China Reclaims World Power Status: Putting an End to the World America Made 9781138040861, 9781315174747

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China Reclaims World Power Status

Using both Chinese and Western theoretical approaches, this book analyses the strategies implemented by China for reclaiming power in the international domain. Examining domestic measures taken by China to assure its economic and social development, it also considers the strengths and weaknesses of its major international opponent, the US, and analyses their competing approaches to developing power resources and leadership dominance. It studies the foreign policies of both China and the US, first by going back to the historical origins of their ideological foundations and secondly by analysing their power building from the nineteenth century to the Trump and Xi Jinping presidencies. Finally, this book focuses on the One Belt One Road Initiative as China’s response to putting an end to the ‘world America made’ and debates the question of whether China will emerge as a new capitalist country embedded in the liberal capitalist world system, or as an authoritarian state with a socialist market economy, able to change the rules of the international order. Providing a comparison of the two major world powers and a comprehensive overview of their relationship, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of Chinese politics and international relations, as well as Chinese Studies more generally. Paolo Urio is Professor Emeritus of Public Management at the University of Geneva, Switzerland.

Routledge Contemporary China Series

For our full list of available titles: www.routledge.com/Routledge-­ContemporaryChina-­Series/book-­series/SE0768 179 The Politics of Memory in Sinophone Cinemas and Image Culture Altering Archives Edited by Peng Hsiao-­yen and Ella Raidel 180 China’s Soviet Dream Propaganda, Culture and Popular Imagination Yan Li 181 Deng Xiaoping and China’s Foreign Policy Ronald C. Keith 182 Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in China Evolution, Drivers and Prospects Jieqi Guan and Carlos Noronha 183 China’s Generation Gap Jiaming Sun and Dongmei Cheng 184 China Reclaims World Power Status Putting an End to the World America Made Paolo Urio 185 The Economic Roots of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong Globalization and the Rise of China Louis Augustin-­Jean and Anthea H.Y. Cheung 186 China’s Hydro-­Politics in the Mekong Conflict and Cooperation in Light of Securitization Theory Sebastian Biba

China Reclaims World Power Status

Putting an End to the World America Made

Paolo Urio

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Paolo Urio The right of Paolo Urio to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-04086-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-17474-7 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents



List of illustrations Acknowledgements List of abbreviations



Introduction

1

1

Understanding China’s strategy

7

viii ix xi

Approaching China from outside and from within  7 The silent transformations and the long time  13 Market economy and capitalism  20 2

Understanding power in the twenty-­first century’s international relations

35

Soft power and smart power, a Weberian critique  36 Analysing power: dissymmetry, structure, interactive processes and resources  43 The power structure and its five sub-­structures  44 The means of power: interactive processes and resources  52 Elementary interactive processes and elementary resources  53 Complex interactive processes and complex resources  57 The state, diplomacy, legitimization and coercion  62 Analysing power in the twenty-­first-century international system  64 3

China’s strategy: a view from Beijing From the Sunzi strategy to the New China’s strategy  83 The first contributions of Hu Angang to understanding China’s strategy  88

83

vi   Contents Hu’s contribution to the reorientation of China’s strategy towards ‘putting people first’  93 Hu Angang’s systematic analysis of China’s strategy to reclaim world power status  95 Comparing China’s comprehensive national power with the US  100 4

Understanding US strategy: how the US became the world hegemon of the twentieth century and how it tries to retain this status for the twenty-­first century The historical origins of US foreign policy: why it does matter  108 The historical origins of US ideology: the ‘Manifest Destiny’ and ‘the end of history’  109 The actualization of US ideology: the ‘new end of history’  113 From the ‘manifest destiny’ to the ‘indispensable nation’  114 Why is the indispensable nation bound to lead the world?  115 Setting the rules of the international system  115 Realizing ‘expansion’: the importance of economic and military resources  116 From religious fundamentalism to democratic and free trade fundamentalism and the identification and demonization of the enemy  118 From the Puritans’ ‘end of history’ to the ‘new end of history’  122 Donald Trump’s foreign policy: the end of the ‘end of history’?  129 The reactions of neoconservatives to Donald Trump’s election  129 The US foreign policy of President Donald Trump  134 US foreign policy and geopolitical thinking  143 The implementation of US foreign policy towards China  145 A very short and factual history of US expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries  145 US strategy towards China in the twenty-­first century  153 Military expenditures  160 Military bases  162 Alliances and partnerships  164 The new Obama doctrine: from overt warfare to covert warfare  165 The control of maritime routes  166 The development of intelligence capacity  167

108

Contents   vii The defence of the US dollar as the major international currency  167 Investments by US companies in China  168 Radio and TV broadcasting, think tanks and NGOs promoting US values and interests  169 5

China’s strategy for reclaiming world power status: putting an end to the ‘world America made’

196

The improbable ‘China model’ and the origins of contemporary China’s foreign policy  199 The construction of China’s strategy: building power resources  202 The One Belt One Road (OBOR) strategy: encircling the world  207 The way towards the OBOR  208 The OBOR, or China’s grand strategy  216 The OBOR and end to the ‘world America made’  221

Conclusion: the rise of China and the new international order

233



Annex

242



Bibliography Index

250 265

Illustrations

Figure 2.1 Power structure, interactive processes and resources

45

Maps 5.1 Map of China’s provinces 5.2 China’s proposed New Silk Roads

197 198

Tables 3.1 Overall comparison of power resources of China and the US in % of world total 3.2 Overall comparison of comprehensive national power of China and the US in % of world total (2000–2020) A1 The nine types of power resources A2 China catch-­up coefficient relative to the US (1950–2030) A3 GDP (in PPP) of five major countries (2015–2030) A4 GDP (in PPP) of the world’s five major economies (1990–2015) A5 GDP (in PPP) of five major countries as % of world total (1990–2015) A6 Comparison between China and the US in terms of export and import proportion in the world (2000–2015) (%) A7 Chinese and US overseas investments in % of the world total (2000–2015) A8 Chinese and US technology capacity in % of the world total (2000–2020) A9 Five currencies’ % of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) – IMF (2006–2020)

101 102 244 245 246 247 247 248 248 249 249

Acknowledgements

This book is the fifth I have written on contemporary China, and inevitably it reflects the knowledge I have accumulated on China thanks to the insights from many university professors, researchers, Master’s and PhD students, senior civil servants and even several ordinary Chinese citizens. It would be tedious for the reader to read the long list of persons to whom I am indebted. However, just let me quote a few of them without whose help, encouragement and criticisms I would have never been able to bring my endeavour to fruition. First of all, Prof. Hu Angang, founder and director of the Institute for Contemporary China Studies of Tsinghua University, whom I met 20 years ago, and impressed me right from the beginning of our long cooperation with his enthusiasm for the study of the extraordinary development of his great country. Also, in spite of the fact that Hu is a political economist whereas I am a political scientist, our cooperation developed quite naturally because we share the view that you cannot study such complex phenomena from the point of view of a single discipline, but you have to build a pluri-­disciplinary approach. Also, we share the view that while you must be as objective as possible in your data and information collection and analysis, you cannot escape from the necessity of orienting your work on the basis of some fundamental values. Here again our views are in tune: it is the well-­being of the entire population of a country that matters when you evaluate the policies of a government, no matter its institutional form. I also benefited from the profound knowledge of China of my other colleagues at Tsinghua University, Cui Zhiyuan, Wang Hui and Li Xiguang, as well as from Dong Keyong (Renmin University), Su Wei (Chongqing Party School), Sun Xuegong and Zuo Chuanchang (National Development and Reform Commissions – NDRC) and Harry Liu Genfa (Party School of Shanghai Pudong). Let me also mention Ms Wang Qizhen who was my assistant at Tsinghua in 2016, and Ms Chen Yali who helps me in Geneva with my documentation on China. The research design and the empirical orientation of this book have been tested on the occasion of numerous conferences I have given in Chinese universities and Party Schools in Beijing, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Shanghai, the NDRC, as well as at Geneva University and two Geneva think tanks.

x   Acknowledgements As usual, my British wife has helped me to put my English in a form acceptable to an international audience. While I am greatly indebted to all the people mentioned above, I will assume, as it is customary, full and exclusive responsibility for omissions, misinterpretations and errors that the attentive reader may nevertheless find inside this book. Finally, the author would like to emphasize that the book is based upon information available at the end of August 2017. Paolo Urio, Geneva

Abbreviations

AEI AIIB ASEAN BRICS CAD CAS CIA CNP CPC EU EUR FAO GBP ILO IMF JPN NGOs NPM OBOR PECC PRC RMB SCO SOEs TPP TTIP UN UNICEF USD, or    US$ or    simply $ WTO

Amer­ican Enterprise Institute Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Association of Southeast Asian Nations refers to the cooperation (formal and informal) between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Canadian dollar China Academy of Sciences Central Intelligence Agency of the United States Comprehensive National Power Communist Party of China European Union euro, currency of the Eurozone Food and Agriculture Organization British currency International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund Japan currency, yen non-­governmental organizations New Public Management One Belt One Road Pacific Economic Cooperation Council People’s Republic of China renminbi (Chinese currency, also called yuan) Shanghai Cooperation Organisation state-­owned enterprises Trans-­Pacific Partnership Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership United Nations United Nations Children’s Fund US currency World Trade Organization

Introduction

Confucius summarized his life as made up of two movements: that devoted to research […] and that spent in the experience of ‘joy’ (by which we understand the joy at arriving at his goal, at having found the object of his quest) […] the Master […] does not present himself as possessing the keys to wisdom or knowledge and makes little of the results obtained, not out of modesty, but because what matters is the tension between the two movements […] in short, what matters is that uninterrupted desire to go beyond, a desire that finds within itself its own end (its ‘happiness’) and keeps life young and evolving. François Jullien, In Praise of Blandness: Proceedings from Chinese Thought and Aesthetics, pp. 30–31

By introducing this book with this quotation, I wish to warn the reader that by analysing the strategy followed by the Communist Party of China (CPC) for restoring the country to world power status, I do not claim to have reached any definite or complete knowledge of the long march China has been on, and is still undertaking, to achieve this goal.1 The journey I started 21 years ago into the Chinese world has also been a very long one, during which I achieved several more or less well-­documented results (the joy), but which has also been full of questionings, hesitations and revisions. Hence, the never-­ending tension between the two movements. So, the results I submit today to the reader are by no means final, as it is certain that in the future there will be more questionings, hesitations and revisions. The first joy came from the understanding of the rationale of the reform process introduced by Deng Xiaoping at the end of the 1970s, the subject of my 2010 book, Reconciling State, Market, and Society in China: The Long March towards Prosperity. But already then, at the moment of submitting the final version of that manuscript to the publisher, there were some hesitations and questionings that were in part dissolved when one of the most renowned and influential Chinese economists, Hu Angang, agreed to write the preface to that book.2 But even so, several questions remained without a clear answer. So, the next step, and joy, has been the evaluation of how China’s public management compared with that of the West. This endeavour was quite stimulating as both areas had engaged, since the beginning of the 1980s, in a vast programme of

2   Introduction reforms, with both giving more space to the economy: the West by further developing capitalism (under pressure from the triumph of neoliberalism), and China by abandoning the command economy of the Mao era and introducing market mechanisms (under pressure from the disaster of the Cultural Revolution). Of course, the two areas had, and still have, some remarkable differences in terms of history, culture and economic and political systems. But many reforms were so similar that I did not hesitate to place them under the umbrella of New Public Management (NPM). In fact, both areas had embarked on implementing some of the main prescriptions of NPM, i.e. privatizations, contracting-­out and deregulations.3 In the meantime I had the opportunity to direct an international research project on one of the aspects of contracting-­out, the so-­called Public–Private Partnerships. The research covered four in-­transition countries, Poland, Ukraine, Russia and China, and confirmed some of the findings of the other two research projects: reforms may have positive as well as negative outcomes, depending on a great number of factors. And this should convince researchers and politicians that it is not wise to suggest or to undertake reforms only on the basis of simple ideological considerations, but only after a very careful analysis (both theoretical and empirical) of the content of the reforms and of the characteristics of the countries in which these reforms should be implemented.4 Last, but not least, taking advantage of the skills of one of my former Chinese assistants, I was able to obtain some joy from a research project on the emergence of non-­governmental organizations (NGOs) in China.5 This research confirmed some of the findings of my previous research: in the process of introducing market mechanisms, the Party-­State had relaxed, at least in part, its grip on the economy and society. Indeed, the rapid introduction of market mechanisms, as well as of human resources management techniques inspired by the West, led state-­owned enterprises (SOEs) and state bureaucracies to drastically reduce their staff and to lay off millions of employees and workers. This resulted in a huge rate of unemployment, as well as the emergence of new forms of poverty, which run the risk of counterbalancing, at least in part, the impressive decrease in poverty that was achieved thanks to the reforms. Moreover, these new inequalities could jeopardize the declared goal of the Chinese leadership to build a harmonious society in which wealth would be distributed equitably, as stated under the leadership of Hu Jintao. The problem was that the transition from a command economy to market mechanisms (and hence the introduction of competition among enterprises) led the government to freeing the SOEs from the obligation of providing their workers and employees with the social services they were used to under the former command economy: not only stable jobs, but also education, lodgings and health and old-­age care. The consequence of the new way of organizing the administrative and production process, in conjunction with the one-­child policy, was the destructuring of both traditional state and intra-­family solidarities. Therefore, the old solidarity system needed to be replaced by a new and modern safety net system, which, very likely, would need several decades before becoming sufficiently efficient. In the meantime, the Party-­State was forced (and in many cases very glad) to see the development of

Introduction   3 NGO activities, especially in the social domain, where it was not in a position to provide decent support to people suffering from unemployment, illness and old age. This does not mean that the Party-­State completely lifted its control over NGOs. On the contrary, it set up a complex system of devices that allowed it to keep NGOs under control, especially foreign NGOs and the Chinese ones financed by foreign funds. It was in fact out of necessity that this limited freedom was granted to NGOs. In spite of the results obtained by the research projects briefly described above, one question, which appeared right at the beginning of my journey, remains without a clear answer: what is the strategy that China has implemented for reclaiming its status as a world power? Today, it is even more necessary to find an answer to this question, as China has achieved, even if only partially, this goal and is in fact contributing in a substantial way to the overall restructuring of the international system that evolved from a bi-­polar system (the post-­war superpowers of the United States (US) and Soviet Union) to a unipolar one (after the collapse of the latter at the beginning of the 1990s) and is evolving to a multipolar system. How can we understand through what strategy China has been able to achieve this remarkable result and, even more importantly, in what ways and with what goals does it envisage playing its role within the new international system today and in the years to come? In order to find an answer to this question, it seems to me that it is necessary to resort to a variety of approaches that are beyond the knowledge and skills of a single researcher. I have therefore built my research strategy by using the contributions of authors working in several disciplines and by adding my own approach and findings whenever appropriate. Moreover, during my studies on China I realized that Western authors generally use different theoretical approaches compared to their Chinese colleagues, which leads very often to contradictory and even non-­satisfactory interpretations of China’s strategy. In order to overcome this difficulty, and for the purpose of avoiding a Western ethnocentric approach and of arriving at a balanced interpretation that may satisfy both cultures, I had to find some Chinese and Western authors that share at least some fundamental elements of their theoretical approaches. There are not many such authors, but luckily there are some. For example, François Jullien and Fernand Braudel share some common ideas with Chinese authors such as Wang Hui and Cui Zhiyuan, with regard to their interpretations of the dynamics of historical development and about the nature of the market economy and capitalism, two dimensions essential for the understanding of the development of China’s strategy. As for the use of the concept of power, I will use the complementary approaches of Hu Angang on the Chinese side, and an adaptation of Max Weber’s analysis of power to the international system, which I started to develop in the 1980s.6 Although using the work of these authors, I do not mean to follow their suggestions completely, nor do I claim to interpret their writings faithfully. In referring to them while planning my research I did not aim to perform an exercise in exegesis. In referring to these authors, my major interest is instead simpler: to find some theoretical hints and frameworks that would help me to identify the information most pertinent to my

4   Introduction research goal, to give a theoretical meaning to the facts collected, and finally to identify the most pertinent elements permitting one to understand and explain the content and the implementation of China’s strategy. These approaches will be analysed in Chapter 1, before I present my conception of power in Chapter 2. Then, in Chapter 3, based upon the works of Hu Angang, I will compare the comprehensive Amer­ican and Chinese power, before I analyse the foreign policy of the US (Chapter 4) and, finally, in Chapter 5, the Chinese strategy to confront the US for reclaiming world power status. In the first chapter I explain how I tried to avoid either a Western-­biased or a Sino-­biased approach to the analysis of historical processes by privileging the understanding of long-­term change, based upon the discovery of several epistemological commonalities between a choice of Chinese and Western authors. First, François Jullien, Fernand Braudel and Wang Hui stress the importance of discovering the silent transformation that develops in the long time, thus overcoming the temptation to describe societal development through events that are a superficial manifestation of what is important, i.e. what is happening slowly and silently beneath the surface, away from the noise of events, such as those that feature on TV news shows. Second, Fernand Braudel, Cui Zhiyuan and Hu Angang distinguish between market economy and capitalism, thus sustaining that it is possible to develop a socialist market economy. Finally, Max Weber and Hu Angang suggest how to analyse power by showing how power, though being based upon a constellation of different resources (material and immaterial), must be considered as a unitary or comprehensive phenomenon that cannot be deconstructed into several types. The second chapter discusses the conception of power that will be used to evaluate US and Chinese power in Chapters 4 and 5. Starting from a critique of Joseph Nye’s ‘soft, hard and smart power’, I then discuss my framework for analysing power in the international domain, based upon a development of Max Weber’s conception of power that treats power as a unitary phenomenon comprising two foundations: first, three socio-­psychological processes through which the ruled comply with the orders given by the rulers; and second, the use of material means, i.e. a mix of administrative and economic means, implemented by the rulers to satisfy citizens’ expectations. Starting from these premises, the chapter develops a three-­level approach to power: the structure of power, the interactive processes that develop within the power structure and the resources produced by these processes. These elements are illustrated by several historical examples, most of the time taken from Amer­ican and Chinese foreign relations history. Chapter 3 deals with the analysis of power by one of the most influential Chinese economists, Hu Angang. Based upon several of Hu Angang’s publications and a number of discussions during my annual visits to Beijing, I present a Chinese approach to the analysis of China’s strategy and to the comparison between US and Chinese power. The latter is mainly a quantitative analysis based upon solid data, generally from the World Bank. So, this chapter offers a first approach to the historical process through which China has managed to fill

Introduction   5 the gap with the United States on every power indicator, except for military resources. Chapter 4 presents a historical analysis of the development of Amer­ican power. It starts with the identification of the major components of the ideology that developed since the arrival of the first English colonizers, up to the contemporary revision and adaptation of that ideology to the changing place of the US in the international system. This allows identification of the means used by the US to establish itself as a world power and, at the end of the process, to keep its position as the sole world power. Thereby I illustrate the development and use of different types of resources (based upon the theoretical framework of Chapter 2), the resort to the international interactive processes producing these resources, and the establishment and safeguard of the rules of the international system (the power structure) that guarantee to the US the position of the sole world power. The fifth chapter starts with an analysis of the development of Chinese values and culture that are still orienting its foreign policy today, and evaluates how China has been successful in integrating traditional values with those imported from the West. The impact of Western aggression in the nineteenth century is also used to explain the origins of present-­day China’s foreign policy. Then the construction of power resources is briefly discussed in the framework of neoliberal globalization and the role played by the US in this context, where it tries to maintain its hegemonic role. The role of the US and the inevitable confrontation with its major competitor, China, is used to explain the various dimensions of China’s policy to reclaim world power status. Finally, China’s grand strategy (the One Belt One Road – OBOR) is used to integrate the various foreign relations initiatives taken by China to understand and give sense to its foreign policy to reclaim world power status. The Conclusion summarizes the major findings of the research and evaluates the results of the US policy to maintain its rank as the sole superpower and of China to reclaim world power status. The international situation is also taken into consideration to evaluate whether we are evolving towards a bi-­polar world (China–US) or, more likely, towards a multipolar world where Europe, Russia and India, as well as several regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Brazil, may play an important role by aligning themselves with one or the other global power. The Conclusion also deals with the question of whether China will play its international role as a new capitalist country embedded in the liberal capitalist world system, or as an authoritarian country with a socialist market economy able to change the rules of the international order. In writing this book, I have tried to avoid a too-­technical approach. While I address the results of my research to an academic audience, I present them in a form accessible to a wider public. In organizing the five chapters, I tried to present them according to a sequence that should make the reading as easy as possible. As all the dimensions dealt with in the five chapters are linked to each other within a kind of structural interdependency, there will be many cross-­ references that have made repetitions necessary. The academic experts in foreign

6   Introduction relations may find this way of presenting my argument rather tedious. My purpose in doing so is to facilitate the reading for laypeople, so that each chapter may stand on its own. Each chapter can be read independently of the others and, should the reader wish to find more detailed explanations, he or she may refer to the other chapters as suggested in the text. Finally, I am well aware that by analysing the foreign policies of the US and China I am dealing with very complex historical, political, economic and social phenomena that may lead to presentations and interpretations biased by moral and/or ideological a priori. While I cannot assure the reader that I have succeeded in avoiding the traps of moral or ideological biases, I can assure him/her that I have tried to stick to the facts, as they have been confirmed by official documents, respected historians and social scientists, as well as by reliable investigative journalists. By facts I mean both physical actions and verbal statements by prominent political leaders. In other words, I will attribute importance not only to what has been done (e.g. the conquest of the Amer­ican West in the nineteenth century or the development of China’s military power in the twenty-­first century) but also to the discourse (or the ideology) that the Amer­ican and Chinese leaderships have developed about their country, its internal organization and its place in the world.

Notes 1 Answering a critical comment by one of the reviewers of my manuscript on China, the West, and the Myth of New Public Management, finally published by Routledge in 2012, I had to explain in detail why I came to the conclusion that this has in fact been the ultimate goal of China’s foreign policy since the defeat in the Opium Wars: ‘Restoring China as a world power’, pp. 92–96. 2 Hu Angang, ‘Foreword: How to know about contemporary China’, in Paolo Urio, Reconciling State, Market, and Society in China. The Long March towards Prosperity, London and New York, Routledge, 2010, pp. xi–xv. 3 Urio, China, the West, op. cit. 4 Paolo Urio (ed.), Public Private Partnerships. Success and Failure Factors in Transition Countries, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 2010. 5 Paolo Urio and Yuan Ying, L’émergence des ONG en Chine, Le changement du rôle de l’Etat-Parti [The Emergence of NGOs in China. The Changing Role of the Party-­ State], Bern, Peter Lang, 2014. 6 Paolo Urio, Le rôle politique de l’administration publique, Lausanne, LEP, 1984, ch. 5. This book is out of print, but the chapter on power is available (in French) on my personal website: http://ecmi.ch/pdf/papers_publications/1984-2_on_decision-­making_ and_power.pdf. A summary of this framework is presented (in English) in my book Reconciling State, Market, and Society, op. cit., ch. 4. In these two books, the framework for the analysis of power was designed for understanding power within a state. In the following pages, I will adapt this framework to the analysis of power in the international domain, while maintaining its original assumptions and theoretical hypotheses.

1 Understanding China’s strategy

Plans always fall behind changes [Jìhuà gǎnbushàng biànhuà] Chinese proverb

Approaching China from outside and from within Understanding how the Chinese think and behave is not an easy task. Not only is China geographically far away from the West, but its culture is also far away from Western languages, thinking and behaving.1 Most of the time Western people, i.e. journalists and politicians, but also scholars and even sinologists, cannot help understanding and evaluating China from the Western point of view, that is, using our concepts, values, theories and ideology.2 François Jullien has made this point very well. The West has dominated the world for the last five centuries. Practically no other culture has been able to resist its domination, at least until very recently. This relationship between the West and the rest of the world has given Westerners the feeling, and for many even the certitude, that, on every count, their culture is superior to the other cultures: better government, economy, military, legal system and social relations, and even a ‘better God’. The titles of a few books published by Western authors on China tell us that the Chinese are lying; beware, conflict with China is coming; China is a threat as it targets America; don’t worry, China is a fragile superpower; and in any case its collapse is coming.3 The foundation of this way of thinking is summarized by the title and subtitle of another book: ‘Economics does not lie: a defense of the free market in a time of crisis’.4 Which clearly means: in the West we have a free market economy (i.e. capitalism) supported by liberal democracy.5 Freedom is one of the two fundamental values of the West, assured by liberal democracy, along with material comfort, assured by the economic efficiency of the market economy. China has neither. True, China has introduced some market mechanisms. But if it does not abandon its authoritarian regime, adopt liberal democracy and a complete market economy (i.e. capitalism), it will inevitably collapse. This way of seeing China is clearly based upon the theory of one of the most influential neoliberal thinkers, Milton Friedman, for whom freedom in the capitalist economy is the guarantee of freedom in the polity. These ideas are

8   Understanding China’s strategy today shared even by scholars generally considered to belong to the moderate left-­wing intelligentsia.6 With the exception of curiosity, and in some cases also genuine admiration for the arts produced by other cultures, the case is clear: we are the best. Even when one admits that our democracy has some problems, China’s problems look much worse. For example, a recent report written for the Project 2049 Institute says that the United States, while an imperfect democracy, is an inspiration to people everywhere who yearn for the freedom and dignity that come from having a representative government, independent legal system, and market economy. In contrast, all power in the PRC is monopolized by the Chinese Communist Party, a political organization whose legitimacy is called into question by its troubled history. Read the State Department annual report on human rights and it quickly becomes apparent that this is a deeply authoritarian regime, and one that continues to oppress the Chinese people.7 It is this kind of analysis that has entitled us to take possession of the rest of the world, to teach the ‘good savage’ how society should be organized. Of course, the Chinese could say: read the Chinese report on human rights in the United States (US), and the World Bank reports that recognize that China has lifted 500 million people out of poverty in about a quarter of a century. So, we boarded our ‘caravels’ and discovered what we have labelled ‘the New World’.8 There we found an empty world, or a world that we have emptied, or at least that has not been able to resist us. There we have found the ‘good savage’, we have dressed him, and we have converted him. And, I should like to add, not much remains today of the original cultures in the Americas. Today, the inhabitants of the Americas, not those who came from Europe and, for example, founded the US, but the descendants of the local ‘Indians’, speak English, Spanish or Portuguese.9 We have emptied their world and filled it according to our image, in the same way God created mankind. But when we arrived in China, we found a very different situation. The world we found here was full. The missionaries and artists who arrived in China had to learn the Chinese language, respect the rites and honour the emperor. Some of them dressed the Chinese way and took Chinese names.10 In short, somewhere they were ‘sinicized’. Nevertheless, still today we persist in believing that the West, which has dominated the world for such a long time, remains the reference point for ways of thinking and doing. Moreover, we claim that we possess universal values that have become ‘the law of reason’. Therefore, even when we claim that we have escaped this cultural ethnocentric posture, we are still submitted to it, without even being aware.11 This has two consequences: first, we have difficulties in opening our mind to other coherences outside those with which we are familiar, those that for us are self-­evident. Second, we have difficulties in articulating China’s cultural dimension with its other dimensions, i.e. economy, polity and society, and this is for us an important point if we want to understand China’s strategy to reclaim world power status.12

Understanding China’s strategy   9 François Jullien’s purpose is to overcome this inadequacy. For assessing the choices made by Western philosophy, Jullien thinks that one must assess them ‘from an elsewhere’, which should be as far away as possible. One may think of India. But as India belongs to the family of Indo-­European languages, it is not far enough. For Jullien, the only possible choice is China, a country that has developed a world as civilized as ours. But it has done so outside our language, outside our history, independently from us, indifferently to us, in any case until the seventeenth century, or even the nineteenth century.13 As a philosopher, Jullien questions the assumptions and choices made by the West around the fifth century bc that have oriented our way of thinking up to the present day. Greek philosophers have chosen rationality, categorizations, clear definitions that fix opposite states (weak–strong, young–old, beautiful–ugly) that inevitably lead to the construction of models. For example, for feminine beauty, the Venus de Milo is pure beauty, and does not show the slightest sign of ugliness. Moreover, we plan action according to a model, for example, market economy and liberal democracy. In other words, the Western way of thinking prefers to analyse the ‘being’ instead of the ‘becoming’. Also, it pays more attention to events, which are ‘fixed moments or states’, than to the underlying long-­ term forces: look at the information on TV, a patchwork of vociferous events. In contrast, Chinese thinking pays more attention to the movement, the transition, the way (dao), the transformation and especially the ‘silent transformations’, i.e. the underlying forces operating silently over the ‘long time’ that shape the environment in which the actors behave, thus defining the limit of their freedom. More on this concept hereafter, which is very important for understanding China’s strategy. In order to be open to Chinese culture and eventually to introduce some of its thinking into our own culture, it will be necessary for us Europeans to place ourselves at a distance from the thinking whence we come, to break its filiations and question it from the outside, to question its evidences and to discover what our thought has not thought. Jullien strongly suggests that it may be possible that the two ways of thinking, the Western and the Chinese, may enrich each other, by helping each other to discover that there is ‘a somewhere else for the thinking’, another way of thinking. This opening to Chinese culture should help us to question the evidence of our way of thinking and discover the ‘non-­thought’ of our thinking.14 It should be noted that Jullien informs his readers that he is not attracted to China because of the fascination of the distance and the pleasure of ‘exotism’, but he resorts to China as a ‘theoretical revealer’ with the aim of opening up some other ‘possibles’ in our mind and thereafter to start philosophy anew.15 But beware, Jullien does not look for a (new) way of thinking that will, in the end, replace the Western way. He says that the ‘detour’ to China must be followed by a ‘return’ to the Western philosophy with the purpose of questioning it in what it does not question. So, there is not a complete opposition between the West and China. Moreover, Jullien does not consider that the two ways of thinking are completely different. Therefore, mutual enrichment is even more possible as one

10   Understanding China’s strategy can build upon the already existing commonalities. In fact, as said above, the difference appeared towards the fifth century bc when the West (i.e. Greek philosophy) chose rationality and modelling. Nevertheless, prior to this choice, the difference between China and the West was very weak. To prove this Jullien invites us to (re)read the two classics of ancient Greece, i.e. the Iliad and the Odyssey, and think about the behaviour of one of its major characters: Ulysses. Ulysses is not someone who first defines a model and then implements it. What makes him powerful is his capacity to see the advantage he can get from the circumstances. He is smart, he understands in what direction the situation will evolve and how to make the best out of it. He possesses flair, cunning and intelligence. In this sense, his way of thinking and behaving is very close to the traditional Chinese way.16 So, if we accept Jullien’s suggestion, we have to look at China’s strategy from both outside (i.e. from the West) and inside. In order to achieve this goal, we have to find in the two cultures some commonalities in their ways of thinking about history and the organization of society. Luckily there are quite a few. For the purpose of this book, whose aim is to understand China’s strategy for reclaiming world power status, the most interesting authors are those working on history, philosophy and political science.17 Apart from Jullien, who has introduced me to the traditional Chinese way of understanding and practising strategy, and especially to the concept of ‘silent transformations’, several other authors have helped me to construct the design of the research on which this book is based. First of all, Fernand Braudel, who has developed two fundamental concepts. The first is an invaluable complement to the ‘silent transformations’, i.e. the idea that the time of history is not uniform or unique, but that there are several historical times, and one of them, the ‘long time’ (or the ‘longue durée’), very clearly complements Jullien’s ‘silent transformations’. Moreover, Braudel is also, like Jullien, very careful not to attribute too much importance to ‘events’, and, as he says, to escape the ‘dictatorship of events’.18 Indeed, the latter are in fact the vociferous (i.e. audible) and evident (i.e. ‘seeable’) temporary emergences of superficial phenomena that do not explain in depth the evolution of history. Second, Braudel offers an in-­depth historical analysis that allows us to make a clear distinction between market economy and capitalism. Complementary to these two authors is the insight provided by Nicolas Zufferey, who has compared Western philosophy to Chinese thought by showing not only the remarkable differences that exist between them, but also the interesting similarities.19 Three Chinese authors, who have an in-­depth knowledge of Western literature, present some commonality with Western thinking. Wang Hui develops a historical analysis of his country based upon long-­term changes, which correspond very well to Jullien’s ‘silent transformations’, and concurs with Braudel (whom he quotes on several occasions) on the distinction between market economy and capitalism. In line with both Jullien and Braudel, Hu Angang has developed an in-­depth analysis of China’s strategy to reclaim world power status based upon long-­term data series on the development of strategic resources that

Understanding China’s strategy   11 describe and explain China’s growing power in the international system. I will analyse in detail Hu’s contribution to the understanding of China’s modernization process in Chapter 3. Here it is sufficient to mention that for Hu, the development of a country’s power must be analysed and understood with regard to key indicators that develop over long periods of time, at least 25 years. Cui Zhiyuan considers, in line with Braudel’s distinction between market and capitalism, that there is not necessarily a contradiction between public and private property, and therefore there is space for an economic system, different from both planned economy and capitalism, that associates these two dimensions of the economy into a ‘socialist market economy’. Finally, the analysis of the interactions of actors in the international domain necessitates the recourse to a clear theory of power, for which I have developed a framework for analysis starting from the seminal work of Max Weber and criticizing the concepts of ‘soft power’ and ‘smart power’ put forward by Joseph Nye. Before I examine the contributions of these authors to the design of this book, it seems to me that it is necessary to mention some of the basic knowledge a Westerner should acquire before trying to enter the contemporary Chinese world. As we shall see, this is not a useless enumeration in a book that is being addressed to a public which is supposed to have already acquired some knowledge about China and its foreign policy, but may have forgotten some important features of China’s history that still today orient the attitudes of Chinese leaders and people towards contemporary events. The first knowledge that is necessary for a Westerner, and which may surprise some readers, is that a Westerner should have acquired a good knowledge of his/her own culture, and more particularly of its historical development from the Greco-­Roman time to the present. In doing so he/she will see all the good things we have done through the centuries, as well as the less good and even the very bad. For the latter, it would be enough to go back 70–80 years to find some events of which we Westerners should be ashamed. This should not be a masochist exercise as someone would qualify it, but it should, in a positive mood, help us to look at other cultures with some modesty, objectivity and compassion.20 Second, a Westerner should consider that China is one of the greatest civilizations, not only for the arts, but also for the organization of government. This may also come as a surprise for some (many?) readers. In fact, according to Weber, China was, together with ancient Egypt, the first country to develop a quasi-­ modern public administration, i.e. a public bureaucracy.21 Not only was its functioning based upon formal rules and hierarchical tiers, but access to it was open to the whole male population without distinction, based upon the acquisition of the knowledge necessary for public management, certified by the passing of formal exams. Third, China suffered its most devastating humiliation between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Western powers reduced it to semi-­colonial status. Of course, this was not the first time China had been defeated. The Mongols and the Manchus defeated China and ruled over it for several centuries. But they

12   Understanding China’s strategy were almost completely assimilated by Chinese culture and governed it according to the traditional Confucian way, so that there is no discontinuity in China’s history, which is structured according to the sequence of the Chinese dynasties. But the ‘barbarians’ (Westerners) who defeated China in the nineteenth century do not want to occupy it (it is too big) nor govern it (at least directly), and moreover they do not even dream of being assimilated by Chinese culture. The reason is very simple: they are deeply persuaded that they belong to the best culture that has existed in world history. So, they just want to do business in China, and quite naturally on their own terms. The sack of the Summer Palace by the Anglo-­ French army in October 1860 is the event that best illustrates the deep rift that existed at that time between China and the West. French writer Victor Hugo summarized the horror of this event in a famous letter with these words: There was, in a corner of the world, a wonder of the world; this wonder was called the Summer Palace. […] This wonder has disappeared. One day two bandits entered the Summer Palace. One plundered, the other burned. […] What a great exploit, what a windfall! One of the two victors filled his pockets; when the other saw this he filled his coffers. And back they came to Europe, arm in arm, laughing away. Such is the story of the two bandits. We Europeans are the civilized ones, and for us the Chinese are the barbarians. This is what civilization has done to barbarism.22 To assess the historical sequence of events that led to the sack of the Summer Palace, one must also take into consideration that, according to British sources, the summer palace was ordered burned to the ground by the British commander, Lord Elgin, not as an act of vandalism, but as an act of calculated retribution, after Chinese imperial officers kidnapped, tortured and killed 12 members of a European diplomatic delegation, among them a correspondent for the Times, Thomas Bowlby.23 But it remains that the sack and looting are acts of vandalism (to say the least) independently of the seriousness of the events that led Lord Elgin to order the sack. Torturing and killing members of a European diplomatic delegation is certainly a barbaric act. But here again, the Chinese could say that it came after years of bullying, cheating and killing by the Western powers.24 The humiliation was rendered even deeper when China was defeated by its ‘small cousin of the rising sun’, Japan, in 1894–1895, and lasted until 1949 when Mao proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China. One may think that the ‘long century of humiliations’ has been forgotten.25 Do not make this mistake. The Chinese left the ruins as they were, and after years of decay and looting by local people of what remained after the sack of 1860, they reorganized the park and opened it to the public. Hugo’s letter is posted at the eastern entrance of the park. In 2010, for the 150th anniversary of the sack, China organized a gala on the site of the remains of the Summer Palace in which several

Understanding China’s strategy   13 actors and singers took part, among them the famous actor Jackie Chan. Tang Can, a young singer, said that the looting of the Summer Palace ‘will remain forever in the memory of the Chinese people; we may forgive, but we shall never forget’. China State TV reported on the event and produced a seven-­part documentary.26 Fourth, the contradiction between the greatness of Chinese culture and the long century of humiliations must be resolved. And this explains why the goal of any Chinese government since the last decades of the empire is to restore China as a world power.27 To achieve this goal, China will use, at least in part, the way of thinking inherited from the empire. And it is here that François Jullien, Fernand Braudel, Nicolas Zufferey, Wang Hui and Cui Zhiyuan will help us not only to understand the traditional Chinese way of thinking, but also to discover that some Chinese and Western thinkers share some ideas about how civilizations develop through history, and what the commonalities and the differences are.

The silent transformations and the long time The silent transformations, as they are commented upon by François Jullien, are based on an analysis of the traditional Chinese way of defining and implementing strategy. They are part of the traditional way the Chinese have conceived the world in which they live. It is therefore interesting, before we go any further, to replace them in the general framework of Chinese philosophy. For this purpose, I will resort to a book written by the Swiss sinologist Nicolas Zufferey, significantly entitled Chinese Thought Today. Better Knowing Ancient China for Understanding XXI Century China.28 Right from the introduction, Zufferey draws our attention to the features of Chinese philosophy that may be of some interest for the West. First of all, its conception of the world, in which all its dimensions (nature, society and individuals) are interdependent, corresponds to our (very recent) interest in respecting the environment, as well as our interest in Chinese medicine which considers human beings in their complex totality. Second, the idea that the process of becoming men or women is determined to a large extent by the process of socialization corresponds to our interest (also relatively recent) in gender studies. Third, the fact that traditional Chinese thinkers do not consider theory and practice as two separate moments is interesting for the revising of our definition of strategy and, as we have already seen above, should lead us to question our obsession with ‘first setting up a model and then orienting our action according to that model’. Finally, the fact that Chinese philosophy has not based morality upon the revelation of a transcendent God, and the religion built upon it, should be interesting to us at a time when God and religion are losing their role as the reference point for determining what is considered to be moral behaviour. Also, Zufferey draws our attention to the revival of the ancient Chinese philosophy, namely Confucianism, through which China seems to be looking for a substitute or a complement to Marxism, in spite of the constant reference to the latter made in official political discourse. One may also

14   Understanding China’s strategy examine whether there is a fundamental incompatibility between liberal democracy and Confucianism.29 Moreover, for Zufferey, utility is an essential criterion for assessing the validity of philosophical postures in ancient China. Chinese philosophers do not like to be too abstract, but refer to circumstances or to examples drawn from the real world, both in the past and the present. Knowledge is always seen in view of action, to know how to act morally or politically. What is important is not ‘what to know’, but ‘to know how to do it’. I have been able to confirm that this attitude is still valid today for Chinese high officials. When I was the director of a training programme for senior Chinese officials, I had to discuss the content of the training with the leaders of the groups of trainees coming to Europe to attend seminars at public and private institutions. They always wanted to have presentations showing how to do things, how to manage human resources, how to privatize state-­owned enterprises (SOEs), how to improve the environment, how to protect natural and cultural monuments, and so on. When I suggested that our experts could also present the theoretical basis of the management tools related to those policies, they always, very politely, made me understand that that was not what they expected from the training, as they already had the theoretical knowledge. In other words, they were saying: give us the practical tools, and we will possibly use them in the framework of our theory. So, for them, the question was: we already know what to do (the theory) and at the same time we have our way of doing it (our practice); we just want to see how you do it (your practice), and if it is useful to us, we will introduce it into our ‘what to do – how to do it’.30 It is little wonder that the Chinese participants were also very interested in ‘action learning’, as developed by some Western scholars and practitioners, which seemed to be in tune with the Chinese merging of theory and practice.31 For almost all the Chinese traditional thinkers the goal of action is to assure the stability of the political order. To this end, words are less important than training, i.e. doing. Once again, we find here the opposition between model and action.32 In the framework of this chapter it is not possible to summarize the numerous comparisons that Zufferey proposes between the different schools of Chinese thought and Western philosophy. It is nevertheless interesting to mention the case of Wang Chong (ad 27–97), as it shows that in spite of the difficulties that the Chinese have in criticizing their predecessors, or the rulers, and the consequent difficulty to innovate in all domains (an opinion generally diffused among Western commentators of contemporary China), one should not consider that this attitude is necessarily the rule, nor that Chinese people are only able to imitate and not to invent or reinvent.33 This should be taken into account when evaluating China’s strategy for reclaiming world power status. Indeed, according to Zufferey, Wang Chong can be considered a pioneer of the post-­ Maoist era, as he considers innovation and creativity to be the major qualities of the intellectuals. No wonder these ideas were severely criticized during the Imperial era, and above all by Emperor Qianlong (r. ad 1736–1795), very likely because they constituted a threat to the ideology upon which rested the Imperial power. Wang Chong’s ideas were rediscovered in China during the twentieth

Understanding China’s strategy   15 century, and they may constitute today an interesting support to the new trends of the development strategy, as defined by Hu Jintao at the Party Congress of October 2007, when he put a lot of emphasis on the necessity to take the initiative to introduce autonomously (i.e. from the West) innovations into several important domains of Chinese society.34 It is in this context that I will examine the contribution of François Jullien to the design of my research. It is not easy to summarize the works of Jullien, who has published an astonishing number of books and articles.35 Moreover, as he says on several occasions, his intellectual project is a long-­term one, a ‘chantier en construction’, which gives the impression that we cannot refer to any of his books as the final result of his endeavours. Nevertheless, Jullien presents a remarkable consistency, in book after book, even if recently he felt the need to summarize, and therefore ‘to put some order’, his findings in a book that is in fact a lexicon of Euro-­Chinese thought. Jullien says that there comes a time in someone’s work when it is necessary to start connecting the various elements, in other words, to put some order into one’s ‘chantier’.36 I do not pretend here to interpret Jullien’s writings faithfully. In referring to his work, while planning the structure of this book, my major interest was instead simpler: to find some suggestions for understanding Chinese culture with regard to its contribution to the concept and practice of strategy. And in any case, I am convinced that the exegesis of Jullien’s writings must be performed by his colleagues, i.e. by philosophers. For the same reasons, I will not comment on the controversy that arose after the publication of a book by the Swiss sinologist Jean-­François Billeter criticizing the work of Jullien and the reply of the latter.37 Jullien’s first suggestion for the understanding of Chinese strategy is the distinction between ‘creation and process’, the former corresponding to the Western way of thinking, the latter to the Chinese.38 Whereas the West (starting from Greek philosophy) has conceived the world as ‘a creation’, Chinese culture has developed a systematic conception of the world as a continuous, regular process, without a religious eschatology or a teleological interpretation. It is for this reason that Chinese culture is particularly apt for thinking the transformation, and it is from the reality of the transformation that it gives meaning to human life.39 Moreover, the transformation is ‘silent’, i.e. it is not immediately audible, contrary to the events, such as those reported in the news (especially on television). The complete Chinese expression qualifying the transformation is ‘qián yí mó huà’, literally translated as: ‘invisible transformation silent transformation’. Jullien thinks that ‘silent’ is more appropriate than invisible because what is important is that one cannot hear the transformation that operates ‘silently’, independently from us. Wang Hui is also in favour of this interpretation and is even grateful to Jullien for having suggested giving more emphasis to the silent character of the transformation instead of the invisible. Moreover, this way of thinking sets some very strong limits on the freedom of the individual.40 Here Jullien has the same interpretation of the historical process as Fernand Braudel, who develops the concept of ‘long time’ or the ‘longue durée’. For Braudel, too,

16   Understanding China’s strategy the more important phenomena occur independently from the will of the historical subjects, whose freedom is thus considerably limited.41 In the West, creation corresponds to action, which seems to be a good attitude when the strategist is confronted with a given situation where it is important to act in order to defeat the enemy. But action is local, limited in time and refers to a subject (the strategist), whereas the transformation is global, progressive, in the long time (or in the ‘longue durée’), silent and therefore difficult to identify. In Jullien’s words: The silent transformation, in contrast, does not use force or thwart anything; it does not fight; but, as the saying goes, makes its way, infiltrates, spreads, branches out and becomes pervasive – ‘spread like a stain’. It integrates and disintegrates […] This is also why it is silent; because it does not give rise to any resistance to it.42 Moreover, the Western way of thinking defines some clear opposite states, such as ‘strong-weak’, ‘big-small’, ‘ugly-beautiful’. This leads inevitably to defining models. For example, the Venus de Milo, was the model for feminine beauty in ancient Greece. She was perfectly beautiful without the slightest trace of ugliness. When models are translated into strategies, they run the risk of losing touch with reality and its silent transformations. For example, the ‘Maginot Line’ was defined by the French military leadership prior to the Second World War, based upon the experience of the First World War. It did not work because the silent transformations that occurred in the domain of warfare were not ‘heard’ by the French military leadership, and the ‘Maginot Line’ lost touch with the new reality of military warfare. In Jullien’s words, dealing with revolutions, it is the silent transformations, more than the force of the rebellious masses, the ultimate utopian representation of the Agent, which overturn and will overturn all the Ancient Regimes through progressive erosion of everything that supports them, in relation to which actions and revolutions are perhaps less catalysers than simply indicators.43 Similarly, based upon the Book of Changes,44 Jullien suggests analysing the transition from growth to decline, and vice versa. Growth, […] does not give way at the approach of the Decline but, precisely as its development increases, it is itself already yielding towards decline. This is why, as the Growth comes to an end […] a manifest decline is acknowledged. As I have been expending my strength with success during the time of the Growth, I have in fact already started to wear myself out, because the more I display my capabilities the more fragile they become, the more ground I occupy, the more I must toil to conserve it; the Roman Empire had pushed its limes too far not to collapse.45 Clearly, this will be useful when analysing the changes in their respective places of the US and China in the international system.

Understanding China’s strategy   17 Finally, according to Jullien, the silent transformations are not only the opposite of action, but also of the events, as action inevitably becomes vociferous, as one can very well see looking at TV news, a patchwork of events to the detriment of in-­depth analysis of the underlying forces, i.e. of the silent transformations.46 It is here that one can see a strong similarity between Jullien’s ‘silent transformations’ and Braudel’s analysis of history. Indeed, Braudel considers that the time of history is a multiple time comprising the short, the medium and the long time (also defined as ‘the longue durée’). The short time corresponds to events, which for a long time constituted the backbone of Western historical research. Braudel was the leader of the French Annales School, which rejects the systematic and almost exclusive use of events for explaining the evolution of history. For Braudel it is necessary to free oneself from the vociferous reality of the events as they are reported with much noise in the news, thus acquiring an importance that they do not necessarily possess. On the contrary, the skilful researcher (and for this book also the skilful strategist) should pay more attention to the long time, which may look motionless, but within which the silent underlying phenomena operate and shape all dimensions of society (social, political, economic), a clear reference to Jullien’s ‘silent transformations’.47 The consequence is that the individual actor is imbedded into a history, which can be a very old one, i.e. the history of the language one speaks, of the religion one practises, in short into a civilization. So, one may have the illusion of having some kind of responsibilities, and therefore of freedoms, and to be able to choose among several possibilities. But in fact, one’s freedom is much more limited, and one is not completely the master of one’s destiny, because, in reality, he is submerged by the flow of history through the slow time (‘la marche lente’). If the profound movements [Julien’s silent transformations] are in your favour, you will be served, independently of your intelligence, your merits, your thoughts.48 So, what should be the attitude of the skilful strategist? Let us first consider the conclusion arrived at by Jullien at the end of his comparison between the Western and the traditional Chinese way: the Chinese way looks like ‘an unmodelled model of becoming’.49 In other words, the traditional Chinese strategy is based not upon the prior definition of a model that is subsequently used to orient action (as in the West), but on the analysis of the situation aimed at discovering the ‘situation potential’, i.e. the favourable and unfavourable elements that may have an impact upon the realization of the strategist’s objectives. Starting from this analysis, the Chinese strategist adopts a mix of inaction and action. On the one hand, he does not act when the analysis of the situation shows that he does not have the means to intervene with success, and therefore he waits until the ‘silent transformations’ inevitably change (‘transform’) the situation, eventually in a way favourable to the realization of his objectives. But on the other hand, he acts when the situation shows that he has the possibility to intervene with success upon some elements so that, in the long time, the situation becomes overall favourable to the realization of his objectives. Thus, Jullien’s

18   Understanding China’s strategy understanding of the Chinese strategy contradicts the Western dominant opinion about the propensity of Chinese strategists towards inaction and slowness and the idea of ‘an eternal China’ incapable of change, innovation and progress. On the contrary, the Chinese strategist acts very quickly when the situation is favourable, and when it is not he waits for the ‘silent transformation’ to materialize and, in the meantime, acts upon the elements of the environment when he has a chance to change them to his advantage. Finally, the best Chinese strategist is the one who wins the war without fighting, its opponent being inevitably led to lose when the ‘potential of the situation’ has become helplessly negative for him, following the ‘silent transformation’ and the changes introduced by the actions of the Chinese strategist. This is not to say that China still uses its traditional ways of organizing strategy in all domains. Indeed, particularly in the natural sciences, China today uses the approach it learned from Western natural science, based upon Galileo’s intuition that the universe is written in a model, based upon mathematical formulae. Today Chinese natural scientists have little to learn from their Western colleagues so far as methodology is concerned and have achieved remarkable results. Nevertheless, in the domain of public policy-­making there is sufficient evidence that China is still following the traditional way of organizing its strategy as presented by Jullien. And this is the major hypothesis that has oriented the research presented in this book, in spite of the fact that many Chinese graduate students and scholars (especially economists and political scientists) trained in the West and work today within Chinese universities, think tanks and even the Chinese State apparatus.50 In fact, Jullien considers that today China walks on its two legs: the Chinese and the Western, and this is to its advantage, especially in international relations. And Jullien adds this final comment: The danger would be to deal with the difference [between the West and China] in terms of nature or of mind-­set (‘he is Chinese’, ‘the Chinese mind’). All my work has been devoted to show that here the question is about the [Chinese] coherences that we did not ignore in our experience, but to which we have devoted little attention.51 One last remark. One may think that the analyses presented above, especially those of the French philosopher François Jullien, are too abstract and thus far away from the main objective of this book, which aims at discovering China’s strategy for reclaiming global power status. Two authors with very different profiles confirm the analyses of Jullien and Braudel: the Chinese historian Wang Hui and the Sino-­French economist André Chieng. Wang Hui confirms both Jullien’s ‘silent transformations’ and Braudel’s ‘longue durée’.52 André Chieng applies Jullien’s analysis to a variety of contemporary situations in both business and public policy-­making in China and in the West.53 It is interesting to note that in the ‘Postface’ to Chieng’s book, Jullien considers that the book constitutes, for him, the empirical verification of his analysis of traditional Chinese strategy. He is particularly pleased that Chieng has used two of his major concepts: ‘the situation potential’ and ‘the silent transformations’. Chieng’s book comforts

Understanding China’s strategy   19 Jullien in his belief that these notions can help to understand contemporary China. For him, China is not projecting any plan for the future, in particular it has no imperial project, but it exploits at its best, day after day, the ‘situation potential’, by making the best out of the favourable factors (in all domains: economic, political and international) for the purpose of strengthening its power and its rank amongst nations. It is only today that we start, with some astonishment, to take stock of the results China has realized.54 In his book Chieng develops and confirms empirically some other dimensions of Jullien’s analysis. More particularly, he insists on the importance of preparation instead of action, and on the capacity to adapt to the situation, without projecting a model on reality with the aim (as we do in the West) to act by making reality correspond to the model. For Chieng, the essence of strategy is, on the one hand, to gradually trap the competitor into a fixed position upon which the strategist can act, and, on the other hand, to constantly change its position in order to make its own strategy incomprehensible for the competitor. Moreover, as well as Jullien, Chieng insists on the importance of managing time, understood not in the Western sense of chance, or destiny, but as ‘time-­ opportunity’. It is by leaving the course of ‘things’ – the occurrence of events – to develop, without interfering, that one can be most efficient; more precisely, by combining ‘the acting’ upon the elements of the situation that one can change to one’s advantage, with ‘the non-­acting’ when one does not have a reasonable possibility to change the elements to one’s advantage. In order to act efficiently, one must wait for the favorable occasion, the favorable moment; and it is here that it is possible and necessary to act. But this does not mean that the strategist must wait passively for the opportunity to occur. On the contrary, by manipulating reality ‘upstream of the silent transformations’, the Chinese strategist induces the opportunity, by a variety of covert actions. And this is the most efficient strategy. This is clearly linked to the concept of manipulation, in the sense of transforming the environment with the purpose of facilitating the advent of the favourable and intended outcome. The Chinese strategist does not wait for the ‘chance’ (in the Western sense) to appear; it induces it by working as far as possible ‘upstream’.55 Contemporary China’s strategy has been very strongly criticized by some Western authors, for example by Michael Pillsbury, a defence policy adviser and former US government official.56 Pillsbury, who is fluent in Chinese and knows the classical Chinese books on strategy as well as the works of Jullien, starts by criticizing the Chinese language by stressing its essential ambiguity: There is no alphabet […] The word for size combine the character for large with the character of small. […] Adding to this complexity are the tones and pitches that delineate words. The effect of tones is to give a single word four possible meanings. […] The language’s very complexity is like a secret

20   Understanding China’s strategy code. […] What we [Amer­icans] all must do better is to look not just at speeches [of Chinese leaders] but also at the context of those speeches, and we need to look for larger hidden meanings. For well over a half century, Amer­icans have failed to do this. […] We believed that America can aid fragile China whose leaders thought like us, would help China become a democratic and peaceful power without ambitions of regional or even global dominance. We underestimated the influence of China’s hawks. […] China has failed to meet nearly all of our rosy expectations.57 Clearly, for Pillsbury, the US helped China with the hope that she would become like them. However, the Chinese leadership has misled and manipulated Amer­ican policy makers to obtain intelligence and military, technological, and economic assistance. […] The goal is to avenge or ‘wipe clean’ (xi xue) past foreign humiliations. Then China will set up a world order that will be fair to China, a world without Amer­ican global supremacy, and revise the U.S.-dominated economic and political world order founded at Bretton Woods and San Francisco at the end of World War II. The [Chinese] hawks assess that China can only succeed in this project through deception, or at least by denial of any frightening plans.58 So it is clear for Pillsbury that China’s deceptive and secret policies constitute a threat to the global supremacy of the US. Nevertheless, he admits (evidently with some regrets and fears) that Chinese leaders are beginning to talk about the goal of their strategy ‘more openly, perhaps because they realize it may already be too late for America to keep pace’; a clear acknowledgement of the efficacy of China’s strategy, as explained by Jullien and Chieng.59 Pillsbury’s analysis may be correct. It is true that, compared to China, US strategy is more open. But it forgets that this is possible given the US’s extraordinary advantage on almost every count, especially its military and cultural resources (Joseph Nye’s soft power, to be dealt with in Chapter 2), and for a long time also economic resources. Moreover, some of the US’s policies are not as open as one may think. The official number of military bases (an astonishing total of about 650) very likely hides another 250 of which the public is unaware.60 Also, the budget of the Pentagon is not an example of transparency and clarity, and the US has conducted several military or quasi-­military covert operations all over the world. Finally, several operations aimed at inducing ‘regime change’ to establish governments more favourable to Amer­ican interests have been conducted under the pretext of establishing democracy, human rights and free market economy, or more precisely capitalism. And this is the subject of the following paragraphs.

