism because power is decentralized, fragmented and 114

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competitive, while viewing the China order as a ‘suboptimal’ order that should best be abolished.

The reception of Tianxia in the Anglosphere: collusion and absorption Scholars have long noticed the inconsistency of the Tianxia/​tributary system. In Fairbank’s edited volume, Lien-​sheng Yang (1968) and Wang Gungwu (1968) pointed out that the China-​centred world order has two aspects: myth and reality. Yang noted that there was little historical evidence to support the assumption that China’s relations with its neighbouring countries were motivated by a sense of superiority as suggested by the theory of Sino-​ centrism. But as Yang (1968: 22) noted, a myth can be influential in that it can still be ‘a cultural or psychological reality’ (Yang, 1968: 22). Likewise, Wang Gungwu (1968: 34–​60) also pointed out that in the actual diplomatic practices of ancient China, security and interests were the main factors affecting decision making. In this sense, Wang is undoubtedly the pioneer of the realist paradigm although he also attaches great importance to the influence of ‘rhetoric’. He traced the source of China’s superiority in detail and believed that this superiority had a huge impact on diplomatic practices in ancient China. Fairbank also pointed out that in the administration of their relations with the outside world, the repertoire of means available to rulers of the Chinese empire ‘lie along a spectrum that runs from one extreme of military conquest and administrative assimilation … to another extreme of complete nonintercourse and avoidance of contact’ (Fairbank, 1968: 12). Many historical studies in English have suggested the asymmetric use of hard power and soft/​normative power in favour of the former in Chinese history. Yuan-​kang Wang, in his work on China’s pre-​modern foreign relations during the periods of the Song and Ming dynasties (2010, 2012), argues that China was not so different from other great powers both past and present, such as the United States, for instance. According to Wang, the ideational power of Confucian pacifism was not as influential as has been assumed. Ming China, for example, was expansionist at the apex of its power. ‘[It] repeatedly attacked the Mongols, annexed Vietnam as a Chinese province, and launched seven maritime expeditions to project power abroad. To consolidate its dominance, the Ming dictated the rules of the game for lesser polities to follow, and used Confucian ideology to justify its dominant position within the tribute system’ (2012: 151–​2). In other words, ancient China followed (structural) realism. ‘Confucian culture did not constrain the leaders’ decision to use force; in making such decisions, leaders have been mainly motivated by their assessment of the balance of power between China and its adversary’ (Wang, 2010: 181). Similarly, Brantly Womack’s study of the relations between China and Vietnam (2006) suggest that although 115

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moral considerations have played a part, it is the logic of realism that actually played a decisive role. When China is unable to conquer Vietnam by force, establishing tributary relations can guarantee a stable border, exempting Vietnam from its northern threat. Wang’s and Womack’s respective views resonate with the findings by Johnston (1995), who explains that the mix of the Confucian-​Mencian and parabellum paradigms in Chinese strategic thought often led to strategic outcomes similar to those anticipated by structural realists. In other words, all these scholars evidence that the core of the tributary relationship is framed by (structural) realist considerations. Consequently, the rhetoric of the Chinese dynasties in the past only played a modifying role, and ideational factors did not affect final decisions, which were determined by material interests. Human nature, and by extension political action, has not changed despite the cultural differences, making the basic logic of political behaviour universal. As a result, Tianxia is just another term for empire, and the tributary relationships in Ming and Qing China, as Zhang and Buzan (2012: 33) demonstrate, were essentially more like hegemonic relationships than the suzerain-​vassal relationships described in the Tianxia discourse. In the Anglosphere, very few studies written by non-​Chinese scholars have considered Tianxia as a universal framework for the explanation and understanding of contemporary IR. The work by both Yuen Foong Khong (2013) and Salvatore Babones (2017) on ‘American Tianxia’ stand out as two exceptions to this trend. Khong believes that, compared to China, the United States has actually established the most successful tributary system in the world. The United States provides military protection and market access permits to its allies (or tributary states). Similarly, Babones (correctly) notes that Zhao Tingyang’s model of Tianxia does not necessarily imply that China should lead the world. According to Babones (2017), as far as the current world is concerned, the United States is the central country that determines the world order, making it effectively the ‘Middle Kingdom’ of the world today. According to the traditional Chinese ‘Five Zone’ theory (Babones, 2017: 3), the world is organized into five concentric circles: (1) ‘the royal domain of lands under the personal lordship of the emperor’; (2) ‘the domains of the emperor’s Chinese subsidiary lords’; (3) ‘the conquered kingdoms of non-​Chinese peoples and pacified barbarian peoples’; (4) ‘the tributary barbarians, who sent customary tribute to the emperor’s court as a token of submission’; and (5) ‘wild barbarians, who did not’. Only the first three zones lie inside the Chinese empire. The American version of the five zones, starting from the first circle, ‘runs along the east coast of the United States from Washington DC through New York to Boston’ (Babones, 2017: 27). The second circle, constituted by the remainder of the United States, ‘is a culturally and politically unified zone comparable to the ethnically Chinese 116

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component of the Ming empire’ (Babones, 2017: 27). The third circle is composed of Washington’s Anglo-​Saxon allies, including the ‘United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand with which the United States shares an integrated signals intelligence network (“ECHELON”) and full military interoperability’. With the fourth circle, Babones refers to the United States’ other allies and aligned states. Finally, the fifth one concerns non-​aligned states and enemies. Following June Dreyer (2015), Babones explains why China is not the most suitable country to realize the Tianxia system. For Babones, China is restricted by its limited capabilities. He admits that China’s economy will surpass that of the United States in the near future, but he does not believe that the overall strength of the United States’ power will be surpassed by China. He cites New York as the world centre of finance, media, art and fashion; Boston of education; Silicon Valley of information technology; and so forth. Therefore, Babones disagrees that American hegemony is in decline. Rather, he predicts that the US-​led world order will be difficult to shake. More importantly, in terms of values, he argues that American individualism is more attractive than Chinese values. According to Babones, the United States has succeeded in making the individualistic lifestyle a universal value, to which still more and more people are attracted, and which has even emerged as the real ‘End of History’ –​as opposed to Fukuyama’s liberal democracy. Therefore, believing that the American order is transforming itself into a more stable Tianxia system, Babones turns the concept into a useful resource for the representation and theorizing of universal values about order in IR.

Conclusion This chapter first traced the genealogy of the concept of Tianxia from its emergence in ancient China to its employment in the domestic and foreign policies of the People’s Republic of China. It then elaborated how the concept re-​emerged in the contemporary Chinese academic (IR) community. Finally, it discussed how Tianxia migrated to the West and was received, interpreted and appropriated there. By doing so, the chapter has contributed to theorization of post-​Western IR by providing an example of the re-​worlding of the West itself through the appropriation and combination of the exotic, external and (still) subaltern knowledge about the concept, history and practices of Tianxia. It is particularly timely, albeit poignant, to critically reflect upon the post-​ Western and re-​worlded identities of the West during the ongoing COVID-​ 19 pandemic. Consider China’s relative success in controlling the spread of the viruses and its willingness to provide medical supplies, as opposed to the Western countries’ quest for monopoly of medical resources for their own use. The pandemic is providing a real-​world illustration of how different 117

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provincial Western sites each try to make sense of, and reply to, Chinese medical activism (Yeophantong and Shih, 2021). By engaging this medical Tianxia of China, they are able to force reconsiderations and restructurations assisting the practice of their own post-​Western/​post-​Tianxia identities. The chapter has also highlighted four dominant ways of how the West, more specifically the Anglosphere, has dealt with Tianxia, namely as an exotic resource that is different from the West yet can be useful to understand the non-​West (for example Fairbank, Callahan and Jacques); entirely denied as a useful concept (for example Wang, F.); in collusion with Western theories, especially structural realism (for example Wang, G., Yang and Womack); and absorbed entirely as a universally applicable concept (for example Babones). Such considerations offer meaningful encounters with the theorizing of China’s rise in IR and facilitate productive reconsiderations of the established frameworks for the explanation and understanding of international affairs. Acknowledgements This chapter is a revised version of an article originally published as Chih-​yu Shih and Yih-​Jye Hwang (2018) ‘Re-​worlding the “West” in Post-​Western IR: The Reception of Sun Zi’s the Art of War in the Anglosphere’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 18(3): 421–​48 (republished by permission of Oxford University Press). References Babones, S. (2017) American Tianxia: Chinese Money, American Power, and the End of History. Bristol: Policy Press Bai, T.D. (2014) ‘Beyond the Nation-​state –​Confucianism’s New Tianxia System’ [chaoyue minzu guojia –​rujiade xin tianxia tixi]. Pengpai, http://​ www.thepaper.cn/​newsDetail_​forward_​1284049 Bunskoek, R. and Shih, C.Y. (2021) ‘ “Community of Common Destiny” as Post-​Western Regionalism: Rethinking China’s Belt and Road Initiative from a Confucian Perspective’, Uluslararası İlişkiler /​International Relations, 18(70): 85–​101. Callahan, W.A. (2008) ‘Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-​hegemonic or a New Hegemony?’ International Studies Review, 10(4): 749–​61. Chang, C.H. (2007) ‘Conflict Between the Eastern and Western Principles of International Order: Negotiations over Status and Order Between China and Siam in the Last Years of the Qing Dynasty and the Early Republican Period’ (Chen S. trans), Social Sciences in China, 28(4): 62–​85. Chang, C.H. (2013a) ‘A Comparison of Eastern and Western Principles of International Order: Suzerainty vs. Colonization’, The Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 79: 47–​86.

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Chang, C.H. (2013b) ‘Suzerainty vs. Independence: An Observation of Korea’s Imo Incident Based on the World Order Principle’, The Journal of History, 40: 31–​73. Chang, C.H. (2018) ‘Zhongguo Lishi Wenhua Jiazhizhong de “Mingyun Gongtongti” Sixiang Yuanliu –​Yi Tianxiaguan Qudai Zhuquanguan de Dongya Zhengzhezhidao’ [The origin and development of ‘Community of Common Destiny’ thinking in Chinese history and cultural values –​Using the concept of Tianxia to replace the concept of sovereignty as a way of integrating East Asia], Shangdong Forum, 1–​18, https://s​ nea.wh.sdu.edu.cn/​ _​_​local/​D/​FA/​D6/​32B45C0B5328A08F0450DA882B8_​53FE6FD9_​ EFD08.pdf Chu, S. (2020) ‘Whither Chinese IR? The Sinocentric Subject and the Paradox of Tianxia-​ism’, International Theory, FirstView, 1–​31. doi:10.1017/​ S1752971920000214 Cohen, P. (1984) Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past. New York: Columbia University Press. Dreyer, J.T. (2015) ‘The “Tianxia Trope”: Will China Change the International System?’ Journal of Contemporary China, 24(96): 1015–​31. Fairbank, J.K. (1953) Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–​1 854. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fairbank, J.K. (1968) The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fairbank, J.K. and Teng, S.Y. (1941) ‘On the Ch’ing Tributary System’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 6(2): 135–​246. Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press. Huang, C.L. (1992) Tianchao Lizhi Tixi Yanjiu (Shangjuan): Yazhou de Huaxia Zhixu –​Zhongguo yu Yazhou Guojia Guanxi Xingtai Lun [The Etiquette System of the Celestial Empire, Vol. 1: Asia’s Chinese Order –​Patterns of Relationships between China and Asian Countries]. Beijing: China Renmin University Press. Huang, C.L. (1994) Tianchao Lizhi Tixi Yanjiu (Zhongjuan): Zhongguo Fengjian Wangchao yu Chaoxian Bandao Guanxilun [The Etiquette System of the Celestial Empire, Vol. 2: Theorizing China’s Feudal Dynasty and Relationships with the Korean Peninsula]. Beijing: China Renmin University Press. Huang, C.L. (1995) Tianchao Lizhi Tixi Yanjiu (Xiajuan): Chaoxian de Ruhua Qingjing Gouzao –​Chaoxian Wangchao yu Manqing Wangchao de Guanxi Xingtailun [The Etiquette System of the Celestial Empire, Vol. 3: The Structure of Korea’s Confucianization –​Patterns of Relationships between Korea and the Manchurian Qing Dynasty]. Beijing: China Renmin University Press. 119

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Hsu, I.C.Y. (1960) China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858–​1880. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hwang, Y.J. (2021) ‘Reappraising the Chinese School of International Relations: A Postcolonial Perspective’, Review of International Studies, 47(3): 311–​30. Jacques, M. (2009) When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of A New Global Order. London: Penguin. Jiang, X.Y. (2007) ‘From the Idea of Tianxia to the Harmonious World’ [cong Tianxia zhuyi dao hexie shijie], Journal of Contemporary Asia-​Pacific Studies, 12: 20–​7. Johnston, A.I. (1995) Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kang, D.C. (2010) East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute. New York: Columbia University Press. Khong, Y.F. (2013) ‘The American Tributary System’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 6(1): 1–​47. Ling, L.H.M. (2002) Postcolonian International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Liu, Q. (2015) ‘Rebuild the Image of the Global: From the Idea of “Tianxia” to New-​Worldism’ [chongjian quanqiu xiangxiang: cong “Tianxia” lixiang zouxiang xin shijiezhuyi], Academic Monthly, (8): 5–​15. Mancall, M. (1984) China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy. New York and London: Free Press. Ngeow, C.B. (2020) ‘COVID-​19, Belt and Road Initiative and the Health Silk Road’. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Bonn), http://​library.fes.de/​pdf-​files/​ bueros/​indonesien/​16537.pdf Qin, Y. (2005) ‘Theoretical Problematic of International Relationship Theory and the Construction of a Chinese School’, Social Sciences in China (English edition.), 3: 62–​72. Ren, X. (2020) ‘Grown from Within: Building a Chinese School of International Relations’, The Pacific Review, 33(3–​4): 386–​412. Shih, C.Y. (1990) The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psychocultural View. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Shih, C.Y. (2010) ‘The West That Is Not in the West: Identifying the Self in Oriental Modernity’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 23(4): 537–​60. Shih, C.Y. (2020a) ‘Re-​Worlding China: Notorious Tianxia, Critical Relationality’, E-​International Relations, 2 September, https://​www.e-​ir.info/​ 2020/​09/​02/​re-​worlding-​china-​notorious-​tianxia-​critical-​relationality/​ Shih, C.Y. (2020b) ‘Bound to Relate: Retheorizing International Order Through Chinese Culture of Power’ in Huiyun Feng and Kai He (eds), China’s Challenges and International Order Transition: Beyond the ‘Thucydides Trap’. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp 182–​201. 120

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Shih, C.Y., Huang, C.C., Yeophantong, P., Bunskoek, R., Ikeda, J., Hwang, Y.J., Wang, H.J., Chang, C.Y. and Chen, C.C. (2019) China and International Theory: The Balance of Relationships. Milton: Routledge. Smith, S. (2002). ‘The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline’, International Studies Review, 4(2): 67–​85. Tobin, L. (2018) ‘Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies’, Texas National Security Review, 2(1): 155–​66. van der Veer, P. (2001) Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Viraphol, S. (1977) Tribute and Profit: Sino-​Siamese Trade, 1652–​1853. Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University. Wang, B. (ed) (2017) China Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Wang, D.D. (2008) ‘The World Citizen and the Theory of Tianxia’ [shijie gongmin yu tianxia zhuyi]. CEOCIO (8), http://e​ conomics.efnchina.com/​ show-​1565-​59240-​1.html Wang, F.-​L. (2017) The China Order: Centralia, World Empire, and the Nature of Chinese Power. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Wang, G.W. (1968) ‘Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay’ in J.K. Fairbank (ed), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, pp 34–​62. Wang, H.J. (2013) The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Wang, H.J. (2017) ‘Traditional Empire-​modern State Hybridity: Chinese Tianxia and Westphalian Anarchy’, Global Constitutionalism, 6(2): 298–​326. Wang, H.J. (2021) ‘Chinese IR Scholarship as a Relational Epistemology in the Study of China’s Rise’, China Quarterly, 245, 262–​75. Wang, Y.K. (2010) Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Wang, Y.K. (2012) ‘Managing Regional Hegemony in Historical Asia: The Case of Early Ming China’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2): 129–​53. Womack, B. (2006) China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. New York: Cambridge University Press. Xie, S. (2017) ‘Chinese Beginnings of Cosmopolitanism: A Genealogical Critique of Tianxia Guan’, Telos, 180: 8–​25. Xu, B. (2017) ‘Is Zhao’s Tianxia System Misunderstood?’, Monde Chinois, 49(1): 48. Xu, J. (2012) ‘A Unique Culture or a Theory of New Tianxia’ [teshu de wenhua haishi xin tianxia zhuyi], Beijing Cultural Review, 2: 20–​23. 121

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Xu, J. (2016) ‘A Theory of New Tianxia: Double Transcendence over Nationalism and Classic Theory of Tianxia’ [xin tianxia zhuyi: dui minzuzhuyi yu chuangtong tianxia zhuyi de shuangchong chaoyue], Exploration and Free Views, (5): 62. Yang, L.S. (1968) ‘Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order’ in J.K. Fairbank (ed), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Yeophantong, P. and Shih, C.Y. (2021) ‘A Relational Reflection on Pandemic Nationalism’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 26(3): 549–72. Zhang, Y. (2017) ‘Worlding China, 1500–​1800’ in T. Dunne and C. Reus-​ Smit (eds), The Globalisation of International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zhang, Y. and Buzan, B. (2012) ‘The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(1): 3–​36. Zhao, S. (1997) Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to the Post-​cold War Regional Multipolarity. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Zhao, T. (2006) ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept “All-​under-​ Heaven” ’ [Tian-​xia, 天下], Social Identities, 12(1): 29–​41. Zhao, T. (2009) ‘A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-​under-​heaven (Tian-​xia)’, Diogenes, 56(1): 5–​18. Zhao, T. (2016a) A Possible World of All-​under-​the-​Heaven System: The World Order in the Past and for the Future (in Chinese). Beijing: CITIC Press Group. Zhao, T. (2016b) Benefits to this China: China as a Divine Concept (in Chinese). Beijing: CITIC Press Corporation. Zhao, T. and Tao, L. (2019) Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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PART II

Theorizing China’s Rise: Critical Reflection on Mainstream Frameworks

6

China in the International Order: A Contributor or a Challenger? Wang Jisi

The rapid growth of China’s power and influence has become one of the most salient phenomena in world politics today. Particularly since 2012, when President Xi Jinping became China’s top leader, China has been viewed as increasingly ‘assertive’ in conducting its foreign relations. Henry Kissinger (2014), in his book World Order, devotes an entire chapter to the complex and subtle relations between China and the international order. As he observes, Beijing has become much more active on the world scene. … By any standard, China has regained the stature by which it was known in the centuries of its most far-​reaching influence. The question now is how it will relate to the contemporary search for world order, particularly in its relations with the United States. (Kissinger, 2014: 225–​6) Likewise, John Ikenberry (2011: 343), a prominent professor of international affairs at Princeton University, remarks that ‘China is in critical respects the “swing state” in world politics’, which begs the crucial question: ‘Will China seek to oppose and overturn the evolving Western-​centred liberal international order, or will it integrate into and assert authority within that order?’ There are three different answers to this question in China as well as in other parts of the world. The first answer is that for the sake of its own interest, China needs to integrate into the existing international order, rather than overturn it, albeit with some reforms (Da, 2021; see also Chapter 7). In his speech in the United States in September 2015, Xi Jinping (2015) pronounced that

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[a]‌s far as the existing international system is concerned, China has been a participant, builder and contributor. We stand firmly for the international order and system that is based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. A great number of countries, especially developing countries, want to see a more just and equitable international system, but it doesn’t mean they want to unravel the entire system or start all over again. Rather, what they want is to reform and improve the system to keep up with the times. At the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Brasilia Summit in November 2019, Xi restated this commitment: ‘It is important that we uphold the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter and the UN-​centred international system, oppose hegemonism and power politics, and take a constructive part in settling geopolitical flash points’. Other Chinese official statements have also reiterated that China wants to work with other countries to ‘uphold an international order based on international law’ and ‘push the international order toward a more just and reasonable direction’ (Xi, 2019). The second answer, expressed by many Chinese and international observers, tends to ignore or discredit Beijing’s assurances. These observers believe that China will try to change the patterns of international order completely by capitalizing on its accumulated capacities and mobilizing possible international allies. Thus, China’s rise seeks to change the world in its own image (Kassam and Lim, 2021; Mitter, 2021). Such scholarship interprets China’s national interests to be in direct conflict with those of the United States, which, together with other developed countries, plays a dominant role in maintaining the current world order. The logical conclusion of this perspective is that China and the United States will eventually have to fight a war for the leadership position in the international pecking order. The third school of thought also believes in this ‘iron logic of power’ that will lead China and the United States to rivalry. However, the claim is that China’s power has not risen to the stage of openly challenging the United States for the dominant position in the international order (Buckley, 2011/​ 12). The Chinese proponents of this perspective most often refer to Deng Xiaoping’s famous saying in the early 1990s about tao guang yang hui (‘keeping a low profile’ or ‘hiding one’s capacities and biding one’s time’). They argue that an early showdown with the United States would inflict unnecessary losses on China (Lin, 2010). Their assumption is that when China has accumulated sufficient capacities, it should create a new international order in which China will replace the United States as the global leader. This chapter attempts to analyse China’s attitude towards, and influence on, the existing international order. Before doing so, a discussion of the basic concepts regarding ‘China’ and ‘international order’ is in order. 126

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What is ‘China’? At first sight, ‘what is China’ seems a non-​issue. However, in scholarly terms it is a big and complicated one. In the Chinese mainland, it is the official position that ‘there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the sole legal government representing the whole of China’ (Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, 2000). The United States and the vast majority of the international community adopt the ‘One China Policy’, despite some variations in its definition. Nonetheless, even today Taiwan calls itself the ‘Republic of China’, even though its identity as part of the Chinese nation is controversial on the island. However the Taiwan issue is defined, the reality is that in the current international system the PRC, founded in 1949, is a contemporary sovereign state and one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. When we discuss ‘China in the international order’, we are clearly referring to the PRC rather than the combination of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. This China is what I would call ‘political China’. In the mindset of almost all the Chinese people in the PRC, two other understandings of China are relevant, which may be confusing to people outside of China. The first understanding could be named ‘historical China’, ‘civilizational China’ or ‘cultural China’. It is commonly said that China represents a continuous civilization with a history of 4,000 or 5,000 years. When people in China claim that the Nansha Islands (known as the Spratly Islands outside of China) have been China’s territories since Emperor Wu’s reign (156–​87 BCE) in the Han Dynasty (202 BCE –​220 CE), or a certain land has been Chinese territory ‘since ancient times’, they express the popular Chinese conviction that the PRC is entitled to inherit territories of ancient dynasties like the Han or the Song (960–​1279). When these understandings are superimposed onto current international life, one may find that such Chinese arguments are hardly acceptable to other states, such as the Philippines and Malaysia, for instance, each of which has territorial disputes with the PRC and claims that the current Chinese state did not even exist in ancient times. The second understanding could be presented as ‘ethnic China’ or ‘Chinese descent’. In the Chinese language, Zhongguo ren could have at least two different semantic meanings: citizens of China (or the PRC), and Han Chinese as an ethnic group. It is a widely shared notion in the PRC that all Zhongguo ren, regardless of where they live, what citizenship they hold, and whether they are ethnically Han, should be patriotic to Zhongguo (China) or Zhonghua minzu (the Chinese nation). This understanding would likely bring about two confusions. First, although the PRC government makes a clear distinction between PRC citizens living abroad (huaqiao) and foreign 127

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citizens of Chinese origin (huaren) in legal terms, in practice the two concepts are often interchangeable. Things could turn more complicated if individuals from Taiwan, Hong Kong or Macau are involved. Secondly, it is debatable whether Tibetans, Uighurs and other national minorities in China should be identified as ‘Chinese’ in an ethnic sense because, while they are PRC citizens, they are ethnically not Han. In the context of the ‘rise of China’ and its relationship with the international order, China is not merely the PRC. It implicitly means the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’, as the official PRC slogan holds, and may include not only ‘political China’, but also ‘civilisational China’ and ‘ethnic China’. Some recent Chinese initiatives, such as the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and the ‘21st-​Century Maritime Silk Road’, as well as the hundreds of Confucius Institutes the PRC has established all over the world, make other countries feel that China’s presence goes far beyond the politics and economics of the PRC. On the one hand, this diversity of Chinese identity may provide more policy instruments for the PRC to influence the formation of international order. On the other hand, this diversity may also lead to miscommunication and misunderstanding between China and the outside world in general, and its neighbouring countries in particular, as they are more sensitive to the impact of ‘civilisational China’, ‘historical China’ and ‘ethnic China’.

What is ‘international order’? International order as a concept and reality originated from the birth of the Westphalian System. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia defined norms and rules of international (interstate, to be exact) relations based on the principles of state sovereignty, equality, peaceful settlement of international disputes, religious freedom, and so on. Since then, international order has been built according to these rules. It should be noted that China prefers to use the term ‘international order’ rather than ‘world order’ or ‘global order’ because the former only takes sovereign states as basic legitimate units while the latter can accommodate a system that has a much wider span of time and space. The concept of ‘world order’ could more easily accommodate, for example, the imperial order established by the Mongol Empire over Eurasia, whereas ‘global order’ could contain certain institutional arrangements established by non-​state actors that participate in global governance. Kissinger (2014: 365) argues that the cohesion of an international order can be challenged by ‘either a redefinition of legitimacy or a significant shift in the balance of power’. According to this understanding, international order is principally about two things. The first is the structure and distribution of power among the major countries in the world in a given time period. These countries’ individual capacities go up and down, and they associate 128

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and compete with each other in formal or informal alliances. Therefore, the power balance among them tends to change. The second is ‘rules of the game’, which may find their expression in international law, international institutions, and international treaties and agreements. These rules are seen as legitimate and are expected to be observed by the international community, especially by the major countries. In the next section I provide a brief overview of these two aspects of the contemporary international order.

Power distribution and rules of the game Contemporary power distribution: one, two, three and multi To define the contemporary international order, it is necessary first to look at the distribution of capabilities among major international powers. After the end of the Second World War, and especially since the end of the Cold War, countries that have actively participated in the world economy have obtained more space and opportunities for development, thanks to the relatively open international order and the historical process of globalization. On every continent there are countries that have gradually lifted themselves from poverty and ‘backwardness’ to present a thriving picture. The international structure has evolved increasingly from the formerly vertical ‘bipolar’ or ‘unipolar’ one to a more horizontal one. Yet, it still has not become a ‘multi-​ polar’ one. I would describe the current power structure as a ladder-​shaped ‘one, two, three and multi’. The ‘one’ is the United States. The United States is still the sole superpower, and it will remain ranked far above other major countries in terms of comprehensive national strength and international influence. US power is growing faster than most other developed countries, though the gap between the United States and China, India and other developing countries is being narrowed. However, various factors, including its isolationism under Donald Trump and its COVID-​19 debacle, have weakened US international standing and its influence on world affairs. The ‘two’ refers to China and the European Union (EU), two power centres of a very different nature. China is an Asian regional power with global influence, though its influence is limited by the United States, the EU, Japan, India and Russia from different directions and at various levels. China is the biggest trading partner of nearly all its neighbouring countries. Yet, it is still a regional power since its projections of geopolitical and geoeconomic sway are focused on Asia. Chinese travellers and commercial activities have now spread throughout the world. The influence of China on other geographic regions, though still new and shallow, has expanded dramatically. Chinese observers and strategists now habitually view China as the world’s ‘No. 2’, next only to the United States, as China’s economic size is smaller than that of the United States only (Zhao, 2019). In reality, 129

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however, if one visits the Middle East (for example Saudi Arabia, Iran or Turkey), Eastern Europe (for example Ukraine or Poland) or Latin America (for example Brazil or Mexico), it is very obvious that the political influence of China is far below ‘No. 2’. Measured by quality of economy, technology, education, social welfare and ecological environment, China could hardly be eligible to be No. 2 in the world. That said, during the 2020–​21 period, China’s confidence has been buoyed by a series of stark contrasts with the United States in terms of combating COVID-​19, as well as maintaining domestic political stability and social governance. Taken as a whole, the EU is the largest economic entity in the world today. With 27 member states, the EU has built a common market and has the largest amount of net wealth. It plays an indispensable role in maintaining peace and stability in the western and southern parts of Eurasia, and in regulating the global financial order and global governance. However, because of restrictive bottlenecks such as unbalanced development, the sovereign debt crisis, high unemployment rates, an ageing population, and deepening social discrepancies, the EU will, for a long time, have a lower economic growth rate compared with that of the United States and most developing countries. The massive influx of immigrants has changed the ethnic and religious composition of Europe, creating challenges, real or perceived (or both), for social cohesion and integration. The ethos of the EU is increasingly diversified and fragmented. Domestic politics has become more polarized in almost every member state. The rising populism and nationalism in the United Kingdom led to its withdrawal from the EU. The untapped potential, if not the lack, of the EU’s common foreign and security policy also significantly limits the EU’s international influence (Annen, 2020). Nonetheless, the positive conditions for future EU development cannot be ignored. Eurozone states have relied on years of collaboration to recover from the 2010–​12 debt crisis. The integration of the EU is not likely to be reversed, despite the United Kingdom’s departure. In fact, perhaps paradoxically, the organizing function of the EU may have been strengthened because of Brexit. At the same time, the advanced technology industry has become a major driving force of the economic development of the EU. The EU also leads the world in improving energy efficiency and building a green economy. The ‘three’ refers to Japan, Russia and India. From the perspective of comprehensive national strength, each of the three has its own comparative advantages. In economic and technological terms, Japan is much more advanced than Russia or India. Japan’s per capita income will continue to be much higher than that of China for the foreseeable future. Although Japan is not as confident as it used to be due to economic stagnation, an ageing population, and the ascendancy of China, many in Japan still hope for the ‘normalization’ of the Japanese state, which means that the country can come 130

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out of the shadow of the Second World War, become a strategic peer of the United States, and play a more active role in international affairs (Teo, 2019). Russia holds abundant natural resources, a vast territory, highly educated citizens and great potential for development. Since its economic growth heavily depends on the export of natural gas, oil and mineral products, Russia is significantly affected by the fluctuating demands for energy and other natural resources in the international market. The burden of social welfare from an ageing population, the shortage of labour arising from a low birth rate, and unbalanced regional development, to name just a few, are all factors that overshadow Russia’s long-​term economic future. With strong military forces, Russia is an assertive and strident international player. The annexation of Crimea, resistance to Western sanctions, and suppression of pro-​Western voices in Russia have all doubtless boosted President Vladimir Putin’s prestige and popularity in Russia today. However, due to the obvious slow-​down of the Russian economy and several setbacks in diplomacy, the real recovery of Russia’s power and status will take a long time. India remains a dominant power in South Asia. The Indian population is younger than that of Japan and Russia (as well as that of the United States and China) and very energetic. India’s potential for economic development is remarkably promising. Under the strong leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s advantages in human resources and confidence in international affairs have been stimulated. However, the system that Modi inherited from the previous administrations has many disadvantages, such as unbalanced economic development, a widening gap between rich and poor, underdeveloped infrastructure, a shortage of energy, a backward industrial system, a huge foreign trade deficit, significant red tape for foreign investment, and acute regional protectionism. Moreover, there are other negative factors, including frequent partisan and religious conflicts, weak decision-​making capacity due to frequent government shifts, and an inefficient bureaucratic system. The disastrous impact of the second wave of COVID-​19 on India in 2021 has exposed the many weaknesses in the Indian political and social fabric (Guha, 2021). As a result, India’s economic reform cannot bear fruit quickly. The ‘multi’ in the international structure refers to numerous emerging regional powers, including Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Vietnam, Turkey, Iran, South Africa and Nigeria. The Republic of Korea, Australia, Israel, Saudi Arabia and some others can also be put into the category of important regional powers. Moreover, there are countries such as Argentina, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, Kazakhstan and Ukraine that are comparable to those listed earlier in terms of the size of territory, population, resources, or potential for development. It seems unlikely that the power distribution among major actors of the world will change significantly in the next decade or so, perhaps except for 131

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China’s impressively growing power. The size of the US economy will catch up with that of the EU in a matter of years. The Japanese economy will continue to lag behind those of the United States and the EU. However, Japan will obtain advanced technological capabilities, and its national defence may be strengthened. The economic gap between Russia and other developed countries is unlikely to be narrowed. The economic competitiveness of BRICS and other emerging economies as a whole will increase. Meanwhile, all major powers will be very occupied with their own domestic challenges. There is likely to be more continuity than change in the relationships among the United States, China, the EU, Russia, Japan, India and other major international actors. Despite the increased power and influence of the developing countries as a whole, they are not formulating any visible alliances that would resemble the blocs in the Cold War era. In contrast, the political, military and economic alliances and associations of the developed countries formed after the Second World War are not expected to break down in the near future, the difficulties in the relations between the Western countries notwithstanding. The preponderance of Western values demonstrated by these alliances is also obvious in the international system. The political ties between China and Russia are becoming closer, owing more to their respective domestic political imperatives than to geopolitical considerations. The BRICS countries will make every effort to protect their own rights and interests, and jointly pose a greater challenge to the traditional domination of the Western countries in the international system. But they would not join each other in creating a separate politico-​economic system or a set of institutions that would challenge directly the established Western alliances and values.

Rules of the game: continuity and adjustment While the international power structure turns more horizontal, the rules that guide international relations will remain generally stable, albeit with certain modifications. Rules guiding international relations in the areas of politics, economy and security set in the UN Charter are widely acknowledged and, more or less, followed by countries throughout the world. These rules include: national sovereignty and non-​interference with each other’s internal affairs; safeguarding of human rights, freedom of religion, and opposition to racial discrimination; open international markets, protection of intellectual property rights, financial stability and product safety; peaceful solution to territorial disputes, prevention of proliferation of weapons of massive destruction (WMD), maintenance of nuclear safety, maritime security, cyber security and space security; opposition to terrorism, smuggling, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration; improving public health, protecting the environment, and coping with climate change. These rules have been 132

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recorded by a number of international organizations, mechanisms, treaties, agreements and conferences. Even those countries which are seen by the Western countries as ‘rogues’ and ‘outlaws’, such as North Korea and Zimbabwe, do not openly challenge these principles and rules. The stability and sustainability of the current international order does not mean that the aforementioned rules will remain unchangeable. In reality, plenty of new issues in the non-​traditional security arena have emerged one after another, such as cyber security, outer space and polar region security. Regarding these new dimensions of global governance, appropriate ‘rules of the game’ are yet to be established or improved. Due to technological transformations, adjustments to international rules in such traditional areas as trade, finance and investment are called for. For example, there emerged certain new rules on international trade in the Trans-​Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) propelled by the Obama administration. If countries like Thailand are interested in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-​Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the modified replacement of the TPP after the US withdrawal in early 2017, they have to abide by the rules restricting state-​owned enterprises and forcefully protecting labour rights. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiated by China may also bring about certain changes to the rules on international investment. The difficult yet fruitless negotiation between China and the United States on the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) from 2013 to 2016, and the trade talks between Beijing and the Trump administration from 2017 had been centred on issues regarding rules such as open market access, fair competition, and protection of intellectual property rights.

