China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics 9780801456992

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China’s Ascent

a volume in the series

Cornell Studies in Security Affairs edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt

A list of titles in this series is available at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

China’s Ascent Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics edited by

Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng

Cornell University Press

i t h ac a a n d l on don

Copyright © 2008 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2008 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2008 Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data China’s ascent : power, security, and the future of international politics / edited by Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng. p. cm. (Cornell studies in security affairs) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8014-4691-7 (cloth : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-8014-7444-6 (pbk : alk. paper) 1. China—Foreign relations 21st—century. 2. China—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign Relations—China 4. National security—China. 5. Peaceful change (International relations) 6. World politics—21st century. I. Ross, Robert S., 1954– II. Zhu, Feng, 1964– III. Title. IV. Series. DS779.47. C45 2008 327.51—dc22 2008007663

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Contents

List of Contributors vii Acknowledg ments ix

Introduction

1

Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng

Part I Structure, Power Transitions, and the Rise of China 1

Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China

11

Jack S. Levy

2

China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful: How Unipolarity Matters

34

Zhu Feng

3

Parsing China’s Rise: International Circumstances and National Attributes 55 Avery Goldstein

Part II International Institutions and the Rise of China 4

The Rise of China: Power, Institutions, and the Western Order 89 G. John Ikenberry

5

Structures, Processes, and the Socialization of Power: East Asian Community-building and the Rise of China Qin Yaqing and Wei Ling

115

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China’s Ascent

Part III 6

Chinese Policymaking and the Rise of China

From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy 141 Tang Shiping

7

Purpose Transitions: China’s Rise and the American Response 163 Jeffrey W. Legro

Part IV Responding to the Rise of China 8

Between China, America, and North Korea: South Korea’s Hedging 191 Byung- Kook Kim

9

A Japanese Perspective on China’s Rise and the East Asian Order 218 Akio Takahara

10 The Consequences of China’s Economic Rise for Sino-U.S. Relations: Rivalry, Political Conflict, and (Not) War 238 Jonathan Kirshner

11 The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul 260 Robert J. Art

Part V Conclusion 12 The Rise of China: Theoretical and Policy Perspectives Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng

Index

317

293

Contributors

Robert Art is Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Director of MIT’s Seminar XXI Program. Avery Goldstein is Professor and Chair of the Political Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania and Associate Director of its Christopher Browne Center for International Politics. G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Byung-Kook Kim is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for Peace Studies, Korea University. He has also directed the East Asia Institute, an independent think tank based in Seoul. Jonathan Kirshner is Professor of Government at Cornell University. He is coeditor of the book series Cornell Studies in Money. Jeffrey W. Legro is Compton Professor of World Politics, Chair of the Department of Politics, and Co-Director of the Governing America in a Global Era Program at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. Jack S. Levy is Board of Governors’ Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, President of the International Studies Association (2007–8), and past President of the Peace Science Society (2005–6). Qin Yaqing is Professor of International Studies at China Foreign Affairs University. He is also Vice President of the China National Association for International Studies.

viii

Contributors

Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science at Boston College. He is a member of the Academic Advisory Group, U.S.- China Working Group, United States Congress. Akio Takahara is Professor of Contemporary Chinese Politics at the Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo. Tang Shiping is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Wei Ling is Associate Professor at China Foreign University. She is also Deputy Director of the East Asian Studies Center, China’s national coordinator for the Network of East Asian Think Tanks. Zhu Feng is Professor of International Relations and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CISS), Peking University.

Acknowledgments

The editors are grateful to the Ford Foundation and to Andrew Watson, Ford Foundation China Representative, for the fi nancial support that made this project possible. They are also grateful to the School of International Studies, Peking University, and to Ren Qimin of the Center for Peace and Development for additional funding. The School of International Studies provided critical staff support that contributed to the success of the conference.

China’s Ascent

Introduction Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng

This volume is a collaborative effort among Chinese, American, Japanese, and South Korean scholars to apply the theoretical international relations literature on power transitions to the contemporary dynamics brought on by the rise of China. Our objective is to understand the implications of the ongoing U.S.- China power transition for contemporary international politics. The contributions to the volume do not reflect the perspective of a single theoretical tradition. Rather, the volume brings together the scholarship of specialists on various aspects of international politics to consider the U.S.China power transition from multiple theoretical and national foreign policy dimensions. The authors do share an understanding that the direction of international politics and the behavior of states are not determined by a single variable and that the outcome of power transitions is not predetermined. This shared understanding of international politics and of state behavior extends to our perspectives on the dynamics of power transitions in general and to the specific dynamics of the U.S.- China power transition.

Power Transitions and International Conflict Power transitions are among the most destabilizing events in international politics. Shifts in the distribution of power among the great powers, together with associated confl icts over the redistribution of the goods of the international system, have been recurring sources of great power confl ict and of prolonged and destructive great power wars. The scholars in this volume recognize this reality and understand that the U.S.- China power transition will be characterized by significant economic and political conflicts of interest and persistent strategic competition. This is expected great power behavior during 1

2

China’s Ascent

periods of stable distributions of power; it is even more so during power transitions. Nonetheless, the participants in this volume also concur that war is not the inevitable outcome of great power transitions. Although the redistribution of great power capabilities may necessarily exacerbate confl icts of interest, this redistribution alone cannot determine the intensity or outcome of those conflicts, or whether there is a peaceful resolution of them. This is because the costs that great powers are prepared to incur, and thus the intensity and means with which they pursue their more expansive interests, are responsive to the particular international and domestic policy conditions during each transition. In this respect, despite recurring heightened conflict associated with power transitions generally, each power transition is a unique event. It reflects the particular historically bounded combination of multiple factors that bear on the behavior of great powers and on the sources of conflict and cooperation among them. The chapters in this volume address various factors that combine to shape the behavior of the great powers involved in power transitions and that influence the severity of confl icts and the likelihood of a peaceful adjustment to the redistribution of power. They consider how these factors combine to create the unique dynamics of the U.S.- China power transition and the prospects for a peaceful transition.

The Structure of the Volume The chapters in this volume divide into four parts. Part I considers the content of contemporary global and East Asian structures and their effect on the U.S.- China power transition. Part II addresses the potential role of international and regional multilateral institutions in mitigating the sources of instability in this power transition. The focus of Part III are the domestic sources of China’s evolving ambitions and its foreign policy behavior, the potential sources of policy change, and the resulting implications for China’s contribution to a stable power transition. The response of South Korea, Japan and the United States to the rise of China and the implications for the emerging regional and global orders and for the prospects for a stable power transition are dealt with in Part IV. The volume’s concluding chapter offers some preliminary fi ndings regarding the sources and likelihood of a peaceful U.S.China power transition. The argument underlying Part I is that fundamental aspects of interstate behavior, including the causes and outcome of confl ict, are shaped by circumstances common to all states, so that there are recurring aspects of power transitions that transcend time and space. The most fundamental element of this structural approach is the anarchic structure of the international system. Anarchy determines that states seek security through self-help mechanisms, including war, and that they are preoccupied with their power position rela-

Introduction

3

tive to other countries. Anarchy leads states to focus on other states’ capabilities, not their intentions, in assessing threats. This creates the security dilemma, whereby what one state does to enhance its security contributes to another state’s insecurity. Anarchy thus explains why shifts in relative power can create insecurity and confl icts. But the content of structure is not determined by anarchy, which is a constant in international politics. Other structural factors that shape the intensity and outcome of great power confl ict include the polarity of the system, the geography of great power placement in the system, and the characteristics of weapons technologies in a par ticu lar era or region. Unlike anarchy, the precise effect of these factors varies, thereby making the nature of power transitions indeterminate. Polarity can influence threat perception, thus affecting security dilemma dynamics and balance of power politics; it therefore can influence the intensity of great power confl ict associated with power transitions. Geography can influence great power confl ict, despite the advent of high-technology warfare, by directly affecting the severity of threat perception and the likelihood of war. Mountains, water, climate (including deserts and permafrost), and access to natural resources continue to influence capabilities, threat perception, and great power allocation of strategic resources. Military technology is the third component of structure that influences the security dilemma and the course of great power politics. Nuclear weapons, for example, have had a fundamental impact on the character of international politics, including the role of force in resolving great power confl icts of interest. The offense- defense balance, reflecting the characteristics of weapon technologies and capabilities, can also affect the intensity of confl ict and the propensity for war through their effect on the likelihood of arms races and crisis instability. In the context of anarchy, how these three factors combine in different historical and/or regional circumstances creates the par ticular characteristics of security dilemma dynamics and thus of the intensity of confl ict associated with a power transition. International structure influences great power competition, but multiple structures can exist simultaneously. In any particular era, the content of structure can vary depending on the arena of great power competition, reflecting the different reach of great powers across the globe. For example, in the contemporary era, the United States is a global power and China is a regional great power. In such circumstances, distinct global structures and regional structures can exist simultaneously, so that polarity can vary across regions, geographic circumstances will be regionally unique, and the prevalence of certain weapons systems can depend on regional circumstances, including geography. Insofar as great power competition can take place in different arenas simultaneously, the course of a power transition can reflect the combined effect of distinct global and regional structures on great power behavior.

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China’s Ascent

All the chapters in Part I share this structural perspective. Jack Levy’s chapter offers a comprehensive analysis of factors that have determined historical variation in the occurrence of power transition wars in European history. He considers the relative importance of raw sources of power, such as population and GDP, and of technology and geography as sources of power transitions. He also considers the affect of the interaction between regional and global structures on power transitions and the implications for the U.S.- China transition occurring in a context of U.S. global dominance. Zhu Feng’s chapter places the U.S.- China power transition in the context of the unipolar global balance of power. It analyzes the constraints imposed by U.S. hegemony on China’s ability to challenge U.S. power through either internal or external balancing. Avery Goldstein’s chapter considers the influence of various aspects of both the global structure and the regional East Asian structure on China’s rising power strategy and on U.S.- China security dilemma dynamics and the corresponding prospects for stable regional balance of power politics. Taken together, these three chapters suggest that the particular global and regional structural context of the U.S.- China competition may facilitate a peaceful power transition. The chapters in Part II reflect a shared understanding that the international sources of great power relations are not limited to intrinsic and immutable structural factors. This research indicates that the great powers can influence international politics insofar as they create and participate in international multilateral institutions that influence threat perception and constrain the use of force. These institutions thus influence the intensity and means with which rising powers pursue new ambitions. International institutions are not unique to the contemporary era. The earliest institution of the state system is sovereignty, which was fi rst established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia at the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War. Just as the norm of sovereignty constrains intervention in the domestic affairs of states, other institutions have contributed to the peaceful resolution of great power conflict. The nineteenth- century Concert of Europe was an international institution that contributed to negotiated solutions to great power conflicts and to the prolonged peace from the Napoleonic Wars to World War I. In the aftermath of World War II, the international system experienced the widespread growth of international institutions. Under U.S. leadership, the reach of international institutions has spread to nearly every facet of international security and economic affairs, and they have exercised unprecedented influence over the foreign policies of the advanced industrial economies. Following the end of the Cold War and of the ideological and economic polarization of international politics, membership in the American-led institutional order spread throughout the globe and now all of the great powers are included in this order. Indeed, China is as much a participant in international global economic and security institutions as the United States. Moreover, regional powers have increasingly taken the initiative to develop local

Introduction

5

economic and security institutional frameworks. In East Asia, Chinese membership and even leadership of economic and security institutions are especially pronounced. Thus, the global and East Asian institutional orders are critical parts of the international environment that influence the course of the U.S.- China power transition. John Ikenberry addresses the role of global multilateral institutions in constraining U.S. unilateralism and the use of force and in lessening Chinese threat perception, reducing the likelihood of a power transition war. Complementing Ikenberry’s focus on global institutions, Qin Yaqing and Wei Ling address the implications of Chinese participation in regional institutions for the power transition. They observe the impact of Chinese membership in East Asian security dialogues on Beijing’s readiness to seek negotiated consensus solutions to regional disputes. These two chapters suggest that not only has China become an engaged beneficiary of the contemporary institutional order and that it possesses an interest in maintaining and consolidating this order. Equally important, they argue that the combined effect of Chinese and American participation in global institutions and Chinese involvement in regional institutions can mitigate the competition inherent in the U.S.- China power transition. Great power transitions create heightened competition over security; international institutions affect the intensity of the competition by constraining the use of force, influencing threat perception, and promoting peaceful resolution of confl icts of interest. But state-level variables can operate within certain international and regional structures and within the context of international institutions to contribute to the course of power transitions. This is the focus of the chapters in Part III. Rising powers will develop more expansive ambitions. But neither the content of a rising power’s new ambitions nor the intensity of its dissatisfaction with a given order are predetermined. Rather, a rising power’s domestic policymaking environment can contribute to the extent of its demand for change and of its impatience for change. Domestic economic conditions can affect foreign policy behavior. On the one hand, prolonged economic success can result in foreign policy overconfidence and to expansive ambitions. On the other hand, prolonged economic decline can contribute to foreign policy belligerence. But economic factors can also contribute to foreign policy moderation, insofar as rising powers engaged in the early stages of economic development or experiencing economic instability may seek a peaceful international environment to enable allocation of resources to economic growth. Frequently, the critical variable affecting the impact of economic conditions on foreign policy is the rising power’s political system and the legitimacy of its leadership. Leaders in authoritarian states and in states in transition to a democratic system may be especially likely to engage in destabilizing foreign policy nationalism to promote their legitimacy and to preserve their political power.

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China’s Ascent

Tang Shiping and Jeffrey Legro address particular domestic factors that can contribute to the intensity of a rising power’s determination to revise the international order. Tang argues that a fundamental determinant of the propensity for heightened conflict is the extent of leadership appreciation of the security dilemma and of the necessity for restraint in pursuing security. He examines the implications of the far-reaching ideological and political transformation in China following the death of Mao Zedong for China’s approach to national security and for the possibility of international confl ict. He argues that contemporary China’s implicit appreciation of the security dilemma contributes to foreign policy moderation and a peaceful power transition. Legro maintains that all rising powers can choose among alternative strategies to achieve their unfulfilled ambitions and that their selections over time can be a function of the changing balance of forces among domestic policy coalitions. He argues that a critical factor affecting the emergence and persistence of a foreign policy coalition advocating a cooperative rising power strategy is the policy of the status quo power. From this perspective, he addresses the domestic sources of China’s historical policy transitions and the sources of its contemporary rising power strategy. Legro concludes with a discussion of how U.S. policy toward China can contribute to the consolidation of China’s contemporary foreign policy moderation. Avery Goldstein and Jonathan Kirshner in his chapter in Part IV also consider the domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy. Goldstein considers how domestic instability, reflecting the uncertainties of economic development, could encourage China’s authoritarian government to pursue a belligerent nationalist policy in order to sustain its domestic political legitimacy, thus contributing to intensified U.S.- China confl ict. Kirshner’s chapter considers how international economic instability could trigger the domestic economic instability that Goldstein considers a potential source of Chinese foreign policy nationalism and international instability. Part IV considers how the behavior of other countries can shape Chinese behavior and the regional order, thus influencing the course of the power transition. Chinese foreign policy will inevitably reflect developments within China, but equally important will be the affect on Chinese behavior of the policies of other countries. Scholars have long recognized that foreign policies of other countries need to be responsive to the particular ambitions of a rising power. This is the familiar appeasement/containment dilemma: appeasement (or accommodation) of an ambitious rising power by a status quo power can elicit unconstrained ambition, but containment of a conservative rising power can also produce unconstrained ambition. Appeasement is best directed at a conservative rising power, while containment is the appropriate policy toward a highly ambitious rising power. But equally important in the development of the status quo state’s policy toward a rising power is its assessment of its own security interests. Appeasement is possible only to the extent that it does not compromise a country’s understanding of its vital interests. Thus, a country’s

Introduction

7

policy toward a rising power will necessarily combine consideration of its own security interests with the rising power’s ambitions. This process will affect the course of the power transition. The chapters on the Korean, Japanese, and U.S. responses to the rise of China address how each country views its national interests in the context of China’s rising power and how its China policy contributes to the course of the power transition. These chapters also analyze how domestic factors in each country operate within these evolving structural conditions to contribute to policymaking. The inclusion of chapters on South Korean and Japanese policy reflects the understanding that secondary states can affect the course of power transitions. Secondary states’ maneuvering between the great powers can influence the process of accommodation and containment of a rising power and thus the prospects for a stable transition. Byung-kook Kim’s chapter analyzes the evolution of South Korea’s strategic adjustment imposed by China’s emerging authority over the Korean peninsula. He observes the emergence of South Korean foreign policy instability and the erosion of its domestic foreign policy consensus in the context of its determined realignment between the great powers, reflected in its moderate policy toward North Korea and in its eroding alliance relationship with the United States. Akihara Takahara discusses the effect of the rise of China on Japanese security policy. Whereas South Korean realignment accommodates the rise of China, Japanese policy resists it. Takahara shows that Tokyo is adopting a more proactive defense policy by easing restrictions on its regional and global military activities and by enhancing its contribution to the U.S.Japan alliance. He further considers the impact of the rise of China on trends in Japanese nationalism and the implications for the management of the rise of China. Reflecting the importance of the U.S.- China relationship on the course of the power transition, Part IV includes two chapters on U.S. policy toward China. Jonathan Kirshner’s chapter analyzes the effect of the rise of the Chinese economy on the political economy of US.- China relations and its implications for confl ict over trade and global sources of petroleum. He argues that these two issues should not contribute to excessive conflict. But Kirshner is more concerned by the potential implications of possible U.S. mismanagement of its economy, in particular the size of the federal budget deficit and the overleveraged dollar. A U.S. recession could undermine the country’s ability to contend militarily with the rise of China. It could also undermine China’s domestic economic prospects and thus contribute to a destabilizing nationalist foreign policy. Robert Art’s chapter addresses U.S. global and regional interests in the context of U.S.- China relations, and Washington’s ability to reconcile these interests with the rise of China and associated U.S.- China conflicts of interests. He suggests policies that have the potential to promote both a peaceful great power transition and American security. From a realist perspective, he is optimistic that the United States can accommodate key Chinese

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China’s Ascent

interests while protecting its own vital interests and maintaining a favorable regional balance of power. The volume’s concluding chapter considers the prospects for a peaceful U.S.- China power transition. It considers how the many factors discussed in this volume either complement or offset each other to shape the particular dynamics of U.S.- China relations. Taking into account the impact of the global structure and the East Asian regional structure on security dilemma dynamics, the prominent role of international institutions in shaping U.S. and Chinese international behavior, the domestic sources and direction of contemporary Chinese foreign policy, and the foreign policies of the United States and other key states, it suggests that while the U.S.- China power transition will necessarily reflect heightened strategic competition over significant conflicts of interest, there is also the likelihood that China and the United States can avoid a destructive power transition war. Considering the historical record of great power transitions, this is an optimistic conclusion. This volume offers only a preliminary judgment on the course of the U.S.China power transition, and its cautious optimism is simply one of various possible perspectives on the transition. There are other perspectives, including more pessimistic and more strongly optimistic ones. Thus, scholarship in this volume does not present all perspectives on either theoretical or policy perspectives on the U.S.- China transition. But the contributors hope that this collaborative effort and its preliminary understanding of the U.S.- China transition will encourage further collaborative research into the dynamics of great power transitions generally and into the U.S.- China transition in particular.

Part I

STRUCTURE, POWER TRANSITIONS, AND THE RISE OF CHINA

chapter

1

Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China Jack S. Levy

Many scholars writing on the rise of China and its consequences for world politics in the twenty-fi rst century attempt to ground their analyses in power transition theory.1 This is not surprising, given the theory’s emphasis on international hierarchies, differential rates of economic development, power shifts, the transformation of the international order, and the violent or peaceful means through which such transformations occur. I argue that applications of power transition theory to the rise of China are compromised by the failure to recognize both the theoretical limitations of power transition theory and the contextual differences between a potential Sino-American transition and past power transitions. I give particular attention to the theory’s focus on a single international hierarchy and its lack of a conceptual apparatus to deal with global-regional interactions, which are important because China is more likely to pose a threat to U.S. interests in East and Southeast Asia than to U.S. global interests, at least for many decades. I summarize power transition theory, identify logical problems in the theory and empirical problems in its application to systemic transitions of the past, and address the relevance of the theory for analyzing the rise of China and its impact on the emerging international order of the twenty-fi rst century.

Power Transition Theory: A Summary Although one can fi nd elements of power transition theory throughout the long tradition of international relations theory in the West, it was Organski 1. For a classification of the literature on the rise of China in terms of realist, liberal, and constructivist international relations theory, see Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.- China Relations: Is Confl ict Inevitable?” International Security 30 (fall 2005): 7–45.

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China’s Ascent

and then Gilpin who fi rst constructed systematic theories of power transitions. 2 Gilpin’s initial treatment was in many respects theoretically richer than Organski’s, but it was not followed by subsequent theoretical and empirical development, while Organski and subsequent generations of students went on to refi ne the theory, extend it to new empirical domains, and analyze its policy implications. 3 Now, a half- century after Organski’s initial conception, power transition theory remains a thriving research program, its relevance enhanced by the end of the bipolar Cold War paradigm, the emergence of American hegemony, and the rise of China. Organski developed power transition theory to correct for the deficiencies he saw in balance of power theory, as systematized by Hans Morgenthau and others.4 Organski rejected balance of power assumptions that equilibrium is the natural condition of the international system; that a parity of power promotes peace while a preponderance of power promotes war; and that concentrations of power generate counterbalancing coalitions and occasional counterhegemonic wars to restore equilibrium. He also argued that balance of power theory’s conception of power was excessively static, narrowly focused on military power and on the role of alliances in aggregating power against external threats, neglectful of the internal sources of national power, and insensitive to the importance of differential rates of growth among states. Unlike balance of power theory’s assumptions that hegemonies rarely if ever form in international politics, Organski posits a hierarchical international system, with a single dominant power at the apex of the system and a handful of other great powers and larger numbers of middle and smaller powers. Organski and his colleagues emphasize that while the dominant power controls the largest proportion of resources in the system, it is not a hegemon because it lacks the coercive power to control the behaviors of all other actors. Dominant states can use their power, however, to create a set of global political and economic structures and to promote norms of behavior that enhance the stability of the system while at the same time advancing their own security and other interests.5 2. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (spring 1988): 591–614. 3. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Ronald L. Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatham House, 2000). 4. Organski, World Politics; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948). 5. Organski, World Politics; Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 6. Gilpin (War and Change) and subsequently Ikenberry provide useful analyses of the leading state’s role in building international institutions and developing norms to help it maintain stability and manage the international system. Schroeder emphasizes the collective mind sets that facilitate the construction of an international order. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Paul

Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China

13

The system evolves with the rise and fall of states, their uneven growth rates driven primarily by changes in population, economic productivity, and the state’s political capacity to extract resources from society. Organski and his colleagues measure productivity in terms of GDP/capita. Their aggregate measure of power is the product of GDP and political capacity.6 If a great power increases in strength to the point that it acquires at least 80 percent of the power of the dominant state, it is defi ned as a “challenger” to the dominant state and to that state’s ability to control the international system. The threat posed by a challenger is a function of the extent of its dissatisfaction with the existing international system. The dominant power, which plays a disproportionate role in setting up the system, is by defi nition a satisfied power. Most of the other great powers, and many middle and smaller states, benefit from the existing system and are satisfied states. They support the dominant state, ally with it,7 and help reinforce the international order that it created.8 One or two of the other great powers, along with many weaker states, may not share this satisfaction with the existing international system. They come to believe that the existing system, and the institutions and rules associated with it, provide a distribution of benefits that is unfair and that does not reflect their own power and expectations. Such states prefer to replace the existing system and its leadership. While most dissatisfied states lack the resources to ever pose serious threats to the dominant power and its system, the emergence of a dissatisfied great power might pose such a threat if it continues to grow in power. A key proposition of power transition theory is that war is most likely when a dissatisfied challenger increases in strength and begins to overtake the dominant power.9 The probability of war is quite low before the challenger W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For an earlier effort to explain the rebuilding of order after major wars see Charles F. Doran, The Politics of Assimilation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971). 6. Earlier, Organski and Kugler used GNP as an indicator of power. They showed that the GNP indicator was highly correlated with the composite capabilities index of the Correlates of War project, which includes equally weighted demographic, economic, and military indicators. Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, 34. They also operationally defi ned political capacity (chap. 2). See also Jacek Kugler and Marina Arbetman, “Choosing among Measures of Power: A Review of the Empirical Record,” in Power in World Politics, ed. Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 49–77; Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 15 n. 8. On the Correlates of War operationalization of national strength, see J. David Singer, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820– 1965,” in Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19–48. 7. Whereas balance of power theory generally treats all alliances as short-term strategies to aggregate capabilities against an existing threat, power transition theory suggests that most alliances are more durable strategies for system management. 8. On the role of other states in strengthening the existing order, see Ikenberry’s chapter in this volume. 9. Organski initially argued (World Politics) that war is most likely prior to the point at which the challenger overtakes the dominant state. Subsequent research suggested that war is

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China’s Ascent

achieves parity, and it drops off sharply after the challenger has overtaken the dominant state and established itself as the new dominant power. It is the combination of parity, overtaking, and dissatisfaction that leads to war, though power transition theorists have been inconsistent regarding the precise relationship among these key causal variables. In the most recent statement of the theory, it appears that dissatisfaction and parity each approximate a necessary condition for war between the dominant state and the challenger.10 The overtaking of the dominant state by a satisfied challenger will not lead to war (the U.S. overtaking Britain in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, for example),11 and a dissatisfied state will not go to war until it reaches approximate parity with the dominant state.12 The importance of satisfaction, for theory as well as for policy, is illustrated by a comparison between the Anglo-American transition at the end of the nineteenth century and the Anglo- German transition a decade or so later. Each involved overtaking and parity, but the fi rst transition was peaceful and the second was not. The key difference—from the perspective of power transition theory—is that the United States shared British political and economic institutions, liberal democratic culture, and the British vision of the desirable political, economic, and legal international order. The U.S. was a satisfied state and believed that its interests could be served by a change in the hierarchy within that system rather than a replacement of that system with a new order. British leaders understood what kind of order the United States was most likely after the point of transition (Organski and Kugler, War Ledger, 59–61; see also Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 43 (December): 675–704). Power transition theorists now argue that the probability of war is greatest before the overtaking, while the most severe wars occur after overtaking. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 28–29. The resolution of this question of the timing of power transition wars is sensitive to precisely how power is operationally defi ned. 10. This is clear from fig. 1.13 in Tammen et al., Power Transitions, p. 28. 11. The United States overtook Britain in GDP by 1880, in GDP/capita by 1913, in crude steel production by 1890, and in naval capabilities by 1920. See Agnus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy,1820–1992 (Paris: OECD, 1995), cited in David P. Rapkin and William R. Thompson, “Power Transition, Challenge, and the (Re)Emergence of China,” International Interactions 29 (October–December 2003): 325; George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), p. 101; George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), p. 131. 12. Power transition theorists are less clear about the impact of overtaking. Presumably, a condition of parity between a dominant state and a challenger is more war-prone if power is shifting and if actors anticipate a complete power transition, but war is still likely if no such overtaking is expected—that is, if the challenger’s trajectory is expected to level out, leaving the challenger in a condition of parity with the leading state. In fact, Kugler and Lemke, Parity and War, give greater emphasis to parity than to transition, as reflected in the title of their volume. As DiCicco and Levy argue (“Power Shifts and Problem Shifts,” 697), this is a significant step back from Organski’s initial emphasis on the dynamics of transition in contrast to the more static nature of balance of power theory.

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15

likely to construct when it ultimately achieved a dominant position, and they were willing to accept a somewhat diminished role within that order. In the Anglo- German transition, however, Germany was politically, economically, and culturally different than Britain, and had a different conception of the desirable international order. Thus Germany was a dissatisfied state. British leaders understood this, and consequently they were willing to make fewer compromises and to accept greater risks of war rather than accept a peaceful transition to a different international order in which British interests would be poorly served.13 Another important theme in power transition theory is that once the demographic, economic, and political conditions for power transitions are in place, neither outside actors nor external shocks can significantly affect the process of transition. In addition, war has only a temporary impact on long-term growth rates.14 Societies recover relatively quickly from war, usually within a generation, a pattern that Organski and Kugler describe as the “Phoenix factor.” War has an impact on the probability of future war, however, by increasing the dissatisfaction of the defeated state.15 The near irreversibility of transitions reflects power transition theory’s conception of power. Given a certain population, political capacity, and state of technology, growth is basically endogenous, and in the long term market economies with an efficient distribution of resources tend to follow similar growth trajectories, one reflected by an S-shaped curve. Growth starts off slowly, accelerates rapidly during a period of technological change, and eventually settles into a pattern of more modest but sustained growth. Societies with higher political capacity grow more rapidly than states with lower political capacity (above a certain GDP/capita), but the differences in GDP/capita diminish once economies reach a level of sustained growth. The central variable is population, which provides a resource pool that can be utilized for a variety of purposes, including economic development and the development of military capabilities. As Tammen et al. argue, “population is the sine qua non for great power status,” and “the size of populations ultimately 13. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, chap. 2 14. Ibid., 16–17. This assumes societies have a sufficient GDP and political capacity. Societies with limited GDP and low political capacity risk falling into a “poverty trap” from which it is difficult to escape. It is conceivable that war might push a less developed society below the critical point, and thus reverse a transition process that has already begun. 15. Organski and Kugler, War Ledger, chap. 3. Power transition theorists argue that punitive peace settlements generate dissatisfaction and hence a relatively short peace, whereas more lenient peace terms, combined with postwar assistance programs and other efforts to transform defeated countries from dissatisfied to satisfied states, generate a more sustained peace. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 31). In contrast, Geoffrey Blainey emphasizes the stability of a punitive “Carthaginian peace” in The Causes of War, 3d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988). There is substantial evidence that civil war settlements based on one-sided victories are the most stable. See Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993,” American Political Science Review 89 (September 1995): 681–90.

16

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determines the power potential of a nation.” When societies with similar populations are at different stages of their growth trajectories, one will be dominant. When two countries with similar political capacities reach similar stages of growth, the one with a substantially larger population will dominate. The most dangerous situation, in terms of the likelihood of a major war, is one in which a dominant state has already achieved a position of stable but modest growth and is being overtaken by a rapidly growing, dissatisfied country with a substantially larger population.16 A key assumption here is that of the three key components of national power, population is the least subject to rapid change, either naturally or through governmental manipulation. While governments can intervene economically to enhance productivity and politically to enhance political capacity, it is harder for them to affect population growth rates, particularly in the short term. Consequently, societies with high populations will eventually overtake states with smaller populations, and that there is nothing that the smaller country can to do avoid this outcome. Thus, population has a critical impact on power in the long term; economic growth has a large impact in the medium term; and political capacity has its greatest impact in the short term. Power transition theory provides a straightforward explanation for the long great power peace after World War II: the United States has been the dominant power, no other state has come close to parity, and consequently there has been no great power war, or even a substantial threat of one. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that nuclear weapons have played a significant role in maintaining peace among the leading powers in the system, power transition theory argues that “the acquisition of nuclear weapons is not a remedy for confl ict. . . . Overtakings, dissatisfaction, and nuclear weapons do not mix without serious consequences.”17 For power transition theory, the centrality of population, combined with endogenous growth theory and the hypothesis of convergence, has enormous implications for the Sino-American relationship. The substantial American advantage in economic productivity, defined in terms of GNP/capita, is only temporary, as is the current American dominance in the international system, given the fact that China’s population is four times larger than that of the United States. The question, according to power transition theory, is not whether China will eventually overtake the United States, since that is practically inevitable once China completes its modernization and moves up its growth trajectory,18 but rather when and with what consequences. Power transition theorists equivocate in their discussion of the timing of the transition, but not about the conditions determining whether the transition will be peaceful or warlike. 16. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 17–18. 17. Ibid., 33. 18. That outcome could be avoided only if China were to break up into smaller units, which is extremely unlikely.

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17

Power transition theorists argue that two of the three conditions for war (parity and overtaking) will be present in the U.S.- China relationship, and that the presence of nuclear weapons or other technologies will play a minor role at best in avoiding a catastrophic war. The key variable is the extent of China’s satisfaction with or grievances against an international order that the United States did much to shape and still has the power to influence. The primary determinants of Chinese satisfaction will be institutional similarity, economic interdependence, and American strategy. The more China adopts liberal democratic institutions, the greater its economic interdependence with the United States and other states in the global economy, and the more the United States acts to minimize Chinese grievances, the greater China’s degree of satisfaction with the system.19 As Tammen et al. argue, “The reconciliation of preferences, the attainment of satisfaction within the international order, is the remedy.”20 The early stages of the power transition research program focused on the international system as a whole and on the relationship between the dominant power and rising challengers. In an important recent development, Douglas Lemke has extended the theory to regional systems, each with its own set of dominant powers, middle powers, and lesser powers, and each operating according to the same set of power dynamics that characterize the global system. Each of these regional hierarchies is nested within the global hierarchy. Lemke found that the same conditions of overtaking, parity, and dissatisfaction can account for variations in war in regional systems, particularly in the Middle East and Far East, and also in Latin America and Africa.21

Limitations of Power Transition Theory With power transition theory, Organski provided an important alternative to balance of power as a theory of power dynamics in the international system. Subsequent extensions and refinements of the theory by Kugler, his students, and their associates have been a major intellectual contribution to the literature 19. The relationship between economic interdependence and satisfaction is undoubtedly reciprocal. The greater Chinese satisfaction with the system, the more China will attempt to reach out to the world economy. On the congruence between current Chinese economic interests and the global economy, see Ikenberry’s essay in this volume. 20. Ibid. Power transition theorists make additional forecasts about the future of a Chinese- dominated international system. They argue that there is a good possibility that India might overtake China late in the twenty-fi rst century or early in the twenty-second century. The peacefulness of that transition, if it occurs, will be determined by the extent of Indian grievances against the international order that China establishes. After that, Tammen et al., make the striking forecast that in all likelihood there will be no further power transitions, since there is unlikely to be another country that can match the population resources of China or India. This is an interesting variant of the “end of history” hypothesis (though power transition theorists do not use that phrase). On the end of history see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 21. Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

18

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on international relations theory and international conflict in particular. Of the various international relations theories, power transition theory is probably the most widely used by scholars seeking to better understand the likely dynamics and consequences of the rise of China in the contemporary global system. The theory’s emphasis on the importance of the satisfaction/dissatisfaction variable in explaining whether international change is accomplished peacefully or with bloodshed seems quite plausible, and its policy implications provide a useful corrective to the hardline rhetoric by some American analysts. Still, some aspects of the theory are misleading, and in other respects the theory does not provide a complete or fully accurate picture of the dynamics of the rise and fall of states. This is not the place for a thorough critique of power transition theory. 22 It would be useful, however, to examine more thoroughly those aspects of the theory that are particularly relevant for analyzing the likely course of Sino-American relations over the decades to come. We begin with the theory’s conception of power, and in particular its emphasis on population as the sine qua non of national power capabilities. Next we argue that the theory’s emphasis on a single international hierarchy for great power relations is theoretically restrictive and historically inaccurate, and that an explanation of the rise and fall of great powers in the past needs to recognize multiple hierarchies—not only the global system, but also the European regional system, which has been neglected in existing treatments of regional hierarchies. We then turn to power transition theory’s view of the causes of war. We note its neglect of preventive logic as a possible mechanism leading from narrowing power differentials to war, as well as its downplaying of the possible deterrent effects of nuclear weapons on the outbreak of war. We question the argument that past great power wars have been driven primarily by competition for power and dominance in the global system, and argue instead that regional issues have played a critical role.

Power Power transition theory posits that national power is a function of population, economic productivity, and the political capacity to extract resources from society and transform them into national power. Thus in most applications of the theory national power = population * GDP/capita * political capacity). One problem with the emphasis on population and GDP is that while GDP captures quantitative changes in the growth of the economy as a whole, it does not fully capture qualitative changes in the form of technological innovations that generate new leading economic sectors and trigger paradigmatic shifts in economic production.23 22. For good critiques see John A. Vasquez, “When Are Power Transitions Dangerous? An Appraisal and Reformulation of Power Transition Theory,” in Kugler and Lemke, Parity and War), 35–56; DiCicco and Levy, “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts.” 23. An emphasis on leading economic sectors is central to leadership long cycle theory and to Thompson’s “challenger model,” each of which also emphasizes sea power as an instrument for

Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China

19

Consider the last couple of centuries. 24 The fi rst phase of the Industrial Revolution took place in Britain and emphasized textiles and iron production, while a second phase focused on the development of steam power and railroads. Leadership in the Industrial Revolution then shifted to the American and German economies and was based on steel production, chemicals, and electrification. Subsequently, new leading sectors involved automobiles, jet engines, and semiconductors, followed by the Information Revolution, with developments in computers and biotechnology. These shifting leading sectors roughly correspond with shifts in power in the international system. In emphasizing the importance of industrialization in generating bursts of economic productivity for different states at different times, Organski and his colleagues acknowledge the role of technological innovation, but they do not give it sufficient prominence in their model. In addition, power transition theorists’ empirical focus on the last two centuries of the industrial era is too limiting. We can easily extend the theory back in time to earlier historical eras and incorporate preindustrial technological changes that have driven economic development. Relative economic productivity and growth grow out of comparative advantages of leading economic sectors. A more direct emphasis on leading sectors provides a more complete causal mechanism to explain growth trajectories, and a better early-warning indicator of significant shifts in those trajectories, than does power transition theory’s treatment of economic productivity. New leading sectors, and the technological innovations upon which they are based, are generally difficult to predict, so that the extrapolation of current economic trends into the future is highly problematic. In the 1980s, when many were predicting a shift in economic power from the United States to Japan, the Information Revolution enhanced American economic dominance in a substantial way. This suggests that power transition theory’s prediction that rates of growth continue to level off in mature economies may not always be accurate, given the possibility of new innovations and the emergence of new leading sectors that propel growth. The relative strengths of the American and Chinese economies in the future, and thus the point of a future power transition, are likely to be affected by the location of new technological innovations and the strategies that states decide to adopt as well as by the expected path of current growth trajectories. 25 maintaining trade routes and political influence. Modelski and Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics; Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490–1990 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994); Thompson, “The Evolution of Political-Economic Challengers in the Active Zone,” Review of International Political Economy 4 (summer 1997): 286–318. 24. This discussion follows Rapkin and Thompson, “Power Transition, Challenge, and the (Re)Emergence of China,” 323. 25. Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

20

China’s Ascent

Although we lack a theory of the origins of technological innovation, many have argued that liberal democratic states—with their political openness and unrestricted access to scientific information, and their open and competitive economies—provide a much more fertile ground for the encouragement of innovation than do less open political systems. China’s relatively closed political system does not currently provide the optimal conditions for the kinds of innovations that might thrust it into a position of world economic leadership, and China’s future economic growth and leadership depends in part on the opening of its political system.26 Another consideration is that technological innovation can affect national power, and hence power transitions, through its direct impact on military power in addition to its impact on economic power and the economic foundations of military power. Examples include the “Military Revolution” of the sixteenth century, the nuclear revolution, and the “revolution in military affairs” of the late twentieth century. Certainly one factor enhancing American military dominance in the last two decades was the revolution in military affairs based on the revolution in microelectronics and information. 27 To summarize, although power transition theory suggests that China’s overtaking of the United States is both inevitable and imminent sometime within the next generation, a focus on the leading economic sectors and the technological innovations that drive them suggests a more cautious attitude in predicting a Sino-American power transition.

Single or Multiple Great Power Hierarchies? Another analytic limitation of power transition theory that bears on any analysis of the international impact of the rise of China is its focus on a single great power hierarchy in the global system and on the rise and fall of great powers within that hierarchy. Power transition theorists, like many international relations theorists, speak of the international system. It is more useful to recognize multiple international systems, each containing its own leading powers. For most of the last five centuries of the modern world, at least until the twentieth century and probably until 1945, there have been two elite power systems, one based in Europe and the other encompassing the entire world, with an overlapping but not identical set of leading powers. 26. One indicator of the weakness of the Chinese economy, despite its enormous growth over the last decade, is its overreliance on foreign direct investment. Huang argues that the key benefits provided by such investment—the ability of foreign fi rms to provide venture capital to private entrepreneurs, promote interregional capital mobility, and other privatization functions—are things that domestic fi rms in an optimal functioning economy should be able to provide themselves. Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 27. McGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

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Each system has evolved with the rise and fall of great powers within it, but the basis of power in the system, the structure of power, and the patterns of strategic interaction of the great powers in each system have been different. The leading powers in the two systems have been different, and the rise and fall of great powers in the two systems have often not been correlated. Moreover, a state can be satisfied in one system but dissatisfied in another system.28 Any attempt to talk about dominance in the international system, the distribution of power in that system, or power transitions in the system, without fi rst specifying the geographic scope of the system and the basis of power in the system, is not particularly meaningful. 29 Power in the pre-1945 European system was based primarily on land power, whereas power in the global system was based on sea power and on the economic wealth underpinning the great maritime empires.30 The European great power system has been much less hierarchical than the global power system. While sustained hegemonies (or at least periods of dominance) have been common in the global system (Britain throughout much of the nineteenth century, the United States throughout much of the twentieth century), they have not arisen in the last five centuries of the European system.31 The leading powers in the two systems have almost always been different, at least until 1945. Britain was the dominant power in the nineteenth- century global system, but the European system was characterized by a handful of great powers of roughly equal strength from 1815 to 1871 and by the leading role of Germany after that. Whereas power transition theorists speak of the Pax Britannica, Eurocentric balance of power theorists often speak of the nineteenth century as the “golden age” of the balance of power. 32 28. Satisfaction/dissatisfaction is a central concept in power transition theory, but it raises a number of conceptual and methodological problems. It is multidimensional, continuous rather than dichotomous, and extraordinarily difficult to measure. See DiCicco and Levy, “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts.” China is highly dissatisfied with its relationship with Taiwan, moderately dissatisfied with its relationship with Japan, satisfied with the rest of the Asian regional order, and somewhat satisfied with the global order. 29. Jack S. Levy, “Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions, and the Long Peace,” in The Long Postwar Peace, ed. Charles W. Kegley Jr. (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 147–76. Alternatively, one can speak of a single global system with a number of regional systems nested within it. In this conceptual framework, Eu rope is one of several regional systems, and the global system was “subsystem dominant” until 1945. Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957). 30. Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Hegemonic Threats and Great Power Balancing in Eu rope, 1495–2000,” Security Studies 14 (January–March 2005), 1–30. See Goldstein’s chapter in this volume for further discussion of the distinction between maritime powers and continental powers. 31. If we use army size as an indicator of power, one state has acquired 50 percent of the military capabilities among the great powers in the system only twice: the Habsburgs throughout most of the 1560–1640 period and Russia during the 1940s and then again after 1970. Ibid. Few would consider either hegemonic during these periods. 32. As A. J. P. Taylor argues, based on comparative data on population and military spending across various ser vices, “after 1890 Germany was clearly the greatest military power on the

22

China’s Ascent

This conventional wisdom that Germany was the leading great power on the continent is based in part on the size, efficiency, and leadership of the German army.33 Power transition theory, with its emphasis on the GDP and GDP per capita indicator of national strength, cannot capture Germany’s power and influence in the European system. In 1913, on the eve of World War I, Germany’s GDP was only 56.1 percent of Britain’s. Germany did not reach parity (defi ned by power transition theorists as 80 percent of Britain’s power) until the 1950s. The GDP per capita indicator gives Germany 77.9 percent of British GDP in 1913, just short of parity.34 Measures of power in continental systems are invalid unless they give significant weight to land-based military power. It is also worth noting that power transition theory’s argument that the global leader serves as the system manager does not apply to the nineteenthcentury European system. A collective great power management of the system by the Concert of Europe emerged after the Napoleonic Wars.35 Later in the century, Bismarck managed the system through a network of entangling alliances.36 Indeed, the 1870–90 period is often described as the “Bismarckian system.” If we go back further in time, we find further support for this view of different power hierarchies in different systems. 37 The global system in the early seventeenth century was dominated by the Dutch based on their strength in trade, finance, and naval power,38 while in Europe power was fairly evenly distributed between Spain, the Austrian Habsburgs, Sweden, the Netherlands, and France, which emerged as dominant by the 1660s. While Britain was the leading power in the global system after the mid-eighteenth- century wars, the European system was characterized by several great powers of roughly equal strength. France was the dominant power on the European continent during the French Revolutionary Wars, while Britain dominated the seas. The only time in the last half-millennium that leadership in the European and Continent.” Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), xxviii. Germany’s leading role after 1871 has led many scholars to make comparisons between the rise of Germany in the nineteenth century and the rise of China in the twenty-fi rst century, in order to facilitate an analysis of the factors that might lead toward or away from the confl ictual outcome that defi ned Germany’s rise. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 204–12. 33. Colonel T. N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807– 1945 (McLean: The Dupuy Institute, 1984). 34. Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992 (Paris: OECD, 1995); Rapkin and Thompson, “Power Transition, Challenge, and the (Re)Emergence of China,” 323–25. 35. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics. 36. William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890 (New York: Vintage, 1964). 37. Levy, “Long Cycles.” 38. Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

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global systems coincided was the late sixteenth century, when Spain was in a dominant position. The European and global systems have also been characterized by different patterns of coalitional balancing against the leading power. Coalitions usually formed against potential hegemonic threats in Europe—against Spain under Philip II late in the sixteenth century, against France under Louis XIV late in the seventeenth century and then again under Napoleon, and against Germany fi rst under Wilhelm II and then under Hitler in the twentieth century.39 In contrast, military or naval coalitions have formed relatively infrequently against the dominant global powers during the last five centuries.40 The prevalence of grand coalitions and war in response to high concentrations of power in the European system, as predicted by balance of power theory but not by power transition theory, reinforces my argument that power transition theory does not capture the strategic dynamics of the European system over the last five hundred years. This is significant, as the European system was a dominant subsystem in global politics until 1918 or perhaps 1945. The European system and the global system have not been entirely distinct, of course, but instead have interacted in complex ways. A full understanding of the dynamics of great power politics of the past or those of the future requires a theoretical integration of the dynamics of strategic interaction in nested international systems, but power transition theorists—and most other international relations theorists, for that matter—have given relatively little attention to this important question. One thing that a more integrated theory of power transitions will have to incorporate is the idea that concentrations of power are probably stabilizing in global systems and almost certainly destabilizing in continental systems, or 39. Levy and Thompson, “Hegemonic Threats.” A balancing coalition also formed after 1945 against the Soviet Union, the leading land power in Eurasia, and not against the United States as the leading global power—just as the great powers coalesced against France under Louis XIV and then against Napoleon, but not against the Netherlands and Britain, the leading global powers in those periods. The absence of great power coalitional balancing against the United States today is not the anomaly that some would suggest, but an enduring historical pattern. Admittedly, though, the United States has power projection capabilities that are historically without precedent, which complicates attempts to draw parallels with past systems. 40. Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing at Sea: Do States Coalesce Against Leading Maritime Powers?” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2003. Dominant maritime states provide less of a threat than do dominant continental states, at least to other great powers. The threat posed by strong continental states and their large armies is far greater than the threat posed by global powers, whose primary aim is to maximize market share rather than to control territory. In addition, the loss of strength gradient over distance and particularly over water further diminishes the threat posed by maritime powers, though that threat can still be substantial to weaker states in the system. States built up their own naval strength against dominant sea powers (as Germany did against Britain before World War I), but the absence of coalitional balancing at sea is still striking. On the loss of strength over water see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).

24

China’s Ascent

at least in the European system that formed the heart of the world system for most of the last five centuries.41 The most destabilizing situation historically is one characterized simultaneously by the combination of the diffusion of power in the global system, to the point of an impending power transition, and an increasing concentration of power in the European system. Many of the most destructive wars in the modern world fit this pattern, including the wars of Louis XIV (1672–1713), the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (1792–1815), and World War I.42 Although Lemke has extended power transition theory to regional hierarchies, one has to be very careful in taking a theoretical logic designed for states at the apex of an autonomous international system, subject to no external influences, and applying it to states in a regional system that is open to the influence of external actors.43 A dominant regional actor cannot shape the rules for the regional system in the same way that a dominant global actor can shape the rules for the global system. Things might be different if the global system is “subsystem dominant,” with influence running from the regional system to the global system. That was in many respects the situation that characterized Europe’s position in the global system for many centuries, but it is unlikely that subsystem dominance is likely to arise in the future (though it might be interesting to speculate about Asia towards the end of the twenty-fi rst century). It is striking that Lemke applies his regional hierarchy model to the Middle East, the Far East, Africa, and Latin America, but not to Europe. Whereas Lemke’s regions include no great power that could pose a threat to the leading global power, at least until Japan did so in the twentieth century, the European region has always included at least one or two strong states that posed a serious threat to the interests of Britain as the leading global power for two 41. For contrary evidence from non-Western historical systems see Stuart Kaufman, Richard Little, and William C. Wohlforth, eds., Balance of Power in World History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 42. Rasler and Thompson, The Great Powers and Global Struggle. The wars of Louis XIV coincided with the decline of the Dutch supremacy in trade, fi nance, and sea power, and simultaneously the rapid rise of France under Louis XIV. The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (1792–1815) occurred under the simultaneous decline in relative British sea power and global economic strength and a concentration of Eu ropean military power in the hands of France. Britain regained its dominant global position in trade, and sea power in the nineteenth century, but Britain’s share of power resources in the global system began to erode by the end of the century with the rise of the United States, at the same time as the increasing concentration of land-based military power in the hands of Germany on the continent. World War II deviates from this pattern, but in a way that power transition theory cannot explain. Tammen et al. (Power Transitions, 51) talk about Germany surpassing Britain, but in fact the United States was the leading global power in terms of GDP and most other indicators. World War II coincided with an increasing (not decreasing) concentration of global power in the hands of the United States, and an increasing concentration of land-based power by Germany on the Eu ropean continent. 43. Lemke, Regions of War and Peace.

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centuries. The Netherlands, as the leading global power in the seventeenth century, faced more immediate land-based security threats than did Britain.44 China will likely face greater land-based security threats than did Britain, but whether those threats will be as great as those faced by the Netherlands is hard to say. Power transition theorists’ neglect of the important role of Europe reflects their broader theoretical argument that the global hierarchy always dominates regional hierarchies. Tammen et al. argue that “regional hierarchies are influenced by the global hierarchical system but cannot, in turn, control that larger system,” and that “regional hierarchies [are] subordinate to the global hierarchy.”45 This is an interesting proposition, but one can make a strong argument that the Eu ropean system has dominated the global system for most of the last five centuries.46 As I argue in the next section, most wars involving power transitions among the great powers have grown out of European regional issues, not global issues.

Power Transition Theory and the Causes of War Although a central aim of power transition theory is to explain the initiation, timing, and severity of war, many of its propositions about these phenomena are problematic. As a consequence, the theory’s analysis of the conditions under which a Sino-American transition might be peaceful or violent could be very misleading. One general theoretical problem is that power transition theory downplays the declining state’s incentives to adopt preventive war strategies, though as we shall see that problem is unlikely to be critical for the purposes of analyzing the Sino-American rivalry in the twenty-fi rst century. A second problem is that power transition theory minimizes the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons on the outbreak of war, and a third problem arises from the theory’s argument that the primary cause of great power wars is the struggle for power and dominance in the overarching global system. We consider each of these points in turn.

44. The major threat to the Netherlands came from the rise of France under Louis XIV in the 1660s. The only other leading global economic power to have a foothold on the Eu ropean continent during the last five centuries was Spain in the sixteenth century, which also faced a threat from France early in that century. 45. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 7–8. 46. A. J. P. Taylor (Struggle for Mastery, xxxvi) traces the end of Eu ropean dominance to the end of World War I. He argues that “Henceforth, what had been the centre of the world became merely ‘the Eu ropean question.’ ” Given the centrality of the subsequent counterhegemonic struggle against Hitler’s Germany, and even the fact that the central issue of the global Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was the future of Germany, Taylor was premature in pronouncing the end of Europe. But his general argument stands. On the Cold War see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

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Organski argued that dissatisfied challengers initiate major wars just prior to the point of a power transition. They aim to accelerate the transition and put themselves in a position of power so they can create a new set of political, economic, and legal arrangements at the international level. That would help bring the benefits they derive from the system into line with their newly acquired military power. Subsequent power transition theorists have consistently reinforced the argument that it is the dissatisfied challenger that initiates war, though as I noted earlier they sometimes disagree about the precise timing of the war.47 Power transition theorists have repeatedly dismissed the argument that the dominant state, in anticipation of being overtaken, adopts a strategy of preventive war in order to block the rise of the challenger before it grows too strong.48 The argument that the rising power initiates the war prior to the point of power transition is theoretically problematic, because at that point the rising state is still weaker and is likely to lose the war. Why doesn’t the challenger wait until after the transition, when its stronger position would significantly increase the likelihood of military victory? Furthermore, why wouldn’t the dominant state, anticipating this, pursue a strategy of preventive war to defeat the rising challenger while it still has military superiority? Historians and political scientists have identified a long list of cases of military responses to rising adversaries by states in relative decline, and have developed a substantial body of theory on preventive war.49 Power transition theorists continue to argue that dominant states do not adopt strategies of preventive war. They emphasize the constraining effects on unilateral preventive action imposed by the system of institutions, rules, and norms created by the dominant state to secure its interests and those of its allies. Prevention would violate the rules, disrupt the system, and result in a serious loss of support. As Tammen et al. argue, “Once the dominant country sets the rules at the international level, its actions are inhibited by adherence to the status quo that it has devised.” Instead, the dominant state uses its resources to attract as many satisfied great powers as possible, creating a strong coalition of power that will deter any challenger.50 Dominant states do sometimes behave in this fashion, and Tammen et al. are correct to illustrate the argument with the NATO alliance against the 47. Organski, World Politics. Organski and Kugler (War Ledger) later found that wars were most likely to occur after the point of transition, but those fi ndings were subsequently reversed as a result of more recent research by power transition theorists, who continue to debate the question of the timing of war. 48. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 27. 49. Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40 (October 1987): 82–107; Levy, “Preventive War and Democratic Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 52 (March 2008): 1–24; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Confl ict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), chap. 4; Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). 50. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 27–28.

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Soviet Union. But what if this strategy does not work? What if the dissatisfied challenger has a large enough population, substantial enough economic productivity, and high enough political capacity (as power transition theorists argue that China will have) to overtake the dominant state and its coalition, and what if it is not deterred from challenging the existing system? Tammen et al. imply that under these conditions the dominant state’s allies would punish it for breaking the rules by resorting to force to block the rise of the challenger. This is possible but not likely. Why would the dominant state’s allies, who reap so many security and economic benefits from the existing system, prefer that the dominant state stand by and allow the dissatisfied challenger to overturn the system?51 Although scholars have conducted no systematic empirical study of the likelihood of system leaders adopting preventive war strategies in response to rising challengers, there is enough evidence of preventively motivated wars by great powers and other states to suggest that the neglect of the possible role of preventive responses by declining leaders against rising challengers is a serious limitation in power transition theory. 52 The omission is puzzling, since a strategy of preventive war is consistent with the basic theoretical logic of power transition theory. It is simply an alternative causal mechanism leading from the rise of a dissatisfied challenger to the outbreak of war, one that is quite plausible under certain conditions. Admittedly, the neglect of preventive war strategies is not critical for an analysis of the likely strategic dynamics of a Sino-American power transition, because other factors—especially nuclear deterrence—counteract any incentives for preventive military action. Any decision for war under conditions of transition must be based on the dominant state’s calculations regarding the costs and benefits of war versus the costs and benefits of delay. While such calculations include a variety of factors, some of which are difficult to measure (like leaders’ time horizons and risk orientations), the unambiguous costs and risks of escalation to nuclear war should almost certainly be sufficient to deter the adoption of a preventive war strategy against a nuclear-armed state. 53 51. Ibid. 52. A brief look at responses by leading Eu ropean states to rising challengers during the last several centuries suggests that preventive logic may have played a role in Germany’s attack against the Soviet Union in 1941 (perhaps affecting the timing of war more than the motivation for it); the German push for war in 1914; the war of the First Coalition against revolutionary France in 1792, and Louis XIV’s initiation of the War of the League of Augsburg in 1688. See Copeland, Origins of Major Wars; Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1967); Jack S. Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914,” International Security 15 (winter 1990–91): 151–86; Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 4; T. C. W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (New York: Longman, 1986); John A. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714 (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999). 53. On time horizons see Philip Streich and Jack S. Levy, “Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 51 (April 2007): 199–226. On risk behavior see Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

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This argument is reinforced by the experience of the U.S. reaction to the rise of the Soviet Union and of China in early Cold War period. Despite some discussions among U.S. officials in the late 1940s and early 1950s about a preventive strike against the Soviet Union, and U.S.-Soviet discussions in the early 1960s about a possible preventive strike against China, U.S. political leaders did not come close to implementing prevention as American policy, even at a time when the risk of a devastating nuclear retaliation was relatively small.54 With the increasing destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and the increasing invulnerability of second-strike retaliatory capabilities in the last four decades, it is virtually impossible to imagine a scenario under which U.S. political leaders could come to believe that a major preventive strike against an adversary like China, with a substantial nuclear capability, would be a rational instrument of policy. Similarly, the chances that later in the century China might respond to the threat of a rising India with a strategy of preventive war are exceedingly small. Power transition theorists, while minimizing the likelihood of a SinoAmerican war, would reject the statement that it is significantly influenced by the presence of nuclear weapons. They argue that nuclear deterrence is not particularly stable, and that nuclear weapons have played only a minor role in maintaining the long great power peace since World War II. Tammen et al. state that “When the conditions of overtaking and dissatisfaction are present, the probability of war is high, nuclear weapons notwithstanding. Nuclear deterrence is tenuous.”55 This interpretation of the long great power peace is at odds with that of the vast majority of strategic theorists, who argue that nuclear deterrence played a significant role.56 Now let us turn to the power transition theory argument that great power wars are the product of the struggle for power and control over the global system. Tammen et al. claim that “wars will diffuse downward from the global to the regional hierarchies but will not diffuse upward from regional to global.” They also argue that “the dominant role of the U.K.- German dyad . . . account[s] for the initiation of both world wars,” with a dissatisfied Germany rising and overtaking Britain fi rst in 1907 and again in 1936.57 Although a thorough assessment of the relative impact of global and regional factors in the emergence of the two world wars of the twentieth century 54. Gordon Chang, “JFK, China, and the Bomb,” Journal of American History 74 (March 1988): 1287–1310; Scott Silverstone, Preventive War and American Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2007); Marc Trachtenberg, “Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 16 (January–March 2007): 1–31. 55. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 39 (emphasis in original). 56. John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace,” International Security 10 (spring 1986): 99–142; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Important exceptions include John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 13 (fall 1988): 55–79; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988). 57. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 8, 51–52.

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is not possible here, a brief response would be in order. The idea that the initiation of these two wars can be traced to the dynamics of the global system rather than to those of the European system is not plausible, especially in the case of World War II. Let me briefly address that case fi rst, since it is the clearer of the two, and then turn to World War I, about which there might be more disagreement. First, it is not clear why power transition theorists focus on Britain in the 1930s, since by their own GDP measure the United States was the dominant power in the world. If we look at GDP for 1940, in billions of 1990 constant dollars, Maddison gives 930.8 for the U.S., 315.7 for Britain, and 242.8 for Germany.58 Germany had not even reached the 80 percent threshold of parity with Britain, much less with the United States. The United States, as the most powerful state in the global system, chose to play little role in the European system. Hitler was quite confident that the U.S. would not enter the war, or at least that if the U.S. did intervene it would be too late to make a difference. Nor did he envision a global struggle for power with the United States. Hitler sought domination on the European continent, with an emphasis on eastward expansion, and often contemplated an agreement with Britain on global issues. Early on he believed that he could fight and win a European war without British intervention, though he probably expected that at some point Britain would intervene in an attempt to contain Germany’s expansion in Eu rope. Few historians would accept the argument that Germany was engaged in a struggle for primacy in the world system, at least not in 1939–45. World War II was fi rst and foremost about European, not global, politics. 59 World War I is more complicated, and some historians might endorse the argument that Germany initiated the war as a means of challenging Britain’s dominance in the world system. Kennedy, for example, emphasizes the importance of the Anglo- German naval rivalry, and many point to Germany’s adoption of Weltpolitik at the end of the nineteenth century.60 A good argument can be made, however, that the war, and certainly decision-making in 58. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992, cited in Rapkin and Thompson, “Power Transition, Challenge, and the (Re)Emergence of China,” 325). The GDP per capita figures, in 1990 constant dollars, are 7,018, 6,546, and 5,545 for the U.S., Britain, and Germany, respectively. In terms of sea power, Britain and the United States were about equal, each about three times stronger than Germany. Modelski and Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 124). In terms of military expenditures, The Correlates of War data show that Germany outspent Britain two to one (in 1938, at the time of the Munich crisis, it was approximately four to one). See http://cow2 .la.psu.edu/. 59. P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (New York: Longman, 1986); Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 60. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo- German Naval Rivalry, 1860–1914 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982). Many argue, however, that German Weltpolitik was driven more by domestic politics than by any consensus about the need for a global presence. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

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the July 1914 crisis, was more about mastery in Europe than about mastery in the world. Power transition theory is correct that power transition played an important role in World War I, but the leading power that worried most about a decline in relative power was Germany, not Britain, and the rising power that posed the greatest threat to destabilize the system was Russia, not Germany. Moreover, Germany was a satisfied power, not a dissatisfied one, at least in Europe, and wanted primarily to secure the status quo, European and domestic, against pressures for change. Though German leaders may have preferred a diplomatic realignment or a localized Austrian-Serbian war as a means of securing the status quo and its benefits for Germany, if those outcomes were not feasible German leaders were willing to adopt a strategy of preventive war to eliminate the growing Russian threat and secure German mastery in Europe.61 To summarize, although power transition theory claims to provide a theory of great power war at the top of the international hierarchy, a look at its application to historical cases reveals that in important respects the theory misspecifies the causal mechanisms leading to war. It underestimates the historical importance of preventive war strategies and the extent to which major wars between the great powers are driven by regional issues rather than by the struggle for primacy in the global system; its interpretations of the two world wars of the twentieth century are quite misleading; and it underestimates the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons in post-1945 power transitions.

Conclusion Power transition theory is a highly successful research program, one that probably attracts more attention now than at any time since Organski introduced the theory a half- century ago. With its emphasis on hierarchy, differential rates of economic development, and systemic transformations, power transition theory is a natural point of departure for those wanting to understand the implications of the rise of China for the international order. Although the theory offers a useful perspective from which to think about the dynamics of systemic transitions, it fails to provide a complete explanation for many of the transitions (or possible transitions) of the past. In addition, there are important gaps between the assumptions of the theory and the conditions 61. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, trans. Isabella M. Massey (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980), vols. 2–3; Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, vol. 2: The European Powers and the Wilheminian Empire, 1890– 1914, trans. H. Norden (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1970); Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914”; Van Evera, Causes of War; Copeland, Origins of Major Wars. For an argument that Germany saw a preventive war strategy as its last opportunity to create the conditions for German hegemony over Eu rope, see Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War; and Keir A. Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security 32 (Fall 2007): 155–91.

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that are likely to defi ne the context for a possible Sino-American transition in the future. For these reasons scholars need to be very cautious in using power transition theory as a conceptual framework for the analysis of the rise of China and its impact on the international order. One important limitation of power transition theory is that its conception of a single international system undercuts the theory’s utility for analyzing situations involving the complex interactions between the global system and regional systems nested within it. This affects the study of both past and future power transitions. While some past transitions were primarily concerned with leadership in the overarching global system, as illustrated by the Anglo-American transition at the end of the nineteenth century, other transitions were primarily about dominance in the European system. These include conflicts arising from the rapid rise of France under Louis XIV in the late seventeenth century and of Germany under Hitler in the mid-twentieth century. Many other competitions for dominance and leadership, however, involved power and influence at both the global and regional levels. The “second Hundred Years’ War” between Britain and France in the eighteenth century was a struggle for empire and control of the seas as well as a struggle for Europe, as was the subsequent British struggle against Napoleon. The multilevel competitions were linked. Britain’s recurring motivation to avoid the emergence of a sustained hegemony over the European continent, and hence its willingness to play the role of the “balancer,” was driven by the fear that a state that was able to control all of the resources of the continent would be able to use those resources to mount a challenge to the British empire and its control of the seas.62 Power transition theory lacks the conceptual apparatus to understand these multilevel struggles for power.63 It might be well suited for an analysis of a situation in which a leading global maritime power faces a rising maritime power, but it is less well suited to explain the strategic interaction between a dominant global power and a rising regional power, and even less well suited ( judging from historical experience) to explain intraregional power transitions, where counterhegemonic balancing plays a significant role. 62. Realists generalize and talk about the role of offshore balancers. Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 63. The same is true of balance of power theory, which is highly Eurocentric and which focuses primarily on balancing within Eu rope or perhaps other well- defi ned regional systems. Jack S. Levy, “Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design,” in Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, ed. John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- Hall, 2003), 128–53. For a useful analysis of China from the perspective of the intersection of global and East Asian systems, see Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-fi rst Century,” International Security 23 (spring 1999): 81–118; Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia,” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 267–304.

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Power transition theory neglects some key questions regarding global-regional interactions: How does a global power balance threats to its global interests and threats to its regional interests? How does the regional threat environment of a rising regional state affect its behavior toward the global power, and the global power’s behavior toward the rising challenger? The rise of China falls in the same category, neither purely regional nor purely global. Power transition theory is correct to identify the rise of China as the leading geopolitical event of the coming decades, but applications of the theory place too much emphasis on its impact on the global hierarchy and not enough on the Asian regional hierarchy. The rise of China will constitute a challenge to the United States in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Asian rimland; Chinese economic growth will continue to erode the leading U.S. position in the global economy; the extension of Chinese economic interests will compromise specific U.S. security interests, as illustrated by recent events in Africa; but it is very unlikely that China will develop the power projection capabilities to pose a challenge to vital American security interests on a global scale for many decades to come. The primary threats posed by China to American interests are likely to be in Asia, and regional dynamics will undoubtedly affect U.S. relationships with Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia. How that will affect U.S. global interests is more difficult to predict. Neither power transition theory nor alternative international relations theories provide a theoretical apparatus adequate to make specific predictions about foreign policy behavior and strategic interaction in the context of complex regional-global interactions. Lemke offers a regional hierarchy model, but he applies the model only to regions consisting of states that play no significant role outside of their regions, while he ignores the historically more relevant case of Europe. Thus Lemke’s model provides little guidance for an analysis of regional-global interactions of the kind that are likely to emerge from the rise of China.64 Power transition theory gives inadequate attention to how the threat environment of a rising regional power might affect its relationship with the global power. As noted earlier, analyses of the rise of China and its consequences for the global system occasionally look for guidance to the experience of the rise of Germany in the late nineteenth century.65 That analogy is useful in some respects, but one important difference is the different regional threat environments facing nineteenth- century Germany and twenty-fi rst- century China. Germany faced a number of potentially serious military threats on the continent, and in fact Germany’s fear of the rising power of Russia was a leading cause of World War I. While Taiwan remains a major issue for China, 64. Lemke, Regions of War and Peace. 65. Another interesting analogy is Britain’s response to the rise of Germany in the 1930s, in the context of its concerns about threats to its East Asian interests from Japan and to its Mediterranean interests from Italy.

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it is quite unlikely that China will face the kinds of regional threats that Germany faced, at least for the foreseeable future. As to what difference this makes, we have no well-developed theory to guide us.66 Let me end by repeating a theme that runs throughout this chapter: most applications of power transition theory focus on challenges to the leading power in the global system, whereas applications of balance of power theory have traditionally focused on the strategic interaction of the leading powers on the European continent, with the assumption that those patterns can be generalized to any continental system. Neither theory alone provides a useful framework for the analysis of the rise of China in Asia and the world, and in its implications for the Sino-American rivalry for the international system more generally. Scholars can invoke insights from each of these theories, but in doing so they must remain cognizant of the assumptions and scope conditions of the theoretical propositions that guide their analyses. A fuller understanding of situations like the rise of China, as well as of many systemic transitions of the past, requires a theoretical integration of strategic dynamics at both the global and the regional levels. 66. One possibility worth exploring is whether the absence of serious military threats on the Asian continent might allow China to direct more resources to the development of its global power projection capabilities, and with what consequences.

chapter

2

China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful How Unipolarity Matters Zhu Feng

China’s rise has aroused endless debate about its implications for international politics and global stability. At the heart of the debate are theoretical and policy discussions about whether a rising China constitutes a threat or an opportunity, whether it is a conservative status quo power to be engaged or a rising revisionist state to be contained. Realists have argued that rising powers affect great power distribution of capabilities and that rising China will “tragically” arouse inescapable great power confl icts.1 From this perspective, Asia is “ripe for rivalry.”2 But other observers argue that China’s diplomacy, its political culture, and its internal socio-economic structure suggest that it will not necessarily threaten its neighbors, but could even make a positive contribution to the “balance of influence” in Asia. 3 China’s rise reflects the prospect of long-term growth of its economic and military capabilities. For many years China will remain preoccupied with 1. For a discussion of this “tragedy,” see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). 2. Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18 (winter 1993/94), 5–33; Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,” ibid., 34–77; Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity,” ibid., 23 (fall 1998): 62–66. 3. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27 (spring 2003): 12–14; Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82 (November–December 2003): 23–25, David L. Shambaugh, “Return to the Middle Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-fi rst Century,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David L. Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski, eds., China’s Rise and the Balance of Infl uence in Asia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007).

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socio-economic problems associated with economic growth and the possibility that these problems could disrupt its development.4 But China is simultaneously seeking a proactive role in international affairs and involving itself more deeply in world affairs. Its oil diplomacy and its economic activism in pursuit of natural resources throughout the developing world clearly demonstrate these trends. Beijing also participates in many regional cooperation organizations and works to enhance its image as a cooperative power. Beijing is thus not waiting to benefit from increasing capabilities and its status as a rising power. But it is too early to conclude that China’s rise will destabilize international relations. Some researchers have argued that domestic economic growth has replaced alliance politics as the primary mechanism of international change.5 Other theorists argue that rising states do not necessarily generate great power wars. They believe that some potential challengers may be satisfied with the existing international order, despite their growing military capabilities.6 In this connection, scholars have argued that not only “situational factors” but also “dispositional factors” need to be carefully reexamined on a case-by- case basis to assess the implications of rising powers for international politics.7 Thus, DiCicco and Levy point out: The power transition research program has done a better job of specifying the structural conditions conducive to war than of explaining the causal mechanisms that drive this process. We have ample evidence of a fairly robust correlation between power parity and war, particularly among contenders vying for control of the international or regional order, but we still lack a complete theoretical explanation for this phenomenon.8

Levy similarly criticizes the misleading effect of treating Eurocentric theory and the balance of power analysis as a “universal” theory, neglecting “the 4. Nicholas R. Lardy, China’s Unfi nished Economic Revolution (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1998); Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter?” Foreign Affairs 78 (September–October 1999): 24–36; Thomas G. Rawski, “China by the Numbers: How Reform Has Affected China’s Economic Statistics,” China Perspectives, no. 33 (January–February 2001): 25–34. 5. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1960), 206–28; Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), 24–27; Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, eds., Parity and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 5–10. 6. Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: the Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 43 (December 1999): 685; Indra De Soysa, John R. Oneal, and Yong- Hee Park, “Testing Power Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 41 (1997). 7. Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: The Management of An Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999). 8. Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, “Power Shifts and Problems Shift: The Revolution of the Power Transition Research Program,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 43 (December 1999): 698.

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scope conditions” of the impact of rising powers on balance of power politics.9 There is also diverse literature regarding particular developments in Chinese foreign policy associated with increased global institutionalization, transparency, and communication.10 Many scholars stress that China’s extensive participation in globalization and normative economic diplomacy may mitigate its revisionist objectives and may socialize it into the existing order.11 Thus, many causal mechanisms associated with the behavior of rising powers, the “paradigmatic battle” in international relations theory, and evidentiary problems posed by attempts to document China’s likely future course have made it difficult to reach a consensus position on the rise of China. Despite significant scholarly attention to the systemic effect of American unipolarity on contemporary international politics, there remains minimal attention to the effect of unipolarity on the behavior of rising powers. Indeed, no rising power has emerged within a unipolar system from 1648 to 1991. Yet attention to unipolarity as a determinant affecting power transitions is now imperative given that China’s rise will challenge U.S. hegemony. The fi rst section of this chapter addresses the systemic constraints of anarchy on China’s ability to balance U.S. power, including the affect of unipolarity on the development of countervailing coalitions. The second section considers the domestic economic and political constraints on China’s ability to contend with U.S. hegemony. The third section focuses on Chinese “soft balancing” and the role of U.S. policy in the evolution of Chinese policy. The conclusion considers the prospects for a peaceful rise of China and for stability in U.S.- China relations.

Unipolarity as a Systemic Constraint: The Implications for the Rising Power There is a consensus among international relations scholars that the world is now in a “unipolar moment.”12 Although some scholars argue that unipolarity 9. Jack S. Levy, “What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 44–45. 10. Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers,” 24; China has made numerous territorial compromises and has been risk-averse in dealing with territorial issues. See M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” International Security 30 (fall 2005): 46–83. 11. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”; Samuel S. Kim, “China in World Politics,” in A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal, ed. Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot (London: Routledge, 2004); David L. Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29 (winter 2004–5); Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 12. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70 (spring 1990): 23–33; William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24

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is a mere transitional development in a trend toward a bipolar or even a multipolar system,13 the dominant school accepts unipolarity as an enduring trend and it has begun to critique the “American empire,” reflected in the policies of the George W. Bush administration.14 In this context, the leading empirical puzzle is that great powers have not balanced the U.S. unipolarity decisively, given that balance of power theory would suggest that balancing is the prerequisite for state survival and security under anarchic conditions.15 As Kenneth Waltz argues, “Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such goals as tranquility, profit, and power.”16 The expected result is that a single dominant state cannot arise because the balancing mechanism creates equilibriums of power.17 But rising China has yet to balance U.S. hegemony. American-led unipolarity is the most critical factor affecting the rise of China and has stimulated much research in international relations theory and into historical perspectives. Indeed, some scholars have focused on the United States rather than China to understand the impact of the rise of China on international politics. This scholarship argues that the United States will be able to maintain the “American system” and preponderance-based unipolarity well into the twentyfi rst century.18 From this perspective, unipolarity is the “defi ning element” of international structure that determines China’s fate. The unipolar “American system” and ongoing U.S. efforts to make its hegemonic position “unchallengeable” have reduced China’s balancing options and compelled China to bandwagon with the United States.19 As Michael Mastanduno points out, “U.S. foreign policy . . . has the potential to shape the perceptions and behavior of other major powers and discourage them from posing a challenge to the global status quo.”20 Thus, U.S. power (1999): 5–41; Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” ibid., 21 (spring 1997): 49–88; Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” National Interest, no. 70 (winter 2002–3): 5–17. 13. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18 (fall 1993): 44–79; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” ibid., 17 (spring 1993): 5–35. 14. Karl E. Meyer, The Dust of Empire (New York: Century Foundation, 2004). 15. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 16. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126. 17. Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace, Annual Review of Political Science (1998): 139–65. 18. G. John Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World Order in Transition,” International Journal of Asia- Pacifi c, no. 3 (2005): 23–45. 19. By “bandwagoning,” I refer to two aspects of state behaviors. One is aligning with a threatening country to neutralize a threat. See Walt, Origins of Alliances, 17. The second aspect is “being on the winning side” to realize economic and political gains. See Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19 (summer 1994): 72–107. 20. Michael Mastanduno, “Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship,” International Organization 52 (fall 1998): 844.

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and policy determine China’s management of its rise and the course of U.S.China ties. Many of China’s choices and behaviors since the end of the Cold War very powerfully point to that observation. In par ticular, Beijing’s foremost security concern is not how to cooperate with the United States, but how to avoid becoming isolated, encircled, and contained by the United States. America’s overriding influence at the end of the Cold War is not the only factor determining the absence of great power balancing. Over the nearly twenty years since the end of the Cold War, the United States has undertaken a persistent strategic effort to consolidate American unipolarity. The Bush Doctrine has made the United States a revisionist state, even a “crusader state.”21 Before the events of September 11, 2001, American unipolarity simply defi ned the wider global structure, but it had yet to fundamentally shape U.S. behavior and the global system. As John Ikenberry notes, the impact of September 11 has been profound and dramatic, possibly even more so than the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. 22 The post–September 11 American effort to “minimize the ability of others to resist U.S. pressures is the mark of a country bent, not on maintaining the status quo, but on fashioning a new and better order.”23 Unipolarity and its “systemic effect” have been growing. There are a variety of alternative, nonstructural international explanations for the absence of balancing in the post–Cold War period, including the democratic peace, minimal threat perception between the United States and other great powers, U.S. dominance in maritime regions, domestic pacifism in European countries, and economic interdependence. 24 Jack Levy, for example, stresses that great powers balance against hegemonic threats, but primarily in continental theaters; maritime hegemony, he argues, has not elicited counterbalancing. 25 But none of these explanations adequately explain Chinese reluctance to balance U.S. power. China is the great power best positioned to do so 21. Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1997); Michael Cox, “The Empire’s Back in Town: Or America’s Imperial Temptation—Again,” Millennium Journal of Intentional Studies 32 (2003): 1–27; Jonathan D. Pollack, “The United States: A Revisionist Hegemon,” in Power and Security in North Asia, ed. Byung- Kook Kim and Anthony James (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007). 22. G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” Foreign Affairs 81 (September– October 2002): 44–60. 23. Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly 118 (2003): 387. 24. See Walt, Origins of Alliances; Kugler and Lemke, Parity and War; Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization (New York: Norton, 2001); John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003); Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, Balance of Power. 25. Levy, “What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?”; Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Hegemonic Threats and Great- Power Balancing in Eu rope, 1945–1999,” Security Studies 14 (January–March 2005): 1–33.

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and drive the power transition that theorists posit results from unequal rates of economic growth.26 But why has China not fulfilled these expectations? Stephen Walt suggests that a hegemonic state may not necessarily be considered the greatest threat against which other great powers will balance. 27 Walt’s balance of threat theory argues that others can perceive a hegemonic power as benevolent because states judge security threats in terms of others’ intentions as well as their capabilities, and consequently they balance against the greatest perceived threat rather than merely against a state’s power. 28 Walt thus suggests China has not balanced U.S. power because Beijing perceives U.S. hegemony as “benign.” But Beijing perceives the United States as the greatest threat to China in the post–Cold War era and it openly portrays the United States as the major obstacle to the rise of China. To neutralize U.S. pressure, Beijing has developed a propaganda campaign to counter the “China threat theory” prevalent in the United States. China is wary of the U.S. threat and is sensitive to signs that the United States resists China’s rise. 29 Another argument holds that the transition from unipolarity to bipolarity needs time and that Chinese balancing will be a protracted process.30 This argument sheds little light on Chinese behavior. Throughout the 1990s China promoted multipolarity as an aid to Chinese security. The 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade fueled strident Chinese anti-American nationalistic sentiment. But the contradiction between China’s opposition to American unipolarity and its weak balancing behavior was underscored by its mild policy response to the Belgrade Embassy bombing. Beijing limited its response to mere nationalist outrage and did not launch a full-scale military buildup to respond to U.S. military power.31 Theories of geography, threat perception, and protracted balancing cannot explain China’s continued reluctance to balance U.S. power. Rather, the absence of balancing reflects the “power peril” that China experiences. Although China experiences a “U.S. threat,” it lacks the domestic resources for internal balancing and there is no other great power available to align with China for external balancing of American power.32 26. Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger; Ronald L. Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatham House, 2000). 27. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 22–26. 28. Ibid., 24. 29. Many Chinese believe that the U.S. will do whatever it takes to prevent China from rising. China’s historical suffering and frustration contribute to this belief. See William A. Callahan, “The Rise of China: How to Understand China: the Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power,” Review of International Studies 31 (2005): 701–14. 30. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25 (summer 2000): 3–4; On protracted Chinese balancing, see Robert S. Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia,” in Paul, Wurtz, and Fortmann, Balance of Power, 267–304. 31. Peter Greis, New Nationalism in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). 32. On internal and external balancing, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 168.

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Although China has been experiencing close to 10 percent annual economic growth since 1979 and its defense budget has increased on average by 15 percent per year since the mid-1990s, it has not sought the military capabilities necessary to challenge U.S. strategic primacy. Rather, its defense effort has focused on deterring the Taiwan independence movement and enhancing the security of Chinese territory. The equipment that the People’s Liberation Army has purchased from Russia consists mainly of radar systems, surface-toair missiles, diesel submarines, and air defense aircraft. These advanced capabilities challenge Taiwan’s security, and contribute to China’s retaliatory deterrence capability and the security of Chinese coastal waters and airspace, but they do not enhance Chinese capability to project power at any significant distance from its coast. For the most part, China’s post–Cold War acquisitions reflect a defensive strategy aimed at preserving Chinese territorial integrity and the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing’s limited military buildup implicitly acknowledges its inability to amass the financial and technological resources necessary to balance Washington’s insurmountable military superiority. The limited buildup further acknowledges that a direct Chinese challenge to the unipolar structure by an attempt to develop long-range power projection capabilities would only contribute to Chinese insecurity by exacerbating U.S.-China conflict and stimulating greater U.S. perception of a “China threat.” China’s strategic dilemma is compounded by ongoing developments in U.S. advanced technology and weapons acquisition and U.S. concentration of its overseas deployments in East Asia, indicating that should China try to balance U.S. power, the gap in military capabilities would nonetheless grow. China may be rising, but its rise is concurrent with the consolidation and expansion of American unipolarity. During the 1990s there was a new wave of American expansion, so that U.S. global military dominance has become increasingly asymmetrical. In 1992, the U.S. military budget equaled the combined budgets of the next eight countries. The figure rose to the sum of the next fourteen countries in 1999. By 2003 the U.S. defense budget was more than the combined defense spending of the next twenty-five military powers. Washington’s defense budget includes approximately 80 percent of the world’s military research and development.33 Moreover, the United States possesses the only military with a global reach and its post–September 11 exercise of military force has made U.S. dominance apparent.34 The continuance and even intensification of the “unipolar moment” mostly reflects the daunting superiority of U.S. power. Only the United States possesses the full range of traditional great power attributes: size of territory and 33. Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy,” International Security 29 (spring 2005): 142. 34. On U.S. military dominance, see Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28 (summer 2003): 5–46.

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population, military capability and readiness, economic and technological superiority, political stability, and “soft power” attributes, such as cultural and ideological appeal.35 Moreover, the huge disparity between the United States and other great powers has endured and in some respects even increased since the demise of the Soviet Union nearly twenty years ago. As Ikenberry has observed, “the preeminence of American power today is unprecedented in modern history. No other great power has enjoyed such formidable advantages in its capabilities. We live in a one-superpower world, and there is no serious competitor in sight.”36 U.S. unipolarity not only precludes a Chinese strategy of internal balancing, but it also precludes Chinese external balancing. Even if China attempted to balance U.S. power through cooperation with other great powers, it would ultimately have no choice but to conciliate the United States; it would be impossible for Beijing to fi nd great powers willing to participate in a rival coalition against the United States. China’s potential partners for external balancing cannot afford to jeopardize the regional and world order by triggering heightened conflict and polarized competition with the United States. The historic coincidence of a rising China and consolidated U.S. power has made China the “lonely rising power,” just as the United States is the “lonely superpower.” The formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been perceived as Beijing-Moscow- centered “counterbalancing” against the United States that could evolve into a military bloc to balance NATO. But the SCO is a subregional organization and Beijing is primarily motivated by its security and energy interests in Central Asia rather than by the U.S. presence in East Asia. Military exercises in the SCO framework are developing greater size and sophistication, but the SCO cannot become an instrument for power projection beyond Central Asia. In this respect, there is interesting research that suggests that dyads involving a dominant power and a rising power that are characterized by an overwhelming asymmetry of power are more likely to be peaceful than more symmetrical dyads. This is primarily because disparate dyads constrain the speed of the challenger’s rise and its potential relative power.37 Thus, China may continue to rise, but it will continue to experience systemic constraints to using alliances to enhance its security.38 35. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 36. G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 1. 37. Erich Weede, “Overwhelming Preponderance as a Pacifying Condition among Contiguous Asian Dyads: 1950–1969,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 20 (1976): 395–411; David Gamham, “Power Parity and Lethal International Violence,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 40 (1976): 279–94; Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of “The War Ledger” (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). 38. Organski, World Politics, 313–16; Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, chap. 1; Tammen et al., Power Transitions.

