Chile and Latin America in a Globalized World 9789812306579

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The Monarchy in Contemporary Malaysia

CHILE AND LATIN AMERICA INA THE ASIAN BOND MARKET GLOBALIZED WORLD

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more than 1,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

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Olarn Chaipravat The Monarchy in Contemporary Malaysia

THE ASIAN BOND MARKET

INSTITUTE OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES Singapore

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Published in Singapore in 2006 by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2006 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the author, and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Ignacio, Walker. Chile and Latin America in a globalized world. 1. Globalization. 2. Chile—Foreign relations—19883. Chile—Foreign economic relations—19884. Organization of American States. 5. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Organization). 6. Latin America—Politics and government—19807. Latin America—Foreign economic relations. 8. Asia—Foreign economic relations. I. Title. F3100 W17 2006 ISBN-13: 987-981-230-411-7 ISBN-10: 981-230-411-8 Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed and bound in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd

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The Monarchy in Contemporary Malaysia

CONTENTS

1. Introduction 1 2. The Challenge of Globalization 3 3. The Objectives of Chilean Foreign Policy 10 4. Latin America and “Open Regionalism” 16 5. Five Dialogues 19 6. The Asia-Pacific Basin 25 About the Author 31 v

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The Monarchy in Contemporary Malaysia

The lecture was delivered by His Excellency Mr Ignacio Walker as a Public Lecture organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies on 18 January 2006.

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1 Introduction

Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. I am very pleased to be here at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Thank you very much for your kind invitation to our candidate, His Excellency President Michelle Bachelet. It is the first time in our history that we have elected a woman as President of the Republic. She is the fourth President in a row belonging to the same coalition that has ruled Chile ever since we recovered democracy in 1989. This is the Party called the “Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia”. Please allow me to share some thoughts with this very distinguished audience. Now, the topic is quite broad: “Chile and Latin America in a Globalized World”. So let me begin with some preliminary thoughts 1

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about the question of globalization, which is the key to the understanding of any foreign policy in today’s world. In our case it is very important to understand why and how we are opening up and integrating into the world economy.

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2 The Challenge of Globalization

One of the important things to understand when addressing Chile’s foreign policy within the context of Latin America, and especially in relation to Asia and the Asia-Pacific, is that, for us, globalization is an opportunity rather than a threat. This is not to ignore, of course, that there are threats, as we all know, related to globalization: international terrorism, for example, is a threat which cannot be ignored; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear or biological, chemical or bacteriological, is certainly a global threat. In fact, we are trying to deal with both issues at the level of the United Nations. In terms of terrorism, we have approved in the last General Assembly a reference to it. We are now working on a 3

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draft for an “International Convention on Terrorism”. Unfortunately, on the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, I think we failed at the last General Assembly in 2005 to deal appropriately with it. In fact, the issue of disarmament and nonproliferation was simply ignored, and that is bad news. We could mention other threats, such as global warming and the deterioration of the environment, which is also an aspect of globalization; or trans-national organized crime and narco-terrorism, which is a hot issue in Latin America and elsewhere. We all realize that there are threats related to the globalized world in which we all live. But, along with those threats, there are also opportunities and challenges ahead of us that are related to positive aspects of globalization. The single most important feature of globalization is the matter on human rights. All the changes that have taken place, for example, in the field of international law, moving away from the traditional views on the nation-state (related to very strict notions of sovereignty) towards the question of the human person, its dignity and inalienable rights, have to be taken into 4

The Challenge of Globalization

account when we evaluate the positive aspects of globalization. When you look at the creation, for example, of the International Criminal Court related to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and you consider this notion of “universal jurisdiction”, you come to the conclusion that for the first time in the history of mankind — and this has to do with the kind of ethical awareness of human kind — there is a decision aimed at defending these rights at the expense of the traditional concept of the “nation-state”. The spread of democracy — this “third wave” of democratization around the world, in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere — is also a positive aspect of globalization. The enlargement of the European Union has given impetus to this new global approach and the search for new schemes of integration. In the end it is not only the coming down of the Berlin Wall (in 1989) that is characteristic of globalization, or the deep transformations within the field of international law vis-àvis the “nation-state” and the new notions of sovereignty that emerge in the last decades, but also the coming down of barriers, such as tariff barriers, around the issue of free trade. Along with the new 5