Market economy and capitalism61 Given that China has introduced some market mechanisms since the end of the 1970s, and has been progressively embedded into the global economic system,

Understanding China’s strategy   21 i.e. into the global market economy or capitalism, it is important to have a clear idea about the meaning and the reality of these concepts, otherwise it will be difficult to understand some important dimensions of China’s strategy to reclaim world power status. What is the nature of the Chinese economy and what are the consequences of it being embedded into the global economy in order to realize the goal of reclaiming world power status? Economic history shows that there have been different forms of market economy, very likely since ancient times, and therefore capitalism cannot be considered as the only form of market economy. Many books have been written during the last decades on capitalism, its origins and main features.62 Nevertheless, the works of Fernand Braudel remain, for me, the most interesting and stimulating analysis.63 Braudel’s analysis of the development of economic activities is based upon a historical ­analysis that goes back almost to the ‘beginning of history’. In fact, Braudel, whose approach contradicts many interpretations of the appearance and development of market economy and capitalism, complains about the lack of historical perspective of too many analyses.64 For his historical analysis Braudel has chosen to deal with the long-­term trends that led to the emergence of capitalism in different parts of the world.65 In doing so, being very close to the ‘silent transformations’ of Jullien, he discovers three worlds that he treats not as three ideal-­ types (in the Weberian sense) but as real phenomena that have emerged through history: first, material life (in which markets do not yet exist); second, markets; and, finally, capitalism.66 Moreover, the first world tends to persist after the appearance and the development of market economy and capitalism, and market economy tends to persist after the development of capitalism. Furthermore, these three worlds are organized within a hierarchy in which, at the end of the process, and more precisely during the industrial revolution, capitalism becomes the upper and dominating layer. Moreover, economic agents, actions and mind-­sets are not the same within the three layers, and, even more interestingly, the laws of market economy, especially free competition as described by classical economics, operate more rarely within the upper layer, which is where calculations and speculation abound. Here there is a ‘zone of shadow’, and of ‘insiders’ activities’; and this is what Braudel considers to be the root of the phenomena that can be covered by the word ‘capitalism’ that are not the real, the true market economy, but so often its clear contradiction.67 So, for Braudel, what characterizes capitalism is the lack of transparency and competition. How far we are here from the dominant discourse of liberals and neoliberals in universities, mass media and political debates! Based upon Braudel’s analysis, I define capitalism as an economic system in which private capital, invested for the purpose of making a profit, becomes the upper and dominating layer within the production and consumption processes. When capitalists succeed in imposing their values, interests and goals on the rest of society, including the polity, we can consider that the corresponding society has become capitalist. What is the interest of Braudel’s analysis for evaluating the true nature of the Chinese economy? Many observers consider that the introduction of what I have

22   Understanding China’s strategy called ‘market mechanisms’ is equivalent to the introduction of market economy. Moreover, as, for them, a market economy is equivalent to capitalism, they come to the conclusion that China’s economy has become capitalist, even if they are compelled to qualify this statement by using the expression ‘State capitalism’. It seems to me that this conclusion is a bit too rash and, indeed, quite superficial. Here another passage of Braudel’s Civilization and Capitalism is very useful: the partial character of market economy may be due to the importance of material life, or to the state, which can take part of the production for its own use, or even more to the role of money that can artificially intervene in price formation in thousands of different ways; market economy can therefore be limited from below by material life, as well as from above by capitalism and/or by state intervention.68 Indeed, following Braudel’s approach, it would be only partially correct to talk about the ‘Chinese market economy’. Moreover, by using ‘market economy’ to describe the Chinese economy, Western academics and journalists run the risk of giving the impression that China’s economy is similar to the Western one, or that it is at least moving in that direction. I am persuaded that it is more accurate to designate these innovations as the introduction of ‘market mechanisms’ instead of the adoption of a ‘market economy’.69 By this I mean that the form of economic organization that has emerged in China since 1978 is by no means a capitalist market economy, but a ‘socialist market economy’ very different from the ‘capitalist market economy’ of the West. Many features of the new China economy and polity point in this direction. First, the freedom of the new Chinese capitalists is limited by the Party-­State: nothing can be done in the economic sphere without the explicit or implicit approval of the Party-­State. One has also to remember that, contrary to what happened in the former Soviet bloc, economic reforms introducing market mechanisms have been decided, implemented, developed and controlled by the Communist Party-­State for a period of more than 30 years, with the success we have seen. There is evidence that the majority of Chinese capitalists have no reasons for opposing the Party, as it seems that the policies of the Party-­State are the conditions of their economic and social success.70 Second, land is still collective property in China and this constitutes a powerful instrument in the hands of the Party-­State for orienting and controlling economic and social development. Third, as I have already pointed out elsewhere, since at least 2002 the Party-­ State has reoriented its public policies away from a strategy of ‘economic development first’ towards a strategy of ‘putting people first’, with a clear departure from the neoliberal policies implemented during the 1990s in strategic domains such as health and education, alongside the replacement of the social functions of the SOEs of the Mao era with a modern safety net.71 Fourth, the banking system (including the Central Bank) is still under the political control of the Party-­State, in spite of several measures taken to improve its economic efficiency that have given Western observers the impression that it was progressively reformed in order to make it compatible with capitalist criteria.72 This predominance of the Party-­State is a very clear indicator that the Chinese

Understanding China’s strategy   23 economy is by no means a capitalist economy. There are clearly several differences from what happens in the West, where economic agents of capitalism in fact dictate the essential items of the political agenda and the essential content of public policies, as demonstrated by the way the West has managed the 2008 crisis. In conclusion, for the time being, the difference between China and the West is therefore one of nature and the two systems cannot be considered as simple variations within the type of ‘capitalist economy’. Neither does this mean that the Chinese system may not evolve towards a capitalist economy in the future; but for the time being many indicators point to the opposite direction.73 These ideas about the real essence of China’s economy based upon Braudel’s analysis of market economy and capitalism are shared by two Chinese intellectuals: Cui Zhiyuan and Wang Hui.74 Cui Zhiyuan has recently affirmed with force that there is not necessarily a contradiction between public and private property.75 Moreover, Cui, who refers to John Stuart Mill, Henry George and Pierre-­ Joseph Proudhon, is a serious advocate of ‘petty bourgeois socialism’ based upon the idea that after the Marxist revolution the proletariat cannot remain proletarian. By this Cui suggests that other social groups may constitute the social basis of Chinese socialism aimed at realizing a ‘socialist market economy’ and a ‘relatively well-­off society’, especially those left aside by the development strategy followed by Deng Xiaoping: peasants, laid-­off workers, migrant workers, students, the emerging middle class and so forth. In fact, Cui considers that ‘socialist market economy’ contains a clear reference to ‘petty bourgeois socialism’.76 Referring more particularly to Mill, who cites in the last chapter of Principles of Political Economy (third edition) examples of partnerships between workers and capitalists for running businesses in the US, Cui mentions the ‘joint-­stock cooperative system’ that has existed in rural China since the 1980s as an example of partnership.77 Furthermore, Cui considers that ‘petty bourgeois socialism’ is necessary for analysing the systemic innovation that emerged in China and that goes together with the concepts of a ‘relatively well-­off society’ and of ‘socialist market economy’ that are the main objectives of the Party-­State. Finally, for Cui, ‘petty bourgeois socialism’ is not synonymous with social democracy, in which governments (and here Cui refers more particularly to Western countries) promote fairness focusing on secondary distribution (i.e. on redistributive policies, after the market has operated the primary distribution of income), thus accepting the dominant role of capitalism. A policy of balancing efficiency and fairness (or equity), as it was adopted by the Communist Party at the Congress of 2002, requires another theoretical framework, one that allows the combination of socialized assets with a market economy. In this sense, the Chinese economy is in fact a ‘socialist market economy’. For Cui, the success obtained in China’s economic reforms cannot be explained by marketization or privatization. He maintains that China’s ‘socialist market economy’ must be taken seriously – that it is not a sort of political compromise. The essence of the ‘socialist market economy’ is the operation of socialized assets in a market economy, and this is precisely one of the systemic

24   Understanding China’s strategy mechanisms for China’s relative success.78 Moreover, Cui insists on institutional innovation, and for this purpose China should take advantage of both Western and Chinese experiments, thus confirming Jullien’s ideas about the possibility that the two cultures may exchange ideas and experiments to mutual benefit. Wang Hui presents some commonality with both Jullien and Braudel. Wang Hui is very critical about the rising trend of neoliberalism and ‘developmentalism’. Examining the strategy implemented by the Party-­State to face the challenges posed to China by the new international context, he considers that in spite of the mistakes committed by the Party since the 1950s, what is important is that it succeeded in establishing the foundation of Chinese political sovereignty and independence, by continuously adjusting the policies of the State: ‘These modifications were in essence self-­modifications, carried out in response to the demands and problems of reality, rather than having been driven by external force or guidance.’ The conclusion that he arrives at is that ‘there are no ready-­ made models of reforms or policies, making the notion of “crossing the river by feeling the stones” correct’.79 For Wang Hui, the lack of ready-­made models has been a characteristic of the Chinese revolution as a whole. Thus, he is quite in tune with Jullien who, as we have seen above, considers that China’s strategy is not based upon a model but on a careful assessment of the situation and consequently to the capacity to adapt to the situation. Nevertheless, Wang Hui raises the following question: ‘Without any basic value orientations, who knows where “crossing the river by feeling the stones” will lead us.’ Clearly, Wang Hui refers to some fundamental values (very likely equality) that should orient China’s strategy, but certainly not to look for a model. Analysing the international context, Wang Hui considers that there are two interdependent trends, i.e. marketization and globalization.80 In the historical context that prevailed before marketization and globalization, the role of the State was ‘to represent the masses and the universal interests of the overwhelming majority, and this led to a break between the State or government and special interests’.81 This is what Wang Hui considers to be the role and essence of a neutral State. However, marketization and globalization have shortened the distance between the State and special interest groups and this has imposed a limit on socialist policies.82 Several features of the new international situation are important for Wang Hui: the transnational movements of capital and the regulatory mechanisms such as those implemented by the World Trade Organization, which have integrated China into the world economy after its accession at the end of 2001. Here Wang Hui is in tune with Braudel, who showed that ‘capital and credit have always been the surest way of capturing and controlling a foreign market. Long before the twentieth century the exportation of capital was a fact of daily life, for Florence as early as the thirteenth century’.83 And this has produced what Wang Hui considers a Chinese paradox: on the one hand China’s ability to govern effectively has been widely acknowledged […] but on the other, contradictions have appeared between

Understanding China’s strategy   25 officials and the people in certain areas. […] The key issue is that such contradictions are often blown up into large-­scale and widely debated legitimacy crises. […] This issue is closely connected with democracy as the source of political legitimacy.84 So, even if Wang Hui does not say it clearly, his analysis that we have briefly presented above is very close to Braudel’s analysis of the capacity of capitalism to renew itself and thus to constitute a menace for the construction of a socialist market economy. But, together with Cui Zhiyuan, Wang Hui does not think that China should find the solution to these problems by imitating the Western model of democracy, as there is ‘a universal democratic crisis, one closely connected to the conditions of marketization and globalization’.85 In China and in the West, there has been an ‘intense permeation’ of State apparatuses by special interests. In the face of this loss of neutrality, what can be done? The answers to these questions must be based on China’s increased self-­reliance, not in the sense of nationalistic and ethnocentric tendencies, ‘but rather the re-­establishment of values and politics along different lines – if anything, it is a new internationalism. The global significance of this exploration should be obvious, given the universal crisis of democracy and market’.86

Notes   1 I will not discuss here the question of whether it is more appropriate to speak about ‘Chinese philosophy or Chinese thought’. I will leave that question to the sinologists and the philosophers. I am interested in finding out the Chinese ‘way of thinking’ that is useful for understanding China’s strategy to reclaim world power status.   2 A good example is the book by Michael Pillsbury, who quotes the major works of François Jullien, p. 246, note 20, and is not only fluent in Chinese, but has served in senior national security positions in the US government since the days of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and draws on his decades of contact with Chinese military and intelligence agencies: The Hundred-­Year Marathon. China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 2015. More on Pillsbury in note 56 below.   3 Guy Sorman, The Empire of Lies. The Truth about China in the Twenty-­First Century, New York, Encounter Books, 2008; R. Bernstein and R. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, New York, Vintage, 1998; Bill Gertz, The China Threat. How the People’s Republic Targets America, Washington, DC, Regnery Publishing, 2000; Susan L. Shirk, China, Fragile Superpower, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007; Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China, New York, Random House, 2001.   4 Guy Sorman, Economics Does Not Lie. A Defense of the Free Market in a Time of Crisis, New York, Encounter Books, 2009.   5 As I will explain below, whereas the dominant opinion in the West is that market economy and capitalism are practically the same thing, according to the works of Fernand Braudel there is a substantial difference between market and capitalist economies.   6 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1962 (1982 with a new Preface by the author); Michele Salvati, Capitalismo, mercato e democrazia, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2009. See also Fareed Zakaria, ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 6, November–December 1997, pp. 22–43.   7 Ian Easton, Strategic Standoff. The U.S.–China Rivalry and Taiwan, Arlington, VA, Project 2049 Institute, March 2016, p. 1.

26   Understanding China’s strategy   8 The following remarks are based upon François Jullien, Conférence sur l’efficacité, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2005, pp. 9–11.   9 The same could be said about the Africans who were deported to the Americas in dreadful conditions, to be sold as slaves like merchandise. Should the descendants of Indians and Africans want to get on well in life, and eventually reach the top of the social hierarchy, they should fully integrate into the Western culture, as has been the case, for example, for former US Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice, General Colin Powell and US President Barack Obama. 10 The most emblematic example is that of Giuseppe Castiglione, a native of Italy (Milan) who was a Jesuit, a painter and an architect. Castiglione arrived in Beijing in December 1715, from Macao. It was during the reigns of Yangzheng (r. 1723–1735) and Qianlong (r. 1736–1795) that Castiglione established his reputation and fame in Beijing under the Chinese name of Lang Shining. Thanks to his work at the emperor’s court, Castiglione was appointed third-­class mandarin by Emperor Qianlong and was given the honorary title of Director of the Imperial Gardens. Castiglione died on 16 July 1766 and was buried in Beijing’s oldest Catholic cemetery, Zhalan, outside Fuchengmen, the western door of Beijing, where the Jesuits have been buried ever since 1610. Emperor Qianlong allotted a considerable sum of money for the funeral (300 silver taels) and elevated Castiglione to the posthumous rank of shilang (vice-­ minister). So, it is the Westerner who became Chinese and not the reverse. It is interesting to note that Emperor Qianlong entrusted Castiglione with the grandiose task of designing several Western-­style palaces in his summer park (Yuanmingyuan, Garden of Perfect Splendour. The gardens and palaces were destroyed during the Second Opium War by the Anglo-­French army). See Michèle Pirazzoli-­T’Serstevens, Giuseppe Castiglione, 1688–1766. Peintre et architecte à la cour de Chine, Paris, Thalia, 2007, pp. 9–10; see also the title of the following book, which underlines the fact that Castiglione is considered a Chinese painter: Michel Cartier (ed.), Giuseppe Castiglione dit Lang Shining, 1688–1766. Jésuite italien et peintre chinois, Paris, Favre, 2004. 11 The original French wording is the following: Nous continuons de croire que l’Occident qui a dominé le monde demeure la pensée de référence porteuse d’une exigence d’universalité et même l’a érigée en loi de la raison. Aussi même quand on croit avoir ébranlé cet ethnocentrisme culturel, lui demeure-­t-on encore soumis, sans même s’en rendre compte. F. Jullien, ‘Postface’, in André Chieng, La pratique de la Chine, en compagnie de François Jullien, Paris, Grasset, 2006, p. 302. See also François Jullien, De l’être au vivre. Lexique euro-­chinois de la pensée, Paris, Gallimard, 2015, pp. 8–10. 12 Jullien, ‘Postface’, op. cit., pp. 302–303. 13 Let us take just one example. In 1662 Emperor Kangxi published a decision authorizing Christian missionaries to preach in China. Unfortunately, on 19 May 1715 Pope Clement XI published a bull that condemned the Chinese rites, thus making them incompatible with the Catholic faith. Reading a Chinese translation of the bull, Emperor Kangxi is reported to have added a note saying: After reading this decision, I wonder how these uncivilized Western people can talk about the great philosophical and moral principles of China […] Most of their words and arguments are ridiculous. In light of this decision, I finally found that their doctrine is of the same kind as the petty heresies of the Buddhist and Taoist monks. We have never seen such a nonsense. From now on I forbid Westerners to spread their doctrine in China. This will avoid much hassle. Jacques Gernet, Chine et christianisme: La première confrontation, 2nd edn, Paris, Gallimard, 1991, pp.  252–253 (my free translation from the French), quoted by Pirazzoli-­T’Serstevens, Giuseppe Castiglione, op. cit., pp. 9–10.

Understanding China’s strategy   27 14 The exact sentences in French are: [Pour nous Européens, il s’agirait de] ‘remettre à distance la pensée dont nous venons, de rompre avec ses filiations et de l’interroger du dehors. Autrement dit de l’interroger dans ses évidences, dans ce qui fait son impensé [et de] remonter dans l’impensé de notre pensée’. Jullien, Conférence sur l’efficacité, op. cit., p. 14. 15 The exact sentences in French are: je ne vais pas en Chine par fascination de la distance ou le plaisir de l’exotisme, mais je recours à elle comme à un opérateur (ou révélateur) théorique en vue d’inquiéter la pensée; en vue de rouvrir d’autres possibles dans notre esprit et, par suite, de relancer la philosophie. Jullien, Conférence sur l’efficacité, op. cit., p. 15. 16 Ibidem, pp. 18–19. 17 Some readers may be surprised not to find reference to the names of some famous economists. The problem with the great majority of economists is that they are embedded in their models, most of the time with no connection to history. With a few exceptions, they are not very useful for our task. 18 ‘Fernand Braudel et les différents temps de l’histoire’, interview published by Jalons, ORTF (Collection: Signes des temps), 30 October 1972: http://fresques.ina.fr/jalons/ fiche-­media/InaEdu04649/fernand-­braudel-et-­les-differents-­temps-de-­l-histoire.html (accessed 21 March 2004). To my knowledge, Braudel is the only historian of the economy quoted by Jullien. 19 Nicolas Zufferey, Introduction à la pensée chinoise. Pour mieux comprendre la Chine du XXIe siècle, Paris, Hachette, 2008. 20 From the Latin ‘compassio’ and ‘compatire’, i.e. suffering together, feeling of proximity to other people’s sufferings: www.treccani.it/vocabolario/compassione_%28Sinonimi-e-­ Contrari%29 (accessed 4 May 2016). 21 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 2 vols (ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich), Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978: for Egypt, see pp. 964, 971–973 and 1401–1402, for China pp. 431, 477, 964 and 1401; Etienne Balazs, La bureaucratie céleste. Recherches sur l’économie et la société de la Chine traditionnelle, Paris, Gallimard, 1968. 22 The Chinese Expedition: Victor Hugo on the Sack of the Summer Palace, available at: www.napoleon.org/en/reading_room/articles/files/477511.asp. The original French version with a Chinese translation is available at: www.chine-­informations.com/man darin/vocabulaire/index.php?id=1618. Let us note that Hugo ends his letter with this interesting comment: Before history, one of the two bandits will be called France; the other will be called England. But I protest, and I thank you for giving me the opportunity! The crimes of those who lead are not the fault of those who are led; Governments are sometimes bandits, peoples never. The French empire has pocketed half of this victory, and today with a kind of proprietorial naivety it displays the splendid bric­a-brac of the Summer Palace. I hope that a day will come when France, delivered and cleansed, will return this booty to despoiled China. Meanwhile, there is a theft and two thieves. 23 ‘Looting China: propaganda then and now’, The Economist, 2 March 2009: www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2009/03/chinese_loot_propaganda_then_a (accessed 4 May 2016). The article also says: ‘As a newspaper correspondent posted to Beijing from 1998 to 2002, Charlemagne remembers seeing solemn Chinese youths being taken round the ruins of the summer palace, as a key part of their patriotic education.’ I can confirm this, something that is well known to people who visit the Summer Palace every now and then. 24 To the credit of the author of The Economist article, he also writes: 

28   Understanding China’s strategy But the uncomfortable truth is also that neither the British, the French nor the Chinese should feel that good about the ruins of the summer palace. The attack on the Yuanmingyuan began before it was known for sure that the foreign hostages were killed, as part of a messy power-­play in the closing stages of the second opium war, an unedifying episode that was essentially about the outside world demanding access to the closed Chinese kingdom at a moment of Chinese weakness. A couple of days after the first assault on the palace, the foreign hostages’ deaths were announced, at which point the burning of the summer palace was ordered in retribution. Ibidem. 25 Although most Western commentators recognize that the Chinese have some good reasons for remembering the ‘humiliation’, many of them are surprised that the Chinese still remember that sad period of their history. For example, according to Gordon Chang: Any matter can become emotional in China once it has been linked with the devil of history. […] Yes, the British burned the Summer Palace and the Chinese have a right to be angry. Yet the British also burned the Amer­ican capital, but when was the last time you heard anyone complaining of the War of 1812? Chang, The Coming Collapse of China, op. cit., pp. 190–191. Chang forgets that, after all, the Amer­icans won that war, and it lasted only a few years (like the Nazi occupation of France during the Second World War), whereas the ‘humiliation’ inflicted on China by the Western powers (including the US) lasted over 100 years, between 1838 and 1949, and even after. Compare this with the emotion with which Amer­icans remember the criminal attack of 11 September, which launched the ‘long war’ against terrorism. See, for example, Zhang Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation. Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, New York, Columbia University Press, 2014. 26 The gala is available at: http://english.cntv.cn/program/cultureexpress/20101020/101379. shtml and http://english.cntv.cn/english/special/yuanmingyuan150/home/index.shtml; the seven-­part documentary at: http://cctv.cntv.cn/2015/03/24/VIDE1427160602937620. shtml in English and in French. Let us note that ‘in 2011, Tang disappeared. Some news reports said she was involved in corruption cases. In June 2016 it was reported that she had been released from prison after having served a sentence for corruption’, Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tang_Can (accessed 27 March 2017). 27 I have developed this point in Paolo Urio, China, the West and the Myth of New Public Management. Neoliberalism and Its Discontents, London and New York, Routledge, 2012, pp. 92–96. 28 Zufferey, Introduction à la pensée chinoise, op. cit., my translation from the French. See also Anne Cheng, Histoire de la pensée chinoise, Paris, Seuil, 1997. 29 Ibidem, pp. 15–18. I will not enter into the discussion to determine what exactly was the teaching of Confucius; neither will I deal with the development of Confucianism. On the interpretation of the origins of Confucian thought and the transformations it has undergone through history, see François Billeter, Contre François Jullien, Paris, Allia, 2006, and especially Zufferey, Introduction à la pensée chinoise, op. cit. I will simply consider what is generally confirmed by sinologists, that Confucianism, which constituted the basis for Imperial power, is in fact an interpretation of Confucius that is not totally faithful to Confucius’ teaching. In this sense, see Zufferey, Introduction à la pensée chinoise, op. cit., pp. 60–61. 30 See the anecdote I present in Urio, China, the West, op. cit., pp. 20–21. 31 See, for example, Ian McGill and Liz Beaty, Action Learning. A Guide for Professional, Management and Educational Development, London, Kogan Page, 1995. In fact, McGill has been one of our experts in the seminars on ‘action learning’ for our participants.

Understanding China’s strategy   29 32 Zufferey, Introduction à la pensée chinoise, op. cit., pp. 22 and 49–51. 33 Ibidem, pp. 178–187. 34 For the changes introduced into the Chinese political culture since the beginning of reforms, see Paolo Urio, Reconciling State, Market, and Society in China. The Long March towards Prosperity, London and New York, Routledge, 2010, pp. 18–44. 35 Among the numerous books published by François Jullien, I quote hereafter those that have been more useful for my understanding of Chinese thought: Procès ou création. Une introduction à la pensée chinoise, Paris, Seuil, 1989; In Praise of Blandness. Proceedings from Chinese Thought and Aesthetics, New York, Zone Books, 2008; The Propensity of Things. Towards a History of Efficacy in China, New York, Zone Books, 1999; A Treatise on Efficacy. Between Western and Chinese Thinking, Honolulu, University of Hawai’i Press, 2004; Conférence sur l’efficacité, op. cit.; The Silent Transformations, London, Seagull, 2011; and ‘Postface’, op. cit., pp. 301–313. 36 Jullien, De l’être au vivre, op. cit., p.  7. The exact, and more poetic, sentence in French is: ‘Il vient un temps dans son travail – un moment de la vie peut-­être – où il convient de commencer de nouer entre eux les divers fils; ou, disons, de faire le tour de son chantier.’ 37 Billeter, Contre François Jullien, op. cit., the response by François Jullien, Chemin faisant, connaître la Chine, relancer la philosophie, Paris, Seuil, 2007, and the collective book in defence of Jullien: Jean Allouch et al., Oser construire. Pour François Jullien, Paris, Seuil, 2007. 38 There is a very large literature on classical Chinese strategy, which is too often reduced to some ‘tricks’ to be implemented in war and in economic negotiations and competition. I have tried to escape this by relying on authors who know the Chinese traditional way of dealing with the very complex idea of strategy, such as François Jullien (Chapter 1) and Hu Angang (Chapter 3). Of course, one can refer to the translations of some of the very numerous Chinese classical strategists. Let me start with the one who is well known: Sun Tzu, The Art of War (translated by Ralph D. Sawyer), Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994; Sun Zi, The Art of War, with comments by Major General Xie Guoliang, Beijing, Panda Books, 1995; General Tao Hanzhang, The Modern Chinese Interpretation. Sun Tzu’s Art of War, New York, Sterling, 2000; Fumio Ota, ‘Sun Tzu in contemporary Chinese strategy’, Joint Force Quarterly, 2nd Quarter 2014, pp.  76–80: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-­Article-View/ Article/577507/jfq-­73-sun-­tzu-in-­contemporary-chinese-­strategy (accessed 25 June 2015) (Dr Fumio Ota was the Director of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters in the Japan Defense Agency). You can also consult a book dealing with both Sun Tze and the other famous Chinese strategist, Sun Bin: L’art de la guerre de Sunzi, L’art de la guerre de Sun Bin, Beijing, Editions Chine Populaire, 1994. 39 Jullien, Procès ou création, op. cit., pp.  11–17. Jullien refers here to the work of Wang Fuzhi. 40 Jullien, Les transformations silencieuses, op. cit., pp.  11–17, 26, 31, 34, 82–87, 102–107, 124 ss. 41 Fernand Braudel, ‘La longue durée’, Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, vol. 13, no. 4, October–December 1958, pp.  725–753; ‘Fernand Braudel et les différents temps de l’histoire’, op. cit.; see also Dale Tomic, ‘The Longue Durée and world-­systems analysis’, Colloquium to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of Fernand Braudel, ‘Histoire et sciences sociales: La longue durée’, Annales E.S.C., vol. 13, no. 4, 1958, Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, 24–25 October 2008; David Armitage and Jo Guldi, ‘The return of the longue durée: an Anglo-­Amer­ican perspective’, published in French in Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, vol. 69, 2014. 42 Jullien, The Silent Transformations, op. cit., pp. 66–67. 43 Ibidem, p. 68. 44 Originally a divination manual in the Western Zhou period (1000–750  bc), over the course of the Warring States period and early imperial period (500–200 bc), The Book

30   Understanding China’s strategy of Changes (I Ching) was transformed into a cosmological text with a series of philosophical commentaries known as the ‘Ten Wings’. After becoming part of the Five Classics in the second century bc, the I Ching was the subject of scholarly commentary and the basis for divination practice for centuries across the Far East, and eventually took on an influential role in the Western understanding of Eastern thought, according to Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Ching (accessed 30 August 2017). 45 Jullien, The Silent Transformations, op. cit., pp. 82–83. See also Julien’s interpretation of the attack on the Twin Towers, ibidem, p. 120, and the rise and decline of the bourgeoisie, ibidem, p. 69. 46 Ibidem, ch. 9, pp. 116–135, significantly entitled ‘Mythology of the Event’. 47 ‘Fernand Braudel et les différents temps de l’histoire’, op. cit., p. 4. 48 Ibidem, pp. 4–5, my free translation from the French. 49 Jullien, The Silent Transformations, op. cit., p. 70. This is also the conclusion I arrived at, at the end of my book on New Public Management in China and the West: Yet one question remains open: is there a ‘China model’? […] The tentative answer I can give, based on the findings presented in this book, as well as on my evaluation of China’s reforms, is, for the time being, negative. There is no China model; or more precisely, and maybe also paradoxically, the China model is that there is no model, but a continuous transformation of the ways of thinking and managing the modernization process of this great country. Urio, China, the West, op. cit., pp. 209–210. 50 Li Cheng, ‘China’s new think tanks: where officials, entrepreneurs, and scholars interact’, China Leadership Monitor, no. 29, 2009: www.hoover.org/publications/ china-­leadership-monitor (accessed 20 October 2009). Li Cheng notes, however, that students trained abroad experience difficulties in being engaged as high officials at the top of Party-­State organizations. 51 Jullien, ‘Postface’, op. cit., p. 312 (my free translation from the French). 52 Wang Hui, who quotes both Jullien and Braudel, is a professor in the Department of Chinese Language and Literature, Tsinghua University, Beijing. His research focuses on contemporary Chinese literature and intellectual history. He was the executive editor (with Huang Ping) of the influential magazine Dushu (Reading) from May 1996 to July 2007. The US magazine Foreign Policy named him as one of the top 100 public intellectuals in the world in May 2008. Wang Hui is the recipient of many awards for his scholarship and has been visiting professor at several universities, among them Harvard, Bologna, Stanford, UCLA and Berkeley: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wang_Hui_%28intellectual%29 (accessed 1 June 2016). 53 André Chieng, La pratique de la Chine, en compagnie de François Jullien, Paris, Grasset, 2006, translated into Chinese. Chieng was born in Marseille to Chinese parents. His family gave him a Chinese education and he attended the French school system up to the top, at the prestigious Ecole Polytechnique, the Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Adminstration economique and the Institut de Science Politique. He specialized in economics and taught the subject in China (1978–1980). On his return to France, he became director general of one of the oldest French commercial companies trading with China, Brambilla-­AEC, and became its president in 1988. In 2001 he moved to Beijing. He is vice-­president of the Comité France-­Chine and Conseiller du Commerce Extérieur de la France en Chine. He is Chevalier de la Légion d’honneur and is the sixth laureate of China’s Top Ten Economic Talents, organized every year by Beijing Cultural Development Research: www.aec-­china.com/fr/andre_ chieng.htm (accessed 3 June 2016). 54 Jullien, ‘Postface’, op. cit., p. 310, my free translation from the French. 55 Chieng, La pratique de la Chine, op. cit., pp. 181–182, 196, 210, 214, 218–223, 225.

Understanding China’s strategy   31 56 Pillsbury, The Hundred-­Year Marathon, op. cit. Michael Pillsbury is the director of the Center on Chinese Strategy at the Hudson Institute, is a former analyst at the RAND Corporation and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. During the Reagan administration, Pillsbury, who is fluent in Chinese, was Assistant Under-­Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and responsible for implementation of the covert aid programme known as the Reagan Doctrine. In 1975–1976, while an analyst at the RAND Corporation, Pillsbury published articles in Foreign Policy and International Security recommending that the US establish intelligence and military ties with China. The proposal, publicly commended by Ronald Reagan, Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger, later became US policy during the Carter and Reagan administrations. Pillsbury served on the staff of four US Senate Committees from 1978 to 1984 and 1986 to 1991. As a staff member, Pillsbury drafted the Senate Labor Committee version of the legislation that enacted the US Institute of Peace in 1984. He also assisted in drafting the legislation to create the National Endowment for Democracy and the annual requirement for a Department of Defense report on Chinese military power. In 1992, under President George H.W. Bush, Pillsbury was Special Assistant for Asian Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting to Andrew W. Marshall, Director of Net Assessment. Pillsbury is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. In 2015, a former CIA Director revealed that a book called The Hundred-­Year Marathon ‘is based on work Michael Pillsbury did that landed him the CIA Director’s Exceptional Performance Award’. The official website: www.100yearmarathon.com, has declassified documents and photos that illustrate the book. Pillsbury played a role in three presidential actions: US–China military and intelligence ties, Stingers for Afghanistan decision, Studies of China and the Pentagon’s annual report (https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Michael_Pillsbury (accessed 4 June 2016)). 57 Pillsbury, The Hundred-­Year Marathon, op. cit., pp. 5–7. 58 Ibidem, p. 12. 59 Ibidem, p. 16. 60 Louis Jacobson, ‘Ron Paul says U.S. has military personnel in 130 nations and 900 overseas bases’, Politifact, 14 September 2011: www.politifact.com/truth-­o-meter/ statements/2011/sep/14/ron-­paul/ron-­paul-says-­us-has-­military-personnel-­130-nation (accessed 29 April 2016). Ron Paul was at that time Republican senator from Texas. 61 I use in this section what I have developed elsewhere in more depth: Urio, China, the West, op. cit., pp. 28–32. 62 See, for example, Ellen Meiskins Wood, The Origins of Capitalism, revised and expanded edition, London, Verso, 2002; Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001; Gosta Esping-­Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990; Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, twentieth anniversary edition with a new afterword by the author, New York, Basic Books (Perseus Books), 1996; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents, New York, W.W. Norton, 2002. For the rise of market economy and an international comparison about ‘the wealth of nations’, see, among the vast literature: Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System, 2 vols, New York, Academic Press, 1974–1980; David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor, New York, Norton, 1999 (with two chapters on China and Japan); Ha-­Joon Chang, Bad Samaritan. The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism, New York, Bloomsbury, 2008. 63 Fernand Braudel, Ecrits sur l’histoire, Paris, Flammarion, 1969 (English translation: On History, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1992); Civilization and Capitalism: 15th–18th Century, vol. 1: The Structure of Everyday Life; vol. 2: The Wheels

32   Understanding China’s strategy of Commerce; vol. 3: The Perspective of the World, Berkeley, CA, University of ­California Press, 1992. For a summary of the main findings and ideas of Civilization and Capitalism, see the texts of three conferences given at Johns Hopkins University in 1976 (published in English before the publication of the three volumes of Civilization and Capitalism): Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism (The Johns Hopkins Symposia in Comparative History), Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. Braudel’s perspective has been further developed (although with some remarkable differences) by Immanuel Wallerstein, who directed the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations at Binghamton University, New York, until 2005. 64 The importance and originality of Braudel’s analysis of capitalism has been very well captured by Immanuel Wallerstein (in fact his intellectual successor) in a short article, the title of which translates the revolutionary character of Braudel’s analysis: ‘Braudel on capitalism, or everything upside down’, Journal of Modern History, no. 6, June 1991, pp.  354–361. For a critique of Braudel’s Eurocentric biases, see Jack Goody, ‘The theft of “capitalism”: Braudel and global comparison’, in The Theft of History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.  180–211. Goody admits that Braudel is ‘much subtler about the question of European advantage [than Weber and Marx]’. Nevertheless, he considers that ‘his sources are inevitably largely European and partake of some of those prejudices about that advantage’ (ibidem, p.  184). Granted; however, this does not diminish the value of Braudel’s analysis of the essence of capitalism that I use in this chapter and in this book. 65 Braudel, Afterthoughts, op. cit., p. 5. 66 To my knowledge, Braudel is the only historian of the economy mentioned by Jullien. 67 The exact sentences in French are: Je suis sûr que cette division est tangible, que les agents et les hommes, que les actes, que les mentalités ne sont pas les mêmes à ces étages différents. Que les règles de l’économie de marché qui se retrouvent à certains niveaux, telles que les écrits l’économie classique, jouent beaucoup plus rarement sous leur aspect de libre concurrence dans la zone supérieure, qui est celle des calculs et de la spéculation. Là commence une zone d’ombre, de contre-­jour, d’activités d’initiés que je crois à la racine de ce que l’on peut comprendre sous le mot de capitalisme, celui-­ci étant une accumulation de puissance (qui fonde l’échange sur un rapport de force autant et plus que la réciprocité des besoins), un parasitisme social, inévitable ou non, comme tant d’autres. […] Pour cette zone qui n’est pas la vraie économie de marché, mais si souvent sa franche contradiction, il me fallait un mot particulier. Et celui qui se présentait irrésistiblement, c’était celui de capitalisme. Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, vol. 2, pp. 8–9; see also pp. 542–546. 68 The exact sentence in French: Le caractère partiel de l’économie de marché peut tenir, en effet, soit à l’importance du secteur d’autosuffisance, soit à l’autorité de l’état qui soustrait une partie de la production à la circulation marchande, soit tout autant, ou plus encore, au simple poids de l’argent qui peut, de mille façons, intervenir artificiellement dans la formation des prix. Civilisation and Capitalism, op. cit., p. 262. 69 I was pleased to see, on reading Joseph Stiglitz’s book on the crisis, that he also uses ‘market mechanisms’ when referring to the reform introduced in East Asian countries, including China: Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy, New York, Norton, 2010, p.  245. Nevertheless, China has been trying for a long time to obtain from Western countries recognition as a ‘market economy’. The reason is very likely that if it succeeds, it will be more difficult to be

Understanding China’s strategy   33 accused of distorting the functioning of the global market, for example by providing State subsidies to subsidize its exporting companies. See, for example, Wendy Wu, ‘China knocks on the door of Europe’s free market club’, South China Morning Post, 13 January 2016: www.scmp.com/print/news/china/diplomacy-­defence (accessed 10 May 2016). 70 This is the result of research based upon interviews of a sample of Chinese entrepreneurs by Jie Chen and Bruce J. Dickson, ‘Allies of the State: democratic support and regime support among China’s private entrepreneurs’, China Quarterly, vol. 196, December 2008, pp. 780–804. 71 Urio, Reconciling, op. cit., pp.  119–152. Let us note that safety nets are still in the development phase, but coverage is already today almost universal, even if rather limited; see Urio, China, the West, op. cit., ch. 6. 72 Commenting on China’s reaction to the 2008–2011 crisis, Barry Naughton, writing for the China Leadership Monitor (of the influential Hoover Institution at Stanford University), considers that: there are strong political forces that benefit from government patronage and extension of government power, and those interest groups do not show the slightest sign of being in retreat. […] This continued failure to tackle some hard issues, trim back the power and resources controlled by the state […] has made most economists increasingly frustrated. […] it is very difficult to get change out of a political system that seems to be succeeding so brilliantly on its own terms. Barry Naughton, ‘The turning point: first steps toward a post-­crisis economy’, China Leadership Monitor, no. 31, Winter 2009–2010, p.  7. In the following issue of the China Leadership Monitor (32), commenting upon Premier Wen Jiabao’s report to the Chinese parliament, Naughton confirms his statement: ‘This is probably the most unambiguous movement to reemphasize centralization and administrative instruments to govern the economy since the term “socialist market economy” was incorporated into the official Chinese rhetoric in September 1992’; Barry Naughton, ‘Reading the NPC: post-­crisis economic dilemmas of the Chinese leadership’, China Leadership Monitor, no. 32, Spring 2010, p. 5. Naughton’s papers are accessible at: www.hoover. org/publications/chinaleadership-­monitor. In an article published by the Financial Times, Henry Sender considers that Chinese commercial banks ‘remain an instrument of the state despite of being publicly traded’, Henry Sender, ‘China’s listed banks still at behest of state’, Financial Times, 7 December 2010. 73 It is worthwhile to quote in this context Fernand Braudel, for whom the strength of capitalism lies in its ability to move from one trick to another, from one way of doing things to another, to change its plans ten times as the economic conjunctures dictate –, and as a result, to remain relatively faithful, consistent with itself. Braudel, Afterthoughts, op. cit., p. 114. 74 Here I summarize the more detailed analysis of the works of these two authors presented in Urio, China, the West, op. cit., pp. 38–42. 75 Cui Zhiyuan, ‘How to comprehend today’s China’, Contemporary Chinese Thought, vol. 37, no. 4, Summer 2006, p. xxx (translated from the Chinese original published in Dushu – Reading, no. 3, March 2004, pp.  3–9). See also his ‘Privatization and consolidation of democratic regimes: an analysis and an alternative’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 50, no. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 675–692, in which he evaluates the privatization strategies followed by Russia and Eastern Europe and proposes an alternative strategy for China. After obtaining his PhD at the University of Chicago, Cui spent several years in the US as a visiting scholar at Harvard Law School; he now teaches public policy at the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University, Beijing. He also spent a year (2010–2011) as adviser

34   Understanding China’s strategy to the local government of the Chongqing municipality, one of the most rapidly developing municipalities in China. 76 For more detail on Cui’s ‘petty bourgeois socialism’, see his article ‘Liberal socialism and the future of China: a petty bourgeois manifesto’, in Tian Yu Cao (ed.), The Chinese Model of Modern Development, London, Routledge, 2005, pp. 157–174. In a recent article Li Minqi, in a much more radical approach, comes to consider that the present development of capitalism makes the proletariat (again) the force that will overthrow the bourgeoisie: ‘with massive proletarianization in Asia, world-­historical conditions are finally approaching what, in line with Marx, will lead to the victory of the proletariat and the downfall of the bourgeoisie’, Li Minqi, ‘The rise of the working class and the future of the Chinese revolution’, Monthly Review, vol. 63, no. 2, June 2011: http://monthlyreview.org (accessed 15 July 2011). See also his last book on the future of China, China and the 21st Century Crisis, London, Pluto Press, 2016. 77 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (with Chapters on Socialism), New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 78 Cui, ‘How to comprehend today’s China’, op. cit., p. 4. 79 Wang Hui, The End of the Revolution. China and the Limits of Modernity, London, Verso, 2009, p. xvii. See also his other works: China’s New Order. Society, Politics, and Economy Transition, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2003; The Politics of Imagining Asia, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2011; China from Empire to Nation-­State, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2014; and China’s Twentieth Century. Revolution, Retreat and the Road to Equality, London, Verso, 2016. 80 Wang Hui uses this approach to provide a remarkable analysis of the Tibetan question, which every person interested in today’s situation in Tibet should read: Wang Hui, ‘The “Tibetan question” East and West: orientalism, regional economic autonomy, and the policy of dignity’, in The Politics of Imagining Asia, op. cit., pp. 136–227. 81 Wang Hui, The End of the Revolution, op. cit., p. xxv. 82 Ibidem. On the role of interest groups in China, see Scott Kennedy, The Business of Lobbying in China, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2005. 83 Braudel, Afterthoughts, op. cit., p. 113. 84 Wang Hui, The End of the Revolution, op. cit., p. xxix. 85 Ibidem, p. xxx. 86 Ibidem, p. xxxii.

2 Understanding power in the twenty-­first century’s international relations

One of the most difficult questions of our time is to decide whether a country is morally entitled to intervene militarily in another country for the purpose of punishing the guilty in order to save the just, knowing that by doing so it will kill some, or even many, innocent people. This question has become more pressing because today many people accept the practice of intervening militarily in other countries for ‘humanitarian reasons’. The question is not new. Already at the beginning of the West’s rush to conquer the rest of the world, the Catholic priest Bartolomé de Las Casas, after witnessing the massacres of the Indios by the Spanish ‘conquistadores’, gave the following unequivocal answer: ‘It is a sin meriting eternal damnation to harm and kill innocents in order to punish the guilty, for it is contrary to justice.’1 This chapter does not have the pretension to deal with this question from a moral and philosophical point of view (which in any case is outside the competence of the writer), but to suggest to the reader some theoretical and methodological tools that may help him or her to appreciate through what means and in what circumstances a country is driven to intervene militarily within another country. The theory of power I present here is based upon the belief that a thorough analysis of any public policy in any domain (including foreign relations) cannot be understood without a clear theory of power. My deep conviction is that we cannot understand the transition from China’s semi-­colonial status (imposed by the imperial policies of Western countries between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) to the world power status that China successfully reclaimed around the beginning of the twenty-­first century, without a general framework for the analysis of power. Here we encounter the first and most serious theoretical difficulty of our task, as many different, and in some respects conflicting, theories of power exist in Western literature. Discussing these different approaches to power is outside the scope of this book. Instead, I will present my own theory of power, so that the reader will be able to appreciate the adequacy of my framework for the analysis of China’s strategy for reclaiming world power status. My purpose here is not to impose a point of view unilaterally, but to allow the reader to accept or reject it on the basis of his or her own theory.2 There exist mainly two ways of defining the concept of power: either one tries to classify the various historical environments in which power has manifested

36   Power in 21st century international relations itself, and the resulting different forms or types of power, or one tries first to define the core characteristics of this phenomenon that exists in any historical situation. The first solution often results in limping classifications, or else in absurdities, such as the distinction between potential power and real power, or in the juxtaposition of different dimensions or faces of power.3 I would rather consider that it is not by adding up the different aspects of power that one arrives at a satisfactory conception, but by taking into consideration the dialectic totality of these different moments of the structural production and reproduction of power.4

Soft power and smart power, a Weberian critique When we turn to the use of power in the literature of international relations, we come across a peculiar approach to power that has been put forward by a famous Amer­ican political scientist, Joseph Nye of Harvard University.5 This approach has the pretension of defining three types of power that a country may be tempted to use for imposing its will and national interests upon other countries, or even upon the whole international system: economic, military and soft power.6 The two first types do not need an explanation. For the latter, it is enough to mention that soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. […] The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. […] It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence.7 Moreover, in international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and the way it handles its relations with others.8 In spite of the interest of this approach by an author who is not only a scholar but has also been a senior civil servant and consultant to the US government on international diplomatic and military relations at the highest level, I will instead follow another path, described hereafter.9 First, as we have seen above, ‘soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others’; in other words, it is a question of taking possession of the people’s minds so that they think and behave as we wish they did. This is clearly at least as hard as, or even harder than, Nye’s ‘hard power’. Let me give an example from Chinese history. During the nineteenth century, Western powers were able to defeat China by using a certain amount of ‘hard power’ (economic and, especially, military). But this did not destroy Chinese culture, the way the Chinese think, speak and behave, in contrast to what happened in the Americas.

Power in 21st century international relations   37 It is thanks to its culture that China could start the long march that allowed it to reclaim world power status, while preserving its language and its way of thinking and behaving. The original inhabitants of the Americas were never capable of achieving a comparable result. When a culture is destroyed, the only way to survive as human beings is to adapt to the dominant culture, as the history of the Americas very well explains. In this context, it is interesting to quote a statement by Yang Guangbin, a professor of politics at Renmin University, who, according to the Chinese Xinhua agency, pointed out that the ‘military-­industrial complex’, which former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against, is kidnapping U.S. domestic and diplomatic policy. The ‘military-­industrial complex’ naturally demands war and military expansion, resulting in the Iraq war, ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings and growing tensions with Russia and China, Yang said. Yang also criticized the United States for selling its ideology, which has brainwashed the elite in some non-­Western countries.10 Moreover, Nye’s approach is weakened by several inconsistencies and by serious theoretical and empirical problems. For example, recognizing the unity of the concept and of its reality, Nye admits that hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behaviour of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources. But he also says that ‘soft power does not depend on hard power’ and considers that some resources can be used as assets for soft power or for hard power, depending on the circumstances. Moreover, the insistence that Nye has put on soft power in several of his writings (quoted above) and his more recent concept of power, combining ‘soft power and hard power’ (i.e. economic and military power) under the general concept of ‘smart power’, have the problematic consequence of insisting too much on an exercise of power that is ‘nice’ (soft and/or smart), thus concealing the real nature of power which, as we will see hereafter with Max Weber, inevitably establishes a relation of domination. In power relations, hard power is at best used as an explicit or implicit menace, or at worst is actually implemented whenever soft power does not allow one to ‘achieve one’s purpose’.11 As we have seen above, Nye considers that ‘soft power does not depend on hard power’; however, in an article also published in 2004, he writes that ‘a country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape international agenda as well as attractiveness’, which are the characteristics of soft power. It is not clear to which country Nye is referring. Not to the United States (US), as in 2004 the debacles of Afghanistan and Iraq were not yet fully recognized. But it is clear that by this statement Nye very strongly suggests that without military power, soft power will not succeed in

38   Power in 21st century international relations ‘shaping the preferences of others’. And Nye is certainly over-­optimistic when he believes that according to polls taken after the Iraq War in 2003, people with unfavourable views for the most part said they were reacting to the administration and its policies rather than to the United States generally. The people in most nations continued to admire the United States for its technology, music, movies, and television.12 By referring to ‘after the Iraq War’, Nye suggested that the war was over and that soft power could be used again ‘to shape the preferences of others’. At the moment of writing this book, however, 13 years ‘after the Iraq War’, not only is that war still ongoing, but the Afghanistan War and other wars by proxy are still going on in Syria, Yemen and Ukraine. Moreover, the US is increasing its military forces in Eastern Europe, the Far East and Africa, and both the former and the newly elected presidents have decided that the US needs to further improve and develop its nuclear capability.13 It is not at all surprising that the concept of soft power has been put forward by a scholar of a country that established its status as the only superpower on the development (and quite often the actual use) of an impressive array of military means, never seen before in human history. There is no doubt that without such an extraordinary level of military resources, the US would not have been able to realize its national interests. Moreover, not only does it constantly improve its military technology and increase its military presence in Europe and the Far East, but it also encourages its allies in the Far East to increase their military spending and build-­up. A clear indicator that soft power is not enough. In his 2011 book, Nye tries to clarify the concept of ‘soft power’ by introducing the term ‘smart power’, defined as ‘the combination of hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction’, i.e. ‘the combining of hard and soft power into successful strategies’.14 So, ‘smart power’ is synonymous with ‘smart strategy’. But as no one would dream of setting up a non-­smart strategy, ‘smart power’ is simply synonymous with strategy. Now, strategy is a powerful concept used by scholars for at least two-­and-a-­half millennia to understand how people, organizations and states construct their ideas and implement their actions in order to realize their goals. So, what is the purpose of substituting a powerful concept with a new term whose only merit is (like soft power) to have become fashionable and to be used by politicians to hide the ‘unpleasant’ dimensions of power? Would it not be better to clarify the concept of power by identifying the various resources that can be implemented to achieve one’s goals and to discover within what strategy these resources are developed, organized and implemented? Clearly, Nye analyses in his books the various resources used to impose one’s will on others and how they combine within the strategy of ‘smart power’, and concedes that ‘soft power is not the solution to all problems’ and that ‘power always depends on context’.15 He admits therefore that in some circumstances coercion may be necessary to

Power in 21st century international relations   39 achieve one’s goals. Unfortunately, by deconstructing power into three different types, he forgets that power is a unitary phenomenon within which force is a permanent resource under the form of a menace (explicit or implicit) or of an actual implementation. So, this conception of power (‘soft and/or smart’) has the consequence (and maybe also the purpose) of hiding the unpleasant manifestations of power. One of the most interesting critiques, which points to another problematic use of Nye’s soft power, appeared in an article published in 2013 in the influential Foreign Affairs, entitled ‘The end of hypocrisy’.16 To be fair to Nye, it must be remembered that he has seen the danger that ‘domestic or foreign policies that appear hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinions of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interest can undermine soft power’.17 He is referring here to the Iraq War, but in the following sentence, which I have reproduced above, he bestows US ‘soft power’ with a self-­satisfactory blessing: ‘most nations continue to admire the United States’. Unfortunately for Nye’s ‘soft power’, the leaks of classified materials revealed to the world the less attractive use of ‘soft power’ in some aspects of US foreign policy. Before this disclosure, according to Farrell and Finnemore, most experts already assumed that the US conducted cyberattacks against China, bugged European institutions, and monitored global internet communications. [These revelations] undermine Washington’s ability to act hypocritically and get away with it. […] Of course, the US is far from the only hypocrite in international politics. But the US’s hypocrisy matters more than that of other countries. That’s because most of the world today lives within an order that the US built, one that is both underwritten by the US and legitimated by liberal ideas. Amer­ican commitments to the rule of law, democracy, and free trade are embedded in the multilateral institutions that the country helped establish after World War II […] this system needs the lubrification oil of hypocrisy to keep its gears turning […] the US cannot impose its hegemony through force alone. But as recent leaks have shown, Washington is also unable to consistently abide by the values that it trumpets. A clear reference to the ‘double standard’ thinking and behaviour that the US has used on many occasions: the annexation of Crimea by Russia versus the dismembering of Yugoslavia by the US-­led intervention, more recently the very different policies and comments about the battle for Aleppo versus that for Mosul, and the US government’s and mainstream media’s outrage following the alleged interferences of Russia within the 2016 presidential campaign, whereas the US has interfered, without shame, in dozens of electoral processes all over the world at least since the end of the Second World War.18 We should recognize that this bias in favour of the use of ‘soft power and smart power’ for describing some aspects of a country’s foreign policy is not limited to Amer­ican politicians and journalists; it corresponds more likely to the universal temptation of those who have power, at least after the end of the Cold

40   Power in 21st century international relations War. It is better to be able to obtain from one’s ‘subjects’ the socio-­psychological predisposition to accept orders, which will make the use of force unnecessary … under condition that the threat of force is there as an efficient ‘warning’ that it may eventually be implemented as the means of last resort to obtain compliance, as we shall see hereafter with Max Weber. That this attitude is not confined to Amer­ican politicians is evident if one examines the competition that has been going on for at least two decades between the US and China in the Far East. Building upon the dramatic experience suffered during the nineteenth century, when European superpowers defeated a weak Chinese army and subjugated China, and considering the presence of important military assets stationed by the US in the Far East, not far from its borders, China has undertaken to improve and develop its military assets. Consequently, this has created concern not only for some of its neighbours, but also for the US, which has for a long time considered that some of its important national interests lie in the Far East. As mentioned above, Amer­ican politicians use the terms soft power and smart power to present US foreign policy in the region under a pleasant and peaceful light, in spite of the huge assets it has stationed there. Given these circumstances, nobody should be surprised to see Chinese politicians using the same terminology to describe China’s policy in the region. And Amer­ican scholars and journalists are well aware that China is also very skilful in advertising its foreign policy as a ‘smart power’ strategy or as a ‘peaceful rising’.19 The influential Wall Street Journal has provided an interesting comment: The Obama Administration has advertised that by using ‘smart power’ it would enhance U.S. influence around the world. So, it’s worth noting an episode in which China is routing the U.S. in economic diplomacy. Beijing has never made a secret of its belief in check-­book politics, and in recent years it has spent vast sums in pursuit of its regional ambitions: $40 billion for a Silk Road Fund to develop trade through Central Asia, $41 billion to lead a development bank with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, billions more in soft loans to countries in Southeast Asia, a ‘Maritime Silk Road’ of ports across the Indian Ocean. China’s latest venture is the $50 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is supposed to provide financing for some of the $8 trillion in projects that the Asian Development Bank estimated the region needs this decade. The Obama Administration has rightly opposed the AIIB, but its entreaties have been ignored.20 This analysis rightly confirms that you cannot separate cultural, economic and military resources. In the first chapter, I oriented my quest for understanding China’s strategy for reclaiming world power status on two approaches, the first being the concept of silent transformations and the second the difference between market economy and capitalism. I turn now to the third step provided by the Weberian theory of power. Max Weber has developed a clear and unambiguous theory of power.21 Since he developed this theory for understanding power within a nation-­state, I will

Power in 21st century international relations   41 therefore need to adapt it to the domain of international relations. After having defined a comprehensive concept of power (‘die Macht’) where force is the primary means that is systematically used for obtaining compliance, Weber considers that any manifestation of power tries to legitimate itself. This is because when legitimacy is assured, the use of force becomes useless in most circumstances, and consequently resources can be diverted to the realization of policy objectives with the support of the people. Only in case of radical opposition is force used to obtain compliance, but in this case the use of violence is considered to be legitimate by most of the people. Therefore, the following question is, how can power become legitimate? First, Weber defines three socio-­ psychological processes between the rulers and the ruled that may be used for legitimizing power, i.e. the transformation of ‘Macht’ into ‘Herrschaft’: respect for tradition (traditional), adherence to the extraordinary character of a leader (charismatic), and respect for the law (legal-­rational). So, Weber does not define three types of power, as it is too often understood, but three ways of legitimizing power, which is not at all the same thing. And this is the first way of obtaining the support of the ruled. Second, Weber considers that legitimacy cannot be maintained if the rulers do not dispose of sufficient economic and administrative means for realizing the policies they intend to implement, thereby maintaining legitimacy. Furthermore, Weber considers that force does not disappear, but remains in the power system as the ultima ratio of power. For Weber, power, and the political system in which power manifests itself, is basically a phenomenon of domination.22 So, for Weber there are two foundations of power, one based upon the socio-­ psychological process of legitimation, and another based upon the possession of material (i.e. economic and administrative) means. Both are necessary for legitimizing power. Therefore, there is a link between the forms of the economy (e.g. market economy, capitalism, planned economy) and power.23 We may even say that for Weber there is a structure of power composed of two intermixing sub-­ structures: one linked to the economy and to the constellation of interests that manifest themselves in the economy (e.g. in the market), the other based upon a socio-­psychological process of legitimization. As I will develop hereafter, inside this structure there is a place for inter-­individual and inter-­group relations, where a single actor or a coalition of actors can exert power on others thanks to the use of economic and administrative resources and to a socio-­psychological process through which its subjects have internalized a duty of obedience. And we may conclude that this holds true for any type of political system, including the international one. One of my Chinese colleagues has drawn my attention to the fact that the three sources of legitimate power defined by Weber may be considered as three forms of soft power. This is certainly not an acceptable objection. The three types defined by Weber are in fact three different socio-­psychological means, which may be used for obtaining compliance without having to resort to force. But not forms or types of soft power. Moreover, these socio-­psychological processes by no means cover the whole reality of power and cannot be used to

42   Power in 21st century international relations construct three different types of power. In fact, this would give the impression that there is a form of power where force is not at all present, thus obscuring the very nature of power. Indeed, as Weber sustains, force is still there, such as an effective deterrent that strongly suggests that it is better (and less harming) to obey, because otherwise force will eventually be used. The history of international relations is full of examples where this scenario has been effectively implemented. It is enough here to remind the attentive reader of the sequence of events that led to the second Iraq War after the 11 September attack on the Twin Towers in New York. As former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has proudly declared: It is the threat of the use of force [against Iraq] and our line-­up there that is going to put force behind the diplomacy. But if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.24 Force was there since the beginning as a menace, and force was actually implemented when diplomatic persuasion (bilateral and multilateral) failed to obtain the desired result, i.e. efficient and in-­depth inspection of Iraq’s military resources.25 Moreover, as said above, Weber is well aware that legitimacy (traditional, charismatic or legal-­rational) is not nearly enough to allow the implementation of public policies that will satisfy the expectations of the members of the political system concerned, i.e. people and their organizations within a state, people, their organizations (e.g. political parties and interest groups) and their states within the international system. Weber refers to administrative and economic means and, as he deals with states, does not mention military means. But these are clearly included in the general category of administrative and economic means, especially when dealing with international relations.26 Finally, as mentioned before, it is rather surprising (or is it really surprising?) that the category of ‘soft power’ has been put forward by an Amer­ican scholar who has also been an active top-­level consultant to and civil servant of the Amer­ican government.27 Having said this, our task will be to identify all the potential means a country may use for imposing its will in the international arena, and then to find out what means are actually put into the international competition between states in order to achieve national goals and interests. In this perspective, it will be necessary to find out in what sequence the various means are used, and whether this sequence varies as a function of different international situations, i.e. in the framework of what strategy the means of power are implemented. Let us take, for example, the foreign policy of the US during the Second World War in the Far East. Without going into too much detail, in face of the state of war imposed by the Axis powers, to begin with, the US imposed an embargo on Japan, supported the UK and improved its military capacity.28 Given the persistence of aggressive military undertakings by the Axis countries in

Power in 21st century international relations   43 Europe, Africa and Asia, the US thereby sent a clear message to the Axis countries. Second, after suffering the Japanese aggression on Pearl Harbor, the US declared war on Japan and entered militarily into the Second World War using traditional, although sophisticated, weaponry. Third, when the Amer­ican leadership considered that the military actions by traditional weaponry did not prove efficient enough (i.e. taking too much time, not inflicting sufficient losses on Japan, and resulting in too many casualties among Amer­ican soldiers), the decision was taken first to use napalm bombing on Japanese cities (especially Tokyo) and finally to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.29 Then Japan capitulated. This event is generally considered as a great Amer­ican success that put an end to the Second World War in the Far East. But this is not the opinion of everybody. For example, the famous Amer­ican magazine magnate Henry Luce, owner of several media, who was particularly influential in international relations, considered that the use of the atomic bomb was a gross strategic mistake. It would have been strategically more efficient to invade the Asian continent, defeat the Japanese army there and help Chiang Kai-­shek to defeat Mao’s communists. The strategic consequence, and advantage, for the US would have been to ‘gain China by putting it on the side of the West’. Instead, Mao won the civil war and then ����������������������������������������������������������� helped North Korea to successfully resist the international coalition headed by the US on the side of South Korea in the Korean War that ended in 1953.30 And, according to this interpretation, one may conclude that, in fact, the Second World War did not end in 1945 but in 1953.

Analysing power: dissymmetry, structure, interactive processes and resources In addition to the inspiring analysis of Max Weber on power, I have much appreciated a short statement by the French anthropologist Georges Balandier, for whom ‘power, as diffuse as it may be, implies a dissymmetry within social relationships’.31 This does not, of course – in my opinion – mean that an actor is necessarily lacking any possibility to confront another actor, but that the possibilities of action of the actors are not identical when they are placed in a power relation. The first problem raised by such a conception is one of identification of the actors having greater action capacity than others, thus allowing them to orient the others’ behaviour more than they are oriented by the latter. The second problem is to determine the extent of this capacity and the consequences thereof for the other actors and for the power structure of the global system. Finally, the third problem consists in determining the causes explaining the differences in the action capacity of the different actors.32 The clarifying insights provided by authors such as Weber or Balandier point out the fundamental characteristic of power: the dissymmetry of social power relations. Thus, contrary to the ideology of win–win international arrangements or to the narrative of strategic partnerships, power in international relations implies a social order, which can be interpreted like a hierarchy and for which one must find the causes. To have a dissymmetry, it is reasonable to assume that

44   Power in 21st century international relations certain characteristics are not distributed in an egalitarian way between the major actors of the global system, i.e. states to which we should add supranational organizations, such as the European Union (EU), and international organizations, but experience shows that most of the time the latter are dominated by a state or a coalition of states.33 I suggest, as many other authors do, calling these characteristics resources that can be material as well as immaterial. Power can thus be looked at as a complex phenomenon that structures the international system, hereby defining a framework that is more or less stable, inside which the logic or the rationality of the power structure (i.e. the ‘rules of the game’) orients the actors’ behaviour in a number of interactive processes in which they implement different types of resource. More precisely, the means of power are processes taking place within the framework of a given power structure, in which, on one hand, the actors intervene with their resources and, on the other hand, these same processes produce and distribute resources inside the global system. The resources that are produced and distributed in the interactive processes constitute the means that can be used within the framework of these same processes in the future. The distribution of resources thus produced can lead to the change or to the confirmation of the power structure and/or of the processes. Thus, the power of an actor is first shaped by the power structure that defines his theoretical freedom, then by the outcome of the interactive processes and by the distribution of resources realized through these processes that ultimately define his actual freedom. So, the structure practically defines the limits or the amount of freedom an actor may use in his interactions with the other actors. If the distribution of resources is unequal, then the actors will benefit from different amounts of freedom, and consequently they will possess different capacities to behave within the power structure and the interactive processes. Their capacity to obtain the maintenance or the change of the power structure will be very different. Starting from these considerations, I propose to summarise the different means of power in Figure 2.1, which can be considered as a repertoire of all the resources theoretically at the disposal of an actor. In reading the figure from left to right, the first column indicates the three power levels that I have identified above: power structure, interactive processes and resources. On the structural level, we find the characteristics of the power system endowed with a certain amount of stability over time, and limiting the actors’ freedom. This structure defines the rules of the game (i.e. its rationality) inside which, on the second level, the interactive processes take place.

The power structure and its five sub-­structures From an analytical point of view, one can subdivide the power structure into sub-­structures, each one having its own logic or its own mode of rationality. But in the perspective of a synthesis, one should analyse the interactions that may occur between the sub-­structures and find a global logic accounting for the mode of rationality of the overall power structure comprising all the sub-­structures, thus taking into consideration the unitary reality of power, as mentioned above.

Power in 21st century international relations   45 Means of power

Elementary means Means 1

Complex means Means 2

Levels of power Power structure

Rationality mode of the structure – rules of the game

Interactive processes

Processes 1 1. Production 2. Distribution

Processes 2 3. Organization 4. Social control 5. Socialization 6. Information 7. Decision

Resources

Resources 1 1. Information 2. Population 3. Territory 4. Formal rules 5. Values 6. Economic 7. Military

Resources 2 8. Manipulations 9. Rewards 10. Sanctions 11. Force 12. Charisma 13. Tradition 14. Legality

Figure 2.1  Power structure, interactive processes and resources.

I suggest isolating the following five sub-­structures that correspond to the concept of functional imperatives of the structural-­functionalists, i.e. functions without which the international system could not exist: the socio-­biological structure, the economic structure, the legal structure, the cultural structure and the communication structure.34 Each of these sub-­structures is important for the identification of power in the global domain because, while they are the result of the interactive processes mentioned above, they also orient the behaviour of the international actors within the interactive processes to be commented upon hereafter. The features of these sub-­structures are relatively stable in time, and this is why their identification is important for understanding the freedom the international actors enjoy within each of the sub-­structures and what are their positive and negative characteristics that favour or limit their power. However, in spite of their relative stability, the five sub-­structures ‘silently change’, as suggested by François Jullien and Fernand Braudel. It is therefore important to identify the changes that occur ‘silently’ in the ‘long time’, because on this depends the ability of the skilful strategist to discover the changes in the power structure that may evolve to its advantage, as well as the elements of the structure on which he can intervene with a reasonable chance of success, thereby contributing to the change of the overall power structure that will turn in favour of its policy goals.

