China's Macao Transformed-Challenge and Development in the 21st Century 9789629375058, 9789629372071

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CHINA’S MACAO TRANSFORMED: CHALLENGE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge and Development in the 21st Century Edited by

Eilo W. Y. YU Ming K. Chan

© 2014 City University of Hong Kong All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, Internet or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the City University of Hong Kong Press

First published 2014 Printed in Hong Kong

ISBN: 978-962-937-207-1

Published by City University of Hong Kong Press Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong Website: www.cityu.edu.hk/upress E-mail: [email protected]

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge and Development in the 21st Century

Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................ xiii Acknowledgements ...............................................................................xxxi

Overviews and Historical Sketch I.

A Chinese View on Macao since 1999, Zhiliang WU (Macao Foundation) ........................................................... xxxv II. The Macao SAR: From A Luso–Macanese Perspective, Jorge A. H. RANGEL (International Institute of Macau) .......lv III. Beyond the Luso Twilight, Into the Sino Glow: A Historical Sketch of Macao’s Transformation Under Chinese Rule, Ming K. CHAN (Stanford)................. lxiii

Part I. Legal and Political Dimensions 1

The Theory and Practice of “One-Country-Two-Systems” in Macao Herbert S. YEE ................................................................................. 3

The Myth and Reality of “Macao People Ruling Macao” ................ 4 Change in Executive–Legislative Relations ................................... 10 A High Degree of Political Autonomy or “Mainlandization”? ....... 13 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 18

2

Public Sector Reform in Macao Bill K. P. CHOU ............................................................................... 21

The Impact of Public Sector Reform: Reality and Public Perception ......................................................... 22

v

Public Sector before the Retrocession ....................................... 24 Public Sector Reform after the Handover ................................. 26 The Weakest Link to the Public Sector Reform ............................. 33 Concluding Remarks ...................................................................... 38

3

Electoral Reform and Political Representation in Macao Jorge GODINHO ............................................................................. 43

Macao Society and Political Representation .................................. 43 The Political System ...................................................................... 44 The Legislative Assembly .............................................................. 45 Election Reforms Are Needed........................................................ 46 The Tripartite Composition of the Legislative Assembly ......... 47 Conversion of Votes into Seats ................................................. 48 Other Aspects ............................................................................ 49 Ensuring Lusophone Representation .............................................. 49

4

Patron-Clientelism and Elections in Macao: The 2009 Chief Executive Election Bruce K. K. KWONG....................................................................... 55

Politics of Patron-Clientelism ........................................................ 56 From Authoritative Colonial Governor to Authoritative Executive-led CE ............................................... 57 The Politics of the Election Committee and CE Election .............. 60 Some Unresolved Questions in the CE Election ............................ 64 The Political Clients of Fernando Chui .......................................... 68 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 69

Part II. Socio-Economic Dimensions 5

Reinterpreting Macao’s Society, Politics and Economy: The Significance and Geopolitical Aspects of Casino Capitalism Sonny Lo ......................................................................................... 75 vi

Introduction .................................................................................... 75 Dependent Casino Capitalism and Its Impact on Economy, Politics and Society ..................................................... 76 Casino Diplomacy, Political Dependence and Patronage Perpetuation ................................................................. 83 The Interplay between Macao’s Society, Politics and Economy .... 89 Conclusion and Geopolitics of Macao’s Casino Capitalism ........... 92

6

Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model and the Las Vegas Casino Resort Model Ricardo C. S. SIU & Miao HE .......................................................... 97

The Ceremonial-instrumental Dichotomy in Institutional Analysis .................................................................. 100 Features and Practice of the Macao Gambling Room Model ....... 102 Features and Practice of the Las Vegas Casino Resort Model...... 105 Tensions between the Integration of the Two Models and Implications .......................................... 109 The Dichotomy in Regime Stance ................................................ 113 Concluding Remarks .................................................................... 117

7

E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism Eilo W. Y. YU, Emma S. M. LAO & Duncan CHEONG ................. 123

Introduction .................................................................................. 123 ICTs and Youth Activism ............................................................. 124 The Emergence of Macao Young Activism Via Internet ............. 127 Youth Participation on the Internet............................................... 132 Conclusion .................................................................................... 140

Part III. Identity, Education & Cultural Dimensions 8

The Chinese of Macao: Identity and Transformation Jean A. BERLIE ............................................................................. 147

Introduction .................................................................................. 147 vii

History..................................................................................... 147 Methodology ........................................................................... 147 Identity .................................................................................... 148 Identity ......................................................................................... 149 Identity of Macao Chinese: Cantonese, Hokkien, Chaozhou Life Stories ........................................................... 150 Guangdong and Cantonese Language ..................................... 154 Importance of Cantonese Residents in the MSAR ....................... 157 Hokkien ................................................................................... 157 Other Chinese of Macao .......................................................... 159 Two Life Stories........................................................................... 159 Joao Baptista Manuel Leao, Liang in Putonghua .................... 159 Leong Heng Teng .................................................................... 161 Social Problem ............................................................................. 162 A Case Study of Ilha Verde (Qingzhou 青洲) ........................ 162 Associations ................................................................................. 167 A Successful Women’s Associations ...................................... 168 Social Change and Globalization ................................................. 169 A More Global World? .......................................................... 171 Conclusion ................................................................................... 172

9

Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity Malte Philipp KAEDING................................................................. 181

Introduction .................................................................................. 181 Theoretical Perspectives on Identity and National Identity.......... 182 The Macao Identity: Formation and Fluidity ............................... 184 Historical Roots....................................................................... 184 Categorizing Macao Identity ................................................... 185 Cultural Identity ........................................................................... 185 Chinese Culture ....................................................................... 186 Portuguese Culture .................................................................. 186 Macanese ................................................................................. 187 Cultural Hybridization............................................................. 188 History and “Moral” Education ............................................... 188 Portuguese Legacy .................................................................. 189 viii

Civic Identity ................................................................................ 190 Border and Nationality ............................................................ 190 Law ......................................................................................... 191 Political Institutions and the Media ......................................... 192 Political Participation .............................................................. 193 Political Values ....................................................................... 194 Shaping Factors of Macao Identity ............................................... 195 Overview on Macao Identity Surveys .......................................... 197 Measuring Identity: Findings of Quantitative and Qualitative Studies .......................................... 199 Quantitative Study ................................................................... 199 Qualitative Study .......................................................................... 205 Discourse Analysis .................................................................. 205 Interviews ................................................................................ 207 Conclusion .................................................................................... 211

10

The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao Benson W. K. WONG .................................................................... 231

Introduction .................................................................................. 231 Contextual Understanding of the Macao’s Case ........................... 234 The Teaching Profession in the Context of Macao’s Education Policy .......................................................... 236 Obstacles to Teacher Professionalism .......................................... 239 Professionalizing Macao Teachers: Reflections on the HKSAR “Experience” ................................. 247 Underdevelopment of Teacher Professionalism in Macao and Hong Kong: Continuities and Changes .................... 251 Teachers’ Subjectivity and Professionalism under the 10-Year Plan for the Development of Non-Tertiary Education (2011–2020) ........................................... 254 Conclusion: Revisiting the Nature of Teacher Professionalism .... 258

11

Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao Hayes H. H. TANG ........................................................................ 265

Academic Capitalism: The Concept and Its Application .............. 267 ix

Political Configurations of Higher Education and Academic Capitalism ............................. 269 Market Forces in Macao’s Higher Education..................................................... 273 Government Intervention and Government-Capitalist Co-optation ........................................... 277 Academic Profession, Professional Autonomy and MSAR Academic Capitalism...................................................... 281 Changes and Continuities in Post-colonial Macao Higher Education, 2000–2009 ........................................ 283 Promotion of Education and Training for Labor Force Competitiveness Enhancement ................................................ 284 Intensification of Professionalism of the Teaching Profession ...................................................... 286 Quest for Research Excellence .................................................. 286 Promotion of Academic Entrepreneurship and Technology Transfer ............................................................... 287 Concluding Remarks .................................................................... 289

12

Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao Derrick C. K. TAM ......................................................................... 297

Introduction .................................................................................. 297 Macao’s Heritage Protection Institution....................................... 298 Heritage Conservation and Tourism............................................. 304 Heritage Conservation and Urban Planning ................................. 312 Strengthening Public Input and Inter-Departmental Cooperation on Heritage Protection ........................................... 318 Conclusion ................................................................................... 323

Part IV. Macao External Links 13

Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries José Carlos MATIAS .................................................................... 331

Introduction .................................................................................. 331 x

Macao’s External Relations .......................................................... 332 Paradiplomacy and Multi-Layered Diplomacy ............................. 335 Soft Power and China-led Multilateralism ................................... 338 China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries ............................. 341 Macao Forum: A “Sophisticated” Mechanism ............................. 343 The 2010 Ministerial Conference: New Impetus .......................... 347 2013 Conference: More Tools for Cooperation ............................ 350 The Institutional Framework of the Forum................................... 351 Conclusion .................................................................................... 359

14

The USA Patriot Act and the Banco Delta Asia Case in Macao Minxing ZHAO ............................................................................... 365

Introduction .................................................................................. 365 Section 311 and Its Applications .................................................. 366 The Banco Delta Asia Case and Macao Government’s Responses ................................................ 368 Objectives of the US Sanction on BDA........................................ 372 Restricting North Korean Access to the International Financial System.................................................................... 372 Kill the Chicken to Scare the Monkey ..................................... 374 Conclusion .................................................................................... 377

15

Macao Local, Macao Global Cathryn H. CLAYTON......................................................... 381 Making Globality.......................................................................... 383 Making Locality ........................................................................... 388 Globalizing the Local ................................................................... 395 Conclusion .................................................................................... 399

Contributors ........................................................................................... 405

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INTRODUCTION Ming K. CHAN and Eilo W.Y. YU

On 20 December 1999, Macao ended its history of some four and a half centuries of Portuguese colonial rule and began a new era as a Special Administrative Region (MSAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), following in the footsteps of Hong Kong. Retrospect to colonial Macao, Portuguese did not use violent and force to occupy Macao while they gradually stretched their prescience in and control of the territory in steps that were relatively more peaceful when compared with the British experience in Hong Kong. Macao’s reversion to China was also smoother. After the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal, Lisbon began its decolonization policy with the intent to return Macao to the PRC. Considering the need to first resolve the more complicated problems concerning Hong Kong’s sovereignty issue, the Chinese central authorities in Beijing wanted to leave Macao under the Portuguese administration for the time being until after its negotiations with the British on the retrocession of Hong Kong. After the Chinese and British governments in late 1984 signed a joint declaration on the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China in mid-1997 the SinoPortuguese negotiations began in mid-1986, leading to an agreement in 1987 that stipulated the return resumption of Chinese rule in Macao in late 1999. During the transition period to 1999, the Portuguese authorities maintained cordial working relationships with the Chinese government and had few disputes over Macao handover issues. Unlike its British counterpart, the Portuguese government did not introduce significant policy changes in the sunset era and had not reformed Macao’s then existing political system into a more open and democratic institution. Nevertheless, Beijing expressed its concern for the slow pace of civil service localization in Macao during the late transition period. The Macao colonial regime did not xiii

have a concrete plan to promote local Chinese officials to senior positions who would then serve in the new MSAR administration. Beijing worried about the capacity of inexperienced local Chinese officials in running the Macao government after 1999. At the same time, the PRC officialdom was also alarmed by Macao’s rising tide of gangland violence. The Asian economic crisis in late 1997 that impacted Hong Kong also depressed Macao’s casinos whose business had heavily relied on high-rolling gamblers from Hong Kong. To protect their own interests in gaming, gangsters fought with each other. As a result, Macao’s public law and order front was disrupted by gunshots, bombs, and assassinations in the streets. Perhaps learning from the experience of Hong Kong’s troubled handover, Beijing was pro-active in suppressing elements that might undermine the smooth reversion of Macao. On the one hand, Beijing announced the deployment of People’s Liberation Army troops to the MSAR as an obvious deterrent against gangland violence. Beijing also allowed more mainland tourists to visit Macao in order to revitalize the tourism-dependent local economy. As a result, Macao’s public law and order was restored while its economy gradually recovered after the handover. Macao soon embarked on an orbit of post-handover economic growth when the new MSAR administration in 2002 decided to end the four-decade casino monopoly of Stanley Ho’s Sociedade de Tourism e Diversoes de Macao (STDM) and to liberalize its gaming industry by granting three gambling operator franchises that were later split into six. Since then, Macao’s economy has enjoyed an almost uninterrupted double-digit GDP growth riding on a gaming industry boom. In 2011, Macao’s GDP was Pataca (MOP) 292 billion (US$36.5 billion), more than double what it was in 1999.1 The employment situation also improved significantly with the unemployment rate dropped from 6.8% in 2000 to 2.0% since mid-2012.2 At the same time, employees enjoyed higher wages as the median monthly income of Macao workers climbed from MOP4,920 in 1999 to MOP10,000 in 2011, an increase of 103%.3 China’s Macao has seemingly transformed itself into a “Las Vegas of the East”. In 2006, xiv

Macao’s total gambling income at US$6.99 billion outstripped the Las Vegas Strip, and its 2007 figure reached US$10.3 billion, surpassing the entire Las Vegas gaming income. The MSAR’s 2011 gaming intakes totaled MOP269 billion (US$33.5 billion) that yielded MOP94.1 billion (US$11.26 billion) in gambling tax (76.5% of local government revenues). For the first ten months of 2012, total MSAR gaming income exceed MOP250 billion (US$31.25 billion, a 13.5% increase over 2010), perhaps trending toward US$40 billion by the year’s end. Macao has clearly become the world’s biggest gaming hub in revenue. Nevertheless, economic growth could not hide Macao’s intensifying social and political problems despite the “through train” style institutional continuity in its legal and administrative systems from the Portuguese era into China’s MSAR new age. Rather, rapid gaming-tourism expansion has generated greater social tensions and also called into question the longer term prospects for Macao’s sustainable development along a healthier and more balanced course. Demonstrations and protests that were few and small scaled in old Macao have broken out more frequently with greater intensity and magnitude during the second term of inaugural MSAR Chief Executive Edmund Ho, with an increasingly harsh confrontational stance toward the authorities. The May 1 Labor Day anti-regime demonstrations in 2006 and 2007 revealed the public’s anger over the rapidly changing socioeconomic circumstances that threatened their livelihood, especially on such triggering issues like sky-rocketing property price/rent, and the massive influx of illegal external workers. Paradoxically, economic development did not improve harmony and stability in Macao society. Instead, imbalanced, ill-coordinated and “too much, too soon and all at once” type of runaway growth in the dominating gaming sector as facilitated by MSAR regime policy tilts has seriously distorted resources allocation and gains distribution while causing rampant price inflation, infrastructure overload, environmental decline, and overall life quality deterioration that intensified social conflicts. Furthermore, public confidence in the MSAR officialdom was rocked when then Secretary for Transport xv

and Public Works, Ao Man-long, was arrested for bribery and money laundering involving over MOP800 million (US$100 million) in December 2006. The Ao case destroyed the image of clean government and severely undermined the legitimacy of the MSAR regime. Following the “economic miracle” of the first decade of gaming liberalization, the MSAR government must pay special attention to internal administrative reforms and longer term public policy articulation to ensure another decade of positive transformation to uplift the life of the Macao populace and the balanced, sustainable development of the community in both the hardware and software realms. In his 13 November 2012 Policy Address to the legislature, current MSAR Chief Executive Fernando Chiu has outlined a host of regime efforts to improve grassroots and middleclass livelihood (via tax rebate, senior welfare benefits, medical care voucher, electricity subsidy, students’ book/stationary grant, and above all, increased amount of direct cash payment (MOP8,000 for permanent residents and MOP4,800 for other residents). He also promised a new attempt at officials/civil servants performance assessment to enhance public service delivery efficiency and policy implementation effectiveness. If properly implemented, these measures would definitely help to promote meaningful social and administrative advancement in China’s Macao. ••••••••••••••••••

This collection of 18 scholarly essays highlights some of the key dimensions of Macao’s remarkable “One Country, Two Systems” actualization experience in its first 13 years. Individual chapter delineates many of the vital issues and pressing problems in the MSAR that are shaping the longer term sustainability of its developmental prospects as a prosperous and stable city domain under the PRC flag. This volume begins with two overviews by Zhiliang Wu and Jorge Rangel sharing their impression of Macao’s post-handover development from the local Chinese and LusoMacanese perspectives. Then Ming Chan’s historical sketch reviews xvi

Macao’s progress from Portuguese sunset rule to becoming China’s MSAR amid Sino-Luso cooperation that underlined its smooth reversion to China and paved the way to its post-handover breakthrough attainments. Part I of this volume focuses on the political and electoral dimensions. Chapter 1 reviews the actualization of “One Country, Two Systems” in the MSAR. While confirming the post-handover achievements have won popular support for the new order, Herbert Yee suggests that the “mainlandization” trends and the MSAR’s limited local autonomy could undermine Macao’s sustainable development. In Chapter 2 on local public administration, Bill Chou argues that the MSAR government has suffered maladministration and bureaucratic corruption that undermined regime legitimacy. He calls for enlargement of public participation as a remedy to reform Macao’s public sector. Jorge Godinho in Chapter 3 evaluates the chief executive and legislature elections and urges an expansion of public electoral participation as to enhance representativeness and legitimacy of the MSAR political institutions. Similarly, Bruce Kwong in Chapter 4 examines the 2009 chief executive election to illuminate the “patron-client” dynamics in local elections. The limited electoral participation has raised questions on the legitimacy of a chief executive selected by an electorate lacking genuine representativeness. Hence, the MSAR administration must rely on governance performance to earn popular support and buttress its legitimacy. Part II highlights some major socio-economic dimensions. Sonny Lo’s Chapter 5 asserts that democratization of the MSAR polity will strengthen both consultative governance and regime legitimacy while public sector reforms can further enhance bureaucratic capacity and improve performance. In Chapter 6, Ricardo Siu and Miao He study the business model in running the lucrative VIP rooms for high-rollers in Macao’s casinos in which the gaming franchisees adopted a traditional agency model to enlist third parties as VIP room operators. As this agency model contravenes the official intent to transform Macao from a “world gambling hub” into a “world tourism-leisure center”, they propose the Las Vegas xvii

institutional model that emphasizes transparency and regulated market conduct for a successful transformation. Eilo Yu, Emma Lao and Duncan Cheong in Chapter 7 delineate the rise of Macao youth activism and report on how the local youth’s utilization of information and communication technologies (ICTs) for political participation has empowered their emergence as a new sociopolitical force to become a governance concern to the MSAR officialdom. Part III looks into the culture, identity and education realms. In Chapter 8, Jean Berlie discusses the culture and customs of local Macao Chinese. Malte Kaeding in Chapter 9 charts the emergence of civic identity among the Macao populace in the context of the 1999 regime change and the MSAR new order. Benson Wong’s Chapter 10 addresses key issues in education reform and the promotion of teacher professionalism as education has been a core element in the long-term strategy for sustainable development by improving human resource quality and quantity. Hayes Tang critiques Macao’s tertiary education in Chapter 11 and argues that the regime-business collusion results in academic capitalism in Macao that aims at profit making instead of upgrading workforce quality, skills and capabilities. Chapter 12 by Derrick Tam pinpoints heritage management and conservation in Macao—a historic city of Sino-Luso cultural hybridist and reflects on heritage protection concerns in parallel to Macao’s development as a world gaming and tourism center. Section 4 articulates the various dimensions of Macao’s external links. In Chapter 13, José Carlos Matias details the development of Macao as a hub connecting China and the Lusophone countries. Chapter 14 by Minxing Zhao sheds light on the emerging USMacao dynamics through a case study of Macao’s Banco Delta Asia which was black-listed by the US Treasury Department in 2005 for alleged money laundry involving North Korean interests. This case unfolded amid new US-MSAR links as three out of the six casino concessionaires are US-based. Finally, in Chapter 15, Cathryn Clayton analyzes the Macao people’s adaptation to the internationalization of their city as both local residents as well as xviii

global citizens. Collectively the 18 learned essays in this volume offer a wide vista illuminating the post-handover transformation of Macao in terms of the political and electoral dimensions, socio-economic development, heritage conservation, education and identity, as well as external linkage. Such in-depth analysis of Macao’s drastic transformations as viewed from a host of interdisciplinary perspectives affords the readers a more informed basis with a finely balanced approach to appreciate the actualization of China’s “One Country, Two Systems” model in this former Luso enclave. In many aspects, the MSAR repertoire differs significantly from the Hong Kong SAR saga while both cases harbor vital implications for Beijing’s quest for its much cherished peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Hence, the fast unfolding new pages in this amazing Macao story is of direct relevance to better understand China’s global ascendancy in the 21st century. ••••••••••••••••••

The publication of this volume is truly timely as the MSAR approaches the 15th anniversary of its establishment in December 1999. This year 2014 also marks the first decade of American casinos’ arrival to “Las Vegasize” Macao gaming-tourism that has since attracted a massive mainland Chinese tourist influx and profoundly reshaped Macao economy and society. Some key trends and major events have unfolded in Macao after most of the chapters here were finalized in spring 2013. Fortunately, these latest developments in Macao did not render out-dated or make less relevant the informed narratives, systematic delineations, careful analysis and penetrative insights provided by the chapter authors. In fact, their chapters’ tight reasoning, solid documentation, balanced conceptual construct and well-justified findings as a whole have largely been validated and even reinforced by recent Macao headlined events of lasting impact. The following Macao key events are worthy to note:

xix

• The 15 September 2013 legislative elections that saw the pro-democratic elements’ retreat with one less seat despite a slightly enlarged Legislative Assembly with four new seats. • Chief Executive Fernando Chui’s 12 November 2013 Policy Address that emphasized efforts on four target areas (welfare-social security, education-talents, public housing, and medical service-healthcare). A Talent Development Commission was soon established with Chui as chair. (In April 2014, this volume’s co-editor, Eilo Yu, was appointed a member.) • Three cases of daily life basic services mishandling to amplify the MSAR officialdom’s incompetence, inadequate preparation, and lack of capacity to cope with real-life situations. (a) The Transport Bureau’s take-over of the service originally provided by a recently bankrupt public bus operator. The anti-corruption agency charged this takeover (as a short term stop-gap measure to maintain vital public transportation) was improperly conducted by contracting under an invalid application of wrong provisions of existing law. Instead of a long term solution with a new bus operator through open bidding contract, the regime opted for a remedial re-franchise plan on a proper legal basis that has yet to be worked out in early June 2014. (b) The April 2014 expiration of a local cable TV system provider’s 16-year monopoly did not yield the long waited opportunity for a competitive market as in the announced broadcasting liberation policy. Instead, the regime has set up a new public-funded unit to run a “new” cable TV system with transmission provided by the old cable TV operator on short-term contract basis.

xx

(c) The relevant official agencies’ inability to offer practical assistance to help dislocated occupants/unit owners of a structurally unsafe mid-rise residential block triggered prolonged street demonstrations by several hundred affected residents. Only the direct intervention by two pro-regime social organizations with offer generous funds to partially underwrite the block’s repair/reconstruction that the agitated “homeless” persons ended their weeks-long vocal protest. It was against such problematic undercurrents in Macao’s regime-state interface behind a facade of prosperity—double-digit increases in GDP and in gross gaming intakes (the tax on which accounted for 85% of government revenue) and a 1.7% low unemployment rate—that an unprecedented political saga erupted to surprise many local observers, activists and elites. This refers to the 25–29 May 2014 regime debacles over enactment of a law on criminal immunity for a sitting chief executive and hefty retirement pensions for the chief executive and principal officials (cabinet appointees) that drew the largest public outbursts in the MSAR era. On 25 May, some 20,000 mounted a protest march and then on 27 May, over 8,000 staged a sit-in demonstration to surround the MSAR legislature building while the bill was dealt with inside. Yielding to public pressure and perhaps Beijing’s concern, Chui withdrew the bill on 29 May. Ironically, exactly a month later, on 29 June, elections will be held to fill the 344 membership slots of the MSAR chief executive election that will select the next chief executive in August. The following pages offer analytical observations by the two editors and a chapter author. Macao’s post-handover economic achievement poses significant socio-political implications for the MSAR as Eilo Yu has pointed out. Socio-political mobilizations come hand in hand with Macao’s economic development. Rapid but imbalanced economic growth intensified social conflicts in Macao that stemmed from increased poverty, high inflation, sky-rocketing property prices/rents and a discernible decline in the quality of life. The MSAR government nevertheless failed to resolve these and other social problems but xxi

rather continues to rely on economic growth and social welfare benefit enhancements to alleviate public dissatisfaction due to quality of life deterioration. Yet this approach cannot effectively address the roots of the problems. Ultimately, the dissatisfaction of Macao populace will adversely impact MSAR governability to challenge the regime’s power, authority and administrative capacity. The intended legislative enactment of a dubious pension scheme for the chief executive and principal officials led to a volcanic explosion of public discontents against the MSAR government. In late 2013, the government proposed a bill to the legislature for a pension scheme to benefit the chief executive and principal officials. As the legislature scrutinized the bill, the government quickly submitted a revised draft. However, the revision was extremely controversial and provoked very strong public opposition that focused on three articles of the bill: First, the proposed principle officials’ pension was very high as officials from the civil service would be given a lump sum pension of 14% of their current earnings as principle officials while those non-civil service principal officials would receive 30% of their total income while in office. The scheme would be retroactive for all principal officials since the 1999 handover. Some currently serving principle officials could thus receive a lump sum pension of over 10 million MOP. Second, the chief executive would enjoy a life-long pension at 70% of his current salary after retirement. Some argued that the government would have to pay current Chief Executive Fernando Chiu over 50 million MOP after his retirement if he lives to 80 years of age. Third, the bill also offers criminal immunity for the sitting chief executive to exempt him/her from any criminal proceedings on his/her conduct while in office. Such questionable provisions of the bill provoked considerable public anger. It brought to a boiling point the long simmering public discontents with the government for its failure to solve social problems while the MSAR regime leaders would gain enormous benefits and special privileges after retirement. Crucially, the events revealed the incompetence of the MSAR government in failing to communicate with the public to clearly explain its pension proposal xxii

for top officials. It rather believed that the pro-regime forces that dominated the legislature would easily pass the bill and hence no full public explanation was needed. Yet, this neglect to curry public opinion led to fierce popular outcries against the bill. The opposition staged a mass demonstration rally that broke the MSAR’s record in demonstrators’ turnout on 25 May 2014 when some twenty thousand marched to protest against the bill and demand its withdrawal. The suddenness, size, scale and magnitude of this 25 May public outburst shocked the MSAR elites. The next day, Chief Executive Fernando Chui requested the MSAR legislature to delay its planned final deliberation and voting on the bill until a regime-revised version would be introduced later. Then on 27 May when the legislature was in session to act on the bill, some 8,000 people mounted a sit-in protest surrounding the Legislative Assembly building to voice stern objection and demanded its withdrawal. Finally, on 29 May, bowing to the tremendous public anger, Chui withdrew the existing bill. He also conceded his regime’s inadequacies and the acute lack of adequate public consultation on this bill and in other policy areas. These events illustrate beyond doubt the serious state-society gaps despite economy prosperity and the regime’s deeply flawed governance. The sharp about-face on this bill within four days under public pressure, among other implications, amplifies the MSAR government’s incapacity to considering public interests and opinions in making public policies. Until then, when it faced less public resistance, it would simply ignore opposition voices and push forward policies of its own choosing. Contrary, it would suspend consideration of a proposal if there was overwhelming public opposition. However, such a governance strategy cannot resolve the regime-mass disconnect as it is being widened simultaneously with everyone’s daily livelihood complaints rising amid economic growth. The MSAR’s drastic economic transformation has yielded the necessity for a major shift of regime direction. Otherwise, continuous economic development without corresponding sociopolitical reforms will beget a crisis of governance in the MSAR soon xxiii

or later. The late May 2014 events seemed to confirm that the time has come. 4 Sonny Lo highlights the late May 2014 protests’ impacts in four key areas: First and foremost, the Macao government had badly miscalculated the strong public reactions to the contents of the bill that were perceived by critics and the protestors as directly benefiting the pockets of the sitting chief executive and principal officials. In an attempt to defuse public anger, Chief Executive Chui stressed in his May 29 press conference that he has no intention of “enriching” himself and any post-tenure payments that he would receive under this bill would be entirely donated to charities. His advisors and subordinates who had decided to submit the bill to the legislature for passage, and who failed to make any decisive move to withdraw the bill right after the 25 May protest, were actually responsible for the political embarrassment. It also demonstrated that even if Chui were re-elected in August 2014 as Chief Executive, he would have little choice but to revamp the cabinet principal officials by injecting new bloods. In particular, the post of the Secretary for Administration and Legal Affairs should logically be split into two Secretaries due to the heavy workloads of both portfolios with a better division of labor and a further refinement of ministerial responsibilities. Second, while some observers have questioned whether the protests-withdrawal saga would affect Chui’s prospects of being reelected for a second term, the Macao style of politics means that a negative scenario would seem less likely. Beijing has so far remained quite satisfied with the performance of the MSAR regime under Chui’s leadership. Yet, the Macao government’s U-turn on the controversial bill has already tarnished the image of its leaders. An implication is that the forthcoming MSAR chief executive election might entice at least one additional candidate to compete with Chui, thus making the previously “harmonious” (uncontested in 2004 and 2009) Macao chief executive elections a little more exciting and competitive excise this summer. Third, the ways in which the MSAR official policy public xxiv

consultations were conducted will have to be reviewed critically. The Chui administration has tried to enhance public consultations in many aspects, but such consultations remain unbalanced and poorly run. While district-level consultative committees were set up on environmental and transport issues, they are composed of all appointed members without any elected elements. After the municipal councils’ late 2001 abolition, Macao really needed a district-level consultative body to more effectively consult public opinions. One option is to merge the existing district-level consultative committees to form a new municipal council with directly elected members so that residents will feel that their views are not being ignored. Otherwise, Macao’s consultative mechanisms would remain problematic as long as many folks consider their views are not adequately respected and heard. Fourth, the controversial bill on the benefits to be enjoyed by the chief executive and principal officials after retirement from office demonstrated a peculiar lack of popular mobilization for public support. Unlike the Basic Law Article 23 national security legislation that went into effect in March 2009 after a series of campaign to galvanize public support, this bill on senior official perks was not only ill-timed but also presumed legislative subcommittee deliberations would be sufficient and legitimately representative or genuinely reflective of popular sentiments. Undoubtedly, it was a total absence of political sensitivity as the bill was expected to rush through the legislature just several months before the chief executive election. Even worse, the Legislative Assembly’s sub-committee majority that had gone over the bill’s contents in detail had utterly lost touch with public opinions. As some of the May 25 protesters complained, the “rubber stamping” legislature failed to reflect their views. If so, a deeper question is whether the electoral reform introduced to the legislature before its September 2013 elections was far from adequate. The local democrats had long insisted on more directly elected seats should be introduced to the legislature, yet the MSAR government put forward a very conservative and minimal 2012 reform for the legislature: increasing the number of legislators from 29 to 33 by xxv

adding only 2 directly elected seats for a total of 14 whereas indirectly elected seats would totaled 12 (after 2 new seats) and 7 would remained as regime-appointed. In hindsight, this conservative reform has limited effect in enabling the MSAR legislature to more fully reflect public opinions as the democrats remain a tiny minority of 4 in the 33-member chamber disproportionate to their direct election popularity. A hidden implication of this outburst over the top official perks bill is that the MSAR government would have to revisit the scope and pace of political reform a few years later. A bolder step in legislative reform would probably not erode the powers of the Macao executive branch. Instead it would strengthen regime legitimacy. An unrepresentative legislature, as seen in the recent protests-regime U-turn debacle, could only make the Macao government even weaker and unable to alleviate public discontents and pre-empt mass protests. The recent sage is a rude awakening to Macao’s conservative political elite. The time is ripe for Macao to ponder improving its representative system in the coming years. 5 ••••••••••••••••••

Finally, in a sweeping reconnaissance of Macao’s drastic socioeconomic transformations as fueled by global “casino capitalism” in the last decade, Ming Chan labels it a case of “crisis of overdevelopment”. The MSAR has witnessed more than the usual postcolonial changes, it has experienced a nearly uninterrupted decade (2004-08/2011-13) of double-digit GDP increase propelled by windfall casino revenue. This sudden breakthrough has resulted in a “too much, too soon and all at once” phenomena generated by a casino-tourism boom. Yet all these amounted to a quantitatively impressive yet imbalance economic growth without the corresponding and necessary qualitative enhancement in state capacity and advancement in societal wellbeing. The easy wealth creation-accumulation has an alarmingly distortive effect on the overall policy orientation of the MSAR officialdom and establishment elites as manifested in several levels. (a) There has been a prevalent regime mindset that prioritized xxvi

economic growth via casino capitalism as the “sure win” means to generate wealth, increase government revenue, fund infrastructure projects and new programs (in education, public health, welfare, culture etc.), and create employment, Thus the casino-tourism boom should be maintained and prolonged to the yield the economic gains that would supposedly benefit everyone in Macao. (b) The above items become key policy objectives necessary to ensure political stability and social harmony cherished by both Beijing and local elites. All these elements have induced the regime’s determined pursuit of economic growth and material wealth to ensure prosperity in order to win popular support and enhance the legitimacy of a non-directly elected government. (c) Justified by the over-riding imperative and real need for economic growth, the MSAR regime has systematically adopted a policy tilt to favor casino operators in areas like development land allocation, imported workers hiring and the still valid casino exemptions from a universal ban on public space smoking since January 2013. Regime promotion of casino-tourism was curtailed only after Beijing put the break on further gaming expansion in May 2008. (d) Floating on a massive pool of reserve funds (US$40 billion) from continuous budget surplus, the MSAR regime has grown increasingly self-confident in attitude and in action that regarded financial resources as a fit-all solution to almost all the problems. Hence, the ruling elites have developed an over-reliance on continuous economic growth to yield welfare benefits to alleviate public discontents due to quality of life deterioration (that ironically stemmed from growth-related undertakings like large-scale casinohotel construction projects, huge importation (150,000 in spring 2014) of external workers to fill construction, hotel-eatery and retail jobs mass influx of tourists (over 29 million in 2013, some 70% from PRC mainland) Yet this “pay more/pay-off” approach cannot address the root cause of many deep-seated social problems. (e) Thus after the police shooting incident in the 1 May 2007 Labor Day protests and the 2006 Ao Man-long (then Secretary of Transport and Public Works) corruption scandal, Chief Executive xxvii

Edmund Ho in April 2008 started the still current practice of “sharing prosperity with the people” through an annual direct cash payment to local residents, with payments in their hands by April, before the sensitive 1 May Labor Day. Yet such “pay-off’ (or as some have called “regime bribe”) did not work this time as intended. Despite Chief Executive Chui’s November 2013 offer of MOP9,000 cash payment per Macao permanent resident, fierce protests broke out in late May 2014 against a blatant case of conflict of interests draft bill to directly benefit top regime officials whose questionable performance can hardly justify public generosity on their retirement pensions. Money simply did not buy support or legitimacy. (f) Wealth from the casino-tourism boom has also translated into a “loose fingers over the purse” approach by the MSAR regime with huge budget surplus as seen in their dismal records in the planning, implementation, management, control/supervision and maintenance of major public projects. Economic boom, population growth and facility needs for new undertakings have led to many massive and big-ticket public works projects (bridges, ferry piers, a brand new light-rail system, public housing blocks, and extensive 5zone land reclamation). Yet sky-rocketing cost over-runs, longdelayed behind-schedule completion, frequent plan alterations and sub-standard/unsafe construction, all these seem the common features to characterize many MSAR publicly-funded development projects as officials failed to ensure a “value for money” bottom line. (g) In fact, the MSAR officialdom has grown used to resorting to its deep revenue coffers to bail itself out of various dark holes ranging from administrative blunders, misguided policy measures, government contracts’ legal non-conformity, flawed scheme on imported labor control, major infrastructure project defects (delays, cost over-runs, sub-standard quality) to the more basic everyday livelihood concerns (like public bus and cable TV problems). It seems a common and standard bureaucratic practice to utilize the amply financial resources as a safety net, an escape hatch or a lifejacket to remediate, compensate or to recover from lax law enforcement, ineffective policy implementation and other difficulties rising from the regime’s acute governance capacity gap in this age of xxviii

hi-tech global linkages and civil society-youth activism. Do these syndromes reflect a serious malfunctioning of an extremely well-funded if only moderately over-bloated MSAR bureaucracy that was over-whelmed and even incapacitated by such vital tasks due to its regrettable lack of technical expertise, managerial experience and legal-administrative competence? Perhaps it is useful consider the facts of a rapid gaming-tourism growth, extensive geophysical realignment, and a host of very complex interrelated developments (like cross-border PRD regional integration and global Sino-Lusophone bloc cooperation) on many levels of Macao’s economy, society and its built environment that have stretched far beyond the capacity of the MSAR state for effective governance. With it well-entrenched, basically unreformed polity and subscription to an economic growth-centered vision that has been actualized at the expense of crucial “social engineering” software realm reforms, the late May 2014 regime debacle was perhaps an inevitable and hence unsurprising fallout effect of Macao’s “crisis of over-development” with serious disequilibrium and disconnect among its economic-political-social pillars. 6 The May 2014 protests might still help to usher in a much needed soul-searching reorientation of the MSAR establishment’s overall policy orientation from wealth creation to gains redistribution with stronger emphasis on social justice, popular participation in the policy process and official accountability. Perhaps some long term good could emerge from this debacle to remake China’s Macao into a more positive actualization of the “One Country, Two Systems” formula for national reintegration and post-colonial transformation.

xxix

Notes 1. 2011 Macao Statistics Yearbook, (Macao: Macao Government, 2012), p. 417. 2. Macao Economic Bulletin, 2nd & 3rd Quarter 2012 (Macao: Macao Government, 2012), p. 45. 3. 2011 Macao Statistics Yearbook, (Macao: Macao Government, 2012), p. 79. 4. Eilo Yu’s interviews with reporters as reported in several Macao news stories in Ming Pao (Hong Kong), 26, 28 May 2014. 5. Sonny Lo, “U-turn Lessons”, Macao Business (June 2014). 6. For Ming Chan’s earlier discussion of Macao’s “crisis of overdevelopment”, see his “Transcending ‘Havanization’: Comparative Perspectives on Gaming’s Social Impact and the Over-Development Crisis in China’s Macao,” in S. H. Lo and Beatrice Leung, eds., Dimensions of the Gaming Industry and Social Impact in Macao, (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2010).

xxx

Acknowledgments As co-editors of this volume, we wish to express our profound appreciation and deep gratitude to many people and organizations whose contributions and assistance have greatly facilitated the putting together of the three special essays and fifteen chapters that form this book. Several of them are specifically mentioned here with our most sincere thanks. First of all, full credit must go to Professor Sonny Lo as the cooriginator of this book. The idea for a collective volume like this one first emerged in his meeting with Ming Chan, when both participated as speakers in the Symposium on the 10th Anniversary of Macao’s Handover that was held at the Scientific and Cultural Center of Macau (of Portugal’s Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education) In Lisbon, May 2009 under the auspices of the International Institute of Macau. Then a preliminary outline of the book project’s main focus, scope of coverage and key topics/issues to be addressed was agreed upon when they met again three weeks later in June 2009 at the University of Waterloo, Canada for the Conference on Post-Colonial Transformations in China’s Hong Kong and Macao that they co-organized. Though subsequent discussions via e-notes and phone calls (between Ontario, where Lo taught at the University of Waterloo, and California, where Chan was/still is based at Stanford University), concrete details on chapters and authors gradually took shape. Then in a division of labor among volume co-editors during 2010–11, Professor Lo collected the first draft of a dozen chapters that were reviewed by an external referee who recommended further revisions in mid-2011. Professor Lo has relocated to the Hong Kong Institute of Education in early 2011 and was by then overloaded with teaching and administrative responsibilities besides research commitments. Hence, he transferred to Ming Chan the entire book task, especially the existing chapters’ revision and the addition of new chapters for an enlarged volume. Through his star student as this volume’s co-editor and with his chapter, Professor Lo is still closely linked to this intellectual enterprise. xxxi

Ming Chan was most fortunate to be able to enlist a Macaobased political scientist, Eilo Yu, to move from being a chapter author to become the book’s co-editor. (Yu was Professor Lo’s MPhil student at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and then became him first doctoral student at University of Hong Kong). The fruitful Chan-Yu collaboration began a decade and half ago when Yu presented a paper on local elections at a 2000 HKUST conference on the HKSAR that Ming Chan co-organized, and Yu’s paper became a chapter in Chan’s co-edited 2002 volume. After becoming this book’s co-editors, we co-organized three Macao panels at the 2012 Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference in Toronto, 15–18 March 2012, and the “China’s Macao SAR: 12 Years of Breakthrough & Transformation” Symposium at the University of Toronto, 19 March 2012. From among the Macao papers presented at these two conferences, we were able to enlist additional chapters to enrich this book. Externally, we wish to very warmly thank Dr. Zhiliang Wu, President of the Macao Foundation for his contribution of an overview essay that starts this volume and for the generous support of his Foundation toward the publication of this volume as well as the gift of his own works and the Foundation’s other publications on Macao that are valuable references for our study of Macao. We like to extend our deep appreciation to Dr. Jorge Rangel, President, International Institute of Macau, whose invitation to the 2009 Lisbon Symposium make possible the Chan-Lo meeting that plant the seeds of this book that now also includes his essay. In fact, Dr. Rangel was directly responsible for the first ever Chan-Lo joint efforts on Macao studies in mid-2004 when he invited both to discuss the MSAR’s early years at a seminar held at IIM’s HQ and our joint paper was published as a special supplement to the IIM bulletin, Oriente Occidente later that year. Dr. Rangel also arranged Chan, Lo and Yu’s long interview with MSAR Chief Edmund Ho right before that seminar. Since then, Dr. Rangel, Chan, Lo and Yu have enjoyed close collaboration on academic conferences held in Macao, Hong Kong, Portugal and Canada. The IIM’s Macao and Lisbon offices have become vital contacts, seminar venues, and xxxii

resource centers to this book’s editors and some chapter authors. We are very thankful to Dr. Rangel and his IIM team. Eilo Yu wants to record his gratitude to University of Macau for the granting of sabbatical in autumn 2012 when he was attached to the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California–Los Angeles. For this academic sojourn, he is most grateful to his UCLA host, Professor James W. Tong. Last but definitely not the least, we like to express our deep thanks to Mr. Patrick Kwong, Director, and Mr. Edmund Chan, Editorial Manager of the City University of Hong Kong Press for their patience, care, and efficient team efforts in the production of this Macao volume. In a real sense, this is a continuation of Ming Chan’s earlier cooperation with them as crystallized in the publication of Ming Chan’s 2008 edited volume, China’s Hong Kong Transformed: Retrospect & Prospects Beyond the First Decade. As a sister volume to that earlier title, the present parallel tome on Macao is another worthy output from this splendid collaboration. As co-editors, we are deeply indebted to all the essay and chapter authors for their vital contributions that make this book possible. It is hoped that their findings and insights will enhance our book’s relevance to a more informed appreciation of the twists and turns in Macao’s ongoing transformations. Their chapters will also invite and encourage further academic pursuit by those inside and beyond Macao to engage themselves in the rewarding efforts to articulate, make fuller sense of and extract new meanings from unfolding trends and fresh developments in their Macao-focused studies from a wide spectrum of disciplines and perspectives. Of course, the authors and editors of this volume dare not make any claim to have the last words on any Macao subject matters, but we will be truly delighted to have been able to shed some light to brighten the path ahead for more scholarly efforts to advance collective understanding of the amazing Macao story that no one should and could take for granted. Ming K. CHAN Hoover Institution, Stanford University, June 2014 xxxiii

Overviews and Historical Sketch I. A Chinese View on Macao since 1999 Zhiliang WU President of the Board of Directors, Macao Foundation

History in Retrospective The evolution of Macao is not only unique in the history of China, but also in that of the world. Macao managed to find its own space for survival despite changes in dynasties in both China and Portugal on several occasions, while the world at large had witnessed deep transformations. The reasons why the Portuguese managed to occupy and settle in Macao for nearly five centuries were firstly because of the decline in power in the final stage of the Ming Dynasty. The perilous internal and external situations at that time rendered the Ming imperial court to take less account of Macao. This provided the Portuguese with the opportunity for long-term occupation and settlement, whose wish was eventually realized with the signing of the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Peking in 1887. The Treaty granted the Portuguese the right to permanent settlement and administration. The imperial court of the late Qing Dynasty had the intention to recover Macao when it first grasped with the skills in dealing with powers from the West, but had to abandon the plan later as the envoy, Don Sinibaldo de Mas, died and no one could be found to replace him. In the Republic of China era, the Nationalist government worked hard to revoke all unequal treaties after the end of the Northern Expedition in the late 1920s. One of these efforts was to respond to the public opinion at that time to recover Macao, but the xxxv

plan was abandoned once again because of the start of the civil war against the Chinese Communist Party, followed by the Japanese invasion. After the victory of the anti-Japanese war, the recovery of Macao was on the agenda of the Nationalist government once again, with the formulation of a recovery plan. However, the restart of the civil war triggered by the failure of peaceful negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party left the Macao question unresolved. When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in October 1949, everything had to begin from scratch while difficulties were experienced in diplomacy. Considering the special status of Hong Kong and Macao, the new Chinese government adopted a policy of “maintaining the status quo and taking advantage (of the two territories) for a long period of time”. The changes in the internal political situation afterwards made the resolution of the Hong Kong and Macao questions an untimely option for the PRC policy agenda. The consequent democratization and decolonization after the dictatorship in Portugal was overthrown in 1974 means Macao was regarded by Portugal as a special territory—a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration. The establishment of the diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1979 conferred to Portugal by China, to a certain degree, the right to administer Macao. The Portuguese Administration in Macao enjoyed some degree of legitimacy, while local economy developed in an accelerated way due to China’s open and reform policy while the mainland society was undergoing modernisation. Negotiations between China and Portugal began in 1986, and concluded successfully with the signing of the 1987 SinoPortuguese Joint Declaration that confirmed Macao’s reversion to China on 20 December 1999. Macao would open a new page in its history under the principles of “One Country, Two Systems”, “Macao people to govern Macao” and “high degree of autonomy” in accordance with the Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR). The process of reversion was a major challenge to the Macao community. Two years before the establishment of the MSAR, the xxxvi

future positioning of development had been a focus of controversy as a result of the Asian financial crisis and internal instability in public security. Under the influence of a number of factors, such as a long-term co-existence but division in governance of the local Chinese and Portuguese population, the Administration’s lack of authority and capability, the lack of macroscopic guidance and control on social development, community confinement, serious aging of political elites, the lack of standardization and institutionalization of the political functioning, an inadequate mechanism for fair competition, difficulties in social mobility for professionals, and the absence of clear layers in the structure of professionals, pre-1999 Macao society was relatively conservative with insufficient openness and vitality. A positive interactive structure and a conformed moral value system were yet to be constructed. The development of a civil society was at its infancy, while there was little overall direction for social development. Despite these difficulties, the Macao community then had a consistent and sober recognition of the crucial relationship between the territory and the Chinese mainland, the region and the world: the socio-economic development of Macao should be considered within the Chinese national context and should take advantage of its own uniqueness. Macao should cooperate with Hong Kong and Guangdong Province to supplement each other’s shortcomings for mutual progress. Macao should enhance its role as a platform and bridge for East-West cultural exchanges by helping China to reach out to the world while helping the world to reach into China. In a nutshell, the formation of such consciousness was closely related to the enthusiastic inspirations and better psychological adjustments by local residents toward the Macao-Mainland reunification, and their expectations for economic revitalization and social stability amid an economy decline with grave concerns for public security. The political enthusiasm and long-prepared mobilization in the early days of the new MSAR galvanized vital support for strong social cohesiveness in difficult times as well as yielding an auspicious start for the MSAR itself.

xxxvii

Developments since Reunification After the Reunification, the foci of Macao’s development have been on its politics, economy, society as well as its culture and academia. Politically, the principle of “Macao people to govern Macao” has been fully established. Economically, the gaming sector liberalization has brought leapfrog development to Macao as a service economy. Such leapfrog has also brought deep-seated changes to the local social structure. The political, economic and social transformations have also promoted locally-rooted developments in culture, education and academia.

A Full Actualization of “Macao People to Govern Macao” In accordance with the principles of “Macao people to govern Macao” and “high degree of autonomy” by the Chinese central government, the politico-administrative organs of the MSAR is formed among the local residents, of which the Chief Executive is elected by an election committee (except for the first term which was elected by a selection committee composed of widely-represented local residents), followed by Chinese central government’s appointment. The Chief Executive nominates and reports to the central government to appoint or remove principal officials, and forms the MSAR government. Deputies to the Legislative Assembly are composed of MSAR permanent residents, the majority of which are elected. Under the principle of incrementalism, the number of directly and indirectly elected seats had increased in 2001 and 2005. The MSAR also enjoys independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. Judges of the courts at all levels are appointed by the Chief Executive on recommendation by an independent commission composed of local judges, lawyers and eminent persons from the community. Judges with foreign nationalities who meet the set criteria can also be recruited. Following the economic growth and social progress, political development in the MSAR since its establishment has been manifested in the form of diversified political participation. On the xxxviii

one hand, the government pays close attention to the role of the incremental electoral system and consultation mechanism in promoting democratic development, by encouraging competitive elections, fostering future politicians through the hierarchical consultation mechanism, as well as enhancing contacts with the community. On the other hand, civil associations have experienced a boom, followed by an increased popular enthusiasm in political participation. Increases in both the number of voters registered for the successive Legislative Assembly elections and the actual electoral turnout rate can be observed. More frequent social movements also reflect the increasingly diversified and complicated civic participation. Under the current electoral system, Macao permanent residents may exercise their right to vote through the directly-elected constituencies in the Legislative Assembly, and each voter can cast only one vote for a particular nomination list under the proportional representation system. Because candidates can only be nominated by political associations or nomination committees, and that nomination committees are principally backed by civil associations, political participation by Macao residents must be realized, to a certain degree, by attachment to civil associations. For indirect elections, the unit of participation is simply the civil associations. Civil associations in Macao, therefore, have played a role in bringing politics into play, while ensuring the order of political participation. Incrementalism has been a fundamental principle followed during the MSAR democratization process. Annex II of the MSAR Basic Law stipulates that the number of seats in the Legislative Assembly is to increase from 23 in the first term to 29 currently, of which directly-elected seats increase from 12 to 14 and indirectlyelected seats from 10 to 12 in 2013. Such arrangements have expanded gradually over time the electoral system’s content of democracy and the representativeness of the deputies. The principle of incrementalism has taken into account the relations between democratic development and guaranteeing a diversified and stable social participation. Based upon an increased popular political xxxix

enthusiasm, fierce competition could be witnessed during the 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013 elections that helped the formation of new political associations and the emergence of new politicians. This way of fostering successors to politics through civil associations makes them also play a role in connecting with the population through formal political communication mechanism (see Table 1). Table 1: Participation to the Direct Elections of the Legislative Assembly since the Establishment of the Macao SAR Number of Voters

Turnout Rate

Number of Participating Lists

Number of Candidates

Number of Seats Contested

2001

159,813

52.34%

2005

220,653

58.39%

15

96

10

18

125

12

2009

248,708

59.91%

16

122

12

2013

276,034

55.02%

20

145

14

The Reunification of Macao with China also signals a substantial change from the previous colonial political ecology. Rapid economic development in recent years has resulted in the emergence of new interest groups that has affected MSAR politics in three ways: impacting on the original association-based politics, triggering a division and realignment of local political powers, making certain persons to distance themselves from the original representative associations and to organize social activities in their independent capacities. However, despite support and guidance from other associations whose political platform is to promote democracy through elections, these movements tend to focus mainly on livelihood demands while political demands often become secondary and seem relatively weak. The emergence of new interest groups has impacted Macao’s original governance mode, particularly when the existing politicoadministrative system was unaffected by the liberal democratic arrangements in force in Portugal after its 1974 Revolution. Recent xl

research also shows that the macroscopic governance institution is in a transition from social corporatism to an impure form of state corporatism, known as “quasi-state corporatism”. Although “quasistate corporatism” carries advantages in maintaining governance order, adjustments and adaptations are still necessary in accordance with the diversified society resulting from Macao’s rapid transformations, so as to reflect more fully Macao’s maturing political democracy. An important means to establish contemporary Macao’s mode of governance is to deepen the development of the political system. The current 3rd term MSAR government has also realized that with the approach of the 5th Legislative Assembly elections in 2013 and the 4th Chief Executive elections in 2014, whether the form of participation and the proportion of representation adapt to the diversified expression of interests in the local community is a major issue worthy of discussion and action. The government formally proposed at the end of 2011 the question on whether there was a need to amend Annex I and Annex II of the Basic Law regarding the methods of election of the chief executive and the Legislative Assembly, and if the community agreed that there was a need for such amendments, how they should be amended to reflect the Macao community’s actual situation and the general wishes of the populace. Based on what is stipulated in the Basic Law, the MSAR government reports to the Standing Committee of the PRC National People’s Congress (NPC) in November 2011 on whether to interpret Section 7 of Annex I of the Basic Law (amendments to the method for selecting the Chief Executive) and Section 3 of Annex II (amendments to the method of the formation of the Legislative Assembly). These provisions were interpreted on 31 December 2011, confirming procedurally that the MSAR government should first report to the NPC Standing Committee on whether the two methods should be amended, followed by the Standing Committee’s decision on whether or not to amend in accordance with Basic Law Articles 47 and 68 and the actual situation of Macao. Based on this interpretation, the MSAR government launched a one-month consultation in January 2012 on three questions: are xli

amendments to the methods of electing the Legislative Assembly in 2013 and selecting the chief executive in 2014 necessary, and if so, what principles should be adhered to and how they should be amended. The results of consultation were reported to the NPC Standing Committee on 7 February that gave a green light to launch the process of amendments on 29 February, under the conditions that the existing method of selecting the chief executive by an election committee, and the composition of the Legislative Assembly to include directly-elected, indirect-elected and appointed deputies remain unchanged. Such a context establishes the nature of “development in political system” under the Basic Law framework, but not “political reform” as claimed by certain interest groups or individuals. It is worth pointing out that some of them even accused the MSAR government of not conducting “political reform” was a “quibble”, and attempted to forcibly impose their demands to realize democracy by form of elections on the authorities and the entire community. This is a reflection of negligence to Macao’s constitutional realities which does not help attaining the broadest consensus within the local community on a stable and matured political development. This is also not the supposed way to actualize the spirit of democracy. Despite this interruption, all sectors of the local community were still able to express their opinions and suggestions during the public consultation rounds. In the January 2012 consultation, a total of 2,692 suggestions were received, of which there were 1,441 e-mail messages, 210 speeches from consultation sessions, 332 facsimiles, 285 postal letters, 17 telephone messages and 407 personally submitted letters. Also 66 persons had requested their submissions not to be published. All of these suggestions have been included in the report to the NPC Standing Committee. Despite differences in specific suggestions, the community did recognize that the methods to select the chief executive and to elect the Legislative Assembly should be amended, and that there should be wider representativeness in the Chief Executive Election Committee and the Legislative Assembly. During the debate, more people were of xlii

the opinion to develop democracy not merely by way of realizing it through the form of elections, but whose vision should be projected to promote wider public participation, such as fostering citizenship, educating the populace on the rule of law, ensuring an effective participation in public policy consultation and formulation. They also shared the opinion that essential conditions should be created for a democratic political life of better quality while enriching the substantive contents and inner significance of Macao’s democratic development. Regardless of the outcome of this process of development in political system, what can be ascertained is that the MSAR is constructing a political system that meets its own historical and social conditions as well as the overall interests of the Chinese nation. The process of democratic development in Macao will eventually progress forward to provide a more worthy reference for further developing socialist democratic institutions with Chinese characteristics.

Rapid Economic Development A service economy has gradually been formed in Macao since the 1980s, but bottlenecks in development were experienced from the mid-1990s, owing to the size of the city. The subsequent Asian financial crisis and concerns in local public security triggered a sixyear consecutive economic recession in Macao. Negative GDP growth was recorded for four years in a row, and deflation was severe. On the other hand, the uncooperative attitude adopted by the Portuguese side in drafting the public financial arrangements in 1999 left a gloomy outlook for the MSAR government when it was first established. This affected the new government to act on policies to improve the livelihood and welfare of the population. The MSAR government later proposed an economic structure “with the gaming sector as the head, the service sector as the subject, while other sectors develop in a coordinated matter” as its economic development principle. The gaming sector monopoly was terminated with the hope to xliii

promote the development of other sectors. Within the 22 bidders, the MSAR government selected the Sociedade de Jogos de Macau (SJM), Wynn Resorts Macao and Galaxy Casino Company as to gaming operators, and later permitted the Venetian Group, MGM Grand Paradise and Melco PBL Gaming (Macao) to operate under sub-concessions. On the other hand, the mainland Chinese authorities allowed its residents to visit Macao on an individual basis, bringing rapid development for the MSAR tourism sector. Macao’s economy experienced a leapfrog development from 2003, with its GDP per capita in 2012 five times higher than the 1999 level and the overall economic capacity seven times larger than in 1999. The unemployment rate fell from 6.3% in 1999 to almost “full employment” in 2012. There has been an increase in public revenue due to more income from gaming as a result of having more gaming sector operators. Total public revenue has increased by nine folds over the past decade, creating resource and capacity conditions for the MSAR government to improve the overall living standard of the populace. The “Wealth Partaking” scheme from 2008, for example, enabled the Macao people to benefit directly from economic development. Although not all residents welcome this cash payment scheme, especially those with higher education, it was of great help to grassroots families in terms of gains redistribution. The scheme had even theoretically wipe out absolute poverty in Macao, as a survey estimated that there would otherwise still be 0.7% of the entire Macao households living under absolute poverty in 2009. The central provident fund system, on the other hand, serves to provide a better financial guarantee to Macao residents, both employers and employees, as it will become a supplement to Macao’s social security programs.

xliv

-5.3

0.3

-4.4

Gaming

Social services

Subtotal

-3.6

Subtotal

-8.1

-8.4

Construction

Finance and insurance

-2.9

Manufacturing

Growth rate of the principal sectors (%)

-4.6

-4.4

GDP growth (%)

Hotels and restaurants

2,118

Public income (USD million)

Tertiary

6.3

Secondary

6,322

2000

3.9

-0.4

19.4

-8.2

10.0

-3.5

-22.9

5.6

2.4

1,918

6.8

14,444 14,684

6,173

Unemployment (%)

GDP per capita (USD)

GDP (USD million)

1999

0.2

4.0

4.1

-6.1

8.5

-13.2

-14.7

-18.4

1.1

1,955

6.4

14,722

6,391

2001

8.9

4.9

14.1

3.6

16.4

1.0

35.0

-5.7

7.2

1,903

6.3

15,627

6,850

2002

8.8

1.7

20.3

6.6

6.9

15.7

73.7

-2.0

13.8

2,296

6.0

17,508

7,792

2003

21.5

13.3

29.0

11.8

35.1

13.6

40.8

2.5

28.9

2,983

4.9

21,980

10,043

2004

15.1

11.2

8.0

38.0

5.2

50.1

133.4

-2.7

14.7

3,525

4.1

24,190

11,518

2005

14.7

10.6

9.0

25.0

17.0

58.0

89.8

12.8

23.4

4,649

3.8

28,464

14,213

2006

2007

26.7

21.0

35.3

23.3

24.3

21.8

35.3

-9.3

24.8

6,714

3.1

33,745

17,742

Table 2: Principal Economic Figures in Macao since Reunification

10.6

14.3

6.7

8.4

28.9

-2.8

-0.1

-22.4

13.9

7,782

3.0

36,813

20,209

2008

6.7

6.5

9.2

4.7

14.6

-36.7

-41.5

-29.5

2.3

8,734

3.6

37,999

20,682

2009

31.3

7.9

61.5

4.3

34.8

-13.6

-14.7

-24.9

31.3

11,061

2.8

49,759

27,166

2010

30.4

17.3

40.3

18.4

34.4

11.9

14.8

4.1

21.8

15,372

2.6

66,892

36,797

2011

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

9.9

18,124

2.0

76,588

43,582

2012 (Provis ional)

However, there are concerns worthy of attention behind the façade of prosperity generated by rapid economic growth. There has been no significant improvement in alleviating basic poverty while the MSAR economic structure continues to tilt toward the gaming sector. Although absolute poverty in Macao has been theoretically eradicated, the prices of the basic living needs in Macao (whose main source of origin is mainland China), continue to rise due to the Renminbi Yuan’s appreciation. The sharp rise in property prices has also surpassed the general affordability of the local populace, resulting in an increase in household and general living expenses, which in turn offsets the increase in income. These factors are the reasons why basic and relative poverty problems have not been improved in recent years. The final increase in income for lowincome families is even less than their medium or high-income counterparts. In view of the “imported” inflation’s effects on local livelihood, Chief Executive Fernando Chui proposed in his November 2011 Policy Address to expand the sources of fresh foods and to encourage competition. The MSAR government also pushes forward massive public housing construction projects and resumes the sales of “economic housing” units. He also promised to reserve some land plots in the new reclamation zones for public housing. It is hoped that this would help alleviate the housing problem for lowincome families, and will serve as a principal element of the strategy to alleviate Macao’s long-standing basic and relative poverty problems. While the gaming sector liberalization has brought economic prosperity and more public revenue for Macao, it also has imbalanced the overall economic structure to favour the gaming sector because of its significant GDP contribution. In fact, by producer’s value at current prices, gaming sector contributed 47.769% of the MSAR GDP in 2011, up from 29.9% in 1999. Owing to its small size and the lack of natural resources, regional cooperation is almost the only option for the MSAR government to realize a “coordinated development” of the economy. The “Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020)”, released by the PRC State Council in January xlvi

2009, has devoted a section to the regional cooperation between Guangdong Province, Hong Kong and Macao. Cooperation to develop the service industries and to upgrade the secondary sector is emphasized, in order to reinforce Macao’s position as a world tourism and leisure center. Economic integration of the three territories has been promoted through the construction of transport networks and coordinated urban planning. In the March 2011 “Framework Agreement on Guangdong-Macao Cooperation”, cooperative efforts to develop Hengqin Island (in Zhuhai city neighboring Macao), tourism, conference and exhibition, Chinese pharmaceutics, logistics and cultural-creative industries were proposed. The University of Macau’s new Hengqin campus has also become a major “early and pilot implementation” project. Besides becoming a hinterland to further develop Macao’s economy with moderate diversification, Hengqin’s “early and pilot” projects will hopefully further advance China’s reform and opening process. Regional cooperation will eventually lead to closer MainlandMacao economic integration and usher profound changes in Macao social development.

Changes in Social Structure and Developments in Culture, Education and Academia The economic takeoff has resulted in deep-level changes to Macao’s social structure. In particular, the rise of the middle class has become one of the foci of the 3rd MSAR government. Surveys conducted in recent years show that there has been an increase in households claiming to be “middle class”, and its medium income is approaching to Macao’s overall medium household income. “Middle class” in Macao can therefore be said to be almost equal to “middle income persons”. Meanwhile, middle class in Macao has its own social characteristics. For example, they have not necessarily received higher education, mostly work in gaming, public administration and social services, may have a higher rate of home ownership and a stronger sense of belonging to Macao, may pay more attention to local public affairs but lack international horizons, xlvii

not being enthusiastic to participate in association activities, etc. Analysis of these results reveals that nearly half of the Macao households that claim to be in the “middle class” category and their support of the government is sufficient to affect its public legitimacy as well as long-term social stability. The government proposed in its 2011 Policy Address to encourage more middle class public affairs participation and that their opinions were to be heard in policymaking. These will help foster a matured civil society in Macao and to achieve greater state-society understanding, consensus and trust on major policy and reform issues. Table 3: Subjective Recognition of Social Class 2005

2007

2009

Lower

22.1%

18.6%

17.7%

Lower Middle

36.2%

31.4%

32.4%

Middle

36.6%

44.3%

43.9%

4.7%

5.3%

5.6%

Upper Middle Upper

0.3%

0.3%

0.4%

N

2,007

2,003

1,976

Table 4: Medium Income in Relation to Subjective Social Class Recognition (MOP)

Lower Lower Middle

2005

2007

2009

6,000

8,000

8,000

9,300

12,000

15,000

Middle

15,000

18,000

20,000

Upper Middle, Upper

26,000

25,000

30,000

Overall medium household income

10,000

14,000

16,000

The profound political and socio-economic transformations also induced an unprecedented development in culture, education and academia as colored with Macao local perspectives. xlviii

Culturally, the MSAR government launched the application process to enlist the “Historic Center of Macao” as a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Cultural Heritage list. Macao’s bid was accepted at the 2005 World Heritage Conference, making it the 31st World Heritage site in China. The successful listing of the Historic Center of Macao (composed of 22 historic monuments and 8 open spaces in the old neighborhoods of Macao) as a World Cultural Heritage site lies not merely on the unique Chinese and Western style physical architecture in stone and brick. This UNESCO designation highlights the intangible way of living (like the acceptance and tolerance of different cultures and peaceful coexistence of residents with different ethnicities) as the outstanding cultural significance and the universal value to be treasured. During the application process, the MSAR government and the community began to organize various kinds of awareness campaigns on local history, culture and custom. These campaigns later have become the catalyst to overcome economic difficulties and to prepare for the economic recovery in the years to come. When the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was rampant in south China during 2003, the Macao Foundation organized a “Passion for Macao” campaign in the second half of 2003. Its “Half-day Macao Tour” attracted over 150,000 participants. The tour’s focus was to publicize the Historic Monuments of Macao, thus bringing internal demands to stimulate the local economy and generating collective senses of recognition, pride and belonging for Macao among them, who are mainly immigrants, making them more actively aware, excavate and conserve local history, culture and custom. The subsequent collective campaigns of “Macao Rejoices”, “School Promotion Project for the Historic Center of Macao” and “Passion for Home and Nation”, organized again by the Macao Foundation, have deepened the support base established in the earlier activities, galvanizing the public to embrace such awareness efforts. Meanwhile, the Historic Center of Macao’s successful World Heritage application has attracted high quality visitors to Macao, xlix

whose principal purpose of visit is to experience for themselves Macao’s profound historic and cultural roots instead of casinos betting. This has helped to lessen the stereotyped impression of Macao as a “gambling hub” in the eyes of many outsiders. The training of high quality human resources, Macao’s most important asset, is crucial to its sustained development and communal progress as well as regional/international competitiveness. The MSAR government has, therefore, paid close attention to the full and healthy development of education, and has devoted vast resources to promote education reform and improve the hardware and software facilities in institutions of all levels in a bid to create excellent teaching and learning environment for more effective training of skilled personnel of all kinds. The MSAR government’s commitment to and investment in education constitute another channel to uplift common livelihood besides social security and welfare provisions. In 1999, Macao’s total public expenditure on non-higher education stood at only US$120 million and in 2012, the amount reached US$1,420 million. Such exponential growth is closely related to the implementation of the 15-year free education (for students attending classes from kindergarten to senior secondary levels in the public schools network), the increased investments in infrastructures and facilities, the promotion of “sustained education subsidies plan”, the “schools development plan” and smaller class sizes, and expansion of the Student Welfare Fund, etc. Macao is also the first Greater China domain to offer 15year free education to the population. The popularization of basic education has helped to improve the differences in human resources qualities in Macao. The first set of students receiving the 15-year free education graduated in 2010. It is expected that by 2022, all working persons in Macao under age 30 will possess the basic knowledge and technical-professional skills meet international job market needs, thus positively upgrading the overall quality of Macao’s working population. Higher education development has also reached new heights in the MSAR era. Firstly, the Macao University of Science and Technology, the first private university in Macao since Reunification, l

was established in 2000. It has become a higher education institution with some academic attainments in only ten years. The Inter-University Institute of Macau, co-founded by the Catholic University of Portugal and the Diocese of Macao, was renamed the University of Saint Joseph in 2009. The City University of Macao was also developed from the Asia (Macau) International Open University. Both the University of Saint Joseph and the City University of Macao are working proactively to construct new campuses with a vision to improve teaching, learning and research conditions. For the public University of Macau, a reform and development target to “build a world-class university with distinctive regional features” has been set. With the support of the PRC central government, a new campus is being constructed on Hengqin Island as a project of “early and pilot implementation” under the Guangdong-Macao cooperation framework. The MSAR legal, financial and fiscal systems will be extended to the new campus, as well as the University’s existing management, teaching and research and administration systems. Cross-border checks will be unnecessary when entering or leaving the new campus that will be managed as distinctly and separately from other parts of the island. MSAR standards in public facilities and services will be applied to the new campus. The intensive and extensive development of MSAR higher education has attracted not only local students but its outreach capacity has extended to Mainland China, Southeast Asia and the Portuguese-speaking countries. (see Table 5) While widening the channels for students to access higher education locally, the MSAR government has supported the training of senior professionals. For example, the Macao Foundation has collaborated with the Macao Association of Postgraduate Education Fund in launching a project whereby ten secondary graduates are sent to Portugal annually to study law at the universities there after Portuguese language training. This aims at fostering local legal expertise that has been in relative short supply in Macao. In 2011, a total of 79 students have participated in this project and are returning to Macao for service upon graduation in Portugal.

li

Table 5: Number of students receiving higher education in Macao Academic Year

Number of students by the end of the academic year

1998/1999

8,444

1999/2000

7,094

2000/2001

8,358

2001/2002

8,520

2002/2003

11,995

2003/2004

13,680

2004/2005

13,967

2005/2006

15,927

2006/2007

17,462

2007/2008

18,743

2008/2009

20,917

2009/2010

22,289

2010/2011

32,543

Since 2006, the Macao Foundation has also collaborated with the MSAR Education and Youth Affairs Bureau to offer special scholarships to encourage and support highly attained students to enroll as full-time undergraduates in designated world-renowned higher education institutions. This scheme is not executed by the Foundation on its own. Through learning in excellent environment, they are potentially poised to become top professionals with cutting edge knowledge and international perspectives. By 2012, 136 Macao students are studying away from home on these scholarships. Finally, the Macao Foundation has collaborated with the MSAR Financial Services Bureau’s Registry of Auditors and Accountants to set up a program to offer scholarships to students aiming to obtain accounting degrees. Some 20 Macao students studying at various world-renowned institutions of higher education now receive such support. They will form a professional reserve pool for Macao’s accountancy sector in the future.

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With the increasing sense of identity with China and Macao among the populace, local academic research has entered a new phrase. Developing “Macaology” has become a consensus in the local academic community in constructing a research discipline for Macao. “Macaology” is a domain of academic research with a strong integration of different subjects. Although its focus mainly lies on the history and cultural studies of Macao, Macaology also covers topics like political system, political development, economic development, modern and contemporary Macao personalities, the relations between Macao and the history of Chinese thoughts on modernization, the theory and practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” formula, etc. Because the role of Macao is irreplaceable in the history of East-West exchanges, the development of Macaology not only can investigate Macao’s contribution to the enhancement of universal values, but also can clarify and magnify Macao’s function in the history of world development, not to mention the fact that it can enhance the image of Macao as a historic and cultural city in the international arena. For both local and international academics, developing Macaology is of essential significance with theoretical and practical implications by constructing local knowledge and explanatory systems. I appeal to international academics in Asian and Chinese studies to devote more attention to Macao and to promote the development of Macaology in joint efforts with local academics.

Conclusive Remarks Despite the difficulties encountered since Reunification, Macao has managed to attain major achievements that attracted world attention. In various political, economic and social aspects, Macao has realized an unprecedented leapfrog development in a matter of only twelve years. The speed and scale of its formation is difficult to be reproduced in the history of world development. On the one hand, the Macao community has a better handling and more complete social consensus on the essence of the “One Country, Two

liii

Systems” model. The principles of “Macao people to govern Macao” and “high degree of autonomy” have yielded a solidly good beginning for the MSAR, laying the essential foundation for the subsequent economic take-off, social modernization and postindustrialization. On the other hand, it was exactly because of the rapid changes in Macao’s political, economic and social ecology that certain deep-seated structural problems have revealed gradually. Some of these were left by history while some were generated by uncoordinated socio-economic development. It is necessary to apply political and legal means to resolve these structural problems, but the reality is that the existing political and legal institutions fail to provide effective responses to the needs of the community. This requires great efforts to reform them. Fortunately, the community has reached consensus on this, and the government has the available resources. If the first dozen years since the establishment of the MSAR has been a period to affirm the long-term positioning and developmental direction of the city, the government or the community of today will, during next decade, share the responsibility to reinforce the past foundation and cherish the fruits that were so difficult to achieve. The main focus is to ensure Macao’s sustainable development in order to achieve a coordinated development between the economy, society and environment. The institutional loopholes and social conflicts exposed by high-speed economic development has prompted the MSAR government to respond to the demands of different interest groups through public policies while the adjustment of community relations and the reconstruction of social order are to be considered from the level of macroscopic governance. The major challenges currently faced by the MSAR are to construct a new mode of governance and to review continuously the resources, level, capabilities and restraints of Macao’s sustainable development. Overcoming these challenges may allow the “One Country, Two Systems” model to continue to demonstrate its exuberant vitality in the new social and economic situations.

liv

II. The Macao SAR: From A Luso-Macanese Perspective Jorge A. H. RANGEL President, International Institute of Macau

Twelve years after the retrocession of Macao to China, we may all conclude, without reasons for hesitation, that the MSAR, in spite of some mistakes and insufficiencies, is, undoubtedly, a success story. After a smooth transition and a dignified departure of the Portuguese leaders on 20 December 1999, the new MSAR administration was well-prepared to take over, and continuity was given to the main policies, to the legislature and to the judicial system. And, with China’s undeniable support, new prospects for Macao’s development have been created and major changes in the gaming operations system, which constitute the MSAR’s indispensable revenue pillar, have stimulated unprecedented growth and prosperity. As Secretary for Administration and Education, my last responsibilities in the outgoing Macao Government were to finalize the localization of the civil service, liaise with the Chinese authorities, work with the MSAR Preparatory Committee, implement a correct transfer of the administration, and oversee and coordinate the handover ceremonies. I had also been a member of the Macao Basic Law Drafting Committee. With the festivities over, Macao entered a new era. The roads to the future were widely opened, in accordance with the principles and objectives set forth in the April 1987 Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration and also enshrined in the Basic Law (that was promulgated by China in March 1993), which guaranteed that Macao would have a high degree of autonomy, compatible with the very long encounter of cultures that shaped its history and gave the territory its own unique identity. These documents assured that the lv

way of life of the Macao people would be retained, with all the rights and freedoms that we enjoyed and which became a fundamental part of our legacy. Despite some initial difficulties, the transition period was fully used to make all the objectives approved by the two countries attainable. Enormous investments had to be made in infrastructures, including the construction of Macao’s international airport, as well as in education, with special emphasis on higher education, training of qualified senior staff, enhancement of the cultural identity, consolidation of the legal framework, enlargement of public participation in civic and political affairs, improvement of the quality of life, and the strengthening of local institutions. When the last Governor Vasco Rocha Vieira solemnly received the Portuguese flag and clutched it to his heart in what was certainly the most memorable moment on that very last day of a 447 years presence, the satisfaction of a job well done was visible in his eyes. The photo of this symbolic and very touching gesture was published in newspapers all over the world. All those who wanted the best possible future for Macao, albeit in a different political and administrative context, were with him at that time of historic change, honoring the past but looking ahead. The necessary conditions for the correct establishment of the MSAR had been created. Hence, perhaps, the natural optimism expressed in all the official speeches and public statements produced in the handover ceremonies. It was important, however, not to forget that what is desirable is often distant from what is possible and that many constraints would likely beset the course of those who had accepted the highest executive responsibilities. The principle of “One Country, Two Systems” has been put to the test and, fortunately, it was proven correct in the course of the years. It is true that not all the traditional leaders of civic institutions understood its scope and meaning, but senior authorities in the Chinese Central Government helped to affirm and strengthen the singular nature of Macao and gave this Special Administrative Region a fundamental role in its new plans and projects, as a lvi

platform for cooperation with the eight Portuguese-speaking countries and with other countries in Europe, Africa and South America, as well as a solidly established international tourism center and a leading education and training center, by taking advantage of the many facilities already available and building new ones. Other chapter authors will surely elaborate on some of these issues. It was within this context that the International Institute of Macau was founded. Its aims and vocation are to enhance and modernize the cultural factors of Macao’s identity, to contribute to the economic, social, cultural and academic development of Macao, and to promote cultural and academic links with institutions of a similar nature in other countries, especially with those based in the Portuguese-speaking world. At the same time, an Institute of European Studies was set up with the European Union’s full support. The inauguration of a permanent Forum for Economic Cooperation with Portuguese-Speaking Countries in the MSAR was, therefore, well received. It was a pragmatic and far-sighted decision, thus making the MSAR more useful, by recognizing and reinforcing Macao’s traditional role as the longest permanent trading post between East and West and a privileged cultural and economic contact center with Portugal, Europe, the Portuguese-speaking countries and the Luso cultural diaspora. Unlike Hong Kong, there was no sovereignty issue involved in the Sino-Luso interface over Macao. It was always Chinese land and the exercise of administrative rule was somehow shared in a unique way, oftentimes with delicate balances and constant readjustments. Over the centuries, numerous historical documents attested to this: the territory of Macao never belonged to the Kingdom of Portugal, it was not conquered as other places were, and it was the result of a situation of mutual understanding. The New York Times reported, immediately after the handover, that the political transfer “had all the pomp and ritual of another ceremony in nearby Hong Kong, two and a half years earlier, but while the British and Chinese leaders conducted their exercise with icy formality, the leaders here seemed much more at ease”. And Hong Kong’s English newspaper South China Morning Post lvii

reported a similar observation: “It was a relationship that began peacefully and ended amicably. There was little of the apprehension that accompanied the handover of Hong Kong”. Macao-born historian Professor Fok Kai Cheong wrote that “indeed, since the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration of 1987, in the public’s eyes, the Portuguese Government in Macau seemed to have a near-unblemished record of cooperation and amicable relations with the PRC”. Perhaps this is what prompted China’s President Jiang Zemin to praise the smooth transfer in a message delivered moments after the handover. He stressed that “the friendship between the two peoples and the amicable cooperation between the two countries will develop from a new starting point”. Many watched President Jorge Sampaio of Portugal greeted President Jiang and chatted warmly with him just before parting. But in his speech earlier, Sampaio forthrightly reasserted Portugal’s commitment to the future of Macao within the framework of the autonomy status guaranteed by the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration. In fact, long before the negotiations with Great Britain were announced, under Deng Xiaoping’s “One Country, Two Systems” formula, Portugal had initiated political reforms in Macao that paved the way for a peaceful transition: (1) The Portuguese parliament, in 1976, when a new Constitution was approved, declared that Macao was not Portuguese territory (or, in other words, a colony), but “a territory under Portuguese Administration”, that is, it was Chinese territory administered by Portugal. (2) The Portuguese military garrison left Macao in December 1975, in an emotional farewell, because for generations Portuguese soldiers married local women and remained in the territory after their terms of duty. (3) In February 1976, the new Macau Organic Law was passed, allowing the territory to enjoy a high degree of autonomy and making it a completely separate economy, with all its resources, including taxes, to be fully utilized by the territory. (4) A Legislative Assembly was established, after public consultations, with directly elected, indirectly elected and appointed members, in a system that is basically the same that is still practiced in the MSAR today. The lviii

so-called “through train” system that was advocated but not accepted for Hong Kong’s transition to Chinese rule, was naturally and easily implemented in Macao. The Macao legislators, who were sitting in the Legislative Assembly on 19 December 1999, the last day of the Portuguese Administration, were exactly the same ones sitting there on the following day. (5) It is also important to note that the Chairman of the Legislative Assembly was no longer, since 1976, the Governor of Macau but one of the members of the Legislative Assembly freely elected among themselves. Please do remember that it was more than a decade before the Joint Declaration was signed and no special arrangements or changes had to be hastily introduced when the Sino-Luso negotiations on Macao began. Pragmatically, China accepted those modifications, and the whole process of transfer of power was conducted in a much simpler and more consensual way. In defining models for societies in the “global era” of the 21st century, one of the core questions is knowing how to manage cultural differences in a world characterized by the confrontation of cultural diversity. This is a problem that never existed in Macao, with its centuries-old practice of living together and developing cultural interchange. This is perhaps one of the greatest legacies that Macao transported from the past to the future. This legacy is, however, the exclusive and private property of no one; it is by nature and meaning a universal heritage. From the 16th to the 19th century, Macao was an open amphitheatre and base for two halves of the world to present themselves to each other. On one side were the European civilizations of the Mediterranean and on the other the Middle Kingdom. According to last century’s greatest Sinologist, Joseph Needham, “it was the most broad-reaching and profound phenomenon of cultural encounter in the history of mankind”. In 1999 Macao had fulfilled its historical mission, to begin a new one. It was also the end of a long cycle in Portugal’s 900 years history, when the country decided, in 1974, to give independence to all its overseas territories that Portugal had retained for five centuries. Without understanding and acknowledging this, it is impossible to lix

understand the reason why the Portuguese remained in Macao for such a long time, being the first to arrive, long before the others came, and the last to leave, in a gracious and mutually accepted manner. At the ceremony for the inauguration of the MSAR Government, President Jiang Zemin promised Macao residents that “their freedoms are safe and their unique culture will be respected”. When assessing the results of the establishment and consolidation of the MSAR in the last twelve years, it is correct to conclude that the promises have been to a very large extent fulfilled. The relations with Portugal remain strong and healthy and have been well extended to all the Portuguese-speaking countries, including São Tomé and Príncipe, which has diplomatic ties with Taipei. The Forum for Economic Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-Speaking Countries performs a pivotal role in strengthening those relations and the MSAR Government has responded well to this challenge and mission. In November 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao attended a ministerial meeting of this Forum, held in Macao. He made a very positive assessment of the work and results achieved and gave new directions for the future advancement of this Forum, that it should go beyond economic and trade concerns but to involve other areas, such as education, training, health, culture and sports, thus enlarging the scope of the initial activities of the Forum. And he also stressed the importance of the development of the Portuguese language, which is also an official language of Macao, to facilitate communication and understanding in all these areas of cooperation. Another singular Macao legacy is related to the diversity of origins of its population and the hybridism that produced the Macanese, a special and steady segment of this population. As an active entrepôt, Macao has since its foundation attracted the most diverse people, cultures and lifestyles. The population of this mercantile city was mainly Chinese and Portuguese, with others constantly arriving: other Europeans, Indians, Malays, Japanese, Filipinos, Indonesians, Timorese and even South Americans. Macao was always open to all. lx

Long before world powers imposed their presence along the coast of China, Macao became a destination of adventurers, missionaries burning with faith, asylum seekers and merchants dreaming of easy fortunes, a stage for utopian dreams, a source of inspiration for renowned painters and poets and an oasis of peace in a world often in turmoil. The Portuguese-Oriental Creole was an early product of this process—the Macanese, the “native sons and daughters” or “children of the land”, as they have been called by historians and anthropologists, the result of biological hybridism, with cross-breeding over the centuries, forming a characteristic culture of their own. The Macanese were a key element of the Portuguese presence since the early days. In the civil service and as professionals (engineers, architects, medical doctors, nurses, lawyers, teachers and others), as well as managers and clerks in private enterprises, they were the ones who made Macao work and grow, and also survive in times of hardship. Their loyalty to Portugal and their attachment to the territory of birth and knowledge of local customs and traditions made them indispensable to the Portuguese Administration, and they were, for centuries, those who helped senior administrators seconded from Portugal understand local realities and liaise with the population at large. Some have attained very high ranks in the Macao administration. After the establishment of the MSAR, many Macanese families decided to remain and are still actively involved, both in governmental institutions and in the private sector. Senior PRC leaders, including President Hu Jintao, Vice-President Xi Jingping and Premier Wen Jiabao, have repeatedly praised the role of the Macanese in shaping the history of Macao and for their commitment to the future of the MSAR. Their sense of belonging remains strong. Others have joined those who, especially since the early 1950s, physically abandoned their hometown in search of greener pastures abroad but left their broken hearts behind and established a worldwide diaspora, where they set up Macao clubs and associations that are at the service of the MSAR. They are all Portuguese passport holders, and even lxi

today Portugal continues to offer the passport to all the MSAR residents who were born in Macao during the Portuguese Administration and to their children and grandchildren. More than 120,000 Chinese born there have Portuguese passports and this is not a different passport, some sort of an “overseas national passport”, but a full European Union passport, the same that is issued in Lisbon to the President of the Republic of Portugal and all other Portuguese nationals. When the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2005 incorporated Macao’s historic city center into its official World Heritage list, it was an occasion of great joy for everyone. China strongly supported this decision. It was an international recognition of our rich architectural and cultural heritage. But, even more significant than that, it was a guarantee that this unique Macao heritage will be officially protected. Macao has grown steadily mainly due to the huge amounts of money generated through its casinos. But in casinos the games are of luck and chance and nothing guarantees that this growth will continue forever. There are challenges that the MSAR Administration will have to face without further delay. And the contribution of scholars and experts in different fields will be essential. The contribution from this volume’s authors will be irrefutable. There are many questions to be addressed but, these are issues that transcend the scope of my essay. I look forward to reading theirs, knowing well that what they are going to present are not mere academic exercises, but informed assessments and careful studies of the MSAR, with positive impact on its future developments.

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III. Beyond the Luso Twilight, Into the Sino Glow: A Historical Sketch of Macao’s Transformation Under Chinese Rule Ming K. CHAN Stanford University Soon upon us is the 15th anniversary of Macao’s 20 December 1999 reversion to China. In viewing Macao’s first decade and half under Chinese rule, it is useful to briefly sketch its transition from Portuguese rule to “One Country, Two Systems” autonomy as a Special Administration Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The year 2014 is the 40th anniversary of the 25 April 1974 Carnation Revolution in Lisbon that ushered in Portugal’s decolonization efforts. This May 2014 also witnessed Portugal President Annibal Silva’s state visit to Beijing, Shanghai and Macao. This visit marked the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the Portugal-PRC diplomatic links on 9 February 1979 (when both sides agreed that Macao “is a Chinese territory currently under Portuguese administration” and its future should be settled through friendly consultation). Such official ties shaped Macao’s final quarter century in the Luso twilight with local reforms that paved the way to Macao’s homecoming to China. As Portuguese Prime Minister, Dr. Silva on 13 April 1987 signed in Beijing the Sino-Luso accord that stipulated Macao’s 1999 retrocession to Chinese rule. Finally, 2014 is the 10th anniversary of the arrival of US casinos in Macao two years after the MSAR government’s gaming policy liberalization to replace a four-decade casino monopoly with a multiple operators gambling franchise that fundamentally transformed local society and economy. As the smallest domain within Portugal’s once extensive overseas empire, Macao was the longest-lasting Portuguese enclave on foreign soil with some 447 years (1553–1999) under the Lusitano color. Also, being the very last overseas territory to be yielded by Lisbon, Macao had accorded the Portuguese a most lxiii

dignified, warmly cordial, well planned, orderly and peaceful departure. In sharp contrast to their involuntary exits elsewhere in Asia (Goa in 1961 and East Timor in 1975), this Macao sunset was a far different story from the hurried Luso retreat from Africa in 1975 after prolonged warfare against local independentists. As such, Macao’s one third of a century (early 1967 to late 1999) transition to Chinese rule constituted a long Portuguese twilight on the China coast that closed the final chapter on their five centuries’ world exploration since Vasco da Gamma’s 1498 arrival in India and ended Euro-colonialism in all Asia. This historical sketch in four sections will outlined Macao’s recent transformation: Part I summarizes the Portuguese presence in Macao and SinoLuso links as the historical foundation for Luso decolonization leading to the 1999 reversion with key factors underlining Macao’s smooth transition as against Hong Kong’s problematic 1997 retrocession to China. Part II and Part III delineate the post-colonial transformations and breakthroughs in the MSAR during Chief Executive Edmund Ho’s first (1999–2004) and second (2004–09) term. Part IV highlights the socio-economic realignment to mitigate over-development and rebalance social fabrics under current MSAR Chief Executive Fernando Chui since December 2009. Hopefully, this historical sketch will offer an overall assessment of Macao’s experience from the Luso sunset era to the MSAR initial years as an informed basis to appreciate the challenges and opportunities in Macao’s ongoing transformation as a vital part of China.

Retrospective on the Luso Legacies and the Transition to 1999 Portuguese Presence in Macao Since 1553 The nearly thrice longer Portuguese presence in Macao was milder and less violent, provoking fewer local Chinese outbursts with far lxiv

less resentment from China than British colonialism’s 156 years in Hong Kong, Four decades after the first Portuguese reached China (Jorge Alvares who set foot in Guangdong in 1513), a tiny Luso settlement in Macao was established around 1553–57 as an ad hoc trading post to facilitate shipping and commerce with China and the Far East. A key feature in this four and half centuries’ Luso presence in Macao was their low-profile and non-confrontational approach to the Chinese state. Absent was gunboat diplomacy and outright armed coercion in Portuguese dealings with China. Unlike the British Opium Wars, the Portuguese fought no war to control Macao. In 1582, the Portuguese signed a lease on Macao with Ming Dynasty China’s Zhongshan County, Guangdong Province authorities on an annual rent of 500 taels of silver. For nearly three centuries, in the eyes of China and international law, the Portuguese were only “tenant-guests” residing in China’s Macao for trade. The Ming and Qing officialdom not only maintained China’s sovereignty over but exercised jurisdiction in Macao until the 1840s. After China’s Opium War defeat with the 1841 British takeover of Hong Kong and the opening of five coastal Treaty Ports, Portugal became more assertive to diminish China’s control of Macao. Governor Joao Amaral stopped tax and rent payments to China and began taxing local Chinese residents in 1846. To expand their Macao domain, the Portuguese demolished the Qing Customs office and expelled Chinese officials in 1849 and took over Taipa Island two years later. The 1887 Sino-Luso Treaty of Friendship and Trade (the Lisbon Protocol) confirmed Macao’s status as under the “perpetual occupation” of the Portuguese. But the treaty did not cede Chinese sovereignty over Macao to Portugal nor did it settle the mainlandMacao border demarcations that continued to cause friction into the 20th century. Both the 1910 and 1911 republican revolutions in Portugal and in China did not alter the “Macao under Portuguese rule” status quo. A 1928 Sino-Luso Treaty of Friendship and Trade confirmed the Portuguese administration of Macao. Due to Portuguese neutrality, Macao was spared Hong Kong’s sad fate of lxv

Japanese attack and brutal occupation during the December 1941– August 1945 Pacific War. The establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949 placed Macao in an uneasy neighborly relationship with the Communist giant due to the Lisbon-Taipei diplomatic ties. In December 1966 as a spillover of the PRC’s Cultural Revolution ultra-left radicalism, conflicts between Portuguese police and soldiers, and local Chinese workers, students and pro-Beijing activists over a school construction escalated into violence, in which 8 Chinese residents were killed, 212 injured and 61 arrested. Local leftists and Beijing demanded compensation for the causalities and punishment of responsible police-military officials. Governor Jose Carvalho’s public apology ended the crisis on 29 January 1967 when he accepted Beijing’s demands with a secret agreement banning proTaipei organs and promising local co-operation with China) in exchange for maintaining the status quo of continued Luso rule in Macao. Lisbon’s decolonization policy after Portugal’s 25 April 1974 Carnation Revolution helped prepare Macao’s eventual reversion to China. After Beijing declined Lisbon’s offer to withdraw from Macao in late 1974, Portugal unilaterally changed Macao’s legalconstitutional designation from a “colony” to a “territory under Portuguese administration” in 1976. In January 1975 Lisbon extended official recognition to the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China upon terminating its diplomatic ties with Taipei. Full PRC-Luso diplomatic relation was established on 8 February 1979, with bilateral understanding on Macao’s status as “a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration”. Beijing’s reluctance to recover Macao then stemmed from its desire to preserve international and local confidence in Hong Kong still under British rule and its top priority agenda on mainland-Taiwan reunification. History once again linked colonial Hong Kong’s fate with Macao’s prospects under Luso rule as Hong Kong’s postOpium War rise has eclipsed Macao’s prominence in Sino-Western maritime trade since the 1840s. Unlike the 1982–1997 Sino-British discords over Hong Kong’s lxvi

contested sovereignty and disputed democratization, Portugal’s 1970s acknowledgement of China’s sovereignty over Macao removed a crucial bone of contention to pave a more cooperative path to Macao’s 1999 handover. Lisbon waited for Beijing to take the final steps to resolve the “historical problems” of Macao which had no specific deadline, unlike the mid-1997 expiration of Hong Kong’s New Territories lease. After the Sino-British accord on Hong Kong was initialed in September 1984, Beijing moved Macao up on its reunification agenda through head-of-state diplomacy. Following Deng Xiaoping’s October 1984 statement that resolution of Macao’s status would follow Hong Kong’s example, PRC President Li Xiannian paid a state visit to Lisbon the next month and to Macao in February 1985. Portuguese President Antonio Eanes made a return state visit to Beijing in May 1985 that yielded a Sino-Luso joint communiqué announcing the start of negotiations on Macao in late June 1986. The Sino-Luso negotiations on Macao lasted only nine months through four rounds of talks from 30 June 1986 to 23 March 1987. Hong Kong’s example and the Beijing-Lisbon entente expedited the Macao settlement on which both sides had reached “early understanding” and “without disputes” as Deng told Eanes. After the Sino-Luso Joint Declaration on Macao was initialed on 26 March 1987, the Chinese and Portuguese premiers signed the accord on 13 April 1987. On 15 January 1988 Beijing and Lisbon exchanged ratification instruments to formally start Macao’s transition to Chinese rule by late 1999.

