China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution And Japan 0674116607, 9780674116603

Challenging most accounts of China's revolutionary transformation at the turn of the century, Douglas Reynolds argu

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Table of contents :
China, 1898–1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan
Preface: The Making of an Idea
I A Golden Decade? A Xinzheng Revolution?
A Golden Decade?
A Xinzheng Revolution?
Part One: The Japanese Role and Its Background
2 Prelude to the Golden Decade
3 Japan's Double-Pronged Strategy: Military and Non-Military
Military Strategy
Non-Military Strategy
The Hundred Days Reform
After the Hundred Days
Part Two: The Xinzheng Intellectual Revolution: New Carriers, New Concepts
4. Chinese Students and Their Schools in Japan
Advocacy of Study in Japan
Numbers of Chinese Students in Japan
Schools for Chinese Students in Japan
The Life of Chinese Students in Japan
Boosters of Study in Japan
Contributions to China
5. Japanese Teachers and Advisers in China
Japanese Educational Initiatives in China
Beijing Dongwen Xueshe under Nakajima Saishi, 1901-1906
Leading Teachers and Advisers during Chinas 'Age of the Japanese Teacher"
Contract Terms and Teaching Conditions
The Language Barrier and Japanese-Language Instruction
Sino-Japanese Cooperation in Education
The Japanese Teachers at San-Jiang Normal School in Nanjing
Chinas New Normal Schools in the 'Age of the Japanese Teacher"
Why Not Westerners? ... and the Factor of Christianity
Not a "Failure"
6. Translations and Modern Terminology
Gearing Up to the Task
Textbooks and Encyclopedias
Publishing and the Commercial Press (Shangwu Yinshu Guan)
The Translators: Brokers of Modernity
Modern Terminology: From Japanese into Chinese
Part Three: The Xinzheng Institutional Revolution: New Leaders, New Directions
7 Chinese Educational Reforms: The Japanese Model
Training "Men of Real Talent"
The Special Impact of Study Missions
Tongwen and Ti-yong: The Viability of Conservative Reform
Abolition of the Examination System
8. Chinese Military Modernization and Japan
Chinese Military Training in Japan
Japanese Military Instructors and Advisers in China, and the Japanese Military Model
View of a Chinese Military Historian
9. China's New Police and Prison Systems
Chinas New Police System
Police Functions
Police Training in Japan
Police Training in China: Kawashima Naniwa and the Beijing Police Academy, 1901-1912
Police Reform in Zhili Province under Yuan Shikai
You ming you shi (Both Name and Reality)
The Need for Comparative Research on "Organizational Transfer''
The Beijing Police Academy and Comparative Research
China's 'New Prison System
The Case of Zhili
Reforms at the National Level and Dr. Ogawa Shigejirō
10. Chinese Legal, Judicial, and Constitutional Reforms
Chinese Legal Reforms
Criminal Law Reform and Dr. Okada Asatarō
Civil Law and Matsuoka Yoshimasa
Commercial Law Reforms and Shida Kōtarō
Chinese Judicial Reforms
Chinese Constitutional Reform: Resources and Interpretations
Toward Constitutional Government
Interpreting the Late-Qing Revolution
Japan: The Missing Key
Directions for Future Research
Appendix Notes References Glossary-Index
Appendix: The Reform Edict
Harvard East Asian Monographs
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China, I8g8-1912

Harvard East Aszan Monographs, r6o

Douglas R. Reynolds

Distributed by HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London

China, 18g8-1912

The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan


Copyright © I993 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America The Council on East Asian Studies at Harvard University publishes a monograph series and, through the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research and the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, administers research projects designed to further scholarly understanding of China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Inner Asia, and adjacent areas. All illustrations, except for Illustration 7, are reproduced from Abe Hiroshi, Chii.goku no kindai kyoiku to Mey·i Nihon (I990 ), with the kind permission of Professor Abe and the cooperation of his publisher, Fukumura Shuppan. The page numbers on which they originally appeared in Chii.goku no kindai kyoiku to Meiji Nihon are as follows: Illus. I, p. 93; Illus. 2, p. 99; Illus. 3, p. I67; Illus. 4, p. I35; Illus. 5, p. I6I; Illus. 6, p. I6I; Illus. 8, p. 201; Illus. 9, p. I27; Illus. ro, p. I27; Illus. II, p. I$ Illus. I2, p. 46; Illus. I3, p. 46; Illus. I4, p. I84. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Reynolds, Douglas Robertson, I944China, I898-I9I2: the xinzheng revolution and Japan I Douglas R. Reynolds. p. em. - (Harvard East Asian Monographs ; I6o) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN o-674-II66o-7 I. China- History-I86I-I9I2. 2. China- Relations-Japan. 3· Japan- Relations- China. .4· Education- China- History-To I9I2. I. Title. II. Series. DS76I.R47 I993 95I' .035- dc20 92-4I724 CIP Index by Douglas R. Reynolds

To my parents Drs. Hubert and (the late) Harriet Reynolds missionary educators in China and the Philippines cultural anthropologists social activists

Acknowledgments Without the timely and generous support of many institutions and individuals, the ideas in this book could not have been developed nor the book itself written. Beginning in 1986, a summer stipend from the National Endowment for the Humanities, supplemented by a grant from the Northeast Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies, took me to Stanford University and its Hoover Institution for War, Revolution, and Peace, where the idea of a Golden Decade in modern Sino:Japanese relations, 18g81907, was born. Ramon Myers, Emiko Moffitt, and Maxine Douglas, all of Hoover Institutions' East Asian Collection, helped make that summer at Hoover a research experience perfect in every way. For the academic year 1g86-1g87, a postdoctoral research grant from the Joint Committee onJapanese Studies of the Social Science Research Council. and the American Council of Learned Societies took me to Japan, enabling concentrated research. By kind arrangement of Professor Eto Shinkichi, retired from the University ofTokyo and currently President of Asia University, the University of Tokyo served as my institutional host. Professor Ishii Akira of the School of Social Science, University of Tokyo, handled all details, making me feel welcome not just one year but two. An unexpected pleasure was my contact with Professor Abe Hiroshi of the National Institute for Educational Research in Tokyo, in connection with our many mutual research interests; it is Professor Abe who provided the illustrations for the present volume. My second year in Japan, 1987-1988, was made possible by a research grant from the History of Christianity in China Project (1985-1991), funded by the Henry Luce Foundation, Inc., of New York. My research topic under that grant, "Friction and Resistance in the Propagation of Japanese Buddhism in China, 18731945: A Comparison with Christianity," deepened my understandvii


ing of the Golden Decade era, since Chinese resistance to Japanese Buddhist missionary work peaked as a popular and diplomatic issue during the years 1904 to 1908. To Georgia State University, my home institution in Atlanta, I owe a double debt: in the short run, for granting me a second year's research leave in 1987-1988, with supplemental funding; and, in the long run, for permitting me annual one-quarter leaves in future contract years to allow me a full six months of each year with my wife, a Foreign Service Officer with the United States Department of State since 1987, and our children. Professor Gary M. Fink, chair of the History Department, was instrumental in each of these arrangements, and I am happy for the opportunity to express my thanks. My longest-term debt belongs to the late Professor John K. Fairbank, and Professors Et6 Shinkichi, Andrew Nathan, and Steven Levine, who over the years have written numerous letters in support of various research project proposals, including those leading to the present book. I am most grateful for their unfaltering support. During my more than two years of primary research in Japan, my wife Carol and our children Sara and Emily contributed more than they know by being "happy to be in Japan," and by their dayto-day sharing and achievements. Sara and Emily perhaps learned the most about Japanese life, by living it for three years in Japanese public schools and through their many good friendships with classmates. Florence Trefethen of the Council on East Asian Studies Publications, Harvard University, provided always timely advice, and her colleague Katherine Keenum truly fine editorial direction. In Atlanta, Carol Schlenker, copy editor and student in the Department of History, Georgia State University, lent a seasoned eye to the final editing. I dedicate this book to my parents, the cultural anthropologists Drs. Hubert and Harriet Reynolds, whose work as educational missionaries in China and the Philippines first brought me to Asia at the age of two. I regret that my mother, who died just six weeks after celebrating her Golden Wedding Anniversary on 12 June 1988, did not live to see the finished product.


Contents Acknowledgments Conventions



Preface: The Making of an Idea


Introduction A Golden Decade? A Xinzheng Revolution? A Golden Decade? 5 A Xinzheng Revolution?


Part One. The Japanese Role and Its Background 2


Prelude to the Golden Decade



3 Japan's Double-Pronged Strategy: Military and Non-Military 24 Military Strategy 24 Non-Military Strategy 27 The Hundred Days Reform 34 After the Hundred Days 36

Part Two. The Xinzheng Intellectual Revolution: New Carriers, New Concepts 39 4 Chinese Students and Their Schools in Japan


Advocacy of Study in Japan 43 Numbers of Chinese Students in Japan 45 Schools for Chinese Students in Japan 49


Contents The Life of Chinese Students in Japan Boosters of Study in Japan 63 Contributions to China 64


5 Japanese Teachers and Advisers in China


Japanese Educational Initiatives in China 69 Beijing Dongwen Xueshe under Nakajima Saishi, rgm-rgo6 73 Leading Teachers and Advisers during Chinas '~ge of the Japanese Teacher" 78 Contract Terms and Teaching Conditions 82 The Language Barrier and Japanese-Language Instruction 88 Sino-Japanese Cooperation in Education go The Japanese Teachers at San:Jiang Normal School in Nanjing g6 Chinas New Normal Schools in the '~ge of the Japanese Teacher" 103 Why Not Westerners? ... and the Factor of Christianity 107 Not a "Failure" 109

6 Translations and Modern Terminology


Gearing Up to the Task III Textbooks and Encyclopedias II7 Publishing and the Commercial Press (Shangwu Yinshu Guan) The Translators: Brokers of Modernity I22 Modern Terminology: From Japanese into Chinese I23


Part Three. The Xinzheng Institutional Revolution: New Leaders, New Directions 127 7 Chinese Educational Reforms: The Japanese Model Training "Men of Real Talent" I3I The Special Impact of Study Missions I34 Tongwen and Ti-yong: The Viability of Conservative Reform Abolition of the Examination System I48

8 Chinese Military Modernization and Japan Chinese Military Training in Japan I52 Japanese Military Instructors and Advisers in China, and the Japanese Military Model I55 View of a Chinese Military Historian I59

9 China's New Police and Prison Systems Chinas New Police System Police Functions I62 X







Contents Police Training in Japan 164 Police Training in China: Kawashima Naniwa and the Beijing Police Academy, 1901-1912 164 Police Reform in Zhili Province under Yuan Shikai 167 lVu ming you shi (Both Name and Reality) 169 The Need for Comparative Research on "Organizational Transfer'' qo The Beijing Police Academy and Comparative Research IJ1 China's 'New Prison System IJ2 The Case of Zhili 173 Reforms at the National Level and Dr. Ogawa Shigejiro 174 IO

Chinese Legal, Judicial, and Constitutional Reforms


Chinese Legal Reforms IJ9 Criminal Law Reform and Dr. Okada Asataro 182 Civil Law and Matsuoka Yoshimasa 184 Commercial Law Reforms and Shida Kotaro 184 Chinese Judicial Reforms 185 Chinese Constitutional Reform: Resources and Interpretations 185 Toward Constitutional Government 186



Interpreting the Late-Qing Revolution 193 Japan: The Missing Key 194 Directions for Future Research 196

Appendix: The Reform Edict Notes








Illustrations Formal request by Tokyo Dobun Shoin for) apanese government recognition from Prince Konoe Atsumaro, President, To-A Dobunkai, January 1902 54 2 Shimada Utako with Chinese students at her Jissen Girls' School 6o 3 Chemistry laboratory instruction, Zhili Normal School, Baoding, ca. 1906 66 4 Japanese teachers of Zhili Normal School, Baoding, including Watanabe Ryiisei and Sekimoto Kotaro, ca. 1906 85 5 Watanabe Ryusei later in life


6 Watanabe Ryusei's imperial citation from the Qing court, 1906 86 7 Chinese normal schools (shijan xuetang) employing Japanese teachers, ca. 1901-1910 104 8 Preschool education textbook, translated into Chinese from the Japanese 119 9 Textbook on education from lectures of a Tokyo Higher Normal School professor, compiled at Kobun Gakuin for Chinese students, ca. 1905 120 10

Textbook on pedagogy from lectures of a Tokyo Higher Normal School instructor, compiled at Kobun Gakuin for Chinese students, ca. 1905 120


Published reports of Chinese education study missions to Japan, 1899-1903 136




Illustrations 12

Luo Zhenyu, pioneer educator, agricultural reformer, and philologist 138


Cover ofjiaoyu shy"ie (Education World) and contents page listing translations of regulations relating to the Japanese Ministry of Education, 1901 138


Kawashima Naniwa wearing Chinese court robes, with Prince Qing, ca. 1905 166


Tables Chinese Students inJapan, I8g6-1914



Japanese Teachers and Educational Advisers in China, 1903-1918 68


Chinese Graduates of Shikan Gakko, by Year and Specialization, Igoo-Ign 154


Conventions A major concern of the present study is to suggest how modern] apanese terms using written Chinese characters or Kanji helped to reshape the Chinese mind between 1898 and 1912. Accordingly, those modern Japanese terms absorbed into Chinese are indicated by "Ch. < J." or 'j. > Ch." (e.g., Ch.falu < J. Mritsu or J. gakkO > Ch. xuexiao ). Whether the Japanese reading precedes the Chinese, or vice versa, depends entirely on the context in which a term appears. As is customary, Chinese and Japanese personal names appear family name first. Chinese names and terms are alphabetized using the Pinyin system of romanization. Exceptions are made for the names of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, for scholars in Taiwan who alphabetize their names using the Wade-Giles system, and for Chinese who publish in English using a variant spelling. In all such cases, cross-referencing is provided, e.g., Chiang Kaishek Oiang Jieshi), Chang P'eng-yuan (Zhang Pengyuan), and Yue-him Tam (Tan Ruqian). Birth and death dates are given for persons in this study at first reference. For those whose dates are not known, the entry reads "dates unknown." The romanized names of Asian institutions and formal organizations are capitalized as in English. Like other proper nouns, they are capitalized in the titles of publications (e.g., Kokuritsu Kyoiku KenkyiiJo kiyO). When an original Chinese- or Japanese-language source provides its own English translation of an article, journal, or book title, that is indicated by quotation marks around the translated entry, as in the bibliography. For the benefit of readers unfamiliar with Chinese or the pinyin system of romanization, the term "Xinzheng'' is pronounced like "shin" followed by 'jung" as in 'jungle." XV

Preface: The Making of an Idea The present book began around the idea of a Golden Decade in modern s'i%o:Japanese relations, 1898-1907. Although not in the title of the book, the Golden Decade- ten years of surprisingly harmonious and constructive relations between China and] a panis a pervasive presence. The Golden Decade idea first took shape in 1986. At the time it was entirely new. More than that, it seemed ·· entirely preposterous. Everyone knew that modern Sino:J apanese relations before 1945 had been dominated by unremitting Japanese aggression against China, with little or nothing of redeeming value. No particular source or event triggered the idea. It grew, rather, out of an accumulation of evidence gathered over the past dozen years, as I explored relations between China and Japan spanning the seventy-five years from 1870 to 1945. Since 1978, my research had centered on To-A Dobunkai (East Asia Common Culture Association), 1898-1946, and its Shanghai school, To-A Dobun Shoin (East Asia Common Culture Academy, later University), 1900-1945. 1 In hindsight, I realize ho"'{ both institutions and their special commitments and involvements helped to shape and make the Golden Decade, and to forge my own views of that period of Sino:J apanese relations. During these dozen years of research, my thinking was shaped additionally by the writings of Marius Jansen, dean of SinoJapanese studies in the United States. 2 The late Saneto Keishii, creator of Sino:J apanese studies as a res·earch field, exerted a major influence on me through his richly documented writings, 3. ·as did Chinese scholars Huang Fu-ch'ing (Huang Fuqing) and Lin Ming-te (Lin Mingde). 4 The works of H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, Meribeth Cameron, Ralph L. Powell, Marinus ]. Meijer, and Mary Clabaugh Wright contributed to my xvi


understanding of late-Qing developments; 5 but, of these, only Ralph Powell gives more than nodding attention to Japan. With respect to Japan's special influence upon late-Qing China, no comments are more penetrating or sweeping than those of John K. Fairbank in East Asza: The Modern Transformation. 6 While preparing the present manuscript, I reencountered these and presume their earlier influence upon me. In the first stages of my research leading up to this book, I vividly recall the impact of reading the 1933 study of Feng-Gang Wang (Wang Fenggang), Japanese Irifluence on Educational Reform in China, I895-1911. That work generated in me a compelling desire to learn more-much more-about specific Japanese influences on China during the years between 1895 and 1gn. That was in the spring of 1986. My opportunity came that summer. Under a summer stipend from the National Endowment for the Humanities, I conducted two months of research at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace and at Stanford University, where half a century earlier Feng-Gang Wang had conducted the research for his own study. Beginning by tracking down items from Wang's footnotes, I supplemented these with materials that documented a Japanese influence going far beyond just education. By summer's end, there could be no doubt about it: The relationship between China and Japan of these years had been close and uniquely fruitful, particularly for China. What disrupted this special relationship was Japanese imperialism. After Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, the Japanese stance toward China turned sharply statist and aggressive. By the time of Japan's Twenty-One Demands of 1915, relations had soured to the point that the memory of any good was fast fading, even as the mere thought of any good was becoming increasingly unpopular and politically unwise. A follow-up investigation was needed to look into the pre-1gn record, Chinese, Japanese, and Western. Fortunately, Stanford was but one stop of a two-stop journey to a year's research in Japan. Stop number two was Honolulu, Hawaii. There, at the 79th annual meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association (August 13-17), my summer ideas saw their first airing. The term I utilized was xvii


"honeymoon decade," in my paper, "Grand Hopes Shattered: ToA Dobunkai and China, r8g8-r945,'' for the panel 'japan Faces Asia'' organized and chaired by Ralph Falconeri of the University of Oregon. Among panel participants were Professors Eto Shinkichi and Hirano Ken'ichiro of the University ofTokyo, who together had helped launch me on my Sino-Japanese research some ten years earlier. Commenting on my paper was professor Hirano. Ever the careful and thoughtful critic, Professor Hirano- a leading authority on japanese activities in Manchuria between rgo6 and 1931- gently but firmly took me to task for my notion of a "honeymoon decade." Motives must be distinguished from actions, he cautioned. Japanese at the time acted almost solely out of concern for Japanese security and interest, and not infrequently with "malicious intent," he pointed out. "Honeymoon decade" was a misnomer, he went on, implying as it does "a truly equal cooperative partnership between japan and China.... At best, what had existed was a relationship of mutual self-interest or of mutual joint exploitation." These comments, instead of discouraging me, only stiffened my resolve to explore my points more systematically and thoroughly, to get to the heart of the matter. Something Professor Hirano said to me after the panel session made me suspect that part of his intent all along had been to goad me forward. Therefore, when I thanked him for his candid remarks, it was sincerely. Once in Tokyo, I renewed acquaintances with friends and colleagues from my rg76-rg8o period of research and teaching there. One special friend from those years was Dr. Ronald Suleski, recently Managing Director for Asia of the publishing house, Harper and Row, and, as it happened, then-president of the esteemed Asiatic Society of Japan. Dr. Suleski invited me to submit my ideas as a written proposal for the society's monthly lecture series. He further came up with the term "golden decade," helping to create my lecture title, ''A Golden Decade Forgotten: JapanChina Relations, r8g8-rgo7." My lecture was presented on 8 December rg86, and a much-expanded version of that lecture published under the same title in The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan. 7 After publication of that article in late rg87, several developments xviii


prompted me to expand it into the present book. Foremost was the interest and favorable comment ofvariousJapanese, Chinese, and Westerners when confronted with data never before marshaled together. Specific encouragement came from Japanese scholars dissatisfied with the tunnel :vision that has caused topics with politically conservative or suspect bents to be excluded from mainstream scholarship (research like mine, for example, challenges academic notions prevalent in Japan since 1949 about the Chinese revolution, Japanese imperialism, and Chinese modernization, which have been dominated as in China by narrow Marxistinspired interpretations and frameworks); from an invitation to write a Japanese-language essay for the magazine, To-A (Asia Monthly); 8 from my three-hour presentation and discussion with the respected Study Group on China's 19n Revolution (Shin'gai Kakumei Kenkyiikai) at its September 1988 monthly meeting; 9 and from a similar presentation to the Faculty Colloquium of the School of Social Science, University of Tokyo, in November 1988, at Professor Hirands invitation. A related stimulus was some exciting and pioneering Japanese research which supported and enriched mine- particularly that of Professor Abe Hiroshi and associates, working out of the National Institute for Educational Research (Kokuritsu Kyoiku Kenkyiijo ). 1o From the Chinese side, I was impressed by the open interest (and skepticism) of Chinese scholars and advanced graduate students at the Chinese Social Science Forum (Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Yanjiuhui), which I attended monthly at International House, Tokyo. Chinese scholars provided added impetus during my twelve-week research trip that included Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the People's Republic of China, from March to June 1988. 11 During that trip, and again as a paper presenter at the International Symposium on the History of Sino:Japanese Relations, Beijing, 25-29 October 1988, 12 I was able to acquaint myself with the latest Chinese viewpoints, and to acquire most Chinese publications on Sino:Japanese relations for the past ten years. ·As of 1988, in short, the climate seemed right to pursue the Golden Decade idea, even from the point of view of Japanese and Chinese scholars. After the establishment of diplomatic ties betweenJapan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1972, the XIX


two countries entered a period of rapprochement, eagerly reexamining past relationships good and bad, and pursuing new friendship and cooperation. 13 Impressive scholarly advances occurred, vastly enriching every facet of my own work, as endnotes make abundantly clear. But this scholarship, generally narrowly framed and wedded to conventional interpretations, contributed little to my conceptual framework of a "Xinzheng Revolution. " 14 That framework emerged only at the end of my research. Early in rg8g, having returned to Georgia State University from two years' leave in Japan, I was pleased by an invitation from Phi Alpha Theta, the history honorary society, to speak about my research. This forced me to ask the question: Which dimensions of my findings are of greatest historical and comparative meaning to non-China specialists, like my colleagues and students? Under the spell of the course World Civilization since 1500, which I teach regularly and which features every kind of modern revolution, violent and nonviolent, the answer came easily: revolution. I discussed the application to China of the concept of modern revolution with my friend Dr. Edward Krebs, a specialist on anarchism in early twentieth-century China who, as a teacher of modern World History, grasped my meaning immediately. When asked about a title, Dr. Krebs pondered for a moment and then lit up, saying with a chuckle, "How about, 'Who Made the Revolution'?" A title was born: "China, r8g8-rgr2: Who Made the Revolution?" This fruitful line of ~nquiry was carried over into my paper, "China's Intellectual and Institutional Revolutions: Meanings and Implications," for the panel, "Ten Great Years: China, rgor-rgw," at the 42nd annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, 5-8 April rggo.15 The first decade of the twentieth century thus emerged quite suddenly as a revolutionary period around the late-Qing Xinzheng or New Systems Reforms, rgOI-IgiO. Those reforms, and Japan's auxiliary role in them, became the centerpieces of my subsequent work, framed around the concept of a quiet Xinzheng Revolution having intellectual and institutional dimensions. The opportunity to summarize these developing ideas came in my paper, "China's Xinzheng Revolution and Japan, rgOI-rgw: The Intellectual and Institutional Foundations of Modern China," XX


presented at The International Conference on Sino:Japanese Relations in the Last Century, in Hong Kong, 10-12 August 1990.16 The ideas of that paper receive their fullest treatment in the present book, around concepts discussed in the Introduction, which follows.


China, I8g8-1912

Introduction This study is constructed upon empirical evidence chiefly from primary sources and from citations in Japanese and Chinese scholarship. Facts long ignored or largely forgotten are brought together for the first time. What those facts say is startling. They suggest the need for a radically revised framework of analysis for China's modern revolution, along the following lines. The real revolution of modern China, which dismantled China's 2,100-year imperial form of government and its philosophical underpinnings, was not the political Revolution of Ign centered on the activities of Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan; !866-1925) and his associates. Rather, it was an intellectual and institutional revolution centered on the Xinzheng or New Systems Reforms of the late-Qing government, IgOI-Igw. 1 The heroes of that revolution were not the self-proclaimed revolutionaries around Sun but, ironically, their targeted enemies- the Manchu government they were trying to overthrow and its conservative Chinese and Manchu official and gentry supporters. The Ign Revolution, in this analysis, is chiefly significant for having secured in placeallowing for no retreat or turning back- the intellectual and ,institutional reforms of the Xinzheng era. Meanwhile, the Xinzheng Revolution and its achievements have since Ign served, unacknowledged and unheralded, as the real bedrock upon which postimperial China has defined its course intellectually and institutionally, even up to today. To phrase it along more familiar lines, China in a mere dozen years- between the "failure" of its 1898 Hundred Days Reform and the "failure" of its Ign Revolution- underwent a radical transformation. In the present study, 1898 represents less a failure than the first big step in China's sustained turn-of-the-century transformation "from tradition to modernity. " 2 A conservative reform


effort, it was successful in important respects. The Boxer fiasco that followed in 1899-1900 then compelled the sweeping Xinzheng Reforms, initiated and promoted by a determined Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908). At court and in the provinces, these reforms were carried forward vigorously by a remarkable group of officials-Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), Prince Qing or Yikuang (1836-1916), Zhang Baixi (1847-1907), Zhao Erxun (1844-1927), Duanfang (1861-19n), Cen Chunxuan (1861-1933), and ShenJiaben (1840-1913), to name only a few. 3 The careers and achievements of these and thousands of lesser figures laid the foundations for post-imperial China, down to today. To emphasize the continuity beyond 1911, this study terminates in 1912. 4 The Xinzheng Revolution had two chief dimensions: intellectual and institutional. Both dimensions are unimaginable without reference to Meiji Japan. Japan is, in fact, the key to any analysis. Without the intimate cooperation of Japan at multiple levels and in multiple guises, China could not have broken the iron grip of tradition and embarked upon its road of modernity. The result- the intellectual and institutional transformation of China-occurred with a speed and ease surpassing even Japan's unprecedented Meiji I shin or transformation. The role of Japan, and the surprising faith of China in Japanese models· and individual persons, both require an explanation, offered in chapters one, two, and three. A major impediment to scholarly understanding of modern China has been notions of revolution so narrowly defined as to blind scholars to the most enduring of China's modern revolutions, the quiet Xinzheng intellectual and institutional revolutions. The history of the world since 1500 is a constant reminder that revolution comes in multitudinous forms, mostly without violence and bloodshed. Revolutions can be quiet and imperceptible, as defined by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure qf Scientific Revolutions. They extend from agricultural, commercial, and economic revolutions, to intellectual, scientific, and technological revolutions, on to political, social, and even sexual revolutions. In the case of China, the late-Qing revolution involved not mere political overthrow, but, more profoundly, China's intellectual and 2


institutional transformation. Freeing the last decade of the Qing dynasty from the straitjacket of conventional thinking about the rgn Revolution and its revolutionaries renders the real revolutionary transformation of China in its late-imperial and post-imperial phases far more comprehensible. After rgn, those claiming credit for the sudden Qing collapse rewrote history by placing radicals and revolutionaries at center stage. As persons in opposition to the Qing or at best on its fringes, those making such claims had neither knowledge of nor interest in the late-Qing reforms. Before the real historical record could be sifted or digested, China was plunged into its turbulent warlord period of rgr6 to 1928. Distracted by turmoil and with the Qing fast fading from memory, few took note of the obvious: that warlord China was being held together by the slender threads of late-Qing innovations and reforms. Ten years into the warlord period, in 1925, Sun Yat-sen died. To the end, he remained true to his ideal of a unified China free of warlords and imperialists, and he inspired support for his cause. Yet, unwittingly, he stood in the way of the ends he championed, owing to his ill-defined ideology, debated even today as to its meaning, and his lack of organizational skill. "Frustrated patriot" he lived, and frustrated patriot he died. 5 Sun in death was promoted ever more vigorously as the answer to that which had eluded Sun in life: to fill the void of postimperial China's desperate spiritual, political, and intellectual vacuum. Those promoting him- former close associates Wang Jingwei (r883-1944), Hu Hanmin (r87g-rg36), and Chiang Kaishek Qiang Jieshi; r887-1975), among others 6 - saw in Sun the sole available symbol around which to rally the nation against warlords and imperialists and, no less importantly, the basis upon which to stake their own political futures and claims to legitimacy. 7 Canonized in the late rg2os as the "Father of Modern China'' (guofu), Sun received mounting credit for the rgn Revolution, until that revolution was metamorphosed into "Sun's rgn Revolution." That view, an article of faith in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, has plagued scholarly understanding ever since, extending its grip to scholarship in Japan and the West. In the conventional histories, those who had stood outside of 3


"Sun's 19n Revolution'' emerged all too often as opponents or enemies of the revolution. Heading the enemies list was Yuan Shikai, a mainstay of the Xinzheng Reforms who, as president of the Republic from 1912 to 1916, had carried those reforms without fanfare into post-imperial China. In 1915-1916, Yuan attempted unsuccessfully to reestablish a monarchy, dooming himself to the label of betrayer of the Republic. His intimate connection with the Xinzheng Reforms shrouded those reforms and their supporters in guilt-by-association. As for Japan, its central role during the Xinzheng era was utterly forgotten, any reminder after the infamous Twenty-One Demands of 1915 merely prompting a reflex dismissal. China's startling Xinzheng transformation, a major achievement in world history, was thus forgotten. Textbook and monographic treatments of the Q}.ng-Republican transition fail altogether to account for China's great leap from a traditional Chinese polity of early 1898 to a modern and syncretic] apanese-Western-Chinese polity of19n-1912. 8 The new polity, however flawed and shaky in practice, was in place to stay. Indeed, the China we know today (and on into the foreseeable future) is grounded so thoroughly on intellectual and institutional foundations of the Xinzheng years that China in the twentieth century is unthinkable apart from the Xinzheng Revolution. Parts two and three of this book provide the evidence, chapter, by chapter, for a Xinzheng Revolution with Japanese participation. The present study is merely a beginning. Separate monographic treatments are needed for almost every chapter. The hope of this study is to inspire other studies.


chapter one

A Golden Decade? A Xinzheng Revolution? The intellectual and institutional transformation of China in the dozen years between 1898 and 1910 was a remarkable achievement. It could not have occurred without Japan-China's model and active partner almost every step of the way. The notion of Japan playing a sustained and constructive (and non-agressive) role in modern China runs counter to conventional thinking. From 1898 to 1907, however, the relationship between China and Japan was so productive and relatively harmonious that it could rightly be called a "Golden Decade. " 1 The Golden Decade relationship in turn proved so instrumental to China's Xinzheng reforms and their success that this chapter opens with a review of that concept. Chapters two and three, which detail the Japanese role and its background, provide further evidentiary support for the Golden Decade. China's Xinzheng reforms produced vastly uneven results. Flawed as those results might have been, the reforms by moving simultaneously on multiple fronts, collectively, quietly, and swiftly, brought about a radical and permanent break with China's 2,10o-year imperial past. They set China on the post-imperial course it follows to this day. For China, the outcome was revolutionary, or what might be called a "Xinzheng Revolution." This concept of a Xinzheng Revo~ution is examined in the second part of this opening chapter. A GOLDEN DECADE?

The concept of a Golden Decade appears, on the face of it, to make no sense. It seems impossible that a close relationship could have materialized so soon after the bitterly contested Sino:Japanese war 5

A Golden Decade? A Xinzheng Revolution?

and settlement of 1894-1895. The concept defies all logic. And this "logic" against it is deeply rooted among both Chinese and Japanese. Among Chinese it springs from searing memories of Japan's brutal "total war" against China from 1937 to 1945, and among Japanese from guilt feelings about Japanese imperialism that culminated in that war. Those memories, to this day, hold Japanese and Chinese scholars hostage. A certain skepticism is surely demanded. The entire period from Japan's Meiji Restoration in 1868 to the Japanese surrender of 1945 could, for example, be viewed without serious distortion as one of unrelieved Japanese aggression in and around China. In the late nineteenth century, starting .in 1874, armed confrontations involving Japan and China occurred almost like clockwork, at ten-year intervals: 1874, Japan's punitive expedition against Taiwan; 1884, armed conflict between Japanese and Chinese troops in Korea; and 1894-1895, full-scale war between Japan and China. With the turn of the century, the pace of conflict quickened to one Japanese armed initiative about every five years or less: 1900, Japan's participation in the anti-Boxer allied expeditionary force and its separate Amoy Incident fiasco; 1904-1905, the RussoJapanese War (by which Japan extracted important rights and privileges in Northeast China [Manchuria] and Korea); 1910, Japan's outright annexation of Korea; 1914-1915, Japan's military takeover of German "rights" and concessions in Shandong province in China and of German territories in the Pacific; 1918-1922, Japan's Siberian Expedition; 1927-1928, Japanese military intervention in Shandong province against China's Northern Expedition forces; 1931, the Manchurian Incident; 1932, Japan's armed attacks on Shanghai; 1933-1937, a series of Japanese military actions in North China leading to the total war of 1937-1945, involving eight long years of destructive warfare throughout China, costing millions of lives. 2 Even as Japanese aggression escalated in the 1930s, however, isolated voices recalled better times in modern Sino:J apanese relations. In 1936, China scholar Kanzaki Kiyoshi recounted at some length in the monthly journal Shina (The China Review):


A Golden Decade?

Japan's position in Chinese international affairs was enhanced by its participation in the Allied Expeditionary Force at the time of the ·Boxer Incident [in rgoo ]. Its attitude of fairness in conducting itself militarily and in its international relations won it the trust of the Chinese. A new relationship then developed, through the direct participation of Japanese in Qing government reforms, chiefly through leadership in such areas as the military, police, and education. The Qing government was seeking escape from Western aggression; the Japanese government was seeking to halt Western penetration. Around this commonality of interest emerged Japan's so-called Golden Age of China diploma~y (tai-Shi gaiko no ogonjidm), at around the time of the Russo:J apanese War. 3

In 1943, Saneto Keishii called the years between 1896 and 1905 "a pure pro:Japanese age" in China. 4 Four years earlier, in 1939, Saneto had written: "Looking at just the modern period, specifically the years between the Sino-Japanese War and the RussoJapanese War, one sees a time of Sino-Japanese friendship unparalleled. So close was the relationship that it was the envy of other foreigners. "5 This final sentence was not just bombast. It was a fact, apparent in the pages of early-twentieth-century Western-language journals. As early as July 1901, for example, the astute Rev. A. P. Parker of Shanghai wrote in his article,'~ New Japanese Invasion of China'': An invasion of ideas instead of one of arms. A propaganda of education instead of one of coercion. A subtle attempt to make a conquest of China by means of mental rather than physical forces. Such is, in brief, the condition of things now rapidly coming to the front in China under the Japanese program, as indicated by their methods of procedure during the past few years. 6

Parker's article noted additionally the formal inauguration in Shanghai (in late May 1901) of To-A Dobun Shoin (East Asia Common Culture Academy, later University) for students from Japan. He reported the warm welcome extended it by high Chinese officials, and speculated upon its long-term value to China "as an important aid in resisting the domination of the white race in Eastern Asia. " 7 To-A Dobun Shoin did indeed develop into a rather remarkable institution- but primarily for Japanese benefit rather than for Chinese. 8 7

A Golden Decade? A Xinzheng Revolution?

Western envy and anxiety are evident in the 1903 article of George Lynch, 'japanization of China."9 They are likewise evident in "La J aponization de la Chine" of 1905, by Rene Pifion, which declares, "This new China will be a Japanese China." Pinon proceeds to explain: It is under Japanese influence that the [recent] reforms have been decided upon and accomplished. The report of Chang Pao-hsi [Zhang Baixi], President of the University, on "the reorganization of education in the Chinese Empire" ... was directly inspired by the Japanese system ... and advises that all professors, except teachers of foreign languages, should be chosen in Japan. In fact, in normaL schools which have just been founded, all the foreign teachers are subjects of the Mikado.... It would be needless to dwell upon the enormous influence which cannot fail to result from this educational mission of the Japanese.lO

A secret report of the German consul general in Shanghai of 1905 expresses similar anxieties: Along with the development of Japanese commerce and industry which is enough to startle anyone, I wish merely to single out two areas that should alarm us: one, namely, the drive [of Japan] to increase shipping by massive state funding and to expand trade through protective subsidies; and, two, the eager encouragement of education for Chinese by such agencies as To-A Dobunkai, and the earnest training of their own people for future involvement with China, by the opening of such schools as To-A Dobun Shoin in Shanghai. In order to counter these, the German government must make available substantial subsidies with all due facility. 11 One final quotation will suffice to represent informed Western opinion about Japan in China during this period. In 1906, Timothy Richard (1845-1919), the renowned British Protestant educator with close connections to the Chinese court wrote in an article, However Peking may regard Tokyo [note the suggestion here of friction at the official level], it is plain that throughout the eighteen provinces Japanese influence had made enormous strides. Japanese travellers, commercial agents, teachers and drill-sargeants are to be found in the remotest parts of the empire. The sons of the Chinese nobility and ruling classes are being educated in Japan by the thou8

A Golden Decade? sands and return home fired by her example and emulous to repeat it. The best of the native Chinese papers are in Japanese control, and the amazing growth of this native press is in itself one of the most significant of all the phenomena of revolution .... We expect nothing startling from the spread of japanese influence believing that Japan's true policy is not to force China into a sham similitude of western civilization or ideals, but to use the accessories if the Occident for the preservation if the fundamentals if Oriental life and polity.t2

Behind this Western (often missionary) commentary lay grave concern about the sharp decline of Western (primarily missionary-related) influence on Chinese reform. That influence had peaked between 1895 and 1898, in the aftermath of China's humiliating military defeat by Japan. Patriotic Chinese, grasping at reform, had turned to reform-minded missionaries or former missionaries like Timothy Richard, Young J. Allen (1836-1907), Gilbert Reid (1857-1927), John Fryer (b. 1839), and W. A. P. Martin (1827-1916), who, "for a flickering moment," writes historian Paul Cohen, e~oyed an influence "beyond their wildest dreams. " 13 One reason for that influence was the enlightened outlook of certain of these veterans. Gilbert Reid in 1897, for example, advanced some sophisticated thoughts with respect to the Chinese government and foreign advisers. As summarized by Mingteh Tsou (Zou Mingde ): Reid held that Chinese reformers needed to learn from the West. [Knowing] that China had imported many Western machines and printed books on Western science, he said that it was necessary to evaluate their advantages and disadvantages. He also stressed the importance of introducing qualified Western personnel into the Chinese official world, which was advocated by [Timothy] Richard .... Reid emphasized that the foreigners appointed as Chinese officials should not be in opposition to Chinese sensibilities, should have a good knowledge of "Chinese ancient philanthropic policies" and be willing to adhere to the "teachings of the Chinese ancient sages," in addition to their abilities, prestige and benevolence. Also, they should have the capabilities to identify which part of learning from the West China should adopt and put into practice and which was not suitable. 14


A Golden Decade? A Xinzheng Revolution?