46   Power in 21st century international relations No need to say that the insights provided by Jullien and Braudel must be a guide not only to the skilful strategist but also to the researcher who, if he/she wants to be efficient, needs to be attentive to the fact that the sub-­structures are not totally static, but evolve in time according to ‘silent’ phenomena that he/she should be able to discover. Similarly, he/she must be able to identify the activities that the international actors undertake to change some elements of the power structure to their advantage, even if these activities emerge most of the time as ‘vociferous’ events. Finally, the result of the functioning of the five sub-­ structures depends on the balance of power within the international system, i.e. from the distribution and combination of resources listed in Figure 2.1 under Processes and Resources 1 and 2, to be discussed below. For the moment, taking the point of view that global governance35 should assure the survival of mankind, I would suggest that the sub-­structures should satisfy the following functional imperatives: first, the socio-­biological sub-­ structure should guarantee the survival of mankind through appropriate policies ensuring that the way society reproduces itself biologically is supported by a healthy physical environment providing sufficient elementary means (i.e. food) necessary for the physical survival of everybody, thus assuring the congruence between population and agriculture. For example, this sub-­structure orients the actors’ behaviour in negotiations about the policies to eradicate poverty and putting at the disposal of vulnerable groups food, drinking water and basic health care; as well as policies to improve agriculture efficiency without polluting air, soil and waters, to limit CO2 emissions, etc. It also has to do with birth control. Second, the economic sub-­structure should guarantee the survival of mankind by providing a fair distribution of goods and services to all its members. This sub-­structure is of particular importance in the age of globalization, as the Western countries have shaped the globalization process by instituting international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), which sets the rules of the global capitalist economy, thus orienting the behaviour of all the countries, even those, like China, which do not conform to the Western model of capitalist economy and liberal democracy. One can expect that the international system will experience some difficulties in its efforts to harmonize the behaviour of countries with different economic systems, and thus avoid tensions and conflicts. This is particularly important for countries such as China, which has developed an impressive economy (one of its sources of power), has increased its economic exchanges with the rest of the world and has been skilful enough to obtain accession to the WTO. Other countries with less powerful economies have been kept largely outside globalization through a policy of embargo, for example, Cuba and Iran. It is no wonder that the policy to isolate these countries from the development of economic globalization has been directed by the most powerful capitalist country, the US. Moreover, we should take into consideration that the economic structure is also linked to the development of military devices, which constitute in some countries one of the most important sectors of the national economy. So, the military economic sector is important not only for the state as a resource for its

Power in 21st century international relations   47 foreign policy, but also for domestic private economic interests that may be tempted to lobby the state to increase its spending on military equipment and to embark on foreign policies that may need additional military weapons. This is the case of the US, where an impressive ‘military-­industrial complex’ was developed during the twentieth century.36 Moreover, the US has extended its ‘military-­industrial complex’ by developing its cyber competencies to such an extent that today it is more appropriate to speak about the ‘military-­industrialcyber complex’.37 But for at least a decade, China has also been developing its military economy and cyber capacity. I will develop this important point in the empirical chapters on US and Chinese foreign policies. ������������������������������������������������������������������������� The last paragraph suggests two additional elements to be taken into consideration when dealing with military resources. To begin with, military power can be analysed, in conjunction with other resources, as a combination of different types of armament: infantry, navy, air, conventional, nuclear, etc. This is particularly important when analysing the US and Chinese strategies in the Far East, given also the geo-­strategic environment, as the control of maritime roads is of primary importance for determining the outcome of their competition: a new equilibrium, as during the Cold War, or, on the contrary, the domination of one country over the other. As Peter Navarro very clearly puts it: whoever controls the South China Sea’s gateway to the Indian Ocean, through the narrow and perilous Malacca Strait, also controls South Asia – and perhaps East Asia too, given that much of the oil that lights lamps in Japan and South Korea must first pass through the South China Sea.38 Here Navarro very clearly is worried about the oil supply to the Amer­ican allies, Japan and South Korea. But it is evident that China too needs to import oil (among other goods) from the Middle East. So, the control of the maritime lanes is of primary importance for both China and the US. And given the presence of a massive US Navy, one can forecast that China will develop its navy as well, in addition to other weapons (missiles, submarines, etc.) that together can match the US military. Finally, a country may decide to establish military bases abroad, in locations where it can build military equipment of different kinds and use them for launching military operations, or simply build infrastructure that may be developed and/or used for military purposes in the future. We will see in Chapter 4 that the US has developed an impressive network of military bases all over the world, whereas China has just opened its first military basis in Djibouti. Furthermore, we can further develop the idea of the existence of a ‘military-­ industrial-cyber complex’ by adding to it another important dimension, i.e. cultural resources, especially the media, so that the complex becomes the ‘military-­industrial-cyber-­media complex’. This means that without the support of the media, foreign policy, no matter how strongly it is supported by other resources, has little opportunity to succeed, especially, but not only, in open societies such as Western liberal democracies. This is particularly important when a country is considering imposing some hard measures on its competitor,

48   Power in 21st century international relations such as economic embargo or even war. In this case, the government must be able to persuade its citizens that the measure to be taken is morally acceptable and in line with national values and/or interests. We can see immediately that, in order to obtain the support of its citizens, the government may be tempted to manipulate the facts, as was the case for launching the second Iraq War. Falsifications and lies were used to obtain the support of US citizens and of US allies. We approach here the idea of a ‘comprehensive national power’, which we will deal with in the fifth section of Chapter 3 (pp. 100–103), or even the idea of ‘unrestricted warfare’. The discussion of this idea in the US has been triggered by the publication of the translation of a book written by two Chinese colonels.39 Although the book was published in 2007, it is only recently that, to my knowledge, it has been given much attention by Amer­ican authors, journalists and politicians.40 Kevin Freeman, who quotes Pillsbury among several other Amer­ ican authors, very well understands the meaning of ‘unrestricted warfare’. He rightly identifies the basic idea of the Chinese colonels: all kinds of resources can be used to win the war, not only military resources, but also the stock market crash weapon, intellectual property theft, currency warfare, etc., used simultaneously in the framework of a ‘grand strategy’.41 And this contradicts the idea of different types of power suggested by Nye, as discussed above. Indeed, the discussion about the concept of ‘unrestricted warfare’ suggests that it is more appropriate to use the expression ‘cultural resources’ than ‘soft power’. For the sake of simplicity, I suggest that we use expressions such as ‘cultural power’, ‘military power’ and ‘economic power’, meaning in fact power implemented thanks to cultural resources, or military resources, or economic resources. Moreover, the ‘unrestricted warfare’ approach very well shows that cultural, economic and military resources of power are not isolated from one another within the international power structure, but they interact together, according to variable mixes, depending on the structural and relational features of the international system existing at any particular moment in time. This mix must be discovered by using the taxonomy I discussed above, summarized in Figure 2.1. Third, the legal structure should define the formal rules that orient the behaviour of individuals, groups and states. Here, we can place the United Nations and its sub-­organizations such as the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF etc., the international global organizations established at Bretton Woods (i.e. the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund), as well as the WTO; supra-­national organizations such as the EU; regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). We should also include the institutional instruments of international law such as the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, etc. There are also associations of national interest groups (both for employers and employees) that defend and promote their interests by lobbying their national governments engaged in international negotiations or are even asked by their government (or have obtained

Power in 21st century international relations   49 from their government) to participate in international negotiations where their interests are at stake, to which it is necessary to add the activities of international organizations of employers and investors, as well as of trade unions. These organizations have been particularly active in the negotiations for the mega trade and investment treaties to be mentioned hereafter. There is in fact also a complex network of international treaties (bi-­lateral or multi-­lateral) that binds the states together, and which is a precious indicator of their will to cooperate in specific economic domains, but that at the same time also poses some limits to their freedom. Here it is necessary to pay special attention to regional organizations or agreements that have been set up recently, or are in the process of being negotiated or ratified, i.e. the free trade and investment organizations such as the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and especially the two mega-­treaties for trade and investments, i.e. the Trans-­Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The importance of these partnerships was clearly recognized by President Barack Obama in his State of the Union address to the US Congress on 13 January 2016: With TPP, China does not set the rules in that region; we do. You want to show our strength in this new century? Approve this agreement. Give us the tools to enforce it. It’s the right thing to do. (Applause).42  Fourth, the cultural structure should provide its members with the intellectual means for understanding the world and the global society in which they live, as well as the fundamental values, beliefs and behavioural norms with which the international actors should comply. These are the elements mentioned by Nye under the term ‘soft power’, such as democracy, human rights, etc. As Nye explains in his numerous books on this topic, values and reputation are necessary to attract and convince actors in the international system of the moral standard of a country and therefore to facilitate the approval of policies (national or international) that are in the interests of the country. So, for example, after the end of the Second World War, not only was the military and economic power of the US very high, but also its reputation, in spite of the use of napalm and nuclear bombs on Japanese civilians. In 1944 its extraordinary level of military, economic and cultural resources allowed the US to set up the Bretton Woods agreements that instituted the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in which it acquired a dominant position, and, even more important, established the US dollar as the only international currency, at least in the part of the world dominated by the West. From that moment on, many of the US initiatives (e.g. the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe, the institution of the Western military organization (NATO), to mention only a few) have been welcomed with enthusiasm, and for several decades this reputation was shared by almost everyone in the West (except for communists and left-­wing socialists). Moreover, from the beginning of the twentieth century, the US started to diffuse its values through the activities of Amer­ican non-­governmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks, and by attracting foreign students to Amer­ican universities (especially in economics and

50   Power in 21st century international relations b­ usiness administration) with the hope that when these students returned to their countries they would diffuse Amer­ican values.43 Moreover, the overall effect (and very likely purpose) of these activities is to have Amer­ican values accepted by the international community as possessing a universal character. It is very often by calling on these values that the US justifies its foreign policies, particularly embargo, regime change, training the military forces of allies, supplying arms to the ‘rebels’ fighting a ‘dictator’, limited military interventions by Special Forces, or even overt war operations.44 Nevertheless, since the Vietnam War the reputation of the US has suffered several setbacks, such as the financing of terrorist organizations to oppose the Russians in Afghanistan, the alliance with monarchical autocratic regimes, the use of subversive tactics and operations aimed at producing ‘regime change’ when governments did not support the realization of Amer­ican interests, such as in Latin America (the most emblematic example being Chile in 1973) and more recently in Georgia, the Middle East, North Africa and Ukraine. Moreover, some features of the Amer­ican model of democracy are also subject to severe criticism: the excessive importance of money in the political arena (especially in the electoral and legislative processes); the increasing power of interest groups (especially multinationals in the fields of banking, insurance, agro-­business, pesticides and genetically modified organisms, oil, etc.); the unresolved question of civic and political rights for the African-­Amer­ican minority, as well as the exclusion of large numbers of African-­Amer­icans from the prosperity of the ‘Amer­ican Dream’; the increasing economic and social disparities; the increasing number of people living below the poverty line; the increasing number of crimes and of people in prison; the increasing deaths by drug overdose; and, last but not least, the sad spectacle of the 2016 presidential campaign, unworthy of a mature democracy.45 In spite of this, the reputation of the US is still very high for people, enterprises, interest groups and countries that share the same values and benefit from US foreign policy, approve of neoliberal globalization, or still count on the US to defend them from other countries, as is the case in some Eastern European countries or in the Far East, where some countries are worried about the increasing power of China and Russia and their more assertive foreign policies. Consequently, one may consider that this reputation is also linked to the other sources of Amer­ican power, economic and military resources, thus confirming the unitary character of power, as we have already mentioned. No wonder that in this context, the Chinese government has also started to improve not only its economy and army, but also its cultural resources, for example, by promoting Chinese language and culture through the dissemination of the Confucius Institutes, an initiative similar to the German Goethe Institutes, the Institut Français and the British Council.46 Finally, the communication sub-­structure should assure the circulation of information and communication among the actors of the international system. The latter can be subdivided into the intellectual means of communication (language, symbols, theories, etc.), and the technical support of communication

Power in 21st century international relations   51 (devices like mass media, newspapers, radio, television, Internet and social media). We understand that this structure is the place where international actors compete to have their values accepted by others. If they succeed in doing so, these values will acquire the status of universal values, and may be used as a resource for obtaining from other actors the support necessary for the implementation of their policies. This is the place where the control of mass media becomes of primary importance. Moreover, it can be sustained by inputs (reports, letters, statements, etc.) produced by think tanks, NGOs and universities. Hence, the need to control these institutions. This does not necessarily mean direct control, but the development of a commonality of world views and of fundamental values, acquired most of the time by attending the same schools and universities, as well as all sorts of other groups, such as clubs, churches, parties and other organized social activities. Also, in a broader perspective, these activities that promote values can be integrated into a coordinated action including NGOs, investment companies, support by outstanding politicians and high officials, use of Internet and social networks with the purpose of obtaining regime change.47 Power will operate in each of the five sub-­structures. The international actor (e.g. country or coalition of countries) that will dominate them will have power over the rest of the world. Whereas this actor will have to dominate each of the five sub-­structures (as they are supposed to perform a function that is necessary for the survival of the global system), it is possible that in a historical situation, the domination of one single structure will provide this actor with the ‘core resources’ of its power. This could be the case for the economy sub-­structure, which is based upon scientific knowledge and is able to produce military resources. The domination of the other sub-­structures, for example, the cultural sub-­structure, will be necessary for making the actual use of economic and/or military resources unnecessary, as I have explained above when dealing with the concepts of ‘soft power’ and ‘smart power’. A good example is provided again by the second Iraq War. After the criminal attack on the Twin Towers, the US received many manifestations of sympathy and condolences from all over the world, and particularly from liberal democracies. This was certainly due not only to the horror of the event and the suffering of so many people. It was also due to the fact that the attack was perceived as an attack on ‘our Western fundamental values’, embedded in our political culture as well as in our traditional Christian heritage. The US government identified the authors of this attack as Al Qaida, considered that Iraq was the place where the terrorists had found a welcoming place to develop their criminal activities, and moreover they claimed they had evidence that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At this point, the US clearly started to implement what Nye would call ‘soft power’ as they appealed to the ‘value resource’ for obtaining international support from other countries, especially their allies within NATO. Mass media in the US and Europe supported the US. Considerable international pressure was exerted on Iraq to allow effective inspections of the alleged Iraqi military build-­up of WMD. Inspections took

52   Power in 21st century international relations place, but the US considered that they were not in-­depth enough and produced some alleged evidence of the existence of WMD. Finally, not satisfied with the inspections, the US proposed to the international community a military intervention in Iraq. It is at this point that the ‘value resource’ started to lose its efficacy. Some European countries, especially France, were opposed to military intervention. Amer­ican mass media, still supporting the new (i.e. military) policy orientation of their government, started to wonder why the French were not supporting an ally with whom they shared fundamental values. And, their astonishment went on, the French should not forget that the US came to their rescue during the Second World War, so why wouldn’t they help the US after the horrible attack on the Twin Towers? Without discussing the fact that the evidence presented by the US to the international community was faked, and without appreciating the real reasons of the US military intervention, this case shows that the ‘value resource’ has its limits. In the case of the second Iraq War, the value resource was certainly very effective at the beginning of the crisis in obtaining the support of other countries (e.g. European countries), but once the US manifested its intention to go to war with or without the approval of the international community, some countries considered that other values (and very likely other interests) were at stake.

The means of power: interactive processes and resources Now, let us go back to Figure 2.1. In this chapter, it is not necessary to comment in detail on the seven interactive processes and the 14 resources, some of which are anyway self-­evident. I will instead briefly comment on them whenever necessary for clarifying their content and I will provide some historical examples to show how I plan to use them in the empirical chapters of this book. The second and third columns of Figure 2.1 list the means of power, subdivided into processes and resources as elementary (Means 1) and complex (Means 2). The second column (Means 1) shows the elementary means of power. At the interactive processes level, it comprises two ‘Processes 1’, i.e. the production and distribution of elementary resources. Production and distribution are necessary, even in the least developed power structure. For example, even in so-­called primitive societies, the production of military resources, such as wooden swords, javelins or arrows, are produced within a simple production process, very likely by the soldiers themselves or by skilful artisans in their shops. Here, hierarchy is limited or non-­existent; decisions are taken by the artisan without interference from anyone else, except from the customers who may have special requirements for quality and price. In a more developed society, where arms are more complex (such as rifles, cannons, fighter planes, submarines, atomic bombs), the production process needs to be supported by at least one or several ‘Processes 2’ listed in the third column, such as organization, decision and information.

Power in 21st century international relations   53 Elementary interactive processes and elementary resources Whereas the production of resources is important to evaluate the power of a country, distribution of resources is important for understanding a country’s strategy when it needs to strengthen its allies. For example, a country that has the ambition to deploy power in large areas, or even the entire planet, will have to transfer some of its resources to its allies when it considers that they can (or must) contribute to the realization of its objectives, as was the case for the US after the end of the Second World War when it transferred a considerable amount of resources to Western European countries to face the threat represented by the Soviet Union. Different types of resources can be transferred from one country to another: military equipment of course, but also economic aid, technology (economy and/or military), promise of assistance in case of conflict, and so on. Of course, in an era where the economy and military are particularly developed and complex, production and distribution processes need to be supplemented by more complex ‘Processes 2’ as we will see below, after the discussion of elementary ‘Resources 1’. Elementary resources (Resources 1) comprise, first of all, information, including all kinds and all levels of information, such as knowledge, competences, intelligence, science and technology. In the international system one kind of information is particularly important: intelligence, i.e. information gathered on other actors. One may expect that intelligence targets only competitors or enemies, but a recent scandal, which exploded thanks to Wikileaks, showed that the US for a long time spied on even its closest allies, and at the highest level, including heads of state and prime ministers. Knowing what other states think appears then as an essential knowledge for orienting the international strategy of a country, especially if it has a global ambition.48 Information may also be subdivided into the ‘lower information level’, for example, the number of soldiers, and the ‘higher information level’, for example, the competence to organize the soldiers into an efficient army able to implement efficient and effective tactics and strategies. In this context, leadership can be considered as a special knowledge of the ‘higher information level’. Moreover, a certain type of information (e.g. scientific knowledge) may develop into different levels of efficiency and be employed in different domains. For example, China was the first country to discover gunpowder, but its use for weapons (apart from fireworks) was not at the same level of efficiency attained by Western powers in the nineteenth century, which, with other resources, determined the defeat of the Chinese army in the Opium Wars. Second, there is the population. This is a very important resource for a state as it may make a difference in power relations. First, the size of the population. At the beginning of the nineteenth century China had 300 million people and England only 11 million, and by 1850 China added another 100 million people. But that resource was not sufficient to avoid defeat in the two Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1857–1860). Despite this huge difference in population size, the Western powers (especially England and France) did not hesitate to launch the

54   Power in 21st century international relations two Opium Wars, knowing that the risk of launching wars against China was practically nil. Today, China has reached 1,350 million people. Should it have remained the same type of society as in 1850, no one would today even dream of talking about the ‘China threat’ and Western powers would perhaps be tempted again to attack China as they did in the nineteenth century. Compared to the nineteenth century, the present situation is that in the meantime, China has developed a whole array of resources, and even if on some counts (e.g. the military) it is well behind the US, nobody is seriously envisaging taking the risk of engaging in an overt military conflict with China.49 As size is not enough, other characteristics of the population suitable for improving the power of a nation-­state should be taken into consideration: first of all, the morale of the population. Here again, China is a good example. The establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 was successful in reclaiming sovereignty after a century of foreign aggressions that had reduced China to semi-­colonial status. The reclaimed sovereignty and the new policies announced by the new leadership (e.g. the land reform) improved the morale of the Chinese people by giving them a renewed faith in the greatness of their culture, history and destiny. Unfortunately, two major events jeopardized the morale of Chinese citizens: the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and the Great Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The State had shown its incapacity to peacefully regulate tensions and conflicts within polity and society. And despite Mao’s goal to develop the economy and catch up with Western countries, the standard of living of Chinese families had fallen behind the level attained before the Great Leap Forward. It looked as if State, Party, economy and civil society (i.e. people) had been disconnected from each other, or worse, that they had been put into a kind of permanent contradiction with each other. The morale of the Chinese people was at its lowest level since the Opium Wars. This was an extremely dangerous situation that could have drawn the People’s Republic of China towards further conflicts and disorders, and eventually to a final collapse. To avoid this tragic outcome, it was necessary to reconstruct, and, as history never repeats itself, to reinvent Chinese society, State and economy; in other words, to find means to reconcile State, market and civil society.50 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� It is at this point in China’s history that two other characteristics of the population, particularly important for the strength of a country, turned out to be an invaluable asset for the Chinese leadership: health and education. Only citizens who are in good health and well educated are able to contribute to the country’s economic development and participate in the political process. When, after the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping launched his new policies to develop China by introducing market mechanisms and partially abandoning the planned economy, he was able to achieve extraordinary results because he could count upon a population in good health and with a satisfactory literacy level, thanks to the policies implemented during the Mao era, and this in spite of the damages of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Cultural Revolution. One of the merits of Deng has been to restore the morale of the Chinese population, by progressively opening up the economy and giving to the most entrepreneurial Chinese citizens great expectations of ‘becoming rich’.

Power in 21st century international relations   55 Nevertheless, the rapid introduction of market mechanisms and competition led State organizations (especially state-­owned enterprises (SOEs), but also State bureaucracies) to drastically reduce their staff and to lay off millions of employees and workers.51 This resulted in a huge rate of unemployment, as well as the emergence of new forms of poverty that run the risk of counterbalancing, at least in part, the impressive decrease in poverty achieved thanks to the reforms.52 This trend, and especially the appearance of new forms of poverty, also had an impact on the increase in crime, in particular petty crimes. Finally, the transition from a command economy to a new economic system, where market mechanisms (and hence competition among enterprises) were introduced quite rapidly, led the government to freeing the SOEs from the obligation of providing their workers and employees with the social services they were used to obtaining under the former command economy, not only health and education, but also housing and old age pensions. The consequence has been that not only did this new situation place an additional burden on families’ budgets, but, for many of them, it was a serious obstacle to accessing these services, and finally one of the causes of new forms of poverty. In other words, large parts of the Chinese population were left outside the new economy and could not benefit from its spectacular development. They needed to be reassured, so that they could contribute to the development of the Chinese economy and society: the old solidarity system, health, education, housing and old age pensions, needed to be replaced in both urban and rural areas by a new safety net system. This was done during the Hu Jintao leadership by starting to develop a modern social security system.53 The third resource is represented by the territory; in fact, a whole set of resources. First of all, the geographical location: latitude and longitude (linked to the prevailing climate), the size, the nature of the border with neighbouring states (their length, natural protection, etc.), the resources of the soil (natural resources, gas, metals, agricultural resources, water, forests, etc.). For example, the British Isles have a natural protection from foreign invasions, but this important asset is not per se sufficient, as was demonstrated at the time of the Roman and Norman invasions, but worked very well during the Napoleonic wars and during the two world wars. This is because other resources operate, such as an efficient navy and air force. Here again, the morale of the population, supported by a charismatic leadership (as it was in the UK during the Second World War), was an indispensable asset for sustaining the defensive military strategy and the morale of the soldiers. Moreover, the UK was part of a powerful coalition comprising the two giants, the US and the Soviet Union, that were to come out of the Second World War as the two superpowers. These examples show again that a single resource is not generally enough for determining the power of a state relative to other countries. On the contrary, the two examples mentioned for the British Isles suggests that a constellation of resources is necessary and that their efficiency depends not only upon them and on the national strategy within which they operate, but also upon the situation and on the power of the competitor or enemy.

56   Power in 21st century international relations Having access to resources is of great importance for many countries when they do not have a sufficient quantity of some domestic resources and have therefore to import them from abroad. Moreover, being able to sell national goods abroad is an efficient way of obtaining foreign currencies that can be used to acquire some other resources and to invest in foreign markets. This is clearly the case for China. Because of the size and pace of its development, the Chinese economy needed (and still needs today) to import huge quantities of natural resources such as oil and gas and to sell its manufactured goods abroad. One of the routes is the maritime one, which goes necessarily through the Strait of Malacca. And here China would face a serious problem, i.e. the presence in the China Sea of the military forces (naval, air mobile forces, military bases and allies) of its most powerful competitor, the US. This explains why China has started to transform its army (traditionally an infantry) into a modern air and maritime force, to develop nuclear power and to start building its first military base in Djibouti, far away from its immediate periphery but close to some of its major economic partners in Africa.54 Moreover, it has also started to build several railroads through the Euro-­Asian continent from China to Europe. This route is not only more secure, but also quicker than the maritime one. In this chapter, it is enough to mention that we are here at the heart of the Chinese strategy to confront the US: the control of the Eurasian continent as the best means to acquire world power status thanks to the One Belt One Road (OBOR). In the last chapter, we will have to understand this strategy in all its dimensions, problems and promises.55 Fourth, we have to take into consideration formal rules produced, as mentioned above, by international organizations such as the United Nations, the WTO and the ILO, as well as international treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions regulating the behaviour of international actors in military conflicts. Formal rules can be used to force a country to accept certain types of behaviour, for example, not to engage in dumping activities or in governmental policies that artificially improve the competitiveness of its national enterprises in the global market, thus distorting the ‘normal functioning’ of the market economy. Here we touch on an important point for the analysis of China’s strategy. In fact, the rules of the economic game have been set by Western countries, mainly by European countries from at least the fifteenth until the first half of the twentieth century, and since then by the US with the support of its European allies. Then, China started to develop its resources to reclaim world power status during the command economy of the Mao era. And even if Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, has introduced market mechanisms into the Chinese economy, some experts still think that China is not a ‘real market economy’. In fact, my evaluation is that China is a special case of mixed economy, but with a considerable difference compared to the mixed economies of the Western countries. In the West mixed economies are dominated by the private enterprises and their associations that orient and intervene in the political process so that public policies do not interfere with the functioning of the capitalist economy, as became evident during and after the 2008 crisis. On the contrary, in China the Party-­State still dominates

Power in 21st century international relations   57 the political and the economic domains, which is the main reason why many Western experts do not consider China as a market economy. If this is the case, then China will have to solve many problems as it is more and more embedded into the global economy, which functions on the basis of the rules of market economy (or, more precisely, the rules of capitalism). Contrary to this opinion, the Chinese neo-­Marxist Li Minqi considers that China is already a capitalist country and is therefore totally embedded into the capitalist global economy.56 In both cases, this does not clarify the strategy China is following (or should follow) in order to become a world power again. In fact, it will face many difficult dilemmas. For example, should it join the Trans-­Pacific Partnership (TPP) promoted by the US to unite 12 countries of the Pacific region into a single free trade and investment area? Even if President Trump, in one of his first decisions, has decided to withdraw the US from the TPP, it is not impossible that the TPP will again be put forward in the future either by Trump or by his successor. In this case, if China stays outside, it will run the risk of being isolated. If it joins (the US permitting), it will run the risk of being forced to play the game by the rules decided by its major competitor, the US.57 To confront this US strategy, China is developing a strategy of bi-­lateral and multi-­lateral agreements with several Asian countries that may limit the impact of the TPP, should this treaty be finally approved by the countries concerned. Moreover, this strategy complements the OBOR initiative mentioned above. Finally, we have the social values and rules, economic and military means, the importance of which has already been explained above when dealing with the corresponding sub-­structures. Complex interactive processes and complex resources In the previous paragraphs we have seen how the seven elementary resources are produced within the two elementary Processes 1: production and distribution. Moreover, the production and distribution processes also produce and distribute the more complex Resources 2. From this stems the importance for the international actors to control these processes, which leads us to take into consideration Means 2. These are more complex means that imply the implementation of processes which require a combination of Means 1 and result in the production of the more complex Resources 2. Let me illustrate this with an example. The production of military equipment can be organized in a simple manner so long as production is totally controlled by one manufacturer (an artisan) as in the case of swords, javelins and the like, as mentioned above. This was basically the case prior to the industrial revolution, in spite of the fact that shipyards had been set up well before the industrial revolution, for example, in the Italian maritime cities such as Genoa and Venice.58 At that time, ‘Processes 2’ were practically non-­existent or very limited in scope. But two revolutions have considerably changed the type of weapons it has become possible to produce, as well as the organization within which they could be produced: the scientific and the industrial revolution, to which we must

58   Power in 21st century international relations add the discovery of the principles of scientific management. The latter orient the production process towards the search for greater efficiency by shaping the organization process upon the principle of specialization, i.e. the division of work. The production process is now subdivided into its elementary components, each of them assigned to different workers, and some more complex organizational capacity is needed. The implementation of these more complex ‘organizational means’ requires the use of information, of competences, of formal norms guaranteeing a certain type of behaviour within the production processes, the coordination of the specialized tasks, the control of the execution of production activities, as well as the use of material goods, etc. Moreover, in order to effectively support the production process, it is necessary to integrate the organization process into a single organizational strategy, comprising the other processes, i.e. information, decision, social control, socialization, the latter having among other things the role of legitimization. Limiting ourselves to the necessity to legitimize the actor’s policies, the organization process can contribute to the production process if it can appeal either to the cultural sub-­structure or to already available Resources 1 (knowledge, beliefs, etc.) and/or to Resources 2 (charisma, tradition or legality), provided, of course, that these resources are already available. As suggested above, under formal rules (as part of Processes 1 and Resources 1) a country may possess resources that it can use for acquiring other resources that exist within the international system and ensure that they are implemented to favour its own policy objectives. Indeed, here I am following the suggestion of Wlodzimierz Wesolowski that it is not always necessary for a state to produce all the resources it needs for realizing its objectives, provided that it manages to control and orient the production and distribution processes of other actors, both states and international organizations.59 For example, a country may improve its power through alliances; or by obtaining resources from allies; or from international organizations in which it can orient the production and the use of international norms binding for other states, as well as economic and military means; by imposing decisions within international organizations in which it has been able to acquire a dominant position; by manipulating information and using it for propaganda purposes;60 by controlling mass media so that they diffuse favourable information, images and values; by distributing to the mass media it controls faked information favourable to its policy objectives; by distributing rewards (either material or immaterial); by menacing or actually imposing sanctions (i.e. embargo) on other states (alone or with allies); by menacing or actually using force (alone or with allies); by behaving in such way as to develop its reputation in the international arena and thereby legitimate its foreign policy, this being based upon the charisma of its leaders, the respect for tradition or the respect for formal rules (both national and international); by obtaining the signature of international treaties favourable to its national interests. It is easy to find numerous historical examples illustrating the above-­mentioned strategy.61 In this context, it is necessary to come back to the case already mentioned of NGOs and think tanks and deal with two special kinds of such organizations that

Power in 21st century international relations   59 can be used by a country to obtain other power resources. First of all, the state agencies for aid for developing countries, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which ‘��������������������������������������������� was born out of a spirit of progress, innovation and a reflection of Amer­ican values, character and a fundamental belief in doing the right thing’, and whose ‘mission statement highlights two complementary and intrinsically linked goals: ending extreme poverty and promoting the development of resilient, democratic societies that are able to realize their potential’62; the British Department for International Development (DFID) that ‘leads the UK’s work to end extreme poverty and it tackles the global challenges of our time including poverty and disease, mass migration, insecurity and conflict’; or the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) that has the goal of reducing poverty. It is meant to foster economic self-­reliance and state autonomy, to contribute to the improvement of production conditions, to help in finding solutions to environmental problems, and to provide better access to education and basic healthcare services. Other Western agencies have basically the same goals that are not only commendable but very necessary given the extreme poverty that still today persist in many parts of the world. These activities are part of the strategy of the Western countries to improve their image, damaged by decades of colonialism and imperialism, and thus improve their capacity to obtain a favourable attitude towards the international goals of the Western countries concerned. Sometimes these organizations have been used to implement less laudable objectives and have been sanctioned by the host countries, as was the case when USAID was expelled from Russia in 2012.63 The second special type of think tanks is represented by organizations such as the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as the Bilderberg Group and the more informal meetings of the World Economic Forum. Generally, these organizations are not directly focused on specific policy options, but they provide places where political and economic decision-­makers (active or retired) can meet and discuss some of the most important problems of the world, confront their ideas and eventually converge on general strategies to resolve those issues. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) was founded in 1921 in the US. It specializes in US foreign policy and international affairs. Its membership has included senior politicians, more than a dozen secretaries of state, CIA directors, bankers, lawyers, professors and senior media figures. The CFR promotes globalization, free trade, reducing financial regulations on transnational corporations, and international free trade and investment treaties such as the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and develops policy recommendations that reflect these goals. The CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign policy community to discuss international issues. CFR publishes the bi-­monthly influential review, Foreign Affairs, and runs the David Rockefeller Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and diplomatic community, testifying

60   Power in 21st century international relations before Congress, interacting with the media and publishing on foreign policy issues. The council has been the subject of debates over sovereignty as well as the subject of numerous conspiracy theories. This is primarily due to the number of high-­ranking government officials (along with world business leaders and prominent media figures) in its membership and the large number of aspects of Amer­ican foreign policy that its members have been involved with. […] In response to the allegations and insinuations, the CFR’s website contains a ‘frequently asked question section’ about its affairs.64 The Trilateral Commission is an NGO founded by David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski in July 1973, to develop cooperation between North America, Western Europe and Japan. The Commission has attracted criticism from both the right and the left. From the right, Republican Senator Barry Goldwater criticized the Commission for being a skilful, coordinated effort to seize control and consolidate the four centres of power: political, monetary, intellectual and ecclesiastical, and to promote the creation of a worldwide economic power superior to the political governments of the nation-­states involved. People of the left have been even more critical: Noam Chomsky has described the Trilateral Commission as being the liberal wing of the intellectual elite, i.e. liberal internationalists from Europe, Japan and the United States. […] [The Trilateral Commission] was concerned with trying to induce what they called ‘more moderation in democracy’ – turn people back to passivity and obedience so they don’t put so many constraints on state power and so on.65 The Bilderberg Group (also called Bilderberg conference, Bilderberg meetings or Bilderberg Club) was established in 1954. It is an annual private conference of 120 to 150 people of the European and North Amer­ican political elite, experts from industry, finance, academia and the media. The first conference was held at the ‘Hotel de Bilderberg’ in Oosterbeek, Netherlands, in May 1954, with the aim of promoting ‘Atlanticism’, i.e. better understanding between the cultures of the US and Western Europe to foster cooperation on political, economic and defence matters.66 The importance of these three think tanks can be seen simply by looking at the list of their members and/or participants in their meetings (available on their websites), as well as from the number and political orientation of their publications. It is therefore understandable that they have raised suspicion and even accusations of conspiracy. For example, according to an article published online by the New York Times’s ‘Campaign Stops’ blog, the controversial Republican US representative Ron Paul said ‘in a 1990 C-­Span appearance, taped between Congressional stints, [that] “there’s pretty good evidence that those who are involved in the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations

Power in 21st century international relations   61 usually end up in positions of power. And I believe this is true.” ’ According to the article, Paul then went on to stress the negligible differences between various ‘Rockefeller Trilateralists.’ The notion that these three specific groups – the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Rockefeller family – run the world has been at the center of far-­right conspiracy theorizing for a long time, promoted especially by the extremist John Birch Society.67 This opinion re-­emerged during the presidential campaign that ended with the election of Donald Trump, under the question: ‘Trump: will he be controlling or controlled?’68 I will not enter into the discussion about the seriousness of the ‘conspiracy theories’. Whereas the thesis of the existence of conspiracies cannot be discarded without empirical evidence, it is clear that for an academic researcher the task would be rather difficult. In fact, it would be necessary to enter the circle of the conspiracy and collect information from an insider, who very likely will speak anonymously, thus rendering the demonstration based upon hearsay. And this is not acceptable in academic research. Moreover, for my research purposes, the interest in discovering conspiracies is rather limited. I am satisfied enough if I can empirically assess the outcomes of the economic and political process, both internally and internationally.69 That this is possible has been confirmed recently by a remarkable short article by Joseph Stiglitz that deals with the two schools of thought about what determines the distribution of income: the liberal one based upon the belief that markets are competitive, and therefore efficient, the other considering that unfettered markets tend towards monopoly, this being determined by their power, i.e. the ‘ability to exercise monopoly control or, in labour markets, to assert authority over workers’. Stiglitz affirms that the former school, which has dominated until recently, cannot help us to understand the economic process ‘through the lens of competition. […] In most industries, […] standard metrics shows large – and in some cases, dramatic – increases in market concentration’. And this is because large banks, for example, lobbied the US Congress to amend or repeal legislation separating commercial banking from other areas from finance. […] Today markets are characterized by the persistence of high monopoly profits. […] The consequences are evident in the data, with inequality rising at every level, not only across individuals, but also across firms.70 Transposing this analysis from the national to the international arena, I will comment upon the lobbying of multinational companies at the international level and supporting international mega-­treaties such as the Trans-­Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Moreover, the academic researcher is not without resources for acquiring some knowledge about the activities of these think tanks. In fact, there is an

62   Power in 21st century international relations interesting literature written by investigative journalists, who do not have the obligation to name their sources. On the contrary, it is their deontological duty to protect their informants.71 Of course, the academic researcher must be very careful when using the findings of investigative journalists, in spite of the interesting questions raised by their investigations. Nevertheless, I will refer to the publications of the type of think tanks mentioned above, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, because they supply the government of their country with analyses, comments and suggestions about how to define and conduct foreign policy. Their publications are thus an invaluable source of information insofar as their members are very often former occupants or even incumbents of very high positions within the government, the economy, the military and the media. We have here an example of the overlap between the private and the public private sectors, which some would call ‘the privatization of the state’.72 Before we conclude, we should define what role the state and its diplomacy can play within the power structure, and how to deal with the relationship between coercion and legitimization. The state, diplomacy, legitimization and coercion Here, it is necessary to develop several qualifications. First, the conception of power developed above is based upon the taxonomy of resources summarized in Figure 2.1. The actors who intervene in power relations by utilizing a combination of these power resources have been mentioned in the numerous examples I have briefly used for illustrating how resources intervene in the international power system. Among these actors, the state still has an important role to play, despite the rising power of the other actors, international organizations and international associations of interest groups. Thus, for instance, according to Weber’s theory, the state constitutes the political group that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate violence. More specifically, it holds two resources: violence and legitimacy, which allow it to have its domination accepted without having to use – apart from cases of violation of legal norms – physical force. I would like to point out that in the case of a legal-­rational legitimation of power, the state would also hold the monopoly of the production of formal norms (legal norms) intended to orient (or even determine) the behaviour of all groups and individuals living on its territory. Moreover, thanks to its administration, the state can interfere in the processes of socialization, social control, information, production and distribution of resources. In the international system, in the absence of an organization similar to the national state, the situation is more complex and fluid. There is not an international institution that can claim to have the legitimate monopoly of force, nor of the production of legal norms binding for the actors of the international system and a well-­organized legal system (police and tribunals) for instructing, judging and sanctioning violations of the international norms. Nevertheless, processes similar to those that occur within a nation-­state exist in the international system. Here, too, it is a question of producing, distributing, using and developing the many resources of power that we

Power in 21st century international relations   63 have discussed above. The only, but important, difference is that in the international system the processes are less formalized and less stable. But this gives more latitude to the international actors to set up strategies that can support their policies. Here operate state strategies that can work on the ‘long time’ (Braudel) or that can follow the Chinese classical strategy attentive to the ‘silent transformations’ (Jullien) and intervene regarding the resources that the actor can produce or control with a reasonable chance of success. According to Chinese classical strategy, at the end of the process, victory will be acquired practically without actually fighting. No wonder the international actors (e.g. states and interest groups) not only try to increase their national resources, but also try to influence the work of international organizations so that they adopt and distribute resources favourable to their interest. For example, these resources can be formal rules produced by the WTO forbidding national policies that distort competition; condemnations by the United Nations of Israeli policies in Palestine; support obtained from an organization such as NATO for allies to intervene militarily in a conflict; authorization to engage military means to solve some international problems, such as the US tried unsuccessfully to obtain from the United Nations for militarily intervening in Iraq in 2003. Second, diplomacy is an important complex resource states can use in their power relations by implementing a combination of processes and resources, such as the information and decision processes, and a vast repertoire of resources such as manipulation of information, promises of rewards, threats of sanctions and actual use of force, and so on. And one must not forget the values used to obtain compliance by appealing to the exemplary behaviour (domestically and internationally) of the actor concerned. For example, to justify its recent military interventions in Africa, France has used a reference to its historical role in favour of democracy and human rights. Similarly, the US, France and the UK have appealed to Western values for obtaining from the United Nations the permission to intervene militarily in Libya. It is quite surprising that Russia and China did not use their veto power. Now, it just happens that these two countries are among those who generally contest the universal character of Western values, and under ‘normal’ circumstances it is plausible that they would have used their veto power. They simply abstained, thus making the decision in favour of military intervention possible, counting on the promise made by the Western powers that they would limit their intervention. As the Western countries did not maintain their promise, one could expect that in the future, in similar circumstances, Russia and China would use their veto power. This is exactly what happened regarding Syria. These examples show that appealing to certain values may work under certain conditions, but the efficacy of these values for obtaining compliance may be nullified by ignoring and violating other values, such as the breaking of formal promises. Third, there is not necessarily an opposition or a contradiction between legitimization and coercion; one could prevail on the other in a more or less clear way. But this does not change the fact that, whatever the relation between legitimization and coercion may be, power is in any case constraining for the actors.

64   Power in 21st century international relations This is true in spite of the fact (and Weber has clearly seen this point) that it is not completely indifferent to the international actors, as well as for the understanding of power, whether power is exercised via the legitimization process or via coercion. But as we have said with Weber, force is always there at least as a threat, if not an actual use. In addition, one can note that in Figure 2.1 legitimization and coercion do not appear as forms or types of power, but as means of power.

Analysing power in the twenty-­first-century international system While analysing power on the basis of the resources in Figure 2.1, I considered that the way the international system satisfies the functional imperatives may assume different forms, according to the existing combination of structures, interactive processes and resources distribution. This explains the need for discovering, in each historical case, the fundamental characteristics of the power system. Following the conception of power described above, one has to admit that if a society is governed by a power system, an entity must exist there which controls most of the means of power (processes and resources) and which, therefore, succeeds in maintaining the rules of the power structure which guarantees, in a sufficient way, that the interactive processes will not result in a redistribution of resources putting in danger the existing power structure, and, consequently, the privileged position of the entity which is benefiting from this structure. As there is no theoretical nor empirical reason forcing us to identify this entity as being one state, a coalition of states or an international organization (ideally a World Government?), it is thus necessary to attribute to this entity a specific theoretical statute which differs from state, coalition of states or international organization(s). Let us call it the dominant group. I think that this term offers several advantages. First, it translates very well the asymmetry of power relations. Second, it avoids theoretical references that could be considered as ideologically biased, such as the ruling class, the political class, the power elite or the dominating class. Third, while giving to this concept a very precise meaning, it prejudges in no way the actual contents that the reality of power will assume in historical cases, nor as to the degree of homogeneity of the dominant group. The concept of the dominant group can very well apply to a social class in the Marxist sense, to a composite elite, or to a more or less disparate coalition. It may also be used to identify the emergence of a new dominant group. Since the beginning of the 1980s we have witnessed a vast movement of de-­ restructuring and restructuring of the international system. The first change worth mentioning is the coming into power of neoliberal politicians as well as the changing ideology and policies of the social-­democratic parties. Representatives of the neoliberal ideology assumed power in the UK with the election of Margaret Thatcher (1979) and in the US with the election of Ronald Reagan (1980). The following year, the socialist party of François Mitterrand won the French presidential election with a programme based upon a left-­wing common

Power in 21st century international relations   65 programme with the communist party. The implementation of the programme did not last long. After a series of nationalizations, in 1983 Mitterrand adopted the so-­called ‘tournant de la rigueur’ (austerity turn) and started the first wave of privatizations.73 The communists left the government in 1984. It was thus proven that it is difficult (or even impossible) to implement left-­wing political programmes within a capitalist economy, especially when the national economy is more and more embedded into the global capitalist economy that dictates the rules of the game. This was the first sign of a slow but steady movement of the social-­democratic parties towards the centre (and therefore towards the right), as confirmed by the policies implemented in Germany by Gerhard Schröder, in the UK by Tony Blair, and more recently in France by François Hollande and in Italy by Matteo Renzi. These ‘socialist’ parties have practically accepted capitalism as the only possible choice, or according to the famous statement by Margaret Thatcher: ‘TINA, i.e. there is not an alternative.’74 The other fundamental change has been the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the consequent emergence of a unipolar world, with the US being the only superpower. Some have even thought that the world had come to the end of history and that liberal democracy and capitalism were going to be accepted and adopted by all the countries (Chapter 4, pp. 122–129).75 It is difficult to know how this extraordinary statement could have been imagined; the only possible explanation is that it was out of ignorance of the dynamic of world history or out of a euphoric enthusiasm following the defeat of the Soviet Union. This euphoric moment did not last long. At the beginning of the new millennium, and especially since the 2008 crisis, a multipolar world emerged.76 As these changes take place according to Braudel’s ‘long time’ and to Julien’s ‘silent transformations’, it was difficult to forecast what shape the new international order would take: two superpowers (the US and China) cooperating or competing against each other; or a multipolar world with the US, China, Russia, India and maybe some other emerging countries. It was even more difficult to forecast whether there will be a dominant group in the sense I have defined above. Nevertheless, one can try to forecast, based upon empirical evidence available today, what seems to be the most likely outcomes of this restructuring, in which globalization plays a dominant role. In order to give meaning to the empirical data, one has to resort to a theoretical framework powerful enough to put some meaningful light on the data. Here again Max Weber may be of some help.77 Through his historical research Weber has demonstrated that the rationalization process, which started in Europe, has produced a special kind of organization, the bureaucracy, which has become the typical organizational form of all institutions (public and private) in a modern society. More particularly, within a country, society is dominated by the rationalization process that gives coherence to the societal whole, comprising the following features: a rational economy (either a market economy or a planned economy) based upon calculus aimed at maximizing the foreseeability of behaviours and therefore the reduction of uncertainty; this rational economy is sustained by a rational state and a rational bureaucracy, entrusted with the

66   Power in 21st century international relations implementation of the rules of a rational (i.e. foreseeable) legal system. The bureaucracy is submitted to the ‘political’ institutions (the state organs in a country, the board of directors in a company). Nevertheless, in his research on the real functioning of the modern rational state, Weber discovers that the public bureaucracy tends to escape political control, thanks to three sources of power: the strategic position it occupies within society, its specialized knowledge and the practice of secrecy. Thereby the bureaucracy succeeds in imposing its will and interests on the political institutions, and in fact in exercising power.78 For Weber, only some other bureaucracies, benefiting from the same three sources of power, are capable of counterbalancing state bureaucracies, i.e. those of the private sector. Indeed, private bureaucracies tend also to avoid control, by acquiring a strategic position, claiming that they possess competencies that other actors do not possess and by practising secrecy. Then the question is: do private bureaucracies today possess a superior knowledge compared to the other actors (especially the public actors), do they occupy a strategic position and are they practising secrecy? During the late 1990s, the consequences of globalization on the structure of the international system were already evident and it was possible to confirm that there was an ongoing transfer of power from the nation-­states to some economic actors, multinationals and economic international organizations such as the WTO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and supranational organizations such as the EU.79 These international actors develop their activities globally or regionally, largely protected from democratic controls, and forcing the states to release what remains of their sovereignty in the economic sphere. It was also possible to identify the financial sector as the major actor shaping this formidable process. This movement was clearly an implementation of the neoliberal ideology thanks to one of its two armed wings (the New Public Management – NPM) claiming that the public sector is inefficient due to its bureaucratization.80 Consequently, large parts of a state’s activities were transferred to the private sector, considered to be more efficient, and markets, considered to be self-­correcting, were deregulated. Contrary to the proponents of NPM who promised to ban bureaucracy, I came to the conclusion that we were witnessing a massive development of some new international and supranational bureaucracies (the ones mentioned above) able to impose their will at the highest global or regional level. As for the question of what would be the form of the new dominant group, I could not tell for sure, but I had sufficient empirical evidence that the transfer of power was mainly in favour of the international organizations mentioned above, the multinationals trying to influence the activities of these organizations either by lobbying their governments and/or the bureaucracies of these organizations. Although it was already then clear that the multinational companies were one of the major beneficiaries of this transfer, I had not understood that a more radical change was on its way. Two decades later, the situation has become clearer, thanks to the 2008 crisis, especially in the US and in Europe. The dominant position of the economic actors, both nationally and internationally, was under the eyes of everybody.

Power in 21st century international relations   67 Politicians were simply following the ‘recommendations’ of the private actors by adopting policies supposed to overcome the crisis. The most probable outcome of this restructuring of the global system could be the emergence of a new dominant group: not a state, nor a coalition of states, nor an international global organization. In this context, one of the most likely outcomes could be the emergence of a dominant group composed of multinational companies from all over the world, possessing the resources necessary for the exercise of power, being in competition but sharing the same values and a clear interest in maintaining the power structure that confers to them their power status. There are some events (and strategies) that point in this direction. It is not necessary to list all the empirical evidence to prove this. Let us take just two examples. First, to overcome the consequences of the 2008 crisis the big banks impelled their national governments to come to their rescue by injecting into the financial system a phenomenal amount of money to avoid bankruptcy, which, due to the strategic position they occupied within the economic system, would result in the collapse of the entire economy. In short, they were ‘too big to fail’. They were able to demonstrate that they occupied a strategic place within the national and the global economies. Moreover, while claiming their competence in the economy, they had implemented the risky investment policies that led to the crisis under the cover of secrecy and the benevolent positive evaluation by the major rating agencies. Second, there has been the negotiations of the two mega-­treaties mentioned above, i.e. the Trans-­Pacific and the Transatlantic Partnerships.81 Whereas these two treaties have been supported by the Obama administration and the EU’s bureaucracy, it is not a secret that they have been sponsored and very strongly supported by multinational companies and their international organizations active in all economic domains, in the US, Europe and Asia. Moreover, there is evidence that the multinationals and their international associations were the major actors participating in the negotiations and orienting the content of the treaties to their advantage.82 Representatives of civil society were carefully kept out of the process, in spite of the fact that these treaties would have some important consequences for them and the people they represent. And the negotiations went on for a very long time in complete secrecy. Let us note that the most problematic feature of these treaties is the possibility given to foreign companies to sue, before a private court, the government of the country in which they have invested their money, if it can be proved that the state’s policies are limiting (or are supposed to limit in the future) their profits. As this may occur in sectors such as health, environmental protection, education, energy, etc., there is a real danger that multinationals will dictate their will to national governments in a large number of very sensitive domains for the populations concerned. These two treaties show that the three Weberian resources permitting the acquisition of a power position, and thus becoming the new dominant group, would be fulfilled. If the general trend, exemplified by these two examples, occurs, the consequence will be what Joseph Stiglitz has called the ‘corporate takeover’ and

68   Power in 21st century international relations more recently ‘the monopoly new era’.83 In this case the multinational companies would have realized the neoliberal dream of subjecting to their interests not only the nation-­states, but also the international organizations and thus the entire world. Therefore, they would constitute the new dominant group. This contemporary situation corresponds very well to Braudel’s analysis of the essence and the strategy of capitalism: capitalism has always been monopolistic, and merchandise and capital have always circulated simultaneously, for capital and credit have always been the surest way of capturing and controlling a foreign market. Long before the twentieth century the exportation of capital was a fact of daily life, for Florence as early as the thirteenth century […] Need I observe that all methods, dealings, and tricks [‘ruses’ in the French edition, p.  118] of the financial world were not born in 1900 or in 1914? Capitalism was familiar with them all, and, yesterday as today, its uniqueness and its strength lie in its ability to move from one trick to another, from one way of doing things to another, to change its plans ten times as the economic conjunctures dictate –, and as a result, to remain relatively faithful, consistent with itself.84 Nevertheless, this outcome is by no means unavoidable. I mentioned before that the restructuring of the international system could be the emergence of a multipolar world. But will it be dominated by multinationals? Or would it be possible for one of the major international actors (a single state, a coalition of states or a supranational organization) to put an end to the ‘corporate takeover’, or at least limit the freedom of private corporations so that they work not only in their own interest but also in the interests of the populations of the international community? For the time being, the US and the EU are not likely to play this role, as they are almost completely embedded into the neoliberal order. Moreover, I have already mentioned that since the 1980s the self-­defining socialist parties have been implementing (and are still implementing today) neoliberal policies that give priority to capital over labour. The problem is that liberal democracy was introduced in the West a long time ago and has been unable to prevent the emergence of powerful economic national and international multinational companies as well as international organizations whose behaviour has too often developed in forms that have little to do with democracy, and have harmed (and are still harming today) so many people, while they have benefited a small minority. Despite these negative and devastating policies, the capitalist economy, which goes together with liberal democracy, is one of the forms of the economy that is very difficult to change. So, change is not likely to come from the Western architects and beneficiaries of capitalism. The only source for a reorientation of globalization, away from neoliberalism, may come from a vast democratic movement or from a powerful country strong enough to play this role. For several years now, we have witnessed the emergence of several anti-­capitalist movements and parties in several Western countries who oppose the austerity policies imposed by neoliberal

Power in 21st century international relations   69 g­ overnments and international organizations. But so far, they do not possess enough resources for orienting the international community towards the kind of change necessary to limit or eradicate the selfish behaviour of neoliberal actors. So, the only remaining possibility is China. I am convinced that there are many features of Chinese culture that may work towards this goal and that a compromise between Western and Chinese values is essential. Moreover, China’s economy is today strong enough to be able to work for changing the rules of the global game and, as I said before, nobody would dare attack China militarily.85 Clearly China has to make some important improvements for democracy and human rights. But the movement is on its way. So, the other, more interesting outcome would be that China succeeds in introducing more freedom in its country and at the same time in changing the rules of the international game so that the global economy works in the interests of everybody and not for a small minority. It is here that the relationship between China and the West (especially the US, but also the EU) becomes of paramount importance for constructing some new and fairer ways of managing the global system. However, some serious obstacles exist on the road to a compromise between the West and China. First, many Western politicians and influential scholars and journalists consider that improvements made by China towards democracy and human rights are too modest and too slow, while some others even think that China will progress on the road of democracy only after the collapse of the Communist Party (CPC).86 However, the collapse of the CPC is not, for the time being, a probable event. The Party is doing all it can to satisfy the great majority of its citizens, groups and organizations, including the new ‘red capitalists’.87 Moreover, the Party is persuaded that it is the only institution capable of guiding China towards a more open well-­off society, while preserving national unity and social and political stability. If it succeeds in this endeavour, one can argue that Western powers will understand that the collapse of the CPC is not likely to occur in the foreseeable future. Then the Party will be able to negotiate with the other international actors a restructuring of the international system where the economy and its actors work not only in their own interests but also in the interests of everybody. But there is another problem. Second, it will be difficult to find a compromise as long as the West (especially the US and the EU) remains dominated by the neoliberal ideology, and persists in believing that liberal democracy and the capitalist economy are not only the best, but also the only choice for any country that wishes to realize the fundamental universal values of which it claims to be the depositary, i.e. freedom, democracy, market economy (i.e. capitalism) and a narrow definition of human rights.88 Consequently, if one considers, with the neoliberals and with one of their most influential intellectuals, Milton Friedman, that capitalism is the necessary condition for democracy, the only possible choice for China would be to be integrated into the global capitalist order.89 Many Chinese multinationals will then become major players in the global economy, and several of them already are. But will they still be Chinese, or will they become some new multinational capitalist companies sharing with the Western ones the same goal of

70   Power in 21st century international relations making as much profit as possible, with the negative consequences for social equity we are witnessing today in the West?90 And, as the French saying goes, ‘money has no odour’, and, I will add, it has no nationality either, so it is likely that they will lose their ‘Chinese characteristics’. The Li Minqi forecast of China being totally embedded into the capitalist world order would be realized.91 In this case, it is likely that Chinese society will have basically the same characteristics Western countries acquired after more than three decades of neoliberal policies: increasing economic and social disparities (or at best maintaining the already existing level); increasing numbers of people living below the poverty line; increasing numbers of crimes and of people in prison; and poor health of people in an unstable working environment.92 And the Chinese dream of a harmonious society with a ‘socialist market economy’ where prosperity is equitably distributed among all its citizens will have faded away for a very long time. It remains to be seen whether the new global order will be accepted by the citizens of the world as the only possible one satisfying the functional imperatives. The conception of power presented above and the examples presented in the preceding paragraphs suggest that the dominant group (no matter its composition and features) must fulfil the functional imperatives mentioned above. Nevertheless, this assertion must not be understood only in the sense of the accomplishment by the dominant group of functional activities necessary to the persistence and development of the global system. The assertion must also be understood in the sense of the persistence of a particular type of power structure allowing the dominant group simultaneously to (1) guarantee the persistence of the global society as a human entity within a non-­human (i.e. natural) environment, i.e. satisfying the functional imperatives; (2) guarantee the persistence of the power position of the dominant group as such, thus allowing it to accomplish a particular type of functions in a particular type of power structure that must be safeguarded; and (3) persuade the international community to accept this particular type of structure and functions as being the only and the best one capable of satisfying the functional imperatives. In other words, safeguarding of a certain type of power structure does not only depend on the capacity of the dominant group to satisfy the functional imperatives, as this task is incumbent upon any form of power, but also, and above all, on the capacity of the dominant group to convince the members of the global system that the power structure of the international system that guarantees the dominant group its position is at the same time the best one, capable of satisfying the functional imperatives. The dominant group thus succeeds in proving the indispensable character of its existence.93 As I said above, I have based my quest for understanding China’s strategy for reclaiming world power status upon two approaches, the first being the concept of ‘silent transformations’ and the second the difference between market economy and capitalism, as������������������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������������������������� I presented in Chapter 1. In this chapter I have discussed a third approach, i.e. the analysis of power in international relations starting from the seminal work of Max Weber’s theory of power. In Chapters 4 and 5 I will use these three approaches to analyse the relations between China and the

Power in 21st century international relations   71 US. In fact, I will show that the use of power resources depends not only on the capacity to develop a country’s resources but also to be able to forecast the changes in the distribution of power resources in the international system in the ‘long time’, i.e. to discover and understand the development of the ‘silent transformations’, and to adapt one’s strategy accordingly. Moreover, it is of paramount importance to have a clear idea of the competitor’s economic and political institutions, in order to be able to understand its modus operandi and to anticipate its tactics and strategy. But before we undertake our journey inside Chinese and US foreign policies, let us take, in Chapter 3, the analysis of a Beijing top researcher, which will give us an interesting point of view of how the relationship between the US and China is appreciated from a Chinese perspective.

