Chiang Kai-shek, his life and times

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CHIANG KAI-SHEK HIS LIFE A N D TIMES By Keiji Furuya

Abridged English Edition By Chun-ming Chang

Published by St. John’s University ©1981

ISBN 0-87075-25-9

Copyright 1981 by St. John’s University, New York Library o f Congress Catalog Card No. 81-86034

Foreword to the Abridged English Edition

The present work, in the Japanese original, was first serialized as a daily feature in the well-known newspaper Sankei Shimbun under the title Sho Kai-seki Hiroku (From the Private Files of Chiang Kai-shek) from August 15, 1974 to the end of 1976. It was subsequently collected in 15 bound volumes, totalling 1,800,000 words. Sankei Shimbun, with a circulation of two million, is one of the four largest newspapers in Japan. Its board chairman, Mr. Nobutaka Shikanai, was the man who had initiated the project which resulted in the publication of the series. In addition to Sankei Shimbun, he controls the Fuji TV, Nippon Hoso (Japan Broadcasting Co.) and Bunka Hoso (Cul­ tural Broadcasting). With these media of mass communica­ tion under his direction, he is considered one of the most influential figures in Japanese journalism. Mr. Shikanai conceived the idea of such a project in 1973. He believed that a sound understanding of Sino-Japanese relations during the past hundred years should form an essential part of the political education of all Japanese. Unfortunately, however, this was easier said than done. Hitherto books on the subject were written mostly from the traditional Japanese point of view, which was necessarily incomplete and distorted. Certain sensitive aspects of Japan’s pre-war China policy continued to lie outside the purview of dispassionate discussion. As a responsible journalist, Mr. Shikanai deemed it his duty to set the record straight, believing that the Japanese people, especially those born and grown up since the war, have the right to know the facts. In August 1973 Sankei Shimbun submitted a request to the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan for assistance in carrying out the project. The Chinese authorities pledged full cooperation. In February 1974 a special editorial office was set up in Taipei and Mr. Keiji Furuya, a member of the paper’s editorial board, was placed in charge. He was assisted by four staff writers (Hiroshi Iwano, Susumu Shimoiii

CHIANG KAI-SHEK: HIS LIFE AND TIMES

mura, Toyowo Kagawa and Nagayoshi Sumida) and a staff photographer (Kimimaro Mayama, deputy editor of the paper’s photographic department). In Taipei the Japanese writing team were given every facility to carry out their assignment. They had access to government archives, as well as to Chiang’s personal files: diaries and other unpublished papers. They were also able to interview hundreds of personalities who in one way or another were in a position to give useful information, including generals, politicians, diplomats, government and Kuomintang officials, even down to platoon leaders who happened to be at Lukouchiao on the fateful night of July 7, 1937, where the Second Sino-Japanese War officially began. Mr. Furuya and his collaborators had of course made extensive use of Japanese source materials: archives of the Foreign Ministry, Office of Military History of Japan Defense Agency, as well as the collections at Tokyo’s National Diet Library and Toyo Bunko (Oriental Library). They examined numerous documents hitherto unavailable. What they have produced is a comprehensive survey of Sino-Japanese relations since the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, with particular emphasis on the period in which Chiang Kai-shek was the dominant figure in China. They have thus written a biography of Chiang in the context not only of Sino-Japanese relations but also of world politics. They have at the same time shown how a relatively small clique of Japanese army extremists could shape the destinies of two neighboring countries, and ultimately plunged Japan into a catastrophic war with the United States. They have made a telling analysis of the forces at work in the world at large and their impact on the course of events in the Far East. The serialization of Sho Kai-seki Hiroku promptly drew fire from both the Right and the Left. Sankei Shimbun found itself in the center of a heated controversy. Mr. Shikanai himself was now the target of a vicious smear campaign, and he was even threatened with physical violence. For a time he deemed it prudent to seclude himself in the privacy of his home. But Sankei Shimbun was not without its supporters. The support came principally from the general public. An avalanche of letters lauding the publication of the series IV

FOREWORD TO THE ABRIDGED ENGLISH EDITION

poured in, hailing the paper for its courage and public service. Mr. Shikanai was acclaimed for having brought into the open a subject which had long been regarded as too sensitive to be aired in the press. The controversy came at a time when Japan was experiencing an acute energy crisis, and, as a result, the circulation of the leading newspapers declined from 10 to 25 percent. The circulation of Sankei Shimbun, on the other hand, witnessed an appreciable increase. In his lifetime Chiang Kai-shek rarely enjoyed a good press in the English-speaking world. Indeed, in certain quarters it has been the established orthodoxy to speak disdainfully of him. One exception was the brief period of a few years immediately following the outbreak of all-out war against Japan under his leadership. But his popularity was shortlived. His reputation in the Western press underwent perceptible change soon after American involvement in the Pacific War. One major factor contributing to the change was the conflict that developed between him and General Stilwell over the question of supplying the Chinese Communist forces with American arms. Mr. Furuya and his collaborators have discussed the Chiang-Stilwell conflict at length and with objectivity. This conflict greatly compounded the enormous dual challenge of foreign aggression and domestic upheaval with which Chiang was confronted. The Japanese authors have made it clear that the loss of mainland China to the Communists is a matter of extreme complexity, and no single factor can account for it. War weariness and general letdown in morale as a result of eight years of stupendous war effort had undoubtedly much to do with it. They have dwelt on one aspect of the question which has been disputed by a number of Western writers on the Chinese scene: they have not under-estimated the impact of Washington’s vacillating and ambivalent China policy and the influence exerted by certain foreign service officers on the shaping of that policy. The Japanese authors have laid no claim to having written a definitive work of scholarship. Their style of presentation is frankly journalistic rather than academic. But this does not in any way detract from the work’s basic value. What they have attempted to do is to present, on the basis of their findings, a

CHIANG KAI-SHEK: HIS LIFE AND TIMES

fair and balanced assessment of Chiang’s character and policy, his achievements and failures in the light of the history of his times. They have done this with flashes of insight. The bound volumes of Sho Kai-seki Hiroku have been a best seller in Japan. Each of the 15 volumes has sold from 100,000 to 150,000 copies. This is a record in Japanese book publishing business. This abridged English edition is not, of course, an adequate substitute for the original Japanese work. In making the abridgement, scrupulous care has been taken to preserve intact the spirit and flavor of the Japanese text. The editor has deleted those parts of the work which has little or nothing to do with Chiang Kai-shek but may be of interest to students of Sino-Japanese relations. He has also allowed himself to interpolate, here and there, sentences or even paragraphs by way of elucidation. These intrusions are of minor significance; they relate to matters which are perfectly clear to Japanese and Chinese readers but not so clear to Westerners. The factual data, the interpretations, and the broad conclusions belong to the authors alone and have not been affected by the abridgement.

vi

CONTENTS PROLOGUE THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

xi

PART I THE FORMATIVE PERIOD 1. The Early Years 2. The Revolution 3. The Birth of theRepublic 4. The Second Revolution 5. From the Twenty-One Demands to Yuan’s Death 6. China and World War I

1 3 20 35 46 60 75

PART II YEARS OF TRIAL AND PREPARATION 7. A Country Divided: the North and the South 8. The Enemy Within 9. A Fresh Start for the Kuomintang 10. The Kuomintang, Soviet Russia, and the Chinese Communists 11. Consolidation of the Revolutionary Base 12. Communist Ascendancy

87 89 102 111 123 147 157

PART III THE POLITICS OF NATIONALUNIFICATION 13. Communist Opposition to Northern Expedition 14. The Launching of the Expedition 15. The Anti-Chiang Campaign 16. Communists and Nationalists in Shanghai 17. Nanking versus Wuhan 18. Kuomintang’s Break with Soviet Russia 19. The Northern Expedition: the Second Phase 20. The Northern Expedition: the Finale 21. Manchuria under Nationalist Flag 22. Demobilization and New Warlordism \2 3 . Emergence of the “Red Army”

169 171 180 191 200 210 228 236 250 260 269 287

PART IV THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES 24. Prelude to the Manchurian Crisis 25. Outbreak on September 18,1931 26. The League of Nations and the Manchurian Crisis 27. National Crisis and Domestic Politics 28. Fighting in Shanghai 29. “Manchukuo” 30. The So-Called “Chinese Soviet Republic”

299 301 313 324 337 348 359 375 vii

CHIANG KAI—SHEK: HIS LIFE AND TIMES 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

Japanese Invasion of Jehol Back to Geneva North China The Fifth Communist-Suppression Campaign The New Life Movement, Japan’s “Monroe Doctrine,” and Chiang’s Appeal to Japan

386 396 406 419 434

PART V FROM CONCILIATION TO WAR 36. The Westward Flight of the Communists 37. Japan’s Second Forward Move in North China 38. The Darkening Scene 39. Last Call for Peace 40. Prelude to War 41. The Sian Coup

449 451 462 472 482 497 505

PART VI LUKOUCHIAO AND AFTER 42. Outbreak of War 43. From War in Shanghai to the Rape of Nanking 44. World Reactioin to Sino-Japanese War 45. Attempts at Mediation 46. The Communists and the War 47. The Defense of Wuhan 48. Wang Ching-wei and the Nanking Puppet Regime

529 531 547 558 571 581 599 613

PART VII WAR IN THE PACIFIC 49. Japan’s Southward Thrust 50. Communist Wartime Expansion 51. Japan’s Fateful Decision

625 627 658 681

PART VIII ALLIED RELATIONS 52. China and the Allies 53. Communist Conspiracy and Sino-American Relations 54. The Road to Cairo 55. A Year of Crisis and Discord 56. The Final Months of the War

713 715 740 766 790 817

PART IX THE FAILURE OF A MISSION 57. The Communist Strategy of Coalition Government 58. The Marshall Mission 59. Communist Seizure of the Mainland

835 837 858 891

PART X TAIWAN 60. The Island Beachhead 61. Last Years

911 913 954

Index

959

viii

PROLOGUE

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THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

The Japanese Surrender August 10, 1945. It was a hot day in Chungking, wartime capital of the Republic of China. The people went about their daily life in the sweltering heat. As daylight faded into the night, the city, operating under strict wartime regulations, appeared uncommonly quiet. Then, suddently, at 7:50 p.m., the calm was broken by shouts of joy in the streets. The radio monitor at the Allied Headquarters had just heard an English broadcast over Radio Tokyo to the effect that the Japanese Government, “in obedience to the gracious command of His Majesty the Emperor,” was ready to accept “the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam, July 26,1945, by the Heads of Government of the United States, Great Britain and China, and later subscribed to by the Soviet Government . . . ” Radio Chungking had picked up the good news and announced on its own that the war was over. The voice of the announcer quavered with emotion. The streets were soon jammed with cheering crowds. Americans joined the Chinese in the excitement. Masses of war-weary people gave themselves over to rejoicing. At that moment President Chiang Kai-shek, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces of the China Theater, was entertaining the new Mexican Ambassador, Major General Heliodoro Escalante, at dinner in his suburban residence. He did not allow the tumult and shouting in the streets to interrupt the diplomatic function. Immediately after the departure of the Mexican diplomat, however, he summoned his military staff to an emergency meeting. This was the second meeting of its kind he called that day. He had known even before the Tokyo broadcast, what was to come. The XI

PROLOGUE

sudden turn of events was expected to give rise to a multitude of problems all demanding urgent and careful consideration. The National Government had to be prepared to meet every contingency. Japanese sources indicate that the August 10 Englishlanguage broadcast was made on the authority of Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori without the express approval of the Japanese military. It is known that the military had been unalterably opposed to any move on the part of the Japanese Government which even remotely smacked of surrender. Not long before the Tokyo broadcast the War Minister, General Anami Korechika, had told the Japanese people over the radio that they must be prepared to fight on under all circumstances, even if “we should be forced to eat grass-roots, to bite the dust, to fill our dales and hills with corpses.” As far as China was concerned, the announcement of the Japanese surrender was a moment of overwhelming joy and relief. Since the so-called Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931, the Japanese invaders had trampled roughshod over a major part of China. The subjection of so vast a territory and so many millions of people for so long a period of time under foreign occupation forces was unparalleled in the annals of modern world history. For ten of the fourteen years of the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, China fought alone, with little help from the outside. Those were lonely and perilous years. Among the Western Powers, some were friendly and sympathetic, others were indifferent, still others frankly opportunistic and even hostile. Yet the Chinese people, under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, remained resolute and unbending. They were willing to have their land reduced to ashes rather than give in. They staked their national survival on the conviction that in the end all would be well. Now the enemy had sued for peace. One can well imagine the intense relief that must have been felt when, after so many years of anxious waiting and hoping in the midst of so much hardship, the enemy had been finally brought to heel. But this was hardly the time for complacency. The path to the future was still full of pitfalls and seemingly insuperable road blocks. No one was more aware of this than xii

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

Chiang Kai-shek himself. For four consecutive days and nights after the August 10 broadcast he scarcely had any rest or sleep. There was too much to be done and too little time to do it in. He was in continuous consultation with one group of officials or another. On the night of the 15th he found time to make this entry in his diary: God be praised for wisdom He has revealed to me and for the blessings He has bestowed upon me. Every sentence, every word in Psalm 9 has in some inscrutable ways come to pass. His guidance has enabled me to forge ahead with courage and in a spirit of humility . . .

Indeed, the Japanese imperialists were “sunk in the pit they made” and “snared in the work of their own hands,” but Japan’s loss was not in every way China’s gain. Some years later President Chiang, in a speech before a body of government trainees, expressed his ideas about Sino-Japanese relations in these terms: From the very beginning of the Republic of China, we have been of the firm conviction that China and Japan, sharing a common written language and belonging to the same racial stock, are truly fraternal countries. We need each other. If, instead of cooperation, we should fight against each other in a bloody war, we would both lose. Just as there cannot be in Asia an independent and free Japan without the existence of an independent and free China, so there cannot be an independent and free China without the existence of an independent and free Japan. Japan was defeated after eight years of war of aggression against China, and subsequently victorious China was overrun by Soviet-sponsored Com­ munism. We were both losers. Had my warning been heeded this would not have come to pass.1

Expanding Communist Revolt Of the questions that had arisen in connection with the Japanese surrender, three demanded immediate decisions: (1) 1Speech made in May 1950. xiii

PROLOGUE

The necessary steps to be taken to receive the Japanese surrender and to disarm the Japanese forces in the China Theater; (2) The ultimate form of government Japan should adopt and the status of the Emperor in the Japanese political system; and (3) The issue of the Chinese Communists and the manipulator behind their back, the Soviet Union. The three questions were in fact inter-related. At the time of Japan’s surrender there were in the China Theater (the three Northeastern Provinces or Manchuria excepted) including Taiwan and Northern Vietnam, some 1.283.000 men in the Japanese armed forces distributed as follows: 320,000 in North China: 290,000 in Central China; 330.000 in the Nanking-Shanghai area; 230,000 in Kwangtung; and 160,000 in Taiwan. They had to be speedily disarmed, and the areas they had occupied immediately restored to Chinese control. This was no easy task. It was the first time in modern times the Chinese had ever had the experience of accepting surrender. On the other hand, the Japanese who had always regarded themselves as militarily invincible, were not in the habit of surrendering to a foreign army, least of all to a Chinese army. There was even fear that some Japanese units in China might resist disarmament and engage in hostile action. The task, beset with difficulties as it was, was further compounded by the intrusion of the Chinese Communist problem. The Chinese Communists, who had at the beginning of the war agreed to renounce their policy of armed uprising and sovietization, were not in open revolt against the central authorities. Taking advantage of the Japanese surrender, they planned to seize Japanese weapons and amunition wherever possible, and extend their influence to areas under Japanese control, with the obvious intention of eventually taking over all China. This being so, President Chiang Kai-shek, on the night of August 10, instructed General Ho Ying-chin, Commanderin-Chief of the Chinese Army, to carry out certain urgent measures to forestall the Communist move, including, among others, the following: (1) To direct the Commanding General of the Japanese forces in China to order all their units to remain where they were, to stop all military action, to guard against destruction of all military and other material as well as lines of XIV

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

communication, to guard against disturbance of order and security in areas under their respective control, pending further orders from the C-in-C of the Chinese Army and of the commanders of the various war zones; (2) To direct the Chinese authorities in all war zones to do the following: (A) take precautionary measures against possible enemy resistance and sabotage, (B) warn enemy forces against surrendering their arms to any unit or representative other than by order of duly authorized military officers of the National Government, (C) order the puppet armies of the Japanese-sponsored Wang Ching-wei regime in Nanking to transfer their allegiance to the National Government and to be ready to move into areas relinquished by the Japanese, pending the arrival of Government troops. How to deal with the Chinese Communists was a source of anxiety and vexation for the Japanese also. Hardly a day passed without one Communist group or another demanding that the Japanese hand over their arms to them. On August 18, the Japanese Command in China decided upon clearcut measures to surrender their arms to the Chinese Government forces and on the 20th issued an 11-point directive in the name of General Kobayashi Sensaburo, Chief of Staff of the Japanese Forces in China, calling upon all their officers and men to observe certain basic principles in dealing with the overall question of surrender. In essence, the directive instructed the Japanese forces “to endeavor, in a spirit of justice, to work for the prosperity of China. . .,” “to assist the Central Government in Chungking in such a way as to enable it to achieve speedy national unification. . . ,” “to go a step farther in doing everything possible to enhance its military strength . . . ,” and “in the event of Communist attack and harassment, take decisive retaliatory action . . .” Pursuant to these principles, the Japanese forces refused to have any dealings with the Chinese Communists and in doing so came into frequent conflict with them. The situation was serious in North China, particularly in Shantung province, and in the coastal regions of Southeastern China. In the two months following V-J Day, no less than 1500 Japanese soldiers lost their lives at the Chinese Communist hands. The man charged with the general responsibility of XV

PROLOGUE

handling the surrender of the Japanese forces was General Ho Ying-chin, C-in-C of the Chinese Army. This was a happy choice because General Ho had at two different periods studied at the Japanese Military Academy and had had frequent contacts with the Japanese military. Nor was General Okamura Yasuji, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in China, a stranger to him. He had known the Japanese general in the 1930’s when the Japanese forces invaded North China. General Ho, who was then China’s Minister of War and concurrently Chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Council, had met General Okamura under humiliating circumstances at the time of the Tangku Truce Agreement, which was in fact a blueprint for further Japanese aggression in China. General Okamura, as Chief of Staff of the Japanese Kwantung Army, signed the famous or rather infamous document on behalf of the invaders. In 1945, however, their roles had been reversed. It was General Ho who dictated the terms of Japanese surrender, and it was General Okamura who was ordered to execute them. But the terms of the surrender were far from harsh. The spirit of magnanimity on the part of the Chinese government was not unappreciated. General Okamura carried out his order with dedication and dispatch. One of the most difficult tasks in connection with the surrender was the repatriation of over two million Japanese prisoners of war and civilians to their homeland. After eight years of war, all means of transportation were in dislocation. Most railroads and highways were in a state of disrepair. There was an acute shortage of rolling stock and trucks of all types. Yet the task was completed within the short space of ten months.

The Question of the Japanese Emperor Prior to the Japanese surrender, there had been much talk about what to do about the Japanese Emperor after the war. There had been those who advocated the abolition of the XVI

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

Emperor system. There had even been those whose cry was: “Exile the Emperor to Siberia!” “Hang him!” But such extreme views had never gained much support. When the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom and China met in Cairo in November 1943, they did not devote much attention to this question. The question of the form of government that Japan should adopt after the war was left in abeyance. In the course of a conversation between President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at the dinner table, however, the former solicited the latter’s opinion on the questions. The Chinese leader, according to Chinese record, replied: The men who started this war were a small band of Japanese militarists. It seems to me that all Japanese militarists must be wiped out in order to purge the political system of every vestige of aggressive militarism. As to the form of government Japan should adopt, we must refrain from trying to make decisions which the Japanese people should make for themselves. We must not create permanent mistakes between peoples.

Implicit in the reply was the belief that it was to the advantage of the Allies to keep the Emperor as a symbol of authority in the aftermath of Japan’s defeat. As one fully cognizant of the ethical and spiritual traditions of the Japanese people, Generalissimo Chiang instinctively knew that the Emperor system should not be abolished by a stroke of the pen. To remove this center of gravity was to create confusion and chaos at a time when order and stability was needed. The wisdom of keeping the Emperor as a symbol of authority has been borne out by subsequent events. The issue of the Emperor system was also very much on the mind of the Japanese policy-makers. At a meeting presided over by the Emperor himself, a heated debate took place in regard to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. It was pointed out by the opponents of unconditional surrender that what was at stake was the very existence of Japan as a nation. Paragraph 12 of that document spoke of the establishment of “peacefully inclined and responsible government” based on the “freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” Although there was no direct reference to xvu

PROLOGUE

the Emperor, the implications, they said, were clear enough. This being so, the ultimatum must be rejected. In addition to the question of the institution of the Emperor, War Minister Anami Korechika took strong exception to the occupation of Japan by forces of the Allied Powers (paragraph 7), the complete disarmament of the Japanese military establishment (paragraph 9) and the punishment of “war criminals” (paragraph 10). Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, on the other hand, argued for acceptance of the terms of surrender. He was of the opinion that to attach conditions to them would be to prolong the agony of a war which had already been lost. The debate raged on from 11:30 p.m. August 9 to 2:30 a.m. the next day without reaching a consensus. At this juncture the Emperor himself intervened. It was his view that the Imperial Government should attach only one condition to the surrender terms, namely, the demand of the Allied Powers should in no way prejudice “the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.” It was on the basis of the Emperor’s decision that Radio Tokyo made its momentous August 10 English-language broadcast which was monitored in Washington, London, Moscow and Chungking. This was not an official communication; it was designed to test the reaction of the Allied Powers to Japan’s expression of intention. In their reply the Allied Powers stated their position in regard to the authority of the Emperor in the following terms: From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. The Emperor and the Japanese High Command will be requested to sign the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, to issue orders to all the armed forces of Japan to cease hostilities and to surrender their arms, and to issue such orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.2

2

The reply was drafted by Secretary of State James Byrnes and subsequently approved by the Allied Powers.

xviii

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

The Japanese Foreign Office, in anticipation of possible objections on the part of the military, sought to soften the impact of the Allied reply by translating the English phrase “be subject to ” into a Japanese phrase meaning “be limited by.” But this did not stop the military from voicing vehement opposition. They vowed determination to fight to the death. They would rather see their island reduced to shambles than give in. Once again the Emperor intervened. On the morning of August 14 he called a council of war. He brushed aside all opposition by declaring that his mind had been made up and nothing could change it. He believed that there was no alternative left to Japan other than unconditional surrender. He was not disturbed by the Allied reply in regard to the form of government Japan was to adopt. It seemed to him that the Allied Powers had already recognized the authority of the Emperor. He therefore ordered the issuance of an Imperial rescript proclaiming Japan’s unconditional acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. For fourteen years following the so-called Mukden Incident in September 1931, Japan had inflicted untold misery and sorrow upon the Chinese people. Yet at the hour of victory the Chinese people had no desire to punish the Japanese people in revenge for the wrongs that had been done to them. President Chiang was voicing the general sentiment of the Chinese people when, in a message to the nation and the world broadcast over Radio Chungking on the 15th, he expressed the hope that “ this may be the last war in which civilized nations engage.” He went on to say: If this is really to be the last war in human history, then our people will not feel that the unspeakable cruelties and inhumanities they have endured were too big a price to pay or that peace for them has been too long delayed . . . It is our sincere belief that all men on earth — wherever they live and whatever the color of their skin — will some day be linked together in close fellowship like members of a family . ..

Turning to the people of Japan, he said: I am deeply moved when I think of the teaching of Jesus Christ that we should do unto others as we would have them do unto us and that we should love our enemies. My fellow xix

PROLOGUE countrymen know that ‘remember not evil against others’ and ‘do good to all men’ have been the highest virtues taught by our sages. We have always said that the violent militarism of Japan is our enemy, not the people of Japan. Although the armed forces of the enemy have been defeated and must be made to observe strictly all the terms of surrender, yet we should not for a moment think of revenge or heap abuses upon the innocent people of Japan. We can only pity them because they have been so badly deceived and misled, and hope that they will break away from the wrong doings and crimes.

The Yalta Secret Agreement and Its Consequences The third problem that troubled the National Govern­ ment of China at the time of the Japanese surrender was that of the Chinese Communists and their relations with the Soviet Union. Soviet troops had already been pouring into the three Northeastern Provinces of China. They were within easy reach of the Chinese Communist forces operating both inside and outside the Great Wall. It was feared that they might take advantage of the situation and equip the Communist forces with captured Japanese arms and abandon large areas of territory to the Communists before the government troops had time to reoccupy them. Subsequent events testified to the justness of these fears. It was on the 8th of August that Molotov informed the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow of his government’s decision to enter the Pacific War. In the early hours of the 9th, after the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, the Soviet armies entered Manchuria. The Soviet Union entered the Pacific War at a time when Japan was already on the verge of capitulation. Stalin decided to embark upon the adventure because he believed the risk was extremely low while the stakes involved were tremendously high. Six months before the Soviet participa­ tion in the conflict in the Far East, Stalin had extracted from XX

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

President Roosevelt concessions which made the Soviet participation in the Pacific War a highly lucrative business. These were embodied in the secret Yalta Agreement of February 11,1945. The Yalta Conference was primarily concerned with post-war problems of Europe. The Far East played no part in the formal discussions. The question of Soviet participation in the Pacific War did not come up until the end of the Conference. Stalin drove a hard bargain. He promised to enter the war against Japan within an estimated ninety days after the end of the war against Germany. In return for Soviet participation in the war, Roosevelt agreed to accept the following conditions: “ 1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia shall be preserved; “ 2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz: (a) The southern half of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union, (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored, (c) The Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchuria Railroad which provide an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the estab­ lishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria; “ 3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union; “ 4. The Soviet Union is ready to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and an alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.” XXI

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President Roosevelt thus placed himself in the amazing position of giving away territories which rightly belonged to another country, and which impaired the sovereignty of a friendly allied state. Sir Winston Churchill in his The Second World War has this to say: I must make it clear that though on behalf of Great Britain I joined in the agreement, neither I nor Eden took any part in making it. It was regarded as an American affair and was certainly of prime interest to their military operations. It was not for us to claim to shape it. Anyhow we were not consulted but only asked to approve. This we did. In the United States there have been many reproaches about the concessions made to Soviet Russia. The responsibility rests with their representatives.3

President Roosevelt acceded to Stalin’s territorial claims because his military advisers estimated that it would take eighteen months after the surrender of Germany to defeat Japan, and that it would cost about 200,000 more in American casualties to assault the Japanese islands if the Soviet Union should continue to remain neutral. Stalin insisted that the Russian people must have “a good reason” for going to war. It was with the objective of reducing American casualties that Roosevelt was persuaded to accept Stalin’s demands. Whatever this may be, it must be said that the secret Yalta agreement cannot by any standard of judgment, be regarded as a shining example of American diplomatic achievements. The distinguished American diplomat and expert on Soviet affairs, the late Charles E. Bohlen, was Roosevelt’s interpreter at Yalta. Aside from Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, he was the only other American present at the Stalin-Roosevelt discussions on the Pacific War. In his view, the secret Yalta agreement was a grievous error because it was based on “a faulty estimate of the length and of the course of the war against Japan.” It was also “unpleasant and immoral” because it involved “arrangements for the territory of a de facto ally behind the back of its government.”4 3 Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (New York, 1953), p. 390. 4 Charles E. Bohlen, The Transformation o f American Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), p. 36. XXII

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

Stalin was of course aware that the agreement concerning Dairen and Port Arthur as well as the Chinese Eastern Railroad required the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek. Who was to break the news to him? Stalin declined to do so because he was an interested party. He would rather have Roosevelt handle the matter. This Roosevelt agreed to do. For the time being, however, they believed that secrecy was advisable. Thus, for allegedly military reasons the Chinese Government was kept in the dark. Chiang could not help suspecting, however, that the Far Eastern situation must have been on the agenda of the Yalta Conference. Yet all the information available to the public concerned only Europe. On February 18th, Chiang confided his doubts to his diary: The Soviet Union seems to be the real gainer. What the United States has been able to gain seems more apparent than real. Britain has got little out of it. I consider the Conference a failure. The communique says nothing about the Far East. I am suspicious about it all.

Ten days later, he noted further: The attitude of the Soviet Union toward China has since the Conference become markedly more friendly. The same is apparent on the part of the United States and Britain. But what are their plans? One cannot but be perplexed by the total lack of information. The success or failure of our foreign policy may hinge upon what has been decided at the Conference. (February 28,1945)

Patrick J. Hurley, then the American Ambassador at Chungking, returned to Washington for consultation in late February. He suspected that secret decisions of major importance to the Far East had been made at the Yalta Conference. He could get no information from the State Department but 'succeeded in prevailing upon the President to allow him to examine his personal papers. He found in the papers the signed copy of the secret document bearing the vague title: “Agreement Regarding Japan.” He pointed out to Roosevelt the inconsistency between the President’s report to the Congress and his personal papers and questioned the right of the United States to give away territory of another sovereign state. Roosevelt, according to Hurley, was xxiii

PROLOGUE

disturbed and asked the Ambassador to go to London and Moscow to seek a way of remedying the situation. Hurley’s talks with Churchill and Stalin, however, were concerned not so much with the modification of the agreement as with the establishment of “ an area of agreement from which to negotiate an amelioration of the agreement’s conditions.”5 As late as May 12, 1945, in his message to Hurley, Harry S. Truman, who had succeeded to the Presidency after Roosevelt’s death, said that “in regard to the ‘prelude’ to the Yalta agreement on the future conduct of the Pacific war, it is not appropriate at the present time for you to give any in­ formation to the Chinese Government.”6 It was not until June 4 that President Truman, having learned from Harry Hopkins in Moscow of Stalin’s readiness to enter into negotiations with the Chinese, alerted Hurley that “in the near future” he would be instructed “to endeavor to obtain approval by Chiang Kai-shek of a military-political matter of the highest importance.” Truman did not divulge the contents of the matter, the reason being “to avoid leakage of highly secret information.”7 Five days after this alert, Truman received the Chinese Foreign Minister T.V. Soong, who was then in the United States to attend the San Francisco Conference. He wrapped up the Yalta package in an attractive way, imparting the information without making each and every phrase exactly known. Following this meeting with Soong, he directed the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, to cable to Hurley in Chungking the full text of that “military-political matter” referred to in his enigmatic cable of June 4th. Hurley was directed “to take up the matter with Chiang on June fifteenth and to make every effort to obtain the latter’s approval.”8 President Chiang had by this time already been informed 5 Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley: A Biography (Chicago, 1956), pp. 366-377. 6 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Year o f Decision (Garden City, N.Y. 1955), p. 266. 7Ibid., p. 268. 6Ibid., pp. 269-270. xxiv

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by his Ambassador in Washington of the main points of the Yalta secret agreement. On June 11th he instructed T.V. Soong to see Truman to point out that the Soviet Union had in 1924 renounced all special concessions, leases, and privileges in China. The Chinese Government and people were firmly opposed to a revival of Tsarist imperialism. Accordingly, Soong met with Truman again on the 14th. The President assured Soong that he “would do nothing that would harm the interests of China.” Meanwhile, in Chungking, the Soviet Ambassador, A.A. Petrov, called upon Chiang to speed up the process of translating the Yalta agreement into a Sino-Soviet treaty. The record of that meeting, which took place on June 12th, follows: “Petrov: The Soviet Union is now prepared to enter into negotiations with China for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and alliance. On the question of Sino-Soviet cooperation we welcome any concrete proposals China may care to make. Before we do that, I should like to state on behalf of the Soviet Government certain pre-conditions. (He proceeded to read his prepared statement.) “Chiang: May we take down these pre-conditions for the record? “Petrov: Of course, you may. “Chiang: I should like to study the so-called pre­ conditions before we discuss them. Here I wish to say something I had said before. We Chinese object to the use of such words as “pre-eminent rights,” “lease” and so on. They had been used in the past to gain special privileges. To use the word “lease” in connection with Port Arthur would vitiate the true meaning of a treaty of friendship and alliance. You don’t have to “lease” Port Arthur in order to use its facilities. China and the Soviet Union can both use that naval harbor for mutual benefit. That is the way we should cooperate with each other. “Petrov: To conclude a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Friendship is tantamount to a declaration of war against Japan. XXV

PROLOGUE

“Chiang: There is nothing I like better than to see the Soviet Union declare war against Japan. I sincerely hope we two countries can cooperate with each other. I don’t think it is the intention of the Soviet Union to alienate the friendly relations between our two peoples on account of the use of the word “lease.” “Petrov: “Leased territory” is not the same thing as “concession.” Concession implies “extra-territoriality” while “leased territory” does not have that implication. “Chiang: I hope the Soviet Union would not insist on making an issue of the word “lease.” Other countries might be tempted to follow the Soviet example. “Petrov: The question is not the word “lease.” In the case of Port Arthur, the Soviet Union will of course fix a strict time limit to the lease. China is still the rightful owner of the port. There will be no impairment of her sovereignty. “Chiang: There can be no territorial integrity if a country’s land becomes the “leased territory” of another country. If China cannot exercise control over her own naval base and cannot use it the way she sees fit, then she has lost her sovereign independence. “Petrov: I shall report Your Excellency’s opinion to my Government. “Chiang: I hope you will point out to your government that after Tsarist Russia had acquired the privilege of leasing Port Arthur as a naval base and the Liaotung Peninsula for a period of twenty five years in 1898, Germany obtained a “lease” of Kiaochow Bay as a coaling station and naval base for ninety-nine years, France took a “lease” at Kwangchowwan, and Britain demanded and got the “lease” of Weihaiwei, across the bay from Port Arthur. These are our national humiliations and we Chinese cannot allow history to repeat itself. “Petrov: In discussing this question, one must take into consideration the fact that the Soviet Union is a Pacific power, and it needs a warm-water port in the Pacific. “Chiang: The Soviet Union seeks stability in the Pacific. So does China. “Petrov: The proposed pre-conditions had the concur­ rence of Prime Minister Churchill and the late President Roosevelt. XXVI

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“Chiang: Do you mean that they had discussed the question at Yalta? “Petrov: That’s right. From the proceedings of the Yalta Conference, it can readily be seen that the Soviet Union never intended to make an enemy of China on account of Port Arthur. The question of “lease” is not the issue. The issue is how to unite in a common front in our fight against the present aggressor or other possible aggressors. “Chiang: We agree with you on that point. But we cannot allow China to be once again laboring under the yoke of unequal treaties. (After a pause, he continued.) The historical facts I have just alluded to show that Tsarist Russia’s leasing of Port Arthur started a chain of events that finally placed China in the status of a semicolonial country. The Soviet Union in 1924 renounced all Tsarist unequal treaties with China. The Soviet Union thus set an example for other countries to emulate. It is important to keep the two periods of history separate and distinct and not to mix them up. “Petrov: The circumstances have changed. The China of today is not the China of former times. And, what is more, unlike the Tsarist times, China and the Soviet Union are now beginning to negotiate for a treaty of alliance and friendship.” Three days after the Chiang-Petrov dialogue, Ambassador Hurley, in a formal conference, presented President Chiang with the Truman memorandum. The first part of this message set out in full the assurances which Stalin had given Hopkins: “1. Stalin has made for us a categorical statement that he will do everything he can to promote unification under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. “ 2. That this leadership should continue after the war. “ 3. That he wants a united stable China and wants China to control all of Manchuria as a part of united China. “4. That he has no territorial claims against China, and he will respect Chinese sovereignty in all areas his troops enter to fight the Japanese. “ 5. That he will welcome representatives of the Generalissimo to be with his troops in Manchuria in order to facilitate the organization of Chinese administration in Manchuria. xxvn

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“ 6. That he agrees with America’s ‘open door policy’ in China. “ 7. That he agrees to a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States.” This was the sugar-coating part of the message intended to make the second part —the part spelling out the conditions laid down by the Soviet Union for its participation in the Pacific War, conditions which seriously undermined China’s territorial integrity — more palatable to Chiang. Hurley was further instructed to explain to the Chinese leader that President Roosevelt had promised to support the Soviet claims and that he, Truman, was in agreement. He was also instructed to obtain Chiang’s approval of the Yalta agreement and to inform Chiang of Stalin’s desire to discuss the Soviet proposals “directly with Soong in Moscow before the first of July.” That evening Chiang wrote in his diary: In reading Truman’s memo I feel more than simply hurt and sad. What I am afraid of is whether there are other secret provisions in the Yalta agreement not yet revealed to me. Even if this is all there is to it, the Chinese people have already been placed in a unparalleled and dangerous predicament. Nor is this all. The United States, too, will suffer from it. In the next hundred years there can be no peace or security in Asia. Henceforth we have no choice but to take our own fate in our own hands and struggle for a place in the sun by the sweat of our own brow. There is no other way to break through the oppressive and enveloping darkness. This is of course not Hurley’s fault. We must continue to treat him with courtesy and respect.

Nonetheless, Chiang determined to make the best of the bad situation. He did everything possible to forestall the threatened engulfment of China by the Soviet Union. He wanted the United States to stand by him in the forthcoming negotiations. He asked Hurley to transmit to Washington three suggestions: “ (1) That the United States and Great Britain should become party to whatever agreement China might sign with the Soviet Union; (2) That Port Arthur should be designated as a joint naval base for China, the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain; and (3) xxviii

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

That the transfer of Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviet Union should be discussed by the same four powers rather than by China and the Soviet Union alone.” 9 But this last effort to enlist United States support in the negotiations did not receive any encouragement from Washington. Chiang was told that the American Government could not consent either to share in the joint use of Port Arthur as a naval base or to become a party to whatever agreement the Chinese Government might decide to sign with the Soviet Union.10

The Sino-Soviet Treaty The Chinese delegation headed by Foreign Minister T.V. Soong (now elevated to Premiership) was scheduled to leave for Moscow on June 27th. He was to be accompanied by Chiang Ching-kuo, President Chiang’s older son and an expert in Russian affairs. Just before their departure, President Chiang called in the Soviet Ambassador to state once again his views in regard to the forthcoming negotiations. He reiterated his opposition to the word “lease” in connection with Port Arthur. He was agreeable to Outer Mongolia’s self-government but opposed to its formal independence. He did not think that the time was ripe for a final solution of the Mongolian question. He expressed the hope that the two governments would be able to work for mutual under­ standing and strengthen their already friendly relations. It was with apprehension and deep anxiety that Soong and his associates started their journey to Moscow. It was known that Soviet troops might be coming down through Manchuria and Mongolia into China and Korea in about a month. Soong was thus negotiating not from a position of 9 Telegram, Hurley to Truman, June 15, 1945. See, Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, 1953), p. 314. Also Lohbeck, op. cit.,pp. 269-367. 10 Herbert Feis, Ibid., p. 315. X X IX

PROLOGUE

strength but from one of weakness. To his surprise Stalin received him and his party, as recalled by Chiang Ching-kuo in a record he kept of the negotiations, with courtesy and affability. But as soon as the formal sessions began another Stalin emerged. From a gracious and charming host he changed into a harsh and imperious bully. Throwing a piece of paper on the table, he demanded to know whether Soong was acquainted with its contents. A glance was sufficient to see that the paper was a copy of the Yalta agreement. Soong replied that he knew the contents of the agreement in a general way. Then Stalin made this curt statement: “We can enter into negotiations only on the basis of this document. As you know, Roosevelt had put his signature on it.” After much hard bargaining, however, Stalin relaxed a little. He agreed to drop the word “lease” in regard to Port Arthur. He showed some flexibility in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railroad and Dairen. But on the question of the independence of Outer Mongolia, he was adamant. An impasse was reached. The negotiations were on the verge of collapse. At this juncture Chiang Ching-kuo was instructed by his father to put formal negotiations aside for a while, pay Stalin an informal visit and explain to him confidentially why the Chinese Government could not formally accept the idea of an independent Outer Mongolia. Accordingly Chiang arranged to have a private meeting with Stalin. He recorded his conversations with Stalin as follows: “Stalin: Why do you oppose Mongolia’s independence with so much vigor and inflexibility? “I (Chiang Ching-kuo): We have been engaged in a war with Japan for eight years. We have only one objective: to recover our lost territories. The Japanese are still in China. Manchuria and Formosa are still in Japanese hands. If we of the Chinese Government, instead of making every effort to recover lost territories, should now give another piece of territory away, our countrymen would never forgive us. They would certainly condemn us as traitors who have betrayed the vital interests of China and vitiated the purpose of the present war of resistance. We would then lose their support. That’s why we cannot agree to the incorporation of Outer Mongolia into the Soviet Union. “Stalin: You may be right on that. But you must XXX

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

understand that today you need my help and I don’t need yours. If your country has the strength and ability to defeat Japan without my help, then I would not have made any demands on you. You don’t have the strength and ability. What is the use of making so much fuss about Outer Mongolia? Outer Mongolia is a vast but barren land. It is sparsely populated. The communications are poor and there is not any abundance of resources. Why are you so insistent on the question of Mongolia’s ‘independence’? “Stalin: I can tell you frankly that I want Outer Mongolia for military and strategic reasons. (Then he took out a map and pointed to Outer Mongolia.) If an army should attack the Soviet Union from Mongolia and cut off the Trans-Siberia Railroad, then we are finished. “I: I don’t think you should worry about that. If Japan is defeated as a result of Soviet participation in the war, she will never again have the strength to occupy Mongolia and use it as a base to attack the Soviet Union. Besides Japan, there is only China. But China is going to enter into a treaty of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union. This treaty will, as you have said, govern the relationship of our two countries for twenty five years. We may even add five more years to it. At least within twenty-five or thirty years there is no possibility of our attacking you. And, as you are well aware, China will not have the strength to attack you even if she wants to. “Stalin: You are wrong about this. Japan may be defeated, but she will rise again. “I: Why do you think so? “Stalin: You may be able to stamp out all other forces in this world, but you can’t stamp out the elemental force of nationalism. This is especially true of Japanese nationalism. “I: Germany has already surrendered. You have occupied a part of German territory. Do you believe that there will be a revived Germany? “Stalin: Of course, there will be a revived Germany. “I: It will take a long time before there can be a revived Japan. There is ample time for you to plan your defenses. “Stalin: It may be sooner or it may be later, but sooner or later, Japan will rise again. If Japan should be placed under XXXI

PROLOGUE

the military occupation of the United States, she would recover from the defeat in five years. “I: What will happen if the Soviet Union be the occupying Power? “Stalin: Under my control Japan’s revival will at most be delayed for another five years. (At this point Stalin showed signs of impatience and added with brutal directness.) I ’ll never be satisfied until I get Mongolia. (Then he said with an air of earnestness.) Today you have come to see me not as a diplomat but as a private individual. Let me tell you frankly, even treaties are only scraps of paper. And you have made another error. You say that China has not got the strength to attack the Soviet Union. This is of course true today, but it may not be true tomorrow. If China is really united she will be able to forge ahead faster than any other country. (After a pause, he continued.) Even if, as you say, Japan and China will not in the near future have the power to take Mongolia and use it to attack the Soviet Union, could you be sure that there would not be a third power who would try to do that? “I: Who can this third power possibly be? (Stalin did not answer me, but I pressed for an answer.) Do you mean the United States? “Stalin: Of course.” Stalin minced no words in this conversation with Chiang Ching-kuo. He seemed to have spoken what was on his mind. He was highly suspicious of the United States. In subsequent conversations, he was never wary of warning Chiang Ching-kuo against American duplicity.11 T.V. Soong and Stalin held six formal meetings. Chiang Ching-kuo kept a record of all these meetings. All that Stalin said about Soviet participation in the war, about Port Arthur and Dairen, about restoration to the Soviet Union of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, about the South Manchurian Railroad and the Chinese Eastern Railroad — was indicative of the Soviet Union’s expansionist ambitions. It may be of interest to quote briefly from Chiang Ching-kuo’s record with respect to each of these questions.* 11

Chiang Ching-kuo, Feng-yu chung ti ning-ching (Calm In The Eye of A Storm), 1974 edition, Taipei, Taiwan, pp. 67-70.

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

(1) Soviet Participation in the War “Stalin: All the Soviet claims in regard to Outer Mongolia, the Kuriles, Port Arthur, the railroads, and so forth have but one objective in view: to strengthen our strategic needs in our war against Japan. We seek no other advantage than this. In the four years of war against Germany, the Soviet people had shed much blood, and they know that when they are attacked they must fight back. It is quite different in the case of Japan. Japan has not attacked us, but we are going to attack Japan. We have lately been having friendly relations with Japan. In fact, Japan has been trying hard to ingratiate herself into our favor. The Soviet people have been far too weary of one war to fight another. If they fight Japan they must have a good cause to do so. This is the way to strengthen our war morale. This is a point you should never overlook. “Soong: But in saying what you have just said, you don’t seem to understand the difficulties in which we of the Chinese Government now find ourselves. We cannot afford to tell our people that we are going to alienate part of our patrimony for the sake of winning the good will of another country. “Stalin: I wish you would give some thought to what I have been trying to explain. “Soong: Your Excellency has repeatedly declared that you want to see a united China. If so, please don’t compound our difficulties by laying claim to Chinese territory. “Stalin: (After a moment of reflection) If this be the case, you might keep the agreement a secret for the time being and publish it after the defeat of Japan.12

12

Exchange at the second formal meeting, July 2, 1945. xxxiii

PROLOGUE

(2) The Internationalization of Dairen “Soong: The ‘Internationalization of Dairen’ —what does it mean? “Stalin: It means that Dairen is a commercial port of an international character, open to the commerce and shipping of all nations. The pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union, however, must be safeguarded. “Soong: What does the phrase ‘pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union’ mean in this context? “Stalin: These are the interests contained in the Treaty of 1898 with some improvement. The administration of the port is to be exercised by the Soviet Union. “Soong: The treaty concluded at the time of the Tsars can no longer be used as the basis of a new treaty. “Stalin: What do you propose to do then? “Soong: In our view, a free port is one open to the commerce and shipping of all nations. Your Excellency has always insisted that China retains full sovereignty over Manchuria. If so, the administration of the port should be exercised by China and not by the Soviet Union. “Stalin: That I cannot agree. If it is only a matter of commerce, there is no need for the conclusion of a new treaty. We propose to enter into a new agreement precisely because we want to have some special rights. We want the port to be open to international commerce, but we also want to safeguard our ‘pre-eminent interests.’ “Soong: Can it be that you have greater ‘pre-eminent interests’ than our pre-eminent interests? “Stalin: It is of course a matter of degree. Compared with those enjoyed by China and other countries, Soviet Union’s interests are pre-eminent. “Soong: Does this mean that the Soviet Union wants to enjoy more privileges as regards Dairen than China? “Stalin: That, I believe, is the case. The Soviet Union needs a warm-water port in the Pacific.”13

13Second meeting, July 2, 1945. XXXIV

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

(3) The Railroad “Soong: What is the precise meaning of the phrase ‘the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company ’? “Stalin: The railroad is to be under the joint management of both countries. “Soong: Ownership? “Stalin: Ownership belongs to those who built the railroad. “Soong: Do you intend to use the railroad to transport troops? “Stalin: Yes, when we are at war with Japan. “Soong: How about in peace-time? “Stalin: There is no need of that in time of peace. What are you afraid of? Are you afraid that the Soviet Union will use the railroad to occupy Peking?”14 The question of transporting troops by rail came up again at another meeting. “Stalin: We intend to use Port Arthur as a naval base. We have to use the railroad to transport weapons, ammunition and replacement troops. When I said that the Sovet Union will not use the railroad to transport troops in time of peace, I did not refer to the replacement. “Soong: I don’t think what you say today is the same as what you said at the second meeting. (The minutes of the second meeting were being read.) The Chinese people cannot allow foreign troops to be stationed on their territory. “Stalin: Our troops cannot even pass through Chinese territory? “Soong: Yes, we are also opposed to that. “Stalin: Of course you can limit the number of troops passing through Chinese territory. “Soong: This is not what you said the other day. I believe in you. I believe your word. We have already made far-reaching concessions as regards Outer Mongolia. I hope you will not press your demands any further. “Stalin: How about using the railroad only for transporting military supplies? “Soong: I can agree to that. 14 Second Meeting. XXXV

PROLOGUE

“Stalin: At the end of the war we may want to transfer part of the troops already in China to Port Arthur. Is that agreeable to you? “Soong: Yes, but must be limited only to that one time. “Stalin: If we limit the number of our troops to be transported each time to one or two divisions, would that be acceptable to you? “Soong: Not acceptable. “Stalin: Not if our troops wear plain clothes instead of uniforms? “Soong: You are the commander-in-chief of your armed forces. I am surprised that you indulge in such sophistry. “Stalin: This is not, of course, the normal way of doing things. But in an effort to show respect for Chinese sovereignty, we may, with your agreement, limit the number of troops to be transported by rail to one division at a time. I think you should give due consideration to this. “Soong: You have often expressed the desire to remove the causes of friction and conflict between our two countries. Therefore, if you must transport troops, I think it is better to do so by sea rather than by rail. “Stalin: In your opinion rail transportation should be limited only to military supplies. “Soong: We are responsible for the protection of the railroad. We can not allow armed foreigners to be stationed on our territory. “Stalin: Railroad guards or police are not troops. They don’t have artillery or tanks. Can we not use Soviet police to guard the railroad? “Soong: I can assure you that we are quite capable of giving adequate protection to the railroad. “Stalin: Japan could instigate its agents to disrupt the service by sabotage. “Soong: After Japan’s defeat she wouldn’t have any armed agents left to do that. “Stalin: Not necessarily so. Germany has now been defeated, yet there are tens of thousands of German agents operating underground. “Soong: I think we are quite capable of dealing with Japanese saboteurs.”15 15Fifth Meeting, July 11, 1945. xxxvi

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

(4) The Question of Soviet Withdrawal “Stalin: I cannot say I am overjoyed at your proposal that the Soviet troops must be completely withdrawn from Manchuria within three months of Japan’s defeat. How can an occupied country ask its liberators to get out within a specific length of time? Had France, even before the landing of American and British troops on French soil, had the temerity to have put forth a proposal such as you have been making today, what do you think would have been the consequences? “Soong: Let me ask you, then, how long do the Soviet troops intend to stay in Manchuria after the defeat of Japan? “Stalin: I would suppose two or three weeks. “Soong: How long would it take them to complete the withdrawal? “Stalin: That would have to depend on the available transportation facilities and the size of the forces involved. I should think that the Japanese would put up a stiff fight in Manchuria, and we must be adequately prepared to deal with the situation. But, in any case, the withdrawal should have been completed within two months. “Soong: May I take this as your public declaration that the Soviet troops would certainly and definitely be completely withdrawn within three months of the Japanese defeat? “Stalin: Barring accidents and other untoward develop­ ments, I am sure that it would not even take that long.”16

(5) The Question of the Chinese Communists “Stalin: Is your government prepared to accept the participation of liberal elements? “Soong: To say the truth, we are still in search of a more practicable way to solve the question. In March this year we decided to organize a War Cabinet in which the Communists 16Fifth Meeting, July 11, 1945. X X X V ll

PROLOGUE

could participate. Ambassador Hurley told me that, in your view, the Chinese Communists are only agrarian reformers... “Stalin: It is doubtful whether they are genuine Communists. “Soong: I have always wanted to go to Yenan, but the Communists have refused to let me. It has been my fond hope that we could have a strong and unified central government and an effective centrally-controlled armed force capable of safeguarding the security of the nation. We don’t like to see the existence of warlords such as the late Chang Tso-lin. Nor do we like to see a political party maintaining a separate armed force and a political structure totally independent of the central authority. If the Communists sincerely want to cooperate with us, we welcome their participation in the war cabinet. We have no desire to discriminate against them. “Stalin: I am referring not only to the Chinese Communists but also to the liberal elements, who are outside the National Government. The National Government is a Kuomintang government. The Kuomintang alone cannot, under the present wartime circumstances, rally adequate support to deal with the situation. I believe it is to your advantage to have a government, while led by the Kuomintang, that is supported by all political elements outside the ranks of the Kuomintang. However, I have no business to butt into a problem which the Chinese people themselves must resolve. “Soong: To tell the truth, we do sincerely hope that non-Kuomintang people would be able to participate in the National Government. But we are not in favor of what is called a ‘coalition government.’ A ‘coalition government’ is an unstable government, and the withdrawal of a participating party will surely cause its downfall.” 17 In these conversations Stalin revealed himself to be the inheritor of the imperialist ambitions of Tsarist Russia. The Pacific War was thus regarded by him as a godsent opportunity to regain, at China’s expense, what had been lost to Japan in 1904. He seemed oblivious of the existence of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of May 1924 by which the Soviet 17Ibid., Second Meeting, July 2, 1945. xxxviii

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

Union had nullified all Tsarist agreements and treaties affecting the sovereignty and interests of China; and recognized Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China, and of China’s sovereignty therein. He talked as if ideological considerations were of no concern to him. He left the impression that he was ready to disavow the Chinese Communists and recognize President Chiang Kai-shek as the sole leader capable of ruling China. Yet this arch-exponent of Tsarist imperialist restoration never hesitated to promote Communist revolution wherever and whenever the oppor­ tunity presented itself. The interplay of the traditional and the revolutionary aspects of Soviet foreign policy has often been a source of puzzlement for Western observers. The fact is, however, that the traditional and the revolutionary aspects of the policy, far from being contradictory, are two sides of the same coin. This two-pronged policy soon found its practical application in post-war China. From July 1 to 12, Soong had held six formal meetings with Stalin and Molotov. The Soviet leaders had at these meetings demanded rights and privileges in Manchuria that went well beyond any claims contained in the Yalta agreement. The focal point of disagreement was the question of Outer Mongolia, on which neither party was willing to yield. The Soviet demands on Dairen and Port Arthur were equally far-reaching. While agreeing to drop the use of the word “lease,” the Soviet proposal envisaged the creation of a military zone which was to include not only the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur but also adjacent land and sea areas. The Manchurian railroads and connected enterprises (fac­ tories, lands, coal mines, timber tracts, etc.) were to be exclusively owned by the Soviet Union, which was also to have a major voice in their management and operation. The acceptance of the Soviet proposals would have placed the whole of Manchuria under Russian control. In an attempt to break the deadlock, President Chiang instructed T.V. Soong to make the following concessions: China would agree to have a plebiscite held in Outer Mongolia after the war to determine the status of the area, if Stalin would give full recognition to Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and agree to withdraw all moral and material aid from the Chinese Communists and the Sinkiang rebels. The X X X IX

PROLOGUE

Soviet Union would be offered the joint use of Port Arthur but not joint control. Dairen would be made a free port but under Chinese administration. The two railroads would be jointly operated but remain under Chinese ownership and sovereignty. On July 10th Stalin accepted the Chinese compromise proposal on Outer Mongolia, with the Russian promise not to support either the rebels in Sinkiang or the Communists in China. Stalin had denied that there had been any such support in the past. The question of Russian military control of the two ports and the Manchurian railroads remained in abeyance. Stalin insisted that the majority of the directors cf the railroads should be Russian and the military zone under Soviet control should include both Port Arthur and Dairen, as well as adjacent land and sea areas. At this point the negotiations were interrupted by the departure of Stalin and Molotov for the Potsdam Conference. T.V. Soong returned to Chungking, and he was prepared to return to Moscow any time Stalin wanted. The talks resulted in no agreement. On July 20, President Chiang, after having heard Soong’s report of the state of the negotiations, cabled President Truman in Potsdam: Although China was not represented at the Yalta Conference, you, Mr. President, will realize that we have gone the limit to fulfill the Yalta formula. We have even gone beyond it in the case of Outer Mongolia, we have gone as far as the public opinion of China will stand. We may even already have gone beyond the limit that the Chinese people will support. I trust in your conversations with Gemeralissimo Stalin you would impress on him the eminently reasonable stand we have taken, so that he will not insist on the impossible.

In reply, Truman said that he asked the Chinese Government to “carry out the Yalta agreement,” but he never asked for “any concession in excess of that agreement.” He hoped that Soong would soon return to Moscow “to reach complete understanding” with Stalin as to the “correct interpretation of the Yalta agreement.” 18 Soong, accompanied by the newly appointed Foreign 18

xl

Harry Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1, “Year of Decisions,” p. 320.

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

Minister, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, returned to Moscow on August 7. On the following day the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and Soviet troops launched their massive campaign in Manchuria. Meanwhile, the second phase of Sino-Soviet negotiations began. A number of difficult issues awaited resolution. On the Chinese side, however, it was feared that in the absence of any agreement, the Soviet occupation forces might remain in Manchuria for an indefinite length of time, thus leaving them in de facto control of the vast resource-rich Northeastern Provinces. It was also feared that a deadlock in the negotiations might lead to misunderstandings between China and the United States, inasmuch as President Roosevelt had committed himself to support the Soviet claims in Manchuria. It was in these inauspicious circumstances that the treaty of friendship and alliance together with six other instruments — four agreements and two exchange notes — were completed and signed. By the main treaty the contracting parties undertook to cooperate with and aid each other in war with Japan till victory, and to continue, after Japan’s defeat, the cooperation and mutual aid so as to make renewed Japanese aggression impossible. They further pledged themselves to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs, and to refuse to join any coalition whatever directed against either of them. Supplementing some of the main points of the treaty was a note signed by Molotov which declared that the U.S.S.R. reaffirmed “its respect for China’s full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) and recognized their territorial and administrative integrity”; agreed “to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be given to the National Government as the Central Government of China” ; and pledged not to interfere in China’s internal affairs. In a statement appended to the treaty, Stalin pledged that the U.S.S.R. would begin to withdraw from Manchuria three weeks after the capitulation of Japan and would complete the withdrawal within three months. xli

PROLOGUE

Mao Tse-tung’s Strategem and Deception It would be out of place here to narrate the vicissitudes of the Chinese Communist movement; suffice it to say that the fortunes of the Chinese Communists had reached their lowest ebb just before and after the much-publicized “ Long March” in 1934. The “ Long March” was in fact a “long rout,” at the end of which the Communists stood in imminent danger of annihilation. It was obvious that if they were to survive they had to rally the Chinese people to their support, and there was only one sure way to do that — to stir up the spirit of nationalism by championing the cause of resistance to Japanese aggression. When the National Government was still obliged to temporize with Japan in order to buy time for preparation, the Communists “declared war” on the aggressors, though they were hundreds of miles away from the nearest Japanese forces. They launched the “united front movement” and challenged the National Government to join forces with them in an all-out war against the common enemy — Japan. The move was a masterpiece of timing; the outburst of national feeling that it produced was so overwhelming that the popular clamor for war became well-nigh irresistible. It is in these circumstances that the National Government accepted the Communist offer to resist Japanese aggression under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. The wartime collaboration between the National Government and the Communists was based on a series of documents issued by Nanking and Yenan, by which the latter proclaimed the abandonment of military insurrection and sovietization while the former announced the change of its policy vis-a-vis the Communists from one of military suppression of “Communist banditry” to that of seeking a political settlement. The first of these documents was addressed to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party dated February 10, 1937. The CC of the CCP declared itself ready to make certain changes in its activities if the National Government under the Kuomintang would abandon its policy of Communist suppression and concentrate China’s national strength against external aggression. The proposed changes included: xlii

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

(1) To stop the program of armed uprising throughout the country for the overthrow of the National Government; (2) To change the Chinese Soviet Government into the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China and the Red Army into the National Revolutionary Army under the direct leadership of the Military Affairs Commis­ sion in Nanking; (3) To enforce the democratic system of universal suffrage within the Special Region; (4) To put an end to the policy of expropriating the land of the landlords and to execute the common program of the anti-Japanese united front. The Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee adopted on February 21, 1937 a resolution which recalled the original lenient policy of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in admitting Communists into the Kuomintang proclaimed in 1924, and forwards their “subsequent treasonable and rebellious activities” up to the time of the session, when the “Communist bandits, reduced to straits in the Northwest, have begun to announce alleged willingness to surrender.” The resolution then stated the Kuomintang’s willingness to give the Communists a chance to “reform” on four conditions: (1) Abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the united command of the nation’s armed forces; (2) Dissolution of the so-called “Chinese Soviet Republic” ; (3) Absolute cessation of Communist propaganda and acceptance of the Three Principles of the People; (4) Absolute cessation of class struggle activities. Events were now moving swiftly towards a climax. The Communist suppression campaign stopped, and the National Government in Nanking had made it clear that if the Japanese went a step further in their encroachments on North China, they would be met with the united strength of the Chinese people.

xliii

PROLOGUE

On the night of July 7, 1937, the Japanese troops clashed with the Chinese garrison near Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge), about twenty miles from Peiping. The Japanese as a matter of course demanded that the Chinese be withdrawn from strategic points around Peiping, that the Japanese be permitted to search the villages in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge, and that the Chinese military authorities apologize for the “ Lukouchiao Incident” and punish the culprits. The Chinese refused to bow to the demands; both sides brought in reinforcements, and the war was on. When news of the Lukouchiao clashes reached Yenan, Mao Tse-tung and his generals wired Generalissimo Chiang offering their services for common defense of the homeland. On September 22, the Communists issued a manifesto which proclaimed that Chinese unity had been restored and they would now, under the banner of Dr. Sun’s Three Principles of the People, fight shoulder to shoulder with the Kuomintang against the Japanese aggressors. On the day following the publication of the Communist manifesto, Generalissimo Chiang issued a formal statement welcoming the change of Communist policies: The National Government has never ceased to call for national unity and for united effort to save the country from its present plight. . . All individual or group interests must be subordinated to the higher interest of the whole nation. The Manifesto recently issued by the Chinese Communist Party is an outstanding instance of the triumph of national sentiment over every other consideration. The various decisions embodied in the Manifesto — the abandonment of the policy of violence and sovietization, the abolition of the Soviet areas and the disbandment of the Red Army — are all essential conditions for mobilizing our national strength in order that we meet the menace from without and guarantee our national existence. These decisions are in accord with the spirit of the Manifesto and resolutions adopted by the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang . . . The National Government is prepared to give all those who adhere to the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen the opportunity to serve the country in this hour of need, irrespective of their past record

With this formal statement the wartime collaboration be­ tween the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party got xliv

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

off to a promising start. Chou En-lai was sent to Wuhan as the Communist liaison officer. He successively served in Wuhan, Chungking and Nanking. On one of his frequent trips to Yenan, he brought back to the Generalissimo a letter in Mao Tse-tung’s own handwriting, dated September 29, 1938: Upon their return to Yenan (from Wuhan), Chou En-lai and other comrades spoke highly of your kindness, for which I am very grateful. Your leadership in this unprecedented war of national revolution has earned the admiration and respect of all our countrymen. During the past fifteen months we have proved our mettle: the more we have suffered, the more we want to fight on. Though the enemy is yet to be stopped, I nonetheless believe we have paved the way to victory and the future is by no means dark. At the sixth plenary session of our party’s Central Committee it was generally felt that the war of resistance is about to enter upon a new stage, a stage characterized by greater difficulties on the one hand and by greater progress on the other. The task before the nation is to unite the people, consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese front, persevere in our war effort, mobilize new strength, overcome difficulties, and prepare for the counter-offensive. We feel sure that at this stage the enemy will take advantage of the European situation as well as of our own weaknesses to launch various subversive activities to undermine our national unity. Never before has unity and solidarity been of greater importance than it is now. The time has come for all of us, whatever may be our party membership or political affiliation, to exert, under your unified leadership, our utmost to foil enemy subversion, rid ourselves of every trace of defeatism, high ten our national consciousness, fortify our faith in ultimate victory, and adopt such wartime measures as may be needed at this new stage. Only thus can we stop the enemy’s advance and prepare for our own counter-offensive. In view of the tense situation now prevailing in the Wuhan area, I am sending comrade Chou En-lai back to Wuhan before the close of our sixth plenum. He will report to you personally our thinking in regard to the present situation. I am firmly convinced that only through the long-term collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party can we hope to mount a protracted war. However strong the enemy may be, he will be defeated in the end, for a nation of 450,000,000 people must be able to surmount all difficulties and gather strength in the course of xlv

PROLOGUE this long and bitter struggle. There can be no doubt that they will eventually expel the enemy in a counter-offensive and establish themselves as a great power in East Asia. This is my view which I trust is also shared by you. Best wishes for your good health and salute to the national revolution.19

During 1937 and 1938 a number of concrete steps were taken to implement the agreements that had been reached between the two parties. By order of the National Government, the “ Red Army” (about 20,000 men) was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, and later into the 18th Group Army, with Communist General Chu Teh as commander and P’eng Teh-huai as deputy commander, and Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch’eng and Ho Lung as division commanders. Scattered Communist guerrilla bands operating in areas south of the Yangtze River (with an estimated total strength of about 10,000 men) were reorganized into the New Fourth Army, with Yeh Ting and Hsiang Ying as commander and deputy commander respectively. Both armies were incorporated into the National Army. The Eighth Route Army was assigned to the Second War Zone in northern Shansi under the command of General Yen Hsi-shan, while the New Fourth Army was placed, by order of the National Military Council, under the command of General Ku Chu-t’ung of the Third War Zone in Southeast China to operate in areas between Nanking and Wuhu, south of the Yangtze. This period, during which the National Government was located in Wuhan, represented the high watermark of Kuomintang and Communist collaboration. At this point, however, the tide receded. It was not very long before the facade of cooperation began to show fissures and cracks. Charges and countercharges of failure to live up to the pledges of 1937 became increasingly frequent, often leading to local clashes of a more or less serious nature. Large scale hostilities were to the best of both parties’ ability avoided but after the so-called “New Fourth Army Incident” of January 1941, Kuomintang and Communist relations 19

This letter was in the confidential files of the Presidential Office. It is now found in a collection of materials on Chinese Communism (Kung-fei ho-kuo hui-pien), vol. III.

xlvi

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

deteriorated.20 The Communist forces, though supposedly incorporated into the National Army, were in fact an independent entity and took orders only from Yenan. They disregarded the directives of the National Military Council and expanded into areas outside the regional defense zones assigned them by the National Government. They swallowed up the local militia and guerrilla units left behind enemy lines by the Government. As they grew in strength they openly attacked regular government troops. Notwithstanding the conditions laid down by the National Government and agreed to by the Communists as the basis of the entente, the Communists designated the areas under their control as “liberated areas” and set up therein Soviet type organizations and administrative agencies independent of the central control. Yet, in spite of all this, the policy of the National Government still remained that of seeking a political settlement with the Communists. On March 6, 1941, Generalissimo Chiang, in a reference to the “New Fourth Army Incident” in a speech before the People’s Political Council, the chief arena in which attempts to patch up Kuomintang-Communist differences were made, said the following: . . . the Government is solely concerned with leading the nation against the Japanese invaders and extirpating the traitors, and is utterly without any notion of taking up arms to ‘suppress the Communists.’ . . . Provided unity can be preserved and resistance carried on to the end, the Government will be ready to follow your direction in the settlement of all outstanding questions.

No settlement was ever reached, however. Mao Tse-tung saw in the war against Japan a good opportunity for the Communists to strengthen their military and political potential in the struggle for power. “The Sino-Japanese War,” The Communist New Fourth Army under the command of Yeh Ting was ordered by the National Government to move north of the Yangtze and engage the Japanese in the Yellow River area. They ignored the order and continued to expand in the countryside of the triangular area of Nanking, Shanghai and Hangchow. General Ku Chu-tung, commander of the Third Zone, took disciplinary action against them by disarming some of their units. Yeh Ting was arrested and later court-marshalled. xlvii

PROLOGUE

he said at the time when Chu Teh assumed the Command of the Eighth Route Army, “gives us Communists an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our policy is to devote 70 per­ cent of our effort to this end, 20 percent to coping with the Kuomintang, and 10 percent to fighting the Japanese.” Mao envisaged three stages in the war against Japan. In the first stage the Communists, while maintaining their own independence, were to hold aloft the national banner, use the slogan of the united front, befuddle the upper echelons of the Kuomintang and undermine the morale of the rank and file, thus creating dissension and antagonism between the leaders and the led. By exploiting the conflict and contradictions inside the Kuomintang, the Communists hoped to enhance their maneuverability. It was during this stage that the Communist forces infiltrated into central Hopei Province from northwestern Shansi on the one hand and, on the other, crossed the Taihang Mountain through Honan and Hopei to Shantung. Their central aim was to establish guerrilla bases both in the almost inaccessible mountainous areas and on the wide plains of North China. In the second stage, the principal Communist targets were the establishment and consolidation of military and political base areas and the destruction of Kuomintang remnants north of the Yellow River. “During this stage,” Mao said, “we may go easy on the Japanese.” In other words, to conserve Communist strength, the Communist forces would avoid decisive battles with the enemy. In the third stage the Communists were to expand into Central China and establish base areas in that key region of China. The building of the revolutionary base was intended to be a grand rehearsal for nationwide victory. Mao’s theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is better understood today than it was in the 1940’s and 1950’s. In those days not a few of the members of the Communist Party questioned the wisdom of joining forces with the Kuomintang. Comrade Chang Hao (alias Lin Yu-ying) in a lecture before the Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy in Yenan, took great pains to explain the Communist strategic and tactical line in the following terms: “The temporary shift from an obvious offensive strategy xlviii

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

)

to a defensive strategy actually means adoption of a zigzag offensive strategy. “Because of the rest needed to recover from combat fatigue and restore revolutionary strength, the temporary giving up of revolutionary systems is just to scratch superficial nomenclature and preserve the substance of the systems in order to score greater victories in the future. “The renaming of the Red Army as National Revolutionary Forces is only a change in designation, and not a substantial reorganization. The Red Army has not only preserved its independence but also won chances for consolidation and expansion. “The temporary change of the Soviet Government into Special Area Government does not affect its basic nature. It has not sapped the strength of proletarian political power but has enhanced the development of the revolutionary potential of the broad masses. “Our Party’s cooperation with the Kuomintang in the stage of resistance against Japanese does not connote our allegiance to it. It is only a temporary tactical retreat and not capitulation.”21 By means of these strategic lines, the Communists, as President Chiang pointed out in his October 10, 1965 message to the Chinese people, “transformed an external war into a civil war.”

Chu Teh’s Defiance of Central Authorities As has already been indicated, President Chiang, on August 10, 1945, directed all units of the Chinese Army to remain where they were, pending further orders from the government. On the same day Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Forces, ordered the forces under his Chang Hao (alias Lin Yu-ying), The CCP Strategic Line (Chung-kung Tang ti tse-lueh lu-hsien), lecture at Kang Ta, Yenan, reprinted by Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, Chungking, 1941. xlix

PROLOGUE

command to proceed without delay to accept Japanese surrender and to occupy all towns, cities and commu­ nications centers. The following day he issued another order directing four groups to move into Manchuria.22 Disturbed by the Communist action, President Chiang, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Military Council, sent the following telegram to Chu Teh on August 11: Japan has announced her intention to surrender. As regards the question of accepting Japanese surrender, the Allied powers are still in the process of consultation, and final decisions will soon be made. I have already wired all armed units to wait for orders from the Government before they take any action. The surrender of all Japanese forces must be handled in accordance with the agreement of the Allied Governments. All group armies should wait for further orders at their present posts, and those operating in their assigned war zones should respect the authority of their respective war zone commanding officers. The Government has an overall plan in respect of the disarming of enemy troops, the disposition of prisoners of war, the reorganization of puppet forces, the restoration of law and order in reoccupied areas, and the establishment of administrative organs. In order to maintain the dignity of Government authority and the sanctity of Allied agreement, all military units are hereby directed to remain in their present posts and refrain from taking further independent action . . .

Chu Teh’s reply, dated August 16, 1945, was as illmannered as it was defiant: . . . Your orders are totally wrong. On August 11 you asked my troops to remain at their posts to wait for further orders and to stop fighting the enemy. To date, Japan has not yet formally surrendered. Britain announced on the 11th of August that the war was not yet over. The Soviet Union declared on the 15th that the Japanese surrender was not unconditional and Japanese resistance has not stopped, and that so long as a proclamation by the Japanese Emperor authorizing the surrender has not been signed and executed, the war continues. You are the only one among Allied Supreme Commanders who has committed so egregious a mistake. Your orders redound to the benefit of the enemy. 22

1

Liberation Daily (Chieh-fang Jih-pao) Yenan, August 11 and 12, 1945.

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED You should now publicly admit your mistake and rescind your orders. Otherwise we shall resolutely and unswervingly oppose your orders. I ask for your early reply.

Meanwhile, Chu Teh issued seven more orders to the Communist forces in such provinces as Shansi, Hopei, Suiyuan, Chahar, Jehol, Shantung, as well as underground Korean Communist organizations, to “coordinate their action with the Red Army of the Soviet Union and the Mongolian forces” operating in Manchuria and Korea. He called for the punishment of all “traitors” who opposed the Communists. In the name of the commander-in-chief of the anti-Japanese forces in the liberated areas, Chu Teh ordered the commanding general of the Japanese forces, Okamura Yasuji, to surrender to any “anti-Japanese armed forces” in the liberated area within a certain limit of time. At the same time he demanded that the National Government, in accepting Japanese surrender, must first secure the agreement of the armed forces of the liberated areas.

Mao Tse-tung’s Visit to Chungking Notwithstanding Communist intransigence, President Chiang continued to seek a political settlement with Yenan. In the ten days between August 14 and 23, he exchanged five telegrams with Mao Tse-tung. The August 14 telegram said: Urgent. With the surrender of Japan, there is hope that lasting peace can at last be achieved. There is need for us to meet and talk over the many crucial problems, both domestic and international, which await solution. You are therefore urged to come to Chungking at the earliest possible date so that we can have the benefit of your opinion. This being a matter of critical importance to our nation, I hope you will not begrudge us the pleasure of your early presence.

Mao’s reply came two days later. It was curt and noncommital. He referred to Chu Teh’s telegram of August 16th as representing the considered opinion of his party, and said that he could not even consider the question of visiting li

PROLOGUE

Chungking without having heard Chiang’s own views on the issues raised in that telegram. On August 20, Chiang replied: I have read your telegram. I have been waiting for your early arrival with eager anticipation. I am disappointed that you have not seen fit to come right away. As to General Chu’s telegram, it seems to me that he was not aware of the existence of the rules of procedure governing the acceptance of Japanese surrender. These rules were prescribed by the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and must be adhered to by all theaters of war. China Theater is no exception. It is not for us to deviate from the rules which all allied Governments had agreed to uphold. I must frankly say that General Chu has not always been overzealous in the execution of Government orders. Such dereliction of duty is serious enough when it relates to matters of purely domestic concern. Now he has challenged the rules laid down by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Such action does not reflect favorably either on our national character or on the character of our military men. If General Chu is a patriotic man, and I have no doubt that he is, I hope he will henceforth observe military discipline and obey orders and thus help accomplish the tasks of national reconstruction. Our people have suffered untold misery and privation during the eight years of war. . . Now that the war has at last come to an end, the Chinese people can no longer tolerate a recrudescence of civil strife. It is my sincere hope that you, as one who is deeply concerned with the difficulties presently facing our country and the dire plight in which the Chinese people find themselves, would join hands with us in the building of a new China. As to how the tremendous task of national reconstruction can best be accomplished and how to reap the greatest benefit from the present victory, your advice and cooperation are indis­ pensable. It is for this reason that I earnestly urge you to honor us with your early presence . . .

This time Mao’s reply was more conciliatory in tone: From the news wires of the Central News Agency I read your reply to my telegram. For the sake of unity, I am sending Comrade Chou En-lai to Chungking to see you. Please arrange to see him.

President Chiang lost no time in wiring back. He was lii

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

delighted, he said, with Mao’s decision to send Chou to Chungking, but he hoped that Mao himself would come along. He was ready, he added, to send his plane to Yenan to bring Mao to Chungking. From Yenan came the report that Mao was willing to make the trip to Chungking provided his safety while there was safeguarded. The same source intimated Mao would like to have Ambassador Patrick Hurley fly to Yenan, then fly back in the same plane with him to Chungking. Ambassador Hurley would have to be responsible for his safety during his sojourn in the wartime capital. With reference to this report, President Chiang noted in his diary: How comical this is! Never imagined that the Communists could be so chicken-hearted and shameless. Only three days ago Communist newspapers and radio denounced Hurley as a reactionary imperialist. This selfsame imperialist has become Mao’s guarantor of safety . . .

In accordance with Mao’s wishes, Hurley flew to Yenan; he stayed there overnight, and on the morning of August 28 Mao, accompanied by Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei, climbed aboard the American plane to fly to Chungking for his first meeting with President Chiang since 1927 — an interval of eighteen years. On arrival he made the following statement: I have come to Chungking on the invitation of President Chiang Kai-shek for the purpose of exchanging views on the problem of national unity and reconstruction. The war of resistance against Japan has now ended in victory, and China has entered upon the epoch of peaceful development. Time is of the essence. We must urgently assure the maintenance of domestic peace, the realization of political democracy and the consolidation of national unity. All important problems of a political or military nature should be resolved in accordance with justice and reason, as well as on the basis of peace, democracy and unity. We must build a unified, independent, prosperous and strong new China. I call upon all anti-Japanese parties and all patriotic Chinese to unite and struggle for the realization of the foregoing objectives. I am grateful to President Chiang for his kind invitation.

That night President Chiang welcomed his guest with a dinner at his official residence. Afterwards he jotted down in liii

PROLOGUE

his diary a six-word entry: “I treated him with utmost sincerity.” During the 6-week period that Mao was in Chungking, the talks between the Government and the Communists seemed to have been conducted in a more or less friendly atmosphere. They appeared to be in agreement on a number of essential principles and avoided quarrels over minor points of position. But when the Communist negotiators Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei first presented on September 3 their list of demands to General Chang Chun and Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh, the Government negotiators, it was obvious that the two sides were miles apart on such basic questions as the reorganization and disposition of the armed forces and the political control of the liberated areas. President Chiang wrote in his diary: At a time when millions are celebrating the victory, Mao Tse-tung has again changed his attitude. His appetite seems insatiable. I have treated him with sincerity, but he does not hesitate to take advantage of my friendliness to make exorbitant demands. He wants to have Communists appointed governors in five provinces in North China as well as Chairmanship of the Peiping Branch Military Council. He insists that the Communist forces be expanded to 480,000 men. This is four times the 12 divisions that I have suggested. Mao is impervious to reason. It pains my heart to think about this. May God give me guidance.

In social gatherings, Mao was all smiles and congeniality. At a tea party in commemoration of the fourteenth anniversary of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931, Mao even went as far as to shout: “Long Live the Three Principles of the People! Long Live President Chiang Kai-shek!” On the day of Mao’s departure (October 11, 1945), the Government released the text of the agreement with the Communists. The important feature of the agreement was that it called for the convening of the Political Consultation Conference for the implementation of the general principles agreed upon. This document, which was euphemistically called the “Basic Principles for Peaceful Reconstruction,” declared that the two sides would, “under the leadership of President Chiang” and with the guidance of the Three liv

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

Principles of the People, endeavor to overcome every difficulty for the building of a “peaceful, democratic, united and unified” China. But even as the negotiations were in progress, the Communists were already doing everything possible to prevent the movement of Government troops into North China. The principal weapon of the Communists in their efforts to thwart Government plans for the reoccupation of northern provinces was the destruction of the main lines of communication. They blocked the railways. They cut off the highways. They managed to seize a substantial amount of arms, ammunition and other supplies from the Japanese despite the fact that the Japanese resisted their demands for surrender. By October, they were concentrated in strength north and west of Peiping in a triangle, PeipingKalgan-Tatung, and active in the provinces of Shansi, Hopei, Honan, Chahar and Shantung. They made no secret of their intention to bring the whole of North China under their domination. The so-called “Basic Principles for Peaceful Reconstruction” had become worthless even as it was signed. From the standpoint of Mao Tse-tung, the negotiations were more a tactical maneuver to buy time than a genuine effort at conciliation.

Soviet Obstruction Tactics in Manchuria Shortly after Japanese surrender, President Chiang, at a joint meeting of the Supreme Council for National Defense and the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, stated: The goals of our national revolution, the most pressing issues before our Government, are three in number: first, the recovery of China’s sovereign rights and the maintenance of territorial integrity in Manchuria; second, the recovery of our lost territories such as Taiwan and the Pescadores; and, third, the independence and freedom of Korea. If we fail in these, then the war would have been fought in vain. These formed lv

PROLOGUE the central goals of the revolutionary mission of our Founding Father, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. For these goals, millions of our compatriots have sacrificed their lives. Now is the time for us to struggle for their realization. It is only by the achievement of these objectives that we can hope to build a free and independent China.

When President Chiang uttered these words on August 24, 1945, the situation in Manchuria had already been causing serious concern. The spread of Soviet forces through Manchuria had since August 8th been swift and extensive. The surrender order issued by the Emperor of Japan on August 14th had been ignored. Soviet offensive operations had gone

invaded Manchuria lvi

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

ahead as if nothing had happened. Detachments of Soviet troops had moved along the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railroads to capture such important cities and ports as Harbin, Kirin, Changchun, Mukden, Dairen and Port Arthur. Units had been sent to occupy the famous strategic pass, Shanhaikuan, the gateway to China proper. Other units had advanced in the direction of Jehol and Kalgan. On August 23 Moscow announced that the Soviet forces had occupied all Manchuria as well as the northern half of Korea. Thus, within two short weeks the Soviet forces, with little fighting and few casualties, were in control of territories twice as large as the combined areas of France and Germany. What did they intend to do in Manchuria? How long would they remain? These were the questions that weighted heavily on the minds of President Chiang and his Government. Wherever the Soviet troops moved, Communist-inspired “democratic unions” of all types were formed and these assumed control of the local governments. By September, Chinese Communist units in the vicinity of Jehol and Kalgan had already come into contact with the Soviet troops. Aided and abetted by the Soviet forces, they swiftly spread all over Manchuria. There they were joined by other Communist units which had been operating underground since the 1930’s. With the large quantities of Japanese arms and equipment handed over to them by friendly Soviet troops, the Chinse Communist units in Manchuria soon became a formidable force.23 Stalin had in August that year assured T.V. Soong that the Soviet forces in Manchuria would begin to withdraw in about two or three weeks after Japanese surrender and the withdrawal would have been completed within three months. On October 1, Soviet Ambassador A.A. Petrov informed the Chinese Government that the Soviet troops would begin to withdraw in the latter half of the month and he hoped that before October 10 a Chinese representative would be in Changchun to consult with General Malinovsky, the Soviet 23

According to a release by Tass in September 1967, the arms and equipment handed over to the Chinese Communists by Soviet forces included 700,000 rifles, 11,000 light machine guns, 3,000 heavy machine guns, 1,800 pieces of artillery, 2,600 mortars, 700 tanks and other military vehicles, 900 planes. lvii

PROLOGUE

commander in Manchuria, on matters of taking over control of the vacated areas. Accordingly General Hsiung Shih-hui was appointed by the Government to deal with the Soviet command in Manchuria and to direct the preparations for assumption of government control of that important region of China. Chiang Ching-kuo, being fluent in the Russian language, was appointed special foreign affairs officer to take off the day-to-day negotiations with the Russians. Because of the urgency of getting government troops into position in Manchuria before the departure of Soviet forces, President Chiang planned to move the troops in the most expeditious manner possible. He requested for American vessels to carry his troops to Dairen, Yingkow, and other southern Manchurian ports. The first batch of Chinese troops assigned to Manchuria had made ready to leave in time to reach Dairen as soon as the Soviet forces withdrew from that port. General Malinovsky had been given advance notice of their coming. But on October 5, the Soviet Ambassador in Chungking informed the Chinese Foreign Ministry that the Soviet government objected to the landing of Chinese troops at Dairen on the ground that Dairen having been denominated by treaty as a commercial port, could not be used to land troops. This was of course a wilful distortion of the agreement on Dairen. The Chinese Government disputed the Soviet interpretation of the treaty with both the Soviet Ambassador in Chungking and the Soviet commander in Manchuria. Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh pointed out that the treaty recognized Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and therefore there was no reason why Chinese troops could not be sent through a Chinese port. The American Government, as a party to the Yalta agreement, had been kept informed of the Soviet violation of treaty obligations. Washington, however, refused to do anything about it, declaring that the taking over of Manchuria from the Russians by the Chinese was a problem to be solved between themselves. General Hsiung Shih-hui brought the matter up with General Malinovsky in Changchun. The Soviet commander said that he did not have authority to allow a landing at Dairen, but he would not oppose landings at other Manchurian ports such as Yingkow and Hulutao. On October 27, when the Chinese troops tried lviii

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

to land at Hulutao, they found the Chinese Communist forces already in control of that port. General Tu Yu-ming, commander of the Chinese forces, next tried Yingkow, but there again be found the Communist forces already entrenched. Thousands of Communist soldiers were digging trenches under Russian protection. On October 29, Government forces were forced to land at Chinwangtao, which lies outside Manchuria. A week later they pushed their way to the strategic pass of Shanhaikuan where they were met by Communist forces under Lin Piao, numbering about 25,000 men, newly equipped by the Russians with captured Japanese arms and in full battle positions. It was after ten days of fierce fighting that the government troops succeeded in breaking through the defile and started their long march overland to Manchuria, being denied the use of the railways

lix

PROLOGUE

by the Russians. Every inch of the way was fiercely contested. It took almost a month to cover a distance of only 200 kilometers. Thus Soviet obstructions prevented the Chinese troops from entering Manchuria through convenient ports and made the effort to secure control of that crucial area perilous and futile. The troops, struggling wearily overland by foot, had to contend with harassing Communist guerrillas all the way. Valuable supplies were used up and much precious time was lost. The consequent delay gave the Communists time to move deep into Manchuria and to acquire Japanese arms from stocks left about by Soviet forces. It allowed them to set up propaganda machinery and take over local admin­ istrations. The time thus lost proved crucial in the contest for the control of Manchuria. Indeed, it decided the fate of China. According to the agreement then in effect between the Chinese Government and the Soviet Union, Soviet troops were to be entirely out of Manchuria by December 3rd. The date for complete withdrawal was subsequently scheduled to take place on January 3rd, 1946. Actually, they overstayed their stipulated time limit by five months — when they finally left on May 31, 1946. The prolonged occupation might have been closely connected with the economic spoilation that had been going on. The Soviet Commanding General Malinovsky informed Chang Kia-gnau, Head of the Chinese Economic Commission in Manchuria, that all industrial establishments in Manchuria, conservatively es­ timated at two billion U.S. dollars, were to be regarded as war booty of the Soviet forces. Soviet experts then began a systematic looting of Manchuria’s industrial plants. The Russians presented a list of 154 Japanese enterprises to be reorganized as joint Sino-Soviet enterprises.

lx

THE VICTORY THAT FAILED

Ambassador Hurley’s Resignation Ambassador Hurley, who had returned to the United States for consultation in September 1945, urged Washington to issue a public statement of American policy in China. When no such definitive statement was forthcoming, he issued a statement of his own on November 14th from New Mexico, from which a few excerpts may be quoted: The only Government of China which was recognized by the United States or by any other member of the United Nations is the Government of the Republic of China headed by President Chiang Kai-shek. General Order No. 1 of the United Nations Supreme Command required the Japanese Army in China to surrender to the Chinese Army represented by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his American Chief of Staff, General Albert Wedemeyer. The Japanese attempted to change this procedure and to surrender part of the arms to the Chinese Communist armed party. Japan’s purpose being to give her equipment and munitions to the Chinese Communist armed party who in turn would attempt to destroy the Government of the Republic of China . . . The urgency of peace in China is one great reason which has made us her ally for many years . . . Let us have the hardihood to stick to our own policy, at least long enough to complete the victory by accepting the surrender of Japan and placing China in the position that we demanded Japan give her in the world. If we are not going to conclude the war, there was not much point in the beginning in involving ourselves in war with Japan. Japan is defeated. Chinese independence for which we fought Japan has not yet been achieved. Until it is, our victory cannot be real . . ,24

Mistrustful of foreign service officers who, he believed, were bent on defeating his effort in China, and disturbed by what he regarded as indifference of the American government to the fate of the Chinese National Government, Hurley resigned on November 26, 1945.

24 Lohbeck, op. cit., pp. 423-424. lxi

Part I THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

C H A P T E R ONE

THE EARLY YEARS

The Chiang Family The Chiang family traced its descent from the third son of the celebrated Duke of Chou of the 12th century B.C. In the 13th century of the Christian era, one branch of the family migrated from North China to the province of Chekiang in Southeast China and settled in the district of Fenghua. In the 17th century one Chiang Shih-chieh took his family to Chikow, a hamlet near the town of Fenghua. This was the origin of the Chiangs of Chikow. It was here that Chiang Kai-shek was born. The date was October 31, 1887, and the time was twelve o ’clock, noon. Chikow is a village of hilly terrain. To the south the river Yenchi flows along the foot of the bluff where the ancestral house of the Chiangs stands. To the north, green hills — with their terraced rice fields, mulberry groves and camphor forests — project their jagged outlines against the sky. Close by is the Hsueh Tou Mountain, famous both for its ancient Buddhist temple and for its waterfall, known as the Ten-Thousand-Foot-Cliff-Cataract, a foamy belt of water tumbling with thunderous force down the towering verdant precipice. This was Chiang Kai-shek’s favorite retreat. In his later life he returned to it again and again to refresh his mind and spirit. The Chiangs had for generations been farmers. They were hard-working and law-abiding people who aspired to no social or political prominence. In the 268 years of the Ch’ing (Manchu) dynasty, no member of the Chiang family ever achieved distinction in the civil service examinations. Chiang Kai-shek’s grandfather, Yu-piao, was the first of the family to engage in trade. His income from his business was modest but steady. In time, he became, by local standards, a wealthy man. He was a devout Buddhist, generous with his money, 3

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

and always ready to extend a helping hand to the needy and destitute.1 The family suffered serious financial losses during the Taiping Rebellion when, in 1862, the battlefield was extended to Fenghua. Much of the family property was destroyed, and the family business was ruined. After the suppression of the Taipings in 1865, old man Yu-piao entrusted his twenty-year-old son, Su-an (Chiang Kai-shek’s father), with the burden of rebuilding the family fortune. In a few years the family once again enjoyed comparative prosperity. About Chiang’s father, Su-an, it is said that he was a man of great probity respected by his fellow villagers for his sense of impartiality and justice. A good Samaritan and peace-maker, he was often called upon by his neighbors to settle disputes. Public-spirited by nature, he was tireless in his efforts to promote local education and other good works. He was forty-five years old when his son, Kai-shek, was born. When he died in 1895, Kai-shek was only nine years of age. It is not surprising that Chiang Kai-shek in his later years had little to say about his father. He was too young to remember his father well. Fatherless at an early age, Chiang’s upbringing fell almost entirely to the lot of his mother, Wang Ts’ai-yu. She was 22 when she married Chiang Su-an, who was her senior by twenty years. She was his third wife, his first having left behind a son Hsi-hou and a daughter Jui-ch’ung, and his second wife having died without issue. A year after her marriage she brought to the world a son, named by his grandfather as Jui-yuan, who in later years came to be known as Chung-cheng, a name given to him by his mother, and Chieh-shih, which is pronounced Kai-shek in Cantonese.12 Three other children followed: two daughters Jui-lien and Jui-chu, and a son Jui-ch’ing. Jui-chu and Jui-ch’ing died young. Jui-lien lived to marry into a local family. By his own account Chiang was not a robust child. “ In my childhood,” he wrote in 1921, “ I was delicate and sickly, 1Chiang Kai-shek, Yu-piao kung hsing-chuang (A Biographical Sketch of my Grandfather Yu-piao), 1918. 2 He was also known by other names such as Chih-ch’ing, Chou-t’ai, etc. 4

THE EARLY YEARS

and more than once my life was despaired of. Yet as soon as I gained enough strength to play, I played hard — hopping, skipping, swimming, fighting and what not. My body was seldom free of cuts, bruises and other injuries. All this caused no end of worry to my mother.”3 A number of stories have been told of Chiang’s childhood pranks. When he was three years old he thrust a pair of chopsticks down his throat to see how far they could reach. They got stuck and were removed by his mother with great difficulty. One winter morning he found the water stored in the family’s large jar frozen. Fascinated by the mirror-like surface of the ice, he clambered up to the top of the jar and bent low with the intention of pulling it out. Bending too low, however, he fell into the jar and crashed through the thin ice. By the time people came to his rescue he was almost half dead. He was then only five years old. He was fond of bathing in the mountain stream in front of his house, and several times narrowly escaped drowning in the swift current. There was nothing unusual about these childish mischiefs. They were part of the normal process of growing up. Mrs. Chiang was a fond mother, but she was also a strict disciplinarian. Lest she should spoil her son, she did not spare the rod.4 Widowed when only thirty years old, she endured long years of great hardship with the single purpose in mind — to bring up her son to be a useful member of society. To this end she dedicated all her energy and prayers. On his fiftieth birthday on October 31, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek paid a moving tribute to his deceased mother: As a boy she loved me as if I were a mere baby. But her love was more than the love of an average mother; she was more of a disciplinarian than any strict teacher. Upon my returning home she would ask where I had been and what I had been doing, and when I got back from school she would question me on the lesson of the day. She taught me about the value of hard work as well as the elements of good social behavior. She would make me do manual work in order to strengthen

3Chiang Kai-shek, H s i e n - p i W a n g t ’a i - f u - j e n s h i h - l u e h Biography of my late Mother Wang), June 25, 1921.

(A Brief

4 Ib id .

5

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD my body. From early morning to late at night every minute of her time was devoted to my well-being.5

It was not easy for a young widow of limited means to take care not only of her own children but also of her two step-children. Hsi-hou, her step-son, soon had a family of his own. Her son Kai-shek wrote of the family plight in these words: In those days the Manchu dynasty was in its most corrupt state. The country bully and petty officers of the local government had made it a habit to abuse and maltreat the helpless people. My family, solitary and without influence, became at once a target of their misdeeds. From time to time we were forced to pay land taxes which we did not owe and render public service which we were not obliged to do. Once we were publicly insulted before the magistrate’s court. To our sorrow and regret none of our relatives did anything to help us. Indeed, the miserable condition of my family at that time is beyond description. It was entirely due to my mother and her kindness and perseverance that the family was saved from utter ruin. With iron determination she boldly undertook to keep the family above water and, with the same determination, she resolutely undertook to bring her children up in the proper manner.6

Chiang attributed whatever success he achieved in life to the values instilled into him by his mother: self-reliance, unflinching devotion to duty, and steadiness of purpose. At the first disappointment I encountered in the early days of the Revolution, my mother again came to my aid. She taught me how to apply the principle of filial piety to the service of the nation. She told me to recall to mind how we overcame our own difficulties in the earlier days, and wished me to apply the lesson in a broader sense — in a national sense — so that injustice and oppression might forever disappear from human history. She impressed upon my mind that to be merely a dutiful son does not fulfil all the exacting conditions of the principle of filial piety; the principle demands also an unflinching devotion to the cause of the nation. 5

Chiang Kai-shek, Pao-kuo yu ssu-ch’in (My Duty to my Country and My Memory of my Mother), October 31, 1936. 6Ibid. 6

THE EARLY YEARS All these good counsels were given by my mother with the purpose of guiding my life in this world. . . Whenever I reflect on the conditions under which we two — a widowed mother and a fatherless son — lived in the shadow of cold realities, I cannot but pray for the day when I should be able to fulfill my mother’s wishes in a worthy manner.7

Mrs. Chiang, a devout Buddhist and lifelong vegetarian, died on June 14, 1921, at the age of fifty-seven. Her son Kai-shek, who was then thirty-four years old, had already been playing a significant part in the national revolutionary movement led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The good woman had before her death had the satisfaction of knowing that the sacrifices she had made during her thirty-five years of widowhood had not been in vain.