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The politics of asymmetry is reflected in the strategic behavior of potential Chinese balancing partners. In contrast to the U.S. development of its military capabilities and its active use of force, other powers have been preoccupied with their relative weakness. The foreign policies of the European powers have been characterized by the pacific liberalism that has prevailed throughout Europe. Russia, on the one hand, is benefitting from oil dollars to revitalize its national revenue and to begin to restore its global role. President Putin’s decision to resume Tu-95’s strategic patrolling in September of 2007 signals the gradual reemergence of Russian influence. Nonetheless, there remains considerable uncertainty regarding the direction of Russian policy and there is little likelihood of the development of a new U.S.-Russian cold war that could constrain U.S. power. Japan has become increasingly aware of its greater power in international politics, but it has willingly accepted subordination within the U.S.–Japan alliance. For all of these countries, cost-benefit calculations have persuaded them against balancing U.S. power. Europe and Japan are also traditional American allies, so that they would be reluctant to oppose U.S. power, even should China try to develop counter-American cooperation. And India has preferred to cooperate with the United States to manage the rise of China rather than to balance U.S. power. Great power asymmetry is the underlying systemic explanation for the absence of balancing alliances. But particular aspects of contemporary international politics reinforce systemic pressures. Balancing behavior can also be affected by state objectives. “The aim of balancing,” notes Schweller, “is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted.”39 When great powers abandon balancing for bandwagoning, they seek to protect their status quo interests by siding with the strongest power. Because American unipolar power does not threaten their security, the European countries, Japan, and Australia are not compelled to realign and balance against U.S. power.40 These dynamics explain Chinese difficulty in fi nding partners for balancing American power. Since World War II and extending into post–Cold War era, there has been “consensual American hegemony” within the democratic order of the Western powers. Thus, given systemic constraints as well as interest accommodation and regime similarity, there has been minimal incentive for cooperation against the emergence of U.S. unipolarity.41 In this context, Chinese balancing appeals will be ineffective and there is little incentive for Bei39. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 74. 40. DiCicco and Levy, “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts,” 690. 41. Randolph M. Siverson and Emmons Juliann, “Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 35 (1991): 285–306; Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,” International Organization 50 (1996): 109–30; Karen L. Remmer, “Does Democracy Promote International Cooperation? Lessons from the Mercosur Region,” International

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jing to attempt to weaken U.S. power by reordering either the global or regional alignments. China’s potential coalition partners have preferred to bandwagon, or “free ride,” with U.S. hegemony.42 This policy is reflected in the slow military buildup of the European countries and their reluctance to lift their post-1989 arms sales embargo on China. Europe has been satisfied with being a “quiet superpower,” especially given that any European attempt to match the United States is doomed to failure and would be costly for the credibility and legitimacy of the European Union.43 Its advocacy of multilateralism has been characterized as “a rationalization of the essential weakness of the Europeans in essential parts of the power inventory.”44 It also reflects Europe’s hope for the future. When survival is assured, great powers prefer to maintain close relations with the dominant power, based on shared values and deep economic interdependence, and avoid balancing in favor of less costly bandwagoning. Thus, German opposition to the Iraq war emerged in an ad hoc fashion, rather than as a result of conscious balancing logic.45 U.S. economic capabilities also enable it to block international cooperation against its power. China has consistently worked to persuade the European Union to lift its arms embargo. Despite European economic incentives to lift the embargo, U.S. opposition and threats of retaliation have persuaded Europe to accommodate U.S. interests. China’s failure to persuade Europe to meet its request is a result of Europe’s overriding fear that the trans-Atlantic alliance might drift apart. Equally important, Europe is increasingly sensitive to the impact of the rise of China on its interests, including Beijing’s growing role in Africa, the affect of its exports on European employment, its emission of greenhouse gas, and its erosion of European leadership in international rule-setting institutions. Although Europe can tone down its critique of China’s human rights record, including its constraint on religious freedom and its Tibet policy, these issues will remain sources of contention in Sino-European relations. Therefore, Europe cannot be a reliable strategic partner for Beijing. Indeed, rather than focus on the prospects for Sino-European cooperation, China is more concerned about the prospect for U.S.-European cooperation vis-à-vis a rising China on a wide range of issues. Studies Quarterly 42 (1998): 25–52; Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52 (fall 1998): 981. 42. The “security community” literature argues that cooperation develops as states look past military imbalances and develop behavior that correlates with “insecurity prevention.” Free riding is an important path to “security community” building. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 43. Andrew Moravcsik, “How Eu rope Can Win without an Army,” Financial Times, April 3, 2003, 19. 44. Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (London: Atlantic Books, 2002). 45. Tuomas Forsberg, “German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism, or Emancipation?” Security Dialogue 36 (summer 2005): 213–31.

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Russia is also constrained by U.S. dominance. Russia is China’s largest weapons provider, but it has been reluctant to supply Beijing with its most advanced technologies. Mutual suspicions undermine Sino-Russian cooperation, but Russian constraint in cooperating with China also reflects Moscow’s reluctance to provoke heightened tension in U.S.-Russian relations. Patricia A. Weitsman’s theoretical perspective on great power cooperation apply to Sino-Russian relations. She points out that “at low levels of threat, states have incentives to hedge their bets by forging low commitment-level agreements with potential friends and enemies. States hedge with an eye to consolidating their power and blocking off avenues of expansion for their potential rivals, while simultaneously seeking to curry favor to ensure their actions are not overly provocative.”46 In the past, states which have engaged in alliance balancing have tended to provoke other states and to elicit heightened tension.47 Thus, only a compelling strategic threat could compel Russia to balance with China.48 European and Russian reluctance to balance with China also reflects coordination problems. In a unipolar system, states readily question their coalition members’ dedication to balancing. Cooperating with a U.S. rival to balance the United States would be perceived by Washington as a challenge, perhaps leading to unacceptable costs vis-à-vis the United States. Each member of a potential coalition might be better off cooperating with others to balance the unipolar state, but each state has to depend on the decision of others to balance. In the absence of coordination, confronting the preponderant state would likely “lead to a quick defeat and the loss of valuable members of an effective balancing coalition before the full coalition has assembled.”49 Great power disinclination to balance U.S. power has had a major effect on Chinese security policy. China faces a strategic dilemma. A hostile and confrontational strategy aimed at forging a balancing coalition would be ineffective. Thus, “lonely” rising China must cooperate with the dominant power to protect its security. In this regard, China’s cooperation reflects its insurmountable power disparity with the United States. This disparity is stable; it will not change fundamentally even should China’s GDP eventually catch up to that of the United States. 46. For a discussion of danger levels and the propensity to alliance formation, see Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 47. For a thorough historical case study, see Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). Taliaferro points that China’s military alliance with the Soviet Union accounted mainly for Mao Zedong’s decision to intervene in the Korean War and, in return, consolidated the Sino- Soviet strategic relationship. 48. On the bandwagoning alternative by dissatisfied powers, see Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 72–107. 49. Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30 (summer 2005): 16–17.

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Chinese Domestic Constraints on Balancing Traditional balance of power theory suggests that a state’s balancing or bandwagoning decisions reflect self-preservation interests in an anarchic structure. But the absence of traditional balancing of U.S. power also illustrates the role of domestic factors in foreign policy. On the one hand, domestic politics can promote foreign policy belligerence. For example, domestically engendered “myths of empire” and supernationalism can promote assertive international behavior.50 China’s growing nationalistic sentiments are frequently considered a potential contributor to an assertive foreign policy. But domestic politics can also contribute to foreign policy caution. In the case of China, domestic insecurity, potential leadership instability, and a protracted political transition can in part explain why China has renounced a balancing strategy. Jack S. Levy and Michael N. Barnett argue that Third World countries are frequently more concerned with domestic threats than external threats. 51 Steven R. David similarly asserts that a state’s international alignment reflects its assessment of domestic threats. Leaders will seek an external alignment that can assist in eliminating such threats, even “at the expense of promoting the long-term security of the state and the general welfare of its inhabitants.”52 For example, E. A. Miller and A. Toritsyn argue that in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, “what would be depicted as bandwagoning with Russia by traditional alignment theories was in fact balancing behavior, albeit against internal threats.”53 China’s domestic political vulnerability in the post–Cold War era has largely reflected its effort to become a prosperous country through economic development in cooperation with the West while minimizing the unintended prospect of Western values and modernization undermining the legitimacy of the Chinese state. Competing national allegiances within China and an inefficient state apparatus that controls the dominant share of national wealth further undermine leadership legitimacy and stability.54 These conditions demand difficult and controversial reforms of national institutions and the political system. These domestic conditions encourage China’s leadership 50. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambitions(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 51. Jack S. Levy and Michael N. Barnett, “Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14 (1992): 19–40; Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliance and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–1973,” International Organization 45 (1991): 369–95. 52. Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 6–7. 53. E. A. Miller and A. Toritsyn, “Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States,” Security Studies 14 (April–June 2005): 358. 54. Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg, “Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis,” Security Studies 6 (spring 1997): 120–28.

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to focus on “harmonizing” relations with the West and to constrain its international ambitions. China is perhaps the great power most sensitive to American global preponderance and its potential impact on domestic security and development. During the early 1990s, Beijing perceived not only Washington but all Western countries as antagonistic toward the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, China’s interest in managing its relations with the United States stems not only from the tension between a dominant and a rising power, but also from Beijing’s unique vulnerabilities posed by its unfinished domestic economic and political transformation. According to Anthony Saich, “good governance and political reform” is China’s final challenge.55 In the meantime, domestic vulnerabilities place China in a weak position to counter the “American threat.”56 The United States presents a comprehensive challenge to China. Not only is it the strongest military power, but it symbolizes the industrial West and its common political values and institutions. Economically, the United States is the world’s largest market for Chinese exports and the largest foreign investor in China. Militarily, the United States maintains a forward military presence in East Asia, including advanced naval and air forces in Japan and South Korea, encircling China and controlling pivotal sea lanes. Ideologically, the United States unified the other Western powers to impose military, political and economic sanctions against China following the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen incident. In all, the United States has posed the most dangerous challenge not only to China’s sovereignty claims and territorial integrity but also to the legitimacy of the Communist Party’s rule and the survival of its political institutions. Deng Xiaoping was not China’s Gorbachev; he and his colleagues never accepted rapid democratization. Thus, the biggest threat posed by the demise of the Soviet Union and subsequent unipolarity was not to Chinese territorial integrity, but to its political stability and the legitimacy of its leadership. Indeed, U.S. policy has at times used political pressure and ideological attacks in support of its “peaceful evolution” strategy. A primary security threat to China has thus been “westernizing, fragmenting and weakening” (xihua, fenhua he ruohua), so that the threat from unipolarity has been more political than strategic. Deng Xiaoping’s response to this challenge was his policy of “coolly observe, calmly deal with things, hold one’s position, hide our capacities and 55. Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China, 2d ed. (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 169. 56. Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations : Interpreting China’s Arrival,” International Security 22 (winter 1997–98): 36–73; Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: Norton, 1997); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Realism(s) and China Security Policy,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 261–318.

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bide our time, and accomplish things when possible” (lengjing guancha, chenzhuo yingfu, wenzhu zhenjiao, taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei). Deng understood that there was no imperative to develop military power to counter an immediate military threat to China’s territorial integrity. Rather, China could adopt policies that were favorable to its long-term political stability and economic development. In his 1992 “southern tour” remarks, Deng argued that the international environment was “advantageous.” This judgment supported China’s priority on dealing with its domestic situation and the development of its inward-looking, “conservative” foreign policy.57 Deng’s legacy remains strong insofar as China’s domestic plight has not dramatically changed; if anything, it has become worse. Jiang Zeming, Deng’s successor, was widely labeled as “pro-Washington.” He improved U.S.- China relations, despite multiple sources of tensions, including the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the midair collision of U.S. and Chinese military aircraft in 2001. Under President Jiang, China entered the WTO and secured the 2008 Olympic games. President Hu Jintao replaced Jiang in 2002 and established a “personal relationship” with President George W. Bush. As Washington became a harsh critic of Taiwan’s independence efforts, China developed an increasingly restrained Taiwan policy, despite the destabilizing independence activism of Taiwan’s leader Chen Shui-bian. This trend in China’s Taiwan policy was an important reflection of China’s domestic vulnerability and its corresponding low-risk foreign policy. Thus, at the October 2007 17th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China Hu Jintao proposed a mainland-Taiwan peace agreement and the party report declared that the “international balance of power is changing in favor of the maintenance of world peace, and the overall international situation is stable.”58 Beijing has focused on domestic insecurity rather than balancing because it has not faced an immediate military threat. Taiwan remains a significant issue for China, and Beijing must consider the possibility of U.S. intervention in a cross-strait conflict, but it is reassured by Washington’s warnings to Taiwanese leaders to halt their pro-independence provocations. Moreover, the United States has not been preparing its military forces to directly challenge Chinese territorial integrity. Equally important, although China is much weaker than the United States in conventional military terms, its limited nuclear force enables it to employ “asymmetric capabilities” to deter an unprovoked military attack. Thus, there is no urgency for China to increase its military power relative to the United States. On the other hand, should China seek sea power by building aircrafts carriers and thereby challenge U.S. maritime hegemony in Asia, it would likely exacerbate regional concerns 57. Robert S. Ross, “Beijing as Conservative Power,” Foreign Affairs 76 (March–April 1997): 33–44. 58. Hu Jintao, “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building A Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects,” Documents of the 17th National Congress of CPC (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2007), 59.

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about its ambition for regional dominance, thus undermining its international strategic position.59 Beijing has thus gradually modernized its military while placing priority on domestic economic construction. Even as it confronted pressure to reinforce its deterrent against Taiwan’s independence movement, it has limited its military buildup. China’s “charm offensive” with its Asian neighbors can be similarly interpreted as serving the survival of the Chinese Communist Party. China has to guard against U.S. efforts to “contain” China and effect “regime change” through an anti- China coalition and strengthened military presence on China’s maritime periphery. By pledging good will, cooperation and mutual respect, China appeases its Asian neighbors and undermines U.S. encirclement of China. Its active involvement in multilateral institutions and its compliance with international regimes and norms similarly reveal Beijing’s effort to offset U.S. efforts at containment. Moreover, Beijing’s diplomatic success in Asia depends on cooperation with the United States. Most Asian countries prefer a stable and collaborative relationship between the two powers over choosing sides in a conflict between them. Because there is little possibility that Beijing could marginalize U.S. power in Asia, Chinese antagonism toward the United States would damage its ties with its Asian neighbors and promote U.S. regional influence.60 The result of Chinese diplomacy is that “the nascent tendency of some Asian states to bandwagon with Beijing is likely to become more manifest over time.”61 Thus, Beijing does not have to participate actively in great power controversies, such as the opposition to the war in Iraq, to undermine U.S. policy against China. Rather, it can participate in global and regional multilateral cooperation to promote the Communist Party’s domestic base and stability, while appealing to the Chinese people’s nationalistic pride at their country’s growing international presence and its impressive economic performance. By reassuring the United States and its neighbors, Beijing has staked out a grand strategy for a “Neo-Bismarckian turn.”62 Beijing’s perspective is that stable relations with Washington are necessary to promote domestic stability. Thus, domestic constraints combine with systemic constraints to determine China’s response to U.S. unipolarity. As Ethan B. Kapstein asks, “If a country 59. For an analysis of different strategic outcomes elicited by a Chinese shift from land power to sea power, see Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twentyfi rst Century,” International Security 23 (spring 1999): 81–118. 60. Robert G. Sutter, “China’s Rise and Implications to America’s Leadership in Asia,” East-West Center, Washington, March 2006. 61. Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 99. 62. Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”; Avery Goldstein, “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo-Bismarckian Turn?” in International Relations Theory and the Asia- Pacifi c, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 171–209; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

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as large as China now fi nds that it must play by the rules of the game if it is to succeed economically, what other challenges to the United States could possibly exist?”63

Soft Balancing and Potential Source of Policy Change China may not be balancing U.S. power, but unipolarity cannot alter the nature of a Westphalia-style state system. In a Hobbesian world of anarchy, the United States “steps forward as the order- creating Leviathan.” In this respect, the end of the Cold War has created a new strategic dilemma for international politics—managing American interventionism, unilateralism, and preemption. The Iraq war is the most dramatic manifestation of this trend in American policy. Some observers argue that the Bush doctrine is “a radical reorientation” of American foreign policy and an aberration attributable to neoconservative ideology.64 But U.S. unilateralism is the systemic result of unipolarity and the lack of substantive balancing against U.S. power.65 It was predictable that American unilateralism would emerge given America’s vast resources and its advantage over other states.66 Originally, Washington’s “institutional bargain” and “public goods– providing” policies had mitigated the threat of unipolarity. But the Bush administration’s diminishing willingness to cooperate through international institutions and accept the restraints of multilateral cooperation has increased the threat perception of many countries. This has gradually altered international political trends. “Soft balancing” against U.S. power is emerging, as other great powers muster the resources needed to advance their security against U.S. unilateralism.67 China has been the great power most worried about U.S. power. In the unipolar system, rising China’s authoritarian system isolates it from the U.S.-led Western order. And with Chinese nationalism rising and Beijing’s resistance to implementing further political reform, cooperation with the United States over such issues as Iraq would likely undermine the Chinese Communist Par63. Ethan B. Kapstein, “Does Unipolarity Have a Future?” in Kapstein and Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics, 479. 64. G. John Ikenberry, “The End of the Neo- Conservative Moment,” Survival 46 (summer 2004): 7–22; Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Minxin Pei, “The Paradoxes of American Nationalism,” Foreign Policy 136 (May–June 2003): 30–37. 65. Stanley Hoffmann, “The High and the Mighty,” American Prospect 13 (2003): 28–31; Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 2003); David Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (2005): 207–28. 66. On distinctive features of present- day American new unilateralism, see the classification in Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited.” 67. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” 20–25.

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ty’s legitimacy by suggesting excessive appeasement of U.S. power. But tense U.S.- China relations might also arouse escalated anti-American Chinese nationalism, leading to criticism of the Chinese Communist Party for excessive “appeasement” and to reduced leadership ability to maintain control. Thus, continued economic development has been the China leadership’s only path to maintain political legitimacy. This has required accommodation with a difficult international strategic environment and cooperation with the international political economy. Thus far, however, this strategy has not been costly for China because mainstream U.S. policy uses engagement to promote Chinese integration within the established global order. According to Even S. Medeiros, China hedges against U.S. power to develop influence, leverage, and freedom of action while pursuing economic development to facilitate its reemergence as a great power.68 Some scholars have characterized this policy as “soft balancing.” Soft balancing involves an effort to balance a hegemon with policies short of formal alliance formation; it can entail a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, and collaboration in regional or international institutions.69 Robert Pape argues that soft balancing includes reliance on social, cultural, economic, and political resources to encourage cooperation against a great power.70 Thus, soft-balancing measures do not directly challenge a unipolar state’s military preponderance, but rather seek to delay, complicate, or increase the costs of that state’s exercise of its power. There are numerous examples of Chinese soft balancing, including its participation in the SCO, its development of regional trade agreements, and its leadership in the formation of the East Asia summit. Chinese soft balancing has also entailed simple lack of cooperation with the United States on key issues, such as Iraq.71 Reliance on soft power has contributed to Chinese international influence. In contrast to U.S. unilateralism in dealing with Iraq, Beijing’s reliance on persuasion and flexibility has earned it admiration and respect. It has capitalized on its soft power in its search for raw materials throughout the developing world. China’s expanded international influence has thus derived from its sophisticated effort to court its neighbors. The result is an overlapping U.S.- China balance of power architecture in East Asia. First, the U.S. and China maintain a stable balance of power framework as the linchpin of the regional security order. In this regional order, most countries feel secure with China’s leadership in the political and economic domains and with the U.S. strategic presence. Second, the U.S. military presence and its security commitments enable low-intensity balancing by the local powers, including the ASEAN countries, 68. Even S. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia- Pacific Stability,” Washington Quarterly 29 (2005): 153. 69. T. V. Paul, “Introduction,” in Paul, Wirtz and Fortmann, Balance of Power, 2. 70. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” 17 n. 16. 71. Judith Kelley, “Strategic Non- Cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq Was Not Just About Iraq,” International Politics 42 (2005): 153–73.

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against China. Third, uncertainty over China’s future has also led Tokyo to seek to balance China by becoming a “normal state” and enhancing its military commitment to its alliance with the United States. Tension between China and Japan over visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese prime ministers demonstrates Wohlforth’s argument regarding the difficulty of collaboration for balancing against U.S. power.72 These trends combine to minimize any Chinese opportunity to alter the regional security framework. No matter how successful China will be at modernizing its economy and its military, soft balancing and the basic regional power structure will endure. The stability of the contemporary regional structure shapes China’s strategic thinking and determines that Chinese policy will not go beyond soft balancing against U.S. power. Beijing is conscious of its limited countervailing military capability. Indeed, regardless of the momentum of the Taiwan independence movement and no matter how unstable and explosive the Taiwan issue might become, Beijing has consistently maintained a tolerant Taiwan policy since the mid-1990s. This underscores China’s reluctance to challenge U.S. power, unless Taiwan should declare de jure independence. As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao asserted on December 8, 2003, at the White House, China was prepared to pay “any price” to resist Taiwan independence.73 Over the long term, the pace of China’s military modernization and the likelihood that it will turn to hard balancing will depend on trends in U.S. policy. No rising power can cede its security to the dominant power, no matter how great the power disparity. But the manner in which a rising power protects its interests is not predetermined. A rising power requires sustained development of its economic and military capabilities. This requires stable relations with the dominant power; China thus far has had no intention to challenge the United States.74 Nonetheless, rising powers must protect their security. Should there emerge a threat to Chinese security requiring a shift to hard balancing and rapid development of its capabilities, this would not reflect revisionism.75 American unipolarity could pose a threat to international stability. According to Robert Jervis, the United States tends to identify its own national interests as necessarily consistent with public, international interests.76 If the United States continues to play the role of “political Messiah” and pursue an ideological foreign policy,77 no great power will be free from America

72. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” 73. Peoples’ Daily, December 10, 2003. 74. A rising great power can also be also defi ned as a superpower candidate. Regarding the independence of great powers, see Hedley Bull, The Anarchic Society: A Study of Order in World Politics(New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 110–12. 75. Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca: Connell University Press, 2005), 174. 76. Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” 378. 77. Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” 143–47.

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intervention and China will be more apt to abandon soft balancing and develop a more forceful challenge to U.S. power. On the other hand, should the United States continue to rely on institutional influence and values to promote its interests, as Ikenberry suggests,78 then Chinese soft balancing will likely not evolve into hard balancing. When and how quickly states will balance U.S. power will depend in part on the imperative to compel the United States to forsake an aggressive unilateral strategy. Should the United States persist in unilateralism, it could elicit hard balancing on the part of the great powers and facilitate China’s rise and increased strategic weight in world affairs. Developing countervailing power against the United States will remain very difficult, but there is no doubt that the Bush administration’s unilateralist foreign strategy has been widely perceived as threatening, encouraging the great powers to employ soft-balancing countermeasures. Thus, accommodation of U.S. power may not endure. The conventional wisdom that the American era is alive and well “is woefully off the mark.”79 President Bush’s foreign policy is a remarkable departure from American realist tradition. The U.S. invasion of Iraq may be a prototypical case. Continued U.S. unilateralism could precipitate Chinese leadership of an anti-American coalition. The threat posed by a hegemon to the security of great powers has frequently served as the catalyst for them to mobilize their resources and transform their latent power into formidable military capabilities.80 But during the American “unipolar moment,” should the United States maintain its collaborative and institutionalist foreign policies, it will remain more desirable and plausible for China to become a great power without traditional overwhelming military power. In these circumstances, China will possess latent great power capabilities, but it will not trigger irresolvable power conflicts by hard balancing. Rather, China’s soft balancing manages U.S. power and its rise in more subtle forms.81

Conclusion The rise of China has led to a fundamental reorientation of China’s objectives. A number of factors have contributed to this process, but the defi ning factor in China’s domestic and international changes has been the challenge of American unipolarity. Robert Gilpin has argued that an increase in relative 78. G. John Ikenberry, Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Also see Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order.” 79. Charles A. Kupchan, “The End of the West,” cited from Cox, “The Empire’s Back in Town,” 23. 80. Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion”; Christopher Layne, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” Washington Quarterly 25 (spring 2002): 238. 81. Ikenberry, America Unrivaled.

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power stimulates a state to demand a larger share of the benefits of the international strategic alignment.82 But whatever additional benefits China may seek, it will be subject to the systemic constraint of American unipolarity. China will continue to increase its own power and seek defense-based soft balancing against the United States globally and regionally in Asia, but it cannot adopt hard balancing measures by resorting to military expansionism and forging an opposing alliance. Domestic constraints reflecting economic and political change, exacerbated by U.S. power, reinforce Chinese strategic restraint. These factors will compel China to avoid military provocations and foreign policy adventurism, as long as the United States continues to engage China’s rise and accommodates its core national interests. There are two options for U.S.- China relations. The optimists assume the possibility of “New Power Concert” in East Asia characterized by multilateral security cooperation.83 In this scenario, Beijing benefits from an asymmetric but increasingly balanced geopolitical landscape in East Asia.84 But skeptics assume that tense relations and instability among the regional great powers will develop.85 Even should China try to enhance cooperation with the United States, it will not be fully integrated into the U.S.-led global political system and this could encourage U.S. disregard for Chinese interests. Thus, at minimum, Beijing’s soft balancing, including moderate military modernization, will continue. There is an ongoing competition between two competing concepts of world order. On the one hand, the United States emphasizes “warrior state” priorities, including preoccupation with threat assessments, risk-taking, and the deployment of material capabilities with a view to domination of the world order. On the other hand, European countries emphasize the importance of institutions, legitimacy and reciprocity, reflective of the priorities of “trading states.” Although such differences might be little more than the reflection of relative capabilities, they can have implications for the conduct of great power competition.86 This “competition of concepts” opens a window of opportunity for China to accommodate the contemporary global order. It enables China to confidently 82. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 112. 83. Hugh White, “The Limits to Optimism: Australia and the Rise of China,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 59 (2005): 469–80; Avery Goldstein, “Balance- of- Power Politics: Consequences for Asian Security Order,” in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 171–209. 84. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace.” 85. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.- China Relations”; Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25 (spring 2001): 5–40; “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” ibid., 23 (spring 1999): 49–80. 86. Michael Smith, “Between Two Worlds? The Eu ropean Union, the United States and World Order,” International Politics 41 (2004): 112.

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adhere to its domestic focus and to economic development within the unipolar system. Beijing can develop a significant stake in the American hegemonic project as Europe simultaneously contributes to China’s realization of its domestic objectives.87 Ultimately, given Beijing’s economic and domestic political objectives, it is in China’s interest to cooperate with the American strategic order.88 By participating in this order, Beijing can also widen its influence by developing shared values with other states operating within American “benign unipolar dominance.” In the present unipolar system, China is a satisfied, cooperative and peaceful country. 87. David Shambaugh, “The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and Eu ropean Reactions to China’s Rise,” Washington Quarterly 28 (2005): 7–25. 88. Kapstein, “Does Unipolarity Have a Future?” 486.

chapter

3

Parsing China’s Rise International Circumstances and National Attributes Avery Goldstein

Over the past decade, so much has been written about China’s rise and its implications for international relations that it seems there should be little left to say. Indeed, this literature contains an impressive range of theoretical perspectives to interpret the meaning of China’s growing capabilities as well as impressive attempts to analyze data that chronicles that growth.1 In many respects, the scholarly debate has been well framed and what remains is the testing of ideas and the gathering of more and better evidence as it becomes available. Rather than offering yet another theoretical lens for interpreting China’s rise, in this chapter I identify a set of considerations that bear on any attempt to understand it. These include both some that reflect the circumstances in which China is rising as well as others that reflect characteristics of China itself. Two caveats are in order. First, the distinction I draw between international circumstances and national attributes might suggest that I am weighing the relative usefulness of what neorealists term “system-level,” as opposed to “unit-level,” explanations for understanding China’s rise. I am not. 2 This essay is neither an exercise in elegant theory-building nor in rigorous theory-testing. Instead, it simply explores considerations that will be important in shaping China’s rise and the inter1. See, for example, Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Rise of China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000); Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.- China Relations: Is Confl ict Inevitable?” International Security 30 (fall 2005): 7–45. 2. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley, 1979), esp. 79–82; Avery Goldstein, “Structural Realism and China’s Foreign Policy: Much (but Never All) of the Story,” in Perspectives on Structural Realism, ed. Andrew Hanami (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 119–54.

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national reaction to it. Second, my focus is principally on international security affairs and relevant military-strategic considerations. This selective attention, however, is not meant to suggest the irrelevance of other important issues that bear on China’s rise. Indeed, since security affairs are often inextricably intertwined with economic and political factors, these are included where germane. In the fi rst section, I examine the international setting and explore the implications of anarchy, polarity, geography, and technology for interpreting China’s growing power. In the second section, I look at the significance of national attributes—China’s historical legacies and its domestic political circumstances—that are less often the focus of international relations scholars but whose impact is essential to understanding the rise of China and its consequences for international security in the coming years.

The International Setting Anarchy and the Security Dilemma A central theme in a wide variety of international relations theories is a close focus on the significance of anarchy, defi ned as the absence of an arbiter standing above sovereign states that can reliably resolve disputes among them. Anarchy constrains states to hedge their bets against the possibility that conflicts among them will be resolved by the ultima ratio in international politics, force, and provides strong incentives for them to monitor one another’s capabilities and intentions. Such hedging against the risks of an uncertain future in an anarchic realm gives rise to the “security dilemma,” defi ned as the difficult choice between taking steps to cope with possible dangers (which may provoke a rival to respond in kind) and exercising restraint (which may leave one more vulnerable than necessary if a potential rival does not reciprocate)3 Though this security dilemma is widespread, its salience or intensity varies.4 Robert Jervis emphasized, for example, that it is affected by the military technology available to states and by beliefs about the relative effectiveness of alternative military strategies. When it is possible to distinguish offensive from defensive weapons, states can more reliably infer intentions from observable capabilities. When it is believed that defensive strategies are a robust way to ensure a country’s political and territorial integrity, states can more reliably distinguish status quo actors (who safely focus on preparing defenses) from 3. See John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2 (January 1950): 157–80; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” ibid., 30 (January 1978): 167–214. 4. The security dilemma is almost irrelevant in cases where states are nearly certain about one another’s intentions. See Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Confl ict,” Washington Quarterly 25 (fall 2002): 7–21. See also Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status- Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies 5 (spring 1996): 225–58.

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revisionists (who tip their hand by striving to gain an offensive advantage that is needed only for aggression).5 What does the logic of the security dilemma suggest about China’s rise and the reaction to it? Because states are unavoidably uncertain about one another’s capabilities and intentions, China and its potential adversaries face tough decisions about the sorts of military preparations they deem prudent.6 Most importantly, believing that there are circumstances under which American power could jeopardize its vital interests, China seeks to increase its military capabilities, even though these increases trigger nervous reactions not only in the United States but also among China’s attentive neighbors. However regrettable, such reactions are the price that any responsible Chinese leader is constrained to accept in order to look out for the nation’s interests. Similarly, responsible leaders in the United States, India, and Japan are constrained to hedge their bets against the possibility of conflict with an increasingly powerful China about whose current and future intentions they cannot be certain. Yet comments about the justifiability of military preparedness in the region often give short shrift to the constraints of the security dilemma. American criticism of China’s determined effort to build up its military as unnecessary, because no one threatens China, disingenuously ignores the obvious dangers U.S. military power can pose and unrealistically implies that China should be expected to accept the risk of waiting to deal with that threat until it becomes manifest.7 Chinese criticism of American (or Japanese) concern about a potential “China threat” similarly ignores the obvious dangers that China’s military power can pose and unrealistically implies that others should be expected to accept the risk of waiting to see if such a threat ever materializes.8 In addition, neither prevailing military technology nor beliefs about the relative advantage of adopting defensive as opposed to offensive strategies in plausible confrontations mitigates the security dilemma that accompanies China’s rise. The purposes for which a modernizing China’s most prominent new weapons systems might be used cannot easily be inferred from their technical characteristics or deployment. As Jervis suggested, such strategic circumstances aggravate the security dilemma, a consequence well illustrated by the situation in the Taiwan Strait.9 5. See Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44 (spring 1990): 137–68. 6. On this point see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 7. See especially Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense.” Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, http://www. defenselink.mil/speeches/ 2005/sp20050604 -secdef1561.html). 8. See “China’s Military Not a Threat to Anyone: Chinese Envoy,” Kyodo News, November 29, 2005, LexisNexis. 9. Note that there is actually little uncertainty about the ultimate preferences of Beijing (unification of some sort) and Taipei (independence of some sort). Nevertheless, uncertainty drives

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China’s expanding arsenal of short- and medium-range ballistic (and soon cruise) missiles covering the Taiwan theater of operations could be used merely as a deterrent to preserve the status quo. This capability constitutes a potent threat to punish the island (and the U.S. military likely to intervene on its behalf), discouraging Taiwan’s leaders from lurching towards independence. But these same weapons could instead be used to alter the status quo because the capability also constitutes a potent means for precursor strikes against the island during the opening stages of an offensive either to militarily conquer Taiwan or to coerce its leaders to negotiate a settlement on Beijing’s terms. Similarly, improvements in Taiwan’s defenses against China’s missiles could represent either an effort to bolster the status quo, or the deployment of a shield to allow Taiwan to change the status quo by more openly and directly defying Beijing’s claim of sovereignty.10 China’s growing fleet of attack submarines has the same inherently ambiguous character as its missiles. These submarines might be just another element in China’s strategy to discourage Taipei from challenging the status quo, insofar as they confront Taiwan with the threat that doing so would prompt China to disrupt the trade-dependent island’s sea lines of communication. But the submarines could also enable Beijing to alter the status quo, insofar as they constitute a means for applying military and economic pressure to the island if it continues to refuse negotiations about reunification. And, as with missile defenses, Taiwan’s interest in modernizing its own submarines could reflect a desire to bolster the status quo by countering China’s fleet or to facilitate a Taiwanese challenge of the mainland’s sovereignty claim.11 The examples cited above show that intentions cannot be reliably inferred from the characteristics of key weapons being deployed on each side of the Taiwan Strait; such ambiguity exacerbates the security dilemma. In addition, discerning intentions from peacetime preparations is difficult because both China and its prospective adversary in a cross-Strait military confrontation, Taiwan with U.S. support, lack confidence in the robustness of defensive strategies they could employ if diplomacy and deterrence fail to head off conflict. Consequently, all are constrained to prepare for the possibility that they might need to undertake offensive operations. Beijing fears that overall U.S. superiority will give the intervening Americans a significant and increasing advantage as a confl ict unfolds unless China behavior because each side is focusing on near-term developments and worrying mainly about the meaning of current steps the other might take that could jeopardize its ultimate goal. See Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23 (spring 1999): 49–80. 10. See Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”; and Thomas J. Christensen, “Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan’s Security,” Orbis 44 (winter 2000): 79–90. 11. See Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28 (spring 2004): 161–96; Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan,” ibid., 28 (spring 2004): 125–60.

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can score a quick victory through offensive military action. Washington fears that increasingly lethal Chinese forces (especially Beijing’s purchases of well-armed Russian Sovremenny destroyers, Kilo class submarines, and Sukhoi fighter jets) will be able to exact a stiff price through attacks on American forces unless the United States relies on superior long-range striking power to quickly preempt Chinese capabilities. Taipei worries that it may not be able to maintain adequate defenses against the improving capabilities of a rising China and also that it may not always be able to count on U.S. intervention on its behalf. This concern has encouraged Taiwan’s analysts to think about deploying long-range weapons that would provide an option for preemptive, offensive strikes against the mainland.12 Where all potential adversaries are constrained to nurture offensive options, even if they are mainly interested in preserving the status quo, the security dilemma grows more intense.13 Examples drawn from the situation in the Taiwan Strait merely underscore the more general point. States that can imagine serious confl icts with a rising China, and which are unable to infer intentions from the pattern of its military modernization, have incentives to hedge their bets against the potentially dangerous uncertainties they could face in the future.14 China faces the same uncertainties in interpreting the reaction to its rise and similar incentives to hedge its bets. All must cope with a security dilemma they cannot escape and that will surely remain a defi ning feature of China’s international relations as its capabilities continue to increase.

Polarity: Rising Power in a Unipolar System In addition to highlighting the consequences of anarchy, international relations theorists have underscored the importance of variations in “polarity” (the number of great powers) as a constraint shaping state behavior. During the decades of the Cold War, scholars mainly focused on alleged differences between the peacefulness and stability of multipolar systems, such as those that existed for nearly three centuries following the Treaty of Westphalia, and 12. In the past, such thinking led Taiwan to explore the nuclear option. See Tim Weiner, “How a Spy Left Taiwan in the Cold,” New York Times, December 20, 1997, A7, LexisNexis. More recently, some on Taiwan have revived the idea of long-range striking power against the mainland, though not relying on nuclear munitions. See Brian Hsu, “Offense Best Defense, Officer Says,” Taipei Times, January 10, 2003, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/ TT/ 2003/ TT-011003.htm; Glenn Kessler, “Ex- President Says Taiwan Needs Missiles,” Washington Post, October 19, 2005, A18, LexisNexis. 13. Uncertainty is compounded by the fact that China and Taiwan disagree about the defi nition of the status quo. For China it is “one China, of which Taiwan is a part.” For Taiwan, it is the separate sovereignty enjoyed by the island’s Republic of China. For the agnostic and ambiguous U.S. position, opposing challenges to “the status quo as we defi ne it,” see Statement of Assistant Secretary James Kelly, U.S. House International Relations Committee Hearing on Taiwan, Washington, D.C., April 21 2004, http://wwwa.house.gov/international _relations/ 108/ Kel042104.htm 14. See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/ 2006/nss2006.pdf.

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bipolar systems such as the one that had emerged after World War II.15 But then the Soviet Union collapsed and a unipolar international arena dominated by the United States took root. When it did, the continuing relevance of an academic discourse about polarity which had so narrowly focused on multipolarity as the alternative to bipolarity was in doubt. Yet in an important respect unipolarity simply reinforced the logic of small numbers and clear incentives that had distinguished bipolarity from multipolarity; in either bipolar or unipolar systems the main threat to each state’s security is easier to discern and the options for responding to such threats narrow. Under unipolarity, any state for which the sole superpower is a potential adversary faces unusually clear incentives to figure out some way to cope with the security threat the superpower could pose. This challenge is as daunting as it is clear, not only because of the gap in capabilities between the system’s preponderant power and all others, but also because unipolarity, like bipolarity, renders alliances an unsatisfactory solution to a superpower threat. By defi nition, under unipolarity even the collective might of others cannot offset that of the world’s dominant state.16 Clarity also prevails for the superpower. It will face a threat to vital national interests like those that great powers faced in multipolar or bipolar systems only if a peer competitor emerges to compromise its privileged position. It, therefore, has strong incentives to remain vigilant against this possibility.17 Vigilance is facilitated by the extraordinarily high barriers that a rising power would have to clear to become a peer competitor, which means any such effort is likely to take a long time and entail activities that will be observable. What are the implications of unipolarity for understanding the significance of China’s rising power? Unipolarity provides strong incentives for the United States to pay close attention to increases in China’s capabilities inasmuch as it 15. See Richard N. Rosecrance, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future,” in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), 325–35; Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” ibid., 315–24; Kenneth N. Waltz. “International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power,” ibid., 304–14; Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36 (July 1984): 461–95. 16. See William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24 (summer 1999): 5–41; William C Wohlforth and Stephen G. Brooks, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 81 (July–August 2002): 20–26. Such alliances might serve as a counterweight to the dominant state if some of the second-ranking powers begin to amass the clout that identifies them as prospective peer competitors. By that time, however, the condition of unipolarity is actually ending and the transition to either bipolarity or multipolarity has begun. For a view of unipolarity that emphasizes the coordination problem among secondranking powers rather than skewed capabilities as the barrier to countering the sole superpower, see Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30 (summer 2005): 7–45. 17. The interest in preserving U.S. preponderance was recognized almost immediately after the Cold War ended, fi rst being articulated in a leaked DOD memo in 1992. See Barton Gellman, “Keeping the U.S. First; Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower,” Washington Post, March 11, 1992, A1, LexisNexis.

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is one of a small handful of states that may have the necessary ingredients to emerge one day as a peer competitor; arguably it is the leading candidate for this role. The distance China must travel before it has the economic and military foundations of power comparable to those of the United States is great, however. While China’s capabilities have grown impressively compared with its own past, the strides it is making in “closing the gap” with the United States are so far rather small. Nevertheless, unipolarity has encouraged the United States to keenly attend to even relatively modest gains as a harbinger of a potentially problematic future. Indeed, the American reaction to objectively small changes in the larger imbalance of power are hard to explain unless one takes into account the long-term U.S. interest in preserving unipolarity.18 Unipolarity also provides strong incentives for China to focus on the dangers (most clearly in the Taiwan Strait) posed by the unparalleled might of a suspicious United States determined to maintain its paramount international position. China’s leaders face tough constraints that affect their response. Unipolarity induces China to set comprehensive military modernization as a long-term goal. But in the near-term, rapidly expanding China’s military might to compete with the United States would be exceedingly difficult. The burden of such competition would be extraordinarily heavy not only because of the current U.S. advantage, but also because a highly attentive and much wealthier United States, eager to ensure its continued preponderance, would likely counter with increasing military investments of its own.19 Moreover, Washington would undoubtedly encourage its allies and others in Asia to counter any rapid Chinese buildup by ramping up their own military investments, playing on already evident regional concerns about the unpredictable implications of China’s rise that reflect the logic of the security dilemma. The upshot could well be to land China in the unenviable position in which the Soviet Union found itself during the Cold War—struggling mightily to match U.S. capabilities, failing to do so, and frightening neighbors who aligned with Washington against Moscow. The lessons of the ultimately self-destructive Soviet competition with the United States and its allies are sobering and have been grasped by sophisticated strategic thinkers in contemporary China.20 A rapid, self-reliant arms buildup is, therefore, an unattractive approach to dealing with the near-term risks that American preponderance poses for a rising China. Collaboration with others in a coalition to hedge against U.S. power is not much of an alternative either. Under unipolarity prospective allies 18. Domestic groups that favor investment in capabilities necessary to cope with external threats have a political interest in reinforcing the vigilance rooted in the simplicity of small numbers. See Allen Whiting, “Book Review, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security,” China Review 6 (spring 2006): 222–24. 19. See “Joint Media Availability with Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and General Cao Gangchuan,” News Transcript, October 19, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ 2005/ tr20051019 -secdef4121.html. 20. See Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 31, 149.

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are not strong enough to meet the challenge of matching the U.S. military and, as important, the world’s major states view maintaining good relations with the United States as a top priority. To be sure, some, like France and Russia, are happy to indulge in emotionally satisfying rhetorical flourishes about the inappropriateness and potential dangers of American hegemony, but such sentiments are of little practical value to China if it is worried that it might actually come into confl ict with the preponderant United States. Neither the Russians nor any of the leading states of Europe which could conceivably provide the sorts of arms that might give the American military a run for its money (nor Israel which could supply selected advanced military technologies) want to sabotage their ties to the United States. Recent experience has made clear that these states still view their relations with Washington as more valuable than their relations with Beijing, limiting the prospects for China to recruit the most capable international partners to help it cope with the risks that unbalanced American power poses. 21 If neither arming nor allying with others offers a satisfactory means to counter the potential dangers that result from the sole superpower’s concern about a rising power like China, what recourse does it have? Two alternatives are available. One is to devise an asymmetric military strategy to deal with the superpower’s daunting capabilities. The other is to engage in proactive diplomacy to deal with the superpower’s potentially hostile intentions. Asymmetric military strategies permit a weaker state to deprive a stronger rival of the advantages that might otherwise follow from its material superiority. Their logic typically entails exploiting an adversary’s distinctive vulnerabilities. The weaker state may embrace an asymmetric defensive strategy, for example, in which it aims to disrupt critical nodes in the stronger side’s military command and control, dramatically reducing its effectiveness and altering the adversary’s calculus about the costs of prevailing in a conflict. Alternatively, the weaker state may embrace an asymmetric deterrent strategy that aims to reduce its more powerful rival’s willingness, rather than its ability, to fight. If the weaker side can threaten to hurt or destroy what the stronger side values, it may be able to dissuade an adversary against whom it could not mount an effective defense. This deterrent logic is manifest most vividly in asymmetric nuclear strategies that emphasize threats of punitive retaliatory strikes.22 Under unipolarity, the turn to asymmetric military strategies is a logical approach for those who believe they must prepare for the possibility of conflict with the world’s sole superpower. But relying mainly on this approach is imprudent if a state’s vital interests entail more than mere survival. For a ris21. See ibid., 215n, 163; Edward Cody, “China Scolds U.S. For Blocking Israeli Arms Sale,” Washington Post, June 28, 2005, A8, LexisNexis. 22. On nuclear deterrence of the strong by the weak, see Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

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ing power like China, maintaining its upward trajectory depends on integration with a global economy in which the United States plays a leading role. Therefore, to complement its military strategy, Beijing has embraced a proactive diplomatic strategy designed to assuage the concerns of the United States and its wealthy allies on whom China’s economic fortunes (and ultimately its military modernization) in large part depend. A rising China’s approach to coping with American preponderance, most clearly evident since the mid-1990s, then, reflects a combination of military and diplomatic approaches. The modernization of China’s conventional and nuclear forces has been fulfilling the immediate requirements of asymmetric strategies of defense and deterrence (discussed below) that address the greatest near-term military risk under unipolarity—confl ict with the United States over the fate of Taiwan. At the same time, Beijing’s increasingly activist diplomacy has been seeking to minimize the likelihood that the United States will be able to successfully promote the containment of China and prevent it from emerging as a true great power by invoking alarmist interpretations that portray its growing power as a threat to others.23 Finally, pondering the implications of polarity together with China’s rise begs an additional question: If China succeeds in forestalling short-term dangers and ultimately emerges as a peer competitor for the United States, heralding the end of unipolar era, what difference will that make? One prominent strand of international relations theory, power transition theory, asserts that the danger of war increases when the system’s leading state faces a serious challenge to its dominance from a rising challenger. 24 Where power transitions occur, diplomacy to resolve disagreements that develop gives way to war when the dominant state and the rising power are unable to compromise on changes in the international status quo that each fi nds acceptable, or at least, preferable to the changes that they believe will result from the use of force. This also means, however, that war is not inevitably the outcome, as power-transition theorists have noted, and as historical examples demonstrate. 25 A rising Germany’s challenge to Britain, and Germany’s fear of a fu23. See Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging Choice,” China Quarterly, no. 168 (December 2001): 835–64; Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82 (November–December 2003): 22–35. 24. See A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage, 1987); Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). For critiques, see Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). 25. Power transition theory, then, identifies a necessary but not sufficient condition for war. See Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy. “The Power Transition Research Program,” in

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ture challenge from a rising Russia, were important causes of World War I. 26 But the transition effected when a rising United States supplanted an internationally dominant Britain in the mid-twentieth century was peaceful. And though the challenge to U.S. dominance from a rising Soviet Union in the second half of the twentieth century resulted in tensions, occasional crises, and even proxy conflicts, at no point did either state conclude that the potentially catastrophic cost of great power war was preferable to the peaceful, if acute rivalry that lasted until the Soviet ability to sustain its challenge collapsed. The obvious lesson from these varied experiences would seem to be that even if China’s rising power one day results in a transition away from unipolarity, the prospects for a peaceful transition will depend on the expectations of the United States, China, and perhaps others about the compatibility of their interests (will mutual accommodation put core values at risk?) and the attractiveness of force as an alternative to diplomacy for resolving disagreements (will states decide they can improve their position more by fighting than negotiating?). 27

Technology Quality and Quantity. Military technology is a third international circumstance that affects the significance of a rising power’s capabilities. It is important fi rst insofar as it affects the relative weight of quantity and quality in assessing state power. When increases in the size of forces (personnel and equipment) easily swamp advantages available through technological innovation, assessing military balances mainly entails numerical comparisons, though counting must also be coupled with a forecast about the strategies and tactics each side is expected to use since these may make forces more or less effective. When improvements in the quality of forces easily swamp advantages conferred by greater numbers, assessing military balances requires a closer focus on characteristics that are not as easily counted, often estimates about the expected performance of innovative technologies that have not yet been battle tested. And in such cases, as with seemingly more straightforward quantitative comparisons, analysts must still anticipate the impact of each

Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 109–57. 26. See William C Wohlforth, “The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance,” World Politics 39 (April 1987): 353–81. 27. U.S. expectations may be reflected in its calls for China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the current international system. See Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks delivered to the National Committee on U.S.- China Relations, September 21, 2005, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682 .htm; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, 41; Steve Hadley, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley to the National Bureau of Asian Research Strategic Asia Forum,” April 5, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2006/04/ 20060405–11 .html.

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side’s strategy and tactics. 28 Thus, although net assessment is a tough task under any circumstances, when technological change contributes to the belief that quality may trump quantity, evaluating the significance of a rising power’s military capabilities becomes even more difficult. Since the 1970s, technology has improved the range, speed, and accuracy of munitions available to modern states and made it possible for small, but highly lethal, forces to destroy larger numbers of less-well-armed adversaries— on the ground, in the air, and at sea. 29 How might the increased significance of advantages resulting from the effect of qualitatively superior military technology shape the way we think about the growing capabilities of a rising China? Defi nitive answers are elusive but several relevant questions are obvious. First, is a rising China beginning to exploit technologies that will enable it to leapfrog militarily more powerful rivals, specifically the United States? If so, the comfort that the latter might otherwise take from predictions about the length of time it will take for a lagging China with limited resources to amass capabilities that would make it a peer competitor may give way to anxiety about possible shortcuts to a dramatic change in the balance of power. 30 Second, is a rising China beginning to exploit technologies that are especially well suited to neutralizing the effectiveness of its rivals’ military strength? If so, well before there is an obvious shift in the balance of forces, it may be able to deprive even a seemingly stronger adversary of the leverage it otherwise would enjoy during a confrontation. Third, and related, does the military strength of China’s more powerful rivals depend on a small number of critical elements whose disruption would have a crippling effect? If so, China may be able to concentrate its investment in technologies focused on attacking these Achilles’ heels. Such organ i zational or “architectural” fl aws are not only a potential hidden weakness in the military strength of a currently dominant rival like the United States. They also signal a rising China about where to invest its scarce resources to yield innovations that will best enable it to exploit the powerful rival’s distinctive vulnerabilities. 28. Increases in quantity “add” increments; key improvements in quality may “multiply” its effectiveness. Unless one is sure about the factor by which technology augments military effectiveness, one remains uncertain about the extent to which it affects the overall military balance. Uncertainty is compounded by the effect of operational innovations that shape the usefulness of capabilities of a given quantity and quality. See Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 29. The military impact of technological developments since the 1970s are central to the assertion of an unfolding “revolution in military affairs (RMA).” For two early perspectives on the RMA, see Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75 (March–April 1996): 37–54; Joseph S Nye Jr. and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs 75 (March–April 1996): 20–36. 30. On the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of arms racing, see Samuel P. Huntington, “Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results,” Public Policy 8 (1958): 41–85.

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New technologies that selectively disable an adversary’s critical hardware (e.g., physically compromising computer or satellite systems) or critical software (e.g., spoofi ng messages or introducing malicious viruses or code) are widely recognized as areas where dedicated investment could dramatically affect the military advantage the United States has over China.31 While a rising China could simply rely on blunt force to produce similar strategic effects (e.g., resorting to sabotage using conventional explosives, or infl icting widespread and nearly instantaneous damage by the electromagnetic pulse resulting from nuclear detonations far above the earth’s surface), these alternatives are easily anticipated by rivals. The possibility that a rising China might one day exploit sophisticated, less readily detectable technological innovations introduces a more troubling uncertainty into the thinking of those concerned about the consequences of its military modernization. 32 Indirect vs. Direct Use of Force. Technology also matters insofar as it affects the prospects for the indirect, rather than the direct, use of force. When technology provides extraordinary means to infl ict unacceptable pain on an adversary, as is most dramatically the case with nuclear weapons, assessments about the indirect use of force, or coercion, become an essential consideration. International confrontations are then often shaped not just by a traditional calculus of relative capabilities but instead, as Thomas Schelling put it, by a “competition in risk taking” where relative resolve can prove decisive.33 The implications for a rising China’s power are twofold. First, the nuclear insurance policy against major attack that even China’s relatively small arsenal provides makes it possible for Beijing to (1) refrain from a Soviet-style crash program to build up its conventional military that would further aggravate the security dilemma; (2) limit the burden of investment in currently available conventional military equipment whose value will likely erode as changing technology renders it obsolete; and (3) focus on developing the civilian economy that must ultimately provide the resources for China to deploy a

31. See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000); Roger Cliff, The Military Potential of China’s Commercial Technology (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001); Larry M. Wortzel, “China and the Battlefield in Space,” Web Memo #346, Heritage Foundation, October 15, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/ Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm346.cfm?renderforprint=1; James C. Mulvenon, “Chinese Information Operations Strategies in a Taiwan Contingency,” Testimony presented at the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, September 15, 2005, http://www.uscc.gov/ hearings/ 2005hearings/written _testimonies/ 05_09 _15wrts/mulvenon.pdf. RAND; Ashley J. Tellis, “Punching the U.S. Military’s ‘Soft Ribs’: China’s Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,” Policy Brief (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) 51 (June 2007): 1–7. 32. Concern about China’s pursuit of the mysterious shashoujian (usually translated “assassin’s mace”) reflects such worries about unpredictable technological innovations that could prove militarily decisive. See Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 201–2n. 33. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Infl uence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 166.

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military that fully incorporates state-of-the-art conventional and nuclear capabilities.34 Second, a rising China’s possession of nuclear weapons dramatically diminishes the plausibility of one of the most dangerous reactions Beijing could face from rivals anxious about its growing military capabilities. Simply put, because of its nuclear deterrent, Beijing needn’t worry as much that any adversary, including the peerless United States, would choose to launch a preventive war against China. Against even modestly armed nuclear states, preventive strikes are distinctly unappealing because anything short of a completely successful disarming fi rst strike requires the attacker to accept the possibility that it will suffer catastrophic retaliation.35 Thus, the enduring strategic consequences of nuclear military technology continue to provide strong reasons to doubt that “hegemonic war” is a likely outcome of tensions between a rising China, however ambitious it may be, and a reigning American superpower, however nervous it may be about conflicts with an emerging challenger.36

Geography Geography is yet another international circumstance that affects the interpretation of and reaction to a rising power. I examine four concerns that bear on the interaction of a country’s physical location with its national interests and capabilities. Maritime vs. Continental States. Some international relations scholars have emphasized the importance of geographic circumstances that reveal whether a state’s security concerns are mainly “maritime” or “continental.” Geography, in such accounts, conditions the military capabilities a state prizes to ensure its vital interests. This in turn can affect the way others react to the forces a rising power chooses to deploy. Geographic circumstances, for example, led a rising Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century initially to invest mainly in its land forces. This emphasis posed immediate challenges for Germany’s continental neighbors such as Austria and France. It was not until the end of the century, however, when Berlin decided that growing overseas interests required it to invest more heavily in its navy, that the direction of German military modernization seriously alarmed the world’s dominant state and leading maritime power, Britain. 34. See Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C. Mulvenon, New Direction for China’s Defense Industry (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005). 35. See Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century, 101–9. See also John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security 10 (spring 1986): 99–142; Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954,” ibid., 13 (winter 1988): 5–49. 36. See Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 100–101. Cf. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30 (spring 2006): 7–44.

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The German case serves as a reminder that geography actually influences, rather than determines, a rising state’s military choices and the reaction it evokes. Changing technology, as well as shifting political and economic interests, can transform the relevance of geography. Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War vividly illustrates this pattern. The United States had initially emerged as an active player on the world stage in the twentieth century as a maritime power. New technology and new political interests during the Cold War, however, reshaped American geostrategic concerns. While still attentive to the security of sea lines of communication, the United States increasingly focused on the rising Soviet Union’s acquisition of long-range air, missile, and nuclear capabilities that posed the most dire threat to American security at home and abroad. In addition, new U.S. political and economic interests generated a historically unprecedented attentiveness to the balance of land power outside the Western hemisphere, especially the implications of a rising Soviet rival dominating Europe. As a result, Washington invested heavily in ground forces concentrated along the central front in Germany, an investment seemingly more appropriate to a continental than to a maritime power. 37 Considering geography alone, one might be inclined to label China a rising continental power. If it were, and if as a consequence China’s leaders believed national security was best served by investing most heavily in modernizing ground forces rather than by an ability to project military might across maritime buffers, China’s growing capabilities would mainly pose a potential threat to adjoining countries on the Asian mainland. Such a pattern of investment would be less likely to immediately alarm states overseas than would a Chinese decision to invest heavily in naval modernization. Yet, despite the expansive continental interests of a China fi rmly planted on Asian soil, when China’s military modernization moved into high gear at the end of the twentieth century, Beijing began to emphasize the importance of gradually extending its navy’s ability to address a variety of enduring and new contingencies that might entail the use of military force. China matched this aspiration with a growing investment in the kinds of forces that such maritime missions require.38 Other Pacific naval powers took note. China’s naval modernization fostered concern in the United States and among American allies in East Asia even though most analysts argued that the PLA Navy would remain thoroughly outclassed by its American counterpart 37. See John J. Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Eu rope,” International Security 11 (fall 1986): 3–57; Linton F. Brooks, “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy,” ibid., 11 (fall 1986): 58–88. 38. ` See John Downing, “China’s Evolving Maritime Strategy, Part I,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 8 (March 1996): 129–33, LexisNexis; John Downing, “China’s Evolving Maritime Strategy, Part II,” ibid. (April, 1996): 186–91, LexisNexis; Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Washington: Congressional Research Ser vice, 2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ RL33153.pdf.

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for at least several decades. Indeed, many asserted that Beijing would fi nd it hard simply to match up with the forces of some of its regional neighbors because most confl icts over their maritime interests would occur beyond the reach of Chinese naval forces that prefer to hug the Asian mainland where they are protected by land-based air cover. Nevertheless, the anticipated implications of a rising China’s future naval power for easily imagined military contingencies that could arise in the Taiwan Strait, the East and South China Seas, and perhaps one day in the more distant reaches of the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, have already prompted China’s neighbors, individually and collectively, to begin reviewing the adequacy of their own naval forces.39 In other words, however minor the immediate impact of China’s naval modernization program, its new priority called into question any presumption that geography and tradition dictate that Beijing will remain a continental power whose strategic interests are unlikely to overlap and confl ict with those of other maritime states in the region and beyond. This anxious interpretation of China’s naval modernization based on new capabilities, of course, ultimately rests on an assessment of China’s national interests that drive the buildup and that others believe are unlikely to change. Without presuming aggressive intentions, it is easy to believe that prudence alone will encourage Beijing to think about the naval military might it needs to ensure China’s interests not only in long-standing maritime sovereignty disputes (e.g., Taiwan, Spratly Islands, Diaoyu Islands) but perhaps more importantly for ensuring the security of ocean lifelines of trade and energy that keep the country’s modernization program on track, as noted below. Near and Far. The degree of physical separation between states that view one another as potential adversaries is a second geographic consideration affecting the significance of a rising power. As with the distinction between continental and maritime states, technological advances have altered, but not eliminated, the once strong strategic implications of distance. Because of the difficulties states confront in projecting power, theorists have long argued that its effectiveness tends to diminish with distance.40 In this view, holding 39. See especially O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization”; The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (2005). Even an outgunned Chinese navy, especially if it includes destroyers and submarines with highly sophisticated armaments, could pose problems for the U.S. Navy despite a preponderance that would seem to ensure American control of major sea lanes. China might embrace an asymmetric strategy, relying on threats to punish a naval power it cannot defeat, by deploying a latter- day incarnation of Admiral Tirpitz’s “risk fleet.” The Chinese, however, would not only be able to manipulate the risk of damage to a more powerful American fleet, but also to manipulate the risk of escalation to a wider confl ict between nuclear-armed states. The different dynamics introduced by such a latter day “risk fleet” underscores the importance of caution in applying lessons from the conventional era to the nuclear age. 40. Kenneth Boulding used the phrase “loss of strength gradient” to describe this effect. Boulding, Confl ict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), 227–47.

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intentions constant, the capabilities of a nearby rising power are potentially more threatening than those possessed by a comparably endowed state farther away. Over the course of the twentieth century, however, the improving efficiency of power projection reduced the “discount rate” imposed by distance; long-range sea power, air power, and ultimately missile power, especially when combined with more reliable, accurate, and deadly munitions, undermined the expectation that physical separation greatly eased the dangers others could pose to one’s security. Even with all the changes that technology has wrought, however, considerations of distance remain relevant to the interpretation of a rival’s growing power. Power projection is more efficient than ever, but it is neither perfectly efficient nor cost-free.41 Distance may no longer decisively reduce the punch that a rival can deliver, but it does still increase warning time and that can be crucial if one hopes to blunt or respond to an attack. Speedy and stealthy ballistic missile warheads, aircraft, and cruise missiles dramatically reduce, but have not yet entirely eliminated warning time. Moreover, states have responded to the challenges of diminished warning time by investing in more sophisticated intelligence capabilities that improve their chances of detecting attacks; the likelihood of successful detection is increased by the need for an adversary to deliver its weapons over greater distances. Distance still matters also because overcoming the hurdles that it poses for the use of force requires states to devote resources to research, development, production, training, and the deployment of delivery systems that will enable the military to project its power at long range. Such systems (e.g., manned bombers, aircraft carrier battle groups, strategic submarines, and ICBMs) can be very costly, often much more expensive than the weapons they carry. Thus, despite the diminished effect of distance on power in the modern era, it still shapes the strategic circumstances in which China is rising. The separation between China and the heartlands of several of its most plausible potential adversaries, for example, strengthens the belief that it will be extraordinarily difficult for others to achieve full tactical surprise in a military confl ict with it. Hence, while the United States undoubtedly has contingency plans that call for preempting China’s military in the event of hostilities, prudent planners in Washington must assume that the effectiveness of such strikes would be less than perfect. Because meaningful preemption would require the mobilization and launching of American forces from outside Chinese territory, most likely some from great distances, China would have at least a brief opportunity to detect and respond to the imminent attack. Even though the United States possesses the world’s most advanced weaponry and impressive technical intelligence capabilities to optimize targeting, Beijing would likely still have some

41. On the enduring difficulties of overcoming distances across water, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).

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tactical warning.42 That reality would be a key consideration if the United States were to contemplate striking a China whose arsenal includes thermonuclear weapons. Absent full tactical surprise, U.S. planners have to anticipate that China would attempt to disperse or shelter its more mobile forces before they were destroyed (i.e., passive defense), activate whatever countermeasures it has to degrade the incoming assault (i.e., active defense), or launch whatever forces it could ready in the time available before all were destroyed during an attack.43 Geography, in short, reinforces the risks that make preempting a nuclear great power like China seem so unlikely. Perhaps as important, geographic separation affects the significance of a rising China’s power projection capabilities for U.S. security. With the exception of China’s rather small ICBM force, the North American homeland remains beyond the reach of even the most impressive conventional and nuclear capabilities that a rapidly modernizing PLA deploys. Beijing’s ability to increase the threat it can pose to the continental United States is sharply constrained by the fi nancial cost and technological challenges that distance creates. Because China, unlike the United States, does not have military bases overseas, if it is to do more than increase the size and improve the capability of its meager ICBM arsenal (a task that itself has proceeded remarkably slowly, most likely because of daunting technical and organizational constraints),44 China faces the difficult task of deploying costly long-range air and naval delivery systems that can overcome American countermeasures. China is investing in a second generation of strategic nuclear submarines and reportedly is interested in purchasing Russian intercontinental-range bombers. The latter could be outfitted with stealthy cruise missiles that could be launched against American targets from outside U.S. airspace defenses, which the planes themselves cannot penetrate. But the hurdles Beijing must clear to 42. “Tactical warning” refers to evidence that an attack is under way, and is typically measured in minutes or hours. In contrast, “strategic warning” refers to evidence that the adversary is preparing for a possible attack, and is typically measured in at least hours, often days and weeks. The challenges for the United States achieving tactical surprise against China that are imposed by distance would be compounded by two other considerations. The size of the American force that conservative planners need to mobilize to maximize the chances of successful preemption increases the likelihood of Chinese detection. And the complications of coordinating American strikes, given the need to vary the timing of launches in order to achieve simultaneous impacts against dispersed and differing targets, increases the likelihood that China would have at least a brief opportunity to respond before it was fully disarmed. 43. Beijing could decide to “launch on warning” (before any detonations on Chinese soil) or “launch under attack” (with those forces not yet destroyed as detonations are occurring). Cf. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 85(March/April 2006): 42–54. 44. For an analysis that highlights the organi zational limits that may be slowing the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, see Kenneth Allen and Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, ed. James Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein (Alexandria: CNA Corporation, 2005), 155–219.

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translate aspiration into operational capability are raised quite high by the great distance that separates China from the American homeland. The effects of distance in muting the significance of China’s growing military capabilities are less pronounced for its neighbors, but even in these cases forbidding land buffers (in the case of Russia and India) or nontrivial maritime buffers (in the case of Japan) have a real, if more modest, impact. Concentration and Dispersal. Geography also shapes considerations of military power insofar as the size and location of a country determine whether it can concentrate its military capabilities to defend its interests or must disperse them to cover wide-ranging contingencies. Moreover, to the extent a rising power faces multiple fronts along its borders that require preparation for the possible use of force, the resources it must devote to these fronts are resources it cannot devote to influencing events farther afield as a global power. Russia, especially in its Soviet incarnation, provides a classic example of the opportunity costs that geography may impose on a rising power. Its extensive borders, along which neighbors warily eyed its emergence as a great power, presented significant problems for Moscow that only grew over time. During the twentieth century, Moscow had to worry about a Western front populated by major European powers backed by their American superpower ally, new challenges emerging in the Far East where Japan, China, and the United States all became significant military powers, and lingering vulnerability to ethnic strife along its southern flank stretching across Central Asia. To be sure, geography alone does not determine the challenges long borders create; the capabilities and intentions of neighboring states are crucial. Sharing borders with weak or friendly states poses few strategic problems, as is illustrated by the American experience since the early twentieth century. It is rare, however, for a large state to fi nd itself in such an advantageous position. Certainly China does not, and the number of geographically distinct theaters along its periphery that Beijing must treat as plausible military contingencies absorbs spending that might otherwise be invested in capabilities that would permit it to project power at significant distances from the continent.45 Although homeland security for China does not preclude simultaneously investing in other missions (e.g., naval modernization), it does impose opportunity costs that reflect the country’s geographic circumstances. This also means that (unlike the American case) geography presents significant challenges for China within the region that raise higher still the already daunting hurdles it faces if it aspires to become a global great power. Disputed Territory. A fourth consequence of geography, and one often linked with proximity, is the likelihood a rising power will be locked in territorial disputes with potential adversaries. If the power of one party engaged 45. Among China’s plausible concerns are the following: Russia to the north; Islamic separatism in the far west; India in the southwest; Taiwan and Japan in the east; and claimants to disputed maritime territories in the southeast.

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in a territorial dispute is rising relative to others, it may decide that it no longer needs to settle for the status quo and it may try to translate its growing clout into increased bargaining leverage. Where the parties are strongly motivated to stand by their claims, the risk of confl ict increases.46 Territorial disagreements are a historically common basis for enduring rivalries that have the potential to escalate to the use of military force.47 Where states share land borders or have territorial waters that abut one another, the opportunities for disputes over sovereignty claims increase. The bases for such disagreements vary. Some reflect divergent interpretations of international law (formal treaties that settled past confl icts or newly established principles governing multilateral agreements such as those relevant to the law of the sea). Others result from nonnegotiable claims about territory rooted in an interpretation of history that convinces each side that contested territory is part of its nation’s birthright. Still others are cases where the perceived intrinsic military or economic value of the territory fuels a dispute.48 And fi nally, some disputes fester because the parties worry that domestic or international audiences will see the outcome of negotiations over them as an index of each state’s resolve possibly relevant to other confl icts. The strategic value of a reputation for resolve in defending one’s interests can contribute to the durability of a territorial dispute even as its origins recede ever deeper into history. The potential militarization of enduring territorial disputes between China and its Asian neighbors is, indeed, one of the key reasons some worry about the implications of China’s rise. This is true despite the fact that Beijing’s record to date has actually demonstrated a general willingness to resolve most such issues peacefully or to postpone resolution when that is not possible.49 46. See James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49 (summer 1995): 379–414; Powell, In the Shadow of Power; Taylor Fravel, Securing China: Cooperation and Escalation in Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). 47. For some of the voluminous research on this topic, see Boulding, Confl ict and Defense; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Harvey Starr, “ ‘Opportunity’ and ‘Willingness’ as Ordering Concepts in the Study of War,” International Interactions 4 (October–December 1978): 363–87; Paul Diehl, “Geography and War: A Review and Assessment of the Empirical Literature,” ibid., 17 (January–March 1991): 11–27; Douglas Lemke and William Reed, “War and Rivalry among Great Powers,” American Journal of Political Science 45 (April 2001): 457–69; Paul D. Senese, “Territory, Contiguity, and International Confl ict: Assessing a New Joint Explanation,” ibid., 49 (October 2005): 769–79. 48. Although the traditional military value of territory as a buffer against invading armies and the traditional economic value of physically controlling raw materials for production have generally declined, states may still covet territory because it serves as a buffer that confers the military benefits of distance suggested above, or because it contains certain natural resources that remain vitally important for modern economies (especially energy resources). 49. See M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” International Security 30 (fall 2005): 46–83; Fravel, Securing China.

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Concerns linger because at the same time that China’s power is increasing, it remains locked in a number of seemingly intractable disagreements with important neighbors about sovereignty claims whose foundations run the full gamut noted above. Beijing’s position on the land boundary with India and its claim to authority over Taiwan are rooted, at least partly, in an interpretation of prior international agreements. Its claim to vast stretches of the South China Sea, to Taiwan, and to the Diaoyu islands are justified with reference to historical records or artifacts that Beijing cites as evidence these areas are part of China’s national patrimony. Recently intensifying disputes with Japan about territorial waters in the East China Sea and the oil and gas fields below them are fueled by the complex defi nition of economic zones under current international law. And in all these cases, bargaining positions have been shaped not just by the actual basis for disagreement about claimed territory, but also by the belief that the handling of these disputes will affect the actors’ reputations for resolve in future diplomatic and military relations. 50 Justifiably or not, how China ultimately handles this array of territorial disputes will be viewed as yet another piece of information about the way a stronger China is likely to interact with its neighbors in the future.

A Rising China’s National Attributes Thus far, I have examined four aspects of the international circumstances in which a rising China is reemerging as a major player on the world stage. For each, I suggested general implications from relevant work in international relations theory, as well as specific implications for understanding the case of contemporary China. I turn next to two other broad factors— historical legacies and domestic political constraints—that typically receive less attention from students of international relations, who often leave the consideration of these topics to their colleagues in comparative politics or area studies.

Historical Legacies History, especially the interpretation of history, affects every country’s contemporary interaction with the outside world. History not only bequeaths some of the substantive issues on the foreign policy agenda (such as the lingering territorial disputes noted above). It also affects foreign policy decision-making when leaders draw lessons from past experience or invoke analogical reasoning that compares the country’s current circumstances to 50. Although analysts and state leaders continue to emphasize the importance of reputations, some international relations scholars now challenge the empirical and theoretical foundations for this emphasis. See Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

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those it faced before. 51 Three important, and familiar, features of China’s history are relevant to thinking about its rising power and other countries’ reaction to it. Western Imperialism. First, as many have noted, China’s traumatic, humiliating encounter with Western imperialism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries left a lasting mark. Modern Chinese nationalists have repeatedly invoked that experience as a negative example from which to learn, transmitting it to succeeding generations. To be sure, over the past decade the “century of humiliation” figures less often in China’s foreign policy rhetoric. Some in China have even begun to argue that it is time for a stronger, more secure China to self- confidently move beyond the tragic story of victimization. 52 Yet, such deep scars are not quickly or easily erased. Beijing still occasionally suggests that the concern some express about China’s rise, and especially intimations that a stronger China may pose a threat to international peace and security, actually reflect a desire to check China or keep it down. Others allegedly prefer China to remain weak because, as in the past, a weak China best serves their interests. Nineteenth- century imperialists had exploited China’s weakness as they sought advantages in their global competition. Twentieth- century superpowers exploited China’s weakness to use it as a “card” in their Cold War rivalry. And in the twenty-fi rst century, the United States wants to prevent the rise of China as a peer competitor because this is essential if it is to perpetuate its preponderant international position. Claims of this sort suggest that China’s now distant experience as a weak country victimized by foreign powers continues to color Beijing’s perspective on the West, and especially the relationship between a reemerging, rising China and a dominant American superpower. In this way, China’s historical legacy could well contribute to the dissatisfaction that, according to power-transition theory, makes for the most dangerous confl icts between the aspirations of a rising power seeking increased influence and the fears of a dominant state determined to preserve its vested interest in the status quo. Japanese Imperialism. A second, and related, legacy pertinent to China’s rise is the history of Sino-Japanese interaction since the last decades of the Qing dynasty. Although in broad terms similar to the story of victimization at the hands of Western imperialists, China’s experience with Japan was distinctive. 51. Such transhistorical inspiration has certainly been evident among Western leaders, for example, when they have periodically invoked the Munich analogy as part of the justification for warning about the dangers of appeasing aggressors. On lessons of history see Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), esp. chap. 6. On analogical reasoning, see Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 52. See Medeiros and Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy.”

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Two watershed events from the past affect not just the tenor of Sino-Japanese relations, but strategic considerations as well. Japan’s stunningly quick victory over China in the war of 1894–95 was a shocking demonstration that this previously weaker neighbor could seriously threaten China’s security, despite China’s much greater size and its longstanding preeminence in East Asia. The experience may partly explain what many outside China fi nd puzzling today—the vigor with which Beijing expresses concerns about even relatively small steps by Tokyo to expand its international role and elevate its military profile. China’s unexpected defeat by a rising Japan at the end of the nineteenth century leads Beijing to keep an especially attentive eye on its position relative to Tokyo today, and to consider Japan’s unrealized military potential a reason China must continue to increase its own power. The historical legacy of 1895, then, feeds China’s belief in the importance of hedging against uncertainty about Japan’s future role in East Asia and intensifies the security dilemma as a problem in Sino-Japanese relations.53 Arguably even more important than the legacy of Japan’s surprising victory at the end of the nineteenth century was its subsequent invasion and occupation of the Chinese mainland several decades later. That aggression not only left a bitter emotional legacy because of the brutality with which it was carried out, but also left an important strategic legacy because of Tokyo’s purpose in the 1930s and 1940s—to prevent a chronically weak and divided China from fi nally unifying under a revitalized national leadership (Kuomintang or Chinese Communist Party [CCP]) since this might jeopardize Japan’s interest in consolidating its position as the dominant power in East Asia. Imperial Japan’s motivation provides historical roots for a Chinese belief that it is not just the Western powers who want to keep their country weak. While it seems hard to believe that anybody in Beijing seriously believes that Japan would want, or be able, to replicate its earlier aggression in today’s much different circumstances, that now distant experience nevertheless contributes to festering doubts in Beijing that Tokyo will ever really welcome, and may very well prefer to prevent, the rise of China that would preclude Japan from playing the role of Asia’s leading power. The Chinese Order. A third historical legacy pertinent to China’s rise is the dominant role Imperial China fi lled during the many centuries when East Asia was an international system largely separated from those in the Middle East and Europe. It is true that Imperial China’s effective influence in East Asia varied greatly over the centuries, and that successive Chinese dynasties were not nation-states exercising rule over far-flung colonies in the fashion of 53. See Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs 75 (September–October 1996): 37–52. On growing Chinese concern about Japan’s military modernization, especially as it is encouraged by the United States, see Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 105–9, 163–68, 194–97; Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” Washington Quarterly 29 (winter 2005–6): 119–30.

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the European imperialists. Yet, there was a long tradition that the capital of China was the center of an administrative entity whose sway, though not control, extended throughout much of East Asia and whose leadership, though not complete authority, was acknowledged in various ways by many nominally independent neighboring countries. 54 The complex details of this long-gone East Asian world order are less important here than the central political role China played in it, and the extent to which this legacy fosters an expectation among some Chinese that their country should not only become wealthy and powerful but should also reclaim its lost mantle of regional preeminence. This historically rooted aspiration to reprise its ancient leading role is also sometimes invoked by foreign observers as a reason to believe that a rising China today aims to become a true great power. Other modernizing Asian states may be rising from their own positions of weakness reflecting a legacy of political disarray, colonial repression, or economic incompetence. And these other states may share China’s determination to raise their peoples’ standard of living and enhance their ability to defend national interests against outside pressure. But few other states in Asia anticipate that their rise will lead them to become great powers exercising international leadership. Although the people of the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, etc., are no less nationalistic or proud than their Chinese counterparts, neither they nor most others in East Asia derive from their history an expectation that modernization should lead them to emerge as great powers, an expectation that plausibly follows from a reading of China’s distant past.55 As important, history in East Asia combines with the commonsense observation that a rising China will fi rst be able to resume its role as a great power within the region. While Americans and Europeans can speculate about a rising China’s ability and desire to become a global great power if it can sustain several decades of arduous effort, the bar to regional influence is lower. History provides grounds, at least for East Asians, to expect that China will want to resume its leading regional role when it can, and China’s currently growing power provides incentives for others to start thinking now about how they plan to cope with that changed international reality. Whether their choice will be to accommodate a more powerful China, to balance against it collectively or with the assistance of the 54. On the practice of international relations in Imperial China, see John King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). More recently, David Kang has reconceptualized this as a type of hierarchic international system, in which China plays the lead role. David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27 (spring 2003): 57–85. 55. A variation on this theme might suggest that China’s leaders see themselves not only as the political representatives of their sovereign nation- state, but as the great power representatives of one of the world’s major civilizations with a mission to defi ne and defend its interests on the world stage. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

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extraregional United States, or to adopt some sort of a hedging strategy that combines elements of both is a question whose answer will depend on choices that China and others make in the coming years. 56 Those choices will be informed not only by contemporary realities, but also by the region’s historical legacy.

Domestic Political Constraints A full discussion of the many ways domestic politics constrains a rising China falls outside the scope of this essay. I briefly address just three points that clearly merit attention—the role of nationalism, the importance of the civilian economy, and the regionalized multiethnicity of the Chinese state. Nationalism. Modern Chinese nationalism emerged in reaction to the suffering the country experienced at the hands of foreign powers and self-interested domestic warlords during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.57 The official interpretation of that bitter experience presented to the citizens of the PRC since 1949 and, more recently, the swelling pride among the Chinese people in their country’s rapid modernization have reinforced the impact of earlier events. Nationalist expectations today impose significant, if somewhat contradictory, constraints on the leaders of a rising China. 58 Because a core element of the nationalist dream has long been for China to regain its status as a respected major power, Beijing cannot set its foreign-policy sights too low.59 This does not mean that a rising China’s ambition must be manifest in boastful rhetoric; cultural style and current international political realities militate against that. But it would be difficult for any leader who claims the Chinese nationalist mantle to embrace foreign policies that suggest a willingness to settle for an international role that entails deference to greater powers. This constraint poses the biggest challenges for the management of foreign policy when the visibility of international events makes it impossible to ignore strong nationalist sentiments among an increasingly attentive Chinese public. The delicate problems it can pose for Beijing have become more prominent as a rising China’s engagement with the outside world has deepened 56. See Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, chap. 9; Evan S. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia- Pacific Stability,” Washington Quarterly 29 (winter 2005–6): 145–67. 57. See Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949, trans. Muriel Bell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). 58. See Michel Oksenberg, “China’s Confident Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs 65 (winter 1987): 501–23; Allen S. Whiting, “Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng,” China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 295–316; Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?” Washington Quarterly 29 (winter 2005–6): 131–44. 59. For Sun Yat-sen’s early articulation of this goal, see Wm. Theodore de Bary and Richard Lufrano, Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol. 2, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 321.

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since the 1980s and as political and technological changes have provided the Chinese people with greater access to information about international affairs. Three recent episodes in particular manifest the constraints that nationalism now imposes on leaders in Beijing as they attempt to manage two of China’s most important bilateral relationships—those with the United States and Japan. In May 1999, China’s response to the accidental U.S. bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade entailed a tenuous balancing act attending to the twin imperatives on which CCP rule currently rests—maintaining international respect for a rising China and increasing prosperity for the Chinese people. On the one hand, the CCP needed to bend to widespread popular outrage by granting an opportunity for demonstrators to vent their anger at the Americans, whose explanation (that the bombing had been a tragic mistake) most Chinese refused to accept. On the other hand, the CCP needed to ensure that the surprisingly violent demonstrations which developed at the American diplomatic compound did not destroy bilateral ties with the United States on which China’s economic prospects so clearly depend. In April 2001, Beijing again found itself caught between the need to sustain Sino-American relations and the need to satisfy popular demands to stand up to the United States. The collision between an American EP-3 spy plane and a shadowing Chinese fighter jet resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot and then a tense standoff over the fate of the American plane and crew who were held in Chinese custody after their emergency landing on Hainan Island. This time, however, China’s leaders proved more adept at anticipating, channeling, and defusing the ensuing nationalist outrage. Potentially uncontrollable anti-American demonstrations were headed off as Beijing more strictly limited expressions of public opinion about the incident. Simultaneously, Beijing bolstered its nationalist credentials by adopting a very tough line in negotiations with Washington over the terms for the release of the American crew and plane detained on Chinese soil. The third recent episode, anti-Japan demonstrations in April 2005, reflects what are arguably the even tighter constraints nationalism imposes on a rising China’s leaders in their management of the intermittently troubled relationship with Japan. Leaders in Beijing (like their counterparts in Tokyo) recognize the huge mutual benefits, especially economic benefits, they derive from good bilateral ties. Yet, leaders in Beijing also recognize that while they must keep ties with Tokyo on a sound footing, they cannot afford to ignore the widespread expectation among the Chinese public that their government, especially as China grows stronger, will vigorously respond to any manifestation of Japan’s failure to adequately address the legacy of its earlier aggression against the Chinese nation. The now familiar issues over which popular expectations periodically prompt Beijing to raise objections with Tokyo include the following: Japanese government approval of history textbooks that offer revisionist accounts of the twentieth- century invasion and occupation; official

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apologies for Japan’s wartime behavior whose wording is faulted; decisions by Japanese prime ministers to visit the controversial Yasukuni shrine that now contains the remains of convicted war criminals; Tokyo’s failure to remove the large numbers of dangerous chemical weapons Japan left on Chinese soil after World War II; and plans to revise Japan’s postwar constitution that would ease the restrictions on the role of the military that were imposed by the victorious United States. During April 2005, a new upsurge in anger about Japan’s alleged historical revisionism and amnesia (as Tokyo pressed to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council) resulted in unruly marches in Beijing and Shanghai that quickly turned violent. The situation confronted China’s leaders in 2005 with risks similar to those they had faced during the May 1999 tensions with the United States. As in 1999, the CCP had again acceded to popular pressure for an opportunity to vent nationalist outrage while it also attempted, without complete success, to safeguard bilateral ties by protecting foreign (in this case Japanese) personnel and property in China. And, as in 1999, when the situation grew ugly, leaders in Beijing began warning participants about the limits of the regime’s tolerance; once it became clear that sporadic violence was jeopardizing a vital economic relationship, the Chinese authorities more vigorously enforced tight restrictions. Although the CCP successfully terminated this wave of protests against Japan, the experience was emblematic of the increasingly significant and difficult constraint Chinese nationalism now places on the leaders in Beijing. The more China’s power grows, the more the Chinese people expect their government to be able to right the alleged wrongs that persist from the history of Sino-Japanese relations. Yet, too enthusiastically indulging this nationalist demand rooted in past grievances feeds Tokyo’s already budding concerns about a rising China’s intentions that aggravate the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. It also risks jeopardizing a Sino-Japanese economic relationship whose rupture would have profound implications for the CCP’s ability to satisfy the equally pressing nationalist imperative to ensure the country’s prosperity.60 The popular expectation that a more powerful China’s leaders will defend the nation’s honor poses new challenges. Moreover, the importance of this constraint on foreign policy is increasing. China’s modernization entails economic, social, and political changes that are providing citizens with greater awareness about their country’s international affairs and an enhanced, if still 60. In the wake of the April 2005 protests, Japanese businesses reassessed their China stakes, Japanese public opinion about China grew more negative, and the visibility of official Japanese discussion about the potential threat from China increased. See James Brooke, “China’s Economic Brawn Unsettles Japanese,” New York Times, June 27, 2005, C1, LexisNexis; “Japan Strategic Realignment: Consequential Changes,” IISS Strategic Comments 11 (November 2005): 1–2; Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine, “Simmering Fire in Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic Confl ict,” Policy Brief (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) 44 (November 2005): 1–7.