China’s general attitudes towards the international order During the 1970s–​80s, Deng Xiaoping, China’s de facto leader, raised the topic of establishing a new international political and economic order on several occasions (Deng, 1993). The political reports of the 14th (1992) and 15th (1997) National Congresses of the Communist Party of China (CPC) proposed respectively the goals to ‘establish a new international order’ and ‘establish a new international political and economic order’. The report of the 16th (2002) National Congress of the CPC set up the goal to ‘promote the establishment of a fair and rational new international political and economic order’. With the acceleration of reform and opening up in China, a subtle yet profound change has taken place in the attitude of the Chinese government towards the current international order. In 2005 the State Council Information Office of the PRC (2005) published a white paper, China’s 133

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Peaceful Development Road, and put forward the notion that ‘China is working hard to push the international political and economic order forward to a just and rational direction’. Since then, no more official documents in China have emphasized the necessity of establishing ‘a new international order’. In 2011 the State Council Information Office (2011) published a white paper, titled China’s Peaceful Development, which states that ‘we will actively engage in handling multilateral issues and addressing global issues, undertake our due international obligations and play a constructive role in making the international political and economic order fairer and more equitable’. This can be interpreted as saying that the current international order is not generally unfair and unreasonable, but needs some reform. This white paper, which systematically interprets China’s attitude towards the world, also mentions that ‘economic globalisation and revolution in science and technology have created historical conditions for more countries to revitalise themselves by pursuing economic development and mutually beneficial cooperation, and made it possible for more developing countries to embark on the path of rapid development’. This seems to suggest that in the existing international system and under its international political and economic order, it is possible for developing countries to achieve the objective of modernization as long as they seize the opportunities of economic globalization and rely on their own strengths for innovation. The Chinese government has repeatedly emphasized its positive attitude towards the current international order. For example, in May 2013 Premier Li Keqiang said that ‘interdependence is a defining feature in state-​to-​state relations in this era of globalisation. China is a beneficiary and a defender of the existing international order and international system, and stands ready to work with India and other countries to advance reform of the system’ (Li, 2013). In April 2015, in a meeting with Lionel Barber, editor-​in-​chief of The Financial Times, Premier Li Keqiang said that the objective of China initiating the AIIB ‘is not to reinvent the wheel. Rather it is intended to be a supplement to the current international financial system’, and that ‘China was deeply involved in establishing the postwar international order from the very outset. … So China has been a beneficiary of the current international system in terms of both peace and development. … So there is no such thing as breaking the existing order’ (Li, 2015). Similarly, Jin Liqun (2015), secretary-​general of the AIIB Multilateral Interim Secretariat, claimed that the ‘AIIB is a supplement, rather than substitute for the World Bank and Asian Development Bank; AIIB is an improvement and promotion of current international financial order, rather than subversion’. From 2018, the Chinese government has frequently stressed its commitment to multilateralism in international relations and economic globalization to safeguard peace and development for all, vis-​à-​vis the US Trump administration’s ‘America First’ banner and unilateral and protectionist 134

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moves (Wang, 2020a). That ‘the world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century’ has become China’s official baseline assessment for the general trend of world politics. Such a trend is perceived to have been accelerated by the COVID-​19 pandemic and featured by sustained ‘chaos’ or transformation since late 2020 (He, 2020; Zhang, J., 2020; Xi, 2021). Yet, time and trend are believed to be on China’s side, with ‘the East rising and the West declining’ (dong sheng xi jiang) (He, 2020), however vague this narrative sounds. Chinese elites also see China as a nation speaking for the developing countries in the world. Increasingly, China identifies itself as acting on behalf of the ‘international community’ as well. President Xi Jinping frequently calls for the establishment of ‘a community with a shared future for humankind’, where China will be taking a leading position. As Wang Yi (2020) stated, China is ‘spearheading the reform of the global governance system, making globalisation more inclusive and beneficial for all and the international order fairer and more equitable’. Based on the statements by Chinese leaders, senior officials and the Chinese government, one can conclude that although China defines itself as a participant, facilitator and contributor in the international order, it holds unique views and expectations for reforms and changes in the order. Given current power balance and distribution, it may not be feasible or practical for China to ‘start all over again’ and set up a tangible counterweight to the Western world. However, China obviously hopes to see not only the increase of its own capabilities and power projection, but also the growth in strength of other BRICS countries, particularly Russia. China will enhance relations and strengthen cooperation with other developing countries as well as Russia to advocate the multi-​polarization of the world. It is self-​evident that a multipolar structure would appear only when US power and influence were considerably weakened. It is subject to debate, however, whether it is China’s strategic intention, and in China’s long-​term national interest, to undermine Washington’s position in world affairs.

Differentiated positions on the ‘rules of the game’ If international order has economic, security and political dimensions, it is relatively easy for China to integrate into the economic part of that order. The argument that the main reason for the ‘backwardness’ of the developing countries was the irrational international economic order was popular in China during the 1970s–​90s. Therefore, a fundamental way to solve the contradictions between the North and the South and to narrow the gap between them would be to break and wipe out control and predatory exploitation by the developed countries and to establish a new international economic order. Essentially, it followed the reasoning of the ‘dependence 135

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theory’ that was popular among some political observers in the Third World at that time. However, the historical experience of China, which has achieved rapid development by actively participating in economic globalization over the previous four decades, has challenged this traditional argument. China now approves of such rules as the liberalization of trade and investment. However, to some extent, its views and practices conflict with the current rules in international trade, investment and finance, especially in relation to the role of the government in the economy and society. China is not satisfied with what it regards as an insufficient share of the voting power in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other financial organizations (Zhang, F., 2020). Many Chinese hold that the United States is the ‘ringleader’ who caused such unfairness and that existing international economic institutions and rules are, to a large extent, the manifestation of the strength of the United States and serve mainly US interests. In June–​July 2015 China’s stock market (A share) fell sharply. Quite a few Chinese officials, business people and analysts were convinced that the market turmoil was the result of US behind-​the-​ scenes manipulations and short selling. This highlights the deep distrust of some Chinese elites as regards the role of the United States (Lieberthal and Wang, 2012). To what extent the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which China has been developing since 2013, will be different from the standards and rules in investment and trade followed by the industrialized countries remains to be seen. In the security arena, China holds differentiated attitudes. It joins other major powers in the commitment of preventing the proliferation of WMDs (Johnston, 2008), and thus has cooperated with others on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Iranian nuclear issue. China has also taken an active part in the UN peacekeeping operations (Foot, 2020). It has played by the rules in many of the non-​traditional security and ‘high frontier’ domains, such as climate change, environment protection, global health, outer space security, maritime safety and security, counter-​terrorism and anti-​piracy operations, as well as cracking down on smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. While joining a growing number of international coordination mechanisms in security issues, China also demands revisions of some rules in line with its own interests. China pursues a policy of non-​alignment and expresses dissatisfaction with the US-​led military alliances and related arrangements in Asia, being especially antipathetic to the strengthening of the US–​Japan military alliance. The majority of Chinese security experts point out that the US military presence and the security alliances it leads in the Asia-​Pacific region are mainly targeted at China, and their purpose is to counterbalance China’s ever-​growing defence capabilities (Shi, Y., 2021). US arms sales to Taiwan are viewed as encouraging ‘Taiwan independence’ and part of a 136

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conspiracy to split China. Usually, Chinese commentators do not engage in virtue signalling when it comes to US military activities in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa and Latin America. They would only express the hope that the United States respects the sovereignty of the countries concerned. But for the enduring existence and function of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), China holds a critical position similar to that of Russia. In recent years, China–​US relations have soured over the South China Sea disputes, in which the two governments are applying different rules. To China, the crux of the disputes is its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as it claims that all of the islands, rocks, reefs and shales in the South China Sea, with their adjacent waters, belong to China, and therefore the basic rules there are related to sovereignty. To the United States, it is freedom of navigation in accordance with international law that is at stake. The real problem there between China and the United States is their strategic competition taking the form of what rules should apply. John Ikenberry and many other Western scholars characterize the existing international order as ‘liberal’. In fact, the political dimension of the order, in which Western values and ideas have prevailed, is more strongly resisted by China than other dimensions. China finds itself much more comfortable under the principles of state sovereignty and non-​interference in other countries’ internal affairs, as established in the UN Charter. Since the end of the Cold War, especially since the ‘colour revolutions’, ‘Arab Spring’ and similar political events that took place in Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and some states of the former Soviet Union, China has become increasingly alert to and guarded concerning what it regards as Western schemes to undermine the legitimacy of the CPC and the political order that it maintains in China. Beijing has been tightening controls over the Internet, NGOs and media, including social media, and has launched media campaigns against Western values. Internationally, Beijing calls for the ‘democratisation of international relations’ as it believes that the developing countries greatly outnumber the developed countries and that the former should have a larger say than the latter, which is what the Chinese define as ‘democracy of international relations’ (Shi, B., 2021). In sum, China expects changes in four aspects of the contemporary international order: (1) strengthening the status of China, other BRICS nations, and the developing countries in the international system; (2) enhancing China’s position in international economic affairs; (3) reducing the influence of the US-​led security alliances and military arrangements in the Asia-​Pacific; and (4) resisting the ‘wave of democratisation’ instigated by the Western countries and their intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and championing democracy of international relations. In all four aspects, China has made tangible efforts to promote transformation, as shown in the following examples: China has put forward 137

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and gradually implemented the colossal BRI; championed the establishment of the AIIB and the New Development Bank (NDB); established the Silk Road Fund; promoted cooperation among the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and invited India and Pakistan as new members; promoted economic cooperation of the Great Mekong Subregion (GMS) Cooperation, and hosted the Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Lancang-​ Mekong River Dialogue and Cooperation; played a more positive role in the G20, Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), China-​Africa Cooperation Forum, and other international institutions and mechanisms; proposed a new Asian security concept by hosting the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-​Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and other security forums; and expanded overseas political influence by way of intensifying cultural communication, economic cooperation and foreign aid, and so on. The results of China’s efforts in promoting changes in the international order are substantial. For example, 57 countries, notably the United Kingdom, Germany and many other European countries, together with South Korea, India and Russia, have become founding members of the AIIB despite obstructions from the United States. This was hailed as ‘a major victory’ of China’s diplomacy and is expected to make an impact on the present international financial order. The effect of some other efforts is less perceptible. For instance, Andrew Nathan (2015), a China specialist at Columbia University, notes that ‘China displays no missionary impulse to promote authoritarianism. But this does not mean that its policies are inconsequential for the fate of democracy.’ As Nathan observes, by displaying China’s own experiences of maintaining domestic stability and sustaining economic development, and by giving aid to some ‘authoritarian regimes’, China has helped block the trend of ‘democratisation’ in these countries. It could take many years to find out the results of China’s interests in promoting its ‘community of shared destiny of humankind’ in many parts of the world.

‘Co-​evolution’: responding to disorder by strengthening order In spite of significant upheavals, the contemporary international order appears still to be undergoing a relatively stable historical phase of its evolution. No subversive or revolutionary changes appear likely in the foreseeable future either in the power balance among the major countries or in the legitimacy of the established rules that regulate their international behaviour. Yet it is undeniable that the United States and China, two of the largest and most powerful sovereign countries in the international system, have been engaged in an increasingly intensive strategic competition. As Kissinger (2011: 528) puts it, ‘an aspect of strategic tension in the current world situation resides 138

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in the Chinese fear that America is seeking to contain China –​paralleled by the American concern that China is seeking to expel the United States from Asia’. To me, the focal point of the strategic competition and rivalry between the United States and China is on the relationship between ‘two orders’ –​China’s ‘restrictive’ domestic order maintained by the strong, resolute CPC leadership and the ‘liberal’ international order that the United States is simultaneously advocating and leading (Wang, 2015). Both the United States and China tend to think that their own side is on the defensive while the other side is on the offensive. The Chinese general public believes that the Western world, led by the United States, intends to undermine China’s political stability, economic prosperity and national unity by subverting the leadership of the CPC. What the United States does in other parts of the world is of secondary importance. The American politicians and strategists, in contrast, care less about what China does domestically (perhaps with the exceptions of Hong Kong and Xinjiang), and more about China’s international behaviour, which they see as increasingly assertive in challenging the world order. Underpinning the obvious Sino-​American competition for power is the not yet clearly demarcated contest of values. Such normative competition is manifested in the struggle over the legitimacy of international rules. Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2014), in her review of Kissinger’s World Order, remarks: For an international order to take hold and last, Kissinger argues, it must relate ‘power to legitimacy.’ To that end, Kissinger, the famous realist, sounds surprisingly idealistic. Even when there are tensions between our values and other objectives, America, he reminds us, succeeds by standing up for our values, not shirking them, and leads by engaging peoples and societies, the sources of legitimacy, not governments alone. If our might helps secure the balance of power that underpins the international order, our values and principles help make it acceptable and attractive to others. These remarks demonstrate that American strategists, ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’ alike, tend to agree that the legitimacy of America’s foreign policy goals must be pursued by intervening in the domestic affairs of other countries, not only through interactions with their governmental counterparts, but also with individual citizens. By contrast, the Chinese concept of legitimacy of the international order is centred on sovereign states represented by their governments, which reflects China’s domestic sensitivities and the way China conducts its diplomacy in state-​to-​state relations. Despite their widening differences in defining the legitimacy of international order and their inevitable contest for power, China and the 139

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United States are both beneficiaries, facilitators, builders and contributors of the present order. Their paths of development are not going in squarely opposite directions. They could achieve what Kissinger (2011: 526) calls ‘co-​evolution’, which means that ‘both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict’. Nothing could be more illustrative of President Barack Obama’s expectations of China’s role in the international order than the interview he gave to The Atlantic in April 2015. To the question ‘what country he considers the greatest challenge to America in the coming decades’, he replied that ‘In terms of traditional great-​state relations, I do believe that the relationship between the United States and China is going to be the most critical’ (see Goldberg, 2016). But in this lengthy interview, Obama referred to Syria 57 times, Iran 36 times, and Russia 28 times. In contrast, China was mentioned only 18 times. It is clear that the Obama administration’s foreign policy was heavily burdened with the quagmires in the Middle East, despite its rhetoric about ‘rebalance to Asia’, and America’s domestic priorities were mounting. However, from 2017 to 2020, China–​US ties deteriorated rapidly in almost every dimension, and strategic competition has intensified expanding ‘horizontally’ across every single issue-​area. The two countries are now quickly plunging into a new Cold War. Even in the face of the COVID-​19 pandemic, China and the United States have not joined hands but rather have blamed each other for the spread of the virus. The two countries waged media campaigns, information wars and diplomatic actions against each other, not only fuelling mutual animosity, but also impeding international cooperation in the global health crisis. Both Beijing and Washington see the other side as a ‘political virus’ that damages its legitimacy at home and its reputation abroad. The Trump administration’s policy towards China seemed to be aimed at isolating China in the international community and isolating the CPC from the population at large. China’s reaction was largely a tit-​for-​tat approach. Even as the Joe Biden administration is trying to distance itself from its predecessor, the China–​US strategic rivalry has shown little sign of easing. For the foreseeable future, their rivalry is likely to intensify and go ‘horizontal’ on the global stage. Both Beijing and Washington will try hard to tap their respective international resources to compete with each other. In the eyes of many Chinese, the world is divided between the developing countries, which are rising, and the developed countries, which are declining. In the eyes of many Americans, the contention between the United States and China represents a clearly defined ideological dichotomy –​freedom vs. tyranny or democracy vs. dictatorship. Under these circumstances, the world may not be entirely bifurcated or bipolar as in the old Cold War, but the China–​US competition will provide some new strategic rationale for the 140

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contestation over rules of the game that may be even more fundamental, long term and painstaking. From a broader perspective, international strategists and foreign policy specialists sometimes pay too much attention to the ‘great power rivalry’ or what some call ‘the return of geopolitics’. The greatest threat to the present international order is arguably not strategic competitions among great powers and their different values, but global chaos or disorder. On the one hand, the disruptions caused by the COVID-​19 pandemic, the slow-​down of economic growth, setbacks in globalization, polarization between the rich and the poor, eco-​environmental degradation, and the disturbances in the Middle East make every major country feel the mounting stress caused by nationalism and populism. Various types of religious, sectarian and ethnic conflict have triggered social agitations and political unrest. On the other hand, fanning the flames of nationalism, populism and even xenophobia is becoming a convenient political tool for some interest groups and governments. To a great extent, the so-​called ‘return of geopolitics’ is the diversion or distraction of domestic problems in the countries concerned. The solutions to the global pandemic, financial crises, economic stagnation, civil conflicts, hotspots and potential flashpoints in many parts of the world, including the bloody violence brought about by Daesh (ISIS), all depend on more international coordination and cooperation. From this perspective, peace, stability and prosperity in the world calls for more cooperation among powerful countries, rather than more intensified competition among them to check and balance each other. A powerful China, a powerful Russia, a powerful United States, a powerful EU, a powerful India, a powerful Japan, and a powerful Iran will be more helpful for making contributions to the strengthening of international order than the decline of any single country. A stronger China, therefore, could make it more of a contributor than a challenger to the international order. References Annen, N. (2020) ‘A Strong and United Europe in the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, New Perspectives, 28(3): 265–​9. Beckley, M. (2011/​12) ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure, International Security, 36(3): 41–​78. Clinton, H.R. (2014) ‘Hillary Clinton Reviews Henry Kissinger’s “World Order” ’, Washington Post, [online] 4 September, http://​ www.washingtonpost.com/​opinions/​hillary-​clinton-​reviews-​ henry-​ kissingers-​ world- ​ o rder/ ​ 2 014/ ​ 0 9/ ​ 0 4/ ​ b 280c654-​ 3 1ea-​ 1 1e4-​ 8 f02-​ 03c644b2d7d0_​story.html Da, W. (2021) ‘The Direction of the International Order and China’s Choice’, China International Studies, 201(1): 99–​110.

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Deng, X. (1993) ‘A New International Order Should Be Established with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as Norms’ in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume III). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, p 274. Foot, R. (2020) China, the UN, and Human Protection: Beliefs, Power, Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goldberg, J. (2016) ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic, [online] 15 April, http://​www.theatlantic.com/​magazine/​archive/​2016/​04/​the-​obama-​ doctrine/​471525/​ Guha, R. (2021) ‘The Unmaking of India’, Financial Times, [online] 30 April, https://​www.ft.com/​content/​80c18d5b-​443e-​48e4-​9f28-​3cc491df4260 He, Y. (2020) ‘The Environment for our Country’s Development Is Undergoing Profound and Complex Change’, The People’s Daily, [online] 8 December, http://​theory.people.com.cn/​n1/​2020/​1208/​c40531-​ 31958495.html Ikenberry, G.J. (2011) Liberal Leviathan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jin L. (2015) ‘AIIB Will Not Trigger Trampling Among Financial Institutions’, Sina, [online] 24 March, http://​finance.sina.com.cn/​money/​ bank/​bank_​hydt/​20150324/​070421791508.shtml Johnston, A.I. (2008) Social States: China in International Institutions 1980–​ 2000. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kassam, N. and Lim, D. (2021) ‘Future Shock: How to Prepare for a China-​ led World’, Australian Foreign Affairs, 11: 31–​53. Kissinger, H.A. (2011) On China. New York: Penguin. Kissinger, H.A. (2014) World Order. New York: Penguin. Li, K. (2013) ‘A Handshake Across the Himalayas’, People.com.cn, [online] 20 May, http://p​ olitics.people.com.cn/​n/​2013/​0520/​c1024-​21544676.html Li, K. (2015) ‘Transcript of Premier Li Keqiang’s Interview with Financial Times Editor Lionel Barber’, [online] 16 April, https://w ​ ww.fmprc.gov.cn/​ mfa_​eng/​wjdt_​665385/​zyjh_​665391/​t1260783.shtml Li, K. (2020) ‘Report on the Work of the Government’, China.org.cn, [online] 3 June, http://​www.china.org.cn/​chinese/2​ 020-0​ 6/0​ 3/c​ ontent_​ 76114748.htm Lieberthal, K. and Wang, J. (2012) Addressing US-​China Strategic Distrust (John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series No. 4). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Lin, L. (2010) ‘China’s External Strategy: New Problems, New Tasks, and New Ideas’, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], 11: 23–​4. Mitter, R. (2021) ‘The World China Wants: How Power Will –​and Won’t –​ Reshape Chinese Ambitions’, Foreign Affairs, 100(1): 161–​75. Nathan, A. (2015) ‘China’s Challenge’, Journal of Democracy, 26(1): 156–​70.

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Shi, B. (2021) ‘China’s View of International Order in the New Era: Concepts, Policy Orientation and Practical Approaches’, Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Journal], 2: 20–​33. Shi, Y. (2021) ‘An Observation on the Biden Administration’s Posture towards China, with an Emphasis on Strategy and Military’, Yunmeng xuekan [Journal of Yunmeng], 42(4): 1–​11. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2005) China’s Road of Peaceful Development, [online] 22 December, http://​ www.scio.gov.cn/​zfbps/​ndhf/​2005/​Document/​307900/​307900.htm State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2011) China’s Peaceful Development, [online] 6 September, http://​www.scio.gov.cn/​ zfbps/​ndhf/​2011/​Document/​1000032/​1000032.htm Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council (2000) The One-​China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, [online] 21 February, http://​ en.people.cn/​features/​taiwanpaper/​taiwan.html Teo, V. (2019) Japan’s Arduous Rejuvenation as a Global Power Democratic Resilience and the US-​China Challenge. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Wang, J. (ed) (2015) Great Power Relations. Beijing: CITIC Press Group. Wang, J. (2015) ‘The “Two Orders” and the Future of China-​US Relations’, China File, [online] 9 July, https://w ​ ww.chinafile.com/r​ eporting-o ​ pinion/​ two-​way-​street/​two-​orders-​and-​future-​china-​us-​relations Wang, Y. (2020) ‘Study and Implement Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, [online] 20 July, https://​www.fmprc.gov.cn/​mfa_​eng/​wjb_​663304/​wjbz_​663308/​2461_​ 663310/​t1799305.shtml Xi, J. (2015) ‘Full text of Xi Jinping’s speech on China-​US relations in Seattle’, China.org.cn, [online] 22 September, http://​www.china.org.cn/​ xivisitus2015/​2015-​09/​24/​content_​36666620.htm Xi, J. (2019) ‘Full text: Chinese President’s remarks at BRICS Brasilia Summit’, China.org.cn, [online] 5 December, http://​www.china.org.cn/​ chinese/​2019-​12/​05/​content_​75476047.htm Xi, J. (2021) ‘Seize the New Development Stage, Implement the New Development Philosophy, and Establish the New Development Landscape’, Qiushi Theory, [online] 30 April, http://​www.qstheory.cn/​dukan/​qs/​2021-​ 04/​30/​c_​1127390013.htm Zhang, F. (2020) ‘Agenda-​setting in Global Financial Governance and China’s International Discursive Power’, Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], 6: 106–​31. Zhang, J. (2020) ‘The Transformation of International Order Amid the COVID-​19 Pandemic and Profound Changes Unseen in a Century’, Journal of the Central Institute of Socialism, 225(3): 73–​7.

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China’s Rise in English School Perspective Barry Buzan

Introduction The idea behind this chapter is that the English School (ES) provides a distinctive perspective on China’s rise, and offers particular insights into the question of whether and how China is a status quo or revisionist power. The ES’s main concern is to differentiate international society (a social structure) from international system (a material structure), and to focus on the former. Its principal analytical tool is the concept of primary institutions, understood as deep, evolved practices shared among states (and other political actors) and defining the criteria for both membership of, and legitimate behaviour within, the society of states (Buzan, 2018; forthcoming). Primary institutions include sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, territoriality, nationalism and several more, and are contrasted with the secondary institutions (instrumental, designed regimes and intergovernmental organizations) studied by liberal institutionalists. Primary institutions constitute the normative framing of international society and can be studied either normatively or structurally or both. States are thus embedded in an international society of their own making, and the degree of order within that society can vary across a spectrum from a thin pluralist logic of coexistence (for ­example 18th-​ century Europe) to a thick solidarist logic based on shared values and institutionalized cooperation (for example the European Union). Unlike secondary institutions, which only appeared in the late 19th century, primary ones date back to the beginnings of civilization. In this chapter I will use primary institutions as the principal lens through which to examine the rise of China (Bull, 1977; Buzan, 2004: 161–​204; 2014a; Holsti, 2004; Hurrell, 2007; Schouenborg, 2011).

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The ES is thus in one sense a historical approach, interested in comparative and evolutionary international society. But given its unique set of concepts, it is also a theoretical approach (Navari, 2009). The main claim of the ES to theoretical status is that it sets out a distinctive picture of what the international system/​society looks like, and a novel taxonomy of what it is that international relations (IR) should be taking as its principal objects of study. Because taxonomy identifies what it is that is to be theorized about, it is absolutely foundational to any theoretical enterprise. The ES offers concepts (international society, primary institutions) and debates (pluralism/​solidarism) that are not available through materialist, system-​based approaches to IR. The ES does not, for the most part, offer a hypothesis testing approach. Its method is to apply its distinctive taxonomy to a mainly historical analysis. Within the ES perspective, China can be addressed both in static terms (locating China within the normative structure of international society at any given time) and dynamic ones (interactions between China and international society and how they shape each other over time). Within that, it is also about locating China not only within global international society (GIS, when that exists) but also international society at the regional level (when that exists). In what follows, I use these approaches to follow two lines of questioning: first, where does the ES fit well enough with China to provide an interesting perspective on its rise; and second, where do ‘Chinese characteristics’ put China outside the standard ES framing and so raise theoretical challenges to it? The first section briefly reviews the ES literature on China over the main periods of Chinese history. The second section places China within the normative structure of contemporary GIS by looking at how China relates to the primary institutions that define that society and what this tells us about the debate over whether or not China is a status quo or a revisionist power. The third section explores two challenges that ‘Chinese characteristics’ pose both for policy makers and for how the ES thinks about international society: hierarchy and ‘face’. The Conclusions assess the strengths and weaknesses of ES theory in relation to understanding the rise of China. The chapter necessarily covers a lot of ground. It aims to set out an overview of what China looks like in ES perspective, and what challenges China poses for ES taxonomies.

China in English School perspective The ES literature on China focuses on four different periods: the ‘Spring and Autumn and Warring States’ (770–​221 BCE); the classical ‘tribute system’ (221 BCE–​1895); the ‘encounter’ with expanding Western GIS (1840–​ 1945), which overlapped with the final decades of the tribute system; and Communist China’s evolving relationship with GIS (1949–​present) (Buzan, 146

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2010: 8–​16). The Communist period divides into two distinct parts: the Maoist, revolutionary one, when China was largely alienated from, and oppositional to, the US-​dominated GIS; and the one since the late 1970s, when China re-​joined what was a more globalized, but still US-​led, GIS. Since 2015, a third phase seems to be unfolding in which China has become more confrontational towards the West and some of its neighbours. These different historical timings generate different points of interest for the ES. In the first period, China appears as a distinctive form of international society in itself. In the second, it was the core of a distinctive regional international society. In the third, it appears as an object in the encounter with Western-​ colonial international society when China was struggling, and mainly failing, to adapt to, and gain status within, a Western-​defined modern ‘standard of civilisation’ (Buzan and Lawson, 2020). In the last period, China appears as an increasingly powerful ‘outlier’ in Western GIS, albeit one that has moved from participating first as a revolutionary challenger; then being a conservative status quo power, supportive of pluralist institutions but resistant to solidarist ones; and now seeming to be moving towards a more assertive form of reformist revisionism. Since 1840 China has been consistent in wanting to increase its status within GIS, but has been quite changeable about whether it supported or opposed the institutions of that society, whether individually or the whole set. During the 19th century China was quickly and harshly pushed from being an empire to being a state, and from constituting the core of an East Asian regional international society to being part of the periphery of a Western global one (Gong, 1984; Suzuki, 2009a). With its forced induction into the Western states-​system, China ceased to be a provider of non-​Western models of international society and became mainly an object in the encounter with Western-​colonial international society. During the Maoist period, China was largely alienated from international society, partly by its own revolutionary ideology, and partly by being denied a seat in the UN, and having restricted diplomatic recognition. This began to change with the rapprochement with the United States in the 1970s, and a more pragmatic leadership in China after the death of Mao. Zhang sees China from the late 1970s as steadily integrating with GIS, playing the diplomatic apprentice rather than the revolutionary, and mainly engaging economically (Zhang, 1998: 73–​91). But China was chasing a moving target and in danger of becoming alienated again as liberal agendas in the West, such as human rights and ‘good governance’ created a new ‘standard of civilisation’, putting pressure on its quite successful adoption of Westphalian standards and institutions (Foot, 2006; Zhang and Buzan, 2020). Just as in the first round of China’s encounter with Western international society, China did not accept the need to Westernize itself completely, but sought to find a stable and workable blend of modernizing reforms and ‘Chinese characteristics’. 147

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China has made major strides in pursuit of economic integration into the Western-​led world economy, most notably its membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It has made some contributions to peacekeeping (Suzuki, 2009b) and non-​proliferation, but politically its position has until recently been relatively marginal. Although accorded great power status, as the only ideologically committed non-​democracy among the leading states it is uncomfortable with many aspects of the US-​dominated political order. Until recently, it has tended to be fairly passive in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and concerned mainly to protect its domestic interests. It is defensive about human rights and democracy, and until recently, also about environmental issues. Along with many other East Asian countries, it has strong and frequently repeated views about sovereignty and the right of non-​intervention, though there are some signs, including its participation in peacekeeping operations (PKOs), that its hard view is softening as its global position becomes deeper, more complex and more nuanced (Huang and Shih, 2014). It has experienced some political and diplomatic setbacks, most obviously in the reactions to the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, to the questions of Tibet and Xinjiang, and in the July 2016 decision on the South China Sea case by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. China’s alleged overthrow of the ‘two-​systems’ arrangement in Hong Kong in 2020 triggered talk of a new cold war between the West and China. There are also some specific areas of international cooperation, such as space science, from which China has been largely excluded. Zhang, X. (2011) argues that China has benefited from the existing GIS despite being out of tune with the emergent liberal solidarist turn towards human rights and democracy. Zhang, Y. (2015) argues that the key question now is how China and the United States renegotiate what constitutes legitimacy for the great power club. As I will show in the next section, in many ways China accepts the existing norms and rules of GIS, but in relation to Western standards of human rights and democracy it is an outlier.

China in the normative structure of a deep pluralist GIS China’s relationship with contemporary international society can be quite substantially captured by looking at how it relates to the structure of primary institutions where there is a clear pattern of which such institutions China accepts and which it does not (Holsti, 2004; Buzan, 2014a: 134–​63; forthcoming). When China was an object in the encounter with Western-​ colonial international society, its views on primary institutions did not matter much to others. More attention was paid to China’s views during its revolutionist, Maoist, phase, but not that much more, because China was both politically extreme and relatively weak. Since the 1990s, however, 148

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China’s views about the normative structure of GIS have become increasingly important. China has become partly integrated with GIS, and as its material power has pushed it into the top ranks, so the power of the United States has gone into relative (but not absolute) decline. The assumption behind the argument in this section is that we are heading into a post-​Western world of deep pluralism (Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018; Acharya and Buzan, 2019; Buzan, forthcoming). This will not be a world of bipolar superpower competition between China and the United States, but one of several great and many regional powers, but no superpowers. India is also becoming a great power, and many countries, including Mexico, South Korea, Turkey and Vietnam, are becoming regional powers. Because many are rising –​what Zakaria (2009) calls ‘the rise of the rest’ –​deep pluralism will be defined not only by the diffusion of wealth, power, and political authority, but also by a decline in the liberal ‘standard of civilisation’ and the diffusion of cultural authority and legitimacy to more civilizations: Hindutva, Islamic values, ‘Chinese characteristics’ and so forth. While the West (and Japan) will remain strong, it will no longer be dominant in either material or ideational terms. China is, and will remain, in the top ranks of powers, but it will not become a superpower for two reasons: first, because the conditions of deep pluralism will not allow any state to achieve (or in the case of the United States maintain) the relative material power necessary to be a superpower; and second, because the ideational primacy enjoyed by the West for two centuries is eroding, and there is no sign of any other universal ideology that might replace it and provide legitimacy for a superpower role. In what follows I will present necessarily brief assessments of China’s perspective on four groups of primary institutions: those that have become obsolete during the last two centuries; the classical, mainly pluralist, ‘Westphalian’ institutions; new institutions that have come into play during the 19th and 20th centuries; and institutions that are, depending on one’s point of view, either emerging or contested. By ‘China’s perspective’, I mean mainly the official view of the party/​state. It is certainly true that within China there is a wide spectrum of views, and many internal debates, on how the country should assess the international system/​society, what position it should take within it, and what its foreign policy should be (for example Shambaugh, 2013: 13–​44). Many think that the centre of gravity of China’s debates lies towards the nativist/​realist end of the spectrum, but policy can change if one school or another happens to catch the leadership’s ear. Although Chinese politics are famously opaque, the current policy in Beijing of clamping down on critical voices, both on the mainland and in Hong Kong, suggests that there is now less room for this kind of influence than in the past. Over the nearly seven decades since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power, the details of China’s foreign policy have been consistently 149

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inconsistent, blowing hot and cold not only on relations with the United States, Russia, Japan, India and most of China’s smaller neighbours, but also on issues ranging from the global market economy, through nuclear proliferation, to environmental stewardship (see Garver, 2016). China’s foreign policy, like that of most states, has been mainly self-​interested, but since China has changed so much internally over the past seven decades, what those interests are has also changed. Whether this zig-​zag habit also applies to China and the deeper level of the primary institutions of international society is one of the questions I hope to answer.