This sage advice confronts an immediate and insurmountable problem: Where was the Chinese government to find Westerners at once professionally qualified and culturally sensitive, knowing the language and classical traditions of China? During and after the Boxer debacle of 1899-1900, the influence of Western missionary elements nosedived. Paul Cohen points to two new developments helping to account for this. First, divisive political issues came to the fore, pitting old-time reformers against radicals and revolutionaries, and causing most missionaries and others to shy away. Second, and more crucial, was the appearance quite suddenly of "alternative (and for most Chinese more acceptable) channels of information concerning the nonChinese world. " 15 The present book identifies the "alternative channels" that opened up, and their startling consequences. It must be stressed that those alternative channels went far beyond offering just "information'' to China, however. Along with information came practical guidance, direction, and training assistance. Nine times out of ten, the most fr:uitful alternative channels were Japanese, served by individuals exhibiting precisely the combination of expertise and cultural sensitivity called for by Gilbert Reid. Who, indeed, but Japanese could have met Reid's exacting standards? Reid's advice might as well have read: "Non:Japanese Need Not Apply." Chinese officials, recognizing as much, hired Japanese by the hundreds between 1901 and 19n while largely eschewing Westerners for China's new reforms. With Japanese employment came influence. That influence excited Western fears of a Japanese alternative to the domination of China by the white race and its ideas. It further conjured up visions of an alliance of yellow peoples against white. The turn of the century, it must be remembered, was an age given over to fears of an impending grand racial struggle between white and colored peoples. Popularized in Germany in the form of a Yellow Peril, thoughts of war along racial lines had been aired in Japan itself as early as January 1898, in the fo~m of a sensationalist piece by the distinguished Prince Konoe Atsumaro (1863-1904), published in the respected Taiyo (The Sun), Japan's most influential and largest circulation magazine of the day. 16 The thrust of Ko10



A Golden Decade?

noe's article is evident in its title: "Racial Alliances, with Reference to the Necessity for Studying the China Problem." 17 "It seems to me," Konoe observed in this article, "that East Asia will inevitably become the setting for a racial struggle in the future. However foreign policies may change for the moment, it is only for the moment. We are fated to have a struggle between the white and yellow races, and in that struggle Chinese and Japanese will both be regarded as the sworn enemies of the whites. Any projection for the future has to keep this disturbing point in mind." 18 The man who wrote this, an imperial prince of firm conviction and with impeccable connections in Japan and abroad, was one of Japan's most influential advocates of the kind of close cooperation between China and Japan that launched the Golden Decade and gave it thrust and meaning. 19 The varied British, American, French, and German reactions to Japanese successes launched the powers onto the road of cultural diplomacy and cultural competition in China. In November rgo8, outgoing American president Theodore Roosevelt joined the chorus: "[T]he remedy for the 'yellow peril,' whatever that is,'' he declared, lies in "the cultivation and direction of [Chinese] life" along lines of American education and Christian ideals. 2o Giving this concrete meaning, Roosevelt on December 28 announced by executive order the remission to China of nearly U.S. $n million in overassessed Boxer indemnity funds, earmarked for educational uses. 21 Motivating him, among other things, were thoughts such as those presented to him by an American educator in March rgo6, urging American education as a means to achieve "the intellectual and spiritual domination of [China's] leaders. " 22 This growing Western interest and creative initiative toward China posed a challenge to Japan's special position there. China's decision in rgo8-rgog to shift from Japan to the West for advanced education and training, examined later, cannot be understood apart from this Western initiative and wooing.


A Golden Decade? A Xinzheng Revolution? A XINZHENG REVOLUTION?

Historians of the West apply the term revolution to a wide variety of situations. Most persons think first of bloody upheavals- the American Revolution against British rule, The French Revolution, the Russian Revolution. Far less dramatic but no less important are the "quiet" revolutions- agricultural r~volutions, commercial revolutions, scientific and intellectual revolutions, industrial revolutions, and even sexual and computer revolutions. What permits the term "revolution" to be employed across such diverse terrain is suggested by Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure qf Scientific Revolutions. A base point of Kuhn's argument is that the human mind structures the world in particular ways, called paradigms. A revolution in science results when "an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one." Extending this to the political arena, Kuhn argues that political revolutions result from "a growing sense ... that existing institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed.... In both political and scientific development the sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to revolution. " 23 Kuhn's chapter titles, moreover, speak of "crisis" and the "response to crisis," "revolutions as changes of world view," the "invisibility" of revolutions, and their resolution. Revolutions involve, in other words, radical change in the structure of the way things are perceived, the structure of actual relationships (political or social, for example), or the structure of the way things are done, such as in agriculture or commerce. Change may stretch across time almost imperceptibly, as with agricultural revolutions. Or it may be abrupt, but not necessarily violent, as with today's computer revolution. Or change may be both abrupt and violent, as with the Russian Revolution. This study focuses upon the "quiet revolutions" in China just before 1gn. In the years between 1898 and 1912, but most especially between 1901 and 1910, China intellectually and institutionally underwent a shift away from long-established paradigms to paradigms radically new, introduced from the outside. The change in orientation of China's dominant elites was so drastic and endur-


A Xinzheng Revolution?

ing that one need not hesitate to characterize this as revolutionary, or as a shift "from tradition to modernity." What launched this transformation was the remarkable Reform Edict of the Empress Dowager, issued on 29 January 1901. Called simply the Imperial Edict (Shangyu) of29January 1901 (wth day, 12th month, 26th year of the Guangxu Emperor's [I8]I-I9o8] reign; translated in full in the Appendix of the present study), this decree included the startling order: We therefore call upon the members of the Grand Council, the Grand Secretaries, the Six Boards and Nine Ministries, our Ministers abroad, and the Governors General and Governors of provinces to reflect carefully on our present sad state of affairs, and to scrutinize Chinese and Western governmental systems (Ch. zhengzhi < J. seyi) with regard to all dynastic regulations, national administration, official affairs, matters related to people's livelihood, modern schools (Ch. xuexiao < J. gakkif), systems of examination, military organization, and financial administration (Ch. caizheng < J. zaisez). Duly weigh what should be kept and what abolished, what new methods should be adopted and what old ones retained. By every available means of knowledge and observation, seek out how to renew our national strength, how to produce men of real talent, how to expand state revenues, and how to revitalize the military. For our reference, report detailed proposals within two months. 24

This bold order- dubbed "the charter of the reform movement" by Meribeth Cameron 25 -in spirit, intent, and result, rivals the succinct and celebrated Meiji Charter Oath of Five Articles (Gokajo no Goseimon) of 1868. The latter included the following as the fifth of its five articles: "The foundations of Imperial rule shall be strengthened by the acquisition of knowledge from throughout the world. "2 6 What followed the Meiji Charter Oath were the sweeping political, social and intellectual changes of the Meiji I shin- the Meiji "Restoration'' that more accurately should be translated as Meiji "Transformation'' or Meiji "Revolution. "2 7 That the Meiji Charter Oath and the late-Qing Reform Edict both sought out foreign learning for the purpose of strengthening "the foundations of Imperial rule" in no way diminishes their record of accomplishments. Scholars of modern Japan universally

A Golden Decade? A Xinzheng Revolution?

credit the Charter Oath of 1868 with signaling Japan's spiritual opening to the outside world and for setting Japan on its postTokugawa course, upon which it continues today. Scholars of China, on the other hand, ignore the Reform Edict of 1901, though it accomplished precisely the same things for postimperial China: it signaled China's spiritual opening to the outside world and set China on its post-imperial course. It was revolutionary in its consequences; it radically and permanently altered the course of Chinese history. "Revolution (Ch. geming< J. kakumez) may be defined broadly or narrowly," wrote the brilliant Liang Qichao (1873-1929), who lived in exile in Japan for fourteen years from 1898 to 1912, where he tackled just about every important issue of the day. Liang continues in this essay of April 1904: "Defined most broadly, it refers to a radical transformation of all elements of a society, tangible and intangible. Defined somewhat less broadly, it refers to a new political era, whether ushered in peacefully or through violence. Defined most narrowly, it refers to armed action taken against the central government. China over the past several thousand years has been infatuated with revolution in only its narrowest sense. "2 8 Liang's discussion of the pattern of revolution in Chinese history is confined to revolution in its narrowest sense of armed insurrection against the state, and therefore is oflittle help to the present study. But his introductory remarks remain germane. The Xinzheng Revolution of this book falls between Liang's second and first definitions: a new era, beyond politics narrowly conceived, one that includes radical transformations of thought and institutions. Neither the term xinzheng nor its reform aims were ever systematically defined by the Qing. Yet in its truest approximate meaning of "New Systems"-that 'is, xin (new) zhengzhi tzzhi (governmental or administrative systems), including the areas of education, the military, police and prisons, law, the judiciary, and constitutional government- the Xinzheng Reforms achieved far more, far faster than its sponsors had envisioned or intended. Despite falling short of Liang Qichao's broadest definition of revolution as transforming "all elements of a society, tangible and intangible," its results nonetheless provide the necessary and indispensable baseline for understanding China in the new century.

part one The Japanese Role and Its Background

chapter two Prelude to the Golden Decade One of the most remarkable things about the Japanese influence upon China between 1898 and 1910 was its utter unpredictability. In I8g4-18g5, China and Japan were enemies at war. By mid 18g8, they were friends, almost allies. How, in the space of three short years, they moved from mortal enmity to apparent friendship is a complex and little understood question. Since the entire Golden Decade is predicated upon post-1898 attitudes and relationships, the postwar transition and its meaning require special documentation here. China's decisive defeat by Japan in 1894-I8g5, on both land and sea, caused shame, shock, and humiliation throughout China. Bitter feelings toward Japan were compounded by the unpopular and widely opposed Treaty of Shimonoseki. Signed on 17 April 1895, that treaty provided among other things for the cession to Japan of Taiwan in the south and the Liaodong Peninsula in the north; for Chinese recognition of Korean independence from China; and for a huge indemnity of 200 million taels (liang) that far exceeded any previous indemnity extracted from China, and which by itself amounted to more than twice the Qing government's total annual revenues of 89 million taels. 1 After the war but before the treaty settlement, the Russian government which had remained scrupulously neutral at the war's outset, 2 had admonished Japan against acquiring territory in Korea or North China, which it considered within Russia's sphere of interest. The Japanese military had chosen to ignore those warnings. Russia, meanwhile, for more than two months before the peace settlement, had discussed its options widely, both at home and with European allies. Braced to take action, only six days after the signing of the treaty the Russian, German and French ministers in Tokyo went jointly on April 23rd to the

Prelude to the Golden Decade

Japanese Foreign Ministry. There they presented their specific objections to Japan's acquisition of the Liaodong Peninsula, and threatened the use of military force if Liaodong were not returned to China. 3 This was the infamous Triple Intervention of r8g5, by which China regained the Liaodong Peninsula- and which thoroughly offended and humiliated Japan. From the Chinese point of view, this Russian intervention was a blessing, prompting Chinese imperial decoration of the thirteen most active Russian, French, and German diplomats involved, for service to China. 4 Russia further endeared itself to China by assisting with low-interest loans, to help China meet its enormous first-year war indemnity payment of 100 million taels. A groundswell of pro-Russian feeling developed. One leading Chinese authority mused in the early 1930s: "Cixi and Li Hongzhang [1823rgor, China's most powerful government official outside the court] had long been staunchly pro-Russian. But after the Triple Intervention and the return of Liaodong, not one official of the court or one governor general in the provinces failed to speak out in favor of allying with Russia to resist Japan (lian-EJu-Rz)." 5 Indeed, in June 1896, Li Hongzhang, chief Chinese negotiator of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed a secret Sino-Russian military pact in Moscow to counter Japan. As part of the agreement, China granted Russia permission to extend the Trans-Siberian Railroad across Northern Manchuria to Vladivostok. 6 All of this caused unease within the Japanese military, contributing to a fear of international "isolation. " 7 Concerned Chinese, meanwhile, impelled by a sense of doom after r8g5, began to rethink China's internal situation. Starting in r8g5, but concentrated in the years from r8g6 to r8g8, three interrelated, mutually reinforcing developments occurred, culminating in a general "discovery" of Japan as a model for modern reform. Scholars, officials, and "gentry-literati" in almost every major city of every Chinese province began to propose revision of the traditional Confucian-based educational curriculum; this same cross section of provincial elites organized more than seventy-five "study societies" that mushroomed during this period; and they founded about sixty new newspapers throughout th~ country. 8 Among the most dynamic of these efforts were those in r8

Prelude to the Golden Decade

Hunan province. Originating in 1895 as a program for provincial self-strengthening, 9 in 1897-1898 it entered a radical phase under the influence of Huang Zunxian (I848-1905), former Chinese envoy to Japan, 10 Liang Qichao, and fellow young scholars. This later phase of the movement is distinguished by its conspicuous interest in elements of Japan's Meiji Ishin or transformation as models for Chinese reform.ll These separate and independent developments generated a sudden, mutually felt need between China and Japan in late 1897early 1898: by China, for Japanese assistance with all manner of complex, modernizing reforms, particularly military strengthening;12 and by Japan, even more intensely, for Chinese assistance in warding off the dreaded advance of Russia and other Western powers on the march. The focus of Japanese fears in late 1897 was the same tripartite group that had intervened against Japan in the Liaodong Peninsula in 1895: Russia in China's northeast, specifically in Manchuria and Korea; Germany in north China, in Shandong province; and France in the southeast, across the straits fromJapan's new colony of Taiwan. These coincided with British worries about foreign territorial claims that might jeopardize Britain's larger commercial interests in Asia. 13 This British concern for unimpeded commercial opportunity helped shape the Open Door Policy of the United States in 1899; 14 and the shared security needs of Japan and Britain at this time laid the foundation for the Anglo:Japanese Alliance of 1902, the very first British alliance with a non-Western power.15 More specifically with respect to late 1897, on November 14th German troops occupied long-sought Jiaozhou Bay in southern Shandong, in retaliation for the murder of two German missionary priests in that province. On pretext of protecting China from the Germans, the Russians on November 15th moved into Lushun (Port Arthur) and Dalian (Dairen). The German minister in Beijing followed up on November 22nd by issuing rigid demands that resulted on 6 March 1898 in a ninety-nine-year leasehold of Jiaozhou Bay, along with expropriative railway and mining rights between Jiaozhou and the provincial capital of Jinan far to the west. Russia for its part obtained twenty-five-year leaseholds on Lushun and Dalian on 27 March 1898, a mere three years

Prelude to the Golden Decade

after expelling Japan from the area. Four days later, on March 31st, Britain obtained a twenty-five-year leasehold of Weihaiwei, on the northern side of the Shandong promontory overland from the Germans at Qingdao and across the Bohai Sea from the Russians at Dalian. On II February r8g8, Britain extracted an agreement from China not to alienate the Yangzi Valley to any other power; on April gth, France secured its ninety-nine-year leasehold of Guangzhou Bay adjacent to French Indochina, and on April roth obtained a commitment from China not to alienate the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan. Japan, now on alert, extracted from China on April 24th a promise not to alienate Fujian province, the same date that Britain obtained its ninety-nine-year leasehold of Jiulong (Kowloon), adjacent to Hong Kong.1 6 Just before the first German and Russian actions to "cut up the Chinese melon," the Japanese military, concerned chiefly about Russia, had made cautious overtures to China. The opening wedge had come in late October r8g7, when the Japanese General Staff invited Chinese military observers to a major military exercise in Kyushu, scheduled for mid November. The invitation, routed through the Japanese consul at Tianjin went to Wang Wenshao (r83o-rgo8), the important Governor General of Zhili and High Commissioner for Military and Foreign Affairs in North China (Beiyang dachen)Y When the group sent by Wang arrived at Nagasaki, it was met by none other than Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Kawakami Soroku (r848-r8gg). From the moment of its arrival, it received VIP treatment at every turn, under the care of select Japanese officers. So pleased was Wang with the Japanese reception that he recommended nine host officers, beginning with Kawakami Soroku, for decoration by the Chinese throne. 18 Kawakami Soroku, who rose to Chief of Staff the following January r8g8, was prime mover behind not only this but a host of other military overtures to China. What occurred should properly be called the "Kawakami initiative"- a set of policies and actions that continued even after Kawakami's death in May r8gg. 19 Kawakami illustrates superbly the elasticity of Japanese strategic thinking in the wake of its victory over China, around the principle of no permanent friends or enemies, only perma20

Prelude to the Golden Decade

nent interests. Ironically, in light of his special role in launching the Golden Decade, it was Kawakami who has been hailed as chief architect and hero of the Japanese victory over China in 1894-1895. More than that, he is recognized as the "one military figure [who] stood out above the rest for his activity and interest in provoking war. "20 But by 1897, Kawakami no longer considered China the primary "hypothetical enemy" (kaso tekz) of Japan. That distinction had shifted to Russia. The October invitation to the Chinese signaled Japan's desire to mend bridges. Still in the midst of that North China initiative, Kawakami conceived a mission aimed at Central China. To launch that mission, he chose Colonel (later General) Kamio Mitsuomi (1855-1927), 21 whose name, significantly, appears directly after Kawakami's on Wang Wenshao's list ofJapanese to be decorated. A rare army "China expert" (Shina tsii), Kamio, who had worked in China from 1882 to 1886, was approaching the end of his second tour as military attache at the Japanese legation in Beijing, 1892-1894 and 1895-1897. His instructions from Kawakami were to return to Japan by way of the middle and lower Yangzi, to contact key officials of that region. Despatched separately to the same region was Utsunomiya Taro (1861-1922), a trusted Kawakami subordinate (and later a general) who may already have worked with Kawakami on plans for a future war with Russia, and whose success in this China mission is said to have "opened the way for a SinoJapanese rapprochement. "22 In something of a blitz between mid December 1897 and February 1898, Kamio, Utsunomiya, and other officers held a series of crucial meetings with leaders of the Yangzi region. These included the influential Liu Kunyi (1830-1902), Governor General of LiangJiang or Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangsi provinces and concurrently High Commissioner for Military and Foreign Affairs in South China (Nanyang dachen) based at N anjing; and Zhang Zhidong, Governor General of Hu-Guang or Hubei and Hunan provinces and based at Wuhan or, more specifically, Wuchang. At first glance, Liu and Zhang would seem unlikely candidates for Japanese overtures. Only two-and-a-half years earlier, in July and August 1895, each had submitted memorials to the throne urging a military alliance with Russia against Japan. 2 3 Wary still 21

Prelude to the Golden Decade

of demands for commercial and military privileges, Zhang chose in mid December 1897 to absent himself from his office, leaving his subordinates to fend off the Japanese. Instead, Kamids actual message astonished him, and Zhang wrote immediately to Kamio apologizing for his absence and indicating general concurrence with Kamids ideas. 24 Those ideas, reported by Zhang Zhidong to the Zongli Yamen or Office of Foreign Affairs on 2 January r8g8, have been aptly summarized by Richard Howard: "that the previous war between China and Japan had been a mistake; that the increasing power of the white race in the Orient presented grave dangers to both China and Japan; and that closer relations should exist between these two Asian nations, which were basically of the same race and culture. " 25 (The term "same race and culture" here derives from a string of terms utilized by the Japanese, and reported by Zhang as tongzhong, tongwen, tongjiao [common race, common culture, common learning].) These arguments, somewhat specious and disingenuous, derived credibility and urgency from the actions of the Germans and Russians in the north. The Japanese called the war "altogether a mistake for both sides," as Zhang reported their saying, yet not one offered to make amends by reducing China's crippling war indemnity or restoring Taiwan to China. Nor did these Japanese criticize their own government's rigid adherence to the burdensome indemnity payment schedule needed to finance Japanese military expansion. The apologies should perhaps be treated as no more than polite speech. Everyday etiquette, then as now, requires that Japanese begin a proper conversation with apologies for one thing or another. Not knowing Japanese etiquette, Zhang and his associates (whose reports still refer to Japanese contemptuously as "dwarfs" [ 110] and to their language hazily as that "eastern language" [Dongwen]), perhaps took these at face value. Fine words aside, the Japanese officers on assignment to China were men of high caliber and seriousness of purpose, sufficient to impress. Their devotion to duty is well exemplified by Kamio Mitsuomi, who terminated mourning for his father in late January r8g8 in order to return to central China to resume his mission for 22

Prelude to the Golden Decade

Kawakami. 26 Then and earlier, alluring promises impressed the Chinese. "Extremely solicitous" is what Zhang Zhidong called U tsunomiya Taro in his 2 January 18g8 report, ·explaining that "under authority of Kawakami Soroku," Utsunomiya has offered to provide China with maps and books about Japan. Utsunomiya is said to have stated, moreover, "that today, military preparedness is most essential. He invited us to send people over to Japan, to enroll at military and other schools. Our geographic closeness will save on our expenses; and that country promises to educate those we send with special energy and care. "27 Thus, on the eve· of 18g8, Chinese interest in reform, Japanese wooing, and mutual alarm at renewed Western aggression combined to overcome deep animosities and to set the stage for an unprecedented era of cooperation between China and Japan-a period of"mutualjoint exploitation" 28 that I call a Golden Decade.

chapter three Japan's Double-Pronged Strategy: Military and Non-Military The Japanese approaches to China of I897-18g8 mirrored an emerging double-pronged strategy for binding China to Japan. One prong was military, the other non-military. Each prong involved separate constellations of actors, with little overlap. The military orchestrated its initiatives through its efficient Army General Staff, or Sanbo Honbu. The non-military had no comparable coordinating center, since the Japanese government was some years away from having (or even trying to formulate) a unified China policy. Despite the lack of coordination, military and non-military elements were inspired by similar sets of motives. These included national pride, national self-interest, and a sense of cultural affinity and indebtedness to China. In conversations with Chinese, the Japanese tirelessly invoked their two countries' mutual interests. MILITARY STRATEGY

Kamio Mitsuomi exemplifies a military man who spoke frankly to the Chinese about Japanese strategic motivations. In late December 1897, invited back to Wuhan to speak to Zhang Zhidong, Kamio asserted on behalf of Kawakami Soroku that Japan "urgently desires alliances with Great Britain and with China as a means of resisting Russia and Germany, and as a strategy for selfprotection. " 1 In this same vein, in mid February 18g8, Kamio, U tsunomiya, and a third officer, Kajikawa Jiitaro (d. 1902), 2 also cited by Wang Wenshao for courtesies rendered, met with Hunanbased reformer Tan Sitong (1866-18g8). After expressing regrets about the war with China, they went on to propose a league or

Military Strategy

union between China and Japan, and to offer Japanese assistance to China. In so doing, they argued, Japan would only be acting in its own best interest. 3 "These Japanese have enumerated the advantages and disadvantages [of cooperation] most lucidly," Zhang Zhidong wrote in his 2 January 1898 report to the Zongli Yamen. "It seems very much in our best inte~est. " 4 The man writing these words was a cautious realist. From years of service at difficult posts, he had developed a national vision. As Governor General of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces during the Sino-French War of 1884-1885, Zhang had provided able logistical support to this war lost by China. That loss converted Zhang into a committed "self-strengthener." Henceforth he devoted great energy to local military, educational, and industrial enterprises, first from his base at Guangzhou and after 1889 from his new base at Wuhan. 5 In the war with Japan of1894-1895, Zhang was again mobilized into action. First from Wuhan and then from Nanjing as Acting Governor General of Liang:Jiang while Liu Kunyi was on temporary military duty in the north, Zhang issued a steady stream of proposals and support measures in defense of Chinese interests from the Yellow Sea in the north to the Yangzi Valley in central China, all the way to Taiwan in the south. 6 Wartime defeat spurred him yet again to greater effort. Almost immediately after the war, he proceeded with earlier plans to build a Self-Strengthening Army (Ziqiang Jun), founding first the modern Jiangnan Officer Academy Qiangnan Lushi Xuetang; 1895-1909) at Nanjing, and then the Hubei Military Preparatory School (Hubei Wubei Xuetang; 1896-1906) at Wuchang. Attributing Japan's military victory to its adoption of the German military model, Zhang proposed in a memorial approved on 2 February 1896 that China likewise adopt the German model and found new military academies. 7 In line with this, he modeled his own military training programs on that of Germany, hiring thirty-five German officers and advisers for his Nanjing academy and six for his academy at Wuchang. 8 At Wuchang after 18g6, however, the arrogant attitudes and domineering manner of certain German advisers prompted student outbursts and staff rebellions, leading in 1898 to at least one forced resignation of a senior Chinese military school administrator. 9 25

Japan's Double-Pronged Strategy

Doubts about Germany were raised further by the German seizure of Jiaozhou in 1897. Circumstances thus conspired to assure that the Japanese overtures to China were admirably timed. For Zhang Zhidong, military assistance from Japan promised to reduce his dependence upon German advisers. He was led to believe, moreover, that cooperation with Japan might open up new routes of access to the British, for developmental assistance and for mediation should Britain try to counter German and Russian moves by demanding leaseholds in the Yangzi region.1o In early February 1898 when Kamio, Utsunomiya, and Kajikawa met with Zhang and his Hubei modernizers, it was agreed to send a local Chinese educational mission to Japan. A first for China, this group was headed by department magistrate Yao Xiguang (1856-192?). It traveled for about two months in the company ofUtsunomiya, visiting military as well as non-military institutions. After returning to China, Yao published a book, Dongying xuexiao jugai (An Introduction to Japanese Schools), which described by category Japanese lower and middle schools, military schools, higher specialized schools, and professional schools. The book appeared in three editions in 1899 and 1900, and is said to have circulated widely throughout China. 11 It is noteworthy that Zhang Zhidong's own influential Quanxue pian (Exhortation to Learn), incorporating elements of the 1897 Japanese arguments for study in Japan, was completed at just about the time of Yao's return to China. 12 The Japanese officer charged in 1898 with superintending Chinese military education in Japan was Colonel (soon General) Fukushima Yasumasa (1852-1919). A man of extraordinary talent, Fukushima, like Kamio Mitsuomi, was something of a "China Hand." It was his name that appeared third on Wang Wenshao's list, just after those of Kawakami and Kamio. In 1892-1893, returning home after five years as military attache at Berlin, Fukushima had made history by taking a 504-day, 15,ooo-kilometer overland trip from Berlin to Vladivostok across Siberia, largely on horseback. This captured the Japanese fancy, and his became a household name. 13 During the war with China in 1894-1895, he had served with distinction at the front, and then helped to bring newly acquired Taiwan

Non-Military Strategy

under Japanese rule. 14 More immediately relevant, in the spring of 18gg, while Chief of Intelligence for the General Staff, Fukushima was dispatched by Kawakami to probe Yangzi attitudes toward the threat of China's dismemberment by the West. For most of April, he met with Governors General Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong and their top aides. All parties agreed on the gravity of the Western threat to China, particularly in the north, and on the need for Sino:Japanese cooperation to counter it through improved military training. In a confidential conversation with Zhang Biao (I86o-1927), a senior military commander and aide to Zhang Zhidong who reportedly had visited Japan in 1897 to inspect its military system, 15 both Fukushima and Zhang agreed on the need for a powerful Yangzi army and naval force but agreed further that the region "should not embark on policies alienating it from the Beijing government." Rather, "its power should be used quietly to nudge Beijing to carry out urgent tasks for the sake of the country." 16 What Fukushima had in mind, judging by confidential reports of his other conversations, was for China to train modern armies in the six Yangzi provinces of Sichuan, Hu-Guang (Hubei and Hunan, under Zhang Zhidong) and Liang:Jiang Oiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi, under Liu Kunyi), to serve as a counterweight to Russia in the north.17 The man to whom Fukushima was to report, Chief of Staff Kawakami Soroku, died on n May 18gg, just one day before Fukushima's arrival back in Tokyo. 18 But already by that time, aided by such talented military officers as Kamio, Utsunomiya, and Fukushima, this able strategist had orchestrated the creation of a most astounding situation: the foundation for military as well as.non-military cooperation between China and Japan, unimaginable only two years earlier. NON-MILITARY STRATEGY

Almost simultaneously with Japanese military initiatives overseas, non-military initiatives made their appearance on the home front, as prominent individuals sounded the alarm about the impending "partition of China'' (Shina bunkatsu), 19 prompting calls for the "pres-

Japan's Double-Pronged Strategy

ervation of China'' (Shina hozen). 20 The term "partition of China'' appears in the r January r8g8 issue of TaiyO, in the commentary by Prince Konoe Atsumaro on racial alliances, already discussed. The inseparable fates of China and Japan, Konoe argued, required that Japan shed her postwar contempt for China, 21 and make direct efforts through travel, social contact,' and field investigations to understand China. This could not wait, he suggested, given the accelerating aggression of the white race against the yellow, and an impending grand racial conflict. 22 In the April 20th issue of the same major journal, educatorphilosopher and president of Tokyo Imperial University, Toyama Masakazu (r848-rgoo) declared in "China's Fate and Our People's Task": "I submit that the existence of China is a pressing matter of direct vital and personal concern to all who are Japanese." Among the categories of persons that should devote themselves to China, Toyama enumerated politicians, diplomats, military men, scholars, engineers, and Buddhist priests, to help promote modern thought and education, and "to encourage a sense of nationhood."23 In a more evidently self-serving vein, party activist and soon-tobe Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Oishi Masami (18551935) argued in his commentary, "The Current Eastern Situation and the Future" in the May 5th issue of Taiyo: "If we wish thoroughly to realize our plans [of protecting our rights and interests in China], we must first halt the danger of China's partition, then secure the peace, lead China forward, promote the development of Chinese production and power, so that in Japan's confrontation with the Western powers, a balance of power can be maintained in the East. " 24 "On Chinese Students in Japan," an August 2oth commentary for Taiyo by Ueda Mannen (r867-1937), head of the bureau for higher specialized education at the Ministry of Education and a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, pointed out that over the past four or five years (since China's loss of the war), a "sudden soulsearching" had reversed Chinese attitudes toward Japan from one of contempt to one of respect. As a consequence, and as part of China's vigorous reforms just then underway (the Hundred Days Reform of June nth to September 21st), China had decided to en-

Non-Military Strategy

trust the modern education of her students to Japan. "Is Japan prepared to meet the challenge," Ueda asked. To answer his own question, U eda spelled out specific supportive measures required of Japan, "to assure these students' success." He then called upon Imperial Japan to "avoid wrecking this great appointed task by establishing ample facilities with sufficient funding for the Chinese students. "25 Thus, suddenly, beginning in early 1898 and for reasons related directly to Western imperialism and to perceived national interests, it became politically fashionable for prominent Japanese to speak out on the issue of China and the need for cooperation. This was a significant new departure, causing China to enter Japanese public consciousness in new ways. At the governmental level, Yano Fumio (1850-1931), Japan's popular Minister Plenipotentiary to China during the crucial twoand-a-half years from March 1897 to December 1899, was the single most important factor. A prominent veteran of the people's rights movement (jiyii minken undO) in early Meiji Japan, and widely known in Japan as a novelist and journalist with close political ties to party leader and educator Okuma Shigenobu (1838-1922), 26 Yano as Japanese minister to China took independent initiatives that bound his government to a policy of encouraging study in Japan. In April and May 1898, Yano both verbally and in writing promised Chinese officials that the Japanese government would defray the expenses of as many as two hundred Chinese students at Japanese schools. This unauthorized move provoked an almost immediate reprimand from Foreign Minister Nishi Tokujiro (1847-1912), for promising too much; yet Nishi's reprimand was accompanied by affirmation that Japan, having made such a promise, was now duty-bound to deliver on it. 27 The "damage" had thus been done- and considerable Chinese goodwill won. Some months later, in fact, China's Guangxu Emperor lavished praise upon Yano in a letter to the Emperor of Japan of 7 September 18g8, saying: With the coming of your esteemed Minister Yano Fumio to China, all matters involving our two countries have been handled with due deliberation and brought to equitable conclusions, demonstrating good-neighborly relations. [Minister Yano] likewise earlier directed

Japan's Double-Pronged Strategy

a communication to our Zongli Yamen in charge of relations with foreign countries, conveying your government's concern about Chin Ch. qudi guize), and called for student strikes and




Chinese Student Life in Japan

massive returns to China. 85 The dampening affects of this Japanese initiative (which enjoyed full Chinese government support) were accentuated by Chinese Education Ministry directives of March and August 1906, spurred by anxieties over anti-Qing radicalism in Japan. 86 These directives tightened qualifications for study abroad and limited, then prohibited, the dispatch of new short course scholarship students to Japan. The "age of the crash course" (tasu sokusei no Jidaz) 87 hereby came to a crashing halt. Though outwardly a sign of failure, the numerical decline of Chinese students inJ a pan had its positive side. This has been characterized by Saneto Keishii as a shift from quantity to quality. 88 A fifteen-year agreement of August 1907, known as the Five School Agreement (Goko tokuyaku), set the tone by opening up (at full cost to the Chinese government) five of Japan's finest national higher schools (kOto gakko or senrrwn gakkif) to 165 Chinese students per year. Under this agreement, between 1908 and 19n, Chinese students filled their quotas at designated preparatory, normal, industrial, commercial, and medical schools, in a program that continued up to 1922. 89 THE LIFE OF CHINESE STUDENTS IN JAPAN

Chinese students in Japan up to 1907 had four distinguishing characteristics, according to Li Xisuo. First, the sweeping range of their intellectual curiosity and studies, which extended to every conceivable subject area. Second, their powerful attraction to social sciences and humanities, following collapse of the notion of a "perfect Chinese order" after the 1898 reforms. Third·, their particular enthusiasm for programs in law and administration and the military, as a direct response to Xinzheng policies and as a "shortcut to wealth and high office." (A 1902 survey reported, for example, that over half of all Chinese students identified their primary studies as related to law and administration, the military, and modern police training.) And, fourth, the appallingly low level of most schooling: "More than ninety percent of all Chinese students in Japan were attending middle-grade institutions and below," writes Li. Many students merely wanted quick certification for choice jobs back home, and "only one or two in a hundred were trained in any depth. " 90 6r

Chinese Students and Their Schools in Japan

Whatever the level or quality of book-learning, the mere experience of Japan was educational. 91 That experience began with tearful shipboard sightings of Shimonoseki, where China had signed the humiliating war settlement of 1895. 92 Then came the sights and sounds of a rapidly industrializing urban Japan, and examples of"good administration, well-run schools, attractive customs, and the Japanese unity of national spirit." The 26 September 1901 issue of the daily Bey"ing xinwen huibao (Beijing News Report) published the student observation that 'japanese schools are as numerous as our opium dens, Japanese students as numerous as our opium addicts. " 93 A Chinese student magazine expressed dismay that "Yesterday's master teacher [China] has today become inferior to its student Uapan]. " 94 China's backwardness and vulnerability became painfully apparent to everyone, awakening a sense of shame mixed with national pride and alarm. 95 The maelstrom of feelings produced hypersensitivity to "real and fancied insults to Chinese sovereignty and dignity. " 96 At a more mundane level, daily life for Chinese students in Japan could be trying and grating. Taunts, discrimination, and unfamiliar foods were only part of the story. More dispiriting, perhaps, were the everyday rules of Japanese life which, however attractive to some, placed cumbersome demands upon most cultural outsiders. The dimensions of this problem are revealed tantalizingly in an etiquette list circulated by Chinese students around the year 1905. Mixed in with advice still valid for visitors to Japan today, such as to remove footwear before entering a home, to wear toilet slippers only in the toilet room, and to wash off thoroughly before entering a bath or furo, were admonitions about public and private behavior aimed particularly at fellow Chinese students: Don't spit just anywhere. Don't urinate just anywhere. Don't overshoot the toilet when urinating or defecating. Don't greet friends noisily on the street, and don't just stand around talking. Don't go around naked, even in the heat of summer. At exhibitions, don't keep asking the price of things. Don't ask people's age.