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limited, ability to express their opinions. In the coming years, then, nationalism is likely to be a more, rather than less, important consideration constraining the leaders in Beijing as they forge a rising China’s foreign policy. There is little indication, however, that these nationalist pressures in a rising China will entail one of the more troubling consequences that have followed from similar ideological impulses in other rising powers. Chinese nationalism so far does not provide a rationale for tapping the country’s growing power to embark on an international mission that would challenge other states’ interests. Chinese nationalism does not yet offer a basis for the equivalent of Britain’s “white man’s burden,” France’s “mission civilisatrice,” Imperial Japan’s “Asia for the Asiatics,” the Soviet Union’s “proletarian internationalism,” or the United States’ “manifest destiny to spread freedom and democracy” that provided ideological glosses for expansive aims in the past. But it is worth recalling that in most of these cases, the ambitious international dimension to the nationalist agenda followed the country’s rise to great power status. At a minimum that suggests it is premature to conclude that China’s understanding of its national mission will remain innocuous. Beijing’s current focus is on defending the country’s interests against foreign encroachment and on building the domestic foundations of national strength—a vision most clearly articulated in the logic of China’s “peaceful development” or “peaceful rise” outlined by Zheng Bijian since 2003.61 But if China fulfi lls the dream of rising peacefully, will its focus and its view of its international mission change? Although such a metamorphosis is not inevitable, it is certainly possible. History provides ample evidence that national interests can change along with national capabilities and that modest aspirations are sometimes supplanted by more expansive ambitions fueled by intensifying nationalist pride. Civilian Economy. China’s economic boom is not only the foundation for the growing capabilities that make it a rising power. It also generates domestic constraints shaping China’s foreign policy. First, because ensuring rising living standards is now an essential component of the CCP’s claim to national leadership, Beijing’s leaders cannot afford a wholesale diversion of resources from civilian to military investment after the fashion that doomed the Soviet regime. Financial considerations do not preclude greater investment in military modernization. On the contrary, robust economic growth makes this possible without increasing the share of government revenues allocated to the PLA. That share remains at historically modest levels and could be raised without incurring prohibitive opportunity costs.62 But political concern for development of the civilian economy does mean that Beijing is sensitive to the 61. See Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great- Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84 (September–October 2005): 18–24; also, Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 38, 48, 191–93. 62. For a careful assessment of the possible variations in percent of GDP China might devote to military spending, see Crane, et al., Modernizing China’s Military.

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domestic risks it would face if it attempted to pursue an international agenda whose price tag was truly exorbitant. Second, and related, the importance of sustaining domestic growth now tied to foreign trade and investment constrains Beijing insofar as it must ensure an environment that permits China to reap the benefits of international economic integration. A rising China that taps its increasing military power to act in a highly assertive or aggressive fashion would risk a reaction jeopardizing the foundations of its newfound strength—especially if, as seems likely, that reaction came from two of the states most important for China’s economic health, the United States and Japan. Third, as China’s economy expands and modernizes, its energy consumption is increasing dramatically and with it, the importance of foreign supplies of oil and natural gas.63 The need for access to imported energy resources in turn affects the missions a rising China’s military will need to fulfi ll. Among these, three stand out: (1) ensuring the security of land-based pipelines carrying supplies from Russia and Central Asia;64 (2) ensuring the security of tankers carrying supplies through the long sea lanes that connect China to energy sources in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; and (3) ensuring the security of both sea lanes and production facilities in the East and South China Seas. For now, Beijing is addressing these concerns mainly through its activist diplomacy with energy partners rather than military deployments. But it would be surprising if China’s policymakers do not view developing a more powerful military complement to its energy diplomacy as one of the main missions to which a rising power’s growing capabilities should be devoted. If so, Beijing’s effort will almost certainly aggravate the security dilemma in the region. An increase in China’s ability to ensure its own energy interests carries with it the potential to undermine the interests of others. Like China, Japan has a vital interest in the security of sea lanes connecting it to the Middle East oil fields, unimpeded flows from pipelines on the Asian mainland, and access to petroleum reserves beneath the East China Sea. Like China, several ASEAN states claim maritime territory in the South China Sea whose possible energy resources all covet. And fi nally, a rising China’s efforts to cope with concerns about protecting its access to overseas energy resources will feed the security dilemma in Sino-American relations, since the required

63. See Erica Strecker Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000); see also Jonathan Kirshner’s chapter in this volume. 64. Maintaining the readiness of ground forces that can respond to large-scale disruption of pipelines by states from Russia and Turkey through the Central Asian frontier is only one facet of China’s response to this energy security concern. Arguably more important has been China’s active diplomacy within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that (1) reduces the danger potential local threats would ever materialize, and (2) may enable China to head off the unnerving prospect of a significant American military presence in Central Asia after operations in Afghanistan end. I thank Bernard Cole for his helpful suggestions on this matter.

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modernization of China’s navy will entail capabilities that could compromise the currently preponderant position of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific.65 Multiethnicity. The fact that China is a multiethnic country is not especially noteworthy. Many other countries are multiethnic, too, and the fraction of China’s population that is comprised of minorities is actually quite modest (less than 10 percent). What is distinctive about China’s multiethnic composition, however, and what makes it relevant to thinking strategically about its rising power, is the concentration of minority peoples in vast border regions (especially Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia). This pattern of settlement is one that the modern Chinese state inherited when it claimed as its national territory the geographic space formerly controlled by the Qing empire.66 In two respects this demographic reality places special demands on the state that affect the significance of China’s rising power. First, Beijing has attempted to foster political loyalty among national minorities through investment in the economic development of the peripheral regions in which they reside. The remoteness of these territories, however, poses stiff challenges to making these efforts pay off. Hence this added burden of development reinforces the larger political imperative of investment in the civilian economy that, as noted above, partly constrains Beijing’s ability to divert resources to rapidly modernizing the military. Second, because economic development has not yet assured the political loyalty of the people in these ethnically distinct border regions, Beijing must also dedicate some of its military investment to contingencies that might affect its control over them. This military requirement is defi ned, in part, by 65. Although it will be many years before the PLA Navy deploys a surface fleet able to challenge American maritime supremacy in areas beyond China’s territorial waters, before that, China may be able to deploy assets that would pose a threat to superior U.S. Navy forces if they attempt to block the sea lanes in the distant Arabian Sea or Indian Ocean. As noted above, even a modestly sized submarine presence (if it exploits advanced technologies that China’s current fleet does not possess) may provide coercive leverage over a larger adversary by exploiting the unnerving risk of escalation that lurks in the background of any confrontation between nuclear-armed great powers. On these issues, see Bernard D. Cole, “Waterways and Strategy: China’s Priorities,” China Brief, February 15, 2005, 3; Tarique Niazi, “Gwadar: China’s Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean,” ibid., 6; and You Ji, ‘The Debate over China’s Aircraft Carrier Program,” ibid., 9–10. 66. See Allen Carlson, Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). See also Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan? A Geo- Strategic Perspective on the PRC’s Quest for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). In many large countries, minority groups are concentrated locally (within par ticular urban neighborhoods, for example) but they more rarely constitute the majority in vast stretches of territory or entire provinces. Such localized ethnic concentration often follows from patterns of immigration. But in cases where minorities are incorporated by the expanding political reach of a growing state as in Tsarist Russia, Imperial China, and the United States of the nineteenth century, contiguous territories are at fi rst more like colonies than provinces. In North America, unlike China and Rus sia, the borderlands lost their ethnic distinctiveness because the colonial settlers who founded the United States adopted a sometimes ruthless approach that combined conquest, genocide, forced resettlement, and assimilation of the indigenous peoples.

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traditional concerns about the security of Chinese territory adjoining major powers. Although China’s relations with the key neighboring states—especially India, Kazakhstan, and Russia—are currently good, uncertainty about the future precludes Beijing from being indifferent to security along these potentially sensitive borders. Moreover, the security challenge is complicated by a long-standing potential for separatist movements, abetted by culturally similar or politically sympathetic foreigners just across the border, that could fragment the Chinese state. The experience of the former Soviet Union certainly demonstrated that concerns about such centrifugal forces in a regionalized multiethnic state are not misplaced. The demand for military resources dedicated to China’s borderlands also, however, reflects newer nontraditional security concerns—about transnational terrorist and criminal organizations that might foster or ally with local insurgencies challenging Beijing’s rule. This concern is especially acute in the case of China’s far western regions because of the obvious potential for ties between the restive Muslim minority population in Xinjiang and violent Islamist organizations operating across Central Asia. In sum, then, the fact that China is a regionally multiethnic state means that Beijing must cope with domestic security problems that a rising power with a less daunting demography would not. As long as regional multiethnicity remains a challenge for Beijing, it will continue to absorb resources that China might otherwise devote to military modernization in support of a more ambitious international role.

Conclusion This inventory of international circumstances and national attributes shaping China’s rise and the reaction to it reflects a complex array of forces in play. Moreover, even this lengthy list is far from exhaustive. It is, therefore, not surprising that as scholars have explored this topic over the past decade, their work has evinced a trend away from simplicity. At its inception in the mid-1990s, much of the writing about China’s rise presented fi rmly held and relatively clear- cut views, typically rooted in a strong commitment to the usefulness of a particular academic theory about international relations or a particular view about the nature of contemporary China. It is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that the early debate about China’s rise was essentially between those who pessimistically predicted danger ahead and those who optimistically predicted growing cooperation.67 67. Although this characterization does not do full justice to the variety of views, it was not difficult to assign one of the two stances to most of the fi rst wave of analysis. See, for example, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, “The Coming Confl ict with America,” Foreign Affairs 76 (March–April 1997): 18–32; and Robert S. Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power,” ibid., 33–44. For a convenient collection of essays from this early period, see Brown et al., The Rise of China.

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Although echoes of this early polarization of views surely remain, ten years later the debate is gravitating towards a very loose consensus around more modest and less confident forecasts that emphasize uncertainty about the future and the contingency of any predictions about China’s rise. Today’s assessments are much less easily characterized as clearly pessimistic or optimistic.68 Typically, they are consistent with the conclusion that follows from the survey presented here: While there are forces and trends in play that cannot be easily or completely controlled, the impact of most of the relevant international and national factors is not preordained but instead will be significantly shaped by decisions that have not yet been taken. Given the fallibility of human beings, that may or may not be reason for optimism about the implications of China’s rise. It does, however, indicate the need for analysis that can offer decision-makers a window into the influences that defi ne the challenge they face—a dynamic international situation in which China’s role looms ever larger. Moreover, it has become clear that understanding China’s rise and figuring out how most wisely to respond to it is not well served by simplistically thinking about its implications for the status quo. Unless one adopts a rather amorphous defi nition, or is referring only to an abstract concept useful for theoretical work, it becomes very difficult to identify what is meant by the status quo, as opposed to an obviously evolving reality. The pertinent question is not how China’s rise will affect the status quo, but rather how an ever- changing China’s rise will shape and be shaped by an ever- changing international system. Different theories can provide insights into various aspects of this exquisitely complex process. As always, however, a more complete understanding entails applying multiple theories, and the difficult exercise of figuring out how to combine their partial insights to create a more comprehensive view. I have not offered that sort of comprehensive picture. Instead, I have offered only a peek through various lenses. At best, this results in a collage that suggests China’s rise in the early twenty-fi rst century is unlikely to be either as benign and smooth as was America’s rise in the early twentieth century or as malign and rough as the rise of Germany and Japan that helped trigger two world wars. The international and domestic factors I have examined depict some predictable problems likely to accompany China’s emergence as a great power. It 68. Such complexity is also evident in the policy community. Rather than sharply dividing between “panda huggers” pushing engagement and “blue teamers” pushing containment, most China hands who circulate through the U.S. government or provide it with advice now acknowledge the usefulness of thinking about the possibility that views about China’s future with which they disagree may prove correct. Thus, policy debates have become disagreements over the plausibility of competing views rather than over their validity in some defi nitive sense. Such a change is at least partly captured in the assessment of Sino-American relations that Aaron Friedberg published shortly after leaving the Bush administration. See Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.China Relations.”

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is, therefore, a safe bet that confl icts, even serious confl icts, between China and its neighbors as well as the reigning American superpower are nearly inevitable. But the survey presented in this chapter also depicts influences that reduce the probability that such conflicts will give rise to worst- case scenarios. It suggests that there will be plenty of room for leaders in Beijing (and elsewhere) to shape outcomes in ways that forestall a repetition of history’s most disastrous experiences with rising powers. And perhaps as important, it indicates that regardless of the preferences of China’s leaders (preferences that are hard to discern and, in any event, always mutable), for the foreseeable future they will be facing constraints on their ability to translate economic growth into military power great enough to permit them to play the sort of aggressive role that would pose the gravest dangers for international security. Any attempt to do so would confront daunting international obstacles and jeopardize the viability of a Chinese regime that has struggled for decades to get its own house in order. Such risks don’t preclude dangerously foolish choices. They do, however, provide grounds to argue against expecting that they are likely, let alone inevitable.

Part II

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE RISE OF CHINA

chapter

4

The Rise of China Power, Institutions, and the Western Order G. John Ikenberry

One of the great dramas of the twenty-fi rst century will be the economic and geopolitical ascent of China. The rapid growth of China’s economy and its active regional diplomacy are already transforming East Asia—and Beijing’s geopolitical influence is growing. China’s commercial and energy ties are expanding around the world. China is at the center of proliferating regional and bilateral trade agreements and the rapid rise of intra-Asian trade. Its capital reserves are a major source of American borrowing—indirectly fi nancing Washington’s tax cuts and the Iraq war. China has a leading role in the Six Party nuclear talks on North Korea. China is seeking to shape the emerging political-institutional contours of the East Asian region, encouraging movement toward an East Asian Community that excludes the United States. China’s spending on defense and its military capabilities continue to grow. By all measures, China is a great power on the rise. Not surprisingly, the world is debating the likely impact of this grand historical transition. U.S. Under Secretary of State Robert Zoellick poses the question sharply: “So, how should we view China at the dawn of the 21st Century? . . . There is a cauldron of anxiety about China. . . . Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the United States—and others as well—to hedge their relations with China. Many countries hope China will pursue a ‘Peaceful Rise,’ but none will bet their future on it.”1 Is the peaceful rise of China possible? What will be the impact of a rising China on East Asia and the global system? Will a rising China attempt to impose a rival set of I wish to acknowledge the helpful research assistance of Thomas Wright. 1. Robert Zoellick, “Whither China? From Membership to Responsibility,” Remarks, National Committee on U.S.- China Relations, New York, September 21, 2005.

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rules and institutions on the outside world or will it accommodate itself to the existing Western-oriented international order? Will China cooperate in the multilateral institutions created by the United States, or will it, after it grows sufficiently powerful, try to balance against the United States and attempt to usher in a China- centered international order? What can the outside world do to shape or influence the way a rising China enters or moves up within the global system?2 These are, of course, classic questions that scholars have asked over the centuries about the rise of great powers and transitions in global order. E. H. Carr argued that the “problem of peaceful change” is a central dilemma of international relations.3 This is the “power transition” problem associated with the rise and decline of states theorized by Organski, Gilpin, and others. The rise of post-Bismarck Germany in the late nineteenth century—and the ensuing great power rivalry, arms races, instabilities, realignments, and “Thirty Years’ War” between England and Germany—is the paradigmatic case. Power transitions are seen as dangerous moments in the international system often accompanied by conflict, instability, security competition, and war. But not all power transitions generate security competition or war or overturn the old international order. Some power transitions result in preventive war but others do not. Britain ceded power to a rapidly growing America in the early decades of the twentieth century without war or a rupture in relations. Japan grew from 5 percent of the American GNP in the late 1940s to over 60 percent in the early 1990s without challenging the existing international order. Clearly there are different types of great power ascents and power transitions. Some states have grown rapidly in economic or geopolitical power and, in the end, accommodated themselves in the existing international order (Japan). Other great powers have risen up and indeed sought to challenge the existing great power order (post-Bismarck Germany). Some power transition moments led to the breakdown of the old order and the establishment of a new global hierarchy of order (Britain after 1815 and America after 1945). Other power transitions do not result in a transformed international order but in more limited adjustments in the regional or global system (Japan and Germany in the postwar era). In this chapter, I argue that China faces a very different type of status quo international order than that faced by previous rising states. The United States is a different type of hegemonic power than past leading states—and the order it has built is different than the orders of the past. It is a wider and deeper political order than any other built up earlier. At the same time, the nuclear revolution has made war among great powers less likely—even unthinkable. 2. For an overview of the different predictions international relations theories make about the future of U.S.- China relations see Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.- China Relations: Is Confl ict Inevitable?” International Security 30 (fall 2005): 7–45. 3. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 208–23.

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This has eliminated the major way in which rising states have overturned old international orders defended by declining hegemonic states. China also has incentives—economic and perhaps political—for working within the existing American-led international order. In short, the global hierarchy today is different than global hierarchies of the past—it is harder to overturn and easier to join. These considerations ensure that the rise of China will manifest itself in a way that is very much unlike past power transitions. China may or may not ever get to the position where it could decisively shape the rules and institutions of the international order in the way the United States did so after 1945. But it is not self-evident that it would seek to establish a radically new set of organizational principles. In the absence of a massive great power war—which neither China nor the United States would want—the existing international order will not break down in a way that would allow China to make fi rst-order choices about the rules and institutions of the global system. It will face problems of security dilemmas and a powerful and growing Western order—not a collapsed system. These circumstances will also impact its choices regarding integration and challenge. The power transition path that China takes will hinge on its interests and its power. The less China has clear material interests in overturning the existing order and the less it is certain that China can grow in power to the point where it reaches parity with the United States or the West, the more it will choose—grudgingly or otherwise—a strategy of accommodation and integration. If China’s material interests truly are frustrated within the existing international order and if it grows into the world’s dominant power, the international order will surely be transformed. This could happen. But indications of this worst- case passage do not exist. The United States—more so than any previous hegemonic states—has created an international order that tends to reproduce itself. It is an open and expansive order built around institutions that bind its members together and which mitigates security competition and rivalry within it. It is not even clear to what extent this order still depends on American leadership, although enlightened American leadership will certainly help it function better and last longer. If all of this is true, we are not entering the age of a classic power transition. In making this argument, I seek to do three things. First, I identify the various types and pathways of power transition and relate them to the specific problem of the rise of China. Following others, I make a basic distinction between rising states that seek to accommodate themselves within an existing order—even if they simultaneously attempt to gain new advantages within it—and revisionist rising states that seek to overturn and transform the order itself. I also make distinctions between different types of challenges to the existing order—security governance rules, political-economic rules, prestige and authority relations, etc. Second, I explore the role of institutions as critical variables in shaping the way in which a rising great power interacts with the existing lead state and

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international order. Institutions matter both for the rising great power and the leading state. Institutions are tools of states and mechanisms that shape the political formations that sit atop the international distribution of state power. Institutions can alter the way in which power is expressed, security dilemmas are manifest, and the hierarchy of order is constructed and maintained. In particular, the institutional character of the “old order” matters most. My claim is that the more institutionalized and encompassing the existing order is, the more difficult it is for a newly rising state to overturn it—and the more likely it will pursue an accommodative strategy. Third, I apply these arguments to the rise of China and the future of the American-led international order. The character of the ideas and institutions embraced by China and the United States will determine how the power transition is played out. Most obviously, the greater the congruence between Chinese ideas—that is, its underlying interests and preferences regarding order—and the Western order, the more likely that the rise of China will be accommodated within the existing international order. But also, the greater the institutional depth and scope of the Western order that China confronts, the more likely that China will fi nd it necessary—regardless of its ideas and material interests—to integrate into rather than challenge that order. If this account is true, the policy prescriptions for the United States are clear. The institutional strategies it has used for half a century to build a Western- centered global order should be strengthened and extended. The U.S. should work with Europe and other democratic capitalist states to renew and entrench the rules and institutions that bind and unify them. The more widely and deeply institutionalized the “old order” is, the greater the chance that it will survive the rise of China and provide a framework for the long-term accommodation of that development.

Hierarchical Order, Rising States, and Power Transitions International order can be understood as a hierarchical political system that reflects the interests of the dominant state or states. Change occurs as great powers rise and decline and as they struggle over the rules and institutions of order. Robert Gilpin provides a classic account of the dynamics of international relations in these terms. The history of world politics is marked by a succession of powerful—or hegemonic—states that rise up to organize the international system. As Gilpin argues, “the evolution of any system has been characterized by successive rises of powerful states that have governed the system and have determined the patterns of international interactions and established the rules of the system.”4 Steady and inevitable shifts in the 4. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 42–43.

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distribution of power among states give rise to new challenger states which eventually engage the leading state in hegemonic war, and this in turn gives rise to a new hegemonic state that uses its dominant position to establish an order favorable to its interests. Within a hegemonic order, rules and rights are established and enforced by the power capacities of the leading state. Compliance and participation within the order are ultimately ensured by the range of power capabilities available to the hegemon—military power, fi nancial capital, market access, technology, and so forth. Direct coercion is always an option in the enforcement of order, but less direct “carrots and sticks” are also mechanisms to maintain hegemonic control. Gilpin also argues that a wider set of resources—ideology and status appeals—is integral to the perpetuation of hegemonic order.5 But the authority of the hegemonic state and the cohesion of the hegemonic order are ultimately based on the preeminent power of the leading state. The hierarchical system is maintained as long as the leading state remains powerful enough to enforce the rules and institutions of order. When hegemonic power declines, the existing order begins to unravel and break apart. As Gilpin contends, “a precondition for political change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution of power toward those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system.”6 The power transition leads to geopolitical struggles and security competition that ultimately culminate in hegemonic war—and the emergence of a new leading state that organizes the international system according to a new logic. Building on this notion of international relations as a succession of hierarchical orders, Organski and others have sought to identify the links between power transitions and great power war. The focus is on declining power disparities and rising dissatisfaction with the status quo among great powers as critical variables determining the risk of system-transforming war. The basic claim is that the likelihood of war increases as the power of a dissatisfied rising state reaches parity with a declining status quo lead state.7 When the lead state occupies a commanding power position in the international system, neither weaker states nor the lead state has an incentive to initiate a great power war. A stable hierarchy persists. But when rapid shifts in power occur—and the power of the challenger state grows and the power of the leading state weakens—uncertainties, insecurities, and dissatisfactions grow and war becomes more likely.8 The challenger state becomes more confident that it can 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., 9. 7. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958). 8. As Organski and his collaborators argue: “Occasionally a great power—like Germany or the Soviet Union—is dissatisfied with its role and status in the international system. If it is growing at a fast rate and extracting resources for use at the national level, that nation may become a challenger to the dominant state.” Ronald L. Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatham House, 2000), 10.

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win a war and the leading state becomes less confident it will be able to defend its command of the international order in the future. Complete agreement does not exist over the specific logic and variation in power transition wars. Organski originally argued that the dissatisfied challenger initiates confl ict prior to the transition, but in a later study, he and Kugler suggest that the dissatisfied challenger initiates war after the transition.9 The rapidity of the ascent of a rising great power is also asserted as a factor influencing how and if confl ict is triggered. It is also not clear how inherent the sources of rising state dissatisfaction are in the power transition itself. Organski argues that dissatisfaction is generated when a rapidly growing power is not given the immediate “respect” that leaders expect, leading to grievances. Rising dissatisfaction might also be caused by more tangible frustrations related to freedom of transit along trade routes, access to territories and raw materials, and representation in international bodies. The growing military capabilities of a rising state will also allow it to expand its ability to project power, thereby threatening the stable relations built by the old hegemonic state around the provision of security to allies and client states.10 These specifications of the causal logic make it clear that great variability can exist in the way that power transitions play out. First, the character of rising power “dissatisfaction” can vary. Clearly this is true in regard to subjective feelings of leaders about respect and prestige. But so too will there be variation in the ability of rising states to advance their expanding economic and political goals within an existing international order. Second, the actual ability to launch or experience gains from a hegemonic war will vary. In the current age when China, the United States, and other great powers possess nuclear weapons, the costs and benefits—indeed the rationality—of hegemonic war are radically altered. Third, the power transition perspective focuses on the dynamic between a hegemonic state and a rising state as it approaches “parity.” But the actual power of the hegemonic state is much greater if it is effectively aggregated with other great powers allied with it. A rising state faces not just a lead state but—at least potentially—a wider coalition of status quo great powers arrayed around the hegemonic state. Finally, the character of the hegemonic order itself will matter. It will influence how a 9. Organski, World Politics, 333; Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 59. 10. For critiques and extensions of the power transition literature, see J. DiCicco and Jack Levy, “The Power Transition Research Program: A Lakatosian Analysis,” in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 109–57; Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Woosang Kim and James Morrow, “When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?” American Journal of Political Science 36 (November 1992): 896–922; and Douglas Lemke and William Reed, “Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace,” International Interactions 22 (1996): 143–64.

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rising state calculates its interests and the choices it makes to either integrate or challenge the order. It will influence the ability of the leading state to aggregate power and enforce the rules and maintain a stable international hierarchy. Indeed, the actual character of hierarchy and rule within a hegemonic order can vary widely. A coercive version of hegemonic order entails the direct and despotic domination of weaker and secondary states. The hierarchical order is highly stratified and the prestige and material benefits of the order accrue disproportionately to the lead state. But a more benevolent and less coercive version of hegemonic order is also possible—organized around more reciprocal, consensual, and institutionalized relations. The order is still organized around asymmetrical power relations, but the most overtly malign character of domination is muted.11 Again, my hypothesis is twofold. First, the more institutionalized and encompassing the status quo international order is, the harder it is for the rising state to reach parity, and the greater its incentives are to accommodate itself to that order. Second, the more open and benign the status quo international order is, the great the opportunities for rising great powers to secure their interests through integrating into rather than challenging the order.

Variations in Power Transitions States are continuously in the process of rising and declining in relative power, gaining and losing ground to each other. On occasion a “power transition” occurs between two or more great powers. These are moments when power disparities between major states shift rapidly—that is, they are moments when at the beginning of a time period one state has greater power capabilities than a second state but at the end of the time period the second state—the rising great power—has surpassed the fi rst state. At rare historical moments, a rapidly growing great power rises up and surpasses a lead or hegemonic state in the international system. These most consequential shifts in power turn out to be hegemonic or system-reordering power transitions. The major power transitions among leading states between 1500 and 2000 are listed in Table 4.1. The early power transitions and great power struggles occurred within Eu rope, while after 1815 the rise and decline of major states and geopolitical struggles encompassed the wider global system. The fi rst major power transition played out in the seventeenth century with the rise of the Habsburg empire and its bid for mastery of Eu rope. Habsburg power peaked in the early seventeenth century and its dominance was challenged by the rise of several European states, led by France. The defeat of the Spanish-led 11. These versions of hegemony are explored in G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), chap. 2.

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1600–1659 1660–1815 1880–1900 1919–1933 1925–1931 1870–1945 1900–1945 1945–1991

War–hegemonic transition War–hegemonic transition Peaceful hegemonic transition Peaceful transition Peaceful transition War–failed hegemonic transition War–failed transition Peaceful transition

Habsburg empire, ratified in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, ushered in a period of pluralistic and decentralized great power struggle on the continent. The next set of European power transitions unfolded between 1660 and 1815. During this century and a half France—led fi rst by Louis XIV and later by Napoleon I—was a rising great power and dominated the European order. British power was also rising in the early eighteenth century and competition and war with France occurred throughout the following century. By the late eighteenth century, Britain and (to a lesser extent) Russia were leading powers on the edges of the European continent—and the decline of France was made fi nal by the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo and the Vienna settlement of 1815. These great power transitions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were also accompanied by the consolidation of nation-states in Europe and a “diplomatic revolution” in the use of treaties, alliances, and the balance of power.12 The next period—between 1815 and 1914—was one where Britain emerged as the dominant power and the international order remained relatively stable, without major shifts in the hierarchy among the great powers. British dominance was based in large part on its leading economy, expanding empire, and naval power. Britain surpassed France in economic size and productivity in the decades before 1815 and the disparities continued to increase between the two countries throughout the nineteenth century. During the fi rst half of the nineteenth century Britain experienced annual growth rates of up to 6 percent while the rest of Europe grew at roughly 1.5 percent.13 In the latter part of the nineteenth century—and through the twentiethcentury world wars—dramatic power transitions unfolded. Two dyadic great power relations experienced the most significant reversal in power disparities: Britain and the United States and Britain and Germany. The classic case of power transition leading to global confl ict is Britain and Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. Germany’s ascent began with 12. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 86. 13. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 48.

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its unification under Bismarck in 1870 and the rapid growth of its economy. By the 1880s and 1890s it was acquiring overseas territories and building a modern navy. In 1870, Britain had a three-to-one advantage in economic power over Germany but by 1903 Germany had pulled ahead of Britain in overall economic and military power.14 Paul Kennedy identifies two factors that ensured that the rise of Germany would have a dramatic effect on British hegemony and great power balances: The fi rst was that, far from emerging in geopolitical isolation, like Japan, Germany had arisen right in the center of the old European states system; its very creation had directly impinged upon the interests of Austria-Hungary and France, and its existence had altered the relative position of all of the existing Great Powers of Europe. The second factor was the sheer speed and extent of Germany’s further growth, in industrial, commercial, and military/naval terms. By the eve of the First World War its national power was not only three or four times Italy’s and Japan’s, it was well ahead of either France or Russia and had probably overtaken Britain as well. In June 1914 the octogenarian Lord Welby recalled that ‘the Germany they remembered in the fi fties was a cluster of insignificant states under insignificant princelings’; now, in one man’s lifetime, it was the most powerful state in Europe, and still growing. This alone was to make ‘the German question’ the epicenter of so much of world politics for more than half a century after 1890.15

The unification and rapid economic growth of Germany led to a dramatic expansion in its power and triggered, as Choucri and North describe the years between 1870 and 1915, “intense competition among countries for resources and markets, military power, political influence, and prestige.”16 The rise of German power triggered the classic dynamics of a power transition: as Germany unified and grew, so too did its dissatisfactions, demands, and ambitions; and as it grew more powerful, security dilemmas emerged and Germany increasingly appeared as a threat to other great powers in Europe. The result, of course, was a European war. After World War I, German power declined under the weight of defeat, territorial losses, and reparations. But after 1932, German power increased rapidly and on the eve of World War II it again surpassed Great Britain. The British-American power transition took a very different path. American economic growth during the decades before 1914 was even more impressive than Germany’s. Indeed, the United States had begun to eclipse Britain as the world’s leading economic power by the 1880s. By the end of the 14. Britain remained econom ically more advanced but German’s population was a third larger than Britain’s and its advancing industrial economy allowed it to engage in a sustained military arms buildup. 15. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 209–10. 16. Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Confl ict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975), 28.

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nineteenth century, its power capabilities were more than double those of Britain.17 But, of course, this did not trigger the same rivalry and security competition as that which broke out on the European continent. Several factors appear to have contributed to this more peaceful transition. To begin, America’s ascent was gradual, it took place “offshore” and away from the other great powers, and it was not manifest (at least initially) in military capacity. The United States also did not challenge Britain because, unlike Germany, it supported the status quo international order as it was established under British hegemonic rule. Britain was obviously less worried about the growth of American power than German power. As a study by a group of power transitions theorists argues: “Scholars do not identify these two countries as engaged in an arms buildup during this period, indicating they were both satisfied with the status quo. This satisfaction probably derived from British leadership, a common institutional heritage, American political separation from European affairs, and a profitable market for British capital in America. All undoubtedly helped reduce British anxieties and suspicions of American growth.”18 In the post-1945 era, no significant power transitions occurred. The United States emerged as the dominant—and hegemonic—state in the system. The Soviet Union grew in power capabilities over the postwar decades but it never surpassed the United States—and, indeed, American power advantages over the Soviet Union continued to increase during the last decades of the Cold War. When the power capacities of NATO partners are included, the Western advantages over the Warsaw Pact countries were even greater. The two most substantial shifts in power among major states were the postwar economic return of Germany and Japan. In both cases, the growing economic capabilities of these states took place within alliance and institutional frameworks led by the United States. There are several general observations we can make about this chronology of power transitions. First, there are important differences in the scale and outcomes of power transitions. Some power transitions were truly contests between major states seeking to establish their leadership or hegemonic control over international order. The Habsburg Empire and France in the seventeenth century, Napoleonic France and Britain in the early nineteenth century, Britain and post-Bismarck Germany in the early twentieth century, and Britain and the United States in the fi rst half of the twentieth century—these were all transitions in which hegemonic leadership hung in the balance. Other 17. The United States overtook all the major Eu ropean powers in the nineteenth century in economic and international power. It passed Prussia in 1834, Austria in 1836, France in 1858, and the United Kingdom in 1879. The United States also overtook Russia in 1880 and China in 1890, although economic data for these countries are inexact. See Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 198 n. 6. 18. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 50.

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power transitions—such as between France and Britain in the 1930s or France and Germany in the post-1945 era—were not reversals in power disparities that carried with them implications for dominance of the international order.19 Likewise, the outcomes varied considerably. More specifically, most hegemonic power transitions culminated in war but some did not. The rise of post-Bismarck Germany and the United States—both challenging a waning British-led international order—took very different paths. As power transition theorists argue, the two rising states differed radically in terms of their dissatisfaction with the British-led international order. Germany could establish its dominance only by challenging and overturning the existing order. The United States found it possible to rise up within that order without directly confronting Britain—and Britain did not feel sufficiently threatened by a rising America to resort to preventive war. But, of course, even in the “successful” power transition between the United States and Britain, war did play a role in ushering in the change, even if it was triggered by German and not American power. The two world wars not only defeated a rising Germany, but they also fi nally exhausted Britain and destroyed the old order in ways that allowed the United States unusual opportunities to assert itself in the build of a new international order. 20 Second, the political character of the states involved in the power transitions seems to matter. It is notable that rising democratic states have not launched war against a declining democratic state—as the British-American hegemonic transition suggests. Power transitions that have led to war have all involved nondemocracies. In a study of preventive war, Randall Schweller argues that structural theory cannot explain the outcomes alone. Only nondemocratic states have waged preventive war against rising great powers. Declining democratic states have not pursued this course of action. When a declining democratic state faces a rising and potentially threatening nondemocratic challenger, it has tended to form a counterbalancing alliance. This is Britain in the face of Germany before the world wars—but it is also France in 1933–36 as it faced Germany and the United States as it faced the Soviet Union (1947–55). When the challenger is another democratic state, the two seek accommodation (Britain facing the United States).21 These observations suggest that it is useful to look more closely at how shifting power disparities are experienced by rising and declining states and 19. For a discussion of variations in great power ascents, see Randall Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999), 1–31. 20. For an argument about how wars create conditions for order building, see Ikenberry, After Victory, chap. 1. 21. Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics 44 (January 1992): 235–69, fig. 2.

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at the strategies they employ. The way in which the United States and other democratic states have dealt with the rise and decline in their power is particularly intriguing. These countries have found ways to reduce the untoward implications of shifting power disparities—both by aggregating power among them and binding themselves to each other in ways that reduce the implications of potentially threatening power asymmetries.

Institutions and the American Postwar Order In the post-1945 era, the United States and other democratic states have found innovative ways to cope with power disparities that otherwise might trigger security competition and political conflict. In particular, they have pursued institutional strategies that bind them together, thereby both making them collectively more powerful in the face of nondemocratic challengers and making them less threatening to each other. As a result of these practices, the American-led international order is a more stable, expansive, and deeply integrated order than it would otherwise be. This world-historical development, in turn, has made the old power transition dynamic less useful as a guide to the future—rising states do not just face the United States, they face a wider, deeper, and more formidable order. The United States emerged as the world’s preeminent power after World War II amidst sharp and dramatic shifts in the global distribution of power. More than Britain in the nineteenth century or other hegemonic states in earlier eras, the United States built its hegemonic order around institutionalized relationships. This is order built around multilateralism, alliance partnership, strategic restraint, cooperative security, and institutional and rule-based relationships. The institutional underpinning of this order made America’s power position both more durable and less threatening to other states—rising, declining, or otherwise. It is the order that came to dominate the global system for half a century—surviving the end of the Cold War and other upheavals.22 One aspect of this argument is the democratic peace thesis: open democratic polities are less able or willing to use power in an arbitrary and indiscriminate manner against other democracies.23 The calculations of smaller and weaker states as they confront a democratic hegemon are altered. Fundamentally, power asymmetries are less threatening or destabilizing when they exist between democracies. American power is “institutionalized”—not entirely, of 22. A large and growing literature illuminates this patter of American postwar order. See, inter alia, Ikenberry, After Victory; Geir Lundestad, The American “Empire” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). 23. The democratic peace literature is vast. See Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” pts. 1 and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (summer and fall 1983); Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001).

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course—but more so than in the case of previous world-dominating states. This institutionalization of hegemony serves the interest of the United States by making its power more legitimate, expansive, and durable. But the price is that some restraints are indeed placed on the exercise of power. In this view, three elements matter most in making American power more stable, engaged, and restrained. First, America’s mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized way in which American foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build long-term, mutually beneficial relations. The governmental separation of powers creates a shared decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states. An active press and competitive party system also provide a service to outside states by generating information about U.S. policy and determining its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of democracy can frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But over the long term, democratic institutions produce more consistent and credible policies than autocratic or authoritarian states. 24 This open and decentralized political process works in a second way to reduce foreign worries about American power. It creates what might be called “voice opportunities”—it offers opportunities for political access and, with it, the means for foreign governments and groups to influence the way Washington’s power is exercised. Foreign governments and corporations may not have elected officials in Washington but they do have representatives.25 Looked at from the perspective of the stable functioning of American’s unipolar order, this is one of the most functional aspects of the United States as a global power. By providing other states opportunities to play the game in Washington, the United States draws them into active, ongoing partnerships that serve its long-term strategic interests. A fi nal element of the unipolar order that reduces the worry about power asymmetries is the web of institutions that mark the postwar order. After World War II, the United States launched history’s most ambitious era of institution building. The UN, IMF, World Bank, NATO, GATT, and other institutions that emerged provided the most rule-based structure for political and economic relations in history. The United States was deeply ambivalent about making permanent security commitments to other countries or 24. For an important statement of the “contracting advantages” of demo cratic states, see Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 25. For a discussion of “voice opportunities,” see Joseph M. Grieco, “State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectory: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and Eu ropean Economic and Monetary Union,” Security Studies 5 (spring 1996): 176–222. The classic formulation of this logic is Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty—Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

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allowing its political and economic policies to be dictated by intergovernmental bodies. The Soviet threat was critical in overcoming these doubts. Networks and political relationships were built that—paradoxically—both made American power more far-reaching and durable but also more predictable and malleable.26 Overall, the array of multilateral institutions and security pacts are not simply functional mechanisms that generate collective action. They are also elements of political architecture that allow for states within the hegemonic order to do business with each other. In championing these postwar institutions and in agreeing to operate within them, the United States is, in effect, agreeing to open itself up to an ongoing political process with other democratic states. The liberal character of the hegemonic order provides access points and opportunities for political communication and reciprocal influence. The pluralistic and regularized way in which American foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build long-term, mutually beneficial relations. By providing other states with opportunities to play the game in Washington, the United States draws them into active, ongoing partnerships that serve its long-term strategic interests. In effect, the political architecture gave the postwar order its distinctive liberal hegemonic character—networks and political relationships were built that—paradoxically—made American power both more far-reaching and durable but also more predictable and malleable.27 Importantly, this American-led institutionalized hegemonic order provided the framework for the reintegration of Germany and Japan—allowing these defeated states to grow in power without triggering security dilemmas in their respective regions. Postwar Germany was bound to its Western European democratic neighbors through the Coal and Steel Community and, later, the European Community, and it was bound to the United States through NATO. George Kennan was an early advocate of this strategy of tying Germany to Western Europe. “In the long run there can be only three possibilities for the future of western and central Europe,” Kennan argued in 1948. “One is German domination. Another is Russian domination. The third is a federated Eu rope, into which the parts of Germany are absorbed but in which the influence of the other countries is sufficient to hold Germany in her place. If there is not real Eu ropean federation and if Germany is

26. On the logic of security binding, see Paul Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1975), 227–62. For more recent formulations, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Sources and Character of Liberal International Order,” Review of International Studies 25 (1999): 179–96. 27. See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Sources and Character of Liberal International Order,” Review of International Studies 25 (1999): 179–96.

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restored as a strong and independent country, we must expect another attempt at German domination.”28 This binding strategy for dealing with postwar Germany was widely embraced by American officials. Secretary of State Marshall made the point in early 1948: “Unless Western Germany during coming year is effectively associated with Western European nations, fi rst through economic arrangements, and ultimately perhaps in some political way, there is a real danger that whole of Germany will be drawn into the eastern orbit with dire consequences for all of us.”29 When Secretary of State Dean Acheson went to the Senate to answer questions about the NATO treaty, Senator Claude Pepper posed the question: “The Atlantic Treaty has given these Western European nations some confidence against a resurgent Germany as well as Russia?” Acheson replied: “Yes. It works in all directions.”30 The binding of Germany to Europe and the Atlantic world was ultimately part of a larger politicalinstitutional settlement that sought to overcome Franco- German antagonism and construct a trans-Atlantic community devoid of security competition. NATO was a security alliance but it was also designed to help organize political and economic relations within the Atlantic area. At the end of the Cold War, the institutional structure of the Western order again proved to be a useful vehicle to facilitate the peaceful growth of German power. This occurred in 1989–90 as German Chancellor Kohl pursued German unification in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the political collapse of the German Democratic Republic. The specter of a unified Germany seriously worried other European leaders inasmuch as it would turn Germany into the most powerful country on the continent. French President Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Thatcher both objected to the idea of an early reunification of Germany. So too did Soviet President Gorbachev who was witnessing the loss of the Soviet Union’s most important Warsaw Pact ally. Yet, in the end, both Western leaders and Gorbachev acquiesced in German unification—abruptly altering the balance of power between East and West and within the West as well. In making Germany unification acceptable to the others, Chancellor Kohl pursued an institutional strategy of reassurance. Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher made clear that a unified and inevitably more powerful Germany would be deeply enmeshed in wider regional institutions. Genscher articulated the German view in January 1990: “We want to place the process of German unification in the context of EC [European Community] 28. “Report of the Policy Planning Staff,” February 24, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 1, pt. 2, 515. 29. “Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States–United Kingdom–Canada Security Conversations, Held in Washington,” 1 April 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 3, 71. 30. Quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, A Covenant with Power: American and World Order from Wilson to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 100.

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integration, of the CSCE [Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe], the West-East partnership for stability, the construction of the common European house and the creation of a peaceful European order from the Atlantic to the Urals.”31 The overriding American strategy during this period was also to ensure that a unified Germany would remain fi rmly embedded in the Atlantic alliance. President Bush presented this view at a NATO meeting in Brussels in December 1989: “[German] unification should occur in the context of Germany’s continued commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated European Community, and with due regard for the legal role and responsibilities of the Allied powers.”32 In the end, Gorbachev and the Western European leaders accepted a unified Germany—as long as it was embedded in Western institutions. These institutions—NATO more importantly—provided the means to reassure Soviet leaders that they would not exploit Soviet troubles, and that German integration within Western security and economic institutions would provide an effective guard against the resurgence of German power.33 The United States also integrated postwar Japan into the Western order through security binding and efforts to redirect its trade and commercial relations toward America. The U.S.-Japan alliance gave Japan a sufficiently credible security guarantee that it could spend less than 1 percent of its GNP on its military and eschew the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This in turn has made Japan less threatening to its Asian neighbors, including China. NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance operate according to a similar logic—and they are reinforced by the wider array of multilateral economic and political institutions in which they operate. These institutions bind all member states and all have a formal voice in them. In exchange, the member states agree to work with the United States rather than resist its leadership. Within the American-led postwar hegemonic order, Japan and Germany both undertook ambitious political-economic transformations—and by the 1990s they were the secondand third-largest economies in the world. These characteristics of the Western order have three implications for power transitions that occur within this order as well as between states in this order and outside rising or declining great powers. First, the array of political, economic, and security institutions in which the United States is positioned plays a role in reassuring other states that American power will not be exercised in 31. Quoted in Robert Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 120. 32. Bush, President’s News Conference in Brussels, December 4, 1989, in Public Papers of President George Bush, 1989, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1990), 648. 33. Historical accounts of this episode include Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unifi ed and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Elizabeth Pond, The Rebirth of Europe (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1999).

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an arbitrary and indiscriminate manner. By creating and operating within and through institutions, American power is made more acceptable to the outside world. It matters in influencing the calculations of other great powers as they determine whether to work with or resist the United States. This is not to say that the United States always plays by the rules and acts through mutually agreed-upon governance institutions. Indeed much of the world is today in a political uproar against America’s seeming disregard for its own rules and institutions as it invades Iraq and pursued other unilateral actions. 34 But the overall complex of institutions continues to operate across a wide range of issues and among a wide array of countries. This institutional complex creates incentives to engage with rather than balance against the United States—to integrate into the Western order rather than challenge it. Second, other democratic states within the order have been able to rise up without provoking security competition. This is the story of Germany and Japan. The American response to the potential security risks associated with the growth of Japanese and German power has been to redouble efforts to keep them integrated within the Western order. When the United States faced a rising Japan in the 1980s, it pushed Tokyo to open up and liberalize its economy. The United States and Europe together invited Japan into intergovernmental groupings such as the OECD and the G7 process. Private sector groups—such as the Trilateral Commission and other business councils—also sought to integrate Japan into the Western economic order. Germany also has followed a postwar path of growth and normalization as a great power by renewing its commitments to European and Atlantic institutions. The leading states within this order—Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States—have all experienced rising and declining economic growth rates and military expenditures, but never have these relative gains and loses in power triggered security competition or power transition confl ict. Third, the Western institutionalized order operates as a dynamic entity within the global system in ways that influence the strategies of rising and declining great powers situated outside the order—and it does this in a paradoxical way. The paradox is that this Western order both works unusually effectively to generate massive aggregate power—but it also tends to make that power less directly hostile to outside states. This is how Gorbachev and the Soviet Union saw the United States and the Western system at the end of the Cold War. The United States and its allies were able to generate huge amounts of economic and military power. They could develop and deploy technologically advanced military capacity much more efficiently than the Soviet Union, and their defense establishments were sustained at a significantly smaller cost in national GNP. At the same time, 34. For a discussion of evolving state strategies for coping with American power, see Stephen Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to American Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005).

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the Western great powers had institutional mechanisms to make their power less threatening, as in the German case. The “push” and “pull” of the Western leaders as they themselves worried about a unified Germany and about how to reassure the Soviets served to reduce the insecurity felt in Moscow as it faced a sharp decline in its power position. The institutionalized character of the Western order—and the binding security ties between the democratic great powers—make the overall impact of the Western order more protean and powerful but also more conservative and reactive. 35 Power transitions are a major source of change in international relations— and they can trigger conflict, security competition and war. But the character of the states involved and the institutional strategies they pursue are critical in determining the pathways of change. The United States and its democratic allies have bound themselves together in a way that has altered the dynamics of power transition—and this will have implications for how a rising China enters the global system.

A Rising China and the West So how will the Chinese power transition play out? Will China seek to challenge or integrate within the existing American-led international order? Will China repeat the experience of post-Bismarck Germany or the United States as it rises up? The answers will in part hinge on the character of the institutions and structural features of the international order in which both China and the United States are situated. In par ticular, institutions and global structures will impact three critical factors that shape the pathway of the Chinese power transition—its underlying interests, security dilemma dynamics, and the overall geopolitical balance of power between China and the West. China’s underlying interests as understood by its leaders will presumably determine the degree of “dissatisfaction” that it will have with the status quo international order. 36 Chinese economic interests would seem to be most congruent with the existing international order. The global capitalist system is open and loosely institutionalized—and it is a system in which China is

35. It is precisely this characteristic of Western order that neoconservatives in the Bush administration complain about as they seek to unbind and project American power. What I identify as a fundamental and deeply functional characteristic of the order is seen by these officials as a liability or constraint. See G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” Foreign Affairs 81 (September–October 2002): 44–60; and Ivo Daalder and James Lindsey, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2003). 36. For analyses of the rise of China by power transition theorists, see Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler, “China: Satisfied or Dissatisfied? The Strategic Equation,” paper presented at the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1–4, 2005; Jacek Kugler, Ronald Tammen, and Siddharth Swainathan, “Power Transitions and Alliances in the 21st Century,” Asian Perspective 25 (2001): 5–30; and Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen, “Regional Challenges: China’s Rise to Power,” in The Asia- Pacifi c: A Region in Transition, ed. J. Rolfe (Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003).

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currently thriving.37 Integration into this order is a necessary condition for the trade and investment that propel Chinese economic growth. Two other features of the prevailing global economic system offer attractions to China. One is the rules and institutions of the WTO and other economic bodies that offer potential legal and political protections against future economic discrimination that might be directed at China as its economy grows. The WTO trade regime is one of the most rule-based realms of the global system. The United States and the other major world economies have committed themselves to these rules for trade liberalization and dispute resolution. Countries that have initiated trade complaints against the United States have succeeded in gaining relief. The world order may be hierarchical but powerful states do abide by WTO rulings. A rising China will want these rule-based protections. Second, the world’s economic governance bodies—particularly the IMF and the World Bank—operate according to weighted voting based on economic size. As China grows, it will gradually gain greater political voice within these status quo organizations. Countries that are declining in economic power have more to worry about. One aspect of China’s economic rise makes it different than past rising states. Because of China’s size, it will reach the aggregate size of the United States—and before that, the other leading economies—before its per capita productivity matches those countries. In the last two centuries, no developing country has done this—that is, reached the overall capability of the leading states before its productivity matched those states. China will have one of the world’s dominant economies while its per capita income will be less than half that of the Western countries. China will be a poor country with a lot of economic leverage over the global system. How this unusual circumstance plays itself out will help determine China’s orientation toward existing international rules and institutions.38 China’s security interests are more complicated because they also include subjective considerations of prestige and authority. As China’s military power grows it will be better able to contest the American security presence in its region. Countries in the region that are growing more economically dependent on China will discover incentives to also tie their security to China. As a result, as China grows, countries in East Asia may fi nd themselves needing to “pick sides”—tying their security to either China or the United States. China will have incentives to follow the example of the United States in extending its security umbrella outward to neighboring countries and thereby strengthening its political position and ability to control events.39 37. David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.- China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 38. See Kugler, Tammen, and Swaminathan, “Power Transitions and Alliances in the 21st Century,” 14. 39. For a sketch of this logic, see G. John Ikenberry, “Globalization as American Hegemony,” in Understanding Globalization, ed. David Held and Andrew McGrew (London: Polity Press, 2006).

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But Chinese security interests may be more complex. To the extent that China wants to pursue more cooperative security relations with the United States—perhaps with the hope of developing joint security management of the region—the existing bilateral security system provides opportunities for China to integrate into it. In effect, the organizational barriers to entry are low. The current regional security order is organized around bilateral security ties to the United States—the so- called “hub and spoke” system. Countries in the region have formal or informal security pacts with Washington, each entailing a “special relationship.” For Beijing to join this system, it merely has to establish a working security relationship with the United States. The complex of bilateral security ties is easy to expand. Of course, the “hub and spoke” logic of the security order bespeaks an explicit hierarchy of power—and America is the “hub.” But China can gain the prestige and authority that would come with a bilateral “special relationship” with the United States.40 It remains an open question what sort of international order would best serve Chinese long-term interests. Is it a multilateral rule-based system or a more exclusive Sino- centered regional order where China is tied to the outside world through exclusive mercantile partnerships? It is useful to recall that the Soviet Union fi rst parted company with the emerging American-led postwar world economic system at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. Soviet representatives came to the meeting and American and British officials made concessions in an attempt to draw them into a commitment to integrate the Soviet economy into the proposed open world system. But Stalin ultimately resisted. Integration into the Western system would have required a degree of Soviet economic openness and transparency that was inconsistent with the communist regime.41 The organizational principles of the Soviet state and the Western global system were deeply incongruent. This seems less the case for China. Even if China were to ever get to the position where it could decisively shape the rules and institutions of the international order—as the United States did after 1945—it is not altogether clear that it would push on the world a distinctively different set of organizational principles. But short of a worldwide great power war that neither China nor the United States would want, the existing international order will not break down in a way that would allow China to make first-order choices about the rules and institutions of the global system. It will face problems of security dilemmas and a powerful and growing Western order—not a collapsed system. These circumstances will also impact its choices regarding integration and challenge.

40. I make this argument in G. John Ikenberry, “Ruling Unipolarity: American Power and the Logics of International Order” (unpublished paper, 2004). 41. For an account of this episode, see Alfred E. Eckes, A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941–1971 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975).

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Security dilemma problems are at the heart of the dangers lurking in power transitions. These are problems that exist even if China has a long-term interest in integrating within the existing order. Here again, institutions can play a role in mitigating these dangers in a way not fully available in past power transitions. China is clearly aware of the unintended consequences of its own rapid growth in power. Other countries in the region—and the other outside great powers, including the United States—worry about rising security threats that manifest themselves as China grows. Beijing appears to be pursuing a regional diplomatic strategy that aims to reassure the neighborhood, what Avery Goldstein has called a “neo-Bismarckian” grand strategy.42 In an echo of Bismarck’s efforts to allay the fears of European leaders as Germany unified, Chinese leaders are cooperating with other East Asian countries in the strengthening of regional dialogues and institutions. ASEAN Plus Three is one vehicle that China is using for this purpose. China’s neighbors are, in turn, also seeking to tie China to regional institutions and dialogues so as to make its rising power more predictable and less threatening.43 On the other side of the security dilemma is the United States—and its allies. As noted earlier, these alliances have provided institutional mechanisms for the signaling of strategic restraint. In Eu rope, NATO has aggregated power but it has also been a useful device with which to reassure Moscow of German and Western intentions on the eve of German unification. Likewise, the American alliance with Japan solved Japan’s security problems, allowing it to forgo building up its military capability, and thereby making itself less threatening to its neighbors. This has served to solve or reduce the security dilemmas that would otherwise surface within the region if Japan were to rearm and become a more autonomous and unrestrained great power. At the same time, the alliance makes American power more predictable and connected to the region. This too reduces the instabilities and “risk premiums” that countries in the region would need to incur if they were to operate in a more traditional balance of power order. Even China has seen the virtues of the U.S.-Japan alliance. During the Cold War it was at least partially welcome as a tool to balance Soviet power—an objective that China shared with the United States. But even today, as long as the alliance does not impinge on China’s other regional goals—most importantly reunification with Taiwan—the alliance does reduce the threat of a resurgent Japan. 42. Avery Goldstein, “China’s Emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo- Bismarckian Turn?” in International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacifi c, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 57–106. See also Shambaugh, China Engages Asia; and Susan Shirk, China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia- Pacifi c, Testimony before the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 12–13, 2004, http://www.uscc.gov/ hearings/ 2004hearings/written _testimonies/ 04 _02 _12wrts/shirk.htm. 43. See Gerald Segal, “Tying China into the International System,” Survival 37 (1995): 60–73.

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There is another feature of the existing system that reduces the risks of security dilemma–driven confl ict: nuclear weapons. Even if the other major powers wanted to overturn the existing order, the mechanism of great power war is no longer available. As Robert Gilpin has noted, great power war is precisely the mechanism of change that has been used throughout history to redraw the international order. Rising states depose the reigning—but declining—state and impose a new order.44 But nuclear weapons make this historical dynamic profoundly problematic. On the one hand, American power is rendered more tolerable because in the age of nuclear deterrence American military power cannot now be used for conquest against other great powers. Deterrence replaces alliance counterbalancing. On the other hand, the status quo international order led by the United States is rendered less easily replaceable. War-driven change is removed as a historical process, and the United States was lucky enough to be on top when this happened. Behind these features is the overall liberal institutional characteristics of American hegemony which in a macrostructural way reduce security dilemma problems among the great powers. Generally speaking, democratic great powers are not plagued by security dilemma confl ict or security competition, which more often occur between democracies and nondemocracies. But when the world’s most powerful state is a democracy that is institutionally bound to other democratic great powers, this reinforces the credibility of strategic restraint. The alliance of democracies—or what might be called the “democratic complex”—operates in a way that makes it very hard for the lead state to orchestrate and sustain a hardline aggressive posture toward another great power. The Reagan administration pursued a hardline policy toward the Soviet Union during the second Cold War, but the Europeans pursued detente and engagement and hosted a continent-wide and vocal peace movement. For every hardline “push” there was a moderating “pull.” Today, the Europeans want to end the arms embargo against China while the United States objects. Even if the United Stats wanted to pursue a long-term policy of containment of China, it is simply impossible given the wider array of democratic- capitalist countries arrayed around China. The structural logic of a democratic complex makes it overwhelmingly defensive. The upshot of this structural democratic circumstance is to make China’s external environment more benign than could otherwise be imagined. To be sure, the United States can act unilaterally and at least partially defy the institutional restraints on its power. The Bush administration has attempted to do this in its Middle Eastern policy and in its general skeptical orientation toward global rules and institutions. It has also pushed the U.S.-Japan alliance in a direction that could reduce the alliance’s role in restraining Japan and dampening East Asian security dilemmas. But the Bush administration’s strategy of “breakout” is not succeeding—indeed in many ways, the administration’s 44. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.

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Iraq war and penchant for unilateralism has only served to make the United States weaker. Looking outward into the future, it is not altogether clear that the United States will want to continue to try to break out of the democratic complex. Finally, we can look more directly at the power distribution between China and the West. The classic power transition pathway pits a rising great power against the status quo leading state and it expects that conflict—and perhaps war—will be generated as the rising state reaches parity with the declining lead state. As a group of power transition theorists note: “China has the potential to overtake the United States because it only requires a level of productivity one-fifth that of the United States due to its tremendous population advantage. Short of a catastrophic nuclear war or domestic disintegration, one cannot but anticipate the emergence of China as the largest and most productive nation in the international system.”45 But China does not just confront the United States. It faces a much larger democratic- capitalist Western system. This changes what it means for China to reach parity and so also the strategic dilemmas that it faces. When the economic capacity of the United States and Eu rope is aggregated, the pace at which China reaches parity significantly slows down. When China’s economic advances are compared against the size and growth of the wider universe of market societies (the OECD world), China remains substantially smaller in relative terms for well into the future. There projections are summarized in tables 4.2 and 4.3. The disparities in military capability shift even more slowly in favor of China than aggregate economic size. These projections are summarized in table 4.4. Future defense expenditures are more difficult to estimate than GDP projections—and PPP measures do not fully apply because a lot of military technology is imported from abroad. These figures show that China will not have military capability anytime soon that matches the United States and when OECD military expenditures are added, the continuing Chinese disadvantages grow greater. China may, in the end, exceed or fall short of current projections. But the point here is simply that the wider capitalist democratic world is a massive geopolitical area and, taken together, it is a powerful constituency for the preservation—and, indeed, extension—of the existing international order. If China intends to rise up and challenge the existing order is has a much more daunting task than simply confronting the United States and grabbling control of the international order. As argued earlier, this larger complex of democracies is not simply an aggregation of GNP and defense spending. It is a more or less institutionalized political order. It is led by the United States in important respects but in a more profound sense it is an order that has its own features and laws of motion. To depose the United States from the apex of this 45. Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 59.

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2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

China

US

US-EU

OECD

8.5 13.8 20.9 30.25 43.56 62.81

12.4 16.6 21.8 28.4 37.1 48.5

24.9 32.1 39.7 48.7 60.1 74.5

33.8 43.9 54.5 73 88.3 105.1

Sources: OECD, Economist Intelligence Unit. Note: These figures, chiefly taken from the EIU, assume that China’s GDP will grow by 8% p.a. from 2005 to 2010, 7% p.a. from 2010 to 2015, 4.7% p.a. from 2015 to 2020, and 4.6% p.a. from 2020 to 2030. Similarly, it assumes U.S. GDP will grow by approx. 3% p.a. from 2005 to 2010, 2.8% p.a. from 2010 to 2015, 2.55% p.a. from 2015 to 2020, 2.5 % from 2020 to 2025, and 2.6% from 2025 to 2030. The EIU projections on the EU and OECD are incomplete. It is assumed here that the EU (of 25) will grow by 2% p.a. from 2005 to 2010 and 2.5% p.a. thereafter and that the OECD countries will grow by 2.5% between now and 2010 and that the non EU/US OECD countries will grow by approx. 2.5% p.a. thereafter until 2030.

Table 4.3. Gross domestic product (GDP) in trillions of US$

2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

China

US

US-EU

OECD

1.68 2.38 3.15 3.98 4.98 6.24

10.45 12.11 13.88 15.74 17.83 20.28

20.929 23.791 27.095 32.897 37.238 42.784

29.6 33.38 37.54 44.3 49.9 56.9

Note: At constant market prices, rebased to 1996 constant prices and translated into US$ using the LCU:$ exchange rate in 1996 Note: These figures are taken from the EIU and the OECD. They do not reflect PPP; instead they are in US$ at 1996 constant prices. The assumptions for growth are the same as in table 1. It is assumed that China’s GDP will grow by 8% p.a. from 2005 to 2010, 7% p.a. from 2010 to 2015, 4.7% p.a. from 2015 to 2020, and 4.6% p.a. from 2020 to 2030. Similarly, it assumes U.S. GDP will grow by approx. 3% p.a. from 2005 to 2010, 2.8% p.a. from 2010 to 2015, 2.55% p.a. from 2015 to 2020, 2.5 % from 2020 to 2025, and 2.6% from 2025 to 2030. The EIU projections on the EU and OECD are incomplete. It is assumed here that the EU (of 25) will grow by 2% p.a. from 2005 to 2010 and 2.5% p.a. thereafter and that the OECD countries will grow by 2.5% between now and 2010 and that the non EU/ US OECD countries will grow by approx. 2.5% p.a. thereafter until 2030.

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Table 4.4. Projections of defense expenditures 2005–2030 measured in constant 2003 U.S. dollars (billions)

2005* 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

China

US

NATO

OECD

60.48 87.98 120.67 151.64 189.92 237.77

417.04 482.46 553.86 628.15 710.68 807.98

652.64 743.76 849.56 962.65 1089.08 1235.98

740.48 842.96 961.69 1089.49 1232.58 1398.3

* This number is for 2003, which is the last year fully available at the time of writing. Note: Defense expenditures are difficult to estimate because PPP is not as relevant (much defense equipment is imported from Western countries, etc.). As a result, this table takes real defense expenditure in 2003 U.S. dollars and updates according to the GDP projections contained in table 1. Thus, expenditure as a % of GDP remains constant from what it was in 2003. NATO is used instead of the EU- US although the growth assumptions for NATO, save for the United States, are the same as those used for the EU. However, one should note that PPP figures may be more relevant if China develops an indigenous defense industry. Already, in some areas, such as the cost of manpower, we should be mindful of the PPP advantage not reflected in these numbers. A further caveat is that the 2005 numbers for China may be understated deliberately by the Chinese authorities in which case the true figure is unknown.

hierarchical order is not to dislodge the hierarchy itself as the dominating logic of twenty-fi rst- century world politics. These structural conditions will inevitably influence how China thinks about the costs and benefits of strategies of integration and challenge. The sheer weight and complexity of the capitalist-democratic complex makes it hard to overturn. What can a large state rising up on the edges of this system really do to overturn and replace its rules and institutions? Add to this the other point made earlier—that major states in the nuclear era are not likely to initiate great power war. If war does not destroy the existing order, it is unlikely China can do it through the exercise of economic power or coercive threats. The more united, institutionalized, and dynamic the Western order is, the more this logic of continuity holds.

Conclusion The Western international order is what matters most in determining the pathway of the China-American power transition. The classic image of a power transition is a declining and overstretched hegemonic state defending the status quo international order in the face of a raising great power that seeks to use its growing capabilities to organize and rule regional or global

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order. But a rising China is not just facing a status quo great power—the United States. It is facing a larger Western order that includes Western Europe, Japan, and other democratic capitalist states—and it is an order that has in fact become quite globalized. It is an order with institutional features that make it quite expansive and durable. It is an order that has embedded organizational principles with wide—and near universal—appeal. Seen in this light, the Chinese power transition looks less like the classic realist image where the international order transitions from one lead state to another. China—however strong—cannot fight a hegemonic war and it probably cannot remake the existing international order. The type of power transition that China undertakes will be shaped by its interests and rising capacities. The less that China has clear- cut material interests in overturning the existing order and the less that China’s power capacities truly rival the aggregate power capacities of the capitalist democracies, the more likely it is that China will seek accommodation and integration with the West. If China’s economic and security interests are profoundly threatened by the existing international order and if it indeed grows into the world’s dominant power, the likelihood grows that it will seek to transform the global system. Such a possibility cannot be ruled out—but it does not seem very plausible. The United States and the other capitalist democracies have created an expansive and integrated—and deeply institutionalized—international order. Compared with past orders that rising states confronted, this one is easier to join and harder to overturn. Because of these distinctive characteristics of contemporary international order, the Chinese power transition is not likely to exhibit the classic pattern. The implications for the United States are clear. The more deeply institutionalized the Western order is, the greater the likelihood that China will rise up inside this order. The more willing the U.S. is to act within institutional constraints and tie itself to other states and a global system of rules, the less fear and uncertainty it will create in the international system and the less likely it is that states will attempt to balance against or seek to establish a rival international order. So America’s strategy should be to protect and reinforce the institutional foundations of Western order. The United States should signal to the world that it intends to continue to uphold its multilateral commitments, maintain and even expand its alliance partnerships, and pursue strategic restraints and commitments necessary to perpetuate the existing international order.

chapter

5

Structures, Processes, and the Socialization of Power East Asian Community-building and the Rise of China Qin Yaqing and Wei Ling

Introduction: Why Peace and Cooperation in East Asia? The most successful regional integration has been so far the European Union. Works on European regionalism provide insight into the fundamental question of international relations—how nations can avoid war and reach cooperation.1 It seems that the European Union, despite the numerous difficulties lying ahead, has achieved the original goal of “making war not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”2 It is interesting to ask whether similar results can be achieved in East Asia, a region where multilateralism and integration have gained conspicuous momentum in recent years. It started with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Since then ASEAN has enjoyed forty years of peace and stability among its members. Moreover, the organization was expanded in the 1980s and 1990s to include all ten Southeast Asian countries. An important step was to accept Vietnam as a member in 1995, a country which has a different ideology and political system from the others. The growth of ASEAN in size, strength, and influence has played a key role in building a Southeast Asia of peace and prosperity in the last four decades. The 1. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation- State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Edward D. and Helen Milner, “The New Wave of Regionalism,” International Organization 53 (summer 1999), 589–627; Peter. J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005). 2. Robert Schuman, “The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950,” http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9 -may/decl _en.htm (accessed August 9, 2007).

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most significant step so far in East Asian regionalism is the establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework. The 1997 Asian financial crisis made it imperative for East Asian nations to make regional cooperation arrangements. The mechanism of ASEAN Plus China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has witnessed rapid development since its establishment. The 2005 APT summit in Kuala Lumpur wrote the promise to build an East Asian community into its official declaration signed by all thirteen leaders.3 The interesting part of East Asian regionalism is that its pattern is different from that of European regional integration. In the former, small and medium-sized nations form the core and try to absorb or integrate big powers into a regional network, while in the latter it was the big powers, especially France and Germany, that initiated the idea and have continued to be the core of regional integration. An even more interesting and thought-provoking phenomenon is that the development of East Asian regionalism has coincided with the rapid rise of China. Since Deng Xiaoping decided to deepen domestic reform and open China wider to the outside world in 1992, China has experienced a rapid development unprecedented in its modern history. China, Japan, and ROK account for more than 90 percent of the region’s economic strength. At the same time, China has improved its relations with almost all neighboring countries, participating actively in regional and world affairs. Is ASEAN able to socialize the major powers in the region? Multilateralism with lesser nations at the core, the rapid rise of a major power, and a region with deepened integration and the long-term goal of building a community do not usually concur according to either the past experiences of the Westphalian international system or mainstream international relations theories. A region with a disputed past and present and vast diversities in terms of cultures, religions, ideologies, and development levels is not expected to enjoy peace and prosperity for long. But why has there been peace and cooperation among ASEAN nations for four decades and for East Asia (the APT nations) for almost thirty years?

Structures, Processes, and Cultures The keys to peace or war according to three major international relations theories—structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism—are international structures of material capabilities; international institutions; and international culture, respectively. Post–World War II peace and cooperation, for example, may be explained by structural realists as the result of either the hegemonic structure4 or the balance of power 3. The term “East Asia” in this chapter includes the countries in the APT framework, i.e. ASEAN’s ten members, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 4. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).`

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between the two giants;5 by liberals as the effects of international institutions at work;6 or by constructivists as the ideational structure of a Lockean (or partly Kantian) culture.7 Have any of these variables made countries in the region give up the means of war and work together to promote peace and common development? Let us examine them in turn.

Power Structures as Necessary Conditions for Regional Peace? Structural realism argues that systemic structure is the most important variable in international relations, determining the international behavior of major powers, and hence also peace or war in the system. This structure is defi ned as the distribution of capabilities across major powers, the capabilities being mainly material, in par ticular military. Structural realists try to figure out what structure can lead to peace and stability.8 The major theories involving power structures are power transition, balance of power, concert of power, and hegemonic stability. Do any of these apply to East Asia? The power transition model holds that “peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations.”9 According to this model, a unipolar system with a conspicuous power disparity between the hegemon and the potential challenger is the most stable, with one dominant power at the apex of the pyramid and other powers far behind. Only powerful and dissatisfied countries would challenge the international system and hence bring about systemic instability or even systemic war.10 In East Asia, though countries differ greatly in size, population, political system, and development level, there is no clear pyramid-like structure with a dominant power and a challenger. It seems to some that the period around 2010 might witness a power transition: China’s capabilities will overtake those of Japan. According to the power transition model, therefore, this will be the most dangerous period. Although China-Japan relations have been difficult, it is still unlikely that the two would engage each other in a bloody war. On the contrary, both promise to promote East Asian cooperation and strive for an East Asian community; both agree, as indicated by the declaration they have signed at the 2005 APT Summit, to take APT as the 5. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). 6. See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 7. See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 8. There has been heated debate over this issue among structural realists themselves. See, for example, Gilpin’s unipolar peace, Waltz’s bipolar peace, and Singer’s multipolar peace. 9. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 19. 10. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1968), citing Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, 19.

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main vehicle for East Asian community-building;11 and both continue to have close economic cooperation. Balance of power theory argues that a balance can be realized when there are a few powers of more or less equal capabilities in the system and when they “control one another’s actions through diplomatic maneuver, shifting alliances, and open conflict.”12 In this case, the system becomes very flexible and is unlikely to see confrontations between two rival blocs or to have systemic war. Since all powers are in balance, no power is able and therefore willing to start an overall war. Waltz says that balance of power politics prevails wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive. For some realists, balance of power applies well to a two-dominator system or a bipolar system, such as the Cold War international structure.13 Once balance exists or is achieved, peace is maintained and cooperation within limits is possible. But in East Asia there exists no clear balance of power structure, whether bipolar or multipolar. In a concert of powers, a few big powers cooperate in line with multilateralism to ensure the stability of a region. Usually lesser states cannot join the concert. Furthermore, the concert can only be produced where there are basic common interests among these big powers to keep the status quo and avoid conflict and war. Moreover, the big powers are not allies; they only share certain norms and codes of behavior. A typical example of a concert of powers is the Concert of Europe from 1815 to 1823.14 East Asia is not a region of big powers that can form a concert. First of all, there is a lack of trust among major powers, especially between the two largest nations, China and Japan; and second, ASEAN as a union of smaller countries is an important player whose role can by no means be excluded or replaced. The hegemonic stability theory holds that there is a close causal relationship between the power of the hegemon and the stability of the system.15 International hegemony is a structure in which “a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system.”16 An important assumption of this theory is that the hegemonic state is the main beneficiary of the system. To guarantee its own interests, it provides other actors with public goods and thereby maintains systemic stability. Therefore, stability and cooperation do not come as a matter of course, but as a result of the conscious efforts of the hegemonic state with its economic and military capabilities. The stronger the 11. “Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit,” Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 12 December 2005, http://www.aseansec.org/18036.htm (accessed August 9, 2007). 12. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 29. 13. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chap. 6. 14. Charles Q. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Eu rope,” International Security 16 (1991): 120. 15. See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Keohane, After Hegemony. 16. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 29.

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hegemon is, the more stable the system will be and more cooperative the members of the system tend to become. However, there is no hegemon in East Asia. Japan is not in a position to play such a role and neither is China. Furthermore, the stronger countries are not leading the integration process. The rules of the game and the agenda of regional integration are set by a group of lesser countries. Hegemonic stability does not apply to East Asia either. To sum up, it seems that there is no clear power structure in East Asia. David Shambaugh discussed eight structural models but he argued that none of them applies to East Asia.17 So it is fair to say that structural realism cannot convincingly answer our question. Peace and cooperation in East Asia do not result from a clear- cut structure defi ned in terms of power distribution at the regional level. Moreover, contrary to the structural realists’ stress on the role of major powers in the system, East Asian regionalism was in the fi rst place initiated by lesser states.

Processes: Institutionalization as a Necessary Condition for Regional Cooperation? Neoliberal institutionalism fi nds that states sometimes choose to cooperate and sometimes not to do so under the same systemic structure. Robert Keohane has pointed out that what has been missed in structural realism is the process factor. Institutions play a decisive role in this process. In the course of repeated interactions of nation-states, institutions work by constraining actors’ preferences through sanctioning mechanisms to prevent cheating and to make behavior more predictable. Therefore, when the structure of material capabilities remains unchanged, states’ behavior of cooperation or confl ict is determined, to a great extent, by institutions. Cooperation is not only possible but also desirable if international institutions are set up to overcome the failure of the political market and reduce the negative impacts of international anarchy.18 To judge the explanatory power of this theory, we have to examine institution-building in East Asia. Western models of regional cooperation are based on legalistic and formalistic institutions prescribed in detail by neoliberal institutionalism. For international institutions to work, a necessary condition is that there be a fairly high level of institutionalization, which is effective enough to produce binding rules. The top-down path of Keohane’s theory presumes a well-established legal network of international institutions, which shapes the behavior of states. In practice, almost every landmark of 17. These models are hegemonic system, major power rivalry, concert of powers, condominium of powers, structural asymmetry and the inevitable clash between the main established power and the main rising power, hierarchy of powers, a region-wide collective security network, and bandwagoning with the region’s strongest powers. See David Shambaugh, “The Evolving Asian System: A New Regional Structure?” Paper presented at the Conference on East Asia Cooperation and Sino- U.S. Relations, Beijing, November 3–4, 2005. 18. Keohane, After Hegemony, 82–83.

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European integration is set by a legal document, very often a treaty, which is a tangible result of the integrating process. To some extent, the European integrating process is a long and tortuous one, but it is result-oriented with institutions established and institutionalization enhanced to guarantee the result already achieved.19 However, the ASEAN Way which has been expanded to cover East Asian cooperation emphasizes “informality and organ i zational minimalism.”20 To institutionalists, ASEAN and APT are not formal institutions based on legal-rationalistic foundations, but merely cooperative frameworks or loose arrangements. They cannot constrain their members’ behavior by imposing sanctions or issuing authoritative orders. ASEAN was established in 1967 largely as a political forum to ensure the collective strategic position of the member states and resolve their confl icts. It was not until the 1990s that substantive functional cooperation got under way. In the pro cess of East Asian cooperation guided by APT, the ASEAN principles of nonerosion of sovereignty, noninterference with internal affairs, and respect for diversity were extended to the Plus Three countries. APT, on many occasions, has also been viewed as a forum for information exchange, a platform for policy coordination through consensus, a bargaining table, and even a talk shop. The ASEAN process is unstructured, lacking any formal agenda or clear format for decision-making procedures and implementation. 21 The Southeast Asian style is characterized by “a preference for concealed and often ‘unofficial’ preliminary transactions by special agents prior to formal ministerial conferences, a preference for ad hoc rather than institutionalized practices, an avoidance of judicial or arbitration machinery for the settlement of disputes, and a readiness to accept mediation or good offices from friendly third parties in the region.”22 Close interpersonal contacts, especially among national leaders, are of great value. Moreover, neither ASEAN nor APT has sought to develop mechanisms for constraining or sanctioning their members. Instead, habits and norms are nurtured through dialogues, consultations, “friendly quarrels,” and interactive socialization. 19. The Eu ropean integration process has been marked by treaties, while East Asian regionalism has been marked by declarations, which have much less binding force. 20. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2001), 5. 21. J. N. Mak, “The ASEAN Process (‘Way’) of Multilateral Cooperation and Cooperative Security: The Road to a Regional Arms Register?” Paper presented to the MIMA- SIPRI Workshop on An ASEAN Arms Register: Developing Transparency, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 2–3, 1995, 5. Cited from Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 66. 22. Peter Boyce, “The Machinery of Southeast Asian Regional Diplomacy,” in New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia: Global Powers and Southeast Asia, ed. Lau Teik Soon (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973), 175. Cited from Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 64.

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Institutionalization in East Asia has been lagging, consciously, subconsciously, or unconsciously. Institutionalization is indicated by a certain degree of bureaucratization and formal procedures and mechanisms on a legalistic basis and with binding effects. It seems that East Asian nations have practiced minimal institutionalism, and in the process of regionalism, institutionalization has always lagged far behind actual cooperation. The fi rst ASEAN summit was not held until eight years after its establishment, and summits remained irregular and informal until the 1990s. The fi rst APT summit was held in 1997, but not institutionalized until 1999. The ASEAN Secretariat, set up in 1976, was kept very small until the 1990s and the coordinating body for APT affairs has remained a unit within the ASEAN Secretariat, roughly at a foreign ministry desk level, till today. Furthermore, the functions of the secretariat have been confi ned to the management of economic and technological cooperation only. Institutionalization in East Asia has been slow and at a very low level, in strong contrast to the European experience. Because East Asians value consultation, consensus by unanimity, and comfort level, many of the ASEAN and APT mechanisms are not highly effective. This kind of soft institutionalism clashes with the mainstream view of Western international relations theorists that substance takes priority over process and that to have value, a process must be effective in terms of producing results.23 It does not fit the argument of neoliberal institutionalists that a higher level of institutionalization is an important condition for international cooperation. The major difference between the ideal type of neoliberal institutionalism and the actual process of East Asian multilateral regionalism is that the former is result-oriented and legally effective while the latter is process-focused, with a low level of institutionalization and binding effects.

Cultures: Ideational Structure as a Precondition for Identity Formation? Social constructivism argues that the ideational structure shapes the identity of the agent. Structure in Wendt’s constructivism is not material but cultural, defi ned by the distribution of ideas. Culture is shared knowledge, which includes shared ideas, understanding, and expectations formed in the process of interaction among social beings. The essence of international politics, in the view of Wendt, is ideas rather than material capabilities. The structure of ideas lies beneath the structure of capabilities and fills the latter with meaning.24 In other words, a material element can only be meaningful in the context of a social structure, which results from social practice and interactions among actors. Different modes of interaction can shape different kinds of 23. See Amy Searight, “Process and the Art of Diplomacy in Asian Multilateralism: The United States, Japan, and China Compared,” paper presented at the Conference on East Asia Cooperation and Sino- U.S. Relations, Beijing, November 3–4, 2005. 24. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, chap. 4.

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anarchic culture. 25 Thus, the relationship between structure and actor is constitutive as well as causal. This view stresses intersubjective interaction and the process whereby it takes place. In fact, in Wendt’s early writings, he stressed two-way interaction and the mutual construction of the structure and the agent. But in Social Theory of International Politics, the ideational structure, or the international culture, becomes a precondition for identity formation, perhaps to serve the need to establish a grand systemic theory. Wendt’s process, therefore, becomes a one-way street, emphasizing the constitutive effect of the systemic structure on the formation of the identity of the agent and overlooking the constitutive effect of the agent on the structure and of each on the other. Because of this “necessary neglect,” the one-way construction gets close to causation and the process loses its dynamics in socialization. Martha Finnemore uses case studies to discuss how systemic factors shape the identity, interests, and even the body of the agent. She argues that social structure is not an international society composed of nation-states but an increasingly deepening and expanding world culture. The international system is controlled by a set of norms, which shape states in two ways. One is by providing states with rational goals, such as modernization and development. The other is by setting up necessary institutions for the fulfi llment of these goals, such as markets and bureaucracies. Norms, the common expectations of appropriate behavior held by a community, are shared, socially and intersubjectively. The international system provides and teaches norms not only to regulate the behavior of the agent, but also to shape its identity and body. 26 States, embedded in an international social structure, inevitably undergo a process of socialization. Following the logic of appropriateness, they accept these provided values, norms and roles. However, Fennimore also emphasizes that systemic factors inform and construct actors, which only becomes another argument of causation. None of the mainstream constructivist theories provides a complete picture of a two-way construction process. Therefore, we can hardly understand how a certain structure could be formed or how a system could transform from Hobbesian to Lockean to Kantian cultures. In fact, the identity of a cultural group is formed, to some extent, both by self-organization and by choice, both given and constituted, both top-down and bottom-up. Therefore when applying the structure-to-agent model of identity constitution to East Asia, we still cannot understand how a region of hostility and turbulence has turned into a region of peace and robust development, for there is no clear regional ideational structure to start with. A structure of ideas in East Asia is 25. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (1992): 391–452. 26. See Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

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just beginning to emerge, and together with this emergence there have emerged expectations, identities, and norms. There is little causal relationship among these factors: they are indeed mutually constitutive through interaction in the multilateral regional process. Just as there is no clear regional structure of material capabilities and the level of regional institutionalization is still low, so also there is no obvious structure of ideas in East Asia. In East Asia, institutionalization is slow and inconspicuous, lagging behind actual cooperation. And the informal nature of the integrating process suggests that there are hardly any binding institutionalized rules and norms or social structures to teach a state how to behave or shape its body, identity, and interests. Intersubjectivity in the context of East Asian cooperation is more a process of practices that give interaction its meaning than a set of institutionalized norms. It is the process itself, rather than a process-produced normative structure or a high level of institutionalization, that moves the states in the region forward. Maintaining the process means maintaining the momentum for cooperation, which leads states away from conflict. The process is often the end in and by itself. The puzzle discussed in this essay is why there have been peace and cooperation in East Asia for decades. In seeking an answer, we have examined the regional structure. But there is no clear regional structure of material capabilities. Power transition, balance of power, concert of powers, hegemonic stability—none of these structures can be clearly found in East Asia. We simply cannot defi ne a structure to characterize the political reality of East Asia. Therefore, structural realism fails to answer our essential question. Then what about structure of ideas? Is there a clear socio- cultural structure in East Asia? Following the logic of Wendt, we can associate such a structure with shared knowledge and collective identity. Yet given the complexity of trust and mistrust, friendliness and wariness in the region, the divergence in political and social systems, and the different levels of development, it is reasonable to say that an East Asian culture is yet in the making. Moreover, the Finnemore model in which systemic factors shape the identity and even the body of an agent does not fit into the regional picture either, because East Asian countries are very sensitive in terms of sovereignty. In the process of cooperation and integration, they prefer learning by themselves to being taught by others. When structural theories don’t work, we turn to institutionalism since neoliberal institutionalism has well supplemented structural realism by adding in the concept of “process.” The core of process, according to Keohane, is institutions, systems including international organizations, international regimes, and international conventions.27 Being authoritative, connected, sanctioning, rewarding, and serving, international institutions can be considered an independent variable. The causal relationship is between institutions and behavior 27. Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 3–4.