Luso Decolonization and Sunset Reforms in Macao Prior to the 1974 Revolution, the Salazarian regime in Lisbon was determined to hold on its African colonies like Angola and Mozambique due to economic interests (markets and materials) and fear of post-colonial Communist control. Soon after the Revolution, Portugal decided to yield its African empire through swift and wholesale decolonization. The end of Luso rule in Macao was far more orderly than in their other Asian and African domains. Unlike lxvii

Goa (seized by India in 1961) and East Timor (evacuated in 1975 before the Indonesian invasion), Macao, the last Luso enclave overseas, enjoyed a peaceful reversion to China in late 1999. In fact, the Luso exit from Macao constituted a case of “decolonization without independence” akin to colonial Hong Kong’s 1997 retrocession to China. Macao yielded a more positive record of Luso decolonization as the colonial rulers did not inflict economic collapse, internal conflicts or political chaos after their sudden departure without adequate local preparation. Without any vigorous Luso assimilation efforts in Macao, the local Chinese majority never became Portuguese citizens or even Portuguesespeakers. They co-existed more or less peacefully with the Portuguese in colonial Macao that became a cultural fusion hub with the Macanese of mixed Portuguese-Chinese ancestry staffing the civil service and the professions. Portuguese decolonization in Macao was characterized by a political reform process starting in 1976 with decisive initial actions but minimal later undertakings, continuous sunset era promotion of Luso culture and slow bureaucratic reorientation from reluctant to more assertive administrators. The Luso Macao regime diminished after the 1966 riots while the pro-Beijing forces dominated local affairs. Yet, Lisbon felt no urgency to overhaul Macao as opposite the extensive British socio-political engineering in Hong Kong after the 1967 leftist riots. Unlike British decolonization in Hong Kong in a continuum of reforms, Macao’s final Luso decades saw a 1976 introduction of democratic reforms that became stagnant after 1984. Macao’s political reform began in 1976 when the Portuguese Parliament passed Macao's Organic Statute to establish a 17member Legislative Assembly of 6 directly elected members, 6 elected by occupational groups and 5 appointed by the governor. Governor Garcia Leandro (1974–80) used the unique political space and historical moment to push the 1976 electoral reform while Lisbon and Beijing were too preoccupied with domestic politics to interference much in the far away Macao. The franchise initially favored Portuguese nationals, who did not have to fulfill any residency requirement to become voters while the local Chinese lxviii

must meet a 5-year residency standard to have a vote, until Governor Vasco Costa (1981–85) voided this rule in 1984. Lisbon’s attempt to amend the Organic Stature in 1989 to empower Macao’s legislature was opposed by Beijing that feared political changes in Macao might stimulate democratization demands in Hong Kong. Macao’s political reforms became stagnant in the 1990s due to Lisbon’s lack of democratization push in the absence of strong local demands amid a strong pro-Beijing influence in Macao society that marginalized local pro-democracy elements. Lisbon’s priorities were to keep friendly Sino-Luso ties, strengthen Luso cultural legacy, complete the infrastructure projects, expand higher education and combat law and order deterioration. Working with the Luso and Macanese elites in colonial Macao legislature in a kind of synarchy, the local pro-Beijing elites tolerated lax administration while civil service localization progressed slowly. To preserve Sino-Luso harmony, local Chinese legislators did not demand a very high standard of public management. As political conservatives they did not wish to disturb the status quo with major reforms too radical for Macao and unacceptable to Beijing. To Lisbon, further political reform in Macao must not come at the expense of friendly ties with Beijing as it wished to exit Macao with national dignity and cultural pride. Unlike the British in Hong Kong, Lisbon offered Portuguese passports with EU rights to 110,000 Macao residents (local-born or naturalized Chinese, 30% of total population) as Luso Foreign Minister Jaime Gama said “Lisbon has a very real commitment” to its Macao passport holders. From October 1988 to March 1993, with inputs from Macao representatives (who occupied 19 of the 48 Drafting Committee seats), the PRC authorities ran the Macao Basic Law drafting process through two rounds of public consultation in late 1991 and mid-1992. The final version was promulgated by the PRC National People’s Congress on 31 March 1993 as the MASR constitutional charter specifying its autonomy, polity, economy, civil rights, social freedoms and the center-region relationship. With more harmonious Sino-Luso ties, Beijing had a much easier task to shape the first MSAR government than in the HKSAR case as marked by Sinolxix

British discord over Governor Chris Patten’s electoral reform. To form the first MSAR administration, legislature and judiciary, Beijing appointed a 100-member (60 Macao locals and 40 mainlanders) MSAR Preparatory Committee. The Lisbon-Beijing cooperation was manifested in the functional and legal-administrative realms in 1990s Macao. As Macao’s “reluctant administrator” Lisbon did try to return Macao to Beijing in 1967 (after the late 1966 riots) and following the 1974 Revolution. On both occasions, Beijing did not recover Macao because of the possible negative impact on Hong Kong while the mainland was engulfed in the turbulent Cultural Revolution. Only after the 1987 Sino-Luso accord, did Lisbon become serious with the imperative for an orderly Macao exit. More determined decolonization efforts began in 1990 with civil service localization. In 1992, the Luso-Macao regime set up an anti-corruption agency and made Chinese an official language of equal status with Portuguese. Facing public order deterioration in their final days, Luso officials in Macao became more assertive to combat organized crime with a purge of undesirable elements in the police. According to Governors Costa (1981–1986) and Melancia (1987–1990), Lisbon cared little about Macao until the 1990s. Shortly before 1999, a belated sentiment emerged among Luso officials who had worked there that Lisbon had long neglected Macao until the 1987 accord. In the first three Luso centuries, Macao was too distant for Lisbon to become deeply interested in. After 1974, Lisbon had higher priorities elsewhere like Africa and the EU. Due to the last few governors’ altered priorities, civil service localization amid a limited pool of available talents was often a more oscillating than a firm indication of Luso assertiveness. It only became an official policy in 1990 when Governor Melancia decided to prepare for “Macao people ruling Macao” as his top priority to meet the urgent need in providing opportunities for locals to acquire the governance skills and experience. Governor Vasco Vieira (1991– 1999) prioritized infrastructure projects like a new airport and friendship with Beijing. In the final sunset years, he was more concerned with the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis impact and the lxx

worsening crime scene than civil service localization, whose relatively slow progress did arouse Chinese concerns for the new MSAR’s effective administrative capabilities. After four and half centuries, Portugal returned to China an urbanized and modern Macao with developed infrastructure. From the angle of democratic development, both Lisbon and the colonial regime did little to advance Macao’s partially elected polity and semi-autonomous public management after the 1976–84 reforms. While deliberately refrained from alienating Beijing over Macao democracy, Lisbon could have made public management more accountable, clean, transparent and citizen-oriented so that a heavier reform burden would not be left to the MSAR. Perhaps the reluctant administrators’ mentality lingered until the 1986–1999 Luso twilight era. Due to Lisbon’s prolonged neglect, a wide-spread perception was that Macao had always been a Chinese territory with a transient Luso administration pending its return to China, with local pro-Beijing elites’ tolerance of lax governance in a cooperative partnership. The post-1987 realpolitik calculus offered little impetus for the Luso officialdom to become proactive in governance. Macao’s decolonization saw a slow bureaucratic transformation from reluctant to more assertive administrators, the absence of political reform after 1984, and concerted efforts to enshrine Luso cultural legacy in Macao beyond 1999. Culturally, the Portuguese could claim credit for endowing Macao with a rich Occidental legacy. The façade of St Paul’s Church ruins (erected by the Jesuits in 1565) symbolizes Luso Catholics’ attempt to convert the Chinese. The opening of museums, erection of statues and monuments, restoration of historic architecture and staging the annual Grand Prix races and Arts Festival helped enhance and consolidate Macao's cultural richness. A key and unique Luso legacy in Macao are the 10,000 Macanese of mixed Portuguese-Chinese ancestry among Macao’s half a million populace who have played a crucial role in Macao history as vital functionaries and professionals (like translators and civil servants) to act as Cantonese-speaking intermediaries across the lingo-cultural gap between the non-Chinese speaking Luso rulers and most lxxi

Chinese residents who did not understand Portuguese. Their continued presence in the MSAR constitutes living human links to the colorful Luso past. Despite the obvious limitations of a colonial regime, especially one with a long tenure, the Portuguese had attained certain achievements in Macao, including a stable economy, a rule of law standard, religious freedom, some toleration of political dissent and modern infrastructure development in the Luso sunset years. Unlike its hasty African colonial retreat, Lisbon had 12 years to prepare for a dignified departure from Macao after four and half centuries. Lisbon’s benign neglect of Macao was partially compensated by the efforts of the last few Luso governors from Leandro to Vieira to introduce elections, open the political arena to local Chinese, localize the civil service, build infrastructure and liberalize society while avoiding Sino-Luso discord. While more could have been done, they did help foster a modest polity, a harmonious community and a functioning economy for the MSAR to thrive. Indeed, the post-1999 transformation of Macao orbiting along an amazing locus as charted by China’s global rise has add many interesting pages to an updated edition of the Macao Story after the Luso sunset chapter. These are enchanting new chapters on China’s Macao beyond what many in Lisbon would regard as a long farewell to the last vestige of an overseas empire from a bygone age. They should be comforted by the fast that the Portuguese did leave Macao in good hands with a solid foundation and promising 21st century prospects. As evident in the 2005 UNESCO World Heritage designation on the “Historic Center of Macao” and the PRC government-entrusted MSAR hub functions in the multilateral SinoLusophone countries interface, the enriching Luso socio-cultural heritages and the warm Sino-Luso friendly ties are the essence of the Portuguese legacies in China’s MSAR.

Key Factors in Macao’s Smooth Transition Unlike the bitter PRC-UK discord coloring Hong Kong’s problematic 1997 reversion to China, much friendlier Sino-Luso lxxii

cooperation characterized Macao’s countdown to 1999 with greater local optimism. In sharp contrast to Hong Kong’s pre-1997 crisis of confidence as manifested in overseas exodus and democratization debates, the MSAR’s auspicious start following a relatively smooth transition as buttressed by five key contributing factors, namely: 1.

Lisbon’s recognition of PRC sovereignty over Macao coupled with offers to withdraw amid post-1974 Luso decolonization.

2.

With less global clout than Britain, Portugal posed no threat to China, especially after its 1967 consent to Chinese demands and its 1975 Macao de-militarization.

3.

The 1984 Sino-British pact on Hong Kong as an example facilitated the 1987 Sino-Luso accord on Macao.

4.

The PRC–UK–HK tensions, from contested sovereignty, democratization debates to transition matters disconnect, prompted Beijing to become much friendlier toward Lisbon (another EU and NATO state) on Macao affairs to refurbish the world image of its “One Country, Two Systems” reintegration formula that Beijing also aimed at Taiwan’s reunification.

5.

Dominant influence of pro-Beijing local bodies amid weak civil society and passive political culture in Macao, infused with new mainland immigrants, nurtured a less critical popular sentiment toward 1999.

In six major areas lied the greatest differences between British colonial Hong Kong’s 1984–1997 transition and Luso Macao’s 1987–1999 countdown processes. These two Western enclaves’ divergent homecoming to China journeys directly affected their respective SAR new order. 1. Bilateral Relations A most crucial difference was Beijing’s contrasting relationship with two departing colonial powers. The 1982–84 Sino-British lxxiii

negotiations on Hong Kong was deadlocked due to China’s sovereignty assertion vs. the UK’s treaty rights claim, invoking bitter Chinese memories of “a century of unequal treaties” that began the 1842 Treaty of Nanking that ceded Hong Kong to Britain. The 1980s–90s British-sponsored partial democratization deepened PRC–UK mistrust that deteriorated into hostility under Governor Chris Patten (1992–97). In contrast, Portugal’s mid-1970s acknowledgement of China’s sovereignty over Macao removed a potential bone of contention and paved a more cooperative and easier path to the 1999 handover. 2. Local Democratization Hong Kong activists’ campaigns for pre-/post-1997 democratization as supported by an increasingly politicized populace further stressed the strained London–Beijing links. The local democracy movement pushed the British electoral reforms and the HKSAR Basic Law drafting into divisive processes and political crossfire that derailed Hong Kong’s legislative “through train” to transcend the 1997 divide. The 1995 all-elected legislature formed under British auspices was replaced in July 1997 by a non-elected, extraconstitutional HKSAR provisional legislature to serve until April 1998. Macao’s earlier electoral reforms yielded lighter impact on transition era power realignment with cordial Beijing–Lisbon ties. Macao’s “trans-1999 legislative through train” ran well as the colonial Legislative Assembly functioned till the first MSAR legislative elections in September 2001. 3. Functional Preparations Despite Sino-British non-cooperation on many transition matters, the British colonial raj had mounted a systematic and wide-ranging pre-1997 decolonization process to lay a solid administrative-legal foundation for the new HKSAR. Yet, behind the friendlier SinoLuso relations façade, colonial Macao had limited success in civil service localization, especially at senior ranks until the end while the Portuguese–Chinese bilingual law codification progressed slowly. lxxiv

The contrasting fates of Hong Kong and Macau new airport projects illustrated how politics overtook economic logic in Beijing’s pre-emptive control. 4. Military Presence Notwithstanding Sino-Anglo antagonism, London and Beijing reached agreement in June 1994 on the transfer of military facilities in Hong Kong to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In spring 1997, PLA advanced teams came to Hong Kong to prepare for their new HKSAR garrison with cordial PLA–British Hong Kong Garrison cooperation. As violent crimes in Macao surged, Beijing decided in late 1998 to station PLA troops in the MSAR. Not specified in the 1987 Sino–Luso accord or the MSAR Basic Law, such PLA presence provoked objection from Lisbon which had demilitarized Macao in 1975. This last minute dispute in the otherwise cordial Beijing–Lisbon interfaces was only resolved by PRC President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Lisbon in late October 1999, eight weeks before the handover. 5. Popular Response The wide-spread crisis of confidence that engulfed transitional Hong Kong, especially after the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Incident, did not affect Macao to the same extent. Since the 1966 riots, the Macao people had lived under Beijing’s increasing dominance. Already living in a post-1966 “semi-liberated zone” as their Mainland sociocultural and economic links grew over time, Macao Chinese did not join the overseas exodus that drained Hong Kong during the 1980s– 90s. 6. Polity Continuity The earlier Luso democratic reforms in Macao inaugurated legislative elections in 1976 with later modifications to enhance local autonomy and enlarge franchise came after Lisbon’s 1974 Revolution that ushered decolonization. This Luso sunset era headstart yielded a 23-year pre-revision electioneering repertoire (vs. lxxv

Hong Kong’s 12-year). This electoral system’s continuation into the MSAR era with little change ensured political stability on a legislative “through train” transcending the 1999 divide that was impossible in Hong Kong’s 1997 power shift. The long practice of political appointees as senior officials hand-picked by Macao governors from Lisbon provided an institutional continuity unlike the HKSAR’s still problematic political appointees system introduced in 2002 and expanded in 2008. These six key matters contributed to Macao’s smooth transition to Chinese rule and yielded an auspicious start for the MSAR. Due to the divergent historical circumstances of their colonial experience and developmental record in the context of dissimilar British and Luso global strength, Hong Kong and Macao naturally had taken different paths to reunite with motherland China. The varied retrocession stories of these colonial enclaves with local distinctiveness reflected Beijing’s priority on sovereignty and national reunification. Of real interest should be their contrasting prospects toward convergence-reintegration with mainland China by the mid-21st century. Macao’s post-1999 experience is of significance as the second yet so far more successful “One Country, Two Systems” actualization over the HKSAR. In retrospect, Portuguese colonialism in Macao was less efficient and forceful than British rule in Hong Kong. Macao never achieved Hong Kong’s global reach and strategic status, but often remained an almost neglected backwater, even to Lisbon. Since 1967 Macao has become increasingly susceptible to Mainland Chinese influence. Already acclimatized to the dominance of Beijing and its local “patriotic” front, the Macao folks are more adaptable to Beijing’s authoritarian political culture as residents in a “semi-liberated zone” one third of a century before the 1999 handover. Their stronger Chinese identity has facilitated much easier Mainland interface than their Hong Kong neighbors, some of whom even cursed the British for “leaving behind colonial time bombs” that caused many HKSAR troubles. In contrast, few in the MSAR would blame the Portuguese for their current problems. Aided by Sino–Luso cordiality, the Portuguese did leave Macao lxxvi

in good hands with a stable foundation and promising prospects toward the mid-21st century. Many in Lisbon would regard this as a long and fond farewell to the last vestige of an overseas empire from a bygone age. As evident in the 2005 UNESCO World Heritage designation of the “Historic Center of Macao” and the Beijingentrusted hub functions for the MSAR in the multilateral SinoLisophone countries interface, the enriching Luso socio-cultural heritages and the warm Sino–Luso friendship ties are the essence of the cherished Portuguese legacies in China’s MSAR for many years to come.

The Initial Macao SAR Years of Growth and Breakthroughs, 1999–2009 Macao’s first SAR decade of 1999–2009 has yielded a mixed record punctuated by signal attainments and major breakthroughs that came at high societal costs, along with some disturbing socioeconomic trends on the horizon. The MSAR’s early experience can be divided analytically into two five-year period corresponding to inaugural Chief Executive Edmund Ho’s two terms (1999– 2004/2004–2009), his first term offered a promising start for both revival and departures, with the problematic dimensions began to emerge at mid-decade during his second term.

Strong Leadership and Continuity The MSAR’s initial years have displayed a sense of forward optimism characterized by (i) a fairly high degree of autonomy, (ii) a popular, strong chief executive, and (iii) a generally harmonious political arena. Unlike the HKSAR’s contentious politics that provoked Beijing’s more direct intervention, the early MSAR has enjoyed considerable autonomy in internal affairs. Compared with the HKSAR’s acute regime incapacity that necessitated a NPC Basic Law interpretation on the right of abode for mainlanders with HKSAR parents and another interpretation to veto demands for lxxvii

2007–08 full direct elections, the MSAR did not encounter any such constitutional-political cries for a host of reasons. The relatively weak local pro-democracy forces means that domestic political demands seldom pose any significant there at to the MSAR regime or the PRC central state. Although two prodemocratic figures were elected to the MSAR Legislative Assembly in 2001, re-elected in 2005 and 2009 when a third pro-democratic legislator emerged, the influence and capacity of Macao’s democratic camp remain limited since the handover. Local democrats have refrained from provoking Beijing. Although Macao’s middle-class and intellectual elements have grown since 1999, and the 2001, 2005 and 2009 Legislative Assembly direct election results show an increase in pro-democracy votes, this has not yielded a proportional gain in the pro-democratic forces’ appeal and effectiveness. Macao’s political culture is far less confrontational than that of the more assertive HKSAR populace. Infused with many recent mainland immigrants whose less politicized orientation and survival pragmatism mean that most Macao residents prefer the communal harmony status quo to potentially divisive pro-democracy undertakings. The MSAR government’s initial success was a key factor buttressing local autonomy. Chief Executive Edmund Ho’s performance was repeatedly praised by Beijing and highly regarded by many Macao residents. A son of colonial Macao’s pre-eminent Chinese community leader Ho Yin who was well trusted by Beijing, Edmund Ho Hau Wah, a Canadian-educated accountant and banker, has strong public affairs experience in various local bodies and served as vice president of Macao’s legislature 1988–1999 and currently a deputy of the PRC National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee. A popular choice to be the inaugural Chief Executive, Ho had enjoyed a near 80% approval rate in public surveys until 2006. In his first term, Ho adopted a pragmatic approach to govern Macao, avoiding measures that would alienate the civil service, professional sectors and the Macanese community. Perhaps, Ho learned from the HKSAR hard lessons of attempting to rush through at once too many major reforms and wholesale policy lxxviii

changes without adequate public consultation that led to serious setbacks. Blessed with a politically more docile populace, Ho’s governing style reflects a consensual approach as gradualism and moderation marked policy decisions, with few grand schemes or drastic reforms. In terms of political wisdom, social finesse and managerial skills, Ho was regarded as one of the most popular leaders in Macao history. Ho’s continued leadership until late 2009 was supported by many Macao folks who favored his uncontested mid-2004 re-election. Most of Ho’s cabinet members, who were younger than most of their HKSAR peers, seemed to have performed adequately. With the passage of time for job honing, these MSAR officials have become experienced administrators who do not face an aggressive media and vocal political opposition as their HKSAR peers do, thus affording them space to accumulate skills and develop expertise under a strong chief executive. Macao under Luso rule had long practiced a political appointee system in which top officials come and gone with the governors from Lisbon. This system has been inherited by the MSAR that was spared the HKSAR’s governance crisis when its Principal Officials Accountability system was introduced in mid-2002. Yet, the Luso–Macao system was not really accountable to the public while maladministration and official scandals did happen. In fact, even after Macao’s legislature included elected seats in 1976, appointed seats until now as the MSAR Basic Law does not eliminate them. Hence, Macao has enjoyed greater polity continuity than Hong Kong with its major political system changes since the 1980s.

Major Breakthroughs and Economic Recovery The MSAR’s initial years witnessed several major undertakings under Edmund Ho that propelled its remarkable post-colonial transformation. These included strengthening of law and order to suppress late 1990s gang violence that undermined tourism, uplifting the local economy depressed by the 1998–1999 Asian lxxix

financial storm and Hong Kong’s recession, and very significantly with long term impact, the 2002 gaming industry re-franchising of multiple new casino operators’ licenses to end Stanley Ho-STDM’s 40-year gambling monopoly and the related attempts to promote high-end leisure-convention/exhibition tourism. Soon after taking office, Ho, buttressed by the PLA’s deterrent effects, stemmed the law and order breakdown in the final colonial days when gangland strife depressed local tourism, Macao’s main economic pillar. He created a unitary command for the two local police forces—the judicial police and public security police. Ending a 40-year monopoly, Edmund Ho re-franchised and structurally enlarged the gaming industry to bring in major US casino investoroperators via a concession tender committee led by Financial Secretary Francis Tam. While casino tycoon Stanley Ho often publicized his views on franchise, Edmund Ho kept silent and maintained a deliberate distance with the former. During the MSAR initial years, Beijing and its local arm, the PRC Central Government MSAR Liaison Office, had largely refrained from overt interference in Macao internal affairs. Rather the Liaison Office involved in local politics in more subtle ways with its tentacles penetrating deeply into Macao’s social fabric. The proBeijing elite-run social associations always play a vital role in local undertakings with their impressive mobilization capacities as demonstrated in public health campaigns, including the spring 2003 SARS epidemic, in which Macao was more fortunate than the HKSAR in avoiding widespread infections with no death. The pro-Beijing forces could not monopolize all the civil society dimensions such as the labor sector with signs of change. Traditionally pro-Beijing unions have remained influential. But some STDM casino workers and the unemployed have become increasingly dissatisfied with regime policies. Both groups nominated candidates to run in the 2001, 2005 and 2009 legislative direct elections. A labor group critical of the MSAR regime publicized a pro-democracy platform calling for the chief executive’s election by universal suffrage. This surge in labor discontent stemmed from the late 1990s economic recession under the Asian lxxx

financial crisis. Mid-2003 to mid-2004 was a crucial turning point for the MSAR economy. As Macao was climbing out of the recession, the spring 2003 SARS epidemic in China and Hong Kong affected Macao tourism and other sectors. Hong Kong’s economy recovery since late 2003, partially aided by Beijing’s beneficial measures, had generated spin-off effects to uplift Macao’s economy. Not only did the MSAR benefit from Hong Kong’s rebound, Beijing’s special policies to revive the depressed HKSAR economy, especially the mid-2003 stimulants aimed at buttressing the embattled HKSAR Chief Executive C. H. Tung (who was targeted by half a million protesters on 1 July 2003), were also applied equally to the MSAR with beneficial effects. Following the late June 2003 mainlandHKSAR Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), the MSAR in October 2003 signed its own parallel CEPA with Beijing to promote economic growth and employment. Likewise, the new “individual visitor scheme” (IVS) for mainlanders to visit Hong Kong and Macao has very drastically boosted their tourist industry and retail sales with massive influx of mainland tourists since late 2003. Also, Beijing’s approval of a Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge project in August 2003 to create a new transport network linking the major economic centers on the Pearl River Delta (PRD) eastern and western shores would deepen the HK/MSAR’s mainland economic dependency. In May 2004, the brand new Sands Casino began operation in Macao as the first US-owned casino under the new franchise. Despite a deflationary trend since the handover (the composite consumer price index was -1.61 in 2000, -1.99 in 2001, -2.64 in 2002 and -1.56 in 2003), the MSAR economy has scored considerable improvement, with its GDP expanded a real 4.6 % in 2000, reversing the 1996–1999 yearly contraction in the Luso sunset era. Macao’s unemployment rate rose from 4.6% at end1998 to 6.3% at end-1999, then peaked at 6.8% in end-2000 and fell to 4.8% by end-2004. In 2004 first quarter Macao’s GDP grew 25.6 % from a year ago, continuing the double-digit growth since mid-2003. Macao’s 2003 GPD (at constant 1996) prices was lxxxi

MOP69.74 billion (US$8.942 billion, a 15.6% increase over 2002). Its GDP per capita (by expenditure at current prices) was MOP110,637 at end-1999 but rose to MOP142,825 (almost US$20,000, a 14% increase over 2002) by end-2003 and reached MOP179,977 (US$24,500) at end-2004. The new casinos (built by STDM ahead of the new competitors) have stimulated a rapid expansion of the leisure and tourism industry. Macao hosted a record 11.89 million visitors in 2003, mostly from Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. This boom has enabled the MSAR government to run a surplus budget in its first five years and revived by the mid-2000s local property market that plummeted soon after the 1999 handover due to earlier overspeculation These were impressive figures confirming economic improvement in Edmund Ho’s first term.

Over-Development and Social Tensions since 2005 The generally positive record of the MSAR’s first five years, if could be maintained over the long run, should make the Macao experience a worthy alternative to the HKSAR’s lackluster performance in “One Country, Two Systems” actualization. The MSAR’s much smaller population and territorial size reduces its public policy complexities and renders them more manageable. Yet, like its narrow harbor, Macao has a smaller human and material resources pool to support its developmental needs when compared with Hong Kong enjoying its global reach.

Casino Capitalism and Rapid Growth The post-2003 economic boom, fueled by massive casino-hotel constructions and a new property upsurge, has rapidly altered Macao’s urban landscape and drastically re-articulated local socioeconomic dynamics. From May 2004, when the US$265 million Sands Macao (then the world’s largest casino in total table number) opened, to the start of the US$1.2 billion Wynn Macao in 2006, the

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inauguration of the Sands’ $2.4 billion, 3,000-suite Venetian Macao in September 2007 and the start of the $1.3 billion MGM Grand Macau three months later, to the mid-2008 commencement of operation of the Four Seasons Hotel and Casino (operated by Sands), the number of American-owned/operated casinos in Macao mushroomed from zero to five within in 30 months. Also on the scene since May 2007 is the super-deluxe Crown Macao, a joint venture between Australian PBL and Melco (under Lawrence Ho, Stanley’s son) that started another casino in mid-2009 in young Ho’s City of Dreams complex of three hotel-casinos in Cotai. Besides these foreign-linked new gaming venues, the Hong Kong Lui family’s Galaxy Group also runs five casinos in new hotels while Stanley Ho answered the US invasion into his old turf with several new large entries to expand his empire to 19 casinos by 2008, including the Grand Lisboa, currently Macao’s tallest casino-hotel. In 2003, the last year of Stanley Ho’s monopolist regime, Macao’s gaming industry (consisted of 11 casinos, all operated by his SJM) employed 12,400 workers (6% of Macao’s total workforce), generated a total gaming revenue of MOP29.5 billion (US$3.7 billion, about 60% of Las Vegas’ US$6.1 billion that year) and paid MOP10.57 billion in direct tax. That accounted for over 70% of MSAR government revenue of MOP14.12 billion while public expenditures were MOP15.71 billion in 2003. Soon, the MSAR gaming scene was transformed drastically upon the arrival of new franchisees-outside competitors, especially the US giants. In 2004, the first year with new operators (Sands and Galaxy, one casino each vs. SJM’s 13 casinos), gross gaming revenue amounted to MOP43.57 billion and paid MOP15.236 billion in direct tax, these increased to MOP47.13 billion and MOP17.318 billion respectively the next year with two more STDM casinos. By 2006 with 24 casinos (SJM 17, Galaxy 5, and Sands 1), local gaming revenue doubled from the old monopoly era to MOP57.52 billion (US$7.37 billion), Macao had overtaken Las Vegas as the globe's top gambling Mecca. The MSAR’s gross gaming revenue soared to MOP83.85 billion in 2007 (with 28 casinos) and MOP109.8 billion in 2008 (with 31 casinos: SJM 19, Galaxy 5, Sands 3, Melco 2, lxxxiii

Wynn 1 and MGM 1). The ballooning of the number of casinos in Macao from 11 to 31 and of gaming tables from 339 to 4,017 (peaked at 4.375 in 2007) in 2008, plus 11,856 slot machines (peaked at 13,237 in 2007), during 2004–2008 was utterly astonishing. The three-fold plus increase in gaming intakes by 2008 as compared with 2003 yielded an increasingly large contribution from direct gaming tax to the MSAR state coffer, amounting to MOP41.9 billion or 82% of total government revenue in 2008. In terms of direct economic impact, Macao’s gaming industry as the pillar sector employed some 78,000 workers in 2008 (with 44,743 employees on the 6 casino-franchise holders’ direct payroll in 2007). The gaming sector expansion and related tourism, construction and service industry surge since 2003 had created new employment that gradually decreased the unemployment rate, from 6% in 2003 to 4.1% in 2005, 3.8% in 2006 and 3.1% in 2007, hitting a record low at 2.8% in spring 2008. This casino boom also substantially raised Macao’s GDP per capita from 2004’s MOP179.77 to 2006’s MOP227,721, 2007’s MOP284,268, and 2008’s 313,091, suppressing Hong Kong since 2007. Likewise, with new employment opportunities in gaming, tourism, construction, sales and services, Macao’s unemployment rate declined steadily from 2004 (4.9%) through 2007 (3.1%) to reach an all-time low of 2.8% in mid-2008 (but rebounded to 3.8% in March 2009) while the total number of employed population grew from mid-2004’s 210, 900 to 326,200 at end-2008 (but declined to 320,500 in March 2009) while median monthly employment earnings also rose from MOP4,882 in mid-2004 to MOP8,500 at end-2008, a nearly 70% gain.

Social Tensions and Over-Development Despite huge GDP gains and lower unemployment, this casinofueled rapid growth also resulted in serious inflation in the MSAR during Edmund Ho’s second term. Reversing the 2000–2004 deflationary trend, inflation spiraled from 2005’s 4.4% to 2008’s lxxxiv

8.6% (125.4 in composite consumer price index, mid-2004 to mid2005=100) to threaten livelihoods amid widening income inequality. The strains and stresses from gaming-generated prosperity on Macao’s social fabrics were keenly felt in many quarters. The proliferation of casinos with higher pay) had induced many workers to switch to casino jobs that also lured students to forfeit further education. Yet gambling can be additive to distort moral values, undermine family/community cohesion, and disrupt priorities for skill training/knowledge acquisition. Indeed, by mid-decade, Macao has suffered a “too much, too soon and all at once” over-development crisis. This was compounded by inadequate state regulatory capacities and the lack of corresponding infrastructure and social services expansion with a coordinated blueprint. For instance, the massive hotel-casino projects and the related speculative property boom created huge demands for construction worker and skilled technicians. This led to a continuous massive influx of outside workers into Macao, where of 39,411 were engaged in 2005 (a 42% increase over 2004 and reflected an inflow of 27,160 new arrivals that year at a 74.6% year-on-year surge). After 2006’s record inflow of 52,409 (a 93% year-on-year increase) and 2007’s 62,206 new labor arrivals (a 18.7% year-on-year jump) the total pool of outside laborers working in Macau peaked at 104,266 in autumn 2008 (then declined to 87,789 in March 2009 due to recession and project stoppage as they formed a thick chunk of construction manpower). Yet, these figures only cover legally imported workers with official permits, but exclude the multitudes of “black market” external laborers (mostly mainlanders with some Hong Kong persons) who worked illegally in Macao without permits. The rising number of unemployed persons in Macao (from 2,700 in 2006 to 5,200 in mid-2008 to 13,000 in March 2009) and the increasingly large share (38.25% in 2005 to 63.7% at end-2007 and 80.3% at end2008) of unemployed construction hands among them became a major cause for grassroots discontents and labor complaints behind the façade of prosperity. Popular outbursts in Macao to condemn illegal/imported lxxxv

workers who undercut local residents’ employment, whose unemployment rate is always higher than the MSAR overall rate (4.8% vs. 3.8% in March 2009) and depress wages and to criticize other policy defects, were clear syndromes of serious social malaise fermenting. The 1 May 2006 Labor Day protest by 2,000 ended with the arrest of four protesters. The 1 May 2007 mass demonstration of 5,000 led to worker-police altercations in which an innocent motorcyclist was wounded by a police warning shot supposedly fired into the sky. These grassroots collective actions of anger prompted the Ho regime to dole out cash payments (MOP5,000 in April 2008 and MOP6,000 in April 2009) to local permanent residents and lesser payments (of MOP3,000 in 2008 and MOP3,600 in 2009) to legal, but non-permanent, MSAR residents in order to defuse the simmering crisis right before 1 May Labor Day. Such gestures of regime generosity were welcomed by many Macao residents. By spring 2007 the Ho regime became tarnished by a corruption-money laundry scandal involving ex-MSAR Transport and Public Works Secretary Ao Man Long that broke open in late 2006. With Beijing’s approval, Ao was dismissed from office by Edmund Ho and detained while awaiting trial by the MSAR Court of Final Appeal that eventually convicted him with a 28-year jail term. Among other implications, the Ao case shows how the gaming boom-linked property surge prompted business-official collusion in improper dealings on land sales, zoning, construction, property projects and public work contracts. The size (US$100+ million) of Ao’s ill-gotten wealth from corruption through extensive and prolonged power abuse (of discretion on land and construction matters) by a cabinet secretary handpicked by Ho to run a crucial portfolio definitely shocked the Macao public and Beijing while gravely undermined the Ho regime’s legitimacy and popularity. On 1 May 2007 some protesters hoisted signs and shouted slogans demanding Ho’s resignation as chief executive. The police shooting that day inflamed already simmering socio-economic discontents laced with mistrust toward Ho and his team. It seemed that Macao has entered another stage of political lxxxvi

development—a potential governance and legitimacy crisis that required systematic administrative-legislative reforms and fundamental longer term remedial measures to recalibrate statesociety dynamics beyond the temporary relief in cash payments to residents. The labor-police confrontations vividly highlighted in the global and local media undermined the MSAR’s once harmonious and peaceful image. As such, the Ho regime’s winter 2008–spring 2009 repeated pre-emptive “Macao entry” ban on some HKSAR democratic activists (during the October 2008–February 2009 MSAR Basic Law Article 23 national security law enactment) and on HKSAR labor unionists were counter-productive by drawing negative publicity to the MSAR and alienating the Hong Kong people who are Macao tourism key patrons. These might reflect over-reactions of a troubled MSAR officialdom in a year of elections and regime change. Related to the over-development crisis is the controversy on the Guia Lighthouse, one of the 30 sites and, structures forming the “Historic Center of Macao” that was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site (WHS) in mid-2005. The planned construction of three tall (99 to 135 meters) office and residential blocks in the city center near the lighthouse would have upon completion totally obstructed any full view of the lighthouse from the city below and from the harbor. They would also blind the vista from Guia Hill, a public park and tourist destination, looking into the city and the South China Sea. Of historical significance as the oldest Western lighthouse on the China Coast and in East Asia, Guia Lighthouse was built in 1864 as part of a costal defense fortress with a chapel set on the highest point (94 meters) in Macao by the Portuguese during 1622–1638 after a failed 1622 Dutch attempt to capture Macao. The lighthouse has a light visible for some 20 miles in clear weather, but this could be changed by these high-rise blocks that were planned after official height limits were lifted in mid-2006 by Ao Man Long. After unsuccessful public campaigns to persuade the MSAR officialdom to limit the height of these buildings to preserve the view of/from Guia Lighthouse, local conservationists managed to lxxxvii

draw UNESCO attention. After investigations, the UNESCO in August 2007 asked for MSAR official explanation on such infringement of WHS conservation requirements for Guia Lighthouse. Dissatisfied with the MSAR official stance that it was too late to halt these approved projects in progress, the UNESCO warned Beijing in late 2007 that Macao could risk a WHS delisting. This forced the PRC officials to step in to prevent a potential embarrassment involving Macao on the world stage that could adversely impact China’s heritage tourism and global soft power projection via cultural exchange on the eve of the Beijing Olympics. As a result, these Macao blocks’ height was substantially trimmed after MSAR officials in April 2008 hastily reset heights limits (up to 90 meters) on new buildings with immediate effect. Illuminating the uneasy balance between heritage conservation and unrestrained development this is an example of Beijing’s finger prints on Macao. In spring 2008, Beijing twice intervened vigorously to cool down Macao’s over-heated growth and over development under foreign “casino capitalism.” As instructed by Beijing, Edmund Ho in April 2008 banned new casino projects and limited gaming tables to 5,500 until 2013. The next month Beijing restricted mainlander influx with tighter controls on Guangdong IVS tourists who could visit Macau only once every two months and their Hong Kong IVS permits were no longer valid for Macao. Such restrains were soon followed by the Wall Street financial debacle that led to decline in Macao tourist arrival, hotel occupancy and gaming intake, plus a halt on the financially stricken Sands Group’s multi-casino/hotel projects. Official data reveal the global financial tsunami’s adverse impact on the gaming-tourism dominated MSAR economy. The continuous trend of impressive increase in visitor arrivals (from 18,711,200 in 2005 to 26,993,000 in 2007) came to an end in 2008 that recorded an annual arrival total of 22,907,724, over 4 million less than 2007. The 2009 first quarter saw a total of 5,454,170 visitor arrivals (a 16% decline from the 6,836,358 in 2008 first quarter) clearly continued the shrinkage seen in 2008 fourth quarter (5,591,563 arrivals as compared with the nearly 7.5 million in 2007 lxxxviii

fourth quarter). Gross gaming revenue decreased sharply from January 2008’s peak of MOP10,425.5 million (yielding MOP3,937.3 million in public revenue the nest month) to MOP7,999.09 million in February 2009 (with MOP3,031 million in public revenue from gaming the next month). Unemployment hit 3.8% in March 2009 while inflation was 2.34% (down from March 2008’s 9.49%). Official analysis points to an economy downturn with rising unemployment while private consumption and investment receded along with gaming revenue and exports. Then, a pessimistic MSAR economic outlook with a double-digit negative growth rate was even aired with fear of a “casino boom becoming casino doom” over-capacity after a short-lived prosperity. An unexpected early turnabout occurred in autumn 2009. Buoyed by mainland China’s economic rebound and relaxed exit controls, Macao enjoyed a gaming-tourism revival in AugustOctober 2009. With an unprecedented single month intake of US$1.42 billion in August (and $1.35 billion in September), MSAR gross gaming revenue rose 22.3% in 2009 third quarter to a record US$4 billion (from $3.25 billion a year earlier). This upsurge continued into October with an all-time high $1.575 billion in gross gaming intake (a 42% jump over a year ago) as unemployment receded to 3.5%. With such positive signs, MSAR Secretary for Economy and Finance Francis Tam in November 2009 predicted a rosier prospect for a 2009 full year GDP negative growth rate at only a single digit as compared with the first half year’s 12.8%. This rapid economic recovery provided a positive platform for Edmund Ho’s 18 November 2009 farewell address to the MSAR legislature. Summing up his decade at the helm record, Ho pointed to a higher than expected 2009 MSAR government budget surplus of over MOP10 billion to yield MOP100 billion in total reserve fund accumulated since the MSAR’s establishment. Amounting to a nearly seven-fold increase over the less than MOP13 billion that the new MSAR inherited from the Luso-Macao regime in late 1999, this MOP100 billion does not include the MOP3.3 billion allocated for a new provident fund system for qualified MSAR residents (at MOP10,000 per person deposited into individual accounts) as Ho’s lxxxix

parting gift to Macao people. Still to be ameliorated are the casino boom’s socio-economic ills that constituted the real challenge ahead.

Reform and Progress in the MSAR Second Decade Elected by a 300-member Electoral Committee on 26 July 2009, Fernando Chui Sai On assumed office as MSAR Chief Executive on 20 December 2009. The non-contested “election” of former Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture Fernando Chui, as the sole candidate to succeed inaugural MSAR Chief Executive Edmund Ho, was viewed by some critics as a regrettable democratic regression. This Ho to Chui succession perhaps reflected Beijing’s positive assessment of Ho’s overall performance despite the Au Man Long scandal as Chui was Ho’s hand-picked successor. Chui’s background as the scion of a prominent mercantile family with close ties to local economic elites had worried some circles that preferred a new chief executive of non-business origins to avoid officialdom-business elite conflict of interest collusion. (Fernando Chui’s uncle Chui Tak Kei was a prominent local Chinese leader and vice president of the colonial era Macao Municipal Council.) Some locals had rooted for a civil servant or a legal professional (like Public Prosecutor-General Ho Chio Meng who declined to be a candidate) to become the next chief executive. By accepting Chui as the sole candidate (who has collected 286 nominations from among the MSAR Election Committee’s 300 members, making any other potential candidate unable to qualify with a 50-nomination minimum), Beijing seemed keen on leadership and policy continuity to confront Macao’s then economic downturn as Chui’s business links seemed a valuable asset for economic recovery to maintain social stability. In mid-2009, the over-development problems and stressful statesociety interface were deepened by local economic downturn under the global financial tsunami. These combined to signal an earlier than expected arrival of a “post-twin Ho syndromes” (Edmund Ho would retire in late 2009 and Stanley Ho was 87-year old) of

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economic decline and social fissure to affect MSAR governance. As a dense and congested city with no room to grow, Macao needs a well-articulated and popularly-subscribed vision for balanced and sustainable development to promote economic diversification, manpower resources, welfare coverage, transport networks expansion, ecological awareness, education-cultural advancement, and bureaucratic reform with re-geared state-society interface to care for the grassroots against deepening socio-economic inequality, all these are real challenges for the new Chiu leadership.

An Auspicious Start Buttressed by his experience in community service and charities leadership, a decade (December 1999–May 2009) tenure as the first MSAR Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture, and armed with three US university degrees in public health, Chief Executive Chui has placed on his agenda particular emphasis on improving common livelihood via social engineering and gain redistribution to mitigate the casino boom’s negative effects. The societal impacts of this “too much, too soon, and all at once” style of rapid growth and drastic transformation have vividly manifested in many aspects of the daily life of local folks who have suffered from continuous high inflation, skyrocketing property prices/rental, sever manpower shortage with a system overloading and inadequate infrastructure capacity. These have contributed to a clearly discernible overall quality of life deterioration for the Macao populace at large. In fact, Fernando Chui has inherited a post-colonial Macao that had been extensively and intensively transformed beyond all expectations only a decade after the 1999 retrocession. Fortuitously, by the time Chui took office in late 2009, the local economy had already rebounded on a steady upward swing propelled by massive mainland tourist influx to revive Macao’s gaming-tourism boom. Buoyed by the post-2002 gaming re-franchise gains with the briefly (2008–09) interrupted growth resumed, Chui was spared the deep recession and huge budget deficits hurting other economies. But he must tackle the consequences of double-digit GDP growth like xci

inflation, over-crowding and resource scarcity. Macao’s overdevelopment woes might seem a “challenge of sudden wealth” that leaders elsewhere would not mind facing, especially those in depressed Western economies still recovering from the 2008 global financial meltdown. Key socio-economic indicators below will reveal the dimensions of this uniquely blessed Macao case of “no worry about wealth creation but urgent need to expand regime capacities and maximize new riches in long term investment to prepare for rainy days ahead.” Besides a hefty reserve fund of over MOP100 billion, the Ho regime also endowed the Chui team with a host of large-scale infrastructure schemes and construction projects in progress for completion under Chui, including several Beijing-bestowed beneficial items to support MSAR development. These include the PRC central authorities’ approval for a 350-hectres in 5 parcels coastal land-fill reclamation to create new land for urban development, the building of University of Macau’s new Hengqin campus, the trans-Pearl River Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge, and the link-up of the Guangzhou–Zhuhai high-speed railway with Macao’s yet to be built new Light Rapid Transit urban rail system. Furthermore, of profound political, socio-economic and practical implications was the MSAR’s full incorporation into the PRC “125” (12th five-year plan) national development blueprint to become an officially designated “world leisure-tourism hub” and “SinoLusophone countries cooperation platform.” Such designations charted Macao’s future course in nationally prescribed functional roles according to Beijing-endorsed developmental objectives as encoded in various cross-border cooperative pacts and jointdevelopment accords between the MSAR and neighboring Guangdong province, Zhuhai city, the HKSAR, and other Pearl River Delta (PRD) localities. Most of these inter-/pan-PRD pacts aim to promote closer regional integration and complementary economic-functional development with rosy labels like “MacaoZhuhai co-urbanization”, “1 hour superior life circle”, “Guangzhou-Shenzhen–HK–Macao–Zhuhai Super Metropolis”, etc. In a highly symbolic gesture during PRC President Hu Jintao’s xcii

19–20 December 2009 official visit to Macao to attend the MSAR 10th anniversary celebrations and to swear in new Chief Executive Chui and his team of principal officials, Hu led the ground breaking rituals for University of Macau’s new Hengqin campus. As his last official act in Macao, Hu’s speech extolled the imperative of higher education expansion and upgrade to train the skills and talents needed for MSAR development as exemplified by the new campus. This new campus project represents a real breakthrough in SARmainland cross-border joint-development transcending legal– administrative–logistical complexities. Build for a total enrollment of 11,000 students, the University of Macau new campus is located in a specially demarcated 1 square km site on Hengqin Island in Zhuhai municipality, just across a narrow river from Macao. The new campus zone will come under MSAR jurisdiction on a Beijing approved lease to last till 19 December 2049, the supposedly end of Macao’s SAR status under the “One Country, Two Systems” formula. This is a creative solution both to overcome Macao’s sever spatial limitations for higher education expansion and to deepen Macao–Zhuhai cross-border bonds buttressing Hengqin’s development as a new PRD West Bank commercial-industrial hub and entertainment-tourism center riding on the spill-over of Macao’s booming tourism and Lusophone bloc links. On 15 December 2009, four days prior to Hu’s arrival, construction commenced on the 22.8km (14.2mi) long Hong Kong–ZhuhaiMacao Bridge for a 2016 completion date to serve as a major transport link across the Pearl River estuary to facilitate intra-PRD functional integration. Estimated to cost US$11.6 Billion (73 billion Chinese yuan), the bridge is 22% funded by the PRC, HKSAR and MSAR governments and 78% by a Bank of China-led consortium loan. Furthermore, there have been ongoing Beijing–Guangdong– Zhuhai–Macao official discussions to build another on land Zhuhai–Macao cross-border passage way to relief the high volume traffic congestion at the Barrier Gate-Gonbei crossing as the main SAR-Mainland interface channel on land that might eventually open 24-hour daily. Expanded facilities are being built in Gonbei. xciii

These massive projects literally set in concrete and stone yield a positive image of forward development in the MSAR toward its eventual merge-convergence with the PRC mainland by mid-21st century. With such visible showcase icons, real progress in Macao’s “hardware” realm still needs extra efforts in critical areas like public housing, but more crucially physical built-up required corresponding advance in the software realms of governance, legal system, social welfare, urban planning, heritage conservation, manpower-employment relations, and education quality. As commonly expected, Chui’s main task as Chief Executive is to transform the gaming-driven growth into balanced and sustainable long-term development through strategic repositioning, economic diversification, urban/infrastructure planning with priorities on environment, heritage conservation, cross-border PRD functional collaboration, and above all he must meet popular demands for substantial improvement in life quality and grassroots livelihood. The following data illustrate the impressive economic growth to pave a solid “hardware’ foundation for Fernando Chui to guide Macao into the second decade of the new millennium: • GDP per capita jumped over six folds from 2013’s MOP115,500 to 2011’s MOP697,502. • Tourist arrivals increased 200% + in the first dozen MSAR years from 2000’s 9.16 million to 2013’s 29.325 million. Per capita tourist non-gaming spending hit MOP2,030 in 2013 to yield MOP59.54 billion in tourism income, with a total of 29,000 hotel rooms in spring 2014, 3.2 times over 2001’s 9,030 rooms. • Unemployment rate declined from a peak of 7.1% in mid2000 to 1.7 in spring 2014. • Median Employment Monthly Earnings jumped from MOP4,658 in 2001 to MOP13,000 in spring 2014. • Total public revenue grew from 2000’s MOP15,338 billion to 2013’s MOP155,512 billion.

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• Gross gaming intake jumped from 2004’s MOP43.5 billion to MOP361,866 (US$45.2 billion) in 2013. Yet changes in other areas reflect the problems software realm: • Total population expanded from 0.4315 million in 2000 to 0.614 million in spring 2014. • Imported workers grew from 24,970 in 2003 to 150,000 in mid-2014. • General Consumer Price Index increased from 100 in 1999 to 123.48 in 2013.

Software Realm Reforms and New Initiative To fulfill the vital social engineering policy goals on his agenda, Fernando Chu must first improve his own administrative capacity with improved instrument for effective governance by reforming the many layers of bureaucratic structure and processes. Taking over from Edmund Ho, Chui retained in his cabinet the entire Ho regime cast (with only two newer faces, Secretary for Transport and Public Lau Si Io since late 2006 to replace Au Man Long who was dismissed on corruption charges after six years in that post (December 1999–December 2006) and Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture Cheong U, (Commissioner Against Corruption until June 2009 when he filled the post vacated by Chiu who resigned to run for chief executive). While providing for a seamless leadership transition, such senior officialdom personnel continuity could pose potential problem for bureaucratic reform and major policy departure, besides the fact that Chui was himself in Ho’s original team until mid-2009. Still Chui must speed up the pace and intensify the efforts to systematically reform, upgrade, update and enlarge MSAR legaladministrative institutions and governance systems, processes and procedures to effectively launch urgently needed tasks in social engineering, gains re-distribution and development planning simply to catch up with Macao’s significantly altered socio-economic xcv

realities and physical-spatial realignment stemming from runaway growth, severe skilled manpower shortage and acute lack of useable land to house rapid increase in population and tourist arrivals. Furthermore, the Au Man Long corruption case rang the alarm on the highly undesirable situation of loose administrative procedures and processes with inadequate checks and balance on land, property and public works bidding/contracting that had created room and loopholes for official-business collusion, bribery and unaccountable official actions in “discretionary power” grey areas. It also drew attention to the grossly out-dated laws and regulations on such lucrative and potentially windfall profitable transactions involving land property, and infrastructure projects that had utterly failed to keep up the speed, scope and complexity of Macao’s physical expansion and runaway development in the past decade Blessed with a seemingly unending double-digit GDP growth under “casino capitalism” that yet net hefty government revenue surplus, the Chui regime has so far been able to dole out benefits in kind and in cash payments to partially meet some socio-economic demands to defuse social tension to promote overall peace and harmony in more positive state-society interaction. Yes, new wealth from gaming proceeds might help to purchase popular tolerance and but time for the regime to address daily livelihood problems created by the casino-tourism boom that the MSAR populace must confront and endure. A mixed preliminary report on Chui’s first 53 months at the helm should include the following positive attainments, some of these undertakings are recently launched new programs and fresh initiatives whose longer term actual effects remain to be seen: • The MSAR Legislative Assembly’s mid-2012 amendments to electoral law, after two rounds of public consultations, to codify and implement the Beijing-approval electoral reforms. Adhering to a “2+2+100” formula to increase electoral participation, this reform entails: (A) Expansion of Election Committee membership from 300 to 400 in the 2014 MSAR chief executive election, and (B) Enlargement of Legislative Assembly membership from 29 xcvi

to 33 in the September 2013 elections with four new seats, two each the geographical constituency and the functional constituency (with one allotted to the social work and education sector and another for the professional sector). • The introduction of a centralized system of civil servant recruitment with competitive general and specialized examinations in late 2012. The MSAR civil service ranks included 28,223 persons in late 2012 (1 civil servant per 25 residents), civil service reform is long overdue and is imperative to governance effectiveness. • The creation of several new units/agencies in the MSAR government, such as the post of government spokesman, an external affairs unit and as a policy research unit that are all attached to the Office of the Chief Executive in the central administration. • Furtherance of the reform to improve and upgrade the justice-legal administration system that has long been much criticized by the public for its outdated laws, inadequate capacity and poorly drafted bills that caused serious enactment delays. New inputs and additional resources led to a new Law Reform and International Law Bureau, new court room and judiciary facilities, enhanced training of Chinese-Portuguese bilingual lawyers, judges and prosecutors, and the sending of students to Portugal for law school study and legal training with public funding support. • Enactment of several major laws with profound impact on public health, economic diversification, urbanization, housing, infrastructure development and environment protection like an anti-smoking ban in public areas (including 50% of casino premises), a mandatory 21-year old age requirement for entry to and employment in casinos, and three urgently needed ordinances on land administration, city planning, and heritage conservation that should be passed in the 2012–13 legislative session. xcvii

• The on-target completion by end-2012 of 19,000 new public housing units in high rise blocks (despite flawed planning that led to a sizable stock of unsold 1-bed room units). Families on the public housing waiting list are receiving a monthly subsidy up to MOP1,900 until they are able to move in their new flats. The government allocated MOP5.9 billion to the housing sector with 86% of the total for public housing that consists of low-rent social housing flats and subsidized home-ownership scheme units. This massive construction has been paralleled by various taxation levy, regulatory rules and administrative measure to ensure a fairer and betterinformed private property market with legally monitored transaction procedures to safeguard buyers’ interest with stipulated code on developers/sellers and middleman agents. Also initial steps are taken to produce a second phase of 6,300 public housing units and to develop plans for a third phase of public housing projects to be built on new land to be reclaimed. • Continuation of the Edmund Ho regime’s annual government handout of cash payment to local residents since spring 2008 as a gesture to enable the people share the fruits of growth and prosperity The Chui team has raised the amount from Ho’s MOP6,000 per MSAR permanent resident to MOP7,000 in 2012 (with nonpermanent residents receiving 40% less at MOP4,200) as announced in Chui’s 15 November 2011 Policy Address with a “promoting moderate economic diversification and improving people’s living standards” theme to highlight his commitment to social welfare and Macao’s sustainable and diversified economic development. Such cash payment became the envy of HKSAR residents who wished their own chief executive would follow Macao’s “sharing wealth with the people” example to grant more benefits to relief the populace from the huge budget surplus. HKSAR

xcviii

Chief Executive Donald Tsang finally took Macao’s lesson and paid HK$6000 to every local folk in 2011. • The building of a two-tier social security-social welfare system as centered on an eventual universal mandatory Central Provident Fund. As a CPF precursor, the MSAR government has set up a non-mandatory Central Savings System to offer retirement benefits to those whose employers provide no pension. To cover each permanent resident age over 21 and lives in Macao for at least 183 days a year, each CSS account comes with a “start-up” allocation of MOP10,000 borne by the government in 2011 and a further injection of MOP6,000 into every resident’s CSS account in 2012. • The establishment of a new distinct fiscal reserve system (under law to empower its regulatory and operational machinery) to better manage the huge MSAR reserve of budget surplus (that is over MOP200 billion). The official MSAR 2013 total public expenses MOP59.25 billion is lower than revenue at MOP155.51 billion to yield a surplus of MOP96.25 billion. Such surpluses stem from the 35% tax on gross gaming intakes as a major source (85%+ at a projected MOP134.35 billion in 2013) of MSAR public revenue that enables regime generosity on extensive social benefits. • The promulgation of a legally binding “regulatory framework” on the operation of private schools, especially the terms of service for their teachers as a major step to improve the quality and uplift the standard of basic education after the Ho regime implemented a “Kindergarten to Grade 12” 15-year free compulsory education for all local children and a string of tertiary education grants and scholarships. • The introduction of a new decade-long youth policy now undergoing public consultation rounds with forums and workshop among local focus group and NGOs. xcix

• The construction of a new full service public hospital in Cotai area to serve the needs of the growing Taipa and Coloane populace. This will be the first such medical facility in these tow outlaying areas of Macao, a very clear reflection of Chui’s strong interest, personal experience and professional training in the field of healthcare. Notwithstanding these laudable undertakings outlined above, there remain many public policy areas with unfinished tasks or yet to be satisfied public demands confronting the Chui regime as the real challenges for the rest of his tenure with a presumed second 5year term. The vital tasks ahead to remake Macao should encompass some of the critical concerns below that will require considerable efforts and vast resources under strong leadership with unweaving political will to succeed. • Must vigorously streamline and upgrade the regime’s legal expertise for better legislative inputs and more productive executive–legislature interactive dynamics. • Should promote in the MSAR officialdom/elite circles a more nuanced and systematic inter-agency-sector articulation of Macao’s long term strategic positioning and developmental visions in a multi-layered localregional-national-external-transnational-global contexts that could help to galvanize energy and coordinate regime actions as well as re-gearing for cross-border intra-PRD cooperation. • Ought to pursue a decisive, consistent and clearly enunciated policy on gaming control to enforce and facilitate key decisions, like those on relocation of slot machine arcades/parlors from school neighborhood, policy integrity on casino expansion limits on Sands’ and Melco’s gaming tables allocation in their new Cotai properties. • Need to substantially increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness on the part of official agencies in policy implementation with precise operational details and

c

workable procedures to produce the desired results and on-target service delivery. • Must forcefully tighten the regulatory regime on imported labor with legal permits and on interdiction of illegal external laborers working in Macao with penalties on employers. Concrete actions are needed to rebalance the regime’s commonly perceived pro-business tilt in industrial relations and labor issues like a minimum wage, maximum work hour and fair compensation for overlapping public holidays. • Should speedily resolve inter-agency discords and public opposition to specific official measures like the new Light Rapid Transit urban railway system’s flawed routings with tracks running through narrow and crowded inner city streets as criticized by the Commission Against Corruption and the Audit Commission. The above list can easily expand to another page or two, but the above six items are sufficient to illuminate the key dimensions of some pressing issues and long overdue repairs that urgently await the Chui team’s policy decisions and remedial measures. As the 2 November 2012 official demographic policy report (for a 3-month consultation) has forecasted, Macao’s population would likely reach 0.852 million within the next quarter century by 2036. This is an alarming figure amid recent demographic growth from 0.445 million in mid-2000 to 0.576 million by 3rd quarter 2012. The gaming-tourism boom (as seen in Macao’s GDP increase from 1999’s MOP47.3 billion to 2011’s MOP292.1 billion) also added to Macao’s human traffic that registered 28 million tourist arrivals in 2011, an almost four-fold jump over 1999’s 7.44 million. As these figures reveal, looming ahead on the horizon is a very real prospect for a “crisis of over-development” in the MSAR public and private sectors. To cope with an expanding population that demands more social services and a fast growing economy that necessitates larger/higher regime administrative/regulatory capacity, the ranks of ci

Macao civil servants also grew from 1999’s 17,239 to 30,031 in late 2013. Such rapid expansion has yielded a bloated MSAR bureaucracy with a lackluster record in policy implementation effectiveness and service delivery efficiency. The functional and jurisdictional overlapping between government units, many of them inherited from the Luso era but unchanged for decades, has resulted in cases of convoluted administrative logic and confused operational chain of command that undermined good governance and regimesociety interface. For instance, the MSAR’s Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau (CMAB under the Secretary for Administration and Justice) has direct responsibility for agencies, programs and activities that often overlap or closely parallel those in the charge of other bureaus under the supervision of other Secretaries). Specifically, the CMAB’s cultural, sports and civic education portfolios can fall under the Cultural Affairs Bureau, Macao Sports Development Fund, Education and Youth Affairs Bureau, all under the Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture. Likewise, the CMAB tasks on traffic control, trench and drainage, and urban design can belong to the Lands, Public Works and Transport Bureau and Infrastructure Development Bureau, both under the Secretary for Transport and Public Works. After functional streamlining realignment, the CMAB may only retain its food safety, food supply, municipal management and cleaning portfolios with its staff for other functions reassigned to the relevant units. As a matter of urgent imperative, following the “economic miracle” of the first decade of gaming liberalization, the MSAR leadership must now pay special attention to internal administrative reforms, longer-term public policy coordination and timely legislative enactment to ensure another decade of positive transformation in order to uplift the life of the Macao populace as well as to safeguard the balanced, coordinated and sustainable development of the community in both the hardware and software realms. In his 13 November 2012 Policy Address to the legislature, current MSAR Chief Executive Fernando Chiu has proposed a host of substantial funding efforts to improve the livelihood of the cii

grassroots and the middleclass. These include income tax rebates and also, increased benefit payments for senior welfare stipends, medical care vouchers, electricity bill subsidies, student grants for book/stationary, and above all, an additional MOP1,000 in direct cash payout to all MSAR legal residents to “share the economic gains” with MOP8,000 for permanent residents and MOP4,800 for other residents. As a further step in long overdue bureaucratic reform Chui also promised to institute a new performance assessment of officials/senior civil servants to enhance public service delivery efficiency and official policy implementation effectiveness. If properly implemented, these measures would promote meaningful social engineering and administrative streamlining in China’s Macao. Then in Chiu’s 12 November 2013 Policy Address, the amounts of these direct cash payments to local folks were increased to MOP9,000 and MOP5,400 respectively while he emphasized long term efforts in the four key livelihood issue target areas of welfaresocial security, education-talents, public housing, and medical service-healthcare). A Talent Development Commission was established with Chui as chair. A recent major breakthrough in Macao’s built environment control was the taking effect on 1 March 2014 of three related laws on land use/transactions, urban planning, and cultural heritage protection. The first two laws can be regarded as belated but still crucial if only partial response to both the Ao Man Long corruption case’s official discretionary power on land and construction matters and to the need for legal mechanism to regulate/coordinate development projects to fit long term sustainability and public interests. The third law aims at cultural heritage sites preservation with a balance between conservation and development. In other words, these laws will rule out unregulated runaway physical builtup and spatial growth at the expense of Macao’s community interests and environmental concerns. This is a significant departure from previous MSAR policy tilt in favor of economic growth and gaming-tourism development. What is urgently needed is a clear sense of vision and mission among its leaders and elites for purposeful commitment and enlightened policy orientation to propel ciii

China’s Macao forward on a positive course of balanced economic growth coupled with corresponding societal advancement toward the 2049 MSAR-mainland merger-convergence on all fronts.

Concluding Observations As this essay was updated after Chief Executive Chui had publicly announced in March 2014 his intention to seek re-election in August 2014 for a second five-year term, it is not premature to conclude that indeed much has changed in post-colonial Macao during the past one and a half decade. In contrast to neighboring HKSAR’s contested politics and tidal waves of social protests, the relatively smooth functioning of the MSAR regime so far has constituted an apparently more appealing “One Country, Two Systems” actualization record. In view of Macao’s generally positive post-handover experience, it is premature to deem the “One Country, Two Systems” model a total failure due to the HKSAR’s many problems. In fact, despite the 1 May 2006– 2007 Labor Day demonstrations demanding livelihood improvements, and the 25–27 May 2014 protests against a bill on senior official pensions, the MSAR was spared the full-scale civil society unrests as devastating as the mid-2003 outburst in Hong Kong. During 2003–2007 and again since 2010, Macao has enjoyed impressive economic growth fueled by a gambling industry boom with massive tourism and infrastructure projects to launch itself as a Pacific Rim entertainment-convention hub. Domestically, as the MSAR government is not burdened by budget deficits but blessed with hefty surplus, it could easily afford to reduce grassroots discontents with generous welfare benefits as a safety valve for social stability. It also has the resources to expand educational facilities and invest in training programs to nurture future skills and talents for Macao’s strategic repositioning to become, besides being a tourism-convention center, a regional service platform for small and medium enterprise within the 2008–2020 PRD integrated

civ

development guidelines unveiled by Beijing. On this score, Macao’s forthcoming cross-border functional expansion into and collaborative development with Zhuhai could yield opportunities for employment and urgently needed efforts toward economic diversification. In 2016 the newly completed Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge will accelerate the functional integration of Macao, Zhuhai, Hong Kong and Shenzhen, linking them to become the core of a rising South China multi-metropolis super-hub. This bridge should facilitate tourist traffic from Hong Kong and the Mainland to support Macao’s casino, hotel, leisure, entertainment and convention-exhibition industry. In a nutshell, Macao has been undergoing potentially significant transformative processes in polity, economy, social program and cultural value orientations with intensifying Mainland interface since its mid-1980s transition to become a Chinese SAR. With adroit leadership, systematic administrative-legislative reforms and enlightened planning strategies toward a longer-term vision for balanced growth and sustainable development, the MSAR might become a genuinely exciting case of successful post-colonial transformation in Asia and beyond. Thus, despite its small size, the unique experience of China’s Macao deserves global attention for its big message on Asian urbanism and its profound implications as a vital showcase for Greater China integration–reunification– convergence. The continuous development of Macao as an open, liberal, pluralistic, modern and cosmopolitan Chinese city will also reflect on the PRC leadership’s effective capacity to confront the challenges and opportunities arising from China’s marketization and globalization reforms. As such, the MSAR constitutes a key dimension in the unfolding saga of contemporary China’s socioeconomic transformation and national reintegration. Indeed, Macao’s transformation orbiting along an amazing locus charted by China’s peaceful global rise will add many interesting pages to an updated edition of the Macao Story after the Luso sunset chapter. Ahead on the horizon are exciting breakthroughs in China’s Macao undergoing transformative changes to actualize its promising prospects by the mid-21st century. cv

Part I Legal and Political Dimensions

1 The Theory and Practice of “One-Country-Two-Systems” in Macao Herbert S. YEE

Beijing designed a “one country, two systems” formula to solve the problem of ruling Hong Kong after its reversion to China in July 1997. Article 5 of the Hong Kong Basic Law stipulates that “the socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.” The “Preamble” of the Hong Kong Basic Law stipulates that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) adopts the principle of “One Country, Two Systems” to maintain the “prosperity and stability” of Hong Kong by “taking account of its history and realities”. The “realities” were many Hong Kong people did not trust the PRC and had fled the territory after the start of Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong’s handover in the early 1980s. China has since 1978 adopted a policy of “reform and opening” and a prosperous and stable Hong Kong would be a great asset to the mainland as a “window” for its opening policy. In any event, the PRC did not have any experience in ruling a “capitalist” Hong Kong and the principle of “One Country, Two Systems” might also appeal to Taiwan as a probable formula for reunification. The PRC authorizes, as stipulated in the Hong Kong Basic Law Article 2, the HKSAR “to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law.” The HKSAR also enjoys 3

4

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

independent finances. Moreover, the Hong Kong Basic Law deliberately establishes an authoritarian, executive-led government, with a powerful Chief Executive. The Macao Basic Law, which was promulgated in March 1993, three years after the Hong Kong Basic Law, is largely a duplicate of the latter, with minor yet crucial changes taking account of Macao’s “history and realities” (Preamble of Macao Basic Law). Like the Hong Kong Basic Law, the Macao Basic Law grants the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) a high degree of political autonomy as well as judicial and financial independence. Yet it gives the MSAR Chief Executive more power than his Hong Kong counterpart. Macao has returned to its motherland for more than 12 years. This chapter evaluates the practice of “One Country, Two Systems” in Macao. It argues that principle of “One Country, Two Systems” has not been successfully implemented in Macao and that the absence of “checks and balances” on the MSAR executive branch’s power has been the major source of administrative corruption. It also argues that the trend of “mainlandization” will in the long-run jeopardize the principle of “One Country, Two Systems”.

The Myth and Reality of “Macao People Ruling Macao” As the introduction of the “One Country, Two Systems” formula is unprecedented in the PRC’s history, its actual implementation in Hong Kong and Macao is highly controversial. It has aroused the debate: “One Country” or “Two Systems”, which one is more important? For pro-Beijing political groups in Hong Kong and Macao, “One Country” is the prerequisite for “Two Systems” and hence national interests override local SAR interests. Other more neutral or pro-democracy local political groups stress the importance of distinguishing the SAR capitalist system from the mainland socialist system. Arguably, ignoring the difference between the two systems would, sooner or later, render Hong Kong or Macao to become just another Chinese city like Shenzhen and

1. The Theory and Practice of “One-Country-Two-Systems” in Macao

Zhuhai. Most political groups, however, agree that the “One Country, Two Systems” formula can work only when the Hong Kong and Macao people are capable of ruling themselves. This section evaluates the practice of “Macao people ruling Macao” after Macao’s 1999 reversion to Chinese rule. Citizens are often concerned about the performance of their respective governments, which in turn affects citizens’ attitudes toward political participations. How well has the MSAR government performed since the handover? Table 1 compares the evaluation of the overall performance of the Macao government by Macao citizens in 1991, 1999, 2001, 2006, 2008 and 2009. Data from 1991 are based on household visits of Macao citizens aged 18 and above conducted by the author and his associates.1 The data from the other years are based on telephone surveys. With the exception of the 2008 survey,2 surveys conducted in 1999, 2001, 2006 and 2009 were supervised by the author.3 The June 2008 survey was conducted by the MSAR’s Strategic Research Center for Sustainable Development. All the above surveys used random samples and their results are reliable. Table 1 indicates that Macao citizens’ satisfaction with the overall performance of the government has been increased significantly since the handover in December 1999. Understandably, citizens’ evaluation of government performance is affected by the state of the economy. Macao’s economy has rebounded strongly from the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, especially after the 2004 opening of American style casinos like the Sands and the flooding of mainland visitors after the lifting of individual tourism travel restrictions by Beijing in 2003. Macao’s casino intakes, the tax on which accounted for over 70% of total MSAR government revenues, have surpassed Las Vegas since 2007. Yet the global financial tsunami and the tightening policy of mainland “individual tourists” in 2008 inflicted a heavy blow to Macao’s economy. Its GDP growth slowed in early 2008 and plunged into negative growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.4 Table 1 shows that Macao citizens’ satisfaction of the MSAR government peaked in 2006 at 39.9% yet eroded to 28.6% in 2008 and 25.1% in 2009. The significant drop of government popularity in 2008 and 2009 was also caused by the Ao Man Long corruption scandal,5 the

5

6

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

widening income gap between the rich and poor, and the fast climbing housing prices. Yet, despite mounting economic crises and social woes, Macao citizens’ dissatisfaction (23.4% in 2008 and 14.5% in 2009) with the government was relatively mild as compared to the eve of handover (39.2% in 1999). Apparently, Macao citizens seem to be more patient with the MSAR government than with the then Portuguese colonial government. Why? Has there been any significant change in Macao citizens’ political participation after the handover? What is the political efficacy of Macao citizens? Table 1. Evaluation of the Overall Performance of the Macao Government (%) Q: What is your evaluation of the overall performance of the Macau government? 1991 1999 2001 2006 2008 2009 (N=658) (N=496) (N=462) (N=5467) (N=1017) (N=863) Satisfied

17.9

22.4

24.9

39.9

28.6

25.1

Neutral

41.1

31.0

51.6

42.7

45.6

51.7

Not satisfied

23.1

39.2

18.6

11.6

23.4

14.5

No opinion

17.8

7.5

4.8

5.9

2.4

8.7

Table 2 below shows that Macao citizens’ confidence in influencing government policies (civic competence of internal political efficacy) remains low after the handover. Although the percentages of those who believed they could influence government policies in the 2006 (13%) and 2009 (10.4%) surveys were more than doubled that in 1999 (5.0%), the proportion of respondents who did not think they could influence government policies remained high (exceeded 70%). Apparently, the slogan of “Macao people ruling Macao” has failed to boost the internal political efficacy of the majority Macao citizens. Moreover, the recent drop (from 13% in 2006 to 10.4% in 2009) in Macao citizens’ political efficacy reflects their frustration with the MSAR government after the Ao scandal.

1. The Theory and Practice of “One-Country-Two-Systems” in Macao Table 2. Civic Competence (%) Q: Can you influence government policies? 1991 (N=658) Can

1999 (N=496)

2001 (N=462)

2006 (N=546)

2009 (N=847)

5.7

5.0

10.1

13.1

10.4

Rarely

18.2

17.8

22.1

13.0

17.4

Cannot

76.1

67.9

63.2

73.8

72.3

-

9.3

4.5

-

-

No opinion

However, Macao people seem to have higher subject competence or external political efficacy. Table 3 below shows that about 27% of the 2006 respondents thought the government departments would help them to solve their problems if they asked for help, a marked improvement over the 1991 (14%) or 1999 (12.2%) survey; while a similar proportion (26.3%) of respondents in 2006 felt that they would not get help from the government departments, also a significant drop from pre-handover surveys. Apparently, the Macau people tend to trust the MSAR government more than the former Portuguese government and expect a government led by local elites to be responsible to Macao citizens. That partly explains why Macao citizens are more tolerant of the present MSAR government’s performance than the former Portuguese government. However, their trust of the MSAR government significantly eroded to 17.3% in 2009 by the Ao scandal and other regime maladministrations. Table 3. Subject Competence (%) Q: If you ask some government departments for help, do you think they will seriously help you to solve your problem? 1991 (N=658)

1999 (N=496)

2001 (N=462)

2006 (N=546)

2009 (N=860)

Helpful

14.0

12.2

20.4

26.9

17.3

Perhaps

32.5

30.7

42.2

35.3

38.3

Not helpful

30.7

41.2

25.2

26.3

32.7

No opinion

22.8

15.8

12.2

11.4

11.6

7

8

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

How do Macao people react to government wrongdoing? Table 4 below shows that the proportion of Macao citizens who might take action to oppose government policies that seriously affect their interests has been increasing after the handover, from 22.7% in 1999 to 40.3% in 2006. The findings again reflect higher expectation of Macao citizens toward the MSAR government and an increasing awareness of citizen rights among the Macao populace. The significant difference between the 1991 and 1999 data could probably be explained by the different governing styles of Governor Carlos Melancia and Governor Vasco Rocha Vieira. Macao people appeared to be more willing to take action against the more liberal Melancia in the early 1990s than against the more authoritarian Vieira in the late 1990s. Moreover, the local people were more concerned about the progress of localization and other issues at the beginning of Macao’s transition to Chinese rule than at the end of the transition period when things were more or less settled. Also note that the Ao Man Long scandal has contributed to the recent drop (from 40.3% in 2006 to 33.1% in 2009) of citizens’ willingness to take political actions. Table 4. Reaction to Government Wrongdoing (%) Q: Will you take any action to oppose a government policy that seriously affects your interest?

Will take action

1991 (N=658)

1999 (N=496)

2001 (N=462)

2006 (N=546)

2009 (N=863)

35.4

22.7

29.2

40.3

33.1

Perhaps

19.8

17.8

30.7

21.8

21.6

Won’t

33.7

44.5

32.9

32.8

39.8

No opinion

11.1

15.0

7.2

5.1

5.6

However, expressed willingness to take action against government wrongdoing is not the same as actually taking actions. In the 1991, 2006 and 2009 surveys, we asked our respondents whether they had ever taken any action against government wrongdoing. In the three surveys, actual actions taken by our respondents were quite diversified (see Table 5). However, the Macao people seem to be more inclined to complain to government

1. The Theory and Practice of “One-Country-Two-Systems” in Macao

departments to express their grievances after the handover, reflecting that they tend to have more confidence in the MSAR government. It is interesting to note that the Macao people in 1991 appeared to be more prone for radical actions such as protests, demonstrations, sit-ins or strikes. This could be explained by Macao citizens’ active participation in street demonstrations supporting the student movements in Beijing in May and June 1989. Respondents in the 1991 survey were apparently still fresh from the memories of the 1989 demonstrations. Table 5. Actual Actions against Government Wrongdoing (%) Q: Have you ever taken any action against government wrongdoing? 1991

2006

2009

(N=658)

(N=546)

(N=863)

(1)

Complain to government departments

8.2

15.8

14.5

(2)

Ask legislators for help

4.4

5.1

6.6

(3)

Write or call up the local press, television and radio stations

5.2

9.2

5.4

5.0

7.1

6.0

13.5

7.1

7.3

-

3.1

-

(4) Ask social and citizen groups for help (5)

Protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, and strikes

(6)

Other actions

In short, our findings indicate that Macao people’s political efficacy has been slightly improved since the 1999 handover. They are more prone to take actions to oppose government policies that seriously affect their interests. They also tend to trust the MSAR government more than the former Portuguese government. The 2008 telephone survey indicates that a plurality (42.2%) of Macao citizens believed that Macao had successfully implemented the policy of political “autonomy” and “Macao people ruling Macao”, only a small minority (13.5%) disagreed. Yet, in the same survey, about 20% of the respondents did not think the Macao people could rule Macao by themselves while 50% were skeptical of their own

9

10

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

people’s ability to govern Macao. These apparently contradictory findings suggest that the principle of “Macao people ruling Macao”, though welcome by the local populace, has yet to be successfully implemented.

Change in Executive–Legislative Relations Another important aspect of Macau’s political development after the handover is the declining influence of the legislature and the rising executive power. The MSAR political system, thanks to the Basic Law’s constitutional design and the political convention inherited from the Portuguese administration, is dominated by the executive branch’s power or an “executive–led” system.6 As a law-making body, the Macao Legislative Assembly had traditionally played a supervisory role over the Portuguese administration. The colonial legislature shared its legislative power with the governor. The governor controlled the legislative process by initiating law proposals (or bills) and mobilizing the pro-government legislators to endorse government’s law proposals. In short, the governor was the center of both executive and law-making power. The pre-1999 legislators, however, were proactive in submitting law drafts for consideration and approval. Indeed, Table 6 shows that private bills submitted by individual legislators even exceeded the number of government bills in the 5th Legislative Assembly (1992–1996). It is important to note that government bills were occasionally disapproved or forced to be withdrawn by the legislature, although private bills had encountered more problems because of conflicting political forces, namely pro-government, pro-Beijing and local Macanese (a mixture of Portuguese and Chinese blood) forces in the Legislative Assembly.

1. The Theory and Practice of “One-Country-Two-Systems” in Macao Table 6. Records of Law-making in Macau’s Legislative Assembly (1976–2009) 1976– 1980– 1984– 1988– 1992– 1996–

Oct 1999– Oct 2001– Oct 2005–

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

(A) Law proposals 60 submitted by the government

50

53

51

41

17

36

42

48

57

34

48

35

35

11

36

42

48

0

2

0

2

3

1

0

0

0

Not discussed

3

14

4

9

2

4

0

0

0

Withdrawn

0

0

1

5

1

1

0

0

0

34

18

20

45

50

31

6

4

8

30

14

14

24

28

16

4

4

6

Disapproved

0

0

0

3

12

9

0

0

2

Not discussed

4

4

4

12

7

5

0

0

0

Withdrawn

0

0

2

6

3

1

2

0

0

Approved Disapproved

(B) Law drafts submitted by individual legislators Approved

Jul 1999 Sept 2001 Aug 2005 Aug 2009

Sources: The table is compiled by the author from information provided by the Secretary Office of the Macau Legislative Assembly.

The reversion of Macao to the PRC on December 20, 1999 has significantly changed the role of the Legislative Assembly, especially its relationship with the executive administration. According to the Macao Basic Law that stipulates the power limits of the legislature and the MSAR government headed by the Chief Executive as well as the power relationship between the two, the new MSAR Legislative Assembly is the sole law-making body. Nowhere in the Basic Law is it indicated that the Chief Executive possesses any legislative power.7 All laws have to be approved by the legislature and the Chief Executive cannot issue law by decree. The MSAR government, however, retains the initiative to table law proposals in the legislature. On the other hand, the individual legislator’s right to table private bills is restricted by the Basic Law. According to Article 75 of the Basic Law, individual legislators can only introduce private bills “which do not relate to public expenditure or political structure

11

12

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

or the operation of the government”. Moreover, the same article stipulates that bills relating to government policies require the written consent of the Chief Executive. Article 75 in effect pre-empts the Legislative Assembly’s legislative power. 8 In any event, the Article 75 stipulations have apparently created caution in individual legislators when tabling private bills; the number of private bills introduced by individual legislators has dropped sharply in the post-1999 Legislative Assembly. In the 10 years following the handover, 126 laws were proposed by the government and all were approved by the legislature whilst only 18 private bills were submitted to the legislature and only 14 were approved (see Table 6). Furthermore, in an apparent attempt to avoid a power struggle and to ensure a harmonious relationship between the executive and legislative branches, the pro-regime legislators have set up internal Legislative Assembly regulations to prohibit legislators from revising or amending government bills which fall into the four areas mentioned above. Individual legislators can only either endorse or reject the government bills as proposed. In a legislature dominated by pro-government legislators, voting on government bills has thus become a mere formality. As a result, the MSAR legislature has become more like a rubber stamp and has failed to play an effective supervisory role over the MSAR administration. Unlike Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, Macao’s Legislative Assembly does not have a Finance Committee to oversee government expenditures. The legislature thus cannot systematically examine and supervise government expenditures. Moreover, the MSAR Legislative Assembly does not have any internal procedural regulation to deal with government expenditures. The government and the pro-regime legislators apparently do not feel any urgent need to introduce such regulations despite pressure from liberal legislators. Furthermore, attempts by individual legislators to amend the budget need, according to Article 75 of the Basic Law, written permission from the Chief Executive. The MSAR Chief Executive, according to its Basic Law, is responsible to the PRC central government in Beijing as well as to the MSAR. Yet, in practice, since the Chief Executive is not universally elected by the Macao people but by an election committee comprised of, exclusively, 300 pro-Beijing members, the

1. The Theory and Practice of “One-Country-Two-Systems” in Macao

Chief Executive is only accountable to Beijing.9 With a weakened Legislative Assembly and without people’s supervision, the MSAR Chief Executive and his administration are arguably more powerful than his Portuguese predecessors. The dominant influence of his administration is further buttressed by the absence of vigorous scrutiny from the local media and opposition political forces. The local press is dominated by the pro-Beijing and pro-regime Macau Daily News (Aomen Ribao), which enjoys a 90% share of the local newspaper circulation. The circulation and influence of vociferous local Portuguese press has sharply declined after the handover. A handful of minor local Chinese newspapers, with the exception of the casino interests-backed Citizens Daily, cannot survive without government subsidies. The local television station is government owned. Moreover, unlike Hong Kong, the Macao SAR does not have a strong and critical liberal voice. While nearly half of the HKSAR Legislative Council seats are taken by liberal legislators, the MSAR Legislative Assembly has only two liberal legislators, Ng Kwok Cheng and Au Kam San, whose influence on the government is seriously restricted by the MSAR Basic Law and the much weakened legislature. Macao has indeed successfully introduced a very powerful “executive-led” government after the handover. Inaugural Chief Executive Edmund Ho’s successors will, by the design of the MSAR Basic Law, become powerful administrators. The slogan of “Macao people ruling Macao” carries little meaning when the power of the MSAR Chief Executive is unchecked and the MSAR government is not responsible to the legislature and the Macao people. According to a 2009 survey, only 20.9% of the respondents felt that the legislature was able to oversee the MSAR government, 36.5% were skeptical of legislative power, while 42.7% did not think the legislature could do anything to check the executive power.10

A High Degree of Political Autonomy or “Mainlandization”? Another important yardstick for judging how successfully the “One Country, Two Systems” formula has been implemented in Macao is the degree of political autonomy obtained in the MSAR after the handover. As mentioned above, the principle of “Macao people

13

14

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

ruling Macao” is not fully realized because Macao citizens cannot elect their Chief Executive and the partially elected legislature has been significantly weakened by the MSAR Basic Law. 11 As the unchallenged top local politician and, thanks to the Basic Law, the powerful head of an “executive-led” MSAR government, can the Chief Executive obtain a high degree of political autonomy from the PRC central government in Beijing? The answer, unfortunately, is negative. In theory, according to the MSAR Basic Law, the Chief Executive is elected by an election committee comprised of 300 members (to be increased to 400 for the next election in 2014). In practice, the Chief Executive is hand-picked by Beijing. Beijing wants, first and foremost, a politically reliable and obedient Chief Executive; secondly, he must be acceptable to local pro-Beijing political elements and social groups. The Chief Executive, according to the Basic Law, pledges his loyalty to the central government. Not being universally elected by Macao citizens, the Chief Executive does not have the mandate of the Macao people; his source of power comes solely from Beijing. In theory and in reality, he is only responsible to the PRC central government in Beijing and not to the Macao people. Understandably, we should not expect too much form the MSAR’s first Chief Executive Edmund Ho Hau Wah. In fact, the performance of Ho’s administration in the 1999–2009 decade indicates a clear trend toward declining local “autonomy” and an increasing trend of “mainlandization”.12 Macao has only limited land, water, food and other resources and is highly dependent on the mainland for survival. Its economic prosperity, the gaming industry in particular, is highly vulnerable to mainland policies. Macao enjoyed double-digit growth rates after the 2002 opening the casino sector to foreign investors (approved and probably initiated by Beijing) 13 and Beijing’s policy of allowing individual mainland tourists to visit Macao in 2003. But Macao’s economy and its gaming industry suffered a serious set-back in 2008 when the mainland authorities tightened the policy on individual mainlander tourism in the name of assisting or forcing Macao to diversify its economy. Mr. Edmund Ho had done little to fight for local interests. In fact, he praised the central government for tightening individual mainlander tourism and assisting Macao to diversify its economy.

1. The Theory and Practice of “One-Country-Two-Systems” in Macao

Mr. Ho and his administration rarely took the initiatives to fight for or protect local interests. He was apparently more concerned about adopting a politically correct policy. Indeed, the increasing “politicization” of mainland policies toward Macao further erodes Macao’s “autonomy”. Macao, of course, had benefited from mainland’s “politicized” economic policies. The opening of Macao’s gaming industry to American investors-operators was approved by Beijing as a friendly gesture to US investment in China mainland. Before the thawing of mainland-Taiwan relations, hundreds of Taiwan businessmen flew to Macao daily for transfer flights to mainland destinations. After the inauguration of direct flights between Taiwan and the mainland in 2008, the number of Taiwan travelers using the Macao airport has dropped sharply. Meanwhile, mainland tourists have been flooding Taiwan after the Taiwan-mainland thaw. Moreover, Taiwan plans to open its own casinos in a few years. As a United Front strategy aiming at an eventual reunification with Taiwan by making Taiwan’s economy more dependent on the mainland, Beijing would likely allow and facilitate mainlanders’ visit to Taiwan’s new casinos while restricting mainlanders’ visit to Macao’s casinos. The MSAR government will then have no choice but to support Beijing’s Taiwan policy because national reunification overrides local MSAR gaming industry interests. In a sense, the MSAR’s “autonomy” level is even lower than a mainland city. It is not unusual for a mainland city to adopt “local policies” to protect local interests. But the MSAR government since 1999 has never taken similar efforts. It accepts Beijing policies and instructions obediently, regardless whether those policies are beneficial or harmful to local Macao interests. Another trend which will further erode Macao’s autonomy and, indeed, the viability of the “One Country, Two Systems” formula, is the increasing signs of “mainlandization”. First, Macao has only limited human resources and it has to rely heavily on imported workers, especially from the mainland. Putonghua-speaking mainlanders are employed in virtually all sectors of the MSAR economy. In the public-funded Macao Polytechnic Institute, for instance, most meetings are conducted in Putonghua. The president and vice-president of the Institute, both come from the mainland, do

15

16

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

not speak Cantonese well. Four of the six faculty deans also come from the mainland. Many courses are taught in Putonghua by mainland teachers. Similar trends are also happening in other local tertiary institutions. The presidents of both the University of Macau and the Macao University of Science and Technology (MUST) are mainland scholars. Moreover, mainland students attending local tertiary institutions have increased significantly since the 1999 handover. Indeed, more than 80% of MUST students come from the mainland and the MUST campus is no different from any university campus on the Chinese mainland. Secondly, increasing number of Macao residents can speak Putonghua. Local primary and secondary schools have introduced Putonghua lessons after the handover. In fact, pro-Beijing “patriotic” (ai guo) schools have introduced Putonghua to pre-school or kindergarten classes. Moreover, attending mainland universities is a popular choice among local high school graduates. Thus, unlike their parents or elder brothers or sisters, the post-1999 MSAR generation can speak good Putonghua. Many Macao folks have also learned to speak Putonghua because of the needs of their work. More than half of Macao’s tourists come from the mainland and the proportion is likely to increase in the future when Beijing loosens the restrictions on mainlander individual tourism. The MSAR government has also assisted and encouraged its employees to learn Putonghua by offering free Putonghua lessons; 68% of government employees can speak Putonghua, an increase of five percentage points over that in 1999. By comparison, only 41% of government employees can speak Portuguese, a drop of five percentage points from 1999.14 Thirdly, “mainlandization” is reflected in Macao people’s increasingly strong identification with mainland China. Table 7 below shows that local people’s identification with both China mainland and Macao have increased significantly since the handover; 77.4% and 60.7% of the respondents in the 2009 survey indicated, respectively, that they were proud of being Chinese and Macao citizens, while the corresponding findings in 1999 were 74.1% and 38.8%. It is important to note that the percentages of those who are proud of being Chinese have been consistently higher than those who are proud of being Macao citizens, reflecting the prevailing

1. The Theory and Practice of “One-Country-Two-Systems” in Macao

pro-Beijing or “patriotic” ai guo feelings among the local populace. In the 2008 telephone survey, 82% of the respondents indicated that they had confidence in China’s future development while only 3% did not have confidence. More importantly, in the same survey, 70% of the respondents believed that increasingly closer mainland-MSAR relations would bring more benefits than harm to Macao; only 9% indicated the opposite. Apparently, a rapidly rising China with increasing global economic clout and political influence has contributed to Macao people’s increasing identification with China mainland and Chinese values. Few local people realize or seem to be concerned about that increasing “mainlandization” will jeopardize the implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” formula in Macao. Table 7. Identifying with China and Macau (%) Q: Are you proud of :

Yes

No

No opinion

N

1991

53.6

28.1

18.3

658

1999

38.8

45.9

15.3

496

2001

43.9

44.2

11.9

462

2006

65.8

26.7

7.5

546

2009

60.7

28.3

11.0

862

1991

66.9

18.8

14.3

658

1999

74.1

15.0

10.9

496

2001

77.5

17.1

5.4

462

2006

79.5

15.0

5.5

546

2009

77.4

14.0

8.6

863

(1) being a Macau citizen?

(2)

being Chinese?

Lastly, another sign of “mainlandization” is Macao people’s acceptance, or at least tolerance, of the mainland’s socialist political values. On the eve of the 20th anniversary of the 1989 June 4th Incident, an estimated 110,000 Hong Kong people joined the candlelight vigil held in the island’s Victoria Park in memory of the young students and intellectuals who sacrificed their lives fighting for democracy in Tiananmen Square,15 while a similar assembly in Macao held in Senador Square attracted only 100 Macao persons.16

17

18

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

Moreover, the local Chinese newspapers including the influential Macau Daily did not even report the candlelight vigils held in Hong Kong and Macao. Unlike the Hong Kong people, who regard freedom and democracy as the core values of Hong Kong, are highly critical of Beijing’s 1989 crackdown on the Beijing student demonstrators and demand official apology for regime wrongdoing, most Macao people choose not to challenge Beijing’s official explanation of the June 4th Incident. Like in the mainland, the June 4th Incident is a taboo in Macao. Macao is apparently conforming to the mainstream political values in the PRC Mainland. Different political values distinguish a capitalist from a socialist system. If Macao people forsake the universal value of freedom and democracy, the MSAR will politically converge with the mainland as “One Country” in two or three decades or even much sooner.

Conclusion The Macao Basic Law intends to enshrine the principle of “One Country, Two Systems” by establishing an “executive-led” MSAR government with a high degree of autonomy assisted by the Macao people who are supposedly expected to rule themselves. This chapter argues, as illustrated by unfolding events and trends since Macao’s reversion to China in 1999, Beijing has successfully established a powerful “executive-led” MSAR government, yet its power is not properly supervised by the local legislature, media or populace. Beijing, however, has been less successful in establishing a MSAR government with a high degree of autonomy. The Macao Basic Law installs an obedient and loyal Chief Executive by holding him to be mainly responsible to the PRC central government in Beijing and not to the Macau people. In effect, Edmund Ho, the first MSAR Chief Executive, has never voiced in public any opposition to or dissatisfaction with Beijing’s policies toward Macao, regardless whether those policies would benefit or harm Macao interests. Neither has Ho’s successor, Fernando Chui Sai On, ever opposed to Beijing’s Macao policies. On the other hand, although the political efficacy of Macao people has been slightly improved since 1999, the

1. The Theory and Practice of “One-Country-Two-Systems” in Macao

majority of Macao residents do not think they are capable of ruling Macao by themselves. In fact, as long as the MSAR political scene is dominated by a powerful Chief Executive who is not universally elected by the Macao people and hence not held responsible to the local populace, the policy of “Macao people ruling Macao” remains a myth. Another trend hindering the effective implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” in Macao is the increasing “mainlandization” of the MSAR. Thanks to the central government’s policy of “individual tourists” in 2003 Macao has since been flooded with mainland visitors. In an effort to attract mainland customers, many local companies have imported Putonghua-speaking mainland workers. Closer mainland-MSAR economic relations also increase the demand for Putonghua-speaking employees in Macao’s other economic sectors. Local primary and secondary schools help to spread the popularity of Putonghua by introducing Putonghua classes. Another sign of “mainlandization” is Macao people’s increasing willingness to accept, or at least tolerate, the PRC mainland’s authoritarian one-party political system. Rising Chinese economic power and international status serve as a centripetal force drawing Macao people closer to the mainstream mainland values. Arguably, “mainlandization” may result in closer mainland-Macao interface and bring prosperity and stability to Macao. However, a Macao which looks increasingly like just another mainland Chinese city means the beginning of the ending of “One Country, Two Systems”.

Notes 1. Herbert S. Yee, Liu Bolong and Ngo Tak Wing, Aomen Huaren zhengshi wenhua (The Political Culture of the Macau Chinese), (Macao: The Macao Foundation, 1993). 2. The author was a member of the research team that conducted the 2008 survey in Macao. 3. See Herbert S. Yee, “Mass Political Culture and Political Development in Post-1999 Macau”, China Perspectives, no. 44 (November–December, 2002), pp. 29–40; and Herbert S. Yee and Lu Guomin, “Da zhong zheng zhi wen hua” (The Mass Political Culture), in Huang Shaolun, Yang

19

20

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Ruwan, Yin Baoshan and Zheng Hongtai, eds., Aomen She Hui Shi Lu (A Societal Record of Macao), (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007), pp. 299–321. 4. Macao’s economy dropped by 7.6% and 12.9%, respectively, in the 4th quarter of 2008 and the 1st quarter of 2009. See Macau Daily News, May 30, 2009, p. l. 5. Macao’s then Secretary for Public Works and Transport Ao Man Long was arrested on 6 December 2006 for allegedly receiving bribes, laundering dirty money, and possessing unaccountable assets that exceeded MOP800 million (US$1.00=MOP8). For a detailed discussion of Ao’s scandal see Sonny Shiu-Hiu Lo, Political Change in Macao (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 26–28. 6. Herbert S. Yee, “The 2001 Legislative Assembly elections and political development in Macau,” Journal of Contemporary China, 14(43), May, 2005, pp. 225–245. 7. This point is acutely pointed out by legal experts. See Antonio Baltar Malheiro de Mgalhaes, “Os principios de separacao dos poderes na Lei Basica da futura regiao Administrativa Especial de Macau,” Administraciio 11 (41), September 1998, p. 730. 8. Ibid. 9. Sixteen out of twenty-nine legislators are represented in the 300-member election committee. According to Ng Kuok Cheong and Au Kam San, the two liberal legislators, they are invited by pro-Beijing political groups to join the election committee but they have chosen not to, fearing their participation will enhance the legitimacy of the Chief Executive. In any case, their participation in the election committee has little impact on the election result. Telephone interview with Au Kam San, 7 June 2009. 10. The survey was conducted by the MSAR’s Strategic Research Center for Sustainable Development. The author was a member of the research team. 11. The present Legislative Assembly now has 12 directly elected seats, 10 indirectly elected (by functional groups) seats and 7 government appointed seats. 12. I use the term “mainlandization” instead of the more common “Sinification” because Macao is already a part of China. 13. See Sonny Shiu-Hing, Political Change in Macao, p. 38. 14. The above figures are provided by the Office of Administration and Public Service, MSAR Government. 15. One independent study conducted by the University of Hong Kong has estimated that some 110,000 to 130,000 people participated in the candlelight vigil held in Victoria Park. Hong Kong Economic Times (Jingji ribao), 13 June 2009, A20. 16. Macau Daily Times, 5 June 2009, p. 3.

2 Public Sector Reform in Macao* Bill K. P. CHOU

In 2013 Legislative Assembly election, the candidates shared one common characteristic: They demanded deepening of public sector reform in their political platforms. The government was criticized by the candidates from both pro-government camp and pro-democracy camp of inadequate efficiency, competence, and integrity. The most usual demand from the candidates was to implement an accountability system through which the underperforming senior officials could be removed. Other demands included stepping up the effort to fight corruption, establishing sunshine government, increasing the transparency of the public administration, cutting back the size of the wieldy bureaucracy, and reforming the public finance.1 In fact, public sector reform in Macao has been implemented for more than ten years to enhance its legitimacy.2 The wide use of government bashing in electoral campaigns may be simply a low-cost strategy of the candidates to attract voters but tell little about exact government performance. However, if the public had widely endorsed the government performance, the strategy of government bashing would have backfired. The political platforms of the candidates reflected public resentment to the performance of the government. The administration was often accused of failing to resolve major social problems, squandering public money on white elephant projects and pro-government social organizations, and refusing to be accountable to the public on important issues. Why did public sector reform fail to impress the public that the performance of the government had 21

22

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

been improved? This paper argued that the piecemeal reform did not tackle the two major institutional weaknesses, namely: 1) lack of the adequate autonomy and stability essential for safeguarding the merit principle, and; 2) lack of adequate civic engagement to legitimate policy outcome, provide sound policy advice, and formulate widely-accepted public policies. As a result of the weaknesses, the professional considerations of improving administrative efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity were displaced by patronage, nepotism, and other political decisions.

The Impact of Public Sector Reform: Reality and Public Perception Improvement in the quality of governance is shown after public sector reform has been implemented for 10 years. Figure 1 is Macao’s governance indicator compiled by World Bank. Macao government has slightly improved all areas of governance except rule of law. However, the quantified improvement in the quality of governance does not necessarily change public perception on government performance. Yee, Lou and Chan undertook public opinion poll on government performance. Generally speaking, the public felt that the government after the retrocession to China performed better than before the retrocession. But the improvement in government performance could not be sustained at constant level: In 2006, 40% of the public were satisfied or very satisfied with the performance. In 2009, only 25% thought this way (See Table 1). Another indicator suggests similar trend. The University of Hong Kong’s public opinion programme has traced the change in Macao’s public opinions on government performance since 2004 (see Table 2). The best record was set in 2004, with over 72% of the public satisfied or very satisfied with the government performance.

2. Public Sector Reform in Macao Figure 1. Macao’s Governance Indicator, 2002–2011

Source: World-Wide Governance Indicator, Macao http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp

SAR,

China,

Table 1. Public Opinions on Government Performance Before and After the Retrocession (%) Are you satisfied with government performance or policy? Very Satisfied

Satisfied

So-so

Dissatisfied

Very Dissatisfied

No opinions

1991

0.6

17.3

41.1

19.1

4.1

17.8

1999

0.9

21.5

31.0

30.7

8.5

7.5

2006

1.1

38.8

42.7

9.2

2.4

5.9

2009

0.9

24.2

51.7

11.7

2.8

8.7

Source: Herbert Yee, Lou Shenghua, Sunny Chan, Aomen huaren zhengzhi wenhua zongxiang yanjiu (A Research on the Political Culture of Macao Chinese), (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2011), p. 54.

In 2006, the corruption scandal involving Secretary for Transport and Public Works Ao Man Long sent trauma across the territory. In 2007, public satisfaction rate dropped to the record low. Afterwards, the rate went up but dropped again in 2010 after the

23

24

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

first Chief Executive Edmond was succeeded by less charismatic Chui Sai On. Although the satisfaction rate rose again, it never reached the highest rate when public sector reform started. The limited success of public sector reform provided a convenient means for the Legislative Assembly election to attract voters’ support through criticizing the government. Table 2. Public Opinions on Government Performance, 2004–2012 (%) Are you satisfied with government performance? Very Satisfied

Satisfied

So-so

2004

5.4

67.0

21.3

2005

14.1

53.6

24.8

2006

6.6

46.2

2007

2.5

31.6

2008

4.7

2009

Dissatisfied

Very Dissatisfied

No opinions

4.4

0.3

1.6

2.8

2.1

2.6

37.6

7.0

1.8

0.8

42.4

14.5

7.3

1.7

39.1

37.5

13.2

4.7

0.8

6.1

45.5

32.6

9.9

4.3

1.6

2010

2.4

32.1

42.5

15.9

6.7

0.4

2011

5.3

44.7

32.4

11.6

5.3

0.7

2012

7.5

41.0

37.8

9.3

4.3

0.1

Source: Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong, Macau Studies Feature Page, http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/macau/index.html

The post-handover public sector reform is a continuous exercise. It can be divided into two phases. The first phase of reform (2000–2007) focused on the technicality of administrative efficiency and work performance. Second phase (2007–) institutionalized a wider extent of civic engagement in response to the legitimacy crisis resulting from the corruption scandal of Ao Man Long.