Early Schooling Young Chiang’s schooling began at the age of five under one Jen Chieh-mei. Two years later he was put under the charge of a new tutor, Chiang Chin-fan, a well-known local scholar. After a year he returned to study under Jen Chieh-mei. After Jen’s death in 1895, he once again became a pupil of Chiang Chin-fan’s, remaining with this teacher for the next three and a half years. Like all boys of those days, he began his studies with the reading and memorizing of the Four Books of Confucianism: Ta Hsueh (Great Learning), Chung Yung (Doctrine of the Mean), Lun Yu (Analects of Confucius) and Meng-tzu (Mencius). He finished the first two by the time when he was seven. In another year he finished the other two. He was not expected to understand what he was reading. One was supposed, however, to memorize these great books in one’s younger days. It was believed that as one grew older and gained in experience, the true significance of what one had learned would gradually begin to dawn. There is perhaps more to this theory than modern pedagogues would care to admit. 7I b i d . 7

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

From the Four Books he moved to Li Chi (Book of Rites), Hsiao Ching (Treatise on Filial Piety,), Shu Ching (Book of Documents), and Shih Ching (Book of Odes). He was also introduced to Tso Chuan (Tso Commentary) and T’ung-chien Kang-mu (Outline of the Comprehensive Mirror of History). At 12 he began to read the prose works of old masters and tried his hand at the so-called eight-legged essay (a form of composition consisting of four paragraphs, each containing two members of an equal number of sentences and words) in preparation of the civil service examination. At 16 he went to take the examination and was disgusted by the cruel and humiliating regulations of the Examination Hall.8 Those were years of turbulence and change. China’s crushing defeat at the hands of Japan in 1894-1895 revealed to the world her basic weaknesses and served as an invitation to the imperialist powers to stake their respective claims in China. The outlying territories of the Chinese Empire had already been lopped off. In addition to leased territories, concessions, and other special rights which foreign powers had exacted from the Manchu government, spheres of influence were now all the rage. Germany claimed exclusive privileges in Shantung, Russia in Manchuria, Japan in Fukien (opposite Formosa — Taiwan —which had been ceded to her as a part of her spoils of war) and Britain in the Yangtze Valley. All in all, thirteen of the eighteen provinces of China Proper were pre-empted in this way, as well as the three provinces of Manchuria. It looked as though China was to be carved up among the European powers. The Chinese naturally regarded the gradual break up of their country with indignation and dismay. In 1900 the whole country was thrown into turmoil and confusion by the so-called Boxer Rebellion which reflected the reaction of the ignorant masses to foreign aggression. The Rebellion served only to deepen China’s woes. For the more thoughtful Chinese, it was clear that if China was to maintain her independence and territorial integrity she must learn from 8Mao Ssu-ch’eng:A/i'n-feuo shih-wu nien i-ch’ing chih Chiang Kai-shek hsien-sheng (Mr. Chiang Kai-shek before 1926); Min-kuo yuan-nien ch ’ien chin Chiang Kai-shek hsien-seng (Chiang Kai-shek before 1912). 8

THE EARLY YEARS

the Western countries the secret of the establishment and maintenance of their national power. Thus, at the dawn of the 20th century, reform was in the air in political, social, and educational fields and it was generally felt that the old order must yield to the new. Even that bulwark of reaction, the Empress Dowager, could no longer resist the tide of change. In 1905 and 1906 she issued decrees ordaining that the educational system be modernized, the army and navy reorganized, and the laws and government regulations revised. The ancient examination system was abolished, and all over the empire, colleges, normal schools, secondary and primary schools sprang up. A good many of the schools were makeshift affairs because of the lack of funds and trained teachers. Chikow, though a village in hilly country, is by no means isolated. It is only forty kilometers from Ningpo, one of China’s oldest seaports. Daily through the little town pass travellers from Ninghai, Tientai, Sinchang and other neighboring towns. The winds of change could not fail to affect the lives of the village people. In 1903 young Chiang, now a lad of 17, for the first time in his life, left home to study at the Feng-lu Hsueh-t’ang (Phoenix Mountain School) at the district seat of Fenghua hsien. This was supposed to be a new type of school and, in addition to traditional subjects, its curriculum included English and arithmetic. Dissatisfied with the still heavily traditional character of the courses of instruction, however, young Chiang led a student protest and demanded reforms. For this he was nearly expelled from the school.9 In 1905 he left the Feng-lu Hsueh-t’ang and enrolled in what was reputed to be the best school in Eastern Chekiang — Chien-chin Hsueh-t’ang. Here he came under the influence of Ku Ch’ing-lien, who was evidently a teacher of great ability. Ku took a special interest in the young man. He introduced his young pupil to the works of ancient philosophers, the writings of Tseng Kuo-fan, and the Shuo Wen, a reference book written in about 100 A.D., regarded as the most basic work on the origins of the Chinese language. Ku was at the same time a great believer in military 9 Ibid.

9

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

education. “Without the backing of armed strength,” he had reportedly told Chiang, “no nation can hope to maintain its national independence. In order to prepare for the defense of one’s country against foreign aggression, the study of military science is imperative.” He urged Chiang to read Sun T'zu p ’ing-fa (The Art of War by Sun T’zu), an ancient Chinese work on the art of war greatly admired by the Japanese. Ku was also a sympathizer of the revolutionary movement led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It was through him that Chiang first heard Dr. Sun’s name. He also stressed the importance of going abroad to acquire new knowledge.10 Thus, Chiang’s close relationship with his teacher Ku Ch’ing-lien formed the foundation of his future actions and finally influenced him in the choice of his career. In those days when people talked about going to study abroad, they generally meant going to Japan. Nor was this surprising. Since her defeat of Russia in th'e war of 1904-1905, Japan’s stock had been soaring high everywhere in the world, and nowhere was she held in greater esteem than in China. To emulate Japan had become the w^ar-cry of all thinking Chinese. The proficiency and high standards of the Japanese army were especially admired. Large numbers of Chinese youths were sent to Japan to study military science. Japan also meant adventure and opportunity. It was only natural that young Chiang should have set his heart on going to Japan. In January 1906 he enrolled at the Lung-chin Middle School at Fenghua where he spent most of his time learning the rudiments of the Japanese language. At that time the late Hollington K. Tong, a well-known journalist and later Chinese Ambassador to the United States, was an English teacher at the School. He recalled: Although the future Generalissimo’s stay there was brief, his personality made a deep impression upon the faculty. He was a serious-minded student. Chiang’s room and mine were on the same floor of the school building. I thus had ample opportunity to observe how the future Generalissimo occupied himself in after class hours.

10Chiang Kai-shek: 10

P a o - k u o y u s s u - c h 'in,

op. cit.

THE EARLY YEARS Chiang Kai-shek was an early riser, and, after his matutinal ablutions, it was his custom to stand erect on the veranda in front of his bedroom for half an hour. During this time his lips were compressed, his features were set in determination, and he stood with his arms folded. It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty what thoughts filled his mind at such times, but it was fairly obvious that he was thinking of his future. In fact it is clear from his own diary that during those few months at the Lung-chin School, he was formulating plans to go to Japan to study military science in order the better to equip himself for a career which was to be wholly dedicated to the nation. Another thing that made a deep impression on me was the avidity with which he seized upon the news­ papers as they arrived from Shanghai. There was a little reading room for the use of the pupils, and there during the recesses he carefully studied them. In those days a few newspapers reached county districts like Fenghua, and when some found their way there they were highly prized, but to my recollection no one was so keen to learn of the march of events in the outside world as Chiang.11

This habit of concentration and self-discipline, formed in his younger days, was to become one of the most outstanding traits of his personality.

Military Education In April 1906 Chiang finally was ready to go to Japan. To show determination, he defiantly cut off his queue and had it sent home. For a man to wear his hair in a queue was originally a Manchu custom. When the Manchus conquered China in 1644 and established the Ch’ing dynasty, all men in China were obliged to shave the front of their head and braid the remainder of the hair in a long queue which hung down the back. This was a visible sign of subjection — a badge of submission to the new dynasty. The Chinese accepted this hair style only after vigorous resistance and not a little bloodshed. As time went on, however, queues became the 11Hollington K. Tong, Chiang Kai-shek: Soldier and Statesman (Shanghai, China Publishing Co., 1937), Vol. I, p. vii.

11

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

customary way of wearing one’s hair for the men. They were even cherished. To cut off the queue was an act of defiance and rebellion. By so doing young Chiang caused for a time considerable consternation in the entire village of Chikow. Now with funds scraped together by his mother, he set sail to Japan, to the surprise and even opposition of his kinsmen and neighbors. “They certainly would have prevented me from carrying out my wish,” he recalled years later, “had it not been for my mother’s resolute will and her efforts to supply me with the necessary funds.”12 But a bitter disappointment was awaiting him in Japan. His purpose of going to Japan was to study military science. He soon discovered, however, that without the recommenda­ tion of the Board of War of the Chinese Government in Peking, no one could matriculate in any of the Japanese military academies. The hapless young man from Chikow then found nothing better to do than to go to school to learn Japanese. This he did for half a year after which he returned to Fenghua. Chiang’s brief sojourn in Japan was not altogether unrewarding from the viewpoint of his subsequent career. For it was in Japan that he first met and formed a close friendship with a fellow student from Chekiang, Ch’en Chi-mei. Ch’en was ten years older than Chiang, and was already active in the revolutionary movement. Through him Chiang was able to link his military career with the revolutionary movement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. As luck would have it, opportunity was waiting for him at home. Upon his return from Japan, Chiang learned that the Board of War in Peking would early in 1907 hold competitive examinations in various provincial capitals to recruit cadets for the newly established Short Course National Army School (T’ung-kuo lu-chun su-ch’eng Hsueh-t’ang), the forerunner of the influential Military Academy at Paoting, Chili (Hopei) province. The quota allotted for Chekiang was 40, of which 26 were to be selected by nomination and only 14 were to be selected by competitive examination. Chiang successfully passed the examination and was admitted to the school in the summer 12

Chiang Kai-shek:

12

P a o - k u o y u s s u - c h ’in

op. cit.

THE EARLY YEARS

of that year. He did not intend to remain there long. For him the school was only a stepping-stone to Japan. An amusing anecdote has often been told of the rebuke Chiang once administered to a Japanese instructor at the school. This instructor was lecturing on hygiene. He placed a lump of clay, roughly about a cubic inch in volume, and felt it incumbent upon him to be facetious and say: “This piece of dirt can contain as many as four hundred million microbes, like China with four hundred million people.” This remark so enraged Chiang that he walked up to the desk and dashed the clod into pieces. The Japanese instructor accused Chiang of being a “revolutionary” a label which in those days could send a man to the gallows. He complained to the director of the school, but Chiang was merely reprimanded for impertinence.13 In the winter of 1907 the Board of War authorized the selection by competitive examination of a certain number of students for advanced studies in Japan. Chiang found himself left out of the list of candidates because he was not enrolled in a class in which the study of the Japanese language was a required subject. He appealed to the director, pleading that since he had studied Japanese in Japan he should be allowed to take the examination even though he had not enrolled in the Japanese class. To his great surprise, his appeal was well received. The night before the examination was held, Chiang was informed that he could participate in it along with members of the Japanese language class. Forty students were selected, and Chiang was among them. Among them also was Chang Chun, a youth from Szechwan, who was destined to become Chiang’s life-long friend and trusted aide. Early in 1908 the students from Paoting arrived in Japan. They were enrolled in the Shimbu Gakko, a special school established in 1903 for the purpose of preparing Chinese students for the regular military academies.14 The 13Hollington K. Tong, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 13-14. 14At the request of the Imperial Government in Peking, Lt. General Fukushima Yasumasa and Major-General Aoki Senjun of the Japanese General Staff formed a committee to deal with the problem of Chinese students desiring to study military science in Japan. They decided to establish the Shimbu Gakko in Tokyo, which was 13

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

instructors were subsidized by the Chinese Government. Until 1905 the program of the Shimbu Gakko lasted only fifteen months. In that year it was increased to eighteen months, and in 1906 to three years. Chiang accordingly attended the school for a three-year term. Chinese students in Japan were subject to a series of regulations laid down by the Board of Education in Peking. They were forbidden to engage in political activities or to publish periodicals of a political nature. Chinese students if found undesirable were to be expelled and deported from Japan. The regulations were, however, difficult to enforce, even with the cooperation of the Japanese Government. In those days Japan was the hub of Chinese political movements. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, one of the leaders of the reform movement of 1898, had, after the debacle of the Hundred Days, fled to Japan and had, through his writings and editing, become an influential force in Chinese intellectual circles both at home and abroad. He was one of the founders of the modern Chinese liberal traditions. He was essentially a reformist rather than a political revolutionist. Sun Yat-sen, on the other hand, was a revolutionist par excellence. He was an inspiring speaker and good organizer. He was a born leader. In 1905 he amalgamated his own revolutionary organization with other groups to form the T’ung Meng Hui (Alliance Society) in Tokyo. Members of the T’ung Meng Hui pledged themselves to overthrow the Manchus and establish a republic. Both Liang and Sun were able to attract large followings among the Chinese students in Japan. Chiang Kai-shek, by nature rebellious and by predilection sympathetic to the revolutionary cause, readily cast in his lot with the movement led by Sun Yat-sen. Through the recommendation of his friend Ch’en Chi-mei, he joined the T ’ung Meng Hui soon after his return to Tokyo as a government sponsored student at the Shimbu Gakko. Such was his enthusiasm for the revolutionary cause that each Sunday he would call together a number of T ’ung Meng Hui comrades, mostly from Chekiang and Kiangsu provinces, for a secret meeting to discuss matters pertaining to the accredited by the Japanese Ministry of Education as a regular preparatory military school. Many prominent Chinese military men were graduates of this school. 14

THE EARLY YEARS

exploitation and oppression of the Chinese people by the Manchus and foreign powers. His favorite reading at this time was that fiery revolutionary tract by Tsou Jung.15 He knew that little book by rote. He often dreamed of fighting the Manchus side by side with the young martyr.16 In 1909 Chiang became a father. He had been married to a girl of the village, Miss Mao, in 1901 when he was only a boy of fourteen. It was a marriage arranged by his mother. Out of this union a son was now born. This son, Ching-kuo, is presently President of the Republic of China in Taiwan. In June of the following year an event of great significance in Chiang’s life took place in Tokyo. He met for the first time the man he had long admired, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It was his friend Ch’en Chi-mei who introduced him to the great man. Dr. Sun, who had come to Japan from Hawaii, was in Tokyo only for two weeks. He soon left for Singapore. Chiang’s meeting with him was necessarily a very brief one. According to Ch’en Chi-mei, Dr. Sun was favorably impressed with the earnestness of the young man. In December Chiang completed the three years of training at the Shimbu Gakko and moved on to Takada (now Joetsu) in northern Japan to serve in the Japanese Army as a candidate cadet for the Military Academy. He was one of the 52 Chinese students from the Shimbu Gakko and one of the 16 who were assigned to serve in the 19th Field Artillery Regiment of the 13th Division. The 1958 edition of the History o f Takada records that Chiang and his fellow Chinese students arrived at Takada on December 4, 1910 and stayed overnight at a local hotel. The December 6th issue of the local paper, Takada Shimbun, reported that at 9 o ’clock December 5th the Chinese students, under the direction of a certain Lt. Sudo, underwent physical examination and were then admitted to the ranks of the Japanese Army. Under the name Chiang Chih-ch’ing (Chiang was then known by that name) it was indicated that he came from “Chekiang, height: 5.59 ft., weight: 59.2 kilograms.” Jung was born in Szechuan province. He had studied in Japan. He wrote his revolutionary tract when he was barely 19 years old. He was arrested in Shanghai in April 1904. He died in prison in 1905.

5 T so u

16Mao Ssu-ch’eng, op. cit. 15

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

The winter in northern Japan is severe. Takada is noted for its snow storms. The Takada Shimbun said that the Chinese students were amazed at the depth of the snow on the ground. Chiang recalled in a speech to a group of student recruits in 1944: When we entered the Japanese Army we were privates of the second class. In Japan new recruits generally entered the Army in the winter. The place where we were admitted was Takada, a little town in Niigata Prefecture, not far from Hokkaido. The climate there was bitterly cold, and in the winter the ground was often covered with heavy snow, the likes of which we had never seen even in the northermost part of China. Even in such inclement weather we never failed to get up before 5 o ’clock every morning and to wash our faces with icy cold water which we ourselves had to bring up from the well.1718

During this time Chiang performed all the menial duties of an ordinary recruit, from grooming horses to shoeshining. He inured himself to hardship and subjected himself to the discipline with rigor which greatly strengthened him both physically and morally. The strictness of the discipline and the monotony of camp life were at first deeply resented by me; I resented them as unreasonable. In retrospect, however, I feel grateful for what I had gone through. It is because of a year’s training as a common soldier that I have been able to lead a very simple life and keep my nose on the grindstone for forty years. If not for the discipline I had received as a common soldier I would not have been able to persevere in the hazardous career of a revolutionary without fear and without misgivings 18

One chore of the daily routine of a common soldier in the Japanese artillery regiment was to take care of the horses used to pull heavy guns. For Chiang this was a novel experience. 17Chiang Kai-shek: Tui ts ’ung-chun hsueh-sheng hsun-hua (Lecture to Students Recruits), January 10th, 1944, in Chungking. 18Chiang Kai-shek: Tui c h ’ing-nien yuan-cheng-chun tui-wu shih-ping hsun-tz’u (Address to Those in the Youth Expeditionary Force who were Retiring from the Service), Chungking, April 1946. 16

THE EARLY YEARS After having washed ourselves, we followed an officer to the stable to rub the horses from their hooves up to their legs and their backs and from the backs up to the heads and necks and down to the tails. Every joint, every muscle had to be carefully curried and brushed with straw. After an hour of this, even the tiniest blood vessels were opened up and the bodies of the horses glowed with warmth and well-being. As a result of vigorous activity, we ourselves no longer felt the cold; we even perspired. After the horses were thoroughly cleaned, we led them out of the stable to be fed. We then returned to our camp to have our own breakfast. The routine of horse grooming was repeated in the evening.19

Such was the life of a common soldier in Japan in the early years of the 20th century. For a Chinese young man from such provinces as Chekiang and Kiangsu like Chiang Kai-shek, the hardest thing to endure was the insufficiency of food. In Japanese army camps every soldier was allowed at each meal only one bowl of rice, not too big a bowl at that. On the top of the rice were three slices of dried turnip and sometimes a small piece of salted fish. Only on Sundays were we given a little beancurd, some green vegetables, and a tiny bit of meat . . . In the first half month of my life in the camp I was distressed by the insufficiency of food, and was hungry most of the time. In the day-time I could do nothing about this. In the evening, however, we could go to the club and buy some biscuits, limited to only two or three pieces. The quality of the biscuits was coarse and poor but we devoured them with gusto. After two weeks, we found ourselves growing accustomed to the scantiness of the food. And by the third week, we did not have to buy the biscuits any more for we no longer suffered from pangs of hunger.20

The History o f Takada tells us that in those days there were in Takada such eating places as the Sanyu Hotel and the Mitsuichi European Restaurant where Chiang and his Chinese friends sometimes repaired to on Sundays to have a change of diet. The eldest daughter of the proprietor of Mitsuichi 19

Chiang Kai-shek: Tui ts ’ung-chun hsueh-sheng hsun-hua, op. cit.

29Chiang Kai-shek, Ibid. 17

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

European Restaurant, Watanabe Tern, now an old woman of 75, recalled that the Chinese sometimes brought their own provisions to the restaurant and concocted various Chinese dishes. They were mostly a pretty noisy group of young people, but Chiang was quiet and even taciturn. The Japanese officers under whom Chiang served at that time did not seem to have been much impressed by him. General Nagaoka Gaishi, then the commanding general of the 13th Division, had in an interview described Chiang as one whose “outward appearance did not reveal innate ability, and there was nothing to indicate that he would ever rise to the heights that he subsequently attained.” In later years when Chiang had occasion to visit Japan, he called on his old commanding general at the latter’s residence at Harajuku, Tokyo, in civilian attire. The old general now found Chiang “a figure of great force and dignity, more like a diplomat than a soldier.” Chiang still addressed General Nagaoka as “Mr. Commanding General.” The old general was quite touched by Chiang’s respectful attitude. He was particularly pleased with the four characters which Chiang wrote on a scroll. “Pu fu shih chiao” which might be roughly translated as: “ Never do anything contrary to the precepts of your teacher.” To a Chinese one’s superior officer is one’s teacher. General Nagaoka was moved to say: I have helped many Chinese, but none of them can be compared with Chiang, who even now does not forget the assistance and kindness rendered to him many years ago. So I have concluded that it is largely due to this trait in his character that the young cadet, who did not show any marked brilliance during his schooling in Japan, has attained to his present position . . . I respect a man who, like Chiang, values friendship and kindness.

Chiang’s service with the 13th Field Artillery Regiment of the Japanese Army afforded him an opportunity to observe the workings of the Japanese military system from the inside. He believed that the strength of the Japanese armed services lay in their rigid discipline, political indoctrination, and their technical education. Unquestioning acceptance of orders and unquestioning belief in the infallibility of their superiors constituted the essence of 18

THE EARLY YEARS

Japanese military discipline. Japanese soldiers were grounded in their country’s history and geography and had an almost religious faith in Japan’s historical mission. Hence their fanatic, fight-to-the end ferocity on the battlefield. Japanese soldiers were, furthermore, required to learn some trade or some skill while serving in the army. The Japanese army was therefore self-sufficient and capable of coping with every possible situation. With the technical training they had received in the services, the Japanese servicemen were fully prepared for the task of earning a living when they returned to civilian life. The experience Chiang had gained at Takada stood him in good stead in the successive stages of his extraordinary career — as a young revolutionary in Shanghai, as President of the Whampoa Military Academy; as Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Expedition against powerful forces which had dominated the Chinese scene for a quarter of a century; as a leader of a nation divided by ideological conflicts and rival ambitions in a war against one of the world’s strongest military powers; as the implacable enemy of world Communism.

19

C H A P T E R TWO

THE REVOLUTION

Twilight of a Dynasty While Chiang was striving to complete his military education in Japan, momentous developments had been taking place in China. Emperor Kwang Hsu, remembered in history mainly for his ill-fated reforms of 1898 (known as The Hundred Days), had died in suspicious circumstances, on the 14th of November, 1908, at thirty-eight years of age. Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, who had dominated the affairs of China for over four decades and whose reactionary policies had brought about so much misery and humiliation to the nation, had passed away on the following day at the age of 74. Before her death she had decreed that Pu Yi, the 3-year old son of Kwang Hsu’s brother, should ascend the Dragon Throne. Accordingly, Pu Yi was proclaimed Emperor of China following the death of Kwang Hsu. He reigned under the name of Hsuan Tung, with his father, Prince Ch’un, as Regent. He thus became the twelfth and last ruler of the Ch’ing or Manchu dynasty and was destined, a quarter of a century later, to play a tragic role under the direction of the Japanese militarists as Chief of State of the so-called “Manchukuo.” Several years before, the Empress Dowager, upon her return to Peking from her flight to the western provinces following the Boxer Rebellion, had sought to placate both the liberal elements at home and the foreign powers by announcing a program of reform. She accepted the idea of constitutionalism and pledged the formation of a constitu­ tional monarchy on the model of Japan. This was followed in June 1908 by the proclamation of a set of principles looking toward full constitutional government at the end of a nineyear period of preparation. It was proposed that the first step 20

THE REVOLUTION

would be the establishment of National and Provincial Assemblies of a purely consultative nature, which would in time develop into full-fledged legislative bodies. But the reform efforts of the Manchu Court got no further than the paper stage. The Hsuan Tung regime, under the tutelage of the Regent, instead of broadening the base of the government and placing the Chinese in the service of the State on a footing of absolute equality with the Manchus, pursued a contrary course of action. Prince Ch’un and his advisers were not prepared to give up the privileges and prerogatives enjoyed by the Manchus for over two hundred sixty years. They were suspicious of those Chinese who had since the Taiping Rebellion (1848-1865) taken into their competent and vigorous hands much of the power to which they had previously been denied. They believed that military power was the basis of political power. The first important move Prince Ch’un made as Regent was the creation in December 1908 of the Chin-wei Chun or Imperial Guard under the direct control of the Manchus. Shortly afterwards (January 1909), an edict was issued in the name of Emperor Hsuan Tung dismissing Yuan Shih-kai, a member of the Grand Council of State and the most powerful Chinese official in the service of the government, from all his posts, divesting him of all his honors, and exiled him to his home in Honan Province. Yuan was alleged to be suffering from “foot disease” which rendered him incapable of discharging the arduous duties of his office.1 The fact is that Yuan was too powerful for the comfort of the Manchu Court. He had under his command a well-trained and well-equipped army, the ranking officers of which were loyal to him rather than to the State. The removal of Yuan Shih-kai from the seat of power was an attempt on the part of the Regent to reassert the authority of the Throne and put a stop to the menace of growing Chinese influence both in the government and in the 1 Prince Ch’un was a man of no great ability and had played no significant role in the government. He was known for his affection for his unfortunate brother, Emperor Kwang Hsu. He could not forgive Yuan Shih-kai for having betrayed his brother at the time of the Hundred Days. Had it not been for the intervention of the elder statesman Chang Chi-tung, Yuan might have been executed by the Regent. 21

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

army. But the hour was already late, and the trend of the times could no longer be reversed. The Manchu elements elevated to positions of power were too inexperienced and incompetent to save the declining dynasty from its final debacle. Even more damaging to the authority and prestige of the Manchu Court was the influence wielded by the newly convened Provincial Assemblies which, contrary to the hopes of the powers that be, were not content to play a mere passive role. Their members were mostly men of ability and ambition who were in no mood to be puppets of the government. The Provincial Assemblies soon became agitators for change. They pressed for a full-fledged parliamentary system. Inl909 the Assembly of Kiangsu province adopted a resolution urging concerted action by all provinces to demand basic reforms in the political system of the country. Chang Chien, President of the Kiangsu Assembly, a man renowned both for his literary achievements and his pioneering efforts in the establishment of modern industries, sent out emissaries to various provincial capitals to enlist support. Delegates representing sixteen provinces met in Shanghai in November of the year. After a week’s deliberation, they decided to form an association for the Early Establishment of the National Parliament (Su-k’ai kuo-hui t ’ung-chi hui), whose first order of business was to send a deputation to Peking. In January 1910 thirty-three of the Association’s representatives arrived at the national capital. They demanded that the nine-year preparation be shortened and that a full-fledged parliamentary system be instituted within the space of one year. The Manchu Court refused to accede to the demands of the petitioners, insisting that so basic and far-reaching a step could not be taken in one leap but could only be realized gradually and after long and careful preparation. Undaunted by threats of repression, the petitioners continued to struggle. They were joined by some of the more enlightened viceroys and governors and the agitation soon took on the character of a mass movement. Yielding to the pressure for reform thus exerted, the Manchu Court finally, in November 1910, promised to convene a parliament and institute a cabinet form of government responsible to it in 1913. 22

THE REVOLUTION

Revolutionary Uprising in Canton Members of the Provincial Assemblies and their representatives in Peking were not revolutionaries but reformers. It had never been their intention to overthrow the Manchu regime. Their goal was to transform the absolutism of the reigning dynasty into a constitutional monarchy more or less along the lines followed by the Japanese reformers. Members of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s T’ung Meng Hui, on the other hand, had been convinced of the futility of the reform movement and had from the start bent their efforts on overthrowing the alien Manchus. On April 27, 1911, members of the T ’ung Meng Hui, led by that Hunanese revolutionary, Huang Hsing, raised the banner of revolu­ tionary revolt in Canton. This was the tenth attempt at revolution that the followers of Dr. Sun had staged. Preparations for it had been going on for a year. It was carefully planned on a scale surpassing all previous attempts. Huang Hsing’s strategic plan called for the attack and seizure of the Viceroy’s yamen, of the headquarters of the naval command, as well as the ammunition dumps. A special “dare-to-die” corps of 800 men led by Huang Hsing would initiate the attack and would then be joined by those revolutionary elements who had already infiltrated into the ranks of the government troops. In spite of the elaborate preparations, however, the campaign did not fare any better than the previous ones. Difficulties of an unforeseen nature confronted the revolutionaries at every hand. The main body of the “dare-to-die” corps recruited in Hong Kong was supposed to be ferried to Canton in time to take part in the uprising. When the time arrived, however, there was no available means of transportation for the purpose. Thus, instead of the 800 men whom Huang Hsing had counted upon as the main force of his campaign, he had to make do with no more than 130. Nor had the arms purchased from Japan and Indo-China been brought in to meet the need of the hour. The fatal fact was that the authorities had somehow got wind of the plans for the uprising and had taken precautionary measures. When the attackers reached the Viceroy’s yamen they found an empty 23

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

shell. Government troops were deployed in the vicinity. Huang Hsing and his men were surrounded on all sides and before they could beat their retreat, more than half of them had been mowed down by government fire. The campaign was a disaster. But the heroic deeds of the revolutionaries live on. The brave men have since been apotheosized as the Seventy-two Martyrs of the Revolution.2

The Revolt in Szechuan On May 8, 1911, the Manchu Court reorganized the Grand Council of State into a Cabinet. This was supposed to be a significant step toward constitutionalism. As a matter of fact, however, nothing could be further from the truth. Far from being a move designed to advance the cause of constitutional government, this was an attempt to strengthen and consolidate the absolute authority of the Throne. What was even more disappointing to the reformers was the fact that the man appointed by the Prince Regent to head the Cabinet was Prince Ch’ing, generally known as the most corrupt and reactionary of the Imperial Princes. Of the thirteen ministers of the Cabinet, eight were Manchus, one Mongolian and only four were Chinese. Among the Manchu ministers, five were members of the imperial family. The control of the armed forces was, moreover, vested in the hands of a group of incompetent young princes. The cabinet was not responsible to the newly elected National Assembly (Tzu Cheng Yuan) but to the Throne alone. To those who had been endeavoring to establish a constitutional regime, this was a step backward rather than a step forward. Feelings against the new set-up ran high. The reformers began to doubt whether the dynasty could be saved at all. They started to waver in their allegiance and gradually turned toward the revolutionary objectives of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s T’ung Meng Hui. 2 Actually 86 men lost their lives. The figure 72 was arrived at by the authorities who counted the dead bodies left behind by the revolutionaries. 24

THE REVOLUTION

To make a bad situation worse, the new Cabinet’s first act was the announcement of a plan to nationalize the as yet unbuilt Szechuan-Hankow and Canton-Hankow Railway Lines. Sheng Hsuan-huai, Minister of Post and Communica­ tions, had signed an agreement with a four-power banking consortium for a loan of £6,000,000 for the construction of these railways. This was in conflict with certain provincial interests, and immediately a wave of protest arose. The opposition in Szechuan was particularly fierce and stormy. Repressive measures by the authorities only added fuel to the fire. The arrest of the leaders of the movement sparked mass demonstrations and riots. When thousands of shouting demonstrators lay siege on the Viceroy’s yamen and demanded the release of their leaders, the guards opened fire and this resulted in more than a score of casualties. The bloodshed touched off an open revolt. In the capital of the province, Chengtu, confusion reigned. Telegraphic communi­ cation with the rest of the country was cut off. In the countryside a number of counties fell into rebel hands. Vacillations and lack of a consistent course of action on the part of the Manchu Court in Peking helped exacerbate a situation already fraught with danger.

Preparing for the Next Step The revolt in Szechuan was at first merely a local dispute. It was neither anti-Manchu nor anti-dynasty. Its leaders were constitutional reformists and not revolutionaries bent on overthrowing the monarchy. Socially they were members of a well-do-do class who had a deep aversion to violence and bloodshed. Indeed, even at the height of the turmoil in September 1911, many demonstrators, kneeling before a wooden tablet of the late Emperor Kwang Hsu, besought the authorities to show mercy on their leaders. The railway dispute might have remained a mere local affair had the authorities been more competent and effective. Thus, a mere quarrel over the means of settling a railway claim was allowed to drift into open rebellion. This crisis was symptomatic of a 25

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

more profound disorder in the body politic of the Manchu regime. It no longer commanded the allegiance of its erstwhile loyal subjects. At the time of the Szechuan crisis there existed in the strategic area of Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow (collectively known as Wuhan) two revolutionary organizations: one operating in Wuchang under the name of Wen Hsueh Hui (Literary Society) and the other called itself Kung Tsin Hui (Joint Advance Society). Members of the Wen Hsueh Hui were for the most part students returned from Japan. They carried on a secret propaganda campaign inside the ranks of the New Army in Hupei province, which consisted of one infantry division and one mixed brigade, with a combined strength of 15,000. Since many of the officers of this army were trained in Japan and presumably acquainted with the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the task of infiltration was made that much eaaer. It is not surprising that by 1911 over 5,000 or one-third of the officers and men of the New Army in Hupei were already members of the Wen Hsueh Hui. The Kung Tsin Hui with its headquarters in Hankow was an offshoot of the T’ung Meng Hui. Operating in the Wuhan area, it was active in recruiting members from the army. Its activities, however, were handicapped by a shortage of funds.

26

THE REVOLUTION

In February 1911 the T’ung Meng Hui sent two emissaries from Hong Kong to the Wuhan area in an effort to strengthen the harmony and cooperation within the revolutionary camp. With their assistance, leaders of the Wen Hsueh Hui and Kung Tsin Hui met and agreed to coordinate their activities. *

*

*

After the failure of the Canton uprising, the difficulties faced by the T’ung Meng Hui seemed insurmountable. Many comrades were for a time quite discouraged. The revolt in Szechuan, however, helped to boost the morale of the revolutionaries. Late in April 1911 leaders of the T’ung Meng Hui met to map out a new plan to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. Three options were discussed and evaluated: (1) to infiltrate the New Army in North China and carry the revolution to the very citadel of Manchu power — Peking; (2) to establish a revolutionary government in the middle region of the Yangtze Valley and from there to extend its influence northward to the rest of China; and (3) to raise the standard of revolt in such outlying provinces as Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan. The most direct and effective way to overthrow the Manchus was, of course, the strategy embodied in the first option. But this was too difficult a task to merit serious consideration. Repeated failures in the past ruled out the third option. Most members favored the second option. The T ’ung Meng Hui therefore decided to set up a Central China Headquarters in Shanghai (T’ung Meng Hui Cheng-pu Tsung-hui) with branch offices in Hupei, Hunan and Anhwei. Ch’en Chi-mei, Sung Chiao-jen and T ’an Jen-feng were the leading members of this new set-up. In order to heighten the political consciousness of the anti-nationalization of railways movement, a branch office was also established in Szechuan. It was evident that a new revolutionary upsurge was in the making. During the month of September the Wen Hsueh Hui and Kung Tsin Hui of the Wuhan area held a series of joint meetings to work out a strategic plan for the impending struggle. On the 12th they decided to set up a Provisional 27

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

Command Post, with Chiang I-wu of the Wen Hsueh Hui as Commander-in-Chief and Sun Wu of the Kung Tsin Hui as Chief of Staff. The young Chinese cadets at Takada, Japan, were not unaware of what was going on in their homeland. In the summer of 1911 Chiang Kai-shek, taking advantage of the summer vacation, returned to Shanghai to see his good friend Ch’en Chi-mei, who had in 1908 set up a secret organization to promote revolutionary activities in Kiangsu and Chekiang. Betrayed by one of his associates, one of his most loyal supporters, one Chang Kung, had been arrested by the police while Ch’en himself escaped. Chiang Kai-shek tried but failed to get Chang Kung out of prison. After the summer vacation, he went back to Japan to complete his training at Takada. But not for long. A sudden turn of events in China brought him back to Shanghai in a hurry.

The Outbreak of Revolution On October 9, 1911, at 10 o ’clock in the morning, a bomb accidentally exploded at the secret headquarters of the Kung Tsin Hui in Hankow. The blast immediately brought the police to the scene. More than thirty suspects were arrested and a number of documents were seized, including the group’s membership list. In the three cities of Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang, collectively known as the Wuhan metropolitan area, martial law was declared. Fear and desperation gripped the revolutionary camp. Rumors of arrests and executions spread, and there was abroad general distrust and suspicion. Officers of the New Army who were members of the Wen Hsueh Hui or Kung Tsin Hui were especially affected. Their identities had already been revealed to the authorities. They had no choice but to gamble on an immediate uprising. At five o ’clock of that very afternoon Chiang I-wu, provisional Commander-in-Chief of the revolutionary forces, sent out instructions to his followers in Wuchang to rise that night. But owing to the fact that the city gates were closed and roadblocks were being set up at all 28

THE REVOLUTION

strategic points, the message failed to arrive in time. Meanwhile, more revolutionaries were caught and executed. In desperation, some soldiers of the Eighth Engineering Battalion decided to act. On the night of the 10th, they struck. After shooting down four loyal officers, they marched to the armory and stormed it. By this time a battalion of the Twenty-first Mixed Bridgate had joined them and together they seized the armory. The rebels then moved on to attack the Viceroy’s Yamen. Jui Cheng, the Manchu Viceroy, fled under cover of darkness to a gunboat at anchor some distance up the Yangtze. General Chang Piao, commander of government forces in the Wuhan area, slipped away at a critical moment to a small village on the Hankow side of the river. In the early hours of the 11th, Wuchang passed under rebel control. Hanyang was taken by the rebels without much fighting. Its great arsenal contained a vast store of guns, ammunition, heavy artillery pieces and other military supplies badly needed by the revolutionaries. On the 12th, Hankow, a commercial and industrial metropolis of great strategic importance in Central China, was taken. Thus, the whole Wuhan area fell to the rebels within the short space of three days. This was beyond the fondest hopes of the revolutionaries. And all this was accomplished without a coordinated plan and without a recognized leader.

The Emergence of Li Yuan-hung The revolutionaries must needs find a man now who had sufficient experience in military affairs to lead them to consolidate the gains they had already made and to carry the momentum of the revolution to the whole Hupei province and thence to other parts of the country. Colonel Li Yuan-hung, commander of the 21st Mixed Brigade at Wuchang, seemed to be the man who filled the bill. He was a native of Hupei and an able soldier. He was popular with the rank and file. He was, however, not a revolutionary, and he had not joined the rebels after the actual outbreak. The need for a well-known military man to lead the 29

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

revolution was so urgent, however, that Li Yuan-hung was chosen to be the leader. He was quickly taken to the Provincial Assembly and made Tutuh or military governor of Hupei. At first he showed no great enthusiasm for the honor thus bestowed upon him. He was torn by conflicting emotions. He could not but feel dubious about the future of the revolution. But he hesitated no longer after the capture of Hankow and Hanyang by the revolutionaries. As head of the new Provisional Revolutionary Government of Hupei, he was assisted by a Military Council of fifteen members which made all the important decisions. In the name of the Military Governor, the Council issued orders and sent out messages to all parts of the country proclaiming that a “ Republic of China” had come into being. This was the first time the phrase “ Republic of China” was used. The effect of the success of the revolution at Wuhan was electrifying. On October 18, the important port city of I-Chang went over to the revolutionaries. On the 22nd, Changsha, the capital of Hunan, followed suit, as did also on the following day the town of Kiukiang in Kiangsi province. The climax was reached shortly afterwards when Sian, the capital of Shensi in Northwestern China, declared for the Republic. Now open disaffection was no longer confined to the Southern provinces; it was spreading to the North.

Uprisings at Shanghai and Hangchow When the news of the Wuhan revolt reached Shanghai, Ch’en Chi-mei sent an urgent telegram to Chiang Kai-shek asking him to return to China immediately to work for the revolutionary cause. The revolution was in dire need of trained military leaders, the telegram explained. More than forty years later, Chiang recalled: I was then twenty five years old. I felt that the time had arrived for us military men to offer ourselves to the service of our nation. I therefore returned immediately to China to participate in the revolution. This was the real beginning of my revolutionary career. To this day I have tried to accomplish the task to which I had dedicated myself in my 30

THE REVOLUTION youth. In my younger days I had to overcome all sorts of difficulties and obstacles to get a military education. As I look back, I believe this is a matter which has given me the greatest happiness.3

Before he could return to China, Chiang had to ask for leave of absence from his regiment. General Nagaoka Gaishi, Commanding General of the 13th Division, refused the request on the ground that without the previous consent of the Ministry of War, no Chinese cadet could leave for home. Chiang, together with his friends Chang Chun and Ch’en Hsing-su, went then to his regimental commander to ask for a short leave of forty-eight hours, the maximum limit within the authority of a regimental commander to grant. By this time it had become an open secret that Chiang and his two friends were going back to China to participate in the revolution. Some Japanese officers quietly gave their Chinese brothers in arms a sendoff party, at which one of them filled his cup with water and raised it to propose a toast. “Japanese soldiers,” he said, “drink water to bid farewell to their comrades. This cup of water symbolizes the bushido spirit of Japan. It means that a soldier going to battle does not expect to come back alive.” He then passed the cup to the young Chinese cadets. This was a solemn moment, reminding Chiang of that famous assassin of the third century B.C., Ching K’o, who was entrusted with the task of killing the powerful king of the Kingdom of Ch’in in order to save his own state from conquest. While crossing the river Yi on his way to the Kingdom of Ch’in, he sang: The wind is blowing and the water of Yi is cold, Once a brave man leaves, he will not ever return. It was in this spirit that Chiang terminated his life as a soldier in the Japanese army. When he and his companions left Takada by train, their first stop was Tokyo. There each of them went to the headquarters of the T ’ung Meng Hui of his respective province to raise passage money. They changed into civilian clothes in order to elude the gendarmes. It was 3

Tui Ts’ung-chun hsueh-sheng shun hua (Speech to Student Recruits of the Army) January 1944. 31

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

the rule of the Japanese army that a soldier who did not return to his barracks upon expiration of a leave of absence would be regarded as a deserter and subject to arrest and severe punishment. Chiang and his friends did not of course return to the barracks, but they did send their uniforms and swords by parcel post to their regiment headquarters. They sailed for Shanghai on October 30 when the Wuhan revolt was barely three weeks old. The Japanese Ministry of War was informed of their departure. Instead of treating them as deserters, the Ministry regarded them as being discharged. In an official communication to the Foreign Office, the War Minister pointed out that the failure of the cadets to return to the barracks upon the expiration of their leave of absence was “a serious offense” in the eyes of military discipline, and that even though the persons involved were Chinese, the Ministry could not let it pass without taking appropriate action. The discipline thus meted out to Chiang and his companions was a matter of form rather than one of substance. When Chiang landed in Shanghai the first thing he did was to get in touch with Ch’en Chi-mei, who had been busily planning for a simultaneous armed uprising at the two of the most important cities in Southeast China — Shanghai and Hangchow. The preparations were then nearing completion and the time for action was at hand. Chiang Kai-shek was instructed to proceed to Hangchow at once and take up the military aspect of the insurrection. He accepted the responsibility without hesitation. Without a minute of rest, he left for the capital of his native province, Chekiang, with two companions. Although Hangchow was only 130 kilometers from his home at Chikow, his sense of duty did not allow him to go home to see his mother. He wrote a letter to her, informing her of the nature of his mission. In reply, Mrs. Chiang told her son to do what was required of him and not to worry about home. When Chiang arrived at Hangchow he found that the Manchu authorities had been aware of the existence of the revolutionary plot and had taken due precautions. The revolutionaries had as their main force those elements in the New Army who were in sympathy with them and who were prepared to take concerted action from the inside to ensure 32

THE REVOLUTION

the success of the uprising. But the imperial authorities were fully alive to the danger they faced. The New Army was under close surveillance. The units deemed unreliable were ordered out of the city so as to make it difficult for them to collaborate with the enemy from within. Each soldier was given only five cartridges. The arsenal was well guarded. The Manchu garrison in the city was reinforced with fresh troops. It was no light thing for the poorly armed and numerically inferior revolutionaries to challenge the far more powerful forces which the Manchus kept at hand near Hangchow. Yet, notwithstanding the overwhelming odds against them, Chiang and his fellow revolutionaries were undaunted. They decided upon a plan of action, which called not only for the full mobilization of the revolutionary elements already in the New Army but also for the recruitment of a Dare-to-Die corps to lead the attack. Armed with the plan, Chiang hurried back to Shanghai to report to Ch’en Chi-mei. While in Shanghai, he lost no time in recruiting volunteers for the Dare-to-Die corps. About a hundred brave men answered the call. On November 3, 1911, he returned to Hangchow with the new recruits. On the night of that very day Ch’en Chi-mei unfurled the banner of revolution in Shanghai. Action in Hangchow could no longer be delayed. The revolutionaries decided to swing into action on the following day. Accordingly, at 2 o ’clock in the afternoon of November 4, they began the fight for the control of Hangchow and with it the province of Chekiang. Chiang Kai-shek led his small band of intrepid dare-to-dies and opened the attack. Advancing in small units of fifteen men each, they fought with skill and reckless courage. They were joined by two women revolu­ tionaries, the Ying sisters, whose bravery earned the admiration of their male comrades. The guards of the Governor’s yamen offered little resistance. The Governor of Chekiang, a Manchu, was taken prisoner. Meanwhile, the arsenal was captured by units of the New Army, whose officers and men had long espoused the revolutionary cause. Before dawn the next day the revolutionaries were in virtual control of all Hangchow. Only the garrison defended by Manchu Bannermen continued to resist. The fighting did not come to an end until the early hours of the 6th when the Manchu defenders, realizing the futility of further resistance 33

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

and bloodshed, surrendered. The old regime was overthrown and a Provisional Revolutionary Government came into being. A new era had begun in Chekiang.

*

*

*

Chiang emerged from his first baptism of fire with flying colors. His contribution to the success of the Hangchow revolution was well recognized. But he had no intention of resting on his laurels. He felt that it was his duty to rejoin his friend and mentor, Ch’en Chi-mei, in Shanghai. In Shanghai he was entrusted with the task of training the troops that would be required to carry on the next stage of the revolution. He was made a regiment commander. The recruits whom Chiang was to train were supported by funds contributed by Shanghai merchants. He served only for a few months, relinquishing his command in favor of his friend Chang Chun. He soon left for Japan. In a letter to Ku Nai-ping, who had in a book given Chiang chief credit for the success of the capture of Hangchow, Chiang wrote: The destructive phase of the revolution has now come to an end and the constructive phase has just begun. I am fully aware of my deficiencies and I am therefore going back to Japan to resume my studies. You have generously attributed the success of the Hangchow revolution to me and complimented me for being too modest to claim that honor. This has made me feel uneasy and embarrassed.4

4 Wei Hangchow Kuang-fu chi fu ku Nai-ping shu (Letter in reply to Ku Nai-ping in regard to his Record of the Hangchow Revolution), 1912. 34

C H A P T E R TH REE

THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC

Yuan Shih-kai’s Return to Power When the news of the uprising at Wuchang reached Peking, Prince Ch’un, realizing the necessity for prompt action if the rebellion was to be crushed, ordered, on October 12, General Yin Ch’ang, the Minister of War, to proceed at once to Hankow at the head of two divisions of the northern Army. A naval squadron under the command of Admiral Sa Chen-ping was also sent to the Wuhan area to help subdue the rebels. All this, however, did not prevent the rebels from gaining a firm foothold. General Yin was a Manchu military man who had studied in Germany but who had never seen action. He proved ineffective as a commander. It was clear to Prince Ch’un that the only man who could save the dynasty from downfall was Yuan Shih-kai, the man he had exiled to Honan. Now he had no alternative but to recall his old enemy from his retreat. On the 14th of October the Regent issued an edict appointing Yuan Viceroy of Hukuang (Hunan and Hupei) and Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces engaged in the suppression of the rebellion. Yuan, however, demurred. He excused himself on the ground of his “foot disease,” the alleged reason for his dismissal from office in 1909. The fact is he was in no hurry to crush the rebellion. On the contrary, he fully intended to make use of the rebellion to maneuver himself back into power and to be avenged on the man who had exiled him. On October 18th the Manchu Court pressed for his immediate acceptance of the new post. At the same time Prince Ch’ing, the Prime Minister, sent his deputy Hsu Shih-ch’ang, who was also one of Yuan’s closest associates, to Honan to plead with Yuan. On the 20th Hsu brought back with him a set of six demands Yuan had laid down: to establish a parliament in 1912, to form a responsible Cabinet, 35

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

to adopt a policy of leniency towards the rebels, to legalize political parties, to give him unrestricted authority over the armed forces and to provide these forces with adequate funds and supplies. Thus, on the one hand he sought to secure the goodwill and support of both the constitutionalists and the revolutionaries and, on the other, he had made it abundantly clear that he would not be satisfied with anything less than supreme power. In other circumstances such sweeping demands would have been met with prompt rejection and the man who had the temerity to make them would have been severely punished for his “disrespect to the Throne.” But these were not normal times. The dynasty was teetering on the brink of ruin and the Manchu Court was forced to yield to Yuan’s wishes. On October 27 Yuan was appointed Imperial Commissioner in charge of all armed forces at the Hankow front. On the 30th, an Imperial Edict was issued in the name of the Emperor in which His Majesty assumed full responsibility for the national crisis. His Majesty, the Edict said, had allowed members of the Imperial Clan to monopolize the great offices, had authorized the nationaliza­ tion of railways, and had failed to carry out necessary reforms. He pledged himself to “make a new beginning and put into effect full constitutional government.” He promised to abide by public opinion in all his future decisions. On the same day it was decreed that no member of the Imperial Clan should be eligible for office in the Cabinet. Armed with new powers, Yuan left his exile for the front. On October 31, he formally took over the command from General Yin Ch’ang. On the next day General Feng Kuo-chang, one of Yuan’s most trusted lieutenants, field commander of the government forces, mounted an offensive and recovered Hankow from the hands of the revolutionaries. Prince Ch’ing, the Prime Minister, resigned and Yuan was appointed to succeed him. At this juncture Yuan started a series of maneuvers for the furtherance of his own ambitions. He ordered the government forces to halt the attack. He dispatched two envoys to Wuchang entrusting them with the mission of trying to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict. His peace overtures were rejected by Li Yuan-hung and the Provisional Military Government. 36

L

THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC

On the 13th of November Yuan finally arrived in Peking. An immense crowd was waiting at the railway station to welcome him. All high government officials were there. There were also a sprinkling of foreign dignitaries. But no member of the Imperial Clan or of the nobility was present. Three days later the roster of the new Cabinet was officially announced. Only one Manchu was included in the Cabinet, and he was given the comparatively minor Department of Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs. In a statement to the press, Yuan said: It is my intention to preserve the monarchy and establish a constitutional government. By so doing, the discriminary practices existing between the Manchu and Chinese will disappear as a matter of course. I hope patriotic people of all parties will abandon their dogmatic political views and help me work toward this end.

Immediately after forming his Cabinet, Yuan issued orders to General Feng Kuo-chang to press forward the attack on the Wuhan area. On the 27th the city of Hanyang and its great arsenal were captured. By so doing, Yuan intended to bring home to the revolutionaries that he was capable of inflicting heavy losses upon them. Unless they were prepared to negotiate peace with him he could even threaten the very nerve-center of revolutionary power — the city of Wuchang itself. By this time, however, the revolutionary cause had already triumphed in fifteen provinces. The irrepressible tide of revolt now reached the historic city of Nanking.

A Central Revolutionary Government? With so large a number of provinces declaring themselves independent of the Manchu dynasty, the need for a unified central revolutionary authority became imperative. Without such authority, it was impossible to speak with one single voice in dealing with those foreign governments which played such an important role in Chinese politics and which had been watching the rising revolutionary tide in China with more than casual interest. 37

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

The Provisional Revolutionary Government at Wuchang was the first to call attention to this problem. On November 7, 1911 Li Yuan-hung sent the following circular telegram to the provinces which had already seceded from the Manchu Court: The general situation has become more or less stabilized, but a central government representing all of us is yet to be established. In the absence of a central government, foreign governments have not accorded us legal belligerent status . . . This is a matter of great importance. What are the views of your military government? Please wire us at the earliest possible time.

Two days later Li Yuan-hung asked the insurgent provinces to send delegates to Wuchang to discuss the question. Nothing came out of these telegrams. On November 11 the military governors of Chekiang and Kiangsu, both of whom had served under the old regime but had recently joined the revolutionaries, in a telegram to the military governor of Shanghai, Ch’en Chi-mei, suggested that all insurgent provinces be invited to send delegates to a meeting in Shanghai to discuss the question of establishing a central government. On the 15th, delegates representing Chekiang, Kiangsu, Fukien, Shantung, Hunan, as well as the cities of Shanghai and Chinkiang, met in Shanghai. They decided to recognize the Wuchang revolutionary regime as the central government and Li Yuan-hung as the head of that government. They suggested that Wu T’ing-fang and Wen Tsung-yao, China’s two veteran diplomats, should be appointed as the regime’s representatives in its dealings with foreign powers. Li Yuang-hung, on the basis of the Shanghai decision, invited the insurgent provinces to send delegates to Wuchang to organize a central government. Delegates from 12 provinces arrived in Wuchang, and on November 30th they held their first meeting in the British settlement of Hankow, Wuchang being under intense Manchu Government fire. On December 2nd, they enacted an Outline for the Organization o f a Provisional Government o f China, providing a Provisional President, a Provisional Council, and five ministries. The Provisional President was to be elected by representatives of the provincial military governors, and the 38

THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC

Provisional Council was to be composed of men appointed by the provincial military governments. It was the consensus of the delegates that Yuan Shih-kai was the man best suited to become the Provisional President of the new regime. Wang Ching-wei, that fiery revolutionary from Canton who had become something of a national hero as a result of his attempted assassination of the Prince Regent in 1910 and who had just been released from prison, was said to have laid before the assembled delegates Yuan Shih-kai’s claim to the Presidency. Those who favored Yuan argued that the Manchu dynasty was in fact no longer a going concern and that Yuan was the real center of power in Peking. He could count on the unswerving allegiance of the most powerful army in China —the so-called Peiyang Army. Without his cooperation the future of the revolution could not be assured. Indeed, Wuchang itself was at that moment in danger of being overwhelmed by Yuan’s forces. If further bloodshed was to be avoided and the future of the revolution was to be assured, it was imperative to win Yuan over to the revolutionary cause. Nothing short of the Presidency would be sufficient to satisfy him, inasmuch as he was already the supreme leader of the North. This argument finally prevailed. It was decided that “pending Yuan Shih-kai’s conversion to the revolutionary cause, the office of the Provisional President should be left vacant.” This decision, which aroused much controversy in the revolutionary camp, was soon to be rendered inoperative by the onrush of events.

Peace Negotiations Capitalizing on the advantage gained by military successes against the rebels, Yuan Shih-kai now made known his wishes to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict. For this he enlisted the services of the British Minister to China, Sir John Jordan, whom he had known in Korea prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and with whom he had been on friendly terms ever since. Sir John instructed the British Consul at Hankow to approach Li Yuan-hung to arrange for 39

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

an immediate cease-fire. The hard-pressed Wuchang revolu­ tionary regime was willing enough to accept the proposal. The cease-fire took effect on December 2. Five days later Yuan appointed his American-educated aide, T ’ang Shao-yi, as his representative to negotiate peace with the revolu­ tionaries. His counterpart on the side of the revolutionaries was Wu T ’ing-fang, a former Chinese Minister to Washington. The talks were to take place in Hankow, but leaders of the T ’ung Meng Hui in Shanghai insisted upon the conference being held in the latter city. On 18th of December the conference opened in the British-controlled International Settlement in Shanghai. The conference ran into rough waters when'the question of the ultimate disposition of the Manchu rulers and of the establishment of a Republican form of government came up. Before any agreement could be reached on basic issues, Dr. Sun Yat-sen returned from Europe. It may not be out of place here to dwell briefly on the revolutionary leader’s activities after the outbreak of the Wuchang revolution.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Election to the Presidency During his long revolutionary career Dr. Sun Yat-sen was constantly on the move in various parts of the world, organizing revolutionary activities, developing connections with people or groups in sympathy with his objectives, or soliciting contributions to finance the revolutionary move­ ment. He moved frequently between Shanghai, Hanoi, Malaya, Honolulu and Japan. At times he also travelled in Europe and America. At the time of the Wuchang uprising he was travelling in the United States. On the night of October 11, 1911, he found himself at the Brown Palace Hotel in Denver, Colorado. He spent some time in deciphering a confidential telegram he had received more than ten days ago. It was from Huang Hsing, leader of the Canton uprising of April 1911, informing him that the New Army at Wuchang was ready to revolt against the Manchu regime and asking him to remit 40

THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC

funds as soon as possible. He had no money to remit. As he was too tired to send a telegram to Huang that night, he went to bed. When he awoke the next day, it was already 11 o ’clock. On his way to the dining-room, he picked up a local newspaper. Imagine his surprise when he saw blazing on the front page the headline: “Wuchang Occupied by the Revolutionaries.” His first reaction was to go to the West Coast and take a fast boat home. Then he changed his mind. His followers in China would do their best to make the revolution a success, and there was little he could do to help them. He believed that the success or failure of the revolution would to a large extent depend on the attitude of those foreign powers which were in a position to influence the course of events in China. He therefore made up his mind to visit England and France before returning to China. He telegraphed Huang Hsing in Hong Kong about his decision. On November 2, he sailed from New York for Europe. In England he found that public opinion was overwhelmingly sympathetic towards the revolutionaries. He hoped he could prevail upon the British Government to lend a helping hand to the revolutionary cause. He succeeded in persuading Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, to impose an embargo on loans to the Manchu regime. In Paris he met with a number of French notables, including Georges Clemenceau and Foreign Minister Stephen Pichou, whom he had known in China when the latter was French Minister to Peking. In press interview's, he took special pains to dispel the fears and doubts felt in some French quarters about the Chinese revolution. After a sojourn of three weeks in Europe, Dr. Sun sailed for home. He arrived in Hong Kong in December 21 and thence he proceeded to Shanghai. His arrival there was greeted with fanfare and enthusiasm. In Nanking, which had just been declared as the capital of revolutionary China, delegates from seventeen provinces met and elected him Provisional President of China. The idea that the office of the Provisional President should be left vacant pending Yuan Shih-kai’s conversion was shunted aside and forgotten. It must have been a proud moment in the life of this great revolutionary leader when, on New Year’s Day, 1912, 41

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

he made his state entry into Nanking, a city teeming with the memories of a glorious past. With Dr. Sun’s inauguration, the Republic of China was formally ushered into the world. This was the first time that a republican form of government was established on the continent of Asia. Immediately upon assuming office, Dr. Sun requested the provincial delegates to revise the Outline for the Organization of a Provisional Government o f China so as to add a Vice President and enlarge the Cabinet from five to nine members. On January 3rd, Li Yuan-hung was elected Provisional Vice President. Of the nine members of the Cabinet only three were members of the T ’ung Meng Hui. The remaining six were members of the old regime known for their pro-revolutionary sympathies or men of outstanding achievements in their respective fields of endeavor. The Vice Ministers were all members of the T’ung Meng Hui. Acting in conformity with the Revised Outline for the Organization o f a Provisional Government, Dr. Sun proceeded to call into session the Provisional Council, whose most important function was to draft a Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China.

The Abdication of the Manchu Emperor In Peking Yuan Shih-kai left no stone unturned to strengthen his own position. At first he made a great show of his unswerving loyalty to the Throne. When he found that the pretense no longer served his purpose, he discarded it without compunction. He knew that the attainment of his supreme ambition — leadership of all China — called for the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty. He therefore took steps to advance its realization. Instead of taking offensive action against the revolutionaries, his armies at the front became militarily inactive. He reported to the Throne that the enemy was too strong to be crushed by force. This being so, the only course open to the government was to seek a compromise solution. In the circumstances it seemed essential, he said, that the Emperor should abdicate in favor of the Republic. 42

THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC

Protracted discussions took place. The young members of the Imperial Clan were not prepared to give up without a struggle. They characterized Yuan as a traitor and demanded the immediate resumption of hostilities against the revolutionaries. But Yuan, a man of great resourcefulness and totally uninhibited by moral scruples, did not allow himself to be thwarted by a bunch of princely mollycoddles. He pointed out that money was needed to carry on the war. The Imperial treasury was empty. The Government was prevented from getting loans from foreign sources by reason of the financial neutrality agreed to by the Powers. If the Princes wanted to resume hostilities against the revolutionaries, they must themselves contribute to the war chest. The Empress Dowager Lung Yu, who had replaced Prince Ch’un as regent, was prevailed upon to issue, on January 3, an Edict directing all members of the Imperial Clan, all members of the Manchu nobility, as well as all high-ranking officials of the regime, to donate part of their wealth to the Imperial coffers. This was intended to silence the war-mongering princelings. Nor was this all. On January 26, Tuan Ch’i-jui and forty-one other generals at the Hankow front, obviously at the instigation of Yuan himself, threatened military action to bring about the Emperor’s abdication. The Empress Dowager bowed to the inevitable, and on February 12, she issued an Edict in the name of the Emperor, by which he renounced for ever the Throne and the vast Empire over which his family had ruled with an iron hand for two hundred sixty-eight years. In the same Edict the Emperor announced that the Republic would be the future form of government in China. He authorized Yuan Shih-kai to organize the Republican government and to negotiate with the revolutionaries for the unification of China.1 The terms granted to the fallen dynasty by the Provisional Government at Nanking were extremely generous.* xIt is commonly believed that the original draft of the Edict did not contain the sentence authorizing Yuan to organize the Republican government. The sentence was added by Yuan himself. In this way, if Sun should refuse to yield the Presidency, Yuan could remain in power as the successor to the Manchus. 43

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

The Emperor Hsuan Tung, in spite of his abdication, was allowed to continue to call himself Manchu Emperor and to enjoy the privileges of a foreign sovereign resident on Chinese soil. He was given the Yi Ho Yuan Summer Palace as a permanent residence, and was to receive an annual allowance of four million Chinese dollars. The stage was set for the final act of this political melodrama. Desirous of restoring domestic peace and having accomplished his object of overthrowing the Manchu dynasty, Dr. Sun tendered his resignation to the Provisional Council two days after the Edict of Abdication was issued and nominated Yuan Shih-kai as his successor. The Provisional Council, not without misgivings, accepted Dr. Sun’s resignation and entrusted the future of the Republic to Yuan Shih-kai. Subsequently it re-elected Li Yuan-hung to the Vice Presidency.

Yuan’s Refusal to Go to Nanking Yuan now found himself involved in what threatened to become a serious dispute with the leaders of the T’ung Meng Hui. Dr. Sun and his party attached great importance to the location of the capital. They favored Nanking because it was already the capital of the Provisional Government and also because it was a stronghold of revolutionary forces. They had little faith in Yuan’s professed loyalty to Republican principles, and they believed it was dangerous to leave Yuan to his own devices in the North. Yuan, for his part, strongly opposed the suggestion that Nanking should henceforth be known as the capital of the Republic and that his residence should be transferred to that city. Nanking lay in politically hostile territory. He never intended to govern so far from the bases of his own strength. He did not relish the prospect of being subjected to the control of the T’ung Meng Hui and did not like to be told how he should run the government. Dr. Sun, however, insisted that Yuan should go to Nanking. He dispatched a deputation of eight prominent men to Peking to act as Yuan’s escort to the southern capital. Led 44

THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC

by the well-known educator, Ts’ai Yuan-p’ei, the deputation arrived in Peking toward the end of February and was received by Yuan with great courtesy. Yuan seemed ready to accede to Dr. Sun’s wishes. He went through the motions of making out an itinerary of the proposed journey and the date was set. On the eve of the departure, however, the troops of the Third Division of the northern army, which formed the main force of the Peking garrison, mutinied. There was widespread looting. This “emergency” provided Yuan with a plausible excuse for cancelling the proposed trip. Although it was widely suspected that Yuan had engineered the mutiny to make his point, his explanation was accepted at Nanking at face value. Yuan was inaugurated in Peking on March 10, 1912. From the time of his inauguration it became obvious that his ideas of a constitutional government differed greatly from those held by Sun Yat-sen and his fellow revolutionaries. This inevitably led to confrontation and conflict culminating in the “ Second Revolution.”

45

C H A P T E R FO UR

THE SECOND REVOLUTION

Conflict Over the Organization and Powers of the Cabinet Yuan Shih-kai’s first important move as President was to appoint his old friend and aide T ’ang Shao-yi Prime Minister. In the Cabinet which T’ang succeeded in forming, the T ’ung Meng Hui occupied a place of considerable importance, although the majority of the ministers were men who had held office under the Manchus. T ’ang himself had been a high official of the old regime. But, while serving as Yuan’s representative at the peace conference, he had come under the influence of the T ’ung Meng Hui. At the time of his appointment to the Premiership he was already a member of that organization. And as such, he believed that his fundamental loyalty was to the principle of constitutional government laid down by the T ’ung Meng Hui rather than to the President. He sought to make the Cabinet rather than the President the real executive. Inevitably, conflicts between Yuan and T ’ang became increasingly frequent and serious. When the question of appointing a Tutuh of Chili (Hopei) came up, they found themselves at loggerheads. T ’ang resigned in a huff. When Yuan sent his Secretary-General to persuade T ’ang to stay, he refused. He could not, he said, let his personal friendship with Yuan interfere with what he considered his public duty. In this connection it may be noted that the T ’ung Meng Hui of 1912 was no longer the same T ’ung Meng Hui of yore. Founded in Tokyo in 1905, it was a secret society engaged in underground activities for the overthrow of the Manchus. Its membership was limited to a relatively small band of dedicated revolutionaries, who were able to impart to their struggle the zeal and fanaticism of a religious cause. With the establishment of the Republic, however, the nature of the 46

THE SECOND REVOLUTION

T’ung Meng Hui underwent a basic change. It came out into the open as one of the many political parties that sprang up in the Republic of China, following its establishment in January. In March 1912 it held its first national membership meeting in Nanking. Some five thousand party members attended. They elected Dr. Sun Director-General and Huang Hsing and Li Yuan-hung1 Deputy Directors of the party. They adopted a party platform whose main planks were (1) to consolidate the Republic and (2) to put into effect the Principle of the People’s Livelihood. The broadening of the membership base did not, however, strengthen the T’ung Meng Hui as a political force; on the contrary, it weakened its revolutionary spirit. Next to the T ’ung Meng Hui in importance was the T ’ung Yi Tang or Union Party, led by Chang Ping-lin, the famed classical scholar and a former member of the T ’ung Meng Hui, and Chang Chien, the former President of the Kiangsu Assembly and Minister of Industries of Dr. Sun’s Provisional Government. This party later merged with a number of minor parties to form the Kung Ho Tang or Republican Party. Li Yuan-hung became the titular head of this party. Politically, the Kung Ho Tang served as a mere tool of Yuan Shih-kai. Upon the resignation of T ’ang Shao-yi as Prime Minister, the Kung Ho Tang recommended Lu Cheng-hsiang, former Chinese Minister to Russia, as his successor. Lu did not belong to any political party, and it was argued that at a time when the country was torn by conflict and strife, a non-party man was an ideal choice for the Premiership. Members of the T’ung Meng Hui took strong exception to this view. Yuan had to resort to strong-arm tactics to get the Lu Cabinet confirmed by the Provisional Council.

The Kuomintang The Lu Cabinet was short-lived. It lasted less than a month. Yuan appointed his fellow provincial and devoted 1Li Yuan-hung, who had never been a member of the T ’ung Meng Hui, soon deserted it to head a new rival party. 47

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

adherent, Chao Ping-chun, as Acting Prime Minister, pending confirmation by the Provisional Council. The T’ung Meng Hui now found itself in a dilemma. It was firmly opposed to Chao, yet it was not strong enough to make its opposition effective. It had already lost much of its political clout in its struggle against the confirmation of Lu Cheng-hsiang. Some of its leading members came to the conclusion that the T’ung Meng Hui was out of date and that a new party should now be formed to deal with whatever governmental problem that might arise in the future. In August 1912 the T ’ung Meng Hui amalgamated with four other parties to form the Kuomintang, with Dr. Sun Yat-sen as its President and Huang Hsing, Sung Chiao-jen and others as Directors. The new party gained in numerical strength but it did not have the cohesion, the sense of purpose and the spirit of enterprise which had characterized the old T ’ung Meng Hui. Nonetheless, as the majority party in the Provisional Council it represented a political force to be reckoned with. Yuan Shih-kai exercised the utmost circumspection in the methods he employed in his dealings with it. In August 1912 Dr. Sim accepted Yuan’s invitation to visit Peking where he was received with the highest honors. This was the first time that the two men met face to face. Dr. Sun was soon joined by Huang Hsing and Ch’en Chi-mei. Huang had resigned his post as Commander of the revolutionary forces at Nanking and disbanded the greater party of his army. The only revolutionary army of any strength left in the country was that commanded by Li Yuan-hung at Wuhan. Li had now openly thrown in his lot with Yuan Shih-Kai. Dr. Sun stayed in Peking for a month in the course of which he had thirteen meetings with Yuan. The question of finding a suitable successor to Lu Cheng-hsiang as Prime Minister was among the topics discussed. Dr. Sun recommended Huang Hsing. Huang, however, was adamant in his refusal. Then the name of Sung Chiao-jen, a former Minister of Education in the Cabinet of T’ang Shao-yi and one of Dr. Sun’s most brilliant and ablest followers, was suggested. Yuan expressed agreement, though actually Sung was unacceptable to him. He was well aware that Sung, as the leading proponent of constitutional government, would seek to make the Cabinet rather than the President the real 48

THE SECOND REVOLUTION

executive. Sung knew Yuan too well to imagine that the offer was sincere. He declined the honor. Then Yuan proposed to give the position to the Acting Prime Minister, Chao Ping-chun. There was one difficulty in the way. Chao was not a member of the Kuomintang, and he could not become Prime Minister if the majority of the Provisional Council should refuse to confirm his appointment. But, of course, there was nothing to prevent Chao from becoming a member. Accordingly, Chao and his non-Kuomintang colleagues, with the exception of the Ministers of War and Navy, registered themselves as members of the Kuomintang, and the Cabinet thus constituted was supposed to be a responsible Cabinet. Chao Ping-chun himself regarded the whole thing as a joke. “I don’t really know what a political party is. They told me to join a party and sent me forms to fill in, and I did what I was told. Now I am a member, I still don’t understand what all this is about.” From the moment of the appointment of Chao Ping-chun, who was no more than an errand-boy of Yuan’s, it became all too obvious that Yuan’s concept of a constitutional government differed widely from that put forth by Dr. Sun and his followers. The idea of political parties was totally alien to Chinese tradition. Aside from the few genuinely progressive-minded revolutionaries led by Dr. Sun, there was little understanding of the democratic process. Yuan Shih-kai was a product of the ancient tradition. To him the very idea of a Cabinet responsible to parliament was incomprehensible. It was unthinkable that his ministers should place their loyalty to the party over and above their loyalty to the head of State. Yuan steadily strengthened his position at the expense of the constitution. The antagonism between the President and the leadership of the Kuomintang was further strained when, in August 1912, two prominent revolutionaries, Chang Chen-wu and Fang Wen, who had played an important role in the Wuchang uprising, were seized and summarily executed in Peking, the charges against them being preferred by Li Yuan-hung. The leaders of the Kuomintang were now no longer in doubt of the real trend of Yuan’s policy, and consequently 49

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

looked upon him with profound distrust, a feeling which soon developed into bitter hatred.

The New Parliament and Sung’s Assassination In March 1913 a general election took place throughout China and a new Parliament was elected in accordance with the provisions of the Provisional Constitution. It was a great victory for the Kuomintang. Of the 596 members of the House of Representatives, no less than 269 were members of the Kuomintang. And Kuomintang members also constituted the majority of the Senate — 123 out of a total of 274 seats. The victory was attributed to the vigorous campaign conducted by the party’s acting President, Sung Chiao-jen. Sung had been travelling in various provinces and cities of South China. In his speeches he was unsparing in his attacks on Yuan Shih-kai. He asserted that the Kuomintang, as the majority party of the Parliament, must now be charged with the responsibility of forming a Cabinet. Passionate in his advocacy, moving and eloquent as a speaker, and endowed with a magnetic personality, Sung was a leader of great force. Yuan decided to use all the means at his disposal to win Sung over to his service. Sung, however, was incorruptible; he could neither be bought off nor coerced into submission. But he was finally overtaken by violence. On the evening of March 20, he was scheduled to leave Shanghai for Peking with every prospect of a brilliant parliamentary career ahead of him. While waiting at the Shanghai railway station, amidst the good cheers of his friends and associates, for the train which was to take him to the capital, a shot was heard. Sung was mortally wounded by the bullet of an assassin. He staggered along for a few steps and collapsed. The assassin escaped in the confusion of darkness. Two days later Sung was dead. He was only thirty-three years old. The murderer was arrested two days after Sung’s death, and in the house in which he had stayed was found evidence in the form of letters and telegrams which implicated Prime Minister Chao Ping-chun. The Kuomintang majority in the 50

THE SECOND REVOLUTION

Parliament demanded Chao’s dismissal from office, charging that he was the direct instigator of the assassination. Chao was subsequently appointed Tutuh of Chili. In February 1914 he died mysteriously in his yamen. It was believed that Yuan had a hand in Chao’s death.

The “Reorganization Loan Agreement” In the early stages of the struggle between Kuomintang and Yuan Shih-kai, the government was on the verge of bankruptcy. In order to consolidate his position, Yuan faced the necessity of borrowing from abroad. Negotiations were immediately instituted with an international consortium of six Powers (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan) for a large loan. The terms exacted by the bankers included the reorganization, under foreign direction, of the Salt Gabelle which was to serve as the principal security for the loan, and foreign supervision of expenditure of the loan. The then President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, withdrew political and government support from the American bankers on the ground that the conditions imposed unduly impaired the administrative integrity of China. The American group consequently withdrew. Notwithstanding the strong opposition voiced by the Kuomintang majority in the Parliament, Yuan Shih-kai went ahead with his negotiations with the Consortium. The loan agreement was finally signed on April 7th, 1913, and Yuan Shih-kai was thus placed in possession of 25,000,000 pounds. This was in contravention of the provisions of the Provisional Constitution which made the legality of a foreign loan conditional upon the assent of Parliament being obtained. But the foreign Powers, convinced that Yuan Shih-kai was the “strong man” capable of maintaining order and stability in China, brushed this aside as of no concern to them. The Kuomintang members of the Parliament, by a vote of 102 to 69, declared the loan agreement null and void. Yuan ratified the agreement in defiance of the parliamentary vote. 51

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

The Outbreak of the “Second Revolution” Now the Kuomintang decided to use more forcible measures to drive Yuan from office. Its military leaders such as Li Lieh-chun, Tutuh of Kiangsi, Po Wen-hui, Tutuh of Anhwei, Hu Han-min, Tutuh of Kwangtung, lodged strong protests against the conclusion of the loan agreement and threatened to apply force of arms to accomplish their objective. It was clear that the country was on the brink of civil war. Yuan deployed his troops in various strategic points throughout the country. He issued a presidential mandate in June dismissing Li Lieh-chun, Po Wen-hui and Hu Han-min from office. In July fighting broke out between the northern and southern armies. Li Lieh-chun, attacked Yuan’s troops as they tried to advance into Kiangsi, declared independence in that province on July 12. Other Kuomintang Tutuhs and generals followed Li’s example in quick succession: Huang Hsing in Nanking on July 13, Po Wen-hui in Anhwei on July 17, Ch’en Chiung-ming (who had replaced Hu Han-min) in Kwangtung on July 18, Hsu Chung-chih and Sun Tao-jen in Fukien and Tan Yen-k’ai in Hunan on July 20. This was the beginning of the “war for the punishment of Yuan,” which is generally referred to in Chinese history as the “ Second Revolution.” *

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At this time Chiang Kai-shek was studying German in Japan in preparation for the completion of his military education in Germany. In addition to his studies, he published a magazine, Chun Sheng (Military Voice) in which he discussed military affairs as well as China’s international relations, boundary questions, and political problems. As the political situation in China deteriorated, Chiang, at Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s urging, abandoned his plan of going to Germany. When fighting started between the Kuomintang forces and Yuan’s armies, he left Japan for Shanghai where his mentor and friend Ch’en Chi-mei had, on July 18, become the leader of the anti-Yuan forces. Once again Chiang, in the capacity of 52

THE SECOND REVOLUTION

a staff officer, drew up a plan to capture the Shanghai arsenal, the largest of its kind in China. On July 22, Ch’en Chi-mei ordered the revolutionary forces to advance upon the arsenal. The small garrison of northern troops in the arsenal made a spirited defense and repulsed the attack. On the 28th the anti-Yuan forces made another attempt. The defenders, aided by a naval squadron stationed in the Yangtze River under the command of Admiral Cheng Ju-ch’eng, were able to hold their ground and beat off the attackers again. Fighting continued until the evening of the 29th when a last desperate attack was made upon the arsenal from three points. Greatly outnumbered, the attackers were forced to retreat to Woosung and Paoshan, 20 kilometers north of Shanghai. A few days later the Woosung fort, after a short bombardment by Cheng Ju-ch’eng’s naval guns, were taken by the northerners. Thus, as far as Shanghai was concerned, the “war for the punishment of Yuan” ended in dismal failure. A similar fate awaited other anti-Yuan forces. On August 5 ,Ch’en Chiung-ming, Tutuh of Kwangtung, was defeated and he fled to Hong Kong. Kwangtung, the province which was the stronghold of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, passed under the sway of Yuan Shih-kai. Kiangsi, the first province to take up arms in revolt against Yuan, fell to northern troops on August 15. Nanking was surrounded on all sides by Yuan’s forces and its Tutuh, Huang Hsing, boarded a Japanese boat in Yangtze on July 29 and left for Shanghai. The city continued to hold out under the leadership of Ho Hai-ming but on September 1, it, too, was taken by Yuan’s generals. On September 12 the anti-Yuan forces in Chungking, Szechuan, were defeated. Thus, within the short space of two months, the “Second Revolution” was crushed completely. The entire Yangtze Valley, the richest region of all China, was in Yuan’s hands. Remembering the remarkable victory achieved by the revolutionaries between 1911 and 1912, it was difficult to realize the swiftness with which the gains were frittered away. To all intents and purposes the Kuomintang, with its leaders in exile abroad and its army dispersed, ceased to exist. What accounted for this tragic debacle? Chiang Kai-shek, citing a letter Ch’en Chi-mei once wrote to him, said: 53

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD In 1911, it was the dedication and selfless spirit of the revolutionaries that enabled them, practically unarmed and with a force of only a few hundred men, to raise the standard of revolt in Wuchang and rouse the whole country to action. In 1913 they were in control of several provinces and of an army of over a hundred thousand strong, yet they were defeated. The reason is that they were no longer animated by that spirit.2

Yuan Shih-kai after the “Second Revolution” The collapse of the “Second Revolution” strengthened Yuan Shih-kai’s hands both domestically and internationally. Domestically he was in an unchallengeable and unassailable position. Internationally, he represented in the eyes of the foreign Powers the de facto as well as the de jure government of China. Although the revolt was crushed, the majority of members of the Parliament still belonged to the Kuomintang. Alternately through tactics of cajolery and bribery and tactics of intimidation, Yuan sought to press the Kuomintang members into his service. He was no longer content to be a Provisional President; he had to be a bona fide President. No sooner had the revolt been put down than Yuan compelled the Parliament to hold Presidential Election, notwithstanding the fact that the draft for the new Constitution had not yet been completed. The election took place on October 6 in the House of Representatives, and Yuan succeeded through bribery and intimidation, in securing his own election to the Presidency and that of Li Yuan-hung to the Vice Presidency. Even in these circumstances, it took three ballots to get Yuan elected. On the day of Yuan’s election as President, the foreign Powers, including Japan, formally recognized the Republic of China. 2Chiang Kai-shek: Ch’en ying-shih hsien-sheng kuei-ch'ou chih ke-ming chi-hua chi shih-lueh (A Summary of Mr. Ch’i-mei’s Revolutionary Plans and Activities since 1913), May 1916. 54

THE SECOND REVOLUTION

The 10th of October 1913, the second anniversary of the outbreak of the Revolution at Wuchang, was selected for Yuan’s inauguration. Five days later the Metropolitan Police was instructed to notify the law enforcement agencies of the country to arrest Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing, Ch’en Chi-mei, Li Lieh-chun, Po Wen-hui and other Kuomintang leaders. On November 4 Yuan ordered the immediate dissolution of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang members of Parliament, some 430 of them, were deprived of their right to exercise parliamentary functions. With the suspension of the Kuomintang members, the Parliament ceased to be a working organ of the government. In a few months it went out of existence. On March 18, 1914, a Constitutional Convention was summoned by Yuan. The new Constitution, which superseded the Provisional Constitution drafted by the Provisional Council at Nanking in 1912, made Yuan Shih-kai a virtual dictator. It was not long before he began to conjure up dreams of the day when he would ascend the Dragon Throne and become the founder of a new imperial dynasty.

The Chinese Revolutionary Party The failure of the “Second Revolution ” had necessitated the withdrawal to Japan of Sun Yat-sen, Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-k’ai, Huang Hsing, Ch’en Chi-mei and a host of other leaders of the Kuomintang. As soon as he arrived in Tokyo in August, 1913, Dr. Sun began to draw up plans to revitalize the revolutionary movement. The Kuomintang had failed because it had expanded too quickly and because most of its members, particularly the new members, lacked the sense of dedication and purpose. Dr. Sun therefore decided to make a fresh start and build a new organization upon the ruins of the old. There had to be a return to the spirit and religious fervor that characterized members of the T’ung Meng Hui. The name of the restructured organization was Chung-hua Ke-ming Tang or Chinese Revolutionary Party. Its members were required to take an oath to observe the following: (1) 55

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

carry out party principles and objectives; (2) obey orders; (3) be loyal to their assigned duties; (4) maintain strict secrecy and (5) be willing, if necessary, to make the supreme sacrifice. Chiang was the 102nd man to become a member of the Chinese Revolutionary Party. The date was October 29, 1913. In December of that year, Dr. Sun received young Chiang alone, for the first time treating him as a revolutionary in his own right. From that time onward their relations became increasingly warm and close. The veteran revolutionary leader took a deep personal interest in the younger man’s welfare and studies. On his part, Chiang felt increasing respect and admiration for the great leader. It was during this period that Chiang began to study the works of Tseng Kuo-fan, the man who had suppressed the Taiping Rebellion in the 1860’s. It may be asked: Why should a young revolutionary like Chiang now apply himself so diligently to the works of a man who did so much for the preservation of the established social and political order and, indeed, for giving a new lease of life to the Manchu Dynasty? The fact is that he was impressed not so much by Tseng’s politics as by Tseng’s moral character. Years later he had this to say about Tseng: Tseng Kuo-fan was a man who turned weakness into strength and transformed defeat into victory. He was able to overcome what seemed to be insurmountable obstacles and annihilate the most formidable and entrenched enemy. His success was not due to any occult knowledge but to his humility and willingness to learn from others. He was always doing everything possible to gather around him men of outstanding ability and integrity, men who could help him in his work.3

Thus, the influence of his mother, the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming, and the moral character of Tseng Kuo-fan —all these had left an indelible imprint on Chiang’s mind. *

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3Ti-san-tz’u Nan-yo chun-shih hui-i hsun-tzu (Address to the Third Military Conference at Nanyo, Hunan), October 20, 1941. 56

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The Chinese Revolutionary Party was formally inau­ gurated in Tokyo on July 8, 1914. Over 400 members attended the inaugural meeting. A covenant of 39 Articles was distributed. In the Manifesto issued on September 1, the Party attributed the failure of the “Second Revolution” to “the lack of solidarity among our comrades.” The Manifesto went on to say: In consequence, many comrades had to flee to Japan to find sanctuary . . . It is encouraging that our comrades at home and abroad have vied with each other in signing up and in making pledges to join the new Party . . . All members of the Party shall cooperate and coordinate with each other in preparing for the Third Revolution . . . As the clouds of war spread all over Europe, the Western nations are too preoccupied with their own problems to pay any attention to China. And, because of the dislocation among the various world financial institutions, Yuan Shih-kai’s financial resources have been exhausted. This is therefore the crowning opportunity for our Party as well as our comrades to redouble their efforts . . . The day of final victory will not be too distant. . .

The new Party did not, however, come up to Dr. Sun’s expectations. Chiang Kai-shek recalled: Among those who answered T s u n g - li's (Dr. Sun’s) call and became members of the Chinese Revolutionary Party in Japan, only a very few really believed in T s u n g - l i ’s ideological principles and understood the meaning of the revolutionary movement . . . They quarrelled among themselves . . . They even acted in an arrogant and insulting way toward T s u n g - li. They refused to carry out his orders and tried to embarrass him in every way. . . I was at that time a young fellow of twenty seven or twenty eight. I was but a junior member of the Party. Yet I could hardly bear the sight of those who acted and talked in such a disrespectful manner . . . I made up my mind then and there that I must, as a Party member, endeavor to vindicate our T s u n g - li against these insolent and over bearing comrades. Otherwise, I wouldn’t be a loyal and worthy member of the Party.4 4Chiang Kai-shek: Ti-san-tz’u Nan-yo chun-shih hui-i shun-tzu (Address to the Third Military Conference at Nanyo, Hunan) October 20 1941. 57

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Chiang’s Missions to Shanghai and Manchuria Not long after becoming a member of the Chinese Revolutionary Party, Chiang was ordered by Dr. Sun to proceed to Shanghai to lead another anti-Yuan Shih-kai military campaign. He was in Shanghai in May 1914. But the prospects in that city were not very promising. Cheng Ju-ch’eng, who had now become the Defense Commissioner, was an alert and able officer. Before Chiang could put his plan of attack into operation, Cheng had already got wind of it. Several of Chiang’s men were arrested and shot. Chiang himself had a narrow escape and was urged by Ch’en Chi-mei to return to Japan. Ch’en Chi-mei held the view that the revolutionaries failed because they had confined their activities to the South. In his opinion, they should now turn their attention to the North, and particularly to Peking, the hot-bed of reaction. He pointed out that Yuan Shih-kai had stationed troops in every strategic point in the South, and that to concentrate on the South to the exclusion of the North was to invite more and more failures. Acting upon this conviction, Ch’en and Tai Chi-tao had in January 1914 gone to Dairen to establish revolutionary organs there. But the Japanese Kwantung Army, apprized of Ch’en and Tai’s activities by Yuan Shih-kai, had kept a watchful eye over them. Ch’en and Tai had returned to Tokyo with comparatively scant results after a stay of six months. After their return, the situation in Manchuria had reportedly become favorable. Reports had reached Ch’en that two military commanders in Manchuria were sympathetic to the anti-Yuan cause and were anxious for Ch’en Chi-mei to proceed thereto to lead an uprising. Ch’en, unable to go himself, sent Chiang and Ting Kung-liang to Harbin, Tsitsihar and other cities in Heilungkiang to survey the situation at first hand. They found nothing to justify the reports. The people there were too apathetic and the Japanese influence too great to expect a successful uprising. Chiang and Ting quietly returned to Japan. It was in Harbin that Chiang heard the news of the assassination of the Archduke of Austria-Hungary by a Serbian nationalist at Sarajevo. From the fragmentary 58

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information available, Chiang foresaw the coming of a general European war. On August 2 he wrote a long communication to Dr. Sun Yat-sen in Japan, setting forth his views of the possible effect of the European war on the Chinese situation. He believed that “the longer the war lasts and the more widespread it becomes, the weaker will become the foreign support accorded to Yuan Shih-kai and the more will our situation improve.” He urged Dr. Sun to take advantage of the situation and lead the Party to overthrow Yuan.

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C H A P T E R F IV E

FROM THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS TO YUAN’S DEATH

Japan’s Occupation of Kiaochow The war in Europe provided Japan with a long-awaited opportunity to carry out her expansionist policy at the expense of China. Under pretext of fulfilling the obligations of her alliance with Britain, the Japanese fleet on August 8, 1914, appeared in waters near Tsingtao, the German leased territory on the coast of Shantung Province. On August 15 the Japanese Government delivered an ultimatum to Germany, demanding the immediate withdrawal of German men-of-war and armed vessels from the Japanese and Chinese waters and the handing over to Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow. As the German Government failed to comply with the Japanese demand within the time limit assigned to it, Japan declared war on Germany. With the capitulation of the German troops at Tsingtao on November 7, the Japanese came into possession of not only the German lease of Kiaochow but also the entire Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, thus extending their control as far west as the provincial capital of Tsinan. The Japanese military action was a violation of China’s neutrality which had been declared by a Presidential Mandate as early as August 6. She was too weak to make her neutrality inviolate and was thus placed in the same uneviable position as she had been in during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which was fought chiefly on Chinese soil.

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FROM THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS TO YUAN’S DEATH

The Twenty-one Demands Surly, snarly, grasping and insatiable, Japan, in the name of law and order in the Far East, taking advantage of Europe’s distress and America’s seeming indifference, decided to reduce China to the status of a Japanese protectorate. This was the burden of the infamous Twenty-one Demands, a clear and comprehensive expression of Japan’s policy of continental expansion which she had energetically pursued but had not been able to fully realize. The demands were decided upon at a meeting of the Japanese Cabinet on November 11, 1914. On December 3, Foreign Minister Kato instructed the Japanese Minister to Peking, Hioki Eki, who had been recalled to Tokyo for consultation, to take the demands back to China for presentation. Hioki Eki pledged to use “threat, cajolery and other means” to secure the assent of the Chinese Government to the Japanese proposal. He suggested that, if necessary, Japan could dispatch part of her troops at Tsingtao to regions north of the Yellow River to back up the demands. The manner in which Hioki presented the demands after his return to Peking was unusual. Bypassing the Chinese Foreign Office, he handed the text of the demands directly to President Yuan Shih-kai on January 18, 1915. In the course of his interview with Yuan, he enjoined strict secrecy on pain of great consequences to China. He asserted that Japanese public opinion was hostile to Yuan, and that some influential publicists even favored the use of the Chinese revolutionaries to overthrow the Yuan regime. “If you do not promptly accept the Japanese proposal, serious consequences will certainly follow. If you should procrastinate, the Japanese Government might enlarge the scope of its demands . . .” Hioki, who had been aware of Yuan’s aspirations to the Dragon Throne, continued: It is our hope that Your Excellency would take a step forward and attain an even higher honor.

The Twenty-one Demands were divided into five groups. Group I had to do with the settlement of the Shantung question. It required China’s assent in advance to any 61

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agreement that Japan might make with Germany for the disposition of all German rights, interests, and concessions in the Province of Shantung; to agree not to cede or lease to any other power, any territory or island within Shantung or along its coast; to permit Japan to construct a railway from Chefoo or Lungchow to meet the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway; and to open certain cities and towns in that province as commercial ports. Group II aimed at defining Japan’s special position in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and required China’s recognition thereof. It stipulated that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen, and that of the South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Railways, should be extended to a further period of ninety-nine years; Japanese nationals should be granted the right to own or lease land in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and to reside, travel and engage in industrial, commercial and mining enterprises; Japanese nationals should be engaged as political, financial and military advisers; and Japan should be allowed to construct railways or make financial investments in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Group III was concerned with the Han-Yeh-Ping Company. The Company should be made a joint concern of the two countries and all mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the company should not be worked by other persons or companies without the consent of the Company. Group IV contained a single article in which Japan demanded that China should not cede or lease to a Third Power any harbor or bay or island of the Chinese coast. Group V required the Chinese Government to employ influential Japanese as political, financial and military advisers; to grant the right of owning land to Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools in the interior of China; to place the police in important places in China under joint Chinese and Japanese administration; and to purchase from Japan a fixed quantity of arms and to establish in China a jointly managed arsenal in which Japanese technical experts were to be engaged and Japanese materials to be used. Furthermore, Japan should have the right to construct railways from Wuchang to Kiukiang and Nanchang, from Nanchang to Hangchow, and from Nanchang to Chaochow. 62

FROM THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS TO YUAN’S DEATH

Finally, the Province of Fukien should be made into a Japanese sphere of influence, and Japanese nationals should be allowed to engage in religious propaganda in China. In short, Japan intended to dominate the whole of China and turn her into a vassal state. It was through the same means that Japan had between 1904 and 1910 transformed Korea into a Japanese dependency. Although the Chinese Government was enjoined not to give out any information about the Japanese demands, it was not long before the news of the Japanese diplomatic demarche was revealed to the world. Japan insisted, however, that the demands neither infringed upon China’s territorial integrity nor impaired foreign rights in China. For a time Japan concealed the existence of Group V. Only gradually did the truth become known. Throughout the negotiations the Chinese Government consistently refused to accept the sweeping demands contained in Group V. On February 5 the Chinese Foreign Minister, Lu Cheng-hsiang, stated his Government’s position as follows: In regard to Group I and Group II there is room for discussion. As to Group III, this is a matter that concerns the interests of private individuals and is therefore beyond the scope of the present discussions. Groups IV and V are unacceptable because they not only infringe upon China’s sovereign independence and internal affairs but are also incompatible with China’s existing treaties and agreements with other foreign Powers.

After repeated Japanese threats to break off negotiations, Peking accepted most of the Japanese demands with the exception of Group V. Tokyo rejected the Chinese counter-proposal as unsatisfactory, and on March 30 the Japanese Cabinet contemplated the use of military force to secure satisfaction. On May 7, the day on which the British passenger liner Lusitania was sunk by a German submarine in the North Atlantic, the Japanese Minister to Peking, delivered an ultimatum to the Chinese Government, demanding China’s unconditional acceptance of all but Group V of the demands and threatening “necessary” measures against China if she failed to give a satisfactory 63

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reply by six o ’clock in the afternoon of May 9. The Chinese Government, finding itself militarily weak and helpless, decided, as a result of a meeting held on the 8th by its high officials under the chairmanship of President Yuan Shih-kai, to back down. The next day it officially informed the Japanese Minister at Peking of its unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum as presented on May 7, thus bringing to a close more than three months of strenuous negotiations with Japan. On May 25 China and Japan signed two treaties and exchanged a number of notes. As a result the Chinese Government granted far-reaching concessions to Japan respecting Shantung, South Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia, and the question of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company. Group V, with the exception of the Fukien article, was left for subsequent consideration. Since these agreements were never ratified by the Chinese Parliament, the Chinese people considered them invalid.

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The Twenty-one Demands must be viewed as a blot on Japan’s escutcheon. The supposed advantages gained in Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia and Shantung could not compensate for the loss sustained by Japan in terms of domestic politics, of the attitude of the Chinese people, and of public opinion abroad. In domestic politics the aggressive policy pursued by Japan in China whetted the appetite for further territorial expansion and enabled the militarists to play a dominant role in Japan’s foreign policy. Japanese expansionism alienated the Chinese people and transformed the whole Chinese nation into a vast enemy camp. Internationally, Japan, having forfeited the confidence and trust of the Western Powers, became increasingly isolated. With the Twenty-one Demands, Japanese imperialist designs on China assumed the proportions of a grave world problem. Japan had thus embarked on the road to self-destruction from which there was no return. For China, 64

FROM THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS TO YUAN’S DEATH

May 7, the day of the Japanese ultimatum, was a day of infamy, a national humiliation. For Japan, it marked the starting point of a journey which led eventually to Pearl Harbor.