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pattern of an agent. Neoliberal institutionalism is a process theory. But its process defi ned in terms of legal institutionalization is not characteristic in East Asia. The rules of the game in East Asia are informality, comfort, respect for sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs. Institution-building in East Asia has lagged throughout the whole cooperation process. The process in East Asia is not legal in effect; rather it is relational in nature. It seems that neither the existing structure nor process theories can offer satisfying explanations for peace and cooperation in East Asia. Despite the lack of a clear structure of power, the low level of institutionalization, and the absence of a regional anarchical culture, East Asia has been moving ahead with robust regional dynamics. It seems that the process itself, with all its informality and looseness, helps shape the expectations and interests of the nations in the region. And since structural constructivism (the Wendtian version of constructivism) has somewhat failed too, can we develop a process theory based on constructivist assumptions to answer the question?

A Process-focused Model of Social Construction This essay attempts to provide a tentative answer to the question raised above by developing a process-focused model of social construction or process-oriented constructivism. 28 It adopts three important assumptions of mainstream constructivism: (1) cooperation among states is a social process; (2) norms have important constitutive effects; (3) culture takes priority. 29 However, it weakens the top-down causal constructivist model in which structure shapes identity. “Process matters” is the key argument of the processfocused model. Process plays a key role in socialization; and to maintain process means to maintain the interactive practices of identity construction. When we say that process matters, we do not merely mean that process is important because rules and norms, both regulatory and constitutive, matter and produce results, but that process itself is the focus. An actor may enter some sort of social process out of interest calculation. But once in the process, he is integrating and being integrated. The actor still calculates his interests, which, however, does not mean that he can detach himself from such process arbitrarily. His interests vary as the process is going on. Therefore, the process-focused model of community-building hypothesizes that process maintenance in East Asian regionalism is very often seen more important than result production. For East Asia, where diversity is so conspicuous and where small and medium-sized nations hope to socialize major powers in regional community-building, the regional process itself is often the 28. See Qin Yaqing, “East Asian Regionalism: A Process-focused Model,” paper presented at the Conference on East Asia Cooperation and Sino- U.S. Relations, Beijing, November 3–4, 2005. 29. Wang Zhengyi, “Asian Regionalization: From Rationalism to Social Constructivism,” World Economics and International Politics, no. 5 (2003): 6.

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Intersubjective process

Norms/rules Expected Identity

Behavior

results

Interest

Process maintenance

Fig. 5.1. Process-focused multilateralism

end as well as the means. Process-focused multilateralism in East Asia helps maintain regional stability and promote economic cooperation by extension of norms and through the socialization of major powers which have been channeled into the integrative process. We can set up a model as shown in the diagram. The core of the model is the gradual transformation of interest and identity through interaction. The integrating process in East Asia, characterized by cooperation and consultation in a great variety of issue areas at different levels, nurtures shared norms and rules, fills the interactions among nation-states with meaning, induces collective identity, changes the role structure in the region, and thus defines the interests and shapes the behavior pattern of actors. Our hypothesis is that East Asian integration represents a process-focused model of social construction. Process-focused multilateral regionalism helps maintain regional stability and promote economic cooperation through expansion of norms and socialization of major powers. Thus, the ability to socialize or absorb major powers through the integrating process is the soul of this model. Since an actor sets up his end when he acts, the distance between the end and the course of working toward this end is mainly explained by the term “means.” In the process-focused model, this distance is explained in terms of both means and ends. In other words, the process itself is both the means and the end. In addition, if the materialization of a preset end threatens to derail the process, the actor prefers to postpone or even give up the realization of the end for the maintenance of the process. This process-focused model does not

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mean that results are not important. Actors act to achieve results. Thus, the soft regionalism of East Asia could develop into hard regionalism. Yet, when the institutionalization level remains low, the dynamics of the process itself maintains peace and cooperation in the region. The following are some important features of this process-focused model of regionalism.

Process Defined by Intersubjectivity Process is interaction and ways of interaction among agents. While interaction can produce tangible results, more importantly it constructs intersubjectivity, which refers to the nature of relations between oneself and others in a context based on continuously formed norms and rules. Interaction cannot be reduced to individual actors. Action carries meaning, but shared meaning exists only in an interactive context.30 The process in East Asia can be defi ned by intersubjectivity. It is a process of practices that gives interactions meaning. And fundamental changes in the international system can be made through practices. 31 Constructivist interaction has three features. First, it shapes shared experience, expectations, and cognition among the states concerned, and establishes the identity of a state in relation to others. Second, material capabilities gain meaning through interactive practices among states and representation systems. Third, interactive practices make a state continually adjust its identity and hence its interests. Actors refer to a context of norms and rules to give their actions meaning and such a context also enables actors to understand the world and others to understand actions. Therefore, the process defi ned by practices in an intersubjective context is meaningful and can alter the political culture of the system. Process-focused Socialization We have defi ned process as practices in a context of intersubjectivity based on norms and rules that are usually incorporated into and reflected by formal or informal institutions. Institutions have two basic functions, namely providing service in return for cooperation, and constructing and redefi ning the preferences, interests, and identities of actors. The differences of the two functions point to the basic distinction between rationalism and social constructivism. While rationalists seek the causal link between institutions and results, they fail to realize that results are produced right through a process, during which the preferences, interests, and identities of actors are shaped and 30. Friedrich Kratochwil, “Is the Ship of Culture at Sea or Returning?” in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 217–18. Cited from Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 96. 31. Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System,” International Organization 8 (1994): 216.

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reshaped. Such a process does not cause the formation of these ideational factors, but has a constitutive impact on them and provides a contextual environment for the construction of identification. Process and the results are not causally linked. Neither does one of them follow the other. Instead, they co-exist. Maintenance of process means a continued construction and reconstruction of norms, rules, and identities, and the production and expansion of common interests. It also means that the constructed norms, rules, and identities help maintain the process. It is not that behavior is shaped after the material, ideational, or normative structure is in place; rather, the material, ideational, or normative factors interact with one another and with the structures to produce a continuing socialization of actors, whose practices are expected to help keep and push forward the interaction. Therefore, the maintenance of the process is more important than any tangible and immediate results, especially when major powers are to be socialized.

Process- nurtured Rules and Norms Norms are standards of generally accepted appropriate behavior of actors with a given identity.32 Norms emerge with the initiation of norm entrepreneurs and spread through institutionalization and socialization. Institutionalization is not a necessary condition for norm cascade. It may take place before or after the cascade.33 When we consider the norm cascade in the East Asian context where informality is cherished and institution-building is made to lag behind, it is quite obvious that the cascade is realized mainly through informal or soft socialization. It can be seen as “a mechanism through which new states are induced to change their behavior by adopting those norms preferred by an international society of states.”34 What is then the motivation for states to engage themselves actively in this socialization process? National interests are, of course, a very important consideration. Equally important is the combination of a country’s desire to be a member of an international society and the community’s readiness to absorb it. When a socialization process begins, the entering agent will experience “peer pressure,” which means the “cumulative effect [on the newcomer] of many countries in a region adopting new norms.”35 The motives of the new member to accept the norms are legitimacy, conformity, and esteem.36 These three factors matter a lot to a state in terms 32. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1–32. 33. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” in Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), 255. 34. Ibid., 262. 35. Francisco Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal, and Suzanne Shanahan, “The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-National Acquisition of Women’s Suffrage Rights, 1890–1990,” American Sociological Review 2 (1997): 735–45. 36. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 263.

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of its identity in relation to others in the system. They fulfill the needs of the state to stay in process, to be part of the in-group, and to be proud of itself. When norms are widely accepted, they can be internalized by states and taken for granted. Because states take certain rights, duties, rules, and norms for granted, we can fi nd commonalities and similarities in their behavior patterns; we can also see the recurrence and habituation of certain behavior patterns. That is when norms mature in a community. Thus, it is fair to say that rules and norms are nurtured in the process of socialization. In East Asia, the ASEAN Way characterized by informality, consensus, and cooperation results from incremental socialization. “It emerged not only from the principles of interstate relations agreed to by the founders of ASEAN, but also from a subsequent and long-term process of interaction and adjustment.”37 At present, the ASEAN norms are being expanded from the smaller states of ASEAN to the bigger ones of the Plus Three, and so far they have run well despite the many difficulties. Whether such momentum can continue in the future mainly depends on the socializing capacity of the East Asian cooperation process.

Process- induced Collective Identity Collective identity is the total socialization of the dominating norms of a given culture and the identification of self with others and the culture. It is the identification process of nurturing the “we-feeling.” Wendt identifies four master variables—interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint—that have causal relations with the formation of collective identity.38 Self-restraint is the core variable and a necessary condition for the formation of collective identity. In an anarchic world, a state has fi rst of all to overcome the fear of being wiped out before it engages itself in collective identity-building. Trust-building is therefore a most fundamental issue in identity-building. To overcome its fear, a state must fi rmly believe that its demands will be taken care of and its personality will be preserved instead of being sacrificed. This belief is, in essence, trust in the self-restraint of others. Therefore, self-restraint is the most fundamental and critical variable in collective identity-building. How can a state represent itself as a self-restraining member of a community? This involves a process during which by reciprocity a state reinforces, internalizes, and habituates norms, and demonstrates its obedience to the norms in repeated games. During the interactive process, a state can also reassure others by deliberately and conspicuously sacrificing its own interests for the success of cooperation or the common good. Self-restraint is the most critical variable, especially in a situation where major powers are being socialized, and since self-restraint can only be represented in the process of interaction, it is reasonable to say that the process induces collective identity. 37. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 71–72. 38. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, chap. 7.

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In the East Asian integration process, we have seen so far a very high degree of interdependence, a sense of common fate against the backdrop of the opportunities and challenges of regional integration and globalization, and increasingly shared norms as well as some signs of self-restraint on the part of big powers.39 East Asian identity is to be derived from this socialization process when conditions mature in these aspects.

Process- produced Results Wendt identifies three cultures, but fails to point out the dynamics for the transformation from the Hobbesian via the Lockean to the Kantian. A transformation of culture occurs with a change of collective identity of agents, including a change of the role structure. Because the structure of ideas at the system level is closely associated with how agents represent or defi ne themselves in relation to others, the internalization of a new role structure will lead to subjective commitments and thence to objective positions. In other words, agents will feel it only natural to behave in the way defi ned by the role or the norms. When rivals become friends, the systemic culture changes from Lockean to Kantian. Of course there are many domestic and international constraints on a state in its transformation of identity. And only when an adequate number of important agents have experienced identity change and the change has gone beyond the tipping point can the systemic culture be transformed. The dynamics of the transformation of ideational structures lies in the process, which enables interaction, nurtures rules and norms, and helps foster a collective identity. It is the process rather than the results that generates dynamics. Structural realists always try to fi nd the structure of material capabilities and infer an order from the structure. They have failed to fi nd it and therefore are puzzled and suspicious when a process-focused model of community-building exists and predominates. Systemic transformation and evolution of the existing inter-agent culture occur when the role structure changes, the dynamics for which lies in the relational and interactive process.

ASEAN, China, and the First East Asia Summit: A Test Case The East Asian multilateral regional process has gained increasing scholarly interest since community-building in East Asia began to involve the three larger powers of China, Japan, and ROK. Granted that the process-focused model has worked for the ASEAN-10 in the past four decades, it will be a more searching test of the model when the three powers join in the process. 39. For instance, the Early Harvest Program in which China sacrifices its own interest to promote and strengthen cooperation with ASEAN nations, and China’s accession to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

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The most critical test is whether the process of community-building started by ASEAN based on its model will successfully absorb and socialize larger and major powers in the region. This can be examined by considering (1) whether the process is joined by the major powers in such a way as to change a hostile role structure to a nonhostile one; (2) whether the process-produced rules and norms are accepted by major powers; (3) whether the major powers restrain themselves to maintain the process. If the major powers join willingly in the process, accept the rules and norms produced by the process, and restrain themselves even if their self-interest is not served so as to maintain the process itself, then we can say that the process-focused model works. We will use the preparations for and the decisions on the First East Asia Summit (EAS) along with China’s rise as our test case.

China’s Participation in the Process: Change in the Role Structure We use the concept of role structure to refer to the characteristics of an international culture, which defines the role an actor takes vis-à-vis other actors in a system at either the global or the regional level. We identify three role structures based on the three international cultures of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant: hostility, cooperation, and friendship respectively.40 The joining of a larger power in a certain process can lead to a change in the role structure. We argue that in East Asia, the role structure involving ASEAN and China changed from a Hobbesian one to largely a Lockean one with some Kantian elements emerging. In the 1960s, ASEAN’s perception of China was as a hostile power. The role structure involving China and ASEAN was suspicion and enmity and realpolitik thinking dominated. Since its reform and opening, China has hoped to improve its relations with neighboring countries, which involves a fundamental role structure transformation. In 1991, China and ASEAN established Dialog Partnership, which indicated an embryonic turn in the role structure. In 1997 when the Asian fi nancial crisis broke out, the transformation of the role structure became quite obvious. The APT mechanism was set up, with China as the fi rst of the Plus Three countries to join it. The role structure of enmity began to transform to a role structure of cooperation and hence led to a fundamental change in the identities of China and ASEAN. The Report of the ASEAN- China Eminent Persons Group describes this shift: “Between the inception of ASEAN in August in 1967 and the formal establishment of ties between ASEAN and China in 1991, relations between the two sides went through a process of evolution from confrontation and suspicion to dialogue, cooperation and strategic partnership based on equality, good

40. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 312. Wendt’s role structures are defi ned by enmity, rivalry, and friendship. We use hostility, cooperation, and friendship instead.

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neighborliness and mutual trust.”41 China has changed its attitude toward East Asian regionalism in general. In its cooperation with ASEAN, China has continually taken important steps to demonstrate its will to restrain itself and share development and prosperity with the region. During the process, China has continually redefi ned its interest. In 2002, China concluded a framework agreement with ASEAN to establish a Free Trade Area (ACFTA) by 2010, and signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; in 2003, China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and signed on as the fi rst strategic partner of ASEAN; and in 2005, China and ASEAN launched the Early Harvest Program as part of the ACFTA. These measures have shown that China has restrained its own behavior according to the norms prescribed in the treaties and declarations, provided further reassurance to ASEAN on regional peace, stability, and prosperity, and demonstrated its willingness to share its growth with the region. It has also promoted its identification with ASEAN by means of closer economic and security ties and by the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership. The transformation of the role structure involving China and ASEAN is also represented by China’s attitude toward the East Asia Summit. The idea of an EAS can be traced back to 1990 when then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed the establishment of an East Asian Economic Group. At the 2000 APT Summit, Thailand and Malaysia proposed that research be carried out on EAS. A year later, a report was submitted to the APT Summit by East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), which set East Asian community (EAc)–building as “the long-term goal” of regional cooperation and proposed the “evolution of the annual summit meetings of APT into East Asian Summit.”42 Clearly, the desired result was the achievement of an East Asia– wide community within the APT geographical framework. In December 2005, the fi rst EAS was held in Kuala Lumpur, however with more participants than the EAVG had proposed. Sixteen countries took part, including the ASEAN-10 countries, China, Japan, ROK, India, Australia, and New Zealand. From the time that the idea of East Asian regionalism was brewing to the time that East Asia Summit was formally proposed and then to the time that the summit was held, fifteen years passed. These years witnessed a process during which different norms and interests competed and the original design was modified and remodified. China joined the process and its identity vis-à-vis ASEAN was changed, leading to a different role structure of the China-ASEAN relationship. This was in fact a process of socializing a major 41. Report of the ASEAN- China Eminent Persons Group (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2005), 13. 42. “Towards an East Asian Community,” East Asia Vision Group Report 2001, http://www .mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/report2001.pdf (accessed August 9, 2007).

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power. The result of the process, the successfully held summit, symbolized the continuation of a greater process, that is, East Asian integration or communitybuilding. As the role structure changed, China’s attitude changed accordingly. EAS was officially proposed in 2001 and held in 2005. During these five years, China was an active participant in EAS. The transformation of the role structure is of special significance given that China is developing rapidly and becoming increasing powerful. Therefore, the transformation of the role structure is the profound reason for China’s acceptance of and participation in EAS.

China Constructed by the Process: Interaction of Norms and Power Being a dialogue partner and active participant in the APT mechanisms, China not only welcomed the change in the role structure, but also accepted the norms of ASEAN. Since the Plus Three countries joined the regional pro cess, a new norm has been emerging as the regional pro cess moves forward, namely the leading role of ASEAN in the pro cess. This is in fact the norm of norms for it has enabled ASEAN to play the role of the standard- setter and norm- giver. The Plus Three countries, as part of the multilateral regional process, need to accept the norms described above and be ready to accept new standards and norms provided by ASEAN. Although the material capabilities of China, Japan, and ROK greatly surpass those of ASEAN, ASEAN’s capacity of standard- setting and norm- giving makes it powerful out of proportion to its material capabilities. During the cooperation pro cess, norm- giving and norm-taking, intermingled with redefi ned interests, have become a frequent form of interaction and produced normative forces that in turn maintain the pro cess itself. In this way, China, though a stronger power, has been socialized mainly through norm-taking. This pattern seems somewhat unusual, but it has helped maintain the core role of ASEAN. And more importantly and fundamentally, it has helped maintain the regional integration pro cess. The alternative would be a fierce competition among major powers, China and Japan in par tic u lar, for the leading role in regional development, a split among ASEAN nations, and the probable discontinuation of the present process of multilateral regionalism. Let us take the criteria for EAS membership as an example of how norms are given and taken. Although the evolution of APT Summit into EAS was proposed in 2001, the decision to convene EAS was not made until 2004. The major reason for this delay was the hesitation, wariness, and disagreement rising around the EAS membership. ASEAN was divided. On the one hand, it was glad to see regional cooperation becoming oriented towards a community; on the other hand, it was afraid that it would be outmaneuvered by the three larger powers in the process. Among the Plus Three countries, Japan was the fi rst to propose an enlargement of membership, to be specific, the

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incorporation of Australia and New Zealand into EAS.43 These two countries had long wanted to join the East Asian integration process and to share the growth of the region. China at the beginning placed greater emphasis on the deepening than the widening of the regional integration and was not very supportive of the enlargement. Outside the Plus Three, the United States supported its allies involving themselves more deeply in East Asia.44 In 2005, ASEAN fi nally agreed to include Australia, New Zealand, and India in the participants under certain conditions. ASEAN established three criteria for membership of EAS, namely, accession to the TAC, dialogue partnership with ASEAN, and substantial relations with ASEAN. The TAC is one of the very few treaties made by ASEAN and serves as a forceful instrument for ASEAN in shaping the future route of EAS as its noninterference principle allows the ASEAN Way of communitybuilding to stay on track. Therefore, ASEAN was very insistent on it. By setting the criterion of dialogue partnership, ASEAN would maintain its role as the hub of EAS and enable itself to decide who would be additional members of EAS and when. And fi nally the “substantial relations” provision leaves ASEAN plenty of room for diplomatic maneuver. With the three standards, ASEAN has secured the door of EAS and ensured its own leading position in the EAS mechanism. It not only decides who can join the game, but also regulates the players with both legal (TAC) and social norms (dialogue partnership and substantial relations). Thus, when the deadline for convening EAS was approaching, ASEAN resolved the issues in a typical ASEAN way. After the fi rst step was completed, ASEAN approached the Plus Three countries to clarify their positions on EAS. On December 12–14, 2005, a series of summits was conducted successively, including the eleventh ASEAN Summit, the ninth APT Summit, 10 + 1 Summits, and the fi rst East Asia Summit. Consensus on key issues were fi rst reached within ASEAN and then agreement of APT and EAS participants on these issues was sought and expressed in the form of “Chairman’s Statements” and “Declarations.” These key issues included: (1) for the building of an East Asian community, APT as the main vehicle and ASEAN in its driving seat; and (2) EAS as a forum for broad strategic issues.45 Such a result shows that ASEAN, the group of lesser states, succeeded in norm-expanding and standard-setting. 43. Lu Jianren, “The Roundtable Game of East Asia Summit,” Beijing, October 1, 2005, http://iaps.cass.cn/xueshuwz/showcontent.asp?id = 809 (accessed August 9, 2007). 44. In early 2005, during her trip to East Asia, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Singapore, ROK, and Japan clearly that U.S. allies should work to keep the new East Asia Summit open and that it would be better still if India could be included. See Martin Walker, “Walker’s World: Battles around New Asia Summit,” Washington Times, April 4 2005, http:// www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/ 20050402 -102241-8632r.htm (accessed March 10, 2006). 45. “Chairman’s Statement of the 11th ASEAN Summit: ‘One Vision, One Identity, One Community,’ ” and “Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit,” Kuala Lumpur, December 12, 2005; “Chairman’s Statement of the First East Asia Summit” and

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Although the EAS membership criteria set by ASEAN did not fit well with China’s initial idea, China (as well as Japan and ROK) accepted them and reiterated its support for the leading role of ASEAN. During this process, nonmaterial power played a major role. Although the original goal of the advocates of EAS was to replace APT with EAS on a one-for-one basis, rigid adherence to the APT geographical framework would cause a split and derail the regional process itself. Thus an important function of these newly created criteria was to keep the process going. The standards were accepted, the summit was held, the APT continues to exist, and the process has been maintained.

China Engaged in the Process: Process Maintenance and National Interests A critical test of this process-focused model is what happens when pro cess maintenance confl icts with national interests. According to the realist argument, national interests will most probably get the upper hand and be given up only under the coercion of stronger power. Institutionalists may hold that the shadow of the future will make the actor give up immediate interests for longer-term benefits. Neither seems able to explain satisfactorily the process leading to EAS. On the one hand, stronger power though it is, China did not use or even threaten to use its power for its perceived interests; on the other hand, there is no reason to argue that China’s longer-term goal is an enlarged grouping including powers outside East Asia. So what has happened? First, let us examine China’s interests. The proposal for an East Asia Summit was submitted to the fi fth APT Summit in 2001. By then China had developed a partnership with ASEAN. Originally EAS was designed to replace APT, involving the same countries, and to be held when APT became mature enough. In this case, all thirteen APT countries would take part in EAS as equal individual members. China would no longer be a guest of the group of lesser states or be in a reactive position of saying yes or (seldom) no to ASEAN’s consensus. Instead, it would take part in agenda-setting and normdeveloping as a major power. East Asian community-building would likely follow the EU model in which members participate equally but with major powers more as the core and engine. This kind of mechanism would further change China’s identity in regional cooperation from a “prejudiced” partner to an influential member, as well as empower China to better promote its national interests in the process of integration. It was therefore in China’s interest to support the original proposal and design of EAS within the APT framework. Thus the enlargement of EAS membership to include sixteen countries was against China’s interests. Australia and India, with their political and economic “Kuala Lumpur Declaration on East Asia Summit,” Kuala Lumpur, December 14, 2005, http:// www.aseansec.org (accessed August 9, 2007).

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strength, could serve as counterbalances to China. Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, allied with the United States, could build up a more influential United States–Japan- centered dominance in the region.46 Moreover, they might disrupt regional trade, economic, and investment cooperation by frequently bringing up issues concerning human rights and democracy. However, if China had strongly opposed ASEAN’s decision, it would have not only offended ASEAN, but also aroused mistrust and harmed the cooperative momentum of the region. In order to keep the ball rolling, compromise on China’s part was crucial. To reduce as much as possible the negative impact of the enlargement of EAS membership on its own interests, among several competing models, China fi rst supported a tiered structure of 10 + 3 + 3, in which the newly admitted three would have less influence. When this model failed to be adopted, China compromised further to accept ASEAN’s decision for a 10 + 6 arrangement. China supported an open EAS mechanism and accepted the norms ASEAN employed in selecting the members and constructing the institution. The process was kept. Second, we need to examine the effect of the shadow of the future. If China’s long-term goal should outweigh its immediate interests, then we could say that China compromised simply to realize its long-term goal. What are China’s long-term interests? A regional community with the original thirteen countries or an enlarged community with other powers such as India, Australia, New Zealand, and even more? International politics may tell us that the fi rst must be a more preferred goal, for China would be the strongest among equals. Furthermore, an enlarged community would make regional communitybuilding even harder. China, therefore, seems not to have compromised for the sake of long-term gains. Thus, the shadow of the future must not have loomed large. This leaves us with two possible answers. One is domestic: China’s domestic economic and social development requires it to stay in the process so that it will continue to have a stable international environment and be able to concentrate on domestic affairs. The other is related to the process: the multilateral regional process has its own momentum and attractive force and its maintenance is considered more important than tangible interests or more significant than the shadow of the future. We think that both factors were at work.47 There is another development that partly illustrates the process momentum. Regarding relations between APT and EAS, despite disagreements in the region, ASEAN spoke in an increasingly louder voice on different occasions, as EAS was drawing near, saying that ASEAN should remain in the driving seat, 46. Rich Bowden, “Battle Looms over Inaugural East Asia Summit,” Sydney, December 11, 2005, http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/ 2192 .cfm (accessed August 9, 2007). 47. China’s domestic process is of great significance to its participation in East Asian cooperation. However, since this essay focuses on the international aspect, we refrain from discussing China’s domestic factors in detail.

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that APT should be the main vehicle for East Asian community-building, and that EAS should deal with broad strategic issues only.48 This was both good and bad news for China. The good news was that the probability of the further development of 10 + 3 would continue with the APT being the main vehicle, while the bad news was that China could face more counterbalancing by strong powers. To improve trust and build confidence, to avoid external disruptions for the continuation of a well-started regional integration process and to work for better identification with ASEAN, China compromised on its desire for a more advantageous role, accepted the EAS model defi ned by ASEAN, supported ASEAN’s leading role in community-building, and also reiterated its policy of open regionalism.49

Process-oriented Constructivism: Features and Limitations East Asian regionalization has been a lengthy open-ended process. The policy choices of China cannot be adequately explained by any of the major international relations theories. Structural realism does not apply because no clear material structure exists in East Asia. Therefore, it is difficult to figure out what structural factors determined the behavior of China. For resultoriented rationalists, East Asian regionalism in general and APT and EAS in particular are poorly institutionalized. There are almost no punishment functions in the regional arrangements that would have worked to make China cooperative. Major variants of constructivism do not have ready answers either. The ideational structure of East Asia is still in the making. The lack of power and ideational structures and the low level of institutionalization in the region erect insurmountable barriers for mainstream international relations theories in attempting to explain China’s policy choices and East Asian regionalism. Pro cess provides an alternative answer to China’s cooperative behavior throughout the lengthy and complicated EAS formation pro cess. It is not that the pro cess has changed China’s identity in such a way that the current model of EAS is fully in China’s interest; rather, the pro cess is defi ned by 48. Representatives of government, business, and academia in the APT countries expressed this view in discussions at the Network of East Asian Think-tanks (NEAT) Working Group Meeting on East Asian Investment Cooperation in July 2005, the third NEAT Annual Conference in August 2005, the third East Asia Forum, and the Joint Study Convention of East Asian Cooperation in October 2005. Nevertheless, there were different views. For instance, Japan holds that EAS should be strengthened. 49. See Wen Jiabao, “Peaceful Development of China and Opportunity of East Asia,” “Consolidate and Deepen Cooperation, and Join Hands in Building a Bright Future,” “Deepen Comprehensive Cooperation and Promote the Continuous Development of China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership,” “Uphold Openness and Inclusiveness, Achieve Mutual Benefit and Win-Win Result,” Kuala Lumpur, December 12, 2005, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/ziliao/wzzt/wjbzlfw (accessed August 9, 2007).

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the intersubjectivity of East Asian nations, in which norms, identity, interests, and behavior are being shaped and reshaped in continuous interaction. The socialization of China initiated by mutual need and common interests goes along with the pro cess, which is expected to eventually lead to an integrated East Asian identity and community. If we say that an East Asian community in the Kantian sense should be the ultimate goal for the region, the maintenance of the pro cess, initiated by ASEAN and expanding to involve major powers, is a means to this goal and at the same time an end in itself. As an end in itself, it maintains regional stability, promotes regional cooperation, shapes regional norms, and constructs collective identity. Process-oriented constructivism as proposed here has three defi ning features. First, process is the core of collective identity-building. Second, the transforming capability of the process is of crucial importance to its effectiveness. Third, it provides a different explanation from mainstream Western international relations theories to states’ cooperative behavior under the circumstances of no clear structures or institutions. As the core of processfocused constructivism, process is of special significance because it can not only lead to results but also shape and transform power. When power, institutional, or ideational factors are uncertain or hardly existent, process itself can maintain peace and promote cooperation if the process to the goal is dynamic, maintained, and strengthened. Nonetheless, just like every international relations theory, process-oriented constructivism has its own limitations. Three aspects deserve further study. First, the relationship between the process and the powers involved in it. A very important argument of this model is about transformation of these powers—especially larger ones—through socialization. But to what extent will such a power be transformed or allow itself to be transformed? To what extent will national interests be reshaped? In other words, how effective can the process be? Second, institutions. East Asian cooperation was initiated under common economic threats. So far, it has remained underinstitutionalized. If EAS is a new landmark in East Asian cooperation, will regional cooperation be guaranteed by institutions as neoliberal institutionalism predicts? If this should happen, will the institutional framework in East Asia be based on legal norms like the EU or social norms as it is at present? Third, the transforming mechanism of international culture. East Asian regional cooperation has involved a process of transformation, in which both the regional political culture and the role structure involving regional states have been transformed. The transformation of the China-ASEAN relationship from hostility to cooperation deserves in-depth research. Can we fi nd out the transformation mechanism in this case? Does this mechanism differ from the mechanism which promotes cooperation among Western states? These are questions that will require further studies.

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Since the fi rst East Asia Summit, the region has continued to see cooperation despite disputes. At the same time, the summit was an event that brought East Asian regionalism to a crossroad. To some extent, with China’s continuing growth and Japan’s search for a new international and regional status, more empirical facts will emerge and the explanatory power of the processfocused model will be further tested.

Part III

CHINESE POLICYMAKING AND THE RISE OF CHINA

chapter

6

From Offensive to Defensive Realism A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy Tang Shiping

This chapter has two principal goals, one theoretical and one empirical. The theoretical goal is to advance a social evolutionary approach for understanding states’ security strategy (or foreign policy in general). The empirical goal is to offer a new interpretation of the “grand theory” or belief system that is guiding China’s strategy today and may guide it tomorrow, using the social evolutionary approach. I argue that China has decisively evolved from an offensive realist state under Mao Zedong to a defensive realist state under Deng Xiaoping and thereafter. By underscoring the major mechanisms behind this evolutionary process, I further argue that China is unlikely to revert to the offensive realism mindset in its past. The opening section of the chapter offers a brief critique of nonevolutionary approaches toward state behavior. The second section introduces the basic theoretical framework, stating explicitly what constitutes an evolutionary approach toward states’ security strategy. The third section briefly outlines the fundamental differences between offensive realism and defensive realism and explains why it is important whether a state practices offensive or defensive realism. The fourth section examines China’s security strategy fi rst under Mao and then under Deng and his successors, underscoring the fundamental differences between the two strategies through the lens of offensive defensive realism. The fi fth section advances an evolutionary explanation for the transformation of China’s security strategy. The sixth section draws some policy implications from the foregoing discussion. Thank you to Rajesh Barsur, Michael Glosny, Peter Gries, Jeff Legro, and Robert Ross for their helpful comments.

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Nonevolutionary Approaches to State Behavior: A Critique Understanding state behavior under anarchy, or developing an adequate theory of foreign policy, remains an important goal of the science of international relations. Because of the enormous implications of getting China’s strategic orientation right, there has been no lack of debate on the nature of China’s security strategy. From this debate a major difficulty emerges—that of dealing with “the problem of time.” This difficulty can be posed simply as follows: Can time bring about transformational changes in state behavior (and the international system at large)? Put differently, even if one’s reading of a state’s past or present behavior is correct, how can one know that it will be the same today (or tomorrow)? I contend that the fundamental reason behind this difficulty and, consequently, our inability to reach a fi rmer understanding about China’s or any other state’s security strategy has largely been that we have been employed socially nonevolutionary approaches in understanding states’ strategic behavior and international politics in general. Because the international system has always been an evolutionary system and states are like organisms operating within the system, and states and the system co-evolve, a socially nonevolutionary approach for understanding state behavior cannot but be inadequate, if not misleading or totally wrong. To understand states’ behavior in an evolutionary system, a genuinely socially evolutionary approach is required.1 The concept of social evolution is based on the premise that human society has always been an evolutionary system. Moreover, the evolution of human society has not been driven by material factors alone but by a combination of material and ideational factors. This prominent role played by ideational factors in social evolution is what most distinguishes social from natural evolution. As a result, a social evolutionary approach toward social change (including the evolution of international politics) must be both materialist and ideationalist, although it must give material forces the ontological priority.2 Moreover, a social evolutionary approach must also bring material forces and ideational forces into an organic synthesis.3 1. I elaborate on the social evolutionary approach elsewhere. Here, it suffices to say that the social evolutionary approach is not biological reductionism, sociobiology, or social Darwinism. 2. John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), 55–56, 110). I prefer the dichotomies of material forces vs. ideational forces and materialist vs. ideationalist because idealism already figures in the dichotomy of realism vs. idealism and idealism can mean “utopianism.” 3. For lack of a better word, I am adopting Schumpeter’s usage of “organic” to describe Marx’s analysis of capitalism: Marx brought historical, political, and economic analysis together to arrive at a holistic understanding of capitalism. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), 82.

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This section offers a brief critique of nonevolutionary approaches toward states’ behavior, thus laying the ground for advancing a genuinely evolutionary approach. As will become clear, although many explanations (or theories) of foreign policy seem almost poles apart, they are actually funda mentally similar because all of them are nonevolutionary or only semi- evolutionary.4

The Nonevolutionary Approach The nonevolutionary approach toward state behavior has two major variants: the (structural) realist theory–driven approach and the historical or cultural legacy approach. The fi rst variant holds that international politics is essentially repetitive. Waltz provided the clearest statement on this assumption: “The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly.”5 As a result, states’ behavior will not (and cannot) change that much either: they will balance, seek hegemony, and largely eschew cooperation.6 Overall, these realist theory–driven analyses tend to make rather gloomy predictions of state behavior, usually with little empirical support.7 The major reason is, of course, that structural realism pays scant attention to the role of ideas in shaping human societies. As K. J. Holsti points out, “realism is essentially a materialist explanation of political behavior. . . . Without them [ideas], you cannot see change in history, and therefore you tend to see international politics as a very static game.”8 In essence, the realist theory–driven approach denies the possibility of social evolution through ideational changes. Social evolution is all material, and there is no independent role for learning, especially social learning. 4. Other than the nonevolutionary and semi- evolutionary approaches discussed here, there has also been a pseudo- evolutionary approach in international relations literature: the long- cycle approach. This approach is pseudo- evolutionary because it merely employs evolution as an analogy or metaphor, and an evolutionary system does not go through cycles. George Modelski, The Long Cycles in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1987). 5. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 66. See also John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 2. While Waltz and Mearsheimer may represent the extreme end of a spectrum, realism overall is a nonevolutionary approach. 6. Waltz actually relies on a selection mechanism to explain these behaviors, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 74–75; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 331. Waltz’s theory is nevertheless nonevolutionary because selection in his framework merely eliminates behaviors that are inconsistent with the imperatives of anarchy without generating new behaviors (e.g., cooperation). 7. For instance, some analyses of China’s security behavior were carried out by scholars with almost no knowledge of China or even East Asia in general, and the supporting “evidence” for their analyses, other than theoretical arguments, largely consists of citing one another’s work. 8. Kalevi J. Holsti, quoted in Adam Jones, “Interview with Kal Holsti,” Review of International Studies 28 (2002): 629–30.

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The second variant of the nonevolutionary approach can be labeled the historical legacy approach or cultural determinism. This approach basically holds that historical legacy or culture largely determines a state’s behavior.9 More recently, this approach has metamorphosed into the more fashionable “strategic culture” approach. Despite being “more rigorous in conceptualization and methodology” (at least in the latest of its three waves as defi ned by Johnston), however, this approach faces the same difficulties as its predecessors—its inability to explain why a par ticular culture (but not another one) is important in understanding a state’s strategic behavior and how that particular culture was selected and adopted—and works with this approach (old or new) tend to simply assert that a par ticular culture matters.10 As a result, these works remain largely “speculation rather than scholarly inquiry,”11 and reflects perhaps their authors’ preconceived convictions that a state must have some kind of strategic culture rather than a real strategic culture per se, despite all the archives and original texts cited. The major problem of this variant of the static approach is essentially the same as that of the first variant, albeit the two set out from completely opposite starting points.12 The historical legacy or culturalist approach is fundamentally a purely ideationalist one. It insists that cultural (ideational) factors largely determine states’ strategic behavior (although when pushed hard, it may claim that culture is shaped by material forces, at least somewhat). As a result, this approach inevitably faces the unpleasant prospect that it needs a new strategic culture to explain each change in a state’s strategic behavior, without telling us why that state’s culture has not remained the same or changed. Because of their fundamentally nonevolutionary nature, these two approaches cannot deal with the challenges posed by changes. They have to 9. Culture is usually defi ned as a social habit that is shaped by history and thus deeply ingrained (and hence also relatively resistant to change) within a community. Therefore, the historical legacy and the cultural approaches often reinforce each other and can be taken as identical. 10. Johnston differentiated the strategic cultural approach into three waves and claimed that the third wave is “more rigorous in conceptualization and methodology” without recognizing (or admitting) that the fi rst and third waves essentially arrive at the same conclusions. See Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 221 n. 8. For a critique of this new culturalism, see Douglas Porch, “Military ‘Culture’ and the fall of France in 1940: A Review Essay,” International Security 24 (spring 2000): 157–80; Jack Snyder, “Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War,” International Organization 56 (spring 2002): 7–45. 11. Norton S. Ginsberg, “On the Chinese Perception of a World Order,” in China in Crisis, ed. Tang Tsou, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 74, 12. Because of their fundamental similarity (both are static and emphasize one side of the social system), the two approaches have often been brought together to arrive at an even more static and grim assessment of states’ strategic behavior (e.g., Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic war and power transition theory, plus China’s parabellum strategic culture), regardless of the incompatibility between them. Robert Gilpin, War and Changes in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

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either deny changes or to explain changes with a list of “cultures” without telling us how those cultures came into existence. Neither position is satisfactory or tenable.

The Semi- evolutionary Approach The semi-evolutionary approach is prominently represented by constructivism, with neoliberalism as its milder form.13 Constructivism is more evolutionary than the nonevolutionary approach in that constructivism gives more weight to the transformational power of ideas in shaping human societies.14 In other words, the semi-evolutionary approach recognizes ideational change, or the evolution of ideas, as a major driver behind social evolution. Unlike the realist theory–driven approach, the constructivist approach holds that social evolution is not all material and that an important force behind social evolution is ideational change. Unlike the culturalist approach, the constructivist approach does not take culture as something that can stay static but as something that is constantly evolving. Indeed, constructivism actually seeks to explain cultural changes. The problem with the semi- evolutionary approach of constructivism, however, is that it tends to lose balance in two respects. First, it tends to overemphasize ideas and deemphasize material forces (e.g., power, geography, and technology). As Wendt has put it explicitly: “The most important structures in which states are embedded are made of ideas, not material forces.”15 As a result, social evolution has now become mostly, if not purely, ideational: “Ideas all the way down.”16 Such a position, however, is simply untenable because the fact that “material circumstances . . . affect the intellectual evolution and policy choices of political decision markers is not in dispute.”17 Secondly, whereas neorealists like Waltz emphasize only selection at the level of state survival and deemphasize (social) learning, constructivism now 13. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared,” International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000): 97– 119. 14. Indeed, Emanuel Adler’s manifesto for his constructivist approach has the title “Cognitive Evolution.” See Adler, “Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress,” in Progress in Postwar International Relations, ed. Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 43–88. Wendt’s discussion on different anarchies also has a primitive evolutionary element embedded in it. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Makes of It,” International Organization 46 (1992): 391–425. 15. Alexander Wendt, Social Theories of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 309. Wendt here contradicts his earlier approving citation of John Searle that “brutal facts have ontological priority over institutional factors.” Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 55–56; Wendt, Social Theories of International Politics, 110. 16. Wendt, Social Theories of International Politics, 90. 17. Robert G. Herman, “Identity, Norms and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, 276.

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emphasizes social learning (especially positive learning) and deemphasizes selection, both at the level of learning and at the level of state survival. At the learning level, constructivism emphasizes positive learning, while neglecting the fact that learning is essentially an evolutionary process in which selection through negative learning plays a fundamental role. Regarding state welfare, constructivism emphasizes the reward of being positively socialized by certain ideas, while neglecting the impact of (negative) selection of ideas despite the fact that selection is a major mechanism through which states learn—states will be punished if they do not learn certain ideas (e.g., self-help). Because constructivism emphasizes certain aspects while neglecting other aspects of social evolution, it is only semi-evolutionary.

A Social Evolutionary Approach to State Behavior In this section, I introduce the social evolutionary approach to understanding states’ strategic behavior. It differs from nonevolutionary and semievolutionary approaches in three key aspects. First, in the social evolutionary approach, material forces (the objective world) and ideational forces (the subjective world) work together organically rather than independently to drive social changes. More specifically, although ideational forces do reciprocally influence the evolution of the material world, material forces retain ontological priority because the objective world serves as the ultimate testing ground (or the source of selection pressure) for ideas. Ultimately, humans must anchor their ideas (or learning) to the objective material world although their knowledge may not capture objective reality all the time. Moreover, at any given time, neither material forces alone nor ideational forces alone can determine a state’s foreign policy, although states’ security strategies tend to reflect objective reality in the long run (because states will be punished, sometimes severely, if they persist in adopting wrong ideas).18 In the context of making security strategy, the material world consists of at least the following dimensions: the geographical environment of the state; the total power of the state; the international (including regional) structure (i.e., the distribution of power); the relationship between the state and other states; and the nature of the international system (i.e., whether it is offensive realist system or a defensive realist system).19 The ideational world consists of at least the following dimensions: ideologies, culture, beliefs, habits, and memories. 18. The statement that the objective world is the source of selection pressure on ideas is meant that human societies tend to adopt ideas that can benefit them in the objective world. Such a formulation does not deny the possibility that societies often adopt ideas that are bad for social welfare. Otherwise, the whole world would be developed and the world would have been far more peaceful. 19. I elaborated on the fi rst four of these dimensions in great detail in Shiping Tang, “A Systemic Theory of the Security Environment,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27 (2004): 1–32. The

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Ideational forces influence a state’s choice of strategies through two primary channels. They influence how a state learns about the objective world, and hence also the pool of possible ideas for making strategies as well as the ideas that eventually win the competition for the right to make strategies. Second, the social evolutionary approach accepts as self-evident that the process of human learning itself is an evolutionary process. 20 In the context of making security strategies, the process usually goes like this. At the beginning, there are multiple ideas for a possible strategy, and states do not simply pick one idea and deploy it as a strategy. Instead, these ideas engage in a competition for the right to be adopted as the strategy through debates and political struggles. Eventually, some ideas are excluded and some ideas emerge as winners, and only ideas that win become part of a strategy. 21 Third, the social evolutionary approach adopts a far more inclusive defi nition of learning. 22 For instance, the social evolutionary approach considers the differentiation between adaptation to environment (i.e., structural adjustment) and learning fundamentally flawed. 23 This is so because for human beings, adaptation is a form of learning. At the very least, adaptation requires assessing the (strategic) environment and assessment requires learning. Likewise, our evolutionary approach also rejects the dichotomy of tactical learning versus strategic learning, because all processes of learning are strategic. Moreover, the social evolutionary approach pays equal attention to both negative learning and positive learning. Since the rise of constructivism (or ideational theories of international politics), it is positive learning that has received the most attention in IR literature. 24 Yet, because human beings tend last dimension is discussed in Shiping Tang, “Social Evolution of International Politics,” forthcoming. 20. Karl Popper developed the original thesis that knowledge is an evolutionary process. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientifi c Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1963); Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). 21. An evolutionary process must have three distinctive stages: generation of diversities (mutations), followed by selection and then stabilization of the selected genotypes and phenotype traits. As such, the selection of ideas is a typical evolutionary process. Legro documented this type of evolutionary process without using the label “evolution.” See Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 22. For a review of the literature on learning in international relations, see Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization 48 (1994): 279–312. 23. Ibid., 296–98. For an application of this dichotomy to China’s foreign policy, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” China Journal, no. 35 (1996): 27–61. 24. Negative learning means that one learns from one’s own and others’ failure (trial and error) while positive learning means just the opposite. Negative learning typically takes the form of disproving existing conjectures, perceptions, and hypotheses. Positive learning typically takes the form of the spreading of good ideas. Good ideas and bad ideas, of course, can be differentiated only by testing them in the objective world.

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Social learning Positive learning Learning from others’ experiences

to continue to do what has worked (due to inertia), it is highly likely that negative learning has played an equally, if not more, important role in shaping human behavior than positive learning has. “Failure is the mother of all success.” Indeed, it has been this process of negative learning (and only then positive learning) that makes human knowledge an evolutionary process.25 As a result, the social evolutionary approach brings together various forms of learning (table 6.1). At any given time, all forms of learning processes may be at work. While it may be difficult or impossible to assign weight to any particular form of learning, it is possible to trace the overall learning process and assess its outcome. 26 More importantly, the learning process does not just happen in a vacuum. It happens within the international environment, with both material forces and ideational forces in play. 27 The whole evolutionary process is captured in figure 6.1. The differences between the social evolutionary approach and the nonevolutionary approaches are summarized in table 6.2, the most obvious difference being that the causal chain to a particular strategy in the social evolutionary approach is much more lengthy and complex than that in other approaches.

Offensive versus Defensive Realism The Differences In the second half of the past century, an important division inside the realism camp emerged. 28 Offensive and defensive realism, despite starting from roughly the same set of bedrock assumptions of realism in international 25. Popper, Objective Knowledge, 261–65. Levy also noted that individuals and organizations tend to learn more from failure than success. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy,” 304. Legro examined the process of ideational changes through the collapse of old ideas and the consolidation of new ones without using the phrase “negative learning.” Legro, Rethinking the World. 26. I leave it to the discretion of other authors on how many types of learning they want to focus on to understand a par ticular issue or process. 27. I thus concur with the constructivist claim that the ideational environment is an integral part of the international environment although I strongly disagree with the claim that the bulk of the international environment is ideational. Wendt, Social Theories of International Politics, 96, 309. 28. This section draws from Tang, “Defensive Realism: A Systematic Statement” unpublished book manuscript), in which I examine the differences between the two realism in greater detail.

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Material world

149

Ideational world

Learning: All

Outcomes

Reassessment: Positive learning, negative learning

Deployment of strategies, interactions with other states

Strategies

Ideas about

The formulation of strategies: Competition, selection, and stabilization of ideas

Fig. 6.1. The social evolution of strategy

politics, 29 arrived at fundamentally divergent conclusions about the nature of international politics. For our discussion here, two aspects of these differences are worth emphasizing. 29. Elsewhere, I show that offensive realism actually needs an extra bedrock assumption—the worst- case assumption over others’ intentions—to drive its logic. Shiping Tang, “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions,” International Studies Review (forthcoming June 2008).

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Table 6.2. Nonevolutionary versus evolutionary approaches Nonevolutionary approaches

Semi- evolutionary approach

Evolutionary approach

Realism

Culturalism

Constructivism/ Neoliberalism

Material world

Ideational world

Ideational world + material world

Material world + ideational world

Assessing, learning

Operational code

Process: Interaction and socialization

Assessing, learning

Identities/Interests

Ideas about strategies Competition, selection, and stabilization

Security strategies

Security strategies

Security strategies

Security strategies

Deployment of strategies

Deployment of strategies

Deployment of strategies

Deployment of strategies

Process leading to outcomes: Interaction

Process leading to outcomes: Interaction

Process leading to outcomes: Interaction and socialization

Process leading to outcomes: Interaction and socialization

Outcome: Mechanism of feedback: Selection

Outcome: Mechanism of feedback: None, culture determines

Outcome: Mechanism of feedback: Unclear

Outcome: Mechanism of feedback: Selection and learning

First, an offensive realist state seeks security by intentionally decreasing the security of others, whereas a defensive realism state does not seek security in this way. Second, two offensive realist states threaten each other’s security intentionally. As a result, the confl ict of interest between them is not only genuine, but also genuinely irreconcilable. An offensive realist state believes not only that the nature of international politics has always been fundamentally confl icting, but also that confl ict is necessary in international politics (“either I kill you or you will kill me”). There is very little or no common interest among states other than temporary alliance in an offensive realist world. As such, offensive realist states see no possibility of genuine cooperation among themselves other than (temporary) alliances. Instead, it dedicates all of its available resources to the preparation for the inevitable confl ict (and, ultimately, war). In contrast, two defensive realist states do not threaten each other’s security intentionally. As a result, while there may be genuine confl icts of interest between them, some of these confl icts are not genuinely irreconcilable. Hence, while defensive realism also believes that the nature of international politics has been fundamentally one of conflict for most of human history and some of these conflicts are genuinely irreconcilable (e.g., when facing a Hitler),

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defensive realism does not believe that states must necessarily end up in actual conflicts whenever they have conflict of interests. Cooperation is another option for resolving confl ict of interests. In other words, defensive realism believes that at least some conflicts (with size unspecified) are avoidable and unnecessary. Moreover, defensive realism believes that states can under many circumstances indeed overcome the obstacles posed by anarchy to achieve cooperation.30

Differentiating Defensive Realist and Offensive Realist States Because of the fundamental differences between offensive realism and defensive realism, which of these two stances China’s actions are grounded in has critical policy implications for other states. If China is guided by the former, it is threatening or will eventually threaten other states’ security intentionally. As such, the rational choice for other (defensive realist) states is “containment”: to maintain a robust deterrence and defense position with regard to China, while waiting for a regime change that embraces defensive realism to take place there.31 In contrast, if China is guided by defensive realism, then it will not intentionally threaten other states’ security. In this case, the rational choice for other states is “engagement”: to seek cooperation with China, and eventually integrate China into the global order, making it a “stakeholder.” In other words, planning a sound China policy depends on figuring out what grand theory of international politics is guiding and will guide China’s security strategy. 32 So how do we tell whether a state’s security strategy is guided by offensive or defensive realism? Kydd suggests four criteria: ideology (intolerant or tolerant); policy towards its domestic minorities; policy towards its weaker

30. Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help,” International Security 19 (1994–95): 50–90; Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” ibid., 24 (1999): 42–63. Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other” Security Studies 7 (1997): 114–55. 31. Here, I am assuming that most states in today’s world are defensive realist states themselves. Even when facing an offensive realist state, the approach of a defensive realist state will be very different from that of an offensive realist state. The later will at least adopt a hard containment approach, if not actively prepare and eventually launch preventive wars. For a more detailed discussion, see my “Defensive Realism.” 32. This exercise of assessing other states’ intentions is performed only by defensive realists because offensive realists simply assume all states to be aggressive. Thus, the containment versus engagement debate makes an explicit or implicit assumption about other states’ intentions. Moreover, the debate also reveals different individuals’ general assumptions about the nature of international politics and their preferences for security strategy. Those who hold a pessimistic view about the nature of international politics are more likely to be offensive realists (i.e., hawks) and support containment, while those who hold an optimistic view are more likely to be defensive realists (i.e., doves) and support engagement. For a more detailed discussion, see my “Defensive Realism.”

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neighbors; and military and arms control policy. 33 I believe the following two criteria are more suitable for differentiating a state that embraces offensive realism from one that embraces defensive realism, and they subsume Kydd’s criteria. The fi rst criterion is whether a state recognizes the existence of the security dilemma and understands at least some of its (defensive) implications. 34 A defensive realist state understands the dilemma: states cannot escape from it simply by accumulating more and more power; states can only try to alleviate it by pursuing cooperation. In contrast, an offensive realist state either denies the security dilemma or tries to escape from it. The second criterion is whether a state exercises self-restraint and is willing to be constrained by other countries.35 These two measures are the basic means to send costly signals of reassurance (thus alleviating the security dilemma) and demonstrate benign intentions.36 An offensive realist state does not exercise self-restraint and is not willing to be constrained by others because it has to constantly seek and exploit opportunities of weakening others. In contrast, a defensive realist state exercises self-restraint and is willing to be constrained because it does not seek or exploit opportunities of weakening others. With these criteria and clarification, we can now move on to assess the nature of China’s security strategy from Mao to Deng, and then to Jiang and Hu.

China’s Security Strategy: From Offensive to Defensive Realism There is little doubt that China’s security strategy is still fi rmly rooted in realism.37 In seeking to overcome the memory of “a century of national 33. Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing,” 141–47. 34. For the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 67–76, 349–55; “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” World Politics 30 (1978): 167–214. Again, much confusion exists regarding the security dilemma. I clarify these confusions in my “Defensive Realism.” Of course, most decision-makers do not understand the whole complexity of the security dilemma dynamics. 35. Exercising self-restraint and being willing to be constrained are two sides of the same coin because being willing to be constrained is a form of self-restraint. When a state accepts the constraint even if it has the power to overthrow those constraints, it is exercising self-restraint. See Charles Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refi ning the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” World Politics 44 (1992): 519–27, 530–32; Jeffery W. Talioferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25 (2001): 129, 159–60; Tang, “A Systemic Theory of the Security Environment,” 6, 27–28. 36. Tang, “Defensive Realism.” 37. This section draws partly from Shiping Tang and Peter Hay Gries, “China’s Security Strategy: From Offensive to Defensive Realism and Beyond,” EAI Working Paper no. 97 (October 2002), East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.

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humiliation” (bainian guochi) at the hands of the West and Japan, generations of Chinese have strived to build a strong and prosperous China. Many Chinese elites believe that because of its size, population, civilization, history and, more recently, its growing wealth, China should be regarded as a great power (da guo). This strong belief in the utility of power and the motivation to accumulate power fi rmly anchors China’s security strategy within the realist camp. The more important question is whether China is an offensive realist or a defensive realist state. 38

Mao: Offensive Realism China’s security strategy under Mao was largely offensive realist in nature.39 China under Mao expounded an intolerant ideology of overthrowing all imperialist or reactionary regimes in Asia and the world at large. More importantly, China under Mao (together with the former Soviet Union) actively supported revolutions (or insurgencies) in many developing countries, thus intentionally threatening those countries that it had identified as imperialists or their lackeys (zougou) and proxies (dailiren). This sense of being threatened was perhaps most severe among China’s neighboring states that were allies of the United States and its Western allies (e.g., Southeast Asian countries).40 Second, as a staunch Marxist-Leninist, Mao believed that confl icts in international politics were necessary and inevitable. To transform the world into a socialist world, struggles—including armed struggles—against imperialists and their proxies were necessary. As a result, despite having settled some major disputes with several neighboring states (e.g., Burma, Mongolia, Pakistan), seeking security through cooperation was never high on the agenda of China’s strategy at that time. 38. Many may question whether it is appropriate to label Mao an offensive realist and Deng a defensive realist. As long as one admits that there are fundamental differences between the two men’s approaches towards security, the evolutionary interpretation outlined below should hold. Also, to label a state one of offensive realism or defensive realism does not mean that the state will behave exactly as theory advocates. The labeling exercise is best understood as an approximation. 39. Johnston argued that Mao was an offensive realist, while Feng challenged Johnston’s conclusion. Both Johnston’s and Feng’s papers have serious theoretical problems because they do not fully grasp the difference between offensive and defensive realism, as well as the diffi culty involved in determining whether a state is an offensive or a defensive realist when that state faces a clear and present danger. See Huiyun Feng, “The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist?” Security Studies 14 (2006): 637–62; Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China.” 40. I do not differentiate offensive realism based on ideological calculation (e.g., Maoism, the Bush doctrine) and offensive realism based on power calculation (e.g., imperialism). In the fi rst decade after the founding of the PRC, both China and the United States were offensive realists towards each other. China was supporting decolonization in Southeast Asia while the U.S. was engaging in subversion inside China (e.g., Tibet) to destabilize the PRC government.

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Third, China under Mao largely believed that all of the People’s Republic’s security problems were due to other countries’ evil policies,41 rather than the interactions between China and other states. In essence, China under Mao had little understanding of the dynamics of the security dilemma.42 As a result, other than the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,”43 China under Mao initiated few measures to assure regional states of China’s benign intentions.

Deng: The Transition to Defensive Realism Among China hands, there is little disagreement over the largely defensive realist nature of China’s security strategy today, whether China is labeled an “integrationist” power, a “globalist” power, a nonrevisionist and nonimperial power, or simply a state embracing “defensive realism and beyond”; or whether China’s grand strategy and diplomacy is characterized as neo-Bismarckian, “New Diplomacy,” or “engaging Asia.”44 At the very least, most analysts reject the notion that China is an offensive-realist state (i.e., an expansionist, revisionist, or imperialist one) today. There are at least four strands of evidence supporting the argument that post-Mao China has gradually transformed itself into a state embracing defensive realism. The fi rst is perhaps the most obvious. China has toned down its revolutionary rhetoric and has backed up its words with deeds. Most clearly, it has stopped supporting insurgencies in other countries, even if they were initiated by communist elements. 41. Such a belief would be correct for much of China’s modern history, at least until the end of World War II and the anti-Japanese war. After the founding of the PRC, however, some of China’s security difficulties could no longer be attributed solely to other states’ policies. Almost every state tends to see itself as a victim of others’ (evil) behavior, and this tendency is an important psychological factor that exacerbates the security dilemma. 42. China, of course, was not the only country that did not recognize the security dilemma at that time. The concept of the security dilemma was not taken seriously in international relations literature until Jervis’s two path-breaking studies, and the concept has perhaps remained largely unabsorbed by policymakers in most countries, including the United States. See Jervis, Perception and Misperception, and “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” 43. The “Five Principles of Peaceful Co- existence” is a defensive realist doctrine. 44. Chen Mumin, “Going Global: Chinese Elite’s View on Security Strategy in the 1990s,” Asian Perspectives 29 (2005): 133–77; Avery Goldstein, “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo- Bismarckian Turn?” in International Relations Theory and the Asia- Pacifi c, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, 57–106; Justin S. Hempson-Jones, “The Evolution of China’s Engagement with International Governmental Organizations,” Asian Survey 45 (October 2005): 702–21; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27 (winter 2003): 5–56; Evan Medeiros and Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82 (November– December 2003): 22–35; David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29 (2005): 64–99; Tang and Gries, “China’s Security Strategy.”

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The second is that China has now clearly recognized some of the most critical aspects of the security dilemma and its implications.45 Touring several Southeast Asian countries in 1978, Deng Xiaoping was given his fi rst lesson on the security dilemma. He was surprised to fi nd that China’s earlier policies of exporting revolution and its unwillingness to resolve the issue of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia had made many Southeast Asian countries suspicious of China’s intentions.46 As a result, Deng realized that China’s security conundrum in the 1960s and 1970s had not been the work of external forces alone but was rather an outcome of the interaction between China’s behavior and the outside world. This interdependent and interactive nature of security is, of course, one of the major aspects of the security dilemma. The third strand of evidence is that China has demonstrated self-restraint and willingness to be constrained by others. This aspect is perhaps most prominently demonstrated in China’s memberships in international organizations and institutions as well as its increased presence in treaties since 1980s.47 Because international organizations, institutions, and treaties are all rule-based, China’s increasing membership in them and its compliance with the rules that were in place before its entry (i.e., that were made by others) unambiguously signals its willingness to be restrained by others.48 Finally, security through cooperation, the hallmark of defensive realism, has become a pillar of China’s security strategy under Deng. Two aspects of this dimension are worth noting. The fi rst is that China has pursued a strategy of maintaining amicable relationships with its neighbors (mulin youhao, wending zhoubian) since Deng, mostly through reassurance and building

45. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory,” in Ikenberry and Mastanduno, International Relations Theory and the Asia- Pacifi c, 130. Of course, one should not expect states to grasp all the (defensive) implications of the security dilemma. 46. Lee Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore, may have played a pivotal role in transforming Deng’s understanding. See Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000 (Singapore: The Straits Times Press and Times Media, 2001), 663–68. 47. Hempson-Jones, “The Evolution of China’s Engagement with International Governmental Organizations”; Johnston and Paul Evans, “China’s Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions”; and Margaret M. Pearson, “The Major Multilateral Economic Institutions Engage China”; both in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (London: Routledge, 1999), 235–73, 207–34. 48. Whether these institutions have changed China’s preferences for outcomes or preferences for strategies, or whether China’s behavior in this arena is due to rational calculation or ideational socialization is not crucial here, and one can easily imagine that both factors play a role. Instrumentalist (or realist) institutionalism (or neoliberalism) is quite common among states and defensive realism is instrumental when it comes to the role of institutions in international politics. For defensive realism’s stand on institutions, see Glaser, “Realists as Optimists”; Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation.” For instrumental neoliberalism, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

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cooperation.49 While such a strategy certainly has a dose of hedging against the bad times of U.S.- China relations embedded in it, the strategy still reduces the anxiety among neighboring countries about China’s rise, thus helping to alleviate the security dilemma between China and regional states. The second is that China has also ventured into multilateral security cooperation organizations and institutions, mostly prominently the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperative Organizations. While these security cooperation institutions may or may not have changed states’ choice of goals, they have institutionalized a degree of (security) cooperation among states, thus changing states’ preferences for strategies. As a result, the security dilemma between China and regional states has not been exacerbated but rather alleviated. 50 Overall, there is ample evidence to support the interpretation that China’s current security strategy is fi rmly rooted in defensive realism, with a dose of instrumentalist institutionalism.

A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of the Shift So how do we make sense of China’s gradual but yet undeniable shift from a security strategy based on offensive realism to one based on defensive realism? A (structuralist) realism–driven (i.e., a purely materialistic) approach explains this shift by arguing that China has fi nally learnt the lesson that it is simply not capable of challenging the hegemon-centric international order (i.e., the status quo). Thus it is merely biding its time. A semi-evolutionary approach makes the case that China has indeed been socialized by the norms and institutions of the international order. They both got something right, but not the whole picture. The following narrative reconstructs the history of this fundamental shift.

The Meaning of the Material World: Getting the Environment Right On the material front, four aspects are worth emphasizing. The fi rst is the geographical location of China. China has many countries as its neighbors, and the region has a high concentration of great powers (i.e., the United States, Japan, Russia, and India). Second, the “unipolar” moment proves to be lasting and there is no clear sign that the United States is in decline. Third, China is still a poor country with very limited capabilities, although its power has been increasing rapidly for the past three decades. Finally, the international system has fi rmly evolved from a Hobbesian to a Lockean world, and 49. Reassurance is part of cooperation-building. I elaborate on reassurance in detail in “Defensive Realism.” For a brief discussion, see Shiping Tang, “Correspondence: Uncertainty and Reassurance in International Politics,” International Security 32 (2007): 180–83. 50. Alan Collins, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 2000), chap. 5; Goldstein, “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy,” 86.

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expansion and conquest are no longer a legitimate option for advancing a state’s security interest. The meaning of these material factors for China’s security strategy has been gradually recognized (or learned) over the years. Regarding geography, from its security difficulties in the 1950s to 1970s China has come to recognize that its geographical location dictates that it cannot afford to adopt an offensive realist strategy because other countries can easily form a countervailing alliance (i.e., balancing of a Chinese threat). So far as the international system is concerned, China flirted with the idea of accelerating multipolarization in the early 1990s, partly because it had envisioned that the “unipolar moment” would really be just a moment. China soon realized, however, that different international structures have often been the result of unbalanced economic growth and unintended consequences, and structural changes cannot be easily accelerated. One cannot escape from the structure; one can only live with it. With respect to national power, after three decades of robust growth, the Chinese elite could generally feel that China’s power is on the rise, and this growing power has given China more confidence in managing its grand transformation. As a result, China feels more secure perhaps than at any other time in the past two centuries, giving it more reason to stay on its current course and behave moderately. A more self- confident China is thus more likely to be a responsible power.51 Regarding the nature of the international system, most Chinese elites recognize that times really have changed. There is very little chance that China can take back its lost territories by force even if it becomes powerful enough, because territorial expansion and conquest are no longer a legitimate option.52 Hence, most Chinese elites harbor no illusion of reconquering its lost territories, and they accept that China has to make peace with its traumatic modern history, or at least to live with it.

Learning and Ideas As expected, all forms of learning have been at play in the process of generating potential ideas for making China’s new strategy. China has certainly learned from its past experiences. Two major lessons deserve special mention. The fi rst lesson is that “self-reliance” is equivalent to self-isolation and will not get China anywhere. 53 The open-and-reform policy, 51. Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “More Self- confident China will be a Responsible Power,” Straits Times, October 2, 2002. For the theoretical argument that the more secure a state feels, the more likely it will behave moderately, see Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy”; Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” 52. Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization 55 (2001): 215–50. 53. Friedrich W. Y. Wu, “From Self-reliance to Interdependence? Development Strategy and Foreign Economic Policy in Post- Mao China,” Modern China 7 (1981): 445–82; Yan

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of course, necessitates that China maintain a working, if not always cordial, relationship with the outside world. The second lesson is literally “anarchy is what states make of it,” in the sense China is not merely a passive consumer, but also an active shaper, of its security environment. From its own experiences, China has gradually come to recognize that its own behaviors were at least partly responsible for its security conundrum in the 1950s and 1960s. This lesson helps China recognize the interdependent nature of security and part of the dynamics and implications of the security dilemma. As a result, Chinese leaders now understand that, because of China’s vast size and power potential, most small and medium-sized regional states do have reasons to feel uneasy about China’s growing power and to demand Chinese self-restraint, even if China does not intentionally threaten them. Today, Chinese leaders and its elite are more nuanced and rational when it comes to dealing with the various versions of the “China threat” theory.54 Other than learning from its own experiences, China has also learned from the experiences of others. In the past decade, Chinese leaders and foreign policy experts have undertaken a major project that seeks to gain an in- depth understanding of the experiences of other rising powers in history so as to draw appropriate lessons and avoid mistakes made by other great powers. 55 As a result of this project, the idea of a direct confrontation with the incumbent hegemon (i.e., the United States) and overthrowing the existing international system has been fi rmly ruled out. Consequently, many have recognized that the only viable option is for China to rise within the system. By doing this, China will not only have more say and influence in reshaping the future of the system as it continues to grow, but will also be more likely to make its rise a peaceful one. 56 A further lesson from this project has been that one of the major reasons why Great Britain was able and Xuetong, “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,” Journal of Contemporary China 10 (2001): 34–35. 54. Tang Shiping and Zhang Jie, “Zhongguo weixielun he yu zhongguo gongchu” (Introduction: China threat versus living with China), in Lenzhan hou Jinjin Guojia duihua zhengce yanjiu (The evolution of regional states’ China policy after the Cold War), ed. Tang Shiping, Zhang Jie and Cao Xiaoyang (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005), 1–7. 55. In November 2006, China broadcast a prime-time TV series called Daguo Jueqi (The rise of great nations). This series can be understood as a by-product of the project for the general public, aiming to stimulate further debates and educate people on the subject. For a news report about the series, see http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2006–11/ 27/content _5394691.htm (accessed December 8, 2006). 56. The strategy of “peaceful rise/development” can be understood partly due to this recognition. For early expositions of this notion of rising within the system, see Tang Shiping, “Zailun zhongguo de da zhanlue” (Once again on China’s grand strategy), Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and management), no. 4 (2001): 29–37; Zhang Baijia, “Gaibian ziji, gaibian shijie” (Change oneself, Change the world), Zhongguo Shehui Kexue (China social science), no. 1 (2002): 4–19. Goldstein also noted that China tried to learn lessons from the experiences of the Soviet Union. See Goldstein, “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy,” 70.

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the United States has been able to remain a leading power has been that both states supported an open trading system and served as a large market for the world. Finally, there is social learning. On this front, the ASEAN Regional Forum has been a major platform for China to learn the benefits of multilateralism and the ASEAN Way, and its transformational impact on China’s strategic thinking and behavior has been well documented. As a result, China now has an “epistemic community” of defensive realists (and instrumental neoliberals) when it comes to promoting security cooperation and multilateralism.57

The Competition of Ideas and Outcomes With so many competing ideas, how has China been able to come up with a more or less coherent security strategy in the past decade or so? The answer, again, is that this has been an evolutionary process: one of fi ltering certain ideas out and certain ideas in. I illustrate this process with the important debate on “peace and development,” which restarted after the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and continued to around 2002.58 The debate was important because it was about whether China’s earlier more or less optimistic assessment of its security environment was really sound. In other words, has human history really entered into an era of “peace and development” or was this assessment simply a Chinese pipe dream? Put differently, is the outside world (mostly the United States and regional states) generally friendly or fundamentally hostile towards China? There were basically two camps in the debate. The pessimist camp held that the 1999 U.S.-NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia (and the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade) symbolized the return of the world to a Hobbesian state in which the strong dictate what they want, and the weak suffer what they must. If so, then the whole grand strategy of open-and-reform would have to be greatly modified, if not totally rejected. In contrast, the optimist camp held that despite small to medium-sized states’ sovereignty being challenged if they did not conform to certain rules dictated by the Western states, world politics per se was not going to return to a Hobbesian state. In the end, despite prominent dissenting voices, the optimist camp carried the day. Along the way, certain ideas were eliminated or weakened during the process while others were selected (or strengthened). For instance, the idea that China should rise within the system is in, while the idea that China rise outside the system (or challenge the system) is out. Hence, China will integrate further with the international system, not withdraw 57. For an assessment of the ASEAN Regional Forum’s impact on China’s security thinking and policymaking bureaucracies, see Rosemary Foot, “China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organization Process and Domestic Models of Thought,” Asian Survey 38 (May 1998): 425–40; Johnston, “Socialization in International Institutions.” 58. The journal Shijie Zhishi (World affairs) devoted two special issues to this pressing question. See Shijie Zhishi, nos. 15 and 16 (April 2000).

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from it. The more recent rise of the “peaceful rise” doctrine can be understood as a further manifestation that the optimistic view still retains the upper hand. Likewise, the idea of strengthening China’s relationships with regional states through greater assurance and cooperation is further strengthened (partly because of the uncertainty associated with the U.S.- China relationship). The rationale is that as long as regional states do not go along, the United States will be hard pressed to effect a hard containment against China even if it wants to. As a result, China initiated the process of building a free trade area with ASEAN, joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of ASEAN states, and further institutionalized the Shanghai Cooperation Organizations. Undoubtedly, there have been several developments in the real world that tend to lend more support to the optimist camp. For instance, the success of China’s economy in the past three decades provides justification for continuing the present policy. Likewise, the reluctance of most regional states to adopt the hard containment advocated by many neoconservatives in Washington, as outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, strengthened the view that most regional states were not hostile towards China even when Washington was. Therefore, the net result from the debate has actually been that China emerged from it with greater confidence rather than with a bleak picture of its future and the outside world. Such a result is extremely important because those who hold an optimistic view of the outside world tend to be defensive realists whereas those who hold a pessimistic view tend to be offensive realists.59 With the optimists winning the debate, the probability that China will continue with its presently defensive realist strategy increases.

Conclusions My evolutionary interpretation of the development of China’s security strategy points to the conclusion that while any one of the driving forces discussed may not be enough to propel China into its present security strategy and keep it there, the combination of these driving forces has been able to transform China into a fi rm defensive realist state and there is a high probability that China will remain such a state. The social evolutionary interpretation of China’s security strategy here has implications for both research and policy. Research-wise, my approach offers 59. Indeed, whether a state holds an optimistic or a pessimistic view about the outside world is related to the fundamental difference between the two strains of realism that can be captured by a single question: Are there fellow defensive realist states out there? For offensive realists, there are few, if any, genuine security-seeking states. In contrast, while not denying there may be offensive realist states, defensive realists believe that there are some, if not many, genuinely defensive realist states. See Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 29, 34; Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 60, 67, 71–72; Tang, “Fear in International Politics.”

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a more organic and thus more nuanced account of the evolution of states’ security strategy. Since the Waltzian structural revolution, students of international politics have embraced parsimony as a guiding light for advancing our understanding of international politics. Too often, pundits have pitted some variables (e.g., power, structure) against others (e.g., ideas). Yet, as Waltz himself has argued, “the explanatory power of a theory, not its parsimony, is the criterion of a theory’s success.”60 The social evolutionary approach implicitly rejects the notion that seeking parsimony when it comes to understanding complex phenomena is always a virtue, and consequently also rejects the practice of seeking mono- clausal explanations. This is merely a candid admission that the world is really very complex, rather than an unwanted challenge to the goal of attaining parsimony in scientific research.61 In the end, the social evolutionary approach calls for a more empirical, systemic, and evolutionary approach to understanding states’ behavior. Following the competing ideas within a state is a good way to start understanding that state’s strategy and behavior. Moreover, consistent with the nonteleological nature of the evolutionary approach, the social evolutionary approach calls for modesty in our goal. The best that we can aim for when it comes to a theory of foreign policy can only be a probabilistic theory, not a determinately predictive theory. Trying to impose a determinately predictive theory on states’ behavior can only lead us to the abuse (or misuse) of history. Furthermore, the social evolutionary approach takes an important step towards theorizing the stubbornly undertheorized interaction between the material and ideational worlds,62 partly because of the polarizing and unproductive debate between extreme materialist positions (i.e., structural realism) and extreme ideationalist ones (i.e., “radical” constructivism). Policy-wise, the social evolutionary interpretation reduces uncertainty about China’s future behaviors. While many have complained that it is difficult to apprehend China’s strategic intentions because of the murkiness of China’s policymaking process, I contend that China’s security behavior has projected a rather clear picture of its security approach and its future direction. China’s general security strategy is fi rmly rooted in defensive realism and is gradually adding a dose of (instrumental) neoliberalism. Moreover, the 60. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Theory of International Politics is not Theory of Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 6 (1996): 57. 61. While the notion that the world is really complex seems so obvious, not everyone keeps this in mind. For instance, Colin Elman failed to recognize it as a potential cause of why we cannot reach a determinate theory of foreign policy. Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why not Realist Theories of Foreign Policy?” Security Studies 6 (fall 1996): 13, 22–32. For a recent study of complexity in social life, see Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 62. Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security,” 276.

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social evolutionary interpretation points to the conclusion that China’s security strategy is most likely to remain one of defensive realism and it is unlikely to go back to an offensive realist mind set. If China’s security strategy is now fi rmly rooted in defensive realism, the principal implications for the United States, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world are that the outside world can afford to take a more relaxed approach towards China’s rise and that engagement with China is the way to go. While China may become more powerful, it is unlikely that it will use its newly gained power to intentionally threaten other states. And if there is a security dilemma between China and another state, two genuine defensive realist states can fi nd a way to signal their true benign intentions and work out their differences. On that account, both China and the world have something to celebrate.

chapter

7

Purpose Transitions China’s Rise and the American Response Jeffrey W. Legro

We know that China is rising, but what will China do with that power? Distracted by power trends, both American policymakers and political scientists have not paid enough attention to purpose—what states intend to do with their power. Power is critical in international relations, but it is not destiny. The dominant lens for understanding the rise of China has been power transition theory, which insightfully probes the effects of power trajectories between rising and falling countries (e.g., the expected future of China and the United States). Yet what we also need to understand is “purpose transition”—that is, when and why the core intentions of countries in international politics change. This is a critical question because China today is mostly a cooperative participant in the existing international order.1 Will it remain so? And what can the United States do to shape that trajectory? This chapter attempts to answer these two questions—focusing on the first as the necessary foundation for dealing with the second. In doing so, I offer several arguments. First, China’s degree of revisionism or cooperation towards international society has varied over time. This record offers some grounds to consider why China’s purpose changes—and why at other times it has not changed. History suggests that the common wisdom today on what drives China’s purpose—i.e., its relative power or its level of economic interdependence—has not been particularly good at explaining its past purpose. There is no reason to think that wisdom will be a better guide in the future. 1. See, for example, Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27:4 (2003): 5–56.

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Second, I provide a general argument for the variation of China’s purpose over time. Power and interdependence cannot account for that variation because they ignore or misunderstand the domestic political dynamics of how states think about responding to external conditions and how internal interests are aggregated. China’s intentions are not simply shaped by its capabilities or level of exchange with other countries, but instead by its experience in international politics that over time is consolidated (in specific ways) in dominant ideas about foreign policy. Leaders make authority claims based on such ideas and do battle with domestic opponents over the results that occur. That dynamic—and its particular logic—have significantly shaped the history of China’s purpose. And it will help decide whether China’s current integration will endure or be replaced by something else. Finally, I attempt to explain what this “purpose transition” view implies for the possibility and ways other countries, especially the United States, might shape China’s purpose. Most of the time America’s ability to mold China’s purpose will appear limited. Still, in some circumstances, especially when coordinated with that of other major and/or regional powers, U.S. policy can be important, at least at the margin. Consider for example, the role of Western powers in undermining the Qing’s isolationism or in discrediting Republican China’s internationalism at Versailles. Such influence is most potent when it works with, and not against, the logic of dominant ideas in domestic politics within China. Whether the United States should contain, engage, hedge against, reply tit-for-tat to, or nurture China in the future depends both on how Chinese leaders justify their policies as well as what alternatives might replace the existing Chinese purpose in the world. This threefold thesis comes with several caveats. My focus is on exploring the logic of purpose in the Chinese context. The general argument, therefore, is presented in a simplified form. Likewise, the historical and policy analysis of China is meant to suggest the plausibility of the argument, but it does not offer a defi nitive test. The overall aim is to make some modest progress in a complex area of great power dynamics—i.e. purpose transition—that is central to the debate on China’s rise. In what follows, I (1) defi ne purpose and chart its development in China since the mid-nineteenth century, (2) explore how power and interdependence arguments cannot explain that variation, (3) offer a “purpose transition” argument, (4) explore how it applies historically and today, and (5) explain its implications for U.S. efforts to shape China’s purpose.

China’s Purpose: Definition and History History shows that China’s foreign policy purpose (what it plans to do in the future) has varied over time. There are many ways to think about such purpose, but this paper will consider China’s approach to international order.

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The nature of a country’s thinking towards the dominant international rules and practices reveals much about general purpose as well as the likelihood of conflict with other countries. In broad terms, national approaches to international order can be categorized in terms of three ideal types: integration, revision, and separation. The fi rst, integration, refers to national strategies that accept the dominant principles, rules, and norms of what Hedley Bull called “international society.”2 Typically such states are seen as “status quo,” “satisfied,” or “conservative” powers based on their desire to work within the international system. A second category includes those states analysts refer to as “dissatisfied” or “revolutionary” or “revisionist,” but the meaning is the same: such states seek to fundamentally revise the international system. Such revision typically breeds confl ict since other countries are prone to defend that same order. 3 A third approach is seen in states that attempt to remove or separate themselves from the orbit of prevailing international norms and practices. Over time states adopt versions of these three positions, which only sometimes change. The descriptive analysis in the following section attempts to identify some major phases of continuity and change in Chinese ideas about international society since 1800. Five rough periods are covered: (1) Qing, 1800–60 (separatist), 2) Republican, 1896–1939 (integrationist), (3) Mao, 1949–76 (revisionist), (4) Deng, 1978–96 (integrationist), (5) Post-Deng, 1997– (integrationist). Qing. This period involved a significant expansion of European powers into Asia. For centuries the question of whether to integrate, separate, or revise the (European) international system was not a pressing issue for China. For all intents and purposes China was at the center of its own tribute system—the “Middle Kingdom.”4 With the British victory in the Opium War in 1842, China could no longer deny the “barbarians”—in this case from the West. Yet China met this expansion of Europe’s international society, not by folding to superior external forces or by outright resistance, but instead by attempting to socialize the Western powers to its own ways, much as it had dealt with outsiders for centuries. This initial reaction was more “a process of temporary resuscitation rather than an innovation, an Indian summer of a declining regime rather

2. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 3. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 3d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1966), 38ff.; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 81–102; Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812–22 (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1957). 4. John K. Fairbank, “The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order,” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 264.

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than the creation of a new one.”5 A “separatism plus” policy endured through most of the rest of the nineteenth century in the face of internal rebellions and piecemeal attempts to accommodate the West.6 Chinese resistance to integration was a product of Western policies as well. The Europeans and Americans were only willing to grant limited membership in the form of “unequal treaties” that did not recognize China as a fully sovereign power. Such treatment generated political resentment.7 Republican. An initial shift to a different approach to international society came with the 1895 Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War. That event set off a race among outsiders to control China and encouraged forces within China to challenge the separatist tradition, including in foreign policy. Japan’s defeat of China, even though Japan had previously been a tributary state, lent weight to Chinese groups that favored modernization. Japan after all had been in a similar situation of weakness as China’s just a few decades earlier but had opened in the Meiji restoration and successfully modernized. The different paths of Japan and China in the years 1870–1900 reflected just how much China had not changed and how change would require more than the administrative reorganization of foreign policy or the simple acquisition of Western armaments or military practices. China began to take part in international institutions at the turn of the century (e.g., the 1899 Hague Convention). The Boxer Rebellion of 1900—in protest against foreign influence in China—was the last-gasp effort of traditional forces to maintain China’s separation from the West. Its futility is seen in its reliance on the “magical powers” of secret societies that would resist the weapons technology of the foreigners. With fits and starts and spurred by its Republican revolution in 1911, China experimented with integration in the international system. China, like other “normal” powers, saw the need to take part in World War I.8 Maoist. Spurred by the United States’ confrontational policy and Mao’s “continuous revolution” ideological mind set, China shifted to a revisionist approach with its communist revolution after World War II. This revisionism took

5. Teng Ssu-yu and John K. Fairbank, China’s Response to the West, a Documentary Survey 1839–1923 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), 49. 6. Fairbank, “The Early Treaty System”; Teng and Fairbank, China’s Response; Yongjin Zhang, China in the International System, 1918–1920: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery (London: Macmillan, 1991). 7. Gerrit Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University, 1984). 8. Ibid.; Gerrit Gong, “China’s Entry into International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998).

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on different faces in the forty years following the revolution.9 China’s “lean to one side” alliance with the Soviet Union challenged the dominant international society led by the Euro-American “Atlantic Pact” countries. In the few years following the Communist victory most of the non-Soviet Western presence and activity in China had been extinguished.10 By 1952 Chinese citizens could be prosecuted for sedition for receiving mail from the West.11 After its later split with the Soviet Union, China adopted its own revisionist view focusing on leadership of the Third World. During the Cultural Revolution, building on Mao Zedong’s “self-reliance” theory, China tilted toward self-isolation—a kind of “diplomatic quarantine” but one that nonetheless offered the most radical critique of the “imperialist” West.12 Even after China’s partial reengagement initiated with “ping-pong” diplomacy, Mao heralded a more moderate (“three worlds theory”) yet still revisionist Chinese view of international order. Deng’s Shift to “Reform and Opening” and Today. Beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s ascent to leadership in 1978, China has not sought separation from the system nor has it aspired to overturning it. Instead it has increasingly opted for integrating. This orientation has manifested itself in significant increases in international institutional membership as well as more informal cooperative behavior with the Euro-American powers.13 This integrative orientation was cautious in the early Deng period, but in the past decade has picked up considerable momentum. There is room to debate the depth of Chinese integration—whether it is shallow or enmeshed—but the trend is clear. China has left behind the “world revolution” and “three worlds theory” rhetoric of revisionism and seemingly gives less emphasis to its former pronounced role as “leader of the Third World.”14 Instead China today shows most of the markers of a conservative great power accepting the basic principles of the existing international order.15 China joined the World Trade Organization, has cooperated more fully with the United States since the 9/11 attacks, and participates regularly in the elite global club, the G8. China’s continued promotion of “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and calls for a “new political and economic order that is fair and rational” 9. Such a shift was also apparent under the Kuomintang in the postwar period. See John S. Gregory, The West and China since 1500 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 177. 10. Beverly Hooper, China Stands Up: Ending the Western Presence (Sydney: Allen & Unwin 1986). 11. William C. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the Republican Era,” China Quarterly 150 (1997): 457. 12. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China,” 458. 13. See Ann Kent, “China’s International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations,” Global Governance 8:3 (2002): 343–64; Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International Studies Quarterly 45:4 (2001): 487–515. 14. Such themes are common in speeches from the 1970s. See for example, the keynote speeches at the Tenth (1973) and Eleventh (1978) Party Congresses. 15. Robert S. Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power,” Foreign Affairs 76:2 (1997): 33–45.