Obsolete institutions China is strongly supportive of the delegitimation and obsolescence of three institutions that played a strong role in international society before 1945: dynasticism, imperialism/​colonialism, and human inequality. The party/​state, and much of the Chinese population, have nothing but contempt for the weak and decadent Qing dynasty, which failed both to modernize China and defend it against foreign powers. The CCP is therefore happy with the way in which nationalism largely displaced dynasticism as the main source of political legitimacy during the 19th century (Mayall, 1990; Hughes, 2006). The CCP makes great play of the ‘century of humiliation’ inflicted on China by imperialist powers and likes to exaggerate its own role in the struggle of the Chinese people against foreign aggressors. Its rhetoric has been strong on anti-​imperialism. It also cultivates memory of the racist attitudes of the West and the Japanese towards China, and the physical suffering and debasement of the Chinese people resulting from being treated as unequal by foreign powers. Until recently, it has been happy with the collapse of these three institutions after 1945, and is likely to remain so on human inequality. China’s recent assertions of its claims in the East and South China Seas, and against India, suggest that its anti-​imperialism is coming into question in practice, if not so much in rhetoric. There are no signs that the CCP will follow North Korea down the path of dynastic communism.

Classical ‘Westphalian’ institutions China has also been broadly happy with the classical, pluralist, ‘Westphalian’ set of institutions that came out of early-​modern European international society: sovereignty and non-​intervention, territoriality, balance of power, great power management, war, international law, and diplomacy. This set derives from Bull’s (1977: 53–​71) conception of society, coming out of a kind of sociological functionalism in which all human societies must be founded on rules of coexistence about security against violence, observance of agreements, and property rights. 150

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China takes a famously strong view on the rights of sovereignty and non-​ intervention, claiming not only a robust form of both for itself, but also that it observes the same principles in its relations with others. The CCP uses these institutions generally to defend Chinese cultural distinctiveness, and specifically to defend its own claim to eternal and exclusive rule against any external pressures for democratization and human rights. China takes a highly conservative, pluralist view of sovereignty and non-​intervention: that these principles are designed to enable nations to protect themselves and cultivate their cultural and political distinctiveness within the boundaries of the state. In line with that, and despite having earlier settled some of its border disputes with fraternal neighbours, China now also takes a strong view on territoriality. Part of the CCP’s self-​defined remit is to reunite the country, and this is interpreted not only as being about Taiwan, but also about a host of contested islands, rocks and reefs in the East and South China Seas (Hayton, 2014), and about some contested land borders, most notably with India (Garver, 2016: 146–​62, 435–​44, 734–​57). China’s behaviour in this regard conforms with Mayall’s (1990: 57–​63; 2000: 84; see also Chen, 2015) observation that nationalism causes states to sacralize territory, and make even small and materially inconsequential territorial disputes into core issues of national pride and security. China seems also to be a firm supporter of the balance of power. Its long-​standing rhetoric about anti-​hegemonism, and for a more multipolar world, are not just anti-​American, but leave balance of power as its default position. Its more recent call for a ‘new form of great power relations’ also suggests balance of power, though pointing as well to the closely related institution of great power management (GPM). On GPM, however, China’s position is more ambiguous. It certainly does not want hegemonic GPM by a US unipole, but whether it wants a collective form of GPM, or just the right of a great power to take primacy in its own region, is less clear. Like India, China accompanies its claim to great power status with a demand that it also retain its status as a developing country. This combination is then used to argue that it should not be burdened by certain GPM responsibilities because its own development, incorporating a significant percentage of humankind, is as much of a contribution as it can manage. Despite its substantial contributions to PKOs, China’s behaviour as a great power is mainly self-​interested, and not much committed to (especially liberal) international norms (Kissinger 2011; Shambaugh, 2013: 7, 152–​5). Its commitment to non-​intervention is a useful prop for this hands-​off policy. China seldom makes explicit its desire for regional primacy, but its recent assertive behaviour towards its East Asian neighbours and some of its rhetoric can be interpreted in that way. The notorious remark by its foreign minister Yang Jiechi at an ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) meeting in 2010 that ‘China is a big country and other countries 151

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are small countries, and that’s just a fact’ seemed to let the mask slip (Scobell and Harold, 2013: 121). Unlike during the Mao period, China has broadly adhered to the practices and conventions of both diplomacy and international law. Like many other states it supports the principle of international law, while often disputing particular content and interpretations of it. Its sovereigntist and anti-​colonial rhetoric also likes to point out that China and many other non-​Western peoples had no voice in the making of much international law. Yet China’s stark rejection in 2016 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration judgment against it regarding its expansive claims to almost the whole of the South China Sea, and its subsequent aggressive actions there, displayed an alarming level of contempt for international law. Post-​Mao China has become comfortable with not only bilateral, but also multilateral diplomacy. It also seems happy with the idea of multilateral institutions, though like others it is unhappy with its status and influence in those set up by the Western powers. Regarding war, China robustly supports its right to self-​defence and broadly goes along with the United States’ post-​2001 extension of the right to war in relation to dealing with terrorism. However, its explicit claim to the right to war to prevent the secession of Taiwan, and its more implicit, but similar claim towards its other territorial disputes related to ‘reunification’, push the limits of ‘self-​defence’.

Newer institutions China is also broadly comfortable with the four new primary institutions that have emerged and consolidated during the 19th and 20th centuries: nationalism, development, the market, and human equality. Since the ideological turnaround in the late 1970s, the CCP has cultivated nationalism as a replacement for the class-​struggle line of Mao’s era. The Party has recast itself as the defender of the nation and carefully cultivated ‘patriotic education’ to bolster its legitimacy (Gries, 2004; Hughes, 2006; Wang, 2008; 2012: 95–​ 118; Schell and Delury, 2013: 307). It has some internal tension between a narrow, ethnic ‘Han’ interpretation of nationalism and a more inclusive, civic, ‘Chinese’ one that incorporates Tibetans, Uighurs, Mongolians, Manchus and other non-​Han minorities (Duara, 1995), but is firmly committed to the institution in general. It is also firmly wedded to the principle of human equality (anti-​racism) as the converse of its strong rejection of racism and human inequality discussed earlier. The CCP is a strong proponent of development and modernization. This was true even in the Maoist period, when the Party warred against tradition and tried to leapfrog the country into modernity, though in that phase its policies for doing so were often counterproductive (Gray, 2002; Dikötter, 2011). It also represents continuity with the Kuomingtang 152

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(KMT) government from the 1920s to the 1940s, which was also strongly committed to development, though unable to accomplish much because of both civil war and Japanese invasion. Since Deng’s ‘reform and opening up’, development has occupied a central place in the Party’s platform. A more market-​oriented economics replaced the rigid Marxist economic model, and delivering prosperity to the people became, along with nationalism, the main prop for the CCP’s legitimacy. This combination has proved to be a successful formula, captured in the slogan: ‘No CCP, no new China’. As noted earlier, China still claims to be a developing country and takes the goals of development very seriously. The CCP’s attitude towards the market is somewhat more opaque. Given that it still thinks of itself as communist, it seems implausible that many, if any, of the CCP’s leaders actually believe in the market as a preferred way of organizing the economy. Since Deng, the dominant factions within the CCP have certainly made an instrumental calculation that the market is the best way for China (and themselves) to pursue wealth and power. But this calculated approach does not make them converts to liberal economic ideology in the way one would find in Britain and the United States, and is therefore perhaps best seen as conditional. Even a calculated acceptance of the market has, however, required China to entangle itself in the web of intergovernmental organizations that are intrinsic to the operation of a global market economy. The commitment to the market has drawn China into the more solidarist aspects of contemporary GIS, and this creates tensions with its strong views on sovereignty, non-​intervention and territoriality discussed earlier. China’s hesitation over allowing its currency to float is but one example of these tensions. Despite the pressures of the global economic crisis from 2008, China has remained committed to developing its own version of authoritarian capitalism (McNally, 2012; Buzan and Lawson, 2014). Under Xi Jinping, China has shifted more towards economic nationalism and state capitalism, reducing the market to little more than the maintenance of strong competition within its economy (Kroeber, 2016: 101–​7; Lee, 2018: 22–​5). Despite that uncertainty, China’s commitment to all four of these newer institutions looks firm. The commitment to nationalism, human equality and development is deeply embedded in both the party and the country. The commitment to the market may be more superficial and contested, but will probably be durable because the Party’s legitimacy rests on its ability to generate wealth and power, and there is as yet no plausible alternative to capitalism for doing this.

Emerging/​contested institutions It is mainly in the area of emerging or contested primary institutions –​ democracy, human rights, and environmental stewardship –​that the CCP 153

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is in basic opposition, if not to the principles themselves, then certainly to the dominant Western interpretations of them. But because these institutions are not consensual across GIS, China is not alone in its opposition to them. The clearest way to see this is that these three institutions are being promoted mainly from the liberal West. They are promoted as universal values, and many of their supporters believe them to be emerging institutions of GIS. But their opponents reject this view, seeing them as unwanted projections of Western values and therefore not as ‘emergent’, but as contested, finding support in some sections of GIS but not in others. This framing is most clearly applicable to democracy and human rights. While the CCP accepts economic liberalism as necessary to its survival, it cannot do the same with the political and social elements of liberalism: the former threatens its monopoly on political power, the latter threatens China’s traditional cultural preference for the collective over the individual. Western conceptions of democracy and human rights are an existential issue for the CCP (and also for other authoritarian governments), and China’s strong line on sovereignty, non-​intervention and territoriality is precisely designed as a defence against them. If there is one thing that can be said with certainty about the CCP, it is that its first priority is the preservation of its own power. Environmental stewardship is somewhat different. Although it may initially have been promoted from the West as a universal value, it is not part of liberal ideology and is increasingly being seen as a shared-​ fate problem facing all of humankind. It is a relatively new idea, yet has already become an institution of GIS rather than a value held by one ideological camp, and seems to be holding firm despite the defection of the Trump administration (Falkner and Buzan, 2019). China was initially opposed to international measures to address climate change, taking the view common among developing countries that it was the Western countries that had created this problem, and so it was their responsibility to pay for cleaning it up. But as environmental issues, particularly air and water pollution, and water shortages, have risen up the agenda of China’s domestic politics, and China has become the biggest carbon emitter, the CCP seems to be moving towards a more accepting attitude to environmental stewardship. Although it still applies the principles of strong sovereignty, non-​intervention and territoriality to environmental issues, its performance at the Paris climate change conference in 2015 (and indeed its recent pledge to achieve carbon neutral by 2060) was altogether more constructive than at an earlier conference in Copenhagen in 2009 (Falkner, 2016). This survey of how China relates to the primary institutions of contemporary GIS throws interesting light on the argument about whether it is a status quo or a revisionist power. In ES perspective, two different 154

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factors are in play in this distinction: first, whether a country is happy with its status or rank in international society; and second, whether it accepts or contests the institutions that compose international society. Status quo powers are generally happy with both the rules and the status distribution of the prevailing international society. Revisionist powers come in three gradients. They can be revolutionary revisionist, wanting to change both the rules and the status hierarchy, and prepared to resort to fair means or foul. Or they can be reformist revisionist, pursuing changes in the rules, but doing so mainly within the existing diplomatic framework of international society. Or they can be orthodox revisionist, generally happy with the rules, but wanting changes in the distribution of status (Buzan, 2007 [1991]: 237–​46). China under Mao was a revolutionary revisionist power but since Deng has adopted a much more moderate line. At the global level, some observers, both Chinese and American, have claimed that China is a status quo power (Johnston, 2003; Qin, 2003; Pan, 2008; Feng, 2009). The case for this, as is evident from the earlier survey, is that China actually does support nearly all of the accepted institutions of GIS, and does so in a conservative way. Its main resistance is to discourses of human rights and democracy, which it sees as being mainly Western values. China is uncomfortable with the predominantly Western world society/​ global civil society, with which it does not deal well, and which, as Clark (2007) argues, is a key driver of the normative deepening of international society: democracy, human rights, environment (see also Buzan, 2018). From the CCP’s perspective, it is the liberal West that is aggressively revisionist, seeking to impose its liberal values on the rest of the world. The flaw in the status quo designation is that while China broadly accepts the institutional structure of GIS, it certainly wants to increase its status, which makes post-​Deng China at least orthodox revisionist. Under Xi Jinping, China is moving towards reformist revisionism, wanting not just more status, but also changes to practices within great power management and the market (Yan, 2014), and starting to push the boundaries on war, anti-​imperialism and international law (see also Chapter 6). This analysis might seem to be forcing China into a Western-​defined set of categories, and up to a point that is true. But I do not think that even from a Chinese perspective there would be much ground for challenging the assessment that under the KMT China was broadly orthodox revisionist, under Mao firmly revolutionary revisionist, under Deng somewhere between status quo and orthodox revisionist, and under Xi moving towards reformist revisionist. Until China provides its own vision of GIS, which it has so far conspicuously failed to do (Kerr, 2015), there is no other standard by which to assess it. One can, however, identify some ‘Chinese characteristics’ that might play both into defining such a vision and shaping the nature of China’s revisionism within GIS. 155

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‘Chinese characteristics’ as challenges for English School theory This section explores two challenges that ‘Chinese characteristics’ pose for how the ES thinks about international society: hierarchy and ‘face’. As Tudor (2012: 42–​52) notes, all of the societies in Northeast Asia have broadly Confucian roots that still play strongly in their contemporary values and behaviours, not least in their disposition towards hierarchical social relations and their concerns about ‘face’. As with Kavalski’s discussion of guanxi in Chapter 3, neither hierarchy nor ‘face’ has been taken into account in ES theories. There is some allowance for hierarchy in ES theory, but none for ‘face’. Deep ‘Chinese characteristics’ are re-​emerging in China’s behaviour as it reconnects its past and present (Buzan and Lawson, 2020). As China grows stronger, these will matter more and more to its foreign policy, especially in the region, if China seeks primacy there, but also globally, because China cannot de-​link Asia from the concerns of other great powers (Buzan, 2017).

Hierarchy The classical Chinese order operated within a hierarchical belief system (Tianxia) which extended Confucian relational logic to ‘all under heaven’. As Chen (2015) notes, sovereignty was forced on China under highly adverse circumstances during the 19th century, displacing its traditional Tianxia way of thinking. The hypocrisy of this has not been forgotten, and Tianxia thinking has remained alive in the background. Under Tianxia, some state (generally China, though others such as Vietnam and Japan also made bids) was the suzerain and the core of high civilization. Power considerations were of course relevant to establishing and maintaining hierarchical relations, but they were not its main foundation (Zhang, Y., 2001; Suzuki, 2009a: 34–​55; Zhang, F., 2009; 2014; Zhang and Buzan, 2012). An example of this is Korea looking down on the Qing as barbarians, and preferring to hold to Ming practices as culturally superior, even while having to deal with Qing power (Swope, 2009: 41–​2). After 1911, the Chinese imperial system was abandoned. Under US primacy after 1945, neither China nor Japan has possessed either the cultural basis or the relative power to reassert ‘Middle Kingdom’ status claims. By contrast, the European system was more based on the principle of sovereign equality (anarchy) even though there was continuous contestation for hegemony within Europe. Within China an effort is emerging to promote some of the principles from this Confucian order as a more collectivist, harmonious alternative to the conflictual individualism of most Western IR thinking (Song, 2001: 70; Yan, 2001: 37–​ 8; Zhao, 2006; Li, 2008; Yan, 2008). Harris (2014: 23) puts a lot of emphasis on the importance of hierarchy in China’s worldview: ‘China sees the world 156

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in a different way than countries in the West, for various reasons, but mostly because of the Confucian belief in hierarchy.’ The basic Confucian model is rooted in a hierarchical family structure similar to that in many traditional agrarian civilizations in which fathers, brothers, sons, wives and so forth stand in status relations of dominance/​ inferiority to each other, and these relationships are mediated by the degree of intimacy/​distance (Hwang, 2011: 109–​10, 199). As Fei (1992) notes, ‘the distinction between the senior and the junior is the most fundamental principle in the Chinese kinship system’. Traditional Chinese ‘foreign policy’ (not a wholly appropriate term for the tribute system) during the Ming dynasty was about a benevolent and morally superior emperor expecting loyal subordination from others, and reserving the right to punish them if they disturbed China’s peace or good order (Zhang, F., 2015: 202–​5). There is support in the literature for the view that this still applies in modern foreign policy terms, with Confucian cultures being more inclined to hierarchy and bandwagoning than to sovereign equality and balance of power (Fairbank, 1968; Huntington, 1996; Kang, 2003; 2003–​4; 2005; Kissinger, 2011: 1–​3; Harris, 2014. For a critique, see Acharya, 2003–​4). China’s rise now puts the question of hierarchy back onto the agenda of international society, especially for Northeast Asia, where China is contesting US hegemony. The question is what sort of order China wants in its home region if it is successful in pushing the United States back. In turn, this raises larger questions for GIS about how to handle a possible return of great power spheres of influence, and how to make such behaviour fit with the institution of sovereign equality. Since 1978 and Deng’s reforms, China has had no strong claim to either political or cultural centrality or superiority, so any claim for hierarchy or regional primacy will be based mainly on its relative power and wealth. Although China might aspire to be a model of authoritarian developmental capitalism, it still has a long way to go in establishing a secure and stable form of political economy (Pieke, 2016). The evidence suggesting that a version of traditional Chinese/​Confucian hierarchy is operating in Chinese foreign policy thinking ranges from the current neo-​Confucian talk from the Chinese party/​state about harmonious society, both domestically and internationally, to the use of Tianxia as a structuring concept for international relations. Such thinking certainly fits both with China’s keenness to deny equal status to Japan, its undiplomatic assertions in Southeast Asia about big versus small countries, noted earlier, and its hegemonic behaviour towards Southeast Asia (the 9-​dash line). In Confucian thinking, social harmony necessarily rests on the precondition of stable hierarchy (Pan, 2011). But almost nothing is said about the hierarchy side of this equation in China’s contemporary foreign policy rhetoric. As Callahan (2009) notes, this linkage gives a worryingly imperial/​hierarchical 157

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implication to China’s discourse about harmony and seems to put it in the same camp as Russia: great powers that still seem to be thinking like empires. The return of Confucian thinking alongside China’s rising power raises a lot of interesting questions not only about China, but about the whole East Asian region. Paradoxically, China is at the same time, as noted earlier, a leading defender of a traditionally Westphalian view of strong sovereign equality and non-​intervention. This view is shared equally strongly by most of its neighbours and for the same reason: a deep postcolonial reaction against the impositions and indignities of Western imperialism, and a consequent commitment to sovereign equality and non-​intervention as the keys to defending their newly won independence. How these seemingly contradictory positions fit together has not been much discussed, and needs to be addressed not just by academics as a key legacy of China’s history, but also by the politicians who promote such contradictory views without understanding the tension and mistrust that creates. Waltz (1979) was not wrong in his argument that hierarchy is a fundamentally different principle of social order from anarchy/​sovereign equality. From the ES, Watson’s (1992) spectrum of international political orders running from anarchy at one end, through hegemony, suzerainty and dominion, to empire at the other end also offers useful structural insights. Among other things, hierarchical structures, with their focus on relative status, generate quite different logics of securitization from anarchical ones, with their focus on the absolute status of sovereign equality. In principle, a disposition towards hierarchy is fundamentally antagonistic to a regime of sovereign equality, and even to a regime that allows some ‘legalised hegemony’ for great powers within an overall structure of sovereign equality (Simpson, 2004). It seems probable that, if it exists, a Chinese disposition towards hierarchy would be differentiated, operating more strongly in the Confucian sphere within East Asia, where a phrase like ‘return to normality’ would mean some form of suzerainty with China at the centre; and less strongly between China and the West, where expectations of cultural reciprocity would not be in play. This kind of suzerain/​hierarchical mindset is fundamentally at odds with the basic construction of GIS. It is small wonder then, that with these contradictory principles in play, China’s foreign policy looks confusing –​ and often threatening –​to outsiders. This cultural analysis suggests that any likely form of government in China would think in the same hierarchical way about ‘the return to normality’. The interplay of these two logics raises various possibilities in reaction to rising Chinese power and attempts to assert regional primacy. If Confucian logic dominates in East Asia, then a rising and hierarchical China might expect Japan and Southeast Asia to submit to its primacy. But if Westphalian logic dominates, then Chinese assertions of primacy will be taken as illegitimate, and responded to in anti-​imperialist mode with fierce resistance and 158

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balancing. Those logics will of course be mediated by the power structure, so that even Westphalian logic might be overridden if China’s relative power became so overwhelming that bandwagoning remained the only sensible option. Judging by the reactions to China’s increased assertiveness since 2008, Westphalian logic has taken deep roots in Japan and Southeast Asia. Unlike the United States, China is not surrounded by weak powers. Many of its neighbours are, or could quickly become, militarily formidable. As I have argued elsewhere (Buzan, 2014b) China will disadvantage itself, and help the United States quite considerably, if it tries to achieve regional primacy by intimidating its neighbours.

‘Face’ ‘Face’ is a cultural feature common to Confucian societies and shapes social interactions in ways quite different from those within Western culture (Moore, 2014). ‘Face’ is a complex concept, relating partly to material accomplishments and positional status, and partly to one’s moral standing in one’s community (Hu, 1944; Hwang, 2011: 266–​81). Ho (1976: 883) defines ‘face’ as the respectability and/​or deference which a person can claim for himself [sic] from others, by virtue of the relative position he occupies in his social network and the degree to which he is judged to have functioned adequately in that position as well as acceptably in his general conduct; the face extended to a person by others is a function of the degree of congruence between judgments of his total condition in life, including his actions as well as those of people closely associated with him, and the social expectations that others have placed upon him. In terms of two interacting parties, face is the reciprocated compliance, respect and/​or deference that each party expects from, and extends to, the other party. It is probably a universal cultural phenomenon, but plays differently in different societies. In the contemporary West it is mainly about material accomplishments and positional status. But before modernity it was more about moral standing, closely related to honour. As Ho (1976: 877) points out, honour was a type of ‘face’, and a standard of behaviour, largely confined to elites, while ‘face’ in the Chinese context applies to everyone. In the West, honour has been eroded both by individualism and by the replacement of dynastic forms of society, in which it was a major institution, with modern, contractual ones, which have pushed it to the margins. Individualism can be seen as contradictory to ‘face’ on the grounds that ‘face’ is always given by others and so depends deeply on a relational social context and the 159

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individual’s position in a group. But Ho (1976: 867, 877–​83) argues that this separation is not as extreme as might at first appear, and that ‘face’ is a universal feature of society, even in individualist societies. It is an interesting question whether face is somehow a distinctive Northeast Asian practice, different in content from what happens elsewhere, or is more or less the same practice as elsewhere, but having a much higher prominence and intensity in Northeast Asian societies than those elsewhere. Hu (1944) argues for the much higher importance of moral standing in the community in China. Her analysis puts a great deal of emphasis on the relational linkage between ‘face’ on the one hand, and trust, and the importance of society structured around collectivism and key referent groups (for example family, school, local community). As she notes, ‘Much of the activity of Chinese life is operated on the basis of trust’ (Hu, 1944: 50). Ho (1976: 883, 867, 873) also notes a ‘Chinese orientation, which places the accent on the reciprocity of obligations, dependence and esteem protection’, that ‘losing face is a serious matter which will, in varying degrees, affect one’s ability to function effectively in society’ and that ‘face can be more important than life itself ’. These themes resonate very strongly with Qin’s (2009) analysis, which also emphasizes trust, reciprocity and collectivist, hierarchical societies. ‘Face’ and Asian relationalism seem to be closely linked, either as different ways of talking about the same thing, or with ‘face’ as a particular feature of relationalism in Confucian societies. There are many authors who take ‘face’ very seriously as a core feature of Northeast Asia’s international relations, both historical and contemporary (Paine, 2003: 257, 306, 349–​51; Gries, 2004: 13-​29; Shirk, 2007; Wang, 2012: 7–​9, 163–​202; Shambaugh, 2013: 55–​9; Moore, 2014). If hierarchy and ‘face’ are as deeply embedded in Chinese thinking as this discussion suggests, then as China rises they pose big challenges not just to ES theory, but also to the practices that compose GIS. Both characteristics are very clearly in play in the disputes in the East China Sea, where Japan and China quite literally ‘face off’ against each other (Hagström and Pan, 2020), and in the South China Sea, where China’s ‘face’ and the United States’ ‘credibility’ are engaged in a dangerous dance. The ES has not thought about ‘face’. Yet ‘face’ might count as a primary institution of international society in East Asia. And in a world in which China is one of the most powerful states, ‘face’ will almost certainly be an important aspect of diplomacy more generally. Chinese characteristics and ES concepts thus play into each other in ways that raise interesting and important questions for both Chinese policy and ES scholars. The ES has thought about hierarchy, but only at the margins of its mainly anarchic conception of GIS. In practical terms, how is GIS to respond when one (China) or more (Russia) of the great powers within it are thinking like an empire? Do hierarchical thinking and ‘face’ concerns in China make it much more difficult for the United States to adjust to its 160

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own weakening position, in which it has both less material power and less moral authority? Is GIS less sensitive to ‘face’ issues than it needs to be? Can China resist both the general temptation of hubris as its power rises, and its own specific cultural one of reverting to a hierarchical ‘Middle Kingdom’ view of the world with itself at the centre, and concerns about ‘face’ dominating its relationships? If it cannot resist, how should its neighbours and other great powers respond? As China becomes powerful, its cultural characteristics will create pressure on some of the key institutions of GIS. How well China and the rest of GIS understand these pressures, and how well they negotiate them, will have a major impact on world order in the coming decades. This is one compelling reason why China needs to set out a clearer view of what kind of international societies, both regional and global, it wants to promote. Simple opposition to US hegemony will not suffice.

Conclusions The earlier discussion shows that the ES fits well enough with China to provide a distinctive and useful perspective on its rise. Yet it also shows that there are areas where ‘Chinese characteristics’ raise theoretical challenges to the standard ES theoretical framing. The strengths and weaknesses of ES theory in understanding the rise of China can be summarized as follows.

Strengths • The ES’s historical perspective provides insights into the China that is now rising. Not only the philosophy of the pre-​Qin period, and the hierarchy of the tribute system period, but also the alienation and revanchism from the ‘century of humiliation’ play importantly into contemporary Chinese foreign policy thinking and behaviour. • The ES’s analytical tool of primary institutions is useful in three ways: • First, it gives a clear and nuanced empirical insight into the question of whether rising China is a status quo or revisionist power. • Second, it highlights the tensions between China’s hierarchical disposition on the one hand, and its apparent firm commitment to sovereignty, non-​intervention, the balance of power, and great power management, on the other. Among other things, this gives leverage on explaining the apparent contradictions in Chinese foreign policy; and on pointing out the significant differences in securitization logics under sovereignty/​anarchy and hierarchy. • Third, it identifies ‘face’ as an important part of the normative structure of international society within Northeast Asia, and between it and the rest of the world. 161

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• The historical and structural approach of the ES raises questions about the appropriateness of concepts such as suzerainty when applied to the Chinese tribute system, which had a quite different and more cultural foundation than the European models of hierarchy. This could become important in trying to design concepts to capture the nature of the ‘new China’ in contemporary GIS.

Weaknesses • The ES has perhaps overstated the alienation of China from contemporary GIS. This was truer during Mao’s time, but since the late 1970s, China has been not so much an outlier in GIS, as part of a group divided from the West on liberal social and political values. As the influence of the West diminishes, China’s fairly mainstream position within GIS, even on issues such as human rights (Zhang and Buzan, 2020) will become more obvious. • The rising power of China strengthens the case for looking more at hierarchical international societies, both regional and global. The ES has not yet developed its own understanding of hierarchical international societies well enough to be able to deal with a rising great power of a hierarchical disposition. But the ES does have resources to deal with this, which makes this challenge also an opportunity for developing ES theory away from its Westphalian assumptions. The standard ES line is that the concept of international society is only relevant for the anarchic side of the spectrum because hierarchy removes the multi-​actor condition required for a society of states. There is now more questioning of this assumption, and a rising interest in hegemony (Gong, 1984: 7–​21; Clark, 1989; 2011a; 201b; Watson, 1992: 299–​309, 319–​25; 1997; Dunne, 2003; Hurrell, 2007: esp. 13, 35–​6, 63–​5, 71, 111–​14; Goh, 2008). Both Watson’s spectrum and the analysis of classical empires by Buzan and Little (2000: 176–​88) suggest that there is room for international society well up towards the hierarchical end of Watson’s spectrum, in which hegemony itself could be a primary institution (Clark, 2011a). In most classical empires, the component units could have a considerable degree of autonomy, and this made room for diplomacy, war, balance of power and other institutions that are hallmarks of international society. Seen in a dynamic perspective, classical empires often look like centralizing phases of an international society that will at other times take a more decentralized form. • The ES perhaps does not take seriously enough the issue of what holds societies together raised by Wendt (1999). Now that China is the second-​, or by some measures even first-​, biggest economy, whether its commitment to the institution of the market is supported by belief or only by calculation begins to matter a lot to the stability of this institution. 162

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Pan, Z. (2008) ‘China’s Changing Image of and Engagement in World Order’ in S. Guo and J.F. Blanchard (eds), Harmonious World and China’s New Foreign Policy. New York/​Lexington: Rowman & Littlefield, pp 39–​63. Pieke, F.N. (2016) Knowing China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Qin, Y. (2003) ‘Nation Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests’, SIIS Journal, 2, http://​irchina.org/​en/​xueren/​china/​view.asp?id=863 Qin, Y. (2009) ‘Relationality and Processual Construction: Bringing Chinese Ideas into International Relations Theory’, Social Sciences in China, 30(4): 5–​20. Schell, O. and Delury, J. (2013) Wealth and Power. London: Little, Brown. Schouenborg, L. (2011) ‘A New Institutionalism? The English School as International Sociological Theory’, International Relations, 25(1): 26–​44. Scobell, A. and Harold, S.W. (2013) ‘An “Assertive” China? Insights from Interviews’, Asian Security, 9(2): 111–​31. Shambaugh, D. (2013) China Goes Global (Kindle edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shirk, S. (2007) China: Fragile Superpower. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Simpson, G. (2004) Great Powers and Outlaw States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Song, X. (2001) ‘Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics’, Journal of Contemporary China, 10(26): 61–​74. Suzuki, S. (2009a) Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society. London: Routledge. Suzuki, S. (2009b) ‘Chinese Soft Power, Insecurity Studies, Myopia and Fantasy’, Third World Quarterly, 30(4): 779–​93. Swope, K.M. (2009) A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Tudor, D. (2012) Korea: The Impossible Country. Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing. Waltz, K.N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-​Wesley. Wang, Z. (2008) ‘National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory’, International Studies Quarterly, 52(4): 783–​806. Wang, Z. (2012) Never Forget National Humiliation. New York: Columbia University Press. Watson, A. (1992) The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. London: Routledge. Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yan, X. (2001) ‘The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes’, Journal of Contemporary China, 10(26): 33–​39. Yan, X. (2014) ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7(2): 153–​84.

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Zakaria, Fareed (2009) The Post-​American World and the Rise of the Rest. London: Penguin. Zhang, F. (2009) ‘Rethinking the “Tribute System” ’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2(4): 545–​74. Zhang, F. (2014) ‘International Societies in Pre-​modern East Asia’ in B. Buzan and Y. Zhang (eds), Contesting International Society in East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 29–​50. Zhang, F. (2015) ‘Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 8(2): 197–​218. Zhang, X. (2011) ‘China in the Conception of International Society: The English School’s Engagements with China’, Review of International Studies, 37(2): 763–​86. Zhang, Y. (1998) China in International Society since 1949. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Zhang, Y. (2001) ‘System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations’ in M. Cox, T. Dunne and K. Booth (eds), Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 43–​63. Zhang, Y. (2015) ‘China and the Struggle for Legitimacy of a Rising Power’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 8(3): 301–​22. Zhang, Y. and Buzan, B. (2012) ‘The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(1): 3–​36. Zhang, Y. and Buzan, B. (2020) ‘China and the Global Reach of Human Rights’, China Quarterly, 241: 169–​90. Zhao, T. (2006) ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept “All-​Under-​ Heaven” ’, Social Identities, 12(1): 29–​41.