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threats that are related to globalization — which when ignored has led to tragic outcomes — we have to deal in a more positive way with opportunities and challenges such as human rights, democracy, free trade, regional integration, and so on. I also think that the ASEAN scheme of integration is something very promising, as it accommodates and responds very adequately to the new challenges of globalization. So, which is the key problem with globalization? I think the basic problem with globalization — and we all have to deal with it in a variety of ways — is the lack of institutions and of rules of the game. In Robert Gilpin’s book The Challenge of Global Capitalism, which was published two or three years ago, and is one of the most illuminating books in my own view, there is a discussion on this major problem in terms of globalization. In fact, Gilpin’s thesis throughout all his academic work is that economic forces do not act in a political vacuum. We usually identify globalization with market forces, with free trade, with liberalization and, of course, that is a major aspect of globalization. But if it is true that 6

The Challenge of Globalization

economic forces do not act in a political vacuum, then we need to make extra efforts in terms of institution-building. We need rules of the game in order to provide for the governability of globalization. That, in my perspective, is the central issue. That is a very central aspect for those of us — I think, most of us — who want to live in a rules-based society, and not only in terms of trade, but beyond that. That is why at the multilateral level we are focusing today on two very major issues: the reform of the system of the United Nations, on the one hand, and the Doha Round within the World Trade Organization (WTO), on the other hand. We all know that the system of the United Nations was created in a different era (1945), within a different historical context, to meet the challenges and realities that existed at that time — at the beginning of the Cold War. That led to the creation of United Nations having very little to do with the new challenges and the new realities of this post–Cold War period, within the era of globalization. I would say that the reform of the system of the United Nations is precisely aimed at creating, at the political and multilateral levels, those institutions, 7

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those rules of the game that are needed in order to allow for the governability of globalization. Related to this major endeavour, you can see from the recent General Assembly in September 2005 that there are new concepts coming out of this new awareness related to the challenges of globalization. I would mention only two: the “responsibility to protect” of the international community visà-vis very critical situations around the world; and the “peace-building” process as a major concept related to the responsibility to protect. These are new concepts emerging from this globalized world which, in turn, are at the core of this need to reform very dramatically the system of the United Nations, including the Secretariat General, the General Assembly, the Commission of Human Rights and the need to create a new Council for Human Rights with a new legitimacy and effectiveness, by raising the standards with “peer review” among its members. We could also refer to the reform of the Social and Economic Council, the need to deal with terrorism, etc. The list is very long but I would say that the reform of the United Nations points exactly at building these new institutions in the era of globalization. In fact, 8

The Challenge of Globalization

both Singapore and Chile — our two countries — belong to this “Group of Friends of the Reform” of the United Nations. The second part of this reform, related to trade and investment issues, is the Doha Round and the question of the WTO, including 150 countries, aimed at achieving trade liberalization as a means to move towards “equitable and sustainable economic growth” — as it was stated by the leaders of APEC in Santiago, Chile, in November 2004. This means that for many of us trade liberalization is not an end in itself; it is a means to pursue equitable and sustainable economic growth. Perhaps we can feel more optimistic when we compare the outcome of the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2005 to the Ministerial Meeting that was held in Hong Kong in 2006 a couple of weeks ago, especially if we take into account agricultural products and the commitment to put an end to subsidies by 2013.

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3 The Objectives of Chilean Foreign Policy

My second thought has a lot to do with our own recent history throughout the last 15 years, following the recovery of democracy and 17 years of a military government, which led to increasing isolation in the international community. It was very clear to us, once we had recovered democracy in 1989, following the plebiscite of October 1988, with the victory of the NO vote, that we had to integrate into the world. In our foreign policy, we have pursued three main objectives in the last 15 years. The first one is related to the need to move towards full integration into the international community. The transitional administration of President Aylwin (1990–94), 10