Public Sector before the Retrocession The public sector of Macao before the retrocession was inefficient and corrupt. Civil service was politicized. The absence of fixed term for political offices (that is, the positions of governor and his

2. Public Sector Reform in Macao

secretaries) provided the President of Portugal with much flexibility to reward their friends by jobs. The leading positions at the levels of bureau directors, department directors and section directors taken by career civil servants were appointed on fixed term, usually lasting for one year only. Re-appointment was dependent as much on factional loyalty as work competence.3 The job insecurity and lack of sufficient insulation from political influence provided incentives for political officials and civil servants to establish patronage against political risk. Work performance was placed at second priority. The competition among these factions for jobs, status, and influence weakened inter- and intra-departmental coordination, bred corruption, and discouraged the accumulation of organizational memory. 4 The phenomenon went against the assumption public management theorists that fixed term employment could reduce organization inertia. The personnel management of the public sector may be best described by lack of professionalism. It was not compulsory to recruit civil servants by open and competitive examinations. Personal connection was the most important criteria in deciding who got which job in the civil service. Job promotion depended more on factional considerations than work performance or examination. There was no institutionalized position planning. The Governor and secretaries were able to arbitrarily create positions. Quality management was unheard of. Police officers were unconstrained in colluding with mafia and protected their criminal activities. Prison officers were bribed to smuggle prohibited items into the cells. Former Chief Executive Edmund Ho once lamented that the dividing line between police constables and criminals was too blurred to tell.5 The government also failed to assure administrative cleanliness. Established in 1992, High Commission against Corruption and Administrative Illegality (ACCCIA) had only 34 officers.6 Its power was further constrained by its lack of statutory authority in investigating civil servants’ bank accounts. It was not authorized to investigate in the corruption of private sector. Average citizens were therefore emboldened to give bribery in return for particularistic treatments in order to circumvent the cumbersome administrative procedures.7

25

26

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

Public Sector Reform after the Handover Public sector reform in Macao was not initiated by the pressure of the public or the legislators, or civil servants, but by the once popular first Chief Executive Edmund Ho. His power was buttressed by high approval rate (over 80% in 2004).8 The high approval rate was owed to his political skills, personal charisma and being the first Chinese to lead the government of Government. Despite serious administrative problems and his popular support, Ho did not introduce sweeping reform. The reform was incremental in nature, focusing on micro but not macro-institutional issues. This reflected Ho’s greater concern for administrative stability than performance improvement, the tolerance of the public to the inexperienced and incompetent civil servants, and the political culture of conflict aversion resulting from Macao’s small population and territorial size. In addition, the economic boom, improvement in law and order, and the government’s high approval rating render sweeping reforms unnecessary.9

Public Sector Reform Phase I: 1999–2006 The public sector reform may be divided into two phases: from 1999 to 2006 and from 2007 onwards. The first phase consisted of three categories of reform: restructuring departments, enhancing customer-oriented culture, and improving civil service management. To restructure departments, judicial police and security forces were merged to improve the coordination of the two departments and competence of crime investigation. Some departments were corporatized for higher managerial flexibility.10 New departments were established and charged with handling the new tasks, such as collection of intelligence on money laundering, migrant workers recruitment, infrastructure construction, traffic management, environment conservation, influenza and contagious diseases prevention, municipal affairs.11 The most controversial measure was to set up Civic and Municipal Affairs Department in 2001 to take over the functions of the two semi-autonomous and democratic municipal councils. The move was criticized of undermining

2. Public Sector Reform in Macao

democratic development and civic engagement. Some candidates from pro-democracy camp running in 2013 Legislative Assembly election demanded the reinstatement of the semi-democratic municipal councils. However, their voice did not make impact. Meanwhile, the demand failed to generate supporting votes, indicating the public’s apathy for that. For enhancing customer-oriented environment, government departments outlined their own performance pledges to assure the public of high level of quality public service. One-stop service centres and enquiry centres were set up to bring the front desks of related departments under the same roofs, to improve administrative coordination, and to provide public with a more convenient way to access government information. E-government was promoted to increase the transparency of administrative procedures and save the time of citizens in submitting their applications to government offices. ISO 9002 certification was used for improving public service delivery.12 To enhance the capacity of individual public employees, the government stepped up civil service training that focused on worked-related skills and knowledge. Besides, the government commissioned the Civil Service College of Singapore to organize short-term development programs, and Peking University and National College of Administration to run master’s degree program of public administration so that middle and high-ranking civil servants could sharpen their managerial skills and widen their horizons. Performance appraisal was reformed in 2005 to more clearly delineate the performance levels of civil servants and to make it easier for linking their performance levels with rewards, punishment, and promotion.13 An appeal system in appraisal process was established to address the grievances involved in performance grading. The coverage of retirement plans was extended to all civil servants. Defined-benefit recruitment plans were phased out to put a cap on its pension expenditure and save personnel cost in long term.14 Meanwhile, more entry-level positions were included in centralized recruitment to reduce nepotism in recruitment and improve the qualifications for rank and file of civil service. With the

27

28

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

expansion of tertiary education, more college graduates were recruited; civil servants with low education attainment (junior high school and below) fell in number (see Figure 2). Many civil servants had higher education than required. For instance, the positions at the rank “technician” required an academic qualification of high school diploma. In 2008, half of the civil servants at this rank had an education at post-secondary education and above level.15 The minimum education requirement on such positions as police constables was gradually lifted; the entry salary level for police was raised substantially to attract candidates of high caliber.16 Figure 2. Macao Civil Servants’ Education Levels, 2002–2008

Source: Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau, Aomen tebie xingzhengqu renli ziyuan baogao (An Overview of Human Resource in the Public Sector of Macao SAR) (various years).

Public Sector Reform Phase II: 2006–Present The phase two of public sector reform was a response to the legitimacy crisis since 2005 when the downsides of the booming casino-based economy and the incompetence of the administration to handle the ever-increasing public expenditure gradually emerged. The economy became overheated after the end of monopoly in casino industry in 2002 and the relaxation of Chinese government on outbound tourism to Macao in 2003. The social problems of inflation, unaffordable housing price, and serious traffic congestions

2. Public Sector Reform in Macao

surfaced although economic boom created many job opportunities and raised the income level substantially. Meanwhile, government malfeasances due to lack of rigorous financial oversight were discovered. Owing to lack of financial control, the actual expenditure of the 4th East Asian Games held in 2005 amounted to MOP 4.4 billion (or USD 550 million), 17 far beyond than the budgeted MOP 2 billion. No senior officials were held responsible for the overspending or subject to disciplinary actions. Financial control on the subsidies on societal associations remained inadequate even though two reports from Commission of Audit were issued to highlight the problem. Public discontentment was culminated by the arrest of the then Secretary for Transport and Public Works Ao Man Long in 2006 for his implication in a series of corruption in handling public work projects and land sale that involve briberies worth more than MOP 800 million. The police’s mishandling of the mass protest on 1 May 2007 provoked further outcry. Public support of the once highly popular Edmund Ho plunged to record low. Figure 3. Public Rating on Edmund Ho*

* The maximum point of rating is 100. Source: Hong Kong University Public Opinion Poll, Macao Studies (various years), http:///hkupop.hku.hk

The year of 2006 was a watershed of Macao’s political landscape. After the handover, mass protests were best described as

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

sporadic, small in scale, and unorganized. The people had little incentive to participate in politics, except electoral politics as they were mobilized by both pro-Beijing societal organizations and democrats. On the Labor Day of 2006, thousands of protestors were organized to air their anger against the government. Since then, demonstrations with thousands of participants have become common. With extensive penetration of Internet, the younger generation once regarded as politically apathetic were more readily mobilized to participate in various demonstrations. In response, the government outlined a public sector reform blueprint “Public Sector Reform Roadmap” (hereafter “roadmap”) in 2007. The roadmap identified two major areas of reform: policy processes and internal management. Policy processes included the dimensions of consultation mechanism, policy evaluation, decision-making process, and policy implementation. Internal management is composed of reform of organizational system, organizational structure, civil service management, financial management, and work process. Each dimension area was further sub-divided into several reform measures. Altogether there were 34 reform measures.18 A major difference of the phase two from phase one was a bigger role assigned to civic engagement in policy processes. Three district-based consultative commissions were set up, with the participation of the appointed members mainly from societal associations. More consultative papers were issued for policy advice. More consultative meetings were arranged to listen to the opinions of the public on a wide range of issues and legislation, such as urban renewal, transport policy, land management, heritage conservation, and the legislation of National Security Bill. A system of government spokesperson was established to improve the communication with the mass media, and above all, the public.19 Sometimes, civic engagement may render a change of policy. In 2011, the government proposed to turn the plaza of the artificial Sai Van Lake into a night market selling cooked food, souvenirs and creative products to attract tourists. The initial consultation was restricted to the pro-government societal associations. Although some people criticized the project of destroying the tranquillity and

2. Public Sector Reform in Macao

beauty of the Lake in mass media, very few of these criticisms were turned into letters to the government. At the end of 2012, the government claimed that the project received very little opposition and prepared to implement the project in the first quarter of 2013. This caused public uproar, accusing the government of paying too much attention to the opinions of pro-government societal associations but too little on public complaints. In face of public pressure, the government introduced four sessions of public consultation meetings and undertook an opinion poll. It turned out that the majority of the speakers in the public consultation meetings opposed the project. The opinion poll also revealed a majority of citizens in opposition of the project. In the end, the government was forced to abandon the project.20 The expansion of public consultation followed a top-down approach. According to the OECD framework of public participation, public consultation in the phase two of the reform is the second-level participation: It was a two-way relationship in which citizens were able to provide feedback to government. It was not the highest level of participation (or active participation) underscored by a partnership between governments and citizens. Citizens were actively engaged in defining the process and content of policy-making. It acknowledged equal standing for citizens in setting the agenda, proposing policy options and shaping the policy dialogue.21 Public consultation and civic engagement in Macao were limited by the fact that the members of district-based consultative commissions were not elected but appointed by the government. The commissions were chaired by government officials who dictated the agenda of meeting, the mode of consultation, and the way of using public opinions. Many of the appointed members had little expertise in the issues of consultation. With no public involvement in electing their representatives for participating in consultation and setting the consultation agenda, it was not sure whether the appointed members in consultative committees could truly reflect the opinions of their constituency. The deliberative poll held in December 2011 on the revision of the Laws of Publication and Broadcasting is illustrative of the

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

limitations of public consultation. The focus of the revision was to establish Publication Committee and Broadcasting Committee which were included in the Laws but never implemented due to the opposition of the press for fear of violation of press freedom. In face of the opposition, the government spent over MOP 3.5 million commissioning a pollster to organize a deliberative poll. More three hundred citizens were randomly selected and invited to the one-day event for consultation on the two laws. As the laws involved too much technical knowledge for most of the participants to understand, the pollster formed a five-person panel to answer various queries from the participants. The panelists included Bureau Director of Government Information and a senior editor from Macao Daily—the pro-government, pro-Beijing newspaper with the largest circulation in Macao which had the mission of supporting both Chinese and Macao governments. None of the panelists opposed the Laws and the two Committees. On the contrary, the media academics who openly voiced against the two Committees were not invited to the panel to provide a more comprehensive view and the implications of media freedom.22 Fighting corruption became high on the government’s agenda of public sector reform when Ao Man Long scandal was found to severely damage public’s perception towards the government. Macao’s corruption perception index dropped from 6.6 in 2006 to 5.7 in 2007, and further down to 5.4 in 2008. Its ranking also fell from 26 in 2006 to 34 and 43 in 2007 and 2008 respectively.23 In 2009, the Legislative Assembly revised relevant legislation to extend the investigative authority of the anti-corruption organ Commission against Corruption (CCAC) into private sector. The manpower of CCAC was also expanded from 96 to 109 in 2003, and to 165 in 2009.24 Its budgeted expenditure has been raised by two folds since 2000. The actual expenditure increased by even more (see Figure 4). In addition, the government reviewed the process of land sale, government procurement, and tendering. E-government and government information centres were used in a more extensive manner. With higher transparency of the administration, the public were believed to be less likely to bribe government officials for access of the public service and government procurement contracts.

2. Public Sector Reform in Macao Figure 4. The Budgeted and Actual Expenditure of CCAC, 2000–2008

Source:

Annual

Report

of

CCAC

2000–2008

(various

years)

The Weakest Link to the Public Sector Reform The weakest link of the public sector reform was its failure to increase the administration’s autonomy from major societal forces and political influence. In his theoretical framework of embedded autonomy, Peter Evans identified the variables of embeddedness and autonomy in influencing the success of developmental strategies. Embeddedness is a relative concept concerning the degree of inter-connectedness of the public administration with the major economic sectors. High degree of embeddedness helped senior government officials to understand how to formulate sensible economic policies. 25 Macao’s administration was sufficiently embedded in the economy, with the government’s representatives in various important public utilities and enterprises, such as electricity, telecommunication, airport management, television and radio broadcast. The appointment of business leaders into different consultative committees on economic and social development assured the close contact between the government and economy.

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What mattered was a lack of sufficient administrative autonomy from political influence. Autonomy was another relative concept concerning the degree of independence of the public administration from political meddling. An independent public administration could assure that the rank and file of civil service was managed strictly according to the principles of meritocracy, such as recruitment by open examination and promotion on the track records and the potentials of the candidates. The impact of political patronage on personnel management and decision-making processes could be minimized. Civil servants were able to make unbiased decisions and implement the decisions on professional considerations. Nevertheless, the autonomy of the public administration was undercut by a modified corporatist system modeled on the half-baked democracy introduced in 1976 by the new Portuguese leaders who were ushered to power by 1974 coup in Portugal. After the coup, the newly appointed Macao Governor Garcia Leandro called for a fully elected Legislative Assembly. Later, he changed his mind and introduced a partially elected Legislative Assembly, composed of members appointed by the Governor, directly elected by the qualified citizens, and indirectly elected by functional constituencies of societal associations. In his autobiography, he explained the limited democracy was the result of the advice of “several people”. These people said that the voter turnout rate, especially among the Chinese community making of 90% of the population, would be low because Chinese did not have the tradition of self-rule. A fully elected Legislative Assembly would not reflect the view of the society.26 Leandro has not elaborated who these “several people” were. Throughout the process Macao’s democratization and the drafting of Macao Basic Law, Macao’s Chinese community leaders patronized by Beijing frowned upon the idea of speeding up democratization. By reasoning, the “several people” were supposed Ho Yin, the number one Macao Chinese representative until his death in 1983, and his successor Ma Man Kei who is currently a vice chairman of National Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The modified corporatist system institutionalized the positions

2. Public Sector Reform in Macao

of pro-Beijing union leaders, social elites, and above all, business class through the 1987 Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration and Macao Basic Law—Macao’s mini-constitution. Through Legislative Assembly indirect election formed on functional constituencies of societal associations, the interests of business associations and co-opted societal groups were allocated with a significant number of seats in the Legislative Assembly and Election Committee—the organ electing the Chief Executive. 27 The consequential pork-and-barrel politics of this modified corporatist system may undermine administrative efficiency and the effectiveness of public sector reform. For instance, the company owned by Executive Councillor Wong Yue Kai, an architect and a leader in a pro-Beijing business association, was granted a contract of hospital design worth MOP 200 million (USD 25 million) without undergoing public tendering in 2013. The government defended the decision, stating that the project was so complicated that very few local companies were qualified to undertake. Therefore the government approached three potential local bidders for price quotation. In the end, only Wong’s company replied the government and was granted the contract. But according to the legislator Au Kam San, public tendering was required to offer contracts of all the public work projects worth MOP 2.5 million or above or acquisition of service worth MOP 750,000 or above. Au argued that the government should invite tenders from potential bidders outside Macao if there were not enough qualified local tenders.28 Meanwhile, political patronage lingered at the expense of meritocracy. The authority of Chief Executive and Secretaries in appointment and job creation remains unchecked by other branches of power. Former Commissioner of Audit Fátima Choi aliás Choi Mei Lei was acclaimed for her fearless exposure of government departments’ breaching of financial regulations and abuse of public fund. Her audit reports on the serious wastage in the organization of the 4th East Asian Games in 2005 were particularly striking due to the acute problem of over-budgeting and the involvement of the then-Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture Chui Sai On. After Chui was elected to Chief Executive in 2009, he replaced Choi with ex-Director of Chief Executive Office Ho Veng On. Ho had neither

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academic qualifications nor work experience relevant to audit and accountancy. When explaining for not appointing Choi, Chui Sai On said that principal officials had to share with the Chief Executive the same “ideas of governance”.29 On the contrary, Florinda Chan, the Secretary for Administration and Justice, was implicated in abusing her power to allocate ten burial land slots to her family and close friend. Although she was charged by Public Prosecution Office, she was found not guilty. Moreover, she did not receive any disciplinary punishment but kept her office.30 Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy underscored the significance of administrative stability to efficiency. This principle was undermined by the prevalence of patronage down to the upper echelon of civil service. The re-appointment of Vong Wan as the Bureau Director of Traffic Affairs is illustrating. Vong was widely accused of his handling of bus service contract that led to squandering of public monies on subsidizing the bus companies in return for poor bus service. He was still re-appointed to the directorship after his contract expired. In 2010, the new Chief Executive Chui Sai On reshuffled couples of leading positions of the civil service. The contracts of Former President of Macao Trade and Investment Promotion Institute Lee Peng Hong and Former Director of Financial Services Lau Ioc Ip were terminated before expiry. Other casualties included former Director of Culture Affairs Heidi Ho and former Director of Housing Chiang Coc Meng. It was rumored that they lost their positions because they did not belong to Chui’s faction. Macao did not have the “revolving door” in Western liberal democracies which provided many career opportunities for the ex-officials to work in state-owned enterprises, think tanks, and academic institutions. The small economy of Macao made it almost impossible for ex-leading officials to find jobs outside the government with equivalent status or remuneration. 31 Administrative instability extended throughout the bureaucracy. Nowadays, almost all civil servants at entry level—except those in disciplinary force which require more stability out of security consideration—are employed on fixed-term contract; civil servants on tenure term was reduced as a ratio to the rank and file of the civil service (see Figure 5).

2. Public Sector Reform in Macao Figure 5. Macao Civil Servants Employed on Tenure Term as a Ratio to All Civil Servants, 2004–2009

Source: Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau, Gonggong xingzheng renli ziyuan tongji ziliao (Statistics on Human Resources of Public Administration), http://www.safp.gov.mo/external/chin/info/statistics/showdata.asp?table= 3

Out of the fear of losing favor and ultimately their jobs, senior civil servants may give up professional considerations when they crash with the political motives of the principal officials. The corruption scandal of Ao Man Long concerning the tendering of public works is illustrative. According to the procurement regulations of the government, open tendering was used for selecting contractors of public works. All the tenders from contractors had to be screened by a committee formed by Bureau of Public Works. The committee ranked the tenders according to the pre-determined criteria. After the committee made decisions of ranking, the decisions had to be referred up to the administrative hierarchy for the approval from division director, department director, bureau director, and Secretary for Transport and Public Works. If the Secretary was dissatisfied with the ranking, he may instruct the committee to re-rank the tenders. The committee has no means to oppose the intervention out of professional consideration because of low job security of the committee members.32 Not only the administration but also Legislative Assembly election was tarnished by corruption. In the past elections, it was found that cash, free travel, and free banquets were provided to

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voters by the social organizations closely connected to some candidates in exchange for votes. Although CCAC succeeded in arresting some people involved in electoral frauds, the ringleaders behind the fraud were never touched. None of the elected Legislative Assembly members were charged even though some of those involved in electoral frauds worked for them. The President of Public Prosecution Office Ho Chao Meng said that the problem of electoral fraud in 2013 was even more serious than before.33 The Commissioner of CCAC Fong Man Chong defended that investigation into electoral frauds was held back by the difficulty in distinguishing electoral frauds from the daily welfare provision of social organizations.34 Such an explanation was not widely accepted, given that many other regions with few electoral frauds could tackle the difficulties. The lack of incentive of CCAC in investigating electoral frauds illustrated the rather ineffectiveness in fighting corruption, especially when political weights were implicated.

Concluding Remarks The original objective of public sector reform in Macao was to bolster its legitimacy through improving the administrative efficiency, capacity and integrity. The first phase of reform focused on technical issues, such as civil service management, installation of quality management to foster citizen-oriented culture, and rationalization of administrative structures and processes. In addition to deepening the aforementioned reform, the second phase of reform emphasized the institutionalization of a wider extent of civic engagement. By and large, the public sector reform was convergent with the paradigm of public management prevalent in many Western, especially English-speaking countries. As shown by Governance Indicator compiled by World Bank, public sector reform improved almost all dimensions of governance. However, the public were not impressed by the reform. The public satisfaction rate to the government performance was not comparable to that recorded at the beginning of the public sector reform. The relatively low rate of public satisfaction offered a convenient target

2. Public Sector Reform in Macao

for the politicians to bombard the government for public support and votes in elections. The institutional shortcomings that dampened civic engagement and weakened the autonomy of the public administration were unreformed. The reform planners cautiously separated the administrative reforms from political set-ups although the two issues are necessarily intertwined. The lack of extensive civic engagement in the policy making and implementation processes affected the transparency of the administration, undermined the general public’s capacity to give the government informed advice, and failed to strengthen the procedural legitimacy of the government. The dysfunctional semi-democracy and inadequate institutional autonomy induced civil servants to yield to the political decisions which may be biased, unfair, and above all, detrimental to legitimacy building at the expense of professional considerations and accountability to the people.

Notes * This paper is revised on a paper, entitled “Legitimacy Building and Public Sector Reform in Macao: Administrative Measures to Address Political Problems” in China: An International Journal, 10, no. 3, pp. 133–148. The author expresses his gratitude to the journal editor for giving permission to adapt the paper to this edited book volume. 1. For details about the candidates platforms, see Zhonghua renmin gongheguo aomen tebie xingzheng qu lifa hui xuanju, Houxuan mingdan zhenggang gaiyao (The Brief Political Platforms of the Candidates), http://www.eal.gov.mo/zh_tw/pp.html 2. Sonny S. H. Lo and Herbert S. Yee, “Legitimacy-Building in the Macau Special Administrative Region: Colonial Legacies and Reform Strategies”, Asian Journal of Political Science, 13, 1, 2005, pp. 51–79. 3. Shiu-hing Lo, “Bureaucratic Corruption and Its Control in Macao”, Asian Journal of Public Administration, 15, 1, 1993, pp. 32–58. 4. A conversation with a deputy director in April in 2003; interview with a civil service union leader in October 2003, and with senior police officer in December 2003. 5. “Zhijie xiang teshou fuze: aomen lianzhenggongshu diwei shangsheng” (Commission against Corruption Directly Responsible to the Chief

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Executive: Its Status Is Rising”, Muzi Web, http://home.muzi.com/cc/fanti/ 10321,19931.shtml?q=53308&cc=13611&a=on 6. Commissioner against Corruption, http://www.ccac.gov.mo/

History

of

the

Commission,

7. Lo, “Bureaucratic Corruption and Its Control in Macau”, pp. 32–58. 8. Hong Kong University Public Opinion Poll, Macao Studies 2004, http:///hkupop.hku.hk 9. Government Policy Plan for the Year 2000 Financial Year of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, the Chief Executive Edmund Ho, March 29th, 2000, p. 6, http://www.macao. gov.mo/policy/en2000_policy.pdf. About the political culture of conflict aversion and its reason, see Herbert S. Yee, Macau in Transition: From Colony to Autonomous Region. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 143. 10. Chou, “Public Sector Reform in Macau after the Handover”, pp. 56–63. 11. “‘Gonggong xingzheng gaige luxiantu’ zongjie ji zhi xing qingkuang baogao, biao yi ‘gonggong xingzheng gaige luxiantu’ zongjie ji zhixing qingkuang baogao—xingzheng gaige xiangmu (A Conclusion and Implementation Report on “Public Sector Reform Roadmap”—Table 1, A Conclusion and Implementation Report on “Public Sector Reform Roadmap”—Administrative Reform), http//www.gov.mo/suggestion/ public/reform/report.jsf 12. Macau Productivity and Technology Transfer Center, Directory of ISO 9000/ISO 14001 Certified Organizations in Macau, http://www.cpttm.org.mo/quality/Info/org_iso_c.htm, (accessed March 5, 2010 ) 13. “Gonggong xingzheng gongzuo renyuan gongzuo biaoxian pinghe yiban zhidu” (Public Sector Employee Performance Appraisal System), http://app.gov.mo/desempenho/index.asp 14. “Gongwu renyuan zhicheng zhidu” (Civil Service Position Classification System), http://carreira.safp.gov.mo/ 15. Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau, 2008 Aomen tebie xingzhengqu renli ziyuan baogao (An Overview of Human Resource in the Public Sector of Macao SAR, 2008), (Macao: Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau, 2009), p. 44. 16. Macao SAR Law http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2008/16/lei02_cn.asp

No.

2/2008,

17. In December 2011, USD1 could approximately be exchanged into MOP8. 18. Macao Special Administrative Region Government,“Gonggong xingzheng gaige luxiantu” zongjie ji zhixing qingkuang baogao (A Concluding Report on the Implementation of “The Roadmap of Public Sector Reform” http://www.safp.gov.mo/download/reform/Chn_report.pdf

2. Public Sector Reform in Macao .

19. “Zhengfu fayanren ban teshou pishi sheli” (The Establishment of Government Spokesperson Were Gazetted), Aomen ribao (Macao Daily), 23 February 2010, p.A2. 20. The author’s personal observation and participation throughout the consultation period. Also see “Xiwanhu yeshi fanduisheng zhong heting yu bacheng dianhua shoufangzhe guanzhu shuiwuran guangwuran lese wuran” (Sai Van Lake Night Market Was Suspended Amidst Opposition. Over 80% Telephone Interviewees Were Concerned about Water, Light, and Rubbish Pollution), Shimin ribao (Citizens’ Daily), 20 September 2013, http://www.shimindaily.net/v1/news/macau/%E8%A5%BF%E7%81%A 3%E6%B9%96%E5%A4%9C%E5%B8%82%E5%8F%8D%E5%B0% 8D%E8%81%B2%E4%B8%AD%E5%96%9D%E5%81%9C%E3%80 %80%E9%80%BE%E5%85%AB%E6%88%90%E9%9B%BB%E8%A 9%B1%E5%8F%97%E8%A8%AA%E8%80%85%E9%97%9C%E6% B3%A8/ 21. OECD, Citizens as Partners: Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-Making, (Paris: OECD, 2001), p. 23. 22. The author witnessed the deliberative poll in the capacity of an observer invited by the pollster. 23. Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index” (various years), http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009 24. CCAC, History of the Commission, http://www.ccac.org.mo/ 25. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). 26. For details about the report on Garcia Leandro’s consideration behind Macao’s political reform, see “Youthful Energy”, Macau Business, 26 April, 2011, http://macaubusiness.culiasolutions.org/news/ youthful-energy/8795/ 27. Bill K.P. Chou, “Interest Group Politics in Macao after Handover”, Journal of Contemporary China, 14, 43, 2005, pp. 191–206. 28. “Huang Rukai gongsi huopangei liang yi lidao yiyuan sheji hetong yiyuan zhiyi” (Wong Yue Kai’s Company Were Granted With a Contract Worth MOP 200 Million. Legislators Queried), Zhengpao (Jornal Cheng Pou), 23 August 2013, http://www.chengpou.com.mo/NEWS/ 2013/8/23/40638.html [9 September 2013]. 29. “Cui Shian xinbanzi liangxiang, lianzheng 、shenji renming re zhiyi” (The New Political Leadership under Chui Sai On Have Been Announced. The Appointment of New Commissioner against Corruption and Commissioner of Audit Were Queried), Zhongguo pinglun xinwen wang (China Review News), 25 November 2009, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1011/4/6/6/101146662.html?colui

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century d=0&kindid=0&docid=101146662 30. “Mudian gang huo zhongyuan fangsheng. Chen Limin tongxin tongliao beikong” (Found Not Guilty in the Case of Burial Slots, Florinda Chan Felt Sad About Her Colleagues Being Charged), Dongfang ribao (Oriental Daily News), 21 June 2013, http://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20130621/ 00176_024.html 31. Liao Kong, “Guanyuan diaoren cheng heque luanfei zhuang. Wenhua chuangyi huhuan xianneng gancai” (The Appointment of Officials Is Uninstitutionalized. Talents Are Required in the Policy Area of Culture and Innovation), Xinbao (Son Pou), 29 January 2010. Xu Ying, “Zhuxi ‘bei li zhi’ shi xian xiqiao. Mou ge ‘qu he hua’ chuxian duanni” (The Appointment of Chairperson to New Position Aroused Suspicion. The “De-Ho-ization” by a Big Brother Is Revealed), Xinbao (Sonpou), 22 January 2010. 32. “Gongwuju zhengren zhi pingshen gongcheng pigei shou dao shangji koutou zhishi”, (The Witnesses from Public Works Bureau Said That Verbal Instructions Were Received from Their Supervisor When Choosing Tenders”, Huaqia bao (Jornal Vakia), 13 November 2007. 33. “He Chaoming yu zongjie xuankuang xiuding xuanjufa” (Ho Chaoming Called Upon Making Conclusion on Election and Revising Election Law), Shinmin ribao (Citizen’s Daily), 16 September 2013, http://www.shimindaily.net/v1/news/macau/%E4%BD%95%E8%B6%85 %E6%98%8E%E7%B1%B2%E7%B8%BD%E7%B5%90%E9%81%B 8%E6%B3%81%E4%BF%AE%E8%A8%82%E9%81%B8%E8%88% 89%E6%B3%95/ 34. Feng Wenzhuang chang xiugai xuanjufa genshang shehui fazhan (Fong Man Chong Called Upon Revision of Election Law to Deal with Social Changes), Shinmin ribao (Citizen’s Daily), 16 September 2013, http://www.shimindaily.net/v1/news/macau/%E9%A6%AE%E6%96%8 7%E8%8E%8A%E5%80%A1%E4%BF%AE%E6%94%B9%E9%81% B8%E8%88%89%E6%B3%95%E8%B7%9F%E4%B8%8A%E7%A4 %BE%E6%9C%83%E7%99%BC%E5%B1%95/

3 Electoral Reform and Political Representation in Macao Jorge GODINHO

Macao Society and Political Representation The Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a unique and long history dating back to the arrival by sea and settlement of a Portuguese community in the 16th century. As a result, it has a particular social fabric characterized by the coexistence of the Chinese and the Portuguese and by the emergence of a Eurasian community, the Macanese.1 From 1974 to 1999 Macau was governed in a post-colonial setting and during this time a culture of rule of law and respect for fundamental rights was established.2 Macau is currently—that is, between 1999 and 2049—in a period where it is governed in an internationalized framework in accordance with conditions agreed between the PRC and Portugal, under a specific constitutional formula of high degree of autonomy which provides several key links to Chinese sovereignty. Macau’s key sociologic trait is that it is not a purely Chinese society; far from it. It is heavily Westernized (under European influence) and multicultural. There is a specific regional identity arising from a history of mixing and cross-fertilization of peoples and cultures, of which the Macanese, a Eurasian ethnic group, is the most visible human expression. 43

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It therefore would not be surprising if it had a unique political system to accurately reflect its specific traits. But does it? How are the various communities represented? What is the long term view of this issue and how does Macau link its past with its vision for the future?

The Political System This is not the place for a full analysis of the political system of the Macao SAR set out in the Basic Law. Suffice to say that it is widely recognized that the center of power is the Chief Executive. The political systems of the Macao SAR and Hong Kong SAR give prominence to the Chief Executive, not to the legislature. This is apparent from the order of the chapters of the Basic Law, which regulates the Chief Executive before the parliament. The Chief Executive represents the MSAR and is accountable towards the central authorities. He can dissolve the Legislative Assembly. The political system is, in this sense, of a presidential nature, and the Chief Executive is the direct link with Beijing.3 The Chief Executive is not directly elected by the residents, but chosen by a committee made of 300 members from various sectors and is appointed by the PRC Central People’s Government. The tenure lasts five years and is renewable once. The Chief Executive leads the Government and is advised in a non-binding manner by an Executive Council.4 The MSAR also has a legislature, the Legislative Assembly. This is not a fully democratic and hence a rather complex structure made of different types of deputies, some directly elected by the permanent residents and others not. The political systems of the two Chinese SARs give more weight to the Chief Executive at the expense of the legislature and contain relatively weak traces of democracy. To keep the link with the sovereign, the SAR legislature cannot have powers as in a normal fully-fledged democratic system, as the basis for political legitimacy. In a non-sovereign region political legitimacy has to derive, even if only partly, from the central power, a link that is made via the Chief

3. Electoral Reform and Political Representation in Macao

Executive. The PRC authorities do mention that if the Chief Executive and all members of the legislature were directly elected by the people then Beijing would have no way to effectively control events in the region. In this sense, it can be said that the legal framework is, on paper, relatively satisfactory. But this does not mean that there cannot or should not be any democratic evolution, especially at the Legislative Assembly level to which the discussion shall now turn.

The Legislative Assembly The current Legislative Assembly traces its origins to 1976, when the Organic Statute enacted by the Portuguese authorities reformed the Macao government system and allowed popular participation in local elections, with a partially democratic composition then made of 6 deputies directly elected by limited sectors of the population,5 6 elected by functional constituencies and 5 appointed by the Governor.6 The then Governor Garcia Leandro (1974–1979) has recently described in his memories the process in this manner: Initially I have considered, in a naive manner, the possibility that the entire Assembly would be directly elected. It was evidently a serious mistake denoting lack of local knowledge, a fact I quickly understood. After various approaches and attempts it was concluded that the viable solution would be the option for a certain number of seats to be returned by direct election (essentially intended to the Portuguese) while the various associations of existing interests would be represented in the Assembly by means of indirect or organic election (by a majority of Chinese members). No rigid separation was intended (as indeed happened) but these would be the broad tendencies. But even in this manner, the problem was not fully solved. The entities consulted were anticipating that the election

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results would not be completely representative of the entire population. There would be gaps such as the participation of women, of young citizens, of certain professions, of persons positioned at the center or even independent of any political or economic force. It was necessary to define a third block of deputies so as to fill these representation gaps. It was concluded that the solution would require a block of deputies to be appointed by the Governor, after knowing the results of the direct and indirect elections.7 The system of three types of seats (direct election; indirect election; appointment by the executive branch) was expanded in 1990 (to 23 deputies: 8+8+7) and still continues essentially unchanged today,8 with two main differences: the total number of deputies has continued to increase and the proportion between the three types has changed, giving a larger portion to directly elected members. The Assembly now has 12 deputies directly elected, 10 elected by functional constituencies and 7 appointed by the Chief Executive. It should be noted that in Macao there are no formal political parties but rather associations. The Legislative Assembly has never outright rejected a government proposal but this nearly happened in 2009 with the law against corruption in the private sector. In any event, the Assembly is not a mere “rubber stamp” but it has been gradually growing in stature in recent years. In general, Macao politics continues to be very personalized and generally does not revolve around ideas or issues of a political-ideological nature. With some exceptions, the direct elections are dominated primarily by associations characterized mainly by individual personalities or businesscorporate figures, and not by a major focus on projects or ideas.

Election Reforms Are Needed There have been constant calls in recent years to expand democracy by having more directly elected deputies and less of the other two types, or to abolish those appointed by the Chief Executive. This

3. Electoral Reform and Political Representation in Macao

section discusses various possible changes and reforms. Indeed, several aspects of the electoral process to the Legislative Assembly are in need of attention and improvement.

The Tripartite Composition of the Legislative Assembly The general thrust of the debates revolves around each of the three categories of seats and how they should evolve. All have their specific problems. Naturally, the standard claim regarding the deputies returned by direct election, currently 12, is to have more of them. This number should in fact increase substantially, for example to 14, as already stipulated in the 2013 elections. With a total of 35 members, the Assembly would have a majority of elected seats. This would represent a small step forward towards democratization and achieving the often quoted slogan “Macao ruled by Macao people.” On the other hand, it would contribute to improve the functioning of the Assembly. Regarding the members elected by functional constituencies, the common critique concerns with the fact that there always appear exactly 10 candidates for the 10 seats. This does not contribute to the democratic legitimacy of the Assembly, which should be based upon open and competitively contested elections. The other clear objection to the current status has to do with the seven deputies appointed by the Chief Executive, which is something that in principle should have no place in a fully democratic system: at its core, it is a mechanism whereby someone at the stroke of a pen is moved from more or less obscurity to a seat in the Assembly without having to go through the rigors of an electoral campaign. This is usually coupled with the suspicion that these appointed members have little independence and they simply follow instructions from the Chief Executive. Furthermore, the legal justification for the Chief Executive’s power to appoint seven deputies is not explicitly stated in the MSAR Basic Law and is not entirely clear. It is thus open to different interpretations. There are various possible broad views on the subject, such as the “technical” and the “political” justifications.

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The “technical” argument states that the appointed members are experts in various fields (law, medicine, architecture, etc.) and therefore may be “better” or at least very useful to fill the shortcomings of the elected members: hence the appointed members would be well prepared, qualified, and capable individuals. However, this is essentially a technocratic view of the function which is at odds with the political nature of the legislative organ. The technical expertise, in a region with vast financial resources, should be obtained by hiring experienced and well-qualified assistants, consultants and other Assembly staff, and by dialogue with government experts in the committee meetings and working groups. The Chief Executive’s power of appointment of some legislators, if it is to be grounded on a sound political basis, must have to do with enhancing the representativeness of Macao people in the Assembly rather than any perceived need of technical expertise. The appointed members should be seen to “complete” the popular vote, as was originally understood in 1976. As such, the appointment may be a mechanism to bring into the Assembly various social elements or forces that, for whatever reasons, are not elected and represented, thereby enriching the mosaic of Macao society that the Assembly should try to mirror as much as possible.

Conversion of Votes into Seats Another major problem relates to the exact method of election. Macao adopts a method of converting votes into seats whereby the total number of votes cast for each association is divided by 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 and so on. This system obviously punishes most the largest forces, making it extremely difficult to win a third seat: this has never occurred. It conversely benefits the smaller associations and makes it impossible for any political force to take a significant number of seats. It is time to change this system and move toward a less distorted and more faithfully proportional representation system. The fact that this method has provided an incentive in the 2009 elections to the artificial splitting division of some lists in two proves this point.9 This division was the first attempt, but if the rules remain

3. Electoral Reform and Political Representation in Macao

unchanged as they are, then this practice will likely to be repeated again. It is not desirable, nor is it normal, that in the next elections several pairs of linked-lists will appear, being split into two lists only due to the existence of rules on the allocation of seats that foster such division. It seems very clear that this will continue to happen unless the rules are changed. The appearance of divided lists is something that Macao people may get used to but it is inherently wrong. In addition, it generates waste: duplication of structures, representatives, candidates, electoral campaigns, documentation, funds and so on. The method of converting votes into seats needs to be changed, eliminating the incentive to split lists.

Other Aspects One of the negative aspects remains the widespread use of regimented private sector workers for electoral campaigns, particularly for public rallies or under the obligation to wear special garments displaying the name or logo of a certain candidates list in the workplace. It is necessary to put an end to these practices, safeguarding freedom of thought and political choice: employers must have no right to limit or even control the electoral choice of their employees. A practical issue is the fact that the electoral campaign takes place in September. This is a problem due to the intense heat and humidity at this time of the year, which is also the typhoon season. Conducting an election under severe weather conditions harms not only the candidates but also the general public. It would be better to conduct the elections in October.

Ensuring Lusophone Representation It has been proposed that the electoral reform debates should have the representation of the Lusophone community as one of its objectives. Experience has consistently shown that a purely

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proportional or “winner-takes-all” electoral system is not adequate to reach this goal. Under the current laws on direct elections, each association receives a number of deputies arising from a mathematic method to convert votes into seats, but the experience of past elections has shown that it is not sufficient to faithfully represent and recognize the multicultural and ethnic fabric of Macao in the Legislative Assembly composition. The Macao populace consists of different groups which have been living together peacefully for centuries. As a result, legal institutions should adapt so as to reflect the underlying and much cherished pluralistic reality.10 This means paying greater attention to the Lusophone minority. The Portuguese/Macanese community is a unique asset of Macao and their existence and role should be treasured and preserved in the context of the Macao demographic diversity that has seen a much faster expansion of the Han Chinese majority. The Lusophone community, despite its small size, is a very old and permanent feature: it is not about to disappear or be assimilated into mainstream Chinese culture before or after 2049. It is not a transitional or temporary phenomenon but a permanent cultural reality and a full part of what Macao people have been, are and will be. The Lusophone community’s continued existence distinguishes Macao from any other Chinese city. To be a minority means not to have a dominant position, therefore to be smaller or less significant in quantitative terms. But a valued minority should be acknowledged and cannot be brushed aside or ignored. The Lusophone minority, while small, is part of the Macao identity and multi-cultural heritage, that has contributes much to characterize Macao’s historical essence. It is, in this sense, an “asset minority” to be appreciated in both the local and global contexts. The well-known issue is that a small minority, however important it may be, cannot play the electoral game to win and obtain seats. This should be recognized as a real problem that ought to be solved at the political level—this community should have its representation. The political system currently does not assign a role or recognize a specific function to the centuries old Portuguese legacy. Therefore, it should have a specific status at the political-electoral level.11

3. Electoral Reform and Political Representation in Macao

It is very well known that the Luso-Macanese population, due to its small quantitative expression, cannot muster the votes necessary to elect one member of the MSAR Legislative Assembly, for which at least 8,000 or many more votes will be needed to gain a seat in the 2013 elections. Despite the various attempts in the past, they never managed to obtain more than 2,500 votes, and in 2009 their total votes were less than 1,000. This has never prevented the Lusophone community from running to the direct elections every four years but the overall conclusion is that a special status should be instituted. The appropriate forum for this purpose in the current constitutional setting is the Legislative Assembly. This could be achieved by two ways: 1. One would be a reform of the functional constituencies, so as to have a Lusophone constituency, in which framework the Luso-Macanese representative associations would vote, as per the standard procedure for indirect elections. 2. Another would be via the deputies appointed by the Chief Executive, who could decide to appoint one or two Lusophone members on a regular basis, much like the Macao governor s did before 1999 in appointing Chinese legislators.12 In addition, it seems clear that the MSAR government should be headed by a Chief Executive and have Secretaries who fully understand the singularity of Macao, and some of them should hopefully be able to speak Portuguese. Whatever the exact solution, it requires political will and an open spirit. If it is a fact that the Lusophone community is a minority but key component of Macao that contributes strongly to its distinct identity and global vitality, then the recognition of this fact should be translated into real institutional action.

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Notes 1. See Zhidong Hao, Macau. History and culture, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), p. 104 ff. Intermarriage was not just between Portuguese and Chinese but also with Japanese, Malaysians and Indians. 2. See Paulo Cardinal, “The judicial guarantees of fundamental rights in the Macau legal system: a parcours under the focus of continuity and of autonomy”, in Jorge Oliveira and Paulo Cardinal, eds., One Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders. Perspectives of Evolution, (Springer-Verlag: Berlin/Heidelberg, 2009), p. 220 ff. 3. For a recent discussion on how the system is being lived, see Bill Chou, “Local autonomy matters: one-country two-system policy in Macao and its implications for China’s policies on its borderlands”, in Yufan Hao and Bill Chou, eds., China’s Policies on its Borderlands and the International Implications, (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011), 225 ff. 4. As widely expected years before the transfer of sovereignty, Edmund Ho Hau Wa, a banker, was the first Chief Executive from 1999 to 2009. In 2004 he was elected without contest for a second term. The second and current Chief Executive, Fernando Chui Sai On, who was one of the Secretaries during the 10-year tenure of Edmund Ho, initiated functions on 20 December 2009, keeping most of the Secretaries from the previous Government. 5. The Chinese population living in Macau for less than 5 years was excluded, but no such restrictions applied to the Portuguese; Moisés Fernandes, Macau na política externa portuguesa 1949–1979, (Lisbon: ICS, 2006), p. 341. As a result, the number of voters in 1976 and 1980 was rather small. 6. China opposed having a fully elected Assembly: Moisés Fernandes, Macau na política externa portuguesa 1949–1979, (Lisbon: ICS, 2006), pp. 340–1. 7. J. E. Garcia Leandro, Macau nos anos da revolução portuguesa 1974–1979, (Lisboa: Gradiva, 2011), pp. 87–8. The author adds that the negotiations leading to this arrangement involved, from the Chinese side, Ho Yin, Roque Choi and Chui Tak Kei. 8. It may be recalled that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is in force in Macau, but the PRC has made a reservation to art. 25(b), which states that “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”

3. Electoral Reform and Political Representation in Macao 9. The Democrats led by Ng Kuoc Cheong divided themselves in two lists for the 2009 election: one list obtained 16.907 votes (two seats) and the other obtained 11.303 (one seat). 10. There is plenty of literature on how political representation should sometimes be molded or adapted to reflect the underlying society and preserve harmony. For example, in the framework of complex societies, consociation representation is practiced in many countries. See Arend Lijphart, Thinking About Democracy, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Benjamin Reilly, “Political reform and the demise of consociationalism in Southeast Asia,” in Aurel Croissant and Marco Bünte, eds., The Crisis of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 114 ff.; for a discussion of the Fiji and New Caledonia cases, see Marion Batogi, Le gouvernement pluraliste en Nouvelle-Calédonie et aux Fidji, (Nouméa: SCEREN-CDP, 2008). 11. There are two Portuguese-speaking members in the current (2009–2013) composition of the Legislative Assembly but none occupies the position primary as a result of their ethnic or linguistic background. Leonel Alves originates from the functional constituency of professional interests. José Pereira Coutinho, directly elected, is the leader of the civil servants’ association. 12. It may be recalled that on the occasion of the 1976 and 1980 elections the then Governors appointed prominent leaders of the Chinese community, such as Ho Yin. After 1984, as a result of the opening of electoral registration to a much wider population took place, Chinese deputies started to dominate the direct and indirect vote and, as a result, Governors tended to appoint Portuguese deputies, so as to balance the composition of the Assembly.

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4 Patron-Clientelism and Elections in Macao: The 2009 Chief Executive Election Bruce K. K. KWONG

The third Chief Executive (CE) election of the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) held on 26 July 2009 was successfully conducted without any sign of competition. The voting carnival started with joyful faces found on most of the members of Election Committee (EC), who were required to cast an “agree” or approval vote to the one and only one candidate, Fernando Chui Sai On, in this influential election in Macao. The lonesome CE candidate Chui, who was formerly the Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture under the Edmund Ho administration (December 1999–December 2009) and who worked with Ho for nearly 10 years, ran the election at the absence of any contestant. As a friend of Ho, Chui was supported to run for taking over the regime by utilizing their personal connections and networks, as this chapter will discuss. Nevertheless, Chui’s road to be enthroned was not as smooth as what Ho could achieve in the previous MSAR CE elections, because considerable political oppositions came from the community—an unprecedented phenomenon in Macao’s history. Furthermore, the Electoral Affairs Commission, which was empowered to monitor the election, might not be able to carry out its duties as strict as expected. Moreover, a unitary candidate to run for the uncontested election unveiled the poverty of political talent in this ex-Portuguese enclave. Most importantly, patron-client politics was still an important factor among those that could be observed in the election. This article argues that patron-client 55

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politics and relations remained the hallmark of the 2009 CE election in the MSAR.

Politics of Patron-Clientelism Patron-clientelism is an exploration of inter-personal relationships between politicians and voters. Its definition is universally applicable and concerned about the personal interests and benefits of each participant in the complex relationships. In the study of patron-clientelism in Southeast Asia countries, James Scott identified the relationships between patrons and clients as being distinguished by three factors, including 1. its basis in inequality (the patron supplies goods and services to the clients who need them for their survival or well-being); 2. its face-to-face character (the trust and affection that exists between the patron and clients are based on a continuing pattern of reciprocity); and 3. its diffuse flexibility.1 In short, patron-clientelism refers to a strong “multiplex” relationship, unintentionally built between the two parties; such relationship can be created by personal connections, tenancy, friendship, past exchange of services, or family ties. 2 Andrew Nathan mentioned similar modes of relationship in his study of factionalism in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He used factions to describe inter-personal relations in the mainland Chinese political arena during the 1960s and the 1970s.3 The explicit characteristics of factional networks are often founded on “the exchange of loyalty and mutual assistance, one of their main functions is to make sure that rewards go to the ‘right people’” and the patron way consolidate the clientelist relationship through “connections (guanxi) friendship and pulling up their own people”. 4 Nathan further distinguishes clientelist ties in mainland China from power relationships and exchange relationships. To Nathan, 5 power

4. Patron-Clientelism and Elections in Macao

relationships are superior-subordinate and, in some cases, authoritative, and exchange relationships refer to “rational, goal-oriented behavior that can profitably be analyzed in terms of exchange”. Thus, patron-clientelism and faction politics are mutually reinforcing in the processes of cultivating inter-personal network so as to consolidate the political power and influence of a core clique. This chapter will adopt these two concepts— patron-clientelism and factional politics—to examine the political manoeuvre behind the stakeholders, who utilized guanxi as a means of extending their political influences as revealed in the 2009 CE election.

From Authoritative Colonial Governor to Authoritative Executive-led CE Notwithstanding the fact that colonial Macao had been democratized after a political coup in Portugal in 1974, Lisbon was still adopting a relatively authoritative governing mechanism to rule this tiny enclave, which had been occupied by the Portuguese since the late Ming dynasty. Adopting an authoritative style of governance, the Macao Portuguese government tended to avoid any political resistance from the colony that might damage their governing capacity. While local resistance to colonial rule persisted, as with the eruption of the 1966 riot sparked by the confrontation between the local people and the Portuguese police over the construction of a school in the Taipa Island, the Portuguese administration tended to co-opt local Chinese community leaders into the colonial institutions so as to stabilize its governance and buttress its fragile legitimacy. Moreover, the colonial government implemented a lot of policies to enhance and consolidate the governor’s ruling authority, including an unchallengeable administrative power.6 Constitutionally speaking, the Portuguese governor empowered himself to amend the Organic Statute (mini-constitutional law of colonial Macao) and to promulgate decrees which had parallel legal status with the laws passed by the colonial legislature. The governor could also extend the influential power in the legislature by means of appointing his

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clients as the members of the Legislative Assembly (LA) to speak and vote for the government. 7 Under Portuguese rule, the colonial administrators utilized personal networks and relations to co-opt the local Chinese elites, thus stabilizing and legitimizing the regime to a certain extent. A joint rule of colonial Macao composed of the Portuguese and local Chinese elites was therefore firmly entrenched. Occupying a powerful position in the establishment favoring relatively authoritative governance, the MSAR CE after the handover of Macao from Portugal to the PRC is enjoying considerable broad authority, even far more than all his predecessors under the colonial regime. Inheriting the above colonial executive power, the MSAR Basic Law endows the CE with a higher degree of governing power even more than that practiced by the late Portuguese governor, such as replacing the effectiveness of the decrees with administrative regulations by means of revising or amending them, and by cooling down the law-making function of the legislature but enhancing the role of administrative regulations. In the first two years after the handover, there were 68 administrative regulations promulgated by the CE while there were only 40 laws made to adapt to the post-colonial transition.8 The law-making function was even shrunk further in 2007 in the sense that only 6 laws were made in the entire year. (See Table 1) The former chairlady of the MSAR Legislative Assembly, Susana Chou, even criticized the government for failing to consult the opinions of the LA before tabling the bill of Regulations concerning Law and Administrative Regulation because this bill was concerned about the Basic Law and the status of LA in enacting laws. 9 The administration chose to consult some government departments only. Pro-government legislator Kwan Tsui Hang even criticized the government for basically failing to respect the opinion of LA.10 In short, the executive dominance of the MSAR political system has persisted after its retrocession to the PRC.

4. Patron-Clientelism and Elections in Macao Table 1. Number of Laws and Administrative Regulations passed by the MSAR Legislative Assembly and the Chief Executive since the handover.

Items Passed Year

Laws

Administrative Regulations

1999 / 2000

19

27

2000 / 2001

21

35

2001 / 2002

11

36

2002 / 2003

14

41

2003 / 2004

10

42

2004 / 2005

11

25

2005 / 2006

9

20

2006 / 2007

6

22

2007 / 2008

13

26

2008 / 2009

27

36

2009 / 2010

15

25

2010 / 2011

12

42

2011 / 2012

16

26

2012 / 2013 Total after hand over

15

27

199

430

Source: for figures of Laws passed by the Legislative Assembly, please see Activities Report, Fourth Legislative section of the Fourth Legislative Assembly, website: www.al.gov.mo/agenda/actividades/c2012-2013.pdf; for figures of Administrative Regulations promulgated by the CE in each Financial Year, please see Government Printing Bureau of Macao website: http://cn.io.gov.mo/Search/default.aspx?t=A&da=59&ya=2010&s=d.

The above incidents did not happen accidentally or contingently, but they reflected the authoritative power possessed by the CE and his executive branch of the administration. In fact, the Basic Law stipulates some conditions under which the CE can choose to exercise his relatively authoritative power. Clauses 5 and 7 of Article 50 have already given the CE specific authority that can “formulate the administrative regulations and promulgate them for implementation;” and “appoint part of the members of the Legislative Council”.11 These clauses are designed to consolidate the

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power of the CE so as to ensure an unimpeded executive-led administration, a phenomenon that its neighboring city-state, the Hong Kong SAR, cannot really enjoy. In other words, the Macao CE can manipulate the administration as well as the legislature. From a realpolitik perspective it is apparent to see that Macao is playing power politics in the sense that the political leader at the top gathers and possesses most of the public power. As such, those political and social elites who seek to have political resources, social status, public career and power will find it is easy to identify the patron to lean on, and the patron can easily generate a core faction or clique through the cultivation of patron-client relations to strengthen the authoritative regime. In a nutshell, a web of patron-client relationships is provided for by the Basic Law, buttressed by the executive-led administration in both the colonial and post-colonial era, and entrenched by Beijing’s intention of maintaining a powerful executive in Macao’s institutional design.

The Politics of the Election Committee and CE Election Procedurally speaking, an Election Committee (CE) must be established to nominate and elect candidates participated in the Macao CE election contest. It was firstly established before Macao’s handover as a 200-member Selection Committee to nominate and elect candidates vetted by the central government for the first term of government. 12 The size of the EC was later expanded from 200-men to 300-men EC after the first term. It is beyond reasonable expectations that the EC for the third CE election was formed in the absence of electoral contest. Candidates of the 300-member EC were first nominated at the same number of seats in each sector. In other words, those who participated in the elections were the only candidates of the respective sector, thus endowing them a sole privilege of automatically “elected”. Like the situation in the Hong Kong SAR, any citizen who wishes to participate in the CE election should acquire a minimum number of nominations from the members of

4. Patron-Clientelism and Elections in Macao

the EC. In order to be a qualified candidate of the CE election in the MSAR, a candidate should be nominated by at least 50 EC members. Due to the fact that each EC member can only nominate one candidate,13 a candidate who can obtain a minimum majority of nominations in the election, namely a total of 151 nominations out of 300 members, would then be the key threshold of electoral success, if there is no other candidate acquiring 150 nominations. Chui had taken the initiative to announce the running the CE election in May 2009 while his major competitor, Ho Chio Meng was still “considering” the possibility to run the election.14 Ho Chio Meng had served as a civil servant in Guangdong Province during 1972–1990 including the judgeship of Guangdong People’s High Court in the late 1980s, and was appointed as the Coordinator of the High Commissioner's Office Against Corruption of Administrative Illegality in 1993. 15 He was appointed as the Prosecutor General of the Public Prosecutions Office of the Macao Special Administrative Region since the handover. His brilliant profile tinted him with “red color” and people in Macao believed that he was supported by Central government to run the CE election of whom one of his major missions was to purge the chronic corruption legacy of Macao. Chui had set up a campaign headquarter and organized his own campaign team. His campaign team members had helped to cultivate a lot of support from the Election Committee. Apparently, Ho’s hidden agenda, albeit not being proved, was not favored by some of the Election Committee. Chui’s campaign team could successfully gain an absolute numbers of written nominations. Ho Chio Meng announced that he would not run the CE election while Chui submitted the nomination form.16 Imitating his predecessor’s practice in the late CE election to obtain most of the EC members’ support by means of signing the nomination form, Chui had acquired 286 subscribers out of 300 EC members, that ruled out the possibility of any potential contester to obtain sufficient subscription from the EC to contest with Chui (See Table 2).

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Table 2. Voters Turnout of the Winers in Macao’s CE Elections 2nd & 3rd Terms Year/Term

2004/2@

2009/3*

Candidate

Edmond Ho

Fernando Chui

No. of voters attended

299

296

No. of nominations obtained

296

286

No. of votes obtained

296

282

3

14

No. of blank votes No. of voters abstained Contested election

1

4

No

No

Sources: @ see http://www.ece.gov.mo/election/public/ece/2004.jsf?article =adv_list20040831. * see http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2009/31/prtui_cn.asp.

Fernando Chui had delivered rewards to his clients in various ways. In view of the all the incumbent principal officials and cabinet members be invited to remain in office, the Commissioner of Audit Fatima Choi Mei Lei was opted out of the invitation list because, perhaps, of her criticism and the poor audit reports against Chui’s scandal in organizing the East Asian Game. Table 3 and Table 4 illustrated part of the major personnel, who had participated in Chui’s campaign activities, had been offered rewards by Chui. In the dyadic relations shown in Chui’s patron-client politics game, in addition to the clientelistic relations cultivated by the patron Chui himself, it is worth to emphasize that clientelistic ties can be shifted from patron Ho to client Chui. What makes the clientelistic ties more interesting is that, patron-client relations is not merely a mean of rewarding those clients, but it can serve as a mean to penalize those disloyal subordinates.

4. Patron-Clientelism and Elections in Macao Table 3. Benefits of Some Key Persons of Chui's Campaign Team Name

Relations

Benefits

Chui Sai Cheong, brother of newly election CE Chui Sai Cheong

Client and business partner with Ho

Concession of 200,000m2 land at Cotai Strip at MOP$230,972,593.00, about MOP$1,150/ m2

Wong Hin-fai (campaign agent of Chui)

Client of Ho and Chui

Appointed by Ho as legislator in 2009

Lao Tak Wa (good friend of Chui and vice Head of Chui’s campaign office)

Client of Ho and Chui

Concession of exhibition contract at MOP$ 32m in 2009. a similar exhibition contract conducted by Hong Kong cost HKD$2m

Table 4. Newly appointed members of Chui Sai On’s Executive Council Name

Status

Personal relations with Chui

Rewards

Chan Meng Kam

Member of CPPCC and EC member

Client and support Chui’s election

Membership of Executive Council

Ho Sut Heng

EC member, and President of Macau Federation of Labour Unions

Client and support Chui’s election

Membership of Executive Council

Eddie Wong Yue Kai

Member of CPPCC and EC member

Participated in East Asian Game construction project led by Chui

Membership of Executive Council

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Some Unresolved Questions in the CE Election From another angle, it was an enigma to witness the birth of an uncontested CE in the 2009 election in the MSAR). The former Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture, Fernardo Chui, could garner the nominations of 286 out of 300 members of the EC in June 2009 and therefore made it almost impossible for any other potential candidate to acquire a minimum of 50 nominators from the EC. Although Chui conducted a well-run electoral campaign, listening to the views of the society and community groups and reaching out to various societal strata so as to enhance his legitimacy, the problematic start of this CE election not only raised questions about the dynamics of this uncontested election but also had profound political implications for Macao. First and foremost, it is an undeniable fact that Chui grasped the opportunity of announcing his candidacy to surprise the public and most importantly to pre-empt other candidates from getting sufficient nominations. Another hot contender Prosecutor-General Ho Chio Meng, who eventually announced that he would not run in this election, appeared to hesitate for too long so that his chance of competing with Chui diminished with the passage of time. What was surprising in this candidacy announcement was its political nature and pre-emptive battle in which Ho Chio-meng as a seemingly publicly popular candidate subsequently decided not to participate, despite the fact that a pro-Beijing newspaper, Macao Daily News, had given Ho considerable and constant coverage before the candidacy announcement. What was more, Ho was portrayed as a hopeful candidate by a magazine of the Chinese Communist Party’s Youth League. All the trends had suggested that if Ho declared his candidacy much earlier, his chance of competing in this election would not be minimized. Surprisingly, Ho’s decision of not running in the CE election raised a number of unanswered questions. Was there any problem related to Ho himself, a hidden problem which could not be accepted by the Beijing authorities or which was unknown to the Macao public? If the answer were yes, was the problem about Ho’s personal inhesitancy or decision of not running in the CE election? If the answer were no, was Ho making a

4. Patron-Clientelism and Elections in Macao

strategic error in not declaring his candidacy to run in the CE election earlier, well before Chui garnered an overwhelming majority support of EC members in the nomination process? If the answer were ambiguous, was Beijing still opening the door for Ho to compete in the future Chief Executive election while giving more time to carefully observe Chui’s performance in the coming years? The inside politics of the 2009 CE elections appeared to be mysterious. Beijing’s intentions were not very clear in the 2009 CE election until Chui was nominated easily and then elected without any opponent. Prior to the CE election, officials of the PRC State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO) kept silent on the Macao CE election, while the Liaison Office in Macao also refrained from giving any views. From the perspective of patron-client politics, Beijing might exercise restraint in voicing any views that could be seen as an interference with the MSAR CE election, while its formal endorsement of the election of Chui after the CE election meant that the super-patron was the central government conferring upon Chui political legitimacy to govern the MSAR. It was reported in Macao that Liao Hui, then director of the HKMAO saw Chui as politically acceptable. What is unknown about the inside politics of the MSAR CE election is the original intention of Beijing, namely which candidate it seemed to prefer as the Macao CE succeeding Edmund Ho. If the Beijing authorities—including the HKMAO and the Liaison Office—did give a free hand to both Chui and Ho to decide their political moves in the CE nomination process, was the political autonomy given by Beijing to Macao running out of control as Ho Chio-meng himself was inexperienced in declaring his candidacy rapidly so that Chui could grasp an overwhelming majority nominating support of the EC members. In other words, Beijing might have the intention of allowing some degree of political autonomy in the 2009 CE election. The super-patron might adopt a publicly cautious attitude toward the 2009 CE election, but as it turned out, Chui was the candidate who quickly utilized Edmund Ho’s personal networks and who could win the election quickly during the nomination process. From the angle of patron-client politics, Ho appeared to lack an

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elite power base although his mass base appeared to be much popular than Chui. Some members of the Macao public favored Ho Chio Meng, whose power base however was much weaker than Fernando Chui. Chui’s family background and political rapport with Edmund Ho meant that his clientelist network was much stronger than Ho Chio Meng. As such, it was perhaps natural for Chui to garner 286 nominating votes out of 300 EC members. Although four of the 286 EC members turned to cast blank votes or abstained in the final voting process, which was still required to confer upon legitimacy on the new CE-designate (Table 3), Chui’s guanxi network appeared to be much stronger than Ho Chio Meng. The closed nature of the EC made the inside politics of the election and nomination processes more secretive and perhaps favorable to Chui’s factional supporters. A citizen who got an application form for the CE election complained to the Electoral Affairs Commission that he failed to find out the addresses and contact methods of the 300 members of the EC—a reflection of the highly elitist nature of the election. This highly elitist and closed nature of the election undoubtedly favored the inside operations of patron-clientelism. Arguably, democratization of the CE election in Macao will be necessary and urgent. The MSAR government and Beijing must reflect on the rules of the games, particularly the electoral requirement that a candidate must get at least 50 nominators, who could only give their support to one candidate in the 2009 CE election. Such requirement severely restricted the political ability and space of any other candidate to run in a small-circle electoral competition. In an increasingly pluralistic and competitive society like Macao, it was perhaps unsatisfactory to envisage a Chief Executive election having a problematic start. Without any other candidate to compete in the CE election, Chui’s political legitimacy is actually much weaker than what he could strive to do through intensive contacts with the public and interest groups, such as civil servants, labor unionists, teachers, professionals, and the Portuguese and Macanese community leaders. Objectively speaking, Chui and his campaign team performed impressively through a well orchestrated electioneering activity that reached out to various members of the public. However, if an uncontested election has already de-legitimized Chui to a certain extent, then his policies and

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performance are going to be critical to the development of a repaired legitimacy during the 2009 CE election. MSAR legislator Au Kam-sun during his interview with Radio Free Asia in June 2009 pointed out boldly that, if a vested interest group wished to perpetuate its interest in Macao under a new Chief Executive, it would protect and support a candidate who enjoyed the greatest connections with the current Edmund Ho administration. Critics of Chui shortly after his candidacy announcement questioned his problematic performance in the past, notably the over-expenditure of Macao’s East Asian Games in 2005. But Chui answered calmly that “human beings are human beings” who could learn a lesson from any problems and who could improve further. While critics saw Chui’s almost “automatic” or uncontested election as a negative sign pointing to the continuation of elitist rule and problematic patron-client networks, moderates regarded Chui’s election as a positive phenomenon that would lead to incremental changes rather than drastic administrative and political reforms. Regardless of the accuracy of the critical and moderate perspectives, both saw patron-clientelism as an underlying dynamics shaping the Chui administration. Public opinion did not really have any direct input into the 2009 CE election, although Chui eventually reached out to various social groups and tapped their opinions on government policies and measures. The nature of Macao politics, which remains executive-led with a powerful Chief Executive who can exercise his discretion and power in accordance with the Basic Law, must render public opinion a factor of minor importance in the politics of selecting the Chief Executive. Yet, if the EC composition were expanded and if the representative groups in various occupational sectors can reach out to more members of the public in the future, public opinion in Macao would hopefully become more significant in the EC formation process. Still, given the predominance of political elites, patrons and their clients in Macao’s EC politics, public opinion will surely play a minimal role in the foreseeable future.

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The Political Clients of Fernando Chui In November 2009, when Chief Executive-designate Chui announced his new batch of ministers and political appointees, it was obvious that patron-client politics was at work. The cabinet line-up included surprisingly seven holdover ministers and only three new appointees—an appointment list that was approved by Beijing. From the angle of patron-client politics, Chui wishes to retain most ministers or secretaries under the Ho administration, while adding three new members to consolidate his patronage umbrella. Of particular importance was Chui’s refusal to re-appoint the Commissioner of Audit Fatima Choi Mei Lei, who and her colleagues had openly criticized Chui over a MOP 1.4 billion overrun in the East Asian Games budget in 2005, when Chui was the former Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture.17 Chui during the media interview in November 2009 played down his refusal to reappoint Choi, saying that the departure of one official should not generate public concern. Choi revealed that Chui only met with her once after his election and did not say whether she would be reappointed. Yet, from the perspective of patron-client politics, Choi was surely not a client of Chui and thus her fate was almost determined once Chui was elected as the MSAR CE. Choi was soon to be replaced by the head of the Chief Executive’s Office, Ho Weng On, who has no relevant professional accreditation but who was obviously a political client of Edmund Ho. Given that Chui would like to transfer a key client of Edmund Ho, namely Ho Weng On, onto his own team of political friends and followers, the decision to replace Choi with Ho seemed a logical move. Chui also retained other clients of Edmund Ho in his new administration so that his power base would be buttressed firmly. The Commissioner Against Corruption Cheong U was selected to replace Chui himself as the Secretary for Social affairs and Culture. The Collegiate bench president of the Court of First Instance, Fong Man Chong, whose handling of the 2009 LA elections was very controversial, would succeed Cheong U as the Commissioner Against Corruption. Fong's younger sister was one of the witnesses

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in the corruption trial of jailed former Secretary for Land and Public Works Ao Man Long. Critics questioned Fong whether he would encounter potential conflict of interests, but Fong replied to the mass media that he would perform his task in accordance with legal procedures. Officials who were retained by Chu to keep their posts under Ho included: Secretary for Administration and Justice Florinda da Rosa Silva Chan, Secretary for Economy and Finance Francis Tam Pak Yuen, Secretary for Security Cheong Kuoc Va, Secretary for Land and Public Works Lau Si Lo, Unitary Police Service Commissioner General Jose Proenca Branco, Customs Service Director General Choi Lai Hang and notably Public Prosecutor-General Ho Chio Meng. From the angle of patron-client politics, the decision of Chui to retain Ho Chio Meng as the Prosecutor-General was a significant one, for the new Chief Executive was keen to act as a political patron protective of Ho Chio Meng, who might be expected to continue with his legal position rather than perhaps challenging Fernando Chui in the next CE election in 2014.

Conclusion From the analytical lens of patron-client relations and factional politics, the election of Fernando Chiu as the new CE from 20 December 2009 demonstrated the hidden inside bargaining, lobbying and exchanges between the political patron and the clients. Edmund Ho’s power base with his supporters and followers was by and large transferred to Fernando Chui, whose legitimacy was conferred upon by most members of the EC and most importantly Beijing. Yet, Chui’s procedural legitimacy is relatively weak in the eyes of the members of the Macao public, who cannot really elect their CE directly. As such, the performance legitimacy of Chui will be critical to his popularity and public acceptability in the years to come. On the other hand, patron-client politics are usually adopted to reward the clients in order to exchange the loyalties and dependences of clients. While these kinds of dyadic relations are effective in the ways to construct and consolidate clientelist relations,

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the patron can also penalize the disloyal or dissident clients by terminating the delivery of benefits or even initiating policies that may affect the interests of such clients. If patron-client politics had indeed characterized Macao’s CE elections in the past, this was no exception in the 2009 CE election, which witnessed hidden politics, factional realignment from Edmund Ho to that of Fernando Chui, and a “new” power base that was actually inherited from the Edmund Ho administration and which can clearly be seen in the line-up of Chui’s ministerial cabinet. To fade away the suspicions of living beneath the shadow of Edmond Ho and the weak procedural legitimacy, improvement of Chui’s performance legitimacy will be critical to boost up his popularity and public acceptability in the years to come.

Notes 1. Scott, James, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia” American Political Science Review, Vol 66, (1972). 2. Ibid. 3. Nathan, Andrew J., “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” in Schmidt, W. Steffen et al. (eds.), Friends, Followers, and Factions: a Reader in Political Clientelism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 4. Walder, Andrew G., Communist Neo-Traditionalism: work and authority in Chinese Industry, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 5. Nathan, Andrew J., “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” in Schmidt, W. Steffen et al. (eds.), Friends, Followers, and Factions: a Reader in Political Clientelism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 6. Lo, Shiu Hing, Political development in Macau Hong Kong, (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995). 7. Yee, Herbert S., “The 2001 Legislative Assembly Elections and Political Development in Macau,” Journal of Contemporary China, 14(43), (May 2005), pp. 225–245. 8. Ibid. 9. Va Kio Post, August 4, 2007, p. 11. 10. Ibid. 11. See MASR Basic Law, website: http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/1999/leibasica/ index_uk.asp#c4s1. 12. See Decision of the National People’s Congress on the Method for the

4. Patron-Clientelism and Elections in Macao Formation of the First Government, the First Legislative Council and the First Judiciary of the Macao Special Administrative Region, http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/1999/leibasica/index_uk.asp#c4s1. 13. See MSAR Basic Law, Annex I, Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Macao Special Administrative Region, http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/1999/leibasica/index_uk.asp#c4s1. 14. Vakio Daily, 13 May, 2009, p. 1; and also see http://big5.gov.cn/gate/ big5/www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-05/13/content_1312596.htm. 15. For more details, Ho_Chio_Meng.

please

read

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

16. Macau Daily, 12 June, 2009, p. A1. 17. Nickkita Lau, “Snub for audit chief as Chui Cabinet cleared,” The Standard (Hong Kong), November 25, 2009.

References Scott, James, (1972) “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia” American Political Science Review, Vol 66. Nathan, Andrew J., (1977) “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” Schmidt, W. Steffen, et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions: a Reader in Political Clientelism, (Berkeley: University of California Press). Walder, Andrew G., (1986) Communist Neo-Traditionalism: work and authority in Chinese Industry, (Berkeley: University of California Press). Yee, Herbert S., (2005) “The 2001 Legislative Assembly Elections and Political Development in Macau” in Journal of Contemporary China, 14(43), May, 225–245. Lo, Shiu Hing, (1995) Political development in Macau Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.

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Part II Socio-Economic Dimensions

5 Reinterpreting Macao’s Society, Politics and Economy: The Significance and Geopolitical Aspects of Casino Capitalism Sonny LO

Introduction Since Macao’s administration was returned from Portugal to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on December 20, 1999, little attempt has been made to reinterpret or revisit the triangular relationships between the society, politics and economy of the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR). This article aims at reinterpreting the MSAR’s dialectical processes of both development and underdevelopment. In terms of development, Macao’s economy has apparently been developing quickly with tremendous growth in the casino sector. However, this casino-driven economic development, as this article will argue, has generated a largely dependent middle class, whose members depend on economic prosperity and social stability to such an extent that they have been shied away from political advocacy and democratic struggle. At best, some of them have been selecting their casino representatives in the direct elections held for the Legislative Assembly. As a result, the tremendous economic growth in Macao has been accompanied by the emergence of a dependent, materialistic and egoistic middle class. 75

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Simultaneously, the society of the MSAR has been envisaging a contradictory development of not only having more pro-government groups supported by the MSAR administration, both financially through subsidies and politically through co-optation into various advisory bodies, but also having more young, independent, critical and pro-democracy citizens who abhor the patron-clientelist politics of Macao. Due to the dependent middle class generated largely by casino capitalism, which however has stimulated the worsening income gap between the rich and the poor, the emergence of young Macao Chinese has propelled the minimal development of the MSAR civil society. Overall, the patronage political system of Macao, where the ruling elites benefit their own friends and supporters through a complex web of pro-government interest groups such as labor unions, women organizations and neighborhood associations, has stifled democratic transformations in the MSAR. Although the MSAR government decided to introduce two additional directly elected seats to the legislature in the 2013 election, basically Macao has been characterized by political underdevelopment, economic dependency on casino capitalism, and the constrained growth of civil society. This combination of political underdevelopment with economic and social underdevelopment will persist in the MSAR for years, as long as the dependent casino economy is perpetuating a large sector of egoistic, materialistic and un-democratic middle class citizenry.

Dependent Casino Capitalism and Its Impact on Economy, Politics and Society Macao’s dependence on using casinos as the driver of its economy has become obvious since 2002, when the casinos franchises were internationalized so that foreign direct investment from Australia, America and Hong Kong would prompt the modernization of the local Macao casinos operators. Administratively and legally, the Macao government hopes to embrace foreign investors so that the local Macao casino industry can be modernized, internationalized and stabilized. The law and order problems resulting from the local

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casino sector originated from the 1990s, when the hotel and casino industries were expanded rapidly without proper policing and control over the criminal elements that slowly penetrated these lucrative sectors. The infiltration of criminal gangsters and groups into the VIP rooms of various casinos was a testimony to the failure of the Macao government to supervise the casinos, which were basically contracted out to the private-sector business elites. The penetration of criminal elements into the casino junkets and their increasingly prominent role in marketing casinos to the Hong Kong clients were detrimental to Macao’s law and order. Compounding the problem of lack of governmental supervision was the corruption among some police officers, who were rotten apples collaborating with the criminal underworld and plunged Macao’s society into triad wars years prior to the return of Macao’s administration from Portugal to the PRC. The international and Hong Kong media’s exaggeration of Macao’s law and order problem prompted the Portuguese and mainland Chinese authorities to intervene further. By arresting the Broken Tooth, the boss of the triad 14K, Macao’s criminal underworld was temporarily controlled (Lo 1999). However, the ultimate solution lies with the internationalization and modernization of Macao’s casino industry. With the entry of foreign players and investors, notably from the Americans, Australians and Hong Kong business people, the local Macao casino industry was no longer a monopoly, but an internationalized entity that has to increase its own competitiveness. The role of the market forces plays a crucial role to the modernization of the Macao’s casino sector, where the local casino operators have to learn from the West, to adapt to external competition, and to forge joint ventures so as to bring Macao’s casino industry to a new era. Yet, by bringing foreign investors into Macao, the local elites did need some time to adapt to the entry of external players. Some local intellectuals criticized the American investment as a harbinger for more US intervention in the Macao economy and politics (Lo 2009). While the anxieties about American benefits from Macao’s lucrative casino proceeds do persist, the worry over the American intervention in local politics was unfounded. The Americans invested in Macao’s casino economy on the condition that they would not participate in influencing local politics, let alone

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nominating or supporting any candidate in Macao’s Legislative Assembly elections. Still, the vocal elites wary of the American influences demonstrated the existence of some hard-liners in Macao’s society as they see the casino development as basically local rather than inviting the entry of foreigners. Yet, anti-foreignism was temporary in Macao. Traditionally, Macao has been embracing foreign influences once the Portuguese arrived at the territory. Politically, both the PRC and MSAR government in 2002 aimed at bringing foreign investors into the local Macao casino industry for the sake of learning the skills of managing Las Vegas-style casinos in the United States, and of preventing the local monopoly from degenerating into an appendage of Macao’s and Hong Kong’s criminal underworld. To this end, the internationalization of Macao’s casino industry was a wise strategy. Politically, it ended the era of the old monopoly in Macao’s casino sector. Economically, it would revive Macao and bring about new economic benefits to the society. Administratively, it would stimulate the Macao-based local operators to learn from the West, to form joint ventures, and to compete with foreign business people in a healthy and mutually beneficial manner. Casino capitalism in Macao is based on several pillars of associated development. The first pillar is family tourism, which means that the surroundings of casinos setting have to direct at families and even children, and that hotels, restaurants and retail sectors can benefit tremendously from tourists who gamble in various casinos. To a large extent, this families-friendly strategy has been working successfully for the casinos in Macao. Yet, casino capitalism in Macao, from a critical perspective, is accompanied by artificial construction of tourist spots rather than by the full utilization of existing cultural sites and heritage in the territory. The protection of cultural sites and heritage in Macao tends to operate independently of the development of casino capitalism. This process is natural as all casinos have been built not around the historical and cultural sites. However, in terms of cultural and heritage development of Macao, casino capitalism was not really characterized by a holistic urban planning that fully utilizes, protects and publicize the territory’s unique cultural, historical and architectural landscape. The disarticulation between casino

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development and Macao’s cultural heritage sites appears to be prominent. As long as many tourists who frequent casinos are not interested in cultural and historical sites, however, such disarticulation does not appear to be economically significant. From the perspective of balanced development, however, economic dependence on casino capitalism has perhaps neglected the question of how to make the proceeds of casinos beneficial to the protection of cultural heritage and historical sites. The second pillar of Macao’s casino capitalism is the reliance on the tourists from mainland China—a direct consequence of the individual visit scheme implemented in late July 2003. Although the scheme has benefited tourism and economic prosperity in both Macao and Hong Kong, the negative side-effects have become obvious in recent years, including the influx of mainland pregnant women giving birth to new babies in the two territories, and the grasp of milk formula which are in high demand in the mainland. The dependence on mainland tourism is also predicated on the assumption that mainland authorities adopt a relatively relaxed policy toward individual mainland visitors. So far, the mainland authorities have not attempted at controlling the visits of mainland tourists from Zhuhai to Macao. The continuation of the mainland’s relatively liberalized policy toward mainlanders’ visit to Macao is a key factor shaping the success of Macao’s casino capitalism. The third pillar of casino capitalism is the traditional dependence on Hong Kong tourists and Hong Kong as a crucial transit point for mainland visits and gamblers. Apart from hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong people who visit and gamble in Macao every day, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) provides a very important transit point through which mainland and foreign tourists visit Macao daily and gamble there. In short, casino capitalism is an informal ideology espoused by the Macao government. Officially, the catchwords are to maintain the territory’s economic prosperity and develop tourism. Underlying this official rhetoric is the unofficial ideological underpinning of casino capitalism, whose three pillars of associated development includes family-type tourism, the dependence on the individual visit scheme and the reliance on Hong Kong as a critical transit point for mainland, Hong Kong and foreign tourists and gamblers.

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This economic policy of casino dependence has tremendous implications for Macao’s politics and society. Politically, although the foreign investors have not participated in local politics and elections, the local Macao casino interest groups have been actively participating in the Legislative Assembly’s elections since 2005. Politically, the Macao casino sector needs to select its representatives into the legislature, articulating its collective and individual operator’s interests. So far, none of the observers in Macao has appeared to question whether a fully directly elected Legislative Assembly, as advocated by some members of the public, especially the democrats, would require the societal elites to ponder the question on the proper proportion of representatives of the casino industry to be elected. Given that the casino operators have tremendous manpower, resources and capital in Macao, their electoral participation, if it is fully mobilized, would perhaps garner sufficient proportion of votes that the direct election result would perhaps be titled unintentionally in favor of them. This hypothetical situation has not yet been considered in Macao, where the debate over the desirability of a fully directly elected legislature has remained relatively weak, not to mention the possible outcomes of such universal franchise. Politically, the rapid development of casino capitalism has stimulated the development of casino forces in electoral participation, but whether the strength of casino forces in elections would constitute a factor contributing to political imbalance, if not necessarily underdevelopment, remains to be seen. Administratively speaking, Macao’s bureaucracy has been undergoing a process of continuous modernization. Not only did the foreign investment in Macao’s casino industry stimulate the local casino operators to modernize their administration and learn from the good model of Las Vegas, but the Macao bureaucratic machinery needs to conduct administrative reforms incessantly in order to achieve, as David Rosenbloom stresses, the three objectives of public administration: efficiency, effectiveness and economy (Lo 1995). The imperative for the Macao government to streamline its operations, to improve its image in the eyes of foreign investors and diplomats, and to accelerate the process of granting licenses as well as to cope with legal procedures professionally prompted positive reforms within the bureaucracy. In other words, while casino

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capitalism aims at achieving the objective of economic modernization, it also triggers administrative reforms. Socially, the dependent casino economy has tremendous implications for social equity, mobility and wealth. The affluent middle class in Macao has stemmed from the flourishing casino industry, which remains beneficial to all its employees, like dealers and managers, and which has stimulated the rapid growth of other tertiary sectors, including hotel, retail and catering industries. However, the social and economic benefits have covered the hundreds of thousands of casinos-related employees rather than filtering downwards to the working-class citizens, some of whom remain in the batch of proletariat in the face of the rapid import of foreign and mainland laborers. Those working-class citizens, who fail to catch up with the rapid growth of the society and economy, and who cannot upgrade their skills, are bound to be the losers amidst the development of casino capitalism. The gap between the rich and the poor has widened since 2002. Although social mobility can be seen among the young and the embryonic middle-class citizens who have been climbing up their societal ladder through the casino sector, many other citizens who are not working directly for the casino industry find it difficult to sustain the increasingly high standard and cost of living in Macao (Ip 2012). Although the Macao government has relied on the annual distribution of subsidies to citizens as a form of safety valve to pre-empt the discontent of the have-nots, especially the working-class citizens, the question is whether such “candies” have to be distributed to citizens annually as a constitutional convention, or as a de facto policy, so as to generate a feeling of calmness and satisfaction among the Macao populace. In other words, Macao’s casino capitalism has generated aspects of development, notably employment and general increase in the living standard, but it has also triggered the contradictory tendencies of perpetuating social inequity, wealth gap and the gulf between the haves and have-nots. Most members of Macao’s middle class are politically conservative. They do not wish to upset the status quo and are keen to maintain economic, social and political stability. A minority of the middle class is pro-democracy, advocating a faster pace of democratic reforms in Macao. However, the voice of the

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middle-class liberal democrats is relatively weak; they rely on the Internet and street protests to make their demands heard. They lack the support of the traditional and mainstream print and electronic media. As such, the political space for Macao’s middle-class liberals to make their demands known is relatively limited, especially amidst a political system where patronage is commonplace so that their opinions critical of the regime cannot be easily adopted. Hence, from the perspective of development, casino capitalism has brought about positive aspects of economic, political, legal and administrative development. Yet, casino capitalism has its dialectical or contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, it has triggered development, but on the other hand, it also led to political underdevelopment and economic dependency. Politically, it can be argued that, once foreign and Hong Kong investors are welcome, they play a crucial part in Macao’s casino capitalism and render the local casino sector dependence on external forces. In the world of interdependence, there is nothing wrong for Macao’s casino operators to depend on foreign business elites and Hong Kong investors. Nevertheless, from the perspective of development, if development is defined as indigenous forces fostering their own growth without relying heavily on outsiders, casino capitalism in the form of external dependence and linkages does curb local development. In other words, the more interdependent the Macao casino economy is, the more fluctuating it would be in case of regional and global economic downturn. In particular, if economic development is not linear, Macao’s casino economy will likely suffer a severe shock in the event of a global or regional economic recession. The global financial crisis of 2008–2009 was a case in point. Although retrenchment in the Macao casino sector could be seen, it was temporary. Ultimately, in the interest of capital accumulation, the capitalistic state of Macao continued in late 2009 to expand casinos construction. The challenge for Macao is to diversify its economic sectors rather than relying heavily on the casino industry. Yet, this is easier said than done. The integration of part of Hengqin into the MSAR is presenting a golden opportunity for Macao to expand the economic sectors into various potential areas, such as convention and exhibition centers, ecological tourism and high technology hub. The

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expansion of Macao’s territorial space into Hengqin is indeed breathing new life to the MSAR, for its limited geographical size cannot afford to have further expansion. The construction of various infrastructure projects and rapid casino developments in the past decade were arguably detrimental to Macao’s environmental protection and cultural heritage. The irony of Macao’s economic development is to persist with casino capitalism, which however was accelerated at the cost of reclaiming more land, creating congested roads, producing noise and air pollution, and entirely transforming the old face of Macao. Although Hengqin provides more territorial space for Macao, it remains to be seen whether the Macao government can manage its development and infrastructure projects in an open, accountable and efficient manner. The Hengqin developmental plan appears to lack sufficient transparency, although the members of the Macao public were invited to comment on it. News on Hong Kong’s business involvement and mainland infrastructure projects often come from the Hong Kong and Zhuhai respectively rather than from the Macao media. In this aspect, the Macao government must provide more information to the Macao public on all aspects of Hengqin development instead of creating any impression that Macao’s new territorial space is bound to be shaped by “external” actors, no matter whether these actors come from the mainland or Hong Kong.

Casino Diplomacy, Political Dependence and Patronage Perpetuation What is interesting about Macao’s casino capitalism is that it became a de facto government policy since the early 2000s without much consultation with the public. Basically, it was a top-down policy formulated and implemented by the Macao government with the full support of Beijing (Lo 2005). Perhaps the Macao ruling elites took it for granted that casino capitalism would definitely be accepted by the Macao masses, and that public consultation would not alter the policy decision and outcome. Casino capitalism was also a hallmark of Macao, which is the only place in mainland

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China where casinos are allowed to exist, persist and proliferate formally. Furthermore, casino capitalism was allowed by Beijing to develop in Macao under unique circumstances. The global rise of the PRC signaled a more open, confident and perhaps liberal China whose leaders have seen Macao as a gateway for the Chinese government to maintain and develop harmonious business relationships with the Portuguese-speaking world. They also regard Macao’s casino capitalism as a special feature in the Macao style of “One Country, Two Systems”. Ultimately, in the minds of the late Deng Xiaoping and his successors, both Hong Kong and Macao are exemplars of the “One Country, Two Systems” model that can be used to appeal to Taiwan for reunification in the future. Although many Taiwan people may cast doubts on the feasibility of the “One Country, Two Systems” model to Taiwan, the PRC leaders’ perception of a unique Macao has contributed to the survival, growth and sustainability of its casino capitalism. If Taiwan also toys with the idea of setting up casinos in some of its outlying islands, such as Penghu, the Macao model is arguably a special one with some degree of economic, if not political, attractiveness to Taiwan. From a broader geopolitical perspective of the PRC, casino capitalism in Macao serves important foreign policy functions. First and foremost, by attracting the American investment into Macao’s casino industry, Beijing adopts a united front strategy toward the United States through the significant development of casino capitalism in Macao. Beijing welcomes Washington’s efforts at modernizing and internationalizing Macao’s casino industry—a significant diplomatic gesture in Beijing’s policy. Second, Beijing also embraces the investment from Australia and Hong Kong, meaning that the former can also be wooed to cement closer relations with China through its investment in Macao, and that the people of Hong Kong are the comrades who should help the “smaller” brother of Macao to develop its casino economy. Third, casino diplomacy can win the hearts and minds of many oversea Chinese, including Taiwan people, who see Macao’s casino capitalism as a signal of the PRC’s continuous economic modernization and globalization. Despite the fact that a minority of Macao people believed that foreign investment in Macao’s casino industry would siphon off the

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territory’s economic benefits and channel them to “imperialistic” countries, this view was by no means the mainstream one shared by both the Macao government and the local business elites. Xenophobic sentiment or anti-foreignism did not have its market in Macao, where the casino industry has traditionally been mixed with local and Hong Kong investors. In particular, Macao as a conduit for China to woo the American foreign direct investment into the territory’s casino industry did and does have its geopolitical value— a perspective perhaps neglected by a minority of Chinese nationalists in Macao. In brief, casino diplomacy has its special place in the PRC’s wider geopolitical considerations. It has tremendous implications for China’s reunification efforts that target at Taiwan (Lo 2009a). It also carries practical diplomatic implications for forging a closer economic partnership with the United States and Australia. By using Macao as a casino window to absorb foreign investment, the PRC has actually been skillfully using casino capitalism in Macao as a tool in achieving its domestic, external and foreign policy objectives. While the Macao economy is one-sidedly dependent on casino capitalism, its political elites have to maintain the spoil or patronage system in order to maintain governing stability and legitimacy. The spoil or patronage system is by no means a new one in Macao. The Portuguese Governors in Macao under Portuguese rule had long practiced patronage to such an extent that the local Chinese media often portrayed them as the patron distributing rewards to his friends and followers from both Portugal and Macao (Lo 1995). This patronage system has been arguably exacerbated by the economic dependence on casino capitalism. Traditionally, the Lunar Chinese New Year witnessed the Portuguese Governor visiting a casino—a signal that the Portuguese administration had to uphold casino capitalism. On the other hand, the Portuguese officials supervising the Macao casinos traditionally cultivated friendly relationships with the casino business magnets and operators. The alliance between the Portuguese ruling elites and the casino operators in Macao before December 20, 1999 was deeply entrenched—a legacy that has been inherited by the MSAR government since the transfer of administration from Portugal to China.

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In the minds of the Macao Chief Executive, he has to maintain his leverage on the casino capitalists. On the one hand, the Chief Executive had to retain good guanxi with the casino operators, including local, American, Australian and Hong Kong ones. On the other hand, he has to augment his autonomy vis-à-vis the casino capitalists, who cannot be seen as having tremendous influence on the Macao government. This balancing act is not easy for the Chief Executive and his subordinates to achieve. But it was possible, for the retrenchment of casino development in the midst of the global and regional financial crisis in June 2008 was a testimony to the Chief Executive’s autonomy (Lo 2009b). Instead of bowing to the pressure from local and external casino operators to build more casinos, the MSAR government led by Chief Executive Edmund Ho made a wise and cautious step in controlling the pace and scope of casino development in Macao. However, the relatively autonomy enjoyed by the HKSAR government vis-à-vis the casino capitalist class appears to be a rare phenomenon. Since casino capitalists have been playing a crucial role in sustaining Macao’s economic growth, they need to secure the cooperation of other capitalists, notably the land developers and big business people, so that they can form a powerful interest group to shape land and casino development. At the same time, the Macao governing elites have understood the importance of forging a friendly alliance with these powerful capitalists. As a result, the capitalist class can influence the policies of the Macao government through formal and informal channels. Formally, they have been appointed to the top policy-making body, the Executive Council. Informally, they can often constitute a collective interest group and easily influence the government’s policies toward property development, casino growth, transportation, infrastructure projects, the import of labor, and taxation. The term “hegemony of the land developers”, which has been used by the leftwing critics of the Hong Kong government since the handover, can arguably be also seen in the MSAR. Indeed, the Macao government has not been totally captured by the land developers, as the term may have implied. Occasionally, it did have autonomy. But Macao remains a capitalist city-state where the big business, casino operators and land developers are politically influential.

5. Reinterpreting Macao’s Society, Politics and Economy

The corruption scandal involving the former Secretary for Land and Public Transport, Ao Man-long, who was arrested in December 2006 and imprisoned later for 29 years, fully demonstrated the nexus between the government and land developers. Ao was responsible for casino and land development, but in its rapid process of transformations, he became the most powerful politician who took bribes from land developers and construction companies. His case prompted the Macao government to tighten all the procedures of land development, ranging from tendering to the final process of approving such tenders. Although the Macao government has learnt a bitter lesson from the Ao scandal, the corruption saga severely undermined the legitimacy and authority of the Edmund Ho administration, sparking a confrontation between the police and protestors on May 1, 2007. Apparently, the protestors involved workers, unemployed people and disgruntled citizens who abhorred the Ao scandal and who saw the government as basically “exploitative”. This public perception of the Macao polity is not without evidence. Traditionally, the Macao political system has been characterized by patronage. This remains the hallmark of politics in the MSAR, where the pro-establishment, pro-Beijing and anti-democracy interest groups are proliferating. Some local commentators have stressed that Macao is like a society made up of interest groups. This statement has to be read carefully, however. Many of these interest groups have overlapping leaders, executive committee members and ordinary members. Most importantly, the patron-clientelist nature of the political system in Macao means that many of these interest groups have acquired so much financial support from the Macao government that they can organize various activities for citizens. Some of these activities, like social gatherings and dinners, are apparently by no means political in nature; nevertheless, these interest groups can easily mobilize their members in support of electoral forces during election campaigns. In other words, interest groups that are subsidized by the government for their social activities can become political during electoral campaigns. If machine politics had existed in Chicago long ago, according to James Scott, it also persists in the MSAR. In other words, patronage politics in Macao takes the form of governmental

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subsidies given to the pro-establishment interest groups, which in turn organize various social activities without political purpose in non-election time but entailing mobilization functions during electoral campaigns. Patronage politics perpetuates in Macao in such a manner that the pro-Beijing and pro-establishment interest groups are constantly the beneficiaries of such clientelist and guanxi networks. The patronage politics in Macao is extensive and damaging to the growth of a vibrant civil society independent of the government. Many print media also receive governmental subsidies so that they can act as the mouthpiece of the citizens; nevertheless, since they receive direct subsidies from the government, their criticisms of the ruling elites are usually mild, with the exception of a very few vocal media outlets. Journalists and reporters working for the mainstream print and electronic media dare not antagonize the ruling elites by covering politically sensitive stories and articulating critical arguments. The lack of an independent middle class persists in the media sector, especially if a vibrant civil society demands the growth of a group of journalists and media professionals whose income does not stem from the government. Since December 1999, the media development in Macao has remained relatively truncated and underdeveloped mainly because of the monopoly of the government. Independent media outside the financial subsidy of the government have remained very weak and they fail to constitute a voice that can trigger the development of the civil society. The relatively weak civil society in Macao is also attributable to the absence of a pro-democracy legal profession. Occasionally, a few Macao legal professionals are the promoters of democratic reforms, but perhaps they are the rare exceptions. Unlike Hong Kong where an independent and pro-democracy legal sector persists and constitutes a menace to various government policies, notably the enactment of the national security legislation in mid-2003, Macao’s legal sector has traditionally formed a partnership with the government. Under these circumstances, the vocal minority of the local pro-democracy elites have relatively limited influences compared to their counterparts in Hong Kong.

5. Reinterpreting Macao’s Society, Politics and Economy

The Interplay between Macao’s Society, Politics and Economy In Macao under the Portuguese rule, the society was “minimally integrated” into the polity, to use the term of sociologist Lau Siu-kai who studied Hong Kong under the British rule (Lau 1982). The Portuguese governed Macao by sending their Governors and expatriates, and by using the local Macanese as the middlemen between the rulers and the ruled. The outcome was a huge communication gap between the Macao society and polity. This phenomenon has changed gradually since democratization of Macao’s legislative elections in the mid-1970s, when the Portuguese revolution promoted positive political development in Macao, such as the expansion of the electoral franchise, the increase in the number of directly elected seats in the legislature, and the participation of more local Chinese in elections. Still, the Macao society was relatively “alienated” from the polity, although the Chinese community leaders played a crucial role in bridging the communication gap between the Chinese citizens and the Portuguese rulers. The civil service in Macao under the Portuguese rule remained ethnically based, with the upper echelon being staffed by the Portuguese expatriates, the middle sector being dominated by the local Macanese, and the lower stratum being filled by the Chinese citizens. This ethnically based civil service structure gradually changed after the localization policy was adopted after China and Portugal reached the Joint Declaration over the future of Macao in 1987. However, the localization of the civil service could not appease the anger and dissatisfaction of some old Macao Chinese citizens, who still harbored bitter memories of the past when the Portuguese elites dominated them and who saw the Portuguese rule as relatively “incompetent” and “patron-clientelist,” if not necessarily “corrupted”. This relatively “alienated” society of Macao has been contained since December 1999 by two major measures taken by the new Chinese ruling elites. First and foremost, economics in command has remained the ruling principle of the governing elites, who have been relying on casino capitalism to contain any possible social discontent

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(Lo 2008). However, as argued before, casino capitalism does have its negative impacts on the society: social inequalities and the increasing wealth gap between the haves and have-nots. Second, the patronage system inherited from the Portuguese rulers has contained the possible “anger” in the society, especially the proletariat who is split into pro-establishment and pro-democracy fragments. The pro-establishment working class is backed up by the pro-Beijing forces and it enjoys the benefits of receiving governmental subsidies. The pro-democracy proletariat allies with the middle-class liberal democrats, but they are relatively outnumbered and politically insignificant in street protests and electoral participation. Hence, the society of the MSAR has been largely but not completely “integrated” into the polity since its return to the Chinese administration. The society of Macao is basically compressed to such an extent that those civil society groups independent of the government rarely exist. Even when they emerge, these civil society groups have to express their views through unconventional media outlets, notably the Internet and the blogs. The use of the Internet by these young civil society groups can reach the young audience, but in terms of political influence they are very limited. The New Macao Society, for example, has more young people’s participation, but they remain the minority which cannot really constitute a significant force propelling social and political reforms in the MSAR. Yet, the socio-political picture is not as pessimistic as conventional wisdom may assume. The younger generation of leaders in the pro-establishment forces is more educated and perhaps more open-minded than the predecessors. In recent years, the pro-establishment women, youth and labor groups have become very active in absorbing young blood into their ruling stratum. However, it is possible that the injection of young blood, together with their new ideas, may eventually provide a factor bringing about the fragmentation of pro-establishment interest groups. Although patronage politics is common and serious in Macao, generational change may lead to more lively internal political discourse and debates within the pro-establishment camp. Generational change in Macao has been proceeding in a way that has perhaps been neglected by many Macao observers and

5. Reinterpreting Macao’s Society, Politics and Economy

commentators. Such generational change means that the younger Macao people have begun to ponder how their society, economy and polity should be reformed. They also have a greater sense of Macao identity, unlike their predecessors who tended to see Macao as a place where they resided after emigrating from mainland China. They also try to mobilize other young peers to discuss socio-political issues and to engage the government and ruling elites on their visions of Macao’s future. The younger generation is now emerging in not only the pro-democracy camp, but also the Macanese elites and the pro-establishment ones. In the event that the younger generation can prompt a critical rethink of each political sector in Macao, including the pro-government Chinese elites, the Macanese community and the pro-democracy Chinese youth, its hidden impacts cannot be underestimated. In fact, recent surveys of Macao’s political culture have appeared to point to some positive changes in the citizens attitudes toward politics (Yee 2012). Younger citizens tend to have a more solid and clearer view of what constitutes democracy, which to them includes majority rule, accountability, and the rule of law. More young people are expecting the government to be more transparent than ever before. If these findings are accurate pointers of Macao’s evolving political culture, generational change will likely be the most important determinant shaping Macao’s politics in the years to come. In fact, generational change may explain why more young people has taken an active role in the annual May 1 protests demanding that the government should care for the well-being of ordinary citizens and that it should accelerate the process of democratic reforms in Macao. In 2012, when the Macao government dictated the outcome of the electoral reform to be introduced to both the Chief Executive election and the Legislative Council election, these young intellectuals severely criticized the government for mishandling the consultation with members of the public. Their expectations of how the government of Macao should be operating and led has already become an indicator of the rising political aspirations of the new generation, whose Macao identity is ironically much stronger than the earlier immigrants from mainland China. In other words, as the identity of the Macao people gets stronger and develops in a more significant manner, their political

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demand for a more democratic Macao will also be stronger, thus exerting pressure on the Macao government in the years to come.