Boosters of Study in Japan

Don't read over people's shoulders. Don't rummage through others' things. In a room, sit still- don't fidget or shuffie around. When entering or leaving a room, bow. Close the doors behind you. Don't chew or suck on ice. Don't eat off the tatami mats after food has spilled. Keep your rooms neat and clean. Don't be noisy at night. Don't fool around with the maids. 97 BOOSTERSOFSTUDYINJAPAN

Those who valued their experiences in Japan often turned into boosters. Zhang Zongxiang (1877-194?) was a Zhejiang native sent to Japan in 1899. Graduating from Tokyo Imperial University's Faculty of Law, he served from 1916 to 1919 as Chinese minister to Japan and in 1919 was beaten up by patriotic May Fourth students in Beijing for being a stooge of Japan. His 1901 R£ben youxue zh£nan (Guide to Study in Japan) enthusiastically endorsed study in Japan. Like Zhang Zhidong in Quanxue p£an, Zhang Zongxiang enumerated the standard litany of advantages of geographical proximity and cost. He then added glowingly, "In terms of schools, not one [field of learning] is lacking, from administration to agriculture, industry, commerce, military studies, and the arts. Thus, for those wishing to go abroad for knowledge unobtainable in China, no place affords more advantages than Japan. "9B Eager to share their new knowledge and to stimulate patriotism among fellow Chinese, students in Japan published numerous periodicals during the Golden Decade years. 99 These occasionally served explicitly as vehicles to promote study in Japan, as in the reasoned and lengthy Hunan student "Letter Exhorting Provincial Elders To Send Their Children Overseas for Study," published in the March 1903 issue of lVuxue yz'b£an (Study Abroad and Translation).100 In July ofthat same year, students from Zhejiang province issued a similarly lengthy "Letter Respectfully Urging Fellow Provincials To Send Their Children Overseas for Study, and To Find Public Funding for Such Students," published in the Zhejiang student provincial monthly, Zhej£ang chao (Zhejiang Tide). 101

Chinese Students and Their Schools in Japan

These are but two examples of the many favorable comments making their way back to China, basically urging fellow Chinese to "come on over." CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHINA

Of those who did "come on over" and then return home, many made outstanding contributions. Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping of Hangzhou University identify three areas of particular note, each important to the present analysis. First, students trained in Japan were instrumental in the translation and compilation of modern textbooks in natural and social sciences. The significance of this cannot be overemphasized because, say Tian and Huo, "up until the Revolution of Ign, most middle- and upperlevel textbooks for every type of school were direct translations from the Japanese or heavily based upon Japanese originals." 102 Second, Japan-trained students served as transmitters and promoters of modern educational theories and practice, by means of lengthy translations and original articles disseminated through a wide variety of books and journals. The terms and concepts introduced by them shaped the thinking about education of a whole new generation of Chinese educators and intellectuals. 103 And, finally, related more to institutionalization than to intellectual change, these returned students served as actual facilitators of China's newly established educational organs and structures, and as founders, administrators, and teachers at China's countless new schools. 104 "Through all these different avenues," write Tian and Huo, "various categories of people trained in Japan, working at various levels, ate away at the rotten body of feudal education, and infused new life blood into modern education. " 105 The exact same statement could be extended to other aspects of modern life in lateQing China.

chapter five Japanese Teachers and Advisers in China Fan Yuanlian, president of Beijing Normal University, three-time Minister of Education since the 19n Revolution, and soon to be named a director and then head of the China Foundation financed by the American Boxer Indemnity Fund, remarked in 1924, "When the history of Chinese education is written, and the beginnings of teacher education recounted, page one will have to start with the work of Dr. Hattori [Unokichi (1867-1939)]." 1 In the intervening years, histories have been written. But the names of Dr. Hattori and a host of other Japanese teachers and advisers have been all but forgotten, lost to mind and history. 2 Half a century ago, in 1939, Sanet6 Keishii produced an eyeopening essay on] apanese teachers and advisers in China. 3 For the next thirty-five years, the subject lay dormant. In 1968, the onehundredth anniversary of Japan's Meiji Ishin, Japanese scholarly interest revived in the subject of foreign contract specialists (oyatoi gaikokuJin) in japan's own early-Meiji transformation. 4 This led in turn to the rediscovery of a generation ofjapanese contract specialists (oyatoi M·honJin) hired by foreign governments like China's in the late-Meiji period. Preliminary investigations· heightened awareness and interest. 5 But it took a series of two- and three-year joint research projects beginning in 1975, under the direction of Abe Hiroshi of Japan's National Institute for Educational Research, to assure the place in history of these forgotten people. 6 In October 1988, a landmark Chinese publication joined these Japanese studies, signaling a Chinese readiness to recall this forgotten chapter of modern Chinese history. This work, by senior Sino] apanese scholar Wang Xiangrong, is simply called Riben Jwoxi Qapanese Teachers in Modern China). Its author in the 1940s and 1950s enjoyed a close working relationship with Sanet6 Keishii,

Japanese Teachers and Advisers In China

first inJapan and then by correspondence from China. But during Chinis Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976, Wang Xiangrong, like most Chinese scholars with foreign contacts, was forced to sever those ties and suspend all scholarly activities. Wang's personal library and papers suffered extensive damage during that time, handicapping his scholarship tremendously. 7 Despite Wang's ordeal, his book enjoys the distinction of being the first monograph in any language on the subject of Japanese teachers in China and has been translated into Japanese. Its centerpiece and most valuable feature is a twenty-eight-page listing of 'japanese Teachers in China," organized by province and institutional affiliation, and including notes on individual teachers. 8 The introduction to that list makes the startling revelation that available lists of Japanese teachers and advisers, including those at the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, completely omit modern Shanghai from among its cities, although Japanese were known to have served there. 9 More discouraging yet for hopes of an accurate count is the comment that, in late-Qing China, Japanese were free to come and go without visas or any kind of registration. How many Japanese teachers and advisers were hired locally, without any official trace? Knowing that Chinese administrators frequently depended upon informal recommendations and introductions by Japanese close at hand in selecting new teachers and advisers makes a definitive answer unlikely. 10 Simple I_J.umbers thus almost defy scholarly reconstruction. In 1983, the meticulous Kageyama Masahiro published a series of estimates from a conservative reading of Japanese Foreign Ministry records. 11 These are similar for corresponding years to the 1976 figures of Nanri Tomoki, likewise based upon Foreign Ministry documents.12 Until such time as numbers are more fully researched, our best course is to follow the ·conservative estimates of the Japanese Foreign Ministry records, as summarized by Kageyama (see Table 2). It cannot be stressed enough that these figures include only those teachers and advisers somehow known to the Japanese Foreign Ministry and its consul~tes in China. Those counted represent the most established Japanese personnel in China- those presumably best qualified and most carefully screened and placed. That the records for the years 1905 through 1908 have somehow been

Japanese Teachers and Advisers in China


Japanese teachers and educational advisers Other advisers and technical experts Total

























Source: Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru kyoiku kindaika katei to Nihonjin kyoshii," p. 9.

lost or destroyed is a tragedy, preventing us from testing Sanet6 Keishu's I939 statement, repeated by Kageyama, that I906 was the peak year for Japanese teachers and educational advisers in China. 13 My personal inclination is to look to I907 or Igo8 as the peak year. The Igi8 jump in non-educational advisers, it is necessary to note, is due not to any healthy increase in Chinese respect for Japanese expertise but to an unhealthy leap in Japanese imperialism before and after the Twenty-One Demands of I9I5, whereby Japan now forced its own officially appointed "experts," such as Customs officers and Salt Administration inspectors, upon the Chinese government, in the manner of Western powers. 14 The early pre-imperialist 15 impetus for Japanese teachers in China came from two directions: a Japanese push and a Chinese pull. Interestingly, a Chinese pull seems to have preceded any J apanese push. In December I8g6, Chinese Minister to Japan, Yugeng, on behalf of the Governor General of Guangdong province, requested Japanese Foreign Ministry help to recruit a person to teach at the new Dongwen Guan or Japanese-language division of the Guangdong [Canton] Tongwen Guan or Interpreters' College. After some hard bargaining over compensation (perhaps to establish a baseline for future contracts), the Foreign Ministry seconded Hasegawa Yutar6 (I865-I904).1 6 Of samurai origins, Hasegawa had experience in China in trade combined with freelance intelligence work and military spyingY Though said to be 68

Japanese Educational Initiatives In China

teaching in China until 1903, his name does not appear on Wang Xiangrong's list of teachers. JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVES IN CHINA

As seen, Japan in 1897 began seeking means to cooperate with China against Western aggression and imperialism. China, for its part, inspired by the partition crisis of 1897-1898, showed a sudden interest in outside help to assure its survival in a hostile world. In the area of education, Japanese involvements in China began with what might be called an historical hiccup: the establishment of a series of Dongwen Xuetang or Japanese Schools (Dongwen means literally "eastern language"-the language of the people to the east of China) founded or co-founded by Japanese. Usually, for lack of funds, these were closed in short order or were taken over by Chinese. Whatever their fate, these schools brought to China some of the first Japanese teachers and educational advisers who trained Chinese students for follow-up education in Japan. What is startling is that fully half of these schools were Buddhist mission schools, inspired by the example of Christian mission schools. Their purpose was "to introduce Buddhist ideas to Chinese children, alongside their instruction in Japanese language and standard modern subjects. "lB The founding ofBuddhist schools followed a March 1898 survey of the mission-oriented Higashi Honganji or Otani branch (Otani ha) ofJodo Shinshii or Shin Buddhism, 19 which targeted China's Yangzi region for Japanese Buddhist proselytization. Within just a year, Higashi Honganji had established schools in three key cities: the Hangzhou Riwen Xuetang (1898-1906); the Suzhou Dongwen Xuetang (1899-1900); and in Nanjing, the Jinling Dongwen Xuetang (1899-1904).2° None of these was oflasting importance, however. A more historic early effort, with enduring consequences, was non-Buddhist. The Fuzhou Dongwen Xuetang Quly 1898-December 1903) was founded at Fuzhou (Foochow) in coastal Fujian province in July 1898. The first of many schools to bear the name of Dongwen Xuetang, it was established at the height of the Hundred Days Reform, at the joint initiative of leading local Chinese reformers and Japanese activists. Its Chinese promoters included 6g

Japanese Teachers and Advisers in China

the head of the local mint (YinyuanJu) and Chen Baochen (18481935), former High Commissioner for Military and Foreign Affairs in South China (Nanyang dachen) and a prominent education official. 21 On the Japanese side, the chief initiator was T 6-A Kai activist and journalist, Nakajima Masao (1859-1943). Nakajima, first head of the Fuzhou Branch of To-A Dobunkai in 1899, moved in 1901 to Beijing where he later helped found and edit Shuntian shibao (Shuntian Times), the respected Japanese-owned Chinese language newspaper. In the mid 1930s, his name appears as editor of To-A Dobunkai's multi-volume Tai-Shi kaikoroku (Memoirs Concerning China), an important source for the present study. 22 At Fuzhou Dongwen Xuetang, the all-important zong jiaoxi, or head teacher in active charge of curriculum and planning and of the Japanese teaching staff was Okada Kenjiro (1867-1901). Okada, of samurai background, had received some higher education at Christian Doshisha in Kyoto before entering Arao Sei's Nis-Shin Boeki Kenkyujo Qapan-China Trade Research Institute) in Shanghai, from which he graduated in 1894. During Japan's war with China, Okada had served as an army interpreter, was decorated, and then appointed a civilian administrator in Taiwan. 23 The courses his school offered were Japanese language, standard courses from the modern Japanese curriculum (Ch. putong xue < J. futsu gaku), and Chinese literature. The thirty to forty students attending were said to be predominantly children of the local elite (xiangshen ). 24 Fuzhou Dongwen Xuetang managed somehow to stay afloat following the September 1898 halt to the Hundred Days Reform. A sharp drop in Chinese support, however, forced Nakajima to look to Japanese sources for additional funding. By May 1899, he had successfully arranged for the fledgling To-A Dobunkai, of which he was a director, to provide a monthly subsidy to Dongwen Xuetang as one ofits educational projects in China. Besides the monthly subsidy, To-A Dobunkai sponsored the services of China-enthusiast, Kuwata Toyozo (1872-1923), a graduate of Tokyo Senmon Gakko (later Waseda University) and an association member, who taught and advised at Dongwen Xuetang for seven years. 25 In July 1899, the school held its first graduation exercise. In accord with the notion that such schools in China. should serve as feeders to higher education inJapan, 26 two Don gwen Xuetang graduates made their

Japanese Educational Initiatives In China

way to Tokyo where, by October, To-A Dobunkai was finalizing plans to house them at its new Tokyo Do bun Shoin. 2 7 To-A Dobunkai support fell short of the funding needs of Dongwen Xuetang, however. Nakajima therefore looked across the straits to Taiwan, where the new Japanese colonial government, eager to cultivate ties with coastal Fujian elites, listened sympathetically. By rgoo, regular assistance began flowing to Dongwen Xuetang from Taiwan. 28 Meanwhile, the Fuzhou mint had terminated its support. Neither To-A Dobunkai nor the Taiwan government was in a position to make up the difference. Writing somewhat later in obvious frustration over funding, Kuwata Toyozo complained: "The United States and France, convinced that national power follows language, have plans to set up French language schools and English language schools which I, for one, strenuously oppose. I also feel most strongly that we must secure this area as a Uapanese] sphere of interest. But a motor cannot run without fuel. . . . I fear most profoundly that Dobunkai is losing interest in our Fuzhou work. "29 In this study it is essential to bear in mind that, at the turn of the century, Japan and its institutions were without exception struggling and poor. Those strugglin'g institutions ran the gamut ofJapanese Buddhist missions, the Japanese colonial government of Taiwan, semi-governmental associations like To-A Dobunkai, J apanese businesses, and central government agencies. All needed funds for grand hopes and dreams that consistently outran resources. Educating foreigners abroad, with no immediate payoff, was an activity difficult to justify or afford. At Dongwen Xuetang by the end of 1902, some r6o students were enrolled in its two divisions of general education (Ch. putong ke < J.futsii ka) and govern:ment and administration (Ch. zhengzhi ke < J. sey'i ka). In addition, 34 students from a pool of 350 applicants had been admitted that summer into a new program initiated by Chen Baochen with provincial funds. 30 This marked the beginning of a Chinese plan to upgrade Dongwen Xuetang and transform it into a basic institution for Chinese teacher training, with a new campus and buildings.3 1 The expanded Dongwen Xuetang ofrgo3 was called Fujian Normal School (Quan-Min Shifan Xue~ang). Under Chen Baochen, it opened its doors on II December 1903, offering a teacher training 7I

Japanese Teachers and Advisers in China

program based on the best of the Japanese system: a four-year basic program that included a one-year preparatory course (Ch. (yu ke < J. yoka) and a three-year regular or main course (Ch. ben ke < J. honka); it also offered a year-and-a-half accelerated or short course (Ch. sucheng ke < J. sokusei ka). The entire program was predicated upon a Japanese teaching staff, as implied in two late-1903 Japanese reports: Those who pass the entrance exam are admitted into the preparatory course, where for one year they receive instruction only in Japanese language. Those successfully completing this training proceed on to the main division, where the courses needed to become a teacher are all taught in Japanese. Graduates will be assigned positions as teachers in middle and elementary schools throughout the province. The accelerated course involves instruction in those fields considered most urgent by Chinese educators. For the first year, the thirty students with the best records [at Dongwen Xuetang] were selected to form the first class of the main division. One hundred students were recruited into the other two divisions [fifty in each]. All expenses are met by the government, and most students come from better families. 32

Kuwata Toyozo reported that more than one thousand persons had applied for the openings, exceeding the wildest dreams of both Chen Baochen and himself. 3 3 Okada Kenjiro had been replaced as zongJiaoxi, or head teacher, in 1900 by Nakanishi Jiitaro (1875-1914), himself now forced to resign by recurring illness. Nakanishi, like his predecessor, had studied at Arao Sei's Nis-Shin Boeki Kenkyiijo in Shanghai, and was a decorated wartime interpreter. 34 In Nakanishi's place, the Chinese appointed Kuwata zong Jiaoxi, a post Kuwata continued to hold at the new normal school. Carrying the burden of instruction were five qualified Japanese, only three of whose names appear on Wang Xiangrong's list. 35 Kuwata and Fujian Normal School enjoyed To-A Dobunkai support at least up until the time ofKuwata's resignation in 1906. 36 The Japanese colonial government on Taiwan, however, terminated its funding in 1904, after the school came under wholly Chinese direction. 37 Kuwata himself welcomed the shift to full Chinese direction, and in his 23 November 1903 report to To-A Dobunkai praised Chinese plans to upgrade the new school to an 72

Beijing Dongwen Xueshe

upper or higher normal school (Ch. gaodeng shijan xuetang < J. kiJto shz'hangakudif) and predicted the school's assuming "a major place in Chinese education. " 38 The school was indeed elevated in 1905, in both name and program, to Fujian Upper Normal School (Fujian Youji Shifan Xuetang), and not long after that t9 Fujian Higher Normal School (Fujian Gaodeng Shifan Xuetang). 39 Though the Japanese role in this school was clearly vital to its launching, Chinese accounts begin their school histories in the year 1902 or 1903, omitting all mention of any Japanese involvement. 40 Besides the four schools above, the record reveals five other J apanese schools founded between 1899 and 1901: in Tianjin, the Tianjin Dongwen Xuetang (r899-19o?); 41 in Chengdu, the Sichuan Dongwen Xuetang (r899-I9oo), with unclear ties to the Japanese military;42 in Xiamen, the Xiamen Dong.Ya Shuyuan (I900-I909), supported by generous Taiwan government funding; 43 in:Beijing, the Beijing DongwenXueshe (I90I-I906), a truly joint Sino:Japanese venture; and in Quanzhou, Fujian province, theBuddhistZhanghua Xuetang or Zhanghua School (I901-I9??), an outreach project ofTaiwan Higashi Honganji, with secret Taiwan government assistance. 44 Holmes Welch, with characteristic humor, has commented on Japanese motivations in founding these schools, and on their sales pitch to the Chinese: "The schools advertised for students with pointed slogans, such as: 'Nations rise and fall on talented men, and talented men are produced by education.' The courses they offered were in the Japanese language and in standard modern subjects. At least four schools were opened in 1898-99· It is doubtful that their only purpose was to help China grow strong by producing men of talent. Rather it was to make sure that some of its men of talent were oriented toward Japan. " 45 BEIJING DONGWEN XUESHE UNDER NAKAJIMA SAISHI, 1901-1906

Of the schools just mentioned, the one most thoroughly researched to date is the Beijing Dongwen Xueshe. 46 Headed by Nakajima Saishi (r869-1939), this school at its founding showed every sign of. a bright future. Only in hindsight does its failure seem preordained. Its story reads like a Greek tragedy. Nakajima Saishi, its founder, was a man of integrity who de73

Japanese Teachers and Advisers in China

voutly desired to do something "to repay Japan's great cultural debt to China. "47 A trusted friend of eminent Chinese educator Wu Rulun, Nakajima had perfected his Chinese while teaching Japanese and English from 1897 to 1898 at Lianchi Shuyuan, Wu's famed academy at Baoding. There, the two men had discussed plans for a new school incorporating modern educational elements. In 1899, however, when Wu Rulun made a generous offer to Nakajima to teach at a new satellite school, Nakajima turned him down for family reasons. 48 Nakajima had first come to China in 1891, immediately after graduating from the Buddhist Nishi Honganji school that evolved into Ryiikoku University at Kyoto. He traveled extensively, visiting numerous provinces and temples, earning his way by selling goods supplied him by Shanghai's Kishida Ginko (1833-1905), "the father of Japan's China adventurers (tairiku ronin)" and a patron of Arao Sei. 49 In June 1899, back in Tokyo, Nakajima joined To-A Dobunkai, of which Kishida Ginko was a councilor and charter member. There Nakajima briefly assisted with educational planning.50 At a To-A Dobunkai banquet honoring Chinese guests in October 1899, Nakajima delivered remarks displaying a command of spoken Chinese rare among his contemporaries. 51 In early 1901, after teaching at the shortlived Sichuan Dongwen Xuetang at Chengdu, Nakajima called upon Wu Rulun in Beijing while en route back to Japan. The two men decided to reactivate their dream for modern Chinese education, in Beijing now. The well-connected Wu introduced Nakajima to appropriate Chinese who could help with start-up funds, a site, and administration of the school, while Wu personally secured clearance from appropriate court officials. 52 On 20 March 1901, Dongwen Xueshe opened its doors for instruction. Times were propitious, since Beijing schools were still closed following the Boxer upheaval. The demand for education was explosive. Instead of the 30 students anticipated, a crush of120 students materialized within just three days. In no time, that figure had ballooned to 280. 53 These numbers were more than one teacher could handle. They were also more than the facilities and resources permitted. Those students drawn to Dongwen Xueshe have been described 74

Beijing Dongwen Xueshe

by Wang Xiangrong as including individuals with every kind of background: "Hanlin Academy scholars, persons with the highest degrees ofjinshi, juren, and xiucai, many more without degrees and only elementary educations, and persons of every shade of professional and social background. " 54 Admission was open to all, tuition-free. In line with Nakajima's spirit of Buddhist charity, only two conditions were imposed: basic literacy, and good health with no opium habit. 55 Nakajima's open-enrollment policy was counter to practice in Japan, where school admission was governed by strict standards and careful placement. 56 His school's failure to screen and place students created problems immediately. 57 Masking those problems and fueling unwarranted optimism was the fact that several individuals from the school's unique first group found responsible positions with Yuan Shikai and Li Hongzhang, gaining the school a favorable reputation and a commitment of funding from Yuan himself. 58 The lack of discernible standards at Dongwen Xueshe caused fluctuations in student numbers almost beyond belief, particularly in 1902. 59 Annual totals over the school's years of operation show 6m students in 1901 (280 the first term; 321 the second); 331 students in 1902; 141 in 1903; 189 in 1904; 137 in 1905; and 168 in 1906. 60 More telling than annual totals, however, are the statistics on class attrition. Of the 6m students entering in 1901, only 152 continued into 1902; 38 into 1903; 8 into 1904; and I into 1905. Of the 331 students entering during 1902, 2 continued into their fourth year in 1906, but were unable to finish. 61 In other words, for a variety of reasons, only one out of more than a thousand students completed a full four-year program in the school's five-and-a-half years. 62 The problem was not alack of vision. DongwenXueshe's founding charter, drafted by Nakajima himself, stated, "Those wishing to rouse China into action must overhaul its schools. A group so committed has today founded Dongwen Xueshe . . . to lay the foundations for a modern [Chinese] transformation (Ch. weixin,]. ishin)." Elsewhere, Nakajima stated his hopes more explicitly: "To train persons having the knowledge and qualifications to serve as teachers to rejuvenate China's eighteen provinces. To train teaching personnel able to help set up normal schools in the various 75

Japanese Teachers and Advisers in China

provinces." 63 These were goals desperately to be desired. 64 Nor was the problem that Nakajima was a bad person; he seems not to have had a wicked bone in his body. He is remembered as going out of his way to lunch with his staff, to attend their lectures, to Ch.Jingcha), it proposed that every Chinese prefecture, department, district, and city should have police officers and police academies (jingcha xuetang). For textbooks, it recommended the various japanese police regulations (RibenJingcha zhangcheng). 10 POLICE FUNCTIONS

Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong, aided by Zhang Jian, similarly advocated a modern police system in the second of their three July memorials. After reviewing the most blatant defects of the Chinese public security system, they commented as follows: "In Japan, the term for police is Jingcha. Their head is a Jingcha zhang, and they are organized aroundjingcha Bu (Police Bureaus). The primary aim of their police regulations is to preserve the peace and prevent trouble, not unlike our Baojiaju and army (yingbing) inspection stations. However, Jingcha are the products of xuetang, their regulations are strict, and their duties broad. It is the Police

Police Functions

Department QingchaJu) that takes responsibility for the census, for keeping the roads clean, fighting fires, differentiating between the good and the bad, and interrogating thieves. " 11 It is worth noting here that China's modern police eventually assumed all of these variegated functions. 12 With respect to urban police, David Strand offers a useful description that spans the early decades of the twentieth century: The new police force [of Beijing] had been given the power not only to make arrests but also to render judgments on minor civil and criminal cases. The police could collect fines and impose short jail sentences .... In addition to mediating disputes, controlling traffic, and fighting crime, the police also regulated all manner of economic, cultural, and political activities.... Policemen enforced hygiene standards in the food business, made sure the public toilets were cleaned regularly, gave licensing exams to medical practitioners, regulated the storage in temples of coffins awaiting shipment back to the deceased's hometown or village, and tried to prevent the indiscriminate dumping of toxic or contaminated waste. Policemen censored public entertainments and political expression. They supervised a variety of institutions designed to administer to and control the city's poorest residents, including soup kitchens, schools, reform schools, and workhouses. After close study, the premier Western student of Beijing society during the Republican period, Sidney Gamble, concluded that the police were "responsible for most of the [governmental] work done in the city and touch almost every side of the life of the people." 13

With respect to Yuan Shikai's province of Zhili, Stephen MacKinnon remarks, "[L ]ike his urban counterpart, the rural policeman's duties were extremely broad. Besides census and intelligence gathering, protection of property and people, apprehension and prosecution of petty criminals, and maintenance of public morality, police were even expected to double as firemen. " 14 These generally followed the Japanese pattern, about which Wang Chia-chien has written at the conclusion of his 65-page article on the new Chinese police system, rgm-rgr6: "One other point warranting serious attention is ·the enormous influence brought in from Japan with respect to China's police affairs in the late Qing and early Republican periods. The sending of Chinese students to Japan for police training, the hiring of Japanese instructors, and

China's New Police and Prison Systems

the adoption of Japanese police regulations and laws are all cases in point. " 15 POLICE TRAINING IN JAPAN

The sending of students to Japan for police training is a topic that Wang Chia-chien mentions frequently, although never systematically. He reports twenty students sent by Zhang Zhidong to a special one-year police course at Kobun Gakuin in July 1902, followed by another forty-seven in 1905. The latter group shifted after one year to Keisatsu Gakk6, or Police Academy, 16 returning to China in September 1907. Yuan Shikai, in November 1902, sent twentyseven students to the same Kobun Gakuin police courseY Students were likewise sent to Japan for police training from the provinces of Jiangsu, Fujian, Anhui, and Guangxi.1 8 (By 1904, it should be mentioned, the Chinese demand for police training in Japan had grown to such proportions that Kobun Gakuin opened two branch schools especially to accommodate Chinese students. Instruction and management at those two branches were truly professional, entrusted to the Tokyo Police Department or Keishich6.19) Of provinces recruiting students trained in Japan for their own new police forces, Wang mentions Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan. 20 POLICE TRAINING IN CHINA: KAWASHIMA NANIWA AND THE BEIJING POLICE ACADEMY, 1901-1912

In 1901, Prince, charged with post-Boxer public security in Beijing, contracted with Chinese-speaking Kawashima Naniwa (whom the prince had come to know and trust 21 ) to continue with police administration and training that had occupied Kawashima since August 1900. What this involved was Kawashima's remaining with the Junshi Jingwu Yamen or Military Police Office, converted and renamed the Jingwu Ting or Beijing Police Headquarters, to continue with his successful training of Chinese police officers. Kawashima, though only age thirty-six in 1901, qualified as much as anyone for the title of Old China Hand or Shina tsii. At age

Kawashima Naniwa and the Beijing Police Academy

seventeen, in 1882, he had enrolled at the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages (Tokyo Gaikokugo Gakko) in its Chinese langu~ge (Shinago Ka) program. The school's radical reorganization ofi885 had prompted Kawashima to quit before his scheduled graduation in 1886. 22 He went instead to China, on funds from Fukushima Yasumasa-a man who, like himself, was of samurai stock from the same castle town of Matsumoto in the large domain of Shinano (Nagano prefecture today). Kawashima's assignment was to report on China's maritime defenses, a task he carried out with the instincts of a born sleuth. 23 Forced back to Japan by illness in 188g, Kawashima was mobilized by the war of 1894-1895 to return to China as an army interpreter. At the end of that war, like so many with China backgrounds, he was dispatched to the new Japanese colony of Taiwan. From 18g6, he supervised enforcement of Japan's opium prohibition, obtaining important practical police experience. Quitting Taiwan in 1897, Kawashima returned to Tokyo where he found immediate employment as a Chinese-language instructor at Shikan Gakko and at Tokyo Higher Normal School. 24 We can surmise that this is the period when Kawashima completed his translation into Chinese of a collection of articles edited by Tojo Hidenori (1855-1913) and published as Riben LuJun Daxuexiao lunlue (Essays on Japan's Military College) at Hangzhou in 18g8. 25 During the boxer troubles, Fukushima Yasumasa, commanding officer of the Japanese Expeditionary Force, asked Kawashima to sign on once again as an army translator. Kawashima, now age thirty-five, was at his prime. 26 Landing in China on 26June 1900, by August he was training Chinese to assist Japanese officers in policing territory under Japanese occupation in Beijing. Impressed by Kawashima's performance, and faced with cutbacks of military personnel, Fukushima recommended Kawashima for various posts culminating at the Military Police Office, where he handled a variety of assignments with consummate skill. Most importantly, from October 1900 to January 1901, Kawashima coordinated an intensive training course in police work for 40 literate Chinese, followed by training of another 50. 27 By April, Fukushima and the Japanese divisional commander had been persuaded by Kawashima to fund the establishment of a Police Education Office

Illustration 14 Kawashima Naniwa wearing Chinese court robes, with Prince Qing, ca. 1905

Reform in Zhili under Yuan Shikai

Qingwu Jiaoyu Suo), where with Chinese military cooperation over 340 students were selected for training, in anticipation of reversion to Chinese control. 28 It is at this point that Prince Qing, charged with foreign affairs, with negotiating a Boxer settlement, and with security matters, began to arrange with Japanese and other authorities the transfer of power back into Chinese hands. He chose to retain the Junshi Jingwu Yamen under the name of Jingwu Ting or police headquarters, with Kawashima as de facto chief of police. (See Illus. 14.) Organized Japanese fashion, each section or division was also headed by a Japanese. The sudden Japanese stranglehold on police matters right in the heart of the empire caused such an uproar among representatives of Germany, France, and Russia as to force Prince Qing to relieve Kawashima ·of his post in August, after a mere two months. In consolation, Prince Qing awarded Kawashima a five-year contract, effective from August, to head the new Jingwu Xuetang or Police Academy of Beijing, which Kawashima had helped to plan and organize. 29 Beijing, near the geographical heart of Zhili province, was administered as Shuntian fu, independently of the province. 30 Developments in one spread easily to the other, as was the case with police reforms. Credit for that belongs chiefly to Yuan Shikai, who was appointed governor general of Zhili province in November 1901. Among Yuan's most pressing tasks upon assuming office was to recover Tianjin from foreign occupation forces, a task accomplished on 15 August 1902. 31 Until that time, Yuan's government was based at Baoding, traditional seat of the governor general of Zhili, which explains why Baoding features in so many reform initiatives of Yuan's Zhili years. POLICE REFORM IN ZHILI PROVINCE UNDER YUAN SHIKAI

Yuan Shikai is perhaps best remembered for his army reforms, since his control ofthe Beiyang Army first brought him to supreme power in 1912, as president of the new Republic, and then brought his military proteges to power after1916, during the tumultuous warlord years. But in police work Yuan also excelled; indeed, a modern police force was essential to his recovery of Tianjian.

China's New Police and Prison Systems

To recover Tianjin, Yuan had to satisfy the powers that he could maintain law and order in the province as a whole, and so protect foreign lives and property. Yuan's right-hand man for police work, first at Baoding and than at Tianjin, was Zhao Bingjun (18591914). From the same province as Yuan, Zhao had been recruited after catching Yuan's eye while suppressing Boxer elements in and around Beijing. At Baoding, the police force Zhao built up earned him a reputation for efficiency and probity. Instrumental to that success was the Baoding Jingwu Xuetang or Baoding Police Academy, established by mid 1902. Like its name, the Baoding academy was very much a spin-off of the Jingwu Xuetang at Beijing. Kawashima Naniwa had helped from the start. He had, for example, authorized transfer to the new academy of Kamata Yasuke (dates unknown), one of Jingwu Xuetang's senior instructors. And it was through Kawashima that Yuan had obtained the services of Miura Kiden (dates unknown), a police superintendent (keishz) of the Tokyo Ke.ishi-ch6. 32 Handsomely paid, Miura served as police adviser and zong Jiaoxi of the Baoding academy. Miura then moved with Yuan Shikai and Zhao Bingjun to Tianjin, where he served as a planner and zong Jiaoxi of the famous TianjinJingwu Xuetang, which was expanded in 1904 into the Beiyang Higher Police Academy. 33 Under Miura at the Tianjin academy were nine other Japanese, most like himself under open-ended (wu qixian) contracts. 34 Upon this base, writes Stephen MacKinnon after carefully scrutinizing Zhili police reforms, Yuan Shikai by the end of his term as governor general had created a modern police force that had become "a genuinely, locally-rooted movement spreading throughout the province. " 3 5 Zhili's importance in police reform is acknowledged by Wang Chia-chien, who states that the Zhili Police Regulations Qingwu zhangcheng) of October 1902 were decreed by the court as the nationwide model. 36 Wang points out further that Beijing attached utmost importance to police reform, pursuing it "with firm determination. " 37 "The imperial court's positive attitude and its planned pursuit [of police reform] served as a great assist to the development of the police," writes Wang. 38 In this, Wang agrees with others, such as Meribeth Cameron who states, "Police forces on the Western or, rather, Japanese model came into favor as a r68

lVu ming you shi

result of the example set by Yuan [Shikai] in [Zhili], and every province was ordered to organize a similar body of men. " 39 Stephen MacKinnon confirms that Zhili under Yuan became "the leading province in police reform" and "a national model."40 YOU MING YOU SHI (BOTH NAME AND REALITY)

Despite Wang's own evidence, he ends up concluding, "But like the other late-Qing Xinzheng reforms legislated from above, these existed in name without reality (you ming wu shz)." 41 Wang has a point. He supports it when discussing the lack of uniformity in practice among China's provinces, even after creation of a national Ministry of Police (Xunjing Bu) at Yuan Shikai's behest on IO October 1905, intended to standardize police administration across the country. 42 Yet Wang must be faulted for failing to pursue his own leads that demonstrate meaningful reforms with enduring consequences, such as the police reforms of Zhili province 43 and the Beijing Police Academy under Kawashima N aniwa. 44 JVu ming wu shi is a favorite Chinese phrase for dismissing meaningless paper pronouncements of government. Scholars must surely be alert to these, for they litter the documentary record. Yet, for such criticism to withstand historical scrutiny requires that a given pronouncement show little implementation or effect, as feeble initiatives backslide into practice as usual. Xinzheng reforms, including police reforms, do not fit the scenario of you ming wu shi. However shaky or tentative individual reforms might appear under intensive scrutiny, virtually all were confirmed in place by the rgn Revolution, certified as the legitimized practice of the day. These never reverted back to established ways of the past, but moved forward in multiple directions from their Xinzheng foundations. For China, they were you ming you shi- both name and reality, or form with substance.


Chinas New Police and Prison Systems


With respect to police matters, more systematic research is needed, with special attention to the Japanese police system and its transfer and adaptation to the Chinese setting. That process, differentiated from simple technology transfer or culture transfer, involves something that has been labeled "organizational transfer"45 by D. Eleanor Westney or, in a later study, as "organizational emulation. " 46 Westney develops these terms in connection with modern police systems and, specifically, a transfer from the Paris prefecture of Police to the Tokyo Keishi-cho. Her work is directly relevant to the present discussion, and provides a sophisticated model for future research. Westney's first study is her 1982 article, "The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan: The Case of the Paris Prefecture of Police and the Keishi-cho." In that article, she examines step by step Japan's selection of a model for its modern police system, its emulation of that model, departures from that model and, finally, "Forty Years After: A Comparison in 1914." She concludes with comments about the Keishi-cho as "a case of organizational development." The same data, considerably reworked, appears in Westney's 1987 study, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Mey"i Japan. This book points the direction for other studies of planned radical institutional change. A counterpart work for China might be titled, "Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Japanese Organizational Patterns to LateQing China." Unfortunately, such a study is hardly feasible. In China, the institutional and organizational elements borrowed from Japan, though surviving, managed to do so only amid political and social turmoil which prevented their maturation and caused records to be scattered and lost. The institutions examined by Westney in Japan (the police, the postal system, and the modern press) were allowed to mature in a relatively settled and orderly environment, with the documentary record preserved. Interestingly, the Chinese manner of borrowing during the Xinzheng years- studied, sophisticated, and hurried- was not unlike the pattern of Meiji Japan. This lends itself to a comparison with 170

Beijing Police Academy and Comparative Research

Westney's sections on Japan's "search for alternatives" and "choosing a model."47 But Westney's rich material on "Building the New System'' and "Surpassing the Model: The Reforms of the Mid188os"48 has no clear Chinese counterpart. The unsettled conditions of post-imperial China never allowed for the settled maturation of institutional change so impressive in Meiji Japan. This unfortunate fact effectively eliminates the possibility for truly sophisticated comparative research. THE BEIJING POLICE ACADEMY AND COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

Having said this, one partial exception may involve the Beijing Police Academy, as primary source materials become available. Founded in mid Igor, this was China's premier police academy until Liberation in 1949. As seen, until 1912 it was headed by Kawashima Naniwa. During those years the school had two names and two clear phases. From July 1gor to August 1go6, it was simply calledJingwu Xuetang or Police Academy. During that time it was "run by foreigners," in the words of Wang Chia-chien, "at a loss of Chinese sovereignty. " 49 Or, as Kawashima himself explained it, "I alone superintended the school ... and could hire most police and army instructors entirely at my own discretion. " 50 Hirotani Takio highlights important components of the story. Kawashima Naniwa received a rare five-year contract in August 1901 (the sole example of a five-year contract known to me), to serve in the top post of Jiandu or school director (again, the only instance known to me of a foreignJiandu of a major Chinese institution). As the expiration date of his first contract approached, China had already entered a time of"growing alarm about Japan'' and of "rights recovery agitation." 51 For this and other reasons, Chinese authorities brought the school directly under control of the new Ministry of the Interior (Neiwu Bu), in imitation of the Japanese practice, and changed its name. This ushered in phase two of the Kawashima years. In a related move, it was decided to reverse the ratio of Japanese to Chinese teachers: to cut back the Japanese by more than half, from ten to only three or four; and to increase the Chinese from their level of three or four up to ten. 52 By this point, Kawashima had begun to use his school as a base



China's New Police and Prison Systems

for political propaganda against Russia during the Russo-] apanese War of1904-1905, and as a gathering place for Japanese adventurers with their eye on Mongolia. 53 If Qing authorities knew of these questionable activities, they chose to ignore them and renew Kawashima for another five years. They raised his hefty salary by half again, from 400 silver dollars (yuan) per month to 6oo silver dollars per month, adding an extra 6o-dollar monthly housing allowance. His formal title and responsibilities remained unchanged. 54 The school's new name, from August 1906 to October 1912, was Beijing Higher Police Academy Qingshi Gaodeng Xunjing Xuetang).55 In 1912, in the Republican era, the name was changed again, back essentially to Police Academy Qingcha Xuexiao ), adopting the Japanese terms for police, keisatsu (Ch. Jingcha), and for school, gakkO (Ch. xuexU.zo)-making the academy's name identical to the Japanese Keisatsu Gakk6. 56 During the eleven-year tenure of Kawashima Naniwa, or up to Octobe.r 1912, the academy had graduated more than 1,6oo police officers, "an outstanding contribution" states Wang Chia-chien. 57 This academy closed briefly in December 1914, only to reopen from July 1915 to December 1916, graduating 344 additional officers. It reopened in September 1917, and continued up to the end of the Northern Expedition in 1928. At that time, it was absorbed into the reorganized Ministry of Interior, and thereafter referred to as the Interior Ministry Higher Police Academy (Neizheng Bu Jingguan Gaoji Xuexiao). "This school graduated very large numbers of students who came to be the backbone oflater higher police personnel across the country," writes Wang, attesting to its enduring importance and the possibilities for comparative research. 58 CHINA'S NEW PRISON SYSTEM

"Cramped and filthy ... Rampant with abuse. " 59 Such terms describe Chinese jails at the turn of the century. Terms of such sweeping condemnation would not normally be associated with high government officials. Yet these are the words of Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong in the second of their three July 1901 memorials, in the section headed "To Lighten Punishments and lmprisonments."60 A detailed supporting argument follows, drawing impe-

The Case of Zhili

rial attention to the compelling need for prison reform. The full argument is available in English translation, in Marinus Meijer's study of modern criminal law in China.61 Liu and Zhang were not the first to advocate prison reform. Nor were they alone in their pattern of advocating prison reform alongside police reform. In 1897-1898, as one dimension of his police work, Huang Zunxian had established reformatories called qianshan suo. This enlightened institution went beyond just holding and rehabilitating criminals; it provided even vagrants and drifters with training in handicraft skills. 62 The Liu-Zhang memorial refers to qianshan suo as well as to gaiguo suo (another term for reformatory) and praises its work and purpose. 63 Theirs was a creative adaptation of the qianshan suo idea, including the attachment of workhouses (gongyifang) to prisons (yu) at the district or xian level, where prisoners could learn a trade and work off their fines. 64 Zhao Erxun, the outstanding interim governor of Shanxi, proved instrumental in prison reforms through an influential memorial of 12 December 1902. Meijer, writing on criminal law, considered Zhao's memorial sufficiently important to include a full English translation under a lengthy heading that ends, "For the Establishment of Workhouses for Delinquents in all Provinces. " 65 Two elements of Zhao's memorial are worth noting, since those become features of China's best-known prison systems. First, is Zhao's use, perhaps for the first time, of the term xiyi suo (or more fully, zuifan xiyi suo) to mean workhouse. 66 And second is Zhao's argument that banishment be broadly replaced by penal servitude; this led directly to the Board of Punishment's partial abolition of banishment, as approved by the throne on 29 April 1903. 67 THE CASE OF ZHILI

By scholarly consensus, prison reform reached its fullest development in Zh,ili, the same province where the new police system was developed most fully. In that province, the connection between police and prison reforms is so close that Stephen MacKinnon mentions them in a single breath: "During the initial stage, 19021904, activity centered in Tianjin and Baoding, where Yuan and Zhao Bing-jun established large police forces, police academies, 173

China's New Police and Prison Systems

model prisons, and workhouses." 68 Zhao, it might be added, rose quickly to the equivalent of Tianjin police chief. In October 1905, when the national Ministry of Police was created, Zhao was appointed its vice minister while continuing as police chief of Tianjin. These were positions he held until the collapse of the dynasty in 19n-1912.69 As Tianjin police chief, Zhao Bingjun was involved in the planning and construction of Zhili's earliest prisons. But he was not the primary actor. That honor belongs to Tianjin prefect Ling Fupeng (dates unknown). On 29 April 1903, Yuan Shikai submitted a memorial detailing his plans to establish zuijan xiyi suo, precisely the term for workhouse used in Zhao Erxun's December 1902 memorial. At the same time, Yuan dispatched Ling Fupeng to Japan to inspect prison facilities in five cities including Tokyo and Osaka. On the basis of his findings, by July 1904 Ling had inaugurated the Tianjin xiyi suo, and exactly one year later, in July 1905, the Baading xiyi suo- both of them said by a contemporary Baoding report to be "based upon Japanese prison workhouse arrangements."70 One or both were placed under the supervision of Murata Yoshihiro (dates unknown), a former Osaka police officer and one-time Baoding police academy instructor. 71 Reinforcing the Japanese influence, in 1905 Ling and others were sent back to Japan to investigate Japanese prison regulations, facilities, training methods, and financing. On the basis of their findings, Prefect Ling, Police Chief Zhao, and their colleagues instituted reforms in four broad areas: creation of new distinctions between petty versus serious offenders, and between convicted criminals versus persons merely under detention or awaiting trial; more emphasis on training of prison personnel; improvement of prison buildings; and expansion of the now-famous xiyi suo and other rehabilitation facilities. 72 REFORMS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND DR. OGAWA SHIGEJIRO

On 20 April 1905, Wu Tingfang (1842-1922) of the Board of Punishments submitted a plan to the throne for the establishment of zuijan xiyi suo in all provinces. Because of funding and personnel shortages, even after two years only the provinces of Zhili, Honan, 174