The Objectives of Chilean Foreign Policy

after 17 years of international isolation, meant that we had to be re-admitted into the international community, in terms of the recovery of a long-standing democratic tradition, respect for human rights, and so on. The first objective has been achieved, and this can be seen in our having won some important respectability, credibility, and a new legitimacy as a country that wants to be a player in Latin America and in world politics. The second objective of our foreign policy, which emerged very clearly in the late nineties, was to integrate into the world economy. This led to the signing, in 1997 with Canada, and in 1999 with Mexico, of Free Trade Agreements of different sorts, as a means of integrating into the world economy. There is a broad consensus in Chile — although it is a highly controversial issue in Latin America — on the decision to integrate into the world economy, that we move swiftly towards the opening up of the economy and trade liberalization in at least three ways: unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally. The first was achieved by bringing down tariff barriers. We had a 15 per cent flat tariff barrier in 1989, which has been reduced to 2 per cent in real terms. In nominal terms it is 11

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6 per cent, but due to the impact of Free Trade Agreements, in fact it is 2 per cent. In this sense, we are already an open economy due to unilateral measures that began under the Pinochet dictatorship and which we have taken even further, both in depth and speed. The strategy of opening up to the world economy has a lot to do with the fact that we are a small country. We are not Brazil or Mexico, whose huge domestic markets make it all the more difficult for them to open up, to liberalize. We are a small country of 15 million people, representing 100 billion dollars in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), so we decided that there were more advantages than costs in opening up to the world economy. Second, we have moved in that direction bilaterally, by signing all these Free Trade Agreements or Partial Trade Agreements with a variety of countries and regions. To cut the story short, by this time we have signed up 16 trade agreements — half of these are Free Trade Agreements, others are Partial Trade Agreements — with 51 countries, including the 25 that belong to the European Union, accounting for almost 3.7 billion people around the world, if we include the more recent agreements with China and India. 12

The Objectives of Chilean Foreign Policy

Thirdly, we have been quite active at the multilateral level. This is the level of the Doha Round and WTO, and we hold the firm conviction that unless you reach some kind of understanding or consensus at the multilateral level within the context of the Bogor Goals, you will not succeed at all in liberalizing trade and investment in such a way that you come to live in a rules-based society. It is not enough to move in that direction by undertaking initiatives at the unilateral and bilateral levels. Today the Chilean economy is already integrated into the world economy in such a way that foreign trade (exports plus imports) represents 65 per cent of our GDP, along with low, flat tariff barriers of 2 per cent in real terms, within an export-led economy. The third objective of our foreign policy could be spelled out in terms of contributing to peace and security in the world. We were members of the Security Council for two years (2002–2003). Along with Mexico, we did play an important role at that time, especially when dealing with the very critical issue of Iraq. At that time Chile opposed the request of President Bush to declare war on Iraq because we thought (and we still think) that one of the key principles of our foreign policy, 13

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multilateralism, was being violated by this unilateral action based on dubious doctrines of preventive wars. So we said “no” to Iraq and the request from the United States, as a matter of principle, although we have an excellent relationship with the United States. In fact, multilateralism is the cornerstone of our foreign policy and we thought, and we still think, that in the case of Iraq this crucial principle was being violated. In addition to matters related to the Security Council, Iraq, and so on, we are committed to peace missions around the world, as in the case of Haiti, Cyprus, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the case of Haiti, as part of our region (Latin America and the Caribbean), it becomes a very emblematic issue. For the same reason that we rejected going to Iraq, we accepted going to Haiti: multilateralism. It was a resolution of the Security Council of United Nations that called for multilateral action in Haiti, and along with multilateralism, “open regionalism” is another principle of our foreign policy. That is why we have managed to build this multinational coalition of seven countries from Latin America. We are present there with our troops, trying to democratize Haiti, to respond 14

The Objectives of Chilean Foreign Policy

to the needs in the fields of security, development, and democracy itself. In fact, on 7 February 2006 we held elections in Haiti, all of which means that we are quite committed not only to trade liberalization, to the open economy, but also to peace and security around the world.