Notes   1 Bartolomé de Las Casas, The Devastation of the Indians. A Brief Account (translated by Herman Briffault), Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974 (first published in Spanish in 1552), quoted by Immanuel Wallerstein, European Universalism. The Rhetoric of Power, New York, The New Press, 2006. The quotation is from p. 1. See also Bartolomé de Las Casas, In Defense of the Indians (translated and edited by Stafford Poole, foreword by Martin Marty), DeKalb, IL, Northern Illinois University Press, 1992. In chapters 31, 32 and 33, Las Casas develops several arguments to sustain his analysis (pp. 204–220). In summary (pp. 204–205): it is not lawful to kill or inflict harm on a large or even a small number of innocent persons in order that a few innocent persons may be rescued from death, and that the ruler or governor who does or permits [such things] commits a mortal sin and is bound to restitution. […] Inasmuch as the soldiers have been instructed in Christ’s teaching, they ought to be aware that innocent persons must be spared. Hence, they do not rightly distinguish […] Therefore they are guilty before God of a most serious crime, and worthy of eternal damnation.   2 I have developed elsewhere a more detailed analysis of this topic: Paolo Urio, Le role politique de l’administration publique, Lausanne, LEP, 1984, ch. 5. This book is out of print, but the chapter on power is available (in French) on my personal website: http://ecmi.ch/pdf/papers_publications/1984-2_on_decision-­making_and_power.pdf. A summary of this framework is presented (in English) in my book Reconciling State, Market, and Society in China. The Long March towards Prosperity, London and New York, Routledge, pp. 156–171. In these two books, the framework for the analysis of power was designed for understanding power within a state. In the following pages, I will adapt this framework to the analysis of power in the international domain, while maintaining its original assumptions and theoretical hypotheses.   3 Robert L. Peabody, Organizational Authority, New York, Athernon Press, 1964; Steven Lukes, Power. A Radical View, London, Macmillan, 1974.   4 Stewart Clegg, The Theory of Power and Organization, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979, p. 47.   5 Perry Anderson dismisses Nye’s discussion on power as ‘insufficiently original, with little more than the banalities of soft power to his name, to warrant consideration’, Perry Anderson, Amer­ican Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers, London, Verso, 2015, p. 165, note 8. I quite agree, and I must say that, at first, I was tempted to do the same. But I decided nevertheless to devote a few paragraphs to refuting Nye’s approach to power as his terms (soft, hard and smart power) are nowadays used by politicians of

72   Power in 21st century international relations all sides, as well as by journalists, and therefore deserve a sharp, even if short, criticism.   6 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of Amer­ican Power. Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. From the same author, see also: Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004; The Powers to Lead, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008; The Future of Power, New York, Public Affairs, 2011; Is the Amer­ican Century Over?, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2015; and the recent interview given by Nye to the Council on Foreign Relations: ‘Hard power’s essential soft side’, Interview of Joseph Nye by Zachary Laub, Council on Foreign Relations, 30 March 2017: www. cfr.org/united-­states/hard-­powers-essential-­soft-side/p38985 (accessed 2 May 2017). See how Joseph S. Nye uses hard and soft power concepts to deal with ‘the war on terrorism’: ‘Hard power, soft power, and the “war on terrorism” ’, in David Held and Mathias Koenig-­Archibugi (eds), Amer­ican Power in the 21st Century, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, pp. 114–133. It must be noted that the origins of the concept of soft power go far back – to the second Roosevelt administration (1937–1941). Franklin D. Roosevelt realized that only by communicating with and winning popular backing in foreign lands could America feel truly secure. That led to the establishment of the United States Information Agency and the Voice of America, and later the Peace Corps during the presidency of John F. Kennedy in 1962. Dilip Hiro, After Empire. The Birth of a Multipolar World, New York, Nation Books, 2010, p. 237.   7 Nye, Soft Power, op. cit., pp.  5–6. See also Nye, The Future of Power, op. cit., pp. xiii–xviii, 3–24, 81–109.   8 Nye, Soft Power, op. cit., p. 8.   9 Joseph Nye was Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Clinton administration, and was on the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations. At the time of writing, he is the Chairman of the North Amer­ican branch of the Trilateral Commission and the Co-­chair of the Aspen Strategy Group. 10 ‘People’s Daily criticizes U.S. as “source of turmoil” ’, 18 September 2016: http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/18/c_135695211.htm?utm (accessed 22 September 2016). 11 Nye, Soft Power, op. cit., pp. 7, 8, 9, 11–18. That Nye defines three well-­distinguished types of power, in spite of the qualifications mentioned above, is apparent in the figure on p. 31 of his book, entitled: ‘Three types of power’. 12 Nye, ‘Hard power, soft power’, op. cit., p. 129. 13 For the decisions of President Obama, see: Lawrence Wittner, ‘The trillion dollar question’, Huffington Post, 17 March 2016: www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-­ wittner/the-­trillion-dollar-­question_b_9481432.html (accessed 5 December 2016). For Trump’s proposal, see Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘Trump’s $54 billion rounding error’, Foreign Affairs, 1 March 2017: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-03-01/trumps-­ 54-billion-­rounding-error (accessed 6 May 2017). 14 Nye, The Future of Power, op. cit., pp. xiii–xiv. 15 Ibidem. 16 Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore, ‘The end of hypocrisy: Amer­ican foreign policy in the age of leaks’, Foreign Affairs, 1 November 2013. The two authors are professors of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University. 17 Nye, ‘Hard power, soft power’, op. cit., p. 128. 18 For the use of ‘double standards’ by the US towards Russia, see Guy Mettan, Creating Russophobia. From the Great Religious Schism to Anti-­Putin Hysteria, Atlanta,

Power in 21st century international relations   73 GA, Clarity Press, 2017, in which you can find a critique of ‘soft power’ related to the relations between the US and Russia, pp. 260–262, 306–309. 19 For the use of ‘soft power’ in China, see, for example: ‘Xi: China to promote cultural soft power’, Xinhuanet, 1 January 2014: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ china/2014-01/01/c_125941955.htm (accessed 15 March 2016): ‘President Xi Jinping has vowed to promote China’s cultural soft power by disseminating modern Chinese values and showing the charm of Chinese culture to the world’; and Xi Jinping, ‘Enforcer le soft power culture chinois’, in La governance de la Chine, Beijing, Editions en langue étrangères, 2014, pp. 191–193. Li Xiguang, ‘From Amer­ican dream to Chongqing dream: the making of soft power in China’, speech given at the Watson Institute, Brown University, 11 November 2011: https://news.brown.edu/events/ detail/2011-11-11-200000-2011-11-11-213000/Amer­ican-­dream-chongqing-­dreammaking-­soft-power (accessed 10 February 2012); at that time Li Xiguang was dean of the Tsinghua University International Centre for Communication Studies and the dean of the Chinese Academy of World Agendas of the Southwestern University of Political Science and Law. For a critical appraisal, see: Xie Tao, ‘China’s soft power obsession’, The Diplomat, 14 April 2015: http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-­softpower-­obsession (accessed 15 March 2016). ‘Smart power’ has become a frequently used concept by Amer­ican researchers dealing with US–China relations; see, for example: Raya Koreh, ‘The Chinese smart power strategy’, Harvard Political Review, 31 January 2015: http://harvardpolitics.com/world/chinese-­smart-power-­strategy (accessed 15 March 2016); Center for Strategic & International Studies, Commission on China, Smart Power in US–China Relations, March 2009. 20 ‘China trounces U.S. “Smart Power”: a case study in declining Amer­ican influence’, Wall Street Journal, 20 March 2015: www.wsj.com/articles/china-­trounces-u-­s-smart­power-1426806094 (accessed 25 March 2015). 21 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 2 vols (ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Watch), Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978. 22 Ibidem, vol. I, pp. 212–227, and vol. II, pp. 941–955. 23 The link between the forms the economy can assume and power has been very clearly outlined by Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Monopoly’s new era’, 13 May 2016: www.project-­ syndicate.org/commentary/high-­monopoly-profits-­persist-in-­markets-by-­joseph-e-­ stiglitz-2016-05 (accessed 16 May 2016). Dealing with the two schools of thought about what determines the distribution of income, and how the economy functions, Stiglitz says: The second school of thought takes as its starting point ‘power’, including the ability to exercise monopoly control or, in labour markets, to assert authority over workers. Scholars in this area have focused on what gives rise to power, how it is maintained and strengthened, and other features that may prevent markets from being competitive. 24 Stated on NBC’s Today Show (19 February 1998), according to Wikiquote: https:// en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Madeleine_Albright (accessed 20 March 2016). See also, presenting the US as the ‘indispensable nation’, the speech of President Obama at the graduation of West Point cadets on 28 May 2014 (available at: https://obama whitehouse.archives.gov/the-­press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-­president-united-­statesmilitary-­academy-commencement-­ceremony), and President Obama’s commencement speech at the US Air Force Academy, 2012: As recently as the 1980s with the rise of Japan and the Asian tigers, there were those who said we had lost our economic edge. But we retooled. We invested in new technologies. We launched an Information Revolution that changed the world. After all this, you would think folks understand a basic truth – never bet against the United States of America. (Applause.) And one of the reasons is that

74   Power in 21st century international relations the United States has been, and will always be, the one indispensable nation in world affairs. It’s one of the many examples of why America is exceptional. It’s why I firmly believe that if we rise to this moment in history, if we meet our responsibilities, then – just like the 20th century – the 21st century will be another great Amer­ican Century. That’s the future I see. That’s the future you can build. (Applause.). https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-­press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-­presidentunited-­states-military-­academy-commencement-­ceremony (accessed 17 May 2017). 25 This being the most favourable interpretation of the US foreign policy in this matter, the other being that right from the beginning the goal was to invade Iraq in order to better safeguard US national interests. One of the reasons in favour of this interpretation is the fact that the Iraqi government had announced its intention to sell its oil in euros and no longer in US dollars. 26 See, for example, Edward Mead Earle, ‘Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: the economic foundations of military power’, in Edward Mead Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1943 (paperback printing 1971), pp.  117–154. See also the interesting article by Peter Navarro, in fact a review article of approaches (including Chinese) to international power: ‘Introduction: crouching tiger – China acts, America dithers’, in Fred Fleitz (ed.), Warning Order. China Prepares for Conflict, and Why We Must Do the Same, Washington, DC, Center for Security Policy Press, 2016, pp. 9–23, especially pp. 20–21. According to Wikipedia: Peter Navarro is an Amer­ican economist who currently serves as the Assistant to the President, Director of Trade and Industrial Policy, and the Director of the White House National Trade Council, a newly created entity in the executive branch of the U.S. federal government. A former professor of economics and public policy at the Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine […] Navarro is known as a staunch critic of China and strong proponent of reducing U.S. trade deficits. He has accused Germany and China of currency manipulation. He has called for increasing the size of the Amer­ican manufacturing sector, setting high tariffs, and repatriating global supply chains. He is a strong opponent of the Trans-­Pacific Partnership. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Navarro (accessed 29 June 2017). 27 See note 9 above. 28 The dynamic of the entry of the US into the Second World War is subject to controversy. For a balanced account, see Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, New York, Harper, 2015 (first edition 1980), with a new introduction by Anthony Arnove, especially pp. 407–424. 29 The use of atomic bombs is well known, the bombing of several Japanese cities with napalm much less so. See the interview of former Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara: ‘The fog of war: Mark Danner in conversation with Robert McNamara and Errol Morris’: www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGn-­Szs-1Fc&nohtml5=False. The opinion of McNamara: I don’t fault Truman for dropping the nuclear bomb. The U.S.–Japanese War was one of the most brutal wars in all of human history? kamikaze pilots, suicide, unbelievable. What one can criticize is that the human race prior to that time? and today? has not really grappled with what are, I’ll call it, ‘the rules of war.’ Was there a rule then that said you shouldn’t bomb, shouldn’t kill, shouldn’t burn to death 100,000 civilians in one night? [General] LeMay said, ‘If we’d lost the war, we’d all have been prosecuted as war criminals.’ And I think he’s right. He, and I’d say I, were behaving as war criminals. LeMay recognized that what he was doing would be thought immoral if his side had lost. But what makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?

Power in 21st century international relations   75 In Errol Morris Films, ‘Transcription of McNamara’s 11 lessons on the fog of war’: http://blogspersonals.ara.cat/desdelparadis/2015/08/22/the-­fog-of-­war-transcript (accessed 2 March 2016). For an objective account of the napalm bombing of Japan, see the article by Paul Abrahams, ‘Breathing fire’, Financial Times, FT Weekend, 4–5 March 2000, print edition. 30 According to Stefano Cammelli, Quando l’oriente si tinse di rosso. Saggi sulla rivoluzione cinese, Bologna, Ed. Viaggi di Cultura, 2013, pp.  56–66, and Stephen R. Mackinnon and Oris Friesen, China Reporting. An Oral History of Amer­ican Journalism in the 1930s and 1940s, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1987, p. 21. 31 Georges Balandier, Anthropologie politique, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1967, p. 45 (my translation from the French). The works of anthropologists are very interesting because they tend to analyse so-­called ‘primitive societies’ simultaneously in all their societal dimensions, thus producing remarkable insights that the specialized disciplines too often fail to provide. 32 Here I will develop starting from my previous work on the concept of power and adapting it to the international arena: Urio, Le role politique, op. cit., ch. 5, and Urio, Reconciling, op. cit., pp. 159–171. 33 In some cases, as we will see hereafter, powerful international organizations of economic interests may also intervene in the international system. 34 I am indebted to Jean-­William Lapierre for this approach: Jean-­William Lapierre, L’analyse des systèmes politiques, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1973. For a different, but similar, perspective, see the Marxist Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, Classes, Strata and Power, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979 (translated from the Polish), who shows that Marx and Engels follow the same approach defining three functional imperatives: the reproduction of humankind, the production of consumer goods, and social organization, pp. 97–100, especially note 29. In the first discussion of this approach (Urio, Le role politique, op. cit., pp.  254–282; Urio, Reconciling, op. cit., pp.  157–164) for a state’s system, the formulation was as follows: each of these functions is produced by a specific structure. First, the socio-­ biological structure, which assures the reproduction of humankind. Second, the economic structure, assuring the production of goods and services necessary to the survival of humankind, eventually (but not necessarily) to its economic development, thanks to an accumulation process. Third, the structure of norms, which can be subdivided into the structure of formal norms (or law structure), and into the structure of social norms, including values, beliefs and norms of behaviour. It is at this level where one will be able to situate the political or ideological culture. Finally, the informational structure, assuring the circulation of information inside the social entirety concerned. The latter can be subdivided into the intellectual means of communication (language, symbols, etc.) and the technological support of communication (such as mass media, newspapers, radio, TV, Internet). The rationality mode of each of these structures constitutes the framework inside which the interactive processes take place (second level), the essential result of which is the production and the distribution of resources (third level) inside the social system. The result of these processes has – as already mentioned – an impact on the processes and on the structure by confirming or modifying its rationality. In this book I will adapt this approach to the domain of international relations. 35 I define global governance as follows, adopting the definition suggested by Michael D. Swaine: Global governance refers to the ways in which global affairs are managed among nation-­states and non-­state actors in the absence of a global government. It normally denotes those structures, processes and norms – usually organized into ‘regimes’ – that provide public goods for the global community.

76   Power in 21st century international relations ‘Chinese views on the global governance since 2008–9: not much new’, China Leadership Monitor, no. 49, 1 March 2016, p. 1. 36

The military–industrial complex (MIC) is an informal alliance between a nation’s military and the defence industry which supplies it, seen together as a vested interest which influences public policy. The term is most often used in reference to the system behind the military of the United States, where it gained popularity after its use in the farewell address of President Dwight D. Eisenhower on January 17, 1961, though the term is applicable to any country with a similarly developed infrastructure. In 2011, the United States spent more on its military than the next 13 nations combined.

Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military%E2%80%93industrial_complex (accessed 17 March 2016). 37 Martin Stabe, Steve Bernard and Marissa Oberlander, ‘The new cyber-­industrial complex’, Financial Times, 10 October 2011; Joseph Menn, ‘Defence groups turn to cybersecurity’, Financial Times, 10 October 2011; Jeff Stone, ‘Meet the cyber-­ industrial complex: private contractors may get $7b windfall from Pentagon’s cyberwar on ISIS’, International Business Times, 7 March 2016. 38 Navarro, ‘Introduction: crouching tiger’, op. cit., p.  14. Peter Navarro is chief economic advisor to Donald Trump’s administration. For a general introduction to the importance of the navy, see Margaret Tuttle Sprout, ‘Mahan: evangelist of sea power’, in Mead Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, op. cit., pp. 415–445. Note that even today, Mahanian sea strategy is mentioned by contemporary authors, for example, Navarro, ibidem. 39 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare. China’s Master Plan to Destroy America, New Delhi, Dehradun, 2007. 40 See, for example, Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-­Year Marathon. China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 2015. 41 Kevin D. Freeman, ‘China, unrestricted warfare, and the challenge to America’, in Fleitz (ed.), Warning Order, op. cit., pp. 55–80. 42 Remarks of President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, 12 January 2016: www.whitehouse.gov/the-­press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-­president-barack-­obama%E2%80%93-prepared-­delivery-state-­union-address (accessed 27 January 2016). 43 I have analysed the role of Amer­ican NGOs in China in Paolo Urio and Yuan Ying, L’émergence des ONG en Chine. Le changement du rôle de l’Etat-Parti, Bern, Peter Lang, 2014. For a more comprehensive critique of the NGOs’ role in developing countries, see: Centre Tricontinental, Les ONG: instruments du néoliberalisme ou alternatives populaires?, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1998. 44 President Obama has made it clear that military power is an essential part of the US power: I told you earlier all the talk of America’s economic decline is political hot air. Well, so is all the rhetoric you hear about our enemies getting stronger and America getting weaker. Let me tell you something. The United States of America is the most powerful nation on Earth. Period. (Applause.) It’s not even close. It’s not even close. (Applause.) It’s not even close. We spend more on our military than the next eight nations combined. Our troops are the finest fighting force in the history of the world. (Applause.) No nation attacks us directly, or our allies, because they know that’s the path to ruin. Surveys show our standing around the world is higher than when I was elected to this office, and when it comes to every important international issue, people of the world do not look to Beijing or Moscow to lead – they call us. (Applause.). Remarks of President Barack Obama: State of the Union Address, 12 January 2016, loc. cit.

Power in 21st century international relations   77 45 On the increasing role of interest groups, and their role in perverting the original Amer­ican liberal project, see the pioneering work of Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism. The Second Republic of the United States, New York, Norton, 1969. On deaths by drug overdose in the US, see: Josh Katz, ‘Drug deaths in America are rising faster than ever’, New York Times, 5 June 2017. 46 On the limit of Chinese soft power, see Joseph Nye, ‘The limits of Chinese soft power’, 10 July 2015: www.project-­syndicate.org/commentary/china-­civil-society-­ nationalism-soft-­power-by-­joseph-s–nye-­2015-07?barrier=true (accessed 10 August 2015). 47 See, for example, the role of Amer­ican NGOs before and during the Arab Spring, according to the New York Times: Ron Nixon, ‘U.S. groups helped nurture Arab uprisings’, New York Times, 14 April 2011. 48 See, for example, Pillsbury, The Hundred-­Year Marathon, op. cit.; as well as Fleitz (ed.), Warning Order, op. cit.; Navarro, ‘Introduction: crouching tiger’, op. cit.; Peter Navarro, Crouching Tiger. What China’s Militarism Means for the World, New York, Prometheus Books, 2015; former US Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, Jr, Dealing with China. An Insider Unmasks the New Economic Superpower, New York, Twelve, 2015; and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, How China’s Leaders Think, Singapore, Wiley, 2010. 49 See, for example: Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.–China Military Scorecard. Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996–2017, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2015. This report was commissioned by the US Air Force, but was conducted independently and does not necessarily conform to the views or analyses of that service, the US military or the US government. 50 Hence the title of my book on China’s reforms: Reconciling State, Market, and Society in China, op. cit., and my article, ‘Reinventing Chinese society, economy and polity: a very short history and interpretation of China’s reforms’, Politics and Society, Special Issues of Journal of Central China Normal University, Wuhan, vol. 1, no. 2, September 2013, pp. 1–39. 51 I have analysed these problems in detail in Urio, Reconciling, op. cit., pp.  45–102, especially pp. 68–76. 52 World Bank, China 2020, 7 vols, Washington, DC, World Bank, 1997; China: Promoting Growth with Equity, Washington, DC, World Bank, 2003; China: Deepening Public Service Unit Reform to Improve Service Delivery, Washington, DC, World Bank, 2005; Mid-­Term Evaluation of China’s 11th 5 Year Plan, 2008; From Poor Areas to Poor People. China’s Evolving Poverty Reduction Agenda – An Assessment of Poverty and Inequality in China, March 2009, available at: web.worldbank.org. 53 On this point, see Urio, Reconciling, op. cit., ch. 3, and Paolo Urio, China, the West and the Myth of New Public Management. Neoliberalism and Its Discontents, London and New York, Routledge, 2012, pp. 185–197. 54 Ankit Panda, ‘Confirmed: construction begins on China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti’, The Diplomat, 29 February 2016: http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/ confirmed-­construction-begins-­on-chinas-­first-overseas-­military-base-­in-djibouti (accessed 17 April 2016). 55 The importance of the Eurasian continent (which has geographical extensions to the Middle East and Africa) has been very well understood and explained by the Amer­ ican strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski in his many books, and more particularly in the classical book The Grand Chessboard. Amer­ican Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, Basic Books, 1997. 56 Li Minqi, The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy, New York, Monthly Review Press, 2008, and ‘The rise of the working class and the future of the Chinese revolution’, Monthly Review, vol. 63, no. 2, June 2011: available at http://monthlyreview.org (accessed 15 July 2011). See also the works of the French sinologist Marie-­Claire Bergère, L’âge d’or de la bourgeoisie chinoise, Paris,

78   Power in 21st century international relations ­ lammarion, 1986; Capitalisme et capitalistes en Chine, Paris, Perrin, 2007; Chine, le F nouveau capitalisme d’Etat, Paris, Fayard, 2011. 57 See again the statement by President Obama already quoted in this chapter above: ‘With TPP, China does not set the rules in that region; we do. You want to show our strength in this new century? Approve this agreement. Give us the tools to enforce it. It’s the right thing to do. (Applause)’, reference in note 42 above. 58 Of course, we also have examples of collective production processes in ancient times, both in China and elsewhere. But, with the exception of ‘public works’ such as the construction of the pyramids in Ancient Egypt or of the Great Wall in China, the essential part of economic production was organized on an individual (or family) basis. 59 Wesolowski, Classes, Strata and Power, op. cit., pp. 19–20, uses this distinction only for economic resources, whereas I propose to use it for all types of resources. 60 On the use of information for propaganda purposes, see Mettan, Creating Russophobia, op. cit., ch. 8: ‘Amer­ican russophobia: the dictatorship of freedom’, and ch. 9: ‘Semantics and anti-­Russian Newspeak’. 61 It suffices to mention three cases. After the end of the Second World War, the US was able (very likely thanks to the reputation they acquired during that conflict) to obtain the support of the United Nations to mobilize forces from other countries to support South Korea against North Korea between 1950 and 1953 during the Korean War. The same can be said of the use of the military forces of NATO to launch several military operations under Amer­ican leadership. Similarly, the Soviet Union set up the Warsaw Pact to confront the Western alliance. 62 See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Department_for_International_Devel opment and www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/sdc/portrait.html (accessed 12 February 2017). 63

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has announced it will close its offices in Russia following an order from the authorities there to cease operations. The Russian government gave the US until 1 October to close the mission, accusing it of meddling in politics. USAID has worked in Russia for two decades, spending nearly $3bn on aid and democratic programmes. The expulsion follows a government crackdown on pro-­democracy groups. ‘The decision was taken mainly because the work of the agency’s officials far from always responded to the stated goals of development and humanitarian cooperation. We are talking about attempts to influence political processes through its grants,’ the foreign ministry said in a statement.

BBC News, 19 September 2012: www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-19644897 (accessed 12 September 2017). 64 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations (accessed 12 February 2017). References on Wikipedia. 65 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trilateral_Commission (accessed 12 February 2017). References on Wikipedia. The Trilateral book on ‘moderation in democracy’: Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy. Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, New York, New York University Press, 1975. 66 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bilderberg_Group (accessed 12 February 2017). 67 James Kirchick, ‘Ron Paul’s World’, New York Times, Campaign Stops, 29 December 2011: https://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/ron-­pauls-world/?_ r=0 (accessed 12 February 2017). C-­SPAN (Cable-­Satellite Public Affairs Network), is an Amer­ican cable and satellite television network that was created in 1979 by the cable television industry as a public service. C-­SPAN televises many proceedings of the US federal government, as well as other public affairs programming.

Power in 21st century international relations   79 68 William F. Jasper, ‘Trump: will he be controlling or controlled?’, The New Amer­ican, 24 May 2016: www.thenewAmer­ican.com/usnews/politics/item/23238-trump-­willhe-­be-controlling-­or-controlled (accessed 12 February 2017). The article reminds the reader that Dr. Ron Paul, […] used his time in political office to resolutely, tirelessly, and much of the time single-­handedly, fight and roll back the federal government’s relentless usurpations of power beyond the narrow confines of the U.S. Constitution. In doing so, he fought the insiders in his own Republican Party, as well as those in the Democrat Party. In fighting the Federal Reserve and the Wall Street powers that operate behind it and through it, Representative Paul was taking on the Insiders with a capital ‘I’ those political and financial insiders who not only occupy positions of power inside powerful institutions, but also share a unified subversive vision of concentrating and centralizing all global authority under a world government, a New World Order. These pro-­world government Insiders operate through a number of semi-­secret organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the Trilateral Commission (TC), the (British) Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA, aka Chatham House), the Aspen Institute, the Club of Rome, and the World Economic Forum, as well as ultra-­secret gatherings such as the Bilderberg Group and Bohemian Grove. 69 I have done this when I evaluated the outcomes of New Public Management in China and in the West; Urio, China, the West, op. cit. 70 Stiglitz, ‘Monopoly’s new era’, loc. cit. 71 See, for example: Holly Sklar (ed.), Trilateralism. The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management, Boston, South End Press, 1980; James Perloff, The Shadows of Power. The Council on Foreign Relations and the Amer­ican Decline, Boston, Western Islands, 1988; Daniel Estulin, The True Story of the Bilderberg Group, Chicago, IL, Independent Publishers Group, 2009 (updated, revised and expanded); Jim Marrs, Rule by Secrecy. The Hidden History That Connects the Trilateral Commission, the Freemasons and the Great Pyramids, New York, HarperCollins, 2000. 72 See, for example, Béatrice Hibou (ed.), Privatisation des économies, privatisation des Etats? Paris, Karthala, 1999. 73 For the impressive list of nationalizations and privatizations in France, see Nicole Chabanas and Eric Vergeau, ‘Nationalisations et privatisations en France depuis 50 ans’, Paris, INSEE Première, No. 440, April 1996: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Priva tisations_en_France (accessed 25 April 2016), and ‘L’occasion ratée’, in Manuel d’économie critique, Paris, Hors série of Le Monde Diplomatique, 2016, pp. 156–157. 74 Gilbert Casasus, ‘Allemagne: la faillite du schöderisme’, L’Hebdo (Geneva), 17 March 2016. 75 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York, Free Press, 1992. 76 Fukuyama has subsequently moderated his forecast about the end of history. In a long interview given to the German newspaper, Die Zeit, he sustains that the US should cease to preach democratic values to the whole planet. Nevertheless, he remains firm on the idea that liberalism is a rational solution for governing in diversity and that it will prevail in the long run. Moreover, he persists in thinking that history will develop into a kind of a liberal democratic capitalism. He ends the interview by saying that when talking about the end of history he wanted to say that he did not see a better option other than liberal democracy. My translation of an interview given to Die Zeit, published by L’Hebdo, 7 April 2016. 77 I have analysed Weber’s approach to power in Urio, Le role politique, ch. 2, pp. 45–59. This book is out of print, but chapter 2, with the analysis of Weber’s approach to power, is available (in French) at my personal website: http://ecmi.ch/pdf/papers_publica tions/1984-1_on_administration_and_policy_making.pdf, pp. 8–31.

80   Power in 21st century international relations 78 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, available at: http://fs2.Amer­ican.edu/dfagel/ www/Class%20Readings/Weber/PoliticsAsAVocation.pdf. 79 Paolo Urio, ‘La gestion publique au service du marché’, in Marc Hufty (ed.), La pensée comptable. Etat, néolibéralisme, nouvelle gestation pulques, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, Collection Enjeux, Cahier de l’IUED, Genève, 1999, pp. 91–124. On the limit of the state and its loss of power, see: John Hoffman, Beyond the State, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies, New York, The Free Press, 1995. 80 The other armed wing being the Washington Consensus, aimed at developing countries. 81 Let us note that in the 1990s there had been already an attempt within the OECD to institute an agreement on international investment, negotiated in absolute secrecy. It was abandoned after the content of the treaty was made public by some leakages. MAI (Multilateral Agreement of Investment) is available here: www.monde-­ diplomatique.fr/md/dossier/ami. For a comment, see Lori M. Wallach, ‘Le nouveau manifeste du capitalisme mondial’, Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1998, p.  22. Lori Wallach is director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, Washington, DC: www.citizen.org. 82 The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) had been supported by the Trans-­Atlantic Business Council (TABC), instituted in 1995 under the patronage of the European Commission and the US Department of Commerce. According to Lori Wallach (director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, Washington, DC: www.citizen.org.), ‘the objective of the TTIP, as from publicly made statements, is to eliminate what it calls “trade irritants”, i.e. to operate on the two continents according to the same rules without interference from public bodies’ (my translation from the French: Lori Wallach, ‘Le traité transatlantique, un typhon qui menace les Européens’, Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2013, pp. 4–5). Similarly, the Trans-­Pacific Partnership (TPP) is supported by multinational companies, especially Amer­ican, e.g. tobacco and pharmaceuticals. On the TPP treaty, see Gordon Lafer, ‘Partnership or putsch?’, Project Syndicate, 14 January 2014: www.project-­syndicate.org (accessed 15 January 2014). Gordon Lafer is a professor at the Labor Education and Research Center, University of Oregon. On the TPP treaty, see Lori Wallach, ‘Government by big business goes supranational: the corporation invasion’, Paris, Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition), December 2013: http://mondediplo.com/2013/12/02tafta (accessed 12 January 2014); Kim Bizzarri, A Brave New Transatlantic Partnership. The Proposed EU–US Transatlantic Partnership (TTIP/TAFTA) and Its Socio-­ Economic & Environmental Consequences, Brussels, published by the Seattle to Brussels Network, October 2013. TTIP has been promoted for a long time by the Trans-­Atlantic Business Council (TABC). The TABC was convened in 1995 by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the European Commission to serve as the official dialogue between Amer­ican and European business leaders and U.S. cabinet secretaries and EU commissioners. Membership was comprised of chief executive officers or chairmen of Amer­ican and European companies operating in the United States, Europe and globally. Among its members are some of the major Amer­ican and European multinational companies, such as ‘AIG, AT&T, Audi AG, BASF, British Amer­ican Tobacco, BT, Chevron Corporation, Cisco Systems, Deloitte, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, Exxon Mobil Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Intel, KPMG, Pfizer, Philip Morris International, PwC, Qualcomm, SAAB Group, Siemens, Telecom Italia’. According to the TABC website: www.transatlanticbusiness.org (accessed 15 April 2016). The site has also a section on TTIP. 83 Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘The secret corporate takeover’, Project Syndicate, 13 May 2015: www.project syndicate.org (accessed 31 May 2015); ‘Monopoly’s new era’, loc. cit.;

Power in 21st century international relations   81 and ‘The free-­trade charade’, Project Syndicate, 14 July 2013: www.project-­ sysndicate.org (accessed 25 September 2013). See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work. The Next Steps to Global Justice, London, Penguin, 2006; Freefall. America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy, New York, Norton, 2010; and The Price of Inequality. How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future, New York, Penguin, 2012. See also Lafer, ‘Partnership or putsch?’, loc. cit. 84 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism. Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, pp. 113–114. 85 See again the report by the RAND Corporation commissioned by the US Air Force: Heginbotham et al., The U.S.–China Military Scorecard, op. cit. Nevertheless, see again President Obama affirming that military power is an essential part of Amer­ican power (quoted in note 44 above). 86 See, for example, Ian Easton, Strategic Standoff. The U.S.–China Rivalry and Taiwan, Arlington, VA, Project 2049 Institute, March 2016. This report says in particular (p. 1): The political systems and national interests of America and China stand in fundamental opposition to each other. […] Read the State Department’s annual report on human rights and it quickly becomes apparent that this is a deeply authoritarian regime, and one that continues to oppress the Chinese people. […] It is Beijing’s aggressive nature that is at the root of the problem [in the China seas]. […] conditions have grown considerably worse under the current paramount leader, Xi Jinping. Beijing’s cognitive failures include a paranoid reading into Amer­ican actions, hawkish ideology, and departures from reality. […] Past [U.S.] presidents have labored in vain to integrate China into the Amer­ican-­led world order, apparently unaware that Beijing is hostile toward the status quo. By now it should be clear that China will never be a true friend of America until it shares common democratic values. The Project 2049 Institute, established in January 2008, seeks to guide decision makers toward a more secure Asia by the century’s mid-­point. Website of the Project 2049 Institute: http://project2049.net/about_us.htm (accessed 20 May 2016). 87 Jie Chen and Bruce J. Dickson, ‘Allies of the State: democratic support and regime support among China’s private entrepreneurs’, China Quarterly, vol. 196, December 2008, pp.  780–804; Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China. The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, and Wealth into Power. The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 88 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at www.un.org/en/universal-­ declaration-human-­rights, consists of a long series of human rights that goes far beyond the civic and political rights mentioned most of the time by Western politicians and journalists. For example, Article 23: 1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. 3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. 4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. And Article 25:

82   Power in 21st century international relations 1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-­ being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 89 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1982. More precisely: the freedom in the economy (and therefore in the capitalist economy) is the necessary condition for assuring freedom in the political system. 90 Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality, op. cit. 91 I have already mentioned the existence of ‘red capitalists’ in China. Until now the Party has kept them under control, and it allows them a sufficient amount of freedom so they can develop their activities. But I cannot rule out that they will not one day develop some interests that the Party will not be able to satisfy. Moreover, they may find some allies among the managers of the numerous semi-­public/semi-­private enterprises and even from the SOEs, without forgetting the liberal intellectuals who work within universities and think tanks (both public and private). These actors may then try to impose a regime change. But there is more. The ‘red capitalists’ may find some other allies also, and this is a Chinese paradox, within the Party elite or in the immediate vicinity of its leaders. 92 I have analysed in depth these aspects for China and the West in Urio, China, the West, op. cit. 93 This last sentence is word for word the same as the one I used in my 1984 book dealing with power within a nation-­state: Urio, Le role politique, op. cit., p. 263: ‘Le groupement de domination parvient ainsi à faire la prevue du caractère absolument indispensable de son existence’, translated in English for my 2010 book as: ‘The dominant group thus succeeds in proving the indispensable character of its existence’, Urio, Reconciling, op. cit., p. 164. It is my pleasure to notice that this sentence corresponds to one of the strongest beliefs of the Amer­ican establishment about America being the ‘indispensable nation’, a statement made famous, as we have already mentioned, by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (see note 24 above). For a critique of the ‘indispensable US nation’ after the end of the Cold War, see Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire. The Breakdown of the Amer­ican Order, London, Constable, 2004.

3 China’s strategy A view from Beijing

The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtained in the field. There are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline. Sun Tze on the Art of War

From the Sunzi strategy to the New China’s strategy In the first chapter I sustained that it is not possible to understand China’s strategy today without referring to the classic works of Chinese strategists such as Sūnzi Bīngfǎ. It is therefore not surprising that one of the most frequently quoted contemporary Chinese experts on China’s development has put the above quotation at the beginning of one of his most important articles, written with Men Honghua.1 Readers not familiar with Sun Tze may be puzzled by the meaning of this quotation. Hu’s and Men’s article makes it quite clear, right from the first two paragraphs, what Chinese scholars (and very likely also political leaders) make of Sun Tze’s Art of War. The authors first recognize that globalization has accelerated the integration of countries into the world economy. Second, globalization results in competition among/between countries, especially among big powers, even though they are interdependent and interconnected. Third, international competition manifests itself in the dynamic changes of the strategic resources of countries, and therefore of their power. The consequence of these changes is that the power of some countries has grown, whereas the power of other countries has declined. This results in significant changes to the structure of the world. This analysis leads the authors to the following questions: what strategic resources are important in the twenty-­first century? How does China stand in the world regarding strategic resources? How does it compare to the United States (US), Japan, India and Russia? And the last and most revealing question: how should China increase its strategic resources and how should it make full use of its advancement in some strategic resources, while constantly reducing its disadvantage in some other strategic resources?

84   China’s strategy And finally, this analysis leads the authors to the concluding question: what are the objectives of China’s grand strategy?2 Starting from these premises, Hu has developed a great number of policy proposals regarding the strategy China should implement, as well an impressive amount of empirical research to show the evolving, and increasing, power of China, especially compared to the US. It is out of the question to summarize here the total contribution of Hu Angang to the understanding of China’s strategy for reclaiming world power status. Limited space within this chapter is a sufficient reason. But even if I had the necessary space, the difficulty would arise not only from his large number of writings (books, articles, reports, PowerPoint presentations) covering practically all the domains of China’s development since at least 1949, but also from the fact that his contributions are at the intersection of scientific inquiry meant for an academic audience and the advocacy of public policies addressed to Chinese leaders. I will therefore simply summarize the main aspects of Hu’s writings that are essential for the purpose of this book, without making a distinction between the two dimensions mentioned above (academic and advocacy writings).3 I will first take the writings pertaining to the analysis of China’s strategy, and then I will summarize the findings of his methodology concerning the comparison between Chinese and US power in a historical perspective, which in fact constitutes the introduction to Chapter 4. I will introduce these two parts by referring to Hu’s career and to the first findings of his research, as this is essential for understanding from what personal and academic trajectory he has come to consider the status of China as a world power, and maybe even the new superpower relegating the US to the second position.4 Hu Angang was born on 27 April 1953 in Anshan, Liaoning Province. At the age of 13, in 1966, he is caught by the Cultural Revolution, must interrupt his studies and spends several years in the countryside. Here he learns how hard the life of Chinese peasants was at that time, a knowledge that later would orient many of his researches towards the establishment of a less unequal and more open Chinese society, where prosperity (measured by income and access to social services such as health and education) would be shared by all the people, as well as an economy that is more respectful of the environment. Following the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, aged 23, after the decision taken by Deng Xiaoping to restore the national college entrance examination in the summer of 1977, Hu Angang is able to resume his studies at the college level and go onto university studies. He obtains a BSc at Tangshan Institute of Technology, an MSc at the University of Science and Technology (Beijing) and a PhD at the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS). In the 1980s Hu starts to work on a framework for analysing China’s development while he is preparing his PhD thesis at the CAS.5 The thesis topic, ‘population and development’, was later developed with Zou Ping in a book published in 1991.6 At the same time, Hu works within a team of CAS researchers studying the conditions of China’s long-­term development; the English edition was published in 1992,7 but the original Chinese text was available to the Chinese leadership at the end of 1988,

China’s strategy   85 that is, before the Tiananmen events of June 1989. These two books constitute a remarkable example of research conducted by Chinese scholars, making the best of both Chinese and Western sources, which shows the great openness of this team of researchers to academic contributions from other parts of the world, as well as their high level of intellectual independence.9 After the completion of the report on survival and development, Hu Angang spends one year as a post-­doctoral scholar in the Department of Economics at Yale University between 1991 and 1992, where he works with another Chinese scholar, Wang Shaoguang. In 1993 Hu and Wang write a report, ‘Strengthen the role of the Central Government during the transition towards a market economy’, that favours the centralization of Chinese policies, especially fiscal policy.10 This report is circulated in China and is at the origin of the centralization of fiscal policy decided by Jiang Zemin in 1995, and which gave the central government more fiscal revenues. Joseph Fewsmith argues that by ‘focusing on extractive capacity, Hu and Wang chose to ignore other, more difficult (but nonetheless important) components of state capacity, such as legitimization capacity, corruption, and bureaucratic efficiency’.11 I do not think that this statement is very accurate, as Hu and Wang have devoted considerable research efforts to the analysis of the increasing disparities within China and have proposed policies aimed at rebalancing the Chinese economy and society, as Fewsmith recognizes.12 This is clearly a substantial contribution to the legitimization capacity of the Communist Party. These ideas circulated internally from the beginning of the 1990s and were later published in English.13 Moreover, Hu has developed, since the 1980s, a theoretical framework for the analysis of the relation between state and market that led to the conclusion that some domains cannot be left to the market, especially those aimed at reducing regional disparities. This is also a general policy option that will be applied later by Hu not only to economic policies but also to social security, health, education and environmental protection. At the beginning of the 1990s, the mastering of the evolution of the relation between state and market was certainly the major challenge to the Chinese leadership. As Zhang Xudong quite rightly has put it: 8

Wang and Hu’s argument can be regarded as one of the first systematic considerations of the state–market interrelationship in the Chinese context and one of the early responses to the economic collapse, political failure, and social tragedy of those transitional societies in Eastern Europe, especially the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.14 Finally, it is necessary to note that Hu has been one of the more vehement critics of the rampant corruption at all levels of the Chinese leadership.15 Back to China in 1992, Hu Angang develops an impressive amount of empirical evidence about the increasing disparities within Chinese society, as well as a number of policy proposals, that have constituted the scientific basis for the generalization of the policies set up for the Chinese West to the entire Chinese population. In 1993 Hu is appointed research fellow at the Research Centre for

86   China’s strategy Eco-­Environmental Science at the CAS and professor at Tsinghua University. In 2000 Hu is promoted to full professor at Tsinghua University, where he founds the Centre for China Studies (recently renamed ‘Institute for Contemporary China Studies of Tsinghua University’), which was to become one of the most influential think tanks in China and has produced an amazing amount of research and advocacy reports (called ‘China Study Reports’) sent directly to the top of the Chinese leadership. These reports have exerted a considerable influence on the transition from Deng’s strategy focused on economic development to the development strategy that puts ‘people first’ (to be dealt with hereafter), and to the preparation of the Five-­Year Plans. In November 2008 Hu Angang received the Award for Outstanding Contributions in the area of macroeconomic management. In the introductory statement to his master’s degree course for international development, Hu explains how he conducts research on China.16 The question that orients his research is: can China realize modernization? First, Hu explains that the realization of this objective must be based upon the following postulates: (1) China’s modernization must be based upon its basic national conditions, the process of modernization must be incremental and should not imitate either the West or the Soviet Union; rather, China should opt for a unique model of socialist modernization and development best suited to China’s national conditions; (2) Party decision-­making must be based upon collective leadership; (3) the policy decision-­makers need to be open to scientific information coming from experts. Second, Hu defines the objectives of China’s modernization: (1) focus on the most important issues concerning the economic and social development and progress of the entire society, because only reform that benefits the majority of the people can be regarded as a true reform; (2) improve the conditions of the common people, focus on important issues such as lay-­off problems, social security problems, peasant income problems, poverty problems in areas inhabited by minorities; (3) liberate the peasants, invest in peasants, transfer peasants, reduce the number of peasants and make peasants rich; (4) narrow the gap between regions, and within regions between urban and rural areas; (5) obtain the relevant scientific knowledge. Hu Angang was asked why his recommendations have been adopted by the central authorities not long after they have been put forward. Hu’s answer is that the policies of central authorities are never only economic, but economic, social and political. Therefore, it is not possible to analyse economic problems only from an economic perspective, but it is necessary to examine them also from a social and political point of view. For Hu, the task of an intellectual is to contribute to creating knowledge, and to explore and suggest ways to create wealth not for individuals but for the people and the country, i.e. he provides a ‘public good’: knowledge. But only when the research achievements have become public policies can the knowledge so created contribute to social development.17 In this endeavour, Hu has analysed several controversial problems of China’s modernization process: different types of inequalities, public health problems, environmental problems, corruption, environmental protection, to mention only

China’s strategy   87 a few. He admits that at one time he was in the minority, but claims, with pride and not without reason, that finally he ended up in the majority, meaning that some of his innovative ideas, such as environmental protection and the green economy, have taken some time before they were recognized as good ideas by the Chinese leadership.19 Based upon this research and advocacy strategy, Hu Angang’s Institute for China Study has provided the Chinese leadership with an amazing number of China Study Reports. The activities of the Institute for Contemporary China Studies are part of the general trend, promoted by the Chinese leadership, to develop first-­class think tanks that should provide policy analyses suggesting ways of avoiding policy-­making errors and correcting them promptly when they occur.20 It is in this context that the Institute has become, since it first started its activities in 2000, one of the most influential Chinese think tanks. Not only does it directly participate in the practice of China’s reform and opening up, but also actively participates in the major policy-­making consultation process about China’s medium- and long-­term development planning. Thanks to its China Study Reports, the Institute has influenced Chinese policy-­makers by providing information about national conditions and advice on national policies with a number of policy reports. Its director, Hu Angang, has contributed to the relevant information since the Ninth Five-­Year Plan (1999–2000), and as a member of the National Development Planning Expert Committee since 2005, he was entrusted with the independent evaluation as the third party of the Eleventh (2006–2010), Twelfth (2011–2015) and Thirteenth (2016–2020) Five-­Year Plans.21 On 27 October 2014, the sixth meeting of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms defined the functions of new think tanks with Chinese characteristics: 18

policy consultation and suggestions, theoretical innovation, public opinion guidance, social services, public diplomacy and other important functions, and clearly stated that high priority should be paid to 25 first class domestic think tanks that be established by the year 2020. In December 2015, the first group of first-­class think tanks was approved by the Chinese authorities and their goal was defined as ‘serving the decision-­making of the central committee of CPC and the development of the country and providing knowledge support’. Hu’s Institute was included in this first group of first-­ class think tanks.22 The quality of the Institute’s research and advocacy work was thus recognized by the Chinese leadership. Summing up the experience of the Institute during its 30 years of existence, Hu has defined its goals and way of working as follows: (1) stick to Chinese characteristics, position the Institute as a university brand and world-­class think tank; (2) stick to combining basic research with policy research, and decision-­ making consultation with teaching and formation; (3) promote cultural construction, team construction, platform construction and mechanism construction; (4)  as a university think tank, the Institute should carry out independent,

88   China’s strategy p­ roactive and professional research on decision knowledge development; (5) the process of participating in Five-­Year Plan development is an efficient way for the Institute to participate in counselling policy-­making, and to influence decisions through multiple channels. These channels are: (1) sending the National Reports to the top Chinese leaders; (2) directly participating, with policy suggestions, in the consultation conferences organized by the national ministries and departments; (3) providing systematic knowledge by publishing the results of its research; and (4) publishing articles in leading media such as the official Xinhua News Agency, the People’s Daily and the Guangming Daily to guide public opinion and expand social influence; (5) publishing academic papers in domestic core journals to lead scholars, and Hu Angang was one of the scholars whose articles are most cited with regard to social sciences. The above presentation of Hu Angang’s research activities very clearly shows that he has been very much involved not only in the study of China’s strategy on its road to modernization, but he also has been actively involved in the definition of that strategy, especially thanks to his contribution to the writing of the Five-­ Year Plans. It is no wonder that he has produced a great number of interesting research works that help us to understand the policies through which China’s strategy is working, in the long run, to reclaim world power status. And this is the subject of the following paragraphs.

The first contributions of Hu Angang to understanding China’s strategy I am interested in Hu Angang’s writings dealing with the development of China after the end of the Mao era. Nevertheless, I think it is important to explain how and to what extent the Mao era has in fact built, despite Mao’s great mistakes, an important basis upon which Deng Xiaoping was able to reorient China’s development, away from planned economy towards an incremental introduction of market mechanisms and the opening up to the global economy.23 There are, in my opinion, at least five improvements that Mao introduced into China since 1949; first of all, the successful reclaiming of China’s sovereignty after one century of foreign domination that reduced China to a semi-­colonial state. As we have seen in Chapter 2, p. 54, Mao improved two characteristics of the Chinese population that are essential for economic and social development: education and health. During the Mao era life expectancy increased from 35 to 61 years (second improvement), and adult literacy increased from as low as 20 per cent to about 70 per cent (third improvement).24 Without these improvements, Deng’s development policy would have been very difficult and in any case would have taken much longer to realize. Fourth, Mao established the basis for China’s industrial revolution. Of course, this was obtained at the price of a considerable deterioration of the environment. But the basis was there, and Deng was able to build upon it. Last but not least, Mao defined the characteristics of collective leadership. Of course, after 1958 (beginning of the Great Leap Forward and throughout the Cultural Revolution) Mao became the unique leader

China’s strategy   89 (and some would say the dictator) of China, but based upon Mao’s behaviour before 1958 and his writings about collective leadership, the empirical and theoretical basis for this type of leadership has been defined and could be re-­ established after the end of the Mao era.25 Dealing now with the post-­Mao era, let us start from a summary of the three generations of development strategies followed by the Chinese leadership as have been defined by Hu Angang.26 The first strategy (Mao) adopted at the beginning of the PRC was the traditional development strategy implemented during the planned economy era, with the aim to ‘catch up with the UK and surpass the US’. In the mid-­1960s Mao set the goal of achieving four modernization goals by the end of the twentieth century by implementing policies of ‘high accumulation, low consumption’, giving priority to heavy industry, including the defence industry and capital-­intensive industries, and providing import protection, resulting in increasing disparities between urban and rural areas. The second generation is the transitional development strategy defined in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping. This was a ‘three-­step strategy’, setting up the goal of quadrupling GDP,27 trade and investment liberalization, market development and competition. This strategy is still centred on materials, with top priority placed on speed of development. Deng Xiaoping advocated an imbalanced development, allowing some regions and some people to get rich first by concentrating on the development of coastal regions. This resulted in greater regional disparities and in enlarging gaps between urban and rural people, not only in terms of income, but also in consumption and access to public services such as education and health. In order to correct the negative consequences of the first and second generations of strategy, the Chinese leadership started to move towards a third approach to development in the late 1990s by first defining the ‘Campaign to open up the West’, which became a top priority for the government in the next decade.28 This new strategy (Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping) clearly changed the focus of development from a purely economic perspective to a social, economic and ecological coordinated development, whose declared objective was to narrow the gap between the coastal and the inner regions.29 This strategy was first defined by Jiang Zemin in the mid-­1990s, and was later developed by Premier Zhu Rongji in his ‘Report on National Economic and Social Development during the Tenth Five Year Plan’ (2001–2005) delivered to the People’s Congress on 5 March 2001. The major dimensions of this strategy are: 1 2 3 4 5

infrastructure construction, such as land, air and water transportation facilities, power generation plants, and water conservation projects; environmental protection; adjustment of the industrial structure of the west of China, namely by putting more emphasis on the consumer goods industry and less on heavy industry and the defence industry, as has been done in the past; the promotion of science, technology and education; making the west of China benefit from the open-­door policy.30

90   China’s strategy This strategy combines hard and soft infrastructure as two complementary components of the development strategy in favour of the West.31 The ground was prepared for this fundamental change in the development strategy by means of an important research work.32 During the 1950s and 1980s the Chinese leadership attributed an increasing importance to the work of intellectuals and researchers, within both universities and think tanks, such as the CAS and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). It is in fact within the CAS that Hu Angang first undertook his research. Two books, written together with some other scholars within the CAS, give a good idea about the origins of Hu’s research topics and methodology: Population and Development and Survival and Development. The analysis presented in the book on population combines historical, demographic, economic, environmental, regional (namely the divide between rural and urban areas), as well as social and family planning perspectives, and lays the foundations for a comprehensive analysis of the development strategy China should follow, which is further developed in the second book, Survival and Development. One of the main findings of the research on population is that both theoretical and empirical models, especially Western models, cannot be transposed mechanically and directly into China, but should be evaluated, taking into consideration the characteristics of the Chinese situation.33 A population theory that does not conform to the actual conditions in China is bound to lead to errors, and become dogmatic. This leads the authors to reject both traditional Marxist development theory34 and the Soviet model of development, including their theory of population, and to adopt a model based upon the contradictions existing within Chinese society between the rapidly increasing population on one side and, on the other side, the shortage of production equipment; the increase in industrial raw materials; the development of employment, education, science and technology; the demand for grain; and the improvement of people’s living standards. This change of paradigm led to the strict adoption of birth control in China in the 1980s with the aim of reducing the fertility rate and hence to resolve, at least partially, the contradictions mentioned above. But this change could not have been possible without the rejection of the hypothesis, prevailing at that time, that economic development is the cause of the drop in the fertility rate, and therefore it must precede it. Hu and Zou contest that such a connection can be constructed as ‘a simple cause and effect relation, regardless of time, place and condition’.35 On the contrary, they consider that the relationship is very complicated and, by referring to the introduction of family reproduction policy in Europe analysed by Wei Jinsheng, they show that the drop in the rate of fertility: is not merely the result of the development of their economies and cultures, but the result of the concerted action by various combinations of factors, including economy, culture, history and customs. […] the fertility rate also began to drop early in countries with relative backward economy and culture. So, the absolute view that the rapid drop in fertility rate can only occur following economic development does not conform to historical facts.

China’s strategy   91 By taking the examples of countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, where the drop in fertility rate was the result of government policies, the authors conclude that, given China’s situation, ‘effective population growth control [by the government] would inevitably serve to provide very favourable conditions for an economic take-­off ’.36 The book Survival and Development identifies the fundamental problems China must face on the road to development, starting from the conditions of the Chinese population and territory: excessively large population, a very poor economic foundation, backward education, culture, science and technology, a relative shortage of natural resources and a very low per capita GNP by world standards. These characteristics have remained basically unchanged and have become even worse in certain fields although China has made great progress in the past decade of reform.37 This research, which was made available to the Chinese leadership at the end of 1988, is remarkable not only for the quality of the analysis, but also because it pointed out the major problems of Deng’s economic development strategy that were already clearly emerging in China at the end of the 1980s. It is unfortunate that the Chinese leadership was, in my opinion, not quick enough to react to the results and suggestions of this research. Therefore, by the mid-­1990s the negative outcomes of Deng’s strategy had developed to a point that measures taken during the second half of the 1990s (and further reinforced during the following decade) have been rather slow in producing the necessary counterbalancing effects.38 It is true that by then, research realized by imaginative and independent intellectuals had started to be needed, and even demanded, by the Chinese leadership. It is not surprising that the report considers, as is also the case for the research on population mentioned above, that the basic problem for China depended upon the contradictions between population and resources. It is even more interesting to note that, at the end of 1988, this report (Survival and Development) points out the four major challenges resulting from the negative consequences of economic development, and that the authors do not hesitate to name ‘China’s unprecedented multiple crises’: 1

2

In spite of the birth control set up by the government, the population continues to grow and it is rapidly ageing, posing a heavy burden on employment; moreover, the average number of schooling years is only 4.6 years, which is rather low if one seeks to develop the economy in sectors demanding a well-­educated workforce; finally, the rapidly growing population is resulting in chronic unemployment and underemployment, especially in the rural areas. Agricultural resources are declining and approaching the limits of their carrying capacity; it is forecast that the situation will become more acute in the future.

92   China’s strategy 3 4

The rapid expansion of environmental pollution and the ongoing degradation of the ecosystem will become a major crisis affecting survival and development in China in the first half of the next century. A rapidly growing demand for grain and the difficulties in increasing grain production.39

Given this analysis, the report suggests that the following policies, some of them already adopted by the Chinese government, should be implemented for a considerably long period of time: 1 2 3 4 5

family planning; high rate of accumulation coupled with moderate consumption; development of education, science and technology; conservation of natural resources and protection of the environment; opening to the outside world, and maintaining sustained development.

Moreover, the report warns that the success of these policies will depend upon some important conditions such as the avoidance of the recurrence of serious mistakes like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, no massive nationwide natural disasters, no large foreign invasions of China, and that China will not be involved in other countries’ military conflicts.40 The report also very strongly confirms that China should follow its own ‘non-­ traditional’ path to modernization, based upon: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

low consumption of resources in the production process; moderate private consumption; sustainable development with constant improvement of economic efficiency while controlling pollution, maintaining ecological balance and a reasonable use of natural resources (ecological efficiency); but also a social system that ensures social efficiency and justice; an appropriate technological system that encourages innovations in all domains, including technological innovation; integration in the international economic system; rational development and utilization of resources, and prevention of pollution to secure ecological balance.

The authors are aware of the fact that this is not an ideal model. Faced with ‘consumption effects’ taught by developed countries and regions, as latecomers the Chinese are increasingly pushed to ‘keep up with the Joneses’ and to consume unrealistically in spite of the fact that they are not yet rich. Moreover, the knowledge that Chinese people have acquired about the lifestyle of developed countries will increase their expectations, and this will put additional pressure on the Chinese leadership. Very reasonably, the authors conclude that:

China’s strategy   93 we must tell the people frankly and sincerely that we do not have the potential to compare with developed countries such as the United States in resource consumption. […] our choice is not discretionary, but is dictated by circumstances. […] the keynote of this report is neither unrealistically optimistic nor pessimistic, it is rather cautiously and conditionally optimistic. […] The basic conditions are very harsh indeed, but this is the last opportunity presenting itself to China in its development. […] The report tells the people about the national conditions as they really are. […] In the face of future development crises, it is possible for decision-­makers, workers, intellectuals, and peasants to achieve a common understanding and recognition of the long, arduous and painful process of reforms and development. And this will produce a long and strong rallying power and make the people better prepared for a long period of hard work and to strive to shake off the crises, overcome difficulties and realize rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the XXI century.41 In commenting on this report, one can be surprised by the moderate optimism of the authors, knowing the phenomenal development of private consumption in the urban areas that took place in the following decade. More interesting is their concern about the necessity that all the segments of Chinese society should be aware of the difficulties facing the development of the country given the major contradictions presented in the report. And this is another sign that the values of unity and harmony constitute a strong cultural trait even among academic researchers trying to scientifically discover truth from facts. Even more interesting is the fact that practically all the major problems that occurred in China at the end of the 1990s are identified and analysed in the report and that all the major leitmotifs of the new development strategy defined by Hu Jintao that ‘put people first’ are already clearly broached in the report: economic efficiency, but also social equity and efficiency, ecological efficiency and innovation in all domains.

Hu’s contribution to the reorientation of China’s strategy towards ‘putting people first’ In 1999, the year he created the Institute for China Study, Hu suggested reorienting the development strategy by including in the Tenth Five-­Year Plan (2001–2005) the key ideas of ‘putting people first’ and improving the quality of the environment as prerequisites for sustainable development. This change should lead to the replacement of the model based upon high consumption and high pollution with a strategy of environmental friendly economy, by employing market mechanisms and advanced technologies. These policy options were later confirmed at the Seventeenth Party Congress of 2007 and especially the Eighteenth Party Congress of 2012, when the new leadership under Xi Jinping was appointed to take over from Hu Jintao in March of the following year. But, as Hu admits, some of his suggestions were not seriously considered by the Party at that time. In fact, it took several years before they were adopted by the Party.

94   China’s strategy In February 2004, Zhu Rongji’s successor, Premier Wen Jiabao, recognized that China’s fast economic development had resulted in the accumulation of issues and conflicts, such as widening gaps between urban and rural areas in income, enlarging regional gaps, increasing inequality in family income, mounting pressure of unemployment and social security, lags in the development of education, health and medicine, culture, intensifying conflicts between the growing population and development and the ecological environment and natural resources, low quality of the economic system and lack of competitiveness. Based upon this appreciation of the situation of Chinese society, Premier Wen concluded that China must solve these problems in good time. According to Hu Angang, by doing so, Premier Wen defined the new approach to development; that is, the third strategy, based upon ‘people first’. This strategy implies the following dimensions:42 1 2

3 4 5

implementation of harmonious development between the urban and rural areas, to narrow their income gaps; implementation of the Western China Development Drive and the drive to revitalize the old industrial bases in north-­east China with the purpose of narrowing regional gaps, especially the gaps between the western and eastern parts of the country and the development gaps between the south and the north; bringing economic and social development into good harmony; implementation of ‘green development’ to improve the ecological environment; prioritizing employment to bring about an employment-­based growth model.

This strategy strongly suggests that the biggest challenge to China in the twenty-­ first century is not how to further speed up economic growth, but how to maintain a sustainable and equitable growth to reduce poverty and promote human development by focusing on the purpose of development instead of on development for the sake of development. The ‘people first’ approach to development means to invest in the people, serve the people, develop the economy for people and promote human development to enhance the people’s development capabilities and increase its development opportunities. The idea of ‘putting people first’ was mentioned in the Eleventh Five-­Year Plan (2006–2010), and the idea of building an energy-­saving and environmentally friendly society was mentioned and developed in detail in five chapters in Part 6 of the plan. In 2005 Hu and Wang Yahua (the vice-­dean of the Institute for Contemporary China Studies, Tsinghua University) suggested reorienting the Party strategy towards four comprehensive and sustainable development strategies: economic globalization, human resources, knowledge (including information) and green development. Moreover, the new strategy should be based upon the ‘Scientific Development Concept’. A few years later, Hu’s book, China in 2020. A New Type of Superpower, was published by Brookings Institution in

China’s strategy   95 2011, and in 2014 Springer published China 2030 (written with Yilong Yan and Xin Wei): Hu had the pleasant surprise of seeing that his idea of respecting and protecting nature was included in the Eighteenth Party National Congress report and in the draft of the Party Constitution Amendments. In October 2015, the Party’s Fifth Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee approved Hu’s proposals, and first proposed the innovative, green, coordinated, sharing and open development concept.43 In the framework of this new development strategy, hundreds of billions of yuan have been invested in the poor provinces and regions, and a new strategy under the name of ‘One Belt One Road’ (to be dealt with in Chapter 5) has added an international dimension to China’s attempt to develop not only its own economy and society but also those of the neighbouring countries and beyond.

Hu Angang’s systematic analysis of China’s strategy to reclaim world power status Let us go back to the article cited at the beginning of this chapter, written with Men Honghua. After a brief but careful examination of the existing approaches to the evaluation of the State’s power, Hu Angang puts forward his own approach for the definition of what he calls a ‘Comprehensive National Power – CNP’. For this purpose, Hu uses a number of hard, i.e. quantitative, data, most of the time taken from the World Bank dataset. He does not build a mathematical model, but prefers to identify the most important strategic resources that may determine the comprehensive power of a country in the twenty-­first century. This does not need the construction of a complex econometric model, the choice being based upon a historical analysis and on the qualitative identification of the changes that occurred in time in the international power system and the resources that are of paramount importance in the twenty-­first century. This approach is relatively easy for China, as the sources of power of its major competitor, the US, which emerged as the sole hegemon at the end of the Cold War, have been studied by many scholars since at least the beginning of the twentieth century.44 For Hu Angang, the outcome of his approach is a list of the eight major categories of resources that can be used in power relations: (1) economic resources, (2) human capital, (3) natural resources, (4) capital resources, (5) knowledge and technology resources, (6) government resources, (7) military resources and (8) international resources.45 Having made this choice, the next step has been the quantification (as far as possible) of the resources thus identified, which I will present in the last part of this chapter.46 In Chapter 2, I have developed a comprehensive approach to power in the international system, by identifying all the strategic resources that may be used by a country to obtain power, independently of a specific historical time. By identifying the eight categories of resources, Hu Angang has identified the major strategic resources of paramount importance for the twenty-­first century. Before we analyse how Hu uses this approach to analyse China’s strategy, we have to see what is, according to Hu, the goal of China’s strategy. In the abovementioned article Hu

96   China’s strategy does not explicitly mention the reclaiming of world power status. Nevertheless, by insisting in many of his writings that, by improving all of the eight resources, China should catch up with the West (and especially the US), it is clear that the goal of this strategy is to restore China as a world power.47 The article provides a set of data covering the eight resources, which Hu has developed in his more recent publications. Furthermore, Hu added a ninth type of resource: information. By examining Hu’s analysis of some of the strategic resources, it is possible to have a good idea of the strategy China has followed for becoming, again, a world power. It is necessary to remind the reader that Hu’s writings cover his prescription for China’s strategy as well as the evaluation of the results of the strategy implemented by the Chinese leadership. Indeed, from reading Hu’s writings, one can very well see that there is a remarkable overlap between his evaluation of the strategy implemented by the Chinese authorities (the practice) and the strategy that China should, according to Hu, implement for becoming again a world power (the theory). Here again we have a case where a Chinese intellectual does not make a clear separation between theory and practice: as I have already noted, knowledge is always seen in view of action, to know how to act morally or politically.48 This overlap is very likely due to the fact, as I have already mentioned above, that Hu has always considered that the knowledge created by academic research can contribute to social development only when it has succeeded in orienting public policies; and this has been the main achievement of the research he has directed within the Institute for China Study of Tsinghua University. When China started, after the Mao era, to systematically develop the strategic resources necessary for realizing its recovery of world power status, the economy was certainly the most important one. Therefore, the weight for this indicator is two times that for the other resources. In fact, the development of the economy improves the quality of the population (health and life expectancy, standard of living, education, etc.), which is necessary for further developing the economy. It establishes a kind of virtuous circle between economic development and the improvement of the strategic characteristics of the population. Moreover, for developing the economy one needs also to develop science and technology in all domains, as well as managerial capabilities. And here we have another virtuous circle; and in turn the development of science, technology and the economy will favour the build-­up of military resources. Given the historical experience of the painful nineteenth century when China was not able to resist economic and military aggression from the West, and taking into consideration the massive presence at its border of the economic and military forces of the most powerful country in the world, we understand why, at the beginning of ‘its rising’, China has first invested in its economy, and why the analysis of China’s economic development was one of the first research topics undertaken by Hu Angang. Nevertheless, Hu never forgets that economic development per se (especially if measured in terms of GDP increase) is bound to create social, economic and environmental problems and, therefore, also political instability. Consequently, for Hu the definition of the objectives of economic development, and

China’s strategy   97 the evaluation of the extent to which they have been achieved, cannot be isolated from other dimensions of society, and therefore should be conceived within an overall strategy, combining all the major domains of the modernization process. These questions are particularly important if one considers, quite rightly, that stability is one of the most important conditions for economic and social development. Indeed, Hu Angang’s explanation of China’s growth covers all dimensions of the modernization process, involving economy, society, polity and environment, and points to the conditions explaining economic growth, its positive and negative consequences, as well as the policy recommendations (what he calls ‘China’s Grand Strategy’) for sustaining economic development while guaranteeing a fair distribution of wealth, and thus assuring social and political stability. Finally, in the perspective of the Chinese way of defining and implementing the strategy of reclaiming world power status, we must recognize that the choice to first develop the economy has been made possible by the relative closedness of the Chinese economic system, in spite of the opening up to the global economy. The speed and size of the opening is not left to the market forces operating in the global neoliberal economy, but is progressive and is kept under control. In particular, China has limited capital movements to the needs of its economic development. This closedness allowed China to resist the 1997 Asian financial crisis much better than the other Asian countries, which had opened their economy to the global economic system, thus following the requirements of neoliberalism. Let us then start by analysing how Hu Angang deals with one of the major dimensions of power, i.e. economic resources. Starting from the works of Alexander Gerschenkron,49 and exploring economic development in other countries from a historical perspective, Hu initially takes into account the advantages of a country with a backward economy: 1 2 3

This country can introduce new technology and equipment into its own economy by importing them from developed countries. It can learn from the successful experiences and failures of developed countries. It can count on a strong social consensus for catching up, which, for the people, means the perspective of improving their standard of living.

Of course, there are many countries that share these characteristics, but not all of them succeed in developing their economy. Therefore, there must be some other factors that explain why a country starting from this position succeeds in developing its economy. According to Hu, three decisive factors will help the developing country to take advantage of this situation and catch up with the most developed one: 1 2 3

It must have a high level of saving rates. It must mobilize international capital by opening up to the rest of the world, but in a controlled way, as mentioned above. It must speed up the dissemination of technology within its economy.