Conclusion and Geopolitics of Macao’s Casino Capitalism Overall, Macao’s dependence on casino capitalism and its accompanied integration of the society into the polity do not bode well for political development in the short run. Casino capitalism has provided more employment for the ordinary people, but it has inherently class nature that benefits the conservative segment of the middle class and that enriches the already influential capitalist class, including the land developers, casino operators, and other big business people. Casino capitalism has also sustained the income gap between the rich and the poor, a phenomenon mitigated by the government’s interventionist policy of providing annual subsidies to all the people of Macao. Indeed, the Macao government has taken more social measures, such as improvement of social welfare and acceleration in the building of housing units, so as to contain any possible societal discontent. Still, the compressed nature of the society with minimal political space for the increasing aspirations of the middle-class liberal democrats and the relatively alienated proletariat means that political discontent is only contained, but not tackled in their root causes. Compounding the problem of simmering political discontent is the perpetuation of the patronage system in Macao’s politics. The pro-establishment elites remain politically influential. So long as Macao enjoys the fruits of casino capitalism, socio-political stability is maintained at the cost of political underdevelopment. Political reform in Macao is basically stagnant, even though the legislature in 2013 witnessed a few additional seats in both the directly elected and occupational sector. Accountability of the Macao government remains limited as long as the middle-class liberal democrats and the disgruntled proletariat are politically marginalized with the voices largely excluded in the policy-making processes. An ideal type of political development is to co-opt them into the policy-making processes rather than

5. Reinterpreting Macao’s Society, Politics and Economy

perpetuating the patron-clientelist style of Macao politics. Sadly, under the circumstances of dependent casino capitalism and partially integrated socio-politically system, the status quo appears to be the “best” mode of political development. If economic fluctuations suddenly take place in Macao due to regional or global economic crisis, the socio-political impacts on Macao would perhaps be totally unanticipated. In order to pre-empt any possible socio-political crisis resulting from a sudden economic downturn, the Macao ruling elites may have to ponder a more proactive strategy of economic and political development, including the questions of how to minimize their dependence on casino capitalism, how to tilt the imbalance of patronage to embrace the politically deprived middle-class liberal democrats and local proletariat, and how to strike a fine balance between dependent casino capitalism and more social welfare for the people of Macao. In the final analysis, although Macao’s polity remains stagnant and civil society space is relatively limited, generational change is gradually propelling political transformations and social changes. The younger generation of Macao has a stronger sense of their local identity, trying to shape Macao’s future, having their own visions of the ideal polity, active society and diversified economy. If this analysis is accurate, casino capitalism will sooner or later undergo tremendous challenges, criticisms and scrutiny in the years to come, especially as the casino franchises of the operators will cease in 2020. Inevitably, the Macao society will witness more lively, critical and vocal discussions of the future directions of casino capitalism as well as its related positive and negative impacts. From a broader perspective of the development of political economy in Macao and China as a whole, Macao’s casino capitalism has its special place in the PRC. Macao remains the only place where casinos are legalized, legitimized and internationalized. As long as Mainland China remains a socialist regime, officially, Macao’s casino capitalism has its special niche in the PRC. Although Hong Kong has its horseracing as the hallmark of the territory’s gaming sector, Hong Kong does have floating casino cruises, which however are no match with Macao’s casinos in terms of the scale of their operations. However, Macao’s casino capitalism can have its own impacts on Mainland China, especially if the PRC is moving

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slowly away from socialism to capitalist mode of economic operations. In late 2012, for example, Hainan Island was reportedly experimenting with Macao’s casino-style operations, but such casinos were quickly played down in the official Chinese media. No matter whether Hainan Island was really experimenting with the Macao style of casino operations, or regardless of whether the Island’s authorities might test the intentions of the central government, Beijing did not and does not want to witness any legalization of casino gambling in the mainland, for gambling remains a socially undesirable issue detrimental to the state ideology of socialism. As such, Macao’s casino capitalism has significant ramifications for other parts of the PRC: Hong Kong having horseracing as its special gaming sector, while the mainland can at most have underground or illegal casinos rather than having any legalized gaming sector parallel to Macao. Most importantly, perhaps Macao’s casinos have become a united front tool utilized by Beijing to attract the American and Australian investment into the territory’s gaming sector so as to maintain China’s diplomatic finesse in face of the so-called “China threat” perspective. If so, Macao’s casino capitalism can be seen as the economic and, to some extent, cultural arm of the PRC diplomacy vis-à-vis the Western nation-states. Economically, Macao symbolizes the continuation of casino capitalism and the status quo of China’s special administrative regions, including Hong Kong as well. Culturally and ideologically, Macao’s casino capitalism can perhaps be seen as a vehicle of China’s soft power in dealing with the United States and Australia. Geopolitically, Macao’s casino capitalism reminds foreign powers of the fact that the PRC remains the heartland, to use the term of MacKinder, of the Asian continent in general and East Asia in particular. Geopolitically, the North Korea, a socialist regime seen by most nations as a security “threat”, has traditionally used Macao as a useful economic channel of conducting trade with the outside world. Yet, Macao can also be a magnet attracting the American and Australian investment, thus showing the peaceful coexistence of foreign powers with North Korea. Hence, the geopolitical, economic and cultural implications of Macao’s casino capitalism are arguably tremendous and deserve our continuous attention in the future.

5. Reinterpreting Macao’s Society, Politics and Economy

References Ip, Wing Tong (2012). “Casino capitalism and social polarization in Macao,” Asian Education and Development, vol. 1, no. 3, 276–293. Lau, Siu Kai (1982). Society and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press). Lo, Sonny (2009a). The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations: A Model for Taiwan? (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press). Lo, Sonny (2009b). “Casino Capitalism and Its Legitimacy Impact on the Politico-Administrative State in Macao,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, vol. 1, 19–48. Lo, Sonny (2008). Political Change in Macao. London: Routledge. Lo, Sonny (2005). “Casino Politics, Organized Crime and the Post-Colonial State in Macao,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 14, no. 43. Lo, Sonny (1999), “Towards the End of the Stanley Ho Connection,” China Perspectives, no. 26, November/December. Lo, Sonny (1995). Political Development in Macau. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Lo, Sonny (1993). “Bureaucratic Corruption and Its Control in Macao,” Asian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 15, no. 1, June, pp. 32–58. Yee, Herbert, Lou Shing Wah and Chan, Cheuk Va (2012). The Changing Political Culture of Macao (in Chinese) (Hong Kong: Commercial Press).

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6 Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model and the Las Vegas Casino Resort Model Ricardo C. S. SIU Miao HE

In the process when a market evolves, its changing structure, organization and performance are determined dynamically by a number of forces, which may or may not simultaneously push the market to move in the same direction. In institutional economics, although curiosity and technological progress (including progress in human mind and the traditional ways of business) do advance instrumental efficiency of the market, the scope and pace of economic changes may be restricted and “encapsulated” by the ceremonial behavior of various existing power groups in preserving their own interests/benefits.1 This simple but crucial dichotomous nature in the process of economic changes is also found present in the evolution of Macao’s casino industry since the dawn of the 21st century.2 Transforming from a “sin city” into the world’s most famous and successful casino resort and entertainment destination,3 business models introduced and developed by the Las Vegas casino resorts since the 1970s provide valuable experiences for the modernization of other gaming sites, including the fabled Chinese gambling city, Macao. In 2002, when the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) Government decided to conclude the casino monopoly by issuing three new licenses, two of them were granted directly or indirectly to the world-class Vegas casino resort operators (Wynn Resorts and Las Vegas Sands). Consequently, it was commonly 97

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anticipated by the market that considerable changes in the organization of Macao’s casino business would take place.4 Among the potential changes, interrelationship between its traditional independent third-party operated gambling room business segment (commonly categorized as “VIP baccarat” in Macao) and the newly introduced Vegas-style market-orientated business segment (including the mass and high-end market as operated directly by a casino license holder), was a remarkable dichotomy faced by the industry intended to make real progress.5 After the May 2004 opening of the first Vegas-based casino (the Sands Casino) and its impressive results in mass-market and high-end play business (that did not operated on Macao’s traditional gambling room model), the MSAR market generally believed that the Vegas casino resort model would become a strong instrumental force to alter the traditional gambling room practice to usher the MSAR casino industry into a new era. However, the long-established gambling room business has mounted a strong resistance to change (the ceremonial dominance that “encapsulated” the real changes introduced by the Vegas casinos in Macao), which not only hampered the development of the Las Vegas casino model, but rather pushed the Vegas casinos to adopt the Macao model. As shown in Table 1, after the Vegas-based casinos have operated in Macao for a decade, the Macao casino industry still retains its unique features as compared with those of Las Vegas (as the benchmark for Nevada). In 2010–2011, while slot machine play accounted for 62.9% of the Gross Gaming Revenue (GGR) in Nevada’s casinos, this segment only represented less than 5% of the casino business in Macao. In addition, Macao was categorized as a table game market, which was dominated by one single game—baccarat. In the calendar year of 2010, 72.0% of Macao’s casino GGR was derived from VIP baccarat which was in fact the gambling room play, as 18.5% was derived from mass-market baccarat and only 4.9% was from the non-baccarat mass market table games.

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model Table 1. Composition of Casinos’ Gross Gaming Revenue in Macao and Nevada (2010–2011) GGRT(VIP)/GGR Macao

†

72.0%

Nevada‡

GGRT(Mass)/GGR

GGRS/GGR

23.4%

4.6%

37.1%

62.9%

Sources: Macao, http://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/en/information/ DadosEstat/2011/content.ht; Las Vegas, http://gaming.nv.gov/factindex.htm. † ‡ GGR: VIP: Mass: T: S:

For the calendar year of 2010 For the fiscal Year July 2010–June 2011 Gross gaming revenue Premium play in Nevada, and “VIP baccarat” in Macao Mass market (or gaming floor) Tables Slots

In fact, features and practice of the “VIP” play as found in Macao’s casinos are quite different from the premium play (or high-end play) as commonly understood in Las Vegas. Taking into account of the huge amount of investment which has been made by the Las Vegas casinos in Macao, and the importance of casino gaming to the Macao’s economic growth and development, areas such as the two business models adopted respectively by the Macao casinos and Vegas casinos, their connecting points and the approach of integration in the long run become essential topics to not only academic studies, but also the formulation of effective business strategies and related public policies. Indeed, the two business models developed respectively in Las Vegas and in Macao are quite different in terms of their social, economic and regulatory settings. To a large extent, the recent wrestles between these two models in the transformation of Macao’s casino industry have focused on the financial benefits sought by the various related parties (casino operators, gambling room operators and their business associates, and the local government). Thus, this study would firstly investigate and reveal the financial features and practices of these two models (e.g., sources/composition and distribution of revenues, profitability and financial risks associated with the various business segments, etc.), their conflicting financial

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configurations in operation, possible adjustments and integration in the foreseeable future. In addition, since the role of the public sector interests (including its entitlement of gaming tax) and related policies evidently exert crucial influence over the ways that the two models are integrated, a second objective of this study is to explore the MSAR government’s influences on the evolving path and performance of its casino industry. To provide a robust and objective ground for this study, the paradigm of ceremonial-instrumental dichotomy from institutional economics will firstly be highlighted, which is found neatly uncovering the forces leading to the transition and changing performance of Macao’s casino industry since the MSAR’s establishment. Then, two sections are organized to present the unique features of Macao’s gambling room model and the Las Vegas casino resort model. In the related analyses, the ceremonial and instrumental features of these two models will be highlighted. In addition, the administrative contexts that enable the practice of these two models will also be examined. On the basis of the relevant facts as identified, a comparative study will be conducted to reveal the financial and administrative tensions between these two models, hence pinpointing the key obstacles to be overcome in the near future for the sake of their effective integration. The last section will explore the existing puzzles faced by the public sector and regulatory issues to be addressed. Indeed, findings presented in this study could provide valuable references for the casino operators in their reviews of long-term business and investment strategies in Macao, as well as MSAR government in their re-assessment of the casino industry’s development path in the future.

The Ceremonial-instrumental Dichotomy in Institutional Analysis Enlightened by the concept of evolution in Darwinism, institutional economists are driven to formulate a realistic ground to explain the nature, process and consequence of economic and industrial changes, with emphasis on the influences of the evolutionary process and the

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model

humanly created institutions on the various patterns of economic behavior.6 When examining the interacting forces leading to the various changes in any economic organizations, the “ceremonial-instrumental dichotomy” as introduced by institutional economics founder Veblen Thorstein in his book The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904), provides a thoughtful approach to outline the fact that every economic society is endowed with a stifled structure of social status running in opposition to the technological aspects of group life. This pragmatic reasoning draws a clear line between institutional economics and the orthodox economics. 7 Accordingly, it is loyally employed by the economists interested in the evolutionary aspects of an economy, as well as the differences in economic change and performance of different economies. By the same token, this analytical approach or reasoning is also found useful to explore topics related to the studies of gambling and commercial gaming (including the recent growth of casino gaming as a global economic sector). In an institutionalist’s point of view, institution is “a set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behaviour.”8 It is argued that the behavior of all economic participants are subject to social prescriptions (determining whether or not any patterns of individual behavior or routines of firms are socially acceptable and the degree of acceptance), and this is particularly important to the advancement of the “problem-solving behavior” of the community.9 In principle, institutionalists categorize human behavior into two major patterns—ceremonial and instrumental. Ceremonial patterns of behavior refer to the habitual behavior evolved from the emotions and social norms, while instrumental patterns of behavior relate to the problem-solving behavior which constantly recombine and provide new opportunities.10 Besides, it suggests that the nature of instrumental patterns of behavior are dynamic by instinct which require changes in habits of thoughts over time, and ceremonial patterns of behavior are “past-binding” which may stifle progress by inhibiting technological innovation. 11 In human society, it is a common phenomenon that technological innovation is constrained by the existing social norms and business routines. Thus, instrumental change may be “encapsulated” by the ceremonial patterns of behavior. In other words, “The history of the human

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race is that of a perpetual opposition of these forces, the dynamic force of technology continually making for change, and the static force of ceremony—status, mores, and legendary belief—opposing change.”12 In a nutshell, new instrumental patterns of behavior that follow a technological innovation in the market may expand if they are not repelled by community’s existing patterns of power, status, and other privileges. 13 Contrarily, if technological change is largely constrained by the ceremonially warranted behavior, minimal instrumental advancement could be ultimately realized. Indeed, interactions of these two forces to determine the evolution and development path of a market could be well elaborated by evidences related to the recent evolution of Las Vegas and Macao—the world’s two largest gaming jurisdictions in terms of their GGRs, and the integration of the two fairly different (or even conflicting) business models in Macao following a major institutional change introduced by the Macao SAR Government in 2002. By following this analytical approach, the root causes of the tensions linking to the integration of the Macao gambling room model and the Las Vegas casino resort model would be uncovered in their respective evolutionary aspects.

Features and Practice of the Macao Gambling Room Model As depicted in Table 1, the impressive performance of Macao’s casino industry is primarily contributed by one single game, baccarat, that has long accounted for around 90% of the industry’s GGR. The baccarat gaming business is amazingly dominated by a particular segment, the gambling room play (VIP baccarat). On top of the Table 1 data, VIP baccarat continues to climb up to 73.4% of the industry’s reported GGR in the first half of 2011. In practice, a significant portion of the business turnover from VIP baccarat is derived from the gambling rooms operated directly or indirectly by independent third parties (commonly known as “gaming agents” and “chip rollers” in Macao).14

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model

To the industry, it is well-understood that profit margin of the premium play (or high-end play) segment to the casino firms in any market (e.g., Las Vegas) is lower than that of the mass market.15 In the case of Macao’s gambling room business, the profit margin may be even lower (see Figure 1). To a casino, although direct internal operation costs could be reduced with part of its business (like gambling rooms) contracted to certain third parties or gaming agents (gambling room operators and their associates), subscription of this form of special agency services is quite costly. Generally speaking, commission paid to the gaming agents could be as high as 40% of the casino’s related GGR.16 Therefore, after deducting 40% gaming tax on the GGR and other business operation costs (but before capital expenditures), profit derived from the gambling room segment is quite slim (around 10% of the related GGR) as compared with the mass market (around 40%), even though the absolute amount of turnover from the former is eye-catching. Figure 1. Distribution of GGR Derived from Macao’s Gambling Room and Mass Market

Indeed, nature and structure of Macao’s gambling room business is quite unique and different from the general understanding of the premium play segment in Las Vegas.17 First, although casino license holders in mass could assert from a legal point of view that gambling room business conducted on their casino properties should be considered as part of their own business, such a segment is effectively operated by one or more highly

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independent third parties. Noticeably, it is the gambling room operators and their associates (e.g., “gaming agents” and “chip rollers” in different hierarchies) instead of the casino who sell the casino betting chips (called non-redeemable chips) directly to the “VIP” players. 18 Accordingly, the licensed casino firms may not have full control over complete information about the “VIP” players who play in the gambling rooms. In addition, it is mostly the gambling room operators who are held accountable for financing the operation of the gambling rooms (including credit lines granted to their patrons and collection of related credits), as well as assuming the business risk associated with high-end plays (e.g., a gambling room operator may have to fully or partly take up losses incurred in his/her gambling room). For the aforementioned reasons, under the routine of Macao’s gambling room business model, the gambling room operators and the related gaming agents are entitled for a fixed portion of GGR derived from the operation of the gambling room business (roughly represented by the $40 out of any $100 GGR as presented in Figure 1).19 To the casino license holders, notwithstanding the low profit margin, business liquidity and risk could be shared largely by the gambling room operators, especially in terms of the provision of casino credit, as well as its collection and possible loss on the tables for any time period. In other words, although the profit margin of the gambling room segment as seen in Figure 1 is much lower than that of the mass market operations (only one-fourth in the scenario illustrated in Figure 1), positive contribution to the casino’s turnover could almost be warranted at minimal resource requirement (casino marketing, casino credit, etc.) on the casino license holder. In view of the particular social and economic contexts, and more importantly the public interests and regulatory settings in Macao,20 it is undeniable that to the casino license holders, the gambling room business model is an “optimal” choice evolving from a set of possible optima (especially in terms of the ceremonial desire of the related interest groups to push up the gross amount of business turnover, hence GGR over time). Despite the low profit margin, as long as the gambling room operators could bring in a large business volume to casinos (including patrons whose sources of gambling funds may hardly be verified), the absolute amount of

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model

profit to be enjoyed by the casino license holders would remain significant. During the process, although a number of socially and ethically controversial issues may be associated with the gambling room business model practice (like crime, commercial sex, loan shark, and money laundering), it is persisting and even expanding since the industrial structure was altered by the MSAR government in 2002. This is largely due to the regime’s ceremonial behavior to keep its hand off the market after ensuring its entitlement to the economic benefits from this sector. In fact, the gaming industry’s development path and performance is largely outlined by the public sector choices at the outset. It is clear that related choices are significantly “locked in” by the regime’s entitlement for a considerable volume of gaming tax as well as an extensive arrays of social contributions from the casinos. For example, if 70% of the industry’s GGR is derived from VIP baccarat and the remaining 30% from mass market, based on the scenario stated in Figure 1, and if the reported GGR from the industry is $10 billion, profit (after gaming tax and business operation costs) derived by the casinos from the gambling room segment is $700 million, while the mass market is $1.2 billion for a $1.9 billion total. In this hypothetical case, although profit derived from the gambling room segment is lower than that of mass market, the casino operators are indeed not required to spend much effort to reap this part of profit from the market. Besides, it is worth noting that the gambling room operators and their associates share $2.8 billion, and the government, as the biggest beneficiary, shares $4 billion.

Features and Practice of the Las Vegas Casino Resort Model Modern development of the casino resort model in Las Vegas is evidently accredited by a set of instrumental changes introduced by the US and Nevada governments in the late 1960s.21 Due to the impact of the regulatory system and the effectiveness of the Nevada and US governments’ enforcement mechanism, most if not all,

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socially and ethically controversial activities that have long puzzled the real performance of the market are successfully mitigated. In addition, its progress is further pushed by the market participants through effective innovations brought forward by various organizations in the industry. Even though Nevada’s monopoly position in the US casino gaming has been deprived since this industry was legalized across various states from the later 1970s (as marked by the gaming legalization of in Atlantic City in 1978), the resultant increase in market competition adversely affected visitor arrivals and GGR, 22 casinos in Las Vegas then responded proactively through effective and continuous innovations in their business organizations and marketing strategies. 23 One of Las Vegas’ key successes in its recent transformation development is featured by a significant amount of capital investment in opulent facilities for non-gaming functions as they also serve as synthetic tourism destinations for recreation, entertainment, meeting, incentive travel, convention and exhibition. Indeed, the successful sustainable growth of the Las Vegas casino resort model are attributed to the provision of highly value-added attractions and quality services that are largely financed by gaming revenues that enable quality services at relatively “reasonable” prices. As pointed out critically by Steve Wynn, a leading Las Vegas casino resort tycoon and entrepreneur: “Gaming is the economic engine of tourism in Nevada, but it is not the hook. It is the non-gaming attractions that are financed from gaming dollars that keep that state growing and the economy healthy.”24 From the opening of the Mirage in 1989 to Treasure Island and MGM Grand in 1993, the Venetian in 1999, and the Wynn in 2005, then the further expansion of Venetian to Palazzo and Wynn to Encore in 2008, and the MGM’s City Center in 2009–2010, the business models developed by the Las Vegas casino resort operators have become increasingly capital intensive (see Table 2). Before the unexpected outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis hit the investment plans of most casino resorts in Las Vegas and the world markets, MGM’s City Center was originally scaled to be a USD9.2 billion record-high project in the industry.

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model

Table 2. Capital Investment by the 3 Major Casino Resort Operators in Las Vegas

Operator Las Vegas Sands

Wynn

MGM Mirage

Property

Billion USD

Opening Date

Venetian

1.5

May 3, 1999

Palazzo

1.9

January 17, 2008

Wynn

2.7

April 28, 2005

Encore

2.3

December 22, 2008

MGM Grand City Center

1

December 18, 1993

9.2

December 16, 2009

Source: Venetian: ttp://www.lasvegassun.com/news/1999/apr/07/ venetian-pushes-opening-back-to-may-2/ Palazzo: http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=185629&p =irol-newsArticle&ID= 1098663&highlight= Wynn: http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2005/apr/28/ crowds-flock-to-wynn/ Encore: http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/dec/22/encore/ MGM Grand: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/ 1G1-14647604.html CityCenter: http://www.citycenter.com/images/pressroom/ ReviewJournal5-20-08.pdf

Indeed, a large portion of the capital investment in the construction of non-gaming attractions (a constant increase on the asset side in the casino resorts’ balance sheets) was financed by the gaming revenue (a relatively high EBITDA in their income statements). In turn, the opulent non-gaming facilities attract higher visitor arrivals in Las Vegas as a tourism and entertainment destination, whose consumption expenditures underwrites the sustainable growth of Las Vegas’ gaming and non-gaming segments since the 1980s (See Figure 2).

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Figure 2. Practice of the Vegas Casino Resort Model

Non-Gaming

C

tal ap i

fun

d w flo

ic aff Tr

Gaming

sh Ca

Unique properties and attractions of the casino resorts

To secure Las Vegas’ long-term attractiveness and competitiveness, enhancement of existing facilities and reinvestment in new properties have been the business strategy undertaken by the casino resorts. During the process, as the scale of both assets and liabilities in the casino resorts’ balance sheets grow, it becomes an essential task for the management to maintain a healthy growth by planning strategically to ensure that sufficient revenue could be generated from the casino operations, i.e., to optimize the GGR from casino operations (i.e., to optimize the GGR from casino operations). Analyzing the practice of casino operations, developing a mass market as opposed to premium (or VIP) plays, has been commonly adopted as a more desirable strategy for casino resort operators. Unlike the mass market, both explicit and implicit costs required to compete for premium players in the market could be very high. For example, as pointed out by Kilby et al,25 costs relating to amenities (capital investment in fixed properties to cater for the premium players), hosts (commission to marketing personnel, airfare allowance and other forms of comps), and deals (rebate or discount on losses, or priori discount) for the premium player segment could be substantial, that tap a significant portion of the casinos’ house advantages in various games. Consequently, profit margin, 26 or EBITDA as a percentage of the total amount of wagered and GGR

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model

respectively, derived from the premium player segment could be very thin. 27 In addition, as premium players ordinarily play limited number of hands in casino, by “reducing the number of hands (or rounds) played, a player can create a relatively high variance (i.e., risk) in the distribution of possible outcomes.” 28 For these two major reasons, incentive and financial ability of casinos in Las Vegas to go with the premium players would not be a principal business strategy. In other words, although premium players may be appealing to casinos on account of the absolute size of their bets, this segment does not necessarily match with the needs for long-term development of the Vegas casino resort model. Instead, effective planning which secures successful development of the mass market explains the success of Las Vegas.

Tensions between the Integration of the Two Models and Implications With reference to the financial and business features of the Macao gambling room model and the Vegas casino resort model as depicted in the last two sections, it is obvious that the business objectives of these two models are quite different, or even conflicting with each other under certain circumstances. This is largely due to the disparities in the social, political and economic environments where the respective businesses are constructed and evolved. Thus, an administrative decision to employ a new business model from another market to its own routine could hardly insure a smooth integration, nor a consequential dominance of the new model. In the case of Macao, it is evident that the ceremonially warranted patterns of business routine (as formulated by the behavior of related market participants) under the gambling room model presents a strong resistance for the industry to integrate effectively with the Vegas mass market based business model. This dichotomy could be uncovered by means of the changes in the share of VIP baccarat and mass market baccarat in the industry’s GGR (see Figure 3).

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Figure 3. Respective Share of VIP Baccarat and Mass-market Baccarat in Macao’s Quarterly GGR (2005.1q–2011.2q)

Source of data: http://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/en/information/DadosEstat/ 2011/content.html#n1

The Sands Macao, as the first Las Vegas based casino to opened in mid-2004, due to both the trade-mark effect in the consumers’ perception that “Las Vegas has arrived Macao” and the caution of the new operator about the Nevada government’s requirements for its overseas business,29 extensive efforts were put in to cultivate the mass market, the “Sand effect” did push up the growth of this business segment and the market’s expectation on Macao’s potential changes. Consequently, as revealed in Figure 3, these two business segments showed a trend of convergence in 2005. With emphasis on the development of the mass market, the high profit margin (which is in line with the estimations as depicted in Figure 1) derived by Sands Macao allowed its USD240 million capital investment in property to be recovered in only 11 months.30 Nevertheless, the pressure exerted by the traditional gambling room segment did obstruct the further development of the mass market, hence posing significant challenge to the integration of these two business models in Macao. To compete for the high-end and “VIP” players in their Macao businesses, US casino operators might be allowed by the Nevada

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model

gaming laws to pay commission directly to junket operators (which may also include the gaming agents and chip rollers in Macao’s practice), it was subject to the condition of no gambling room operated by independent third party. Accordingly, as depicted on the right side of Figure 4, by saving the commission paid to one major level of the gaming agent (i.e., gambling room operators), the Vegas casinos operating in Macao in the middle of the 2000s might choose to provide a higher commission directly to the gaming agents and chip rollers (0.7% to 1.1%), than what these parties would have usually obtained from the gambling room operators.31 In addition, direct incentive scheme (e.g., rebate) would be offered by the casinos to walk-in high-end and premium players, or those who were approached directly by the casinos with similar arrangements as the Vegas comp (complimentary) play schemes.32 Figure 4. Difference between the Flows of Commission in Macao’s Gambling Room Model and the “Revised” Las Vegas Model

Casino license holders 0.7% - 1.1%

Gambling room operators

0.7% - 1.1%

0.4% - 0.7%

Chip rollers/Gaming Agents

> 0.1% (Rebate, etc.)

0.1% (?)

Customers

In order to regain the losing (or potentially lose) market share and customers, some casino operators reacted by offering higher commissions to the gambling room operators, so that they could retain their associates (i.e., gaming agents and chip rollers at various hierarchies) in the business. Thus, the share of VIP baccarat in the

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industry’s GGR picked up again in the said period (see Figure 3). Ultimately, owing to the unregulated and irregular business activities as traditionally associated with the gambling rooms, it was reported in the late 2007 and beginning of 2008 that the commission rate paid by some casinos to the gambling room operators was bid up to 1.35%,33 which meant that the $10 profit to the casinos as shown in Figure 1 mostly evaporated, although the aggregate amount of GGR reported by the industry as a whole remained very impressive. In other words, further development of the Vegas casino resort model in Macao might be restricted by the casino license holders’ inadequate profit margin for financing non-gaming attractions. On the other hand, the practice of the Macao gambling room model might similarly not be sustainable as a result of actual profits gained by the casino license holders (and even the gambling room operators) eliminated by higher commission paid to the gaming agents and chip rollers at various hierarchies. In view of the uncontrolled uplift in commission, as well as the increasing number of cases identified with questionable sources of gambling funds spent by some Chinese officials in Macao, the PRC government cut back and in May 2008 imposed extra restrictions on individual permits for the Individual Visit Scheme (IVS)34 for the mainland Chinese to visit Macao. Subsequently, share of VIP baccarat declined (as seen in Figure 3). Due to the “One Country, Two Systems” policy, to insulate Macao from the 2008 global financial tsunami and to celebrate the MSAR’s 10th anniversary of establishment as well as considering the cooperative actions undertaken by the industry and the MSAR government to slash the related problems, the visa restriction was gradually eased from late 2009. Besides, as business organization of the existing gambling rooms also evolved as a response to the changing administrative context, its share in the industry increased again from the summer of 2009. Nevertheless, it is evident that although under the brand names of the Las Vegas casinos, their business organizations and practice in Macao had revised significantly vis-a-vis those in Las Vegas.

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model

The Dichotomy in Regime Stance So far, the contradictory qualities of the Macao gambling room model and the Las Vegas casino resort model uncovered mostly relate to their business organizations and market performances. Nonetheless, as a policy-biased industry, the dichotomous role of the MSAR Government since its decision to replace the industry’s monopoly by an oligopoly structure undoubtedly contributed an essential factor giving rise to the tensions as presented in the process of integration between the two models. First, it is necessary to highlight that without the initial instrumental change in the public choice (interests), the casino resort model developed in Las Vegas may not have been introduced in Macao since 2002. 35 In other words, the recent change in the organization of Macao’s casino industry is largely triggered by public choice instead of a result of the market’s evolution. To complete the process (diffusion of the new instrumental value over the market following the initial change) of transforming Macao’s casino industry from a traditional structure (widely associated with various socially and ethically controversial activities) into a truly high value-added entertainment destination, or to achieve an amalgam of the two, a free market approach is not necessarily effective. It is part of the public sector’s responsibility to take a proactive role to coordinate the integration of these two models, especially to alter the distribution of the financial benefits among various parties in such a way that long-term investment and re-investment incentive of the industry could be insured. Nevertheless, inherited from the tradition of the Macao-Portuguese government minimal regulations have been ever imposed on the casinos’ business practice (a kind of ceremonial “encapsulated’ behavior of the Macao government in the market), it is evident that there has been inadequate level of necessary measures adopted by MSAR Government since its initial decision to conclude the monopoly structure, to supervise and monitor the industry’s expansion and business practice. Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that if proactive roles were taken by the government since its decision to liberalize the industry (with approval to double the

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number of gaming operators from three to six soon after three new gaming licenses were granted in early 2002), the uncontrolled growth of the industry’s scale and the commission battle as snowballed during the period of 2007–2008 could have been suppressed (or even winded). Second, although it is evident that an integration of the Las Vegas casino resort model and Macao’s third-party operated gambling-room model requires an effective involvement by the government, the existing gambling-room operators ↔ casino operators ↔ government relationship in terms of their share of the GGR may indeed hold back the government’s role in pushing fundamental changes in the industry from its existing practice. With reference to the distribution of the related financial benefits from the business of casino gaming as depicted in Figure 1, it is evident that the Las Vegas model is more appealing to the casino operators than the other two parties. For example, given Macao’s 2010 GGR was USD23.7bn, where 70% was derived from “VIP baccarat” and 30% from mass market, distribution of the GGR between casino operators, gambling-room operators, and the public sector were USD7.58 billion, 6.64 billion and 9.48 billion respectively. Take a scenario of only 50% of GGR derived from “VIP baccarat”, a direct effect to the performance of Macao’s casinos would be a lower GGR because in terms of the volume of chip rolling, mass market plays would be smaller than the “VIP” plays. Suppose that GGR drops to 19.0 billion instead of 23.7 billion (i.e., a 20% drop in the casinos’ GGR) under this scenario, and the distribution of this amount to the three beneficial groups would become USD7.6 billion, 3.8 billion and 7.6 billion respectively. It is evident that with this change, the two immediate “losers” would be the existing gambling-room operators and the government. Nevertheless, after this change, if the market picks up the business volume, say a few years later, it is then not necessarily a “loss” to the government. Consequently, public decision becomes a crucial “external” factor in pushing through the integration of these two models. However, as the “biggest beneficiary” from the practice of the gambling room business, which pushes up the GGR over time, hence gaming tax instead of profit margin of the casinos (see the numerical

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model

example as illustrated in the last paragraph of the section of “Features and practice of the Macao gambling room model”), the public sector is evidently locked up in the related economic benefits. As seen in Figure 5, after the rapid (but somehow uncontrolled) growth of the casino industry for almost a decade, the government’s revenue (in terms of both current and total revenue) has been increasingly reliant on the gaming tax. Despite the fact that gaming tax has long been accounted for over 50% of the government’s fiscal income, the significance is further raised since 2002. In 2010, for example, gaming tax represented 88% of the MSAR’s current revenue and 86% of its total revenue, while they were only by 51% and 71% respectively in 2002. Consequently, its drive to take an active role to integrate the two models is quite likely be curbed. Figure 5. Changes in the MSAR Government’s Revenue Reliance on Gaming Tax36

Source of data: Yearbook of Statistics (2003, 2006 and 2009).

Third, introduced regulations practice of regulations regulations

despite the fact that after the MSAR government the instrumental change in 2002, a series of new have been promulgated to refine the composition and the traditional business segment, enforcement of such is barely evident. For example, promulgation of related to supervise and guide the practice of the gaming agents

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and chip rollers (Administrative Regulation no°6/2002) and the casino credit (Law no°5/2004), are definitely big official steps to upgrade the traditional low-transparency business segment to meet international practice. Nevertheless, owing to the intricate organization of Macao’s traditional casino business, especially the independent third-party operated segment, it is evident that its long-established “way of the business” could hardly be altered in a short period of time by changes in formal rules. Besides, ambiguities traditionally surrounding the structure and presentation of certain regulations may always adversely affect implementation effectiveness. For example, it is pointed out by Leonard (2006) that the regulations for the practice of gaming agents and chip rollers seemingly has not yet defined a clear scope as to well cover all parties and individuals engaged in this business. Indeed, it is observed that the drawbacks with the enforcement mechanism have led to unfavorable results despite the good intents, which further explain the tensions in the market in the second half of the 2000s as aforesaid. As a matter of fact, the dichotomy of the government’s stand in the market has led to duality of the market structure and performance. Based on the existing administrative structure and its practice in Macao, co-existence of the two very different market segments instead of a progressive integration is quite likely to persist, at least for the foreseeable decade of the 2010s. Under the most recent Chinese government’s proposal to urge and support Macao’s development as a “World Tourism and Leisure Center”, 37 it is reasonable to anticipate that an external force (instrumental change) will step into the existing routine of the Macao Government in approaching the composition and conduct, as well as the dichotomy of the casino industry. There is definitely an essential era ahead, with regards to both the Macao Government’s related policies, as well as related researches.

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model

Concluding Remarks Analyzing from the angles of the organization of casino gaming as a modern economic sector, as well as its global competitiveness and sustainable growth, the instrumental privilege of the Vegas casino resort model is indisputable. Nevertheless, as a socially and ethically controversial industry, hence a policy-biased sector in practice, its industrial organization is highly influenced by public interests at the outset. While a key to the success of the Vegas casino resort model is backed by the related policies of the Nevada Government to insure the transparency and appropriate conduct of the market (hence attracting continuous fixed capital investment in the opulent non-gaming properties and facilities, financed by the gaming dollars derived from the relatively profitable mass market segment), Macao’s gambling room model is largely approved by a long-established tradition of the Macao government and the related parties to chasing for larger GGR, it is therefore not necessarily equivalent to high profitability to the casinos. As revealed by the related facts and evidences, these two models are even in conflict with each other under certain circumstances. Indeed, an effective integration of these two models for a real achievement of Macao’s casino gaming industry as a modern economic sector is curbed by the resistance from the related gaming agents and chip rollers (worrying loss of their possible shares of the economic benefits) on one hand, and the Macao Government’s traditionally heavy reliance on the high gaming tax revenue on the other hand. Together with the drawbacks in Macao’s administrative and regulatory systems (especially the enforcement mechanism of the system), the Vegas model is unarguably “encapsulated” by the ceremonially warranted business routines of the gambling room model. As a significant portion of the business turnover is “retained” to be reaped by certain “agents” as well as by the public sector, the privileges of the Vegas model could hardly be effectively employed in the existing market segment. Yet, owing to the changing public interests from both the Chinese government and MSAR government to re-package and transform Macao from a “world gambling center” to a “world tourism and leisure center,”

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certain essential features of the Vegas model will have to be further developed in Macao. Consequently, coexistence of these two models is likely to be more viable than a smooth integration in the foreseeable future.

Notes 1. “Ceremonial encapsulation”, “ceremonial dominance” and “ceremonially warranted patterns of behavior” are essential concepts in institutional economics, which explain how the traditions or “the way of business” adopted by members of an economic society may resist and interact with the changes as introduced by new idea/knowledge (i.e., instrumental change), hence determining the path of evolution and changes in efficiency of that economic society over time; see Thorstein, V., The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, ( New York, N.Y.: Mentor Books, 1899); Junker, L., ‘The ceremonial-instrumental dichotomy in institutional analysis: The nature and radical implications of the conflicting systems,’ American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 41(2), (1982), pp. 141–150; Bush, P.D., ‘The theory of institutional change,’ Journal of Economic Issues, 21(3), (1987), pp. 1075–1116. 2. For more discussion about the evolution and practice of Macao’s casino industry (including its gambling room business), see Siu, R.C.S., ‘Evolution of Macao’s casino industry from monopoly to oligopoly⎯Social and economic reconsideration,’ Journal of Economic Issues, 40(4), (2006), pp. 967–90; Siu, R. C. S. ‘Formal rules, informal constraints, and industrial evolution ⎯The case of the Junket Operator Regulation and the transition of Macao’s casino business,’ UNLV Gaming Research and Review Journal, 11(2), (2007), pp. 49–62; Siu, RC.S., ‘The marvel and dilemma in the progress of Macau’s casino industry,’ Macau Business, (December 2010), p. 72. 3. Schwartz, D. G., Suburban Xanadu: The Casino Resort on the Las Vegas Strip and Beyond, (New York, NY: Routledge. 2003). 4. Leslie, D. and Farell, D. Macau⎯Threat or opportunity? Deutsche Bank: Equity Research, Asia-Pacific, July 15, 2004; Cashmore, N. and Fischer, A., Macau Mania: The real deal, (CLSA: Asia-Pacific Markers, June 2005); Fung, E., Asia economic flash⎯Macau: Extending the “boom town” story, (Goldman Sachs Economic Research, January 11, 2007). 5. Siu, R. C. S., ‘The puzzles behind the mania: Macao’s unfinished projects,’ Casino & Gaming International, Issue 4, (2006), pp. 59–63; Siu, R. C. S.

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model ‘Formal rules, informal constraints, and industrial evolution⎯The case of the Junket Operator Regulation and the transition of Macao’s casino business,’ UNLV Gaming Research and Review Journal, 11(2), (2007), pp.49-62; Siu, R. C. S., ‘The marvel and dilemma in the progress of Macau’s casino industry,’ Macau Business, (December 2010), p. 72. 6. Thorstein, V., The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, ( New York, N. Y.: Mentor Books, 1899); Thorstein, V., The Theory of Business Enterprise. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1904); Commons, J. R., Institutional economics. American Economic Review, 21,(1931), pp. 648–657; Ayres, C. E., The Theory of Economic Progress, 3rd edition, (Kalamazoo, Michigan: New Issues Press, Western Michigan University, 1978); Hamilton, D., Technology and institutions are neither. Journal of Economic Issues, 20(2), (1986), pp. 525–532; Bush, P. D., The pragmatic instrumentalist perspective on the theory of institutional change. Journal of Economic Issues, 28(2), (1994), pp. 647–657. 7. Hamilton, D., Technology and institutions are neither. Journal of Economic Issues, 20(2), (1986), p. 527. 8. Bush, P. D., The theory of institutional change. Journal of Economic Issues, 21(3), (1987), p. 1076. 9. Ibid., p. 1077. 10. Hayden, F. G., Social fabric matrix: From perspective to analytical tool. Journal of Economic Issues, 16(3), (1982), p. 638. 11. Bush, P. D., The theory of institutional change. Journal of Economic Issues, 21(3), (1987), p. 1080–5. 12. Ayres, C. E., The Theory of Economic Progress, 3rd edition, ( Kalamazoo, Michigan: New Issues Press, Western Michigan University, 1978), p. 176. 13. Bush, P. D., ‘The pragmatic instrumentalist perspective on the theory of institutional change,’ Journal of Economic Issues, 28(2), (1994), p. 652. 14. Before the liberalization of the casino industry in 2002, “VIP baccarat” referred to GGR derived from independent third-party operated gambling room business. Following the opening of several Vegas-based casino resorts in the second half of 2000s, a few gambling rooms were seen operated directly by the casino license holders even though they may still employ highly independent gaming agents from Macao or Mainland China to approach the high-end players by offering them the non-redeemable chips directly. 15. Kilby, J., Fox, J. and Lucas, A. F., Casino Operation Management (2nd edition). (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), Chapter 16. 16. In Macao, it is well-known that commission paid by casinos directly to their gaming agents could be as high as 1.25% of the rolling amount of the related betting chips. As the house advantage of baccarat game with non-redeemable chip plays which includes the option of “Pair Bet” in

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Macao is around 2.9%. Accordingly, the 1.25% represents around 0.4 of the 2.9%. 17. Siu, R.C.S ‘Formal rules, informal constraints, and industrial evolution—The case of the Junket Operator Regulation and the transition of Macao’s casino business,’ UNLV Gaming research and Review Journal, 11(1), (2007), pp. 49–62. 18. Leong, A. V. M., ‘The “Bate-Ficha” business and triads in Macau casinos,’ Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal, 2(1), (2002), pp.83–97; Siu, R. C. S., ‘Evolution of Macao’s casino industry from monopoly to oligopoly—Social and economic reconsideration,’ Journal of Economic Issues, 40(4), 2006, pp. 967–90. 19. See also Chang, O., Revenue sharing Revealed. Inside Asian Gaming, (2007), available from: http://www. asgam.com/article.php?id_article =1211&page=1. 20. Eadington, W. R. and Siu, R. C. S., ‘Between law and custom—Examining the interaction between legislative change and the evolution of Macao’s casino industry,’ International Gambling Studies, 7(1), (2007), pp. 1–28. 21. Eadington, W. R., ‘The economics of casino gambling,’ Journal of Economic Perspective, 13(3), (1999), pp. 174–175; Schwartz, D.G., Suburban Xanadu: The Casino Resort on the Las Vegas Strip and Beyond, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), pp. 157–161. 22. Shonkwiler, J. S., Assessing the impact of Atlantic City casinos on Nevada gaming revenue. Atlantic Economic Journal, 21(2), (1993), pp. 50–61. 23. Eadington, W. R., ‘The economics of casino gambling,’ Journal of Economic Perspective, 13(3), (1999), pp. 173–192; Schwartz, D.G., Suburban Xanadu: The Casino Resort on the Las Vegas Strip and Beyond, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003). 24. Wynn, S., ‘Legalized Gaming: Winners and Losers,’ WLC Annual Meeting (September 1993), p. 6. 25. Kilby, J., Fox, J. and Lucas, A.F., Casino Operation Management (2nd edition). (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), Chapter 16. 26. ‘Estimated contribution to fixed costs’, Ibid., p. 307. 27. Binkley, C., ‘Reversal of fortune: In Las Vegas, casinos take a big gamble on the highest rollers⎯Lavish digs, steep discounts lure baccarat moguls, but is the cost too high?⎯Larry flynt’s special treat,’ The Wall Street Journal, September 7, 2001, A1; Lucas, A. F., Kilby, J. and Santos, J., ‘Assessing the profitability of premium players: High rollers may not mean high profits, particularly when casinos offer financial incentives to attract premium players,’ Cornel Hotel and Restaurant Quarterly, 43(4), (2002), pp. 65–78. 28. Kilby, J., Fox, J. and Lucas, A. F., Casino Operation Management (2nd edition). (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), p. 306.

6. Integration of the Macao Gambling Room Model 29. In principle, under the supervision of the Nevada government’s gaming regulations, casino resort operators may not be able to apply the independent third-party operated gambling room business model in their Macao businesses. 30. Leslie, D. and Farrell, D. Macau⎯Threat or opportunity? (Deutsche Bank: Equity Research, Asia-Pacific, July 15, 2004), p. 1. 31. Lui, P., ‘Stanley Ho feels the heat as Macau casinos raise stakes,’ (2006), Available from http://www.ttgtravelhub.net/index.php?option=content& task=view&id=8092. 32. Siu, R. C. S., ‘Formal rules, informal constraints, and industrial evolution: The case of the Junket Operator Regulation and the transition of Macao’s casino business,’ UNLV Gaming Research and Review Journal, 11(2), (2007), pp. 49–62. 33. Siu, R. C. S., ‘Macau’s mood: Facing challenges and embracing opportunities,’ Casino & Gaming International, Issue 4, (2009), pp. 47–51. 34. To support tourism development in Hong Kong and Macao, the Chinese Government introduced the IVS from the summer of 2003 which allowed the Mainland Chinese in certain high-income cities to travel to these two SARs with faster and easier individual visas approval procedures. 35. Siu, R. C. S., ‘Evolution of Macao’s casino industry from monopoly to oligopoly – Social and economic reconsideration,’ Journal of Economic Issues, 40(4), (2006), pp. 967–90. 36. Gaming tax as a percentage of the Government’s current revenue dropped significantly in 2007 was “due to a large amount of (complementary) tax received from a casino concessionaire in selling a gaming sub-concession” (Annual Report 2007, Monetary Authority of Macao, 68). 37. The long-term objective for Macao to be developed as a “World Tourism and Leisure Center” was firstly stated in the Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020) as promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission of the Chinese Government in December 2008. This objective was further reinforced under the Chinese Government’s Twelve Five-Year Plan (from year 2011 to 2015). In other words, Macao’s long-term development path had been clarified and clearly defined at the national level.

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7 E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism Eilo W. Y. YU Emma S. M. LAO Duncan CHEONG

Introduction Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have become in widespread use on the interaction of people in modern society. They are a breakthrough from traditional communication means which focus on one-to-one and one-to-many channels, like letter, telephone, newspaper and television that facilitate platform with many-to-may as well as group interactions, such as electronic mail, cyber discussion group and teleconferencing.1 Internet, which is regarded as a major component of ICTs, “reconfigured the geography and time horizons of access” for human interaction.2 The use of internet and other ICTs has characterized the contemporary life of human beings. The full the impact of ICTs on political process has begun to be examined academically.3 Recent studies have shown that ICTs have created favorable platforms and effective channels for youth engagement in politics and have become major tools and vital means for political mobilization.4 ICTs have integrated into the daily life of youth that they heavily rely on for communication as well as for their participation in politics. The features of ICTs, like interactivity, multi-to-multi communication, accessibility and information search, 123

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and anonymity, are favorable for their discussion and participations in politics in the cyber world.5 Andersen concludes that the application of ICTs can improve the political communication among youth, and ultimately stimulate and enhance their political participation.6 In the case of Macao, the use of ICTs has been transforming political participation of younger generation. On 1 May 2010, a group of young activists mobilized hundreds of youth to protest government policies through the Internet. Afterward, participants inaugurated the pro-democracy group Macao Youth Dynamics (MYD) and have continued to use the Internet for political communication and mobilization. The event proves Macao youth are not political apathetic as mentioned by Yee7 while the ICTs take a significant role for the mobilization and participation of Macao youth in the post-colonial era after 1999. This chapter studies and delineates the use of ICTs by Macao youth for their political participation to illuminate the rise of pro-democracy young activists in the cyber world. It will also discuss the pro-Beijing groups’ reaction to the rise of democratic young activists as they are keen to promote their own young members’ participation and campaign in cyber politics. Furthermore, this chapter also focuses on young Macao persons in their politics participation via the Internet. It will present survey results from focus groups involving university students whose understanding and use of ICTs for political engagement were asked. It will conclude that pro-democracy and pro-Beijing forces are undergoing a transition in leadership succession methods while their political campaigns can no longer rely on traditional community services and mobilization, as they are fast extending into the cyber world.

ICTs and Youth Activism Different to the traditional mass media channel (like newspaper, television and radio etc.), the ICTs are possessed of sophisticated features encouraging political communication and participation.

7. E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism

First, the boundary for political communication is substantially enlarged. Mass media have their limitation for communication in terms of information that media agencies control the type of information being transmitted in the community and manipulate the communication process. 8 Individuals may have difficulty let their voices and opinions spread away by the media. ICTs provide a relative free and autonomous space for public discussion that individuals can upload their opinion on the Internet as well as other ICTs means freely. There is no screening process prior to the transmission of information. Second, the capacity of ICTs for political communication is gigantic compared to the mass media which channels have limited volume for information. There are huge amount of information available in the cyber world. Individuals could search information for their interests that is beneficial to their engagement in public affairs.9 Third, ICTs consist of the function of multi-to-multi communication, instead of a one-way transmission, that allowing politician-citizen interaction. 10 ICTs facilitate platform for the direct communication between politicians and citizens. Political elite as well as individuals could express their views and opinions on discussion groups and social networking services (like Facebook, Twitter and blog etc.) on the Internet. Others could respond and reply on the web pages that wrapping up multi-to-multi discussion. Forth, ICTs are convenient for political communication. Individuals can publish their views on the Internet whenever and wherever they want once they can access Internet. 11 Finally, anonymity may be a concern to individuals for political expression that they avoid to identify themselves due to adverse effect for their personal interests. It is not necessary for them to disclose their identity when posting their views on Internet so that they can freely express themselves, and hence, encouraging their engagement in politics. Many studies prove the natures and features of ICTs, mentioned above, are favorable for the political engagement of youth.12 Younger generation is growing up in the information age and they get along with the use of ICTs in their daily life. Youth always seek for information on the Internet and would like to circulate the content plus their views immediately after reading

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online. The mode of political communication by ICTs is a convenience to young people that they can collect information they like and circulate freely among their peer as well as to the public, with less restriction in terms of content and volume of information. The simultaneity in the communication process (including information collection and redistribution) is encouraging for the political participation of youth in the cyber world that is very efficient and without the approval of authorities publishing their views. Besides, anonymity is a major concern of youth for their political expression according to Jennings and Zeitner. 13 They found that many youth worried about the adverse implications for their political opinions when disclosing their identity in the communication process. The use of ICTs can, to an extent, ease their anxiety that they feel more comfortable expressing them. Furthermore, ICTs can release their potential for political participation.14 Youth are deemed to be political inactive and not interested to involving public affairs. 15 However, Livingstone argues that youth cannot get along with the mass media as means for political communication because of their stereotype of immaturity and childhood.16 Mass media tend to ignore and pay less attention on the views of youth. Internet can make the ignored voices and ideas by youth to be published and accessed to the public that breaking through the hurdle by mass media for political expression. ICTs allow youth to express themselves not only limited by wordings but extending to the use of multi-media functions, like graphic and posters, flash, animation and videos.17 They will have fun and feel attractive to political communication with the use of multi-media elements, usually with satire on politicians. That will generate virtuous circle that young people are encouraged to continue political communication when their creative works recognized by netizens in the cyber world. Consequently, youth have strong incentive to political engagement via Internet that they can interactive with their peers, circulate their messages and creative works instantaneously, and hence, increasing their political awareness that may result to political mobilization in the actual world.

7. E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism

The Emergence of Macao Young Activism Via Internet Macao youth have been deemed to be politically inactive. There were few youth organizations for social movement and few young people participated in politics. Groups and organizations which are active in public affairs have been led by elite emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, the New Macao Association (NMA), a flagship organization of pro-democracy forces, had been led by Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong, Au Kam-san and Chan Wai-chi since its establishment in 1992. For the pro-Beijing groups, some leaders of Kaifong Associations and the Macao Federation of Trade Unions (MFTU) have been political activists since the 1980s. After the handover, these elites maintained their domination on the political avenue. On the other hand, although labor movement flourished in the post-colonial Macao that many labor groups, which are independent from the pro-Beijing MFTU, have been inaugurated and fighting for the labor interests. They have been organized many demonstrations in the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) and generated huge political pressure on the government. For instance, they dared to confront the authorities like the 1 May Labor Day demonstrations in 2006 and 2007. 18 The MSAR government tried to introduce welfare policies in order to alleviate public grievance. However, most leaders of these independent labor groups have been in their middle age and there were very few young people participating in the social movement. In 2010 a group of young Macao people called for a demonstration on 1 May, signifying the emergence of youth activism in Macao. Since 2006, the independent labor groups have been organizing the annual 1 May Labor Day demonstrations. A group of young people posted discussions on the difficulties faced by Macao youth as well as the Labor Day demonstration in a major cyber forum “Qoos” (www.qoos.com) on 13 April 2010.19 At the very beginning, the young netizens talked about what they could do in the coming Labor Day. Some raised the various problems in Macao, to criticize the government, and to suggest for activity in the May Day Demonstration. On 14 April, some

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participants began to talk about their organization and resource management for their participation in the demonstration. Esther Un and Scott Chiang, the hosts of the page, migrated the discussion to a group in the Facebook as the “response was so good, that it passed to the Internet social network Facebook.”20 Their focus did not only point to social problems like housing and employment while they place more emphasis on “river crab culture” in Macao. “River crab” is a slang created by netizens in Mainland China and means the phenomenon of internet censorship. The mandarin pronunciation of “river crab” (héxiè) is similar to the sound of “harmony” (h é xi é ). Netizens describe one is harmonized or “river-crabbed” when his/her post and speech on the Internet was censored and deleted by the authorities—a euphemism for censorship.21 The Macao youth group argued on the Internet that political communication were dominated and manipulated by the government and the main stream media agency, namely the local Chinese newspaper, Macao Daily, that enjoyed over 80 percent of the market circulation. 22 The dominant media agency did not balance views in the public spare but tried to shape public opinion favorable to the government authorities. There was no or insufficient space for minority expressing their views which may contravene government policies. The group of Macao youth alleged the Macao media were “river-crabbed” and possessed of self-censorship, argued that “young people have their rights to be informed the truth”. 23 Some young people established a group “Refuse to Read Macao Daily, Macao Needs a Better Newspaper” on the Facebook condemning the Macao Daily for its possible censorship prior to the discussion on “river crab culture” in April 2010.24 Finally, some “netizens” suggested real action and called for a face-to-face meeting in the Qoss discussion group for their campaign migrating from cyber space to the real world. Yet, they were calling for an “Anti-River Crab Campaign” on the Internet aiming to extend public sphere for political communication and participation for Macao youth, and mobilize Macao youth to the Labor Day Demonstration. They designed logo, posters and banner for the campaign and circulated them on the Internet. Besides, some of them made T-shirt printed with logo for their demonstration on the May Day.25 Their campaign was really

7. E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism

hot on the Internet in April 2010. Finally, they could unexpectedly mobilize 400 young people participating in the Labor Day Demonstration that their success made a surprise in the Macao society. The conveyors merely campaigned on the Internet but hundreds of young Macao netizens echoed and showed their support in the physical world. The success of the “Anti-River Crab Campaign” implicates a rising tide of youth activism in Macao politics. The May Day Demonstration was not an end of the “Anti-River Crab Campaign” while Esther Un and Scott Chiang, the conveyors of the campaign, kept their momentum encouraging youth participation by organizing forums in the real world for the discussion on various public issues and events. The government officials were prompted to be responsive for their campaign and mobilization. The Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture, Cheong U, invited 500 young people from different organizations, including “Anti-River Crab Campaign” members, to a public forum and discussed the concerns of Macao youth.26 On the other hand, the youth were keeping their eyes on censorship issue in Macao mass media. When some reporters of Macao Television (TDM) spoke openly for pressure of censorship from their superior, the young activists again mobilized on the Internet and condemned against the management of TDM for self-censorship.27 Finally, the group decided to formalize their organization by establishing a new Macao Youth Dynamics (MYD) for their continuation of political participation in the Macao polity, and established a new Facebook group “Anti-River Crab Campaign” to “Macao Youth Dynamics” that trying to transfer their social network established in the May Day Demonstration to the new organization.28 Scott Chiang elaborated: “We want to give young people a chance to hang out and talk to each other. It is not necessary to be the streets fighting for democracy. …we will continue going on as a pressure group, especially regarding issues close to our audience. … but we haven’t even thought about having any public office or of how we will raise money. We just want to be a visible voice for the youth.”29 The inauguration of MYD signifies a new generation of youth activism and their enduring campaign in the MSAR regime.

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The rise of MYD triggered a transformation of the pro-democracy camp in Macao. Some MYD core members joined the NMA and sat on its Executive Committee.30 The overlapping membership implies the cooperation between MYD and NMA although some members denied the close relationship of the two organizations. 31 Particularly, the youth activists receive support from the NMA and continue their campaign on the Internet by making videos, posters and comics and lashed out at the MSAR government. They also digitalize the newspaper Concealing Daily produced by the NMA and circulate it on the Internet. Thereby, the NMA could extend its political campaign onto the Internet by receiving technology support from the MYD members while the latter could share resource with the NMA for their political participation. Consequently, the pro-democracy camp does not only enlarge its size but also strengthen its capacity for political campaign in the cyber world that can help grasping more support from young generation on the Internet. Some of the youth activists became core members in the NMA and aiming at checking the government. For example, the young members actively campaigned in the political reform in 2012. They organized civil referendum that asking for a reform of the legislature by decreasing the number of indirectly-elected members and politically-appointed members as well as increasing the number of directly-elected seats. They, cooperated with other activists, formed a new organization “Macao Conscience” and continued their check on government policies. Furthermore, the NMA tried to promote the young elite by nominating some of them in running the 2013 legislative direct elections. However, the young elite had a frustration that none of them could be elected while the total number of vote the NMA received dropped substantially that leading to a decrease of its directly-elected seat from 3 in 2009 to 2 in 2013. Nevertheless, the young activists successfully mobilized twenty thousand people demonstrating against the pension scheme proposal for the Chief Executive and chief MSAR officials and organized a rally with seven thousand people surrounding the legislature for the opposition of the bill. In May 2014, the legislature was going to pass the pension scheme of Chief Executive

7. E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism

and other chief officials although there had been strong public opposition to the legislation. The public opposition focused on three articles of the bill. First, the proposed pension to the chief officials was very high. Officials who were from the civil service would be given a lump sum pension of 14 percent of their total earnings as the chief officials while non-civil service chief officials would receive 30 percent of their total income during their service. The scheme would be retroactive for all senior officials since the handover. Some existing officials would thus receive a lump sum pension of more than ten million MOP. Second, the Chief Executive would be given a life-long pension of 70 percent his monthly salary for every month after his retirement. Some argued that the government would have to pay the current Chief Executive Fernando Chiu over fifty million MOP after his retirement if he had not passed away until he was eighty years of age. Third, the bill also proposed a criminal immunity for the Chief Executive such that he/she would be free from any criminal charge or investigation of his/her conduct during his/her term of office. Due to tremendous opposition to the pension scheme, the government finally withdrew it. The campaign is a political landmark of MSAR that the campaign broke the historical record in terms of number of demonstrators and that it is first time the populace of Macao halt a legislation of bill through protest and demonstration. Their success is partly because they used ICTs to mobilize young people in the campaign as well as to overseas Macao students that asking them to post photos on the Internet showing their opposition to bill. Thus, the democratic youth consolidated their political significance in the MSAR. Furthermore, the emergence of MYD triggered the growth of youth elites in the pro-Beijing camp. Although there are some youth organizations supported by the pro-Beijing forces, like the Macao New Chinese Youth Association (MNCYA) and Macao Youth Federation (MYF), these organizations were regarded as supporting units to the mainstream organizations Kaifong Association and MFTU in elections. Members of the pro-Beijing youth organizations may have few opportunities for climbing up to upper strata in the political hierarchy. However, when the MYD had a rigorous campaign in the cyber world, the leaders of pro-Beijing

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groups felt impotent for the competition on the virtual world as they were lacking of knowledge to ICTs. Instead, they have to rely on their young members in that regards. To compete with the MYD, a group Macao Tri-Decade Action Union (MTDAU)—an organization for Macao youth at their age of 30s—was established by the pro-Beijing forces after the inauguration of MYD. Following the strategy of MYD, the MTDAU mocked the MSAR government by creating and circulating videos, posters and banners on the Internet in order to draw the attention as well as gain the support of Macao netizens. It has its own Facebook group and official website for their cyber campaign. 32 At the same time, the MTDAU issued reports expressing their views on government policies that aiming to represent Macao youth and to receive their political support. The campaign of MTDAU aims to avoid the domination of MYD in the cyber world and therefore, it has to be critical to the authorities so as to win the support of young people. The MTDAU, same as the democratic young elite, ran the 2013 legislative direct election. Although it did not win a seat in the legislature, it aims to check the democratic youth activists. Au Kam-san, a pro-democracy legislator, admits that the emergence of MYD prompted the pro-Beijing forces to promote its young generation for their political competition to the pro-democracy young activists.33 As a result, the MYD does not only strengthen the pro-democracy forces but also push the political participation of youth from the pro-Beijing forces.

Youth Participation on the Internet The Internet has become an indispensible element in daily life of Macao youth. The emergence of MYD shows how a group of young Macao elite pursue their interests in politics via the Internet. What is the situation of ordinary young people? To what extent, do they use Internet as means for political participation? Are they concerned about politics in cyber world? How do they participate in politics

7. E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism

on the Internet which regarded as a significant means for participation and mobilization among the youth? According to the Survey of Macao Youth’s Access on Social Network Service on the Internet by Macao Internet Project, 98.1%of young people aged 13–29 use Internet.34 88% of them have social network Facebook account and 70.5% of youth access Facebook every day. 22% of respondents indicated that they posted their comments and personal opinions on the Facebook. 31.2% believe social network service on the Internet will be increasingly important for the government. This survey implies that Internet has been an indispensible element in the daily life of Macao youth and social network service has become a significant means for their political participation. To understand how Macao youth using Internet for political participation, we conducted two focus groups on 13 and 14 March 2010. 20 students (10 in each focus group) of the University of Macau were invited to the study and their backgrounds are listed on Table 1. The study focuses on what and how the Macao youth receive information of politics, their understanding on the discussion and campaign of “netizens”, and finally, the implications to their participation in politics from virtual space to real world. Table 1. Backgrounds of Focus Group Participants Group

1

Name

Sex

Faculty

Daisy

F

Social Sciences and Humanities

Year of Study 3

Elaine

F

Social Sciences and Humanities

4

Fanny

F

Social Sciences and Humanities

3

Angel

F

Social Sciences and Humanities

1

Kenny

M

Business and Administration

4

Patrick

M

Business and Administration

4

Zoie

F

Business and Administration

1

Yanny

F

Education

2

Samantha

F

Education

2

Katie

F

Law

4

Eric

M

Social Sciences and Humanities

4

Steven

M

Social Sciences and Humanities

2

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2

Elmo

F

Social Sciences and Humanities

1

Ming

M

Social Sciences and Humanities

1

Helen

F

Business

4

Freddie

M

Business

2

Mandy

F

Education

1

Rax

M

Law

3

Paul

M

Science and Technology

4

Mathew

M

Science and Technology

4

In terms of reading news reporters, most respondents prefer to online newspapers mainly because of convenience. Interviewee Katie summarized “Although reading printed newspaper makes you feeling of tangibility, it is not easy to get a copy whenever you would like to read news. For Internet, I can switch on my computer and read news via online newspaper whenever I want to.” Freddie and Patrick, other interviewees, added that the three-dimension illustration and anime in the Internet news report made the articles more attractive for reading. Importantly, many interviewees consider that news report and discussion on the Internet can provide diversify of view and in-depth analysis while the stance of mainstream media (like television and printed newspaper) is conservative and they do not provide different views in their reports. All interviewees indicated that they had their accounts in the social network Facebook and receive political information through the network; believed that this communication would bring their daily life “closer” to politics. Elaine, an interviewee, elaborated that she kept “surfing” the online discussion forums like “Qoss” and “Cyber CTM”, which are the two major online discussion groups in Macao, for receiving gossips and side stories of Macao politics that can only be circulated on the Internet instead of the mainstream media. Besides, interviewees revealed their difficulty for making comment to the mainstream media while they could easily make comment on the Internet. All interviewees indicated that they received political information from the mass media but they never tried to express their view in them. They believed that the mass media offered little help to them in expressing their own opinions:

7. E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism

Patrick:

I do not think that I can change anything even if I write a letter to the newspaper complaining against politicians and social events. I cannot do anything although I comment and discuss politics.

Daisy:

Agree! In addition, I think my ability is solely trifling.

Fanny:

I think writing a letter to journal is extremely troublesome. Nevertheless, I can easily call to the phone-in radio program “Macao Square” and make comment. But it is useless to express my opinions.

Interviewee Steven added that writing to the newspaper and calling to radio program were not convenient to them. They argued that the procedure was troublesome when they try to express their opinion in the mass media, and therefore, they have no motivations to speak in the mass media. Some claimed that they did not want to share their political stances face-to-face with the public. Instead, they can give their comment whenever they like once they have their computer and smart-phone on hand. To test young people’s understanding of the multi-media function of the Internet, two videos, which are circulated on the Internet, were shown during the focus group meeting and interviewees were asked for their opinion on them. The first video was about new MSAR Chief Executive Fernando Chui’s oath-taking in the inauguration ceremony on 20 December 2009. The video producer made subtitles for the oath speech with some dirty words for mocking the non-standard mandarin of Chui. Another video was a music TV “Have Guts” produced by Civil Watch, a candidate list of 2009 legislative direct election. The video was for the campaign of Civil Watch in 2009 election and tried to promote societal support for the betterment of Macao that encouraging Macao residents to stand out and forge good

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governance in Macao. For the video of Chiu’s oath-taking, which is regarded as negative campaign material, many interviewees considered that they did not like this creative work while it would harm the reputation of Macao. Some of them said that they would not circulate the video on the Internet as it would harm Macao’s reputation, but some did: Patrick:

Elaine:

Daisy:

No, I will neither forward this video nor give comments on it. I think this ironic video is not glorious and is not worth to share with friends. If I forward or leave comments on it, more and more people will get to see this video and it will not be good to the reputations of the Chief Executive and Macao SAR. I don’t think so. I will put this video on my “Facebook” wall and let my friends to check it out as well. However, I will not comment it on my page because I don’t want to share too much with others for my personal political stance. The video content is important and I will also share it with friends so as to let them know about it.

For the Civil Watch’s video, which is perceived as promoting a positive image of Macao, interviewees positively evaluated it and said that they would forward it to their friends on the Internet. For example, interviewee Eric indicated that he liked the video content and had post on his Facebook wall for sharing with his friends. He added that he had a short discussion on his views and feelings for the 2009 legislative elections attaching to the video, and confessed that this approach of information sharing would generate discussion among his peer but also enrich his knowledge on Macao politics. Interviewee Steven echoed that the use of video could make electoral campaign more attractive in comparing with printed text

7. E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism

which is boring. Furthermore, most interviewees indicated that they would search for relevant videos and materials on the Internet after watching Civil Watch’s music TV: Elaine:

I think this promotion approach fits our (youth) taste. It does not like other kinds of promotion which are boring and not attractive at all. Kenny: Agree, I will have more interests to watch this kind of political information Samantha: I also agree that the song and music are more attractive to us. Moreover, the melody of this song is so melodious and I have intention to look for the lyrics song and music like this on the Internet. Fanny: I also think that it is a tuneful song and listened many times during the 2009 legislative election. This song was so hit during election period. We could easily access it in different websites and browse for other relevant information. Furthermore, Miss Agnes Lam (a candidate ranked first at the Civil Watch List) is a professor from our university, and I pay more attention on Civil Watch’s information on the Internet. Zoie: I will attend to this kind of promotion which delivers positive message instead of irony. Interviewees’ comments on the two videos reveal that Internet enables political information transmitted in various forms, including video, song, anime etc. These new elements made political information to be funny and attractive to young people for participation. Like interviewee Fanny’s experience, she has listened

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and watched the Civil Watch’s campaign music video for many times during the election period. This proves that young people will pay attention to political information if its outlook and style match their taste and they intend to search for relevant information on the Internet; finally, they are motivated to possess political communication on the Internet and may transfer their political momentum from cyber space to the physical world. Furthermore, Internet can enhance the communication between politicians and Macao youth. Some interviewees mentioned they made friends with some legislators and politicians in the social network “Facebook” and keep dialogue with them: Steven:

Eric:

Rax:

Some politicians, like Ng Kuok-cheong (a pro-democracy legislator) sent requests to me for friendship on the Facebook. I will accept them. … If I am interested to some politicians, I will search for them on the Facebook and send a request of friendship to them. Thereby, I can learn more about politics from them. Well, if a politician sends me a friendship request but I am interested to him/her, I will not accept it. For me, I am curious about my friends who added some politicians on their friend list of Facebook. I think the politicians only added them as friend but do not really have communications with them. I don’t think so. If I accepted the friendship request from a politician, I will constantly read the news posted by them. I want to know the politicians’ views on public issues. For example, I made friend with Ng Kuok-cheong and Au Kam-san (the two pro-democracy legislators). I can observe that Au

7. E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism

Kam-san updates his information very frequently. Freddie: I also keep checking their (politicians) updates. I found Ng Kuok-cheong and Ho Ion Song (legislator from Kaifong Association) update their status [on the Facebook] constantly. … Their action gives me positive impression on them. At least, it lets me know the politicians do comment on social issues and are not doing anything after elected. The focus survey reveals that Macao youth rely on Internet for political news and information mainly due to convenience that Internet has become part of their life. Second, they prefer to make comment and express their political views on the Internet instead of via the mass media as they don’t think their words could be easily be published in the mainstream channel. Third, they circulated news, videos and other e-resources for political communication. Fourth, when they come across with interesting materials on politics that attracting their attention, they will search on the Internet for relevant information in sake for their curiosity. They intend to enrich their knowledge on particular issues and events by searching on the Internet if they are stimulated by other e-recourses. At the same time, they will share information with their friends on the Internet, especially through the social network Facebook, that creating a virtuous cycle for political communication and participation. Fifth, Facebook facilitates a political communication platform between politicians and youth that the latter eager to receive more information from the former. At the same time, the youth can observe the politicians’ performance in terms of their comments making on the Internet. In sum, the Internet reshuffles the living style of Macao youth that they heavily rely on ICTs for their communication and there is no exception in the political arena. They have their own style of political participation different to the older generation. Macao government as well as politicians has to keep up with the changing circumstances with the use of ICTs in order to maintain effective

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communication with the young generation; otherwise, the gap between political elites and young people will be widened and will result in governance problem.

Conclusion The use of ICTs has penetrated into the Macao youth community and become an indispensable part of their daily life. Some of them have been learning using ICTs for their political communication and mobilization. The emergence of MYD illuminates that Macao politics is extending to the cyber space and that the ICTs can be an effective tools to stimulate youth for a political issue and hence, to mobilize them in the physical world. The rise of youth activism in the cyber space implicates to the political elites, no matter in the pro-Beijing and pro-democracy camps, that they have to pay more attention and effort on the Internet only not for their communication with young people but also for their support and mobilization in the real politics. Indeed, they are recruiting and promoting young elites for their campaign on the Internet. This accelerates the leadership succession of these organizations, as observed in the pro-democracy New Macao Association. In the pro-Beijing forces, the promotion of youth participation has been on the agenda for many years. When Jimmy Li of MFTU was selected into the legislature in 2005, the pro-Beijing groups tended to promote young members to the higher political strata. However, leadership succession was not obvious in the pro-Beijing camp that few young elites could take up leadership role among the forces. The rise of MYD pressures the pro-Beijing forces for its acceleration of leadership succession in order to recruit and promote young elites for political campaign on the Internet; otherwise, they will lose their support when more and more Macao people communicating with the use of ICTs. On the other hand, the MSAR government must have to learn for its communication with people on the Internet on where netizens will share their opinions on public affairs and generate momentum for political mobilization. Its delay on collecting

7. E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism

opinions in the cyber world may lead to political challenge from netizens. In the long run, the Macao government has to establish a mode of e-communication articulating public opinions and demands for the sake of good governance.

Notes 1. Lin Wan-ying and William H. Dutton, “The ‘Net’ Effect in Politics: The ‘Stop the Overlay’ Campaign in Los Angeles,” Party Politics, vol. 9, no. 1, (2003), p. 125. 2. Ibid., pp. 133–134. 3. Leslie M. Tkach-Kawasaki, “Politics@Japan: Party Competition on the internet in Japan,” Party Politics, vol. 9, no. 1, (2003), p. 105. 4. T. Kelso and B. Cogan, eds., Mosh the Polls: Youth Voters, Popular Culture, and Democratic Engagement, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008); S. Livingstone, “Interactivity and Participation on the Internet: Young People’s Response to the Civic Sphere,” in P. Dahlgren, ed., Young Citizens and New Media: Learning for Democratic Participation, New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 103–124. 5. D. Owen, “The Internet and Youth Civic Engagement in the United States,” in S. Oates, D. Owen, and R. Gibson, eds., The Internet and Politics: Citizens, Voters and Activists, (London: Taylor & Francis, 2006), p.21; S. Livingstone, “Interactivity and Participation on the Internet: Young People’s Response to the Civic Sphere,” in P. Dahlgren, ed., Young Citizens and New Media: Learning for Democratic Participation, (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 103. 6. J. Andersen, “Democracy and Virtual Politics: Young People, the Internet and Political Participation,” in J. Hoff (ed.), Internet, Governance and Democracy: Democratic Transitions from Asian and European Perspective, (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2006), p. 105. 7. Herbert Yee, The Political Culture of China’s University Students: A Comparative Study of University Students in Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, (Commack, New York: Nova Science, 1999). 8. R. M. Negrine, The Transformation of Political Communication: Continuities and Changes in Media and Politics, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 26; John Street, Mass Media, Politics and Democracy, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p.4; J.D. McCarthy, C. McPhail and J. Smith, “Images of Protest: Dimensions of Selection Bias in Media Coverage of Washington Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991,” American Sociological Review, vol.61, no.3, (1996), pp. 478–499.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century 9. I. Banerjee, “Political Participation and Democratization: The Role of the Internet in Asia,” in J. Hoff (ed.) Internet, Governance and Democracy: Democratic Transitions from Asian and European Perspective, (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2006), pp. 21–45. 10. O. Perez, “Global Governance and Electronic Democracy: E-Politics as a Multidimensional Experience,” in P.M. Shane (ed.), Democracy Online: The Prospects for Political Renewal through the Internet, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 88. 11. A. Lupia and T.S. Philpot, “Views from inside the Net: How Websites Affect Young Adults’ Political Interest,” The Journal of Politics, vol.67, no.4, (2006), pp. 1122–1142. 12. I. Banerjee, “Political Participation and Democratization: The Role of the Internet in Asia,” in J. Hoff (ed.) Internet, Governance and Democracy: Democratic Transitions from Asian and European Perspective. (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2006), pp. 21–45; B. Bimber, “Information and Political Engagement in America: The Search for Effects of Information Technology at the Individual Level,” Political Research Quarterly, vol.54, no.1, (2001), pp. 53–67; M.K. Jennings and V. Zeitner, “Internet Use and Civic Engagement: A Longitudinal Analysis,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, vol.67, no.3, (2003), pp.311–334; A. Lupia and T.S. Philpot, “Views from inside the Net: How Websites Affect Young Adults’ Political Interest,” The Journal of Politics, vol.67, no.4, (2006), pp. 1122–1142. 13. M.K. Jennings and V. Zeitner, “Internet Use and Civic Engagement: A Longitudinal Analysis,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, vol.67, no.3, (2003), p. 330. 14. S. Livingstone, “Interactivity and Participation on the Internet: Young People’s Response to the Civic Sphere,” in P. Dahlgren (ed.), Young Citizens and New Media: Learning for Democratic Participation, New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 103–124. 15. R.J. Klotz, “Different Experiences of Young Adults and Other Adults in Mediated Campaigns,” in T. Kelso and B. Cogan (eds.), Mosh the Polls: Youth Voters, Popular Culture, and Democratic Engagement, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), p. 25. 16. S. Livingstone, “Interactivity and Participation on the Internet: Young People’s Response to the Civic Sphere,” in P. Dahlgren (ed.), Young Citizens and New Media: Learning for Democratic Participation, (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 109. 17. M. X. D. Carpini and B.A. Williams, “Let Us Infotain You: Politics in the New Media Environment,” in W.L. Bennett and R.M. Entman (eds.), Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 161–163.

7. E-Politics and the Rising Tide of Macao Youth Activism 18. Yu Wing-yat, “Political Modernization of Macau and its Challenge,” Journal of Macau Studies, vol.56, no.1, (2010), p. 12. 19. The post is available at: http://bbs.qoos.com/viewthread.php?tid= 1716068&highlight=, accessed on 13 April 2011. 20. Macau Daily Times, 1 June 2010, available at: http://www.macaudailytimes.com.mo/macau/12884-New-youth-group-a spires-social-force.html, accessed on 13 April 2011; for their Facebook group, please visit: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid= 106967859324410&v=wall, accessed on 29 April 2010. 21. See a note by Habeas Corpus Project 2010 on the Facebook, which is available at: http://www.facebook.com/notes/habeas-corpus-project-2010%E8%AB%BE%E8%B2%9D%E7%88%BE%E5%92%8C%E5%B9 %B3%E7%8D%8E%E8%97%9D%E8%A1%93%E8%A8%88%E5 %8A%83/river-crab/177970295550254, accessed on 13 April 2011. 22. Journal of Citizens, 2 May 2010, p. 3. 23. Cheng Po, 30 April 2010, p. 1. 24. For the Facebook group “Refuse to Read Macao Daily, Macao Needs a Better Newspaper”, please visit the webpage: http://www.facebook.com/ notes/habeas-corpus-project-2010-%E8%AB%BE%E8%B2%9D%E7% 88%BE%E5%92%8C%E5%B9%B3%E7%8D%8E%E8%97%9D%E 8%A1%93%E8%A8%88%E5%8A%83/river-crab/177970295550254 #!/group.php?gid=481769460721&v=wall. 25. They formed groups on Facebook and circulated their creative works, please see the page: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid= 110089139033552, accessed on 2 May 2010. 26. Macao Daily News, 13 May 2010, A03. 27. For instance, they set up a group on the Facebook against the TDM management, which is available at: http://www.facebook.com/ group.php?gid=126104710743919, accessed on 7 June 2010. 28. Please see the Facebook group at: http://www.facebook.com/ group.php?gid=126104710743919#!/group.php?gid=115446115155123 &v=wall, accessed on 30 May 2010. 29. Macau Daily Times, 1 June 2010, available at: http://www.macaudailytimes.com.mo/macau/12884-New-youth-group-a spires-social-force.html, accessed on 13 April 2011. 30. For example, Scott Chiang, a leader of MYD, was selected to be the External Vice-Secretary of Executive Committee, see Cheng Po, 25 June 2010, p.04. 31. Personal interview Albert Wong, a core member of New Macao Association, 20 January 2011. 32. Its Facebook group is at: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century 110735305635146#!/profile.php?id=100001666308213, and its website is at: http://mypaper.pchome.com.tw/mtu30action. 33. Personal interview with Au, 12 March 2011. 34. Angus Cheong, Survey of Macao Youth’s Access on Social Network Service, (Macao: Macao Internet Project, 2011), available at: http://www.macaointernetproject.net/, accessed on 13 April 2011.

Part III Identity, Education and Cultural Dimensions

8 The Chinese of Macao: Identity and Transformation Jean A. BERLIE

Introduction History From c.1550 until now, with some historical ups and downs, a mutual Sino-Portuguese harmonious alliance of Confucianism and tolerance 容忍 (rongren) prevails in Macao.1 The Chinese in Macao have some 500 years of history. In 1867, Manuel de Castro Sampaio wrote Os Chins de Macau, a pioneering work concerning this group. At present, Macao is a Special Administrative Region (MSAR) of China. The group we now call the “Chinese of Macao” is essentially linked to China, although it may also sometimes exhibits some cultural links with Portugal, but not linguistically, sometimes just limited to a simple Portuguese passport rarely used to travel to Europe. More than half of the present population of Macao came from mainland China during the last two decades.

Methodology The methodological check-list is as follows: observing, listening, interviewing and questioning. This study is based on my first inquiry during 1995–2000 and a recent survey in 2010–2011. Clifford 147

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Geertz 2 presents a check-list for fieldwork of establishing relationship, selecting informants, transcribing texts, mapping fields, keeping a diary and taking genealogies; 225 questionnaires concerning households, including many family genealogies, were collected during the recent fieldwork in Macao. This chapter is mainly focused on a particular group, the Chinese of Macao. These Chinese live, study, work and are susceptible to sickness, and, naturally, finally die as other human beings, but do have a very specific identity. We do not consider the legal aspect of the number of years of residency in the MSAR necessary to have a Macao ID card, but look at the social and cultural impact of this question. Evidently we include Chinese mainlanders and overseas Chinese who have had their main residence in Macao. The term “Chinese of Macao” is a particular identity used in my questionnaires, and when necessary in this chapter, which include only permanent residents over twenty years. However, some of them naturally continue to look first to mainland China and are in priority concerned with the success of China. Even if these Chinese receive MOP8,000 per year (four thousand MOP, the MSAR currency) as permanent resident that does not mean they identify themselves with Macao. It is interesting to note that 20% of my interviewees declare to be “Chinese” without any identification with Macao.

Identity The ancient Portuguese architecture is interesting, but Augustin Jean, concerning the context of the identity of the Chinese and Macanese, thinks that Macao offers “the picture of a Chinese-dominated city.” When this statement was made in 1999 it was rather in advance of the time, but it is still quite true. 3 In 2011, the main cultural reference in Macao society is China. 90% of MSAR’s population is Chinese. However, Macao is an exemplary “tolerant, multicultural society” that could result from a unique shared sovereignty before the handover in 1999. The Chinese of Macao possess a unique culture and a strong Cantonese identity that makes them different

8. The Chinese of Macao: Identity and Transformation

from other Chinese. In first approximation, four types of Chinese in Macao could claim to be from there: The bendiren4 (Punteiyahn in Cantonese) “locals” are mainly Cantonese speaking Han Chinese, from Guangdong province; the other categories are the Fujianese, mainly Hokkien; the Teochew and Hakka (Kejia in Putonghua); and the Fishermen Tanka. These Fishermen migrated in mass to Zhuhai in 2000, although some families are still currently residing in Macao. The Hakka constitutes some 2% of the population. Identity is psychological, relational and cultural. We insist on a paradigm of complexity5 and propose a new general vision of a specifically modern Chinese group. Language and family are among others two main markers to understand Macao Chinese identity. Identity has numerous meanings or constructions of meaning, depending on actors and situations, and this evidently changed after 20 December 1999, when the long expected return of Macao to China took place. The Macao Chinese remain the main object of the present study relying on social facts.6

Identity The Macanese are born in Macao but not considered to be Chinese by both the Portuguese and the Chinese, so it may seem strange to put them forward when studying the Chinese in Macao. The Macanese are the sons and daughters of many vivid cultures. Their identity is Portuguese and mixed. Their heterogeneity was originally Indian or Malaccan, and later became also Chinese. To explain the point, using the Macanese culture to define the Chinese in Macao, see below the life story of a “Portugalized” Chinese of Macao, Mr Leao. The late He Tian, another Macao Chinese of great culture and one of the rare grand entrepreneurs of the Sino-Portuguese territory, has said: “Ruguo meiyou Tusheng, jiumeiyou Aomen” (“If the Macanese were not created, then Macao

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does not exist”). 7 Before the 1999 handover, some Macanese became Chinese. However, the posthumous book on cinema in Macao by the late Henrique de Senna Fernandes (1923–2010), presented at a Macanese meeting in December 2010, explains another distinctive character, the hybrid culture of Macao, a bridge between East and West. The long history of Macao hopefully provides support for local culture which could be at risk in our global world.

Identity of Macao Chinese: Cantonese, Hokkien, Chaozhou Life Stories It is right that the Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao have to build their own identity because China mainland is too big and omnipresent. “This identity has national, political, cultural, social and economic aspects”.8 It is also right that the term “identity”, like “religion”, has no exact equivalent in Chinese. (Shenfen 身份 is closer to “social status” and rentong 認同 is placed in conjunction with an approved culture.) The Chinese of Macao have multiple origins and are consequently complex, but finally are “themselves in relation to others”.9 In Chinese, the concept of identity leads to a certain ambiguity. 1. It is difficult to define this abstract idea in Chinese. 2. Macao is a multicultural melting pot, a meeting point of Chinese, Europeans, Indians, Southeast Asians and others, with a long history, so Macao Chinese are different from other Chinese. They managed to resist 450 years of Portuguese acculturation without any “clash” and without changing the bases of their “Chineseness”. Wang Gungwu views this Chineseness in Greater China;10 here I examine Macao as a microcosm of China. In the 16th and 17th centuries, it was difficult for Chinese to enter into Macao’s walled city and in the beginning it was not possible to stay intramuros overnight. However, Macao did attract Chinese merchants, interpreters, and laborers. Some Chinese, in particular refugees and orphans, were converted to Christianity over

8. The Chinese of Macao: Identity and Transformation

centuries due to famines or other calamities in mainland China. The Chinese Bazaar, at the center of the walled city, was an important place. The Chinese villages within Portuguese Macao territory included Wangxia or Mongha (in Cantonese), Longtian, Shalitou or Patane and Mage or Barra, among others.11 Shalitou probably took its name from the old maritime pier where sand pear fruits might have been unloaded.12 Patane probably refers to Patani in South Thailand, a port of call for sailing ships coming to Macao from Europe and the Middle East, but this etymology is uncertain. How to demonstrate the fact that the Chinese of Macao do have their own identity? How could we define these particular Chinese and their culture? The definition of the concept “identity” in Chinese is useful to start with. Between the three following definitions of “identity”, we chose the third one:13 1. Tongyixing 同一性 which is more “identity and unity” defines “Chineseness” more than “dentity”. 2. Xiangtong 相同 is too far of our goal. Xiangma means “look over a horse and judge its worth” and does not fit our research. 3. Shenfen is the closest definition, but still not so good. It mentions the “social status” which is well defined by the “identity” of the ID card (shenfenzheng 身份証). Language is an essential marker of identity. Macao Chinese want to keep their mother tongue, Cantonese. The point is not that language is essential, but it means that we must ask questions about Cantonese and other languages/dialects in Macao. Mandarin, Putonghua, is becoming more and more significant. Chinese characters are the reference under the legal, neutral and unsettled, phraseology “language” (Macao Basic Law I–9). Portuguese and Chinese are the official languages. However, except during non-Chinese official ceremonies and, for example, to get a job or a university degree, Portuguese is not really promoted in the MSAR. On 28 February 2011, when it was opened in Taipa Island, the new Immigration Center uses in priority Chinese characters. The Center staff was polite, but foreigners have to read these characters to understand waiguoren, meaning “foreigners” and follow the

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correct line. Few foreigners were present that day, mostly some Filipinas without knowledge of written Chinese. However, the façade of the building respects the Basic Law in relation to Portuguese; the new building has the Portuguese word “immigracao” (immigration) side by side with its Chinese equivalence. The Law of Macao is in Portuguese. Portuguese has consequently its own linguistic power. The Chinese translation of the Law of the MSAR is not so reliable and the Macao Basic Law is the key law in Chinese and in Portuguese. The Basic Law is a reliable legal foundation in the MSAR. So, the Executive Board of the Consultative Council for the Basic Law, headed by the former Chief Executive, is an essential body of the MSAR. Can we say: “We do not dwell in a country, we dwell inside a language? At homeland this is it”. 14 Putonghua is not yet the dominant language in Macao, but Cantonese currently has less influence now than in the year 2000. However, this language remains very useful for Cantonese speakers born in Macao, for many other Chinese who speak Cantonese, for a certain number of Macanese and very rare Indonesian and Filipinos, who constantly speak Cantonese in Macao. Cantonese residents in the MSAR are very proud of their mother tongue. Research on identity requires a multi-disciplinary approach involving social sciences, including geography, linguistics and the study of religion. For example, Catholicism is a sine qua non identity marker of the Macanese minority, or Tusheng. Currently, a duality exists within the post-1999 structure of Macanese identity, but very rare are the Macanese knowing Portuguese and Chinese cultures. These Macanese are defined as “flexible”, or having a “bamboo identity”. The Chinese are dominant, the Macanese adapt themselves to the Portuguese culture first but at present in the MSAR also adapt to the Chinese traditions more than before. Macanese and Chinese inter-marriages are more frequent after 2000. For the late first Macanese wife of casino tycoon Stanley Ho, Clementina Leitao, it was a tough decision in 1942 to marry a Chinese and not a Portuguese.

8. The Chinese of Macao: Identity and Transformation

The different Chinese groups in Macao today are: 1. Gwongdung yahn (Cantonese) the majority, 2. Fukgin yahn (C) divided into Hokkien or Hokhlo, a majority among Fujianese from the same province, 3. Chaozhou or Chiujau yahn (C) linguistically related to the Hokkien, 4. Hakka, 5. The Fishing People Tanka or Tehnga yahn (C), 6. Other Chinese Seuhnghoi yahn (C) or Shanghainese, Hunanese and Chinese from other provinces, 7. The Overseas Chinese (from Indonesia, Myanmar-Burma, Thailand, Vietnam…) Before the 1999 handover, the population of Macao was adjusted partly because mainlanders from Guangdong and other provinces who have also another main residence in Macao cannot be registered in both Census reports of the mainland and Macao. In 1999, my estimated Macao’s total population was 490,000 as based on intensive research at that time. 15 The official population of Macao was 513,000 in 2006, 538,000 in 2007 and 542,000 in 2009.16 In 1999 half of the legal immigrants came from Guangdong Province, 2,408 against a total of 4,984. In 2007 and 2009 these percentage increased respectively to 75% and 66%, 1,514 out of 2,221 and 2,099 out of a total of 3,121 immigrants.17 In 1999, 2,206 legal immigrants came from Fujian (45% of the total); in 2007, 223 (10%) and in 2009, 339 (11% of the total of legal migrants). This confirms the importance of the Fujianese in the MSAR. Other provinces and region are less important concerning the migration to Macao. From Hunan, 108 migrants came to Macao in 1999 (2%), 101 in 2007 (5%) and 117 in 2009 (3%).From Guangxi, 68 came in 1999, 77 in 2007 and 131 in 2009 (4%). From Shanghai, 37 immigrants entered in Macao in 1999 and 25 in 2009 (less than 1%). We will use the results of my survey of 225 interviewees and their households in the following Table 1, these respondents have more than twenty years of residence in Macao. Lacking updated

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data on hand, the Shanghainese and Chinese from other provinces, other than Guangdong and Fujian, are not intensively studied here. Wong Hon Keong (Huang Hanqiang) at University of Macau gave a forecast population of one million for 2021 which might be reached before that date because of the increasing economic development and Hengqin Island in a new close relationship with the MSAR. Cantonese answering to my questionnaires, in 2011 are a large majority; however, the percentage of Cantonese will probably decrease in the future. Chinese of all provinces also want to be part of a dynamic new MSAR. So, the Macao Chinese are a “social barometer” of the current and future social change in the MSAR.

Table 1. Percentage of Macao Chinese from Guangdong and Fujian Provinces (225 questionnaires, 2011) Origin

Number

Percentage

Zhongshan—Shiqi, Zhuhai, Shunde and Panyu

78

55

Cantonese from Xinhui, Jiangmen, Nanhai, Toumen and Heshan

32

24

Cantonese from Taishan, Foshan and Guangzhou

17

13

Fujianese (Minnan, Fuzhou, Mindong, Minbei and other)

10

8

Guangdong and Cantonese Language In Table 1, according to our research 555 of the respondents come from Zhongshan, Shunde and Panyu in Guangdong province, which is higher than the 47% found in my previous research.18 However, for the Chinese of Macao whose ancestors come from Taishan, Foshan and Guangzhou, the percentage is slightly lower to the estimation in 1999 (13% instead of 14%) found in Table 1. Xinhui, Jiangmen, Nanhai, Toumen and Heshan give a high percentage of

8. The Chinese of Macao: Identity and Transformation

24%. A percentage of 92% of Cantonese is too high, the interviewees are mainly Cantonese speakers and do not reflect the complex reality of the MSAR. However, it is sure that the number of legal migrants coming from Guangdong Province is high according the official statistics (Census DSEJ). We consider that twenty years of residence, in the territory and later the MSAR, is really a minimum to possess the “Macao” identity. The majority of respondents (who answered to the questionnaires of the 100 households selected) below the age of 30 included “Chinese” in their responses—those who responded “Chinese of Macao” were the largest in number, while 7 declared themselves simply “Chinese”. 18 of the 47 respondents under 30 merely responded with “Macao” (see Table 2). Of respondents between 31 and 59 years old, 12 (12 individuals or 12% of 100 respondents for their household) answered this identity question with “Macao” and 12 (or 12%) with “Chinese of Macao”. Of those 60 and above, 10% (10 individuals) answered “Chinese of Macao”. So we can say with certainty that, from our data, the largest minority of our respondents 44% considered themselves “Chinese of Macao” (22+12+10). However, if we consider the total of 225 respondents, which includes many youths with a high level of education not representing the reality, we find that 50% had reached the tertiary educational level. The MSAR Government Statistics of 2006 show only 11% of the population having a university degree. However, the number of university graduates has been increasing over the years in the MSAR. These youths prefer to say that their identity is that of “Macao”. Many of them have a Portuguese passport, although they do not speak Portuguese, so that the identity “Macao” fits their egos and corresponds to a certain commonly accepted reality. It is difficult for them to declare their Portuguese identity, and they prefer to travel to Singapore and Thailand rather than to Europe.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Table 2. Responses by Generation of 100 Interviewees from 100 Selected Households Extracted from the Data for 225 Households: Omoonyahn (Macao person), Omoontek Zhongkokyahn (Chinese of Macao) and Zhongkokyahn (Chinese) Macao

Chinese of Macao

Chinese

Age 30 or below:

18

22

7

Age 31 to 59

12

12

7

Age 60 or above

6

10

6

Percentage total

36%

44%

20%

Remembering that those below 30 years of age are over-represented, out of the total of 225 interviewees we find that: 48% responded with “Macao” (instead of the 36% found in Table 2), 32%, with “Chinese of Macao” (instead of the 44%, Table 2) and 20% simply with “Chinese”. These Chinese come from Guangdong Province, and also from Asia (in particular, from Southeast Asia), Europe, and South America. An association in Macao, the Guiqiao Zhonghui, is composed of Overseas Chinese from more than twenty different countries. In my questionnaires, 10% of the respondents have family links with Southeast Asia and 42% have a brother, a sister or another kin in Hong Kong. The majority of the Chinese in Macao are, of course, Cantonese. So the main language in the MSAR is Cantonese, but Putonghua is becoming increasingly important. At the turn of the century a Nepali businessman, speaking of the main language of communication, has said: “To become international, Macao must follow Hong Kong and speak English.” This statement concerns in particular the MSAR Secretary for Economy and Finance and also the tourist agencies more than the grassroots people who continue to speak Cantonese. The increasing importance of Putonghua, is a key factor in the MSAR’s transformation. Monica is an ethnic Chinese woman, born and raised in Macao where she has a prestigious job. She believes that “Chineseness” represents something very ordinary: “We just live the way we live, have our families and our little traditions or ways of doing things”. We “do things in line” with our history and customs.19 History and culture strengthens Cantonese identity, the dominant identity in the MSAR.