National Reform and Ogawa Shigejiro

Shandong, and Yunnan had workhouses. 73 More significantly, on October 15, a joint memorial from Shen Jiaben and Wu Tingfan, as joint directors of the Legal Revision Office, reported that [t]he criminal codes of the various foreign countries have been translated, and can more or less be understood. Now it is time to grasp more fully the actual practice of criminal procedures. In the early stages of Japanese reforms (gaige), that country frequently sent persons to France, Britain, and Germany to investigate actual practice. Having distilled the essence of Western law, Japan finally was able to write its own laws. Because Japan is geographically close to us, we desire to send specialists to that country to investigate its laws. Dong Kang [r867-1947], Wang Shouxun [dates unknown], and Mai Zhiyan [dates unknown] of the Board of Punishments are highly qualified individuals. Because they are thoroughly familiar with studies of foreign legal and administrative systems, they are recognized as most suited to the task. 74

Dong, Wang, and Mai were in fact dispatched on an official mission to investigate all aspects ofjapanese criminal law and practice, including the Japanese experience with revising and promulgating its own new criminal laws. Upon returning to China, Dong Kang, the senior member of the mission, published two works, one reporting on visits to Japanese courts, and the other on visits to Japanese prisons. Appropriately, the preface to the latter by Shenjiaben singled out a 'japanese prison authority'' by the name of Xiaohe Zicilang (Ogawa Shigejiro) as most helpful in assisting and advising the group about prison reform in China. 75 Ogawa Shigejiro, Doctor of Law, professor at Tokyo Imperial University, and a lecturer to Chinese students at Hosei University, was indeed an authority on prisons. He is one of those remarkable men who seem to pop up everywhere in Meijijapan. A graduate of Tokyo Senmon Gakko, he studied in Germany and returned to Japan in 1886, when he joined the Ministry of the Interior. Shifting over to the Ministry ofJustice, by 1891 he was chief of the Prisons Section. A biographical dictionary reports that, from 1895 to 18g8, Ogawa traveled around Europe and the United States "investigating prison conditions." 76 The Chinese public came to know him during the years 1905 to 1907, through publication of two different Chinese translations of his authoritative Kangokugaku (Prison 75


Chinas New Police and Prison Systems

Studies). 77 At that same time, in 1906, he received his Doctor of Law degree from Tokyo Imperial University, where he had lectured for some time, pioneering prison studies in Japan. Thus,. at the time of the Dong Kang mission, Ogawa Shigejir6 was at his prime. Known by his translated writings, his lectures to Chinese students at Hosei University, and his assistance to the Dong Kang mission, he seems an eminently sensible choice for the Qing government to have employed as adviser on prison matters. It is in that capacity, from May 1908 to 1910, 78 that Ogawa emerged as incontestably the most important individual in late-Qing prison reforms. It was Shen Jiaben who invited Dr. Ogawa to Beijing. Ogawa's assignment, commensurate with his high salary of Boo silver dollars (yuan) per month,7 9 was multifaceted: to assist with Shen's determined effort to improve China's prisons; 80 to facilitate the introduction of prison studies (jianyu xue) into the curriculum at China's law schools (falu xuetang, instituted in late 190581 ); and to aid with actual planning of Shen's own ambitious system of"model prisons" (Ch. mqfanJianyu < J. mohan kangoku), which was announced in his memorial of II June 1907 and specified. Tokyo's Sugamo Prison (Sugamo Kangoku) as its model. 82 The model prisons were not meant to replace xiyi suo, but to serve as the place of incarceration for more dangerous criminals sentenced there by China's new courts of law. 83 Ogawa's primary task, in his own mind, was to draft a new law for .the Chinese prison system. Upon its completion, his draft was sent up for review. The new law, Da Qjng Jianyu lu, was issued in 1910. "Some changes have been made," Ogawa wrote at the time, "but for the most part it follows my draft in its essential principles and organization."84 Ogawa's draft was based in turn upon Japan's revised prison code of 28 March 1907. 85 After 19n, new Chinese prison laws were issued- in 1913, 1928, and 1946. But, observes legal scholar Shimada Masao, none of these strays very far from the Ogawa code.86 Ogawa's next major involvement was to design the prototype for China's model prisons. Upon completion of the task, and after some delay, orders were issued on 30 March 1909 to proceed with the construction of the Beijing Model Prison Qingshi Mofan

National Reform and Ogawa Shigejiro

Jianyu). 87 All major Chinese administrative and trading cities, including treaty ports, were expected to construct model prisons in this same mold. Contemporary Chinese records give Ogawa due credit: "The plan [of the Beijing Model Prison] was drawn up by the Japanese, Dr. Xiaohe [Ogawa]."88 Dr. Ogawa confirms this in notes kept while in Beijing, notes which also reveal the limits of his involvement and the potential problems ahead: "Construction is newly underway on a prison in Beijing called the 'Model Prison.' The design is one I prepared, and work has begun on the basis of that design, to be completed in two years. The outside looks like my design, but whether the inside is according to plan is anybody's guess. My involvement was confined to drawing up the plans, and I have been totally excluded from the construction itself. The Chinese on their own have neither the architects nor the engineers who understand [the requirements of] a prison system, which means that things are being overseen and run by amateurs (shiroto). The results are hard to imagine."B9 Ogawa Shigejiroleft China in rgro, well before completion of the Beijing prison. Other model prisons, however, were reported by various localities as completed or under construction even before Ogawis departure: Honan, August rgo8; the Northeast (DongSan sheng), January rgog; Jiangning, July rgog; Shandong, July rgog; Yun-Gui (Yunnan and Guizhou), September rgog; Guangxi, December rgog; Jiangsi, May rgro; Min-Zhe (Fujian and Zhejiang), May rgn; Rehe, May rgn; and Anhui, May rgn. 90 Shimada Masao, while a student in Beiping (Beijing) in the early 1940s, ran across a collection of photographs published in 1919 under the English title of "The Thirteen New Prisons of China." These featured the exteriors and interiors of prisons number one, two, and three in Beijing, and prisons in Zhili, Fengtian, Jilin, Shandong, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Hubei. Excited by the prospect ofleads or information about lateQing prison reform, Shimada hunted in vain for even a single reference to the Qing dynasty or to its prison reform program. 91 The process of erasing all memory of any good in the late Qing was well advanced. So too was erasing the memory of the pivotal role of Japan. Whatever the situation with regard to prison buildings, Lin

Chinas New Police and Prison Systems

Ming-te makes an important observation about prison personnel. Virtually all senior prison system administrators of China, Lin concludes after a quick examination, were "a product directly or indirectly of a Japanese education." In terms of punishments, Lin adds, China's enduring shift in emphasis away from harsh punishments to programs for rehabilitation was a result of the Japanese influence. 92

chapter ten Chinese Legal, Judicial, and Constitutional Reforms: Japanese Blueprints and Advisers Legal and judicial reforms, like police and prison reforms, tended to advance together. Chinese administrators and legal reformers could not be indifferent to the court mechanisms for bringing violators of the new laws to justice; nor could foreign powers (under pressure of which China was undertaking legal and judicial reforms) be indifferent to either. That legal and judicial reforms were intimately associated is therefore not surprising. Formal attention to legal reforms by the Qing court dates back at least to early 1902. But it was during the year-long period from September 1905 to September 1906 that legal and judicial reforms took on a qualitatively new intensity. This occurred in the context of the court's developing commitment to constitutional government. Because of the linkage between constitutional, legal, and judicial reforms, these three are discussed together in the present chapter. CHINESE LEGAL REFORMS

Chuzo Ichiko (lchiko Chuz6) has written: "China from ancient times had had laws corresponding to modern administrative law and a criminal code, but none or few corresponding to modern civil law or a commercial code. Again, judicial and administrative authority were not separate as in the modern West. " 1 Clearly, bringing Chinese law and practice into line with the outside world would be no easy task. Truly sustained efforts at legal reform occurred only after Empress Dowager Cixi's momentous Proclamation for Preparing a 179


Legal, Judicial, and Constitutional Reforms

Constitutional Government (Yubei lixian zhi zhao) of1 September 1906. During the preceding five years, hopes had been spawned that Chinese legal reform, like legal reform in Japan, could lead to full revision of the hated unequal treaties with the West. As early as 20 July 1901, Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong in the third of their landmark memorials drew imperial attention to China's need for modern "mining laws, transportation laws, commercial laws, laws of negotiation and penal codes. " 2 Yuan Shikai carried these concerns forward in memorials to the throne of early 1902. Recalling the success ofJapan at treaty revision and its full recovery oflegal rights by 1899, Yuan proposed seeking assistance from this proven source: 'japanese legal studies are clearly defined by category and have achieved real excellence. Their civil law, in particular, has won Western praise and admil·ation." In this same memorial, Yuan recommended that China hire Japanese legal scholars (falu boshz), one each in the fields of civil and criminal law, to assist with compiling modern Chinese codes. ''As a country having a writing system similar to ours ( tongwen ), Japan has many legal scholars able to read our state statutes and regulations. Moreover, Japanese local conditions and customs (fengtu renqing) are not unlike our own, which should facilitate any assistance. " 3 Yuan Shikai, Liu Kunyi, and Zhang Zhidong are collectively credited with persuading the throne to establish the Legal Revision Office (Xiuding Falu Guan) or, rather, its nameless predecessor in April-May 1902. 4 This office's mandate was sweeping, spurred by negotiations for commercial treaty revision: ''At present the matters connected with international commercial negotiations become daily more intricate. We therefore appoint Shen Chia-pen and Wu T'ing-fang to examine carefully, and to reedit all the laws at present in force, and to bring them into accord with the circumstances resulting from these negotiations, consulting thereby the laws of the various countries, and to make the appropriate proposals to Us. " 5 As intimated, this office was headed jointly by the experienced scholar-officials Shen Jiaben and Wu Tingfang, both outstanding legal scholars respected and patronized by Yuan Shikai, "the pillar of the whole reform movement. " 6 Wu Tingfang, born in Singapore and educated in Hong Kong in the 185os, obtained his advanced legal training in London from 18o

Chinese Legal Reforms

1874 to 1876, becoming China's first modern barrister. 7 His subsequent career qualified him admirably to direct Chinese legal reforms. But "[b]ecause Wu then held a number of posts, each of which demanded time and attention, Shen Uiaben] became almost solely responsible for the entire law reform program. " 8 ShenJiaben, ajinshi degree holder of1883, was inspired early in life to specialize in legal studies by his father, a respected authority on Chinese law at the Board of Punishments. The younger Shen spent long years himself in service at the Board of Punishments. 9 Openminded, Shen nonetheless lacked specialized training in Western law. Without Wu Tingfang close at hand, Shen Jiaben was thus forced to rely upon Japanese legal counsel in his subsequent reform efforts. The revised Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and China of 5 September 1902, which resulted from the aforementioned negotiations, raised real hopes for legal reform through such provisions as Article 12: "China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extra-territorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for their administration and other considerations warrant her in so doing." 10 When the United States and Japan copied this formula into their respective revised treaties of October 1903, Chinese reformers picked up the refrain of "rights recovery through legal reform. " 11 It took Shen Jiaben and Wu Tingfang an additional two years, nonetheless, to file their joint memorial of 15 October 1905, advancing the arguments which led to the legal study mission of Dong Kang in 1906, discussed above in chapter nine. The year 1905-1906 thus represents a divide. One sees, on the one hand, the culmination of erratic initiatives since 1901 and, on the other, a new and sweeping commitment to legal and judicial reforms. The 19o6-19u reforms were distinguished by at least two things. First, their comprehensiveness: they embraced the drafting of a completely new criminal code (Ch. xingfa, J. keihO), China's very first civil code (Ch. mirifa < J. minpO), and its first full commercial code (Ch. shangfa < J. shOhO). And second, the central and 181

Legal, Judicial, and Constitutional Reforms

indispensable role of Japan: each of these three major efforts at codification was headed and actively guided by a highly trained and experienced (and very highly paid) Japanese legal expert, initially under three-year contracts. Foo Ping-Sheung (Fu Bingchang; b. 1895), then a young legal scholar who chaired the Civil Codification Commission under the Legislative Yuan of the Nanjing government from late 1928, paid a rare and candid tribute to Japan in a statement contained in his 1930 introduction to the English edition of China's new Civil Code of 1929. This captures the essence of China's prodigious debt to Japan with respect to its Xinzheng legal reform: [T]he country from which the Codification Commission [Xiuding Falu Guan] made their main borrowing was Japan. The reasons for this were obvious.... [H]undreds of Chinese in search of modern knowledge had gone to Japanese universities, principally to the J apanese law schools, where their studies were facilitated by the great similarity of the two languages. Japan at the time had completed her civil and commercial codification, which she had modelled principally after the German Codes. She had created a technical legal Japanese vocabulary, translated a number of the leading juridical text books of Europe, and produced a large Japanese legal literature. The Chinese could then find in Japan an adaptation to the Far Eastern mind, in a language closely related to their own, of what represented at the time the most advanced stage of western scientific juridical science. 12


In the area of criminal law reform, Japanese direction began as early as September 1906 with the arrival in Beijing of Okada Asatar6, Doctor of Law, professor at Tokyo Imperial University, and a lecturer in criminal law to Chinese students at Hosei University. A leading authority on criminal law with four years' legal training in Germany and France, 1897-1900, Okada taught criminal law at Tokyo Imperial University until dismissed in 1905 as one of the "Imperial University Seven'' (Teidai shichi hakase) who publicly criticized the government for being "soft on Russia'' during the Portsmouth peace treaty negotiations. 13 Like Ogawa Shigejir6, Okada became known to the wider Chi-

Criminal Law and Okada Asataro

nese public in 1905 and 1906 through translations of his books, under the titles of Xingfa ge lun (Writings on Criminal Law) and Xingfa zong lun (On Criminal Law). 14 For the next ten years, from 1906 to 1915, Dr. Okada served in China as adviser on revision in the Legal Revision Office (Xiuding Falu Guan), as zongJiaoxi at the new Beijing School of Law Qingshi Falu Xuetang), as professor of criminal law at the Imperial University and at the Beijing College of Law and Administration Qingshi Fazheng Xuetang), and in other law-related capacities. 15 Dr. Okada's arrival at the Legal Revision Office in September 1906, under a three-year contract at the unprecedented salary of 850 silver yuan per month, 16 made a swift and decided difference. First, he rejected outright, as utterly inadequate, the draft criminal code already 8o to go percent written by that office. With the approval of Shen Jiaben and Wu Tingfang, he embarked upon a thoroughly new draft criminal codeY Given his gargantuan efforts, it is only fitting that ShenJiaben's memorial presenting the Qing Draft Criminal Code (Da Qing xinglu cao'an) to the throne on 30 December 1907 singles out Okada for recognition. 18 The Okada draft, which drew predominantly but not exclusively upon modern Japanese criminal law, sparked a raging controversy for its excessive leniency with respect to crimes considered particularly heinous by orthodox Confucians: parricide, crimes against ancestors and tombs, revolt and conspiracy, and so forth. 19 A further objection came from the excessive use of Japanese terminology in the draft. 20 By the time of its promulgation inJanuary 1gn, Okada's handiwork in this sensitive legal arena had undergone five revisions. Yet it stood the test of time. After 1912, Chinese governments came and went. New provisions were added here, old ones amended there. But Dr. Okada's Qing Criminal Code (Da Qing xinglu), or simply New Criminal Code (Xin xinglu), remained the "nucleus" (zhutz) of China's Republican-era criminal code, in the opinion of Lin Ming-te. 21

Legal, Judicial, and Constitutional Reforms CIVIL LAW AND MATSUOKA YOSHIMASA

In the arena of China's very first civil code, help arrived in the person of Matsuoka Yoshimasa (dates unknown) in October 1906. A Tokyo Court of Appeals judge, Matsuoka was contracted for three years, at the impressive monthly salary of Boo silver yuan, 22 to prepare a modern civil code for China. The large compendium prepared under him, known as the Qing Draft Civil Code (Da Qing minlu cao'an), was completed in 1910 in 1,316 articles, in five parts dealing with general principles, obligations, real or property rights, family, and inheritance. Because the code was based chiefly upon Western legal theory and the civil codes of Japan and Germany, Chinese rightly faulted certain portions for disregard of Chinese social traditions and customs, for factual errors with respect to China's legal past, and for oversights and omissions. Yet, as Foo Ping-Sheung wrote in 1930: "[The 1910 Civil Code] had not been abrogated or modified by the laws of Republican China, until the promulgation of the present code [in 1929]; and it still formed the foundation of the civil code which was in force all through the country at the time of the publication of the new civil code. " 23 COMMERCIAL LAW REFORMS AND SHIDA KOTARO

With respect to a commercial code, the Legal Revision Office contracted the services of Shida Kotaro for three years, beginning October 1908, at the record salary of 950 silver yuan per month. 24 A Doctor of Law educated in Germany and France, professor of commerce and law variously at Gakushuin, Tokyo Koto Shogyo Gakko (Tokyo Higher Commercial College) and Tokyo Imperial University, a distinguished lecturer at the Hosei program for Chinese stude;nts, and from 1938 to 1943 president of Meiji University, 25 Shida was assigned in China to prepare the draft of a comprehensive and fully modern commercial code to replace the hastily compiled Qing Commercial Ordinances (Da Qing shanglu) of 1902. Shida's reputation, as with Okada Asataro and Ogawa Shigejiro, had preceded him to China through translations of three works in 1905 and 1907, under the titles Shangfa (Commercial Law),

Chinese Constitutional Reform

Shangfa shangxing pian (Essays on Commercial Law and Commercial Administration), and Shangfa zong ze (Principles of Commercial Law). 26 In China, although only two sections of his work on Chinese commercial law had been published by late 1911, his larger Draft Commercial Ordinances (Shanglu cao'an) is said to have served as the indispensable reference for all later basic compilations-"all, in their format, modeled upon Japanese commercial law," according to Lin Ming-te.27 CHINESE JUDICIAL REFORMS

In the area of court reform, 1906 was likewise a benchmark year, with impetus from comprehensive administrative reforms gaining momentum since the previous year. 28 By the end of 1907, at least on paper, the new Law of Court Procedures (Fayuan bianzhi fa) had established a Japanese-style system of graded courts, from local to district up to high and supreme courts. Okada Asatar6 and Matsuoka Yoshimasa both had a direct hand in drafting this and other laws related to the new court system. Significantly, a law of 1909 directed all provinces to distinguish the administration of justice (Ch. sija < ]. shiM) from general public administration (Ch. xingzheng < ]. gyosez) for the first time. 29 Although practical problems offunding and personnel forced the new government in 1914 to instruct county magistrates to resume their judicial functions, 3 ° China's laws of court procedure remained throughout "directly modeled on Japan," in the words of Lin Ming-te. 31 CHINESE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: RESOURCES AND INTERPRETATIONS

Of all the topics examined in the present study, constitutional reform is the only one having a monographic study both framed like my own and in English. Norbert Meienberger's Emergence qf Constitutional Government in China (1905-1908): The Concept Sanctioned by the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi opens by enumerating conventional interpretations of the constitutional movement. These have been dominated, he points out, by views "with the eyes of the opponents r8s

Legal, Judicial, and Constitutional Reforms

to the Ch'ing government."32 Meienberger then declares his counter intention: to examine the constitutional movement "with the eyes of the Ch'ing government." By so doing, "the facts appear in a different light. From this vantage point the reproach of insincerity seems invalid, the accusation of procrastination unfounded. " 33 Meienberger does for the constitution, in other words, what Luke Kwong does for the Hundred Days of 1898: each frees scholarship from the grip oflatterday critics by going directly to primary sources and contemporary opinion. Meienberger grounds himself on the basic public documentary record. He supplements that record with some excellent primary English-language materials, like The North China Herald. 34 The problem is that his sources seem only vaguely aware of Japanese cooperation with the Qing in matters of the constitution. Meribeth Cameron's fine study, lauded by Meienberger for arriving at "a similar conclusion" to his own, 35 likewise overlooks the Japanese connection almost completely. This leads both studies to neglect Japan and its role, a major oversight in light of Lin Ming-te's telling observation that the Meiji Constitution was the "blueprint" (lanben) of the Qing Principles of the Constitution (Xianfa dagang). 36 TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

Constitutionalism as a widely discussed possibility for China came into its own in 1904. Outside of government, much of the credit for assembling essential information and funneling it to high officials belongs to the energetic Zhang Jian, who enjoyed direct access to governors general and to the court. In late 1903, Zhang took advantage of the Osaka Exposition (Osaka Hakurankai) to visit Japan, to investigate modern industry, education, and government. The visit, which resulted in his published Dongyou ry·i (Diary of Travels East), 37 sharpened his sense of the virtues of constitutional government and the reasons for Japan's Meiji achievements. After returning to China, Zhang Zhidong and Governor General Wei Guangtao (1837-1916) of Liang-Jiang prevailed upon Zhang to spend much of the month of May 1904 consulting with friends including Luo Zhenyu, to prepare multiple drafts of a memorial to the throne in support of constitutionalism. At the end r86

Toward Constitutional Government

of June, Zhang Jian also renewed contact with Yuan Shikai after a hiatus of twenty years, urging constitutionalism upon him. 38 From a different direction prior to July 1904, Sun Baoqi (18671931), Chinese minister to France since 1902 and p~ominent official during the first decades of the Republic, submitted a formal petition to the throne for the establishment of a constitution. This sparked a public debate involving the influential journals Dongfang zazhi and Dagong bao. 39 Instrumental to the success of Chinese efforts WqS reliable" information. In the summer of 1904, Zhang Jian along with Zhang Zhidong's able private secretary Zhao Fengchang (dates unknown), printed a translation of the Meiji constitution and forwarded a copy to Cixi, who is said to have responded favorably. At the same time, Zhang printed copies of his [Rib en] xianja yy"ie (Exposition of the Uapanese] Constitution) and Riben yihui shi (History of the Japanese Diet). In November he sent copies of these and personally discussed them with the high Manchu official Tieliang (18631910 ), named in 1905 head of the Army Ministry and later a key proponent of constitutionalism.40 All during this time, the Russo:] apanese War of February 1904 to June 1905 was in progress. To many Chinese, the successive Japanese victories over tsarist Russian forces signaled "a victory of constitutionalism over autocracy, "41 and gave the constitutional movement a mighty thrust. Demands for a Chinese constitution surged.· Increasingly, Chinese leaders of every sector came to regard constitutional government, with its national and provincial assemblies, 42 as an essential form of government to bring people and state together, to make the nation strong. 43 On 4 June 1905, the eve of Japan's final victory over autocratic Russia, Yuan Shikai, Zhang Zhidong, and Zhou Fu, new governor general of LiangJiang, submitted a joint memorial to the throne calling for adoption of a constitution. Just six weeks later, on 16 July 1905, the court announced plans to dispatch five ministers to investigate the governmental and constitutional systems ofJapan, Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and France. The mission, as Min Tu-ki points out, "implied that the government was considering the adoption of a constitution in the near future." 44 By mid 1905, there had thus emerged a remarkable coalition of elites actively espousr87

Legal, Judicial, and Constitutional Reforms

ing constitutionalism, from leading provincial officials to highlevel bureaucrats to Chinese diplomats from their posts overseas to progressive Manchus. 45 On this and other fronts, the court pressed ahead in this important year. On 2 September 1905, it announced its momentous decision to abolish the traditional examination system. On September 18th, the court instructed Chinese ministers abroad to extend every courtesy to the Mission to Investigate 'the Practice of Constitutional Government in Foreign Countries, scheduled to depart from the capital on September 24th. An assassination attempt that injured two of the five special ministers, however, caused the mission's postponement until December 12th. Meanwhile, on November 19th, the court ordered the committee in charge of scrutinizing reform proposals-the Committee of Ministers, Bureau of Government Affairs (Neige Huiyi Zhenwu Chu; successor to the Duban Zhengwu Chu)-to prepare an outline of a constitution; and on November 25th it created the Office for the Investigation of the Principles of Modern Politics and Government (Kaocha Zhengzhi Guan).46 On 12 December 1905, the five special ministers, two Manchus (Zaize [b. 1876] and Duanfang) and three Chinese (Dai Hongci [I853-19IO], Shang Qiheng [b. 1866], and Li Shengduo), departed from the capital without incident. They traveled in two groups, with entourages of more than eighty attaches, secretaries, and advisersY Upon their return six months later, in July 1906, Cixi met once with Dai Hongci and Shang Qiheng, twice with Zaize, and three times with Duanfang. Zaize separately submitted a formal memorial to the throne, and Duanfang submitted three. All five commissioners unanimously recommended constitutionalism for China. 48 Discussion of their findings culminated in a high-level conference called by Cixi on August 26 and 27, which resulted in creation of the Office for Revising Government Institutions (Zhengzhi Biancuan Guan) and Cixi's landmark Proclamation for Preparing a Constitutional Government of I September Igo6, written largely by Yuan Shikai, Tieliang, Zaize, and Duanfang. 49 Members of the drafting department of the Zhengzhi Biancuan Guan, according to Min Tu-ki, "were for the most part students who had been r88

Toward Constitutional Government

studying in Japan or who had otherwise been exposed to new ideas."50 It was this office that drafted the edict of 6 November 1906, substantially reorganizing the central government, 51 amid an ongoing debate of how far to go, and how fast. 52 Several advisers on constitutional government cautioned Cixi that only a British-, German-, or Japanese-style system could safeguard the prerogatives of the throne. A warning too hazardous to ignore: more than one year after the Proclamation for Preparing a Constitutional Government, on 9 September 1907, Cixi dispatched three further missions abroad, one to each of these three countries. These missions "did not attract the attention given to the 1905-1906 missions," states Meienberger, leading him to the erroneous conclusion that they were "certainly far less important. " 53 Deliberations in the months that followed and the concrete results show that it was these missions that gave final shape to constitutional thinking and planning. The lack of fanfare may well have been calculated. From reports sent back, the court decided that the British system would be impractical to follow, since it was founded on tradition without codification. The German (Prussian) constitution, though codified, had been adopted only after review and approval by the Imperial Diet, an intrusion upon the throne. Only the Japanese constitution was both clearly codified and in no way infringed on imperial prerogatives, having been issued directly as a gift by the sovereign without prior public review or scrutiny. After a further comparison of the Japanese and German systems, it was decided unanimously to adopt a Japanese-style constitution that would preserve full imperial sovereignty. 54 According to Lin Ming-te, At the end of 1907, Dashou [b. 187o; a Manchu vice president in the Ministry of Education] was dispatched to Japan. There, for half a year, as previously agreed upon with Ito Miyoji [r857-1934; an architect of the Meiji constitution, confidant of Ito Hirobumi, and high official in several Ito cabinets], and under the direction of [major legal scholars like] Hozumi Yatsuka [r86o-rgr2], Ariga Nagao [r86o-rg2r], and Ota Minejiro [dates unknown], Dashou prepared for presentation to the throne five volumes in fifteen books of materials falling into the six categories of japanese constitutional history, comparative constitutions, national assembly laws, jurisprudence, government adminr8g

Legal, Judicial, and Constitutional Reforms

istration, and finance. These covered constitutional matters in lucid detail. He recommended the adoption of a constitutional government, but by imperial decree. Dashou's advoc;;tcy of a constitution by imperial decree took account of the fact that the constitutions of most European countries were arrived at by process of public agreement or popular approval, thereby infringing upon "full sovereign power." Only by emulating the Japanese Meiji constitution would the court be able "to preserve the national polity and solidify sovereign power (cun guoti er gu zhuquan ). "55 To prepare its subjects for the coming constitution, the government published a series of books in 1907 and 1908 explaining the Japanese constitutional and administrative systems. Some of these came out of the Office to Draw up Regulations for Constitutional Government (Xianzheng Biancha Guan), established on 13 August 1907 by reorganizing the Kaocha Zhengzhi Guan of November 1905. Modeled upon a Meiji counterpart of 1885, this office assumed chief responsibility for drafting constitutional guidelines. It was staffed by more than 160 persons, fifty of whom were specialists with overseas study or investigative-mission experience. Forty of those fifty had been to Japan. More significantly, the important Organization Section (Bianzhi Ju) of the office, with a staff of twenty-nine, included nineteen persons with overseas experience, sixteen of those in Japan. 56 It was the Office to Draw up Regulations that prepared the twenty-three-article Principles of the Constitution (Xianfa dagang), adopted on 27 August 1908. Articles one and two of this fundamental document are translated almost directly from articles one and three of the Meiji Constitution of 1889: "1) The emperor of the Great Qing (Da Qing) shall reign over and govern the great Qing empire with his majesty's unbroken line of succession for ages etc;:rnal. 2) The emperor shall be sacred and inviolable (junshang shensheng, bukQ qirifan)."57 The concepts underlying both articles, it is essential to note, are Japanese. They are utterly alien to the age-old Chinese notion of the emperor as Son of Heaven (tianzz), ruling under a Mandate of Heaven (tianming) that is conditional. Fourteen of the twenty-three articles in Principles relate to "imperial sovereignty" (junshang daquan). Lin Ming-te has prepared rgo

Toward Constitutional Government

a valuable table reproducing the fourteen articles, identifying the exact Meiji counterpart of each. This systematic comparison confirms that not only did the Meiji Constitution serve as blueprint for the Principles, but that Qing claims of sovereign powers for the throne exceeded even those of its mentor 58 - the most restrictive constitutional monarchy of its day. Political insider Ito Miyoji may be responsible for Dashou's recommendation that the throne, in true Japanese fashion, decide directly upon the Qing constitution and not brook interference even from its own government ministers. 5 9 The japanese model is evident moreover in the phased nine-year timetable leading up to promulgation of the constitution. 60 The first national elections were scheduled for 1916, and a national assembly was to convene in

1917. The Empress Dowager Cixi and the Guangxu Emperor died in quick succession on 14 and 15 November 1908. During the previous four years, China "without great interference from outside"61 had made remarkable progress in the direction of constitutional government, following an approach that Meienberger labels "reform within tradition. " 62 After 1908, writes Meienberger, "[ t ]he Ch'ing government began to feel the influence of the provincial assemblies after their first session in 1909, was criticized by the Political Consultative Council in 1910 and unable to control this forerunner of parliament during the second session in 1gn. " 63 As conditions grew more unsettled, and post-Cixi paranoia set in, the overriding concern of the court narrowed to "preserving the [Qing] dynasty. " 64 Chinese reformers in and out of government had demanded through constitutionalism a meaningful voice in government and a share of power. The Manchu court betrayed such expectations by singling out the Meiji Constitution for its blueprint, by pressing claims to prerogatives that exceeded even the Japanese originals, and by narrowly reserving high positions for jittery Manchus. That the throne was relentlessly attacked for its monarchcentered constitution by the anti-Qing revolutionaries, its unyielding enemies, is not to be wondered at; any damage from that fringe should have been containable. But the alienation of the throne from its staunchest conservative Chinese allies and officials,

Legal, Judicial, and Constitutional Reforms

on account of the constitution and the ill-advised actions around it, wounded the throne mortally. And so, in Igii-I9I2, when China's 2,IOo-year old imperial system of government suddenly crumbled under the combined but disorganized opposition of revolutionaries, disenchanted reformers, New Army soldiers, frightened provincial officials, and rural gentry and urban merchant elites, who remained to come to the Manchu rescue?

Conclusion As of1898 on the eve of the Hundred Days Reform, the ideals and institutions of China rested squarely on elements distinctively Chinese, deriving from the Chinese past. By 1910, a mere dozen years later, Chinese thinking and governmental institutions had been radically transformed, by models and influences from outside of China. These changes were revolutionary in the most fundamental sense of that word. Intellectually, they altered the language and content of Chinese thought among China's elites and, with that, the processes, structures, and even the mainstream media for expressing thought. Institutionally, they transformed Chinese governmental organs and the laws and institutions that shape state and society, shifting away from long-established indigenous patterns to ones based upon external models. A comparison of Chinese thought and institutions as of 1910 with those of1925 or even those of present-day China, whether Taiwan or the People's Republic, reveals a basic continuity. They are of the same order of reality. Comparing 1910 with early 1898, on the other hand, one sees two universes clearly separate and moving further apart, divided intellectually and institutionally by the Xinzheng Revolution. INTERPRETING THE LATE-QING REVOLUTION

If the findings of this study are even half as significant as imputed to them, why have they been neglected by standard treatments of China's revolutionary transformation? Several final thoughts suggest possible reasons. First, the Xinzheng reforms were associated with a regime that "failed." Why study failure? Second, post-19u scholarship on leaders of the revolution concentrates on 93



revolutionaries versus others, around narrowly conceived analytical categories. Complex individuals, even complex revolutionaries like Zhang Binglin, are reduced to caricature. 1 Xinzheng actors, mere "reformers," are generally disqualified from serious study by their uncertain political views and alignments, which shifted with the times in which they lived. Third, scholarship on China has tended to assign importance to modern developments in proportion to their association with revolution, narrowly defined as a disorderly and uncompromising rejection of the past. Orderly change and ideas colored by tradition have been blocked out from academic sightlines by scholars themselves. Fourth, researchers have failed to appreciate the awesome complexities of the late-Qing achievement. Even the lay public today is aware of the intricacies of technology transfer across nations. The late-Qing Xinzheng reforms involved transfers far more complex than technologies: transfers of thought, of culture, and of organization. Despite their complexities, the Xinzheng reforms glided from success to success, with so little apparent effort as to attract little comment or serious study. Their existence was simply taken for granted. Finally, balanced understanding has been retarded severely by academic taboos that bar from consideration the key element of Japan, which alone can explain what happened and how. Postwar scholarship has trained specialists worldwide to regard Japan in the twentieth century as aggressive, imperialistic, and the enemy of China. Period. What has not been taught- and has been lost from sight and memory-is that Japan, before embarking upon sustained aggression against China, cooperated peacefully and eagerly to bring China into the twentieth century, for their mutual survival in a hostile world. JAPAN: THE MISSING KEY

Little of the Xinzheng achievement could have been attained without Japan, this story's missing key. The role of Japan was multifaceted, each facet part of a complex of interlocking elements, every one insufficiently appreciated by scholars. First, the role of

Japan: The Missing Key

Japan as a model: By the end of the nineteenth century, Japan had essentially completed its own modern revolution, devising in the process a ti-yong synthesis that worked: its ti or basic principle, modified Confucian; its yong or practice, modified Western. This synthesis inspired much favorable Chinese comment, and cleared the way for China to accept ideas and institutions heretofore resisted because of their association with a heterodox West. Second, Japan as providing an educational "open door" to China: For a wide variety of reasons, from naively altruistic to baldly self-serving, Japan courted China to provide training for Chinese military officers, modern educators, and government administrators. The Chinese rush to Japan that followed was accommodated by a truly impressive Japanese effort, both governmental and private. What other newly modernizing country would have exerted itself so strenuously on behalf of another? Third, Japan as a source of highly trained and experienced talent available and eager to be hired as teachers and advisers by China: This surplus human capital from Japan's own modern revolution responded in impressive numbers to the opportunity to assist China. Lured by high Chinese salaries, Japanese responded further out of rightful pride in Meiji achievements, out of a genuine desire to repay Japan's ancient debt to China and, at the state level, out of calculated (and enlightened) national self-interest and an emerging (and potentially dangerous) sense of national mission. Fourth, a factor usually passed over without comment, but upon which reformer and revolutionary alike were utterly dependent: modern Japanese terminology. Prior efforts in China to translate Western concepts and terms into a Chinese idiom had proved an unmitigated failure, from the clumsy transliterations of Lin Zexu (I'j85-185o) and Wei Yuan (1794-1856) in the 183os and 184os, 2 to the varied but uncoordinated coinages of Western missionary translators, on down to the more elegant but equally futile creations ofYan Fu at the turn of the century. Without Meiji Japan's Kanji-based modern vocabulary, fully standardized and functionally coherent by the 18gos, China's every effort at reform would have foundered on terminological battles and bickering. Related to point four is point five: Japan's sophisticated body of Western works in Japanese translation, complemented by modern 195


Japanese scholarship, thought, literature, and textbooks. Together with the late-Qing rash of translations, the Chinese emulation of Japanese modern literature, modern arts, and modern thought triggered a pre-rgn "new culture movement" in China, having dimensions of a "literary revolution." 3 These hurtled China intellectually into the modern age. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Where does scholarship go from here? For intellectual dimensions, more research is urgently needed in those areas enumerated in point five, above; in late-Qing arts and literature, in thought and ethics, and in religion including Chinese Buddhism. Scholars must pursue the question raised by Mabel Lee and Gao Guimin, as to whether or not Liang Qichao and other late-Qing cultural and intellectual pioneers have been robbed of "credit which should rightfully be theirs, " 4 which has gone instead to May Fourth Movement figures. As for institutional dimensions, more systematic study is needed of China's chambers of commerce (Ch. gongshang hui; J. shOkokaz), 5 agricultural and industrial initiatives, and the local self-government (Ch. difang zizhi < J. chihO jichz) movement, 6 all influenced by Japan. Just as important, every one of the chapters in parts two and three of the present study need full monographic treatments involving, ideally, international research teams. 7 The ultimate goal of this research on China's transformation with Japanese participation is, of course, a fuller, more objective comprehension of modern China itself. This requires a rigorous understanding of institutional and intellectual transformations at every level, national, regional, provincial, and local, as separate and discrete entities but also in dynamic interaction across levels. Yokoyama Suguru's suggestion that state political programs from r8g8 gave shape to "local political modernization'' before and after rgn; 8 Mary Rankin's examination of Xinzheng initiatives as they helped to redefine relationships between the state and local elites in Zhejiang province; 9 Prasenjit Duara's analysis of "the impact of state strengthening on the organization of power in rural North China'' starting with the Xinzheng reforms; 1 Chang P'engyuan's ongoing investigations into political participation of elites



Directions for Future Research

old and new; 11 Min Tu-ki's penetrating insights into the lateQing debates on local self-government and on the establishment of provincial assemblies, informed as much by Chinese tradition as by external models; 12 and Shimada Kenji's insistent probing into "the native Chinese intellectual influences on revolutionary Chinese thought" 13 - all of these point to directions for further research. Back to the late-Qing revolution itself: the wonder remains. In speed, scale, and permanence, the transformation that occurred was unparalleled in modern world history up to that time. It makes Kang Youwei's absurd prediction ofr8g8 appear almost prophetic: "The Japanese did in thirty years what the Europeans had done in three hundred." Then, adds Kang: "China should be able to do it in three. " 14 The main elements of the lightning Xinzheng Revolution- the intellectual and institutional elements examined in this study and their offshoots- have endured remarkably since their confirmation in place by the rgrr Revolution. Only time will tell whether they can endure as long as the system they replaced,. ushered in 2,roo years earlier by the First Emperor in his equally lightning Qin dynasty revolution of 221 to 206 B.c.15


Appendix Notes References Glossary-Index

Appendix: The Reform Edict The following is a translation of the Sho.ngyu of 29 January 1901, as reproduced in Guangxu cho.o Donghua lu, IV, 135-136. 1