98   China’s strategy All of these three factors are related to each other and contribute to the availability of know-­how and domestic and foreign financial means for the purpose of making investments possible and efficient. Using appropriate statistical data, Hu shows that, since the beginning of reforms, China has been able to narrow the gap in per capita GDP with developed countries.50 The next step has been the construction of a growth model that Hu defines as ‘a comprehensive growth framework covering capital, labour, institutional change, and knowledge’. Using this method, Hu arrives at three major conclusions for China: 1 2 3

About half of the per capita output came from capital growth per capita. One-­third of the per capita output growth came from institutional changes. One-­fifth of per capita output growth came from knowledge development.

On the basis of these results, Hu concludes that this method better interprets the sources for China’s economic growth. It implies that institutional changes can be stimulated through reforms, and knowledge development can be promoted through opening up and technical innovation. Thus, policies can be made accordingly to achieve a sustainable growth in the future. This means that China should make technology and knowledge, rather than capital and natural resources, the driving forces for economic growth.51 Given the influence that this type of research and policy advice had in China at the moment of the drawing up of the Eleventh Plan, this conclusion should be well understood by all those who want to grasp the real meaning of the changes introduced by the Chinese leadership during the Hu Jintao era. The next step in Hu’s analysis of China’s economic development helps us to understand these changes, that is, the identification of five major effects that stimulate China’s rapid economic growth: 1 2

The speed effect: during a given period, the industrialization latecomers, such as China in the 1980s and 1990s, grow faster than the forerunners. The structural effect: during the same period, the structural indicators change faster in less developed economies than in the developed ones. These indicators concern: i the transfer of population from rural to urban areas; ii the transfer of manpower from agriculture to industry and services; iii the transfer of contribution to GDP from agriculture to the secondary and the tertiary sectors; iv the changes in domestic demand (i.e. changes in household and government consumption, total capital formation and net exports); v the changes in household consumption structure between rural and urban households; vi the changes in the foreign trade ratio (i.e. between exports and imports).52

Moreover, accelerated growth may stimulate labour to move to higher-­level production sectors. This transfer is always concomitant with the growth of material

China’s strategy   99 capital stock, improvement of the skills of workers and the development of education and managerial know-­how, and will result in an economy more open to international trade. The final result of these improvements is that they will further stimulate economic growth.53 3

4

5

The opening up effect corresponds to the fact that latecomers move faster than developed economies in participating in the global economy. China’s share in world exports increased from 1.6 per cent in 1985 to 6.1 per cent in 2000. All components of exports increased (i.e. primary products, resource and non-­resource products, low-­tech, medium-­tech and high-­tech products), but what is more interesting is that the product mix has undergone a dramatic change: the percentage of primary products dropped from 50.2 per cent in 1980 to 4.7 per cent in 2000, while export of manufactured goods reached 87.1 per cent by 2000. The percentage of low-­tech products rose to 47.6 per cent in 2000 from 4.5 per cent in 1985 and, more interestingly, the proportion of high-­tech products rose to 22.4 per cent in 2000 from a very low 2.6 per cent in 1985. And Hu concludes that ‘this shows that China displayed its advantages in both labour-­intensive products export and in the exports of high-­tech products’.54 The institutional effect is one of the most interesting results of Hu’s research as it shows the importance of institutional building in the process of sustaining economic development through the state’s measures and interventions. This effect measures the degree of liberalization of the Chinese market using nine areas and 24 indicators.55 The technology catch-­up effect completes the five effects that drive China’s rapid economic growth. It refers to the rate of technology diffusion of technologically lagging countries that is higher than the technological innovation speed of technologically advanced economies. This difference is because less developed countries acquire technology mainly by importing it from abroad, and the cost of importing existing technology is less expensive than endogenously developing it. China’s technology comes from several sources: i direct import of high-­tech products; ii acquisition of technology and the spill-­over effects through foreign direct investment; iii direct financing of research and development by Chinese enterprises; iv cooperation with advanced countries in science and technology.

Using different methods for measuring the development of technology in China, Hu comes to the conclusion that overall China has made important progress in this domain which he considers as fundamental for sustaining the development of the economy. This is because the process of catching up with developed countries is a process where knowledge and economic growth mutually reinforce each other. And for this reason Hu considers that China should operate a transition from a capital-­driven economy to a technology-­driven one, and this will be

100   China’s strategy possible especially if China succeeds in becoming an endogenous technological innovator.56

Comparing China’s comprehensive national power with the US Given the complexity of Hu Angang’s analysis of the modernization process of China, its achievements and its problems, it is not surprising that his approach to the evaluation of China’s power compared to the US is particularly dense and, as we have seen, comprises nine major sets of strategy resources (Hu last model has ‘information’ as a ninth resource, in addition to the eight listed above). It is not possible, nor necessary, to reproduce here all the data and comments Hu has provided to evaluate the respective power of China and the US. Luckily, he has summarized in a few tables the main results of his research. You will find some more detailed data in the Annex. In summary, the general conclusion is that, if one looks at the available data in a historical perspective, China has already caught up with the US and in some domains has even surpassed it. Moreover, given the general trend, the forecast is that, unless China in the future makes some major mistakes, it is very likely that it will become a new world power in the not too distant future. This does not mean that China will inevitably replace the US as the new hegemon, but it is more likely that its rise will determine the transition from the unipolar international system that emerged at the end of the Cold War, to a multipolar world, comprising the US, China, Russia, the European Union and eventually some other countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa. The overall result of Hu’s evaluation of the power resources is given in Table 3.1.57 In 2000, only China’s human resources were much higher than those of the US, compared to the world total (27.04 per cent against 9.46 per cent). The other eight strategic resources were lower than the US in different degrees. In 2005 there was not a significant change. By contrast, in 2010 four of China’s strategic resources (human capital, energy, capital and information) were higher than those of the US. And in 2015, China’s strategic resources surpassed the US, except for military and international resources. Nonetheless, the latter were closer to the US than in the past. These data reflect the speed of China’s catching-­up with the US. Moreover, the data show, in Hu Angang’s words, that since 2000, China and the US present opposite trends: China presents a ‘sustainable rising’, and the US a ‘continuous decline’. In fact, by adding the nine resources to obtain their overall impact, Hu shows that between 2000 and 2010 China’s overall national strength increased from 8.76 per cent to 15.88 per cent, while that of the US declined from 21.38 per cent to 15.94 per cent. And by 2015, China’s overall national power reached 19.39 per cent of the world total, whereas the US declined to 14.14 per cent. One important dimension of strategic power resources is the development of high-­tech industry. In a recent article, Hu developed this aspect, which is important to mention, as the majority of the Western observers of China’s development still consider, even today, that China is behind the US.58 This is not the result of Hu’s research:

China’s strategy   101 China high-­tech industry is catching up and even surpassing the United States in terms of industry added value, exports volume and export added value. This is mainly because the complementarities and mutual benefits between high-­tech industry and economic development, are reflected by the compatibility of their life-­cycles. In addition, high-­tech has great externalities, Table 3.1 Overall comparison of power resources of China and the US in % of world total 2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

9.83 19.33 1.97

13.99 16.72 1.20

17.21 15.67 0.91

19.9 14.6 0.74

9.78 –4.90

Human capital resources China 27.04 29.26 US 9.46 8.93 US/China 0.35 0.31

30.27 8.43 0.28

28.36 7.94 0.28

26.60 7.49 0.28

1.32 –1.52

Energy resources China 10.68 US 24.63 US/China 2.31

16.40 21.48 1.31

20.42 18.76 0.92

22.92 17.35 0.76

25.74 16.04 0.62

12.24 –7.28

Capital resources China 5.31 US 30.60 US/China 5.76

8.49 27.17 3.20

18.11 17.43 0.96

30.29 20.06 0.66

40.00 23.07 0.57

24.98 –10.54

Scientific resources China 3.97 US 25.63 US/China 6.46

9.29 24.58 2.65

15.78 22.64 1.43

24.17 19.66 0.81

29.31 17.06 0.58

20.20 –5.97

8.67 18.35

10.38 16.24

13.23 12.73

16.85 9.98

5.78 –5.88

7.95 22.29 2.80

8.60 22.65 2.63

9.92 21.01 2.12

11.12 19.51 1.75

2.62 –0.94

International resources China 2.99 5.56 US 16.21 13.03 US/China

7.98 11.31

10.67 12.03

14.26 14.26

7.68 –4.18

19.32 8.15 0.42

19.95 6.98 0.35

19.92 5.87 0.29

11.55 –15.04

Economic resources China 7.43 US 20.57 US/China 2.78

Government resources China 7.45 US 18.61 US/China Military resources China 7.30 US 21.95 US/China 3.01

Information resources China 8.40 US 22.03 US/China 2.62

14.20 14.33 1.01

2000–2015

Source: Hu Angang. Data source: mainly from World Bank database, and estimates by Hu Angang for 2020.

102   China’s strategy Table 3.2 Overall comparison of comprehensive national power of China and the US in % of world total (2000–2020)

China US US/China

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

8.76 21.38 2.44

11.93 18.98 1.59

15.88 15.94 1.00

19.39 14.94 0.77

22.61 14.14 0.63

Source: Hu Angang. Data source: mainly from World Bank database, WTO database and UN database, and estimates by Hu Angang for 2020.

namely promoting high-­tech growth of economy and manufacturing industry, facilitating the economic structure transformation, increasing trade growth, accelerating trade structure upgrading, and creating technology spillover effects.59 It is on the basis of the results of his research that Hu Angang has developed a formidable faith in the capacity of the Chinese leadership to lead China towards world power status.60 Of course, this attitude has raised some criticism, especially in university circles. Nevertheless, even the more critical observers of China’s political system and of the Chinese Communist Party recognize Hu’s outstanding contribution to the study of China’s strategy and modernization process, and several influential Chinese businessmen share with Hu Angang this positive attitude.61 For my part, I consider that his analyses of China’s strategy and his evaluation of China’s comprehensive national power have been useful for understanding China’s strategy for reclaiming world power status. Starting from these insights, it is now necessary to understand the very nature of the confrontation between the US and China. In spite of the rhetoric of ‘strategic partnership’ and of ‘win–win’ international arrangements, I will show that the strategies implemented by the US and China are better understood from the point of view of competition. This does not necessarily mean that an overt military conflict is bound to break out between the two major world powers, as some forecast. Nevertheless, history shows that an emerging world power has never accepted reshaping the international order on the terms of the declining world power. We can only hope that the transition will lead to a new international system where the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned are recognized and that the divergences, which will inevitably persist, are dealt with through dialogue and mutual understanding, without the pretence to impose ‘universal values’ that, too often in world history, have masked national and parochial interests. As the US has been one of the two dominating powers since at least the end of the Second World War, and the sole hegemon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is more convenient, for the purposes of the demonstration, to consider first its strategy for acquiring and, today, retaining that status. At least since the onset of the 2008 financial and economic crisis, the leadership of the US has

China’s strategy   103 been challenged by the systemic changes evident at the beginning of the twenty-­ first century. The world is evolving towards a multipolar system. The main event of this change is certainly the rising of China as a world power. In this chapter, we have seen that the gap between the US and China is narrowing as far as the resources of power are concerned. So, in Chapter 4 we must analyse the strategy that the US is implementing in order to safeguard ‘the Amer­ican-­led liberal international order’ that has given it the status of the sole world power, and eventually how it tries to adapt to the rising of a multipolar international system. What is the US strategy towards the rising of China, certainly the most serious challenge to the US? In Chapter 5, we will analyse China’s strategy to assert its new rank as a world power and how it tries to confront the US foreign policy.

Notes   1 Hu Angang and Men Honghua, ‘The rising of modern China: comprehensive national power and grand strategy’, paper presented at the international conference on Rising China and the East Asian Economy, Seoul, 19–20 March 2004, kindly provided by the authors. The original Chinese version was published in Strategy & Management, no. 3, 2002. This article is available on the website of Wikipedia, under ‘Comprehensive National Power.’   2 Ibidem, pp.  1–2. Compare with what I said about the traditional Chinese way of dealing with strategy in the first two sections of Chapter 1.   3 I have already mentioned in Chapter 1, quoting Nicolas Zufferey, that traditional Chinese thinkers do not consider theory and practice as two separate moments, and that knowledge is always seen in view of action, to know how to act morally or politically. What is important is not ‘what to know’, but ‘to know how to do it’; Nicolas Zufferey, Introduction à la pensée chinoise. Pour mieux comprendre la Chine du XXIe siècle, Paris, Hachette, 2008, pp. 15–18.   4 In the first part of this chapter I will reproduce and/or summarize what I have already published elsewhere: Paolo Urio, Reconciling State, Market and Society in China. The Long March towards Prosperity, Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2010, pp. 60–64, 101–111, and I will complete this with informal information (discussions, non-­published papers and translations of published articles) given to me by Hu Angang during my stay at Tsinghua (September–November 2016), as well as with Hu’s publications on China’s grand strategy: China in 2020. A New Type of Superpower, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 2011; Roadmap of China’s Rise, Abingdon, Routledge, 2011; and China by 2030. A Changing World towards Common Prosperity [in Chinese], Beijing, Renmin University Press, 2011; China Innovative Green Development, Berlin, Springer, 2014; and China’s Collective Presidency, Berlin, Springer, 2014. I thank Chen Yali and Qi Zheng for translating several of Hu’s articles and papers.   5 Hu Angang, Population and Development [in Chinese], Beijing, Automation Institute under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, June 1988.   6 Hu Angang and Zou Ping, China’s Population Development, Beijing, China’s Science and Technology Press, 1991.   7 The Chinese edition was published in 1989.   8 Hu Angang and Wang Yi, Survival and Development. A Study of China’s Long-­Term Development, Beijing and New York, Science Press, 1992 (first published Chinese in 1990). Hu and Wang are the authors of the main report, with annexes written by Hu Angang, Li Lixian, Wang Yi and Chen Xikang. This report has been circulating internally since end 1988/beginning 1989: a member of the Standing Committee of the

104   China’s strategy Political Bureau of the CPC read the report. A copy was given to Deng Nan, who was working within the National Committee of Science and Technology and who transmitted it to her father, Deng Xiaoping, and Deng added highlighted postils.   9 Apart from classical Marxist references, it is interesting to note the names of several famous Western scholars such as T.R. Malthus, Alfred Sauvy, Joseph Needham, Montesquieu, S.N. Eisenstadt, J.W. Forrester, Charles Kindelberger, Simon Kuznets, Wassily Leontief, W.W. Rostow, as well as several World Bank reports. 10 Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, ‘Strengthen the role of the Central Government during the transition towards a market economy’, report on China’s state capacities, Shenyang, Liaoning People Press, 1993. 11 Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 134. 12 Ibidem, pp. 137–141. 13 Ibidem, for additional references to Chinese sources. Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, The Political Economy of Uneven Development. The Case of China, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1999; Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, The Chinese Economy in Crisis. State Capacity and Tax Reform, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2001. 14 Zhang Xudong, ‘The making of the post-­Tiananmen intellectual field: a critical overview’, in Zhang Xudong (ed.), Whither China. Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China, Durham, NC and London, Duke University Press, 2001, p. 57. 15 Hu Angang, ‘Corruption: an enormous black hole – public exposure of the economic costs of corruption’, in Economic and Social Transformation in China, Abingdon, Routledge, 2007, pp. 217–223. 16 Hu Angang, ‘MID course, China economic development: theory and practice – How do I conduct China study?’, 2005, printed document from Tsinghua website, provided by the author. 17 We find here the attitude of the Chinese scholar who does not make a clear distinction between theory and practice, as I already noted in Chapter 1 and above in note 3 of this chapter. 18 Hu Angang, Economic and Social Transformation in China, Abingdon, Routledge, 2007. 19 Hu Angang, ‘A new approach at Copenhagen’, available on China Dialogue’s website: www.chinadialogue.net (accessed 7 September 2009). 20 Information on the centre’s activities described hereafter are based upon discussions with Hu Angang and an unpublished paper by Hu Angang, Jiang Jiaying and Yan Yilong, ‘The influence of think tanks in China’s medium and long-­term strategic plan: a case study of Institute of Contemporary China Studies of Tsinghua University’, kindly provided by the main author. 21 The National Development Planning Expert Committee was instituted by the State Council in 2005 and comprises more than 40 of China’s best scholars, including Hu Angang. 22 Hu Angang et al., ‘The influence of think tanks’, op. cit., pp. 9–10. 23 Note that Hu Angang has written a three-­volume book dealing with the political and economic history of China that deals with the Mao era. Hu Angang, The Political and Economic History of China (1949–1976), Hong Kong, Enrich Professional Publishing, 2013, a balanced analysis of Mao’s policies recognizing the achievements as well as the tragic mistakes made by Mao, which are also recognized by the Party: see, for example, the history of the Communist Party of China written by the historians of the Party: Hu Sheng (chief editor), A Concise History of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, Foreign Language Press, 1994. 24 Approximate figures, as data of this period are not totally reliable according to most scholars. But the scope of the improvement is not debated. For an in-­depth analysis of these data, see Chris Bramall, Chinese Economic Development, Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2009. Among the many books on China’s economy, one can

China’s strategy   105 consult, for an overall understanding of China’s economy, Rongxing Guo, Understanding the Chinese Economies, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2013, in addition to the references in Urio, Reconciling, op. cit. 25 A good example of collective leadership is given by the debates that occurred in China in the 1950s about the growing population and the question of birth control. After years of debate between political leaders and some university researchers, the decision was postponed and finally taken during the 1980s: Hu and Zou, China’s Population Development, op. cit., pp. 67–109. 26 Hu Angang, Conference at Tsinghua University, January 2005. 27 This goal was to be achieved in three steps: the first step consisted of doubling GDP during the 1980s; then, with the second step, GDP should be doubled by the end of the twentieth century; finally, the third step should double again GDP twice during the first 30–50 years of the twenty-­first century. 28 Gregory C. Chow, China’s Economic Transformation, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, p. 168. 29 See, for example: Heike Holbig, ‘The emergence of the campaign to open up the West: ideological formation, central decision-­making and the role of the provinces’, The China Quarterly, 2004, pp. 336–357. 30 Chow, China’s Economic Transformation, op. cit., pp. 169–180. 31 I have developed elsewhere the reasons in favour of this strategy: Paolo Urio (ed.), Public Private Partnerships. Success and Failure Factors for In-­Transition Countries, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 2010, chs 1, 2 and conclusion. 32 In my book on China’s reforms, in the fourth chapter I presented the role played by various organizations that contributed to gathering the most relevant sources of theoretical thinking and empirical evidence that permitted the Chinese leadership to partially revise the foundations of its ideology, and to redefine its development strategy: Urio, Reconciling, op. cit. 33 Hu and Zou, China’s Population Development, pp. 79, 84–85. They refer to the population theory of the famous Chinese demographer Ma Yinchu. 34 Ibidem, p. 62. They reject the Marxist theory according to which ‘the conditions for mankind to multiply are determined directly by the structures of different social bodies’, to which the authors reply by considering that to us, the historical evolution of population is neither determined purely by the mode of socio-­economic production nor purely by the superstructure of society. There exists the decisive role of the population itself and the external environment under a given condition. 35 Ibidem, p. 153. 36 Ibidem, p. 155; see also Wei Jinsheng, Historical Experiences of the Changes in the Fertility Rate in Foreign Countries Merits Attention, a report by the Population-­ Economic Development Strategy research group under the State Science and Technology Commission, Beijing, 1988. 37 Hu and Wang, Survival and Development, op. cit., p. xi. 38 The difficulties in rebalancing the economy are confirmed by the findings of the World Bank’s evaluation of the results achieved at mid-­term by the Eleventh Five-­ Year Plan that clearly has been conceived to achieve this key objective: World Bank, Mid-­Term Evaluation of China’s 11th 5 Year Plan, 2008, available online at: www. worldbank.org (accessed 15 June 2009). In spite of strong political commitment and remarkable progress achieved in all domains, ‘little progress has been made in rebalancing the overall pattern of growth, which has in turn limited progress on other key objectives’, ibidem, p. v. 39 Hu and Wang, Survival and Development, op. cit., pp. xii–xiii. 40 Ibidem, p. xiv. 41 Ibidem, pp. xvi–xvii.

106   China’s strategy 42 Hu Angang, Conference at Tsinghua University, January 2005. 43 This is the ranking of the Five Developments of Hu Angang. See: ‘President Xi calls for “people-­centric” reform’: China’s deepening reforms must be ‘people-­centric’ and just, President Xi Jinping said at a meeting of the Leading Group for Overall Reform on Monday. ‘A people-­centric approach should be implemented in all areas of development, addressing people’s demands and concerns, and giving them more tangible benefits’. Xinhuanet, 18 April 2016: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-04/18/c_135290561. htm (accessed 20 April 2016), and: Xi urges implementation of new development concepts. President Xi Jinping has called for supporting measures to implement China’s new innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development model, as outlined in the Five-­Year Plan. It is imperative that coordination is improved to ensure the efficient implementation of the new model, as it plays an integral part in China’s journey to achieving a moderately prosperous society by 2020, Xi told a meeting of the Central Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform on Tuesday. Xinhuanet, 22 March 2016: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/22/c_135213227. htm (accessed 20 April 2016). 44 It is interesting to note that this approach is similar to that of Joseph Stiglitz regarding the analysis of the measures taken (or not taken) to overcome the 2008 crisis: In recent years, I correctly foresaw that, in the absence of stronger fiscal stimulus (which was not forthcoming in either Europe or the United States), recovery from the Great Recession of 2008 would be slow. In making these forecasts, I have relied more on emphasis of underlying economic forces than on complex econometric models. Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Trumpian uncertainty’, Project Syndicate, 9 January 2017: www. project-­syndicate.org (accessed 15 January 2017). 45 Hu and Men, ‘The rising of modern China’, op. cit. 46 It is not necessary in this book to quote the numerous proposals for measuring the power of a state. Let me just mention the methodology suggested by David Singer (University of Michigan): the Composite Index of National Capability that uses six variables: total population of country ratio, urban population of country ratio, iron and steel production of country ratio, primary energy consumption ratio, military expenditure ratio and military personnel ratio: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Composite_ Index_of_National_Capability (accessed 6 February 2017); Hyung Min Kim, ‘Comparing measure of national power’, International Political Science Review, vol. 3, no. 4, 2010, pp.  405–427; Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne and Melissa McPherson, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2000. 47 Here it is enough to mention two of the most recent books published by Hu: China in 2020, op. cit., and Roadmap, op. cit. 48 Zufferey, Introduction à la pensée chinoise, op. cit., pp. 15–18. 49 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1962. 50

The per capita GDP is used as the variant of output; capital is the indicator of per capita capital stock; ‘labour’ is the employment participation indicator to reflect the impact of the population change on labour supply; ‘institutions’ is the institutional accumulation indicators (ten indicators); knowledge is the knowledge accumulation indicators (ten indicators).

China’s strategy   107 For more details, including statistical data and analysis, see Hu Angang, Economic and Social Transformation in China, op. cit., ch. 1, pp. 9–32. 51 Ibidem, p. 17. 52 Data are presented in ibidem, p. 20. 53 Ibidem, p. 19. 54 Ibidem, p. 21 for the data and Hu’s comment. 55 See Urio, Reconciling, op. cit., p. 63, where you can find a table that summarizes the results obtained by this methodology that shows that in all areas there have been considerable improvements for adapting the Chinese market to the requirements of market mechanisms. 56 I recall that in his speech at the 2007 Party Congress President Hu Jintao stressed the necessity for China to become an endogenous innovator in all domains. For more, see Hu Angang and Wang Yahua, National Condition and Development, Beijing, Tsinghua University Press, 2005, pp. 34–38. 57 A brief description of the methodology is presented in the Annex. 58 Hu Angang and Ren Hao, ‘How can China’s high-­technology industry catch up with United States’, Strategy and Policy Decision Research, Proceedings of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 1355 Phase 12, vol. 31, 2016, pp. 1355–1364. 59 For a complementary and different opinion, see Jost Wübbeke et al., MADE IN CHINA 2025. The Making of a High-­Tech Superpower and Consequences for Industrial Countries, Merics, Mercator Institute for China Studies (Berlin), no. 23, December 2016. 60 See Hu, China’s Collective Presidency, op. cit. 61 Jie Chen and Bruce J. Dickson, ‘Allies of the State: democratic support and regime support among China’s private entrepreneurs’, China Quarterly, vol. 196, December 2008, pp. 780–804. See also the Foreword by John L. Thornton and the Introduction by Cheng Li, in Hu Angang, China in 2020, op. cit., pp. vii–ix and xi–xl, respectively; the positive opinion of the venture capitalist and political scientist, Eric X. Li, ‘A tale of two political systems’, speech given in June 2013, available at: www.youtube.com/ watch?v=s0YjL9rZyR0, transcription available at: www.ted.com/talks/eric_x_li_a_ tale_of_two_political_systems/transcript?language=en, and ‘The life of the Party: the post-­democratic future begins in China’, Foreign Affairs, January–February 2013, pp. 33–46, and the reply by Yasheng Huang, ‘Why democracy still wins: a critique of Eric X. Li’s “A tale of two political systems” ’, 25 April 2014, available at: www. globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/25/04/2014/why-­democracy-still-­wins-critique-­eric-x-­ li%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9C-tale-­two-political-­systems%E2%80%9D.

4 Understanding the US strategy How the US became the world hegemon of the twentieth century and how it tries to retain this status for the twenty-­first century

However our present interests may restrain us within our limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times when our multiplication will expand it beyond those limits, and cover the whole northern, if not the southern continent, with people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws. Thomas Jefferson (1801)

The historical origins of US foreign policy: why it does matter In the first chapter I suggested that in order to understand China’s strategy for reclaiming world power status one should go back in history and find the origins of the country, and especially of its leadership, its way of thinking and of organizing society, economy and polity. I also said that it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. A similar approach is necessary for understanding today the foreign policy of the United States (US). The paradox is that, despite a much shorter history, it is necessary in the case of the US to go back to the eighteenth century, i.e. right to the beginning of the building of the US republic. As I said in the Introduction, I am aware that I am dealing here with some very complex phenomena. Dealing with a country that has become the world hegemon is not easy, as it is possible that the demonstration may be biased by moral or ideological considerations. While I cannot assure the reader that I have avoided the trap of moral or ideological biases, I can assure him/her that I have tried to stick to the facts, as they have been confirmed by official documents, respected historians and social scientists, as well as by reliable investigative journalists.1 The analysis of the ideological origins of US foreign policy will be completed with an overview of the contemporary developments of the original US ideology. I will show that, in spite of changes in the international system that emerged during the twentieth century, today’s ideological foundations and geopolitical theories of US foreign policy present some remarkable similarities, mutatis mutandis, with those that appeared right at the beginning of the establishment of the US, and remained remarkably faithful to the ideology of the

Understanding US strategy   109 Founding Fathers. Finally, given the controversy that has developed, especially after the Cold War era, concerning the importance of geography as a factor orienting and explaining a country’s foreign policy, I will make some brief comments about the different schools of the Amer­ican (in fact Anglo-­Saxon) geopolitical theories.3 Before we go any further, it is necessary to warn the reader that by identifying the main features of Amer­ican ideology, more particularly for foreign affairs, I do not consider by any means that all its dimensions are specifically and exclusively Amer­ican. Several aspects of Amer­ican ideology are also present in other cultures, and above all in European culture. After all, Amer­icans and Europeans come from the same matrix. For example, the sense of superiority, racism and expansionism (in the forms of colonialism and imperialism) has been one of the major dimensions of European ideology since the Roman Empire, which many Amer­ican writers compare with the empire of their own country. Nevertheless, America has developed an ideology that, considered in its totality, is quite different from the ideology developed by other cultures and other countries, including those of Europe. A territory protected by two wide oceans that spared the country from wars of invasion, the presence of native inhabitants badly equipped for resisting foreign colonizers, a declining colonial power at the southern border (Spain) not prepared to sustain war between colonial powers, and in the north an ideologically compatible neighbour (Canada): these were the ideal preconditions for developing a peculiar ideology for a country, separated geographically and also culturally from the original homeland of the Pilgrim Fathers (Europe), whose major features I present hereafter. 2

The historical origins of US ideology: the ‘Manifest Destiny’ and ‘the end of history’ First of all, it is necessary to place the Amer­ican ideology in the context of the European ideology that had developed at least since the Renaissance. After all, the first immigrants who came to North America were Europeans who took with them the European ideology structured according to a mix of religious and secular beliefs (Christianity and capitalism), even if, as we will see hereafter, Amer­icans have developed a variant with some specific features. Indeed, these features were already embedded into a variant of Protestantism, that is to say Puritanism, that the first immigrants took with them to the New World. From the time of the Renaissance, Europe had developed the ideological foundations of its relationships with other cultures that can be briefly defined as follows: (1) the sense of superiority and belief in the exceptional character of European culture; (2) the belief in the values of the Christian religion and in the values and laws of capitalism; (3) the definition of European values as universal; (4) the right to diffuse these values and therefore to civilize the barbarians and the savages; (5)  the belief in economic growth and progress based upon European values; (6) the right to take possession of the land of the barbarians as it is not protected by legally binding property rights; (7) the right of the ‘civilized world’ to intervene

110   Understanding US strategy in the ‘non-­civilized’ world to end practices that violate universal values – this right would be developed in the 1980s and used to justify interventions in several places, for example, in Bosnia and Kosovo; and (8) the belief that the diffusion (and expansion) of European values is beneficial to mankind and historically inevitable. ‘The expansion has involved, in most regions of the world, military conquest, economic exploitation, and massive injustices […] justified on the grounds of the greater good that such expansion has had for the world’s population.’4 This ideology was operating since the beginning of the European conquest of the rest of the world, starting with South America. Immanuel Wallerstein summarizes the debate in favour of and against the brutal conquest of South America by Spain at the beginning of the sixteenth century, between Juan Ginès de Sepúlveda justifying the conquest, and the Catholic priest Bartolomé de Las Casas criticizing it.5 In particular, it is interesting to note that already in the sixteenth century, ‘las Casas was implacable against what we would call collateral damage: “it is a sin meriting eternal damnation to harm and kill innocents in order to punish the guilty, for it is contrary to justice” ’.6 The ideology that took form in the 13 British colonies and then in the United States of America since the seventeenth century, a variant of the European one, is rather complex, but if one has to choose one feature upon which all its other dimensions depend, I would take the one that Stephanson has called ‘chosenness’, i.e. the profound belief shared by the Founding Fathers that the Amer­ican people had been chosen by God (or Providence) to create a new republic, away from ‘corrupt Europe’, free from the European wars, persecutions, etc., and to organize it as a ‘pure’ and exceptional example that the rest of the world should imitate. ‘Exceptionalism’ and ‘universalism’ are then the two major components of this ideology. In the words of Stephanson: the nation had been allowed to see the light and was bound to show the way for the historically retrograde. This vision has been the constant throughout Amer­ican history, but historically it has led to two quite different ways of being toward the outside world. The first [based upon exceptionalism] was to unfold into an exemplary state separate from the corrupt and failed world, leaving others to emulate it as best they can. The second [based upon universalism] […] was to push the world along by means of regenerative inter­ vention. Separation, however, has been the more dominant of the two.7 Clearly Stephanson refers to the different era of the implementation of this ideology; without entering into too much detail: (1) intervention in the Americas and later in the Asia-­Pacific but concomitant separation from the rest of the world; (2) brief intervention at the end of the First World War and at the peace conference that followed; (3) return to separation in the inter-­war period, but concomitant interventions in Latin America; (4) strong intervention during the Second World War, the Cold War and the post-­Cold War eras; (5) and now, with the election of Donald Trump, a return to separation is likely, although it seems that

Understanding US strategy   111 it will take different forms, not excluding interventions, given the interdependence of the major international actors following the long period of neoliberal globalization. To complete and sustain this analysis, let us take some statements by the Founding Fathers, as reported by Perry Anderson and Anders Stephanson: 1

Jefferson to Monroe in 1801: However our present interests may restrain us within our limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times when our multiplication will expand it beyond those limits, and cover the whole northern, if not the southern continent, with people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws.

2 3

4

Adams to Jefferson in 1813: ‘Our pure, virtuous, public-­spirited, federative republic will last forever, govern the globe and introduce the perfection of man.’ In 1845, these two statements fused into the famous slogan of an associate of Jackson, John O’Sullivan: ‘the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and possess the whole continent that providence has given us for great experiment of liberty and federated self-­government.’8 And ‘for Europeans, land not occupied by recognized members of Christendom was theoretically land free to be taken’.9 Moreover, at that time ‘an enormous expansion was taking place across North America in the name of liberty often also said to be “Anglo-­Saxon in spirit or race” ’;10 A statement by Jefferson dated 1816: We are destined to be a barrier against the return of ignorance and barbarism. Old Europe will have to lean on our shoulders, and to hobble along by our side […] What a colossus shall we be, when the southern continent comes up to our mark.11

So, manifest destiny ‘became a catchword for the idea of a providentially or historically sanctioned right to continental expansionism’.12 Surely, at the beginning this mission was limited to the conquest of the Amer­ican West, but in fact, the only long-­term limit to the ‘expansion’ of this model to the rest of the world was the capacity to do so. As we know, that capacity manifested first in the Americas, then in the Asia-­Pacific, then in the rest of the world after the Second World War. It culminated with the apotheosis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The manifest destiny had reached its end. I will come back to this important point when dealing with ‘the new end of history’. Also, it is necessary to insist upon the religious sources and foundation of this ideology. In fact, the British immigrants that first colonized New England were a particularly fierce and uncompromising phalanx within the Reformation – the Puritans. […] English Protestantism, early on, had developed a notion

112   Understanding US strategy of England as not only spatially but also spiritually separate from the European continent, as the bastion of true religion and chief source of its expansion: a place divinely singled out for higher missions. The Separatists who crossed the Atlantic were part of this tradition, only more radical. It is upon this religious basis that the idea of exceptionalism and separateness took form. Within this vision, the New World has been conceived quite easily, contrary to the Spanish and the Portuguese, as the Promised Land, a sacred territory. In this framework, the manifest destiny was embedded in the biblical notions, recharged through the Reformation, of a predestined, redemptive destiny revealed. The world as God’s ‘manifestation’ and history as predetermined ‘destiny’ had been ideological staples of the strongly providentialist period of England between 1620 and 1660, during which, of course, the initial migration to New England took place.13 Moreover, this religious way of conceiving the manifest destiny is clearly tainted with a kind of messianic belief, and the consequent messianic activism necessary for the realization of this project. Within this religious vision, manifest destiny is not only a possible outcome of separation (exceptionalism) or intervention (universalism) but a duty for the Puritan Christian: to be a Protestant and especially a Puritan was to master the Bible as an epistemic code of revelation, to understand the always causally effective providential hand in the world. Current events were fulfilments or re-­enactments of the Scriptures. Failure to recognize this constituted atheism and apostasy. Every visible saint was consequently obliged to have an account of common and uncommon occurrences that was related directly to interpretations of the Book. By mastering prophecy, one would be able to understand the course of history and ‘cooperate’ with it. To be free was precisely to understand this destiny and conform to the direction of divine will, to ‘make our destiny our choice’, as it was said at that time. […] Once destiny was known with reasonable certainty, there remained the personal responsibility of choosing to follow it or to turn away. The missionary aspect of this endeavour was therefore well-­established since the beginning.14 And Stephanson comments: obscure but enormously suggestive [this thinking] offered the fullest vision of the end of history and the aftermath. It is a story of deadly struggle between the forces of good and evil, ending after many phases in final victory for the good and the Messiah’s reappearance.15

Understanding US strategy   113 Finally, one of the most interesting features of this ideology is the mix of religious and secular concepts. Whereas the duty to behave in order to fulfil the prophecies of the Book is clearly a religious imperative, the way of doing so is secular, i.e. by implementing economic and/or military means. The way that this has been done through history, beginning with the Indian Wars and the stealing of the Indians’ territory, has been oriented by the religious belief, but with time also by the secular belief, that those people were not worthy of respect and consideration as human beings, because they were not ‘like us’, i.e. white, English-­speaking, Protestant Christians; in short: civilized people. The mix of religious and secular concepts has combined, through history, the predestined, redemptive role of God’s chosen people in the Promised Land; Christianity (in the Protestant form); redemption; a new world order; freedom; liberal individualism; democracy; free trade; and capitalism.16 This not to say that this ideology has not been contested within America. Many Amer­ican ‘voices denounced the megalomania of Manifest Destiny, the plunder of Mexico, the seizure of Hawaii, the slaughter of the Philippines, attacking every kind of racisms and imperialism as a betrayal of the anti-­colonial birthright of the republic’.17 Nevertheless, history shows that in spite of these voices, the tendency, especially in the twentieth century, has been to intervene everywhere, whenever possible, to diffuse the good news of the new world order.

The actualization of US ideology: the ‘new end of history’ Since the time of the establishment of the US many changes have occurred within the country as well as in the international system. One may think that the ideology described above may have lost some of its most important features. It is my opinion that several of the initial aspects of this ideology are still operating today, even if the drive to expansion seems to have come to a halt.18 Not only has the space for further expansion considerably diminished, but several territories seem to develop towards more independence, whereas some others correspond to the emergence of new powers (such as China) or to re-­emerging powers such as Russia, and still some others are reclaiming an independent role in their area, such as Turkey, Iran and, hopefully, Europe. Daniel Bell has brilliantly summarized the persistence of US ideology through time: This blind faith in the universal potential of liberal democracy would not be so worrisome if it had not taken the form of US government policy to promote human rights and democracy abroad, regardless of local habits, needs, and traditions. Notwithstanding the rather huge gap between liberal democratic ideas and the reality at home, the repeated history of misadventures abroad due (at least partly) to ignorance of local conditions […], nothing seems to shake the faith in the universal potential of Western democracy in [US] official circles.19 Let us now analyse how the fundamental features of the original US ideology are still operating today.

114   Understanding US strategy From the ‘manifest destiny’ to the ‘indispensable nation’ I start with one of the more interesting developments of manifest destiny, i.e. the belief that the US is the indispensable nation. It seems that this statement was used for the first time by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on 19 February 1998 on NBC’s Today Show, speaking about US intervention against Iraq: It is the threat of the use of force [against Iraq] and our line-­up there that is going to put force behind the diplomacy. But if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.20 In 2012 Albright confirmed this statement in an interview with the German magazine Spiegel. Answering the question about what she actually meant by that, she replied: We coined that term after the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, during which the Amer­ican public had become tired and concerned about overextension abroad. President Bill Clinton and I felt America needed to be engaged, especially when it was in a mood to worry about itself more. So, it was a term that was very important to make clear to the Amer­ican people that the international system needed an engaged America.21 And indeed, President Bill Clinton used this expression in his inaugural address of January 1997: When last we gathered, our march to this new future seemed less certain than it does today. We vowed then to set a clear course to renew our Nation. In these 4 years, we have been touched by tragedy, exhilarated by challenge, strengthened by achievement. America stands alone as the world’s indispensable nation.22 President Obama also presented the US as the ‘indispensable nation’, in his speech at the graduation of West Point cadets on 28 May 2014 and again in the commencement speech at the US Air Force Academy: the US is exceptional, and will always be the one indispensable nation in world affairs. […] I see an Amer­ican century because no other nation seeks the role that we play in global affairs, and no other nation can play the role that we play in global affairs. That includes shaping the global institutions of the XX century to meet the challenges of the XXI century.23

Understanding US strategy   115 Why is the indispensable nation bound to lead the world? During the 2016 presidential campaign the theme of the indispensable nation was one of the major issues discussed both by the candidates and the press. Trump said that he dislikes the term ‘Amer­ican exceptionalism’ and described it as insulting to other nations. Hillary Clinton criticized Trump by saying that he ‘missed something important’ and sketched a view of America as a model for other nations. She added that ‘part of what makes America an exceptional nation is that we are also [the] indispensable nation. […] People all over the world look to us and follow our lead’.24 The association of the indispensable nation and the idea that the US is ‘naturally’ the leader of the world is also a recurrent theme in speeches and writings by Amer­ican politicians, journalists, university professors and members of think tanks. For example, in the speech quoted above, after having stressed the indispensable character of the US, Hillary Clinton very strongly associated these two terms: My friends, we are so lucky to be Amer­icans. It is an extraordinary blessing. It’s why so many people, from so many places, want to be Amer­icans too. […] My opponent misses something important. When we say America is exceptional, it doesn’t mean that people from other places don’t feel deep national pride, just like we do. It means that we recognize America’s unique and unparalleled ability to be a force for peace and progress, a champion for freedom and opportunity. Our power comes with a responsibility to lead, humbly, thoughtfully, and with a fierce commitment to our values. Because, when America fails to lead, we leave a vacuum that either causes chaos or other countries or networks rush in to fill the void. So, no matter how hard it gets, no matter how great the challenge, America must lead. The question is how we lead. What kind of ideas, strategies, and tactics we bring to our leadership. Amer­ican leadership means standing with our allies because our network of allies is part of what makes us exceptional.25 President Obama has also insisted upon the leadership of the US: Surveys show our standing around the world is higher than when I was elected to this office, and when it comes to every important international issue, people of the world do not look to Beijing or Moscow to lead – they call us.26 Setting the rules of the international system We have seen above that, according to Thomas Jefferson, one of the goals of the new republic was to expand its territory so that the resulting new land would be inhabited by ‘people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws’. This vision has not changed. As we have mentioned above, dealing with the indispensable nation theme, President Obama declared:

116   Understanding US strategy I see an Amer­ican century because no other nation seeks the role that we play in global affairs, and no other nation can play the role that we play in global affairs. That includes shaping the global institutions of the XX century to meet the challenges of the XXI century.27 More specifically, speaking in his State of the Union Address about one of the major components of his international strategy for maintaining the US as the world hegemon (the Trans-­Pacific Partnership), Obama made it clear that the US has the responsibility, and very likely the right, to set the rules governing international trade and investments: With TPP, China does not set the rules in that region; we do. You want to show our strength in this new century? Approve this agreement. Give us the tools to enforce it. It’s the right thing to do. (Applause).28 More generally, the will to set the rules of the international system manifested itself also in the twin of the TPP, the TTIP, i.e. the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. This partnership will complete the NATO military alliance between the US and Europe, by setting common rules for international trade and investments legally binding for all the contracting parties and that, given the huge coverage of these treaties in terms of GDP, trade and investment, could be easily imposed upon other nations. These treaties are clearly the more advanced components of the US strategy for containing China and Russia, as they bind Europe and 11 Asian countries within these two treaties dominated by the US. Moreover, although negotiations may lead, as the TPP has shown, to some concessions in favour of the less competitive contracting countries, the rules will be set mainly by the US to satisfy its economic and political national interests, as well as those of Amer­ican multinational companies.29 The same can be said about other important international organizations. The US has, for a long time, been against changing the rules of the organizations they dominate, such as the World Bank and the ������ International Monetary Fund (IMF ) and has tried everything it could to forbid its closest allies (starting with the UK) to join the China-­led new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). When developing countries, led by India, refused to bend to the diktat of developed countries (led by the US, the EU and Japan) within the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha negotiations, the US abandoned the idea of setting rules valid for all the countries within the WTO, and redefined its strategy by trying to set up new regional organizations such as the above-­ mentioned mega treaties (TPP and TTIP) or by strengthening existing bilateral agreements to boost its alliances, for example with Japan and South Korea. Realizing ‘expansion’: the importance of economic and military resources We have seen above that right from the beginning it has been a question for America to surpass the limits existing at the time of the ‘Conquest of the West’

Understanding US strategy   117 and, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, it was ‘not impossible to look forward to distant times when we will expand beyond those limits’. But clearly expansion depended not only on values but also on means. Very quickly the Amer­ican leadership discovered that a strong industrial economy and a powerful military were necessary for realizing the values set by the ideology. The economy was developed under the protection of very high customs duties.30 Only when the US emerged from the Second World War with an economy that had been spared by war did it promote free trade, to be realized within international organizations dominated by the US, i.e. the World Bank, the IMF and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the predecessor of the WTO), while the US dollar was chosen as the sole reserve currency at the Bretton Woods meeting. As for military resources, the US discovered at the beginning of the Second World War that, after two decades of isolationism, it was not ready to enter the war. Only after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did the US enter the war, first in the Far East and much later in Europe when the build-­up of military resources was strong enough to sustain the war effort on two fronts. This case is interesting for another reason: it shows that military resources are the ultimate resort when other means have not been sufficient to realize policy objectives. Indeed, the US started by sending an ultimatum to Japan requesting that it abandon the Asian continent, especially China. When Japan refused, the US imposed an economic embargo that cut the sea lines through which Japan imported the patrol necessary for its economy and military equipment. Then Japan militarily attacked Pearl Harbor and the US entered the war.31 Since then, the US has developed, maintained and improved its military resources to the point that its military spending equals the combined spending of the next ten countries. Already in 2014 the New York Times reported on a nationwide wave of atomic revitalization that includes plans for a new generation of weapons carriers. A recent federal study put the collective price tag, over the next three decades, at up to a trillion dollars […] the Obama administration is engaging in extensive atomic rebuilding while getting only modest arms reduction in return.32 And recently, both Presidents Obama and Trump announced the investment of several billions of US dollars to improve the nuclear arsenal of its armed forces.33 It is one thing to possess outstanding quantitative and qualitative military equipment; it is another thing to have the will and capability to use it. On several occasions, Obama reassured the country that the US would not refrain from using military means, whenever necessary. In his 2016 State of the Union Address, he made it clear that military power is an essential part of US power: I told you earlier all the talk of America’s economic decline is political hot air. Well, so is all the rhetoric you hear about our enemies getting stronger and America getting weaker. Let me tell you something. The United States

118   Understanding US strategy of America is the most powerful nation on Earth. Period. (Applause.) It’s not even close. It’s not even close. (Applause.) It’s not even close. We spend more on our military than the next eight nations combined. Our troops are the finest fighting force in the history of the world. (Applause.) No nation attacks us directly, or our allies, because they know that’s the path to ruin.34 And speaking at the Amer­ican University in Washington, DC about the ‘Iran Deal’, Obama did not hesitate to speak as the Commander in Chief: As Commander-­in-Chief, I have not shied from using force when necessary. I have ordered tens of thousands of young Amer­icans into combat. I have sat by their bedside sometimes when they come home. I’ve ordered military action in seven countries. There are times when force is necessary, and if Iran does not abide by this deal, it’s possible that we don’t have an alternative.35 And this of course contradicts Nye’s concept of soft and hard power, as I explained in Chapter­2. From religious fundamentalism to democratic and free trade fundamentalism and the identification and demonization of the enemy When dealing with the historical origins of US ideology, I have insisted (quoting Stephanson) upon the coexistence of religious and secular elements: the duty to fulfil the prophecies of the Bible and the secular means (economic and military) to achieve this goal. Today, these two dimensions are combined in one of the most frequently made assertions used by US politicians: ‘our values and national interests’. This expression summarizes the Amer­ican ideological basis put forward to justify public policies in the international system. Moreover, the implementation of the policies, thus justified, require the identification of the obstacles to the realization of their goals. We have seen above how the Puritans developed the idea of ‘manifest destiny’ entrusted upon the chosen people living in the Promised Land and beyond, and how this led to the distinction between the ‘chosen’ Amer­ican people and the other people. The latter should be civilized either by conversion, thanks to the implementation of exceptionalism and separation, or by force, through the implementation of universalism and intervention. The next easy step was to define those people as the ‘enemy’, as the ‘evil opposed to the good’. Let us start with the first ‘local’ enemy (the first ‘foreign’ enemy being Great Britain) and how they have been qualified in the Declaration of Independence: [The King of Great Britain] has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless

Understanding US strategy   119 Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.36 After independence, the presidents of the US have evaluated Amer­ican Indians in no less merciless a manner. One can find excerpts of these statements online with the following caveat: ‘The reader will get a sense of how the hostility towards Amer­ican Indians has lessened during the past two hundred plus years. Just as federal policies toward Amer­ican Indians have altered, so too have attitudes by presidents.’37 In fact, at least since Franklin Roosevelt, US presidents have expressed an increasingly positive opinion towards Native Amer­icans.38 Nevertheless, during the period in which Indians were considered ‘the enemy’, statements by US presidents have been rather negative. Here are a few examples: Indians and wolves are both beasts of prey, tho’ they differ in shape. (George Washington) If ever we are constrained to lift the hatchet against any tribe, we will never lay it down till that tribe is exterminated, or driven beyond the Mississippi […] in war, they will kill some of us; we shall destroy them all. (Thomas Jefferson) My original convictions upon this subject have been confirmed by the course of events for several years, and experience is every day adding to their strength. That those tribes cannot exist surrounded by our settlements and in continual contact with our citizens is certain. They have neither the intelligence, the industry, the moral habits, nor the desire of improvement which are essential to any favourable change in their condition. Established in the midst of another and a superior race, and without appreciating the causes of their inferiority or seeking to control them, they must necessarily yield to the force of circumstances and ere long disappear. (Andrew Jackson) I don’t go so far as to think that the only good Indians are dead Indians, but I believe nine out of ten are, and I shouldn’t like to inquire too closely into the case of the tenth. (Theodore Roosevelt) One may think that this way of seeing other people has faded away in time, as it has for the Native Amer­icans. Nevertheless, we must consider that other people may become the enemy if they constitute, or may constitute in the future, a threat to US values and national interests. It is clear that after the US victory in the Indian Wars, the Native Amer­icans were not a menace to America. A quite different situation happened during the Second World War. The war with Japan led the US government to consider that Amer­ican citizens of Japanese origin constituted a menace, and therefore should be isolated from the rest of the

120   Understanding US strategy ‘­ reliable’ white Amer­ican population by putting them in concentration camps. As for Japan and the Japanese people, President Truman did not show a particularly ‘Christian’ attitude. In the radio broadcast announcing, urbi et orbi, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima, he refers to the Japanese as ‘the Japs’. Truman starts his broadcast with a warning clearly addressed to the potential enemies that may rise in the future: No one can foresee what another war would mean to our own cities and our own people. What we are doing to Japan now – even with the new atomic bomb – is only a small fraction of what would happen to the world in a third World War. Then he comments in more detail on the use of the atomic bomb on Japan: The British, Chinese, and United States Governments have given the Japanese people adequate warning of what is in store for them. We have laid down the general terms on which they can surrender. Our warning went unheeded; our terms were rejected. Since then the Japanese have seen what our atomic bomb can do. They can foresee what it will do in the future. The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base [sic]. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians [sic]. But that attack is only a warning of things to come. If Japan does not surrender, bombs will have to be dropped on her war industries and, unfortunately, thousands of civilian lives will be lost. I urge Japanese civilians to leave industrial cities immediately, and save themselves from destruction. I realize the tragic significance of the atomic bomb.39 More recently, presidents of the US have further dramatized the perception of the ‘enemy’ by publicly equating the enemy with the manifestation of ‘evil’, as opposed to the ‘good’ of which America is the secular incarnation. In fact, this type of reasoning has been applied to other countries considered as enemies of the US, in particular China, but also Russia. For example, the term ‘axis of evil’ was used by President George W. Bush in his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, and often repeated throughout his presidency, to describe governments that his administration accused of sponsoring terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction. And Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton […] compared recent actions by Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Ukraine to those implemented by Adolf Hitler in the late 1930s. Putin’s desire to protect minority Russians in Ukraine is reminiscent of Hitler’s actions to protect ethnic Germans outside Germany, she said.40 But Hillary Clinton is by no means the only member of the US establishment who still today, more than 25 years after the end of the Cold War, considers

Understanding US strategy   121 Russia as an ‘enemy’, or even ‘the enemy’. This has emerged very clearly during the debates that developed on the possible intrusion of Russia during the presidential campaign to favour one of the candidates; rather surprising, as we know that the US interfered in other countries’ elections on many occasions. The presidential debate also shows that the suggestion, put forward by candidate Trump to negotiate with Russia, was considered by most members of the Amer­ican establishment as, at best, a departure from the US constant foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War depicting Russia as one of the most threatening enemies of the US, and, at worst, a clear treason of the Amer­ican people. As for the time of the Indian Wars, this attitude may be used, and has indeed been used on many occasions, to launch an overt war (as for Iraq) or a non-­ conventional war by proxy or by special forces on countries that ‘are not like us’. It is not necessary here to enumerate the long list of overt wars, proxy wars, special forces operations, subversion activities and regime changes that have characterized the ‘expansion’ of the values that took form right from the beginning of the Amer­ican republic. A general picture of these events will be analysed in the sixth section of this chapter (pp. 145–171). When analysing a country’s foreign policy, it is nevertheless important to have in mind the sequence or set of events (and reasoning) that may be implemented, following the definition of the enemy. This has been done by Diana Johnstone analysing the US interventions in Kosovo and Ukraine.41 Here my purpose is not to judge these interventions on their merits, but to understand the sequence or set of events that may lead, at the end, to military intervention. Johnstone chooses the term ‘hitlerization’ to characterize the first stage of the process, ‘whereby the targeted country disappears under the shadow of its leader, labelled a “dictator” (even if elected), who is portrayed as the embodiment of evil on earth and must go’; this phase is in fact ‘a propaganda war, waged by mainstream media and think tanks’ whose goal, in my opinion, is to obtain the support of the majority of citizens. This stage operates through the whole process that may lead to military intervention. The following measures may constitute a sequence of stages or, more likely, a concomitant and/or concurrent implementation of different measures aimed at obtaining from the ‘enemy’ compliance with the objectives of the ‘good’ country. In this context, the second measure (or stage) concerns the implementation of economic sanctions that ‘serve to stigmatize the evil one, destabilize relations and rally internal allies who hesitate to have recourse to arms but are willing to go along with the supposedly “peaceful” methods of making him change his ways’, as in the case of Cuba and Iran. The next measure concerns the mobilization of local clients, of which numerous examples may be quoted.42 The fourth stage, which can be concomitant and/or concurrent with the third one, is the use of non-­governmental organizations (NGOs), especially, for Johnstone, human rights NGOs, but in fact any kind of NGOs, especially those specialized in the diffusion of the ideal of market economy (in fact, capitalism) and liberal democracy, such as those

122   Understanding US strategy financed directly by the US government (most notably the National Endowment for Democracy and its subsidiaries), play a central role claiming to incarnate a genuine democracy which is being strangled by the targeted ‘Hitler’ when police intervene against disorder provoked by ‘genuine democrats’ The other element of this strategy is to sabotage diplomacy. Johnstone gives the example of the intervention in Kosovo. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright organized false negotiations between the Yugoslav government and the Albanian nationalists, and introduced an ultimatum (total military occupation of Serbia) that obliged the Serbs to refuse and thus take blame for ‘refusing to negotiate’. It has been customary for US representatives in the United Nations to sabotage negotiations by moralizing tirades, insults and lies. Although this last evaluation may be considered by some to be excessive, one cannot discard it without careful examination, which is outside the scope of this paragraph. The other measure is the continuation of the criminalization of the enemy that started right from the beginning, that reach its climax by using, without undisputable evidence, the qualification of ‘genocide’ to characterize the actions of the enemy. Moreover, ‘the sword of Damocles [i.e. the menace to resort to military means] is hanging over every dispute’, as I have sustained at the start of Chapter­2, dealing with the definition of power. Military force may finally be implemented, should the ‘evil enemy’ fail to comply with the diktat of the ‘good’. From the Puritans’ ‘end of history’ to the ‘new end of history’ One of the most interesting actualizations of the Puritans’ end of history is, without doubt, that of Francis Fukuyama. In his 1989 article and his 1992 book, Fukuyama has provided a contemporary version of the end of history.43 I was not able to establish whether he was explicitly aware of the similarity between ‘his end of history’ and that of the Puritans. But I cannot help seeing a striking similarity between these two types of ideological construction of the end of history. On the one hand, the Puritans’ version was based upon (as we have seen above) an interpretation of the Bible as an ideological epistemic code of revelation with which the believer had the duty to cooperate, in order to facilitate the realization of its prophecies. And at the end of this process, as Stephanson rightly concludes, we will arrive at the end of history. The messianic character of the human activities this project needs to be realized is thus quite clear. On the other hand, the ideology upon which the Fukuyama version of the end of history is based is clearly liberal democracy, very likely concomitant with a specific form of economy, capitalism.44 The duty of the ‘democratic citizen’ is therefore to do whatever he or she can to ‘help’ the realization of liberal democracy, and eventually

Understanding US strategy   123 also of capitalism. In this view, we can better understand with what unfailing energy the US has tried to realize, all over the world, the prophecy of the coming of the ideal democratic republic, through the implementation of foreign policies under the form of ‘exceptionalism and separation’, or of ‘universalism and intervention’. In the introduction to the 1992 book Fukuyama explains the origin of the idea that history had come to an end.45 I argued [in the 1989 article] that a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism. More than that, however I argued that liberal democracy may constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and the ‘final form of human government’, and as such constituted the ‘end of history.’ That is, while earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions. […] While some present-­day countries might fail to achieve stable liberal democracy, and others might lapse back into other, more primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship, the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved on. Clearly, the almost 400 pages of the book have been used to make the point with a considerable amount of qualifications and caveats. And Fukuyama came back to his ‘end of history’ on many occasions, very likely under pressure from the changes in the international system that was developing into a multipolar world. In a 2008 contribution to a collective book, Fukuyama recognizes that the Bush way of managing US foreign policy was not a success. He even qualifies the second Iraq War as a ‘fiasco’, and he advocates a humbler attitude. But he refuses to envisage a radical change of the US foreign policy. The messianic bias is still operating in favour of ‘universalism and intervention’: the power, however, is a reality, and although a more multipolar world may come to exist in another generation, it is still a long way off. This is why, in my view, the ‘talk softly and carry a small stick’ visions of Amer­ican foreign policy are not realistic: we cannot wish away our dominance of the global economy, the dependence of various friends and allies on our military power, or the fact that Amer­ican power continues to provide predictability in international relations in many parts of the world. A transition out of this role will create large uncertainties unless it is carefully negotiated, and in many instances it will simply not be believable.46 Four years later, in 2012, Fukuyama even entitled an article ‘The future of history’, and in the subtitle he asked himself the question: ‘Can liberal democracy

124   Understanding US strategy survive the decline of the middle class?’47 Nevertheless, in spite of some departure from the messianic character of the end of history, Fukuyama remains faithful to his first approach. And indeed, four years later, in 2016, the end of history is still there, although under the wording of a more ‘soft’ kind. In an interview given to the German newspaper Die Zeit, Fukuyama answers the last question of the journalist, ‘do we have to adjourn the end of history?’, by saying: By the end of the story I meant that I see no alternative that would be better than democracy. This end of history is not adjourned, but certainly it is not a reality for many people. We are currently going in the wrong direction.48 So, the ‘new end of history’ is here to stay and, taking into consideration the events that have occurred since the 2016 Fukuyama interview, in particular the election of Donald Trump, it is likely that the US will continue to manage its foreign policy hesitating between ‘universalism and intervention’ and ‘exceptionalism and separation’, or more likely a combination of both. But what will remain is the ‘ideal liberal democratic republic with capitalist economy’ towards which every country should converge, either by imitating the ‘exceptional republic’ or by being led to it by US intervention.49 There is another aspect of Fukuyama’s ‘new end of history’, which further accentuates its similarity with the Puritans’ one, and helps us to better understand today’s US foreign policy. For Fukuyama, today ‘we are going in the wrong direction’. In other words, in several parts of the world liberal democracy is losing its appeal, and forms of authoritarian regimes are developing (China) or re-­emerging (Russia, Syria, Turkey, to name a few). Nevertheless, liberal Western democracy, similarly to the Puritans’ Bible, remains today the ‘ideological epistemic code of revelation, the believer has the duty to cooperate with, for facilitating the realization of its prophecies’. But there is even more. As the prophecy has not been realized yet, the believer has not only the duty to do whatever he can to facilitate its coming, but, to avoid any further development towards ‘the wrong direction’, he has also the duty to maintain the dominance of ‘the liberal free world’, as this is the only means and the only road towards the fulfilment of the prophecy that will take us to the ‘new end of history’. One understands why the US (eventually with its allies) tries to do whatever it can to oppose any forces (states, ideologies, think tanks, etc.) that may limit, and eventually put an end to, the ‘US-­led liberal international system’, the only guarantee that can allow us to go in the right direction. And, of course, the US is the indispensable leader. This leitmotif appears in the discourse of Amer­ican politicians, journalists and members of think tanks. And quite frequently actions follow the discourse. Dealing with the origins of Amer­ican ideology I said that many Amer­ican ‘voices denounced the megalomania of Manifest Destiny’ since the beginning of the formation of the Amer­ican state.50 This has been true throughout the history of the US. Today, and as we are witnessing the passing of the unipolar world dominated by the US, this criticism has become more pertinent than in the past.