Yuan’s Monarchical Movement An autocrat at heart, Yuan Shih-kai never really cared for the development of republicanism in China. By first expelling the Kuomintang members from Parliament and then dissolving Parliament itself and by promulgating a revised Provisional Constitution, he succeeded in centralizing great powers in his own hands. Although his monarchic ambition had begun to be manifest in early 1915, the movement itself gained momentum only after the acceptance of the Twenty-one Demands. Europe and America were too preoccupied with problems of the expanding war to pay much attention to what was happening in China. Inasmuch as Japan had already exacted from him all that was possible for him to grant, Yuan believed, quite erroneously, that Tokyo would not be hostile to the achievement of his personal ambitions. Yuan Shih-kai himself, however, repeatedly denied the report of his intention to restore the monarchy. In June 1915 he told an American journalist that China was a Republic like the United States and he would endeavor, to the best of his ability, to develop the spirit of genuine republicanism in China. Yet, despite his disclaimers, he never tried to do anything to halt the monarchical movement set in motion by his supporters. On the contrary, he looked upon it with tolerance and complacency. The fact is that Yuan, crafty and unscrupulous, did not want to leave the impression that he aspired to the Dragon Throne; he wanted the world to believe that the imperial mantle was thrust upon him by an adoring people. The prime movers of the campaign needed some theoretical justification for the restoration of the monarchy. They found the justification in a memorandum prepared by 65

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the well-known American educator and authority on constitutional law, Frank J. Goodnow. Goodnow was then President of John Hopkins University and constitutional adviser to the Chinese Government. He was highly regarded in official circles in Peking. In the middle of July 1915 he was in China for a brief visit. The memorandum was written at the request of Chou Tsu-ch’i, Yuan’s trusted supporter and Minister of Finance. It was subsequently published in the August 3 issue of Asia. In his memorandum Goodnow dwelt on the respective merits of the republican and monarchical forms of government, with special reference to Chinese conditions. The suitability of one form or the other to a given country, he said, must be viewed in the light of its history, its traditions, as well as the stage of its social and economic development. China, with its long history of autocratic rule, its high percentage of illiteracy, and its international position, could hardly maintain its national independence under a republican form of government. There could be little doubt that a constitutional monarchy was better suited to China than a republic. Goodnow dealt more with generalities than with expediency of an actual change of the form of government under the circumstances then prevailing in China. The promoters of the monarchical movement exploited Goodnow’s memorandum for the advancement of their objectives. On August 13, a group of Chinese politicians, led by brilliant but opportunist Yang Tu, organized what was called Ch’ou An Hui or The Peace Planning Society. This organization immediately made use of the memorandum as the basis of its propaganda. Yang Tu quoted or misquoted Goodnow’s views in a series of three articles under the general title, “National Salvation Through Constitutional Monarchy.” The agitation for the re-establishment of a monarchical form of government was in full swing.

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FROM THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS TO YUAN’S DEATH

The Assassination of Cheng Ju-ch’eng Yuan Shih-kai’s military agent in Shanghai, Cheng Ju-ch’eng, since July 1913 had been doing his utmost to suppress the activities of the revolutionaries in areas under his control. A number of revolutionaries had been arrested and executed. The Chinese Revolutionary Party decided that it was essential that Cheng be removed. In August 1915, at a time when the agitation for the monarchical movement had become very active and when the so-called Peace Planning Society had just come into being, Dr. Sun Yat-sen asked Ch’en Chi-mei to come to Tokyo for consultation. In the middle of October Ch’en returned to Shanghai. He wired Chiang Kai-shek to come to Shanghai to assist him in the work of eliminating Cheng Ju-ch’eng. Together they mapped out a plan. It became known that on November 10 a reception would be held at the Japanese Consulate-General in celebration of the coronation of the new Japanese Emperor. Cheng Ju-ch’eng, as the highest local Chinese official, would certainly attend the reception. Revolutionaries armed with bombs and revolvers would be awaiting him at points suitable for carrying out the assassination. Cheng, who had perhaps received some warning of the plot, travelled down river as far as the Hankow Road jetty in the International Settlement by steamer instead of by car, and thus evaded eight of the revolutionaries who had been waiting for him along the road on which he had to travel. But from the jetty to the Japanese Consulate-General he had to proceed by motor car and cross over a bridge. On the bridge the car slowed down. This offered the revolutionaries an opportunity to do their job. One of them, whose name was Wang, threw a bomb at Cheng’s car. He missed his aim. He tried again and this time Cheng’s chauffeur was killed. Simultaneously his comrade, also named Wang, fired ten shots at Cheng, killing him instantaneously. The revolu­ tionaries made no attempt to escape and surrendered themselves to the Settlement police. They told the police that they had to kill Cheng because he was the agent of a man who was trying to subvert the revolution and make himself the Emperor of China. 67

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Another Attack on the Shanghai Arsenal Shanghai was a city of great strategic and financial importance. Cheng Ju-ch’eng was an officer of ability. Being an Admiral of the Navy, he could be relied on to keep the naval squadrons loyal. His death was thus a severe blow to Yuan. The officer who was appointed to take Cheng’s place was Yang Shan-teh, a mediocre man who possessed neither the talent nor the influence of his predecessor. To the revolutionaries the time had come for another attempt to wrest Shanghai from the reactionary camp. Chiang Kai-shek drew up a detailed plan of action. According to this plan, in order to capture the arsenal, an attempt must be made to gain the support of the warships in the Whampoo. Only by simultaneous action on the part of both naval and land forces could the arsenal be taken. At that time there were three warships in the Whampoo. The commander of the warship, Chao-ho, Captain Huang Ming-ch’iu, was an old colleague of Ch’en Chi-mei’s. Most of the officers were sympathetic to the anti-Yuan movement. On October 5 at 3 o’clock in the afternoon, Yang Hu, commander of the revolutionary marine corps, put out for the Chao-ho in a small launch with thirty of his comrades. They boarded the warship without meeting any resistance. Yang took command of the warship and, after hoisting the revolutionary colors, ordered that fire be opened on the arsenal. The other warships, however, remained loyal to Yuan, and began to shell the Chao-ho. Although she fought gallantly, the fire power of the other ships was too much for the Chao-ho to withstand. She was soon put out of action. Yang Hu escaped in a sampan. In the meanwhile, Ch’en Chi-mei led his followers, among whom was Chiang Kai-shek, to launch an attack from Nantao, in the belief that land operations in conjunction with the naval action would prove irresistible. In this he was doomed to disappointment. Yuan’s forces were fully prepared to meet the attackers. Finding themselves outnumbered and outmaneuvered, the revolutionaries were forced to retire and disperse. Altogether 20 persons were killed and a hundred or so wounded in this attempt to capture the Shanghai arsenal. But 68

FROM THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS TO YUAN’S DEATH

the revolutionaries were not discouraged by the defeat. They were ready to try again should the opportunity present itself.

Japan and Yuan’s Imperial Ambitions During the Sino-Japanese discussion of the Twenty-one Demands, Tokyo did not in any way give the impression that it was opposed to Yuan’s imperial ambitions, nay, it actually encouraged them. Count Okuma, the Japanese Prime Minister, told the Japanese press: Japan is a monarchy. If China wishes to restore the monarchy and adopt the same form of government as Japan, we will be pleased to give it our blessings. Yuan Shih-kai has already centralized all the powers of government in his own hands. The restoration of the monarchy merely brings the form of government in line with the reality.

Even as late as September 1, 1915, Count Okuma could still say in a press interview: Whether China is a republic or a monarchy is a matter for the Chinese people to decide; it is not for us to say what she should do. Yuan Shih-kai has shown himself to be capable of dealing with the difficulties now confronting China. He is a great man and no one should be surprised if he should want to be the Emperor.

Six days later, however, Count Okuma sang an entirely different tune. In a conversation with the Chinese Minister to Japan, Lu Tsung-yu, he warned against the proposed change of the form of government on the ground that it might give rise to internal disturbances and adversely affect Japanese trade in China. On the same day (September 6) he instructed the Japanese charge d ’affaires in Peking to refrain from expressing any opinion in regard to the monarchical movement. On September 27 he instructed Japanese consular officers in various parts of China to investigate whether the movement would provoke acts of violence. On the 29th the Japanese Ambassador in London was instructed to make inquiries about the British attitude toward the matter. It was not long before the Japanese Government formally decided 69

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upon a course of intervention in China. It tried to strengthen its stand by securing the cooperation of other Powers. On October 28 the Japanese charge d ’affaires, accompanied by his British and Russian colleagues, called upon the Chinese Foreign Minister and drew attention of the Chinese Government to signs of disturbance in South China. With a view, to strengthening the foundation of peace in the Far East, he counseled delay in the change of policy. In its reply to the joint warning, the Chinese Government on November 1 denied the reported under-current of opposition and unrest in South China and reiterated its ability to maintain internal peace and order. The Tokyo Government considered this reply unsatisfactory and continued to bring pressure to bear upon Peking. France and Italy added weight to the Japanese arguments by participating in the joint action of admonition to China. The United States was the only Power that decided to abstain from the demarche initiated by Japan.

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In defiance of the Japanese opposition, the Chinese monarchists went ahead with their plans and carried through what was supposedly a “referendum” to ascertain the wishes of the people. On December 11 it was announced that the result of the referendum showed that the Chinese people approved of the restoration of monarchy. Thereupon the Council of State invited Yuan Shih-kai to accept the throne in response to the demand of the popular vote. On the following day Yuan Shih-kai met with more than two hundred high government officials in the Huai Jen Hall of the Imperial Palace and made a short speech of acceptance. To be an Emperor, he said, was to bear the burden of State and to work ceaselessly for the country and the people, and for their sake, he was prepared to make whatever sacrifices he was called upon to do. It was proclaimed that formal coronation would take place on January 1, 1916. The alleged universal support for the monarchy soon proved to be false and unfounded. On December 25 the 70

FROM THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS TO YUAN’S DEATH

Governor of Yunnan Province suddenly demanded the cancellation of the monarchy and the punishment of Yang Tu and other leaders of the restoration movement. Upon Yuan’s rejection of the demands, Yunnan declared its independence of the central government. The tide of opposition soon swept over the whole country. As the wave of secession gained strength and momentum, some of Yuan’s supporters began to doubt the wisdom of the restoration. Yuan himself was held back by indecision. On February 23, 1916, he issued a mandate postponing the date of accession. In the meantime, some of his trusted generals began to waver in their support of the monarchy. On March 20, five of them advised Yuan against the restoration in a confidential telegram. On the following day Yuan called a meeting of his closest supporters. On the 22nd he issued a mandate formally cancelling the monarchy. He was an Emperor for eighty-three days. Aside from the internal situation, outside opposition from Japan also played a role in this tragic comedy. The Japanese Government had several times warned Yuan against the change of the form of government. With a view to winning Japanese favor, Yuan proposed to dispatch a special envoy to present the Japanese Emperor with a decoration. It was rumored that the special envoy was to present to Japan special “gifts” in the form of additional privileges in China not granted in the 1915 agreements. The Japanese Minister to Peking had given a send-off party for the special envoy on January 14. But on the next day he was suddenly informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ishii Kikujiro, that the Emperor was on “winter vacation and would not be able to receive the special envoy.” The Japanese expressed their displeasure at Yuan in various other ways. They had made it known that they would not recognize the new regime. At the same time the Japanese Government assisted the anti-Yuan forces with both funds and arms. On January 21 the Japanese Foreign office called in the Chinese Minister to Japan and threatened military intervention. *

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In Shanghai the Chinese Revolutionary Party, under the leadership of Ch’en Chi-mei, once again tried to contribute its share in the movement to overthrow Yuan Shih-kai. On April 14 Ch’en gave orders to Chiang Kai-shek and Yang Hu to capture the Kiangyin fortress on the southern bank of the Yangtze River between Nanking and Shanghai. They attacked and captured the fort with the object of making it a base for operations in the Yangtze Valley. Five days later a mutiny broke out among.the troops. Although all his associates made their escape as best they could, Chiang stood firm. But two soldiers finally prevailed upon him to leave. With their help, he was able to return to Shanghai. For a long time Ch’en Chi-mei had been a thorn in the side of the supporters of Yuan Shih-kai. Many a time they had tried to remove him from the scene. But this was not an easy task; Ch’en’s devoted bodyguards were too vigilant to give them the opportunity to carry out their murderous plots. Knowing that the revolutionaries suffered chronically from a lack of funds, they now dreamed up a plan to lure him to his own destruction. For this they made use of the services of one Li Hai-chiu, who was known to Ch’en as a member of the Chinese Revolutionary Party. Li told Ch’en that a certain mining company was in need of additional capital and that if Ch’en could arrange a loan for it with the mine as security, 40 percent of the proceeds would be donated to the revolutionary cause. Not suspecting that Li had turned traitor, Ch’en Chi-mei undertook to make arguments to secure a loan from some Japanese financiers. It was agreed that on May 18 Li would prepare an agreement to be signed by the parties concerned. On the appointed day Li appeared with four other men who were supposedly representatives of the mining company but who were in fact assassins. They met at the secret Party headquarters in the French Concession. The assassins shot down Ch’en Chi-mei in cold blood. Ch’en was then forty years of age. With Ch’en Chi-mei’s death the revolutionaries lost one of their most competent and resourceful leaders. To Chiang Kai-shek it was a most grievious personal loss. “ Alas! From now on where can I find a man who knows me as well and loves me as profoundly as you did?” said Chiang in his 72

FROM THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS TO YUAN’S DEATH

funeral oration. He vowed to carry on the work which Ch’en had left unfinished. After Ch’en’s death, Chiang Kai-shek became Sun Yat-sen’s most trusted lieutenant in Shanghai. In June 1916 Dr. Sun dispatched Chiang to Shantung to participate in the anti-Yuan movement in that province. The Japanese Government connived at the use of Tsingtao as a base for the revolutionaries. Chu Cheng, who was in command of the revolutionary forces, had begun his military operations against Yuan in May. With only about a thousand men, he succeeded in capturing Wen Hsien, a strategic town on the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway. He was assisted by a number of Japanese soldiers of fortune.

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Yuan Shih-kai’s position was deteriorating fast. His relinquishment of the monarchy did not fully satisfy his enemies. They demanded his complete removal from the scene. On May 22, he received a telegram from General Ch’en Yi, military governor of Szechuan and one of Yuan’s most trusted generals. After reading the telegram, Yuan fainted. Ch’en Yi had declared Szechuan’s independence of the central government. With tears in his eyes, he said: “I have been deserted by all. What more can I say!” On May 27 Yuan was taken seriously ill. Two days later another cruel blow fell upon him. T’ang Hsiang-ming, military governor of Hunan, whose loyalty had never been in doubt, revolted. Yuan’s dejection deepened and his vitality ebbed. He was suffering from urinary infection due to enlargement of the prostate gland. If his case had been properly diagnosed and skillfully treated from the first, he might conceivably have been saved. But he and his family did not trust modern medicine; they believed in quacks and even witch-doctors rather than trained physicians. When a French physician was called in on June 4 it was already too late. During his illess Yuan continued to wear himself out with work. Seemingly unable to relax, he paid personal attention 73

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to all matters large or small, in particular to military affairs. On the evening of June 5 he lapsed into a semi-coma. It was obvious that the end was not far off. A few of his closest aides and associates, men such as Tuan Ch’i-jui, Hsu Shih-ch’ang and Wang Shih-chen, were summoned to his bedside. Hsu Shih-ch’ang bent over him and whispered in his ear, “Should anything happen to you, what are your instructions?” Yuan murmured something, and Hsu seemed to have heard the words “Provisional Constitution . . .” It would never be known what thoughts passed through his mind when he uttered these words. In the early hours of the 6th Yuan breathed his last. He was fifty-eight years of age.

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The death of Yuan Shih-kai marked the end of an era. The monarchical form of government died with him. When General Chang Hsun, that unreconstructed militarist of the old regime, attempted in July 1917 to restore the Manchus to the throne, he found that he was opposed by all classes of the Chinese people. The restoration lasted only three weeks. With the old center of gravity gone and with no new center of power to take its place, China drifted into a decade of anarchy and confusion. During the decade, there was but a bare pretense at the maintenance of central authority. Yet Peking continued to be recognized by foreign Powers as the Government of China. This state of affairs lasted until the unification of China by Chiang Kai-shek in 1928.

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Prelude to Warlordism After the death of Yuan Shih-kai in June 1916, the military organization he had built up, commonly referred to as the Pei-yang or Northern Army, was left with no one with sufficient personality and prestige to impose his will on it. It soon disintegrated into a smoky confusion of bickering factions and competing individuals. Two groups dominated the general chaos in North and Central China: the Chili Military Clique and the Anhwei Military Clique. They were so labelled because the leader of the first group, Feng kuo-chang, was a native of the Province of Chili (now Hopei) and the leader of the second group, Tuan Ch’i-jui, was a native of the Province of Anhwei. Both Feng and Tuan were Yuan Shi-kai’s chief lieutenants, and both aspired to leadership of the Pei-yang Army. In terms of foreign relations, the Chili Clique had generally the moral, though perhaps not the material, support of Britain and the United States, while the Anhwei Clique was Tokyo-oriented and received from time to time considerable Japanese military and financial assistance. In addition to these two groups there was another military bloc which was then fast becoming a crucial factor in Chinese politics. The leader of this emerging military bloc was erstwhile bandit chieftain Chang Tso-lin, whose power base was the Three Eastern Provinces known to the world as Manchuria. This was the so-called Mukden Clique. The Chili, Anhwei and Mukden military factions constantly struggled not merely to enlarge their territorial domains within the country but also to establish themselves in a position of dominance over the shadowy Central Government in Peking. 75

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In Southern China two militarists dominated the scene: T’ang Ch’i-yao was in full control of Yunnan and Lu Yung-t’ing was the recognized ruler of Kwangsi. T’ang, it may be remembered, was one of the first to raise the standard of revolt against Yuan Shih-kai’s monarchical movement. Lu, though at first a supporter of Yuan, was later prevailed upon to join the anti-Yuan forces. Both T’ang and Lu had thus contributed to Yuan’s downfall. But, like other militarists of their time, they were interested not so much in promotion of national unity as in enlarging their respective spheres of influence. They never ceased their attempts to extend their control to the neighboring provinces. The struggle of the Tuchuns or Military Governors for supremacy ushered in an era in which military satrapies in the provinces ruthlessly exploited the territories under their control. This state of affairs did not come to an end until the late 1920’s.

The Revival of the Republic On the day following Yuan Shih-kai’s death, Li Yuan-hung was proclaimed President of the Republic, in accordance with the Provisional Constitution which provided for the Vice President succeeding to the presidency in case of unforeseen contingencies. Li had come into prominence through participation in the 1911 revolution. Although a military man, the new President had no power base in the armed forces. The man who really held the reins of the Central Government in Peking was Tuan Ch’i-jui, who served both as Prime Minister and Minister of War during the interregnum between the collapse of the monarchical movement and the revival of the Republic. Tuan regarded himself as Yuan Shih-kai’s legitimate successor to the leadership of the Pei-yang military organization and, indeed, he was accepted as such by the majority of the Tuchuns. He now fully expected to play a dominant role under Li Yuan-hung’s Presidency. He believed that the revived Republic was to operate, not in accordance with the 76

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provisions of the Provisional Constitution of 1912, but with those of the revised version drafted in Peking in 1914. Under the later document all governmental power was concentrated in the hands of the President. But Li Yuan-hung was relatively weak in personality, and Tuan had not the slightest doubt that he would have a free hand to run the government as he wished, and that he would not have to account for whatever he might do as he did under Yuan Shih-kai. And what was even more important, he would not have, as under the 1912 Provisional Constitution, to contend with an unruly and meddlesome Parliament. This, however, was not to be. No sooner had Li Yuan-hung been proclaimed President than it had become evident that articulate opinion of the country was firmly opposed to the 1914 Provisional Constitution, associated as it was with the unsavory reputation of Yuan Shih-kai. The first person to be heard from was no less a personality than Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In a telegram to Li Yuan-hung on June 9, Dr. Sun demanded the immediate revival of the 1912 Provisional Constitution. Other influential people at once took up the cry. Included among these was Admiral Li Ting-hsin, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Navy. Together with his squadron commanders, he threatened to take forceful action against the Government if this was not done. In a declaration published on June 25, the naval officers said that “unless the Government undertakes to restore the 1912 Constitution, reconvene the Parliament and institute a responsible Cabinet, we shall not be able to take orders from the Ministry of Navy in Peking any more.” In consequence of all this, Tuan Ch’i-jui was forced to accept the point of view embodied in the revived Nanking constitution with respect to parliamentary supremacy. On June 29 a Presidential Mandate was issued in the name of Li Yuan-hung, proclaiming that the Parliament that had been dissolved by Yuan Shih-kai in 1914 was to be reconvened. On the same day President Li nominated Tuan Ch’i-jui for the Premiership. On the following day other members of the Cabinet were nominated, with Premier Tuan serving concurrently as Minister of War. On August 1, the Parliament was called into session. On the 19th Li Yuan-hung was formally sworn in as President. On October 30 Feng Kuo-chang was elected to the Vice-Presidency. All the 77

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provinces which had seceded from Peking now reaffirmed their allegiance to the Central Government. It seemed that the country was at last ready to settle down for a period of peaceful reconstruction.

The Politics of China’s Participation in the World War But the euphoria was short-lived. Conflict soon arose between the Parliament and the Premier over a number of issues, not the least of which was a difference of opinion over the proper steps to be taken to resolve the financial problem. But the issue that finally brought about a national crisis was the question of China’s participation in the European War. Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare against allied and neutral shipping had led the United States to break off relations with her in February 1917. On instructions from Washington the American Minister to China, Paul S. Reinsch, urged Peking to take similar action. Premier Tuan was all for it. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, on the other hand, was strongly opposed to such action. He insisted that there was no point in China’s involvement in a war in which she had no direct interest. He believed such a step would precipitate serious domestic dissension. President Li sided with Dr. Sun. So did Vice President Feng Kuo-chang and Foreign Minister Wu T’ing-fang. A vehement controversy, conducted with no little asperity, ensued. Premier Tuan tendered his resignation and left for Tientsin in high dudgeon. Confronted with the intransigence of his Prime Minister, President Li, who felt that it would be impossible to reconstruct the Cabinet under any other leadership, was forced to give in. He sent his Vice President, Feng Kuo-chang, to Tientsin to persuade Tuan to return to Peking, with the promise that he would not again oppose the Prime Minister’s war policy. Thereupon Tuan resumed the Premiership and pressed Parliament for the passage of a bill calling for breaking off relations with Germany. The Premier was sustained by considerable majorities in both Houses. Following the severance of relations, the next logical step 78

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was a declaration of war. As a preliminary to this, the Premier began negotiations with other Powers in order to define the extent of China’s participation, and to secure tangible evidence of benefits to be derived from it. In return for a declaration of war, which the Entente Powers and the United States had come to desire actively, Tuan asked that they agree to the cancellation of the German and Austrian portions of the Boxer indemnity, and to the suspension of payments on the interest and principal of the Boxer indemnity due to the Allies; that foreign troops, maintained in China under the Boxer Protocol, should be withdrawn; and that the conventional tariff should be revised upwards. The Allied diplomats in Peking refused to give him any promises as to the action of their respective governments, and suggested that China declare war first and then proceed to negotiate for the concessions she wanted, intimating, however, she would be well treated in the event of her adherence to their side of the struggle. Chinese opinion was divided on the question. The Kuomintang majority in Parliament was overwhelmingly opposed to China’s participation in the war. In his dispute with Parliament, Tuan resorted to a show of force. On April 25 he summoned the Tuchuns to Peking to hold a military conference. The very presence of these powerful provincial military governors was looked upon as an attempt at intimidation. On May 7 a bill calling for the declaration of war was introduced in Parliament. To secure swift passage of the bill various pressures were applied, the most flagrant of which was the staging of mob demonstrations before the Parliament building. The mob was boisterous and unruly, and a number of Kuomintang parliamentarians were harassed and assaulted. But Parliament stood firm and refused to be intimidated. To show its resentment and displeasure, after a preliminary debate, it adjourned further consideration of the bill. The deadlock was complete. On May 23 President Li dismissed the Prime Minister. Tuan Ch’i-jui immediately went to Tientsin and set in motion an anti-Li campaign. The Tuchuns of twelves provinces now declared their independence of Peking and demanded the dissolution of Parliament. Some of them even threatened to march on the capital, assertedly to 79

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enforce respect for the constitution. With a massive military revolt on his hands, President Li invited one of the most notorious of the provincial militarists, General Chang Hsun, to come to Peking as a mediator. He might just as well have asked an arsonist to help put out a fire. General Chang was a soldier of the old type, totally uneducated, uncouth in manner and unscrupulous in action, yet possessing a certain strength of purpose which had made him one of the most powerful members of the provincial military Junta. He accepted Li’s invitation with alacrity. Taking with him a force of no less than five thousand men, he proceeded to Peking as if he were going to the battlefield. He arrived in the capital on June 14 more like a conqueror than a mediator. The first thing he did was to demand the dissolution of Parliament. President Li resisted no longer. Thus, the reconvened Parliament was once again relegated to the lumber-room of Chinese politics. It soon transpired that General Chang had other objectives in view when he came to Peking. He had long been known as a dyed-in-the-wool royalist. To show his undying loyalty to the late imperial house, he refused to cut off his queue, a badge of servitude to the Manchus. In Peking he spent a great deal of time in the company of members of the deposed imperial family and held frequent meetings with other royalists. His troops were distributed in strategic points about the city. It was obvious that something momentous was about to take place. At the crack of dawn of July 1 General Chang, accompanied by his fellow royalists entered the Forbidden City and placed the deposed Emperor, now twelve years old, on the Dragon Throne. He soon discovered, however, that to restore the monarchy was one thing, but to keep it restored was quite another. Chang had neither the means nor the intelligence to make his coup a success. The provincial military governors, upon whom he had relied for support, deserted him. They were no more enamored of the monarchy than they were of parliamentarian republicanism. Those provincial militarists who had threatened to march on Peking to overthrow the Parliament a while ago now brought Chang Hsun’s ludicrous attempt at restoration to an abrupt end. President Li Yuan-hung, who had taken refuge in the 80

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Japanese Legation, sent an emissary to Tientsin and instructed his dismissed Prime Minister, Tuan Ch’i-jui, to take immediate steps to suppress Chang Hsun’s treasonable act. Tuan acted at once. With the troops he had hastily assembled, he moved against Chang Hsun. In a few days Chang’s pig-tailed troops were put to rout. On July 12 the restoration movement was over, and Chang Hsun himself fled to the Diplomatic Quarter and sought asylum in the Dutch Legation. On the 14th Tuan Ch’i-jui made a triumphant entry into the ancient capital. President Li, in weariness apparently over the whole thing, resigned in favor of the Vice-President, Feng Kuo-chang, and retired to private life. Once again Tuan was made Prime Minister as well Minister of War. The way was now clear for Tuan to carry out his war policy without fear of being hamstrung by an anti-war President and anti-war Parliament. In this connection it may be well to inquire into the reasons behind Tuan’s determination to push China into the European War. Undoubtedly, the pressures that had been brought to bear on China by the Entente Powers and the United States had much to do with it. Far more crucial was the influence exerted by Japan. In the first year and half of the European War, Japan had been opposed to China’s involvement in the conflict, lest it should help enhance China’s international position in such a way as to affect Japan’s expansionist policy on the Asian continent. In 1917, however, she changed her policy in regard to China’s participation in the war from one of opposition to one of active promotion. War had not been going well for the Allies. Japan had not been slow to take advantage of the situation to safeguard and consolidate her new position in China by agreements with those states who had interests in the Far East. In 1916 the Japanese press had conducted a campaign against the maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In February 1917 the Japanese Government had demanded a quid pro quo for her continued adherence to the alliance — Britain’s support, at the peace table after the war, of Japan’s claims to German rights in Shantung and to the possession of the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. On the 24th of Februaiy London had acceded to the Japanese demands, with the proviso that the German islands south of 81

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the equator should be placed under British control. Similar demands had been made on France and Italy. They had all agreed to support Japan’s claims on condition that Japan would encourage China’s participation in the war. All these agreements had been made before the United States’ entry into the war and had been officially kept secret. China had of course been kept in the dark. As for Russia, Japan had entered as early as in the summer of 1916 into an alliance with the Tsarist government for the surface and published purpose of preserving peace in the Far East, but by secret protocols, with a view to delimiting their respective interests in Eastern Asia. In this delimitation of interests, Moscow had recognized the changes that had taken place in the status quo as a result of the Sino-Japanese Agreements of 1916, while Japan on her part had accepted as an accomplished fact the Russian occupation of Outer Mongolia during 1912-1915.

The Nishihara Mission to China The United States had been the first Power to urge China to participate in the European War.The American leadership, if it had been continued and made effective, would have done much to break down the conception of Japanese hegemony on the continent. But this was not to be. After having entered into secret agreements with the Entente Powers for the safeguarding of her ill-gotten rights in China, Japan now proceeded to wrest the leadership in the move to bring China into the war from the United States. A special envoy was sent to Peking to bring this about. He was Nishihara Kamezo, a trusted adviser of the Prime Minister, Viscount Terauchi. Nishihara was ostensibly not a representative of the Government but a representative of private economic and financial interests. His mission, according to his autobio­ graphy, was to steal a march on the United States. He arrived in Peking on February 16, 1917 and lost no time in insinuating himself into the confidence of Tuan Ch’i-jui and other influential Chinese officials. He stressed the importance 82

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of Sino-Japanese cooperation. If China should join hands with Japan in the war effort, she would be able, according to Nishihara, to “put her political house in order, to strengthen her national defense, enhance her international standing, rid herself of the incubus of foreign domination, establish internal peace” in the space of “five or six years.” Tuan listened to Nishihara’s words through an interpreter with rapt attention. They were music to his ears. Then, “trembling with emotion,” he jumped from his seat and said, “ I am in complete agreement with what you say. That’s what I ’ll do.” Thus, with cajolery and prevarication, Nishihara was able to sell his bill of fare to Tuan Ch’i-jui, who was of course in a highly receptive mood. Peking had an empty treasury and needed foreign loans to keep afloat. After the American withdrawal from the International Banking Group in 1913, Japan furnished the funds for a large part of China’s needs. Now, in the name of Sino-Japanese cooperation in the European war. Tuan was in a position to secure from Japan both money and equipment for the expansion and modernization of the forces of that part of the Pei-yang military organization which were loyal to him. This, he believed, would enable him to carry out his long-cherished dream —the military unification of all China. Meanwhile, however, he instructed the Chinese Minister at Tokyo, Chang Tsung-hsiang, to negotiate with the Japanese Government in regard to the cancellation of the German and Austrian portions of the Boxer indemnity and the suspension of payments on the interest and principal of the Boxer indemnity due to the Allies for a period of ten years; the upward revision of the customs duties; the withdrawal of foreign troops maintained in China and the prohibition of the stationing of Chinese troops within twenty li of Tientsin under the Boxer Protocol. The Japanese Government made no categorical reply to the points raised by Peking. It was in these circumstances that China finally declared on August 14,1917, that a state of war existed between China and the Central Powers. As a result of this China, after some negotiations, gained some upward revision of the custom duties; resumed control of the German and Austrian residential areas in the various treaty ports, such as Tientsin,

;

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

where they had been granted extensive concessions; cancelled German and Austrian shares of the Boxer indemnity; suspended payments to Allies of the Boxer indemnity for a five-year period. As to the maintenance of foreign troops on Chinese soil, however, nothing was accomplished. Chinese troops could, however, operate within the 20 li limit in Tientsin in order to supervise German and Austrian nationals. While China’s participation in the war did not take the form of a dispatch of troops, she did perform a vital service in the military effort by sending thousands of laborers to the Western front, where they built roads and harbor works, repaired railroads, and even dug trenches for the Allied armies. In addition, China supplied many of her vital raw materials to the war effort in the Allied countries.

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement The country that had not recognized as an accomplished fact the establishment of Japanese hegemony on the Asian continent was the United States of America. In June 1917, at the height of the controversy over China’s participation in the war, the Japanese decided to send its former Foreign Minister, Viscount Ishii Kikujiro, to Washington to obtain from the United States a statement on Japan’s special position in Asia. This resulted in an exchange of notes between the then Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, and the Japanese special envoy, known as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 2, 1917. These notes contained the statement: Territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

No attempt was made to itemize in detail these special interests, and, consequently, the phrase was interpreted differently by Washington and Tokyo. To the Japanese it meant that, in addition to those rights defined in treaties and 84

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agreements, Japan had a general right to control, and, when deemed necessary, to dictate the political policies of China and of all other Powers with reference to the Far East. This assertion was described as a “Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine,” placing upon Japan both a right and obligation to preserve the peace in the Far East. As a corollary to this, Japan claimed the final judgement to determine what conditions must exist in order that this peace might be maintained upon a stable basis. China was thus reduced to the status of a vassal state, notwithstanding the reaffirmation on the part of both Japan and the United States of their continued adherence to the principles of Open Door and the territorial integrity of China. Thus, by means of demands served on China, supplemented by threats of interference in the internal affairs of China, and by acts of actual intervention, Japan established her hegemony on the continent. Then, by successive agreements with Russia, Britain, France and Italy, as well as with the United States, entered into under conditions of war, she was able to safeguard the fruits of aggression.

The So-called Nishihara Loans The Japanese Government regarded Tuan Ch’i-jui as the “strong man” capable of taking personal responsibility for the Chinese Government and was therefore prepared to back him to the hilt. At its meeting of July 20, 1917, the Japanese Cabinet decided to extend to Tuan its “friendly assistance” so as to enable him to bring stability to the country and resolve those problems which continued to beset SinoJapanese relations. In specific terms, the Cabinet decided: “(1) to supply China with necessary funds, (2) to give favorable consideration to Peking’s requests for arms and other equipment, and (3) to restrict assistance to the Southern faction (revolutionary) and under no circumstance should any encouragement or assistance be given to it in regard to military supplies.” 85

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As a result of the European War, Japan was enjoying unprecedented economic prosperity. She was in a position to make available such funds as were required by Tuan to realize his plan for the military unification of China. Through Nishihara, eight separate loans, amounting to a total of ¥ 145 million, were made available to Peking. These were the so-called Nishihara loans of 1917 which were regarded by the Chinese people as shady deals designed to put China in hopeless bondage to Japan.

Part II YEARS O F t r ia l a n d p r e p a r a t io n

C H A PTE R S E V E N

A COUNTRY DIVIDED: THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

Military Government in Canton After the debacle of Chang Hsun’s attempt to restore the Manchus, Dr. Sun Yat-sen called for return to constitu­ tionalism; revival of the 1912 Provisional Constitution and reactivation of the Parliament that had been illegally dissolved under pressure of the militarists in May 1917. Tuan Ch’i-jui and his collaborators in Peking, however, had other plans. In their view, the old Parliament had outlived its usefulness and a new Parliament should be elected to meet the requirements of the new situation. Seeing that the fruits of the 1911 Revolution were being frittered away by Northern militarists, Dr. Sun called upon the Chinese people to rally around him and work towards revitalization of the spirit of the Revolution. One of the first to answer his call was Admiral Ch’en Pi-kuang of the Chinese Navy, who had under his command a squadron of three gunboats and a number of other craft. Admiral Ch’en provided the facilities for Dr. Sun and his followers to sail from Shanghai to Canton. Once there, Dr. Sun sent out an appeal to members of the old Parliament to come to the South. About 130 of them responded to the appeal. They gathered in Canton to form what was called an Extraordinary Parliament. Toward the end of August they adopted a 13article “ Outline of the Organization of the Military Government of the Republic of China,” and elected Dr. Sun Generalissimo, with T ’ang Chi-yao, Military Governor of Yunnan, and Lu Yung-t’ing, Military Governor of Kwangsi, as his deputies. The Military Government was formally inaugurated on September 10, 1917, with the declared purpose of overthrowing the Northern militarists. China was 89

YEARS OF TRIAL AND PREPARATION

thus governed by two separate governments. The one in Peking was recognized by foreign Powers as the de jure government of China, while the Military Government in Canton was a revolutionary regime dedicated to the realization of Dr. Sun’s policies. As a matter of fact, however, the country was divided into various military satrapies beyond the control of either government. The Military Government was a loose confederation of such provinces as Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Szechuan and Hunan were at times also associated with it. In the South as in the North, there was no real sense of unity; petty jealousies and intrigues were rampant. Yunnan and Kweichow were the private preserves of T ’ang Chi-yao, who was primarily interested in the consolidation and expansion of his sphere of influence. His attitude toward Dr. Sun was, to say the least, ambiguous. Lu Yung-t’ing dominated the military scene in Kwangtung and Kwangsi. He was the “strong man” of the Southwest and even the city of Canton, the base of Dr. Sun’s operations, was in the clutches of Lu’s Kwangsi army. Under such circumstances, Dr. Sun was thwarted at every turn. It was all too obvious that if he was to achieve the objectives he had set for himself, he had to have a dependable and loyal military force, a force strong enough to command the respect of the militarists. A beginning toward this end was made in November 1917 when Chu Ch’ing-lan, the Civil Governor of Kwangtung, agreed to hand over to Dr. Sun 20 battalions of his provincial gendarmes over the objections of the Military Governor of Kwangtung, who was a Kwangsi general. The gendarmes were reorganized as the Kwangtung Army which Dr. Sun placed under the command of Ch’en Chiung-ming. In December Ch’en was ordered to lead the new Kwangtung Army to the southern part of Fukien to launch an attack against Li Hou-chi, Military Governor of Fukien, one of Tuan Ch’i-jui’s loyal supporters.

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Tuan’s Attempt at Military Unification Tuan Ch’i-jui who regarded the establishment of a rival regime in Canton as an act of rebellion, was determined to suppress Dr. Sun’s Military Government by force of arms. His plan called for a two-pronged attack on the Southwestern provinces, using Szechuan as springboard for controlling Yunnan and Kweichow, and Hunan as a base for conquering Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Tuan appointed Wu Kuang-hsin, his brother-in-law, Commander-in-Chief of the army in the upper valley of the Yangtze River and concurrently InspectorGeneral of Szechuan. But before Wu could transfer part of his troops to Chungking, Hsiung K’e-wu, commander of the Fifth Division of the Szechuan army, who had secret connections with the Military Government in Canton, disarmed Wu’s troops. Wu escaped by boat, losing all his arms and ammunition. Thereupon Chungking was occupied by Hsiung K’e-wu. On the Hunan front, the prospects seemed at first more favorable for the government in Peking. By mid-September 1917 the Northern forces had penetrated deep into Hunan and occupied such strategic towns as Paoch’ing and Hengshan, the gateway to Kwangtung. It seemed that the ultimate objective was well within reach. Just as they were on the verge of success, however, politics intervened. President Feng Kuo-chang of the Peking Government and his Prime Minister, Tuan Ch’i-jui, were, as has already been noted, the recognized leaders of the Peiyarig military organization. Of the two leaders, Tuan was clearly the more influential. Feng, the Chief of State, was opposed to Tuan’s policy of military unification. Not being strong enough to oppose Tuan himself, he instigated the leading members of the Chili faction to oppose military unification. On November 13 three of the most powerful Tuchuns of the provinces in the Yangtze Valley called for a peaceful settlement of the North-South dispute. On the following day the two commanding generals on the Hunan front joined the appeal. The whole anti-Southern campaign, which for a time looked so promising, collapsed. The province of Hunan fell into the hands of the Southerners.

YEARS OF TRIAL AND PREPARATION

This was a severe blow to Tuan’s prestige and on November 15 he handed in his resignation. But Tuan’s influence with the Northern militarists was still something to be reckoned with. Less than a month after Tuan’s resignation, a number of powerful provincial military leaders gathered in Tientsin and demanded the immediate launching of another campaign against the South. The campaign was led by Tuan’s ambitious protege, Hsu Shu-ts’eng. Hsu was in fact the man who initiated, impelled, and guided all the activities in connection with Tuan’s policy of military unification. Flamboyant and unscrupulous, he did not hesitate to engage in vertiginous intrigues and dangerous maneuvers. More than anyone else, he was largely responsible for the conflict and bad blood that developed between Tuan and Feng Kuo-chang, thus bringing about a new cleavage between the so-called Chili and Anhwei factions of the Pei-yang military organization, leading eventually to fra­ tricidal wars. Toward the end of 1917 Tuan was appointed by President Feng Director-General of the War Participation Board with extensive powers. He was given a free hand in all matters pertaining to China’s participation in the European conflict and was thus able to negotiate new loans from Japan to strengthen his own position in the struggle for power. Since these loans were of a political nature, terms were attached to the agreements which further tightened Japan’s stranglehold on China. In January 1918 the pro-Canton military governor of Hunan, Chao Heng-t’i, mounted an offensive against the Northern troops in that province. Tuan and his supporters clamored for a counter-offensive, and President Feng was again forced to authorize a punitive expedition. The expeditionary forces captured in rapid succession Changsha, the capital of Hunan, Hengshan, Hengyang and a number of other strategic towns. In March Tuan Ch’i-jui became Prime Minister for the fifth time. It seemed that his dream of the military unification of China was once again on the verge of fulfilment. Once again, however, he was doomed to failure. The Third Division of the Northern Army, which had been fighting with so much brilliance and spirit and which had already penetrated deep into enemy territory, suddenly halted 92

A COUNTRY DIVIDED: THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

its advance. Its commander, Wu Pei-fu, who was to be one of the dominating military figures in China a few years later, was reported to have concluded a pact of non-aggression with Chao Heng-ti. Factional rivalry, personal grievances, as well as nation-wide resentment against Tuan’s secret dealings with Japan —all these contributed to Wu’s decision.

The Situation in Canton Dr. Sun Yat-sen in Canton now found himself in the same unenviable situation as Feng Kuo-chang in Peking. The Military Government had only such authority as its military supporters were willing to concede to it, thus existing mainly on their sufferance. Moreover, the Extraordinary Parliament was far from united. The majority of its members were members of the Kuomintang, but not all of them were loyal to Dr. Sun. A splinter group, known as the Cheng Hsueh Hui, or the Political Science Clique, with the encouragement of the Kwangsi militarists, carried on secret intrigues against the veteran revolutionary leader. In the latter part of April 1918, T’ang Chi-yao and Lu Yung-t’ing, the two most powerful men in the Southwest, were in secret communication with the President of the Peking Government, Feng Kuo-chang. They now proposed that the Military Government should be reorganized. On May 4 Dr. Sun tendered his resignation as Generalissimo to the Extraordinary Parliament. The Office of the Generalissimo was abolished and in its place a Commission of Seven Directors was instituted. Dr. Sun’s enemies took the opportunity to humiliate him by electing Ch’in Ch’un-hsun, a seasoned politician from Kwangsi who had held high offices under the Manchus, as Chairman of the commission. Dr. Sun quietly left Canton. After a short sojourn in Japan, he went to Shanghai, where he was to devote the next two years to writing to make his political philosophy better understood by his followers and fellow countrymen.

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Peking’s Call for Peace In the North a general election took place in August 1918 and a new Parliament was thus ushered into existence. The new Parliament was dominated by members of the Anfu Club, a newly formed political group which was in fact the political arm of Tuan Ch’i-jui’s Anhwei military faction. At the expiration of Feng Kuo-chang’s term as Acting President in October, Hsu Shih-ch’ang, an old-time official and classical scholar, was elected to the Presidency. Tuan retired from the Premiership but continued to serve as Director-General of the War Participation Board. The new President had been Yuan Shih-k’ai’s life-long friend and confidant. He had been associated with Yuan when the latter was entrusted with the task of training a modern army in 1895. Tuan Ch’i-jui and Feng Kuo-chang were then junior officers. Though a civilian, Hsu was considered a senior member of the Pei-yang military organization. He was elected to the Presidency mainly through the efforts of the Anfu Club. Tuan thus had every reason to expect Hsu’s support of his military unification policy. But Hsu was nobody’s tool. He was for a peaceful settlement of domestic issues rather than military unification. The international situation was in his favor. The war in Europe was now drawing to an end, and peace was in the air. President Wilson in his congratulatory message to Hsu, dated October 12, 1918, suggested that Chinese leaders of whatever political persuasion should now come together and work for national unity. In Japan the Terauchi Cabinet, which had supported Tuan Ch’i-jui with both money and arms, was replaced by a new Cabinet whose declared policy (December 3, 1918) was that “until China is united Japan will not extend further loans and other financial assistance to the Chinese Government.” All these developments were not calculated to gladden the hearts of Tuan and his followers. But they were not yet prepared to admit defeat. With the so-called “war participation loan” extended by Japan in September 1918, Hsu Shu-ts’eng was able to train and equip three additional divisions and four mixed brigades of new troops. Even after the signing of the armistice agreement, the 94

A COUNTRY DIVIDED: THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

War Participation Board continued to exist under a new designation — the Frontier Defense Board — on the pretext of the necessity of protecting China’s frontiers against invasion from Russia. It went out of existence only after the defeat of the Anhwei faction by the armies of Wu Pei-fu in the summer of 1920. Five days after conclusion of the armistice agreement in Europe on November 11, 1918, President Hsu Shih-ch’ang ordered the northern troops to halt all hostile activities against the South, and the Military Government in Canton, on its part, also ordered a cease-fire. A Peace Conference was scheduled to be held in Shanghai in February 1919.

Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangtung Army In July 1917 when Dr. Sun Yat-sen sailed for Canton to establish the Military Government, Chiang Kai-shek remained in Shanghai to maintain contact with comrades in that great metropolis and conduct such activities as needed to further the cause of revolution. He found time to draft a detailed blueprint for a military expedition against the northern militarists and a less ambitious plan for an invasion of Fukien and Chekiang. He submitted these to Dr. Sun for consideration on September 20 and October 1, respectively. On March 18, 1918, in response to a call from Dr. Sun, Chiang sailed for Canton where he received a staff appointment as head of the Field Operations Department at the headquarters of the Kwangtung Army, which was then operating in the southern part of Fukien. The Kwangtung Army under the command of Ch’en Chiung-ming was the only armed force which was loyal to Dr. Sun. Ch’en was favorably impressed with the young staff officer’s ability and earnestness. His high regard for Chiang aroused the antagonism of the latter’s fellow officers. At the end of July 1918 Chiang handed in his resignation and returned to Shanghai where Dr. Sun was then living in retirement. 95

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No sooner had he reached Shanghai than letters and telegrams arrived from Ch’eng Chiung-ming urging him to return to Fukien. Twenty days later he was in harness again. He had the satisfaction of knowing that it was on the basis of the operational plans he had drawn up that the Kwangtung Army had just scored an impressive victory over the enemy. On September 26 Chiang was given a line assignment as commander of the Second Detachment. In December the Kwangtung Army mounted an offensive against Li Hou-chi, Tuchun of Fukien. The Second Detachment, numbering about one thousand men, rendered a good account of itself in this campaign. It defeated a numerically much more superior northern force south of the strategic town of Yungtai, gateway to Foochow, capital of Fukien. At this point Ch’en Chiung-ming, seeing that the unsupported Second Detach­ ment had penetrated too far into enemy territory, arranged a cease-fire with the enemy and ordered Chiang to stop advancing. But the northern troops ignoring the cease-fire brought up reinforcements and launched a counter-offensive. Hopelessly outnumbered, Chiang was forced to beat a hasty retreat. Some months later he wrote an analysis of the defeat. “ From this I learned a big lesson. When an unsupported army penetrates too far, the only safe plan is for it to press on to its goal before it stops fighting. Never cease fighting midway, nor depend upon the enemy keeping faith.”1

The Paris Peace Conference and the May Fourth Movement When the Peace Conference met in Paris in January 1919, the Chinese factions agreed to send a united delegation to represent the interests of the country. Of the five delegates to the Conference, four were appointed by Peking and one (Wang Cheng-t’ing, better known as C. T. Wang) by Canton. The Chairman of the delegation was Lu Cheng-hsiang who, as 1 Chiang Kai-shek, Yueh-chun ti-erh chih-tui chin-kung yung-kang shih-mo ch ’ing-hsing (An Account of the Attack on Yung-kang by the Second Regiment of the Kwangtung Army), January 26, 1919. 96

A COUNTRY DIVIDED: THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

Foreign Minister, had been the chief negotiator in the Sino-Japanese talks in relation to the Twenty-one Demands and had signed the 1915 treaty resulting from the talks. The Military Government in Canton advocated a firm policy against Japan. Among the delegates appointed by Peking, V. K. Wellington Koo was in sympathy with the South. The Chinese delegation presented to the Conference a request for: (1) the direct restoration to China of the German leasehold and rights in Shantung province; (2) the cancellation of all agreements relating to Shantung entered into by China and Japan in 1915 and 1918; and (3) the abolition of all special privileges enjoyed by foreign Powers in China. The Shantung question constituted the heart of contention. To neutralize American opposition to Japan’s claims, the Japanese delegation raised the question of racial equality. Needless to say, the principle of racial equality had application particularly against the United States and the British Dominions, which barred free access to their shores by Asians. At the plenary session of the five Great Powers (the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) on January 27, the Japanese delegate, Baron Makino Nobuaki, revealed the existence of secret agreements signed by Great Britain, France and Italy by which they agreed to support Japan’s claims at the peace table, and to a reversion of the German rights in Shantung. The United States, to which China looked for support, found itself isolated. Japan, furthermore, contended that the legality of her claims were based on the Sino-Japanese Treaty of May 25, 1915 and the exchange of notes between China and Japan on September 24, 1918. On that date, Peking had negotiated a secret loan (one of the so-called Nishihara loans) from Japan for the construction of the Tsinan-Shunteh and KaomiHsuchow railways in Shantung. In the exchange of notes, Baron Goto Shimpei, the Japanese Foreign Minister, had handed to Chang Tsung-hsiang, Peking’s Minister to Japan, a seven-point proposal concerning Shantung which provided, inter alia, the following: (1) Japanese troops stationed along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway were to be concentrated in Tsingtao; (2) the police force guarding the railway was to 97

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have Japanese officers at the headquarters, at the principal stations and at the training school; and (3) the railway should be worked jointly by Japanese and Chinese. In his reply to Baron Goto’s note, Chang Tsung-hsiang said that the Chinese Government would “gladly agree” to the Japanese proposal. The phrase “gladly agree” had been inserted on the insistence of the Japanese Foreign Minister. The existence of these arrangements was unknown to the world until the morning of the meeting on January 28 of the Council of Ten at the Versailles Conference. It was a revelation to the Chinese plenipotentiaries also, with the possible exception of Lu Cheng-hsiang. On the basis of the inter-Allied agreements, of the 1915 and 1918 agreements with the Chinese Government, and on the basis of her sacrifices of men and treasure in the war, Japan demanded that her right of succession to the German holdings in Shantung, including the leasehold of Kiaochow Bay and the economic rights enjoyed in the province, be recognized. She threatened to boycott the conference if her claims were not recognized. President Wilson, who had opposed the Japanese demand, was forced to give in. And with the loss of his support, the Chinese lost their cause in Paris. The Chinese people, both at home and abroad, watched the developments in Paris with great concern. They inundated their representatives at the Peace Conference with telegrams registering strong opposition to any compromise on the Shantung question. When news of China’s debacle in Paris reached Peking toward the end of April 1919, the Chinese people, especially the intelligentsia, were stunned and outraged by the injustice perpetrated against China. They were particularly incensed by the Chinese “traitors” who had sold China down the river through political loans and secret agreements. Their war cry was: “ Give back our Shantung!” Their targets of attack were Ts’ao Ju-lin, Minister of Communications, the man mainly responsible for the so-called Nishihara loans; Lu Tseng-yu, former Chinese Minister to Japan, then Chairman of the Bank of Communications and Chinese Director of the ChineseJapanese Bank; and Chang Tsung-hsiang, Chinese Minister to 98

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Japan, who had “gladly agreed” to Japan’s seven-point proposal in relation to Shantung. On May 4, a Sunday, thousands of students from thirteen colleges and universities of Peking gathered at the Tien-An Men Square (Square of Heavenly Peace) to hold a mass meeting. They carried white flags bearing slogans such as: “ Struggle for Sovereignty and Resist the Great Powers! Throw out the Traitors!” At first they were peaceful and orderly, but they turned violent during the latter part of the demonstration. They marched on Ts’ao Ju-lin’s residence and demanded Ts’ao’s personal appearance and explanation of the loans and secret agreements he had signed with Japan. The police tried to turn the students away but a few of the more militant students climbed up the wall, broke open a window and entered the house. They flung open the front door and the mass of students forced their way in. Ts’ao Ju-lin himself escaped in the confusion; but Chang Tsung-hsiang was found in the drawing room with another man. The students beat Chang up and set Ts’ao’s house on fire. The arrest of thirty students incited more demonstra­ tions. They demanded punishment of the “traitors” and started a massive boycott of Japanese goods rallying merchants, industrialists and workers to their standard. The arrest of more and more students in the days that followed the May Fourth incident led to widespread strikes in such cities as Tientsin, Shanghai, Canton, Nanking, and elsewhere. Public opinion was on the side of the students. On June 6 the arrested students were released and the “traitors” dismissed from their posts. Ts’ao Ju-lin, Lu Tsung-yu and Chang Tsung-hsiang never again held public office. The Chinese plenipotentiaries at the Paris Peace Conference, keenly alive to the state of public opinion at home, refused to append their signature to the peace treaty with Germany. That the boycott against Japan was effective was shown by the pressure which Tokyo brought to bear on Peking to put a stop to the students’ anti-Japanese activities. Japan, however, indicated a willingness to enter into negotiations with China with respect to Shantung. Peking refused to consider such negotiations except on the basis of complete and unconditional restoration of the rights wrested from 99

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China in that province. The impasse continued until the meeting of the Washington Conference in 1921-1922. Started as a patriotic mass demonstration against the decisions concerning China at Versailles, the May Fourth incident soon developed into an intellectual, social and political movement with far-reaching ramifications. It was a watershed in Chinese culture and history — with currents sweeping forward to the future on the one hand and backward to the past on the other.

Chiang’s Disillusionment with the Kwangtung Army After the disaster at Yungtai in December 1918, Chiang requested to be relieved from his post with the Kwangtung Army but Ch’en Chiung-ming prevailed upon him to stay. In March 1919 Chiang was granted a brief leave of absence so as to allow him to go to Shanghai to see Dr. Sun and his mother. His mother made a special trip to Shanghai from her home at Chikow to be with her son. He then returned to Fukien to resume his command of the Second Detachment. The Kwangtung Army was far from being a modem fighting force. Chiang found provincialism and factionalism rife among the officers. Feeling utterly discouraged, he unburdened himself on June 21, 1919, in a letter to Teng K’eng, Ch’en Chiung-ming’s Chief of Staff, with whom he was on terms of warm friendship: “After I assumed command of the Second Detachment, I found that there was nothing I could do to reform it. The pay for the soldiers was merely wasted . . . I feel ashamed of myself. There are, I believe, two reasons why it is not possible to reform the detachment. First, the detachment had been fully organized before I took it over. For this reason I could not choose my officers and give my soldiers adequate training. So my ideas of reform could not be carried out. In time of peace the officers and men might obey my orders, but in time of war they are unmanageable. When I tried to introduce reforms, 100

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obstacles inevitably set in. Today, the conditions in the detachment are deplorable. “The second reason is that when I took over the detachment, I was unable to get experienced and competent men to assist me. Officers were collected in a haphazard fashion. Once they were engaged, it was practically impossible to get rid of them. In consequence, there is a lack of coordination in the detachment.”1 On July 7 Chiang wrote a second letter to Teng setting forth reasons why he wanted to quit the Kwangtung Army. Physically he was suffering from gastric trouble and insomnia and mentally he was tired and weary. He believed that irreparable damage would be done to his health if he did not quit there and then. He went on to say that politics had crept into the rank and file of the Kwangtung Army and that he was being discriminated against by other officers. “ In such circumstances,” he said, “if I do not leave, people will say that I am loath to give up my position and will look upon me as an adventurer.”2 On July 12 Chiang handed in his resignation, but he did not actually leave until more than two months later. He seriously considered making a comprehensive study tour of Europe and the United States for three or more years. But he was dissuaded from doing so by Dr. Sun, who told him that he was needed at home to help build up a genuine revolutionary party and that it would be “ a great loss to the revolutionary cause” if, at this critical juncture, a competent and trusted military aide like him should leave the country for such a lengthy period of time. Chiang derived much comfort and satisfaction from the knowledge that the great revolutionary leader held him in such high esteem.

2 Chiang Tsung-t’ung yen-lun hui-pien (Collected Works of President Chiang, Taipei, Taiwan, 1956), Vol 24, pp. 82-87. 101

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THE ENEMY WITHIN

The Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang On October 10, 1919, Dr. Sun, who was in retirement in Shanghai, reorganized the Chinese Revolutionary Party into the Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang — the Nationalist Party of China. This was the same name Dr. Sun’s Party had used in the first years of the Republic. Started as a secret revolutionary organization in Hawaii in 1894 under the name Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society), it was reorganized in 1905 as the Tung Meng Hui, in 1912 as Kuo-min-tang, and in 1914 as Chung-hua Ke-ming-tang (the Chinese Revolu­ tionary Party). Soon after the reorganization of the Party, acting upon Dr. Sun’s instructions, Chiang Kai-shek paid a visit to Japan. Armed with letters of introduction from Dr. Sun, Chiang sailed for Japan on the 25th of October, after an absence of four years. While in Tokyo he paid respects to Dr. Sun’s old friends: Yamada Junsaburo, Kayano Nagatomo, Toyama Mitsuru and others. On November 19 he was back in Shanghai where a message from Ch’en Chiung-ming, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Army, was awaiting him. Ch’en urged his immediate return to the Army headquarters in Fukien to take up his original post. Chiang, however, remained in Shanghai with Dr. Sun, and during the first half of 1920 was often ill. In January he suffered from an eye ailment. In April, after returning from a brief stay in Fukien at the headquarters of the Kwangtung Army, he had an attack of typhoid fever. During his convalescence in June his mother came to Shanghai to look after him, even though she herself was not in the best of health. 102

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It was at this time that Dr. Sun ordered Ch’en Chiung-ming to proceed with his Kwangtung Army to Canton with the express purpose of ousting the Kwangsi generals who were then in control of Kwangtung province. Ch’en Chiung-ming successfully accomplished his mission. Having recovered from typhoid fever and persuaded by Dr. Sun, Chiang . Kai-shek returned to serve with the Kwangtung Army for a brief period and participated in the battle of Waichow. He was dismayed to find that factionalism was still rain pant among the officers. In November he left Kwangtung again for home in Fenghua.

Dr. Sun’s Return to Canton Meanwhile, Dr. Sun, accompanied by Wu T’ing-fang and T’ang Shao-yi, returned to Canton. Members of the Extraordinary Parliament, who had been scattered in various places after the departure of Dr. Sun in May 1918, also drifted back. On April 2, 1921, the Extraordinary Parliament disbanded the Military Government and established the Government of the Republic of China in accordance with the new Organic Law. On April 10, Dr. Sun was elected Extraordinary President of the Republic. Canton was once again the base of Dr. Sun’s revolutionary activities. On April 21 Chiang Kai-shek received a telegram from Dr. Sun urging him to proceed to Canton immediately to participate in the military expedition against Kwangsi. He left home on May 10 and arrived in Canton ten days later. But on the night of the 24th he dreamed of a vast panorama of snow-covered hills and plains, a boundless expanse of white. He awoke from the dream with a vague feeling that it portended ill for his mother (snow being the Chinese color for mourning). Leaving Canton in a hurry, he rushed home and arrived at Chikow to find his mother, to whom he owed so much, indeed seriously ill. She died on June 14. She was only 58. After the death of his mother, Chiang intended to remain in his native place for the customary mourning period, which, 103

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in accordance with the Confucian tradition, was to last three years. A telegram from Dr. Sun came on June 23 urging his immediate return to Canton. Another telegram arrived a month later. The urgency of the request was reinforced by wires from Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Shao Yuan-ch’ung, and Chang Ching-chiang. On August 10 he finally decided to leave for Canton. He got only as far as Shanghai. There, one stormy day his thoughts turned to the safety of his mother’s bier in his ancestral home, which was on the bank of a river and which might be in danger of being inundated. He sped to Chikow and was relieved to find his home undamaged. He did not actually start for Canton again until September 3. When he arrived in Canton on September 13, the Kwangsi campaign was almost over. Wuchow had been captured in the latter part of June; Kweilin, capital of Kwangsi, had been taken in August; and the Kwangtung Army was soon to be in control of the entire province. After having called upon Dr. Sun, he went to Nanning in Kwangsi to see Ch’en Chiung-ming, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Army. The meeting did not seem to be a pleasant one. He returned to Canton and after seeing Dr. Sun and other leaders, returned to Shanghai. Thence he went to Chikow to bury his mother, which took place on November 23, 1921. Dr. Sun sent Ch’en Kuo-fu to Chikow to pronounce a eulogy at late Mrs. Chiang’s funeral.

Ch’en Chiung-ming’s Betrayal After having brought both Kwangtung and Kwangsi under the control of the Kwangtung Army, Dr. Sun was anxious to launch his long-contemplated military expedition against the northern warlords. The time seemed propitious. The situation in North and Central China had undergone significant changes in the past two years. Tuan Ch’i-jui’s Anhwei faction had been driven out of Peking by Wu Pei-fu in July 1920. Wu had been but a division commander under Ts’ao K’un, who, after the retirement of Feng Kuo-chang, 104

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had assumed leadership of the Chili faction. However, while Ts’ao K’un was the acknowledged leader, Wu Pei-fu had the whip hand. He had become a dominant influence in a large part of China. The ascendancy of the Chili faction could not fail but provoke the envy and resentment of the powerful Manchurian warlord, Chang Tso-lin, who could not let an arrogant upstart like Wu control the Central Government in Peking. It is true that the so-called Central Government had little or no authority in the country. It was nonetheless the government recognized by foreign Powers as the de jure government of China. Those who controlled Peking had control of such national administrative machinery as continued to exist and had a basis for claiming the allegiance of the country. Even more important than this was the financial advantage it enjoyed. As the “Central Government of China,” it could contract foreign loans, assert a claim to any surpluses from the customs collections after loan and indemnity charges defrayed from the customs had been met, as well as to the internationally supervised Salt Gabelle. Thus, with the defeat of Tuan Ch’i-jui’s Anhwei faction in 1920, the Chili and Mukden (Manchurian) factions moved on a collision course. For the purpose of overthrowing Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin sent emissaries to Canton to enlist Dr. Sun’s cooperation. Dr. Sun was not averse to cooperating with the Manchurian militarist, believing that the overthrow of Wu Pei-fu would be a forward step toward the eventual liquidation of warlordism. Dr. Sun’s plan for the northern campaign had begun to take definite shape in December 1921 when he went to Kweilin, Kwangsi, to establish the Generalissimo’s Head­ quarters. At the same time he appointed Chu P’ei-teh Commander-in-Chief of the Yunnan troops, P’eng Cheng-wan Commander-in-Chief of the Kiangsi troops, Ku Cheng-lu Commander-in-Chief of the Kweichow troops, and Li Lieh-chun Chief of the General Staff. In urgent need of competent military personnel, he sent for Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang arrived at Kweilin in mid-January 1922 and was appointed Chief of Staff to Hsu Ch’ung-chih, Commander of the Second Kwangtung Army. Ch’en Chiung-ming, in whom Dr. Sun had placed 105

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unlimited confidence, was not enthusiastic about the Northern Expedition. The Kwangtung Army under his command had grown from 20 to a hundred battalions and had been transformed into his private military organization, the officer corps of which felt loyalty to him rather than to the cause Dr. Sun had been fighting for. As his influence grew, he was no longer content to play second fiddle to Dr. Sun. When he intimated that he was opposed to the military expedition against the North, Dr. Sun told him that he did not have to participate in the campaign if he did not want to and that all he requested of him was to take care of the affairs in Kwangtung and Kwangsi and keep the expeditionary force supplied with munitions and provisions. Ch’en promised to do so, even though he never intended to keep his promise. Indeed, he had already been in secret communication with Wu Pei-fu, for whose overthrow Dr. Sun had been striving. In mid-March 1922 the Second Kwangtung Army under the command of Hsu Ch’ung-chih slowly made its way to the Hunan border, fully expecting a smooth passage through the province, inasmuch as Chao Heng-t’i, the provincial governor, professed to be Dr. Sun’s follower, had maintained friendly relations with the Canton regime. This was not so, however. Chao Heng-t’i, a leader of the so-called federalist movement, had formally declared the independence of Hunan as a self-governing province. He refused to let the Kwangtung Army pass through Hunan. The expedition was thus halted at the Kwangtung-Hunan border. Meanwhile, the situation in Kwangtung deteriorated. On March 21 General Teng K’eng, Ch’en Chiung-ming’s Chief of Staff and commander of the First Division of the Kwangtung Army, was murdered. It was generally assumed that the assassination was instigated by Ch’en Chiung-ming, because Teng was the one person on Ch’en’s immediate staff whose loyalty to Dr. Sun was not in doubt. On March 26 Dr. Sun called an emergency meeting of his advisers. It was decided that the expeditionary forces should immediately return to Kwangtung. The main body of Ch’en Chiung-ming’s troops were then at Nanning, Kwangsi. Not being in a position to prevent the expeditionary forces from returning, Ch’en tendered his resignation as Commander-in-Chief of the 106

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Kwangtung Army, as Governor of Kwangtung, and as Minister of War. Dr. Sun accepted his resignation as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Army and as Governor of Kwangtung, but asked him to continue to serve as Minister of War. This was contrary to what Chiang Kai-shek had recommended. Since Ch’en had clearly showed his hand, Chiang urged that an immediate attack be launched against him. In his view, no successful campaign against the Northern militarists could be undertaken without first consolidating the home base. Dr. Sun, however, still hoped that Ch’en could be prevailed upon to mend his ways. Disappointed and finding himself in an impossible situation, Chiang on April 23 requested to be relieved of his commission as Chief of Staff of the Second Kwangtung Army. But Dr. Sun would not hear of it. “If you leave at such a time,” he said, “ Hsu Ch’ung-chih and I will not be able to function at all . . .” Deeply touched by Dr. Sun’s words, Chiang agreed to stay. But after further reflection, he decided that under the circumstances, he could not be of effective use to Dr. Sun. He therefore insisted upon resigning and sailed for Shanghai. Arriving in that city on April 27, he returned to his home in Chikow the following day. On May 6 Dr. Sun established his headquarters at Shaokuan to resume the campaign against the northern militarists. On May 11 he ordered his troops — about 50,000 strong — to attack Kiangsi, a province held by the northern general Ch’en Kwang-yuan. The expeditionary forces captured in rapid succession a number of important towns. On June 13, Kanchow, a major commercial center of the province, was taken. The success was beyond all expecta­ tions. At this juncture Ch’en Chiung-ming ordered his troops to withdraw from Kwangsi and march towards the vicinity of Canton in order to occupy all strategic points in that region. Dr. Sun, while realizing the gravity of the situation, continued to hope that Ch’en was not altogether beyond redemption. He asked Ch’en to meet him in Canton with the hope of persuading him to return to his fold. On June 1 he left his headquarters at Shaokuan and proceeded to the presidential palace in Canton. To show that he had nothing to fear from Ch’en, he did not bring his bodyguards with him 107

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and did not take any other precautions for his personal safety. Ch’en, however, had left for Waichow, a walled-city east of Canton, and refused to come to Canton to meet with Dr. Sun. Meanwhile the military situation in the North was rapidly changing too. On April 28, 1922, the long-expected war between the Chili and Mukden military factions finally broke out. Within a week the forces under the Manchurian warlord, Chang Tso-lin, were defeated and compelled to withdraw to areas beyond the Great Wall. A month later Wu Pei-fu, who had become the most powerful man in North China, removed Hsu Shih-ch’ang from the Presidency and reinstalled Li Yuan-hung in the Presidential chair. At the same time the Parliament that had been dissolved in 1917 was reconvened in Peking. All this was calculated to take the wind out of Dr. Sun’s sails. Inasmuch as the new set-up was in line with the spirit and letter of the Provisional Constitution of 1912, it was constitutional. This being so, said the northern leaders, Dr. Sun’s Canton regime, which was established in the name of the constitution, had lost its raison d'etre and should therefore be abolished. This claim sounded reasonable to many people and won support even among some highly respected members of the Kuomintang. This was the opportunity Ch’en Chiung-ming had been waiting for. In the early hours of June 16, Ch’en’s troops stationed in the vicinity of Canton rose in open revolt against Dr. Sun. They marched toward the Presidential residence. Dr. Sun had been warned of the impending revolt a few hours in advance, but he discounted it. He refused to believe that a man in whom he had placed so much confidence could turn against him in so unconscionable a manner. At about 2 o’clock in the morning it was reported that Ch’en’s troops had completed preparations and were awaiting orders for attack. Dr. Sun did not wholly believe all this until he heard the movements of troops from afar. He then left the residence and made his way alone through the streets, without meeting with any interference. He proceeded to the Bund and safely arrived at the Navy Headquarters. Admiral Wen Shu-teh, who was in command at the naval yard, hurdled him aboard the gunboat Chu-yu which sailed out into the river off Whampoa. There the gunboat rode at 108

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anchor. On the 18th, in desperate need of a military aide on whom he could rely in this hour of danger, Dr. Sun wired Chiang Kai-shek, who was then in Chekiang: “Matters critical; hope for your speedy arrival.” Chiang’s friends, in view of the state of confusion that seemed to prevail in Canton, advised him to wait until the situation cleared up. Chiang brushed aside all friendly advice and set out for Canton on the 25th. At considerable personal risk, he made his way to Whampoa. When he boarded the command ship Yung-feng, on which Dr. Sun had established his headquarters, Dr. Sun greeted him with these words: “You are as good as 20,000 troops.” From that moment on, Chiang was in full command. Ch’en Chiung-ming, meanwhile, had been exerting great efforts to induce the Navy to go over to his side. Three large warships subsequently left Whampoa, having been bought over by Ch’en Chiung-ming. Once they had left Whampoa, Yung-feng was exposed to fire from shore batteries. To evade this, Yung-feng, accompanied by a few small gunboats, sailed on July 10 for Haihsin Kang. To reach there, they had to pass through a strongly defended fort. Chiang ordered the warships to open fire on it. Six shots from the fort hit Yung-feng, resulting in a number of casualties. But Yung-feng, followed by other craft, continued her way and safely reached Pai-e-tan. Here Dr. Sun and Chiang remained. For over a month Chiang was in attendance on the revolutionary leader, scrubbing the decks like an ordinary sailor, carrying meals and doing all sorts of menial chores. The quarters were cramped and the weather was unbearably hot. There was a shortage of drinking water and other provisions. At night Chiang sometimes ventured ashore to buy food and other necessities. They could easily have gotten away, but they hung on, hoping against hope that the returning expeditionary forces under the command of Hsu Ch’ung-chih and other loyal generals would soon reach Canton and crush the rebels. But they were doomed to disappointment. On August 6 reports of the defeat of the loyal troops by Ch’en Chiung-ming were received. On the 9th Dr. Sun and Chiang pulled out of Kwangtung waters and made their way to Hongkong on a British gunboat. On the morning of the 10th they sailed for Shanghai on a Canadian 109

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boat, S.S. Empress o f Russia, where they awaited a more propitious time to stage a comeback. The days spent aboard Yung-feng in the summer of 1922 with Dr. Sun marked a turning point in Chiang’s career. Until then he had been a relatively obscure figure in Kuomintang circles. He had, it is true, rendered valuable services to the party, but still he had been something of an outsider. His future had been clouded by frustrations and uncertainties. Dr. Sim had held him in high esteem, yet his relationship with the veteran revolutionary leader had been more formal than close. The perilous days the two men shared aboard the gunboat changed all this. There developed between them a rapport and a bond of affection which would not have been possible in normal circumstances. In due time Chiang was given an opportunity to play a central role in Kuomintang, and it was not long before his star, rising with extraordinary swiftness, was suddenly seen to be shining alone in the firmament.

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A FRESH START FOR THE KUOMINTANG Dr. Sun’s Return to Canton In Shanghai Dr. Sun never ceased to plan for an early return to his revolutionary base in Canton. The only military force he could count on to recapture Kwangtung from rebel hands was the Second Kwangtung Army under the command of Hsu Ch’ung-chih. Hsu, however, had been defeated by Ch’en Chiung-ming and had retreated to Fukien. There, in cooperation with the northern general Wang Yung-ch’uan, who professed allegiance to Tuan Ch’i-jui’s Anhwei military faction, Hsu captured Foochow, capital of Fukien, on October 12, 1922. On October 18 Dr. Sun appointed Chiang Kai-shek Chief of Staff to Hsu Ch’ung-chih. Chiang lost no time in going to the field of action in Fukien. When he arrived there on the 22nd, he found the conditions in the Second Kwangtung Army far from satisfactory. Factionalism and provincialism continued to flourish. He felt that he was discriminated against by his fellow officers, who looked upon him as something of an intruder. Hardly a month had passed before he was back in Shanghai again. Dr. Sun ordered him to return to Fukien immediately. But he did not leave Shanghai until about three weeks later. In the meantime the Kwangsi armies of Shen Hung-ying and Liu Chen-huan, the Yunnan armies of Yang Hsi-min and Fan Shih-sheng rallied under the Kuomintang banner and advanced on Canton. On January 16, 1923, Ch’en Chiung-ming withdrew from Canton to his stronghold at Waichow. On March 23 Dr. Sun returned to Canton and immediately restored the Military Government. He appointed Chiang Kai-shek his Chief of Staff. Chiang was not at that time in Canton; he was nursing an eye ailment in Ningpo. The state of affairs in Kwangtung was far from 111

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encouraging. The Kwangsi general Shen Hung-ying was planning to establish himself as the master of Kwangtung. In April he turned against the Military Government and units of his troops advanced on Canton. Dr. Sun gave orders to the Yunnan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi forces to suppress the rebellion. Ch’en Chiung-ming, though no longer in control of Canton, remained a source of trouble to the Military Government. His army was still intact in eastern Kwangtung. He constituted a potential threat to both Canton and Fukien. Realizing the basic unreliability of warlord armies as instruments of the Kuomintang, Dr. Sun urged Chiang Kai-shek to come to Canton at once. Chiang arrived in Canton on April 20. By this time Shen Hung-ying had already been defeated but Ch’en Chiung-ming had once again raised the standard of revolt. Chiang immediately involved himself in the campaign against Ch’en. In late May, Ch’en’s troops were in occupation of such important towns in eastern Kwangtung as Meihsien, Chaochow, and Swatow. At the same time they made a threatening advance toward Canton. On June 16, Chiang was appointed Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo’s Field Headquarters. It was through his efforts that a number of strategic positions were recaptured and the highly fluid military situation was stabilized. But he found it difficult to work with officers who conspired against him. On July 12 he resigned and left for Chekiang.

Chiang’s Mission to the Soviet Union Hard-pressed by foreign intervention, hemmed in by a cordon sanitaire, and weakened by the October Revolution and its aftermath, the new Bolshevik state in Russia found it imperative to enter into normal diplomatic relations with its immediate neighbors both in Europe and in Asia. In China the Bolsheviks had inherited extensive political and economic interests. Because of Allied intervention and counter-revolutionary activities in Siberia, the new regime 112

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was unable to assert these interests. In order to retain the basic Tsarist gains, it was necessary for the Soviet Government to secure a diplomatic foothold in China. For this purpose it sent a succession of missions to Peking to win the recognition of the Chinese Government. Soviet policy toward China in the immediate post­ revolutionary years operated on two separate yet closely related planes — diplomatic and revolutionary. This dual policy was carried out with considerable skill and finesse, weaving a new pattern of Russian power in the Far East. Adolf A. Joffe and Leo Karakhan, who headed Soviet missions to China during the 1922-1924 period, were past masters in the art of double-talk and double-dealing. The Joffe mission of 1922 failed to reach any agreement with Peking. In January 1923 Joffe broke off the negotiations by announcing that he was ready to go to Japan, allegedly for reasons of health. He stopped over in Shanghai to see Dr. Sun Yat-sen, with whom he had been in touch ever since his arrival in China. His conversations with the Chinese leader resulted in a joint pronouncement on January 26, 1923, of which more will be said in another connection. At that time the fortunes of the Kuomintang were at a low ebb. Dr. Sun himself had been driven out of Canton and was living in Shanghai. He was in desperate need of foreign assistance. After having been rebuffed by the Western Powers, he was forced to turn to the Soviet Union, which was more than pleased to oblige. In those days Dr. Sun was preoccupied with the unification of China by military means. The question of obtaining military aid was thus given the highest priority. He wanted to find out what the Soviet Union could do to help him in this regard. He planned to send one of his top aides to Russia to discuss with Soviet leaders the ways and means by which such aid could be extended. Chiang Kai-shek was the logical choice for such a mission.1 He had been studying the Russian language, and he 1 Russian documentary sources reveal that another important purpose of Chiang’s mission to Russia was to get Soviet help “for military action. . . in and about the regions lying to the Northwest of Peking and beyond.” See Letter of Dr. Sun, September 17, 1923 to Karakhan quoted in C. Martin Wilbur’s Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot (Columbia University Press, New York 1976), p. 151. 113

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was knowledgeable in military science. On August 16,1923, Chiang, armed with letters of introduction from Dr. Sun to the Soviet leaders, left Shanghai for Moscow by way of Manchuria. He was accompanied by Shen Ting-yi, Wang Teng-yun, and Chang T’ai-lei. The last named was a Communist who later played a leading role in the Canton Commune of December 1927. Chiang and his party arrived in Moscow on September 2 and were well received by the Soviet Government. In Moscow they had interviews with the top Soviet leaders, including Trotsky and Stalin. They were unable to see Lenin, who was seriously ill. They studied Soviet party, military and government organizations, and listened to briefings by responsible officials. They called at the Central Party Headquarters of the Soviet Communist Party where Rudzutak, Secretary of the Politburo, gave them an account of the Russian Revolution and of the circumstances under which the Russian Communist Party was formed. They inspected the Red Army, and the system of political commissars attracted their particular attention. They learned that, while the commanders were to train the army and lead them in battle, the commissars were to watch over the conduct of the officers and “educate politically” the rank and file. Each military order had to be signed by both the commander and the commissar; and they both were authorized to enforce military discipline. Chiang was impressed by this bold and novel experiment. They were in Petrograd for three days (September 26-29). There they visited the naval academy and other service schools as well as the Kronstadt naval base. Chiang recalled in his book Soviet Russia in China: My impression was that the military schools in Moscow were well organized, but the naval academy at Petrograd and the Russian fleet were depressed in spirit. Two years previously, incensed by Bolshevik dictatorship and acts of Communist brutality during Russia’s civil war, the naval ratings at Kronstadt rose in revolt. Though the revolt was soon put down, we could see that it had left deep scars.2 2Chiang Kai-shek: Soviet Russia in China (New York, first revised and abridged edition, 1965), p. 17. 114

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In the same book Chiang recorded his impression of the workings of political institutions: From my observations and conversations with Soviet leaders, I readily perceived that fierce struggles were not only going on in Russia but also among the Communists themselves. I became convinced that Soviet political institutions were instruments of tyranny and terror, and basically incompatible with Kuomintang’s political ideals. This was something I could never have imagined had I remained in China.3

On November 25 he attended a meeting of the Third International (Comintern). Present at the meeting were its Chairman Zinoviev, Secretary of its Far East Bureau Gregory Voitinsky, as well as Communist leaders of various countries. In his reply to Zinoviev’s words of welcome, Chiang said: The Kuomintang, operating under the banner of the Three People’s Principles, stands together with all oppressed peoples of the world in the struggle against imperialism. In China our greatest enemy is warlordism nurtured by the imperialists. It is our expectation that in two or three years we would be able to achieve some success in our revolution. I have learned much in my travels in the Soviet Union. It seems to me that in the Soviet Union certain misunderstandings continue to exist in regard to the reality of the Chinese revolution. I hope our international friends would do us the honor of visiting our country in order to observe the Chinese revolution in operation and study the whole problem of revolution in the East.

In his conversations with Soviet leaders, Chiang discovered that however glibly and eloquently they talked about Western imperialism, they seemed unable to rid themselves of the expansionist ambitions of the Tsars when the question of Outer Mongolia was under discussion. Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, told him in an interview that the Mongolians wanted to associate themselves with the Soviet Union because they were afraid of the Chinese. Afterwards, Chiang wrote Chicherin: In our conversation the other day, you said that the Mongolians were afraid of the Chinese. I must tell you that 3

Chiang Kai-shek: Soviet Russia in China (New York, first revised and abridged edition, 1965), p. 17. 115

YEARS OF TRIAL AND PREPARATION what they are afraid of is not the Kuomintang but the warlords of the Peking regime . . . We of the Kuomintang like nothing so much as to enable the Mongolians to achieve self-government . . . If the Soviet Union is sincere in its friendship with the Mongolians, it should do everything possible to dispel their fears.

While in Moscow Chiang had more talks with Trotsky than with other Soviet leaders. He found Trotsky to be “the most forthright of them all.” Trotsky discussed with Chiang revolutions in such Asian countries as Japan, Indo-China, India and Turkey. Finally, he touched upon the Chinese revolution and inquired what assistance the Soviet Union could render in the matter. He asked Chiang to take back to Dr. Sun a verbal message. Since the conclusion of the war with Poland in 1920, he said, Lenin’s new policy toward the anti-imperalist revolutionary struggles in the colonial and semi-colonial countries was to give as much moral and material assistance as possible, but all direct military action was to be avoided. Therefore, he added, “the Soviet Union would do its best to help China’s program of National Revolution through providing positive assistance in the form of weapons and economic aid, but not direct participation by its troops.” On October 10 (Double Ten), Chinese students in Moscow came to Chiang’s hotel to celebrate the founding of the Chinese Republic. Present at the meeting were also representatives of the Russian Communist Party and officers of the Foreign Office. Chiang made a speech on the history of the Chinese revolution and spoke at length about the greatness of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. For this he was accused by some Chinese students of being a promoter of the personality cult. Chiang began his homeward journey on November 29 and arrived in Shanghai on December 15. He then returned to his home in Chikow. In a written report to Dr. Sun, he expressed his misgivings about the policy of alignment with the Soviet Union. On December 30 he received a cable from Dr. Sun urging him to proceed to Canton as soon as possible to report on “all matters and make plans for Sino-Soviet cooperation.” He left for the South soon afterward. When he saw Dr. Sun in January 1924 he repeated his misgivings. Dr. Sun brushed 116

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them aside and said: “Don’t let yourself be bogged down by doubts and anxieties.” Members of the Kuomintang who believed that the Soviet Union was a true friend of China were highly critical of Chiang’s report. Among the critics was his friend Liao Chung-k’ai. In a letter to Liao Chung-k’ai, Chiang reinforced his misgivings by additional observations. Copies of this letter were circulated among members of the Kuomintang Central Standing Committee. Here is a brief excerpt of that letter:4 In regard to the Russian Communist Party, I believe a distinction should be made between facts and theories. We cannot ignore the facts simply because we believe in certain aspects of their theories. My personal observations lead me to the conclusion that the Russian Communist Party cannot be wholly trusted. I told you that we could believe only about 30 percent of what the Russians had to say. That was really an understatement because, in view of the excessive trust you seemed to repose in the Russians, I did not want to upset you too much. As far as their attitude toward Dr. Sun is concerned, only members of the Communist International, as distinct from those of the Russian Communist Party, seemed to hold Dr. Sun in high esteem. The Chinese Communists in Russia always speak of Dr. Sun with scorn and suspicion.

The Reorganization of the Kuomintang The decision to transform the Kuomintang into a well-organized and highly disciplined political party was made in 1922 while Dr. Sun was still in Shanghai. Exile afforded him time to reflect and ponder. Why was the Kuomintang so fragile an instrument that it went to pieces whenever it was confronted with a grave crisis? Dr. Sun was convinced that he must now start from scratch and rebuild the Kuomintang into a party controlled by a hard core of dedicated revolutionaries, animated by a set of inspiring and constructive principles, and held together by strict 4Chiang Tsung-t’ung yen-lun hui-pien, op. cit. 117

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discipline. When he returned to Canton early in 1923, the situation in Kwangtung was still fluid and he had other pressing business to attend to. It was not until October that he appointed an ad hoc committee of nine members to study the problem of reorganization and make preparations for the convening of a national congress of party members. In November the preparatory work was completed and a Manifesto on the Reorganization was issued. The Manifesto attributed the party’s past failures to “the lack of a good organization and comprehensive training.” It went on to say: In regard to Party organization and training, our objective is to bring about coordination between the upper and lower echelons of the Party. Measures will be adopted to weed out bad elements and retain good members. The future of our Party hinges upon this.

In the meantime, work of a preparatory nature, such as the registration of Party members and the establishment of provincial and local party organs, was immediately started. The First National Congress of the Kuomintang, the first of its kind in the party’s history, was convened in Canton on January 20, 1924. It was attended by 165 delegates from various provinces and Chinese communities overseas. In his opening speech Dr. Sun said that the guiding principles of the reorganization were to make the party into “a powerful political organ with concrete platforms” and “to use the power of the political party to reconstruct the nation.” Essentially the Congress was called upon to adopt the draft constitution, to admit the Chinese Communists formally into the party, and to ratify the party’s entente with Moscow. On the last question there was little disagreement. It was clear to all that if the Kuomintang was to hold and consolidate its position in Kwangtung and thence to make its influence felt throughout China, outside aid and support was indispensable. The Kuomintang was certainly in no position to turn away the proffered hand from Moscow, though the question of Soviet motives was on the minds of not a few members. Members of the old guard, however, were bitterly opposed to the draft constitution and the admission of the Chinese Communists. Dr. Sun was able to persuade them to drop their objections. The whole question of Moscow-Canton 118

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entente and of the Communist participation in the Kuomintang will be discussed in a later chapter. One of the proposals submitted to the Congress by Dr. Sun was the formal establishment of a National Government. In Peking Ts’ao K’un, leader of the Chili military faction, had in October 1923 been elected President through bribery and intimidation of the members of Parliament. Ts’ao K’un was as corrupt as he was incompetent. Yet Peking was recognized as the legal government of China by foreign Powers. The time had come, said Dr. Sun, to establish a government worthy of its name. He therefore proposed to replace the Military Government or the Headquarters of the Generalissimo by a National Government which would command the respect and support of the Chinese people. The National Government was not to be a constitutional government which Dr. Sun had formerly striven to establish. He had by this time lost faith in Western representative institutions. His faith in democracy, however, remained unshaken. He was far too experienced to believe that democracy could work automatically in China. He proposed, therefore, that there should be a preparatory period in which the people, under the guidance of enlightened leaders, would be given an opportunity to learn their political roles. This he called hsun-cheng shih-ch'i —the period of political training. (The term hsun-cheng has often been translated into ‘political tutelage’ with all its implications of guardianship and control.) On January 23 the Manifesto o f the First National Congress o f the Kuomintang was adopted at a plenary session, an important document providing a summary of the vicissitudes of the Republic and an expanded account of the Kuomintang’s ideology and policies. The ideology of the Kuomintang was to be Dr. Sun’s San-min chu-i or the Three Principles of the People, formulated by him as early as 1905. In their embryonic form these principles consisted only of three terse statements. The Principle of Nationalism, for example, did not go beyond the overthrow of the alien Manchu regime. The Principle of People’s Rights stated that in place of the Monarchy, a Republican form of government was to be established. In regard to the third principle — the Principle of People’s Livelihood — there was only one single cryptic phrase: equalization of land rights. In the Manifesto 119

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the Principle of Nationalism now supports two aims: the liberation of China from foreign domination and the establishment of equal rights for all ethnic groups living in China. The Principle of the People’s Right or Democracy supports not only many indirect rights but also the specific rights of election, initiative, referendum and recall. As to the third principle, the Principle of Livelihood, it comprises two major aims: equalization of landholdings and regulation of capital. The Kuomintang political platform adopted at the First National Congress called, in foreign policy, for the abolition of all unequal treaties and, in domestic policy, for an equal division of powers between the central government and provincial and local governments, which has been interpreted as assumption of power by the central government in all matters affecting the whole country and retention of power by provincial or local governments in matters which vary with respect to specific localities. The reorganized Kuomintang exalted the party to a position over and above that of the state. But neither in theory nor in practice was the Kuomintang a dictatorship. In Dr. Sun’s scheme of things the concept “people” replaced the concept “class.” The very idea of “ class,” “ class struggle,” or “class dictatorship” was alien to his mind. His hsun-cheng shih-ch’i or the period of political training was no more than a transition to constitutionalism.

The Whampoa Military Academy One of the results of the First National Congress was the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy. The purpose was to lay the foundation of a new army imbued with revolutionary ideology. On January 24, 1924, Chiang was appointed Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Military Academy, and on February 3 he was appointed to the party’s Military Council. 120

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The cadets of the academy were to be recruited from all parts of China. But the northern provinces were then under the control of the warlords and it was difficult to get recruits from these areas. In consequence, most of them, on account of geographical propinquity, came from Kwangtung, Hunan, Fukien and Yunnan. A determined effort was made to wipe out provincialism and regionalism. The new army was to be a national and party army, not tainted by traditional prejudices of any kind. On May 3 Chiang was appointed Commandant of the Military Academy and concurrently Chief of Staff to the Kwangtung Army under the command of Hsu Ch’ung-chih. Two days later 350 cadets were admitted. As the need for new officers was urgent, more and more cadets were admitted, and by June 16 when the Academy was formally opened there were almost five hundred cadets. Following the Soviet practice, Dr. Sun appointed Liao Chung-k’ai the party’s representative at the academy, with powers equal and parallel to those of the commandant. The system was designed to make the academy a direct instrument of the party. Under the commandant there were various departments, the most important of which were the Department of Training with Li Chi-shen as Director, Department of Instruction with Wang Po-ling as Director, and the Political Department with Tai Chi-t’ao as Director. Communist elements soon wormed their way into all departments; for example, Yeh Chien-ying became Deputy Director of the Department of Instruction and Chou En-lai Deputy Director of the Political Department. The training was both military and political, with the latter occupying an even more important place than the former. Among the political instructors were such outstand­ ing members of the party as Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min and Shao Yuan-ch’ung, who gave lectures on the history and principles of the Kuomintang. Chiang himself addressed the academy frequently. He instilled into the cadets the importance of discipline and obedience. He desired the cadets to be not only good soldiers but good party members as well. For the sake of the party and for the propagation of the 121

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party’s principles, he said, they should not hesitate to make the supreme sacrifice. Chiang gave all his time and energy to the Academy; he lived and rose and retired with the students. At 5 a.m. he was up and about. Testimony from many quarters shows that, notwithstanding his stern discipline, he was well liked by the cadets. But not all went well with the Academy. There was an acute shortage of funds. The Kwangsi and Yunnan generals in Kwangtung controlled the sources of provincial revenue. They did not want the academy to succeed. They knew that the establishment of the party army spelled the doom of their own power in Kwangtung. What was even more serious was the lack of weapons. The arsenal at Canton was controlled by Kwangsi and Yunnan militarists. Fortunately, the manager of the arsenal was a loyal party member and through his efforts 500 rifles were delivered to the academy. The need for new officers was so pressing, that more and more cadets were admitted. Within a little over a year more than two thousand new officers were trained. This was the beginning of the Kuomintang army, an army which would soon be given the opportunity to prove its worth.

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THE KUOMINTANG, SOVIET RUSSIA, AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Beginnings of the Chinese Communist Movement The Chinese Communist Party is not indigenous to China. It is an outgrowth of Soviet Russia. This offshoot of Soviet Communism had first to live as a parasite on the Kuomintang and then seek a chance to organize workers, farmers, and other masses in order to stir up class struggle in the name of the Kuomintang. Its aim was to set up, during China’s fight for national unification and independence, Russia’s very first satellite in Asia.

These are Chiang Kai-shek’s own words; they appear in his book Soviet Russia in China.1 With the downfall of the Tsarist regime in Russia, the collapse of the Austro-Hungary Empire in Central Europe, and the rise of the revolutionary tide in Germany in 1917, international Communism arose with youthful vigor and an unbridled ambition. World revolution seemed just around the corner. Revolutionary situations were everywhere discernible, particularly in Central Eastern Europe. To direct the revolutionary movement on a world-wide basis, the Communist International (Comintern) was created in Moscow in March 1919. The Comintern enjoyed a short period of boom. It soon became clear, however, that the world was not yet ready for immediate revolution. The planners of World Revolution now turned their attention to China. As early as July 1918, speaking before the Fifth Congress of the Soviet, Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, outlined the content of Soviet Russia’s foreign policy toward China as follows: 1 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, op. cit, p. 11. 123

YEARS OF TRIAL AND PREPARATION We renounce the conquests of the Tsarist government in Manchuria and we restore the sovereign rights of China in this territory . . . We recall from China all military consular guards . . . We are ready to renounce all indemnities . . .

This was designed to kindle sympathy for Russia and to reawaken the deep-seated resentment against other im­ perialist Powers. The most dramatic gesture made by Moscow in regard to China was the famous Karakhan Manifesto of July 25, 1919, issued by the Council of the People’s Commissars. In a blanket address “to the Chinese Nation and the Governments of Southern and Northern China,” the Manifesto proclaimed that the Soviet Government abrogated “all secret treaties made before the revolution with China, Japan, or the Allies;” returned “to the Chinese people without any kind of compensation the Chinese Eastern Railway, and all mining, gold and forestry concessions which were seized from them by the government of Tsars . . renounced the Boxer Indemnity as well as “all territory obtained through aggressive means by the former Russian imperial government in China, Manchuria, and elsewhere . . . all special privileges formerly obtained by Russia in China . . . ” The Manifesto further stated: If the Chinese people as a result of our proposals wish to become a free people and escape the evil fate of becoming a second India and Korea as has been planned for them at the Paris Peace Conference, we fervently hope that the Chinese people will make common cause with the peasants, and the Red soldiers of the Soviet Union and fight for their freedom!