Certain principles of morality (changjing) are immutable, whereas methods of governance (zhija) have always been mutable. The Book qf Changes states that "when a measure has lost effective force (qiong), the time has come to change it (bian ): " And the Analects states that "the Shang and Zhou dynasties took away from and added to (sun yz) the regulations of their predecessors, as can readily be known." Now, the three cardinal guides [sani'ang: ruler guides subject, father guides son, and husband guides wife] and the five constant virtues [wuchang: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and fidelity] remain forever fixed and unchanging, just as the sun and the stars shine steadfastly upon the earth. What can be changed is Order A or Order B, which should raise no more objection than the changing of strings on a lute or a guitar. Throughout the ages, successive generations have introduced new ways and abolished the obsolete. Our own august ancestors set up new systems to meet the requirements of the day. Times differ, such as when our dynasty ruled at Shenyang [Mukden] and after it had breeched the Great Wall [and captured Beijing]. Since the Jiaqing [1796-1820] and Daoguang [1821-1850] periods, rulers have changed ( bian) many old practices (jiu) of the Yongzheng [1723-1735] and Qianlong [1736-1795] eras. Laws and methods (ja) become obsolete and, once obsolete, require revision in order to serve their intended purpose of strengthening the state and benefiting the people. Since the removal of the court [to Xi'an in August 1900], the Empress Dowager has been consumed with anxiety night and day, and the court is filled with remorse as it reflects upon how the accumulated and continued abuses and our excessive attention to empty formalities over the past several decades have contributed to the present calamitous situation. Now that peace negotiations have commenced, all affairs of government (zhengshz) must be thoroughly overhauled (zhengdun), in hopes of


gradually achieving real wealth and power (fuqiang). The Empress Dowager has enjoined upon us the need to appropriate the strong points of foreign nations in order to eliminate the weak points of China (Zhongguo2), to rectify errors of the pa~t, and to serve as lessons for the future. Ever since the twenty-third and twenty-fourth years of the Guangxu Emperor [1897 and r8g8], specious arguments have been propounded nonstop, confounding the differences between the new (xin) and the old (Jiu). The disaster wrought by the traitor Kang [Youwei] was worse than that of the Red Turbans [of earlier dynasties]. Even though he and others have fled overseas, they continue to lead people astray with their "RichYou Honorable-wei" [a play on the name "You wei"] membership certificates and their incitement to rebellion. With their false cries of upholding the emperor and protecting the race, they plot to create dissension within the court. It is well known that the new laws (xinja) propounded by the Kang rebels were less reform laws (biarifa) than lawlessness (luanfa). These rebels took advantage of the court's weakened condition to plot sedition. It was only by an appeal for guidance from the Empress Dowager that the court was saved from immediate peril, and the evil rooted out in a single day. How can anyone say .that in suppressing this insurrectionary movement the Empress Dowager declined to sanction anything new? Or that in taking away from and adding to (sun yi3 ) the laws of our ancestors we advocated a complete abolition of the old? We sought to steer a middle course between the two extremes, and to follow a path to good administration. Officials and the people alike must know that mother and son [the Empress Dowager and the Guangxu Emperor] were activated by one and the same motive. We have now received Her Majesty's decree to devote ourselves fully to China's revitalization, to suppress vigorously the use of the terms "new" and "old," and to blend together the best of what is Chinese and what is foreign. The root of China's weakness lies in harmful habits too firmly entrenched; in rules and regulations too minutely drawn; in the overabundance of inept and mediocre officials and in the paucity of truly outstanding ones; in petty bureaucrats who hide behind the written word and in clerks and yamen runners who use the written word as talismans to acquire personal fortunes; in the mountains of correspondence between government offices which have no relationship to reality; and in the seniority system and associated practices that block the way of men of real talent (rencaz). The bane of our country (Ch. guojia < J. kokka) lies in the one word si, or selfishness; the ruin of the realm (tianxia) lies in the one word li, or narrow precedent. 202

The Reform Edict

Those who have studied Western methods up to now have confined themselves to the spoken and written languages and to weapons and machinery. These are but surface elements of the West and have nothing to do with the essentials of Western learning. Our Chinese counterparts to the fundamental principles upon which Western wealth and power are based are the following precepts, handed down by our ancestors: "to hold high office and show generosity to others," "to exercise liberal forbearance over subordinates," "to speak with sincerity," and "to carry out one's purpose with diligence." But China has neglected such deeper dimensions of the West, and contents itself with learning a word here and a phrase there, a skill here and a craft there, meanwhile hanging on to old corrupt practices of currying favor to benefit oneself. If China disregards the essentials of Western learning and merely confines its studies to surface elements which themselves are not even mastered, how can it possibly achieve wealth and power? To sum up, administrative methods and regulations (fating) must be revised, and abuses eradicated. If regeneration is truly desired, there must be quiet and reasoned deliberation. We therefore call upon the members of the Grand Council, the Grand Secretaries, the Six Boards and Nine Ministries, our Ministers abroad, and the Governors General and Governors of provinces to reflect carefully on our present sad state of affairs, and to scrutinize Chinese and Western governmental systems (Ch. zhengzhi < J. sefjz) with regard to all dynastic regulations, national administration, official affairs, matters related to people's livelihood (minsheng), modern schools (Ch. xuexiao < J. gakkO), systems of examination (keJu), military organization, and financial administration (Ch. caizheng < J. zaisez). Duly weigh what should be kept and what abolished, what new methods should be adopted and what old ones retained. By every available means of knowledge and observation, seek out how to renew our national strength, how to produce men of real talent, how to expand state revenues, and how to revitalize the military. For our reference, report detailed proposals within two months. These will be reported to the Empress Dowager, in consultation with whom and on whose advice the court shall adopt methods best calculated to achieve our objectives, and to carry out their full execution. While the court was in temporary residence in Taiyuan [en route to Xi'an], it sent out a request for expressions of public opinion. We received many memorials which fall generally into two groups: mindless plagiarism from articles in newspapers, and the shallow views of pedantic students. The former point to all kinds of problems but fail to examine their root causes, and are plagued by persistent biases; the latter see

Appendix advantages to certain measures yet fail to note their drawbacks, rendering them impractical. Newly appointed officials who discuss matters of wealth and power often lose sight of matters of principle, whereas Confucian scholars who discourse upon matters of principle are often uninformed about the real world. It is now up to you, our metropolitan and other officials, to avoid either extreme. We desire that your views be elaborated in the fullest detail for our consideration in charting a course of action. The first essential, even more important than devising new systems (zhifa), is to secure men of administrative ability (zhi ren). Without new systems, the corrupted old system cannot be salvaged; without men of ability, even good systems cannot be made to succeed. If, when judging a person, one disregards his hundred shortcomings or fails to take into account his one preeminent strength; if rigid adherence to written forms is assumed to constitute the faithful discharge of one's duty; if one merely blindly follows past precedent- then all reforms, whether to bring about a renewal or to clear away abuses, will degenerate into empty formalities. If the task of reform is entrusted to officials constantly rotating in office, the evils of the present system which we deplore will simply persist. To remedy such evils, great care is required from beginning to end. To realize our objectives, a high resolve and, even more, an honest effort are essential. Once the appropriate reforms are introduced to clear away abuses, it will be more than ever necessary to select upright and capable men (Jian neng) to discharge the functions of office. Everyone, high and low: take heed. The Empress Dowager and we have long pondered these matters. Now things are at a crisis point where change must occur (wu qiong ze bian 4 ), to transform weakness into strength. Everything depends upon how the change is effected. Should any persist in the old ways of callous indifference and perfunctory neglect, confining the discharge of duties to empty words and seeking ease by shirking those duties, we remind you that all statutes remain in effect and no leniency will be shown in enforcing them. Let this edict be promulgated for the information of all.

Notes PREFACE 1. The main results of that research are Douglas R. Reynolds, "Chinese Area Studies in Prewar China: Japan's Toa Dobun Shoin in Shanghai, 1900-1945,'' The Jounud qf Asian Studies 45.5:945-970 (1986); and Douglas R. Reynolds, "Training Young China Hands: Toa Dobun Shoin and Its Precursors, 1886-1945,'' in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Iriformd Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, 1989), pp. 210-271. 2. Jansen's classic study, The Japanese and Sun Tht-sen (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), contains numerous examples ofJapanese cooperation with Sun, along with lively examples of Japanese skullduggery. Of broader sweep isJansen'sJapan and China: From Uflr to Peace, 1894-1972 (Chicago, 1975), esp. chap. 5, 'japan and Change in China." Most recent is his chapter, 'japan and the Chinese Revolution of1911,'' in John K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu, eds., The Cambridge History qf China, XI: Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 2 (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 339-374. All suggest a oncespecial relationship between China and Japan, but nothing like a Golden Decade. 3· See esp. Sanet5 Keishu, ChiigokuJin Nihon ryiigaku shi: zolw (Tokyo, 1970); and Sanet5 Keishu, ChiigokuJin Nihon ryiigaku shiko (Tokyo, 1939). The former is available in a careful Chinese translation by Tan Ruqian and Lin Qiyan that corrects a number of errors and adds its own scholarly notes. See Sanet5 Keishu (Shiteng Huixiu), Zhongguo ren liuxue Riben shi (Hong Kong, 1982). 4· See esp. Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri xuesheng (Taipei, 1975); Huang Fuch'ing, Jindai Riben zai-Hua wenhua Ji shehui shiye zhi yanJiu (Taipei, 1982); and Lin Ming-te, "Qingmo Minchu Riben zhengzhi dui Zhongguo de yingxiang," in Yue-him Tam, ed., Sino-Japanese Cultural Interchange, III: The Economic und Intellectual Aspects (Hong Kong, 1985), pp. 187-213. 5· See H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organization qf China (1912; Taipei, 1971); Meribeth E. Cameron, The Reform Movement in China18981912 (Stanford, 1931); Ralph L. Powell, The Rise qf Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955); Marinus Johan Meijer, The Introduction qf Modem Criminal Law in China (Batavia, 1950); and Mary Clabaugh Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913 (New Haven, 1968) (see esp. pp. 1-63). 6. See "The Late Ch'ing Reform Movement" in John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modem Transformation (Boston, 1965), pp. 613-633. Note esp. Fairbank's comment: "[T]he period from 1898 to 1914

Notes to Pages xviii-xx saw a major Japanese influence on the course of Chinese history.... Japan's influence in this brief period was more direct, profound, and far-reaching than that of Britain in the nineteenth century or of the United States from 1915 to 1949, or even, one may suspect, of the Soviet Union after 1949" (pp. 631-632). The present study fleshes out this sweeping claim. 7· Douglas R. Reynolds, '~ Golden Decade Forgotten: Japan-China Relations, I8g8-Igo]," The Transactions qf the Asiatic Society qfjapan, fourth series, 2:93-153 (198]). 8. Dagurasu Reinoruzu (Douglas Reynolds), "Kindai Nit-Chii kankei shi no naka no wasurerareta ogon no jiinen" (A Forgotten Golden Decade in Modern Japan-China Relations), To-A 25o:g-u (April1g88). g. Entitled "Nit-Chii kankei shi no wasurerareta ogon no jiinen, I8g8-Igo]'' (A Golden Decade Forgotten: Japan-China Relations, I8g8-Igo]), this talk took place on 24 September 1988 at Nihon Joshi Daigaku, Tokyo, the usual meeting place of this active study group. 10. Two meticulously researched publications under Professor Abe's direction, and of great help to me, were Abe Hiroshi, ed., Mt-Chu kyoiku bunko. kiiryil to masatsu: Senzen Nihon no zai-Ka kyoiku Jigyo (Tokyo, 1983); and Oyatoi NihonJin kyoshu no kenkyil: AJia no kyiiiku kindaika to NihonJin, special theme issue of Kokuritsu K;yoiku Kenkyiijo kiyo 115 (1g88). Most recent are the landmark bibliography, Abe Hiroshi, ed., Mey·i koki 9oiku zasshi ni mirareru Chii.gokuKankoku 9oiku bunko. kankei kiji mokuroku (Tokyo, 1g8g); and the monographic study, Abe Hiroshi, Chugoku no kindai kyoiku to Mey·i Nihon (Tokyo, 1990), the source of all my illustrations except for Illustration 7. 11. For a summary of my presentation and discussion at the Institution of Modern History Colloquium, Academia Sinica, Taipei, on 17 March 1988, see Douglas R. Reynolds, "New Perspectives on Japan-China Relations, I8]0-1945,'' jindai Zhongguo shi yanJiu tongxun (Newsletter for Modern Chinese History) 5:47-50 (March 1988). In Hong Kong, my host was noted Sino:Japanese specialist, Professor Yue-him Tam (Tan Ruqian) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. And, in the People's Republic of China, I visited universities and scholars of modern Sino:Japanese relations in the following cities: Shantou (Swatow), Xiamen (Amoy), Quanzhou, Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Nanjing, Tianjin, Beijing, Changchun, and Shenyang, between March 31 and 3 June 1988. For my report on those travels, see Dagurasu R. Reinoruzu (Douglas R. Reynolds), "Chiigoku kiko zuiso' (Random Notes on My Travels in China), Shin'gai Kakumei kenkyu (Studies of China's 1911 Revolution) g:g3 and 20 (1988). 12. Sponsored by Zhongguo Zhong-Ri Guanxi Shi Yanjiu Hui (China Association for the Study of Sino:Japanese Relations), founded in Beijing in 1984. 13. In China, the most significant manifestation of this may well be the Associations for Sino:Japanese Studies (Zhong-Ri Guanx{ Shi Yanjiu Hui) formed at local, regional, and national levels since 1g8o, particularly in Northeast and North China. For a sympathetic but critical analysis of the objectives and research methodologies that should guide such associations, see Liu Tianchun,


Notes to Pages xx-I "Sino:Japanese Studies: Three Problem Areas," Douglas R. Reynolds, tr., SinoJapanese Studies 2.2:57-7I (May I990 ). I4. Representative of the PRC perspective (which is highly influential in Japan) is Shi Yuanqin, Cao Guimin, and Li Lingyu, ZhongguoJindai zhengzhi tizhi de yanbian (Beijing, I990 ). That carefully crafted work sees the Xinzheng reforms, I90I-I9IO, in the framework of a feudal Chinese society, an autocratic state struggling for survival in collaboration with foreign imperialist powers, and an emerging Chinese bourgeoisie demanding a voice in local and national affairs. My perspective sets the Xinzheng reforms in the framework of a China dominated for 2,Ioo years by indigenous imperial institutions and thought, transformed suddenly and permanently by ideas and institutions largely from outside of China. This triggers the obvious question: How does one account for this dramatic reorientation? These two frameworks are not necessarily in conflict. They start, however, by asking different questions; they look at different materials; and they lead to different insights about modern China. I5· Chaired by Ernest P. Young. Papers were presented by Yue-him Tam, Roger R. Thompson, and myself. Mary Backus Rankin served as discussant, along with Ernest Young. I6. This conference was organized jointly by the Institute of Chinese Studies and the Japan Study Program, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; International Programs and Services, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale; and the Chinese Alliance for Commemoration of Sino:Japanese War Victims. INTRODUCTION

I. The term xinzheng had been used in I895 to mean "new policies," and in I898 to mean "new institutions" or "institutional reform," as related in Min Tu-ki, National Polity and Local Power: The Transformation r!f Late Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass., I989), pp. I20, I25. In the present study, xinzheng has the meaning of "new systems." The term xinzheng does not appear in the Reform Edict (Shangyu) of 29 January I90I, which launched the Xinzheng Reforms; but the thrust of that edict toward xin (new) zhengzhi tizhi (governmental systems) in multiple arenas of public life is manifest in its order for the review of "all dynastic regulations, national administration, official affairs, matters related to people's livelihood, modern schools, systems of examination, military organization, and financial administration" (from the Reform Edict, as reproduced in Guangxu chao Donghua lu [Beijing, I958], IV, I36; see full translation in the Appendix). "New systems" in education, the_ military, police and prisons, law, the judiciary, and constitutional government are indeed what Xinzheng reforms achieved. For a note on the contemporary usage of the term xinzheng for post-Boxer reforms, see Qiao Zhiqiang, Xinhai geming qian de shi nian (Taiyuan, I987), p. 239· 2. I employ these terms advisedly. By tradition I mean the entire Chinese past, ever-changing and complex, but distinctively Chinese, with its operating assumption that the range of China's past experience holds the answers to the problems

Notes to Pages 2-3 of state and society in the present and the future. By modernity, I mean a new state of mind- from looking backward to the past for guidance, to an attitude of open investigation, extending even outside of China, for strategies of survival in a hostile world. Neither is static nor simple: China?s tradition was dynamic and multidirectional, just as its modernity has been dynamic and multi-directional. These concepts are starkly meaningful for the Xinzheng years, even in light of problems raised in Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Limits of 'Tradition versus Modernity' as Categories of Explanation: The Case of the Chinese Intellectuals," Daedalus 101.2:71-88 (Spring 1972). The phrase "between tradition and modernity" will be familiar to readers from the title of the important study by Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Uizng Tho and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), where these concepts are discussed in relation to the pioneering career of Wang Tao (1828-1897). 3· On Zhang Zhidong, see Daniel H. Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-tung and the Issues of a New Age, 1895-1909 (Ann Arbor, 1978); and Su Yunfeng, Zhang Zhidong yu Hubei Jiaoyu gaige (Taibei, 1976). On Yuan Shikai, see particularly Stephen R. MacKinnon, Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-kai in Bey"ing and Tianjin, 1901-1908 (Berkeley, 1980); also see Hou Yijie, Yuan Shikai pingzhuan (Zhengzhou, Henan, 1986); and Watanabe Atsushi, "Shinmatsu En Seigai to Hokuyo shinsei: Hokuy5 ha no keisei o megutte," Rekishi kyoiku 16.1-2:134-148 anuary-February 1968). On Zhao Erxun, see Roger Thompson, "Visions of the Future, Realities of the Day: Local Administrative Reform, Electoral Politics, and Traditional Chinese Society on the Eve of the 1911 Revolution," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1985; and Roger Thompson, "Statecraft and SelfGovernment: Competing Visions of Community and State in Late Imperial China," Modern China 14.2:188-221 (April1988). On Shenjiaben, see the biographical sketch and frequent references to Shen in Shimada Masao, Shinmatsu n/okeru kindai teki hOten rw hensan-Tiiyo ho shi ronshii, dai san (Tokyo, 1980 ). 4· The continuity of new governmental institutions into the Republican period after 1911 is recognized in the important research series, Zhongguo xiandaihua de quyu yanjiu, 1860-1916 ("Modernization in China, 1860-1916: Regional Studies"), of the Institute of Modern History of Academia Sinica (Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan, Jindai Shi Yanjiu Suo). Despite its time frame of 1860-1916, however, none of the individual studies of provinces or regions systematically pursues the question of continuity up to 1916. 5· C. Martin Wilbur, Sun l&t-sen: Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). 6. A 1988 study edited by Min Tu-ki and published in Korean examines six major associates of Sun- Hu Hanmin, Chiang Kai-shek, Liao Zhongkai (18781925), DaiJitao (1891-1949), Chen Gongbo (1892-1946), and Gan Naiguang (18971956)- a list that includes the men chiefly responsible for Sun's apotheosis. Min's introduction to this valuable collection is translated into Japanese in Min Tu-ki, "Chugoku kokumin kakumei no rikai no hok6'' (''Approaches to Understanding the Chinese National Revolution"), Chikaki ni arite 16:63-86 (November 1989).



Notes to Pages 3-7 7· China?s political culture, highly personal, seems to require a larger-than-life personality or symbol to rally around and a network of trusted persons with special relationships or guanxi to make things work. Japan's political culture, more highly institutionalized and impersonal, operates more generally around established structures and hierarchies, rendering Chinese-style "cults of personality" almost nonexistent. Reflecting this difference, informed Americans today know the names of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping- but how many of those same informed people can name or even recognize one Japanese leader of the Meiji era, or name the present Japanese prime minister? 8. Ranbir Vohra, China's Path to Modernization: A Historical Review from zBoo to the Present, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992) is a welcome move in the right direction. Note Vohra?s statement, "The imperial reform program covered five fields: military, education, administration, state constitution, and law. In all cases the approach was radical and serious; in the cases of the military, education, and constitutional program, substantial progress changed the nature of China?s future society and polity" (p. 95). ONE. A GOLDEN DECADE? A XINZHENG REVOLUTION?

See Douglas R. Reynolds, ''A Golden Decade Forgotten." 2. According to the mathematical "accounting'' of Zhang Zhenkun: "During this period [187I-I945], Japan used armed force against China (including wars directed at China, battles with other foreign powers on Chinese soil, actual armed intervention against China, and the occupation of Chinese territory) on eleven different occasions, for a total of thirty-six years. About half of that time involved Japanese armed aggression directly against China. Counting just from 1894, in the fifty-two years up to 1945 there were ten Japanese military actions in China, covering thirty-five years. In other words, for the half century from the late nineteenth century to the mid twentieth century, nearly seventy percent of the time witnessed the Japanese use of armed force against China." Interestingly, because Zhang limits himself to military actions on Chinese soil, he omits the 1884 conflict in Korea and the Siberian Intervention ofi918-1922. That makes his list shorter than mine. See Zhang Zhenkun, "Kindai Nihon on tai-Chu kankei no tokucho," in Inoue Kiyoshi and Eta Shinkichi, eds., Nit-Chii semo to M"t-Chu kankei (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 155-157· 3· Kanzaki Kiyoshi, "Hoku-Shi ni okeru Nihongo no bunkateki seiryoku (jo)," Shina 27.8:48 (1 August 1936). 4· See Sanet6 Keishu, "Shin-Nichijidai monogatari," in Sanet6 Keishu, Mefji Nis-Shi bunka kOsho (Tokyo, 1943), pp. 359-393. The phrase "a pure pro:Japanese age" appears on p. 360. 5· Sanet6 Keishu, Chilgoku;i"n Nihon ryugaku shikO (Tokyo, 1939), p. 141. 6. Rev. A. P. Parker, ''A New Japanese Invasion of China," Chinese Recorder 32.7:356 Quly 1901). 1.


Notes to Pages 7-n 7· Ibid., pp. 357-358. I was baffied by Parker's quick perception of the long term implications of To-A Dobun Shoin, until reading two brief essays on Japanese hopes for educational cooperation with China, written in classical Chinese in early rgoo by Nezu Hajime, headmaster of To-A Dobun Shoin until 1923. These essays spell out the intentions Parker attributes to Japan. Entitled "Xingxue yaozhi" (Aims of Learning) and "Lijiao gangling" (Principles of Education), they were reissued in Shanghai in 1901 preparatory to the formal inauguration of To-A Dobun Shoin on May 26th, and so were available to Parker. Both are reprinted in To-A Dobunko.i shi (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 325-327. In Japanese translation, these essays are reprinted in To-A Dobun Slwin Daigaku shi (Tokyo, 1982), pp. 715-718; see also pp. 71 and 88-8g. 8. See Douglas R. Reynolds, "Chinese Area Studies in Prewar China'; and Douglas R. Reynolds, "Training Young China Hands." g. George Lynch, 'japanization of China," Nineteenth Century 54:216-224 (August 1903). 10. Rene Pinon, "LaJaponization de la Chine,".Revue des Deux Mondes (August 1905), as quoted in Feng-Gang Wang, Japanese Influence on Educational Reform in China, from I895-191I (Peiping, 1933), p. 107. II. Quoted in Japanese translation in Nezu Hajime's report to the fall membership meeting of To-A Dobunkai in Tokyo, December 1905, and reprinted in To-A Dobunko.i shi, p. 403. 12. Timothy Richard as quoted in Feng-Gang Wang, p. 106, quoting from Living Age 248:637 (1go6). Emphasis added. 13. Paul A. Cohen, "Christian Missions and Their Impact to 1goo," in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History qf China, X: Late Ch'ing, rBoo-Igii, Part I (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 586-587 and 590. 14. Mingteh Tsou, "From Missionary to Reform Advocate: Gilbert Reid and the Reform Movement in Late Qing," pp. 23-24 (with slight modifications). Cited with permission of the author. 15. Cohen, p. 589. 16. For a history of Taiyo, including analytical essays on the magazine's positions on Chinas 19II Revolution and on the May Fourth Movement of 1919, followed by a comprehensive listing of contents for each issue (1.1-34.2; 5 January 1895-1 February 1928), see Suzuki Masasetsu, Hakubunko.n "Taiyil' no kenkyu (Tokyo, 1979)· 17. Konoe Atsumaro, "Dojinshu domei, tsuketari Shina mondai kenkyu no hitsuyo," Taiyo 4.1:1-3 (I January 18g8), reprinted in Konoe Atsumaro, Knnoe Atsumaro nikki (fuzoku bunslw) (Tokyo, 1g6g), pp.62-63. The same item is reprinted more recently and conveniently in To-A Dobunko.i shi, pp. 180-181. 18. Konoe Atsumaro as translated in Marius B. Jansen, "Konoe Atsumaro," in Akira Iriye, ed., The Chinese and the japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions (Princeton, rg8o ), pp. II3-II4. rg. Jansen, "Konoe Atsumaro," is a delightfully readable essay. It may be supplemented by the informative section on Konoe in To-A Dobunko.i shi, pp. 48-67.


Notes to Pages II-I3 Prince Konoe's importance, despite his untimely death in 1904 at age forty-two, is illustrated by an early 1940s poll of leading Japanese China experts who were asked: "Who is Japan's outstanding pioneer of modern Sino:Japanese relations?" The resounding result was Konoe Atsumaro, representing relations at the official level, and Kishida Ginko, representing non-official relations. This poll is cited in Eta Shinkichi, "Chugoku kakumei to Nihonjin, Kishida Ginko no baai" Qapanese and the Chinese Revolution: The Case ofKishida Ginko), in Sogif kifza Nilwn no shakai bunkashi, VII: Sekai no noka no Nilwn (Series on Japanese Social and Cultural History, VII: Japan in the World), Miwa Kimitada ed. (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1974), p. 214. For an English-language treatment ofKishida Ginko, who helped to usher in the Golden Decade, see Douglas R. Reynolds, "Before Imperialism: Kishida Ginko Pioneers the China Market for Japan," Proceedings and Papers if the Georgia Association o/ Historians 1984 s:II4-I20 (r985)· 20. Theodore Roosevelt, "The Awakening of China," The Outlook (New York) 90.13:666 (28 November 1908). 21. Michael H. Hunt, "The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal," Thejournol o/ Asian Studies 31.3:539n2 (May 1972). See also Abe Hiroshi, "Giwadan baishokin ni yoru Amerika no tai-Ka bunkajigyo," in Abe Hiroshi, ed., Bei-Chu kyoiku kifryu no kiseki (Tokyo, r985), pp. rs5-205. 22. As quoted in Hunt, p. 550. 23. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o/ Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago, I970), p. 92. 24. From translation of the Reform Edict of29January I90I in the Appendix, p. 203. 25. Cameron, p. 57· 26. No treatment of modern Japanese history can avoid reference to the Charter Oath. Because it is brief, it is usually translated. in full. But "misleading translations abound," asserts Robert M. Spaulding in his entry, "Charter Oath," in Kodansha Encyclopedia o/japan (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983), I, 267. The best English translation, printed directly opposite the Japanese original, appears in Nippon Steel Corporation, ed., Nippon: The Land and Its People, Richard Foster and John Bowen, tr., 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Gakuseisha Publishing Co., 1984), p. 49· My translation is a slightly modified version of the latter, with reference to Spaulding. 27. Tetsuo Najita has argued convincingly that "Meiji Restoration," the standard English rendering of Meiji Ishin, is "an extremely inadequate translation of the term ishin, and may indeed be taken as a clear case of mistranslation that has influenced in a significant way the Western view of the Meiji Ishin. The ideograph for i means to pull together the disparate strands in society, to regroup, as it were, and the second part of the compound, shin, means starting out in a totally new direction. This revolutionary connotation ofthe term ishin is not conveyed at all by 'restoration' ... " He subsequently speaks of Meiji Ishin as having achieved "the total restructuring of the polity [ofJapan] inclusive of economical, educational, and ideological systems." Najita Tetsuo, "Conceptual Consciousness in the Meiji Ishin," in Nagai Michio and Miguel Urrutia, eds., Mey'i !shin:


Notes to Pages 14-18

Restoration and Revolution (Tokyo, 1985), pp. 83 and 85, respectively. For elaboration, see pp. Ss-86, 101-102. The entrenched use of the term Meiji Restoration among English-speaking historians has helped to squeeze out the notion of revolution from one of the most complete revolutions the world has ever witnessed. The problem of terminology lies ultimately in the quiet nature of the revolution: Had Meiji Ishin been bloodier, had it crossed class lines and been less "aristocratic," had it been more prolonged and anguished, had it produced more visible martyrs and "revolutionary heroes"- had it been all these things, there can be no doubt that, with exactly the same results, it would be featured among the most celebrated and "successful" of modern revolutions. 28. [Liang Qichao], "Zhongguo lishi shang geming zhi yanjiu" (A Study of Revolution in Chinese History), Xinmin congbao (New People's Miscellany) 46/48 (April 1904), published anonymously under the name of Zlwngguo zhi xinrrum. Reprinted in Zhang Nan and Wang Renzhi, comps., Xinhaigeming qian shinianjian shilun xuanji, I, pt. 2 (1901-1904) (Beijing, 1960), p. 803. TWO. PRELUDE TO THE GOLDEN DECADE

1. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, "Late Ch'ing Foreign Relations, !866-1905," in Fairbank and Liu, eds., pp. 107-110. 2. See Yo Sasaki [Sasaki Yo], "The International Environment at the Time of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95): Anglo-Russian Far Eastern Policy and the Beginning of the Sino-Japanese War," Memoirs if the Research Department if the Toyo Bunko 42:1-74 (1984). 3· See Mutsu Munemitsu, Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record if the Sino-Japanese T#!r, 1894-95, Gordon Mark Berger, ed. and tr. (Tokyo, 1982), pp. 203-255 passim. See also the superb entries in Japan, Gaimusho, Nilwn gaikiishi jiten (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 333-335 and App., pp. 22-23, for the official Japanese record of each minister's declaration. 4· The recommendation for decoration originated with Yugeng, Chinese minister to Tokyo, dated 22 November 1896. The names, titles, and decorations of these diplomats (five French, four German, and four Russian) appear on a memorial dated 25January 1897· See QGC, 50:7a-b and 13b-14b, respectively (pp. 963 and 966). 5· Wang Yunsheng, Liushinian lai Zlwngguo yu Riben (193s; Beijing, 1980-1982), III, 94· 6. Hsu, pp. 110-112. For the text of that treaty in English translation, see Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 18391923 (1954; Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 130-I3I. 7· Nanri Tomoki, comp., Chilgoku seifu koyo no M"honjin: Nilwnjin komon jinmeihyo to ko,isetsu (Tokyo, 1976), pp. 10, 17. 8. Hao Chang, "Intellectual Change and the Reform Movement, 189o-8," in Fairbank and Liu, eds., pp. 330-336.


Notes to Pages 19-20 9· Charlton M. Lewis, "The Hunanese Elite and the Reform Movement, 18951898," The Journal oj_Asian Studies 29.1:36 (November 1969). 10. On Huang Zunxian, see Noriko Kamachi's excellent study, Reform in China: Huang Tsun-hsien and the Japanese Model (Cambridge, Mass., 1981). Note especially that Huang's most influential and important work Riben guozhi (Treatises on Japan), was more or less completed in 1887 and first published around 1895, in time to shape Chinese thinking about Japan and its modern political transformation. By design, Huang had included many concrete proposals for reform in China, intending his book to serve as "a reference for reform in China'' (Kamachi, p. 148). 11. Hao Chang, pp. 300-318; Richard C. Howard, ':Japan's Role in the Reform Program ofK'ang Yu-wei," inJung-pang Lo, ed., K'ang Yu-wei: A Biography and a Symposium (Tucson, 1967), pp. 284-288; and Peng Tse-chou, "Ko Yu'i no henp5 undo to Meiji Ishin" ("K'ang Yu-wei's Reform Movement and the Meiji Restoration"), and "Nihon hensei kif no seiritsu to sono eiky5'' ("The Influence and Effects of the Jih-pen pien-cheng k'ao [Reforms in Meiji Japan: A History]"), in Peng Tsechou, Chiigoku no kindai'ka to Mei,ji !shin (Kyoto, 1976), pp. 1-79, 81-158, respectively. See also appropriate pages of Charlton M. Lewis, Prologue to the Chinese Revolution: The Transformation qf Ideas and Institutions in Hunan Province, r8gr-rgo7 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). 12. The extent of Chinese self-strengtheners' awareness of Japan between 186o and the war of 1894 is helpfully charted in Liu Xuezhao and Fang Dalun, "Qingmo Minchu Zhongguoren dui-Ri guan de yanbian," Jindai shi yarljiu 54:124-133 (November 1989). The real limitations of Chinese knowledge of Japan during those same years, even among the most knowledgeable, are nowhere better revealed than in Carol T. Reynolds, "East Meets East: Chinese Views of Early MeijiJapan" (Ph.D. diss., 1986). 13. The coincidence of these Japanese and British concerns are evident in Chinese documents of the period, which record information from both British and Japanest; sources. See QGC, 51:6-9b (pp. 973-975). 14. See Marilyn Blatt Young, The Rhetoric qf Empire: American China Policy, r8g5rgor (Cambridge, Mass., 1968). 15. On the circumstances surrounding this alliance, see Ian H. Nish, The AngloJapanese Alliance: The Diplomacy qf Two Island Empires r8g4-1907 (London, 1966). 16. For these dates with a summary, see Kojima Sh5tar5, Shina saikin dai,ji nenpyo (Tokyo, 1942), pp. 245-246, 251; and Nakamura Tadashi, Shin'gai kakumei shi kenkyil (Tokyo, 1979), p. 58. 17. Wang Wenshao's report of the invitation was received by the Zongli Yamen on 29 October 1897, in QGC, 51:5b (p. 973). My translation of Beiyang dachen as High Commissioner for Military and Foreign Affairs, in preference to the more common but misleading translation of Superintendent of Trade for Northern Ports, follows John K. Fairbank, Katherine F. Bruner, and Elizabeth McLeod Matheson, eds., The I. G. in Peking: Letters qf Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs, r868-rgo7 (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), II, 1338. For a brief and useful explanation of

Notes to Pages 20-25 the functions of the Beiyang dachen at Tianjin and of the Nanyang dachen at Nanjing, see Huang Fu-ch'ing, Chinese Students in japan in the Late Ch'ing Period, Katherine P. K. Whitaker, tr. (Tokyo, 1982), p. 283n62. This note does not appear in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngrrw liu-Ri xuesheng (Taibei, 1975), the original Chinese version from which this work was translated. The note reveals why High Commissioner for Military and Foreign Affairs is a far superior English translation. r8. Wang's recommendation to the Zongli Yamen, which includes names, ranks, and proposed decorations, is dated 9January r898. It appears in QGC, 51: rob-II (pp. 975-976). 19. See Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Shoki no Chugoku tai-Nichi ryugakusei haken ni tsuite: Bojutsu seihenki o chushin to shite," Shin'gai Kakumei kenkyil 4:13 (May 1984). 20. Ernest P. Young,'~ Study of Groups and Personalities in Japan Influencing the Events Leading to the Sino:Japanese War (1894-95)," Papers on japan 2:250 (1963). 21. TSSK, III, 243-244. 22. TSSK, III, 390; also, Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chugoku tai-Nichi ryugakusei," p. 5· 23. For the texts of their memorials, see Wang Yunsheng, III, 94-96. In English translation, see Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, pp. 127-130. 24. The letter to Kamio is dated 27 December 1897. This section is based on Howard, p. 340m2. 25. Ibid., p. 284. The original report is in Zhang T#nxiang gong quarg'i, Wang Shutong, ed. (1928; Taipei, 1953), 79:r9b-2ob. It also appears in QGC, 5r:8b-9 (pp. 974975), where it is dated "received 3 January 1898." 26. Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chugoku tai-Nichi ryugakusei," pp. 5-6, 15m2. 27. QGC, 51:9 (p. 975); also quoted in Japanese translation in Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chugoku tai~Nichi ryugakusei," p. 5· 28. Hirano Ken'ichiro, quoted in the Preface, above, p. xviii. THREE. JAPAN'S DOUBLE-PRONGED STRATEGY: MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY I. As reported by Zhang Zhidong in his 2January 1898 report, in QGC, 51:9 (p. 975)· 2. See TSSK, III, 248-249. 3· Howard, pp. 285-286. 4· QGC, 51:9 (p. 975). 5· See Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. 7-10. 6. For a careful study of Zhang's proposals and actions before, during, and immediately after the war with Japan, see Guan Jie and Xu Yingqian, "Lun Zhong-Ri jiawu zhanzheng de Zhang Zhidong," in Dongbei Diqu Zhong-Ri Guanxi Shi Yanjiu Hui and Qiqihe'er Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao Bianjibu, comps., Zong-Ri guanxi shi lunji (1985), II, 399-416.