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seem vague enough to suggest no real commitment to major revision of the system except when the system precludes Chinese influence.16 To suggest that China accepts the basic principles of today’s international order is not to ignore areas where it would like to see change. Four stand out. First, China favors “multipolarization”—i.e. that all states (or at least great powers) have a more equal say and the United States (or any other predominant country) less influence—especially in terms of the U.S. ability to use force to achieve its goals or to intervene in the domestic politics of other countries.17 Second, China favors reunification and rejects any move that enhances Taiwanese independence. China in this issue, as with Tibet or other disputed territories, portrays itself as defender of extant sovereignty rules. Third, China is (perhaps the only) nondemocratic major power and its leaders would prefer there be no emergent norm or pressure in international politics that favors human rights, free speech, and elections. China does not rule out democracy in its future, it just insists that it will follow its own path, style of democracy, and timing. Indeed, China has made some progress in terms of liberalization. Most Chinese recognize that their personal freedoms are significantly better than was the case in the past (especially under Mao).18 Finally, in terms of regional politics, China may be more revisionist—in terms of supplanting Japanese and U.S. influence—than in its approach to international order.19 Overall, despite these four sources of dissatisfaction with contemporary international order, China remains integrationist. There are obviously seeds of future revisionism, but we need to explore what conditions could make them grow—or keep them dormant.

Explaining Purpose: Is There a Puzzle? A focus on purpose is only interesting if it is puzzling for extant explanations. Two arguments have dominated the debate on the rise of China. One focuses on the threat of China’s growing power. A second features the beneficial effects of growing economic interdependence. Both offer a critical influ16. Jiang Zemin’s Report to the Sixteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, November 8, 2002, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm. China’s recent “reassurance diplomacy” in Southeast Asia suggests a mode of cooperative leadership not easily equated with domination or balancing behavior, but is nonetheless compatible with extant norms. 17. Even assuming the Chinese economy triples by 2025, Chinese military spending is expected to reach $185 billion or only half of current U.S. military spending. Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan S. Medeiros, James C. Mulvenon, and William H. Overholt, Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005): xxiii–xxv. 18. Suisheng Zhao, “Introduction: China’s Democratization Reconsidered,” in China and Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: Routledge, 2000), 11–12. Ian Johnson, “The Death and Life of China’s Civil Society,” Perspectives on Politics 1:3 (2003): 551–54. 19. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29:3 (2005): 64–99; and Nicholas Khoo, Michael L. R. Smith, and David Shambaugh, “Correspondence: China Engages Asia? Caveat Lector,” ibid., 30:1 (2005): 196–213.

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ence on China’s trajectory. Neither, however, is sufficient for understanding purpose transition (or not) in China. For example, one might argue that purpose is an analytically uninteresting category because purpose follows power: as states grow, so too does their appetite for revision. This is the essence of the power transition account. 20 Yet as mentioned in Jack Levy’s chapter, the literature that looks at transitions fi nds that we must explain both power and “satisfaction”: the latter is not simply a product of the former. While power is undeniably important in affecting transitions, power does not unilaterally determine purpose, as seen in the record of change and continuity in China. China has been consistently weaker than the dominant powers of world politics since the nineteenth century, but its ideas have varied. It may be that China’s power trajectory (not static position) is most important, but that trajectory has been rising (in fits and starts) since the Communists seized control of the mainland. China’s ideas, however, have shifted from revisionism to integration. And contrary to the “rising China” thesis—i.e., that foreign policy ambitions grow with relative power—China was most intent on revising the system when it was weakest (not strongest) in its rising trajectory—between 1949 and 1954 (see figure 7.1)21. One also might argue that it is not power transitions per se that matter, but the security threats that countries face. Yet China in the Qing era did not alter its isolationist ideas to deal with the encroaching and threatening European powers even though the security situation indicated mounting dangers. A different argument comes from those who believe that China’s increasing interdependence in the current world order will determine China’s purpose by reinforcing its status quo attitude. The more that China is economically and socially entwined with other major powers (e.g., the United States) the more it gains from the overall system and the more it has to lose by changing the system or engaging in major confl ict. 22 The problem is that increasing interdependence does not lead inevitably to national changes towards satisfaction with the status quo. Indeed one of the 20. As Robert Gilpin once put it: “As its relative power increases, a rising state attempts to change the rules governing the system.” Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 187. See too John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 402. 21. Relative power is given as a composite of the relative share of absolute total global data on six categories: energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditure, military personnel, total population, and urban population. See National Material Capabilities Study (v3.01), http://www.correlatesofwar.org. GDP data are expressed in millions of real 1990 USD converted at “Geary- Khamis” purchasing power parities. See The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, “Total Economy Database,” January 2007, http://www.ggdc.net. 22. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2000).

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0.9 0.8 China CINC China GDP in 10 trillion USD (1990)

CINC and GDP

0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1950

1955

1960 1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000 2005

Fig. 7.1. China’s relative (CINC) and absolute (GDP) power

main gaps of bottom-up liberal arguments is the absence of a logic for why those individuals and interest groups that favor opening can effectively come together to shape national strategy. 23 For example, what number of international business–interested citizens or internet users or foreign-educated citizens or officials who have taken part in international negotiations translates into an integrative policy? The history of national economic modernization via engagement with the international arena is filled with stories of countries undertaking integration and then later moving in the opposite direction. Here we might think of Germany’s shift from Weimar to Hitler or Japan’s shift from Taisho democracy to the Showa era. China itself reversed directions in moving from Qing China to Nationalist China to Communist China. Interdependence itself is at least in part a Chinese policy choice that needs to be explained. Other countries shaped this outcome as well. U.S. policy after Mao came to power was largely aimed at isolating and containing China. Thus as seen in figure 7.2, Chinese interdependence declined following the rise of Mao’s revisionism, and when China began to recalibrate after the disastrous Cultural Revolution, interdependence began to rise—especially after 1978.24 23. See, for example, the absence of an aggregation explanation in Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Relations,” International Organization 51:4 (fall 1997): 513–53; and Jeffry A. Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview,” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25–47. 24. Trade data are the total current value of imports and exports over the total current GDP. See http://chinadataonline.org/member/macroy/.

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0.8 0.7

Trade/GDP

0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1952

1957

1962

1967

1972

1977

1982

1987

1992

1997

2002

Fig. 7.2. China’s interdependence

Interdependence, furthermore, does not always lead to satisfaction—as witnessed by the high level of interdependence that existed before World War I. In Asia today, China’s interdependence is most developed between itself and Japan and Taiwan. Yet it is with those countries that China has the most revisionist aims and confl ict.25 Overall, what the above suggests is that the two central current hypotheses on China’s future purpose leave much to explain. Purpose can hardly be reduced to either power or the level of interdependence. We need to know more about what drives purpose.

A Purpose Transition Argument A usable purpose transition theory would explain why the intentions of states regarding international order usually endure but sometimes are vulnerable to change. 26 China’s purpose, past and present, is molded by the collective ideas that leaders rely on to guide the state and the conditions that weaken those concepts, allowing their critics to replace them. Ideas in this view are the critical terrain around which domestic politics take place—they are where interests aggregate. Political leaders use collective ideas to explain national action and justify their own choices. The interaction between these ideas and outcomes, as well as the availability of replacement concepts, defi nes whether 25. Khoo et al., “Correspondence,” 200. 26. That is, ideas help to determine their own transformation. For the full development of this general argument, see Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

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states transform their approach to international order or not. This divergence follows a distinct logic which I outline below. The problem with existing power and interdependence arguments is that they give no reliable account of how international conditions are filtered through domestic politics. What is needed is attention to the mechanisms that inform states about how to act in an uncertain international environment as well as to the way that numerous confl icting domestic interests congeal into national purpose. The general explanation that follows is based on three claims: (1) Leaders base foreign policy on broad concepts about how to act (2) These ideas are typically institutionalized and difficult to change (3) Change only occurs in specific circumstances based on the interaction of ideas and events and the nature of replacement ideas.

Ideas as Orthodoxy States tend to formulate broad concepts—almost operational philosophies— that orient their international behavior. As large societies, nations require ideas that signify to their members what they stand for; as large organizations they require ideas to guide them in their interactions in the international arena. “Ideas,” as I use the term here, are not mental constructs of individuals, but instead the collective beliefs of societies and organizations about how to act. For example, China’s current “reform and opening” is one such view. National ideas about international order are difficult to change and continuity is the norm in foreign policy ideas. Those who want to challenge tradition face significant hurdles. It is often hard for change agents to know if others desire change and if so how much they will risk acting on such preferences. Lacking such information, change agents cannot be sure if their own desire and efforts for change (should they exist) will have any effect. They must mount a case why the old ideas are defunct which can involve considerable effort, and because it threatens tradition, invites social and political criticism. Likewise the formation and institutionalization of new ideas breeds strife and uncertainty because particular orientations offer differing costs and benefits to domestic groups that can stalemate over which, if any, new direction is more desirable. Continuity, therefore, is a potent force. Yet we know that change does occur and it seems to happen via two analytically distinct stages: (1) collapse of the old ideas and (2) consolidation of the new. Both stages, I argue, are affected by preexisting ideas. When Orthodoxies Are Vulnerable In the collapse stage, preexisting ideas affect how leaders justify policy and set a baseline of social expectations of what should result. Political opponents within countries then use those baselines to assess—and support or

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critique—existing policies depending on events. When events contradict these expectations and the consequences are starkly undesirable, change is more likely. Such situations facilitate change by giving ammunition to the opponents of the current orthodoxy, allowing them to rally support to their side while supporters of the current orthodoxy are put on the defensive. In most other circumstances, continuity is likely. For example, continuity is probable if undesirable results follow actions that are deviations from existing ideas. When the United States intervened in World War I it violated its long-standing taboo against entanglement in Europe’s politics. The results of World War I brought widespread disillusionment in the United States and Americans returned to their tradition of “no entanglement” in Eu rope. In such situations, defenders of the old ideas will be able to make political hay (as the American isolationists did) by claiming “told you so, we should never have strayed from our tried and true tradition.” Intervention in World War I, they argued, had been a disastrous mistake. Continuity is likely even when dominant ideas are ignored yet desirable results occur (suggesting the irrelevance of the old). It is hard for critics to gather momentum to change collective ideas when outcomes are agreeable. Consider for example the dearth of investigations of large stock market gains that no one expected versus the special commissions that always seem to form to examine unexpected stock market crashes. The delegitimation of an extant orthodoxy requires events that both contradict its logic and have undesired consequences. In such circumstances, individuals will be more motivated and more likely to challenge those ideas and believe others are of a like mind, and hence the possibilities for change are more significant.

When New Ideas Stick Even when dominant ideas are delegitimized, however, change is not automatic. Consolidation, like collapse, presents hurdles to change and comfort to inertia. Individuals may agree that the old view has to go but may not be able to agree on what should be the new orthodoxy. Such a dynamic is familiar in revolutions (e.g., the French Revolution), but it also exists in foreign policy disputes and debates. The consolidation of a new foreign policy approach depends not only on the collapse of the old ideas, but also on the existence of a leading replacement concept. When there are no developed alternatives or when there are many equally strong alternatives, the result could be a return to the old thinking due to default in the fi rst case and deadlock among factions in the second. The sustainability of a new orthodoxy (when a prominent replacement does exist) over a longer period often hinges on some demonstration of its effi cacy. Ideas that endure do so because they appear to generate desirable results. When those notions do not, revanchists often fi nd fertile ground to argue for a return to the old ideas. This was the case in Weimar Germany when the results of Versailles undermined the liberal international policy of the fledgling

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Social Democratic government. In contrast, the economic miracle of West Germany after World War II cemented the pro-Western integration notions of that era. Overall, then, the account of foreign policy change (and continuity) offered here depends on the interaction of the dominant foreign policy ideas of states with the results encountered, as well as the distribution of replacement ideas in a particular society and their initial success, if any. We can posit that national change will depend on the degree to which the expectations of par ticular dominant ideas are defied by events, negative consequences result, and some socially viable replacement idea exists.

Explaining China’s Purpose Transitions The utility of this argument can be assessed—relative to alternative arguments—against the record of continuity and change in China’s purpose. Given space constraints, this can only be done in a brief way here—thus what follows explores the plausibility of the logic, it is not a conclusive test. The key criterion is whether this purpose transition argument better accounts for the record than the standard power or interdependence accounts. We need to understand not only why change occurred when it did, but also why some ideas endured despite pressures for change. A power approach would expect that purpose will vary with external power/threat conditions. Change should occur when existing purpose endangers the country’s relative position or its security or when growth in power leads to new opportunities for expanded aims. An interdependence approach would expect that China would shift towards integration in eras when it is more connected to the international system and would stay outside of the system when interdependence potential is low. Table 7.1 summarizes the results, indicating with a check when the conditions of the different approaches would expect change as compared with when change actually occurred. Not surprisingly, none of the explanations provides a perfect account. Yet as seen in table 7.1, the purpose transition argument matches actual outcomes better than either a spare power or interdependence account. As the purpose transition logic anticipates, in instances where either collapse or consolidation dynamics were missing continuity prevailed. Yet when collapse and consolidation conditions existed, change took place. In contrast, neither power nor interdependence influence correlated as closely with the outcomes. The following brief descriptions detail the degree to which the evolution of purpose happened in the way the theory envisions. Qing-Era Continuity: Qing-era China showed surprisingly little change in its foreign policy thinking despite the substantial challenge from the West. This continuity was a result of the absence of either collapse or consolidation at different times. After 1800 the increasing presence and capabilities of the

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Table 7.1. Ideas versus power and interdependence: Predications of change in China’s purpose compared with the actual outcome. Purpose transition Collapse?

Consolidation?

Change Occurred?

Power → Change?

Qing I (1800 >)

≠

≠

≠

√

≠

Qing II (1842 >)

√

≠

≠

√

∞

Republican (1896 >)

√

∞

√

∞

√

Mao (1949 >)

√

√

√

∞

≠

Deng (1978 >)

√

√

√

√

√

Post- Deng (1997 >)

≠

≠

≠

∞

≠

Era (Year)

Interdependence → Change?

Note: √ = Yes; ≠ = No; ∞ = Mixed

European powers indicated a rising threat to China that was to varying degrees ignored. In the fi rst part of the century, there were few noteworthy events to motivate Chinese (especially those not devoted to foreign affairs) to think about the need for change and especially to act. Moreover there was little economic and social exchange that would breed interests in interdependence. Hence prevailing traditions retained sway. In the second phase after the First Opium War (1842), the old separatist orthodoxy clearly faced a legitimacy crisis. That is, China had adhered to its traditional Sinocentrism and suffered significant negative results. The Qing empire already faced decline due to internal unrest, but that condition was inflamed by external setbacks such as the losses to foreigners in the Opium Wars. It is not a coincidence that China’s “age of rebellions” followed defeat in the First Opium War. Yet despite major setbacks and the clear challenge from the West (i.e. conditions favoring collapse) there was no immediate rush to change. One of the central reasons for this was the absence of a clear replacement concept and constituency. After China’s long period at the center of an Asian international order, there were too few in China who could even think about a different form of international relations. Thus in the period 1840 to 1880, China mostly attempted to fit the world to its view, not vice versa. 27 Likewise China’s tentative moves towards opening and reform—i.e., adopting procedural diplomatic norms of Western countries—began after the Second Opium war, and were limited. 28 As the 27. Teng and Fairbank, China’s Response to the West, esp. 18–24; Fairbank, “The Early Treaty System.” 28. Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsü, China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858–1880 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Zhang, China in the International System, 16–19.

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future revolutionary Sun Yat-sen wrote to an official in 1893, “the reason why we have not achieved much [relative to other countries that had opened up]; public opinion and entrenched ideas simply will not allow it.”29 The limited reform movements that took shape after 1860 began to constitute the basis for an alternative view, but did not congeal until the end of the century. Nationalist Change to Integration: The event that marked the emergence of a full-fledged integration contender to the old orthodoxy was the Japanese defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. There were two differences at this time that facilitated change. The fi rst involved the collapse of the old orthodoxy. While losses to distant European powers certainly challenged Qing foreign policy ideas, the defeat by Japan, a country that had paid tribute to China in the past, was a different-order setback. It put a spotlight on Chinese martial weakness even in an Asian context and it meant the end of Chinese suzerainty over Korea—a stark threat to traditional notions. The most critical difference, however, was that it gave momentum to those forces within China that favored change and in particular to those who had been slowly developing social support for integration over the decades since the Opium War. There was now an alternative that might serve as a focal point for consolidation of a replacement orthodoxy. This movement was helped by Japan’s successful precedent.30 The pronounced shocks to the prior separatist position, in combination with the development of integrationist thinking and constituencies, created strong momentum in China towards joining international society, not just in terms of procedure, but by abandoning “conceptual sinocentrism.”31 This outcome might also be explained through power conditions (Chinese weakness owing to its isolation demanded change) and interdependence (China’s growing connections to the outside world and potential in the future gave incentives for integration). Yet doing so is a stretch. The power approach may suggest the need for change but has little to say on why integration would be the chosen option. In the interdependence approach, the level of exchange was still relatively low, so there were no extant pressures from established internal interests. The Republican Period. This period was characterized by the absence of a strong central government and by fighting among groups within China— communists, nationalists, warlords, and foreign powers—for regional and national control. A variety of different foreign policy tactics were employed in this period. But despite this turmoil and internal fighting, the Republican era represented a fairly consistent integrationist outlook—a “high mark of 29. Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 32. 30. When Japan then beat Russia in its confl ict in 1904, the notion that Japan was doing something right, while China was not, gained additional influence in domestic reform and nationalist movements. Mitter, A Bitter Revolution, 32–24; Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 2003), 24ff. 31. The term comes from Zhang, China in the International System, 21.

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internationalism”—for China.32 Yet due to the turmoil of domestic politics, it was one that was never fully consolidated. Mao’s Shift to Revision and Separation. A major change in China’s approach to international society came with the triumph of the Communists in 1949 after decades of weak central government and the incompetence of the nominal Republican leadership. While issues of domestic stability were certainly involved, the origins of this change can also be found in the contestation over foreign policy ideas, specifically over China’s integration policy. When China took up a role as normal power in World War I, the expectation was that in doing so it would be treated as an equal country. China had joined the victorious Allies before the war ended and fully supported Wilson’s Fourteen Points plan for the postwar order. Yet such integrative policies met an early rebuke in the Versailles Peace Treaty that caused deep outrage by handing German concessions in China to Japan. This latter action spurred the May Fourth Movement (the day the terms of the Versailles treaty were announced) that helped incite the Kuomintang and the Communist political movements.33 Mao recognized in 1952 that his popularity was linked to the failure of the Republican and Nationalist forces to provide autonomy from foreign control: “China’s modern revolutionary struggle has for its goal, fi rst and foremost, the opposition against the invasion of imperialism.”34 The grudging integration (never fully consolidated) that emerged in China in the decades after the turn of the century had not achieved what it was intended to do—restore China’s sovereignty. Instead, it marked continued subordination to and domination by European powers. Such subordination was again revisited at the end of World War II when the victorious powers made decisions on China and Asia at Yalta without Chinese input.35 This failure fueled the rise of Chinese nationalism and ultimately (after the failure of the incompetent Nationalists) Mao Zedong’s successful communist revolution that offered a very different approach to international relations. On the Tiananmen Gate on October 1, 1949, with the defeated Kuomintang army on the run, Mao declared that “China has stood up.”36 Consolidation in this case—at least in terms of moving away from integration—was aided by the fact that revisionism gained legitimacy with the successful defense of China in the Korean War. 37 China had prevented what it 32. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China,” 457. See too Zhang, China in the International System. 33. See Michael Hunt, Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 77ff. 34. Quoted ibid., 74. 35. Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984), 297–99. 36. Hooper, China Stands Up. 37. Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Confl ict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) plumbs the links between the Korean War and Chinese domestic politics.

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perceived as a likely march of U.S. forces into China from the Korean peninsula. With the later split with the Soviet Union, China turned toward a more separatist notion of revisionism, yet under Mao continued to aspire to overturning the dominant international order.38 Mao’s unhooking of China from international order does not fit predictions of an interdependence perspective in that China could have easily benefited from greater connection to the global economy and there was no precipitous drop in cross-border flows that undermined pro-interdependence domestic groups. Separation in this case was a choice that reduced interdependence, not the opposite. There is a debate over whether China really had any other option than revisionism due to the hostility of the United States towards the Communists in the 1940s. Yet it appears that the Chinese leadership’s ideology and Mao’s own “continuous revolution” view heavily tilted China towards revisionism, even precluding a “Tito” solution where China would seek neutrality.39 A power perspective offers mixed predictions in this case. On the one hand, the existing Republican government had not established autonomy in the desired fashion. Yet from a security/power perspective, it is not clear how a shift to a revisionist approach would enhance Chinese security given that this would provoke the wrath of the United States. Even given a U.S. predisposition against the Communist leadership, a Tito solution would have been desirable from a realpolitik view. Moreover, in contrast to the power transition view, China became most revisionist when it was weak (not strong). Deng’s “Reform and Opening”—And Its Continuity. A third major turning point in China’s international thinking followed Mao’s death. Mao’s revisionism was widely recognized as a failure—almost a continuation of the earlier isolation that had been a major source of China’s decline.40 Mao had in fact turned away from such a course with the renewal of relations with the United States and China’s subsequent admission to the UN (replacing Taiwan) in 1971. Still, Chinese integration in the period 1971–78 was relatively modest. There were those who wanted to continue Mao’s revisionist legacy, yet the setbacks of the Cultural Revolution and its attendant foreign policy allowed room to consider other ideas. The 1970s were a decade when those seeking a replacement gathered their forces. In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China made a major shift to “reform and opening” that actively attempted to develop China and protect its well-being, not by separation from international society, but instead by 38. Lieberthal, Governing China, 76, 90, 115; Kirby, “The Internationalization of China,” 448. 39. See Hunt, Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, and Zhang, China in International Society since 1949, vs. Christensen, Useful Adversaries, and Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 40. Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,” Journal of Contemporary China 10:26 (2001): 34–35.

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deeper integration. Deng recognized that foreign capital—and integration—was critical to development. His implementation of integration, which his successors deepened, produced positive economic results that marginalized its critics and encouraged its institutionalization as the dominant orthodoxy. As discussed below, integration today enjoys a privileged position in Chinese thinking that has few challengers. The shift to integration—and its continuity in the post-Deng era—is one that might be expected by either a power or an interdependence perspective. Certainly China’s continued weakness under Mao’s revisionism was an indicator that a different approach might better serve the growth of China’s relative capabilities, as well as its security. The continuity of Chinese purpose up to the present day, even as China’s relative power has increased significantly is less understandable from a power transition perspective, but the answer may be that it has not yet gathered enough power. From an interdependence view, the “opening” of China produced a potential for significant gains through exchanges with the West. That potential was realized under Deng and reinforced integrationist factions, which is why this view anticipates continuing Chinese support of international order, assuming its continued openness, in the future. What is clear in these periods of both continuity and change is that ideas played a role in the evolution of Chinese foreign policy. Yet, simply because the purpose transition account better explains outcomes than a monocausal power or interdependence argument does not mean those factors were irrelevant. Indeed they mattered a great deal. The point is that the effects of power and interdependence work through interaction with ideas. Strategic circumstances and relative power frequently matter in shaping negative and positive feedback to prevailing ideas—e.g., the fate of Hitler’s world domination aspirations when they met the combined economies and force of the Allies. Dominant concepts that ignore relative power can lead to disappointing results that contribute to their delegitimation. Consider the decline of the Qing-era tribute system and Sinocentrism under the weight of European and Japanese power in the late nineteenth century. Likewise, the number and nature of replacement ideas so central to consolidation is shaped by the political activity and resources of interest groups and individuals that promote them. Economic interdependence and the promises of growth inherent in it can indeed strengthen those in favor of such ideas.41 Long-term efforts that encourage international exchange can facilitate the rise of replacement ideas in particular societies.42 For example, efforts made over 41. This is the thrust of Frieden and Rogowski, “The Impact of the International Economy.” 42. See Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

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many years by a variety of groups in the United States (and in Britain) after World War I had much to do with why internationalism (a fusing of geopolitics and Wilsonianism) was a coherent replacement for isolationism in American strategy after World War II. Likewise during the Cold War, U.S. and European interaction with the Soviet Union helped “new thinking” (and not some other thinking) take shape as a viable replacement when the old Soviet foreign policy dogma disintegrated.43 Thus the success of ideas can be shaped by the degree a country is involved in international society.

Crucible of China’s Future Purpose The argument above highlights particular signposts as important for understanding what China might do with its growing power in the future, specifically the factors that drive collapse and consolidation. China’s “reform and opening” mentality depends on the expectations leaders promoting it generate in the domestic arena and the results that are experienced (collapse considerations) as well as on the supply of ideas that might replace integration (consolidation factors). Expectations and Results. China’s leaders justify and promote integration on the basis of an enduring idea that links internal development and external relations—i.e. “reform and opening”—in two fundamental ways. The fi rst, and most important, justification is that integration within the existing international order provides the best means for national economic development. China’s government is controlled by the Communist Party of China. Yet the legitimacy and popu lar support of the government does not rest on socialist ideology, but instead on economic per for mance. Chinese leaders explicitly put development at the top of their “to do” list and recognize they (and integration itself) will be judged by how well they fulfi ll that goal.44 Thus one situation where the integrationist orthodoxy would be vulnerable involves troubles in China’s economic modernization. Ironically China might abandon integration not because it is rising but instead due to major ruptures in growth that could put the dominant “openness” view on a slippery defensive. A reasonable case can be made that a leveling of Chinese economic growth is as likely in the future as is China’s rise to supremacy.45 If China’s government is somehow implicated (i.e. assuming ruptures are not global), 43. Legro, Rethinking the World. 44. Jiang Zemin, Report to the Sixteenth National Party Congress in 2002; “President Hu Outlines Work Agenda for 2005,” http://www.chinaembassy.org.il/eng/xwdt/t178046.htm (accessed February 8, 2005). 45. Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, “What Kind of Landing for the Chinese Economy?” Institute for International Economics, Policy Briefs in International Economics, PB04-7, November 2004. David Dollar, “China’s Economic Problems (And Ours),” Milken Institute Review 7:3(2005): 48–58.

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internal critics of the current orthodoxy will have incentives to use faltering Chinese economic prospects to rally political authority around a new approach to the international system. The Chinese government would have fewer resources to transfer to losers (e.g., peasant farmers with complaints about the WTO).46 The motivating source in such a scenario will be the combination of surprising economic setbacks and exaggerated domestic expectations generated by leaders seeking legitimacy. The second major justification for integration within the existing international order is that it enhances sovereignty—i.e., Chinese autonomy and territorial integrity. Integration should prevent the colonial subordination of the past and the infringement of China by outside powers—one of the main claims of the Communist Party of China for its competence and authority.47 Integration facilitates such a goal by providing access to institutional forums where global politics are decided that might affect China’s autonomy. Such integration also provides the imprint of major power status that confi rms the country is no longer simply an object manipulated by more powerful Western countries or Japan, but an important actor itself. The most concrete marker of sovereignty for China today is Taiwan. China expects that its participation in the extant institutions and conventions of world politics will help to fulfill a desire (seemingly widespread across the political spectrum) to unite the mainland and Taiwan. Such participation also allows China to stymie efforts by Taiwan to claim sovereign international standing.48 The integration orthodoxy could, therefore, also be vulnerable due to events that China sees as neocolonial e.g., those which move Taiwan towards independence against China’s desires. Much of course will depend on particular circumstances and whether they make the Beijing government seem complicit in such a move. Taiwanese efforts to establish formal independence cause deep concern in China—indeed the type that can set the stage for China to take aggressive efforts on an issue seen as a priority even by “reformist” governments. Taiwanese independence efforts in 2004–5 were met by a strong reaction from Hu Jintao and by the National People’s Congress 46. Joseph Lin, “In A Fortnight—Beijing Looking After the Rural Poor,” China Brief 7:5 (March 8, 2007), http://www.jamestown.org/china _brief/article.php?articleid =2373275. 47. For an example, see China’s October 2005 white paper “Building Political Democracy in China,” especially Section I, “A Choice Suited to China’s Conditions,” http://english.people .com.cn/whitepaper/democracy/democracy.html. 48. These two themes, economic modernization and sovereignty, may look very close to the realist focus on power and autonomy. The key difference, however, is that Chinese leaders justify them not in terms of increasing China’s security, but in terms of bettering the living standard of Chinese citizens. China’s obsession with Taiwan and other territories is also hard to understand from a strict power perspective. Without knowing China’s history, and the centrality of Taiwan to CPC legitimacy gains, it is impossible to understand the role this issue plays in Chinese politics and security decision-making. Hence, newcomers to China are always puzzled by China’s fi xation on Taiwan.

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passing antisecession legislation which authorized China to use force against Taiwan if it continued to push for independence.49 Contenders for Future Purpose. What exactly might replace China’s current purpose is elusive. The nature and distribution of replacement ideas about international society within China are largely elite matters and are difficult to track given the taboo against discussing such topics.50 Three potential replacement ideas seem distinguishable. The fi rst was identified by Jiang Zemin as a challenge to his own “reform and opening” emphasis in the years following the 1989 Tiananmen Square fiasco.51 Jiang labeled this the threat from the “Right,” and it comes from those (e.g., the new private businessmen and state-owned enterprise executives, artists and intellectuals, coastal city regions and their officials, and even parts of the bureaucracy that have an interest in integration) who want an even more rapid pace of integration and political openness—perhaps at the expense of the Party. Jiang was focused on this challenge and went to considerable effort to lure successful businessmen into the Party and welcome the return of Chinese from abroad who might otherwise be a voice for more forceful political change. Jiang also identified a second group with alternative preferences for China’s foreign policy. He called it “those with leftist tendencies”—i.e. people who would critique reform and international involvement as contributing to social injustice and inequality. In the current context, this might include farmers, rural citizens, inland cities, and parts of the military or the Communist Party that have not shared equally in China’s development and could rightly blame “reform and opening” or participation in the global order (think WTO) as the cause. In foreign policy such tendencies translate into social support for halting and reversing China’s integration in the current order. If the communiqué from the Fifth Plenary of the Sixteenth Party Congress in October 2005 is an indicator, the challenge from the left—and the inequality of growth—are of particular concern to the leadership of Hu Jintao who has emphasized the more egalitarian goal of a “harmonious society” in contrast to Jiang’s mantra of a “well-off society.”52 49. Edward Cody, “China Sends Warning to Taiwan With Anti- Secession Law,” Washington Post, March 8, 2005, A12. 50. A notable effort to clarify this area is Susan Shirk, China, Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 51. Jiang Zemin’s Report at the Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1992, reprinted in China Documents Annual 4, ed. Peter R. Moody (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press) 1996. 52. “Chinese Communist Party Fifth Plenary Session Communiqué—Text,” Xinhua News Agency Domestic Ser vice, Beijing, October 11, 2005; Joseph Kahn, “China Approves Plan to Ease Wealth Gap,” New York Times, October 11, 2005; Cheng Li, “Hu’s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai’s Coming of Age,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 15 (summer 2005), http://www .chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20053/ lc.html; Cheng Li, “China’s Inner-Party Democracy: Toward

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A third contender might come from those who are critical of globalization and Western values, but are not necessarily isolationist or anticapitalist. These people might advocate a nationalist realpolitik policy that favors a more confrontational strategy with the West, and stability and central authority at home, while pursuing a soft line and integration in Asia. Think of this perhaps, as the platform for the resurgence of a modern-day “Middle Kingdom” role where China would exercise increasing hegemony within Asia while perhaps distancing itself from overall international order. 53 The point would be integration and dominance in the region with distance from broader international order. Chinese strategy will of course always be a mix of these different approaches; the issue is the direction of shift and the degree to which one orientation dominates. To the extent that a factional account of Chinese politics is overdrawn (e.g., because the decision-making dynamic is one of consensus not groups fighting over control) then any change in foreign policy thinking will demand especially negative results and could take considerable time, just as it did in Qing China. 54 If there is a continued shared view that “isolation is the major factor explaining China’s decline” and “opening fueled China’s rise” then shifting significantly away from “reform and opening” would not happen quickly. 55 Although not so dominant as the separatist mentality of Qing China, integration today enjoys a privileged status against which replacement idea proponents may have a hard time making headway.

U.S. Policy and China’s Purpose This section considers the implications of a purpose transition argument for U.S. policy towards China in the years ahead. First, however, there is a more basic question. Can U.S. influence matter at all? Two extreme views exist on the possibility of American leverage over China’s development and its policies. The fi rst is the United States is the maker of the world, a “unipolar” power whose interventions, however episodic, craft the politics of every region. In this view (one shared by both power and interdependence proponents), the United States will have significant leverage on China’s future purpose. The second position is that China is so large that outside influence is minimal—China’s future will almost wholly be a domestic matter not influenced by outsiders. 56 a System of “One Party, Two Factions,” China Brief 6:24 (December 6, 2006). http://www. jamestown.org/china _brief/article.php?articleid =2373247. 53. David Kang, “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations,” International Security 28 (winter 2004): 165–81; Khoo et al., “Correspondence.” 54. Paul Heer, “A House United,” Foreign Affairs 79:4 (2000): 18–25; Cheng Li, “The New Bipartisanship within the Chinese Communist Party,” Orbis (summer 2005): 387–400. 55. Yan, “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,” 35. 56. Robert Kagan, “The Illusion of ‘Managing’ China,” Washington Post, May 15, 2005.

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The ideational account I have offered splits this difference, arguing that domestic dynamics are in fact central to China’s purpose formation and that in most circumstances the United States on its own cannot fundamentally determine those dynamics. Nonetheless, the argument accepts that American influence—in some circumstances and in par ticu lar ways—can in fact matter. If the ideational purpose transition argument is right, then U.S. policy must pay attention to how Chinese leaders justify their policies and what the alternatives to their positions are in domestic debates. If Beijing’s leaders are attempting to build their authority and legitimate their rule based on claims and actions that challenge international order, other states should object to and/or penalize such actions. Assuming the goal is to incorporate China into the international system, doing so means helping to make sure those Chinese who have staked their legitimacy on the positive aspects of integration have something to show for it. A modern-day repeat of the undermining of pro-liberalization advocates by Western action—as occurred when the Versailles Treaty spawned the May Fourth Movement and a reactionary China—would be a tragedy. This may mean making an extra effort to assure payoffs to China for particularly bold moves in terms of integration—or in terms of restraint vis-à-vis Taiwan (or Tibet)— depending on how leaders present such actions domestically. There is a risk in supporting China’s current rapid development through integration. It may lead—through unforeseen events, or miscalculation, or inadequate means—to a China that grows strong enough to be dangerous, but has not yet changed enough internally to be satisfied with the norms of the system. In such circumstances, where integrationist ideas are undermined, China may well look to another and much less desirable set of ideas to guide its foreign policy. To deal with this scenario, it makes sense to pay attention to the potential replacement ideas (and their backers) circulating in China—i.e. the ones that may someday be the new orthodoxy. Hence U.S. policy should be concerned not only with collapse dynamics, but also heed the politics within China that will determine the rise of a new orthodoxy. Patient, low-key, long-term efforts might encourage those Chinese groups and individuals who would support, in the event of significant setbacks to reform and opening, replacement ideas that would be more desirable than an aggressive separatist nationalist approach to foreign policy. At least in some circumstances such influence will be limited because the United States cannot understand the dynamics of China’s domestic debate or because the fate of particular Chinese foreign policy ideas is beyond the reach of U.S. clout. Timing can matter. If China’s foreign purpose is already under assault within China, marginal outside influence may be a tipping factor (even a visit by a ping-pong team). Likewise if some new idea is vying for ascendancy, either reinforcement or penalization could determine its fate.

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Table 7.2. Alternative theories and policy implications Theory

Cause

Policy advice

Risks

Purpose transition

Interaction of ideas and events

Strengthen claims of integration backers; support desirable replacement ideas

Domestic politics hard to read

Power transition

Shifts in the relative capabilities of countries

Contain China

Could push a cooperative China into confl ict

Interdependence

Level of economic and societal exchange

Engage China

Might reward revisionist leaders

Socialization

Treatment by others

Cooperate with China to make China a cooperator

Might strengthen, not change revisionist leaders

Evolutionary cooperation

Interaction; increasing returns

Tit-for-tat; mimic whatever China is doing.

Could strengthen revisionist leaders pursuing short-term integration

This reasoning has some overlap, but it also contrasts with at least four other prominent ways of thinking about managing the Sino-American relationship. These are summarized in table 7.2. The argument rejects the stark options offered by either power or interdependence proponents—i.e., a strict policy of engaging or containing China. Either might be appropriate depending on what particular policy China is pursuing and how that relates to the Chinese government’s rationale for its actions. The danger of either policy is it could reward or penalize the wrong domestic argument (and its backers) and produce the opposite effect than that desired. Another prominent view argues that China’s purpose will reflect the treatment China gets from the outside world. If China is treated like an enemy it will become an enemy; if treated as a friend it will be a friend. Outside policy is a critical determinant of China’s intentions and that policy is largely a self-fulfi lling prophecy. 57 This argument, however, likely overstates the degree of influence the outside world has on China—the future of which will be dependent on its own internal dynamics as well. Moreover the argument neglects the key link between China’s response and its prior expectations and feedback. If a revisionist mindset is guiding China and the U.S. reinforces that with conciliatory policies that allow revisionist parties to claim success,

57. See, e.g., Joseph Nye, “Advancing U.S. Strategy for East Asian Security,” Asian Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2005. Nye calls for balancing China as well.

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Chinese supporters of integration will be marginalized. In this instance, nice outside treatment would not lead to China becoming nice. A fi nal approach to China is found in Robert Axelrod’s classic advice to “tit-for-tat”—to reflect China’s actions back at it, in order to induce cooperation.58 This is one variant of the hedging strategy so popular in current policy discussions. Over time, the expectation is that China will be able to see what is in its best interest and if it does not, the United States will be best prepared to deal with such an outcome. The risk of such a policy is that a cooperative response to specific Chinese actions that are deviations from a revisionist orthodoxy could simply reinforce revisionism because these actions produce no obvious setback. The timing of particular actions could have long-term unintended consequences if a particular action serves to institutionalize a revisionist claim. Or harder line U.S. actions that are a hedge for U.S. cooperative moves intended to reinforce Chinese integration will send mixed signals feeding the critiques of hardliners within China and neutralizing bragging rights of those defending integration. According to the purpose transition view, tit-for-tat should be reconfigured based on domestic politics. The aim is to reinforce accommodative policies that are backed by integration justifications—especially as their supporters struggle for policy dominance in internal Chinese debates. The key point is that the effects of outside influence on China will be mediated by the nature of the current ideas within China about appropriate policy—and the opposition critical of that position. Of course there may be times when China values a specific purpose so strongly that it will not yield or be swayed by outside influence. Indeed in those instances, penalizing nonintegrative behavior could have undesired escalatory effects. For example, in the past China has put such a premium on the security of its borders that foreign powers have sometimes taken self-defeating actions to impose costs on “revisionism.” Soviet clashes with China over borders merely reinforced China’s desire for security and its resolve to achieve it. Attention to ideational dynamics does not rule out zero-sum politics that cannot be swayed by external influence from powers lacking the same level of resolve. The Taiwan question, in the current context, may exemplify this dynamic. But it also suggests that the possibilities for outside leverage should not be foreclosed. The degree of foreign leverage on China’s purpose depends both on how much values clash as well as the resources for both sticks and carrots that outsiders bring to the table. On Taiwan, countries favoring a long-term peaceful resolution of the issue still wield considerable influence. And the domestic debate in China over how to handle reunification suggests no unyielding “single voice” in favor of using force to settle the issue.

58. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

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Conclusion If history is an indicator, China’s purpose need not follow either its power or interdependence trajectory, primarily because those factors operate through the ideas that underlie purpose. Such ideas are necessarily largely the domain of internal politics and thus hard to affect. Yet as seen in history, outside influence has sometimes played a role in the evolution of China’s approach to international society—from the Opium Wars to the May Fourth Movement to the early Cold War period to ping-pong diplomacy to the current integration. Central to this history—and China’s future—are not just the perils of power or the promises of interdependence, but also how they relate to the way China thinks about the world. And it is useful to keep in mind that outside influence on China has always been most significant when it has reflected a multilateral effort of major powers—a timeless truth especially in the fading unipolar American era. The ability of international society to keep an increasingly capable China on an integration track will depend on the ability of major powers both to accommodate a newcomer, to speak with some consensus on what norms and practices China must respect, and to wield influence in a way that sustains supporters of integration and liberalization within China.

Part IV

RESPONDING TO THE RISE OF CHINA

chapter

8

Between China, America, and North Korea South Korea’s Hedging Byung-Kook Kim

A South Korean security dilemma is on the rise. Everywhere signs of major change are visible. On the Korean peninsula, the balance of power has tilted toward Seoul, enlivening realist debates on whether a regional power transition will be a moment of peace or war.1 To provoke even more debate, Korea is a divided nation, where power transition involving its two halves inevitably gets entangled with the issue of regime legitimacy, and this in turn makes accommodation between the rising and declining states that much more difficult. 2 With North Korea looking at South Korea as an enemy-occupied territory, and South Korea’s mirror-image identity as a liberal state born out of a Cold War struggle to repel communism, the inter-Korea gap in economic performance necessarily has an ideological spillover as it is seen as a test of each regime’s claim to superiority and, hence, national legitimacy. In North Korea’s competition against the South for the status of the sole legitimate state of the Korean people, its economic decay since the end of the Cold War has turned into a regime crisis exposing the defeat of its Stalinist path to modernity, and also into a national crisis threatening its takeover by the South. The leadership’s choice of nuclear brinkmanship to shore up Kim Jong-il’s I would like to thank Robert J. Art, Avery Goldstein, G. John Ikenberry, Jonathan Kirshner, Robert S. Ross, and Zhu Feng for their comments on the earlier version of this article. This paper is based on research supported by a Korea University Grant. 1. See A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958), and Ronald L. Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the Twenty-fi rst Century (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000) for power transition theory. 2. For a discussion of the importance that the character of states plays in determining the peaceful or confl ictive resolution of power transition problems, see Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacifi c?” World Politics 44 (January 1992): 235–69.

191

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legitimacy and North Korea’s sovereignty has, in turn, made North Korea’s crisis South Korea’s problem. The shift in the regional power structure is equally extraordinary, with Beijing on a trajectory of ascent since Deng Xiaoping’s experiment with the market and Tokyo countering its perceived decline by playing its “Washington card” more actively than ever. Judging the United States as the best bet for containing China, Japan has consistently deepened its alliance system since 1994, integrating its armed forces with America’s agile IT-based “joint force” in security doctrine, military organization, and force structure. South Korea is directly affected by China’s rise, too, pulled into China’s orbit of power in the process of sharing in its prosperity. However, South Korea’s security dilemma is much worse than Japan’s because Japan has the sea to protect it from China, whereas South Korea does not. Once China realizes its power potential, it is unlikely to tolerate a large presence of U.S. military forces on the adjacent Korean peninsula, especially if unification occurs. Whether the United States would be willing to station a sizeable military force in a unified Korea in spite of the danger of entrapment in a military conflict with China over the Korean peninsula is an open-ended question, too. The rise of China is bound to prompt not only China, but also South Korea and the United States to reevaluate the benefit and cost of having U.S. troops stationed next to China. For most countries, the security dilemma arising from a regional power transition constitutes a long-term issue. But for South Korea, whether to bandwagon with or balance China and how to transform or reconcile with North Korea are perceived not only as long-term choices, but also as immediate issues, closely intertwined with its two ongoing security crises and, thus, decided partly by the choices it makes regarding short-term crisis management. The two crises have prevented South Korea from simply deferring its choices until China fully rises, which may be decades away. One of these crises, which acts as an agenda and pace setter forcing South Korea to face the security dilemma arising from regional and peninsular power transitions, thus locking its long-term choices together with short-term crisis management, involves North Korea. The nuclear problem, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, human rights violations, and refugee problems have refused to go away in spite of international pressures on North Korea. The reason is that these issues reflect the North Korean regime’s failure to earn hard currency through trade, to maintain the internal order without recourse to naked force, and to feed its population by generating economic growth. As long as the Stalinist regime persists, these problems can only continue, encouraging the United States to apply coercive pressure on the North and, by extension, making the South run for cover while appealing to both America and North Korea to negotiate a deal. The other issue forcing South Korea to make long-term strategic choices through short-term crisis management involves the U.S. strategy of “military transformation.” Initiated under President Bill Clinton but implemented by

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President George W. Bush on a larger scale and with a more unilateralist spirit, the military transformation is devised to counter “asymmetric threats” through an overhaul of U.S. naval, air, and ground troops into a “joint force,” which systematically harnesses information technology in weapons systems, command structures, military organization, and alliance relations.3 The objective is to construct armed forces that possess “greater mobility, precision, speed, stealth, and strike ranges [with a] logistics footprint.”4 For this joint force to work, America strives to build a “ubiquitous network” of military bases and supply points throughout the world, 5 as well as enable allies as well as U.S. troops to fly in and out of war zones “anytime anywhere” to hit terrorist groups and their state sponsors. U.S strategy has challenged South Korean security in three ways. First, the construction of a global defense network requires the United States to end its Cold War strategy of concentrating its armed forces in a few fi xed military zones, thus triggering a downsizing of U.S. troops in South Korea. Second, the idea of a coalition of the willing brings back South Korea’s nightmare of confrontation with North Korea. Third, by creating a web of military bases, which could potentially serve the goal of containing China, the military transformation provokes the specter of South Korea becoming entangled in great power struggles. This chapter analyzes how South Korea’s short-term crisis management has become entangled with its options on the long-term issues of power transition. Depending on how it behaves in the Six Party talks, South Korea could give the impression of having strategically chosen a Pax Sinica over the Pax Americana as East Asia’s new order, or even of opting for a policy of minjok gongjo (inter-Korea cooperation) against hanmi gonjo (South Korean–American cooperation). Similarly, depending on how South Korea responds to America’s request for strategic flexibility in the use of its troops stationed on the Korean peninsula, and depending on what kind of war time operational command system South Korea envisions for allied “joint forces,” South Korea could risk alienating America, China, or even both great powers. In other words, South Korea is caught by what Carl J. Friedrich once called the “law of anticipated reactions.”6 Each neighbor adjusts its view of South Korea’s future strategic options on the basis of its current moves because these are rightly or wrongly assumed to show what South Korea believes to be its mission, role identity, and pattern of external relations when peninsular and 3. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Vision 2020,” May 30, 2000, http://www.dtic. mil/ jointvision/jvpub2.htm. Also see U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, “New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century,” September 15, 1999, 6, http://www .nssg.gov/ Reports/ NWC .pdf. 4. National Defense Panel, “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century,” December 1997, iii, http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/ FullDoc2 .pdf. 5. Ibid., 2, 23–24, 34. 6. Carl J. Friedrich, “Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility,” Public Policy 1 (1940): 3–24.

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regional power transitions are completed. Today’s crisis management is seen as a straw in the wind, revealing South Korea’s long-term preferences, which make South Korea’s choice of action in today’s crises that much more difficult. In the face of these formidable challenges, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (2003–8) zigzagged with unfortunate consequences. The zigzagging was partly a product of South Korea’s extremely difficult security dilemma, which inhibits development of any clear- cut strategy of balancing or bandwagoning. However, it also reflected misinterpretation of the intentions, preferences, and strategies of major players in the power transition and crisis management. A populist without experience in foreign policymaking, Roh interpreted intentions as either black or white. Though China’s strategy of “peaceful ascent” and America’s response to it have been constantly adjusting, he took each to be fi xed, and necessarily leading to confrontation. In the eyes of Roh, Japanese prime minister Koizumi Junichiro’s endorsement of Bush’s military transformation was a sign of Japan irreversibly tilting toward a balancing strategy against China. Roh also judged cross-Strait relations to be irrevocably on a collusion course based on Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian’s rhetoric of independence. The reality was more complex. The war on terror led the United States to search for a modus vivendi with China, and Taiwanese domestic politics and U.S. interest in regional stability put a brake on Chen’s “separatism.” However, simplifying the American and Chinese intentions to be conflictive without any common interests, Roh developed many detrimental foreign policy initiatives. The second problem was his consistent misreading of power capabilities. Zeroing in on South Korea’s high ranking in world trade, Roh thought the South deserved great power status. With his exaggerated notion of South Korea’s capabilities, Roh chose not the middle power strategy of acquiescence, adjustment, or accommodation, but the great power option of reshaping regional security relations. Sometimes he played with the idea of transforming South Korea into a balancer that would preempt either China or Japan from becoming a regional hegemon. At other times, in the opposite spirit but with an equally misplaced role identity, Roh projected South Korea as a “bridge” that would bring China and Japan into a regional community. The problem with his way of calculating power was profound. In dealing with security issues, Roh should have focused on military rather than economic capabilities. Being the tenth-largest trader in the world did not guarantee South Korean influence in East Asian security, where the other players were great powers. Also, much of South Korea’s power resources were certain to be lost in the process of converting economic capabilities into military power, because power was “infungible,” to quote David A. Baldwin.7 Moreover, it is wrong 7. David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics,” World Politics 31 (January 1979): 161–94.

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to assume, as Roh did, that South Korea’s power closely correlates with its economic ranking when the top ten major trading states vary greatly in size as they do in today’s world. Nowhere was the problem of misperceived intentions and capabilities more acute than in Roh’s strategy regarding the North Korean nuclear crisis. On the one hand, he correctly diagnosed that Washington and Pyongyang were locked in a fundamental ideological conflict. The United States looked at North Korea’s nuclear programs as a fundamental reflection of its political regime, whose tyrannical character made it ready to pursue regime survival at all costs. The corollary was that the nuclear crisis could be resolved only if the North Korean regime “changed” or “collapsed.” In Kim Jong-il’s mirror-image view, a nuclear weapons capability was the security guarantee that would deter American military attack. From this appraisal of intentions, preferences, and strategies, Roh made a huge jump to project South Korea as a mediator, able to persuade the United States and North Korea to negotiate what was initially thought as lying beyond negotiation. The jump did not look illogical to Roh because he believed South Korea had leverage over both parties. In more sober moments when he recognized South Korea’s limitations, Roh turned to a linkage strategy, dispatching noncombat troops to Iraq (2003–4), negotiating bilateral free trade area (FTA) talks with the United States (2006–7), and accommodating the U.S. request for base relocation as part of military transformation (2003). All this was in the hope of creating leverage with which to persuade the United States to accept his North Korea policy of buying peace through aid. Ultimately, Roh’s grand strategy failed to satisfy South Korea’s strategic requirement of resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis without jeopardizing long-term strategic relations with America or China. To examine the deterioration of South Korea’s security dilemma through Roh’s foreign policy failures, the fi rst section of this chapter analyzes how East Asian regional politics has made South Korea zigzag in a search for an elusive regional strategic doctrine. The second section shows that Roh’s regional doctrine did not fit South Korea’s peninsular security requirement of nonproliferation and military transformation. In both sections, it will be argued that not only South Korea’s extremely challenging security conditions, but also Roh’s misperceptions contributed to his failure to design a viable grand strategy for regional and peninsular security.

The Elusive Search for a Regional Doctrine Hard Questions, High Stakes The rise of China is a reality. When asked in 2005 which state will impact South Korea most strongly in the economic realm a decade later, 73.5 percent of South Koreans polled chose China and 8.7 percent America. The gap

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Table 8.1. South Korean public perceptions of major East Asian countries

Trust Trust Neither trust nor distrust Distrust Influence Positive Neither positive nor negative Negative

America

China

Japan

North Korea

Russia

19.8 34.3

6.1 29.2

6.4 20.2

6.1 31.1

3.7 34.0

44.4

63.6

72.3

61.6

57.4

33.1 33.7

18.4 36.3

13.2 28.5

9.6 30.1

5.8 45.7

31.7

44.2

57.2

59.2

42.2

Source: Nationwide face-to-face survey conducted by the East Asia Institute between August 31 and September 16, 2006, with a randomly selected sample of 1,038 men. Sampling error: ± 3% P (95% confidence intervals).

narrowed regarding political influence, but China (40.7 percent) still topped America (31.3 percent) by a sizeable margin.8 Recognition of Chinese power did not mean that South Koreans saw Chinese power as intrinsically benign. On the contrary, in spite of rapid economic Sinicization, siding with China militarily was not seen as a viable option, given its authoritarian regime and its security alliance with North Korea (see table 8.1). In a national survey conducted in 2005, only 6.1 percent showed trust toward China, which put it in the same category of distrust as North Korea (6.1 percent) and Japan (6.4 percent). The United States scored higher, but was still low in absolute terms (19.8 percent). When asked whether China had a positive or negative influence on international politics, 18.4 percent gave positive answers—this time, considerably higher than North Korea (9.6 percent) and Japan (13.2 percent). The United States did better, with 33.1 percent favorably assessing its role. Apparently, the Chinese show of muscle in bilateral trade disputes over garlic (2000) and kimchi (2005), as well as its attempt to rewrite the history of the ancient Korean Kokuryo kingdom to make it a part of China’s imperial heritage (2002), have deeply tarnished its image. These polls portray South Korea as a distrustful middle power, entrapped in a tough neighborhood, with festering memories of foreign domination, and suspicious of the intentions of all great powers. The country favored U.S. hegemony as the lesser of evil. China’s alliance with North Korea has also constrained South Korea from embracing China. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show what South Koreans expected America and China to do in a crisis situation, such as a North Korean military invasion. In spite of South Korea’s dramatic surge in trade with and 8. A national public survey conducted by the East Asia Institute in September 2005, with a randomly selected sample of 1,038 people.

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Table 8.2. South Korean public anticipations of the Chinese response to an inter- Korean security crisisa

Actively assist South Korea Remain friendly toward South Korea Maintain neutrality Remain friendly toward North Korea Actively assist North Korea

1997

1998

1999

2001

2002

2003

2004

2.0 10.4

0.9 11.5

2.4 10.0

0.9 7.1

1.1 10.7

1.9 8.9

0.9 9.8

45.2 35.2

47.3 28.8

37.3 39.5

34.9 40.3

32.9 40.0

43.0 36.8

40.9 38.8

7.1

4.9

7.3

13.0

2.9

9.4

9.6

Source: “Survey on General Public Security Attitudes,” conducted annually by the Korea National Defense University between 1997 and 2004, with randomly selected samples of more than 1,000. a The survey asked respondents to anticipate how major countries would “react to a crisis situation like North Korea’s military invasion of the South.”

investment in China since the normalization of bilateral relations in 1992, and notwithstanding the strengthened security role China has played as a mediator in the Six Party talks since 2003, nearly half of South Koreans expected China to “actively assist” (9.6 percent) or “remain friendly” with the North (38.8 percent) in the event of war. 40.9 percent anticipated China’s neutrality, whereas only 0.9 percent expected it to aid the South. Remarkably, little change has occurred in the South Korean perception of China’s security preferences and intentions since 1997. Unlike the United States–South Korean alliance, to which a third of the population gave an unswerving loyalty even during the worst days of anti-American sentiments,9 the political relationship between China and South Korea has not possessed a strong domestic constituency that can prevent deterioration of the relationship during hard times. Consequently, what South Korea has agonized over was not whether to end the alliance with the United States, but how to upgrade it into a more equal partnership befitting its enhanced economic and military capabilities, as America has demanded and South Korea has aspired to since the end of the Cold War—but without unduly threatening North Korea and alienating China. Ironically, for South Korea, it has been the United States more than any other power that has made difficult its adaptation to the trends of power transition, because the United States has been the most unpredictable of the East Asian powers in foreign policymaking. It has moved fast in unexpected directions, thus forcing South Korea to constantly alter its assessment of East Asian relations of strategic interaction and its place in those relations. Searching for a strategy to maintain U.S. hegemony, Bush discarded the Cold War ideas of containment and deterrence for the radical notion of preventive defense, moved from rule-based multilateral and bilateral alliance systems to 9. National surveys conducted by the East Asia Institute in December 2002, June 2003, February 2004, and July 2004, with randomly selected samples of 1,000 or more.

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Table 8.3. South Korean public anticipations of the American response to an inter- Korean security crisisa

Actively assist South Korea Remain friendly toward South Korea Maintain neutrality Remain friendly toward North Korea Actively assist North Korea

1997

1998

1999

2001

2002

2003

2004

61.4

54.7

52.0

44.8

23.6

43.3

44.9

31.5

29.9

38.1

44.3

50.3

43.8

46.1

6.6 0.3

9.7 0.5

7.3 0.4

8.7 0.2

19.6

12.0 0.7

8.7 0.3

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.2

Source: See table 8.2. a See table 8.2, note a.

threat-based “coalitions of the willing” as the preferred mode of collective action, restructured its armed forces into an IT-based joint force, and adopted unilateral actions based on the faith in its power rather than in international organization. Ironically, the greatest challenge for South Korea in the post-9/11 era has been adjusting to its U.S. ally’s revisionist security policy. To be sure, China’s power potential has increased rapidly, but in comparison with America’s policy of military transformation and transformative diplomacy, its grand strategy has been surprisingly stable since Deng Xiaoping initiated reform more than two decades ago. Under the principle of taoguang yanghui (hide one’s talents and bide one’s time), China avoided escalating conflict with America outside vital cross-Strait relations, lest a premature confrontation disrupt China’s economic growth and, with it, destroy the opportunity to show its talents. The policy of acquiescing to U.S. hegemony, but with the security hedge of halting Taiwan’s “creeping independence” and America’s support of it,10 was reconfi rmed by Hu Jintao in his doctrine of heping jueqi (peaceful rise). Rather than confronting America, China has worked with it to grow into a superpower. As part of this grand strategy of “hedged acquiescence,”11 China sought membership in multilateral organizations, including those dominated by its real or imagined U.S. rival, in order to harness global resources for its economic growth. As Minxin Pei writes, 10. See Yun-han Chu, “Taiwan’s Security Dilemma: Military Rivalry, Economic Dependence, and the Struggle over National Identity,” in Byung- Kook Kim and Anthony Jones, eds., Power and Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies, ed. Byung- Kook Kim and Anthony Jones (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 228, 232. 11. The idea of “hedged acquiescence” is borrowed from Minxin Pei, “Coping with American Hegemony: The Evolution of China’s Strategy for Stabilizing Sino-American Relations since the End of the Cold War,” in Kim and Jones, Power and Security in Northeast Asia, 99–123.

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China free-rode on American hegemony to maintain a liberal global trade regime, a stable international fi nancial order, and oil supplies, without which it could not hope to catch up with the United States.12 Trouble started for South Korea when Roh, unaware of the tidal changes in U.S. security doctrine, came to power in February 2003 with an “antiAmerican” platform to strengthen South Korean “independence.” Although his call for a more equal alliance was looked upon as an act of betrayal in some quarters in Washington, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld included the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) in the program of military transformation. The traditional American strategy maintained deterrence by locating USFK troops in South Korea’s strategic Musan-Uijongbu axis through which North Korean troops had to pass to hit Seoul. In 2003, Rumsfeld ended the strategy of using U.S. soldiers as a “human tripwire” and implemented troop redeployment ahead of schedule. As part of the Global Defense Posture Review announced in November 2003, America began reducing USFK ground troops by 12,500 men in three stages over four years, as well as relocating the remaining forces to Pyongtaek and Osan, away from the front line and safely below the Han River. Any North Korean military attack was to be repelled by the South Korean armed forces, with their U.S. ally playing a support role with air and naval forces. The USFK troop relocation exacerbated South Korea’s security dilemma in regional arenas, too. For America’s mobile joint forces to operate as an international police force in the war on terror, U.S. troops stationed outside its home territory had to have the “strategic flexibility” to fly in and out of their foreign military bases to group into integral forces of varying sizes. The troop redeployment in South Korea was part of this vision, making South Korea fear an unwanted military entrapment in distant places. The danger of alienating China was particularly serious because the U.S. global network of military bases, originally justified as enabling America to strike terrorist groups and their state sponsors, also encircled China. The United States had used the war on terror to orchestrate a deep military penetration into what it called the “Arc of Instability”: a danger zone of ethnic-religious conflict, a breeding ground of terrorist groups, and also a “strategic energy ellipse,” which ran from fundamentalist Middle Eastern states, through Central Asia, into Southeast Asia.13 To the southeast of this arc stood another long string of U.S. military installations in India, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. Serving as “lily pads” to which U.S. troops, as well as those of its key allies including South 12. Minxin Pei, “Coping with American Hegemony: The Evolution of China’s Strategy for Stabilizing Sino-American Relations since the End of the Cold War,” in Kim and Jones, Power and Security in Northeast Asia, 109–10. 13. By 2002 the United States had constructed an arc of military bases across Afghanistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. See Geoffrey Kemp, “Arcs of Instability: U.S. Relations in the Greater Middle East,” Naval War College Review 55 (summer 2002): 62.

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Korea, would jump from the larger bases in the American homeland,14 these installations could turn against China if its ascent suddenly looked threatening U.S. interests.

“Cooperative Independence” The Rumsfeld initiative awoke Roh to the realities of power. Aware of America’s pivotal role in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis and hedging against China, Roh had to make a U-turn on alliance issues only six months after his inauguration. In August 2003, Roh retreated from his platform of strengthening independence to project a grand strategy of “cooperative independence.” He arqued that strengthening South Korea’s defense capabilities constituted not only a precondition for independence, but also a requirement for maintaining a robust alliance, which was undergoing fundamental restructuring under Bush’s strategy of military transformation. To remain a valued ally of the United States, the South Korean armed forces had to acquire high-tech capabilities so as to be interoperable with U.S. troops. In October 2003, before a public military parade, Roh was more explicit, calling for slim IT-based armed forces, much like America’s changing force structure. He also promised an “equal development of army, naval, and air capabilities” six months later, again following America’s concept of a joint force. The Ministry of National Defense echoed his vision by planning to raise defense expenditure by 11 percent a year for four years.15 Trying to strike a balance between America and China, however, Roh also hedged. In need of Chinese support to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, as well as hedging against the danger of becoming entangled in a crossstrait Taiwan conflict, Roh tried to deny USFK troops participation in strategic flexibility. Moreover, Roh showed his spirit of independence even when he accepted U.S. troop reduction and base relocation. Recollecting the turbulent history of the U.S.–South Korean alliance and U.S. unilateralism, Roh declared: “South Korean defense policy gets shaken up and public opinions turn upside down whenever U.S. strategy alters. This should end. . . . Opposing U.S. military withdrawal will not resolve our problem.” With those puzzling words in his Independence Day speech of August 15, 2003, Roh pledged he would construct the infrastructure to realize South Korea’s “independence in national defense within a decade.” In his view, “it is not right to think we 14. See Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic [New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2004] for a critical appraisal of America’s defense transformation. 15. The Ministry of National Defense plans to implement a massive force restructuring program, including the purchase of reconnaissance drones, early warning aircraft, military satellite communications equipment, K1A1 tanks, K-9 self-propelled artillery, multiple launch rocket systems, counterbattery radars, F-15K fighters, airborne tankers, Aegis- equipped destroyers, and eighteen-hundred-ton submarines. See Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper—2004 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2005), 101, 168, 217.

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201

could indefi nitely depend on U.S. troops for national security. A sovereign nation should be able to protect oneself through its own defense capabilities.”16 To reassure South Korea’s conservatives who feared a loosening of alliance ties, however, Roh made a traditionalist appeal, too: “Realizing independence in national defense and maintaining a robust United States–South Korean alliance are not mutually contradictory, but complementary.” The Independence Day speech captured Roh’s style of presidential leadership, which brought him as much trouble as opportunities. He was a master of colorful but ambiguous, and strong but elusive rhetoric. He acquiesced in Rumsfeld’s unilateral plan of troop redeployment, but depending on how one interpreted his speech, his “acquiescence” could be either a step toward building a more equal partnership, with high-tech South Korean troops integrated and interoperable with U.S. troops; or a strategy to buy time before an eventual breakup of alliance ties. To end the ambiguities surrounding his intentions, Roh needed to take a stand on the American demand for strategic flexibility of USFK troops as well as work out a joint vision statement for the future of the U.S.–South Korean alliance, much as Japan had done through a series of declarations, guidelines, defense outlines, and legal acts since 1996. The dangers of misinterpretation and miscommunication notwithstanding, Roh left his thoughts on America’s place in future South Korean security ambiguous and open-ended by refusing to make a clear choice on the issues of strategic flexibility and a joint vision statement, lest he enrage China or alienate America. Roh purposely pursued a hedging strategy.

Community-Building Roh’s second ideational experiment in his development of a regional security strategy focused on East Asia. Given China’s rise, Roh foresaw that South Korea was entering an “era of East Asia,” where power would shift eastward and prosperity would be driven by a new trans- Pacific rather than the old trans-Atlantic locomotive. Not only to bandwagon on this epochal interregional shift of power, but also to balance South Korea’s acquiescence in Rumsfeld’s military transformation with an overture toward China, Roh called on South Korea to initiate a regional program of community-building, with itself playing the role of East Asia’s hub17 for distribution18 and fi nance.19 Occupying a central position in East Asia’s division of labor, 16. Consult http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/ kr/archive/archive _view. 17. The initiative culminated in an “FTA Roadmap” in May 2004. See Chung Jin-young, “Dongbuka gyongjae hyopryokkwa han’gukui FTA jeonryak: Chamyeo jeongbuui FTA jeongchaek pyong’ga” (Economic cooperation in Northeast Asia and South Korea’s FTA strategy: An evaluation of FTA policy during Roh’s presidency), NSP Working Paper 13, East Asia Institute, Seoul, November 2005. 18. See http://www.cwd.go.kr/cwd/ kr/archive/archive _view. 19. See http://www.cwd.go.kr/cwd/ kr/archive/archive _view.

202

China’s Ascent

South Korea was a natural “bridge” linking the early developers of Northeast Asia with the late modernizers in Southeast Asia. This was Roh wearing a “liberal” hat. He called for China and Japan to join South Korea in a trilateral FTA, or even better, an ASEAN Plus Three East Asian community. In a similar spirit, his Northeast Asian Era Commission (NAEC) promoted FTA negotiations as the basis for an EU-like “Northeast Asian Community.”20 The strategy of community-building was, however, flawed in four ways. First, the FTA initiatives ran against the trend in Sino-Japanese relations over security and history issues. Second, Japan opposed Sino-Japanese integration for fear of inadvertently aiding China’s rise to the rank of a regional hegemon, whereas China brushed aside the idea of community-building lest its economy be run over by technologically stronger Japan.21 Third, even if the FTA initiatives succeeded in fostering a regional community, Roh never explained how the South Korean cities could outmaneuver Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai, and Tokyo to become East Asia’s hub. On the contrary, without the protection of regulatory barriers, South Korea could lose much of its industries to the rival cities of East Asia. Fourth, it was not obvious why China would opt for regional community when its mercantilist strategy of going alone was working. For China, some of its sovereignty to construct an East Asian Community constituted a cost it did not have to pay for generating economic growth. Confident of its future status as Northeast Asia’s regional hegemon, as expressed in its grand strategy of “hide one’s talents and bide one’s time,” but also fearful of its vulnerability as an industrializing country facing economically powerful Japan, China preferred to delay FTA talks with South Korea, especially if these were to be the groundwork for a trilateral China-Japan–South Korea FTA or an ASEAN Plus Three East Asian community. More critically, as Seoul pursued its strategy of partnering with China and Japan in a trilateral or ASEAN Plus Three format, America become increasingly disenchanted with South Korea. The president and his aides failed to clarify whether the United States constituted an integral part of their envisioned East Asian regional community. Nor did they clarify how their efforts to “upgrade” the United States–South Korean security alliance fitted in with their regionalist initiative. Like Roh’s concept of “cooperative independence,” his presidential commission’s FTA- centered strategy of East Asian regional integration raised uncertainty surrounding his intentions. Some thought Roh was trying to lay a groundwork for an eventual tilt toward China not only in economics but also in security. Moreover, like Roh’s concept of cooperative 20. Consult http://www.cwd.go.kr/cwd/ kr/archive/archive _view. 21. See Jorge I. Domínguez and Byung- Kook Kim, “Between Compliance and Confl ict: Comparing U.S.–East Asian and U.S.–Latin American Relations,” in Between Compliance and Confl ict: East Asia, Latin America, and the “New” Pax Americana, ed. Domínguez and Kim (New York: Routledge, 2005), 17–23.

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203

independence, his regionalist strategy overestimated South Korea’s ability to persuade unwilling or disinterested China and Japan into not only a trilateral FTA, but also the ASEAN Plus Three community.

The Balancer The most damaging American backlash, however, came in March 2005 when Roh ventured into his third policy innovation. The strategic flexibility of U.S. troops became a controversial issue in alliance relations when the United States launched its Proliferation Security Initiative in October 2004.22 Soon thereafter Roh presented South Korea as a “Northeast Asian balancer” in March 2005. 23 This was Roh the realist, forecasting East Asia’s future to resemble its nineteenth- century Hobbesian past of hegemonic struggles. South Korea’s claim to the status of a regional balancer undermined Roh’s other grand strategic idea of cooperative independence, because his balancer idea implied that the United States had lost its unique status as South Korea’s only security ally. Now it the United States was presented simply as one of many neighbors among which South Korea militarily balanced. Then there was the contradiction with the “liberal” idea of regional community-building which made his intentions even more uncertain. Roh’s National Security Council (NSC) aides tried to clarify his remarks, only to worsen the situation. The president, a NSC strategist explained, opposed “America forcing South Korea into an exclusive security alliance against any third party in Northeast Asia.” He hoped to “break away from Northeast Asia’s Cold War paradigm that pitted the southern triangle of the United States, South Korea, and Japan against the northern triangle of China, Russia, and North Korea.”24 This bold interpretation of what the NSC aide called the “Roh Doctrine” raised an uproar in Washington, prompting another presidential aide to tone down talk of balancing and to present Roh’s initiative as just another idea in South Korea’s orthodox Cold War security strategy. The balancer role, a NAEC aide explained, targeted China and Japan, which seemed to be on a collision course. In this subregional game of power politics, South Korea was described as sharing interests with America in preemption of any power shift, whether toward China or Japan, as well as in deterrence of an open military confl ict between the two East Asian great powers. Consequently, in a deft twist of ideas, South Korea was portrayed as a “subregional” minibalancer holding back Sino-Japanese power rivalries within the broad regional framework set up by the United States, East Asia’s regional megabalancer. 25 22. 23. 24. 25.

Donga Ilbo (Seoul), October 23, 2004. See http://www.cwd.go.kr/cwd/ kr/archive/archive _view. Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), March 22 and 30, 2005. Ibid., April 11 and May 31, 2005.

204

China’s Ascent

This reconceptualization, however, only avoided confronting South Korea’s real issue: What should be its strategic choice if Japan’s drift from China continued under the shadow of China’s ascent, North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship, and America’s war on terror? Should it balance against “militarizing Japan” at the subregional level, even if Japan’s inexorable progress toward its post–Cold War ideal of a “normal state” was welcomed—if not driven—by the United States, given its grand strategy at the larger regional and global levels? How could South Korea balance against Japan at the subregional level without sabotaging its U.S. ally’s regional balancing act against China? Roh also failed to resolve how the balancer role fitted in with his other efforts to transform the United States–South Korean alliance into a relationship of “cooperative independence” and to construct an East Asian regional community. How and why Northeast Asia’s great powers would agree on his vision, and whether South Korea had the power capabilities to win their endorsement, were left unanswered. To sum up, in spite of his earnest efforts, Roh was unable to develop a grand strategy to upgrade South Korea’s alliance system into a more equal partnership befitting its economic and military capabilities, as America demanded and South Korea aspired to—but without alienating China.

A Moralistic Peninsular Strategy More Hard Questions, More High Stakes The gaps and contradictions in Roh’s regional strategy would have posed less of a challenge for South Korea had it enjoyed stable inter-Korean relations. Roh’s inability to develop a clear policy for East Asian security frustrated the United States, drove away Japan, and prevented China from improving relations with South Korea. But all this great power anxiety and distrust could have been interpreted as a reasonable cost for South Korea to bear in order to keep open its future options on issues with huge political stakes, if inter-Korean relations had not been in crisis. Such a crisis, however, was a major part of South Korea’s geopolitical situation for more than a decade. The North was in a deep trouble, with its economy collapsing since the disintegration of its Soviet patron and its society paralyzed by famine. In spite of, or because of, these traumas, Kim Jong-il sought revitalization through a policy of seon’gun jeongchi (military first politics) after Kim Il Sung died in 1994. Rather than admitting his defeat in the two Koreas’ Cold War and discarding his father’s juche ideology, Kim Jong-il doggedly held on to it and further militarized the North Korean regime, with its armed forces commanders filling top party and state posts, as part of honoring his father’s yuhun (dying injunctions). Pursued as part of Kim Jong-il’s military first politics was a nuclear development program as its ultimate insurance for regime survival. The stakes were high for all major protagonists. For Bush, Kim Jong-il’s nuclear blackmail confi rmed North Korea as a rogue state, part of what he

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once called an “axis of evil,”26 a terrorist ring challenging America with asymmetric threats. The North Korean nuclear program had to be stopped, lest its unpredictable leader transfer nuclear devices and technologies to nonstate terrorist groups. The Nonproliferation Treaty could also collapse, weakening U.S. global influence, if North Korea acquired a nuclear capability despite U.S. sanctions. In a vicious circle of anticipated reactions, it became difficult to distinguish who was threatening whom. The U.S. discussions of sanctions only worsened North Korea’s paranoia and made its elite rally around Kim Jong-il’s military fi rst politics in spite of its time-proven limitations in assuring military deterrence and economic recovery. A perverse mirror effect prevailed, with North Korea’s policy of deterring hostile U.S. actions through nuclear development programs inspiring U.S. hostility, which only strengthened North Korea’s belief that such hostility must be deterred. The stakes were high for South Korea, too. Seoul saw nuclear North Korea as a threat to its security, but it was just as afraid of its U.S. ally’s neo-conservative policy makers, whose crusade to annihilate terrorists could boomerang into a deeper crisis on the Korean peninsula. The survey results reported in table 8.4 show South Korea’s alarm. The poll asked a total of 169 top foreign business executives whether they would continue investment in South Korea even after sanctions were imposed against the North. To identify where a “red line” existed for foreign business leaders, sanctions were categorized into four types: (1) a United Nations Security Council resolution on North Korean nuclear programs, (2) economic sanctions, (3) a naval and air blockade, and (4) limited military sanction such as a surgical air strike. Given South Korea’s fear of unilateral U.S. sanctions, moreover, table 8.4 categorizes each of the four kinds of sanction into two subgroups: one imposed jointly by South Korea and the United States in the spirit of alliance and the other unilaterally imposed by America. For a solid majority of foreign business executives, imposing a naval and air blockade on North Korea would trigger suspension or even withdrawal of investment. Such fears were higher, but by only ten percentage points, when a naval and air blockade was imposed unilaterally by the United States rather than jointly in consultation with South Korea. For many of the foreign companies doing business in South Korea, the imposition of a naval and air blockade was the time to exit, whether the alliance remained strong or was disintegrating under the impact of American–North Korean confrontation. Roh, then, did not have much room to maneuver in the North Korean nuclear crisis. Given the economic constraints, he strove to avoid an escalation of sanctions. By rejecting both military and nonmilitary sanctions, Roh seemed to be siding with China, which had also called for restraint in the interest of keeping its North Korean buffer state afloat. His rejection of sanctions profoundly alienated America because it weakened what limited leverage the 26. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2002/01/ 20020129 -11.html.

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China’s Ascent

Table 8.4. Attitudes of foreign business executives to sanctions against North Koreaa Unilateral American sanctions Sanction types UN Security Council resolutionb Economic sanctions Air and naval blockade Surgical military strike

Stop or withdraw investment 13c 20 63 73

Joint South Korean-American sanctions Sanction types UN Security Council resolution Economic sanctions Air and naval blockade Surgical military strike

Stop or withdraw investment 7 13 53 68

Source: The data are from a survey conducted by the East Asia Institute between February 15 and April 15, 2005. The survey was completed with the assistance of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, and was conducted through both email and interview. a A total of 169 business executives working in foreign- owned or joint business ventures were interviewed. Among those 169 business executives, 76 percent had plans to further invest in South Korea next five years. The business response to each of the four types of sanctions reported in this table includes only those with plans for further investment. b The questionnaire only posited a submission of the North Korean nuclear crisis to the UN Security Council for a resolution and did not specify the contents of the resolution. c Figures are percentages.

U.S. negotiators had over North Korea in the Six Party talks. By unambiguously articulating on uncooperative position on what Bush saw as part of his global war on terror, Roh was frequently seen as a spoiler of U.S. policy, the result of which was South Korea’s loss of credibility within top U.S. policy circles as a reliable partner. This hurt South Korea, because it needed the support of the United States to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. After all, it was America—not China—with which North Korea sought a dialogue. The carrots North Korea hoped to secure and the sticks it feared most were all under U.S. control. In his grand effort to accommodate conflicting North Korean, Chinese, and American interests, Roh offered a grand strategy of mediation.

The Mediator From the days of his presidential election campaign, Roh sought to fi nd a middle ground between the options of resistance and acquiescence in his dealing with U.S. policymakers. Open resistance to Bush’s North Korea policy could endanger U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea. Acquiescing to the U.S. policy of confrontation could trigger the opposite danger of North Korea taking the South hostage in nuclear brinkmanship. The South Korean search for a third alternative that satisfied its triple strategic requirements of U.S. support, Chinese accommodation, and North Korean acquiescence, however, triggered a loosening of alliance relations. When Roh became alarmed by press reports of U.S. pursuit of a “tailored sanction” in December 2002, he publicly pledged to play a “lead role” in peacefully resolving the

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North Korean nuclear crisis. During the last days of his presidential campaign, he interpreted that role to be one of “neutral mediator” who strove to persuade not only North Korea but also the United States to enter a dialogue. In this way, Roh once again showed his propensity to overestimate South Korea’s power capabilities, to misinterpret other states’ intentions, and to wrongly defi ne South Korea’s role identity. The strategy of mediation was flawed on several fronts. First, by positing the possibility of mediating between the United States and North Korea, Roh underestimated their respective threat perceptions. Judging the United States to be in a permanent state of war against terrorism after 9/11, Bush could not tolerate the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by failing states like North Korea, fearing that it would sell nuclear devices and technologies to terrorist groups. North Korea’s threat perception was no less grave. It judged the survival of its Stalinist regime to be at stake and opted for nuclear weapons development as a security guarantee against hostile America. In lieu of the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” mechanisms to simultaneously eliminate the threat of nuclear proliferation against America and the specter of regime collapse haunting Kim Jong-il, it was unlikely that South Korea would succeed in mediation. Second, South Korea lacked the leverage to mediate between the two unwilling countries. Geopolitically vulnerable and economically exposed, it could not wield the stick, lest North Korea escalate conflict. As a middle-income country barely emerging from financial crisis, South Korea did not have the resources to buy off the North. Its aid to North Korea was certainly sizeable, helping Kim Jong-il weather the worst days of famine, but it was also not enough to guarantee his regime’s survival, a precondition for nuclear dismantlement. Not even the United States could guarantee that. Unless Kim Jong-il’s regime changed its fundamental character, it could not secure the kind of external aid that would bring about its economic and social rehabilitation. Third, Roh’s mediator strategy also suffered from a mismatch between policy objectives and instruments. The regime instability and economic decay that prompted Kim Jong-il to pursue the high-risk survival strategy of nuclear development were essentially political problems that originated from the Stalinist character of his regime and the demise of its Soviet patron. These political problems needed political remedies—not economic aid. Inevitably, South Korea’s conciliatory “sunshine policy” did not answer the needs of Kim Jong-il, thus failing to produce any progress in the nuclear negotiations. Fourth, the aspiration to be a mediator reduced inter-Korean tensions, but at the expense of South Korean credibility as a partner in the eyes of the United States and China that could decisively impact the dynamics of the North Korean nuclear crisis, because its aspiration contradicted South Korea’s geopolitical fundamentals. Because South Korea was a contentious but still indispensable member of the hub-and- spoke system of U.S. bilateral alliances in East Asia, Roh’s aspiration for a mediator role looked like an act of

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betrayal in the eyes of the United States and like more a rhetorical than a realistic option in the eyes of China.

Marginalization The role identity of a neutral mediator in the North Korean nuclear crisis resembled Roh’s regional strategic experiments in challenging orthodoxy. At the regional level, he aspired to make South Korea a “hub,” a “bridge builder,” or even a “balancer” while striving to base its alliance system on the principle of “cooperative independence.” Now, at the peninsular level, he rechristened South Korea a “neutral mediator” between its formal U.S. ally and the historical North Korean jujeok (main enemy). These ideational experiments constituted Roh’s answers to South Korea’s security dilemma of how to consolidate the military alliance with America without unduly threatening North Korea and alienating China. With the United States waging war on terror, Japan pursuing its ideal of a normal state under U.S. leadership, China alarmed by its potential encirclement by U.S.-led coalitions of the willing, and North Korea playing the game of nuclear brinkmanship, it became exceedingly difficult for Roh to balance his three competing goals of alliance upgrading, inter- Korean peace, and Chinese– South Korean strategic partnership. Rather, his ambitious policy experiments in both regional and peninsular theaters isolated South Korea and damaged its credibility. The “mediator” jump-starting the Six Party talks in August 2003 was not South Korea but China, whose three-day interruption of oil supplies to North Korea27 prompted Kim Jong-il to briefly slow down reprocessing in favor of dialogue. However, even after China’s show of muscle, the Six Party talks only muddled along rather than led to a breakthrough because both the United States and North Korea believed that their vital national interests were at stake. The United States demanded that North Korea implement a “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of all nuclear development programs as the precondition of any normalization of relations. In contrast, the North proposed only a freeze in its program to protect its nuclear ambiguity as a source of leverage against the United States. As the price of a nuclear freeze, North Korea demanded that America rescind economic sanctions, remove it from the U.S. list of states assisting terrorism, and initiate a program of international energy assistance totaling 2 million kilowatts. To frustrate U.S. policymakers even more, North Korea declared that its nuclear dismantlement needed be closely coordinated with a “complete, verifiable, irreversible security guarantee” (CVIS), which presumably required the United

27. See Antoaneta Bezlova, “Politics China: Security Worries Include Korea, U.S. and Japan,” Inter Press Ser vice, April 7, 2003. Also consult Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: The Limits of Influence,” Current History 102 (September 2003): 278.

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States to militarily withdraw from the South and sign a peace treaty with the North.28 To bridge the gap between between the United States and North Korea, the South launched a campaign of summit diplomacy in mid-2003, only to reveal its limited leverage. In a meeting with Bush, Roh embraced CVID as his end point, but emphasized that this should be pursued through “peaceful means based on international cooperation.” In Japan, he agreed with Koizumi in “not tolerating” North Korea’s nuclear programs, but with a proviso calling for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis through diplomacy. How this could be done when North Korea looked at nuclearization as its ultimate insurance for regime survival was left unanswered. Moreover, for the United States and Japan, nonmilitary measures did not exclude economic sanctions, whereas Roh did not distinguish the two in the belief that economic sanctions would be a prelude to military confl ict. Then, in July, a third summit meeting was held—this time, with Hu Jintao. Whereas South Korea emphasized the need to build a coalition on the basis of CVID, China sympathized with North Korea’s anxiety over regime security and called for low-profi le diplomatic options. 29 The United States did not help either, announcing its Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction materials in May.