Understanding US strategy   125 Several voices within the US cast some doubts on the capacity of America to maintain its role of sole superpower, leading the rest of the world.51 The unbelievable number of books, articles and papers published recently by scholars, think tanks and journalists raises a lot of questions from two different points of view. On the one hand, those who still believe in the ‘manifest destiny’, and are most of the time members of the ‘establishment’, criticize the strategy implemented by the US government to maintain its leading role in international affairs. Both Barack Obama and Donald Trump are the target of this criticism, although it comes from different sectors of the establishment. On the other hand are those who do not believe in the manifest destiny and criticize both the domestic and foreign policies of the US. Their criticism is based upon the condemnation of the imperialistic character of the US foreign policy, which is, most of the time, explained by the capitalistic character of the US economy that shapes both domestic and foreign policies. Moreover, they point as well to the fact that liberal democracy gives US citizens the illusion that they have a say in the shaping of both domestic and foreign policies, whereas in fact these are designed by the political institutions under pressure from the ‘military-­industrialcyber-­media’ complex. There is no need to develop here the rationale of this second type of criticism as it is quite simple to understand: it is against the present implementation of the ‘manifest destiny’ and all its derivatives, as I have defined them in the first part of this chapter.52 It is more interesting to analyse the criticism and proposals coming from ‘today’s believers’ in the manifest destiny (or, ‘the new believers’), as they are likely to orient, or reorient, the US foreign policy in the years to come more than the non-­believers. These criticisms are structured into the following dimensions that show the extent to which the new believers in the US ‘manifest destiny’ are worried about the trends that have emerged during the last decades within the international system, and which risk putting an end to the realization of the manifest destiny.53 Within this context, one can identify four main specific themes the ‘new believers’ have developed, even if they sometimes overlap. The first theme concerns the recognition that there is a China threat. But even more, China is the real threat and must be distrusted as it has duped the US since the Mao era. In his 2015 State of the Union Address, President Obama clearly identified China as a formidable rival to the global influence of the US. And he has warned members of Congress that failure to support the TPP agreement could be tantamount to ceding America’s leadership to China. Voices have arisen warning of China’s Grand Strategy. Fears that China is planning to destroy the US have been put forward by serious Amer­ican sources. And, therefore, the worrying question remains: can China be contained?54 The second theme worrying the ‘new believers’ concerns the crisis of liberal democracy. Not only has there been since the 1990s, i.e. after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a considerable surge of illiberal democracies, but today a crisis is even developing within liberal democracy itself. This leads strong believers in the ‘manifest destiny’ to ask the question: is there an Amer­ican political decay and, if so, is its renewal at all possible? And

126   Understanding US strategy even worse, the debates during the 2016 presidential campaign, which ended with the election of Donald Trump, have unmasked to the Amer­ican citizens, and to the world, the very serious contradictions that have developed within Amer­ican society after several decades of neoliberalism: unemployment, poverty, crime, racism and lies.55 On top of this, the very sad and uncivilized spectacle of the electoral campaign has raised some serious doubts about the capacity of the Amer­ican democracy to regenerate itself, not to mention Hillary Clinton’s accusation that Donald Trump was working for a hostile foreign power, Russia. The hysteria that developed within the mainstream media, and beyond, about the possibility that Russia had interfered with the electoral process to favour one of the candidates looks quite ludicrous, as we know that the US has interfered within many, many countries’ electoral processes since at least the end of the Second World War.56 So, the question is: is this how democracy ends? The only possible way to explain this attitude (a good example of the use of ‘double standards’) is to refer to the division of the world between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, already present at the beginning of the building of the Amer­ican state, as we have seen above. Clearly, this division is still operating today: the US, the paramount representative of ‘good’, is ‘entitled’ to intervene all over the world to fight against ‘evil’, even if by doing so it is necessary to violate international laws that the US proudly claims to have contributed to establishing under its leadership. It suffices to quote the example of the interference (the word is too mild) of the US in Italy’s electoral process in the late 1940s, at the beginning of the Cold War. The evil, represented by the Communist Party of Italy with its socialist allies, had a good chance to win the national elections. Given the geographic position of Italy at the edge of communist Yugoslavia, and at the centre of the Mediterranean Sea, the evil should be prevented from winning the election by any means. And they did it.57 The third theme concerns the crisis of the US-­led liberal international order: the election of President Trump imperils the international liberal order that America has championed since the Second World War. As one of the most influential ‘new believers’ has put it: ‘The world that America made.’ Trump has questioned long-­standing US alliances like NATO and has promised to abandon major international trade agreements, such as the TPP. Some even consider that the next administration will ‘become complicit in dismantling’ the very world that America made, i.e. the expansion of liberal democracy all over the world and the integration of the world economy into the capitalist order.58 Fourth, given the themes and trends recognized above, the next worrying question the ‘new believers’ are compelled to ask is: what can we do to preserve US primacy? Even more than the other trends mentioned above, this fourth dimension is a mix of worries and assertive statements. Preserving primacy first of all means to fight against those who are seeking to overturn the rule-­based international order under the leadership of the US, above all China, Russia and the Islamic State. These ‘revisionist powers’ are creating the conditions for international instability and the consequent decline of US influence which is of paramount importance for the safeguarding of Amer­ican values and national

Understanding US strategy   127 interests. The strategy to counter these developments is clearly to prevent a hostile state from establishing dominance in the key regions, i.e. Europe, the Far East and the Middle East. For achieving this end, it is important to restore the US economy, reinforce the US alliance system and, last but not least, create a more effective military that should be present in all the sensitive parts of the world. Nevertheless, there is also some good news in the analysis of the international situation made by the ‘new believers’. Indeed, it seems that there are good reasons to think that China will not overtake the US in the foreseeable future. China is still far behind the US in terms of military resources, technology and cultural resources, not to mention its weak alliances system and the internal imbalances that undermine its rise as a new dominant world power: ageing population, increasing inequalities, environmental damage, underdeveloped financial sector, inefficiency of state-­owned enterprises. Whether this optimism is justified or not remains to be seen in the years to come. But the analysis and data I have presented in Chapters­2 and 3 seem to point towards the end of the US-­led unipolar world and the emergence of a multipolar international system where China will certainly play a significant role, along with the US, Europe and eventually other emerging powers.59 The analyses of the ‘new believers’ we have summarized above shed some light on the way they evaluate the changes that have occurred in the international system since the end of the Cold War, and what policies they propose to preserve the leadership of the US. Their views have been integrated into a coherent and comprehensive framework by one of the most influential representatives of the ‘new believers’, generally presented as belonging to the ‘neoconservatives’, Robert Kagan. A co-­founder of the neoconservative Project for the New Amer­ ican Century, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the influential think tank the Brookings Institution and a member of the no less influential Council on Foreign Relations.60 Kagan has been a foreign policy adviser to US Republican presidential candidates as well as Democratic administrations via the Foreign Affairs Policy Board. He and his wife, Victoria Nuland, constitute one of the most formidable couples within the Amer­ican political system.61 While he is one of the major ‘masterminds’ of Amer­ican neoconservatism, she developed an outstanding career within the State Department, where she was finally appointed Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs in 2013. In this capacity, she oriented the US foreign policy in controversial activities, such as the regime change in Ukraine. Nuland is famous, inter alia, for her very imaginative way of qualifying allies and enemies. In a telephone conversation with the US ambassador in Kiev, discussing the strategy for the 2014 coup d’état in Ukraine, impatient to overrule the possible objections from the EU, she ejaculated: ‘fuck the EU.’62 On another occasion, she encouraged the US to ‘get the Russians to eat their spinach’ in the circumstances described by Tony Wood: Already on Washington’s agenda even before the fall of the USSR, the expansion on NATO was treated as a given from 1994 onward, the only question being how to make the Kremlin swallow it – to ‘get the Russian to

128   Understanding US strategy eat their spinach’, as Victoria Nuland, then chief of staff to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, put it.63 It is interesting to note that in September 2014 (i.e. after the coup d’état in Ukraine) the Brookings Institution proudly reported on Politico magazine’s list of the 50 most influential people in Washington as follows: ‘Politico Magazine released a list of the top 50 influential people in Washington, D.C., including Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, described as “the ultimate Amer­ican power couple.” ’64 Should Hillary Clinton have won the 2016 presidential election, Nuland would have had a good chance to become Secretary of State, as the two women were showing a similar aggressive attitude in managing international relations, especially towards Russia. With the election of Trump, Nuland had to leave her post of Assistant Secretary of the State Department. Nevertheless, it seems that she is back, with her husband, in the Washington top 50.65 Kagan is a strong believer in the mission of the US, although he has recognized, contrary to the 1989 Fukuyama article, that we have not come (yet?) to the end of history; on the contrary, history has come back.66 But, as for Fukuyama, the messianic goal remains the same. Only, it will take more time and the US needs to strengthen the means to achieve it. Already in 2012 Kagan had strongly confirmed his faith in the vitality of America in an article entitled, ‘Not fade away: against the myth of Amer­ican decline’, published first in the New Republic and reprinted by the Brookings Institution: Let’s start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America’s position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy. […] Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-­ century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, ‘military strength underpins hegemony.’ Here the United States remains unmatched.67 Brookings proudly introduced the article by informing its readers that: In his State of the Union address on January 24 [2012], President Barack Obama argued, ‘Anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn’t know what they’re talking about.’ According

Understanding US strategy   129 to a Foreign Policy Report the president was influenced by the following [i.e. Kagan’s] article discussing it at length in an off-­the-record meeting on the afternoon of the speech.68

Donald Trump’s foreign policy: the end of the ‘end of history’? The reactions of neoconservatives to Donald Trump’s election In February 2017, i.e. after Donald Trump’s election, Robert Kagan summarized his views in a long article published simultaneously by the influential magazine Foreign Policy and the no less influential Brookings Institution think tank’s website.69 The article can be considered as the most complete and coherent version of the ‘New Manifest Destiny’, even if this term does not appear explicitly in the text. First of all, Kagan says that it is absolutely necessary to maintain the ‘dominant position the US has held in the international system since 1945’, referred to also as ‘the US-­led postwar global order’, ‘the US-­supported world order’, or ‘the world order they [i.e. Amer­icans] created after World War II’, a clear reference to his book quoted above: The World America Made. The reason is that otherwise ‘the existing world collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy’. The values that this event is likely to damage are free market capitalism, democracy and political freedom(s), associated with Amer­ican national interests. Moreover, ‘the liberal enlightenment project elevated universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences’.70 The danger comes from the new enemies, i.e.: two great revisionist powers, Russia and China […] [who] are dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power. Both seek to restore the hegemonic dominance they once enjoyed in their respective regions. […] Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led post-­war global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the Amer­ican-­led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. […] It is a myth, prevalent among liberal democracies, that revisionist powers can be pacified by acquiescence to their demands.71 Consequently, and quite logically, Kagan rejects the idea of the emergence of a multipolar world, which would be governed by a joint leadership shared between the US, Russia and China, because ‘revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security’.

130   Understanding US strategy Moreover, ‘revisionist great powers with growing military capabilities invariably make use of those capabilities when they believe the possible gains outweigh the risks and costs’.72 And this poses a threat not only to the US but also to its allies and partners. The consequence is that the US must remain the ‘indispensable nation’ and continue to lead the liberal world it made. Very generously Kagan concedes that within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the democratic system, even if it is not itself democratic. But military and strategic competition is different. The security situation undergirds everything else. It remains true today as it has since World War II that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security and relative stability. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And Kagan adds, not without reason, that ‘soft power’ and ‘smart power’ will always be of limited value when confronting raw military power. To sustain his demonstration Kagan uses a few historical examples that, according to him, make it clear that revisionist powers are very aggressive towards the US-­led liberal order. On the one hand, Kagan considers that Russia has been far more aggressive: it invaded two neighbouring states, Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, ‘not to mention Putin’s repressive policies toward his own people’; sent substantial forces into Syria where its role increased the refugee flow into Europe; funds right-­wing populist parties across Europe; and uses its media outlets to support favoured candidates and attack others. Here we have another example of the pattern described by Diana Johnstone (mentioned above) for creating the ‘enemy’ before attacking it. This way of presenting the Georgian and Ukrainian conflicts shows how neoconservatives (but this could be said more generally of the US establishment and the majority of Western governments) consider the ‘invasion’ of a country by another. Clearly for them the only way to invade a country is to occupy it by military means, all other means such as NGOs, economic advisers and investors being excluded from the category of ‘invasion’. A rather restrictive way to define ‘invasion’. Or should one explain this by reference to the will to simply ‘expand’ all over the world anticipated by Jefferson since the beginning of the nineteenth century (p. 111 above), where ‘expansion’ very clearly is not considered as an ‘invasion’ but as a liberation of the ignorant and oppressed people? On the other hand, Kagan considers that ‘Beijing, until recently has succeeded mostly in driving Amer­ican allies closer to the US out of concern for growing Chinese power – but could change quickly’. Clearly Kagan has some serious problems with history. First, he forgets (or does he really?) that the West has not ceased to provoke Russia since the end of the Cold War by breaking the promise made to Gorbachev (in exchange for the approval of the reunification of Germany) not to expand the NATO military alliance nor the EU in Eastern

Understanding US strategy   131 Europe. Several commentators deny that this promise was ever made as they argue that the US did not confirm that promise in writing. It is thus easy to deny that the promise was ever made, or to refuse to accept an oral promise as legally binding.73 Even so, one can hardly deny that NATO and EU have expanded in Eastern Europe to the border of Russia; this policy can be qualified at best as a series of provocations, at worst as a number of aggressive moves towards Russia. It has never been a wise policy to humiliate the defeated adversary and to ignore its legitimate needs to ensure security at his borders. Second, Kagan also forgets that the catastrophe in Syria (and elsewhere) has, in the main, been provoked by the US encouraging, training and funding fundamentalist Islamist organizations.74 Moreover, it is the US’s massive military presence in the Far East that is at the origin of the development and modernization of the Chinese military resources. Finally, whereas he maintains, as we have seen above, that the sphere of influence of Russia and China ‘is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security’, he does not see that this is just what the US has done since the end of the Second World War. The only reason that can explain this patent contradiction is that for Kagan the US is on the side of ‘good’, whereas Russia and China are on the side of ‘evil’.75 The similarity is therefore obvious with the ‘old’ Puritan Manifest Destiny, where God (or Providence) had given to the chosen people the Promised Land and the right, and even the duty, to realize the prophecy of the Book, i.e. to expand their republic beyond the limits existing at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The prophecy of Thomas Jefferson quoted above will then be realized: However our present interests may restrain us within our limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times when our multiplication will expand it beyond those limits, and cover the whole northern, if not the southern continent [and today the whole world], with people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws. Granted, Kagan concedes that ‘Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the democratic system, even if it is not itself democratic’, but it will have to behave within the laws of the liberal international system ‘that America made’.76 In analysing the US foreign policy to face the declining power of the US, Kagan is very critical of the Bush administration for its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more particularly of the Obama administration for not restoring Amer­ican power and influence but by further reducing them […] Obama, in fact, publicly acknowledged Russia’s privileged position in Ukraine even as the United States and Europe sought to protect that country’s sovereignty. In Syria, the administration practically invited Russian intervention through Washington’s passivity, and certainly did nothing to discourage it, thus reinforcing the growing impression of an America in retreat across the Middle East.

132   Understanding US strategy Finally, regarding the Obama policy towards China, Kagan considers that ‘despite the Obama administration’s insistence that Amer­ican strategy should be geared toward Asia, U.S. allies have been left wondering how reliable the U.S. commitment might be when facing the challenge posed by China’. Even the competing candidates in the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, take their dose of criticism. Clinton, because she declared that she was no longer supporting the TPP, one of the pillars of US foreign policy to contain China. On the contrary, for Kagan, what is needed is a more affirmative strategy towards the revisionist powers, otherwise the US will lose its leading dominant role in the world. More interesting is the critique of the newly elected president, as he, and not Hillary Clinton, will direct US foreign policy for the next four to eight years. For Kagan, Trump’s foreign policy is too weak because it redefines Amer­ican interests in a too-­narrow way, meaning that by criticizing NATO and the EU, and suggesting that the US would not necessarily defend some of its allies, his foreign policy is a dangerous departure from the neoconservative foreign policy according to which the US should be present all over the world in order to defend its national interests. For understanding the profound meaning of this statement, we have to come back to the founding document of the neoconservative movement: Without a broader, more enlightened understanding of America’s interests, conservatism will too easily degenerate into the pinched nationalism of Buchanan’s America First, where the appeal to narrow self-­interest masks a deeper form of self-­loathing. A true conservatism of the heart ought to emphasize both personal and national responsibility, relish the opportunity for national engagement, embrace the possibility of national greatness, and restore a sense of the heroic, which has been sorely lacking from Amer­ican foreign policy – and from Amer­ican conservatism – in recent years. George Kennan was right 50 years ago in his famous X article: the Amer­ican people ought to feel a certain gratitude to a Providence, which by providing [them] with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear. This is as true today – if less obviously so – as it was at the beginning of the Cold War.77 One may think that this analysis of the role of the US in the world is typical of the neoconservatives. This is not the case. If we analyse the US foreign policy from at least the end of the Second World War, the main features of the policy, which we have described above and summarized thanks to the 2017 Kagan article, are basically the same. Differences, when they exist, are marginal, limited to different forms of rhetoric, a different mix of means, and/or different priorities. But the main goal remains the same: maintain the US as the sole superpower. There are some good reasons for that, no matter who is in power. On the one hand, there is the role the US assumed at the end of the Second

Understanding US strategy   133 World War, based upon a mix of a generous support to a devastated Europe, but also on the selfish will to safeguarding US national security interests, given the menace that the Soviet Union represented for the US and the West. During the Cold War, the ‘indispensable nation’ concept had good historical, economic, cultural and military raisons d’être. At the end of the Cold War the US had the opportunity, unique in world history, to become the world benevolent hegemon they claimed to be. This is the period that Andrew Bacevich describes as the ‘age of great expectations’, when the US leadership thought that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were no limits to the fulfilment of the promises of the ‘Manifest Destiny’: the world was wide open to the diffusion of the good news of global capitalism and liberal democracy … by all means.78 And indeed, the US engaged in a series of wars, proxy wars, regime change and all sorts of interferences in other countries. If there is a reason why the US lost its reputation, it is not, as Kagan suggests, because of loss of military power and assertiveness in managing its foreign policy, but because of the mistakes made by using that military power in a variety of unnecessary ways. As Chalmers Johnson would say: today the consequence of these mistakes is a ‘blowback’.79 On the other hand, one must not forget that whereas domestic policies are negotiated within a complex system of checks and balances, foreign policy is more the realm of the president and his senior advisers, the State Department, the Defense Department and the very complex system of security and intelligence organizations, supplemented by a great number of university professors and influential think tanks. The latter are generally presented as independent and/or non-­political. But if one looks at the list of their members, one discovers that they employ (especially on their boards) several former or even serving high officials from several sectors of the administration, which makes the intersection of public bodies, think tanks and university professors a relatively well-­integrated system. If we add to this the representatives of the ‘military-­industrial-cyber complex’, we can consider that this complex system corresponds to the US ‘power elite’ or to the US ‘establishment’. Moreover, mainstream media generally support the foreign policy implemented by the establishment, as the 2016 presidential campaign has very well demonstrated, in particular regarding the alleged interferences of Russia with the electoral process: the ‘enemy’ was made responsible for the defeat of the candidate of the establishment, and this interpretation could be easily sold to the general public. This was possible because, according to Perry Anderson, the US presents two interesting characteristics: the provincialism of an electorate with minimal knowledge of the outside world, and a political system that […] has increasingly given virtually untrammelled power to the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs, freeing presidencies […] to act without comparable cross-­cutting pressure abroad [contrary to what happens for domestic policies].80 Should the foreign policy of the new president follow the agenda of the neoconservatives as defined by Kagan, the US would be unable to understand the reality

134   Understanding US strategy of the emerging multipolar world that the ‘silent transformations’ started to shape from at least the end of the Cold War: not aware of this reality, they will still be dreaming of the fulfilment of the ideology of the ‘manifest destiny’ and of the ‘indispensable nation’ and its derivatives, as I have described them at the beginning of this chapter. But will that dream come true? The US foreign policy of President Donald Trump The election of Donald Trump has put the US establishment in a terrible situation. Divided about what is today necessary to do to safeguard US national interests, obsessed by the Russian ‘enemy’, fearful of the emerging Chinese giant, doubtful of the capacity of its enormous military resources, unsure whether its culture is still capable to attract leaders and citizens of other countries, incapable of figuring out in what direction the new president will lead the ‘chosen people’, fearful that the end of history may be quite different from that envisaged by the Founding Fathers (as other powers seem to be able to drive the world towards ‘another end of history’), aware of the contradictions that have weakened and fractured the ‘melting pot’ after 40 years of neoliberalism, the US establishment seems to be unable to find an agreement to redefine its role at home and in the world.81 At the time of concluding the writing of this book (end of August 2017), it is difficult to forecast what policies the new president will actually implement. Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest some possible outcomes, by simultaneously taking into consideration the career and personality of the new president, his statements during the presidential campaign, the first decisions taken, the US foreign policy the US establishment has consistently implemented since the end of the Second World War, as well as the ‘silent transformations’ that have been shaping the new world order since the end of the Cold War. Let us put aside for a moment the statements of candidate Trump that have attracted some of the most violent and vociferous oppositions to his candidacy (i.e. sexism, racism, inexperience, etc.) and consider some of the most significant statements about the US foreign policy.82 My purpose here is not to evaluate President Trump’s statements from a moral point of view, and not even on the merit of the policies he has already undertaken to implement or those that he will probably implement in the future. This has been done by others, both journalists and politicians.83 My goal is to understand in what direction Trump will probably lead the US in the international system. A first conclusion, based upon the reactions to Trump’s statements, is that the establishment has not yet ‘eaten the spinach’ of the failure of its candidate, Hillary Clinton, to conquer, again, the White House.84 If one has followed the presidential campaign and knows enough about the power structure of the US, one can easily understand that several of Trump’s foreign policy proposals run counter to some of the most important interests of the establishment, namely the mix of ideological, economic and power interests shared by the military industry, the Pentagon, large sectors of the political elite from both parties, and mainstream think tanks and media. Let us

Understanding US strategy   135 see what Trump has said, which can help us to understand in what direction he is likely to lead US foreign policy.85 First, Trump declared that it is better to negotiate with Russia. Very wise attitude indeed, when we know that Russia is a nuclear power, second only to the US, and that by continuing to bully this great power, as the West has done since the end of the Cold War, there is a serious risk of starting a Third World War, something that the mainstream media and think tanks have been (and still are) envisaging with unbelievable nonchalance. Second, Trump criticized the NATO alliance as ‘obsolete’, with some very good reasons. NATO was established on 4 April 1949 to face the threat (real or imaginary) of the Soviet Union. As I said above, this was understandable and very likely necessary at the time.86 But after the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s, the enemy had been defeated and it was no longer able to represent a real threat to the US and Europe. Moreover, after the devastating ‘shock therapy’ promoted by self-­proclaimed Western experts in Eastern Europe and in Russia (with the help, it is fair to mention, of former nomenklatura recycled as crooked businessmen), the Eastern European leaders and especially the Russians could do nothing but witness the cultural, social, economic and political decadence of their countries. The Soviet regime was certainly a brutal one, but helping the Russians to replace it with a fair and viable economic and political system capable of leading towards a more open society would have been a better bet than the ‘shock therapy’. Instead, the US considered that part of the world as a space where they could ‘expand’. Businessmen, investors, NGOs and think tanks invaded Eastern Europe and Russia, eager to take advantage of the national resources these countries were no longer able to keep under the control of their national government and economy. Offers by Russia (especially by Vladimir Putin since 2000) to set up a common security organization were ignored with arrogance.87 Instead, the West expanded the NATO military alliance and the EU to Eastern Europe as far as the border of Russia. The last expansion, the accession of Montenegro, was proudly announced by the NATO website on 5 June 2017.88 Montenegro is a small country and its accession to the alliance may be considered as NATO’s last ‘marginal’ move, after demonization of Russia that has been going on for decades89 and has been worsened by the US establishment in the context of the Donald Trump election. So, the accession of Montenegro is only a small part of NATO expansion. In fact, the alliance has implemented a strategy of global expansion, well outside the periphery of its original enemy, Russia, that justified its creation in 1949: the reach of the alliance has been extended to Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Africa, Eurasia and the Far East.90 After the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy looked as if the US considered that the time had come to fulfil Jefferson’s dream and the Puritans’ end of history: However our present interests may restrain us within our limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times when our multiplication will expand it beyond those limits, and cover the whole northern, if not the southern

136   Understanding US strategy c­ ontinent, with people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws. (Jefferson to Monroe in 1801, quoted above) The ‘end of history’ was to come soon. Third, Trump criticized the member states of the EU, as well as other countries, for not fulfilling their duties as allies of the US by not investing enough money in common defence commitments. Quite true. If these countries consider that there is a threat to their security in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East, why do they rely mainly on the US, when their economy is strong enough to devote part of their financial resources to fund military equipment and military personnel? In my opinion, this would also work to free the Europeans from a too-­heavy reliance on the US. Discussions have taken place recently among major European countries to set up stricter cooperation for defence, which may lead to the establishment of a European army within the EU. This would constitute a military force more independent from the US military command than exists today within the NATO alliance, with unnecessary tensions between the US and Europe. Of course, the EU may remain in NATO as long as the US and the EU keep on perceiving a threat from Russia. But if Russia joins the US and the EU within an organization entrusted with guaranteeing security in Eurasia (as Putin has asked on many occasions), there is a chance that the ‘Russia threat’ will vanish from the articles published by mainstream media and think tanks. Or, maybe, this is the real problem for mainstream media and think tanks? Fourth, Trump also announced that he is going to reduce US military commitments all over the world, i.e. spending Amer­ican money on military bases, military equipment and military personnel. This potential change in US foreign policy, together with the criticisms of NATO and of allies that they do not spend enough on common defence commitments, may have the consequence of reducing the conventional equipment of the US military, and therefore causing a reduction in the US government’s procurement to the military industrial sector. Moreover, as Trump suggested during the presidential campaign, this may limit the US’s will and capability to defend allies and partners. As a former businessman, Trump understands the basics of accounting, even if the management of public finances is by no means the same as that of a private company. He is certainly aware that the US has for a long time been living beyond its means: Our country is a debtor nation, we’re a debtor nation. I mean, we owe trillions of dollars to people that are buying our bonds, in the form of other countries. You look at China, where we owe them $1.7 trillion, you have Japan, $1.5 trillion. We’re a debtor nation. We can’t be a debtor nation. I don’t want to be a debtor nation. I want it to be the other way. One of the reasons we’re a debtor nation, we spend so much on the military, but the military isn’t for us. The military is to be policeman for other countries. And to watch over other countries. And there comes a point that, and many of

Understanding US strategy   137 these countries are tremendously rich countries. Not powerful countries, but – in some cases they are powerful – but rich countries.91 It is only thanks to the special status of the US dollar as the main international currency that the US has been able to survive, so far. Without the US dollar, the US would be in a situation of bankruptcy, not basically different from that of Greece, except that it would have a devastating effect on the global economy. In another remarkable interview, Trump spoke about how he sees the situation in the Middle East.92 He compared the engagement of the US in Syria, and more generally in the Middle East and Afghanistan, with the situation of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989, and said that because of that war ‘they went bankrupt’. Of course, there are other reasons explaining the collapse of the Soviet Union. But overspending on the military is certainly one of them. Moreover, Trump says that he is very aware of the fact that the US has financed ‘rebels’ without knowing who they are. Maybe he is wrong. The US Defense and State Departments and the CIA very likely knew who they were supporting and financing. But it remains that Trump considers that it is unwise to support that type of people, in fact terrorists. Moreover, the fact that Trump met Democratic Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard, one of the most severe critics of US foreign policy, especially on Syria, is an additional indicator that he will not necessarily follow the policy of his predecessor.93 This suggests that Trump may be much less prone to organize regime change, as previous administrations have done on a large scale.94 But we have to wait until he deals with the Syrian civil war and with the new policy initiated by one of the most reliable US allies, the Philippines, since the very controversial President Rodrigo Duterte has manifested the will to abandon the alliance with the US and to cooperate instead with China. As Duterte has a very critical record for not respecting human rights in his fight against drug trafficking, there is an ideal situation for favouring a regime change in the Philippines. Fifth, Trump also criticized international trade and investment treaties, naming the examples of the NAFTA (North Amer­ican Free Trade Area) and the TPP (Trans-­Pacific Partnership). These treaties are at the origin of massive relocations of US factories in developing countries where Amer­ican capital has been associated with cheap labour, and where it is possible to organize production without being bothered by independent trade unions and by strict labour and environmental regulations. Moreover, most of these products are then imported by the US. This has generated higher profits than those that would have been obtained at home, should the production have remained in the US. The consequence has been the destruction of production units and jobs.95 These phenomena are at the origins of massive unemployment (which unfortunately is masked by the official statistics), even if other factors have played a role, such as the development of new technologies. Trump has threatened the companies that are engaged in these activities with putting a 30 per cent tax on their import to the US of goods they have produced abroad. Trump has been accused of abandoning free trade in favour of protectionism, considered as the main drive

138   Understanding US strategy for the improvement of the wealth of all countries, developed and developing, both in terms of GDP and per capita income. This critique is certainly unfounded and not very honest. It opposes two completely different policies, treated as ‘Weberian ideal types’, i.e. two ideal theoretical constructs that do not represent reality, but should be used as an epistemic device to help the researcher to understand reality. Every student of international relations knows that no country implements free trade completely, but resorts to protectionist measures whenever it considers that its national economy and security are threatened by foreign economic powers. This is what Joseph Stiglitz has named ‘free trade fundamentalism’.96 Indeed, since the end of the Second World War, under pressure by the West under the leadership of the US, there has been a process of deregulation (neoliberals prefer to call it liberalization of international trade, putting a positive emphasis on the process that leads to job destruction), especially through the GATT and its successor, the WTO, the policies imposed upon developing countries by the ‘Washington consensus’, and finally those imposed by the New Public Management upon developed countries.97 More recently, the trade fundamentalists have tried to further expand the liberalization trend by adding the deregulation of services. As this concerns both publicly and privately owned services (especially financial services), this is very likely to lead to the privatization of public services.98 These are the objectives of the new mega-­treaties (TTIP and TPP): by deregulating financial markets they will make the export of capital completely free. Moreover, they allow a foreign company to sue the government of the country in which it invests, should this country implement or consider implementing laws and regulations that reduce, or may reduce in the future, the profits of that company. In this case, the investor company can sue the foreign government before private courts, whose decisions are implemented without the possibility of appeal. These treaties were conceived by the Obama administration to contain Russia and China. Trump has very well understood that they could be used against the US. In fact, this type of treaty is generally in favour of the most developed countries (such as the US, Japan and EU member states). My guess is that Trump has very well understood that the time when the West could impose its own way to organize the global economy is coming to an end with the emergence of China and the re-­emergence of Russia, but also of other countries with regional ambitions, such as Iran.99 Sixth, in spite of a long-­standing aggressive US policy towards North Korea, on 1 May [2017] Trump told Bloomberg News: ‘If it would be appropriate for me to meet with [Kim Jong-­un], I would absolutely; I would be honoured to do it’. There is no telling whether this was serious, or just another Trump attempt to grab headlines. But whatever else he might be, he is unquestionably a maverick, the first president since 1945 not beholden to the Beltway. Maybe he can sit down with Mr Kim and save the planet.100 Finally, Trump has clearly identified China as the US’s major competitor and threat. If we consider this statement together with his will to negotiate with

Understanding US strategy   139 Russia, we have here an additional proof that the new president is not totally without a clear vision (as too many of his opponents tend to think) of the present international situation and the developments it is likely to undergo. As we have seen in Chapter­ 3, China is rapidly catching up with the US in every domain, and given its size in terms of population and GDP, it is clearly the only country that can catch up with and even surpass the US in the not too distant future. Moreover, the mistake made by the Obama administration in attacking Russia in Eastern Europe, thus jeopardizing its understandable need to secure its border with the EU and the NATO military alliance, has favoured the establishment and the development of the Russia–China partnership that risks weakening, and in fact has already considerably weakened, the US strategy to contain Russia and China. If one adds to this the non-­ratification of the TPP by the US, the disaster of the Obama strategy is even more evident. Also, it is possible that Trump will try to attract Russia to the West so that it ceases its cooperation with China. Given the old rivalry between China and Russia, this is not at all impossible. Nevertheless, to attract Russia after several decades of ostracism and demonization of its leader, Trump will need a lot of persuasion (at home and abroad) to succeed, should he follow this strategy. Russia has not enough power to impose its will on its own. But cooperating with either one of the two superpowers, Russia could constitute a formidable partnership that may very well shape the structure of the emerging multipolar world to the advantage of the US–EU–­ Russia alliance. Surely, Trump will need more than ‘soft power’ to succeed, as China will not stand aside and watch this ‘seduction policy’. Let us summarize the possible changes in US foreign policy suggested by Donald Trump during the presidential campaign: negotiate with Russia, reform NATO, not necessarily defend allies, reducing defence commitments abroad (as well as expenditure on conventional armaments), abandon or renegotiate multilateral trade and investment agreements, and face China as the major US competitor. Apart from the last point, all the others are contrary to the traditional US foreign policy implemented since 1945 by Democratic and Republican presidents and supported by the establishment and, to a large extent, by the neoconservatives, despite Kagan’s criticism explained above. In fact, Trump’s slogan ‘America First’ does not preclude the use of force, should the president consider that US national interests are at stake. Nor that he will able to refrain from military interventions abroad, should the establishment (i.e. the alliance mentioned above between business, military, politics, mainstream think tanks and media circles) put such pressure on him that he will be compelled to act in order not to run the risk of losing the majority in Congress and/or even the popular support that put him in the White House. This could be done by a combination of pressures coming from both Republican and Democrat members of the US Congress, from the so-­called ‘intelligence community’ (more than a dozen agencies, including the CIA), from mainstream think tanks and the media. The latter can play an important role in ‘informing’ the US citizens about the situation that, according to them, requires a military intervention. This is important as the US political system implies partial national elections every two

140   Understanding US strategy years, which may change the majority within the US Congress to the disadvantage of the president, as has happened on many occasions during US history. If we remember Perry Anderson’s statement about the ‘the provincialism of an electorate with minimal knowledge of the outside world’, this possibility is far from being unthinkable, when we know the ability of the mainstream media to manipulate information. Moreover, the domestic policies the new president plans to implement could very well constitute some additional obstacles, in particular the contradiction between, on the one hand, his stated goal to massively invest in infrastructure to boost employment and to invest in nuclear power to strengthen the military, and on the other hand his desire to cut taxes.101 This may lead to an increase of the public debt and to reductions in public spending in social policies, which would harm the important part of the US electorate that put Trump in the White House. This may also lead to a change in the majority within the US Congress. But as long as the US dollar keeps its privileged international position, increasing the debt should not be impossible … at least in the short and medium terms. Also, we cannot presume that Trump will not intervene in the world to protect its allies, nor that he is going to dismantle the military bases abroad, certainly not the most important ones in Europe and the Far East. And indeed, Trump announced a substantial investment in military technology and nuclear power.102 This is the type of weapon with which the US still has an advance on China and even on Russia. Even if China and Russia are likely to catch up with the US, this is the type of weapon that can be used as a deterrent in international relations, as was the case during the Cold War. So, investing in nuclear power and less in traditional military equipment is apparently a rational decision in the context of serious competition (if not conflict) with Russia and China. Nevertheless, the total budget covering all the dimensions of national security that Trump has announced goes well above the Pentagon budget, and is so huge that it will certainly pose some serious problems as it will contribute to an increase of the overall public debt and to a reduction of federal expenditures for social security, education and renewable sources of energy.103 In fact, at the time of writing (end of August 2017), under Trump’s presidency the US has launched two massive military attacks (mainly by air raids) on Syria. The first was on a huge dam located in the small town of Tabqa, some 40 kilometres east of the ISIS stronghold in Syria, Raqqa. The dam, 60 metres high and more than four kilometres long, was built by Syria to regulate the Euphrates river, and is used to irrigate and supply electricity to a vast region. It seems that the attack damaged the technical device that allows the opening of the dam to be controlled, and it consequently remains closed. The risk is that the dam may collapse under the pressure of the water and devastate the whole region. It seems that, for the sake of defeating ISIS as soon as possible, the US has not considered such a possibility, which would hurt (i.e. kill and displace) a large number of civilians, thus adding to the suffering of the Syrian people.104 The second attack was launched on 4 April 2017 on a Syrian military base as a retribution for the alleged chemical gas attack by the Syrian government on the

Understanding US strategy   141 town of Khan Sheikhun, in the southern province of Idlib. The rapidity with which the US establishment concluded that Syria was responsible (eventually with the support of Russia) is not surprising, as it has already been the case in the past, for example before the second Iraq War; the Iraqi invasion was justified by producing faked documents attesting to the existence of weapons of mass destruction. Mainstream media have been very quick to uncritically accept and diffuse the affirmations of the ‘US intelligence community’ that accused Syria and Russia without providing indisputable evidence.105 It is also important to note that these military actions have been decided by President Trump unilaterally, without approval by the UN and without any form of consultation of US allies, and not even of the US Congress.106 The consequence has been a serious deterioration of the relationships between Russia and the US, and Trump vehemently criticized the Syrian president. Nevertheless, the following day Trump reaffirmed his will to cooperate with Russia. This episode suggests that Trump’s decisions depend on how he evaluates the threat all over the world where he considers that some important US national interests are at stake, on how he evaluates the domestic support he can obtain by taking those decisions, and on how the establishment succeeds in limiting his freedom. This way of seeing the dynamic of Trump’s decisions has been confirmed by another, more recent episode.107 After the media announced Trump’s decision to discontinue the CIA programme in support of the ‘Syrian moderate rebels’, the mainstream media interpreted this as a ‘gift to Putin’. This happened in the midst of ongoing investigations into possible collusion between Russia and Trump’s team. It is therefore not surprising that a few days later a large majority, comprising both Democrats and Republicans, passed a law that in fact not only denies the president the possibility to eventually reduce or even discontinue sanctions on Russia, Iran and North Korea without Congress approval, but may well impel him to place new sanctions on these countries. This is clearly a quasi-­unanimous decision (Senate 92–8, House 419–3) taken by the US Congress with no consultation with US allies within NATO, which shows once again with what arrogance the US Congress considers the European members of NATO as vassals and not as allies. This decision also shows that the establishment’s opposition to Trump is determined not by his unusual personality, nor by his destructive social and environmental policies, but by some of the policies that are at odds with the interest of the establishment, represented, in this episode, by a large majority of congressmen and women of both parties. Moreover, this episode also shows that the US establishment is not ready to take stock of the changes in the international system that make it difficult for the US to continue to behave as if it were still the sole superpower. After this decision was made public, ‘Russia announced that the Amer­ican diplomatic mission in Russia must reduce its staff by 755 employees’.108 Moreover, this decision was taken unilaterally in spite of warnings from member states of the EU.109 Whereas the US, far away from Europe, can easily consider relations with Russia as a kind of strategic video-­game, for Europe sanctions against a neighbour such as Russia cannot go on forever, and a diplomatic solution should be found. Is the

142   Understanding US strategy US ready to be part of the negotiations or should the Europeans talk directly with the US mortal enemy, Russia? Finally, as the US decision also targets Iran (another of the US’s long-­standing mortal enemies), this runs the risk for the US of seeing the already ongoing cooperation between Russia, China and Iran further developing. Even if Trump has clearly taken sides against Iran in favour of Saudi Arabia (which has not been criticized by the US establishment, in spite of the non-­democratic nature of that country), this ‘alliance’ does not seem to be able to counterbalance a China–Russia–Iran partnership, to which other countries may be willing to adhere. No matter what reasons explaining the incertitude and changes in Trump’s foreign policy (either pressure from the establishment or his own evaluation of the situation), nor those explaining the mix of ‘separateness from the corrupt and failed world’ and ‘regenerative intervention’ to save the world,110 the policies President Trump has declared himself willing to implement, and the decisions already taken, suggest that he will probably become the first Amer­ican president who will have the difficult task of leading his country through the labyrinths of the new multipolar world. It is always difficult to master a changing environment, and to adapt to it, especially when one has been used to acting within the relatively stable post-­Second World War environment in which he thinks he has found the best way to act, i.e. to safeguard the interests of his country. What is astonishing about the way the Amer­ican establishment has reacted to the foreign policy statements of the new president is that it has not realized (yet, I hope) that the world has changed, not since the beginning of the third millennium, but well before. The uncritical way with which the establishment supported its candidate (Hillary Clinton) and the hysterical way in which it reacted, and is still reacting today, to the election of the candidate it did not want show that it is not ready yet to accept the reorientation of US foreign policy within the new international context.111 Because of not having listened to the ‘silent transformations’ that were in progress already by the end of the Cold War, the establishment has not been able to adapt its way of thinking and doing. The acceptance of US leadership by all the major powers had given the illusion that it was because of its cultural attractiveness that the US was able to make other people and countries agree, almost naturally, to comply with its national interests. Moreover, the US establishment came to consider the latter as an ‘indispensable’ component of the interests of the international system, namely stability, security and peace.112 Unfortunately, the US establishment behaved as if the faith it had in its culture (liberal democracy and capitalism in the form of market fundamentalisms) was not strong enough to avoid the use (more often than necessary) of its economic and military resources whenever it had failed to impose its will by persuasion and by cultural means. Paradoxically, the faith in the superiority of its ideology has led the US establishment to implement some unfriendly and/or violent activities, such as spying on both enemies and allies, financing opposition movements in other countries, organizing numerous regime changes and using double standards to support friends and criticize enemies for the same type of behaviour.

Understanding US strategy   143 This explains why the most prominent representatives of the US establishment, when they have been entrusted with the highest responsibilities at the apex of the political system (e.g. Bill and Hillary Clinton, the two Bushes, Obama and the people around them), have committed the mistakes we know. Not only have they devastated large areas of the world (with the deaths of thousands of civilians and massive movements of refugees), but they have also damaged the image and reputation (attractiveness) of some of the most positive features of the Western ideology. The case of the US shows that powerful people and countries often have the desire to be loved and feared at the same time, and how difficult it is to achieve these two objectives simultaneously. Moreover, it is not by following the suggestions put forward by the neoconservatives (of all boards) that the new president will be able to safeguard the interests of the Amer­ican people and sustain a peaceful development of the planet. This is not to say that Trump will succeed, especially if he goes back to the megalomania of the ‘manifest destiny’, the arrogance and unilateralism of the ‘indispensable nation’ and the illusion of the ‘Amer­ican end of history’. In spite of the recent military interventions in Syria, by his reaffirmed will to cooperate with Russia, at least he gives the impression that he has understood a couple of important things about the new world: the US can no longer act as if it were the sole superpower, and behave as if its values and national interests coincide perfectly with the values and interests of other people and other nations. Very likely, the ‘new end of history’, if it ever occurs, will be written by several authors, working together. As they come from different historical and ideological frameworks, the ‘new end of history’ is likely to be quite different from that of the Founding Fathers or that of the neoliberal and neoconservative ideologues.113

US foreign policy and geopolitical thinking Before we analyse the implementation of US strategy towards China in the last part of this chapter, it is necessary to briefly present the major contributions of the geopolitical theories to the purpose of this book, i.e. the understanding of Amer­ican and Chinese foreign policies.114 This intellectual domain, part of the more general field of international relations, has produced a considerable volume of interesting theories and practical advocacies that it is impossible to summarize in the context of this book, without the risk of committing some regrettable omissions. Our purpose here is limited to the importance given to geography by the different schools that have developed inside the vast production of geopolitical thinking. Traditionally, geopolitics attributed an important, if not decisive, impact of geographical conditions upon the national character of states, their history and institutions, and especially their politico-­strategic relations. However, some authors put forward the idea that geography is no longer important as distances have been reduced, or even practically nullified: in the economic domain by the rapidity of transportation and in the military art of war by the development of ballistic intercontinental missiles.115 In other words, these developments have broken the causal link between physical geography and political geography.

144   Understanding US strategy Nevertheless, after 1945, British and Amer­ican authors have re-­examined and in fact reinvented the discipline, taking into consideration the changes that emerged after the end of the Second World War, while keeping geography as the more important factor determining the relations between states. This gives the discipline a remarkable coherence, despite the emergence of different schools.116 There is another way to sustain that geography is no longer important after the end of the Cold War, i.e. to maintain with Francis Fukuyama that we have arrived at the end of history. The end of the competition between liberalism and communism with the victory of the former means that liberal democracy and capitalism will expand from the West to the rest of the world, no matter the distances and socio-­economic differences. The victory of one of the two competing ideologies gives birth to the ‘global uniformized village’, ‘governed in similar forms, and by similar laws’, as in the dream of Thomas Jefferson. Nevertheless, many influential authors and policy advisers, such as Edward Luttwak, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, consider that geography retains, at the beginning of the twenty-­first century, a considerable power for explaining competition in foreign policies.117 We have also seen that, contrary to those who proclaimed the end of history, some policy advisers, such as the neoconservative Robert Kagan, have come to the conclusion that history did not end with the defeat of Soviet Russia.118 The emergence of China and the re-­emergence of Russia, the difficulties in managing the instability of the Middle East, control of the regional ambitions of Iran, Turkey and North Korea, maintenance of unity within the NATO alliance, the difficulties in limiting the expansion of the Chinese economy abroad (Latin America, Africa, Asia), maintenance of the US dollar as the most important reserve currency, avoiding the emergence of new international organizations and/or the reforms of the existing ones (such as the AIIB and the IMF ), all these difficulties in keeping the status of the sole world power have forced neoconservatives, and more largely the US establishment, to postpone the end of history and to take again into consideration the impact of geography on foreign policy. The stated goal is clearly to discover the best ways to lead (again) the world towards the end of history, as Kagan has sustained. This is one of the most important meanings of the neoconservative project.119 It is interesting to note that Kagan’s position is not fundamentally different from that of the author of one of the most assertive US foreign policy proposals for the twenty-­first century, Zbigniew Brzezinski. In an article published recently by the influential The Amer­ican Interest, Brzezinski recognizes that the US ‘is no longer the globally imperial power’, but he immediately adds (in the subtitle of the article) that the US ‘needs to take the lead in realigning the global architectures’. All the other powers must support the US (the European countries), or play a regional role on condition that it accepts the US way of defining it (Russia), or cooperate with the US (China) who should ‘become America’s principal partner in containing global chaos of the sort that is spreading outward from the Middle East’. Why would China be willing to play this role? Although Brzezinski recognizes that China will become ‘America’s eventual coequal and likely rival; … for the time being

Understanding US strategy   145 it is careful not to pose an outright challenge to America [because] the United States are still the world’s politically, economically and military most powerful entity’.120 Kagan’s and Brzezinski’s foreign policy proposals also mean the ‘revenge of geography’, as Robert Kaplan has entitled one of his most interesting articles.121 That geography is still today one of the most important factors explaining international relations becomes apparent when we consider in the last part of this chapter the implementation of US policy towards China: the policy of encircling China with a number of military bases in the vicinity of its territory (in spite of the US capability to deploy intercontinental missiles and the rapidity with which the US army claims to be able to intervene in all parts of the world), and the control that the US maintains on maritime roads (under the official claim to guarantee freedom of navigation). In the final chapter of this book we will analyse China’s reactions to the US strategy: the building of a new Silk Road on both land and sea; the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative to reach Africa, the Middle East and Western Europe, thus unifying the Eurasia continent; the development of maritime and air military capacity; the investments all over the world; the bilateral trade agreements undertaken with many countries. All these strategic and tactical moves prove that geography matters. As I have suggested in Chapter­2 dealing with the analysis of power, many other factors can intervene in the strategy countries may implement to defend their national interests (no matter how they define them). The structure of power existing at a moment in time depends on all those factors, on their relationship and on the strategy the countries are willing and able to implement. Moreover, the power structure and the interactive processes that develop within it are not immutable: they change, even slowly, but surely under pressure from the ‘silent transformations’. Comparatively, geography is much more stable, hence its importance, as changes, which inevitably occur, take millions of years.

The implementation of US foreign policy towards China A very short and factual history of US expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Having in mind the historical origins of the ideology of US foreign policy and its contemporary developments, we are now going to explain how this ideology has been implemented, especially after the end of the Second World War. Let me first summarize the development of US foreign policy as described by the Office of the Historian of the Department of State.122 I will more particularly insist on Jefferson’s idea of ‘expand’, by taking events used by the Office of the Historian that have contributed to US expansion, i.e. wars, invasions, annexations, purchases, acquisitions, treaties, embargo, openings of countries, disputes and interventions. The history of the Historian mentions at least 33 such events in the title of the 212 milestones (regrouped within 19 historical periods) that summarize the history of the US foreign policy from 1750 to 2000. In the text of the 212

146   Understanding US strategy milestones, ‘war’ is mentioned 1,295 times, ‘peace’ 258.123 One may think that by taking the ‘Jeffersonian expansion’ as the guiding concept covering the US conquest of the rest of the world, one reduces US foreign policy to the less pleasant part of that history. Nevertheless, it is easy to show, by using the exact wording of the official history prepared by the Historian of the Department of State, that expansion has indeed been the guiding principle of US foreign policy. Moreover, ‘expansion’ is used five times in the title of the milestones, and quite interestingly already in the first historical period (1750–1775) for the title of the sixth milestone: ‘Proclamation line of 1763, Quebec Act of 1774 and Westward Expansion’. In fact, expansion was already taking place before the proclamation of independence as, between 1750 and 1775, the British attempted and succeeded to ‘expand’ their colonial possessions at the expense of the French, and with their colonial allies at the expense of the Indians, thus behaving as the predecessors of US expansion. If one looks, even briefly, at the official history of the US foreign policy, one is stunned and astonished by the scope, rapidity and consistency of the US expansion. Hereafter I simply start by enumerating the major events of the US expansion from 1750 and 1904 (Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine), taken word for word from the official History of the Historian of the Department of State: • • • • • •

1763: The Treaty of Paris: France gave up all its territories in mainland North America, effectively ending any foreign military threat to the British colonies there. 1763–1774: Anglo-­Amer­ican colonists began to pour over the Appalachian Mountains in search of land. 1803: The Louisiana Purchase: Louisiana purchased from France for $15 million. 1819: Acquisition of Florida ceded by Spain. 1823: Monroe Doctrine. Monroe’s administration forewarned the imperial European powers against interfering in the affairs of the newly independent Latin Amer­ican states or potential United States territories. 1830–1860: Diplomacy and Westward Expansion. During this crucial period, the US pursued a policy of expansion based on ‘manifest destiny’ [emphasis added], the ideology that Amer­icans were in fact destined to extend their nation across the continent. The United States even proved to  be willing to go to war to secure new territories. While it managed to negotiate an agreement with Great Britain to secure the Oregon territory [1846], acquiring the valuable territory south of it – including California and its important Pacific harbors – required the use of force, and, in 1845, the United States embarked on its first offensive war by invading Mexico.

The US began to turn to the Pacific for new economic opportunities, establishing a presence in China, and opening Japan and Korea to Western commercial interests.

Understanding US strategy   147 •

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1830: Indian Treaties and the Removal Act. The U.S. Government used treaties as one means to displace Indians from their tribal lands, a mechanism that was strengthened with the Removal Act of 1830. In cases where this failed, the government sometimes violated both treaties and Supreme Court rulings to facilitate the spread of European Amer­icans westward across the continent. 1839–1844: The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War; the Treaty of Wangxia was the first formal treaty signed between the United States and China in 1844. It served as an Amer­ican counterpart to the Anglo-­Chinese Treaty of Nanjing that ended the First Opium War in 1842. 1846: The Oregon Territory became a focus of those who believed that it was the United States’ obligation and right to extend its rule and liberties across the North Amer­ican continent. The Oregon Territory stretched from the Pacific coast to the Rocky Mountains, encompassing the area including present-­day Oregon, Washington, and most of British Columbia. 1845–1848: The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-­Amer­ican War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-­Hidalgo. These events brought within the control of the United States the future states of Texas, California, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Washington, and Oregon, as well as portions of what would later become Oklahoma, Colorado, Kansas, Wyoming, and Montana. United States Maritime Expansion across the Pacific during the nineteenth century.

The westward expansion of the US during the nineteenth century was not limited to North America, but rather included an ongoing push to establish a stronger US presence in and across the Pacific Ocean. This maritime expansion, driven mostly by commerce, had important implications for US foreign policy. The appeal of profits to be earned from the China trade served as the initial impetus to motivate US citizens and officials to enter the Pacific region. China was the source of some of the world’s most sought-­after commodities – tea, porcelain and silk – and Western merchants had sought access to this highly lucrative trade since at least the seventeenth century. Following US independence, US-­based merchants continued to seek opportunities in China. In February 1784, the Empress of China became the first ship to sail from the US to China, and in its wake came a steady flow of merchants in search of wealth. During the first decades of the nineteenth century, US merchants amassed sizeable fortunes that they subsequently invested in the development of their homeland. Making the journey to China and maintaining the US presence there also required a network of ports extending across the Pacific Ocean, and as such, the China trade soon drove the US to expand its presence throughout the Pacific region. Expansion across the Pacific fundamentally changed the global position of the US. •

1853–1854: The Gadsden Purchase, finalized in 1854, in which the US agreed to pay Mexico $10 million for a 29,670 square mile portion of Mexico that later became part of Arizona and New Mexico.

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1853: The United States and the Opening to Japan. The same combination of economic considerations and belief in ‘Manifest Destiny’ [emphasis added] that motivated U.S. expansion across the North Amer­ican continent also drove Amer­ican merchants and missionaries to journey across the Pacific. At the time, many Amer­icans believed that they had a special responsibility to modernize and civilize the Chinese and Japanese. 1857–1859: The Opening to China Part II: the Second Opium War, and the Treaty of Tianjin. Under the most-­favoured-nation clause contained in the existing treaties, all the foreign powers [including the US] operating in China were permitted to seek the same concessions of China that Great Britain achieved by force. 1849–1861: Territorial Expansion, Filibustering, and U.S. interest in Central America and Cuba. While U.S. Government officials attempted to acquire territorial possessions in that region, private citizens (known as ‘filibusterers’) also organized armed expeditions to various places in Mexico, Central America, and Cuba. 1866–1898: The Continued Expansion of United States Interests. Following two devastating economic recessions, U.S. foreign policy leaders focused on finding foreign markets to absorb excess goods. This renewed emphasis on exploring international business opportunities resulted in a build-­up of U.S. naval forces to protect commercial shipping and overseas interests. 1867: The Purchase of Alaska, marked the end of Russian efforts to expand trade and settlements to the Pacific coast of North America, and became an important step in the United States’ rise as a great power in the Asia-­Pacific region. 1850s: Chinese Immigration and the Chinese Exclusion Acts. 1898: Annexation of Hawaii. 1898: The Spanish-­Amer­ican War ended Spain’s colonial empire in the Western Hemisphere and secured the position of the United States as a Pacific power. [Spain] relinquished claims on Cuba, and ceded sovereignty over Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to the US. The US also annexed the independent state of Hawaii during the conflict. Thus, the war enabled the United States to establish its predominance in the Caribbean region and to pursue its strategic and economic interests in Asia. 1899–1913: Defending U.S. International Interests. Following the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-­Amer­ican War of 1898, the United States acquired overseas colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In its new status as an imperial power, the United States pursued a series of policies designed to protect Amer­ican territories and aggressively expand its international commercial interests. 1899–1902: The Philippine-­Amer­ican War. Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. President Theodore Roosevelt’s assertive approach to Latin America and the Caribbean has often been characterized as the ‘Big Stick’, and his policy came to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The Roosevelt Corollary

Understanding US strategy   149 of December 1904 stated that the United States would intervene as a last resort to ensure that other nations in the Western Hemisphere fulfilled their obligations to international creditors, and did not violate the rights of the United States or invite ‘foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of Amer­ican nations.’ As the corollary worked out in practice, the United States increasingly used military force to restore internal stability to nations in the region. So, during the nineteenth century the expansion of the US took different forms other than pure territorial conquest, typical of the beginning of the creation of the republic: it completed the conquest of today’s territory (mainly westward and southward), institutionalized Central and South America as its exclusive backyard, started the expansion in the Pacific and the development of its military resources (especially the navy), and accelerated the development of its economy, under the screen of protectionist laws. The US was then ready to make the new century the ‘Amer­ican century’. Let me now summarize the major events between the beginning of the twentieth century and the end of the Second World War. The US entered the First World War in 1917. In spite of strong support by President Woodrow Wilson, the US Senate voted against the participation of the US in the League of Nations, one of the most important outcomes of the peace conference. The US entered a period of relative isolation, but maintained its dominance over the Americas, followed the events of the interwar period in Europe, maintained its presence in the Pacific and continued to develop its economy under the protection of a very strong protectionist trade policy. After the Japanese aggression on Pearl Harbor, the US entered the Second World War. At the end of the war, the US was ready to reclaim a leading role in international affairs, by implementing a formidable mix of power resources. Taking now the elements presented in Chapter­2 for the analysis of power in the international system, let us first summarize the resources that the US possessed or could control and mobilize immediately after the end of the Second World War, for the purpose of establishing and maintaining its global leadership. This is, for me, the fundamental objective of US foreign policy, upon which all the other goals depend. It corresponds to China’s goal to reclaim world power status after the Western aggression of the nineteenth century, as I have explained in Chapter­1. For this purpose, the US has implemented several resources in the framework of a strategy that has become more and more complex to face the changes in the international system that developed after the end of the Second World War. Some may raise the question as to whether this strategy is based upon a rational analysis or is simply the implicit and conjunctural consequence of the US will to control the international system in order to protect the interests of its economy and more generally those of the US establishment. I am not interested in this question. It seems to me more important to understand the US strategy that can be discovered by using the statements by the different components of the establishment and the different types of actions implemented by the US administration.