Notes to Pages 25-28 7· Powell, p. 67. 8. Ibid., pp. 61-62; Bays, ChiM Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. n-14; Su Yunfeng, Zlwngguo xiando.ihua de quyu yary'iu: Hubei sheng (I86o-1916), 2nd ed. (Taipei, 1987), pp. 240-242, 248; and Zhu Youxian, comp., Zhongguo ;'indo.i xuezhi shiliao, diyi;;'i shangce (Shanghai, 1983), pp. 541-547. 9· Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chi1goku tai-Nichi ryilgakusei," p. 4; Su Yun-feng, Zhongguo xiando.ihua, p. 252; and Su Yun-feng, Zhang Zhidong yu Hubei Jiaoyu gaige, pp. n7-II8. On the problems with German officers and instructors both at Nanjing and Wuchang, see Powell, pp. 68-69. 10. Howard, pp. 284-287, citing Zhang mnxiang gong quary'i; and Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chugoku tai-Nichi ryi1gakusei," p. 6. n. Sanet6 Keishi1, Chiigokl!J'in Nihon ryiigaku shi: zoho (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 42, 173; and Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping, "Youxue Riben rechao yu Qingmo jiaoyu," unpublished paper, October 1988, p. 3· 12. Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chugoku tai-Nichi ryilgakusei," pp. 6-7. A further intriguing source of influence on Quanxue pian was the prominent Japanese journalist and Sinophile, Nishimura Tenshu (1865-1924), who met with Zhang or senior members of his staff several times at Wuchang in December 1897 and January 1898. See De-min Tao, "Nishimura Te~shu's Journey to the. Yangtze Basin in 1897-98," in Sino-Japanese Studies 4.1:28-43 (October 1991). 13. Watanabe Ryusaku, Kindo.i Nit-Chii minshii kiiryu gaishi (Tokyo, 1981), pp. 5°-51• 14. For biographical data on Fukushima, see TSK, II, 262-284. 15. Su Yun-feng, Zhongguo xiando.ihua, pp. 240, 244, 246. The year 1897 is undoubtedly an error for 1898, though I cite the date as given. 16. Quoted in TSK, II, 276-277; also in Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chugoku taiNichi ryugakusei," pp. 11-12, 8. 17. TSK., II, pp. 274-275; also, Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chugoku tai-Nichi ryugakusei," p. 12. 18. TSK., II, 278. 19. The Japanese term bunlw.tsu can mean ''break up." It is significant that in 1899, Lord Charles Beresford published his influential book, The Break-up ifChiM, with an Account if its Present Commerce, Currency, T#zterways, Armies, Railways, Politics and Future Prospects (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1899). Citation from Joseph W. Esherick, The Origins if the Boxer Uprising (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 73 and 361n15. The similarity of terminology is striking; whether one influenced the other is not known. 20. The term ShiM was used in Meiji]apan as a generalized, basically neutral Western-influenced equivalent for "China." The term transcended politics, as it were, by avoiding reference to a particular dynasty (the Qing) or having to call China "the country of the Qing" (Shinkoku). Many Chinese students and radicals, to express anti-Qing sentiments, eagerly latched onto it during the first decade of the twentieth century. But with the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the estab-


Notes to Pages 28-29 lishment of a Republic in 1912, most Chinese dropped their use of Shina as foreign, and demanded that] a pan do the same, replacing it with ZlwnghuaMingua ("Republic of China'') or simply Zfwnggua ("China''). When Japan refused, out offorce of habit or out of spite or contempt, the situation polarized. A term that had once brought Chinese and Japanese together ended up driving them apart. In 1946, the Chinese government demanded-and obtained-a Japanese government promise to drop all use of Shina. Today, except for a stray Shina saba or "Chinese buckwheat noodle" restaurant, the term is effectively dead. For a detailed history of this term, see Sat6 Sabur6, "Nihonjin ga Chugoku o 'Shina' to yonda koto ni tsuite no kosatsu" (A Study of the Japanese Use of the Term "Shina'' for China) in Sat6 Sabur6, Kindai Nit-Chu kiishii shi no kenkyu (Tokyo, 1984), pp. 25-66. More recently, in English, see Joshua A. Fogel, "On Japanese Expressions for 'China,"' Sino-Japanese Studies 2.1:5-16 (December 1989). 21. On Japanese postwar contempt, see the brilliant piece by Donald Keene, "The Sino-Japanese War of1894-95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan," in Donald H. Shively, ed., Tradition and Modernization in japanese Culture (Princeton, 1971), pp. 121-175· 22. Konoe Atsumaro, "Dojinshu domei," in To-A Diibunkai shi, pp. 180-181. 23. Toyama Masakazu, "Shina teikoku no unmei to Nihon kokumin no ninmu" (China's Fate and Our People's Task) Taiyli 4.8:rr-15 (20 April 1900), quoted in Hosono Koji, "Shinmatsu Chugoku ni okeru 'Tobun Gakudo' to sono shilhen: Meijimatsu Nihon no kyoikuken shildatsu no ronri o meguru sobyo," in Abe Hiroshi, ed., Nit-Chu kyiiiku bunka kiiryu to masatsu, p. 53· Toyama exhibits some of the puzzling and disconcerting ambiguities and contradictions present in many Japanese of the mid-Meiji era. In 1890, for example, after a visit to the flagship ofthe Chinese North Pacific Fleet, Toyama waxed eloquent and declared that "the Chinese and ourselves are like elder and younger brothers. We should definitely not make the Chinese our enemies." Yet, when war came just four years later, Toyama took special pride in claiming to have written the lyrics for the very first war song, "Battotai" (The Drawn Sword Unit), in a conflict that inspired hundreds of war songs. His lyrics to a later war song, "Yuke Nihon danji," contain sensational anti-Chinese sentiments, calling Chinese "evil monsters," "burglars," "wolves," "the enemy of our mothers, the enemy of our wives, the enemy of our sisters and daughters," and urging that "the pure blood of the divine land not be defiled by the beasts of the enemy country." Keene, pp. 123-124, 134-135. 24. Oishi Masami, "T6y6 no gensei oyobi shorai" (The Current Situation and the Future), Taiyii 4.10:1-6 (5 May 1898), quoted in Hosono Koji, p. 72nr8. 25. Ueda Mannen, "Shinkoku no ryilgakusei ni tsukite" (On Chinese Students in Japan), Taiyii 4.17:ID-15 (20 August 1898), quoted in Sanet6 Keishil, Chugakuji"n Nilwn ryugaku shi, pp. 44-47, 16. 26. Chen Yingnian, "Liang Qi.chao yu Riben zhengzhi xiaoshuo zai Zhongguo de chuanbo ji pingjia," Zlwng-Ri wenhua yu Jiaaliu 1:II2-II4 (1984). 27. Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngrrw liu-Ri, pp. 15-16. See also the English translation of this study: Huang Fu-ch'ing, Chinese Students, pp.12-13. Because of deficiencies


Notes to Pages 28-33 in the English translation, I cite both the Chinese and English versions hereafter. 28. QGC, 52:7a-b (p. 994); quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngrrw liu-Ri, p. 17, and Chinese Students, p. 14. 29. Quoted in KawamuraKazuo, "Chu-Shin koshijidai no Yano Ryilkei" (Yano Ryilkei [Fumio] as Japanese Minister to China), in Kawamura Kazuo, Kindai NitChil kankei shi no shorrwndai (Tokyo, 1983), pp. 58-59, from unpublished documents at Japan, Gaimusho, Foreign Ministry Archives. Also quoted in Chinese and English translations in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngrrw liu-Ri, p. 8, and Chinese Students, p. 8. 30. To-A Dobunkai shi, pp. 28-29. 31. Sakeda Masatoshi, Kindai Nihon ni okeru taigaikO undo no kenkyil (Tokyo, 1978), pp. IIO-III. 32. The most thorough recent study of Arao Sei is Paul D. Scott, Japan-China: Arao Sei and the Paradox qf Cooperation (Osaka, 1988). 33· See To-A Dobunkai shi, pp. 30-32, 265-266. For information on Arao Sei as related to these developments, see Omori Chikako, "To-A Dobunkai to To-A Dobun Shoin: Sono seiritsu jijo, seikaku, oyobi katsudo," Ajzix keizai 19.6:78-79 Oune 1978); and Kat5 Yilzo, "To-Ajiron [East Asia Review]," in Kojima Reiitsu, ed., Senzen no Chilgoku jironshi kenkyil (Tokyo, 1978), pp. 8-ro. Also, Douglas Reynolds, "Training Young China Hands," pp. 224-227. 34· This specific point is brought out in Ken'ichiro Hirano, "Arao Sei and the Process of the Establishment of the Toa Dobun Kai: An Early Advocacy of the Promotion of Sino:Japanese Trade," unpublished research paper for the Seminar in Modern Japanese History (History 285), Regional Studies- East Asia, Harvard University, 1964, p. 57· 35· To-A Dobunkai's primary commitment to Shina hozen was reaffirmed by resolution at the height of the Boxer troubles, at its 15 August 1900 general meeting. See To-A Dobunkai shi, pp. 298-301, 329, 678. 36. Sakeda Masatoshi, pp. 120-127; Omori Chikako, pp. 8r-83; and To-A Dobunkai shi, pp. 32-33, sr-s6, and 266-268. In the new To-A Dobunkai, Chinese were denied the status offull membership (kaiin), being granted instead the separate designation of "friend of the association" (karyii). 37· See Douglas R. Reynolds, "Training Young China Hands," pp. 226-227 and 236-241. 38. Jansen, 'japan and the Chinese Revolution of I9II," p. 346. See also pp. 349. 365. 39· Otori Keisuke, "Shinkoku ni taisuru kokon kanjo no henkan" (Changes in Japanese Feelings Toward China, Past and Present), Taryo (5 May r899), quoted in Sanet5 Keishil, ChiigokuJin Nihon ryilgaku shi, p. 208. See also Huang Fuch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. u8-u9, and Chinese Students, p. 99· 40. Translated into Japanese in Sane to Keishil, Chiigokujin Nihon ryilgaku shi, p. 208. For the Chinese original, see Saneto Keishil (Shiteng Huixiu), Zhongguo ren liuxue Riben shi, p. II5. 41. See QGC, 52:7b (p. 994). This phrase does not appear in the lengthy passage quoted earlier, however.


Notes to Pages 34-35 42. The emperor's central role, as seen through the inner workings of the lateQing court, is admirably explored in Luke S. K. Kwong, A Mosaic qf the Hundred Days: Personalities, Politics, and Ideas qf1898 (Cambridge, Mass., 1984). This revisionist study gives us a fresh understanding of the Hundred Days, freed from the distorted accounts of its victims and particularly propagandists like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. 43· For critical appraisal of Kang Youwei, the myth and the reality, see esp. Kwong, pp. 175-200. For a more favorable recent view, see the valuable essay of Wang Xiaoqiu, 'jindai Zhongguo fangxiao Riben bianfa de lantu: Kang Youwei Riben bianzheng kao yanjiu" (Modern China's Blueprint for Copying Japan: A Study ofKang Youwei's Riben bianzheng kao), in Wang Xiaoqiu,jindai Zlwng-Ri qishi lu (Beijing, 1987), pp. 192-210. 44· For a wide range of Japanese comment on the reforms, culled from contemporary newspapers, see Shimura Toshiko, "Bojutsu henp5 to Nihon: NisShin sengo no shinbun o chiishin to shite" (China's Hundred Days Reform and Japan: Newspaper Accounts from after the Sino:Japanese War of 1894-1895), Tokyo Toritsu Daigaku Hogakukai zasshi 6.2:253-290 (1966). 45· Tsuji, whom we shall encounter again in the chapter on Japanese teachers and advisers in China, became famous under the name of Tsuji Choka, as a longtime drama critic in Beijing for the Japanese-run Chinese-language newspaper, Shuntian shibao. 46. Tsuji Takeo's report in the 15 November 1898 issue of K;yoikujiron, quoted in Hosono Koji, p. ss; see also p. 71. 47· See QGC, 52:1-12 (pp. 991-996), passim. 48. Peng Tse-chou, "Ita Hirobumi to Bojutsu henpo" ("Ito Hirobumi and the 1898 Coup d'Etat in China''), in Peng Tse-chou, pp. 279-280; and Howard, p. 301. 49· For a report of this audience and the events surrounding it, see Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, pp. 179-18o; Wang Yunsheng, III, 229-231; and Howard, pp. 301-302. 50. For details, including an official memorial delivered to the Empress Dowager on September 18th, see Kwong, pp. 204-209. 51. See ibid., pp. 30-40. 52. Ibid., pp. 5-13, 223-224, for a critical discussion. Japanese scholarship, like most English language scholarship until recently, has been marred by accepting the exaggerated claims of the egotistical Kang Youwei at face value. References to the entire episode as "the Kang You wei reform of 1898," a major error, are still all too commonplace in every language. The distortions growing out of this error exceed even those of the term "Sun's 19u Revolution," discussed in the Introduction. 53· Kwong, p. 174. 54· Daniel H. Bays, "Chang Chih-tung· after the 'roo Days': 1898-1900 as a Transitional Period for Reform Constituencies," in Paul A. Cohen and John E. Schrecker, eds., Reform in Nineteenth-Century China (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p. 317· 55· Sue Fawn Chung, ·"The Image of the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi," m Cohen and Schrecker, eds., p. 103.


Notes to Pages 35-37

56. These are terms used by Bays in "Chang Chih-tung," pp. 317, 318. 57· The terms in quotation marks are from Jansen, Japan and China, p. 138. 58. On the roles ofltO and Hayashi, see XieJunmei, "Wuxu zhengbian shiqi Riben yingjiu Zhongguo weixinpai de huodong," in Zhongguo Zhong-Ri Guanxi Shi Yanjiu Hui, comp., Riben de Zhongguo yimin (Beijing, 1987), pp. 194-203. 59· For the names and dates of these recommendations during the four months from October 18g8 to January 18gg only, see QGC, 52:12-23 .(pp. gg6-10o2). 8o. Tsuzuki Keiroku as quoted in Nanri Tomoki, comp. pp. 24-25, citing Japan, Gaimusho, Nilwn gaiko bunsho (Tokyo, 1936- ), XXXI, 610. 61. From Beijing, Ito had traveled to Shanghai and then up the Yangzi River to Wuchang, where he was warmly received by Zhang Zhidong (one of the most venomous critics of Kang Youwei, whom Ito had just helped to escape from China). There, the two men undertook discussions that initiated the process whereby, in exchange for guaranteed deliveries of coal and iron ore and for a voice in management, Japan between 1903 and 1930 extended loans of more than fifty million yen to the Hanyeping Coal and Iron Company centered at Wuhan. See Wuhan Daxue Jingji Xuexi, comp., jiu Zhongguo Hanyeping Gongsi yu Riben guanxi shiliao xuary"i (Shanghai, 1985), pp. 1-3, 1112-1121. On Zhang's vitriolic feelings toward Kang Youwei, see Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. 25-28, 45-46,

51, 59-61. 62. Quoted in Hosono Koji, "Shinmatsu Chugoku," pp. 52-53. For Ito's private views, see Peng Tse-chou, pp. 286-294. 63. NaitO Konan, "Shina kaikakujosei no ichi shudan'' (One Means of Assisting Chinese Reform), To-AJ"iron 5 (February 18gg), quoted in Hosono Koji, "Shinmatsu Chugoku," pp. 55_56. February I8gg is the same month that NaitO was appointed editor in chief of To-AJ"iron, a position from which he resigned only two months later. See To-A Dobunkai shi, pp. 26g, 273. 64. To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 291. 65. Ibid., p. 309; and, for a 1902 reference, see Jinbo Kotora, "Shinago kaiwa no sokusei" (Conversational Chinese the Quick Way), Taiyo 8.10 (5 August 1902), cited in Sanet6 Keishu, ChiigokUJ"in Nihon ryiigaku shiko (Tokyo, 1939), p. 144. 66. China's Boxer Incident of 1900 provides a good example of divided J apanese opinion. Nohara Shiro has assembled data on three prominent Japanese who were critical ofJapanese military action during the Boxer Incident, and even sympathetic to Boxer anti-foreignism. On the other hand, Sugano Tadashi has surveyed public opinion in newspaper editorials and among leading individuals and organizations, and concludes that the Boxer crisis was a turning point for Japan: from a public demand for equality in international politics with Western powers, to a demand for superiority vis-a-vis China. See Nohara Shiro, "Giwadan undo: Nihonjin no hyoka ni kanshite'' (The Boxer Movement: Its Assessment by Japanese), in Suganuma Masahisa, et al., eds., Koza gendai Chugoku (Series on Contemporary China) (Tokyo: Taishukan Shoten, 1g6g), II, 37-53; and Sugano Tadashi, "Giwadan jihen to Nihon no yoron" (The Boxer Incident and Public Opinion in Japan), Hisutoria 44/45:26-50 Qune 1966).



I. "The Intellectual Revolution, I9I7-23" is the title of one chapter in a widely used textbook, Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise if Modern China, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, Iggo). FOUR. CHINESE STUDENTS AND THEIR SCHOOLS IN JAPAN

I. The first appearance of the term ryiigalcu in print occurs in a Japanese history of A.D. n6, ShokuNihongi (Chronicles of Japan, Continued). See Morohashi Tetsuji, Dai Kan-T#! jiten (Tokyo, I955-Ig6o ), VII, I093· For particulars on the first group of Japanese students dispatched to China, see Kimiya Yasuhiko (Mugong Taiyan), Ri-Zhong wenhua jiaoliu shi, translated from the Japanese by Hu Xinian (I955; Beijing, Ig8o ), pp. 57-6r. 2. Zhang Zhidong, Quanxue pian (I8g8; Taipei, n.d.), p. go (waipian, p. 5). 3· Quoted by Li Xisuo, jirulo.i Zhongguo de liuxuesheng (Beijing, I987), p. I68;, see alsop. I95· On Sun Yat-sen and Japan in general, see the classic study ofMarius B. Jan sen, The japanese and Sun J:&t-sen. 4· Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. I3I, I62, I59, and 2I7, respectively. 5· Jansen, Japan and China, p. I49· 6. Jansen, ':Japan and the Chinese Revolution," p. 348. 7· Wang Xiangrong, Ribenjiaoxi (Beijing, Ig88), p. 51. 8. Although the English translation of Huang Fu-ch'ing's study was of great help to my research, it is sufficiently rough to force me to rely primarily on the Chinese original. Other major studies include Sanet6 Keishu's classic, Chilgokujin Nihon ryiigalcu shi, and his earlier Chiigokujin Nihon ryilgalcu shiko; Li Xisuo, pp. rr7-2o6; and Paula Sigrid Harrell, "The Years of the Young Radicals: The Chinese Students in Japan, Igoo-Igo5" (Ph.D. diss., I970 ), published as Paula Harrell, Sowing the Seeds if Change: Chinese Students, Japanese Teachers, IB95-1905 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, I992). For compactness and intellectual stimulation, Marius Jansen's chapter, "The Student Movement to Japan," in Jansen, Japan and China, pp. I49-I58, is without peer. g. Quoted in Sanet6 Keishu, Chilgokujin Nihon ryilgaku shi, p. 43· This memorial may well have been a response to those initiatives and promises of Yano previously discussed. ro. QGC, 5I:33b-34b (p. g87). This memorial resulted in the "Regulations for Study in Japan," promulgated on I8 August I8g8. Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kirulo.i kyiJiku, p. 6I, states that Yang's June memorial was actually drafted by Kang Youwei, who lacked sufficient rank to submit it directly himself. Yang's execution on 28 September I8g8 was a consequence of official accusations that he had misused his privileged position to facilitate Kang Youwei's "intrigues." Kwong, p. 2I2. rr. Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, p. I4, and Chinese Students, p. rr. Also, Wolf-


Notes to Pages 43-45 gang Franke, The Reform and Abolition if the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, Mass., 1g6o), p. 41. 12. Min Tu-ki, "Chinese 'Principle' and Western 'Utility': A Reassessment," in Min Tu-ki, National Polity and Local Power: The Transformation if Late Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass., 1g8g), pp. 51-81, reexamines this central concept systematically and critically for the first time in English. Quanxue pian employs a variant wording of the ti-yong formula, discussed by Min on page 51n1. For further discussion of this phrase in association with Zhang Zhidong and his Quanxue pian, see ibid., pp. 74-76, So-81. 13. Lin Ming-te (Lin Mingde ), "~ngmo Minchu Riben zhengzhi dui Zhangguo de yingxiang," in Yue-him Tam, ed., Sino-Japanese Cultural Interchange, III: The Economic and Intellectual Aspects (Hong Kong, 1985), p. 206nn5. Abe Hiroshi in fact translates the title of Quanxue pian as Gakumon no susume, on the inside jacket of Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku. 14. Saneto Keishil, Chilgokvjin M"hon ryilgaku shi, p. 1:2; cited in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, p. 14, and Chinese Students, p. II. 15. Zhang Zhidong, p. go (waipian, p. 5). Also quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, p. 2, and Chinese Students, p. 2. 16. The phrase shi ban gong bei appears frequently in Chinese arguments for study in or learning from Japan. See, for example, the memorial from Chinese minister to Japan, Yang Shu, concerning studies of law and administration in Japan, dated g January 1905, in QGC, 68:35b (p. 1317); and the memorial of China's most distinguished legal reformers, including Wu Tingfang, dated 15 October 1905, arguing for China to follow the Japanese example in legal reform, quoted in Shimada Masao, p. 25. 17. Zhang Zhidong, p. 91 (waipian, p. 6). Translated with reference to Y. C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, rB72-1949 (Chapel Hill, 1966), p. 53· Part of Zhang's wording here is reminiscent ofUtsunomiya TarO's argument oflate 1897, quoted at the end of chapter two, above. 18. The practice of quoting this passage from Quanxue pian in truncated form applies across language and nationality lines: In Japanese, Sanet6 Keishil, Chilgokuji·n Nihon ryilgaku shi, p. 41, and his Chilgoku ryilgakusei shidan (Tokyo, 1981), p. g; Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chilgoku tai-Nichi ryilgakusei," p. 7; and To-A Dobunkai shi, pp. So-81. In English, Jan sen, japan and China, p. 150; and Y. C. Wang, p. 53· In Chinese, Wang Xiangrong, Ribenjiaoxi, pp. 41, 52nr, 145; and Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping, p. 2. 19. China's lack of interest in Japan in its own right is a major reason for modern China's great lag behind the West in appreciating Japanese classical literature. For a penetrating discussion of the Chinese tendency to "stress the present, not the past" in Japanese literature, see Tan Ruqian, "Zhong-Ri zhi jian fanyi' shiye de jige wenti," in Tan Ruqian, jindai Zhong-Ri wenhua guanxi yargi"u (Hong Kong, 1988), pp. 171-173. For the persistent opposing Japanese tendency to "stress the past, not the present" in Chinese thought and literature, see ibid., pp. 172, 173-179·


Notes to Pages 45-48 20. Sanet6 Keishil, Chiigoku ryilgakusei shidan, pp. 2-3, ro-n. See also Nakamura Tadashi, "Kano Jigoro to Yo Do," Shin'gai Kakumei kenkyil 5:41-58 (rg85). 21. Sanet6 Keishil, Chiigoku ryilgakusei shidan, p. n; Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liuRi, pp. rog-no, and Chinese Students, pp. gr-g2. See also the poster ofJapanese children taunting Chinese on the streets after the r8g4-r8g5 war, in Sanet6 Keishil, Chugoku;in Nihon ryilgaku sht~ p. 218, and Saneto's commentary on pp. 2H-217. 22. For sketches of each of the seven, see Sanet6 Keishil, Chilgoku ryilgakusei skidan, pp. 13-20. For selected copies of their school records, see Kageyama Masahiro, "Kobun Gakuin ni okeru Shinmatsu Chilgokujin ryugakusei no kyoiku ni tsuite [r]," Kumatsu shi12:144-147 (rg8o). 23. Kobayashi Tomoaki, ·"Chilgoku tai-Nichi ryilgakusei," pp. 2, 8. The imperial edict appears in QGC, 52:5b (p. 993). 24. Nakamura Tadashi, "Seijo Gakk6 to Chugokujin ryilgakusei," in Shin'gai Kakumei Kenkyilkai, comp., Chiigoku kin-genrhi ski ronshii: Kikuchi Takaharu sensei tsuitif ronshii (Tokyo, rg85), pp. 251-252. The Foreign Student Division had been created in r8g8 basically for resident Korean students, who had attended Seijo Gakko since late r8g5. 25. As reported in ibid., p. 253· 26. Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chilgoku tai-Nichi ryilgakusei," pp. g-ro. 27. Ibid., p. 8. 28. Bays, Cht"na Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. 6o-6r. 29. Ibid., p. 6r. 30. Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chilgoku tai-Nichi ryilgakusei," p. g. 31. Munakata Kotar6, Munakata Kotara bunsho: Kinrhi Chilgoku hiroku, Kamiya Masao, comp. (Tokyo, 1977), pp. 45-46. 32. Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chilgoku tai-Nichi ryilgakusei," p. ro, citing records in Japan, Gaimusho, Gaiko Shiryokan. Nineteen students are identified by name, school affiliation in Wuhan, and province of origin in Munakata Kotara bunsho, pp. 53-54, which is partially quoted in Nakamura Tadashi, "Seijo Gakko," p. 257· 33· Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chugoku tai-Nichi ryilgakusei," p. ro, citing Japan, Gaimusho, Gaiko Shiryokan documents. 34· Ibid., pp. I0-11. 35· Ibid., p. ro. 36. Konoe Atsumaro, Knnoe Atsumaro nikki, II, 256-257; see generally pp. 253-271, passim. See also Jansen, "Konoe Atsumaro," p. ro8. 37· For details, see To-A Dobunkai ski, pp. 265 ff., and appropriate sections of Konoe, Knnoe Atsumaro nikki, II. 38. Yung Ying-yue, "Go J orin to Toyil sifroku: Aru 'yomuhi no kyoiku kaikaku an," in Hirano Ken'ichiro, ed., Kt"nrhi Nihon to AJia: Bunka no koryil to masatsu (Tokyo, rg84), P· 47· 39· Noriko Kamachi, p. 241. 40. From a letter preserved in Japan, Gaimusho, Gaiko Shiryokan, quoted in Kobayashi Tomoaki, "Chugoku tai-Nichi ryilgakusei," pp. 8-g.


Notes to Pages 49-51 41. The imperial edict transmitted to provincial governors on 18 August 1898 reported Japanese government assurances as to "appropriate adjustments in middle and higher school regulations to facilitate Chinese student admissions," including through "preferential treatment." QGC, 52:5b (p. 993). 42. See the charts in Sanet5 Keishu, ChilgokuJin Nihon ryilgaku shi, p. 544, with explanatory comments on pp. 137-143. These figures are close to those accepted by Huang Fu-ch'ing. For Huang's reasoning, see Qjngmo liu-Ri, p. 84 and esp. P.· 92n8, and Chinese Students, pp. 68-69 and 288n43. Jansen, japan and China, reproduces Sanet5's figures, remarking, however, that they are based on "very conservative contemporary estimates" (p. 150). 43· These are 1) Li Xisuo, pp. 126-127, citing figures from his own published survey of 1982; 2) Wang Xiangrong, Riben jiaoxi, p. 54, citing a 1936 Shanghai study without comment; and 3) the excellent unpublished paper of Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping, p. 2. 44· Futami Takeshi and Sat5 Hisako, "(Fu) Chugokujin Nihon ryugaku shi kankei t5kei," Kokuritsu Kyoiku KenkyiiJo kiyif94=99-ro5 (1978). Based upon a reexamination of Japan's Foreign Ministry records, these unfortunately cover only the years 1906-1932. Wang Xiangrong, Ribenjiaoxi, p. n7, cites these figures for 190619II, calling them too low. In 1987, Abe Hiroshi, head of the project funding the Futami-Sat5 calculations, reiterated that "even at its peak in 1905-06, the number was between 7,ooo and 8,ooo." Hiroshi Abe, "Borrowing from Japan: China?s First Modern Educational System," in Ruth Hayhoe and Marianne Bastid, eds., China's Edll(;ation and the Industrialized "WOrld: Studies in Cultural Transfer (Armonk, N.Y., 1987), p. 75· In 1990, si~nificantly, Abe revised his thinking upward, placing the figure for the peak year of 1906 at "over ro,ooo," in Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 70. 45· Jansen, Japan and China, p. 151. 46. Li Xisuo, p. 129. 47· Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 120. 48. Ibid., pp.12o-I2I; and Sanet5 Keishu, Chilgokujin M"hon ryilgaku shi, p. 83. 49· Sanet5 Keishu, Chilgoku ryilgakusei shidan, pp. ro-13. 50. As translated (with minor modification) in James Legge, The Chinese Classics, I: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, and The Doctrine of the Mean (Oxford, r883), p. 137, which includes the Chinese original alongside this English translation and critical notes. 51. Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 75-76. 52. Ibid., pp. n8-n9. s3. Ibid., PP· ?6-n 54· Ibid., pp. 78-79. 55· For careful lists of the many hundreds of Chinese students enrolled in these various programs, see Kageyama Masahiro, "Kobun Gakuin ni okeru Chugokujin ryugakusei kyoiku ni tsuite (2)," Kurnatsu shil5:n6-189 (1987). For overviews, see Kageyama Masahiro, "Kobun Gakuin [1]," pp.r34-144; and Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 72.

Notes to Pages 51-56 56. Abe Hiroshi, Chugoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 72. I translate the Buddhist term daihonzan or Head Temple as Flagship here. 57· Quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, p. 124, and Chinese Students, p. 105. 58. Ibid.; and Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 72-73. 59· For names of twenty-four students and some of their universities, see Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. I25-I26, and Chinese Students, pp. I05-I06. See also Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 62; and Sanet5 Keishu, Chilgokujin Nihon ryugaku ski, pp. 65-66, 208-2og. 6o. Abe Hiroshi, ChOgoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 146, I79· 6r. To-A Dobunlw.i ski, pp. 73-74, 282, 283; Konoe, Konoe Atsumaro nikki, II, 455; and '6uchi Chozo, "Konoe Kazan ko to To-A Dobun Shoin" (Prince Konoe and To-A Dobun Shoin), Shina 25.2:144 (1934). Konoe's invitation to Zhang came at the end of his successful seven-month world tour of r8gg. For a convenient list of the places visited, between his departure from Tokyo on April I to his return on November 25, see Jansen, "Konoe Atsumaro," p. n5. 62. To-A Dobunlw.i ski, pp. 73-81. This is an excellent summary that sets the record straight. 63. Quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, p. 132, and Chinese Students, p. no. See also Abe Hiroshi, Chugoku on kindai kyoiku, p. 95· 64. Hosei Daigaku Daigaku Shi Shiryo Iinkai, Hosei Daigaku ski shiryo shu, dai ju'ichi shu: Hosei Daigaku Shinkoku ryiigakusei Hosei Sokusei Ka toku shil (Tokyo, rg88) is an invaluable documentary history of all aspects of the Hosei program, ranging from official university records including student rolls to excerpts from contemporary publications and biographical sketches. I am grateful to Mi Chu Wiens Mi), Area Specialist in the Chinese Section, Asian Division of the Library of Congress for lending me her copy of this not-for-sale publication. Listed among the fourth group of graduates is Dr. Wiens' grandfather, Chii Cheng Zheng; I876-I95I), in ibid., pp. 152, I78. A lengthy biography of Chii Cheng, head of Chinas Judicial Yuan for sixteen years, 1932-1948, appears in Boorman, I, 469-475. Chii's life exemplifies the ongoing influence of Japantrained students on Chinas post-imperial modern institutions, even as Japanese aggression forced many to mask or disavow their Japanese connections. 65. QGC, 68: 35 (p. 1317). 66. Ibid., 68:34-35 (pp. 13r6-I3I7); Shimada Masao, 257-258. 67. Hosei Daigaku Daigaku shi Shiryo Iinkai, pp. 263-264; also, Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 71, 83, 131. 68. Hosei Daigaku Daigaku Shi Shiryo Iinkai, pp. gr and n4-n6, lists the program instructors, their degrees and affiliations, and their areas of legal specialization and teaching responsibility for the years rgo4 and rgo6; see also Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 82-83. Note how the standardized Japanese terms of the Hosei curriculum entered Chinese directly from the Japanese. 6g. Hosei Daigaku Daigaku Shi Shiryo Iinkai, pp.r48, 93-94; and Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. r76-r78. 70. Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 83-84.




Notes to Pages 57-61 71. Huang Fu-ch'ing, QjngTTUJ liu-Ri, pp. r3S-r3g, and Chi11£Se Students, pp. n6-rq. Huang's convenient statistical breakdown gives higher totals than the information in Hosei Daigaku Daigaku Shi Shiryo Iinkai. These need to be reconciled. 72. The Chinese phrase is "Zhongguci xiansheng zhi dao." 73· QGC, 6S:36 (p. I3I7)· 74· Quoted in Shimada Masao, p. 262. 75· Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, p. Sr; and Huan Fu-ch'ing, QjngTTUJ liuRi, p. 134, and Chi11£Se Students, pp. m-n2. 76. Quoted in Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyifiku, p. S7. 77· Ibid., p. S6. 7S. Ibid., p. SS. 7g. See the representative list of eight names and their educational posts in ibid., pp. go, 170. So. Huang Fu-ch'ing, QjngTTUJ liu-Ri, pp. r3g-r4o, and Chi11£Se Students, pp. rq-nS; and Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoko no kindai kyiJiku, pp. SS-go. Sr. Quoted in Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. gS-gg. The standard Japanese expression is "good wives and wise mothers" (ryifsai kenbo). This same set of moralistic aims was carried to China by Japanese promoters of Chinese female education, as discussed in ibid., pp. rSg-205. S2. Ibid., p. roo. S3. For revealing excerpts, see ibid., pp. ror-ro2. S4. Ono Kazuko, "Shimoda Utako to Hattori Unokichi," in Takeuchi Yoshimi and Hashikawa Bunzo, eds., Kindai M"hon to Chilgoku (Tokyo, rg74), I, 202-212; Ono Kazuko, Chinese Women in a Century qf Revolution, 1850-1950, Joshua A. Fogel, ed. (Stanford, rgSg), pp. 54-65; Sanet5 Keishu, Chilgokv:fin Nihon ryilgaku shi, pp. 75-7g; and Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyiJiku, pp. I02-105. S5. On Chinese student reactions to these tighter restrictions, see Saneto Keishu, ChilgokuJin Nihon ryilgaku shi, pp. 46r-4g4; and his Chilgoku ryilgakusei shidan, pp. 2rg-2S3. See also Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. 276-3n, and Chi11£Se Students, pp. 2IS-24S. S6. Huang Fu-ch'ing, QjngTTUJ liu-Ri, pp. 277, S6-S7, and Chi11£Se Students, pp. 2rS, 70-7I. S7. Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyifiku, p.rq. For an extended discussion of. the measures to upgrade the quality of education for Chinese in Japan, and the rapid Japanese response, see ibid., pp. n7-r2S. SS. Sanet5 Keishu., ChilgokuJin Nihon ryilgaku shikiJ, pp. 2orff; and his Chilgoku:fin Nihon ryilgaku shi, pp.ro4-II0. Sg. For details, see Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoko no kindai kyifzku, pp. r2S-r3o. A lengthy report, including terms of the agreement and the assessed annual costs to Chinese provinces, appears in QGC, 72:21-25b (pp. 13Sr-r3S3)· go. Li Xisuo, pp. 143-14S. The pathetically low overall level of Chinese training in Japan was confirmed in an official Chinese report as follows: "Over the past several years, official investigations reveal more than ten thousand Chinese studying in Japan. However, of this number, sixty percent are taking accelerated


Notes to Pages 62-65 courses, thirty percent regular [lower middle school] courses, five or six percent drop out before completing any course, three or four percent enroll in higher or specialized education, and a mere one percent enter university." QGC, 72:2rb (p. r38r); partially quoted in Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, p. ng. gr. Marius Jansen has written that "it is certain that the students' experience counted for more than their formal education." japan and China, p. 152. g2. Li Xisuo, p. 155· g3. The above quotations are both from Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngrrw liu-Ri, pp. 107, ro8, and Chinese Students, pp. 8g, go. g4. Quoted in Li Xisuo, p. 154. g5. For an effective further discussion of this point, see ibid., pp. 154-r6r; and Jansen, Japan and China, pp. 152-156. g6. Ibid., p. 156. g7. Selective translation from Saneto Keishil, Chiigokujin Nihon ryugaku shi, pp. rg3-rg5; for the etiquette list in Chinese, see Sanet6 Keishil (Shiteng Huixiu), Zhongguo ren liuxue Riben shi, pp. 107-ro8. g8. Quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngrrw liu-Ri, pp. 6-7 and Chinese Students, p. 6. For extensive quotes from Zhang's Guide, see Sanet6 Keishil, Chiigoku,jin Nihon ryilgaku shi, pp. 172-rg2, passim; and Saneto, Chiigoku ryilgakusei shidan, pp. 103-13I, also PP· 43-45· gg. A superb list of these is Huang Fu-ch'ing's "Periodicals Published by the Chinese in Japan, r8g8-rgn," giving name, founding year of publication, place of publication, editor and publisher, and general purpose and content, in Qjngrrw liu-Ri, pp. r88-rg5, and Chinese Students, pp. 271-275. roo. Translated in full in Sanet6 Keishil, Chugoku ryilgakusei shidan, pp. 155-r86. ror. Translated in full in Sanet6 Keishil, Chiigoku,jin Nihon ryilgaku shi, pp. 58I-5g4. 102. Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping, p. q. For substantiation of this critically important point, see pp. 17-20. 103. Ibid., pp. 20-22. 104. Ibid., pp. 22-24. 105. Ibid., p. 24. For a less rigorous essay on the contributions of domestically trained students to the new China, see Sang Bing, "rgo5-rgr2 nian de guonei xuesheng qunti yu Zhongguo jindaihua," jindai shi yary'iu 53:55-76 (rg8g). FIVE. JAPANESE TEACHERS AND ADVISERS IN CHINA

r. Quoted in Otsuka Yutaka, "Chugoku kindai kot6 shihan kyoiku no hoga to Hattori Unokichi," in Oyatoi Nihory'in kyoshil, p. 45· 2. One partial exception is the regional modernization study of Hubei province by Su Yun-feng, which identifies by name many Japanese military contract specialists. See Su Yun-feng, Zhongguo xiandaihua, pp. 242-256, passim. But eve~ this study does not attempt to interpret the meaning of the Japanese presence.

Notes to Pages 65-68 3· See chap. 6, "Nihon kyoshu no jidai" (The Age of the Japanese Teacher [in China]), in Saneto Keishu, Chilgokujin Nihon ryilgaku shiko, pp. 139-200. 4· This has spawned a field of scholarly research that might be called "oyatoi studies." For an excellent guide to English language materials, see chap. 5, "Foreign Influences on Education in Meiji Japan," in Edward R. Beauchamp and Richard Rubinger, Education in japan: A Source Book (New York, 1989), pp. 57-775· See Kato Yuzo, "Chugoku ni okeru oyatoi gaikokuji~," in Shiryif oyatoi gaikokUJi"n, Yunesuko Higashi Ajia Bunka Kenkyu Senta, comp. (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 3243, which touches lightly on the subject of Japanese specialists in late-Qing China. Nanri Tomoki, comp., Chilgoku seifu koyiJ, goes into far greater detail, and provides invaluable tables and appendices. 6. For brief descriptions of Abe Hiroshi's research project& for the years 1975-197], 1977-1979, 1980-1982, and 1983-1985, see Abe, ed., Mt-Chii kyiiiku bunko. kiiryil to masatsu, pp. ii-iii. Each of these resulted in major publications. Findings from Abe's two-year project for 1986-1988 are reported in Oyatoi Nihonjzn kyiishil, a special issue of Kokuritsu Kjyiiiku Kenkyiljo kryii (March 1988). Abe's own grand summary of his project findings appears in Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku (1990 ). 7· As related in Wang Xiangrong, Ribenjiaoxi, pp. 4-5, 127, 258-260. 8. Wang Xiangrong, Riben jiaoxi, pp. 67-95. For the sources of Wang's information, and a brief discussion, see ibid., pp. 67, 128-129. For this study's Japanese translation, see Wang Xiangrong (0 Koei), Shinkoku oyatoi Nihonjin, Takeuchi Minoru et al., trans. (Tokyo, 1991). Unfortunately, the Japanese translation fails to correct the occasional errors of the original. 9· Wang Xiangrong, Riben jiaoxi, pp. 66, 84. For evidence of Japanese-language instructors at Shanghai institutions as oflate 1902, see To-A Diibunko.i shi, p. 358. ro. On the undocumented flow of Japanese and on Chinese hiring methods, see Wang Xiangrong, Riben jiaoxi, pp. 96, 100-101. II. These appear in Table I of Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru kyoiku kindaika katei to Nihonjin kyoshu," in Abe Hiroshi, ed. M·t-Chii kyiiiku bunka kwyil to masatsu, p. 9· 12. See Nanri Tomoki, comp., Table 4, "Table ofJapanese Teachers and Advisers in China and of Chinese Students in Japan (1901-1916)," p. 16. Nanri includes estimates for years not supported by documentary evidence. 13. Sanet6 Keishu, Chiigokujin M"hon ryilgaku shzkiJ, p: 141, based upon a survey of November 1909; and Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," p. 8. Kageyama's personal view, mentioned to me in a conversation at the National Institute for Educational Research, Tokyo, 26 March 1987, is that the figure for 1905-1906 might be as high as 1,ooo. We did not separately discuss the years 1907 and 1908. 14. Albert Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early Twentieth Century (Ann Arbor, 1976), pp. 66-70, 77, offers suggestive comments about increases in numbers ofJapanese in the foreign-controlled Chinese Maritime Customs Service and the Salt Administration between 1905 and 1915. 15. Japanese imperialism in China may be periodized as follows: before impe-

Notes to Pages 68-71 rialism (to 1894), transition to imperialism (1895-1914), accelerating imperialism (1915-1931), and high imperialism (1932-1945). See Douglas Reynolds, "Training Young China Hands," p. 2II. 16. QGC, 50:12, 13 (pp. 965, 966); Rokkaku Tsunehiro, Chugokugo kyoiku shi no kenkyu (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 213 and 2II, quoting from TSK, II, 513; and Nanri Tomoki, comp., pp. 2, 23. 17. TSSK, III, 82. 18. Quoted in Hosono Koji, p. 66. 19. Also known as True Pure Land Buddhism. For an excellent study of the origin, development, and meaning ofJodo Shinshu, see James C. Dobbins,jodo Shinshu: Shin Buddhism in Medievaljapan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). 20. Hosono Koji, pp. 51, 66; and Takanishi Kensho, camp., Higashi Honganji Shanhai kaikyo rokujunen shi (Shanghai, 1937), pp. 84-89. 21. Chen Baochen, later a tutor and adviser to Chinis last emperor, was a prominent proponent of a Qing Restoration after 1912. 22. Nakamura Takashi, "To-A Shain to Tobun Gakudo: Taiwan Sotokufu Kanan kyoiku shisetsu no ransho," Tenri Daigaku gakuho 124:12 (1980). Iai-Shi kaikoroku appears in the references under TSK. 23. TSK, II, 630. Chinese respect for Okada is apparent in remarks by a Fujian official in Tokyo on 30 September 1899, in To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 283. Strangely, Okadis name does not appear under Fuzhou Dongwen Xuetang in an 1898 list of Japanese in China, in ibid., p. 265. 24. Nakamura Takashi, p. 12. 25. Ibid.; and To-A Dobunkai shi, pp. 274, 291, 386, and 417. Kuwata was dispatched to Fuzhou in June 1899 (p. 274), and resigned his position in 1906 (p. 417). Why he is reported in mid 1904 to have served at the school for six years (p. 386) is not clear. TSK, II, 778-779, is mistaken in stating that Kuwata was at this school from 1898 to 1908. 26. The most impressive example of this feeder effect was in 1904, when Hattori Unokichi sent thirty-one out of forty-seven select students who had completed a special accelerated program for modern school teachers at Chinis Imperial University in Beijing to prestigious First National Higher School (Daiichi Koto Gakko) in Tokyo, preparatory to entering Tokyo Imperial University. See Otsuka Yutaka, p. 55· 27. To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 282. The two graduates, ages eighteen and nineteen, emerge later as high officials in the puppet Manchukuo government of the 1930s. TSK, II, 630. Their arrival in Japan is mentioned above in chapter four, in the discussion of Tokyo Dobun Shain.· 28. Nakamura Takashi, pp. 12-13. Also, Uenuma Hachiro and Hirotani Takio, "Taiwan Sotokufu no Kanan kyoiku taisaku ni tsuite: Fukken ·Kanton ryo sho ni okeru sekimin kyoiku no seisui," in Abe Hiroshi, ed., Nit-Chii kyoiku bunka kifryil to masatsu, pp. 266-267; Hosono Koji, pp. 61-64; and To-A Dobunkai shi, pp. 274, 282, 283, 291. 29. Quoted in TSK, II, 779, undated. Emphasis added.