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Deconstructing the Established Westphalian Architecture in Light of China’s Rise Hung-​jen Wang

Introduction The establishment of a Westphalian world order gave rise to universally accepted Western norms for state sovereignty, legal state equality, and non-​ intervention, among other principles. Today, China is both challenging broadly accepted Western norms and capitalizing on certain Westphalian values. According to Chinese representative Yang Jiechi, who participated in high-​level strategic talks with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on 18–​19 March 2021, China’s political discourse emphasizes a defence of the UN Charter’s core principle of respect for the sovereignty of individual countries. During this meeting, Yang presented China as both emphasizing its own characteristics and reminding the United States that it should not use a double standard when applying the UN Charter to international relations and governance. Ever since the onset of the COVID-​19 pandemic, the world has witnessed a return to traditional forms of self-​help sovereignty in cross-​state competition. The pandemic is one of several reasons why cooperation and trust between different types of regimes have sharply declined while fragmentation has increased. In China’s case, the more Beijing wants to defend its autonomy when confronting Western powers in areas such as foreign policy, the more it is being treated by the rest of the world as the main international threat, perhaps even bearing responsibility for the COVID-​19 pandemic itself (Kavalski, 2021). In this chapter I will argue that this view of China is a product of our established way of understanding world affairs according to

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Westphalian state order principles and their epistemology, both built on assumptions regarding self-​help and estrangement among nation states. Some International Relations (IR) scholars have started to describe the political practices of China and other Asian countries as examples of an emerging ‘Eastphalian order’. It has to be acknowledged that this proposition suffers from some geopolitical limitations. For instance, the projected Eastphalian order appears to suggests that China and its neighbouring countries have the potential to form a strong multilateral base for pushing against the constraints of the existing Westphalian order, which might be a contributing factor to destructive competition among Asian countries. In this setting, the idea of an Eastphalian order is increasingly associated with the deepening divisions between the Global North and the Global South (Chowdhury and Jomo, 2020) and/​or competition between authoritarian and democratic regimes (Fukuyama, 2020). Admittedly there is little consensus on the meaning of Eastphalia, especially when China’s defence of Western norms such as national sovereignty projects an image of nationalism or protectionism. So why discuss an ‘Eastphalian order’? One reason is the point Pan and Kavalski make in the Introduction to this volume: emphasizing theory generation rather than theory testing. This does not mean that we need to create something completely new, but there is value in interrogating the entrenched views on the meaning of China and its rise –​in particular, by challenging the perception that such views are self-​evident. For example, I believe that China’s contradictory goals of pursuing and defending ‘national characteristics’ (a form of exceptionalism) while endorsing certain Westphalian values (a form of multilateralism) concurrently represent a rational approach to resisting Western pressure and a relational approach to understanding China’s efforts to both resist and engage with Western powers (Nordin et al, 2019). Note that William Callahan (2010), in his discussion of contradictions in Chinese foreign policy, described China as a ‘pessoptimist nation’ to be understood according to a positive-​negative dynamic. The positive part refers to China’s reiteration of its culture as a reflection of universally desirable values; the negative part re-​emphasizes past acts of national humiliation at the hands of Western imperialists. As such, China’s self-​identity consists of positive and negative parts representing half-​ truths in Chinese foreign policy. Callahan’s pessoptimist assertion explains the obvious Sino-​centric aspect of China’s rise and resistance to Western powers, but not China’s support for the established international system. In an earlier paper (Wang, 2015), I described self-​identity and self-​image concerns associated with China’s rise, with the need for self-​identity pushing China to clarify its self-​description, and with its self-​image driving its efforts to control how it appears to others. In other words, China’s rise entails both expressions of Chinese characteristics and a need for acceptance by others. 169

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Our understanding of the Eastphalia and Westphalia concepts must consider these concerns. While they share similarities in the Anglophone IR literature, writers discussing the Eastphalia idea emphasize a sense of resistance to the established Westphalian system. In order to break the resulting epistemological bifurcation, this chapter will analyse China’s efforts to overcome this dualism when relating to others. The chapter will begin with a review of the literature in order to clarify the suggested Eastphalian principles and the justification of the Eastphalian order, and to outline difficult-​to-​reconcile results –​that is, instances where approaches differ but conclusions do not. The chapter ends with an argument that the Westphalia and Eastphalia concepts endorse an epistemological dualism that essentializes both subject and object. To de-​emphasize this dualism, China’s rise will be treated as emerging from four mechanisms –​exceptionalism, sociological-​institutional exchanges, universalized Western appropriation, and core–​periphery tension. The intention is to present a hybrid view or alternative epistemological-​ methodological toolkit for studying possible links between China, its rise, and the idea of Eastphalia. China’s rise appears to be renewing interest in an imagined Eastphalian order, which in turn appears to offer an alternative perspective for understanding China’s rise.

Asia as a hybrid space for theorization The term ‘Eastphalia’ was created to describe an imagined Asian order for comparison with the European Westphalian system based on nation states. Between the Eastphalian and the Westphalian concepts, for instance, there exists shared insistence on state sovereignty norms. Such similarities may reflect historical patterns, national characteristics, or idiosyncratic diffusion and borrowing (Ross and Homer, 1976), which in turn seems to suggest that the practices of nation states differ rather than resemble one another. In this context, the term Eastphalia, however awkward it may appear, may offer alternate explanations for a world order, a separate organizing principle for international relations, and a different approach to understanding local and regional particulars. As China’s rise illustrates, foreign policy practices must include both some of the established Westphalian elements to secure recognition by others, and new localized elements for purposes of resisting the external intervention. Both of these self-​identity needs must be negotiated according to the specifics of individual countries or regions. A hybrid model, responding to the degree to which these potentially conflicting elements can coexist, may have utility for understanding specific aspects of different Asian countries. While today’s Asia is in great part a Westphalian product, the idea of ‘Asia’ is epistemologically open to interpretation. 170

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The English language IR literature lacks any focused discussion of a Westphalia-​Eastphalia hybrid for analysing Asia –​especially a rising China. I will approach the concepts from a relational perspective to describe an alternative hybrid framework, not just bringing together various components, but encountering the dynamic interactions among the various component parts. In theory, there are multiple strategies for establishing relationships: engagement, looking and acting like others in order to join a group, or taking confrontational positions in order to preserve one’s autonomy. In practice, it is difficult to implement a single approach as part of a relational model, but it is possible to apply a combination of approaches in a context-​dependent manner. Assuming that a meaningful hybrid model exists, China’s rise might be insufficient for testing it or predicting what its long-​term results might be. Any such model will likely develop along two axes: China’s historical relations with its Asian neighbours, and the traumatic experiences involving China or other Asian countries and Western great powers. This chapter will focus on the second axis, specifically analysing a hybrid model in terms of four mechanisms underlying China’s development as a rising power, its recovery of confidence lost during the early 20th century, and the ongoing impacts of actions taken by Western countries. My description of a hybrid model will offer an alternative epistemological view of China’s relationship with the West, as well as the country’s imagined relationships with Eastphalia, Westphalia or both concepts. However, the power of ‘Eastphalia’ should not be considered relevant only to a specific ‘eastern’ location; it should be viewed as one of several efforts to challenge established Westphalian meanings in international politics. An Eastphalia concept can presumably be used to analyse power relations in Asia, the Global South, the Third World, or anywhere across the vast expanse of the ‘non-​West’. Thus, this chapter’s analysis of China’s rise supports a tentative understanding of the complexities involved in China’s efforts to become a modern nation state accepted by the West, while concurrently projecting a Sino-​centric world order that justifies its vision of domestic and global governance. The same mechanisms can be used to examine and compare India, Japan and other Asian states in terms of their approaches to their idiosyncratic relationships with Western nations. There is potential for separate hybrid models that reflect the specific historical and cultural experiences of Asian countries in their dealings with Western states.

China’s rise as a precondition for the Eastphalian idea Wang Gungwu’s influential article ‘The Fourth Rise of China: Cultural Implications’ (2004) is a reminder that if China were not rising, and if its rising were not accompanied by wealth and power, this issue would have 171

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been of little interest outside of the mainland. But China’s rise is affecting world affairs, as well as the concepts and frameworks for the explanation and understanding of international politics. In Chapter 6, Wang Jisi correctly points out that while China has a long history of cultural and political values, it is difficult for individuals interested in a modern and progressive state to return to those values. In foreign policy, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government has long pursued a Westphalian identity in terms of insisting on national sovereignty, legal equality, and non-​intervention when dealing with established Westphalian powers. Thus, China sometimes seems to be a defender rather than a challenger of Westphalian values (see also Chapter 7). Despite such aspirations, China’s compliance with certain Westphalian principles has not received the recognition that Beijing desires from other nations, and the country’s rising material power is still perceived as a threat (Pan, 2004; Horesh and Kavalski, 2014). Referring to China’s struggle with its own relationship to traditional cultural values in the context of building a modern nation state, Lucian Pye (1998) describes China as a civilization pretending to be a nation state –​a statement that could also be applied to other Asian countries whose state systems depart from the Westphalian practices rooted in European experiences. Pye’s argument is a reminder that the ideas of balance and bandwagoning that the United States has long pursued in Asia belie the complexity of the region and its international dynamics. In his article ‘Will Europe’s Past Be Asia’s Future?’, Aaron Friedberg (2000) argues that Asian powers such as China and India are rising economically and politically in the 21st century, just as Western powers were doing during the 19th and 20th centuries. This reflection causes Friedberg to speculate on whether Asian countries will follow the footsteps of European powers in terms of seeking new hegemony and engaging in interstate conflict. Friedberg agrees with culturalist views which emphasize differences between Asia and Europe. However, he does not share the optimistic view that Asian countries will opt for peace due to cultural or historical differences. What Friedberg perceives as a lack of stability-​supporting mechanisms suggests that Asia will find it hard to sustain peace in the face of a rising power like China. David Kang (2003) also uses a culturalist perspective to contemplate how Asia’s past will impact future regional security. He believes that Chinese cultural values and historical experiences with its neighbours over the course of 5,000 years have produced a unique system. Kang argues that Asia has never been a primary focus of our understanding of international relations and that there is a tendency among Western IR theorists to use Eurocentric knowledge to analyse events in Asia. The broad use of realist approaches in Western academia, for example, has resulted in generally pessimistic views of post-​Cold War Asia. Emphasizing a potential return to power politics 172

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and regional rivalries, such views reflect a Westphalian-​influenced belief that Asian nation states are destined to follow the same path as that of their European counterparts. Amitav Acharya (2003/​2004) agrees with Kang about where Western IR theorists may have gone wrong. Yet, Acharya disagrees with Kang about the reasons for such failure. Whereas Kang draws on the history of China’s relations with its neighbours, Acharya refers to more recent experience (for instance, ASEAN’s dealings with great powers) to demonstrate that expectations of balancing or bandwagoning behaviours among Asian countries may not be true. Kang, Acharya and other scholars call into question the futility of relying on any single theory to understand Asian realities. My position is that the framing of China’s rise in Western IR is a matter of epistemology. In particular, such understanding reflects an underlying belief that Westphalian values and definitions determine our views of Asian countries and regional systems, and that those views are rooted more in European than Asian experiences. Perceptions of individual Asian countries, the Asian political order, Asia as a whole, its future, and China as a rising power are all preconditioned on an established epistemological framework reflecting Westphalian values. This is not to say that we can only understand Asia from theories proclaiming the region’s exceptionalism or exclusivity, since such claims can easily result in dogmatism. Instead, there is an urgent need to break away from the sense of epistemological dualism that accompanies the arbitrary dichotomy of West and East, and resist arguments that one view is better than another. Critiques of an epistemological bias have come from both inside and outside the North American IR theoretical community (Kavalski, 2020). One of the best-​known insider critiques is Stanley Hoffmann’s (1977) examination of the dominant role of American political scientists in global IR development due to three institutional factors: ties between academia and powerful policy networks, influential IR research foundations, and the role played by universities in training American intellectual elites according to scholarly–​political connections that place the United States at the centre. Such considerations presaged multiple calls for democratizing the discipline to obviate the concentration of American social science power in the IR field. From outside the American IR community, both European and British IR scholars tend to draw on different traditions and experiences. As the British IR scholar Steve Smith (2002) notes, the gross generalizations on which mainstream American IR theories rely have hindered efforts to understand other cultures and national/​regional realities. Due to the rising economic power of Asian countries, Chinese scholars are joining forces with some Western IR scholars to demand theoretical efforts that break free from this Western-​centrism (Acharya and Buzan, 2007). We are now witnessing a growing number of challenges to the dominance of American IR, as well 173

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as efforts to establish or expand new categories such as ‘global IR’ (Fonseca, 2019), ‘non-​Western IR’ (Acharya and Buzan, 2007) and ‘post-​Western IR’ (Ikeda, 2010). We can add ‘Eastphalian IR’ to this list of challenges to the current Euro-​and North America-​centric IR discipline.

Recognizing Eastphalian ideas The question remains whether or not there is a need for a new term such as ‘Eastphalia’ to describe what is currently happening outside or inside the Westphalian system –​that is, to address issues and ideas that IR scholars have been discussing for decades. Would an Eastphalian conceptualization make unique contributions to our understanding of international politics that the Westphalian framing cannot? Some IR scholars are already looking at this question (Fidler et al, 2009). But overall, the topic has received surprisingly little attention in the IR community. This can, perhaps, be explained through the belief that an Eastphalian idea/​concept does not provide any original insights to IR. According to this view, Asian countries (similar to states in other parts of the world) are still acting according to established power politics theories (Waltz, 1979). As such, Asian international politics can be pre-​ theorized according to ‘universally applicable’ principles rather than regional or country-​specific experiences. Instead of choosing between Westphalian and Eastphalian systems, adherents to this view prefer using sovereignty and other entrenched concepts as organizing principles, regardless of state size or strength (Krasner, 1999). They believe that upon closer examination, anything identified as Eastphalian will eventually be revealed as something that already exists within the Westphalian system. Another possible explanation for the lack of attention to Eastphalian ideas is that some IR scholars are already sensitive to biases that favour the West –​ they may use the same concepts when making comparisons between East and West, but refrain from using the word ‘Eastphalia’. For example, scholarship on third-​wave democracies and Asia’s economic miracle in the 1990s was already aware of Asian uniqueness without referring to an ‘Eastphalia’ concept (Cummings, 1995; Diamond, 1997; Hung, 1989; Haggard, 1990; Rozman, 1991; World Bank, 1998). At the same time, the literature on comparative political economy has addressed the weaker explanatory power of Asian regionalism in contrast to the thick theorization of the experience of European integration (Kim, 2004; Katzenstein, 2005). A noticeable increase in the number of such studies occurred following the 1997/​98 Asian financial crisis, resulting in revised discussions of Asia’s rise that contrasted with pre-​crisis analyses of ‘the Asian miracle’ (Asian Development Bank, 2008). Still other examples include debates among IR scholars on whether systems in Asia will ever function like the ones in Europe (Kang, 2003). The argument prompted by such explorations is 174

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that Asia, with its different culture, history, traditions and values, is bound to perform differently from Europe. This difference is clear in the China-​ centric hierarchy that exists among Asian countries, which contrasts with the Westphalian system’s emphasis on nation state equality. Some IR scholars have recently gone a step further to contextualize China’s recent rise according to a broader narrative of historical continuity associated with the deepening ‘Sinicisation’ of international life (Katzenstein, 2012). The Eastphalia idea appeared to have gained some traction in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis (Kim et al, 2008; Fidler et al, 2009; Fidler, 2010; Fidler and Ganguly, 2010; Ginsburg, 2010a; 2010b; Lo, 2010; Coleman and Maogoto, 2013; Weiss, 2013; Kassim, 2014; Edge, 2015). A key factor in this interest appears to be the growing realization of a global power shift to the East. As Kim et al (2008) noted: As many have observed, the global order that is emerging has a distinct Asian tilt because of the rise of China and India as geopolitical forces. The two countries’ growing power may stimulate an ‘Eastphalian’ order that challenges the Western-​led approaches that dominated the Age of Imperialism, the Cold War and the post-​Cold War period. Kim et al (2008) recognized the potential contribution of Asian countries (especially China and India) to the construction of an ‘Eastphalian order’; yet, their arguments offered little that had not already been addressed by power transition theorists (Organski and Kugler, 1980; Walton and Kavalski, 2017). In their provocative article, Fidler et al (2009) indicated that ‘ideas for world politics are something the West had in abundance’. Their point was that material power alone is insufficient for establishing a Chinese and Indian-​led Eastphalian order. They apparently believe that as rising powers, China and India may provide Asian countries with good opportunities to challenge the established Westphalian order, not only through their expanding material, military or economic power, but also through their respective interpretations of concepts such as national sovereignty. In other words, Fidler et al (2009) suggest that the gap between material power and the ideational requirements of a potential Eastphalian system stands as a challenge to its emergence. There is a need for a careful reconsideration of the substantial ideas that the Eastphalian concept might offer. The current literature on the topic seems to offer unsatisfactory accounts of the Eastphalian order it seeks to theorize. For most authors the focus is on what Asian countries (especially China and India) already have, and how proximate they are to principles of territorial sovereignty and non-​interference associated with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (Kim et al, 2008; Fidler et al, 2009; Fidler, 2010; Fidler and Ganguly, 2010; Ginsburg, 2010a; 2010b; Lo, 2010; Coleman and Maogoto, 175

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2013; Weiss, 2013; Kassim, 2014; Edge, 2015). In terms of what China and India might bring to a new Eastphalian system, discussions frequently address the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (hereafter referred to as the Five Principles). For example, Yang Razali Kassim (2014: 49) observes that Beyond Asia, both India and China have used the Five Principles to shape their relations with countries across the Middle East and Africa. They argue that the concepts underlying the Five Principles derive from the basic tenets of the Westphalian system but Asian countries have embraced them and given them an Asian texture. Notions of sovereignty and non-​interference are now recognized as Asian characteristics and pan-​Asian commitment to the Five Principles makes them a cornerstone for an Eastphalian perspective on international relations. Kassim’s account represents one of several efforts to define a new Eastphalian system by extracting values from Chinese foreign policy doctrines created during Mao Zedong’s New China era. Since the ideas emphasized in the Five Principles are fundamentally Westphalian concepts, they give Eastphalian notions the appearance of ‘a return to Westphalia’ (Ginsburg, 2010a: 27). Further, a growing number of China watchers, IR scholars and world leaders believe that under Xi Jinping, the current Chinese government is abandoning moderate foreign policy norms in favour of more assertive behaviours (Wang, 2018). Shih and Wang (2019) point to Xi’s ‘striving for achievement’ (fenfa youwei) announcement when discussing global impressions that China is moving away from multilateralism. They argue that ‘this could even be applied to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is described as a multilateral design based on bilateral agreements for individual investment projects’ (2019: 156). The point here is that China’s multilateral BRI design indicates a willingness to contribute to the established Westphalian value-​ based international order. Within the context of the current multilateralist-​ based Westphalian system, Beijing is using its own methods –​both bilateral and unilateral instead of only multilateral –​to accommodate differences in China’s various international relationships. At the same time, there is evidence that the world order, currently dominated by Western powers, has already entered a period in which countries are ‘deviat[ing] from Westphalian principles in order to advocate universal adoption of democratic forms of government, market-​based economic systems, and protection of human rights’ (Fidler et al, 2009: 55). To describe this shift, some scholars are using terms such as ‘an emerging non-​Western IR period’ (Acharya and Buzan, 2007) and a ‘new age of post-​ Western IR’ (Behera, 2007; Chong, 2007; Inoguchi, 2007; Chen, 2010; Ikeda, 2010; Shahi and Ascione, 2016; Owen et al, 2017). The boundaries 176

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between practising Westphalian or non-​Westphalian normative orders are becoming increasingly fuzzy, and state actors feel free to move between them, depending on their specific motivations. Therefore there is a need to reconsider connections between Eastphalian and Westphalian concepts, but in a manner that avoids epistemological dualism. In the Anglophone literature, Eastphalia is almost always understood as an alternative to the Westphalian framework. Such an approach is bound to reinforce an East–​West dualism (see Chapter 2). Examples of the difficulties of overcoming this polarity associated with an emerging Eastphalian order are evident in the theorization of practices such as the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) (Fidler, 2009; Kassim, 2014). According to the R2P framework, the sovereignty of states over their populations is conditioned on how well they treat them; gross violations of human rights may abrogate the rights of sovereignty. In particular, in instances of genocide and ethnic cleansing, the proponents of R2P argue for humanitarian interventions to protect populations from their own governments. Many non-​Western countries read the R2P discourse as yet another neocolonial ruse of Western powers to stifle the aspirations of their former colonies. As such, humanitarian intervention is merely an update on the practices of Western imperialism. Refuting the value of human security is not considered a common Chinese position, but Beijing currently describes itself as having a historical responsibility to ensure that foreign forces never again invade its territory or cause damage to Chinese civilization. Culturally speaking, Asian countries lack universalist traditions that justify military interventions outside their borders (Shih, 2012). Therefore when China intervenes politically or militarily in foreign territories, it does so reluctantly, and only following requests that fit with its old tributary system or a regional consensus within the current international system. This ‘Chinese style of non-​intervention’ can be applied to situations involving human security in foreign countries (Kassim, 2014). However, Kassim, an R2P advocate, argues that there is a crucial, and nuanced, difference between interventionism –​including humanitarian interventionism –​and R2P. While interventionism justifies the use of force by the international community on ‘humanitarian grounds’, R2P supports the use of force only as a last resort, and even so, only with the unanimous endorsement of the United Nations Security Council in strictly four specific cases of mass atrocity crimes –​genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. (Kassim, 2014: v) In the situation he describes, the potential for conflict between East and West or global South and North when reacting to humanitarian crises 177

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in sovereign states is always present (Edge, 2015). When considering the details of a potential Eastphalia, most international observers and analysts see no other option but to use Westphalian ideas as reference points when posing questions, setting agendas and determining analytical ground rules for responding to such crises. Accordingly, there is a need to revisit potential post-​China rise issues regarding the presence or absence of rules for state behaviours that can be adhered to by all regions and nation states. If there are such norms then, from a universalist point of view, a Westphalian or a post-​Westphalian system has little or nothing to do with the West, since all issues and challenges can be considered simultaneously cross-​cultural and universal. In this manner, conflicts or gaps between West and East can be viewed as temporary detours along an extended, dialectical and linear history. This idea is compactly addressed in Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis (1992), which posits that East and West are simply at different stages in the same teleology. From an anti-​universalist perspective, using either a Westphalian or post-​Westphalian discourse to establish an Eastphalian version of global order not only reinforces East–​West differences and epistemological dualism, but also supports a perception of the Westphalia concept as both self-​evident and universal. To resolve the epistemological challenges associated with a universalist view, Eastern and Western concepts need to be equally empowered so as to reduce the potential for privileging Western models. Since it is methodologically or epistemologically possible to universalize Eastern experiences and cultures, there is no reason for denying universal applications of an Eastphalian system based on Asian geopolitics or culture. China’s rise, which provides a good scenario for formulating a middle-​ground hybridity that rejects both universalism and dualism, should not be viewed as only involving material powers, but also in terms of its potential for mimetic learning and working with practices from its own past, as well as with Western ideas and discourses (Wang, 2015). Historically, China has described itself as a model to be emulated by its neighbours. It was only in the early 19th century (with China’s two defeats in the Opium Wars) that it was put into a position of following the model of outside powers. Whether or not China will eventually dominate Asia as it once did is unknown, but according to the current discourse of national rejuvenation and the Chinese tendency to view history as cyclical rather than linear, it is only a matter of time before luan (‘chaos’) returns to zhi (‘order’) –​that is, a Chinese version of order –​before the cycle begins anew. This approach to governance requires patience in international affairs, which contrasts with the prioritization of immediate responses in the US-​led international order (Shih et al, 2019). A major difference between historical and contemporary China is that the latter, currently a member of many international organizations and agreements, has learned how to appropriate and challenge Westphalian values. 178

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According to this view, the central question is not about Chinese exceptionalism versus universalism, nor about whether Chinese or Western ways of thinking and governance will prevail. At times of weakness, China has always been adept at taking ideas from outside the centre (which it claims to occupy) and applying what external powers have to offer to achieve its goals, with the presumption that all ideas and thoughts are to be used freely without ownership by any single individual or institution (see Chapter 10). This conflicts with the idea of individual property rights requiring protection from sovereign nation states. It remains to be seen if China is capable of appropriating the necessary ideas and experiences from both its own history and the West in a manner that concurrently supports political survival and world peace. There is no reason why the West cannot learn from its experiences with China to establish positive relations, though it will require a reassessment of power politics and interest-​driven competition. In other words, for China’s rise to succeed in a manner that supports diversity within an Eastphalian system, it will have to convince, push and perhaps even threaten the West to participate in a process of mutual learning that will require intersubjective understanding, self-​restraint and actions based on relationality (Emirbayer, 1997; Jackson and Nexon, 1999; Hafner-​Burton et al, 2009; Selg, 2016; Kavalski, 2018; Nordin et al, 2019). Whereas power-​and interest-​driven thinking are rational responses based on self-​motivation, intersubjective understanding and self-​restraint are based more on relational considerations and imagined resemblances associated with a core Chinese foreign policy tenet for dealing with disputes: seeking common ground while preserving differences. However, executing the difficult task of achieving relational connectivity requires an application of the four mechanisms shown in Table 8.1. In summary, there are good arguments in favour of the term ‘Eastphalia’ because our current epistemological understandings of world affairs should not and cannot be constrained by the existing Westphalian framework. In light of Beijing’s stated intention to preserve Chinese characteristics, the country’s rise supports the development of an Eastphalian order, one that shares some commonalties with the Westphalian pattern, but stands independent from it. As an imagined space, any proposed Eastphalian system should entail a deconstruction of the established Westphalian system as part of the process of creating a hybrid epistemological view of how actual practices can work in China and other Asian countries. Acceptance of a Westphalian-​cum-​Eastphalian concept will be based on both a multilateral framework requiring synchronized rationality among all actors, and on interdependent bilateral relations involving China, the West and the rest of Asia, along with a complex mix of emotional, historical and identity factors associated with individual nations (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). According to this view, the Westphalian-​Eastphalian hybrid will emphasize 179

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multi-​bilateral practices –​that is, when Asian countries (including China) deal with multilateral issues, bilateral interactions reflecting the specifics of each relationship will always constitute the best strategy for consolidation.

Chinese resistance and exchangeable behaviours: four mechanisms China’s modern experiences with Western nations explain why a Westphalian-​Eastphalian hybrid should not simply reflect the transfer of Westphalian norms from West to East. Connections between China’s rise and an emerging Eastphalia can be examined from at least two perspectives, one consisting of China and all other Asian countries, and one consisting of Asian and Western countries (Figure 8.1). The focus here is on the latter, especially the relationship between China and the Western great powers from a Chinese viewpoint. Depending on the national context or analytical perspective, China’s rise can be viewed either as a great opportunity or a grave threat to the established international order (for a critique of the bifocal ‘threat/​opportunity’ approaches to China’s rise, see Pan, 2012). Researchers are assessing this opportunity/​threat continuum based on what China claims, argues and practises. Sino-​Western interactions involve four mechanisms: culture-​centric identity in the form of claims of exceptionalism, sociological-​institutional exchanges, universalized Western appropriation, and core-​periphery tension (Table 8.1). These are not products of theory, but of induction. Looking at the degree of China’s openness to international society and its achievements as a rising great power, one can construct an understanding of how the four mechanisms play important roles in China’s engagement with the West, especially the United States. An important assumption is that the four mechanisms, as interpreted by China, can also be applied to other Asian countries (which are supposedly at the core of any nascent Eastphalian system). However, based on current and historical experiences involving individual relationships between Asian countries and China, an Eastphalian system is unlikely to produce a unified set of rules and norms because of the prevalence of bilateral practices. It is difficult to imagine a sustainable multilateral institution in Asia, especially after looking at the experiences of ASEAN. One reason is that the Westphalian order is based on a synchronized and universalized rationality, while a potential Eastphalian order would likely be based on a bilateral and contextualized rationality. The culture-​centric identity mechanism refers to the trust that citizens have in their cultural values, and their belief that such values are distinct from others. This does not necessarily indicate short-​sighted nationalism since cultural confidence can be open to outsiders from different ethnicities, countries, regions and territories. However, it does translate into the strong 180

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belief in exceptionalism currently found in Chinese foreign policy and many aspects of American life and politics (Kingdon, 1999). In China’s case, this emphasis is associated with a crisis mentality that views declining cultural values as requiring rescue and repair, as opposed to the American tendency to promote a belief of supremacy in social and political systems. Elsewhere I have analysed China’s culture-​centric complex in the contexts of two 20th-​century examples: (1) the 1919 May Fourth Movement, which pitted conservatives against reformers, and (2) the 1980s debate between traditional and anti-​traditional schools (Wang, 2013). The first focused on saving the Chinese nation from ‘extinction’, the second on modernization and the establishment of a Chinese intellectual identity. I see similarities in both, not in terms of goals, but in terms of China-​specific concerns and apprehension about Western cultural intrusions. Recently there have been calls for Chinese IR theory that reflects a strong sense of the history and traditions that distinguish the Chinese worldview from its Western counterparts, for example discussing and applying the tianxia (‘all under heaven’) system to studies of international politics (Zhao, 2005; see also Chapter 5). Chinese scholars are not alone in believing that their country’s past can be reconstructed and revitalized in a manner that mixes cultural-​historical attitudes regarding diplomacy with current realities. Chinese foreign policy statements often cite the Confucian doctrines of harmony and filial virtue. Qin Yaqing (2010: 139) argues that such a China-​ centric identity should not be reduced to an either/​or logic, but approached as a ‘both-​and’ situation. Qin suggests that such approach is evident in two of the four mechanisms shown in Table 8.1: sociological and institutional changes, and the appropriation of universalized Western resources. The sociological-​institutional exchange mechanism involves interactions between local and foreign intellectual communities (Wæver, 1998). Yongjin Zhang’s work (2003) is an inspiring example of how certain worldviews and knowledges might be (re)produced by an Eastphalian system of exchanges. As he noted, in the early 1980s only a small number of Chinese scholars were exchanging ideas with non-​American-​centric theorists such as those in the English School (ES). Zhang (2003: 101) points to the ‘condominium of American foundations and IR academies [that have] made concerted efforts since 1979 to promote American studies of IR in China’. He suggests that three factors have influenced this condominium: first, the financial assistance provided by American foundations (such as the Ford, Rockefeller, Asia, Luce and MacArthur foundations) to promote IR studies in China; secondly, the role played by Chinese universities and research centres (such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) in transmitting Western values; thirdly, the links between individual American scholars and Chinese academic communities, which provided timely details on American IR trends and debates; and fourthly, Zweig and Fung (2004) outlined the ‘diasporic option’ provided 181

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by overseas Chinese contributing not only to China’s economic, social and technological development, but also to the intellectual debates in the country. In addition to passively importing knowledge from the West, China is actively exporting its perspectives on sovereign and territorial issues in an effort to promote its self-​defined national image (Wang, 2015). Since 2004, ‘Confucius Institutes’ (whose stated goal is to propagate Chinese language and culture) have been used to clarify what Chinese perceive as misunderstandings about their country’s status as a rising power (Paradise, 2009). According to Cai Mingzhao, Director of the State Council Information Office (SCIO) and Vice Director of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) External Publicity Office, the Chinese government will continue to make significant investments in public diplomacy and media resources in an effort to explain China’s views and policies to the rest of the world (Cai, 2013). Thus, China is no longer only on the receiving end of sociological-​institutional exchanges with Western countries, but is striving to become an active agent and meaningful participant in global conversations. The third mechanism is the appropriation of universalized Western resources. Depending on which analysis is being considered, a universalist understanding of world order (either implicit or explicit) suggests the arrival of Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘End of History’. This view reflects the neoliberal belief that the forces of modernization, Westernization, democratization and globalization are driving the world and will continue to do so. Without emphasizing sociological communication and engagement between China and the West, or the impact of specific Chinese cultural and historical concerns on China’s relationships with Western countries, this universalist understanding assumes abstract geographic spheres and shared understandings of such concepts as ‘sovereignty’, ‘national interests’ and ‘power’ that justify the extent to which China is similar to all modern nation states. Arguably, such universalized Western concepts are best viewed as resources that China has already appropriated in order to defend itself from intrusions by external powers. Accordingly, China is discovering ways to use Westphalian principles such as sovereign rights and non-​intervention (along with realist IR theoretical notions of power and national interests) to survive in the current international system and to deal with Western powers. If true, this means that universalized Western concepts and principles are, at best, instrumental to Chinese aspirations. However, it will be difficult for China to abide by fundamental values (that is, liberal democracy and human rights) that the West expects it to internalize so as to produce certain types of political reforms. The fourth mechanism, core–​periphery tension, has its roots in the struggles for decolonization, whose proponents assert that local knowledge production is reproduced within power relationships that are structurally 182

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Figure 8.1: Two principal axes in a potential Eastphalian system China

Asia

Second axis

The West

First axis China’s Asian neighbours

similar to real-​world power politics, but with marginalized non-​Western voices (Dunn and Shaw, 2001). These scholars describe unequal relations between dominant and weaker states as products of Western imperialism that must be challenged to achieve emancipation and resolution. According to Donald Puchala (1998: 141), colonialism persists in neocolonial forms such as ‘Western control of the world’s media, the prevalence of Western languages, particularly English, and the Western near-​monopoly over advanced academic training and the determination of disciplinary canons’. Looking at China’s history, it is one of the few countries ever occupied by more than one foreign force at the same time. In the eyes of the Chinese people, the 19th century and much of the 20th are marked by a national humiliation that demands foreign policy doctrines that specifically resist imperialism and hegemonism. Such resistance is a natural consequence of feelings of marginalization and humiliation, as is the desire to have greater say or influence in frameworks created and controlled by dominant powers. The recent call for more discourse power in international organizations concurrently challenges unfair/​unjust aspects of such institutions, while acknowledging their legitimacy (Wang, 2015). The mechanisms shown in Table 8.1 are associated with two variables through which China alternates between self-​perceived hard and soft power roles, as well as between learned Westphalian sovereignty ideals and an inherited tianxia worldview. A schematic representation of the two variables is shown in Figure 8.1. If China addresses its rising power exclusively from a hard power-​based Westphalian perspective, then rising tensions between China and Western powers might emerge due to its insistence on protecting its national interests, usually framed in a postcolonial context that is confrontation based. In contrast, if China addresses its 183

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Table 8.1: Four mechanisms for relations between China and the West according to power and ideal variables Ideal

Power Role

Westphalian sovereignty: self-​identity

Tianxia worldview: self-​image

Hard

core–​periphery tension

culture-​centric identity

Soft

sociological-​institutional exchanges

appropriation of universalized Western resources

rise from a soft power-​based Westphalian perspective, its discourse may be dominated by sociological-​institutional exchanges meant to establish reciprocal relationships with other nations, with a reduced emphasis on the idea of absolute sovereignty. When China prioritizes its self-​image within a hard power role context –​that is, in light of other countries’ expectations –​it may choose to rely on its cultural resources to offer merit-​based justifications of its actions in international politics. In contrast, when soft power roles are emphasized, the appropriation of universalized Western resources may be viewed as representing either a Westphalian or post-​Westphalian China, depending on what is being appropriated. For example, it may emphasize sovereignty or human security ideals as framed by the R2P discourse, with the former reinforcing power-​based tensions between China and other nations, and the latter encouraging the dissolution of state boundaries. Table 8.1 hints at the difficulties of determining the characteristics of China’s rise according to current Westphalian or post-​Westphalian system perspectives. It is important to remember that any representation of China as either a Westphalian or tianxia state (Zhao, 2006) is a choice rather than a reflection of any system. If China decides to move towards Westphalian notions of sovereignty, it will likely emphasize a sense of self-​identity to distinguish itself from others, ostensibly for purposes of preserving an image of China as a modern nation state –​note Xi Jinping’s promotion of ‘the Chinese Dream’. When describing itself as a soft power, China will likely continue to interact with others in order to import knowledge and to influence what it views as misunderstandings of its goals and intentions. If China emphasizes a tianxia worldview, it may express greater concern about how non-​Chinese recognize China’s role in an existing system, even one that is Western built –​an example of ‘face politics’ (Gries, 2004). It is difficult to predict whether China will pursue Westphalian sovereignty or a tianxia worldview.