150   Understanding US strategy In fact, based upon the goal to establish and retain world power status, the fundamental guiding principle of US strategy since the end of the Second World War is certainly the containment of potential competitors. Clearly, expansion since the end of the Second World War could not be envisaged as it was in the nineteenth century when US power expanded in the Americas, as we have seen above. At the end of the Second World War, further expansion could only have been possible by implementing different means. It is here that containment becomes a fundamental principle to orient US foreign policy. The basic reasoning that founded the US policy of containment was defined by George Kennan in a telegram sent from Moscow to the Department of State, later published in the influential Foreign Affairs.124 It is interesting to see how the Historian of the Department of State explains and appreciates the policy of containment defined by Kennan: Few in the West had experience with the communist state and even fewer understood what motivated the Soviets. One man who had first-­hand knowledge was a Foreign Service officer, George F. Kennan. In 1946, while he was Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, Kennan sent an 8,000-word telegram to the Department, the now-­famous ‘long telegram’, on the aggressive nature of Stalin’s foreign policy. Kennan, writing as ‘Mr. X,’ published an outline of his philosophy in the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs in 1947. His conclusion was that ‘the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-­term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.’ Containment provided a conceptual framework for a series of successful initiatives undertaken from 1947 to 1950 to blunt Soviet expansion.125 When one looks at the US foreign policy promoted by the US establishment since the beginning of the Cold War (when Kennan defined and explained the reasons for the containment policy) and sees the reactions to President Trump’s proposal to ‘discuss with the Russian’, one is compelled to consider that nothing has changed since then: the Russians (no matter by whom they are led, Stalin or Putin) are the enemy who aggressively try to expand … but where? And why? So, let us see what power resources the US has implemented within this strategy between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War. First, the US came out of the war with an economy practically intact, in contrast to its allies and enemies in the Second World War, the European states, Japan and the Soviet Union. The US is the most powerful economy not only in terms of GDP but also thanks to the international organizations set up at the end of the Second World War that the US dominates. During the last phases of the Second World War, several conferences with its allies (Casablanca, Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam and Bretton Woods) allowed the US to define spheres of influence and to set up the structure of the new international system based upon the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT (the predecessor of the WTO), and obtained that the US dollar be the international reserve currency in a

Understanding US strategy   151 system of fixed exchange rates based upon it. This system (i.e. the world America made) allowed the US to become one of the two major world powers, along with the Soviet Union. In this context, the extraordinary economic development of the US economy during the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth centuries (in spite of the 1930s crisis) allowed the US to promote policies of international economic liberalization supported by the organizations mentioned above. Second, the US maintains a military presence in Western Europe (supported since 1949 by the NATO military alliance) and in the Far East (especially Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines) and continues to keep the Americas under its control.126 Moreover, despite the acquisition of the atomic military power by the Soviet Union in 1949, the US has the strongest military army, especially in terms of air and naval forces. Third, the US enjoys an outstanding reputation (Nye’s ‘soft power’, see Chapter­2, pp. 36–43) as the country that won the Second World War, liberated Italy, Germany and Japan from dictatorships and saved the other countries from defeat from the latter. No matter the massive contribution of the Soviet Union, of the UK and of the European national liberation movements, the US emerged from the Second World War as the major (or even the sole) defender of freedom and democracy. Nevertheless, despite this considerable accumulation of power resources, the Cold War and the diffusion of communism in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America inevitably led the US to develop a more complex strategy to defend the interests of the US and of the West. Fourth, given the circumstances described above, the diffusion of Amer­ican values become a must, should the US choose to restrain from primarily using its economic and military resources to obtain acceptance of its international policy. For this purpose, the US establishment has set up a whole range of instruments to diffuse the values of democracy, human rights and free trade: the radio broadcaster ‘Voice of America’; the television news channel Cable News Network (CNN);127 a number of NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its subsidiaries, which ‘is a private, not-­for-profit foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world’;128 as well as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which ‘was born out of a spirit of progress, innovation and a reflection of Amer­ ican’s values, character and a fundamental belief in doing the right thing’, and whose ‘mission statement highlights two complementary and intrinsically linked goals: ending extreme poverty and promoting the development of resilient, democratic societies that are able to realize their potential’.129 Fifth, the intelligence capacity has been strengthened thanks to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the framework of the National Security Act of 1947. This Act mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the U.S. Government. The act created many of the institutions that presidents found useful when formulating and implementing foreign

152   Understanding US strategy policy, including the National Security Council (NSC). The act also established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which grew out of World War II era Office of Strategic Services and small post-­war intelligence organizations. The CIA served as the primary civilian intelligence-­gathering organization in the government. Later, the Defense Intelligence Agency became the main military intelligence body. The 1947 law also caused far-­reaching changes in the military establishment. The War Department and Navy Department merged into a single Department of Defense under the Secretary of Defense, who also directed the newly-­created Department of the Air Force. However, each of the three branches maintained their own service secretaries.130 Since then, the CIA has been used to organize regime change, to interfere in the electoral process to support the parties favourable to Western and US interests, to train allies’ and partners’ armed forces, and even to set up ‘secret armies’ in Europe to fight the threat of communism.131 The only obstacle to the US becoming the world hegemon was the presence of one of its allies in the Second World War, the Soviet Union, especially after 1949 when it exploded its first atomic bomb. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was never able to develop a network of alliances, partnerships and territorial presence (military and/or economic) in other countries, capable of matching the US power, in spite of its efforts to diffuse and support communism all over the world. After the end of the Second World War, an ideological, economic and military conflict, the Cold War, broke out between the Soviet Union and the West led by the US. Very quickly, in 1948 the US set up the Marshall Plan to help the European states to recover from the damage of the Second World War and to constitute a strong opposition to the Soviet Union, and in 1949 created, with several Western European countries and Canada, a military organization (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO) to face the potential threat from the Soviet Union. Also, the US engaged in a series of regional wars in different parts of the world (especially in Asia) to prevent the diffusion of communism, namely the Korean War (1950–1953) and the Vietnam War (1964–1973), with additional military interventions in Laos and Cambodia, as well as numerous interferences in other countries through ‘regime change’ activities and other covert military activities to support national forces favourable to the West and US interests.132 Finally, at the beginning of the 1990s the Soviet Union collapsed and the way was then clear for the US to become the sole superpower.133 Then follows the years of ‘great expectations’: the US and its European allies started an aggressive policy towards Russia by expanding NATO to Eastern Europe and admitting several Eastern European countries into the EU.134 Moreover, military interventions in Yugoslavia allowed the US to establish a military base in Kosovo, in addition to the many other military bases established by the US after the Second World War in Europe and everywhere else. This aggressive policy had the result (wanted or unwanted) of humiliating the defeated enemy, and of rejecting its understandable needs to ensure security at its borders, in spite of

Understanding US strategy   153 many moves by Russian leaders (and especially Vladimir Putin) to associate Russia with the management of European security. Russia’s only international policy choice would have been to accept the dominance of the West and to integrate into the international world that the US made. This short-­sighted policy on the part of the US was based upon the belief that the world that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union was there to stay forever. For some observers of international politics this was the beginning of Cold War II, targeting Russia and China with the aim of establishing a unipolar world dominated by the US and its allies: the ‘expansion’ of US power would by then have realized Thomas Jefferson’s dream beyond any optimistic expectations. Nevertheless, the unipolar world that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union did not last long. Powerful long-­term forces (the ‘silent transformations’) had been at work for a long time and prepared the emergence of a multipolar world, with China the most serious competitor of the US, and Russia coming back to the international scene under the presidency of Putin. We now have to see through what kind of strategy the US has tried to maintain its global leadership to ‘contain’ the rise of China. US strategy towards China in the twenty-­first century We have seen above that the interest of the US in the Far East had started already in the nineteenth century. But then, the goal was mainly motivated towards the safeguarding of Amer­ican economic interests by joining the European powers in signing unequal treaties with China, thereby obtaining the same economic advantages, thanks to the application of the most favoured nation principle (nineteenth century). It is true that the opening up of Japan (1853) and the conquest of the Philippines (1902) were the beginning of a more aggressive policy in the Far East. Nevertheless, only recently, when it became clear that the development of China’s economy occurred not only in low-­value-added goods, but also in high-­ tech products, and, more worrying, in the military domain, the threat from the Soviet Union, which vanished (or should have vanished) at the beginning of the  1990s, was soon replaced by the ‘China threat’ and by the forecast of the ‘coming collapse of China’ … which did not come. At the turn of the millennium, several books were published in the US showing a growing worry about the rise of China. It was the time when the ‘China threat’ became a frequent reference point in US mainstream media and scholarly works. At the same time, to comfort the US public and the establishment, several books stressed the fragility of China’s development and the possible (or even inevitable) collapse of China became a frequent leitmotif.135 Later, several books published by renowned Western sinologists provided a more in-­ depth analysis, but basically from the same perspective. For example, a book with a title bearing the worrying question, Will China Dominate the XXI Century?, ends with a final chapter entitled ‘China will not dominate the XXI century’.136 Some other books have more descriptive titles: The New Chinese Empire and What It Means for the United States, The Chinese Century: The

154   Understanding US strategy Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global Economy, the Balance of Power, and Your Job, or, even more, worrying, In the Jaws of the Dragon: America’s Fate in the Coming Era of Chinese Dominance.137 While it could be possible to sustain this demonstration by quoting the numerous articles and reports published by the most influential Amer­ican think tanks,138 here it suffices to quote a passage of a report from the very influential Council on Foreign Relations: To deal with Xi’s more assertive foreign and defense policies, the United States should devise a grand strategy for Asia at least as coherent and coordinated as the one that has been formulated in Beijing, which appears designed to maximize China’s power while challenging the long-­standing role of the United States in the region. What we have in mind is not containment, which in any case is a U.S.–Soviet concept that has no relevant application in East Asia today. Instead, the United States should use a variety of instruments of statecraft to incentivize China to commit to a rule-­ based order but impose costs that are in excess of the gains Beijing would reap if it fails to do so. This Amer­ican grand strategy should account for the fact that the decades-­long endeavor to integrate China into the global order has not significantly tempered China’s strategic objective to become the most powerful and influential country in Asia. This being the case, the United States needs a long-­term approach that demonstrates U.S. internal strength, external resolve, and steadiness of policy.139 The reason is clear: China is challenging ‘the long-­standing role of the United States in the region’ and, we have to add, elsewhere in the world. Let us note that the denial of ‘not having containment in mind’ is not credible, given the content of this Council’s report and the fact that it was evident that, at the same time, the US was implementing a containment policy towards Russia (a new Cold War) supported by other Council reports.140 One may think that such assertive policy analysis and proposals are the fact of independent think tanks and do not correspond to the official US foreign policy choices. Nevertheless, these think tanks are among the most influential sources of policy proposals in the US, and many of their members are, or have been, high officials and/or advisers of the US government. Moreover, if one looks at the speeches of the last US president, we can see some remarkable similarities. It is also significant that President Obama felt the need to reassure his fellow citizens as well as the US military hierarchy and soldiers about the capacity of the US to retain its leading role in the world. Here follows a selection of quotations from some of the most important Obama speeches: •

President Obama, State of the Union Address, 2016: I told you earlier all the talk of America’s economic decline is political hot air. Well, so is all the rhetoric you hear about our enemies getting

Understanding US strategy   155 stronger and America getting weaker. Let me tell you something. The United States of America is the most powerful nation on Earth. Period. (Applause.) Period. It’s not even close. It’s not even close. (Applause.) It’s not even close. We spend more on our military than the next eight nations combined. Our troops are the finest fighting force in the history of the world. (Applause.) No nation attacks us directly, or our allies, because they know that’s the path to ruin. Surveys show our standing around the world is higher than when I was elected to this office, and when it comes to every important international issue, people of the world do not look to Beijing or Moscow to lead – they call us. (Applause.)141 •

President Obama, State of the Union address, 2016: That’s how we forged a Trans-­Pacific Partnership to open markets, and protect workers and the environment, and advance Amer­ican leadership in Asia. It cuts 18,000 taxes on products made in America, which will then support more good jobs here in America. With TPP, China does not set the rules in that region; we do. You want to show our strength in this new century? Approve this agreement. Give us the tools to enforce it. It’s the right thing to do. (Applause.)142

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Remarks by the President Obama in Commencement Address to the US Air Force Academy, 2016: Our standing in the world is higher. I see it in my travels from Havana to Berlin to Ho Chi Minh City – where huge crowds of Vietnamese lined the streets, some waving Amer­ican flags. So, make no mistake, the United States is better positioned to lead in the XXI century than any other nation. And here’s another fact: Our military is, by a mile, the strongest in the world. (Applause.) Yes, after two major ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, we’re drawing down the size of our armed forces, which is natural and necessary. And we have to keep improving readiness and modernizing our force. But it is undeniable – our military is the most capable fighting force on the planet. It’s not close.143

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Remarks by the President of the United States at the Military Academy Commencement Ceremony, US Military Academy–West Point, 2014: In fact, by most measures, America has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world. Those who argue otherwise – who suggest that America is in decline, or has seen its global leadership slip away – are either misreading history or engaged in partisan politics. Think about it. Our military has no peer. The odds of a direct threat against us by any nation are low and do not come close to the dangers we faced during the Cold War. Meanwhile, our economy remains the most dynamic on

156   Understanding US strategy Earth; our businesses the most innovative. Each year, we grow more energy independent. From Europe to Asia, we are the hub of alliances unrivalled in the history of nations. America continues to attract striving immigrants. The values of our founding inspire leaders in parliaments and new movements in public squares around the globe. And when a typhoon hits the Philippines, or schoolgirls are kidnapped in Nigeria, or masked men occupy a building in Ukraine, it is America that the world looks to for help. (Applause.) So, the United States is and remains the one indispensable nation. That has been true for the century passed and it will be true for the century to come.144 •

President Obama commencement speech at the US Air Force Academy, 2012: As recently as the 1980s with the rise of Japan and the Asian tigers, there were those who said we had lost our economic edge. But we retooled. We invested in new technologies. We launched an Information Revolution that changed the world.    After all this, you would think folks understand a basic truth – never bet against the United States of America. (Applause.) And one of the reasons is that the United States has been, and will always be, the one indispensable nation in world affairs. It’s one of the many examples of why America is exceptional. It’s why I firmly believe that if we rise to this moment in history, if we meet our responsibilities, then – just like the XX century – the XXI century will be another great Amer­ican Century. That’s the future I see. That’s the future you can build. (Applause.)145

In fact, it appears that the main theme that summarizes Amer­ican reactions to China’s rise is the fear of losing the capacity to lead the world, to lose the status of sole world superpower that sets the rules of the international system, i.e. of the ‘world America made’, according to Robert Kagan’s famous statement.146 Even Brzezinski, while he recognizes that the US ‘is no longer the globally imperial power’, affirms that the US ‘needs to take the lead in realigning the global architectures’.147 Given these fundamental policy goals, shared by all the components of the US establishment, it is understandable that the election of Donald Trump has provoked a remarkable hysteria that cannot be explained only (or, more likely, mainly) by the domestic policies announced by candidate Trump, some of which had already been implemented by President Trump at the time of writing (end of August 2017), nor by his being a womanizer, a racist and an inexperienced politician. It seems to me that what worries the US establishment more are the international policy changes announced by Trump. Otherwise one cannot understand the establishment’s hysteria about the alleged contacts Trump and his associates may have had with Russia. I remember that in 1987 I met Gary Hart in Geneva, where he gave a conference sponsored by the Geneva US Democratic Party. Hart was on his way to Moscow to meet the Russian officials when the communists were still in charge of the Kremlin. Hart was the front-­runner for the 1988

Understanding US strategy   157 ­ emocratic presidential nomination. A few months later he dropped out of the D presidential race not because of that Moscow trip but over allegations of an extramarital affair.148 Does this mean that we have to understand that the US establishment considers Putin as a more formidable enemy than his communist predecessors? The idea of finding an agreement with Russia is certainly the most brilliant move announced by a US president since the end of the Cold War. In fact, we must not forget that Russia and China may cooperate (and are in fact already cooperating) and contest the leading role of the US. An agreement with Russia may be the only way to break the de facto alliance, or partnership, between Russia and China, which could become the dominant actor in Asia and beyond. So, while Russia remains today a serious competitor, the US has to face an even more formidable competitor: China. These are not new ideas, as the experts in geopolitics have already put forward for a long time. Let us take the analysis of Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the most influential contemporary Amer­ican geopolitical experts. In his 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard: Amer­ican Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Brzezinski develops an in-­depth analysis of the strategy the US should implement in order to maintain its leading role in the world: the future of US leadership will be decided in Asia.149 In summary: Eurasia is the world’s axial supercontinent. A power that dominated Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world’s three most economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia. A glance at the map also suggests that a country dominant in Eurasia would almost automatically control the Middle East and Africa. [Moreover,] what happens with the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America’s global primacy and historical legacy. […] In the short run, United States should consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism on the map of Eurasia. This strategy will put a premium on political maneuvering and diplomatic manipulation, preventing the emergence of a hostile coalition that could challenge America’s primacy […] [Finally,] by the medium term, the foregoing lead to the emergence of strategically compatible partners which, prompted by Amer­ican leadership, might shape a more cooperative trans-­Eurasian security system. In the long run, the foregoing could become the global core of genuinely shared political responsibility.150 Brzezinski is very clear in considering that Russia should be integrated into a larger network of European cooperation. As for China, he considers that much will depend on its relationships with the US: More specifically, the medium-­term goal requires fostering genuine partnerships with a more united and politically defined Europe, a regionally preeminent China, a post-­imperial and Europe-­oriented Russia, and a democratic India. But it will be success or failure in forging broader strategic relationships with Europe and China that shapes Russia’s future role and determines Eurasia’s central power equation.151

158   Understanding US strategy But for Brzezinski, as for Kagan, the fundamental goal of US foreign policy remains the same: to keep US dominance and, under the leadership of the US, integrate the other countries into the liberal and capitalist order ‘that America made’. The analyses presented above lead us to conclude that the fundamental goal of US foreign policy is to maintain global dominance by implementing the fundamental principle guiding its foreign policy, i.e. a strategy of containment of potential competitors all over the world. The distribution and development of power resources at the turn of the millennium, especially in Asia, should have led the US to define a new strategy. However, even the majority of books published recently by mainstream think tanks and university professors, just before or at the beginning of the Trump presidency, remains faithful to the idea that the international liberal order America made should be preserved by containing potential competitors, especially China, whose goal is to change the rules of the system and to challenge the leadership of the US. Therefore, the US should manoeuvre so that China will not dominate the twenty-­first century. The only policy option for China and other potential competitors is to integrate the liberal world by adopting its major characteristics, i.e. liberal democracy and capitalism. Or, should they prefer to keep some of their non-­liberal features at home, they will have to integrate into the liberal international order and behave according to the rules America made.152 The reader who is interested in more radical criticisms towards the US foreign policy should consult alternative websites, such as Tom­ Dispatch, which defines itself as ‘a regular antidote to mainstream media’, with contributions from reliable authors and serious investigative journalists such as Tom Engelhardt, David Vine, Nick Turse and many others.153 The ‘mainstream reader’ may be horrified by these references, but I trust the attentive reader to be critical towards alternative websites, as well as towards the mainstream media and authors. Professor emeritus John W. Dower in the preface of his 2017 book pays a tribute to ‘the many investigative reporters who have written perceptively on the multiple tragic faces of violence of our post-­World War II world’, and quotes ‘the invaluable website TomDispatch’.154 What, then, are the resources that the US government has developed and implemented, and is still developing and implementing today, to contain China’s rise? The most important elements of the containment strategy were developed by President Obama through two mega treaties: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-­Pacific Partnership (TPP), the latter being an important part of his ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy.155 The aim of the TTIP is to strengthen the containment of Russia by further integrating Europe into an Atlantic area dominated by the US and by Western multinational companies, in addition to the NATO military alliance.156 The aim of the TPP is to strengthen the containment of China by integrating the economies of 12 countries of the Pacific region into an economic area dominated by the US. These two treaties, if approved, would constitute two formidable tools for containing the rise of the two major competitors of the US.157 The project of the Transatlantic Agreement has long been supported by the Trans-­Atlantic Business Council (TABC),

Understanding US strategy   159 created in 1995 under the sponsorship of the European Commission and the US Department of Commerce. Similarly, the Trans-­Pacific Agreement is supported by multinationals, especially Amer­ican, for example, those in the pharmaceutical and tobacco industries. The objective of these treaties is to eliminate practically all the obstacles to trade and investment other than tariffs and quotas, which had been already reduced to a very low level. For this purpose, these treaties would allow multinationals to sue states before a private court if their public policies reduce not only the profits the investors would have achieved in the absence of these policies, but also the profits expected for the future. Moreover, the decisions taken by these private courts are final, i.e. not subject to appeal.158 If those two treaties were approved, they would legitimize the domination of multinationals (including those of the financial sector) over states in a vast area, and would be able to dictate these treaties’ conditions beyond its borders.159 It must be said that these treaties have been very seriously criticized by civil society organizations, ad hoc associations of citizen and academic researchers. The criticism of these treaties has been based upon research carried out on the consequences of the implementation of the North Amer­ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a similar treaty between the US, Canada and Mexico, in force since 1994, showing that the implementation of this treaty has destroyed millions of jobs in the US.160 What is feared with TPP and TTIP is that these treaties will open to the multinational companies the possibility to invest abroad and transfer national industrial activities to countries where the cost of production is lower, due to lower labour costs and to more lax health and environmental regulations, when they exist. And this is the reason why the multinationals supported these treaties. This was also a recurrent theme of Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign. In January 2017, President Trump withdrew the US from the TPP, has manifested the intention to renegotiate NAFTA and has postponed the decision on TTIP to an unknown date. This is one of the major reasons explaining the ferocious opposition from representatives of the US establishment to Trump, especially from the ‘military-­industrial-cyber-­media’ complex. Nevertheless, even if the TPP has been abandoned by the US and the TTIP has still to be approved by the US and the EU, the power resources that may be used to contain Russia and China will remain in the hands of the new president as a framework (a new pivot to Asia?) within which to structure the US strategy of containment. But, one can have doubts about the real meaning of ‘strategy’ when applied to the US. In a brilliant and stimulating article analysing US foreign policy from the perspective of ‘the grand strategy’, two Amer­ican professors start by explaining that US strategy is an illusion: In the complex and highly uncertain world of international politics, it is all but impossible to identify the ideal strategy ahead of time. […] This is not to say that U.S. foreign policy simply shifts with the winds. Indeed, the United States has acted as a liberal hegemon, more or less coherently, ever since World War II. But this is less the product of a formal grand strategy [such as the ‘pivot to Asia’] than the result of enduring structural features of

160   Understanding US strategy the international and domestic landscape: the United States’ material preponderance, the powerful corporate interests that profit from global integration, the dominance of core liberal tenets in Amer­ican political culture.161 Therefore, if one wants to understand the actual role of the US, it is more efficient to evaluate the very complex mix of resources implemented by the US presidents for maintaining the leading role of the US and containing China’s rise, instead of trying to identify the US strategy that very probably will turn out to be a list of theoretical and verbal statements. This is not to say that it is not necessary to read the assessments of the various components of the US establishment regarding the strategy that the US should implement. This analysis, which I have made in the preceding paragraphs, gives a good idea about the values and the interests the establishment wants to put into effect, as well as the means that should be implemented to realize these goals.162 US power resources are: military weapons, military bases, alliances and partnerships, defence of the US dollar as the major international currency, investments in China by US companies, control of maritime routes, intelligence, radio and television broadcasting, think tanks and NGOs promoting US values and interests, to which one may add the transfer to China of Amer­ican technologies not necessarily favourable to China and to the Chinese people. Some have considered that this last point can be included in the US strategy to contain China. However, it is difficult to provide indisputable empirical evidence that this is so. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that these technologies may in fact have negative consequences on the population concerned and, in the case of China, they may diminish the capacity of the country to efficiently resist the dominance of the US. Therefore, I do not examine this point in this chapter in relation to the US strategy, but I will briefly discuss it in the next chapter in relation to China’s strategy to reclaim world power status. In the preceding paragraphs, I have already mentioned and discussed the resources the US has developed during its long journey to the sole world superpower status. Taking the approach to power presented in Chapter­2 (Figure 2.1), let us see how the US resources are, or may be, implemented to contain China’s rise. I will add some new information whenever necessary. Military expenditures The US has been very skilful at taking advantage of its territory, protected by two vast oceans, and by investing in the education of its (white) population – two resources indispensable for developing the economy. Nevertheless, in spite of the rhetoric about soft power (see Chapter­2, pp. 33–46), there is no doubt that the most important resource the US has used to impose its will on other countries is its formidable military arsenal developed during and since the Second World War. The decisive importance of military resources in the international domain can be seen, for example, in the re-­emergence of Russia as a global actor. Given its relatively small population (about one-­third of the US) and the

Understanding US strategy   161 not very brilliant status of its economy, Russia would not have been able to re-­ emerge as a world player without its impressive nuclear power that can match the US nuclear arsenal. Russia intervened in Georgia and Ukraine, and in spite of verbal and non-­verbal reactions from the US and the EU, nothing could stop Russia and no overt military conflict emerged. This is what some have called the emergence of the ‘New Cold War, or Cold War II’. This situation is not completely dissimilar from what existed during the Cold War after 1949 when the Soviets exploded their first nuclear bomb. Before that, the US was able to flex its muscles by announcing to the world the use of their (exclusive, at that time) nuclear power on Japan. At the same time, the US made it clear to other countries that no one can foresee what another war would mean to our own cities and our own people. What we are doing to Japan now – even with the new atomic bomb – is only a small fraction of what would happen to the world in a third World War. […] the Japanese have seen what our atomic bomb can do. They can foresee what it will do in the future. The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base [sic].163 After 1949, the tone of US presidents has been more careful. And I add: luckily, as it has contributed to avoiding a nuclear war that would have ended only with losers and no victors. So, the US did not use its military power in a direct confrontation with the Soviets, which would have been technically possible, for example, during the uprisings against Soviet power in Hungary (1956) and in Czechoslovakia (1968). Nevertheless, the US engaged in several regional wars against smaller and underdeveloped states with very weak military power, as well as numerous wars by proxy.164 Paradoxically, in the spectrum of military resources going from overt warfare using conventional (even if sophisticated) weaponry to the art of covert warfare (e.g. special operations forces, to be discussed below), it appears that the most efficient has been the latter. In fact, since the end of the Second World War, the US has been unable to win a single overt conventional war. On the contrary, it has been more efficient in organizing war by proxy, selling arms to allies and partners, instructing local military and security forces and organizing regime change. In 2016, the overall number of personnel engaged in these activities is about 70,000, whereas the overt wars have seen the deployment of hundreds of thousands of soldiers. This is, of course, a debatable statement, especially if one takes into consideration that these covert wars, in addition to the overt ones, have contributed to the backlash, for example, in the form of the development of terrorism, and loss of a positive image of US culture (i.e. cultural resources, to be dealt with below). In this context, nuclear power has a special place. In fact, US nuclear military power is an efficient deterrent capable of dissuading competitors from launching an overt military attack on the US. In 2017, Russia has approximately 7,000 nuclear warheads, the US 6,800 and the other nations are far behind: France 300, China 260, UK 215, Pakistan 130, India 120, Israel 80. Only Russia compares to

162   Understanding US strategy the US, but for now it lags well behind the US with regard to other military weaponry, especially for the navy.165 Also, the decisive importance of military power explains why China has decided, from the last decades of the empire, to develop its weaponry and, under the Chinese Communist Party, all the major components of its military power: nuclear, air force, navy and ballistic missiles. Finally, despite the fact that the EU is among the first three economies in the world, with the US and China, its weight in international affairs is seldom taken seriously into consideration, unless it acts as a support to US foreign policies, as in the case of Afghanistan and, more recently, Ukraine, Syria and Libya. The reason is quite clear: the EU lacks a credible military force.166 Today, US military power is unmatched by other countries in the world. First, in 2016 the US spent $611 billion, almost three times more than China ($215 billion, rank 2). The other countries are far behind, including Russia (rank 3, $69.2 billion) and Saudi Arabia (rank 4, $63.7 billion). By taking into consideration all the expenditures for national security, we arrive at an astonishing total of $1.1 trillion.167 It is well known that China has accelerated its military expenditure, but it lags well behind the US also in terms of quality. For example, recently China launched a new carrier developed by its military industry, in addition to a carrier bought from Ukraine years ago. But the new carrier does not match the US carriers: for example, the Gerald Ford new carrier carries 90 fighters, against only 30 for the new Chinese one. And for the moment China has only two carriers and the US ten. The same conclusion may be arrived at by comparing other types of weapons, although the gap here is less important, except for nuclear power.168 Nevertheless, by reading some official or semi-­ official documents, and considering the recent decisions taken by both Obama and Trump (quoted above) to improve the US atomic capacity, it appears that the US is quite worried by the development of China’s military expenditure, should China keep increasing its military spending and improving the quality and efficacy of its weapons.169 Military bases The US military strategy is supported by an unbelievable number of military bases. In fact, not only does the US spend more money in the military than any other nation, but it has also developed an impressive number of military bases scattered all over the world. Military bases can be considered as a new way of realizing ‘Jefferson’s expansion’, with the advantage of acquiring additional resources not only for placing military weaponry in strategic locations, but also for keeping the host states under control without the burden of occupying and governing the whole country. The search for ideal locations for military bases is not new, but is a well-­known and documented fact of all the historical empires. However, the case of the US is interesting as bases were already used during the first phase of continental expansion when it was necessary to support and protect the emigrants to the Amer­ican West against the native inhabitants (the savage

Understanding US strategy   163 Indians), and to institutionalize the occupation of their territories so that they are ‘governed in similar forms, and by similar laws’, according to the, by now, familiar vision of Thomas Jefferson. As David Vine puts it: hundreds of frontier forts helped enable the westward expansion of the US, and they were built on land that was very much abroad [emphasis in the original] at the time. […] By the middle of the nineteenth century, there were sixty major forts west of the Mississippi River and 138 army posts in the western territories.170 Vine also shows that expansion overseas had already started in the first half of the nineteenth century: ‘through the mid-­nineteenth century, the US navy used temporary bases to support military operations around the globe, in Taiwan, Uruguay, Holland, Mexico, Ecuador, China, Panama, and Korea.’ And this ‘reflected and foreshadowed US aspirations to global power’. By 1844 the US opened five Chinese ports to US trade and military forces. Other places followed between 1853 and the end of the century: Okinawa, Alaska, Samoa, Pearl Harbor, Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam and Wake Island. The bases’ expansion was intensified in the twentieth century, especially after the end of the Second World War, to the point that ‘by the mid-­1960s, the US was firmly committed to more than 43 nations by treaty and agreement and had some 375 major foreign military bases and 3,000 minor military facilities’. The goal of this development was clearly to protect global US economic interests and to discourage any military aggression.171 The exact number of current military bases is difficult to evaluate, in part because of the definition of what is a base. Some bases have sophisticated military weaponry, for example those in Italy (Vicenza, Naples, Gaeta, Sigonella), Japan (Okinawa), Singapore and the Philippines, but others look more like basic infrastructures that have been built in strategic places to be developed and/or used in the future in case of necessity. In fact, small bases, officially defined as Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) and often called ‘lily pads’, can be transformed into big ones.172 After the Middle East and the Caspian Sea region witnessed a huge development of US bases, it was the turn of Africa, in the framework of US strategy to contain China’s economic expansion on this continent. In Africa, ‘where China has provided some military aid and weaponry, the US lily pads may encourage China to build lily pads of its own’. In fact, Vine thinks that the proliferation of lily pads, ‘especially those placed near China, Russia and Iran, may accelerate the militarization of large swaths of the globe, and contribute to heightening military tension’.173 Today, the overall number of US military bases can be estimated at between 650 and 900.174 In fact, the expansion of military bases is part of the US strategy to impose its leadership all over the world, which has little to do with the proclaimed goal of diffusing democracy and human rights. Many of these bases back dictators, autocrats and military regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.

164   Understanding US strategy The 45 nations or territories with little or no democratic rule represent more than half of the roughly 80 countries now hosting US bases (who often lack the power to ask their ‘guests’ to leave) […] more than 70 years after World War II and 64 years after the Korean War, there were, according to the Pentagon, 181 US ‘base sites’ in Germany, 122 in Japan, and 83 in South Korea. […] By my conservative estimate, to maintain such a level of bases and troops abroad, US taxpayers spend at least $150 billion annually – more than the budget of any government agency except the Pentagon itself.175 Compared to the US on this count, China looks quite modest, as it has only recently opened its first military basis in Djibouti. Moreover, many US military bases are scattered not far from China from West to East, and are certainly perceived as a menace by the Chinese authorities.176 These are the main bases that may be considered a menace by China: Thailand, Singapore, Guam, South Korea, Japan, Philippines, Marshall Islands, Australia. To these bases in the Pacific one must add the bases in Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, the US is trying to instal in South Korea the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense system – THAAD, officially aimed at North Korea, but in fact pointed at China. Together, these bases, supported by the US Navy in the Pacific Ocean and the China Sea, constitute an important and indispensable component of the US strategy (the ‘pivot to Asia’ announced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011) to contain and encircle China. In the final chapter, we will see how China acts to face this menace.177 Alliances and partnerships The US has further developed its military resources by implementing a vast network of military alliances and partnerships with European countries and Canada (the NATO military alliance), Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, among many others. The importance of the resources and the effective capacity of deploying them in case of necessity has been very clearly expressed by Donald Trump during the presidential campaign and confirmed during his visit to Europe and to the seat of the NATO: allies should pay what they are supposed to pay to make the alliance as efficient as possible. The same can be said for US allies in the Far East, especially Japan and South Korea. For NATO, it is important to understand the central role that this alliance represents for the US. Whereas at the beginning of the Cold War NATO was set up to face the threat of the Soviet Union, after the end of the Cold War the alliance has been used to intervene in countries that did not represent a similarly serious threat. In the case of former Yugoslavia, we can even say that the alliance has been used to dismember one of the last socialist countries to serve the interests of the US and its European allies. The results have been chaos, death and thousands of casualties, and the establishment of a US military base in Kosovo. Moreover, the alliance has been used, and is still being used, to intervene in the Middle East and elsewhere, to the point that it is not surprising if some people speak today of the

Understanding US strategy   165 internationalization of NATO. In the case of South Korea, the deployment of the THAAD system, mentioned above, which the US wants to instal in the country is another example of the will of the US to take advantage of the resources of its allies to safeguard its position as the sole superpower. The new Korean president announced at the beginning of June 2017 that he had decided to halt the deployment of THAAD. Immediately, the influential Forbes manifested its worries, should this decision lead to a definite halt of the project.179 It is, of course, understandable that the US considers North Korea as a serious threat and that China should put more pressure on its neighbour. Nevertheless, the US, who is very keen to assure its security, should understand that this may also be the policy of other countries. Now, the history of the relations between the US and other countries since the end of the Second World War should help the US leadership to understand that after the devastating bombing of North Korea between 1950 and 1953, Korean leaders (no matter who is in power) may have some doubts about the sincerity of the US government.180 Moreover, as I said above, whereas the US claims that the THAAD is directed towards North Korea (whose present leader is certainly a dictator who may not be trusted), it is also understandable that the Chinese cannot help but consider that THAAD is pointed towards its territory and people, and that they cannot envisage the reunification of Korea until the US keeps its military bases on Korean soil. Here we have another example showing that the US has not yet taken stock of the changes that have happened in the international system. The time when the sole superpower was capable of unilaterally imposing its will is over. And this necessitates a more constructive and cooperative approach to the problems of the twenty-­first century. 178

The new Obama doctrine: from overt warfare to covert warfare181 Military bases and alliances have also been an indispensable asset to the change introduced by President Obama for the use of military power. The ‘new Obama doctrine’ is quite different from the policy of his predecessor, who privileged the launching of several full-­scale regional overt wars. Obama, contrary to the dominant opinion, has been no less assertive in using military resources, but within a strategy that does not privilege overt warfare.182 As explained by Nick Turse, the ‘new Obama doctrine’ consists of six dimensions: special operations forces, drones, spies, civilian partners, cyberwarfare and proxy fighters.183 In 2016 the US elite special operations forces (such as the Navy SEALs and Army Green Berets) conducted operations in 138 countries, 70 per cent of the world total, under the responsibility of SOCOM (US Special Operations Command), an increase of 130 per cent since the end of the Bush administration. In 2016, on any given day, around 8,000 commandos are operating in more than 90 countries worldwide. In particular, special operations were conducted in China (specifically Hong Kong) and in 11 countries surrounding it: including Taiwan, Tajikistan, Nepal, India, Laos, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan.184 Moreover, since the US has become worried about China’s increasing economic

166   Understanding US strategy a­ ctivities in Africa, the US has increased the operations of its commandos on that continent. In 2016, on any given day, between 1,500 and 1,700 special operations are conducted on the African continent, placed under the Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA). Operations cover a wide range of activities: training of military and security local forces, civil military support, military information support, unconventional warfare, counter-­terrorism and drills. Overall, the goal is to develop and sustain military relationships across the continent: the 2012 SOCAFRICA strategic planning document obtained by Tom­ Dispatch, reveals that Special Operation Command Africa’s primary aim is not fostering African development governance, or military professionalization. ‘SOCAFRICA’s foremost objective is the prevention of an attack against America or Amer­ican interests,’ according to a declassified secret report.185 The analysis of the special commandos’ operations in Africa allows Turse to establish a clear link between the development of military bases and special operations, a kind of vicious circle: the development of an efficient network of military bases facilitates the location and deployment of operations, and the development of operations requires a consequent development of military bases.186 The development of these activities may lead to tensions and conflict with China, especially if the US is going to use bases and special forces to prevent China from developing its commercial activities in Africa. The control of maritime routes The US has been very keen to let it be known that it considers itself as an indispensable guarantor of freedom of navigation in the Far East and especially in the China Sea. This is certainly understandable not only for the defence of US interests, but also because China’s neighbours may be, and in fact are, worried about the increasing power and assertiveness of their big neighbour. In this case, it may be a good policy to rely on the Amer­ican Big Brother. However, the US should be aware that defending national interests, and protecting relatively small countries in the Far East, is not the exclusive preoccupation of a country thousands of miles away. Moreover, it would be naive to think that China will be satisfied with its major competitor guaranteeing freedom of navigation. The history of US foreign policy is full of examples where the US has resorted to economic blockades and regime change activities, if not overt warfare to realize its national objectives. It would be more efficient, and less provocative and pretentious, to suggest an international cooperation to guarantee freedom of navigation. Finally, the fact that the US is present in the Far East by way of an important part of its military (navy and air force), military alliances, a great number of military bases and special operations activities (dealt with above) explains, and justifies, the development of China’s military resources. The country cannot take the risk of being cut off from the flow of economic resources it needs for its economic

Understanding US strategy   167 development. This is also one of the reasons that explain the ‘One Belt One Road – OBOR’ initiative announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013, to be dealt with in Chapter­5. The development of intelligence capacity Since the end of the Second World War, the US has developed its intelligence capacity by instituting a special agency, the CIA, responsible for conducting these activities. This is not, of course, anything new in the history of international relations. Nevertheless, the CIA has from the beginning been involved not only in intelligence activities, but also in activities aimed at influencing the outcome of electoral processes in numerous countries, starting with Italy in 1947–1948, as well as regime change, starting with Iran in 1953. Since then the number of such interventions increased up to the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the number of such activities has decreased but still remains quite high.187 Given these indisputable facts, the hysteria that developed during and after the election of Donald Trump accusing him (and/or his entourage) of collusion with Russia to influence the outcome of the presidential election to the detriment of his opponent, Hillary Clinton, comes as an irrational and ridiculous manifestation of double standards logic. The defence of the US dollar as the major international currency The US has done, and are still doing, everything they can to safeguard the international role of the US dollar that they managed to acquire at the end of the Second World War, which is one of the most important resources upon which US power is based. This was possible and generally accepted while the US GDP represented a large share of the world GDP and the US economy played the role of the locomotive of the global economy, whereas China’s GDP was only a small fraction of the world total. The first attempt to contest the US’s leading role in international financial matters has come first of all from China’s spectacular and rapid economic development. Today, according to World Bank data, China’s GDP is more or less equivalent to US and EU GDPs (in Purchasing Power Parity) and China has become one of the most important trading partners in the world. Already in October 2008, at the beginning of the financial crisis, a clear warning was addressed to the US by the governor of the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuam: The crisis called again for creative reform of the existing international monetary system toward an international reserve currency with a stable value, rule-­based insurance and manageable supply, so as to achieve the objective of safeguarding global economic and financial stability.188 It was only in 2016 that the US accepted the entry of China into the IMF Special Drawing Rights Basket with a share of 10.92 per cent, alongside the US, which

168   Understanding US strategy nevertheless keeps the largest share: US 41.73 per cent, EU 30.93 per cent, Japan 8.33 per cent and UK 8.09 per cent. Moreover, the use of USD as an international payment currency has declined from 43.89 per cent in 2015 to 40.47 per cent in July 2017, compared to EUR 32.89 per cent, GBP 7.29 per cent, JPY 3.16 per cent, CAD 2.04 per cent and RMB 1.98 per cent, up from 0.5 per cent in 2014.189 The attentive reader has certainly remarked upon the high percentage of transactions made in euro, which leads some economists to consider that before China’s rise, it was the Eurozone and its ‘unique currency’ that the US considered as their more serious competitor.190 Second, the US has not been able to forbid their allies from joining the China­led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), despite heavy warnings addressed to the UK and continental European allies, as well as to South Korea and Japan. In spite of several voices from the mainstream financial media questioning the professionality and independence of the new bank, other voices have considered that the US made a grave mistake, and more recently some have come to consider that it would be better for the US to join the AIIB. Today about 60 countries have joined the bank, including some of US allies such as the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Australia, Canada, Israel, South Korea, the Philippines, as well as Pakistan and India, and even Japan is today considering joining.191 Moreover, China, with the other countries of the BRICS group, has instituted another investment bank that, in addition to the AIIB, is certainly a strong competitor to the World Bank (led by the US), the IMF (led by the EU and the US) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) led by Japan and the US. More generally, the internationalization of the RMB is on its way, and without some colossal mistakes made by the Chinese leadership, it seems that the process is going to amplify in the years to come. Finally, China and other countries that are dissatisfied with the US dominant strategy have passed several bilateral currency-­swap agreements allowing them to pay for their commodity transactions in their own currency instead of the US dollar. The consequence of the important changes in the international financial system, described above, has been qualified by some experts as the process of ‘de-­dollarization’ of the world economy. The future will tell whether this appreciation is correct. Investments by US companies in China Amer­ican politicians, companies and investors very often complain about the closure of the Chinese market to their investments and the difficulties they are encountering in developing their economic activities in China, to which they oppose the relative openness of their own market. There are indicators that this may be true, but this is maybe the most important resource the US may use for maintaining its leadership, i.e. attracting China into the capitalist world order that the US has created. Just let us remember the conclusion of the analysis of the development of capitalism by one of the most interesting historians of the twentieth century, Fernand Braudel:

Understanding US strategy   169 Capitalism has always been monopolistic, and merchandise and capital have always circulated simultaneously, for capital and credit have always been the surest way of capturing and controlling a foreign market. Long before the XX century the exportation of capital was a fact of daily life, for Florence as early as the XIII century […] Need I observe that all methods, dealings, and tricks of the financial world were not born in 1900 or in 1914? Capitalism was familiar with them all, and, yesterday as today, its uniqueness and its strength lie in its ability to move from one trick to another, from one way of doing things to another, to change its plans ten times as the economic conjunctures dictate –, and as a result, to remain relatively faithful, consistent with itself.192 This is what the US has done since the nineteenth century, and (as we shall see in Chapter­5) China has started doing the same, investing its enormous currency reserves all over the world. But will China agree to be integrated, or if it does so, will it agree to be integrated as a second-­rank player (thus accepting US leadership), or will it try to become a world player on an equal footing with the US? Furthermore, will China abandon the concept of a ‘socialist market economy’, will it try to change the rules of the international system? I will try to suggest an answer to these difficult questions in the final chapter devoted to China’s grand strategy and in the Conclusion to this book. Radio and TV broadcasting, think tanks and NGOs promoting US values and interests In Chapter­2 we have seen that these means correspond to the concept of ‘soft power’, as opposed to ‘hard power’ (Chapter 2, pp.  36–43). I explained there why I do not accept this typology as it deconstructs in theory what is a unitary phenomenon in practice. But let us take the definition of ‘soft power’, and see how it corresponds to the practice of US foreign policy. Joseph Nye defines ‘soft power’ as follows: Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. […] The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. […] It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence.193 Moreover, in international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and the way it handles its relations with others.194

170   Understanding US strategy In fact the US has tried to diffuse a positive image of its culture (both its national way of organizing polity, economy and society, and its behaviour abroad) through several means such as the statements by politicians, journalists and think tanks about the values of liberal democracy, free trade and human rights; the use of radio and TV broadcasting and the use of think tanks and NGOs.195 These means have been used all over the world, unfortunately quite often to destabilize countries by supporting, financing and training opposition groups and organizations. Moreover, with the help of governmental agencies such as the CIA and the National Endowment for Democracy and its subsidiaries, there have been many cases where these activities have favoured regime change with the aim of putting into power a new government more likely to support Amer­ican interests. The most recent case is that of Ukraine in 2014, another has been developing before our eyes in Syria, and it is not impossible that another example is under way in Venezuela and maybe also another in the Philippines. Here there is an overlap between quasi-­military and economic power resources on the one hand, and cultural resources on the other. If US cultural power is so strong, one does not understand why it has been very often necessary to resort to military power (under the form of both overt and covert warfare) to obtain compliance with US interests. This seems to be one of the important reasons that explains the loss of US power since the end of the Cold War, in addition to the emergence of new powers, such as China, and the re-­emergence of old powers such as Russia, as well as the awakening of Europe, which seems to be on its way to develop a new defence and foreign policy more independent from the US. And the latter may represent an additional reason for the loss of US power. Based upon the analyses presented above, it appears, as I have sustained in Chapter­2 (pp. 36–43), that there is not a separation between military, economic (‘Nye’s hard power’) and cultural resources (Nye’s ‘soft power’), but in reality all dimensions of power are operating simultaneously in a mix that can be different from one US administration to another, but which operate, in all circumstances, to safeguard the leading role of the US as the sole world superpower. First, constantly increasing spending on military weaponry, bases and special operations forces has considerably increased the US budget, thus subtracting resources that may (and, according to some, should) be spent on other domains, such as the maintenance and upgrade of infrastructure, social security, health and education. These domains are also important because they significantly contribute to the strength of a country. Second, the domestic problems that derive in part from the shortcomings mentioned above have contributed to the increase of disparities and unemployment, as well as to the failure of the integration of African Amer­icans, to cite just a few. Moreover, the excessive importance of private money in politics (especially in the electoral and legislative processes) and the extraordinary development of pressure groups’ influence on parliament and government contribute to deteriorating the image of the US democracy abroad: one important component of a country’s comprehensive power. Finally, the excessive use of military power (both for overt and covert warfare, worsened by the inefficiency of overt warfare), the frequent use of

Understanding US strategy   171 media, NGOs and special operations forces for sustaining and instigating regime change have the consequence of reducing not only military power, but also, considerably, cultural power as a means of ‘attraction and acquiescence’ to US foreign policy, and hence to the overall capacity of the US to impose its will upon others. My interpretation of the US foreign policy echoes the more general analysis of François Jullien. Based upon the Book of Changes and dealing with the transition from power to weakness, from growth to decline, Jullien writes: Growth […] does not give way at the approach of the Decline but, precisely as its development increases, it is itself already yielding towards decline. […] As I have been extended my strength with success during the time of the Growth, I have in fact already started to wear myself out, because the more I display my capabilities, the more fragile they become, the more ground I occupy, the more I must toil to conserve it.196 So, the negative consequences of the shortcomings of US foreign policy, which I have analysed in this chapter, suggest that the US would be well advised to seriously examine their internal and external situation, the domestic and international policies implemented so far, the changes of the distribution of power resources in the international system (‘the situation potential’), to arrive finally at a substantial redefinition of its foreign policy. Otherwise, the US will face very serious problems domestically and internationally. The world still needs the US, but not as an exceptional and indispensable nation, nor as a hegemon that considers the rest of the world as a territory to be conquered, entrusted with the right and even the duty to lead humankind towards an end of history based upon a parochial ‘manifest destiny’. Instead, the US should cooperate with the other nations to institute a new international order, based upon mutual understanding and respect, capable of peacefully managing the formidable challenges of the twenty-­first century. Hopefully, this new order may one day be labelled ‘the world we made together’. Now, the question is: what may be the contribution of China to this end?

Notes    1 As there are several similarities in the US foreign policy towards China and Russia, I suggest reading this chapter at the same time as a chapter by Guy Mettan, Creating Russophobia. From the Great Religious Schism to Anti-­Putin Hysteria, Atlanta, GA, Clarity Press, 2017, ch. 8: ‘Amer­ican Russophobia: the dictatorship of freedom’, pp. 241–276. Mettan is a Swiss journalist and politician of the Christian-­Democratic Party.    2 This part is based first of all upon some texts dealing with the general history of the US, which have been useful for understanding the general context in which foreign policy is embedded: Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the Amer­ican Republic, 2 vols, New York, Oxford, 1962; Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, New York, Harper, 1980 (last reprint 2016 with a new Introduction by Anthony Arnove). For a general history of US foreign

172   Understanding US strategy

   3

   4

   5    6

relations, I have consulted the two authoritative Oxford books by George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower. US Foreign Relations since 1776, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, and The Amer­ican Century and Beyond. US Foreign Rela­ tions, 1893–2014, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008 (with a new Preface, dated February 2016). But the most inspiring sources have been some books, outside the mainstream US historiography, that offer a critical interpretation of the US; in addition to Zinn’s book quoted above, I am particularly indebted to the enlightening analyses of three authors who helped me to understand the ideological bases of US foreign policy: Perry Anderson, Amer­ican Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers, London, Verso, 2015; Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny. Amer­ican Expansion and the Empire of Right, New York, Hill & Wang, 1995, and ‘ “The toughness crew”: review of Peter Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome. A History of Amer­ican Hubris, New York, Harper & Collins, 2010’, New Left Review, July–August 2013, pp.  145–152; Gore Vidal, Inventing a Nation. Washington, Adams, Jefferson, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2003, and Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace. How We Got to Be So Hated – Causes of Conflict in the Last Empire, Forest Row, Clairview Books, 2002; and John W. Dower, The Violent Amer­ican Century. War and Terror since World War II, Chicago, IL, Dispatch Books and Haymarket Books, 2017. For the geopolitical thought of the US (and the UK, as the two countries are closely related, historically and culturally, and were the two hegemons in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, respectively), I have benefited from the analysis of one of the best European specialists of Anglo-­Saxon geopolitics: Federico Bordonaro, La geopolitica anglosassone. Dalle origini ai nostri Giorgi, Milan, Guerrini Scientifica, 2012. In addition to the analysis of François Jullien quoted in Chapter­1, the features of the European ideology have been analysed by Immanuel Wallerstein, European Uni­ versalism. The Rhetoric of Power, New York, The New Press, 2006. The quotation is from p. 1. Ibidem, pp. 1–10, and its actualization to the twentieth century on pp. 11–29. Quoted by Wallerstein, European Universalism, op. cit., p.  9, quoting Las Casas, The Devastation of the Indians. A Brief Account (translated by Herman Briffault), Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974 (first published in Spanish 1552); see also Bartolomé de Las Casas, In Defense of the Indians (translated and edited by Stafford Poole, Foreword by Martin Marty), DeKalb, IL, Northern Illinois University Press, 1992. In chapters 31, 32 and 33, Las Casas develops several arguments to sustain his analysis (pp. 204–220). In summary (p. 205): it is not lawful to kill or inflict harm on a large or even a small number of innocent persons in order that a few innocent persons may be rescued from death, and that the ruler or governor who does or permits [such things] commits a mortal sin and is bound to restitution. […] Inasmuch as the soldiers have been instructed in Christ’s teaching, they ought to be aware that innocent persons must be spared. Hence, they do not rightly distinguish […] Therefore they are guilty before God of a most serious crime, and worthy of eternal damnation.

   7 Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, op. cit., p. xii.    8 These three quotations are from Anderson, Amer­ican Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 4–5.    9 Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, op. cit,, p. 6.   10 According to Stephanson: Not only did O’Sullivan coin the phrase ‘manifest destiny’ but his political sallies formed a veritable summa of the argument of this type. […] O’Sullivan, after consulting Jackson and Van Buren, founded the Democratic Review in 1837 in order to give the Jacksonian movement intellectual and political presence in the domain of highbrow culture, which was then dominated by staid and conservative forces.

Understanding US strategy   173 Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, op. cit., pp. xii, 6, 38–42.   11 Ibidem, p. 24. It is interesting to note that ‘old Europe’ has been used by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, two centuries after Jefferson used it.   12 Ibidem, p. xii. Stephanson further comments that this attitude was anything but new. Already in 1616, an agent of colonization had ended a prospectus of fabulous green vistas in North America to an English audience with this rhetorical flourish: ‘What need wee then feare, but to goes up at once as peculiar people marked and chosen by the finger of God to possess it?’   13   14   15   16   17

  18   19   20   21   22

  23   24   25

Ibidem, p. 5. Ibidem, p. 5. Ibidem, pp. 6 and 8–9. Ibidem, p. 9. ‘The United States harboured from the very outset an individualist and capitalist dynamic of considerable vibrancy’, ibidem, p.  16; Anderson, Amer­ican Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 5. Anderson, Amer­ican Foreign Policy, op. cit., p.  5. For a historical analysis of the implementation of this ideology from the beginning to the demise of the Soviet Union, the interested reader should consult the brilliant work of Stephanson, Mani­ fest Destiny, op. cit.; to be completed by Anderson, Amer­ican Foreign Policy, op. cit.; Stephanson, ‘ “The toughness crew” ’, loc. cit.; and Vidal, Inventing a Nation, op. cit. See, for example, Stephanson’s last chapter: ‘Falling into the world, 1914–1990’, in Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, op. cit., pp. 112–129. Daniel Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy. Political Thinking for an East Asian Context, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006, Introduction, paragraph titled ‘The uniquely parochial development of liberal democracy’, pp. 4–5. Stated on NBC’s Today Show (19 February 1998), according to Wikiquote: https:// en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Madeleine_Albright (accessed 20 March 2016). Spiegel Online, 11 May 2012: www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-­withformer-­us-secretary-­of-state-­madeleine-albright-­a-865308.html (accessed 5 March 2017). William J. Clinton, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1997, available at: The Amer­ican Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara: www.presidency.ucsb. edu/ws/?pid=54183 (accessed 5 March 2017). The same year, one of the most influential Amer­ican geo-­strategists published an article in which he agrees with the statement of President Clinton ‘when he says America has become the world “indispensable nation” ’, Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘A geostrategy for Eurasia’, Foreign Affairs, 1 September 1997: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1997-09-01/ geostrategy-­eurasia (accessed 6 December 2016). Kent Klein, ‘Obama: US “The one indispensable nation in world affairs” ’, Voice of America News, 28 May 2012: www.voanews.com/content/obama (accessed 18 April 2016). Seattle Times, 31 August 2016: www.seattletimes.com/nation-­world/jabbing-­attrump-­clinton-extols-­us-as-­indispensable-nation (accessed 5 March 2017). Speech given at the Amer­ican Legion’s national convention, Time, August 2016, full transcription available at: http://time.com/4474619/read-­hillary-clinton-­Amer­icanlegion-­speech (accessed 5 March 2017). On the theme of the indispensable nation, see for some contradictory opinions: Xenia Wicket, ‘Why the United States remains an indispensable nation’, Chatham House, 30 June 2015: www.chathamhouse.org/ expert/comment/why-­united-states-­remains-indispensable-­nation (accessed 5 March 2017); Peter Lee, ‘America: the indispensable nation … not!’, Counter Punch, 5 September 2016: www.counterpunch.org/2016/09/05/america-­the-indispensable-­ nationnot (accessed 5 March 2017); Micah Zenko, ‘The myth of the indispensable

174   Understanding US strategy   26   27   28   29

  30

  31

  32

  33

  34   35

nation’, Foreign Policy, 6 November 2014: http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/ the-­myth-of-­the-indispensable-­nation (accessed 15 May 2016). Remarks of President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, 12 January 2016: www.whitehouse.gov/the-­press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-­president-barack-­obama%E2%80%93-prepared-­delivery-state-­union-address (accessed 27 January 2016). Klein, ‘Obama: US “The one indispensable nation in world affairs” ’, op. cit. Remarks of President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, 12 January 2016, loc. cit. President Trump has criticized these treaties and manifested his will to renegotiate them (as for the NAFTA), to change the commitments of the partners (as for NATO) or to abandon them (as for the TPP). But, so far, it is difficult to understand how far the new president will go in his policy to introduce some forms of selective protectionism for avoiding additional relocations of Amer­ican industrial companies and for obtaining the relocation to the US of some of those that have been transferred to developing countries, especially, but not only, to China. Paul Bairoch, Economics and World History. Myths and Paradoxes, New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993 (French version: Mythes et paradoxes de l’histoire économique, Paris, La Découverte, 1999), with many examples of the strategy followed by the US and UK in the early stages of their economic development: in 1875 the average levels of duties on manufactured goods was between 40 and 50 per cent; ibidem, p. 24. The idea that industrialization is not possible without tariff protection was put forward for the first time by Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury (1789–1795) in the first US government. It was later theoretically developed by Friedrich List, whose book, The National System of Political Economy, was published only in 1841. The dynamic of the US’s entry into the Second World War and the decision to participate officially after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor is subject to controversy. For a balanced view on these events, see Zinn, A People’s History, op. cit., especially pp. 407–424. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, ‘U.S. ramping up major renewal in nuclear arms’, New York Times, 21 September 2014: www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/us-­ ramping-up-­major-renewal-­in-nuclear-­arms.html?_r=0 (accessed 15 October 2014). This news was bitterly and ironically commented upon by Russia Today, ‘Bitter nuke promises: Nobel Peace laureate Obama spending billions on US nuclear arsenal’, 24 September 2014: www.rt.com/usa/190340-nobel-­obama-nuclear-­ upgrade (accessed 15 October 2014). For the military spending, see: Doug Bandow, ‘Ripped off: what Donald Trump gets right about U.S. alliances’, Foreign Affairs, 12 September 2016: www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/world/2016-09-12/ripped (accessed 15 October 2016); Deidre McPhillips, ‘U.S. a global leader in military spending: national defence budgets may affect global perceptions of power’, US News, 11 November 2016: www.usnews.com/news/best-­ countries/articles/2016-11-11/10-countries-­with-the-­largest-military-­budgets (accessed 15 December 2016). For the decisions of President Obama, see: Lawrence Wittner, ‘The trillion dollar question’, The Huffington Post, 17 March 2016: www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-­wittner/the-­trillion-dollar-­question_b_9481432.html (accessed 5 December 2016). For Trump’s proposal, see Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘Trump’s $54 billion rounding error’, Foreign Affairs, 1 March 2017: www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/2017-03-01/trumps-­54-billion-­rounding-error (accessed 6 May 2017). Remarks of President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, 12 January 2016, loc. cit. ‘Remarks by President Obama on the Iran Nuclear Deal’, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 5 August 2015, Amer­ican University, Washington, DC: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-­press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-­ president-iran-­nuclear-deal (accessed 7 March 2016).

Understanding US strategy   175   36 ‘IN CONGRESS, JULY 4, 1776, The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen United States of America’: www.ushistory.org/declaration/document (accessed 22 May 2017).   37 ‘US presidents in their own words concerning Amer­ican Indians’, Native News Online.net, 20 February 2017: http://nativenewsonline.net/currents/us-­presidentswords-­concerning-Amer­ican-­indians (accessed 6 March 2017); www.whitehouse. gov/the-­press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-­president-barack-­obama-%E2%80%93prepared-­delivery-state-­union-address (accessed 27 January 2016).   38 For example, Harry Truman: ‘The United States, which would live on Christian principles with all the peoples of the world, cannot omit a fair deal for its own Indian citizens’; and Lyndon Johnson: The Amer­ican Indian, once proud and free, is torn now between White and tribal values; between the politics and language of the White man and his own historic culture. His problems, sharpened by years of defeat and exploitation, neglect and inadequate effort, will take many years to overcome.   39 ‘The Japs will soon learn some more of the other military secrets agreed upon at Berlin. They will learn them first-­hand – and they will not like them.’ Radio Report to the Amer­ican People on the Potsdam Conference: www.trumanlibrary.org/ publicpapers/?pid=104 (accessed 20 May 2015).   40 ‘Hillary Clinton’s Putin–Hitler analogy’, BBC News, 6 March 2014: www.bbc.com/ news/blogs-­echochambers-26476643 (accessed 25 May 2015); Karen Robes Meeks, ‘Hillary Clinton compares Vladimir Putin’s actions in Ukraine to Adolf Hitler’s in Nazi Germany’, Long Beach Press Telegram, 5 March 2014: www.presstelegram. com/general-­news/20140304/hillary-­clinton-compares-­vladimir-putins-­actions-in-­ ukraine-to-­adolf-hitlers-­in-nazi-­germany (accessed 25 May 2015). For another example of how this famous Amer­ican politician, who failed to win the 2016 presidential election, can manifest a non-­Christian attitude towards a defeated enemy, see how she commented on the death (in fact, the murder) of Muammar Gaddafi. Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State, triumphantly exclaimed: ‘We came, we saw, he died’ (available on YouTube: ‘Hillary Clinton on Gaddafi: We came, we saw, he died’: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fgcd1ghag5Y (accessed 6 March 2017)).   41 Diana Johnstone, Queen of Chaos. The Misadventures of Hillary Clinton, Petrolia, CA, Counterpunch, 2016. The analysis of the sequence leading to intervention is summarized on pp. 98–101, from which the following quotations are taken. Johnstone was the European editor of In These Times and press officer of the Green Group in the European Parliament from 1990 to 1996. She lives in Paris. She is the daughter of Paul H. Johnstone who was a senior analyst in the Strategic Weapons Evaluation Group in the Pentagon. He was the assistant director of three crucial studies on outcomes of nuclear war and the director of a fourth, on the impact on civilians. He also initiated a series of ‘critical incident’ studies recounting decision-­making problems, which led to the McNamara study of errors of Vietnam War policy that became known as The Pen­ tagon Papers, of which he was one of the authors. See his memoir published by his daughter: Diana Johnstone, From Mad to Madness. Inside Pentagon Nuclear War Planning – Memoir by Paul H. Johnstone, Atlanta, GA, Clarity Press, 2017, with an introduction by Diana Johnstone. On the demonization of Putin, see also Mettan, Cre­ ating Russophobia, op. cit., pp. 313–322.   42 Let me insist upon the fact that seeking the support of local clients is one of the most indispensable means a country can implement to impose its will on a foreign country. When a country invades another country (through colonialism or because of victory in a war) or opens up its economy (imperialism, Japan and China in the nineteenth century), it is easy to find within the local elite people who are ready to cooperate with the invading country, either because they share its values (e.g.

176   Understanding US strategy ­ odernization, liberal democracy, free market, human rights) or for personal or clan m interests.   43 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The end of history?’, The National Interest, no. 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3–18, and The End of History and the Last Man, New York, Free Press, 1992. After the publication of this book, Fukuyama modified his earlier position to acknowledge that culture cannot be cleanly separated from economics. [He] is also associated with the rise of the neoconservative movement, from which he has since distanced himself. Fukuyama has been a Senior Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University since July 2010. […] He is a council member of the International Forum for Democratic Studies founded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and was a member of the Political Science Department at RAND.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Fukuyama (accessed 8 March 2017). The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a U.S. non-­profit soft power organization that was founded in 1983 with the stated goal of promoting democracy abroad. It is funded primarily through an annual allocation from the U.S. Congress in the form of a grant awarded through the United States Information Agency (USIA).



The NED has come under severe criticism: One criticism of the organization includes a lack of openness and public accountability in its stewardship of millions of dollars a year in taxpayer funds in the year 1985. Libertarian congressman Ron Paul also argued against NED funding in 2005 stating that NED has ‘very little to do with democracy. It is an organization that uses US tax money to subvert democracy, by showering funding on favored political parties or movements overseas. It underwrites color­coded “people’s revolutions” overseas that look more like pages out of Lenin’s writings on stealing power than genuine indigenous democratic movements.’



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Endowment_for_Democracy March 2017). The RAND Corporation

(accessed

8

is an Amer­ican nonprofit global policy think tank originally formed by Douglas Aircraft Company to offer research and analysis to the United States Armed Forces. It is financed by the U.S. government and private endowment, corporations including the health care industry, universities and private individuals.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAND_Corporation (accessed 8 March 2017). Against Fukuyama’s thesis, see: Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, London, Atlantic Books, 2008; Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the Amer­ ican Era. US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-­First Century, New York, Vintage Books, 2005, especially ch. 8: ‘The rebirth of history’, pp. 304–336, and No One’s World. The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012; Richard N. Haass, Foreign Policy Begins at Home. The Case for Putting America’s House in Order, New York, Basic Books, 2013, especially Part I, ‘The return of history’, pp. 11–80.   44 On the ideological character of democracy, see Luciano Canfora, Democracy in Europe. A History of an Ideology, New York, Wiley, 2006. Canfora is an Italian classicist and historian. Since 1975, he has edited the periodical Quaderni di storia. He stood in the European Parliament election in 1999 for the Italian Communist Party. For the link between liberal democracy and capitalism, see Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1962 (1982

Understanding US strategy   177   45   46   47   48

with a new Preface by the author); Fareed Zakaria, ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 6, November–December 1997, pp. 22–43. Fukuyama, The End of History, op. cit., p. xi. Francis Fukuyama, ‘Soft talk, big stick’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Geffrey W. Legro (eds), To Lead the World. Amer­ican Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 204–225. The quotation is on pp. 224–225. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The future of history: can liberal democracy survive the decline of the middle class?’, Foreign Affairs, 1 January 2012: www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/2012-01-01/future-­history (accessed 15 May 2014). Francis Fukuyama, ‘Demokratie stiftet keine Identität: Ist das Modell des Westens am Ende? Ein Gespräch mit dem amerikanischen Politikwissenschaftler Francis Fukuyama’, interview by Michael Thumann and Thomas Assheuer: www.zeit. de/2016/13/francis-­fukuyama-politikwissenschaftler-­populismus-usa (accessed 25 May 2017); my free translation from the German: Mit dem Ende der Geschichte meinte ich, dass ich keine Alternative sehe, die besser wäre als die Democratie. Dieses Ende der Geschichte ist nicht aufgeschoben, aber sicherlich ist es nicht die Realität für viele Menschen. Wir gehen derzeit in die falsche Richtung.