This Manifesto was not transmitted to the Peking Government until March 26, 1920. It was not the original Russian document but a French translation of it signed by one Yanson, a member of the Siberian and Far Eastern People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Though the Karakhan proposals looked extremely attractive, the Peking Government did nothing to bring about a rapprochement with Moscow. For one thing, the Allied Powers were against it, and Peking never moved without first securing Allied approval. For another, those who controlled 124

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the Peking Government questioned the sincerity of the Soviet Government, and there were also those who harbored the illusion that they could get what they wanted by unilateral action and that there was no necessity to reach an agreement with the Soviets. Nonetheless, as a propaganda move, the Karakhan Manifesto succeeded beyond all expectations. The intellec­ tuals in China leaped to welcome it, regarding it as marking the beginning of a new day in Sino-Russian relations. The impact of the Soviet gesture on the course of subsequent developments cannot be overestimated. In 1920 the Soviet position in the Far East had begun to show signs of improvement. The high tide of intervention had begun to recede. The Red Army, having transversed the Ural plateau, poured into Siberia. The counter-revolutionary forces had been routed. Admiral Kolchak had surrendered to the French and was later handed over to the Bolsheviks to be shot. In April the Soviet-sponsored buffer state of the Far Eastern Republic was established at Chita. It acted in the interests of Moscow. Slowly but surely Peking was moving away from its hostile attitude and preparing the ground for increased contact with its northern neighbor. It was in the light of this development that Leo Karakhan issued on December 27, 1920, a second manifesto, which, to all intents and purposes, was no different from the first, though it was more carefully worded than its propagandistic predecessor. The first Soviet official mission to China did not come from Moscow but from the Far Eastern Republic. Headed by M. Y. Yurin, the mission was in Manchuria in May 1920 where it was well received by local Chinese officials. Three months later Yurin arrived in Peking. Foreign diplomats in the Chinese capital were alarmed. The Peking Government, unwilling to incur the illwill of the Allies, was forced to resort to dilatory tactics in dealing with the Yurin mission. Formal talks were again and again put off on various technical grounds. When these were cleared up another obstacle arose to make negotiations difficult. Counter­ revolutionary activities carried on by the White Russians in Outer Mongolia afforded the Bolsheviks an excuse for military intervention. In June 1921 Soviet troops crossed the 125

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Soviet-Mongolian frontier and proceeded to set up what was called the “People’s Revolutionary Government” controlled by the so-called “People’s Revolutionary Party of Mongolia” — which was in fact organized by the Bolsheviks on Russian soil only in the previous year. All Yurin’s efforts to conclude a trade agreement with China in order to bolster the economic and political position of the Far Eastern Republic, as well as to orientate China toward Moscow, proved nugatory in the face of inexorable events. Yurin left Peking on August 1,1921. The failure of Yurin’s official mission did not prevent him from carrying on Communist propaganda. He succeeded in entering into contact with those Chinese youths who showed an interest in the Russian revolution. Some of them went with him to Russia. About the same time as the Yurin mission, there arrived in China a Comintern agent who, more than any other man, was responsible for launching the Communist movement in China. His name was Gregory Voitinsky (alias Zarkhin), a member of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau. He was then only 27 years old and had had only an elementary education. But he was an experienced organizer and had first gained insight into the Chinese situation when he was an underground worker at Vladivostok. Voitinsky arrived in Peking in June 1920. He was accompanied by a Chinese youth named Yang Ming-chai who served as his interpreter and liaison man. In Peking he met Li Ta-ch’ao, a graduate of Waseda University of Japan, who was then Professor of History and head librarian at Peking University. Li had come into contact with Marxism in 1919 and had organized a society for the study of the Marxist theory. Mao Tse-tung once served under him as a library assistant. Since Voitinsky was interested in organizational work, Li Ta-ch’ao referred him to Ch’en Tu-hsiu in Shanghai. Ch’en had been a colleague of Li’s at Peking University, where he had served as Dean of the College of Liberal Arts. While at the university he founded and edited a magazine, Hsin Ch’ing-nien (New Youth), the undisputed organ of the advanced intelligentsia of that time. He was converted to Communism a little later than Li Ta-ch’ao. He had left Peking 126

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after having had a brush with the law for distributing “seditious” handbills in the streets. In Shanghai Voitinsky installed himself on Rue Joffre in the French Concession. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, who had now begun to take more than a passing interest in the nascent labor movement, lived on the same street. It was not long before the two men met in secret conferences. Shanghai was at that time the center of all sorts of radical activities. Anarchists, professed socialists, and other intellec­ tuals and faddists congregated in the French Concession and International Settlement. Although they differed widely in political outlook, they had one thing in common: they were all dissatisfied with the status quo, and they all wanted to bring about some fundamental changes in Chinese society. This motley crowd of men soon came under Voitinsky’s influence. In August 1920 the “Shanghai Socialist Youth League” came into being. Soon afterwards similar organiza­ tions appeared in such cities as Peking, Canton, Changsha, and Wuchang. None of these organizations was Communist, but Voitinsky used them to meet all people who professed an interest in the Marxist-Leninist doctrines. It would be difficult to exaggerate the role Voitinsky played at this crucial period of Chinese history. Before his appearance on the Chinese scene, there were men who were interested in Communism or even men who regarded themselves as Communists, but there was no Communist movement. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-ch’ao and men of their like knew nothing of the Leninist quasi-military apparatus party; they had little understanding of the role they were expected to play in that apparatus; and their ideological education was far from complete. Left to themselves they would have become armchair Communists, given to some ineffective agitation but essentially incapable of practical action. It was Voitinsky who changed all this. It was Voitinsky who was the real founder of the Chinese Communist Party.

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The Founding of Chinese Communist Party Voitinsky’s mission was to form a “proletarian nucleus” which would in time develop into a full-blown Communist movement. For this work he had to rely on Ch’en Tu-hsiu in the South and Li Ta-ch’ao in the North. Ch’en became the provisional Party Secretary. His Hsin Ch'ing-nien (New Youth) became the Party organ. A foreign language school was started in Shanghai, with Yang Ming-chai, Voitinsky’s interpreter and liaison man, as principal. The foreign language school was in fact a Russian language school designed to train revolutionary workers. The more promising of the students were to be sent to the University of Toilers of the Far East in Moscow. In 1921, 60 students enrolled in the school. Among them was Liu Shao-ch’i, who was to become one of the leading figures in the Chinese Communist Party and who was finally to suffer ignominy and liquidation at the hands of Mao Tse-tung. In Peking Li Ta-ch’ao organized a Communist cell composed of eight university students. Among these were such men as Chang Kuo-t’ao, Teng Chung-hsia, Ho Meng-hsiung, and Lo Chang-lung, who were soon to play prominent roles in the Communist movement. They published Workers’ World (Lao-Tung Chieh) and organized a “Secretariat of the Labor Organization of China,” of which Chang Kuo-t’ao was in charge. They were active in the organization of the workers of the Peking-Hankow Railway. Early in 1921 Ch’en Tu-hsiu was invited by Ch’en Chiung-ming in Canton to be the Commissioner of Education in the Kwangtung Provincial Government. Ch’en accepted the invitation and carried the work of Communist propaganda to Southwestern China. A Communist cell soon came into being there. Ch’en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-ch’ao were in correspondence with “progressive elements” in other provincial centers. With their support and promotion, Communist cells began to be formed in Hunan, Hupei, and Shantung. Now with the work of integrating the various Communist cells into a national party could no longer be delayed. Voitinsky was particularly anxious to have members of the cells gather together and lay the foundation of a Communist 128

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Party before his departure for Russia. Accordingly, a meeting was scheduled to take place in the summer of 1921. In order to make the meeting a success, six prominent men were named to act as sponsors. They were Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-ch’ao, T’an P’ing-shan, Shao Li-tzu, Shen Hsuan-lu, and Tai Chi-t’ao. The first three were Communists while Shao, Shen and Tai were members of the Kuomintang. Tai was one of Dr. Sun’s closest collaborators. Shen had been President of the Chekiang Provincial Assembly, and was prominent in provincial politics. Shao was Dean of the College of Arts at Futan University in Shanghai and a journalist of note. The fact that members of the Kuomintang were called upon to sponsor the organization of the Communist Party, a party noted for its exclusiveness and intolerance, is sufficiently indicative of the tentative nature of the Communist group­ ings at the time. The meeting was duly held in July 1921 in the French Concession in Shanghai. None of the sponsors was present. Li Ta-ch’ao could not leave Peking. Ch’en Tu-hsiu was too much occupied with his work in Canton to come to Shanghai. Tai, Shen and Shao had consented to act as sponsors without Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s knowledge and had to withdraw. The thirteen young men who attended the meeting were supposed to represent various geographical areas: Li Ta represented Shanghai, Chang Kuo-t’ao represented Peking, Ch’en Kung-po represented Kwangtung, Tung Pi-wu and Ch’e/i T’an-chiu represented Wuhan, Mao Tse-tung and Ho Shu-hung represented Hunan, Chou Fu-hai represented Chinese students in Japan. With the exception of Tung Pi-wu, Mao Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-t’ao, most of them later died a tragic death. Ch’en Kung-po ended up as a Japanese puppet and was hanged as a traitor after World War II. A similar fate was met by Chou Fu-hai. Ho Shu-hung hanged himself in Fukien in 1925. Ch’en T ’an-chiu was killed in Sinkiang. The Comintern agent who assisted at the birth of the Chinese Communist Party was Maring, a Dutch Communist who had lately been sent by the Comintern to step up the Communist movement in China. The meeting was held at a girls’ middle school which was unoccupied on account of summer vacation. The organizers did not stay there long. The school was too public a place for 129

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so clandestine a gathering. After exchanging greetings and other preliminaries, they retired to the residence of Li Han-chun, a member of the Shanghai cell, to get down to business. There they debated and argued for four days. On the evening of the fourth day, a strange character suspected of being a detective of the French Concession police was seen in the neighborhood. Maring, who had had much experience with the police, suggested that they should disperse immediately. And disperse they did. Shortly afterwards three police officers of the French Concession appeared. By that time, however, most of the budding Communists had already left. The next day the fledgling Communists fled to Kiashing, a town on the Shanghai-Hanchow Railway, and, masquerad­ ing as holiday makers, they hired a boat and concluded their business on the waters of the South Lake. What did they discuss and decide? There is no record to go by. Fragmentary accounts seem to indicate that the topics discussed included the political situation in China, the tasks which the new party was to carry out, party constitution, and problems of organization. They adopted a six-point program. Point 5 dealt with the Party’s relations with other political parties. Here the party was enjoined to “maintain absolute independence.” Point 6 provided that the Party should report to the Comintern at least once a month and, if necessary, send a representative or representatives to the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau. Ch’en Tu-hsiu was elected General Secretary of the Party. Since he was still in Canton, Chou Fu-hai acted on his behalf. The 1921 meeting has been referred in Communist literature as the First National Party Congress. But the Party was a very small one, and its membership was less than fifty. Left to itself, it could do little to accomplish the tasks it had set for itself. However much they talked about independence, the Communists knew that they had to have allies. It was in this context that the idea of a Communist-Kuomintang alliance was bom.

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Maring and Dr. Sun Yat-sen At the end of 1921 Maring went to Kweilin, Kwangsi, where Dr. Sun was then busily engaged in preparing for the Northern Expedition. Maring, through the introduction of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, had an interview with Ch’en Chiung-ming. The two men did not seem to have hit it off well. Then, accompanied by Chang T’ai-lei Maring journeyed to Kweilin and reached there on December 23. He and the Chinese leader had two long conversations. Present also were Hu Han-min, Hsu Ch’ung-chih and other Kuomintang members. Maring proposed to Dr. Sun the following: (1) the Kuomintang must be reorganized in order to extend its influence over all strata of society, particularly the toiling masses of peasants and workers; (2) the Kuomintang should establish a military school in order to lay the foundation of a truly revolutionary army; and (3) the Kuomintang should collaborate with the newly formed Chinese Communist Party. Maring had much to say about the New Economic Policy which Lenin had just introduced in place of the system of War Communism. Dr. Sun was delighted to know the new policy established a mixed economy, in which large-scale industry remained state-owned, and private enterprise was allowed in small- and medium-sized industry and in trade. In a telegram to Liao Chung-k’ai, he said: When I heard that Russia was already being transformed into a Communist state I was surprised, because the economic conditions in Russia were not such as to allow the building of a Communist society. Maring has told me that the Soviet Government has encountered great difficulties in the attempt to put Communism into operation and has now adopted a new economic policy, a policy in essence no different from the industrial plan I have drawn up. I am quite heartened by this.

Dr. Sun, however, did not give a definitive reply to Maring’s proposals. He expressed his sympathy for the Russian revolution but doubted whether what was applicable in the Soviet Union was also applicable in China. In the course of their conversations Maring asked Dr. Sun: “Why do you spend your life in promoting revolution?” Dr. Sun’s answer was, “ Because I love mankind.” Maringwas 131

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perplexed by this answer, and he later said to Chang Chi that “to carry on a revolution in the name of mankind is to court defeat; a successful revolution must be based on class struggle.” Though his proposals were not accepted by Dr. Sun, Maring did not regard this as a rebuff. He continued to promote Communist-Kuomintang collaboration. In January 1922 the Comintern, in opposition to the Washington Conference, called a Congress of Toilers of the Far East in Moscow. The Chinese delegation to the Congress included both members of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Lenin discussed with the Communist delegate Chang Kuo-t’ao the question of CommunistKuomintang collaboration.

Kuomintang-Communist Alliance The idea of a Kuomintang-Communist alliance, promoted so assiduously by the leading group in the Kremlin, did not at first commend itself to the leadership of the CCP. Ch’en Tu-hsiu believed that the Party’s independence in the pursuit of what he considered its basic task should in no way be restricted. The CCP should identify itself, not with a bourgeois pplitical party like the Kuomintang, but with the proletariat. Though still young, immature and numerically weak, the CCP in 1922 was already a well disciplined party, full of youthful vigor and rosy dreams. Under its leadership the labor movement was making great headway. Though hardly out of its swaddling clothes, the CCP toddled about with confidence and looked into the future with unbounded hope. But the pressure from Moscow was too great to resist. On June 10, 1922, the CCP issued its First Manifesto on the Current Situation, in which it stated: Of all the political parties existing in China, only the Kuomintang can be characterized as a revolutionary party, 132

THE KUOMINTANG, SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS yet it possesses only a relative amount of democratic and revolutionary spirit. The program of this party has not yet been fully elaborated. But its three principles, ‘of the people, for the people, and by the people,’ in conjunction with plans for the industrial development of China, reflect the democratic spirit of the Kuomintang.

The Manifesto went on to say that “until such time as the Chinese proletariat is able to seize power in its own hands . . . the proletariat’s urgent task is to act jointly with the democratic party to establish a united front of democratic revolution . . In July the CCP, at the conclusion of its Second National Congress held in Shanghai, issued another Manifesto, declaring: At present and poor democratic of workers,

the CCP must, in the interests of the workers peasants, lead the workers to support the revolution and forge a democratic united front poor peasants, and petty bourgeoisie.

It added: However, the workers must not become an appendage of the petty bourgeoisie within the democratic united front, but must fight for their own class interests.

This so-called “democratic united front” was unaccept­ able to Dr. Sun. Dr. Sun, who regarded himself as the only leader of the Chinese revolution and his party — the Kuomintang — as the only vehicle capable of carrying that revolution to a successful conclusion, was not inclined to favor any kind of alliance that would place the Communist Party on a footing of equality with the Kuomintang. For him the Communist Party as such did not exist. If the young men who called themselves Communists wanted to play a part in the revolution, they must come to him, enroll under his banner, and submit to his leadership. Since Dr. Sun would not accept the CCP as a co-equal partner in a joint enterprise, Maring was forced to conclude v that the Communists must enter the Kuomintang as individuals and not as Communists. On the basis of his experience in Java, he probably believed that this kind of dual membership was not without advantage for the CCP. The Comintern accepted Maring’s formula for CCP-KMT 133

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collaboration. In August 1922 the CCP, at Maring’s behest, convened a Special Plenum of the Central Committee at Hangchow. The Kuomintang, said Maring, was not strictly speaking a conventional bourgeois party but “a coalition of all classes.” This being so, the Communists should have no hesitation in cooperating with it. The question was what form the cooperation was to take. Inasmuch as the Kuomintang was “a coalition,” individual members of the CCP could, without compromising class interests, also be members of the Kuomintang. The leader of the CCP, Ch’en Tu-hsiu, did not see eye to eye with Maring. Ch’en was supported by Li Ta-ch’ao, Kao Yu-han, Ts’ai Ho-shen and others. It was their contention that “our union with the Kuomintang would simply confuse our class structure and curb our independence.” Seeing that there was a strong current of adverse opinion, Maring invoked the authority of the Comintern. The Central Committee was forced to accept Maring’s proposal.

Joint Manifesto of Sun Yat-sen and A. A. Joffe Reference has been made to Adolf Joffe’s mission to China. Joffe was a diplomat of international repute. He had played an important role in the negotiations leading to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 1918 with Germany and had worked actively to precipitate an insurrection against the Imperial German Government to which he was accredited as ambassador under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. When he came to China, he was charged, in addition to negotiating for the establishment of relations with the Peking Government, with making formal contact with Dr. Sun. As soon as he arrived in Peking in August 1922 he sent an agent to Shanghai to see Dr. Sun, intimating that the Soviet Union was ready to help him in carrying on his revolutionary activities. Dr. Sun, who had just been driven out from Canton by Ch’en Chiung-ming, was anxious to get Soviet support to enable him t.n r-nmnlptc 134

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the work at which his whole life had aimed. Moscow had made vague promises to him more than once, but there had not been any definite commitment. Dr. Sun was confident that this time Joffe should have something definite to offer. And he was not disappointed. On January 17, 1922, Joffe arrived in Shanghai. He and Dr. Sun held a series of conferences and, on the 26th, a joint statement was issued. Of the four points contained in that document, only the first concerned itself with the question of entente between Moscow and the Kuomintang: Dr. Sun is of the opinion that, because of the non-existence of conditions favorable to their successful application in China, it is not possible to carry out either Communism or even the Soviet system in China. Joffe agrees entirely with this view; he is further of the opinion that China’s most important and most pressing problems are the completion of national unification and the attainment of full national independence. With regard to these great tasks, Joffe has assured Dr. Sun of the Russian people’s warmest sympathy for China, and of their willingness to lend support.

The traces of hard bargaining are plainly visible. Dr. Sun did not want Communism or Sovietism in China; he wanted only Soviet assistance. He exacted from Joffe the promise not to introduce Communism or Sovietism to China. Ironically enough this promise was made at a time when the CCP had already been in existence for two and a half years and was soon to allow its members to infiltrate the Kuomintang. Dr. Sun took the promise at face value because he felt that so long as the Communists entered the Kuomintang as individuals and accepted his program, there was little danger that Communism or Sovietism could flourish on Chinese soil. On the day following the issue of the joint statement, Joffe left for Japan. Dr. Sun asked Liao Chung-k’ai to accompany Joffe so that they could discuss the question of Moscow-Kuomintang entente in depth. Joffe stayed at the pleasure resort of Atami for a month. Liao asked Ch’en Kung-po, who was then in Japan, to go to Atami also so that they could all participate in the discussions. Joffe told Ch’en Kung-po that “the Soviet Union ordered the Chinese Communists to become members of the Kuomintang for no 135

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other purpose than to complete the national revolution in China.” He further elaborated this point by saying that “ only Dr. Sun’s Three Principles of the People are applicable in China. There can never be Communism in China.” When Ch’en asked him “When will the Soviet Union begin to practice Communism?” Joffe only shook his head. Ch’en asked again: “Will sixty years do?” Joffe replied, “Even that is questionable.” Then Liao Chung-k’ai laughed and said, “Kung-po, have you anything more to ask? It seems to me that we are revolutionists only in the present-day world, why should we be bothered about what might happen in a hundred years?” Liao was no longer in doubt about Soviet motives. He returned from Japan more than ever convinced of Soviet sincerity in helping the Kuomintang carry the national revolution to a successful conclusion. As far as the Chinese Communists were concerned, although they had accepted the Maring formula for CCP-KMT collaboration at the Special Plenum of the Central Committee, no decision was made in regard to its implementation. A few months later Moscow intervened. On January 12, 1923 the Executive Committee of the Comintern adopted a special resolution ordering the CCP to take immediate steps to effectuate the collaboration along the following lines: members of the Communist Party should enter the Kuomintang as individuals; the CCP itself must preserve its absolute political and organizational independ­ ence ; and the CCP should support the Kuomintang so long as the latter’s policies were “ objectively correct.” In other words, the Cominten strategy was to infiltrate and subvert the Kuomintang in order to take over its leadership of the national revolution. In June 1923 the CCP held its Third National Congress in Canton. On the basis of the Comintern’s special resolution, the Congress renewed discussion of the CCP-KMT coopera­ tion. In the Manifesto issued at the close of the Congress, the Kuomintang was recognized as “the central force of the national revolution.” The Manifesto, however, took the Kuomintang severely to task for its reliance on the imperialist Powers and its preoccupation with military unification of China at the expense of propaganda work among the people. 136

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The Advent of Borodin In the fall of 1923, M. M. Borodin arrived in Canton. He did not come by invitation of the Kuomintang but on the initiative of the Soviet Government. Because of the fact that the Soviet Government did not wish to make it known that Borodin was its official representative in Canton, Dr. Sun appointed him adviser to the Kuomintang. He served thus in a dual capacity. As Soviet representative, he had the free use of Russian diplomatic and consular services for the transmission of dispatches and confidential reports, had at his disposal the Rosta News Agency (predecessor of Tass), controlled both Comintern agents and the supposedly independent Soviet military mission, and was in a position to give or withhold Soviet aid and supplies to the Canton Government. As adviser to Dr. Sun and the Kuomintang, he sat at Kuomintang committee meetings, pulled the wires, manipulated the levers, and rigged the issues of Nationalist politics. The Chinese Communists were at his beck and call. Within a few months of his arrival he was in fact in supreme command in Canton. When Dr. Sun, in October 1923, appointed a nine-member committee to prepare for the proposed First National Congress of the Kuomintang, Borodin participated in the drafting of the party constitution. In his capacity as adviser, he tried to divide Kuomintang members into the “rightists” and “leftists”, thus splitting the party in two. It was he who later conspired against the Northern Expedition. In November 1923, on the eve of the Kuomintang’s First National Congress, Teng Tsai-yu charged that the draft constitution was the handiwork of Ch’en Tu-hsiu who intended to make use of the Kuomintang to enhance Communist objectives. Dr. Sun indignantly denied this. Borodin, and not Ch’en Tu-hsiu, he said, was the real author of the draft constitution. Borodin, he added, had done this at his request, and he had himself made a number of important changes in the original draft. Dr. Sun saw no danger of Communist subversion. After all, he was the master of the Kuomintang, and the Communists, once they were admitted, must take orders from him. “If Ch’en Tu-hsiu disobeys our party,” he asserted, “he will be expelled.” 137

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Dr. Sun’s confidence in his ability to control the Communists inside his party was based in part on his understanding of Soviet intentions and in part on his low opinion of the Chinese Communist Party. The Russians, he believed, wanted to ally themselves with the Kuomintang because it was the only political group in China capable of carrying out a program of anti-imperialism. With his life-long revolutionary experience and political acumen, he must have been aware that the united front could not be anything more than a temporary expedient and that as soon as the national phase of the revolution was completed, Soviet support might be shifted from the Kuomintang to the Communist Party in order to carry the revolution to a “higher stage” of development. But the national phase of the revolution could not be completed within a short span of time. The Communist Party was young and numerically unimportant. Its threat was more potential than real. Dr. Sun could not allow something in the dim, distant future to interfere with his present plans. If the Kuomintang, with Soviet support, could indeed complete the national revolution successfully, its influence and prestige could be so strengthened that it would have nothing to fear from the Communists. In any case, a number of Communists had already entered the Kuomintang in 1923. One of the very first to do so was Li Ta-ch’ao. He was admitted at the end of August 1922 on the recommendation of the stalwart Kuomintang member Chang Chi. He told Dr. Sun of Li’s Communist Party affiliation and inquired whether he could be a member of the Kuomintang at the same time. Dr. Sun answered in the affirmative. Lin Tsu-han had as early as 1906 joined Dr. Sun’s T’ung Meng Hui but had since 1921 been a member of the Communist Party. Through his recommendation not a few Communists joined the Kuomintang in 1923. Other Communists who climbed onto the Kuomintang bandwagon included T ’an P’ing-shan, Chang T’ai-lei and Mao Tse-tung. Members of the Chinese Communist Youth League in France, founded by a group of students who had gone to France on the so-called work-and-study plan, were admitted en masse to the Branch Party Headquarters in Paris in July 1923. This was a group of eighty talented youths, including 138

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such future notables as Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, Li Fu-ch’un and Ch’en Yi. Dual membership afforded the Communists the ad­ vantage of maneuverability and flexibility. When it suited their purpose to do so they operated through the regular channels provided for by the Kuomintang and its government. At other times they unfurled their own banners and acted independently. Secretly they enlarged their party membership. Promising young people were pressed into their own ranks, while leaving the less promising ones to the Kuomintang. On the eve of the Kuomintang’s First National Congress, the Communists were everywhere active in getting their members elected as delegates. Of the 165 participants in the First National Congress about one-tenth were Communist. Of these four were from Hunan, and one from each of the following provinces and municipalities: Chekiang, Chili (Hopei), Shantung, Kiangsu, Hupei, Canton and Peking. Five additional Communists were appointed as delegates by Dr. Sun. One of the Communists, Li Ta-ch’ao, was made a mem­ ber of the five-man Presidium. During the Congress Fang Jui-lin, Kiang Wen-fan and Huang Chi-lu, all loyal Kuomintang members, proposed that the constitution be amended to bar its members from joining other political parties. Thereupon, Li Ta-ch’ao, speaking on behalf of the Communists in the Kuomintang, submitted a memorandum to the Congress, in which he stated in part: We believe that China today is a semi-colony, or, as Dr. Sun has described it, a sub-colony. It will be impossible for China to remove the dual oppression imposed upon her by foreign imperialism and by the warlords who curry favor with the foreign Powers, unless we throw the strength of the entire nation into the National Revolution . . . Looking around the country, we find that the Kuomintang is the only revolutionary party which has prestige, principles and leadership. For this reason we have decided to join the Kuomintang . . . Dr. Sun had given us permission to retain our connection with the China branch of the Communist International. Consequently, our joining this party and at the same time keeping our membership in the Communist Party is an open and honorable action, not a surreptitious move . . . 139

YEARS OF TRIAL AND PREPARATION There are those who believe that by having us join the Kuomintang, the Kuomintang itself will be transformed into a Communist Party. This is a misunderstanding. When we join the Kuomintang, we shall carry out its program and abide by its constitution and by-law . . .

Wang Ching-wei welcomed Li Ta-ch’ao’s memorandum. He pointed out that in the party constitution there was a chapter on discipline. So long as this was the case, the question of dual membership was of no great importance. Wang Ching-wei’s statement did not prevent other loyal Kuomintang members from raising other objections to dual membership. At this junction there rose from his chair a delegate who shouted: “Mr. Chairman, Delegate No. 39 proposes that the debate be adjourned.” The delegate, medium in stature, wearing a blue long gown, with the outward appearance of a country bumpkin, speaking with a heavy Hunan accent, was no other than Mao Tse-tung. His motion was carried and the debate on the question of dual membership thus came to an end. In the reorganized Kuomintang the most important organ of the party is the Central Executive Committee, which directs the entire work of the party. In 1924 the committee had 24 members and 17 alternates. Three Communists were elected members (T’an P’ing-shan, Li Ta-ch’ao, and Yu Shu-teh) and seven Communists were elected alternate members (Shen T ’ing-yi, Lin Tsu-han, Mao Tse-tung, Yu Fang-chou, Chu Chiu-pai, Han Lin-fu and Chang Kuo-t’ao). Since alternate members participate in plenary sessions with the right of a consultative voice, their importance could not be underestimated. Thus, of the 41 regular and alternate members of the 1924 Central Committee, about one-fourth were Communists. They were thus in a position to influence the Central Committee’s decisions. Under the Central Executive Committee there was then a Secretariat and nine administrative departments. To them belonged the day-to-day management of party affairs. The Communists were particularly interested in the departments in charge of organization, workers and farmers. Their members preferred to be secretaries rather than heads of departments. They could thus hold the levers of power without attracting undue public attention. Chiang Kai-shek in 140

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Soviet Russia in China described how the Communists were able to maneuver themselves into positions of real power: The Kuomintang Central Executive Committee had then eight departments2. . . At that time, it was Dr. Sun’s intention to make Lin Tsu-han, a Communist, head of the Department of Farmers; Liao Chung-k’ai, a Kuomintang member, head of the Department of Organization; and to put other Kuomintang members of long standing in charge of other departments. Later in view of the importance of organizing Cantonese workers, it was felt that a Cantonese party member should be put in charge. Liao offered to serve as head of the Department of Workers instead. That was how Tan Ping-shan came to be the head of the Department of Organization. Tan, formerly a member of the Kuomintang, originally had been authorized by Liao to join the Chinese Communist Party at its inception in 1920. As soon as Tan took over the Department of Organization, he recommended one Yang Pao-an as secretary. Yang turned out to be a Marxist, purposely planted in the department to facilitate Communist infiltration. Meanwhile, Liao had to leave most of the affairs in the Department of Workers to his secretary Feng Chu-po, a Communist. Soon, labor unions in various places and the Central Labor Union in Canton came under Communist control. When Lin Tsu-han became the head of the Department of Farmers, he recommended one P’eng Pai, another Communist, as secretary. Before long, the Commu­ nists controlled all the farmers’ training classes and admitted as trainees only Communists or members of their front organizations. Similarly, they controlled the farmer’s union and ‘farmers’ volunteer corps’ in various places in Kwangtung.3

This phalanx of Communist secretaries had their hands on every wheel of the Kuomintang party machine. They were responsible for appointments to provincial party leaders. They were responsible for the mass movements. Any attempt to criticize them would at once be labelled as an act of disloyalty to the party. In the Department of Farmers, for example, P’eng Pai was in full control. He hired two o

Originally there were eight departments; another department was added later.

3Chiang Kai-shek: Soviet Russia in China, op. cit. pp. 23-24. 141

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additional secretaries, both of whom were Communists. When an anti-Communist, Huang Chu-su, was appointed head of the department, P’eng told him in no uncertain terms that he either took orders from him or got out. Huang was forced to get out. P’eng Pai, though comparatively unknown at that time, was one of the most gifted organizers of peasant unions. In August 1924 he established in the Department of Farmers a Peasant Institute with himself as director. The purpose of the institute was to train cadres for the peasant movement. He invited Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Li Li-san and other well-known Communists to be instructors. Subsequently he relinquished the directorship to Mao Tse-tung. P’eng Pai lives in Communist history as the man who formed the first peasant Soviet in China. In the Department of Workers Feng Chu-po had a free hand to organize trade unions and to lead strikes and to stir up class warfare.

Communist Activities at Whampoa Academy At the Whampoa Military Academy a number of Communists held key positions: Chou En-lai was deputy director of Political Department, Yeh Chien-ying was deputy director of Department of Instruction, and Hu Kung-mien was captain of the guard. The deputy director of the Training Department was Teng Yen-ta. He was not a Communist, but his pro-Communist sympathies were such that he could properly be classified as a crypto-Communist. At first members of Kuomintang and of the Communist Party worked together in harmony. Chiang Kai-shek recalled: When the academy was first established, the total number of officers and cadets did not exceed 500. In those days we worked together in a spirit of unity and harmony. There existed, it is true, considerable mutual suspicion between the Communists and non-Communists. But I always did what I 142

THE KUOMINTANG, SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS could to prevent any open struggle between the two ideological groups . . . 4

But not for long. The Communists soon stepped up their efforts to create dissension among the cadets in the military academy and eventually to seize control of the institution. On January 25, 1925, the Communists sponsored a Young Servicemen’s Club for dual party elements in both the academy and the armed units. They even spread the rumor that I, too, had joined the Communist organization. Cadets in the academy and officers and men in the armed forces who were loyal to the Three People’s Principles and to the Kuomintang, formed, under the leadership of Ch’en Ch’eng, an opposition body known as the Society for the Study of Sun Yat-senism.5

The two rival groups confronted each other with hostility and vied with each other in winning adherents.

Attempt at Impeachment The Communists never concealed the fact that they did everything in their power to maintain their independence, to organize the masses for their own purposes under the Kuomintang banner, and to control these masses within the Kuomintang framework. The August 25, 1923 and April 11, 1924 issues of the Bulletin of the Socialist Youth Corps contained resolutions adopted by the Corps which spelled out the Communist strategy and tactics in plain terms: Members of the Youth Corps must support the proposals put forth by the Communists and must speak and act like Communists. Although we have joined the Kuomintang, we must maintain our own organizational independence; we must endeavor to attract from among labor organizations as well as 4Chung-kao chun-chiao t'ung-hsueh shu (Since Words to Cadets of the Military Academy), April, 1926. 5Chiang Kai-shek, op. cit., p. 26. 143

YEARS OF TRIAL AND PREPARATION from the Kuomintang left class conscious and revolutionary elements in order to expand our organization, to tighten our discipline, and to strengthen the mass foundation of the CCP. We must prevent the Kuomintang from placing too much emphasis on military action . . . from making compromises in its dealings with reactionary forces. Inside the Kuomintang . . . we have won complete victory in our fight for key positions at higher levels. Henceforth we must, in so far as it does not affect the sphere of our activities, try to assume the attitude of patience and humility. We should devote our full energy to the basic work in the district and municipal party organizations. We must make a gesture of friendliness towards lower echelon Kuomintang members in order to win their goodwill. Unless it is absolutely necessary, don’t show hostility.

It was on the basis of the resolutions of the Socialist Youth Corps that such Kuomintang stalwarts as Chang Chi, Hsieh Ch’ih and Teng Tse-ju, members of the Central Supervisory Committee, submitted on June 18, 1924, to Dr. Sun and the Central Executive Committee a document entitled “ An Impeachment of the Communist Party.” They openly charged that the Communists were disloyal to the Kuomintang, that they used the Kuomintang to forward Communist objectives, and that they acted, not as individuals, but as a solid group, taking orders from the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In their opinion, the Central Executive Committee should make a thorough investigation of the matter. No action, however, was taken either by Dr. Sun or the Central Executive Committee. A few days later (June 25) Chang and Hsieh went to see Borodin and questioned him on a number of points in regard to Kuomintang-Communist collaboration. Here is a record of that interview: V is ito r s :

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144

(showing copies of the B u l l e t i n of the Socialist Youth Corps) Have you seen these? No, I have not. . . . from the viewpoint of organization, do you think it is right to have a party within a party? We refer, to the Communist Party and the Socialist Youth Corps existing inside the Kuomintang as a group.

THE KUOMINTANG, SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS B o r o d in :

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Factions and cliques are unavoidable. The Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang is not yet a real central organ; it is inevitable that factions and cliques should develop. There are the Rightists and the Leftists... The Communists are the Leftists. Do you think it is right for the Communists, having pledged their allegiance to the Kuomintang, to act as if they were an independent group? The Kuomintang as such is dead and buried. There is no such thing as the Kuomintang. New elements like the Communists, acting as a group, have called into being a new Kuomintang by instilling a spirit of emulation into the old comrades. In our view your method of reviving the Kuomintang is in fact calculated to send it speedily to its grave. There is not a surer way of killing a party than to have its factions fight against one another. Sure. It may have that effect. But I hope it is not so. I hope as a result of competition a real central force will emerge as the hard core of the party. (Chang Chi): I have always been in favor of the admission of Communists . . . but after listening to you, I have changed my opinion. It might be better for the two parties to go their separate ways. The Third International believes that the Kuomintang’s ideology is most suitable to the present stage of the Chinese revolution. No other ideology can take its place. For this reason the Communists and members o f the Socialist Youth Corps were ordered to join the Kuomintang. They cannot disregard the orders of the Third International. Are all members of the CCP and the Socialist Youth Corps now members of the Kuomintang? In principle all of them should. But I don’t really know, (after a pause) Even if there are Communists who are outside the Kuomintang, even if they call themselves by some other name, their ideology would still be the same as the Kuomintang’s. Why dissipate revolutionary energy that way. That would be bad for the future of the revolution. We do not mean that the Communists must get out of the Kuomintang. But we do mean that they must not function as a caucus. As matters now stand, the two parties make use of each 145

YEARS OF TRIAL AND PREPARATION

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other for mutual advantage . . . On balance the Kuomintang is the net gainer. . . . Since spring the Communists have done more harm than good. The CCP has a very short history; its influence in Chinese society is not great. For the Kuomintang’s sake . . . the Communists should be welcomed rather than expelled. The CCP is but a servant of the Third International. By itself it is not important. The Third International is a Soviet creature. It is the Soviet policy to have the Communists control the Kuomintang . . . Complete misunderstanding! We know a lot of people in the Kuomintang who oppose collaboration with Soviet Russia. . . . On the basis of this publication it is clear that in their plan for the future they consider Kuomintang as their opponent . . . From the point of view of the Kuomintang, we must consider the existence of a Communist caucus a problem of vital concern. No, no. All parties have factions and cliques. . . . Since all members of CCP are members of the Kuomintang for the purpose of realizing the revolutionary principles of the Kuomintang, why should they continue to use the Communist banner and retain their organizational independence? The central organization of the Kuomintang is still lax, and its orders are not obeyed by all party members . . . The Communists cannot be expected to give up their organization under such circumstances. (Pause) Of course the Kuomintang can always throw the Communists out if the majority of its members so desire. But I hope that this will never happen.

The interview confirmed the worst fears of the “old comrades.” Chang, Hsieh, and their group could do nothing to alter the course of events. Too many factors operated against them. But the developments that were unfolding in Canton did not bode well for the future of KuomintangCommunist relations.

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Suppression of the Merchant Volunteer Corps The reorganized Kuomintang encountered during the first year of operation a series of crises which threatened its very existence. One of the very first challenges to its authority came from the Merchant Volunteer Corps in Canton. For years the province of Kwangtung had continually been under the heels of troops from other provinces. The merchants had been mercilessly preyed upon by the mercenary hordes from Kwangsi and Yunnan. Understandably the merchants grew weary and impatient. They had the sympathy and support of the British colonial administrators in Hongkong, who had never been friendly toward the revolutionary regime in Canton and who were alarmed by the arrival of Borodin. As a preventive measure the British began to agitate among the dissenting Cantonese merchants for the overthrow of the Kuomintang government. Hongkong thus became the hub of counter-revolutionary activities. It was one thing to organize a Merchant Volunteer Corps for self-defense and quite another to raise an army to undermine the authority of the established government. And the latter was exactly what the merchants in Canton, with the support of the British in Hongkong, intended to do. The leader of the Canton Merchant Volunteer Corps was one Ch’en Lien-po who was said to be the chief compradore of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the leading British financial institution in the Far East. Ch’en had bought large quantities of arms from a German firm in Hongkong. The first consignment of 9,000 rifles had already been loaded in a Norwegian freighter destined for Canton. Dr. Sun had got wind of the shipment and had, on the night 147

YEARS OF TRIAL AND PREPARATION

of August 9,1924, instructed Chiang Kai-shek at Whampoa to seize the arms. Early in the morning of the 10th, the Norwegian ship was sighted. Chiang ordered the naval vessels to escort the freighter to Whampoa and unload the arms. In protest Ch’en Lien-po threatened to call a general strike. On the 14th a mass demonstration was staged, demanding the immediate release of the detained weapons. Dr. Sun explained to the demonstrators that it was illegal to smuggle arms; that since there were only about a thousand merchant volunteers, the purchase of so vast a quantity of arms was obviously uncalled for; and that if the merchant volunteers should resort to violence they would be dealt with by the government by all available means at its disposal. Dr. Sun tried to reach a compromise agreement with the merchants. He promised to return to them those arms which had been bought with funds contributed by individual merchants, but declared that those purchased by Ch’en Lien-po for the purpose of overturning the government had to be confiscated. In a letter to the merchants, dated August 19, he spoke of Ch’en’s conspiracy with northern militarists and imperialist Powers to install himself as the Tuchun of Kwangtung. He called upon the merchants to cooperate with the government and purge the volunteer organization of traitors and conspirators. But Ch’en Lien-po remained adamant in his opposition to the government. On August 23, the Merchant Volunteer Corps demanded the immediate release of all detained arms and the establishment of a general headquarters for the Corps. This was tantamount to the formation of a rival government in the city of Canton. When the government refused to accede to the demands, a general strike was declared. It seemed that at last Dr. Sun, after all the attempts of compromise, was forced to take action. At this juncture the British Consul-General issued a virtual ultimatum, threatening British naval intervention in case of an attack on the Merchant Volunteers. Dr. Sun protested, vainly, to the British Labor Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. He also appealed to the League of Nations but received no response. Preoccupied with preparations for a military expedition against the northern militarists whose two principal factions — the Chili and the Mukden cliques — 148

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were then locked in a life-and-death struggle, Sun was anxious to avoid precipitating an internal crisis. But the Merchant Volunteers took this as a sign of weakness. On October 9 another general strike was called. Canton was plunged into the depths of confusion and uncertainty. Dr. Sun even considered the idea of abandoning Canton and Whampoa and concentrating all material and military resources in Shaokuan in order to launch an all-out northward push. Chiang Kai-shek was against this. He believed that Canton and Whampoa were crucial to the revolution and should under no circumstances be abandoned. “ I know that Whampoa is exposed to imminent enemy attack,” he said, “but I am prepared to defend it to the death. I cannot let this important revolutionary base, this unpolluted strip of land, pass into enemy hands, thus depriving our party of its vital foothold.”1 The Government continued to seek a peaceful solution. As a result of negotiations, 5,000 rifles were released to the Merchant Volunteer Corps on October 10. October 10 was the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Republic. Cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy and other organizations celebrated the occasion by parading along the thoroughfares of Canton. When they reached the Bund they were fired on by the Merchant Volunteers. A battle ensued. On the next day the Merchant Volunteer Corps distributed handbills denouncing the government and vowed to wage war against the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek, with the Whampoa cadets and a few regular troops under his command, countered the threat by military action. On the night of the 14th the two sides joined battle. Early in the morning of the following day the Merchant Volunteers were surrounded and disarmed. Ch’en Lien-po fled to Hongkong. The British gunboats in the river did not intervene after all. This was the first time that the Whampoa cadets participated in actual military action. They acquitted themselves with flying colors.

1Chiang Kai-shek, Ke-ming Li-shih ti ch ’i-shih yu ke-ming tse-jen ti kuan-ch 'e (The Lesson of Revolutionary History and the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Responsibilities), March 1969.

YEARS OF TRIAL AND PREPARATION

Dr. Sun’s Journey to the North While the Merchant Volunteer incident was going on in Canton, the second war between the Chili and Mukden military factions in the North was already in process. On October 23, 1924, not long after the suppression of the Merchant Volunteer Corps, Feng Yu-hsiang in the North rebelled against his superior Wu Pei-fu and the Chili military faction collapsed. Ts’ao K’un, who had been elected to the Presidency through bribery and intimidation in October 1923, was deposed. Tuan Ch’i-jui was made Chief Executive of the so-called Provisional Executive Government. Tuan had no power base of his own. The real power in North China was in the hands of Chang Tso-lin, overlord of Manchuria, and Feng Yu-hsiang, popularly known as the “Christian General” who was then favorably disposed toward the Soviet Union. The Kuomintang had at that time a great potential power in the North, built almost entirely on young students and intellectuals. Dr. Sun was invited by Tuan Ch’i-jui, Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang to come to Peking in order to call a National Assembly and settle the problem of national unity once and for all. Dr. Sun accepted the invitation, contrary to the wishes of Borodin and the Communists who maintained that the immediate task of the Kuomintang was not to meddle in the affairs of North China but to consolidate its position in Kwangtung. After all, they continued, the changes in Peking simply reflected conflicts between rival factions of militarists and between Anglo-American and Japanese imperialists. But Dr. Sun’s mind had been made up. The achievement of national unity was dear to his heart, and he was not going to let any opportunity pass him by, even if the changes for success were not great. On November 13, 1924, he boarded the gunboat Yung-feng for the Whampoa Military Academy. Chiang Kai-shek, together with officers and cadets of the academy, welcomed him at the jetty. After having made a tour of the grounds and reviewed the cadets, Dr. Sun said: I know it is a risky business to go to Peking, and I am not sure whether I could ever come back . . . But I am already fifty-nine years old; even if I should die, I would die in peace. 150

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Chiang was astonished at Dr. Sun’s words. Dr. Sun continued: I say this because I am touched by what I see here . . . The spirit of discipline and dedication shown by the cadets assures me that it is they who will carry out my principles and complete the task of national revolution . . . Had I died two or three years ago, I would have died in vain. Now it is different. There are now people who will be able to carry on the work which I have not been able to finish. I can now die without regret.

The fact is Dr. Sun was in poor physical condition. He had been seriously ill for some time. Probably he knew he had not long to live, and it was this knowledge that had impelled him to make the arduous journey. He wanted to see China united before he took final leave of the world. Dr. Sun left Whampoa for Shanghai that very evening. He was accompanied by an entourage of twenty persons, including his wife and such close associates as Wang Ching-wei, Shao Yuan-ch’ung, Li Lieh-chun and others. He did not go to Peking by train from Shanghai but by boat via Japan. He arrived at Kobe on November 24 and stopped over for six days. On the 28th he was invited by five Japanese organizations to speak at a Girls High School. He spoke on Pan-Asianism. He pointed out that China and Japan were the two most important countries in Asia. Japan, he said, had since the Meiji restoration earned an enviable place for herself in the contemporary world. It should be remembered, however, that the basis of Asian culture is wang-tao (humanism) while the basis of Western culture is pa-tao (force). “We must now create a new Pan-Asian culture on the foundation of wang-tao, although for purposes of self-defense we must also learn science and technology from the West,” he said. Japan was in a unique position to make valuable contributions to the future of world culture. He hoped that Japan, instead of being the leading exponent of pa-tao in Asia, would use her influence to champion wang-tao of the East. This was what he meant by Pan-Asianism. In another speech, Dr. Sun appealed to Japan to help China achieve national unity and in the abolition of “unequal treaties.” 151

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The Unification of Kwangtung After Dr. Sun’s departure for the North, Ch’en Chiung-ming, taking advantage of the leader’s absence, launched another attack on Canton. In February 1925 the Kuomintang Government decided to mount a counter-attack against Ch’en. The Yunnan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung provincial forces were placed under the general command of the Yunnan general, Yang Hsi-min. They were to take the offensive against Ch’en’s forces. Two regiments of troops commanded by officers and cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy were eager to participate in the expedition, but they were not wanted by the Kwangsi and Yunnan armies. They were incorporated into the Kwangtung Army, which formed the main force of the right route. Chiang Kai-shek was concurrently Chief of Staff of the Kwangtung Army. The Whampoa regiments, while deficient in combat experience, were highly motivated; they knew what they were fighting for and proved themselves to be effective fighting units. They attacked the enemy’s strongholds and scored one victory after another. In the space of two months they occupied a series of strategic towns — Tamshui, Sheklung, Tungwan, Pingshan, Haifeng — and drove Ch’en’s forces out of Chaochow and Swatow. Ch’en Chiung-ming’s forces were far from annihilated, but they were no longer a threat to Canton. While the military operations had been going on, Dr. Sun died in Peking. Chiang heard the news of Dr. Sun’s death on March 21 when his troops had just captured the town of Hsingning and the First Eastern Expedition was approaching its end. On the 30th a memorial service was held and Chiang instructed the cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy to swear an oath of allegiance to the deceased leader in words which he had drafted: We, cadets of the Military Academy and members of the Kuomintang, do declare that we shall strive to carry out the late T s u n g - l i ’s will and continue to struggle for the realization of his wish in regard to the National Revolution until the end of our lives.

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While the Kwangtung Army and the Whampoa regiments under Chiang Kai-shek’s right route command were fighting in the East River area and scoring victories over Ch’en Chiung-ming’s forces, the central and left routes, composed mainly of Yunnan and Kwangsi troops, quartered in the suburbs of Canton, remained inactive. Their leaders were more interested in enriching themselves at the expense of the people of Kwangtung than fighting. Indeed, they had been in communication with Ch’en Chiung-ming. When the Whampoa regiments captured Hsingning, several confidential telegrams between the Yunnan general Yang Hsi-min and Ch’en Chiung-ming were uncovered. Also found were documents recording a secret trip made by the Kwangsi general Liu Chen-huan to Yunnan to persuade warlord T ’ang Chi-yao to send troops to attack Kwangtung. Further uncovered evidence showed that Yang Hsi-min, who had been appointed by the Kuomintang government commander-in-chief of the anti-Ch’en Chiung-ming forces, had made a secret journey to Hongkong to solicit British support in his struggle for the control of Kwangtung and had at the same time instigated the merchants in Canton to petition the Peking Executive Government to appoint him military governor of Kwangtung. On April 28 Chiang Kai-shek went to Swatow to meet with the commander-in-chief of the Kwangtung Army, Hsu Ch’ung-chih, and the Party Representative in the army, Liao Chung-k’ai, and they decided to take immediate action against the Yunnan and Kwangsi forces. On May 21 Chiang ordered his troops to return to Canton. In the first week of June they reached the vicinity of Sheklung. The Yunnan and Kwangsi forces were immobilized by a railway workers strike engineered by Liao Chung-k’ai. Within a few days the more than twenty thousand Yunnan and Kwangsi mercenaries were demoralized, scattered and disarmed. Their leaders, Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan, sought asylum in the British Concession of Shameen.

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The Formation of the National Government At the first National Congress of the Kuomintang held in Canton in January 1924, a decision was made to organize a National Government in place of the Military Government. The organization of the National Government was delayed because of the presence of Kwangsi and Yunnan mercenaries in Kwangtung, as well as the threat posed by Ch’en Chiung-ming. Therefore the military government structure and the title of Generalissimo were kept until Dr. Sun’s death. Shortly after his death, the title of Generalissimo was abolished in order to avoid its being taken by some ambitious militarists such as T’ang Chi-yao of Yunnan. On July 1, 1925 the National Government was formally inaugurated in Canton. Wang Ching-wei was elected Chairman of the State Council, Hsu Chung-chih Minister of War, Hu Han-min Minister of Foreign affairs, and Liao Chung-k’ai Minister of Finance. Two days later a Military Council was established to unify the military command. Wang Ching-wei was made Chairman of the Council and Chiang one of its eight members. Under the Council, all former designations and titles of military units were abolished; all armed forces, irrespective of their provincial origins, were to be simply called “the National Revolutionary Army” (Kuo-min ke-ming chun). Wang Ching-wei, as head of the National Government and the Military Council, was now the leader of the Kuomintang. Behind him was Borodin, who pulled the wires and manipulated the politics of the Canton regime. Meanwhile a tragic event of great significance occurred. Liao Chung-k’ai, one of Dr. Sun’s closest associates, the man who was mainly responsible for the Moscow-Canton entente, presently the leader of the Kuomintang Left, was assassinated on August 20, 1925. The tragedy took place near the headquarters of the Central Executive Committee. At the suggestion of Borodin, Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei and Hsu Chung-chih were named members of a triumvirate charged with the responsibility of apprehending the criminals. The assassination of Liao Chung-k’ai caused a great outcry against Hu Han-min as his brother Hu I-sheng was 154

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allegedly the instigator of the crime. Borodin believed that Hu Han-min himself was involved in the assassination and urged that Hu be disciplined by the party. Although the charge was completely unfounded, Hu was forced to leave Canton to take “a tour of inspection” in Russia. The fact is that Hu was too much of an anti-Communist to be tolerated in a city where the Communists were then at the height of their power. On August 26 the various military units in Kwangtung were regrouped into five army corps as follows: First Army Corps (Whampoa or Party Army) with Chiang Kai-shek as commander; Second Army Corps (Hunan troops) with T’an Yen-k’ai as commander; Third Army Corps (Yunnan troops) with Chu P’ei-teh as commander; Fourth Army Corps (Kwangtung troops) with Li Chi-shen as commander, and Fifth Army Corps (Kwangtung troops) with Li Fu-lin as commander. After reorganization of the armed forces, the National Government decided to launch a Second Eastern Expedition to clear the East River region of the remnants of Ch’en Chiung-ming’s forces, who, seeing that the authorities in Canton were preoccupied with a multitude of problems, had begun to stage a comeback. They had retaken such important towns as Meihsien and Chaochow. One of their columns had penetrated as far as Pingshan, only 150 kilometers from Canton. On September 28 Chiang Kai-shek was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Expeditionary Force. He had under his command the main forces of the newly organized First and Fourth Army Corps. Chou En-lai was appointed Party Representative to the First Division of the First Army Corps. Chiang’s first target was the ancient city of Waichow. A walled city surrounded on three sides by a moat and protected on another side by a hill, Waichow is the key to the East River region and has long been noted for its impregnability. It was defended by 3000 of Ch’en’s best troops. A contingent of Chiang’s army began to storm the city on October 13 and by the following day had succeeded 155

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in crossing the moat and climbing over the city wall. The city that had been captured only once in China’s history, and that was during the Sung Dynasty, fell to Chiang’s troops. After regrouping, Chiang’s forces pushed forward on a wide front to clear the East River region of enemy troops. On November 6, he reported his successes in a telegram to Canton: It is a month since I started out on this expeditoin. On account of the courage and determination of our officers and men, we have routed the enemy’s main force, capturing over 6000 rifles, seven field guns and more than 6000 prisoners... we have covered 600 l i of territory, and whenever we went, people from all directions came out in droves to see us and welcome us with food and drink. Today we are at Swatow and the welcome extended to us by the people is particularly warm and impressive . . . When I think of those who have sacrificed themselves on the field of battle, I cannot help being overwhelmed by grief.

Having thus unified the province of Kwangtung, Chiang Kai-shek was ready to carry out the next step in his revolutionary program —the unification of all China.

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The Impact of Dr. Sun’s Death Dr. Sun was already a very sick man when he left Canton for the North. When he reached Tientsin by boat from Kobe on December 4, 1924, he was physically exhausted, and the rigors of the northern winter were too much for him. He rested a few weeks in Tientsin before proceeding to Peking on the 31st. An enthusiastic crowd was on hand to give him a warm welcome. He was too weak to make a speech. Instead of speaking, he handed out a pamphlet outlining his views on national unification. His ailment was diagnosed as cancer of the liver; he had been suffering from that disease for at least three years. On March 12, 1925, the great revolutionary leader breathed his last. Dr. Sun’s death removed from the Chinese scene a figure who was the embodiment of the spirit and aspirations of modem China. He had given his life to the cause of national unity, independence and democracy. His alignment with Soviet Russia was dictated by patriotic motives. He died with the concern for the future of China on his lips. In death he was even a more potent force than when he was alive. The feuds and differences he had aroused in his lifetime were forgotten. There remained only the unblemished and revered memory of a personality whose name is synonymous with Chinese nationalism. Before leaving Canton he had appointed Hu Han-min Acting Generalissimo during his absence; entrusted Chiang Kai-shek with full authority to train a new party army; and made Liao Chung-k’ai the Chief Party Representative of all armed forces. Dr. Sun’s sudden death left the Kuomintang with no leader of sufficient prestige and authority to command the 157

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wholehearted support of all members. The Communists saw in this their greatest opportunity to wrest from the Kuomintang the leadership of the revolution. Under the direction of Borodin, the Communists now sought to create dissension and conflict in the ranks of the Kuomintang. They classified Kuomintang members into three categories: the Leftists, the middle of the roaders, and the Rightists. Their strategy consisted of three stages: First stage:

To overthrow the Rightists by allying with the Leftists and the middle of the roaders. Second stage: To isolate the “New Rightists” from among the Leftists. Third stage: After the overthrow of the “New Right­ ists,” to isolate and attack the middle of the roaders. Even before Dr. Sun’s death, Borodin had already begun to consider the question of succession. According to Hu Han-min, Borodin believed that Dr. Sun’s successor had to be a man of high prestige but had to be at the same time one who had no clear-cut and firm ideological beliefs. He must be vain, egocentric and fond of power. Borodin narrowed his choice down to three persons: Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei and Tai Chi-t’ao. After careful consideration, he eliminated Hu as being “hard to work with,” and Tai as being “difficult to control.” The only suitable man was Wang Ching-wei because he was “ambitious enough to be susceptible to skillful manipulation.” Wang was flattered when Borodin told him that he was most qualified to serve as the “future leader of the Kuomintang.” Dr. Sun had before his departure for Peking, as indicated, made Hu Acting Generalissimo of the Military Government. To be denigrated as a Rightist and therefore something of a counter-revolutionary, was to lose all chances for leadership. Thus, when the Military Government was reorganized into the National Government on July 1, 1925, Wang Ching-wei, and not Hu Han-min, was elected Chairman. Wang, moreover, was made Chairman of the Military Council of which Chiang Kai-shek was a member. Wang was not, of course, the sole leader either of the 158

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party or of the government. The system was one of collective leadership, of which Wang was merely primus inter pares. The Communists believed that collective leadership under the circumstances then prevailing in the Kuomintang would inevitably lead to struggle and dissension.

The May 30th Incident in Shanghai

The May 30th Incident resulted from the death of a Chinese worker at a Japanese-owned cotton mill in the International Settlement of Shanghai. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki concluded between China and Japan in 1895 as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan was given the privilege of establishing factories in the coastal cities of China. In May 1925 there were twenty-two Japanese cotton mills in Shanghai, which comprised about two-thirds of the total number of cotton mills in the city. The wages were low, the hours were long, and the working conditions were deplorable. A few months previously the body of a child worker had been found in the storage room of a Japanese mill. A Japanese foreman had been accused of having beaten the child to death. The indignation aroused by the brutal act was tremendous. Workers of all Japanese-owned mills, numbering well over thirty thousand, struck. The feeling of indignation and outrage among the Chinese population, and especially among the students, reached a climax on May 30th when students from Chinese schools and colleges organized a procession of protest and, despite warnings from Concession authorities, persisted in carrying out their plan. They paraded along Nanking Road (the Fifth Avenue of Shanghai) and its vicinity, carrying banners of protest, while their leaders made speeches to the huge crowds which in the natural course of events had assembled to see what was going on. A detachment of Sikh police was sent to the scene. A 159

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number of students were arrested, some of whom were in the midst of speech-making. A large crowd of students followed the police and the prisoners to the Police Station and demanded the release of the arrested. They were locked up. A few minutes later another crowd of students had assembled in the streets. A student carrying anti-Japanese banners was arrested, and the usual crowd followed to the Police Station. They, too, were locked up. In the meantime enormous crowds were gathering on Nanking Road. Once more some demonstrators were arrested. Once again a large crowd came to the Police Station and asked to be locked up. The police, seeing that the quarters were becoming crammed, decided that the time had come for a change of tactics. Accordingly orders were given to chase the mob out of the compound. At this juncture the mob spirit began to assert itself and several British police constables were manhandled. A British officer, one Inspector Emerson, gave orders to shoot. Eleven students were killed and more than twenty wounded. This shooting has come to be known as the May 30 Massacre. The tragedy touched off a nationwide anti-imperialist movement. A general strike was called. A strike was also called against British and Japanese shipping. The wave of labor agitation soon swept the whole country. The May Thirtieth movement was planned and set in motion by a group of people led by the Communists. But it would be a mistake to believe that the students, the workers, as well as the merchants who took part in the movement were puppets manipulated by a handful of Communist malefactors. It was the expression of long pent-up resentment and antagonism against a century of foreign arrogance and domination. Most foreigners in China, however, were slow to appreciate this. By their high-handed and altogether uncalled for display of force they walked right into the Communist trap. The shootings, intended as a measure to maintain at all cost British authority and prestige in a semicolonial country, were more than the Communists had bargained for, giving point and cogency to the contention that the imperialists were in China to enslave the Chinese people and would not hesitate to use brutal force to perpetuate their ill-gotten spoils of conquest. 160

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The Shameen Massacre in Canton The anti-British campaign soon spread to South China. On June 23 thousands of workers, peasants and students gathered in Canton to commemorate the Shanghai tragedy. Among them were also 800 cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy. They paraded in the streets and shouted slogans. As they were passing the Shakee Road Bridge they were fired upon by British and French machine gunners on the Shameen side of the creek.1 Sixty workers and peasants and twenty-two cadets and soldiers were killed, and over 500 were wounded. Protests were lodged by Chinese authorities with the British and French consulates in Canton, but no satisfactory replies were received. The National Government severed economic relations with Britain and a general strike against Hongkong was immediately declared. The strike was under the direction of the committee composed mainly of radical elements. The purpose was to paralyze the British colony completely. At the behest of the organizers a hundred thousand workers took the unprecedented step of evacuating Hongkong. They moved en masse to Canton. The population of Hongkong was reduced by 40 per cent and business was at a standstill. The strike did not come to an end until October 10, 1926. Hongkong suffered heavily. Chiang Kai-shek, in commemorating the anniversary of the general strike in June 1926, said: Last year today the imperialists murdered more than a hundred of our people. The workers in Hongkong declared a general strike from the effects of which the economy of that British colony has not yet recovered . . . we must endeavor to make the strike a complete success, to force the British into submission, and to work for the abolition of the unequal treaties which the imperialists have imposed upon China . . .

The strike exerted a powerful influence for radicalism. To the Communists this meant that “proletarian hegemony” in the Chinese revolution would soon be a reality. To carry the revolution to a higher stage of development the Communists* JThe British and the French believed that they had been fired on first; to this day the question of who did fire first remains unanswered. 161

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needed more trained personnel than they had at their command at that time. In November 1925 the Sun Yat-sen University was founded in Moscow. Under the directorship of Karl Radek, who was assisted by Pavel Mif, this institution became the training center of future Chinese Communist leaders.

The Western Hill Conference The Communist campaign against the Rightists increased in intensity as their influence grew. Anyone who did not see eye to eye with them was labelled a Rightist, and a Rightist was synonymous with a counter-revolutionary. In revolu­ tionary Canton so much odium was attached to such a label that to be so designated was to suffer the infamy of an outcast. This name-calling device was used with such devastating effect that in a short time all opposition was silenced. Many veteran members of the Kuomintang were forced to leave Canton. Even then the tumult of animosity followed in their wake, and upon them was turned the full blast of Communist fury. Some old members —among them were some of the most highly placed politicians — for fear that they should bring upon their heads the organized fury of the Communist Party, sought refuge in dissimulation and bided their time. Two prominent “ Rightists” — Lin Sen and Tsou Lu — remained in Canton. Both were members of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee (Kuomin­ tang counterpart of the Soviet Politburo), the highest policy-making organ of the Kuomintang. Tsou Lu, moreover, was President of Kwangtung University, which was a hotbed of anti-Communist activities. Such men were thorns in the Communist flesh and could not be allowed to remain in Canton. At the suggestion of Borodin, they were sent to North China allegedly in the interest of the revolution. Lin and Tsou were well aware that they were being banished on account of their politics. They were, however 162

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glad enough to get away from a city where they were not wanted. As soon as they left Canton they were replaced on the Standing Committee by two Communists — Lin Tsu-han and T’an P’ing-shan. Thus, of the five members of the Standing Committee three were Communists (Lin Tsu-han, T’an P’ing-shan and Yu Shu-teh) and two (Wang Ching-wei and Ting Wei-fen) were old-time Kuomintang members. Since T’ing and Yu were in Peking, and since Wang Ching-wei was always at the beck and call of Borodin, it was Borodin and the Communists who really controlled the Kuomintang. When Lin and Tsou reached Shanghai, they at once got in touch with such Kuomintang stalwarts as Tai Chi-t’ao, Hsieh Ch’ih, Shao Yuan-ch’ung, Yeh Ch’u-ts’ang and others, and declared to call a Fourth Plenum of the Central Executive Committee in Peking. On November 23, 1925, they held a conference in a Buddhist temple at the Western Hills outside Peking where the remains of Dr. Sun Yat-sen were temporarily deposited. Inasmuch as the Central Executive Committee in Canton was in their view under complete Communist domination and no longer free to act in the best interests of the Party, they elected a new Central Executive Committee to take its place. By a series of resolutions, they “expelled” the Communists from the Kuomintang; “re­ lieved” Borodin of his duties as the party’s adviser; “suspended” Wang Ching-wei’s party membership for a period of six months; and “removed” the headquarters of the party from Canton to Shanghai. Wang Ching-wei was charged with having committed such serious offenses against the party as: he allowed Borodin to dominate over the affairs of both the party and the government; he banished Hu Han-min from Canton at the behest of Borodin; he promoted Mao Tse-tung to be head of the propaganda department even though Mao had spent 14 of his 18-month service at the Kuomintang headquarters in Hunan to propagate Com­ munism. Chiang Kai-shek had no more love for the Communists than those old comrades who held the Western Hills Conference. He had made this clear even before the Kuomintang’s First National Congress at which the Communists were formally admitted. Chiang, however, did not allow his private feelings to affect public policy. He kept 163

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his misgivings to himself and to a few of his intimate friends. It was his party’s policy to enter into alliance with the Soviet Union and admit the Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang, and it was his duty to carry out what was expected of him to make this policy a success. He therefore called upon the Chinese leaders of the Western Hills Conference to ponder the consequences of their actions. To split the party was to play into the hands of the Communists. It is obvious that at this point in time Chiang, as a genuine revolutionary and faithful disciple of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, hoped that the Communists within the Kuomintang would cooperate with all members of the Party to bring the national revolution to a successful conclusion. He also hoped that the Communists on their part would not be too impatient in trying to wrest the leadership of the revolution from the Kuomintang. But the Communists were carried away by their successes in the mass movement. They failed to realize that, in spite of the sound and fury of the mass movement, Chinese workers and peasants were not yet in fact politically conscious, and there was a limit to the sacrifices they were prepared to make for the revolution.

The Second National Congress of the Kuomintang The Western Hills Conference was the first open revolt against the Kuomintang-Communist collaboration. But it was an ineffective revolt. The “old comrades” who led the revolt had little influence among the rank and file. They possessed neither political nor military power. They had no mass following. In the eyes of the Communists they were mere renegades and must be deal with as such.The Second National Congress of the Kuomintang was called to deal with the situation. It was the Communists who stage-managed the whole business. The Credentials Committee appointed to verify the credentials of the delegates was dominated by the Communists. Members of the committee were Teng Tse-ju, Lin Sen, Lin Tsu-han, Mao Tse-tung and T’an P’ing-shan. The 164

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first two were old-time Kuomintang members while the last three were Communists. Teng, who refused to associate with the Communists, did not always attend the meetings of the Credentials Committee. Lin Sen, a leader of the Western Hills Group, was not in Canton. The three working members of the Committee were all Communists. It is not surprising that of the 256 delegates to the Second National Congress, 90, or more than one-third, were Communists. The Congress opened in Canton January 1, 1926. Wang Ching-wei headed the seven-man Presidium, of which T’an P’ing-shan was also a member. Wu Yu-chang, a Communist, was the Secretary-General. T’an P’ing-shan, Mao Tse-tung, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Lin Tsu-han, and seven other Communists formed a secret Communist caucus which met daily to discuss ways and means to control the proceedings of the Congress. Although the Communists constituted only a third of the delegates, their actual influence far exceeded their numerical strength. They were indeed a party within a party. The main thrust of Communist maneuvers was the expulsion of the leaders of the Western Hills Conference from Kuomintang membership. Chiang Kai-shek, who participated in the meetings of the Congress as a delegate from Chekiang, was opposed to the Communist move. At a dinner given by him on January 10 in honor of the delegates, Chiang said that the Kuomintang was a legacy handed down by Dr. Sun, and members of the Congress should refrain from doing anything contrary to the wishes of the late Tsung-li (Dr. Sun). “ If we must, as some delegates would like to have us do, expel the old comrades in order to enable a few to tighten their control of the party, to monopolize the party’s activities, then we must bear the responsibility for having sabotaged the national revolution. Let us not sow the seeds of dissension at the Kuomintang’s Second National Congress.”1 On January 11 Chiang discussed the question of party unity with Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun, who had just returned from Shanghai. They agreed that discussion in relation to the 1Chiang Kai-shek: Chung-kuo Kuomintang ti-szu-tz’u tsuan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui pao-kao-tz’u (Report to the Fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang of China), November 1931. 165

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Western Hills Conference should be postponed until the next National Congress. But the Secretary-General of the Congress, Wu Yu-chang, and other Communists insisted that the question should be formally inscribed on the agenda. On January 13 debate on the question started. On the 16th the Congress resolved: (1) that Hsieh Ch’ih and Tsou Lu be permanently expelled from the Kuomintang; (2) that Lin Sen, Chu Cheng, Shih Ying, Shao Yuan-ch’ung and eight other members be reprimanded for deviations and must be required to file with the Central Executive Committee written recantations within two months, and that failure to do so would subject them to expulsion; and (3) that Tai Chi-t’ao should be directed by the Congress to mend his erring ways or else he would be subject to party discipline. Thus, the strategy of wresting leadership of the national revolution from the Kuomintang through infiltration was used with devastating effect at the Second National Congress, at which the Communist influence within the Kuomintang reached its high watermark. On the same day that the resolution on the Western Hills Conference was adopted, the Congress elected a new Central Executive Committee and a new Central Supervisory Committee. The Central Executive Committee was enlarged to include 36 regular members and 24 alternate members. Eight Communists were elected to the Central Executive Committee and six were elected alternate members.1 Of the 12 regular members of the Central Supervisory Committee one was a Communist.12 Another Communist was elected alternate member.3 On the nine-man Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, three were Communists (Lin Tsu-han, T’an P’ing-shan and Yang P’ao-an). Most of the Kuomintang members of the Standing Committee were Leftists and habitually toed the Communist line. Hu Han-min was an anti-Communist member, but he was exiled to Russia. Other 1Lin Tsu-han, LiTa-ch’ao, Yu Shu-teh, Wu Yu-chang, Yang P’ao-an, Yun Tai-ying, T ’an P’ing-shan, and Chu Chi-hsun. The alternate members were Mao Tse-tung, Hsu Su-huen, Hsia Hsi, Han Lin-fu, Tung Yung-wei, Teng Ying-chao (Mrs. Chou En-lai). 2 Kao Yu-han 3Kiang Hao. 166

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anti-Communist members were T’an Yen-k’ai and Chiang Kai-shek. This was the first time that Chiang was elected a member of both the Central Executive Committee and the Standing Committee. Communist influence was even greater than what met the eye. A number of them held key positions in the party apparatus. As we have already noted, T’an P’ing-shan headed the party’s Organization Department while Lin Tsu-han headed the Peasant Department. Mao Tse-tung was at first Wang Ching-wei’s secretary at the Propaganda Department. Since Wang was too busy with other affairs, he left the management of the Department to Mao Tse-tung, who was later promoted to be head of the department. However, Mao failed to distinguish himself there. After spending a few months in his native province of Hunan, he developed an inordinate interest in the peasant movement. It was on the peasant movement that he now concentrated his major attention. The result of the Second National Congress represented a great victory for the Communists. They had reached the threshold of a period of development commonly referred to in Chinese Communist literature as “the Great Revolution”. They had begun to believe that the bourgeois-national revolution could be condensed, under the titanic blows of the mass movement, into a brief span of a few years and then pass immediately to the proletarian-socialist stage. They now called for the intensification of the class struggle. The Kuomintang was still useful as an instrument at the present stage of development. But like all instruments, it could be discarded once it had outlived its usefulness. In their aggressiveness they moved inexorably toward a head-on collision with loyal members of the Kuomintang.

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Part III THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION

C H A P T E R TH IR TE E N

COMMUNIST OPPOSITION TO NORTHERN EXPEDITION

Chiang and the Northern Expedition When Chiang accepted his appointment as Commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy, he formed in his mind a definite program of action. First, he was going to train, in the shortest possible time, a corps of young officers recruited from all parts of China and dedicated to the revolution. Second, he would build up a new army on the foundation of the trained personnel. Third, he would lead a military expedition to Central and North China to liquidate warlordism. While others wrangled over questions of high policy, he kept his nose to the grindstone. Amidst a group of men frustrated by conflicting aspirations and divided desires, Chiang stood out all of a piece. He was determined to bring his program step by step to fruition. For Chiang, the unification of all China under the Kuomintang was more than a matter of personal ambition; it was a sacred trust. In his lifetime, Dr. Sun had more than once tried to overthrow the militarists who had carved China into private spheres of influence and ruled in a manner reminiscent of the feudal lords of medieval Europe. Dr. Sun never succeeded in translating his dreams into reality. It was his wish that his successors would complete the work he left undone. Now that the revolutionary base in Kwangtung had been stabilized, Chiang believed it his duty to fulfill his master’s wishes. But the Communists were opposed to this. Their ostensible reason was that the whole project was a military adventure for which the Nationalists were not ready. The real reason was something else again. The Communist hold on 171

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Kwangtung was still insecure. They felt that the program of social revolution must first of all be completed. Premature dispersion of resources and personnel would be inimical to the Communist cause. They therefore did all they could to prevent the launching of the Northern Expedition. Inasmuch as Chiang was the prime mover of that military project, the Communists did not hesitate to start an anti-Chiang campaign. The first time Chiang raised publicly the question of Northern Expedition was on January 4, 1926, when he was honored at a dinner by members of the State Council. On that occasion he said: . . . I have carefully studied the situation in China in relation to the future of our party, and I am convinced that the Kuomintang is capable of unifying China, and I believe it can do so within the current year . . . The disintegration of the enemy forces has been going on at an accelerated pace. If our party could redouble its efforts to overthrow the warlords, the warlords would be overthrown . . .

He broached the subject again in his military report to the Second National Congress on the 6th of January. This time he was even more explicit and concrete: It is now within the capability of the National Government to mobilize a force of eighty-five thousand men, equipped with 60,000 rifles. The soldiers are being paid regularly and their standard of life has been improved. We have 6000 cadets who have already graduated from the Military Academy . . . Our Government has the power to extend its influence to other provinces . . . In the past two years the achievement of the National Revolutionary Army has not been negligible. Its victory has been the victory of Dr. Sun’s Three Principles of the People. We have the support of the people . . . The National Revolutionary Army is the people’s army, the people’s armed force.

Chiang’s advocacy of the Northern Expedition met with no open disapproval from Wang Ching-wei. Most of the delegates to the National Congress seemed to be in general agreement with his assessment of the situation. Nor did Borodin voice any objection. Shortly after the Second National Congress, Borodin, on 172

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instructions from Moscow, left Canton for home. Kissanka,1 head of the Soviet military advisory mission, began to question the feasibility of Chiang’s military plan. He repeatedly asserted that to launch an expedition against the northern militarists at this time was to court disaster and defeat. Chiang’s attempts to convince him of the feasibility of the campaign were met with sarcasm and ridicule. What was even more galling to Chiang was Wang Ching-wei’s change of attitude. Wang had now joined the opposition. To show his disappointment, Chiang announced on February 8 that he would not assume the post of Inspector-General of the National Revolutionary Forces to which he had just been appointed. On the following day he tendered his resignation as a member of the National Military Council and as the Commander of the Canton Garrison. Wang Ching-wei neither accepted his resignation nor asked him to stay. On February 27 Chiang told Wang that either he be allowed to resign or Kissanka must go. On March 8 he paid another visit to Wang. He spoke at length about the danger of letting the Russians dictate what the Kuomintang should do. He added that the Third International should not be permitted to infringe upon the independence and sovereign rights of the National Government. In a letter to Wang, he said: Since the Second National Congress, we have ceased to play an active role in party affairs, in policy-making, as well as in military matters. I am quite pessimistic about all this. If in the military sphere we can no longer play an active role, then the future of the revolution is doomed. I therefore make bold to suggest to you that you take immediate steps to remind the Russians that to limit the initiative of China is to distort the purpose behind the late T s u n g - l i ' s policy of alignment with the Soviet Union and to subvert the Soviet promise of helping China achieve national independence . . .

Chiang’s conversatons with Wang were strictly confiden­ tial, but it was not long before Kissanka knew all about them. Chiang was thus convinced that Wang was hand in glove with the Russians and the Communists, and there was no way to * Kissanka was actually N.V. Kuibshev who was to become Vice Chairman of the People’s Commissars and concurrently Commissar of Economic Affairs in the summer of 1926. 173

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make him understand the nature of the Communist intrigues.2 Kissanka did not stop at verbal opposition. He instigated some officers of the army to revolt against Chiang. He told Wang Mou-kung, commander of the Second Division of Chiang’s army, that Moscow would give him financial and other assistance to enable him to become commander of an army corps if he would oppose the Northern Expedition. The conspiracy was discovered, and Wang Mou-kung was arrested and dismissed from his command. Attacks on Chiang Kai-shek now appeared in Communist publications. Chiang was being referred to, either openly or in a veiled tone, as another “warlord.” Kao Yu-han, a prominent intellectual of the Communist Party and chief political instructor at the Military Academy, likened Chiang to the northern military leader Tuan Ch’i-jui. “ In our organization,” he was reportedly to have said, “there is a Tuan Ch’i-jui, and in order to overthrow the northern Tuan Ch’i-jui we must first overthrow the Tuan Ch’i-jui in our midst.”3 Chiang’s sensitive pride was stung by such invidious comparison. During this period, Chiang suffered from insomnia and profound depression. He thought of going abroad. Wang Ching-wei hinted that it was best for him to leave Canton. After careful consideration, however, Chiang decided to remain in Canton and fight it out.

The Chungshan Gunboat Incident This is an event so fantastic, so complicated as to be beyond belief . . . Had I not been a central figure in this strange affair I would not have believed it myself.4 2Chiang Kai-shek: Soviet Russia in China, op. cit., p. 28. 3Chiang cited this in his speech about the Chungshan Gunboat Incident, delivered on April 29, 1926, at Whampoa Military Academy. 4Chiang Kai-shek: Chiang-shu Chungshan-lan Li Chih-lung shih-chien hsiang-hsi ching-kuo (Detailed Account of Li Chih-lung and the Ghungshan Gunboat Affair), April 1926. 174

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So said Chiang about the Chungshan Gunboat Incident which took place on March 18-19, 1926. On March 18 Chiang reaffirmed his determination to carry out the campaign against the northern militarists at a meeting of the Whampoa Military Academy. He left for Canton soon afterwards. That evening the gunboat Chungshan, the largest naval craft of the Canton regime, sailed from Canton into Whampoa harbor. Being told that Chiang had already left for Canton, Li Chih-lung, acting chief of the naval bureau and a well-known Communist, telephoned Chiang to ask whether he wanted the vessel back in Canton. According to Chiang’s own account: Whereupon, I asked him by whose order was it moved down to Whampoa in the first place. He could not answer. On the evening of March 19, the ship returned to Canton. Throughout the night its engines were kept running and all lights on board were on. Moreover, security precautions of the most stringent nature were taken on the ship. All I suspected at that time was that the Communists were about to stage a revolt. I had no idea of the extent of their evil designs. Only later did I learn that it had been their intention to seize me and then send me to Russia.5

Chiang’s Reaction to the Affair On the evening of March 19 Chiang declared Canton under martial law. In the early hours of March 20, troops were on the move. The Communist-dominated “CantonHongkong Strike Committee” was surrounded and its armed pickets were disarmed. Party Representatives in the armed forces who were Communists were rounded up and arrested, and Chou En-lai, Party Representative in Chiang’s First Army Corps, was among the detained. Troops also surrounded the residences of the Russian advisers. But they were soon withdrawn. It was all due to 5Chiang Kai-shek: Soviet Russia in China, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 175

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“misunderstanding,” the Russians were told. In fact, the Russians were believed to be directly involved in the Chungshan gunboat affair. Stepanoff, adviser to the First Army Corps, admitted that the Soviet military advisory mission had something to do with ordering the naval vessel back to Canton. At first there was panic and confusion. But the storm subsided as quickly as it had come. Most of the detained Communists, with the exception of Li Chih-lung and a handful of others, were soon released. A few days after the incident, a representative of the Soviet Consulate in Canton came to see Chiang. He asked whether Chiang’s move was directed against certain individuals in the Soviet military advisory mission or against the Soviet Union. Chiang replied that it was directed against certain individual members of the mission rather than against the Soviet Union. The consular representative was satisfied with Chiang’s reply. He assured Chiang that the undesirable members of the advisory mission would be sent back to Russia. Soviet advisers in Canton favored the continuance of the Moscow-Canton entente. At a meeting held soon after March 20, they discussed at length the implications of Chiang’s move. The Russians, they concluded, were to a large extent responsible for the unfortunate incident. They were ignorant of Chinese traditions and sensibilities, and had thus brought about unnecessary frictions and conflicts. The Chinese Communists, in the Russian view, had violated the tactical principle of infiltration and boring from within; they had devoted too much effort to expanding their own mass movement and attracted altogether too much attention by their open bid for power. In this, they believed, the Russians were as much at fault as their Chinese comrades; they should have done more in the way of direction and coordination. On March 24 Kissanka and those associated with him left Canton for Russia. On April 14, the National Government revoked the contract of more than ten Soviet advisers, thus greatly reducing Soviet influence in Canton. It was not Chiang’s intention to break off relations with the Soviet Union or to put an end to the United Front. What he had set to accomplish was to curb Communist influence 176

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both in the army and in the government and recapture the leadership of the revolution. His position was not that of an anti-Russian or anti-Communist, but that of a man who had studied Communist organization and technique in the Soviet Union and had worked with the Communists for over two years. He believed that his action would not materially affect Moscow-Canton relations. That he was correct in his assessment was vindicated by subsequent developments. Chiang’s move was carried out without the authorization of Wang Ching-wei who, by virtue of his position as Chief of State, as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee and as Chairman of the National Military Council, was Chiang’s immediate superior. Wang was cut to the quick. He felt it humiliating to be brushed aside by a man who, until the Second National Congress, was not even a member of the Central Executive Committee. On March 23 he quietly moved to a village near Canton allegedly for reasons of health. In a letter to Chang Ching-chiang, a veteran Kuomintang member and a close friend of Chiang’s, he said that he was through with politics because he had incurred the suspicion and displeasure of Chiang. In May he left for France. As far as Chiang was concerned, he readily admitted that his action was an abuse of power. He was willing, he said, to receive any punishment the Military Council might see fit to mete out. On the other hand, he pleaded that the matter was of such urgency and secrecy that it was not possible to go through the routine procedure of securing proper authorization.

The Aftermath The Chungshan Gunboat incident took place during Borodin’s absence. As soon as he heard of what had happened, he hurried back to Canton, arriving there on April 29. He was definitely committed to a policy of conciliation which represented a temporary retreat on the part of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. The idea was to 177

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postpone the final struggle as far to the future as possible. He conferred with Chiang almost daily, for long hours at a time, and their conversations centered on the Northern Expedition and the future of Kuomintang and Communist relations. The two men seemed to be on the friendliest of terms. On the basis of these conversations, Chiang submitted on May 15 a special resolution for “the readjustment of party affairs” to the second Plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. The resolution contained the following eight points:6 1. The Communist Party should order its members to modify their utterances and attitude toward the Kuomintang and in particular, to stop casting doubts or criticizing T s u n g - l i (Dr. Sun) and the Three People’s Principles. 2. The Communist Party should hand over to the Chairman of the Kuomintang’s Central Executive Committee for safekeeping a complete list of its members in the Kuomintang. 3. No one with dual Kuomintang-Communist membership would be eligible for appointment as head of departments at the Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang. 4. No member of the Kuomintang is to call any party caucus in the name of the Kuomintang without specific authorization of the party. 5. Communists within the Kuomintang are not to form other organizations or engage in any activities without orders from the highest authorities of the party. 6. Instructions and directives on strategy from the Communist Party and the Third International to Communists within the Kuomintang should first of all be submitted to a joint Kuomintang-Communist conference. 7. Without first obtaining permission to quit the party, no Kuomintang member could acquire membership in other political parties. Those who have left the Kuomintang and joined the Communist Party would not be readmitted to the party. 8. Party members violating the foregoing stipulations would be deprived of their membership and be subject 6Chiang Kai-shek: Soviet Russia in China, op. cit., pp. 29-30. 178

COMMUNIST OPPOSITION TO NORTHERN EXPEDITION to penalties commensurate with the seriousness of their offense.

After submitting the special resolution to the Second Plenum, Chiang had this to say: In my conversations with Borodin in regard to these proposals, his attitude toward me was friendly and conciliatory, and at several points he made reasonable concessions to meet my views. Meanwhile, in accordance with Dr. Sun’s teachings, I refused to appease or compromise with the Communists just because of our alignment with Russia.

The Kuomintang-Communist struggle in China formed part of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky in the Soviet Union. Trotsky had demanded the liberation of the Chinese Communists from the strait jacket of the Kuomintang. He had warned that the Communists would have to preserve their own independence, preserve their own leadership, and prevent the national revolution from being derailed. He therefore advocated the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang. Stalin, on the other hand, had painted a glowing picture of the conditions in Canton. He did his best to minimize the effect of the March events. It would be bad politics, he reasoned, to take a serious view of the Chungshan affair at a time when he was at death-grips with Trotsky. It is not surprising that Borodin was “friendly” and “conciliatory” and did not hesitate to make “reasonable concessions” to meet Chiang’s views. Some Chinese Communists regarded the eight-point readjustment as representing complete capitulation on the part of Borodin. But they could do nothing to change the situation. Accordingly, T ’an P’ing-shan relinquished his post as head of the organization department and Mao Tse-tung as head of the propaganda department. The relations between the CCP and the Kuomintang slipped to a new footing.

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Developments in the North With the Chinese Communists in temporary retreat and with the Soviet Union promising support, Chiang Kai-shek was now ready to set out to reclaim China from the northern warlords and thus complete the task which his late patron and leader, Dr. Sun, had twice sought to accomplish but failed. At this time the situation in the North had undergone radical changes. Tuan Ch’i-jui’s Executive Government, supported by Chang Tso-lin’s Mukden Army and Feng Yu-hsiang’s Northwestern Army, declined in influence. Four groups of militarists dominated the northern scene: Chang Tso-lin and his Manchurian troops, Feng Yu-hsiang and his personal Nationalist troops, the new Chihli clique led by Sun Ch’uan-fang and the old Chihli clique led by Wu P’ei-fu. Of the four, Chang Tso-lin, with Manchuria under his control, was the strongest. The four military blocs vied with one another for supremacy. They constantly struggled not merely to enlarge their territorial domains but also to establish themselves in a position of dominance over the fiction of a central government. For either or both of these purposes, they made and unmade alliances and counter-alliances. And what is more, each of the northern militarists had his foreign supporters. Chang Tso-lin was supported by Japan, Wu P’ei-fu by Britain, and Feng Yu-hsiang by the Soviet Union. A few days prior to the Chungshan gunboat incident in Canton there took place in the North what was known as the Taku incident. Taku is a harbor near Tientsin. Feng 180

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Yu-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin were engaged in a bitter struggle. Taku harbor was mined by Feng’s troops. Chang’s naval craft hired Japanese gunboats to guide it through the mine field. An exchange of fire ensued between Feng’s troops and the Japanese. Japan and other foreign powers sent an ultimatum to the Executive Government demanding immediate cessation of all military activities in the Peking-Tientsin area. Tuan Ch’i-jui was forced to submit to the demand, although he had little power to enforce his orders. The students in Peking, who were overwhelmingly sympathetic to the Kuomintang, with which Feng was then allied, denounced Tuan’s submission to foreign pressure as an act of national humiliation. On March 18, 1926, they staged a mass demonstration against the Executive Government at the Tien An Men Square. Tuan’s guards fired into the crowd killing forty-seven students and wounding over 200. This has come to be known as the “March Eighteenth Massacre.” The tragedy provoked a nationwide protest. “Down with the Warlords!” “Down with Imperialism!” became the universal cry of the students all over China. Meanwhile, Feng’s troops were routed by the Mukden and Chihli allies. He tendered his resignation and declaring that he planned to go abroad as soon as his resignation was accepted, relinquished the command of his troops to his subordinates. He subsequently went to Russia while his troops retreated to the Northwestern regions of China. The confusion and disarray prevailing among the northern militarists provided a most favorable opportunity for Chiang to launch his military expedition.

The Launching of the Expedition Chiang emerged from the Chungshan gunboat crisis with increased moral prestige. His undogmatic logic and courage of conviction enabled him to defy the party’s prevailing mood, and his extraordinary power of persuasion enabled him in the 181

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end to sway the mind of the party. On April 16 he was made Chairman of the National Military Council. On June 4 he called an extraordinary meeting of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang and urged that the Northern Expedition be delayed no longer. On June 5 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary forces. On July 1, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Military Council, he issued orders for mobilization. On July 4 the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in a manifesto called upon all Chinese people to support the Northern Expedition. On the 9th Chiang formally assumed command of the expeditionary forces and proclaimed that (1) he would wage a vigorous and uncompromising war against foreign imperialists and their lackeys in China; (2) he would call upon all military commanders in China to participate in the revolution and to fight against foreign enemies in order to work for the early realization of Dr. Sun’s Three Principles of the People; and (3) he would endeavor to promote harmony between the people and the troops so as to transform the National Revolutionary Army into a truly people’s army. The expeditionary forces comprised seven army corps with a total strength of about 100,000 men. Their commanders were Ho Ying-chin (First Army), T ’an Yen-k’ai (Second Army), Chu P’ei-teh (Third Army), Li Chi-shen (Fourth Army), Li Fu-lin (Fifth Army), Ch’eng Ch’ien (Sixth Army), and Li Tsung-jen (Seventh Army). The First Army Corps was staffed by graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy, and the Fourth Army Corps was part of the old Kwangtung Army. However, most of the troops were from different provinces, commanded by incompetent military men who had thrown in their lot with the revolutionary cause. The troops were poorly equipped, carrying discarded weapons of every conceivable description and manufacture. Only about half of the troops could actually be deployed into the ranks of the expedition. In addition to the seven army corps, there was a small squadron of naval craft and an “air force” which boasted of three antiquated planes. On the side of the Northern warlords, their combined strength was overwhelmingly greater. Wu P’ei-fu and his 182

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allies had under their command about 250,000 men deployed in Honan, Hunan, Szechuan, Kweichow, and other provinces; Sun Ch’uan-fang had 200,000 troops in Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Fukien and Kiangsi; and Chang Tso-lin had in Manchuria, Chihli (Hopei) and Shantung over 350,000 men. The Northern troops were also much better equipped. The Northern militarists, however, had little understand­ ing of the nature of Chiang’s National Revolutionary Army. They were at loggerheads with one another. They quarreled among themselves for influence and territorial expansion. They tended to have a low opinion of the southerners as fighters. Their antagonisms prevented them from forming a coordinated plan to counter enemy attack. They thus enabled Chiang’s forces to carry out the strategic plan of striking them down one by one. Before they realized what was happening, the invaders were already at their throats. Chiang’s first target was Hunan province, whose military governor, Chao Heng-t’i, was allied with Wu P’ei-fu. Long before the expedition started, Chiang had reached an understanding with one of Chao’s generals, T ’ang Sheng-chih, who was to join the Nationalists and cooperate with the invaders from within. No sooner had T ’ang jumped on the Nationalist bandwagon than he was appointed commander of the Eighth Army Corps of the National Revolutionary Army and field commander of the expeditionary forces. On July 11 Changsha, capital of Hunan province, fell into Nationalist hands. Chiang arrived at that ancient city a few weeks later. The invading forces met little resistance. On August 22 they captured Yochow, a strategic port on the Yangtze. The entire province of Hunan was now under Nationalist control. The invaders now converged on the three great industrial and commercial cities at the confluence of the Han and Yangtze Rivers — Hankow, Hanyang and Wuchang — collectively known as Wuhan, the birthplace of the Chinese Republic and soon to be renowned as the revolutionary center of China. When the expeditionary forces reached T’ing Szu Chiao, a railway station about eighty kilometers south of Wuchang, they met with stiff resistance. T ’ing Szu Chiao is protected on the east by a high cliff and on the west, north and south by water, which is spanned by a railway bridge. Wu P’ei-fu had ordered his troops to take a determined stand against the 183

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invaders and planned to personally direct the operations. But before Wu arrived at the front T ’ing Szu Chiao had already fallen into the hands of the attackers. Wu moved two of his crack divisions to the front and ordered the dreaded Big Sword Squad to execute on the spot anyone who fell back. As a result, T ’ing Szu Chiao was re-taken by Wu’s troops on the evening of August 27. But before the Northern troops had time to reorganize themselves, Chiang ordered a counter-attack. The strategic bridgehead was recaptured on the morning of August 28. It was not long before Wu’s troops counter-attacked and recaptured T ’ing Szu Chiao from the Nationalist hands. The Fourth Army of the expeditionary forces bore the brunt of the fighting and suffered heavy losses. Chiang ordered the First Army Corps, the general reserve, to proceed to the assistance of the Fourth Army. Bitter fighting ensued. On August 29 the valour of the Revolutionary Army prevailed and T’ing Szu Chiao was recaptured for the last time. On September 1, Wu’s men, after having failed to hold the line, fell back and made hasty plans to defend Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow. The fighting in Wuchang was a sanguinary one. Under cover of darkness troops of the Revolutionary Army made three assaults upon the city, but they were repulsed by heavy guns and machine guns fired from the city wall. Meanwhile the two other Wuhan cities — Hanyang and Hankow —fell to the Nationalists. Wuchang was isolated and surrounded on all sides. Yet its defenders held out behind the great city walls for nearly a month before it was finally taken by the Revolutionary Army on October 10, which was the 15th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Republic. Wu P’ei-fu with remnants of his once powerful army retreated to Honan. The flag of the Kuomintang was firmly established over the heart of the fertile Yangtze Valley.

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The Campaign Against Sun Ch’uan-fang At the start of the Northern Expedition it was Chiang’s strategic plan “to attack Wu P’ei-fu, to maintain a friendly attitude towards Sun Ch’uan-fang, and to leave Chang Tso-lin temporarily alone.” Accordingly, on August 20 he sent a telegram to Sun from Changsha complimenting Sun for “the maintenance of order and stability in the five provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Fukien” and inquiring whether Sun would not, in view of the rising of the revolutionary tide, join the forces of the revolution. Should Sun decide to do so, Chiang assured him that he, Chiang, would recommend to the National Government that Sun be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces within the five provinces under his control. Sun rejected Chiang’s offer with contempt. He was determined to fight it out. On August 31 he ordered Lu Hsiang-ting, field commander of his army, to defend Kiangsi against the advancing Revolutionary Army. On September 6, before Lu had had time to deploy his troops according to an elaborate plan, the invaders attacked. On September 19 Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi, was captured. Lu Hsiang-ting, with his headquarters at Kiukiang, sent reinforcements along the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway to counter-attack and recaptured the city on September 21. On the next day the Sixth Army corps of Chiang’s forces, reinforced by a fresh division, again gained possession of Nanchang. But unable to hold on to it, the Sixth Army Corps was soon once again forced to withdraw from the city. By this time the battle of Wuhan was drawing to an end, and on October 2 Chiang Kai-shek arrived at Kaoan, sixty kilometers southwest of Nanchang, to take personal charge of the operations. He brought from the rear the Fourth Army Corps and part of the First Army Corps to join in the fight. Nanchang finally fell to the Nationalists on November 7, 1926. The battle of Nanchang was one of the decisive engagements of the whole Northern campaign. Six division and brigade commanders of Sun’s forces were captured, and the cream of his army was annihilated. Sun himself fled to 185

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Nanking. Thus, Kiangsi, along with Hunan and Hupei, passed under Kuomintang control. With the elimination of Sun Ch’uan-fang as a major obstacle to national unification, there remained only the forces of Chang Tso-lin in North China. Sun Ch’uan-fang appealed to Chang for help. On December 1, Chang proclaimed himself Commander-in-Chief of the An Kuo Chun (National Pacification Army) and appointed Sun Ch’uan-fang and Chang Tsung-ch’ang, military governor of Shantung, Deputy-Commanders-in-Chief. Chang’s military plan was to have Wu P’ei-fu, who, after the loss of Wuhan, had established his headquarters in Chengchow, Honan, advance along the Peking-Hankow Railway towards Hupei, while Sun Ch’uanfang was to advance from Chekiang to Fukien. The Mukden troops under Chang Hsueh-liang were to assist Wu P’ei-fu in the Hupei campaign, while Chang Tsung-ch’ang’s Shantung troops were to render help to Sun Ch’uan-fang. Meanwhile, the National Revolutionary Army under Ho Ying-chin occupied Foochow, capital of Fukien, and Sun Ch’uan-fang’s commander in Fukien, Chou Ying-jen, fled to Chekiang.