8. The Chinese of Macao: Identity and Transformation

Importance of Cantonese Residents in the MSAR There is an evident acculturation of the Cantonese in Macao, both linguistically and socially, that takes place, not through English as in Singapore and Hong Kong, but more through Putonghua (Mandarin). I discovered an increasing lack of knowledge of many kinship terms in Cantonese among informants born in Macao and very fluent in their mother tongue. The new media orientation toward Putonghua in Guangzhou in 2010 has evidently influenced the MSAR. However, thanks to their literature and the rich Cantonese opera (yueju), we believe in the resilience of the Cantonese language in Macao, until the MSAR’s likely integration into Guangdong province in 2049. This Cantonese resilience is part of an essential mapping among the “totality of Chinese ethnicities in all their subtleties”.20 It is interesting to note an initiative of the Education and Youth Affairs Bureau (DSEJ), which has organized a six-month course in Cantonese language for non-Cantonese residents that began on 19 February 2011.

Hokkien It is evident that Macao Chinese from Fujian province represent an important part of the MSAR population, about 20% of a population totaling some 550,000 permanent residents. My survey gives 8% of Hokkien or Minnan speakers, the majority of the Fujianese residents in Macao. All of them speak correctly Cantonese. In Taiwan during the 1950s, the Hokkien dialect became less important, yet it still has a huge cultural impact nowadays. So, the Beijing officialdom for business and political reasons is trying to reinforce the link between Hokkien speakers from Fujian, Macao and Taiwan. Concerning the Hokkien who speak Oklo oe, we found in my survey around 10% speaking this “dialect”. “Hokkien” belong to an essential “ethno-linguistic” group.21 There are some forty million Hokkien speakers in the world. Among the Hokkien speakers in Macao, Xiamen and Putian dialects are dominant. The Hokkien speakers thus constitute the second most important group in the MSAR, after the dominant Cantonese.

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Following my enquiry among other Hokkiens around the Fujian Association (near the Zhuhai border), I found that all are proud to use their mother tongue. The majority of them know perfectly Cantonese. However, the native Cantonese speakers of the MSAR and the HKSAR can easily detect the provincial origin of the non-Cantonese natives. My Hokkien informant Lim, 62 years old, originally came from Xiamen, always speaks Cantonese and does not want to speak Hokkien. In 1975 Lim entered Macao with his wife, also from Xiamen, and his eldest son. He did not graduate from secondary school. He of course understands Hokkien, but he became a Chinese of Macao. His main language of communication is Cantonese, which now characterizes his identity. He has never returned to Xiamen, except once for his father’s funeral. Sometimes he even denies the good knowledge of his mother tongue, Xiamenhua, a branch of Minnanhua. His younger son took advantage of his Portuguese citizenship, as a Chinese born in Macao under Portuguese rule before 1999. Now he lives in London. Lim has no intention to go to London. He seems to survive his harassing 12-hour per day, 365 days a year job as a hotel night receptionist. He speaks rather respectfully of Mao Zedong when he refers to the policies of different periods during 1958–1976, like those of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The fact that he does not want to return to the mainland is somehow strange and does not match his deference when he speaks of Mao. The dynamism of the Hokkien community and Minnanhua speakers was demonstrated in the Singing Competition at the Forum in February 2011. The Forum was full and the audience enthusiastic. The majority of the Singing Masters judges of the Singing Competition, four out of the five masters, were from Taiwan. The Fujianese Association president Chen Ming Jin attended that cultural event. As a Hokkien, Chen’s success story of member in the MSAR Legislative Assembly and as an entrepreneur who plays a key role in the development of the local Hokkien community is well known.

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Other Chinese of Macao The Chinese of Macao are not all from Guangdong and Fujian provinces. All the following categories may constitute together 30% of the MSAR population in 2011 And this will probably increase over time. These non-Cantonese and non-Fujianese Chinese of Macao may be Chaozhou linguistically or related to the Hokkien, Hakka, Shanghainese or Hunanese Chinese from other provinces and the overseas Chinese mainly from Southeast Asia. Still, some Chinese permanent residents in the HKSAR may also be MSAR permanent residents. At present, the Chaozhou community, or Teochew, is proportionally less important in Macao (4% of the Chinese community) than in Hong Kong (where 8% of the local Chinese population belongs). They are not classified among the Cantonese even if they speak fluently Cantonese. The Chaozhou folks’ sea-oriented culture is a consequence of the lack of good roads in eastern Guangdong, even during the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). The Teochew are sea-traders and sojourners and so are present in Southeast Asia, in particular in Thailand, and in Macao. The current president of the Macao Chaozhou Association is Xu Shi Yuan. He is also president of the Charitable Association Tung Sin Tong and vice-president of Kiang Wu Association and Hospital. He received the MSAR’s Golden Lotus medal for his contribution to Macao community life.

Two Life Stories

Joao Baptista Manuel Leao, Liang in Putonghua Mr Leao, born in Macao, is chairman of the Consultative Committee of Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau since 2002 and has been a deputy in the MSAR Legislative Assembly, 1999–2002.22 He is president of the Executive Committee of the Association for

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Adult Education in the MSAR. His father and ancestors as well as his wife are from Xinhui, Guangdong. Leao became a Portugal-ized, Catholic Chinese of Macao, thanks to his godfather, the late Alberto Antonio Angelo, head of the Social Welfare Department. His godfather also indirectly guided Mr Leao toward an administrative career, for which Portuguese language was a must before 1999. However, Mr Leao, unlike the majority of the Macanese, and even some Chinese, masters Putonghua and written Chinese. His fluent Portuguese and good written Chinese proficiency have opened the doors of the then Portuguese administration to him. He studied in Hong Kong in English, and this enables him to read, speak and translate Chinese, Portuguese and English. This tri-lingualism is rare and is very useful in Macao, where, unfortunately, many Chinese of Macao still do not understand the importance of learning many languages. Educated at Colegio Dom Bosco in Macao, Leao graduated in Mechanical Engineering from the Hong Kong Polytechnic. We can say that he is a self-made man. He is able to teach courses in administration to other civil servants in both Portuguese and Chinese. In 1971 Leao married Cecilia Chung. The couple has two daughters: Maria Vanessa, who has an MA in music from Hong Kong Baptist University and Eugenia Florinda who has a MA in tourism from University of Surrey in the UK. During 1974–1983 Mr Leao taught mechanical drawing at Colegio Dom Bosco. Always friendly and easy to reach, Mr Leao is fully dedicated to promote education in Macao. Education is precisely what the MSAR needs to develop as a priority and building schools and universities is good but is not enough. Promoting education as a priority is not easy, even if all the Chinese in Macao, from the top to the bottom, understand this point. Education being a priority, yet more creativity is needed to upgrade Macao’s education quality and standards. Mr Leao is member of over one hundred associations in Macao, including the Xinhui Association and Rotary Club of Macao Central. He is also a Council member of Macao City University. He is an Executive Board standing committee member of the Consultative Council for the Basic Law that comprises 15 members. (Former MSAR Chief Executive Edmund Ho chairs the Council with a total membership of 90).

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Mr Leao has many friends in Macao, Hong Kong, Europe and the USA. He likes to read, swim and to sing in many languages. In 2010 he traveled with the MSAR Council for Youth Education to Frankfort, Prague and Tallin. He also visited Rome, Milan, Turin, Paris and Lourdes that year. Mr Leao’s identity (Chinese of Macao) is well defined. He likes to travel, a Macanese cultural trait, only God knows what sort of “Macanese” he is.

Leong Heng Teng Leong Heng Teng, born in 1947 in Guangdong, is the son of Liang Rong Gen. Mr Leong late mother came from Guangdong’s Nanhai while his father’s family is from Shunde. Thus, Leong Heng Teng is a Shuntak Association member. Liang Rong Gen is more than eighty years old and has had four daughters and three sons, including the eldest Leong Heng Teng. All of them are married and residents in Macao. The eldest daughter passed away at an early age. Liang Rong Gen has many great-grandchildren. Mr Leong married in Macao; his elder son also, so Leong Heng Teng has one grandson and a granddaughter. Leong Heng Teng’s daughter is the last child and lives with her parents. In 1965 Leong Heng Teng has completed his secondary studies at Hao Jiang School in Macao. He taught there as a primary school teacher for twenty years. At the age of 50 he graduated from Jinan University in Guangdong and so he is a self-made man. In 1960, Leong became interested in politics. He has been a member of “Xinqiaofang” since 1980, later became president of the Union of Neighborhood Associations. He is also the founding p resident of Kaifong, the Street Committee of Macao.23 During 1991–1999, Mr Leong was an elected deputy of the Macao Legislative Assembly On 3 May 2008, he became was a really torch bearer in Macao for the Beijing Olympic Games. He is a former captain of the basketball team of Macao and a dynamic community leader. Mr Leong particularly appreciates tea parties (cha gordo in Macanese patois), where he can meet elderly people and the youth of Macao, and listen to their problems. There he can even sing to entertain them. Heping, peace, is essential for him he said.

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Since 1999, Leong Heng Teng has been an influential member of the MSAR Executive Council, and in the first two weeks of March 2011, he went to Beijing with the Executive Council delegation. This is the most important period of the year for China’s National People’s Congress.24 Mr Leong is particularly concerned with the MSAR social problems, in particular those affecting Qingzhou, the northwestern district of Macao Peninsula. Wishing to balance economic and social developments, he proposed to reduce the tax amount by 300 hundred million MOP paid by those who possess their own flats as these proprietors receive no government aid unlike those in social houses.25

Social Problem

A Case Study of Ilha Verde (Qingzhou 青洲) Our methodology is to assess society with an economic yardstick. Like the increasing number of tourists, some Chinese in Macao may be fascinated by the number of casinos, the physical magnificence of some of them, and are consequently lured to gamble. This dominant economic situation cannot be ignored. However, the Chinese of Macao know how to take risks and seize coming opportunities. In general, one single case is not enough to have a good view on social problems. However, Ilha Verde is a case in point for the Chinese proverb yi shi zhu xin (clothing, food, shelter and transportation). The housing situation in Qingzhou was “the key social question” in late 2010. Due to the drastic transformation of this area in early 2011, it is difficult to find three vital things, rice, bread and tea. Contrary to East Timor, after Macao’s 1999 revision Portuguese bread is becoming rare and often baked with some sugar like in Hong Kong. Starting from such an angle, it is useful to look at the environment front so crucial to upgrade the MSAR. For the media, in particular, all the Macao newspapers in Chinese, Portuguese or English, the recent demolition of the wooden houses

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in Qingzhou to clear the way for a reconstruction of this district is a difficult task. Some residents were allegedly attacked by on-site workers hired by the landlords. The residents evidently want to be relocated by the MSAR government. By 2 January 2011, it seemed that only five houses made of wood were still standing there; two days later, out of the 1,400 shacks, only 3 remained, but these were no longer fit to be used as residences. All the others are said to have been demolished. 26 Residents were supposedly to have been relocated or to have access to other property, because they were rich enough to do so. I went there personally with my assistant on the first day of the Chinese Lunar New Year to check and see if this information was correct. In Qingzhou, we noticed that it was not at all certain that only three wooden houses remained. On the hill above the Canal of the Ducks (Yayong He) between Zhuhai and Ilha Verde, we photographed more than three such houses that day. Of course it is more difficult to build on this hill but still there are pieces of land in Qingzhou and elsewhere. The Qingzhou case is a remarkable example for looking at the Chinese of Macao and their relationship with the officialdom. The MSAR government is in the process of preparing a grand plan to reassure the Qingzhou folks. The planned improvement of the Health Center of Qingzhou constitutes a priority. Two influential legislators, Chui Shiping and He Runsheng, support the government’s yet to be fully detailed plan.27 Early in January 2011, a taxi driver, Mr Ho, said he approved the government plan, which “cleans the city and uplifts a remote part of Macao”. However, some residents of the shacks have claimed that the demolition of the house where they have lived was carried out without legal permission. Legislator Ng Kuok Cheong said that new projects are expected elsewhere in areas with similar conditions. The pro-democratic elements in Macao demand details on such projects. There are 100 plots of land repossessed by the regime from developers who want to be involved in this part of the Peninsula. Ng wants to increase the political pressure to avoid further developments like that of Qingzhou.28 Social housing is a major issue confronting Macao. The elders who have been relocated in Qingzhou in the last half of 2010 are

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not so satisfied.29 Mr Hua Rong and Mr Shui Seng, who were relocated to the Madam Robinson Building in Areia Preta (Haksa Wan in northern Macao), had the good fortune to be relocated within Qingzhou. However, there was a fire on the 25th floor and they were transferred to the 14th floor, which is equipped with fire alarm. Yet they complain they have no toilets on the 14th floor. The residents in Qinzhou are isolated; the area lacks frequent bus links to the faraway San Januario Hospital. They also complain of the inadequate green space, sports ground and shops. They have politely asked the government to find solutions to their problems. Social housing residents are expected to pay less in monthly rent. 30 The Public Housing Affairs Committee vice-president Mr Leong Keng Seng announced that there would be either no increase or a reduction for 90% of the social housing residents. Providing 19,000 subsidized flats by 2012 is a tall order. There are some 6,000 families living in social units at present, and this batch of 19,000 new units is a big task for the MSAR government. Hosing is a constant subject of Legislative Assembly debatesm as many deputies are pinning their hopes for the 2013 re-election on this social housing issue. Rent is another key point. The rent ceiling for a four-bedroom social housing unit is P 2,500 on Macao Peninsula and P 2,200 in Taipa, where land/property price is lower. According to the calculation presented in the Macau Daily Times, if the income of a one-person household reaches P 9,000 a month, the rent will jump from P 600 to P 1,254. However, if this person’s income drops to only P 3,000 per month, he/she will pay only P 130, a sharp reduction. The access to social housing is limited to low income applicants to rent or buy low price government flats. The maximum salary ceilings for those in social housing cannot exceed more than twice the upper limits for their rent categories, or their housing contracts may be unilaterally terminated by the Housing Bureau. The MSAR Executive Council spokesman and Kaifong Association chair Leong Heng Teng thinks that the law on Social Housing in preparation would allow qualified persons to buy flats more easily but would make them tougher to sell. Sonny Lo31 and Mr Leong are also concerned with the question of public consultation which is necessary.32

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In 2010 and early 2011, the problem of Qingzhou became one of the most important debates. Even entrepreneur and influential Hokkien leader Chen Ming Jin criticized the MSAR government and in particular the housing officials for their inactivity on the Qingzhou issue. The law (6/93/M passed before the handover) notes the obligations of the Housing Bureau to register and control wooden shacks and “even provide, if necessary, that the security forces may assist in this task”. However, the Bureau has sometimes ignored its duties. The number of staff in charge of inspection is not increasing. Since 8 December 2010, without legal order, brutal demolition of the shacks by force has occurred, sometimes before the residents had moved out. How do this government bureau and the MSAR police evaluate their performances? How does one have the right to force somebody to move out of his/her home? In Hong Kong there are strict laws regulating this type of expulsion. In Macao, for the coming project of reconstruction of old suburbs, it is necessary to have rules, but there is no law on these problems in the MSAR. This type of regime appropriation of private properties for common use requires precise laws including dates by which inhabitants must depart. Eventually, the court may have to intervene in such cases.33.This is not the case yet. The debates and the interventions on 7 December 2010 at the Legislative Assembly of legislators Kwan Tsui Hang and Jose Pereira Coutinho significantly demonstrated the gap between the elected legislators and the MSAR government. Elected democrat Ng Kuok Cheong hoisted a sign on 7 December announcing that there were 754 days left to build over 16,000 units, other deputies did not care about this deadline for the completion of social housing units to meet public needs. On 30 December Coutinho, president of the MSAR Civil Servants Association, confirmed he importance of the housing debate. On the regime side, Housing Bureau chief Tam Kuong Man tried to find solutions. Some 12,000 families are on the waiting list for the promised 19,000 housing units, and they cannot be ignored. Too many of these families have been waiting for a unit for years. Ng handed a petition signed by many citizens to the Legislative Assembly on 13 January 2011. Qingzhou’s violence is new in Macao

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according to Ng. In February 2011, three pro-democratic legislators, Ng, Au Kam San and Chan Wai Chi, anted to pursue this issue that they had started to push actively a month ago. Still some deputies like Leonel Alves have taken a softer stance. Lawmakers Kwan Tsui Hang and Ho Ion Seng accepted some of the reasons for the slow resolution of this problem while wanting to accelerate the 19,000 new social housing units’ construction. Yet, they also demanded better publicity and transparency on the allocation of land to developers in the future and that land disposal should be more clearly defined by the government according to new rules. The proposal for a public hearing on Qingzhou was finally rejected by the Legislative Assembly in February 2011 by 19 to seven vote.34 Kaifong (General Union of Neighborhood Associations) and its president and Executive Council member Leong Heng Teng wanted to protect the residents’ rights. To cool down the debates, Chief Executive Fernando Chui announced in March 2011 a three-month rent exempt for all social housing occupants. MSAR urbanization section head Liu Rong unveiled the regime’s grand plan for Qingzhou redevelopment—the Qingzhou Hill and the Monastery will be preserved. He announced that 9,000 housing units would be ready in 2011.35 The improvement of the environment and the creation of green spaces at the core of the new urbanization plan that has been applied to Qingzhou will certainly contribute to upgrading the international image of the MSAR as a star in the Pearl River Delta. However, in early 2011 it was difficult to imagine any quick resolution of the MSAR housing problem. While his stance on older public housing buildings renovation did not satisfy the majority of the lawmakers, MSAR Secretary for Transport and Public Works Lau Si Io reiterated that 19,000 social housing units would be built on time, by 2012. It is sure that a clean new Qingzhou district will be more attractive for developing the idea of Macao as a cultural city, which has been both a dream of the Portuguese and of the MSAR government. Concerning their identity, Macao Chinese in particular in that district want a clean Macao, but resist the idea to be removed by force. To compete with Hong Kong and Shanghai, Macao may need more international shops for high end tourists, but a creative

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effort is necessary to improve the MSAR’s international image, yet it has to be implemented by balancing the key economic goals and societal objectives.

Associations Associations are also essential for the Chinese of Macao. Macao has five-hundred-year history and was the center of nascent globalization in the 19th century. The economic and geopolitical relations of Macao at that time included Asia, Europe, Africa, and South America, from which silver came, the real currency of the Middle Empire. Thus, already in the 19th century, the Chinese of Macao were motivated to unite in various associations. These associations, in Southeast Asia as well as in Australia, South America, and also in Cuba, were powerful enough to help transform the plight of the “coolies” into the basis for the success stories of Chinese communities in many countries. K. C. Fok’s historical Macao formula reconciled two extreme opinions that often separated the staunchly doctrinaire central officials and the more practically-minded provincial officials.36 The revised formula explaining the socio-economic structure of the former Portuguese territory is still valid. The power, almost everywhere, in departments, institutions, committees (standing and ordinary) and enterprises (contrary to Macao, in mainland China corporate governance in private enterprises often do not exist), is divided into two levels: the upper level including the president, the vice-presidents and the executive secretary and has a variable level of opacity. Some presidents, and rarely some executive secretaries, may have a particular charisma which may modify this theoretical structure. The lower board is composed of directors and inspectors. In certain associations such as Sin Meng, important decisions are taken by all the members of the board meeting together once a year. 37 In associations significant decisions may be also decided during an annual meeting including the board and all the members of the association present. This Macao formula expresses also nowadays the specificity of the MSAR. Associations, and also

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Bureau of the government, have an inspectorate level which may have a certain power sometimes.

A Successful Women’s Associations The case study of the Women’s General Association of Macao (Funulian Hezonghui) founded in 1950, demonstrates the capacity to organize in Macao. Its internal regulations were later modified to be more modern from the original system. In the 1950s, the women in China were persuaded to be good “socialist women” encouraging their husband to work hard and educating their children in the proper way.38 Macao at that time was very different, but that does not change the close past and present relationship between Beijing and Macao’s Women’s Associations. Women’s “participation is not solely about numbers and percentages; consciousness is far more important.”39 A new law was promulgated in 1992 in mainland China concerning women, and this has certainly influenced the philosophy of the Women’s General Association concerning politics, economy, culture, marriage, divorce and the family. The number of divorce in the mainland and the MSAR is dramatically increasing. This Women’s General Association currently has 18,000 members. A sine qua non condition for membership is to be a woman but marriage is not a compulsory condition. Its headquarters is located Rua do Campo (Shuikengwei). In terms of work ethic and a constant will to act for the development and welfare of the society, the president, Ms Ho Teng Iat,40 is certainly the follower of her entrepreneur father, the late Ho Tin. The first modern electronic factory in Macao established by him has been an industrial success for both Macao and his family. However, Ms Ho rejects the idea of creating a museum in this historic factory which still stands. Ms Ho prefers to devote her energies to promoting women, and to act, rather than to look back. She does not regret that she is no longer a Legislative Assembly deputy, where she sat during the first MSAR decade. She acts for the MSAR and often goes to Beijing, especially when the National People’s Congress met annually as in March 2011. The importance of “teamwork” expresses the spirit of the Women’s General Association. Its administration model contrasts

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with that of other associations in Macao, where few staff are available, except on meeting days. On 3 February 2011 the Macao Women’s General Association had its 60th anniversary dinner, hosted by its president Ho Teng Iat. Women and staff associated with its six kindergartens, the school and the Youth Women’s Association, a total of 300 persons, attended. One of the six nurseries will be transferred in 2011 from the center of Macao to Qingzhou to assist the development of this suburb in reconstruction. This social problem and the importance of nurseries to assist women were discussed with the author. The managing vice-president, Ms Yang Xiu Wen, explained in her speech the numerous activities undertaken by the association in 2010. She stated that, in 2011, the association would continue to be a harmonious point for social gathering for women of all classes. Women would be promoted, their rights protected, and all services for them and their children would be organized. The power, in this Women’s Association, is concentrated at the top. Its president seems to have more power in her association than the president of the Tung Sin Tong. However, the executive secretary of the charitable association Tung Sin Tong seems to have more autonomy than does the executive secretary of the Women’s General Association. Ms Ho pointed out a structure of three levels in her association. However, she recognized the validity of Macao formula of a two-level structure. In fact for Women’s General Association as well as Tung Sin Tong, power lies in the “higher board” that includes the president and six vice-presidents. However, a new power of the inspectors seems to be “in fashion” in the MSAR. It is not known why but it could be related to new laws in the Mainland influencing Macao, further research is necessary.

Social Change and Globalization In December 1966, more than 9,000 Red Guards were ready to enter Macao from Zhuhai.41 One can say, in fact, that 1, 2 and 3 April 1967 marked the beginning of the end of Portuguese colonial rule because the Red Guards invaded Macao. Logically for legislator

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Ng Kuok Cheong the marking event was the 20 December 1999 handover. In 2011 nobody uses the old Chinese name of Macao, Omoonkai (The market-street of Macao). The MSAR is now too big. Macao the casino-city is in direct competition with Las Vegas. Social change involves the Sinicization process in the MSAR. Macao is really a very special place on earth. For a trader in carpets and rubies, Fayaz Khan, who has lived in the MSAR since 2003, Macao is changing. In 2004 he affirmed that it was gaming that ushered this rapid change, and in February 2011 he confirmed this view. Despite this rapid change, however, a fascinating social harmony still prevails.42 Transportation and communication have improved over the years. However, why half of Gositak or Horta e Costa Avenue, a key boulevard in a densely populated area, was closed due to works in progress to be improved for car and bus traffic. In the mainland it happens but never during such a long period for a similar road project. Is it a lack of management and follow-up or a bad choice of enterprises involved in this useful project? In the 1980s it was not possible to reach Guangzhou by bus from Gongbei-Zhuhai in less than four hours. Now Guangdong’s provincial capital can be reached in two hours, and soon bullet trains will further shorten this voyage. Evidently, the MSAR Chinese community will continue to change at a rapid pace with the completion of the Macao Light Rail to serve the Zhuhai border and the Taipa piers near the airport. Many traditional tea houses disappeared, like Yuanlai and Ruxin on the Rua dos Mercadores in the Chinese Bazaar. 43 By 2004, it seems that Sinicization had increased, and the old houses of rich Chinese families in Macao had disappeared. By 2009, less advertising on the buses and in the streets was Chinese-Portuguese bilingual than before. In the MSAR, as in other Chinese cities, Chinese characters naturally dominate publicity. While in Hong Kong, Bloomberg’s program “Morning Cal” was a popular program in 2009, in Macao many Chinese watch CCTV2 instead. The 12th anniversary of Macao’s handover was celebrated in 2011, with a short visit by PRC Premier Wen Jiabao. Afterwards the MSAR Chief Executive went to Beijing. In early 2011, the MSAR

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Legislative Assembly rejected a motion of the pro-democratic deputies asking for a hearing on the problem to probe accountability for the dismantling of the Qingzhou shacks for the construction of new social housing units amid hot debates.

A More Global World? In this 21st century, no systematic research in sociology can avoid the key recurrent issue of globalization. On 12 February 2011, MSAR Chief Executive Fernando Chui affirmed that the MSAR would become more proactive in regional cooperation, particularly with Guangdong. Chui also affirmed clearly that globalization is essential.44 Being more “global”, Macao, like Hong Kong and Paris, has a new free newspaper, Jinri Aomen (Macao Today) that is popular partly because of an increasing inflation. But what is the local impact of globalization? The Chinese of Macao are rather egocentric, because their identity is that of the majority, and Omoonyahn are not simply “Chinese”, although they are really Chinese, as are other Chinese in Macao and in the Mainland. For Macao’s youth, like many in Hong Kong who consider themselves “Hongkongese”, their identity is rather localized. Yet, even they do not travel too much, the Chinese of Macao (just like mainland Chinese who travel more), are certainly more “globalized” today. Like it or not, McDonalds is part of this global social phenomenon. In a remote northwest area in the MSAR, at the corner of Bracial Sul Street in Patane, the McDonalds restaurant is open 24 hours a day, as is the one on Horta and Costa Avenue, as they are in New York. Globalization is part of education in the MSAR. Ms. Laura Cha, head of the HKSAR higher education funding agency,45 affirms that Hong Kong’s future relies upon the ability of its best educated to “understand the wider global world”. This is the case in Macao. But the proliferation of casinos in Macao, part of this globalization, is a problem. Society is linked to the economy. Concerning a possible new financial crisis, Chen Zhiwu of Yale University, considers that since the 2008-09 global Wall Street crisis, there are uncertainties.46 The

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huge transformation of China and its globalization are not risk-free for China's unity. This might be discussed, but we have to recognize the positive aspect of Sinicization on unity, modernization and progress. It would be utopian to try to promote Macao too strongly, as its current domain of only 30 square kilometers obviously limits its possibilities.47 Without having an opportunity to speak more than a few minutes with Ms. Pansy Ho, she certainly understands well the question of what Macao and the Chinese of Macao can really achieve. The question of rethinking the “East” and the “West”, from c. 1550 up to the present, is a key question in the MSAR, and this question needs to be constantly re-asked. For Macao, the East is now Beijing.

Conclusion In Macao, dramatic changes occurred after WWII, during the Cultural Revolution, after the revision of the former Portuguese enclave to China, and during the period 2000–2012. The year 2011 is also the beginning of a transformation of the MSAR. Could we say that “Chinese of Macao” constitutes the only identity in the MSAR? Certainly not, there are many identities in the MSAR, including those of the resident Burmese, Chinese, Europeans, Filipinos, Indians, Indonesians, Japanese, Portuguese, Thais, Timorese and Vietnamese... And even within the Chinese of Macao there is a complexity of subgroups, but their Chineseness “is reproduced in the intimacies of daily life”. 48 “We are Chinese” proves something very serious. Out of the 225 interviewees from my questionnaires, the large majority affirmed clearly its Chineseness. The percentage of “Chinese” and “Chinese of Macao” is superior to the simple identity “Macao”. On the basis of 100 households randomly selected and more “balanced” concerning the age group, 66% have confirmed their “Chineseness”. However, the distribution of seats in the Legislative Assembly (including Macanese) slightly “balances the ethnic composition of the legislature… (and) enrich

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the content of the Basic Law.”49 In my questionnaires 14% of the interviewees have international links, 10% have family links in Southeast Asia and 42% have a brother, a sister or another kin in Hong Kong. Since the year 2000 the link with mainland China has strengthened. The increasing number of mainland Chinese visitors constitutes a proof of the MSAR’s transformation. To sum up the results of this study, it is evident that the Chinese of Cantonese origin are the majority among the dominant Macao Chinese. Cantonese which is considered a dialect by the PRC central government remains the main language of the MSAR, however, Putonghua is essential. The already significant number of non-Cantonese permanent residents in Macao, the increasing number of Chinese “tourists”, coming sometimes from China’s far away regions, such as Xinjiang, and in particular the media are favorable to the promotion of the national language, Putonghua. The Chinese of Macao who originated from Guangdong are the majority. The Fujianese, and in particular Hokkien, make some 20% of the total population. Chinese of Macao with Chaozhou, Hakka, Shanghainese, Hunanese or other origins in China, and also all non-Chinese, in particular Portuguese and even Brazilian, are also essential for the MSAR’s development. My study forecast an acceleration of the multi-ethnicity in the MSAR as linked to the evident globalization bringing businessmen, engineers and professional highly qualified. Language constitutes a fundamental core of overall identity. In Macao the de facto situation in 2000 was the pre-eminence given to the simple term “Chinese language” (Basic Law I-9), which generally means Cantonese for the Chinese of Macao. Some Chinese probably do not know that Portuguese is an official language of the MSAR. However, the Chinese of Macao are submitted to the forces of both globalization and “Mainlandization”, 50 and we understand the importance of Putonghua and Sinicization. It seems that Cantonese is slowly losing its dominance. Already in neighboring Hong Kong, Putonghua and English are gaining a larger audience. However, the percentage of Mainlanders is much greater in Macao than in Hong Kong, so that Putonghua is more important at present in the MSAR than in Hong Kong. Traditional Chinese characters continue to dominate in the MSAR, but it remains to be seen whether, in 2049,

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Macao will finally begin to use simplified characters, as is the case in mainland China. Culture is seriously considered in Macao. In 2010–2011 important changes have been proposed on culture affairs by the MSAR government. The Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture, Cheong U, chairs the Cultural Industry Committee (IC) that includes the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau (IACM) president, the heads of the Macao Polytechnic Institute and other institutes. Secretary Cheong’s main program is a commitment to building a “city of culture”, an idea often put forward by the Portuguese administration. Such a project is ambitious and may upgrade the image of Macao in competition with Hong Kong. In January 2011, Ung Vai Meng, head of the Cultural Bureau thinks that the Mandarin’s House (home of noted late Qing reform Zheng Quanyin) had attracted more than 100,000 visitors since its opening and it shows progress in the field of culture. This may be so, but there is still a recurrent problem of creativity and follow-up. Recently, Dr. Wu Zhiliang, President of the Macao Foundation and historian of Macao, asked the IC to increase contributions to local associations that are involved with local culture and the links with Guangdong and Fujian provinces.51 Associations can actively and positively boost the cultural development of the society. 45% of the 225 Chinese of Macao who answered the questionnaires of my survey were members of at least one association—usually one related to their places of origin, which is a fundamental identification for them. Education and health are two priorities for the society and the Chinese of Macao. Sin Meng Association’s survey also points out the importance of education policy and in second position the health institutions. 52 The relocation of University of Macau to a new campus on Hengqin Island is a challenge not only for the Tertiary Education Services Office but for many MSAR government units. The education inspector, Li Xiao Peng, with solid experience in the UK and Hong Kong where he was a school principal for two years, recognized the huge challenge to clearly upgrade Macao’s education system. The MSAR is still far behind Hong Kong on these fronts despite great progress over the last dozen years. The point is not to give

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money to the people of Macao, although this is done regularly. Wong Iek Soi, a former chief editor of the daily newspaper Va Kio and present general-secretary of the Returned Overseas Chinese Association, has mentioned the negative effects of the MSAR government’s annual distribution of funds to the people, feeling that such cash payments may have a negative effect on creativity. Concerning government assistance, we must not exclude the elders, the poorest and all those who are really in need, such as the children of low income families. There are, of course, similar practices of annual financial assistance elsewhere, followed recently by the HKSAR. Lao Chi Ngai of Hong Kong’s Association of Economic Sciences calls for a “bigger investment on education” and vocational training.53 Sin Meng Association found that 79.6% of its survey interviewees were seriously considering the problems of Macao’s youth.54 Education is essential to solve these problems. One should be confident that in the MSAR relevant education will be promoted. In fact, a harmonious alliance of Confucianism and tolerance continues to prevail, despite the drastic change in the culture, economy and society of the MSAR since 2000. Current MSAR Chief Executive Fernando Chui, who took office on 20 December 2009, will undoubtedly seek to develop new models of public and private cultural promotion. For Macao the current question is globalization. For Bourdieu 55 globalization is “truly a myth” but also a “powerful discourse”. Globalization, hopefully, does not always imply the homogenization of our world. The small autonomous region, Macao, is a kaleidoscope of sub-groups and minorities. We have to radically question an economic vision which particularizes everything and does not care about society. For Li Peilin56 the market economy in China is a factor and the reforms are a debatable subject, and this is also true for the MSAR. Both mainland China and the MSAR are in constant transformation. There is a recent increase of tourism, 28 million visitors entered Macao in 2011, this means encouraging mutual aid and cooperation from the leaders of the administrative region, and also from the people themselves. The youth are the future of the society, but in Macao they are traditionally uninterested in questions of policy.

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In 2011, some small scale social movements occurred before the Chinese New Year in Macao. It may seem that the Chinese of Macao are much less interested in “democratization of the society” than are the “Hongkongese”. It seems that in the MSAR, there is a tendency to emphasize the Macao identity among those with higher levels of education, and, overall, 109 out of 225 interviewees in our survey place “Macao” ahead of the other two identities suggested (“Chinese of Macao” and simply “Chinese”). We had expected the persons over 60 to affirm their Chineseness more strongly, but this was not the case in our questionnaires. If a hypothetical new global financial and economic crisis occurs in the coming years, Macao will certainly suffer, it will be impossible to maintain the incredible flow of “gamers”. We cannot say that the Chinese of Macao who have relatively good jobs in the casino industry will be exempt from the perturbations of the globalized world. In fact this study shows that due to the rapid evolution of social changes in Macao, it remains important to study and restudy the specificity of Macao Chinese and try to find new ways to preserve their local Cantonese culture and traditional identity.

Notes 1. The author is indebted to Professor Wu Zhiliang, President of the Macao Foundation, who generously invited him in December 2010 and 2011 to do a research on the Chinese of Macao on the spot. Professor Eva Hung kindly asked to her students at Macao University to assist for questionnaires; I express my gratitude to them. Professor Zhang Tingmao and Lo Baoling are deeply thanked for their valuable assistance. Dr. Paul Pun, who is a key actor on the making of questionnaires, has also largely contributed to their successful complete existence. 2. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 1973, p. 6. 3. Augustin Jean in Jean A. Berlie (ed.), Macao 2000, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 105–119. 4. The transliteration of Chinese characters is in pinyin and, for Cantonese language, (C) follows. 5. Alex Mucchielli, L’ Identite (Identity), Paris: PUF, 2007, p. 5.

8. The Chinese of Macao: Identity and Transformation 6. E. Durkheim, Les Regles de la Methode Sociologique (The Rules of the Sociological Method, New York : The Free Press, 1982),1947, pp. 15, 27, 31. 7. Gary Ngai’s interview 17.2.2011. 8. Hao Zhidong, Macau History and Society, Hong Kong University Press, 2011, p. 207. 9. Cathryn H. Clayton, Sovereignty at the Edge: Macau and the Question of Chineseness, London: Harvard University, 2009: 9, 264; Clifford Geetz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 1973). 10. Wang Gungwu, The Chineseness of China, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991. 11. Li Fulin, Aomen Siban Shiji (Macao: Four Century and a Half), Macao, 1995, p. 17; C. C. Choi, “Settlements on Chinese Families” in R. D. Cremer (ed.), Macau City of Commerce and Culture, Hong Kong: API Press, 1997, pp. 61–63, 77. 12. Interviews by the author: Paul Spooner, Feb. 2011. 13. French-Chinese Dictionary, Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1983. 14. Emil Cioran, Aveux et Anathemes (Confessions and Anathema), Paris: Gallimard, 1987, p. 21. 15. Jean A. Berlie (ed.), Macao 2000, Oxford University Press, 1999. 16. Macau’s Demographic Statistics, Macau: DSEJ, 2009, p. 6. 17. Yearbook of Statistics 2010, p. 77. 18. ibid., Macao 2000. 19. Clayton, ibid., pp. 274–5. 20. Gregory E. Guldin, “Hong Kong Ethnicity of Folk Models and Change” in Grant Evans and Maria Tam (eds.), Hong Kong. The Anthropology of a Chinese Metropolis, Richmond Surrey: Curzon, 1997, p. 38. 21. Guldin ibid., p. 50. 22. Many interviews by the author between 1995 and March 2011. 23. Lam Fat Iam, Aomen Qingji Xinqiaofang (Macao: Oral History), Macao Oral History Association, 2008, p. 136. 24. Interview by the author on 19 March 2011. 25. Aomen Ribao (ARB), 4 December 2010, p. A10. 26. Jornal Tribuna de Macau (JTM) 4 January 2011, p. 3; ARB, 2 January 2011, p. C5; Jornal do Cidadão, 2 January 2011. 27. ARB, 5 January 2011, p. B7. 28. Macau Daily Times (MDT), 14 January 2011, p. 3.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century 29. ARB, 1 February 2011, p. B5. 30. MDT, 28 January 2011, p. 2. 31. Sonny Lo, “Consultative Governance. Legitimacy Problem and Democracy Deficiency”, in Yiguo Liangzhi Yanjiu (A Research on “One Country Two Systems”) in Review online, Macau Polytechnic University, 2011–1, pp. 90–7. (www.ipm.edu.mo/Cweb/Cenpds/2systems_content11_1.htm/). 32. Va Kio, 11 February 2011, p. 1-1. 33. Va Kio, 8 February 2011, pp. 2–3. 34. ARB, 18 February 2011, p. A7. 35. ARB, 21 February 2011, p. A1. 36. K. C. Fok, “The Ming Debate on How to Accommodate the Portuguese and the Emergence of the Macau Formula” in Revista de Cultura 13–14 (Review of the Cultural Institute), Macao, 1994, 328–44. 37. The Deputy Chen Mei Yi has her own charity association, called the Sin Meng (Shanminghui), which in priority wants to improve the condition of the youth and elderly people. Deputy Chen married the Tycoon and former deputy David Chow and the couple has two children (interview in November 2010 and March 17, 2011). 38. Esther S. Yao, Chinese Women Past and Present, Texas : Ide House, 1983, p. 167. 39. Jakie West and als. (eds.), Women of China. Economic and Social Transformation. New York: St. Martins Press, 1999, pp. xii, 41. 40. Ho Teng Iat, interview by the author on 23 February 2011. 41. Survey of Mainland China Press, 14 December 1966, p. 38. 42. JTM, 28 August 2004, p. 4. 43. Carlos Marreiros’ article, in R. D. Cremer’s, ibid. 44. Macau Hoje, 14 February 2011, p. 5. 45. Mary Ma, “Students...” in The Standard, Hong Kong, 1 December 2010, p. 4. 46. Chen Zhiwu, The Logic of Finance, 2009. 47. Macau Statistics, DSEJ, 2011. 48. Clayton, ibid., p. 303. 49. Sonny Lo Shui-Hing, paper presented at Macao’s Ricci Institute, 2003, p. 100. 50. Hao Zhidong, ibid., p. 198. 51. MDT, 30 December 2010, p. 7.

8. The Chinese of Macao: Identity and Transformation 52. Happiness Survey: Aomen Jumin Kuaile Zhishudiaocha, Macao: Sin Meng Association, 2011, p. 28. 53. MDT, 20 January 2011. 54. Happiness Survey, ibid. 55. Pierre Bourdieu, “Globalization” in Contre-Feux (Back-Fire), Paris: Liber, 1998, pp. 39, 46. 56. Li Peilin, “Thirty Years of Reforms...” in Li Qiamg (ed.), Thirty Years of Reforms and Social Changes in China, Leiden: Brill, 2010, 477–478.

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9 Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity∗ Malte Philipp KAEDING

Introduction

Chinese nationalism and the question of Chinese identity became a topic of great academic interest in the 1990s. At the same time, motivated by Taiwan’s democratization and the sovereignty retrocession of Hong Kong and the administrative revision of Macao, scholars also became increasingly aware of these smaller off-shore domains of the Greater China region. Of particular interest were the unique indigenous identities that had developed in this region and which were fundamentally different from the Mainland Chinese identity propagated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Macao became a Special Administrative Region of the PRC in 1999. Some studies have looked at the survival of the unique Macao identity after the revision. Macao identity was framed as a cultural identity with a strong Portuguese element,1 or an identity based on cultural syncretism,2 with the culture of the Macanese, people of mixed Portuguese-Chinese and Portuguese-Asian ancestry as an ethno-cultural expression of this hybridity.3 Almost 15 years after the Macao Special Administrative Region’s (MSAR) establishment, it is time to revisit the question of what constitutes Macao identity, how it has developed since 1999 and why it is changing. 181

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Employing the ethno-cultural versus a civic identification structure, this chapter offers a novel analysis of previous research on the cultural identity of Macao and its political culture and participation. The main argument is that basic elements of a civic identity exist in the MSAR and there are signs that this part of its identity is slowly developing, especially among the youth. Yet, for the time being many people’s identification with Macao is primarily ethno-culturally defined. The theoretical framework for this chapter is provided by a set of theories on national identity construction. The MSAR administration, gaming industry and local elites are identified as the three key shaping factors of Macao’s identity. Together with the ethno-cultural versus civic identity model they function as a guideline for quantitative and qualitative pilot studies. Expert interviews and a discourse analysis of MSAR Chief Executive Fernando Chui’s Policy Addresses inform this guideline. The pilot study on identity among University of Macau students in October 2009 raises important questions on the cultural and political identifications with Macao and China. Qualitative interviews with Macao youth during spring-autumn 2011 provide novel insights into the dynamics between ethno-cultural and civic realms of identity. A rise of civic identity among youngsters and potential identity conflicts point towards new areas of research in youth participation.

Theoretical Perspectives on Identity and National Identity The term identity is used in many academic disciplines with a variety of meanings and hence definitions are abundant. Stuart Hall represents the constructivist perspective and has gained widespread acceptance in the study of personal identity. He argues that one’s self “assumes different identities at different times, identities that are not unified around a coherent ‘self’. Within us are contradictory identities, pulling in different directions, so that our identifications are continually being shifted about.”4 Furthermore, he analyzes an ingredient critical to identity construction, the “relation to the other,

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the relation to what is not, to precisely what is not, to what has been called its constitutive outside.”5 Hall first points out the plurality of identity, even within the “self”. He then develops a “self/other” dichotomy to better appreciate the communication between different identities held by different individuals. The perspective focusing on the personal identity construction is relevant as change in one’s identity can be tracked and investigated. His theoretical guideline informs the qualitative interviews conducted for this study, analyzing possible changes in identity by youngsters. Expanding the personal identity concept to that of groups, communities and even nations, the constructivist approach sees the nation as an “imagined political community.” 6 It stresses the invention and construction of a nation, refusing “ethnic perennialism” and the possibility of the rediscovery of a nation.7 National identities hence develop not from something pre-existing in communities, but are based on “invented traditions” and symbols created by a society’s elites. “‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices… of a ritual or symbolic nature, that seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”8 Yet, only those traditions are successful which are “broadcast on a wavelength to which the public was already to tune in.”9 As such, Anthony Smith sees national identity either as Western/political/civic identity or as Eastern/ethnic/cultural identity. The Western or civic model entails a historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, articulated in a set of rights and duties, and as a common civic culture and ideology. On the other hand, the non-Western concept’s emphasis is a community of birth and native culture.10 For Smith “The nation is seen as a fictive ‘super-family’.… . Genealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions: these are the elements of an alternative, ethnic conception of the nation.…”11 He also acknowledges that most states/nations contain both “civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms”.12 A careful application of the civic/ethno cultural division of identity is needed to avoid an equation with a negative/positive division. This division is nevertheless valid and useful to understand the construction and reconstruction of identity.

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Macao's identity development is a unique opportunity to apply Smith's civic versus ethno-cultural spectrum.

The Macao Identity: Formation and Fluidity

Historical Roots Portuguese landed on the Chinese coast and established a trading post in Macao in the mid-16th century.13 Their rule of the territory was considerable different from the British in the neighbouring colony Hong Kong. The key event in recent history that shaped Macao's political culture and the Portuguese local regime-Chinese state relationship were the 3 December 1966 riots (or the “12-3 Incident” yiersan shijian). As a spill-over from the PRC’s Cultural Revolution, the conflict over the illegal construction of a pro-Beijing school on Taipa Island triggered anti-colonial protests and riots.14 Local police and Portuguese soldiers used force to suppress the protesters. The local Chinese suffered casualties and the colonial regime lost credibility among the Chinese populace. The Luso officialdom diminished its effective rule over Macao as it was compelled to accept an accord promising local cooperation with Beijing in exchange for continued colonial rule.15 Hence, all local organizations close to the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) regime in Taipei were banned. The pro-Beijing “patriotic” groups took over many services from the Luso administration to become the dominant local force. Further Luso retreat from Macao manifested in 1976, when Lisbon (that intended to decolonize after Portugal’s April 1974 Revolution) offered to return Macao to the PRC. Beijing declined but Macao’s official status was altered to become “a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration.” Democratization began in 1976 with the introduction of Macao Legislative Assembly direct elections.16

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Categorizing Macao Identity Discussing and defining a distinctive Macao identity was for a long time a taboo in the territory. This resulted in a weak sense of belonging among the populace that was further aggravated by the massive influx of mainland immigrants since the PRC’s opening and reform in 1978. 17 This immigration wave coupled with a rapid increase in living standards in the 1980s, weakened the neighborhood communities and created a new middle class with a generalized Macao identity. 18 In the 1990s, a clear demarcation emerged between the “Macao people” or “Macao Chinese” (Aomen ren), who would also describe themselves as “local persons” (bendiren), and other Chinese groups like new immigrants and overseas Chinese (huaren).19 The length of residence in Macao is an important distinction marker20 and the adaptation to a certain way of life and customs. The “local person” category is inclusive to incorporate the ethnically mixed Macanese. Its defining feature is not so much whether one was born in the city, but having undergone basic schooling in Macao. The identity contains a strong economic notion and is closely related to being a member of the middle class. In cultural terms these “local persons” are accustomed to the freedom of religion and expression and a level of cosmopolitism. But the main marker is the ability to speak Cantonese in the way that it is spoken by the local middle class. Many “Macao people” have foreign passports and are Portuguese citizens from birth, but still consider themselves as Chinese and feel close to China in a socio-historic sense.21 They often opt for a “Macao people” identity despite their Portuguese passport.

Cultural Identity The discourse on Macao’s culture since the late 1980s has promoted a rather idealistic perception as crystalized in the “Macao Model”. Its key components are the coexistence, interaction and partly blending of cultures based on mutual respect and tolerance, harmony instead of conflict, and stability in plurality. 22 Three

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cultures form the unique Macao culture: the Chinese culture, the Portuguese culture and the culture of the Macanese. Developments in language and civic education and the presence of the Luso legacy in daily life indicate that the colonial regime concentrated on cultural aspects of identity yet weaker in translating into unique values of the Macao people.

Chinese Culture Macao is a dominantly Chinese city,23 with most residents born in Mainland China (47.1%) and a majority resided in Macao for less than five years (27.3%).24 The distinctive composition of Macao’s population has a direct impact on the territory’s unique culture. The Chinese cultural realm is identified with south China characteristics, especially the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. The various Chinese groups have often retained their traditional native customs while also mixed with other Chinese local and regional practices. 25 In Macao the worship of goddess of seafarers Ah-Mah that originated in Fujian co-exists with Cantonese folklores and customs. Macao residents’ links abroad add to its overseas Chinese cultural element.26

Portuguese Culture Although Macao has been extensively shaped by Chinese culture, the Latin and Lusophone cultural elements also have enriched it over time, 27 especially in material culture. Macao’s urban space was designed like a Portuguese town28 and the architectural heritage of centuries of Luso influence creates a distinctive cultural identity for Macao. In 2005, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) designated Macao’s historic city center as a World Heritage site, recognizing its uniqueness to be valued by the coming generations. There are a wide range of hybrid Luso-Asian architecture, landmarks and urban spaces in Macao.29 This syncretism-fusion that is discernible not only in furniture design30 and architecture but also in aspects of religious rituals,

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highlighting the fact that the Catholic Church had concedes to accept the Chinese “theistic cult” of ancestor worship.31 Religious tolerance and multi-ethnic harmony are the key features of Macao’s cultural identity, 32 with Catholic and Buddhist dignitaries both present at important events reflecting a well-balanced power relation with a subtle religious compromise.33 The Portuguese presence in the territory decreased visibly after the handover. Many Portuguese residents were government officials or employed by the regime on limited duration contracts had left after 1999. 34 A number of Portuguese have resided in Macao for decades or longer, and those who married Chinese and Macanese persons have been integrated into the Macanese community.35

Macanese A key feature of Macao’s culture is the emergence of a distinctive ethnic group of Eurasians or Macanese 36 of partial European descent or with close connections to the Portuguese-based communities in Macao. 37 Some Macanese are part of long established families (with up to 10 local born generations) in Macao who are descendants of inter-racial marriages between Portuguese and indigenous women from other former Portuguese colonies or trade posts in Africa, South and Southeast Asia and Brazil. Others originated from more recent pairings of Portuguese and Chinese individuals.38 Identification39 as a Macanese largely depends on the individual’s relationship with Portuguese heritage in forms like the Portuguese language, Catholicism and some type of Eurasian phenotypic appearance. Yet there is a certain element of personal option, as some individuals chose to be identified as Chinese despite their Macanese family background, or as a result of Portuguese schooling opt for a Macanese identity. 40 Due to their language abilities (with fluency in Portuguese and Cantonese, plus English), the Macanese often acted as intermediaries between the local populace and the Portuguese administration. A majority worked in the Luso regime in mid-ranking civil service positions or other professions that required Portuguese language proficiency such as

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law or architecture, and enjoyed a higher social status than most local Chinese residents.41

Cultural Hybridization Cultural hybridization is most evident in the two cultural areas of language and cuisine related to the Macanese ethnic group: the Portuguese creole dialect Patois and Macanese food. Macanese food has become very popular in the region and there are a variety of Macanese restaurants in Macao. Rufino Ramos describes the Macanese cuisine as an adaptation of traditional Portuguese cuisine to the Asian context. 42 In a small territory like Macao, the amalgamation of Portuguese, Goan, Malay, African, Brazilian and Chinese practices developed into an “indigenous” culinary culture.43 The reproduced cultural practices and values in turn provide the Macanese community with a means of self-definition, adding their restaurants as an assertion of a unique identity.44 In daily life, these cases of hybridization and syncretism in Macao’s culture are however rare and in general the Portuguese and Chinese cultures have retained their own identity and specificities within Macao’s domain.45 Political scientist Herbert Yee argues that for the common Chinese residents of Macao, the relevance of this hybrid identity remains low.46 Journalist José Carlos Matias calls it the “projected Macao identity” created by the Macanese community.47 Yee sees the Macao identity more as a sense of belonging to the own neighborhood, to the “small town feeling,” with a slower pace and local restaurants that is still alive in the older parts of the city.48 The idea of a genuine and strong multi-culturalism has not gained ground largely due to inadequate teaching of the city’s pluralistic cultural tradition.49

History and “Moral” Education The Macao colonial government’s role in social affairs and education was very limited with a primarily concern on the education of local Portuguese children, neglecting the majority

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity

Chinese inhabitants.50 To a large extent this “laissez faire” stance can be attributed to the ownership structure of the schools, as the majority are run privately and only a few schools are administered by the government directly.51 The diverse ownership of schools and their different social-political perspectives had thwarted attempts to develop an integrated curriculum in the Luso era. Indeed, Macao history teaching began only in the 1990s. 52 Furthermore, the Chinese schools in Macao usually relied on textbooks from Hong Kong, Taiwan or the PRC, due to the general lack of localized teaching materials.53 Civic education was basically invisible until the 1990s. When the Macao government launched non-compulsory citizenship courses in their Luso-Chinese schools that supposedly should be a guide for the private schools, the syllabus was oriented towards moral and life skills education and was generally conservative in outlook. Its emphasis was on national identity and the local society, while retaining Portuguese influence in Macao by highlighting Portuguese culture. 54 The post-1999 curriculum was “characterized by a shallow and confused presentation of multicultural education”, Confucian traditional virtues and pro-PRC patriotism.55 The lack of a unified school curriculum, civic education’s focus on moral ideals and the absences of unified history textbooks focusing exclusively on Macao’s history 56 have all severely limited the formation of a local identity.57

Portuguese Legacy Portuguese influence on the city’s collective identity in general is largely restricted to the material culture and its architectonical heritage. Although the Macao government emphasizes Portuguese heritage and language as a part of the territory’s distinct identity, its presence in daily life is fading. The Portuguese language, until 1993 the only official language in Macao, is spoken by less than one percent of the population.58 Ratna Ghosh’s study on the identity of Macao youth reveals that the direct influence of Portuguese language and culture is limited to schools and related social activities. The limited impact of the Portuguese on the identity of the Chinese Macao residents also has economic reasons. Macao was functionally

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heavily dependent on Mainland China and Hong Kong. The former British colony is an important reference point for the Macao people, who readily consume Hong Kong’s popular culture products. 59 Hong Kong’s cultural influence is so pervasive that many Macao people identify themselves as Hong Kong persons rather than as Portuguese.60

Civic Identity The emergence of a distinctive identity based on the civic realm of national identity is connected to unique political and legal structures, a fixed distinct territory and political culture compromising political values and forms of participation.

Border and Nationality Although Macao’s precise territorial limit was never agreed upon by the Portuguese and Chinese governments, the imposition of border controls in 1951 severely limited the once intimate Macao-Mainland interface.61 With the PRC’s opening and reform since 1978, the volume of border crossing rose dramatically and Macao witnessed a massive influx of immigrants. 62 The border is still regarded as necessary to safeguard Macao’s special identity and hence increased cross-border contacts might also lead to a stronger perception of differences.63 In legal terms, Macao was, during colonial times, treated as an overseas province of Portugal. Thus, its citizens enjoyed full Portuguese nationality including the European Union (EU) right of abode and Portugal and the EU’s consular protection. The Nationality Law in force until 1981 granted Portuguese nationality to everyone born in Macao; there were no restrictions on immigration from China until 1979. 64 Yet, having a Portuguese passport and nationality does not translate into allegiance towards Portugal or identification as its citizen. Instead these people would

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identify themselves as “Macao people” or as simply “Chinese”65 in larger ethnic concepts.66

Law The Macao legal system is based on the principles of the European continental law system originated in Roman law and influenced by French and German legal traditions. It is distinct from both Hong Kong’s and Mainland China’s systems. Yet unlike in Hong Kong where the legal system and the rule of law are the cornerstones of a distinct civic local identity vis-à-vis the PRC, the Macao legal system has a low level of social support and legitimacy.67 One reason is the historically complex relationship of the Portuguese state with the rule of law. Diogo de Sousa e Alvim of University of Macau’s Faculty of Law points out that after the end of monarchy in 1910, only in 1974 did Portugal make its transition to democracy. Hence values like democracy and the rule of law were domestically not a source of pride or identification.68 A further important factor is the language barrier. The law in Macao was copied from the Portuguese law and then translated into Chinese only very late in the transition to 1999. Portuguese language proficiency is crucial to understand Macao laws and since the quality of translation was not properly controlled, the spirit of the law was not captured accurately.69 The Macao people know little about the laws that govern their life and the colonial regime had not created information campaigns to make it accessible for the ordinary folks.70 In transforming societies, lawyers and other trained professionals often act as the vanguard of democratization or play the role of defenders of civic rights and freedoms. The legal community in Macao has not emerged as a strong critic of the government to monitor regime actions. This is attributed to the close attachment of local elites to the government and to the pro-Beijing PRC business, which the private law firms are connected to as well, in absence of large international companies and organizations71 72. Although the Macanese community is split in a pro-regime and another that is more critical towards the administration factions,73 Carlos Matias argues that its status as an ethnic minority makes it

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naturally dependent on the MSAR government to protect its unique heritage and cultural projects.74 The importance of Macao law and the rule of law in the MSAR are reflected in the qualitative study. The in-depth interviews with law students provide important and keen insights into the relationship between civic identity and law, and the views of the elites.

Political Institutions and the Media The Chinese community is still dominated by communal groups like the Kaifong associations that have played a critical role in Macao politics as intermediaries between the colonial regime and the common people. They are also involved in political affairs like candidate nomination in legislative elections. Their pro-Beijing loyalty can be seen in their patriotic rhetoric and conservative political stance.75 With a growing middle class since the 1980s, new pro-democracy groups have gained popularity among the young and educated segments of Macao. Their members were born and bred locally in the 1950s and had a strong sense of belonging to Macao.76 Yet the power of the traditional groups has so far been little challenged due to the weakness of the newly emerged liberals who lack financial resources, personal networks and organizational clout for political mobilization.77 The conservatism of the old elites and the weakness of the new social forces form a major hurdle for the development of a unique Macao identity based on civic or political ideas. There are very few democratic champions that can function as public icons. Prominent community leaders are align with the power centres in Macao or Beijing while democratic activists are locally marginalized and intentionally ignored. The media plays a crucial role in assisting the regime in this regard. Conservative interests control the Chinese language media and the main Chinese language paper, the Macao Daily, is strongly pro-regime, MSAR and PRC. 78 Subjects like critique of regime performance and democratization are avoided and their pro-Beijing stance is clearly evident in their stance on Macao identity. Unlike Hong Kong, a unique Macao identity is very rarely mentioned.79

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity

Political Participation The democratization process in Macao has remained slow since the first ever legislative elections in 1976.80 After the enfranchisement of all Chinese adults in 1984, the numbers of registered voters and the voter turnout have continuously risen to well over 50% since the 1990s.81 This increasing voter turnout in past elections with more young voters getting involved suggests a genuine wish for political participation. 82 The electoral results of the 2009 Legislative Assembly elections seem to support these observations, with the democratic camp winning one more seat to gain a total of four seats. 83 Carlos Matias argues that in a closed and conservative society like Macao, many citizens refrain from openly voicing their views critical of the regime for fear of dire consequences. Elections are their only means of expression and the increasing support for pro-democratic groups indicate their wish for change. Historically, alternative forms of public political participation in Macao had been rare, yet since 1999 the number of major protest and demonstrations has gone up dramatically, especially after liberalization of the local casino market in 2002 and the ensuring economic boom. 84 Most of these protests are indeed related to livelihood issues and employment opportunities for local workers.85 Labor protests began on a larger scale on 1 May 2000 and have become an annual event marked by clashes with police. The 2007 protests are of special significance as the protesters denounced the MSAR regime’s collusion with big business and cabinet official corruption.86 On 20 December 2007, the eighth anniversary of the handover, some 2,000 protestors joined force in street rallies demanding democratization and social justice. Moreover this protest was for the first time joined by hundreds of young people calling for freedom of speech and the direct election of the Chief Executive.87 Current research into youth activism and communication technologies confirms the MSAR youth’s growing participation in public affairs. The 1 May 2010 Labor Day protest, drew some 400 young people. They soon formed a group called “Macao Youth Dynamics”.88

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A major successful protest via different means was the campaign against a high rise construction near the Guia Lighthouse, a world heritage site.89 Heritage activists staged protests, galvanized support on the Internet and alerted the UNESCO.90 While the number of participants was small, this action is of high relevance as it is directly linked to Macao’s identity and most of activists are local Chinese from Macao.91

Political Values Despite the fact that the level of participation in elections and protests has risen since the handover, public understanding of democracy remains limited. Surveys suggest that Macao people retain a traditional Chinese concept of democracy—for a government that would consult people’s views rather than identifying with the Western idea of a democratic government elected by citizens under checks and balance.92 Research on Macao’s political culture also highlights the linkage between education and the understanding of Western democratic values. Since 1991, the education level of Macao people has significantly increased and with it the acceptance of Western democratic values and the duty and right to vote in elections. 93 Today the vast majority of people already views democracy as the ideal form of government and believe that Macao is ready for full democracy.94 Young people are especially critical of regime policies and are interested in political participation.95 Therefore there are signs for a slow rise of a civic identity based on political participation. The deeper understanding of democracy coupled with critique of the MSAR polity and demands for political reform96 would mean that this identity would be contrary to the PRC Chinese notion of national identity.97 The qualitative pilot study among Macao youth conducted for this chapter supports these findings. The civic identity described by law students and the wish for more political participation by democratic activists carry the possibility of a conflict over defining the civic realm in Macao identity.

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity

Shaping Factors of Macao Identity The three most influential actors in shaping Macao’s image and identity as a city are the MSAR government in coordination with the authorities in Beijing, the gaming industry and to some extend the elite and community leaders in society. In the last decade of colonial rule the Luso regime began to strengthen the city’s image as a city of culture, highlighting especially its Portuguese legacy.98 A number of cultural institutions and museums like the Macao Foundation and the Macao Cultural Centre were established in the hope to leave a Portuguese presence in the territory.99 The post-1999 administration embraced the city’s diverse cultural heritage and employed it to position Macao as Chinas link to the Portuguese speaking world and as unique tourist destination in the region. In 2003 the city hosted the inaugural Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries, making use of Macao’s Lusophone legacy.100 The so-called Macao Forum offered the possibility to add another international dimension to the city’s image as a gambling metropolis and reinforced its distinctiveness and uniqueness in particular in opposition to Hong Kong and Guangdong.101 Under the slogan “Macau: a world of difference—the difference is Macau” the government highlights foremost the city’s Portuguese material culture and variety of cuisine.102 The inclusion of the historic centre of Macao on UNESCO's World Heritage List has further strengthened the attempts to promote cultural tourism under the brand “Macau World Heritage”.103 The market reality however reveals that the vast majority of tourists come to the city for the purpose of gambling, likely limiting the viability of the cultural tourism concept.104 The importance of the gaming industry for Macao and its impact of politics and society has been analyzed en detail.105 The position of the gambling sector does affect the self-imagination of Macao’s citizens, as the survey included in this study has shown. This influence is to a large extent based on the omnipresence of the casinos in the urban space. Hendrik Tieben demonstrates how the local and international casino owners have altered the landscape of the territory and almost at will

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created images of the city that suit their commercial interests, stressing both the Chineseness and European heritage of Macao.106 Nevertheless the casino industry projects undertaken in association with those of the government underline Macao’s uniqueness vis-à-vis the neighboring mainland city of Zhuhai and the general pressure of integration.107 Also in terms of civic identity the gaming industry has a variety of contradictory effects. While most casino owners are part of the conservative Macao elite and forge close regime links, the international operators might push for more transparency and openness of decision making processes. The casino industry has contributed to the internationalization of Macao by foreign professionals and tourists, and the increasing identification with Western values, popular culture and lifestyle.108 Should this move beyond superficial material issues, it could create a breeding ground for further political participation with a stronger civic identity of Macao people in the years to come. Yet, economic opportunities from the casino boom could lead youngsters to join the casino industry instead of further studies.109 The official consensus among the local elites is that Macao should cherish its multicultural elements. But many pro-Beijing or patriotic groups together with the business sector lean toward closer cooperation with Guangdong hence stressing Macao’s Chineseness.110 Indeed, even closer integration with the Mainland might result in the “Mainlandization” of Macao.111 Increasingly the use of Putonghua 112 and the acceptance of Mainland political values113 could perhaps curb the development of a Macao identity in cultural and civic realms. Still there are other voices. More concerned about the city’s Latin cultural elements is the group of Macanese, who still possess considerable social influence. Through cultural bodies like the International Institute of Macau they aim to protect and promote Portuguese heritage and Macanese culture in Macao. A novel development was the participation of “Voz Plural—Gentes de Macau” in the 2009 MSAR legislative elections as an alternative to the Macanese political groups that traditionally focuses on civil service issues. This pro-democratic group of Macanese, Portuguese, Chinese and Filipino candidates114 ran on a “multicultural society” platform advocating Macao’s diverse heritage protection.115

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity

Overview on Macao Identity Surveys The analysis shows that there are strong indicators for a Macao identity while there are severe structural limitations for its development. A review of several surveys on Macao identity as well as my own pilot study among Macao students could provide further insights. The findings of quantitative surveys are further supported and elaborated through a number of qualitative interviews with Macao youth. The general trend shows that Macao residents continue to identify with China rather than with Macao, reflecting the high rate of new immigrants from China among the population.116 In the only longitude study since 1991 conducted by political scientist Herbert Yee, Macao and the Chinese identity are not perceived as mutually exclusive categories and thus respondents are asked to state if they are proud of their Chinese and Macao identity. In 1991, 66.9% of the respondents were proud of being Chinese and in 2006 the number rose to 79.6%. At the same time the number of citizens who feel proud to be Macao people was significantly lower at 53.6% in 1991 and 65.8% in 2006.117 From 2003 to 2006 the University of Hong Kong Public Opinion Programme (POP), together with the Union for Construction of Macao and the Macao New Generation Association, conducted surveys on similar presumptions and asked the respondents to rate the strength of their identity on a 1 to 10 scale with figures above 5 indicating positive answers. In December 2003, respondents rated their Chinese identity at 8.12 and their Macao identity at 7.83, in 2006 both figures went up to 8.2 and 7.9 respectively. 118 The increase in identification and pride in being Chinese and a Macao person is explained with Macao’s improving socio-economic situation, the idea of “Macao people ruling Macao” after the handover and the rise of China as an important economic and political power. 119 The choice of the Macao people to feel greater pride in being Chinese and identify with China more than with Macao underlines the high level of patriotism locally. This could also be seen in their reaction to the handover, in a POP survey days before the 1999 revision: 63.2% stated they were proud to become Chinese nationals, 27.4 percent were not. One year later

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66.4% were proud to be Chinese nationals while 28.3% were not. In comparison, in 1997 Hong Kong, only 46.6% of citizens were proud to become Chinese nationals and 45.7% were not, but one year later the number of those who were proud of being Chinese citizens dropped dramatically to 31.6% and not proud was 65.7%. 120 The different post-handover socio-economic situations explain probably some of these changes. In a POP 2005–2007 comparative study of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Okinawa, Macao respondents were asked if they identify as Macao people, Chinese or Macao/Chinese, 37.7% of them consider themselves as Chinese, 13.0 percent as “Macao people” and 47.8% as a combined identity of “Chinese/Macao people.” Two years later the Chinese identity category (31.0%) remains dominant over the Macao identity (12.8%), yet the largest group of respondents chooses the mixed category Chinese/Macao identity (55.8%).121 The data suggest that Macao is in line with the overall trend of a strong indigenous identity in Hong Kong and Taiwan122 while a large many adopt a dual or combined Chinese-indigenous identity. A 2008 survey of Macao university students offers only two options with 60 percent of students stating that they are Chinese and 58.3% that they are Macao people. Emotional attachment to Macao is however clearly stronger than with China, with 82.3% stating they love Macao and 68.8% loving China. The study concludes that their pride in Macao (61.7%) is lower than in Mainland China (65.4%), and that the findings reflected the youngsters’ higher demands and hopes for the city.123 The data on Macao identity shows that although identification with Macao has increased, the local identity remains significantly weaker than the Chinese identity.

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity

Measuring Identity: Findings of Quantitative and Qualitative Studies

Quantitative Study A 2009 pilot study124 among 59 University of Macau students125 analyzes identification with Macao and China in more detail. Following the Ma and Fung example in Hong Kong,126 students were asked a series of questions on identification with symbols representing Macao and China, their pride in the achievements of the MSAR and the PRC and their attitude toward political participation. The results confirm the notion that the Macao identity is mainly understood in cultural terms and that China is central to Macao people’s identification. Although the timing of the survey was chosen to avoid the impact of legislative elections and the PRC 60th anniversary celebrations on student sentiments, the small sample size and the fact that the students were chosen from only two classes (Economics; and Government and Public Administration) limited the findings generalization. Still, this survey as a pilot study points to the identity development of some Macao university students. Most students surveyed were born in Macao (67.8%), with 25.4% Guangdong-born and 8.4% Fujian-born or from other areas in Mainland China. The students were asked to choose one identity category that they felt most appropriate. The majority of students (44%) chose a mixed identity of “Macao Chinese person” (Aomen de Zhongguoren) (13.5%) or “Chinese Macao person” (Zhongguo de Aomenren) (30.5%), and 30.5% of students identify themselves as solely “Chinese persons” (Zhongguoren) while 25.5% as only “Macao persons” (Aomenren) (Table 1). The birthplace is directly linked to the choice of identity, with the “Macao person” identity only preferred by students born locally while the “Chinese person” category is dominated by Mainland-born students (60% of those who chose that identity). Interestingly, when opting for a mixed identity category, most Mainland-born students chose the category

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that in Chinese language connotes an emphasis on the Macao part of the identity. This study shows that there are more commonalities in identification with Macao and attitudes toward democracy between the “Macao Chinese person” and the “Macao person” categories than among the other groups. Thus, combining these two categories into a perceived “pan-Macao identity” is viable and the combined strength of this category was at 56%. Table 1 Self-proclaimed Identity of Interviewees (in percentages) Question: Please choose one term of which you think it would most accurately describe your identity. (Respondents were asked to choose one of the answers) Chinese person

30.5

Macao person

25.5

Chinese Macao person

13.5

Macao Chinese person

30.5

Total (N)

100.0 (59)

N = No. of respondents

The students were also asked for their thoughts on what icons best represent Macao by choosing and ranking three items (Table 2). The 19 symbols cover the Portuguese and Chinese architectural heritage, modern landmarks, food and beverages and gambling culture. The results were the classic choices of Macao heritage, the St. Paul’s Cathedral ruins (93.2%, with 72.8% respondents declaring it as their first choice) and the Ah-Mah Temple (39%, with 23.7% as their top two choices). The Hotel Lisboa was chosen by 37.8% as their second or third choice and the icon of modern Macao, Macau Tower, by 30%, mostly as a second choice. Icons of the gambling industry like the new American casinos, Wynn, Sands and Venetian Macao, accounted for 18.6% and gambling tycoon Stanley Ho took 16.9% (only Macao-born students chose him as a symbol of their city). The Portuguese heritage site of the St. Paul’s Cathedral is by far the most popular iconic image of Macao and symbolizes the city for the vast majority of students. Icons which relate to the casino culture of the territory are the choice of 73% of the respondents, highlighting the impact of the industry on the self-image of its residents.

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity Table 2 Most Popular Choices of Icons Representing Macao (in percentages) Question: Which of these best symbolizes Macao for you? Please rank the top three by putting a number besides the item (1, 2, 3). (Respondents could choose more than one answers) Answers: Ruins of St Paul’s Cathedral

93.2

Ah-Ma Temple

39.0

Hotel Lisboa

37.8

Macau Tower

30

Venetian Macau/Sands Macau/Wynn Macau

18.6

Casino Magnate Stanley Ho

16.9

Half of the students felt proud or very proud to be a Macao person, with the other half feeling neutral, while 54.3% of students had a strong or very strong sense of belonging to Macao, and 40.7% felt neutral or weak (5%) about belonging to the city. Birthplace and identity make significant differences; those born in Macao had a pan-Macao identity feeling considerably stronger about the city. Identification with Macao and China is analysed with two sets of questions. Students were asked about their level of pride in the cultural symbols of Macao and China (the St. Paul’s Cathedral and the Great Wall of China), symbols of the state (the MSAR flag and the PRC national flag) and icons of modern China and Macao (the Olympic Stadium in Beijing and the Macao-Taipa Bridge) (Table 3). Following were questions on pride in the achievements of Macao and the PRC (economic development, history and culture, freedom and democracy, art and literature and global status) (Table 4). The overall results show that the students had more pride in symbols and achievements related to China than to Macao. Birthplace and identity choice did impact their level of pride for China, with Mainland-born students much prouder. Those who opted for a Chinese identity were less critical of the PRC and MSAR record in freedom and democracy.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Table 3 Pride in Symbols of Macao and China (in percentages) Question: How do you feel about the following icons? (Respondents were asked to choose more than one answers) Great pride/ Pride

Neutral

No pride/ No pride at all

Great Wall

93.2

5.0

1.8

Ruins of St Paul’s Cathedral

44.0

54.2

1.8

Flag of the Macao SAR

44.0

52.6

3.4

Flag of the PRC

74.6

22.0

3.4

Macao-Taipa Bridge

28.8

62.7

8.5

Olympic Stadium in Beijing

84.7

15.3

–

In total, 93.2% of my respondents were proud or very proud of the Great Wall. Only 44% had pride in the St. Paul’s Cathedral ruins, most of them were either born in Macao or have a pan-Macao identity, and 54.2% felt indifferent towards the symbol of Macao culture. Students felt less strong about state symbols; with 74% proud or very proud of the PRC flag, 26% felt neutral and most of them claimed a pan-Macao identity. Only 44% were proud or very proud of the MSAR flag, while the majority of students were not concerned with the flag. A majority of 84.7% was proud of Beijing’s Olympic stadium symbolizing modern China and the small cohort that remained neutral consisted of students with a “Macao person” identity. Only 28.8% of students were proud of the Macao-Taipa Bridge, 62.7% felt neutral and 8.5% felt not proud. A reason for the low level of pride could be the choice of the bridge as modern Macao’s symbol. If a different icon, like Macao Tower, which seems to be more in tune with the young generation, would have been chosen, the students might have responded differently. Overall students identified with symbols of China more than with Macao, especially with the cultural symbol of the Great Wall. Identification with the modern Chinese state was high, but students with a Macao identity seemed to be less willing to favor PRC symbols. These patterns are again seen in the students’ responses toward the PRC and Macao achievements (Table 4). The students were mainly proud of Macao’s history and culture (73%), economic development (55.9%) and the MSAR’s place in the world (37.2%); they felt

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity

neutral or less proud of the city’s art and literature (77.8 %) and the responses to Macao’s democracy and freedom record was mixed with 25.5% proud, 25.5% not proud (most of pan-Macau identity) and 49% neutral. Most students were proud of China’s history and culture (84.7%), art and literature (81.3%), economy (72.8%) and global status (71.2%t). Mainland-born students were in general more proud of China than Macao-born students. On the freedom and democracy situation in China, the students felt neutral (45.1%), or were not proud or proud at all (44%), only 10.9% were proud. The Mainland-born and Chinese identity students dominated the neutral category while those with a Macao identity were the least pride. The majority of students felt that Macao’s status as a UNESCO heritage site makes it special in Greater China (69%) and were confident that the PRC government would continue protecting Macao’s position as a casino city (67%). Table 4 Pride in Achievements of Macao and the PRC (in percentages) Question: How proud are you of Macao’s/Mainland China’s achievements listed below (Respondents were asked to choose more than one answer in both, the Macao and Mainland China section of the question) Great pride/ Pride

Neutral

No pride/ No pride at all

Macao Economic development

55.9

40.6

3.5

History and culture

73.0

25.2

1.8

Present situation of freedom and democracy

25.5

49.0

25.5

Literature and art

22.0

67.8

10.2

International place

37.2

50.8

12.0

PRC Economic development

72.8

25.4

1.8

History and culture

84.7

15.3

–

Present situation of freedom and democracy

10.9

45.1

44.0

Literature and art

81.3

16.9

1.8

Most of these Macao students state that they were interested in public affairs (74.4%) and follow the news regularly (49.1%).

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Students with a Chinese identity but were born in Macao were more interested in politics and followed the news more regularly; yet this did not translate into different patterns of political participation. All students believe that voting and joining in demonstrations are the most meaningful ways of participation (64.4% and 50.8% respectively). Protest letters and signature campaigns are not viewed as effective as 71.2% chose neutral or not meaningful (Table 5). Table 5 Interest in Public Affairs and Participation (in percentages) Questions: Do you have interest in public affairs? Do you follow the news frequently (newspapers, TV, radio, online)? How meaningful do you think signing petition letters and signature letters/participation in protests and demonstrations/voting in elections is? (Respondents were asked to choose more than one answer) Great interest/ Interest

Neutral

No interest/ No interest at all

Interest in public affairs

74.6

22.0

3.4

Reading the news

49.1

37.3

13.6

Very meaningful/ Meaningful

Neutral

Not meaningful/Not meaningful at all

Protest letters/signature campaign

28.8

64.4

6.8

Protests and demonstrations

50.8

42.4

6.8

Voting in elections

64.4

My pilot study shows that, in terms of public affairs and political participation interest, there are positive signs for a developing civic identity among students. The fact that the majority of students chose the more active ways of political participation (voting and demonstrations) over signing protests letters or joining signature campaigns shows that they are willing to get involved in Macao’s public affairs. The high percentage of students who believed that protests are meaningful, and the fact that a third of the respondents had reservations over the effectiveness of electoral voting can be interpreted as follows: students have high demands on

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity

Macao government and they are ready to use unconventional means of participation to pressure the regime in case their voices are not heard. Voting, however, remains the top choice of participation and many youngsters participated in the 2009 elections. In combination with the comparatively high rate of dissatisfaction in Macao’s current freedom and democracy level and the high identification with the city, the relatively high level of student political participation indicates the rise of a civic Macao identity. This Macao identity, however, does not stand in opposition to any politico-cultural identification with the PRC Mainland. The fact that Macao identity is not understood in opposition to Chinese identity makes it very different from Taiwan and Hong Kong identity. Most students identify themselves as culturally Chinese and they respect the PRC government’s rule. Still, their political identification with the PRC does not imply endorsement of Beijing’s dubious record on freedom and democracy.

Qualitative Study

Discourse Analysis The most recent framing of Macao identity under the Fernando Chui administration is outlined in a brief discourse analysis of his three Policy Addresses during 2010–2011. This provides the background for the qualitative interviews on identity with youth activists and law students. The research highlights in the cultural realm the official understanding of Macao’s culture and points out related policies. It is evident that the official discourse of Macao identity differs from the understanding of youngsters, particularly in the civic realm. In fact, Chui has only mentioned the term “democracy” once during three years. In the Policy Address for 2011 as issued in November 2010, after the large scale Labor Day demonstrations earlier in the year. The MSAR regime employed rhetoric similar to that of the PRC government, promising “gradually establish a more scientific, open and democratic

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decision-making process, and prioritize public interests to implement the administration tenet of “Sunshine Government.”127 Interestingly, the MSAR regime mentions Macao’s law or legal system only in conjunction with the “Cultural Heritage Protection Law”, hence framing the civic element law as a cultural issue. Macao’s culture is mentioned in 2010, in the “Society and culture section” which is later renamed into “Human development section”. The uniqueness of Macao culture is emphasized, “Macao’s historic sites have preserved the historic essence of Chinese and Eastern cultural integration, reflecting the universal values of civilisation.”128 This is uniqueness is instrumental for tourism129 and as a platform for trade with Portuguese speaking countries.130 It is important that the idea of harmony appears frequently in all Policy Addresses, reflecting traditional Chinese perspectives on social and political culture and ideological conformity to the PRC harmony discourse. Harmony is either framed as harmony among different ethnic groups or related to culture like the cultural policy in the 2010 Policy Address “tradition, innovation and harmony”.131 All three Policy Addresses include sections that target Macao youth. In 2010 the emphasis is on the “cultivation patriotism and love for Macao among youngsters”. 132 . Although some specific measures like student visits to the Shanghai Expo are promoted, civic education is not mentioned. The 2011 Policy Address mentions civic education twice and like in the PRC the community is designed as a unit of civic education. This Policy Address has a strong focus on youngsters; stressing local activities and issues, emphasising identity construction and raising awareness of identity among youngsters: “We attach high importance to fostering young people’s sense of belonging and responsibility to Macao. We encourage young students to develop a correct outlook on life and strengthen their patriotism. Next year, we will continue to invite relevant officials to conduct exchanges with young people and listen to their ideas; encourage them to care for society and participate in voluntary services; and provide them with more opportunities to contribute to society.”133 These government proposals can be interpreted as a reaction to the strong youth presence among demonstrators in the 2010 Labor Day protests. The following Policy Address is even more specific in

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity

its civic education proposals, targeting students and suggests “holding volunteer work for university students in cooperation with social associations”. Furthermore university students should be able to study on the Chinese mainland “China and language studies” to “strengthen the knowledge for Chinese history and culture and cultivate the complex of love and patriotism for Macao.”134 The first part of the qualitative study shows how the MSAR government continues the narrative of a unique cultural Macao identity, with obvious beneficial economic implications. The administration is committed to promote patriotism among the youth. It reacts to public expressions of discontent by youngsters twofold. First, it criticizes the youth for not being actively involved in society, hence the encouragement to “care for society”. Then, it promotes stronger patriotism for Macao and China. These proposals’ effectiveness remains to be seen. An early indication is seen in the interviews with youngsters. These illustrate the perceptions of Macao among a section of local youth with bearing on the civic realm of their identity.

Interviews For the in-depth interviews, youngsters who are likely to have a strong civic identity were deliberately chosen, such as law students and leaders of political and civic groups and bodies. This sample selection enables a focused analysis of the interaction between the civic and ethno-cultural aspects of the Macao identity. The aim of the pilot study is to gain new insight into the role of participation and institutions for the civic identity of young Macao residents. Two sets of interviews with a total of six youngsters, aged in their twenties, were conducted in spring and autumn 2011. In-depth interviews were conducted with student and leaders of various youth organizations from the so-called patriotic pro-Beijing/pro-establishment as well as from pro-democracy circles. Another round of in-depth interviews involved two Bachelor of Law in Portuguese students from University of Macau135. All interviewed, except one Portuguese law student, were Macao Chinese who grew up in the city. Overall the interviews confirmed a strong civic Macao

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identity of all participants with the rule of law, political awareness and participation as its basis. The detailed analysis of the conversations pointed towards a number of important findings for the relationship between the ethno-cultural and civic realms of identity in Macao. The interview with the law students revealed three crucial aspects of civic identity in Macao: trust in the rule of law and local institutions, a certain ethno-cultural underpinning, and the importance of the training of civic values. Firstly, as expected for the law students, the rule of law was a key element in Macao society. They pointed toward the differences between China Mainland and Macao in this regard. The Macao born student stated that the rule of law guarantees fairness and equality to all people, without special privileges for some. Yet he also found that compared to Hong Kong the MSAR rule of law was less prominent in the public awareness and that this has still to be developed. The Portuguese student further emphasized this unique civic realm vis-à-vis the PRC stating the importance of the rule of law in protecting human rights, freedoms and private initiatives. This was echoed by the Macao born student who stated that “people in Macao are different from the mainland; they would dare to speak about things people in China would not.”136 In case Macao’s rule of law would come under attack, this student stated that he would remain firm to his principles and that it is important not to alter his stance on this issue. At the same time he pointed out that he believed that the legislators should become more forceful in defending the rule that should be examined in subsequent research. The student made a further crucial remark by stating the importance of more people standing up for the rule of law and to form relevant groups or the like. He mentioned that at University of Macao a group exists to promote and defend the rule of law. In terms of civic identity and participation, this clearly shows a movement from the individual to the group level, driven by civic identity. This indicates the transfer from civic identity into real actions in form of the promotion of civic values to the wider society. Secondly, the interview with the law students highlighted an interesting relationship between the ethno-cultural realm of identity and that of civic identity. Both students mentioned that they found

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity

studying Macao law in Portuguese more appropriate than in Chinese. They repeated the argument that the “spirit” of the law could not be equally appreciated in Chinese translation. Yet more importantly they also commented on the differences in teaching the law. The Macao-born student said that he felt the Chinese approach, although comprehensive and wide, lacked the depth of the teaching in Portuguese. The Portuguese student felt it was a difference between explaining and interpretation between the two languages. This means at the individual level, specific elements of an ethno-cultural identity-language-becomes a precondition for a better appreciation of certain civic values and hence civic identity itself. Thirdly, both students felt that they had changed after studying law, becoming more interested in current affairs and politics and better able to critically evaluate concepts, news and social issues. While the Portuguese student already had a rather negative image of the PRC before his studies, the Macao-born Chinese student felt that his opinion toward China changed. He realized that people in the PRC have no influence and he recognized the dark sides of the state. This highlights another important interview finding on civic identity. The training of civic values and the reflection on their own civic identity is able to question the regime narratives and their identity construction in Macao and the PRC. While the Chinese and Macao authorities promote a hybrid Macao identity, it is clearly confined to the cultural realms, including Portuguese cultural elements. For future research, the ethno-cultural identity—civic identity linkages become apparent in a comparative analysis of these two law students. The Chinese student born and bred in Macao, was quite satisfied with the MSAR overall political scene as it being significantly better than in Mainland China. Yet the Portuguese student has a more negative appraisal of Macao’s democratization and political consciousness when compared with Portugal. It indicates ethno-cultural identity informs the basis for a comparative judgement. A number of interviews conducted with student leaders and student association members on political participation revealed more important insights into civic identity the development of among the youth. Particularly relevance was the influence of the space on identity either in the sense of a concrete area or territory in which

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identity is developing and also in the abstract sense of “narrative space”. A student leader from a pro-democracy student organisation commented on the difficulties to organize public activities that are critical of the regime due to Macao’s small size. The effect of small size in terms of population and space is that virtually everybody will know who has participated in any public activity. Many youngsters will therefore chose not to join these events in fear of negative impact on future employment. Another “spatial” impact on civic identity is that higher education institutions cannot provide on-campus accommodation to local students. Therefore students will return home after classes and not stay on the campus that causes practical difficulties for organising any events. A former leader of a pro-Beijing youth association came to different judgement on the influence of the spatial environment on civic participation. He found that Macao’s smallness allows people to get to know each other fast and since many people are association members, it is easy to get information and make connections. Individuals use membership in associations for a variety of purposes but it is relatively easy to organize events through associations. In terms of the relationship between ethno-cultural and civic realms of identity, leaders of pro-democracy and patriotic organisations come to similar conclusions. The leader of a youth association on Macao cultural heritage affiliated with the government mentioned that his interest in local history in secondary school and the lack of information on the issue motivated him to form a new association. The pro-democracy student leader stated that an important reason for organising a public protest was the rejection of the MSAR regime’s concept of “harmony” and promotion of a “harmony narrative”. In both cases identification or rejection of ethno-cultural identities has led to a civic public expression. In terms of political awareness among youngsters, more and more secondary and university students now would discuss social issues in public, a novel phenomenon. Via social media platforms like Facebook young people would share posts from local politicians and legislators. Yet they will seldom give their own opinion on the issue. This inability to comment might be due to a lack of confidence in their statements and the feeling that they do

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not understand the issue well enough. Nevertheless both situations indicate the rising awareness of young people, which is a first step on the way to a civic identity.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that Macao has developed a unique cultural identity and local consciousness; hence Macao identity is clearly positioned toward the ethno-cultural side of the civic versus ethno-cultural framework. Yet at the same time Macao citizens’ identification with China is very strong and a majority of the locals see themselves as Chinese citizens rather than Macao citizens. A commonly accepted cultural “hybrid” identity of Macao has not been sufficiently reflected in daily life and translated into a set of specific values. Although the Chinese Macao persons feel close to the Portuguese architectural icons and consume Macanese food, various forms of Chinese culture dominate the city and exist in a parallel universe with the Luso tradition. The pilot study confirms that a key difficulty in the development of a Macao identity in both cultural and civic terms remains the high rate of recent immigrants, who continue to identify overwhelming with their China homeland and the PRC. The Macao identity is shaped by the MSAR government as well as by local elites and the gaming industry. A consequence is the strong emphasis of an official apolitical “cultural identity” and harmony discourse. This contributes to the difficulties in the nurturing of a Macao civic identity based on political participation and democratic values, already hampered by the MSAR’s corporatist state structure. However, drastic economic changes after the casino market liberalization have given rise to more political participation. The populace’s education standard is rising and more concerns emerge over casino capitalism’s impact on the common folks’ daily life and Macao’s cultural heritage. The Macao middle class and the educated elites realize that Macao still enjoys a high degree of freedom and the rule of law. At the micro level the interviews with Macao youth

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illustrate the process of identity construction and changes in the complex relationship of civic and ethno-cultural identity elements. The impact of civic values and civic participation on identity choices reveals a likely rejection of the PRC’s and Mainland Chinese discourses. Further research will be aided by applying micro level findings to quantitative studies with the youth participation issue further examined, possibly in a comparative perspective. For the moment, the overall picture suggests that Macao identity remains weak as its civic part has not yet emerged fully. The development of a stronger Macao identity appears to be necessarily constrained by the political structures and the rapid process of Macao’s closer socio-economic integration with the PRC.

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9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity & Paul du Gray (Eds.), Questions of cultural identity (pp. 1–17). London: Sage., 3–4. 6. Anderson, Benedict R. (1983). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso., 6. 7. Anderson, 6. 8. Hobsbawm, Eric. (1983a). Introduction: Invention of traditions. In: Eric Hobsbawm & Terence O. Ranger (Eds.), The invention of tradition (pp. 1–14). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Hobsbawm, Eric. (1983b). Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1840–1914. In: Eric Hobsbawm & Terence O. Ranger (Eds.), The invention of tradition (pp. 263–308). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10. Smith, Anthony D. (1991). National identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press., 11. 11. Smith, 12. 12. Smith, 13. 13. Zepp, R. A. (1991). Interface of Chinese and Portuguese cultures. In: R. D. Cremer (Ed.), Macau: City of commerce and culture, continuity and change (pp. 153–164). Hong Kong: API Press.; Edmonds, Richard Louis. (1992). Macau: Past, present and future. Asian Affairs, 1 (Feb.), 3–16.; Porter, Jonathan. (1999). A question of sovereignty. China Perspectives, 26 (Nov–Dec.), 8–17. 14. Edmonds, 7. 15. Chan, Ming K. (2003). Different roads to home: The retrocession of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese sovereignty. Journal of Contemporary China, 36 (Aug.), 493–518. 16. Yee, Herbert. (1999). Prospects of democratisation: An open ended game? China Perspectives, 26, (Nov–Dec.), 28–38. 17. Ngai, 112. 18. de Pina-Cabral, João (2002). Between China and Europe: Person, culture and emotion in Macao. London: Continuum, 44. 19. Berlie, Jean A. (1999). Society and economy. In: Jean A. Berlie (Ed.), Macau 2000 (pp. 20–52). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 20. Yee, Herbert. (2002). Mass political culture and political development in post-1999 Macau. China Perspectives (Hong Kong), 44 (Nov–Dec.), 29–40. 21. de Pina-Cabral, 44. 22. Ngai, 120. 23. Recent estimates put the number of inhabitants at 549,000 with 96% Chinese, about 10,000 Filipinos, around 8,000 Macanese—Eurasians of

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century mixed blood, and 1,800 Portuguese (Statistics and Census Service, 2008). 24. Statistics and Census Service, Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region. (2007). Global results of by-census 2006. Macao: Statistics and Census Service. Retrieved online on November 9, 2009 from: http://www.dsec.gov.mo. 25. The Cantonese population largely comes from the areas in close proximity to the SAR, like Zhongshan and Shunde, less from Taishan and Guangzhou. A large group of Chinese speaks different Min-dialects from their home province Fujian. There are also factions of Shanghainese, Chaozhou and Hakka people in the territory. (Berlie 2002, 69–70). 26. Ngai, 116. 27. Ngai, Gary M. C. (1998). Progression or retrogression? The preservation and development of Macau’s cultural identity. In: Rufino Ramos, Jose Rocha Dinis, Rex Wilson & D. Y. Yuan (Eds.), Macau and its neighbors toward the 21st century: Proceedings of the International Symposium organized by the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Macau (pp. 307–309). Macao: Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Macao & Macao Foundation. 28. Flores, 40. 29. Chung, Thomas. (2009). Valuing heritage in Macau: On contexts and processes of urban conservation. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 38 (1), 129–160., 137. 30. Duan, Baolin. (1997). Macau’s cultural distinction: Reflections on cultural policy during the transition. In: Rufino Ramos, Jose Rocha Dinis, Rex Wilson & D. Y. Yuan (Eds.), Macau and its neighbors in transition: Proceedings of the International Conference held at the University of Macau (pp. 151–165). Macao: Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Macao & Macao Foundation., 156. 31. Cheng, Christina Miu-bing. (1999). A historical and cultural prelude. In: Jean A. Berlie (Ed.), Macau 2000 (pp. 3–19). Oxford: Oxford University Press., 7. 32. Ngai, 119. 33. Ngai, 119; Cheng, 211. 34. Edmonds, Richard Louis, & Yee, Herbert S. (1999). Macau: From Portuguese autonomous territory to Chinese special administrative region. China Quarterly, 160 (Dec.), 801–817. 35. de Pina-Cabral, 37. 36. The Portuguese term “Macanese” describes the Portuguese-based community of Macao and is the origin for the English term “Macanese.” The local born decedents of mixed marriages are called “Filhos da terra” (sons of the earth) and in Chinese, turen (local person), and more recently, tushengren (local-born person) or tushengzai (local-born boy) (Berlie, 23).

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity 37. Amaro, Ana Maria. (1988). Filhos da terra. Macao: Instituto Cultural. (In Portuguese), 4–7; Amaro, 218. 38. Cheng 1999, 8; Watts, Ian E. (1998). Mediating cultural identities: Three Macanese women in the transition. In: Rufino Ramos, Jose Rocha Dinis, Rex Wilson & D. Y. Yuan (Eds.), Macau and its neighbors toward the 21st century: Proceedings of the International Symposium organized by the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Macau (pp. 287–297). Macao: Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Macao & Macao Foundation. 39. For alternative definitions of the term Macanese, see also Teixeira (1965) and de Pina-Cabral & Lourenço (1993). 40. de Pina-Cabral, 39. 41. Yee, Herbert. (2001). Macau in transition: From colony to autonomous region. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York: Palgrave, 132. 42. Interview with Rufino Ramos on October 6, 2009, Macao. 43. Cheng 1999, 9. 44. Cheng, 204; Augustin-Jean, Louis. (1999). Macanese identity and food. In: Jean A. Berlie (Ed.), Macau 2000 (pp. 105–119). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 45. Cheng, 217. 46. Interview with Herbert Yee on October 6, 2009, Macao. 47. Interview with José Carlos Matias dos Santos on October 6, 2009, Macao. 48. Interview with Herbert Yee on October 6, 2009, Macao. 49. Rocha, Rui. (2002). Macau: Da identidade a interculturalidade [Macao: From identity to interculturality]. Oriente, 4 (Dec.), 105–113. (In Portuguese). 50. Tse, Kwan Choi. (2005). Civic and political education. In: Mark Bray & Ramsey Koo (Eds.), Education and society in Hong Kong and Macau: Comparative perspectives on continuity and change., 2nd ed. (pp. 175–200). Dordrecht: Springer. 51. Adamson, Bob, & Li, Titus Siu Pang. (2005). Primary and secondary schooling. In: Mark Bray & Ramsey Koo (Eds.), Education and society in Hong Kong and Macau: Comparative perspectives on continuity and change, 2nd ed. (pp. 35–60). Dordrecht: Springer. 52. De Pina-Cabral, 32. 53. Lo, Jennifer Ying Chun. (2005). Curriculum reform. In: Mark Bray & Ramsey Koo (Eds.), Education and society in Hong Kong and Macau: Comparative perspectives on continuity and change, 2nd ed. (pp. 161–174). Dordrecht: Springer.