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4 Latin America and “Open Regionalism”

My third point for discussion — very briefly, because I want to move towards Asia and the Asia-Pacific, and trade-related issues — is about Latin America. Of course, Latin America is in our immediate neighbourhood, the geographical and political unit to which we belong. We are a part of Latin America and that is why it is a top priority of our foreign policy and thus we speak about “open regionalism”. “Regionalism” meaning that our foreign policy takes place from within the region, from within Latin America. But “open” regionalism, which means that it is not an exclusionary policy. That is why we are here in Asia, or dealing with Europe, North America, and so on. We have failed in Latin America to address the issue of an integration 16

Latin America and “Open Regionalism”

scheme that may give some “voice” to our region in world politics. The fact of the matter is that Latin America is a non-issue in world politics and economics. Let me give you only one example as to why I say so. In the 1950s Latin America accounted for 12 per cent of international trade; in the 1970s it was 6 per cent, whereas today it is only 3 per cent. Let me give you another example: at the meeting of the World Economic Forum in January, there were all kinds of panels, conferences, and lectures related to different areas of the world, such as Asia, Europe, North America, and Africa. But Latin America was simply ignored, partly because we lack a scheme of integration. That is why I think that ASEAN, by putting together ten countries, notwithstanding its diversity, has done such an impressive job, or the European Union itself, or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), among others. In short, we in Latin America are committed to stability and to democracy. Of course, as you know, it is not the most stable region in the world: since 1985, 14 presidents from the region have not ended their constitutional term. The positive side of this picture is that 17

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this year we are having twelve elections — democratic elections — so electoral democracy is present in the region. There is a kind of strong legitimacy on democratic processes in spite of everything: of corruption, narco-traffic, political instability, ideological prejudice, among other evils. So, that is where we basically stand in Latin America: trying to bring about economic growth, political stability, and democratization within a region that is characterized by inequality, poverty, marginalization, and instability.

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5 Five Dialogues

In terms of our foreign policy, I would like to mention five dialogues taking place within the hemisphere. One dialogue refers to the Hispanic-American world. We have had this recent summit in Salamanca, Spain, a couple of months ago that was related to the cultural and historical roots we share: we belong with Latin America, Spain, and Portugal, and share a common heritage. So, that is part of our scheme of integration: a forum like the “Hispanic American Summit” that has just created a permanent secretariat, with Enrique Iglesias, a very well-known and respected Latin American citizen, leading this secretariat towards a new and much more vigorous scheme of integration, dealing more with 19

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culture and historical roots rather than anything else. The second dialogue is related to the Americas, with 34 countries belonging to it, from Canada to Tierra del Fuego. There are two issues here: the OAS (Organization of American States), which gathers all those 34 states (all except for Cuba), and the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas). We must admit that the OAS has been a declining organization for many years — perhaps even decades — and is in need of a new leadership. An encouraging recent development is that a couple of months ago we elected Jose Miguel Insulza as the new Secretary General of the organization. He is Chilean, and a very wellknown and respected leader in the region, and he is providing the leadership that is needed in the Americas to deal with very sensitive political issues. How is it possible, for example, that Haiti was not dealt with in the OAS? It was taken to the Security Council of the United Nations, but not to the OAS. So we lack a kind of forum on the Americas to deal with political, economic, and social issues. I think the Organization of American States and the leadership of Insulza are providing a kind of new impulse aimed at 20

Five Dialogues

redressing the declining process of the organization in the region. The second issue is, of course, that of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. We were in Mar del Plata, in Argentina, two or three months ago, in the Summit of the Americas trying to deal with this issue: how to be in tune with the globalized world and not to stay behind while other regions of the world are opening up, are liberalizing, are integrating into the world economy. Unfortunately, there is a strong ideological prejudice in Latin America, which makes it difficult to go faster in terms of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, and it was a very divisive issue in this Summit of Mar del Plata in Argentina. A third dialogue refers to “Latin America and the Caribbean” itself, which is another reality, another entity. In this case we have the Rio Group. The Rio Group is a forum in which Latin American and Caribbean countries gather to discuss issues like Haiti, for example, which is very similar to many of the things we are trying to pursue in the region. But this Rio Group has failed to meet the expectations. A fourth dialogue, one which is perhaps 21