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Conclusion Understanding external relations involving China or other Asian countries and Western nations requires a conceptual separation of potential Eastphalian and existing Westphalian concepts. Only then can we understand and acknowledge the possibility of two epistemological views, and not be surprised to see connections between both of them and China’s rise. China’s rise is not limited to a Sino-​centric view, nor is it overwhelmingly influenced by China’s past, as many Chinese IR culturalists argue. It is also false to argue that China’s rise will culminate in the establishment of a European-​ style nation state, or that China’s rise will result in liberal and democratic reforms based on Western models. The idea of a Westphalian-​Eastphalian hybrid offers an alternative understanding of China’s rise and the situations of various Asian countries. The argument that China’s rise has both positive (for example economic benefits) and negative (for example fear of a military threat) implications appears to be the result of a Westphalian perspective. If a hybrid model is used, then the meaning of China’s rise cannot be limited to a threat, an opportunity or any other fixed category; instead, its implications will be determined by China itself and the countries it interacts with. Thus, when considering what an Eastphalian system might look like and which values would be emphasized, it is important to avoid approaching it as a modified copy of the Westphalian system. When the four mechanisms in Table 8.1 are used to analyse China’s relations with Western great powers, one finds that China’s rise entails needs for both resistance and relations based on a process of showing off and learning. A hybrid perspective seems better suited to comprehending the complexities of China’s efforts to become a modern nation state worthy of acceptance by others (especially Western great powers) while emphasizing a Sino-​centric worldview based on its long-​imagined Middle Kingdom status. The same hybrid perspective may also be useful for analysing and comparing India, Japan and other Asian states in terms of their separate relationships with Western nations, influenced by individual historical and cultural factors as well as tasks associated with modern statehood. Acknowledgements The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Taiwan Ministry of Science and Technology, project no. 104-​2410-​H-​006-​002-​MY2. References Acharya, A. (2003/​2004) ‘Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?’, International Security, 28(3): 149–​64. 185

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Sino-​capitalism’s Dialectical Processes and International Relations Theory Christopher A. McNally China’s international ascent over the past 40 years knows few historical parallels. Nonetheless, as several chapters in this volume have pointed out, Western attempts to understand this phenomenon have mainly relied on theoretical constructs established in the West and based on Western historical experiences. This is especially the case with the theoretical approaches that have informed the crucial debates in Western capitals regarding what China’s rise implies for the future of the international order. Some Western perspectives, such as Constructivist and Marxist ones, have been less prevalent in informing these debates. Rather, discussions have been framed by the two dominant approaches in contemporary international relations (IR) theory: the realist school, including approaches to power transition theory; and the liberal school, especially its liberal institutionalist perspective. The reliance on these two dominant strands of Western IR theory has tended to create opposing points of view insufficiently open to alternative interpretations. China’s international ascent, however, represents an epochal event that has the potential not only to prove or disprove existing theories, but also to serve as a crucial case (Eckstein, 1975) that generates and informs advances in IR theory. The purpose of this chapter is then to contribute to ‘theory building’, especially to give contemporary IR theory a much deeper appreciation of the capitalist dynamics shaping international affairs. As the contributions to this volume elucidate, the failure of China’s rise to create a shock to IR scholarship is lamentable. For the first time in modern history a non-​ Western power is in the process of becoming the globe’s largest economy. This should be a paradigm-​shattering phenomenon (Kavalski, 2018; Pan 190

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and Kavalski, 2018), but so far even the most thoughtful works (cf. Kang, 2007; Lampton, 2008; Christensen, 2015) have primarily concentrated on applying existing theories derived from the modern European experience (Acharya and Buzan, 2017). Put differently, dominant IR analyses continue to see China’s rise through Western lenses, often fitting this case in a pre-​scripted narrative (Kavalski, 2018), such as the Thucydides Trap scenario. But this historical event should not just be an object of analysis for already established theories. It should also be fruitful terrain for challenging, expanding and reimagining IR theory (Pan and Kavalski, 2018). The case of China’s rise can force us to critically reimagine foundational assumptions and ‘pluralize’ our analysis to move beyond dichotomized debates. Like other contributions to this volume, this chapter contends that mono-​ disciplinary frameworks for understanding the potential consequences of China’s rise are inadequate and even dangerous. They neglect the complex dynamics that are propelling China’s international ascent in the first place (Pan and Kavalski, 2018). My aim is to bridge paradigmatic and disciplinary divides by consciously integrating novel analytical vantage points. Specifically, these focus on the role of China’s domestic political economy and its interactions with the international system, the centrality of capitalist logics in ordering international relations, dynamics of complex multidirectional change, and the role of ideas. The premise of this chapter is that IR theory has been too mono-​causal and mechanical, paying insufficient attention to tension-​ridden iterative feedback loops that can best be described as dialectical processes. As a result of mechanistic interpretations, black and white images of China’s potential effects on the international order have dominated. Dichotomous scenarios –​China aims to undermine if not destroy the American-​led liberal international order (Pompeo, 2020) or, conversely, will assimilate as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ (Zoellick, 2005) –​are too simplistic to capture the complexities of China’s rise. From the point of view of 2022, neither of these binary scenarios is empirically and analytically satisfying. Assimilation is highly unlikely to occur given the intensifying frictions between China and the United States, not least because of unresolved questions about the origins of COVID-​ 19. Conversely, playing up a ‘China threat’ risks becoming a self-​fulfilling prophecy. Clearly, limiting analysis to binary scenario options can be perilous. They tend to obscure more than they contribute to our understanding, since China is neither purely revisionist nor conformist vis-​à-​vis the liberal international order (see also Chapter 10). Employing dialectical historical dynamics can unravel novel scenario conceptions and allow for the inclusion of additional factors that shape international order transitions. In this chapter, I focus on two seminal 191

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dialectics: the dialectic underpinning China’s political economy, what I term Sino-​capitalism; and the dialectic Sino-​capitalism’s global emergence is unleashing at the international level, namely a melding of neo-​statist and neoliberal precepts to forge a new transitional politico-​economic order. Sino-​capitalism is here regarded as a novel form of capitalism that is based on the interplay of state-​centric coordination top down and private/​local entrepreneurship and initiative bottom up (McNally, 2007; 2008; 2012). It is extremely pertinent to understand the domestic dynamics driving China’s rapid economic expansion and upgrading. There are still quite a few in the West who predict a collapse of China’s economy (for example Chang, 2001). Their analyses misinterpret the nature and logic of Sino-​capitalism. In fact, many Western perspectives tend to either deny that China is capitalist (as does, ironically, the Chinese Communist Party [CCP]) or argue that China is employing a form of state capitalism that is inherently prone to failure. The ‘China Collapse’ theory then triggers a false hope that somehow the CCP is living on borrowed time and only a nudge (by instituting a trade and technology war, for instance) is required to create the conditions for domestic regime change. In the same way, assessments that China, since it is practising a form of capitalism, is bound to become more like the West and transition to a form of liberal democracy are insufficiently open to historical contingency. Capitalism, after all, can coexist with a variety of political arrangements, ranging from fascism to social democracy. Under capitalism there is an essential need to improve institutional and political certainty of private property rights. Successful capitalist development therefore tends to strengthen the rule of law. But institutional and political certainty is relative, both temporally and spatially. The concept of Sino-​capitalism can help elucidate how Chinese domestic dynamics shape and impact the global order. The growing sway of Sino-​ capitalism is actually generating a novel dialectical dynamic at the global level, recalibrating domestic economic policies of major trading powers by encouraging more state-​centric strategies. In a twist worthy of satire, criticism of China as too state capitalist is being met in the West with exactly what is criticized: the wider employment of state capitalist and neo-​mercantilist policies, including protectionism in trade and investment, as well as the rise of techno-​nationalism. Sino-​capitalism is thus reshaping the global economic order in profound ways. To meet the challenge this vibrant new form of capitalism poses, Western economies are adapting counter-​strategies that move their political economies further away from the ideal of the neoliberal laissez-​faire state. Neoliberalism is infused with neo-​statism, creating the conditions for an unstable chaotic mélange that fuses the remnants of the neoliberal economic order with Sino-​capitalism’s neo-​statist orientation (McNally, 2020). 192

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To proceed, this chapter will first examine the shifting debates in Western capitals on what China’s rise implies, noting their antecedents in Western IR theory. I will then introduce the concept of Sino-​capitalism, noting its underlying dialectical logics. The fourth section of this chapter transitions to examine the global implications of Sino-​capitalism, especially how its juxtaposition of state-​centric coordination top down and vibrant private entrepreneurship bottom up is recalibrating the global political economy. Dialectical dynamics playing out at the international level are recognized. In the concluding section multidirectional and iterative dialectical progressions are offered as theoretical tools that can make better sense of the implications of China’s rise. Novel approaches are proposed that rely on utilizing two-​way domestic/​international politico-​economic processes to map future scenarios. Neither economic decoupling nor a persistence of the present order looks likely under these scenarios. Rather an uneasy marriage of neo-​statism, techno-​nationalism, and increasing political populism with continued global market competition and integration, above all driven by super-​corporations, is likely to dominate a chaotic transitional order in the 2020s.

The changing China debate and IR theory Events in China as well as changing Western attitudes towards China have deeply affected debates on China’s rise. Nonetheless, these debates continue to be framed by the seemingly timeless nature of Western IR theory, mirroring major theoretical debates in the field. Historically, views of China in the West have always been conflicted. The debates in the 1990s and 2000s focused on whether China would fully join the liberal international order. As Robert Zoellick (2005) proposed, China could be prodded to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’, acting as a content major power within the established system led by the United States. This would mean that China could integrate successfully with the liberal international order and rise peacefully (Zheng, 2005). Such arguments are framed by the liberal institutionalist approach to IR theory. This approach holds that the present order is more deeply institutionalized than any prior international order. Ikenberry (2011: 26) characterizes its major precepts as being ‘open’ and built upon ‘mutually agreeable institutions and working relationships’ that even constrain the hegemonic United States. International relations thus are characterized not only by states jostling for power in an anarchic system (balancing), but also by hierarchy (command) and mutually agreed-​upon rules and institutions (constitutionalism). There is little doubt that China has joined many international institutions and integrated successfully with aspects of the global system. ‘China has 193

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already made moves to embrace the American-​led system of international rules and institutions’ (Ikenberry, 2011: 346). However, Beijing was never fully content with the Western order (see also Chapter 7). Its attitude has been one of pragmatic integration since the order’s openness and economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, provided peaceful and relatively unrestricted avenues to develop economically. Whether China can in the future function as a valued contributing member of the liberal international order hinges on one’s viewpoint and emphases. Debating this point, though, is becoming increasingly moot. Deliberations in most Western capitals have irrevocably shifted, embracing insights that emanate from the realist strand of IR theory. One expectation supporting the liberal institutionalist view was that economic development in China would trigger over time a domestic political transition to liberal democracy (Campbell and Ratner, 2018). China’s domestic political-​ economic arrangements would then align with the liberal nature of the US-​led international order. These hopes have been dashed in the last decade (Campbell and Ratner, 2018). With the rise to power of Xi Jinping and his China Dream rhetoric, a ‘China First’ policy approach rose to prominence. The ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ began to spark an international backlash, just as Trump’s ‘America First’ policies realigned American foreign policy to become much more adversarial vis-​à-​vis China. Xi began advocating his changed goals for China starting in 2013. According to Minzner (2018), Xi’s ascendance to power brought the Dengist reform era and its pursuit of ‘autocracy with democratic characteristics’ to an end. Xi is intent on obfuscating Deng’s policy approaches to reach back and forge closer links with the CCP’s past, especially the Maoist era. His approach is ushering in an ‘authoritarian revival’ (Minzner, 2018) and a much more state-​centric approach to economic and social governance (Economy, 2018; Lardy, 2019). Changing debates in the West on how to approach China can thus be traced back to the centralization of power under Xi. He ‘personalized’ the ‘organizational emperor’ (Zheng, 2010) that constitutes the CCP and endeavoured to reinsert the Party into every corner of Chinese society. These changing politico-​economic winds have also recast China’s global role. Under Xi, Beijing is consciously seeking to reclaim its past glory and to recalibrate the international order to better serve its interests. These changes emanating from Beijing have shifted the image of China in the West. From a potential partner and member of the international order, views have tipped to see China as a state capitalist threat with escalating hints of Orwellian control. No wonder realist orientations to IR theory encompassing power transition studies are gaining in influence. Their historically grounded theorizing seems especially apt when faced with a 194

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China intent on recapturing its former glory, thus setting up a geopolitical competition for global hegemony. As realists of most stripes maintain, the process of a new power rising inevitably leads to a security competition with a high likelihood of war. Proposing a theory of ‘offensive realism’, Mearsheimer (2014) argues that China will seek regional hegemony in East Asia. It will tend to act as a ‘revisionist’ power that seeks to overturn the established US-​led order. Mearsheimer (2014: 4) warns that ‘China and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China’s power grows’. An intensifying security competition raises the distinct possibility of US–​ China relations slipping into the scenario of a Thucydides Trap (Allison, 2017). This scenario refers to the ancient Greek historian’s warning that when a rising power threatens to displace an incumbent ruling power in an international system danger impends. Indeed, during the second half of the Trump administration, especially after Mike Pompeo’s appointment as Secretary of State, it looked as if Washington was hell-​bent on making China the enemy. The danger of Washington actually working to realize a Thucydides Trap scenario, to create the conditions for a new ‘cold’ or even ‘hot’ war, is turning theory on its head. Rather than using theory to inform decisions that try to avoid an intensifying security competition, policy makers are taking the Trap as an empirical given and pursuing it. Allison (2017), though, emphatically cautions that not all power transitions have generated war; falling into Thucydides Trap is not a given. This approach by the Trump administration was not fully replicated throughout Western capitals; it is also changing, so far mainly on the margins, under the Biden administration. Nonetheless, most Western policy makers agree that China represents a major danger to the liberal international order. Differences centre on how to face this risk: to either fully decouple from the Chinese political economy and pursue a containment strategy akin to the Cold War, echoing realist theory in a foreboding fashion; or to more forcefully pressure Beijing to conform to the rules of the liberal international order, ideally with a multilateral coalition. This latter approach still holds out the liberal institutionalist hope of peacefully integrating China under global norms and rules. The debate on China has thus shifted, though it is still binary in nature and continues to be informed by the two major strands of IR theory. Liberal institutionalists had to give up on the notion that China could smoothly integrate with the Western order. Nonetheless, they still hope that China can be prodded to ‘play by the rules’, even under Communist rule. ‘Peaceful coexistence’ is one of the new concepts expressing liberal hopes. On the other side, realist views are being employed to create an increasingly ominous threat perception, although one could argue that these views are not purely realist, but a neoconservative combination of realism and 195

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liberalism (Pan and Turner, 2017). Mike Pompeo’s (2020) speech at the Nixon Presidential Library in July 2020 is one of the most striking examples of trying to create a nefarious ‘other’. Pompeo argued that China, especially the CCP, must be seen as a major threat to the Western liberal order. As a result, the United States and all like-​minded powers must contain China and rapidly decouple their economies. The ultimate goal, it seems, is to put so much pressure on China as to cause regime change, mirroring the China collapse theory (Chang, 2001). Needless to say, if pushed to their logical conclusion, such policies to contain or even to crush the ‘other’ would create an ever more brutal security competition. Thucydides Trap becomes a self-​fulfilling prophecy. Ominously, implications derived from realist theory are being put in rhetoric, thus creating an ever more likely scenario reaffirming realist theory. Ideas are powerful, including those advanced by IR theory. It is thus of extreme importance that a historical event as seminal as China’s rise is understood from a ‘pluralized’ vantage point that moves beyond dichotomized debates. Most fundamentally, mainstream IR analyses concerning the origins of the ‘Chinese’ challenge continue to be incomplete. Without understanding the nature of the challenge, it becomes difficult to design effective policies to face it. The nature of China’s increasing global power is not purely politico-​ ideological. It is better conceived to lie in the realm of political economy, namely the emergence of a new form of capitalism centred on China that is global in reach yet differs deeply in its organizing principles and ideational precepts from established forms of capitalism in the West. Once viewed from this politico-​economic perspective, the challenge of China’s rise is reframed. The potential threat China represents is not based on the emergence of a neo-​statist authoritarian empire set on destroying the liberal order. Rather, it is more complex and nuanced –​the result of how a new form of capitalism that has both synergies and conflicts with the present order is recalibrating both global geopolitics and geo-​economics.

The dialectical logic of Sino-​capitalism Sino-​capitalism represents an amalgam of at least five institutional legacies (McNally, 2007; 2008; 2012; 2018): China’s Imperial political economy; the socialist period which created China’s massive state sector; the legacy of East Asian developmentalism, including the developmental state; the influence of neoliberal economic orthodoxy; and, finally, Deng Xiaoping’s experimental and incremental policy reform approach, best captured by his famous phrase, ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’. One aspect often overlooked is how China’s economic transition occurred during the heyday of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s. As 196

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a result, Sino-​capitalism adapted certain elements of neoliberal economic orthodoxy, including an emphasis on global integration and market competition to improve productivity (McNally, 2007; 2008; So and Chu, 2015). In quite a few areas of the economy China has established highly competitive market-​based activity, such as in labour markets and for the vast majority of goods and services. Even in capital markets, where liberalization has been slow and cautious, market-​strengthening reforms are moving apace. Beyond this contemporary influence, a central understanding of Sino-​ capitalism must go back to the legacies of the Imperial political economy (McNally, 2018). As then, Sino-​capitalism calibrates a dominant state with highly entrepreneurial private enterprise, often networked into production systems with fine divisions of labour (Gates, 1996). There is thus a unique dialectic (McNally, 2019) that reproduces Sino-​capitalism: central state guidance top down is juxtaposed with private and localized initiative bottom up. This reflects the balance found in Chinese Imperial political economies between an intrusive state and vibrant semi-​autonomous networks of private entrepreneurship (Gates, 1996; Faure, 2006). Sino-​capitalism evidently inherits the state-​centric nature of Imperial political economies. The economic role of the state is bigger than in most advanced industrial and developing economies (Naughton and Tsai, 2015). Markets are seen as potentially efficient tools to create competitive pressures, allocate goods and services, and create incentives for innovation. However, under CCP leadership markets are ‘freed’ only to the extent that they do not display chaotic tendencies and create large negative externalities. The market has to be ‘governed’ (cf. Wade, 1990) by an activist and, at times, intrusive state. This East Asian legacy is reinforced in China by a Leninist party-​state that sits at the vanguard of seeking to control economic activity using political tools. Despite the state-​centric nature of China’s political economy, state coordination and control are balanced by an increasingly influential and sophisticated Chinese private sector. Technology innovation is now in large part driven by private entrepreneurship. Although Huawei certainly has close relations with the CCP, it is still a privately owned company built on private ingenuity. Under Sino-​capitalism’s unique dialectic two countervailing forces –​state control top down/​private initiative and entrepreneurship bottom up –​are balanced. Critically, the CCP party-​state has throughout the reform period opted to tolerate private capital accumulation. Pragmatic reforms utilizing various localized and controlled experiments (Heilmann, 2018) have enabled policy makers to come up with institutional solutions to the challenges of a developing transition economy. Experimentation and tinkering then enabled further private sector and market development, creating dynamic cycles of induced reforms. Each small step at restructuring created demands for further 197

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modifications (Jefferson and Rawski, 1994; Naughton, 1995), ultimately creating a globalized, marketized, yet state-​coordinated political economy. In sum, Sino-​capitalism represents a novel form of capitalism rooted in Chinese history. But it should not merely be conceived of as ‘state capitalism’. Sino-​capitalism incorporates a highly entrepreneurial and dynamic private sector. To be sure, like its industrializing predecessors in East Asia, China has used industrial policy programmes to subsidize investments in ‘strategic industries’ and provide other policy supports to nurture cutting-​edge industrial capacities (So and Chu, 2015). Yet, as noted earlier, other aspects of China’s political economy have been highly liberalized. How to make sense of this dialectical contradiction? First, I must recap that China does represent a form of capitalism (McNally, 2007). The relentless human drive to accumulate capital stands at the centre of its vibrancy. This further implies that China is bound to continue to integrate globally, just as all other forms of capitalism have. Second, the variety of capitalism China produced assigns the party-state an outsized role in supporting and managing the economy, including private capital (Naughton and Tsai, 2015). Under Xi Jinping the CCP is exerting even more active control over economic matters (Economy, 2018; Lardy, 2019). Nonetheless, quite a few policies over the past years have sought to regularize and institutionalize aspects of the political economy, a progression that is common in all cases of capitalist development. Despite increased centralization of state power, market reforms, including in the power generation and, most importantly, financial sectors, are progressing. Third, Chinese government initiatives to upgrade the economy and develop indigenous technology depend on the vibrancy of the Chinese private sector. In many key areas of research and development, including IC chips, Artificial Intelligence, alternative energy, electric vehicles, the internet and so forth, the Chinese private sector is at the forefront of innovation. At the core of the CCP’s legitimacy is sustained economic and social development. Even Xi’s centralization cannot disturb the basic dialectic of Sino-​capitalism. The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is tied to the vibrancy of Chinese private entrepreneurship and capital accumulation. A symbolic representation of this reality was when Xi attempted in late 2018 to reassure private Chinese entrepreneurs that their businesses would be protected by the CCP (Olsen, 2018). He promised equal treatment of the private and public sectors, saying personal and private property rights would be safeguarded. He also promised ‘substantial’ tax cuts, bailout funds and other benefits to private industry. For its own survival, the CCP needs to sustain the dialectic of Sino-​capitalism, enabling private capital accumulation, entrepreneurship and innovation. Xi Jinping’s administration is thus undertaking reforms to strengthen the role of state and Party, while at the same time sustaining conditions 198

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for private entrepreneurship, especially at the technology frontier. Such efforts also increasingly focus on restructuring the economy to generate greater domestic consumption, thereby diminishing China’s dependence on overseas markets and suppliers. And it encompasses substantial financial reforms that are opening capital markets and altering the role of the state banking system. Therefore, even though the political climate has clearly shifted, the souring of the mood in the West vis-​à-​vis China cannot solely be traced back to Xi Jinping’s rule. China is now the second-​largest economy on earth, seeking to capture the leading frontiers of global technology innovation. The country is also spreading its influence via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, outreach to Eastern Europe, and many other initiatives. No wonder that China’s growing power is creating a backlash in the West. This is exactly in keeping with what realist IR theory would predict. However, debates in the West still do not take into account the full nature and logic of what China’s rising challenge represents. Most pertinently, Sino-​ capitalism is viewed through one-​sided prisms. These tend to range from images of a nefarious form of state capitalism unfairly stealing technology to an inefficient state-​dominated behemoth bound to collapse. The vibrancy and key role of the Chinese private sector, except in business circles, is either glossed over or then merely seen as an extension of the state sector. As a result, analyses end up with the wrong conclusions. Although Sino-​capitalism contains destabilizing dynamics, the system is for now sustainable. Consequently, China cannot be contained à la the Soviet Union. It is wrong to imagine that the United States, or even the West at large, has the capacity to suppress China in something resembling a Cold War scenario. This time has passed. Economic decoupling from China would exact enormous economic costs and fail to achieve its intended goal of weakening or even destroying the CCP. Put differently, the West will need to learn to live with a strong and prosperous China containing a political system and form of capitalism quite unlike any history has seen. Pressure can be put on China to reform its economy to level the playing field and create opportunities for Western business, such as regarding intellectual property rights protections, forced technology transfers and market access. But Western hopes to change fundamental aspects of the system are fantasy. Sino-​capitalism’s challenge to the West is thus complex and nuanced. The binary debate derived from IR theory makes two major mistakes: on one side, Sino-​capitalism’s vibrancy and deep integration into global production and financial systems is not sufficiently taken into account (Pan, 2009). Containment strategies and economic decoupling to forestall the ‘Chinese’ challenge are not realistic in an open, integrated, capitalist world system. 199

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In fact, such policies directly undermine the fundaments of the liberal international order upon which Western power continues to rest. On the other side, Sino-​capitalism truly represents a challenge to the liberal international order since its competitive advantages, often reliant on activist state interventions, are creating the potential to capture leading-​edge industries. Such industries stand at the centre of modern power projection and could form the groundwork for Chinese hegemony (Modelski and Thompson, 1996; Rapkin and Thompson, 2013). No one should forget that China’s rise represents the first time in modern history that a non-​Western power could decisively shape global commerce and finance. Yet, this will in no small part rely on Sino-​capitalism’s bottom-​up dynamics of highly energetic and entrepreneurial private firms, now growing into formidable global competitors and innovators. Like any form of developing capitalism, Sino-​capitalism is spreading globally, bringing with it the very dialectical characteristics seen within China: a myriad of small Chinese firms multiplying from Zambia to Tonga; by now very large private companies starting to challenge Western incumbents; state-​driven capital represented in particular by the massive state banking system; and the intensifying application of new power sources to exercise economic statecraft and diplomacy.

Sino-​capitalism in the global system The global integration of Sino-​capitalism, a process that is continuing, means that the realist-​inspired conception of China as a revisionist power seeking to overturn the US-​established order in whole is misleading. Sino-​ capitalism incorporates both economically liberal as well as heavily state-​ guided activities. Like all forms of capitalism, it depends on a healthy global economy and the rules and norms that govern it. Even using ‘selectively’ revisionist (Glaser, 2019) to describe China’s stance gives the impression that Beijing aims to undermine or overturn established institutions. In those aspects of the liberal international order pertaining to human rights and the spread of liberal democratic principles, Chinese statecraft aims to constrain and redirect (Roy, 2020). However, so far Chinese policies have not attempted to overturn established institutions. Rather, the goal is to transform the international order incrementally so that it conforms better to Chinese interests (Nye, 2018). This is most evident in the global political economy. Here there are no major institutional arrangements that China wants to undermine or sabotage –​the preferred method is to exert influence from within, as China has been able to do successfully with various agencies of the United Nations. If this method is shut off, the new institutions China builds, such as the AIIB, actually resemble established institutions in both set-​up and ideational outlook (Gabusi, 2017). 200

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Put bluntly, the conception of China practising a nefarious form of state capitalism intent on taking over the world is wrong. For sure, Sino-​capitalism is a state-​centric system that uses state power to strategically build new industries and technologies. There is a strong strand of techno-​nationalism contained in Chinese industrial policy. Some initiatives, such as the Thousand Talents Program, which seeks to recruit leading international experts in scientific research, innovation and entrepreneurship, smack of a systematic effort to acquire new technology for economic and military advantage. Similarly, Chinese policies tend to exist in grey areas and use all methods to acquire advanced technology, including joint ventures, overseas acquisitions and outright cybertheft. It is from this vantage point that the profound challenge of Sino-​capitalism manifests: the combination of a highly powerful centralized state with few constraints and little transparency in combination with an able and nimble Chinese private sector. Perhaps no event presaged this challenge more vividly than the takeover of the German robotics firm Kuka by the Chinese white goods maker Midea in 2016. The takeover by a private Chinese firm of such an advanced and pivotal concern created a distinct new feeling of ‘angst’ in German business circles, most of which had hitherto been very positive about China. Sino-​capitalism’s combination of state guidance and private initiative increasingly was perceived as being in the process of procuring the crown jewels of German industry. An inevitable backlash followed that restricted Chinese investment in Germany. The domestic dialectical qualities of Sino-​capitalism are thus recalibrating the global political economy and creating dialectical dynamics at the international level. A brief proviso is in order. The rising global influence of a state-​centric form of capitalism is no historical anomaly. Modern capitalism evolved via mercantilism, a form of capitalism under which the state actively supports private capital accumulation, including the use of force. And as capitalism enveloped the globe in the 19th and 20th centuries, state-​ centric forms of capitalism shaped most instances of successful late capitalist development (Gerschenkron, 1962), including in Europe and East Asia. Nonetheless, Sino-​capitalism’s global heft is unprecedented. It is creating a counter-​point, an antithesis to the dominance of the neoliberal economic order, now headed by large corporations in the West (Crouch, 2017). Sino-​ capitalism is often subsumed under the discursive category of the ‘new state capitalism’ (Alami and Dixon, forthcoming). These forms of capitalism are characterized by the growing importance of state-​centralized capital. Sino-​capitalism is by far the most important representative of the new state capitalism, armed with an enormous mountain of capital centralized within and controlled by the Chinese party-state. On the international level, this fact is creating both synergy and contestation. As Sino-​capitalism interacts with the global economy, the episodic intensification of competition among 201

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capitalist firms to capture leading economic sectors is starting to shape geopolitical rivalry. This rivalry, however, is neither purely economic nor political. It might best be summarized as ‘capitalism against capitalism’ (Albert, 1993). Intriguingly, the international dialectic pitting Sino-​capitalism against neoliberal capitalism is not only reshaping global economic arrangements and power balances, but also recalibrating domestic economic arrangements in the West. These have been trending towards liberalization for the past four decades. But now the threat of state capitalism is used by Western governments to justify tougher policy stances vis-​à-​vis China. In turn, this is giving rise to more statism at the traditional centre of the global economy (Alami and Dixon, forthcoming). Geopolitical rivalry in the early 21st century is thus inherently linked to newly industrializing economies, chiefly in Asia, that are moving from the periphery of global value creation to the centre. New statist developmental modalities in what is now the semi-​periphery are fuelling anxieties in the West. As a consequence, a turn towards increasingly statist policies can be observed at the centre of global capitalism, including in the United States. A crucial feedback loop is occurring: combined and uneven development opened up opportunities for China to move up the value-​added ladder and transform the global division of labour. Up until several years ago many Western economic observers actually expected Sino-​capitalism to become increasingly liberal and converge with the neoliberal economic order. The business synergies and market opportunities Sino-​capitalism generated stood front and centre. Over time, however, the open juxtaposition of state capitalist guidance top down with vibrant private entrepreneurship bottom up, unlike anything found in the West, reshaped China’s image. Perhaps it is understandable that Sino-​capitalism became imagined as a state capitalist ‘other’, a deviant and deceitful economic power threatening the Western liberal order. In this manner, Sino-​capitalism can be excluded from the accepted capitalist universe, considered aberrant and thus delegitimized. A more productive approach is to focus on a dialectical narrative. Sino-​ capitalism, together with state capitalisms in the developing world in general, is forming an antithesis to neoliberal economic orthodoxy, the thesis hitherto. As inter-​capitalist competition heats up, Western corporations and state actors are using the state capitalist ‘other’ to justify policy responses that ironically are themselves increasingly turning towards statism, manifested by the rise of new techno-​nationalist policies in Europe, the United States and beyond. At the historical turning point when Sino-​capitalism is emerging as a global force, the West is not strengthening its liberal economic principles. Quite the opposite, Western political and business leaders seek an expansion of state prerogatives, even leading to some emulation of Sino-​capitalist practices. Statism in the East seems to increasingly beget statism in the West. 202

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In sum, the dialectical approach taken here can open up new conceptual and theoretical frontiers in the study of IR. The global political economy is clearly witnessing a sea change. The neoliberal economic order, already under strain due to internal contradictions, especially rising income inequalities, is being reshaped by Sino-​capitalism. Neoliberal market principles are melded with neo-​statist practices (McNally, 2020) to re-​legitimize the state’s role in the economy, especially to mediate inter-​capitalist competition and technology creation. Sino-​capitalism’s ascendance has created a new economic discourse in inter-​capitalist competition.