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65. This “ethnic approach” explains that in the 2006 Macao Population By-Census, 93.9% of the resident population was identified as of Chinese nationality, 2% of Filipino nationality and only 1.7% of Portuguese nationality (Statistics and Census Service, 2007). 66. Kaeding, 146. 67. Hook, Brian, & Neves, Miguel Santos. (2002). The role of Hong Kong and Macau in China’s relations with Europe. China Quarterly, 169 (Mar.), 108–135. 68. Interview with Diogo de Sousa e Alvim on November 3, 2011, Macao. 69. Interview with José Carlos Matias dos Santos on October 6, 2009,

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity Macao. 70. Cabral, Goncalo, & Nataf, Joao. (1999). 1999: A peaceful revolution? China Perspectives, 26 (Nov–Dec.), 18–27. 71. Interview with José Carlos Matias dos Santos on October 6, 2009, Macao. 72. Kaeding, 147. 73. Lo, Sonny Shiu-hing. (1999). Macao’s political system. In: Jean A. Berlie (Ed.), Macau 2000 (pp. 53–70). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 74. Interview with José Carlos Matias dos Santos on October 6, 2009, Macao. 75. Lo, 63. 76. Lin, Yuan. (2006). Exploring conflict and harmony: Hong Kong and Macao. In: Alan Hunter (Ed.), Peace studies in the Chinese century: International perspectives (pp. 163–177). Aldershot: Ashgate. 77. Lo, 66–67. 78. So, Clement Y. K., & Mok, Catarina L. M. (1999). The media’s uncertain future. China Perspectives, 26(Nov.-Dec.), 39–42. 79. Kaeding, 148. 80. The total number of legislators increased from 17 in the 1980s to 23 during the 1990s, and to 27 in the early and 29 in the late 2000s. At the same time the number of directly elected members was increased from 6 to 12 in 2005 and 2009. The current composition of the Macao Legislative Assembly includes 12 directly elected members via territory wide lists, 10 members are indirectly elected through functional constituencies and 7 are appointed by the Chief Executive (Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region, 2009a). 81. Yu, Eilo Wing-Yat. (2007). Formal and informal politics in Macao special administrative region elections 2004–2005. Journal of Contemporary China, 52 (Aug.), 417–441. 82. Interview with Eilo Yu Wing-yat on September 20, 2009, Macao. 83. Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region. (2009b). Resultado da eleição dos deputados à assembleia legislativa da região administrativa especial de macau por sufrágio directo e indirecto [Results of the legislative assembly election of the Macao Special Administrative Region by direct and indirect election]. Macao: Government Printing Bureau. (In Portuguese) 84. Kaeding, 149. 85. Interview with Rufino Ramos on October 6, 2009, Macao. 86. Lo, Sonny Shiu-hing. (2009). Casino capitalism and its legitimacy impact on the politico-administrative state. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs,

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9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity 96. For an analysis of Chinese nationalism and the understanding of national identity as a unity of nation, state and CCP see Chang, 2001. 97. Kaeding, 151. 98. Clayton, Cathryn H. (2009). Sovereignty at the edge: Macau and the question of Chineseness. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 14. 99. Lam, Wai-man. (2010). Promoting hybridity: the politics of the new Macau identity. China Quarterly, 203 (Sep.), 656–674. 100. Bray, Mark, & Koo, Ramsey Ding Yee. (2005). Language and education. In: Mark Bray & Ramsey Koo (Eds.), Education and society in Hong Kong and Macau: Comparative perspectives on continuity and change, 2nd ed. (pp. 141–158). Dordrecht: Springer. 101. Mathias, Carlos José (2009). Macau, China and the Portuguese speaking countries. Working paper presented at the Hong Kong Political Science Association 2009 Conference. Inside/Outside: 60 Years of Chinese Politics. 20–21 August 2009. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. 102. Macau Government Tourist Office (2010). Macau. Macao: Macau Government Tourist Office. Available from: http://www.macautourism.gov.mo/en/index.php (accessed 10 March 2010). 103. Macau Government Tourist Office (2008). A new chapter in Macao’s tourism history. Macao: Macau Government Tourist Office. February 2008. Available from: http://marketing.macautourism.gov.mo/en/ezone/ mtdetail.php?lan=cn&id=1787 (accessed 10 March 2010). 104. Du Cros, Hilary. (2009). Emerging issues for cultural tourism in Macau. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38 (1), 73–99. 105. Lo, Sonny Shiu-hing. (2008). Political change in Macao. London: Routledge.; Lo, Sonny Shiu-hing. (2009). Casino capitalism and its legitimacy impact on the politico-administrative state. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 38 (1), 19–47. 106. Tieben, Hendrik (2009). Urban image construction in Macau in the first decade after the “Handover”, 1999–2008. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38 (1), 49–72. 107. Tieben, 66. 108. Zheng Xiaoyun (2010) Aomen huigui hou de wenhua rentong bianhua yu zhenghe [Macau´s cultural identity after the handover: change and integration]. Xinhua Aobao (Waou), 23 December 2010, P03. (In Chinese). 109. Lo 2009, 34. 110. During the Legislative Assembly Election campaign 2009 the closer cooperation was forcefully promoted by the Macau-Guangdong Union.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century 111. Yee, Herbert. (2009). The theory and practice of “one country–two systems” in Macau. Unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Political and Social Development in Hong Kong and Macao: Implications for Canada’s Relations with Greater China, June 23, 2009. Waterloo: University of Waterloo. 112. The usage of Mandarin and simplified Chinese characters is encouraged by education institutes and the media (Yee 2009). 113. The Tiananmen massacre has become a taboo topic (Yee, 2009) and there were virtually no protests against the controversial security law introduced which in Hong Kong had triggered mass protests (Lo, 2009: 35). 114. In their program Voz Plural (Plural Voices) targets a wide spectrum of voters including the large group of foreign workers from the Philippines and Indonesia. Their Chinese, Portuguese and English program and website adds to their multicultural appeal. 115. Voz Plural (2009). Political Programme. Macao: Voz Plural Gentes de Macau (Plural Voices of Macao). Available from: http://www.miro.org/ pluralvoice/programme (accessed 10 March 2010). 116. Li, Xinyuan. (2005). Nanyi biaoshu de shenfen: Aomenren wenhua rentong [An identity difficult to express: the cultural identity of Macao people]. Ershiyi shiji [Twenty-first century], 92 (Dec.), 16–25. (In Chinese), 25. 117. Yee, Herbert. (2001). Macau in transition: From colony to autonomous region. Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York: Palgrave., 71.; Yu & Lü, 306. 118. POP. (2007a). Joint project on regular opinion surveys in Macao. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme. Retrieved online on October 25, 2009 from: http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/ macau/motp13/freq.html. 119. Yu & Lü, 305. 120. Zhong, Tingyao (2003). Gang-Ao liang di huigui zhounian minqing bijiao [Comparison of public sentiment in Hong Kong and Macao one year after handover]. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Opinion Programme. Retrieved online on October 25, 2009 from: http://hkupop.hku.hk (In Chinese), 12. 121. POP. (2007b). Xianggang, Taiwan, Aomen, Chongsheng minzhong wenhua yu guojia rentong guoji bijiao diaocha (International comparative survey on Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, Okinawa mass culture and national identity). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme. Retrieved online on October 25, 2009 from: http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/release/release529.html (In Chinese) 122. Kaeding, 154–155. 123. Macao Youth Research Association. (2008). Aomen daxuesheng guomin

9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity shenfen rentong diaocha: yanjiu baogao. [Survey on the identity as citizens of Macao university students: research report]. Macao: Aomen qingnian yanjiu xiehui [Macau Youth Research Association]. (In Chinese). 124. The pilot study was conducted at the University of Macao on October 12–15, 2009 with the help of political scientists Dr. Eilo Yu and Dr. Bryan Ho. The sample of 59 students included 28 males and 31 females. 125. The age of the respondents was 18–20 years and the female-male ratio 53 to 47%. 126. Ma, Eric K. W., & Fung, Anthony Y. H. (2007). Negotiating local and national identifications: Hong Kong identity surveys, 1996–2006. Asian Journal of Communication, 17(2)(06), 172–185. 127. Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region. (2010a). Er ling yi ling nian caizheng niandu shizheng baogao [Policy address for the fiscal year 2010]. Retrieved online on December 6, 2011 from: http://bo.io.gov.mo/edicoes/en/raem/lag2010/Default.asp (In Chinese), 27. 128. Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region. (2011). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo aomen texing zhengqu zhengfu: Er ling yi er nian caizheng niandu shizheng baogao [Policy address for the fiscal year 2012 of the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) of the People’s Republic of China]. Retrieved online on December 6, 2011 from: http://www2.gcs.gov.mo/policy/download/cn2012_policy.pdf (In Chinese),18. 129. Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region. (2010b). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo aomen texing zhengqu zhengfu: Er ling yi yi nian caizheng niandu shizheng baogao [Policy address for the fiscal year 2011 of the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) of the People’s Republic of China].Retrieved online on December 6, 2011 from: http://www2.gcs.gov.mo/policy/download/cn2011_policy.pdf (In Chinese), 21. 130. 2011 Policy Address, 27. 131. 2010 Policy Address, 66. 132. 2010 Policy Address, 61. 133. 2011 Policy Address, 19. 134. 2012 Policy Address, 16. 135. Studies of Macao law are offered either in Portuguese or in Chinese. 136. Interview with first year Macao born Chinese student of Macao law in Portuguese on November 3, 2011, Macao.

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9. Post-Colonial Macao’s Changing Identity Kaeding, Malte Philipp. (2010). The evolution of Macao’s identity: toward ethno-cultural and civic-based development. Journal of Comparative Asian Development, 9 (1) (June), 133–168. Lam, Wai-man. (2010). Promoting hybridity: the politics of the new Macau identity. China Quarterly, 203 (Sep.), 656–674. Lau, Siu-kai, & Kuan, Hsin-chi. (1988). The ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Leung, Ambrose, & Wu, Eva. (2009). The people have not forgotten. South China Morning Post, June 5, 2009, EDT1. Li, Xinyuan. (2005). Nanyi biaoshu de shenfen: Aomenren wenhua rentong [An identity difficult to express: the cultural identity of Macao people]. Ershiyi shiji [Twenty-first century], 92 (Dec.), 16–25. (In Chinese). Lin, Yuan. (2006). Exploring conflict and harmony: Hong Kong and Macao. In: Alan Hunter (Ed.), Peace studies in the Chinese century: International perspectives (pp. 163–177). Aldershot: Ashgate. Liu, Shih-Diing. (2008). Casino colony. New Left Review, 50 (Mar.-Apr.), 109–124. Lo, Jennifer Ying Chun. (2005). Curriculum reform. In: Mark Bray & Ramsey Koo (Eds.), Education and society in Hong Kong and Macau: Comparative perspectives on continuity and change, 2nd ed. (pp. 161–174). Dordrecht: Springer. Lo, Sonny Shiu-hing. (1990). Political culture and participation in Macau. Asian Affairs: An American Review, 3(Fall), 147–155. Lo, Sonny Shiu-hing. (1999). Macao’s political system. In: Jean A. Berlie (Ed.), Macau 2000 (pp. 53–70). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lo, Sonny Shiu-hing. (2008). Political change in Macao. London: Routledge. Lo, Sonny Shiu-hing. (2009). “Casino Capitalism and its Legitimacy Impact on the Politico-Administrative State”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 38 (1), 19–47. Ma, Eric K. W., & Fung, Anthony Y. H. (2007). Negotiating local and national identifications: Hong Kong identity surveys, 1996–2006. Asian Journal of Communication, 17(2)(06), 172–185. Macau Government Tourist Office (2008). A new chapter in Macao’s tourism history. Macao: Macao Government Tourist Office. February 2008, at http://marketing.macautourism.gov.mo/en/ezone/mtdetail.php?lan=cn&id =1787 (accessed 10 March 2010). Macau Government Tourist Office (2010). Macau. Macao: Macau Government Tourist Office. Available from: http://www.macautourism.gov.mo/ en/index.php (accessed 10 March 2010). Macao Youth Research Association. (2008). Aomen daxuesheng guomin shenfen rentong diaocha: yanjiu baogao. [Survey on the identity as citizens

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10 The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao Benson W. K. WONG

Introduction In approaching the education system of a place, the role and status of teachers in many aspects is of the salient importance. Without teachers, education system does not work. From a political perspective, teachers play an important role in delivering, indoctrinating, and interpreting state’s ideology and belief by schooling, a key remark that can be useful for understanding the official administration and supervision of teacher education, such as the colonial Hong Kong in the pre-1997 era and Taiwan under the Japanese occupation (1895–1945) and Kuomintang rule during the Chiang’s period (1945–1988). To identify and approach the subjectivity of teachers in the social and education system, teacher professionalism is the core concept to be deployed and interpreted throughout this chapter. Two approaches are adopted in understanding teacher professionalism. The first approach focuses on the technical and instrumental dimension, with special reference to the efficiency of teachers in promoting teacher professionalism through official recognition. The second one emphasizes the increasing importance of professional competence through introducing and buttressing autonomy in order to resist the official interpretation, intervention 231

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and manipulation in the short term and to defend the de facto professionalism in the long term. While teacher professionalism is constantly viewed as a technical and an instrumental issue aiming at identifying, defining, updating and upgrading the capacity and competence of teachers under the official orchestration and manipulation so as to improve the educational quality and competitiveness in the era of globalization, an official assertion that is shared collectively in the profession. As a matter of fact, it is fundamentally a political issue, especially under the circumstances of state intervention and manipulation, as manifested in an enduring contestation between state and teachers in professional and political aspects. Defining and interpreting “teacher professionalism” is no longer a technical and an official issue to be managed, decided, manipulated, and enforced not by the professionals, but solely by the educational bureaucracy, it seems to be destined that education is a political, not authentically professional, issue, with the intention to shape the entire education system and policies being dictated by regime ideology and belief. As Anthony Sweeting (1992) notes, there is “a lack of clarify in much educational discourse about the concept of professionalism, which tends to float uneasily between claims about attitudes, aspirations towards a collective solidarity, and the emergence of an ideology (p. 1).” Based on the Sweeting’s interpretation, professionalism can be complicated in the light of the understanding, formulation and interpretation established and enforced by different stakeholders within the educational realm. Teacher professionalism is arguably a manifestation of a political contestation between the state and teachers in the sense that they struggle for the power to define and determine how and what constitutes the “professionalism” of teachers. Sachs’s assertion of teacher education does further validate the above argument: To struggle the various arenas where policy is determined, to wrest back and then maintain some greater degree of autonomy in their curriculum work. This will require the capacity to recognize the way curriculum operates, the critical skills to uncover hegemonic constructions of teacher as an apolitical

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activity, and the will to work collectively, through union and professional associations, to do something about it. It requires political understanding, including knowledge about how and where educational policy is shaped, who to target in political campaigns, and how education unions and political parties work. And it demands a significant array of political skills including the capacity to negotiate, advocate, lobby, communicate, and organize in the wider political arena (Sachs, 2003, p. 72). In practice, teachers often have a marginal and powerless status within their profession, having no say to shape the meaning and development of professionalism. Their voices and concerns are actually swept in an authoritarian political setting and they are often forced to strictly and intensely observe the official version of professionalism, thereby disempowering themselves in the long run. This chapter aims at deploying the case of Macao to examine the emergence and transformation of teacher professionalism, including its development and limitations, focusing on those engaging in teaching in elementary and secondary schools. Unlike university professors who are committed mainly to contribute to academic and intellectual underpinning, apart from engaging the limited teaching duty, school teacher identity is to be established, understood and maintained by establishing and maintaining closer teacher-students and teacher-parents relationships so as to proliferate their personal growth and developments, and by buttressing teacher professionalism by receiving and verifying teacher training and qualification through the educational bureaucracy in Hong Kong’s and Macao’s cases or the professional bodies and councils with establishing and undertaking their own code of conducts, regulations and systems. Also, working hours of teachers are mainly devoted to classroom instruction, apart from such administrative duties as student recruitment, counseling, and organizing the extra-curricular activities. Given the divergent nature of the scope and operation of work, this article focuses on teachers in elementary and secondary schools only. Another key point is that this chapter is not focused on Macau’s

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educational system; in other words, while the historical and policy review of educational system will be covered as background information for the forthcoming sections, the relevant and salient parts should form a critical review of and reflection upon the subjectivity of teachers in the professional and social settings, rather than the comprehensive examination of different school systems within Macao. Most importantly, the narration of official policies and regulations arising from education system would readily fall into the trap of concealing and sidetracking the discussion of the nature and working of teacher professionalism in a socially and politically realistic setting.

Contextual Understanding of the Macao’s Case During the 1557–1999 colonial period of Macao, both education and the development of teacher professionalism were not the core agendas in the minds of the Portuguese administration. For example, there was no teacher training institute in Macao to train and educate the local teachers. The colonial regime did not establish and articulate a clear, formal and official framework on teacher qualifications and profession. This phenomenon can be attributed to the unwillingness and incompetence of the colonial regime to introduce and undertake changes in the education sector. A notable example is that no official curricula was introduced and enforced to unity the entire schooling system. Instead, students, based on their ethnical, social and/or political orientations, studied in different schooling systems, including the Portuguese (for the Macanese), Taiwanese (for those pursuing their further study in Taiwan), mainland (for those in mainland China), or Hong Kong system (for those sitting for the public examinations and then entering such universities in Hong Kong). In fact, education not only embraces schooling and training of the young generation through a formal system, but it also entails political ramifications, such as the critical issues of the role of teachers in shaping the curricula and school systems, of how the state ideology is formulated and propagated or delivered to students,

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao

and of how resources are allocated and spent on the development of education. Since Macao’s revision to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in December 1999, the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) government has come to realize gradually that it must abolish its past policy of neglecting the development of local manpower and the lack of any clear trend for its future educational directions. As pointed out by Bruce Kam-Kwan Kwong (2003, p. 363), inaugural MSAR Chief Executive Edmond Ho (1999–2009) was keen to take remedial measures to address public grievances.1 Ho admitted: “Macao had no consistent education policy in the past and the reform today is aiming at exploring a proper education policy in line with the guideline of the “Macao people ruling Macao” (Citizen Daily, 26 August 2004, p. P01). Of course, Kwong’s remark does not elaborate further the relationships between local education and “Macao people ruling Macao”, nor explain how far has Ho addressed such grievance, and evaluate their effectiveness at the end of his tenure. Undoubtedly, the MSAR government acknowledges the role of education in rebuilding Macao’s social and cultural foundation, and teachers can and must play a critical role in the setting up and reform of the entire educational system. As such, teacher professionalism is the prerequisite for the effective training of local manpower. However, it is another important matter whether the local teachers can and would have a say in the process of shaping teacher professionalism. This chapter will attempt to answer the following questions in light of teacher professionalism: 1. What are the objectives of initiating teacher profession in Macao’s educational policy? 2. What difficulties is Macao’s teacher professionalism facing? 3. What experiences that Macao can perhaps learn from Hong Kong? 4. What will be the future professionalism in Macao?

prospects

of

teacher

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The Teaching Profession in the Context of Macao’s Education Policy From the perspective of educational system as a whole, professionalism is officially interpreted as teachers’ improvement of qualification and skills. Based on the Education System of Macao (No.11/91/M) promulgated in 1991, teacher profession required the teachers to possess suitable academic qualifications and receive teaching training (Annex 1 for relevant provisions) (Su, 2003, p. 61).2 In 2003, the MSAR government issued a discussion paper (Annex 2 for relevant provisions) stating that the teacher profession should be established on the basis of their academic qualifications (Articles 30.2 and 30.3), their reviews (31.4), teacher training (32.1, 32.3, 32.4 and 32.5), and the material incentive mechanisms (31.4 and 32.2). All these stated policies had the intention of uplifting teachers’ morale and status. However, it should be noted that the requirements mentioned in the document on Macao’s education system are not mandatory, and the effectiveness of their enforcement remains questionable for several reasons. First, over 90% of the local schools are operated by religious and social groups while the authorities adopt a laissez-faire stance to supervise their management. As a result, the enforcement of teacher professionalism is not the MSAR government’s major concern. Second, the civil servants responsible for educational issues are not really or sufficiently and professionally trained in educational studies, and they may selectively comprehend and appreciate the importance of professionalizing teachers in the education system from an instrumental perspective, noting that the training of local manpower to fulfill economic needs as their key and sole concern. Third, there is a lack of independent social and professional forces composed of educators or teachers to strive for teacher professionalism, due to inadequate professional and political space for them to articulate and reflect upon their professional identity and status in light of the prevalent conservative socio-political setting. In approach the teaching profession of Macao, Table 1 shows the official data of the teachers in different settings from academic years 2002/03 to 2010/11.

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao

237

Table 1. The Official Data of the Teachers in Different Settings from 2002/3 to 2010/11 No. of Teachers / Years

2002/ 03

2003/ 04

2004/ 05

2005/ 06

2006/ 07

2007/ 08

2008/ 09

2009/ 10

2010/ 11

461

459

454

444

477

501

519

570

648

Primary Education

1,507

1,534

1,513

1,526

1,525

1,590

1,585

1,577

1,602

Secondary Education

1,663

1,871

1,968

2,041

2,094

2,177

2,294

2,355

2,523

89

85

88

84

86

81

79

81

84

Primary Recurrent Education

19

13

8

7

7

9

9

9

8

Secondary Recurrent Education

102

130

109

113

116

111

118

136

148

Pre-Primary Education

Special Education

Source: “Education Survey for the 2010/11 Academic Year”, at http://www.dsec.gov.mo, accessed on 17 November 2011

The above table reveals that over 80% of Macao teachers are working in the regular (from pre-primary to secondary) education, and the number of teachers have been increasing gradually in various settings. Since the Macao’s population drops to 541,200 in 2008, the number of regular education’s teachers occupied 1% of total population (Macau Post Daily, 10 November 2009, P02). In light of radio of teachers to students during 2006 to 2007, it dropped from 19.5% to 18.9%. Pre-primary school teacher-student ratio was 1:22.6; primary school teacher-student ratio was 1:22.8; secondary school teacher-student ratio was 1:21.7 and special education teacher-student ratio was 1:6 (Macao Daily, 16 September 2006, B06). In 2008, the teacher/student ratio for regular education was 1 to 15.5; the ratio for non-tertiary and higher education was 1 to 17.2 and 1 to 10.7 respectively (www.dsec.gov.mo, accessed on 17 November, 2009). However, the above radio does not necessarily reflect the actual school and classroom environment, as reflected in which the number of students is generally over 35 students in class

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in most of the primary and secondary schools (Macao Daily, 12 March 2007, p. E10). Despite the material incentives and professional recognition mentioned above, the MSAR government regards teachers as an instrument of fostering the training of students. Teachers are expected to observe and implement the policy of teaching as instructed by the government, and to achieve self-enhancement and self-enrichment through ongoing on-the-job training at the appropriate time. Under these circumstances, teacher professionalism has little space for further development towards professional autonomy. As a matter of fact, the MSAR government still believes that teachers should be under the dominance and supervision of the educational bureaucracy. To synthesize the viewpoints put forward by Kai-ming Cheng and Suk-ying Wong (1997), Sweeting (1992), H. L. Pan and L. Y. Wang (2000), teacher professionalism covers the following aspects: 1. Teachers are aware of their unique status in society and profession, In other words, the professional status shall be acquired through an established mechanism operating in an ideally impartial and accountable manner. 2. Teachers are able to fight for and defend their professional benefits and independence through formal (lobbying, bargaining with the educational bureaucracy) and informal (campaigns, rallies) channels. 3. Teachers have a statutory autonomous organization to draw together educational workers (like a teachers’ union or association). 4. Teachers institutionalize autonomous status.

their

organization

with

an

5. The organization mentioned above has the legal status to define and assess teachers’ professional qualification, stipulate the license rules, and handle matters about “teachers’ professional qualification” based on its fair, open, and impartial rules and mechanism. Teachers should ideally meet the recruitment criteria, possess the required disciplinary and professional knowledge, continuously

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao

upgrade their knowledge and pedagogies for self-enhancement, and establish an open, fair, stable, impartial, and constructive review system. On top of this, teachers should be given legal professional status. However, neither the statutory provision in 1991 nor the discussion paper in 2003 identified the features of Macao teachers in line with the advocacy of the above characteristics mentioned by Cheng, Wong, Sweeting, Pan and Wang. In other words, in the entire educational system, teachers are only the “professional laborers” of the educational industry, merely serve the government, schools, students, parents, and the business sector, and they lack, and are not assigned the professional, political and personal identity. Except for a few teachers who have the intrinsic motives or the morale to upgrade their teaching skills, the community of teachers as a whole finds it very difficult to improve their overall quality due to the lack of professional identity and recognition. This phenomenon may impede the long term development of Macao manpower. Overall, given the official absence of a holistic and consistent education policy, and the general ignorance of understanding and appreciating teachers’ subjectivity, it is inevitable that teacher professionalism actually lacks substance on the one hand, and virtually rejects teachers’ voices and concerns on the other.

Obstacles to Teacher Professionalism In retrospect, organizational, personal and contextual factors all contribute to the handicap of teacher professionalism in Macao. Teachers can only be regarded as “professional laborers” in terms of their social status without any material incentives and professional might to defend their rights and interests in face of official and school authorities. This predicament can be interpreted in the following way: Firstly, Macao has no independent professional organization for teachers, and teachers are unable to elevate further their professional level through professional groups or participate in the formulation of educational policy through their professional status and lobbying activities. Instead, the Chinese Education Association (CEA) of

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Macao, a leading pro-Beijing educational body, serves as a representative of all educators, including teachers. Established in 1920, the CEA was a local educational organ with the goals of striving for the improvement of Chinese language education and culture in Macao and promoting Chinese patriotism by networking with the PRC education sector.3 In other words, its primary concern is to set up and consolidate the pro-Beijing power base in the professional, political, and social arenas through school and social networks, rather than appreciate, support and then empower teachers in political and professional settings. Although it is said that the CEA did have some inputs into government educational policy making, but it is doubtful whether such inputs are reflected in policy implementation, or whether teachers are encouraged to engage in policy-making and that are teachers’ opinions to be consulted and collected through an open and accountable platform. As one commentator has highlighted, “During the process of undertaking educational reform, the government should encourage deeper and comprehensive consultation and encourage more educators to participate in discussions, including the need to consult educational associations.”4 In other words, the CEA appeared to lack sufficient inputs into the government’s educational policy-making process, which remains relatively closed in the eyes of the critics. The limitation of the association can be reflected in which some teachers participated in the 1 October 2007 rally to express their dissatisfaction of the existing educational system, and the CEA believed that there has been a vast gap between policy formulation and policy implementation due to the absence of communication between government and teachers, explicitly implying that the association exercises the limited influence in the existing educational system (Hong Kong Daily News, 3 October 2007). The absence of communication, to a certain extent, can be attributed to the lack of an independent, institutionalized, and regular consultative framework that works for collecting and synthesizing teachers’ voices, thereby shaping policy formulation and implementation. Although the CEA has repeatedly claimed to be representative of teachers’ interests, a critical point is what incentives can trigger the educational groups to fight actively for teachers’ benefits.

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao

Stakeholders, such as the educational sponsors and donors, school principals, administrative staff, teachers and students have different pursuits and considerations. When teachers are not at an equal and a powerful position or due to a lack of an obvious professional image or role, they are unable to reunite or even improve their strengths and benefits. Unless teachers are short in supply, which forces educational groups to improve teachers’ benefits package to attract more talents into the teaching profession, teachers gradually feel alienated, helpless, estranged, and set back about their working environment. These problems lead them to cast doubts on their own profession once they are immersed into the school environment or work just teach for the sake of making a living. Teachers feel that they are no different from the low-class disadvantaged laborers (Liu, 2004; Wong, 2007a, 2007b).5 Secondly, teachers are not encouraged to establish and enhance their distinctively professional image and are unable to participate in the school administration and safeguard their professional benefits with legal status. As a consequence, influential stakeholders, namely the educational officers and school authorities, formulate and implement policies totally from the managerial and economic perspectives and often neglect the concerns of the teaching profession, such as the establishment and maintenance of statutory professional status for teachers within an impartial mechanism, the articulation and implementation of a professional framework to qualify and benchmark the teaching profession, and the introduction to a time-table or schedule aiming at professionalizing teachers in a comprehensive and an incremental manner. Based on the collection and classification results of the opinions on the “Macao Special Administrative Region Educational System Draft for Discussion”,6 we find the following opinions: • “We feel that the draft was written in a management’s perspective instead of teachers’ one.” • “The current educational system lacks guarantees on the teaching profession, and humanistic conditions are more than rational conditions. Hence, it is necessary to develop a teaching career’s procedure that responds to the situation in Macao. Although the draft regulation about

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educational reform has rules, it allows schools to customize the teacher career procedure based on the school situation, and hence it cannot be rid of human factors. • “The teacher career procedure should be stipulated impartially by treating all teachers equally.” • “The teacher career procedure is important and cannot be stipulated by the school itself.” • “Nowadays, teachers are required to possess professional qualifications but do not receive professional remuneration.” • “The Education Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) should have seats for teacher representatives.” • “Macao teachers are still employed on a yearly basis. Although most teachers in government-sponsored schools can have their contracts renewed every year, the system itself cannot guarantee the teaching profession adequately and does not help to stabilize teacher teams. The absence of such a teacher team is not helpful to the educational reform and its stable development.” • “Proposers cast doubts on the rationality of delegating the power to schools to stipulate the teachers’ career procedures. Schools and teachers belong to two classes: the former is an employer while the latter is an employee. They may have conflicting benefits and do not stand on a fair platform of dialogue. How can the government guarantee that the teachers’ career procedures are objective and operable? As teachers are regarded as engaging in activities of public benefits and interest, the government is obliged to provide a career procedure or path that protects the teaching profession and teachers’ interests.” The above opinions reflect that many Macao teachers basically lack professional identity and status within their profession, display a lower level of participation, and possess relatively weak influence

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao

on the stipulation, consultation, and formulation of not only educational policy but also in school administration. As teachers are constrained by the educational authorities and powers of both sponsors and principals in the schools, as reflected above in which the yearly contract can be deployed by school authorities to manipulate teachers, it is difficult for them to advance their teaching objectives or propose reform opinions based on their professional judgment, experience and discretion. Some teachers prefer to stick to the passive and defensive approach of making more mistakes if you do more, making fewer mistakes if you do less, and making no mistakes if you do nothing (Wong, 2005). In addition, due to the lack of a professional organization with teachers as the core, a genuine and an independent teachers’ voice can be easily neglected or partially interpreted by representatives from the educational community, thus damaging the teaching profession even further. The so-called representatives of the educational community are often co-opted by the educational bureaucracy and establishment, thereby disempowering the teachers as a whole. The passivity, indifference and powerlessness of teachers in the profession manifests that they are generally marginalized and their interests are misunderstood by the general public and distorted by the educational bureaucracy. It is an illusion that teacher professionalism can be fully appreciated and can flourish under these constrained socio-political settings. Apart from teachers’ powerlessness in the policy-making process and school context, members of the public, notably parents and students, do not completely understand, and even appreciate the importance of, the teaching profession in improving and excelling the education system. Based on the discussion of the draft version of the “Macao Special Administrative Region Education System,” some believe that increasing the resource and reducing the workload are meant to “bribe” teachers. The negative impression of teachers, in the light of the above assertion, may presumably be attributed to the unpleasant learning experiences in the past. Chief Executive Edmund Ho reiterated that these reforms were feasible measures in uplifting teachers’ qualifications instead of bribing teachers per se (Citizen Daily, 26 August, 2004, p. 1). Of course, some parents understand that the role of teachers in educational reform cannot be neglected and they advocate that “the result would be limited if any

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one party among the parents, teachers, and principals does not cooperate.” (Macao Daily, 26 August, 2004, p. 10). This observation is meaningful in the sense that teachers are still politically subordinate to other actors, notably school principals and educational bureaucrats, and are generally powerless within the existing socio-political mechanisms. It is apparent that media reports and publications of sponsors and parents have failed to introduce, discuss and probe the following topics thoroughly: 1. whether teachers are professionalized; and 2. whether the teaching profession can improve the overall quality of education effectively and continuously. Instead of encouraging and engaging the official discourse on building, accumulating, and renewing the educational practices, knowledge and skills, the teaching profession in Macao remains loose and marginalized. Ideally, Macao’s teaching profession, if united as a collective force, should cultivate the professional identity and solidarity among teachers, develop an accountability system for schools, parents, teachers, and students, and establish a mechanism acceptable to all parties to provide feedback and handle not only the affairs of teachers but also policies affecting students under the principles of fairness, openness, impartiality and constructivism. Should Macao teachers take an active role in the government’s consultative policy framework? If Macao teachers do not have an independent and autonomous organization, but relying on the pro-government and co-opted CEA, any efforts of the existing educational groups that claim to represent the teachers’ interests in general are bound to be an inadequate guarantee of teachers’ interest and professionalism. Some critics have asserted that “it has been a fact for years that the educational group of the committee cannot represent the majority of its members.” Its black box-style operation brings about a phenomenon in which the educational authority seems to turn a blind eye to the inputs and opinions from teachers, who have not been allowed to shape the government’s educational

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao

decision-making and reform processes (Overseas Chinese Newspaper, 2 July 2004, p. 24). Hence, “teaching professionals in the committee should be elected by general voting in the educational field to replace the ‘representatives of educational groups’ today.” (Ibid.) In other words, the undemocratic, unrepresentative, and unaccountable nature of Macao’s educational consultative committee not only dictates and manipulates its agendas for discussion, but also distorts and undermines the nature of teacher professionalism by deploying a top-down mode of policy-making in education. Finally, other unfavorable factors make it difficult for the development of teacher professionalism, including the fact that the gambling industry has been growing so rapidly that public servants receive unjustly high levels of salaries while teachers have been burdened with tremendous heavy workload but have received relatively low remuneration. These imbalances in the salary structure between the civil servants in general and the teachers have contributed to the brain drain of some teachers and seriously undermined the teaching profession (Macao Daily, 26 August 2004, p. A3). Using for example the collective resignation of 11 foreign teachers from Macao Sheng Kung Hui Primary School in Taipa in July 2006, some pointed out incisively in this way: “New casinos were opened recently, and the gambling industry is quite prosperous after Macao’s return to the mainland. Would the authorities listen to the call of all investors that Macao is short of human resources? Would the authorities not meet their demand for high-caliber talents? When will the government consider deploying more resources from its huge revenues to improve the educational facilities of middle and primary schools and the welfare of teachers, especially foreign teachers?” (Macao Daily, 14 July 2004, p. B12) In fact, the MSAR Education and Youth Affairs Bureau also admitted that the “economic issue” is one of the reasons for the foreign teachers’ collective resignation. If the welfare or even the profession of teachers cannot be cherished and acknowledged, teacher professionalism only becomes an elusive target, especially when there is a genuine societal demand of mobilizing teachers with their professional spirit to promote the training of more local talents. (Macao Daily, 14 July 2004, p. B12). The Casino capitalism

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development in Macao also entails the consequence of relying on foreign, Hong Kong and mainland casino workers, employees and managers at the expense of spending more efforts and resources to develop a coherent educational policy and respect teacher professionalism. Arguably, Macao’s teacher professionalism has suffered under its rapid processes of capital accumulation through casino capitalism and growth. Teacher professionalism, to a certain extent, is not only a professional but also political issue in three major aspects. First, who have the power to determine ultimately the nature and meaning of teacher professionalism? Contextually, an alliance between the educational bureaucracy and the pro-government or co-opted educational associations has been forged to maintain the status quo. By giving more subsidies to the CEA, the MSAR government intentionally or unintentionally perpetuates such unholy and arguably unrepresentative alliance. Second, what are the meaning and nature of teacher professionalism? While the improvement of material incentives, such as salary increase is of paramount concern, the overall pay and status of Macao’s teachers, especially at the high school and primary school levels, remains relatively low. Under the circumstances in which the MSAR government pays lip service to improving teacher professionalism and maintains the rhetoric of using education as a means to improve economic competitiveness, it is meaningless and groundless to deepen the societal discourse on how to upgrade teachers’ professional status, competence, influence and autonomy. Finally, the question of how to actualize teacher professionalism is another political matter in the sense that, to use the definition of politics by Harold Laswell, the government determines who gets what, when and how. The educational bureaucracy in the MSAR orchestrates a top-down educational policy-making and enjoys the hegemony of defining what is teacher “professionalism”. At the same time, the absence of any policy to encourage teachers’ active involvement and engagement in the educational policy-making processes, and the lack of a collective force articulating the interest of teachers, mean that the official hegemony on education persists in the MSAR.

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao

Professionalizing Macao Teachers: Reflections on the HKSAR “Experience” While teacher professionalism is arguably underdeveloped in Macao, the Hong Kong experience is pertinent in two dimensions. First, while Hong Kong seems to be more desirable than Macao in terms of overall educational level, and the recruiting criteria, training, and resources of the teaching profession, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) still lacks educational professionalism or “professional autonomy”. The HKSAR case is illuminating as its government, like the MSAR counterpart, adopts a similar approach to deal with teacher professionalism, notably the role of teachers in defining and shaping educational reform and policies. Second, in both Hong Kong and Macao, the societal responses, including the mass media, to the protection of teachers’ interest have become a critical factor shaping teacher professionalism. Moreover, the extent to which members of the general public generally shares the official discourse and assumptions on educational policies and reforms has shaped the process of professionalizing teachers. In other words, if the public shares with the official hegemony and values over education, teacher professionalism can be easily politically and socially subordinated to the interest of the bureaucracy under the disguise of serving “public interest”. Similar to the Macao’s case, teacher professionalism was not discussed widely in Hong Kong during the colonial era. In 1982, an international advisory panel recommended building a “Hong Kong Teacher Organization” in its report “Perspective of Hong Kong Education” for the sake of uplifting the professional status of teachers. Unfortunately, the colonial regime had no intention of establishing any teacher organization independent from the establishment and led by the educators themselves. The Hong Kong colonial authorities, however, promised to set up a preparatory committee to draft a professional charter with the intention of uplifting the awareness of teachers on professionalism. Eventually the charter was promulgated by the 1990 Educator Professional Code.

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Although Hong Kong’s Educator Professional Code is by no means a legally binding profession code of conduct, it still lays a “value” foundation for teacher profession. The preparatory committee stipulated the code based on the following targets (Council on Professional Conduct in Education, 1995, chap. 1): 1. Develop the professional identity of professional educators. 2. Enhance the morale of professional educators by stipulating a set of ethical codes commonly recognized and to which to commit. 3. Provide professional educators a set of conduct codes and self-disciplinary guidance to maintain a high level of education. 4. Emphasize the responsibility of the educational profession to the society and obtain the trust and support of the society. 5. Strengthen professionalism and improve the autonomy and social status of the teaching profession. 6. Improve the democratic process in formulating the educational policy. 7. Promote social democracy. The Code’s second chapter (refer to Annex III) specifies the obligations of educators (including principals and teachers) to the profession, students, colleagues, and parents (or guardians). These obligations cover five aspects: “self-disciplinary and autonomy,” “expand the reservoir of teaching knowledge,” “democratic and open attitude,” “accountability,” and “respecting others.” Yet, the code is only a ritualistic and moral obligation without a subsequent mechanism and set of regulations to enforce. Of course, the code has shown its progressive move in comparison with Macao in terms of interpreting the meaning of teacher professionalism. On the other hand, the birth rate decline after Hong Kong’s 1997 return to China has decreased the number of school children, and teachers become oversupplied. The educational reform pushed forward by the government has abruptly increased teachers’ workload in handling trivial administrative affairs. From a critical perspective, there is a lack of appropriate government support for

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao

teachers in the HKSAR. In addition to the children’s learning and behavioral issues, many Hong Kong teachers are gradually demoralized. Some schools request “actively” busy teachers to receive training to uplift the “professional image” of schools. Such a situation has brought about undue influence on teachers’ professionalism, which is arguably a governmental rhetoric without addressing the fundamental problem of the insufficient support for teachers’ well-being, concerns and interest in the HKSAR. The gravest factor is the educational system manipulated by the HKSAR bureaucrats at the top. The adverse consequences of this top-down approach in educational administration are shouldered by educators, notably teachers, who are however bombarded with the media criticisms. For example, a teacher rally against the government’s reduction in its educational budget in February 2006 was not applauded by the media, showing that the media adopted a negative approach of interpreting the rally as a “political threat” to the government without deeply considering the adverse effect of the budgetary measure.7 In addition, given the incomplete and predisposed understanding of the educational setting, some media commentators and reports have endorsed the misleading and uncritical viewpoints held by the general public. For example, it has been taken for granted by the public that Hong Kong operated schools well and generated extraordinary students in the 1970s and the 1980s, when educational resources were inadequate. The media and the public share an unquestionable assumption that in the 1970s and the 1980s, when there was no compulsory educational system, most students were from affluent families. Hence, becoming “extraordinary students” seemed natural in light of their relatively advantaged material conditions and upper-class background in this specific historical context. In this regard, “good” schools and students were only a small fraction of the elite society receiving excellent examination results because of acquiring examination skills and rote learning. In fact, it would be problematic in case of approaching the educational issues and even policies based on the nostalgia of personal experiences in schooling, as the predisposition of which the personal success/failure being regarded as the success/failure of an educational system/policy would be emerged (Wong, 2005).

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The criticism above is arguably biased and simply a reflection of the media’s being influenced by HKSAR governmental hegemony. The “expensive” educational expenditure in the eyes of the HKSAR government actually originates from Chief Executive Chee-hwa Tung’s belief of supporting education, deliberately allocating more resources to the educational field (Tung, 1997). However, the teaching profession remains characterized by a lack of a consistent system based on the principle of accountability (Wong, 2005). In addition, Hong Kong teachers encounter more negative media coverage than those in Macao. One of the accusations is that the choice of some Hong Kong middle-class families to send their children to study abroad (or choose local international schools), the decision is actually the result of a series of educational projects, notably educational reforms launched by the HKSAR bureaucrats, after July 1997. These vanity projects included the promotion of Chinese as the medium of instruction and the use of Information Technology (IT), for example. First, the governmental authority’s efforts at promoting schools to teach by using Chinese (Cantonese) as the medium of instruction was intended to demonstrate Hong Kong’s sovereignty return to mainland China, but the policy was not accepted by school authorities, especially for those using English as the medium of instruction because of the decline of English language standard. Second, efforts in promoting IT teaching came to a dead end due to budget deficit issues under the Tung leadership in 1998. The HKSAR government believed that IT was the panacea to improving teaching efficacy, but they have actually neglected the essence of teaching, especially the classroom interactions between teachers and students. Superficial reforms in education were implemented at the expense of protecting the concerns and professionalism of teachers in the HKSAR (Wong, 2005). Hence, teacher professionalism should cover three dimensions: increasing educational resources, protecting teachers’ benefits, and empowering them. More importantly, educators, including schools principals and teachers, should understand the local education system in an open, accountable, and communicative manner so that the non-schooling stakeholders, such as the educational bureaucracy and the mass media, can truly understand the education sector problems and the appropriate areas of reforms. Otherwise, teachers

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao

can easily become the scapegoats of a top-down and an unaccountable educational administration, as the Hong Kong’s case vividly shows. In short, despite the efforts made by the HKSAR government at coordinating resources for education and improving the teaching profession, unfortunately the educational bureaucracy and educational groups are narrow-minded and deny that teachers can realize professionalism through the development of professional autonomy. Many local media serve as the mouthpiece of the Hong Kong government and focus on the maladministration of schools and the incompetent performance of some teachers without any attempt to investigate the structural constraints on teachers. As such, teachers in the HKSAR cannot advance their interest easily, not to mention the issue of professionalism. The political powerlessness of teachers is exacerbated by the fragmented nature of the teacher associations in the Hong Kong case and by the heterogeneous nature of memberships embracing non-teacher members, such as schoolmasters, educational officers, administrative and clerical officers. Due to the fragmented and heterogeneous nature of teachers association, union solidarity among teachers has been undermined (Wong, 2007a).

Underdevelopment of Teacher Professionalism in Macao and Hong Kong: Continuities and Changes Comparatively speaking, the underdevelopment of teacher professionalism in both Hong Kong and Macao has several similarities. First, the educational bureaucracy manipulates and dominates the identification, definition, interpretation, and validation of teacher professionalism. Second, the political and professional representativeness of teachers is deprived by such educational associations with diverse vested interests. In the final analysis, the absence of an impartial and a statutory body without official intervention to qualify and defend teacher professionalism in both places hampers teacher professionalism in the long run.

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Overall, the existing socio-political context, the Macau’s case is relatively similar to the Hong Kong’s case in the latter part of the colonial administration. At present, the MSAR government does not take action to adopt and follow up the suggestions and criticisms leveled by teachers and some citizens, and the policy addresses during the Edmund Ho administration from December 1999 to December 2009 did not really tackle the issue of teacher professionalism. It shows that the MSAR government, as with the case of Hong Kong during the early phase of colonial administration, does not regard the need to professionalize teachers as a policy priority or top on its educational agenda. Another problem of the underdevelopment of teacher professionalism in Macao is that the absence of an influential social/professional organ, like Hong Kong’s Professional Teachers Union, to exert continuous pressure on the MSAR government to formulate better policy toward the protection of teacher professionalism. During the current discourse on teacher professionalism, there is no proposal of setting up a statutory body or agency to professionalize teachers. Instead, the main focus is merely on the improvement of material and working conditions of teachers (Macao Daily News, 21 September 2009, p. D07; 17 September 2009, p. E02; 8 September, 2008; p. E09; 6 October 2008, p. E05; Jornal Do Cidadao, 11 September 2009, p. 02; 17 June 2006, p. 08; Jornal Va Kio, 5 March 2006, p. 24). Overall, while teacher professionalism in Macao is still in its infancy, its future development will likely depend on the following three factors. Firstly, expanding and deploying educational resources, according to Liu (2003, p. 113), is one of the key indicators.8 Training should focus more on the classroom management and communication skills instead of only improving the teaching skills and professional disciplinary knowledge of teachers. If teachers are subject to increasingly heavy workload, training could become a mere formality. Under heavy workload, teachers are unable to care much about student interests and to tailor fit teaching to their needs. Macao schools may have to consider hiring teaching assistants to help and support teachers’ work. 9 Improving teachers’ benefits cannot be neglected. The MSAR can consider borrowing from the practice of some mainland Chinese schools: assigning senior teachers

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao

to conduct research and development work, to share experience with colleagues through seminars and/or publications so as to improve professionalism. Professionalism without upholding academic autonomy is contradictory and meaningless despite enhancement of research capacity to improve teaching and learning, as teachers must to follow political dictates to engage in the setting, apart from the party control over the school setting through the interlocking leadership between school administration and party apparatus (Tai, 2009).10 Second, acknowledging and actualizing the importance of the teaching profession is another aspect that deserve the public concern in Macao. It is partially similar to the situation in Hong Kong where many members of the public are misinformed of the role of teachers in the educational system. As independent individuals in the educational system, parents are ideally playing a crucial role in understanding the institutional and school systems, thus contributing indirectly to the advancement of teacher professionalism. Unlike some Western countries where parent participation in managing school board affairs may contribute to their better understanding of the school system through an accountable, regular, and democratic framework, the relatively weak participation of parents in the education systems of both Macao and Hong Kong appears to hamper the development of teachers’ interest, not to mention their professionalism. On the other hand, teachers can develop a sense of belonging, responsibility, and success through their active participation in the formulation of educational policies with the establishment of a statutory framework that impinge on them and the students. Unfortunately, in the cases of Macao and Hong Kong, teacher participation remains a political illusion. If teachers strive for professionalism only for the sake of keeping their jobs, the entire educational system would perhaps suffer from insufficient inputs from teachers. In this regard, it is imperative for the educational authority and bureaucracy, educational groups, schools, the media and members of the public to recognize the significance and value of teacher professionalism from a teacher, not from a bureaucratic, perspective, which is not simply an instrument to achieve the objective of producing more local talents, but also the improvement

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of teachers’ morale, standard and profession and thereby benefiting the society and economy of Macao as a whole. Third, if other jobs, especially those in the casino industry, are more attractive in terms of remuneration and career prospects, it would be difficult to retain existing teachers and recruit outstanding ones to renew and improve the quality of education. Macao’s economy has over-relied on the gaming, entertainment and tourism sectors, and many citizens regard these sectors as the natural choices for achieving their objectives of acquiring high salaries and desirable fringe benefits. The brain drain of some Macao teachers to the casino sector is an unfortunate outcome of the MSAR’s rapid development of casino capitalism. It is hoped that the majority of teachers in the MSAR can and will put more efforts at striving for the improvement, if not perfection, of both the teaching profession and the school system, even though they are not adequately compensated in terms of financial income and personal benefits. Hence, the teaching profession is at a disadvantaged position under Macao’s quest for economic development through the reliance on the casino and entertainment sectors.

Teachers’ Subjectivity and Professionalism under the 10-Year Plan for the Development of Non-Tertiary Education (2011–2020) In early 2011, the MSAR government introduced and released the Ten-Year Plan for the Development of the Non-higher Education (2011–2020). Referring to the introductory section of the proposed plan, the government adopts an economic perspective to justify the importance of the plan to excel Macao: Education is the milestone of social progress and the crucial point of talent training. Given the limited natural resources of Macao, the construction of human resources must serve as a foundation for the long-term development in the future by developing a high-quality education, training talents, and upgrading the overall

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quality of the competitiveness….

residents,

and

enhancing

Currently, Macao is in the crucial phase of progressive development, and will develop into a center of world tourism and leisure. To promote the appropriate and diversified economic development, (while the government) protects the appropriate, orderly and normative development of the casino industry, such modern service industries as tourism, finance, cultural recreation, and social industries in technological and cultural aspects, will also be developed tremendously. The above developments are mainly attributed to the forceful development of education, (and) training the high-quality talents, (with the objective of) upholding the manpower for the long-term development in Macao (Direcção dos Serviços de Educação e Juventude, January 2011b, p. 1). Analyzing the above text, three major points should be noted. First, the notion of “education reforms serve to economic development” is introduced and advocated, an identical discourse used by state to dominate and orchestrate education in the ground of competiveness, excelling the quality, and training talents. Second, the proposal is not aimed to introduce any fundamental changes in the existing education system, but serves as a subordinate role aiming to maintain the economic strength. And finally, the role of teachers in the possible educational changes is limited and passive. Citing from the consultation paper, the term “teachers” (Jiaoshi) does not appear in the entire document; instead, “teaching staff” (Jiaoxu Renyuan) is deployed. In making an expectation of the “teaching staff”, the paper states: “observing the professional standards and work ethics, being equally important in teaching (Jiaoshu) and breeding (Yuren), (and) loving every student. (Additionally), actively formulating the professional self-development, enrolling in on-the-job training and engaging in teaching research with diligence, (aiming at) upgrading education and teaching quality” (Ibid, p. 7). Teachers’ subjectivity is

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legitimately deprived by de-titling and by being imposed a number of unfounded requirements. One notable requirement is that professionalism is unsubstantial and then manipulated by the bureaucracy without the foundation and working of a professional, independent, and accountable system without political intervention. The deployment of the term “teaching staff” means that teaching is articulated to be an instrument serving and facilitating economic growth and development, not to educate the humanistic aspect of the young generation. “Teachers” are expected to meet the expectations of the educational bureaucracy so as to achieve the efficient teaching. Another interesting observation is that teachers have no role in school administration. In section 3.4 of the paper entitled “Excelling School System”; section 3.5 named “improving educational leadership and internal management of school”; and section 3.6 denoted “strengthening educational quality for protection”, while such stakeholders as government, schools, parents are included in school setting, teachers are intentionally not included in school management, administration and leadership, thereby disempowering teachers in personal, professional and political dimensions. Teachers being marginalized in the consultation can also be revealed in another document entitled The Consultation Paper of the Ten-year Plan for the Development of Non-tertiary Education, 2011–2020: Background Information for Reference. By studying the textual and numerical data, while there are increasing number of teachers in the past decade (2011b, p. 2), increasing subsidy to teachers teaching in private schools (2011b, p. 5), the age of teachers received teacher training (2011b, p. 6) with relatively lower proportion in secondary school setting, and the number of teaching lessons per week (Ibid.), such data has politically and socially reconstructed the imagination of official efforts in materially professionalizing teachers. However, the improvement of working conditions, qualification and material inducement does not virtually mean teacher professionalism, and even does distort the nature of professionalism with the muting of teacher identity, participation, and engagement in policy-making and decision-making process. Another interesting observation is that while the last three sections

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of the entire document are about views and expectations of Macau’s parents (p. 14), school management (p. 15) and space and environment of schools (p. 16), views and expectations of teachers are surprisingly not mentioned and included. As a result, the collected views of teacher professionalism do basically follow on the official line, but some of the views seems to be insightful, saying that “actively defending the autonomy of teachers in teaching” (code number 004_54, dated 4 March 2011c at http://www.dsej.gov.mo/~webdsej/www/dsejnews/eduplan/comment / comment1.php). Another identical view expresses that “apart from the government, school, teaching staff, the society should encourage the talent to join the teacher profession so as to strengthen the teaching team, teachers should acquire the appropriate social status. Parents and students should place the importance of teachers in discharging the teaching duties, care teachers so that teachers should get the due respect, and a respectful, appreciative and trustful teachers’ team should be constructed” (Ibid, code number 004_75, dated 4 March 2011c). To sum up, the fulfillment of instrumental and materialistic needs seems to be a part of teacher professionalism, but the Hong Kong’s experience mentioned in the previous sections has revealed that teachers without personal, professional and political empowerment are virtually and continuously marginalized and de-professionalized in school and policy settings despite the assignment of materialistic inducement. Critically examining the submission of major political and social groups, a divergence is attached in regard to the nature and working of teacher professionalism. The pro-Beijing CEA follows the official line and constructs an instrumental approach, with the aim not to empower teachers, but to fulfill the national development, noting that “the plan fails to address the concern of such national leaders as Premier Wen Jiabao on his expectations for Macao’s education. (The association) wishes to (revise the plan) according to the Framework of Mid- and Long-term Educational Reform, Development, and Planning of the Nation (2010–2020) and coordination with the Twelfth Five-Year Plan” (The Chinese Education Association, 2 March 2011). In other words, Macao’s education system should be planned and merged with the national educational and economic developments. However, the Civil Power,

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a local political group, thinks that the plan is economic-oriented and distorts the nature of school education, meaning that “the ultimate goal of education is narrowed to serve economic purposes. The value of school education would be undermined thoroughly. The government makes a future plan of the development of the non-higher education in the next decade and needs to clarify the fundamental meaning of education so that students (can) have moral obligations and care about society; that is the meaning of educating the people to be kind people (Jiaoren Shenren). We can only see as based on the text that the policies are economic-oriented, and are not planned from students’ perspective” (The Civil Power, 29 March 2011). While the CEA adopts the subordinate approach to view the local educational system and the Civil Power focuses more on clarifying the nature of education before undertaking the educational policies, both of them fails to address teacher professionalism, notably teacher empowerment in personal, political and policy dimensions, thereby demonstrating the underdevelopment of teacher professionalism despite the introduction to, and implementation of, the Ten-Year Plan for the Development of the Non-higher Education.

Conclusion: Revisiting the Nature of Teacher Professionalism This chapter pinpoints that Macao, like Hong Kong, exhibits the underdevelopment of teacher professionalism due to a multiplicity of factors, such as the inability of teachers to act as a collective interest group, the dominance of pro-government educational association, the hegemony of the educational bureaucracy, the top-down nature of educational policy making, and the structural constraint of a capitalist economy that places much emphasis on casino development. In 2004, Edmund Ho promised “promoting the educational reform from all aspects and gradually realizing educational modernization” in his statement during the second term election of the Chief Executive (Overseas Chinese Newspaper, 16 September

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2004, p. 13). Some Macao people thought that his statement was only a “show of reform” determination (Son Pou Daily, 26 June 2004, p. 6). In practice, educational modernization addresses not just the problem of the lack of material aspect of Macao’s education but also the fundamental reforms to revamp the system and its values. In particular, teacher professionalism can be regarded as an important indicator of Macao’s educational modernization and reformist values. To achieve any breakthrough in the process of grooming local talents in Macao rather than just depending on foreign, Hong Kong and mainland Chinese talents, the Macao government must liberate the local teachers in the long term, especially those at the high and primary school levels, in terms of their professional identity, status and autonomy. Above all, pseudo-professionalism can be seen in the MSAR and it arguably is proliferating with the enforcement of official hegemony, governmental manipulation and co-optation of educational groups, and weakness of the teaching profession itself. The MSAR’s top-down mode of educational policy making with insufficient inputs from teachers ought to be rectified so that substantial teacher professionalism will be achieved with effective enforcement of relevant rules to protect teachers’ interests and rights. This should also facilitate the transformation of the entire educational system, and the fulfillment of instrumental goals of improving local manpower crucial to sustaining balanced and diversified economic development in the long run. In this regard, the MSAR legislature’s 29 February 2012 approval of the government’s “System Framework for Private School Teaching of Non-tertiary Education” after many years’ consultation may be a positive step forward.

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Notes 1. Also, the efforts of Macao government during the Portuguese reign cannot be ignored in shaping the educational system. For example, Macao’s last governor Vasco Vieira promulgated the ordinance “Popularization and Priority of Free Education on 26 June 1995, which included “the free education of preparatory classes and six years in primary schools that are willing to join the government’s network schools.” However, inadequate deployment of the government expenditure and the less positive attitude of the government have remained the handicaps (Koo, 1998, p. 334; and Liu, 2004a). 2. About the educational development in Macao since the 1990s, refer to Su, 2003. 3. http://www.waou.com.mo/wa/2003/09/20030910a.htm, accessed on 23th November, 2009. 4. Ibid. 5. According to Liu (2004b), the sixth section of the article are “Improving the Professional Status of Teachers is the Central Task of Educational Group.” She said that “the vitality of teacher group is to reflect the will of teachers, realize the ideal of all teachers, maintain the benefits of all teachers, and take satisfying all needs of teachers as their work. Improving the professional status of teachers during the transition from old to new educational concepts and marching towards modernization are the missions of the era. Macao teachers take advantage of the time and location while unifying themselves to fight for and establish the professional status. The most important one is to get the support—including the solidarity of the education circle—and the sincere cooperation of educational groups, and the approval of parents. However, the paper does not specify who in which educational (or teaching) groups can fight for the benefits and improve the teaching status. Moreover, her assertion confused educational groups with teaching groups. For details, refer to http://www.schoolnet.edu.mo/msnvc/vc012/p15.htm (accessed on 26th September 2004); Wong (2007a, 2007b). 6. “Macao SRA Education System” Draft for Discussion” Advice Collection and Sorting Result,” at http://www.dsej.gov.mo/~webdsej/www/dsejnews/ 2003/edu_comment/consult1a.htm (accessed on 26 September 2004). 7. “Hong Kong media thinks that educational quality is more important than the budget”, “Chinese News Net”, at http://www1.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/SinoNews/Hongkong/2004_ 2_16_14_27_30_295.html (accessed on 27 September 2004). 8. As calculated by the international standard, the average ratio of educational budget in GDP in modern countries is 5.91905%, but only 3% in Macao. The average educational cost per capita in modern countries and regions was USD1357.397 in 1999, but only USD422.86 in

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao Macao (p. 113). 9. “Macao Special Administrative Region Education System” Draft for Discussion” Advice Collection and Sorting Results. Website: http://www.dsej.gov.mo/~webdsej/www/dsejnews/2003/edu_comment/con sult1a.htm (accessed on 26 September 2004). 10. Personal communication with Hei-lap Tai, November 18, 2009. Tai has been a former committee member of the Hong Kong Education Commission, a consultative body for Hong Kong’s education issues and development, and he is a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

References Chinese Education Association of Macau (2011, 2 March). Views and Suggestions for the Ten-year Plan for the Development of the Non-higher Education (in Chinese), from website: http://www.edum.org.mo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article &id= 98:2011-01-03-10-22-38&catid=66:2010-08-16-02-30-46. Cheng, K. M., & Wong Y. Y. (1997). Empowerment of the powerless through the politics of the apolitical: Teacher professionalisation in Hong Kong. In Biddle, B. J., Good, T. L., & Goodson, I. F. (Ed.), International Handbook of Teachers and Teaching, 1, 411–436. (1995). Code of Conduct for Education in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Council on Professional Conduct in Education. Civil Power (2011, 29 March). Submission of the Ten-year Plan for the Development of the Non-higher Education (in Chinese), from website: http://www.civil-power.org/?p=524. Kwan, K. K. (2003). “Human resource and human resource policy in Hong Kong and Macao”. In Yu, Z., Yu, Y., & Ho, H. W. (2003), Tale of two cities II – Political, economic and social development of Hong Kong and Macao after return. Macao: Macao Academy of Social Science, 349–366. Koo, D. Y. (1998). “The educational development in Hong Kong and Macao during the transition period”. In Yu, Z. (1998), Tale of two cities – Political, economic and social development in Hong Kong and Macao. Macao: Macao Academy of Social Science, 327–344. Liu, X. B. (2003). “Development and Cultural and Educational Policy of Gambling Industry in Macao”. Administration, 16 (59). Direcção dos Serviços de Educação e Juventude (Education and Youth Affairs Bureau) (2011a, January). Figures and Overview of Education Sector:

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Figures of Education Sector, 2010/2011 & Overview of Education Sector, 2009/2010 (in Chinese). Direcção dos Serviços de Educação e Juventude (Education and Youth Affairs Bureau) (2011b, July). Figures and Overview of Education Sector: Figures of Education Sector, 2010/2011 & Overview of Education Sector, 2009/2010 (in Chinese). Direcção dos Serviços de Educação e Juventude (Education and Youth Affairs Bureau) (2011c, January). The Consultation Paper of the Ten-year Plan for the Development of the Non-higher Education, 2011–2020: Collected Views and Results arising from Consultation (in Chinese), from website: http://www.dsej.gov.mo/~webdsej/www/dsejnews/eduplan/comment/com ment1.php. Pan, H. L., & Wang, L. Y. (2000). “Empowering teachers through Teachers’ Association”, paper presented at the Thirteenth Annual Conference of the International Congress for School Effectiveness and Improvement, Taipei, Taiwan, 4–7 January. Sachs, Judyth (2003). The Activist Teaching Profession. Buckingham: Open University Press. Su, C. F. (2003). “Clue of educational reform”. Administration, 16 (61). Sweeting, A. (1992). “Historical perspectives: The long march towards teacher professionalism in Hong Kong”. In Chincotta, D. M. (Ed.), Professionalization and education. Hong Kong: Faculty of Education, the University of Hong Kong, 1–40. Tung, C.H. (1997). The 1997 Policy Address: Building Hong Kong for a New Era. Hong Kong: Printing Department. Wong, W.K. (2005). “Teacher Professionalism in Macao: Dilemma and Prospect”, in Human Resource Development and Policy Protection. Macao: Macao Study Center, the University of Macau, 233–246. Wong, W. K. (2007a). Teacher Participation and Empowerment: The Cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Unpublished doctoral thesis. Hong Kong: Department of Politics and Public Administration, the University of Hong Kong. Wong, W. K. (2007b). “Teachers, Social Movements and Democratization: Cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan”, paper presented at the Annual General Meeting and Conference of Hong Kong Political Science Association, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong (December 1). Hong Kong media thinks that educational quality is more important than the budget. Retrieved 27 September, 2004, from Chinese News Net website: http://www1.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/SinoNews/Hongkong/2004_ 2_16_14_27_30_295.html. Liu, X. B. (2004a). Mobilize the social force and facilitate the educational development in Macao. Retrieved 22 September, 2004, from website: http://www.schoolnet.mo/msnvc/vc007/IB1301.HTM.

10. The Politics of Teacher Professionalism in Macao Liu, X. B. (2004b). Improving professional status of teachers is the central task of Educational Groups and mission of the era. Retrieved 26 September, 2004, from website: http://www.schoolnet.edu.mo/msnvc/vc012/p15.htm Macao Special Administrative Region Education System Draft for Discussion. “Advice Collection and Sorting Result”. Retrieved 26 September, 2004, from website: http://www.dsej.gov.mo/~webdsej/www/dsejnews/2003/edu_comment/con sult1a.htm. Citizen Daily Hong Kong Daily News Jornal Do Cidadao Jornal Va Kio Macao Daily Overseas Chinese Newspaper Son Pao Daily

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11 Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao Hayes H. H. TANG

Situated in a geographical reality with minimal natural resources, Macao has long relied on its human capital for social and economic development. Since the return of its administration and sovereignty to mainland China in December 1999, Macao has been accelerating its economic development against the tide of the dwindling export trade. In particular, Macao’s development has been focusing on the industries of tourism, gaming, hospitality and convention. Since the monopoly of casinos and gaming was opened up in 2001, foreign investment has transformed Macao into the world’s largest gaming center. 1 Amidst this gaming-driven development, the Macao workforce bears the characteristics of service-oriented and high reliance on non-local labor, including the higher education sector. According to recent Macao Special Administration Region (MSAR) government statistics, one-fourth (24.7%) of the workforce were in the sector of recreational, cultural, gaming and other services, with another 12.7% in hospitality and catering services. 2 Non-local workers constitute nearly one-third of the complete workforce.3 The high degree of dependence on non-local labor is due to the lack of highly-qualified staff in the local employment market. With merely one-fifth (20.7%) of the working population having higher educational qualifications, the senior management and professional positions are filled more by non-locals and their averaged incomes 265

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are far more than those of the Macao residents. 4 Under these circumstances, Macao has to upgrade its local workforce, especially the higher education, so as to maintain its economic competitiveness and sustain a knowledge-based economy. As the MSAR government realizes, upgrading the local workforce has become a strategic objective of Macao higher education since 2000. 5 Working with entrepreneurialism, as maintained by a government-commissioned consultation report, was the theme for advancing Macao’s higher education.6 Against the backdrop of massification of higher education and quests for educational credentials, education services offer a promising source of entrepreneurial opportunities and revenue for Macao economy. Macao is a destination that “pulls” students from mainland China for further studies opportunities. 7 The phenomenon will become more noteworthy given the further integration of Macao into the Pearl River Delta region. In the past decade, privatization was the trend of the expansion of Macao’s higher education. All of the five newly established institutions since 1997 are privately-run. Academic capitalism, which is defined as the utilization of capital to expand educational development and fulfill the objective of advancing economic development and competitiveness, has been on the rise in Macao. This phenomenon is particularly prominent in Macao’s higher education. This chapter examines the power relations between the state and the market in shaping the development of Macao’s higher education since its preparations for the 1999 handover of sovereignty to mainland China. The concept of “academic capitalism” is employed to make sense of the political configurations amid the stakeholders in the higher education sector. It discusses not only the ways in which academic capitalism has been jeopardizing the autonomy of Macao’s academic profession but also the concerted efforts of state officials and capitalists that steer the development of the higher education in Macao.

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Academic Capitalism: The Concept and Its Application The concept of “academic capitalism” is utilized in this chapter to help understand the increasing marketization of academic programs, the prevalence of private higher education institutions, the capitalization of knowledge and profit-driven academic activities within and beyond Macao’s higher education sector. Academic capitalism has a long history. Over half a century ago, sociologist Max Weber coined the term “state capitalist enterprises” to illustrate the academic disciplines of natural sciences and medicine.8 The notion of “academic capitalism” appeared in the literature during the 1990s. In Academic Capitalism and Literary Value, Harold Fromm labelled some literary critics who aimed at profiting material success, power and privilege as “academic capitalists,” a term with negative connotation. Sheila Slaughter and her colleagues probed the financial structure of four Anglo-Saxon higher education systems—Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States of America—and found that universities’ increasing ties with industry radically transformed the nature of scholarly work. They also found that intellectuals who wanted to perform in academia needed a deeper understanding of academic capitalism, especially the fact that the formation of “academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime” was an outcome of the reciprocal interactions between higher education institutions and the post-industrial economies. 9 Conceptually, Slaughter and Leslie admitted that “academic capitalism”10 has room for clarification and improvement.11 Some researchers comment that the concept of “academic capitalism” is built on a slack methodological ground and is fuzzy.12 They call for further efforts to strengthen the explanatory power and general utility of the concept. My elaborated definition and dimensions of “academic capitalism” are as follows: First, academic capitalism refers to the phenomenon that higher education institutions and academic units are increasingly operated as economic organizations. Within a higher education system, resources are allocated on the basis of performance rather than on the membership of academic units and individual intellectuals.

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Competitions are the “life-blood” in academia, as they are in capitalist economy. A market framework is developed to regulate the activities of knowledge production. Like a typical market framework, in academic capitalism there are on one side supply of educational services, research and knowledge products, consultancy and knowledge-based services, as well as demands from knowledge consumers and knowledge users on the other side. The market is differentiated into the market for students (consumer market) and the market for academics (labor market). The two markets are highly influenced by the institutional market. “Institutional market” refers to the quests for performance, prestige and reputation among students and scholars. More often the mobility of both pupils and teachers are from a less attractive place to a more attractive one. Wide-reaching quest for talents and brains becomes a global phenomenon, by ways of highly competitive academic salaries and remuneration packages for scholars, and attractive scholarship and stipend for students. Knowledge and education are becoming less a public good but increasingly “capitalized”. 13 Through globalization the market framework is further open, competitions are intensified, and cross-border capitalist academic activities are more a commonplace. Second, an ideology of academic capitalism legitimates the domination of university managerialism and inequalities between the privileged groups and their disadvantaged counterparts in academia. The ideology constitutes the “superstructure” of an academic enterprise and indoctrinates a new understanding on academic excellence, which is redefined as excelling in the academic game by accumulating profits and prestige. Different institutional support (funding and manpower) for academic units and individual academics represents the social returns on their contributions. The academic capitalism ideology induces profound changes in the meanings and ideals of academic autonomy and freedom. Academic freedom has more to do with the freedom to perform and excel in a liberal academic system than with the high calling of intellectuals to speak truth to the powerful. The academic capitalism ideology blinds academia members to the contradictions in capitalist society, and to their mission to pursue social justice for the people. Third, academic capitalism further empowers the bureaucracy

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao

of academic enterprises. In the name of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, administrators of higher education tighten the control and coordination of resources allocation, curriculum and research agenda (strategic research planning). There is an increasing lack of academic staff’s involvement in the decision making process. The phenomenon of having more appointed academic deans and top-down management is prevalent. Managerialism as such is justified by the issue of “accountability,” whether to the government, private sponsors, the general public or students. University administration imposes the laissez-faire principles and formulates pro-competition policies in their institutions so as to provide the conditions conducive to the operations of capital accumulation in the economy. Market forces are allowed to enter the academe to shape the future of higher learning, to determine the career prospects of individual scholars and to achieve the goal of advancing growth and competitiveness in the capitalist economy. As this paper will shows, Macao can be used as a case study to illuminate these features of academic capitalism.

Political Configurations of Higher Education and Academic Capitalism The political configurations of academic capitalism can be understood by borrowing the ideas by Burton Clark on the power coordination among the state, market and academic profession in higher education systems. Clark formulates three “ideal types” of systems that locate the centrality of authority in different national higher education sectors.14 The three ideal types are namely the state system, the market system and the academic/professional system. Putting the three systems at each corner of a triangular conceptual space (as shown in figure 1) whereas the corners resemble the extreme of one, the framework illustrates the forms of authority that pull in different directions. The resultant position in the triangle locates the centrality of authority of a particular higher education system. In actuality, power relations in every higher education

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system are a resultant of combinations of three forms of authority in varying degrees. At the top corner of the triangle, we have an extreme form of state authority over affairs of higher education. With unitary state coordination, policy goals are uniformly set and planned, problems are commonly defined, and all solutions are centrally decided. The formal higher education structure is tightly-regulated and inclusive. The totality of power originates in the state, but at the discretion of state policy, power can be passed into selected capitalists and some prominent scholars who are more than often pro-regime. In the Greater China area that is composed of mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, the higher education of mainland China demonstrates the characteristics of a state-led model. In line with the spirit of its planned economy, the mainland Chinese higher education system holds the strongest form of state coordination. At the other end of the conceptual triangle is the sole coordination by the “invisible hand” of market forces. Unlike the state-led model, there are no inclusive goals in the pure academic marketplace. Academic higher education initiatives are taken on the basis of “social choice”, which refers to “a resultant of actions and competitive interactions of autonomous organizations, rather than a solution to common problems.” 15 The characteristics of Taiwan higher education system share the attributes of this market model. In view of massification of higher education since the late 1990s, the number of tertiary education institutions proliferated and more than seventy per cent of them are privately-run. Taiwan’s democratic development provides checks and balances against possible state-capitalist cooperation from intervening in higher education affairs. This is contrasted with the marketization of Macao’s higher education, which is more shaped by the government-capitalist collaborative power, the personalization of politics, and the lack of checks and balances against the non-democratic government. Lastly, at the bottom corner lies the academic/professional system. In the professional model where academic autonomy is valued and protected to the fullest extent, higher education institutions are funded mainly by the government. Decision-making is based on the professional expertise of academics, whereas the distribution of power and resources is based on academics’

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao

representation and their membership in the academia. One example is United Kingdom in the classical time, namely before state power increased in the 1960s. Academics were protected from the influence of the market and the state by a buffer body, namely the University Grant Committee. Basically run by prominent scholars, the Committee upheld its mission to defend the intact value of both university autonomy and individual academic freedom. Academic quality was maintained through peer reviews by experts in the academic profession. Therefore the main authority in the professional higher education model was regarded as the form of academic power, in a way of “taking the government’s money without taking orders from the government’s officials.”16 If the state coordination of higher education is weak, the academic profession can modulate state-initiated rules. Take the case of Hong Kong. Its government does not have concrete long term higher education policies. The influential mass media offers checks and balances against the government from time to time, and to safeguard the rule of law, which is one of the Hong Kong’s core value although Hong Kong is not a Western-style democracy. Along with the buffer body of the University Grant Council, which has been inherited since the colonial time,17 the mostly publicly-funded Hong Kong academic profession is comparatively less affected by market forces and interventions by the government. 18 In a comparative but not a normative sense, Hong Kong can perhaps be located at the bottom of the conceptual triangle, a position closer to the corner of “academic autonomy”. For Macao, the centrality of the authority of its higher education system lies comparatively far from the ideal professional model, as this paper will discuss below. There is no buffer body to protect the autonomy of its academic profession, and the reviews of academic quality and the monitoring of higher education policies are far from developed. The concerted efforts by the state officials and business leaders contribute to the dynamics of academic capitalism in the MSAR.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Figure 1. Academic Capitalism in Greater China: Locating the Centrality of Authority of Various Higher Education Systems

State Authority/ Government Intervention

Mainland China Macao Market Taiwan

Hong Kong

Academic Autonomy Source: Author (modified from ‘The Triangle of Coordination’ by Clark, 1983, p.143).

Macao can be regarded as a small city-state. In comparison with the situations in large states, the forces that shape education in small states are different. 19 The reasons are two-folded. Economically speaking, given the minimal availability of other resources, human resources are comparatively on greater demands. A small-state economy tends to be more open to new opportunities with an entrepreneurial spirit. Yet the remarkable difference is that the mechanisms of free market in small states do not function as well as they do in large states. Because of its scale, the small internal market can hardly sustain a rigorously competitive system. The power of coordination by the market in small states is weak. Godfrey Baldacchino explains it as the “big fish in a small pond” syndrome.20 In terms of governance and public administration, they are easily affected by local politics and influences of the more powerful states. Internally there is high personalization in the policy-making processes. 21 Claims and decisions made by

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao

individuals, especially those from powerful group, are rarely checked and challenged in small states. This is more the case if the small state is not a Western-style democracy that is characterized by a rotation of political power and the election of the chief executive by citizens through universal suffrage. Paul Sutton argues that because of the high personalization in small societies, private institutions can acquire public funding through their connections with senior officials.22

Market Forces in Macao’s Higher Education The history of Macao’s higher education is less than thirty years, where a “modern” university had long been absent until 1981. Small population, as one of the key characteristics of small states or city-states, is one of the factors unfavorable to public investment of government’s investment on higher education. The concern of Macao’s Portuguese colonial government for higher education was lukewarm. The colonial government usually encouraged sending students across the border for university education. The diversity of high school systems (for example Portugal, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and America) complicated any possible initiatives to establish the first university. Therefore the establishment of the first university in 1981, namely the University of East Asia (UEA), was neither a venture by the Portuguese Macao government nor an initiative from the private sector of Macao. Instead, the UEA establishment came from a group of some Hong Kong business leaders whose concern was to further the study opportunities of Hong Kong’s young people. As the private provision of education disagreed with the prevailing educational philosophy of Hong Kong colonial government,23 the UEA founders approached the Macao government and it supported the UEA proposal with a land grant. That venture was realized despite the fact that the mission of the University was to serve external students from Hong Kong, mainland China and Malaysia, and that its medium of instruction was English. The founding of the first modern university in Macao as a private entity reflected the education philosophy of Portuguese administration. Such a

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philosophy would shape the future marketization of higher education in the MSAR. Regarding the provisions of educational service, Macao is adopting the strategy of diversified provision by various types of higher education institutions. Privatization has become the trend for the expansion of Macao’s higher education starting from the 1990s. As shown in Table 1, there are four public higher education institutions and six private-run institutions in Macao. Instead of merging the smaller institutions with their counterparts of larger size, the diversification of institutional types is sustained and so are their provisions. The existing ten institutions are of very different sizes and shapes, ranging from a small nursing college with 270 students to universities with size of more than 8,000 students. Recently most of the institutions have substantially expanded their bachelor’s programs: they are University of Saint Joseph, University of Science and Technology, Millennium College, Asia International Open University and Institute for Tourism Studies. Four out of these five institutions are private institutions. 24 Private institutions are as active as their public counterparts in Macao’s development of its higher education. The proportion of students registered at private institutions accelerated from 39.5% (of the total student population) in 1999/2000 to 67.4% in 2008/2009. In a decade’s time the actual student registrations experienced more than a six-fold expansion from 3,385 students to 21,059 students.25 Amid the globalization of knowledge-based economies, education services offer a very promising source of entrepreneurial opportunities and revenue for an economy. Privatization in fact serves also as a form of strategic development for higher education’s expansion across the region of Asia.26 Macau’s universities take an active role in this regard. In March 2011, the Macau University of Science and Technology co-hosted a “University Presidents Forum” with private universities in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan for collaborations and strategic planning for the cross-border higher education development in Asia-pacific region. The forum was well-received by presidents from more than 20 Asian private universities and well-supported by the MSAR government.27

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao Table 1. Public/Private Divide in Macao’s Higher Education Institutions Institution

Founding Year

Operation Mode

Institutional Type

University of Macau (formerly University of East Asia)

1991 (1981)

Public (Private)

Comprehensive

Macau Security Force Superior School

1988

Public

Vocational/ Professional

Macau Polytechnic Institute

1991

Public

Comprehensive

City University of Macau (formerly Asia International Open University)

2011 (1992)

Private

Comprehensive

Institute for Tourism Studies

1995

Public

Vocational/ Professional

University of Saint Joseph

1996

Private

Comprehensive

Kiang Wu Nursing College of Macau

1999

Private

Vocational/ Professional

Macau University of Science & Technology

2000

Private

Comprehensive

Macau Institute of Management

2000

Private

Vocational/ Professional

Macau Millennium College

2001

Private

Comprehensive

Nationally, Macao is especially a destination of further studies opportunities for students from mainland China. As shown in the educational statistics for the school year 2008 and 2009, more than half (52%) of the student population were from places outside Macao whereas local citizens constituted the remaining 48% (Table 2). More specifically, non-local students outnumber the locals in doctorate programs, master’s programs and postgraduate diploma programs. Macao’s postgraduate programs are attractive to mainland graduates who wish to work and reside in Macao after graduation, and those who may treat Macao as a “springboard” for overseas education in a later stage. Among the ten institutions, four are providing postgraduate programs, including doctoral programs. The Macau University of Science and Technology has been the most responsive to the continual increase of doctorate students by accommodating about 70% of students at that level. Taking advantage of most of the entrepreneurial opportunities

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for the sake of increased revenue and hence expansion of the higher Table 2. Registered Non-Local Students in Macao’s Higher Education, 2000–2009 Academic Year

Registered Non-Local students Number

Percentage

2000/01

12,749

44.6%

2001/02

22,571

65.6%

2002/03

29,152

67.6%

2003/04

30,257

56.6%

2004/05

26,324

57.5%

2005/06

25,448

54.6%

2006/07

25,907

53.0%

2007/08

27,374

52.5%

2008/09

31,249

52.0%

Source: Macao Higher Education Data Bank at http://www.gaes.gov.mo/MHEDB/stat_main.asp ,accessed on March 12, 2010.

education, Macao needs to be strategic in its student recruitment. Bray and others in a government-commissioned report recommended that financial subsidies should be offered for students in strategic disciplines and from strategic location.28 Strategic areas of study were to be identified whereas other areas, for instance medicine and dentistry, should be left to external providers. During the academic year 2006/2007, 57.4% of the total students enrolled in the studies of Business, Management or Gaming Management, 10.3% in Tourism and Entertainment (being the second largest), but there were only 0.2% studied Humanities, which remains perhaps the least popular subject in Macao. In a 2008 country report to the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Macao Tertiary Education Services Office addressed the questions of revising higher education regulations for more flexible systems (for example, credit unit system and double-degree system) and establishing the Tertiary Education Fund for students’ financial aid with a view to attracting more students to study in Macao.29 Professor Sou Chio Fai, the newly appointed director of

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao

Tertiary Education Services Office in March 2011, responded positively to the calling for scholarship assisting Guangdong students to pursue higher education in Macao. 30 The Macao government also endeavors to solve the drops-out problem (which is rather unusual in other higher education systems) and to increase the attractiveness of its higher education institutions as the first choice for high school graduates, especially male students. The closer link between the university sector and the business world is also shown by the increasing donations by capitalists through philanthropy. From 2007 to 2008, the Venetian, a luxury hotel and casino resort owned by the Las Vegas Sands Corporation, gave the University of Macau a total of MOP650,000 twice for setting up new scholarship and fellowship program at the University. It was the largest donation the University ever received from a single sponsor. On top of that, in May 2008 this university-capitalist partnership signed an agreement to establish the 1,435-square-metre advanced education centre named as “Adelson Advanced Education Centre of University of Macau” at the company’s casino-hotel complex in Cotai. Under the patron-client relationship,31 University of Macau is responsible for running professional training program in the area of hospitality, entertainment and retail.32 It is anticipated that, to better finance more higher education activities, more university-business cooperation will be forged in the future. Academic capitalism is becoming intensified in Macao.

Government Intervention and Government-Capitalist Co-optation Apart from the direct involvement of the business sector in higher education affairs, the government can also indoctrinate and reinforce academic capitalism indirectly, through introducing pro-competition policy, privatization and government-capitalist co-optations. This section chronicles the history of government intervention in Macao’s higher education, discusses the recent government-capitalist co-optations in academic capitalism, and critically discusses their consequences.

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Notwithstanding the Portuguese administration’s lukewarm attitude toward education, higher education in Macao has been increasingly politicized since the territory’s preparation for the return of sovereignty to the People’s Republic of China in the late 1990s. This politicization was facilitated by the lack of professional autonomy of the academics and the absence of unionism among the Macao academic profession since the colonial era. The personalization of politics of small states is arguably a hallmark of academic capitalism in Macao’s higher education. The trace of government invention in higher education can be found soon after the Sino-Portuguese Declaration in 1987. From a tepid attitude toward the investment in higher learning, the Macao government became more proactive in employing higher education as an apparatus for its future political development of the city-state.33 One year after the signing of the Joint Declaration, the Macao government purchased the University of East Asia and changed its operation model from profit-making entity into a public-funded organization. The faculties of Law and Education were opened to offer programs in line with the political and economic development of the future special administrative region. The Macau Security Force Superior School was set up in 1988 to train security personnel for the revision. Regarding the curriculum structure, the University of Macau was transformed from a three-year program (which corresponds to the British model adopted by Hong Kong and Malaysia, the long term consumers of UEA service) to a four-year program that suits the mainland and Portuguese systems. Explicitly renaming of the university to “University of Macau” in 1991 implied the transformation of its vision from providing educational services for the overseas students of Hong Kong, Malaysia and elsewhere in East Asia to catering for local concerns. The original Polytechnic College of the University of East Asia was also separated to form an independent institution named Macau Polytechnic Institute. The focus was to provide training for professionals in Macao’s economy and for the region’s human resource development. Its curriculum was changed to the four-year Portuguese model. As a common practice in the higher education sector worldwide, regime intervention in higher education is ushered in under the

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao

banner of achieving quality assurance. Because the operations and their courses of Macao’s higher education were reported to be relatively “weak,” one consultancy paper recommended in 2001 that the Macao government should play the role of monitoring and underpinning the quality. 34 Several perspectives on quality improvements were suggested: achieving fitness for purpose, excellence, innovativeness, meeting the needs of stakeholders and public, accountability, and adopting value-added measures. External quality assurance mechanisms are so far not the commonplace. The MSAR government, as indicated in a 2008 UNESCO report, planned that it would appoint an independent institute to evaluate the quality of the ten Macao higher education institutions in reference to internationally recognized standards. The Institute of Tourism Studies is the first institution adopting an external quality assurance mechanism. In 2000, the Institute was accredited by the Tourism Education Quality (TedQual) administered by the United Nations World Tourism Organization.35 In recognition of its quality of administration and performance in environmental protection, the University of Macau (a public institution) acquired ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 in May 2008.36 On top of quality assurance, the MSAR government is actively participating in the higher education planning in aspects of academic internationalization and capacity building in research expertise and the academic profession. Being a former colony of Portugal, the MSAR government promotes linkages and networking of Macao higher education institutions with the Portuguese-speaking countries to intensify the internationalization of Macao higher education. In 2008, there were 80 projects of collaboration with the Lusophone countries and 62 projects with European countries other than Portugal. 37 The government encourages the use of English for teaching and research. At present English is the official medium of instruction at University of Macau, the Institute for Tourism Studies and Saint Joseph University. Regarding the regime-led capacity building initiatives, there are plans to establish a research grant commission and to conduct research assessment exercise. The aims are to increase research linkages, collation and dissemination of research as well as publications. Top-down management style is the feature of Macao’s academic capitalism.

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Yet, the personalization of politics in small states may make government intervention in higher education dangerous, especially in a non-democracy like Macao. The Frontline Magazine exposes the patron-client politics inside the Macao University of Science and Technology (MUST). 38 Given its official status as a private institution, MUST is less monitored by the government and less accountable to the public. Still, it enjoys very close ties with government officials and business leaders. Edmund Ho, the first MSAR Chief Executive (1999–2009), was the University’s Honorary Chancellor. Liu Chak Wan, the Chancellor, also an Executive Council member and a Macao deputy of China’s National People’s Congress, was a close business partner with Ho. MUST was allocated a 150,000-square-meters plot of government land (twice University of Macau’s size but less than a third of land used). Some MSAR legislators queried the allocation of two funding schemes (Macao Foundation and Macao Technology and Development Fund) that appear to favor the applicants from MUST.39 In 2009 Macao Foundation was publicly criticized for favoring pro-regime and pro-Beijing bodies in its funds allocation. An academic corruption case on a cross-border MBA program even aroused the attention of the PRC Ministry of Education that eventually investigated the case. Lacking rigorous quality control over higher educational development and funding allocation, Macao’s higher education sector has witnessed a convenient exchange of academic credentials for tuition fees payment, particularly from mainland students who now can afford to pay MUST’s relatively high tuition fees. Criticized as a “diploma mills”, MUST can confer a degree in around one week in exchange for a fee of USD 10,000.40 At the University of Macau, the MSARS flagship university, there is a planned spring 2013 relocation to a brand new and much bigger campus on Hengqin Island (in Zhuhai out of the Macao’s territory). This plan did generate heated public debates. However the USD 769 million new campus construction plan, which allows 20 times the existing campus space for university development, was so highly regarded by the Beijing that PRC President Hu Jintao officiated the ground-breaking ceremony of the new Hengqin campus on 19 December 2009 during his visit to celebrate in the

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao

MSAR’s tenth anniversary. On the MSAR’s strategic development, Hu restated the imperative of improving the educational system to nurture different kinds of talents to diversify the economy. This point was reiterated by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao who visited Macao in 2010. Hence, current MSAR Chief Executive Fernando Chui sees the Hengqin campus project as an initiative for closer regional integration in Guangdong under the “Reform of the Pearl River Delta Region Development Plan”. To realize Hu’s expectations, University of Macau Rector Wei Zhao implements plans across the institution to make it an internationally recognized institution in China. The land and financial resources infused by the national and MSAR governments provide facilities and necessitated hardware for the University of Macau to scale new heights. Of much greater significance is the software component, the academic profession that is at the heart of a university.

Academic Profession, Professional Autonomy and MSAR Academic Capitalism Under the sweeping influence of capitalists in Macao’s society, economy and politics, as well as increasing state intervention in higher education affairs, the professional autonomy of Macao’s academics has become a genuine social concern.41 Despite the fact that the academic profession of Macao increased in size, its demographic structure and nature of employment put the academics’ autonomy at stake. Illustrated in Figure 2, the size of the Macao’s academic workforce underwent a 42.2% growth from 824 in 1999/2000 to 1,951 in 2008/2009. According to MSAR Statistics and Census Service (2007–2008 data), more than half of the academic staff (53.8%) working on part-time basis and only one-fifth (21.1%) were local-born whereas nearly half (44.2%) were born in mainland China and 14% were born in Hong Kong. In Macao’s academic profession, there is a lack of local-born talents for local socio-economic development. Due to a persistent lack of local talents, the dependence of Macao’s higher education sector on other capitalist societies for the import of talents, especially Hong Kong,

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has been inevitable since the establishment of the UEA. Mark Bray has found that university administrators advocate academic mobility, rather than sustaining a stable academic workforce, as desirable for a higher education system in the small state.42 The reason is that they lack a holistic vision of integration with local society to develop the social and educational strength. On Macao, Bray quoted a University of Macau senior administrator who thought that local scholars who had many personal connections in Macao society hesitated to take the managerial actions of disciplining and firing. As such, the “outsider” academics, especially those retiring non-local academics, were deliberately recruited to fill management positions43 and to make decisions on dismissals and penalties on some academics. This tendency of Macao was in conformity with the personalization issue in small states. As in 1999/2000, the proportion of Macao citizens in the academic profession was more than double that of the non-citizens. Yet since 2004/2005 through 2008/2009 the two groups reached similar sizes (Figure 2). A gender imbalance (32.1% females and 67.9% males) is also found in Macao’s academic profession. Figure 2. Size and Citizenship of the Macao’s Academic Workforce, 1999–2009

Source: Macao Higher Education Data Bank

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao

Meanwhile there has yet an institutional mechanism in place to protect the professional autonomy of academics, although managerialism was on the rise. Tenure system is not commonplace in Macao’s higher education institutions and hence academic freedom becomes highly vulnerable. Take the case of the University of Macau, the first and one of the foremost universities, the first appointment of its new academics is at maximum for a period of three years. The appointment may be further extended or renewed by mutual consent by a maximum of five years. Yet given a three-month advance unilateral notice—either by the University or the appointee, the contract will be terminated. 44 Through the termination of employment contracts, academics who challenge the powerful groups may have their career security threatened by the university administration. The case can be worsened as Macao is not a Western-style democracy and its government is by no means truly accountable to the people. State intervention in higher education by a non-accountable government can be highly problematic.45 On the contrary, protecting the academic freedom and maintaining the professional autonomy of academics are arguably conducive to democratic development and societal benefits.

Changes and Continuities in Post-colonial Macao Higher Education, 2000–2009 In the midst of continued growth and expansion in both student populations and academic workforce (Table 3), the profound change of Macao’s higher education sector in the decade 2000–2009 was the government’s entrepreneurial vision about education and training. Stated explicitly in the Policy Address at the turn of the new century, the MSAR Chief Executive highlighted that: “We also hope that citizens will make a greater effort in their respective sectors, and contribute to the constant raising of standards within society at large by pursuing education, training and practice. …we are aware that the enterprising spirit and efforts of entrepreneurs and

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the population in general constitute the main driving force for developing society and a market economy.”46 This statement reveals the spirit embracing an array of policy initiatives that continue to shape the future of Macao’s higher education in the 21st century.47 The policy changes and initiatives can be scrutinized as: 1. Promotion of education and training for an enhancement of economic competitiveness of the labor force; 2. Intensification profession;

of

professionalism

of

the

teaching

3. Quest for research excellence; and 4. Promotion of academic entrepreneurship and technology transfer. Table 3. Higher Education Development in Macao, 1999–2009 Academic Year

Number of Registered Students

Academic Staff

2000/01

12,749

939

2001/02

22,571

1,152

2002/03

29,152

1,164

2003/04

30,257

1,229

2004/05

26,324

1,521

2005/06

25,448

1,571

2006/07

25,907

1,725

2007/08

27,374

1,826

2008/09

31,249

1,951

Source: Macao Higher Education Data Bank

Promotion of Education and Training for Labor Force Competitiveness Enhancement According to the 2001 MSAR Policy Address, economic globalization gives rise to economic integration nationally and regionally, and results in increasingly intensified competition. As a

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao

liberal and open capitalist economy, Macao is inevitably affected by the surrounding international macroclimate. 48 With dynamism, vigor and integration of science and technology, information, innovation and management, the MSAR government keeps its posture of being proactive and entrepreneurial to meet the challenges in the new century’s knowledge-based economy. Various institutes launched courses and training programs in support of development of Macao’s key industries.49 Since 2001 the MSAR government also continued its efforts to create a comprehensive recurrent education system and promote continuing education. This catered to the top-priority goal, as in the regime agenda, of increasing Macao’s employment rate. Financial resources allocated to vocational training were increased to offer training courses with standardized curriculums to job seekers, who were able to upgrade their education level and sharpen their competitive edge prior to entering the marketplace. The aims of these policy initiatives are to “align the content of training with the appraisal of skills, to strengthen and promote the recognition of professional qualifications, and establish institutional frameworks and processes that will enhance the competitiveness of the local workforce.”50 Prior to becoming the second MSAR Chief Executive in December 2009, Fernando Chui revealed the plan of his team to encourage workers in Macao’s casinos to pursue higher education aiming at promotion to managerial ranks.51 In his 2011 Policy Address, Chui announced that every Macao citizens aged 15 or above would receive a three years’ subsidy for continuing education, with a maximum of MOP5,000 per applicant.52 In March 2011, Professor Sou Chio Fai became the new director of the Tertiary Education Services Office (GAES) appointed. Reporting for duty, Professor Sou plans at the outset of his tenure is to work on the legal, financial and administrative aspects of Macao higher education, specifically enhancement of Higher Education Ordinance, establishment of Higher Education Fund (for continuing education), and restructuring of the GAES.53 In a career fair at MUST participated by more than sixty companies from mainland China and Macao, Professor So also expressed that Macao graduates should broaden their horizons to embrace the opportunities and challenges made

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

available by Agreement”.54

“Guangdong-Macao

Co-operation

Framework

Intensification of Professionalism of the Teaching Profession For the advancement of Macao higher education, the 2004 Policy Address identified the critical need to recruit internationally acclaimed scholars on solid basis of the existing teaching force. There is also a need to create an academic and cultural atmosphere on the Macao higher education campuses that is centered on elite academics. Students can then benefit from the influence of distinguished professors in a scholarly environment. Enhancement of teachers, in general, is of utmost importance in the educational reform efforts. Hence on-the-job training that reinforces current teachers, and recruitment exercises that seek high-caliber intellectuals from inside and outside Macao were in place.55 The Government also endeavored to increase the quality of education by improving teacher training via education faculty in universities, with a view to aligning local education more with the needs of Macao society. Further the MSAR Government aimed to raise teachers’ pride in their professionalism by encouraging them to honor their duties and upgrade their abilities in serving Macao citizens with premier professional services.56

Quest for Research Excellence Research excellence was introduced in the new century’s higher education goal. The MSAR government encouraged teachers to advance their teaching with research, and supported establishments of research centers, research institutes and various institutes of higher learning. The government also aroused students’ interest in research activities and motivated them to participate in academic research.

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao

Promotion of Academic Entrepreneurship and Technology Transfer With the restructuring of the MSAR Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation, entrepreneurs, specialists and experts were consulted regarding policies concerning science and technology. In the 2005 Policy Address, the MSAR government directed the higher education institutions should invest resources in forming partnerships with non-governmental academic bodies, engaging in both timely and long-term strategic development issues. Cooperation with private institutions should be expanded for the sake of contributing to the development of Macao. On top of that, the Science and Technology Development Fund encouraged innovation and the popularization of scientific knowledge.57 All in all, the promotion of professional and vocational training, intensification of academic professionalism, sponsorship for research excellence and quest for academic entrepreneurship and technology transfer offer an assortment of entrepreneurial opportunities for higher education institutions to scale new heights. In the decade of 1999–2009, private institutions were more engaging than pubic institutions in response to the available opportunities. In light of education provision for students, public institutions catered more students than their private counterparts (1.5 times: 5,091 vis-à-vis 3,385) in 1999/2000. But along the expansion of Macao’s higher education since 2000, private institutions outperformed in opening new programs and recruiting new students. As in 2008/2009 number of students registered in private institutions (21,059) were more than double (2.1 times) of those registered in public institutions (10,190). The situations are uncovered below in Figure 3.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

Figure 3. Expansion of Student Population in Macao’s Higher Education

Source: Macao Higher Education Data Bank

In table 4, we can see the growth of student enrollments of individual institutions in post-colonial Macao. Shown distinctly, the top three high-growth institutions of over 80% are all privately-run institutes, namely Macau University of Science & Technology (665.8%), Saint Joseph University (499.4%) and Macau Institute of Management (404.3%). Privatization and high performance of private institutions, a change started in 2000s, are likely to become a new continuity in the decades ahead. The pattern is further consolidated with acceleration of economic globalization, progression of knowledge-based economy, the rise of China’s and Asian economies, as well as increasing dominance of academic capitalism. Quite apparently, the result is in an intensification and advancement of academic capitalism.

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao Table 4. Student Population in Macao’s Higher Education Institutions, 2000–2009 2008/09

2000/01

Growth

Public Institutions University of Macau

6316

3223

96.0%

Macau Security Force Superior School

52

23

126.1%

Macau Polytechnic Institute

2695

2020

33.4%

Institute for Tourism Studies

1127

233

383.7%

Asia International Open University

10183

5480

85.8%

University of Saint Joseph

1049

175

499.4%

Kiang Wu Nursing College of Macau

259

273

-5.1%

Macau University of Science & Technology

8768

1145

665.8%

Macau Institute of Management

474

94

404.3%

Macau Millennium College

326

242#

34.7%

Private Institutions

Source: Macao Higher Education Data Bank # This is the 2002/03 figure as Macau Millennium College was established in 2001.

Concluding Remarks Through the mechanism of government-business collaboration in the development of academic capitalism, Macao’s academic autonomy is arguably quite limited. In a non-democratic setting where the government’s higher education policy is driven by the objectives of achieving economic growth, serving the casino economy and accelerating capital accumulation, Macao’s higher education is

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characterized by a relatively small-scale market vulnerable to political influences, the personalization of politics that favors the government-business alliance in shaping the policies of higher education, and the threats posed to academic autonomy. The situations are becoming more problematic in Macao as it is a small city-state punctuated by the centralization of political power, the relatively embryonic rule of law, the comparatively insufficient checks and balances against the government by political groups and the mass media, and the virtual absence of academic unionism. The continual development and deepening of academic capitalism in Macao will likely undermine the autonomy of the academic profession, whereas the prospect of academic freedom will be highly dubious, especially if any academic who would like to espouse views critical of the government and Beijing. Unless the Macao academics develop a collective consciousness and rally to defend their academic ideals and professional autonomy—a situation that is unlikely given their fragmented nature and diverse interests—universities in Macao will be mainly regarded by the regime and political elites in power as a place selling diplomas, fulfilling the objective of capitalist accumulation, and playing an instrumental role of achieving economic development without a comprehensive approach to developing the higher education sector.