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more promising, at least in terms of its potential, is South America. South America is also a geographic, political, and economic unit to which we belong. We have created in Cusco, in Perú, in November 2004, the “South American Community of Nations”. The model is that of the European Union, although we are far from having accomplished at least a fraction of what has already been achieved by the Europeans. The South American Community of Nations should lead to at some point, and that is our aim, some kind of South American Union that includes 12 countries: four from Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), six from the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and Venezuela), plus Chile, and Guyana and Suriname. At this level and within the context of this new initiative, we are trying to undertake some steps to account for the systematic failures of Mercosur and the Andean Community. Mercosur was created in 1991 with the view of becoming a customs union, with a common external tariff barrier, which has not yet taken place due to the list of “exceptions” of goods, and the variety of tariffs that are in place, going from 0 to 24 per cent, with 14 per cent being the average. Our 22

Five Dialogues

tariff barriers are 2 per cent in real terms, which means that we have remained an “associate” member to Mercosur, and not a full member, precisely because of this asymmetry in terms of trade and tariffs. Perhaps the failures of Mercosur — which nowadays is more of a political scheme of integration rather than anything else — and of the Andean Community could be overcome by creating this South American Community of Nations on the basis of four prerequisites: integration in infrastructure (roads, railroads, air transport, and so on); integration in the field of energy (as we all know there is a serious discussion all around the world, and also in our region, about how to integrate, diversify, and complement each other in terms of energy resources); a free trade zone of the South American nations, and a mechanism of political consultation. The fifth dialogue within our foreign policy refers, of course, to our immediate neighbourhood: Argentina, Bolivia, and Perú. We have defined, and we try to follow a “Good Neighbour” policy, to integrate these three countries while at the same time having to deal with a history of distance and resentment as regards the 1879 “Pacific War” with Bolivia and Perú, and of course that is a 23

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very important part of our policy. We are doing, and will continue to do, all that is necessary to overcome this history which is so full of tensions that we were almost led to a war with Perú and Argentina in the 1970s. The basic point about Latin America around these five dialogues — some more successful than others — is that we have failed to reach a scheme of integration that may give some identity to the region to enable it to count as an actor in world politics.

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6 The Asia-Pacific Basin

My last point is related to Asia and the AsiaPacific basin. We have discovered a new neighbourhood. Our natural neighbourhood is Latin America, of course, because we belong to Latin America. But, Asia, the Asia-Pacific basin, and what it represents in world economics and politics today is a very promising region, a very promising area for us Chile and for Latin America. Chile, with 4,000 miles of coasts, looks face to face with Asia and the Asia-Pacific. We have been particularly active in trying to take seriously what Henry Kissinger said about the axis of power in the world moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Europe to Asia. We feel very comfortable participating in the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 25

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Cooperation) forum. It is one of the most important fora in the world, as it gathers 21 economies representing 2.5 billion people around the world, 50 per cent of international trade, and 60 per cent of global GDP. In the case of Chile, 56 per cent of our exports are directed to Asia (compared with 26 per cent to Europe). APEC is also interesting in that it represents a very diverse and heterogeneous group of countries, which becomes all the more interesting in terms of the possibilities of WTO, for example, with its very diverse and heterogeneous component. In fact, it could be said that APEC is anticipating what the WTO could become in the near future. That is why we are so committed to this part of the world and the reason for having hosted the APEC meeting in Santiago in November 2004. In our case, that meeting gave birth to what we call the “Asia Plan”, which is related to the way we integrate into Asia, even though we are far away in terms of geography. This is where the whole thing about the Free Trade Agreements come in, in terms of our foreign policy. We have signed up a Free Trade Agreement with South Korea, which came into effect in April 2004 — in fact it was the first FTA between Asia and Latin America 26

The Asia-Pacific Basin

and it has been very successful. In the first 15 months, our exports to Korea increased by 72 per cent. Second, we have signed up the TransPacific Economic Strategic Agreement with Singapore, New Zealand, and Brunei, the socalled P-4, which is a very comprehensive trade agreement that includes not only goods, agricultural and industrial, but also services, rules, cooperation, environment, labour, science and technology. There is something very original in it, which is the “access clause”, so any other country can participate, by simply signing the FTA as long as it is admitted by the four permanent members. This FTA is in the process of being ratified by our parliament. Third, in November 2005 we signed in Busan, Korea, a Free Trade Agreement with China. After five rounds of negotiations, this is the first agreement to be signed by a Latin American country with China. We were the first country in Latin America to establish diplomatic relations with China — in fact, exactly 30 years ago; the first to endorse its application to the United Nations; the first to recognize its status as a “market economy”, and the first in Latin America to support its application for WTO membership, all of 27