Conclusion: enriching IR theory with dialectical perspectives The use of open dialectics enables us to uncover the implications of China’s rise for the international order with considerably more complexity and nuance than the dominant strands of IR theory. These theories, despite much development and diversity, remain primarily mono-​causal, mono-​directional and mono-​disciplinary in nature, while only focusing on one level of analysis. Realism emphasizes the anarchical nature of the international system, with states jockeying for power and advantage (Morgenthau, 1954). It concentrates on analysing the balance of power among states, arguing that any change in the distribution of power will increase international friction and create amplified competition for security (Mearsheimer, 2014). Especially if an established power feels threatened by an up-​and-​coming power, the classical Thucydides Trap scenario appears (Allison, 2017). Power transition theory is closely related to realism but emphasizes a lot less the role of balance of power politics and anarchy. Rather, its central claim is that the international system is hierarchical in nature, dominated by one major power at the top, the hegemon (Organski, 1958). This hegemon creates and sustains the international order, in particular by providing international public goods, such as the norms and rules sustaining global commerce and interstate relations. Because of uneven economic growth rates, new powers regularly rise, potentially destabilizing the system (Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy, 1987). Still, even after a hegemon has ceased to be the most powerful actor in an international system, the usefulness of the institutions it created can persuade emerging powers into continuing to support them (Keohane, 1984). Hence, aspects of power transition theory create a transition to liberal institutionalism. Its proponents stress the strength of the liberal international order, especially its openness to newcomers, its constitutive nature and the strong institutions sustaining it (Ikenberry, 2011). International anarchy, in this view, is mediated by both the hierarchical nature of hegemony and the constitutionalism of the rules and institutions it creates. 203

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As the China debate illustrates, these IR theories provide important avenues for understanding China’s international ascent. Nonetheless, they limit the canvas upon which our analysis rests, omitting crucial factors and dynamics shaping international relations. Their single discipline framework is inadequate for grasping the full panoply of consequences generated by the rise of Sino-​capitalism (Pan and Kavalski, 2018). IR theory must be enriched by insights derived from political economy. First and foremost, the international system is not merely constituted by states. The actions of states, while embedded in a geopolitical security environment, are also conditioned by global capitalist competition focused on markets and corporations (Wallerstein, 2004). Indeed, the nature and logic of the global capitalist system fundamentally constrains and shapes state action, since geopolitical success is ultimately dependent upon capturing leading economic sectors at the forefront of technology (Modelski and Thompson, 1996). Second, as soon as global capitalist competition is seen as shaping interstate relations, analytical emphasis turns to the domestic arrangements driving and sustaining capital accumulation. The state cannot be solely conceived of as a unitary and self-​contained unit. A multi-​level approach is necessary that incorporates dynamics at both the international and domestic levels. Such two-​level analysis (cf. Putnam, 1988) ideally incorporates multidirectional interactions. ‘Second image’ explanations (Waltz, 1959) focusing on how domestic politics affect international actions need to be combined with ‘second image reversed’ (Gourevitch, 1978) dynamics that pay attention to how global factors mould the internal workings of major political economies. An open dialectical approach captures such multidirectional interaction to create a more empirically fine-​grained view. It is thus well suited to trace the contradictory nuances of how Sino-​capitalism is shaping the international political economy. Such an analytical framework reveals Sino-​capitalism’s domestic arrangements as reverberating into the domestic politico-​economic activities of other major economic powers. Put together, the analytical framework used here emphasizes the interaction between interstate and inter-​capitalist competition at the global level. It also requires a multilevel analysis combining ‘second image’ with ‘second image reversed’ narratives. In this fashion, it allows us to understand how the rise of Sino-​capitalism is destabilizing the neoliberal economic order. At this point in time, however, increased statism remains tempered by continued global market integration and competition. The thesis and antithesis pitting the neoliberal economic order against the ‘new state capitalisms’ outlined in the previous section remains far from resolved. The dynamics uncovered by this analytical framework point to a complex and messy scenario for the future: aspects of neo-​liberalism will persist, but the liberal international order with the United States as its undisputed leader 204

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is coming to an end. An ideological muddle is emerging that combines neo-​statism with the still powerful forces of neoliberalism (McNally, 2020). Those advocating a decoupling of global economies fail to see how strong capitalist forces are. To be sure, powerful states can ignore these forces and aim to constrain, even curtail, them. But they do so at their own peril since the sustenance of technology leadership necessitates increased, not decreased, global economic integration and competition. This analytical point cannot be repeated sufficiently. At the base of the global political economy is a dialectical juxtaposition of state power and capitalist competition. These forces are deeply intertwined since geopolitical power rests upon successful capital accumulation. Yet, they also stand in contradiction to each other since they are sustained by different logics. The global capitalist system at first welcomed the rise of Sino-​capitalism. Multinational corporations rushed into the Chinese market, and Chinese investment was cheered in most locales. But as Sino-​capitalism matured and developed technological capacities rivalling those of corporations in advanced industrial economies, geopolitical concerns rose to the fore. The resulting destabilization of the neoliberal economic order ushered in techno-​ nationalist tendencies globally. Neither the realist nor the liberal institutionalist perspectives of IR theory depict these dynamics and possible scenarios. They sacrifice complexity in the name of theoretical parsimony. In contrast, capturing dialectical dynamics necessitates the development of interwoven multilevel narratives that paint intricate, but often puzzling pictures. As outlined in this chapter, the initial emphasis of my narrative rests on the role of China’s domestic political economy in generating the unique dialectic of Sino-​capitalism. Then, it rests on how Sino-​capitalism interacts with the international political economy, in turn reshaping state–​capital relations within major powers. Throughout this, I draw attention to the centrality of capitalist logics in ordering international relations and the importance of capturing complex multidirectional change. This dialectical approach immediately enriches the insights and prescriptions derived from the major strands of IR theory. By utilizing an open evolutionary method, it is more dynamic than the binary debate on China. To be sure, Thucydides Trap remains a distinct possibility, but it is likely to be conditioned by the logic of global capitalist synergy. Perhaps the ‘capitalist peace theory’ (Weede, 2005), which posits that advanced capitalist political economies do not engage in war with each other, holds true even for China. In any case, dichotomous views of China’s rise –​China is either ‘playing our game’ (Steinfeld, 2010) or engaging in a nefarious attempt to overturn the liberal international order (Pompeo, 2020) –​must be superseded. On the one hand, liberal optimism that China will be constrained by the strength 205

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of international institutions is misplaced. Other forces at play, though, could condition ‘peaceful coexistence’ of China with the global order. In particular, capitalist accumulation necessitates relatively open systems combining competition with synergy. On the other hand, the prescriptions some policy makers have derived from realist IR theory are unlikely to work in inhibiting Chinese ambitions. For example, full economic decoupling between China and the United States would involve such dislocation that it would upend the business models of major American corporations (for example Walmart) and undermine economic growth and wealth in the United States. Unilateral moves to fully sever ties in a globally networked capitalist system carry enormous risks. This is the beauty of capitalist integration: moving closer together creates synergies and generates wealth; moving apart creates barriers and damages wealth. Any economic decoupling taking place is thus likely to be very partial and focused on particular sectors. Even during the global COVID-​ 19 pandemic of 2020, with all its economic disruptions, US–​China trade held steady when compared to 2019. Finally, the dialectical analytical framework employed here draws attention to the powerful role of ideas. Both the liberal and realist approaches to IR theory are tinged with heavy doses of ideology, one optimistic, the other pessimistic. They generate powerful ideas on how the international system works and what to expect from its dynamics in the future. While most academic work is nuanced and at pains to distinguish historical analysis from ideological prescription, dangers loom in the simplicity of IR theories. It is all too easy to move from the Thucydides Trap scenario to actually expecting war, making the scenario a self-​fulfilling prophecy. The dialectical approach taken here can provide alternative interpretations regarding the implications of China’s rise. No neat picture derived from a singular theoretical construct emerges; rather a two-​directional dialectic full of incongruous and paradoxical features. This brings us back to the most likely future scenario this approach paints for the 2020s: an uneasy marriage of neo-​statism encompassing various forms of increased state intervention with continued global market competition and integration. I term this the chaotic mélange (McNally, 2020). Sino-​capitalism interfaces with the continued power of global markets and the remnants of the neoliberal economic order to create an uneasy transitional era. In this context, the global COVID-​19 pandemic is most likely to accentuate the chaotic mélange. Both continued global integration and increased state intervention are likely to be employed to decrease economic, social and political risks in the aftermath of the pandemic. Nevertheless, the chaotic mélange should not be seen as outlining a pre-​set scenario. Rather, it harnesses the investigative power of an open evolutionary dialectical approach to force analytical openness. Dialectics are 206

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inherently wobbly, pitting two major opposing forces against each other. In this manner, they enable the creation of narratives that leave room for a multitude of interactions ranging from antagonism and competition to coexistence and symbiosis. References Acharya, A. and Buzan, B. (2017) ‘Why Is There No Non-​Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years On’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 17(3): 1–​30. Alami, I. and Dixon, A.D. (forthcoming) The Specter of State Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Albert, M. (1993) Capitalism Against Capitalism [trans. Paul Haviland]. London: Whurr Publishers. Allison, G. (2017) Destined for War? New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Campbell, K. and Ratner, E. (2018) ‘The China Reckoning’, Foreign Affairs, 97(2): 60-​70. Chang, G.G. (2001) The Coming Collapse of China. New York: Random House. Christensen, T.J. (2015) The China Challenge. New York: W.W. Norton. Crouch, C. (2017) Can Neo-​liberalism Be Saved from Itself? London: Social Europe Edition. Economy, E. (2018) The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eckstein, H. (1975) ‘Case Studies and Theory in Political Science’ in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7. Reading, MA: Addison-​Wesley, pp 79–​138. Faure, D. (2006) China and Capitalism. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Gabusi, G. (2017) ‘Crossing the River by Feeling the Gold’, China & World Economy, 25(5): 23–​45. Gates, H. (1996) China’s Motor. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Gerschenkron, A. (1962) Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gilpin, R. (1981) War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Glaser, B. (2019) ‘China as a Selective Revisionist Power in the International Order’, ISEAS Perspective, no 21, Singapore, 5 April, https://​ www.iseas.edu.sg/​images/​pdf/​ISEAS_​Perspective_​2019_​21.pdf Gourevitch, P. (1978) ‘The Second Image Reversed’, International Organization, 32(4): 881–​912. Heilmann, S. (2018) Red Swan. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Ikenberry, G. (2011) Liberal Leviathan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Jefferson, G. and Rawski, T. (1994) ‘Enterprise Reform in Chinese Industry’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(2): 47–​70. Kang, D. (2007) China Rising. New York: Columbia University Press. Kavalski, E. (2018) The Guanxi of Relational International Theory. London: Routledge. Kennedy, P. (1987) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Penguin Random House. Keohane, R. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lampton, D.M. (2008) The Three Faces of Chinese Power. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lardy, N. (2019) The State Strikes Back. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. McNally, C.A. (2007) ‘China’s Capitalist Transition: The Making of a New Variety of Capitalism’, Comparative Social Research, 24: 177–​203. McNally, C.A. (ed) (2008) China’s Emergent Political Economy: Capitalism in the Dragon’s Lair. London: Routledge. McNally, C.A. (2012) ‘Sino-​capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the International Political Economy’, World Politics, 64(4): 741–​76. McNally, C.A. (2018) ‘Tracing the Emergence of Sino-​capitalism: Social Change and Development in Contemporary China’ in H. Fagan and R. Munck (eds), Handbook on Development and Social Change. Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, pp 269–​90. McNally, C.A. (2019) ‘Theorizing Sino-​capitalism: Implications for the Study of Comparative Capitalisms’, Contemporary Politics, 25(3): 313–​33. McNally, C.A. (2020) ‘Chaotic Mélange: Neo-​liberalism and Neo-​statism in the Age of Sino-​capitalism’, Review of International Political Economy, 27(2): 281–​301. Mearsheimer, J. (2014) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics [updated edition]. New York: W.W. Norton. Minzner, C. (2018) End of an Era: How China’s Authoritarian Revival Is Undermining Its Rise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Modelski, G. and Thompson, W. (1996) Leading Sectors and World Powers. Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press. Morgenthau, H.J. (1954) Politics Among Nations. New York: Knopf. Naughton, B. (1995) Growing Out of the Plan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Naughton, B. and Tsai, K. (eds) (2015) State Capitalism, Institutional Adaptation, and the Chinese Miracle. New York: Cambridge University Press. Nye, J. (2018) ‘Human Rights and the Fate of the Liberal Order’, Project Syndicate, 9 May.

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Olsen, Kelly (2018) ‘China’s Xi Tries to Reassure the Country’s Worried Private Companies’, CNBC, [online] 8 November, https://​ www.cnbc.com/​2018/​11/​09/​chinas-​xi-​tries-​to-​reassure-​the-​countrys-​ worried-​private-​companies.html Organski, A.F.K. (1958) World Politics. New York: Knopf. Pan, C. (2009) ‘What Is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the “Rise of China” in Global Production Networks’, Journal of Contemporary China, 18(58): 7–​25. Pan, C. and Turner, O. (2017) ‘Neoconservatism as Discourse: Virtue, Power and US Foreign Policy’, European Journal of International Relations, 23(3): 74–​96. Pan, C. and Kavalski, E. (2018) ‘Theorizing China’s Rise in and Beyond International Relations’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 18(3): 289–​311. Pompeo, M. (2020) ‘Communist China and the Free World’s Future’, Speech at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, 23 July, https://​www.state.gov/c​ ommunist-c​ hina-​and-​the-​free-​worlds-​future/​ Putnam, R. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics’, International Organization, 42(3): 427–​60. Rapkin, D. and Thompson, W. (2013) Transition Scenarios. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Roy, D. (2020) ‘China Is Not a Threat to US Liberty or Democracy’, Asia Times, [online] 28 October, https://​ a siatimes.com/​ 2 020/​ 1 0/​ china-​is-​not-​a-​threat-​to-​us-​liberty-​or-​democracy/​ So, A. and Chu, Y. (2015) The Global Rise of China. Cambridge: Polity. Steinfeld, E. (2010) Playing Our Game. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wallerstein, I.M. (2004) World-​systems Analysis. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Waltz, K. (1959) Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press. Weede, Erich (2005) Balance of Power, Globalization and the Capitalist Peace. Potsdam: Liberal Verlag. Zheng, B. (2005) ‘China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great-​Power Status’, Foreign Affairs, 84(5): 18-​24. Zheng, Y. (2010) The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor. London: Routledge. Zoellick, R. (2005) ‘Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?’, Remarks to the National Committee on US–​China Relations, New York City, 21 September.

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China’s Rise as Holographic Transition: A Relational Challenge to International Relations’ Newtonian Ontology Chengxin Pan

Introduction The study of China’s rise in International Relations (IR) is at a crossroads. Every conceivable question about the rise of China seems to have already been asked, and nearly every theoretical perspective has been deployed to shed light on this remarkable phenomenon. In the face of an extremely diverse and still-​g rowing body of literature, one wonders what else may be added to the booming debate on China’s rise. To some, the attention should now focus more on rigorous empirical testing of existing competing perspectives (Kang, 2003/​04; Chen, 2012: 71). To others, the rise of China demands nothing less than the search for a new vocabulary (Kavalski, 2014) and the further development of IR theories, perhaps particularly from Chinese perspectives (Zhao, 2009; Qin, 2009; 2010; 2016; 2018). Such emphases on further empirical and theoretical investigations are indeed necessary, and many scholars have already contributed interesting findings and stimulating insights (Kang, 2007; Zhu, 2008; Buzan, 2010; Glaser, 2011; Garlick, 2016; Hameiri and Jones, 2016; Pan and Lo, 2017; He, 2021). In this chapter, I take a different approach and turn attention to a hitherto seldom examined aspect in the China debate, namely its ontological underpinnings. Just as mainstream IR theories are substantialist in their ontological orientations (Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 293; Pan, 2021), the dominant approaches to China’s rise have been informed by a substantialist ontology. In the otherwise heated China debate, what is rarely questioned 210

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is a shared ontological assumption about China as a more or less independent and self-​contained entity. This assumption is based on a classical Cartesian/​Newtonian worldview, which has not only heavily shaped the development of modern science, but also influenced the ways social scientists understand human society. In the IR context, this conventional ontology assumes that the international system is made up of largely self-​contained (though possibly interdependent and/​or potentially socializable) units such as sovereign states, each possessing a certain essential and distinctive identity and occupying a more or less clearly demarcated territorial space. With the China debate so far largely silent on the issue of ontology (with the possible exception of Zhao Tingyang’s and Qin Yaqing’s works, for example Zhao, 2006; Qin, 2009; also Chapter 3), China’s rise has been framed primarily within this conventional ontological parameter. Yet, the ‘rise of China’ provides both a good opportunity to question this dominant ontological metanarrative and an empirical case for exploring the promises of what I call a ‘holographic relational ontology’. Building on, but going further than, the relational turn’s emphasis on relations and relationality, the holographic relational ontology is concerned with a particular type of relationality between parts and whole. Drawing on the holographic principle in quantum physics that each part contains information about the whole, this ontology in the IR context sees the world as a hologram in which each state is a situated holographic microcosm of that world (Pan, 2020). From this perspective, both ‘China’ and its relations with the world can be understood in different, more dynamic, and more complex ways. The chapter proceeds in four parts. First, it will briefly examine how the Newtonian ontology has informed the IR discipline in general and the study of China’s rise in particular, before it turns to a survey of some alternative ontological positions from poststructuralist, relational and emergent perspectives. Second, proposing a holographic relational ontology, I develop concepts such as holographic transition in order to shed new light on state transformation in international relations. Next, turning to China, I examine how its rise is more than another classic example of power transition (Organski, 1961; Organski and Kugler, 1980) or straight-​ line Westernization, but a case of complex holographic transition: that is, China’s rise is best understood as a process of China’s further enfolding of the world. China is thus not just China but ongoing holographic reflections of the complex world with which it is inextricably bound up. The final section explores how the holographic ontology allows a fresh approach to both understanding and dealing with profound global challenges of a holographic nature, with the rise of China being just one example. 211

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The Newtonian ontology in IR and its discontents Ontology ‘lies at the beginning of any inquiry’ (Cox, 1996: 144). A particularly influential ontology in both natural sciences and social sciences in the West has been a Cartesian/​Newtonian worldview and ontology (Capra, 1999, 22; McMullin, 2001; Heylighen et al, 2007). This ontological foundation, referred to as ‘substantialism’ (see Emirbayer, 1997), allows both natural and social scientists to define their objects of study as intrinsically independent units whose relations, treated as a derivative phenomenon, are largely mechanistic and compositional in nature. Not immune from this ontological influence (Zanotti, 2013; Kavalski, 2020), IR has long been predicated on the Newtonian ‘geographic division of the world into mutually exclusive territorial states’ (Agnew, 1995: 379). With some exceptions (Callahan, 2004; Breslin, 2005; Agnew, 2010; Pan, 2012; Ling, 2013; Garlick, 2016), mainstream IR theories have to a large extent dominated the study of China’s rise (Garlick, 2016: 287). Although scholars disagree with what China’s rise means, they share the ontological starting point that China is a separate, atomistic entity. This common assumption about China’s being reflects a deep-​seated Newtonian substantialist ontology of things (see also Chapter 4). Ontology conditions the way we both conceptualize and practise power relations in world politics (Stout and Love, 2015: 448–​9). In the China context, the Newtonian ontology helps set the parameters for understanding what China is, where the China challenges come from, who is responsible for those challenges, and how they should be dealt with, all of which are enormously important questions of our time. For example, both Barrack Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy and Donald Trump’s trade sanctions on ‘Chinese’ imports hinged on the ontological assumption of China as a self-​ contained actor who is primarily responsible for the China challenge, hence the natural target of their policies. Given that ontology is never far removed from IR theory and practice (Wight, 2006; Odysseos, 2007; Hay, 2011: 461; Zanotti, 2015), there have been some critical reflections on the dominant Newtonian ontology. Three alternative ontological positions can be identified in the IR literature: (i) discursive ontology; (ii) relational ontology; and (iii) emergent ontology. Discursive ontology is an umbrella term that encompasses critical constructivist, critical geopolitical, feminist and poststructuralist reflections on ontology. Sharing an anti-​foundationalist position, these perspectives argue that things and phenomena such as regions, states, sovereignty, anarchy, security, interests, identity, gender and norms are not objective entities or objects out there, but socially constituted through language and discursive practice in (often gendered) power relations (Peterson, 1992; Wendt, 1992; Walker, 1993; Agnew, 1994; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ashley, 1988; Campbell, 212

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1998; Dalby, 2003). Their contingent being cannot be understood outside of meaning, interpretation and discourse (Bleiker, 2002: 25). Discursive ontology (Hansen, 2006: 17) treats language, symbols, discourse and intersubjective meaning as ontologically fundamental (see Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 16). Whereas discursive ontology emphasizes an ontology of things as inseparable from discourse, relational ontology focuses on relationality as the primordial condition of being. Relational ontology has a long history in philosophical inquiries such as Martin Heidegger’s notion of ‘Being-​in-​the-​world’ (see Odysseos, 2007) and in sociology (Donati, 2011). Its growing popularity has led to a ‘relational turn’ in recent critical IR scholarship (Bousquet and Curtis, 2011; Jackson and Nexon, 1999; Shih, 2016; see also Chapters 3–​4). Drawing from relational sociology, Jackson and Nexon (1999: 301) suggest that social interaction should be treated as ‘logically prior to the entities doing the interacting’. In part to challenge the conventional constructivists’ re-​reification of agent and structure as essential, pre-​existing entities such as in Wendt’s (pre-​quantum) structural constructivism, Qin Yaqing turns to traditional Chinese cultures for a relational ontology of interconnectedness, without which things, persons and events would not exist (Zhao, 2009: 10, 15; Qin, 2016: 36; Qin, 2018). A third type of ontological intervention comes from emergent ontology. An important concept in philosophy, emergence refers to the phenomenon of emergent properties existing at the level of ‘an emergent whole’, but irreducible to the properties of the parts at the sub-​level (Wight, 2006: 110; Heylighen et al, 2007: 120). As a particular iteration of relational ontology (Heylighen et al, 2007: 121), this notion has begun to gain traction in IR (Wight, 2006; Joseph and Wight, 2010; Kavalski, 2015; Wagner, 2016). The idea of complex systems with emergent properties challenges Newton’s closed systems (Wight, 2015: 67–​8; Heylighen et al, 2007: 121). And yet, some forms of the emergent ontology may be best described as a ‘reformed’ Newtonian ontology insofar as they lack a social emergent ontology about the ‘parts’, which remain as parts, ontologically separable from one another as well as from the emergent whole, unaffected by the latter except at the level of ‘behavior’ (Heylighen et al, 2007: 122). This largely unidirectional emergent ontology is characteristic, for example, of Waltz’s structural realism (Waltz, 1979). Employing an emergent ontology at the systemic, but not state, level (Wight, 2015: 62–​3), Waltz explains state behaviour rather than its ontological connection with the system. Thus, even as Waltz seeks to rectify unit-​level reductionism, his ‘structural realism’ remains wedded to an individualist, hence Newtonian, ontology (Ashley, 1984; Wight, 2006: 75). Wendt (2015: 33) addresses this structuralist shortcoming through the notion of quantum emergence, which argues that ‘agents and structures are both emergent effects of practices’. In this quantum emergent 213

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ontology, the identity of parts cannot be separated from the whole (Wendt, 2015: 257): ‘parts and whole are “co-​emergent,” rather than only the latter emerging from an ontologically prior base of the former’ (Wendt, 2015: 257; emphasis in the original). These alternative ontological stances have mounted important challenges to the dominant Newtonian ontology, but there is room for further exploring ontological alternatives. In relational sociology, for instance, beyond ‘a clear belief in the importance and centrality of relations … there is no consensus or coherent research program’ (Eacott, 2018: 32). Poststructuralists such as Lyotard, Derrida and Foucault are mostly interested in ‘undermining’ existing ontologies (Choat, 2010: 130), which has led some to argue that poststructuralists have yet to elaborate an explicit social ontology of their own (Wight, 2006: 82; Howarth, 2013: 22). While these non-​Newtonian ontological reflections all believe that the world exists in relationality, it remains unclear how exactly relationality exists and in what sense (Pan, 2020). Building on and going beyond these important ontological reflections, I now outline a more specific relational ontology through holographic insights drawn from both quantum physics and traditional Asian thoughts.

The promise of a holographic relational ontology What’s in a part? Introducing a holographic relational ontology In the Newtonian classical ontology, the relations between the whole and its parts follow a substantialist logic: ‘the whole is nothing more than the sum of its parts, and … each part is a discrete phenomenon being isolable from the whole and being a fundamental constitutive element of the system’ (King, 1994: 52; see also Bousquet and Curtis, 2011: 45). As such, relations in the classical ontology are additive and compositional. They are epiphenomenal and external to substances, which are believed to exist independently and outside of relations. The holographic relational ontology offers a different perspective on relations between the whole and its parts. Holography is a Nobel Prize-​ winning method of producing a type of three-​dimensional image called a hologram (derived from the Greek words holo, meaning ‘whole’, and gram, meaning ‘to write’, Bohm, 1980: 183; see also Pitts, 1995: 294–​5). In a hologram, ‘each part mirrors the whole, such that one could reconstruct the whole from any of the parts’ (Wendt, 2006: 201). Thus, holographic relations mean the entanglement of the whole inside its parts. Such relations are intrinsic to the being of the parts and cannot be detached from them without affecting their properties or ‘essence’. In this way, holographic relations reveal a form of deep relationality of the world. Such relations have been confirmed, for example, in quantum theory. The picture of hadrons described by the bootstrap theory indicates 214

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that ‘every particle consists of all other particles’ (Capra, 1999: 295–​6). In fractal geometry, holography finds expression in ‘self-​similarity’ or ‘self-​ scaling’, a phenomenon of fractal shapes or patterns repeating themselves at descending scales, ‘so that their parts, at any scale, are similar in shape to the whole’ (Capra, 1996: 138; see also Bohm and Peat, 1987: 152–​6). The fractal geometric phenomenon of holography, widely observable in plants, mountains, rivers, coastlines, lightning, blood vessels and so forth, ‘lies much closer to the forms of nature than do the circles, triangles, and rectangles of Greek geometry’ (Bohm and Peat, 1987: 154). In addition to their connections with quantum physics, systems theory and fractal geometry, holographic ideas are no stranger to many traditional cultures (Capra, 1996). In Mahayana Buddhism, cosmic holographic consciousness is conveyed through the metaphor of Indra’s net. Within this net is ‘a network of pearls, so arranged that if you look at one you see all the others reflected in it. In the same way each object in the world is not merely itself but involves every other object and in fact is everything else’ (Sir Charles Eliot, quoted in Capra, 1999: 296). In China, there exists a strong philosophical tradition of systemic and holistic thinking (Kaptchuk, 1983: 7; Liu, 1990: 115–​17). According to Mencius (2003: Book VII, Part A, 145–​6), ‘All the ten thousand things are there in me’ and ‘a man [sic] who knows his own nature will know Heaven’, meaning that humanity and heaven are holographically resemblant and interlinked (tian ren he yi). Meanwhile, traditional Chinese medical practices such as acupuncture and palmistry are based on similar ideas that various parts of a body, such as ears, feet and hands, mirror the structure of the whole body (see Liu, 1990: 305–​9). The holographic whole–​part relations thus differ from the Newtonian compositional and structural relations of pre-​existing, autonomous parts. According to the holographic relational ontology, from the outset a part as a microcosmic whole owes its very existence, identity and characteristics to its whole(s). Pure parts in the conventional ontological sense of the word do not exist, nor do their supposedly essential characteristics. The ‘inertia of a material object’, as physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach, a critic of Newton’s theories of space and time, observes, ‘is not an intrinsic property of matter, but a measure of its interaction with all the rest of the universe’ (quoted in King, 1994: 55). This ontology highlights the holographic mutual implication and co-​emergence between the whole and its parts (Wendt 2015: 257), a type of relationality existing between, for example, plants and their seeds, chicken and egg, and yin and yang (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014: 144; Ling, 2014: 96–​7). That the whole is in its parts is best understood in an informational sense. Perhaps not coincidentally, holography in Chinese means ‘whole information’ (quanxi 全息). By nature, information does not belong to or stay in one place; it is to be shared, communicated and interrelated. It is 215

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through (infinite) informational interconnectedness across both space and time that ‘our sense experiences, nervous system, and brain are understood as continuous with the whole of the material world’ (Nichol, 2003: 79). In the social world, which cannot be reified as ontologically separate from the natural world, informational interconnectedness depends especially on consciousness, language, ideas and discourse (Wendt, 2015). The process of implicating the information of the whole in its parts is what I call holographic transition or holographic emergence. Holographic transition is an ongoing process in which a part, which must already have been holographically emblematic of its whole(s), continues to reflect and internalize the information of its evolving whole(s). Quantum physicist David Bohm (1980: 251) calls this process enfolding, whereby ‘information … concerning the entire universe of matter [is fused] into each region of space’. Given that there exist multiple wholes, which in turn contain sub-​ wholes as well as parts (which themselves are wholes of still smaller parts, and so ad infinitum), a part’s holographic transition is necessarily a very complex process, rather than a linear, teleological, homogenizing and one-​ off one. The ‘outcome’ of such a process is always transitory and unstable, and cannot be crystallized in the image of any particular whole, let alone its parts. This has important implications for understanding complex and ongoing change in the social world. For example, the West, however dominant in the world as a whole (for example in the form of ‘the liberal international order’), cannot be equated with the world. It is best seen as a holographic part (or more precisely, parts), rather than a universal whole itself (Chakrabarty, 2000). Thus, while China’s holographic transition or its enfolding of the whole certainly involves a certain degree of Westernization, it is not reducible to it. Holographic relations and holographic transition exist in both a spatial and a temporal sense. A part is not only a holographic representation of its multiple worlds in a spatial sense, but also a reflection of its temporal wholes, meaning that it is a product of its traditional linkages as well as its contemporary (and future) entanglements. Consequently, even within apparently the ‘same’ whole, different parts necessarily have different rather than identical informational and discursive holographic connections. This may further account for inevitable variations and contingencies in holographic transition in the world.

International relations as holographic relations: implications for theorizing and methodology Despite increasing attention to relationality in the social sciences and emerging interest in quantum theory in IR (Der Derian, 2013; Wendt, 2015; Der Derian and Wendt, 2020), holographic relationality remains 216

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understudied (Milovanovic, 2013: 1). Wendt’s book (2015) briefly examines the state as a holographic system. But in his own words, that book ‘is all philosophy’, rather than IR (Wendt, 2015: 2). Yet, holographic ontology provides a new way of theorizing IR and doing IR research (see Pan, 2020). I now briefly examine some conceptual and methodological implications for IR in general and for understanding China’s rise in particular. First of all, to the extent that international relations contain parts (such as states) and wholes (such as international society and the global economic system), such relations can be understood in holographic terms. Various parts within the whole of international relations, such as states and non-​state actors, are not self-​contained and discrete things with their own intrinsic properties, but local instantiations of the whole. At a pragmatic level we can still talk about states and their characteristics as if they were separately existent, but to make good sense of them or deal with challenges conventionally associated with them, we need to look at their holographic roots in their wider worlds and understand how such entanglements enable a state to become ‘the way it is’, not as an essential being, but always as a relational process of holographic becoming. All states necessarily emerge from, and contain information of, multiple worlds, and in this sense their relations are not merely inter-​national relations or foreign relations, but also mutually implicated relations that define their very ‘being’. With world politics grounding in a holographic ontology, it becomes possible and indeed imperative to perceive and practise IR in a more dynamic, holistic and cooperative way. ‘Foreign policy’ as a concept, befitting a Newtonian ontology of self (inside, domestic) and Other (outside, foreign), needs to be recast as a global public policy of empathy and common responsibility in dealing with challenges arising from such holographic relations. Poststructuralist, postcolonial and feminist IR literature has usefully deconstructed the essentialist, binary oppositions of identity/​difference, self/​Other, inside/​outside, domestic/​foreign and West/​Rest. But the holographic ontology can help clearly illustrate why such dichotomies are fundamentally flawed: those ‘opposites’ are necessarily holographically entangled. Holographic entanglement does not mean that all parts (such as states) end up being like-​units (Waltz, 1979). The world is not an ideal-​ type holographic system within which each part equally shares the same properties of their holographic whole. As mentioned earlier, parts ‘occupy’ different positions in their spatial and temporal wholes, and such relative and relational differences –​rather than absolute and intrinsic differences –​account for their seemingly unique identities. Second, insofar as holographic relations in global politics are constituted and sustained largely through informational and discursive connections, discourse analysis can help trace the lineage and genealogy of norms and 217

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ideas which make global society hang together. Thus, in a methodological sense, the holographic relational ontology has much in common with the poststructuralist discursive ontology. Yet, while the latter sees things as constructed by discourse, it says little on the ‘being’ of discourse itself. The holographic ontology, by contrast, treats discourse as existing in as well as constitutive of holographic relations. The holographic relational existence of discourse, implied in notions such as discursive formation and intertextuality (Merrell, 1991: 193; Pitts, 1995: 302–​3), can explain why discourse cannot be attributed to a single author and why it (and its associated power effect) appears at once to be everywhere and nowhere. Thanks to their holographic nature, discourse and power go capillary (Foucault, 1980: 142). Third, given the existence of holographic relations in both spatial and temporal terms, understanding a part requires paying attention to both its holographic relationalities in/​with the past and the present, so as to avoid both ahistorical analysis and historicist determinism. History is not destiny in that we are not bound by ancient hatred, nor do we have to mechanically repeat time-​honoured great power tragedy (Mearsheimer, 2001); nor is it something which we can completely transcend (aka the ‘End of History’). We are a holographic part of space and time, our ultimate ontological wholes. Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, knew too well his country’s historically situated holographic ‘identity’: [T]‌he history of India is a long history of her relations with the other countries of Asia. Streams of culture have come to India from the West and the East and been absorbed in India, producing the rich and variegated culture which is India today. At the same time, streams of culture have flowed from India to distant parts of Asia. If you would know India, you have to go to Afghanistan and West Asia, to Central Asia, to China and Japan and to the countries of South-​East Asia. (Nehru, 2011: 315) While Newtonian-​inspired theorizing favours ‘simplifying’ (Waltz, 1979: 6), holographic ontology highlights a strong quantum characteristic of entanglement, complexity, uncertainty and indeterminacy about global life. Instead of a teleological process of homogenization, holographic transition is more multifaceted, multidirectional and dynamic. In this complex mix, scholarly discourses are part and parcel of holographic relations in IR, and rather than merely a neutral analytical tool independent of the world they describe, they are an inherently participatory factor in how holographic relations take shape and evolve. Consequently, holographic reality is necessarily protean and complex, and our theorizing effort ought to reflect it accordingly. 218

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China’s rise as holographic transition China in the world and the world in China Not only is China in the world but the world also exists in China. It is much easier to understand the former equation than the latter because the former is both informed by and describes a Newtonian worldview. Nevertheless, it is also crucial to understand the latter equation, which is more in line with a holographic relational perspective. China qua China is always a dynamic constellation of relations, and what we see as ‘China’s rise’ today is best seen as the intensified emergence of such holographic relations. To highlight China’s contemporary rise as holographic transition does not mean that China was not a holographic part before. Rather, today’s China represents a significant new phase of it, which has yet to be more fully examined in the ‘China’s rise’ literature. From the beginning, ‘China’ may be seen as a holographic project, namely tianxia (All under Heaven). In fact, the term China (Zhongguo 中国 in Chinese) in its contemporary national-​ identity sense is largely absent in traditional Chinese canons. For example, it exists neither in the Confucian classic text Analects nor the Daoist text Daodejing, whereas, by contrast, the word tianxia appears 23 and 60 times respectively. As tianxia, China was open, for example, to Buddhist influence from India. Under the rule of the Mongols, China was introduced to Islamic and Persian medicine. In their study of China, French scholars started to unravel India and Central Asia (Chandra, 1998), meaning that inside so-​ called ‘China’ there were traces of ‘Indian’ and ‘Central Asian’ cultures (which in turn are products of holographic entanglements with their respective wholes). Tu (1994: 4) likens ‘Chinese culture’ to ‘a majestic flowing stream’, arguing that many ‘great outside influences altered this stream at various points’, though the terms ‘stream’ and ‘outside influences’ still do not go far enough in conveying the inherently holographic nature of China’s being/​ becoming. As Rey Chow (1998: 6) points out, the obsession with China and Chineseness among Chinese intellectuals was largely a product of recent world history, which itself testifies to China’s modern holographic emergence in the Eurocentric world of Westphalian statehood and nationalism (see also Zhao, 2005: 8, 13–​14). Given that China has always been a holographic part of its changing worlds, it is no longer adequate to cast its contemporary rise merely in terms of change in power balance (a term which assumes the prior and constant existence of self-​contained actors); it must also be an ongoing process of holographic transition, emergence, worlding or enfolding. The existing literature has made much about a rising China with increasingly global presence (Shambaugh, 2013; Wortzel, 2013). Yet the same literature continues to treat China in ‘national’ terms. While China’s rise has no doubt cast a large shadow on the world, its ability to do so is precisely due, at 219