Notes 1. Gabinete de Apoio ao Ensino Superior (GAES), Documentation provided for the Country Report to the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Sub-regional Preparatory Conference for the 2009 World Conference on Higher Education, Macao: September 25–26, 2008. Bangkok, UNESCO. 2. Direccao dos Servicos de Estatistica e Census Website material, http://www.dsec.gov.mo/, retrieved September, 2008. 3. Ibid. 4. K.R.B. Morrison, Higher Education in Macau. Country report to UNESCO, presented at the UNESCO Asia-Pacific regional preparatory conference for the 2009 world conference on higher education, Macao (2008).

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao 5. Gabinete de Apoio ao Ensino Superior (GAES) (2008). Documentation provided for the Country Report to the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Sub-regional Preparatory Conference for the 2009 World Conference on Higher Education, Macao: September 25–26, 2008. Bangkok, UNESCO. 6. Bray, M., Butler, R., Hui, P.K.F., Kwo, O.W.Y. and Mang, E.W.L., Higher Education in Macao: Strategic Development for the New Era. Consultation document prepared for the Macao SAR government. January, 2001. 7. Li, M., Cross-border Higher Education of Mainland Chinese Students: Hong Kong and Macao in a Globalizing Market. Ph. D. thesis. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong (2006). 8. E.J. Hackett, “Science as a Vocation in the 1990s: The Changing Organizational Culture of Academic Science,” The Journal of Higher Education, 61 (3), (1990), pp. 241–279, quoted from S. Slaughter and L.L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 8. 9. Slaughter, S. and Rhoades, G., Academic capitalism and the new economy. (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2004). 10. According to Slaughter and Leslie, “academic capitalism” was defined as “the way public research universities were responding to neoliberal tendencies to treat higher education policy as a subset of economic policy.” S. Slaughter and L.L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 154. 11. S. Slaughter and L.L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 12. Deem, R., “Globalisation, New managerialism, Academic Capitalism and Entrepreneurialism in University,” Comparative Education, 37(1), (2001), pp.7-20; and Tang, H.H.H., “Academic Entrepreneurialism and Its Related Concepts: A Review of the Literature,” Research Studies in Education, 7, (2009), pp. 42–49. 13. Etzkowitz, H., Capitalizing Knowledge: New Intersections of Industry and Academia. (New York: SUNY Press, 1998). 14. B.R. Clark, The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-national Perspective, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 136. 15. E.C. Banfield, Political Influence, (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1961), pp. 326–327; quoted from B.R. Clark, The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-national Perspective, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 137. 16. B.R. Clark, The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-national Perspective, (Berkeley: University of California Press,

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century 1983), p. 141. 17. The University Grants Committee in Hong Kong was set up according to the suggestions made by the Hong Kong Legislative Council during the 1964 Budget Debate. It was recommended that a committee similar to the British University Grants Committee should be set up in Hong Kong to advise the Hong Kong Government on the facilities, development and financial needs of universities in the territory. With principles and practices based on the British model, the Committee was formally appointed in October 1965. In light of the needs of the Hong Kong community, these principles and practices have been adapted over the years with reference to the situations of Hong Kong (information retrieved from http://www.ugc.edu.hk on March 15, 2010). 18. For example, Postiglione and Tang (2008) find that more than half (53.8%) of the Hong Kong academics agree that the administration of their institution supports academic freedom (p. 241). 19. M. Bray and O.W.Y. Kwo, “Higher Education in Small Territories: Political Transition and Development in Macao,” Asia Pacific Education Review, 3(2), (2002), pp. 184–196. 20. Baldacchino, G.. Human Resource Management Strategies for Small Territories: An Alternative Proposition. International Journal of Educational Development, 21(3), 205–215. 2001 21. Sutton, P., “Political aspects,” in D. Clarke and T. Payne (eds.) Politics, Security and Development in Small States, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1997), pp.3–25; and M. Bray and O.W.Y. Kwo, “Higher Education in Small Territories: Political Transition and Development in Macao,” Asia Pacific Education Review, 3(2), (2002), pp. 184–196. 22. Sutton, P., “Political aspects,” in D. Clarke and T. Payne (eds.) Politics, Security and Development in Small States, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1997), pp. 3–25. 23. M. Bray and O.W.Y. Kwo, “Higher Education in Small Territories: Political Transition and Development in Macao,” Asia Pacific Education Review, 3(2), (2002), p. 187. 24. Gabinete de Apoio ao Ensino Superior (GAES) (2008). Documentation provided for the Country Report to the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Sub-regional Preparatory Conference for the 2009 World Conference on Higher Education, Macao: September 25–26, 2008. Bangkok, UNESCO. 25. Please refer to Figure 3. 26. Shin, J.C. and Harman, G., “New challenges for higher education: global and Asia-Pacific perspectives,’ Asia Pacific Education Review, 10(1), (2009), pp. 1–13. 27. Macao Daily News, March 29, 2011 28. Bray, M., Butler, R., Hui, P.K.F., Kwo, O.W.Y. and Mang, E.W.L., Higher Education in Macao: Strategic Development for the New Era.

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao Consultation document prepared for the Macao SAR government. January, 2001, pp. 95–96. 29. Gabinete de Apoio ao Ensino Superior (GAES) (2008). Documentation provided for the Country Report to the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Sub-regional Preparatory Conference for the 2009 World Conference on Higher Education, Macao: September 25–26, 2008. Bangkok, UNESCO. 30. Hou Kong Daily, March 10, 2011. 31. For the culture and practice of patron-clientism in Macao’s Special Administrative Region, please refer to Kwong, this volume., 2010. 32. The Macau Post Daily. May 13 and May 16, 2008; December 3, 2010. 33. As a special administrative region of People Republic of China, Macao underwent its unique path of retrocession to Chinese sovereignty and engaged in its legitimacy-building project of the politico-administrative state. Please see Chan, M.K., “Different Roads to Home: The Retrocession of Hong Kong and Macao to Chinese Sovereignty,” Journal of Contemporary China, 12(36), (2002), pp. 493–518; Lo, S.H.H. and Yee, H.S., “Legitimacy-Building in the Macao special administrative region: Colonial legacies and reform strategies,” Asian Journal of Political Science, 13(1), (2005), pp. 51–79, and Lo S.S.H., “Casino Capitalism and Its Legitimacy Impact on the Politico-administrative State in Macao,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 1, (2009), pp. 19–47. 34. Bray, M., Butler, R., Hui, P.K.F., Kwo, O.W.Y. and Mang, E.W.L., Higher Education in Macao: Strategic Development for the New Era. Consultation document prepared for the Macao SAR government. January, 2001, p. 69. 35. Gabinete de Apoio ao Ensino Superior (GAES) (2008). Documentation provided for the Country Report to the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Sub-regional Preparatory Conference for the 2009 World Conference on Higher Education, Macao: September 25–26, 2008. Bangkok, UNESCO. 36. Va Kio Pou, August 29, 2008 37. Gabinete de Apoio ao Ensino Superior (GAES). Documentation provided for the Country Report to the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Sub-regional Preparatory Conference for the 2009 World Conference on Higher Education, Macao: September 25–26, 2008. Bangkok, UNESCO. 38. Frontline Magazine, November 2009 issue. 39. The Macau Post Daily. May 13 and May 16, 2008 40. Frontline Magazine. November 2009 issue. 41. For example, see Lo, S.S.H., “Casino Capitalism and Its Legitimacy Impact on the Politico-administrative State in Macao,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 1, (2009), pp. 19–47. 42. M. Bray and O.W.Y. Kwo, “Higher Education in Small Territories: Political Transition and Development in Macao,” Asia Pacific Education

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Review, 3(2), (2002), pp. 184–196. 43. M. Bray, R. Butler, P.K.F. Hui, O.W.Y. Kwo, and E.W.L. Mang, Higher Education in Macao: Strategic Development for the New Era, consultation document prepared for the Macao SAR government. January, 2001, p. 192. 44. Information retrieved from the University of Macau’s website https://isw.umac.mo/recruitment/showTermsAppoint.do on March 10, 2010. 45. Yee, H., “Government Intervention in Higher Education in Macao,” Higher Education Management, 13(1), (2001), pp. 75–91. 46. MSAR Chief Executive’s Policy Address, 2000, p. 16. 47. In line with the spirit of valuing the instrumental use of education for economic competitiveness, Mr. Fernando Chui, the MSAR Chief Executive who succeeded the First Chief Executive, announced in his first Policy Address on March 16, 2010 that education is essential for human capital creation and it is the motivating force for development (MSAR Chief Executive’s Policy Address 2010, p. 10. 48. MSAR Policy Address, 2001, p. 17. 49. MSAR Policy Address, 2005. 50. MSAR Policy Address, 2006, p. 12. 51. South China Morning Post, July 20, 2009. 52. The Macau Post Daily, December 3, 2010. 53. Jornal Va Kio, March 10, 2011. 54. Jornal Cheng Pou, March 15, 2011. 55. MSAR Policy Address, 2005. 56. MSAR Policy Address, 2008, p.12. 57. MSAR Policy Address, 2006.

References Baldacchino, G. (2001). Human Resource Management Strategies for Small Territories: An Alternative Proposition. International Journal of Educational Development, 21(3), 205–215. Banfield, E. C. (1961). Political Influence. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. Bray, M., Kwo, O. W. Y (2002). Higher Education in Small Territories: Political

11. Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Macao Transition and Development in Macao. Asia Pacific Education Review, 3(2), 184–196. Bray, M., Butler, R., Hui, P. K. F., Kwo, O. W. Y. and Mang, E. W. L. (2001). Higher Education in Macao: Strategic Development for the New Era. Consultation document prepared for the Macao SAR government. January, 2001. Chan, Ming K. (2002). Different Roads to Home: The Retrocession of Hong Kong and Macao to Chinese Sovereignty. Journal of Contemporary China, 12(36), 493–518. Clark, B. R. (1983). The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-national Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press. Deem, R. (2001). Globalisation, New Managerialism, Academic Capitalism and Entrepreneurialism in University. Comparative Education, 37(1), 7–20. Direccao dos Servicos de Estatistica e Census Website material, retrieved September, 2008 and March, 2010. http://www.dsec.gov.mo/. Etzkowitz, H. (1998). Capitalizing Knowledge: New Intersections of Industry and Academia. New York: SUNY Press. Frontline Magazine. November 2009 issue. Gabinete de Apoio ao Ensino Superior (GAES) (2008). Documentation provided for the Country Report to the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Sub-regional Preparatory Conference for the 2009 World Conference on Higher Education, Macao: September 25–26, 2008. Bangkok, UNESCO. Hackett, E.J. (1990). Science as a Vocation in the 1990s: The Changing Organizational Culture of Academic Science. The Journal of Higher Education, 61 (3), 241–279. Jornal Cheng Pou. March 15, 2011. Jornal Va Kio. March 10, 2011. Li, M. (2006). Cross-border Higher Education of Mainland Chinese Students: Hong Kong and Macao in a Globalizing Market. Ph. D. thesis. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong. Lo, S. S. H. (2008). Political Change in Macao. London: Routledge. Lo, S. S. H. (2009). Casino Capitalism and Its Legitimacy Impact on the Politico-administrative State in Macao. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 1, 19–47. Lo, S. S. H. and Yee, H. S. (2005). Legitimacy-Building in the Macao Special Administrative Region: Colonial Legacies and Reform Strategies. Asian Journal of Political Science, 13(1), 51–79. Macao Special Administrative Region Chief Executive Policy Address, 2000 to 2010. Morrison, K. R. B. (2008). Higher Education in Macau. Country report to

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century UNESCO, presented at the UNESCO Asia-Pacific regional preparatory conference for the 2009 world conference on higher education, Macao. Postiglione, G.A. and Tang, H.H.H. (2008). A Preliminary Review of the Hong Kong Changing Academic Profession Data. In RIHE (ed.) The Changing Academic Profession in International Comparative and Quantitative Perspectives, p. 227–249. Hiroshima: RIHE, Hiroshima University. Shin, J. C. and Harman, G. (2009). New Challenges for Higher Education: Global and Asia-Pacific Perspectives. Asia Pacific Education Review, 10(1), pp. 1–13. Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. L. (1997). Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Slaughter, S. and Rhoades, G. (2004). Academic Capitalism and the New Economy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Sutton, P. (1997). Political aspects. In D. Clarke and T. Payne (Eds.) Politics, Security and Development in Small States, pp. 3–25. London: Allen & Unwin. South China Morning Post. July 20, 2009. Tang, H. H. H. (2009a). Academic Entrepreneurialism and Its Related Concepts: A Review of the Literature. Research Studies in Education, 7, 42–49. Tang, H. H. H. (2009b). Higher Education Governance and Academic Entrepreneurialism: The Cases of Hong Kong and Macao. In H. Yee, W. Y. Yu, K. K. Kwong. (eds.). A Tale of Two Cities III: Review and Prospect of the Political, Economic and Social Development of Hong Kong and Macao, pp. 549–570. Macao: Macao Social Science Society. (In Chinese). The Macau Post Daily. May 13 and May 16, 2008; December 3, 2010. Va Kio Pou. August 29, 2008. Yee, H. (2001).Government Intervention in Higher Education in Macao. Higher Education Management, 13(1), 75–91.

12 Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao Derrick C. K. TAM

Introduction Since the Portuguese colonial era, Macao has been a gateway for East-West cultural exchanges. Many buildings and sites are fusion of Portuguese and Chinese architecture styles that mark the East-West interface.1 Since 1953, the Macao government had paid attention to heritage protection, and tried to brand the city as a East-West meeting point as seen in cultural heritage. Such image of the city was consolidated when the “Historic Center of Macao” that consists of 30 historic sites and buildings, became part of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) “World Heritage List” in 2005. Macao residents strongly endorse the essence for the conservation of historic sites and structures, and support the promotion of heritage tourism to attract the international community. However, the Macao Special Administrative Region’s (MSAR) heritage protection policy is merely for window dressing as the authorities have tried to undermine historic buildings for economic growth and urban redevelopment regardless of heritage preservation. This chapter illuminates the disarticulation between heritage protection and urban planning and tourism promotion through four heritage dispute cases, namely the Municipal Market of S. Lourenço, 297

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the Social Welfare Bureau’s building, the Guia Lighthouse, and the Mong Ha Military Barrick. It argues that the MSAR government fails to effectively integrate heritage management into the urban planning and tourism development policy-making processes, and it concludes that social movement by concerned citizens can remedy the MSAR government deficiency in heritage protection in order to help the sustainable development of Macao as a city of East-West exchange.

Macao’s Heritage Protection Institution Since the 1950’s, the Macao colonial regime had introduced policies and measures to protect heritage buildings and historic sites. Many Western countries started making attempts on historic preservation while rehabilitating their territories after World War II. Portugal echoed such conservation campaign and extended her heritage protection policy to overseas colonies, including Macao.2 In 1953, a committee was appointed by then Macao Governor Marques Esparteiro to compile a list of historic buildings and sites for conservation.3 A few Macao government departments took up the responsibility for heritage conservation, like the Public Works and Transport Bureau.4 The Leal Senado Council of Macao (LS) and the Municipal Council of the Islands (CIP) as the units for municipal and district administration were responsible for historic objects, running libraries and museums. 5 The governor also appointed Deputy Secretaries, for instance, Deputy Secretary for Education, Culture and Tourism, Deputy Secretary for Education and Culture, and Deputy Secretary for Communications, Tourism and Culture, to assist him in making heritage policy. Then Governor José Leandro issued Decree-Law No. 34/76/M of 7 August 1976 on the conservation of historic buildings and sites on the heritage protection list. He also established the Committee of Urban, Landscape, and Cultural Heritage that included a few public members to take charge of heritage matters like heritage protection listing and public consultations on heritage management.6 In 1976,

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao

the Macao colonial regime first announced a list and later it modified the list by issuing Decree-Law No. 52/77/M of 31 December 1977.7 During the decade from 1980, the Macao colonial authorities tried to strengthen the heritage management institution by establishing departments and committees as well as through legislation and regulations. They amended the heritage protection list on a continuous basis. A Education and Culture Bureau was created in 1980, with a Culture Section whose responsibilities were the conservation, protection and enhancement of cultural heritage.8 However, the Section was dissolved in 1986 when the Education and Culture Bureau became the Education Bureau.9 A public agency, Cultural Institute of Macao (ICM) that was managed by the Cultural Heritage Department, was inaugurated in 1982 to be responsible for the conservation and restoration of heritages. ICM cooperated with the Education and Culture Bureau on cultural activities and heritage protection during 1982–1986.10 Meanwhile, the Committee of Urban, Landscape, and Cultural Heritage was replaced by a new Committee for the Conservation of Architecture, Landscape, and Cultural Heritage in 1984 when Vasco Costa became governor.11 The next governor Carlos Melancia dissolved it and set up a new Culture Committee in 1989.12 In the same year, ICM was restructured and the Cultural Heritage Department was replaced by the Office of Cultural Heritage that had the responsibility for heritage protection and restoration.13 Later, the Macao government promulgated the Decree Law No. 83/92/M of 28 December 1992 to update the heritage protection list that was not further amended until 2011.14 The Cultural Institute of Macao was again restructured in 1994 to become the Cultural Affairs Bureau (IC) in an attempt to make these more appropriate to the needs of the transition period (of Macao’s late 1999 revision to China). This move accorded the Bureau greater administrative autonomy, and meanwhile the Office of Cultural Heritage was replaced by the Cultural Heritage Department for the heritage conservation and restoration. 15 ICM became more active in heritage conservation operations and more responsive to the goals of administrative modernization and personnel localization. After the handover, the MSAR government inherited the

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colonial practice in heritage management. The most significant was the accession of the “Historic Center of Macao” onto the UNESCO “World Heritage List”. The Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture (SASC) is responsible for cultural affairs policy-making. 16 The Cultural Affairs Bureau is responsible for heritage conservation.17 The Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau (IACM), established in 2002, shares the responsibility in heritage management as the Provisional Municipal Council of Macao (CMMP) and the Provisional Municipal Council of Islands (CMIP)18 were abolished at the end of 2001.19 The Division of Cultural Activities and the Division of Cultural Facilities of IACM are responsible for construction, maintenance and conservation of monuments and buildings with cultural value, managing some museums, and preserving Macao history. 20 The consultative committee was reorganized, and the Committee of Culture was replaced by the Cultural Consultative Committee (CCC) that is responsible for advising SASC on cultural affairs.21 When the “Historic Center of Macao” was placed on the “World Heritage List” by UNESCO in 2005, the Chief Executive promulgated the Dispatch of the Chief Executive No. 202/2006, which defined the graphics and protection area of monuments, architectures with artistic values, classified architecture group and classified sites of the “Historic Center of Macao”.22 However, this was not sufficient for the protection of the heritage buildings and sites in Macao. It did not cover the issue of the site management around the World Heritage, the sight view of them as well as the protection of other historic buildings which are not on the World Heritage List but worth for conservation. Macao residents have become more attentive to the government’s work on heritage conservation after the inscription on UNESCO’s “World Heritage List”, and expected the government to put further efforts on the conservation of monuments, architectures with artistic values and classified sites. When the government has failed to protect historic building sites but tried to dismantle them, Macao citizens mobilized and pressured the government to change its policy. The Law no. 11/2013 "New Heritage Protection Law" was approved by the Legislative Assembly in July 2013 and is valid from 1 March 2014. The following sections will discuss the relationship between

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao

heritage conservation and tourism and urban planning, as well as the four major disputed cases involving heritage protection in the MSAR era: 1. the reconstruction of the Municipal Market of S. Lourenço (St. Lawrence); 2. the demolition of the Social Welfare Bureau Building (commonly known as “Blue House”, at Estrada do Cemitério no. 6); 3. the construction Lighthouse; and

of

skyscrapers

blocking

the

Guia

4. the demolition of the Mong Ha Military Barricks. The main argument is that cultural tourism was not fully accomplished and the MSAR authorities tried to dismantle historic building for urban development regardless of heritage preservation. The MSAR government failed to integrate heritage management in making policies of urban planning and tourism. Table 1. The Laws and Regulations of the Heritage Conservation Year

No. of Laws and Regulation

Aims and Objectives

Remark

1980

OD3/80/M-12Jan

New buildings on Avenida Almeida Ribeiro (between Senado Square and Rua Visconde Paco de Arcos) should have arcades.

–

1984

DL56/84/M-30Jun*

Protection of the Architectural, Natural and Cultural Heritage Committee

altered by DLN 83/92/M-31 Dec

1989

Ordinance 89/89/M-31May*

The disqualification of an element attached to the Lou Lim Ioc Palace.

–

1989

DL72/89/M-31Oct

The system of legal deposit

Altered by AR10/2008

1992

DL83/92/M-31Dec*

The list of monuments, classified architecture group and classified sites

–

301

302

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Year

No. of Laws and Regulation

Aims and Objectives

Remark

1999

–

Basic Law

Adopted on 31 March 1993

2001

NCE33/2001

The Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage

–

2006

NCE32/2006

The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage

–

2006

DSASC 45/2006

Academic Research Grant Regulations

–

2006

DCE202/2006*

Definition of graphics and related protection areas of monuments, architectures with artistic values, classified architecture groups and “Historic Center of Macao” sites

–

2008

NCE1/2008

Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Expressions Diversity

–

2008

DCE 83/2008

Maximum permissible altitudes for new buildings around Guia Lighthouse area

–

2013

LAW11/2013

Cultural Heritage Protection Law#

–

* Will be abolish from 1 March 2014 # Will be valid from 1 March 2014 Sources: Official Bulletin of Macao, Macao: Printing Bureau; Official Bulletin of Macao Special Administrative Region, Macao: Printing Bureau. (In Portuguese). Remark: AR=Administrative Regulation; AO=Administrative Order; DSAJ=Dispatch of Secretariat for Administration and Justice; DCE=Dispatch of the Chief Executive; NCE=Notice of the Chief Executive; OD=Ordinance; SARC=Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture; SAJ= Secretariat for Administration and Justice.

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao Table 2. The Applicable Laws and Regulations of the Culture Department Year

No. of Laws and Regulation

Aims and Objectives

Remark

1978

DL15/78/M-20 May

Performance Classification Committee established

Altered by DL 35/89/M-18 May and. 40/93/M-23 Aug

1989

OD183/89/M-31Oct

Macao Historic Archive Regulations

Altered by OD 171/91/M- 16 Sep, 165/93/M-31 May and DSASC 9/2006

1989

OD186/89/M-31Oct

Central Library Regulations

Altered by DSASC 68/2002 and 101/2010

1994

DL 26/94/M-16May

Culture Fund structure and functions

–

1994

DL 63/94/M-19 Dec

New organizational structure of ICM

Changed by DL 31/98/M-20 July, AR 4/2008 and 5/2010

1999

Law 1/1999

The Reunification Law.

–

1999

AR 6/1999

Organization, duties and functions of public services and entities.

Altered/revoked by various laws, AR, AO and DCE

2001

DCE 65/2001

Cultural Consultative Committee established.

–

2001

Law 17/2001

IACM established.

Altered by AO 74/2010

2001

AO 53/2001

IACM logo.

–

2001

DCE 260/2001

Authority on financial resources and assets of IACM Administration Committee.

–

2001

DCE 264/2001

The establishment of a Committee for Monitoring the Statute of IACM.

–

303

304

China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Year

No. of Laws and Regulation

Aims and Objectives

Remark

2002

DCE 2/2002

The Organic Regulation of IACM.

Altered by DCE 117/2008 and revoked partially by AR3/2008

2002

DSAJ No. 1/2002

The establishment of the Working Group for Revision of Municipal Ordinance” and “Working Group for the Assessment of Authority at IACM

–

2009

DCE No. 164/2009

Macao Conservatory Internal Regulation

–

Sources: Official Bulletin of Macao, Macao: Printing Bureau; Official Bulletin of Macao Special Administrative Region, Macao: Printing Bureau. (In Portuguese) Remark: AR=Administrative Regulation; AO=Administrative Order; DSAJ=Dispatch of Secretariat for Administration and Justice; DCE=Dispatch of the Chief Executive; IACM=Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau; ICM=Cultural Affairs Bureau; OD=Ordinance; SARC=Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture; SAJ=Secretariat for Administration and Justice.

Heritage Conservation and Tourism Cultural heritage conservation not only retains traces of cultural history of a place, but also plays a role in promoting tourism development. The purpose of local tourism development is mostly for economic and social benefits. The tourism industry develops when there is a strong market demand for tourist attractions.23 The particular reasons that convince the traveler to make their visits usually constitute the core theme of travel. Therefore, it is unlikely for tourism industry to achieve success when tourist attractions fail to induce visitors to stay longer for an in-depth exploration as well as an extensive travelling experience of a city.24 Cultural tourism is extremely apt to be seen as a catalyst for a sustainable tourism. When cultural attractions embody the local flavors that reflect or

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao

convey the essential local culture, history and ambience, cultural tourism can promote diverse cultural traditions, ethnic origins and local landscape.25 By making use of cultural tourism resources as visitors’ consumer products, tourism potential and value of the unique heritage, culture or historical architecture can be realized.26 Tourism and culture have to function in a symbiotic way to achieve a mutually beneficial impact. Cultural tourism indicates a result of a wide range of social changes, and due to the changes, the supply has become increasingly commercialized. 27 In terms of development and utilization, the attractions can be divided into three hierarchical ranks. The attractions that play a key role in defining the image of the destination and guaranteeing the amount of visits belong to the highest rank, and probably, they are reasons why the visitors are willing to come a long way.28 The local sights that enrich the tourism experience go to the second rank. Though these attractions are appealing and popular, they are not influential enough to persuade visitors to come. Lastly, those that mainly provide a shopping experience are ranked third as the lowest. In most cases, visitors drop by the attraction for convenience sake or arrive there coincidently.29 However, with different considerations some tourists may make their own ranking of the same attraction, and it depends on the purpose that they visit the destination.30 There are five measures to optimize cultural heritage resources and turn them into cultural tourism attractions, including allocating more resources to the first-ranking attractions; second, constructing a group of second-level attractions around a theme to create an appealing image as strong as those of the first levels; developing tourist areas; building up a network of linear routes for heritage tour; lastly, taking advantage of festive events.31 After a visit to tourist artworks, a series of festivals and special theme parks, visitors would be impressed by the tourism products and experiences offered, and the consumer culture can be successfully shaped.32 In fact, the standardization, modification, and commercialization of cultural heritage are not to belittle the heritage, but to play a key role in promoting tourism consumption. Visitors, tourism industry and the asset itself can benefit from the process that transforms cultural heritage resources into cultural attractions. Most visitors aim to have a pleasure sightseeing to experience

305

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

something uniquely different, but safety is their priority. Commercializing an experience is to promote safe consumption that is not only an added value to the tourism industry but also an increase of product sales. Heritage manager should offer a unique impression to manipulate travel experience and effectively convey information that they expect.33 After the handover, the MSAR government has wished to develop cultural tourism as part of Macao’s economic diversification and tried to brand the city as an East-West exchange hub with rich local cultural heritages. In 2000, the MSAR government aimed at developing the tourism industry as a domestic economic growth engine and a promoter of the MSAR’s image—a blending of Eastern and Western cultures.34 The promotion for cultural tourism has been mentioned in the Chief Executive’s Policy Address annually since 2000 (see Table 3). Table 3. Objective for the Cultural Tourism of the MSAR Government Fiscal Year

Objective for the Cultural Tourism

2000

Bolstering Macao’s identity, shaped through the fusion of East-West cultures, will enhance its unique character and attract more tourists. This aims at allowing tourism to play a fundamental role in stimulating the local economy and in projecting the MSAR’s image effectively. Unique characteristics as reflected in Macao’s multicultural society will be protected to maximize culture-tourism interactions. (2000:7–8)

2001

Tourism organs will continue to intensify and expand tourist products. In addition to promoting Macao as a city of culture, we should map and develop more diversified tour routes. (2001:11-12, 19–20)

2002

The MSAR government intends to make use of and cultivate its tourism resources. Building on gaming and cultural tourism, it will work closely with local people to develop tourist products, undertake focused promotions, establish strategic partnerships and improve service and training quality to give impetus to associated industries. (2002:12–14)

2003

From tourism and Macao’s global contacts, the MSAR’s cultural industries are noticed, supported and encouraged by the international community. We need to fashion these various advantageous external factors into the impetus for self-development. (2003:9 & 18)

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao Fiscal Year

Objective for the Cultural Tourism

2004

Macao, as a city rich in classical traditions and refined culture, is also a modern, dynamic city that is an ideal tourist destination where historical memories coexist nicely with modern landmarks, man-made landscape complements the natural landscape, and economic and cultural lifes complement one another. Then Macao will become one big family that is even more valued and loved by its members, as well as a pleasant place where visitors feel at home and reluctant to leave. (2004:28–29)

2005

The Government and business community will continue their close collaboration in promoting cultural tourism, with our blend of Chinese and Western cultural heritages as its theme. (2005:19–20)

2006

Besides adding major tourism resources, the government will keenly demonstrate and utilize Macao’s uniqueness as a melting pot of Chinese and Western cultures, so as to foster the organic integration of internationally recognized heritage sites, culinary heritage and leisure facilities, as well as major international events. (2006:10)

2007

As regards economic development, the traditional tourism model will quickly transform into an integrated model, comprising various elements including culture, conventions and exhibitions, gaming, retail, sports, leisure, dining and large-scale events. This will drive the service sector to play a major role in economic development. (2007:6)

2008

In line with the spirit of China’s 11th Five-year Plan and opportunities arising from it, and based on actual needs, the MSAR government will push for a diversified economy with stronger momentum by promoting integrated tourism, optimizing economic and trade platforms, developing related service industries, and supporting transformations and upgrades of traditional manufacturing industries. (2008:14)

2009

Will encourage tourism industry to develop in a direction boasting diversified source markets, a wide range of tourism products and high quality service. Will make better use of World Heritage sites to promote different types of theme tourism and extend regional cooperation in this area. A key strategy is to capitalize on the resources generated by gaming industry growth to feed the development of leisure, holidaymaking, cultural tourism and related industries. Will tap the World Heritage sites to add cultural value to tourism. (2009:7–8)

2010

Shall further strive to protect and promote Macao’s world cultural heritage and integrated cultural-leisure tourism development. Besides highlighting the “Historic Center of Macao” World Heritage advantage, shall draw attention to our special festive activities embracing our unique cultural characteristics that have been rooted

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Fiscal Year

Objective for the Cultural Tourism in Macao for centuries and originated from China and the West cultural exchanges. These are favorable to cultivate a cultural tourism brand, and build an image as a world-class leisure-tourism city. (2010:13, 16–19)

2011

As the only Chinese city endowed with a Southern European leisure culture, Macao has its own historical features and tourist image that stands out in the region. Will harness the added value of regional cooperation and through active participations in international/regional conferences and promotional activities, promote complementary and mutually beneficial multi-destination itineraries. (2011:20–22)

2012

Combining Macao’s unique Southern European style with its strong cultural heritage, the government is committed to advance a leisure travel destination image. Leisure elements will be integrated into local daily live to further enhance Macao’s quality of life. (2012:23)

2013

The Government will also enrich cultural tourism by further exploring and promoting tour elements with local characteristics, and will strive to establish leisure facilities and foster a leisure atmosphere. (2013:20)

Sources: Policy Address for the Fiscal Year of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (various years), Macao: SAR Government.

According to the 2003 “classification, investigation and evaluation of tourism resources” of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) National Tourism Administration, the “Historic Center of Macao”, the tourism resources of museums, famous persons and religion were listed as 5-star tourism resources, the top priority for tourists; traditional festivals, delicacies and cultural activities were listed as 4-star tourism resources. 35 Cultural elements are key resources for the marketing of Macao’s tourism industry. The MSAR Government Tourism Office (MGTO) is responsible for the enrichment and diversification of Macao tourism products and the promotion of Macao tourism overseas. 36 Since 2000, MGTO has highlighted the unique East-West Western culture fusion in the city as the core emphasis in marketing strategy. After its listing as World Heritage sites, the MSAR government utilized the “Historic Center of Macao” as the selling point to attract tourists. MGTO created a slogan “A World of Difference, The Difference is

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao

Macao!” aiming to highlight Macao’s World Heritage sites, culture, delicacies and entertainments to diluting Macao’s the gaming hub image.37 Furthermore, the MSAR government designated 2006 as “Macao World Heritage Year” during which MGTO held a series of promotion activities for “The Historic Center of Macao”.38 During 2007–2009, “Experience Macao!” became the tourism promotion slogan. The promotional activities included roadshows, tourism exhibitions and trade fairs, and advertisements. Macao collaborated with Guangdong, Hong Kong and other countries and regions for tourism development. 39 In 2011, MGTO adopted a new slogan “Touching Moments Experience Macao!” which aims to promote various tourist options like Green Culture Eco-tour, City Tour on the Buildings Cementing Luso-Sino Relation, and Would Heritage tour and etc.40 Moreover, the MSAR government aimed at strengthening residents, identity and knowledge of Macao’s heritage. For instance, the Institute for Tourism Studies (IFT) launched a bachelor degree in “Heritage Management” program in 2005 41 and a “Heritage Management” diploma program in 2010. 42 Besides, IFT and UNESCO host a joint certificate program of “The Cultural Heritage Special Guide Training and Certification Program for UNESCO World Heritage Sites.” Participants are required to take 2 courses, “Macao Heritage Tour Guide Course” and “Cultural Heritage Interpretation for World Heritage Sites” and pass the tests to become a Cultural Heritage Specialist Guide. Till November 2013, there were 15 batches organized with 87 participants granted the title of “Specialist Guide for World Heritage Sites (Macao)”.43 Although the MSAR government has been trying to promote cultural tourism with the use of “Historic Center of Macao”, that objective was not fully attained The government prioritized the gaming industry as the growth engineer for other sectors.44 In fact, the gaming sector generated most revenue for Macao. The gaming tax was only 7.77 billion MOP (USD962.5 million) in 2002 but skyrocketed, to 113.38 billion MOP (USD14.17 billion) in 2012. Tax generated from gaming activities formed only 51% of total public revenues in 2002 but grew to 78.2% in 2012 (see Table 4). The purpose of tourist visiting Macao was mainly for vacations

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(61–73%) and for business (4–16%) with only 3–10% for gaming. However, the percentage of gaming expense of visitor expenditures grew from 67.5% in 2002 to 86.4% in 2012 (see Tables 4 & 5). This confirms the fact that tourists came to Macao mainly for gaming and cultural tourism cannot achieve the MSAR government’ target for tourists.

Table 4. Economic Impact of Travel & Tourism Unit: 106 MOP (USD1=MOP8) Visitor Expenditure

Public Finance

Gross Domestic Product1

Total Expenditure

Gaming Expense

Accommodation & Other Expense

Total Revenue

Gambling Tax 3

2002

89,045.4

34,335.8

23,180.5

11,155.3

15,226.9

7,765.8

13,487.0

2003

100,252.6

40,884.8

29,893.4

10,991.4

18,370.6

10,579.0

15,713.0

2004

127,202.4

57,169.3

43,002.9

14,166.4

23,863.5

15,236.6

17,703.0

2005

138,089.2

62,048.2

46,303.2

15,744.9

28,200.8

16,516.9

21,184.3

2006

158,004.9

72,102.8

56,181.2

15,921.5

37,188.5

19,788.9

27,349.8

2007

180,644.9

98,963.9

81,800.2

17,163.7

53,710.5

31,919.6

23,346.0

2008

186,770.5

124,485.1

107,065.8

17,419.3

62,259.3

43,207.5

30,443.4

2009

189,968.6

137,577.8

116,345.8

21,232.0

69,870.9

45,697.5

35,459.9

2010

242,207.4

213,388.2

181,556.1

31,817.1

88,488.05

68,776.12

38,383.91

2011

295,046.3

307,484.0

266,329.0

41,155.0

122,972.32

99,656.45

45,593.32

2012

324,398.3

349,653.0

302,194.0

47,459.0

144,944.54

113,377.72

54,012.62

Sources: Yearbook of Statistics (Various Years), Macao: Statistics & Census Services. 1: Figures with constant (2011) prices of the publication “Estimates of GDP” by Statistics & Census Services 2: Provisional 3: Starting from 2007, the Financial Services Bureau compiles the consolidated public accounts. Thus, the gross tax revenue from gaming sector included the transfer of 1.6% of gross gaming receipts from the gaming enterprises to Macao Foundation, and this amount of transfer was not included in the corresponding figure for years prior to 2007.

Total Expenditure

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao

311

Table 5. Purpose of Tourist Visit Unit: %

Vacation

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

69

73

72

64

68

75

71

69

65

62

61

10

10

5

5

4

11

12

12

16

13

11 1

01

01

01

0

Business Attending Conventions Visiting relatives or friends

7

7

8

11

11

7

8

7

7

8

7

Gaming

5

3

4

6

5

4

4

8

10

9

9

Others

8

5

4

3

3

3

6

5

13

16

19

Sources: Macao Travel and Tourism Statistics (Various Years), Macao: Statistics & Census Services. 1: Less than half of the unit employed

Thus the MSAR Government attempts to optimize the benefits of local cultural heritages and foster the urban image of a East-West blending. Its campaign with an “Experience Macao" theme is part of a tourism promotion strategy to turn the local world heritage sites into top-ranking tourist attractions. It hopes that developing a diversified cultural touring area of world heritage sites (like St. Paul’s Ruins area, Barra A-ma Temple area and Sao Lazaro Cultural Creative area) and planning the heritage tourism itineraries, along with numerous annual traditional Chinese and Western festivals in Macao (like Chinese New Year, Buddha's Birthday, Dragon Boat Festival, Procession of Our Lady of Fatima), and special cultural event festivals (like the Macao International Music Festival, the Macao International Arts Festival, Macao Grand Prix) can help uplift external impression of second-ranking attractions. Only by connecting diverse cultural attractions to structure a tourism itinerary that fully makes a combination of points, lines and surfaces between attractions will enable visitors to embrace a distinctive cultural experience, and cultural consumption can be achieved as a result. The current tourism itineraries, such as the City Tour in Historic Center of Macau, Sun Yat-sen Historical Tour, Three Cultural Touring Routes, are apt to be further elaborated as the

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major touring projects in the near future. The Macao Cultural Heritage Tourism Market Research concludes that more inputs and efforts should be allocated for cultural tourism brand-building to achieve a significant change in the city image itself. Several manifest competitive disadvantages can often be seen that hinder efforts to promote heritage tourism. First, in the eyes of the current travelers, Macao is well known as an Eastern Las Vegas, and the image of a gaming city has been firmly rooted in their travel experience. The prevalence of a gambling image overwhelms the regime’s heritage tourism promotion. Second, the promotion projects have so far failed to impress most tourists that Macao is also internationally famous for cultural heritage, and they lack organized, detailed, systematic and sustainable tourism projects. Last but not the least, most cultural tourism products have been sightseeing-oriented while current facilities are not well-equipped, and hence the supportive services are weak. 45 Therefore, few tourists take the heritage sites and related products into consideration when they decide to visit Macao. The local World Heritage attractions have yet to become the key theme of their visits. Also, due Macao’s physical confines as a small, “on-foot” city where distance between cultural attractions is often close, it does not take too long to visit them so to induce visitors to stay longer. During 1999–2010, visitors spent an average 1.21 to 1.54 days in Macao.46 On the other hand, the MSAR government has made an effort in promoting the cultural heritage internationally, but somehow the authorities have paid little attention to conservation. As a result, the uniqueness of local heritage, culture and historical architecture are not fully recognized and its tourism potential has not been realized.

Heritage Conservation and Urban Planning A city is composed of people, buildings and spaces, and there is an intimate relationship in between.47 Buildings alike to the human kind grow in different ages and obtain various personalities. They play different roles at certain period of times with diverse social functionalities. In a historical evolutionary process, they constitute the urban cultural landscape and reflect the values of people living in

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao

the city. 48 Modern urban planning concepts originated from utilitarian ideas in economy as proposed after the Western industrial revolution. The “People-oriented” philosophy of development is a collaborative reflection in response to utilitarianism by a group of scholars and experts in the field of sociology, architecture and urban planning, who believe that today’s urban designing should not solely take economic objectives into account, but must also address historical and cultural concerns, environmental conservation, social behavior and resource efficiency and other factors. Hence, communal participation in urban planning is to avoid the tendency of overly pursuing economic development. Meanwhile, according to urban design scholars, the trend of urban development is going to emphasize the concept of urban integration rather than the factors of individual cities, before undertaking any large-scale urban construction that guarantees none of the resources will be wasted. Shaping urban style and the conservation for community landscape and architecture heritage can serve as an advantage to increase the value of properties, advance regional economic activities, create a harmonious living environment and strengthen local sense of belongings and civic identity. Historic buildings are a record of history, economics, social sciences, technology, literature, art and a variety of cultural elements that showcase all the past interactions between every ethnic group and nature. The value of historic buildings is not solely measured by its age or architectural design, quality and technology, but more importantly, the social role it plays in the historical context. Hence, when a historic building is detached from the relevancy of the place or environment of the events happened, its value will likely diminish or even disappear. Thus, in urban planning terms, it is necessary to have an overall planning strategy to preserve and wisely connect all cultural heritages in the city as a whole to restructure public space design. The linkage between the heritages can be realized by sharp contrasts, like virtuality versus reality, simplicity versus complexity or classicality versus modernity. The original landscape with a rich historical context can stand out from the crowd of modern architecture by contrast. If it is inevitable to demolish a heritage building, the new buildings to be constructed in the site should be designed in a way that embraces the history, culture, social

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interaction, architecture and science that it had in the past, as a means to aptly convey and re-interpret the value and spirit of the original structure. In Macao, the MSAR’s heritage protection regime is merely for window dressing as the authorities have tried to dismantle historic building for the purpose for urban growth regardless of heritage preservation. After the handover, the Secretary for Transport and Public Works (STOP) is responsible for infrastructure and public works, and shares the duty of urban planning. 49 Macao urban planning involves three bureaus: the Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau (DSSOPT), the Infrastructure Development Office (GDI) and IACM. DSSOPT is the major unit for urban management and planning.50 GDI (former Support to Development of Landfill Taipa-Coloane Office, GADA) was responsible for Cotai area planning that was transferred to DSSOPT in 2009.51 IACM (former CMMP/CMIP) participates in the definition of urban planning and land use, road traffic, and launches special projects for planning,52 and it provides advice on infrastructure and municipal facilities proposals.53 Macao has not yet to establish a clear and systematic urban planning framework until 2013. In 1963, the Macao government first enacted a law on urban planning, Legislative Diploma 1600-31 July 1963, General Regulations of Urban Construction. 54 It formulated other laws and regulations on urban planning like the Land Law 55 , Legislative Diploma on Reserve, 56 Inner Harbor Reorganization Plan57, Regulation of Urban Intervention Plan for New Outer Harbor58, Regulation of Detailed Plan for Praia Grande Bay Reorganization, 59 Regulation on Fire Safety, 60 Basic Environment Law,61 and various laws on heritage conservations, etc. Nevertheless, there is no law and regulation to guide land development, land use and old districts redevelopment. Regime officials have huge discretionary power to define the purpose of land use and to dismantle buildings for redevelopment. As a result, the government might undermine heritage conservation in urban planning. In the following cases of the Municipal Market of S. Lourenço, the Social Welfare Bureau Building, the Guia Lighthouse and the Mong Ha Military Camp will illuminate the MSAR government’s failure in striking the necessary balance between urban

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao

development and heritage conservation. In the case of Municipal Market of S. Lourenço, IACM proposed to dismantle the old market and to construct a new Municipal Market Complex of S. Lourenço on the same site. However, some heritage concern groups like the Macao History Association and the Association of Macao Historical and Cultural Heritage Protection (APPHCM), opposed demolition of the old market; arguing that the building was a fusion Chinese- Western architectural styles worthy of conservation, and that it was designed by the Public Works Bureau’s first Chinese architect, Mr. Chan Kuan-pui.62 They tried to alter public attention and mobilize for protecting the market. The MSAR government rejected such views and claimed that the market was not worth protecting and the new building would improve residential environment and the southern district’s economy. IACM mobilized some neighborhood associations, architectural associations and engineers associations and the media to support the regime proposal. Meanwhile, it conducted a public poll on the reconstruction. Finally, the government gained sufficient public supports to dismantle the old market. The MSAR official urban planning policy did not care much for historic building conservation, it instead focused on improving municipal facilities. Until the civil society raised the concern of heritage preservation, the government did not take note of the value of historic building conservation in its redevelopment planning. The Social Welfare Bureau Building dismantlement proved that the MSAR government overlooked the issue of heritage conservation when renovating its premises. The Social Welfare Bureau Building (commonly known as “the Blue House” for its blue exterior) was originally placed on the heritage protection list in 1984 but was deleted in 1992.63 The Macao Post and Telecommunications Office (CTT) printed a stamp with the picture of the “Blue House” as it had been deemed an important public building in Macao.64 In June 2006, the Social Welfare Bureau (IAS) proposed to demolish the “Blue House” and build a new office tower. However, many local Chinese newspapers opposed the plan and criticized the government in their editorial columns. Some heritage concern organizations echoed and tried to mobilize the public against the proposal. Due to

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

the strong public opposition against the reconstruction, SASC put the proposal in pending and appointed IFT to conduct a survey of public opinion on the “Blue House” demolition. 65 Finally, IFT survey report deemed the “Blue House” a valuable heritage site and Macao residents had a strong attachment to it.66 IAS resolved to conserve the building and would either look for alternative site for a new office or rent office space at commercial building.67 Again, the government paid scant attention to heritage conservation in the proposal for dismantling the “Blue House”. It only considered the building’s historic value when facing stern public opposition. The Guia Lighthouse case proved that the MASR government had ignored the conservation of heritage in urban planning. The Guia Lighthouse sits atop the 91-meter high Guia Hill.68 In August 2006, MSAR Chief Executive Edmund Ho announced the invalidation of Decree Laws 68/91/M-18 April and 69/91/M-18 April that regulated the height limit of buildings in the business and commercial center in the New Outer Harbor and Bay of Praia Grande areas. 69 Hence, the view of Guia Lighthouse would be blocked and developers could construct skyscrapers. In fact, the MSAR government approved a plan from local developer with the PRC central government’s MSAR Liaison Office (LOCPG) to build two high-rises near Guia Hill, a 99.12-meter building for the LOCPG at the hill’s base and a 126-meter high apartment block.70 This decision triggered a strong rebound from heritage organizations and citizens. APPHCM together with architectural and other professionals formed a Lighthouse Protection Alliance to mobilize the public to oppose skyscrapers in the business center.71 They sent two complaints to UNESCO over the MSAR regime’s failure to protect heritage sites on the World Heritage List. 72 Another voluntary group, the Macao Guia Lighthouse Protection Alliance mounted a campaign by successfully enlisting over 6,500 individual Macao residents to press the government to solve the problem. 73 The Concern Group on Guia Lighthouse Protection (formed by residents in the apartment buildings around Guia Hill) and the General Union of Neighborhood Associations of Macao (UGAMM, commonly known as “Kai Fong”) launched demonstrations and submitted letters to Chief Executive Ho and the LOCPG director to petition Beijing on the case.74 Then UNESCO

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao

contacted Beijing to express its concern for heritage conservation in the MSAR, hinting that the “Historic Center of Macao” might be put on the “List of World Heritage in Danger”.75Hence Beijing instructed the MSAR government to review its policies and to protect the view of Guia Lighthouse. Consequently, it appointed heritage protection professionals to advise the MSAR on the heritage conservation advancement. 76 In April 2008, Edmund Ho issued Chief Executive Dispatch 83/2008 to restrict building height in area around Guia Lighthouse to avoid blocking its sights.77 This case revealed the MSAR government’s blatant disregard for legitimate heritage conservation concerns in urban development. In the Mong Ha Military Barrack case, the MSAR government ignored the barrack’s historic value and proposed to dismantle the compound for the construction of public housing. Since the handover, the MSAR public have been demanding more public housing units after the colonial regime halted public housing construction in the mid-1990s amid a property market gloom.78 In 2008, the MSAR government proposed to reintroduce public housing projects due to shapely rising property prices and increasing public demand. It intended to build public housing on the Mong Ha site.79 Besides, DSSOPT warned that the Barrack suffered a high risk of collapsing due to structural problem. 80 Some heritage organizations, like Lighthouse Protection Alliance, insisted on the Barrack’s historical value as a key military site in Macao. But they failed to galvanize strong public sympathy as many people prioritized public housing needs over heritage conservation.81 Also, MSAR officials who have learnt from past lessons, they were willing to communicate with the heritage organizations to explain regime policy. 82 Finally, the government faced little opposition to the Barrack’s demolition but still it did not really know how to protect historic structures in urban redevelopment. The above cases of heritage disputes reveal that the MSAR regime policies did not effectively balance urban planning and heritage conservation, and it failed to consult the public on heritage management. Yet, IC avoided taking part in these cases even the Bureau is in charge of heritage protection, as these cases were managed by other units like IACM, DSSOPT and IAS. While giving priority to economic development, the MSAR government does not

317

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

pay sufficient to the preservation of architecture with rich historical roots. Yet, it is necessary to take the public's "collective memory" into account in urban planning and social development in order to preserve the icons of historical development and human cultural values of a city. Although there is a consultation body, the Cultural Consultative Committee (CCC), to incorporate public opinions into the discussions, it did not hold meetings on the above cases.83 In the Municipal Market of S. Lourenço, “Blue House” and Mong Ha Military Barrack cases, the MSAR government tended to ignore the historical value of existing municipal facilities and administrative buildings when considering local redevelopment projects and did not manage them according to the heritage conservation framework. These buildings have either showcased Macao’s various historical stages or played different vital social roles. For instance, the Blue House had been a landmark for social relief while the Mong Ha Barrack reminded the public of past Luso military presence. The S. Lourenço Market played a key socio-economic role in common livelihood and daily life. The buildings are records of history, architecture, construction technology and socio-culture and other elements, so urban planning and cultural heritage protection are both key public concerns, and they hope that the MSAR leadership can take these factors into consideration for community space planning. If heritage protection is detached from urban planning then the lack of inter-agency cooperation will retard heritage conservation. Good urban planning is supposed to balance all such interests. New Cultural Heritage Protection Law becomes valid from 1 March 2014.

Strengthening Public Input and Inter-Departmental Cooperation on Heritage Protection Heritage has been protected for several decades in Macao. Public identification with cultural heritage conservation was consolidated when UNESCO placed “the Historic Center of Macao” on its World Heritage List in 2005.84 At the same time, the MSAR government has tried to boost an image of a cultural and historic city, stressing

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao

its East-West cultural exchange. Nevertheless, the regime has failed to integrate heritage management into its tourism and urban planning policy-making process. The residents’ social mobilizations have remedy regime deficiency in MSAR heritage protection. The MSAR government’s consultative body, CCC, on cultural heritage policy, but it did not serve its purpose well in policy-making. CCC has held no meetings or discussions regarding heritage policy. Consequently, heritage organizations and activists opted to pursue social mobilizations to bring themselves back into the heritage protection circle. Recognized the heritage protection campaigns through the rising tides of public participation, the MSAR government released “Cultural Heritage Protection Draft Law” for public consultative in February 2009. The document suggested the responsibilities of different departments for cultural heritage conservation. Specifically, IC is the coordinator on heritage policy within the government.85 It also proposed to establish a Cultural Heritage Committee as a consultative body involving public members. 86 The Chief Executive must consider the Committee’s views before placing a historic object on the heritage protection list. 87 Citizens can also suggest the registration of historic buildings/sites on the list. Finally, the Legislative Assembly was approved the Law on 13 August 2013, and becomes valid on 1 March 2014. Still, the MSAR community is playing a more proactive role in heritage protection. Community bodies, heritage concern groups, and even some individuals have taken actions to protect potential historic sites. For example, IACM decided to construct a permanent trash room beside St. Lawrence’s Church (that is among the Historic Center of Macao sites) in September 2010 with the support of IC.88 Yet, heritage groups like Macao Heritage Ambassadors Association and General Union of Macao Neighborhood Associations, and residents were concerned with the trash room’s close proximity to the Church. They complained and pressured IACM to relocate the trash room. As a result, IACM suspended the plan, consulted public opinions again, and sought consensus with local residents.89 Macao people’s growing heritage protection awareness has generated pressure on regime institutions on the inclusion of citizens’ inputs in related processes.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century

After these heritage disputes, the MSAR government has to pay more attention to public opinions on cultural heritage issues. When making public policies, regime units must consider the effects on cultural heritage and collect public opinions. (see table 6) The MSAR officialdom has strengthened cooperation among government units in managing cultural heritage. For urban planning, the regimes MSAR proposes to include heritage protection as a core element in urban planning laws so that departments must take account of heritage protection when drafting plans and regulations.90 It also extends the Macao Historic District protection project’s scope to buttress protecting the buildings in the “Historic Center of Macao” and to regulate rehabilitation of buildings in the district.91 On old districts redevelopment, the relevant agencies must factor in the conservation of buildings and sites with historic, cultural and architectural values,92 and protect scenic views and landscape in new reclamation projects. 93 DSSOPT cannot issue permits for building construction on the protected heritage list without the IC endorsement to affirm the proposed construction will not harm the heritage object.94 Also, Law no. 10/2013 “Land Law” and Law no. 12/2013 “Urban Planning Law” becomes valid on 1 March 2013. Table 6. Consultative Documents of Policies about Heritage Protection Year

Consultative Document

Department

2008

Framework of the Cultural Heritage Protection Law

Working Group of the Framework of the Cultural Heritage Protection Law

2008

Plan for the Optimization and Remediation of Public Transport

Public Transport Policy Group

2008

Outline for Macao Urban Concept Plan

Research Center for Sustainable Development Strategies

2008

An Approach on the Establishment of a System of Scientific and Modern Urban Planning

Internal Working Group for the Study of Urban Planning

2008

Redevelopment of Macao Old Areas

Cross-Department Working Group

2009

Cultural Heritage Protection Law

Cultural Affairs Bureau

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao Year

Consultative Document

Department

2009

Feasibility Study for the 2nd Phase of the Light Rail System in Macao

Transportation Infrastructure Office

2010

General Framework for Policy on Transit and Land Transportation of Macao (2010–2020)

Transport Bureau

2010

Environmental Protection General Planning Conceptual Framework (2010–2020)

Environmental Protection Bureau

2010

Legal Framework of Urban Legal and Administrative Rules on Urban Construction

Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau

2010

Land Law

Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau

2010

The First Phase of Public Consultation in Urban Planning for New Landfills

Working Group of Urban Planning for New Landfills

2011

Study on the Action Plan for the Bay Area of the Pearl River Estuary

Study Team of the Action Plan for the Bay Area of the Pearl River Estuary

2011

Underground Container Construction Project at Rua de S. Lournço

Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau

2011

Plan of Modal Transport Center of Barra

Coordinating Group for the Plan of Modal Transport Center of Barra

2011

10-Year Plan for Non-Tertiary Education

Education and Youth Affairs Bureau

2011

Realization of the Forth Public Consultation for Granting Land

Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau

2011

Planning of Environmental Protection in Macau (2010–2020)

The Secretariat for Transport and Public Works

2011

Regional Cooperation Plan on Building a Quality Living Area

Environmental Protection Bureau

2011

The Second Round of Public Consultation for the New Urban Master Plan

Working Group of Urban Planning for New Landfills

Sources: Consolidation by the author.

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The demand on balancing urbanization, cultural tourism and heritage protection is not only from domestic pressure but also came from external/regional co-operation. Beijing has been devoting more attention to Macao’s economic diversification to lessen its gaming industry reliance. It has been encouraging Pearl River Delta (PRD) cooperation with Macao.95 In 2008, the “Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020)” was published by the PRC National Development and Reform Commission. Macao is to become a world-class leisure-tourism city in China and is encouraged to cooperate with other PRD municipalities in terms of culture, tourism and exhibition projects.96 Macao’s role has been reconfirmed in the “The Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic & Social Development of the People’s Republic of China” approved by the PRC National People’s Congress in March 2011. 97 The PRC State Council approved a “Hengqin Island Overall Development Plan” in 2009 calling for Hengqin’s development as a tourism center through Macao-Hong Kong-Zhuhai collaboration.98 Macao is expected to devote more efforts to develop itself into a world-class tourism-leisure center and to promote its unique East-West cultural fusion heritages. A “Guangdong-Macao Cooperation Framework Agreement” was signed in Beijing by the Guangdong and MSAR governments in 2011. This pact boosts, among other items, Guangdong-MSAR cooperation on cultural tourism. The two governments aim at building a “world destination for tourism and leisure” in south China with a tourist route crossing Guangdong and Macao, like a multi-city “Historic Center of Macao-Kaiping Fortress-Shaoguan Danxi Mountains” trip. They attempt to promote the Lingnan region and the fusion of Chinese and Western cultures in Guangdong-Macao tourism cooperation. The MSAR government is steering to advance local heritage protection as related to tourism cooperation with Guangdong and Hong Kong.

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao

Conclusion Since the colonial era, Macao government has established institutions for the protection of cultural heritage. At the same time, historical sites and buildings became essential elements in the promotion of Macao as a city for cultural tourism. After the “Historic Center of Macao” was inscribed on the UNESCO’s “World Heritage List”, Macao society has been paying more attention on heritage conservation. However, the MSAR government has failed to strike the correct balance between urbanization, heritage protection and cultural tourism. After several heritage disputes, the regime began to reform institutions for heritage protection and attempted to incorporate heritage concerns in urban planning and tourism development strategies. Indeed, with Beijing encouraging Macao to spend more efforts on the creation of a “world-class tourism-leisure center”, the MSAR government must advance heritage protection.

Notes 1. Macao World Heritage, Macao: Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2006, pp. 137–138. 2. Personal interview with Lui Chak-keong, Macao architect and former part-time consultant for Research Center for Sustainable Development Strategies of the Government of the Macao SAR, 24 February 2009. 3. Lam Fat-lam Johnny, ‘The Protection and Utilization of World Cultural Heritage in Macao’, in Annual Report on Economy and Society of Macao (2008–2009), Hao Yu-fan and Wu Zhi-lian (eds.), (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2009), p. 287. (In Chinese). 4. Law No. 13/81/M of 17 August and Decree Law No. 103/84/M of 1 September. 5. Law No. 24/88/M of 3 October 1988. 6. Decree Law No. 34/76/M of 7 August. 7. Decree Law No. 56/84/M of 30 June promulgated the cancelation of this decree law. 8. Decree Law No. 27-F/79/M of 28 September. 9. Decree Law No. 10/86/M of 1 February.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century 10. Decree Law No. 43/82/M of 4 September. 11. Decree Law No. 56/84/M of 30 June. 12. Decree Law No. 31/89/M of 15 May. 13. Decree Law No. 63/89/M of 5 September and Decree Law No. 20/90/M of 14 May. 14. Decree Law No. 83/92/M of 28 December. 15. Decree Law No. 3/94/M of 19 December. 16. Administrative Regulation No. 6/1999. 17. Administrative Regulation No. 6/1999. 18. The LS and the CIP were replaced by the CMMP and the CMIP after the handover. (Law No. 1/1999). 19. Law No. 17/2001. 20. Dispatch of the Chief Executive No. 2/2002; The IACM is under the Secretary for Administration and Justice. 21. Administrative Regulation No. 20/2001 and Dispatch of the Chief Executive No. 65/2001. 22. Dispatch of the Chief Executive No. 202/2006. 23. EPCG, Packaging and Selling to the United States, Ottawa: Economic Planning Group of Canada for Tourism Canada, 1995. 24. McKercher, Bob & du Cros, Hilary, Cultural Tourism: The Partnership Between Tourism and Cultural Heritage Management, New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2002, p. 101. 25. Copley, Paul & Robson, Ian, “Tourism, Arts Marketing and the Modernist Paradox”, in Robinson, Mike, Evans, Nigel & Callaghan, Paul, eds., Tourism and Culture: Image, Identity and Marketing, Sunderland: The Center for Travel and Tourism / British Education Publishers, 1996, pp. 15–34. 26. McKercher, Bob & du Cros, Hilary, Cultural Tourism: The Partnership between tourism and Cultural Heritage Management, New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2002, p. 101. 27. Craik, Jennifer, “The Culture of Tourism Sites”, in Rojek, Chris, & Urry, John, eds., Sociocultural Perspectives on Tourism Planning and Development, Virtual Conference Center, MCB Press, 1997, p. 14. 28. Mill, Robert C. & Morrison, Alastair, The Tourism System, Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 2nd ed., 1985. 29. McKercher, Bob & du Cros, Hilary, Cultural Tourism: The Partnership Between Tourism and Cultural Heritage Management, New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2002, p. 110. 30. Hughes, Howard L, “Theater in London and the Interrelationship with

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao Tourism”, Tourism Management, 1998, 19(5), pp. 445–452. 31. McKercher, Bob & du Cros, Hilary, Cultural Tourism: The Partnership Between Tourism and Cultural Heritage Management, New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2002, pp. 110–111. 32. Craik, Jennifer, “The Culture of Tourism Sites”, in Rojek, Chris, & Urry, John (eds.), Sociocultural Perspectives on Tourism Planning and Development, Virtual Conference Center, MCB Press, 1997, p. 14. 33. McKercher, Bob & du Cros, Hilary, Cultural Tourism: The Partnership Bwtween tourism and Cultural Heritage Management, New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2002, pp. 120–122. 34. Policy Address for the Fiscal Year 2000 of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China , Macao: SAR Government, 2001, pp. 13–14. 35. Leong, Man Wai & Ma, Yong, Macao Cultural Heritage Tourism and the Interaction of City Development, Beijing: Science Press, 2010, pp. 31–32. (In Chinese). 36. Decree-Law No. 50/95/M of 25 September 2005. 37. Activity Report 2007 of the Macao Government Tourism Office, Macao: Macao Government Tourism Office, 2008, p. 12. 38. Macao Daily News, 19 February 2006, A2. 39. Activity Report 2007 of the Macao Government Tourism Office, 2008, pp. 8–14; Activity Report 2008 of the Macao Government Tourism Office, 2009, pp. 8–16; Activity Report 2009 of the Macao Government Tourism Office, 2010, pp. 8–16, Macao: Macao Government Tourism Office. 40. Policy Address for the Fiscal Year 2012 of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Macao: SAR Government, p. 199. (In Chinese). 41. Dispatch of the Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture No. 82/2005 and No. 83/2005. 42. Dispatch of the Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture No. 140/2010. 43. http://www.ift.edu.mo/EN/unesco_specialist_guide/Home/Index/333, Institute for Tourism Studies. (30 November 2013). 44. Leong, Man Wai & Ma, Yong, Macao Cultural Heritage Tourism and the Interaction of City Development, Beijing: Science Press, 2010, pp.56–57. (In Chinese). 45. Ibid. 46. Tourism Statistics, Statistics and Census Service of Macao Special Administrative Region Government, 1999–2010. 47. Einar, Lillebye. “Architectural and Functional Relationships in Street

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Planning: An Historical View’, Landscape and Urban Planning, 1996, Vol.35, pp. 85–105. 48. Lo, King Hong, Architecture in Political-Economic Context - Sample Reflective Journals on Urban Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 2010, p. 56. (In Chinese). 49. Administrative Regulation No. 6/1999. 50. Decree-Law No. 27/97/M of 7 July. 51. Dispatch of the Chief Executive No. 68/2000 and No. 97/2009. 52. Law No. 17/2001. 53. Administrative Regulation No. 32/2001. 54. It was revised by Legislative Diploma No. 1773 of 9 November 1968, No. 1792 of 7 June 1969, No. 1802 of 1 November 1969; Decree-Law No. 4/80/M of 26 January, No. 21/80/M of 2 February, No. 42/80/M of 15 November. 55. Law No. 6/80/M of 19 January. It was revised by Law No. 5/81/M, of 27 Jane, No. 2/82/M of 6 February, No. 8/83/M of 13 August, No. 78/84/M of 21 July, No. 8/91/M of 29 July, No. 13/91/M of 18 November, No. 2/94/M of 4 July. 56. Such as Decree-Law No.33/81/M of 19 September, which was revised by Decree-Law No. 30/84/M of 28 April and No. 3/99/M of 25 January. 57. Ordinance No. 218/90/M of 30 October. It was revised by Ordinance 171/95/M of 12 June and Administrative Order No. 5/2002. 58. Ordinance No. 68/91/M of 18 April. It was revoked by Dispatch of the Chief Executive No. 248/2006. 59. Ordinance No. 69/91/M of 18 April. It was revoked by Dispatch of the Chief Executive No. 248/2006. 60. Decree-Law No. 24/95/M of 9 June. 61. Law No. 2/91/M of 11 March. 62. Personal interview with Cheang Kuok-keong, President of Association of Macao Historical and Cultural Heritage Protection, 28 February 2009. 63. Decree-Law No. 56/84/M of 30 June and No. 83/92/M of 31 December. 64. Yang Hao, Macao Postage Stamp Catalogue, Taipei: Gregarious Culture Limited, 1997, p. 55. 65. Journal San Wa Ou, 14 July 2006, p. 1. 66. Journal of Citizen, 20 January 2007, p. 1. 67. Journal Va Kio, 20 January 2007, p. 13. 68. Journal San Wa Ou, 16 September 2006, p. 2. 69. Dispatch of the Chief Executive No. 248/2006.

12. Heritage Protection, Tourism and Urban Planning in Macao 70. Administrative Regulation No.20/2005 and Macao Daily News, 9 August 2006, p.1. 71. “The Implication of Lighthouse Protection Alliance on the Development of Civil Society in Macao: The Emergence of Civic Identity”, Macao Youth, vol. 14, (May 2008), pp.13–14. (In Chinese). 72. Macao Daily News, 1 November 2007, p. B11. 73. Tai Chung Daily, 17 September 2007, p. 14. 74. Journal Va Kio, 27 January 2007, p.23 and Macao Daily News, 20 October 2007, p. C6. 75. Macao Daily News, 29 November 2007, p. A2. 76. Macao Daily News, 19 January 2008, p. B2. 77. Macao Daily News, 17 April 2008, p. A3. 78. Lou Shenghua. “Macao Housing Policy: From Safety Net to Moderate Benefits”, Journal of Public Administration of Macao, Vol.80, (2008), pp.265–266. (In Chinese). 79. Consultative Document of Family Wedding Rental Program, Macao: Housing Bureau, 2008, p. 3. 80. Macao Daily News, 9 November 2008, p. A6. 81. Personal interview with Chao Wai-chu, President and Former Director General of Macao Heritage Ambassador Association, 20 March 2009. 82. Personal interview with Lam Fat-lam, President of Macao Association for Historical Education, 4 March 2009. 83. Personal interview with Liu Bolong, member of Cultural Consultative Committee, 25 May 2009. 84. Personal interview Lam Fat-lam, President of Macao Association for Historical Education, 19 February 2009. 85. Cultural Heritage Protection Law Consultative Document, Macao: Cultural Affairs Bureau, pp. 17–47. 86. Ibid. 87. Ibid. 88. Macao Daily News, 8 September 2010, p. B5. 89. Journal Va Kio, 24 September 2010, p. 11. 90. Consultative Document of an Approach on the Establishment of a System of Scientific and Modern Urban Planning, Macao: Internal Working Group for the Study of Urban Planning, 2008, pp. 48–49. 91. Consultative Document of the Outline for Macao Urban Concept Plan, Macao: Research Center for Sustainable Development Strategies, 2008, pp. 82–83.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century 92. Consultative Document of the Redevelopment of Macao Old Areas, Macao: Cross-Department Working Group of Macao Special Administrative Region Government, 2008, pp. 3–4. 93. Consultative Document of the First Phase of Public Consultation in Urban Planning for New Landfills, Macao: Working Group of Urban Planning for New Landfills, 2010, p. 8. 94. Consultative Document of the Legal Framework of Urban Construction and the Legal Administrative Nature Rules of Urban Construction, Macao: Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau, 2010, pp. 6–7, 15. 95. Policy Address for the Fiscal Year 2010 of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (English. Translate Version), Macao: SAR Government, 2011, p. 16. 96. Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020), China: National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 2008, pp. 52–53. (In Chinese). 97. The Outline of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic & Social Development of the People’s Republic of China, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-03/16/c_121193916_30.htm (10 April 2011). 98. The Hengqin Island Overall Development Plan, China: National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 2009, pp. 14–15. (In Chinese).

Part IV Macao External Links

13 Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries José Carlos MATIAS

Introduction In October 2003, China set up a new mechanism in its foreign relations: the Forum for Economic and Commercial Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Portuguese Speaking Countries (PSC)—hereinafter the “Macao Forum”. Under the umbrella of China’s Ministry of Commerce, the headquarters of this Forum were established in the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR). Through this instrument, China added a new dimension to its pre-existing bilateral relations with seven out of the eight Lusophone nations: Portugal, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Angola, Mozambique and East Timor (São Tomé and Príncipe was excluded due to its official diplomatic links with Taipei instead of Beijing, but was invited to join with an observer status). This chapter starts by delineating the MSAR external relations framework in the “One Country, Two Systems” formula context. The first section explores the type of autonomy enjoyed by the MSAR in external relations. After a brief contextualization of the “One Country, Two Systems” formula, it delves into the concepts of para-diplomacy and multi-layered diplomacy concerning the intersection of the diplomacy of a nation state with a group of foreign countries and the regional diplomacy (external relations) of 331

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an autonomous region. On top of this, as Macao’s external relations are developed in tandem and in full articulation with China’s foreign relations, it highlights the PRC’s multi-layered and multidirectional diplomacy. After reviewing China’s bilateral relations with each Portuguese Speaking nation, it offers a detailed overview of the activities since the Forum’s inception and to explore the multiple dimensions of this multilateral organ. Thus this will provide partial answers to four key questions: Why did China decide to establish a Forum with the PSC? Why did Beijing choose Macao as the host of the ministerial sessions and the headquarters of the Permanent Secretariat? What has been the added value of Macao in this process? How does the instrument fit into China’s foreign policy?

Macao’s External Relations During the first 13 years as China’s Special Administrative Region (SAR), Macao has been playing a relatively low profile but complementary role in the PRC’s overall foreign policy. The end of Macao’s colonial era was the outcome of a shared willingness of Portugal and China. Similarly to Hong Kong’s case, Macao’s retrocession to become as a SAR of China was possible according to Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s “One Country, Two Systems” formula that was affirmed in article 31 in the PRC constitution.1 As stated in Annex I, Section 7 and Chap. VIII of the 1987 Sino-Luso Joint Declaration, Macao enjoys a “high degree of autonomy except in foreign and defense affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government.”2 According to Article 136 of the Macao Basic Law (MBL), the MSAR “may, on its own, using the name "Macao, China", maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with foreign states and regions and relevant international organizations in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, tourism, cultural, science and technology, and sports fields.” The MBL also allows the establishment of MSAR official and semi-official economic and

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trade missions in foreign countries. Compared to other non-central governments (NCG), Macao benefits legally from a clear framework on the specific areas where the Region can develop its own external relations. In terms of external relations, Macao and Hong Kong have different features from other autonomous regions, not only because of the SAR’s unique legal and political nature but also due to their colonial past and the previous para-diplomatic activities developed under Portugal and Britain. MBL Article 13 states that: “The Central People's Government shall be responsible for the foreign affairs relating to the Macao Special Administrative Region. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China shall establish an office in Macao to deal with foreign affairs. The Central People's Government authorizes the Macao Special Administrative Region to conduct relevant external affairs, on its own, in accordance with this Law.” Despite the apparent clear-cut “division of labor” between the PRC central government and the MSAR authorities in external relations, reality shows a more complex scenario. Going beyond the literal meaning of the provisions in the Joint Declaration and the Macao Basic Law, Miguel Santos Neves suggests that Macao (and Hong Kong) has a four-tier external relations structure:3 1. First, the Policy Formulation tier is a positive area of autonomy, in the sense that it is conducted in articulation with the Central Government’s foreign policy. 2. The second tier is related to MBL Article 136 that enables Macao to develop relations and sign agreements with foreign countries, territories and international organizations in fields other than defense and high politics. 3. The third tier denotes a restricted autonomy, referring to agreements and pacts for which specific authorization from Beijing is needed, like in a visa exemption case. The fourth tier is the negative area of autonomy on issues that are dealt with exclusively by the PRC Central Government. As of 31 December 2011, 88 nations had established consular services in Macao, most of which have their consulates located in

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Hong Kong Portugal, Angola and the Philippines have established a consulate-general in the MSAR. A total of 269 multilateral treaties have provisions that apply to the MSAR.4 In addition, 13 years after the handover, Macao has signed 66 bilateral treaties, while the PPC had inked 11 treaties concerning diplomatic and consular issues that are applied to the MSAR5. Figure 1. Macao’s External Relations Framework

6

Source: Based on Neves’ analysis (2002, p.61).

Furthermore, Macao enjoys independent status in 13 intergovernmental organizations. Macao joined most of these organizations in the 1990s. The territory joined the Asia and Pacific Group on Money Laundering, in 2001, as MSAR.7 During the dozen years, the MSAR focused its external relations strategy in three regions or groups of countries: European Union, Portuguese Speaking Countries and Southeast Asia. This is shown by the ministerial-level visits to Macao and by the overseas visits of the MSAR Chief Executive. By the end of his two terms as Chief Executive, Edmund Ho had twice visited Portugal and Brussels in

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2000 and 2006. This signaled the willingness to maintain good relations with the former foreign metropolitan administration and with the EU. 8 In addition, he also visited Germany, the top European economic powerhouse, in 2004. As for Portuguese speaking countries (PSCs), besides Portugal, Edmund Ho was in Mozambique (2002) and Brazil (2005). Since 2003, Macao’s linkages with the Lusophone countries became more intense, with ministerial-level visits to the MSAR and several events and activities related to the Macao Forum. In 2007, Edmund Ho visited three Southeast Asian countries, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, to boost economic and commercial relations with these nations that became a growing source of tourists. Current MSAR Chief Executive Fernando Chui who took office in December 2009, followed Ho’s footsteps to make his first official oversea visit to Portugal in June 2010. Before the handover, doubts were cast on the MSAR’s international status as it was a “small economy with no specific role either in the world economy or in the regional one”.9 Whereas Hong Kong was a world financial hub, Macao’s global dimensions were deemed mostly historic and symbolic. Neves suggests that Macao would need “even more than Hong Kong to develop formal external relations.”10 After the handover, on December 20th 1999, initially local authorities kept a very prudent approach to external relations, but, gradually, Beijing’s master plan for the newly created SAR was unraveled. Following the liberalization of the gaming industry and the opening of the first foreign-owned casinos, in 2004, Macao would be a leading world gaming hub (it eventually became the world’s top casino jurisdiction surpassing Las Vegas in terms of gaming revenue) and would play the role of a platform for China’s linkages with the Portuguese Speaking Countries.

Paradiplomacy and Multi-Layered Diplomacy Whereas diplomatic relations are carried out exclusively by sovereign nation states, via central governments, the concept of

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external relations is broader, encompassing non-sovereign entities. Even one of most renowned realist international relations theorists Kenneth Waltz says “States are not and never have been the only international actors”. 11 By para-diplomacy it means the external relations of sub-national non-central government (NCG) actors. Since the early 1980s, scholars have been debating on how to clarify the meaning of this “neologism”. 12 Para-diplomacy became a buzzword applied to different actors: autonomous regions, federated states, non-autonomous provinces or even municipal units. Moreover, it is used to describe several types of external contacts: between a NCG and foreign nation-states, trans-border regional diplomacy (between neighboring regions belonging to separate nation-states) or between non-contiguous sub-national entities.13 In any of these situations, contrary to state diplomacy, which is focused on pursuing “a defined state interest in the international arena”, para-diplomacy “is more functionally specific and targeted, often opportunistic and experimental.”14 Other authors refuse to embrace the para-diplomacy concept. In the eyes of Iñaki Aguirre, it does not make much sense to use “para-diplomacy to characterize the international involvement of NCG, as their activities are not a parallel form of diplomacy.” He believes that “the international involvement of NCGs could much more properly be labeled post-diplomatic, because it is a process that moves beyond the nation-state, that is, beyond diplomacy.”15 Barry Bartmann conceptualizes para-diplomacy as “the outreach of non-sovereign jurisdictions to actors beyond their own borders and the frontiers of their metropolitan relationships or claimant states”. 16 In most cases, surely in Macao’s case, the rise of para-diplomacy does not imply the weakening of the nation state as the ultimate bearer of sovereignty. It illustrates the tendency of nation states to endow NCGs with a role in certain fields, often regarded as “low politics”. Therefore, “para-diplomacy is, at best, a competence devolved to autonomous entities and hence it is the sovereign state that decides how much of its power it shares”.17 Moreover, this phenomenon often increases the power of nation-states, as they make use of regional features to deepen their linkages with external partners in a multilayered diplomatic approach, not only through the NGCs but also major private actors

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with similar interests in widening their business in tandem with national and regional diplomatic and para-diplomatic strategies. As noted by La Palombara, “even as national governments decide to share some of their sovereignty with their internal regions, their scope of power can actually grow and not decrease.”18 Perhaps there may be negative implications for national diplomacy from the NCG’s external relations activities that may be a harmful derogation of national prerogatives and a menace to the unity and coherence of the nation–state’s foreign affairs. Yet Macao’s para-diplomacy yields “positive” evaluation; it is a contribution to “rationalize foreign policy in the context of an ever-growing complex world as NCGs can clearly promote their interests but act in accordance and also share costs and pool resources with central government that to complement its foreign policy.”19 Going beyond para-diplomacy, Brian Hocking prefers to delve into the concept of multi-layered diplomacy, a notion that, contrary to most of the para-diplomacy authors, looks at NCGs as actors that exert their external activities in tandem with the central governments’ policies and as an expansion of classical foreign policy.20 Thus, NCGs external relations are regarded in most cases as part of a multi-layered comprehensive foreign policy strategy that simultaneously localizes foreign policy and internationalizes domestic issues. As noted by Chen Zhimin, subnational governments “are pulled by forces beyond national borders and pushed by national governments to play a more visible role in foreign affairs.”21 In the case of Macao, as underlined by Zeng Lingliang, the quality of Macao’s “actorness” in the international system, which is bestowed by the PRC Central Government, doesn’t hamper in any way the scope of action of the sovereign policy. On the contrary, it supplements and enhances China’s status in the global arena. 22 While studying the role of provinces in the external relations of China, Chen Zhimin and Jian Junbo and Chen Diyu argue that “The rise of local or sub-national foreign policy actors in China indicates that a new multi-layered foreign policy system has (re) emerged in China. Within it, the central government remains as the dominating actor in China’s foreign relations; nevertheless, the provinces have

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raised their profile on the international stage, and made themselves important foreign policy players in low-politics areas.”23 Likewise, when analyzing Macao’s external relations, especially the Macao Forum, one shall not adopt a dichotomous view of central-local relations as the roles of Beijing and the MSAR are not in conflict. On the contrary: Macao’s role is clearly defined by Beijing as a complement to its multilayered diplomatic framework.

Soft Power and China-led Multilateralism Since the mid-1990s, China began a shift in its strategy and behavior as a player in the international arena. During the last 15 years, Beijing has been pursuing a multi-level and sophisticated diplomacy, strengthening bilateral and multilateral linkages worldwide. In East Asia, China deepened its relations with Southeast Asia, both bilaterally and by participating in regional organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum 24 and the ASEAN+3 Process (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea). In 1996, with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, China launched what was then denominated “Shanghai Five”, a multilateral device created to enhance confidence building measures and cooperation on cross-border issues, later baptized as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with Turkmenistan also a member state, and various Central and South Asian nations as observer states). In 2000, China set up an even more ambitious mechanism: the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), bringing together China and 48 among the 50 African countries that have diplomatic relations with Beijing. FOCAC’s formation is a watershed in Sino-African relations, not only because of the mechanism's originality but also because since then bilateral diplomatic, trade and economic relations have increased dramatically. Following the FOCAC footsteps, the Macao Forum, launched in 2003, adds a new layer to China’s external relations, setting up an innovative mechanism that links the world’s most important emerging economic powerhouse with a heterogonous group of nations sharing a common official language. Locating its headquarters in an autonomous region, the MSAR, is in itself a new

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polity in global politics. In 2004, Beijing’s multilateral outreach extended to the Arab world. While PRC President Hu Jintao visited the League of State Arab secretariat in Cairo, the Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum (SACF) was established to bring together China and the 22 Arab nations of the League. China has been at the forefront of other new multilateral inter-regional arrangements like the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), an initiative launched in 1996 as a gathering of seven ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea and the EU member states. With the world major powers, including Russia, USA and the EU, China set up strategic partnerships and developed networks of multi-level dialogue. In several multilateral platforms, Beijing has a flexible approach and understanding of multilateralism, with differentiated objectives for each mechanism. Yong Deng underlines China’s three main goals in its multilateral ventures, especially in what concerns the developing world: 25 First, to promote social and economic development at home. Second, as a way to undermine the “China Threat” theories and advance international recognition of China as a “responsible great power”. Indeed, institutions are important instruments in international relations, particularly for those nations that strive for stability and predictability. As noted by Lisa Martin, “The entire point of institutions is to embody norms and rules, and thus to induce more certainty and predictability in patterns of international interactions.” 26 China relies on international institutions to reassure the outside world of its peaceful intentions. Third, to restrain “potential hostile powers from gaining initiative in shaping the international environment.”27 On the other hand, by embracing institutions and multilateralism, even if only due to desires to maximize political and economic power, China may end up not only shaping but also being shaped by the institutionalist logic, “even if China’s political elites started out with present materialist goals in mind, the multilateral processes inevitably have changed what they view as appropriate, credible and sound policy choices.”28 Joshua Kurlantzick describes China’s stance in world affairs and informal diplomatic initiatives as a “charm offensive.”29 Based on Joseph Nye’s soft power, Kurlantzick broadens this concept to include formal diplomacy and investments as China’s soft power

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instruments in its “charm offensive”. Following Nye, “soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. It is leading by example and attracting others to do what you want.”30 China’s soft power has been unleashed in multiple ways, anchored in “win-win” rhetoric and in the global promotion of Chinese language and culture worldwide. China’s charm offensive in the 2000s coincided with the USA decline. The Chinese strategy was intensified and thrust into the mainstream when Chinese officials promoted in their discourse the concept of peaceful rise (heping jueqi), later reframed and altered to peaceful development (heping fazhan) because of the potentially pejorative impact of the word “Rise”. What is behind this strategy of disseminating soft power? Kurlantzick believes the PRC leadership decided to promote a peaceful rise in recognition of their fragile hard power and probable failure if a tougher stance were adopted. Hence, “Peace would foster prosperity, providing opportunities for Chinese companies to seek overseas outlets for their goods, allowing resources like oil to flow in and out of China unimpeded and paving the way for China to build its own national science and technology capabilities.”31 Zheng Bijiang sums up China’s stance as follows: “China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs. It advocates a new international political and economic order, one that can be achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of international relations. China’s development depends on world peace—a peace that its development will in turn reinforce.”32 While studying how and why China set mechanisms for multilateral cooperation such as the FOCAC and SACF, Nicola Cossetti argues that these endeavors fall under a Chinese design of strategic social construction that is “defined as the effort of one player to persuade the other player to alter its utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the norms entrepreneur.”33 Authors of constructivist persuasion could argue that through instruments like FOCAC, Macao Forum and SACF, China also instills a looming narrative capable of upholding a sort of collective inter-subjective identity over time.

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China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries Angola and Brazil represent 96% of China’s trade with the Lusophone countries. However, it is not accurate to conclude that China’s foreign policy is completely proportional to trade statistics. It is clear about how Brazil and Angola top Beijing’s priorities in its relations with the Portuguese Speaking Countries. China has strong and deep bilateral ties with each one of the Portuguese speaking countries (with the exception of Sao Tome and Principe due to its official links with Taipei). Brazil and Angola are of paramount importance to China, as they are the major partners of China in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. For different motives, the other Lusophone countries also play important roles in China’s foreign relations, either for economic reasons or for political motives. Figure 2. China-PSC Trade (2012) in Proportion

Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, via Forum for Economic and Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries website, in http://www.forumchinaplp.org.mo/pt/notice.aspx?a=20110131_02.

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Chinese foreign policy deals mostly bilaterally with these countries, despite having the Macao Forum, a multilateral instrument under the Ministry of Commerce but not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With a combined population of 230 million spread throughout four continents, the Lusophone states are diverse in size, economy, geopolitical relevance and culture. They share the same past, former parts of Portugal’s overseas empire, and the same official language Portuguese.

Figure 3. 2010 China-PSC bilateral trade (billion US dollars)

Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, via Forum for Economic and Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries website, in http://www.forumchinaplp.org.mo/pt/notice.aspx?a=20110131_02

13. Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries

Macao Forum: A “Sophisticated” Mechanism The Portuguese Speaking nations form their own forum, the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP, Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries), an intergovernmental organ established in 1996 and Lisbon based. But China’s multilateral dialogue framework bypassed CPLP. There are two main reasons why Beijing did so. Firstly, Sao Time and Principe’s diplomatic ties with Taipei have ruled out the possibility for a China-CPLP forum. Secondly, China would always prefer to create a new mechanism as a Chinese initiative. This was the case of the China-Africa Forum and is the same for the Macao Forum. Beijing also has dialogue frameworks with the EU and ASEAN, but those organizations are of different nature and importance as compared to CPLP. So the Macao Forum was born, in 2003, a novelty in international relations, as it links an emerging world power with a group of states sharing the same official language. As underlined by Ian Storey and Loro Horta, “Having relations with CPLP members is hardly unique, but China’s methods are quite farsighted, attesting to the increasing sophistication of Chinese diplomacy. Unlike other powers who have engaged in close relations with particular CPLP countries—but had little or no interaction with other members—China not only connects with the various CPLP nations on a bilateral basis but also as a group.”34 The Macao Forum again shows China’s multifaceted approach to world affairs and Beijing’s flexibility and sophistication. The Macao Forum has a unique nature also because it was established in the MSAR that is itself, along with Hong Kong, a new polity. After the previous section explains how important is the PRC-PSC relation, here it answers the other key questions of this chapter: Why China decided to set up the Macao Forum? Why in Macao? What is the added value of Macao in this process? China would not need the Macao Forum to deepen its relations with the PSC. The outcomes of this relationship in terms of investment and trade are to a great extent independent of the Macao Forum. In fact, China does not need Macao to seal the business deals with Angola, Brazil and Mozambique. If this is the case, why bother to set up a mechanism like the Macao Forum? There are

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several motives for this option. First, as seen in the China-Africa Forum, summitry is a good way to prevent potential adversities to coalesce against China. As noted by Yong Dong, multilateral diplomacy allows China to be recognized as a responsible great power.35 Multilateral forum enable China to emerge as a responsible and generous partner that symbolically brings all the countries on stage at the same level. The Macao Forum is part of China’s “charm offensive” as Kurlantzick describes by using soft power means and diplomacy to improve China’s image and to promote its profile in countries where Beijing is investing heavily.36 By adding a multilateral dimension to the bilateral sphere China adds a new layer, a Forum where China is always the host and promoter. Second, the Macao Forum can persuade Sao Tome and Principe to abandon its Taipei ties and set up linkages with Beijing. By showing how much each Lusophone country is benefiting from its Beijing links, Beijing may seduce this “renegade” PSC. At the Second Ministerial Session in 2006, a Sao Tome and Principe official was invited as observer: His presence was supposedly unofficial and discrete, but it was indeed an important fact at this meeting and perhaps a signal for gradual change. Third, Macao has a long history of relations with the other former Portuguese colonies. Macao was the first European port in East Asia, in the mid-16th century. For over two centuries (before the foundation of Hong Kong), it was the hub of the Europe-Africa-South Asia-East Asia trade, a key harbor of globalization. In the 1950s and 1960s, aiming to boost Macao’s industrial sector, the Portuguese regime promoted trade with African colonies. The local industrialists, mostly in textile and garment, benefited from duty-free policies. As a consequence Angola and Mozambique, Africa’s most important Portuguese colonies, became a major destination for Macao exports. In the 1970s–1980s Lusophone Africa lost its place as Macao’s major trade partner after their independence and subsequent civil wars. By then the European Economic Community (EEC) became a more attractive market, as Macao profited from the Multi-Fibre Agreement. At a different level, during the last decade before the handover, Macao developed ties with other Lusophone cities, at a municipal level, through sister

13. Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries

cities agreements and by taking part in UCCLA, an NGO registered with the United Nations, joining together the city governments or municipalities of former and current capital cities of Lusophone countries and territories. After the 1999 revision and based on Macao’s historical features, Beijing decided to develop economic relations in new fields involving the PSC. Fourthly, as Macao was opening its gambling market to foreign investors (especially US casino firms), and becoming the world’s top gaming hub in terms of revenues, China wanted to give Macao an special role within the PRC, changing the MSAR profile from a mere gaming city into both a Sino-Lusophone cooperation platform and also a gateway to the PRD. The Macao Forum gave Macao another international dimension besides being the world’s top casino city as it has been labelled “Asia’s Las Vegas”. The Forum also reinforced Macao’s distinctiveness. As Moisés Silva Fernandes says “The Forum reinforces the autonomy and uniqueness of Macao vis-à-vis Guangdong and Hong Kong.” 37 This has indeed been an opportunity for Macao to develop and explore its para-diplomacy, in articulation with Beijing. And what Macao has to offer as added value to the PRC-PSC relations? At first glance, the MSAR provides good reasons to fulfil the role of a services platform for the Sino-Lusophone economic and commercial relations. First, Portuguese is the second official language alongside Chinese, as agreed by Portugal and China in the Joint Declaration and what is inscribed in the Macao Basic Law. Although Portuguese is only mastered by a tiny minority of the local populace, it is still an important working language in public administration, the legal system and in some public utility companies. All the official documents are translated into Portuguese. Around 40% of Macao civil servants have knowledge of Portuguese. Annually, hundreds of Chinese from Macao and the mainland study Portuguese. They can become a pool of translators for Lusophone companies to deal with China and for Chinese entrepreneurs to enter the Lusophone markets. Macao has some 9,000 Macanese of mixed Portuguese-Asian blood who are bilingual in Chinese and Portuguese and can work as inter-cultural middlemen and bridge link.

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Second, the MSAR juridical system is based on the Portuguese legal system that shares similarities with the French and German codes. As most of the Lusophone countries share this background, Macao is portrayed as the ideal base for Lusophone businessmen as a gateway to China. These companies can use Macao as a platform to set up an office and outsource the local expertise to open the door to the Chinese mainland market. Macao’s economy has been increasingly integrated into the South China Region. This trend has deepened since 2004 with the Pan-PRD Regional Cooperation process. Comprising the nine South China provinces, Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and the HKSAR and the MSAR, this region is home to 460 million people and accounts for over 35% of China’s total economic output. In addition to this cooperation Forum, Macao also benefits from the PRC Mainland-MSAR (Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement), a free trade-like pact between two separate customs territories in a single sovereign state. Macao-based companies benefit from CEPA provisions that deal with trade in goods, trade in services and trade and investment facilitation. Lusophone businessmen may also enlist the support of local public institutions, namely the Macao Trade and Investment Promotion institute (IPIM) and the Macao Forum Permanent Secretariat. The former provides a business support centre with local staff and expertise in the Lusophone and Chinese markets. IPIM provides information and database for contacts between both parties. Every year, IPIM organizes in a Lusophone a Meeting of Entrepreneurs for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Language Countries that links entrepreneurs, government agencies and experts from all the Macao Forum member states. Since 2005, this Meeting was held in Luanda (Angola), Lisbon (Portugal), Maputo (Mozambique), Praia (Cape Verde) and Rio de Janeiro ( Brazil). Interestingly, in 2009, in addition to the Macao and PRC mainland delegations, a group of Guangdong entrepreneurs and officials attended the meeting. This indicated a new dynamic in China’s strategy. Macao by itself has limited business opportunities as the local economy is too dependent on the gaming-tourism-service sectors, the MSAR delegation was attached to neighboring Guangdong, China’s most dynamic powerhouse province.

13. Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries

In the 2003, 2006 and 2010 Forum ministerial conferences were held in Macao, drawing the PRC and PSC trade and economy ministers. At the conferences, they approved Action Plans to be actualized in the next three years. In 2003, the First Ministerial Conference agreed to strengthen Sino-Lusophone economic cooperation, intergovernmental cooperation, trade, investment and entrepreneurial cooperation, fish and agriculture, engineering and infrastructures building, natural resources, human resources. In 2006, new cooperative areas were added: financial service (multilateral), Macao Forum financial cooperation mechanisms, tourism, transports, direct air links and sea routes, pharmaceutics and cooperation against infectious diseases, science and technology, media cooperation, promotion of China’s image in the Lusophone bloc; PSC cultures in China as well as people-to- people links.

The 2010 Ministerial Conference: New Impetus The 3rd ministerial conference held in Macao on 18–19 November 2010 took the Sino-Lusophone cooperation to new heights. PRC Premier Wen Jiabao, presided the opening ceremony and delivered a speech in line with Beijing’s diplomatic charm offensive as he promised a USD1 billion development fund—which only came into fruition almost three years later—a 1.6 billion Yuan credit line, cooperation in human resources training, medical equipment and lofty words that pleased the Lusophone bloc officials. Moreover, the Forum boosts Macao’s symbolic role as, a SAR of China and a platform for China’s relations with the Lusophone world. Attending the conference for the first time were three Lusophone chiefs of government (Portugal, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique) and one head of state, president of East Timor José Ramos Horta. Also for the first time, China’s Premier joined the ministerial conference, after Vice Premier Wu Yi in 2003 and Commerce Minister Bo Xilai in 2006. Seven years after its inception, the Macao Forum has become a complementary instrument in China´s foreign relations adding a multilateral dimension to Beijing’s existing bilateral ties with seven

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of the eight Lusophone states that took part in the Forum, except Sao Tome and Principe due to of its diplomatic ties with Taipei. After years of not-much-more-than-high-rhetoric, the Macao Forum seemed ready to leap forward, taking into account Wen Jiabao’s proposals from. Trade continues to be the cornerstone of their economic relations. Since 2003 PRC-Lusophone bloc trade increased seven-fold. In his speech, Premier Wen set a trade target of reaching USD100 billion in 2013, a not unrealistic goal as trade reached US$91 billion in 2010. But the main purpose of the 2010 ministerial conference was to go beyond the Sino-Lusophone “shopping spree” but to focus on investment and to engage more private firms. The conference’s theme, “Diversified Cooperation, Harmonious Development" mirrored Beijing’s core approach to Sino-Lusophone cooperation. In a sense, the Macao Forum follows the footsteps of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) launched in 2000. It is noteworthy to stress that only a few days after the ministerial conference in Macao, PRC Vice President and heir apparent to Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping, mounted a tour of Africa, visiting South Africa, Angola and Botswana, 38 where China signalled its intention to upgrade FOCAC, after two years of lower profile. After Xi’s visit to Luanda, China and Angola announced their decision to establish strategic partnership to continue shoring up bilateral cooperation. A week before the Macao conference, PRC President Hu Jintao visited France and Portugal, two EU states with whom Beijing has established comprehensive strategic partnerships. In Lisbon, Hu offered a helping hand to Portugal’s struggling economy as Portuguese and Chinese companies signed deals in infrastructure, renewable energy and tourism worth USD1 billion. This signals a coordinated effort by PRC leaders to honor two of the three top PSC partners, Portugal and Angola. The interface with China’s top Lusophone partner, Brazil, was handled differently. Brazil was the only PSC that did not send a minister to the Macao conference as its representative Luiz Carneiro de Mendonça was Foreign Ministry deputy secretary-general. The Brazilian delegation downplayed the absence of a higher official, citing the transition from outgoing president Lula da Silva to new president Dilma Rousseff as the reason. Yet, this it is not the first time that Brazil has undervalued

13. Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries

Macao Forum’s importance. In the past decade, diplomats and businessmen involved in this process have privately criticized Brazil’s Macao Forum as half-hearted.39 The proposals rolled out by Premier Wen at the 3rd ministerial conference were expected to elevate the Forum’s status by putting the action where words have been. Wen set the tone in his speech when he emphasized that both sides should expand bilateral trade to reach USD100 billion by 2013, push forward two-way investment, explore new fields of cooperation and take full advantage of Macao as a platform. China put forth six main measures that were included in Economic and Trade Cooperation Action Plan 2010–2013 signed by the trade ministers of China and PSC. These include a USD1 billion cooperation and development fund to be set up by financial institutions from Beijing and Macao; a 1.6 billion Yuan concessional loan scheme; providing materials, equipment and technical personnel; training 1,500 officials and technical personnel at a training center to be established in Macao, offering 1,000 one-year government scholarships for studying in China; and donating 10 million Yuan worth of medical equipment. Aside from the first measure, all proposals address the “Asian and African members of the Forum”.40 This means that China clearly looks at Brazil and Portugal separately as the most developed PSC. Wen also said that the Forum’s “eight brothers” are at different stages of development and it is the common responsibility of all Forum members to help the less developed Lusophone states expedite development and lift themselves from poverty.41 The 2010–2013 Action Plan also emphasizes the need to deepen cooperation in various sectors. Cooperation in the financial sector is seen as a key to boost economic ties, while media and culture activities are regarded as important means to promote exchange of knowledge and raise PSC’s image in China and vice versa. Cooperation is set to be strengthened in areas covered by previous Action Plans signed in past ministerial conferences: intergovernmental cooperation, investment and entrepreneurial cooperation, fishing and agriculture, engineering and infrastructure construction, natural resources, human resources, tourism, transports, direct air links and sea routes, pharmaceutics and

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cooperation against infectious diseases, science and technology and people-to- people links.