The Sucker The tasks Roh faced as a mediator, in essence, boiled down to persuading the United States to soften, if not discard, its post-9/11 global strategy and North Korea to refrain from demanding U.S. military withdrawal from the South as one of its security guarantees. These two tasks lay beyond South Korea’s power capabilities since what was at stake was the principles of war on terror and regime survival that the United States and North Korea respectively could not compromise on.30 Undiscouraged, however, Roh promised in May 2005 to provide 2 million kilowatts to the North, in return for a resumption of cabinet-level inter-Korean meetings as well as the Six Party talks. In September, as China revised the draft of a joint communiqué four times and South Korea advocated measures to meet North Korea’s security concerns, the United States agreed with North Korea to issue a Six Party joint communiqué to widen the mission of talks to the negotiation of a package deal on four issues: denuclearization, economic aid, normalization of relations, and construction of a peace regime for the Korean peninsula. The last two addressed the North Korean agenda of security guarantees. 28. See Ha Young-seon, “Bukhaek munjaewa yukja hoidam: Pyonggawa jeonmang” (The North Korean nuclear crisis and the Six Party talks: An evaluation and a forecast), NSP Working Paper 4, East Asia Institute, Seoul, September 2004. 29. Chosun Ilbo, May 15, June 8, and July 10, 2003. 30. See “National Security Strategy Report” (September 2002) and “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” (February 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov.

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In seeking a mediator role to bring the resistant North to the negotiating table, then, Roh found himself forced to go beyond the role of mediator to pledge additional aid. He accepted the North Korean demand to put nuclear issues in a package deal that could potentially make the United States–South Korean alliance a subject for negotiation. Moreover, this mediator role was pursued in the context of inter-Korean reconciliation, which worsened U.S. concerns about South Korea’s intentions. Since Kim Dae-jung’s summit meeting with Kim Jong-il in June 2000, South Korea had pursued an unorthodox strategy of buying peace with economic aid outside of the framework of the Six Party talks. By September 2005, Hyundai Group had poured $553 million into its Geumkang Mountain Tour project alone,31 while over a million South Korean tourists individually paid the North $100–130 for sightseeing between 1998 and 2005. Food assistance hit $135–376 million annually between 2000 and 2004, 32 while fertilizer aid cost $45–79 million per annum from 1999 on. 33 Hyundai also began constructing an industrial complex in Gaesung to serve as an entrepôt for South Korean small and medium-sized companies in August 2002. By 2002, the South became North Korea’s second largest trade partner (24.7 percent), trailing behind China by only 3.8 percentage points.34 This policy of engagement alienated U.S. policy makers because it undermined U.S. efforts to dissuade North Korea from nuclear development. Roh recognized the decline of his influence in the United States, but rather than fi ne-tuning his North Korea policy to harmonize with the U.S. coercive nonproliferation policy, he tried to reshape U.S. policy through a linkage strategy. Roh sent three thousand noncombat South Korean troops to Iraq in April 2003 and maintained their presence in Iraq even when America’s other allies began deserting the Bush administration’s Iraq policy following the withdrawal of United Nations peacekeeping troops in 2005. As Roh saw it, the troop dispatch was an act of political exchange, albeit a fundamentally asymmetric one, whereby South Korea backed the U.S. cause in Iraq in return for America’s accommodation of South Korea’s conciliatory Nordpolitik. This, however, failed to boost U.S. trust as it was seen as an attempt to gain leverage on an ally. U.S. discontent was muted because its Iraqi war was turning into a quagmire, but its frustration with Roh was an open secret in U.S. and South Korean policy circles. 31. Maekyung Business News (Seoul), September 16, 2005. 32. Pak Hyongjung, “Tong’gyero bon bukhan gyongjae jawon sugeup hyonhwanggwa gue jeongchi gyongjaejeok uimi” (Statistics on North Korea’s supply of economic resources and political- economic implications) (Seoul: Korea Institute of National Unification, 2005), 8. 33. Yi Geum-sun, “Daebuk indojeok jiwonui yonghyangryok bunseok” (An analysis of the influence of humanitarian aid to North Korea) (Seoul: Korea Institute of National Unification, 2003), 52. 34. KOTRA, Bukhanui daewae muyeok donghyang (Trends in North Korea’s international trade) (Seoul: KOTRA, 2003), 6.

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Conclusion Roh’s strategic innovations suffered from three flaws. First, the misinterpretation of intentions and capabilities led to misplaced role identities. As a middle power surrounded by great powers and entrapped in a geopolitically vulnerable condition of national division, South Korea could not become a mediator, let alone a balancer. Lacking power, it was more likely to become a “sucker” in the game of North Korean nuclear crisis, making unilateral concessions just to keep multilateral Six Party talks going, but without any proportionate increase in the prospect for negotiated nuclear dismantlement. Moreover, in sharp contrast to its aspiration of becoming a balancer, South Korea was more likely to be disregarded by its neighbors, who had not only different intentions, but also overwhelming power capabilities. After the United States suspended its supply of crude oil to North Korea, South Korea pledged energy aid of 2 million kilowatts to jump-start the Six Party talks. When Roh requested China to support America’s CVID policy, Hu Jintao balanced with a call for conciliatory measures to address North Korea’s security dilemma. Two years later, Roh found himself toning down his CVID policy to keep talks with North Korea going, the result of which was the expansion of the agendas of Six Party talks to nonnuclear issues. Second, Roh mixed the contradictory ideas of liberalism and realism to articulate South Korea’s new role identities, thus confusing its allies, friends, and foes alike about its strategic intentions, and damaging South Korea’s credibility. The liberal idea of becoming a regional hub or a bridge presumed Northeast Asia’s potential to develop into a community, with its member-states drawn together by a sense of common interests and values engendered through the market-driven processes of regionalization. By contrast, his balancer strategy was based on a realist appraisal of Northeast Asia as an arena for great power rivalry, which, if left uncontrolled or unbalanced, could threaten South Korea as it had in 1894, 1905, and 1910. How South Korea’s balancer role could fit in with its efforts at regional community-building was not explained. Moreover, in the middle of pursuing a balancer role, Roh launched a “diplomatic war” against “declining” Japan—not “rising” China—over the issues of Japan’s revisionist history textbooks and “aggression” on Tokdo Island in April 2005. To confuse South Korea’s neighbors even more, Roh pledged to make South Korea a regional hub, bridge, and balancer while embracing the U.S. initiative to upgrade the United States–South Korean alliance through military redeployment and base relocation. Even here, his strategic intentions remained unclear because he embraced Bush’s strategy of military transformation only partially, evading the U.S. request for strategic flexibility. Third, regional and peninsular politics moved in a direction unfavorable to Roh’s strategic experiments. The game of realpolitik, played out dynamically and asymmetrically between today’s maritime American hegemon and tomorrow’s continental Chinese superpower, made neither cooperation nor

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confl ict the prevailing norm in East Asian interstate relations. The reality was somewhere in between these two poles, with the great powers both cooperating and competing at the same time. To borrow Pei’s concepts, the United States pursued a strategy of “hedged engagement” and China a policy of “hedged acquiescence;” For South Korea to guard its interests in this gray zone of East Asian security politics with its limited power capabilities, it needed sophistication to not only accurately assess the neighboring countries’ complex intentions and capabilities, but also to pursue short-term crisis management within the framework of a clearly articulated long-term grand strategy. The diplomatic agility to adapt to the complexity of an ambiquous transition era is a rare commodity in any country, but even so Roh’s presidency stood out for its lack of subtlety. Led by the radical “386ers,”35 who had made careers through political protest against authoritarian rule, the presidency of Roh made decisions on the basis of untested ideas. The path Roh chose after February 2003 consisted of juxtaposing all available ideas in South Korea’s ideologically heterogeneous intelligentsia into an inconsistent policy package to manage the two interrelated strategic issues of positioning South Korea between China and America, and resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis without sanctions. To illustrate his indiscriminate borrowing of ideas, table 8.5 summarizes South Korea’s most frequently discussed security paradigms. The horizontal axis contrasts two regional strategies, which were alike in taking South Korea’s integration into China’s orbit of economic growth as an irreversible macrotrend, but diverged over how to deal with the security dilemma arising from this economic Sinicization. Those perceiving China to be a benign power called upon South Korea to construct a regional security community, with or without the United States as a member-state, as a logical outcome of market-driven regional economic integration. With China locked into regional security arrangements, it was hoped, China would exercise its power responsibly within the framework of common rules. What organizational form these multilateral arrangements would take and, indeed, whether it would be possible to construct a regional security regime were, however, left unarticulated. By contrast, the proponents of “reverse Finlandization” looked at China as less benign. To enjoy the economic fruits of China’s ascent, but at the same time preempt it from converting its rising economic power into political- military influence, they fell back on South Korea’s alliance with the United States as the insurance of military security. Benchmarking the strategy of pre-1991 Finland but in a reversed way, they sought to bandwagon China economically, but balance it militarily through the use of U.S. power. To reassure China of nonag35. The name “386 Generation” came from their ages (thirty to thirty nine), the decade of their college entrance (the 1980s), and the decade of their birth (the 1960s). Having spent their formative years under the authoritarian Fifth Republic (1980–88), the 386ers were the central element of South Korea’s ideologically contentious progressive forces.

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Table 8.5. Alternative security paradigms for South Korea Peninsular security arrangements

Regional security arrangements Reverse Finlandization

Regional security community

Hedged engagement

Q1

Q2

Reconciliatory engagement

Q3

Q4

gressive South Korean intentions, the strategy also envisioned embedding the U.S.–South Korean alliance in a regional web of loosely organized multilateral security linkages, which would encompass China. The media reports of South Korea’s unambiguous tilt toward China notwithstanding, none of South Korea’s major political forces, including the advocates of regional security community, supported allying exclusively with China in the security realm. The issue was how to restrain or check the colossal land power. The advocates of regional security community put their hope on regional multilateral arrangements and the proponents of reverse Finlandization on the U.S.–South Korean alliance. On the other hand, the vertical axis in table 8.5 categorizes strategic ideas on inter-Korean security relations into two competing paradigms. After Lee Hoichang’s Cold War warrior image cost him the presidential election in 1997 and 2002, and with America’s tough talk of sanctions causing a war scare in the South, the conservative wing of South Korea’s intelligentsia became “reformed,” articulating an engagement strategy. However, these conservatives sought only partial engagement because they were skeptical of Kim Jong-il’s will to change his hard line security policy. The conservatives also questioned Kim Jong-il’s capacity for regime transformation, given his dependence on the military for survival. Consequently, they called for hedging engagement in three ways: (1) by maintaining a robust alliance with the United States as an insurance against the danger of a total breakdown in the Six Party talks; (2) by continuing humanitarian aid to the North, but refraining from “giving away” nonessential goods and resources unless North Korea reciprocated by changing its foreign policy; and (3) by making human rights a central part of South Korea’s post-9/11 Nordpolitik to pressure Kim Jong-il into reform. As a revisionist on inter-Korean security relations, Roh embraced another kind of engagement. The strategy of “reconciliatory engagement,” advocated by the progressive wing of the South Korean intelligentsia, was based on a set of sympathetic assumptions about North Korea. In their view, North Korea had become a “rogue state” because South Korea, hand in hand with the United States, had isolated it from the international community and threatened it with sanctions. The progressives believed that North Korea would doff its Cold War attire if the South freed itself from the McCarthyite “red complex” and provided the North with a ray of sunshine. They argued that

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deepening inter-Korean trade and investment relations would not undermine South Korean security because the North was too weak and too demoralized. Moreover, romanticizing the two Koreas as “brother nations” sharing a common ancestry, the radicals of the progressive wing claimed that North Korea would not wage war unless threatened by South Korea and the United States. Thus, what was needed was perseverance in the reconciliatory act of unilateral and unconditional giving to North Korea even in the face of U.S. opposition, until the North realized South Korea’s sincerity and reciprocated with its own good will. In terms of table 8.5, then, Roh appeared to choose the strategy of reverse Finlandization and reconciliatory engagement (quadrant Q3) when he called for upgrading the U.S.–South Korean alliance to ensure South Korea’s “cooperative independence,” on the one hand, and continuing Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy on the other. However, he also envisioned South Korea becoming a hub in regional economic relations, a mediator in the North Korean nuclear crisis, and a balancer against Sino-Japanese rivalry, thus accepting some ideas of the Q4 strategy which mixed the regional security community policy with the inter-Korean policy of reconciliatory engagement. By zigzagging back and forth between Q3 and Q4, Roh de facto accepted the two competing security paradigms’ contradictory ontological propositions and assumptions about South Korea’s two central strategic questions: (1) whether China was benign, interested in making Northeast Asia a community, or malign, with hegemonic ambitions that could only be contained by U.S. military prowess; and (2) whether North Korea was a failed state, entrapped in an irreversible systemic crisis, or a normal state with the possibility of redemption if only South Korea and America dismantled their Cold War containment policy. The ruling Uri Party, too, had its legislators dispersed over Q3 and Q4, demonstrating a consensus on the need of reconciliatory engagement, but disagreeing over South Korea’s regional positioning. The opposition Hannara Party, by contrast, was more internally homogeneous, mixing reverse Finlandization with hedged engagement (Q1). Roh’s choice to zigzag between Q3 and Q4 was explained in diverse ways by South Korean political forces. Some saw his choice as a sign of incompetence, mixing what were unmixable. Others were more sympathetic, diagnosing the contradictory pressures of South Korea’s regional and peninsular strategic requirements as driving Roh to zigzag, sometimes away from the United States and other times toward it. Still others emphasized his ideological values and norms. As they saw it, his preference lay with the construction of a Northeast Asian community and the cultivation of unity with North Korea through reconciliatory engagement (Q4), but the vulnerabilities originating from U.S. hegemony forced Roh to tone down his anti-American agenda. The opposite interpretation of his ideology was also circulated in policy circles, describing Roh as pro-alliance at heart, pursuing Q3 as his main strategy, but supplementing it with regionalist talk not only to

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demonstrate South Korea’s good will toward China but also to keep the progressives within his ruling electoral coalition. These four competing interpretations essentially made Roh’s intentions and preferences the central issue of South Korean security politics. Also intensely debated was his interpretation of South Korean capabilities. Depending how one interpreted Roh’s intentions and South Korea’s capabilities, he looked like a novice unable to determine his priorities and accurately diagnose national capabilities; or like a hardheaded pragmatist juggling with several contradictory, but legitimate, security goals in increasingly bipolar Northeast Asia; or like an anti-American ideologue toning down his regionalist project under severe structural constraints, while waiting for an opportunity to break away from U.S. hegemony; or like a pro-American simply trying to live with a rising China and with South Korea’s contentious progressive political forces. Unfortunately for Roh, however, the fact that his intentions were a contentious issue in both domestic politics and external relations prevented him from forcefully leading South Korean security policy. Whatever he decided turned into an ideological issue, burying the real security issues and distorting political discourse. The incessant ideological clashes within South Korea’s security community spilled over onto society, too, dividing it between Left and Right. Herein lay South Korea’s security crisis. Both Presidents Roh and Bush profoundly damaged the U.S.–South Korean alliance system, upon which South Korea’s peace and prosperity had been built since 1953. The weakening of South Korea’s traditional security arrangement, however, did not lead to any new security paradigm. China was perceived by South Korean society as a security threat, prohibiting Roh from leaving the U.S.–South Korean alliance. Roh thought he could build a Northeast Asian community, but this remained an unreachable ideal because no great power endorsed it. In fact, given Japan’s drift away from China and America’s military transformation, both of which were likely to persist for some time as macrotrends because of uneven regional economic growth and the war on terror, Roh’s regionalist ambitions hurt South Korean interests by making U.S. policymakers question his intentions and credibility. The U.S.–South Korean security alliance was damaged while no new system was emerging. The situation, if not arrested, posed the danger that South Korea would face alone the challenge of the post-9/11 regional and peninsular power transitions. The alliance crisis demonstrates the centrality of Sino-American relations for the development of U.S.–South Korean relations. Much of Roh’s policy zigzags and wavering was exacerbated, if not caused, by rising but manageable tensions between the United States and China. Unlike Japan, which is an economic superpower and also a maritime great power with the sea to shield it from China, South Korean interests have been best served when the United States and China accommodated one another in sustaining regional peace and prosperity. But many South Koreans believed that

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the interplay of the war on terror with the North Korean nuclear crisis and Japan’s resistance to the rise of China threatened this security requirement, prompting Roh to adopt the unsustainable strategy of zigzagging between table 8.5’s Q3 and Q4 paradigms in the hope of satisfying the three security requirements of: (1) working with U.S. policymakers to upgrade its alliance system, but without driving off China; (2) continuing South Korea’s integration into China’s orbit of economic growth, but with the United States remaining as its ultimate insurance of military security; and (3) resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, but without resorting to sanctions. However, it is also true that Roh made South Korea’s security situation even more difficult by misinterpreting Sino-American relations through his distinctive analytic lens. As argued above, Sino-American relations were neither “warm” nor “cold.” Rather, they belonged in a gray area where neither confrontation nor accommodation ruled. The two great powers shared common interests in regional peace and prosperity, but were also caught in an asymmetric struggle for power, with the United States pursuing the strategy of hedged engagement and China the path of hedged acquiescence. They competed against one another, but peacefully without challenging each other’s vital interests. In such a spirit, U.S. policymakers accommodated Chinese interest in opposing Taiwan independence, without acquiescing to its ambition for national unification. China, in return, opted for gradual unification as a gesture of respecting U.S. interests in the control of vital sea lanes and the defense of Taiwan’s democracy. By alleviating America’s worst fear of Taiwan falling to Chinese military invasion, China was assured that the United States would not support Taiwan’s policy of “creeping independence.” To encourage China to stick to its promise of a gradual negotiated settlement, the United States periodically restrained Taiwan from declaring independence based on its newly found “Taiwanese” identity. But Roh’s call for a balancer role was based on a one-sided image of Northeast Asia. In drawing an analogy with the Chosun Dynasty’s loss of sovereignty in 1910, Roh posited Northeast Asia as entering an era of great power rivalry, with the United States and Japan encircling China to contain its rising power. He developed his balancing policy to prevent such encirclement in the belief that South Korea could not afford Sino-Japanese confl ict. In doing so, Roh overlooked the collaborative side of Northeast Asia’s geopolitical equation and made South Korea’s three security requirements look more intractable and contradictory than they actually were. In spite of China’s periodic disavowals of intent to wage war against the United States, and America’s pressure on Taiwan to restrain from an irreversible separatist move, Roh assumed Sino-American relations to be a zero-sum game and tried to strike a balance by zigzagging between his alliance talk and regionalist ideas.

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Until South Korea begins to see Sino-American relations in its entirety and recognizes its collaborative as well as confl ictive nature, thus freeing itself from a doomsday scenario, it will not be able to arrest its own foreign policy paralysis. For any middle power squeezed between great powers like South Korea, a doomsday scenario can only result in policy zigzags, wavering, and ambiguities, which damage the national interest.

chapter

9

A Japanese Perspective on China’s Rise and the East Asian Order Akio Takahara

There is little doubt that a central question in considering China’s rise and its impact on the East Asian order is China’s relationship with Japan. As of the end of 2004, the Japanese economy still amounted to over 60 percent of the GDP of East Asia, that is Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia combined. That was more than twice as large as the Chinese economy. However, a shift in the relative balance of national power between the two countries has been in progress since the early 1990s, when Japan plunged into a relatively long period of recession after the bursting of the economic bubble while China’s economy was catapulted by Deng Xiaoping’s so- called Southern Tour in early 1992. Despite the recent recovery of the Japanese economy, the gap between the two continues has continued to narrow. It is generally predicted that China’s economy will surpass Japan’s sometime around 2020. China’s rise has been met with mixed feelings in Japan and other nations in East Asia. Its economic growth, which was promoted by a large influx of direct foreign investment, fi rst threatened some Japanese industries that could not compete with the inflow of cheap products from China, and worried the Japanese and the Taiwanese about the “hollowing out” of their industries and the Southeast Asian nations about intensified competition in attracting foreign investment. However, the neighboring nations have gradually come to realize the economic benefit of China’s rise. The Japanese economy was lifted by the rapid growth of demand in the Chinese market, and in Japan the economic threat of China is hardly talked about any more. In 2004, China became the largest trading partner of not only Japan, but also South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The integration of the East Asian economies proceeds forcefully, and this is accompanied by an increase in cultural and other exchanges at the societal level. China shifted its policy in the latter half of the 218

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1990s to promote the formation and development of regional fora, which has been welcomed and praised by Tokyo despite the conspicuous competition for influence and initiative. There are other aspects of China’s rise, however, that have only increased the concern of its neighboring nations. First, in the realm of security, there is little sign yet that the phase of confrontation will be replaced by that of trust and cooperation. It is true that China adopted what it calls the New Security Concept, which is an idea to promote cooperative security. On this basis, it has started to play an active role in regional fora such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Central Asia, the ASEAN Regional Forum in East Asia and the Six Party talks over the Korean nuclear crisis. Among the neighboring nations including Japan, however, the development of confidence in China has been prevented by its lack of transparency about the intentions and strategy behind its rapid and continuing military buildup, and by confl icts involving so- called ocean research vessels and a Chinese nuclear submarine intruding into Japanese territorial waters. The second source of deep concern is the rise of Chinese nationalism. The policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to infuse the people with patriotism has contributed to a surge in popular nationalism that seems to have grown out beyond the party’s control. China’s rise has imbued the public with self- confidence, which interacts with China’s remaining sense of inferiority and is expressed in the form of aggressive nationalism. Recent incidents include the anti-Japanese jeering and violence inside and outside the stadia at the 2004 Asian Cup soccer games and violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005, which have in turn aroused anti- Chinese and nationalistic sentiments in Japan. The rise of China has thus occasioned a profound complexity in its relations with Japan. The processes of economic integration and societal interaction will continue to progress and in the main function as a bond between the Japanese and the Chinese. However, China’s rise, which is both a cause and a result of economic integration, also has an aspect that gives rise to political and strategic confrontation. This interacts with the complex psyches of the two nations and the sense of uncertainty about their future relationship. It is this growing complexity that this chapter aims to analyze. After identifying the political, strategic, economic, cultural, and psychological factors that contribute to the complex trends in the development of the relationship since the 1990s, we shall discuss the measures that both sides should be taking to promote the positive elements in the relationship and neutralize the negative ones for the sake of a peaceful common future in the region.

The Rise of the Chinese Economy: Japan’s Role and Reaction It is no surprise that economics has functioned mainly as a binding factor in Sino-Japanese relations. Historically, China’s natural resources and market

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potential have attracted the attention and capital of the industrialized world. Even during the days of the planned economy in China, Japanese did not forget the economic importance of their huge neighbor, with whom they signed long-term trade agreements on a private or semiofficial basis.1 The provision of Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) to China since the late 1970s supported China’s fledgling reform and opening policies, which Japan considered conducive to bilateral economic exchange as well as to stable Chinese economic growth. With growth and marketization of the Chinese economy, an increasing number of Japanese fi rms have moved their production facilities to China, the so- called “factory of the world.”2 Of course, this does not mean that there have not been any problems in the economic relationship between the two nations. The fi rst blow to Japanese business was the sudden cancellation of a number of heavy industrial plant contracts under the policy of “readjustment” in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. During the 1980s, it was the Chinese who complained about their trade deficits with Japan. Japanese economic imperialism was a major target of student demonstrations in the mid-1980s. Then from the 1990s onwards, as economic exchange deepened and widened, there have been a good many incidents, such as the bankruptcy of GITIC (Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation) and the cancellation of its huge debt with the Japanese banks; breaches of intellectual property rights; and Chinese consumers’ complaints about “discriminatory” treatment over faulty laptop computers and sport utility vehicles, as well as about “insulting” advertisements of Japanese products.3 Above all, there was the trade dispute that led to Japan’s adoption of tentative safeguard measures against the import of three agricultural products in 2001, to which the Chinese government responded by drastically increasing the tariffs on three Japanese manufactured products. Obviously, it was the Japanese side that suffered more in this “trade war.”4 In the end, a compromise was reached: the Japanese canceled the safeguard measures while the Chinese promised to adopt voluntary measures to curb the rapid rise in the export of the agricultural products. This trade dispute and its settlement was a clear indication of the deepening interdependence between the two economies. After all, most of the controversial agricultural imports from China reflected the investment and expertise of 1. On Japan- China trade, see, for instance, Akihiko Tanaka, Nittyu Kankei 1945–1990 (Japan- China relations 1945–1990) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1991), 43–60. 2. It was in 2001 that books with such titles as Made in China or The Factory of the World, The Market of the Century, began to be published in Japan. 3. Yoshikazu Shimizu, Chugoku wa Naze “Han- nichi” ni Natta ka (Why China became “anti-Japanese”) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2003), 200–204; Mo Bangfu, “Nihon kigyo ga Chugoku de seiko suru hiketsu” (The knack of success for Japa nese fi rms in China), Gaiko Forum 204 (July 2005): 60–62. 4. According to the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Japanese automobile fi rms lost ¥51.2 billion in the latter half of 2001 because of the tariff increase. It estimated that the loss would rise to approximately ¥480 billion in 2002 if the sanction continued.

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Table 9.1. Japan’s trade with China, 2000–2005 (billion U.S. dollars)

Exports Growth (%) Imports Growth (%)

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

30.4 30.4 55.3 29.1

31.1 2.2 58.1 5.1

39.9 28.2 61.7 6.1

57.2 43.6 75.2 21.9

73.8 29.0 94.2 25.3

80.4 8.9 109.0 15.7

Source: JC Economic Journal (June 2006): 43.

Japanese trading houses. The growth rate of Japanese exports to China, which had recorded 30.4 percent in 2000, dropped to 2.2 percent in 2001, but picked up to 28.2 percent in 2002 and a staggering 43.6 percent in 2003 (table 9.1). In 2004, for the fi rst time in post–World War II history China surpassed the United States as Japan’s largest trading partner. As for Japanese investments, they took a nosedive a year after the trade disputes, but bounced back in 2003 to a growth rate of 50 percent on contract basis compared to the previous year (table 9.2). By 2003 the Japanese media started talking about the “China special procurement boom,” along the lines of the “Korean War special procurement boom” in the 1950s. China’s economic threat was hardly talked about any more in the Japanese press. According to a March 2004 survey conducted by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 70 percent of Japanese business leaders wanted a trilateral free trade agreement with China and South Korea. 5 The annual government survey in October 2003 indicated that the percentage of Japanese who felt close to China increased by 2.3 points compared to the previous year, which went against the oft-repeated claim that the antipathy held by the Japanese toward China was constantly rising.6 Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Table 9.2. Japanese investment in China, 2000–2005 (billion US dollars) 2000 Amount Growth (%) Contract Growth (%) Implementation Growth (%)

1,614 38.3 3.7 42.1 29.2 −1.7

2001 2,019 25.1 5.4 47.3 4.4 49.0

2002 2,745 37.0 5.3 −1.9 4.2 −8.9

2003

2004

3,254 18.5 8.0 50.2 5.1 20.6

3,454 6.1 9.2 15.2 5.5 7.9

2005 3,269 −5.4 11.9 30.1 6.5 19.8

Source: JC Economic Journal (June 2006): 43.

5. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo), March 24, 2004. 6. See the public opinion polls on foreign relations, conducted every year by the Cabinet Office of the Japanese Government. A graph of the results from 1978 to 2005 is available at http:// www8.cao.go.jp/survey/ h17/ h17-gaikou/images/z05.gif.

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Koizumi had been stressing that he saw China not as a threat but as an opportunity, a point that was increasingly accepted by business circles in Japan. A major means through which the government promotes economic integration is ODA. Japan has been by far the largest donor to China since it started providing China with ODA in 1979, despite its decision to decrease the amount of ODA beginning in 2001. In the 1980s, many of the larger ODA projects involved assistance to industrial infrastructure that would facilitate the exporting of natural resources to Japan, such as electrification of railroads and construction of berths and other port facilities. With the growth of the Chinese economy and increased wariness about China in the late 1990s, however, it was strongly argued within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party that there was no longer any need to help China, which had allegedly not shown any gratitude for Japanese aid. This led to an eventual reduction of the amount provided and to the shifting of major target areas to those relating to social development and particularly to environment and poverty. The environment is more directly appealing to Japanese taxpayers as the risks of air pollution, yellow sand, and sea pollution are transnational. However, the environment and poverty are both major causes of social instability and are important target areas of the government of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, who have proclaimed their intention to “put people fi rst” and pursue a balanced and sustainable development of the nation. Another policy of the Japanese government in promoting economic integration was its support for China’s engagement with and entry into the regional and global systems. Thinking that isolating China was counterproductive, Japan became the fi rst to cancel the economic sanctions imposed by the developed countries on China after the “June 4 Tiananmen Incident” in 1989. However, the Japanese were slow to realize China’s changing capabilities in the late 1990s as Beijing developed its economy, became confident, and assumed a positive attitude towards regional cooperation. It was only when China proposed a free trade area with ASEAN in November that year that Tokyo understood Beijing was serious about regional cooperation.7 The Japanese government was fi nally spurred into action as if to compete with the Chinese over economic agreements with ASEAN. Despite this element of competition, Prime Minister Koizumi, who came to power in 2001, highly praised China for its active role in promoting regional cooperation.8 A disagreement has existed, however, over the confines of the re7. In fact, Japan had changed its long-standing policy of shunning bilateral free trade agreements and started negotiating with South Korea and Singapore in the late 1990s. This was one factor that urged the Chinese to change their policy on free trade agreements. See Feng Zhaokui, “Guanyu Zhongri guanxi de zhanlue sikao” (On strategic thinking about China-Japan relations), Fuyin Baokan Ziliao: Zhongguo Waijiao, no. 3 (2001). 8. See Koizumi’s January 2002 speech, in which he also advocated the East Asian Community. Koizumi Junichiro, “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia—A Sincere and Open

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gional community. It became clear at the first East Asian Summit in December 2005 that Japan, together with Indonesia and Singapore, supported the inclusion of India, Australia, and New Zealand as a counterbalance to China, while China, together with Malaysia, questioned their East Asian identity and insisted that the community should be confined to ASEAN plus Japan, China, and South Korea.9 This difference notwithstanding, it is significant that the two countries, together with the rest of East Asia, have agreed on aiming for a community that would serve as a framework for sustainable peace and development.

Increasing Societal Interaction and Cultural Exchange Along with economic growth, Chinese society is becoming increasingly open to foreigners. Societal exchanges between Japan and China have been greatly facilitated by easier communications resulting from institutional changes and technological advances. In September 2003, China abolished visas for Japanese citizens visiting China for up to fi fteen days. Although the number of Japanese visiting China decreased from 2.92 million in 2002 to 2.25 million in 2003 due to the outbreak of the SARS crisis, tourism bounced back to 3.33 million visits in 2004. Chinese visitors to Japan have also increased, from 0.45 million in 2002 and 0.44 million in 2003 to 0.62 million in 2004.10 Tourism from China grew further after July 2005 when Japan started issuing group tourist visas to groups from all over China, altering the policy of allowing them only to groups from certain coastal cities and provinces.11 The number of Chinese who worked in Japanese fi rms in China amounted to over 1 million, and those employed by Japanese fi rms either directly or indirectly through contracts, etc., were estimated to be approximately 9.2 million.12 The activities of Japanese NGOs are an underreported subject. Preliminary research reveals that around one thousand Japanese NGOs were engaged in exchange and/or cooperation with the Chinese as of 2002.13 It is most significant Partnership,” January 14, 2002, http:// www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ koizumispeech/ 2002/ 01/ 14speech _e.html. 9. From Japan’s point of view, the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand is also an indication that regionalism in East Asia is of an open nature, which could allay U.S. suspicion. 10. See the website of the Embassy of Japan in the People’s Republic of China at http://www .cn.emb -japan.go.jp/ bilateral _j/ koryu0603 _j.htm. This source states that more than 1 million Chinese visited Japan in 2004 according to Chinese statistics. 11. When the provision of group tourist visas started in September 2000, it was limited to Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong. In September 2004, it was extended to Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Tianjin. 12. See the website of the Embassy of Japan in the People’s Republic of China at http://www .cn.emb -japan.go.jp/ bilateral _j/ koryu0603 _j.htm. 13. Akio Takahara, “Japanese NGOs in China,” in Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power, ed. Lam Peng Er (London: Routledge, 2006), 166–79.

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China’s Ascent Table 9.3. Japanese NGOs engaged in greenification in China, 1999–2004 1999 29

2000 52

2001 65

2002 70

2003 76

2004 81

Source: Tomoko Takahashi, “The Development of Greenifi cation Activities by Japanese NGOs in China” (in Japanese), Gendai Chu¯goku, no. 79 (August 2005): 88.

that the NGOs have not been deterred by political tension between the two countries in recent years. For example, the number of Japanese NGOs directly engaged in China’s greenification has been increasing steadily (table 9.3). The increase in exchange is even more visible in the realm of culture and education. Chinese classical literature and history continue to be admired by the Japanese. Cultural and historical affi nity, combined with curiosity about China’s contemporary dynamism, were most likely major reasons that the Chinese Pavilion received the largest number of visitors at the 2005 Aichi World Expo held in Japan. Nowadays, although English remains the fi rst foreign language taught from middle school on, Chinese has become the most popular among the second foreign languages studied by university students in humanities and social science.14 A 2005 survey indicated that 10.2 percent of high schools offered Chinese language courses.15 On the Chinese side, a survey by the Japan Foundation indicated that the number of Chinese studying Japanese increased from approximately 240,000 in 1998 to 390,000 in 2003.16 While job opportunities seemed to be a common motive for Japanese and Chinese to study each other’s language, Chinese have also been drawn to study Japanese by the popularity of Japanese pop songs and Japanese animation.17 In academia, it is estimated that over 5,000 Chinese have received doctoral degrees in Japan, and more than 1,000 of them have joined the faculty of Japanese universities.18 The impact of cultural exchange is hard to measure, but there are surveys that suggest its positive effect on the perceived image of the other side. Liu Zhiming, director of the Media Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has been conducting a series of surveys on how Japan is perceived by the Chinese. His survey in 2004 indicated that the percentage of 14. At the University of Tokyo, for instance, this has been the case since 2003. 15. 553 high schools taught Chinese, while 286 taught Korean, and 248 taught French (Mainichi Shimbun [Tokyo], 26 October 2005). 16. See the website of the Embassy of Japan in the People’s Republic of China at http://www .cn.emb -japan.go.jp/ bilateral _j/ koryu0603 _j.htm#5. 17. See the interview with Chinese students in Japan and a report on Chinese students studying Japanese in China in Wang Min, “Nihon ryugakusei to iu Chugoku ni okeru chinichi ha tachi” (Former students in Japan: A group in China that knows Japan well), Gaiko Forum 204 (July 2005): 63, 40–45. 18. Sakanaka Hidenori, “ ‘Sekai ni hirakareta Nihon’ wo mezashite” (Aiming at a “Japan that is open to the world”), Gaiko Forum 215 (June 2006): 52–59.

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Chinese who disliked or somewhat disliked Japan, compared to 2001, had decreased by about 10 points to 40.2 percent, while the percentage of those who liked or somewhat liked Japan was much higher among the youth than among the middle-aged and the old, and more than 10 points higher in Shanghai and Guangzhou, where the “Japan fever” (ha ri) phenomenon was more salient.19 More recent surveys conducted in September 2004 and June 2005, that is, before and after the sprouting of anti-Japanese news reports and demonstrations in the spring of 2005, indicated that those who disliked or somewhat disliked Japan had increased by 6 points to 46.0 percent. However, those who liked or somewhat liked Japan only decreased by 0.8 points to 27.7 percent. In Guangzhou, those who liked Japan even showed a slight increase in this period. 20 Wang Min, professor at Hosei University in Tokyo, reports that the Chinese students she interviewed unanimously told her that their interest in Japan was kindled by the “Japan phenomenon” (Riben xianxiang), which “those who grew up in the cities inevitably would have the chance to experience.”21 Despite the plethora of information in China that depicts Japan in a negative light, economic integration and the pervasiveness of Japanese pop culture in urban China have contributed to an underlying Chinese affi nity for Japan, especially among urban youth.

The Rise of Chinese Military Power and Japan’s Reaction What is of prime concern for China’s neighbors is the rise of its military might. China has not concealed its intention to develop its military forces along with economic development. In recent years, this has been justified by the idea that a competition of “comprehensive national power” is intensifying day by day in the international arena. According to the Chinese leaders, comprehensive national power consists of economic, military, and scientific and technological power, and the power of national integrity. 22 Their intention is to develop every element of comprehensive national power, and hence their pursuit of a military buildup. In terms of concrete policy, a new military strategy was established in 1993 at the instructions of Jiang Zemin, the civilian chairman of the Central Military Commission, after a careful study of the Gulf War of 1991. The new strategy emphasized the defense of maritime rights and interests, and extended the area of defense of the mainland to the air and especially the territorial

19. Huanqiu Shibao (Beijing), December 15, 2004. 20. Sakaba Noboru and Yasuda Narumi, Chugoku no Nihon Kigyo Image: Chosa Report (The Chinese image of Japanese fi rms: An investigation report) (Beijing: JSS NET, 2005), 32–33. 21. Wang Min, “Nihon ryugakusei to iu Chugoku ni okeru chinichi ha tachi,” 45. 22. People’s Daily (Beijing), June 5, 1999.

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waters and exclusive economic zones. 23 The effect of the new strategy fi rst appeared in February 1995, when the Philippines announced that the Chinese had constructed a building on Mischief Reef, which the Philippines claimed to be their territory. The new strategy inspired China’s military modernization policy, with its central focus on winning a limited, high-tech war with Taiwan. In a nutshell, Jiang ordered that the People’s Liberation Army should be transformed from a “manpower-intensive military” into a “science and technology–intensive military.”24 In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, then China’s paramount leader and chairman of the Military Commission, repeatedly emphasized that the military must wait its turn and that “economic development was primary and defense buildup was secondary.” Since the end of the 1990s, however, that formula has receded and the phrase “coordinated development of defense buildup and economic development” has been used more often. 25 In late 1999, Jiang Zemin remarked that “I have repeatedly said . . . that the state should consider the actual needs of defense and military buildup in deciding state expenditures. In recent years, the state has done its utmost to increase the amount devoted to military expenditure. . . . We must gradually formulate a mechanism through which we can achieve mutual promotion and coordinated development of defense buildup and economic development.”26 There is little doubt that China’s pursuit of military prowess will proceed unhindered. Along with the rapid growth in GDP and in state revenues, the double-digit increases in China’s official defense budget continue under the auspices of Hu Jintao, who succeeded Jiang as chairman of the Central Military Council in September 2004. 27 As far as Japan was concerned, besides the lack of transparency in the military buildup, notable incidents with China in recent years included a Chinese naval reconnaissance ship sailing around the Japanese archipelago in 2000; repeated Chinese violations of the 2001 agreement to inform the other side in advance of the activities of ocean research vessels in designated waters; intrusion into undisputed territorial waters by a Chinese nuclear submarine in 2004, which was merely “regretted” by a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs;

23. Akio Takahara, “ ‘Chugoku kyoiron’ o umu chuka sekai no kakuju to atsureki” (The expansion of the China- centred world and the frictions that cause the China threat theory), Gaiko Forum 68 (May 1994): 50. 24. Jiang Zemin, Guanyu Ershinianlai Jundui Jianshe de Lishi Jingyan (On the historical experience of military construction in the past twenty years) (Beijing: People’s Publishers, 1999), 2. 25. For instance, in Jiang Zemin’s report to the Sixteenth Party Congress in November 2002, only the latter phrase was included. 26. Jiang Zemin, Lun Guofang he Jundui Jianshe (On the buildup of defense and the military) (Beijing: Central Document Publishers, 2003), 432–33. 27. Abe Jun’ichi, Chugoku gun no Honto no Jitsuryoku (The real strength of the Chinese military) (Tokyo: Bijinesu sha, 2006), 22–25.

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and the appearance of five Chinese destroyers in the vicinity of the disputed oil and gas fields in the East China Sea in 2005. There have been three aspects to Japan’s security policy response to China’s military buildup: further development of Japan-U.S. security cooperation, new plans for equipping and deploying the Self Defense Forces, and closer regional and bilateral dialogue. First and foremost, many Chinese suspected that the reconfi rmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the mid-1990s was an integral part of the new U.S. strategy to maintain its preeminent position in the region and the world, and that it provided the Japanese with an excuse to pursue a more active security policy such as: agreeing to joint missile defense research and development; assisting the United States in the war in Afghanistan; and sending the Self Defense Forces to Iraq. 28 For Japanese policymakers, however, what initially mattered most was the political significance of the alliance. They have had to explain to the public the significance of the alliance after the Cold War in the face of domestic controversy over bilateral economic friction, as well as the problems arising from U.S. bases in Japan, especially those in Okinawa, which could lead to stronger anti–United States feelings and questioning of the alliance. With regard to China, the April 1996 Japan–United States Joint Declaration on Security stated, “it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and, in this context, the interest of both countries [is] in furthering cooperation with China.”29 When the Japanese and U.S. governments talked about possible “circumstances surrounding Japan” in the new guideline for defense cooperation, they were mainly alluding to a war in the Korean peninsula, where a crisis had just been overcome in 1994. However, the idea of reinforcing the Japan-U.S. alliance to hedge against the rise of the Chinese military took hold in the early twenty-first century. The United States took the initiative in the context of its military transformation. The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, which comprised the ministers in charge of foreign affairs and defense, met twice in 2005. The February meeting decided on common strategic objectives that included encouraging the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue, and the October meeting produced a document on the specific measures for transformation and realignment to achieve those objectives.30 In explaining 28. Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” Washington Quarterly 29, 1 (winter 2005–6): 119. For a comprehensive analysis of the post–Cold War developments in Japan’s defense policy, see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re- emergence as a “Normal” Military Power (Oxford: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005). 29. http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f _work/sengen _.htm. 30. For the February joint statement and the October document, see http://mofa.go.jp/ region/namerica/us/security/scc/joint0502 .htm; http://mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/ security/scc/doc0510.html, respectively.

228

China’s Ascent

these measures, which included close coordination between ballistic missile defense command and control systems, American military sources were open about their intention of preparing for the enhancement of China’s military capabilities.31 This view was increasingly shared by some influential Japanese politicians. Although Prime Minister Koizumi had made clear that he did not regard China as a threat despite its possession of nuclear weapons, Foreign Minister Taro Aso stated in December 2005 that China was becoming a threat as a country with a population of 1 billion that possessed atomic bombs, and which increased its military budget by double-digit amounts for seventeen years in a row with a considerable lack of transparency.32 The Chinese have been concerned that Japan was becoming a “normal country,” discarding the post–World War II limitations on its security policy.33 Japan had discarded its taboos on discussion of arms exports and on collective self-defense; the Liberal Democratic Party had offered concrete proposals to amend Article 9 of the Constitution; and in 2004 Japan decided to purchase in-fl ight refueling aircraft, demonstrating that Japan was testing constitutional restrictions on power projection.34 However, the government declared that preemptive strikes were impermissible and that the ban on arms exports would be lifted only partially in regard to the United States and ballistic missile defense;35 the Liberal Democratic Party’s proposal on constitutional revision kept the fi rst clause of Article 9 intact, which declares that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”36 As far as the buildup of the defense forces was concerned, developments vis-à-vis the military rise of China focused on defending the remote islands in the East China Sea. The December 2004 new defense program guidelines emphasized a swift response to invasion of offshore islands by rapid transport and deployment capabilities, and talked of measures against submerged foreign submarines infi ltrating Japan’s territorial waters.37 Acquisition of air tankers and other new transport aircraft was planned to defend against an invasion of the islands.38 When the 2004 guidelines were issued, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs castigated the Japa nese government for spread31. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 30 October 2005; Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), October 30, 2005. 32. Remarks made at the Foreign Minister’s press conference on 22 December 2005, available online at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/ kaiken/gaisho/g _0512 .html#5. 33. Wu, “The End of the Silver Lining,” 122–23. 34. Hughes, Japan’s Re- emergence as a “Normal” Military Power, esp. 79–92; National Institute for Defense Studies, Higashi Ajiya Senryaku Gaikan 2006 (East Asian strategic review 2006) (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2006), 237. 35. Hughes, Japan’s Re- emergence as a “Normal” Military Power, 88–92. 36. Quoted ibid., 32. 37. National Institute for Defense Studies, Higashi Ajiya Senryaku Gaikan 2005 (East Asian Strategic Review 2005) (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2005), 220. 38. National Institute for Defense Studies, Higashi Ajiya Senryaku Gaikan 2006, 237.

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ing a “China threat theory.” In fact, the guidelines stated that China continued to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as naval and air forces, and that it was also expanding its area of operation at sea. These are objective facts that any neighboring security agency should be concerned about, especially when there was a surge of antagonism towards one’s country. The guidelines did state that the Japa nese side would have to remain attentive to China’s future actions, but this was rather different from “listing China as the primary threat” as was reported widely in the Chinese media. Contrary to the numerous Chinese news reports on the remilitarization of Japan, the growth rate of the defense budget in Japan was in the negative for five years in a row from 2003 to 2007.39 As for the future, the guidelines actually modified the defense force building concept based on Cold War–type antitank, antisubmarine, and anti-air warfare, and announced a significant reduction in the personnel and equipment for defending the country from a full-scale invasion.40 This was primarily because, as the 2003 Defense White Paper had already stated, “more than a decade has passed since the collapse of the bipolar Cold War structure, and the circumstances in neighboring countries at present indicate little likelihood of an amphibious assault against Japan on a scale requiring massive preparations.”41 Secondly, ballistic missile defense was an expensive endeavor. In the fiscal year 2006, its budget was ¥139.9 billion, compared to a mere ¥10.3 billion for new measures to counter weapons of mass destruction and ¥760 million for countering submarines and armed spy vessels in surrounding waters.42 There is also a rising concern on the part of the Chinese about the changing military role of Japan. When the Japan-U.S. common strategic objectives included encouraging the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue, it was loudly reported that Japan openly supported Taiwan’s independence and planned to defend it if hostilities broke out.43 A PLA naval officer, who was director of the Strategic Research Office at the Naval Strategic Institute, seemed to believe that the 2004 guidelines and the midterm defense program that followed represented an adjustment of Japan’s strategy from “exclusively defense-oriented” to “proactive preemption” and “overseas intervention.” He also claimed that China had been listed in the defense program guidelines as the major threat for the fi rst time, and that Japan planned to intervene in the Taiwan Strait affairs, willing to use its mili39. For detailed explanation, see http://www.mof.go.jp/seifuan18/yosan014 -3.pdf. 40. National Institute for Defense Studies, Higashi Ajiya Senryaku Gaikan 2005, 223. For instance, the guidelines stipulated that the number of tanks, destroyers, and combat aircraft would be reduced from 976, 53, and 560 at the end of March 2004, respectively, to 600, 47 and 500 in the next ten years or so. 41. Ibid., 223. 42. The Ministry of Finance website is http://www.mof.go.jp/seifuan18/yosan014 -3.pdf. 43. See, for instance, Huanqiu Shibao, February 21, 2005.

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tary strength and attack China’s land and sovereignty.44 From a Japanese perspective, it seemed truer that the Chinese side was spreading a “Japan threat theory,” with much mirror-imaging at work. It was rather worrisome that the “Japan threat theory” seemed to be gaining currency in Chinese society, adding fuel to the rising fi re of assertive nationalism.

The Rise of Chinese Nationalism and the Reaction in Japan The economic rise of China has provided the basis on which a sentiment of love for and pride in the Chinese nation has grown notably since the mid-1990s. Nationalism, which I defi ne as an idea or movement to cherish and advance the culture, status, and strength of a nation, has no doubt constituted an essential motivation of the leaders of modern China, including those of the CCP. In the mid-1990s, just when the power transition from Deng Xiaoping’s generation to the so- called third generation of leadership was completed, the latter intensified the use of nationalism to enhance national integrity. This endeavor proved successful, perhaps too successful, in amplifying the growing popular nationalism at the societal level. The CCP decided to step up its “patriotic education” in August 1994 with the “CCP Central Committee Circular on Printing and Distributing the Guidelines for Implementing Patriotic Education.”45 According to the circular and the guidelines, the aims of patriotic education included rousing the national spirit, reinforcing the power of national integrity, establishing national self-respect and pride, uniting people of all ethnicities and making them overcome hardship and strive in the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Along this line, a major slogan since the late 1990s has been “The Great Revival of the Chinese Nation.”46 The 1994 circular was issued one month before the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth CCP Central Committee, where it was proclaimed that “the third generation central collective leadership with Jiang Zemin as the core, right now leads the whole party and carries on with the work launched by the second generation central collective leadership with Deng Xiaoping as the core.”47 That such an announcement was made five years after Jiang became the general 44. People’s Daily, 22 July 2005. the director’s name is Fang Kun. 45. CCP Central Committee Document Research Office, Shisi Da Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian Shang (Selected important documents since the Fourteenth Party Congress), vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishers, 1996), 919–51. 46. Zheng Bijian, a leading foreign policy advisor to Jiang Zemin, acknowledged that the use of the adjective “Great” could arouse a sense of threat among foreign countries but was necessary to intensify the self- confidence of the Chinese. See his conversation with Lu Yongxiang, president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, on April 9, 2006, at http://news.gucas.ac. cn/ Detail.asp?Newsid =10947. 47. Circular of the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth CCP Central Committee, collected in CCP Central Committee Document Research Office, Shisi Da Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuan-

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secretary of the party meant that he finally stood as the core leader with ultimate responsibility. In addition to the proclaimed aims, such timing suggests that patriotic education was also a measure to consolidate the power and legitimacy of the central leadership. Another important factor contributing to the intensification of patriotic education was the concern among some leaders about Western influence on the Chinese, particularly after the “June 4 Incident” in 1989, which was condemned as a plot by traitors colluding with hostile forces to split the nation and overthrow the regime. The National Flag Law was promulgated in 1990, stipulating that a flag-hoisting ceremony, to be attended by all, be conducted once a week in every school, together with a talk on a patriotic theme.48 In March 1991, Jiang Zemin wrote to Li Tieying and He Dongchang, the Minister and the Deputy Minister of the State Education Commission, respectively, on the subject of educating youth and schoolchildren about modern and contemporary Chinese history and the state of the country.49 Jiang stated that the purpose of such education is to “let the Chinese people, especially the youth, enhance their pride and self- confidence in the nation, and prevent the rise of the worship of the West.” The 1994 Guidelines for Implementing Patriotic Education stipulated that the contents of such education should include especially the lofty spirit and the glorious achievement of the CCP in leading the people nationwide and courageously struggling to establish a new China.50 Methods of patriotic education included designating museums and relics as “patriotic education bases,” and making patriotic thoughts the main theme of society by creating a social atmosphere in which “people can be infected and permeated with patriotic thought and spirit any time, any place, in all aspects of daily life.” This was to be achieved by utilizing contemporary media, including newspapers, journals, radio, television and fi lms. Prime-time television was to show mainly programs that reflected the main theme (zhu xuanlü), that is, patriotism. 51 Peter Gries points out that compared to the days of Mao, in the 1980s many Chinese started to see themselves less as victors and more as victims of war.52 In fact, in the 1991 letter to Li and He, Jiang instructed that humiliation bian Shang (Selected important documents since the Fourteenth Party Congress), vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishers, 2002), 334. 48. Shimizu Yoshikazu, Chugoku wa Naze “Han- nichi” ni Natta ka (Why China became “anti-Japanese”) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2003), 156–58. 49. Ibid.; Editing Committee of the PRC Daily History, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Ri Shi 1991 Nian (Daily history of the People’s Republic of China 1991) (Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publisher, 2003), 72. 50. CCP Central Committee Document Research Office, Shisi Da Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian Shang, 1:922–24. 51. For details, see ibid., 927–33. 52. Peter Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 43–53, 69–85.

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by outside powers, the sacrifice of the public in resisting this, CCP leadership, and the Chinese people’s courage in opposing invasion and supporting justice should be clearly taught in history classes. 53 It thus seems that one purpose of emphasizing the damage inflicted by the great powers on the Chinese was to nurture a sense of caution against Western and Japanese influences in an increasingly open society. “You get beaten up if you fall behind” (luohou aida). This slogan remained a main message at the sixtieth anniversary of the Victory of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression in 2005. On the societal level, there has been a noticeable rise of popular nationalism since the mid-1990s. This was reflected, for instance, in the publication of books and articles fi lled with nationalistic sentiments. The most notable bestseller published in 1996 was China Can Say No, which demonized and castigated the United States and Japan. 54 As far as the more recent expression of anti-Japanese sentiments is concerned, notable incidents included the following: in November 2003, a silly and obscene yet innocent skit by a couple of Japanese students at a university cultural festival in Xian triggered indiscriminate violence against Japanese on campus and Japanese restaurants in town; in March 2004, seven Chinese activists forced their way onto Uotsuri-jima, or Diaoyudao in Chinese, which is one of the Senkaku Islands that have been under Japan’s effective rule for over one hundred years; in August 2004, the Japanese soccer team and its fans were jeered and booed at the Asian Cup soccer matches held in China, and the car of a Japanese minister at the Embassy was surrounded and damaged outside the stadium by an angry crowd after Japan defeated China in the fi nal; in April 2005, violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in a number of big cities were triggered by Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and an e-signature petition movement against it, which originated among Chinese in America. 55 There were numerous sources of popular anti-Japanese nationalism in China. First, economic growth had raised the self- confidence of the Chinese people. In some cases, the rise in pride seemed to be an outcome of a remaining sense of inferiority and found expression in an aggressive form of nationalism. In this respect, we should note that there are common psychological sources of nationalism in both China and Japan. 56 While some Chinese feel superior to the Japanese about their tradition, their long history of civilization, and their power and status in international politics, they feel at the same 53. Editing Committee of the PRC Daily History, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Ri Shi 1991 Nian, 72. 54. The popularity of this book can be understood from an interview article with one of the authors in the Beijing Workers’ Daily (Gongren Ribao), entitled “Let the World Hear the Voice of the Chinese Public” (Workers’ Daily, 31 August 1996). 55. See the remarks by Takeshi Igarashi, in his dialogue with Yukio Okamoto, in Kokusai Mondai (International affairs), No. 549 (December, 2005)} 2–20. 56. Hidenori Ijiri has expressed a similar view in Hidenori Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalisation,” China Quarterly, no. 124 (December 1990): 639–61.

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time inferior about the state of their economic and social development. On the other hand, exactly the opposite senses of superiority and inferiority affect the minds of some Japanese. When either side senses its superiority is undermined, for instance by China’s economic rise or by Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, nationalism is incited. Second, patriotic education had an impact. Perhaps most influential was the repeated broadcasting of various programs that featured the war against Japan, stepped up in the summer of 1995 to commemorate the fi ftieth anniversary of China’s victory. One Japanese correspondent reported the following: “An intense patriotic campaign has permeated the ‘generation that does not know the war,’ which constitutes the majority of the Chinese nowadays. The mass media have repeatedly taken up the atrocities of the invading Japanese army, and with the by-product of negatively affecting the sentiments about the Japanese.”57 The Chinese government claims that patriotic education is not meant to cause or promote anti-Japanese feelings among the public, but it is hard to deny that, whatever the intentions, that has been the result. Third, some neoconservative Chinese intellectuals aimed to jump-start nationalism by exploiting past humiliations.58 They were dissatisfied at the negative effects of reform and opening, such as the decline of central control and authority, widespread corruption, and the widening gap between the rich and the poor. Their solution was to rouse nationalism by stimulating a profound sense of humiliation. Fourth, anti-Japanese nationalism reflected in part an indirect attack on the Chinese government. For some Chinese espousing anti-Japanese sentiments was a safe way to challenge the government and vent their anger.59 Fifth, there was a plethora of negative reporting of Japan in the Chinese media, which carried mistakes or misinformation (e.g. “Asahi Beer fi nancially supports an organization that wrote a controversial textbook”), misinterpretation of facts (e.g. “Prime Minister Koizumi deliberately chose the date of his fi fth visit to the Yasukuni Shrine to coincide with the return of the Chinese astronaut from space”), and negative generalizations (e.g. “Japanese deny the Nanjing Massacre”). Information on the internet is even more critical than visual and printed media. The Internet was also used to promote e-signature campaigns and disseminate news of anti-Japanese demonstrations in the spring of 2005.60 One cause of these problems is the commercialism of 57. Asahi Shimbun, September 14, 1995, cited in Shimizu, Chugoku wa Naze “Han- nichi” ni Natta ka, 165. 58. Matt Forney, “Patriot Games,” Far Eastern Economic Review (October 3, 1996): 22–28. 59. Interview with an informed Chinese intellectual, September 2004. 60. Liu Zhiming (2005) “Nittyu komyunikehshon gyap to jouhou hasshin” (Communication gap between Japan and China and information dissemination), Nittyu Sougo Rikai no tame no Chugoku Nashonarizumu to Media Bunseki (Chinese nationalism and media analysis for Sino-Japanese mutual understanding), ed. in Kiyoshi Takai and Japan- China Communication Association (Tokyo; Akashi Shoten, 2005), 106–31.

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the media. Liu Zhiming’s study of Chinese newspapers indicates that newly established papers that face severe competition tend to be harsher on Japan, while established ones tend to tend to be less sensationalist.61 Sixth, there was a rise of nationalism in Japan in the 1990s. Especially after the bursting of the economic bubble and in the midst of rising doubts about the Japanese style of management, the value system of society was doubted and some Japanese sought to rebuild national confidence by beautifying the past. The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform was established in 1996 to defend national pride and patriotism from what it alleged was masochistic teaching of history in post–World War II education. Although the textbook system in Japan is different from China’s and only 0.04 percent of the Japanese middle schools chose the society’s textbook in 2001 and 0.4 percent did so in 2005, such facts were underreported in the Chinese media. There was also top- down nationalism in Japan. In 1999 the Diet passed legislation which fi nally designated the controversial national fl ag and the national anthem. Koizumi, who became prime minister in 2001, paid annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, causing uproar in China. Originally, it seemed he promised to visit the shrine simply to gain the votes of the Association of the War Bereaved in the presidential election of the LDP. Furthermore, not many Chinese knew that Koizumi explained that his visits to the shrine commemorated martyrs compelled to fi ght against their will and that he vowed never to wage war again. But Koizumi soon viewed his visits as part of a diplomatic tug- of-war with China, as Chinese leaders escalated their protests and then refused to meet with Koizumi, even in third countries. Anti- Chinese sentiments among some Japanese, including politicians, tended to arise partly from the sense that they were being eclipsed by their vigorous, giant neighbor. For instance, these people tended to see China’s protest against the prime minister’s Yasukuni visit as interference in internal affairs and as a display of arrogance, rather than a reflection of weakness. What contributed to the growth of such a sense of threat was the reporting in some of the mass media, particularly weekly and monthly journals that faced severe competition in the market. Their commercialism and abundance of negative information and sensationalism, just like those of their counterparts in China, were a serious problem in Japan. Aggressive Chinese nationalism aroused anti- Chinese sentiments in Japan. A 2004 government survey indicated that the percentage of those who felt close to China declined by 10.3 points from the previous year to 37.6 percent, and that it was by far the lowest among the youths aged from twenty to twenty-nine—6.3 points below the average. In 2003, however, this age bracket

61. Ibid., 118–19.

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had shown the highest percentage of close feelings.62 Assuming that the younger generation watch more soccer than their elders, we can surmise that the display of strong anti-Japanese sentiments at the 2004 Asian Cup soccer games had a strong impact on the Japanese perception of China. In 2005, a year in which rampant anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in several large cities, the percentage of those who felt close to China dropped another 5.2 points to 32.4 percent.63 In this year, however, the percentage of youths aged from twenty to twenty-nine that felt close to China actually rose sharply by 8.1 points, and was 7.0 points higher than the average.64 In sum, patriotic education by the Chinese government that centered on the country’s history of humiliation reacted on a vibrant people who were more self-confident about the rise of their nation but dissatisfied with growing domestic problems. The government needed nationalism for national integrity, leadership consolidation, and legitimacy, and prevention of what they saw as negative Western influence upon the minds of the people. The rise of popular nationalism, however, seemed to grow beyond the government’s control. It was used by intellectuals critical of the current state of affairs and of the government, and by an increasingly commercialized media. The internet provided an effective medium for people to vent their anger and also to organize protests. The more reliable surveys conducted in the two countries suggested that there was a strong risk of a vicious circle emerging, in which the display of negative feelings on one side aggravated the antipathy on the other. The surveys also seemed to suggest, however, that the younger generation of the two nations had more in common and more sympathy with the other side than their elders.

Sino-Japanese Collaboration for a New East Asian Order The above analysis demonstrates the growing complexities of Sino-Japanese relations. The processes of economic integration, cultural exchange, and societal interaction will continue to advance and in the main function as a bond between the two nations. Nevertheless, China’s rise, which is both a cause and a result of economic integration, also has an aspect that occasions political competition and strategic confrontation with Japan. Friction and a sense of uncertainty about the future relationship develop in the complex psyches of the two nations. The simultaneous resilience and fragility of Japan- China relations explain the new state of affairs since October 2006, when Shintaro Abe, the new Japanese prime minister, visited Beijing and agreed with the Chinese leaders 62. For the breakdown according to age for 2003 and 2004, see, respectively, http://www8 .cao.go.jp/survey/ h15/ h15-gaikou/images/ h05.csv; http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/ h16/ h16-gaikou/ images/ h05.csv. 63. http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/ h17/ h17-gaikou/images/z05.gif. 64. http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/ h17/ h17-gaikou/images/ h05.csv.

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to strive for the construction of a relationship of mutual benefit based on common strategic interests. The bond arises from economic interdependence and the growing perception of common interests, while cultural affi nity and societal exchange constitute a less-noticed yet increasingly important source of resilience in the relationship. Both sides agreed to enhance trust by more security dialogue and defense exchange, though this will take some time to take effect. This is because the future image of Japan- China relations remains uncertain, and each side fears that the other side may become hegemonic in East Asia. There still exists the danger of falling into a security dilemma, and the interaction of popular nationalisms in the two countries could cause the negative perceptions about the other side to plunge into a vicious spiral. What should be done, then, to place the dynamic relationship on a stable course that leads to an acceptable new order in East Asia? The above analysis suggests the following points. First, each side should support the stable economic development of the other. This would bring about tangible benefits and contribute to preventing the rise of aggressive nationalism as well. In particular, an unstable, trouble-ridden China would be a huge time bomb for the world and especially for the neighboring countries including Japan. At present a number of countries are considering the cancellation of bilateral aid to China, but it would be wise for Japan to announce that it would be the last donor country to eliminate its assistance. Second, there is a need to promote security dialogue, both bilaterally and regionally. We need a mechanism for crisis management between Japan and China in the East China Sea. In the long run, both sides must discuss and agree on how all parties, including Japan’s ally, the United States, can co-exist comfortably in the region. Japan should take the lead, since its geographical proximity renders it most sensitive to the pressure of China’s growing military might. An interim target would be to construct a Northeast Asian security architecture based on the ongoing Six Party talks over the Korean nuclear crisis. Third, Japan and China should work more on joint projects for a common cause. For instance, this would include developing the East Asian Community as a framework for sustainable peace as well as sustainable development; advancing energy efficiency, joint energy exploration, and negotiation with the suppliers of energy; and cooperating on maritime security and other nontraditional security issues. We should aim for a democratic regional regime based on the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, or in our terms, harmony and coexistence. Fourth, we must quell assertive nationalism on both sides by providing better information to the public, that is, by increasing the quantity, variety, and quality of information about each other. This would include ending generalizations about and demonizing of the other nation, and increasing the understanding of how ordinary people on the other side live and think. Good use needs to be made of the internet and open more homepages in the language of

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the other side. Commercialism in the media is a difficult issue to solve, but it helps if both sides are fully conscious of this common problem. The media world in both countries should spontaneously establish an ombudsman system that would check factual mistakes. Personal contact should be increased at all levels, especially between peers who would have much to share. As the Chinese say, “Take history as a mirror and look towards the future,” but make sure that more prewar history is taught in Japan and more postwar history is taught in China. The list can go on, but what seems most important to overcome the fragility of the relationship is for the two nations and their leaders to discuss how they view history; that is, articulate a view of history that extends into a future vision of the region.

chapter

10

The Consequences of China’s Economic Rise for Sino-U.S. Relations Rivalry, Political Conflict, and (Not) War Jonathan Kirshner

This chapter considers the international political implications of China’s economic ascendancy, in particular with regard to its relations with the United States. How the rise of China will affect world politics is one of the most important questions in contemporary international relations—both in theory and practice. China’s far-sighted strategy of “peaceful rise,” which anticipates that good things will come to rising powers that wait, sounds a promising note for the prospects for international stability; but history strongly suggests that the rise of new great powers tends to generate powerfully dangerous currents in the international system.1 Thus while all involved would certainly prefer that China’s emergence as a great power occur peacefully, as events unfold interests will undoubtedly clash, often sharply, and a smooth transition is not guaranteed. The analysis here is limited to the political consequences of the economic changes that accompany China’s development; this focus means that less For helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter I thank Tom Christensen, Zha Daojiong, Zhu Feng, Avery Goldstein, Robert Ross, and Adam Segal. 1. On “peaceful rise,” see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) esp. 177, 193, 202, 211; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27 (spring 2003): 47; Zheng Bijan, “China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84 (September–October 2005). On how changes to the distribution of power from rising and declining states can disrupt the international system, see in par ticular Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For efforts to sift through the logics underlying optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, see Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.- China Relations: Is Confl ict Inevitable?” International Security 30 (fall 2005): 7–45; Thomas Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy Toward East Asia,” ibid., 31 (summer 2006): 81–126.

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attention is given in this chapter to a number of prominent issues, including those involving Taiwan and North Korea, that will necessarily play a major part in future Sino-American relations. With this qualification, I argue that, if present trends continue, China’s expanding economy will create greater challenges for and frictions with the United States—challenges, because China’s economic might will enhance its political influence, which will increasingly frustrate some U.S. foreign policy efforts; frictions, because the importance of China’s economy will exacerbate not easily resolved international macroeconomic confl icts, adding a new source of tension to Asia-Pacific international relations more generally. Neither of these two issues (money and influence) will contribute, even indirectly, to the prospects for war between the two states, but they will remain salient irritants to bilateral relations and active arenas of international rivalry and political conflict. Potentially more dangerous are the consequences of China’s economic growth on its demand for foreign sources of energy, and in turn the consequences of efforts by the world’s two largest consumers of energy to control access to the world’s supply of oil. Note that these dangers derive from the desire to control the flow of the world’s oil, not from a shortage of global energy supplies. The oft-touted prospect of war emerging from competition over scarce energy resources between an increasingly energy-hungry China and a profl igate United States is greatly overstated. While American energy policies are shortsighted, misguided, decadent, and foolish, increased prospects for war (with China) are far down the long list of the pernicious effects of those policies. As elaborated below, for the foreseeable future (the next several decades) the price mechanism will efficiently supervise the distribution (and assure the adequacy) of the world’s oil supplies. However, the risk remains that great power anxiety about the vulnerabilities implied by dependence on foreign oil supplies might lead China and the United States into ambitious, zero-sum (and ultimately unrequited) efforts to assure political control over foreign supplies. These heavy-handed gambits could place the two oil-hungry giants in more aggressive global political competition with each other, and possibly even place them on the opposite sides of armed confl icts in various parts of the globe—confl icts that could conceivably tumble out of control and raise the risk of direct confrontation between the two. But at a practical level, this fi nal link in the chain is a remote and unlikely possibility, and, it should be emphasized, wholly unnecessary, as such a misguided confl ict would be tragic even by the sorry standards of world history. 2 In sum, then, the principal consequences of sustained high growth by China—a reshuffl ing of political influence from changing patterns of trade 2. The tragedy of many wars throughout history was that ultimately the game was not worth the candle; in a future energy war, not only would the game not be worth the candle, but the victor would soon fi nd that the candle had slipped through his fi ngers.

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and investment flows, macroeconomic confl ict due to the inherent difficulties of coordinating international monetary relations, and tensions emerging from increased global energy demands—will raise new but manageable international challenges. If present trends continue, China’s economic rise is likely to complicate its relations with the United States and generate a host of new frictions in international relations, but will not likely be a source of war between the two. This chapter explores these claims in four parts. First, it addresses the ways in which China’s rising economic power will translate into increased political influence. Second, it considers exchange rate conflict—in particular, pressure by the United States for China to appreciate the yuan—and explains why this issue will not lend itself to sustained resolution, and will thus remain indefi nitely a recurring irritant to relations between the two states. The third section looks at energy competition and explains why, in this issue area, the market mechanism will mitigate the pernicious effects of each side’s misguided policies, at least with regard to the prospects for war. Once again, however, the potential for new sources of political conflict is great. A fi nal, more speculative section looks at the more alarming implications of discontinuous change. The warning that emerges here is that although, as stated above, “if present trends continue,” it is very unlikely that economic change will be an important catalyst for war between the United States and China, if present trends do not continue, it becomes much easier to envision scenarios whereby economic change makes military confl ict much more likely. Although international relations scholars have understandably emphasized the political consequences of China’s emergence as a great power, it is important, if counterintuitive, to recognize that a sudden interruption in China’s remarkable growth trajectory would likely be more destabilizing and dangerous for world politics than its continued advance.

From Economic Power to Political Influence The most notable consequence of China’s economic rise for the pattern of international politics will be the resulting increase not in China’s coercive power (though this may occur), but in its political influence. In Asia, the tug of the gravity of China’s economy is increasingly felt. 3 China’s remarkable growth, on the order of 9 percent a year, year after year, with no signs of abating, has heralded its arrival as both a pillar of the global economy and a vital cog of global economic growth. After decades of growth its absolute size puts it on the map as one of the world’s largest economies; perhaps even more important, its economic growth, especially as manifested in the continued, 3. For some evocative anecdotal evidence, see Jane Perlez, “With U.S. Busy, China is Romping with Neighbors,” New York Times, December 3, 2003; Perlez, “Across Asia, Beijing’s Star is in Ascendance,” ibid., August 28, 2004; and Perlez, “Chinese Move to Eclipse U.S. Appeal in South Asia,” ibid., November 18, 2004.

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rapid growth of both its imports and exports, serves as an engine for global economic growth. China is now the third-largest trading nation in the world, after the United States and Germany. Its imports have soared from $132 billion in 1995 to $225 billion in 2000 to $561 billion in 2004. China is now South Korea’s biggest trading partner—and South Korea’s exports to China are more than double the size of its imports from China. Japan also has a large trade surplus with China, and Chinese demand for Japanese goods, to the tune of over $94 billion in 2004, is credited with fi nally hauling the Japanese economy out of its extended doldrums. China’s insatiable demand for raw materials (it is now the world’s number one consumer of copper, tin, zinc, platinum, steel, and iron ore), has boosted the fortunes of primary product producers throughout the globe. China is also an increasingly important customer of oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran; it is the second-largest trading partner of both Canada and Mexico. Its reach is felt keenly even in Latin America, where China’s imports from the region have produced large trade surpluses for Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Peru, and its expanding business activities there, while still relatively modest, are increasingly visible.4 China’s economic attraction, especially as a source of demand for foreign exports but also as a magnet for foreign investment, will, especially over time, translate into greater political influence for China. The logic behind this argument was fi rst articulated by Albert Hirschman in his influential book, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Hirschman’s elucidation of the role of economic exchange in shaping political influence is often overlooked in the international relations theory literature, which has largely emphasized the coercive elements of the study. This is understandable given the context of the book, and its focus on German trade schemes in the interwar period. As a consequence, Hirschman’s work has been most celebrated for illustrating how an asymmetric economic relationship can provide an imposing coercive lever for a great power—because any interruption in the relationship would cause much greater distress in the small state than it would in the large one. Thus threats to end or to interrupt the relationship, both explicit and implicit, provide power to the larger state. But there is much more to Hirschman’s study than a story about coercion; there is also an important argument about influence. Hirschman does develop 4. Nicholas Lardy, “China, The Great New Economic Challenge?” in The United States and the World Economy: Foreign Economic Policy for the Next Decade, ed. C. Fred Bergsten (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2005), 122–24; Stephanie Hemelryk and Robert Benewick, The State of China Atlas: Mapping the World’s Fastest Growing Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 14–15, 96–97; David Hale, “China and the Financing of American Debt,” The International Economy 18 (fall 2004): 18; “China and Latin America: Magic, or Realism?” The Economist December 4, 2004; Haward W. French and Norimitsu Onishi, “Economic Ties Binding Japan to Rival China,” New York Times, October 31, 2005.

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more fully and systematically the mechanics of coercion, but he also illustrates the crucial significance of influence. 5 In practice, this less-visible mechanism is the more common and more consequential stuff of international relations. As National Power shows, behind the headlines and with little fanfare, the pattern of international economic relations affects domestic politics, which in turn shapes national interests. This is always the case but is most significant in asymmetric relations, where the effects on the smaller state can be quite considerable. Large and expanding trade relations between a large and a small state will, over time, shape the way in which the small state will perceive its own interests—specifically, it will place greater value on the relationship with the larger state and see its interests as converging with those of its partner. As Hirschman observed, business groups “will exert a powerful influence in favor of a ‘friendly’ attitude toward the state” upon which their economic interests depend.6 Moreover, when these relationships are sustained, and especially when they involve expanding sectors of the economy, over time the reshuffling of power, interests, and incentives among fi rms, sectors, and political coalitions will increasingly reflect these new realities. Those that favor warm relations will be empowered, and the trajectory of the “national interest” remolded.7 Thus, while China, perhaps inevitably given its size, is occasionally perceived as throwing its weight around to get what it wants in trade negotiations, this exercise of “economic power” is a sideshow, and likely to be recognized by China as self-defeating of broader interests. Much more significant is how generally, and without necessarily effort or plan, through the normal business of international economic exchange the People’s Republic will increasingly reap the benefits of Hirschmanesque influence. This will be most obvious in Asia, where intraregional trade has expanded dramatically and China’s role as an engine of growth is most obvious. As one study concluded, “Asian countries thus have a huge stake in China’s continued economic growth and stability.”8 Essentially, China’s growing and important global economic role will enhance for China something very much akin to 5. Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980/1945), 18, 28, 29, 34, 37. An attempt to elaborate and illustrate this mechanism can be found in Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner, “Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Defi nition of National Interests,” Security Studies 9 (1999–2000). 6. Hirschman, National Power, 29. 7. See Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August 1983): 373–400; Charles Kindleberger, “Group Behavior and International Trade,” Journal of Political Economy 59 (February 1959): 30–47, and the illustrations in Kirshner and Abdelal, “Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Defi nition of National Interests.” 8. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29 (winter 2004–5): 83, 85 (quote); Michael Vatikiotis, “A Too-Friendly Embrace,” Far Eastern Economic Review (June 17, 2004): 20–22; Lardy, “China, The Great New Economic Challenge?” 127–28.

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what Nye has dubbed “soft power”: not forcing others to do what you want them to do, but getting them to want what you want them to want.9 China’s enhanced soft power (deriving in this case more from the tug of Hirschman’s economic gravity than from Nye’s emphasis on culture and attraction) will ruffle the feathers of Sino-U.S. relations, albeit in a somewhat subtle and indirect way. In international institutions and bilateral relations, the United States, to its consternation, will find other states increasingly sensitive to how outcomes and agreements will affect their relations with China. More pointedly, in political disputes where China and the United States fi nd themselves on opposing sides, increasingly in the future, in many corners of the world, China’s case will be heard with more sympathetic ears, and this will come at the expense of American priorities. This may be exacerbated if U.S. unilateralism evokes “soft-balancing”: nonmilitary efforts by states to “delay, frustrate, and undermine” American initiatives. From the perspective of international relations theory, the analytical problem with soft balancing is that it is awfully difficult to measure.10 But for world politics that difficulty is confounding in that it also makes soft balancing hard to attribute. As a result, if the United States fi nds some amorphous but nevertheless clearly increased international resistance to its policy preferences while China’s influence is obviously on the rise, it may come to identify China as the conductor of an increasingly anti-American orchestra.

Across the Pacific—Confounding Macroeconomic Conflicts China’s economic rise thus suggests a general and somewhat abstract heightening of geopolitical tension with the United States. It also generates concrete and direct bilateral economic confl icts that are highly salient and difficult to resolve. The most obvious of these is China’s trade surplus with the United States, and the political pressures this generates for exchange rate adjustment. China’s trade surplus with the United States now tops $200 billion annually, and the overall American trade deficit shatters record after record, surpassing $700 billion for 2005. As a percentage of GDP, the U.S. current account deficit is now running at or above 5 percent annually, by a considerable amount the highest levels in U.S. history.11 9. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 10. Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security 30 (summer 2005): 11 (quote); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” ibid., 74. 11. Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, “The Unsustainable U.S. Current Account Position Revisited,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 10869 (October 2004); Vikas Bajaj, “U.S. Trade Deficit Hits $66 Billion, Another Record,” New York Times, November 10, 2005.

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A country’s external accounts are commonly used for back-of-the-envelope calculations about exchange rates. Large and sustained deficits suggest that a currency is overvalued, since depreciation would make its exports cheaper and its imports more expensive; surpluses suggest the opposite. Not surprisingly, then, there is a fairly wide consensus among economists that the dollar is considerably overvalued, although the dollar’s steady and continuous slide against the euro has narrowed the scope of that claim.12 Also, since the dollar floats freely on international markets there is some inherent ambiguity about what the “right” exchange rate should be. (And this serves as an important reminder that factors other than the trade balance affect exchange rates.) The renminbi (RMB), on the other hand, long had a fi xed exchange rate, and from 1994 to 2005 traded at the rate of 8.28 yuan/dollar.13 Chinese authorities have intervened heavily in the market, purchasing dollars to sustain the yuan peg, and accumulating hundreds of billions of dollars in reserves as a consequence. Without this intervention it has been estimated that the RMB would have appreciated by 15–20 percent between 1996 and 2003. This is consistent with most recommendations calling for dollar/yuan realignment (even with the subsequent appreciation of the yuan to 7.3 at the end of 2007), although there are some voices of dissent regarding whether and to what extent the RMB is undervalued.14 China’s exchange rate policies, massive dollar purchases (which do seem to violate IMF provisions against protracted, one-sided interventions in the market), and enormous and burgeoning trade surplus with the United States, combined with troubled times for the American manufacturing sector, have led to considerable agitation in the United States for action on the exchange rate front. While this is a complex issue, involving the distinct (though interdependent) issues of the exchange rate level (up or down), regime (fi xed or flexible) and management (capital controls and regulation),15 the basic conflict is about U.S. demands for (and China’s resistance to) an increase in the value of the RMB. Members of Congress, powerful interest groups such as 12. See C. Fred Bergsten and John Williams (eds.) Dollar Adjustment: How Far? Against What? Institute for International Economics, Special Report 17 (November 2004). 13. China in July 2005 shifted the management of the renminbi from a hard dollar peg to an unspecified basket of currencies, which initially revalued the yuan by about 2 percent against the dollar, to 8.11, and was followed by a slow but steady appreciation in 2007. 14. Fan Zhang and Zuohong Pan, “Determination of China’s Long-run Nominal Exchange Rate and Official Intervention,” China Economic Review 15 (2004): 364; Morris Goldstein, “Adjusting China’s Exchange Rate Policies,” Institute for International Economics Working Paper 04/1 (2005): 3, 17, 22; Jiawen Yang, “Nontradables and the Valuation of the RMB—An Evaluation of the Big Mac Index,” China Economic Review 15 (2004): 358–59; Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Yee Wong, “China Bashing 2004,” International Economics Policy Briefs (Washington: Institute for International Economics, September 2004), 4, 8, 41–42. 15. Eswar Prasad, Thomas Rumbaugh, and Qing Wang, “Putting the Cart Before the Horse? Capital Account Liberalization and Exchange Rate Flexibility in China,” IMF Policy Discussion Paper, January 2005; Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, “Two Stage Currency Reform for China,” Asian Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2003.

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the National Association of Manufacturers, and some scholars have cited unfair competition as a source of American job losses and have become increasingly vocal in their calls for currency realignment.16 The U.S. Treasury has stepped up its own rhetoric, concluding that the yuan peg “is a substantial distortion to world markets,” and has asserted that “China is now ready and should move without delay” to introduce greater flexibility in its “highly distortionary” currency regime. To the dismay of those pressing for more aggressive action, however, the Bush administration has repeatedly avoided formally citing China for currency manipulation.17 But an economic downturn in the United States or a change in the American political climate would turn up the heat on this issue. It might be tempting to dismiss the dispute over exchange rate management as an ephemeral phenomenon generated by narrow interest groups and pandering politicians that will be resolved by market forces in any event. And indeed, there is an important element of political opportunism and rank “China-bashing” at play.18 But dollar/yuan controversy will not go away; rather, it will prove resistant to conclusive settlement and resurface as a salient irritant to U.S.- China relations at inopportune times. The basic problem is that it is inherently difficult to resolve disagreements that emerge in the international monetary arena, for two reasons. First, unlike trade, about which there is a basic economic consensus (liberalization is globally efficient), monetary theory is more ambiguous—there is no clear consensus (or decisive empirical evidence) as to which type of exchange rate regime, level, style of capital control, and “rules of the game” more generally, 16. U.S. manufacturing job losses are attributed to unfair currency practices in Ernest H. Preeg, “Exchange Rate Manipulation to Gain Unfair Competitive Advantage: The Case Against China and Japan,” in Dollar Overvaluation in the World Economy, ed. C. Fred Bergsten and John Williamson (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2003); this is countered by Martin Neil Baily and Robert Z. Lawrence, “The Impact of Trade on U.S. Job Loss, 2000– 2003,” in Bergsten and Williamson, Dollar Adjustment, 145, who argue that trade does not account for the large majority of manufacturing job losses (“the loss of manufacturing jobs between 2000 and 2003 that can be attributed to trade is between 260,000 and 600,000, representing between 9 percent and 22 percent of the total decline”). 17. U.S. Treasury, “Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,” May 2005 (fi rst two quotes); “Statement of Secretary John W. Snow on the FOREX Report,” May 17, 2005, U.S. Treasury, Press Release js-2449 (third quote); Elizabeth Becker and Edmund L. Andrews, “Currency of China Is Emerging as a Tough Business Issue in U.S.,” New York Times, August 26, 2003; “Statement of Treasury Secretary John W. Snow on the Report to Congress on International and Exchange Rate Policies,” November 28, 2005, Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury; National Association of Manufacturers, “Treasury’s Failure to Cite China on Currency Dismays NAM,” NAM Press Release 05-384, November 28, 2005. 18. See Hufbauer and Yee Wong, “China Bashing 2004,” 2–3 and passim; Richard C. K. Burdekin, “China and the Depreciating U.S. Dollar,” Asia- Pacifi c Issues 79 (East-West Center, January 2006): 2, 4; Jeffrey Frankel, “On the Renminbi: The Choice Between Adjustment under a Fixed Exchange Rate and Adjustment under a Flexible Rate,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 11274 (April 2005): 3; “China-bashing and Trade,” The Economist, April 23, 2005, 49.