The Nanking Incident On January 6, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek reorganized the expeditionary forces into three routes: The Eastern Route Army under the command of Ho Ying-chin was to attack Hangchow and Shanghai from Fukien; the Central Route Army, commanded by Chiang himself, was to attack Nanking; and the Western Route Army under the command of T’ang Sheng-chih was to join forces with Feng Yu-hsiang, who had just returned from the Soviet Union to resume the command of his troops in Northwestern China, to attack Honan. The Eastern Route Army occupied Hangchow on February 17 and next day advanced on Kiahsing, less than 186

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fifty miles from Shanghai. On March 21, a portion of the Revolutionary Army coming down the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway arrived in Nantao (one of the Chinese sections of Shanghai). The Central Route Army moved down both banks of the Yangtze towards Nanking. On March 23 the Sixth and Second Army Corps under the overall command of Cheng Ch’ien reached the outskirts of the town. The troops entered the ancient city early the next day. At about 9 o ’clock a band of soldiers wearing uniforms of the Revolutionary Army entered the premises of the British Consulate and began looting, ransacking, and shooting. The American and Japanese Consulates were also ransacked and pillaged. As a result of the outrage, two Britishers, one American missionary, one French missionary and one Italian missionary were killed. The British consul was wounded. British and American gunboats anchored in the Yangtze shelled the city, in an attempt to protect British and Americans who had sought refuge in the compound of the Socony Co., killing 24 soldiers and 15 civilians, and wounding 7 soldiers and 9 civilians. It may be worth noting that although there were Japanese gunboats in the river, they did not, contrary to their customary aggressive attitude toward China, participate in the shelling. This was the result of the policy of Sino-Japanese cooperation inaugurated by Baron Shidehara, the then Foreign Minister of Japan. The Japanese militarists denounced Shidehara’s “weak-kneed” policy as destructive of Japanese prestige in the Far East and demanded that the army should be given political leadership. It was not long before Japan embarked on a “positive” policy of aggression. Chiang Kai-shek learned of what had been happening in Nanking when he was aboard a Chinese gunboat in the Yangtze. He stopped briefly at the Nanking wharf and instructed Cheng Ch’ien to do all he could to protect the life and property of foreign residents in the city. He further instructed Cheng to find out who were the perpetrators of the outrage. At the same time he ordered Ho Ying-chin, Lu Ti-ping and Cheng Ch’ien to be jointly responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Nanking. He then hastened to Shanghai. 187

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When Chiang arrived at Shanghai he found foreign language newspapers carrying exaggerated versions of the Nanking incident. It was reported that the British Consul-General in Nanking was murdered and that several hundred foreigners lost their lives. The foreign communities in Shanghai were in a state of great nervousness and agitation. It was rumored that the International Settlement would be attacked. This was given credence due to seizure of the British Concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang a few months before. On March 31 Chiang called a press conference, which was attended by foreign correspondents of various countries as well as by Chinese newsmen. He assumed full responsibility for what had happened in Nanking. He had, he said, ordered an investigation to be made and severe punishment would be meted out to any Nationalist troops guilty of the outrages. At the same time he protested against the wanton shelling of Nanking by foreign gunboats. The gunboat policy was frequently used by imperialist Powers in the 19th century to intimidate the Chinese people. The China of today, he reminded the British and American correspond­ ents, was not the China of the 19th century and the use of gunboats would do more harm than good. He continued: It is not necessary for foreign Powers to send troops or gunboats to cities or towns to be taken over by the National Revolutionary Army because we will assume full responsi­ bility for the protection of the life and property of foreign residents . . . It is true that we intend to abolish the unequal treaties and recover all foreign concessions. But we shall do this, not through force or mob action, but through accepted diplomatic channels . . . The objective of the National Revolution, as clearly stated in Dr. Sun’s Last Will and Testament, is to struggle for international equality for China.

The effect of Chiang’s statement was instantaneous and favorable. His sincerity was at once recognized. But the question remains: Who were in fact responsible for the lawless acts perpetrated against the foreign residents in Nanking? Cheng Ch’ien, who had been instructed by Chiang to inquire into the matter, attributed the whole affair to a plot hatched by “counter-revolutionaries” to smear the good 188

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name of the National Revolutionary Army. On the other hand there were those who believed that it was part of a Communist conspiracy to “embarrass” Chiang and to embroil him with the foreign Powers. Evidence seems to show that the latter explanation is nearer to the truth. Among the documents seized by Chang Tso-lin’s gendarmes in the Soviet Embassy in Peking on the morning of April 6,1927, there was one which is of special significance in this connection. This document contains a decision of the Executive Committee of the Communist International at its seventh enlarged plenary session to be carried out by the Soviet Military Attache in China. The original text of the document was in Russian and more than half of it was destroyed by fire. The Soviet Government sought to cast doubt on its authenticity, but judging by internal evidence and the nature of Soviet policy of that time, there is no reason to believe that the document was not genuine. Paragraph 5 of the document states: It is necessary to take all measures to arouse the masses of the people against the foreigners . . . To bring on internal interference by foreign Powers, do not hesitate to use any measures, including even robbery and beatings. In case of clashes with European troop detachments make broad use of these incidents for agitation.

Paragraph 7 states: In directing this movement against Europeans it is extremely important to preserve the existing antagonism between the individual foreign powers. It is particularly important to isolate Japan as a country that might land large military forces in China very swiftly. For these purposes during any demonstrations it is necessary to be careful to see to it that none of the victims are Japanese residents. However, in conducting agitation against foreigners, to set Japan apart might create an unfavorable impression. Therefore it is necessary to conduct agitation against foreigners in the form of an anti-British movement.

The scenario fits into the Nanking picture perfectly. In Nanking the British suffered the greatest number of casualties. The Japanese, on the other hand, suffered the least. As realists, the Communists knew that it was not a good policy to attack all enemies at the same time. The best approach was to single out the most important enemy and hit 189

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him hard. For this reason the British were selected as the main targets. There is reason to believe that the Communists Lin Tsu-han1 and Li Fu-ch’un played an important role in the Nanking affair. Lin was at the head of the political department of the Sixth Army Corps while Li served in the same capacity in the Second Army Corps. They were responsible for the political indoctrination of the troops. Those who attacked and looted foreign residents in Nanking were not “reactionaries” or “counterrevolutionaries” bent on besmirching the reputation of the National Revolutionary Army, but Communist elements within units of the Second and Sixth Army Corps. From the Communist point of view, even the shelling of Nanking was welcome; it would have the effect of intensifying the revolutionary ardor of the Chinese masses and creating a situation favorable for Communist seizure of the Revolutionary leadership.*

^Xin Tsu-han was at the time of the Nanking Incident in Wuhan to attend a meeting of the Central Political Committee. Together with Borodin, he proposed that Cheng Ch’ien be appointed Chairman of the Kiangsu Political Council in order to enable Cheng to control Southeastern China. 190

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Communist Tactics of Divide and Rule The Communists and their Soviet mentors, as we know, had been opposed to the Northern Expedition. When they realized that Chiang was not to be easily deflected from the course of action on which he had set his mind, they tried to make the best of a bad situation. In a resolution adopted at the 2nd Enlarged Plenum of the CCP Central Executive Committee held on July 12-18, 1926, it was decided that “positive efforts” should be made to “develop the KMT leftwing” and the “leftist mass organizations outside the party,” and “to operate with the leftists in waging a more practical and more frequent struggle against the rightists, to expose their crime of seeking compromise and selling out the country and people.” In the political report of the Central Committee there was a section on “Chasms within the Kuomintang,” which classified Kuomintang members into four categories: The chasms within the Kuomintang mirrored the four categories of social forces: The reactionary rightists (Teng Tse-ju, Ma Su, Sun Fo, Ku Ying-feng, etc.) represent the first category ( v i z . warlords, compradores, bureaucrats, old and new gentries); the Communists represent the second category ( v i z . workers, peasants and students); the leftists (Wang Ching-wei, Kan Nai-kuang, etc.) represent the third category (medium and small merchants); the new rightists (or centrists like Tai Chi-t’ao and Chiang Kai-shek) represent the fourth category (reformist elements within the bourgeoisie). Therefore our policy toward Kuomintang should be consistent with our policy toward social forces in the nation. That is, we should unite with the leftists and compel the centrists to attack the reactionary rightists. At the same time, 191

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION we should prevent the centrists from growing and compel them to shift from right toward left. If we can properly use our united front tactics, the victory of the national revolution will be certain.

In order to strengthen the influence of the leftists, the Communists set in motion a campaign calling for Wang Ching-wei’s immediate return. The campaign was so effective that at a joint meeting of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang on October 15, 1926, it was decided that Wang Ching-wei should be formally requested to return to China to resume the leadership of the Kuomintang. In this connection it may be remembered that after Wang Ching-wei’s departure for Europe in the wake of the March 20 affair, Chiang Kai-shek was made acting head of both the party and the government. When Chiang left Canton for the battlefront, he deputized T ’an Yen-k’ai as Chairman of the State Council and Chang Ching-kiang, a fellow provincial and trusted friend, as Chairman of the Central, Executive Committee. T’an, Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army Corps, was a scholar and politician of the old school. He was too generous and magnanimous a man to resist pressures put on him by the Communists. Chang Ching-kiang, in whom Chiang had the greatest confidence, was distrusted by the Communists and the Kuomintang left, who suspected him of being one of the stage managers of the March 20 coup. Borodin now gathered around him a new leftist group, the leading spirit of which was Hsu Ch’ien, who had lately returned from Moscow in the company of Feng Yu-hsiang. He regarded himself as an authority on Soviet affairs. As Feng Yu-hsiang’s personal representative in Canton and as a member of the Central Executive Committee, Hsu was a man of considerable importance. Soon after the capture of the Wuhan cities, the Political Council of the Kuomintang decided to move the Nationalist capital from Canton to the historic city of Wuchang. On November 16, a week after the capture of Nanchang by the Nationalists, Borodin, accompanied by Foreign Minister Eugene Ch’en, Justice Minister Hsu Ch’ien, Communications Minister Sun Fo, Finance Minister T.V. Soong, as well as Ku Meng-yu, head of the Kuomintang propaganda department, 192

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left Canton for Wuhan. On December 5 T’an Yen-k’ai, acting Chairman of the State Council, and Chang Ching-kiang, acting Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, left for Central China via Nanchang, where Chiang Kai-shek had his headquarters. While they were still in Nanchang, Borodin at Wuchang formed, on December 13, what was called a Joint Party-Government Conference, which was to function as the supreme directing organ of both party and government pending the formal establishment of the State Council and the Central Executive Committee at Wuchang.1 The Wuhan cities offered an exceptional field for Communist activity. There was a developed industry. There were more industrial workers than in Canton, indeed more than anywhere else in China except Shanghai. Politically and militarily, the Wuhan cities were also favorable for Communist expansion. T’ang Sheng-chih, now one of the most powerful military figures in the Nationalist camp, had his headquarters there. In the north Feng Yu-hsiang, who had just returned from Moscow, was believed to be sympathetic to the Kuomintang Left. The Communists lost no opportunity in creating dissension among the military leaders in the Nationalist camp. This was in line with the decision of the Communist International at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum held in Moscow in November 1926: The Chinese Communists should use all possible means to strengthen the political work in the military forces . . . Now many militarists who have nothing in common with the Kuomintang have joined the Kwangtung faction (National 1It seems that the idea of forming a Joint Party-Government Conference was suggested to Borodin by Teruni, chief Soviet adviser with the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army. In this report to Borodin following the occupation of Wuhan, Teruni wrote: “Even after the arrival of the National Revolutionary Army in the Wuhan area, the residents seem to show no significant change in their political views. . . The Army came to Wuhan without a central political organ. Although we had insisted while at Changsha that it was desirable to have such an organ, nothing has yet been established. . . It is necessary that two or three Central Executive members should come and set up the Committee here, since it is impossible to begin serious business or to establish the Party’s power without it.” C. Martin Wilbur & Julie Lien-ying How: Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927, New York, 1956, p. 420. 193

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION Revolutionary Army) . . . In order to neutralize them or to transform them into genuine Kuomintang members (that is, pro-Communist members), it is necessary to strengthen the political work and exercise strict revolutionary supervision over them.

Since the most important military leader in the Wuhan area at that time was T ’ang Sheng-chih, Borodin tried to make use of him to counteract the growing influence and prestige of Chiang Kai-shek. Nor was T’ang averse to making use of Borodin to enhance his own position. With Hunan and Hupei under his control, he was ready to challenge Chiang’s supremacy. In his October 1926 report to Borodin, the chief Soviet adviser with the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army Teruni said that T’ang had refused to have his troops go to Kiangsi because “such action would help Chiang obtain victory in - Kiangsi.” T’ang, according to Teruni, “not only did not wish a victory for Chiang but even wanted him destroyed.” T ’ang reportedly told Teruni: Chiang Kai-shek is fatigued. It would be better for him to take a rest, since he will not be able to accomplish anything in Kiangsi. If I were to take the command, I would attack not only Kiangsi but Nanking.2

T’ang had contact with Sun Ch’uan-fang and the Japanese. Without the authorization of the National Government, he asked the Soviet Union to supply him with arms to enable him to take over the command of the National Revolutionary Army from Chiang. Teruni in his report also alluded to T ’ang’s attempt to form a Paoting Clique3 in opposition to Chiang. The establishment of the so-called Joint PartyGovernment Conference in Wuhan was clearly an attempt to undermine Chiang’s authority. On January 3, 1927 Chang Ching-kiang, in his capacity as acting Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, called a meeting of the Political Council at Nanchang. The Political Council in a resolution ordered the 2C. Martin Wilbur & Julie Lien-Ying How: ibid. p. 415. 3Most of the important commanders of the National Revolutionary Army were graduates of the Paoting Military Academy. 194

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dissolution of the Joint Party-Government Conference at Wuhan, and it also decided that the headquarters of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang as well as the National Government be temporarily located at Nanchang. Instead of carrying out the decision of the Political Council, Borodin called, in the name of the Joint Party-Government Conference, a Third Plenary session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee at Hankow. Thus, at the height of the military campaign against northern warlords, the revolutionary camp was split in two: one center at Wuhan and another at Nanchang. In an effort to patch up the differences between Wuhan and Nanchang, Chiang Kai-shek, on January 11, paid a hurried visit to Wuhan. He was given a rousing welcome. In the Communist view he was still a leader of the Center, and they did not want at this juncture to drive him further to the Right. Borodin, however, was critical of the Kuomintang. Chiang recounted his meeting with Borodin in these words: On the first evening of my visit to Wuhan, I spoke at the dinner in my honor. Borodin was the last to speak. He was highly critical of our party. The main point o f his criticism was that in the revolutionary camp there are those who are trying to suppress the mass movement o f the peasants and workers. He heaped insult and abuse on our party leader (Chang Ching-kiang) in every conceivable manner. Finally he warned me: ‘Comrade Chiang, you and I have been working together for three years; you know very well that we cannot allow those who are anti-Communist, anti-labor and anti-peasantry to exist in our midst.’ When he finished his speech, I fully intended to question him on a number of important points. Hsu Ch’ien, who presided, adjourned the meeting without giving me an opportunity to do so. When I saw him the next day I asked him: ‘Who is the military man who is suppressing the workers and peasant movements? Who is the leader who is undermining the authority of the party?’ He couldn’t answer me. Then I said: ‘You should not hurl accusations at people without evidence. You are a representative of the Soviet Union. You should not try to create dissension among Kuomintang members. The Soviet Union of today is not the Soviet Union of three years ago. Today the Soviet Union is a powerful country. Indeed, there are those who say that the Soviet Union represents another 195

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION brand of imperialism — Red imperialism. If you are arrogant enough to say what you said last night, then you will certainly incur the hatred of the Kuomintang as well as of the entire people of China. If you try to play tricks with the Kuomintang, you are in fact trying to oppress the Chinese people. It is not we who are abandoning Dr. Sun’s policy of alignment with Russia; on the contrary, it is you who are trying to destroy Dr. Sun’s policy of alignment.4

Chiang’s words produced no profound impression on Borodin. It did not take long for Chiang to sense that the air at Wuhan was definitely hostile to him. On January 18 he returned to Nanchang. On the 27th, after consulting with T’an Yen-k’ai and Tai Chi-t’ao, he said: I hope that the party and the government will unanimously demand the termination of Borodin’s services in China. We should not pay too much attention to what foreigners have to say about us. We must maintain our own independent stand in regard to the revolution. If we let such a bully like Borodin to dominate us, then how are we to accomplish the revolutionary tasks we have set for ourselves?

The So-called Third Plenum of the KMT

Early in February Borodin and the Communists decided to bring the anti-Chiang campaign into the open in order to force his hand. A huge demonstration was held and anti-Chiang speeches were delivered by Teng Yen-ta, a leading member of the Kuomintang Left and director-general of the political department of the National Revolutionary Army, and other pro-Communist politicians. Resolutions condemn­ ing “military dictatorship” were adopted by acclamation. Wang Ching-wei was urged to return to China to resume the 4Chiang Kai-shek: Ch’ing-chu kuo-min cheng-fu tien-tu Nanking huan-yen hsi-shang chih-tz’u (Speech delivered at a banquet in celebration of the establishment of the National Government in Nanking), April 1927. 196

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control of party and government. Later in the month the leftists in the Wuhan area held a mass meeting presided over by the Communist leader Tung Pi-wu. In his opening speech Tung said that the purpose of the meeting was “to save the Kuomintang from militarist domination.” Hsu Ch’ien, the fiery leftist Minister of Justice, demanded that Communists be placed in positions of importance in the central and local organs of the Kuomintang in order to strengthen the force of revolution. In none of the speeches and resolutions was Chiang Kai-shek’s name ever mentioned. This was a deliberate omission. The door was left ajar for last minute maneuvers. On February 25 Chiang, in a statement to the press, said that the so-called movement for heightening the powers of the party was in fact a veiled attack on him. As for “military dictatorship,” Chiang said: I do not know what my detractors have in mind. If this is a reference to the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, then I must say that these powers, though great, . . . are derived from specific authorizations of the National Government and the Central Executive Committee . . . 5

He went on to say that the Communists were behind the anti-Chiang campaign. He reminded the Communists that in the Canton days he used to go out of his way to shield them from the merciless attacks of some Kuomintang members. Now that they had turned against him, he could no longer be depended on to defend them in the future. Chiang’s statement put a quick end to the Communists’ hope that they could still through political pressure force him to turn to the left and do their bidding. Borodin now pressed the Communist members of the Kuomintang to call a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee at Hankow. Chiang and his associates would have preferred Nanchang to Hankow as the place where the meeting should be held. But as a gesture of goodwill and conciliation, they did not make an issue of it. They consented to attend the meeting, which was scheduled to take place on March 10. T’an Yen-k’ai and four others from Nanchang arrived in Wuhan on the 7th to participate in the preparatory meeting. Chang Ching-kiang, Kuo-wen chou-pao (National News Weekly), Vol. IV, No. 16, May 1, 1927. 197

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acting Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, remained at Nanchang because he knew he was not welcome at Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek and Chu P’ei-teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army Corps, were unable to be at Wuhan on time to attend the meeting on account of the military situation. T ’an Yen-k’ai proposed that the meeting be postponed for a few days in order to allow the participation of Chiang and Chu. T ’an’s proposal, however, was unacceptable to such Communist members as Wu Yu-chang, Yu Shu-teh and Mao Tse-tung, who argued that no one should be permitted to hold up the meeting. It was in these circumstances that the Third Plenum of the Second Central Executive Committee was finally held. The Third Plenum was dominated by the Communists and the Leftists. Of the 33 members and alternate members of the CEC who attended, they formed a clear majority. It was no secret that the chief purpose of the Third Plenum was to undo the decisions of the Second Plenum held in Canton a year before. Accordingly, a series of resolutions were quickly pushed through. The emergency powers conferred upon Chiang as Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army at the beginning of the Northern Expedition were revoked. All powers in regard to the appointment and removal of military officers were to be concentrated in the National Military Council. The Commander-in-Chief was to be responsible to the Central Executive Committee. The principles underlying the Kuomintang-Communist alliance were reaffirmed, and the Communist Party was invited to nominate “responsible comrades to join in the central and local governments,” thus annulling the decision of the Second Plenum which provided that “only those without dual party membership would be eligible for appointments as heads of departments in the Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang.” Chiang was supposed to have “resigned” from the Chairmanship of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, and the post was abolished in order to avoid the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual. It was resolved that anyone who, without the specific authorization of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, entered into diplomatic negotiations with the imperialists was subject to expulsion from the party. This was intended to 198

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curb Chiang’s dealings with foreign powers and thus prevent him from “capitulating” to the imperialists. Five new ministries were added to the National Government, and two Communists were requested to fill the newly created portfolios of labor and peasant affairs. The Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee was reorganized and of its nine members two were Communists (T’an P’ing-shan and Wu Yu-chang). T’an, Wu and Lin Tsu-han were also elected as members of the KMT Central Political Council, with T’an serving as a member of the Presidium. At the conclusion of the Plenum, the Central Executive Committee issued a letter to all party members declaring that the resolutions of the Third Plenum had the sole purpose of checking “corruption and military dictatorship” and were not directed against any individual or group of individuals. Thus the humbug of party unity was kept up. Indeed, Chiang Kai-shek’s name appeared as a member of the Standing Committee, Political Council, State Council and National Military Council. The anti-Chiang campaign, however, went on. Wu Yu-chang and Lin Tsu-han spoke of Chiang’s wanton waste of military funds, his suppression of peasants and workers movements, his “capitulation” to Japanese im­ perialists, and his collusion with northern militarists. On March 18 Wu Yu-chang staged an anti-Chiang mass meeting. Anti-Chiang articles by Teng Yen-ta and Kuo Mo-jo appeared in Wuhan papers. Borodin and the Communists began to identify the so-called “Three Great Policies” — alliance with Soviet Russia, alliance with the Communist Party, and support of workers and peasants — with Sun Yat-sen and exalted them over and above the Three Principles of the People. On paper at least, the Communist victory was complete. Chiang, who was preoccupied with the National Revolu­ tionary Army’s drive towards Shanghai and Nanking, ignored the decisions of the Third Plenum. The focus of attention was soon shifted to Shanghai, where struggle for power between the Communists and the Kuomintang reached the height of intensity.

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C H A PTE R SIX T E E N

COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS IN SHANGHAI

The Three Uprisings

As early as July 1926 when the Northern Expedition had just started, the Communists in Shanghai had already begun to organize the workers and to form a committee on military affairs in preparation for the seizure of power before the National Revolutionary Army could formally take over the city. Three Soviet agents —Gotikoff, Arno, and Bouharoff — were in Shanghai to plan and direct the operations. Chou En-lai also played a leading part in the Communist plot to seize Shanghai. The Kuomintang was also active in Shanghai. On September 4 the Kiangsu Committee for Special Affairs was established to rally the people of Shanghai to the support of the national revolution and thus prepare the way for the Nationalist take-over. The leading members of the committee were two veteran Kuomintang members — Niu Yung-chien and Wu Chih-hui. Two Communists also participated in the work of the Committee. On December 24, 1926, Niu Yung-chien and his associates staged the first uprising, in which over a thousand workers and shopkeepers participated. But the preparatory work was not sufficiently thorough, and the uprising was quickly suppressed by Sun Ch’uan-fang’s garrison com­ mander, General Li Pao-chang. In February 1927 a second uprising was set in motion. Niu Yung-chien called a joint meeting of the Special Affairs Committee, the Kuomintang Shanghai Committee, and the 200

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Kuomintang Kiangsu Provincial Committee for the organiza­ tion of a Shanghai Municipal Government as the authority in charge of the revolutionary activities. The Communist-led Shanghai General Labor Union, through its leader, Wang Shou-hua, on the other hand, demanded the establishment of a People’s Committee. He intended in fact to set up a Soviet system as a new type of power in place of the regular city government. Niu Yung-chien turned down the Communist demand. But this did not stop the Communists from stirring up mob violence. Street fighting between workers, soldiers and police resulted in much confusion and bloodshed. The failure of the February uprising was more than made up for by the March insurrection. By this time Li Pao-chang’s troops had withdrawn and the task of defending Shanghai against the National Revolutionary Army was entrusted to Pi Shu-ch’eng, a subordinate of the notorious Shantung warlord Chang Ts’ung-chang. The Nationalists converged on the city from three directions. On the night of March 20, the spearhead of the Eastern Route Army under the command of Pai Ch’ung-hsi reached Lunghua on the outskirts of Shanghai. Pi Shu-ch’eng, realizing that the situation was hopelessly against him, had tried to negotiate for a surrender to the invaders. But the Northern troops were so demoralized that they evacuated without waiting for the arrival of the Nationalists. This gave the Communists an opportunity to mobilize the workers to seize power. The result was that Shanghai experienced an interregnum in which Communistled labor unions and their armed pickets were in complete control. Preparations were made for the seizure of control of the International Settlement and French Concession in the manner of Hankow and, as at Hankow, there were parades, mass meetings, and distribution of incendiary literature. On March 22, before the Communists could carry out their plan, the First Division of the First Army, commanded by Hsueh Yueh, entered the city. Direct conflict between China and the foreign Powers were thus avoided in Shanghai.

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Chiang and the Communists

When Chiang Kai-shek landed in Shanghai from his gunboat on March 26, the Nanking Incident was but two days old, and the foreign community had slipped itself into a frenzy of anti-Nationalist feeling. His first order of business was to assure the foreign residents that the National Government, while determined to rid China of the inequities imposed on her by foreign Powers, would not use force or mob violence of any kind to effect a change in the status of the foreign settlements in Shanghai. He then turned his attention to Communist activities. The problem of the armed workers’ pickets had to be urgently dealt with. These pickets, who now patrolled the streets, were armed with rifles and machine guns and had a large stock of ammunition captured from retreating Northern troops. They numbered about 3,000 men and could easily be expanded into a much larger force. They constituted an independent army commanded by one Ku Shun-chang, who took orders from Chou En-lai. When Ku later turned against the Communists, his entire family was murdered in cold blood by Chou and his associates. Chiang ordered the Communist-led General Labor Union to disarm the pickets and place them under the supervision of General Pai Ch’ung-hsi. The General Labor Union refused to carry out Chiang’s orders. The Communist-dominated Central Political Council at Wuhan, at the instance of Wu Yu-chang, adopted on April 1 a resolution recognizing the armed pickets as “a legitimate armed force” of the Kuomintang responsible for maintenance of the “revolutionary order,” and condemning any attempt at repression against them as “counter-revolutionary.” On the same day the Wuhan regime, on the basis of the Central Political Council’s resolution, “relieved” Chiang Kai-shek of his post as Commander-inChief of the National Revolutionary Army. But Chiang refused to be “relieved.” “If it were a matter of purely personal concern,” he said, “ I would not have hesitated to relinquish the post.” “But,” he added, “this is not a personal matter; this is a responsibility I have assumed, responsibility I am not free to give up. I have pledged myself to carry the 202

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Northern Expedition to a successful conclusion, and this is what I shall do.” Thus, the rift between the Wuhan regime and Chiang reached the point of no return.

Wang Ching-wei’s Return from Europe

In the meantime Wang Ching-wei, who had left Canton soon after the March 20, 1926 coup, returned from Europe by way of Moscow. Chiang, Wu Chih-hui, T.V. Soong and other Kuomintang leaders were at hand to welcome him. Wang’s position was of crucial importance. If he sided with Wuhan, the prestige of the Communist-dominated Leftist regime would be immensely enhanced. If, on the other hand, he sided with Chiang, the scale would be tipped in favor of the anti-Communist cause. At first he seemed not altogether pleased with what the Communists had been doing. He had reportedly told Wu Chih-hui: The Communists have not been in the habit of changing their policies; they have been using the Kuomintang for their own advantage. I am not in favor o f the class struggle or the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. It is my observation that it is difficult for the KMT and the CCP to coexist in peace. Yet I hope we can continue to cooperate with them, and I am prepared to assume the responsibility of trying to harmonize the views of the two sides.

In his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army, Chiang Kai-shek, in a telegram to his commanders under the date of April 3, 1927, paid a high tribute to Wang’s leadership. He said: Chairman Wang is our party’s most loyal member and my most revered teacher and friend . . . I sincerely believe that his return will result in strengthening the foundation of our party and enhancing its authority, so that we may complete the work of the national revolution and realize the ideals of our late leader. Hereafter with Chairman Wang at the helm of both party and government I shall be free to devote myself to the military aspects of the revolution . . . 203

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Chiang concluded his telegram by pledging “complete obedience” to Wang and exhorted his commanders to do the same. The two leaders held several conferences, and Chiang did his best to convince Wang of the necessity of purging the Communists from the Kuomintang. Wang demurred. Chiang advised Wang not to go to Wuhan. “If you go,” he warned, “you will not be able to come out of Wuhan again. In that event you will be forced to toe the Communist line. If you are really for the Kuomintang, then you should go to Nanking instead . . . Once you are in Nanking, you can invite members of the Central Executive Committee who are now at Wuhan to come to Nanking. If you go to Wuhan you will be blamed for splitting the party, for having betrayed the Kuomintang.”

The Wang-Ch’en Joint Statement

In Shanghai Wang had long talks with the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Ch’en Tu-hsiu. Ch’en proposed the issuance of a joint statement for the purpose of clarifying the Communist position in relation to the Kuomintang. The joint statement, published on April 5th, began by saying that now that the national revolution has been victorious, “it is all the more necessary for us to be united.” It went on to say: The cooperation between our two parties may be different in form. But the important thing is that the majority of the members of both parties should have the goodwill to settle their differences . . . Those members of the KMT who understand the CCP theory about the revolution and its sincere attitude towards the KMT, will not doubt the wisdom of Dr. Sun’s policy of alignment with the Communists . . .

The joint statement pleased nobody. To a large section of the Kuomintang, it amounted to an admission on Wang Ching-wei’s part that the Communist Party was on a footing of equality with the Kuomintang. When the Kuomintang

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leaders met in conference the following day, Wu Chih-hui asked Wang point-blank: “ Is it true that China will henceforth be under the condominium of two parties?” Wang evaded the question and laughed. Wu then said that the admission of Communists into the Kuomintang was based on the understanding that they would enter as individuals. Nothing was said of joint control. Now, it seemed to him that they were no longer satisfied with condominium; they wanted dominium. Would Wang let the Kuomintang be pushed out of existence?1 Wang did not attempt to make a satisfactory reply. On April 6 Wang suddently left for Wuhan in strict secrecy. On board a foreign steamer on the Yangtze he wrote three letters: one to Chiang Kai-shek, one to Chang Ching-kiang and the third to Li Shih-tseng, a member of the Kuomintang “old guard” . In these letters he explained his reasons for leaving Shanghai. In one of them there was this sentence: “The spirit of 1924 must never be sacrificed, party discipline must be maintained, and party unity must be preserved.”12 He was of course implying that Chiang was sacrificing the spirit of 1924, violating party discipline, and sabotaging party unity. Wang Ching-wei was primarily an opportunist. With all his wonderful opportunities, with all the glittering qualities of mind and personality, he never achieved real leadership. More often than not he found himself a follower rather than a leader. He must now go to Wuhan and resume his duties at the head of the Central Executive Committee and the State Council. He must force Chiang into submission in the name of party discipline. What had escaped him was the fact that the Communists had now decided to achieve “proletarian hegemony” in earnest. They wanted Wang’s presence at Wuhan because he would enhance the prestige of the leftist regime and give it an aura of legitimacy. As such he was courted, flattered, and given all the outward respect which was his due as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee 1Kuo-wen chou-pao (National News Weekly), Vol. IV. No. 16, May 1, 1927. 2Kuo-wen chou-pao (National News Weekly), Vol. IV, No. 16, May 1, 1927. 205

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and of the State Council. But he was more a tool than a leader. At heart he knew he was being made use of, yet he played his role with becoming modesty. He tried to get along with both the Communists and local militarists. After Wang’s departure for Wuhan, the leadership of the Communist Party in Shanghai instructed its members to launch a propaganda campaign against Chiang. “It is not enough to attack imperialism or warlordism, we must now also be anti-Chiang Kai-shek,” said the party directive. The Communists within the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army were told that “graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy are all counter-revolutionaries” and “all students and subordinates of Chiang Kai-shek are his tools, his running dogs.” At first Chiang tried to temporize with the Communists. Then he began to take steps to assure his control of the city. He installed one of his staff officers as commissioner of police. Inasmuch as Eugene Ch’en, Wuhan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, had refused to come to Shanghai to deal with a multitude of problems in relation to the Nanking Incident and to the foreign community in Shanghai, he appointed Quo T’ai-chi Commissioner of Foreign Affairs. He thus opened official contact with foreign authorities. For this he was reprimanded by the Wuhan regime for overstepping his authority. “Without specific instructions from the government,” he was told, “you are not permitted to deal with matters pertaining to diplomacy, to express opinions on foreign policy, or to communicate, either orally or in writing, with representatives of foreign governments.” Chiang Kai-shek did not approach the task of breaking up the Communist-led workers organizations without an awareness of the magnitude of the problem. He did not move against the Communists until he had completed his arrangements. First of all, he had to get rid of the Communist elements in his army. On April 2 the Communist-infiltrated Political Departments of the First and Second Divisions of the Eastern Route Army were disbanded. On the 6th the headquarters of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army, the center of Communist influence within the armed forces, was closed down. A new set of slogans replaced the old on April 7. Instead of the 206

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familiar “ Down with imperialism! Down with feudalism! All powers to the people!” the new ones proclaimed: “Down with anti-Kuomintang conspirators! Down with the reaction­ aries who are wrecking the National Revolution! Whoever opposes the Three Principles of the People is opposing the Revolution! All Powers to the real Kuomintang!” On the 9th Shanghai was under martial law and Pai Ch’ung-hsi was given the authority to enforce it. On the same day Chiang left Shanghai for Nanking. The mobilization of forces for a general crack down on the Communists and the Communistled workers’ pickets was already under way. Before Chiang left Shanghai he had already dispatched the First and Second Divisions of the First Army Corps, which were his most seasoned and most reliable troops, to Nanking. He quickly disarmed the troops which were pro-Communist. He wired Wang Ching-wei and T’an Yen-k’ai in Hankow, Hu Han-min in Shanghai, and Chu P’ei-teh in Nanchang, inviting them to come to Nanking before the 14th of April to discuss problems awaiting urgent resolution.

The “Purification” Movement in Shanghai

In the early hours of April 12, 1927, detachments of Pai Ch’ung-hsi’s Twenty-second Army, simultaneously and according to a pre-arranged plan, attacked the Communist-led labor unions and armed pickets at various points of the Chinese city in Shanghai as well as in such outlying areas as Woosung and Pootung. By mid-morning the situation was well under control. This marked the beginning of the armed conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists — a conflict which has lasted to this day. Pai Ch’ung-hsi, who was in charge of the whole operation, issued a proclamation which was posted on all walls, announcing that all strikes were forbidden and those who violated the prohibition would be severely punished. Yet the Communist-led General Labor Union called, on April 13, for a

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general strike of protest. At noon a great crowd of workers gathered in a mass meeting on Chinyuan Road in Chapei. Resolutions were passed demanding the return of seized arms, punishment of union-wreckers, and protection for the General Labor Union. The demonstrators shouted slogans and a parade was formed to march to the headquarters of the Second Division of the Twenty-sixth Army on Paoshan Road. In the ensuing conflict between the demonstrators and the soldiers many were killed and wounded. On April 14 the authorities searched such centers of Communist activities as the Provisional Shanghai Municipal Government, Shanghai Kuomintang headquarters and Shang­ hai Students’ Union. Wang Shou-hua, head of the General Labor Union, and Lo I-nung, one of the Communist leaders, were put under arrest and condemned to death. In a message to his commanders and troops, Chiang Kai-shek revealed that not all the armed pickets were workers. According to him, among the 90 armed pickets captured on April 13, no less than 40 were soldiers of the Northern army. The Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai in his April 21 report to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (secret intelligence report No. 367) said: Most of the workers who participated in the strike were compelled to do so by terrorist methods used by the armed pickets. The strict measures taken by the authorities have produced the desired result. The influence of the more moderate elements has been growing and the call for general strike is no longer effective . . . The orders of the General Labor Union have ceased to produce any effect . . .

Foreign reports tended to exaggerate the number of Communists and workers killed during the “purification” movement. Basing their figures on Communist sources, they reported that thousands of workers had lost their lives. According to an investigation conducted by the Japanese Foreign Office, “up to April 22, 90 people were executed.” This number did not include of course the casualties resulting from street fighting. In faraway Moscow Leon Trotsky accused Stalin of having brought the Chinese revolution to disaster which might have been avoided by bold action. The Shanghai 208

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workers, he declared, were in power, and they were armed. Yet Stalin did not want the workers to prepare for a decisive struggle; he wanted them to “lie down and play dead.” The fact is, however, that Trotsky had exaggerated the power of the Communists, who could not have succeeded by whatever “bold action” they might have taken.

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CH APTER SEVENTEEN

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The National Government at Nanking

While the “purification” movement was going on in Shanghai, pro-Chiang members of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees gathered in Nanking to prepare for the holding of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Centred Executive Committee, scheduled to take place on April 15, 1927. Both the date and the place of the meeting had been agreed upon at a meeting between Chiang and Wang in Shanghai. But Wang soon left for Wuhan and it was not expected that he would come to Nanking to attend the meeting. Members of the two Central Committees decided, instead of holding a formal plenary session, to call an informal session to exchange views on the following propositions: (1) to make Nanking the capital of the Republic of China; (2) to declare that the so-called central organs of the Kuomintang at Wuhan were illegal; (3) to repudiate the so-called National Government at Wuhan as an illegal set-up; and (4) to expel party members who were also members of the Communist party. On April 17 the Central Political Council decided that the National Government at Nanking would start operations on the following day. Hu Han-min, the man who was banished to the Soviet Union following the assassination of Liao Chung-k’ai in 1925, was made Chairman of both the State Council and the Central Political Council. Since his return in 1926 he had been living in Shanghai. Upon his assumption of office, Hu called upon the armed forces to support Chiang in his effort to overthrow the forces of counter-revolution. In a message to the officers and men of the National Revolutionary Army, Hu, in the name of the National 210

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Government, commended Chiang for his loyalty and courage in the discharge of his responsibilities, for having expanded the influence of the Kuomintang to seven provinces, and for having achieved unprecedented successes in the campaign against the Northern militarists. In accepting the com­ mendation, Chiang pointed out that the situation in which the National Government found itself was a difficult and dangerous one. Nanking is situated between Shanghai and Hankow. Shanghai is the bastion of the imperialists who are constantly threatening us with brutal force, while in Hankow the Communists, under the direction of Red imperialists, are creating chaos and confusion in our rear. We are thus hemmed in by two types of imperialism — Red and white. We have yet another enemy to contend with — the forces of the Mukden and Shantung militarists. Unless we can fight our way out of this precarious situation, we are doomed to greater and far more serious disasters.

In another statement he said: It was our late T s u n g - l i (Dr. Sun) who had selected Nanking as our capital. . . I, who have been given great responsibilities in the service o f our government, am determined to lead the National Revolutionary Army to defend unto death the true National Government at Nanking as well as to annihilate the Communist-dominated bogus National Government at Hankow.

Thus, there existed in 1927 two rival Kuomintang governments, each claiming legitimacy and each denouncing the other as apostate and renegade. The Wuhan regime’s reply to Nanking was to issue its mandate on April 17, excommunicating Chiang and his associates, cataloguing their “crimes,” expelling them from the party, and depriving them all of government posts. Nanking’s countermeasure to Wuhan was to order the arrest of Borodin, Ch’en Tu-hsiu, T’an P’ing-shan, Lin Tsu-han, Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Kuo Mo-jo, Wu Yu-chang, Liu Shao-chi, Hsu Ch’ien, Teng Yen-ta and more than a hundred others. It is significant that Wang Ching-wei’s name did not appear on the list. On May 7 a special organ — the Central Committee on Party Purification — was set up to supervise the enforcement of the 211

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“purification” orders. Party purification was simultaneously carried out in the provinces of Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Anhwei and Szechuan. Communists in these provinces either went underground or escaped to the Wuhan area.

Northern Expedition Resumed

Towards the end of 1927 the Mukden-Shantung troops, who were in force just across the Yangtze from Nanking at Pukow, posed a direct threat to the newly established Nationalist capital. Chiang summoned a conference of all high military and naval commanders at Nanking, and it was decided that the Northern Expedition should be resumed immediately. The plan called for a northward advance along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway by three routes. Ho Ying-chin was in command of the First Route, Li Tsung-jen headed the Third Route, and Chiang himself led the Second Route. The actual command of the Second Route was delegated by Chiang to Pai Ch’ung-hsi. On May 11 the Second and Third Route Armies crossed the Yangtze and occupied Pukow, driving the Northern forces towards Shantung. On May 21 Pengpu, an important strategic point on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, was captured by the Third Route Army. Pushing rapidly on, this army entered the ancient city of Hsuchow, the city that had witnessed innumerable battles in Chinese history. Yangchow, another historic city, was taken by the First Route Army. The entire Kiangsu province was now under Kuomintang control. Thus, the provinces under the sway of Nanking now included Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kweichow, and Szechuan. The Northern armies, demoralized and poorly led, proved no match for the forces under Chiang’s command. At this time the Communist-dominated Wuhan regime also decided to advance towards the North and extend its domain to Honan. For one thing, its survival depended on its 212

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ability to break through the hostile encirclement of its enemies. On the south, east and west the forces of Chiang Kai-shek posed a direct threat. On the North Chang Hsueh-liang, son of the Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin, was pushing forward in the direction of Hankow with a powerful and excellently equipped army. Should the regime launch an Eastern Expedition against Chiang? Some of its military leaders favored this course of action because they believed that Chiang was in a particularly vulnerable position. The Shanghai-Nanking area, they argued, was seething with unrest, and Chiang’s own troops were said to be in a rebellious mood. The newly arrived representative of the Communist International, M. N. Roy, an Indian Communist famed for his radical views, advocated a southward expedition. He wanted the Wuhan regime to move its troops towards Kwangtung, which was then poorly defended, and establish a revolutionary base in Canton. At the same time it should intensify the peasant movement in the provinces of Hunan and Hupei so as to pave the way for the formation of rural Soviets, which, he believed, would render the masses independent of the vacillation and compromises at the top. The Roy line was supported by T ’an P’ing-shan, Chang Kuo-t’ao and other Communists. There was, however, yet another point of view. Borodin argued that a Northern Expedition was more in the interest of Wuhan. By ex­ tending its control to North China the regime would not only fend off an immediate physical threat but would also improve its economic and military position. Feng Yu-hsiang whose troops were advancing towards the pivotal Honan province, had become an important political factor. He had been receiving Soviet military and financial aid since 1924. He had just returned from Moscow and had reportedly been supplied by the Soviet Union with 200 pieces of heavy artillery, 2,000 machine-guns, 200,000 rifles, millions of rounds of ammunition, as well as armored cars and other military equipment. It was reasonable to expect that a man who owed so much to the Soviet Union, would do everything within his power to enhance the prestige of Wuhan and forward the Communist cause. For this and other reasons the Wuhan regime adopted on April 19 Borodin’s proposal and decided to deal with Chang Hsueh-liang first.

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The Fourth Army Corps, now commanded by Chang Fa-k’uei, started to march on Honan on the 22nd, and a week later they were joined by units of the Eleventh Army Corps. T’ang Sheng-chih was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary forces. On May 14 a decisive battle was fought near the town of Chumatien in Honan, 125 miles northwest of Hankow. The Mukden troops under Chang Hsueh-liang were defeated, but Wuhan paid a very heavy price for the victory. Meanwhile Feng Yu-hsiang moved down from the Tungkuan pass along the Lunghai Railway and occupied Loyang in western Honan on April 26 and seized the junction of the Lunghai and Peiping-Hankow Railways at Chengchow on June 1. The troops of Feng and T’ang converged on Chengchow and the two military leaders found themselves in disagreement over a number of questions. On June 10 Feng called a conference at Chengchow, which was attended by Wang Ching-wei and other Wuhan leaders. After the conclusion of the conference on the 12th, T’ang Sheng-chih ordered his troops back to the Wuhan area, leaving Feng in sole control of Honan. Feng, the erstwhile “Christian General,” was nobody’s ally. His life-long preoccupation was the strengthening of his own power. On June 19 he travelled down to Hsuchow to meet Chiang Kai-shek. A week later the two leaders issued a joint communique reaffirming their determination to go ahead with the Northern Expedition. At the same time Feng made known a telegram he had just sent to the leaders of Wuhan. In this telegram he said that (1) Borodin, who had already resigned as advisor to the Kuomintang, should return to Russia immediately; (2) members of the Wuhan regime who wished to go abroad for a rest should be allowed to do so, while others, if they so desired, might join the National Government at Nanking; and (3) T’ang Sheng-chih was requested to come to Chengchow to participate in the Northern Expedition. Feng concluded the telegram with a fervent, if hypocritical, plea for national unity. Wuhan was stunned by this sudden turn of events. Pessimism, defeatism, and even despair pervaded the air. Borodin, sick in bed, retained his calm. He believed that the Communists must make use of the irreconcilable contradic­ 214

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tions within the reactionary camp and turn the impending disaster to positive advantage. In view of T ’ang Sheng-chih’s undying hatred for Chiang and insatiable hunger for power, Borodin suggested that the Communists should urge T ’ang to launch an “eastern expedition” against Nanking. T’ang seemed agreeable to the suggestion. On June 23 he ordered his troops to be ready for the campaign. In July the troops under the command of such Wuhan generals as Chang Fa-k’uei, Ch’eng Ch’ien and Chu P’ei-teh assembled at Kiukiang and moved towards Anhwei. Nanking was threatened. Chiang had no option but to move a considerable number of his troops from the northern front to meet the new threat. The Northern troops under Sun Ch’uan-fang and Chang Tsung-ch’ang took advantage of the situation to mount an offensive. Chiang’s armies fell back 50 miles upon Hsuchow. Here they made a desperate stand against the better equipped forces of Sun Ch’uan-Fang. On July 24 Hsuchow passed into enemy hands. This marked one of Chiang’s major military reverses since the launching of the Northern Expedition in 1926.

The Collapse of the Wuhan Regime

From the beginning, the Wuhan regime was an uneasy alliance of three groups: the so-called Kuomintang Left, which was in fact no more than a motley assortment of disgruntled politicians, opportunists, and fellow travellers; the new militarists, of whom the most prominent was T ’ang Sheng-chih; and the Communists. Aside from their shared hatred of Chiang Kai-shek, they had little in common. They did not speak the same language or encompass the same hopes. The bonds between them were so tenuous that it was only a matter of time before they snapped under the strains of failure, jealousy and rivalry. Of the three groups the Communists were most active. The most influential Communists at Wuhan were T ’an 215

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P’ing-shan and Wu Yu-chang. As a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party and a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, T’an was the de facto leader of the Party at Wuhan. In the Kuomintang T ’an held a number of key positions. He was a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Standing Committee (Politburo), a member of the Political Council, and a member of the State Council. Concurrently he was Minister of Peasant Affairs. The most dynamic Communist at Wuhan was, however, Wu Yu-chang. Curiously, Wu, though a Communist, was the Kuomintang’s Secretary-General. As such, he prepared the agenda for Central Executive Committee’s meetings, supplied documentation material on every point under debate, transmitted the Committee’s decisions to lower party organs, controlled a large staff of party workers and was responsible for their appointments, promotions and demotions. He was in daily touch with the Kuomintang’s party organization at all levels. The excesses of the mass movement aroused opposition. The small shopkeepers in the cities were especially hard hit. They became increasingly antagonistic to Communist leadership. But the shopkeepers were not strong enough to resist. Not so were the officers of the army whose land was being confiscated and whose relatives were suffering humiliation and mistreatment at the hands of peasant associations. On May 12 General Hsia Tou-yin, commander of the 14th Division and garrison commander at Ichang, revolted and marched on the revolutionary capital. He was ten miles from Wuhan when he was stopped. In Hunan the parents of General Ho Chien, one of T’ang Sheng-chih’s chief lieutenants, were denounced by the peasant association as “rural bullies” and forced to parade in the streets as an object-lesson to other “bullies.” On May 21 anti-Communist riots flared up at Changsha, capital of Hunan. Hsu Ke-hsiang, a regimental commander under Ho Chien, pounced upon the headquarters of the Communist-led labor unions and peasant associations and arrested their leaders. On May 29 Chu P’ei-teh, Commander of the Third Army Corps and governor of Kiangsi, expelled the left-leaning political officers of his army and asked all Communists to leave the province. Thus, with anti-Communist movements spreading in Hunan, Hupei 216

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and Kiangsi, the Wuhan regime became unstable and was on the verge of collapse. Moscow, apparently oblivious of what was taking place in the Wuhan area, ordered the Communists to step up the agrarian revolution. The Comintern Executive Committee at its 8th session held in the latter part of May adopted a “ Resolution on the China Problem.” The resolution stressed the importance of agrarian revolution, without which victory was impossible. The Communists were instructed to carry out the following five points: 1. The agrarian revolution should begin by confiscating lands from below, and there was no need for the National Government to issue decrees for the confiscation. 2. The old members of the Kuomintang Central Committee should be replaced by the worker and peasant representatives. 3. The Kuomintang was to be restructured along more radical lines. 4. The unreliable generals must be eliminated, the 20,000 members of the Communist Party should be armed and the 50,000 workers and peasants selected from Hunan and Hupei should be organized into new troops. 5. A revolutionary tribunal should be organized with prestigious non-Communist Kuomintang members as its members to punish the counter-revolutionaries. On June 1, 1927, M.N. Roy, the Indian Communist who was then one of the top Comintern representatives at Hankow, showed a telegram from Stalin containing the Comintern’s resolution to Wang Ching-wei. Wang was flabbergasted by its contents. Obviously, Wang had been laboring under the delusion up to this time that cooperation with the Communists was still posible in accordance with the terms laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He reminded Roy of the understanding reached in 1923 between Dr. Sun and Joffe. Roy replied by saying that the conditions were to be changed in accordance with the new instructions. On June 21 Wang issued a declaration asserting that the leadership of the national revolution was vested in the Kuomintang and not in any other party. Many months later he said that Stalin’s telegram was a revelation to him. For the first time he realized that the Communist Party and the Kuomintang 217

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could not coexist in China; the Kuomintang must either destroy the Communist Party or allow itself to be destroyed. Meanwhile, the anti-Communist movement gained momentum in the areas under the control of Wuhan. On June 28 Ho Chien called upon Wang Ching-wei and T ’ang Sheng-chih to sever relations with the Communists. At the same time his troops occupied the headquarters of Communist-led labor unions and many Communists were arrested. Liu Shao-ch’i, Li Li-san and other Communists asked Wang Ching-wei to protect labor unions against indiscriminate attacks by Ho Chien. When Wang told Ho to exercise restraint in his actions, Ho’s reply was that the government must first of all restrain the Communists from resorting to terror and violence against the people. At this juncture the Comintern in an urgent telegram censured the Chinese Communist Party for its “oppor­ tunism.” While calling for a “demonstrative withdrawal” from the Wuhan government, the Comintern directive added that “the Chinese Communist Party should not withdraw from the Kuomintang in spite of the campaign of its leaders for the expulsion of the Communists.” On the contrary, the Communists should carry on the agrarian revolution as members of the Kuomintang. The Communist Central Committee decided on the basis of the Comintern instruction to authorize the Communists in the government “to leave in order to reduce the difficulties of the political situation.” Accordingly, on July 13 T ’an P’ing-shan and other Communists withdrew from the Wuhan government. By this time Wang Ching-wei realized that the collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had come to an end. At an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee on July 15, Wang, for the first time, proposed that the time had come for the two parties to part company in a “peaceful and amicable manner.” The decision of the Standing Committee was kept secret for fear that its publication would “gladden the hearts of the imperialists” . But the Communists had no such scruples. In their “Declaration on the Current Situation,” the Communists accused Wang Ching-wei of having capitulated to the counter-revolutionary military 218

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commanders. On the 26th Wang formally ordered all party and government agencies to expel the Communists. On the following day the leaders of the Kuomintang Left gathered at the railway station to bid farewell to their “honored guest” , Borodin. Two secretaries from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs went with him as escorts. When he reached Chengchow, Honan, he was entertained by the “Christian General” Feng Yu-hsiang, whose telegram a month before had hastened the collapse of the Wuhan regime. On his long journey across China he was welcomed and entertained and given a guard of honor in areas controlled by Feng. On his return to Russia Borodin led a life of comparative obscurity. He was first made a member of the Labor Commissariat and then editor of the English language newspaper, Moscow News. The man who had played so momentous a role in the Chinese revolution of the 1920’s died unnoticed and unsung in 1952.

The Nanchang Uprising

After the Wuhan debacle Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, was made a scapegoat and deposed. The new Communist leadership, under the direction of the new Comintern representatives, Lominadze and Heinz Neumann, resorted to “direct struggle” . The first of a series of adventures carried out by the Communists in 1927 was the Nanchang Uprising of August 1. The idea of the uprising was first discussed during July 20-25 by a group of Communist leaders at Kiukiang and had Lominadze’s approval. On the night of July 31 Chou En-lai instigated Ho Lung, commander of the 20th Army, and Yeh T ’ing, commander of the 24th Division of the 11th Army, to raise the standard of revolt. Early in the morning of August 1, they attacked the Central Bank, looted the shops and arrested members of the Kuomintang. Chu Teh, then 219

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deputy commander of the Ninth Army, joined the rebels. All told, they had a nominal strength of 20,000 men. Not all the military leaders were Communists. Yeh T ’ing and Chu Teh were Communist Party members of long standing. Ho Lung, who began his career as brigand chief in Hunan, did not join the Party until some days after their insurrection. In keeping with the Party line and in accordance with Lominadze’s instructions, the Nanchang Uprising operated under the banner of the Kuomintang. In the name of the “ Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang” , the rebels considered themselves rightful heirs of the Wuhan regime. It was the intention of its leaders that the insurgents, most of whom were Cantonese, would fight their way back to Kwangtung where a revolutionary base was to be established. Essentially, the plan was no different from the so-called “ Southern Expedition” proposed by M.N. Roy in June 1927. On August 4 Chu P’ei-teh, commander of the Third Army Corps and Governor of Kiangsi, moved his troops towards the city and attacked the rebels. On August 5, the rebels were forced to leave Nanchang and march southward towards Kwangtung. They were defeated and dispersed in battles at Chaochow and Swatow in northeastern Kwangtung. Remnants of the Yeh-Ho army fled to the East River region where they joined forces with P’eng Pai, a leader of the peasant movement, to establish a Soviet government in Haifeng and Lufeng districts, the first of its kind in China. The Soviet government soon collapsed. That was the end of the Yeh-Ho adventure.

Chiang Kai-shek’s Resignation

Although Wang Ching-wei had now embarked on a course of action which was no different from Chiang’s “purifica­ tion” campaign, he was by no means convinced of the necessity of a reconciliation with Nanking. He wished to heal 220

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the split in the Kuomintang, but he insisted that this must be done on his own terms. He even urged Li Tsung-jen, who was then at Nanking in command of the 7th Army Corps, to overthrow Chiang. T ’ang Sheng-chih was vehement in his anti-Chiang diatribe. He threatened to take Nanking by force of arms. On August 11 Chiang noted in his diary: In the South as well as in the North the situation is confused and the problem is highly complicated. At such a time it is necessary to be firm of purpose, to keep one’s calm and detachment, and move only when the opportunity presents itself. If one could do all this, one would ultimately be the victor.

On August 12 at a joint meeting of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees, the two Kwangsi generals, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch’ung-hsi, obviously influenced by Wang Ching-wei, proposed the sending of a peace mission to Wuhan to bring about the cooperation of the two factions of the Kuomintang. Realizing that his own person constituted the only real obstacle to a fusion of Nanking and Wuhan, Chiang made a sudden and dramatic gesture by submitting his resignation. He left for Shanghai that very evening, and on the 13th he issued a statement calling for the cooperation of Wuhan and Nanking. Speaking of the reasons for his retirement, he said: I have, in accordance with the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, made two resolutions which I will never abandon. The first is that I acknowledge that the Party is above everything, and when the interests of the Party are at stake, a member must follow the Party principles without heeding his personal feelings or private interests. The second is that I hold it to be the highest duty of a member to consolidate the foundation of the Party, and for this reason I shall do my utmost to struggle against those who, through trickery and duplicity, try to undermine the foundation of the Party and reduce it to utter impotence. In accordance with the first resolution, I have dedicated my life to the Party, and I shall unquestioningly obey the Party’s orders . . . In line with the second resolution, I expect every member of the Party, in spite of minor differences of opinion, to live up to his duty to defend the Party against any attempt to destroy it or usurp its powers such as the Communists had been doing

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At the conclusion of his statement, Chiang expressed the hope that members of the Kuomingtang would do the following: 1. I desire that members of both factions (Nanking and Wuhan), instead of listening to words designed to drive a wedge between them, will sink their differences and cast aside petty prejudices and mutual suspicion. I wish the Wuhan comrades to come to Nanking and help direct the future of our Party.. . 2. I desire that those of our comrades who are in command of the armed forces in Hunan, Hupei and Kiangsi will immediately advance northward and join forces with those troops now fighting along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and complete the tasks of the revolution. . . 3. I hope that the authorities in Hunan, Hupei and Kiangsi will carry out thoroughly the purification campaign

On the 14th Chiang left Shanghai for his native village Chikow where he found peace and tranquility at the Hsueh Tou Temple, an ancient Buddhist monastery on a spur of one of the highest mountains in Chekiang.

Chiang’s Visit to Japan

Chiang remained in his mountain retreat for over a month. Late in September he was in Shanghai again and spoke of his plan of going abroad on a study tour. He sailed for Japan on the 28th and reached Nagasaki the next day. He stayed a few days at Unzen and then, accompanied by T.V. Soong, wentto the Arima Hotsprings near Kobe and checked in at a hotel. Mrs. Soong, mother of T.V. Soong, had taken a

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Gospel. He was also a successful businessman and had contrlbuted Iiberairv-'to Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary activities. At the time of Chiang’s visit, Charles Soong had already passed away and hie wiHmy was in Japan for health reasons. With her was her eldest daughter Eling, wife of H. H. Kung, the man who was for many years the National Government’s Finance Minister and Prime Minister. Her second daughter, Ching-ling, was married to Dr. Sun Yat-sen. She had gone to Russia after the collapse of the Wuhan regime. After^having secured the consent of Mrs. Soong, Chiang’s engagement to Mayling became official. Chiang, as we know, had married a girl chosen by his mother when he was only fifteen. A son was bom of the union. Chiang left home to study in Japan soon after his marriage. Before he had completed his military education the Revolution broke out. Thereafter he threw himself whole-heartedly into the perilous activities of the revolutionaries, and had little opportunity of visiting his wife except at rare intervals. Subsequently by an amicable arrangement they were divorced on the grounds of incompatibility. In Japan Chiang found time to call on old acquaintances and refresh his contacts. He also visited such scenic spots as Takarazuka, Nara, Ohtsu, Hakone, Yumoto, Ashiinoko, Kakoko, Atami and Ito. Late in October he was in Tokyo. He recorded his impressions in his diary: The pace of progress in Japan is indeed amazing. There has also been progress in education and social order. Before I came I thought that material progress would inevitably be accompanied by spiritual decadence. I now know that it is not so. (October 14, after seeing the Westernization of Takarazuka) Errors of Japan’s foreign policy: (1) regards success of Chinese revolution as a threat to Japan’s position in East Asia; (2) exploits the disunity of China; (3) encourages the ignorant militarists to oppreso the Chinese people. Is this an expression of the wisdom and perspicacity of Japanese statesmanship? (October 11) Parks are everywhere. How admirable! (after having visited the Kowakiya Park at Hakone, October 15)

Chiang reached Tokyo on October 23. As soon as he had 223

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registered at the Imperial Hotel and deposited his luggage in his suite, he went to pay his respects to Dr. Sun’s old friend, Toyama Mitsuru. On the same day he released to the press a statement entitled “To the Japanese People.” He said: The late Dr. Sun Yat-sen was fond of calling China and Japan ‘fraternal countries.’ The relationship between the two countries is one of interdependence. For this reason, I believe that the Japanese people should be more concerned about the independence of the Chinese nation than any other people in the world . . . In my opinion, in order to improve Sino-Japanese relations it is necessary to remove the obstacles. I refer, of course, to the militarists of my country . . . There are those powers which, being ignorant of the real state of affairs in China, with little concern for the peace and security of East Asia, and attracted by short-term profits to be obtained, do not hesitate to utilize the militarists to oppress the Chinese people; to stunt the growth of the new revolutionary forces; and to deepen and exacerbate the existing antagonism and animosity between our two peoplesI I am sure that enlightened Japanese leaders . . . know that it is not possible to enhance the friendly relations of our two countries through the exploitation of the Chinese militarists ...I earnestly hope that the 70,000,000 Japanese people, who share with the Chinese people linguistic and racial affinities, will be able to have a thorough understanding of the Chinese revolutionary movement and extend to it their moral and spiritual support . . . Otherwise, there cannot be any friendly relations between the two countries. It is unnecessary for me to elaborate on the consequences that will flow from this state of affairs. It may indeed lead to a world war in the not too distant future . . .

The Japanese militarists turned a deaf ear to Chiang’s prescient admonition. They blindly precipitated a global conflict, thus bringing untold sorrow to the Japanese people and to all mankind. In Tokyo Chiang followed a rigid schedule. For two weeks beginning from October 24 to November 8, almost every minute of his time was occupied by visiting with old friends, both of his own and those of his late master, 224

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Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s. He also had interviews with responsible Japanese officials. He paid respects to Elder Statesman Inukai Tsuyoshi and General Nagaoka, his commanding officer in the days when he served in the 19th Artillery Regiment of the 13th Division of the Japanese Army. The most important item on his agenda was his meeting with the then Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, which took place on November 5 at the latter’s residence in Tokyo. The interview lasted two hours. Major General Sato Yasunosuke, an expert on China, acted as Tanaka’s interpreter while Chang Chun interpreted for Chiang. The gist of the Chiang-Tanaka conversation, according to a record kept by the Chinese, is as follows: C h ia n g :

It seems to me that prosperity or disaster for East Asia will largely depend on the future of Sino-Japanese relations. Does Your Excellency agree with me?

Tanaka:

I should like to hear Your Excellency’s views first.

C h ia n g :

I should like to lay before Your Excellency three points which I regard as important. First, if China and Japan can cooperate with each other sincerely and on the basis of real equality, there will be co-existence and co-prosperity. This will depend on whether Japan will improve its policy toward China. Japan, instead of dealing with the corrupt warlords, must turn her attention to the Kuomintang, which endeavors to create a free and independent China. In other words, Japan should cease to enslave the Chinese people but should seek out the truly patriotic Chinese and make friends with them. This is the only way to bring about genuine cooperation between the two countries. Second, the Chinese National Revolutionary Army is determined to carry forward its campaign against the Northern militarists and complete the task of national unification. I hope the Japanese Government will help us instead of interfering in our internal affairs. Third, Japan must abandon the use of force in her relations with China. I believe we can cooperate in the economic realm. I am anxious to exchange views with Your Excellency in regard to Sino-Japanese cooperation while I am here. I hope some concrete result will come out of our conversations.

Tanaka:

Your Excellency should first of all consolidate your base at Nanking and unify the areas south of the Yangtze. Why should Your Excellency be so impatient about completing the Northern Expedition? 225

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION C h ia n g :

The objective of the Chinese revolution is to bring about the unification of the entire country. We cannot afford to repeat the errors committed by the Taipings in the 19th century. The completion of the Northern Expedition is important to us. Without a united China there cannot be peace in East Asia. For China such a situation is perilous indeed. Nor can this be of benefit to Japan.1

Chiang was disappointed with the result of the interview. As soon as he went back to the hotel he made this entry in his diary: From my conversation with Tanaka I have come to the conclusion that . . . Sino-Japanese cooperation is out of the question. It is all too obvious that Tanaka does not want our revolution to succeed, will not hesitate to stop the Northern Expedition, and cannot tolerate a united China . . . Tanaka treated me in the same way as he has treated the Northern militarists . . . While I was unable to persuade him to change Japan’s traditional policy of aggression toward China, the interview was not altogether unprofitable. At least I now know where we stand . . . *

XThe Japanese version of the Chiang-Tanaka conversation, as recorded by Major General Sato Yasunosuke, differs somewhat from the Chinese version both in emphasis and in tone. In regard to Northern Expedition, Tanaka said: “In view of China’s internal disunity, it is difficult to carry the revolution to a successful conclusion. . . This being so, for the sake of consolidating your base south of the Yangtze, there is no reason why you should be in such a hurry to complete the Northern Expedition. Why not concentrate your effort on the unification of the South?” In regard to Japan’s support of the warlords, Chiang pointed out that Japan’s support of Chang Tso-lin was the cause of the anti-Japan movement in China. Tanaka denied that Japan had in any way supported Chang Tso-lin. In regard to the Communist menace, Chiang and Tanaka were in full agreement. (A copy of the transcript of the Chiang-Tanaka conversation was sent by Debuchi Katsuji, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, on November 14, 1927, to the Japanese Consulates-General in Mukden, Shanghai and Hankow.) 226

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Chiang’s Marriage Telegrams now poured in from China urging Chiang’s immediate return. Two days after his meeting with Tanaka, Chiang left Tokyo for Kobe. On November 8 he sailed for Shanghai. On November 26 a notice appeared in Shanghai papers announcing the coming marriage of Chiang Kai-shek and Mayling Soong. On Decemb01’ 1, I 0*2?, thay wfirfl married in a private religions c e r e m o n y in t h e h o m e o f t h e bride, Dr. David Z. T Yllij -a-w e ll knnma P h in c s p r h r i s t i a n officiating. Later the newly married couple moved on to the public part of the double event, a Chinese-stylc wedding in the ballroom of the Majestic Hotel. On the morning of his wedding day Chiang iss statement in which he said, among other things: I sincerely believe that after my marriage with Miss Soong, my work in the revolution will make greater progress. With her help and support, I can henceforth bear the heavy responsibility of the revolution with peace at heart . . .

Chiang and his bride spent their honeymoon at Mokanshan in northern Chekiang, famed for its wooded hills and lovely lakes.

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KUOMINTANG’S BREAK WITH SOVIET RUSSIA

The August Seventh Emergency Conference of the CCP At the time of the Wuhan debacle in 1927 the Communist Party was badly shattered. Inside the Party leadership there was dissension and bitterness, disillu­ sionment and demoralization. A number of well-known leaders deserted the Communist cause. Party membership dwindled from almost 60,000 to barely 10,000. From top to bottom the Party was in the grip of a grey, unrelieved, profound lack of faith in the future. As viewed by the leadership of the Comintern, however, the debacle of Wuhan represented a necessary stage of the revolution and whatever failures had occurred during this stage had been due to the opportunistic errors of the Chinese leaders. For this reason it was essential that the Central Committee of the CCP be reorganized. It was Lominadze’s job to see to it that this was done. The disastrous situation also demanded that something positive be done quickly to save the Party from complete disintegration and ruin. The August First uprising at Nanchang was an attempt to meet this urgency, while the August Seventh Emergency Conference was called to deal with the problem of leadership. The August Seventh Emergency Conference was called at the insistence of the Comintern and under the personal supervision of Lominadze. It was not an impressive gathering. Most of the prominent leaders of the Party had left with the Nanchang insurgents or else to Shanghai and other places of safety. Ch’en Tu-hsiu was not present though it was known that he was in hiding somehwhere in the vicinity of Wuhan. 228

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The men who attended the meeting were Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, Mao Tse-tung, Teng Chung-hsia, Ts’ai Ho-shen and a handful of others. Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and Mao Tse-tung were unquestionably the stage managers. The Conference drew up a lengthy account of Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s mistakes and declared that he “not only pursued a deadly wrong policy toward voluntary liquidation and capitulation, but stubbornly refused to admit his mistakes and submit to the counsels of the Communist International.” He and his fellow “opportunists” violated international discipline. On this and other grounds the Ch’en Tu-hsiu leadership was deposed, and the office of the SecretaryGeneral held by Ch’en was abolished. Ch’en Tu-hsiu had in the latter part of July already resigned from the Central Committee. It remained for the August Seventh Emergency Conference to depose him in a formal manner. As far as the CCP was concerned, the KuomintangCommunist alliance was still in effect. In reality this meant no more than the continued use of the Kuomintang as a front organization. This was why the August First uprising at Nanchang operated under the banner of the kuomintang and why a number of prominent Kuomintang members were included in the “ Revolutionary Committee” set up by the Communist insurgents. Within a few months, however, the Kuomintang banner was discarded for good by the new leadership of the CCP headed by Ch’u Ch’iu-pai. On September 19 the Communist Politburo resolved that the Kuomintang banner was no longer an asset and the Party would henceforth operate under its own banner. “It is now the duty of our Party,” said Ch’u, “to hoist the Red flag of the Soviet as the sole banner of revolution.” According to him, the so-called Kuomintang Left had long ceased to exist. Only a few individual “ Leftists” remained. The principal accomplishment of the August Seventh Conference was the adoption of a new tactical line. The time had come, the Communists believed, for direct military action. If the more cautious line of the Ch’en Tu-hsiu leadership was opportunism, the new line of the armed uprising was pure adventurism. The Ch’u Ch’iu-pai leadership planned to stage armed uprisings as a means to boost the 229

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Party’s sagging morale and stir the broad masses into motion. There were also those — Mao Tse-tung was one of them — who intended to make use of the uprisings to lay the foundation of their own power. Such theoretical trappings as the rise of revolutionary tide was only a justification for action. To stage the uprisings was what mattered, not what they would actually accomplish. The new Politburo elected at the Conference met on August 8. It set to work at once to carry out a series of armed insurrections. The most important of those was the Hunan-Hupei “Autumn Harvest Uprising” of AugustSeptember. Mao Tse-tung was charged with the responsibility of directing the uprising in Hunan. He managed to put together a band of riffraffs, desperadoes, and deserters from the regular armies —probably not over two or three thousand men all told. With this makeshift mob of an army Mao started thirty different uprisings in the rural areas of P’ingkiang, Liuyang, Changsha, Pinghsiang and other districts. Mao’s followers were looked upon by the people as bands of bandits, and indeed they acted very much like outlaws. They pillaged, burned and murdered. In the end nothing was achieved. The peasants on whom Mao had relied for support were not in a revolutionary mood. Ch’u Ch’iu-pai took Mao severely to task for the failure. Mao was dismissed from the Politburo, of which he was an alternate member. As far as Mao Tse-tung’s personal fortunes were concerned, the Hunan autumn harvest uprising was a great success. The remnants of the army he had put together became the “ First Division of the First Workers’ and Peasants’ Army,” which formed the nucleus around which Mao Tse-tung subsequently built up his military power. After the failure of his Hunan adventure, Mao took this band of armed desperadoes, now depleted to less than a thousand men, to the remote and inaccessible Chingkangshan mountains lying athwart the border area between Hunan and Kiangsi. There he gradually enlarged his forces through absorption of groups of bandits and other miscellaneous, straggling armed units. A year later he was joined by Chu Teh, Ch’en Yi and Lin Piao. The mountain fastness at Chingkangshan became Mao’s first base of operation. 230

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In Hupei Ch’u Ch’iu-pai was able to secure the cooperation of a bandit chieftain, one Chang Ch’ao-feng, who, with a band of 1,000 men, began to operate in Chienning and Tungcheng districts. For two weeks Chang held a section of the Hankow-Canton Railway, thus cutting this vital artery of communication. The Hupei uprising also met with disaster. Ch’u Ch’iu-pai escaped to Shanghai in disguise. A far more successful uprising during this period was the one engineered by the famed Communist agrarian leader P’eng Pai at Haifeng and Lufeng, two rural districts in the East River area of Kwangtung and only 150 miles from Canton. Son of a wealthy Haifeng landlord, a graduate from a university in Japan, and one-time protege of Ch’en Chiung-ming, P’eng Pai joined the Communist Party as early as in 1921. As director of education in his native district he became interested in the agrarian problem. In 1927 he was at Wuhan to attend the Fifth Communist Party Congress and was elected a member of the Central Committee. He participated in the Nanchang uprising and was a member of the Revolutionary Committee. When the forces of Yeh T’ing and Ho Lung were defeated at Swatow, he retreated to Haifeng. He soon gathered around him a large following. On November 1, 1927 he occupied the Haifeng county seat where he set up a Soviet government. He inaugurated a system of land confiscation and land redistribution and organized a “ Red Defense Army” and a “ Revolutionary Court” . Over 10,000 people were condemned to death for failure to carry out his agrarian reforms. In March 1928 P’eng Pai’s Soviet government was liquidated by the Kuomintang forces. Thus, one after another, the uprisings failed. Yet Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and Lominadze, eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the Stalinist line and fearful of being accused of opportunism, called for still more insurrections.

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The “Canton Commune”

In the middle of October T ’ang Sheng-chih, the power behind the Wuhan regime, taking advantage of Chiang Kai-shek’s temporary retirement, moved his troops into the heart of the Nanking territory. In a battle which lasted a little over a month, T ’ang was defeated. With the elimination of T’ang, Wuhan as a political center came to an end. Wang Ching-wei returned to Canton at the invitation of Chang Fa-k’uei, Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, who had taken his troops back to Kwangtung after the Communist uprising at Nanchang. Wang affected a moderate stance, though he was boiling with resentment. He was determined to make Canton his own base in opposition to Chiang’s Nanking. In order to do so he first of sill had to get rid of Li Chi-shen, the supreme political and military authority in the Southwestern provinces. Li, in addition to being a Kwangsi man, was allied to Nanking. Wang secured the support of Chang Fa-k’uei to overthrow Li Chi-shen. On November 15 Wang persuaded Li Chi-shen to go with him to Shanghai ostensibly for the purpose of holding a conference with Chiang Kai-shek. While Wang and Li were still on their way to Shanghai, Chang Fa-k’uei’s forces had executed a coup d'etat and seized the political power in Kwangtung. Huang Shao-hsiung, the Kwangsi general who was Governor of Kwangtung, managed to escape. The bulk of Chang Fa-k’uei’s troops moved out of the city of Canton in anticipation of a counterattack by the Kwangsi generals. Canton itself was defended by a very small garrison. What was significant was the fact that the Canton garrison, consisting of a cadet regiment and a garrison regiment, was heavily infested with Communist influence. The cadet regiment, made up of cadets of the Wuhan Political and Military Academy, was Communist-led and Communist-staffed. Its commander was the well-known Communist leader Yeh Chien-ying. At the same time of the Canton insurrection, however, Yeh had been transferred to the Whampoa Military Academy. The garrison regiment was commanded by another Communist, one Liang Ping-chu. These two regiments, with a total strength of about two or three thousand men, formed the main force of the insurrectionists. Presumably a far greater 232

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number of workers could be called into service if the insurrection showed signs of success. About 150 miles away from Canton there was the so-called Hailufeng Soviet government under P’eng Pai, who promised to provide the necessary “coordination between the uprisings of the town and the countryside.” All this looked good to the Communist plotters headed by Chang T’ai-lei, Secretary of the Kwangtung Committee, and Yeh Chien-ying. The conspirators did their plotting in the Soviet Consulate in Canton. Several foreign Communists, notably the German Communist Heinz Neumann, parti­ cipated in the planning. In the early hours of December 11, 1927, the cadet regiment went into action. They took the police station and occupied most of the government buildings. Slogans, placards and proclamations appeared on the walls overnight. A Soviet Government was established, with Su Chao-cheng as Chairman (Su was in fact in Shanghai; Chang T ’ai-lei acted for him), Yeh T ’ing, one of the leaders of the Nanchang uprising, as commander of the Red Army, Yun Tai-ying as Secretary-General, and P’eng Pai as head of the Land Commission. Although there were thousands of people in the streets, very few appeared at the mass meetings to “hail the new government.” Only the riffraffs, wearing red arm bands, came out in force to join in an orgy of looting, burning and indiscriminate shooting. Chaos and carnage reigned for three days and nights. Some fifteen thousand innocent people lost their lives in the process. The “Canton Commune,” as the uprising has come to be called in Communist literature, was a failure from the very start. The people did not rally to the support of the Communists. Nor did the peasants in the environs of Canton. P’eng Pai’s peasant Soviets in the East River area of Haifeng and Lufeng, on which the plotters had placed so much hope, did practically nothing to help the insurrectionists. Even their calculations about the counter-revolutionary forces were wrong. It is true that there were plenty of disagreements and conflicts of interest among the Kuomintang generals. But these “inner contradictions” did not prevent them from uniting when the Communists’ insurrection was staged. There was no revolutionary upsurge that the Communists had predicted. 233

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The insurrectionists controlled only a part of Canton. The fifth Army Corps of the Kuomintang’s National Revolutionary Army under the command of Li Fu-lin and the Second Division of the Fourth Army Corps under the command of Hsueh Yueh began to strike back soon after the uprising. By the 13th they were in control of most of the city. Members of the Machine Workers’ Union rallied to the Kuomintang. The Communists made their last stand at the police station, the headquarters of the short-lived Soviet government. In no time the remnants of the Communist force entrenched behind sandbag barricades were wiped out, leaving in the wake only carnage, destruction and misery. The uprising was thus speedily put to an end. Chang T ’ai-lei died in the battle. Yeh T’ing managed to escape to Hongkong. Secret documents and other evidence unearthed in subsequent investigations proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the events in Canton were inspired by Moscow. After the Wuhan debacle. Stalin needed a victory to vindicate his theory of the rising revolutionary tide in China. The crushing defeat suffered by the insurrectionists in Canton showed that no such upsurge ever existed. Yet the Stalin leadership was by no means willing to concede that the revolutionary tide had definitely receded. For to do so would play directly into the hands of the Trotskyist Opposition who, as soon as the Communists broke with the Left Kuomintang at Wuhan, had declared that there was no revolutionary climate in China. The Soviet Consulate and Soviet commercial establish­ ments in Canton were the espionage and subversive organs where the insurrection was planned. A Soviet vice-consul and his assistant took an active part in the mob violence and were caught red-handed on the scene. This brought matters to a head, and on December 14, 1927, the National Government at Nanking severed diplomatic relations with Russia and ordered the immediate closing of all Soviet diplomatic and commercial establishments in China, thus bringing to an end China’s ill-fated alignment with Soviet Russia. Commenting on severance of diplomatic relations with Russia Chiang Kai-shek wrote:

234

KUOMINTANG’S BREAK WITH SOVIET RUSSIA It is unfortunate that in the process of our national revolution, many countries in the world did not seem to know what we were striving for. The Russians, in their anxiety to communize the world, fully intended to substitute the Leninist Communist revolution for the national revolution based on Dr. Sun’s Three Principles of the People. They not only used the agents of the Third International to destroy the Kuomintang through the activities of the Chinese Communist Party, their diplomatic and consular officers, taking advantage of the special privileges accorded to them, played an active and direct role in sabotaging our national revolution, thus doing incalculable harm to the Chinese people. For self-defense we have to break relations with Russia . . .

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THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION: THE SECOND PHASE

Chiang’s Return to Nanking

On January 2, 1928, Chiang Kai-shek, then still in Shanghai, received a telegram from the Government at Nanking urging him to return to his post immediately to complete the task of the Northern Expedition. Political and military leaders of varying shades of opinion sent personal telegrams pledging their support. On January 4 Chiang, accompanied by T ’an Yen-k’ai, Yang Shu-chuang, Ch’en Li-fu and others, left Shanghai for the capital. All the way from Shanghai to Nanking he was greeted by cheering crowds and was received with jubilation upon his arrival at the capital. T’an Yen-k’ai, touched by the spontaneous expression of joy manifested by the people, said to him, “Today the people rejoice at your return. This offers a graphic contrast to the gloom and despondency which gripped them at the news of your retirement in August last year.” On the 7th of January, he formally resumed his post as Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army. Two days later he issued a message to all the officers and men under his command expressing regret that circumstances had made it necessary for him to leave his post last year without waiting for the formal acceptance of his resignation by the Central authorities. He was gratified, he said, that his comrades-in-arms had fought so valiantly for the cause of the party in the face of so many internal and external problems. He expressed the belief that party unity would soon be a reality and that, with their support, he would be able, within the shortest possible time, complete the Northern Expedition in fulfillment of the wishes of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. 236

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On the day he issued the foregoing message, he also issued a message to members of the Kuomintang and to the people of the country. Asking for their support, Chiang said, “I want my comrades to join together and my fellow countrymen to lend support to us . . . I crave your advice and guidance. The future of our Party and country depends upon you.” He pledged himself “to support the Central authorities in order to strengthen the foundation of the Government, and to suppress all Communist activities in order to bring peace and order to the people.” He added: As regards all Party and Government affairs, I hold that the Central authorities shall be solely responsible. I shall, as a member of the Central Executive Committee, follow the lead of other members and share the responsibility.”

The Fourth Plenary Session o f the Central Executive Committee

On February 2 the Kuomintang’s Central Executive Committee held its Fourth Plenum at Nanking. The meeting had originally been scheduled to open on or about the first of January, but for various reasons it was postponed for a month. Of the 36 members of the Central Executive Committee and 12 members of the Central Supervisory Committee, 29 attended the session. The Communist members were of course excluded; as were also those closely associated with Wang Ching-wei. Chiang, T’an Yen-k’ai, and Yu Yu-jen formed the Presidium. In his opening speech, Chiang said: The Communists have done all they could to undermine our revolution and distort our Party’s principles. We have discovered their conspiracy, and we have now expelled them from our Party. Those who are gathered here today are all loyal members of the Kuomintang . . . This is a meeting for the rejuvenation of our Party; it also offers us an opportunity for the rejuvenation of China.” 237

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The Plenum was mainly concerned with the problem of reconstruction both of the government and of the Party. All previous decisions in regard to alliance with Soviet Russia and alliance with the Communists were repealed. During the session, members of the Standing Committee were elected, as well as members of the State and the Military Councils. Decisions providing for a nationwide registration of Kuomintang members were made, and a Third National Congress was to be called in August of the same year. The new Military Council consisted of 73 members headed by Chiang Kai-shek. T ’an Yen-k’ai was elected Chairman of the State Council. Chiang continued to serve as Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army. The Plenum unanimously decided to concentrate all Party efforts on the successful conclusion of the Northern Expedition. Chiang now turned his full attention to preparations for a vigorous renewal of the campaign against the Northern warlords, which had hung fire since his temporary retirement more than six months before. Early in February he went north along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway to Hsuchow to inspect the troops at that important point. His return to the front was enthusiastically hailed by officers and men. He reorganized the First Route Army under the command of Ho Ying-chin into the First Group Army. He then went to Chengchow to confer with Feng Yu-hsiang. The two men discussed plans for continuation of the Northern Expedition, and reorganization of forces. Feng’s Kuominchun was reorganized into the Second Group Army. The forces of Yen Hsi-shan, Governor of Shansi, who had thrown in his lot with the Nationalists, were reorganized into the Third Group Army. To these was later added a Fourth Group Army under the command of the Kwangsi general Li Tsung-jen. There were 18 armies in the First Group Army, 25 in the Second, 11 in the Third, and 16 in the Fourth, supplemented by 9 independent divisions. The total strength amounted to about half a million. Opposing the Nationalist forces were the armies of Sun Ch’uan-fang, Chang Tsung-ch’ang, Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Yu-t’ing under the over-all command of Chang Tso-lin in Peking, numbering about a million strong. 238

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The Launching of the Campaign The Nationalist drive began on April 7, 1928. Fighting started immediately on a number of widely separated fronts. Chiang took personal command of the First Group Army. Ho Ying-chin was now appointed Chief of Staff of the National Revolutionary Army. The First Group Army advanced along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, the Second pushed northward along the Peking-Hankow Railway, and the Third drove from Shansi along the Chengtai Railway. The ultimate target of all of them was Peking. Chiang’s own Group army quickly occupied Taierhchuang at the southern tip of Shantung province. Within a week Lincheng, Linchi, and other important towns were in Nationalist hands. It was only a matter of days before Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, would be captured. Tsinan is a large and important city on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. The Japanese, whose influence had been spreading throughout Shantung for several years, had considerable commercial interests in Tsinan. More than 2,200 Japanese nationals resided in that city. Chiang Kai-shek was well aware that as he carried his campaign into Shantung Japan might under one pretext or another intervene. Indeed, Japan had done precisely that the year before when, after establishment of the National Government at Nanking, the Nationalist troops had attempted to advance on Shantung. Tanaka Giichi, who had become Prime Minister of Japan on April 20, 1927, by virtue of his presidency of the Seiyukai party, was the exponent of a “positive” policy in China. In May 1927 he had ordered Japanese troops into Shantung along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway to block the advance of the Nationalists. At that time a clash had fortunately been averted. Would the Tanaka government intervene again in 1928? This was a question very much on Chiang’s mind. Early in March, a month before the resumption of the northern campaign, Chiang entertained a group of Japanese reporters at dinner and told them: . . . Japan and China have maintained very close relations and the Japanese people have long been friends of the Kuomintang. We are justified in believing that among the 239

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION friendly powers only Japan is in a position to understand the real meaning of China’s national revolution. And we are convinced that Japan, instead of trying to obstruct the progress of our revolution, wishes us well. We are about to resume the Northern Expedition. This is a struggle on which the very survival of the Chinese nation depends . . . We believe that the Japanese people want us to succeed . . . We have no doubt that the success of our mission will enhance the happiness and prosperity of Asia and ensure the peace of the world. It is my earnest hope that you will convey my sincere wishes to the Japanese people and government.

The fact is, however, that the Tanaka government had, as early as December 20, 1927, already decided at a Cabinet meeting to intervene in China if the Nationalists should resume its northward drive. When the Nationalist troops had penetrated deep into Shantung in the middle of April 1928, Japanese military and consular officers at Tsinan informed Tokyo that the time for intervention had arrived. Soon afterwards, the Japanese Cabinet met and formally accepted War Minister General Shirakawa’s proposal for intervention. On the night of April 20 the first contingent of Japanese troops, numbering about 460 men, arrived at Tsinan from Tientsin. At the same time Lieutenant-General Fukuta Hikosuke, commander of the Sixth Division in Kumamoto Prefecture of Japan, was ordered to Tsingtao allegedly to protect Japanese interests in Shantung. On the 21st the Foreign Minister of the National Government, Huang Fu, lodged a strong-worded protest with the Tanaka govern­ ment: In May last year Japan had unjustifiably dispatched troops to the province of Shantung. My Government had pointed out at that time that this was an infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of China and contrary to all principles of international law . . . Now the Government of Japan has once again violated the obligations solemnly assumed by it under the treaties with my Government. The Government of Japan will have to bear full responsibility for consequences that might flow from this flagrant act of aggression . . .

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At 9 o ’clock on the morning of May 1, 1928, contingents of Chiang’s First Army Corps entered Tsinan. Chang Tsung-ch’ang’s northern troops had already left the city and Nationalist flags were seen everywhere. On the following day Chiang Kai-shek himself arrived and established his headquarters at the governor’s office premises. Soon after Chiang’s arrival General Fukuta and the Sixth Division of the Japanese Army reached Tsinan from Tsingtao. They were quartered in the new commercial district just outside the ancient walled city, where most Japanese nationals resided. The whole area was sealed off by barbed-wire entanglements and sandbags, and fortified by machine-gun and artillery emplacements. Lorries filled with Japanese soldiers, steel-helmeted and armed to the teeth, rushed through the streets not only in the new commercial district but also in other parts of the city. Wall posters warned that any intrusion into Japanese military areas would be dealt with “in a drastic manner.” To all intents and purposes, Tsinan was a city under foreign military occupation. The air was heavy with foreboding. Chiang tried to avoid the risk of a clash with the Japanese. It was essential to the success of the Northern Expedition that nothing should happen to impede the progress of the campaign. Through the intermediary of the Japanese Consul-General, Nishita Koichi, he requested that the Japanese troops be withdrawn and the commercial district of the city be reopened for free passage of vehicles and men. General Fukuta’s reply was that the Japanese had come to Tsinan by order of their government and could not accede to the request of the Chinese authorities. On the night of May 2, however, the barbed-wire entanglements and sandbags surrounding the commercial district were suddenly removed. At first it was believed that this was a conciliatory move on the part of the Japanese military. The removal of the barbed-wire entanglements and sandbags had in fact made clashes between the Japanese and Chinese forces inevitable. At 8 o ’clock on the morning of May 3, the Japanese Consul-General and the commander of the Japanese gendarmes called at the provisional headquarters where Chiang had established himself. They were amicably received and in the course of the conversation they praised the 241

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discipline and good behavior of the National Revolutionary Army and its efficiency as a fighting unit, pointing to the lack of discipline on the part of the retreating troops under Chang Tsung-ch’ang. They added that in sending troops to Tsinan, the object of the Japanese Government was to accord protection to Japanese residents in the city. Since order was being maintained by the Revolutionary Army there was no necessity for the Japanese troops to remain at Tsinan, and they were ready to withdraw their troops that very afternoon. Chiang was relieved by the knowledge of the impending Japanese withdrawal. This, however, was but a brief illusion. Within half an hour of the Japanese officers’ visit, Chiang heard machine-gun firing in the streets. Taken aback, he and his staff officers waited at the headquarters while an aide-de-camp went out to see what was happening. The aide came back with the dismaying information that the city gates had been closed and that there had been fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops. Chiang immediately issued orders that all Chinese troops should return to barracks. He requested the Japanese to do the same. He tried desperately to get in touch with General Fukuta, but since all means of communication had been cut off, there was no way to get the message across. In order to avoid any escalation of the conflict, Chiang then ordered all Chinese troops stationed outside the walled city to withdraw before 5 o ’clock that afternoon to places farther away from Tsinan. He informed General Fukuta of this fact and requested that a Japanese representative be sent to his headquarters for the purpose of settling the matter amicably. This the Japanese commander refused to do, demanding that a Chinese representative be sent to his headquarters to discuss the matter. Finally a neutral meeting place was suggested and agreed upon. General Hsiung Shih-hui represented the Chinese side while General Kurota Shuichi, Fukuta’s Chief of Staff, represented the Japanese side. The two generals and their aides met at the offices of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. General Hsiung was a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy and spoke Japanese fluently. He was a schoolmate of Kurota’s and had every reason to expect that he would be treated with courtesy and sincerity. 242

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It was not so, however. In an arrogant and truculent manner, the Japanese officer placed before Hsiung a document and asked him to sign. The document contained three demands: (1) no Chinese officers or men be permitted to pass through the streets in the new commercial district; (2) no Chinese troops be allowed to use the Tsingtao-Tsinan and Tientsin-Pukow Railways; and (3) all Chinese troops be withdrawn to a distance of 20 li from Tsinan. General Hsiung refused to append his signature to the document. The meeting reached a deadlock. At 5 o ’clock on the morning of May 4 Hsiung returned to Chiang’s headquarters and reported bitterly that the Japanese seem determined to look for a fight. He believed that there were only two options open to the Chinese: either to take up the Japanese challenge and fight to the end or to swallow the bitter pill and withdraw completely from Tsinan, leaving the accounts to be squared at some later date. Chiang counselled patience. He noted in his diary: “The insolent behavior of the Japanese military will some day bring disaster to the Japanese nation and people.”

The Detention of the Chinese Foreign Minister

Meanwhile, further complications were arising. Huang Fu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the National Government, had accompanied the troops to Tsinan and had set up a temporary office there. As soon as the fighting started on the morning of May 3, Japanese troops surrounded the office and raided it. Huang had studied in Japan and known Fukuta personally. He believed that a talk with the Japanese commander would settle the problem. He therefore went directly to the Japanese military headquarters. Arriving there he was seized by Japanese sentries and put under arrest. They would not let him see Fukuta but instead gave him a prepared document to sign. The document stated that the clash between Japanese and Chinese troops was due to an attempt by the Nationalists to rob and attack Japanese residents. Huang indignantly refused to sign the document. 243

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One Japanese officer threatened him with death. Huang told him that as Foreign Minister he would not submit to such indignities and insults, nor could he be intimidated by threats. At this juncture a Japanese and a Chinese who had been sent into the streets to ascertain the real situation returned. The Japanese declared that he had seen Japanese civilians being killed by Chinese soldiers and that his Chinese companion had been a witness. Intimidated, the Chinese agreed to the verity of the Japanese prepared document. Huang glanced at the document and wrote the word “read” on it, indicating that he had read the report, but had not signed it. Huang was then released. He had been detained at the Japanese headquarters for 18 hours.

The Murder of Commissioner Ts’ai Kung-shih and Other Foreign Service Officers

Shortly after the detention of Huang Fu, some twenty Japanese soldiers forced their way into the office of the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs for the province of Shantung. They alleged that two Japanese soldiers had been shot by bullets fired from that building.They smashed the furniture, cut the telephone lines, destroyed everything they could lay their hands on and huddled all the 16 members of the staff into one room. The officer in charge sitting in the center of the room ordered Commissioner Ts’ai to kneel on the floor before him and disclose the identity of the man who had fired the shots. Ts’ai denied that any shot had been fired from his office, and adamantly refused to kneel before the Japanese officer, because, as a Chinese gentleman, he considered this the height of humiliation and indignity to which he could be subjected, something even more cruel than death itself. Then a Japanese soldier took out a pistol and fired at one of the staff members. Ts’ai was warned that the 244

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same would happen to him if he persisted in being uncooperative. Ts’ai continued to resist. Then another of his staff was shot. All 16 of them were thus murdered one by one in cold blood. Ts’ai was not the only one that remained, yet he still refused to bend his knees. A Japanese soldier knocked him down with the butt of his rifle, breaking his legs. When he cursed the Japanese military for their inhuman cruelty, his tongue was cut off. He was finally given the coup de grace when a soldier put a bullet through his head.