2013 Conference: More Tools for Cooperation Contrary to what happened in the previous Ministerial Conference, the 2013 conclave was not presided over by a Premier of the Central Government’s State Council, but by Vice Premier Wang Yang who worked closely with both Macao and Hong Kong between 2007 and 2012, while Guangdong Province Communist Party Chief. In his address, in the opening ceremony, Wang Yang mapped out eight new measures, in line with what Wen Jiabao had announced three years earlier, aimed at strengthening the Sino-Lusophone ties, again targeting mostly Asian and African Portuguese Speaking Countries. These include 1.8 billion preferential loans—prioritizing infrastructure construction and production projects—establish overseas economic and trade cooperation zones, provide aid construction with one education training facility and contribute one solar-powered lighting application project and a batch of broadcast, television and news equipment; train 2,000 skilled personnel; provide 1,800 government scholarships; dispatch 210 person-times of medical personnel; establish an information-sharing platform in Macao for bilingual talents, enterprise cooperation and communication; and carry out trilateral cooperation in education and training, agriculture, environmental protection and new energy. The non-African and Asian Portuguese Speaking countries—Portugal and Brazil—were encompassed in China’s differentiated approach to the Lusophone bloc. The Minister of Commerce of China stated that the Forum would encourage trilateral partnerships involving China, Brazil and Portugal and the remaining Portuguese Speaking Countries. In addition, the 2014–2016 Action Plan spells out an expansion of the areas or cooperation, with an emphasis on urban planning, sister cities agreements and at the people-to-people level more youth exchanges. As for the role of Macao as a platform, the Ministerial

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Conference agreed to consider supporting the establishment three Macao-based business centers: a service center for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises; a Sino-Lusophone Conventions and Exhibitions Center; and a distribution center for Portuguese Speaking Countries’’ food products.

The Institutional Framework of the Forum The ministerial conferences are the top body of the Forum’s institutional structure. In the meetings, held every three years, China and PSC ministers of commerce have their final say on the Action Plan proposal and ink the document that serves as guideline for cooperation in the next three years. The Permanent Secretariat is the Macao Forum’s executive arm of the. The Secretariat is responsible for assuring the logistic and finance support for the multilateral initiatives. Between ministerial conferences, the yearly ordinary meeting of the Permanent Secretariat is the highest-level organ.42 The ordinary meeting is chaired by the Permanent Secretariat Secretary-General and includes the Assistant Secretary-Generals, ambassadors of PSC accredited to Beijing, officials from the PRC Commerce Ministry’s Department of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs, delegates of PSC and coordinators of the offices under the Permanent Secretariat. Decisions are taken on consensus reached. The Secretariat is composed of a Secretary-General nominated by China (Ministry of Commerce) and three Assistant Secretary-Generals (ASG) designated by the PSC, MSAR and Beijing’s MOFCOM. The ASG representing the PRC central government (which has been vacant since the post was created in 2008) should be responsible for the liaison between the Permanent Secretariat and the relevant departments and bureaus in the PRC government and mainland Chinese firms and institutions. Macao’s designated ASG connects the Permanent Secretariat with the MSAR government, while the ASG appointed by the PSC is responsible for the liaison with the “focal points” in the central governments of the Lusophone countries and for the coordination of the tasks

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undertaken by the Liaison Office that includes a delegate from each PSC. The Administrative Office is composed of officials appointed by the MOFCOM and is in charge of promoting linkages between the MOFCOM and the PSC, while the Supporting Office which manages the funds to finance all costs related to the Secretariat and activities carried out under the Forum umbrella.43 While analyzing the balance of power within the Permanent Secretariat, Sofia Gaspar quotes PSC officials saying that the Administrative Office “runs the show”, the Supporting Office “pays the bill”, and the PSC delegates are “mere spectators”44. So what kind of body is the Macao Forum? As noted by Ana Cristina Alves, even though all the member countries sent to Macao a resident representative to become part of the Permanente Secretariat, “this Forum is not a traditional multilateral organization so much as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy.” Alves underscores that before the ministerial conferences, “trade and cooperation agreements within this Forum are reached on a bilateral basis and China negotiates with each country separately.”45 It should then be regarded as a mechanism to coordinate and promote cooperation, moderately institutionalized. The Forum carries elements of multilateralism if one considers Robert Keohane’s nominal concept: “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states,”46 in accordance with certain principles. The Forum may not be a traditional organization but it embodies several features of multilateralism “with Chinese characteristics, as part of the broader China-led multilateralism.” As a matter of fact, institutions matter. The institutionalization of mechanisms of dialogue via the Macao Forum plays an important role in China’s strategy to promote mutual trust in order to boost China’s political influence over these countries. This would then turn into a more favourable environment for business and political agreements and would ultimately be reflected in the countries’ stance regarding China in the International system.47 The Secretariat has been actively involved in the organization of trade and investment seminars, courses, supporting PSC business delegations in trade fairs and exhibitions in mainland China and PSC.

13. Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries Figure 4. Macao Forum Organizational Chart

In addition to trade and economic events, Macao has also been hosting other kind of activities, linking China and the PSC in different sectors. Since 2003, the MSAR has hosted conferences on the aviation industry, television broadcasting, central banks, academic seminars, cultural events and music and gastronomy festivals. The Permanent Secretariat and the MSAR Government are usually either directly or indirectly involved while those events are portrayed as part of the growing PRC-PSC partnership with Macao as a platform. Thus, dozens of officials, business leaders, professionals and intellectuals from mainland China, Macao and PSC have been engaged in meetings, seminars, exhibitions or other kind of events on a regular basis. Civil society has also been engaged in this process. Citizens from the different Lusophone states who live and work in Macao created or re-activated associations to promote their countries’ culture in Macao and mainland China. In the private sector, businessmen set up a Sino-Lusophone chamber of commerce, Associação Comercial Internacional para os Mercados Lusófonos (ACIML). In reality, what is the Macao Forum’s output? Macao-Lusophone bloc trade has steadily increased.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Figure 5. Macao-PSC Trade — 2009 (million $US)

Source: Data compiled from Macao SAR Statistics and Census Service, in www.dsec.gov.mo/NCEM.aspx, access date: November 30, 2011.

It is not easy to single out Macao’s contribution to spurring Sino-Lusophone economic relations. It is true that the PRC-PSC trade has enjoyed seven-fold increase since 2003, when the Macao Forum was established. But what was the share of the Macao connections in this process? Directly, not much for sure. The lion share of Sino-Lusophone trade is carried out by the big corporations, often Chinese state-owned enterprises. The same happens with large scale investments, conducted at a state-to-state level. There is scant information on Macao’s quantitative contribution. The only figure was reported by Macao Business magazine, during 2003–2008 participants in the meetings organized by IPIM and the Macao Forum Secretariat signed many investment deals and trade agreements totalling USD5 billion. Most of these agreements were import and export contracts “Companies from mainland China and Portuguese-speaking countries have signed contracts and agreements on the import and export of goods such as marble, wood, spices, wine, frozen meat, mineral water, electronic products and medicines. Deals have also been done on tourism services and the setting up of factories.”48 Nevertheless, there were various cases of Macao-based or

13. Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries

Macao-linked firms that set up or increased their business in China and several Lusophone states since the Macao Forum’s 2003 birth. The most notable case is Geocapital Goldings. Since 2005 the partnership between Macao gambling tycoon Stanley Ho and Portuguese investor Jorge Ferro Ribeiro has been widening its web. Currently they have investments in all the PSC (except Sao Tome and Principe) Brazil, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau, Portugal, Cape Verde and East Timor. Being a Macao-based joint venture of a Portuguese investor and a HK/MSAR Chinese tycoon, Geocapital is the best example of what the Macao Forum intends to become. Geocapital thus leads the way to actualize the rhetoric of Macao as a Sino-Luisophone bloc platform. Their strategy is, according to Ferro Ribeiro, to “work in the heart of the economy in each country where it operates”, as “the financial and energetic resources are a crucial basis for all economic activities.”49 They started their operations in Mozambique through Moza Banco and Moza Capital, in partnership with Moçambique Capitais. These institutions work on project management and investment banking. Geocapital is also involved with Zambcorp, a firm in charge of exploring business opportunities in the Zambeze Valley, a region in Mozambique very rich in natural resources. In Angola, Geocapital carries out its business through Geopactum, a joint venture with Global Pactum, a joint venture with Sonangol’s Global Pactum. In 2011, both companies set up in Macao Geopactum Oriente that, according to its chairman, aimed at driving “business between the Portuguese-speaking world and the Far East” and “with the Macao Forum spirit.” 50 In Brazil, Geocapital invested in partnership with the Portuguese airlines TAP to acquire the Brazilian aeronautics engineering and maintenance company VEM. In Guinea Bissau, after taking over the country´s largest bank, Banco da África Ocidental, Stanley Ho and Ferro Ribeiro set up Geogolfo, a company that will work in agro-industry business and in biofuel production. In East Timor, the firm has set up a bank, Banco Timorense de Investimento, in a country also endowed with rich energy resources like liquefied natural gas and oil. In Cape Verde, they have set their foot in the banking sector after acquiring a part in Caixa Económica Postal, the country’s largest credit institution. Portugal works, alongside with Macao, as a base

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and platform. In Portugal Geocapital has invested in the biggest private bank, Millenium BCP and in the country’s major energy utility company EDP Energias de Portugal. It also helps to fund a biofuel research and development center. Geocapital is thus the only large scale example of a company created after Macao Forum’s inception by using Macao as a business platform in all PSC countries, pooling the network of Ferro Ribeiro, an experienced investor in Lusophone areas. Before the revision, he had businesses in Macao involving Stanley Ho, Macao’s most influential entrepreneur and a long time investor in Portugal. Without the Macao Forum, Geocapital probably could still run its business, but this mechanism yields a very attractive political environment for these activities. Some even say Stanley Ho was the Macao Forum’s main local driving force.51 Other Macao entrepreneurs have also invested or pledging to invest in Lusophone countries. John Lo plans to invest 60 million MOP in building a hotel in Guinea Bissau, following previous agricultural investments since 2001. In 2006, David Chow announced US$100 million plans to build a resort on the Islet of Santa Maria in Cape Verde. If Sino-Lusophone big business is carried out despite Macao, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can take advantage of the MSAR and use it as a platform. In Macao, they can find experts with knowledge of mainland China market and the PSC opportunities and take advantage of friendly environment. Nonetheless, there is a big gap between what is officially portrayed and the reality on the ground. Macao has the potential to play a useful and complementary role in this process, but there are few examples. Among smaller businessmen, who are eager to promote trade and investment within the PSC-Macao-PRC mainland trio, there is a sense of dismay over local government efforts.52 The MSAR authorities have been keen to officially promote Macao’s role in the PRC-PSC interface, but the direct economic outcome behind the rhetoric is questionable. What it lacks is a more proactive involvement of the MSAR local business community. As stated by Chang Hexi, Secretary-General of the Macao Forum Permanent Secretariat, “Business owners should be more pro-active in taking part in direct

13. Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries

investments and not just as intermediaries.” Thus, one shall also underscore that the government acts as a facilitator and a provider of a friendly business environment. The MSAR authorities cannot run the businesses on their own. But as stressed by Billy Ip Kuai Peng, more attention needed to be devoted to “how to strengthen market research and delivering and distributing information.” 53 Perhaps the fruits can be reaped later as Macao gradually becomes better prepared in terms of human resources, especially regarding bilingual talents and well-qualified young professional specializing in Lusophone economy and culture. To attain these, much more should be done to promote such Lusophone linkages not only overseas and in mainland China but also domestically. Despite its shortcomings, Macao has promoted several Sino-Luso people-to-people events that may have a positive future impact. The successful staging of the fifth Lusophone Games (Jogos da Lusofonia) was a good example of a far-reaching initiative, bringing forth Macao civic society dynamics. Macao was not only the host, but also the main propellant of the 5th Lusophone Games. It has served as headquarters of the Association of Portuguese Speaking Olympic Committees’ permanent secretariat. A number of academic exchanges and PSC cultural festivals were sponsored by the MSAR government, as well as granting scholarships to African Portuguese Speaking students. The annual Lusophone Countries Festival (Festival da Lusofonia) has helped to bringing together in the MSAR many artists, musicians, chefs and writers from the Portuguese Speaking Countries, Macao and mainland China. The event is jointly funded by the Forum Permanent Secretariat and the MSAR Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau. The Macanese communities’ meetings have also been playing a role in Macao’s external relations. Every three years, overseas Macanese based in Australia, Hong Kong, Portugal, Brazil, United States and Canada return to their homeland. The meetings have been fully supported by the MSAR Government. The International Institute of Macao has also been proactively effective in this respect. For the moment, in terms of direct output, the Macao Forum has yielded more political bonus than direct economic gains. Still Macao could be assertive on grasping this opportunity to enhance its international profile not only in official discourse, but also in

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concrete terms. In addition to an overly timid attitude, typical of Macao when it comes to issues involving mainland China, there are other factors hindering a fuller development of the Macao Forum and of Macao as “de facto” platform. Meanwhile, Beijing has tried to move Macao into a deeper economic and commercial relation with the PSC. A good example of this tendency was the three Lusophone nations tour (to Mozambique, Angola and Portugal) of China’s vice-minister of commerce, Jiang Zengwei. In March 2009, he led a Chinese trade and economic delegation and for the first time Macao was invited to join a high ranking mainland China official visit. In assessing the structural aspects of the PRC-MSAR-PSC relations, this process has been a “win-win” game. But in relative terms, the PRCe and to some extend the MSAR authorities have been taking larger economic and political advantages. From the PSC perspectives, the importance of the Forum has been perceived in different ways depending on each country’s relative position vis-à-vis China. Indeed, smaller PSC such as Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and East Timor have been attaching a great deal of importance to the Macao Forum, as their entrepreneurs have enjoyed the opportunity of joining missions organized/sponsored by the Macao Forum Permanent Secretariat to attend trade fairs in mainland China. Figure 6. Macao-China-PSC Relations

13. Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries

This matrix illustrates the intersection between china-PSC and Macao-PSC bilateral relations, the added value of a multilateral mechanism—the Macao Forum—and the international impact on the power projection and profile of Macao and China.

Conclusion The Macao Forum is not only the sum of previous bilateral relations, but itself a new impulse, with some new values added. In addition to generate a common agenda for Sino-Lusophone development, the Macao Forum also creates a sort of regime.54 Not a large-scale institutionalized international regime, but a “lightweight and flexible para-regime”, able to exhale effectively China’s soft power. This “para-regime” is not so much about what it is and what is done under the Macao Forum’s auspices, but more about what it represents. Despite the Forum’s low to moderate level of institutionalization, by using a multilateral institutional mechanism and by advancing the ideas of Sino-Lusophone win-win partnership and Macao as a Platform, Beijing is instilling a looming narrative. Here, ideas and interests walk hand in hand. The ideational dimension crossed with the institutional encounters and the private sector and civil society meetings constitute a relevant inter-subjective dimension that reduces the cultural and symbolic gap between China and the Lusophone countries. All in all, it is also about power. Mutual benefits in a “win-win” situation can bring about a bolder power projection. China emerges from this process as a reliable and responsible partner, and paves the way for keener political support from these countries in the international system. Macao, as the Forum host, projects an external relations identity and is portrayed as an important complement to China’s strategy towards PSCs. Simultaneously, this has been a kind of laboratory for the MSAR’s external relations under the “One Country, Two Systems” formula. The Macao Forum is clearly under the first tier of Neves’external relations framework as it is an example of Policy Formulation: long term definition of objectives and priorities in

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articulation with China’s foreign policy. However, how proactive Macao has been in Policy Formulation and if the MSAR has been able to uphold its own agenda within the PRC’s broader strategy requires further investigation. Nevertheless, as the Macao Forum has to be understood in the light of China’s emergence as the world’s number two economic powerhouse and global actor, preliminary finds point to an emphasis on the Forum as part of China’s multi-layered diplomacy and Soft Power charm offensive. As for the external relations of Macao, the Forum definitely raises the international profile of Macao, but it is not yet clear what’s left for a substantial expansion of its own external space as a sub-state actor.

Notes 1. According to Article 31: “The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions”. See “Constitution of the People's Republic of China”. Accessed on June 28, 2009: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. 2. “Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and The Government of the Republic of Portugal on the question of Macao”, Imprensa Oficial de Macao, 1995. 3. Neves, Miguel Santos, idem, ibidem. 4. Data from the Macao Year Book 2012, pp. http://www.gcs.gov.mo/files/factsheet/External_EN.pdf.

184,

571–587.

5. Data from the Macao Government Printing Bureau. Accessed on 3 December 2012 from: http://en.io.gov.mo/Legis/International/2.aspx. 6. Neves, Miguel Santos (2002), “Macao and Europe: The Challenges of the Paradiplomacy Games”, China Perspectives, nº44, November-December 2002, p. 61. 7. Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in the Macao Special Administrative Region. Accessed on February 14, 2011 from: http://www.fmcoprc.gov.mo/ eng/gjzzhy/t189359.htm.

13. Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries 8. Macao and the EU hold regular high-level contacts and have been cooperating in several fields. The relationship is based on the “Agreement for Trade and Cooperation between the European Economic Community and Macao” signed in Luxemburg on June 15th 1992. For a broad perspective on the framework of the relations between Macao and the EU, see Neves, Miguel Santos ,op. cit.; Sales Marques, José Luís (2008) “Macao and Hong Kong in the context of EU-China relations”, Jean Monnet Conference - The European Union at 50: Assessing The Past, looking Ahead", University of Macao, May 10, 2008; Neves, Miguel Santos & Bridges, Brian (Eds) (2000) Europe, China and the Two SARS: Towards A New Era, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 9. Neves, Miguel Santos (1998) “The External Relations of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, June 1998, Lisbon. Accessed on February 4, 2011: http://www.ieei.pt/files/THE_EXTERNAL_RELATIONS_OF_THE_HO NGKONG_SPECIAL_ADMINISTRATIVE_REGION.pdf. 10. Neves, idem, ibidem, p. 19. 11. Waltz, Kenneth Neal. (1979), Theory of international politics. Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., p.125. 12. See Aguirre, Iñaki (1989) “Making Sense of Paradiplomacy” in Francisco Aldecoa & Michael Keating (Eds), Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign relations of Subnational Governments, London and Portland: Frank Cass. 13. For a thorough analysis on the different dimensions of paradiplomacy, see Duchaek, Ivo D. (1986), The Territory Dimension of Politics: Within, Among and Across Nations, Boulder and London: Westview Press. 14. Michael Keating, “Regions and International Affairs: Motives, opportunities and Strategies” in Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, London: Frank Cass, 1999, p. 4. 15. Aguirre, Iñaki, idem, ibidem, p. 205. 16. Barry Bartmann “In or Out: Sub-national Island Jurisdictions and the Antechamber of Para-diplomacy” The Round Table, 95(386), September 2006, pp. 541–559. 17. Wolff, Stefan, (2007) “Paradiplomacy: Scope, Opportunities and Challenges”, BC Journal of International Affairs, Volume 10, Spring 2007. Accessed on June 28, 2009: http://bcjournal.org/2007/ paradiplomacy/. 18. La Palombara, J. (1989) “International Firms and National Governments: Some Dilemmas”, The Washington Quarterly, 17(2), pp. 89–99. As quoted in Brian Hocking, “Patrolling the Frontier: Globalization and the Actorness of Non-Central governments”, in Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments”, London: Frank Cass, p. 19. 19. Neves, Miguel Santos (2002) “Macao and Europe: The Challenges of the

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century Paradiplomacy Games” China Perspectives, nº44, November–December 2002, pp. 54–66. 20. Hocking, Brian, Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy, London, UK: The MacMillan Press Limited, 1993, p. 26. 21. Chen Zhimin, (2005) “Coastal Provinces and China’s Foreign policy-making”, in Yufan Hao & lin Su (eds.) China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005. Accessed on February 14, 2011 from: http://www.irchina.org/en/pdf/czm5.pdf. 22. See Zeng, Lingliang, “ A Qualidade do Sujeito de Direito Internacional da Região Administrativa” in Wei Dan, Os Países de Língua Portuguesa e a China num Mundo Globalizado, Almedina: Coimbra, 2009. 23. Chen, Zhimin, Jian, Junbo & Chen, Dia]]yu, (2010) “The Provinces and China’s Multi-Layered Diplomacy: The Cases of GMS and Africa”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 5 (2010) 1–26. See also Cheung, T. Y. Peter & Tang, T. H. James, (2001), “The External Relations of China’s Provinces”, in Lampton, Davis (Ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, pp. 91–120. 24. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an informal Forum gathering 23 countries: the ten ASEAN member states, the ten ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, United States, India, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Russia and the EU) and one ASEAN observer, Papua New Guinea. 25. Deng, Yong (2008). China’s Struggle for Status: The realignment of International relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 233–237. 26. Martin, Lisa L. (1999). “An Institutionalist View: International Institutions and State Strategies” in T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (Eds.) International Order and the Future of World Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 91. 27. Deng, op. Cit. p. 237. 28. Idem, Ibidem, p. 244. 29. Kurlantzick Joshua (2007) Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft power is Transforming the World. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 30. Nye Jr., Joseph S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, pp. 5–6. 31. Kurlantzick, op cit, pp 38–39. 32. Zheng Bijiang, (2005). “China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005. Retrieved April 2011 from:

13. Macao, China and Portuguese Speaking Countries http://www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=397. 33. Nicola Cossetti, (2009), “Experiments In Soft Balancing: China- Led Multilateralism In Africa and The Arab World”, Caucasian Review Of International Affairs Vol. 3 (4) – Autumn 2009, p. 432. 34. Storey, Ian and Horta, Loro (2006) ,“China’s Portuguese Connection”, YaleGlobal, 22 June 2006, in http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id =7634, access date May 2008. 35. Deng, Yong (2008), China’s Struggle for Status: The realignment of International relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 36. See Kurlantzick Joshua (2007), Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft power is Transforming the World. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 37. As quoted in Matias, José Carlos (2008), "Cementing Sino-Luso Relations", Macao Business, October 2008., in http://www.Macaobusiness.com/news.asp?newID=818&categoryID=5&c ateName=ECONOMY, access date January 14, 2009. 38. See Global Times, “Chinese vice president calls for stronger FOCAC”, November 19 2010: http://china.globaltimes.cn/diplomacy/2010-11/ 594088.html. In a Seminar on the 10th anniversary of FOCAC, Xi called for joint efforts to make FOCAC stronger and to strengthen the development of a new type of Sino-African partnership. 39. Based on interviews with PSC officials and diplomats. 40. Macao Government Information Bureau, “China rolls out six measures to help developing Portuguese-speaking countries”: http://202.175.87.29/ web/guest/info_detail?infoid=99682. 41. Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal (2010), “China proposes measures to assist less-developed Portuguese-speaking countries”, November 13, 2010: http://www.gov.cn/english/2010–11/13/ content_1744946.htm. 42. Under a proposal by any of the participant countries, the Permanent Secretariat may hold an extraordinary meeting. 43. Permanent Secretariat of Macao Forum (2008) “Regulamento de Funcionamento do Secretariado Permanente do Fórum para a Cooperação Económica e Comercial entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa (Macao)”, March 10, 2008. Accessed on May 1, 2011: http://www.forumchinaplp.org.mo/pt/notice.aspx?a=20080318_03. 44. Sofia Gaspar (2008), “Fórum de Macao: um Novo Instrumento de Política Externa da República Popular da China?”, Dissertação Apresentada ao Programa de Mestrado em Relações Internacionais para a Obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Relações Internacionais, Faculdade de economia da Universidade de Coimbra, Estudo Geral: repositório digital da produção científica da Universidade de Coimbra., p. 60. Accessed on April 27: https://estudogeral.sib.uc.pt/jspui/handle/10316/12088.

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century 45. Ana Cristina Alves, “Chinese economic Diplomacy in Africa: The Lusohone Strategy”, In Chris Alde, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, China returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, p. 76. 46. Keohane, Robert (1990), “Multilateralism: An Agenda for research”, International Journal, Autumn 1990, 45, p. 731. 47. See Gaspar, op cit, p. 91. 48. Matias, op cit. 49. As quoted in Matias, José Carlos, “A league of their own”, Macao Business, September 2008. Accessed on June 20, 2009: http://www.Macaobusiness.com/news.asp?newID=876&categoryID=5&c ateName=ECONOMY. 50. MacaoHub, “Company created in Macao to boost business between Far East and Portuguese-speaking countries”, February 20, 2011. Accessed in May 1, 2011: http://www.Macaohub.com.mo/en/2011/02/22/ company-created-in-Macao-to-boost-business-between-far-east-and-portu guese-speaking-countries. 51. Based on interviews with entrepreneurs and officials in Macao. 52. Interview with Macao-based SMEs. 53. As quoted in Matias, José Carlos, (2010), “Macao China and Portuguese Speaking Countries: Ever closer partnership”, Macao Magazine, July 2010. Accessed on May 1, 2011: http://www.macaomagazine.net/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=90:macao-china-and-p ortuguese-speaking-countries&catid=39:issue-4. 54. Here we use regime in the same vein as John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil. They argue that regimes not only have regulatory purposes, but also have a constitutive dimension. See Friedrich V. Kratowil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: a State of the Art on an Art of the State”, International Organization, 40, 1986, pp. 764–766.

14 The USA Patriot Act and the Banco Delta Asia Case in Macao Minxing ZHAO

Introduction As a legal response to the 11 September 2001 “9/11” terrorist attacks, the USA Patriot Act was passed by the US Congress to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world. To this end, the Patriot Act strengthens US measures to prevent, detect and prosecute international money laundering and financing of terrorism. Section 311 of the Act empowers the US Secretary of the Treasury to take “special measures” against foreign banks, other countries, or specific types of accounts or transactions the Secretary determines to be “of primary money laundering concern.” Since its inception, the extraterritorial application of Section 311 received little attention until the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) case in Macao when the US Department of Treasury in autumn 2005 imposed special measures on the small Macao private commercial bank for its alleged involvements in facilitating North Korea’s illicit financial activities. Compared with previous Section 311 cases, there is every indication that the BDA case is by far the strongest expression of the extraterritorial power of Section 311 and the impact of the US regulatory actions can still be felt in Macao today (Macao Daily Times, 7 September 2011). In addition to reviewing the background and the process of the 365

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Section 311 rulings on BDA, this chapter will also discuss the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) government’s responses to the US regulatory actions. In particular, the US objectives that made the BDA case a notable application of the Section 311 provisions are highlighted. This Chapter explains that the real aim of the US government to target BDA was not exclusively to effect a cracking down on the bank’s alleged illicit financial activities, but rather largely centered on realizing its foreign policy objectives. This and other factors combined together to indicate that even though this BDA case brought significant reputational damages to Macao, the case seems now to be an isolated incident without affecting Macao as a whole in a longer term perspective.

Section 311 and Its Applications The Patriot Act’s Section 311 deals with “Special Measures for Jurisdictions, Financial Institutions, or International Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern.” Under Section 311, the US Secretary of Treasury is authorized to impose any of the five regulatory restrictions, known as “special measures”, individually, jointly, in any combination and in any sequence upon finding that a foreign jurisdiction, financial institution, or any certain transaction or account is “of primary money laundering concern.” These five types of special measures include requiring: 1. recordkeeping transactions;

and

reporting

of

certain

financial

2. collection of information relating to beneficial ownership; 3. collection of information payable-through accounts;

relating

to

certain

4. collection of information relating to certain correspondent accounts; 5. prohibition or conditions on the opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts.

14. The USA Patriot Act and the Banco Delta Asia Case in Macao

These special measures range from enhanced record keeping or reporting obligations to a requirement to terminate correspondent banking relations with the designated entity. Four of them impose information-gathering or record-keeping requirements on US financial institutions dealing either directly with the jurisdiction designated as “primary money laundering concern”, or dealing with those having direct dealings with the designated jurisdiction. Under the fifth special measure, a US financial institution may be prohibited from opening or maintaining in the US a correspondent or payable-through account for a foreign financial institution if the account involves the designee. Taken as a whole, these measures are meant to provide the US Treasury Department with a range of options to bring additional pressure on institutions that pose specific money laundering threats (Doyle, 2001). The process of imposing special measures under Section 311 is divided into four stages including: “Finding” stage, “Proposed Rulemaking” stage, “Final Rule” stage and “Rescind” stage. In the “Finding” stage of the Section 311 sanction process, the US Treasury Department makes a finding to designate a foreign jurisdiction or a foreign financial institution “of primary money laundering concern.” Prior to making such a finding, the Treasury Secretary must consult with the US Secretary of State and the US Attorney General and consider certain factors relating to the foreign jurisdiction or the particular institution targeted. The second stage is the “Proposed Rulemaking” stage. In this stage, the Treasury Department proposes to make a rule and to impose “special measures” against the designated foreign jurisdictions or foreign financial institutions. Not all the rules are finalized even if the “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” is issued. In the “Final Rule” stage, the Treasury Department determines whether to finalize or rescind a proposed rule by reviewing written comments and sometimes meeting with the interested parties. The final rule may prohibit the opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts by any US financial institutions for or on behalf of foreign financial institutions found to be of primary money laundering concern. The orders implementing the special measures are not necessarily permanent. In the “Rescind” stage, the Treasury may rescind the “Notice” or the “Special Measure Order” if it is

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determined that the circumstances justifying the original designation as a “primary money laundering concern” no longer exits. Greenburg et al. (2007) notes that the special measures of Section 311 are generally applied to three types of situations. The first type has been used in assisting the US in fulfilling its obligations in the multilateral body responsible for setting international anti-money laundering standards, such as the Financial Action Task Force. In the second situation, the Treasury Department has used Section 311 as a classic anti-money laundering control measure. Such use fulfills the original and the most fundamental purpose underlying Section 311, with which it has enabled the Treasury Department to close loopholes that allowed “bad” foreign banks access to the US financial system through correspondent accounts in US banks. The third situation involves the imposition of Section 311 sanctions to further US foreign policy goals. Unlike the other Section 311 cases in which the US government simply intended to realize one purpose at a time (Greenburg, Roth & Sawyer, 2007), the BDA case, as discussed below, not only fulfilled the purported fundamental purpose of Section 311 to crack down on money laundering, but, more importantly, successfully furthered US foreign policy objectives at that point.

The Banco Delta Asia Case and Macao Government’s Responses Established in 1935, Banco Delta Asia is a small family-owned Macao commercial bank with eight local branches in Macao and a deposit-taking company in Hong Kong. In addition, Banco Delta Asia maintains correspondent accounts in Europe, Asia, Australia, Canada, and the United States. For a long time, BDA was believed by some people to be North Korea’s principal conduit to the international financial network for both legal and illicit financial transactions (Klingner, 2007). Stanley Au, BDA’s owner, chairman and CEO, admitted that BDA had maintained a 30-year long business relationship with North Korea clients and North Korea-related business accounted for 2% to 3% of its total business

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transactions (Lo, 2009). From the 1990s until the BDA sanctions in 2005, BDA had handled trade and financial transactions, including sales of gold bullion, for a number of North Korean government companies and entities (Lague & Greenlees, 2007). Due to BDA’s suspected involvement in North Korea’s illicit activities, the US investigative agencies have kept a close eye on the bank since the mid-1990s (Funabashi, 2007). On 15 September, 2005, the US Treasury Department issued a “Notice of Finding” that designated BDA as “a financial institution of primary money laundering concern” under Patriot Act Section 311. Stuart Levey, the US Treasury Department’s Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, accused BDA of being “a willing pawn for the North Korean government to engage in corrupt financial activities through Macao.” (US Department of Treasury, 2005) In the same “Notice of Finding” the US Treasury Department also identified Macao as a region that needs significant improvement in its anti-money laundering controls. The finding was published in conjunction with a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking”, which proposed prohibiting US financial institutions from, directly or indirectly, opening or maintaining correspondent accounts in the US for BDA or any of its branches, offices, or subsidiaries. Although the US official designation was in the form of a “Notice of Proposing Rulemaking” rather than a final decision, the mere statement of US intention to sanction BDA was sufficient to devastate BDA’s business operations (Schooner & Taylor, 2010). Within days after the US Treasury Department’s notices, many panicked customers withdrew one-third of BDA’s total deposits (Lo, 2009). On 16 September 2005, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) appointed a manager to temporarily manage BDA’s Hong Kong banking subsidiary, Delta Asia Credit, a local deposit-taking firm. The HKMA explained this action was needed to provide a measure of protection to depositors with the institution and to safeguard the integrity of the wider Hong Kong banking system. Having noticed the unusual bank run on BDA, the MSAR government issued a statement that called upon all depositors and citizens to keep calm and have faith and confidence in the Macao financial system. At the same time, the MSAR government temporarily assumed control of the bank to ensure operational

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stability as well as facilitate the addressing of the money laundering allegations raised by the US Treasury Department. On 29 September 2005, BDA yielded its management control to a three-member Administrative Committee appointed by the MSAR government. This Administrative Committee had full authority to run the bank and was accountable only to the MSAR government. In the public statements and letters to the US Treasury Department, BDA confirmed that the bank had terminated all accounts and business dealings with North Korean entities as well as non-North Korean entities that have business connections with North Korea entities. BDA has begun to implement new, enhanced anti-money laundering policies and procedures. BDA also promised that it would no longer provide financial services of any kind to North Korean entities and non-North Korean entities that do business with North Korean enterprises. BDA’s new Administrative Committee retained a major US accounting firm, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, to devise and then implement a revised and enhanced anti-money laundering program. The MSAR government retained Ernst & Young to lead an investigation into matters relating to BDA’s prior North Korean business links. In addition to these remedial measures, the MSAR government froze more than USD25 million in accounts held by clients connected with North Korea. The MSAR government’s very prompt and positive measures were not limited to actions relating specifically to BDA. In the following year, Macao took significant steps to reform its anti-money laundering laws to be consistent with international standards. The MSAR government under Chief Executive Edmund Ho (a Canada-educated accountant and former banker) enacted new laws and promulgated new regulations to strengthen anti-money laundering mechanisms and to close the loopholes that money launders can exploit. In April 2006, the MSAR Legislative Assembly passed the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing legislation, Law no. 2/2006 and Law no. 3/2006. In May 2006, Administrative Regulations no. 7/2006 was published as a supplementary regulation. Moreover, in order to meet international standards, Macao’s new legislation on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing requires the establishment of a special unit to collect, analyze and disseminate information on suspicious

14. The USA Patriot Act and the Banco Delta Asia Case in Macao

money laundering and terrorist financing transaction reports. On 8 August 2006, a new Financial Intelligence Office was established in Macao under Chief Executive Ruling no. 227/2006. It is the first-ever anti-money laundering unit created within Macao’s police force. While all these systemic developments still needed to be tested through rigorous and effective implementation across Macao’s entire financial system, they certainly represented important progress and a sign of serious official commitment in Macao. Despite the implementation of remedial measures and improvement in regulatory environment made by the MSAR government, on 14 March 2007, the US Treasury Department issued a Final Rule that imposed the fifth special measure against BDA as a “financial institution of primary money laundering concern”. The final rule prohibited all US financial institutions from maintaining correspondent accounts for BDA and prevents BDA from accessing the US financial system, either directly or indirectly. On 15 March 2007, the MSAR government expressed its deep regret on the US Treasury Department’s final rule and declared that BDA would continue to be under the management of the MSAR government. Since the MSAR officialdom first took control of BDA management, the term of BDA’s new Administrative Committee had been extended three times on 29 March, and 29 September 2006 as well as 29 March 2007 until the MSAR government decided to return the bank’s control to its original owners. On 28 September, 2007 the Monetary Authority of Macao declared that “in view of the remarkable improvement made in the bank’s management by the joint efforts of the Administrative Committee and the relevant parties concerned during the period of intervention and the persistent requests of Mr. Stanley Au, the original shareholder, for resumption of management control over the bank, the Macao government has decided to return the management control of the bank to its original shareholder.” At the same time, the Monetary Authority stressed that the MSAR government will perform the necessary supervisory duties to safeguard the interests of depositors and to maintain the stability of Macao’s financial system. Whatever one’s perspectives are on the US sanction on BDA, damages had been done to this small private bank and to Macao. However, this was not the end of BDA case. According to Macao

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Monetary Authority head Anselmo Teng, the, BDA “has not made any serious attempts to improve AML/CFT (Anti-Money Laundering/ Counter-Financing of Terrorism) compliance” since it returned to its original owners in September 2007 and BDA “is still subject to rigorous oversight and has consumed a significant percentage of his staff resources over the past several years, with no end in sight.” (Macao Daily Times, 7 September 2011) Meanwhile, Banco Delta Asia continues to feel victimized. In a chairman’s message posted on its website, Banco Delta Asia’s major owner, Stanley Au stated that “BDA was involuntarily involved in the political tug of war in the denuclearization process of the Korean Peninsula from September 2005 to February 2007, and was subject to a special measure under the US Patriot Act 311.”

Objectives of the US Sanction on BDA In the Banco Delta Asia case, the US government issued a mixture of implicit threats backed by explicit financial sanction measures. This section examines two implicit US foreign policy objectives, that is, first, restricting North Korea’s access to international financial system and, second, influencing the large banks in mainland China.

Restricting North Korean Access to the International Financial System North Korea had enjoyed a decades-long special relationship with the Macao government since the colonial era under Portuguese rule. Before the US Treasury Department’s sanction on BDA, Macao had often been used as a global platform by North Korean state agencies and front companies to carry out transactions relating to money laundering, nuclear weapons transfer programs and other allegedly “illegal” activities (Asher, 2007; Lo, 2009; Chinoy, 1999). After the increasingly tight US and United Nations economic sanctions have turned North Korea into one of the most isolated countries in the world, Macao’s financial system appeared to be one of North

14. The USA Patriot Act and the Banco Delta Asia Case in Macao

Korea’s few channels to the international financial network (Klingner, 2007). Therefore, targeting banks in Macao would, in the eyes of US policymakers, severely restrict North Korea’s access to the international financial system. Financial sanctions with market forces behind them can reinforce their economic impacts because banks outside the sender-target dyad may perceive the target to be more risky due to financial penalties. This risk augmentation is stronger when the target is a country with few alternative sources of external financial markets (Elliott, 2002). In contrast to the difficulties the US has faced in securing international support for tougher economic sanctions against North Korea, foreign banks tended to be far more cooperative when they encountered the prospects of losing access to the world’s most important economy. The US allegation that Banco Delta Asia was a “willing pawn” in North Korean “money laundering and counterfeit-currency trafficking” became the catalyst for an informal financial embargo gradually tightened around North Korea. The chain reactions sparked by the BDA sanction quickly spread around the region, with the Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Thai, and Singaporean banks increased their scrutiny of North Korean account holders. On 1 December 2005, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory warning that the US and international financial institutions should “guard against the abuse of their financial services by North Korea” (Department of the Treasury Finance Crimes Enforcement Network, 2005). In addition, Stuart Levy, US Treasury Department Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence visited several countries like China, Singapore and Thailand where he emphasized US concerns for North Korea’s financial dealings. Accordingly, international banks, not only those in the US but from other nations, refused to engage with North Korea on legal business ventures for fear that they could also become targets of US restrictive measures in the same way that BDA had experienced. By April 2006, at least two dozen financial institutions restricted or ended their financial dealings with North Korea (Levey, 2006). The US Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser noted that the US financial restrictions on North Korea were producing “encouraging” results by early 2006. Glaser remarked, “Our designation of Banco Delta Asia has produced

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encouraging results. Jurisdictions in the region have begun conducting investigations and taking necessary steps to identify and cut off illicit North Korean business. Responsible financial institutions are also taking a closer look at their own operations, terminating or declining to take on such business” (Glaser, 2006). Coupled with the UN sanctions like UN Resolution 1718 and 1874, the informal financial embargo prompted by BDA sanctions almost dismantled North Korea’s overseas financial network and the operations of North Korea’s many overseas front companies (Nanto, 2009).

Kill the Chicken to Scare the Monkey In the BDA case, the US government specifically cited the bank’s role in facilitating North Korea’s “illicit” activities, but the implications of the BDA case went far beyond that of targeting the small Macao bank. David Asher, a senior in George Bush regime testified to the US Congress in 2007 that “Banco Delta was a symbolic target. We were trying to kill the chicken to scare the monkeys, and the monkeys were big Chinese banks doing business with North Korea, and we are not talking about tens of millions. We are talking about hundreds of millions of dollars” (Asher, 2007). In an interview with the New York Times, David Asher made the US intention more explicit by claiming that “Banco Delta may be a sacrificial lamb in some people’s minds, but it is not about Banco Delta Asia. It’s about Macau, Macau’s government, China, the Chinese government and their complicity and their accommodative behavior toward North Korea’s illegal activities, proliferation activities and leadership financial activities” (Greenlees & Lague, 2007). Now it should be very clear that the true intention of the US sanction on BDA was to “kill the chicken to scare the monkeys”, two questions arise regarding the true intentions of the US government: first, why did the US government want to scare the Chinese banks? Traditionally, North Korea has been using banks in the PRC for many of their international transactions. Although BDA sanction dealt a heavy blow to North Korea’s financial activities in Macao and in some other countries, Pyongyang still enjoyed good

14. The USA Patriot Act and the Banco Delta Asia Case in Macao

access to the international financial system through its accounts with the big banks in mainland China. Shortly after the BDA sanctions, it was reported that a North Korean firm, Zokwang Trading Company, long believed to be an important front for “illicit” activities, closed its headquarter on the fifth floor of an office building near the BDA. Most of its personnel relocated to Zhuhai, a city in mainland China just across the Macao border (Demick, 2006). In January 2006, North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-Il visited southern China. Some analysts suspected that Kim’s trip might include an attempt to move some North Korean accounts to a financial institution there. The US Treasury Department indicated that some reports suggested North Korean agencies had transferred assets to banks in mainland China. Clearly, North Korea could adapt flexibly to the BDA sanction. Secondly, why did the US take all the trouble to kill the “chicken” instead of killing the “monkey”? One possible answer to this question is that the US sought to secure cooperation from the PRC over issues related to North Korea without directly challenging the Beijing officialdom. For a long time, the US government has been aware of the fact that any pressure on North Korea would have limited impacts if China does not fully cooperate. It has been widely believed that China possesses the most influential leverage on North Korea policy and behavior. The PRC has tremendous influence on North Korea not only because it shares borders with North Korea but also because of the special legacies of the two countries’ historical and trade relations. China is North Korea’s traditional ally, biggest trading partner and main source of food, arms, and fuel. It has been supporting North Korea ever since PRC troops came into the Korean Peninsula to fight against the US forces in the 1950–1953 Korean War. Since then, the PRC has remained North Korea’s single most important ally. Pyongyang is economically dependent on Beijing on most of its food and energy supply. China’s major exports to the DPRK include mineral fuels, machinery, electrical machinery, knit apparel, plastic, vehicles, man-made filaments, and cereals. With the exception of knit apparel, these exports are essential to the functioning of the North Korean economy. Nicholas Eberstadt, a World Bank consultant, said that since the early 1990s, China has served as North Korea’s chief food

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supplier and accounted for nearly 90% of its energy imports. By July 2009, China provides 80% of North Korea’s consumer goods and 45% of its food (Bajoria, 2009). By targeting Macao’s BDA, the US government had tactically “frightened the monkey by killing the chicken” without direct confrontation with the PRC. In the Banco Delta Asia sanction, the U.S. government took full advantage of the “One Country, Two Systems” framework as enshrined in the Macao Basic Law. In its BDA ruling, the U.S. Treasury Department blamed the Macao government solely for its lax control on money laundering activities by saying that “Macau, as a Special Administrative Region to the People’s Republic of China, retains substantial autonomy in all areas related to the regulation and oversight of its financial services sector and domestic economic affairs.” The US ruling on Banco Delta Asia also carefully restricted its target by saying that “references in this rule to the money laundering risks in Macau are limited to that jurisdiction and not applicable to the entire jurisdiction of China.” In addition, although the US sanctions were not as accurate as a cruise missile due to BDA’s small size and its limited business transactions in the PRC, the U.S. has calculated that its sanction on Banco Delta Asia may not have any substantive damage to China’s financial system. David Asher said, “The fact is that Banco Delta was an easy target in the sense that it was not so large that its failure would bring down the financial system” (Greenlees & Lague, 2007). There seemed to be both qualitative and quantitative improvement in the cooperation between the PRC government and the US government after the BDA sanctions. White House Spokesman Tony Snow publicly confirmed on 26 July 2006 that the PRC took other, much more significant actions against North Korean “illicit” funds in Macao by freezing significant sums of money not only in BDA but elsewhere in Macau. In July 2006, China continued to work with the US to check any “illicit” North Korean behavior by freezing North Korean assets at the Bank of China’s Macao branch because of the charges that Pyongyang “counterfeited” not only USD100 billion, but also Chinese Yuan as well (Kirk, 2006). On 31 October 2006, China passed its first ever anti-money laundering law that came into effect on 1 January 2007. It remains unclear whether these moves happened coincidently or as

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a direct result of the BDA sanctions. The move might be due to the PRC’s need to control domestic money laundering activities, but it was perhaps a move, intentionally or unintentionally, to respond to the US complaints about the alleged North Korean money laundering activities in Macao and mainland China. Interestingly, the US sanctions on North Korea in the BDA case were actually just a US warning followed by a Chinese regulatory action, which seemed to indicate active or coincidental Chinese cooperation with the US (Snyder, 2006). Thus it seemed that BDA was chosen as an easy test case to threaten China with an attack on their banking interests in Macao if the PRC failed to toe the US line on North Korea. This third-country sanctions policy was an attempt to impose a unilateral US policy toward North Korea when the Bush regime was unable to persuade the PRC, Russia, and other countries to impose the same vigorous sanctions on North Korea.

Conclusion Although the US government application of Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act to target Banco Delta Asia in Macao has significantly affected Macao’s international reputation and financial stability, as this Chapter vividly illuminates, the real target is not Macao. Indeed, the BDA case did not represent a simple law enforcement action to crack down on money laundering and counterfeiting activities. On the contrary, the US sanctions on BDA illustrated how the US employed financial penalties to achieve its foreign policy objectives. With the BDA sanctions, the US sought to achieve two major objectives: restricting North Korea’s access to the international financial system and forcing China into cooperation with US sanctions on North Korea. In terms of restricting North Korea’s access to the international financial system, the US apparently made some progress toward their desired goal. The BDA sanctions not only successfully blocked one of North Korea’s important conduits for laundering profits from its “illegal” activities but also greatly

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disrupted North Korea’s international transactions and trade at least in the short term.

References Bajoria, J. (2009, July 21). The China-North Korea Relationship. Retrieved May 25, 2010, from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097. Bechtol, B. E. (2007). Red Rogue: the Persistent Challenge of North Korea. Washington, D. C.: Potomac Books, Inc. Chinoy, M. (1999, December 18). Will China end North Korea's illegal activities in Macao? Retrieved May 20, 2010, from http://archives.cnn.com/1999/ASIANOW/east/macau/stories/macau.north. korea/index.html. Demick, B. (2006, April 6). No more gambling on North Korea. Retrieved June 10, 2010, from Los Angeles Times: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-macao6apr06,0,12 75407.story. Elliott, K. A. (2002). Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions. In D. Cortright, & G. A. Lopez, Smart Sanctions: Targeting economic Statecraft. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Funabashi, Y. (2007). The Peninsula Question: a Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press. Greenburg, D. N., Roth, J and Sawyer, K.A. (2007). Special Measures under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act. The Review of Banking & Financial Services. Vol. 23. No. 6. Greenlees, D., & Lague, D. (2007, April 13). Trail Led to Macao as Focus of North Korean Corruption. Retrieved June 2, 2010, from New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/world/asia/13macao.html. Kirk, D. (2006, July 28). At Southeast Asian gathering, bid to engage North Korea. Retrieved March 20, 2010, from The Christian Science Monitor: http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0728/p05s01-woap.html. Klingner, B. (2007, March 15). Banco Delta Asia Ruling Complicates North Korean Nuclear Deal. Retrieved November 28, 2009, from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/03/banco-delta-asia-rulingcomplicates-north-korean-nuclear-deal. Lague, D., & Greenlees, D. (2007). Squeeze on Banco Delta Asia hit North Korea where it hurt. International Herald tribune, January 18. Lo, S. S.-H. (2009). The Politics of Cross-Border Crime in Greater China: Case Studies of Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.

14. The USA Patriot Act and the Banco Delta Asia Case in Macao Macao Daily Times (2011). Delta Asia still a concern: cables. September 07, 2011. Nanto, D. K. (2009). North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency. CRS Report RL33324, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2009. Snyder, S. (2006). China-Korea Relations: Kim Jong-il Pays Tribute to Beijing-In His Own Way. Comparative Connections, 8 (1), 109–118. Schooner, H. M & Taylor M. W. (2009). Global Bank Regulation: Principles and Policies. Academic Press. US Department of the Treasury (2005). Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA Patriot Act, 15 September.

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15 Macao Local, Macao Global Cathryn H. CLAYTON

In June 2011, I sat at a table in a Shanghainese restaurant in Hong Kong deep in conversation with two colleagues from the University of Hong Kong. The topic was local identity, and whether Macao had gotten more of it or less of it in the first decade of the 21st century. We could not come to a consensus about it. One colleague argued that the Labor Day protests in Macao—which have been held annually since 2006 to voice concern over illegal labor importation, rising costs of living and associated inequities in Macao’s booming casino economy—were evidence of the Macao people finally asserting themselves as a collectivity, claiming their rights as Macao residents as against “outsiders,” and thus expressing an organic consciousness of local identity. The other countered that the protests were more a measure of the erosion of any sense of shared local identity that might have once existed in Macao, as the process of globalization—the city’s greater integration into national and transnational markets for labor and capital—had led to growing gaps of income and trust between the Macao government, Macao capitalists and Macao laborers, as well as growing competition and atomization among the local workforce itself. In this sense, he pointed out, the protests involved only that small sector of the Macao population that found itself on the losing end of that process. Much of the scholarship on Macao in the past decade has, in various ways, echoed this uncertainty. 1 Have the thoroughgoing 381

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transformations of Macao’s political, economic, social and physical landscape since 1999 made Macao more “global,” and if so, what does that mean? Have these changes eroded or heightened a sense of local autonomy and identity, and how can we tell? These are questions that I, too, have asked myself on repeated visits to the city since I left in 2005. Yet in this chapter I would like to suggest that this formulation of the question, though tempting, is ultimately a dead end. For, as the above example demonstrates, how can we measure or quantify or even distinguish between abstractions such as localness and globalness? And even if we could define and measure them to everyone’s satisfaction, would that tell us anything about the daily lives, affinities and subjectivities of Macao residents? Instead, a more illuminating line of inquiry may be to ask what kinds of work various claims to “localness” and “globalness” are doing. How do the various agents and victims of change in Macao define the “global” and the “local,” and what do they perceive them to be good for? How might the categorizations of “global” and “local,” and the relationship between them, be shifting in meaning and value? To answer these questions, we must look not (or not only) to grand theories, but to how these categories are made meaningful at the level of the everyday. Thus, rather than asking what the rubrics of “global” and “local” may tell us about Macao, in this paper I would like to try starting from the ways people talk about the changes Macao has undergone in the twenty-first century to see what they may tell us about how and why claims about locality and globality become powerful metaphors through which to understand the effects of rapid change. In what follows I trace three different narratives about the relationship between local and global in post-handover Macao, building on the argument that I have made elsewhere about Macao in the 1990s: namely, that these terms are not just transparent descriptions of the realities of geographic scale; they are, in Anna Tsing’s words, “scale-making projects”—ways of conceptualizing and telling moral tales about the roots of community and conflict, the nature of selves and others, and the potential to transform the world for the better, in the past and in the future (Tsing 2005; see also Clayton 2009). Although these narratives entail different and sometimes contradictory notions of what the global and the local

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really mean, they nonetheless coexist and inform each other as they are taken up by different people or institutions with different political agendas, or sometimes by the same people and institutions in different times and places. But this is precisely the point: what makes it impossible to pin down the degree of Macao’s local identity or the degree of its attainment of true globality is not so much the rapidly changing reality on the ground as it is the shape-shifting ways in which these categories themselves get used to frame and comment on the changes Macao is undergoing, by the individuals and institutions who stand to gain and to lose from those changes.

Making Globality What has happened in Macao since the partial liberalization of the gambling industry in 2002 has often been described as a quintessential example of globalization: the transformation of a “sleepy backwater” into a “global gaming hub.” As is by now well-known, the modus operandi for the gaming industry in Macao since 1930 had been the monopoly system, whereby the Macao government granted a single privately owned company the rights to control all legal public gaming in return for an increasingly hefty percentage of revenues and, by the 1960s, the promise to invest in cultural, educational and infrastructure projects to benefit the city as a whole. In 2002, this monopoly system was scrapped; gambling concessions were awarded to three syndicates, selected out of an applicant pool of 18, in return for a minimum contracted investment of over one billion US dollars and an effective tax rate of 39% of net revenues (Gasper 2007; McCartney 2006; Kwan and Lee 2008). In the run-up to the Legislative Assembly’s 2002 decision to liberalize the gaming sector, it seemed to some that Macao’s problem was that it didn’t have enough globalization, or at least not of the right sort. According to many observers, the problem with the casino industry under the Portuguese was the lack of transparency and openness, the lack of rationality and competition. This was what gave Macao’s 10 casinos, and by extension the whole city, their air of seediness and decay. This is what opened up the casinos,

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and by extension Macao’s streets, to infiltration by organized crime. Indeed, these problems were often cast not just as problems with a single sector of the economy, but with the entirety of Portuguese rule (at least since the mid-nineteenth century), which seemed content with conservative, irrational and short-sighted policies that facilitated quick gain by the few at the expense of sustainable wealth for the many, and as a result kept Macao’s economy mired in marginalized forms of profit generation: gambling, opium processing, prostitution, smuggling, quota-jumping, money laundering and real estate speculation.2 Those in favor of allowing Las Vegas companies to open casinos in Macao bandied about the catchwords of late-20th century-neoliberal capitalism—“competition,” “transparency,” “accountability,” “efficiency,” “diversification,” “rationality”—and framed the liberalization as a globalizing project in which becoming global was envisioned as greater adherence to a uniform set of state and corporate standards and norms (see Tsing 2009). In this vision, the “local” was all that impeded, complicated, or detracted from this adherence. Indeed, the liberalization process was guided by this transformative vision of globality from the beginning: the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) government, hoping to turn Macao from a “sleepy backwater” into “a global center of tourism and recreation,” invited transnational consulting and accounting firms Arthur Andersen and, after Arthur Andersen’s effective demise in 2002 following the Enron scandal, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)—in many ways poster-children of the ideologies and institutions we have come to call neoliberal globalization—to evaluate the pros and cons of liberalizing the industry. Perhaps unsurprisingly, PwC recommended in favor of liberalization, and the policies subsequently implemented by the Macao government not only “globalized” Macao by opening it up to unprecedented levels of foreign direct investment from a handful of entrepreneurs from the US, Australia and Hong Kong—including Las Vegas casino magnates Steve Wynn, Sheldon Adelson, and Kirk Kerkorian, Australian media mogul Kerry Packer, and Hong Kong property tycoon Lui Che Woo (Simpson 2008: 1066)—they “globalized” the Las Vegas Sands Corporation and Wynn Resorts, which had previously been operations wholly local to Las Vegas, Nevada.3

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Liberalization also required the MSAR government to enact a broad slate of regulatory reforms, from accounting and auditing practices to gaming law and international agreements intended to curb money laundering, which would bring Macao more in line with those much-lauded international standards for ensuring accountability and transparency. As a result, Macao’s casino industry—which in 1999 was controlled by a single, privately held company that ran eleven casinos and generated 60% of local government revenue and 35% of gross domestic product (GDP)—is now, in the wake of the establishment of sub-concessions, divided up among six transnational, publicly traded corporations that operate thirty-three casinos with a total of 5,379 gaming tables and nearly 16,000 slot machines. 4 The phenomenal profits subsequently reaped by the casinos, the individual investors, and the MSAR government are the stuff of legend: by 2006, gross gambling revenue in Macao had surpassed that of the Las Vegas strip. By 2011, it was more than double that of all the casinos in the state of Nevada combined,5 and Steve Wynn was reportedly considering moving his global headquarters to Macao.6 Sheldon Adelson, owner of the Venetian Sands, leaped 12 places on the Forbes 400 chart to the position of the third richest person in the US in 2006, behind Bill Gates and Warren Buffet (Simpson 2008:1067). Macao’s growth rate was well over 20% in 2004, 2007, and 2010, and only slipped out of double digits in the wake of the global financial crisis in 2009. And as the gaming tax accounted for over 82% of total government revenue in 2009, the Macao government has been awash in cash, with budget surpluses each year since 2002, even after implementing tax cuts, cash handouts, raises for public sector employees, massive infrastructure projects, and vastly expanded social welfare programs.7 Despite sharp declines in growth and income in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, in broad economic terms, it appears that Macao’s globalist project has been a resounding success. In social terms, too, the idea that Macao has “gone global” in this way seems compelling. In the face of transformation on such a massive and rapid scale, Macao’s local workforce was deemed too small, too expensive, and too unskilled; building and staffing the mammoth casino-hotel complexes in a “timely” and “cost-effective”

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manner (read: as fast and cheaply as possible) required importing workers from mainland China, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Nepal, the US and Australia. Today, in late 2012, over 100,000 legal non-resident workers from these and other countries comprise over 25% of Macau’s labor force and work in every sector of the economy except, theoretically, as casino dealers, bus drivers and civil servants (for which a Macao ID card is a must).8 Not counted in that estimated are the tens of thousands of undocumented workers (in 2007, estimates varied from 40,000 to 70,000), who likely swell the number of expatriates in Macao to some 20% of the total population.9 In 2010 alone, some 28 million tourists from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, India, the Europe Union, the US and elsewhere visited Macao. English and Mandarin have become far more useful and prominent in a public linguistic environment once dominated by Cantonese and Portuguese; in addition, the simplified form of Chinese characters—which has been used in mainland China since the 1950s but was never adopted in Hong Kong, Taiwan or Macao—is used to the exclusion of traditional characters in Macao’s casinos, and can be found increasingly in other venues in Macao (and on MSAR government websites) as well. These changes are, of course, not only justified but made to seem inevitable as they are framed in terms of a rational response to market demand: as Macao’s economy globalizes, any social and cultural idiosyncracies that would impede the generation of profit will naturally be effaced; in this logic, any resistance to such effacement—phrased, say, as a defense of local culture or the interests of local workers—can only be understood as irrational and counterproductive. Last but far from least, representationally, too, the boom in the casino and entertainment industry seems to have quite literally brought the world to Macao. The Fisherman’s Wharf entertainment complex—built not on an old wharf but on land reclaimed expressly for the purpose—allows visitors to shop, dine, gamble and play in 150 different businesses located in one of thirteen differently themed “regions” (both real and imaginary), each characterized by its distinctive architecture: Amsterdam, Cape Town, Portalegre, Évora, Havana, Miami, Venice, ancient Rome, Babylon, an “African

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village,” Aladdin’s Fort, a Tang Dynasty fortress, the Potala Palace, and “the highest man-made volcano in Southeast Asia,” which erupts nightly. Across the bay, the Greek Mythology Casino boasts gigantic statues of Poseidon and Zeus and in the winter requires its parking lot attendants to dress (apparently) like Roman centurions. The Venetian Macao is an enlarged replica of the Las Vegas replica of an Italian city that was for centuries the Western terminus of the Silk Road, Europe’s source for commodities from across and beyond the Eurasian continent, and home to the iconic global cosmopolite, Marco Polo. The flashy new casino-hotels serve as destinations for international conferences, offer food and décor from around the world in their restaurants, and bring in shows from globally recognized brands such as Cirque du Soleil, Céline Dion, and the Police, not to mention Hong Kong-based transnational pop icons such as Andy Hui who can draw audiences from across East Asia. Just as the term “world music” refers not to distinct musical traditions from different places in the world but to a genre of hybridized, non-Western-sounding, industrially produced music that simultaneously creates and profits from “the global” as a site of desire (Feld 2000), so in Macao the deliberate and sometimes downright confusing mash-up of aestheticized cultures and locales—at Fisherman’s Wharf, you can eat at the Japan Hokkaido restaurant in Capetown, snack on New Zealand Natural ice cream in Amsterdam, or walk a few blocks to play baccarat in Babylon—cuts these place-names loose from their geographical and historical moorings and turns them into icons of globality itself, commodified and primed for consumption. As Tim Simpson has noted, this attempt to transform Macau into a “phantasmagoric consumer utopia”, where production and consumption, center and periphery, labor and capital, state and market merge into a single wealth-generating system and create profits that “seem to defy the structural precedents of economic growth,” is perhaps the most striking articulation of millennial capitalism10 the world has yet seen, and makes Macao the “capital of the 21st century” (Simpson 2008). In this view, then, invoking the word “globalization” to describe the changes Macao has undergone in the past decade frames the global as an object of multiple desires on the part of everyone involved: investors, government officials, tourists, migrant workers,

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and residents alike. Indeed, a 2002 survey of 366 young Macao residents aged 15–24 (completed just before the liberalization was announced) showed that although only about 38% of them were happy with Macao’s current reputation as a “gambling city”, if Macao could become known as a “global gambling city”, over 75% of them would feel proud (Jiang et al. 2002: 4). In these students’ responses, as much as in the rhetoric of the Macao government and the transnational investors, it’s not the gambling itself that is objectionable, but the scale on which it takes place. As one respondent put it, if Macao were to become known as a “global gambling city”, Macao residents would be able to “hold their heads high” (澳門人可抬起頭). This vision of the global, with its promise of transformative openness, transparency, celebrity and a future of unlimited gain, is in itself an object of desire that casts the local as shameful: corrupt, stagnant, ungovernable, unregulatable, and invisible to the world.

Making Locality But another way that some scholars and Macao residents have conceptualized the changes Macao has been undergoing over the past decade is in terms of a rapid process of “localization,” a sudden surge of a local consciousness or identity among Macao residents that has been defined not so much politically against mainland China (as we see to a certain extent in Hong Kong) as economically, culturally and historically in opposition to the various processes of “globalization” discussed above. In other words, Macao in the 21th century has been transformed from a society characterized by its “stepping-stone” mentality (Yee 1989) into one marked by a stronger sense of belonging and permanence in Macau, and a greater willingness to assert “the local” as a meaningful scale for collective rights, interests and culture. This process arguably has been facilitated by Macao’s integration with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the “One Country, Two Systems” formula that has required Macao to define the nature and extent of its distinctiveness, to bolster those aspects of its legal, economic,

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political and social “systems” that it deems essential to the maintenance of this distinctiveness, and that as a result has provided legitimacy for the very notion of a local Macao identity—a legitimacy that in pre-handover Macao was weak or ambivalent at best. In this view, the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, in conjunction with the ever-closer alliances between outside capital, the MSAR government, and the PRC state that have been occurring since 2002, has laid the groundwork for the unprecedented emergence of a popular sense of the Macao people as a collective self. This is in marked contrast to the transition period of the 1990s, when, ironically, “localization” was a keyword of the preparations for Macao’s transfer to Chinese administrative control. Under the Portuguese administration, “localization” referred to the slow and cumbersome bureaucratic process of replacing Portuguese civil servants with ethnic Chinese Macao residents, ensuring that the legal system did not contravene the Chinese constitution, and establishing Chinese as one of the two official languages of the territory. Simultaneous to this, however, the Portuguese government mounted a different “localization” project: a massive effort to inculcate among Macao residents a strong sense of local identity which was drawn in contradistinction to the Chinese in mainland China and in Hong Kong, and grounded in a particular interpretation of the effects of the city’s long history of Portuguese governance. According to this version of the past, Portuguese presence and their mode of governing Macao belonged to an era prior to the onslaught of “Anglophone hegemony” (Ptak 1998), in which Europeans and Chinese had met as equals, and in which the presence of a Portuguese state on Chinese soil could be seen not as one more instance of “national humiliation,” but as a mutually agreed-upon arrangement that suited the needs and interests of all parties involved. This view of the past, unencumbered by the latter-day, agonistic categories of colonizers vs. colonized, imperialists vs. nationalists, had enabled Macao’s residents to be more tolerant and respectful of ethnic and religious diversity, more open to economic and cultural stimuli from elsewhere and thus simultaneously more “Latin” and more traditionally Chinese than their neighbors in China or Hong Kong. This view of local identity did not reject

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globalization per se, but positioned Macao’s local identity as the surviving remnant of an earlier, more civilized era of globalization—the era of respect and dialogue between civilizations, of Matteo Ricci discoursing in Chinese on science and philosophy with the Ming dynasty emperors and elites—that had been overrun and displaced by the cold, calculating, often belligerent form of capitalist globalization in the modern era, which was spearheaded by Great Britain and the US and which had relegated Macao, Portugal, and China to its margins. During the transition era, most Portuguese officials and a good number of ethnic Chinese intellectuals I spoke with felt that this effort had fallen on deaf and uncaring ears—that most Macao Chinese had no sense of belonging or attachment to Macao, and did not envision themselves as anything other than “Chinese.” For many who were worried by this apathy, it was Macao residents’ lack of local identity, not its lack of globality, that was the city’s biggest problem. A shared sense of local identity, belonging and community, many felt, was a prerequisite for a Macao’s long-term autonomy, stability, and prosperity under the “One Country, Two Systems” model: for if Macao people themselves had no sense of the value of their own “system”, no number of administrative pronouncements could prevent its rapid demise. If they did not recognize and work to sustain their own “difference”, the Beijing government could hardly be expected to step in to sustain it for them. And if Macao ceased to be “different,” they suggested, it would be “swallowed up” by a vast and undifferentiated China, and simply cease to be (Ngai 1999). What became clear under the Portuguese administration was that, far from being a naturally occurring scale for identification and solidarity, “the local” was a strategic commitment, one that had to be willed into existence not just by governments but by a wide range of institutions, individuals and discourses. What some observers have found is that, contrary to expectations, the conditions in post-handover Macao have been far more conducive to this kind of commitment to the local than during the transition period. As Macao Chinese filmmaker Albert Chu puts it, “[At] the time of the handover, we were very proud of our status as Chinese, but now, especially among young people, residents [have] developed a different feeling, as they regard themselves as Chinese

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from Macao.” 11 Geographer Werner Breitung demonstrates that even as the rate of cross-border flows at the Gongbei customs station has skyrocketed (to more than 50 million crossings per year in 2002), there is nonetheless a strengthening among Macao residents of the idea that, although they are Chinese, they are “different” from mainlanders in ways that are positive and worth maintaining (Breitung 2009). Similarly, surveys done in 1999 and in 2006 found shifts in Macao residents’ identification with Macao. When asked “are you proud to be Chinese?,” 74.1% of Macao respondents answered in the affirmative in 1999 as compared to 79.5% in 2006; yet when asked “are you proud to be from Macao?,” the percentage of respondents who answered “yes” jumped from 39% in 1999 to 67% in 2006 (Chou 2011:241).12 It is in the domain of politics that we may see claims to the “local” being made most urgently in contrast to “the global.” A wide range of groups and individuals marginalized by the rapid shifts in the structure of employment, wages and benefits and by the cutthroat competition for labor and market share have found speaking in defense of “the local” to be an effective way of mobilizing support, not just among Macao residents but also at the highest levels of government in Beijing. The trigger for much of this political expression was the widely-publicized arrest in 2006 of Ao Man Long, the MSAR’s first Secretary for Transport and Public Works, on charges of corruption and money-laundering. Ao had taken over USD100 million in bribes and kickbacks in relation to the tender process for the construction of casinos and related developments (see Lo 2009). The anger and shock over Ao’s misdeeds were not aimed solely at him; the scandal shook the foundations of the enormous confidence that Macao residents had previously had in their MSAR government (in 2005, nearly 80% of Macao residents expressed trust in the Macao government, compared to less than 50% in 2007),13 and provided them with evidence of, in Sonny Lo’s words, the “unholy coalition between the government and the capitalist class” (Lo 2009: 42). Although corruption had been rife in the pre-1999 Portuguese administration, this was the highest ranking government official to ever be arrested on corruption charges; and the vast sums of money involved seemed to suggest that the brave new world supposedly being created by the

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influx of foreign investment was in fact simply a whole new era in the history of corruption, decadence and naked self-interest on the part of Macao’s ruling elites. In a sense, then, this was a moment at which Macao residents realized that the MSAR government, although it was “of” the Macao people in a way the Portuguese administration had never been, was not necessarily “for” the Macao people. Thus, 2006 marked a turning point that led to the increasing conviction among a broader segment of the population that, without a degree of solidarity and cohesion at the local level, Macao’s globalization would result in the further economic and political marginalization of its own residents. Perhaps the most often cited examples of this newfound sense of local political identity are the annual 1 May Labor Day demonstrations, discussed in the opening of this chapter, that attracted thousands of protestors and erupted into violent clashes with the police in 2006, 2007 and 2010. 14 While these are commonly portrayed, in English and Chinese, as “labor protests”—organized by labor unions, attended by unemployed construction workers, and demanding more stringent measures to control the influx of illegal labor—political scientist Bryan Ho has shown that the participants and underlying motivations were far more complex and broad-based than this characterization lets on (Ho 2011). As Ho points out, in 2006 and 2007 the Macao Civil Servants’ Association and the New Macao Association, Macao’s major pro-democracy political party, allied with labor unions in organizing the protest, and their demands included a range of social and political reforms in the name of protecting the interests and rights of Macao residents: an end to government corruption, immediate measures to limit skyrocketing housing prices, the implementation of 15 years of free basic education, as well as broader calls for a more equitable distribution of wealth and a move to universal suffrage and democracy. Ho suggests that these protests also reflected broader concerns among the Macao public over the deleterious effects of the casino boom, including widening wealth gap, severe traffic congestion, environmental pollution, and anger over the sale to private developers of land slated for public housing projects. “The government is rich, the casinos are rich, but nobody is looking out for the Macao people,” one marcher told journalists

15. Macao Local, Macao Global

in the 2007 protests; “let Macao residents share the economic harvest,” read a banner in 2010.15 To be sure, these appeals on behalf of “the Macao people” may be understood as the tactical political rhetoric of the disenfranchised and the malcontent, rather than a genuine expression of a widespread sense of local solidarity; but we should not neglect the fact every public assertion of the collective rights, interests and grievances of “the Macao people” contributes to the naturalization of the local as a legitimate frame for precisely that kind of solidarity. Clearly, then, disenfranchised workers have not been the only group to find appeals to the local to be an effective framework for making moral-political claims about social and economic justice and the responsibilities of government. Residents of districts at a distance from the glitzy casinos have demanded that the MSAR government ban slot machines and other gaming facilities from residential neighborhoods, thus drawing a conceptual and geographical boundary between those individuals who may be legitimately and actively exposed to the lures of gambling in the name of profiting the territory (visitors), and those who should be protected from the predations of casino operators (locals). 16 Indeed, coalitions of middle-class and working-class groups whose interests were, prior to the handover, disparate and sometimes even in opposition to each other have found “locality” a useful way of forging political solidarity and a powerful language in which to frame both grievances and solutions to Macau’s deeply rooted social problems. The discursive power of this category may also be reflected in the fact that even groups inside the casino industry, which arguably have been the greatest beneficiaries of the “globalization” of Macao, have also taken up the rhetoric of the “local”. In 2008, some 270 gaming table dealers who were laid off and replaced by foreign laborers (in direct violation of Macao law) appealed to the MSAR government to protect the interests of local workers within the casino industry (Lo 2009). Even the top management of Sociedade de Jogos de Macau (SJM) —which is essentially a restructured version of STDM, the company owned and run by tycoon Stanley Ho which held the sole casino franchise from 1962 to 2002—has found it expedient to position itself as the “local” player in the casino market. In a 2008 interview with Macao journalist Ricardo

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Pinto, SJM Executive Director Ambrose So claimed that, in contrast to the Venetian and other foreign casino interests, “SJM is a native operator here. We are very much attached to the society, and we are involved in the development of the economy of Macao. We always have very close to our heart the benefit of Macao as a whole.”17 In this narrative, then, invoking “the local” is a way of critiquing the indiscriminate and rapacious exploitation of capitalist globalization, which only serves the interests of the powerful. “Local” in this context comes to signify not just a geographic designation, but “the grassroots”. This vision of the local, with its promise of social justice, equity, authenticity and honesty, itself becomes an object of desire defined in opposition to the shameful disregard of fairness, dignity and integrity exhibited by the global capitalist elite. Viewed in this way, it may then come as no surprise that, just as the proponents of casino capitalism described above viewed the structural changes Macao was undergoing as “inevitable” market rationalizations, so the advocates of local interests have begun to portray the implementation of democratic reforms as an “inevitable” response to the increase in political participation and popular protests.18 The 2009 legislative elections saw the highest number of new political parties standing for election and the highest voter turnout on record, some 59%. In this sense, it seems that the “globalization” of Macao has prompted many residents to slightly reinterpret, and take more closely to heart, one of the key tenets of the Basic Law: that Macao should be governed by Macao people. During the transition period to the 1999 revision, this was generally interpreted as a means of ensuring that the “handover” would not amount to a wholesale “takeover” of Macao, since instead of sending in its own “lackeys” Beijing would have to appoint Macao permanent residents to the top leadership posts in the territory. But within one short decade, it seems that the interpretation has shifted: to ensure its continued well-being, Macao must be ruled not by just any individual Macao people, but by “the people” of Macao.

15. Macao Local, Macao Global

Globalizing the Local A third narrative frames the changes in Macao not as an antagonism between the “global” and the “local,” but as beneficial symbiosis between the two. In this narrative, “globalization” is not a welcome antidote to Macao’s condition of abject localness, nor is it a predatory, rapacious force threatening to destroy the local; instead, it is the best way to instill in Macao residents a new sense of the value of local culture and history, and of the urgent need to shore up certain aspects of the local that are threatened with extinction. In 2005, after several years of preparation, delays, and false starts under the Portuguese administration, the PRC central government successfully submitted an ensemble of several monuments, streets and squares in downtown Macao (now christened the “Historic Centre of Macao”) in bid for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage status. Despite the fact that the structure and operation of the World Heritage list has done much to fuel, or at least re-inscribe, cultural and ethnic nationalism worldwide (see Scott 2002; Evans 2002), the PRC government’s decision to pursue World Heritage designation was framed not in terms of national interest but in terms of the productive interaction between the global and the local: for one thing, it would bring Macao the international prestige of inclusion on a list of sites around the globe deemed to have “outstanding universal value”; for another, it promised, once again, to bring Macao in line with internationally-defined frameworks for the definition of heritage and globally-mandated strategies for management of heritage assets (du Cros and Lee 2007). In fact, in the narrative of Macao history that accompanied the application, the local is inseparable from the global: tiny Macao has been global since the moment of its founding, and the justification for its status as world heritage is precisely due to its early modern role as a harbinger of the particular form of economic globalization that is now transforming the world—and Macao—almost beyond recognition: as the blurb reads, the Historic Center of Macao “bears witness to one of the earliest and longest-lasting encounters between

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China and the West, based on the vibrancy of international trade” (UNESCO Website, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1110). In a 2009 survey, Macao residents deemed the UNESCO bid to be the MSAR government’s “most successful policy”—more successful, even, than the decision to liberalize gaming (see Chou 2011: 238). Residents have articulated a range of reasons for their support: some believe that the UNESCO listing has put Macao on the world map as a city of culture and history rather than just gambling; others hope that it will provide a modicum of diversification in a tourism economy now almost wholly dependent on casinos; and still others feel that it demonstrates that the Macao government is concerned about quality of life issues rather than simply the GDP. Whatever their reasons, however, the fact is that public interest in Macao’s cultural and architectural heritage appears to be increasingly widespread in the past dozen years—a stark contrast to the 1990s, when the Portuguese government’s attempts to make heritage preservation a major public concern elicited little sympathy. As Thomas Chung has noted, there may be several reasons for this shift in public opinion, including the MSAR government’s achievements in improving public security and lowering employment rates, the strain on existing urban infrastructures of the massive casino and property developments and the huge influx of tourists that have followed in the wake of gaming liberalization, and the mere fact that the main proponent of heritage preservation is no longer a lame-duck colonial government perceived to have a vested interest in perpetuating its cultural (read: colonial) legacy (Chung 2009). But I would suggest that another, more conceptual factor is also at work: when the salvaging of something called “local” history and culture becomes a global project, framed in terms of human universals rather than (or in addition to) local or national interests, the politics of value are shifted. Suddenly, invoking the need to maintain local culture and history is (or can be) a way of asserting cosmopolitanism and responsible world citizenship; conversely, destroying in the name of development that which others—both at the national and international levels—have deemed of universal value can be portrayed as greedy, irresponsible thuggery rather than a rational response to economic supply and demand.19 The globalization of the heritage project also provides

15. Macao Local, Macao Global

heritage proponents with a new vocabulary, clear-cut mechanisms, and a wide array of sticks and carrots that they can use to pressure governments and institutions to conform to the global consensus on the value of the local. This, indeed, seems to be what has happened in the past dozen years in Macao, where the prospect of UNESCO listing spurred the MSAR government and its residents into a greater consciousness of the multiple forms of value that old buildings could have. Local architects and urban planners, who had long lobbied the Portuguese and MSAR governments to invest not just in preserving dilapidated structures, but in revitalizing large swaths of the urban fabric by making them publicly accessible and attractive to tourists, began to find a more receptive audience: in the mid-2000s, just prior to and just after the UNESCO listing, the Macao government invested in restoring and revitalizing other, non-listed neighborhoods, such as the São Lazaro district and the Old Taipa Village, that had picturesque but dilapidated or under-utilized buildings. But as the survey mentioned above suggests, “heritage consciousness” appears to have taken roots even more firmly among Macao residents than it has among MSAR government officials. In 2006, two separate controversies regarding heritage buildings (Guia Lighthouse, which is on the UNESCO list, and the “Blue House,” which is not) erupted in the local press, both sparked by government attempts to remove or impinge upon heritage buildings in the name of economic development, and both resulting in the MSAR government reversing its plans under the weight of public opinion (see Chung 2009 and du Cros 2009).20 While this could be invoked as an example of Macao residents articulating a sense of local identity (or at least, in the language of heritage management, a sense of their own role as “stakeholders in heritage stewardship”), it is equally clear that this articulation is thoroughly inextricable from discourses of globality and global citizenship that are promoted and indeed embodied by institutions such as the UNESCO. The idea that locality and globality are mutually constitutive rather than dialectical opposites is not a new one (see Hall 1991): it has been well-established that local interests often work through global forces and discourses, and that would-be global endeavors must localize themselves in order to gain traction. If we take the

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inseparability of global and local as a given, then, what I find to be a more interesting question is how certain physical or social features, processes or relationships get framed as “local” and others “global,” and why this seems to be such an efficacious way of framing complex and thorny questions. Think of the controversy over the Guia Lighthouse—a structure built on the Chinese coastline by Portuguese administrators, and used to guide seafarers from Europe, India, and Southeast Asia who had come to trade in China, today deemed a structure of “universal value”: was this part of Macao’s “local” heritage that had to be saved from the destructive forces of global capitalism? Or was it a symbol of the early history of globalization that was now at risk from corrupt, small-minded local officials? The answer, of course, is either, or both. In a full-page spread in a Macao Chinese-language newspaper from 2008, for example, the Guia Lighthouse Protection Group 21 attempts to garner support from its readers by appealing to both local and global desires: making the case that the Guia Lighthouse should be protected because it is an icon of Macao’s unique culture, the author employs discourses of “localness” to appeal to Macao residents’ nostalgia for the days before development congested their city with skyscrapers, crowds and pollution. Yet the author also appeals to residents’ sense of global cosmopolitanness by noting their pride in having an “internationally recognized city of culture,” drawing comparisons between Macao, New York, Seoul and other major cities that have dealt with the need to balance development with history, and invoking universal principles of good governance, scientific reason, respect for nature and respect for history, all of which were being violated by the MSAR government’s decision to allow commercial and political interests to too closely coincide. Ironically, of course, given that the Portuguese empire has been characterized as mercantilist in nature, we may say that the coincidence of commercial and political interests is precisely what enabled the construction of the Guia Lighthouse in the first place. But the ability to employ narratives of both local uniqueness and global universality to anchor what is essentially a critique of the government’s myopic, unbalanced vision of what “development” means suggests that these terms derive their efficaciousness from their ability to mobilize deeply felt senses of belonging, community,

15. Macao Local, Macao Global

and justice that, far from being contradictory, can overlap in powerful ways.

Conclusion The three narratives I have traced above certainly do not exhaust the ways that “global” and “local” circulate in post-colonial Macao. In fact, my own narrative here produces its own stereotypical oversimplifications, presenting an image of discrete logics being applicable in discrete domains of social life: the trope of globalization to characterize economic transformations; that of localization to describe changes in the political sphere; and that of global-local symbiosis to typify interactions in the cultural field. In attempting to highlight the distinct moral claims that each narrative makes, I may have overstated their absoluteness and their mutual exclusivity: to be sure, many of the workers and civil servants who protested so vociferously in defending local interests against incursions of global capitalism would also recognize the positive aspects of globalism as invoked by the Guia Lighthouse Protection Group, and might also agree that ultimately, liberalizing the casino sector was the right move. But my purpose in doing so is to draw attention to the fact that if we are to understand the ubiquitousness of discussions about globalization and local identities—not just in Macao, but in the world today—we must recognize that these terms do not reference clear-cut analytical terms as much as they invoke discrepant desires, and motivate collective action aimed at fulfilling those desires. This ability to link questions of geographic scale to deeply resonant moral themes has become a hallmark of the era, and one reason that the terms “local” and “global” continue to have such a hold on our imaginations as we seek to grasp the implications and to assert some kind of control, however partial, over the forces that seem to be transforming the world almost beyond recognition, right before our very eyes.

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Notes

1. See, for example, Breitung 2009; Chou 2010; Lo 2009; Zandonai 2009. 2. See Clayton 2009, chapters 3, for a more detailed discussion of this view. 3. Note that this is a case of businessmen from two countries investing in a third country—in and of itself, hardly a “global” enterprise. But as Tsing notes, “the global is defined as the opening-up process in which remote places submit to foreign finance. Every time finance finds a new site of engagement, we think that the world is getting more global” (2005:73). Macao’s inward FDI jumped from about US $160 million in 2001 to a peak of US$5 billion in 2005, and has totaled approximately US$15 billion since 2002 (World Bank World Development Indicators, http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=b x_klt_dinv_cd_wd&idim=.country:MAC&dl=en&hl=en&q=foreign+dire ct+investment+macau). 4. The six companies are: Galaxy Entertainment Group (a subsidiary of K.Wah Group), Wynn Resorts, Sociedade de Jogos de Macau (SJM), MGM Grand Paradise, Melco Crown, and Venetian Macao. 5. In September 2011, revenue from casinos in Macao was US$2.64 billion; in August 2011, this figure for the state of Nevada was almost $887 million. See “Nevada Gaming Statistics: The Last Six Months February to July 2011.” Available online at http://gaming.unlv.edu. 6. “Wynn Opens Macao Casino, Weighs Moving Headquarters,” in the Las Vegas Sun, 21 April 2010. Available online at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/apr/21/wynn-resorts-might-move -headquarters-macau. 7. These welfare programs include increased payments into the Social Security fund, raising welfare and pension subsidies, higher limits on who can apply for government food assistance, healthcare vouchers and electricity assistance, textbook subsidies for all students in primary, secondary and tertiary education, and free rent for more than 6000 families living in social housing units. See Macau Daily Times, ‘Bigger Cash Handout in 2012,” Nov 16, 2011.Available online at http://www.macaudailytimes.com.mo/macau/ 31492-Bigger-cash-handout-2012.html. 8. For these figures, see the Macao government statistics website, http://www.dsec.gov.mo. 9. A 2006 report from the Hong Kong Liaison Office of the international trade union movement (IHLO) reported the number to be 40,000; labor spokespersons during another round of protests on Oct 1, 2007, put the number at 70,000. See IHLO website (http://www.ihlo.org/ HKM/010506m.html) and “Workers in Macau protest against illegal

15. Macao Local, Macao Global labor,” China Post, Oct 2, 2007. Available online at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/china/local-news/macau/2007/10/02/12493 3/Workers-in.htm). 10. This is Jean and John Comaroff’s term; they describe it as “a capitalism that presents itself as a gospel of salvation; a capitalism that, if rightly harnessed, is invested with the capacity wholly to transform the universe of the marginalized and disempowered” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000). 11. In “Directors look for Macau’s identity,” Macau Daily Times Aug. 12, 2009. Available online at http://www.macaudailytimes.com.mo/macau/ 6748-Directors-look-for-Macaus-identity.html. 12. Note that Chou interprets these numbers to mean that “in the absence of a strong local identity, Macao people who are mostly ethnic Chinese naturally seek identification with cultural and political China” (Chou 2011:240). He is most likely looking at the increase in the percentage of respondents who answered affirmatively to the first question. However, what strikes me as even more significant is the nearly 30% jump in the percentage of Macao residents who, in the years since the handover, have come to feel that Macao is a place they can be proud to call their home. 13. See Hong Kong University Public Opinion poll, in Chou 2011: 236. See also England 2008. 14. Estimates of the size of these demonstrations vary widely. In 2006, the estimated number of participants was 5000. In 2007, police estimated 2000 people participated, while organizers put the figure at 10,000. The 2007 incident gained notoriety for the fact that one police officer fired his weapon into the air and the bullet lodged in the neck of a passing motorcyclist. But the 2010 protests, though smaller (estimate between 800 and 1000 demonstrators) appear to have been far more violent, with 41 injuries after police used pepper spray and water cannons to prevent the marchers from entering a downtown street that was full of tourists enjoying the mainland’s 3-day weekend (Macau News, 3 May 2010, available online at http://www.macaunews.com.mo/index.php?option =com_content &task =view&id=851&Itemid=3). 15. See “Rare Macau protest turns violent,” BBC News Online, Tuesday, 1 May 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk /2/hi/asia-pacific/6611245.stm; and “May Day Protests Leave 41 Injured,” Macau News, 3 May 2010. Available online at http://www.macaunews.com.mo/index.php?option =com_content&task=view&id=851&Itemid=3. 16. See “Residents Want Slots Out of Fai Chi Kei,” Macau Daily Times, 26 October 2011. Available online at http://www.macaudailytimes.com.mo/ macau/30845-Residents-want-slots-out-Fai-Chi-Kei.html. 17. In “The Venetian Should Not Concentrate on Gambling: SJM executive director Ambrose So, on fierce competition among casino operators and the most recent and controversial decisions of the local government,” Macau Closer, June 2008, pp. 26–30. Sonny Lo also notes that “after the global financial crisis in late 2008, some casino elites, such as Ambrose So

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China’s Macao Transformed: Challenge & Development in the 21st Century of the SJM… the casino sector should favor the local people rather than the foreigners… Stanley Ho also remarked during the ”” Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to Macao in January 2009 that…the authorities should provide more assistance to the local casinos (Lo 2009). 18. MSAR Legislative Assembly Vice president, Ho Iat Sen, has been quoted as saying that “democracy is inevitable,” though a gradual reform process is needed. Ho is also a Standing Committee member of the PRC National People’s Congress, the body ultimately charged with deciding the constitutionality of Macao’s electoral laws. See Macau Daily Times, 22 Nov, 2011 (available online: http://www.macaudailytimes.com.mo/ macau/31690-Democracy-unavoidable-Iat-Seng.html). As Bryan Ho notes, however, exactly what “democracy” may be taken to mean is still a matter of debate (Ho 2011). 19. Thus, for example, pro-democracy Macao legislators Au Kam San and Ng Kuok Cheong argued that the MSAR government’s disregard for UNESCO regulations gave Macao the international image of a “culprit vandalising world heritage vistas” (quoted in Chung 2009: 152). 20. In 2006, the “Little Blue House,” an old Portuguese residence that has for some 50 years housed the Social Welfare Institute, was slated for demolition as the SWI needed larger facilities (see du Cros 2009). That same year, the MSAR government, in violation of its own regulations, approved several high-rise buildings for construction at the southern end of Guia Hill, which critics feared would form a “wall of concrete” blocking sightlines to and from the Guia Lighthouse and Chapel complex, a protected UNESCO heritage site (see Chung 2009). 21. Guia Lighthouse Protection Group, “保護松山燈塔景觀，延續本奧獨有文 化” [Protect the Guia Lighthouse Landscape, Preserve Macau’s Unique Culture], Shimin Ribao 市民日報, June 23, 2008.

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Contributors Jean A. BERLIE. French researcher, affiliates with the Centre for Greater China Studies, Hong Kong Institute of Education. He received his Ph.D. degree in Social Science at Paris University. His research focuses on ethnical culture in mainland China and Macao and has published several books including The Burmanization of Myanmar’s Muslims (2008), and The Chinese of Macau (2012) as well as a co-edited volume Macao 2000 (1999). Ming K. CHAN. Visiting fellow, Center for East Asian Studies, Stanford University, where he was a Hoover Institution research fellow, 1976–80/1999–2009. Born and schooled in Hong Kong, he obtained 3 US degrees, including a PhD from Stanford at age 25. Taught at the University of Hong Kong, held endowed chairs at Swarthmore and Grinnell, he was visiting professor at Duke, UCLA, Mount Holyoke and EL Colegio de Mexico. He is an International Advisory Council member of the University of Lisbon’s Orient Institute, and an advisor to the Richard Charles Lee Canada–Hong Kong Library, University of Toronto. Author/editor of 13 academic volumes and 80 articles/book chapters on Chinese history, Sinoforeign links, and Hong Kong–Macao studies, his most recent books are Historical Dictionary of the Hong Kong SAR & the Macao SAR (2006), China’s Hong Kong Transformed (2008), Perspectives on Lingnan Modern History (2010), and The Luso-Macau Connections in Sun Yatsen’s Modern Chinese Revolution (2011). He is General Editor of the Hong Kong Becoming China series of 12 titles issued by M E Sharpe, 1991–2009. Duncan CHEONG. Graduate, Bachelor in Public Administration Program, University of Macau. His Bachelor Social Sciences thesis focuses on the student movement in the Macao Special Administrative Region and discusses the local youth’s political mobilization through the Internet.

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Bill K. P. CHOU. Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Macau. He has held visiting positions in University of CaliforniaLos Angeles, Asian Development Bank Institute, National University of Singapore, and City University of Hong Kong. He is the author of Government and Policy-Making Reform in China (2009), and an editor of China's Policies on Its Borderlands and the International Implications (2011). Cathryn H. CLAYTON. Cultural Anthropologist of China and Associate Professor in the Asian Studies Program at University of Hawaii-Manoa. Her 2009 book, Sovereignty at the Edge: Macau and the Question of Chineseness (Harvard University Asian Center, 2009) examines how conceptions and practices of sovereignty shaped the categories through which Chineseness was imagined in Macao as that city prepared to be transferred from Portuguese to Chinese administration in 1999. It is the winner of the 2010 Francis Hsu Award for Best New Book in East Asian Studies from the Society for East Asian Anthropology. She taught at the University of Macau, 2001–2005. Jorge GODINHO. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Macau. He received his doctoral degree at the European University Institute. His publications were in Portuguese, English and French, some translated to Chinese. He published a major treatment of Macao law in English, Macau Business Law and Legal System (2007). He translated the Macao Commercial Code into English. He is a member of the Gaming Law Review board of editors. His current research focuses on gaming law. Miao HE. Ph.D. candidate, Economics, University of Macau. She received her master degree in Economics from the University of Macau with a thesis investigating Macao’s economic competitiveness. Her research interests include public policy, the Chinese and Macao economies, and Asian casino gaming markets. Currently, her studies focused on the evolution and legalization process of casino gaming in Asia, especially in Macao and Singapore. She has published several related articles in local journals and newspapers.

Contributors

Bryan HO. Assistant Professor, Government and Public Administration, University of Macau. He received his undergraduate education in Singapore and completed his postgraduate studies in Britain and Hong Kong. His research interests include the legitimation of power, participation, public management and policy studies in Asian states and societies. Malte Phillip KAEDING. Lecturer, International Relations, University of Surrey. He holds a Magister degree in Chinese Studies and Political Science from the University of Heidelberg, Germany and a Ph.D. from Hong Kong Baptist University. He is an Associate Fellow at the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan, and a member of the Hong Kong Transition Project based at HKBU. Bruce K. K. KWONG. Assistant Professor, Department of Government and Public Administration, the University of Macau. Editor, Journal of Public Administration and Policy. His interests in greater China studies include topics about elections, patron-client politics, policing and public ethics. Recently, he has published a book entitled Patron-Client Politics and Election in Hong Kong and translated an English book into Chinese entitled Government Capacity and Civil Service of Hong Kong. He has co-edited two Chinese comparative political books, A Tales of Two Cities II and A Tales of Two Cities III on Hong Kong and Macao social-political affairs. Emma S. M. LAO. She received her bachelor and master’s degrees in public administration at the University of Macau. Her research focuses on e-politics. Her master thesis evaluates the development of e-government in Macao and the new trends in e-democracy. Sonny LO. Professor and Head, Department of Social Sciences, Hong Kong Institute of Education. Co-Director, Center for Greater China Studies, and Associate Director, Center for Governance and Citizenship. He received his three degrees from Canadian universities, including a University of Toronto Ph.D. in 1993. He

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was a political science professor at the University of Waterloo in Canada, 2004–2010, and taught at the University of Hong Kong, 1996–2004 and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 1993–1996. He also taught at the University of East Asia in Macao, 1989–1990. He is the author of numerous academic articles and eight books on Greater China politics, including The Politics of Cross-Border Crime in Greater China: Case Studies of Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao (2009), Political Change in Macao (2008), Political Development in Macau (1995), and Historical Dictionary of the Hong Kong SAR and the Macao SAR (2006, with Ming Chan). José Carlos MATIAS. Macao-based journalist and researcher. He has been working as a journalist and editor with Telediffusion de Macau (TDM), Macao’s public service broadcaster since 2003. In 2007, he obtained a Master’s degree in European Studies at the Institute of European Studies, University of Macau, and in 2010 he joined a research team based at the University of Coimbra, Portugal, that has been conducting a research project on “The Role of Macao in China’s Relations with the European Union and Portuguese Speaking Countries.” Jorge A. H. RANGEL. President, the International Institute of Macau (IIM). Educated in Europe (Lisbon, Portugal; Cambridge, UK; Bonn, Germany; and Navarra, Spain), he served the Macao Government for 25 years, having been Secretary for Administration, Education and Youth, and also for Culture, Tourism and Sports. He was also Acting Governor of Macao and was responsible for the coordination of the handover ceremonies in 1999 and of the transfer of administrative responsibilities to the Macao SAR Government. Elected member of the Macao Legislative Assembly, he was a member of the Macao Basic Law Drafting Committee, President of the Macao Foundation, and chaired the committee that changed the University of East Asia from a private to a public institution renamed the University of Macau. He was founding president of the Macau Polytechnic, where he is now Honorary President. He was

Contributors

Chairman of Macau’s Education, Youth and Sports Councils and now does academic and research work in several universities in Portugal and other countries, where he is also actively involved in the activities of numerous cultural institutions, recently as President of Portugal’s Historical Society for National Independence. Ricardo C. S. SHIU. Associate Professor, Business Economics, and Acting Head, Department of Finance and Business Economics, University of Macau. He was the programme coordinator of the Gaming Management program at the University of Macau, 2005– 2009. He is an internationally-known scholar in the stream of casino gaming, specializing in the areas of public policies and evolution of casino gaming in Macao and other Asian jurisdictions. He has many gaming studies-related publications in academic journals and professional magazines. He also takes part in various international gaming conferences and expos as an invited speaker. Derrick C. K. TAM. Ph.D. candidate, Public Administration, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou. He obtained his first two degrees from the University of Macau. He is the chairman of the Assembly of Macao Heritage Ambassadors Association and the Executive Director of Macao Youth Federation. His major research interests include governance and public policy in Macao, specifically on cultural and heritage protection and policy. Hayes H. H. TANG. College Lecturer, Asian Studies, the University of Hong Kong. A sociologist, he is interested in the fields of education, global migration and academic profession. The notion of academic entrepreneurialism informs his forthcoming works, in particular “Scholarship Reconsidered in an Era of Entrepreneurialism: Academic Professions in Hong Kong and South Korea,” “Academic Capitalism in Greater China: Theme and Variations” and “New Trends in Innovation Strategy at Chinese Universities in Hong Kong and Shenzhen.”

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Benson W. K. WONG. Assistant Professor, Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University. His research interests include comparative politics of Hong Kong and Taiwan, cultural studies, Internet and politics, the politics of education, identity change, and youth politics and policies. He served as an Assistant Professor at Chu Hai College of Higher Education in Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong Institute of Education. He is engaging in two concurrent research projects — one explores how cyberspace like Facebook creates and reconstructs the Hong Kong identity; another examines how China study tours reconstruct local and national identities. Zhiliang WU. President of the Board of Directors, Macao Foundation. He received his first degree in Portuguese from Beijing Foreign Studies University in 1985. Before joining the Macao Foundation in 1988, he spent a year in Portugal, studying at the Faculties of Arts and Law, University of Lisbon and Portuguese Catholic University. He received his doctoral degree in history from the University of Nanjing in 1997. He is a Visiting Professor at the University of Macau, the Macao University of Science and Technology, Nanjing University and Beijing Foreign Studies University. Herbert S. YEE. Formerly Professor, Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University. He has been Visiting Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Macau, Macao Polytechnic Institute and University of Saint Joseph of Macao since his retirement from the Hong Kong Baptist University. His recent publications include: The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality (co-editor), Return of the Dragon: US–China Relations in the 21st Century (co-editor), China’s Rise — Threat or Opportunity? (editor) and A Longitudinal Study of Macau’s Chinese Political Culture (co-author).

Contributors

Eilo W. Y. YU. Associate Professor in the University of Macau’s Department of Government and Public Administration, where he is Coordinator of Public Administration (Bachelor) Program. He specializes in the research areas of party politics, election and democratization, politics of Internet, and public administration in Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In spring 2014, he was appointed a member of the Talent Development Commission by the Macao SAR Chief Executive. Minxing ZHAO. Ph.D. candidate, Department of Social Sciences, Hong Kong Institute of Education. He has a background in political science and law. His research interests include comparative politics, social and political change in China, transnational crimes and international relations in Northeast Asia.

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