  49 The indispensable link between liberal democracy and capitalism does not need to be explained here. It suffices to mention the work of Nobel Prize-­winner Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, op. cit., ch.­1: ‘The relation between economic freedom and political freedom’, pp.  7–21, ch. 2 ‘The role of government in a free society’, pp. 22–36; Fareed Zakaria, ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’, loc. cit.   50 Anderson, Amer­ican Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 5.   51 There are many books witnessing or forecasting the decline of the US, or more generally of the West. Here is a limited choice in chronological order: Edward N. Luttwak, The Endangered Amer­ican Dream, New York, Touchstone, 1993; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of Amer­ican Power, New York, New Press, 2003; Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire. The Breakdown of the Amer­ican Order, London, Constable, 2004; Kupchan, The End of the Amer­ican Era, op. cit.; Naomi Wolf, The End of America, White River Junction, VT, Chelsea Green, 2007; Kupchan, No One’s World, op. cit.; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-­Amer­ican World, London, Allen Lane, 2008; Andrew J. Bacevich (ed.), The Short Amer­ican Century. A Postmortem, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2012. Even one of the most influential writers within the Amer­ican neoconservative intelligentsia has come to contest the ‘end of history’: Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, op. cit.   52 It would be interesting to analyse the content, and the reactions to the publication by the Harvard Library, of a list of websites that are considered as the main producers of ‘fake news’. For those interested, a good starting point is the Library’s website, to which one could conduct a website search to find reactions from both believers and non-­believers in the ‘manifest destiny’. Those who have analysed the very long list have found that it contains both leftist (i.e. websites very critical of the ‘manifest destiny’) as well as conservative websites. I did not have the time nor the interest in examining the Harvard list in detail and, not surprisingly, I did not know the great majority of the websites. It is nevertheless interesting to remark that the list contains several ‘critical’ websites that seem to me quite serious and which, in any case, I would hesitate to consider as a systematic source of fake news. Among these one can find: CounterPunch, Global Research, Naked Capitalism, Nomi Prins, Off-­ Guardian, Paul Craig Roberts and WikiLeaks. The interested reader can visit these websites and build his/her own opinion.   53 For a good idea of the persistence of the belief in the ‘manifest destiny’, one can read the excellent book review by Thomas Meaney, ‘So it must be for ever’, London

178   Understanding US strategy Review of Books, vol. 38, no. 14, 14 July 2016: www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n14/thomas-­ meaney/so-­it-must-­be-for-­ever (accessed 8 July 2016). The books reviewed are: Anderson, Amer­ican Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers, op. cit.; John A. Thompson, A Sense of Power. The Roots of America’s Global Role, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2015; and Daniel J. Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of Amer­ican Foreign Relations in the 1970s, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.   54 The references given hereafter to illustrate each of the four points are not based upon a systematic analysis based upon a random sample of the writings and speeches of the ‘new believers’; but the references are certainly meaningful as they come, most of the time, from renowned authors and politicians. For the first theme, see: Bill Gertz (The Washington Free Beacon), ‘Top China analyst: Beijing has been duping the US since Mao’, Business Insider, 2 February 2015: http://uk.businessinsider. com/?IR=C (accessed 24 February 2015); James Jay Carafano, ‘Wake up, America: China is the real threat!’, The National Interest, 7 February 2015: http://national interest.org/feature/wake-­america-china-­real-threat-­12204 (accessed 24 February 2015); Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Obama in Asia: confronting the China challenge’, Foreign Affairs: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/obama-­and-asia (accessed 24 November 2015); Andrew Browne, ‘Can China be contained?’, Wall Street Journal, 12 June 2015: www.wsj.com/articles/can-­china-be-­contained-1434118534 (accessed 13 June 2015); Michael Forsythe, ‘Obama citing China as rival, warns lawmakers over inaction on trade measure’, New York Times, 21 January 2015: https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/21/obama-­urges-congress-­not-to-­leave-a-­tradevacuum-­for-china/?_r=0 (accessed 21 January 2015); Jeff M. Smith, ‘Beware of China’s Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, 20 May 2015: www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/china/2015-05-20/beware-­chinas-grand-­strategy (accessed 13 June 2015); Kevin D. Freeman, ‘China, unrestricted warfare, and the challenge to America’, in Fred Fleitz (ed.), Warning Order. China Prepares for Conflict, and Why We Must Do the Same, Washington, DC, Center for Security Policy Press, 2016, pp. 55–80.   55 Zakaria, ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’, loc. cit. Some 16 years later, Zakaria admits that there is a new crisis of Amer­ican democracy: ‘Can America be fixed? The new crisis of democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 1 January 2013: www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/united-­states/2012-12-03/can-­america-be-­fixed (accessed 13 February 2017); Francis Fukuyama, ‘Amer­ican political decay or renewal?’, Foreign Affairs, 13 June 2016: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-­states/2016-06-13/Amer­ican-­ political-decay-­or-renewal (accessed 11 December 2016); David Runciman, ‘Is this how democracy ends?’, London Review of Books, vol. 38, no. 23, 1 December 2016: www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n23/david-­runciman/is-­this-how-­democracy-ends (accessed 25 November 2016).   56 Even the progressive Amer­ican magazine Mother Jones has joined the mainstream media: The Trump-­Russia scandal is the subject of multiple investigations that may or may not unearth new revelations, but this much is already certain: Donald Trump is guilty. We don’t need additional information about the Russian covert scheme to undermine the 2016 campaign, or about the curious interactions between Team Trump and Russia, or about Trump pressuring and then firing FBI Director James Comey, to reach the judgment that the president of the United States engaged in wrongdoing.

David Corn, ‘Trump is already guilty of aiding Putin’s attack on America. Collusion? Maybe. Active enabling? Definitely’, Mother Jones, July–August 2017: www. motherjones.com/politics/2017/05/trump-­putin-russia-­scandal-guilty (accessed 29 July 2017).   57 See the memoirs by the then Director of the CIA, William Colby, Honorable Men. My Life in the C.I.A., New York, Simon & Schuster, 1978, ch.­4. On William Colby,

Understanding US strategy   179 see John Prados, William Colby and the CIA. The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster, Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 2009, originally published by Oxford University Press in 2003 under the title Lost Crusader. The Secret Wars of CIA Director, William Colby; and Randall B. Woods, Shadow Warrior. William Egan Colby and the CIA, New York, Basic Books, 2013. For the origins of the CIA and the role of Allen Dulles, the first civilian director of the CIA (1953–1961), see Davis Talbot, The Devil’s Chessboard. Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of Ameri­ ca’s Secret Government, London, William Collins, 2015.   58 Joseph S. Nye, The Powers to Lead, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008; Robert Kagan, The World America Made, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2012; Stewart M. Patrick, ‘An open world is in the balance: what might replace the liberal order?’, World Politics Review, 10 January 2017: www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ articles/20868/an-­open-world-­is-in-­the-balance-­what-might-­replace-the-­liberal-order (accessed 9 February 2017); Robert Kagan, ‘The twilight of the liberal world order’, Brookings Report, 24 January 2017: www.brookings.edu/research/the-­twilight-of-­ the-liberal-­world-order (accessed 27 January 2017).   59 Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, ‘Preserving primacy: a defense strategy for the new administration’, Foreign Affairs, 3 August 2016: www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-­america/2016-08-03/preserving-­primacy (accessed 26 August 2016); Richard N. Haass, ‘The unraveling: how to respond to a disordered world’, Foreign Affairs: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-­states/2014-10-20/ unraveling (accessed 22 April 2016); Richard N. Haass, ‘America and the world in transition’, Project Syndicate, 23 November 2016: www.project-­syndicate.org/commentary/trump-­america-world-­in-transition-­by-richard-­n--haass-­2016-11?barrier= accessreg (accessed 27 November 2016); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, ‘The once and future superpower: why China won’t overtake the United States’, Foreign Affairs, 13 April 2016: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ united-­states/2016-04-13/once-­and-future-­superpower (accessed 20 April 2016); Michael J. Mazarr, ‘The once and future order: what comes after hegemony’, Foreign Affairs, 12 December 2016: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/ once-­and-future-­order (accessed 20 December 2016); Sheila A. Smith, ‘Looking ahead in Asia, with our allies’, Council on Foreign Relations: Asia Unbound: http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/11/30/looking-­ahead-in-­asia-with-­our-allies (accessed 3 December 2016).   60 The Project for the New Amer­ican Century (PNAC) was a neoconservative think tank (1997–2006) that had strong ties to the Amer­ican Enterprise Institute: It was established as a non-­profit, educational organization in 1997, and founded by William Kristol and Robert Kagan. PNAC’s stated goal was ‘to promote Amer­ ican global leadership.’ The organization stated that ‘Amer­ican leadership is good both for America and for the world,’ and sought to build support for ‘a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity.’ Of the twenty-­five people who signed PNAC’s founding statement of principles, ten went on to serve in the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_for_the_New_Amer­ican_Century (accessed 28 March 2017). The following article, published by the influential Foreign Affairs, can be considered as the founding text of the neoconservative movement: William Kristol and Robert Kagan, ‘Toward a neo-­Reaganite foreign policy’, Foreign Affairs, 1 July 1996: www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1109929 (accessed 27 March 2017).   61 On Robert Kagan’s career, see ‘Robert Kagan’, Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Robert_Kagan (accessed 20 March 2017). On Victoria Nuland’s career, see ‘Victoria Nuland’, Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victoria_Nuland (accessed

180   Understanding US strategy 20 March 2017). On the Kagan family, see Robert Parry, ‘A family business of perpetual war’, Consortiumnews, 20 March 2015: https://consortiumnews.com/2015/03/ 20/a-­family-business-­of-perpetual-­war (accessed 20 May 2015).   62 The transcript of the notorious phone call is available on the BBC website: www. bbc.com/news/world-­europe-26079957 (accessed 20 March 2017). During the Bill Clinton administration, Nuland was chief of staff to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott before moving on to serve as deputy director for former Soviet Union affairs. She served as the principal deputy foreign policy adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney and then as U.S. ambassador to NATO. Nuland became special envoy for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and then became State Department spokesperson in summer 2011. She was nominated to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs in May 2013 […] In her role as assistant secretary, […] she was the lead U.S. point person for the Ukrainian crisis. ‘Victoria Nuland’, Wikipedia, loc. cit.   63 Tony Wood, ‘Eat your spinach’, London Review of Books, vol. 39, no. 5, 2 March 2017: www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n05/tony-­wood/eat-­your-spinach (accessed 15 March 2017). In this article Wood reviews three books that are worth reading: Robert Legvold, Return to Cold War, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016; Dmitri Trenin, Should We Fear Russia?, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016; Peter Conradi, Who Lost Russia? How the World Entered a New Cold War, London, Oneworld, 2016.   64 ‘Op-­Ed The POLITICO 50: Robert Kagan and Victoria Nuland’, Brookings Institution, 4 September 2014: www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-­politico-50-robert-­kaganand-­victoria-nuland (accessed 15 March 2017).   65 Robert Parry, ‘The Kagans are back; wars to follow’, Strategic Culture Foundation, 19 March 2017: www.strategic-­culture.org/news/2017/03/19/kagans-­back-wars-­ follow.html (accessed 22 March 2017).   66 Kagan, The Return of History, op. cit.   67 Robert Kagan, ‘Not fade away: against the myth of Amer­ican decline’, Brookings Institution, 17 January 2012: www.brookings.edu/opinions/not-­fade-away-­againstthe-­myth-of-­Amer­ican-decline (accessed 4 February 2016).   68 Ibidem.   69 Robert Kagan, ‘Backing into World War III’, Brookings Institution, 6 February 2017: www.brookings.edu/research/backing-­into-world-­war-iii (accessed 14 February 2017). Other publications by Kagan that are worth reading are: The Return of History, op. cit.; The World America Made, op. cit.; ‘Superpowers don’t get to retire: what our tired country still owes to the world’, New Republic, 27 May 2014: https:// newrepublic.com/article/117859/superpowers-­dont-get-­retire (accessed 20 March 2017).   70 Kagan, ‘Backing into World War III’, loc. cit.   71 Ibidem.   72 The subtitle of the last section of the article is quite revealing: ‘Give ’em an inch, they’ll take a mile’.   73 This promise has been the source of a controversy between the defenders of the West and those who try to have a more balanced and objective view of this event. From the latter, see Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, ‘Russia’s got a point: the U.S. broke a NATO promise’, Los Angeles Times, 30 May 2016, and his article: ‘Deal or no deal? The end of the Cold War and the U.S. offer to limit NATO expansion’, International Security, vol. 40, no. 4, Spring 2016, pp. 7–44. Those who sustain that there has been no promise argue on the basis of the absence of a formal (i.e. written) document; see in this sense: Mary Elise Sarotte, ‘A broken promise? What the West really told Moscow about NATO expansion’, Foreign Affairs, 11 August 2014: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-­fsu/2014-08-11/broken-­promise (accessed

Understanding US strategy   181 20 May 2017); Steven Pifer, ‘Did NATO promise not to enlarge? Gorbachev says no’, Brookings, 6 November 2014: www.brookings.edu/blog/up-­front/2014/11/06/ did-­nato-promise-­not-to-­enlarge-gorbachev-­says-no (accessed 28 March 2017). Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the George Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University. Mary Elise Sarotte is a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Academy of the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/people/002345-mary-­elise-sarotte). After the manuscript of this book was sent to the publisher (31 August 2017) the disclosure of documents seems to have put an end to this controversy: http://nationalinterest.org/ profile/dave-majumdar, Dave Majumdar, ‘Newly declassified documents: Gorbachev told NATO wouldn’t move past East German border’, The National Interest, 12 December 2017: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/newly-declassified-documents-gorbachev-told-nato-wouldnt-23629 (accessed 20 December 2017).   74 I will deal with the Chinese strategy for opposing the US military presence in the Far East in the last chapter of this book. On the reasons for the Amer­ican intervention in Syria: Robert F. Kennedy, ‘Why the Arabs don’t want us in Syria. They don’t hate “our freedoms”. They hate the fact that we’ve betrayed our ideals in their own countries’, Politico, 16 September 2016: www.politico.eu/article/why-­the-arabs-­dont-want-­ us-in-­syria-mideast-­conflict-oil-­intervention (accessed 18 December 2016). Robert Francis Kennedy Jr. (born January 17, 1954) is an Amer­ican radio host, environmental activist, author and attorney specializing in environmental law. He is an Irish Amer­ican, son of Robert Francis ‘Bobby’ Kennedy and the nephew of former U.S. President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy is President of the Board of Waterkeeper Alliance, a non-­profit focused on grass-­roots efforts to protect and enhance waterways worldwide. He currently co-­hosts Ring of Fire, a nationally syndicated Amer­ican radio programme. Kennedy has written three political books and two children’s books.   75

  76   77

  78

Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_F._Kennedy_Jr. (accessed 28 March 2017). For Russophobia and the Ukrainian crisis, I suggest Mettan, Creating Russophobia. Guy Mettan is a journalist and Swiss politician. Former director and editor-­in-chief of the Geneva newspaper Tribune de Genève, he is presently the executive director of the Geneva Press Club and columnist for various Swiss newspapers. See also: Stephen Lendman (ed.), Flashpoint in Ukraine. How the Drive for Hegemony Risks World War III, Atlanta, GA, Clarity Press, 2014. Kagan, The World America Made, op. cit. Kristol and Kagan, ‘Toward a neo-­Reaganite foreign policy’, loc. cit. The article refers to Pat Buchanan, who was probably the first Amer­ican politician to use the expression ‘America First’. Buchanan was a senior advisor to US presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan, and was an original host on CNN’s Cross­ fire. He sought the Republican presidential nomination in 1992 and 1996. He ran on the Reform Party ticket in the 2000 presidential election. He co-­founded The Amer­ ican Conservative magazine and launched a foundation named The Amer­ican Cause; Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pat_Buchanan (accessed 18 March 2017). See the comment by Buchanan of Trump’s ‘America first’: ‘Pat Buchanan on “America First” under Trump’, National Public Radio, 22 January 2017: www.npr. org/2017/01/22/511048811/pat-­buchanan-on-­america-first-­under-trump (accessed 28 March 2017). Andrew J. Bacevich, ‘The age of great expectations and the great void: history after “the End of History” ’, TomDispatch.com, 8 January 2017: www.tomdispatch.com/ blog/176228 (accessed 28 March 2017), and The Limits of Power. The End of Amer­ ican Exceptionalism, New York, Henry Holt, 2008.

182   Understanding US strategy   79 See the works of Chalmers Johnson: Blowback. The Costs and Consequences of Amer­ican Empire, New York, Henry Holt, 2000; The Sorrows of Empire. Milit­ arism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, New York, Henry Holt, 2004; Nemesis. The Last Days of the Amer­ican Republic, New York, Henry Holt, 2006; Dismantling the Empire. America’s Last Best Hope, New York, Henry Holt, 2010.   80 Anderson, Amer­ican Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 1–2.   81 The title of the March 2017 issue of Foreign Affairs is quite revealing: ‘What was the liberal order? The world we may be losing’, a collection of articles written between the Second World War and today.   82 For a defence of Donald Trump’s project of ‘making America great again’, see: David Horowitz, Big Agenda. President Trump’s Plan to Save America, West Palm Beach, FL, Humanix Books, 2017. According to Wikipedia: David Joel Horowitz (born January 10, 1939) is an Amer­ican conservative writer. He is a founder and current president of the think tank the David Horowitz Freedom Center; editor of the Center’s publication, FrontPage Magazine; and director of Discover the Networks, a website that tracks individuals and groups on the political left. […] Horowitz was raised by parents who were members of the Communist Party USA during the Great Depression; they gave up their membership in 1956 after learning of Joseph Stalin’s purges and abuses. From 1956 to 1975, Horowitz was an outspoken adherent of the New Left. He later rejected liberal and progressive ideas completely and has since become a proponent of conservatism. Horowitz has recounted his ideological journey in a series of retrospective books, culminating with his 1996 memoir Radical Son: A Generational Odyssey. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Horowitz (accessed 17 May 2017).   83 At the time of writing (August 2017) there is already an enormous literature about what Trump really said, what he will do, and especially what he should do. It is out of question to give here even a small sample of this literature.   84 See note 63 above referring to the use of this culinary image by Victoria Nuland referring to the necessity of making the Russians accept the US foreign policy in Eastern Europe: ‘get the Russians to eat their spinach’.   85 This type of analysis is not very frequent, especially in US mainstream media and think tanks. Nevertheless, there are some writings that go in this direction, for example: Bandow, ‘Ripped off ’, loc. cit.; William Blum, ‘What can go wrong? The brighter side of Trump’s election’, Foreign Policy Journal, 2 December 2016: www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/12/02/what-­can-go-­wrong-the-­brighter-side-­ of-trumps-­election (accessed 19 December 2016); Donald Trump, ‘Transcript: Donald Trump expounds on his foreign policy views’, New York Times, 26 March 2016: www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-­trump-transcript.html?_r=0 (accessed 20 April 2016).   86 At the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union was exhausted; it had lost between 26 and 27 million people, among whom were 10 to 17 million civilians, whereas the US had 407,300 military deaths and 12,100 deaths of civilians due to military activities (according to Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_ War_II_casualties (accessed 31 March 2017)); moreover, the US economy was not only intact but had experienced an important increase in GDP. Granted, the Soviet Union had occupied several East European countries in its rush to defeat Nazi Germany and to get to Berlin, where it started to set up governments dominated by the local Communist parties. But the US had done the same, and in fact had taken more time to intervene in France (6 June 1944) after the Soviet Union had supported the major burden of the war on the Eastern Front. In these circumstances, it is debatable whether the Soviet Union had the will and the capacity to further expand towards Western Europe. But the danger was felt in the West and it could not be

Understanding US strategy   183 ignored by the Western powers. Hence the constitution of the NATO alliance, 17 March 1948. Conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western powers led to the creation by the Soviet Union of the Warsaw Pact military alliance in 1955.   87 In 2000–2002, Putin was publicly hinting at, and privately seeking, NATO membership for Russia. […] The principal supposed change was that, from now on, Russia would be a co-­equal member of the group, no longer confronted by a unified NATO ‘side’. This did not work out as hoped. Dmitri Trenin, Post Imperium. A Eurasian Story, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011, p.  106; the whole of ch. 2 is worth reading: ‘Geopolitics and security’, pp.  83–143. See also the interviews with Vladimir Putin by the German journalist Hubert Seipel, Putin: Innenansichten der Macht, Hamburg, Hoffmann und Campe, 2015 (French translation: Poutin: une vision du pouvoir, Geneva, Editions des Syrtes, 2016). The book uses a lot of references to official documents. It is possible that at the time this book is published (beginning 2018) there will be an English translation of Seipel’s book. Among the numerous accounts on the relationship between the US and Putin’s Russia, I suggest Mettan, Creating Russophobia, op. cit.; Legvold, Return to Cold War, op. cit.; Trenin, Should We Fear Russia?, op. cit.; Conradi, Who Lost Russia?, op. cit.   88 ‘Today, Montenegro joins NATO with a seat at the table as an equal, with an equal voice in shaping our Alliance, and its independence guaranteed,’ the Secretary General said. Mr. Stoltenberg noted that NATO will benefit from Montenegro’s insight into the Western Balkans ‘and the professionalism, bravery and dedication of its men and women in uniform’. He stressed that NATO’s collective pledge, Article 5, has kept Allies safe for almost seven decades.    The NATO website further relates that the accession has been preceded by intense commercial negotiations: In order to further develop commercial ties between the U.S. and Montenegro, the first Amer­ican Chamber of Commerce (AmCham Montenegro) was launched on November 19, 2008, and as part of the strategic partnership between Montenegro and State of Maryland, the U.S.–Montenegro Business Council was formally opened in Podgorica on December 16, 2008. President Vujanovic met U.S. Secretary of State Rice on May 1, 2007 during his visit to Washington, DC. Speaker of the Parliament Ranko Krivokapic visited Washington in November 2007 and met with Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. The Montenegrin military also established a partnership with the Maine Army National Guard, and efforts are underway to broaden this relationship to include cooperation in the civilian sector. www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/me.htm (accessed 5 June 2017).   89 Mettan, Creating Russophobia, op. cit.   90 See Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, The Globalization of NATO, Atlanta, GA, Clarity Press, 2012; Randall Schriver and Tiffany Ma, ‘The next steps in Japan–NATO cooperation’, Project 2049 Institute, 2010: www.project2049.net (accessed 15 May 2013).   91 ‘Transcript: Donald Trump expounds on his foreign policy views’, loc. cit.   92 ‘Donald Trump telling the truth about Syrian war’, YouTube, 4 November 2016: www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhDj1kEy5Go (accessed 29 March 2017).   93

Tulsi Gabbard is an Amer­ican politician and member of the Democratic Party. She was also a vice-­chair of the Democratic National Committee until February 28, 2016, when she resigned to endorse Senator Bernie Sanders for the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination. Gabbard supports abortion rights, opposed

184   Understanding US strategy the Trans-­Pacific Partnership, has called for a restoration of the Glass–Steagall Act, and has been in favour of same-­sex marriage since 2012. She opposes US-­led regime-­change wars like those in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and has opposed removal of Bashar al-­Assad from power, arguing that US regime-­change intervention in Syria’s civil war is a source of the Syrian refugee crisis.   94

  95

  96   97   98   99

100

Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tulsi_Gabbard (accessed 31 March 2017). Several interviews of Tulsi Gabbard are available on YouTube. William Blum, ‘Overthrowing other people’s governments: the master list’, February 2013 (updated 2014): https://williamblum.org/essays/read/overthrowing-­otherpeoples-­governments-the-­master-list (accessed 29 March 2017). Blum has identified 59 cases of attempted regime change (1949–2014), of which 37 have been successful, e.g. China (1949 to early 1960s), Iran (1953) Guatemala (1954) Iraq (1963), Cambodia (1955–1970), Laos (1958, 1959, 1960) Congo (960) Brazil (1962–1964), Bolivia (1964) Chile (1964–1973) Greece (1967), Australia (1973–1975) Portugal (1974–1976), Libya (1980), Nicaragua (1981–1990), Panama (1989) Albania (1991), Iraq (1991), Afghanistan (1980s), Yugoslavia (1999–2000), Venezuela (2002), Iraq (2003), Somalia (2007), Honduras (2009), Syria (2011), Ukraine (2014). For an in-­ depth analysis covering many other aspects of US foreign policy see William Blum, Rogue State. A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower, London, Zed Books, 2014, and William Blum, Killing Hope. US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II, Monroe, ME, Common Courage Press, 2014. Joseph Stiglitz, Around the World with Joseph Stiglitz. Perils and Promises of Glo­ balization, a documentary film realized by the author, 2009; Globalization and Its Discontents, New York, W.W. Norton, 2002; Making Globalization Work. The Next Steps to Global Justice, London, Penguin, 2006. See also Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair Trade for All. How Trade Can Promote Development, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. Joseph E. Stieglitz, ‘The free-­trade charade’, Project Syndicate, 14 July 2013: www. projectsysndicate.org (accessed 25 September 2013). For a critique of New Public Management in China and in the West, see Paolo Urio, China, the West and the Myth of New Public Management. Neoliberalism and Its Discontents, London and New York, Routledge, 2012. For a critique of the Trade In Services Agreement (TISA), see Jane Kelsey, TISA Foul Play, Nyon, Switzerland, Uni Global Union, 2017, available at: www.uniglo balunion.org/news/tisa-­foul-play. See, for example, the declaration of General Joseph Votel, Commander of the US Central Command, reported by Jeff Daniels, ‘General calls Iran “destabilizing” force, suggests US “disrupt” regime by military means’, CNBC, 29 March 2017: www.cnbc.com/2017/03/29/general-­c alls-iran-­destabilizing-force-­suggests-us-­ disrupt-regime-­by-military-­means.html (accessed 29 March 2017). See also Evelyn Cheng, ‘ “Five empires” threaten to replace US and Europe on the global stage, writer says’, CNBC, 30 March 2017: www.cnbc.com/2017/03/30/five-­empires-may-­ replace-the-­united-states-­on-global-­stage.html (accessed 30 March 2017). This article refers to ‘Bernard-­Henri Levy, a prolific [French] writer and widely followed philosopher [who] told CNBC … [that] Those five empires are …: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Islamic extremism and the commercial power of China’. Bruce Cumings, ‘A murderous history of Korea’, London Review of Books, 18 May 2017: www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n10/bruce-­cumings/a-­murderous-history-­of-korea (accessed 20 May 2017). For those not familiar with US political terminology: Beltway means the political and social world of Washington, DC, viewed especially as insular and exclusive. The article is an excellent history of US policy towards North Korea. Bruce Cumings is an Amer­ican historian of East Asia, professor, lecturer and author. He is the Gustavus F. and Ann M. Swift Distinguished Service Professor in History,

Understanding US strategy   185 101 102 103

104

105

106

107

108

and former chair of the history department at the University of Chicago, Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruce_Cumings (accessed 22 May 2017). See the critique of Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Why tax cuts for the rich resolve nothing’, Project Syndicate, 27 July 2017: www.project-­syndicate.org/commentary/tax-­cutsfor-­the-rich-­solve-nothing-­by-joseph-­e-stiglitz-­2017-07 (accessed 28 July 2017). See note 33, p. 174. William Hartung has calculated that the total spending on national security for the next fiscal year amounts to almost $1.1 trillion, well above the $931 billion of the Pentagon budget. This includes the Pentagon, the war budget, nuclear warheads, other defence, homeland security, military aid, intelligence, supporting veterans, military retirement and defence share of interest on the debt, the latter an impressive $100 billion per year. William Hartung, ‘The hidden cost of “national security”: ten ways your tax dollar pays for war – past, present, and future’, TomDispatch, 25 July 2017: www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176213/tomgram%3A_william_hartung,_trump_ for_the_defense (accessed 29 July 2017). Luis Lema, ‘Jeu de la mort autour du barrage de Tabqa’, Le Temps (Geneva), 30 March 2017, print edition. The same can be said about the situation in Mosul, where Iraqi military forces, supported by US airstrikes, special US military forces and military ‘advisers’, have launched a massive attack on ISIS that is already killing many civilians and is displacing dozens of thousands, and risks being worse than the attack on ISIS in Aleppo by Syrian military forces, supported by massive Russian airstrikes. US mainstream media manifested the same attitude in 2013 when the US accused Syria of a chemical weapon attack in Ghouta, a rebel-­held suburb of Damascus. Here again, the US government was not able to provide indisputable evidence. This is not to say that Syrian President Bashar al-­Assad is not responsible for crimes against his own people, but this is not a sufficient reason for manipulating information for the sake of finding a pretext justifying military intervention. On several occasions, the new president has also manifested a very strong will to resolve the North Korean nuclear threat and has put some additional pressure on Iran: Jonathan Marcus, ‘Why has Trump been so harsh on Iran?’, BBC News: www. bbc.com/news/world-­us-canada-­40006734 (accessed 26 May 2017). Simon Petite, ‘Donald Trump lâche les rebelles syriens’, Le Temps (Geneva), 21 July 2017; Alex Johnson, ‘Senate joins House in overwhelmingly passing new Russian sanctions’, NBC News: www.nbcnews.com/news/us-­news/senate-­joinshouse-­overwhelmingly-passing-­new-russian-­sanctions-n787291 (accessed 28 July 2017); Jim Brunsden and Courtney Weaver, ‘EU ready to retaliate against US sanctions on Russia’, Financial Times, 23 July 2017: www.ft.com/content/211de8006fbc-11e7-aca6-c6bd07df1a3c (accessed 15 July 2017). The New York Times reported that Mr. Putin said Russia had run out of patience waiting for relations with the United States to improve. ‘We waited for quite a long time that, perhaps, something will change for the better, we held out hope that the situation would somehow change. But, judging by everything, if it changes, it will not be soon.’ Mr. Putin said the staff reduction was meant to cause real discomfort for Washington and its representatives in Moscow.



Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Putin, responding to sanctions, orders U.S. to cut diplomatic staff by 755’, New York Times, 30 July 2017: www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/world/ europe/russia-­sanctions-us-­diplomats-expelled.html (accessed 31 July 2017). 109 ‘EU sounds alarm, urges US to coordinate on Russia sanctions’, EURACTIV.Com Reuters, 24 July 2017: www.euractiv.com/section/justice-­home-affairs/news/eu-­ sounds-alarm-­urges-u-­s-to-­coordinate-on-­russia-sanctions (accessed 31 July 2017); this site considers that ‘Several European nations, including Germany, are livid

186   Understanding US strategy because the new law would allow punishing companies working on pipelines from Russia, for example by limiting their access to US banks’, ibidem, 26 July 2017; Jorge Valero, ‘Eight European projects to be hit by US sanctions on energy sector’, EURACTIV.Com Reuters, 25 July 2017: www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/ eight-­european-projects-­to-be-­hit-by-­us-sanctions-­on-energy-­sector: Eight projects involving European companies could be affected by US sanctions if Congress passes a bill on Tuesday (25 July) to hit firms working with Russia in the energy sector. […] The legislation would punish any company working not only to develop, but also to upgrade and maintain, Russian-­related projects across the planet. This would place any European company involved with Russian pipelines in Europe under its scope. ‘This would be brutal,’ an EU official told EURACTIV.com. 110 Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, op. cit., p. xii, already mentioned above (p. 110) in a more complete quotation. 111 On the behaviour of US media, see: Myret Zaki, ‘Affaire Trump vs. médias’, Bilan (Geneva), 1 March 2017, p. 3: What is the problem here? What is the diagnosis? Are we now confronted with an authoritarian president who put the Amer­ican democracy in danger and does not accept the facts nor the contradictions, to the point that he menaces the freedom of expression? Or, are we facing a wider problem, that would imply the objectivity of the work of the media during the electoral campaign and after the inauguration of the unwanted president?

112 113

114

115

116 117

My free translation from the French. Myret Zaki is a Swiss-­Egyptian economist and chief editor of the Swiss economics magazine Bilan. She has published a book on the crisis of the US dollar: La fin du dollar. Comment le billet vert est devenu la plus grande bulle spéculative de l’histoire, Lausanne, Favre, 2011. On this point, see the article by Kagan, ‘Not fade away’, loc. cit. It is plausible that the difficulty the US establishment experiences in adapting to the changes occurring in the international system is due to the fact that its members are trained in universities where, most of the time, they learn the ideology of the Founding Fathers that I have analysed at the beginning of this chapter. See: Henry Heller, The Capitalist University. The Transformations of Higher Education in the United States since 1945, London, Pluto Press, 2016. It would be more appropriate to speak about Anglo-­Saxon geopolitics as suggested by Bordonaro, La geopolica anglosassone, op. cit, pp.  7–8. In fact, given that the UK first and then the US were the dominating powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is not surprising that the first authors who put forward the idea of the importance of geography have been British and Amer­ican, for example, Alfred T. Mahan (1840–1914) and Halford J. Mackinder (1861–1947), to whom we can add Nicholas J. Spykman (1893–1943), an Amer­ican of Dutch origin. Christopher Fettweis, ‘Sir Halford Mackinder, geopolitics and policymaking in the XXI century’, Parameters, 2000, pp. 58–71. Harold J. Mackinder, ‘The geographical pivot of history’, Geographical Journal, no. 23, 1904, pp. 421–437, and Demo­ cratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1966. See Klaus Dodds and James D. Sidaway, ‘Halford Mackinder and the “geographical pivot”: a centennial retrospective’, Geographical Journal, vol. 170, December 2004, pp. 292–297. Edward Luttwak, ‘From geopolitics to geo-­economics’, The National Interest, no. 20, Summer 1990, pp.  17–24; Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1979; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan. How to Conduct the

Understanding US strategy   187

118 119 120

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US–Soviet Contest, New York, The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986, and The Grand Chessboard. Amer­ican Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, Basic Books, 1997. Kagan, The Return of History, op. cit. Kagan, ‘Backing into World War III’, loc. cit. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, op. cit., and ‘Toward a global realignment: as its era of global dominance ends, the United States needs to take the lead in realigning the global power architecture’, The Amer­ican Interest, 17 April 2016: www.the-­ Amer­ican-interest.com/2016/04/17/toward-­a-global-­realignment (accessed 30 June 2016). It is interesting to note that the enumeration of US strengths does not include culture, soft power or smart power. For a comment on Brzezinski’s global strategy towards Russia, see Mettan, Creating Russophobia, op. cit., ch. 8, especially pp. 256–260. Robert Kaplan, ‘The revenge of history’, Foreign Policy, May–June 2009: www. foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4862 (accessed 24 March 2010), and ‘The geography of Chinese power: how far can Beijing reach on land and sea?’, Foreign Affairs, 1 May 2010: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-05-01/ geography-­chinese-power (accessed 20 May 2010). US Department of State, Office of the Historian, A Short History of the Department of State, Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, Key Milestones 1750–2000: https://history.state.gov/milestones (accessed 18 April 2017). The introduction informs the reader that: Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations provides a general overview of the history of U.S. engagement with the world through short essays on important moments, or milestones, in the diplomatic history of the United States. The basic objective of these essays is to provide a clear, accurate, narrative account of the events being discussed, with a brief discussion of each event’s significance for U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic history. The publication is divided into 19 chapters covering time periods from 1750 until 2000, with brief introductions providing context for each period.



Let us note that the milestones ‘Annexation of Hawaii, 1898’, ‘The Korean War, 1950–1953’, ‘The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)’, ‘Trilateral Diplomacy: the United States, Western Europe and Japan’ and ‘Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, 1991 and 1993’ have been removed ‘pending review to ensure it meets our standards for accuracy and clarity. The revised article will be posted as soon as it is ready. In the meantime, we apologize for any inconvenience, and we thank you for your patience’. Moreover, the Office has recently published the following note to readers, posted on 9 May 2017: This publication, ‘Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations,’ has been retired. The text remains online for reference purposes, but it is no longer being maintained or expanded. Why retire ‘Milestones’? The Office of the Historian recently reviewed its online offerings and concluded that extensive resources would be needed to revise and expand this publication to meet the Office’s standards for accuracy and comprehensiveness. At the same time, the events described in the ‘Milestones’ essays are amply covered by numerous respected secondary sources. Rather than duplicate these efforts, the Office of the Historian has decided to focus its resources on areas where it is uniquely suited to make a contribution, such as coverage of the Department of State’s institutional history. In keeping with the publication’s new status, it can now be found under ‘More Resources’ in the site-­wide menu.

https://history.state.gov/milestones (accessed 21 May 2017). 123 The frequencies of other events: invasion 96, annexation 20, purchase 41, acquisition 7, embargo 50, openings (of countries) 27, dispute 69 and interventions 78.

188   Understanding US strategy 124 George Kennan, ‘The sources of Soviet conduct’, Foreign Affairs, July 1947: www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-­federation/1947-07-01/sources-­soviet-conduct (accessed 15 May 2017); see also Louis Menand, ‘Getting real: George F. Kennan’s Cold War’, New Yorker, 14 November 2011: www.newyorker.com/maga zine/2011/11/14/getting-­real# (accessed 16 May 2017); Matthew Rojansky, ‘George Kennan is still the Russia expert America needs’, Foreign Policy, 22 December 2016: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/22/why-­george-kennan-­is-still-­americasmost-­relevant-russia-­expert-trump-­putin-ussr (accessed 16 May 2017). Matthew Rojansky is the director of the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. He is an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the US executive secretary of the Dartmouth Conference, a track-­two US–Russian conflict resolution initiative begun in 1960. 125 US Department of State, Office of the Historian, ‘George Kennan and containment’, op. cit.: https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-­history/kennan (accessed 21 May 2017). 126 Yan Xuetong, ‘Inside the China–U.S. competition for strategic partners’, The World Post, no date: www.huffingtonpost.com/yan-­xuetong/china-­us-competitionallies_b_8449178.html (accessed 17 May 2017); Timothy R. Heath, ‘China and the U.S. alliance system’, The Diplomat, 11 June 2014: http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/ china-­and-the-­u-s-­alliance-system (accessed 6 May 2017); Richard Bush, ‘America’s alliances and security partnerships in East Asia: introduction’, Brookings, 1 July 2016: www.brookings.edu/wp-­content/uploads/2016/07/Paper-­1.pdf (accessed 6 May 2017); Larry Wortzel, ‘Change partners: who are America’s military and economic allies in the XXI century?’, Heritage Foundation, 6 June 2005: www.heritage. org/defense/report/change-­partners-who-­are-americas-­military-and-­economic-allies-­ the-21st-century (accessed 6 May 2017). 127



128

The Cable News Network (CNN) is an Amer­ican basic cable and satellite television news channel owned by the Turner Broadcasting System division of Time Warner. It was founded in 1980 by Amer­ican media proprietor Ted Turner as a 24-hour cable news channel. […] CNN has also been accused of having a left-­ wing bias, most notably during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election between the now 45th U.S. President Donald Trump (who has targeted the network multiple times) and former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CNN (accessed 27 May 2017). Author’s comment: by ‘left-­wing bias’ one should understand that CNN is generally favourable to the Democratic Party, which, although to the left of the Republican Party, cannot be reasonably considered as a left-­wing party by international standards. Each year, NED makes more than 1,200 grants to support the projects of non-­ governmental groups abroad who are working for democratic goals in more than 90 countries. Since its founding in 1983, the Endowment has remained on the leading edge of democratic struggles everywhere, while evolving into a multifaceted institution that is a hub of activity, resources and intellectual exchange for activists, practitioners and scholars of democracy the world over.

www.ned.org/about (accessed 17 May 2017). 129 www.usaid.gov (accessed 12 February 2017). 130 US Department of State, Office of the Historian, ‘National Security Act of 1947’, A Short History of the Department of State, op. cit.: https://history.state.gov/milestones (accessed 15 May 2017). The National Security Act of 1949 establishes the new organization for US security. 131 On this last point, see: Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies. Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe, London and New York, Frank Cass, 2005.

Understanding US strategy   189 132 Blum, Rogue State, op. cit. 133 Among the vast literature on the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union, see the interesting and unusual interpretation of the French historian and demographer, Emmanuel Todd, The Final Fall. An Essay on the Decomposition of the Soviet Sphere, New York, Karz Publishers, 1979. 134 The term ‘great expectations’ is due to Bacevich, ‘The age of great expectations and the great void’, loc. cit. 135 See, for example: R. Bernstein and R. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, New York, Vintage, 1998; Bill Gertz, The China Threat. How the People’s Republic Targets America, Washington, DC, Regnery Publishing, 2000; Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China, New York, Random House, 2001. 136 Jonathan Fenby, Will China Dominate the XXI Century?, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2017. 137 Among the numerous books on these topics, see: Ross Terrill, The New Chinese Empire and What It Means for the United States, New York, Basis Books, 2003; Oded Shenkar, The Chinese Century. The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global Economy, the Balance of Power, and Your Job, Upper Saddle River, NJ, Wharton School Publishing, 2005; Eamonn Filgleton, In the Jaws of the Dragon. America’s Fate in the Coming Era of Chinese Dominance, New York, St. Martin Press, 2008; C. Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek J. Mitchell, China. The Balance Sheet – What the World Needs to Know Now about the Emerg­ ing Superpower, Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institute for International Economics, New York, Public Affairs, 2006; C. Fred Bergsten, Charles Freeman, Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek J. Mitchell, China’s Rise. Challenges and Opportunities, Washington, DC, Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009. 138 Let me quote a few such reports. Two reports from the influential Brookings Institution: Philippe Le Corre and Jonathan Pollack, ‘China’s global rise: can the EU and US pursue a coordinated strategy?’, Brookings Institution, October 2016, which sustains the necessity of close cooperation between the US and the EU to contain China’s rise; Myreya Solis, ‘The Trans-­Pacific Partnership: the politics of openness and leadership in the Asia-­Pacific’, Brookings Institution, October 2016, which supports this partnership for maintaining US leadership in Asia; and a report by the very influential Council on Foreign Relations: Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Revising US grand strategy toward China’, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report no. 72, March 2015. 139 Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt Campbell, ‘Xi Jinping on the global stage: Chinese foreign policy under a powerful but exposed leader’, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 74, February 2016. To be completed by a study by the RAND Corporation: David Gompert et al., War with China. Thinking the Unthink­ able, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2016. 140 See, for example: Order from Chaos Project, ‘Building situations of strength: a national security strategy for the United States’, Foreign Policy in a Troubled World, Foreign Policy at Brookings, February 2017, written by several authors, among them Robert Kagan: Vladimir Putin’s vision of international order is fundamentally at odds with the interests of the United States. Putin believes that the U.S.-led post-­war order weakens his hold on power and denies Russia the regional and global influence it deserves. He has made it his mission to weaken this order. Putin would replace it with spheres of influence in which major powers are preeminent in their respective regions and they all have a roughly equal say on matters of global importance. Russia will act unilaterally to defend its interests and to gain leverage over the West, including by means of military intervention; active

190   Understanding US strategy measures against Western democracies; greater reliance on Russia’s nuclear arsenal; and cyber-­warfare.

Moreover, the report says that in Europe, the United States must block and deter Russian aggression wherever it violates the principles of the international order and thereby impinges on our interests and those of our friends and allies. Once deterrence has been re-­established and the parameters of a new equilibrium are clear, the United States should be willing to negotiate a modus vivendi with Moscow that respects Russia’s interests and those of the United States and our European allies and partners consistent with the principles of the international order [that America made].

Order from Chaos Project, ‘Building situations of strength’, pp. vii and ix. 141 President Obama, ‘State of the Union Address 2016’, The White House, 13 January 2016: www.whitehouse.gov/the-­press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-­president-barack-­ obama-%E2%80%93-prepared-­delivery-state-­union-address (accessed 17 May 2017). 142 Ibidem. 143 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Commencement Address to the United States Air Force Academy’, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2 June 2016: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-­press-office/2016/06/02/remarks-­ president-commencement-­address-united-­states-air-­force-academy (accessed 17 May 2017). 144 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement ceremony’, U.S. Military Academy–West Point, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 28 May 2014: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ the-­press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-­president-united-­states-military-­academycommencement-­ceremony (accessed 17 May 2017). 145 Barack Obama ‘Commencement speech at the U.S. Air Force Academy’, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 23 May 2012: https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/the-­press-office/2012/05/23/remarks-­president-air-­force-academy-­ commencement (accessed 17 May 2017). 146 Kagan, The World America Made, op. cit. 147 Brzezinski, ‘Toward a global realignment’, loc. cit. 148



Gary Warren Hart […] is an Amer­ican politician, diplomat, and lawyer. He is perhaps best known for being the front-­runner for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination until he dropped out over allegations of an extramarital affair […]. When Lois Romano, a reporter for The Washington Post, asked Hart to respond to rumors spread by other campaigns that he was a ‘womanizer’, Hart said such candidates were ‘not going to win that way, because you don’t get to the top by tearing someone else down.’ The New York Post reported that comment on its front page with the headline lead in ‘Straight from the Hart’, followed below with big, black block letters: ‘GARY: “I’M NO WOMANIZER.” ’, and then a summary of the story: ‘Dem blasts rivals over sex life rumours’.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gary_Hart (accessed 21 May 2017). It is amazing how history repeats itself in the US presidential campaigns! But it did not work for Trump. 149 This book, The Grand Chessboard. Amer­ican Primacy and Its Geostrategic Impera­ tives, op. cit., was preceded by the publication of an article summarizing the forthcoming book: Brzezinski, ‘A geostrategy for Eurasia’, loc. cit. Clearly, Brzezinski was inspired by Mackinder, ‘The geographical pivot of history’, loc. cit., and Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, op. cit., according to whom the country that could integrate Europe, Asia and Africa would dominate the world. In 1997,

Understanding US strategy   191 Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in 1977–1981, was Counsellor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Professor of Foreign Policy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. 150 Brzezinski, ‘A geostrategy for Eurasia’, loc. cit. It is interesting to note that in this article Brzezinski agrees with the statement of President Clinton ‘when he says America has become the world “indispensable nation” ’. The title of a section of the article is ‘The indispensable power’. 151 Ibidem. Brzezinski also encourages the enlargement of NATO and the EU: Enlargement of NATO and the EU would also reinvigorate Europe’s waning sense of a larger vocation while consolidating, to the benefit of both America and Europe, the democratic gains won through the successful end of the Cold War. At stake in this effort is nothing less than America’s long-­range relationship with Europe. A new Europe is still taking shape, and if that Europe is to remain part of the ‘Euro-­Atlantic’ space, the expansion of NATO is essential.

See also Brzezinski’s timetable for realizing these objectives, which is in fact an accurate forecast of what was really going to happen in the following decade, especially in regard to Ukraine. 152 See, for example, the last book by one of the most renowned Amer­ican sinologists, David Shambaugh, China’s Future, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016. But be reassured, China will not dominate the twenty-­first century, if you follow the demonstration by Fenby, Will China Dominate the XXI Century?, op. cit.; the answer is given in the last chapter, entitled ‘China will not dominate the XXI century’, pp. 117–131. 153 TomDispatch website: www.tomdispatch.com. 154 Dower, The Violent Amer­ican Century, op. cit. John W. Dower is professor emeritus of history at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 155



President Obama’s Asia strategy represents a significant shift in Amer­ican foreign policy from a Middle Eastern/European focus to an East/South Asian one. Previously, the Clinton and Bush administrations deployed significant naval and air weapons systems to Guam and Japan, cooperated with Singapore by constructing an aircraft carrier facility at Changi Naval Base, and strengthened U.S. bilateral defense cooperation with Japan and the Philippines. The Bush administration assigned an additional aircraft carrier to the Pacific theater and the Pentagon announced in 2005 that it would deploy 60 percent of U.S. submarines to Asia. […] Additional focus was placed on the region with the Obama administration’s 2012 ‘Pivot to East Asia’ regional strategy, whose key areas of actions are: ‘strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-­based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.’ […] There has been strong perception from China that all of these are part of US’ China containment policy. Proponents of this theory claim that the United States needs a weak, divided China to continue its hegemony in Asia. This is accomplished, the theory claims, by the United States establishing military, economic, and diplomatic ties with countries adjacent to China’s borders. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Asian_foreign_policy_of_the_Barack_Obama_ administration (accessed 22 May 2017). On the US pivot to Asia, see Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘The Amer­ican pivot to Asia’, Foreign Policy, 21 December 2011: http:// foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/21/the-­Amer­ican-pivot-­to-asia (accessed 7 June 2014); Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific century’, Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011: http:// foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-­pacific-century (accessed 7 June 2014).

192   Understanding US strategy 156 In the same sense, see Le Corre and Pollack, ‘China’s global rise’, op. cit. 157 The 12 countries of the TPP: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US (until 23 January 2017) and Vietnam. On the strategy for containing China, see Alfred W. McCoy, ‘Grandmaster of the Great Game: Obama’s geopolitical strategy for containing China’, Tom Dispatch, 17 September 2015: www.tomdispatch.com/post/176044/tomgram:_alfred_ mccoy,_maintaining_Amer­ican_supremacy_in_the_twenty-­first_century (accessed 18 September 2015). 158 For a critique of the procedure called ‘Investor-­state dispute settlement (ISDS)’, see Pia Eberhardt, ‘The zombie ISDS: rebranded as ICS, rights for corporations to sue states refuse to die’, Corporate Europe Observatory, March 2016. 159 For detailed critical analysis, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Monopoly’s new era’, Project Syndicate, 13 May 2016: www.projectsyndicate.org (accessed 16 May 2016); Lori Wallach, ‘A dangerous new manifesto for global capitalism’, Le Monde Diplomatique, English edition, February 1998: http://mondediplo.com/1998/02/07mai (accessed 23 May 2017), ‘The corporation invasion’, Le Monde Diplomatique, English edition, December 2013: http://mondediplo.com/2013/12/02tafta (accessed 22 May 2017), and ‘The choice is not between TPP or no trade’, Huffington Post, 25 March 2017: www. huffingtonpost.com/lori-­wallach/the-­choice-is-­not-between_b_9541300.html (accessed 15 May 2017); Jane Kelsey, ‘International civil society demands end to secrecy in TPPA talks’, media release, 16 February 2011: http://tppwatch.org (accessed 29 March 2011); Wolf Jäcklein, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: ten threats to Europeans’, Le Monde Diplomatique, 14 June 2014: http://mondediplo. com/2014/06/11ttip (accessed 23 May 2017); Lori Wallach, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: ten threats to Amer­icans’: http://mondediplo. com/2014/06/10ttip (accessed 23 May 2017). In favour of these treaties, see Peter S. Rashish, Bridging the Pacific: The Americas’ New Economic Frontier?, Atlantic Council, Global Business and Economic Program, July 2014; Andrea Montanino and Earl Anthony Wayne, The Arguments for TTIP and the Concerns to Address, Atlantic Council, Global Business and Economic Program, April 2016; on the back page of these documents one can learn that ‘The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that promotes constructive US leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting today’s global challenges’. 160 Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, NAFTA’s 20-Year Legacy and the Fate of the Trans-­Pacific Partnership, Public Citizen, February 2014, available at: www.tradewatch.org (accessed 4 April 2015). For a different opinion, see Dany Bahar, ‘When renegotiating NAFTA, Trump should re-­evaluate his premises on international trade’, Brookings, 17 August 2017: www.brookings.edu/blog/up-­front/2017/08/17/ when-­renegotiating-nafta-­trump-should-­re-evaluate-­his-premises-­on-international-­ trade (accessed 20 August 2017): most of these jobs weren’t lost to Mexico or any other country. They were lost to increases in productivity. Only very few jobs losses in the U.S. can be attributed to NAFTA. Given that more than half of U.S. imports from Mexico are intermediate goods, it means that NAFTA has allowed Amer­ican firms to become more competitive in making final goods, and thus able to hire more and to export more.

See also in the same sense: J. Bradford DeLong, ‘NAFTA and other trade deals have not gutted Amer­ican manufacturing – period’, Vox, 24 January 2017: www.vox. com/the-­big-idea/2017/1/24/14363148/trade-­deals-nafta-­wto-china-­job-loss-­trump (accessed 31 January 2017). 161 David M. Edelstein and Ronald R. Krebs, ‘Delusion of grand strategy: the problem with Washington’s planning obsession’, Foreign Affairs, 11 September 2015: www.foreign

Understanding US strategy   193

162

163 164 165 166

167 168 169

170

171 172

affairs.com/print/1115584 (accessed 22 May 2016). David M. Edelstein is Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, the Center for Security Studies, and the Department of Government at Georgetown University. Ronald R. Krebs is the Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. For the reader interested in documents published on US strategy towards China, in addition to the references already given above and the US official documents, I suggest consulting, for example, the reports of Chatham House, the Brookings programme ‘Order from Chaos’, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Jamestown Foundation and the Council of Foreign Relations. Radio Report by President Truman to the Amer­ican People on the Potsdam Conference, available at: www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/?pid=104 (accessed 20 May 2015). See, for example: Dower, The Violent Amer­ican Century, op. cit. According to estimates by Statista, ‘The countries holding the world’s nuclear arsenal’: https://statista.com (accessed 20 June 2017). The last time Europe acted on its own initiative was in 1956 when Israel, the UK and France intervened in Egypt after the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. But then the US put an end to this intervention by very clearly informing the European allies that from then on, such a decision could not be taken without its consent. Hartung, ‘The hidden cost of “national security” ’, loc. cit. Data from Sipri, quoted by the Statista website: www.statista.com (accessed 22 May 2017), and the RAND report in the next note. See, for example: Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.–China Military Scorecard. Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996–2017, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2015. This report was commissioned by the US Air Force, but was conducted independently and does not necessarily conform to the views or analyses of that service, the US military or the US government. Nevertheless, these demands for more military development from the US military-­industrial complex could be interpreted as a tactical discourse for obtaining more investment from the US Congress. David Vine, Base Nation. How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2015, pp. 19–22. For an in-­depth analysis of US bases, see the whole book, and for a recent update: ‘Forty-­five blows against democracy: how U.S. military bases back dictators, autocrats, and military regimes’, TomDispatch, 16 May 2017: www.tomdispatch.com (accessed 16 May 2017). For the Middle East, see David Vine, ‘Doubling down on a failed strategy: the Pentagon’s dangerous “new” base plan’, TomDispatch, 14 January 2016: www.tomdispatch.com/ post/176090/tomgram%3A_david_vine%2C_enduring_bases%2C_enduring_war_in_ the_middle_east/#more (accessed 14 November 2016). Vine, Base Nation, op. cit., pp. 22–25, 41. For an analysis of who profits from the construction of bases, see ibidem, pp. 215–231. A Cooperative Security Location (CSL) is a U.S. military term for facilities used for regional training in counterterrorism and interdiction of drug trafficking, and also to provide contingency access to continental areas. ‘A CSL is a host-­nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. personnel presence, which may contain pre-­positioned equipment and/or logistical arrangements and serve both for security cooperation activities and contingency access.’ These sites were established as the Pentagon began to address regional threats primarily in Africa and Latin America following its 2004 global posture review. They are sometimes referred to as ‘lily pads.’ The establishment of such bases has accelerated under the Obama administration, especially with the pivot to the Asia Pacific region and increased operations in Africa.

194   Understanding US strategy 173 174 175 176

177

178 179

180 181 182

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cooperative_Security_Location (accessed 28 May 2017). Vine, Base Nation, op. cit., pp. 318–319. At the end of the Second World War, the US controlled more than 2,000 bases and 30,000 installations overseas. At the end of the Cold War, the US controlled 1,600 bases overseas; ibidem, pp. 335–338. Vine, ‘Forty-­five blows against democracy’, loc. cit. ‘The coming war on China’, New Internationalist, 6 December 2016: https://newint. org/features/2016/12/01/the-­coming-war-­on-china (accessed 26 November 2016). This article refers to the documentary of the same title by investigative journalist John Pilger. New Internationalist is an ‘independent, non-­profit, publishing co-­ operative, based in Oxford, United Kingdom. Predominantly known for its monthly independent magazine, it describes itself as existing to “cover stories the mainstream media sidestep and provide alternative perspectives on today’s global critical issues”.’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Internationalist (accessed 6 June 2017). The same can be said of other countries like Russia. For an analysis of the US bases from a Chinese point of view, see Wang Hui, ‘Okinawa and two dramatic changes to the regional order’, in The Politics of Imagining Asia, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2011, ch.­5, pp. 228–263. Schriver and Ma, ‘The next steps in Japan–NATO cooperation’, loc. cit.; Nazemroaya, The Globalization of NATO, op. cit. Scott Snyder, ‘South Korea’s decision to halt THAAD carries hidden risks’, Forbes, 11 June 2017: www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/11/south-­koreasdecision-­to-halt-­thaad-carries-­hidden-risks/#17165358429a (accessed 13 June 2017). Cumings, ‘A murderous history of Korea’, loc. cit. ‘Doctrine’ is a term normally used in the US to qualify the foreign policy defined by US presidents. Remember the speech by President Obama quoted above: As Commander-­in-Chief, I have not shied from using force when necessary. I have ordered tens of thousands of young Amer­icans into combat. I have sat by their bedside sometimes when they come home. I’ve ordered military action in seven countries. There are times when force is necessary, and if Iran does not abide by this deal, it’s possible that we don’t have an alternative.



‘Remarks by President Obama on the Iran Nuclear Deal’, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 5 August 2015, Amer­ican University, Washington, DC: https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-­press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-­president-iran-­ nuclear-deal (accessed 7 March 2016). 183 Nick Turse, ‘The new Obama doctrine: a six-­point plan for global war – special ops, drones, spy games, civilian soldiers, proxy fighters, and cyber warfare’, Tom Dispatch, 14 June 2012: www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175557nick_turse_changing_ face_of_empire (accessed 10 June 2016); The Changing Face of the Empire. Special Ops, Drones, Spies, Proxy Fighters, Secret Bases, and Cyberwarfare, Chicago, IL, Haymarket Books and Dispatch Books, 2012; the update especially devoted to Africa: Tomorrow’s Battlefields. US Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa, Chicago, IL, Haymarket Books and Dispatch Books, 2015; as well as his regular updates published online by TomDispatch: www.tomdispatch.com. Nick Turse is a journalist and historian, managing director of TomDispatch and a fellow at the Nation Institute. 184 Nick Turse, ‘The year of the commando’, TomDispatch, 5 January 2017: www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176227/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_special_ops,_shadow_wars,_ and_the_golden_age_of_the_gray_zone (accessed 5 March 2017), that gives several maps on which you can locate the location of the operations.

Understanding US strategy   195 185 Nick Turse, ‘Commands without borders: America’s elite troops partner with African forces but pursue US aims’, TomDispatch, 18 December 2016: www. tomdispatch.com/blog/176223/tomgram%3A_nick_turse%2C_washington%27s_ america-­first_commandos_in_africa (accessed 3 January 2017). See also Nick Turse, ‘America’s war-­fighting footprint in Africa: secret U.S. military documents reveal a constellation of Amer­ican military bases across that continent’, TomDispatch, 27 April 2017: www.tomdispatch.com/post/176272/tomgram%3A_nick_turse%2C_ the_u.s._military_moves_deeper_into_africa (accessed 28 April 2017). 186 Turse, ‘America’s war-­fighting footprint in Africa’, loc. cit. 187 See Blum, op. cit., for regime change; and for interference in electoral processes, see the instructive classical example of the re-­election of Boris Yeltsin in 1993: Michael Kramer, ‘Rescuing Boris’, Time, 24 June 2001: http://content.time.com/time/ printout/0,8816,136204,00.html (accessed 10 June 2017). See also, for a general appreciation: Owen Jones, ‘Amer­icans can spot election meddling because they’ve been doing it for years’, Guardian, 5 January 2017: www.theguardian.com/com mentisfree/2017/jan/05/Amer­icans-­spot-election-­meddling-doing-­years-vladimir-­ putin-donald-­trump (accessed 13 June 2017); Dov H. Levin, ‘Sure, the US and Russia often meddle in foreign elections. Does it matter?’, Washington Post, 7 September 2016: www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-­cage/wp/2016/09/07/sure-­ the-u-­s-and-­russia-often-­meddle-in-­foreign-elections-­does-it-­matter/?utm_term=. ca54b59ff042 (accessed 13 June 2017). 188 Full text of the Chinese proposal by Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, Reform the Inter­ national Monetary System, available online at the Bank of China website: www.pbc. gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col = 6500&id = 168 (accessed 23 March 2009). 189 Swift, ‘RMB internationalization stalls in 2006’: www.swift.com (accessed 7 March 2017); ‘Will the Belt and Road revitalise RMB internationalisation’, RMB Tracker Special Report, July 2017: www.swift.com/news-­events/press-­releases/rmb-­ internationalisation_can-­the-belt-­and-road-­revitalise-the-­rmb_ (accessed 28 July 2017); and ‘Worldwide currency usage and trends’, information paper prepared by Swift in collaboration with the City of London and Paris EUROPLACE, March 2017, p. 3. 190 See Zaki, La fin du dollar, op. cit. 191 ‘Japan would consider joining China-­led AIIB if doubts are dispelled, Abe says’, Japan Times, 16 May 2017: www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/05/16/business/ japan-­consider-joining-­china-led-­aiib-doubts-­dispelled-abe-­says/#.WUlUb-­lZ6Uk (accessed 15 June 2017), and ‘China welcomes Abe’s interest in Silk Road initiative’, Japan Times, 6 June 2017: www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/06/national/ politics-­diplomacy/china-­welcomes-abes-­interest-silk-­road-initiative/#.WUlVlulZ6Uk (accessed 16 June 2017). 192 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism. Afterthoughts on Material Civiliza­ tion and Capitalism, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, pp. 113–114. 193 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, pp.  5–6; The Future of Power, New York, Public Affairs, 2011, pp. xiii–xviii, 3–24, 81–109. 194 Nye, Soft Power, op. cit., p. 8. 195 It is interesting to compare the implementation of Amer­ican ‘soft power’ towards China and Russia. See Mettan, Creating Russophobia, op. cit., ch. 8, ‘Amer­ican Russophobia: the dictatorship of freedom’, pp. 240–276, with several references to the activities of Amer­ican NGOs. 196 François Jullien, The Silent Transformations, London, Seagull, 2011, pp.  82–83. And, more generally, ch. 7, ‘The fluidity of life (or how one is already the other)’, pp. 81–99. See also above (Chapter­1, pp. 15–19) on how the economic consultant André Chieng analyses these phenomena.

5 China’s strategy for reclaiming world power status Putting an end to the ‘world America made’

Since ancient times, China has established relationships with other countries. Whereas in some cases this has meant conquest by force at the periphery of what is generally accepted to be ‘the Chinese space’, most of the time these contacts have been motivated by the interest in other cultures and by the will to develop commercial exchanges without territorial conquest. The famous Chinese historian Sima Qian has reported the exploration of Central Asia (and beyond) by the imperial envoy Zhang Qian between the second and first centuries bc. After translating Sima Qian, the French sinologist Jacques Pimpaneau synthesizes Zhang’s life as follows: ‘He lived and took wife amongst these people of the West [of Asia] […] and defended the idea, not of armed conquest but of cultural and commercial exchanges on an equal footing.’1 It is significant to acknowledge that in 2013, President Xi Jinping, announcing the launch of the new ‘One Belt One Road’, came back to Zhang Qian’s travels: Over 2100 years ago during China’s Han Dynasty, a Chinese envoy Zhang Qian was sent to Central Asia with a mission of peace and friendship. His journey opened the door to friendly contacts between China and Central Asian countries as well as the Silk Road linking East and West, Asia and Europe.2 The purpose of this book is to explain why and how China has developed this strategy in modern times. It started to take form during the last decades of the empire, and underwent an increasingly spectacular development with Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, and even more from the beginning of the twenty-­first century when China established commercial and financial exchanges with foreign countries all over the world. The ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative is the last and comprehensive development of this strategy that will be analysed in the last part of this chapter.

Map 5.1  Map of China’s Provinces. Source: d-maps, URL: http://d-maps.com/m/asia/china/chine/chine29.pdf.

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