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are the most efficient or appropriate.19 Second, even when states agree on what they want to accomplish in the international monetary arena and how they want to achieve it, leaders will face often intense pressure to abandon macroeconomic agreements that have been reached. Exchange rate management is about mediating international and domestic macroeconomic pressures. To stick with international agreements, states are often called upon to cut budgets, tighten the money supply, and engage in costly interventions. Often this is at odds with what seems right for the domestic economy, most obviously, for example, during a recession. When forced to choose, most states, and especially large states like the United States and China, will favor retaining domestic macroeconomic discretion over adherence to international monetary agreements.20 Monetary relations between the United States and Japan during the Cold War illustrate the types of problems that will aggravate future Sino-American exchange rate politics: the failure of exchange rate movements to resolve trade imbalances and absence of a shared security vision to serve as an inhibitor of monetary conflict.21 During the fi rst two decades of the Cold War, the United States was eager to stimulate the development of the Japanese economy. Pressure built, however, by the end of the 1960s, as the undervalued yen and overvalued dollar produced large sustained trade surpluses with the United States. With détente and the easing of the Cold War, the increasing prominence of Japanese exports, and, crucially, expansionary U.S. policies that eroded the credibility of its commitment to the value of the dollar, overt monetary conflict erupted in the 1970s. In 1971 the Americans unilaterally abandoned the Bretton Woods fi xed exchange rate system, in an effort to force currency realignment. This was the dramatic opening gambit in the protracted monetary battle of the 1970s, driven by trade concerns, whereby the United States would press for yen appreciation in an effort to stem the flood of inexpensive Japanese imports, while Japan desperately resisted, often intervening in foreign exchange markets to limit yen appreciation. In fits and starts, from 1971 to 1978 the yen appreciated from 360/$ to 180/$, although trade remained imbalanced. With the resurgence of Cold War tensions at the end of the decade, monetary confl ict was put on the back burner, only to reemerge in the 19. Richard Cooper, “Prolegomena to the Choice of an International Monetary System,” International Organization 29 (winter 1975): 63–98; Jonathan Kirshner, “The Inescapable Politics of Money,” in Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics, ed. Jonathan Kirshner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 20. John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Money: The Applied Theory of Money (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971 [1930]), 272; see also Kenneth A. Oye, Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 21. For a more elaborate discussion of the Cold War influence on U.S-Japan monetary relations, see Jonathan Kirshner, “Money, Capital and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region,” in The Uses of Institutions: U.S, Japan, and Governance in East Asia, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Parlgrave Macmillan, 2007).

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late 1980s and early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and in the context of high-profi le debates in the United States about Japanese exports undermining U.S. industry. The yen doubled in value again before fi nally retreating, again failing to resolve the trade balance but contributing to Japan’s economic malaise of the 1990s. 22 United States–Japan monetary confl ict has been muted in recent years by the anemic performance of the Japanese economy and by the emergence of China as the largest contributor to the U.S trade deficit. But Sino-American monetary conflict is likely to be even more intractable. For the foreseeable future (at least the next ten years), massive trade imbalances across the Pacific will ensure that the United States will routinely call for revaluation of the RMB, demands that will grow more strident during challenging phases of the business cycle. But China will resist, more forcefully and successfully than did Japan; moreover, if the RMB is revalued, its effect on the U.S.- China trade balance will be modest at best, and soon enough the United States will come knocking for another revaluation. Even if it some appreciation of the yuan makes economic sense, as the U.S. Congressional Budget Office concluded, “China’s exchange rate policy has only a modest influence on the overall trade deficit.” There are a number of reasons for this. As a technical matter, J-curve effects and local price adjustments would postpone and mitigate the exchange rate effects. Additionally, a large percentage of China’s exports to the United States are essentially reexports of components produced elsewhere in Asia and then assembled on the mainland. Only the cost of the value added by assembly would be altered by an appreciation of the RMB—if the cost of Chinese workers of assembling a DVD player produced elsewhere is 20 percent of the final product, even if the yuan were revalued by 20 percent the price of that DVD player in the United States would increase by only 4 percent (and sell for, say, seventy- eight dollars instead of seventy-five). But an even bigger issue than these mechanical attributes of exchange rate adjustment is that the U.S. trade deficit is not driven primarily by the exchange rate, but rather by its extremely low rate of savings and high rate of consumption, compared with the rest of the world, and especially China. The U.S. net national savings rate is now at the postwar low of 1.3 percent of GDP; for China the figure is closer to 40 percent. As long as 22. C. Fred Bergsten, “What to Do about the U.S.-Japan Economic Confl ict,” Foreign Affairs 60 (summer 1982): 1059, 1065–66; Robert V. Roosa, The United States and Japan in the International Monetary System, 1946–1985 (New York: Group of Thirty, 1986), 1; Koichi Hamada and Hugh Patrick, “Japan and the International Monetary Regime,” in The Political Economy of Japan, ed. Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel Okimoto, vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 118–19; Robert C. Angel, Explaining Economic Policy Failure: Japan in the 1969–71 International Monetary Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 38; Ronald McKinnon and Kenichi Ohno, Dollar and Yen: Resolving Economic Confl ict between the U.S. and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 10, 205; William Grimes, Unmaking the Japanese Miracle: Macroeconomic Politics 1985–2000 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 125, 132.

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these disparities continue, U.S. external accounts will remain unbalanced. A dramatic change in the yuan/dollar rate would be more likely to have a larger effect on the composition of U.S.- China trade than it would on its overall balance. 23 Even if (as is likely), exchange rate adjustment will not fundamentally alter the Sino-American trade balance, looking objectively at the RMB, and especially from an American perspective, the case for revaluation seems strong. But China also has a host of good reasons to be very cautious about fiddling with the value of its currency. Although China has a huge trade surplus with the United States, the relationship between the two economies is such that even at “ideal” exchange rates, bilateral trade between the two states should not balance. Notably, China’s overall trade surplus is less salient (and American trade accounts for most of it, even with China’s recent dramatic surge in exports to the European Union). About half of China’s trade takes place within Asia, and is relatively balanced. Additionally, as Ronald McKinnon has argued, the stability of the RMB has been an important stabilizing influence in the region. External currency stability has also been a welcome policy anchor for the management of China’s unbridled domestic economy. All of these concerns speak to a preference for continuity rather than change in the exchange rate.24 In addition to these “if it ain’t broke, don’t fi x it” concerns for regional and domestic monetary stability, China also has reasons to be trepidatious about the risks involved in revaluing its currency. Japan’s unhappy experience is just offshore—yen appreciation failed to resolve its large external imbalances with the United States, but it did contribute to the stalling of its economy—a fact not lost on Japanese authorities, who in 2003 and 2004 engaged in their own massive interventions in foreign exchange markets to prevent “premature” appreciation of the yen from snuffi ng out Japan’s nascent economic recovery. As a still developing and reforming economy, China has additional, novel concerns that give further pause. Its banking sector is notoriously weak, and fi nancial liberalization (which admittedly is not the same thing as revaluation) would increase the risk of crisis in that sector. Another fear is that yuan 23. Statement of Douglas Holtz Eakin, director, Congressional Budget Office, “Economic Relationships between the United States and China,” before the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, April 14, 2005 (quote); Goldstein, “Adjusting China’s Exchange Rate Policies,” 8, 15; Prasad, Rumbaugh, and Wang, “Putting the Cart Before the Horse,” 7; Jonathan Anderson, “How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Forget the Yuan,” Far Eastern Economic Review (December 2004): 39, 42; Albert Keidel, “China’s Currency: Not the Problem,” Policy Brief 39, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (June 2005). 24. Ronald I McKinnon, Exchange Rates under the East Asian Dollar Standard: Living With Conflicted Virtue (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 10–11, 129, 147, 248; Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 83; Lardy, “The Great New Economic Challenge,” 125, 127; Keidel, “China’s Currency,” 2; Donald and Benewick, State of China Atlas, 15; Hongying Wang, “China’s Exchange Rate Policy in the Aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis,” in Kirshner, Monetary Orders, 160.

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revaluation could decrease the price of imported food and put pressure on the agricultural sector, exacerbating the already serious problem of surplus workers in agriculture and the implications for labor markets, displacement, and employment. These concerns have a speculative element to them but are taken seriously by a government that places a premium on domestic stability. 25 In sum, the United States will continue to press for yuan revaluation (and, beyond that, for fi nancial liberalization); moreover, American demands will not be a one-time thing, since there will inevitably be disappointment about the results of any changes that are made. At the same time, China will resist U.S. pressure; if faced with credible threats of significant American protectionism, it will probably make grudging adjustments. But monetary confl ict will be chronic, and become acute at the worst possible (economic) times, and, unlike the U.S.-Japan relationship, there is no “emergency break” of high politics to contain macroeconomic squabbles. Sino-American currency conflicts will thus be harder to resolve, and understandings reached will be brittle.

Oil Policies: Self-inflicted Wounds While China’s economic rise means that macroeconomic confl ict with the United States is virtually inevitable, it is not the sort of thing that nations go to war over. Energy security, on the other hand, is something that some states are willing to fight about, and the United States and China would appear to be among them. Certainly this is the case for the United States; the Carter Doctrine formalized the U.S. commitment to use force to assure that Persian Gulf oil would not come under the control of any single hostile power, and this rhetoric was put to the test during the fi rst Gulf War and in its aftermath. 26 China has not yet fought for oil, but its leaders are obviously eager to establish secure access to foreign supplies, upon which the country is increasingly dependent. As a result, the most common scenario that links China’s growth with military confrontation connects the dots from China’s growing energy demands to the reality of the physical limits of global petroleum supply, to the vital interests of the United States (and China) in securing adequate 25. McKinnon, Exchange Rates under the East Asian Dollar Standard, 130, 151–53, 161; see also McKinnon, “China’s New Exchange Rate Policy: Will China Follow Japan into a Liquidity Trap?” (unpublished paper, October 2005); McKinnon and Ohno, Dollar and Yen, chaps. 3 and 5; Takatoshi Ito, “The Yen and the Japanese Economy, 2004,” in Bergsten and Williamson, Dollar Adjustment, 173, 181, 183; Goldstein, “Adjusting China’s Exchange Rate Policies,” 3, 26, 30; Lardy, “The Great New Economic Challenge,” 135–36; Prasad, Rumbaugh, and Wang, “Putting the Cart Before the Horse,” 3–4, 7. Note that Lardy, Goldstein, Prasad, et al. all share the consensus view that the RMB should be revalued; in stressing the risks their emphasis is on the need to sequence reforms properly. 26. President Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980; Herman F. Eilts, “Security Considerations in the Persian Gulf,” International Security 5 (fall 1980): 79–113; Robert J. Lieber, “Oil and Power after the Gulf War,” ibid., 17 (summer 1992): 155–76.

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access to and supplies of the world’s oil.27 Evidence that global petroleum production will max out later in this decade and then diminish gradually over time adds a sense of urgency to these efforts. 28 These concerns (regarding competition over oil and future oil production) are plausible but overstated. Rising prices will assure adequate energy supplies and will dictate the flow of oil. If there is a Sino-American confrontation over energy, it will be the result of a panicked reaction to failed domestic policies. This is unlikely but not outside the realm of possibility. China’s increased demand for energy as a result of its economic growth is the most significant change in global energy markets. Until 1993, China was a net exporter of oil; its energy needs were met largely by its enormous coal production (and the People’s Republic remains by far the world’s largest producer of coal, which still accounts for most of its energy needs). But by 2003 China was also importing oil at a brisk pace, with overall demand growing at 8 percent a year and imports accounting for 30 percent of its oil consumption. The International Energy Agency estimates that China’s demand for imported oil will rise from 1.5 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2001 to 4.2 mb/d in 2010 to 9.8 mb/d in 2030.29 Most of China’s imported oil comes from the Persian Gulf region. Increased dependence on oil imports, and on Middle Eastern oil supplies (under the shadow of the U.S. Navy), have not gone unnoticed by China’s leadership. Eager to reduce its dependence on the Gulf and sensitive to its growing energy needs (and the competing energy demands of other states, such as India and Japan) China has left no stone unturned in its efforts to diversify its supplies, and where possible to lock in proprietary control of resources. Searching for more geopolitically attractive alternatives than the Gulf, President Hu Jintao has traveled on missions to Latin America, South East Asia, and Africa with energy security at the top of his agenda; Chinese officials have been active both in seeking supplies of existing oil and in pursuing potential opportunities for exploration, in, among other places, the Caspian region, throughout Africa (especially Angola and Sudan), Indonesia, and even Canada and Peru.30 27. See for example Michael T. Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Petroleum De pen dency (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), esp. 175–79; Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 9, 98, 101, 192, 263. 28. Kenneth S. Deffeyes, Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Paul Roberts, The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World (New York: Houghton Miffl in, 2004). 29. International Energy Agency, Key World Energy Statistics, 2004 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2004), 15; International Energy Agency, Findings of Recent IEA Work, 2003 (Paris: OECD/ IEA, 2003), 9, 68; Paul Crompton and Yanrui Wu, “Energy Consumption in China: Past Trends and Future Directions,” Energy Economics 27 (January 2005): 196, 206; Philip Andrews- Speed, “China’s Energy Woes: Running on Empty,” Far Eastern Economic Review (June 2005): 14. 30. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 2002 (Paris, OECD/IEA, 2002), 237, 249, 254; David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy,” Foreign Affairs 84 (September–October 2005): 27–28, 31; Peter Cornelius and Jonathan Story, “China Revolu-

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China’s energy vulnerability was illustrated in 2004 when surges in demand during the hot summer months of June, July, and August forced widespread power outages and factory shutdowns. These were caused by limits to the capacity of the country’s power-generating capability, not a shortage of oil, but they underscored the obvious crucial role energy plays in sustaining economic growth, and can only further encourage what has been characterized as China’s “very muscular petro-diplomacy” in competition for pipeline projects and over disputed drilling claims. 31 Certainly states will seek to assure adequate and uninterrupted access to energy. Moreover, Chinese energy fi rms, as late entrants into a highly competitive global market, may fi nd it necessary to overbid to secure rights and also see unique opportunities in markets marginalized by Western competitors due to political pressures and greater economic risks. 32 Nevertheless, China’s geopolitical energy ambitions will inevitably face some real limitations, and if these structural realities are not understood, then the potential for confl ict will increase. There are stubborn facts about how much oil there is, where the oil will come from, and the mechanism by which it will be distributed. These supply-side essentials will not be fundamentally altered by the foreign policies of oil- consuming states. With regard to production, even though global energy demand is expected to continue to grow over the next quarter century, from 75 mb/d in 2000 to 120 mb/d in 2030 (with demand from developing counties like India and China accounting for about two-thirds of that increase); global production should be able to meet that demand. 33 These estimates are fairly robust, as the price mechanism will mitigate the errors of these long-term projections—if disruptions complicate the delivery of proven reserves, or if global demand rises faster than tionizes Energy Markets,” Far Eastern Economic Review (October 2004): 22–23; Xiaojie Xu. “The Oil and Gas Links between Central Asia and China: A Geopolitical Perspective,” OPEC Review 23 (March 1999): 35, 46, 52; Simon Romero, “China Emerging as a U.S. Rival for Canada’s Oil,” New York Times, December 23, 2004; Joseph Kahn, “China’s Costly Quest For Energy Control,” ibid., June 27, 2005. 31. Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Rising Energy Competition and Energy Security in Northeast Asia: Issues for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Ser vice Report RL32466 (February 9, 2005): 9–12, 14, 17; Ben Dolven, “China Struggles to Fuel its Miracle,” Far Eastern Economic Review (September 16, 2004): 37; Brian Bremmer et al., “Asia’s Great Oil Hunt,” Business Week, November 15, 2004 (quote). 32. Zha Daojiong, “China’s Energy Security: Domestic and International Issues,” Survival 48 (spring 2006): 179–80; U.S. Department of Energy, “National Security Review of International Energy Requirements” (February 2006): 14–15, 24–28, 32; Amy Myers Jaffe and Kenneth B. Medlock III, “China and Northeast Asia,” in Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, ed. Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 277–78; Amy Myers Jaffe and Steven W. Lewis, “Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy,” Survival 44 (spring 2002): 126. 33. IEA, Findings of Recent IEA Work, 2003, 8, 12; IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2002, 92; for a very (and probably overly) optimistic vision of global energy supply, see Steve A. Yetiv, Crude Awakenings: Global Oil Security and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

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anticipated, the price will increase, reducing demand and calling forth alternative supplies. Energy markets are extraordinarily efficient and equilibrating; they are efficient in that, unlike in many markets, prices are extremely flexible, both up and down; they are equilibrating in that the behavior of market participants is price-sensitive in the appropriate direction. Additionally, large increases in the price of oil are further self- correcting in that they tend to have a recessionary impact on consumer economies, further tamping down demand. Given this, many “energy pessimists” are really pessimistic about the future price (as opposed to the availability) of oil, and the distressing consequences for economic growth in consuming countries that higher and higher prices imply.34 With regard to aggregate supply, then, there will be enough oil (for a price), which is a somewhat optimistic message. But it will come, increasingly in the future, from the Middle East, which is where most of the world’s proven reserves remain. Although China will import oil from a number of countries, such as Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran are currently China’s two largest suppliers, and every indication is that Gulf sources will be at least as important, if not more so, in the future.35 This implies limits to China’s “scour the globe” approach to alternate sources of crude that should take a bit of the edge off an international scramble for oil (although this does increase the prospects for emerging Sino-American political rivalry in the Gulf region). Finally, and especially given the primacy of Gulf resources, it should be clear that efforts by consuming states to “lock up” supplies of oil are literally a pipe dream, one that could be a source of international conflict, but which will not guarantee any state’s particular supply. Aside from making sure that the Strait of Hormuz (through which 26 million barrels of oil pass each day) remains open, price, not power, will determine where oil will go. Oil is a homogeneous, fungible product that will seek out its highest dollar level. This will hold true even for oil that is domestically produced—choices about how to allocate that oil will be affected, if not dictated, by what economists call the “shadow price” of oil, or its “opportunity cost”—what is forgone elsewhere by using it here—and this will be established by the world price of oil set on international markets. 34. See for example Philip K. Verleger Jr., “Energy: A Gathering Storm?” in The United States and the World Economy: Foreign Economic Policy for the Next Decade, ed. C. Fred Bergsten (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2005), 209–10, 212. The International Energy Agency remains certain that “resources are more than adequate to meet demand until 2030 and beyond. Less certain is how much it will cost,” an uncertainty reflected in the IEA’s 2002 projection that oil prices would remain at about $21/barrel through 2010 before rising to $29 through 2030, compared with its 2004 projection of a $35/barrel price between 2005 and 2030. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 2004 (Paris: OECD/ IEZ, 2004), 29 (quote), 33; IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2002, 37. 35. Gawdat Bahat, “Energy Partnership: China and the Gulf States,” OPEC Review 29 (June 2005): 118, 123, 125, 127; Yetiv, Crude Awakenings, 7, 121–22; IEA, World Energy Outlook 2004, 32; IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2002, 96.

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In sum, the elements of the supply side of the global energy equation are essentially fi xed and relatively impervious to manipulation by the foreign policies of consuming states. The demand side is another story. If potential international conflict over oil derives in part from overly ambitious Chinese foreign policy, it derives as well from inadequately ambitious U.S. domestic policy. American energy policy is profoundly misguided and costly, but as with China’s petro-diplomacy, the pernicious effects of those policies are not likely to cause war, at least not Sino-American war. China’s energy consumption has attracted attention because it is a relatively new player on the world energy market and because of the rapid rate of growth of its energy demands. Often lost in such discussions is the elephant in the room (or perhaps the watering hole): the fact that world energy markets remain driven by U.S. consumption. There is an enormous amount of slack on the demand side of energy markets, and most of that comes from potential savings in U.S. use. Consider the apparently alarming projection that as a function of continued rapid economic growth, China’s total demand for crude oil will double, and grow from 5.2 million barrels a day in 2002 to 10.7 million barrels by 2015. But right now the United States consumes over 20 million barrels of oil a day, easily more than the rest of the top five oil- consuming nations (China, Japan, Germany, Russia, and India) combined; the United States also imports more oil (12.1 million b/d) by an order of similar magnitude. Moreover, in absolute terms, the U.S. demand is projected to increase by about as much as China’s, but the similar growth in U.S. demand reflects a slower rate of increase due to its already very high current consumption.36 Changes to U.S. policy could fundamentally alter the nature of world energy markets, and take the edge off global political rivalry over oil. (Such changes would also have a host of other potential benefits, but that is a different discussion.) The potential for energy savings are enormous. United States auto drivers traveled 1.5 trillion miles in 1982 and 2.5 trillion in 1995—in larger and less fuel efficient cars. Opportunities for increased energy efficiency exist throughout the U.S. economy, involving home appliances, insulation, and innovations in new construction, but gasoline use remains the most prominent issue. One out of every eight barrels of oil produced in the world is currently burned on American roads. Studies show that U.S. households are very responsive to energy price changes, and as the price of oil goes up, the 36. Total oil consumption, 2004: U.S. 20.7 million b/d; China 6.5; Japan 5.4; Germany 2.6, Russia 2.6; India 2.3; oil imports 2004: U.S. 12.1 million b/d; Japan 5.3, China 2.9, Germany 2.4, South Korea 2.2; source, U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Top World Oil Tables,” U.S. Department of Energy, International Energy Annual 2005. Projections of future consumption are from U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2005; the International Energy Agency makes similar forecasts, but combines the United States and Canada in its statistics: U.S./Canada demand increases from 20.2 mb/d in 2000 to 24.8 in 2020; China’s demand increases from 4.9 to 9.4 over the same period—note that China’s demand is projected to almost double, but the absolute increase is actually slightly higher for the United States and Canada—4.6 vs. 4.5. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2002, 92.

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behavior of U.S. consumers and producers will adapt, as they did after the oil shocks of the 1970s, and generate substantial energy savings. 37 Oil prices are going to go up, as a general trend, over the coming years and decades, and increases in U.S. consumption will slow or decline in response to these higher prices. These expectations have led to some renewed calls for an increase in American federal gas taxes, which have been unchanged at eighteen cents a gallon since 1993 (with additional state taxes adding an additional eight to forty cents). U.S. gasoline taxes are dramatically lower than those in other advanced industrial countries, which largely range from two to five dollars per gallon. As a rule of thumb, each penny of gas tax would raise about a billion dollars in revenue; studies project that each twenty-five- cent- pergallon increase in gas taxes would cut consumption by 200,000 barrels per day within six months and 700,000 b/d with a few years.38 Given the consensus that oil prices are going to rise, and given the known responsiveness of American households and fi rms to changes in energy prices, it would indeed be immeasurably wiser public policy for the U.S. government to anticipate these increases with a large gasoline tax, phased in over time (such as an additional twenty-five cents a gallon per year for ten years). A gasoline tax would provide an anchor for energy price expectations, so that households and fi rms (and producers of alternate sources of energy and energy saving products) would be able to anticipate market efficient behavior, something less likely to happen with energy prices left solely to the market that will dip up and down dramatically around the general upward trend. Further, some of this tax would be “paid” by oil producers, as the reduced demand would cause a reduction in the price of crude (thus adding a twenty-five- cent tax to a three-dollar gallon of gas will not result in a price of $3.25, but in some figure in between $3 and $3.25). Without such a tax increase, revenue from price increases (which will occur in any event) accrues totally to producers. The revenue raised by a gas tax could be used to subsidize conservation efforts (such as tax rebates for hybrid cars or home insulation) and support research and development of alternative forms of energy, or 37. Verleger, “Energy: A Gathering Storm,” 237; Peter C. Reiss and Matthew W. White, “Demand and Pricing in Electricity Markets: Evidence from San Diego During California’s Energy Crisis,” NBER Working Paper 9986 (September 2003); William T. Gavin, “Gasoline Affordability,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, National Economic Trends, November 2004; Anna Bernasek, “Real Energy Savers Don’t Wear Cardigans. Or Do They?” New York Times, November 13, 2005. Opportunities for energy savings in the U.S. abound—5 percent of all electricity used in U.S. households is lost to “standby power waste”—appliances not in use but still plugged in. International Energy Agency, Things That Go Blip in the Night: Standby Power and How to Limit It (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2001), 87. 38. Verleger, “Energy: A Gathering Storm,” 231, 233; Carol Dahl and Thomas Sterner, “Analyzing Gasoline Demand Elasticities: A Survey,” Energy Economics 27 (July 1991): 210; American Petroleum Institute, “Nationwide and State-by- State Motor Fuel Taxes, November 2004”; “Gas Taxes: Lesser Evil, Greater Good,” New York Times, October 24, 2005; Christopher J. Neely, “Will Oil Prices Choke Growth?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, International Economic Trends, July 2004.

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returned in the form of reduced payroll taxes or increases in the earned income tax credit (thus targeting those most hurt by the gas tax), or retained to help reduce the enormous U.S. federal budget deficit. Add to these benefits (stability, burden shifting, and revenue) the fact that reduced U.S. energy consumption would take some of the edge off geopolitical rivalry for secure energy supplies, especially as the United States would be credibly signaling that its future oil use was likely to decline, and a gas tax makes even more sense. But that is unlikely to happen. The U.S. political system seems incapable of generating such a policy. Like the old Tareyton smoker with the black eye, the U.S would rather fight than switch, and it will probably continue to act—at a minimum—in accordance with the Carter Doctrine, and use force to assure that no single hostile power gains control over Persian Gulf oil. In the coming decades that threat is not likely to come from China. The bigger energy picture is most likely one with bumpy price shocks, occasional short-run disruptions in supply, and a general wealth transfer from oil consumers to oil producers, none of which seem likely to provide the impetus for Sino-American war. There remains, however, much politics short of war, and the scramble for energy will provide yet another source of tension between the two states, deriving from geopolitical wariness, divergent interests, and Hirschmanesque effects that accompany China’s relentless economic rise. On the fi rst issue, the U.S. government has sent mixed signals regarding China’s efforts to secure oil aboard. The Department of Energy rightly notes that the effect of any energy China “removes” from world markets “should be economically neutral.” But the political position of the White House is that by “acting as if they can somehow ‘lock up’ energy supplies around the world,” China jeopardizes its good standing in the international community.39 Regarding divergent interests, China’s cultivation of close ties with resource-rich nations in conflict with the United States, including Sudan and Iran, will likely create new and nontrivial conflicts of interest—on this both the Department of Energy and the White House agree.40 Finally, because in any event most of China’s oil will come from the Middle East (and also Russia), the growing importance of China as an outlet for oil exporters will enhance its political influence in many parts of the world, which the United States will likely fi nd frustrating.

Speculations: The Dangers From Discontinuous Change In sum, if present trends continue, China’s economic rise will lead to greater Sino-American political rivalry and increased tension between the two countries, 39. Department of Energy, “National Security Review,” 3, 28; “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” (White House, March 2006), 41. 40. Department of Energy, “National Security Review,” 2–3, 22, 29, 33; Department of Energy, “National Security Strategy,” 42; see also Zha Daojing, “China’s Energy Security,” 182–83; Jaffe and Lewis, “Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy,” 116, 124–25.

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as a result of China’s increased global political influence, chronic disagreements between the two over macroeconomic policy coordination, and the negative political externalities generated by each country’s counterproductive energy strategy. These problems will occasionally generate and exacerbate Sino-American political disputes, and may contribute to the calcification of a more adversarial relationship; but they are not, in and of themselves, the sort of things that will likely to lead to war. Of course, wars don’t necessarily start for good reasons. It would be a mistake not to be alert to arguments associated with scholars such as Robert Gilpin, for whom the central mechanism driving war is not found in the particulars, but rather in the political environment fostered by the general difficulties associated with resolving the disequilibrium generated by rising powers in the context of an established international system.41 Nevertheless, my assessment remains that the issues explored here—influence, international money, and energy—are suggestive of political conflict and rivalry, but not war. On the other hand, if present trends do not continue—and this is worth close attention as perhaps the most common mistake made by international relations scholars is to project linear trends indefi nitely into the future—then it is considerably easier to envision a much more dangerous turn of events. Currently, two engines that drive the world economy are China’s growth rate and American consumption, each of which are rocketing along at historically unprecedented levels. China’s growth rate plays an essential role in mitigating potential domestic political crises; and is increasingly an essential contributor to global economic growth. Despite its remarkable performance, however, the Chinese economy is potentially vulnerable to labor, resource, or environmental bottlenecks or to an exogenous shock elsewhere, developments which could prove politically disruptive.42 If China’s economic growth were to slow suddenly—even a very respectable growth rate on the order of 4 percent annually would seem like a dramatic downturn—the Communist Party could be faced with a legitimacy crisis, and resort to a nationalistic foreign policy as the only available pillar of domestic support. This could intensify the security dilemma, especially given the adverse effect a slowdown in China’s economy would have for other states in the region. One such possible exogenous shock—with even broader global implications— would be a sudden collapse in the level of U.S. imports. This is an all too 41. According to Gilpin, great powers are sluggish to appropriately adapt to new underlying political realities, and states jockey aggressively to assert or retain status and prestige. From this broad-brush perspective, the par ticular arenas of confl ict are less significant than the expectation that states will increasingly fi nd themselves in disputes over disparate issues that share at bottom disagreements over relative status. See Gilpin, War and Change, esp. 30–31 (“prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency of international relations”); 94–95, on incentives for rising states to challenge the status quo; and 192–95, on the difficulties involved in accommodating rising power. 42. Zheng Bijan, “China’s Peaceful Rise,” 21; Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” 49.

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plausible scenario, given the growing consensus that the U.S. current account position is not indefi nitely sustainable; with the only remaining question whether there will be a “hard landing” or a “soft landing” for the dollar and for necessary international adjustments. The U.S. current account deficit is now running at 5 percent or more of U.S. GDP annually, an unprecedented figure in American history. Even in the nineteenth century, when the U.S. would have been classified as an “emerging market economy,” its deficit never exceeded 3 percent; in the twentieth century, the U.S. current account balance was mostly positive, briefly plunging below 3 percent of GDP in the mid-1980s. Total U.S. net external liabilities are now at 25 percent of GDP and are projected to reach 50 percent within ten years and 100 percent within twenty-five. As a rule of thumb, the “crisis threshold” usually applied to developing countries is when external liabilities equal 40 percent of GDP. Given the attractiveness and the position of the U.S. economy (with its liabilities denominated in its home currency), it certainly operates on a much longer leash than the average developing country, but it would be naïve to assume that it operates without limits. It is worthy of note that the two most recent large imbalances in U.S. external accounts were associated with major realignments, the fi rst with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and the second with the coordinated depreciation of the dollar agreed upon as a result of the Plaza accords of 1985. Contemporary U.S. deficits are larger, and are not correcting; rather, they are on a trajectory of widening imbalances and rising external liabilities.43 A coordinated effort to gradually walk down U.S. external deficits in a way that does not damage the world economy would probably involve an elaborate bargain involving the realignment of exchange rates in exchange for a considerable reduction in the U.S. federal deficit; this would offer the smoothest path to a soft landing but would involve levels of international cooperation— and some combination of tax increases and spending cuts in the United States—that do not obviously seem forthcoming. In the absence of coordinated efforts (or unilateral house- cleaning by the United States) to place American accounts on a more sustainable trajectory, the prospects for a hard landing increase. This pessimistic scenario holds that adjustment will only occur in the wake of a crisis—in this case, a U.S. fi nancial crisis featuring a collapse of the dollar. The risk of a major American fi nancial crisis is greater now than it has been in over half a century. This argument has increasingly made its way into the mainstream, most notably with Paul Volcker’s comment that there was in his view a 75 percent chance

43. Obstfeld and Rogoff, “The Unstable U.S. Current Account Position Revisited,” 1, 5, 7, 18; Michael Mussa, “Sustaining Growth While Reducing External Imbalances,” in Bergsten, The United States and the World Economy, 175–76, 186, 194–95, 201–3; William R. Cline, The United States as a Debtor Nation (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2005), 3, 66, 85, 99, 154, 168–71, 275–77.

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of a currency crisis in the United States within five years.44 Fears for a fi nancial crisis involving the dollar derive from the combination of underlying expectations about the long-run value of the dollar and the self-fulfi lling attributes of fi nancial panics. Guesses about the future value of the dollar are based on anticipated inflation (which in this case must consider the potential consequences of the large, sustained U.S. federal budget deficits), and anticipated depreciation (a likely consequence of a succession of record-setting trade deficits ($418 billion in 2002, $651 billion in 2004, and $856 billion in 2006). Given these underlying expectations, and the enormous amount of dollars held abroad (Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea hold well over two trillion dollars; many others, including Saudi Arabia, also have significant dollar reserves), a mid-sized macroeconomic disturbance in the United States (say, the sudden failure of a large bank or investment house) could cause some holders to get out of the dollar, starting the ball rolling on a classic self-fulfilling fi nancial crisis. The risk is not that states like China will threaten to dump their dollar holdings—this would not be in China’s interest.45 Rather, the collapse of the dollar would result from thousands of uncoordinated, individually rational decisions to get out of the dollar in anticipation of further dollar decline, decisions which collectively will guarantee that further decline will occur. From a purely economic perspective, a sudden collapse in the value of the dollar would be painful and highly disruptive, especially in the short run, but it would not be catastrophic. It would, however, have potentially profound effects on international relations. The U.S. economy would be thrown into a recession, and, more permanently, it would probably significantly reduce the ease with which the United States could borrow money from abroad in its own currency. The drop in U.S. demand would have a negative impact on China’s exports, and thus on its economy, which, as noted above, would present the Chinese Communist Party with a legitimacy crisis that might be countered with a foreign policy assertiveness designed to fall back on nationalism as a legitimating device. Directly and indirectly, many of the other economies in Asia, including Japan, would also suffer from a retraction of American demand. At the same time, faced, uncharacteristically, with real economic constraints on its purchasing power, the United States could conceivably foresee the need to scale back its military presence in Asia. This is troubling as scholars from disparate perspectives have maintained that the American military presence in Asia has been on balance a force for stability and has helped con44. Volcker quoted in “Checking the Depth Gauge: How Low Might the Dollar Sink?” The Economist, November 11, 2004; see also Cline, The United States as a Debtor Nation, 175, 180, 236. 45. Arguably, the fact that a large percentage of dollars and dollar liabilities are held by governments is relatively stabilizing, as governments will be less sensitive to profit motives in managing their reserves.

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tain potentially dangerous regional rivalries.46 A sudden collapse of the dollar, which is a real possibility, would thus increase the risk of more aggressive foreign policies on the part of China and other Asian states, while at the same time shaking the foundations of the relatively stabilizing influence of the U.S. military commitment to the region.

46. Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security 23 (spring 1999): 114, 116–17; Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.SJapan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” ibid., 49, 52, 58, 74; see also Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for Stability with America,” Foreign Affairs 84 (September–October 2005): 48, on some potential negative consequences for China of a reduction in U.S. power.

chapter

11

The United States and the Rise of China Implications for the Long Haul Robert J. Art

Today, the United States stands at the pinnacle of its power when power is measured in terms of hard economic and military assets. Although its economy will continue to grow and although it will remain the most powerful military nation on earth for some time to come, America’s economic and military edge relative to the world’s other great powers will inevitably diminish over the next several decades. The country best positioned to challenge America’s preeminence, fi rst in East Asia, and then perhaps later globally, is China. If China’s economy continues to grow for two more decades at anything close to the rate of the last two decades, then it will eventually rival and even surpass the United States in the size of its gross domestic product (measured in purchasing power parity terms, not in constant dollar terms), although not in per capita GDP.1 Even if its economy never catches up to America’s, China’s remarkable economic growth has already given it significant political influence in East Asia, and that influence will only grow as China’s economy continues to grow. Moreover, now that China has emerged as the low- cost manufacturing platform of the world, its economic influence extends well beyond East Asia and affects not only the rich great powers but also the struggling smaller developing ones, because of both its competitive prices for low-cost goods and its voracious I thank Risa Brooks, Taylor Fravel, Robert Ross, Richard Samuels, Zhu Feng, and participants at the conference on International Relations Theory and the Rise of China, held at the School of International Affairs at Beijing University, January 5–7, 2006, for their helpful comments; Jill Hazelton, for her research assistance; and Loren Cass, for his help with the economic data. 1. For a skeptical view of this happening anytime soon, see Lester Thurow, “A Chinese Century: Maybe It’s the Next One,” New York Times, August 19, 2007, 4 (business section).

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appetite for raw materials. China is already the dominant military land power on the East Asian mainland, and it has made significant strides in creating pockets of excellence in its armed forces. If it continues to channel a healthy portion of its GDP into its military forces over several more decades and if it makes a determined naval and air power projection effort, China might be able to deploy a maritime force that could contest America’s supremacy at sea in East Asia, much as the German fleet built by Tirpitz in the decade before World War I posed a severe threat to the British fleet in the North Sea. Historically, the rise of one great power at the expense of the dominant one has nearly always led to confl ictual relations between the two, and, more often than not, eventually to a war between them that has dragged in other great powers.2 Is the history of dominant-rising great power dyads the future for U.S.- China relations? Clearly, there will be political and economic confl icts and friction between the United States and China as its economic and military power in East Asia, and its global economic and political reach, continue to expand. Clearly, there will also be some arms racing between China and the United States as each jockeys for advantage over the other, as each is driven by their respective military necessities of intimidating and defending Taiwan, and as the United States responds to China’s growing power projection capabilities. Historically, dominant powers have not readily given up their position of number one to rising challengers, and rising challengers have always demanded the fruits that they believe their growing power entitles them to. There is no reason to expect that things will be different in this regard with China and the United States. Thus, they will not be able to avoid a certain level of confl ictual relations and political friction over the next several decades. Are mostly political friction and confl ictual relations, and even war, the main things that these two powers have to look forward to, or are there also some significant shared interests and hence bases for cooperation in both the medium and the longer term, such that the peace-inducing aspects of the U.S.China relationship could come to overshadow the conflict-producing ones? No one can say for certain which is the case. However, if we believe that there are distinct elements in the Sino-American relationship that differ from past dominant power–rising power dyads, then the dismal history of such dyads need not be the future of this one. If this is so, then the right policy choices by both countries can keep the two on a path that has more cooperative than conflictual elements to it, thereby avoiding the doom-and-gloom scenario that too many of today’s analysts portray. To explore this possibility, fi rst, I lay out what I conceive to be the fundamental parameters or starting points regarding the nature of current and 2. See Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

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future U.S.- China relations. Then I lay out America’s interests in East Asia and assess whether these are opposed to China’s interests. Finally, I prescribe policy guidelines for America’s China policy over the long haul.

Three Key Benchmarks Fundamental to my analysis of future U.S.- China relations are three key benchmarks. First, we cannot predict with any certainty the content of China’s intentions and goals several decades out, but we can with confidence state that they will be more expansive than they now are. Second, the United States, short of preventive war, which is not a viable policy, cannot stop China’s rise, although perhaps it could slow that rise for a time through hostile economic policies. Third, we should not assume that the Sino-American relationship is doomed to repeat the dismal record of the three previous dominant power–rising power dyads of the last one hundred years because there are marked differences between the former and the latter three.

China’s Future Intentions Much has been made of China’s strategy of “peaceful rise” (which is now called “peaceful development”). According to Avery Goldstein, it consists of two main efforts: fi rst, to emphasize to China’s neighbors, by actions and not simply words, that China is a responsible and cooperative member of the international community; and second, to improve relations with the world’s leading states. The fi rst involves an active multilateral policy and the avoidance of a heavy-handed unilateralism in asserting China’s interests; the second, cultivating good bilateral relations with major powers to demonstrate the advantages of dealing with China.3 The fi rst is a reassurance strategy to assuage the fears of China’s neighbors about its rising power; the second is a calculated policy to prevent a hostile coalition of great powers from forming. The strategy of peaceful rise is the policy of a weak state, of a great power not yet arrived, but of one whose power is growing, that needs a peaceful environment for its power to continue to grow, and that wishes to avoid encirclement as it grows more powerful. The strategy of a rising great power is not likely to be the strategy of a fully arrived great power. Of course, we cannot know with certainty what course China will follow once it has reached the power status it clearly desires, but we would do well to expect much the same for China as has happened with every other emergent great power of the modern era: its ambitions will grow as its capabilities increase. Great powers always fi nd reasons to wield their great power. Expanding power creates new goals because more power creates more opportunities for influence. 3. Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp 188ff.

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Thus, although we cannot predict the exact nature of Chinese intentions and goals a few decades from now, we can assert with high confidence that China’s goals will be more expansive than they now are. China, too, will want its “place in the sun,” just as every other great power that has arrived. This does not mean that China will be an aggressive warlike nation, nor simply a strictly peaceful one. It only means that China will do what all great powers do: not simply react to its international environment, but instead act to shape that environment in ways that are conducive to its national interests.

China’s Inexorable Rise A second benchmark for American policy towards China is that the United States cannot stop the rise of China, although it could make China’s rise more difficult by working actively to disrupt its economic growth for a time. The most forceful advocate of attempting to slow China’s rise is John Mearsheimer, who argues that American policy has sought to integrate China into the world economy and facilitate its rapid economic development, so that it becomes wealthy and, one would hope, content with its present position in the international system. This U.S. policy is misguided. A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony. . . . Although it is certainly in China’s interest to be the hegemon in Northeast Asia, it is clearly not in America’s interest to have that happen. . . . it is not too late for the United States to reverse course and do what it can to slow the rise of China.4

Mearsheimer only makes a policy prescription; he does not lay out in specific terms how the United States could slow China’s rise. Careful inspection of this idea shows that under current conditions China’s rise is inexorable; consequently, trying to slow or disrupt it is foolhardy and will only backfi re. Stopping the rise of China means containing Chinese power. That, in turn, requires halting or drastically curtailing China’s economic growth, upon which all else depends, and thwarting its rising influence regionally and globally. Stopping China’s rise would be equivalent to what I have called “compound containment,” which was applied against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.5 Compound containment involves two central ingredients: stalemating a power militarily and waging economic denial against it. The former is designed to prevent the state from gaining any political leverage from its military power; the latter, to weaken a state economically, either by actually 4. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 402. 5. Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 113–14.

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reducing its gross domestic product, or by severely constricting its technological improvement and rate of economic growth. As I have argued, the record of America’s success with the economic component of compound containment is mixed at best. The United States has applied economic denial against nine states since 1945. The larger ones—China and the Soviet Union—suffered less than the smaller ones because their economies were less dependent on foreign trade than the smaller ones; the smaller ones suffered less than they might otherwise have because they were bailed out by their respective Chinese and Soviet patrons; and strategic embargoes (denying a state access to advanced technology and arms) worked better than economic warfare (weakening the overall ability of a state’s economy to generate and sustain its military power).6 Would economic denial work better against China today than it did for the Cold War cases? A reasonable conclusion is “no,” for four reasons. For starters, a determined policy to hurt China economically so as to slow its growth would hurt the United States economically as well because the two have a high level of economic interdependence with one another, even if that interdependence is not symmetric. Who would be hurt more is difficult to say, but both could be hurt substantially in any determined and vicious policy of economic warfare. The most direct way for the United States to hurt China would be to block all of China’s exports to the United States. In 2005 China (which includes mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao) exported $271 billion to the United States, or 26 percent of its total exports of $1,054 trillion for the year.7 In 2005 China’s GDP (current prices) was $2.4 trillion.8 This means that in 2005, 11.3 percent of China’s GDP was exported to the United States, an astoundingly high figure and one that looks as if it creates a huge dependency of China on access to the U.S. market.9 This dependency is large, but not quite as large as the above figures would imply, because, as Richard Cooper points 6. Ibid., 114–19. 7. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2006 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2005), 510, 133, 137, 140. The figure for China’s total exports to the world is based on Chinese export data. The figure for China’s exports to the United States, however, is based on U.S. import data, not China’s export data. These two figures are not the same because, as the International Monetary Fund makes clear, there are discrepancies in bilateral trade statistics as reported by China and its industrial trading partners. I used U.S. import figures from China to measure China’s exports to the United States because I deem the U.S. figures more accurate. Finally, in 2005, the United States exported to China, Hong Kong, and Macao $58 billion, or a little less than 6 percent of its exports. See Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2006, 111. 8. IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2006, at http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/weo/ 2006/01/data/index.htm. GDP figure is rounded. 9. A useful benchmark for assessing China’s dependence on the U.S. market is the percentage of U.S. exports to Canada, which is America’s largest trading partner. In 2005, U.S. exports to Canada amounted to $211 billion, or 23 percent of total U.S. exports for that year (IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2006, 509).

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out, China’s exports are measured in terms of gross value, not the value added in China. Because many of China’s exports involve the processing of imports, a total cessation of exports to the United States would affect something less than 11.3 percent of GDP.10 Still, the abrupt loss of the U.S. market would be highly disruptive in the short term to China. The problem is that such a policy of economic warfare would be highly disruptive as well to the United States because China holds a powerful fi nancial lever over it and could retaliate. As of June 2007, China held $405 billion (8 percent) of the $5 trillion of the total outstanding U.S. Treasury securities that are privately held. (Japan is the biggest holder at $612 billion or 12 percent.)11 China could retaliate against an American embargo on China’s exports by dumping its holdings of Treasury securities or by refusing to buy any more. That would hurt the value of these holdings because it would depress their price and thus hurt China, but the United States, too, would be hurt in the process. Unless others stepped in to pick up the slack, interest rates would have to rise in the United States, probably significantly, and that would bring on a recession, or perhaps even something worse—a fi nancial crisis. During the Cold War, economic warfare worked poorly against China and the Soviet Union because these two economies were not highly connected to the global economy. Perversely, economic warfare could work better now, but because China is highly connected to the global economy and to the United States, it could hurt the United States badly in ways that economic warfare against the Soviet Union never could. Second, waging economic warfare against China, when it appears unprovoked by any Chinese actions, would backfi re politically against the United States. Unless imposed in retaliation against some grievous Chinese aggression, such a policy would smack of U.S. unilateralism and would not be supported by other states. The political results for the United States could be disastrous, including a severe hollowing out, or even destruction, of its main East Asian alliances. The problem for the United States is that China is not the Soviet Union: China does not have the same heavy-handed policy, missionary zeal, and threatening military posture that the Soviets did. As a consequence, economic warfare would bring disastrous economic and political results for the United States. Third, waging economic warfare through a ban on Chinese exports to the United States, a cessation of U.S. foreign direct investment in China, a ban 10. Richard N. Cooper, “Is ‘Economic Power’ a Useful and Operational Tool?” 25, at http:// economics.harvard.edu/faculty/cooper/papers/Economic percent2Power.pdf. 11. Total foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities are $2.2 trillion, of which Japan and China hold $1.017 trillion. See the U.S. Treasury’s International Capital Flow data at http:// www.treasury.gov/tic/mfh.txt. Total U.S. Treasury securities as of September 2006 amounted to $8.5 trillion. Of that total, $3.7 trillion was held by the Federal Reserve and U.S. Government accounts and the rest privately held. See United States Treasury, Trea sury Bulletin, December 2006, at http://www.fms.treas.gov/ bulletin/index.html.

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on U.S. agricultural and high-technology exports to China, and the like would not work if only the United States imposed them. Historically, the evidence about economic warfare suggests that it will not work or will not work well if only one country wages it, even if that country is as powerful as the United States. Sanctions are more effective when all of a country’s trading partners work in unison and when multilateral sanctions are supported by an international organization, which makes the multilateral coalition more robust and durable.12 Evidence and logic therefore suggest that in the event of U.S. economic warfare against a China that had not become aggressive, other countries would merely step in to fi ll the shoes of the United States. This result seems all the more probable given the fact that the Chinese economy is a powerful economic magnet not only in East Asia but also globally. Other states would be more than happy to see a cessation of American economic competition for the fruits of China’s economy. The China market is simply too important to too many states for them to cooperate with the United States in waging economic warfare against a state that is pursuing a peaceful rise strategy. Thus, we are led to this perverse result: if China’s low dependence on foreign economic activity made it a poor target for economic warfare during the Cold War, then today China’s huge and growing economy and high dependence on foreign economic activity still make it a poor target for economic warfare. Finally, waging unprovoked economic warfare against China would be foolhardy because it would create a self-fulfilling prophecy. As Joseph Nye put it: “the best way to make an enemy of China is to treat it like one.”13 In sum, if the point of America’s policy towards China is to produce as cooperative, benign, and satiated a great power as possible through integration into the Western order as China’s power grows, then an American policy of unprovoked economic warfare against a state cannily pursuing a policy of peaceful rise is downright stupid. The United States cannot stop China’s rise on its own, and it cannot get the cooperation of others to do so unless China stumbles badly diplomatically. Only a militarily aggressive, heavy-handed, unilateralist Chinese foreign policy would create the political conditions necessary for a compound containment strategy against China. China’s leaders are too smart for that, and short of that, the United States will simply shoot itself in the foot if it tries to stop or slow China’s rise single-handedly. If China’s rise is to be thwarted, then China itself will have to do it, either through a self-defeating diplomacy abroad or through gross political and economic malfeasance at home. China’s rise is China’s to lose. 12. See, for example, Elizabeth S. Rogers, “Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Confl icts,” Security Studies 5 (summer 1996): 45, 71–71; and Daniel W. Drezner, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?” International Organization 54 (winter 2000): 75 and 97–98. 13. Quoted in Cooper, “Economic Power,” 35.

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Power Transitions and Security Dilemma Dynamics A third benchmark for U.S. policy towards a rising China is this: do not assume that Sino-American relations will follow the course of recent cases where a rising power has challenged a dominant one. There are too many significant differences between these cases and the current one to draw such a fi rm conclusion. To defend this assertion, in table 11.1 I compare the current Sino-American competition with the three most important rising-power-versus-dominant-po wer competitions of the last one hundred years—those that resulted in either a great power hegemonic war or a sustained and intense political-military competition for hegemonic dominance between two great powers. (Hegemonic wars and hegemonic political-military competitions are conducted to determine which power will be number one and be able to set the rules of the international system.) The fi rst two competitions—Britain versus Germany in the decade before World War I and Britain versus Germany from 1933 to 1939—resulted in war; the third—the United States versus the Soviet Union during the Cold War—resulted in an uneasy peace between the two powers, punctuated by numerous proxy wars.14 I focus on three variables in order to explain the outcome of these cases: the level of security that both powers enjoyed, or believed they enjoyed, in general and vis-à-vis one another, with security defined as protection of the state’s homeland from physical attack and its political sovereignty from severe infringement; the extent of economic interdependence between them, with interdependence defi ned in terms of the level of economic interactions—especially 14. These three cases do not include all the great power cases of rising-versus- dominant power dyads of the last one hundred years. Most prominently and deliberately excluded is the U.S.-British case of the late nineteenth—early twentieth centuries. In this table, I am focusing on two types of competitions: those that resulted in a great power hegemonic war or those that entailed a hostile, intense, and sustained political competition for hegemony and that involved heavy reliance on military force to fight proxy wars or to engage in arms races so as to achieve political hegemony. The U.S.-British case does not fall into either category, although the United States did threaten the British with a naval arms race after World War I if they did not renounce the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902. By focusing on the three cases I have chosen, I have selected on the dependent variable—on those cases in which the outcome is either war or a sustained political-military rivalry rather than peace or peaceful accommodation, with the result that the conclusions of this analysis are to a degree biased. Nonetheless, there is still analytical merit in focusing on these two types of hegemonic competitions to see what conclusions we can draw. For a slightly different list of important power transitions, see Jacek Kugler and A. F. K. Organski, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 49. For an analysis of why the U.S.-British case ended in peace, not war, see Stephen R. Rock, When Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Historical Rapprochement in Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), cha2. For a more general treatment of the strategies that dominant powers employ to cope with rising powers, see Randell L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Robert S. Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston (London: Routledge, 1999), 1–32.

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trade—between the two states; and the degree and intensity of ideological competition that they experienced. I do not present these three variables as a full-blown deductive theory about war and peace between rising and dominant great powers; such theories have been presented by others, although with somewhat contradictory results.15 Instead, I argue that these three factors—and especially the fi rst, as made clear below—are the most important ones to look at in order to determine the level and intensity of hostility and confl ict, and hence the likelihood of war, between two great powers that believe they are experiencing, or may soon experience, a fundamental power shift between them. All other things being equal, the intensity of competition and the likelihood of war between a dominant power and a rising challenger should vary as follows. First, the lower the level of security each enjoys or believes it enjoys vis-à-vis the other or in general, the more likely are serious security dilemma dynamics, intense arms racing, and war between the two. Conversely, if these states feel that they are relatively secure from attack and that their political sovereignty is not being compromised (or will not be compromised) by the actions of the other, then they can experience a greater level of hostility that may arise from confl icts over nonsecurity issues without war being the result. There are many reasons why two states can wage war with one another; however, if each believes it is relatively safe from attack by the 15. There are four distinct theories as to why wars occur between rising and dominant great powers, but in one way or another, all four revolve around perceptions of, or actual manifestations of, fundamental power shifts between the two states. The fi rst three theories argue that the dominant power launches the hegemonic war; the fourth, that the rising power launches the hegemonic war. Dale Copeland argues that the dominant power will launch a preventive war against a rising power when it believes that its own decline is both inevitable and steep and at a time when it believes it is still more powerful than the rising challenger. (See Copeland, The Origins of Major War, chap. 2.) Robert Gilpin argues that hegemonic wars occur between a dominant and rising power when the governance of the system and its power distribution are in disequilibrium, in other words, when the rising power does not benefit from the system as much as its power entitles or enables it to, and although he is a little vague about which state starts the war, it is generally the declining but still dominant power that does. (See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, chap. 5.) Stephen Van Evera argues that windows of vulnerability and opportunity produce war between a declining dominant and a rising power when the former attacks the latter. See Stephen Van Evera, The Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Confl ict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), chap. 4. Finally, the power transition school, founded by A. F. K. Organski, argues that peace obtains when the dominant state has a huge preponderance of power over any potential challenger, but that wars occur as the power disparity between the dominant and the rising power narrows, and occurs just before the rising power achieves parity with the dominant power, or at the moment when it has achieved parity, or just after it has overtaken the dominant power—the time when war is initiated depending on which version of the power transition theory is used. See A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1958), chap. 12, esp. 333; Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, 19–22, 49–61; Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chap. 1; and Ronald L. Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatham House, 2000), chap. 1.

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Table 11.1. Dominant power versus rising power competitions Security enjoyed by both powers vis-à-vis one another

Level of economic interdependence

Ideological competition

Outcome

United KingdomGermany pre-1914

In 1914 security thought to be low for the future if corrective action (war) not taken

High

Low

War

United KingdomGermany pre-1939

Low in the 1930s due to presumed airpower threat

Low to medium

Medium to high

War

U.S.- Soviet Union during the Cold War

Initially believed to be low; turned out later to be high

Low

High and intense

Cold War; serious crises at fi rst; then an uneasy peace

U.S.- China today

High for U.S., but problematical for China because Chinese nuclear forces at present are potentially vulnerable to a U.S. fi rst strike

High

As yet, low to nonex istent

To be determined

Dominant-rising power dyad

other, then one of the most powerful historic incentives for war—security—is removed. Second, under the right conditions, the higher the level of economic interdependence between two states, the less likely will security competitions and war between them take place. The three conditions under which high levels of economic interdependence can be peace-inducing are: (1) when two states believe that they can more profitably resort to economic rather than military means in order to prosper; (2) when they believe that the economic vulnerabilities that result from economic interdependence cannot be quickly and easily turned to their military disadvantage; and (3) when they believe that should the fi rst two conditions change, they can readily protect themselves or fi nd allies who will protect them.16 Finally, the greater the ideological differences between the two states, the more intense will be their competition and the more likely they will be to experience arms races, intense security dilemmas, and war. Security concerns 16. See Art, A Grand Strategy for America, 66–67.

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have been powerful factors for war, but they are not the only factors. Ideological hostilities—conflicts over how social power should be organized within states—have also contributed to hostility and war between states. The Cold War, for example, was not simply about U.S.-Soviet security, it was also about values—democratic market capitalism versus communism—and which would prevail globally. Close inspection of table 11.1 reveals that neither economic interdependence nor ideological competition is a good predictor of whether a dominant and rising power will go to war or remain at peace. In 1914, for example, Germany was England’s second best customer for its exports, and England was Germany’s best customer for its exports.17 Before the war, they did not experience intense ideological competition, and in fact shared many political similarities. Yet, the two ended up at war. Throughout the 1930s, England and Germany did not have as high a level of economic interdependence with one another as they had before World War I, and they did experience some ideological competition.18 At the outset of, and during the course of, the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union experienced a low level of economic interdependence with one another, and their ideological competition was high and intense.19 Yet they remained in an uneasy peace, although one that was much more fragile during the fi rst phase of the Cold War than during the second. Thus, the relationship between levels of economic interdependence and intensity of ideological competition, on the one hand, and war or peace, on the other, is indeterminate. High and low levels of interdependence are correlated with war, and high and low levels of ideological competition are correlated with both war and peace. Therefore, it is the degree of security enjoyed by these pairs of states visà-vis one another, and especially the severity of the threat to its security that the dominant state perceives emanating from the rising state, that constitutes 17. In 1913, 10 percent of Britain’s total trade (imports and exports) was with Germany, and 12 percent of Germany’s total trade was with Britain. These percentages are derived from the Correlates of War data. The data were prepared by Katherine Barbieri for her doctoral dissertation “Economic Interdependence and Militarized Interstate Confl ict, 1870–1985” (Binghamton University, 1996). The data set is at http://cow2 .la.psu.edu/. I am indebted to Loren Cass for arranging the data for easy use. 18. In 1938, 4 percent of Britain’s total trade (imports and exports) was with Germany, and 6 percent of Germany’s total trade was with Britain. See note 17 for data source. 19. In 1977, for example, during the height of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, when one would expect trade to be the highest, the United States sent 1.4 percent of its total exports to the Soviet Union and received 0.3 percent of its total imports from the Soviet Union. By 1983, when détente had ended and U.S.- Soviet relations were hostile, the United States sent 0.1 percent of its exports to, and received 0.1 percent of its imports from, the Soviet Union. In 1977, the Soviets exported 2.5 percent of its exports to the United States and took 8 percent of its imports from the United States. By 1983, these Soviet figures had fallen to 1 percent and 5.7 percent, respectively. See International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1984 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1984), 378 and 385.

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the most important variable to predict whether a hegemonic struggle will result in war. 20 When security was low or believed to be low, intense crises and war were more likely; when security was high or believed to be high, better relations and peace tended to prevail. Economic interdependence and ideological competition are not irrelevant to producing peace and war, but they are only “helper variables.” They can reinforce peaceful trends when the security enjoyed by both states vis-à-vis one another is high, but they cannot override the deleterious effects produced when the security enjoyed by both states vis-à-vis one another is low. In 1914, Germany needed England to stand aside so that it could shore up its failing great power ally Austria-Hungary and deal with the growing power of Russia. Diplomatic isolation for Germany (the dissolution of Austria- Hungary) meant the political encirclement and eventual strangulation of Germany in the eyes of Germany’s leaders. If Britain stood aside while Germany attained continental hegemony, however, then Britain’s security would be at risk if a hegemonic Germany deployed the resources of the European continent against it. So, in classic security dilemma terms, Britain’s security would be at risk from the continental hegemony that Germany believed it needed for its security, and, similarly, Germany’s leaders believed that Germany’s security would be at risk if Britain denied it continental hegemony. The same logic applies to the British- German struggle during the 1930s. A Nazi Germany that had defeated Russia and dominated the continent could aggregate its resources and turn them into an invasion force to crush England’s defenses. The threat that German hegemony posed to Britain brought on the two World Wars. Security factors are also central in explaining why the Cold War stayed “cold.” The United States and the Soviet Union experienced an intense ideological competition for most of the Cold War, but that competition never turned into a direct war between the two primarily because of the restraining effects of nuclear deterrence. True, the stability-instability paradox did not work to prevent all serious crises between the two, and true, two of these crises—the Berlin blockade crisis of 1948 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—brought the United States and the Soviet Union closer to war than either would have liked.21 However, the workings of the stability/instability paradox were ultimately beneficial: it worked to prevent those crises that did 20. This is close to the argument that Dale Copeland makes about the causes of hegemonic great power wars. See Copeland, The Origins of Major War, chaps. 1 and 2. 21. The stability-instability paradox says either that two nuclear-armed and hostile states will start a conventional war with each other because they feel confident that it will not escalate to all- out nuclear war, or that they will not start such a war because they fear that it might escalate to all- out nuclear war. During the Cold War, the paradox produced the second, not the fi rst, effect. Glenn Snyder was the fi rst to formulate the paradox. See Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in The Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 198–99. Also see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 31–33, 148–57.

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occur from escalating to war, and it worked, ultimately, to reduce dramatically the frequency and the severity of crises after the Cuban missile crisis. In fact, one could make a strong argument that with one exception serious security crises between the United States and the Soviet Union disappeared after 1973. 22 China does not present the type of security threat to the United States that Germany did to Britain, or Britain to Germany. America’s nuclear forces make it secure from any Chinese attack on the homeland. Moreover, China clearly presents a potentially different type of threat to the United States than the Soviet Union did during the Cold War because the geopolitics of the two situations are different. The Soviet geopolitical (as opposed to nuclear) threat was twofold: to conquer and dominate the economic-industrial resources of western Eurasia and to control the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. Europe and the Persian Gulf constituted two of the five power centers of the world during the Cold War—Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States being the other three. If the Soviets had succeeded in dominating Europe and the Persian Gulf through either conquest or political-military intimidation, then it would have controlled three of the five power centers of the world. That would have been a significant power transition. China’s rise does not constitute the same type of geopolitical threat to the United States that the Soviet Union did. If China ends up dominating the Korean peninsula and a significant part of continental Southeast Asia, so what? As long as Japan remains outside the Chinese sphere of influence and allied with the United States, and as long as the United States retains some naval footholds in Southeast Asia, such as in Singapore, the Philippines, or Indonesia, China’s domination of these two areas would not present the same type of geopolitical threat that the Soviet Union did. As long as Europe, the Persian Gulf, Japan, India, and Russia (once it reconstitutes itself as a serious great power) remain either as independent power centers or under U.S. influence, Chinese hegemony on land in East and Southeast Asia will not tip the world balance of power. The vast size and central position of the Soviet Union in Eurasia constituted a geopolitical threat to American influence that China cannot hope to emulate. If judged by the standards of the last three dominant power–rising power competitions of the last one hundred years, then, the U.S.- China competition appears well placed to be much safer. Certainly, war between the two is not impossible because either or both governments could make a serious misstep over the Taiwan issue. War by miscalculation is always possible, but the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides has to have a restraining effect on 22. The exception came in November 1983 with the NATO exercise Able Archer. This was a serious crisis from the Soviet point of view, and they briefly believed a nuclear attack from the West was imminent. At the time, however, neither the United States nor NATO was aware of the Soviet concerns, making this crisis hard to classify. See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 227–28.

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both by dramatically raising the costs of miscalculation, thereby increasing the incentives not to miscalculate. Nuclear deterrence should work to lower dramatically the possibility of war by either miscalculation or deliberate decision (or if somehow such a war broke out, then nuclear deterrence should work against its escalation into a large and fearsome one.) Apart from the Taiwan issue, it is hard to figure out how a war would start between the United States and China. There are no other territorial disputes of any significance between the two, and there are no foreseeable economic contingencies that could bring on a war between them. Finally, the high economic interdependence and the lack of intense ideological competition between them help to reinforce the pacific effects induced by the condition of mutual assured destruction. The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic confl icts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant– rising state dyads, this is truly exceptional. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.China relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia should China decide eventually to contest America’s maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be economic and political conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the security of each state’s homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a second-strike capability vis-à-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation and their competition changes dramatically from what would be the case if they could. These three benchmarks—China’s ambitions will grow as its power grows; the United States cannot successfully wage economic warfare against a China that pursues a smart reassurance (peaceful rise) strategy; and Sino-American relations are not doomed to follow recent past rising–dominant power dyads—are the starting points from which to analyze America’s interests in East Asia. I now turn to these interests.

America’s Interests in East Asia The United States has six overarching interests in East Asia. They are: (1) preservation of Sino-American mutual assured destruction; (2) stability in the Taiwan Strait and a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue; (3) the denuclearization and ultimate unification of the Korean peninsula; (4) the preservation of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the maintenance of Japan’s nonnuclear status; (5) the peaceful settlement of China’s maritime disputes with its neighbors

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and the preservation of freedom of commercial navigation in the South China Sea; and (6) the preservation of economic openness in East Asia. I consider each in turn.

Sino-American Mutual Assured Destruction For reasons outlined above, it is crucial that neither the United States nor China believe it is vulnerable to a disarming nuclear fi rst strike by the other. With its sophisticated and large nuclear forces, the United States remains secure from such a strike by any state, including China. China’s second-strike capability, however, is not as secure as it needs to be, and according to some analysts, is highly vulnerable to an American fi rst strike.23 China needs to make its nuclear forces sufficiently robust that the United States can have no confidence that it could launch a disarming fi rst strike. It will therefore need to expend resources to make its nuclear forces more secure, and it is in the process of doing so.24 From an American perspective, this conclusion may sound odd. After all, if the United States possesses a disarming fi rst-strike capability against China, is that not to America’s interest? True, this capability gives the United States a military advantage that could potentially be used for political intimidation during a crisis, but appealing as this logic may seem, it is more to America’s interest that decision-makers of all nuclear-armed states not worry about fi rst strike attacks. Such decision-makers must believe that neither side has an advantage in striking fi rst against the adversary’s nuclear forces because that might embolden one or both of them to take greater risks during a crisis and tip the crisis towards war—and even all-out war—rather than towards deescalation. It is not to America’s interest (or China’s) for American decision-makers to believe that they can disarm China’s nuclear forces. Therefore, just as it served America’s best interests for the Soviet Union to have a secure 23. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that the United States “stands on the cusp of nuclear primacy,” by which they mean a disarming fi rst-strike capability, vis-à-vis Russia. Although their analysis focuses on Russia, they argue that by extension their conclusions have even greater validity with respect to China because the Russian nuclear arsenal is so much larger and sophisticated than China’s. See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD: The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30 (spring 2006): 7–44. The quote appears on 8. 24. China currently deploys twenty CSS- 4s, which are silo-based, liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are slow to fi re and highly vulnerable to a fi rst strike. China will deploy in the next few years the DF-31 and DF-31A ballistic missiles, which are solid-fueled and road-mobile, with multiple warheads, as well as the JL-2 sea-launched ballistic missiles from its JIN- class submarines, all of which the Department of Defense says “will give China a more survivable and flexible nuclear force.” See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, 18–19, at www.defenselink.gov. The U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission estimates that China will have an intercontinental nuclear force of 75–100 warheads by 2015. See Report to Congress of the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission, 109th Cong., 1st sess., November 2005, 121, at http://www.uscc.gov.

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second-strike force once it had acquired nuclear weapons, so, too, is it in America’s interest to have China achieve the same. Nuclear weapons may be less important in world politics today than they were during the Cold War, but that does not make them unimportant. There may well be plenty of rough times ahead for China and the United States as they negotiate the difficult waters of China’s continuing rise. During the transition, it is better that leaders in both states, and especially in China, feel as secure as possible about the core safety of their homelands.

Stability in the Taiwan Strait and the Peaceful Resolution of Taiwan’s Status The United States and China are entangled in a tough situation over Taiwan, and neither can afford to back away from their respective positions. For historical, precedent, and nationalistic reasons, China’s leaders cannot give in on the ultimate status of Taiwan: it is part of China. Given the strong nationalist feelings in China regarding Taiwan, and given the regime’s increasing use of nationalism to shore up its political position, no government could survive long if it were seen as soft on Taiwan. Moreover, given the government’s concerns about some of its borderland regions, allowing Taiwan to become independent would set a disastrous precedent. China cannot and will not back away from its core contention that Taiwan is part of China. The U.S. position on what Taiwan’s ultimate status is deliberately not crystal clear, although it has become progressively clearer in recent years. The United States does not favor a two China policy, or a one China and one Taiwan policy, nor does it support Taiwan’s unilateral declaration of independence. This position comes awfully close to a U.S. de facto acceptance of Taiwan as part of China, but the U.S. government has not explicitly said so in order to keep open the option of Taiwanese independence should both the mainland and Taiwan agree to it. This is an outcome, of course, to which the mainland would never agree. The U.S. position on how Taiwan’s status is to be settled, however, is crystal clear: it will not allow China to use force to bring Taiwan to heel. Rather, the United States is committed to the peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s status. Because of this commitment, the United States must have sufficient military power in the region to deter China from using force to resolve Taiwan’s status, or to protect Taiwan should the mainland use force against a Taiwanese government that had not provoked the mainland by moving towards, or actually declaring, independence. (The U.S. stance on protecting a Taiwan that had provoked a mainland attack by moving towards, or declaring independence, is not clear, but it should be: any Taiwan government that acts in such a fashion is on its own.) Why does the United States favor a peaceful settlement of Taiwan’s ultimate status? The answer is clear: the United States cannot back away from this commitment for reasons that have to do largely with the credibility of its other

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commitments in East Asia. If the United States reneged on this commitment and allowed the mainland to reintegrate Taiwan forcibly into China, then America’s commitment to Japan, as well as its reliability in the eyes of its other allies in East Asia, would suffer grievous harm. Why would Japan, for example, continue to put stock in the U.S.-Japan alliance, and America’s commitments to defend it, should the United States fail to defend Taiwan from an unprovoked attack by the mainland? For better or worse, how Taiwan’s status is settled bears centrally on America’s overall political-military position in East Asia. It would be tragic, however, for a war to occur over a piece of territory that in my view both the United States and China view as part of China, although for political reasons that have as much to do with American domestic politics as anything else, the U.S. government cannot say so. Therefore, short of backing away from their respective positions, what is needed is for both sides to buy time—time for the continued economic integration of Taiwan into the mainland’s economy and time for the continued political evolution of China. There are many ways for Taiwan’s status to be ultimately resolved. Two look especially likely: a nondemocratic China has reduced Taiwan to a political vassal through the economic leverage that it exerts over the Taiwanese economy, or Taiwan “rejoins” a democratic China. The former outcome is probably more likely to happen sooner than the latter, and those who favor Taiwan’s autonomy if not independence clearly worry about it.25 Whatever is the ultimate outcome for Taiwan, what the United States has to care about, given the centrality of Taiwan to the credibility of its other East Asian commitments, is that Taiwan’s fi nal status be resolved peacefully. This can be achieved only if American deterrence remains strong in the Strait to dissuade China from using force against Taiwan and only if the United States restrains Taiwan from taking steps that China would interpret as moving towards, or declaring, full independence.

Denuclearization and Unification of the Korean Peninsula The third interest of the United States in East Asia is to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, and the primary reason for doing so is clear. The threat from North Korea is not so much its use of nuclear weapons against its neighbors (South Korea and Japan), although that can never be ruled out should it be attacked by the United States. Rather the more serious threat is its sale of fissile materials to terrorist groups that want to acquire them for purposes of either blackmail or destruction. 25. For example, President Chen Shuibian, who favored Taiwan’s independence, said in a speech on January 1, 2006: “Globalization is not tantamount to China-ization. While Taiwan would never close itself off to the world, we shall also not lock in our economic lifeline and all our bargaining chips in China.” Quoted in Keith Bradsher, “Taiwan Chief Seeks More Arms, Not Better Ties to China,” New York Times, January 2, 2006, A3.

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The North Korean regime has talked out of both sides of its mouth on the sale of fissile materials. In talks in Beijing with the United States in May 2003, Li Gun, a North Korean Foreign Ministry official, said to James Kelly, then assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, that Pyongyang will “export nuclear weapons, add to its current arsenal, or test a nuclear device.”26 In a 2004 interview with Selig Harrison, a senior analyst at the Center for International Policy, who has made many trips to North Korea, Kim Yong-nam, president of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea and reputedly the number two man in the Kim Jong-il regime, denied that North Korea would ever sell fissile material to terrorist groups, telling Harrison: “We make a clear distinction between missiles and nuclear material. We’re entitled to sell missiles to earn foreign exchange. But in regard to nuclear material our policy past, present and future is that we would never allow such transfers to al- Qaeda or anyone else. Never.”27 But in late September 2006, on another trip to North Korea, Harrison spoke with Kim Kye Gwan, North Korea’s lead nuclear negotiator, who said, according to Harrison: “The United States should be concerned about the possibility of fi ssile material being transferred to third parties or nuclear weapons being transferred to third parties.”28 How much these threats have been part of North Korea’s coercive diplomacy is not clear, but whatever the regime’s actual policy is, there is strong circumstantial, although not defi nitive evidence, according to both the Bush administration and experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that North Korea sold 1.87 tons of uranium hexafluoride to Libya.29 Given the Kim Jong-il government’s past history of drug running, counterfeiting, and sale of missiles, together with the suspicions that it sold fissile material to Libya, it would be foolhardy to trust this regime never to sell fissile material to terrorists. A much safer, though difficult course is to work to denuclearize the regime and the peninsula. The nuclear issue aside, over the longer term, the unification of the Korean peninsula under South Korea’s leadership is in America’s interest because it means that the United States could withdraw its troops from the Asian mainland. The purpose of their presence there is to deter a North Korean attack, not to wage war against China. So, if North Korea ceases to exist and Korea is unified, these troops could be withdrawn. Unless a strong argument can be 26. This was reported in several news sources, but the quote comes from Bill Gertz, Washington Times, May 7, 2003, A1. 27. See “Inside North Korea: Leaders Open to Ending Nuclear Crisis,” Financial Times, May 4, 2004, 9. Pam Nam-soon, the foreign minister, also told Harrison: “Let me make clear that we denounce al- Qaeda, we oppose all forms of terrorism and we will never transfer our nuclear material to others.” 28. Jon Fox, “North Korea Hints at Nuclear Weapons Transfer,” Global Security Newswire, September 29, 2006, at www.nit.org/. 29. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Using Clues from Libya to Study a Nuclear Mystery,” New York Times, March 31, 2005, 31.

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made that American troops need to remain in a unified Korea in order to make American troops in Japan more politically palatable to the Japanese, it is hard to fi nd compelling reasons for keeping American troops on the Asian mainland, unless, of course, Korea and China were to have intensely hostile relations.30 The more likely course is for a united Korea to have friendly relations with China and to fall into China’s economic and political sphere of influence, or in international relations theory lingo, a united Korea will choose to bandwagon with China, not balance against it. (Indeed, some argue that this process has already begun in South Korea.)31 In that case, there would be few tangible benefits, and too many potential risks, for the United States to retain a military presence on the Korean peninsula.

Preservation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Japan’s Nonnuclear Status Fourth, it is crucial to America’s position in East Asia, its general world position, and its global nonproliferation policy that the U.S.-Japan alliance remain solid and that Japan remain a nonnuclear state. The alliance and Japan’s nonnuclear status are tightly linked: Japan eschews nuclear weapons, primarily or in part (depending on the analyst consulted), because of the nuclear umbrella that the United States extends over it. 32 Were Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, this would be a clear political statement that it puts little or no credence in the U.S.-Japan alliance. After all, why would Japan obtain nuclear weapons if it believed fully in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee? Without the U.S. umbrella, Japan would either have to acquire its own nuclear weapons, or else forgo them and thereby be at a political-military disadvantage vis-à-vis nuclear-armed North Korea and China—both of which Japan named for the fi rst time in 2004 as potential threats to Japanese security—and perhaps even be subject to political intimidation by these two.33 30. The Japanese government’s preference is not to be “singularized”—not to be the only site of forward- deployed U.S. forces in East Asia because this would be, in its view, politically untenable. Nonetheless, Richard Samuels argues that if the option were no alliance with the United States or being singularized, the Japa nese government would accept singularization over abandonment by the United States. Communication with Richard Samuels on August 31, 2006. 31. See Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia,” Security Studies 15 (July–September 2006): 374–79. 32. Analysts differ on why Japan continues with its nonnuclear status. Some believe it is due to the alliance with the United States. Others believe that Japan’s “nuclear allergy” is strong enough to keep Japan nonnuclear should the alliance collapse. I adhere to the fi rst view. So, also, does Richard Samuels in his excellent new book on Japa nese security. See Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), chap. 6. 33. China and North Korea were fi rst named as potential threats in Japan’s December 2004 New Defense Program Guidelines. See Samuels, Securing Japan, chap. 3. Also see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re- emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power, Adelphi Paper 368–69 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 67–71. Japan’s 2007 Defense White Paper continued to

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A solid U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of America’s politicalmilitary position in East Asia and one of the two cornerstones of America’s global forward defense posture—the other being the NATO alliance in Europe. The political demise of the U.S.-Japan alliance would dramatically alter—for the worse—America’s forward defense posture in East Asia by making its power projection in the region more difficult and by signaling to other states there that America’s fi rmest ally in the region no longer put much credence in the alliance, with all the consequent adverse effects on America’s relations with its other allies there. In addition, the demise of the alliance could potentially affect NATO. That is, if an ally as close to the United States as Japan were perceived as no longer believing in the U.S. guarantee, then the Eu ropeans could well begin to consider the credibility of America’s guarantees to them also. Contagion considerations should be taken seriously here. Moreover, a Japan that goes nuclear would certainly not strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and could even mortally wound both. Finally, a Japan set free from the constraints of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and one that armed itself with nuclear weapons, would likely increase the political hostility between China and Japan which is already far too high, and probably between South Korea and Japan also, and set in motion undesirable security dilemma dynamics. For all these reasons, it is important to keep the U.S.-Japan alliance strong and preserve Japan’s nonnuclear status. A Japan bereft of the United States is ultimately a Japan with nuclear weapons. Fortunately, the Japanese have concluded that alliance with the United States remains their best security option under present circumstances.34

Peaceful Settlement of China’s Maritime Disputes and Preservation of Free Navigation in the South China Sea China has settled nearly all of its frontier disputes with its continental neighbors, but it still has several offshore territorial and maritime disputes. A fifth United States interest in East Asia is to see China settle these offshore disputes peacefully and to preserve freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. China settled fourteen of its sixteen frontier disputes peacefully, largely through offering substantial compromises to its neighbors in return for their express concern about China’s military buildup. See David Pilling, “Japan Feels Threat of China’s Military,” Financial Times, July 7/8, 2007, 4. 34. Samuels, Securing Japan, chaps. 7 and 8; Hughes, Japan’s Re- emergence, conclusion; and Thom Shanker and Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan Assures Rice That It Has No Nuclear Intentions,” New York Times, October 19, 2006, A13.

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cooperation in helping it strengthen its control over these frontier areas.35 Apart from Taiwan, China currently has three offshore disputes: with Vietnam, over ownership of the Paracel Islands; with Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei, over ownership of the Spratly Islands; and with Japan, over ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. These offshore disputes may be more difficult to solve than the continental ones because all three involve not simply ownership of islands, but also control over sea lanes and natural resources, especially large potential reserves of oil and natural gas.36 In addition to the tangible stakes involved, nationalism and regime security could make it nearly as hard for the regime to back down on these three offshore disputes as it would be for it to back down over Taiwan. In contrast to the compromises it made to settle most of its continental frontier disputes, China has never offered to compromise on these three, although it did agree in 2002 on a declaration for a code of conduct with ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) over the South China Sea, which forswears the use of force there (although the declaration is not legally binding), and it has discussed escalation control measures with states claiming ownership of the Spratlys.37 It has not, however, ceded sovereignty over either the Spratlys or the South China Sea and continues to claim sovereignty over both. Of these three disputes, the one with Japan is probably the most worrisome at present not only because of the power rivalry between Japan and China, but also because the United States has a treaty with Japan to defend it if attacked. The United States has no interest in seeing any of its East and Southeast Asian regional allies, trading partners, and friends become embroiled in military hostilities with China about the extent of its territorial seas and exclusive economic zones, possession of islands, or ownership of seabed resources. It especially has to avoid a situation whereby China and Japan become engaged in the large-scale use of force to resolve their disputes over ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands or over control of the East China Sea and its gas fields. America’s interest, then, lies in seeing all three offshore disputes solved through negotiation and compromise, not war. 35. The two remaining frontier disputes are with India and Bhutan. See Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” International Security 30 (fall 2005): 55–58. 36. For example, a 1999 Japanese survey estimated that as much as 200 billion cubic meters of natural gas might lie beneath the Senkaku archipelago. The Spratlys could lie above an estimated 100 billion barrels of oil and 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas. See Agence France Press, “Japan to Explore Oil and Gas in Political Minefield with China,” April 13, 2005; and Bruce Vaugh and William M. Morrison, “China–Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues and Implications for the United States,” Congressional Research Ser vice, updated April 4, 2006. 37. Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation,” 62; and Ralf Emmers, “Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo” (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, September 2005), 9–14, at www.ntu.edu.sg/ IDSS/ publications/ Working Papers/ WP87.pdf.

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Finally, the United States has a strong interest in preserving freedom of navigation for commercial vessels through the South China Sea. The United States is a trading nation and has a vested interest in freedom of the seas, and since World War II it has been the provider of that collective good to the world. For both commercial and strategic reasons, it cannot tolerate China eventually moving to prevent freedom of commercial navigation though the South China Sea because it contains crucial sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) through which Middle East oil and other vital resources flow not only to China, but to Japan, Korea, and other states in the region. Preservation of America’s maritime supremacy in East Asia (see below) is essential to keep the South China Sea SLOCs open. Thus, for all these reasons, the United States must stand for the peaceful resolution of these maritime disputes through whatever mechanisms prove most useful.

Maintenance of Economic Openness America’s sixth interest in East Asia is to preserve economic openness in the region, for two reasons. The fi rst has to do with its own prosperity; the second, with the prosperity and political relations of the states in the region. Asia has become of central economic importance to the United States. The Asia-Pacific region now constitutes the second most important region economically to the United States, still behind North America but now ahead of Europe, measured in terms of exports and imports of both merchandise goods and ser vices. 38 In 2006, the United States sent 18 percent of its exports to, and received 28 percent of its imports from, the Asia-Pacific region. The comparable figures for North America are 25 percent and 23 percent, and for Europe, 17 percent and 17 percent. 39 America’s trade with East Asia benefits the United States in innumerable ways, though there remains much controversy over its trading deficit with the region, especially with China and Japan, and with the loss of manufacturing jobs to China. Whatever the resolution of these controversies, on balance America’s trade with Asia is a plus for the American economy, and maintaining as free and open a trading regime with East Asia as possible continues to be in America’s economic interest. An open economic order is also of benefit to the states in the region. Regionalization of trade within East and Southeast Asia has grown significantly 38. Asia- Pacific means Australia, China, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and others. 39. Figures for the Asia- Pacific come from U.S. Census Bureau, “FT900: U.S. International Trade in Goods and Ser vices,” December 2006; release date February 13, 2007, at http://www .census.gov/foreign-trade/ PressRelease/ 2006pr/12/ and are not revised. Figures for North America and Eu rope are from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. International Trade in Goods and Ser vices: Annual Revision for 2006,” June 8, 2007, 5 and 22, at http:// bea.gov/ newsreleases/international/trade/tradannewsrelease.htm and are revised.

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over the last ten years, in part because of the stabilizing military presence of the United States. Peace is good for trade, and trade benefits the development of middle classes within countries, which is a net benefit ultimately for democracy. Increasing economic interdependence within the region is also good for pacific relations, even if it cannot on its own produce them. Thus, on both counts—its contribution to American prosperity and to the peace and prosperity of the region—economic openness between the United States and East and Southeast Asia and within the region is a strong and continuing interest for the United States.

America’s Interests and China’s Rise This survey of America’s interests and goals in the region makes clear one point of crucial significance for Sino-American relations: China and the United States share broad agreement on these goals, even if they do not wholly agree on the means to attain them or on the priority that each state gives to them. China wants to have a secure second-strike capability. It prefers stability in the Taiwan Strait, a peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s status, and no unilateral moves towards independence. China favors denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the ultimate reunification of Korea, if it does not bring U.S. troops up to its borders, and would prefer to see U.S. troops off the peninsula. It certainly favors preventing Japan from going nuclear, even if it no longer sees the U.S.-Japan alliance as being so fi rm a restraint on Japan as it once was.40 China appears to favor the peaceful settlement of its maritime disputes with its neighbors; it clearly benefits from economic openness with the United States and within states in the region; and it does not want to see economic closure with either. At this general level, then, America’s goals for the region are also China’s goals for the region. To stress that China and the United States share many common goals for East Asia is not to make light of their many differences. What makes this rivalry different from the three earlier ones discussed above, however, is that there is a basic agreement between China and the United States on many fundamental goals. Disputes over means to achieve goals are easier to manage than disputes over goals. There is clearly more room for bargaining, horse trading, and successful negotiation in the former case than in the latter. China and the United States may well end up contesting the primacy of the other in the region, but ironically they both share an important set of common goals, even if they may not be able to agree in the future on who is, or should be, number one.

40. Today, some Chinese analysts, although not the majority, see the U.S.-Japan alliance as emboldening Japan to act more aggressively in East Asia. Representative of this view is Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” Washington Quarterly 29 (winter 2005–6): 119–31.