Chinese Restraint

The arrogance and high-handedness of the Japanese were too much for the Nationalists to take. The Chinese troops had been provoked into a fighting mood, and there had been much talk about teaching the Japanese a lesson. Indeed, had they been allowed to bring up their artillery, they could have done so. But Chiang was determined to have no foreign war on his hands to prevent him from completing the unification of China. Consequently he resisted the pressure from his subordinates, and took steps to make the clash at Tsinan a local incident to be settled later by negotiations. On the afternoon of May 4, Fukuta sent an aide-de-camp to Chiang’s headquarters to deliver the message that the Japanese did not intend to expand the conflict and that Fukuta himself bore no ill-will toward the National Revolutionary Army and was prepared to lend a helping hand to the Chinese revolution. Chiang expressed satisfaction at the message, but could only hope that the Japanese would demonstrate their goodwill by cessation of provocative action. He was well aware that the seemingly conciliatory attitude of General Fukuta was no more than a tactical move to gain time to bring up reinforcements from Tsingtao, Manchuria, Korea or Japan in order to stop the Nationalist 245

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drive toward North China.1 Pending the arrival of Japanese reinforcements, Fukuta encouraged Chang Tsung-ch’ang, whose troops had retreated to Tehchow, about 100 kilometers from Tsinan, to launch a counter-attack against the Nationalists. But Chang’s troops had been too badly shattered to mount an effective offensive. On the night of the 4th Chiang ordered the main body of his troops to cross the Yellow River and thus remove the possibility of a large-scale conflict. The troops evacuated Tsinan with orderliness and dispatch, and by the afternoon of the next day most of them were already on the north bank of the Yellow River. The Japanese sent planes to drop bombs on the troops, resulting in the killing of a number of men. Chiang himself did not leave the city until the morning of May 6. He then made his temporary headquarters at a small village called Tangchiachuang, some 17 kilometers from Tsinan. He left one regiment of about 3,000 men inside the walled city to maintain order under the command of Colonel Li Yen-nien. The Japanese made several assaults on the city, but these were successfully repulsed. The regiment grimly held out for two days. On May 9, Fukuta, seeing that he was getting nowhere against this comparatively small, but courageous and obstinate body of men, decided to resort to deceptive tactics. He informed Li that he would leave unguarded the city’s east gate and allow the passage of Li’s troops to leave for Tangchiachuang. On the evening of the 9th, therefore, Li led his troops, under the terms agreed upon, out of the designated gate and headed north. Before the weary men had covered a distance of barely a mile, they were attacked without warning in the open country by Japanese troops who had lain in ambush along the way. The onslaught took Li unawares. He and his 1 According to Japanese sources, on May 3 the General Staff in Tokyo informed Fukuta that reinforcements would be forthcoming and ordered him to take a firm stand toward the Chinese. Plans had already been made to send an infantry division and a regiment of railway engineers from Japan proper, a mixed brigade from Manchuria and an air force from Korea. Prime Minister Tanaka’s Seiyukai Party was a minority party in the Diet, and he hesitated to give prompt approval to the General Staff’s plans. By the time he made his decision (May 8), the crisis had passed. 246

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men had to fend for themselves as best they could. Only 500 survivors succeeded in making their way to Tangchiachuang. After May 9th the fighting gradually died down. There had been heavy losses of life and property. According to the report of an investigative team published on June 7, 1928, 3,254 Chinese were killed and 1,450 wounded. The losses on the Japanese side, according to a report submitted by the Japanese Foreign Office to the Diet in December, 1928, included 15 killed and 15 wounded.

The Settlement

On May 7 General Kurota, Chief of Staff of the Japanese Sixth Division, handed to Chao Shih-hsuan, Acting Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Shantung, a series of five demands: punishment of Nationalist officers involved in the fighting; disarming of all Nationalist troops involved; cessation of anti-Japanese agitation throughout the country; withdrawal of Nationalist troops outside a zone 20 li (7 miles) around Tsinan and along 250-mile length of the TsingtaoTsinan Railway; and evacuation of two villages in the vicinity of Tsinan where Chinese barracks were located. Chao was given 12 hours to comply with these demands. In reply to the Japanese ultimatum, General Hsiung Shih-hui was instructed to inform the Japanese military authorities that while the National Government was prepared to give serious consideration to the Japanese demands, it demanded on its part that those Japanese officers who had been guilty of atrocious acts against the Chinese people be punished. Pertaining to the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Tsinan and the vicinity of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, however, it was pointed out that the National Government could not be denied the sovereign right of stationing troops on its own territory. Fukuta rejected the Chinese reply out of hand and regarded it as an “insincere” attempt to settle the conflict. 247

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He threatened to take “drastic action” if Chiang failed to give complete satisfaction to the Japanese demands. Chiang then sent his chief adviser, General Ho Cheng-hsuan, to negotiate with the Japanese. The Japanese refused to deal with him on the ground that he did not have the necessary credentials. The Tsinan conflict between the Chinese and Japanese forces was the direct outgrowth of the much-publicized “positive policy” of Prime Minister Tanaka. Chiang, as had been noted, had had in November 1927 occasion to meet Tanaka at the latter’s residence in Tokyo. Tanaka had made it abundantly clear that he was not enthusiastic about Chiang’s northward drive. When Chiang resumed his campaign against the Northern militarists he knew that the Tanaka Cabinet might try to intervene. Therefore, Chiang had sent his close friend and adviser, Chang Chun, to Japan to explain to his wide circle of influential friends that the Northern Expedition was not inimical to Japanese interests and should have their support. When Chang reached Tokyo a clash between the Japanese and Chinese forces in Tsinan had already taken place. He at once got in touch with his good friend, Arita Hachiro, who was then chief of the Asian Bureau at the Foreign Office. In an arranged interview with Tanaka on May 5, Chang proposed that the conflict should be settled through diplomatic channels. Tanaka was not receptive to Chang’s suggestion. But when Japanese aggression and atrocities in Tsinan attracted world-wide attention, Tanaka realized that Fukuta, by his excess, had brought the Japanese Army into disrepute. He informed Chang Chun that he was sending Lieutenant-General Matsui Iwane, Chief Intelligence Officer of the Japanese General Staff, to Tsinan. Chang Chun immediately returned to China. He and Matsui met at Tangchiachuang, which the Japanese had occupied soon after Chiang’s departure for the North. Chang’s talks with Matsui were full of twists and turns. Chang pointed out that the Tsinan conflict was the direct result of the unwarranted intrusion of Japanese troops upon Chinese territory and demanded that the troops be withdrawn. Matsui brought up the five demands made by Fukuta. Chang insisted that unless Japan was prepared to negotiate upon the main issues through proper diplomatic channels, China would refuse to continue the conversations. 248

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After hours and hours of talk, the two parties agreed that formal negotiations should take place. Protracted correspond­ ence ensued and the agreement was finally signed by C.T. Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the National Government, and Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Japanese Minister to China, on March 28, 1929. The terms of the agreement were simple and direct: (1) within two months after the signature of the agreement all Japanese troops should be completely withdrawn from Shantung and (2) damages resulting from the conflict should be determined by a Commission of Inquiry composed of representatives of both China and Japan. Nothing was said about the responsibility of the conflict. The murder of Ts’ai Kung-shih was passed over in silence. The Tsinan affair, so fraught with dangerous consequences, was localized so that its ultimate consequences were not as serious as they might have been. This was due to Chiang’s patience and statesmanship. But the bloodshed at Tsinan will always be remembered as an infamous episode in Japan’s military history.

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CHAPTER TW ENTY

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The Drive toward Peking

The Japanese intervention at Tsinan did not stop the Northern Expedition; it had only impeded its progress by more than a week. By the middle of May Chiang’s First Group Army had taken P’ingyuan in northeastern Shantung; the Second Group Army under Feng Yu-hsiang had taken Tehchow on the Chili-Shantung border; and the Third Group Army commanded by Yen Hsi-shan had taken the important railway town of Shihkiachwang. The Fourth Group Army commanded by the Kwangsi general Li Tsung-jen had joined the other forces in a concerted drive toward Peking. The Northern armies under Chang Tsung-ch’ang and Sun Ch’uan-fang were no longer capable of effective resistance, and the only northern warlord who still stood in the path of the victorious Nationalist armies was Chang Tso-lin, who had since June 1927 made Peking the capital of his military government. It seemed that the glittering prize of Peking was within easy reach of the Nationalist armies. Before launching a general offensive against Chang Tso-lin, Chiang considered it important to confer with his principal allies. On May 19 he crossed from the Tientsin-Pukow Railway at Hsuchow to the Peking-Hankow Railway at Chengchow to meet with Feng Yu-hsiang and Pai Ch’ung-hsi, field commander of the Fourth Group Army. Later in the month he proceeded to Shihkiachwang to confer with Yen Hsi-shan. As the Nationalists closed in upon the Peking-Tientsin area, the Tanaka government in Japan feared that the war might affect Japanese interests in Manchuria. Early in May 250

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Yamanashi Hanzo, former Minister of War, went to Peking to persuade Chang Tso-lin to take his troops out of the Peking-Tientsin area before it was too late. Chang refused to take Yamanashi’s advice. On May 16 the Japanese Cabinet decided that the war must be prevented from being extended to Manchuria at all costs. Japan was ready to do everything possible to facilitate Chang Tso-lin’s withdrawal from within the Great Wall before the war had been extended to the Peking-Tientsin area; but Japan would not hesitate to disarm both Chiang’s and Chang’s forces should they allow the war to spread beyond the Great Wall. On the basis of this decision the Japanese Minister in Peking, Yoshizawa, was instructed to deliver the following message to Chang: War is now being extended to the Peking-Tientsin area. Should it be further extended to Manchuria, the Imperial Government of Japan, in order to maintain peace and security in Manchuria, would be forced to take appropriate and effective action.

In other words, Japan was prepared to intervene militarily in the Chinese civil war. Chang Tso-lin, however, continued to reject Japan’s unwarranted interference in China’s internal affairs. On May 18 General Muraoka Chotaro, commander of Japan’s powerful Kwantung Army, ordered his troops to be prepared to move southward to Chinchow to disarm any Chinese forces that might have entered Manchuria from China Proper. This was a move which had not been authorized by Tokyo, and the Tanaka Cabinet, through the Chief of the General Staff, General Suzuki Soroku, told General Muraoka to wait for imperial sanction before moving troops to areas outside the South Manchurian Railway zone. But the imperial sanction was never given, and the Kwantung Army was thus prevented from carrying out its plan of disarming Chinese troops at Chinchow. The reason for this was that Tokyo’s aggressive diplomatic demarche, which reflected a basic desire to detach Manchuria from the rest of China, was condemned by world public opinion. On May 19 Secretary of State Frank Kellogg of the United States declared that the administrative sovereignty of Manchuria remained vested in China. The Tanaka government, for all its insolence and aggressiveness, was not altogether unmindful of the state of world opinion. 251

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The Assassination of Chang Tso-lin

The Kwantung Army chafed under the restraint placed upon it by the Tanaka government. General Saito Hisashi, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, was expressing the general sentiment of his fellow officers when he wrote in his diary: It seems to me that a Prime Minister who plays politics in so flagrant a manner should forthwith be removed from office. (June 1, 1928) Such timid, myopic diplomacy is shameful. (June 3,1928)

In the opinion of the younger and more extremist elements in the Kwantung Army, Tanaka’s so-called “positive policy” was not positive enough; it only served to encourage Chang Tso-lin to show signs of greater resistance to Japanese pressure and greater tendency toward self-assertion. In time, they believed, Chang Tso-lin would certainly be beyond the control of Japan. Therefore, Chang Tso-lin must forthwith be done away with and replaced by some one who was less assertive and more amenable to manipulations. They were of course well aware that Chang’s removal might plunge Manchuria into chaos and confusion. If so, it would be a godsend for the Kwantung Army to seize control of that vast and resource-rich territory. The time for action was soon at hand. While Chiang Kai-shek was conferring with Yen Hsi-shan at Shihkiachwang toward the end of May, the strategic city of Paoting fell into Nationalist hands. Paoting, which had long been the cultural and political center of Chili province, was only 140 kilometers from Peking. Chang Tso-lin, who had hitherto been inclined to hold out against the Nationalists, had now changed his mind. On June 1, in full military regalia, he entertained the diplomatic corps at a farewell party. He announced that he had decided to withdraw his troops from within the Great Wall. The removal of his headquarters from Peking to Mukden, he said, did not detract an iota from his being a patriotic Chinese. “I, Chang Tso-lin,” he proclaimed with considerable pride, “will never sell China down the river, nor am I afraid to die.” At one o ’clock on the morning of June 3, Chang Tso-lin, 252

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accompanied by his close advisers, left his residence for the railway station. Fifteen minutes later he boarded the train to Mukden. On the train were also his two Japanese military aides: Colonel Machino Takema and Lt. Colonel Giga Seiya. Colonel Machino got off the train at Tientsin. When the train reached Shanhaikuan, Wu Tsun-sheng, Governor of Heilungkiang, came aboard to welcome the returning 'Old Marshal. At dawn on June 4, as the train neared Mukden, Chang looked out of the window of his car and smoked a cigarette. At 5:23 when the train reached the junction of the South Manchurian and Peking-Mukden Railways at Huangkutun, there was suddenly a deafening explosion. The coach in which Chang Tso-lin was travelling was blown to pieces. The Old Marshal was fatally wounded, as was Wu Tsun-sheng. His Japanese aide, Lt. Colonel Giga, was only slightly wounded. Chang died at 10 a.m., at the age of 55.

The Assassins: The Kwantung Army

There has never been any doubt that the Japanese were responsible for the dastardly act. But the proof of the Japanese guilt did not come to light until the end of World War II when the Japanese war criminals were put on trial. It is now known that Lt.General Muraoka Chotaro, commander of the Kwantung Army, was the real perpetrator of the crime. Disappointed at the Tanaka Government, he decided to take the law into his own hands. He at first ordered Major Takeshita Yoshiharu to assassinate Chang Tso-lin in Peking. When this was deemed impracticable, a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, one Komoto Daisaku, undertook to do the job in Manchuria. From the moment Chang Tso-lin boarded his special train he was being kept under surveillance by Komoto’s co-conspirators. The number and exact location of the car in which Chang Tso-lin was travelling were checked and double-checked every step of the way. Komoto and his men had mines securely planted at the foot of the South 253

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Manchurian Railway bridge under which Chang’s special train was to pass. As soon as Chang’s car was seen to be passing under the bridge, the switch of the electric cable attached to the mines was closed and a terrific explosion ensued. Komoto’s meticulous planning paid off, and the mission was a complete success. No one was more annoyed by what the Kwantung Army had done than Prime Minister Tanaka himself. Only a few weeks before, he had, through the agency of Yamamoto Jotaro, Director-General of the South Manchurian Railway, secured in Peking from Chang Tso-lin the right to build five railway lines which would strengthen Japan’s economic and political hold in Manchuria. It was expected that after his disastrous adventure inside the Great Wall, Chang Tso-lin would have to rely on the Japanese for survival and would therefore be willing to serve as an instrument of Japanese penetration. Now the Kwantung Army had, without his knowledge, impetuously upset the apple-cart, and the deal he had made with Chang Tso-lin stood in danger of falling through. The Tanaka government, at the end of June, summoned Komoto to Tokyo and questioned him about Chang’s assassination. Komoto was evasive and denied that the Kwantung Army had anything to do with it. Later Tanaka sent Mine Komatsu, commander of the military police, to Mukden to inquire into the matter. It was only then that the Tanaka government was able to get to the bottom of the sordid business. On December 24,1928, Tanaka, after having informed the Emperor of the matter, ordered War Minister Shirakawa Yoshinori to court-martial the officers suspected of the crime. This was met with the bitter opposition of the military hierarchy, and the court-martial was quietly dropped. In January 1929 members of the Minseito opposition party in the Japanese Diet, raised the question of the Tanaka government’s responsibility in regard to Chang Tso-lin’s assassination. They clamored for an investigation. At the same time Elder Statesman Prince Saionji demanded the tightening of military discipline. It was not until July 1 that the War Ministry announced the retirement of General Muraoka, commander of the Kwantung Army, and the 254

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suspension of the culprit of the case, staff officer Komoto. General Saito Hisashi, chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, and General Mizuno Takezo, commander of Japan’s Garrison Forces in Manchuria, were relieved of their duties. The punishment thus meted out was not calculated to satisfy the critics of the Tanaka government. Nor did it satisfy Emperor Hirohito, who told the Prime Minister that this did not seem to be in accord with what Tanaka had proposed last December. When the Prime Minister begged to explain, the Emperor cut him off by saying that no explanation was now necessary. The next day the Tanaka Cabinet tendered its resignation. Less than three months later (September 29), Tanaka died of angina pectoris at the home of his mistress. But his so-called “positive” China policy lived on. After Chang Tso-lin’s death his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, stepped into his shoes. Chang Hsueh-liang was then only 28 years old. The Young Marshal, as he has been popularly known to Western journalists, quickly withdrew all his army to Manchuria, leaving only a small number of troops in Peking to maintain peace and order pending the arrival of the National Revolutionary Army.

The Triumphant Entry into Peking

On June 4, 1928, the Nanking Government appointed Yen Hsi-shan, commander of the Third Group Army, Garrison Commander of the Peking-Tientsin area. On the morning of the 6th the vanguard of Yen’s army reached the suburbs of Peking, and immediately the remnants of the Manchurian troops pulled out. The Nationalist flag fluttered in the wind everywhere in the city. On the afternoon of the 11th, Yen Hsi-shan and Pai Ch’ung-hsi, field commander of the Fourth Group Army, made a triumphant entry into the ancient capital of China. On June 9, when Chiang Kai-shek had been informed of the entry of the Nationalist troops into Peking, he begged the 255

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National Government to relieve him of his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army and as Chairman of the National Military Council. This, he said, was to carry out the promise he had made in February when the Northern Expedition was resumed. As might have been expected, the National Government refused to accept his resignation. On June 20 the Political Council of the Kuomintang changed the name of Peking (Northern Capital) to Peiping (Northern Peace). Peiping was not a new name; that was the name that ancient city had for thousands of years been known until the advent of the Mings in the 14th century. On June 26 Chiang Kai-shek started from Nanking for Peking. He was welcomed on the way by Li Tsung-jen, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. On July 3 the four leaders entered Peiping amidst thunderous applause. Immediately Chiang, in company with his generals, proceeded to the monastery in the Western Hills where Dr. Sun’s remains temporarily rested. He stood before the shrine of the dead master and prayed in silence. Two days later a formal service was held at the monastery. It was a simple, impressive ceremony. Chiang wept as he stood there before Dr. Sun’s tomb.

The Fifth Plenary Session of the KMT CEC

Late in July, Chiang returned to Nanking to attend the Fifth Plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, scheduled to take place on August 8, 1928. The Northern Expedition as such had come to an end, and the unification of China was apparently achieved. For the first time in the history of China had a military campaign starting from so distant a province as Kwangtung ever succeeded in unifying the country. Chiang’s achievement was an event of unprecedented significance. According to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang’s 256

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responsibility in the political reconstruction of China must pass through three successive stages: the period of military operations, the period of political education or tutelage, and the period of constitutionalism. Now that the fighting was over, the Kuomintang must move on to the second stage — a period of readjustment and education of the people in order to transform China into a genuine democracy. Hence, the most important result of the Fifth Plenary Session of the CEC of the KMT was the promulgation of the Organic Law of the National Government of China. This was based on the five-power plan devised by Dr. Sun. The Organic Law called for the establishment of five co-equal and independent branches of government known as the five Yuan: Executive, Legislative, Control, Judicial and Examination. Dr. Sun’s innovation was the addition of control and examination to the three familiar governmental divisions. The Control Yuan, with powers of review, impeachment, and auditing, was not altogether new because it had existed in the Chinese political system for thousands of years. Nor was the Examination Yuan, which checked on qualifications of functionaries. On October 1, the Standing Committee of the CEC of the KMT adopted a set of general principles governing the Period of Political Education or Tutelage as follows: (1) During this period the National Congress of the KMT guides the people in the exercise of political authority. (2) Upon its adjournment, the National Congress of the KMT entrusts this authority to the Central Executive Committee of the KMT. (3) With a view to laying the foundation of Constitutional Government, the people should be trained in the gradual exercise of four political rights, namely, election, recall, initiative and referendum. (4) With a view to laying the foundations for government elected by the people during the Constitutional Period, the five divisions, namely, executive, legislative, judicial, examination and control, of the governing power are entrusted in toto to the National Government for execution. (5) The Political Council of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT shall guide and supervise the execution by the National Government of important national affairs. 257

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(6) The amendment and interpretation of the Organic Law of the National Government of the Republic of China shall be made by resolutions adopted by the Political Council of the CEC of the KMT. The Standing Committee of the CEC of the KMT on October 8 appointed T’an Yen-k’ai President of the Executive Yuan, Hu Han-min President of the Legislative Yuan, Wang Ch’ung-hui President of the Judicial Yuan, Tai Chi-t’ao President of the Examination Yuan, and Ts’ai Yuan-p’ei President of the Control Yuan. Over and above the five Yuan was a State Council of which all the Presidents of the five Yuan were members. Other members of the State Council were chosen from among the most outstanding citizens of the realm. Thus, all such political and military leaders as Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, Li Tsung-jen, Ho Ying-chin, Lin Sen, Sun Fo, Ch’en Kuo-fu, and Yang Hsu-chuang were made members. Surprisingly, Chang Hsueh-liang, who had succeeded his father Chang Tso-lin as ruler of Manchuria, was also made a State Councillor notwithstanding the fact that Manchuria was not yet under the Kuomintang flag. This was a tactical move on Chiang’s part, who believed that Chang Hsueh-liang would sooner or later join the Nationalist fold. Chiang Kai-shek declined the post of the President of the Executive Yuan and was made Chairman of the State Council, a position of great honor but with no real power. He did, however, have considerably more power than his office conferred, since he was Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The Chairman of the State Council was the titular Head of State and was commonly referred to in the press as the President of the Republic of China. The Fifth Plenum of the CEC of the KMT was not an unqualified success. It was characterized by factional bickerings and struggle for influence among various groups. The Session came to an abrupt close by mid-August when some of its leading members departed for Shanghai over the issue of the abolition of branch political councils that had been set up at Canton, Hankow, Kaifeng, Taiyuan and Peiping in the course of the Northern Expedition. These branch councils often acted independently of the Political Council at Nanking. Now that the country had been unified 258

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there was no longer any reason for the existence of the branch councils. But there were those who relied on the existence of the branch councils as the base of their political influence. They were not ready to give up what they considered to be their rightful spoils of war. On the 10th of October, China’s National Day, being the anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, Chiang Kai-shek took office as Chairman of the State Council. On that occasion he issued a statement in which he urged his countrymen to develop national physical fitness in order to avoid degeneration into a weak and feeble race; to preserve the moral values of the Chinese people in order to eradicate selfishness and slipshod work-style; to increase scientific knowledge in order to discard superstitions; and to become thoroughly conversant with the culture of the Western world in order to facilitate national and social progress.

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MANCHIRIA UNDER NATIONALIST FLAG

Chang Hsueh-liang’s Resistance to Japanese Pressure

When Peking was occupied by the Nationalists, Chang Hsueh-liang sent four emissaries to visit Chiang at the ancient capital, pledging his support for national unification. As a first step, the emissaries proposed the sending of 100 youths from the Three Eastern Provinces to Nanking to be trained in Sun Yat-senism preparatory to the establishment of party organs in Manchuria. Chiang welcomed this gesture of cooperation, though he had reservations about Chang’s sincerity. The emissaries assured him that Chang was sincere, and it was agreed that the Young Marshal would formally announce his allegiance to Nanking on July 24, 1928. Chiang was well aware, however, that this declaration of allegiance would probably be looked upon by Japan with disfavor. Four days before the scheduled date of announcement Chiang, in discussing the problem with his colleagues, said: Han Ch’ing (Chang) seems quite sincere; if so, the unification of the Three Eastern Provinces seems assured. But this may arouse the ire and opposition of Japan. Han Ch’ing is perhaps too inexperienced to deal with so difficult and potentially so dangerous a problem. What I am afraid of is that he may not have the kind of iron will to resist the pressure. But I’ll do what I can to help him.

Chiang’s fears were soon confirmed. Indeed, while Chang’s emissaries were still in Peking, Prime Minister Tanaka ordered the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden, Hayashi Kujiro, to warn Chang against flirting with the Nationalists. Said Hayashi to Chang: 260

MANCHURIA UNDER NATIONALIST FLAG At the present juncture there is no necessity of trying to meet with the wishes of the Southerners. You should maintain the s t a t u s q u o and watch what might be in store in time to come.

Hayashi found that Chang Hsueh-liang’s advisers were divided on the question of allegiance. He believed, however, that sooner or later Manchuria would have to come to some kind of agreement with Nanking. He therefore advised Tanaka to maintain a more flexible stance on the question: There is no other way for Chang Hsueh-liang to maintain himself in Manchuria except to hoist the Nationalist flag. If we continue to prevent Chang from coming to terms with Nanking we might invite criticism from other powers.

Hayashi’s advice was unacceptable to the military. General Saito Hisashi, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, as well as Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, the Japanese military attache at Peking, believed that the time had come for Japan to detach Manchuria from the rest of China. Tanaka himself was ready ta bring more pressure to bear on Chang Hsueh-liang. On July 19 he instructed Hayashi to deliver to Chang a personal letter in which he urged Chang, in the strongest of terms, not to change over to the Nationalist regime in Nanking. The regime, he said, was far from stable and not yet free of Communist influence. He saw no reason why Chang should be in such a hurry to enter into relations with it. Should Nanking use military pressure to force the authorities in Manchuria into submission, Japan would not stand idly by. If they were beset by financial difficulties, he would arrange for the Japanese banks to render such help as might be needed. The letter combined threat with bribery. After glancing over the contents of the letter, Chang Hsueh-liang said to Hayashi: In the Three Eastern Provinces all important political questions have to be decided by the people; if the people insist on uniting with Nanking, I can do nothing to prevent it.

Tanaka’s letter did produce the intended effect. July 24 had come and gone, and there was no announcement of Chang’s allegiance to Nanking. On July 26 Chang Hsueh-liang 261

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instructed his representatives in Peking to inform Chiang of the difficulties in which he found himself. He assured Chiang that his determination to put Manchuria under the jurisdiction of Nanking was unchanged, but that the question of allegiance was a matter of great delicacy and he hoped that Chiang would negotiate with Japan for a settlement through diplomatic channels. Thereupon Chiang instructed the Chinese Foreign Minister to protest to Japan against the Japanese attempt to block China’s national unification. The reply he received from Tokyo was to the effect that the Japanese had done nothing to prevent the unification of China, it was none of their business, and the entire matter must be decided by Chang Hsueh-liang in Mukden. Weeks had passed, and the question of Manchuria’s allegiance still hung in the wind. The remains of Chang Tso-lin were to be buried on August 4. Tanaka designated Hayashi Kensuke, Japanese Minister to China, as special envoy to represent him at Chang’s funeral. Tanaka had made it clear to Hayashi that Japan was not opposed to the unification of China, but she would under no circumstances be prepared to sacrifice her special position in Manchuria. Tanaka pointed out that there were those who were inclined to dismiss the question of allegiance as a matter of no great importance. It seemed to him, however, that should Chang Hsueh-liang be allowed to place Manchuria under the jurisdiction of the Nationalists, then Japan would have to deal with the Nanking government in matters pertaining to Manchuria. That government would be less amenable to direct pressure than the Mukden government had been, and it would even be less inclined toward a settlement of questions at issue, except on its own terms, than the government of Chang Tso-lin. In order to strengthen Japan’s policy as regards Manchuria, Tanaka appointed Yoshida Shigeru, Japan’s former Consul-General at Mukden, to be Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yoshida was an advocate of the policy of continental expansionism. After Chang Tso-lin’s funeral, Hayashi Kensuke, accompanied by Japan’s Consul-General at Mukden, Hayashi Kujiro, paid a formal visit to Chang Hsueh-liang. On the following day Chang returned the call and expressed his 262

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appreciation of the honor they had done him by attending the funeral of his father. Then the following dialogue between the Japanese Consul-General and Chang Hsueh-liang ensued: H a y a s h i K u jir o :

I believe Your Excellency is well aware that the Imperial Government is opposed to any com­ promise between Mukden and Nanking. At present the Imperial Government is of the opinion that any attempt to come to terms with the internally unstable and pro-Communist National Govern­ ment at Nanking will necessarily do great damage to Japanese interests and the special position enjoyed by Japan in Manchuria. If, unfortunately, in spite of repeated warnings, you nonetheless hoist up the Nationalist flag at Mukden, Japan will be forced to take whatever steps that may be necessary to stop it. I hope you will refuse to be influenced by those who are determined to lead you astray. Any unlawful attempt to bring about the change-over to Nanking should be suppressed by force. Japan stands ready to help you to the limit of her power.

C hang:

I am grateful to both the Special Envoy and the Consul-General for their frank representations. But I cannot let Consul-General Hayashi’s words pass unanswered. I am a Chinese, and I must speak from the Chinese point of view. I intend to arrive at some agreement with the National Government because I want Manchuria to be a part of united China — united in spirit but administered as a separate area — in order to fulfill the long cherished aspirations of the people of the Three Eastern Provinces. . . As one who is seriously concerned with the future of Sino-Japanese relations, I shall personally take the warnings of the Japanese government into consideration. But I don’t believe the Japanese government is oblivious of world opinion in its intervention in the internal affairs of a friendly country. I fail to understand why the Japanese government should use naked threats to obstruct the unification of China.

H a y a s h i K u jir o :

Let us stop talking about theory. To put it bluntly, the Imperial Government is determined to 263

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION prevent the Three Eastern Provinces from joining hands with Nanking. We don’t care if other countries should accuse us of having intervened in the affairs of China. I ask Your Excellency to ponder the seriousness of the matter. C hang:

My decision in this matter will be based on the will of the people. I cannot do anything which is contrary to their will.

H a y a s h i K u jir o :

Prime Minister Tanaka has already made up his mind. If your Excellency should oppose the will of Prime Minister Tanaka, the consequences would be grave indeed! (Chang Hsueh-liang’s interpreter, Mr. Wang Chia-Cheng, said that he could not interpret such blunt language. Then a Japanese interpreter took up the interpreting.) At this point Minister Hayashi Kensuke intervened: Your father the late Chang Tso-lin was my good friend, and I take you as my own son or my nephew. I candidly tell you that your way of thinking is quite dangerous.

C hang:

I am of the same age as your Emperor. I don’t want to say any more on this subject.1

After this sharp encounter with the Japanese, Chang Hsueh-liang summoned a meeting of the Manchurian Security Council. The majority counselled caution, and he agreed with them. It was decided that, in order to avoid direct confrontation with Japan, the hoisting of the Nationalist flag be delayed for a period of three months. The Japanese government was duly informed of the decision. The postponement of Mukden’s formal adherence to Nanking did not, however, prevent Chang Hsueh-liang from demonstrating, by concrete action, his sincerity in the search for national unity. In the Peking-Tientsin area there were still pockets of the remnants of the Chili-Shantung troops which continued to constitute a source of trouble to the Nationalists. Since these troops were formerly under the 1This is based on the report of the Kuo-wen Chou-pao (National News Weekly) of August 19, 1928. Hayashi Kujiro had received a telegram from Tanaka instructing him to threaten Chang Hsueh-liang with serious consequences if he failed to bow to the wishes of the Japanese government. At the same time Japan tried to instigate Chang Tso-lin’s old associates and advisers such as Yang Yu-t’ing to overthrow Chang Hsueh-liang and establish a pro-Japan regime. 264

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general command of his late father, his influence with them was considerable. Through his effort, they were persuaded either to lay down their arms or to be incorporated into the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army. At the October 18th meeting of the Kuomintang Standing Committee Chiang Kai-shek proposed that Chang Hsueh-liang be made a member of the State Council. Not all members saw eye to eye with Chiang on the proposal. Some argued that the move was premature, since Chang himself had not yet formally declared his allegiance to Nanking. There were also those, notably Li Tsung-jen, who urged Chiang to subjugate Manchuria by force of arms. Chiang took great pains to explain why he had made the proposal. The offer of this high and prestigious position to Chang Hsueh-liang, he said, was in itself a demonstration of national unity thus exposing the sinister designs of Japan to detach Manchuria from the rest of China. It might not be possible for Chang to accept the offer at present. Nor did Chiang expect him to accept it. Yet he was convinced that this was a right step to take. He finally persuaded the opposition to accept his point of view. In his telegram to Chang Hsueh-liang, Chiang Kai-shek expressed the hope that the Manchurian leader would accept the appointment and would raise the Nationalist flag on October 10, 1928, the seventeenth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Republic. In reply Chang said that he deemed it a great honor to have been included in the list of State Councillors, but he was silent on the question of flag raising.

Manchuria in Nationalist Fold

Japan was not alone in opposing the raising of the Nationalist flag. There was also considerable opposition inside Chang’s own camp. The leader of the opposition was Yang Yu-t’ing, regarded as the most influential man in the Three Eastern Provinces. A graduate of the Japanese Military 265

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Academy, Yang was the trusted aide of the late Chang Tso-lin. He was inclined to look upon Chang Hsueh-liang as a “mere boy” who needed his guidance and supervision. The Japanese treated him with great respect and used him as an instrument to counteract Chang’s “wayward” ways. He was suspected of conspiring with the Japanese to overthrow Chang. He was subsequently executed by Chang for treason. Despite all the seemingly insuperable obstacles in the path of his rapprochement with Nanking, Chang Hsueh-liang nonetheless decided, as the year 1928 was drawing to a close, to take the plunge, whatever might be the consequences. On December 29 he announced in a circular telegram his adherence to Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, his acceptance of the authority of the National Government, and the raising of the Nationalist flag in the three provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang. In the presence of the representatives of the Nanking government and foreign consular officers at Mukden, he formally took the oath of allegiance. In a brief speech, he said that the step he was taking might be compared to what had happened in Japan in the 19th century when the powers wielded by the shogunate were restored to the legitimate central authority. Needless to say, Chiang Kai-shek was overjoyed at the news. He noted in his diary: The brutal pressure exerted by Japan since May this year has not been able to prevent our brethren in the Northeast from returning to the fold. Hardly three years have passed since the launching of the Northern Expedition, yet national unification has already become a reality. The cause of the Three Principles of the People has indeed triumphed over the forces of opposition!

When presented with a fait accompli, Japan, instead of resorting to military intervention as she had threatened to do, began to make the best of a bad situation. Prime Minister Tanaka now turned his attention to the question of railway building. Hayashi Kujiro, Japanese Consul-General at Mukden, was instructed to extort from Chang Hsueh-liang additional rights for constructing a number of railways which, in conjunction with existing Japanese railways, would form a new Japanese trunkline with outlet in North Korean ports. This trunkline would have not only economic but also 266

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tremendous military significance. Hayashi paid a visit to Chang Hsueh-liang on December 31. The visit lasted two hours. He made it clear that Japan was not pleased with what had happened. “The abrupt and hasty raising of the Nationalist flag,” he said, “is tantamount to breaking off relations with Japan. Japan will watch your next step very closely. If necessary, Japan will not hesitate to take drastic action.” Then he broached the subject of railway rights. He hoped that Chang Hsueh-liang would be more cooperative and understanding in this matter. Chang replied by saying that this was a matter which was beyond his competence; only the National Government at Nanking was competent to deal with matters pertaining to foreign relations. Hayashi left Chang’s office in high dudgeon. That evening he went to the hot springs at T ’angkang to calm his pent-up emotions. The construction of railroads was one of the many questions which were in dispute, questions which eventually led to Japan’s military invasion of Manchuria in September 1931.

Tariff Autonomy

The Northern Expedition had a twofold purpose: the unification of China through the eradication of warlordism, and the abolition of what Dr. Sun Yat-sen called the “unequal treaties” which held China in semi-colonial bondage. One of the effects of the unequal treaties was the control of China’s Maritime Customs by foreign Powers. Since the middle of the 19th century the rates of import duty were held to a nominal 5 per cent. But such was the greed of the Powers for a free market for their exports that in fact the rates were held at an even lower level. After the capture of Peking, the National Government acted promptly to seek full tariff autonomy through formal agreement with the Powers. The break-through came in July 1928 when the National Government concluded with the United States a 267

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brief treaty on tariff autonomy. The treaty was signed on July 25, and on December 20 the United States formally extended diplomatic recognition to Nanking. Agreements were made with other Powers: first with Germany on August 17, then with Norway, Belgium, Italy, Denmark and Portugal. On December 20 a new tariff treaty was signed with Britain, and two days later a similar treaty was signed with France. The signing of the agreements involved, of course, diplomatic recognition. The new tariff took effect February 1, 1929. The enforcement of higher tariff rates was of great fiscal benefit to the National Government which, in the wake of the Northern Expedition, was in need of increased revenues. Alone among the foreign Powers Japan refused to abide by the new tariff regulations. Tokyo sought assurance of continued favorable rates for its exports and settlement of the defaulted Nishihara and other loans made available by Japan during the period when Tuan Ch’i-jui and the Anfu clique were in control at Peking. The National Government refused to recognize these loans on account of their political character. Negotiations began in November 1929 and the National Government agreed to set aside 5 million Chinese dollars yearly from customs revenue for debt settlements. On June 3, 1929, Japan formally recognized the National Government. It was not until May 1930 that Japan finally agreed to the new tariff.

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DEMOBILIZATION AND NEW WARLORDISM

The Necessity of Demobilization We all know that conflicts between the imperialist Powers can take place in the Far East, especially in China, at any time, any moment. The conflict of interests between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Japan on the other is particularly acute. So is the conflict between Japan and Russia. Since the Powers are on a collision course in China, we can be sure that the Second World War will start here in China. If we are not fully prepared to meet the exigencies inherent in the situation, if we do not exert ourselves to bring about a united and strong China, then the day when the Second World War breaks out will be the day of China’s undoing. A nation which is unprepared will be at the mercy of others. Such a nation has no right to enjoy independent statehood. On the other hand, if we can, before the outbreak of the imperialist war, strengthen our national defense and make preparations for every contingency, our nation will not merely survive the crisis but will emerge from it with greater strength and greater political independence than ever before. Hence the Second World War is crucial to our national existence, and China’s future hinges upon what we do today. When will this come about? This is by no means such a difficult thing to predict. I say it cannot be more than fifteen years, or it may come much sooner than that . . . We should make good use of the time that still remains so as to be fully prepared when the opportunity arrives.

The foregoing quotation is from a speech which Chiang Kai-shek delivered at the War College in Peiping on July 9, 1929, more than two years before the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, five before Mussolini’s rape of Ethiopia, and more 269

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than ten years before the German invasion of Poland.The world was then in relative peace. As Chiang scanned the horizon, however, he discerned signs of an approaching storm. He was anxious to have his country fully prepared for all contingencies. This called for the consolidation of national unity and the existence of a strong and effective central authority capable of carrying out a program of national reconstruction. When the National Government at Nanking took over nation-wide authority in 1928, Chiang’s unification was still more apparent than real. The Kwangsi generals like Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch’ung-hsi controlled not only Kwangtung and Kwangsi, but much of Hupei and Hunan. Feng Yu-hsiang held away over Shantung, Honan, Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai and Ninghsia. Yen Hsi-shan, who had been in control of Shansi ever since the founding of the Republic in 1911, now extended his sphere of influence to Hopei, Suiyuan and Chahar. The raising of the Nationalist flag by Chang Hsueh-liang did not automatically make Manchuria subservient to Nanking’s will. The National Government was undoubtedly stronger and more effective than any central government that had existed in China since the downfall of the Manchus. But its authority was unquestioned only in the provinces of the lower Yangtze region. Such a state of affairs was obviously unsatisfactory. The most pressing problem facing the National Government was that of demobilization. When the Northern Expedition came to a close, the National Revolutionary Army had been expanded to some 300 divisions, with a total of 2,200,000 men under arms. And this did not include those in Manchuria, Yunnan, Szechuan and Kweichow. Put together, China had then the largest standing army in the world. At that time the total annual revenue of the National Government did not exceed $450,000,000. Out of this more than $100,000,000 had to be set aside to service foreign loans. Over 80 percent of the remainder was for maintenance of the armed forces. This, Chiang pointed out, was an intolerable burden on the government: Our military expenditure is now $300,000,000. In fact, the actual military outlay may be much greater than this. The 270

DEMOBILIZATION AND NEW WARLORDISM sum of $300,000,000 is already excessive. Any country that spends 80% of its annual revenue on its military establishment is bound to go bankrupt. If its military expenditure amounts to as much as 90% of its annual revenue, then it will surely be faced with the possibility of total collapse . . . In our case, with military expenditure exceeding 80% of our annual revenue, nothing is left for national reconstruction, for laying a solid economic foundation, for improving the livelihood of our people. Such a country has no right to survive. It is only by reducing our expenditure that we can hope to stabilize our national economy. Without a stable national economy there can be no social and political progress.1

The urgency of disbanding the huge armies under the Nationalist banner was such that Chiang turned his attention to the problem as soon as Peking was taken. He conferred with Feng, Yen and Pai Ch’ung-hsi about the problem, and it was agreed that a special Disbandment Conference be held in Nanking on New Year’s Day 1929. After more than three weeks of discussion, it was decided that (1) the country should be divided into six disbandment districts, (2) the standing army should be reduced to 65 infantry divisions, 8 cavalry brigades, 16 artillery regiments, and 8 engineer regiments — a total of 800,000 men, and (3) military expenditures should be reduced to not more than 40% of the annual revenue. The disbanded soldiers should be used to build roads, dredge rivers, mine minerals and so on. They would thus be turned into productive personnel for national reconstruction. The ambitious plan for general demobilization was designed to bring to a definite end the feudal militarism that had ravaged China for years. At the same time an up-to-date military organization would be built up in place of the half-trained, half-disciplined coolie soldiers which had been the bane of China for ages.

1Chiang Kai-shek: Pei-fa ch ’eng-kung hou tsui-chin-yao ti kung-tso (The Most Important Tasks after the Northern Expedition) December 18, 1928. 271

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The Revolt o f the Kwangsi Generals

Such a sweeping program of disbandment was not calculated to win the favor of those generals who depended on armed manpower to maintain their spheres of influence. Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch’ung-hsi and a host of other minor military chieftains ruled vast areas by sheer weight of their troops. Like the warlords that had been overthrown in the course of the Northern Expedition,

Domains of the warlords before the Northern Expedition 272

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they believed in regionalism, localism, and territorialism, and were not prepared to give up the basis of their power. Paying lip service on the evils of warlordism and the necessity of demobilization, they reported to Nanking that they were cutting down their troops. Actually, they continued to recruit men and strengthen their personal positions for they did not want a centralized national defense force. Closely related to troop disbandment was the problem of fiscal reconstruction. The building of a united and strong China could be realized only through an effective central authority drawing revenues from most of the chief productive parts of China. Extension of political control had to go hand-in-hand with extension of control of revenues. At the National Economic Conference held at Nanking in June 1928, soon after completion of the Northern Expedition, it was decided that certain revenues (customs; taxes on salt, tobacco and wine; mining; stamp dues, revenues from government properties and enterprises, etc.) be reserved for the National Government while other sources of revenue (land tax, formerly a national revenue, and miscellaneous business taxes and licenses) be allocated to the provinces. The military authorities in the provinces, however, had been in the habit of appropriating national revenues for their own use. This posed a major fiscal problem for Nanking. The Kwangsi leaders — Li Tsung-jen, Li Chi-shen, and Pai Ch’ung-hsi — had been firmly entrenched in the Wuhan area. Li Tsung-jen was Chairman of the Wuhan Branch Political Council which had been supervising the collection of national revenues in Hunan and Hupei, the two rich provinces under its control. In fact, such supervision amounted to retention of these revenues. On February 21, 1929, Li Tsung-jen, in the name of the Wuhan Branch Political Council, suddenly removed Lu Ti-p’ing, governor of Hunan, from office. He then dispatched two divisions of his troops to Changsha, capital of Hunan, to enforce the order. This was an act of open rebellion, for the branch council had no authority to appoint or dismiss high provincial officials without the approval of the National Government. The reason for Lu Ti-p’ing’s dismissal was that Lu, in accordance with regulations, had been remitting national revenues collected in his province directly to the 273

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National Government. The Wuhan chiefs demanded that he remit the funds through the Council. This Lu had refused to do. The Kwangsi leaders seized upon this as a pretext to remove him. Chiang at first tried to settle the dispute by negotiations. As the Kwangsi troops moved to take more and more territory in Hunan and Kiangsi, Chiang realized that if this state of affairs was allowed to pass unchallenged there was little to prevent other warlords from taking their cue from Wuhan, seizing more territory and expanding their own spheres of influence. On March 14, the Central Political Council resolved to abolish all branch Political Councils. On the 19th it ordered all Kwangsi troops to return to the Wuhan area. When they refused to obey the orders, Chiang decided to take punitive action against them. By the end of April the rebellion was quelled, and the National Government was in control of Central China.

The Revolt of the “Christian General”

After the completion of the Northern Expedition, Feng Yu-hsiang, in addition to being a member of the State Council, was made Vice President of the Executive Yuan (Deputy Prime Minister) as well as Minister of War, apparently in the belief that after having familiarized himself with the difficult problems with which the National Government was faced, he would help tackle them with his customary courage and dynamic energy. Above all, it was hoped that he would lend his great influence to the problem of demobilization. But Feng had not been in the habit of playing second fiddle to anybody. He descended upon the Nationalist capital more like a conqueror than one who was anxious to know what he could do to help the government. He criticized everybody and everything. Dressed in a tattered grey uniform of a private soldier, he rode about in the city in an army lorry and derived much malicious satisfaction out of humiliating high government officials whose life-style was 274

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more polished and graceful than his own. He was, however, treated with courtesy and deference. In him Nanking recognized a potent antagonist. Feng’s sojourn at Nanking was, however, a brief one. In February 1929 he left for Honan for reasons of “health.” In March he offered to lead his troops to suppress the rebellion of the Kwangsi generals. This was a ploy to get more money from Nanking and probably also to join forces with Li Tsung-jen to topple the Nanking government. After the collapse of the Wuhan rebellion, he ordered his troops to move westward to the Honan-Shensi border and had his generals nominate him as “Commander-in-Chief of. the Northwestern Army to Protect the Party and Save the Country.” His troops blew up a number of bridges along the Lunghai Railway. The bridges on the Peiping-Hankow line were also destroyed. An effective barrier was thus set up against invasion from the South. The crux of the matter lay in the problem of demobilization. Chiang demanded that the quarter of a million troops under Feng’s command be drastically reduced and placed under the unified command of the National Military Council. Feng, on the other hand, was determined to maintain his Kuominchun (People’s Army) as a separate and independent military establishment. He had no intention of giving up the source of his power and leaving Chiang in sole control of all armed forces. At this stage Chiang and Feng fought their battles with words rather than with weapons. Lengthy telegrams passed to and fro, but little actual fighting took place. In a truculent telegram Feng accused Chiang of trying to starve out the Kuominchun by withholding its pay. On May 24 the National Government issued a mandate divesting Feng of all his official positions and ordered his arrest. In a telegraphic message addressed directly to Feng’s commanders, Chiang forcefully rebutted Feng’s charges. He pointed out that since the conclusion of the Northern Expedition, the revenues from the provinces of Honan, Shantung, Shensi and Kansu as well as the earnings of Peiping-Hankow and Lunghai Railways had been withheld by Feng. In addition to the sums thus detained, the National Government had regularly remitted $500,000 a month to him. In April, as a result of Feng’s offer 275

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to suppress the Wuhan rebellion, the remittance was increased to $1,500,000 . . . In view of the financial difficulties in which the National Government had found itself, this was more than generous. Chiang went on to say that Feng had been in close contact with the Wuhan rebels, who had supplied him with large sums of money. If the Kuominchun had not been paid, then Feng must bear the responsibility. Chiang’s message was designed to drive a wedge between Feng and his commanders. It produced the desired effect. Toward the end of May two of Feng’s important commanders, Han Fu-chu and Shih Yu-san, declared in favor of the National Government. This defection was a heavy blow to Feng, recalling his own betrayal of his former chief, Wu P’ei-fu. With the defection of Han and Shih, Feng lost some 100,000 of his best troops. He was forced to give up for the time being his original plan of armed opposition. What was he to do next? Yen Hsi-shan, governor of Shansi, who was also in control of Hopei, Chahar and Suiyuan, now appeared on the scene as a sort of deus ex machina to save Feng from an embarrassing situation. Yen had followed until then a rather tortuous and ambiguous course. In a telegram to Feng under the date May 22, he suggested that both Feng and himself should, for the sake of national unity, retire from politics and go abroad. On May 25 Chiang himself, taking note of Yen’s suggestion of retirement and foreign travel, telegraphed to Feng assuring him that should he decide to go abroad, he (Chiang) would ask the National Government to give him every facility. In a telegram to Yen dated May 27, Feng said that he wanted to seclude himself in a mountain retreat in order “to read books.” At Yen’s invitation, Feng went to Taiyuan, capital of Shansi. On July 6, at the request of Yen, the National Government rescinded its order for Feng’s arrest. Feng remained in Shansi until March 1930 when he, in collaboration with Yen Hsi-shan, once again raised the standard of revolt against Chiang Kai-shek.

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War with Soviet Russia over the Chinese Eastern Railway

The year 1929 was not only one of internal strife but also of foreign war. The severance of diplomatic relations between the National Government and the USSR in 1927 following the so-called Canton Commune had put an end to direct contact between Russia and the greater part of China. Soviet interests in Manchuria, however were not affected by the rupture because in 1927, Chang Tso-lin, the overlord of Manchuria, had not accepted the authority of the Nationalist regime. The decision of Chang Tso-lin’s son and successor, Chang Hsueh-liang, to come to terms with Nanking in December 1928 in return for the confirmation of his authority in Manchuria and Jehol did not at first impair the Russian position. But the position of Russia in Manchuria had presented difficulties of its own ever since the Soviet Government had come into inheritance of Tsarist imperialism in the area by the recognition of its title to the Chinese Eastern Railway in the agreements and declaration made with the Peking Government on 31 May 1924. The Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway placed China and Russia on a footing of equality in regard to its operation. The actual control of the line, however, remained in the hands of the Russians. The Russian directors had been in the habit of making decisions without the concurrence of their Chinese counterparts. The principle of equal representation in the employment of persons in the various departments of the railway was vitiated by the declaration that its operation was “not to be understood to mean that the present employees of Russian nationality shall be dismissed for the sole purpose of enforcing said principle.” Thus in 1929, almost 80 percent of the line’s employees were Russians and they held all the key posts. The survival of Russian domination was resented by the Chinese and constituted a source of friction between the USSR and China even before the advent of the Nationalists. Thus, in January 1926, Chang Tso-lin had given orders to arrest the Russian manager of the railway and other Russian officials, but had later been forced to abandon the attempt as a result of Russian pressure. Shortly after Chang Hsueh-liang succeeded his father as 277

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the ruler of Manchuria he learned that the Communist International had called a secret regional conference to be held in Harbin on May 27, 1929. While the meeting was in progress the Manchurian police staged a raid and arrested some forty Russian consular officers and a large number of Chinese Communists from various parts of Manchuria. They also seized two truckloads of papers and documents, confirming the suspicion that officials of the CER were taking active part in the propagation of Communism. In July while Chiang Kai-shek was in Peiping, Chang Hsueh-liang made a special trip to the ancient capital to consult with him on the CER question. They decided that the time had come for a radical solution of the problem. On July 10 and 11 a series of arrests and other actions effectively gave the Chinese control of the railway and its subsidiary services. A Russian ultimatum to Nanking on July 13 was countered on the 17th by a note which defended the Chinese action on the grounds that the Treaty of 1924 had been violated by the Soviets, in particular in regard to propaganda. On the 18th the Chinese charge d ’affaires in Moscow was informed of the Soviet Union’s breaking off of diplomatic relations with China. As far as the National Government at Nanking was concerned, relations between China and Russia had been broken off more than two years before when it was discovered that Soviet consular officers had taken part in the Communist uprising in Canton. But the Peking regime was then recognized by the Soviet Union as the government of China. Hence there was in 1929 still a Chinese charge d ’affaires in Moscow. Meanwhile Moscow mobilized units of the Red Army, and reserves were called to the colors. A war, though an undeclared one, was on. Fighting soon broke out along the CER at both the eastern and western borders of Manchuria, resulting in heavy casualties to the Chinese forces at Manchouli. The town of Pogranichnaya at the eastern end of the railway was badly shattered by Russian artillery fire. A Chinese town known as Lahasusu at the mouth of the Sungari River, opposite Khabarovsk on the Amur, was bombed and burned. The Russian army invaded Chinese territory for about 200 miles at each end of the CER and bombed and occupied most of the Chinese towns along the 278

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border. The National Government sought to settle the dispute through the good offices of friendly Powers. The Soviets, however, rejected third party mediation and insisted on direct negotiation between the parties concerned. A provisional agreement was reached at Nikolsk on December 3, 1929, and this was succeeded by the definitive protocol concluded at Khabarovsk on the 22nd. The Protocol provided for restoration of the status quo ante both with reference to the CER and in the matter of commercial and consular relations. It was further provided that outstanding questions, including a resumption of full diplomatic relations, should be the subject of a conference to be held later. Subsequently the National Government sent Mo Teh-hui, the newly appointed Director-General of the CER, to Moscow to negotiate for a new agreement in place of the Khabarovsk Protocol. The Chinese delegation reached Moscow on May 8, 1930. For various reasons actual negotiations did not begin until October. The parleys came to an end when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in September 1931.

War Clouds in the South The Manchurian crisis came at a time when the National Government was beset with momentous internal problems. Feng Yu-hsiang, albeit his “retirement,” was potentially a formidable threat to Nanking. His troops, with the exception of those commanded by Han Fu-chu and Shih Yu-san, were mainly intact and concentrated along the Lunghai Railway on the Honan-Shensi border. The Kwangsi generals were down but far from out. In September trouble came from another quarter. Chang Fa-k’uei defied the government by refusing to move his troops from I-chang in Hupei to areas along the Lunghai Railway. Chang, it may be recalled, had been commander of the Fourth Army Corps during the Northern Expedition and had been relieved of his command after the Communist uprising in Canton in 1927. The Fourth Army Corps was subsequently reorganized into the Fourth 279

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Division of the National Revolutionary Army, and Chang Fa-k’uei was recalled to the service by Chiang Kai-shek. As commander of the reorganized division, he supported Chiang both during the revolt of the Kwangsi generals and the early stages of Feng Yu-hsiang’s rebellion. But he was in fact a loyal follower of Wang Ching-wei. When Chiang ordered him to move his troops to the Lunghai Railway, he interpreted this as a move preliminary to his removal. He decided to defy Chiang by taking his troops, who were mainly of Cantonese origin, southward to Canton where he hoped he could establish a new regime under the leadership of Wang Ching-wei. His troops met very little opposition along the way. By November 1929, they arrived intact in Kwangsi and continued to advance toward Kwangtung. Chiang Kai-shek sent his trusted lieutenant Ho Ying-chin to Canton to take charge of the operations there. Chang Fa-k’uei’s drive toward Canton was turned back and finally badly beaten. The revolt came to an end early in January 1930.

The Epidemic of Revolts

The disease of military revolts proved highly contagious. No sooner had Chang Fa-k’uei’s rebellion been put down than other militarists had begun to emulate him. Confusion and chaos pervaded the land. Feng Yu-hsiang’s Kuominchun, after a patched up truce, reopened the hostilities. But the revolt was quickly suppressed. Shih Yu-san and T’ang Sheng-chih soon followed suit. Both Shih and T’ang were notorious for their readiness to change sides whenever it suited them to do so. After his defection from Feng’s Kuominchun, Shih was rewarded by Chiang with the governorship of the rich Anhwei province. When Canton was threatened by Chang Fa-k’uei’s rebels, Chiang ordered Shih to take his troops to Kwangtung to help suppress the rebellion. On December 2, 1929, the troops under Shih’s command mutinied at Pukow, which is directly across the Yangtze 280

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River from Nanking. This was too close to the seat of the National Government for comfort. Had the mutineers tried to take the Nationalist capital by storm they would have succeeded, for Nanking was virtually undefended. Only a regiment of gendarmes and a few thousand cadets of the military academy were on hand to put up any kind of resistance. But the mutineers made no attempt to attack the capital; they marched northward instead. T’ang Sheng-chih was even more of an opportunist and double-dealer than Shih. More than once Chiang had held him at his mercy, had accepted his submission, and had reinstated him in his honor and given him the command of vast armies. More than once he had treacherously used the power and influence which Chiang’s generosity had enabled him to acquire to try to bring about Chiang’s downfall. When Feng Yu-hsiang showed signs of insubordination early in 1929, Chiang Kai-shek placed T’ang in command of the government forces to quell the rebellion. His troops were concentrated in Western Honan along the Lunghai Railway. In December he suddenly circulated a series of telegrams which were openly anti-Chiang. On December 2 he called upon Chiang Kai-shek to stop fighting civil wars in order to lead the whole country to fight against Soviet aggression in Manchuria. On the 3rd, he hailed Wang Ching-wei, who had only recently returned to China after three years of self-imposed exile in Europe, as the "‘true disciple” of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the only one capable of leading the country to complete the national revolution. In the same telegram he condemned Chiang for attacking Chang Fa-k’uei. On the 5th he proclaimed himself “Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Route Army for Party Protection and National Salvation.” T’ang’s histrionics, however, were short-lived. On the 7th the National Government in a mandate stripped T’ang of all his official positions and ordered his arrest. On the 20th, Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Hsueh-liang supported Chiang’s endeavor to suppress the rebellion. By January of 1930 T’ang’s resistance collapsed. T’ang himself escaped to Kaifeng, thence to Tientsin and Hongkong.

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From Battle of Words to Battle of Weapons

The rebellions of 1929 had been put down. There was a short interlude of uneasy peace. The pivotal figure in North China was Yen Hsi-shan. Yen maintained a posture of seeming neutrality when Feng Yu-hsiang defied Chiang by moving his troops to the Honan-Shensi border. He sided with Chiang when Chiang clashed with T’ang Sheng-chih. He had no more love for Chiang than Feng or T ’ang. Nor was he prepared, any more than Feng or T’ang, to surrender his military or financial power to the Central Government. He bided his time. He believed that Chiang would eventually dissipate his strength and be overthrown. Meanwhile he secretly communicated with Wang Ching-wei and the so-called “ Reorganizationists” .2 When Chiang’s opponents one after another fell by the wayside, he felt that the time had come for him to act. On February 10, 1930, he opened his anti-Chiang campaign with a lengthy telegram. He advised Chiang to abandon once and for all the idea of unifying China by force. The best way to achieve national unification, he asserted, was for Chiang to retire to private life and set an example for others to follow. He himself would be more than pleased to do the same. In his reply, Chiang said that he had no intention of resigning; indeed, he was determined to suppress all seditious and reactionary elements throughout the country. The times were too perilous and the problems were too critical to allow him to shirk his responsibility and retire to private life. This did not mean that he did not relish the pleasure of accompanying Yen on a journey to foreign countries, but he believed the time was not opportune for such leisurely enjoyment. He therefore asked Yen to remain at his post and join with him in the building of a united and peaceful China. Yen remained unmoved. He reiterated his opposition to military unification and believed that Chiang’s resignation was the only solution to China’s problems. This set off an 2 The “Reorganizationists” were the followers of Wang Ching-wei who were determined to reorganize the Kuomintang under Wang’s leadership. 282

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avalanche of telegrams from various quarters which were for the most part long on self-righteousness and double-talk and short on candor and logic. Almost all military men of any importance got into the act. All of them professed undying loyalty to the Kuomintang and to the country. On February 14, a telegram bearing the name of 57 generals — followers of Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang, as well as those of Li Tsung-jen and Chang Fa-k’uei — joined in with a telegram denouncing the National Government for bribery, corruption and dictatorship. Wang Ching-wei now fired off a salvo of his own, declaring that Chiang had departed from the original spirit of the revolution and betrayed it. Wang, though without an army of his own, was yet a potent political force. The anti-Chaing militarists piously echoed his words. The battle of words got the contending parties nowhere. Gradually the conflict shifted from telegraphic exchanges to military action. Early in March, Feng Yu-hsiang, who had been Yen’s “guest” in Shansi since May 1929, was presented with $800,000 in cash and a quantity of arms and ammunition by his host. He immediately went to Tungkuan to assume command of the Kuominchun. On the 15th the pro-Yen generals urged him to assume the post of “Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Naval and Air Forces,” with Feng Yu-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen and Chang Hsueh-liang as deputies. Chang Hsueh-liang, however, refused to accept the offer and assured Chiang of his support. A few days later Yen’s troops took over the assets of the National Government in the provinces under his control. He moved his forces southward along the Peiping-Hankow and Lunghai Railways. On April 5, the National Government ordered Yen’s arrest. Thus began one of the most bitterly fought civil wars in modem Chinese history.

The Battle of Honan

The battleline extended to several thousand miles on a 283

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number of widely separate fronts. The National Government mobilized an army of about a million men. Yeng, Feng and their allies had under their command a force of about 600,000. The main battle was fought in Honan, and it was here the outcome of the struggle was finally decided. On the Lunghai front Feng’s Kuominchun were well-armed and good fighters. They captured Kaifeng, capital of Honan, and pushed forward to the vicinity of the strategic city of Hsuchow. They fought in close cooperation with the cavalry units from the Northwest which harassed the Government forces by sudden raids behind Nanking’s lines. Along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, Yen Hsi-shan’s forces under the command of Fu Tso-yi invaded Shantung Province. Han Fu-chu, governor of Shantung, formerly one of Feng Yu-hsiang’s commanders, offered little resistance. Yen’s forces entered Tsinan, capital of Shantung. In the South Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch’ung-hsi, Chang Fa-k’uei and other dissident elements formed a military coalition and launched an attack on the areas held by pro-Chiang commanders. In June Pai Ch’ung-hsi’s Kwangsi troops invaded Hunan and captured a string of important towns: Hengyang, Changsha and Yochow. Pai’s thrust directly threatened the Wuhan cities. The anti-Chiang forces were on the offensive on all fronts. To give added momentum to the movement, Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang, Wang Ching-wei, together with such disgruntled politicians as Tsou Lu and Hsieh Ch’ih of the Western Hills Conference fame, decided to stage a political offensive as well. On July 13, 1930, they proposed the holding of what was called an “ Enlarged Conference” of all anti-Chiang elements for the purpose of reorganizing the Kuomintang and the National Government. The first meeting of the Enlarged Conference took place in Peiping on Auguat 7. In a stinging manifesto the Conference denounced Chiang for having packed the Central Executive Committee with people subservient to his wishes, gathered into his own hands all the reins of government and all levers of power, subverted the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and subjected loyal Kuomintang members to banishment and expulsion. Inasmuch as the Third National Congress of the Kuomintang of March 1929 was dominated by Chiang Kai-shek, it was 284

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declared illegal, and all its decisions null and void. But by this time the tide of the war had turned in favor of Chiang. On August 15, Fu Tso-yi’s Shansi troops suffered an overwhelming defeat at Tsinan. Nanking troops advanced northward in a number of strong columns along the Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, and Lunghai Railways. In the South the armies of Chang Fa-k’uei and Pai Ch’ung-hsi had also been defeated. Members of the “ Enlarged Conference,” in order to bolster up the changing military fortunes of the anti-Chiang forces, forged ahead with the task of organizing a rival government. Yen Hsi-shan was made Chairman of the State Council. Among members of the Council were Feng Yu-hsiang, Wang Ching-wei, Li Tsung-jen and three others. On September 9 the regime was officially proclaimed in Peiping. But its fate had been sealed even before it was ushered into the world. In this contest of strength between Chiang and the Yen-Feng coalition, the balance of power was held by Chang Hsueh-liang in Manchuria. For months the heaviest pressure had been brought to bear upon him from both sides. Emissaries from Peiping had been doing everything possible to persuade him to throw in his lot with the Yen-Feng coalition. But on September 18 Chang announced his support of Nanking. Simultaneously, his troops were advancing upon Peiping from the north. Yen Hsi-shan left for his stronghold in Shansi. Wang Ching-wei quietly slipped out of the ancient capital. The newly inaugurated regime came to an abrupt end. By the close of September, Peiping and Tientsin were in the hands of Chang Hsueh-liang’s troops. Chiang appointed Chang Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Land, Naval and Air Forces. Along the Lunghai Railway in Honan Feng Yu-hsiang’s troops continued to resist. The Nanking forces pressed on. Kaifeng, capital of Honan; Loyang the historic city in Western Honan; and the famous strategic pass Tungkuan were cleared of Feng’s troops. Kuominchun generals began coming over to the Nanking lines in ever-increasing numbers. Feng Yu-hsiang himself henceforth ceased to be a major factor in Chinese politics. Yen Hsi-shan for a time sought refuge in Dairen. But his 285

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influence in Shansi was still considerable. Six months of the most devastating of all Chinese civil wars in the Republic of China thus came to an end. The loss of life was staggering. On the side of the Yen-Feng coalition approximately 150,000 had been killed and wounded. Nanking had suffered 30,000 killed and 60,000 wounded. Much of Honan was laid waste. Incalculable suffering was inflicted on the people.

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EMERGENCE OF THE “RED ARMY”

The Li Li-san Line After the failure of the so-called Autumn Harvest Uprisings the rank and file of the Chinese Communist Party found themselves in a state of weariness, exhaustion, and disillusionment. The cost of the adventurist policy pursued under Ch’u Ch’iu-pai’s leadership during the previous year had been high. The failure of the series of uprisings had inflicted heavy losses on the Party. Thousands of its members had lost their lives, among them were some of the most resourceful and talented organizers. Politically, the policy of arson and massacre had completely discredited the Communists in the eyes of the common people. The man who took over the leadership > of the Communist Party from Ch’u Ch’iu-pai was Li Li-san. Li had been an able labor organizer and agitator. He was something of a national hero at the time of the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925. He had played an outstanding role as a member and director of the Political Guards of the Revolutionary Committee set up at Nanchang following the uprising of August 1, 1927. After the crushing defeat of the insurrectionists late in September in the vicinity of Swatow, Li Li-san, together with Chou En-lai, Hsiang Chung-fa and Chang Kuo-t’ao, all found their way to Shanghai. The Li Li-san line called for Communist victory in one or several provinces for the consolidation of the proletarian leadership and the establishment of the Soviet system. In his Soviet Russia in China, Chiang Kai-shek wrote: At the Communist International’s Sixth Congress held in Moscow in July 1928, Stalin, having defeated the ‘leftist’ Trotskyists, turned against the ‘rightists’ led by Bukharin. In 287

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION order to attack the ‘rightists,’ Stalin himself now turned to the left. At their Sixth National Party Congress (which was also held in Moscow), the Chinese Communists announced ‘Ten Big Demands,’ among which were ‘the overthrow of the National Government,’ ‘the confiscation of all lands owned by landlords,’ and ‘the establishment of a Soviet form of government.’ These demands formed the basis of the so-called Li Li-san Policy Line . . . Heinz Neumann . . . who was present at the Chinese Communists’ ‘August Seventh Meeting’ in 1927, was an expert in armed insurrection. The series of uprisings which the Chinese Communists staged at Nanchang, Swatow, and Canton had all been carried out according to the theories and formulas as laid down by Neumann in his work, T h e A r m e d U p r is in g .

Besides learning of armed uprising from Neumann, the Chinese Communists also adopted the methods employed by roving brigands in Chinese history.1

Mao Tse-tung and the “Red Army”

Following the failure of his armed uprising in Hunan, Mao Tse-tung took refuge in the remote recesses of the Chingkangshan mountains in the border region between Hunan and Kiangsi in the Winter of 1927. He had but a small force of a few hundred men — a poorly disciplined horde of hoodlums, idlers, deserters from provincial troops, and ne’er-do-well peasants. Wang Tso and Yuan Wen-tsai were two bandit chieftains of the Chingkangshan area. They had gathered around them about 300 or so desperadoes with about 120 rifles. Mao Tse-tung was in desperate need of men and weapons. He soon pressed the outlaws into his service. With only a few hundred men Mao Tse-tung organized what was called the First Division of the First Workers’ and Peasants’ Army. 1Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, (revised, abridged edition) New York, 1957, pp. 39-40. 288

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In May 1928 Chu Teh arrived at Chingkangshan and joined forces with Mao Tse-tung. Chu, it may be recalled, was one of the three military leaders of the Nanchang Uprising, the other two being Yeh T’ing and Ho Lung. After the Swatow rout, Chu Teh led a straggling band of defeated soldiers to Northern Kwangtung where he accepted the protection of Fan Shih-sheng, a Yunnanese general who had once been a colleague of Chu’s. Here Chu Teh’s men, about 500 in number, were incorporated into Fan’s army. When the Canton insurrection broke out, Chu Teh responded with a small uprising of his own. In time he found his way to Chingkangshan and effected a junction with Mao Tse-tung. They combined their forces and rechristened them the “ Fourth Red Army of Workers and Peasants,” with Chu Teh as commander and Mao Tse-tung as Political Commissar. In June 1928 the Kiangsi provincial troops moved into the Chingkangshan region and launched an attack on Mao’s stronghold. They were not successful. In July P’eng Teh-huai, a regimental commander in the Hunan provincial army, revolted and staged what was known as the Pingkiang insurrection. He soon joined Mao and Chu at Chingkangshan and was made commander of the Fifth Red Army. In these early days of the Red Army neither the Communist Central Committee in Shanghai nor the Communist International in Moscow was impressed with it. Chu and Mao were frequently referred to in the Communist press abroad as valiant partisan fighters and nothing more. It seemed extremely unlikely that his hit-and-run tactics could ever carry the Communist movement to victory. Indeed, the so-called Red Army could not have survived had it not been for the interminable civil wars that had plagued China soon after the completion of the Northern Expedition. In January 1929 Ho Chien, Governor of Hunan, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the “Bandit Suppression forces of Hunan and Kiangsi.” Mao Tse-tung was not slow to realize that his forces were in deadly peril of encirclement. He pulled his Fourth Red Army out of Chingkangshan and moved to the Western part of Fukien, leaving P’eng Teh-huai to defend the mountain fastness. In April Chingkanshan fell into the hands of the provincial troops. P’eng Teh-huai 289

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took his Fifth Red Army to the border region of Hunan, Hupei and Kiangsi. The terrain of Western Fukien was rugged and dif­ ficult of access. Prior to Mao’s arrival a group of Communists had already been at work there. The leader of the group was Chang T’ing-chen, a former student at Mao’s Peasant Institute in Canton. Fukien was then controlled by five generals who were at odds with one another. The garrison was weak. The Communists could range at will without government interference. They were soon in control of a number of counties — Shanghung, Wuping, Lungyen and Changting. The year 1929 was most favorable to the Communists. The National Government was too much preoccupied with the war with Russia and the interminable struggle for power among the Kuomintang generals to give adequate attention to the Communist problem. Mao Tse-tung was left in peace to expand his base of operations. He now extended his control into Kiangsi, occupying the counties of Hsingkuo, Ningtu, Juichin, and so on. By this time the ranks of the Fourth Red Army was swelled by many fold. Much of southern Kiangsi was to become the principal territorial base of the Communists in the next five years. Wherever the Communists went they stirred up all forms of class warfare calculated to tear the traditional Chinese society asunder and to uproot the people psychologically. It was their objective to plunge rural society into such depths of despair that the peasants had no choice but to follow them. The year 1930 witnessed the outbreak of the war between Nanking and the Yen-Feng coalition. For months the two sides were locked in a war of attrition. Defeated soldiers roamed the countryside and the Communists took special pains to win them over to their side. There had sprung up in Central and Southern China many independent or semi-independent armed bands which called themselves Red Armies. By the end of the year the Communists could boast that there were 14 “armies” fighting under their banner. The majority of these were small bands of a few hundred men operating within a restricted area. There were also larger units, ranging from a thousand to several thousand men each. They ravaged the countryside in the border regions of Hunan, 290

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Hupei, Honan, Anhwei, Kiangsu, Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi. In addition to the “Central Soviet” established by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh in Kiangsi, there had come into existence a number of other Soviet districts, of which the one headed by Hsu Hsiang-ch’ien and Chang Kuo-t’ao on the Hupei-Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu borders was one of the most important.

Li Li-san and the Shift to the Hinterland

Acting on the premises set down in Moscow, the Communist Central Committee in Shanghai did not at first set much store by the guerrilla activities of the Mao-Chu team. The Li Li-san line called for the consolidation of the proletarian hegemony. This meant that the main task of the CCP was to recapture the leadership of the urban workers. In Moscow’s view, China stood on the brink of a new revolutionary surge and revolution could be consummated only under proletarian hegemony. The guerrilla activities in the countryside were important only as a supporting auxiliary force to the urban revolution. The phenomenal growth of Communist forces in the rural areas had, however, attracted wide-spread attention. Li Li-san, who had been obliged to re-establish contact with city workers and prepare the ground for armed insurrections in urban centers, began to take notice. He now thought well enough of the guerrillas to want to make use of them for the accomplishment of his grandiose plan — the capture of such important urban centers as Nanchang, Changsha, and Wuhan. Ostensibly, he continued to insist on the necessity of armed uprisings by the proletariat within the cities. But the objective economic and political conditions of China were not such as to lead him to the conclusion that armed uprisings in the cities were imminent. While armed uprisings within the cities were improbable, there was no reason why he should not adopt a strong aggressive tactics against the cities from without. The time was indeed propitious. Chiang 291

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and the Yen-Feng coalition were engaged in a life-and-death struggle. In April the biggest and longest battle of the war broke loose in Honan. To Li Li-san the time for the decisive struggle had indeed come to pass. All the class forces arrayed against the Communists were in a state of utter confusion. They were sufficiently embroiled with one another and sufficiently weakened to allow the Communists to act boldly. Moreover, the provinces of Hunan, Hupei and Kiangsi were at that time practically undefended, all troops having been sent to the Honan front to reinforce the hard-pressed government forces. In May Li Li-san called an “All-China Conference of the Soviet Areas.” Forty-nine delegates representing workers, peasants and the Soviet districts participated in the conference. It was decided that a determined offensive should be launched against Changsha and Nanchang, with Wuhan as the final objective. In the latter part of July P’eng Teh-huai’s troops moved toward Changsha. He met with little resistance. On the night of the 27th P’eng’s forces poured into the city. They plastered the city with posters proclaiming: “Abolish All Taxes! Establish Workers’, Peasants’ and Soldiers’ Soviets! Down with Warring Militarists!” Although Li Li-san himself was still in far away Shanghai, he was named as the “Chairman of the Changsha Soviet.” P’eng held Changsha for ten days. The brief Communist occupation was characterized by pillage, arson and carnage. When the city was retaken by government forces, it was in ruins.2 Nor did the Communists spare foreign consulates and residents. The Japanese consulate was burned down. They exchanged gun fire with foreign gun-boats anchored in the Hsiang River. Strong protests were lodged with the Nanking authorities by Japanese, British and American governments. For a time it seemed that an incident like the one that had taken place at Nanking in 1927 could be repeated at Changsha. Fortunately this did not happen. At the time when P’eng Teh-huai attacked Changsha the Mao-Chu forces made an attempt to take Nanchang. They 2 For a detailed and vivid account of the Communist occupation of Changsha, see I-Yueh, Changsha shih-jih chi (Ten Days of Changsha) in Kuo-wen chou-pao (National News Weekly), Vol. VII, No. 34 (September 1, 1930). 292

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were repulsed by government troops. On September 2 they made another attempt and once again they failed. The Communist failure at Changsha set in motion the forces which underminded Li Li-san’s position as leader. Within the Party there were those who were ready to take advantage of the situation to topple Li’s leadership. The Central Committee of the CCP, however, completely absolved him of the sin of both commission and omission. It found no discrepancy between Li Li-sanism and the Comintern line. The Comintern, however, did not agree. In its letter of November 16, 1930, it accused Li Li-san of being the fountain-head of all the errors committed in China and of having willfully misinterpreted the unfailingly correct line of the Kremlin. This was a devastating blow to Li Li-san. His position became completely untenable. He was forced to resign the Party Leadership and was sent shortly afterwards to Moscow for “re-education.” Upon his arrival in Moscow, he was crossed-examined by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Commintern and had to make a most extravagant admission of guilt. Very little was heard from him thereafter. In 1945 when the Soviet troops invaded Manchuria, he suddenly appeared on the scene. When the Communists took over the Chinese mainland in 1949, Li Li-san was for a time Minister of Labor of the Communist regime and concurrently First Vice-Chairman of the General Federation of Labor and also a member of the Central Committee. He was purged during the so-called Great Cultural Revolution.

The Communist-suppression Campaigns

P’eng Teh-huai’s capture of Changsha, even only for a few days, was sufficient to show that the so-called Red Armies could no longer be dismissed as mere small-time “bandits.” Thus, soon after the conclusion of the Battle of Honan, Chiang Kai-shek turned his attention to the Communist problem and launched the first Communist-suppression campaign. Early in December 1930, he made a tour of inspection in Kiangsi in order to investigate the situation at 293

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first-hand. At Nanchang he called a military conference. It was decided the first target should be the so-called Central Soviet District under the control of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh. Here the Communists had a force of about 44,000. There was also a small air force. General Lu Ti-p’ing, former Governor of Hunan, was appointed Commander-in-Chief. On the 29th of December the First Communist-suppression Campaign was officially launched. This was a new kind of war with which the Kuomintang commanders were unacquainted. Confident of their superiority in weapons and other equipment, they did not take the Communists seriously. They penetrated deeply into Communist-held territory where they found no resistance, and, indeed, no Communist troops were to be seen. But they encountered something far more dangerous than resistance — the insidious, yielding, and undermining atmosphere of the whole Communist area. They were lured to move on, on, and still on. Their lines became stretched, uneven, and thin. Then, all of a sudden, they found themselves falling into an ambush. The Communists launched concentrated attacks on each separate unit. The commander of the 18th Division of the government forces, General Chang Hui-tsan, was taken prisoner and later executed by the Communists. The 50th Division, seeing what had happened to the 18th Division, became more cautious. But it too suffered heavily at the hands of P’eng Teh-hui and Lin Piao. Thus in a little more than a week the First Communist-suppression Campaign was over. The government forces lost nine thousand men and quantities of supplies. On April 1, 1931, the Second Communist-suppression Campaign was launched under the chief command of General Ho Ying-chin. A total of more than 100,000 men participated in the campaign. Though numerically strong, the government forces were a heterogeneous group, consisting of various units formerly belonging to Feng Yu-hsiang and other dissident generals. The campaign ended in two months. For the National Government, it was another disaster, costing heavily both in men and in arms. In his report to the National Assembly on May 12, 1931, when the Second Campaign was still in progress, Chiang Kai-shek spoke of the misery and suffering of the people in areas under Communist occupation: 294

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EMERGENCE OF THE “RED ARMY” The provinces that have suffered most cruelly at the hands of the Communists are Kiangsi and Hunan. Hupei comes next, but not as badly as the other two. In Kiangsi 186,000 people have been killed and over two million have become refugees; 100,000 houses have been destroyed; over $600 million worth of property and 39,000,000 piculs of grains have been lost. In Hunan some 72,000 innocent people have been murdered and the value of property loss amounted to $300 million . . . In the Communist areas all those between the ages of 8 and 16 are being pressed into the children’s brigades; those between 16 and 23 serve in the vanguard units; and those between 23 and 40 are being organized into Red Guards . . . ”

Just how the Communists extorted men and supplies from the people may be gauged from the following document captured in the village in Tungkiang County in Szechuan province. The document, dated October 24, 1931, was addressed to Communist cadres in four villages:

!

Comrades: We have been instructed by the district Soviet to accomplish the following tasks within a week: As of October 20, each village is required to send 5 persons to the Enlarged Red Army; 5 to the youth vanguard; 4 to the fighting company; 4 to the transport corps; 2 to the carrier corps; 2 to the workers corps; 3 to the propagandas corps; and 3 to the land inspection corps. Each village must supply 30 catties of saltpeter and 20 suits of winter uniforms. Delivery must be made within ten days. All grains produced by the village must be concentrated in the Soviet storage, and no village is permitted to retain them. How about landlords, rural bullies and reactionary elements in your village? How many have been arrested and how many have escaped? The village must submit a detailed list of these to the higher authorities within ten days. The Soviet is in urgent need of tailors, blacksmiths, charcoal burners. It also needs wood boards, bamboo, big kettles. You are requested to supply them within the shortest possible time. Today we have received another letter from the Soviet asking each village to supply 80 bales of cloth and 2 students from the schools. Each village is also asked to send 30 men to the transport corps and the Red Guard, as well as 4 carriers 295

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The Red Army was essentially a guerrilla force having terrorist control of the countryside which was the source of food supply and manpower. It was a fighting force of great mobility. By mounting surprise attacks and creating massive disturbances in the rear of the government troops, they successfully wore down the government units defending key positions and blunted government drives into the Communist areas. Undaunted by the failure of the first two campaigns, Chiang Kai-shek planned the launching of a third expedition. On June 22, 1931, he called a military conference at Nanchang and made various military appointments. On July 1 Chiang ordered the opening of a general offensive against the Communists under his personal command. The offensive was carried out simultaneously from two different directions, with General Ho Ying-chin in charge of the left wing and Ch’en Ming-shu in charge of the right wing. The strength of the government forces reached a total of 130,000 men. The campaign got off to a flying start, so much so that Ho Ying-chin’s forces were able to capture such Communist strongholds as Kuangchang Ningtu, the chief target of two previous campaigns; and Juichin, soon to be the capital of the so-called Chinese Soviet Republic. Chiang was so encouraged by the success of the campaign that he believed that the complete annihilation of the Communist forces was at hand. But this was not to be. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria coupled with internecine strife forced Chiang to suspend temporarily the anti-Communist military campaign. The Red Army was thus given a breathing-space in which to grow and expand. The relations between Ch’en Chi-t’ang, Governor of Kwangtung and Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Army, and the National Government had been deteriorating for some time. Toward the end of May 1931, Ch’en, together with Li Tsung-jen, Chang Fa-k’uei, Wang Ching-wei, Eugene Ch’en and other anti-Chiang politicians, formed a Central Executive Com­ mittee and a Southern government in Canton. In the North, Shih Yu-san, that fickle militarist who had so often revolted and so often failed, believed that the time had come to expand his sphere of influence in Hopei. In July he began to detain the rolling stock along the Peiping-Hankow Railway. 296

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But once again his revolt proved abortive. It was quickly put down by government troops. The threat from the South was far more serious. Events now moved rapidly toward a crisis. The troops of Kwangtung and Kwangsi entered southern Hunan in September, and it seemed that a civil war on a large scale was about to break loose. Chiang shifted two crack divisions from the Communist front in Kiangsi to the front against the rebels in Hunan. But a major clash between the two opposing sides never took place. It was averted by the Japanese military action in Mukden on September 18, 1931.

Part IV THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

C H A P T E R TW EN TY-FO U R

PRELUDE TO THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS

Prelude to the Manchurian Crisis The Three Eastern Provinces of China or Manchuria had been the target of Japanese aggression ever since the time of the Meiji restoration in the 19th Century. Japan’s interest in these Chinese provinces was deep-rooted. Manchuria’s abundance of natural resources and sparse population offered possibilities of great development. It had become fixed in Japanese thinking that Manchuria was economically in­ dispensable not merely to the well-being but even to the continued existence of Japan as a world power. This view was based on the belief that without the coal and iron of Manchuria the industrialization of Japan would be endangered and that without the agricultural resources of Manchuria the growing population of Japan would suffer hunger and deprivation. Hence Manchuria was Japan’s life-line and must be brought under Japanese control.

A Brief Interlude During a short period prior to the September 1931 crisis, Sino-Japanese relations had actually been relatively friendly. This was a period in which the policies of Baron Shidehara prevailed. After the fall of the Tanaka Cabinet in Japan in September 1929, Hamaguchi of the Minseito Party succeeded 301

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to the Premiership. He reversed the “positive” policy enforced by the previous Seiyukai government under General Tanaka. Hamaguchi’s China policy was grounded on the premise that friendly relations with China provided the soundest basis for expansion of Japan’s trade and the solution of her economic difficulties. On July 9, two days after its assumption of power, the Hamaguchi Cabinet announced its China policy in these terms: The most pressing issue is to make a new start in SinoJapanese relations on the basis of good neighborliness . . . To resort to force of arms at the slightest provocation is hardly the way to gain prestige and respect for the country. What this government seeks to accomplish is mutual benefit and co-prosperity, particularly in the development of free and unrestrained economic relations. We should reject all aggressive acts in all parts of China, but we must at the same time protect those legal and vital rights which are indispensable to Japan’s existence and prosperity. We believe that in this we have the understanding of the Chinese people.

Baron Shidehara Kijuro, who had served as Foreign Minister before (1924-1927) was given the same portfolio by Prime Minister Hamaguchi. This time he held the office for two years and five months. During this brief period he endeavored to create an era of comparative good feeling between China and Japan. He ruled out the use of force as an instrument of policy. Let us review briefly the events that had taken place between China and Japan from the time when Baron Shidehara assumed office in July 1929 to the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis in September 1931. On June 1, 1929, when Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s remains were laid at rest in the mausoleum on the southern slope of the Purple Mountain on the outskirts of Nanking, many of the late leader’s Japanese friends such as Inukai Tsuyoshi and Toyama Mitsuru were invited to participate in the ceremonies. On June 3, 1929, the Japanese Government formally recognized the National Government at Nanking as the legal government of China. On September 5, 1929, Foreign Minister Shidehara, in his conversation with the Kuomintang stalwart Chang Chi, 302

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informally suggested the possibility of concluding a Sino-Japanese non-aggression pact. The projected pact, according to an article written by Komura Toshisaburo, advisor to the Foreign Office, was to contain the following main provisions: (1) Japan’s recognition of Manchuria as an integral part of China; (2) all unresolved questions relating to Dairen, Port Arthur, the South Manchurian Railway, as well as the so-called Twenty-one Demands, to be settled by negotiations; (3) renunciation on Japan’s part of coercive diplomacy and aggressive policies; and (4) Manchuria’s development to be based on the principle of Sino-Japanese cooperation. The rationale of the projected pact, as Komura saw it, was that, with Sino-Japanese relations firmly established on a basis of peaceful cooperation and mutual trust, all outstanding disputes between the two countries could easily be resolved.1 The projected pact, however, never became a reality. China feared that the conclusion of such a pact would, instead of resolving all outstanding issues between the two countries, further strengthen Japan’s hold on Manchuria. Another friendly gesture made by Foreign Minister Shidehara was the appointment of Saburi Sadao as Minister to China. Saburi had been Japan’s delegate to the tariff conference held in Peking in 1925, and had shown himself to be a good friend of the Chinese people. His appointment was well received in Nanking. He arrived in Nanking early in October 1929. On November 20 he returned to Japan, bringing with him a draft treaty of commerce and navigation. It happened that the Japanese Foreign Office was then preoccupied with the forthcoming naval conference to be held in London. It had no time to discuss the draft treaty with Saburi. On November 28 Saburi committed suicide in a hotel at Hakone. It was widely believed that his death was in part due to his being embittered by frustrations. The appointment of a successor to Saburi caused not a little controversy between Tokyo and Nanking. When the name of Obata Torikichi was presented to the Chinese Government for approval, Nanking refused to give it. Obata was unacceptable because, while serving as Counsellor of the 1The article appeared in the October 5, 1929 issue of the Gaiko Jiho. 303

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Japanese Legation at the time of the Twenty-one Demands, he had acted in a manner offensive to the Chinese people. All the pressure that had been brought to bear on the Chinese Government was of no avail. Tokyo was finally prevailed upon to appoint another man to the post. That man was Shigemitsu Mamoru, then Consul-General in Shanghai, who fifteen years later signed the surrender for Japan aboard U.S.S. Missouri. As soon as he assumed office in January 1930, the Chinese Government started negotiations with him in regard to the question of tariff autonomy. An agreement was reached in May. Since the Powers other than Japan had already agreed to China’s full tariff autonomy, agreement with Japan completed the process. This was an important step toward ending the 19th century servitude known as the unequal treaties.

Military Ascendancy in Japan

Even as the Hamaguchi Cabinet endeavored to improve the relations between China and Japan, the political climate in Japan was undergoing a basic change. With the onset of the world depression in 1929, Japan’s national economy suffered the same catastrophic reverses that were suffered by all highly industrialized nations. Poor economic conditions and social unrest provided a favorable environment for the militarists. Leadership for a military-fascist movement was already at hand. The older clan generals were being pushed out by middle-rank officers coming from the poorer and less influential clans. This middle group of officers exercised great influence over the young army officers, who were dissatisfied with the existing socio-economic order. They demanded fundamental changes. They favored an aggressive foreign policy. At this time Japanese trade with China declined precipitously as a result not only of the world depression but also of Chinese boycott of Japanese goods following the Tsinan intervention and massacre. Industrial unemployment was high and the farming population was particularly hard 304

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hit. This provided an advantageous field of action for the military. The belief that the salvation of Japan lay in the control of the resources in Manchuria became an article of faith in the military circles. The Hamaguchi Cabinet incurred the displeasure of the militarists not merely because of its “weak-kneed” China policy. Even more unacceptable to the military was the Minseito government’s policy of disarmament and reduction of defense expenditures. The London Naval Treaty of 1930, which fixed the ratios of the naval strength of Britain, the United States and Japan at 5-5-3, gave rise to a struggle of major proportions. What was at stake was more than the question of cruiser ratios; it involved the basic constitutional issue with regard to who had control over the naval and military establishments. Did it reside in the Cabinet, by virtue of the Emperor’s prerogative over affairs of state, or did it rest with the military and naval leaders, by virtue of the Emperor’s prerogative over the supreme command? This gave a focal point for anti-government propaganda, which though inspired by the military leaders, was circulated through the medium of various “patriotic” societies. In November Premier Hamaguchi was shot by a “patriotic” assassin; eight months later he died from the wounds. Japan was thus ushered into a period of military-fascist development. Another element in the situation was the growth of Chinese nationalism. When Chang Hsueh-liang placed the Three Eastern Provinces under the authority of the National Government in the face of the strong objections raised by Japan, the direction of foreign affairs was transferred to Nanking. The National Government, being determined to overthrow imperialism and abrogate all unequal treaties, was less amenable to direct Japanese pressure than the Mukden government under Chang Tso-lin had been. Of even greater importance was the construction of a separate Chinese railway system in the region previously served exclusively by the South Manchurian Railway. By September 1931, the Chinese had built and were operating railways with a total length of nearly a thousand kilometers. The Chinese efforts to route all freight, if possible, over the Chinese-operated lines, with a seaboard exit at the Chinese port of Yingkow and potentially at Hulutao, the Japanese claimed, deprived 305

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the South Manchurian Railway of freight from North Manchuria which would normally find an outlet at Dairen. Thus the Chinese railway policy was looked upon as a threat to Japanese interests in Manchuria. The Japanese military were vociferous in calling attention to the danger to which Manchuria, the “life-line” of Japan, was exposed.

Colonel Itagaki’s Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria

The plan for the conquest of Manchuria now entered the phase of political and military action. The headquarters of the Japanese Kwantung Army was the hub of conspiratorial activities. Colonel Itagaki Seishiro, who had become a high-ranking staff officer at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army in May 1929, was the propelling force behind Japan’s expansionist campaign in Manchuria. On July 3, 1929, he and a group of staff officers made a trip to North Manchuria to survey the potential area of conflict at first-hand. They visited Changchun, Harbin, Tsitsihar, Hailar and other important points. The journey lasted thirteen days. Itagaki made a careful study of Harbin and its environs as an area for military operations. In May 1931, he set forth a threefold plan for the solution of the “Manchuria-Mongolia problem” : independence of Mongolia; independence of the Chientao District of Kirin province, where a large number of Koreans resided; and the creation of provocative disturbances in North Manchuria. The Koreans, though living under Chinese sovereignty, were regarded by the Japanese, for purposes of aggressive activities against China, as Japanese nationals. The Itagaki plan, translated into plain language, called for the establishment of puppet regimes and the use of provocative developments in China to seize control of Manchuria. This was indeed the scenario soon to be acted out not only in China’s Three Eastern Provinces but also in the provinces south of the Great Wall. Itagaki was not of course alone in the advocacy of a strong policy. Japanese capitalists no less than the militarists 306

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were interested in external aggression and had not been slow to take advantage of its results in China. Thus, on December 7, 1929, a group of capitalists and military officers met at the Ministry of Overseas Affairs to concoct what was called “A Secret Plan for the Control of Manchuria and Mongolia.” The participants included Matsuda Genji, Minister of Overseas Affairs; Sengoku Mitsugu and Kimura Eiichi, DirectorGeneral and Director of the South Manchurian Railway respectively; as well as the Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs, War, and the General Staff. They believed that the cooperation between Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek was at best a temporary arrangement and that sooner or later the two men would have their differences and would seek to resolve them by force of arms. Although Chang Hsueh-liang insisted that all questions of foreign affairs should be discussed through the Foreign Office at Nanking, Japan decided that, in order to protect her special interests, she must continue to deal directly with the Mukden authorities. At the same time Japan must prevent the completion of a separate Chinese railway system to the detriment of the prosperity of Dairen. When the opportune time arrived, Japan should not hesitate to achieve her “final objective” in Manchuria. By “final objective” they meant military occupation.

Japan’s Drive Toward Fascism By 1930 the young army extremists, though still few in number, were gaining influence. They had at their disposal an extraordinary set of facilities. Their propaganda was disseminated through various “patriotic organizations” embracing a membership of several million. Convinced that the politicians were corrupting Japan’s institutions of government, they called for the abolition of the parliament­ ary system. They demanded that the army should be given political leadership, inasmuch as it was the sole disinterested force that could be trusted to uphold the prestige of Imperial 307

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Japan and subordinate conflicting interests to the welfare of the whole nation. In the realm of foreign affairs, they believed that Japan’s survival required the creation of a powerful colonial empire on the Asian continent. One group of young army extremists organized in January 1931 what was known as Sakura Kai (Cherry Society). The leader of the group was Lt.-Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro who, along with Itagaki, Doihara, Okamura, Nagata and Ishihara, was one of the notoriously militant “young colonels.” The Sakura Kai had an active membership of about a hundred, composed mainly of officers below the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Its members believed that the time had come to strike, before the power of initiative was removed from them. A plan of action was determined upon and a detailed scheme was drawn up. A mass meeting of more than ten thousand people was to be held at the Hibiya Park in Tokyo on or around March 20, 1931. Okawa Shumei, a graduate of the Tokyo Imperial University, a former employee of the South Manchurian Railway, and author of a book on the spirit of Japan, was given the responsibility of organizing the mass meeting. After the meeting, the mob was to march on the Diet building under the pretext of maintaining public order. Major Generals Koiso Kuniaki and Tatekawa Yoshitsugu would then enter the Diet building and demand the resignation of the Cabinet. A new Cabinet would then come into being under the Premiership of General Ugaki Kazushige, formerly Governor-General of Korea and thrice Minister of War. But the coup failed to materialize. The mass meeting, on which the success or failure of the coup depended, did not come off. General Ugaki, who had allegedly supported the insurrection, had at the last minute changed his mind. The military dictatorship which the Sakura Kai had set out to establish proved premature. The whole affair was hushed up. The failure of the March 1931 affair did not stop the young army officers from planning other coups aimed at seizure of political power. The most spectacular of these was the one which took place five years later in February 1936. Meanwhile the agitation for the conquest of Manchuria forged ahead with gathering momentum. Resolutions adopted by the Chinese National Assembly at Nanking in 308

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May 1931 for the abolition of unequal treaties was seized upon by the Japanese militarists as evidence of China’s determination to do away with the “special position” of Japan in Manchuria. Japan must, therefore, disabuse Nanking of its delusions before it was too late. On June 12 a special committee on the Manchurian question was organized at the headquarters of the Imperial General Staff, with Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, head of the First Department, as chairman; Nagata Tetsuzan and Okamura Yasuji, section chiefs at the War Ministry; Yamawaki Masataka, Juto Chiaki and Wata Hisao, section chiefs at the General Staff, as members. In its “Outline of a Plan for the Solution of the Manchurian Question,” the Committee recommended that before taking any military action, Japan should prepare the world as well as domestic public opinion for it. Perhaps a year’s time would be needed for that, members of the Committee believed. Pending the launching of this propaganda campaign, the Committee further believed, it behooved the Kwantung Army to act with the utmost patience and restraint. The Kwantung Army, however, was visibly impatient of further delay. It was ready to go into action at the drop of a hat. It had already got off to a headstart by erecting barracks along the South Manchurian Railway and by strengthening the defense of Japanese factories and residential districts in Mukden. At Dairen the Japanese police added eight special units to its force for intelligence work. All Japanese shops were transformed into espionage organs of the Kwantung Army. The publisher of the Manshu Nichiniehi Shimbun (Manchurian Daily News), Tsukuno Shigekatsu, urged in a leading article that the time for action had now come: The anti-Japanese policy of China is a hostile act. It is futile to protect our interests in Manchuria and Mongolia through diplomatic channels and by peaceful means. There is only one way to do this. It is the way of armed might.