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least in part, to its transformation as a result of its global connections. That is, China not only has gone global, but many elements of ‘the global’ have simultaneously gone inside ‘China’, thus creating a further globalized China (Zweig, 2002; Zhang, 2003; Pan, 2009; Carlson, 2015). In this ongoing process of mutual implication and co-​emergence between ‘China’ and its multiple worlds, China is never confined to, or merely defined by, itself. In fact, there is no such thing as ‘itself ’ to speak of. In this sense, Aihwa Ong (2005: 18) is right that ‘When a book about China is only about China, it is suspect’. To truly understand China entails considering its global holographic connections. At first sight, the notion of China as a holographically global state flies in the face of its reputation as a stubbornly Westphalian state ring-​fenced with its so-​called Great Firewall, seemingly impervious to foreign influence and particularly liberal change (Mann, 2007). But as noted earlier, holographic transition is never meant to be mere Westernization. If we look only for rapid change in China mostly in our own image, we are likely to overlook or downplay China’s opening up to the wider worlds and to their goods, resources, capital, science and technology, information, norms, cultures, fashions, crises and challenges, among other things. Emanating from these extensive relations is not just the intensification of two-​way transactional flows or interdependence in trade, investment, people and ideas between an otherwise self-​bounded China and the rest of the world, but a China that has been simultaneously transformed in the complex images of its multiple worlds. Such holographic transition, by no means always positive, can be illustrated through the holographic nature of the ‘Chinese’ economy, the ‘Chinese’ state and ‘Chinese’ society. The ‘Chinese’ economy is perhaps China’s holographic transition par excellence. Since the beginning of its opening up policy, the economy has been gradually transformed into a world economy writ small, so to speak. In 2020 China’s total imports and exports reached $4.97 trillion (Xinhua, 2021a), compared to $20.6 billion in 1978. It now ranks as the largest trading nation in the world. By the end of 2018, around 960,000 foreign-​invested enterprises (FIEs) had been set up in China (Schaub et al, 2019), more than doubling the number of 436,800 in 2012 (Xinhua, 2012). China’s actual use of foreign capital in 2018 reached $134.97 billion (excluding the bank, securities and insurance sector), about 150 times the amount in 1983 (Schaub et al, 2019). In 2019 FIEs in China accounted for 39.9 per cent of its total foreign trade value (CGTN, 2020). What these figures reveal is not just increased interdependence between the Chinese economy and the world economy, but also the deepening transformation of the former as a holographic part of the expanding global supply chains and production networks (Pan, 2009). Ranging from computers to smart phones, many so-​ called ‘Made-​in-​China’ products are in fact made by numerous transnational 220

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corporations and suppliers. It has become difficult to ‘speak of … China as a single economic unit’ or to attach ‘an accurate national label’ to ‘the goods and services now produced and traded around the world’ (Ohmae, 1995: 12–​13). Despite the Chinese leadership’s deliberate avoidance of labelling the economy as ‘capitalist’, there is no denying that market capitalism is now part and parcel of it. In the words of Long Yongtu, China’s chief representative in its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession negotiations, ‘China’s economy must become a market economy in order to become part of the global economic system’ (quoted in Lardy, 2002: 21). In this process, FIEs, and the ideas and norms they represent, have played a key role. Consequently, their presence and penetration in China has brought not only higher environmental standards, increased awareness of social corporate responsibility, and modern business management practices to their Chinese partners, but also inappropriate worker relations, corrupt practices and anti-​ competitive behaviour (Enright, 2017). In short, what can be found in the world can be found in China, hence ‘the world in China’. As the private sectors of the Chinese economy grow, even the Communist Party of China (CPC), now welcoming private entrepreneurs into its ranks, could not be immune from being holographically affected. Indeed, the very ideas upon which the CPC was first founded came from Europe. Today, internal CPC reforms continue to be influenced by the multiple worlds, including Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Central Asia and a variety of non-​communist states in Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Latin America. As a result, the CPC itself ‘is evolving into an eclectic hybrid, composed of bits and pieces of a wide variety of systems’ (Shambaugh, 2008: 296). Similarly, Wei Pan (2003: 3) argues that China’s political regime is a mixed regime which has drawn upon ‘the Chinese tradition of civil service via examination and the Western tradition of legalism and liberalism’ as well as ‘the experiments of Hong Kong and Singapore polities’. The CPC’s holographic emergence and transition mirrors a similar process concerning the change of the Chinese state. As some ‘state transformation’ literature demonstrates, the Chinese state has been transformed into a ‘regulatory state’ as a result of ‘changes in political-​economy relations, particularly class formation and the political strategies of socio-​political forces’ in a new global environment (Hameiri and Jones, 2016, 78). Yet as a holographic part of the world, the Chinese state defies any single labels, for it bears closer resemblance to something of what Michael Mann (1993: 75–​82) describes as ‘polymorphous’. In the words of Linda Weiss (2012: 38), a polymorphous state is ‘internally a non-​unitary configuration whose various components have crystallised at different points in time, obeyed different rationales, experienced often separate histories, and become linked to different constituencies, domestic and international’. Thus, it is 221

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not self-​contradictory to claim that China is at once a neoliberal capitalist state, a developmental state, a mercantilist state and a socialist party-​state (see Chapter 9). Its polymorphousness testifies precisely to the holographic nature of a Chinese state in transition. China’s holographic transition is both enabled by and reinforces the transnational flows of people, ideas and discourses at the societal level. For instance, between 1978 and 2019, more than 6.56 million Chinese students went overseas to study, and during the same period more than 4.23 million of them returned (Ministry of Education, 2020). There were 492,185 international students from 196 countries and regions around the world studying in mainland China in 2018 (Ministry of Education, 2019). According to China’s latest national population census data, about 845,000 foreigners were living in mainland China in 2020 (Xinhua, 2021b). The city of Yiwu, a globally connected small merchandise hub, is home to about 10,000 foreign business people from 85 different countries, working for over 3,000 foreign trading companies (Chen, 2015: 38). While China’s global holographic entanglements illustrate the deep and extensive connections between China and the world, such connections also facilitated the global spread of the COVID-​19 pandemic. The pandemic shows that what happens in a holographic part of the whole is highly likely to happen in the whole. In this sense, the geographic origins of the novel coronavirus become less important than the holographically entangled state of the world. For example, even amid worldwide tight border control, the highly infectious Delta variant had managed to spread to 98 countries within eight months of its first detection in India in October 2020 (UN News, 2021). As COVID-​19 wreaks havoc around the world and intensifies great power rivalry, the underlying holographic conditions of the world in general, and China’s holographic transition in particular, have received surprisingly little attention. Given the profound impact of such conditions on world politics, when we talk about China’s rise, we should not just focus on its rise in power or capabilities (for example in terms of power shift), but also on its holographic transformation and the global implications of such transformation.

A holographic critique of mainstream International Relations theorizing of China’s rise A China that holographically emerges out of the contemporary globalized world cannot be adequately understood by theories that are still based on the Newtonian ontology, which treats states like China as ontologically separate and distinct. In opening up a new ontological perspective, this chapter now turns to a brief examination of why mainstream IR theories, particularly realism and liberalism, need to be rethought. First, realism, and power transition theory in particular (Tammen and Kugler, 2006; Lai, 222

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2011), have almost completely overlooked China’s contemporary holographic transition. Analysts from those perspectives routinely see in China the rise of a Nazi Germany-​like great power, but the world in which China has been rising has largely moved on from the one in which Nazi Germany emerged. The current international system is more ‘regime-​intensive’ than the period during which Europe and the United States came into prominence (Lanteigne, 2005: 32). Western theorists may have good reason to draw upon past European and American experiences to fear the prospect of China adopting its own ‘Monroe Doctrine’ or falling into the ‘Thucydides Trap’ (Allison, 2017). What they fail to adequately appreciate is that the whole from which China has emerged has now become quite different (Wang, 2013). The holographic relational perspective does not necessarily mean that China’s rise or ‘Chinese’ relationality will be peaceful (Shih, 2016: 687). Hard power still matters in contemporary world politics, and realism remains part and parcel of China’s strategic thinking. Hence, despite the existence of a holographic world, if Chinese leaders behave as if they live in a Newtonian world of mechanistic relations, then the earlier-​mentioned fears of China may be warranted. In the face of the COVID-​19 pandemic, rising anti-​ globalization sentiment and increasing global trade tensions, the shift to more emphasis on domestic circulation in China’s ‘dual circulation’ economic strategy seems to signal the winding back of its holographic engagement with the world. Nevertheless, a couple of points are worth noting here. One is that there is some Chinese recognition, at both scholarly and official levels, of the world as a cosmopolitan whole (for example in terms of ‘the community of common destiny’), and of the holographic entanglement that there is something of each in the other (ni zhong you wo, wo zhong you ni 你中 有我，我中有你) (Xi, 2015). Whether Chinese foreign policy (for example the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)) will live up to such rhetoric remains to be seen, but at least such understanding could help underpin a consistent policy of opening up. Another point is that China’s holographic relational being/​becoming is by definition relational and reciprocal. Given that how its significant ‘Others’ behave constitutes part of China’s holographic whole, the dominance of a zero-​sum, non-​holographic way of understanding and dealing with China from the ‘outside’ world is likely to produce a China that is similarly uncompromising and assertive. As China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was quoted as saying during his discussion with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, ‘China will consider how to engage with the U.S. side based on the U.S. attitude towards China’ (Reuters, 2021). Second, while liberal scholars do pay close attention to China’s transformation and socialization (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999; Johnston, 2008), they also fail to recognize that its transformation/​socialization is fundamentally holographic and multidirectional, rather than linear or 223

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unidirectional. Some liberal thinkers are right that it would be illogical and extremely difficult for today’s China to overturn the international capitalist order (Ikenberry, 2008); after all, China is already a holographic part of that order and so turning against that order would mean turning against itself. Still, many tend to misconstrue its holographic transition as reducible to Westernization or democratization in the Western image (Gilley, 2004; Hutton, 2006; Kristof, 2013), while forgetting that the sources of holographic influence on China are global, rather than merely ‘Western’. The global whole in which China exists and evolves includes also the ‘non-​ Western’ world as well as ‘Chinese’ history and tradition (or what Wang Jisi calls ‘historical China’, see Chapter 6). To ignore those connections and their complex impact on China is to miss a significant aspect of China’s rise that does not fit well with the liberal narrative. Furthermore, even as China has absorbed many ‘Western’ influences (bearing in mind that there is nothing purely Western to begin with, as Hobson [2004] points out), such outside influences, once transmitted into China, may undergo further local holographic transition of their own by taking on some ‘Chinese’ characteristics (Pan, 2012: 116–​17). Also, as China’s power grows and its relations further expand (such as through the BRI), it is certain to once again become a major source of holographic transition for other countries, just as it once was, particularly through its tributary system, in which the participation of the ‘barbarians’ was in part to ‘come and be transformed’ (lai-​hua) (Fairbank, 1942: 132). Thus, China’s rise is both an object and an agent of holographic transition. To sum up, both the ‘identity’ of China and its implications for the world are inherently complex, dynamic and indeterminate. As a case of holographic transition, China’s rise defies the binary scenarios of either a hegemonic challenge to the Western-​dominant order or a linear integration into it (see also Chapter 9). With China unable to meet the liberal expectation, there has now been growing disillusionment with, and renewed realist fear of, it in recent years (Pan, 2012: Chapter 7; Campbell and Ratner, 2018). China’s rise does pose many profound challenges, whether economically, politically, normatively or environmentally. But such challenges, despite their apparent ‘Chinese’ symptoms, often have their holographic origins in the world. Thus, without denying Chinese responsibility or agency, to effectively deal with those challenges requires us to see them also as global and holographic challenges that cannot be reduced to, let alone solved as, uniquely Chinese problems. Global problems demand global public policy and cooperative solutions. As such, the United States’ focus on ‘Chinese’ imports, for instance, as the cause of its job-​loss problem misses the point. Similarly, attempts to contain China are unlikely to be effective given that China’s very being has been embodied and embedded in holographic relations with the global whole, with which we are all inextricably entangled and implicated. 224

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Conclusion The basic starting point of this chapter is that the main obstacle to better understanding China’s rise is not primarily theoretical or empirical, but ontological. Specifically, mainstream IR theories, informed by the Newtonian ontology, continue to see China’s rise as the ascent of another self-​contained actor, with its own identity, power, challenges and/​or opportunities. Questioning this ontological framework, this chapter has proposed a holographic relational ontology. From this perspective, China’s rise is not just a matter of power transition, but also a complex process of holographic transition into the multiple worlds, economically, politically and socially. As a consequence, the various challenges associated with its rise are best understood and dealt with from a holographic standpoint. This ontological rethinking calls into question both the realist and liberal theorizing of China’s rise. Focusing almost exclusively on the implications of China’s rising power, the former fails to take into account its holographic transition in the contemporary world. The latter, suffering from a Columbus syndrome (Pan and Kavalski, 2018: 296), sees China’s rise either as a more or less linear and teleological process of ‘Westernization’, or no political change at all. Both fail to come to terms with the complexities and indeterminacies of China’s holographic re-​emergence. Beyond China, the implication is that the world is not simply a grand chessboard, with countries as single self-​bounded chess pieces vying for power in a zero-​sum game. Rather, it resembles a boundless holographic web, with each part of the web in one way or another mirroring the complex whole. As global challenges such as climate change and COVID-​19 persist, transnational interconnectedness deepens, and a myriad of issues interact in unpredictable ways, it is now time to take the worlds’ holographic existence more seriously. Acknowledgements An earlier version of this chapter was published as Chengxin Pan (2018) ‘Toward a New Relational Ontology in Global Politics: China’s Rise as Holographic Transition’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 18(3): 339–​ 67 (Open Access). References Agnew, J. (1994) ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumption of International Relations Theory’, Review of International Political Economy, 1(1): 53–​80. Agnew, J. (1995) ‘The Hidden Geographies of Social Science and the Myth of the “Geo-​graphic Turn” ’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 13(4): 379–​80. 225

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Epilogue: Towards International Relations beyond Binaries Emilian Kavalski and Chengxin Pan

Introduction This project started with the aim of reconsidering the effects of China and its rise on the knowledge production of International Relations (IR). In particular, the contributions to this volume have probed why the phenomena and transformations spurred by China’s rise do not seem to have been accorded the requisite attention by IR theory. Both the scholarship on and the history of the discipline indicate that any major junctures in the patterns of world affairs have invariably exhorted urgent reconsideration of IR’s frameworks for explanation and understanding. From the origins of IR in the wake of the First World War, all through the vicissitudes of the ‘long twentieth century’ –​the Second World War, the decolonization conflicts, the end of the Cold War, and the ‘war on terror’ (to name only some of the cornerstones) –​IR theory has tended to respond quickly to such momentous events in the dynamics of world affairs by offering new perspectives, interpretations and formulations. Even if we were to put aside the narrow focus on warfare as the marker of major change, Japan’s economic –​and potential political and military –​rise during the 1970s and 1980s provoked substantive critical reflection and theory building. Starting with the so-​called ‘neo-​neo’ debate and the analytical framework of ‘complex interdependence’, going through the proliferation of perspectives in International Political Economy, and the introduction of concepts such as ‘developmental state’ and ‘soft power’, all these innovations in IR theory developed against the background of either concern about, or consideration of, the question how the West (and, especially, the United States) would fare under possible Japanese hegemony. The probability of such a shift seemed

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to increase with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the bipolar Cold War order. Admittedly, much of the effort backstopping such theory building was aimed at reinforcing the primacy of Western actors and allaying the fears that Japan could ever challenge their hegemony. Joseph S. Nye (1992: 99–​100) seems to offer an apt summary of these theoretical commitments in his acknowledgement that there are significant limits to Japanese power. The three main resources to produce power in international politics include military strength, economic capabilities, and ‘soft power,’ that is, cultural and ideological appeal. Japan’s portfolio of power resources is primarily economic. … The United States and Europe have more universalistic cultures and more inclination to proselytize. Against this background, China’s rise appears to be an outlier because (at least until very recently) it does not seem to have been accorded similar attention by IR’s theory building. Instead, existing theoretical frameworks have been deployed to assess China’s rise, but there has been extraordinarily little attention to the applicability and relevance of existing approaches –​ and even less concern with the need to produce novel analytical lenses –​to account for China’s growing prominence on the world stage. Instead of proffering new approaches, concepts and perspectives, empirical evidence has been mined mainly to examine whether Beijing’s arrival into the spotlight of global politics will be peaceful or not. Consequently, such considerations have validated the continuing relevance and explanatory potential of existing theoretical approaches in IR. ‘Thucydides Trap’, a relatively new concept coined by Graham Allison (2017), appears to be an exception as it has been deployed specifically to understand China’s rise and its implications for US–​China conflict. And yet, despite this new terminology, its theoretical inspirations still draw on the analytical foundations of power transition theory and rest on Thucydides’ historical account of a war in Europe more than 2,000 years ago, rather than on China itself. This appears to be a strange and puzzling trend. ‘Power-​shifts’ have so far backstopped ‘idea-​shifts’, if not necessarily ‘paradigm shifts’, in IR’s theory building (Cho and Kavalski, 2015; Acharya 2016). If, indeed, IR has been quick to offer theoretical innovation to come to grips with previous shifts on the world stage, why has it been slow to theoretically innovate in response to China’s rise? Is it because, as some have claimed, (so far at least) China’s global prominence has not been marked by a major military conflict? In this respect, its rise has been taking place against the background of other developments and, thus, has remained on the periphery of IR’s theoretical attention. In this respect, owing to its gradual and complex dynamics, China’s rise has only relatively recently caught the eye of IR theory building (Pan, 235

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2012; Ling, 2017). Or is it because China’s awkwardness, as simultaneously a non-​Western giant and one of the last remaining communist autocracies, makes it better suited as an object to be observed, rather than an agential subject for IR’s theory building? Or has such analytical innovation been happening on the peripheries of IR theory, unable to gain the limelight of mainstream scholarship? There are multiple reasons why IR has tended to obviate China’s rise in its theory building, and some of these have been addressed both in the Introduction and in the preceding chapters of this collection. At the same time, as should be obvious by now, this volume does not purport to claim that existing IR theories are unable to explain and understand the multidimensional effects on world affairs provoked by China’s rise. Yet, the contributions to this volume suggest that while an update of their conceptual software might be sufficient for some of the existing frameworks of analysis, others require a complete reboot, and still others need to be invented if IR is to respond meaningfully to the pressing questions posed by China’s rise. As such, the full complexity of dimensions and effects of China’s growing prominence call for novel debates, perspectives and concepts. The recent emergence of global/​post-​Western IR theory has been responding directly to some of these concerns and demands (Ling 2013; Kavalski 2018c). The contributions to this volume actively engage in these conversations, albeit in their distinct and idiosyncratic ways. This concluding section of the volume does not wish to impose homogeneity on the contributions, nor does it seek to imply that they subscribe to a particular analytical perspective. Instead, if there is a commonality among the contributions it is the purposeful pursuit of dialogues across paradigmatic and disciplinary divides. At the same time, the contributions to this volume agree that theorizing China’s rise needs to go beyond the binary thinking dominating IR’s explanation and understanding. There are multiple bifurcations that need to be overcome. Some of those include (but are not limited to) the disciplinary bifurcation between IR and other fields of knowledge; the analytical divide between the West/​Global North and the non-​West/​Global South; the epistemic split between Sino-​centrism and Euro-​centrism; and so on. Such binary thinking hinders the ratiocination of IR and undermines its capacity to explain, understand, speak and act. The contributions to this volume stress the need to break free from the stultifying bifurcations of self/​other, friend/​ foe, peace/​war, subject/​object, knower/​known, inside/​outside and so forth, which have been dominating the still largely monolingual and mono-​cultural explanation and understanding of mainstream IR (Kavalski 2020; Zhao 2021). In instrumental terms its implications are that China’s rise is meaningful both as a phenomenon and as a point of departure for critical theoretical reflection. Thus, accounting for its full complexity requires overcoming IR’s entrenched ontological, epistemic and normative dichotomies, intent 236

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on disciplining, excluding and denigrating non-​Western experience and contributions to the making, observation and explanation of world politics. It is therefore not surprising that overcoming the logic of binaries emerges as the leitmotif of this collection. The following sections outline some of the key themes that emerge from this volume’s trespassing onto the less-​trodden paths of theorizing China’s rise in and beyond IR.

Key themes In his reflections on the role played by theory in the study of China, the historian Phillip C.C. Huang (1998: 183–​4) noted: Theory … can be exciting to read and use, but it can also be corruptive. It can lead to creative thinking but also to mechanical application. It can lead to big vistas and questions, but it can lead too easily to ready answers and gross simplifications. It can lead to dialogues with colleagues beyond the confines of our China field, but it can also open the way to subtle yet ideological influences. It can make us broadly comparative, but it can also pigeon-​hole our perspectives into narrowly Western-​centric or Sinocentric ones. Its use is much like a difficult journey full of exhilarating possibilities and rewards, yet also fraught with traps and dangers. The contributions to this volume concur that theoretical journeys –​regardless of whether they are about China or not –​are beset by the promise and pitfalls attendant on the process of explanation and understanding. And yet, this volume insists that just because the ocean of theory is inhabited by sharks, this does not mean that we should stay in the safety of our paradigmatic islands in lieu of swimming and exploring its deep analytical waters. Instead, the foreknowledge of the ‘dangers’ of theorizing should infuse self-​reflective and critical humility about the endeavour at hand. Moreover, the meaningful encounter with the complex effects associated with IR’s theory building in response to China’s rise demands an open-​source medium for its theorizing that can overcome the aforementioned binary thinking in IR (Pan and Kavalski, 2018). With this in mind, and despite the diverse and distinct ontological and epistemic commitments of the contributions included in this volume, the following sections outline four mutually constitutive themes that arise from the analyses of China’s rise.

Encountering China’s rise To begin with, the diverse perspectives of the contributions to this volume should offer ample evidence that there is no such thing as the theory of 237

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China’s rise. The volume does not intend to suggest that there is a single analytical approach that can fully capture the effects of China’s rise on IR theory. This phenomenon, just like global life itself, is ‘simply too complex and multidimensional to fit easily and completely into any one ready-​made model’ (Huang, 1998: 186). Instead, this volume contributes to the call for dialogical theory building that acknowledges a multiplicity of theoretical takes on the variety of experiences and phenomena enfolded under the label of China’s rise (Nordin et al, 2019). As such, a key feature of all the contributions included in this volume is the emphasis that the encounter with China’s rise calls for dialogue across theoretical and disciplinary divides. Such a dialogue intends neither synthesis nor accumulation, but rather transformational imaginary that can, in varying degrees, free the explanation and understanding of China’s rise from the anxiety and/​or prejudice dominating so much of current analysis. The contributors propose different ways in which such re-​theorizing can unfold: • Some engage in historical process tracing. For instance, Buzan (Chapter 7) points to the framing of China’s past by the English School (ES) theory in order to uncover the ways in which Chinese experience, in particular around the practices of hierarchy and face, simultaneously challenges and enriches its framework. Similarly, Hwang, Bunskoek and Shih (Chapter 5) offer a parallel chronological reading of the concept of tianxia and highlight the three lopsided modalities of its incorporation into IR theory. Yet, unlike Buzan, whose focus is squarely on the ES, Hwang, Bunskoek and Shih purposefully seek to ‘re-​world’ Western knowledge production. They urge ‘epistemological equality’ between the West and the non-​West. The proposition is that IR theorizing needs to learn and employ different languages if it is to offer meaningful accounts not just of China and its international agency, but also of the heterogeneous global life it seeks to comprehend. • Other contributors approach China’s growing prominence by probing the established practices for its analysis in IR. For instance, Agnew (Chapter 1) urges more diversity both in IR’s sociological make-​ up and in the intellectual rootedness of its theoretical perspectives. The phenomenon of China’s rise and its enfolding in the processes of global life reflect theorization steeped in a selective ‘politics of choice’. Nordin and Smith (Chapter 4) develop this point further by situating the emergence, maintenance and diffusion of knowledge about China’s rise in social interactions. This research focus allows them to position China as part of a global social space defined by ongoing and shifting relationships and intersected by the overlapping repertoires of knowledges and power. The suggestion is that shifts in material capabilities do not in and of themselves reveal much about the 238

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patterns of world politics unless these are assessed in their contingent interactive setting. • And still other contributors interpret China’s rise by drawing on the plurivocality of perspectives, concepts and traditions interacting on the world stage. According to Ling (Chapter 2), accounting for the so-​called shift to the East in world politics calls not merely for the analytical, political or ethical emancipation of IR, but for its ‘spiritual’ liberation. Such an inquiry into the ‘heart’ of IR requires conscious transgression of the multiple epistemic, ontological, linguistic and geographic borders established by the Anglophone ‘mind’ of the disciplinary study of world politics. According to Ling, this requires venturing into the domain of the ‘magical’. Pan (Chapter 10), on the other hand, draws on another counterintuitive source for IR theorizing –​the holographic ideas permeating both quantum physics and traditional Asian thought. Such a view makes it very difficult to treat China as a homogeneous, self-​contained unit.

Pluralizing the practices of IR theory One of the claims made by the contributions to this volume is that mainstream IR theory –​regardless of whether it is produced in the West/​Global North or elsewhere –​is dominated by an extremely narrow mono-​disciplinary outlook. This observation has recently prompted a European Journal of International Relations Special Issue to challenge the status quo by exploring a new form of interdisciplinarity (Daxecker et al, 2020). In this setting, China’s rise, too, can and has emerged as a major challenge to the geopolitical and geo-​epistemic imaginary of the discipline. Such an observation calls not merely for multi-​/​inter-​/t​rans-​disciplinary theorizing, but pluralizing the practices of IR theory building by stimulating conversations across paradigmatic and disciplinary divides (Pan, 2020). As the contributions to this volume have demonstrated, there are multiple ways in which such an endeavour can be pursued. One of the implications of such pluralizing initiatives is that IR theory is constituted by multiple, and often contradictory, practices. Paradoxically, and contra mainstream predilections for gatekeeping and maintaining the purity of the disciplinary core, the messiness associated with such plural sense-​making practices can make IR’s explanation and understanding more meaningful and relevant through a confrontation with the struggles, tensions and inconsistencies of global life (Kavalski, 2018a). In fact, it questions the possibility for objectivity and communicative or instrumental rationality expected by the established narratives of Westphalian/​Anglophone IR. According to these mainstream accounts, anarchy (and by extension, conflict) is the natural starting point of both theorizing and global life. As such, China’s rise can seemingly only be understood through the conflict 239

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potential of its power-​projection capabilities and economic output. Little wonder that there has not been much appetite for theorizing China’s rise anew and in a different way from that which mainstream IR theory already has to offer (Horesh and Kavalski, 2014). Little wonder too that there has not been much space to consider friendship and face, let alone the complexity of China itself, its multiple interactions across time and space, and the diversity of contexts, actors and agency entangled in these holographic connections and interactions (Pan, 2018). In other words, IR is invariably incoherent and socially mediated –​just like the everyday patterns and practices of the global life it intends to explain and understand. Thus, the disclosure of a messy pluriverse of practices involved in IR’s theory building promises to heal the habits of control, manipulation and exploitation and to foster different ways of seeing and encountering the world that can help IR generate meaningful answers to the pressing questions of our times (Kavalski, 2018b).

Engaging the relationality of global life Many contributors to this volume emphasize that what is at stake in IR’s encounter with China’s rise and its theorizing is the ability to engage other ways to observe and encounter the world, ourselves and the problems in which we are embroiled; and to put such alternatives into a nuanced, comparative conversation with more familiar critical-​political lexicons and procedures (Bilgin and Ling, 2017). As already indicated, the individual contributions to this volume outline different ways in which such endeavour could proceed. Thus, be it in the particular instances of China’s rise or its theorization, the chapters included in this volume have uncovered relationality as the underlying context of their research endeavours. Whether it is ontological, as is the case in the chapters by Nordin and Smith (Chapter 4) and Pan (Chapter 10); epistemic, as suggested in the analyses by Ling (Chapter 2), Kavalski (Chapter 3) and Wang (Chapter 8); interpretative, as illustrated in the studies by Hwang, Bunskoek and Shih (Chapter 5) and Buzan (Chapter 7); or ideational, as is the case in the chapters by Agnew (Chapter 1) and McNally (Chapter 9), relationality has been deployed to illuminate alternative ways of discovering, questioning and reflecting about existence, normative problems, and the nature and meaning of events. The acknowledgement of such relationality draws attention to the simultaneous interactions among a multiplicity of sites (be they geographic, gender, ethnic, religious, cultural, historical or of any other kind). In Ling’s case, such relationality is a defining characteristic of the ‘world-​ of-​worlds’ made possible by the encounter with the pre-​Westphalian idea of ‘Interbeing’. In a similar fashion, for Hwang, Bunskoek and Shih, relationality offers a framework for illustrating how different worlds are co-​constituted and each informed in its own fluid discourse, to the extent that none can 240

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claim autonomy nor achieve dominance. Pan develops this point further through his account of the holographic whole–​parts relationship and the informational interconnectedness that it bespeaks. According to Kavalski, relationality does not presage a deterministic unidirectional ‘arrow’ linking structure to agency and agency to structure, but a dynamic framework (merging both ideational and material characteristics). This resonates with Nordin and Smith, who insist that relationality creates and maintains our continuous becoming with others and the ontological parity of multiple worlds. Such attentiveness to relationality makes a powerful case for envisioning the fluid iterations of social transactions that percolate and gain salience in the context of ongoing interactions with others. At the same time, the ethical openings offered by the theoretical encounter with relationality assist with imagining global life beyond the divisiveness and violence suffusing the ethnic, Westphalian, territorial and ideological myopias framing current domestic, national and world politics.

Projecting the future trajectories of China’s rise This book explores simultaneously the ways in which China’s rise is theorized and how such experience can enrich IR’s own theorization. These are clearly analytical objectives; yet, despite such primarily theoretical (and in quite a few instances, meta-​theoretical) concerns, the analyses included in this volume do not shy away from projecting the likelihood and the (normative) implications of the possible trajectories of China’s rise. It seems that mindfulness is the key word shared by the projections outlined in the contributions to this volume (Ling, 2002). Such mindfulness emerges from the awareness of coexistence, the nuanced practices of living together, and the cultivation of adaptations sensitive to the emergent, historically contingent, and self-​ organizing character of global life. In particular, the emphasis is on the moral and ethical responsibility of observers (be they pundits, policy makers, or scholars) because what is at stake is not merely the relative position of this or that actor involved in status or power competition, but the well-​being of societies and, indeed, the whole world. To be sure, it is not the intention of the contributors to romanticize the consequences of China’s rise nor to suggest that its trajectory will be a peaceful one. As has been demonstrated in the individual contributions to this volume, China’s complexity, relationality and holographic entanglements suggest contingent and interactive rather than singular and predetermined possibilities. Thus, as McNally (Chapter 9) acknowledges, while China’s rise can proceed in multiple alternative ways, no theoretical account can provide a neat picture of the future. Yet, not all of them have the humility to recognize this shortcoming. Agnew (Chapter 1) notes that many policy analyses draw on China’s historical experience to make inferences about 241

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its future directions. For him, such analyses are problematic both because they project a particular territorialized idea of China into the past and treat its culture and history as a homogeneous and unchanging constant. Consequently, the strategic calculations that such analyses make are suspect as they rest on and reify stylized and idealized visions of what China is and how it interacts with others. Thus, China’s rise and its global implications are not linear but contingent on its dynamic and reciprocal relations with its multiple worlds, or its holographic wholes (Chapter 10). Meaningful observation will need to heed the nuances of specific space–​time dynamics and interactions (Rojas, 2016; Winter, 2019). While these suggestions might not be particularly palatable for the bullet-​point preferences of foreign policy analysts, this collection has demonstrated that only by acknowledging the multiple sites, voices and faces of global affairs can we begin not only a meaningful conversation on the implications of China’s rise, but also a much-​needed reconsideration of key concepts of IR (such as power, identity, security, strategy, and history).

Conclusion It has to be conceded that by necessity this collection could not (and does not purport to) bring together the full spectrum of research, approaches and perspectives on the theorization of China’s rise in IR. Also, it needs to be acknowledged that the conversations that ultimately led to the fruition of this volume began well before the emergence of the COVID-​19 pandemic (Smith and Fallon, 2020). It is no exaggeration that the pandemic will have profound effects on global life and on the ways in which China both acts and is perceived. Such effects will reverberate through the global order even after a modicum of predictability has returned to international interactions. Yet, these developments do not supersede the need for meaningful theoretical engagement with China and its roles on the world stage. If anything, the pandemic makes such need even more urgent if IR is to maintain its relevance for the interpretation of such momentous changes (Ling, 2019; Kavalski, 2021). In this respect, the contributions in this collection see themselves as part of the ongoing ‘search for a vocabulary … by means of which we can start to ask systemic questions about the possibility of fundamental international transformations today’ (Ruggie, 1993: 142). In pursuit of these aims, the contributors have not only discussed how we might be better able to understand China, but also explored how the case of China could provide opportunities for IR scholars to rethink the ways in which we have long theorized IR more broadly. This, we hope, may serve as a point of departure for further theoretical innovation and transformation in the discipline of IR itself, which needs to increasingly engage with and critically reflect on 242

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emerging complex global events, especially those taking place seemingly outside of the ‘Western core’. References Acharya, A. (2016) ‘Idea-​shift: How Ideas from the Rest are Reshaping Global Order, Third World Quarterly, 37(7): 1156–​70. Allison, G. (2017) Destined for War? Melbourne: Scribe. Bilgin, P. and Ling, L.H.M. (2017) Asia in International Relations. London: Routledge. Cho, Y.C. and Kavalski, E. (2015) ‘Governing Uncertainty in Turbulent Times’, Comparative Sociology, 14(3): 429–​44. Daxecker, U., Freyberg-​Inan, A., Glasius, M., Underhill, G. and Vigneswaran, D. (2020) ‘Interdisciplinarity and the International Relations Event Horizon’, European Journal of International Relations, 26(S1): 3–​13. Horesh, N. and Kavalski, E. (eds) (2014) Asian Thought on China’s Changing International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Huang, P.C.C. (1998) ‘Theory and the Study of Modern Chinese History’, Modern China, 24(2): 183–​208. Kavalski, E. (2018a) The Guanxi of Relational International Theory. London: Routledge. Kavalski, E. (2018b) ‘Guanxi or What Is the Chinese for Relational Theory of World Politics’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 18(3): 268–​91. Kavalski, E. (2018c) ‘The Guanxi of Relational International Affairs’, Chinese Political Science Review, 3(3): 233–​51. Kavalski, E. (2020) ‘Inside/​outside and Around: Complexity and the Relational Ethics of Global Life’, Global Society, 34(4): 467–​86. Kavalski, E. (2021) ‘Quo Vadis Cooperation in the Era of Covid-​19’, World Affairs, 184(1): 33–​56. Ling, L.H.M. (2002) Postcolonial International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Ling, L.H.M. (2013) The Dao of World Politics. Abingdon: Routledge. Ling, L.H.M. (2017) ‘World Politics in Color’, Millennium, 45(3), 473–​91. Ling, L.H.M. (2019) ‘Three-​ness’, Politics, 39(1): 35–​49. Nordin, A.H.M, Smith, G.M., Jackson, P.T., Kavalski, E., Nexon, D., Qin, Y. and Ling, L.H.M. (2019) ‘Towards Global Relational Theorizing: A Dialogue Between Sinophone and Anglophone Scholarship on Relationalism’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32(5): 570–​81. Nye, J. (1992) ‘Coping with Japan’, Foreign Policy, 89: 96–​115. Pan, C. (2012) Knowledge, Desire, and Power in Global Politics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Pan, C. (2018). ‘Toward a New Relational Ontology in Global Politics: China’s Rise as Holographic Transition’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 18(3): 339–​67.