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which may explain the speed of negotiations leading to an FTA, which is in the process of being ratified by our parliament. Next comes India, with which we have concluded negotiations around a Partial Trade Agreement. It is not a Free Trade Agreement as such, but it is an agreement made on a list of goods. Today we export 83 products to India; with the Partial Trade Agreement we will export 266 products with preferential access to that market. With Japan, we finished a feasibility study last year, and are about to begin the first round of negotiations towards a Free Trade Agreement between both countries. (In 2007 we will celebrate 110 years of diplomatic relations with Japan — something unique in our region). China, Japan, and South Korea are our three most important trade partners in terms of foreign trade with Asia. I shall be visiting today and tomorrow, Malaysia first and then Thailand, to launch the feasibility study that we are going to negotiate with both countries, with the intent to move towards a Free Trade Agreement with them. As you can see, for a very small country like Chile to have this network of 16 trade agreements, with 51 countries accounting for 28

The Asia-Pacific Basin

3.7 billion people around the world, and 75 per cent of global GDP, is a major opportunity not only in terms of trade but also in terms of investment. In this way, a foreign investor that arrives at Chile is not limited by the small economy of 15 million people, but is instead open to a network of trade agreements with a variety of countries, meaning preferential access to those markets. Hence the idea of Chile and Latin America becoming a “springboard”, “gateway”, or “platform” is a powerful idea, not only in terms of integrating into the world economy, but should also look very closely and in a very proactive way to the Asia-Pacific. In addition to what has already been said, we have 12 embassies in Asia — having recently opened a new one in Vietnam — eight commercial offices, and four consulate generals, with 36 per cent of our exports going to Asia (56 per cent going to the Asia-Pacific). So our business people, our business community, our government — and there is a strong public-private association behind this export-led economy — are moving towards trade liberalization and the opening up of our economy, not only in terms of the economy itself, but also of related social issues. In this way, for example, in the last 15 years, under 29

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the governments of the “Concertación”, we have doubled the GDP and diminished poverty from 40 per cent to 18 per cent. We think that an important part of it, of the creation of new jobs and of new wealth, is related to this strategic decision of integrating into the world economy. We have come to realize that if we do things well, we can take advantage of the opportunities that are present in this new global world. That is where we stand today. With Singapore we have a very close relationship. First of all, bilaterally, we have diplomatic relations ever since 1979 and we have signed up this new Free Trade Agreement and Strategic Partnership, along with New Zealand and Brunei. Regionally, most of the countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Asian countries belong to APEC, in which we are very active, and, multilaterally, with Singapore we are part of the “Group of Friends of Reform” of the United Nations. Together, we have been promoting trade liberalization in the Doha Round and WTO, and we share substantial views on global issues.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ignacio Walker is the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Chile. He began his political career in 1978 working as an attorney for the Vicariate for Solidarity in the Archbishopric of Santiago de Chile, defending victims of human rights violations. During the 1980s he was active in the struggle for freedom and democracy in Chile. Once democracy was restored, he was appointed Director of Political and Institutional Relations in the Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency in 1990. He was elected Representative to the Chamber of Deputies in 1994, and re-elected in 1998. As a Representative, he first chaired the National 31

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Defence Committee, and then the Committee on Constitution, Law, and Justice. He was appointed to his ministerial position in 2004. Mr Walker has combined his participation in politics with an academic career in political science. He holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, is the author of three books, and has contributed to academic journals and other publications. He has been a Visiting Fellow at the Kellog Institute for International Relations, University of Notre Dame; a member of the Advisory Council of the Latin American Studies Programme, Princeton University, and also of the Advisory Council of the aforesaid Kellog Institute at the University of Notre Dame. In Chile he has held teaching, research, and executive positions in various prestigious academic institutions. In December 2005, on the occasion of the 6th Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Hong Kong, Mr Walker was one of the six “facilitators-at-large” ministers.

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