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Principles of Policy There are no big surprises on the general principles of policy that the United States should follow over the long haul with respect to China’s increasing power; they flow from the basic assumptions and the nature of America’s interests in East Asia laid out above. 1. Do not undermine Sino-American mutual assured destruction. There are two policy prescriptions for the United States that flow from this principle. First, the United States should not make a political issue out of China’s efforts to develop a larger and more secure strategic nuclear force; it is in America’s interest, as well as China’s, that China do so. For general stability in SinoAmerican relations, particularly for crisis stability, it is crucial that China not feel that its nuclear deterrent is vulnerable to a first strike. Given the size and sophistication of America’s nuclear forces, this will require that China not only deploy the mobile land-based missiles that it is developing but also build a sophisticated sea-based nuclear deterrent.41 Second, the United States should not take counter-actions that undermine China’s modernization of its strategic nuclear forces. This, in turn, means that if the United States persists in building a missile defense system, then that system should remain limited enough and small enough not to challenge a Chinese strike-back capability. Although China has had a slow-paced strategic nuclear modernization program, many of its actions have been in response to America’s own modernization program. It is wasteful of resources, and potentially dangerous to boot, for the United States to stimulate an offensedefense arms race with China by building a missile defense force large enough to neuter China’s strategic nuclear force. (This assumes, of course, that such a defense system actually works.) 2. Maintain clear red lines and general clarity on the Taiwan issue. The United States must continue to draw two clear red lines on the Taiwan issue: for China, that the United States will not permit it to resolve the issue forcefully; for Taiwan, that the United States will not allow Taiwan to move towards de jure independence. Maintaining these red lines requires, in turn, that the United States do three things: maintain a strong naval and air presence in East Asia, not permit U.S. domestic forces to push for a more independent Taiwan, and keep a fi rm hand on any Taiwanese moves towards independence. In regard to the last, as 41. China’s sea-based force is currently more wish than reality. Its sole ballistic missile carrying submarine—the XIA class—has never been on patrol and is not fully operational. Even if it goes to sea with strategic nuclear missiles, China’s submarine fleet is likely to be highly vulnerable for a time to America’s formidable submarine detection capabilities. See Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington: The Federation of American Scientists and the National Resources Defense Council, November 2006), 79–85, for full details on China’s sea-based deterrent, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ book2006.pdf.

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I stated earlier, the United States must make this unequivocally clear to any Taiwanese government that takes provocative steps towards independence: “Do so and you are on your own.”42 The United States does not owe Taiwan political independence from China; it owes Taiwan the opportunity to have its status resolved peacefully with China. 3. Avoid policies that produce adverse self-fulfilling results. The principle policy prescription here is to avoid taking actions against China that appear simultaneously punitive and unprovoked. Punitive actions may be necessary at times, but if they are unprovoked by Chinese actions, or more importantly, if they appear to be so in the minds of America’s allies and friends in East Asia and elsewhere, they will backfi re politically within China and will not receive the required support from other states. Actions that look like premature containment, political and military encirclement, economic warfare, and the like should be avoided, unless they can be credibly justified as responses to Chinese aggression or heavy-handedness with neighbors. Unprovoked punitive actions will only strengthen the hardliners in Beijing and fail to garner support from America’s allies and other states in the region and elsewhere whose cooperation is required if such actions are to be effective. 4. Maintain the cohesion of America’s East Asian Alliances and Security Arrangements. The United States has a number of formal alliances and strategically important security arrangements with Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, and Japan. At present, it is to America’s interest to maintain these alliances and security arrangements if it wants to remain an East Asian military power.43 Over the medium to longer term, however, should the two Koreas become unified, a united Korea may well choose to bandwagon with its giant neighbor rather than balance against it, and the U.S.-South Korean alliance may well pass into history. Should that happen, Sino-American relations may be better off: potential security dilemma dynamics between the United States and China could be significantly muted were there no longer an American military presence on the Korean peninsula. After all, a unified Korea with American troops on the peninsula puts U.S. troops potentially up against the Chinese border, even if they would not actually be deployed there. Thus, the end of the U.S.-South Korean alliance may well be the price of Korean unification, but the price is well worth it if Korea is denuclearized, or if North Korea’s nuclear weapons pass into the hands of a democratic Korea. 42. President Bush came close to saying this on December 2, 2003: “We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose,” at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2003/ 12/ 20031209-2 .html. 43. For a succinct overview of the steps the United States has recently taken to enhance its security ties in East Asia, see Evan S. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia- Pacific Stability,” Washington Quarterly 29 (winter 2005–6): 148–53.

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Should the U.S.-South Korean alliance pass into history, it will not be fatal to America’s position as an East Asian military power. That position does not depend upon a foothold on the Northeast Asian mainland but instead, fi rst, on America’s offshore naval and air power, and second, on a sufficient number of significant allies who favor a U.S. military presence in the region and who are prepared to provide onshore facilities in the form of either permanent bases or visiting rights. Even though the bulk of America’s military power in East Asia will remain afloat, selected airbases and porting rights are crucial to sustaining and augmenting the forces afloat. If the alliance with South Korea is expendable, the one with Japan is not. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the key to, and the bedrock of, America’s maritime presence in East Asia. It is Japan’s strategic location, economic might, and military power that make it America’s most important ally in East Asia. Therefore, the nurturing and preservation of this alliance remains a central task for every American administration. The problem in preserving the alliance with Japan does not lie with Japan, which, as a consequence of China’s growing power, has chosen to tighten its ties with the United States. Rather, the problem lies with China: it has come increasingly to view this alliance negatively, no longer seeing it as a restraint on Japan but, instead, as an enabler for Japan to take a more nationalist and assertive stance in East Asia. To preserve the U.S.-Japan alliance while maintaining good relations with China, the United States must square the circle: use the alliance with Japan in ways that serve both U.S. and Japanese interests, but in doing so, minimize the friction that the alliance causes with China. Clearly, this is not easy to accomplish. At the strategic level, the task for U.S. administrations in East Asia is equivalent to the task that President George Bush faced in Europe in 1990. Bush had to convince Gorbachev that since German unification was inevitable, the Soviet Union was better off with a united Germany in NATO than with a united and militarily powerful Germany outside of NATO. Similarly, U.S. administrations will have to remind China continually of the following: the Japanese are in the process of becoming a more “normal” nation; the Japanese foreign policy elite is becoming more concerned about China’s growing power; Japan will inevitably continue to increase its military power, even if it receives no encouragement from the United States to do so; a Japan bereft of alliance with the United States is not likely to bandwagon with China, as a united Korea probably will, but rather to balance against China by boosting its military power even more, including acquiring nuclear weapons; and therefore, the real choice for China is not between a militarily strong and a militarily weak Japan, but between a powerful Japan tethered to the United States and an even more powerful Japan independent of it. A more powerful Japan allied with the United States is clearly not China’s fi rst choice (a weak Japan), but rather a second-best solution, and yet one that

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is clearly better than the worst outcome (a powerful and unaligned Japan). China’s leaders need to be constantly reminded that the second-best solution avoids the worst outcome and thus that for all concerned, including China, it is better for Japan to remain tethered to the United States than independent of it. 5. Preserve U.S. Maritime Supremacy in East Asia. America’s diplomatic clout in East Asia, its ability to defend Taiwan, and the credibility of its alliances and other security arrangements depend in part upon maintenance of its maritime (naval and air) supremacy in East Asia. China is the dominant land power in East Asia; the United States is, and should remain, the dominant naval power there because maritime supremacy is essential if the United States is to remain a significant political-military player in the region. After all, states there will not want to remain allied with the United States, make bases available, allow its ships to dock, provide logistical and other types of assistance, and generally support the United States if it cannot back up its political actions with credible military power. Hard power is not the be all and end all for America’s East Asian diplomacy and its ability to shape events in the region, but it is an essential ingredient for both. Maritime supremacy means that the United States can defeat China in a conflict on the high seas, maintain freedom of the sea lanes in the area, and protect the insular nations in the region from Chinese political-military coercion, attack, and conquest—except for Taiwan, where the United States can prevent coercion and conquest but not thwart a devastating mainland air and short-range ballistic missile attack. Preservation of its maritime supremacy in East Asia requires, in turn, that the United States maintain a healthy military edge in sea and air power over China’s sea and air power, including its long-range, land-based air power. In the short term, this task is relatively easy because the United States currently has a commanding lead in naval and air assets and because “China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance is limited.”44 However, if China chooses to channel significant resources into longer-range power projection capabilities, the task will become increasingly difficult, because, as the Pentagon states: “China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies.”45 Currently, China’s maritime power is best described as “sea denial” or “area denial” in the waters up to and around Taiwan. China does not yet possess a 44. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, executive summary, at www.defenselink.mil. The report also stated that China will take until the end of this decade or later for its military modernization program to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate- size adversary. Ibid., 24. 45. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, 22, at www.defenselink.mil.

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blue-water navy capable of sea control on the high seas. Its current military buildup and power projection capability, such as it is, is designed primarily to coerce Taiwan from declaring independence and to prevent the United States from intervening successfully to save Taiwan from coercion or conquest. Consequently, China’s current forces are being designed for area and sea denial out to the waters surrounding Taiwan. From the standpoint of U.S. maritime supremacy, however, what is worrisome is that China appears to be beginning to develop sea control capabilities that can put surface ships at risk out to the “second island chain,” a distance that extends well beyond the Philippines, so as to be able “to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might deploy to the western Pacific.”46 True sea control would require that China build capabilities that include aircraft carriers comparable to those of the United States, deep water antisubmarine warfare assets, and a large number of nuclear attack submarines—things China has not yet procured and that would easily take more than a decade to field.47 The aspiration for a blue-water navy, however, appears to be present: President Hu Jintao, in a speech to a congress of the navy’s Communist Party branch, in December 2006, said: “We should strive to build a powerful navy that adapts to the needs of our military’s historical mission in this new century.”48 To counter China’s maritime buildup, the United States plans, among other things, to make six aircraft carriers and 60 percent of its submarine force available for Pacific duty.49 Should China begin to move beyond area denial to sea control, the United States will have to take additional measures to preserve its maritime supremacy. Finally, preservation of U.S. maritime supremacy does not require a weak Chinese navy, although it would be easier with one. U.S. maritime supremacy is possible even if China has a powerful blue-water navy, and such a navy is likely 46. 2006 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 15, 24–25; and 2007 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 16, 23. 47. Wen Wei Po, a Chinese government–backed newspaper in March 2007 claimed that the Chinese navy would have its fi rst aircraft carrier by 2010. See Richard Spencer, “U.S. Unnerved by Chinese Naval Build- Up,” The Telegraph, at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml = / news/ 2007/03/08/wchina08.xml. 48. Quoted in Peter Ford, “Fighter Jet Signals China’s Military Advances,” Christian Science Monitor, January 11, 2007, 7. A recent report by the Chinese Academy of Sciences made the case that China now had long-range maritime interests and was in the process of changing from a land power into a sea power. See “Why China Wants a Bigger Navy,” The Economist, January 4, 2007, at http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id = 8497626. The December 2006 China White Paper on defense stated that while “China’s overall security environment remains sound,” the Navy “aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations. . . .” See Information Office of the State Council, China, China’s National Defense in 2006, 3 and 5. For a good assessment of the current state of the Chinese navy, see Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, “China’s Maturing Navy,” Naval War College Review 69 (spring 2006): 90–108. 49. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 47.

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to materialize because China will make certain, as its power grows, that it can protect its coasts from attack and its overseas commerce from interference. As its global interests continue to grow, moreover, China will not be satisfied with total reliance on the U.S. Navy to protect its sea lines of commerce. Over time, therefore, the United States will have to adapt to a more powerful Chinese navy, but given its long lead, its long naval tradition, its unparalleled systems integration capabilities, and its wealth, the United States should be able to do what maritime supremacy requires: maintain the capabilities necessary to defeat on the high seas any Chinese navy that is built, thereby ensuring that its power projection capabilities are superior to those of China’s. Thus, just as the United States will have to accept a more powerful Chinese navy, China will have to accept America’s maritime supremacy, just as the Soviet Union did. 6. Institutionalize Security Multilateralism in East Asia. The final U.S. policy guideline over the long haul is to work towards the creation of a multilateral security institution for the region. International institutions are instruments of state power, not a substitute for state power, and they do not dominate states; rather states dominate them. Nonetheless, institutions can be of use for negotiations and bargaining and can provide transparency in relations, which can often, although not always, facilitate the reaching and implementation of agreements. The United States should seek to devise those institutional security arrangements in East Asia that can foster communication, transparency, and the reaching of agreements, as long as it takes care that these arrangements supplement, not supplant, its key bilateral relationships in the area. East Asia is not multilaterally institutionalized as Europe is, and the possibility of establishing either a NATO-like institution or a European Security and Defence Policy–like arrangement in East Asia is problematical for the foreseeable future. These are organizations designed to protect states against attack. For such a multilateral institution to develop in East Asia, there would have to be a radical transformation in political relations among the states in the region, as well as a dramatic change in the nature of two of them (China and North Korea). Instead, what the United States should aim for is the creation of a security dialogue organization that encompasses the main actors in the region. Such an institution could be broad-based and include Australia, Japan, Korea, China, Russia, the United States, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Alternatively, it could focus on Northeast Asia and be organized around the Six Party talks (the United States, Russia, China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea); be more narrowly based and include only the great powers—the United States, China, Russia, and Japan; or be restricted only to the United States, Japan, and China.50 50. For similar proposals, see Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia- Pacific Stability,” 161–64; and Michael Schiffer, “Time for a Northeast Asian Security Initiative,” PacNet, no. 59, Pacific Forum CSIS December 8, 2006, at www.pacforum.org.

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However broad- or narrow-based the organization is, the key consideration is that China must be in it. This will serve two of the five main purposes of such an organization: to soften the exclusionary and anti- China aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance and to recognize institutionally the prominent role that China now plays in the region. The third, fourth, and fi fth purposes of such an organization are, respectively, to provide a multilateral forum for discussion of common security problems, to moderate security dilemma dynamics among the great powers, and most ambitiously, to foster cooperative approaches to security problems. These purposes are arranged in ascending order of difficulty and the last may not be realized for a very long time, if ever, but if several of the fi rst four materialize, the organization will more than have justified itself.

Conclusion China’s interests and ambitions will continue to grow as its power continues to grow. This does not mean, however, that China’s intentions are predetermined and that their exact content is fi xed. After all, power is not destiny. What a state does in international relations is determined by both purpose—the values it holds and the political choices it makes—and power—the capabilities it wields. The range of purposes to which great power can be put is large. If history is a reliable guide, China’s appetites will grow as its power grows, but the specific nature and content of those appetites will be determined, not simply by China’s greater capabilities, but also by the policy choices made by the social groups that run China and by the choices that other states take in regard to China. Therefore, great power status does not doom a state to be aggressively expansionist and warlike, especially in the modern era when the generation of wealth has been severed from territorial conquest and when nuclear weapons make great power war problematical. At the minimum, what states have done, once they have achieved great power status, is to seek to shape their external environments in ways congenial to their interests. China will follow that path, as other great powers before it have done, and it is here that United States policy can affect the content of China’s growing ambitions—by accommodating Chinese interests where they do not threaten America’s vital interests and by drawing clear red lines when they do. A policy of accommodation will help make way for a rising China and go part of the way to making China’s international environment congenial to its interests. 51 A policy of strength will communicate deterrence and prevent China from violating vital U.S. interests. A combined strategy of accommodation and strength is best suited to keep China on the path where 51. For a similar argument, see Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia,” International Security 31 (summer 2006): 81–126.

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American and Chinese interests can largely, although never completely, overlap. The role for both U.S. and Chinese policy is clear. In future decades, these two states are likely to experience considerable tensions due simply to their changing status in East Asia and globally. China is the one power best placed to challenge the United States’ global position, certainly economically and perhaps one day militarily, too. China knows that; so does the United States. The United States will have to adjust to China’s growing power and influence in East Asia and worldwide, but so, too, will China have to adjust to the fact that there will remain two economically and militarily powerful states in East Asia—it and America—with neither possessing hegemony both on land and at sea. Thus, the challenges for American and Chinese leaders are, fi rst, to see that their common interests—and remember that they have many common interests—remain strong enough to outweigh the inevitable confl icts that will arise between them, and then, second, to lay the basis for a cooperative strategic relationship. These two challenges are daunting but not impossible.

Part V

CONCLUSION

chapter

12

The Rise of China Theoretical and Policy Perspectives Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng

One of the dominant research traditions in the fields of both diplomatic history and international relations is the study of the impact of rising powers on great power politics and the contribution of power transitions to the outbreak of great power war. This scholarly tradition, extending as far back as Thucydides’ examination of the causes of the Peloponnesian War, rests on the widely shared argument that a redistribution of capabilities among the great powers is a source of strategic instability which frequently, if not always, leads to war. Greater relative capabilities lead to new ambitions and to confl icts over the redistribution of the goods in the international political system. Nevertheless, the precise outcome of power transitions is indeterminate; they do not always lead to war. This volume offers a collaborative effort to understand the factors that influence the course of power transitions and how the interplay of these various factors shapes the environment of the U.S.- China power transition. The volume focuses on the impact on the power transition of the international system, including the roles of regional and global structures and of international institutions, developments in the policymaking environment in the rising power, and the policies of status quo powers toward the rising power. It is thus a conscious effort to relate international relations theory to a pressing problem in contemporary international politics and to wed power transition theory with the policy problems of peaceful management of the rise of China.

Anarchy and Power Transitions At its most basic level, the confl ict associated with power transitions reflects the anarchic international system and the corresponding pressures on 293

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states to enhance their security. A great power or an emerging great power that experiences beneficial uneven rates of change in such sources of strategic capabilities as population, economic size, and technology development will possess the potential to improve its strategic capabilities vis-à-vis other great powers. In these circumstances, the rising power will seek to enhance its military capabilities and its influence in international politics in order to minimize its dependency on the great powers for security and reduce its vulnerability to coercion and war.1 Robert Art argues in his chapter that uneven rates of change and the associated power transition are consistently associated with great power war. This is because the rising power’s effort to enhance its security necessarily diminishes the security of the status quo state. Insofar as the existing political order was established without the rising power’s participation, before it had become a great power, satisfying the security demands of the rising power requires adjustment of the political order. Such adjustment may require, for example, redrawing of boundaries and adjustment of spheres of influence in the central theater of the balance of power, where the security of the great powers is most involved. Or it may require acceptance by the established great powers of strategic parity with the rising power in critical weapon systems. But such demands for greater security on the part of the rising power necessarily encounter resistance from established great powers, because adjustments necessary to satisfy the rising power’s demand for security commensurate with its improved capabilities necessarily diminish the security of status quo states. From this perspective, power in international politics is relative and relative change in power relations is a zero-sum process. Secondary state alignments among the great powers are zero-sum—one state’s gain of an ally is another state’s loss of an ally. Relative change in military capabilities and the emergence of parity reduces the security of the heretofore superior state. Rarely, if ever, can military capabilities and political relationships which enhance one state’s security not also be used for offensive purposes and thus erode another state’s security. From this structural realist approach, this is the essence of the

1. The classic approach to anarchy and the drive for security is Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979). On rising powers, unequal rates of change, and security confl icts, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Also see, for example, George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987}; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), chap. 1; Charles F. Doran, “Power Cycle Theory of Structure and Stability: Commonalities and Complementarities,” in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 4; Joshua S. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

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security dilemma in anarchic systems; capabilities, rather than intentions, drive threat perception. 2 The great wars in history are frequently associated with the instability of power transition among the leading states in a system. The great powers, unable to peacefully renegotiate the political order and accept a redistribution of the sources of security, may ultimately go to war to resolve the security conflicts associated with the power transition. The Thirty Years’ War is frequently explained as the result of great power instability reflecting the rise of France and Sweden and the impact on Spain. The wars of Louis XIV are associated with the rise of France in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and its challenge to the European balance of power. The Napoleonic Wars are associated with the late eighteenth- century and early nineteenthcentury rise of France and another French challenge to the European order. World War I and World War II are frequently explained as the outcome fi rst of German unification in 1870 and then of the uneven rates of change in the European economies and in the strategic balance associated with the relative advances of German industry beginning toward the end of the nineteenth century. World War II in East Asia is similarly associated with the rise of Japanese power following its industrialization and the opportunities for Japanese revisionism as the Western powers turned their attention to the rise of Germany in Europe early in the twentieth century.3 Such great wars have reflected the inability of states to negotiate peacefully the redistribution of power in the international order. But to argue that war has been caused by power transitions is not the same as arguing that power transitions cause war. War may be an enduring reflection of anarchy, but par ticular wars reflect par ticular circumstances, so that a variety of factors can affect the likelihood of war.4 Whether or not a power transition will end in war may depend on particular circumstances exogenous to the power transition.

International and Domestic Factors Affecting Power Transitions Scholars have examined the diplomacy of the great powers to discover the variables that determine the course of power transitions and the corresponding foreign policies most conducive to peaceful management of political change. Three types of political variables have attracted considerable scholarship: 2. On the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978): 167–215. For a discussion of the security dilemma in the context of power transitions, see Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 94. 3. See the selection of cases in Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, chap. 2; Midlarski, “Power Cycle Theory,” 84–86. 4. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Confl ict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 7–8.

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variation in the strategic context of great power competition, the salience of international institutions in framing great power relations, and the domestic political structures of the contending great powers.

Great Power Structures and Power Transitions Conflict over power transitions reflects the structural pressures of anarchy. But anarchy does not determine whether or not a particular war will occur. Other aspects of international structure can affect the outcome of power transitions. In par ticular, polarity, geography, military posture, and weapons technology all affect the likelihood of war. Structural neorealists stress the impact of polarity on the stability of great power maintenance of a balance of power. 5 Recent research on contemporary great power relations has tended to focus on balance of power politics within the contemporary post–Cold War American unipolar system.6 From this perspective, the structural context of the rise of China is unipolarity, insofar as the United States is the only global power and it dominates the security environment of all other countries. Scholars have observed that the effect of unipolarity is the absence of escalated great power tensions associated with “hard balancing,” including the absence of formal alliances and arms races.7 Unipolarity and U.S. dominance have a distinct impact on the rise of China by constraining China’s ability to challenge and its interest in challenging the status quo.8 American power and its implications for Chinese security preoccupy Chinese policy makers.9 As both Zhu Feng and Avery Goldstein argue in their respective chapters, as much as China might want to balance U.S. power and enhance its security, it simply lacks the combination of domestic and international resources to resist U.S. unipolarity. China’s domestic resources are inadequate to balance U.S. power. Should it attempt to challenge U.S. naval 5. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chap. 8; John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). 6. Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005); G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of The Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Ethan B. Kapstin and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 7. On unipolarity and great power politics, see, for example, T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Kapstein and Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics; Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30 (summer 2005); Stephen G. Brooks and William C Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” ibid.; Keir A. Leiber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,” ibid., 30 (summer 2005). 8. On U.S. dominance, see, for example, Paul Kennedy, “The Greatest Superpower Ever,” New Perspectives Quarterly 19 (2002); Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70 (1990–91). 9. For a discussion of Chinese concern for U.S. dominance, see Wang Jisi, “Searching for Stability with America,” Foreign Affairs 84 (September/ October 2005): 39–48.

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supremacy or engage in a nuclear arms race, it would not only fail to alter the U.S.- China balance, but it would also undermine its security by exacerbating conflict with the United States. China also lacks the option of cooperating with other states to resist U.S. power. In the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet power in Europe and Chinese power in East Asia contended respectively with U.S. global power. This situation contributed to global balancing of U.S. power by the Sino-Soviet alliance. But in the early twenty-first century, because the United States not only towers over China in East Asia but over all other countries in other regions, China cannot develop cooperative cross-regional relationships to counter American power. First, potential partners lack the capability to augment Chinese balancing capabilities. Second, potential allies, including Russia and the European countries, share China’s reluctance to challenge the United States and thus share China’s interest in prioritizing cooperation with the United States over challenging American power. Moreover, Chinese behavior is shaped by ongoing U.S. efforts to enhance its military capabilities through high defense spending and ongoing development of high-technology weaponry, which has the effect of consolidating unipolarity. Thus, Chinese leaders see little opportunity to redress the imbalance in U.S.- China relations by either mobilizing domestic resources or cooperating with other states. In these circumstances, as China enhances its economic potential and increases its defense spending, it must also prioritize cooperation with the United States. It has resisted a large-scale naval buildup, despite U.S. naval supremacy in Chinese coastal waters, cooperated with the United States in managing nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula, and avoided conflict over Taiwan, despite provocative Taiwan policy toward China, for fear of provoking conflict with the United States. Unipolarity thus imposes on China a cooperative, conflict-avoidance rising power strategy. In this context, China marshals its economic and political resources to carry out protracted balancing by undertaking long-term domestic economic development and military power, rather than engage in immediate and intense balancing of American unipolarity.10 Unipolarity has a direct impact on the affect of the rise of China on great power politics. But, as Jack Levy points out in this volume, within the global system there can simultaneously exist multiple regional systems, insofar as regional balance of power systems have their own distinct great power dynamics apart from the global balance and thus can experience their own power transitions. Moreover, the major power transition wars have been fought over confl icts regarding developments within regional systems, rather than over global confl icts.11 Thus, the U.S.- China power transition will reflect 10. On this point, see Robert S. Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia,” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century. 11. Also see Jack S. Levy, “ ‘Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design,” in Realism and The Balance of Power: A New Debate, ed. John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003), 142–44.

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not only China’s response to U.S. hegemony in the unipolar global system, but also the polarity of the East Asian regional system and its impact on the power transition. Regional polarity affects the course of regional power transitions. The global system may be unipolar, but regional systems can be bipolar or multipolar. Multipolar systems tend to characterized by fewer crises and arms races, but by greater likelihood of war as buck passing allows imbalances to occur, so that war becomes the ultimate option to restore a balance of power. In contrast, bipolar systems, reflecting clarity of threat, are characterized by frequent arms races, crises, and proxy wars. But clarity of threat also encourages responsive balancing, thus minimizing the likelihood of large imbalances and great power war. The logic of polarity applies to balance of power politics generally as well as to the specific dynamics of power transitions. Thus, the instability associated with the rise of Germany can in part be explained by buck passing among other European powers and its contribution to late balancing.12 The arms races, crises, and proxy wars, as well as the great power peace, associated with the Cold War can in part be explained by the impact of U.S.-Soviet bipolarity.13 Whereas the contemporary global balance is unipolar, the East Asian regional balance is bipolar. China dominates the land mass of Southeast Asia, possessing spheres of influence in Indochina, Burma, and Thailand, and in Northeast Asia it possesses a sphere of influence encompassing North Korea and increasingly South Korea. It also dominates Asia’s interior regions, including its borders with the Russian Far East, Mongolia, and the neighboring Central Asian republics. On the other hand, the United States, through its naval superiority, possess superiority in maritime East Asia. It exercises strategic dominance over the maritime states of Southeast Asia, including over the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, and in Tokyo through Japan’s subordinate role in the U.S.-Japanese alliance.14 East Asian bipolarity may combine with global unipolarity to ease the likelihood of a power transition war. Goldstein argues that unipolarity encourages U.S. strategic vigilance over improving Chinese capabilities. Regional bipolarity encourages similar vigilance. The result is a strong incentive for the United States to be alert to the rise of China and to take the steps necessary to prevent a dramatic shift in relative capabilities and any associated escalation in great power confl ict. Thus, not only is the United States consolidating global unipolarity, but, as Art establishes, it is strengthening its 12. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder. “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44 (spring 1990): 137–68. 13. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 170–76. 14. See Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: Great Power Stability in Twenty-First Century East Asia,” International Security 23 (spring 1999). The U.S. assessment of this mainland-maritime division is expressed in U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006).

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military presence in East Asia and balancing the rise of China by consolidating its alliances and increasing regional deployments of advanced capabilities.15 The stability of the regional balance is also shaped by geography. As Jack Levy points out in his chapter, power transition wars in Eu ropean history have reflected balance of power confl icts among the continental powers.16 This suggests that a maritime power transition war between the United States and China is less likely than power transition wars in European history. Furthermore, there are few examples of a major great power war waged by a maritime and a continental power. Such wars, when they occur, tend to be brief and decisive. This has been the British and Japanese experiences with land-based naval competitors. This is because geography affects the strategic priorities and comparative advantage of the great powers. Goldstein’s chapter discusses how geography affects the U.S.- China power transition. Whereas the United States enjoys secure borders and the liberty to devote its resources to maritime power, China confronts numerous interior strategic challenges, so that it will face severe constraints should it challenge U.S. naval power, even should it eventually seek to develop a significant blue-water naval capability. Moreover, as Goldstein points out, the presence of significant water separating U.S. and Chinese military forces creates a buffer that enhances each state’s security.17 Thus, whereas China’s geopolitical environment constrains its ability to challenge U.S. naval supremacy, the presence of water constrains U.S. ability to challenge China’s presence on mainland East Asia, thus minimizing China’s perception of the U.S. threat. This relatively benign U.S.- China geopolitical environment contrasts with the security situation confronting two proximate continental great powers. Thus, whereas as regional bipolarity has the positive effect of promoting strategic vigilance, the geography of East Asia has the effect of mitigating the negative intense security dilemma dynamics usually associated with bipolar structures; it offsets bipolar pressures for arms races and crises associated with power transitions.18 Weapons technology can also have a system-wide effect. Such is the case with nuclear weapons. The transformative effect of nuclear weapons on 15. For discussions of ongoing balance of power politics under unipolarity, see, for example, see Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18 (fall 1993); Robert Art, “Striking the Balance,” International Security 30 (winter 2005/2006); Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” ibid., 17 (spring 1993); Robert S. Art, “Eu rope Hedges Its Security Bets,” in Paul and. Wurtz, Balance of Power; Barry Posen, “Eu ropean Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies 15 (April–June 2006); Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia.” 16. Also see Jack Levy, “Hegemonic Threats and Great- Power Balancing in Eu rope, 1495– 1999,” Security Studies 14 (January–March 2005). 17. On the role of water in great power confl ict, see also Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Poltics. 18. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace.”

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international politics has been profound.19 Nuclear weapons have no warfighting utility when two nuclear powers can infl ict costs on each other that outweigh any conceivable benefit from use of force. Moreover, the mere possibility of escalation to a nuclear exchange deters conventional war. The long peace of the Cold War can in part be explained by the superpowers’ mutual possession of secure nuclear retaliatory capabilities. 20 The presence of nuclear weapons thus affects the course of power transitions and the likelihood of war. As Levy points out, this is a major limitation to power transition theory predictions of war and assumptions of historical continuity. This is especially true concerning the rise of China. Zhu Feng points out that China’s nuclear weapons yield China fundamental security, contributing to the effect of unipolarity in mitigating China’s incentive to catch up to the United States and balance U.S. power. Equally important, Levy, Goldstein, and Art concur that the development of mutual U.S.- China second-strike capabilities reduces the likelihood of a U.S.- China power transition war. Power transitions may be eased by enduring structural conditions, including geography, polarity, and weapons technology. But despite structural factors conducive to U.S.- China stability, such factors are not determinants of peaceful relations. For example, continental powers have frequently sought power-projection navies, only to be challenged forcefully by naval powers. Russia’s nineteenth- century experience with Great Britain and then with Japan, and Germany’s early twentieth- century experience with Great Britain, indicate that arms races and naval wars can occur even in the context of mitigating geographic conditions. Similarly, naval powers have challenged continental powers on the land, contributing to land wars, such as the American Cold War presence on the East Asia mainland and its challenge to Chinese security. Polarity can also lead to varied outcomes. The Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens indicates that a destructive power transition war can take place within bipolar structures. On the other hand, the European arms race in the decade prior to World War I suggests that multipolarity may not necessarily contribute to greater stability than bipolarity. Thus, to the extent that structural factors are not a determinant, other factors can contribute to the outcome of power transitions.

International Institutions and Great Power Conflict Management Another influential scholarly tradition emphasizes the role of international institutions in the management of international confl ict and, by extension, the 19. See Robert Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). 20. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

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outcome of great power transitions. International institutions, including formal organizations and more informal regimes, create rules and norms of behavior that can promote negotiated solutions to international confl ict. 21 Collective rule-making within international institutions can also contribute to the legitimacy of an international order, constrain the behavior of status quo powers, and mitigate the ambitions and threat perceptions of rising powers. For these reasons, international institutions are widely credited with contributing to the stability among the advanced industrial powers in the post–World War II era. To the extent that institutions contribute to peaceful resolution of conflicts generally, they should also contribute to negotiated resolution of specific power transition confl icts. In the contemporary era, much of international politics takes place in a web of institutions established under American auspices following World War II. John Ikenberry argues that these institutions constrain American use of force by “binding” the United States within an established set of rules calling for consensus decision-making by a broad-based membership of countries that expect and promote American compliance with these rules. In so doing, the contemporary “hegemonic” institutional framework mitigates other states’ threat perception and their incentive to challenge both U.S. power and the existing international order. Furthermore, these same international institutions provide a framework to peacefully integrate growing powers into the international political order, enabling adjustment to the new capabilities and interests of a growing power. Ikenberry argues that just as this institutional order enabled the peaceful integration of West Germany and Japan into the post–World War II international order, it provides an institutional order that can contribute to peaceful management of the rise of China. 22 Current trends in U.S. and Chinese multilateral diplomacy suggest that China’s rise will occur within the post–World War II institutionalized global order. Amid the balance of power policies pursued by China and the United States, China has become an active member of the international institutional order, including in multilateral economic institutions and arms control treaties. In many respects, its participation in arms control treaties exceeds that of the United States. 23 The opportunity thus exists for this institutional order to constrain American policy toward China, thus easing Chinese security concerns and its necessity to engage in more assertive balancing of U.S. power. Zhu Feng suggests that this is already the 21. On the role of institutions in international cooperation, see, for example, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 22. Also see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 23. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27 (spring 2003): 5–56.

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case. Chinese participation in contemporary international institutions also provides the opportunity to integrate China peacefully into the great power order because China benefits from the international order. American acquiescence to growing Chinese authority in the World Trade Organi zation and the International Monetary Fund suggest that such accommodation is taking place. 24 Qin Yaqing and Wei Ling also make the case for an institutionally led peaceful integration of China into the international order. But rather than focus on the contribution of rules and norms of formal global institutions to great power behavior, they examine how participation in regional multilateral dialogues creates a norm of consultation and consensus decision-making which can constrain a rising power’s unilateralist challenge to the status quo. Qin and Wei argue that this dynamic is taking place in Chinese involvement in the dialogues held under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). First as part of “10 + 3” dialogue (the ten ASEAN members plus China, Japan, and South Korea) and then in the consultations culminating in the agreement to establish the East Asian Summit, Qin and Wei argue, China is increasingly becoming socialized into the regional norm of consultation and consensus. In this respect, their perspective on Chinese participation in regional dialogues reinforces Ikenberry’s focus on the role of global institutions as constraining great power behavior. Chinese membership in a broad range of international and regional institutions combines with positive structural conditions to suggest the prospect of a peacefully managed power transition. But much like structural factors, institutions are not determinants. Although they can contribute to peaceful management of confl ict, war has occurred within institutionalized orders. The Concert of Europe was an institutional framework for negotiating security conflicts and contributed to confl ict resolution for much of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the Concert of Europe could not prevent either the Crimean War or the escalating tensions associated with the rise of Germany that contributed to World War I. The more formal American-led institutionalized order promoted cooperation throughout the Cold War, but among countries that possessed similar economic and political systems and that were embedded in alliance relationships targeted against a common adversary. Whether these institutions can be effective in mitigating great power security conflict and managing power transitions, such as between the United States and China, necessarily remains in question. Thus, the positive role of multilateral institutions in power transitions must be considered in combination with other variables associated with great power confl ict. 24. Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Seeks Bigger China Role in I.M.F.,” New York Times, August 30, 2006, C1. For an extended discussion of this issue, see Margaret Pearson, “China in Geneva: Lessons from China’s Early Years in the World Trade Organization,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006).

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Domestic Politics and Power Transitions Domestic variables are widely understood to affect the likelihood of war and peace, and thus the likelihood of a power transition war. In the case of China, two particular domestic dynamics may combine to affect China’s foreign policy and thus the course of the power transition: (1) to the questionable legitimacy of an authoritarian leadership and the politics of mass nationalism; (2) the growing liberalization of society and the implications for diminished autonomy of Chinese foreign policymaking from the pressures of mass nationalism. For all of the dramatic developments in China’s economy and society since the death of Mao and the end of the Communist totalitarian system, China remains a single-party state. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party leadership does not rest on either ideological or institutional legitimacy. Marxism-Leninism has been effectively refuted by the successes of Chinese capitalism and party power depends on control over political processes and organization. In this context, party legitimacy depends on economic performance, insofar as development contributes to peoples’ livelihood. As Zhu and Goldstein point out, this constrains China’s international behavior because the leadership cannot risk policies that would undermine economic development. But, as Goldstein further argues, party legitimacy also depends on the leadership’s nationalist credentials, which promotes an aversion to exhibiting deference or conciliation, a demand for international respect, and pursuance of ambitious foreign policies. Thus far, the Chinese leadership has managed to balance these two competing pressures; it has aggressively responded to apparent international challenges to Chinese great power standing, such as the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the collision of U.S. and Chinese aircraft over the South China Sea, without jeopardizing interests important to Chinese security and economic growth, including cooperative U.S.- China and Sino-Japanese relations and a reputation for cooperation throughout East Asia. Nonetheless, as Goldstein observes, diminished social controls in China have enabled the growth of influential nationalist public opinion. In this context, should economic growth diminish, the absence of performance-based legitimacy could create greater pressure on the leadership to rely on nationalism for legitimacy and to adopt a belligerent foreign policy. 25 Insofar as nationalism contributes to the likelihood of war, heightened Chinese nationalism could contribute to U.S.–China hostilities. 26 Potential nationalist-based sources of war include the Taiwan issue, insofar as a weakened leadership may adopt coercive measures to achieve rapid unification; and confl ict over 25. Also see Zhao Suisheng, A Nation- State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004). 26. For a discussion of various causal relationships between nationalism and war, see Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security 18 (spring 1994).

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regional security, should the Chinese leadership use a major naval buildup to establish its nationalist legitimacy. Leadership dependency on nationalist legitimacy could also contribute to a more belligerent Japan policy, reflecting pressures from broad-based Chinese public hostility toward Japan’s apparent disregard for its past atrocities in China and its determination to become a “normal” military power. Anti-Japanese nationalism could contribute both to Sino-Japanese and to Sino-American tensions. 27 Trends in Chinese politics and public opinion reflect in part the societal liberalization associated with market reforms and economic development. These trends also reflect Chinese transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism and perhaps to democracy. These trends in state-society relations suggest that a long-term transition to democracy may be underway. Regardless of whether China actually democratizes, the transition process can be domestically destabilizing, with foreign policy consequences. As Goldstein points out, the transition has thus far led to greater influence of public opinion in foreign policy. As the transition continues, public opinion will likely reflect increasing dissatisfaction with such issues as unemployment, inequality, corruption, and other social problems associated with economic development. The resulting combination of declining party legitimacy and weakening social controls may promote a nationalist foreign policy. As Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield have argued, such dynamics, as they approach and cross the democratic transition, increase the likelihood of war involving the country in transition.28 This process may especially apply to foreign policies of democratizing rising powers, such as China, which possess greater capability to press for international change. Moreover, the international politics of the U.S.- China power transition may become more difficult to manage just as China’s domestic politics become more unstable. This coincidence could contribute to greater instability in the power transition. A democratic China could contribute to a peaceful power transition, insofar as war in democratic dyads is far less frequent than is the norm in international politics.29 Voters seem to resist waging war against another democracy, thus deterring their leaders from initiating such a war. Democracies also share a political culture that promotes a negotiated resolution to confl ict. Insofar as power transitions wars are a subset of the larger phenomenon of war in international politics, power transitions involving democratic dyads may not necessarily exhibit the general tendency of war between a rising power and a 27. Ming Wan, Sino- Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes Towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?” China Quarterly, no. 179 (2004). 28. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20 (summer 1995). 29. Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: Norton, 1997); Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001).

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status quo power. Proponents of the democratic peace theory argue that there was a peaceful U.S.-British power transition in the Caribbean in the early twentieth century because both the United States and Great Britain were democratic countries.30 A democratic China might well contribute to a peaceful power transition. But in the context of heightened Chinese nationalism, the political transition to democracy in China could well contribute to an unstable international power transition. This suggests that an interest in a peaceful transition tempers the interest in a democratic China. The answer to this quandary is not international opposition to China’s political transition, but rather allowing China to move at its own pace while avoiding pro-liberalization policies that have the unintended effect of interacting with China’s domestic politics and public opinion to exacerbate Chinese popular nationalism and/or undermine a leadership consensus in Beijing to use China’s growing capabilities in support of a stable international order.

Chinese Strategic Intentions and the Power Transition The concept of power transition wars is predicated on the argument that states with improved relative power are non–status quo states. They necessarily seek to revise the international strategic order to enhance their own benefit, thus compelling difficult strategic adjustments on the part of status quo states. The underlying assumption is that in anarchic structures capabilities determine interests and that greater capabilities necessarily give rise to more expansive defi nitions of a state’s interests. Ambition follows power. But scholars have argued that interests and revisionist ambitions are not structurally determined, but rather can reflect underlying domestic ideas concerning the legitimacy of a preexisting security order or underlying rising power appraisals of the posture and intentions of other great powers. Frequently, this scholarship focuses on debates in the rising power between proponents of a status quo foreign policy and proponents of a revisionist foreign policy.31 30. Russet and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 288. For a contrary view, see Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 31. See, for example, Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), chaps. 1, 2; Charles A. Kupchan, Emanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Yuen Foo Khong, eds., Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001). Lemke considers a rising power’s degree of satisfaction with the status quo as a factor contributing to its revisionist ambitions. Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Ronal L. Rammen, Douglas Lemke, Carole Alsharabati, et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (London: Chatham House, 2000), chap. 7, directly considers how other countries’ policies can influence China’s relative satisfaction with the international status quo.

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One influential approach argues that the outcome of a power transition is contingent upon other countries’ policies toward the rising power. The tradition in this literature focuses on the role of appeasement and containment strategies in managing the rise of a great power.32 On the one hand, stability may be maintained and war avoided if status quo powers timely and adequately appease a rising power with adjustments to the strategic order through concessions to interests, thus sating its ambitions and obviating the need for forceful change. Appeasement also reduces threat perception, thus mitigating domestic security dilemma–driven arguments for forceful change. Thus, an explanation for World War II is British and French failure to appease Germany in the aftermath of the German defeat in World War I, when Germany had yet to develop the insatiable nationalist revisionist ambitions associated with the subsequent emergence of the Nazi Party. In contrast, accommodation by Great Britain and Austria of French “legitimate interests” following the French defeat in the Napoleonic Wars obviated French interest in challenging the postwar settlement and thus contributed to French willingness to work within the Concert of Europe system as a status quo power. Containment is the alternative to appeasement. Containment relies on deterrence to maintain stability. From this perspective, a rising power will forsake ambitious revisionist objectives and forceful change if the established great powers are determined to protect forcefully their interests in the status quo. Thus, scholars argue that World War II reflected the failure of Europe’s status quo powers to contain German expansionism in the 1930s. Appeasement merely encouraged German expansion by signaling the absence of costly resistance.33 On the other hand, containment is frequently credited with transforming the Soviet Union from an ambitious revisionist state to a status quo state with an interest in détente and to eventual Soviet relinquishment of its occupation of Eastern Europe. From this perspective, once Moscow understood that it would require a prohibitively costly war to transform the Eu ropean order, détente and stability became possible. A status quo state’s policy choices can contribute to conflict management by influencing the intentions of a rising power. But evaluating the efficacy of a particular policy is fraught with uncertainty. The outcome of appeasement or containment policies is frequently contingent upon the a priori intentions of the rising power’s leadership or on the sensitivity to the foreign policies of other states of its domestic political system and of the domestic balance of power

32. For case studies of appeasement, see Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000). For a discussion of a range of responses to a rising power, see Randall Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999). 33. See, for example, A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961).

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among contending policy preference groups.34 Thus, containment policies directed at a cooperative state can beget greater ambitions less amenable to management; appeasement directed toward an ambitious leadership can beget even greater ambition and greater likelihood of instability. The risk associated with appeasement suggests an optimal policy of “appeasement from strength,” or “deterrence with reassurance.” Such policies combine accommodation of a rising power’s most critical interests, its security “requirements,” with capabilities that enable forceful resistance to more expansive objectives, its security “electives.” Such policies signal cooperative intentions without the risk of signaling weakness against hegemonic aspirations. Such may have been the optimal policy of the European powers at the Versailles Conference after World War I. Rather than pursue unmitigated punishment of vanquished Germany, 1919 was the time to offer Germany security concessions while the European powers enjoyed unquestioned superiority.35 This was the strategy of the victorious anti-Napoleon coalition in 1815, when the European powers accommodated French security interests from a position of unquestioned strength. This strategy contributed to the ensuing fifty years of French acquiescence to the status quo. 36 Thus, a rising power’s ambitions may reflect its a priori conceptions about its legitimate interests, its proper place in the world, the nature of existing international order, and what constitutes a “just” world order. These ideas may spring from cultural factors, domestic and diplomatic historical processes, and domestic politics. Such domestic-based ideas can contribute to stability, to the extent that a country does not see itself as deprived of legitimate aspirations. But they can also be destabilizing, to the extent that a country develops an insatiable appetite for expansion. Grievance-based nationalism can be a driver of domestic-based destabilizing policies. Thus, understanding the rising power’s a priori intentions is critical to the development of appropriate policy— appeasement or containment—from the status quo states. This critical relationship underscores the importance of China’s conceptions of international politics and of a just world order to the course of the power transition. Tang Shiping’s chapter argues that China’s understanding of international politics underwent a fundamental evolution under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Chinese foreign policy under Mao Zedong was based on assumptions associated with “offensive realism,” including emphasis on maximizing relative gain and on the inevitability of irreconcilable threat-based conflict. In contrast, post-Mao foreign policy has increasingly reflected the 34. John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 6, considers the role of domestic policy debates on use of force by dissatisfied powers. 35. The classic statement of this argument is Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 221–23. 36. This is essentially the argument of Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822 (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, n.d.).

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tenets of defensive realism, including recognition of the security dilemma and thus the importance of cooperation and self-restraint, rather than power maximization. Tang observes many elements of defensive realism and the security dilemma in contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Beijing recognizes that the mere rise of Chinese capabilities can appear threatening to other countries; it strives to rise “within the system”—to influence the international order without exacerbating confl ict; and it participates in multilateral diplomacy and exercises self-restraint to assuage other countries’ concern about the rise of China. Other observers observe considerable uncertainty in China’s foreign policy debate and argues that rising China’s underlying ideational approach to a just world order remains in flux. In recent Chinese history, as China contended with its international decline and its protracted rebuilding effort, contending ideas emerged reflecting distinct Chinese cultural traditions. Today, the debate continues. China’s official position is that it seeks peace and development and an international order based on tolerance, mutual benefit, multilateral cooperation, and resistance to hegemony. But zero-sum visions of international politics and interest in a transformed world order, derived either from contemporary Western realism or from revolutionary and revisionist Marxism, remain prevalent and influential in Chinese strategic thinking. The absence of a Chinese consensus on the advantages of a liberal world order creates considerable uncertainty regarding how China will use its growing power and about the power transition in general. Nonetheless, any indeterminacy in Chinese intentions creates an opportunity for other countries’ China policies to affect China’s role in international politics by contributing to the outcome of China’s domestic debates. On the one hand, Jeffrey Legro concurs with Tang’s observation that in the post-Mao era China has pursued an integrationist policy—“reform and opening”—that promotes China’s rise “within the system” and that promotes multipolarity, rather than hegemony, and thus has contributed to a stable power transition. But Legro also understands Jia Qingguo’s concern that there remains an indeterminacy to Chinese policy, that there exist different Chinese historical traditions regarding China’s role in the world order.37 Whereas Tang argues that China has “evolved,” Legro argues that contemporary China has adopted one strategy among the various options it has pursued since the mid-nineteenth century, including aggressive revisionism, and that its strategy could once again change, with negative consequences for stability. He argues that the source of Chinese policy change has been the “efficacy” of an existing policy and its impact on domestic foreign policy coalitions. Thus, the key issue in determining the course of Chinese intentions and of the power transition may well be other countries’ China policies. Policies 37. See Jia Qingguo, “Pluralism at the Center: China’s View of World Order and International Justice” (unpublished paper).

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which permit China to achieve the expectations of its integrationist strategy will reinforce the domestic base of that policy and contribute to policy continuity. On the other hand, other countries’ policies that undermine China’s expectations will encourage China to adopt alternative policies, perhaps aggressive destabilizing revisionist ones. Legro identifies three critical expectations that justify China’s current integrationist strategy—economic development, consolidation of sovereignty, and progress toward the unification with Taiwan. Other countries’ policies on these issues may well determine rising China’s objectives and the course of the power transition.

Managing China’s Rise: National Responses This volume considers the response to the rise of China of three critical countries—South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Their respective policies will reflect an understanding of both Chinese intentions and their own security interests. And how they respond to the China’s rise will contribute to the course of the power transition. As Kim Byoong-kook explains, South Korea is the country that has been most affected by the rise of China. Its proximity to China, its expectation of eventual Korean unification and of a common border with China, and its growing dependency on the Chinese economy have combined to compel Seoul to reconsider its alignment among the great powers. This has been a difficult process, requiring South Korea to make difficult adjustments in its policy toward its long-term ally and fellow democracy, the United States. The result has been considerable volatility in public opinion, heightened controversy over security policy, and, at times, considerable instability in policy toward the China and the United States. But as Kim also shows, beneath the public controversy, there has been a determined evolution of South Korean security policy that reflects Seoul’s adjustment to the rise of China. On key issues reflecting great power interests, South Korea has accommodated China. Seoul is now closer to Beijing than to Washington regarding management of North Korea’s nuclear program. It has resisted U.S. efforts to cooperate with the Pentagon’s post–Cold War strategy of strategic flexibility, because this strategy includes plans to contend with China in a regional war, including in a Taiwan contingency. Seoul has also negotiated the end of U.S. war time command of South Korean armed forces. And it has willingly cooperated with the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea. The challenge for Seoul has been to maintain cooperative security ties with Washington even as it reduces U.S.–South Korea defense cooperation and expands its accommodation to Chinese security interests. This should be possible, because ongoing albeit attenuated South Korean cooperation with the United States can occur even as South Korea acknowledges enhanced Chinese influence on the Korean peninsula. Thus, rather than contribute to a polarized region by either resisting the rise of China or alienating the United States,

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beneath its contentious debates and policy uncertainty, South Korea contributes to a peaceful power transition by making timely incremental adjustments to its alignment among the great powers. In contrast to South Korea’s gradual realignment amidst the Northeast Asian power transition, Japan has strengthened its ability to resist greater Chinese regional influence. Whereas the rise of China has elicited debate in South Korea over how to manage simultaneously greater cooperation with China and continued cooperation with the United States, in Japan there is consensus that Japan should adjust to the rise of China by strengthening its defense capability; the only debate is over how much and how fast Japan should adjust. There have been debates over amendment of the Japanese constitution to revise Article 9, which prohibits Japanese participation in collective self-defense. Prime Minister Abe, who was elected in October 2006, actively supports revision of the constitution. There have also been debates over whether Japan should develop an independent nuclear deterrent ability. Japanese support for developing nuclear weapons has grown. And the Japanese legislature has repeatedly sanctioned expanded Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping activities and Japanese military deployment abroad in support of U.S. forces at war. Akio Takahara’s chapter shows that the outcome of these political changes in Japan is an evolution of Japan’s defense strategy and alliance policy. Over the past decade Japan has modernized its naval and air capability, including development of in-fl ight refueling capability, and it has developed missiles and rapid deployment capability to defend its control over islands also claimed by China in the East China Sea. It has also strengthened defense cooperation with the United States. Tokyo is Washington’s most important partner in the development of missile defense capabilities, including recent deployment in Japan of an advanced Patriot III battery. It has cooperated with U.S. strategic flexibility and it has committed to provide logistical support for U.S. forces at war. It announced that it would hold joint a military exercise with the United States, simulating defense of a small Japanese island against a challenging power, i.e., China. It has also granted improved access for U.S. forces to American bases, including home-porting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at the U.S. naval base at Yokosuka. Japan’s response to the rise of China does not necessarily entail hostile Sino-Japanese relations. U.S. dominance of maritime East Asia enables Japan to resist the rise of China through participation in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Insofar as Japan’s role in East Asian balancing is subsumed within U.S. leadership, it is not part of the critical dyad determining the course of the power transition. In addition, the material confl icts in Sino-Japanese relations appear manageable, including sovereignty disputes over barren islands and the delimitation of exclusive economic zones that have nominal deposits of important natural resources. Moreover, as Takahara shows, economic cooperation between the two countries has grown and China has become the most

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important engine of Japanese growth. Japanese society is also becoming engaged in China. Over one thousand Japanese nongovernmental organizations are active in China and Chinese language study in Japan is increasing, reflecting employment opportunities in China as well as the popularity of Chinese popular culture in Japan. Nonetheless, as Takahara also points out, nationalism in both China and Japan has the potential to destabilize relations over otherwise minor confl icts. The rise of popular anti-Japanese nationalism in China, in part the result of Chinese education and propaganda campaigns, has caused violent antiJapanese street demonstrations. The rise of Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism has converged with the rise of Japanese nationalism, a response to both the rise of China and to Japanese doubts about Japan’s own prospects following the collapse of its bubble economy in the mid-1990s. This has promoted Japanese societal support for revision of government-approved textbooks to place a more positive interpretation on the Japanese occupation of China, South Korea, and other East Asian countries during World War II. Nationalism has also promoted public support for the prime minister’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, including World War II “class A” war criminals. Thus, an escalation cycle of nationalism can develop as each responds to perceptions of the other side’s perfidy. The rise of China has contributed to the development of a more proactive Japanese security policy, to Sino-Japanese territorial confl icts, and to growing Chinese and Japanese nationalism. But whether the rise of China will lead to great power war will ultimately depend on the course of U.S.- China relations. The United States and China are the two dominant powers in East Asia and the U.S.- China relationship dominates the regional balance of power and the security dynamics involving secondary states, including Japan. Thus, compared to both South Korean and Japanese policies, U.S. policy toward China will play a far greater role in determining the impact of the rise of China and of the course of the power transition. Jonathan Kirshner’s examination of the impact of the rise of the Chinese economy on U.S.- China relations permits cautious optimism. He observes the growing importance of China for the exports and investments of its neighbors and the resulting dependence of China’s neighbors on the Chinese economy. Such dependence will yield Beijing growing influence over the foreign policies of traditional American security partners. 38 Nonetheless, such conflicts do not tend to lead to war. Similarly, although there will likely be growing U.S.China political friction over the U.S. trade imbalance with China, this too 38. For a discussion of the role of trade and investment in creating dependency and foreign policy influence, see Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Jonathan Kirshner and Rawi Abdelal, “Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Defi nition of National Interests,” Security Studies 9 (fall 1999–winter 2000): 119–56; Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975), chap. 6.

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will not be a source of war. Kirshner is concerned, however, about growing U.S.- China competition for energy resources. Great power confl ict over energy resources can elicit war and China’s growing demand for oil suggests increasing U.S.- China confl ict over access to international oil reserves. China’s growing oil imports will generate Chinese influence in traditional U.S. oil suppliers in the Middle East and elsewhere. Similarly, China’s need for oil will encourage it to develop ties with U.S. adversaries in the Middle East. Nonetheless, Kirshner argues that such diplomatic friction is an unlikely source of great power war. Kirshner’s greatest concern is the potential for confl ict from U.S. mismanagement of its economy. Should the there be an international collapse of the dollar, rather than a “soft landing,” the resulting U.S. recession would undermine stable foreign policies in both China and the United States. First, the decline of U.S. imports from China could contribute to a Chinese recession and a setback to economic development, undermining support for China’s integrationist foreign policy. Thus, developments in America’s domestic economy could trigger in China the domestic-foreign linkages discussed by Jeffrey Legro. The result could be a crisis of Chinese leadership legitimacy, leading to an aggressive nationalist and revisionist Chinese foreign policy. Avery Goldstein also calls attention to this danger of heightened Chinese nationalism to a stable power transition in his chapter. Second, Kirshner observes that a U.S. recession would reduce U.S. government revenues and could significantly constrain also defense spending, compelling the United States to scale back its military presence in East Asia. The result could be inadequate U.S. balancing of the rise of China and Chinese challenges to U.S. regional presence. Such trends in the balance of power could contribute to heightened great power conflict. Robert Art considers the impact of U.S. security policy on the rise of China. He argues that the course of the power transition will primarily depend on U.S.- China security dilemma dynamics, with secondary influence from the level of U.S.- China economic interdependence and ideological confl ict. U.S.China economic interdependence is already very high and, thirty years after the death of Mao Zedong, ideological confl ict has all but disappeared, despite continued differences over human rights issues. These are positive trends that reduce potential sources of U.S.- China confl ict, but by themselves they cannot assure a peaceful power transition. Rather, their contribution occurs in the context of security dilemma dynamics. Similar to Kirshner, Art is an “optimistic realist.” He focuses on realist variables to explain the likely course of the power transition, but he fi nds that these variables do not suggest that the rise of China necessarily will sufficiently erode U.S. security so that war becomes the ultimate arbiter of U.S.China security confl icts. Rather, U.S. policy can both protect U.S. security while simultaneously managing U.S.- China confl icts to minimize the likelihood of war. Foremost, Art draws comfort from China’s development of a

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secure nuclear deterrent. Mutual nuclear deterrence was a major factor contributing to the absence of a U.S.-Soviet conventional war in Europe and Washington should welcome its contribution to a peaceful China power transition. Equally important, the rise of China is contributing to peaceful resolution of the two existing regional confl icts that could otherwise elicit U.S.- China hostilities—the mainland-Taiwan confl ict and U.S.-North Korean confl ict. Taiwan is increasingly dependent on the Chinese economy and increasingly vulnerable to Chinese military power. These trends are compelling Taiwan to abandon its objective of de jure independence, the most immediate potential source of a U.S.- China war, while likely leading to peaceful Taiwan evolution into a Chinese “vassal,” and perhaps even peaceful unification should China eventually democratize. Because the United States has little interest in Taiwan’s alignment, it can accommodate such a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan conflict. The politics of the Korean peninsula are equally favorable to a peaceful transition. Although the United States has not been able to prevent North Korean acquisition of a nuclear capability, the reduced North-South tension and eventual unification of the peninsula will enable the United State to draw down its troops there, the last remaining site of U.S. deployments on mainland East Asia. Although a unified Korea will likely fall into China’s sphere of influence, with the end of the North Korean challenge to the U.S. deterrence commitment, Washington can welcome the resolution of the Korea conflict. Given these positive trends in U.S.- China relations, the remaining potential source of a power transition war would be a significant Chinese challenge to the region-wide military balance of power. In this respect, the status quo interests vital to U.S. security include maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the irreplaceable foundation of U.S. forward presence in East Asia; ongoing dominance of East Asian sea lanes of communication; continued access to the region’s economy; and peaceful resolution of East Asian maritime disputes. Art argues that realization of these interests depends on continued U.S. maritime supremacy in East Asia. As these chapters show, a country’s response to the rise of China reflects its unique strategic environment. South Korea’s proximity to China and its economic dependency have promoted strategic realignment toward China. Japan, despite its increasing economic dependency on China, derives security from U.S. power and in this context has resisted China’s rise by increasing its military capabilities and consolidating U.S.-Japan defense ties. The United States, as a great power, enjoys the widest range of choice in responding to the China’s rise. Thus far, it has acquiesced to regional change when its essential security interests have not been at stake, as in the Korea confl ict and the Taiwan issue. On the other hand, it has simultaneously balanced China’s rise by continuing to develop its East Asian forward-deployed air and naval capabilities, thus maintaining its maritime superiority. Despite the distinct responses of South Korea, Japan, and the United States to the rise of China, all three countries have encouraged the strengthening of

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regional security institutions to promote dialogue and transparency. Dialogue will not eliminate region-wide suspicion of Chinese intentions, but the historical record of great power relations suggests that it can help to ameliorate them. Thus, widespread regional interest in strengthening East Asian security institutions provides the prospect for consolidated multilateral cooperation and tension reduction.

The Rise of China and the Prospects for Stability The scholarship in this volume argues that power transitions do not invariably lead to war and that there is not a single variable that determines the outcome of such transitions. Strategic factors play the most decisive role in contributing to whether a power transition is peaceful or violent, but depending on the mix of various strategic variables, including polarity, geography, and weapons systems, there is variation in the likelihood of war. Moreover, although nonstrategic factors may not be decisive, they too can contribute to the likelihood of war. The intentions of rising powers are not fi xed and not inexorably expansive, despite improving capabilities. Extensive participation in multilateral institutions can mitigate great power confl ict by constraining destabilizing behaviors of a status quo state and a rising power. The nature of domestic political systems in the rising power can either contribute to heightened great power confl ict, if the rising power is a weak authoritarian state experiencing liberalizing transition; or it can mitigate great power confl ict, if the rising power and the status quo state(s) are democracies. The foreign policies of other states inevitably affect the power transition, since they can influence the intentions of the rising power to the extent that they accommodate rising power’s security interests and/or influence the domestic determinants of the rising power’s intentions. The contributors to this volume are under no illusion that a U.S.- China power transition will be easy or characterized by cooperative relations. On the contrary, power transitions are inevitably difficult and are generally characterized by intense strategic competition. Thus, the primary variation in the outcome of great power transitions is whether such strategic competition leads to war. The authors’ analyses of the impact of various variables on the transition suggest that major U.S.- China war is avoidable. Structural variables, including global unipolarity, regional bipolarity, geography, and weapons systems combine to mitigate both security dilemma dynamics and the prospect for war. Similarly, U.S. and Chinese enmeshment in the web of global and regional institutions constrains great power threat perception and revisionist ambitions and promotes negotiated solutions to confl icts of interest. In this international context, the authors’ greatest concern is the wide range of choice in Chinese and U.S. foreign policies. China’s current integrationist and “peaceful rise” policies may contribute to a peaceful transition, but the

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continued existence of competing foreign policy traditions and potential leadership instability suggest that Beijing could develop a nationalist and assertive foreign policy that would aggressively challenge the regional status quo, contribute to heightened U.S. threat perception, and thus increase the likelihood of conflicts and war. Regarding the United States, current policy toward Taiwan and the Korean peninsula and toward Chinese membership in multilateral organizations suggests a constructive accommodationist strategy. However, the domestic politics of U.S. China policy and U.S. nationalism could interact with Chinese rising power to elicit an American China policy that would eschew engagement and prioritize strategic containment, contributing to Chinese nationalism and belligerence and escalated bilateral confl ict. Equally important, U.S. mismanagement of the international value of the dollar could contribute to a destabilizing U.S. recession that could undermine U.S. balancing capabilities, and to a Chinese recession that could exacerbate nationalist pressures for an assertive foreign policy. Structural and long-term international factors and short-term U.S. and Chinese policy trends allow for tempered optimism that a power transition, albeit competitive and costly, can remain peaceful. The critical factor determining the course of the transition may well be policy leadership in China and the United States and the prospect for continued U.S. and Chinese adherence to constructive foreign policies. On the one hand, the potential for domestic instability and irresponsible leadership to disrupt a peaceful transition is worrisome. On the other hand, it is source of optimism that the mix of enduring international factors combines to maximize policymakers’ opportunity to develop constructive policies that mitigate the danger of the U.S.- China power transition.

Index

Page numbers in italics refer to figures or tables. Abe, Shintaro, 235–36, 310 Able Archer NATO exercise crisis, 272n22 accommodation strategy. See appeasement/ containment dilemma Acheson, Dean, 103 American postwar order. See Western order American unipolarity, 60–61 absence of balancing against, 37–39, 41–44, 61–62, 296–97 expansion of, 40–41 soft balancing against, 49–52 anarchy, 2–3, 56, 293–95 Anglo-American transition, 14–15, 64, 90, 97–98 Anglo- German transition, 14, 15, 63–64, 90, 96–97, 267, 269, 270, 270nn17–18, 271 appeasement/containment dilemma, 6, 306–7 APT (ASEAN Plus Three), 116, 130 “Arc of Instability”, 199 Argentina, 241 Art, Robert, 7–8, 294, 298, 300, 312–13 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 115, 156 China and, 130–34 membership debate, 222–23 See also East Asia Summit ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 116, 130 ASEAN Way, 120, 128 Asia- Pacific, U.S. trade, 281

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See ASEAN asymmetric military strategy, 62–63 Australia, 133 Axelrod, Robert, 186 balance of power theory, 12, 13n7, 31n63, 118 balance of threat theory, 39 balancing American unipolarity, absence to, 37–39, 41–44, 61–62, 296–97 China against U.S. power, 38–41, 50–52 See also counterbalancing; soft balancing balancing, coalitional, 23, 23nn39–40 Baldwin, David A., 194 bandwagoning, 37n19, 42 Barbieri, Katherine, 270n17 Barnett, Michael N., 45 bipolarity, East Asian, 298–99 bipolar systems, 298 Bismarck, Otto von, 22 Brazil, 241 Bretton Woods Conference (1944), 108 Bull, Hedley, 165 Bush, George H. W., 104, 285 Bush, George W., 110–11, 192–93, 284n42 North Korean nuclear crisis and, 204–5 revisionist security policy, 197–98 Bush doctrine, 49

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Canada, 241, 264n9 Carr, E. H., 90 Carter Doctrine, 249 CCP (Chinese Communist Party) legitimacy of, 303 patriotic education, 230–31 Chen Shui-bian, 47, 194, 276n25 Chile, 241 China ASEAN and, 130–34 domestic political vulnerability, 45–49 East Asia Summit membership debate and, 134–36 economic capacity and military capability projections, 111, 112–13 economic interdependence, history of, 170–71, 171 economy of, 20n26, 81–83, 240–41 energy demand and security concern, 82, 250–51, 253n36 Eu ropean relations, 43 historical legacies, 75–78 maritime disputes, 280 (See also Taiwan) military, 40, 168n17, 225–26, 274n24, 286–87 monetary policy, 244n13 multiethnicity of, 83–84 nationalism within, 78–81, 219, 230–34, 235, 303 North Korean nuclear crisis and, 208, 209 nuclear armament capability, 283n41 political influence, 50, 89, 242–43 relative and absolute power of, 169, 170 Russian relations, 44 security dilemma, 57–59, 61 Southeast Asian dominance, 298 South Korean relations, 241 sovereignty of, 181–82 U.S.-Japan alliance, perception of, 285 U.S. power, balancing against, 38–41, 50–52 Western order, integration into, 106–9, 168 World Wars and, 177 See also Sino-Japanese relations; U.S.- China relations China, domestic political constraints, 78–84 civilian economy, 81–83 multiethnicity, 83–84 nationalism, 78–81 China, foreign policy, 165–68 debate over, 308 hedged acquiescence strategy, 198–99 international cooperative efforts, 35 regional diplomacy strategy, 109 revisionist strategy, 166–67, 177–78

separatist strategy, 165–66, 174–76 See also defensive realist strategy; integrationist strategy Chinese Communist Party. See CCP Chinese order, 76–78 Choucri, Nazli, 97 Clinton, Bill, 192–93 collective identity, 128–29 Concert of Eu rope, 22, 302, 306 Congress of Vienna, 4 constructivism, 145–46, 150 See also process- oriented constructivism; social constructivism containment strategy, 151, 263–64 See also appeasement/containment dilemma Cooper, Richard, 264–65 Copeland, Dale, 268n15 counterbalancing, 42 See also balancing; nuclear deterrence; soft balancing cultural determinism, 144, 150 culture, defi ned, 144n9 currency exchange rates, determinants of, 244 defensive realist strategy, 154–60, 308 under Deng, 155–56 learning, 157–59 material world, 156–57 peace and development debate, 159–60 See also structural realism democracy deterrent to war, 304–5 power transitions and, 99 democratic complex, 110 of Western order, 100–101, 110–11 democratic peace theory, 100–101, 305 Deng Xiaoping, 116, 167, 226, 307 defensive realist strategy, 155–56 integrationist strategy, 167, 178–79 DiCicio, Jonathan M., 14n12, 35 EAS. See East Asia Summit East Asia, reaction to China’s rise, 218–19 East Asian bipolarity, 298–99 East Asian integration, 115–16 soft institutionalism of, 120–21 See also APT; ASEAN; process- oriented constructivism East Asia Summit (EAS), 131 membership debate, 132–33, 134–36 Elman, Colin, 161n61 energy markets, 251–53 supply and, 253–55 engagement strategy, 151

Index Eu rope Chinese relations, 43 U.S. trade, 281 Eu ropean arms race, 300 Eu ropean great power system, 20–24 Eu ropean power transitions, 96, 96 Eu ropean Union (EU) advocacy of multilateralism, 43 economic capacity projections, 111, 112 regional integration, 115, 120 Finnemore, Martha, 122 France, as hegemonic power, 96 free riding. See bandwagoning French empire, appeasement of, 307 Friedrich, Carl J., 193 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 103–4 geography, 3, 67–74 concentration and dispersal of military resources, 72 maritime vs. continental states, 67–69 physical separation between states, 69–72 security dilemma dynamics and, 299 territorial disputes, 72–74 Germany appeasement of, 306 containment of, 306, 307 oil consumption, 253n36 rise of, 96–97 unification of, 103–4 Western order, reintegration into, 102–4, 105 See also Anglo- German transition Gilpin, Robert, 12, 110 on great power wars, 256, 256n41, 268n15 on international order, 52–53, 92, 93, 169n20 global power system, 20–24 See also international order Goldstein, Avery, 4, 6, 109, 299, 300 on American unipolarity, 296, 298 on CCP legitimacy, 303 on China’s peaceful development strategy, 262 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 103, 104 Great Britain as hegemonic power, 96 See also Anglo-American transition; Anglo- German transition Gries, Peter, 231 Guidelines for Implementing Patriotic Education (CCP), 230, 231

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Habsburg empire, 95–96 Hannara Party (South Korea), 214 hard balancing. See counterbalancing Harrison, Selig, 277 hegemonic stability theory, 118–19 Hirschman, Albert, 241–42 historical legacies, 74–75 China, 75–78 historical legacy approach, 144, 150 Hitler, Adolf, 29 Holsti, K. J., 143 Huang, Yasheng, 20n26 Hu Jintao, 198, 209, 222, 250 military buildup under, 226, 287 Taiwan policy, 47, 181–82 Hyundai Group, 210 ideational world, 146–47 IEA (International Energy Agency), 252n34 Ikenberry, John, 5, 38, 41, 52, 301 IMF (International Monetary Fund), 107 India, 17n20, 42, 253n36 Industrial Revolution, 19 Information Revolution, 19 integrationist strategy, China, 165, 166, 167–68, 176–77, 178–79 criticism of, 182–83 justifications for, 180–82 See also China, foreign policy interdependence theory, 185 International Energy Agency (IEA), 252n34 international institutions, 4–5, 118, 288 See also Western order; specifi c international institutions International Monetary Fund (IMF), 107 international order hierarchy of, 92–93 power transitions within, 94–95 See also global power system; Western order international structure, 2–3 Iran, 241, 252 Japan China, foreign policy toward, 310–11 China’s rise, reaction to, 218–19 defense forces, 228 economy of, 218 military expenditures, 229 nationalism within, 234, 311 nonnuclear status, 278, 278n32 North Korean nuclear crisis and, 209 oil consumption, 253n36 political influence, 42 rise of, 90 security dilemma, 192

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Japan (continued) Western order, reintegration into, 104, 105 See also Sino-Japanese relations; U.S.-Japanese relations Japanese imperialism, 75–76 Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, 234 “Japan fever”, 225 Japan- U.S. Consultative Committee, 227–28 Jervis, Robert, 51, 56 Jiang Zemin, 47, 182, 225–26, 230–31, 231–32 Johnston, Alastair Iain, 144n10

Mastanduno, Michael, 37 material world, 146 May Fourth Movement, 177 McKinnon, Ronald, 248 Mearsheimer, John, 263 Medeiros, Even S., 50 Mexico, 241 Miller, E. A., 45 Mitterand, François, 103 monetary theory, ambiguity of, 245–46 Morgenthau, Hans, 12 multipolarization, 168 multipolar systems, 298

Kang, David C., 77n54 Kapstein, Ethan B., 48–49 Kelly, James, 277 Kennan, George, 102–3 Kennedy, Paul M., 29, 97 Keohane, Robert, 119, 123 Kim Byoong-kook, 7, 309 Kim Dae-jung, 210 Kim Il Sung, 204 Kim Jong-il, 191–92, 195, 204, 208, 210, 276–77 Kim Kye Gwan, 277 Kim Yong-nam, 277 Kirshner, Jonathan, 6, 7, 311–12 Kohl, Helmut, 103 Koizumi Junichiro, 194, 209, 221–22, 228, 234 Kugler, Jacek, 13n6, 14n12, 15, 26n47, 94 Kydd, Andrew, 151–52

NAEC (Northeast Asia Era Commission), 202 Napoleonic Wars, 295, 306 National Flag Law (China), 231 National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Hirschman), 241–42 NATO, military capability projections, 111, 113 neoconservatives, U.S., 106n35 neoliberal institutionalism, 117, 119, 124, 150 neorealist theory, 145, 296 “New Power Concert” scenario, 53 New Security Concept (China), 219 New Zealand, 133 nonevolutionary approaches, 143–45, 150 critique of, 142, 143–46 North, Robert C., 97 North America, U.S. trade, 281 Northeast Asia Era Commission (NAEC), 202 North Korea regime crisis, 191–92 South Korean aid to, 209, 210 North Korean nuclear crisis, 195, 204–6, 206, 208–9, 276–77 nuclear deterrence, 27–28, 67 power transitions and, 110 U.S.- China relations and, 272–73, 274–75, 283 Nye, Joseph S., 243, 266

“law of anticipated reactions”, 193 learning, 147–48, 147n24, 148 Lee Hoichang, 213 Legro, Jeffrey, 6, 308, 309 Lemke, Douglas, 14n12, 17, 24 Levy, Jack S., 4, 14n12, 35–36, 45, 148n25, 297, 299, 300 on balancing, 23nn39–40, 38 Liberal Democratic Party (Japan), 228 Lieber, Keir, 274n23 Li Gun, 277 Liu Zhiming, 224–25, 234 long- cycle approach, 143n4 Louis XIV, wars of, 295 Maddison, Angus, 29 Mahathir Mohamad, 131 Mansfield, Edward, 304 Mao Zedong, 153–54, 307 revisionist strategy, 166–67, 177–78 Marshall, George Catlett, 103

ODA (Official Developmental Assistance), 220 OECD, economic capacity and military capability projections, 111, 112–13 offensive realist strategy, 307 under Mao, 153–54 See also structural realism Official Developmental Assistance (ODA), 220 oil consumption, global, 253n36

Index Organski, A. F. K., 11–13, 13n6, 93n8 on great power wars, 13–14n9, 15, 26n47, 93–94, 268n15 Pam Nam-soon, 277n27 Pape, Robert, 50 Paracel Islands, 280 patriotic education, 230–31, 233 peace and development debate, 159–60 Pei, Minxin, 198–99 Peloponnesian War, 300 People’s Republic of China. See China Pepper, Claude, 103 Peru, 241 Philippines, 226 “Phoenix factor”, 15 polarity, 3, 59–60 power transitions anarchy and, 293–95 democracy and, 99 Eu rope, 96, 96 nuclear deterrence and, 110 variations in, 95–100, 96 war and, 1–2, 99 See also Anglo-American transition; Anglo- German transition power transitions, determinants of, 295–305 domestic politics, 303–5 great power structures, 296–300 international institutions and confl ict management, 300–302 power transitions, security dilemma dynamics, 267–73 economic interdependence, 269, 270–71 ideological differences, 269–70, 271 level of security, 267–69, 270–71 power transition theory, 11–30, 13n7, 117–18, 185 conception of power, 15–16 hierarchical international system, 12–13 India and, 17n20 summary of, 11–17 U.S.- China relationship and, 16–17 war and, 13–14n9, 13–15, 14n14, 93–94 power transition theory, limitations of, 18–30 causes of war, 25–30 power, misconceptions of, 18–20 single great power hierarchy, 20–25 PRC. See China Press, Daryl, 274n23 preventive war strategies, 26–27 process- oriented constructivism, 124–29, 137 collective identity, nurturing of, 128–29 intersubjectivity and, 126

321

multilateralism of, 125, 125 rules and norms of, 127–28 socialization and, 126 transformation of culture, 129 See also constructivism; social constructivism “purpose transition”, 163 purpose transition theory, 171–74, 185 China, application to, 174–79, 175 collapse stage, 172–73 consolidation stage, 173–74 Putin, Vladimir, 42 Qing era, separatist strategy, 165–66, 174–76 Qin Yaqing, 5, 302 Reagan, Ronald, 110 Report of the ASEAN- China Eminent Persons Group, 130–31 Republican era, integrationist strategy, 166, 176–77 revisionist strategy, 165 China, 165, 166–67, 177–78 Rice, Condoleezza, 133n44 “rising China” thesis, 169 “risk fleet”, 69n39 Roh Doctrine, 203 Roh Moo-hyun, 199–210 balancer strategy, 203–4 hedging strategy, 200–201 mediator strategy, 206–8 misperceptions by, 194–95, 215, 216 North Korean nuclear crisis negotiations, 205–7, 209–10 political zigzagging, 194, 214–15, 216 regional integration strategy, 201–3 Rumsfeld, Donald H., 199 Russia, 42, 253n36 Chinese relations, 44 See also Soviet Union Saich, Anthony, 46 Samuels, Richard, 278n30, 278n32 Saudi Arabia, 241, 252 Schelling, Thomas, 66 Schweller, Randall, 42, 99 SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), 41, 82n64, 156 security dilemma, 3, 56–57, 154n42 China, 57–59, 61 geography and, 299 Japan, 192 South Korea, 191–95 Taiwan, 58–59 U.S., 61

322

Index

security dilemma (continued) See also power transitions, security dilemma dynamics semi- evolutionary approach, 145–46, 150 See also constructivism; neoliberal institutionalism Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 280, 280n36 separatist strategy, 165 China, 165–66, 174–76 Shambaugh, David, 119 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 41, 82n64, 156 Sino-Eu ropean relations, 43 Sino-Japanese relations, 76, 79–80, 219–30, 310–11 anti- Chinese sentiments, 234 anti-Japanese sentiments, 232–34, 235, 311 economic cooperation and integration, 117–18, 219–23, 221, 241 security concerns, 225–30 societal interaction and cultural exchange, 223–25, 224 Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), 166, 176 Six Party talks, 208–9 Snyder, Glenn, 271n21 Snyder, Jack, 304 social constructivism, 117, 121–23, 185 See also constructivism; process- oriented constructivism social evolutionary approach, 146–48, 150, 185 social evolution concept, 142 social evolution process, 149 Social Theory of International Politics (Wendt), 122 soft balancing, 49–52, 243 See also balancing; counterbalancing “soft power”, 243 South China Sea SLOCs, 281 South Korea, 191 China, accommodationist policy toward, 309–10 China, economic integration with, 241 North Korea, aid to, 209, 210 North Korea, reconciliatory engagement strategy with, 213–14 North Korean nuclear crisis and, 205–6, 206 oil consumption, 253n36 public perceptions of major East Asian countries, 195–97, 196, 198 role structure concept, 130 security dilemma, 191–95 security paradigms, 212–13, 213

U.S. relations, 199, 205–6, 210, 215 See also Roh Moo-hyun South Korea, foreign policy balancer strategy, 203–4 community-building, 201–3 cooperative independence, 200–201 mediator, 206–8 sovereignty, 4 China, 181–82 Soviet Union, 272, 306 See also Russia; U.S.- Soviet competition Spratly Islands, 280, 280n36 stability-instability paradox, 271n21 Stalin, Josef, 108 strategic culture approach, 144 “strategic warning”, 71n42 structural neorealism. See neorealist theory structural realism, 116–17, 129, 143, 150 offensive vs. defensive, 150–52 See also balance of power theory; hegemonic stability theory; power transition theory Sun Yat-sen, 176 “tactical warning”, 71n42 TAC (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation), 133 Taiwan independence efforts, 181–82 security dilemma, 58–59 U.S.- China relations and, 275–76, 283–84 See also Chen Shui-bian Takahara, Akio, 7, 310–11 Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., 44 Tammen, Ronald L., 15–16, 15n15, 17, 17n20, 25, 26, 28 Tang Shiping, 6, 307, 308 Taro Aso, 228 Taylor, A. J. P., 21–22n32, 25n46 technological innovation, 64–67 Thatcher, Margaret, 103 Thirty Years’ War, 295 See also Anglo- German transition Thompson, William R., 23nn39–40 “386ers”, 212, 212n35 tit-for-tat strategy, 186 Toritsyn, A., 45 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), 133 Treaty of Versailles (1919), 177 Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 4 unipolarity, 60 See also American unipolarity U.S. Asian- Pacific trade, 281 Canadian trade, 264n9

Index China, foreign policy toward, 311–13 currency crisis risk, 257–59 current account deficit, 243, 247–48, 257 economic capacity and military capability projections, 111, 112–13 energy demand, 253–54, 253n36 Eu ropean trade, 281 global military dominance, 40 Korean peninsula, strategic interest in, 276–78 maritime supremacy, 286–88, 298 military transformation strategy, 192–93, 197–98, 199–200 neoconservatives, 106n35 North American trade, 264n9, 281 North Korean nuclear crisis and, 208–9 rise of, 97–98, 98n17 security dilemma, 61 South Korean relations, 199, 205–6, 210, 215 World War I intervention, 173 See also American unipolarity; Anglo- American transition; U.S.- China relations; U.S.-Japa nese relations; U.S.- Soviet competition U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 247 U.S. Department of Energy, 255 U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), troop relocation, 199 U.S.-Japanese relations military alliance, 109, 192, 227–28, 278–79, 285, 310 monetary confl icts, 246–47, 248 U.S.- Soviet competition, 267, 269, 270, 270n19, 271–72 U.S. Treasury, 245 securities, foreign holdings of, 265, 265n11 Uri Party (South Korea), 214 U.S.- China relations, 79 China’s maritime disputes, 279–81 common goals, 282 economic interdependence, 264–65, 312 energy competition, 239, 249–50, 255, 312 EP-3 spy plane collision, 79 exchange rate confl ict, 243–45, 247–49 nuclear deterrence, 272–73, 274–75, 283 PRC embassy bombing in Belgrade, 79 security dilemma dynamics, 272–73, 312–13 Taiwan and, 275–76, 283–84 U.S. currency crisis risk and, 257–59 U.S.- China relations, key benchmarks

323

China’s future intentions, 262–63 economic warfare scenarios, 263–66 security dilemma dynamics, 272–73 Van Evera, Stephen, 268n15 “voice opportunities”, 101 Volcker, Paul, 257–58 Walt, Stephen, 39 Waltz, Kenneth N., 37, 118, 143, 145, 161 Wang Min, 225 war democracy as deterrent to, 304–5 power transitions and, 1–2, 99 theories as to causes of, 268n15 weapons technology, 3, 299–300 Wei Ling, 5, 302 Weitsman, Patricia A., 44 Wendt, Alexander, 121–22, 128, 129, 145 Wen Jiabao, 51, 222 Western imperialism, 75 Western order, 4, 100–105 China, dissatisfaction with, 168 China, integration of, 106–9 democratic complex of, 100–101, 110–11 Germany, reintegration of, 102–4, 105 institutionalization of, 100, 101–2 Japan, reintegration of, 104, 105 power transition implications, 104–6 Wohlforth, William C., 51 World Bank, 107 World Trade Organization (WTO), 107 World War I, 29, 295 causes of, 63–64 China and, 177 U.S. intervention in, 173 World War II, 29–30, 295 causes of, 306 China and, 177 WTO (World Trade Organization), 107 Wu Xinbo, 282 Xiaoping, Deng, 46–47 Yasukuni Shrine, 234, 311 Zheng Bijian, 80, 230n46 Zhu Feng, 4, 296, 300, 301–2, 303 Zoellick, Robert, 89