In the summer of 1931 the campaign of the Kwantung Army for direct action was given a new impetus on account of the Wanpaoshan and Nakamura cases.

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The Wanpaoshan Incident The Wanpaoshan Incident involved 200 Koreans who had emigrated to China and went to live in a little village by that name in Kirin province, about 24 kilometers from Changchun, the provincial capital. Koreans in Manchuria were often used by the Japanese as instruments of aggression. In the present case, the Koreans had in April 1931 leased from a Chinese company a piece of land in Wanpaoshan which the company had leased from the original Chinese owners. The original lease stipulated that its validity depended on the approval of its terms by the district magistrate. This approval was not secured before the signature of the second leasing agreement. In May, 40 Korean families at Changchun moved to Wanpaoshan to cultivate the leased land. The success of the Korean venture was dependent upon the availability of water to irrigate the land. The Koreans immediately set out to dig an irrigation canal, 9 meters in width and 12 kilometers in length, to draw water from a nearby river. The canal had to be dug on land belonging to owners who were not parties to either lease agreement. The Koreans, moreover, had begun the construction of a dam which would inundate thousands of acres of land owned by neighboring Chinese farmers. The farmers appealed to the district magistrate for redress. On May 24 the magistrate ordered the Koreans to stop the construction of both the canal and the dam. The order was ignored. A Chinese police force appeared on the scene and nine Koreans were arrested. At this point the Japanese consul at Changchun intervened on behalf of the Koreans. As a result of negotiations, it was agreed that an investigation by representatives of both sides should be made in order to settle the dispute peacefully and on an equitable basis. It was further agreed that pending the investigation, all work on the dam and the canal should be halted. But the Japanese did not abide by the agreement. Japanese consular police took control of the area and under its protection, the Koreans completed their work. This aroused the hostility of the Chinese farmers whose livelihood was threatened by the Koreans. The enraged farmers from several villages, armed with pitchforks, shovels and spades, tried to drive the 310

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Koreans away. The various encounters resulted in few casualties on either side, but sensational accounts were published both in Korea and Japan, which brought about anti-Chinese riots in both countries. Negotiations to settle the dispute were soon replaced by the Kwantung Army’s military action against China in September 1931.

The Nakamura Case

The Nakamura case came as the culmination of a series of “incidents” which had embittered Chinese-Japanese feelings during 1930 and 1931. Nakamura Shintaro was an officer of the Japanese General Staff. In June 1931 he started out to travel in Manchuria. Although a Japanese military officer on active service, he presented himself to the Chinese authorities both at Harbin and Mukden as an agricultural expert. He was in fact in Manchuria on a secret mission under orders of the Japanese Army. There was a region in Manchuria which, infested with roaming bandits, was unsafe for travel and forbidden access to foreigners. Captain Nakamura nonethe­ less entered that out-of-the way region under false pretenses. He was expected to reach Taonan in Liaoning province, where the South Manchurian Railway Company had an office, late in June or early in July. But he did not arrive during that period. Upon investigation, the Japanese asserted that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers, that the disrespect thus shown by the Chinese for the Japanese Army and nation was intolerable, and that the Chinese authorities in Manchuria had delayed to institute official inquiries into the circumstances and had been insincere in their claim that they had made every effort to ascertain the facts in the case. The Chinese on their side asserted that Captain Nakamura had been detained pending examination of his passport, which all foreigners were required to carry during travel in the remote interior; that he was shot while trying to escape; and that the documents

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found on him proved that he was either a military spy or an officer on a special mission. The death of Captain Nakamura greatly aggravated an already tense situation. The Chinese authorities bent over backwards to settle the unfortunate affair by negotiation. The Chinese officer responsible for it was arrested and put into prison. Chang Hsueh-liang sent a special emissary to Tokyo to apologize to the Japanese Government for what had happened. But the Kwantung Army increased its agitation in favor of use of force for the solution of all outstanding Sino-Japanese disputes in regard to Manchuria. On the afternoon of September 18, 1931, General Yung Cheng, Chief of Staff of the Northeastern Defense Forces, visited the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden in further search of a peaceful solution of the Nakamura case. On that very night the Japanese army struck.

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The Kwantung Army Strikes On the night of September 18, 1931, between 10 and 10:30, an explosion occurred on the South Manchurian Railway at a place about one kilometer to the north of the city of Mukden. It was not a big explosion and the damage done to the railway was minimal; indeed it did not prevent the punctual arrival of the southbound train from Changchun, travelling at a speed of 80 kilometers per hour and passing over the portion of the track alleged to have been damaged. Who was responsible for the explosion? The Japanese claimed that the bomb had been set by Chinese soldiers. This was denied by the Chinese. Whatever the facts with respect to and responsibility for the explosion, this in itself hardly justified the military action resorted to by the Japanese Kwantung Army in the name of self-defense. Judging by the military operations of the Japanese during the following weeks and months as well as on the basis of the records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, it seems certain that, prior to the night of the 18th, the Kwantung Army had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable, upon a plausible pretext, to bring Manchuria under effective Japanese control, and, for reasons known to themselves, decided to act on the night of September 18. And what they did that night was to have fateful consequences for the future of both China and Japan, and, indeed, for the whole world. Not far from the site of the explosion were barracks of Chinese troops known as the Northern Barracks. Of late the Japanese had been engaging in military exercises in the 313

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vicinity of the barracks. The officers and men inside the barracks did not pay much attention, therefore, to the explosion, believing it to be part of the Japanese exercises. But they soon discovered that this was not so. Within five minutes of the explosion a band of Japanese soldiers from the South Manchurian Railway zone approached the barracks and started shooting and throwing grenades in all directions. The Chinese troops inside the barracks did not return the fire. They had been under strict orders not to provide the Japanese with pretexts to expand minor incidents into major conflicts. For some days the clouds had been gathering, and the Manchurian authorities had known that something ominous was in the making. Chang Hsueh-liang, commanderin-chief of the Northeastern Defense Forces, was then in Peiping. Twelve days before the outbreak of September 18th, he had issued a top secret order to the Political Council of the Three Eastern Provinces as well as the Northeastern Defense Forces at Mukden as follows: As the diplomatic situation becomes increasingly tense, we should exercise the greatest restraint in dealing with the Japanese. In order to avoid furnishing the Japanese with any pretext for aggressive action, we must not allow ourselves to be provoked into a fight with them even under circumstances which are humiliating and intolerable. Strict adherence and undeviating obedience are required.

This was the pre-determined policy of non-resistance. Accordingly on the night of the 18th, Yung Chen, Chief of Staff of the Northeastern Defense Forces, as soon as he had been informed of what had been taking place, ordered Brigadier General Wang I-che, commanding officer of the barracks, to restrain his troops from offering any resistance to the Japanese invaders and, if necessary, to withdraw or even allow themselves to be disarmed. Thus, by 11 o ’clock two of the three regiments in the barracks had already withdrawn. The regiment which had been left behind was commanded by Colonel Wang T’ieh-han who, in the midst of the confusion, had not been able to get in touch with the headquarters of the Northeastern Defense Forces by telephone. His men were not inclined to give up without a fight. They were the only ones who exchanged fire with the Japanese. It was midnight when Colonel Wang finally got his 314

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orders to withdraw. By the time he had completed the withdrawal it was already 5 o ’clock in the morning of the 19th. The Japanese were in complete control of the barracks soon after.

Japanese Occupation of Mukden

When the Japanese started to attack, the Manchurian authorities had taken it as one of those unfortunate incidents which had occurred so many times in the past and which could probably be settled through negotiations. Tsang Shih-yi, Governor of Liaoning province of which Mukden is the capital, tried to find out from the Japanese Consul-General what the Japanese soldiers were up to . The reply was that the Consulate itself was completely in the dark as to what was happening. Around 11 p.m. of the 18th the Japanese had begun to shell the Mukden arsenal, one of the most modem in China, on the outskirts of the city. Japanese troops soon poured into the commercial district just outside the city wall. They occupied the police station by the western gate, and a number of policemen were killed. The Chinese authorities established contact with the Japanese Consulate by telephone and wanted to know whether the Japanese soldiers could be restrained from further attacks. In reply it was stated that the Japanese were then in conference and that the Chinese authorities would in due time be informed of their decisions. A few minutes later the Japanese Consulate informed the Chinese by telephone that once the troops had been on the move it was not possible to stop them and that all the Consulate could do was to ask the military authorities to prevent the soldiers from entering the walled city. But at 2 o’clock of the 19th Japanese troops were at all the gates of the city. By 4 o ’clock they were on the city wall and shooting wildly. Two hours later the entire city was occupied. The sign “ Under Japanese Military Occupation” was pasted on all public buildings. Governor Tkang Shih-yi and Yung Chen, Chief of Staff of the Northeastern Defense Forces, even at this late hour, were still hopeful that some 315

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development might yet turn up to enable them to negotiate a political settlement with the Japanese. They made another telephone communication with the Japanese ConsulateGeneral, and the reply they received was that the commanding general of the Kwantung Army, Honjo Shigeru, was on his way to Mukden and that pending his arrival, no one was in a position to know what the military intended to do. At 11 a.m. of the 19th General Honjo arrived with members of his staff, bringing with him a regiment of fresh troops for reinforcement. Acting more like a conqueror than one who was interested in preventing the extension of military operations, he categorically refused to settle matters swiftly with the Chinese authorities. In a proclamation issued upon his arrival, he declared that the Chinese must bear the responsibility for the present crisis. The destruction of a section of the South Manchurian Railway and the subsequent attacks on Japanese troops by Chinese soldiers, he alleged, constituted not only a flagrant act of aggression against Japanese treaty rights in Manchuria but also a direct challenge to the Japanese Army. He went on to assert: As one who is responsible for the protection of the railway, for the safeguarding of Japanese vested interests, as well as for the maintenance of the prestige and honor of the Imperial Army, I am in duty bound to take drastic action without the slightest hesitation.

The Conspirators

The Japanese military action was not confined to the city of Mukden. Within 24 hours most of the strategic points in South Manchuria were in the hands of the Kwantung Army. These included the cities and ports of Antung, Yinkow, and others. Foreign aggression was nothing new to China. In the 19th and early 20th century China had been invaded more than once by foreign armies. But never in her long history had she ever witnessed such naked and brutal military aggression 316

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as that which took place in Manchuria in 1931. And what made that series of events even more extraordinary was that it was engineered by a handful of conspirators in the Kwantung Army who, apparently without the knowledge of the authorities in Tokyo, plunged China and Japan into a conflict which was to last, with varying degrees of intensity, for 14 years and which resulted in the defeat of Japan in World War II and in the Communists’ take-over of the Chinese mainland. The men who master-minded this sinister plot were Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and Lt.-Colonel Ishihara Kanji, senior staff officers of the Kwantung Army. They had been planning for the operation for some time, and they had taken into their confidence a number of other Japanese officers in Manchuria, including, ironically, Captain Imada Shin taro, aide to one of Chang Hsueh-liang’s Japanese advisers. They had early in July selected the spot where the South Manchurian Railway was to be bombed. The operation was to be put into effect at the end of September. In Tokyo rumors about the impending military action on the part of certain Japanese officers in Manchuria had been circulating in official circles. Foreign Minister Shidehara had received reports to that effect and had, on September 5, 1931, instructed the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden, Hayashi Kujiro, to try to stop the “wild actions” of the Kwantung Army. The military high command in Tokyo had also been aware of what was being planned in Manchuria. Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, Director of the First Department of the General Staff, armed with letters from his own chief and the Minister of War, Minami Jiro, was sent to Mukden to warn against the creation of any incident that was reportedly being planned. Another member of the General Staff, Hashimoto Kingoro, however, had been privy to the conspiracy. In a series of telegrams, he urged the conspirators to present Tatekawa with a fait accompli: Plan has been discovered and it is imperative to act imme­ diately and without any hesitation. Must decisively put the plan into operation before Tatekawa’s arrival. Disregard what people think at home; must act with determination. 317

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In the light of these telegrams, Itagaki, Ishihara, Imada and their co-conspirators met on the night of September 15th at the office of the Kwantung Army’s Special Service Agency at Mukden to discuss the matter. They reached no clearcut decision that night. The next morning Itagaki and Ishihara decided that the timing of the operation must be advanced in order to forestall the delivery of the letters from the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War. Tatekawa arrived at Mukden at 7 p.m. September 18. He was taken immediately to the Kikumo restaurant in the city where he was royally entertained. He had too much to drink at the restaurant and soon fell asleep. It was then that Captain Komoto Suemori, who had been assigned to plant the explosives, set out to carry out his mission.1 The attack on the barracks of the Northeastern Defense Forces immediately followed. Itagaki then reported to the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, Honjo Shigeru, who was at his headquarters in Port Arthur, 250 miles to the south of Mukden, in these words: Because of an explosion which occurred on the track of the South Manchurian Railway, a state of war now exists between our forces and the enemy at the northern barracks. Our forces are in danger of being surrounded by the numerically superior enemy. Hence the 29th infantry regiment under the command of Hirata Sachihiro has been ordered to attack Mukden with all its strength. As a senior staff officer of the Kwantung Army, I took the liberty of giving the order of attack.

Upon receipt of this report, General Honjo left for Mukden at 2 a.m. Prompted by other staff officers who were involved in the conspiracy, he issued a series of orders which brought into action all Japanese forces in Manchuria. He also asked for help from the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Korea. 1 According to the testimony of Tanaka Iyukichi, staff officer of the Kwantung Army, Tatekawa, though charged with the mission of delivering the letters from the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War warning against creating any incident, was in fact in sympathy with the objectives of the conspirators. He therefore went directly to the restaurant and got drunk. He did not awake until the next morning when the deed had already been done. International Military Tribunal for the Far East. 318

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Was General Honjo aware at the time that the explosion had in fact been instigated by his own officers? In a note written before his suicide in 1945, he insisted that the Army had acted in self-defense. Inasmuch as evidence showing that something was being planned had already been available to Japanese official circles in Tokyo, it is reasonable to suppose that General Honjo could not have been totally ignorant of what was going on. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, Morishima Morito, first assistant to the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden, hastened to the Special Service Agency of the Kwantung Army where he was told by Itagaki that “the Chinese had bombed the South Manchurian Railway and our forces have already been mobilized.” When Morishima inquired as to the authority who had issued the order, Itagaki replied that “This is an emergency and, since the Commanding General is at Port Arthur, I acted on his behalf.” Morishima urged that negotiations should be entered into with the Chinese authorities for a peaceful settlement. Itagaki became impatient and retorted that this was a matter involving the prerogatives of the Army and the ConsulateGeneral had no business to butt in. Another officer, one Major Hanatani Tadashi, who was present at the meeting, menacingly drew his sword and said that no interference with the Army’s prerogatives would be tolerated.2 Such was the insolence and lawlessness of the Japanese military!

Reactions in Tokyo

The military high command in Tokyo first learned of what had taken place at Mukden at 1:07 a.m., September 19th, from a telegraphic report signed by Colonel Doihara Kenji, Chief of the Special Service Agency of the Kwantung Army at Mukden. The report blamed the Chinese for having international Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit 245, Morishima affidavit. 319

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320

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bombed the South Manchurian Railway. Foreign Minister Shidehara, however, did not give much credence to Doihara’s report and his suspicion was reinforced by a series of telegrams from his Consul-General in Mukden on the morning following the explosion. These telegrams indicated that the incident had been “wholly planned by the Army” and would be followed by operations throughout the zone of the South Manchurian Railway.3 The army chiefs were also aware that the Japanese army officers were responsible for the incident. An emergency meeting of the Cabinet was scheduled to take place at 10 a.m., September 19. Prior to the meeting, Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro asked War Minister Minami Jiro whether the military action taken by the Japanese Army in Manchuria was in fact an act of self-defense. The War Minister replied that it was indeed so. At the meeting Foreign Minister Shidehara produced the telegrams he had received. He added that there was every reason to believe that the army was determined to expand the incident. War Minister Minami, who had intended to bring up the question of dispatching reinforcements from Korea, was forced to drop the subject. The Cabinet decided that morning to make every effort to avoid an extension of the conflict. The army authorities in Tokyo, however, were not prepared to accept the decision of the Cabinet. At a meeting of the officers of the War Ministry, Imamura Hitoshi, acting Chief of the First Department of the General Staff, made an impassioned speech emphasizing that it was unwise to restrain the activities of the officers in Manchuria. What the authorities should do at the present moment, he asserted, was not to impose restrictions on the Kwantung Army’s actions, which would have a deleterious effect on its morale, but to encourage it “to loyally serve the nation, to maintain its authority and prestige abroad, and to achieve the great tasks it has set out to do.” The Chief of the General Staff, General Kanaya Hanzo, was urged by his young staff officers to refrain from dampening the ardor of the Kwantung Army. The General Staff, in a telegram to General Honjo, while giving approval to the steps that had already been taken, 3

International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit 156, and Proceedings, 20006. 321

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cautioned against overstepping the bounds of self-defense. The Kwantung Army, interpreting the phrase “self-defense” in its broadest possible sense, took this as a signal to go ahead with its aggressive operations. In this fashion the Manchurian crisis was systematically expanded and escalated.

The Entry of the Japanese Korean Army As had been noted, when General Honjo left Port Authur for Mukden in the early hours of September 19th, he had not only issued orders to bring all Japanese forces in Manchuria into action but at the same time asked for help from the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Korea. The response was prompt and resolute. Almost immediately Hayashi Senjuro, Commanding General of the Japanese forces in Korea, sent a squadron of planes to Manchuria to make a reconnaissance. Simultaneously he telegraphed Tokyo to the effect that in view of the urgency of the situation and in response to the request of General Honjo he had decided to dispatch the First Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division to the vicinity of Mukden to reinforce the Kwantung Army. He added that the reinforcement had already moved across the Yalu River and had been placed under the command of General Honjo. General Hayashi’s decision to send troops from Korea to Manchuria, with neither the knowledge of the Cabinet nor the authorization of the Emperor, was clearly a violation of long established practice and tradition, according to which, in the absence of Imperial sanction, there could be no troop movement across national frontiers. The General Staff was therefore forced to go through the motions of trying to stop the troops in Korea from crossing the Yalu River. It was of course a futile gesture, since the troops were already in Manchuria. As a remedial measure, the Chief of the General Staff was advised to avail himself of the right of direct access to the Emperor in order to obtain Imperial sanction of General Hayashi’s decision. The Chief of the Military Affairs of the War Ministry, Nagata Tetsuzan, took exception to this 322

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procedure. He contended that troop movement involved the expenditure of funds which must be provided for by the Cabinet. It was unwise to appeal directly to the Emperor without the approval of the Cabinet. Thus, on September 22, the matter was submitted to the Cabinet. The Cabinet, taking cognizance of the awkward situation, was obliged to give its retroactive approval to the fait accompli and to provide the necessary funds for the supporting action taken by the Korean Army. The Emperor, who was known to have been opposed to the troop movement and to have called upon the General Staff to maintain discipline in the army, was persuaded by his senior advisers not to become embroiled in political controversy. The army extremists in Manchuria were thus given a free hand to expand their conquests. Within three days of the explosion at Mukden, the Kwantung Army had secured not merely key points along the length of the South Manchurian Railway but also, more ominously, had branched out far from the railway zone into the province of Kirin and proceeded to proclaim the independence of that province.

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Chiang Pleads for National Unity

Chiang Kai-shek was at Nanchang in the midst of the Third Communist-suppression Campaign when news of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria reached him. An hour of unprecedented crisis had struck for the Chinese nation. He noted in his diary on September 20th: “The Japanese militarists are now in the saddle and they will not stop until they have put their plan of conquest into operation. Henceforth there will be no peace in East Asia.” Chiang left Nanchang for Nanking and on September 21 called a meeting of political and military leaders. He believed, he said at the meeting, that China should not be dragged into an all-out war with Japan at a time of domestic turmoil and inadequate preparation. He was of the opinion that China should first of all appeal to the League of Nations and the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact for justice. “ We must,” he said, “unite and present a solid front against foreign aggression; we must be calm and determined; and we must be prepared to take up arms for self-defense if all hopes for a peaceful settlement should fade.” Differences between Nanking and the Cantonese leaders had a few days before threatened to touch off a civil war. The Japanese invasion had made this unlikely, but reconciliation was still a long way off. Chiang decided to send such veteran Kuomintang leaders as Ts’ai Yuan-p’ei, Chang Chi and Ch’en Ming-shu to Kwangtung to express his willingness to cooperate with the Southerners in the interest of national solidarity. While continuing to be in personal opposition to Chiang, the Southerners nonetheless agreed to a “ peace conference” to be held in October. 324

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China Appeals to the League

On September 21, Dr. Sao-ke Alfred Sze, China’s representative at Geneva, acting on instructions of the National Government, formally submitted to the SecretaryGeneral of the League of Nations, China’s case against Japan under the terms of Article Eleven of the Covenant. In that communication, the Chinese representative requested that a meeting of the Council of the League be held “ in order that it may take such action as it may deem wise and effectual so that the peace of nations may be safeguarded.” Dwelling on the gravity of the situation, Sze pointed out that Japanese troops, without provocation of any kind, not only “took military occupation of the cities of Mukden and Antung and other places” but also seized lines of communication. He asked the Council, in pursuance of authority given to it by Article Eleven of the Covenant, to take immediate steps “to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; to re-establish the status quo ante; and to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to the Republic of China.” Dr. L. W. Rajchman, Director of the League Health Section, was then in China. Accompanied by T. V. Soong, then Vice President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Finance, he went to see Chiang on the day when China brought her case to the League. He took a highly optimistic view of the situation. He believed that pressure exerted by the League would be sufficient to force the withdrawal of Japanese troops. Chiang, however, was not convinced. He did not believe that the Japanese would withdraw. “I know the Japanese and I know the Japanese psychology: they would rather let Tokyo and the Japanese archipelago be destroyed than withdraw from Manchuria.” That evening he wrote in his diary: “With the Japanese aggression in China the Second World War has begun. I wonder whether statesmen of the world are aware of this.” (September 22, 1931) The communication which the Chinese representative had sent to the Secretary-General of the League on September 21 was immediately circulated to all members of the Council, and a meeting of the Council was scheduled for the next day. 325

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Dr. Sze read to the Council telegrams he had received showing the extent to which the Japanese military occupation had developed. In the light of the seriousness of the situation, he declared, other provisions of the Covenant than those contained in Article XI might need to be applied. The Japanese representative, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, for­ merly Tokyo’s Minister to China, said in reply that the acts of the Japanese troops, including the occupation of certain towns, had been defensive in character. He asserted that the “incident” was local in character and that his government had sent a formal order to the commander of the Japanese troops to take the necessary steps to prevent the trouble from spreading. He assured the Council that Japan had no intention of aggravating the situation. He concluded by saying that it was his firm conviction that a peaceful settlement could be achieved by direct negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. He warned the League that “premature intervention in the circumstances would only have the deplorable result of needlessly exciting Japanese opinion, which is already overexcited, and thus impede the peaceful settlement of the situation.” The Japanese assertion that the Kwantung Army’s military actions were wholly defensive in character was of course untenable in the face of incontrovertible facts. The Japanese contention was never accepted by other members of the Council. The Chinese representative, with regard to the Japanese suggestion that the controversy could be settled by direct negotiations, took occasion to declare: . . . I do not think that any self-respecting State can agree to open diplomatic negotiations for the solution of a situation so long as a considerable portion of its territory is under forcible military occupation by the party which requests a diplomatic settlement.

He repeated his request that the Council should order the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the stations they had occupied prior to September 18,1931. As a result of the discussions, the President of the Council, Senor Alexandra Lerroux of Spain, sent to the Chinese and Japanese Governments a telegram containing an “urgent appeal” that they should “refrain from any act 326

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which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem.” In Nanking Chiang Kai-shek considered this “a turning point” in China’s diplomatic effort. When General Wan Fu-lin, Chang Hsueh-liang’s deputy, went to see him on September 23rd, he expressed the hope that the League might be able to help China to recover the lost territory. In the event that the League should fail, he added, China would have to fight Japan with might and main. Accordingly, in reply to the telegram of the President of the Council c*f the League, the Chinese Government accepted the recom­ mendation that it should refrain from any action liable to aggravate the situation and prejudice the peaceful solution of the controversy. It pointed out, however, that the situation was hourly growing in gravity, so that effective application of the Council’s powers brooked no delay. The Japanese on their part continued to insist on the defensive character of the actions taken by the Kwantung Army, which, they said, had been “ careful to act only within the limits necessary to ensure their own safety, the protection of the railway and the safety of Japanese nationals.” The Japanese Government in its reply to the Council said, that it “firmly pursued the object of preventing an extension of the situation” and had in fact already withdrawn the greater part of its troops to the railway zone. As a precautionary measure, the Japanese Government declared, only a few troops remained at Mukden and Kirin, and a small number of soldiers were placed at certain other points. The reply further stated that the Japanese Government felt that the Council would “trust the sincerity of its attitude.” At the fourth meeting of the Council held on September 25th, the Japanese representative, Yoshizawa, once again called for direct negotiations. He warned the Council that the Council “would do well not to intervene prematurely, as by so doing it might run the risk of adversely affecting the situation which already shows signs of improvement.” The Chinese representative, Dr. Sze, called attention to the fact that the Japanese military forces in Manchuria were already operating at points a considerable distance from the scene of the alleged outbreak, again urged that the first 327

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immediate step to be taken by the Council was to secure the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the stations occupied by them prior to September 18th, and asked that, in conformity with earlier precedents, a commission composed of neutral members should be appointed by the Council and empowered to observe the modes in which, and the times at which the troops were withdrawn, and to report thereupon to the Council. The Manchurian crisis came at a time of world economic depression. At Geneva, where the economic crisis dominated all thoughts, the news of the clash at Mukden was not received with as much concern as it deserved. The League of Nations, moreover, was dominated by Britain and France. Neither the British nor the French had any desire to be drawn into antagonism with Japan. They never intended to take any collective action in the cause of peace; they contented themselves with urging the swift withdrawal of troops. At the fifth meeting of the Council on September 28th, the Chinese representative reported a series of acts on the part of the Japanese military forces which greatly aggravated the situation in Manchuria. Once again he stressed the necessity for the early dispatch of a neutral commission to determine the true facts. Once again the suggestion was ignored. On September 30th the Council, after private consultations between individual representatives or groups of them, adopted unanimously a resolution calling for the restoration of normal relations between China and Japan, urging the withdrawal of Japanese troops into the railway zone “in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals” was assured, and requesting the two Governments “to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations.” Before the introduction of the resolution, the President of the Council said that, in view of the special circumstances prevailing in Manchuria, a certain period of time had to be allowed for the withdrawal of troops in order to ensure safety of life and property. This being so, he suggested that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the present discussion of the controversy. Accordingly, the September 328

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30th resolution provided that the next meeting should not take place until two weeks later, namely, October 14th. Dr. Sze, while giving China’s approval to the resolution, stated: . . . When the complete and full re-establishment of the had been effected, the Government of China reserved its rights under the Covenant and would continue to look to the Council for aid in determining the several responsibilities of the two parties for the events which had occurred since the night of September 18th, and the fixing of reparation justly due.

s ta tu s q u o a n te

The Deepening of the Crisis

The September 30th resolution of the Council of the League produced no effect. Hopes for the restoration of normal relations between China and Japan were soon shattered by continued Japanese advances. The fact is that the young army extremists in Japan had long planned to detach Manchuria from China, and they were now determined to carry the plan into execution. Six months prior to the September 18 outbreak, the General Staff had already outlined the steps by which Manchuria was to be taken over by Japan: (1) to make use of Chinese renegades to establish pro-Japanese regimes; (2) to establish an auto­ nomous Manchu state (Manchukuo) under Japanese protec­ tion, and (3) outright annexation of this “autonomous” state by Japan. After the September 18 outbreak, staff officers of the Kwantung Army fully intended to condense the three steps into one, namely, to detach Manchuria from China without further ado. Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, director of the First Department of the General Staff, was then in Mukden. He advised them to go slow and proceed from step to step. After heated debate, they formulated a concrete plan of action. Doihara proposed the establishment of a Republic of Five Ethnic Groups. Others like Itagaki and Ishihara believed that the most practicable plan was the creation of a separate, 329

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multi-racial state embracing Manchuria, Jehol and Inner Mongolia under the nominal leadership of the deposed Manchu Emperor of China Hsuan Tung, who was living in Tientsin under the name of Henry Pu-yi. As a first step, it was proposed that Manchuria and Inner Mongolia be divided into five military districts under five renegade Chinese generals who would be willing to serve as Japanese puppets. This was the plan that was adopted. The date was September 22, 1931, five days after the Mukden outrage. The place was a Japanese hotel in Mukden. The participants — in addition to Doihara, Itagaki and Ishihara — included Miyake Mitsuharu, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and Katakura Tadashi. The conspirators lost no time in putting their plan into execution. When the Kwantung Army advanced on Kirin in the latter part of September, the local commander, General Hsi Hsia, was captured and forced at gun point to proclaim the independence of the province under Japanese tutelage. The initial step toward the establishment of a Japanesesponsored “autonomous” state in Manchuria was thus taken. On September 29 Nanking, in a note to the Japanese Foreign Office, condemned the Japanese action as “a flagrant violation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of China,” a violation of which “the Government of Japan must bear full responsibility.” The Foreign Minister of Japan, Baron Shidehara, denied that the Japanese had anything to do with the attempt on the part of the Chinese people in Manchuria to set up their own regimes. The Japanese Government, he said, had forbidden Japanese nationals to participate in such a movement, and it could not be held responsible for what the Chinese people themselves were trying to do. The Japanese Government, however, would “welcome” the establishment of local security organizations which afforded protection to the local population as well as the safety of the Japanese military units stationed there. It was not long before other Chinese renegades followed Hsi Hsia’s footsteps and declared their independence of the National Government of China — Tsang Shih-yi in Liaoning, Chang Ching-hui in Harbin, and Chang Hai-p’eng in Taonan. The military high command in Tokyo did seek to restrain the Kwantung Army from engaging in political activities. War Minister Minami Jiro, in a letter to General Honjo, warned 330

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that the Kwantung Army’s political activities in Manchuria could entail fateful consequences for the Japanese Army. The General Staff was also opposed to the promotion of separatist movements and cautioned the Kwantung Army against overstepping the limits of prudence. The military chiefs in Tokyo were concerned not so much with the Kwantung Army’s political activities as with the possibility of armed conflict with the Soviet Union. It was feared that the attempt to transform Manchuria into another Korea might raise the specter of Soviet intervention. The “young colonels” in Manchuria were not, however, deterred by such scruples. Itagaki, Doihara, Ishihara and their fellow conspirators believed that the Soviet Union was too preoccupied with the struggle at home to become embroiled in a war with Japan. They did not allow the warnings from Tokyo to interfere with their plans. On October 4, the Kwantung Army issued a statement extolling the separatist movement in extravagant terms: At present the movement for the establishment of political regimes has gained momentum in various places. The masses of the people sing the praises of the Imperial Army’s magnanimity. They do not have the slightest wish to return to the rule of their former leaders . . . It is our fervent hope that, for the sake of the thirty million people in Manchuria and Mongolia, this blessed land would soon realize the benefit of co-prosperity and co-existence. This is our moral responsibility. We believe that the newly established political regimes in various areas will soon be united to form a single movement. This will afford Imperial Japan an opportunity to practice good neighborliness and put into effect the policy of emergency relief and rehabilitation.

The die was cast, and both the War Minister, General Minami, and the General Staff had no option but to support the Kwantung Army. The Wakatsuki Cabinet, which had at first sought to curb the activities of the Kwantung Army, was now forced to accept the faits accomplis. The Kwantung Army found in General Ugaki Kazushige, former Governor-General of Korea, and Uchida Kosai, Director-General of the South Manchurian Railway, two of its most influential allies. In order to drum up popular support for what the Kwantung Army was doing in 331

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Manchuria, Uchida decided to make a trip to Japan. General Honjo, at a meeting with Uchida on October 6th, set forth his “Three Principles of a New Regime” in Manchuria: (1) to detach Manchuria and Mongolia from China Proper; (2) to unify Manchuria and Mongolia under the control of the Kwantung Army; and (3) to put Manchuria and Mongolia under the nominal rule of the Chinese. By this time public opinion in Japan, under the influence of the propaganda campaign of the army, had begun to demonstrate support for the Kwantung Army’s aggressive actions. By invoking the “right of supreme command” which the Emperor exercised through his military advisers, the army high command effectively silenced all opposition.

China Asks Earlier Meeting of League Council

On October 8, Japanese planes dropped a large number of bombs upon the important Chinese city of Chinchow, well down the railway line towards Peking and more than 50 miles from the Japanese railway zone, where the Chinese authorities, having been forced out of Mukden, had established a provisional government. The purpose of the attack was not merely to keep Chang Hsueh-liang’s troops on the run but also to force Tokyo into unambiguous support for the army in the field. The bombing of Chinchow completely shattered the hopes for a peaceful settlement of the affair. Instead of withdrawing, as called for by the September 30 resolution of the League of Nations, the Japanese aggravated the situation by extending their military operations. On October 9th, the President of the Council of the League of Nations sent to the Chinese and Japanese Governments identical telegrams urging them to refrain from any action that would further aggravate the situation. The Council convened at China’s request on October 13 under the Presidency of M. Briand of France. The Chinese representative, Dr. Sze, pointed out that China had 332

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from the start of the Japanese aggression, instead of resorting to armed resistance, “turned to the institution at Geneva which had been created to protect peace and to secure international justice and right.” After reading Chiang Kai-shek’s proclamation exhorting the Chinese people to remain calm, and to do nothing that would aggravate the situation which the Japanese troops, by their actions, had created, Dr. Sze went on to say: China had therefore offered no resistance, withdrawn her troops, and maintained an attitude of dignified calm. She had done so because she is a loyal member of the League of Nations and has put her trust in the League . . . the Covenant and the Pact of Paris are our two sheet-anchors, to which we have moored our ship of State and with the help of which we believe we shall ride out this storm.

He then warned that should the Covenant and the Pact of Paris be allowed to fail the test, the consequences would be dire indeed. The nations of the world would have to draw the conclusion that each State must rely on its own armed forces to defend its independence and territorial integrity. The result would be the collapse of the projected disarmament, as well as of the idea of collective international security. Dr. Sze concluded his statement with the following words: China has put herself in the hands of the League and abides the issue with confidence in her destiny and in the moral forces of civilization. The League cannot fail, for its success is bound up with the interests of all civilized nations, with those of Japan and America as well as those of China and other members of the League.

In his rejoinder, the Japanese representative dwelt at length on the history of circumstances under which, and the means by which, Japan had obtained her treaty and other property rights in Manchuria, and of the difficulties placed by the Chinese in the way of the full enjoyment of these rights. Before the Japanese troops could be withdrawn, it would be necessary for the two parties, by direct negotiations, to reach an agreement on certain underlying points relating to their policies vis-a-vis each other. Dr. Sze, however, repeated the determination of his Government not 333

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to enter into direct negotiations with Japan as long as Japanese troops remained illegally upon Chinese soil. At the Council’s meeting on October 15, M. Briand proposed that the United States, as a signatory of the Pact of Paris, be invited to participate in the meeting of the Council. The proposal was adopted over the objection of Japan, and Prentiss Gilbert, the American Consul-General in Geneva, took his seat at the Council table on the 16th. In his speech, Gilbert made it clear that he was there only in respect of the Kellogg Pact, having nothing to do with the machinery of the League as such. Beyond the making of this purely formal speech, Mr. Gilbert did not speak at all. Moreover, he remained at the table of the Council only until the meeting of the Council on October 24th.

The Resolution of October 22nd

Meanwhile, the “ Committee of Five” (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) held numerous meetings, severally, with the Chinese and Japanese representatives in an effort to obtain their common consent to some sort of action which could be expected to bring about a settlement of the Manchurian crisis. When this proved unavailing, the President of the Council found it necessary to submit on October 22nd a draft resolution, which was finally voted upon on the 24th and received the affirmative votes of all members with the sole exception of Japan. In this resolution, the necessity on the part of China and Japan of refraining from further aggravation of the situation was reaffirmed, as were also the undertaking of the Japanese to withdraw their troops as rapidly as possible into the railway zone in proportion as the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the evacuated areas were assured, and of China to provide such security. The Japanese Government was called upon to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops, and such withdrawal was to be completed by a definite date, namely, November 16th, when 334

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the Council was again to be convened. The Chinese Government was called upon to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as would ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there. The resolution recommended that the two Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory, and that they should, as soon as the evacuation was completed, begin direct negotiations on questions out­ standing between them, and in particular those arising out of recent incidents as well as those relating to existing difficulties due to the railway situation in Manchuria. The resolution was not altogether satisfactory from the Chinese point of view, because it failed, in the words of Dr. Sze, “to grapple with some of the most urgent necessities and pressing dangers of the present situation.” “We accept it,” he continued, “ as a bare minimum, as marking merely the present stage in the League of Nations’ handling of this problem.” After strongly emphasizing the point that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops was the only issue before the Council, he said that the Chinese Government expected, after the withdrawal had been completed, to raise the questions of the responsibility for the events that had occurred since September 18th, and of the assessment of damages caused by such events. In Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek, speaking to the assemblage of government officials on October 26th, said: From the standpoint of the Chinese people, the Council’s resolution falls far short of our expectations. However, inasmuch as the resolution represents the unanimous will of all Members of the Council of the League, we unhesitatingly accepted it. It is our hope and conviction that, with the adoption of the present resolution, the League will endeavor to establish international justice so that world peace can be securely maintained.

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

Students Clamor for War Notwithstanding his official optimism, Chiang was not unaware of the fact that the League Council’s resolution of October 24th, like all its previous resolutions and other actions, was likely to be no more than an exercise in futility. Yet the League’s action was to be welcomed for its effect on world public opinion. Chiang knew that sooner or later he would have to lead the nation in resistance against the Japanese aggressor. But he needed time to prepare China for such a task. In the first place, the country must be truly united under his leadership. In the secod place, China’s economy must be put on a sound basis. To engage a formidable military machine like Japan without adequate preparations amidst domestic turmoil was to commit national suicide. He thought it far better to allow himself to be villified than to gamble with China’s future. In order to gain time, he had no option but to temporize with Japan. But the students of China were in no mood to accept Chiang’s policy of “non-resistance.” In the latter part of September 1931, the students of thirty universities and colleges organized what was called the “Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association” and elected fifty represen­ tatives to go to Nanking to demand all-out war against Japan. On September 28th, Dr. C. T. Wang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was assaulted by a crowd of students from the Central University in Nanking. The students started a volunteer movement for the purpose of fighting Japan. They demonstrated in the cities and clamored for immediate action. There can be no doubt that the students were motivated by a desire to save the country from Japanese aggression. At the same time, it must be admitted that there were those disgruntled politicians as well as Communist propagandists who did their best to inflame the students, to create social unrest, and to try to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek.

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Disturbances in Tientsin

Three days after the adoption of the October 24th resolution by the Council of the League of Nations, the National Government of China, through its Minister in Tokyo, informed the Japanese Foreign Office that it had, pursuant to the resolution, appointed representatives to arrange for the evacuation of Japanese troops and requested the Japanese Government to do the same as soon as possible. Japan, however, declined to comply with the request on the ground that the resolution, having failed of unanimous acceptance, was without force and not binding on Japan. Meanwhile the Kwantung Army renewed its military activities in Manchuria. This involved areas sufficiently far north to give rise to the possibility of Soviet intervention. As has been noted, the renegade Chang Hai-p’eng had established an “autonomous” regime in Taonan in Heilungkiang province. With money and equipment supplied by the Japanese, Chang began to expand the area under his control. The acting Governor of Heilungkiang, Ma Chan-shan, in order to halt the advance of Chang Hai-p’eng, had on October 7th, 1931, destroyed the railway bridge over the Nonni River. The Kwantung Army intervened on the grounds that, inasmuch as the railway was built with a Japanese loan, the destruction of the bridge was an infringement on Japanese interests. The Japanese proceeded to repair the bridge and fighting broke out on November 4 between them and Ma’s troops. On the 17th the Japanese advanced northward beyond the Chinese Eastern Railway and captured Tsitsihar, seat of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, two days later. Japanese activities were not confined to Manchuria. 337

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Inside the Great Wall, far to the south in Tientsin, the Japanese hired a band of Chinese ruffians to create disturbances in the Chinese city. At 10 p.m. on November 8th, 2,000 armed hoodlums emerged, under cover of darkness, from the Japanese Concession and began firing wildly with carbines and machine-guns. By daybreak they returned to the Japanese Concession. The same performance was repeated each night for almost a week. Confusion and fear reigned in the Chinese city. Many inhabitants fled to the British and French Concessions for safety. Nobody knew what was really happening. The city did not return to normalcy until the 14th. It soon became clear that the acts of violence in Tientsin were in fact the prologue to the establishment of the “Manchukuo.” It was in the wake of the confusion and disturbances created by the hooligans that Colonel Doihara, Chief of the Japanese Special Service at Mukden, smuggled the deposed Manchu Emperor, Henry Pu-yi, out of the Japanese Concession in Tientsin and sent him to Manchuria under the protection of the Kwantung Army. On November 26 Colonel Doihara staged another riot in Tientsin, this time for a different purpose. In Tientsin the Japanese had since 1901 stationed troops under treaty arrangements. In the winter of 1931 the number of Japanese troops in Tientsin and other areas in North China was about 1,000 men. It was deemed insufficient to meet the requirements of the military plans which Doihara and his fellow “young colonels” had concocted. The disorders thus created served as a pretext for the Japanese to reinforce their troops in Tientsin. Simultaneously, units of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria had begun to move towards Chinchow where the Chinese authorities, after having withdrawn from Mukden, had established, provisionally, the seat of such civil authority as they still retained in Manchuria. The General Staff in Tokyo, meanwhile, alarmed by the fact that the Kwantung Army was acting out of all control, sent its Deputy Chief, General Ninomiya Harushige, to Mukden to prevent the forces in the field from further escalating the conflict. It succeeded only to the extent of temporarily diverting the advancing Japanese forces from the city of Chinchow to the east of the Liao River. 338

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The Commission of Inquiry When the Council of the League reconvened in Paris on November 16th, the United States designated no representa­ tive to sit with the Council at its meetings. It did, however, send General Dawes, the American Ambassador in London, to Paris that he might be available with regard to matters involving the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty. At the 18th meeting of the Council on November 21, the Japanese representative made known the willingness of his Government to receive a commission of inquiry from the League to investigate the situation in the Far East. What motivated this change of mind? Hayashi Kujiro, who was then Tokyo’s Consul-General at Mukden, had this to say in his Memoirs: After the outbreak of the Mukden incident, numerous British, American, French and other foreign correspondents came to Manchuria. At the same time foreign diplomats and military attaches paid us frequent visits. At first the Japanese Government regarded all this with disfavor, but later it believed that if it could take the opportunity to expose the ‘brutality’ and ‘lawlessness’ of the Chinese officials to the outside world, the result might be advantageous to Japan . . . The fact that the Japanese had acted in self-defense was recognized by all. Hence it was to Japan’s advantage to have the League of Nations send a Commission of Inquiry. China would of course raise no objection to this. After due consideration, Japan believed that it should take the initiative in making the proposal. . .

The Chinese representative, while raising no objection to the proposal, made it clear that his Government would “not for a moment agree that the creation of a Commission of Inquiry should, in any way, furnish an excuse for a delay in beginning and progressively carrying out, in the shortest possible time, the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops.” The Chinese Government, he added, would “not be willing to discuss the proposal for a Commission of Inquiry upon any other basis.” The Resolution providing for the sending of the Commission of Inquiry was finally drafted and presented to the Council at its meeting of December 9th. It was 339

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unanimously adopted the next day. The main provisions of the Resolution included: (1) The Commission to consist of five members with the object of studying on the spot and reporting to the Council “on any circumstance which threatens to disturb the peace between China and Japan” ; (2) The Governments of China and Japan would have the right to nominate one assessor each to assist the Commission; (3) Any negotiations initiated by the two parties would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission; nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either party; and (4) The appointment and deliberations of the Com­ mission should not prejudice the undertaking given by the Japanese Government in the resolution of September 30th as regards the withdrawal of Japanese troops within the railway zone.1 In his comment on the resolution, Dr. Sze stressed the importance of having the Commission make its “first duty to inquire into and report its recommendations on the withdrawal of Japanese troops” if such withdrawal had not been completed when the Commission arrived on the spot. It was the assumption of the Chinese Government, he said, that the sending of the Commission neither directly nor by implication affected “the question of reparations and damages to China and her nationals growing out of the recent events in Manchuria.” Speaking as representative of Japan, Yoshizawa said that with regard to paragraph 2 of the Resolution urging the parties to avoid any further aggravation of the situation, it was the understanding of his Government th a t: This paragraph is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be necessary to provide directly for the protection of lives and property of 1The September 30th Council Resolution, in point 3, reads “The Council. . . notes the Japanese representative’s statement that his Government will continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured. . .” 340

NATIONAL CRISIS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria.

In other words, the Kwantung Army’s freedom of action was not to be curtailed by the sending of a League commission of inquiry. This certainly did not augur well for a peaceful solution of the problem. Itagaki and his friends could always find convenient excuses to forge ahead with their military activities, with or without the approval of military and civilian leaders in Tokyo. Indeed, they chose to interpret the League’s Resolution of December 10th, not as a prohibition against the extension of the Manchurian conflict, but as a tacit recognition of it. On December 11 — a day after the adoption of the Council’s resolution — the Wakatsuki Cabinet, which had sought to prevent an extension of the Manchurian crisis and to settle matters with the Chinese authorities, resigned and was succeeded by a Seiyukai Prime Minister, Inukai Tsuyoshi. Although he had private hopes of re-establishing government control, it was all too clear that the prospects were far from bright. While Shidehara relinquished the Foreign Office in frustration, the new War Minister, General Araki Sadao, was an outstanding leader of the army extremists. Unhampered by any save minor Cabinet restrictions, the military leaders now set out to complete the conquest of Manchuria. The new Cabinet lasted only five short months, and on May 15, 1932, Inukai himself was to be murdered by young officers.

The Conference for National Unity

Reference has already been made in another connection to Chiang’s call for national unity in the face of the Japanese aggression. Early in October 1931, efforts were made to patch up the differences between Chiang and his opponents in Canton. Accordingly, toward the end of the month, the Southern leaders, including Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, C.C. Wu and Eugene Ch’en arrived in Shanghai to meet with Chiang. 341

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Together with Hu Han-min, Ts’ai Yuan-p’ei, Chang Ching-kiang, Ch’en Ming-shu and other members of the Nanking delegation, Chiang met the Southern leaders at the home of Sun Fo. He pointed out that as a result of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the position of China had become extremely perilous. All past differences between Nanking and Canton must now be set aside in the face of the national crisis. He set forth for the consideration of the Southern leaders three propositions: (1) If the Southerners were ready to assume the responsibilities of the government in this national emergency, they should come to Nanking without delay and take up the reins of the government; (2) If they were not ready to do so, they should immediately dissolve the separatist regime in Canton and come to Nanking to cooperate with the National Government in the task of national defense; and (3) If the Southern leaders were sincere in their desire to cooperate with the National Government, they should come to Nanking to work out ways and means of participating in the government. The informal exchange of views yielded no agreement. On October 27th, at the request of the Southerners, the conference held its first formal session. In the course of the discussions the Southerners formulated a series of demands as follows: (1) all military men should be barred from the position of Chairman of the State Council; (2) the Chairman of the State Council should be a titular or ceremonial head of State with no real government powers; (3) the post of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Naval and Air Forces should be abolished; and (4) no military man should be President of any of the five Yuan. All these demands were obviously directed at Chiang Kai-shek, who was concurrently Chairman of the State Council, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and President of the Executive Yuan. A thick atmosphere of gloom settled over the conference. Finally on November 7th a compromise solution was arrived at. It was agreed that the long projected Fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang was to be held in two divisions, one in Nanking and one in Canton. Each division of the Congress was to elect 24 members of the Central Executive 342

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Committee, who would then assemble in Nanking to draw up a plan for the reorganization of the government. The Nanking division of the Congress held meetings from November 12th to 23rd. The Southern division of the Congress delayed its opening until November 18th and was characterized by squabbles and factional in-fighting. But on one subject there was full agreement: Chiang Kai-shek must go.

Chiang’s Resignation

Meanwhile, there was a resurgence of the student movement. At the end of November some 20,000 students from various parts of the country marched into Nanking and took up a determined vigil outside the Government buildings. The occasion was the report that Wellington Koo, the newly appointed Foreign Minister, had, on November 24th, approached the British, American and French diplomatic representatives in Nanking for the establishment of a demilitarized “neutral zone” around Chinchow, with Chinese troops to be withdrawn to Shanhaikuan in return for a Japanese pledge not to advance on the city. The students regarded this as abandoning Chinese territory to international control. This, in their view, was an act of treason. They demanded to see the head of the Government. They shouted: “Immediately withdraw from the League of Nations! Declare war against Japan! Unify Nanking and Canton Govern­ ments!” and other such slogans. It was easy to see that behind the students there were elements exploiting the patriotic youths for political advantage. Chiang, as Chairman of the State Council and President of the Executive Yuan, decided to speak to the students directly to dispel their doubts and fears. He called their demands unreasonable and ill-advised. He told them to return to their studies and leave the Government to deal with the Japanese by such measures as it deemed appropriate. He concluded his remarks by saying: “Support your Government in its effort to bring 343

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about national unity. All of us must do our duty and stay within the law. There is no other way to save our country from foreign aggression.” The students were persuaded to return to their schools. Early in December large bodies of students once again descended upon Nanking. This time, obviously politically inspired, they resorted to violence. They beat up station masters of the railways, and occupied the seats of the passenger trains by force. They clashed with the police, shouting anti-government and anti-Kuomintang slogans. On December 5 the National Government issued an order banning all student demonstrations. This, however, did not seem to have done much good. In mid-December tens of thousands of students poured into Nanking. The trouble came to a climax when a group of youths from Peiping attacked the Foreign Ministry and manhandled its staff members. Some of them carried sticks and even small firearms. Another group attacked the Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang. When Ts’ai Yuan-p’ei and Ch’en Ming-shu came out to meet them, they were beaten up. The situation had become so serious that the Government had to call out local garrison troops to maintain order. The students were forced to leave Nanking under military escort. For a time at least, this type of national turmoil came to an end. Amidst the student disorders, the Cantonese politicians continued to press for Chiang’s ouster. On the 15th of December Chiang tendered his resignation. In a message to the people, he said: . . . the affairs of our country have come to such a critical pass that unless we can step up the process of national unity and solidarity, we will not be able to meet successfully either the problem o f foreign aggression or the aspirations of the Chinese people . . . As for myself, I have dedicated myself to the revolution and am ready to do what is good for the Party . . . Even after my retirement from Government service, I shall continue to serve my country as a private citizen and my party as a loyal member. I shall not hesitate to bear any burden and make any sacrifice to enable us to weather the national crisis . . .

On December 22nd, accompanied by Madame Chiang, 344

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after having paid a visit to Dr. Sun’s tomb, he left Nanking for his native village in the Chekiang hills. He left the work of reorganizing the Government to members of the newly elected Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. On the day of Chiang’s departure, the First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee met in Nanking. At the close of the Plenum on the 29th, the venerable and stalwart Kuomintang member, Mr. Lin Sen, was elected Chairman of the State Council and Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, was appointed President of the Executive Yuan. The three most influential leaders of the Party — Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min, and Wang Ching-wei —held no posts in the new setup, although each was a member of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang.

Japan’s Occupation of Chinchow and Chiang’s Return to Power

As the Chinese politicians squabbled over trifles, the Japanese Kwantung Army steadily extended and con­ solidated their control of Manchuria. On December 5th, 1931, the Army high command in Tokyo decided that Chang Hsueh-liang’s forces at Chinchow must be forced to withdraw to the west of Shanhaikuan. On December 22, the Japanese troops were on the move. On the 27th the Japanese Government issued a statement in which it declared: Since September 18, 1931, most of the local Chinese officials have either deserted their posts or resigned. In consequence, the Japanese have had no choice but to take upon themselves the responsibility of protecting the lives and property of their own nationals. To the west of the South Manchurian Railway zone, bandits and other lawless elements, aided and abetted by the military authorities at Chinchow, have been very active. For the sake of self-defense, Japan has undertaken to subjugate the bandit bands and other lawless elements.

Remembering what the Japanese representative had said 345

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at the time of the adoption of the Resolution of December 10 by the Council of the League of Nations, this was hardly surprising. On December 24th, the Japanese launched a general offensive against Chinchow. The National Government ordered Chang Hsueh-liang to defend that strategic city at all costs. But Chang’s troops were too demoralized to make a determined stand against the enemy. Before the arrival of the invaders, the Chinese troops had already been withdrawn. The city was completely abandoned on New Year’s Day, 1932. This marked the end of Chinese authority in the northeastern provinces. Ironically, on the same day the newly reorganized National Government was formally inaugurated.

Chiang’s Return to Power The loss of Chinchow was a shock to members of the new National Government. On January 2, 1932, the Political Council of the Kuomintang was called to an emergency meeting. It was decided that Chiang’s presence in Nanking was urgently needed. The Chairman of the State Council, Lin Sen, and the President of the Executive Yuan, Sun Fo, were entrusted with the task of persuading Chiang to come back to Nanking at once. Sun Fo, who as a member of the Cantonese delegation to the “peace conference” had only a short while before pressed for Chiang’s resignation, now turned around and humbly begged for his return. In a telegram to Chiang, he said: So long as you, Chan-t’ang (Hu Han-min) and Chi-hsin (Wang Ching-wei) are not in Nanking, the new Government is without a center of gravity . . . It is difficult to manage the affairs of state under such circumstances. Since you love your Party and your country, surely you cannot allow yourself to stand by without doing anything about it. We are anxiously awaiting your early return to steer the helm. Your presence will have a salutary effect on the psychology of the nation.

Chiang was bombarded with telegrams from all kinds of 346

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people — politicians, military men, civic leaders and organizations, even students — beseeching him to play his part in a critical situation. Under all this pressure, Chiang at last consented to leave his mountain retreat for the scenic city of Hangchow. On January 17, Wang Ching-wei, who had been convalescing in a Shanghai hospital, came to meet him. In a private conclave of two hours, the two old rivals laid aside the enmity of years and vowed to work together for the good of China. Chiang afterwards told his wife that the fate of China hung suspended by a feeble thread and it was imperative that he should return to Nanking. Madame Chiang agreed with him. On the 18th Sun Fo arrived in Hangchow from Nanking. That evening Chiang said at a dinner in honor of his visitor: If I don’t go back to Nanking, there is a real possibility that the Government might on the spur of the moment be pressured into breaking relations with Japan. In the absence of a comprehensive plan, it is suicidal to be carried away by emotionalism and gamble with China’s future. I have therefore brushed aside all other considerations and decided to return to Nanking. I have a clear conscience, and I have no other wish than to assist Chairman Lin Sen in the task of national salvation.

Chiang left for Nanking on the 21st of January. In Shanghai the Japanese were creating one incident after another, and it seemed that an armed conflict had become inevitable. On the 25th a meeting of the Kuomintang Standing Committee was held, at which Sun Fo tendered his resignation, as did Eugene Ch’en as Foreign Minister. On the 28th, Wang Ching-wei succeeded Sun Fo as President of the Executive Yuan. That evening hostilities broke out in Shanghai.

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FIGHTING IN SHANGHAI

Bad Blood between the Japanese and Chinese in Shanghai

In Shanghai, as in other parts of China, there had been, due to the happenings in Manchuria, much ill-feeling between the Japanese and the Chinese. The natural resentment of the Chinese against the Japanese had found its chief expression in the extensive boycotting of Japanese trade, and the headquarters of the boycott movement had been established in Shanghai, the most important port city of China. The Chinese anti-Japanese trade movement provoked the Japanese residents in Shanghai to launch counter movements. In October 1931 the Japanese in Shanghai called mass meetings of Japanese residents to deal with the Chinese boycott and subsequently called meetings of Japanese residents living in the Yangtze Valley as well as in other parts of China. They demanded punitive actions against China and in this state of acute tension, incidents of violence frequently occurred. The Japanese army and naval authorities were soon involved in the conflict, culminating in the fighting of January 28-March 3, 1932 in Shanghai. Shanghai and Manchuria are separated by a distance of more than 1,400 kilometers. Yet the fighting in Shanghai had much to do with the Kwantung Army. It may even be said that the Kwantung Army was mainly responsible for the Japanese attack upon Shanghai. In October 1931, not long after the outbreak in Mukden, Major Hanatani Tadashi of the Special Service Section of the Kwantung Army, invited Major Tanaka Ryukichi, Japanese Assistant Military Attache in Shanghai, to visit him in Manchuria. In Mukden Major Tanaka met with Colonel Itagaki, who reportedly told him that the Kwantung Army intended in the not too distant future to occupy Harbin and 348

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then to set up a new, independent Manchu-Mongolian state with Henry Pu-yi at its head. This, Itagaki pointed out, was bound to arouse the opposition of the League of Nations, and might even be looked upon with disfavor in Tokyo. In order to divert attention from Manchuria, he favored the creation of some kind of incident in Shanghai. He asked Major Tanaka, who was a good friend and classmate of his at the military academy, to help bring this about. Tanaka was supplied with a sum of $20,000 for the job. Upon his return to Shanghai, Major Tanaka was able to get an additional sum of $100,000 from the Japanese textile manufacturers in Shanghai. He proceeded to recruit the scum of Chinese society to attack and even to murder a few Japanese residents in order to provoke Japanese military intervention. He also secured the services of well-known female Manchu spy known by the Japanese name of Kawashima Yoshiko. A minor incident occurred on January 9th, 1932, when a Chinese newspaper in Shanghai reported an attempt on the life of the Japanese Emperor by a Korean assassin with the

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headline: “Unfortunately Bullet Missed; Assassin Escaped.” This headline was regarded by the Japanese as disrespectful and insulting. Major Tanaka saw in the incident an opportunity to create trouble. But when the Japanese Consul-General demanded an apology and punishment of the publishers, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai,1 General Wu T’ieh-ch’eng, acceded to the demands, and the incident was closed. Another opportunity was not slow in coming. On January 18th, five Japanese including Buddhist monks of the Myohoji Temple in Japan were walking past the San Yu Towel Factory on Ma Yushan Road in Chapei. They were attacked by a group of Chinese, some of whom were, it was alleged, members of the anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps. The Chinese police arrived too late to arrest the culprits. Two Japanese were seriously wounded, and one of them, a Buddhist monk, subsequently died. On January 19th, 30 members of the Japanese Youth Protection Society, armed with knives and clubs, broke into the San Yu Towel Factory. On the pretext that the workers of the factory were responsible for the attack on the Japanese monks, they wrecked the machinery of the factory and set fire on the buildings. On their way home, they clashed with Chinese police, three of whom were seriously wounded. On the next day two thousand Japanese residents in Shanghai held a protest meeting at the Japan Club against the attack upon the Japanese monks as well as against what they regarded as derogatory references in the Chinese press to the Japanese Emperor. They adopted a resolution calling upon the Japanese Government to send naval vessels and military forces to Shanghai to suppress the anti-Japanese movement. 1Shanghai was then divided into various areas: the International Settlement, the French Concession, and the Chinese city known as the Greater City of Shanghai. The Settlement and Concession had been set apart for the residence of foreign nationals who enjoyed extraterritorial rights. In fact, however, the majority of the residents were Chinese. Japan had no Settlement or Concession in Shanghai. Many of her nationals lived in the International Settlement or the French Concession or just outside these areas. Many Japanese resided in the district of Chapei which enjoined, on the north, the International Settlement. 350

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They then took to the streets and staged a demonstration in the course of which they smashed Chinese shops, wrecked tram-cars and motor buses, and attacked passers-by. This was an opportunity which Major Tanaka had been waiting for. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the Major was the instigator of the whole business. He began to agitate for military action by forcing the manager of the Shanghai office of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to telegraph Dan Takuma, head of the Mitsui interests, to bring pressure to bear on the Japanese Government to send a military expedition to Shanghai. On the same day (January 20th, 1932) the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai, Murai Kuramatsu, presented to the Mayor of Greater Shanghai the following demands: (1) formal apology by the Mayor; (2) immediate arrest of those responsible for the attack leading to the death of the Japanese monk; (3) payment of a solatium and hospital bills; (4) suppression of the anti-Japanese movement; and (5) immediate dissolution of all anti-Japanese organizations. The next morning the Chinese Mayor communicated to the Japanese Consul-General his readiness to consider the first three of the demands, but said that he would have difficulty in complying with the last two. The organizations, he explained, were voluntary associations of patriotic citizens and, insofar as they did not disturb the peace and order of the community, the municipal authorities had no reason to suppress them. Should their activities go beyond those prescribed by law, they would be punished accordingly. At the same time, the Mayor demanded the punishment of those Japanese who set fire on the San Yu Towel Factory.

Intervention of the Japanese Navy

The commander of the Japanese naval forces lying off Shanghai now served notice that unless a satisfactory reply was given to the Japanese demands, he would take necessary steps to protect the Japanese Imperial rights and interests. On 351

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January 24th, Japanese naval reinforcements consisting of the aircraft carrier Notoro and a number of other craft arrived in the Whangpoo River, and the Japanese Consul-General notified the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, Wu T’ieh-ch’eng, that if no reply to his demands was forthcoming within a reasonable time, or if the reply was not satisfactory, the Japanese Government reserved the right to take such action as the circumstances required. On the 27th, the Japanese Consul-General delivered an ultimatum to Mayor Wu demanding a satisfactory reply before 6 p.m. on the following day. Mayor Wu called a meeting of the commercial and industrial leaders as well as leaders of various civic and other organizations. It was decided at the meeting that in order to avoid the destruction of the city, all the Japanese demands should be complied with. That night Mayor Wu ordered the closing of the Shanghai Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association. Alarmed by the impending danger of a Japanese attack upon the Chinese city, the Municipal Council of the International Settlement decided on the 28th that a “state of emergency” be declared as from 4 p.m. that day. Early in the afternoon of the 28th, General Wu T’ieh-ch’eng, Mayor of Greater Shanghai, informed the Japanese Consul-General that he was ready to accept the Japanese demands in their entirety. The Consul-General replied that this was quite satisfactory, but added that it remained to be seen whether the Mayor would be able to enforce the terms that had been accepted. However, late at 11:30 p.m. that evening, Rear Admiral Shiozawa, Commander of the Japanese Navy in Shanghai, issued two proclamations, copies of which were sent to Mayor Wu. The first proclamation declared that the Japanese Imperial Navy, being anxious in regard to the situation in Chapei (part of Greater Shanghai), where a large number of Japanese nationals resided, had decided to send troops to this area for the maintenance of law and order, and, therefore, it was hoped that the Chinese authorities would speedily withdraw its troops from the area and remove all “hostile defenses” . Half an hour later Japanese marines advanced down North Szechuan Road into Chapei. Armed Japanese civilians came with the marines and together they sprayed 352

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the Road and the buildings along it with machine-gun fire as they marched. Units of the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army, commanded by Generals Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai and Chiang Kuang-nai, confronted them. Thus the savage and destructive battle of Shanghai had begun. The ease with which they marched from city to city in Manchuria had convinced the Japanese that they would have a walk-over in Shanghai. They could not have been more mistaken. The Nineteenth Route Army fought with absolute determination and courage. The Chinese forces resisted the Japanese onslaught against tremendous odds, for the Japanese

Sketch of the battlefield in the Shanghai Incident on Jan.28,1932 353

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had virtually unchallenged control of the air. Planes from the carrier Notoro dropped bombs indiscriminately and destroy­ ed everything in sight. Heavy artillery and tanks did their share in the destruction. Buildings along the Paoshan Road in Chapei were set on fire with incendiary bombs, and this was deliberately done on the pretext of destroying vantage points overlooking the Japanese lines. The Commercial Press, the largest publishing house in China, was burned down. Its famous Eastern Library, a treasure house of priceless rare books of the Sung (960-1179) and Yuan (1260-1368) dynasties, perished in the holocaust. This was an irreparable loss to Chinese culture. The civilian losses were staggering. Amidst the smoulder­ ing ruins of no-man’s-land, helpless Chinese civilians wandered aimlessly under a reign of terror and were picked off wantonly by the advancing Japanese in a manner with which the world subsequently became familiar during the Second World War. In the afternoon of January 29th, at the request of Mayor Wu of Greater Shanghai, American and British Consuls-General succeeded in arranging a cease-fire, which started from that day at 8 p.m. On the same day the Chinese Foreign Minister appealed to the United States through the American Consul-General in Nanking to take immediate measures to help bring the hostilities to an end. On January 31 the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo requested the United States to use its good offices to induce the Chinese troops not to bring up further reinforcements and to withdraw Chinese troops then in Shanghai to a safe distance to avoid clashes. In Shanghai, on the same day, the Japanese agreed to an extension of the cease-fire for a period of three days. It soon became evident that the Japanese had agreed to an extension of the cease-fire because they needed time to bring up reinforcements from Japan. They had not expected that the Chinese would resist in so fierce a manner. Between January 30 and February 1, over a thousand marines arrived from the home bases at Sasebo and Yokosuka. On February 2, Rear Admiral Shiozawa’s flotilla of 3 cruisers and 3 destroyers were reinforced by the Third Fleet of the Japanese Navy under the command of Vice Admiral Nomura 354

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Kichisaburo. The Third Fleet had in service one aircraft carrier and forty-seven warships of various types. The naval forces were further reinforced by an expeditionary force consisting of the Ninth Division as well as parts of the Third, Fifth and Twelfth Imperial Guards Divisions of the Japanese Army. When the Shanghai hostilities broke out on the night of January 28th, Chiang Kai-shek, who had just emerged from his retirement, held no government post except as member of various committees. At a meeting of the Political Council of the Kuomintang held on the 29th, he was appointed member of the Military Council, the supreme military high command of China, along with Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Hsueh-liang. As a member of the Military Council, he took an active part in the direction of the fighting in Shanghai. He was in daily touch with the commanders of the Nineteenth Route Army and later threw into the battle two of the crack divisions he had personally trained. These —the 87th and 88th Divisions — formed the Fifth Army, which soon gave a good account of themselves as a fighting force. Since Nanking was only 300 kilometers from Shanghai and vulnerable to naval bombardment from the Yangtze, Chiang urged the leaders of the National Government to transfer the nation’s capital to the interior in order to prepare for a long struggle with the enemy. On the 30th of January Lin Sen, Chairman of the State Council, and Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan, led a group of high officials to the ancient city of Loyang in Honan province. On the night of February 1, three Japanese cruisers and four destroyers were anchored in the river, and one of the ships loosed off several rounds of fire into the city.

Another Japanese Ultimatum

On February 2nd, the Japanese attacked again. Artillery fire and incendiary bombs reduced much of the Chapei area to ruins. On the 7th, Japanese ships and aircraft had 355

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commenced a bombardment of the Woosung forts, where the Whangpoo River joined the sea. On the 9th and 10th the “Shanghai Expeditionary Army” commanded by Lt. General Ueda Kenkichi sailed from Japan for China and landed at Shanghai between the 14th and 16th. On the 18th the Japanese Consul-General and the commander of the Japanese forces, General Ueda, issued an ultimatum to the Mayor of Greater Shanghai and the commander of Chinese forces. It demanded the complete evacuation of the Chinese forces from the first line by 7 a.m. on the morning of the 19th, and evacuation from designated areas by 5 p.m. the same day. All military establishments were to be removed and no new establishments put up. The promise to suppress anti-Japanese movements was to be effectively carried out. If the demands were not carried out the Japanese forces would have “to take necessary action,” and all consequences must rest with the Chinese Army, the ultimatum said. On the 19th, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai rejected the Japanese ultimatum, declaring that the grave situation in Shanghai was due to invasion of Chinese territory and brutal murder of Chinese people by Japanese troops in violation of all international treaties and law. He further pointed out that Chinese outrage had been so intensified by continued acts of provocation by Japanese troops, that it was natural that the so-called anti-Japanese activities should continue unabated. On the 20th, after preliminary aerial reconnaissance, which satisfied them that the Chinese had not evacuated their lines in conformity with their demands, the Japanese started their general offensive against Chapei, Kiangwan and Woosung. The Chinese resisted with spirit and verve so that the Japanese failed to make much headway. Successive Chinese resistance led the Japanese to a greatly increased military commitment in order to save face. On February 23rd, the Japanese Cabinet decided to dispatch two additional divisions to Shanghai, and the highly-placed General Shirakawa Yoshinori was to take over the supreme command of the Japanese expeditionary forces. The total strength of the Japanese forces in Shanghai now reached 50,000. In one of his telegrams to the commanders of the 356

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Nineteenth Route Army, dated February 25th, Chiang Kai-shek pointed out that the line of defense at Liuho on the Yangtze was weak and in his view at least three regiments should be placed there to prevent a possible landing by Japanese troops. Although Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai and Chiang Kuang-nai agreed on surface to follow Chiang’s advice, they failed to station any troops at that strategic point. At dawn on March 1, 20 Japanese warships and more than a hundred other craft appeared up the mouth of the Yangtze, carrying on board the troops of the 11th Division. With an air cover of 80 planes, over 10,000 troops landed at Liuho and turned the flanks of the Chinese. The Nineteenth Route Army was forced to withdraw. Most unfortunately, when they withdrew, they did not inform the Fifth Army of their move, thus exposing the flank of that force to Japanese fire subjecting it to heavy losses. The battle of Shanghai thus came to an end. Without an air force or anti-tank guns or any of the modern weapons, the Chinese fought gallantly against the formidable Japanese war-machine for more than a month. The casualties included over 4,000 killed and 7,700 wounded. Civilian losses were incalculable.

Agreement for Cessation of Hostilities

The Shanghai situation was discussed at a special session of the Assembly of the League of Nations on March 3rd, 1932. A resolution recommending negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese representatives for the effective cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Japanese troops, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers with special interests in Shanghai, was adopted. The Japanese and Chinese opened negotiations on March 14th, at the British Consulate-General. China was represented by Quo T’ai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Japan by Shigemitsu Mamoru, Tokyo’s Minister to China. Representatives of the Powers included the Ministers 357

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of Britain, the United States and France, as well as the charge d’affaires of Italy. An agreement for a definite cessation of hostilities was reached on March 30th, though the formal agreement was not signed until May 5th. This delay was due largely to the desire on the part of the Chinese that a definite time be fixed for the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops to within the International Settlement, and the imwillingness on the part of the Japanese to agree to this. On April 29th, while the negotiations were still going on, General Shirakawa was assassinated by a Korean patriot and Shigemitsu was seriously wounded. The truce agreement was unpopular with those Chinese who demanded all-out war with Japan. On May 3rd, Quo T ’ai-chi, who had negotiated with the Japanese for the agreement on China’s behalf, was badly beaten up by students.

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The Plan to Detach Manchuria from China

The period immediately following the cessation of active hostilities in the Shanghai region saw the establishment of the so-called State of Manchukuo, independent of China and claiming sovereign jurisdiction over Manchuria and the province of Jehol. The plan for the establishment of such a puppet Japanese state had been in the making for a long time. In another connection, mention has been made of the fact that the army extremists in Japan had long cherished the dream of detaching Manchuria from China and that, six months prior to the September 18th outbreak in 1931, the Japanese General Staff had already outlined the steps by which the Chinese Eastern Provinces were to be taken over by Japan. With the occupation of Chinchow by the Kwantung Army on January 3rd, 1932, leaders of the notorious “young colonels” — Itagaki, Ishihara and Doihara —stepped up their efforts to translate the idea of a Japanese-dominated regime in Manchuria into reality. General Araki Sadao, who had succeeded General Minami Jiro as Minister of War, was sympathetic with the extremist goals of the “young colonels.” At his request, General Honjo, commander of the Kwantung Army, sent his senior staff officer Itagaki back to Japan on January 4 to lay before the politicians and imperial advisers a blueprint for the establishment of a new “Manchu-Mongolian state.” The salient features of this new state were as follows: 1. It was to be a centralized Republic headed by a President. 359

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2. It was to be proclaimed in mid-February before the arrival of the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations. 3. Its capital was to be Changchun, in Kirin province. 4. There was to be an advisory council composed of one Manchu, one Mongol, three Chinese and three Japanese. 5. The territories of the new state were to be the provinces of Fengtien (Liaoning), Heilungkiang, Kirin, Jehol and Inner Mongolia. The establishment of a new “independent” state was to be presented to the world at large as representing the spontaneous will of its inhabitants and not as something foisted upon them by an outside power. The Japanese Army was to assume the responsibilities of national defense, though the expenses thus incurred were to be defrayed by the new state. Japan was to be represented in the new state by a Governor-General or by a Political Department to be established at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. While Itagaki was presenting the Kwantung Army’s blueprint to the authorities in Tokyo, he was informed of the principles that had already been laid down on January 6th at a joint meeting of the bureau chiefs of the Ministries of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs. These were embodied in a document entitled, “Outline on the Disposition of the China Question.” In regard to Manchuria and Mongolia, the document envisaged Japan’s permanent control of the politics, economy, national defense, and communications of these regions. In order to attain these objectives, it was deemed important (1) to have Japanese advisers attached to all political and administrative organs; (2) to use the power and prestige of the imperial army to enforce Japanese policies; and (3) to reject all outside intervention, including that of the League of Nations. These broad principles subsequently received the endorsement of the Japanese Cabinet at its meeting of March 23, 1932.

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The State of Manchukuo As a preliminary step towards the formation of the new state, the Kwantung Army organized what was called The Executive Committee of the Northeast Provinces, with well-known Chinese renegade politicians and military figures as members, including Chang Ching-hui of Heilungkiang, Tsang Shih-yi of Fengtien (Liaoning), and Hsi Hsia of Kirin. The Chinese general Ma Chan-shan had earlier held up and defeated the vanguard of the Japanese invaders at the Nonni River, on the southern border of the Russian sphere in North Manchuria. Owing to shortage of ammunition he had been compelled to withdraw his forces into the mountains along the Amur River. Since he had been waging successful guerrilla war against the Japanese and since his stronghold in the mountains was practically inaccessible, the Japanese now decided to try diplomacy. If he could be induced to come to the Japanese side, the “independent” movement would gain additional momentum. Through arrangements made by Chang Ching-hui, the ubiquitous Itagaki journeyed to Hailun to meet with General Ma and persuaded him to accept the idea of an independent Manchuria. After several meetings General Ma consented to “go over” to the Japanese, providing the Japanese would withdraw from Tsitsihar and leave him in control of the region. He also had Itagaki’s promise to provide him with money to re-equip his forces and appoint him Minister of War in the proposed “Manchukuo” Government. The Japanese finally agreed to Ma’s terms. On February 16, 1932, together with Chang Ching-hui, Tsang Shih-yi and Hsi Hsia, Ma flew aboard a Japanese military plane to Mukden to formally inaugurate the Executive Committee of the Northeast Provinces. Two days later the Committee declared Manchuria’s independence from the rest of China. The new state they intended to establish was said to have a threefold mission: (1) to sweep away old abuses; (2) to observe the principle of Open Door regarding economic activities of foreign nations; and (3) to abolish class warfare. The new state was to be styled “Manchukuo.” Although Jehol was not yet under Japanese control, the province was declared to be an integral part of “Manchukuo.” 361

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According to the plan drawn up by the Kwantung Army, the new state was a Republic and not a monarchy. When Henry Pu-yi was asked to accept the leadership of “Manchukuo”, he demurred on the grounds that, as one who had been Emperor of China, he could not very well accept the leadership of a Republic. Through a combination of cajolery and threats, he was finally prevailed upon to serve with the title of Regent. At the same time he exacted from the Japanese the promise to change the form of government into a monarchy within the space of a year. The chief agency in bringing about the “independence” of Manchuria was in fact the Self-Government Guiding Board which had its central office in Mukden. The officers of this organization were mainly Japanese although its nominal chief was a Chinese. It functioned as an organ of the Fourth Department of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. Under its direction and supervision, local self-government committees were formed in various parts of Manchuria and, as occasion demanded, it sent out members from its large and experienced staff of inspectors and lecturers, many of whom were Japanese, to spread propaganda in favor of the “independence” movement. The Declaration of Independence was published on February 18. The capital of the new state was Changchun, later renamed Hsinking (new capital). The Self-Government Guiding Board took a leading part in organizing popular manifestations of support. It was instrumental in forming societies for the “ Acceleration of the Founding of the New State.” On February 28th, a meeting was held in Mukden in which hundreds of people, including Japanese and Koreans, took part. This meeting issued a declaration in which it supposedly expressed the joy of the 30,000,000 people of Manchuria at the downfall of the old oppressive military regime and the dawn of a new era. It sent representatives to Port Arthur to beseech Henry Pu-yi to assume leadership of “Manchukuo.” On March 5 a twenty-five-man delegation from Mukden was sent to Port Arthur to hasten Henry Pu-yi’s journey to Changchun. On the next day the Ex-Emperor of China paid a special visit to General Honjo at his headquarters at Tangkangtzu, 100 kilometers south of 362

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Mukden. It was at this meeting that he secured General Honjo’s approval of the roster of appointments he intended to make, namely, Chang Ching-hui as President of the Advisory Council, Cheng Hsiao-hsu as Prime Minister, Tsang Shih-yi as Minister of Civil Affairs, Ma Chan-shan as Minister of Military Affairs, Hsi Hsia as Minister of Finance, and Hsieh Chieh-shih as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Henry Pu-yi left for Changchun on March 8th. On the afternoon of the following day he was inducted into office in the presence of Japanese and Chinese dignitaries, including General Honjo of the Kwantung Army, Uchida Kosai of the South Manchurian Railway, and members of the new Cabinet. Cheng Hsiao-hsu, the Prime Minister, read on behalf of the Regent a statement which declared that the new state was founded on “morality and benevolence,” on racial and international harmony, and on the principle of Wang Tao or the “kingly way.” The language and content of the statement were more Japanese than Chinese, and it was obviously written by a Japanese. Henry Pu-yi now stepped down from the dais and bowed to General Honjo. The commanding general of the Kwantung Army did not bow in return. On March 10th an Organic Law was promulgated. This Organic law vested supreme executive authority in the Regent and provided for executive, legislative, judicial and supervisory departments to act under his direction. The highest offices of Manchukuo were held exclusively by Chinese, Manchus and Mongols. Actual administrative control, however, was vested in the powerful General Affairs Board, which functioned within the Council of State and was dominated by Japanese officials. No less revealing was the data on the composition of Manchukuo’s Civil Service. In 1933 there were 2,049 “Manchurian” and 1,259 Japanese civil servants, and a few years later the number of Japanese civil servants were on a par with the number of “Manchurian” civil servants. Thus, even on the lowest level, the work of day-to-day administration was being carried on increasingly by Japanese underofficials.1 lrT. A. Bisson, Japan in China (New York, 1938), pp. 367-368. The term “Manchurian ’ embraced all the native population of Manchuria, which was overwhelmingly Chinese. 363

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On March 12 the Chinese Government formally denounced the new situation in Manchuria as having been brought about by means contrary to all principles of law and justice and in violation of the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China. The Chinese Government did not regard the change in Manchuria as permanent and refused to recognize the existence of so-called “Manchukuo.”

The Lytton Commission

The Commission of Enquiry to be established under the terms of the resolution of the League’s Council of December 10, 1931, was not finally organized until the middle of January 1932, and did not reach the Far East until the end of February. Members of the Commission were: Count Aldrovandi of Italy, General Henri Claudel of France, Lord Lytton of Britain, General Frank Ross McCoy of the United States, and Dr. Heinrich Schnee of Germany. Lord Lytton was unanimously elected to serve as Chairman. The Secretary General of the League designated Robert Haas, a Director in the Secretariat, to serve as Secretary-General of the Commission. As “ Assessors” to assist the Commission, Japan appointed Yoshida Isaburo, Ambassador to Turkey, and China appointed Wellington Koo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs. On February 29, 1932, the Commission reached Tokyo. Members of the Commission had an audience with the Emperor and interviews with Prime Minister Inukai, Foreign Minister Yoshizawa and War Minister Araki. They were royally entertained by the Japanese Government. The Commission arrived in Shanghai on March 14th. The fighting in Shanghai had just come to an end, and the Commission surveyed the ruins of Chapei, but refrained from being involved in the peace talks which were being planned. After a stay of two weeks in Shanghai, the Commission left for Nanking where they met with Chiang Kai-shek and other 364

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high officials of the National Government. They then journeyed north to Peiping to pay a visit to Chang Hsueh-liang. The Commission had at first planned to proceed to Manchuria by rail so as to investigate the military situation at Shanhaikuan and Chinchow. The Japanese had not been willing, however, to let the Commission travel by the overland route. After much haggling, only two members of the Commission, General Frank R. McCoy of the United States and Count Luigi Aldrovandi, were allowed to travel by train, while the others sailed to Dairen by boat and then proceeded to Mukden by the South Manchurian Railway. The Japanese had also raised objections to Dr. Wellington Koo’s accompanying the Commission within the domain of “Manchukuo,” because, as one who had served under Chang Tso-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang, he was persona non grata to the new state. It was only after strenuous protests by Lord Lytton and Sir Eric Drummond, the League’s Secretary General, that the Chinese Assessor was permitted to travel in areas north of the Great Wall. Upon his arrival in Manchuria, the Japanese placed numerous restrictions upon him and his staff as regards their movements and right of communication with the Lytton Commission. They were kept under close police surveillance. In Mukden they were cut off entirely from communication with one another. In Changchun Dr. Koo was spied upon when he received two foreign missionaries in his room at the Yamato Hotel. In Kirin he was “escorted” about by Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets and in Harbin by policemen in uniform as well as plainclothes agents. “As a consequence of the unwarranted restrictions and prohibitions, the Chinese Assessor was prevented from either visiting in company with the Commission the scene of incidents to be investigated or arranging for the presentation of Chinese witnesses to the Commission. Nor was any Chinese in Manchuria permitted to visit the Chinese Assessor or the Commission without previous approval of the Japanese authorities.”2 2Dr. Koo’s statement at the fifth meeting of Council of the League of Nations held on November 21st, 1932 when the Lytton Report was under discussion. 365

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Nor was the movement of the Commission itself free from restrictions. Wherever it went in Manchuria it was spied upon and heaped with false evidence. The obtaining of information was made difficult due to the dual facts that police measures, provided ostensibly for the personal protection of the members of the Commission, tended to keep away witnesses and that many Chinese were frankly afraid of even meeting the members of the Commission. Even the highest officials of the “Manchukuo” could not talk freely with the Commission; they were under the watchful eyes of their Japanese advisors who had provided them with set answers to each and every question which members of the Commission cared to ask. When the Commission expressed a desire to visit the Tsitsihar region where a hostile and resentful population had been waging continual guerrilla warfare against the Japanese, the “Manchukuo” authorities refused to grant the permission. The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was a Japanese, said that it was unsafe for the Commission to venture into that out-of-the-way region. Yet, for all the watchfulness of the Japanese, the Commission did manage to have some private interviews with businessmen, teachers, doctors, police, tradesmen and others. Invariably, they were hostile to “Manchukuo,” and they had no liking for the Japanese. The professional classes complained that they were being spied upon and intimidated. Even the higher Chinese officials of the government were in service by reason of inducements or intimidations of one kind or another — some said they were forced to remain in office under duress. Thus, “Manchukuo” certainly could not be “ considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous independent movement.” The government of “Manchukuo” owed its existence, not to any Chinese support, but to two factors above all others: “The presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials,both civil and military.”3 Without these it would not have come into being and would not have been capable of maintaining itself. Following the establishment of “Manchukuo,” there had been an unparalleled growth of banditry and lawlessness in o

Report of the Lytton Commission, Chapter V.

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the countryside and organized warfare waged between the troops loyal to China and the Japanese and “Manchukuo” forces. General Ma Chan-shan, who had for a time been induced by Itagaki to serve as War Minister in the “Manchukuo” government, was in fact a patriotic Chinese. As soon as he heard of the arrival of the Lytton Commission in China he slipped out of Tsitsihar and secretly rejoined his forces in the mountains and defied the Japanese and “Manchukuo.” With a force of about 3,600 men, equipped with old rifles, he fought with amazing skill and effectiveness. He was active in the vicinity of Harbin and made lightning raids on a number of important towns. The Kwantung Army mobilized a full division of troops to engage him. With superior resources, up-to-date equipment, access to unlimited supplies, as well as a modem air force, the Japanese finally succeeded in defeating Ma’s irregulars. In doing so, however, they sustained heavy losses. Checking over the Chinese bodies left on the field, following the Chinese withdrawal, the Japanese found a corpse attired in the uniform of a general. Near the body was a dead Mongolian pony similar to that usually ridden by General Ma. They came to the conclusion that Ma had been killed in the fighting. In fact, however, Ma Chan-shan had transferred his forces across the Amur to Blagoveshchensk on the Soviet side of the line, where the soldiers were entrained for Sinkiang Province. General Ma himself returned to China via Germany. He was hailed as a national hero. Ma Chan-shan was not, of course, the only guerrilla leader in Manchuria. There were many others. There was, for example, Chu Chi-ching, whose “Northeast Army for National Salvation” carried on stiff resistance against the Japanese. In the heyday of guerrilla warfare, no less than 160,000 partisan fighters operated in various parts of Manchuria.

367

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

The May Fifteenth Affair in Japan

While the Lytton Commission was trying to establish the facts about the Manchurian crisis and the nature of the events since September 1931, an event of tremendous significance occurred in Japan. On May 15, 1932, Premier Inukai was assassinated; bombs were hurled at the residence of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Count Makino Nobuaki, at the Tokyo Police Headquarters, at the Mitsubishi Bank and the offices of the Seiyukai Party; and an attempt was made to blow up the metropolitan power stations. These acts were carried out by several terrorist societies, composed mainly of young naval officers, military cadets and other extremist elements. They were part of a wider conspiracy, involving high army commanders, which aimed at taking over control of the capital by a military coup d'etat. The May 15th Affair, as it came to be known, sounded the death-knell of party government in Japan. At the same time it broke the only line of communication that still existed between Japan and China. Inukai was one of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s oldest Japanese friends who, perhaps more than any other Japanese leader of his time, had some understanding of the nature and objectives of the Chinese national revolution. Within a month of assumption of the Premiership, he sent Kayano Nagatomo, also an old friend of Dr. Sun’s, as his personal emissary to Nanking to contact Dr. Sun’s son, Sun Fo, who was then President of the Executive Yuan, to see whether there might not be a possibility to improve Sino-Japanese relations. His private attempts to come to an arrangement with the Chinese Government did not endear him to the militarists. The immediate cause of his assassination was the signing of the Sino-Japanese Agreement on May 5th, 1932, for the liquidation of the Shanghai hostilities. The army and naval extremists, particularly members of the Blood Brotherhood League, resented the agreement, which they regarded as a treasonable act. The new coalition government, led by Admiral Saito Makoto in place of the murdered Inukai, pursued a hard line in regard to Manchuria. As former Governor-General of Korea, Admiral Saito showed every sign of continued and 368

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resolute support of the policies pursued by the Kwantung Army. General Araki Sadao, outstanding leader of the army extremists, was retained as War Minister. In his speech before the Diet on June 3rd, Premier Saito said that the existence of the new state in Manchuria was a “reality” that should “not be ignored.” On June 14th, the lower house of the Japanese Diet resolved that “the government should recognize Manchukuo as soon as possible.” On July 6th, Count Uchida Kosai, a former Director-General of the South Manchurian Railway, the man who was one of the most militant proponents of the “positive” policy, was made Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Lytton Commission went to Japan for a second time to ascertain what the new Cabinet had to say about the situation in Manchuria. Lord Lytton expressed the hope that pending the report of his Commission, the Japanese authorities would refrain from making hasty decisions in regard to “Manchukuo.” Uchida unceremoniously reminded him that this was a matter for the Japanese to decide and not the business of anybody else. On August 8th General Muto NNobuyoshi arrived in Mukden as Special Ambassador and Commander of the Kwantung Army rolled into one. His mission was to prepare the ground for formal recognition of “Manchukuo.” On August 25th, Premier Saito told the Diet that the Government was ready to accord diplomatic recognition to the new state. On the same day Foreign Minister Uchida, in reply to a question addressed to him by a member of the Diet, said that the recognition of “Manchukuo” was just and legal and that the Japanese people were “solidly determined not to concede a foot, even if the country be turned to scorched earth.” The remarks made by Uchida brought forth an immediate rejoinder from Dr. Lo Wen-kan, the Foreign Minister of China: The speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister on August 25th was virtually a declaration of war on world public opinion. It has thrown down the gauntlet against the conscience of the whole world. It is contemptuous of the League of Nations. It tramples under foot sacred treaty obligations assumed by Japan. It is highly preposterous to assert that the organization created and supported by Japan herself has achieved independence through the spontaneous will of the people of Manchuria . . . 369

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

“Manchukuo” was formally recognized by Japan on September 15, 1932, with the signing of a Protocol by the so-called Prime Minister of “Manchukuo,” Cheng Hsiao-hsu, and Japan’s Special Ambassador and Commander of the Kwantung Army, General Muto Nobuyoshi. In this document all the rights and interests claimed by Japan in Manchuria on the basis of treaties with China, including those of 1915 as well as all private and public contracts and concessions, were recognized. In return, Japan assumed responsibility for the defense of “Manchukuo” and for the maintenance of peace and order in the new state. And Japan was granted the right to station troops in “Manchukuo.” The Japanese commitment to take and hold Manchuria was now irrevocable. Yet the transparent fiction of the so-called “independent” state of “Manchukuo” was being kept up. On September 16th, the Chinese Government sent a note to the Japanese Government protesting against the recognition which, the day before, Japan had extended to the so-called State of Manchukuo. The Government of that so-called State, the note declared, had been created by Japan, and every vestige of its power rested in the hands of the Japanese. The note further pointed out that the recognition had come at a time when the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the League of Nations with Japan’s approval had completed its investigations and was about to make known its recommendations as to how the situation in Manchuria should be dealt with. “ Such an act on the part of Japan, which makes her guilt increase in gravity, amounts to an insulting challenge to the authority of the League of Nations whose judgement will necessarily be based on trust and justice.” The Note concluded with an enumeration of the acts of violence of which Japan had been guilty since September 1931.

370

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The Lytton Report The final draft of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry was completed in Peiping on September 4th, 1932. On September 30th, copies of the Report were delivered to the Governments of China and Japan. On October 1st, the Report was made public in Geneva, Nanking and Tokyo. In its official form the Report includes the Report proper, with 14 maps in a pocket of the cover, and a separate volume entitled “ Supplementary Documents.” The Report proper contains 139 large folio printed pages. The “ Supplementary Documents,” 280 pages in length, include: a list of documents received from the Chinese and Japanese Assessors, a list of organizations or persons interviewed by the Commission, special studies by experts, etc. The Report of the Commission made it abundantly clear that Manchuria was and had for centuries been an integral part of China (Chapter II); that the military operations of the Japanese troops on the night of September 18, 1931, could not be regarded as “measures of legitimate self-defense” (Chapter IV); that the so-called State of Manchukuo was fostered, organized, directed by the Japanese and could not by any stretch of imagination be said to be “independent” or “to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous- independence movement” (Chapter VI); and that the Japanese activities in Manchuria constituted a violation of both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris. The Report, however, did not pursue the matter to its logical conclusion. It recommended neither sanctions against the aggressor nor the evacuation of Japanese troops. The Commission did not believe that “a mere restoration of the status quo ante” would be adequate to settle the conflict between Japan and China. The solution of the problem must take into consideration the following general principles (Chapter IX): 1. Compatibility with the interests of both China and Japan; 2. Consideration of the interests of the U.S.S.R.; 3. Conformity with existing multilateral treaties; 4. Recognition of Japan’s interests in Manchuria; 5. The establishment of new treaty relations between China and Japan; 371

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES 6. 7. 8. 9.

Effective provision for the settlement of further disputes; Manchurian autonomy; Internal order and security against external aggression; Encouragement of an economic rapprochement between China and Japan; 10. International cooperation in Chinese reconstruction.

On the basis of the general principles thus enunciated, the Commission went on to suggest, in Chapter X, that “Manchuria under Chinese sovereignty, should be governed by an autonomous regime with an adequate number of foreign advisers . . . of which a substantial proportion should be Japanese.” Japan’s economic interests, together with those of the Soviet Union, should be rendered secure, while the Powers should assist in the reconstruction of China and the maintenance of her territorial and administrative integrity. In conclusion, the Report asserted that “the interests of peace are the same the world over” and that “any loss of confidence in the application of the principles of the Covenant and of the Pact of Paris in any part of the world diminishes the value and efficacy of those principles everywhere.” The Report of the Lytton Commission reflected the views of the two most influential members of the League — Britain and France. Neither Britain nor France liked to antagonize Japan, yet neither could ignore the fact that Japan had in fact been the aggressor in Manchuria. This ambivalent attitude was reflected in the Lytton Report. On the one hand, the Report blamed Japan for the Manchurian crisis and, on the other, it made recommendations for settlement which, if accepted, would have strengthened rather than weakened the position of Japan in Manchuria. To have an autonomous regime under the guidance of Japanese advisers was tantamount to creating a modified version of “Manchukuo.” Chiang Kai-shek noted in his diary under the date of October 9, 1932: Lord Lytton’s recommendations show how timid he really is! But the findings of his Commission contained in the first eight chapters of the Report are by and large fair and just. In my view, this part of the Report should, with certain revisions and reservations, be accepted by us . . . 372

“MANCHUKUO”

On October 17th Chiang, as Chairman of the Military Council, summed up his views on the Lytton Report as follows: Under present conditions, the Chinese Government, in order to enlist the sympathy of the League and world opinion, should take a moderate attitude toward the Report and avoid any violent opposition to it. But at the same time we should devote our attention to the following: 1. Since the Report will be considered both by the Council and the Assembly o f the League of Nations, we must make the greatest effort to bring about a modification of its recommendations. 2. Unless the League is prepared to impose sanctions on Japan or some momentous development unfavorable to the militarists should take place inside Japan, it is extremely unlikely that the Report will be acceptable to Japan. This being so, even if China should be willing to make concessions, there can be no settlement of the present conflict. Such concessions will only tie our hands in future negotiations and provoke violent reactions at home. 3. The foreign policy of the Kuomintang has been to work for the emancipation of the oppressed peoples. If we abandon this basic principle in regard to the Three Eastern Provinces, then the people’s confidence in our Party and in its ability to abolish the unequal treaties will be shattered. 4. Though the findings of the first eight chapters of the Report are by and large fair and just, it is regrettable that the recommendations contained in Chapters IX and X give too much emphasis on Japan’s military power instead of condemning Japan for what had been taking place in Manchuria since September 18, 1931. For the sake of the Covenant of the League, for the sake of the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty, for the future of the League itself, as well as for the peace of the Far East and the world, we cannot allow these recommendations to pass unchallenged.