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Pan, C. (2020) ‘Enfolding Wholes in Parts: Quantum Holography and International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 26(S1): 14–​38. Pan, C. and Kavalski, E. (2018) ‘Theorizing China’s Rise in and Beyond International Relations’, International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 18(3): 289–​311. Rojas, C. (2016) ‘Contesting the Colonial Logics of the International: Toward a Relational Politics for the Pluriverse’, International Political Sociology, 10(4): 369–​82. Ruggie, J.G. (1993) ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’, International Organization, 47(1): 139–​74. Smith, N.S. and Fallon, T. (2020) ‘An Epochal Moment: The COVID-​ 19 Pandemic and China’s International Order Building’, World Affairs, 183(3): 235–​55. Winter, T. (2019) Geocultural Power. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Zhao, T. (2021) All Under Heaven. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

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Index References to figures appear in italic type; those in bold type refer to tables. ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’  128 see also BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) A Acharya, Amitav  9, 10, 173 Advaita monism  11, 43, 45–​7, 52 ayurveda  47, 48–​50, 54, 55–​6 darsana  46, 47, 57 dharma  46, 47–​8, 57 and IR  52–​4, 57 agency  23, 24, 36, 54, 67, 70, 102, 241 AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank)  133, 134, 138, 199, 200 Allison, Graham  195, 235 Alter  89 alter ego  89 ‘America First’ policies, US  134–​5, 194 American IR studies 181 analogies, in IR theory  25, 26, 27 anarchy  25, 29, 87, 89, 156, 161, 203, 212, 239 Andean people  45 Anglosphere, the 103–4, 111, 113, 115–16, 118 ‘apartheid’ analogy  26 APEC (Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation)  138 Argentina  131 Aristotle  93 Ascione, G.  46 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)  151–​2 Asia  and IR theorizing 5, 6, 7, 8, 74, 172–6, 185 as hybrid space for theorization  170–​1 see also East Asia; Northeast Asia; Southeast Asia Asian area studies 5 Asian capitalism  67 Asian Development Bank  136 Asian financial crisis, 1997/​98  174

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)  133, 134, 138, 199, 200 Asian Investment Bank  134 Asian regionalism 32, 160, 174 Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)  138 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)  151–​2 Australia  117, 131 ayurveda  47, 48–​50, 54, 55–​6 B Babones, Salvatore  116–​17, 118 balance of power  36, 115, 128, 139, 150, 151, 157, 161, 162, 203, 219 Bangladesh  131 Bangladesh-​China-​India-​Myanmar (BCIM)  56 Barbalet, J.  69, 70 Barber, Lionel  134 BCIM (Bangladesh-​China-​India-​Myanmar)  56 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)  32, 70, 72, 106, 107, 136, 138, 176, 199, 223, 224 Benedict XVI, Pope  45 Berenskötter, Felix  90, 92–​4, 96 Biden, Joe  140, 195 BIT (Bilateral Investment Treaty)  133 Blinken, Anthony  168, 223 Bohm, David  215, 216 Book of Changes (Yijing)  50 Book of Documents, The (Shujing)  104 Book of Poetry, The (Shijing)  104 bootstrap theory  214–​15 Brazil  131 see also BRICS (Brazil-​Russia-​India-​China-​ South Africa) countries Brexit (UK withdrawal from the EU)  130 BRI (Belt and Road Initiative)  32, 70, 72, 106, 107, 136, 138, 176, 199, 223, 224 BRICS (Brazil-​Russia-​India-​China-​South Africa) countries  56, 126, 132, 135

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Buddhism  43, 49–​50, 51–​2, 106, 215, 219 Bull, H.  150 Buzan, Barry  3, 6, 44, 116 C Cai Mingzao  182 Callahan, William  23–​4, 30, 112–​13, 118, 157–​8, 169 ‘capitalist peace theory’  205 Capra, F.  215 Carlson, Allen  34 Cartesian/​Newtonian worldview  13, 211, 212 see also Newtonian ontology ‘castle syndrome’ in IR  76 ‘century of humiliation’  150 chakras  49, 54, 55–​6 Chang Chi-​hsiung (Zhang Qixiong)  109–​10 Chanyuan Treaty, 1005  114 chaotic mélange  206–​7 Charaka Samhita  47, 48, 49 Cheng Yangyang  62, 76, 156 China  and Asia 178–80 ‘century of humiliation’  150 ‘China First’ policy  194 China’s rise as holographic transition  13, 211, 219–​25, 239 definitions of  127–​8 economic decoupling from  193, 196, 206 economic statistics  220 foreign policy  149–​50 four mechanisms of Sino-​Western interactions  179, 180–​4, 184, 185 future trajectories  241–​2 hard and soft power  183–​4, 184 hegemony of  113 and the international order  125–​6, 133–​8 co-​evolution in  138–​41 overview of  128–​9 power distribution  129–​30, 129–​32 rules of the game  129, 132–​3, 135–​8 and IR (International Relations) theory  63–​4, 203–​6, 234, 235–​43 (see also Chinese School of IR) Chinese IR narratives  29–​36 context and overview  1–​11, 13–​14 current discourses on  43, 44–​5, 190–​1, 193–​6 multilateralism  134–​5 philosophical traditions  215, 219 policy making  35 population data  222 relationship with Russia  132 relationship with US  126, 133, 137, 138–​41, 149, 157, 191, 194, 195, 206, 224, 235 as a revisionist power  6, 107, 145, 146, 147, 154–​5, 161, 191, 195, 200

security issues  136–​7 as a status quo power  5, 6, 44, 145, 146, 147, 154–​5, 161 students studying overseas  222 Westernization campaign in  105–​6 see also BCIM (Bangladesh-​China-​India-​ Myanmar); BRICS (Brazil-​Russia-​ India-​China-​South Africa) countries; Sino-​capitalism dialectic China-​Africa Cooperation Forum  138 ‘China Collapse’ theory  192, 196 China Order, The (Wang)  114 China’s Peaceful Development Road white paper (State Council of the Information Office of the PRC)  133–​4 China’s Peaceful Development white paper (State Council of the Information Office of the PRC)  134 Chinese Constructivists  44 ‘Chinese descent’  127 Chinese dialectic  91–​2 Chinese exceptionalism  7, 24, 32 Chinese Exclusion Act (US)  28 Chinese School of IR  4, 8, 44, 83, 90 patriarchy in  45 and tianxia  103–​7, 107–​11 Chinese Westphalians  44 ‘Chinese World Empire’ concept  109–​10 ‘Chinese World Order’ concept  111–​12 Chinese World Order, The: Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations (Fairbanks)  111, 115 Cholango, Humberto  45 Chow, Rey  219 CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence-​Building Measures)  138 ‘civilizational China’  127, 128 Clark, I.  155 Classic of the Way (Daodejing)  50, 219 Classical Westphalians  44 climate change  132, 154, 225 Clinton, Hillary  139 CLS (Creative Listening and Speaking)  55 Cold War  1, 7, 34, 107, 235 colonialism  45, 110, 150, 183 Columbus syndrome  7–​8, 225 community of practice, and guanxi  72–​3 ‘complex interdependence’  234 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-​Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)  133 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-​ Building Measures (CICA)  138 ‘Confucian nepotism’  67 Confucianism  44, 45, 51, 86, 106, 156, 157, 158, 219 Confucian-​New Orientalist narrative  25, 30, 32, 34 Confucius  67, 85, 93 Confucius Institutes  128, 182

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constructivism  1, 2, 3, 5, 87, 88, 90 core-​periphery tension  170, 180, 182–​3, 184 COVID-​19 pandemic  35, 107, 117–​18, 129, 130, 131, 135, 140, 141, 168, 191, 206, 222, 223, 225, 242 Cox, Robert  97 CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-​Pacific Partnership)  133 Creative Listening and Speaking (CLS)  55 critical theory  74, 212 ‘crony capitalism’  67 ‘cultural China’  127 culture-​centric identity mechanism and exceptionalism  170, 180–​1, 184 Cumings, Bruce  31 cyber security  132, 133 D Daesh (ISIS)  141 Daodejing (Classic of the Way)  50, 219 Daoism  44, 54, 219 Daoist dialectics  90, 94–​6 Daoist trialectics  11, 43, 50–​4, 57 darsana  46, 47, 57 decolonization  182–​3 democracy  26 as an emerging/​contested institution  153–​4 democratisation  137, 138 Deng Xiaoping  108, 126, 133, 155, 157, 194, 196 ‘dependence theory’  135–​6 Derrida, J.  93, 214 development, as a newer institution  152–​3 ‘developmental states’  6, 196, 222, 234 dharma  46, 47–​8, 57 dialectic perspectives in IR theory  191–​3, 196–​207 diaspora  32 discourse 25, 43, 213, 216 discursive ontology  212–​13 Dreyer, June  117 drug trafficking  132 Dutton, Michael  5 dynasticism  150 E Eacott, S.  214 East Asia 6, 110, 114, 158, 160, 195, 197, 198, 201 East Asian developmental state model  24, 196 East Asian international society 147 East China Sea  33, 44–​5, 150, 151, 160 Eastphalia concept  13, 169–​71 China’s rise as precondition of  171–​4 four mechanisms of Sino-​Western interactions  179, 180–​4, 184, 185 recognition of Eastphalian ideas  174–​80 ecology  48 see also environmentalism

economic decoupling  193, 196, 206 Ego  89 Egypt  131 Eihei Dōgen  51 Eliot, Sir Charles  215 emergent ontology  212, 213–​14 ‘End of History’  102, 117, 178, 182, 218 enfolding process  216 English School (ES) of IR  see ES (English School) of IR environmentalism  48, 132 as an emerging/​contested institution  153–​4 epistemic compassion  42–​3 ‘epistemic disobedience’  56 epistemic violence (epistemicide)  42, 53, 55, 56 ES (English School) of IR  2, 3, 181, 238 and China  5, 12–​13, 145–​8 ‘Chinese characteristics’  146, 147, 155, 156–​61 and the deeply pluralist GIS  148–​55 strengths and weaknesses of  146, 161–​2 patriarchy in  45 ‘ethnic China’  127–​8 ethnic cleansing  177 etiquette system  104, 105 EU (European Union)  power distribution in the international order  129, 130, 132 UK withdrawal (Brexit)  130 Eurocentrism in IR theory  64, 74, 87, 103, 173, 219 European Journal of International Relations, ‘End of IR Theory’ special edition  3 exceptionalism, culture-​centric identity mechanism  170, 180–​1, 184 F ‘face’  12–​13, 156, 159–​61 Fahr, J.L.L.  66 Fairbank, J.K.  111, 118 Fei Xiaotong  90–​1, 157 femaleness, and yin/​yang  50, 51 feminist theory  45, 74, 88–​9, 93, 217 Fider, D.  175 FIEs (foreign-​invested enterprises)  220, 221 financial stability  132 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence  176 ‘Five Zone’ theory  116–​17 foreign-​invested enterprises (FIEs)  220, 221 Foucault, Michel  63, 214 fractal geometry  215 France  26 Friedberg, Aaron  172 friendship in IR  12, 83–​4, 96–​8 in ancient and modern societies  84–​7 and the ‘ontology of relations’  83, 84, 90–​6, 98 and the ‘ontology of things’  84, 87–​90, 98

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Fukuyama, Francis  102, 117, 178, 182 Fung, C.S.  181–​2 G G20  138 genocide  177 geography of knowledge  24 ‘geopolitik turn’  33 Germany  201 Nazi period  223 Ghosh, Anjan  47 Giddens, Anthony  93 GIS (global international society)  146 China’s relationship with  146–​8 normative structure of deeply pluralist GIS  148–​55 global financial crisis, 2008  175 global IR  4, 8, 10, 174, 236 GMS (Great Mekong Subregion) Cooperation  138 Gold, T.  67 GPM (great power management)  151 Great Mekong Subregion (GMS) Cooperation  138 great power management (GPM)  151 ‘great power rivalry’  141, 222 ‘Greater Nine Regions’  104 guanxi  12, 64–​8, 84, 96, 156 and dialectics  90–​2 and IR  68–​73 and ‘post-​Western’ IR  73–​7 guoji guanxi  64 H Han Chinese  33, 105, 110, 127, 128 Han dynasty period  114, 127 hard power  183–​4, 184 harmony  69–​70 Harris, S.  156–​7 Hay, John  28 Health Silk Road (HSR)  106, 107 Hegel, G.W.F.  50 Hegelian dialectic  91 hegemony  161, 203 Heidegger, Martin  92, 94, 213 heterotopia  63 hierarchy  12–​13, 156–​9, 160, 161 ‘historical China’  127, 128, 224 Ho, D.Y.-​F.  67, 159, 160 Hobbes, T.  45, 88 Hoffman, Stanley  173 holographic relational ontology  13, 211, 214–​18, 225 holographic transition, China’s rise as  13, 211, 219–​25, 239 Hong Kong  109, 128, 148, 149 honour  159 Hori, V.S.  50 HSR (Health Silk Road)  106, 107

Hsu, I.C.Y.  110–​11 Hu, H.C.  160 Hu Jintao  106–​7 Huainanzi  51 Huang Chih-​lien  109 Huang, Phillip C.C.  237, 238 Huawei  197 Hughes, Christopher  33 human equality  150 as a newer institution  152, 153 human rights  132, 177 as an emerging/​contested institution 153–​4 humanitarian crises  177–​8 Hwang, K.K.  65, 68, 73 hypermasculine theorists  45 I Ikenberry, G. John  44, 125, 137, 193–​4 IMF (International Monetary Fund)  136 immigration  130, 132 imperialism  45, 74, 110, 150 India  138, 150 and the COVID-​19 pandemic  131 history of  218 power distribution in the international order  131, 132, 149 territorial disputes with China  151 see also BCIM (Bangladesh-​China-​India-​ Myanmar); BRICS (Brazil-​Russia-​ India-​China-​South Africa) countries Indian medicine  see ayurveda individualism  159–​60 Indonesia  131 information  215–​16 Inner Asian zone  112 intellectual property rights protection  132 Interbeing  43, 56, 240 international law  152 International Monetary Fund (IMF)  136 international order, the  and China  125–​6, 133–​8 co-​evolution in  138–​41 overview of  128–​9 power distribution  128–​32 rules of the game  129, 132–​3, 135–​8 International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific  8 international relations (IR) theory  see IR (international relations) theory international society  145, 146 see also GIS (global international society) International Theory  4 Internet, Chinese controls over  137 IR (international relations) theory  and China  23–​4, 63–​4, 203–​6 (see also Chinese School of IR; Sino-​capitalism dialectic) Chinese IR narratives  29–​36

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context and overview  1–​11, 13–​14 current discourses on  43, 44–​5, 190–​1, 193–​6 dialectic perspectives in  191–​3, 196–​207 dominance of Western scholarship in  6, 8, 28, 76, 173–​4 dominant models of  63 epistemic blinkers  42 epistemological bias in  173 Eurocentrism in  64, 74, 87, 103, 173, 219 geographical origins of  24, 25–​7 geopolitics and dominant theory  27–​9 and guanxi  68–​73 and language  63, 238 Newtonian ontology in  210–​11, 212–​14, 218, 219, 222, 225 ontological inadequacies of  13 and the ‘ontology of relations’  83, 84, 90–​6, 98 and the ‘ontology of things’  84, 87–​90, 98 pluralizing practices of  239–​40 spiritual emancipation of  11 Western centrism in  3, 6, 8, 10, 28, 64, 102, 173–​4, 239–​40 ‘with Chinese characteristics’ narrative  29, 30, 33–​4 see also ES (English School) of IR; friendship in IR; global IR; liberalism; post-​Western IR; realism Iran  131, 136 ISIS (Daesh)  141 Israel  26, 131

Korea  55, 156 denuclearization of Korean peninsula  136 see also North Korea; Republic of Korea; South Korea Kristensen, P.M.  5 L Lancang-​Mekong River Dialogue and Cooperation  138 language  62, 63, 183, 212, 213, 216 law, public international  110 Lawson, G.  3 Lee Kuan Yew  67 Legalism  51 Leninism  86 Leviathan (Hobbes)  45 Li Keqiang  134 Liang Shuming  67 Liberal Westphalians  44 liberalism  2, 3, 87–​8, 90, 106, 114–​15, 222, 223–​4, 225 liberal institutionalism  190, 193–​4, 195–​6, 203, 205 Ling, L.H.M.  10, 63, 90, 94–​6 Little, R.  6 Liu, Q.  67 Long Yongtu  221 Lyotard, J.-​F.  214

J Jackson, P.T.  213 Jacques, Martin  113–​14, 118 Jain, Pankaj  47–​8 Japan  30, 33, 44–​5, 55, 105, 136, 157, 159, 160, 234–​5 power distribution in the international order  130–​1, 132 Jervis, Robert  88 Jha, Prakash  42 Jia Wenshan  66, 72 Jin Liqun  134 Johnston, A.I.  6, 9, 116 K Kang, David  6, 114, 172–​3 Kassim, Yang Razali  176, 177 Kazakhstan  131 Keohane, Robert  1 Khong Yuen Foong  116 Kim, S.  7 Kim, S.W.  175 King, I.T.  214 Kissinger, Henry  44, 125, 128, 138–​9, 140 KMT (Kuomingtang) government  152–​3, 155

M Macau  128 MacFarquhar, Roderick  36 Mach, Ernst  215 Mahabharata  42 Mahayana Buddhism  215 Malaysia  127 maleness, and yin/​yang  50, 51 Mancall, Mark  112 Mann, Michael  221 Mao Zedong  36, 86, 107, 155, 176 Maoist revolutionary period  147, 148, 194 maritime security  132 markets  132 as a newer institution  152, 153 Marxism  34, 86 materialism  105–​6 May Fourth Movement 1919  181 Mayall, J.  151 Mearsheimer, John  3–​4, 195 media, Chinese controls over  137 medicine  Chinese traditions  49, 53–​4 Indian traditions (see ayurveda) Mencius  215 mercantilism  201 metaphors, in IR theory  25–​6 Mexico  131, 149 Middle East 130, 137, 140, 141, 176, 221 Middle Kingdom  104, 105, 106, 110, 156, 161, 185

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CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

mindfulness  241 Ming dynasty period  115, 116, 157 Ming, W.  33 Minzner, C.  194 ‘modern geopolitical imagination’  24, 26–​7 modernization  152–​3 Modi, Narendra  131 ‘Monroe Doctrine’  6, 223 Multiple Worlds  94, 95 Myanmar  see BCIM (Bangladesh-​China-​ India-​Myanmar) N Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands)  127 Nathan, Andrew  138 national sovereignty  75, 132, 169, 172, 175 nationalism, as a newer institution  151, 152, 153 ‘nationalist geopolitik’ (realpolitik) narrative  25, 30, 33 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)  137 Nazi Germany  30, 33, 223 NDB (New Development Bank)  138 Nehru, Jawaharlal  218 neocolonialism  56, 177, 183 neo-​Confucianism  106, 157 neo-​imperialism  55 neoliberal institutionalism  5, 13, 91 neoliberalism  182, 222 and Sino-​capitalism  13, 192, 196–​7, 201, 202, 203, 204–​5, 206 ‘neo-​neo’ debate  234 neo-​statism  13, 193, 196, 203, 205, 206 New Development Bank (NDB)  138 New York Times  42 Newtonian ontology in IR  3, 13, 210–​11, 212–​14, 218, 219, 222, 225 Nexon, D.H.  213 NGOs, Chinese controls over  137 Nhat Hahn, Thich  43 Nichol, L.  216 Nigeria  131 Nihonjin ron discourse, Japan  33 ‘Nine Regions’ (Jiuzhou)  104 non-​duality with duality  49–​50, 51–​2, 57 non-​interference/​non-​intervention  132, 137, 148, 151, 153, 154, 158, 172, 182 ‘non-​West,’ the  102–​3 non-​Western IR  4, 10, 13, 64–​5, 74, 102, 174, 176 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  137 North Korea  133, 150 see also Korea Northeast Asia  156, 157, 160 Northern Wei dynasty period  105 nuclear safety  132 Nye, Joseph S.  235

O Obama, Barack  133, 140, 212 ‘offensive realism’  4, 195 Ohmae, K.  221 ‘One China Policy’  127 Ong, Aihwa  151 ‘ontology of relations’  83, 84, 90–​6, 98 ‘ontology of things’  84, 87–​90, 98 orthodox revisionist powers  155 see also revisionist power, China as Other, the  63, 88–​9, 94, 95, 98 outer zone  112 P Pacific Rim narrative  25, 29–​30, 31–​2 Pakistan  131, 138 Palestine  26 Pan Wei  221 patriarchy  45, 74 Peace of Westphalia  27 see also Treaty of Westphalia, 1648; Westphalian IR; Westphalian system peacekeeping operations (PKOs)  148, 151 Peat, F.D.  215 Permanent Court of Arbitration  148, 152 Philippines  127, 131 ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy  212 PKOs (peacekeeping operations)  148, 151 Plato  85 pluralism  145, 146, 147, 151 and the deeply pluralist GIS  148–​55 polar region security  133 ‘policy entrepreneurs’  35 ‘political China’  127, 128 polymorphous states  221–​2 Pompeo, Mike  195, 196 positivism  1 postcolonial theory  28–​9, 45, 74, 88–​9, 217 post-​positivism  1 poststructuralist theory  88–​9, 93, 212, 214, 217, 218 post-​Western IR  64–​5, 67, 73–​7, 102–​3, 174, 176, 236 and guanxi  73–​7 power  87 GPM (great power management)  151 ‘great power rivalry’  141 hard and soft  183–​4, 184, 223 and language  62 power balance  151, 219 power distribution  128–​32, 151 power transition theory  2, 4–​5, 7, 63, 190, 194–​5, 203, 211, 222–​3, 235 PRC (People’s Republic of China) see China primary institutions  145, 146, 161 classical ‘Westphalian’  149, 150–​2 emerging/​contested  149, 153–​5

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INDEX

new  149, 152–​3 obsolete  149, 150 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence  36 private sector in China  197, 198, 199, 201, 221 problem-​solving theory  97 product safety  132 public health  132 public international law  110 Puchala, Donald  183 Putin, Vladimir  131 Pye, Lucien  66, 113, 172

Ringmar, Erik  88 Rosemont, H.  67 Rosenau, James  3, 7 Rozman, G.  8 Ruggie, J.G.  14, 242 rules of the game  129, 132–​3 differentiated positions on  135–​8 Russia  131, 132, 135 see also BRICS (Brazil-​Russia-​India-​China-​ South Africa) countries

Q Qin dynasty period  109, 114, 156 Qin Yaqing  4, 44, 52, 67, 71, 90–​2, 96, 160, 181, 211, 213 Qing dynasty period  105, 106, 109, 116, 150 quantum emergence  213–​14 quantum theory  214, 239 queer theory  45, 50 R R2P (‘responsibility to protect’)  177, 184 Raajneeti  42 racial discrimination, opposition to  132 racism  45, 74, 152 rationalism  1, 34 realism  2, 3, 4, 13, 29, 34, 87–​8, 90, 115, 116, 190, 194–​6, 199, 203, 205, 206, 222–​3, 225 structural realism  91, 115, 116, 213 realpolitik (‘nationalist geopolitik’) narrative  25, 30, 33 reflectivism  1 reformist revisionist powers  155 see also revisionist power, China as relational sociology  214 relationality  3, 12, 64–​5, 67, 68, 69–​70, 71–​2, 74, 75–6, 84, 86, 179, 211, 213, 214, 215, 240–​1 and the ‘ontology of relations’ in IR  83, 84, 90–​6, 98 relational ontology  13, 88, 91, 95, 96, 212, 213 relational turn in IR  211, 213 religious freedom  132 Republic of China  see Taiwan Republic of Korea  131 Republican period  114 reputation  70 ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P)  177, 184 ‘return of geopolitics’  141 ‘returnism’  76 revisionist power, China as  6, 107, 145, 146, 147, 154–​5, 161, 191, 195, 200 revolutionary revisionist powers  155 re-​worlding of the West  101–​4 ‘Rimspeak’  31

S Saudi Arabia  131 Schmitt, Carl  85–​6 ‘second image’ and ‘second image reversed’ narratives  204 secondary institutions  145 security dilemmas  87 security issues  136–​7 Self  88–​9, 90, 94, 95, 98 sexism  45 Shahi, D.  46 Shanghai Cooperation Organization  138, 199 Shankara  45 Shih Chih-​yu  83, 94, 96, 176 Shijing (Book of Poetry, The)  104 shinfūdoron  33 Shujing (Book of Documents, The)  104 ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’  128 see also BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) Silk Road Fund  138 Sinic zone  112 Sino-​capitalism dialectic  13, 192–​3, 196–​200, 203–​7 and the global system  200–​3 Smith, Steve  173 social constructivism  88 see also constructivism social media, Chinese controls over  137 Social Theory of International Politics (Wendt)  88 Socialism  106 sociological-​institutional exchanges  170, 180, 181–​2, 184 soft power  183–​4, 184, 234 solidarism  145, 146, 147, 153 Song dynasty period  114, 115, 127 South Africa  26, 131 see also BRICS (Brazil-​Russia-​India-​China-​ South Africa) countries South Asia 48, 131, 137 South China Sea  44–​5, 137, 148, 150, 151, 152, 160 South Korea  149 see also Korea Southeast Asia  54–5, 157, 159 sovereignty  87, 137, 148, 151, 153, 154, 156, 158, 168, 170, 172, 177, 182

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CHINA’S RISE AND RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Soviet Union  235 see also Russia space  133, 148 Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands)  127 ‘Spring and Autumn Warring States’ period (770-​221 BCE)  146 ‘state capitalism’  197 ‘new’  201, 204 State Council of the Information Office of the PRC publications  133–​4 statehood, European/​US conceptions of  26–​7 states  87 anxiety about uncertainty  93 friend/​enemy dichotomy  85–​6 ideal-​type model  26 status quo power, China as  5, 6, 44, 145, 146, 147, 154–​5, 161 status recognition  70 structural constructivism  91, 213 structural realism  91, 115, 116, 213 students, international  222 substantialism  12, 212 substantialist ontology  210–​11 Sullivan, Jake  168 Susruta Samhita  48 suzerainty  158, 162 Swadhyaya  47–​8 T Taiwan  109, 126, 128, 151, 152 US arms sales to  136–​7 Tang Shiping  4 technology innovation  197, 198, 199, 201 territorial disputes  127 China/​India border  151 East China Sea  33, 44–​5, 150, 151, 160 peaceful resolution of  132 South China Sea  44–​5, 137, 148, 150, 151, 152, 160 territoriality  145, 150, 151, 153, 154 terrorism, opposition to  132 Tessenow, H.  54 Thailand  133 theory building  190, 235–​6, 237 theory generation  2, 14, 169 theory testing  2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 169 ‘third culture’  72 Third Debate  1 Thousand Talents Program  201 Thucydides Trap  2, 6, 63, 191, 195, 196, 203, 205, 206, 223, 235 Tian, C.  50 Tiananmen Square  148 tianxia  12, 32, 102–​4, 117–​18, 156, 157, 181, 184, 184, 219, 238 Anglosphere’s reception of  111–​17 contemporary Chinese scholars’ interpretations of  107–​11

patriarchy in  45 post-​Western genealogy of  104–​7 Todorov, T.  7 Tong, S.  65 tongbian  50 TPP (Trans-​Pacific Partnership)  133 Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-​1854 (Fairbanks)  111 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)  133 Trans-​Pacific Partnership (TPP)  133 Treaty of Westphalia, 1648  128, 175 see also Peace of Westphalia; Westphalian IR; Westphalian system trialectical healing  49–​50 ‘tribute system’  111–​12, 115, 116, 157, 162, 224 ‘tribute system’ period (221 BCE-​1895)  146 ‘Tribute to Yu’ (Yogong)  104 Trump, Donald  35, 129, 134–​5, 140, 154, 194, 195, 212 trustworthiness (xinyong)  70 Tsui, A.S.  66 TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership)  133 Tu, W.M.  219 Tudor, D.  156 Turkey  131, 149 U UK (United Kingdom), withdrawal from EU (Brexit)  130 Ukraine  131 UN (United Nations)  200 UN Charter  126, 132, 137, 168 UN Security Council (UNSC)  127, 148 universalized Western appropriation  170, 180, 182, 184 Unschuld, P.U.  54 US (United States)  ‘America First’ policies  134–​5, 194 and the COVID-​19 pandemic  129, 130 decline of  24, 35, 149, 160–​1 as an empire  25–​6 hegemony of  117 as a model of statehood  26 ‘One China Policy’  127 Open Door policy  28 ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy  212 power distribution in the international order  129 relationship with China  126, 133, 137, 138–​41, 149, 157, 191, 194, 195, 206, 224, 235 security issues  136–​7 and tianxia  116–​17 utilitarianism  43

252

INDEX

V Van Loon, G.  47, 49 Vietnam  115–​16, 131, 149 Viraphol, Sarasin  112 W Walt, Stephen  4 Waltz, Kenneth  6, 87, 158, 213 Wang Fei-​Ling  114–​15, 118 Wang Gungwu  115, 118, 171–​2 Wang, H.J.  176 Wang Yi  135, 223 Wang Yuan-​kang  115 Warring States period  104 Washington Consensus  196 water  and the dao  50–​1 as a metaphor  52–​6 Watson, A.  158, 161 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)  132, 136 Weiss, Linda  221 Wendt, Alexander  87, 88–​9, 94, 161, 213–​14, 217 Western centrism in IR theory  3, 6, 8, 10, 28, 64, 102, 173–​4, 239–​40 Western scholarship, dominance of in IR theory  6, 8, 28, 76, 173–​4 Westphalia World  94, 95, 97 Westphalian IR  11, 13, 34, 44, 45, 56 and the Eastphalia concept  168–​71, 172, 175, 177, 179–​80, 182, 183–​4, 184, 185 Westphalian system  27, 36, 108, 112, 114–​15, 128, 158–​9 When China Rules the World (Jacques)  113 Wilhelmine Germany  6 WMDs (weapons of mass destruction)  132, 136 Wohlforth, W.  1 Wolf, Eric  28

Womack, Brantly  71, 115–​16, 118 World Bank  134, 136 World Order (Kissinger)  125, 139 ‘world order,’ as a concept  128 WTO (World Trade Organization)  148, 195 wuwei  51, 54 X Xi Jinping  35, 36, 83, 106, 107, 108, 125–​6, 135, 153, 155, 176, 184, 195, 198–​9 xinyong (trustworthiness)  70 Xunzi  32, 34 Y Yan Xuetong  32, 34, 36, 44 Yang Jiechi  151, 168 Yang Lien-​sheng  115, 118 Yijing (Book of Changes)  50 Yin, J.  83 yin/​yang  49, 50, 57, 91, 92, 92, 94​ and China’s rise  54–​5 Yuan dynasty period  105 Z Zakaria, Fareed  149 Zen Buddhism  49–​50, 54–​5, 57 non-​duality with duality  49–​50, 51–​2, 57 Zhang Qixiong (Chang Chi-​hsiung)  109–​10 Zhang, X.  148 Zhang Yongjin  116, 147, 148, 181 Zhao Suisheng  112 Zhao Tingyang  36, 83, 108–​9, 111, 116, 211 Callaghan’s critique of  112–​13 Zhongguo ren  127 zhongyi  49, 53–​4, 57 Zhou dynasty period  108 Zimbabwe  133 Zoellick, Robert  193 Zou Yan  104 Zweig, D.  181–​2

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“China’s rise deserves more theoretical and empirical scrutinization from International Relations scholars. This edited volume will help unpack China’s rise beyond the traditional theoretical lens.” Huiyun Feng, Griffith University

Chengxin Pan is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Macau. Emilian Kavalski is the inaugural NAWA Chair Professor at the Jagiellonian University.

Bringing together leading scholars from Asia and the West, this book investigates how the dynamics of China’s rise in world politics contributes to theory-building in International Relations (IR). The book demonstrates how the complex and transformative nature of China’s advancement is also a point of departure for theoretical innovation and reflection in IR more broadly. In doing so, the volume builds a strong case for a genuinely global and post-Western IR. It contends that ‘non-Western’ countries should not only be considered potential sources of knowledge production, but also original and legitimate focuses of IR theorizing in their own right.

Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations combines original research and theoretical innovation to give fresh insight into the changing politics of the region.

SERIES EDITORS Yongjin Zhang Shogo Suzuki Peter Marcus Kristensen

ISBN 978-1-5292-1294-5

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