Notes to Pages 71-74

30. To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 354; and Li Kuo-ch'i, Zlwngguo xiandaihua de quyu yanJiu: Min-Zhe-Tai diqu, r86o-r9r6 (Taipei, 1982), p. 513. Apparently because of this program, Li Kuo-ch'i gives 1902 as the founding year of Fujian Normal School. He also says that it had 6o students that year. Going back to 1901, the report in To-A Diibunkai shi (p. 331) of 200 students enrolled at Dongwen Xuetang as of mid 1901 was apparently mistaken. 31. Nakamura Takashi, p. 13. 32. Translated with reference to two reports, one in ibid., pp. 13-14; and the other by Kuwata Toyozo dated 23 November 1903, in To-A Dobunkai shz~ p. 364. My numbers follow the lower figures in every case, but still exceed those of Li Kuoch'i, p. 513. 33· To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 364. 34· TSK, II, 632-634. To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 417, reports that Nakanishi was en route back to Fuzhou as To-A Dobunkai representative in 1906; but his worsening health must have prevented his assuming the post. 35· Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, p. 91. As if to highlight the perils of our profession, two of the three names on Wang's list, including that of Kuwata, contain errors in their Chinese characters! 36. For increasingly brief news notes on this school after its reorganization, see To-A Diibunkai shi, pp. 391, 398, 402, 412, 417. See also Nakamura Takashi, p. 14. 37· Ibid. 38. To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 364. See also p. 366, for To-A Dobunkai's favorable reaction to these developments. 39· Li Kuo-ch'i, p. 513. 40. This is true ofLi Kuo-ch'i's account, which bases itself upon Chen Qitian, Jindai Zlwngguo Jiaoyu shi (A History of Education in Modern China) (Taipei: Zhongguo Shuju, 1969). 41. Saneto Keishu, ChiigokuJin M!wn ryiigaku shi, p..89; and Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, pp. 249-250. 42. Ibid., pp. 232, 234-235. This Chengdu school was possibly a purely Chinese initiative. 43· See Nakamura Takashi, pp. 2-12. 44· Ibid., pp. 14-1s; and Uenuma Hachiro and Hirotani Takio, p. 265. 45· Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 163-164. Welch is referring in particular to the schools of Higashi HongaJ1ji, but in fact his comments apply even better to Japanese motives in general. Wang Xiangrong, Riben jiaoxi, pp. 237-238, expresses views identical to these. 46. The major studies are the lengthy and sympathetic 1970 article of Sat5 Saburo, "Nakajima Saishi no Pekin Dobun Gakusha ni tsuite," reprinted in Sat5 Saburo, Kindai Nit-Chii kOshif, pp. 278-337; and the briefer more incisive chapter, "Zhongdao Caizhi [Nakajima Saishi] he Dongwen Xueshe," of Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, pp. 225-257. 47· Quoted in Sat5 Saburo, "Nakajima Saishi," pp. 283, 331. 48. Ibid., pp. 281-282; and Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, p. 231.


Notes to Pages 74-77 49· Douglas Reynolds, "Before Imperialism," p.II4; Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," p. 281; and Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, p. 230. Hasegawa Yiitar5, the man sent by the japanese Foreign Ministry to Guangdong in early 1897, had also worked for Kishida, at his branch Rakuzendo stores in Hankou and Tianjin, from x888. TSSK, III, 82. 50. To-A DiJbunkai shi, pp. 267, 270, 272-274; and Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," p. 281. 51. To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 283. 52. Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," p. 283; and Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, pp. 232-233· 53· Ibid., pp. 234-235. 54· Ibid., p. 235. 55· Ibid., pp. 233-234. 56. Sat6 Saburo, "Nakajima Saishi," p. 313. 57· Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, p. 250. 58. Abe Hiroshi, "Shinmatsu Chokurei sho no kyoiku kaikaku to Watanabe Ryiisei," in Oyawi NihonJin kyoshii, pp. II-I2; Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," pp. 296-298, 309; and Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, p. 238. Later, Yuan distanced himselffrom Nakajima, refusing even to see him in 1905. Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," pp. 326-327. 59· See chart showing monthly fluctuations in Sat6 Saburo, "Nakajima Saishi," p. 313; and in Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, p. 239· 6o. Ibid., p. 246. 6x. Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," p. 313. Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, p. 239, inadvertently omits the information that only two students proceeded into the year 1906. 62. Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, p. 250. 63. Quoted in ibid., pp. 246-247. For my translation of weixin or ishin as "modern transformation," see above, pp. 13 and 2IIn27. 64. Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, p. 247· 65. Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," pp. 317, 325, 330. 66. Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, pp. 234-235. 67. See Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, pp. 240-245, for a good summary treatment of fundraising efforts and problems; also, p. 238. See also Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," pp. 289, 291, 295-301. 68. For examples, see Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," pp. 319-324. 69. See his teaching schedule in Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, p. 234; and in Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," pp. 286-287. 70. Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, pp. 236-237, 235· 71. Ibid., p. 237· Another 55 came just to study Chinese for unspecified time periods, making a total of III young Japanese. · 72. Ibid., p. 252; and Sat6 Saburo, "Nakajima Saishi," p. 310. 73· On these and other internal problems and outrages, see ibid., pp. 301-312; and Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, pp. 252-255.

Notes to Pages 77-81 74· Sat6 Saburo, "Nakajima Saishi," p. 310. 75· Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, p. 252. 76. Ibid., pp. 237, 226, and 255, in order of detail. 77· Quoted in ibid., p. 251. See also Sat6 Sabur5, "Nakajima Saishi," p. 2g4. 78. Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, p. 251. 7g. The replies are reproduced in To-A Dobunkai shi, pp. 348-350; see also p. 354· 8o. Sat6 Saburo, "Nakajima Saishi," p. 332. Tobun Gakusha kiyo (Memoirs of Dongwen Xueshe), Nakajima's informative account, was published in rgo8. Both Sat6 and Wang Xiangrong rely heavily on this source, which reconstructs the school's history, warts and all- further testimony to Nakajima Saishi's fun dam ental honesty and goodness. 8r. Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, pp. 12g-r3o, u5. 82. Ibid., p. 158. 83. This phrase is a chapter title in Sanet5 Keishii, ChiigokuJin Nihon ryiigaku shikO, pp. I3g-200. 84. Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxz~ p. gg; and Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku. These are supplemented by the authoritative ten-volume biographical dictionary, Dai Jinmei Jiten (Tokyo, rg55). 85. See Otsuka Yutaka, pp. 45-64; Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 155-r6o; and the entry for Hattori Unokichi in DaiJinmeiyi"ten. 86. Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, p. 6g (three entries). See also the entry for Okada Asatar5 in Dai Jinmei yi"ten. 87. Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, p. 76; and Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. I8I-183. 88. Kageyama Masahiro, "Koso kyoiku kaikaku to Fujita Toyohachi," in Oyatoi MlwnJin kyoshii, pp. 27-43; Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 172-174; and entry for Fujita Toyohachi in Dai Jinmei Jiten. 8g. Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyOiku, pp. 176-r8o. See also Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, pp. 68, 6g, gg; Otsuka Yutaka, p. 53; and the entry for Iwaya Magoz5 in Dai Jinmei Jiten. go. Futami Takeshi, "Kyoshi Hosei Gakud5 no Nihonjin kyoshu," in Oyatoi NihonJin kyoshii, pp. 80-82, also 75-76; and Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. I78, I7g. gr. Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, p. 6g. g2. Ibid., p. 7s; and Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. r6g-172. g3. Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, p. 73· g4. Ibid., p. 68. g5. Ibid., p. 6g; Futami Takeshi, "Kyoshi Hosei Gakudo to Matsumoto Kamejiro," in Abe Hiroshi, ed., Nit-Chii kyoiku bunka karyii to 11U!Satsu, pp. 85-87; and especially Yang Zhengguang and Hirano Hid eo, Songben Guizilang zhuan (Beijing, rg85). g6. Futami Takeshi, "Kyoshi Hosei Gakud5 no Nihonjin kyoshu," pp. 82-85; and Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, p. r8o. g7. Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, pp. 87-88. g8. Ibid., p. g3.

Notes to Pages 81-84 99· Ibid., pp. 68, 69; Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyifiku, pp. 17], 179; and Futami Takeshi, "Kyoshi Hosei Gakudo no Nihonjin kyoshii," p. 79· roo. See the various indexes and entries of Tan Ruqian, comp., with Sanet6 Keishii and Ogawa Hiroshi, Zhongguo yi Riben shu zhonghe mulu (Hong Kong, 1980). ror. Yoshino Sakuz6, "Shinkoku zaikin no Nihonjin kyoshi," Kokka Gakkai zasshi 23.5:769-794 (May 1909). 102. Ibid., pp. 773-774; summarized in Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," pp. 8-9. Feuerwerker's is an informative treatment of foreigners and foreign institutions in China, ca.r9I0-1920, which gives substantial attention to Japan. It contains no information, however, on Western counterparts to Japanese teachers and educational advisers in Chinese government service for the years 1900-19IO. Table r, "Estimated Number of Foreign 'Firms' and Residents in China [r9o3-192I]" (p. 17) demonstrates that Japanese firms and residents (inclusive of Manchuria) had overtaken all other foreign nationals by 1906. 103. See the series of tables in Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," pp. 9-n; and Hiroshi Abe, "Borrowing from Japan," pp. 69-70. 104. Rev. J. Harada, 'japanese Educational Influence in China," Chinese &corder 36.7:358 (1905). Wang Xiangrong (RibenJiaoxi, pp. 109, II2) cites the figure of "three to five times." The pay-scale difference for Japanese female teachers, whose numbers peaked at twenty-six in 1908, was on the low side of these figures. See Ogawa Yoshiko, "Shinmatsu no kindai gakud6 to Nihon joshi kyoshii: Kanton Joshi Shihan Gakudo o chiishin ni," in Oyatoi Nihonjin kyifshu, pp. 109, II2-II3. 105· Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, p.I09i also pp. IIO-II3 for more discussion and examples of salaries. Japanese scholars also agree with the figure of "five to ten times higher," as in Otsuka Yutaka, p. 48. ro6. For a photolithographic reprint of the original, see Taga Akigor6, Kindai Chiigoku kyifiku ski shiryif (Tokyo, 1972-1976), I, 217. Jiandu is translated as "director" in accordance with Brunnert and Hagelstrom, p. 273· ro7. See Hosono Koji, pp. 56-6o. ro8. Abe Hiroshi, "Shinmatsu Chokurei sho," pp. ro, 12, 24. 109. Ibid., pp. 9, n. no. Ibid., pp. 8, 14-15. It is possible that Yuan's ambitious education plans were drafted with the assistance of American missionary-educator, Charles D. Tenney (1857-1930 ). A missionary in China beginning in r882, Tenney has been identified as "President (r895-1906) of Peiyang University in Tientsin (formerly the Imperial Chinese University), and concurrently Superintendent of High and Middle Schools in Chihli (1902-6). From 1906 to 1908 he served as Director of Chinese students in the U.S.A. and joined the U.S. Diplomatic Service in 1909, serving until 1920 in various capacities, including those of Secretary and Counsellor of the Legation, in Peking." See Lo Hui-min, ed., The Correspondence qf G. E. Morrison, 1: r8g5-1912 (Cambridge, 1976), p. 245m; see also Feuerwerker, pp. 28-29. m. Abe Hiroshi, "Shinmatsu Chokurei sh6," p. ro, quoting the 25 April 1902 issue of Kyifiku Jiron. II2. Quoted in ibid.

Notes to Pages 84-90 II3· Ibid., pp. 12, 15. For the names, positions, monthly salaries, lengths of stay, and affiliations in Japan of these twelve, see the chart in ibid., p. II. II4. Ibid., p. 12. II5. In 1903, Japanese Foreign Ministry records report 82 Japanese advisers (kmnon) in the single province of Zhili, out of a reported total of 151 for China as a whole. See Nanri Tomoki, comp., Table 5, p. 16. As of July 1909, records of the same ministry show II4 teachers (kyoshil) in Zhili, out of a total number of 405 for China as a whole. This data is reproduced in Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyiJiku, p. 154. II6. See statistical chart in Abe Hiroshi, "Shinmatsu Chokurei sho," p. 14. II7. For these bylaws, see ibid., p. 15. II8. On Sekimoto, see ibid., pp. II, 20-22, 25. II9. MacKinnon,. p. 150. 120. Abe Hiroshi, "Shinmatsu Chokurei sho," p. 12. 121. As abbreviated by Abe Hiroshi in ibid., p. 10, with minor modifications by me. 122. Ibid., p. 20, quoting from the published writings of Sekimoto. Abe Hiroshi (ibid., p. 24n3o) reports that all five contracts are reproduced in Sekirrwto KiJtariJ bunsho (The Papers of Sekimoto Kotara). For a 1907 contract from the Zhonglu Normal School in Hengzhou, Hunan province (Wang Xiangrong calls this the Nanlu Normal School, in Ribenjiaoxi, p. 168), showing the same accountability to the school director and preceptor with no right to interfere in other than teaching matters, see Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," p. 42n33. Kageyama omits to indicate his source, unfortunately. As with director, the term preceptor is translated with reference to Brunnert and Hagelstrom, p. 274· 123. Otsuka Yutaka, p. 6o, quoting from the Japanese translation of Jonathan Spence, To Change China: T#stem Advisers in China r6zo-rg6o (1969; New York~ 1980), p. 292· 124. This term is from Wang Xiangrong, Riben jiaoxi, p. 106. 125. Quoted in Abe Hiroshi, "Shinmatsu Chokurei sh5," p. 21. Partially translated in Wang Xiangrong, Ribenjiaoxi, p. 107. 126. See the schedule of weekly courses and hours in Futami Takeshi, "Kyoshi Hosei Gakud5 no Nihonjin kyoshU," p. 76. 127. See course schedules and comments in ibid., pp. 78-79. 128. Photolithographic reprint in Taga Akigor5, I, 6os, 66o. 129. Quoted in Wang Xiangrong, Riben jiaoxi, p. 106. 130. Abe Hiroshi, "Shinmatsu Chokurei sh5," p. 18. Compare the charts ofJ apanese staff members in 1902 with 1904, on pp. II and 18, respectively. 131. Hirotani Takio, "Pekin Keimu Gakud5 to Kawashima Naniwa," in Oyatoi Nihon;i·n kyiJshil, p. 101. Wang Xiangrong, Ribenjiaoxi, pp. II8-II9, also makes mention of this. 132. For the full list, see Futami Takeshi, "Kyoshi Hosei Gakud5 no Nihonjin kyoshu," 79·

Notes to Pages 90-94 133· Quoted in Marianne Bastid, EducatiOTUll Reform in Early Twentieth-Century G'hina (Ann Arbor, 1988), p. 139· 134· TSK, II, 273· The date of this conversation was 9 April 1899. Liu's expressed concern for more than just his region reflects the "national vision" that led Daniel Bays to label Liu, Zhang Zhidong, and other late-~ng reformist officials as "national bureaucrats" exhibiting "bureaucratic nationalism," in China Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. 3, 24, 182, 218. 135· Ibid., pp. 276-277- For the full names of the Japanese teachers and the report of student interest in Japanese, see Su Yun-feng, Zhang Zhidong, pp. 99-103. 136. For the text of this meeting, see To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 199. 137· For reports of these meetings, see ibid., pp. 204-206. 138. On the founding of this school and its early years, see Douglas R. Reynolds, "Training Young China Hands," pp. 227-233. 139. See under the entry, "Liu K'un-i," in Arthur W. Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese qf the Ch'ing Period (r644-1912) (194$ Taibei, 1967), pp. 523-524. 140. This joint proposal is discussed in greater detail in the introduction to part three, below. 141. Nezu Hajime, "Shinkoku kyoiku dan" (Comments on Chinese Education), Kyoiku jiron, 595 (25 October 1901), cited in Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," p. 24. 142. This plan, "Ryo-Ko gakusei hoan shigi," is summarized in Kageyama Masahiro, "Shimatsu ni okeru," p. 24. 143. Ibid., p. 42n23. Jiaoyu shijie is discussed more fully in chapter seven below. 144· Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," p. 24. 145. Report of the Secretary General to the fall membership meeting of To-A Dobunkai, 20 December 1902, in To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 354· 146. Ibid. 147. William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 229. 148. For the text of Zhang's cable, see Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," p. 25. 149. From material quoted in ibid., pp. 24-25. 150. Ibid., p. 25. See also Konoe Atsumaro, Konoe Atsumaro nikki, V, 303, 305. 151. Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. n6-125. Without Zhang Zhidong and his records, the story ofSan:Jiang's early operations is almost wholly dependent upon Japanese materials. 152. The translation Second National Higher School-and First National Higher School (Daiichi Kot5 Gakko)- follows Benjamin C. Duke, comp. and ed., Ten Great Educators qf Modern japan: A Japanese Perspective (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1989). 153. To-A Dobun Shoin Daigaku shi, p. 261; and Konoe Atsumaro, Konoe Atsumaro nikki, IV, So, 185. 154· Ibid., V, 8. The date of this agreement was 7 January 1902. 155. To-A Dobun Shoin Daigaku shi, pp. 251-252; also, pp. 74, 98-99.


Notes to Pages 94-100 156. Kikuchi's letter, dated 5 March 1903, is reprinted in Konoe Atsumaro, Konoe nikki, V, 301. 157. These areas of responsibility are enumerated in Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," p. 27. See also Wang Xiangrong, jibenJiaoxi, pp. 166-167. 158. "Nankin San-Ko Shihan Gakudo kyoshU shokun o okuru" (Sending Our Friends Off to the Nanjing San:Jiang Normal School)," ~oikuJiron, no. 627 (15 May 1903), quoted in Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," p. 26. 159· Report of the secretary general to the spring membership meeting of ToA Dobunkai, 8 May 1903, in To-A Dobunklli shi, pp. 360-361. 160. Report of the secretary general to the fall membership meeting of To-A Dobunkai, 13 December 1903, in ibid., p. 366. 161. Something may be amiss with this figure from Nezu Hajime. Abe Hiroshi reports San:Jiang undertaking the "retraining" of only thirty-five students in its first class of June 1903, in Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 212. 162. Report of the secretary general to the spring membership meeting of ToA Dobunkai, 30 July 1904, in To-A Dobunklli shi, p. 366. 163. As quoted in Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi, pp. 135-137· Several of the Chinese characters in Wang's version are erroneous and have been corrected against the authoritative renderings in Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," p. 26. Note that wherever Zhang uses Liang:Jiang I have substituted San:Jiang, since the school's name did not change to Liang:Jiang until 1907. 164. Wang Xiangrong, RibenJiaoxi,p. 137. Emphasis added. 165. The entire scheme of training at San:Jiang is called "Chang's plan" in Ayers, p. 229. On the same page, Ayers calls the founding of San :Jiang "Chang's most important contribution to education during his second tour of duty in Liangkiang." 166. For their names, monthly salaries, teachings assignments, past affiliations in Japan, and contract periods, see the chart in Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," p. 26. 167. For the names of the twenty chosen by exam, see ibid., p. 44n42. 168. Ayers, p. 229. 169. See Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," pp. 27-28. 170. See the curriculum table for the one-year accelerated or abridged course in ibid., p. 29. My translation of terms here generally follows Brunnert and Hagelstram, pp. 246-251. 171. For the first-year curriculum charts of the two- and three-year programs, see Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," pp. 30-31. 172. See ibid., pp. 34, 36; also p. 46n64. I73· Ibid., p. 25. See also To-A Dobunklli shi, p. 360. I74· Japan, Gaimusho, Gaiko Shiryokan, quoted in Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," pp. 32-33, 45n51. See alsop. 25, on the college friendship between Kikuchi and Suga. I75· Ibid., p. 32. 176. Cited in ibid., p. 45n52.


Notes to Pages 100-108 177· Ibid., p. 33; To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 412; and Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 214. For more on thejiangsu Education Association, with its internal organization "based on that of education societies in Japan" (p. 127), and on Zhang Jian's role as chairman, see Bastid, pp. 123-128. 178. Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," pp. 33-34; and Abe Hiroshi, Chugoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 215. 179. Report of the secretary general in To-A Dobunkai shi, p. 412; and Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," p. 34· r8o. Ibid., p. 35· This same page contains a table of the names, teaching assignments, contract terms, salaries, and institutional affiliations of these five. r8r. Ibid., pp. 35-37. Liang:Jiang refers to the two provinces of Jiangsu and Jiangsi, since Anhui province had established its own separate Normal School. For Liang:Jiang's educational offerings and enrollments as of late 1907, see Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 216. 182. Based on the accounts, including quoted materials, in ibid., p. 217; and Kageyama Masahiro, "Shinmatsu ni okeru," pp. 38, 47n73. 183. For details, see Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 216-219; also, for Funatsu, see the entry in Japan, Gaimush6, Nihon gaikOshi ;"iten, pp. 832-833. 184. Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 217-218. 185. For their names, teaching assignments, training, salaries, and contract periods, see .ibid., p. 39· r86. Li Xisuo, pp. 144-145· 187. This list is based chiefly upon Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, p. r68. Strangely, Wang's list omits mention of normal schools at Baoding, Nanjing, and Suzhou, discussed elsewhere in his book. I suspect therefore that his list overlooks other schools as well. Wang mentions one or two names of japanese educators at each institution, which I omit here. r88. On Sichuan University in Chengdu, see Howard L. Boorman, ed., Biographical Dictionary if &publican China (New York: 1970) III, 465. r89. See Uenuma Hachiro, "Uchibori Korefumi to Santo Shihan Gakud6," in Oyatoi NihonJin kyoshil, pp. 65-73190. See Ogawa Yoshiko, pp. 105-I14. 191. Wang Xiangrong, Riben Jiaoxi, pp. 98-99. 192. The reader is again referred to the extremely useful essay and bibliographic guide, "Foreign Influences on Education in Meijijapan," in Beauchamp and Rubinger, pp. 57-77193. An unofficial survey as of November 1909 by Nakajima Hanjir6, a Waseda University professor at Beiyang Normal School from 1906 to 1909, reported that of 356 foreign teachers at Chinese government schools, over 85 percent, or 31l, were Japanese. Cited in Sanet6 Keishii, Chiigokr.g'in Nihon ryiigaku shi, p. 96. Also see Kanzaki Kiyoshi, "Hoku-Shi ni okeru," p. 51. 194· Quoted in Randall E. Stross, The Stubborn Earth: American Agriculturalists on Chinese Soil, IBgB-1937• (Berkeley, Calif., 1986), p. 47· See also Su Yun-feng, Zhongguo xiandaihua, pp. 419-425.

Notes to Pages Io8-u3 I95· Stross, 43, 47-49. The term "confrontational" appears on p. 49· I96. Su Yun-feng, Zhongguo xiandaihua, p. 420. I97· Zhang Li and LiuJiantang, ZhongguoJiaoan shi (Chengdu, I987), pp. 20-22, 275-648 passim. The disruptive effects of "imperial Christianity" upon Chinese state and society constitutes a central theme of Joseph Esherick, The Origins qfthe Boxer Uprising. I98. The original document is reproduced in Taga Akigoro, I, 6I3. I99· For the original, see ibid., p. 217. 200. Letter from Hart to J. D. Campbell, dated 8 March I902, in Fairbank, Bruner, and Matheson, eds., II, I305. 20I. At both the Tongwen Guan and Imperial University, Martin rendered the title of zong Jiaoxi in English as "president," a distortion if not outright deception. ZhangJinglu, comp., ZhongguoJindai chuban shiliao (Shanghai, I953-I954), II [I896I9I8], 428, erroneously gives the year of Martin's dismissal as I90I. From I902, the Imperial University came under predominantly Japanese influence through Hattori Unokichi and others (see Otsuka Yutaka). 202. Quoted in Cameron, p. 69; and in Yung Ying-yue, pp. 5I, 70n39. 203. See Wang Xiangr"ong, Riben Jiaoxi, pp. 3, I24, I25, I26, I29, I38, 245-257 passim. SIX. TRANSLATIONS AND MODERN TERMINOLOGY

I. Zhu Yuxian, pp. I8, I-2I3 passim. See also Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. I47-I49, and Chinese Students, pp. II9-I2I. As seen, the Guangdong branch Tongwen Guan, founded in I864, also began to offer Japanese-language instruction in I897· 2. Reprinted in ZhangJinglu, comp., ZhongguoJindai chuban shiliao, I, 5o; quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, p. I52, and Chinese Students, p. I24· 3· Tan Ruqian, comp., Zhongguo yi Riben shu, p. 348 (no. 550.2I8). 4· Ibid., pp. 250 (no. 480.002) and 280 (no. 520.062), respectively; Tan Ruqian, "Zhong-Ri zhi jian yishu shiye," p. 6on49; and Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 24. 5· Quoted in Shimada Kenji, "Zhang Binglin: Traditional Chinese Scholar and Revolutionary," in Shimada Kenji, Pioneer qf the Chinese Revolution: Zhang Binglin and Confucianism, Joshua A. Fogel, tr. (Stanford, I99o), p. 49· 6. Quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. 152-I53, and Chinese Students, p. I25. Note that Liang's terminology here, with the sole exception of the word for constitution, is strictly Chinese. 7· Quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, p. I53, and Chinese Students, p. I26. 8. Quoted in Li Jiequan, "Liu-Ri. xuesheng yu Zhong-Ri keji wenhua jiaoliu," in Zhongguo Zhong-Ri Guanxi Shi Yanjiu Hui, comp., Riben de Zhongguo yimin, p. 283n8. A memorial from Yang to promote translation work is alluded to in a Grand Council document of I June I898, in QGC, 5I:34b (p. 987). 9· Boorman, ed., II, 348.


Notes to Pages II4-II5 10. For a note on the origins, range of meanings, and scholarship related to 'UV, see Ryusaku Tsunoda and L. Carrington Goodrich,japan in the ChiTI£Se Dynastic Histories: Later Han Through Ming Dynasties (South Pasadena, Calif., 1951), p. 4n2; also Morohashi Tetsuji, V, IIO. For the sources and meanings of the term Dongying, see ibid., VI, 173. For use of the poetic Fusang for Japan, see ibid., V, IIO. And for the exclusive Chinese use of Dongyang to mean Japan (as opposed to meaning "the Orient"), see the brief entry in ibid., VI, 197. II. Quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. 154-155, and ChiTI£Se Students, pp. 127-128. In 1902, Liang further enumerated specific advantages to studying Japanese over Western languages, quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. 155-156, and ChiTI£Se Students, pp. 128-129· See also Mabel Lee, "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1929) and the Literary Revolution of Late-Ch'ing," in A. R. Davis, ed., Search for Identity: Modern Literature and the Creative Arts in Asia (Sydney, 1974), p. 208. 12. Quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. 109, 212, and ChiTI£Se Students, pp. 91, 159· 13. Tan Ruqian, "Zhong-Ri zhi jian yishu shiye," p.56, and Table 2, p. 41. 14 . Ibid., PP· 41, 56. 15. For a study that documents this statement, see Carol T. Reynolds, "East Meets East." 16. Tsuen-hsuin Tsien, ''Western Impact on China Through Translation," Far Eastern Quarterly 13.3:315 (May 1954), reproduced in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liuRi, pp. 183-184, and ChiTI£Se Students, p. 141. 17. Tsien, p. 319, identifying works translated not only by language of origin but by field (history and geography, social sciences, natural sciences, etc.). Tsien's illuminating table is reproduced in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. 184-185, and ChiTI£Se Students, p. 143· For a useful note on sources for Tsien's and other such counts, see Tan Ruqian, 'jin sanbainian Zhong-Ri yishu shiye yu wenhuajiaoliu," in Tam, ed., p. 226n40. 18. This annual average has since been surpassed every year up to 1978, with the exception of the war years, 1938-1945: 1912-1937, 70.36 titles per year; 1938-1945, 20.00 titles per year; and 1946-1978, go.5o titles per year. See Tarn's original table in ibid., p. 41, and Tarn's comment on p. 61. This table, with a different layout, is repeated in Tan Ruqian, 'jin sanbainian Zhong-Ri yishu shiye," p. 218, with Tam's comment on p. 226. The 1982 article by Chen Yingnian, 'jindai Riben sixiangjia zhuzuo zai Qingmo Zhongguo dejieshao he chuanbo," in Beijing Shi Zhong-Ri WenhuaJiaoliu Shi Yanjiu Hui, comp., Zhong-Ri wenhuajiaoliu shi lunwen ji (Beijing, 1982), pp. 268-26g, states that Tam's 958 figure actually exceeds 1,ooo, after incorporating titles overlooked. 19. Tan Ruqian, "Zhong-Ri zhi jian yishu shiye," p. 63. 20. Kageyama Masahiro, "Koso kyoiku kaikaku to Fujita Toyohachi," p. 43, states that Luo embarked on these efforts with the backing of Zhang Zhidong. Daniel Bays, however, states that it was Luds magazine that drew Zhang's attention to Luo in the first place, in China Enters the Twentieth Century, p. 46.

Notes to Pages n6-n7 21. Kageyama Masahiro, "Koso kyoiku kaikaku to Fujita Toyohachi," p. 39n4; also, Boorman, ed., II, 426. . 22. Tan Ruqian, "Zhong-Ri zhijian yishu shiye," pp. 56, 2oo (no. 430.140). 23. See Kageyama Masahiro, "Koso kyoiku kaikaku to Fujita Toyohachi," pp. 39-4°· 24. Su Yun-feng, Zlwngguo xiandaihua, pp. 421-422. 25. See Joey Bonner, l#!ng Kuo-wei: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge, Mass., 1986). For a listing of Wang's translations from Japanese into Chinese, see Tan Ruqian, comp., Zlwngguo yi Riben shu, p. 838. 26. For listings of the published translations by Fan Bingqing, Shen Hong, and Sa Duan, see ibid., pp. 889, 846, and 896, respectively. 27. Su Yun-feng, Zhang Zhidong, pp. 131-133; and Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, p. 46. 28. The major societies and their publications are ably surveyed in Huang Fuch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. 161-187, and Chinese Students, pp. 131-145, 261-266. 29. See the listing of journals, 1898-19n, by year of founding, in Huang Fuch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. 188-195, and Chinese Students, pp. 271-275. 30. According to 'jiaokeshu zhi fakan gaikuang, 1868-1918" (1934), p. 228, as of 1903 Japanese lower and middle grades used textbooks whereas "higher specialized schools and universities have no textbooks, relying strictly upon class lectures (jiaoxi lroushou) and student notes (xuesheng bi,jz)." If such was truly the case, it helps to explain the publication of class lectures and notes (Ch. JZangyi lu < J. kifgiroku) by enterprising students, institutions, and even faculty members. At the Imperial University, for example, Hattori Unokichi gathered together his own lectures and readings for publication for his psychology courses. See Otsuka Yutaka, p. 58. Students atJiangsu Normal School in Suzhou compiled the lecture notes of their Japanese teachers into sixteen volumes, which they had printed in Japan. See 'jiaokeshu zhi fakan gaikuang," p. 236. For middle level students, Kobun Gakuin in Tokyo published its own series ofJiangyi lu in twenty-one volumes, identified by title in Kageyama Masahiro, "Kobun Gakuin ni okeru Chugokujin ryugakusei kyoiku: Shin makki ryu-Nichi kyoiku no ittan," Nihon no kyoiku shigaku 23:74 (1980 ). The stated purpose of this series is quoted in Kageyama Masahiro, "Kobun Gakuin ni okeru Shinmatsu Chugokujin ryugakusei no kyoiku ni tsuite," pp. 141, 143· 3!. Wang Xiangrong, Ribenjiaoxi, pp. 156, 157· 32. Sanet6 Keishu, "Gendai Chugoku bunka no Nipponka," in Saneto Keishu, Nilwn bunka no Shina e no eikyo (Tokyo, 1940), p. 6. 33· Tan Ruqian, "Zhong-Ri zhijian yishu shiye," p. 62. In 1919, the scholar Fu Sinian (1896-1950) stated categorically, "With respect to translated works, the very best are several scientific books brought over from Japan." Quoted in LiJiequan, p. 263. 34· Saneto Keishu, Chiigokujin M"lwn ryugaku shi, pp. 264-266; Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngmo liu-Ri, pp. 170-171, and Chinese Students, pp. 137-138, 264.


Notes to Pages II7-124

35· Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngrrw liu-Ri, 172-!73, and Chinese Students, pp. 138-139 and 264-265. 36. For the names of all 100 works and their Japanese authors, see Sanet5 Keishu, Chilgoku:fin Nihon ryilgaku shi, pp. 268-272. A summary of the number of works by category appears in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngrrw liu-Ri, p. 172, and Chinese Students, p. 138. 37· Zhong Shaohua, "Qingmo baike quanshu chutan," Xianggang Zhongwen Daxue Zhongguo TMinhua Janjiu Suo xuebao, !8:139-159 (1987). I am grateful to the author for a copy of this fine piece of detective work and scholarship, given to me during the October 1988 International Symposium on the History of SinoJapanese Relations at Beijing. 38. See Li Jiequan, p. 265. 39· Zhong Shaohua, pp. 139-140 inspired this series of thoughts. 40. This 1934 survey, 'jiaokeshu zhi fakan gaikuang," is the one item that scholars refer to over and over again; seemingly, there is no other. See, for example, Sanet5 Keishu, Chiigokujin Nihon ryilgaku shi, pp. 273-275; Tan Ruqian, "ZhongRi zhi jian yishu shiye," p. 6m51; and Lin Ming-te, pp. 2I0-2II. 41. See Tan Ruqian, comp., Zhongguo yi Riben shu, pp. 86o-861, also 62. 42. Tam addresses the issue of textbook omissions in ibid., p. 6m51. 43· 'jiaokeshu zhi fakan gaikuan," p. 220. 44· Ibid., p. 24$ Boorman, ed., II, 14. 45· These periods are identified in Sanet5 Keishu's brief essay, "Shoki no Shomu Inshokan," in Sanet5 Keishu, Nihon bunka no Shina e no eikyO, p. 241. I have not seen the original official history. 46. Ibid., pp. 242-245. 47· See the guidelines as reprinted in Zhang Jinglu, comp., I, 207-210. 48. Sanet5 Keishu, "Shoki no Shomu Inshokan," pp. 246-247. This statement applies similarly to the chronological history of Commercial Press reprinted in Zhang Jinglu, comp., Zhongguo chuban shiliao bubian (Beijing, 1957), pp. 557-564. 49· Sanet5 Keishu, "Shoki no Shomu Inshokan," p. 248. Yue-him Tam mentions the names of several other joint publishing ventures in China, in Tan Ruqian, "Zhong-Ri zhi jian yishu shiye," p. 6o. 50. See Zhong Shaohua, p. 155. 51. For a pertinent comment and example of Liang's translation style, see Sanet5 Keishu, "Gendai Chugoku bunka no Nipponka," pp. 20-21. 52. Chen Yingnian, 'jindai Riben sixiangjia zhuzuo," p. 269. 53· Ibid., p. 281. These nine names and their translated works are surveyed on pp. 269-281. 54· Marius B. Jansen, "Foreword," in Tan Ruqian, Zhongguo yi Riben shu, p. 27. Yue-him Tam himself makes essentially this same point in Tan Ruqian, "ZhongRi zhi jian yishu shiye," p. 37· 55· Quoted in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngrrw liu-Ri, p. 182, and Chinese Students, p. 144. Translated with reference to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing

Notes to Pages 124-126

Period, trans. with introduction and notes by Immanuel C. Y. Hsu (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. "4· 56. Nipponka, 'japanization," is used in multiple senses relating to language and thought, in Sanet5 KeishU, "Gendai ChUgoku bunka no Nipponka," pp. 20-34· 57· Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of "Wealth and Power: :Min Fu and the West (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. g!)-g6. 58. Quoted in Li Jiequan, p. 268. In a careful search of terms from a Republican-period government dictionary of standardized scientific terms, Li counted 2,677 items for which the Chinese form was identical to the Japanese, in ibid., p. 285n4o. For specific scientific terms borrowed in the physical and biological sciences, see the lists in Gao Mingkai and Liu Zhengtan, Xiandai Hanyu wailaici yanJiu (Beijing, 1958), pp. 129-132. 59· Shimada Masao, p. 234· The twenty-two volume series, Faxue huibian Uingshi Falu Xuetang jiangyi) (Comprehensive Legal Studies: Lectures by Japanese Legal Scholars at the Beijing School of Law) (Beijing, 19n) highlights one method by which modern Chinese legal concepts and vocabulary were secured with Japanese assistance- in this case involving four names examined at some length in part three, below: Okada Asatar5 (five volumes), Matsuoka Yoshimasa (four volumes), Shida K5tar5 (four volumes), and Ogawa Shigejir5 (one volume). Shimada Masao lists the name of each volume and its author in ibid., pp. 232-234. For other references to legal vocabulary, see Sanet5 KeishU, "Gendai Chugoku bunka no Nipponka," p. 6; and Gao Mingkai and Liu Zhengtan, p. 139. 6o. Li Yu-ning, The Introduction of Socialism into China (New York, 1971), p. 6g. For corroborative evidence, see the lists for politics, philosophy, economics, and society in Gao Mingkai and Liu Zhengtan, pp. n4-124 passim. 61. See the list of philosophical terms in Tan Ruqian, "Xiandai Hanyu de Riyu wailaiciji qi souji he bianren wenti," in Tan Ruqian,Jindai Zhong-Ri wenhua guanxi ymyiu, pp. 333-335. See also Gao Mingkai and Liu Zhengtan, pp. ng-120. 62. The debate, with appropriate citations, is ably summarized in Tan Ruqian, "Xiandai Hanyu de Riyu wailaici," pp. 327-330. 63. Yue-him Tam, like others, demonstrates that the Gao Mingkai and Liu Zhengtan study is neither complete nor error-free. But it is brilliantly conceived, and in my mind establishes the essential categories for future research. Tam himself suggests new methods and directions for future research, among which is joint research projects of Chinese and Japanese linguists, in Tan Ruqian, "Xiandai Hanyu de Riyu 'wailaici," pp. 331-345. 64. Sanet5 Keishu, "Gendai Chugoku bunka no Nipponka," p. 28. This thought-provoking passage is quoted in Sanet5 KeishU, Chiigokujin Nihon ryiigaku shi, p. 39$ and in Tan Ruqian, "Xiandai Hanyu de Riyu wailaici," p. 328. 65. Guo Moruo as quoted in Cao Guimin, "Zhongguo liu-Ri xuesheng yu 'wusi' qian de xin wenhua yundong," Zhong-Ri guanxi shi yanJiu 2:38 (1983). 66. On Chinese emulation ofJapanese literature, see C. T. Hsia, ''Yen Fu and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao as Advocates of New Fiction," in Chinese Approac/>.es to Literature