Chiang favored the conclusion of a multilateral agreement guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China; the estab­ lishment of a Committee of Reconciliation to settle disputes arising between China and Japan; and the declaration by China or her determination to bring about reforms in the administration of the Three Eastern Provinces.l 373

l

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

The Japanese characterized the Lytton Report as marked by “ omissions, inconsistencies and misapprehensions,” and the investigations by the Commission as “ not only incomplete but inadequate.” War Minister Araki was especially vehement in his denuncations. He dismissed the Lytton Report as a mere “travelogue.” In a lengthy document entitled “Observations,” issued on November 20th, the Japanese Government stressed the “ special position” enjoyed by Japan in Manchuria. As to the Japanese military operations on the night of September 18, 1931, the “Observations” charged that the Commission failed to take into account two vital factors: “the state of acute tension already existing between the conflicting military forces and the existence of an emergency plan of campaign, which the Japanese Army, like any other organized force, must necessarily prepare wherever it is stationed or in the neighborhood of.foreign territory, particularly when repeated occurrences show that prompt measures may become imperative.” The “Observations” refuted the charge that “the movement to proclaim the independent State of Manchukuo was inaugurated, organized and carried through by the Japanese.” It admitted, however, that when the movement had gained momentun and become one of great influence, the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army could not evidently ignore it. That, the “Observations” noted, in no way altered the spontaneity of the movement. Regarding the proposal of the Commission for inter­ national cooperation in Chinese reconstruction, the “Obser­ vations” declared that it would result in an international control of China and of Manchuria which would not be acceptable to Japan, and which would be rejected by “Manchukuo.”

374

C H A PTE R T H IR T Y

THE SO-CALLED “CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC”

The Expansion of the Communist Areas

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 had, as we have seen, brought Chiang Kai-shek’s Third Communistsuppression Campaign to a standstill. Most of the Government divisions in southern Kiangsi had been withdrawn, leaving only some supporting troops behind to guard a few important outposts on the fringes of the “Soviet” districts. For a period of ten months the National Government at Nanking, confronted with the larger and graver problem of foreign aggression, was compelled to leave the Communists temporarily alone. Mao Tse-tung and his cohorts were not slow to take advantage of the situation. For them it was a period of consolidation and expansion. The Communists now decided that the time had come to set up a Central Government of their own in opposition to Nanking. On November 7th, 1931, less than two months after the Mukden outbreak of September 18th, the First All-China Congress of Soviets met at Juichin, Kiangsi, and the so-called Chinese Soviet Republic was proclaimed. Mao Tse-tung became the Chairman of the “Central Soviet Government,” and Chu Teh was made Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. At the height of its power, the so-called Chinese Soviet Republic, in addition to the Central Soviet District on the Kiangsi-Fukien-Kwangtung border, exercised jurisdiction over seven other Soviet Districts: 1. The Hupei-Honan-Anhwei Soviet District controlled the border areas of these provinces, and its leaders were Hsu Hsiang-ch’ien, Kuang Chi-hsun, etc. 375

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

2. The Hunan-West Hupei Soviet District controlled parts of these provinces, and its leaders were Ho Lung, Tuan Teh-ch’ang, etc. 3. The Hunan-Kiangsi Soviet District controlled the Hunan-Kiangsi border region including Mao Tse-tung’s former stronghold, Chingkangshan. 4. The Hunan-Hupei-Kiangsi Soviet District controlled the border regions of these provinces, and its leader was P’eng Teh-huai. 5. The Eastern Kiangsi-North Kiangsu Soviet District controlled the northeastern part of Kiangsi, and its leaders were Fang Chih-min, Shao Chih-p’ing, etc. 6. The Kwangsi Soviet District controlled parts of that province, and its leaders were Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Chang Yun-yi, etc. 7. The Western Fukien Soviet District controlled parts of that province, and its leaders were Lo Ping-hui and others. The seven Soviet Districts covered parts of seven provinces with an area of some 200,000 square li and a population of roughly about 9,000,000. The largest of Soviet areas was the Central Soviet District under the direct control of Mao Tse-tung. It embraced some 30 hsien or counties, with an estimated population of 3,000,000. The HupeiHonan-Anhwei Soviet District was second in importance, with some 2,000,000 souls under its control. It should be noted, however, that the so-called Soviet Republic was not a continuous expanse of territory with fixed boundaries. The Soviet Districts were in fact isolated islands of Communism scattered over a number of provinces. They expanded or contracted according as the Government pressure relaxed or intensified. In many places their control over the local population was more apparent than real. On April 26, 1932, the so-called Central Soviet Government at Juichin declared war on Japan, though it was thousands of miles away from the nearest Japanese controlled areas. In political system the Soviet Government called itself a “democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.” Inasmuch as there were no industrial workers in the mountainous hinterland, it controlled only peasants. Early in January 1932 the newly established Central 376

THE SO-CALLED “CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC”

Soviet Government called a meeting to discuss the problem of unification, consolidation and further expansion. The blueprint drawn up at this meeting called for expansion of the various islands into a single, contiguous territory, as well as the capture of one or more key urban centers. This was reminiscent of the Li Li-san line of “initial victory in one or several provinces.” But this ambitious plan was never carried out. The Communists did make every effort to extend their control. Their territorial development was particularly rapid at the beginning of 1932. The southern part of Fukien became almost completely Communist. The gain was also substantial in Kiangsi and in the Hupei-Honan-Anhwei Soviet District.

Chiang’s Fourth Communist-suppression Campaign

At the Second Plenum of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, held at Loyang in March 1932, Chiang was appointed Chairman of the Military Council. Concurrently he was Chief of the General Staff. When he assumed his posts on March 18th, the so-called “New State of Manchukuo” had already come into existence and the Shanghai fighting had just come to an end. Chiang was in a most difficult position. The clamor for all-out war against Japan was insistent and strident. It was his belief that he could not carry out a war against Japan while his rear was exposed to the mercy of Mao Tse-tung. And it was his conviction that Communism was ultimately more deadly to the soul of China than Japan. He therefore decided to deal with the Communists first. He explained his policy in the following terms: Our country is confronted with a crisis which is both internal and external. Internally, the mthless Communists have been killing and burning day after day. Externally, the Japanese imperialists have been committing incessant aggression against our country. The Japanese imperialists attack us and even plan for our extinction. Owing to the existence of the Communist bandits, we cannot offer unified, 377

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES effective resistance to the aggressor . . . Internal disorder is the surest way to invite foreign aggression.1

The Fourth Campaign had two phases. In the first phase Chiang’s main effort was directed against the so-called Hupei-Honan-Anhwei Soviet District. The main Communist force was Hsu Hsiang-ch’ien’s Fourth Front Army, which was numerically one of the strongest of all Communist armies. It had a total strength of about 80,000 men. To this must be added Ho Lung’s Second Front Army in central Hupei, with a total strength of about 40,000 men; and Rung Ho-ch’iung’s forces on the Hupei-Kiangsi border, with an estimated strength of 20,000 men. For a time these Communist forces threatened the vital Wuhan area as well as the main artery of communications between North and South China —the Peiping-Hankow Railway. On May 21, 1932, Chiang assumed supreme command of the Tri-Province Communist Suppression armies, with Li Chi-shen as Deputy Commander-in-Chief. On June 7th he sailed aboard a gunboat for Kiangsi. On the 18th, he called a military conference at Ruling, a summer resort in the Lushan Mountains of Riangsi. It was at this conference that Chiang unfolded his policy of “70% politics and 30% military” in dealing with the problem of Communism. The strength of the Communists, he believed, derived from their skillful use of violence, deception and organization. In their propaganda they gave the people what seemed to them, under the stress of civil war and perennial misery, a plausible explanation of the present and an acceptable account of the future, a future in which they would have an honorable role to play. They were thus able to stir the peasant masses out of their millennial apathy into active allies. Therefore, said Chiang: The most urgent task before us at present is how to conduct our propaganda work in the Communist-controlled areas, how to convince the peasants of the evil nature of Communism, how to induce them to come over to our side and support us in the Communist-suppression campaign.2 1 Chiang Kai-shek, Ke-ming-chun ti tse-jen shih an-nei yu jan-wai (The responsibility of the Revolutionary Army is to Maintain Internal Order and Repel Foreign Aggression), Speech of May 8, 1933. 2Chiang Kai-shek: Chiao-fei chi-neng chih yen-chiu (Study of the Technique of Bandit-suppression), April 25, 1933. 378

THE SO-CALLED “CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC

Chiang paid special attention to the question of organizing the peasant masses. For this purpose he used the local security system invented in the 11th century known as Pao-chia. Under the system every ten peasant families formed a Pao and every ten Pao formed a Chia. It was a mutual-guarantee system in which the principle of collective responsibility reigned supreme. All or a part of the group could be held responsible for any offence committed by one of its members. The Pao-chia was introduced as a counter measure for combatting Communist peasant organizations. Said he: They are superior to us particularly in the work of organizing the peasant masses . . . From now on we should not rely solely on regular troops to suppress the Communists. Regular troops should be used in planned assaults and positional battles. In other words, we should use the people to do the job. This means that we must organize people’s self-defense corps, we must perfect the P a o - c h i a system, we must organize the masses of the people and we must arm them . . ,3

Chiang assumed supreme command with three com­ manders each in charge of a route left, right and central. The central route was under Chiang’s personal command, with General Liu Chih as deputy commander; the right by General Li Chi-shen, with Wang Chun as his deputy; and the left by Ho Ch’eng-chun, with Hsu Yuan-ch’uan as his deputy. The central route under Chiang constituted the main force of the campaign. Its target was the Communist Fourth Front Army commanded by Hsu Hsiang-ch’ien. This was a strong force operating in the Hupei-Honan border regions. On June 26, before Chiang’s campaign had started, the Communist Fourth Front Army destroyed a section of the Peiping-Hankow Railway near the town of Hsinyang in Honan, thus disrupting for a time this main artery of North-South communication. On the 27th, Chiang, who had been nursing a cold at Ruling, left for Hankow. As soon as he arrived at that city, he ordered his troops to attack the Communist forces along the Peiping-Hankow Railway. The 3op. cit. 379

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Communists were forced to retreat, and the damaged railway tracks were repaired. Chiang’s troops advanced on the Communist strongholds in six columns, with one or more divisions for each column. But he also expected the local officials to do their part to combat the Communist menace. On July 12th, 1932, he summoned a conference of district magistrates at his headquarters at Hankow. He told them that they should not be intimidated by Communist propaganda. If they would pay more attention to the organization and training of the peasant masses there was no reason why the Communist menace could not be eradicated. He told them to train local defense corps known as min-t’uan, or militia. Each district or county was to train and equip a 500-man min-t’uan under the command of a respected local citizen. Every five counties were required to have a common plan for self-defense. This was the method used by Tseng Kuo-fan during the T ’aiping Rebellion in the 1850’s and 1860’s. Meanwhile the second column of Chiang’s forces under the command of General Ch’en Chi-ch’eng captured the important town of Hsuanhuatien, and the sixth column captured another Communist stronghold at Hokuochen. The Right Route Army under General Li Chi-shen was successful in taking a number of strategic points. The Left Route Army under General Ho Ch’eng-chun also scored signal victories over the Communists in Hupei province. Thus, within the space of three months, the Communists in Hupei, Honan and Anhwei were completely routed; their bases of operation such as Kinkiachai and Sintsi fell into government hands. The remnants of Ho Lung’s Second Front Army escaped to the mountainous districts of Western Hunan. Hsu Hsiang-ch’ien’s Fourth Front Army suffered heavy losses. With a small force of about 4,000 men, Hsu fled to Shensi and later found his way to the fertile and populous province of Szechuan. The Communists left the Hupei-Honan-Anhwei border area in ruins. Many villages were practically depopulated. Those who had been classified as landlords and rich peasants had either been liquidated or else had fled to other parts of the country; and the young and able-bodied had for the most part been forcibly pressed into the Communist armies. Farm land lay uncultivated and implanted. The National 380

THE SO-CALLED “CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC”

Government was faced with the gigantic task of rural rehabilitation. A series of regulations concerning farm land were promulgated. These provided for the promotion of land ownership by the tiller, the protection of owner farms and of farm tenants with regard to security of tenure, reduction of rents, etc.

The Fourth Campaign: Second Phase

The first phase of the Fourth Campaign thus came to a successful conclusion. Chiang now turned his attention to Kiangsi, the heart of the so-called Soviet Republic. As early as April 19, 1932, Nanking had already appointed General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, as Commander-in-Chief of the Communist-suppression forces in the border region of Kiangsi, Kwangtung and Fukien, and had on May 15th transferred the Nineteenth Route Army, which had won international renown as valiant defenders of Shanghai a few months before, to Fukien and appointed its commander, General .Ts’ai T ’ing-k’ai, Pacification Com­ missioner of Fukien province. General Ho sought to encircle the Central Soviet District by a three-prong movement: General Yu Han-mou advanced from Southern Kiangsi, General Ch’en Ch’eng from Southeastern Kiangsi, and General Ts’ai T ’ing-k’ai from Southwestern Fukien. The Central Soviet District was about 400 kilometers in length and 200 kilometers in width. The Government forces gradually tightened its encirclement and moved inward, with the ultimate objective of crushing the Communist armies in a vise. By the end of 1932, it seemed that success was at hand. It was at this time that disagreement arose between Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the so-called Soviet Republic, and Chou En-lai, Chief Political Commissar of the Communist Armies, over the question of strategy and tactics. Mao was in favor of a protracted, long-drawn-out struggle. According to him, the first and most serious problem was how to conserve 381

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

1) Central Soviet area 2) Hupei-Honan-Anhwei Soviet area 3) Hunan-Western Hupeh Soviet area 4) Hunan-Kiangsi Soviet area 5) Hupei-Hunan-Kiangsi Soviet area 6) Northeastern Kiangsi Soviet area 7) Left Kwangsi Soviet area 8) Right Kwangsi Soviet area 9) Western Fukien Soviet area

Soviet areas before the fourth Bandit-suppression Campaign 382

THE SO-CALLED “CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC”

strength and wait for an opportunity to defeat the enemy. For this purpose the tactic to be used should be one of “luring the enemy into the depths of our territory, then attacking with all our force at the enemy’s weakest point.” Chou, on the other hand, believed that the Communists should take the offensive and destroy the Government forces before they had time to rest and be ready for battle. In the end Chou En-lai seemed to have won out, thanks to the intervention of the Comintern representative. Chiang Kai-shek once again found himself in a painful dilemma. The Japanese, after a brief respite, were again on the move. This time their target was the mountainous province of Jehol which bordered on Manchuria but was in fact not a part of it. From the outset the Japanese had maintained that Jehol fell within the jurisdiction of “Manchukuo” for the simple reason that under both Chang Tso-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang the region had been loosely controlled from Mukden. Jehol, furthermore, was viewed by the Japanese as constituting an important strategic position in defense against both the Soviet Union and incursions into Manchuria from North China. In his diary, under the date of December 9, 1932, Chiang wrote that he was well aware that Japan intended to bring the whole of China under her domination and that sooner or later China would have to go all-out to fight Japan. But, he continued to say: Until all tolerable alternatives are denied to us, until we can be reasonably sure that we stand to gain by war and that our country and our party will survive the terrible ordeals of that war, we should not lightly gamble with our future. The most urgent business before us is to put our own house in order, to consolidate our base areas, and to strengthen our armed forces. Until we have reached the point of no return we should not abandon the fundamentals in favor of other courses of action. In other words, it is vital to rid the Yangtze Valley of the Red menace and to establish internal political order. This is the central task I have set for myself. It is only after the eradication of the Red bandits in Kiangsi that I can be in a position to make such sacrifices as may be necessary to deal with the Japanese in the Northeast. This is the conclusion I have reached after painful reflections and innumerable hours of meditation . . .

383

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Having thus made up his mind, Chiang left Hankow for Nanking on the 12th of December and, on the 25th, he instructed his Chief of Staff, General Ts’ao Hao-shen, to telegraph his field commanders to the effect that the Japanese would soon invade Jehol and threaten North China, that they should within the shortest possible time clear Kiangsi of the Communists so as to enable them to fight the Japanese without fear of being attacked from the rear. The plan for “encirclement and annihilation” was completed by the end of December 1932. Altogether 17 divisions and two mixed brigades with a total of 153,500 men were mobilized. On the side of the Communists there were the First Red Army commanded by Lin Piao, the Third Red Army commanded by P’eng Teh-huai, the Fifth Red Army commanded by Tung Ch’en-t’ang, the Seventh Red Army commanded by Lo Ping-hui, the Hunan-Kiangsi Red Army commanded by Chang Chi-fei, the Kiangsi Red Army commanded by Ch’en Yi, etc. Their total strength was estimated at 64,800 men. The Communist armies were inferior to the government forces both in numerical strength and equipment. But they enjoyed the advantage of being in familiar terrain, and they were more mobile and skillful in the use of maneuvering warfare. On New Year’s Day, 1933, General Ch’en Ch’eng, field commander of the central route of government troops, advanced from southwestern Kiangsi toward the north with the objective of mopping up the remnants of Red forces in the vicinity of Chinch ’i, of strengthening the defenses of Nanch’eng, and then of reinforcing the government bridgehead at Linchuan. The Communists were fully prepared to meet him. On the night of January 4th, they suddenly launched a concentrated attack and inflicted heavy losses on the Fifth Division of the government troops, capturing a regimental commander. On the 5th they took the town of Chinch’i, and on the 6th they destroyed another unit of government troops. Now, with a main force of over 30,000 men, they threatened the headquarters of the Central Route Army at Lichuan. On January 27th, Chiang Kai-shek paid a visit to Nanchang and, on the 31st held a military conference to 384

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formulate a new plan of encirclement and annihilation. On February 6th, he assumed personal command of the campaign and established his headquarters at Nanchang. It was at this time that the Japanese Kwantung Army renewed its southward push. On January 3rd, the Japanese occupied Shanhaikuan, where the Great Wall crosses the narrow plain between the mountain and the sea. This is the historic gateway to North China for the control of which countless battles had been fought for thousands of years. The Japanese were now posed for action not only against Jehol but also against North China. This being the case, Chiang was forced to withdraw a portion of his troops from the Kiangsi front to North China. The Communists now mounted an offensive of their own. With a main force of 40,000 men, consisting of units of the First, Third, and Fifth Red Armies, they advanced on the strategic town of Nanfeng, and the 8th Division of Chiang’s troops was in danger of being surrounded. General Ch’en Ch’eng dispatched the 52nd and 59th Divisions to Nanfeng to come to the aid of the hard-pressed 8th Division. When the troops reached a little village 60 kilometers west of Nanfeng, they walked into the Communist trap. Two-thirds of the troops were either killed or captured. Its commander, General Li Ming, was wounded, and in order to avoid capture by the enemy, he committed suicide. The 59th Division fared no better. On February 27 it fell into an ambush which the enemy had carefully prepared for it. The 5th and 7th Red Armies pounced upon it with tremendous force. Like the 52nd Division, it suffered almost total annihilation. The Fourth Communist-suppression Campaign thus ended in disaster.

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JAPANESE INVASION OF JEHOL

Prelude to Invasion The Japanese Kwantung Army had long planned to invade Jehol. Indeed, this had already been made explicit by the inclusion of this mountainous territory as one of the provinces of “Manchukuo.” What the Japanese needed was a suitable pretext for military action. On July 17, 1932, one Ishimoto Kenshiro, a civilian liaison officer of the Kwantung Army, while travelling aboard a train from Peipiao, a mining town in Jehol, to Chinchow, was kidnapped by Chinese guerrillas operating in that area. Units of the 8th Division of the Kwantung Army stationed at Chinchow were dispatched to Chaoyangshih on a rescue mission. They came into conflict with a battalion of provincial troops who attempted to stop them. With reinforcements from Chinchow, the Japanese pressed on and forcibly occupied Chaoyangshih. Jehol provincial authorities sought to prevent an extension of the clash and expressed regret for what had happened. An emissary was sent to the Japanese to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The Japanese insisted that Ishimoto must be rescued from the guerrillas within seven days, that the commander of the 109th Brigade at Chaoyang must go personally to Chinchow to apologize for the incident, and that grave consequences would follow if these demands were not complied with. The news of the Japanese demands reached Chiang Kai-shek in the midst of his Fourth Communist-suppression Campaign in Kiangsi. He was not sure whether the Japanese action at Chaoyangshih portended the beginning of a planned invasion or should be regarded as a local incident. Whatever this might be, China must be prepared for all eventualities. He therefore ordered Chang Hsueh-liang to move troops towards the southern borders of Jehol. At the same time the 386

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National Government ordered Tang Yu-lin, Governor of Jehol, to be prepared to resist any Japanese invasion at all costs. But the crisis passed as suddently as it had arisen. The Japanese quietly withdrew from Chaoyangshih. It is now known that on July 22, 1922, General Hashimoto Toranosuke, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, in a telegram to General Ueda Kenkishi, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, said that for a large-scale military operation in Jehol additional troops were needed. He suggested the sending of “at least one additional infantry division and one cavalry brigade.” But his request was turned down. General Ueda told him that both domestic and international developments were unfavorable for the military solution of the Jehol problem at the present moment, and he advised General Hashimoto to be patient and wait for a more opportune time to launch the attack. The situation in Jehol remained precarious. Tang Yu-lin, Governor of Jehol, and the man responsible for its defense, was one of those corrupt and unprincipled officials who placed a higher premium on his own personal interests than those of the nation. The 20,000 men under his command were poorly trained and poorly motivated, and could not be expected to put up much of a fight against the Japanese. While professing undying loyalty to Chang Hsueh-liang and the National Government, his name was among those which appeared on the proclamation ushering the “New State of Manchukuo” into the world. Chiang Kai-shek, mindful of Tang Yu-lin’s unreliability, exhorted Chang Hsueh-liang to rush troops to Jehol. Chang appeared hesitant. This aroused the indignation of Wang Ching-wei, then President of the Executive Yuan. On August 6th, he fired off a telegram to Chang, charging him with irresponsibility. Wang pointed out that Jehol was within the defense perimeter of Chang’s troops and that, so long as Chang was there, others could not very well take up the responsibility. Wang concluded his telegram by saying that Chang should immediately relinquish his command and let others do the job for him. Wang himself tendered his own resignation and left his post. On August 8th, two days after Wang Ching-wei’s telegram, Chang Hsueh-liang wired his resignation. 387

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The resignation of both Wang and Chang precipitated a national crisis. On August 10th, Chiang met with T ’ang Yu-jen, Secretary-General of the Political Council and one of Wang’s trusted aides, and discussed with him the critical situation in which the nation had found itself. That night he confided to his diary these thoughts: It seems to me that the words and deeds of both Wang Ching-wei and Chang Hsueh-liang are childish and harmful to the present situation . . . Wang is even worse than Chang. But it is useless to let oneself be annoyed by this; one must be patient and try to do what is best for the country. I think Chang should be allowed to resign and should be told to put the welfare of the country above personal feelings. A branch office of the Military Council should be established in Peiping in place of the old set-up, and I intend to ask Chang to nominate a suitable man to take charge of it. As for Wang Ching-wei, I told T’ang Yu-jen about my plans for the strengthening of the defense of Jehol, and had Wang been more patient and had refrained from sending that angry telegram, Chang would have by this time moved units of his troops to Jehol. Unfortunately, Wang had upset the apple-cart by arousing the resentment of the Northern generals. . . Alas, Wang is not a man to be entrusted with important affairs of State!

On August 16th the National Government formally accepted Chang Hsueh-liang’s resignation. On the following day the office of Pacification Commander in Peiping was abolished. In its place a Branch Office of the Military Council was established. Chiang Kai-shek assumed titular leadership of the new office, but Chang Hsueh-liang acted on his behalf.

Japanese Occupation of Shanhaikuan

In the next few months the situation at the Jehol front was comparatively quiet. The Japanese were too much preoccupied with fighting the guerrillas who had sprung up in all parts of Manchuria. These armed Chinese volunteers 388

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created considerable trouble for the Japanese. They were capable of making lightning raids on a number of important cities, including Mukden itself. In one of these raids they destroyed 27 Japanese military planes. They had once laid seige on Changchun, the capital of “Manchukuo.” Towards the end of 1932, however, the wave of guerrilla activities subsided. With the threats of guerrilla raids removed, the Japanese now turned their attention once again to Jehol and North China. On December 3rd Chiang Kai-shek received a telegram from Chang Hsueh-liang reporting disturbing developments which belied the seemingly calm surface. The Japanese, Chang reported, had sent secret agents to Inner Mongolia to persuade the Mongolian princes to cooperate with them in overthrowing Chinese rule. They had brought up heavy armored trucks, equipped with machine-guns and other weapons, preparatory to the invasion of Jehol. Huge quantities of rice and other military supplies had been transported to Chin chow. The Japanese had used Chinese thugs to recruit a band of mercenaries to collaborate with them in the assault on Jehol. This time the Kwantung Army seemed determined to complete the subjugation of the mountainous Chinese province. Chiang Kai-shek vowed to fight the Japanese to the end. He wrote in his diary on December 3rd, 1932: Japanese invasion of Jehol seems certain to take place within the next two or three months. There is a possibility that they might even invade Hopei province and install Henry Pu-yi on the throne of China, or to set up puppet regimes in North China so as to bring about a fragmented China under Japanese rule. The enemy is insatiable, and he will not stop until all China has been brought under his domination. So long as there is any breath of life in me, I will not cease fighting the enemy. I shall not weaken or falter so long as there still remains a base area from which to carry on the struggle. Even if we should be forced to retreat to some remote corner of China, I shall nonetheless endeavor to transform it into a base for our national revival. If unfortunately I should die before this is accomplished, the base can still be used by others to carry on the struggle. I am confident that we, descendants of the Yellow Emperor, cannot be wiped off from the face of the earth. 389

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Meanwhile, Shanhaikuan became the target of Japanese aggression. This ancient and strategic gateway to China proper is situated midway between Mukden and Peiping. By Protocol of 1901 foreign Powers secured the right to station troops at Tientsin, Tangku, Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan. The Japanese garrison at Shanhaikuan was relatively small, consisting of about 100 infantry troops and a small corps of engineers. Fifteen kilometers southwest of Shanhaikuan is the port of Chinwangtao, where the Japanese had also maintained a small garrison. With Manchuria under Japanese control, Shanhaikuan and Chingwangtao were now to serve as jumping-off places for the conquest of North China. At Shanhaikuan Chang Hsueh-liang had stationed a regiment of his troops under the command of General Ho Chu-kuo. Toward the end of 1932 the Japanese deliberately tried to heighten the tension in the Shanhaikuan area by staging provocative nightly exercises in the countryside. The situation was reminiscent of that prevailing in Mukden on the eve of the September 18th outbreak. The Chinese made every effort to avoid any aggravation of the situation. But the Japanese were determined to occupy Shanhaikuan, and no amount of restraint on the part of the Chinese could deflect them from a course of action they had set their mind on. On New Year’s Day, 1933, a group of Japanese soldiers suddenly appeared at the South Gate of the town and began throwing hand grenades right and left. They also amused themselves by taking pot-shots at Chinese guards and policemen, who, in order to avoid the kind of incidents which the Japanese seemed intent on provoking, retired into the walled city and closed the South Gate. Meanwhile a train-load of Japanese troops arrived at the station of the Peiping-Mukden Railway. On January 2, 1933, the Japanese, alleging that they had been fired upon by Chinese soldiers, presented to the Chinese authorities the following demands: (1) the area outside the South Gate, where most Japanese residents lived, be handed over to the Japanese; (2) all Chinese troops be withdrawn into the walled city; (3) all Chinese police and other public security forces be similarly withdrawn; and (4) Chinese troops guarding the South Gate and Chinese patrols on the city wall be withdrawn. The Japanese expected the Chinese to refuse to accede to the 390

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demands, thus providing them with a pretext for military action. The Chinese garrison commander, however, expressed his readiness to give favorable consideration to the first three demands, but refused to withdraw the patrols from the city wall. The Japanese now made an additional and even harsher demand: “ Open the South Gate and let Japanese troops patrol both the city wall and the area inside the South Gate,” and warned that “failure to comply would be followed by military action.” This time the Chinese authorities replied in the negative. Japanese reinforcements including infantry and artillery units, now arrived from Chinchow. Order was given to take the city by storm. The city was bombarded from the air, from ground batteries, and from gunboats anchored in the sea. The Chinese defended the city with courage and determination but by the afternoon of January 3rd, the Japanese had captured the city. One Chinese battalion was wiped out completely.

Japanese Conquest of Jehol Following the occupation of Shanhaikuan, the Kwantung Army began preparations for a military thrust into Jehol province. On January 21, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Uchida Kosai, in a speech before the House of Peers, declared: . . . the Great Wall is the dividing line between China on the one hand and Manchuria and Mongolia on the other. This is indisputable from the standpoint of history. As far as Jehol is concerned, it is a part of Manchukuo. One has only to look at the map to know this is true. Recently, there have been developments which seriously threaten the security of that province. Regular troops of Chang, Hsueh-liang’s army have crossed national boundaries into Jehol province. In accordance with the Protocol concluded between Japan and Manchukuo, the two countries share the responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. Hence, the so-called Jehol question is purely a matter of domestic concern for 392

JAPANESE INVASION OF JEHOL Manchukuo. At the same time Japan, basing herself on the treaty obligations she has assumed, is also seriously concerned about it.

On January 27th, Chiang Tso-pin, China’s Minister to Japan, reported that Prince Saionji, last of the Genro or Elder Statesman, had sent an aide to see him, saying that the Japanese Cabinet would soon be reorganized, that the young army extremists would probably no longer be able to exert a preponderant influence in the Government, that there was hope for improvement of relations between China and Japan. Chiang Kai-shek, however, did not give much credence to the report. He wrote in his diary: The traditional policy of Japan has been one of aggressiveness. Unless this policy has met with serious reverses, it is not likely to be changed. If there should be any change, the change would be one of tactics rather than one of basic policy. The invasion of Jehol may perchance be postponed. But even that is unlikely. (January 27,1933)

The correctness of this evaluation was confirmed by General Muto Nobuyoshi, commanding officer of the Kwantung Army, who, on the very day when Chiang made the foregoing entry in his diary, told his officers: The situation in Jehol has become increasingly dangerous. In order to consolidate the foundation of Manchukuo, we can no longer ignore the developments that have been taking place We have come to a most crucial point in time, at which the Kwantung Army has to go into action.

In the face of the impending crisis, T.V. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan of the National Govern­ ment, went to Peiping to confer with Chang Hsueh-liang with respect to the defense of Jehol. On his arrival on February 12th, he said at a news conference that Jehol was as much a part of China as Kiangsu or Kwangtung, that to attack Jehol was the same as to attack any other Chinese province, and that China was prepared to defend Jehol with all its strength. On the 17th, accompanied by Chang Hsueh-liang, Soong went to Jehol to confer with the Governor of this province, General Tang Yu-lin. Four days later, the 6th and 8th Divisions of the Japanese Army were ordered to advance toward Jehol. An ultimatum demanding the immediate 393

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withdrawal of all Chinese troops from Jehol was presented to the Chinese Government on February 23rd. The Japanese Minister to China outlined the Japanese demands as follows: The presence of troops under Chang Hsueh-liang and other anti-Manchukuo forces is incompatible not only with the sovereignty of Manchukuo, but also with the restoration of peace and order in Jehol. The Manchukuo army is now putting into execution its plan to exterminate bandits and the remnants of soldier-bandits in the province of Jehol, and the Japanese army is obligated to give assistance to it under terms of protocol concluded between Japan and Manchukuo . . . The activities of Japanese troops . . . have no other objective than to insure order and tranquility in that province. In principle, they will remain in the territory of Manchukuo. But, if Chang Hsueh-liang’s troops and other anti-Manchukuo forces persist in taking positive action, it will be difficult to guarantee that fighting will not spread to North China. The Government of Manchukuo stands ready to receive with open arms those forces which will lay down their arms and come over to its side. Tang Yu-lin, should he decide to do so, will be treated with magnanimity. In rejecting the Japanese ultimatum, Lo Wen-kan, the Foreign Minister of China, castigated the Japanese Govern­ ment for its temerity in basing its aggression in Jehol on the so-called “Manchukuo-Japan Protocol” of September 15th, 1932. So far from being a cloak of defense for its action in Jehol, this so-called Protocol was in fact the documentary evidence of Japan’s self-confessed guilt. As regards General Tang Yu-lin, it was ridiculous to suggest that a high official of the Chinese Government could be induced to betray the interests of his country in order to serve those of the enemy. On February 25th, the day after the Assembly of the League of Nations had adopted its report on Manchuria, the Kwantung Army invaded Jehol in full force from three directions. The coincidence in time was believed to be a warning to Western nations against meddling in Far Eastern affairs. Despite the difficult penetration of Jehol’s mountainous terrain, which afforded every advantage to defensive operations, the Japanese advance was swift and almost unopposed. The ill-trained and ill-led troops under Tang Yu-lin speedily gave way. On March 3rd Tang left Chengteh, 394

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capital of the province, ostensibly for the front to take personal command of the defense. On March 4th, the Japanese vanguard entered Chengteh. Less than a week later all organized Chinese resistance in Jehol collapsed. The loss of Jehol in so shameful a manner created a tremendous outburst of popular anger. Chang Hsueh-liang’s immediate resignation was demanded. Chiang Kai-shek was urged to proceed at once to the north to see what could be done to strengthen the defenses of North China. On March 6th Chiang left his headquarters at Nanchang for Hankow, and then proceeded to the north by the Peiping-Hankow Railway. When he reached Chengchow on the morning of the 7th, he released the following statement to the press: I must be held responsible for the loss of Jehol and the Northeastern provinces. So long as the lost territories are not recovered, I am duty bound to lead the Chinese people in their struggle against the enemy . ..

It was at Chengchow that Chiang received a telegram from Chang Hsueh-liang begging to be relieved of his duties as Pacification Commissioner of Peiping. On March 9th he arrived at Paotingfu, where he assumed personal charge of affairs in the north. After having conferred with T. V. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan, he accepted Chang Hsueh-liang’s resignation. Chang’s post as northern com­ mander was taken over by General Ho Ying-chin, the Chinese Minister of War, who was made chairman of the newly established Peiping Branch Military Council. The northern troops were reorganized, additional troops were brought up from the south to strengthen the defenses of North China and the Great Wall had become the first line of defense.

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Sino-Japanese Dispute Before League Assembly

When the Lytton Report came up for consideration at the fifth meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on November 21st, 1932, the discussion was opened by the Japanese representative, Matsuoka Yousuke, former DirectorGeneral of the South Manchurian Railway and a prominent exponent of Japanese expansionism. Matsuoka found little to praise, but much to criticize, in the findings of the Lytton Commission. At the Council’s 8th meeting held on November 24th, he declared: Japan has been and is a loyal supporter of the League, and hopes to remain a loyal supporter of it if she does not find it absolutely incompatible with the existence of Japan, as well as with her great policy of maintaining and preserving peace and order in the Far East.

This was a veiled threat of the possibility of Japan’s withdrawal from League membership in the event that she should find the League’s decisions unacceptable to her. It was probably for this reason that, aside from the statements made by representatives of the parties directly concerned, there was no general discussion of the Lytton Report by other members of the Council. At its tenth meeting on November 28th, the Council decided to transmit the Lytton Report to the Assembly. The Assembly met in plenary session on December 6th and began its consideration of the Lytton Report. The discussion was opened by the Chinese representative Dr. W. W. Yen, who submitted the following requests: “ (1) That the Special Assembly, basing on the findings of the Commission of Inquiry, declare that Japan has violated 396

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the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty of Washington. “ (2) That the Special Assembly call upon Japan to put into execution forthwith the Council resolutions of September 30th and December 10th, 1931, so that all Japanese troops will be withdrawn into the so-called Railway Zone, pending further withdrawal therefrom, and the so-called Manchukuo will be dissolved. “ (3) That the Special Assembly, pending the dissolution of the so-called Manchukuo Government and recalling its own Resolution of March 11th, 1932, wherein it pledged itself not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris, declare that it will not recognize the said ‘Manchukuo Government’ and will not enter into any relations therewith.” In his reply, the Japanese representative, Matsuoka, stressed the special position enjoyed by Japan in Manchuria. With regard to any suggestions that the Assembly might decide to make for the settlement of the situation, he declared that the terms of such a settlement “must be such that they can be effectively put into operation, and they will accomplish and preserve peace in the Far East.” On the third day of the general debate, Matsuoka took to task those members of the Assembly who were against Japanese actions in Manchuria. Likening the criticisms leveled at Japan to the crucifixion of Jesus, he said: But suppose that public opinion were so absolutely against Japan as some of the people try to make out, are you sure the so-called world opinion will persist forever and never change? Humanity crucified Jesus of Nazareth two thousand years ago. And today? Can any of you assure me that the so-called world opinion can make no mistake? We Japanese feel that we are now put on trial. Some of the people in Europe and America may wish even to crucify Japan in the twentieth century. Gentlemen, Japan stands ready to be crucified! But we do believe, that, in a few years, world opinion will be changed and we also shall be understood by the world as Jesus of Nazareth was.

Such brazen disregard of world opinion was rarely heard 397

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at an international forum like the League of Nations. Matsuoka’s comparison of the situation in which Japan had found herself to that of Jesus of Nazareth was a masterpiece of effrontery. In the course of the Assembly debate, representatives of the small nations took an active part. They were emphatic in their denunciation of Japanese military action. On December 7th the delegations of Czechoslovakia, Irish Free State, Spain and Sweden circulated to members of the Assembly a Draft Resolution which urged the acceptance of the conclusions reached by the Lytton Report to the effect that “the vast operations and military occupation which followed the events of September 18th, 1931, cannot be considered as measures of legitimate defense;” that “the regime set up in Manchuria has been able to be carried into effect thanks to the pressure of Japanese troops;” “that the recognition of the present regime in Manchuria is not compatible with existing international obligations.” The Draft Resolution authorized the Committee of Nineteen “to solicit the co-operation of the Governments of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the purpose of getting in touch with the parties with a view to ensuring a settlement of the dispute on the basis of the above-mentioned findings.” The Draft Resolution was not brought before the Assembly for a vote. Representatives of the Big Powers were not very enthusiastic about the findings of the Lytton Report. M. Paul-Boncour of France, while commending the Lytton Report for its clarity and impartiality, expressed no unqualified acceptance of its views. Sir John Simon of Britain went him one better. Echoing the contention of the Japanese representative, he declared that the League should concern itself with “realities.” At its meeting on December 9th, the Assembly adopted a Resolution proposed by Switzerland and Czechoslovakia requesting that the Lytton Report be studied by the Special Committee of Nineteen in order “to draw up proposals with a view to the settlement of the dispute” and to “submit these proposals at the earliest possible moment.” In the meantime the Special Committee drew up certain texts indicating the basis on which it might be possible to effect a conciliation 398

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between China and Japan. In one of these texts, the Special Committee proposed to set up a Committee whose duty was to conduct, in conjunction with the parties, the negotiations with a view to a settlement, on the basis of the principles set out in Chapter IX of the report of the Commission of Inquiry, and having regard to the suggestions made in Chapter X of that report. It considered it desirable to have the United States and the Soviet Union to take part in the negotiations. It requested the Committee to report on its work before March 1st, 1933. The Chinese representative declared the willingness of his Government to negotiate for a settlement “through the League,” providing that the general principles controlling the settlement should be those stated by the Commission of Inquiry, and, especially, that the possibility of an infringement of China’s territorial and administrative integrity by a recognition of the then existing regime in Manchuria should be precluded. The Japanese representative objected to the participation of the United States and the Soviet Union in the negotiations. Nor was the principle of non-recognition of “Manchukuo” acceptable to him. While the smaller states were ready to go to any lengths to force Japan to give way and thus preserve the League as a bulwark of peace for the future, the Great Powers in the Special Committee, Britain in particular, still hoped that something could be done to make settlement possible. The Assembly adjourned for Christmas holidays without having reached a decision. The plenary session of the Assembly did not meet again until February 21st, 1933. Meanwhile the United States, which had hitherto remained silent on the subject of the Lytton Report, began to take a more positive attitude. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had won the Presidential election in November 1932 on the Democratic ticket, expressed a desire to meet with Secretary of State Henry Stimson in regard to the Far Eastern situation. On January 9th, Stimson, with the concurrence of President Hoover, visited Roosevelt at the latter’s family estate at Hyde Park. He found the President-elect’s views on the Sino-Japanese dispute closer to his own than to Hoover’s. Roosevelt assured the Secretary that he would not undermine any policy statement the latter 399

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might wish to make on the issue. With Roosevelt’s approval, Stimson informed London that no change in United States policy in regard to the Far East was to be expected under the incoming Democratic Administration. He also informed Hugh Wilson, American Minister to Switzerland and observer at the League of Nations, of Roosevelt’s position. At Geneva there were still those who tried to bring about a settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute through negotia­ tions. The League’s Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, and his Japanese assistant, Sugimura Yotaro, continued to play a major role behind the scenes. On January 12th, 1933, Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, inquired of the Japanese Ambassador, Matsudaira Tsuneo, whether Japan would accept the proposal for conciliation without the participation of the United States and the Soviet Union. Matsudaira replied in the negative. The Special Committee now decided that further efforts to bring about a settlement of the controversy by conciliation proceedings would be futile, and it therefore went ahead with the preparation of the draft of the Report which the Assembly would be called upon to make under paragraph 4 of Article 15 of the Covenant.1 The British representative, influenced by the positive attitude of the United States, went along with this decision.

Paragraph 4, Article 15, reads: “If the dispute is not thus settled (by conciliation), the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.” Paragraph 10 of the same Article provides that, if the dispute is referred to the Assembly, a Report by it concurred in by the Representatives of the Members of the League of the Council and a majority of all other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the Parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a Report by the Council concurred in by all the Members thereof other than the Representatives of the Parties to the dispute. 400

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Adoption by the Assembly of the Special Committee’s Draft Report When the Assembly met on February 21st, 1933, its President reviewed the futile efforts that the Special Committee had made to provide a basis and procedure for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese controversy, and stated that, for the moment, no such settlement was possible. At its meeting on February 24th, the draft Report prepared by the Special Committee was presented to the Assembly for consideration. Undoubtedly, this was one of the most important pronouncements that the League had issued since its establishment. The general character of the Report, and its chief findings of facts and recommendations may be briefly summarized as follows: 1. The sovereignty over Manchuria belonged to China. 2. The treaty rights which Japan had in Manchuria were derived from that sovereignty, although it was claimed that these rights restricted the exercise there of sovereignty by China. 3. The military action taken by Japan violated Article 10 of the Covenant of the League and infringed upon China’s territorial and administrative integrity. 4. Without excluding the possibility that, on the night of September 18th-19th, 1931, the Japanese officers on the spot might have believed that they were acting in self-defense, the Assembly could not regard the Japanese military operations as legitimate measures of self-defense. 5. The so-called State of “Manchukuo” was created with the assistance and direction of the Japanese General Staff and could only be carried through owing to the presence of the Japanese troops. It could not be regarded as a spontaneous and genuine independent movement. 6. While a state of tension existed before September 18th, 1931, no question of Chinese responsibility could arise for the developments of events since September 18th, 1931. 7. The economic boycott against Japan must be regarded as falling under the category of “reprisals,” and not as anti-foreign. On the basis of the foregoing findings, the Report recommended: 401

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“ 1. Whereas the sovereignty over Manchuria belongs to China, (a) “the presence of Japanese troops outside the zone of the South Manchurian Railway and their operations outside this zone are incompatible with the legal principles which should govern the settlement of the dispute;” (b) “having regard to local conditions special to Manchuria,” “an organization under the sovereignty of, and compatible with the administrative integrity of China,” endowed with “a wide measure of autonomy,” should be established. 2. The settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be based on the general principles set forth in Chapter IX of the Lytton Report.2 3. “Each of the parties is invited to inform the Secretary-General whether it accepts . . . the recom­ mendations of the Assembly, subject to the sole condition that the other party also accepts them.” The negotiations between the parties should take place with the assistance of a Committee set up by the Assembly. The United States and the Soviet Union would be invited to serve on the Committee, should they so desire. The Report of the Special Committee concludes with the observation that its recommendations “do not provide for a mere return to the status quo existing before September 1931,” and “they likewise exclude the maintenance and recognition of the existing regime in Manchuria.” This being so, “it follows that . . . the Members of the League intend to abstain . . . from any act which might prejudice or delay the carrying out of the recommendation of the said report,” and they “will continue not to recognize this regime either de jure or de facto.” And they “intend to abstain from taking any isolated action with regard to the situation in Manchuria and to continue to concert their action among themselves as well as with interested States not Members of the League.” 2The general principles for settlement: (1) Compatibility with the interests of both China and Japan; (2) considerations for Soviet interests; (3) conformity with existing multinational treaties; (4) recognition of Japan’s interests in Manchuria; (5) establishment of new treaty relations between China and Japan; (6) effective machinery for settling future disputes; (7) Manchurian autonomy; (8) internal order & security; (9) encouragement of economic rapprochement between China and Japan; (10) international cooperation in Chinese reconstruction. 402

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Before this draft Report was formally discussed by the Assembly, opportunity was given to the Chinese and Japanese delegations to examine and comment upon it. Since the proposed Report followed closely the findings of the facts and the recommendations of the Lytton Commission, it is not surprising that the Japanese delegation should have found it unacceptable for the same reasons that they had found the Lytton Report unsatisfactory. With regard to the conclusion of the Report that Members of the League and other States should refrain from recognizing “Manchukuo” , the Japanese contended that “in so pro­ nouncing judgment and proposing to influence, or even to bind, if only morally, both member and non-member states in the matter of recognizing or not recognizing another state, the League would be acting ultra vires. ” The Japanese delegation went on to warn the members of the League that the adoption of the Report might lead to results contrary to those desired by it, and that it would “tend to intensify the situation, jeopardize it, and possibly produce consequences of a serious character.”

Japan’s Withdrawal from League Membership

According to a memorandum written by Lt. Colonel Tsuchibashi Yuitsu, an officer of the Japanese General Staff detailed to serve at the Japanese delegation, the Japanese learned of the Special Committee’s decision on the night of February 15th, 1933, from a French journalist in its pay. The news caused great consternation. Up to that moment, the Japanese had convinced themselves that the veiled threat contained in their “Observations” would have been sufficient to make the Special Committee have second thoughts about the draft Report and modify its contents and conclusions. Tsuchibashi went into Matsuoka’s office and said: “Matters have come to such a pass that it seems that we have come to the parting of the ways . . . ” Matsuoka, who seemed to have been lost in thought, made no reply. After having consulted 403

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with his senior colleagues, Nagaoka Shunichi, Japanese Ambassador to France, and Sato Naotake, Japanese Ambassador to Belgium, he dashed off a telegram on February 16th to Tokyo advising Japan’s withdrawal from the League. Prime Minister Saito Makoto, upon receipt of the telegram, solicited the opinion of Elder Statesman Prince Saionji, who said: “We have no option but to accept the views of the delegation.” The Japanese Cabinet held an emergency meeting on February 20th and instructed the Japanese delegation at Geneva to withdraw from the League. This decision was ratified by the Privy Council on February 22nd. Almost simultaneous with this decision was the launching of a general offensive against the Chinese provinces of Jehol by the Kwantung Army. The world was inclined to be incredulous at the news of Japan’s intended withdrawal from the League. Lord Lytton discounted the possibility. The well-known American commentator Walter Lippmann also made the mistake of underestimating the firmness of Japan’s decision. The draft Report came before the Assembly for its consideration on the morning of February 24th. The discussion was opened by the Chinese representative, Dr. W. W. Yen. He expressed satisfaction that the courage of the League was to be manifested in the verdict which it was about to render in regard to Japanese aggression against China. He regretted certain omissions, and his Government did not agree in every detail of the events narrated and conclusions stated in the Report. “ As a loyal Member of the League,” he said, “my Government believes in third party judgment as the basis of justice.” Dr. Yen commended the League for not recognizing “Manchukuo” either de jure or de facto, and his Government welcomed the cooperation extended to nonmember States, including the United States and the Soviet Union, for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute. The participation of these two great countries in the negotiation process would be of inestimable value. He closed by saying: “Mr. President, I have now the honor to make to the Assembly a solemn declaration: the Chinese Government will vote for the Report . . . ” The representative of Japan, Matsuoka, who spoke next, 404

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began by declaring that his Government had already notified the Assembly that it could not accept the proposed Report. He criticized the Committee of Nineteen for its failure “to realize the actual situation in the Far East, the difficulties of Japan’s position in the midst of an unparalleled and appalling circumstance, and the ultimate aim that is impelling Japan in her action.” Japan, he pointed out, had fought two wars in Manchuria, and she had staked her very survival on the outcome of these wars. Japan did not want to fight another war. But at the same time, she would not retreat or compromise on an issue which involved her national survival. The Manchurian question was such an issue. The discussion was comparatively short. The draft Report was then put to a roll-call vote, with the result that, of the 44 members voting, 42, including China, voted for its adoption. Siam (Thailand) abstained from voting, and Japan voted in the negative. After the vote, Matsuoka rose and said: On behalf of my Government, I wish to make a declaration. It is a source of profound regret and disappointment to the Japanese delegation and to the Japanese Government that the draft Report has been adopted by this Assembly . . . The Japanese Government now finds itself compelled to conclude that Japan and other Members of the League entertain different views on the matter of achieving peace in the Far East, and the Japanese Government is obliged to feel that it has now reached the limit of its endeavors to cooperate with the League of Nations in regard to the Sino-Japanese differences . . .

After this brief declaration, Matsuoka and other Japanese representatives withdrew from the Assembly hall, and, on March 27th, the Japanese Government gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw from the League. By then the Japanese conquest of Jehol had already been completed.

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The Great Wall Passes The Japanese armies did not pause long after the conclusion of the Jehol campaign. On March 4th, 1933, General Muto Nobuyoshi, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, ordered the seizure of the principal passes through the Great Wall, which formed the southern boundary of Jehol. His first target was Kupeikou, which lies 100 kilometers northwest of Peiping. To control this strategic pass was to pose a direct threat to that ancient metropolis. The next target was Hsifengkou Pass, 100 kilometers east of Kupeikou. Here the Japanese met with stiff resistance from the 29th Army commanded by General Sung Che-yuan. In the face of virtually unchallenged Japanese control of the air, Japanese tanks and superior fire-power, the Chinese made a determined stand reminiscent of that at Shanghai early in 1932. They had to fight with nothing more formidable than small caliber infantry weapons, and not infrequently they had to use weapons of an even more primitive character —big swords. Yet they inflicted heavy losses on the invaders. After a bloody battle, which lasted more than a week, the Japanese were forced to retreat. On March 19th, Chiang Kai-shek commended the officers and men of the 29th Army for their courage and indomitable spirit in the face of overwhelming odds. More than a year later, in July 1934, he cited the Shanghai and Hsifengkou battles as instances showing the importance of men over weapons: . . . from the experiences gained from the two battles, we know that for every two casualties sustained by us the Japanese suffered at least one. We have a population of more than 400,000,000 while Japan has a population of only about 60,000,000. By the sheer weight of numbers, we have 406

NORTH CHINA nothing to fear from the Japanese. Furthermore, we have the advantage of having a vast territory endowed with immense natural resources, as well as of a rich cultural and historical heritage. If our people and our armed forces are alive to the peril confronting our nation and are united in our effort to resist aggression, is there any reason why the enemy cannot be overcome? Remember that the fightings at Shanghai and Hsifengkou were only skirmishes in which only a small part of our troops were engaged. Yet the enemy sustained heavy losses. In time to come when we are fully prepared and when we meet the enemy with all our strength, can there be any doubt that the victory will be ours? . . .

On March 26th, 1933, Chiang Kai-shek left Paoting, Hopei, for Nanking. Wang Ching-wei, who had left China for France in August 1932 over the issue of Chang Hsueh-liang’s resignation, had now returned to China and resumed his duties as President of the Executive Yuan. Chiang, together with Wang, Sun Fo, and Tai Chi-t’ao, discussed the international situation following Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, as well as the policies which the National Government should pursue in the light of the new development. In the course of the discussions, Chiang advocated the strengthening of both national defense and Communist suppression. He said: The most urgent task before us at the present is to strengthen the defense in North China and hold the line against further Japanese inroads. As for the Communistsuppression campaign, the main responsibility must now be borne by troops from Hunan and Kwangtung. Basically, we must not only intensify the training of our armies but also help strengthen the local militia. We must stamp out insubordination and mutinies . . . (Diary, March 28th, 1933)

Chiang Kai-shek’s departure from Paoting was the signal for a renewal of Japan’s advance into North China. Stubborn resistance on the part of the Chinese defenders at the Great Wall passes forced the Japanese to move forward from Shanhaikuan into Hopei Province. General Ho Ying-chin, chairman of the newly established Peiping Branch Military Council, had established the first line of Chinese defense at the village of Shihmen to the north of Shanhaikuan and the second line of defense along the Luan River, with the main force concentrated at Luan chow. The Japanese were now 407

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poised for action within the vital strategic triangle bounded by Shanhaikuan, Luanchow and Hsifengkou. On April 1st, the Kwantung Army, supported by planes and tanks, occupied Shihmen. On the 4th, they advanced to the vicinity of Chinwangtao. On the 5th they bombed the districts east of the Luan River. On the 12th, Chiang Kai-shek said at a military conference at Nanchang that the only way for China to overcome the enemy was to wage a protracted war of resistance: Increased, prolonged resistance — this is the only way to deal with the Japanese. If our first line troops are defeated we must move up our second line troops, third line troops. If our first line of defense collapses, we still have our second, third line of defense. The enemy has to fight every step of the way, contest every inch of the ground. We must be always ready to resist and be ever on the alert. We must never weaken or falter. The longer we can do this, the better it is for us. If we can resist for three or five years, I can assure you that new developments will take place in the international realm and that new developments will also take place inside the enemy camp. It is only in this manner that the hope of our national survival can be realized.

Sir Miles Lampson Asked to Mediate

Meanwhile, the Japanese launched a general offensive. Along the coast they moved forward to the Luan River. At the Hsifengkou Pass, where the Chinese troops had been fighting so valiantly against the invaders, the Japanese pressure was intensified. It seemed likely that the Peiping-Tientsin area would soon be affected. At this juncture, Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister to China, who had been mainly responsible for the restoration of peace in Shanghai in 1932, was approached by Nakayama Shoichi, Japanese charge d ’affaires at Peiping, about the feasibility of using the British diplomat’s good offices to bring about a cease-fire. At the same time Chiang Monlin, Chancellor of 408

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the Peking National University, and Hu Shih, a noted scholar, called upon General Ho Ying-chin to ascertain about the real military situation. After the interview with General Ho, Chiang Monlin, in his capacity as an educator and private citizen, went to see Sir Miles and asked him to mediate between China and Japan. While all this was going on, the Japanese Kwantung Army pressed forward to occupy the entire area east of the Luan River, including the strategic town of Changli and the well-known summer resort of Peitaiho. While favoring the mediation effort, Chiang Kai-shek wanted it to be understood as a private undertaking in which the government did not participate. Foreign

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Minister Lo Wen-kan questioned the wisdom of negotiating with Japan for an armistice at a time when the articulate elements in Chinese society were clamoring for all-out war. The mediating effort never got off the ground. Chiang Kai-shek now ordered General Ho Ying-chin to strengthen the defenses of Peiping. He withdrew some of his best troops from the Great Wall passes to Peiping and transferred the crack 88th Division, which had really borne the brunt of the fighting in Shanghai, to North China. He was prepared to make a determined stand in the Peiping-Tientsin area. At the supreme moment of tension, however, the Japanese commanders suddenly called a halt to the drive toward the Peiping-Tientsin area and withdrew their troops behind the Great Wall. At that time it was generally believed that the sudden change of plan was due to inadequacy of forces. It is now known that the reason for the withdrawal was that the advance into North China had not had the sanction of the Emperor and the Japanese High Command was forced to call a halt to the drive. While withdrawing its troops for the time being from Hopei province, the Kwantung Army’s plan for the conquest of China remained intact. Its secret activities to detach Hopei from the rest of China continued. The man in charge of this work was none other than Itagaki Seishiro, formerly Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and now a senior officer at the Imperial General Staff. This arch-conspirator had quietly set up a Special Service office in the Japanese Concession of Tientsin in February 1933 and had begun to entice China’s unemployed militarists and disgruntled politicians to foment a separatist movement in North China. The first Chinese he tried to enlist were Tuan Chi-jui, once the leader of the Pei-yang military clique and for a time Chief Executive of the Peking Government; and Sun Ch’uan-fang, formerly a powerful warlord in control of five provinces in Southeastern China. Both Tuan and Sun were too proud to serve as Japanese tools. Itagaki then approached Chang Ching-yao who, as tuchun of Hunan in the 1917-1920 period, had been notorious for his corruption and rapacity. Since his expulsion from Hunan in 1920, he had never ceased to plan for a comeback. He was more than willing to do Itagaki’s bidding. He bragged about his connections with various 410 1

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military commanders in North China, asserting that he had intimate relations with General Sung Che-yuan, commander of the 29th Army. Itagaki handed over to him 300,000 silver dollars for the job and reported to the Kwantung Army on April 8 that Chang Ching-yao planned to stage a coup on or about April 21st in which he would be joined by Sung Che-yuan. Itagaki urged the Kwantung Army to advance to the Peiping-Tientsin area as soon as possible so as to enable Chang Ching-yao to carry out the coup successfully. To his surprise the Kwantung Army had suddenly halted its advance and returned to Manchuria. Chang Ching-yao was soon to meet death at the hand of a patriotic Chinese assassin. Itagaki made another attempt to foment revolt which too, failed. Itagaki was not a man to give up easily. He remonstrated with the Kwantung Army for sabotaging the separatist movement which he had been trying so hard to promote. In his April 30th telegram to the Kwantung Army, he said in substance the following: The anti-Nanking movement is beginning to take shape in Hopei province. The National Government’s peace overtures are no more than a device to gain time. Its anti-Japanese policy will surely reassert itself once the danger of internal dissension subsides. It has been rumored that Japan is prepared to resort to compromise with Nanking. This has done irreparable damage to the separatist movement.

Itagaki found in Nagatsu Sukehie, Japan’s military attache at Peiping, a fellow supporter of the “positive” policy. Nagatsu had long been a resident of Peiping, and his intelligence activities were as thorough-going as they were far-reaching. He advised the Kwantung Army to send an additional division to attack the Peiping-Tientsin area. His reports carried great weight in Japanese military circles. Chiang Kai-shek knew that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Hopei was only temporary and that sooner or later the Kwantung Army would make another, and perhaps a more determined, assault on northern Hopei. But the breathing spell thus afforded by the Japanese withdrawal could be used, not only to consolidate the military position in North China, but also to make another gesture of pacific intentions toward Japan. He needed time to prepare for the 411

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eventual showdown. On May 3rd a “political readjustment council”, under the Chairmanship of his good friend General Huang Fu, was created for North China. Most of the members of this organization, later known as the Peiping Political Council, were men well-informed about Japan and persona grata to Tokyo. Both Ho Ying-chin and Huang Fu, the respective military and political heads of the North China set-up, were educated in Japan and had many Japanese connections. The stage was thus set to seek a general diplomatic settlement of the North China situation. But the Japanese military were by no means receptive to Chiang’s pacific overtures. On the same day as Huang Fu’s appointment to the Peiping post was announced, General Koiso Kuniaki, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, who had been called to Tokyo for consultations, returned to his headquarters at Dairen. He brought back with him the authorization of the Japanese High Command to go ahead with the invasion of North China. The Emperor, who had at first been opposed to the venture, had finally given his consent. General Muto Nobuyoshi, commander of the Kwantung Army, immediately ordered his troops to invade northern Hopei. Bitter fighting broke out at Kupeikou,

The Japanese troops cross the Great Wall and close in on Peiping and Tientsin

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Hsifengkou, and other passes along the Great Wall. Chiang Kai-shek noted in his diary: In spite of the enemy’s repeated assaults on Kupeikou, Nantienmei, etc., our defenders have stood firm. Now the enemy has moved up thirty additional pieces of heavy artillery, and it seems that this time he is determined to take the passes. Our troops would have to retreat to a buffer zone. Thus, the Japanese will trample roughshod over us from Kupeikou to Shanhaikuan. We know we would be forced to yield ground in the end, yet we must not lightly give up a single inch of our territory. This is a case in which we have to struggle on against overwhelming odds. It pains me to think of this! (May 5 ,1933)

On May 7th, the Sixth Division of the Kwantung Army advanced from Shanhaikuan in the direction of Wuning. On the night of the 11th, the Japanese crossed the Luan River and occupied Luan chow. Kupeikou and other passes along the Great Wall passed into Japanese hands. Japanese reconnaissance planes flew over Peiping and Tientsin. The occupation of these cities seemed imminent. General Huang Fu was still in Shanghai. There he was in constant touch with the Japanese military attache, Nemoto Hiroshi, from whom he learned that the Kwantung Army had no intention of occupying Peiping and Tientsin, but the Chinese forces must withdraw to a distance “beyond the reach of the artillery of the Japanese defense area.” It was not clear what was meant by “the Japanese defense area,” but it seemed obvious that the Japanese intended to create a special zone in eastern Hopei free of all Chinese influence. In Peiping General Hsiung Pin, chief military adviser to General Ho Ying-chin, approached Nagatsu Sukehie, Japanese military attache in that city, to ascertain what the Japanese really wanted. Nagatsu’s reply was that the Chinese forces must withdraw to the line between Lutai and Paoti. General Hsiung indicated that the Chinese authorities would be prepared to accept the Japanese demand but this did not stop the Japanese from occupying more Chinese territory. On May 17th they took over the industrial town of Tangshan, and by the following day they were in control of Miyun, Sanho, and Chihsien. They were within 50 miles of Peiping. Meanwhile, Itagaki’s special service agents in Tientsin 413

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were busily engaged in creating “autonomous” regimes in areas under Japanese control. They instigated that notori­ ously treacherous Shih Yu-san to set up an “independent” government at Luanchow. They hired a bunch of ruffians to disturb the peace and tranquility of Tientsin. At the same time the Japanese reinforced its garrison at Peiping by 600 men, complete with artillery and infantry units. Thus Peiping was threatened from both within and without.

The Tangku Truce Agreement

General Huang Fu meanwhile hastened north to assume his new post as Chairman of the Peiping Political Council. Late on the night of May 22nd, his secretary reported that the Japanese naval attache, Fujihara Kiyoma, requested General Huang’s immediate presence at his residence. When General Huang arrived there he found that, in addition to Fujihara, two other Japanese were waiting for him. They were Nakayama Shoichi, Secretary of the Japanese Legation, and Nagatsu, the military attach^. The Japanese laid before General Huang the conditions for a truce. They demanded the demilitarization of the entire eastern Hopei province: regions west and south of the line from Yenchang to Changping, Kaoliying, Sunyi, Tunchow, Hsiangho, Paoti, Lintingkow and Ningho. This was a vast piece of territory, roughly about a quarter of the province’s total area of 115,830 square miles, with a population of 6,000,000. The Japanese further demanded that General Ho Ying-chin designate representatives with full powers to proceed to Miyun to inform the Japanese field commander of China’s acceptance of the truce terms. The Japanese alternated threats with conciliation. But on the question of the demilitarized zone, they were tough and inflexible. For General Huang this was a most humiliating experience though he bore himself with dignity and patience. When he finally emerged from the meeting at 4:30 on the morning of the 23rd, he lost no time in going into a conclave 414

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with Ho Ying-chin, Chang Chun and Hsiung Pin. Hsiung Pin urged acceptance of the Japanese terms, since that was the only way to prevent Peiping, for centuries China’s cultural and political metropolis, from falling into Japanese hands. In view of the critical military situation, the alternative to acceptance was ruin and defeat. Many others agreed with Hsiung that they now have to bow to the inevitable and wait for the day when China would be strong enough to square accounts with the enemy. General Huang informed Fujihara of General Ho Ying-chin’s acceptance of the Japanese truce terms. General Ho on his part dispatched Hsu Yen-mou, a senior staff member at his headquarters, to Miyun to arrange for the truce negotiations. In Nanking Wang Ching-wei and other top party and government leaders held, for two successive days (May 23rd and 24th), long and agitated meetings to discuss what was to be done with the Japanese demands. The general consensus was that acceptance of the demands was unavoidable, but in order to minimize the serious consequences that were bound to flow from it, the agreement should not be committed to writing. Should this prove unavailing, then it should be made clear that this was a military document only, entailing no political concessions. But in Peiping, with Japanese invading forces only a few miles away, the Chinese authorities had no bargaining power left to them. Thus, beginning May 24th, 1933, the Chinese troops withdrew within the line drawn by the Japanese. On the next day, Hsu Yen-mou and Li Tse-yi, Huang Fu’s confidential secretary, accompanied by the Japanese military and naval attaches, set out to Miyun to tender to General Nishi Giichi, commander of the 8th Division of the Kwantung Army, China’s formal acceptance of the Japanese terms. Even at that moment Chiang Kai-shek still hoped that the agreement would not be committed to writing or, failing that, would be confined purely to military matters such as the one signed in Shanghai in 1932. Under no circumstances was it to be taken as a de facto recognition of “Manchukuo” or impinging upon the boundaries of the Northeastern provinces. The formal negotiations began at 4 P.M. at the little town of Tangku, at the mouth of the Haiho River below Tientsin. 415

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The six-man Chinese delegation was headed by General Hsiung Pin. The Japanese delegation was led by General Okamura Yasuji, with Nagatsu and five others as members. On the next day they exchanged credentials and then adjourned the meeting. When the negotiators met again on the morning of the 31st, General Okamura presented the Chinese negotiators with a prepared text and demanded that the Chinese negotiators give a definite reply within the space of an hour. This was typical of the unbending attitude of the Japanese military, and of the manner in which China was being kept under unrelenting pressure. China was given but two options — either to yield or to fight. In either case China was destined to lose. The Truce Agreement, as dictated by General Okamura, reads as follows: “ 1. The Chinese Army shall immediately withdraw to the regions west and south of the line from Yenchang to Changping, Kaoliying, Sunyi, Tunchow, Hsiangho, Paoti, Lintingkow, Ningho and Lutai and undertakes not to advance beyond that line and to avoid provocation of hostilities. “ 2. The Japanese Army may at any time use aeroplanes or other means to verify the carrying out of the above article. The Chinese authorities shall afford them protection and facilities for such a purpose. “ 3. The Japanese Army, after ascertaining the withdrawal of the Chinese Army to the line stated in Article 1, undertakes not to cross the said line and not to continue to attack the Chinese troops and shall voluntarily withdraw to the Great Wall. “4. The regions to the south of the Great Wall and to north and east of the line as defined in Article 1, the maintenance of peace and order shall be undertaken by a Chinese police force. The said police force shall not be constituted by armed units hostile to Japanese feelings. “ 5. The present agreement shall come into effect upon its signature. In faith thereof the two representatives have signed the present agreement and affixed thereto their seals.” General Hsiung, before signing the agreement, declared that it was his understanding that the draft agreement was purely military in nature and had nothing to do with any political issues. He further stated that, after the withdrawal 416

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of both Chinese and Japanese troops, questions involving the peace and order of the Demilitarized Zone should be resolved by prior agreement reached between the two parties. But General Okamura cut him short by saying that there was no room for further discussion and that what he asked of the Chinese representative was a categorical “Yes” or “No.” Little did General Okamura imagine that twelve years later, in his capacity as the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China, he was destined to hand over to General Ho Ying-chin Japan’s instrument of unconditional surrender. While the truce agreement was being signed, two Japanese destroyers — the Asagao and the Yugao — were anchored on the river side of the barracks, with guns pointing to the meeting place. The Tangku Truce Agreement placed virtually all of Hopei province north of the Peiping-Tientsin area within the demilitarized zone. No Chinese troops could enter this zone; the Japanese army, even after withdrawing to the Great Wall, was, by virtue of the Boxer Protocol, free to maintain garrisons at Shanhaikuan, Chinwangtao, Changli, Luanchow, Tangshan and Lutai, all of which were located within the zone. Had the Japanese strictly observed the Tangku Truce Agreement, peace in North China could at least be nominally maintained. But the Japanese never intended to carry out either the spirit or the letter of the agreement. Instead of being a guarantee for peace, it was in fact a charter of Japan’s later aggressions against China. Chiang Kai-shek believed that the signing of the Tangku agreement would give China time for preparing herself for the eventual recovery of lost territories. In his diary he wrote: The signing of the agreement gives the people a breathing spell they so badly need. The international situation may also improve. We should utilize the respite to prepare ourselves. Can we now lay the foundation for national revival? (Entry of June 5th, 1933) At a time of national humiliation we should ‘lie in faggots and taste gall’1 and should never be discouraged or relax our* JThe Chinese expression for nursing vengeance. 417

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES vigilance. We must draw up a plan for national reconstruction and carry it out with dispatch and effectiveness. May we hope that we can wipe out this humiliation in ten years! (Entry of June 6th, 1933)

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THE FIFTH COMMUNIST-SUPPRESSION CAMPAIGN

Preparations for the Campaign Taking advantage of the Government’s preoccupation with the Japanese invasion of Jehol and North China, the Communists once again began to expand their influence. In the so-called Central Soviet District in Kiangsi, the Communist forces under the command of Chu Teh and Chou En-lai, with the mountainous districts of Yihuang, Ch’ungjen and Loan as their bases, started their northward expansion. It had become abundantly clear that the normal processes of war were no longer applicable to the Communist-suppression campaigns. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek declared on May 15, 1933 that the Communists, though poorly equipped, were strong in organization. The war against the Communists, he said, was “not one of weapons and equipment but one of organization and spirit.” The result was the adoption of a new defensive-offensive strategy designed to beat the Communists on their own chosen ground. On May 21st, Chiang established his headquarters at Nanchang and took personal charge of the Communistsuppression campaign in the five provinces of Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien, Hunan and Hupei. On June 8th, he called a Five-Province Military Conference at which the new strategy was proclaimed. This called for the building of public roads, the construction of blockhouses and the strengthening of the economic blockade against the Red areas. The new strategy would diminish the Communist superiority in maneuvering, accentuate the Communist lack 419

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of resources, and enable the government forces to make the fullest use of their assets. Chiang needed officers capable of carrying out the new strategy. For this purpose he inaugurated an officers’ training camp at Lushan, near the famous summer resort of Ruling, with General Ch’en Ch’eng as commandant. The training program started on July 18, 1933. Three classes of some 7,500 junior officers and political workers received intensive training in the new strategy and tactics. At the opening exercises, Chiang spoke at length on the meaning of the training in relation to the future of the revolution. He said that the purpose of the training was to instill in the cadets the qualities of revolutionary heroism which would enable them, not only to uproot Communism, but also build a new China based on Dr. Sun’s Three Principles of the People. For the realization of this great revolutionary ideal they would be called upon to make great sacrifices. They must be prepared to fight the enemy to the bitter end. They must be animated by the spirit that it was better to die than to submit to Communist tyranny. They must fight Communism with everything at their command; with bullets, rifle butts, if necessary with bare hands, with bare feet, even with bare teeth. They must have faith in the future of the revolution, faith in their commanders, faith in themselves and faith in subordinate officers and common soldiers. Chiang took great pains in imparting into the campaign the zeal of a religious cause. On the success or failure of the campaign, he said, depended the survival or extinction of the Chinese people. The Fifth Campaign was a combination of military and economic action. Militarily, it was based on the basic principle of carrying out the offensive strategy through defensive tactics. That is to say, Chiang abandoned the tactics of swift and deep penetration into Red territory, thus depriving the Communists of opportunities to spring surprise attacks and to ambush. Instead, the troops advanced at a snail’s pace, consolidating every step and never venturing far beyond the roads and blockhouses. Moving from the periphery gradually towards the center, they were to form a ring around the Red districts. It has often been asserted that the Fifth Campaign, which 420

THE FIFTH COMMUNIST-SUPPRESSION CAMPAIGN

finally succeeded in dislodging the Communists from their strongholds in Kiangsi, was largely planned and executed by Chiang’s German advisers. This was far from the truth. The German advisers were men of great ability and experience. But they had little to do with Chiang’s Communistsuppression campaigns. Their main responsibility was to help him in the modernization of the Chinese armed forces in preparation for the war against Japan which, as Chiang saw it, was inevitable. The strategy and tactics of the Fifth Campaign were based for the most part on the teachings of Tseng Kuo-fan, who suppressed the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850’s and of Tso Tsung-t’ang, who pacified the revolt in Singkiang in the 1870’s. The fact is that the kind of strategy and tactics adopted by Chiang belonged not to the 20th century, but to the medieval times. This was a kind of warfare with which the German advisers were unacquainted. Chiang regarded the suppression of the Communist menace as vital to China’s national survival. This time, he believed, success was assured. He told a gathering of his commanders and staff officers at Nanchang on October 2, 1933: Our preparations for this campaign have been thorough­ going and meticulous in every way. There is no question that we shall succeed in exterminating the Communists. It is imperative that we complete our work within the shortest possible time. The original three-year plan must be achieved in record time. We must finish up the first phase of our plan — destruction of the main Communist forces and the capture of their strongholds — within six months. In view of the perilous international situation and of the problems at home, we cannot afford to spend three or five more years to finish the job.

In the Fifth Campaign Chiang used with devastasting effect three principal weapons: economic blockade, road­ building, blockhouses. The blockhouses were made of brick, stone and mud, bearing no resemblance to the steel and concrete of modern fortifications. Since the Communists did not have heavy artillery, the countless blockhouses along the military roads, with interconnecting machine-gun and artillery fire, were effective in the defensive-offensive strategy. The purpose was to imprison the main forces of the 421

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Red Army in an ever-shrinking pocket and then annihilate them at the end.

The Launching of the Campaign

The campaign was launched in October after a six-month period of preparation and training. Chiang mobilized 65 divisions with a total strength of 800,000 men. Actually, the number of troops actively participating in the fighting in Kiangsi never exceeded a quarter of a million. Chiang organized the government troops into three routes. The west route consisting of provincial troops from Hunan and Hupei was placed under the command of General Ho Chien, governor of Hunan. The south route was made up of Cantonese troops commanded by General Ch’en Chi-t’ang, governor of Kwangtung. These two routes were charged with the responsibility of preventing the Red forces from entering their respective defense areas. The brunt of the fighting in Kiangsi was borne by the north route commanded by General Ku Chu-t’ung. Its main force pushed southward in three columns from Nancheng, Nanfeng, and Linchuan. Arrayed against the government forces were about 150,000 Communist troops. Not all these were in the Central Soviet District in Kiangsi. The Fourth Front Red Army commanded by Hsu Hsiang-ch’ien had been forced during Chiang’s Third Communist-suppression Cam­ paign in 1932 to flee from the Hupei-Honan-Anhwei border region to the distant province of Szechuan. The Second Front Red Army under Ho Lung was in central Hupei. The main force of the Red Army in the Central Soviet District was known as the First Front Red Army of Workers and Peasants. Its Commander-in-Chief was the Chairman of the Military Council of the so-called Chinese Soviet Republic, General Chu Teh. Its Political Commissar was the Vice Chairman of the Military Council, Chou En-lai. Yeh Chien-ying was its Chief of Staff. Commanders of the various units of this army included Lin Piao, P’eng Teh-huai, Tung Ch’en-t’ang, Hsiao Chin-kuang and Ch’en Yi. 422

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The First Front Red Army had about 90,000 rifles of various makes, 300 light and heavy machine-guns, 48 mortars and 8 mountain guns. It had five aeroplanes, but under conditions of government blockade, there was no aviation fuel to get them off the ground. Simultaneously with Chiang’s Fifth Campaign, the Communists began to prepare for a counter-campaign. The most pressing task before them was the recruiting of new soldiers. In July the Central Committee decided in a resolution to expand the Red forces into an army of a million men. Each hsien or county was assigned a montly quota. But no county was able to fulfill the quota. Able-bodied men suitable for military service were simply unavailable. Most of them had already been pressed into the fighting forces. Others had fled to non-Communist areas. In the middle of October the North Route Army under the command of General Ku Chu-t’ung started its general offensive against the Communists. On the 17th the column led by General Ch’en Ch’eng occupied the important town of Lichuan. The Fifth Red Army under the Command of Tung Ch’en-t’ang, in the hope of recovering it, attacked Siaoshih and Tzehsichiao north of Lichuan. The government forces were able to make use of the blockhouses to repulse the enemy. The battle raged for three days (October 22-24) and the Communists suffered heavy losses. They had no alternative but to withdraw to their base area. The battle at Tzehsichiao marked the initial success scored by the government forces during the Fifth Campaign. The supply line between the two strategic points of Nancheng and Nanfeng was thus secured. In the early days of November the First Red Army under Lin Piao and the Third Red Army under P’eng Teh-huai attacked the points southeast of Nancheng, with the objective of cutting the line of communication between Lichuan and Nancheng, thus isolating the government forces at Lichuan. This too failed. The Reds moved back and forth seeking battle between Chiang’s main forces and the blockhouses and were unable to pick out the weak spots for attack. The Reds mounted another counter-offensive later in November. The Third and Seventh Red Armies using main 423

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forces, launched a concentrated attack on a government position at Huwan to the north of Nan cheng. The government forces numbering only three battalions of a little over one thousand men, were in a very critical situation. But, having entrenched themselves in the blockhouses, they were capable of keeping the attackers at bay. The Fourth Reserved Division of Chiang’s troops soon moved up to relieve the beleaguered blockhouses. With the support of the air force, they finally succeeded in beating off the attackers. In this battle the Communists lost more than 3,000 men.

Nationalist forces besiege the Central Soviet area 424

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One of the outstanding characteristics of the Red Army’s operations was the absence of a fixed operational front. Following the tactics of swift concentration and swift dispersal, the Communists had been able, as during the Fourth Campaign, to stage sudden massive attacks on isolated units of government troops and inflict heavy losses on them. The new defensive-offensive strategy and tactics adopted by Chiang in the Fifth Campaign changed all this. By means of blockhouses and by advancing by slow stages and consolidating every step, combined with numerical and technical superiority, the government troops moved from the periphery gradually toward the center. Thus, a little over a month after the launching of the Fifth Campaign, the Reds were forced to retreat southward to conserve strength and reorganize. Meanwhile, the government troops built more blockhouses and tightened the ring around the Red districts. Then suddenly Chiang was confronted with a situation fraught with perilous implications. He was challenged by a group of disgruntled politicians and generals in Fukien province.

The Fukien Revolt

The prime mover of the Fukien revolt was Ch’en Ming-shu, who had been one of Chiang’s key commanders during the Northern Expedition and had subsequently served as Governor of Kwangtung, Acting President of the Executive Yuan, Minister of Communications, and Garrison Com­ mander of the Nanking-Shanghai Area. In 1932 he was removed from office for alleged corruption. He then went to Europe. Upon his return after a short sojourn abroad, he stayed for a while in Hong Kong. It was at Hong Kong that he came into contact with people who were bitterly opposed to Chiang. The most prominent among these was General Li Chi-shen, formerly Chiang’s Chief of Staff and Commander of the famous Fourth Army Corps. In 1929, as a member of the Wuhan Branch Political Council, he plotted with his fellow Kwangsi generals against Nanking and was arrested by 425

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Chiang but he was later released. He had since lived in Hong Kong waiting for an opportune moment to recoup his lost fortunes. From Hong Kong Ch’en Ming-chu journeyed to Fukien to see General Chiang Kuang-nai, now Governor of Fukien, and General Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai, commander of the 19th Route Army. Both Chiang and Ts’ai had served under Ch’en Ming-chu. After the Shanghai truce the 19th Route Army was transferred to Fukien to participate in the Communistsuppression campaign, as it had done so many times before. Its leaders nursed a grievance against Chiang who, they believed, had treated them unfairly. Instigated by Ch’en Ming-chu, they became the spearhead of an anti-Chiang movement within the ranks of the government troops. In October 1933, at a time when the Fifth Campaign had just started, Li Chi-shen, Ch’en Ming-chu, Chiang Kuang-nai and Ts’ai T ’ing-k’ai sent a secret message to Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh requesting Communist cooperation in their anti-Chiang movement. Hard pressed by Chiang Kai-shek’s troops, the Communists were only too glad to oblige. On October 26th the two sides signed a preliminary agreement for cooperation. As a first step, the two sides agreed to immediately stop hostile acts against each other and to delimit the boundaries of their respective areas. They further agreed to take up as soon as possible military action against both Chiang and Japan. Chiang was aware of what was going on and tried vainly to persuade the conspirators to abandon their nefarious plans before it was too late. He wrote in his diary November 15: I was inclined at first to attach little credence to the rumor about the plot engineered by Ch’en Ming-shu in Fukien. But from the intelligence I have received, it is unquestionably true. I shall do my best and exert every humanly possible effort to meet the crisis. (November 15,1933)

What was even more astounding was that Ch’en Ming-shu & Co., while loudly proclaiming their determination to fight Japan, had in fact received secret support from certain Japanese quarters. The Chinese Minister to Japan reported on November 19th that a Japanese ronin named Yamada Junsaburo had been promoting the establishment of an 426

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“independent” regime at Foochow (capital of Fukien) and that General Matsui Iwane, commander of the Taiwan Japanese Army, had told the press that since “the work in Manchuria had already been accomplished, it is time to do something of a similar nature in South China, particularly in Fukien.” At this time Ch’en Ming-shu and his fellow conspirators had begun to take action against the National Government. They took over the control of the Central Bank. They forcibly seized all strategic points in the province. On November 20th they staged a mass meeting at Foochow. A manifesto was issued denouncing the National Government. They established what was called the “ Fukien People’s Government.” Distinguished politicians and jobless military men rallied around them. These included members of the defunct “Third Party,” renegades of the Kuomintang, and a sprinkling of Feng Yu-hsiang’s followers. This motley assemblage of men had nothing in common except their shared hatred of Chiang Kai-shek. Together they formed the “People’s Party of Protection.” Ch’en Ming-shu was made Chairman of the Executive Committee, with Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai, Chairman of the Military Committee, and Eugene Ch’en, Minister of Foreign Affairs. The activities of the rebels had been quietly noted by Chiang for some time, and he was not unprepared when the rebellion broke into the open. On November 21st, he ordered a general campaign against Fukien, moving 11 divisions of his troops from the neighboring province of Chekiang. Fukien was the portcullis protecting the Soviet districts against attacks from that direction. Properly reinforced, the 19th Route Army, well-known for its fighting qualities, might have held Fukien for a considerable length of time, and Chiang’s Fifth Communist-suppression Campaign might have been bogged down there and then. But the Communists, notwithstanding the secret agreement they had made with Ch’en Ming-shu and his fellow conspirators, failed to come to the rebels’ rescue in an hour of desperate need. The reason was that the leaders of the Fukien insurrection were not Communists and were unwilling to adopt the Communist program in toto. Thus, on December 12th the Communists denounced the rebels as not being sufficiently revolutionary 427

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to merit support. In their view, Ch’en Ming-chu & Co. were trying to find a middle way between revolution and counter-revolution and, as such they were doomed to failure. They thus allowed their strongest potential allies to be wiped out of existence.1 On New Year’s Day 1934 the government forces started their general offensive against the rebels. Within a few days Foochow was captured, and the so-called Fukien People’s Government died an ignominious death. The leaders of the revolt — Ch’en Ming-shu, Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai, Li Chi-shen, Chiang Kuang-nai and others —fled to Hong Kong. On January 26th, the Communists issued another document denouncing the rebels as men who, under the guise of revolution, tried to flirt with the United States and Japan. The so-called Fukien People’s Government lasted less than two months. The 19th Route Army, famed defenders of Shanghai, was reorganized into the 7th Route of the Communist-suppression Army. With the liquidation of the Fukien revolt, the government troops were able to establish a base of operations southeast of the Central Soviet District, ready to descend into the very centers of the Communist areas with no fear of interference.

Resumption of the Fifth Campaign

On January 22nd, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek, having had the satisfaction of seeing that the revolt was swiftly put to an end, flew from Fukien to Nanking to attend the Fourth Plenum of the Fourth Central Executive Committee. At this session of the CEC Lin Sen was elected Chairman of the State Council. The most urgent business before the Government was to strengthen the Communist-suppression campaign which had been temporarily interrupted by the Fukien uprising. A total of 2,900 additional blockhouses were built 'Two years later Mao Tse-tung confessed that the Communists’ failure to come to the aid of the Fukien revolt was one of the two fatal mistakes committed by them. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (Modern Library, 1944 edition), p. 186. 428

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in Kiangsi in order to tighten the encirclement of the Soviet areas. The main force of the Third Route of the North Route Army commanded by General Ch’en Ch’eng advanced from Lichuan toward Chienning in the Kiangsi-Fukien border region. On January 9th General Ch’en was promoted to be Commander-in-Chief of the North Route Army in place of General Ku Chu-t’ung, and General Chiang Ting-wen, who had commanded the government forces in Fukien, was made Commander-in-Chief of the newly created East Route Army. The ring around the Soviet districts grew progressively tighter. On January 22nd, ten days after the collapse of the so-called Fukien People’s Government, the Second All-China Congress of Soviets was convened at Juichin, the Red capital. On the 29th, Mao Tse-tung interrupted Lin Po-ch’u ’s (Lin Tsu-han) economic report with an urgent account of the deteriorating military situation. Now that the Fukien revolt was suppressed, he said, the East Route of Chiang’s troops were advancing from Fukien toward Shihcheng and Juichin; the Third Route of the North Route were advancing from Lichuan towards Kuangchang and Ningtu; and the Sixth Route of the North Route were advancing toward Hsingkuo. The situation was far from optimistic. At the meetings of the Second Congress, Mao Tse-tung was the target of scathing attacks at the hands of the so-called returned students group (those who had studied at the Sun Yat-sen Academy in Moscow) headed by Ch’in Pang-hsien (alias Po Ku). Mao was castigated both for his rightist opportunism in the land inspection movement and his advocacy of mobile warfare which, according to his critics, was the tactic of running away from the enemy. As a result of these attacks, Mao was replaced as Chairman of the Soviet Republic by Chang Wen-t’ien, while his mobile warfare was replaced by the new strategy of “swift thrusts” formulated by the German military adviser who was known by his Chinese name2 Li Teh. This new strategy called first of all for the building of fortified positions for both defensive and 2James Harrison has identified Li Teh as Otto Braun. See his The Long March to Power (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 227. 429

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offensive purposes. As soon as the enemy was known to have emerged from his blockhouses for a forward push, the Red Army must, through sudden and overwhelming action, destroy him before he could bring up reinforcements. This new strategy, however, proved to be of no avail against the determined onslaught of the government troops. On April 9 the main forces of the government’s North Route Army under the command of General Ch’en Ch’eng advanced toward the crucial town of Kuangchang in two columns along the Hsu River. Kuangchang, the gateway to Juichin, the Red capital, was defended by the Fourth and Fifth Divisions of P’eng Teh-huai’s Third Red Army. Taking a leaf out of the book of the government troops, the Communists constructed numerous blockhouses in the Kuangchang area, where the mountainous terrain offered natural advantages to the defenders. The attackers fought hard to secure control of the strong Communist position at Taloshan. Fierce fighting raged and this strategic point repeatedly changed hands. At dawn on the 21st of April Taloshan was finally overrun by government troops. With the capture of this crucial enemy position, the battle of Kuangchang was just as good as won. In the town of Kuangchang Communist chieftains — Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, P’eng Teh-huai, as well as the German Li Teh — gathered to make a last-ditch effort to avert the impending disaster. They issued a “Directive to All Party Members and Soviets in the War Areas” calling for the mobilization of the armed masses, the extension of guerrilla warfare, and the application of “ Red terror.” But the attackers were already at the gate of the town. On the morning of April 28th the town of Kuangchang was in government hands. The government forces pushed forward to occupy all the Communist positions southeast and southwest of Kuangchang. Meanwhile, units of the East Route Army under the command of General T’ang En-po, having occupied Tabling in western Fukien, joined forces with units of the North Route Army to advance upon the town of Chienning. Thus, within seven months of the launching of the Fifth Campaign, the Communists, who had at one time controlled at least two-thirds of the 81 hsien or counties in Kiangsi, now held only six — Ningtu, Hsingkuo, 430

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Shihcheng, Juichin, Yutu and Changting. The last-named was in western Fukien. The end of Communist power in these districts was clearly in sight.

Demise of the So-called Soviet Republic

After the defeat at Kuangchang, the Communists called an emergency conference at Juichin in the first week of May to decide what was to be done in the face of the critical situation. Mao Tse-tung proposed that the Red forces should be divided into four groups and proceed to withdraw to Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu and Hunan. This, he argued, would force the government to divide up its forces. When the government forces were sufficiently dispersed, the Com­ munists, if the conditions proved favorable, could return to Kiangsi and recover the Central Soviet District. Mao’s proposal found no support and was dismissed as suicidal. There were those who advocated the abandonment of the Kiangsi Soviet District and the establishment of a new base area in Hunan. There also were those who believed that the Central Soviet District should be defended at all costs. Chou En-lai, Chairman of the Military Council, offered a compromise. He recommended the construction of a strong defense line at Shihcheng in order to slow down the enemy’s advance. He stressed the importance of boosting the numerical strength of the Red Army. He believed that it was still possible to break the enemy’s campaign of encirclement and annihilation. Acting on Chou En-lai’s proposals, the Communists on the one hand began to construct fortifications at Shihcheng and, on the other, sent Hsiang Ying to the Kiangsi-Fukien border region and Liu Shao-ch’i to Fukien to recruit new soldiers. Between May and July, according to the Military Council of the so-called Chinese Soviet Republic, some 63,000 were inducted into the Red Army. The effect of the economic blockade was keenly felt in the Central Soviet District. Food supply was running short. 431

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In the months of June and July 240,000 piculs of grains were exacted from the peasants. This proved inadequate and in the latter part of July an additional 600,000 piculs were “borrowed” and a new land tax was levied. Inasmuch as the territory controlled by the Central Soviet District had then shrunk to only six counties, frightful exploitation of the peasantry must have been necessary to collect grain in such huge quantities. Thousands of peasants starved to death. When the Soviet districts were recovered from the Communists by government troops, it was found that the rural areas were virtually depopulated. In the latter part of May the Third Route of the North Route Army began to drive from Kuangchang to Shihcheng; the Sixth Route of the same army advanced toward the Communist stronghold of Ningtu; while the East Route Army in Fukien closed in upon Changting. On July 9th the Sixth Route under the command of General Hsueh Yueh encountered stiff resistance at Yichien, which was strongly fortified and which was regarded as the Communists’ last line of defense. The battle raged on for more than a month and both sides suffered heavy casualties. It was not until the latter part of August that the government forces were able to destroy the defenses by artillery fire and bombings from the air and the Communists were finally forced to withdraw. The town of Shihcheng was taken on October 14th. Two Red generals — K’ung Ho-ch’ung, commander of the 13th Division of the Red Army, and Chang Yi, commander of the 4th Division — surrendered. With the fall of Shihcheng, the fate of the “ Soviet Republic” was sealed. The main forces of the Red Army were bottled up in the triangular area on the Kiangsi-Fukien border. They were faced with imminent annihilation. But this was not to be. Just as Chiang’s campaign of encirclement and annihilation was about to succeed, the Communists eluded him. On October 14th the Red leaders called a military conference at Juichin and decided to abandon the present base area and seek their fortunes in other parts of China. The Red forces, numbering roughly about 100,000 men, slipped through the government lines on the night of October 27th and embarked on its westward trek across the face of China. 432

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This was done in so secret and swift a manner that before the government troops were aware of what was taking place, the Reds had already been on the march for several days. When the East Route Army reached Juichin on November 10th, the Red capital was already empty and devastated. The Communists had been marauding the province of Kiangsi for the past six or seven years. Countless people had been murdered, rendered homeless, or driven into exile. With the recovery of the Communist areas by government troops, the refugees gradually drifted back. The most urgent task before the government was to resettle these suffering people and enable them to live in peace in the land of their ancestors.

433

C H A P T E R TH IR TY-F IV E

THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT, JAPAN’S “MONROE DOCTRINE,” AND CHIANG’S APPEAL TO JAPAN

The New Life Movement In the midst of Japanese aggression and the Communistsuppression campaigns, Chiang Kai-shek found time to inaugurate what was known as the New Life Movement. This was an attempt to improve the life-style of the Chinese people by returning to Confucian principles. It was a sort of moral rearmament at a moment of unprecendented national crisis. The New Life Movement was inaugurated in Kiangsi in 1934 just after the suppression of the Fukien revolt and the launching of the second phase of the “ Fifth Campaign of Encirclement and Annihilation.” What inspired Chiang to do this was the general lack of discipline and orderliness on the part of the people in Kiangsi. One incident made a deep impression upon him: He saw a little school boy smoking a cigarette on the street. He asked himself: if he could smoke cigarettes at such a tender age, then what would he not do when he grew up? He might end up as an opium addict. This started a train of thought as to ways and means of improving the life-style of the Chinese people in general and of the Chinese youth in particular. Chiang believed that he had perceived one of the main causes of China’s backwardness and inability to defend itself against foreign aggression. In his speech of February 19th, which marked the beginning of the movement, Chiang laid great emphasis upon knowledge and virtue as the foundation of national greatness. He illustrated his point by reference to the speedy recovery of Germany sifter her defeat in World War I. He also made 434

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reference to the discipline of the Japanese people. He believed that the Chinese would do well to learn from Germany and Japan. The New Life Movement was not merely a crusade against old habits and old abuses; it was more importantly a campaign for the preservation and revival of old values. The values which Chiang commended to the attention of his countrymen were li, yi, lien ch'ih, commonly translated as “propriety, righteousness, integrity and a sense of shame.” Chiang pointed out that these values had always been the foundation of the Chinese nation, although present-day conditions called for a new interpretation to be given to them. He defined li as “a regulated attitude of mind;” yi as “right conduct;” lien as “honesty in private and public life;” and ch'ih as “honor and self-respect.” These were the general principles upon which the New Life Movement was based. But in the practical, work-a-day world of the ordinary people, one had but to observe the simple rules of good behavior. At present we want to save our country and to revive the Chinese nation. We don’t have to go into profound and esoteric principles to do this. We have but to start with such simple things in our daily life as orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, frugality, and so on. The ancients said, ‘Regard yesterday as a period of death, today as a period of life.’ Let us have the determination and will power to rid ourselves of the habits and manners which are no longer viable in the present-day world . . .

At Nanchang more than 200 groups of students were trained and sent out to lecture to the public, and in addition 13 lecture stations were established where leaders of the movement gave daily lectures. The response to these preliminary efforts was so gratifying that steps were immediately taken to extend the movement to other parts of the country. On March 11th, a gigantic mass meeting attended by 100,000 people was held for the purpose of expanding the movement into a nationwide campaign. The movement was officially launched in the national capital, Nanking, on March 17th at a mass meeting attended by Wang Ching-wei, the President of the 435

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Executive Yuan, and other dignitaries. Similar meetings were held in Peiping, Canton and other cities. The New Life Movement gave a new impetus to the work of opium suppression. Since 1928 the National Government had made a special effort to stamp out the evil of opium­ smoking. But the progress had been slow. In May 1932 the Central Political Council entrusted Chiang with the responsibility of enforcing the opium-suppression laws in areas where active anti-Communist military campaigns were in progress. Thereupon Chiang started a vigorous campaign with a view to eradicating the smoking, sale, cultivation and transportation of opium. Traffickers were punishable by death. As a result, the evil of opium, which had been the bane of Chinese life for two centuries, was practically wiped out. Routes o f N ationalist forces .