Notes to Pages I28-I32

from Corifucius to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Adele Rickett, ed. (Princeton, I978); and Chen Yingnian, "Liang Qichao yu Riben zhengzhi xiaoshuo." On the emulation of modern Japanese arts, see Ralph Croizier, Art and Revolution in Modem China: The Lingnan (Cantonese) School if Painting, 1906-1951 (Berkeley, I988); and Xu Xingping, Hongyi dashi (Beijing, I988). On borrowing aspects of modern Japanese thought, see Chen Yingnian, 'jindai Riben sixiangjia zhuzuo." The term "new culture movement" appears in the title of Cao Guimin, "Zhongguo liu-Ri xuesheng yu 'wusi' qian de xin wenhua yundong." And "literary revolution'' appears in the title of Mabel Lee, "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Literary Revolution ofLate-Ch'ing." PART THREE. THE XINZHENG INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: NEW LEADERS, NEW DIRECTIONS

I. Franke, p. 48. 2. As quoted in Guangxu chao Donghua lu, IV, I35, I36; translated in the Appendix. 3· On these matters and connections, the reader is again referred to Kwong, A Mosaic if the Hundred Days. 4· See Shi Yuanqin, Cao Guimin, and Li Lingyu, Zhongguo Ji'ndai zhengzhi tizhi de yanbian (Beijing, I990 ), pp. 77, 293; Kung-chuan Hsiao, A Modem China and a New WOrld: Kang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858-1927 (Seattle, I975), p. 275; and Franke, pp. 57-58. 5· Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, pp. I97-205, contains excerpted translations of all three memorials; Franke, pp. 48-52, contains a more detailed discussion of the July I2 memorial. 6. For reference to the imperial edict, see Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. no-m; for the term "blueprint," see Shi Yuanqin, Cao Guimin, and Li Lingyu, P· 77· 7· Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, Research Guide for China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923 (Cambridge, Mass., I954), p. 22n4. SEVEN. CHINESE EDUCATIONAL REFORMS: THE JAPANESE MODEL

I. For examples of criticisms dating back to I043, as well as post-I895 proposals, see Franke, pp. I6-43. 2. QGC, 52:1-Iob (pp. 99I-995), passim; and Franke, pp. 45-46. 3· Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping, pp. 3-4. 4· As early as July I897, Liang Qjchao had employed the Japanese term for "school" Q. galcko > Ch. xuexiao) in Liang Qichao, "Xuexiao yu lun" (All about Schools), in Shiwu baa, no. 36 (30 July I897), cited in Min Tu-ki, National Polity p.nd Local Power, p. 284. Until I9I2, however, when the term xuexiao was officially adopted, the preferred Chinese term for "modern sch~ol" was xuetang. 5· The term rencai appears twice in the Reform Edict. 6. Guangxu chao Donghua lu, IV, I36; see also translation in the Appendix. 7· Similarly, up to I905, the number of official decrees and regulations related

Notes to Pages 132-137 to educational reform outpaced all others. These have long been available in published form. The best collections, in order of appearance, are Shu Xincheng, comp.,jirukli Zlwngguojuwyu shiliao [rBgB-IgzB), 4 vols. (Shanghai, 1928); Shu Xincheng, Zlwngguo jirukli jiaoyu shi ziliao [rBsz-Igzzj, 3 vols. (Beijing, 1962); and Taga Akigoro, Kirukli Chiigoku kyoiku shi shiryif [rgoz-Ig6oj, 5 vols. (Tokyo, 1972-1976). 8. Kanojigoro, "Rekkyo no kyoso' (Competition Among the Powers), Kokushi (The Patriot), quoted in Nakamura Tadashi, "Kano Jigoro to Yo Do," p. 5· g. "Shinkoku kyoiku mondai," quoted in Hosono Koji, p.56. Identical ideas were elaborated three months later by Nezu Hajime in "Shinkoku kyoiku dan'' (A Discussion of Chinese Education), Kyoiku jiron 595:5-7 (25 October 1901). 10. Franke, p. so; also 52· II. Adapted from the translations in ibid., p. 52; and in Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, p. 198. 12. Franke, p. 52; see also Yung Ying-yue, pp. 49-50. 13. Yung Ying-yue, pp. 50-51, 58-59, 6s; and Taga Akigoro, I, 37-39. The regulations themselves appear in photolithographic reprint form in ibid., pp. 128-184. 14. As translated in Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, p. 201, with slight modifications. 15. Franke, p. 54· For a discussion of the efforts that followed, see pp. 54-59. 16. "New generation" appears in Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century on pp. 129, 182; "national bureaucrat'' on pp. 2, 182, 216, 218; and "newly activist central government" on p. 218. 17. Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kirukli kyoiku, pp. 41, 62. 18. Ibid., p. 6; and Su Yun-feng, Zhang Zhidong yu Hubei jiaoyu gaige, p. 174. 19. Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping, pp. 6, II. 20. Individually listed in Tan Ruqian, Zlwngguo yi Riben shu, pp. 290 (no. 520.151), 287 (no. 520.127) and 291 (no. 520.161), respectively. The first of these came out in a string-bound edition, the latter two in book form published by the active Guangzhi publishing company of Shanghai. 21. Luds observations are discussed generally in Wang Xiaoqiu, '"Ta shan zhi shi, ke yi gong yu': Jindai Riben youji yanjiu zhaji," in Wang Xiaoqiu, jirukli Zlwng-Ri qishi lu, pp. 231-233. 22. For a representative list of those publishing their views, including Zhang Zhidong, Yuan Shikai, Cen Chunxuan, Tao Mo, and Xiajiefu, and the titles of their pieces, see Kageyama Masahiro, "Koso kyoiku kaikaku to Fujita Toyohachi," p. 28. 23. Ibid., pp. 27-28. 24. On the close working relationship between Luo Zhenyu and Fujita Toyohachi, and their collaboration on jiaoyu Shy"ie, see Kageyama Masahiro, "Koso kyoiku kaikaku to Fujita Toyohachi." 25. Significantly, these translations were used themselves as textbook materials for students at Jiangsu Upper and Lower Normal School in Suzhou during the tenure of Fujita Toyohachi. Abe Hiroshi, Chiigoku no kirukli kyoiku, pp. 173-174.


Notes to Pages 137-142 26. Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping, p. 6; and Kageyama Masahiro, "Koso kyoiku kaikaku to Fujita Toyohachi," pp. 27-32. 27. Kageyama Masahiro, "Koso kyoiku kaikaku to Fujita Toyohachi," pp. 28-2g. 28. For the names of many of these works, see ibid., p. 29. 29. Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping, p. 6. 30. Ibid., p. 12. 31. These points are drawn from ibid., pp. 12-13. For a copy of the complete Elementary School Regulations, see Taga Akigoro, I, 166-177. 32. Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping, p. 11. 33· See Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 43· The schools visited, classified by category, and the mosft important personages interviewed, by name and date, are given in Yung Ying-yue, pp. 53-55. 34 . Ibid., PP· 56-58. 35· Compare Wu's chart and the chart contained in the 1904 School Regulations, as reproduced in Yung Ying-yue, pp. 66-67. 36. Ten or twelve names and some of their accounts are given in Tian Zhengping and Huo Yiping, p. g. 37· Letter reproduced in Lo Hui-min, ed., p. 255· 38. Quoted in Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, pp. 33-35. 39· Franke, p. 65. 40. Hiroshi Abe, "Borrowing from Japan," p. 62. 41. Abe Hiroshi, Chilgoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 35· 42. Chief credit for the powerful grip of this view upon Western scholars belongs to Joseph Levenson, whose prose overwhelms the reader into thinking that the ti-yong formula is no more than a "fallacy" (p. 6o) and a "vulgarization'' (p. 65). See his chapter 4, "T'i and Yung-'Substance' and 'Function,"' of Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The Problem if Intellectual Continuity (Berkeley, 1958), pp. 49-78. 43· Marius Jansen, paraphrasing the words of Got6 Shinpei (1857-1929) during his official inspection tour ofFujian province in April 1900, in The japanese and Sun Tht-sen, p. 100. 44· Japanese did not speak of ti-yong, but had at least two equivalent expressions: Wakon Yiisai or 'japanese spirit, Western skills," and Tiiyo dotoku Seiyo gijutsu or "Eastern morality, Western technology." Cited in Teruhisa Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern japan: State Authority and Intellectual Freedom, Steven Platzer, ed. and tr. (Tokyo, 1988), p. 28. For a perceptive discussion of Tiiyo dotoku Seiyo [gy'utsu] (erroneously spelled geijutsu), see Min Tu-ki, "Chinese 'Principle' and Western 'Utility,"' pp. 58-64. 45· Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, p. 135. 46. Quoted in ibid., p. 134. 47· As examples of borrowings independent of Christianity, see Donald Keene, The japanese Discovery if Europe, IJ20-I8Jo, rev. ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1g6g); and John Z. Bowers, When The Twain Meet: The Rise if Western


Notes to Pages 142-147

Medicine in Japan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1g8o). On Japan's official policy toward Christianity after 16oo, see George Elison, Deus Destroyed: The Image if Christianity in Early Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973). 48. This term, taken from J. A. Hobson and a propos to the age, appears in Esherick, pp. 92, 93· 49· Quoted in To-A Diibunko.i shi, p. 204. 50. Quoted in ibid., p. 210. 51. Nezu was simultaneously a professing Zen Buddhist and an active promoter of the Japanese penetration of China, a combination which cannot detain us here but which deserves future analysis. 52. Quoted in To-A Dobunko.i shi, p. 326. 53· Quoted in ibid., pp. 325-326. 54· This phrase occurs toward the end of a section in which Confucius queries four disciples about their ambitions. The last of the four, Dian, replies in a spirit that blends a Daoist celebration of nature with Confucian social and moral imperatives, "In this, the last month of spring, with the dress of the season all complete, along with five or six young men who have assumed the cap [of manhood], and six or seven boys, I would wash in the I (River], enjoy the breeze among the rain altars, and return lwme singing' (emphasis added). Clearly, Eikisha was chosen as the school's name to express the joy of its founder in classical Chinese learning and culture. This passage from Lunyu (bk. 11, ch. 25, verse 7), in Chinese and this English translation, appears in Legge, I, 248. 55· On Miyajima and his schools, see Rokkaku Tsunehiro, pp. 204-210. 56. To-A Dobunko.i shi, p. 74· 57· Guangxu chao Donghua lu, IV, 135, 136; see also the translation in the Appendix. 58. The original regulations for all five levels of schools are reproduced in Taga Akigor5, I, 128-184. 59· For these statements at each school level, see ibid., pp. 146, 157, 166, and q8, respectively. 6o. Significantly, Zhongguo is the term for China used in the Reform Edict of 1901. See pp. 202 and 257n2. 61. Quoted in Taga Akigor5, I, 128. 62. Cai Yuanpei as quoted in Tan Ruqian, "Zhong-Ri zhijian yishu shiye," p. 63. 63. For the curriculum within this division, almost wholly Confucian, see Taga Akigor5, I, 227-231. The curriculum of this and the other seven divisions is conveniently listed in Brunnert and Hagelstrom, pp. 223-226. 64. The details on classroom hours are drawn from the commentary of Taga Akigoro, I, 43· 65. QGC, 70:21 (p. 1342); quoted with punctuation in Huang Fu-ch'ing, Qjngrrw liu-Ri, pp. 3-4, and Chinese Students, pp. 3-4.


Notes to Pages 147-151 66. Hiroshi Abe, "Borrowing from Japan," p. 65; the same statement, in Japanese, appears in Abe Hiroshi, Chugoku no kindai kyoiku, p. 37· 67. Cited in 'jiaokeshu zhi fakan gaikuang," p. 242. Simultaneously, the ministry reaffirmed its other late-Qing school regulations and officially adopted the Japanese term for school (Ch. xuexiao ~13'Jlf{-1t{t3&!;f.!U:: B *A~~ (Japanese Teachers and the Process of Educational Modernization in Late-Qjng China). In Abe Hiroshi, ed., Nit-Chii kyoiku bunka kOryii to masatsu, pp. 5-47. - - - . "Kobun Gakuin ni okeru Chiigokujin ryiigakusei kyoiku ni tsuite (2)" *X:-¥~l'Gt:.;f.,-tt{>rp@l]A~$:!E~13't:.-::>PT (2) (On the Education of Chinese Students at Kobun Gakuin [part 2] ), Kumatsu shil5: II6-189 (March 1987). - - - . "Koso kyoiku kaikaku to Fujita Toyohachi" ?I~~13'cx~ .ii'i%83 :ft/1.. (Jiangsu Educational Reforms and Fujita Toyohachi). In Oyatoi Nihonjin kyoshii no kenkyii, pp. 27-43. Kamachi, Noriko. Riform in China: Huang Tsun-hsien and the Japanese Model. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. ---,John K. Fairbank, and Chiiz6 Ichiko. Japanese Studies of Modem China Since 1953: A Bibliographical Guide to Historical and Social Science Research on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1975. Kanzaki Kiyoshi 1$~ftlj. "Hoku-Shi ni okeru Nihongo no bunkateki seiryoku (j6)" ~tst t:.;Q~ ft {> B *a\%0) )( {tB~~ :fJ ( J:) (Cultural Influences of the Japanese Language in North China [Pt. 1]), Shina JtW ("The China Review") 27.8:46-69 (1 August 1936). Kat6 Yiiz6 iJO _iiiffj _::.. "Chiigoku ni okeru oyatoi gaikokujin" rp @lJ t:. ;/;,' tt {> ;/;,' 71 P j~@l] A (Foreign Contract Specialists in China). In Shiryo oyatoi gaikokujin ~*41.flllflj~@l!A (Materials Relating to Foreign Contract Specialists), Yunesuko Higashi Ajia Bunka Kenkyii Senta, comp., pp. 32-43. Tokyo: Shogakukan, 1975. - - - . "To-Ajiron" r*.!IE.BifililfiJ (East A;ia Review). In Kojima Reiitsu /Nil'; !fl!}.it, ed. Senzen no Chiigokujironshi kenkyii !j!X;W 0) rp §;!BifilifD~j\;.jiJf~ (Studies in Prewar Japanese Journals of Opinion on China), pp. 3-22. Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyiijo, 1978. Kawamura Kazuo ~iiJH-*· Kindai Nit-Chii kankei shi no shomondai Jlf{-lt B r:p ~f*-51:: 0) ~ti r,~N1j (Problems in Modern Japan-China Relations). Tokyo: Nans6sha, 1983.


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References Late-Ch'ing." In A. R. Davis, ed. Search for Identity: Modern Literature and the Creative Arts in Asia, pp. 203-224. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1974. Legge, James. The Chinese Classics, vol. r: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, and The Doctrine iifthe Mean. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, r883. Levenson, Joseph R. Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The Problem iif Intellectual Continuit;•. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958. Lewis, Charlton M. Prologue to the Chinese Revolution: The Transformation iif Ideas and Institutions in Hunan Province, I8gi-1907. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. - - - . "The Hunanese Elite and the Reform Movement, r895-1898," The Journal iif Asian Studies 29. r: 35-42 (November 1969). Li Guangjian '$JJ(flf;. "Qjngmo liu-Ri xuesheng dui Zhongguo jindai jiaoyu de gongxian: yi Hu Yuantan wei li" frf3Kfl/ 81¥\1=.!Mi=J:t~3ii~il&WS9J§tl):: tJ 1i!l5C*=~19U (Contributions to Chinese Modern Education by JapanTrained Students of the Late Qjng: The Case of Hu Yuantan). In Dongbei Diqu Zhong-Ri Guanxi Shi Yanjiu Hui and Qjqihe'er Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao Bianjibu, comps., Zhong-Ri guanxi shi lunji; diwuji, pp. I41-r46. LiJiequan (Li Kit Chuen) '$~*· "Liu-Ri xuesheng yu Zhong-Ri keji wenhua jiaoliu" fl/ 81¥\1=.W:i=J:t 8 f413tX:1t~VIE (Japan-Trained Students and the Flow of Science-and-Technology Culture from Japan [r896-r9rr]). In Zhongguo Zhong-Ri Guanxi Shi Yanjiu Hui, comp., Riben de Zhongguoyimin, pp. 262-288. Li Kuo-ch'i (Li Guoqi] '$~Jii13). Zhongguo xiandaihua de quyuyanjiu: Min-Zhe-Tai diqu, I86o-Igi6 J:j:t~Jl.~1U9@:fWGliff~: l?a9i':!Jfil':f1!!@:, r86o-r9r6 ("Modernization in China, r86o-r9r6: A Regional Study of Social, Political, and Economic Change in Fukien, Chekiang, and Taiwan"). Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan,Jindai Shi Yanjiu Suo, 1982. Li Xisuo '$ ~ .P.IT • Jindai Zhongguo de liuxuesheng 3ii ~ J:j:t ~ 139 fl/ 1¥\ 1=. (ForeignTrained Students in the History of Modern China). Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1987. Li Yu-ning. The Introduction iif Socialism into China. New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University Press, 1971. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Liang Qjchao) ~~jj]. Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period, trans. with introduction and notes by Immanuel C. Y. Hsu. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. Lin Ming-te (Lin Mingde) ;f.t!JJH~· "Qjngmo Minchu Riben zhengzhi dui Zhongguo de yingxiang" frf3K~W 8 ::i&11JU!tti=J:t~s9~~ (Influences of the Japanese Political System upon China during the Late-Qjng and EarlyRepublican Periods). In Tam, ed., pp. 187-213. Liu Tianchun ~U::K*· "Sino-Japanese Studies: Three Problem Areas," Douglas R. Reynolds, tr., Sino-Japanese Studies 2.2:57-71 (May 1990). Liu Xuezhao ~U/¥\1\?i\ and Fang Dalun 7J7dfiti. "Qjngmo Minchu Zhongguoren dui-Ri guan de yanbian" frf3K~Wi=J:t~A!tt 81ll.s9~~ (Changing Chinese Views of Japan, ca. r86o-r919). Jindai shi yanjiu 54: 124-143 (November 1989).

References Lo Hui-min, ed. The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison, vol. 1: 1895-1912. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. MacKinnon, Stephen R. Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-kai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901-1908. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Meienberger, Norbert. The Emergence of Constitutional Government in China ( 19051908): The Concept Sanctioned by the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi. Bern: Peter Lang, 1980. Meijer, MarinusJohan. The Introduction of Modern Criminal Law in China. Batavia: De Unie, 1950. Min Tu-ki 004£. National Poliry and Local Power: The Transformation of Late Imperial China, Philip A. Kuhn and Timothy Brook, eds. Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989. - - - . "Chinese 'Principle' and Western 'Utility': A Reassessment." In Min Tu-ki, National Poliry and Local Power, pp. 51-88. ---."The Late-Ch'ing Provincial Assembly." In Min Tu-ki, National Poliry and Local Power, pp. 137-179. Morohashi Tetsuji ~tf~~;j(. Dai Kan-Wa jiten :;k?JiUDili¥:J!ll.. (Great ChineseJapanese Dictionary). 13 vols. Tokyo: Shukushaban, 1955-1960. Munakata Kotaro 7f:1J/j,::;( 2I3niO huazu nu xuexiao ¥~~~;{3( (school for aristocratic women), I I2 Hubei Wubei Xuetang l'iill~t:!EI:vm ~:¥: (Hubei Military Preparatory School), 25, I56 Huiwen Xueshe fr)(~jjtl: (Huiwen Society for Translation; Tokyo), II7-II8 Hunan reforms, I9, I6I Hundred Days Reform, I, 33, 34-36, 69, I3I, I93, 254n42; and study in Japan, 28-29,43,46-47,6I;end of, 3I, 46, 70, I28, I33-I34; revisionist view of, 35-36, I28, I86, 2 I 8n42; events prior to, 45, I 03; coeval with other events, I I3, I6r. See also bianfa Huo Yiping~£i:1if 8o, 8I, 89, I05, I08-I09, I3I, I4I, I83, 228n26, 237n2or. See also Jingxue Ke; Jinshi Guan; Shifan Guan; Shixue Guan imperialism: Japanese, xvii, xix, 6, 68, 109, I4I, I47, 227nr5; and Japanese-trained students, 224n64; Western, 29, 69 Imperially Approved University Regulations. See "Qjnding daxuetang zhangcheng"

Glossary-Index Inoue Enryo ;Jt J:p:j T (r8s8-r9r9), 122 Inoue Masaji ;Jt J:H= (r877-1947), gr Inoue Midori ;Jt J:~ (r875-1957), 8o,8r Inoue Tetsujiro ;Jt J:'fg';bi:flB (r8ss-r944), r22 interpretations of the late Qjng, xix, 2-4, 123, r69, r8s-r86, 193-194, 196, 197, 254n34;Japanese, xix; Great Man theory rejected, 39-40; Chinese, 41, 207nr4 Inukai Tsuyoshi ::R:1lU~ (r8ssI932), gr, 32 ishin itt!U.If ([modern] transformation), 75, r 14, 21 rn27. See also Meiji I shin. Ito Hirobumi 1!1l"iilt:f:X: (r84r1909), 34, 35, g6, 37, 43> r89, 2 19n6r Ito Miyoji 1!1l"JitB{-I::rE1 (r8s7-1934), r89, 191 lwaya Magozo Jtlt~I*Ji& (r867r9r8), s6, 8o, 8r Jansen, Marius, xvi, 42, 49,_123, 22on8, 226n9r Japan: role of in Xinzheng reforms forgotten, xvii, 4> 5-6, 65, ]3, I 77, 194; imperialism of, xvii, xix, 6, 68, ro9, 141, 147, 227nrs; as key to Xinzheng Revolution, 2, 5, ro, 109-rro, 127, r8r-r82, 194-196; as model for China, 5, r 8, r 9, 34, g6, 131, 147, 156, 194-195; Western challenge to, in China, r r; security needs of, and China, 19, 21, 22, 23, 27-29, r r2; lacks unified China policy, 24, 37-38, 219n66; spies from, in China, gr, 68; as shortcut to Western learning, 44-45; Buddhist mission schools in China, 69, 71, 73; non-Buddhist schools in China as feeders to

higher education in, 69, 70, 95, 228n26; lacks funds for projects, 7 r; school regulations of, and China, 92, rgs-r37, 139; pride in Meiji accomplishments in, 96, 132, 195; legal system praised by Yuan Shikai, r8o. See also Chinese students in Japan, Japanese encouragement of; imperialism, Japanese; Meiji Ishin Japan, Army General Staff. See Sanbo Honbu Japan, Chinese names for. See Dongyang; Dongying; Fusang; Riben; Wo Japan, Foreign Ministry, r8, 32, g6-g7, 67, 68, 92, 96, 135; records in, 67, rss:_r56, 223n44; Archives of, 82, 87, roo Japan, Ministry of Education, 28, 53, 55, 8g, 93, 135, rg8, 139, 140, r46. See also China, Ministry of Education Japanese language: among Chinese students, 49, 50, 53, 88, 97, 98; instruction in, in Japan, 5 r, 8o; instruction in, in China, 72, 76, 8o-8r, 82, 88-90, 98, 99; Chinese government shift from, 89, rog; differs linguistically from Chinese, rrg, rrs. SeealsoJapanese terminology Japanese teachers and advisers in China, 39, 65-r ro, 78, rog, 132, 134-135, 195; numbers of, 67-68, Br-82, 227nr3, 232nro4, 233nr 15, 236nr93; problem cases of, 73-78 passim, roo-ro2; warnings about hiring of, 78; contract terms for, 82-88, ror, ro2; specialties among, 82; salary scales for, 82, 8g, 87, 156, 157, r 72, r 76, r8g, r84; lauded by fellow Japanese, 83-84, 94-95; at Chinese normal schools, 89, 9 r, rog-ro7; replaced by Chinese,

Glossary-Index 89-90, r 7 r; as human capital resource, ro7, 135, 195; military, IS5-I59, r6o, 247ns; legal, r8r-r82 Japanese terminology, transferred to China, 39, s6, 64, I 13, 195, 224n68; and Western knowledge, I I I, I I 3, I !4, I I 5; indiscriminate adoption of, r 24; loan words, listed, 125-126; debates over, in PRC, 125, 24rn62; legal, 125, r82, r83, 24In59· See also translations from Japanese Japanization of China, 8, 24rn56; linguistically, r 24; educationally, 149-150, 246n79; militarily, 160. See also Nipponka; Ribenhua jian neng 'lUI§ (upright and capable men), 131, 204 jiandu lfiii'l (director): of schools, 83, 87, r r6, 232nro6; ofBeijing Police Academy, 171 Jiang Fangzhen jf~)J~ (r882-1938), 153-154 Jiang Jieshi. See Chiang Kai-shek Jiangnan Lushi Xuetang ?Iffillflfrli ~'¥: (Jiangnan Officer Academy), 25 Jiangsu Education Association (Jiangsu Xuewu Zonghui ?Iii*~J9J~f[, 1905- ), roo, ror; and Japanese model, 236nr77 Jiangsu Upper and Lower Normal School (Jiangsu Liangji Shifan Xuetang ?Iii*iifH&~ilil!flf~'¥:), 79, !05, 239n30, 243n25 jiangyi lu MU.U~ (published class lectures and notes), 56, I I 7, 239n3o, 24In59· See also kOgiroku jianyu xue lfiii ~ ~ . See kangokugaku jiaokeshu $)(f4W (school textbook), r r 7. See also textbooks Jiaokeshu Yiji She $)(f4!l=~iji!j:Jitt (Society for the Translation and Compilation of Textbooks), r r 7 288

jiaowu zhang $)('K9J~ (preceptor), 87, 233ni22 jiaoxi koushou $)(WI Q ~ (class lectures), 239n30 jiaoyu $)(~(education), r r8 jiaoyu guize $)(~ '):JJ!IJ (educational regulations), 137 Jiaoyu shijie ~ ~ i!t !fl. (E 63, I 13, 133, 215ni2, 221n12, 221nr8; compared to Fukuzawa's Gakumon no susume, 43, 221lll3 qudi gui;::e. See torishimari kisoku qun xue ff~ (sociology), 114 Rankin, Mary Backus, 196 Reform Edict (Shangyu 1:: ~il1l), 13- 14, !28, 131-132, 144, !62, 207ni; translated, 201-204; employs term Zhongguo, 202, 257n2; as canonical sanction for reform, 257n4 Regulations for Modern Schools. See "Zouding xuetang zhangcheng" Reid, Gilbert (1857-1927), 9, 10 religion in education decried, 142, 148 ren t: (benevolence), 143 rencai (men oftalent), 129, 202 revolution, xx; problem of definition, 2-3, 12-13, 194; defined by Liang Qj.chao, 14; in Meiji Ishin, 21 m27; in China, 256n15. See also Xinzheng Revolution revolutionaries, r, 3, 123, 191, 192, 193- 194 Revolution of 191 1 (xinhai geming "f:~:i!j!i:i[J), r, 53, 64, 65; secures Xinzheng Revolution, 1, 40, 109, 169, 192, 197; and Sun Yat-sen, 3, 4,2I8n52 Riben B :;ji: (Japan), II3, I 14. See also Dongyang; Dongying; Fusang; Wo Ribenjiaoyu ;::hidu B :;ji:iJ&'f!ifillU/t (Japanese educational system), 112 Ribenjingcha ;::hangcheng B :;ji:!,i~-~ (Japanese police regulations), 162 Rib en Lujun Daxuexiao lunlue B :;ji: ~ ]![ :*:~:Bi:~ftliPI~ (Essays onjapan's Military College; Kawashima Naniwa, tr.), 165

Riben re B :;ji:~ (Japan fever), 37 Riben wen B :;ji:)C (Japanese language), 114 [Rib en J xianja yijie ( B :;ji:) ~ 7.HH~ (Exposition of the [] apanese] Constitution; Zhangjian), 187 Riben yihui shi B :;ji: ~WI" 5I:. (History of the japanese Diet; Zhangjian), !87 Ribenyouxue ;::hinan B :;ji:~~11ii'i¥i (Guide to Study in japan; Zhang Zongxiang), 63 Riben ;::hi wen. B :;ji: ~ )C (Japanese language or writing), 114 Ribenhua B :;ji:{t (Japanization), 149. See also J apanization of China; Nipponka Richard, Timothy (1845-1919), 8, 9, 35 rigaku !.ll!"f. (physical sciences), 102 rinri. See lunli. Riwen Xuetang B )(~'!it (Japanese School; Hangzhou), 69 Ronglu '!!H'* (1836-1903), 129 Rongqing ~~ (r854-1912), 129, 1 39 Roosevelt, Theodore, 11 ronsetsu ~ifli~#. (commentary). See lunshuo Russia, 17-18, III, 157,167,172, 182; threat from brings japan and China together, 19-22, 24, 26, 27, 112 Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), x, 6, 7, 77 , 97 , r 56, r 58, r 72, r8 7 ryo 1lR (army brigade). See lu ryosai kenbo .15!: ~ ~ilj: (good wives and wise mothers), 225n81 ryiigaku "00 :'f: (extended study abroad),41, 220n1 ryiigakusei kyoiku no daihon;::an "00 "f. 1:. il& 'f!if!}) Ll.I (Flagship of Chinese Education injapan), 51


Sa Duan 1!6


(dates unknown),


Glossary-Index Saionji Kinmochi g§'JE~0~ (I849-I940), 45,50 saibansho kOseihiJ ~'I'll fi!T~ JiX: (court organization law), 55 San-Jiang Normal School (San-Jiang Shifan Xuetang :=:f-[ffljj]lll1~:£), 93-103, 105, 234ni5I "determined dependency" onjapan, I03. See also Liang-Jiang Y ouji Shifan Xuetang Sanbo Honbu ~~7.fs:{fB (Army General Staff), 24, I 57 Sane to Keishii ~iii~~ ( I 8g6I985), xvi, 7, 43> 48, 49, 6I, 65, 68, 78, I I 5, I I7, I2I-I22, I26 sangang :=:ij;f,Uj (the three cardinal guides), I44, 20I Sawayanagi Masataro ¥R;f#PiE:*.I'I~ (I865-I927), I40, I4I scholarship students. See guanjei schools, modern. See xuetang Schwartz, Benjamin, I 24, 208n2 science education in China, 66, 97, gg, I47i emphasis on, in Igo8-Igog, I02-I03i textbooks for, II7, II8, I24-I25, 239n33 seifu i&ffif(government), 125 ka i&iiJ!M5f4 (political economy course), 58 seiji. See z:.hengz:.hi seijigaku i&ril~- See z:.hengz:.hi xue seiji hifritsu. See z:.hengz:.hi jalil seiji ka i& ril f-1- (government or politics course), 53, 7 I Seijo Gakko PX:~~:f)E (Seijo School), 45-46, 47, 59, I 53, I 57· See also Shinbu Gakko Sekimoto Kotara ~7.js:;$i;:.l'l~ (I8 73 -I 959 ), 84 , 85,8 7-88, I 49 . See also Watanabe Ryiisei senmon gakkO r~ :*=:fiE (specialized professional school), 6I shakai *±~(society), I25 shakai shugi *±~.±.~(socialism), I25



shakai shugi shiso U ~ .±. ~ }fj!, ~. See shehui z:.huyi sixiang shang ke. See shifka Shang Qjheng f,1ij ;It"¥ (b. I866), I88 shang shu imi!= (books on commerce), II2 shangfa imi* (commercial law or code), 55, I8I. See also legal reforms Shangfa i'mi*(Commercial Law; Shida Kotara; Chinese translation), I84 Shangfa shangxing pian 1m!* 1m ff ~ (Essays on Commercial Law and Commercial Administration; Shida Kotara; Chinese translation), I85 Shangfa z:.e imi*~!'!IJ (Principles of Commercial Law; Shida Kotara; Chinese translation), I85 "Shanglii cao'an" lmff:ljt~ (Draft Commercial Ordinances), I85 Shangwu Yinshu Guan 1m~ ~p i!=®1i (Commercial Press), I2I-I22 shangye. See shiJgyo Shangyu. See Reform Edict shehui lit!: fr. See shakai shehui z:.huyi lit!: fr ± il%. See shakai shugi shehui z:.huyi sixiang lit!: fr ± il% }~, ~ (socialist thought), I23 · Shen Hong rtM.: (dates unknown), II6 Shenjiaben rt~Oj;: (I84o-I9I3), 2, I75, I76, I8o, I8I, I83 Shenjunru ¥x~11ffl (I875-I963), 56 shenfu ~$)((Catholic priest), 109 Sheng Xuanhuai !£11!:JJ (I84:4Igi6), I I I shengjing ~~ (Sacred Classics), I45 shenqing. See shinsei shenshi $$±(gentry elite), 56. See also xiangshen shi ~ili (army division), I6o shi ban gong bei $~J3J1'§' (twice the results with half the effort), 4I, 44, I I3, 22Ini6

Glossary-Index Shida Katsumin ;E";EB~~~ (dates unknown), 97 Shida Kotaro ii\;;EB~;;/,I:flB (I868-I 95 I), 55 , 56, I8 4-I85, 24Ill59 Shifan Guan mffl!ili~ (Normal School Division; Imperial University), 79, 95, I05. See also Youji Shifan Xuetang shijan ke. See shihan ka shijan xuetang mffi!ili$:£ (normal school), 103. See also normal schools Shiga Shigetaka iJS;~:li!.ITJ ( I863I927), 3I shihan ka ~iji f!m f-1- (teacher training course), 58 shiM. See sija shihon ~*(capital), I25 Shikan Gakko ±1§"¥-:Bi: (Military Academy), 46, I52-I53, I6o, I65; Chinese graduates of, I5I-I52, I 54 I 97 Shimada Kenji ,iffi EB ~ Shimada Masao /ffiEB.iEflB, I25, I76, I77 Shimada Toshio /ffiEB1~tlt (I877I947), 8I Shimoda Utako rEBlifJ\-=f (I854I936), 58-59, 6o, I44 shin *Ji' (new), 2I m27 Shin Buddhism. See Jodo Shinshii Shina xm (China), 2I5n2o Shina xm (The China Review), 6 Shina Bu xJJI)ff~ (Chinese Division; Jissen J ogakko), 59 Shina bunkatsu x JJI) )3- j!fU (partition of China), 27-28, 32, 69, 2I5ni9 Shina hozen xm1*1E: (preservation of China), 28, 32, 37, 95, 2I7n35 Shina kaizen xJJI)cxtf (betterment of China), 32 Shina netsu xmil!~ (China fever), 37 Shina tsu x JJI) 3i (China expert), 2 I, 26, I64 Shinago Ka xJJI)~]%f{ (Chinese language course of study), I65


Shinbu Gakko :tllR~#:Bi: (Military School), 59, I 53· See also Seijo Gakko Shin'gai Kakumei Kenkyiikai -*~:!¥ i[J.pJf~~ (Study Group on China's I9I I Revolution), xix Shinkoku H!fOO (country of the, 2 I 5n2o. See also Qj.ngguo "Shinkoku no shin kyoiku seido" tJ!f 00 0) *Jf i¥x 13' ifiiJ & (The New Chinese Educational System; Sawayanagi Masataro), I40 Shinkoku R yiigakusei Bu tJ!f 00 f€1 ¥~ {f~ (Chinese Student Division; Waseda University), 58 "Shinkokujin o nyiigaku seshimuru ko-shiritsu gakko ni kansuru kitei" H!fOOA 7 A."f.-!o ~;.,. Jv~~LJL.¥­ :Bl:.::. M :A Jv ~J\\:1£ (Regulations Concerning Government and Private Schools Admitting Chinese Students), 59· See also torishimari kisoku shinpai ,I)i!!ic (worried), 98 shinsei $~~(application, request), I25 shinshi hosha § Jlill ~ill!~! (like lips to teeth, like axle to wheel), 33· See also fuche chunchi shiroto ~A (amateur), I77 shiso ,1l'!,@\ (thought, idea), I25 Shiwu bao IJi!} ~ ¥~ (The Times; Shanghai, I 896- I 898), I I III2 Shixue Guan {± $~ (General Education Division; Imperial University), 56, 8o. Seealsojinshi Guan;Jingshi Fazheng Xuetang shiye -~ (industry), I I8, I44 shizen kagaku 13 7/.H>!-#. See ziran kexue "Sh6gakk6 rei" /J,#:B/:1:1 (Elementary School Order), I39 shOgaku + #. See xiaoxue shOgyo ifl'j ~ (commerce, trade), I 26 shOhO. See shangfa 299

Glossary-Index sMka ~H (business course), 58 sMkOkai ~I 45; (chamber of commerce), Ig6 Shoku Nihongi Mr. B 2js: ~c (Chronicles of Japan, Continued), 220nr shoushu liang duan 1ff [email protected]!tffii (like a rat looking both ways), 246n74 shuangchong jiangshou ~ ]t ~ ~ (lecture with simultaneous interpretation), 88 shiikya. See zongjiao Shuntianfu !II& 3( Iff (Metropolitan Beijing), I 67 Shuntian shibao !II& 3( m'j ¥/i (Shuntian Times), 70, 77 shushi no ;f.!H-=fO) ("the seed's ... "), g8 shiishin. See xiushen shuxue ~ ~· See silgaku shuyuan -~ (academy), go si f.L, (self-serving actions), 202 Sichuan Dongwen Xuetang rz:g I II ~ )(~¥:(Sichuan Japanese School), 73, 74, 76 sifa R]$ (administration of justice), I85 Sino-Japanese War (I894-I895), 6, I7-I8, 25, 26-27,62, I I2, I65, 2I6n23 sixiang. See shiso Society for Translation and Compilation. See Yishu Huibian She sago kunren. See xianghu xunlian saM. See caofa sokusei ka JiRiiX:N (accelerated or short course), 50-5I, 58, 6r. See also sucheng ke saza ~1~ (imagination or supposition), I25 Spence, Jonathan, 88 Strand, David, I 63 study abroad, 43-44, I32, I33, I34· See also Chinese students in Japan study missions. See educational study missions to Japan 300

Su, Prince (Su qinwang Shanqi i!l\'iii';JEEw~ [I866-Ig22]), I62 Su Yun-feng (Su Yunfeng) fi*~i':, Io8 sucheng ke JiR JiX: f>!- (accelerated or short course), 72, gg. See also sokusei ka Suga Torao ~JJE~ (dates unknown), g6, 100, IOI silgaka ~~(mathematics), I26 Sugamo Prison (Sugamo Kangoku ~.~ ~5~*), I 76 Sugi Eizaburo ;fM;!~~R~ (dates unknown), 8I Sugita Minoru ;f~l33 'ffi (dates unknown), 97, IOI SugiuraJiigo ;f~imm~U (I855-I924), 53,93-94 Sun Baoqi f* j:lf IM;f (I 867- I 93 I), I 87 Sun Chuanfang f*f$15' (I885-I935), I5I SunJianai l**im (I827-I909), I29 Sun Y at-sen (Sun Zhongshan f*l=j:lrlJ; I866-I925), I, 3, 32, 4I, I23. See also Revolution of I9I I, and Sun Yat-sen sunyi tffi!iit (taking away and adding to), 20I, 202, 257n3


Tachibana Koichiro 1L. 1't/J'- RB (I86I-I929), I57 "tai-Shi gaiko no ogonjidai" j;f;S(j~ X 0) ~Ji'i:B~{-'C (Golden Age of Japan's China diplomacy; Kanzaki Kiyoshi), 7 Tainei jiaoyu Hil pq i\l!{ 1f (Prenatal Education; Chen Yi, tr.), I35 tairiku ranin -:k. ~i. ii A (China adventurers), 74 Taiwan, 6, Ig, 22, 25, 26-27, 70, 7I, 72, 73, I65 Taiyo :7